



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

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SOLED

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

IMPARTIAL INQUIRER.

ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING A SUITABLE MEDIUM FOR THE DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

"They who speak truth, however discovered, have a right to be heard; they who assist others in discovering it, have the yet higher claim to be applauded."—PARR.

"Weigh not so much what men say as what they prove: remembering that truth is simple and naked, and needs not invective to apparel her comeliness."—SIDNEY.

VOL. I.

FIFTH EDITION.

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INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS.

In introducing to our readers this new candidate for public support, it will not be deemed inappropriate if we offer a few observations on the work to which we have addressed ourselves: the mission which we hope to fulfil.

We have long felt a deep interest in those great and momentous questions which agitate the minds of thoughtful men, as well as in those more practical ones which absorb so much of public attention; and believing, as we do, that the highest interests of humanity are concerned in the discussion of these questions, we cannot remain silent spectators when it is thought we may render active service in the cause of truth. We have marked the readiness with which some opinions are received on mere authority; the tenacity with which others are held without examination; and the different conclusions to which men come on the same subjects; and we have felt the want of some unsectarian medium for the free interchange of thought—the open discussion of truth. It is surprising, that throughout the whole range of literature, there is no impartial arena for the contest of mind; no spot on which men of every creed may meet as upon neutral ground, and there engage in calm and deliberate controversy. It is our object to form such an arena into which men of all sects and parties may enter to state and maintain their views, so that the impartial spectator may see the strength or weakness of every proposition, and be led to receive that truth, which, amidst the conflict of opinion, it is hoped will be evolved.

The evils attendant upon taking a narrow view of subjects, and of not looking at both sides of a question, were noticed by that acute reasoner John Locke, and so ably set forth by him that we cannot refrain from

taking an extract from his writings on this subject. In speaking of some men of study and thought who make no great advances in the discovery of truth, he says, "The reason is, they converse with but one sort of men, they read but one sort of books, they will come in the hearing but of one sort of notions; the truth is, they canton out to themselves a little Goshen in the intellectual world, where light shines, and, as they conclude, day blesses them; and the rest of that vast *expansum* they give up to night and darkness, and so avoid coming near it. They have a pretty traffic with known correspondents in some little creek; within that they confine themselves, and are dexterous managers enough of the wares and products of that corner, with which they content themselves, but will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge to survey the riches that nature has stored other parts with, no less genuine, no less solid, no less useful, than what has fallen to their lot in the admired plenty and sufficiency of their own little spot, which, to them, contains whatsoever is good in the universe. Let not men, therefore, who would have a sight of what every one pretends to be desirous to have a sight of, Truth in its full extent, narrow and blind in their own prospect. Let not men think that there is no truth but in the sciences that they study, or the books that they read. To prejudge other men's notions, before we have looked into them, is not to show their darkness, but to put out our own eyes. 'Try all things, hold fast that which is good,' is a Divine rule, coming from the Father of light and truth: and it is hard to know what other way men can come at truth, to lay hold of it, if they do not dig and search for it as for gold and hid treasure; but he that does so must have much earth and rubbish before he gets the pure metal—sand and pebbles and dross usually lie blended with it, but the gold is nevertheless gold, and will enrich the man that employs his pains to seek and separate it." "One man, muffled up in his zeal and the infallibility of his own sect, will not touch a book, or enter into a debate with a person, who will question any of those things which to him are sacred. Another surveys our differences in religion with an equitable and fair indifference, and so finds probably that none of them are in everything unexceptionable. These divisions and systems were made by men, and carry the mark of fallible on them; and in those whom he differs from, and, till he opened his eyes, had a general prejudice against, he meets with more to be said for a great many things than before he

was aware of or could have imagined. Which of these two, now, is most likely to judge right in our religious controversies, and to be most stored with truth, the mark all pretend to aim at?" Evidently the man who has given a thoughtful examination to the arguments on both sides of the question. To enable our readers to do this, by placing the means within their reach, will be our constant aim.

It appears necessary at the commencement of our work that we should pledge ourselves to the course we intend to pursue with respect to all controversy conducted in our pages; and we therefore state, once for all, that that course will be one of strict *neutrality*. We shall not adopt any sect or party as our own; nor even announce our own decision at the conclusion of a discussion. We shall endeavour to place the arguments on both sides of a question fairly before our readers, and then leave them to draw their own conclusions. We aspire to no higher office than to hold the scales of justice with a steady hand, then to allow men whose opinions differ to place those opinions and the reasons in support of them in either scale, so that they, and others also, may have an opportunity of seeing which side preponderates. Men of different sects and parties have too long kept apart as enemies, instead of meeting and consulting together as brethren and friends.

Having said thus much for ourselves, we would offer a word of advice to our readers. They must all be prepared in turn to see their own opinions controverted, and some which they deem erroneous boldly stated; but then, they will have an opportunity of arguing the points at issue, and, if they have any faith in the power of truth, they will rest with confidence in its final triumph. Let prejudice and bigotry be put far away. Let all desire the simple and unmixed truth for themselves and others; and let each and all be ready to communicate and receive one of another that which no man can claim as private property, but which will benefit each individual, not only in proportion as he possesses it himself, but in proportion to the extent in which it is shared by others. The desire of each should be "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

To those friends who may be willing to occupy a place in our pages,

to take part in the discussions therein conducted, we offer the following suggestions for the guidance of their pens. 1st, Never maintain opinions you do not believe. This is often done in Debating Societies, on account of the fewness of their members, or merely for the sake of argumentation; but in a periodical like ours, circulating among men of all parties, such a course is both unnecessary and undesirable. 2nd, Be not ashamed to acknowledge the force of an opponent's reasoning, nor to confess a change of opinion when such change has taken place. Truth is the great object to be sought, and our desire for it ought to be supreme. 3rd. Never maintain your opinions with harshness nor with anger. Bitterness may intimidate, but it can never convince. 4th, Endeavour to take a complete view of a subject. Look at all sides of a question; but stop not at the accidental: go to the essence. Upon such conditions as these, we invite communications from thoughtful men of all sects in religion and all parties in politics. To the young men of our country in particular we look. To meet their wants and wishes will be our constant aim; and to aid them in their search for truth will be our ceaseless desire. Papers from the pens of such will be always acceptable, and although we cannot promise insertion to all that we may receive, yet each paper shall have due consideration, and be made the subject of suitable remarks. We hope to gain the confidence of the Young by criticising that which is defective in composition, while we applaud exertion and urge to high thought, to greater diligence, and to more accurate investigation.

On the other sections of our Magazine we shall not here remark; their design may be inferred from their designations, and it will be more fully developed in their contents.

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THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST, AND IMPARTIAL INQUIRER:

The Art of Reasoning.

No. I.

The present age is one of progress and inquiry. Society is undergoing rapid and important changes. The aspect of the world is becoming altered. The large eye of humanity is gazing on the future with expectancy. Force, wealth, fraud, and prejudice are losing their supremacy, and intellectuality is steadily advancing and becoming dominant. Mind is gaining an upward and elevating tendency. We seem as if we had attained the verge of a new era. Truth is the object of earnest search and serious investigation. Thought is reaping richer fruits, and *thinking* men are less scarce than formerly. In the faith of this elevation, progressiveness, and desire for truth, the following articles have been written.

The nature of man has always been a favourite study; and well may he be pardoned for the apparent self-love which this fact seems to indicate. What object in the visible universe is so worthy of diligent and enlightened investigation?—His frame so exquisitely constructed, so wondrously fitted for his situation, so admirably adapted to his internal and external relationships! When we compare ourselves with the existences around, we feel that in many things our homogeneity is evident; but when we read our own consciousness, and feel the power of thought exerting itself within us, we readily perceive the basis of the exclamation, "How noble a thing is man!" The generic distinction of the human race is Reason. By this faculty have men been led to speculate upon the world beyond them, and the still more wondrous phenomena within—by this have the foundation facts and primary elements, upon which the glorious superstructure of science and art has been upbuilt, been discovered and applied—by this has the star-typed page of the evening sky been read, the hieroglyphics of the fossilized strata been discovered, and the mysterious language of nature been understood, interpreted, and taught—by this has science been originated, advanced, and applied—by this the progression of humanity has been effected, and by it greater and more glorious triumphs will yet be proposed and successfully accomplished. New facts, new inferences, new results, and applications, thus in unending series proceed the operations of the rational faculty. True, error is incident to humanity. True, the nightly watchers on Chaldea's plains imagined that some occult influence was eliminated from the

gems which deck eve's lustrous mantle, and ruled, as they thought, the fate of all the children of mortality! True, the alchymist, with anxious beating breast, sat o'er his crucibles and watched the processes and transmutations which occurred within them, in the illusory hope that wealth untold would gleam before his eyes, and an uncounted treasure be extracted from the earthy ores. But even then the "light which led astray was light from heaven." After long years of tedious watching and persevering observation, the inquiries of the astrologer resulted in the deduction so ably expressed by our own poet—

"The fates, dear Brutus, are not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings."

After long years of "patient expectation," many years of unrequited toil and self-deceiving hopes, when experiment had been repeated ten thousand thousand times, and still the hope was blighted, the futility of the attempt became too evident, and from the wreck of these imaginary sciences has arisen that magnificent body of truths which Astronomy unfolds and Chemistry reveals. "Newton brought down the old divinities from their starry thrones, and converted lovely Venus and potent Jove into silent monitors of the lapse of time, or friendly guides of the adventurous navigator on a lonely ocean; Judicial Astrology was for ever confuted, and men learned to gaze unmoved on the comet which they once thought

'From his horrid hair
Shook pestilence and war.'"*

Light has now been thrown on the profoundest secrets of nature, and as the eye becomes accustomed to the brilliancy, how glorious shall the disclosures and discoveries of the future be! But in all this, Reason must be our guide, and observation and experiment her handmaids. In this manner have all the discoveries and inventions of modern times been effected. The circulation of the blood, vaccination, the steam engine, the telegraph, with all their advantages, applications, and effects, what are they but the results of observation and experiment, guided and controlled by the deductions of reason? But it is not alone in the elevated walks of science and philosophy that reason gains her triumphs; it is not alone amid the far distant planetary orbs, in the dim caverns of the earth, or on the surface of the plant-covered globe, that she may be found. She may not only be seen poring over the glyphography of the eternal-seeming hills, classifying the myriads of the flowers, searching, scalpel in hand, for the arcana of life, arranging a cabinet of ocean shells or earth's treasury of minerals, sitting in a museum of natural history, and "counting the number of the stars," but also unfolding the scroll of a nation's laws, summing huge columns of statistical accounts, revealing the prerequisites of a sanitary condition, and conducting the business of ordinary life. And what were life without her all-needful aid? A series of sensations, feelings, passions, yielding delight, it is true, but a delight short-lived and transitory. How frequently do we wander "unweeting of the perilous way," bewildered amid mere present impressions, the delicious nature of which we feel, but the insidious charac-

* STODDART'S *Universal Grammar*, p. 80.

ter of which we think not of attempting to discover! What is the origin of error? In what manner do we solve tho strange and startling enigma of *vice*, if we admit not that *unreflectiveness* bears a share in the divergence of the unwary from the track of well-doing and well-being? if we do not believe, with the poet, that

> "Evil is wrought by want of thought,
> As well as want of heart?"

Correct principles of thought, accurate habits of reasoning, cannot but be advantageous; they enable us to examine the chart of life with care, to elude the insidious snares which seek to lure us into error, and preserve us from being "like a vessel tossed upon the waters, rudderless and without a compass, with no port to make for, and no stars to steer by." They enable us to regulate our thoughts, to test the accuracy of arguments, to refute sophisms, and to adopt rules for our conduct in every-day life. They teach us to keep our eye constantly fixed on the focus of truth, and preserve us from all wavering and fluctuation.

In the above remarks we have arguments sufficient to justify our present attempt to simplify and place within the reach of all a knowledge of "The Art of Reasoning." In what branch of life is this unrequired? In what position in society can we exist without its exercise? In the operations of the farm, in the labours of the loom, the lathe, the sledge-hammer, in the management of machinery, in the pursuit of literature, in the advocacy of truth, and in the multifarious topics of controversy and conversation, it is equally necessary. But in the present crisis, when the weal or woe of our nation seems about to be more entrusted to the guardianship of each member of the community, how exceedingly important is it that we should find some means to prevent ourselves from being tossed about by every wind of doctrine! We must become acquainted, so to speak, with the mechanism of thought, the understanding must be anatomized—the method of its action ascertained and applied to the constantly recurring difficulties of thought and practice. Whether, therefore, we speak to men of speculative disposition, to men of business or of trade, the subject of our prelections will be seen to be equally indispensable to success. But, we may be told, common sense is the best logic; and we answer, we do not wish to dispense with common sense, but to *train* it, to habituate it to the best, nay, the *only legitimate* method which the mind can take in the examination of any question in philosophy, science, literature, or business. Which artizan will argue that natural talent alone will suffice to enable any one successfully to perform the peculiar duties belonging to any walk of industrial exertion? But this innate ability operated upon by the *training* undergone during the period of apprenticeship, sufficiently capacitates any moderately gifted person to follow his calling in a tolerable manner. Here no new faculty is imparted, but the inherent ability, improved by continuous exercise and attention, enables him to perform his duties. In like manner, Logic bestows no new sense, no additional mental faculty, but superinduces improvement, refinement, and skill, on the already and previously existent capacity. The powers of the mind we possess by nature, and these do in some sort instinctively exert themselves. But we know that there is false as well as true reasoning—that some men are conspicuous for the accuracy

and clearness of their ideas and their power of perspicuous exposition, persons who can "thread the labyrinth" of intricate and interblended investigations, and present them to the "mind's eye" with order and clearness, while some are precisely the reverse—people who confound facts, misconstrue statements, garble thoughts, mystify plain and obvious distinctions, and are almost incapable either of perceiving things accurately themselves, or of presenting them in a lucid or intelligible form to others.

"The Art of Reasoning" pre-supposes the *substratum* of reason to be already existing, and endeavours to explain *how* some men succeed in elucidating thought, while others fail. To watch the procedure of the intellect when exerted correctly in the search for truth, or the investigation of phenomena, to describe this examinative process, to point out the sources of error, and the method of avoiding mistakes, are all that logic, properly so called, pretends to perform. By thus describing, explaining, and exemplifying the correct use of the investigative powers, we place before those who are desirous of becoming adepts in its application, the means of comparing their several acts with the *formulæ* to which all true reasoning must perforce conform. We show them how to trace thought from its most rudimentary form to its completion as an act of ratiocination. We explain how thought succeeds thought, and what relations and connections are pre-supposed or implied in them. By this means the vigour of the mind is increased, its vigilance and acumen kept on the alert, and its perceptive powers quickened and refined. In short, we heartily subscribe to and endorse the opinion of J. S. Mill, pithily expressed in the following sentence:—"If a science of logic exists, or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If there be rules to which every mind conforms, in every instance in which it judges rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is more likely to observe those rules when he knows the rules, than when he is unacquainted with them." What can be more valuable as an agent in strengthening the intellect, in enlarging knowledge, and promoting our own welfare and prosperity, than to possess a gauge of our own powers, and an acquaintance with the best method of employing them?

We do not intend to treat with dry and uninteresting frivolousness of the *questiones vexatæ* of the schools; we do not intend to attempt the solution of the mystery-involved verbiage of the dark ages; we will not talk of "intention and remission, proportion and degree; infinity, formality, quiddity, and individuality," and a dozen other "occult qualities and imaginary essences;" but while we aim at lucidity of expression, conciseness, and philosophical accuracy, we will endeavour to fit our lucubrations for the purposes of ordinary life and the necessities of the thinking masses.

Every "Art" depends upon some theory, some principle or collection of principles which underlie, and form the substratum of, the practices of those who employ it. Theory thus appears to be essential to the successful prosecution of any *art*. As it is a systematized series of all the most important observations and rules, deduced from the most approved methods of procedure adopted by the most eminent speculators and operators, it would appear evident that, after the theory is

fully developed and accurately studied, nothing farther is necessary than to habituate the mind and accustom the intellectual powers to promptitude and precision in the processes which it describes and explains. By this we see what others have done; how they did it; what measure of success attended their efforts; what obstacles they overcame; with what difficulties they wrestled; how the victory was gained; and how error, vanquished, left the field. Man should live at perpetual enmity with ignorance. It is the bane of life, and the antagonist of well-being; every conquest of truth is another addition to the average happiness of our race; every error refuted is an obstacle to man's progressiveness removed and foiled. If men desire a diminution of pain, and an increase of delight, ignorance is the first foe to be attacked; against this must we continually engage in an inveterate warfare. Ignorance, however, is either positive or negative; negative ignorance is the absence of *knowledge* in the soul. We are all born negatively ignorant; the soul, philosophically considered, is an unwritten volume on which perception and reflection write the accumulated mass of facts of which life is composed; positive ignorance is the absence of truth, is error, crime, wrong-doing, and wrong-thinking. The former supposes the mind a "*tabula rasa*," a series of blank forms to be filled up; the latter looks on it as "scribbled o'er" with notions needful of deletion, and, to continue the figure, in this up-filling of the mental manuscript errors must be erased, emendations introduced, revisal and correction are necessary, new facts must be registered, old ideas re-examined, and new ones submitted to the ordeal of trial and experiment. In such circumstances it is that logic is required; and here let us admit that the task is difficult and the study abstruse. To keep watch and ward over the avenues of the soul, to detect the entrance of inaccurate impressions, to guide the evolutions of the intellect, and curb the wayward wish by the stern reign of *will*, is no easy task. There *is* no "royal road" to certitude of thought, there *is* no intellectual mastery attained but by courageous effort. We do intend to simplify, but not so much as to render thought unnecessary. We desiderate a thoughtful, self-inquiring soul; to *him* we will unfold our thoughts, and in the light of his own spirit shall he view them and feel their truth. Study, then, the following concise abstract of our subject, and criticise as you proceed, feel that each step is accurately taken, and we doubt not you will reap the fruit of your exertions in correctness of thought, accuracy of reasoning, and a clear perception of truth.

Logic properly signifies discourse; and, as the mind is that which employs discourse, logic, as a SCIENCE, includes a theory of mind so far as its operations are necessary for the purposes of speech, or the intercommunication of ideas. All discourse is *educative*, and should have for its object the outleading and upbuilding of the intellect. All the mind's intercommunications ought to be employed either in the discovery of the truth, or the imparting of it, in the attainment of knowledge hitherto unpossessed, or the exposition and explication of some department of inquiry, either not at all, or imperfectly comprehended by those whom we address. Hence logic, as an ART, teaches the method in which truth *is* discovered, and how the explication of it *must* proceed.

According to the above view of the subject, logic *may be* defined as the *science* which instructs us in the principles of correct reasoning, and the *art* of applying these principles to the discovery and communication of truth. Truth consists in the coincidence of our ideas with the objectivities by which they are originated. The operations of the intellect which are employed for the above-mentioned purposes are Perceptivity, Judgment, Ratiocination, and Method.

Perceptivity is that faculty of the mind by which the impressions which phenomena,—that is, the external appearances of things,—make upon the thinking powers, and the knowledge of the mental operations employed in cogitation, and conveyed to us through the medium of consciousness, are observed and registered. Those impressions and mental operations which are thus noticed by the mind are called perceptions, and these perceptions, when treasured up in the memory, become the objects of *thought* and *knowledge*, and are called ideas.

Judgment is that mental power by which we compare two distinct perceptions, and by this simple comparison predicate agreement or discordancy regarding them. A judgment expressed in words is called a proposition.

Ratiocination is the synthesis of two judgments, or the comparison of two distinct ideas through the intermediatcy of another object or idea. The verbal expression of an act of ratiocination is called a syllogism.

Method is the arrangement of our knowledge, that is, the *results* of our perceptivity, judgment, and ratiocination, so as to be most easily remembered and communicated.

The above-mentioned faculties may be called the integrants of reason. Perceptivity collects and judgment adjusts the materials of thought. Ratiocination builds them, and method displays the edifice of upbuilt fact. We have not felt constrained at present to enter at any greater length upon the explication of the foregoing definitions: in the meantime it behoves our readers to strive after a correct knowledge of the meaning attached to these terms, as they will recur at every step of our future progress. The necessity of definition is obvious; for words are the mere *circulating medium* of speech, and if their value be not definitively settled, misunderstanding, doubt, and difficulty must arise.

Let these definitions be entered, then, amongst our present verbal currency, and let their value be accurately appreciated now, so shall we the less require to interlard our future articles with explanatory clauses and parenthetical divergencies.

In our next paper we shall proceed to analyse the perceptive powers of man: this will afford us an opportunity of explaining, illustrating, and reducing to practical use the primary and rudimentary investigative faculties of our race. We will endeavour to point out their mode of action, and the precautions necessary for the attainment of correct ideas, the basis of all correct reasoning and all true knowledge. You have seen the necessity for the art of which we have been speaking. You have attained a glimpse of what it proposes; will you go along with us in its attentive study, the results of which must be so advantageous, the rewards of which will be so great?

Religion.

IS WAR, UNDER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE, OPPOSED TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE question of war may be taken up on either of two questions—its political expediency or its christian legality. To the latter view of the question we are at present confined. Ought a Christian ever to take, or risk taking, the life of a fellow-creature, in national, social, or personal defence? In the absence of explicit commands on the subject—or at least of what are clearly ascertained and universally allowed to be such—the argument employed must be of an inferential character; or the specific direction wanted must be shown to be involved in more general precepts. Our Saviour does not say, "Never fight. Never, in the protection of your country, your religion, or your life, precipitate a fellow-creature into eternity with all his unrepented sins upon his head." But he says what amounts to the same: "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you." Can a man shoot whom he loves? Can he at the same time, with his hands, thrust a bayonet into the heart of an enemy, and with his tongue or in spirit utter a prayer on his behalf? A prayer for what? For his long life, of which he himself deprives him? For the salvation of his soul, which, if it has not been previously secured, he by that act, according to his own belief, renders henceforth impossible? "Dearly beloved," writes the Apostle Paul, "avenge not yourselves. Vengeance is mine. I will repay, saith the Lord." "Do not take the law into your own hands. The administration of justice is my exclusive prerogative. I will secure, as I alone can, that innocence shall not finally be a loser, or injustice a gainer. Obey the law in your own person: but never attempt to punish its infringement in the person of another." "It hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil." That is, evil viewed in the light of a personal injury or grievance. For evil, as evil, we are enjoined habitually to resist: "striving against sin," even, if circumstances require, "unto blood:" not the blood of others, but our own.

The principle of the Christian law is evidently this—that never, in any case, are we to meet an injury inflicted or intended with an expression, by word or act, of personal resentment; but, on the other hand, by words, and, if possible, deeds of kindness—feeding our enemy, if he be hungry, giving him drink if he be thirsty, or, according to the rule of a part being put for the whole, doing him any service in our power: and thus "overcoming evil with good." And in setting ourselves habitually against whatever is opposed to the will of God, and the real welfare of men, employing no other weapons than those of light and love. Not attempting to expel one devil by another—a practice too common in the world and in the church—but opposing the spirit of all good to the spirit of all evil. Truth against error—meekness against ambition—humility against pride—purity against vice—beneficence against cruelty—forgiveness against revenge.

If this be the law of Christ—a law for all times and all cases—what judgment must we pronounce, or rather, what judgment does the law of Christ itself pronounce, on those Christian men who in various periods and countries have fought for their own and others' civil and religious liberties? That they were not good as well as great men? That they were not, what they professed to be, loyal and faithful subjects of Christ's kingdom? Far from it. Their many Christian deeds imperatively forbid such a charge. But that, in as far as they resisted political or ecclesiastical

oppression, in the shape of a personal injury in their temporal and civil capacity, irrespectively of its bearing on the interest of God and of humanity, they did *wrong:* that as far as they opposed it as moral evil—as a sin against God and man—they did *right:* and that in opposing it in this aspect by force of arms, they did grievous *wrong*—wrong to the authority of their spiritual King, and wrong to the very interests which they endeavoured to serve.

The quality of courage has ever received the world's admiration and applause: and, in the opinion of some, has been improperly extolled—not unduly, but indiscriminatingly and blindly. Courage is an essential element of greatness: of intellectual and moral, no less than of martial greatness. No coward can be great or good. The heavenly crown is promised "to him that overcometh;" and the "fearful" are ranked in their final doom with "unbelievers and murderers," and others of similar guilt. But if he is courageous who stakes his life against the life of a foe, and commits it to the chances of battle, which of two, or which of many, shall live or die; his is surely a firmer courage, a nobler bravery, who, when insulted, calumniated, defrauded, oppressed, or persecuted, has principle enough, and love enough in his heart, to refrain from every outward expression, and to repress, if possible, the emotion of resentment, with no harsher utterance than the calm and dignified appeal of the Saviour, "If I have spoken (or done) evil, bear witness of the evil, but if well, why smitest thou me?" and who can pacifically brave the loss of property, fame, friendship, or life, in bearing testimony to the cause of truth, and righteousness, and love.

It is high time to learn, where it has not already been learned, and to learn more completely where it has, that to endure injury meekly is more courageous than to resent it angrily: that to suffer for truth is nobler than to fight for it; and that he who on any occasion, or from any motive, employs the coarse and vulgar weapon of the sword, or whatever in the shape of angry resistance bears an analogy to it, not only directly violates the law of Christ, but in so far evinces his deficiency in the heroic quality.

Let not the man of worldly courage deny or malign that of the Christian in the meek acceptance of suffering, and the pacific resistance of moral evil, because it is not like his own: or he who professes allegiance to the "Prince of Peace" prostitute the sanction of Christianity to principles and practices to which it is diametrically opposed. And let Christian teachers and Christian men not satisfy themselves with denouncing the excesses of arms; but urge and exemplify those equitable, peaceful, and benevolent maxims of their religion, which involve the condemnation of war in every form and guise: equally when it appears in the shape of murderous conflict in the battle-field, or angry collisions in the arena of politics, or heartless rivalries, selfish graspings, fraudulent chicaneries in the mercantile and trading world; or unheavenly wranglings, sectarian exclusiveness, dishonest covetousness, proud ambition, or "strivings for mastery" amongst the professed followers of Christ. For war is a many-headed monster, whose vitality or influence is not destroyed by a partial decapitation, or his cruel and destructive operations arrested by an exclusion from one field of conflict, or a deprival of one class of weapons. War, so called, is but one effect or mode of manifestation of the passions of pride, envy, covetousness, ambition, and revenge; and with little comparative advantage to mankind are these checked in one direction, while allowed uncontrolled action in others, and probably strengthened by the diversion; nor can they be subdued but by antagonism of the simple and all-embracing principles of Christianity, and the "expulsive power" of its new and nobler affections.

Infidelity is advancing over the civilized world, with philosophy in the one hand, and philanthropy in the other. And its insidious encroachments are to be met, and its devastating conquests stayed, not by angry disputes and one-sided arguings about shades of theological truth, or systems and forms of ecclesiastical polity: not by hackneyed and

unedifying reiterations of stereotyped commonplaces on Christian doctrine and experience,—with or without talent, but without depth and largeness of soul, elevation and excursiveness of genius, or intensity of emotion; not by special pleading, or rhetorical tirades and declamatory invectives against unbelief; nor yet by concealing or keeping in the background the distinctive peculiarities of revelation, in compliance with the prejudices and tastes of an "enlightened age;" but by demonstrating, in word and deed, the immeasurable superiority of the social morality of the New Testament to that of any other system: at the same time indicating and illustrating its fundamental and inseparable connexion with the supra-rational truths and disclosures of revelation and the Christian's inward and heaven-derived life: in a word, evincing, in the spirit of Philosophy, Philanthropy, and Christianity, that Philosophy, Philanthropy, and Christianity, are one.

J. T. Y.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

After a careful investigation of the subject under consideration, the writer has arrived at the conclusion, that circumstances may arise in the present state of society, which may not only justify, but render it the imperative duty of the Christian man to take up arms.

The object of the present paper is, as briefly as possible, to state the grounds from which this conclusion has been drawn, together with the manner of eliciting it: in order, if those grounds are false, they may be controverted and removed, and, if the reasoning is unsound, it may be refuted.

If the question were asked, What is the leading characteristic of man? we think the almost universal answer would be—Selfishness. If we go to Africa, and inquire into the source of all her woes—the petty wars which from a very early period have raged between tribe and tribe, with all their attendant evils—the attempts of tribe to plunder tribe, and chief to rob chief of property, servants, wives, children, and even liberty itself, the answer is to be found in one word—Selfishness.

If we are informed of inhabitants who years ago occupied the West Indian Islands, and on visiting those islands feel astonished that no inhabitants are to be found to answer their description, and in amazement ask the cause of their destruction, an answer is returned by full ten thousand voices. That cause was Selfishness.

If we look abroad upon the world, witness the captive led in chains to do another's work without remuneration, and listen to the sighs and groans of some millions of others who are similarly treated, and wish to know the source of all this human suffering, the answer still remains the same.

If we return to our mother country, and in looking over its history discover scenes of blood, internal wars, extending over a lengthened period, in which the peerage of the country has well nigh been annihilated, while serfs have fallen in the battle-field by thousands, and, still inquisitive, desire to know the cause, the answer still is—Selfishness.

Nay, further, if we seek to know the origin of human woe, in whatever form it may be found, wherever or whenever it may have been experienced—whether it be of a physical, mental, or spiritual nature, whether it relate to the individual or relative condition of man, whether it have to do with time, or with eternity—we shall be obliged to conclude that Selfishness was the source of all. In the word of God we are told, that "God made of one blood all nations of men." But Selfishness has introduced almost innumerable distinctions, in order to estrange man from man, so that one class of men may be enabled to profit at the expense of another.

The Bible attaches a glory and importance to the nature of man far transcending all other creatures. Selfishness divests certain portions of the human race of this importance, and places them on a level with the brute creation.

In the Bible we read, that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth

in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." Selfishness, however, in order to retain unjustly the service of a fellow-man for a few days, is willing to sacrifice not only his temporal, but his eternal interests.

In fact, mankind, guided by this principle, have not been ashamed to give the lie to the Almighty in thousands of instances, from the time that the mother of us all, under its influence, took of the fruit of the forbidden tree, to the present moment. The entire evidence of the human family has been one grand attempt to convict the Almighty of falsehood. This attempt, however, has been vain: for the very men who have set themselves up as oracles, and who, in this capacity, have tried to give the lie to God, have carried in their own persons incontrovertible evidences of his veracity.

The wonder is, that, long ere this, this principle has not exterminated the human family. Nor can we account for it, except as we consider that He who sits in the heavens is eminently benignant, and has merciful designs to accomplish with regard to the human race, notwithstanding their accumulated and ever accumulating load of guilt.

1. The principal means which has been used for man's preservation is *Government*.

Notwithstanding that man, in a state of nature, is pre-eminently a selfish being, he has been led to see the necessity of living in a state of community. He has seen, times without number, the evils arising from being unprotected, and for the sake of avoiding these evils, he has become willing to submit to certain regulations which limit the exercise of his grasping nature, and bind him, in return for the security he enjoys, to use whatever power he possesses for the defence of the community to which he belongs, should circumstances require it, and further, to bear his share in the general expenses.

I am well aware that the power of communities has often been put into requisition for aggressive purposes. With aggression, however, I have, at present, nothing whatever to do. My business is with the defensive principle, and that alone.

2. Governments which have answered the purpose of defence the best, are, for the most part, founded on the principle of mutual defence.

In this case, each individual has virtually made a barter, or exchange, *i. e.*, he has given up his right to defend his own property, with whatever ability he possessed for that purpose, for a right of defence in the possession of whatever is lawfully his, against the aggression of any member of the same community, or, indeed, any other, who may prove himself an aggressor; and also in case of the aggression of a foreign power, for such security as the combined power of the community is able to afford.

By this arrangement, at least as far as the internal state of the community is concerned, might is ensured on the side of right, not only from the circumstance that every member of the community is bound, as such, to defend the interests of every other member, but also from the fact, that the interests of all being placed upon the same foundation, the rights of one cannot be interfered with without disturbing those of others; and hence, in mere self-defence, men stand forward to defend the rights of others.

Thus it will be seen, that the very principle which has produced so much mischief, is by this means effectually secured on the side of order and right; for the moment that the man steps beyond the bound of his own rights, on to those of any member's of the same community, that moment he is in danger of being overwhelmed by the power which is pledged to defend his neighbour.

3. Every man possesses the right of self-defence.

We think it is sufficiently evident that, if man does not possess this right, he cannot exchange it for a share in the defence of others. And since the right of defence possessed by the executive in behalf of the community, is but the sum of the rights of the individuals of which the community is composed, that right also is a name; and consequently every time the power of the community is put forth by the executive to establish police, institute courts of assize, appoint magistrates and judges, subpœna juries, take,

try, and punish criminals, however guilty, it is stepping beyond its proper sphere, and, in consequence, what are usually termed courts of justice, are but courts of tyranny—that such persons as Turpin, Cox, Greenacre, and Rush, so far from suffering death at the hand of the public executioner, ought to have been permitted to go at large.

This, however, we know is not the case. On the contrary, we are informed in the Bible, that "the powers that be are ordained of God," and that "whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God;" and so far from the punishment of evil-doers being denominated an assumption, the officer of justice is designated "the minister of God."

Seeing, then, that the punishment of evil-doers is patronized by God himself, we cannot but conclude that the community has a right thus to act; and knowing, as we do, that the community is composed of individuals, we are obliged to conclude that the right of the executive is derived from these individuals. In other words, that the right of the executive consists of the sum of the rights of the individuals it represents; and if so, then each individual must have an original right of self-defence.

There is another circumstance which somewhat tends to strengthen this conviction. It is, that we are not aware of a single case in all the Bible in which either an individual or a nation was condemned for acting in self-defence, though the aggressor may have been God's own people Israel, acting under Divine direction: whilst there is at least one case in which certain people were condemned for refusing to do so. We refer to Meroz, Judges v. 23.

4. This right may justly be exercised against a foreign aggressor.

If man, in his individual capacity, has the right to defend himself against the aggression of any other man, since every community is composed of men, each community must have a similar right to defend itself against any other community that may prove an aggressor, since each individual of which such community is composed is but adopting the best means in his power for defending his own particular rights, by uniting with the other members of the same community for the general defence.

5. Every man who ceases to do his part towards the defence of the community of which he forms a part, is an outlaw from that moment, and, as such, forfeits all right of defence from his community.

Here is a compact, in which certain conditions have to be performed by two parties. Hence it follows, that if one party ceases to perform the conditions which are binding upon it, the other ceases to be bound to perform the conditions which are binding upon it. In other words, the community engages to defend the man, provided the man does his part towards defending the community. But according to the hypothesis, the man ceases to do his part towards defending the community; hence the community ceases to be bound to defend the man.

6. Every Christian man is bound to do his part towards defending the community of which he forms a part.

One injunction of the New Testament is, "Owe no man anything." Now, every man who enjoys his own in security, through the arrangements of the community for that purpose, owes to his community his support, to the extent of which we have spoken; and, therefore, if the rights of the community are intrenched upon, either by the members of his or any other community, he is bound to do his part towards defending them.

But it may be objected, that "there are many portions of Holy Writ which make it incumbent on a Christian man to suffer personal wrong without resenting it." Granted. But in this case I am called upon, not to rob my neighbour for a sacrifice, but to give up a portion of that which is lawfully mine, for the glory of Christ. In the case, "If an enemy smite thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also," I suffer a personal insult, where I could, by law, obtain redress; *i. e.*, I sacrifice a part of my right in the defence which the community affords, in order to show that the religion I profess is a religion of love,

and my religion gets the credit of it. But if my neighbour is smitten on the one cheek, am I at liberty to offer the other? No! I am bound, as an honest man, to defend him by every lawful means. I am bound to seek for him that defence which he has a right, as an honest man, to demand from the community. Not to do so would be positively unjust. To say that my conscience won't allow me, is to say that my conscience will allow me to enjoy ease and comfort at the expense of others, while it will not allow me to contribute to the security of others.

Suppose that, instead of an individual, it is the community itself whose rights are jeopardized; the principle remains the same. I owe the community—to act in its defence,—I am bound to pay it.

If Christianity denounces war, when war is conducted in favour of right, since right between nations and individuals, in the present constitution of society, is almost universally the result of war, one would be ready to imagine that, when Christianity entered the world, it was designed as a signal for right to flee. But since Christianity is itself pre-eminently a system of right, and has given the greatest example of it which the world has ever witnessed, I contend that the defence of right is not incompatible with the spirit of Christianity. W. W.

Philosophy.

IS BEAUTY A QUALITY INHERENT IN OBJECTS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

Mr. Editor,—The investigation of philosophical problems appears to many a useless and unnecessary employment—the occupation of a few visionaries—unworthy of the practicality of the age in which we live, and unfruitful in any advantageous results. To us it seems far otherwise: the unflagging accuracy of thought—the necessity for collecting all our ideas to one *focal* point—the habitual self-search—the subtle thought-anatomy which they involve—must, as we suppose, inevitably conduce to the discipline of the mind—the formation of a correct estimate of our own abilities, and the education of an independent and unfettered judgment. Upon these grounds, we hail with great satisfaction the announcement of such a Magazine as yours. Had it been a mere theological arena, on which the partizans of sectaries were to cross swords and band self-boasting commonplaces, and, perchance, foul-mouthed vituperation; or a mere tournament, in which the Quixotic *heroes of creed* might wield the venom-pointed lances of unholy conflict in the name of Religion—we could not, and would not, have said "good-speed" to the undertaking. But as the gymnasium of mind, as the common wrestling-ground of *intellectual athletæ*—as the Thermopylæ, where Truth and Error, Progression and Conservism—are to wage impartial, yet affectionate warfare with each other—the chief object being the conviction, not the defeat of the opposing party—Truth being the "Queen of Beauty," whose favours we all wish to win—as a field for exerting the whole of the intellectual faculties of man—we are desirous of giving your Magazine a hearty welcome, and wish it that success which its honesty and impartiality of intention deserves.

But a truce to digressive compliments, and we pass on to the subject of our present communication. You have announced in your Prospectus, as a subject for discussion under the head "Philosophy," the question, Is Beauty a quality inherent in objects?—on the negative of which, if my observations may be deemed worthy, I beg the liberty of offering a few remarks. Beauty is a general and vague term, used to express that agreeability which we feel on the presentation of objects to our visual organs—though its signification is often

extended so as to include, in a comprehensive name, the various agreeable emotions originated by objects without and operations within us—as, a beautiful poem, a beautiful invention, beautiful music, beautiful thoughts, &c. The emotion is, indeed, difficult of analysis: it seems to include the most conflicting and contradictory attributes or qualities: unity, variety, simplicity, uniformity, complexity, diversity, utility, form, colour, grace, motion, expression, are all elements of the same idea. To any one, however, who is in the habit of investigating the operations of his mind, the analysis of the motion will be comparatively easy if he place himself in circumstances to draw forth the feeling. Suppose he sits among "the leafy woods," under the elm-tree's far-stretching shadow, in sight of the ivy-clad cots of the neighbouring village—sees at a distance the heaven-pointing church-spire, "embosomed high in tufted trees;" the castled mansion, nestled in groves, and encircled with odour-breathing orchards; the verdant sward around him decked with the wildling children of the summer; perchance a streamlet in mazy course, and with most delicate murmurings, flows at his feet, gilded by the sunbeam's golden glory, and kissing the flowers that grow upon its bank, while the sun himself throws glorious resplendency on everything around—the emotion of the beautiful will instantaneously be excited in his bosom; and in the analysis of that delight-bringing thought, the solution of this question may be best found. What are the prominent ideas which compose the complex emotion, agitating and gratifying his breast?—rural quietude and innocence—the holy calm of Sabbath's sacred hours—the pomp, the leisure, and the elegance of mansion life—the cool, refreshing breezes of the sheltered walk—the sweet deliciousness of the fruit—the gratefulness of the proprietary feeling—visions of Eden blessedness—poetic reveries of health and joy—balmy days and sleep-blessed nights—the all-bounteousness of Heaven and heaven's great hierarch, the sun,—freedom from the cankering care, the fever, fret, turmoil, and bustle of the world—the joys of lonely contemplation—the "pleasures of solitude," an "Egeria" of the affections, or a "Vaucluse" of unrequited hopes, and mournful, yet undisturbed meditation — no misery-trode streets — no close neighbourhood of pinching poverty and *millionaire* greatness, grandeur, and magnificence—but guilelessness, happiness, and temperate joy—this is the mental feast on which the mind feeds in its ecstatic states. Are our thoughts only employed in gazing at and admiring the forms and colours which surround us? Sir Joshua Reynolds says, "Art is nature idealized;" but can any work of art, however accurate in outline, perspective, and colouring, rival the consummate perfection of beauty which Nature's every aspect shows? Yet what is painting but an assemblage of lines, forms, colours, *suggesting* Nature and the associations which such a landscape would excite—a memorandum of delightful thoughts written in a copy of Nature's signature? What sculpture of Phidias or Chantrey can equal the grace of the human form? What painting of Parrhasius or Apelles could rival the symmetry and elegance of Nature? Who has immortalized his canvas by an adequate representation of the glorious hues and shades of an autumn eve? Who has transferred by human art the rich tint which the orient king flings on the clouds to herald his approach? No one: and why? Because art cannot quicken the affections—the humanitarian feelings—the emotions of the heart, as Nature can: because the associations excited by a work of art are drawn towards the difficulties and niceties of execution, rather than to the harmonizing series of ideas which compose the beauty-emotion.

Is there any gratification of mind arising from a perception of mathematically correct "lines of beauty," or artistically contrasted hues and shades of colour, considered in themselves? Why, a piece of furniture print will show you lines more theoretically graceful—forms more mathematically uniform, colours more carefully contrasted, than any which Nature forms. Any pattern-designer in our manufactories, or even apprentice in

a "School of Design," will assemble on paper a galaxy of gaudy hues and grace-endowed lines more scientific far than Nature drew. Is it not evident, therefore, that it is not the mere minglement of form and colour which constitutes beauty?—

"Lull'd in the countless chambers of the brain,
Our thoughts are linked by many a hidden chain:
Awake but one, and lo! what myriads rise!—
Each stamps its image as the other flies.
* * * * * * * *
Each thrills the seat of Sense, that sacred source
Whence the fine nerves direct their mazy course;
And through the frame *invisibly* convey
The subtle, quick vibrations as they play."

Thus is it with beauty: the outward objects which impress the external senses are the originating elements of a train of exquisite feelings and associations, which, all combined, go to compose the emotion of which we speak.

"Wanting these,
Lo, beauty withers in your void embrace,
And with the glittering of an idiot's toy
Did fancy mock."

The organs of sense are the chief inlets of knowledge; they receive either actual or intermediate impressions from objects; these impressions produce in us nervous perceptivity and sensuous knowledge. But these nervile excitations cannot convey to the mental percipient the actual qualities of bodies; hence we have only a phenomenal knowledge of existences, and that, too, not a knowledge of appearances as they perhaps really are, but as the mind within us apprehends them; our knowledge is, therefore, not objective, but subjective; not real, but mental. By this we do not deny the reality of external objects, but the accuracy of the phenomenal perceptivity of our mind—the inadequacy of our sensations to represent the qualities of bodies to the mind. For instance, the eye does not perceive but by the agency of light: this light is only the intermediate informant of the eye, not the quality-possessor. How much less, then, can the mind perceive inherent qualities, when the eye does not so much as gain a knowledge of them! Hence the emotion called Beauty must only exist in our minds, and cannot be inherent in the external and thought-exciting objects by which our minds are impressed. The nervile excitement, the sensuous stimulation, is all that we perceive in the mental penetralia, and, consequently, we cannot *know* what qualities are inherent in objects. The *result* of the action of the qualities we *can* perceive, for *that* is sensation, so that our notion of Beauty is considerably removed from the perception of "inherent qualities," and is the *result* of our percipiency being brought into contact with the *effect* of sensation, and agreeably set in motion thereby. If the *same* stimuli be applied to the different sensitive organs, it will excite not the same effect in each, but the peculiar effect of each individual organ. Thus it appears we are *mediately*, not *immediately*, in connexion with the outward world, and all that we can *know* of phenomena (that is, qualities or appearances) is the mental impression which they produce: and hence the accuracy of the poet's conclusion is obvious:

"Mind, mind alone (bear witness earth and heaven!)
The living fountain in itself contains
Of beauteous or sublime."

Our senses, when excited by the various objects composing any scene, produce associative chains of thought, feeling, and desire, either of an accordant or discordant nature. If these be such as accord with each other, we call the feeling produced the emotion of the beautiful; if the reverse, they suggest the idea of deformity. This concord and agreement of feelings—this adjustment and suitableness of proportion and parts, which originates harmony of emotional impressions, is the great elementary and rudimental substratum of the beautiful. This it is which gives its value to the painting of a Titian, Rembrandt, or Vandyke. But what proof is more convincing that Beauty is the result of associated ideas than the fact, that painful as has been the elaboration, accurate as has been the perception, careful as may have been the execution, no picture of the "great masters" can produce the same exquisite feeling as the wild, uncultured, and unreclaimed heath, clad in fantastic, gnarled, knotty, stunted shrubs,

or dressed in the wild garment of weeds which Nature's careless hand, with liberal and profuse plenteousness, has strewn around?—for the humanizing emotions are not so vividly excited and called forth by any work of art as by the scenery displayed amid the rough and ungainly landscapes of the world.

How frequently do we throw forth the prominent feeling, passion, or desire of our souls upon the landscape without, and make the scene gay or sombre, as our mental mood may be! Let us be animated with hope, enraptured with joy, entranced in ecstacies of gratification, and how widely will the aspect of Nature differ from what it would seem were we crushed by disappointment—shrouded in sorrow, or weighed down by grief and ill-health! In the one case, how gladsome and sprightly would the view appear: in the other, how cheerless, dull, and desolate! So true is it, that in gazing upon external objects, association and imagination are needful to the education of the Beauty-emotion; so true, indeed, is that which the poet has so pithily expressed thus:

"We half create the wondrous world we see."

This every-day use of imagination in the embellishment and beautifying of ordinary and commonplace occurrences and objects has been too much overlooked by metaphysicians; there is scarcely a sensation which enters "the airy precincts of the soul" which is not adorned with brilliance not its own by the radiant pencil of this *omniactive* "decorative artist." Herein we find another objection to the theory which makes "Beauty a quality inherent in objects."

Have we, then, said enough to prove that Beauty is *not* inherent in objects? We humbly think so. One other remark we will, however, venture. Were "Beauty a quality inherent in objects," it would necessarily be a definite and definable *something;* but it is far otherwise: nothing is so notorious as the difference of taste in everything relating to the Beautiful; for instance, in human beauty, what a diversity of opinions! "The lassie wi' the lint-white locks," and eyes of the heavenliest blue, delights one, while "hair as black as the raven's wing," and eyes like twin stars in a moonless sky, captivate another; auburn ringlets, and "lips like roses wet wi' dew," compel the capitulation of one heart, while a stately mien, pale forehead, clear, transparent colour flushing o'er the cheek, golden locks, and gently smiling lips are needful to induce another to surrender. In some countries a black skin is the perfection of loveliness; in others, a brown, a bronze, a yellow, or a white. In some, no one is a beauty under two hundred weight; in others, plumpness is the hugest of deformities. Custom, in some countries, legislates for waists of extraordinry dimensions, feet of enormous size, lips of extravagant thickness; while in others wasp-waists, diminutive feet, compressed, prudish lips, a mincing gait and speech, are assiduously cultivated as the essential attributes of a beauty. In short, the most opposite extremes may be cultivated to captivate, ensnare, and enslave, as custom regulates and habit decides. A parent can see gentility in the most awkward booby; beauty in the snubbest of noses and reddest of locks; ability in the dullest of brains; and wit in the least humorous of the human race. All these facts go to prove that affection, imagination, association, custom, are the regulators of what is considered beautiful. If this can be so, can "Beauty be a quality inherent in objects?" If there is, indeed, a "Beauty for ever unchangingly bright," the world has got into strange quandaries in the search. If there be a loveliness involving the soul in a "magic of bliss," it has not yet been distilled by any of the philosophical alchymists from the objects in which it inheres. Meantime the world goes on its journey, creating beauty in its own way; and by the potent weird-lore of affection, desire, and imagination, throws a garment of beauty —a lustrous halo of loveliness, around visual appearances, and decorates the objects of sense in robes of fascination and enchantment.

Begging pardon for my dry and somewhat rambling disquisition, allow me to subscribe myself, Yours, &c.,

PHILOMATHOS.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

In this glorious spring season, when it almost appears a luxury to live—in those dreamy, swift-passing, though pleasure-giving hours, how delightful it is, when "the earliest beams of the sun arise," to be loitering alone, the mind suffused with the charms of nature, gazing with rapture on her graces, and breathing the jocund air of the yellow-haired morning! Away by the calm blue lake, along the bank of rippling rivulet or flowing stream, up the steep mountain-side, then through the rich meadows, how many fair and golden glories meet the eye! How bright is the green of the wheat-field! how beautiful the white blossoms of the mountain ash! how yellow and glittering the laburnum's graceful flower-blooms! The modest cowslips, the golden king-cups, the lake-blue hyacinths, the fragrant wall-flower, the meekly delicate lily-of-the-valley, the "crimson-tipped" daisy, the blooming rose, the flowery furze, and the wild-coloured weeds in the emerald hedge-rows, how beautiful, how lovely! And there too flutters past in the genial sun-gleam the flower-winged butterfly, a living incarnation of Beauty. O that ours were the gift of minstrelsy! O that our soul could melt itself into words as bright as the primal beauty of the earth in this season of bounding joy and heart-ravishing delight! O that we could express each harmony of sound, display each shade of colour, describe each shape of beauty, which greets the eye or pulsates on the ear! But ours is not the mellow note of the poet. We cannot in numbers "musical as is Apollo's lute" tell the soul, the life, the harmony, the beauty, our eye beholds in nature. But what boots it thus to sigh for and repine about the power of expressing thought, warm-glowing with the inspirations of the poetic afflatus, and ornate with the fertile flowers of fancy? Our vocation is far different: our present intention is, not to hymn a lofty pæan to the captivating goddess Beauty, but to write a few dry metaphysical pages for the purpose of attempting the discovery of the origin of that feeling—to dissect the emotion it produces, and analyze the operation of external objects in causing that state of mind.

Does this charm reside in us, or does it *indwell* in the objects which surround us? Is it a primitive or derivative feeling? Is Beauty a quality inherent in objects? We answer in the affirmative, and would fain attempt to render a reason for entertaining such an idea. But first let us define our term: in all disquisition and discussion it is advisable so to do. And here let us freely confess, that in the whole range of our language there are probably few terms more difficult of accurate and sufficiently generalized explication. If minutely examined, we shall be surprised at the complexity of idea it involves, and the multiplicity of objects of which it may be and is predicated. When applied to objects, it frequently denotes uniformity, artful contrivance, use, variety or superior execution, and sometimes many of these combined. When used with reference to truth, it implies clear and refined demonstrations, accurate deductions, mind-elevating ideas, or beneficial and important discovery; and when employed in connexion with living beings, it includes colour, symmetry, gracefulness, youth, health, &c. Such is its common every-day usage; and were we to pursue the question through all these various divergent by-paths, we should require a volume for its elucidation, and, after all, be apt to get entangled amid the vast multiplicity of relations through which it would be necessary "to wend our devious way."

From these considerations, we think it advisable, at least in the present stage of the inquiry, to confine our remarks to physical beauty alone,—that is, the sensation of the beautiful which is made visible to us through the agency of the eye. In this sense we would define *beauty as that colour, or harmonious blending of colours, and symmetrical proportion of parts, which superinduces pleasure in the beholder.* According to this definition, we are inclined to maintain that Beauty is intrinsic. All our

ideas of external things are derived through our sensational organs: of these the organ of sight is by far the noblest and most useful, as it conveys to the sensorium the greatest amount, variety, and diversity of impressions; it pictures there the world, with all its beauties and sublimity, the varied aspects of humanity, and the operations of the laws of the natural world, whilst, since the introduction of the art of printing, it almost supersedes the ear as the communicated knowledge-receiver of the soul. Now, we think it is self-evident that, if we possess sensations at all, they must be originated by substances possessing a sensation-producing power; and although we readily grant that *noümena*, or the *essence of things*, is inappreciable by our faculties, yet we cannot well conceive of qualities being developed from that in which they are not resident. Be the essence of external objects, however, settled as it may, we cannot for a moment doubt that we are surrounded on all sides by myriads of objects which are not ourselves, but which, by impinging their effects upon our perceptive organs, convey impressions to our minds and realise in them ideas—the germs of thought and action. For if it be maintained that mankind are idealogists, and dwell only in a theatre of shadowy and unreal phantasies, self-begotten in the intellect, and upbuilt only with the unsubstantial architecture of the imagination, it will be evident that a part, that is, a sensation, cannot contain the whole, that is, sensations; if the eye be only a sensation, it cannot surely contain and realise within itself all visible sensations. Now, let this sensation-recipient be shut out from the contact of anything external, and let the mind, the idealogic portion of man, strive to repaint the landscape upon which the eye has erewhile gazed, and how faint and inadequate will be the portraiture! Reflection upon the idea slightly indicated in the foregoing sentence will, we think, convince any man that there is *beyond* and *without* him objects other than himself, which possess a sensation-imparting power, and that he himself is a sensation-recipient. So far on the general question of sensationalism. Now let us apply this to the present subject of discourse. Sensation being an action of external objects upon our sensorium, it is plain that were our sensations generally unpleasurable, we should be unwilling to admit them to the mind,—we should shut them out as obtrusive and unwelcome visitors. Beauty is a quality which we perceive through the senses: this is evidenced by its continued reference to *the without*. If this perception be imparted from an outward agent, then that agent must be possessed of the quality of which it produces an impression in the arcana of the intellect. Do not let it be imagined that we are here arguing for the identity —the *self-sameness* of the qualities of objects with our sensations. We only assert that objects impinge upon our sensational organs impressions of certain qualities of which the perceptions in our minds are the signs, and these signs are the evidences to us of the *inherency* of that quality in the objects thus presented to us. For how can there be a sign without a thing which is signified thereby? If this be not so, why do we, on perceiving the round shadow which the earth throws upon the moon during an eclipse, predicate the rotundity of the globe? Do we not here infer, from the sign of the quality, the existence of the quality itself? Sensations constitute the inarticulate language in which nature converses with the soul. And as words do not present to us the qualities or objects about which speech is employed, but are a series of symbols indicative of these qualities and objects, so sensation does not produce the quality in our mind, but indicates it. If the idea of beauty, therefore, be a sensation produced by an object apart from and extrinsic to the sensorium, the above exposition of the formation of ideas in the soul will amply substantiate and prove the affirmative of this question—viz., that beauty is a quality inherent in objects.

But it may be objected that the beautiful does not display itself alike to every member of the human race; that the colour or harmony of colouring and proportion which is considered beautiful by one person, appears the reverse to others.

Is this, then, proof of the incorrectness of our argument? We trow not. Perceptive power differs in different individuals. All men are not similarly endowed. We observe this fact every day, not only in beauty, but in taste. That sapid body which yields to one pleasure, creates in another only loathing nausea. But surely no one will find warranty in this for denying the sapidity of bodies. Surely no one will be inclined to uphold that those objects only which originate in our imagination ideas of luxuriating in the pleasurable sensations of eating, are possessed of taste-gratifying and nutrition-yielding properties. Yet this is precisely what is attempted to be done with the emotion of beauty. Mr. Alison and the late lamented Lord Jeffrey assert that "there is no intrinsic or physical beauty in objects." Now our own idea is, that the perception of beauty is co-existent with sensation. We know that there are some colours and shades of colour which instinctively affect the eye in a disagreeable manner, as bright red, while others convey a gentle, soothing, agreeable sensation, as the various shades of green. We think there is a sensational beauty, a beauty which is instantly and instinctively perceived as soon as the object is placed before us. If it were not so, what pleasure would the outward world convey, ere we had associations to connect to our perceptions? Association assuredly may heighten the pleasure and augment the gratification, but how could it create a perception anterior to its own existence? The child, when it opens its eyes on the world into which it has newly been ushered, feels itself surrounded by nothing else than an assemblage of colours and forms differing in their agreeability to the organs of sight. Upon those objects which are most gratifying he gazes most intently, until, through the instrumentality of sensation, he educates his perceptions. As he progresses in years, he advances in intellectual development, until he can unsheathe, as it were, the objects around him of that abstract quality which he has so frequently observed in combination, and can, by his imagination, clothe any object, real or ideal, with the garb of beauty. Here sensational beauty is the origin, imaginative beauty the end. There can be no doubt but that this beauty-perceptive power requires cultivation for its due development, and that there are in the world blockheads enough, who, "after yawning in a sort of disconsolate terror along the banks of Loch Lomond, enlarge with much animation on the beauty and grandeur of Finsbury Square;" but if our previous analysis be correct, we shall be able easily to see the erroneousness of that opinion which asserts that, "by the recollection or conception of *other* objects which are associated in our imagination with those before us," we receive the impression of beauty, and that "this is distinctly felt only when the imagination is stimulated to conceive a connected series of such objects, in unison with that which was first suggested by the particular form, which is called beautiful only for having been the parent of that train." Here we conceive the intermediate steps are forgotten; and it is overlooked, that on our first perception of the beautiful, we could have no "connected train or series of such objects" to recal to our minds, or on which to employ our imagination. It is true that beauty is often—with a few exceptions, perhaps always—conjoined with some other emotion of utility or agreeableness; but we do not infer the beauty from the use or agreeability, but these latter from the former. We hear it remarked, almost daily, that such and such a woman is beautiful, but not agreeable, and *vice versâ.* We see children coveting the possession of beautiful objects, even though these objects are poisonous or hurtful—as, for instance, flame and berries—evidently inferring their use from their beauty. If what we have asserted, and attempted to prove, in our foregoing statement be correct, it will appear that sensations are signs; that these signs are evidence of the inherent nature of the qualities represented by them; that there is a beauty of sensation antecedent to the beauty of imagination, and consequently that "beauty is a quality inherent in objects." If these things be not so, why do the poets celebrate the loveliness of the lily, yet chant

no heaven born strain in the poppy's praise? Why do we perceive the beauty of the tiger's form and colour, and yet find no pleasurable emotions in the contemplation of a moonlight walk in his favourite haunts? Why are we fascinated with the splendour-tinted serpent's charms, and yet can entertain, even in imagination, no indefinite feeling of love, or emotion of pleasure regarding it? Why is the loud-resounding and impetuous though unnavigable river more beauteous than the sluggish canal current? Why is the unhewn marble block, fresh from the quarry blast, not as capable of creating the emotion of the beautiful as when it is sculptured into apparent life by the genius of a Praxiteles? Why do we study the picturesque? If imagination does the work, wherefore does painting create her thousand forms of beauty? Wherefore does the engraver immortalise the master-pieces of art's beauty-educing children? Wherefore the sculptured temple and carved dome, the pillared palace and chiselled stone, if it be not to impart that quality of beauty which previously existed not? And why, in the early periods of the world's history, did poetical expression—the daughter of Beauty—more abound than now, when "use and wont" have in many instances "deadened the idea of beauty in the soul?"

S. N.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY MONARCHY PREFERABLE TO AN ELECTIVE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

The political constitution of a country should never be violently and inconsiderately changed. Rash and unthinking men often fondly imagine, that by one sudden stroke of policy the whole face of a country may be altered, and a realm be conspicuously elevated to be the "envy of surrounding nations, and the glory of the world," forgetful that thought, mind, habit, have not been altered, and that unless these be so, external forms may be remodelled, and the political relations of society varied, yet no perceptible amount of national advantage or prosperity be permanently secured. Men become wedded to forms, their thoughts become accustomed to flow in particular channels, and their habits assimilate themselves to the relations which circumstances impose. Abstract these forms, divert these channels, change these circumstances, and they are unable to think or act. Their former modes of thought must be unlearned and thrown aside as useless. Their minds become chaotic and confused; disorder gains the ascendency, and the intended benefit frequently becomes a burdensome excrescence on the body-politic, through which the life-blood of the nation cannot flow. The relevancy of these remarks will be apparent to any one who calmly reflects upon the change implied in the negative of the above question. It would be tantamount to a complete revolution of the relations, habits, and modes of thought in which our population has been educated. It would be equivalent to an entire subversion of our established forms and customs. It would introduce a new "apple of discord" into society, and arm ambition with a new motive to trample upon the rights, feelings, and privileges of humanity.

In the remarks which follow, we shall be much aided by knowing exactly the point in dispute, and the relation which that point bears on the general weal. All governments, according to Montesquieu, and the majority of writers on government, of which we have any knowledge, may be divided into three primary classes, viz., Despotic, in which *one* person alone, without law or rule, directs affairs after the dictates of his

own will, or the promptings of caprice: Republican, in which the whole people, or a large proportion of them, or delegates, representative of them, possess the sovereign power: Monarchical, in which *one* alone governs, by laws fixed and established with the sanction and by the agreement of the people. The first of these we consider beyond the pale of our debate, for we consider an elective autocracy a pure and palpable absurdity. If there be an election, there must be certain stipulations made and agreed to, and these conditions form the limitations to which a monarch must succumb. Besides, it is not at all likely that an autocrat would put himself to the trouble of being elected. His elective commissariat would be the sword, the musket, and the cannon—the piercing war-cry, the floating banner, and the moving mass of hired assassins, whose unholy trade is war. "The shriek, the groan, the crash, frequent and frightful, of the bursting bomb—the ceaseless clangour, and the rush of men inebriate with rage"—would be the instruments whereby, in his ambitious aim, he would attempt to gain the golden prize. The second is evidently out of our discussional scope. The third, as we suppose, is the only form of government which, under our subject of debate, can be brought forward for our consideration.

Is, then, an hereditary monarchy preferable to an elective one? We are inclined to answer affirmatively; and, perhaps, if our readers will follow us in our remarks, they may find the reasons for our affirmation somewhat elucidated.

Different forms of government are suited to the varied disposition, culture, and circumstances of different nations. A people who, from gradations of rank or social position, are not well-knit by interest; who are animated with a wish of rising from one status to another, and have an opportunity of doing so; who are only conventionally subordinate; whose relative positions are unequal, yet continually changing; whose virtue, generally, is less powerful in its operations than self-interest; whose vanity and love of grandeur and ostentation is highly developed; whose trading and commercial intercourse is extensive, intricate, and involved—best suit the Monarchical government. In such a country, the interests of men gain a converging point in the throne; those who surround it look to it with respect and reverence, as the dispensatory of honour, preferment, and favour. Hence, they strive to gain court favour by illustrious actions, useful at once to the state and its monarch; this feeling descends through the subordinate grades, and thus the members of the community, in all its gradations, are drawn together by interest and respect for the head of the state, from whom honours and riches flow. Each one, by striving to be elevated, comes nearer the centre of advancement; this increases the conventional subordinacy, and causes the constant fluxion of position. In this, self-interest gains its gratification; ostentation and vanity gain their ends; and round this point trade and commerce revolve. Where all is unstable, this is fixed, and, however much change may operate upon the lower and subordinate ranks, the Monarchy is unchanging—the bond of union is unloosed—the centre is unmoved, although the radii be revolving. By this means the permanency of the executive functions are secured, while the executive officials and functionaries are constantly changing, and the fixity of social institutions is provided for, while society itself is in perpetual ebb and flow.

Upon these grounds, then, do we advocate the preferability of an hereditary to an elective monarchy. The stability of the executive power—the chain of self-interest binding the orders of society together—the conventional submission to order secured—the aspirative tendency duly fostered and rewarded—the freedom from periodical and perplexing excitements—the uniformity of constitutional administration, and the equilibrium of governmental powers. That such are the natural results of a well regulated and properly organised hereditary monarchy, we presume will not be denied. But, having thus placed a bulwark of defence around our own debated territory, it becomes us next, as a good

general, to take the field against the forces of the opposition, and make an incursion into the domains of the controvertists.

That an elective monarchy is disadvantageous, we think may be proven from the fact that it entails a candidateship for the vacant honour; that *that* is seldom, perhaps never, honestly conducted; that the power of appointment would necessarily reside in the nobility; that this would introduce servility and hypocrisy among them, because he who could bribe highest, or promise most fairly, would have the best poll; that it would multiply interregna, and, in part, suspend authority; that it would, in all likelihood, involve foreign and domestic broils—for neighbouring states would look upon it as a fine nest for an extra member of its unprovided brood—and as parties at home could never be unanimous, plots, counterplots, conspiracies, confiscations, strategies, and skirmishings, would be the order of the day; discontent and disaffection would prevail; trade would fail, commerce fly our shores, industry be paralysed, and honesty and integrity become the scoff and scorn of the desperadoes and bravoes whom necessity would conspire to place around the throne. But the book of experience is on all these points the best volume we can read. Never was there a country in which the love of freedom was more innate and unconquerable than in that of now unhappy Poland. Never was there a fairer field for the trial of the question at issue. There the people were represented in the Diet by popular election. There the king was elected by the suffrages of the Palatines. There strict laws opposed any dishonest or base measure. Where could a better evidence be had? where a better precedent by which our decision may be guided? Is it in the election of a monarchial race to fill the British throne—the elevation of Napoleon to wield the imperial sceptre—or the more recent choice of Louis Napoleon to occupy the Presidental chair? Assuredly no!

Let us proceed, then, to try the question on its fairest field—Poland. In the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, article Poland, paragraph 116, the following remarks occur:—"As soon as the throne is vacant, all the courts of justice, and other ordinary springs of the machine of government, remain in a state of inaction, and all the authority is transferred to the Primate, who, in quality of interest, has in some respects more power than the king himself; and yet the nation takes no umbrage at it, because he has no time to make himself formidable. He notifies the vacancy of the throne to foreign princes, which is in effect proclaiming that a crown is to be disposed of; he issues the *universalia*, or circular letter for the election, gives orders to the Starost to keep a strict guard upon the fortified places, and to the grand generals to do the same on the frontiers, towards which the army marches." And in 117, describing the election, "the corruption of the great, the fury of the people, intrigues and factions, the gold and arms of foreign powers, frequently fill the scene with violence and blood." * * * * "The nobles, who are always armed with pistols and sabres, commit violence against one another, at the time they cry out *Liberty!*" The following extract will show the *necessary criterion and qualification* of a king!! Paragraph 8, "On the death of Premislaus, several candidates appeared for the vacant throne, and the Poles determined *to prefer him who could overcome all his competitors in a horse race.* A stone pillar was erected near the capital, on which were laid all the insignia of authority, and a herald proclaimed that he who first arrived at that pillar, from a river at some distance, named Pouderic, was to enjoy them. A Polish lord, named Lechus, was resolved to secure the victory to himself by stratagem; for which purpose he caused iron spikes to be driven all over the course, reserving only a path for his own horse. The fraudulent design took effect in part, all the rest of the competitors being dismounted, and some severely hurt by their fall. Lechus, in consequence of this victory, was about to be proclaimed monarch, when, unluckily for him, a peasant, who had found out the artifice, opposed the ceremony, and upon an examination of

the fact, Lechus was torn in pieces, and the insignia and office were conferred upon the peasant." Par. 53 shows us the futility of expecting good governors by election: "On the death of Boleslaus, the states raised his brother Mieczslaus to the ducal throne, on account of the great opinion they had of him. But the moment Mieczslaus ceased to be a subject, he became a tyrant, and a slave to every kind of vice—the consequence of which was that in a short time he was deposed, and his brother Casimir elected in his stead." Disastrous consequences and a civil war ensued, and that reign and the next were filled with strife and slaughter. Par. 75, "On the death of Sigismund, Poland became a prey to intestine divisions, and a vast number of intrigues were set on foot at the courts of Vienna, France, Saxony, Sweden, and Brandenburgh, each endeavouring to establish a prince of their own nation on the throne of Poland. The consequence of all this was, that the kingdom became one universal scene of corruption, faction, and confusion: the members of the Diet consulted only their own interest, and were ready on every occasion to sell themselves to the best bidder." Par. 89, "The death of Batori involved Poland in fresh troubles. Four candidates appeared for the crown, viz., the princes Ernest and Maximilian, of the house of Austria; Sigismund, Prince of Sweden; and Theodore, Czar of Muscovy. Each of these had a separate party; but Sigismund and Maximilian managed matters so well that in 1587 both of them were elected. The consequence of this was a civil war, in which Maximilian was defeated and taken prisoner. And thus SIGISMUND III., surnamed DE VASA, became master of the throne of Poland." We shall cease the above citations. We have proved, from a page in the biography of humanity, all that we urged above as the disadvantages of Elective Monarchies. That anarchy, discontent, civil war, foreign aggressions, intrigues, bribery, and suspension of authority, were the concomitants of such governments; while order, harmony, content, prosperity, virtue, progression, and continuous executive functions, appertained to hereditary monarchies. Can any one hesitate in his verdict, Is an hereditary monarchy preferable to an elective one? We pause for a reply.

S. N.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"THE proper study of mankind is man." This is one of the most frequently quoted lines of one of the most popular among our standard poets, and it is not merely its beauty, but its truthfulness, that has commended it to the judgment of the thinking portion of the community. Man—the noblest being that treads the earth—the masterpiece of the Almighty's hand—is worthy of close attention, of deep thought, of careful study. If you view him with respect either to his physical, mental, or moral character, he presents an interesting and important subject for consideration, and not less so if you regard him in his social capacity, as a member of a family, as a citizen of a country, as a denizen of the world. Leaving that which is general, our attention is to be confined to an institution arising from man's social character; viz., Monarchy, and to the solution of the question, "Is an hereditary monarchy preferable to an elective one?"

There are few, we suppose, in the present day, who believe that there is anything *sacred or absolutely right* in hereditary monarchy as a form of government; we presume its friends will be prepared to support it merely on the ground of its supposed superiority, though there have been those who have taken another view of the question. Sir Robert Filmer maintained that kings had a Divine hereditary right to their thrones, in virtue of Adam's absolute, unlimited, and arbitrary dominion over his offspring. If this hypothesis were true, it would nullify the claims of all monarchs but one, and he the lineal descendant and heir of Adam, if he could be discovered, who on this principle is the legitimate monarch of the globe! Algernon Sidney and Locke suppose that there was an agreement on the

subject of government between the founders of a state, which involved a tacit and implied contract between all succeeding members of it. In reply to this we need only observe, that such an agreement is only *supposed*, and that if it could be proved, its obligation upon *us* would then have to be shown.

The great object of all governments, and all governors, should be the promotion of the general good, by the preservation of peace, and the protection of life and property. To do this efficiently, knowledge, wisdom, and moral worth are required; and he who is destitute of these is unfit to hold any office in the state: on this principle, we are led to the conclusion that an elective monarchy is preferable to an hereditary one. By an elective monarchy, that individual may be secured to fill the highest office in the state who, in public opinion, possesses the highest qualifications for it. If knowledge, wisdom, and goodness ought to belong to him who exercises a ruler's power, and if these be not hereditary—descending from father to son—then, on the plainest principle of logic, ought not an office to be hereditary in which these are required.

Again, in every country, whether civilized or barbarian, it is necessary for the public good that the supreme magistrate, or chief, should be supported by something more than force of arms. There ought to be a strong sympathy and feeling of respect between him and his people. If this does not exist, they will seldom work together in unison, and never with heartiness. In an elective monarchy this is secured; for he who is not respected by the people will not be elected by them. But it is not so in an hereditary monarchy; for he who sits upon the throne and wields the sceptre may be justly obnoxious in the eyes of his subjects, because utterly unfit to perform the duties of his position.

There is another great advantage in an elective over an hereditary monarchy, in that it continually reminds rulers of their dependence upon the people, and makes them anxious to promote their well-being. "The best of men are but men at the best;" and they need a vigilant eye ever to be watching them, or they may stray from the path of rectitude and uprightness. Give a man irresponsible power, and what inducement has he to do right, but "the love of virtue for its own sake?" And who would trust his own life and property to the strength of that principle in the human breast? It was well said by the present premier of Great Britain* in his younger, and perhaps his *better*, days: "All experience of human nature teaches us the fact, that men who possess a superiority over their fellow-creatures will abuse the advantages they enjoy. A man cannot even drive a one-horse chaise without looking down upon those who walk on foot; much less can a mortal be intrusted with the uncontrolled guidance of an empire, and not be guilty of insolence or oppression towards those who are styled his subjects." This reasoning, whether so intended or not, appears to us plainly to point out the advantages not merely of a limited, but of an elective monarchy.

It will be said in objection, that what we have advocated would be found to work very prejudicially in the constant excitement of the public mind which it would occasion. This objection might be made to all election; though we presume the friends who make it would not be willing to give it so extensive an application; and after all there is little to be feared in wholesome agitation. It is more alarming in appearance than in reality. "Tavern speeches, field meetings, tumultuary processions, often seem to portend the instant destruction of the order of society; but the sound and the smoke are greater than the mischief; and the people, accustomed to the noise, pursue their occupations with as much composure as a crew of a frigate manœuvre the vessel amid the roar of the wind. The evils of despotism, though less striking, occasion far more suffering; the one is like an eruption of the skin, of little importance, though visible to every eye; the other is a mortal, deep-seated disease, which attacks the noblest parts of the frame." C. A.

* Lord John Russell.

Social Economy, etc.

OUGHT CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS TO BE ABOLISHED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

If there be one subject more than another deserving the deep attention of all classes of the community, and claiming a careful and impartial discussion, it is that of capital punishments. There are many questions which may be occasionally treated in a free-and-easy manner, but this one is only to be approached with that gravity its serious importance demands. Of late years, the question as to the propriety of capital punishments has been much discussed, and the advocates for their abolition have, I believe, considerably increased in number. Nevertheless I am prepared to defend death punishments, and to show that they are necessary and just, and consistent with the Divine will. I argue their propriety on three grounds. I. Because they are commanded by God. II. Because they are in accordance with the principles of Justice. And III. Because they are necessary for the suppression of crime, and for the good of the community at large.

I. Death punishments are commanded by God. On this part of the subject much comment has been made, some asserting that there is no real command, others that it was not meant to be perpetual; and others contending that the command was abrogated by the doctrines of Christianity. But, notwithstanding all that has been urged to this effect, the passage of Scripture, upon which I found my present argument, remains changeless and decisive. "*Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed*," is, I contend, a solemn command, and one that has never been repealed. Several have attempted to show that the sentence is prophetic and not imperative, but a glance at the context, and particularly at the words which follow, proves that this position is utterly untenable. Considering the passage, then, as an unquestionable commandment, I conceive that it is binding upon *us* for several reasons. Let us just consider the peculiarity of the circumstances under which it was delivered. It was not given forth on Mount Sinai for the guidance of the children of Israel; it was not stated to any particular people; it was promulgated in the most solemn manner to Noah, the second father of mankind, and was evidently intended as a law for the future generations of men. As for the assertion that the command was repealed by the doctrines of Christ, I really cannot see anything, either in the letter or the spirit of the Christian dispensation, that can be construed into such a meaning; and, indeed, it is scarcely conceivable that we should there find a command contradicted, which was delivered under such remarkable circumstances, and which emanated directly from the Supreme Governor of the universe.

II. Capital punishments are in accordance with Justice. Now, what is Justice? Barclay says, "It is the virtue whereby we give every one his due, inflict punishment on those that deserve it, and acquit the innocent after a fair trial." While it is just, then, to reward good deeds, it is not less so to punish bad ones; and as, in the one case, the reward ought to be equivalent, to the good effected, so, in the other, the punishment, strictly speaking, must be measured by the crime.

According to this definition, to put a man to death for murder, is an instance of as true and impartial justice as our laws can render. Murder is an offence of such unapproachable magnitude, that almost all others seem trifling in comparison. To break open the sanctuary of life; to destroy the image of Divinity; to send the unprepared spirit into the presence of its Creator and Judge, constitutes a crime which, in all ages and in all countries, has been visited with the severest possible retribution. If crime is to be punished at all, as in the existing state of society it MUST be, it is

surely right that there should be some special punishment to denote the horror and detestation with which the crime of murder is regarded. Would it be proper for a murderer again to mingle freely with mankind? Would it not be a punishment, even to other criminals, were they compelled to endure the society of one whose hand is stained with the blood of his brother? Would perpetual solitary confinement purge his soul, or render him more prepared for the hour of dissolution? I cannot believe it. Death, and death only, is the expiation required. Deliberate murder is the greatest of all crimes, and death alone is the punishment which strict justice demands, and, at the same time, the highest doom that man can pronounce. As Shakspere says—

> "The weariest and most loathed worldly life,
> That age, ache, penury, and imprisonment
> Can lay on nature, is a paradise
> To what we fear of death."

But we must temper the decrees of judgment with mercy; for—

> "Earthly power doth then show likest God's,
> When mercy seasons justice."

And is not this, in our country at least, done? The accused has every means afforded him for establishing his innocence, if he be innocent; should mitigating circumstances be found in the case, he is recommended to mercy, and his sentence in all likelihood commuted; and even after the deed, in its full atrocity, has been thoroughly proved, he is allowed that time, which he did not grant to his helpless victim, for preparation and repentance. And who shall say his repentance is unacceptable? Before quitting this part of the subject, I would repel, with indignation, the heartless charge which has been sometimes made, that the punishment of death is prompted by *revenge*. The feeling of revenge exists only in him who has been immediately wronged; it is utterly incompatible with the administration of the law: it has no abiding place in a British court of justice. There *all* personal feelings must be set aside, and a decision come to upon facts and sound reasoning only. It is *not* revenge which secures punishment for guilt; it is the principle of Justice united with the Divine attribute of Mercy.

III. Death punishments are necessary for the suppression of crime. I think it is Professor Wilson who says, that "no man can plan a murder well," and, accordingly, we find that whatever schemes and precautions may be used, the deed of blood, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, is brought to light, and retribution pursues the real perpetrator. Now, why are these schemes and precautions adopted by the murderer? Undoubtedly with a view to elude detection, and to avoid the punishment which he knows must await him. When one man kills another in the heat of passion, under the influence of intoxication, ungovernable fury, or blind revenge, I admit that the consequences are entirely lost sight of, and the dread of punishment utterly unknown. But when, as is more frequently the case, the deed is deliberate and premeditated, the murderer (short-sighted wretch!) generally leaves no means untried to secure his safety. He studies and chooses his opportunity; perhaps attempts to conceal the bloody business altogether, and at any rate taxes his ingenuity for the deepest-laid schemes to screen himself from the retribution of the law; thus evidently confessing that the fear of death is before his eyes, and that, although he may sear his conscience, and stifle the still small voice within him, he dreads to think that he may have to expiate his crime on the scaffold. Seeing, then, the strong probability, which (aided as we are by electric telegraphs, active police, chemical analyses, and other means) almost amounts at the present day to *certainty*, of every great crime and its author being discovered, it may be asked by some, why, with the detection and punishment so sure to follow, we find wilful murders committed at all? To this it is answered, that the criminal has always too much confidence in his schemes of villainy and concealment. Again and again is the murderer detected and punished, and again and again is some one found who believes he can commit the crime without incurring the penalty: until retribution overtakes him

also. Now this general knowledge of inevitable retribution has unquestionably a good effect. We are told that "the heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked." And who knows what amount of vice might be unfolded, were the punishment which attends its manifestation removed? I can conceive a wretch dead to feeling, lost to the sense of virtue, regardless of all religion, and whose only vulnerable part is his desire for self-preservation. There is one, we shall say, towards whom, from some cause or another, he entertains the deepest enmity, and whom he would like to remove from his path. I can conceive, I say, of such a man, and of a number of such in society, murderers in thought, and whom nothing but the dread of a shameful death prevents from becoming murderers in reality. I consider, then, that the punishment of death thus acts as a deterring influence in respect to the crime of murder, and am seriously apprehensive that were the restraining power withdrawn, the amount of crime would certainly increase.

It is to be understood, however, that it is the crime of murder *only* to which I would have the punishment of death affixed. Even for what is styled high treason, unless the effects were really detrimental, I think there should be some milder penalty. I shudder when I think of the thousands of lives which were sacrificed in past years, and more particularly during the long and somewhat sanguinary reign of George III. I speak not of those so-called heroes who fell on the field of battle (and what a fearful list that is!), but of those that died on the scaffold, victims of what was designated "the offended majesty of the law." For simple theft; for breaking into a house; for speaking of the misdeeds of government; for poisoning a horse; for returning from transportation;* for fifty other offences, many of which would not be considered crimes in the present day, what numbers of lives were brought to a premature close? Surely that state of society could not be denominated CIVILISED which tolerated such customs as these.

It will be observed that I have not spoken of what is called the great *moral example* of public executions. Were there not more solid grounds for the continuance of capital punishments than this, I would denounce the gallows as an engine of evil, and rejoice to see such a relic of a former state of barbarism rooted out from the land. These public exhibitions are altogether bad; they harden the criminal, they harden the spectators, and they cast a sort of pollution over the whole community. This brings us to the subject of public and private executions, and I do not affect in any way my previous arguments when I say, that I consider the latter to be in nearly all respects preferable. The culprit, uninfluenced by the desire to sustain that false courage generally witnessed, could direct his thoughts more completely to his own spiritual condition; the public would be deprived of a spectacle which experience has fully shown to be most pernicious, and the demands of justice would be equally answered.

Such are my views of capital punishments. There are some subjects which must be considered only by the light of reason and sound judgment, and with which feelings and emotions are not to interfere. This is one of them. To every sensitive heart there is surely something peculiarly revolting in the display of deliberate judicial bloodshed, in calmly going to work to deprive a fellow-creature of existence. The thing is painful in the highest degree, but let us seriously reflect whether it be not a painful *necessity*, alike required by the will of the Almighty, the principles of justice, and the well-being of society at large.

C. C. M.

* These are veritable cases, and are to be found in the blood-stained pages of the "Newgate Calendar."

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE question which we are now called upon to discuss is one that is receiving considerable public attention, and one on which much has recently been said and written. The bold spirit of the age raises itself erect, and is no longer satisfied

with "things as they are," unless they coincide with its opinion of "things as they ought to be." Every institution is fearlessly examined, and every dogma is freely discussed, regardless of the authority which it can adduce on its side, or the antiquity which it can boast as its origin. Opinions "new and strange" are zealously promulgated and extensively received; but we need be careful lest we reject the old only because it is old, and adopt the new merely because it is new; for this, we fear, is done by many of our contemporaries and friends. Let all things stand or fall by their own merits, and nothing else. We would apply this principle to capital punishments;—not denouncing them because it is fashionable to do so, much less advocating them, because around them the ivy of antiquity entwines its awe-inspiring tendrils.

At the onset of this debate, it will be well to inquire what is the object of all judicial punishment. Although there has been much diversity of opinion on this point, we think all will admit that punishment should be either reformatory or preventative. We presume that none will advocate vindictive punishment, for revenge can be no more lawfully cherished by a society than by an individual. That capital punishments are not reformatory, is plain, for they place the criminal where reformation is impossible; that they are preventative, is what their supporters maintain; but this we are prepared to deny. We shall endeavour to substantiate the position we have thus taken by an appeal to facts as well as arguments.

In the first place, we will call in the testimony of ancient time. Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus inform us, that in Egypt, under Sabaco, for a period of fifty years no capital punishments were inflicted, these penalties being changed with much success into stated kinds of labour. Grotius recommends this example unto all other nations:—"Throughout all the better age of the Roman Republic, for a period of two centuries and a half, the infliction of death upon a Roman citizen, for any cause whatever, was expressly forbidden by the famous Porcian law, a Democratic enactment passed in the four hundred and fifty-fourth year of Rome by the Tribune Porcius Lecca. So high was the value set upon the life of a citizen by the Roman policy, that to put him to death was esteemed almost a parricide." Blackstone says:—"In this period the Roman Republic flourished: under the emperors, severe punishments were revived, and then the empire fell." Amongst the ancient writers who advocated the total abolition of death punishments, are some of great eminence; as Juvenal, Horace, Livy, Caius Cæsar, Cyrus, Scipio, Tacitus, and many others. Seneca, speaking of the infliction of death for murder, tells us that "the worst kind of murder began with the laws thus made against it;" and Cicero exclaims—"Away with the executioner, with the capital execution, with the very name of things like these!"

If we descend to more recent times, and to our own country, we find that in the time of Alfred the Great capital punishments were more rare than they have been since, and that the land was then so free from crime, that traditionally it is said, "that a child might walk with a bag of money in its hand through any part of the kingdom, without fear of being molested." Let this be contrasted with the state of things under Henry VIII., when punishment with death was annexed to almost every kind of crime. "In the reign of this infamous monarch, seventy-two thousand thieves fell by the hand of the executioner; two thousand per annum—forty in every week! and we have overwhelming contemporaneous evidence of the fact, that crime advanced, in spite of these inflictions, in the most frightfully rapid manner. This statement quite harmonises with the experience of later times, which testifies that those crimes, for which capital punishment has been abolished, have not increased with the population in the same ratio as those have for which it has been retained. Nor is this surprising when we consider the philosophy of the subject. What is there preventative in death punishments, except to the individuals who suffer it? As an example to others, they have utterly failed. Witness the horrid levity displayed by the spectators

both before and after an execution. The graphic pen of Dickens has described one of these recent demoralizing scenes, and the effect of that description is still fresh upon the public mind. It appears that the most depraved classes of the community flock together on such occasions, and instead of being awed by the sight, they display their moral indifference in a thousand forms, and even commit crime in sight of the gallows! Life is a sacred treasure given to man by God, and he who deprives his fellow of it commits an offence of the highest magnitude in the eyes of both Heaven and earth. Our security lies mainly in the sanctity with which life is regarded. "But the deliberate destruction of human life by man never can produce, in the public mind, an impression of the sanctity of human life, nor of the solemn interest involved in its destruction, even though it be with the sanction of the Government, and under the pretence of punishing and preventing murder: for the mass of the unthinking do not discrimnate between the act of the Legislature and the act of an individual. It is my solemn and deliberate conviction, that it has the very opposite effect. It says plainly that life may be destroyed by man. It is an act of killing to show that man ought not to kill." It is as baneful in effect as it is bad in philosophy.

But the advocates of capital punishments, when driven from other ground, fall back upon the theological argument, and say this kind of punishment was commanded by God in the words, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." This is the only passage they can plead as a foundation for the practice in the present day. The infliction of death was attached to many offences under Judaism, but that dispensation has long passed away, and has been succeeded by one whose pervading spirit is benevolent and mild. The occasion on which the words in question were spoken to Noah should be borne in mind. It was after the waters of the deluge had assuaged, and Noah had left the ark, when God gave him permission to eat the flesh of animals, that this sentence was uttered. It seems designed as a prohibition against man taking the life and eating the flesh of his fellow-man; and many eminent critics regard it as predicting the evil that would follow from such a course, rather than enjoining it. There seems good reason for understanding these words as we do those of our Lord when he said, "They that use the sword shall perish by the sword." But if this language be understood as a command, it should be remembered that it was never repeated by Christ —that it is opposed to the spirit of all his teaching, and to his example on the cross, where he prayed for his own murderers. Surely those who seek to justify death punishment on religious grounds "know not what manner of spirit they are of."

L. S.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. I.

The Art of Speaking with beauty and effect is an acquirement gained but by few even of our itinerant Lecturers, our legal professors, or our Senate Orators. It is a matter of great surprise that Oratory is not more studied, as a correct knowledge of its rules, in a practical point of view, is of the highest importance in our day of Educational questions, philosophical disquisitions, and debating associations; in short, it is not only invaluable, but indispensably necessary to every one who wishes to become eminent either in the pulpit, on the platform, at the bar, or in the senate. While Greece and Rome were free, it was almost the only passport to distinction and power.

That the manner or address of the Speaker is of the utmost importance, seems unquestionable, from the deficiencies so commonly observed in the address of our public speakers, much more than in the *matter* uttered by them, and from the little effect they produce.

Of the learning necessary for furnishing *matter*, and of the Art of arranging it properly; of correct *ideas* of the subject on which the speaker is employed; of *invention;* of *syntactical* grammar, which teaches the arrangement, dependence, and construction of words in a sentence according to rule; of *composition*, or the art of putting together *words to express ideas* in such a manner as to be clearly apprehensive to the understanding of others; of *Style;* of *Rhetoric*, which directs us to affect the passions, by suitable illustration and imagery, and to arrange the arguments to the best advantage, so as to make the greatest impressions on the feelings and judgment of the person addressed,—of these we shall not here treat. We intend to furnish essays on the management of the passions—to illustrate them by appropriate examples, for the exercise of young speakers, and more particularly on the first, second, and third part of Oratory—namely, on *Gesture*, *Looks*, and *command of Voice.*

It is sometimes, though falsely, argued that the generality of even respectable persons, or the politely educated, need not trouble themselves in acquiring a cultivated manner of expressing their ideas and sentiments. But we think that the man ought to blush who asserts that there is "no need of acquiring the Art of Speaking." Indeed, if thousands of our tolerably educated individuals are never intended for the bar, nor to appear in the pulpit, does it follow that they need bestow no pains in learning to speak properly their *native language?*

Address in speaking, even in private life, is not only highly ornamental, but very useful. Suppose a young man be not intended for the platform, will he never have occasion to read, in the company of his friends? Should the reader be ever so sincere and zealous for the love of virtue and of his country, without a competent skill in giving clothing or expression to his ideas, he can only sit down and see them wronged, or anathematized, without having it in his power to prevent or redress the evil. Let an artful and eloquent statesman harangue the House of Commons upon a point of the utmost consequence to the present or future public good: he has it in his power to mislead the judgment of the majority of its members, if they be unable to discriminate between true and false reasoning, and have no power of eloquence to undeceive. He who sees through the delusion, and is awkward in delivering his ideas, or clothing them with appropriate language, can do nothing to prevent the ruinous schemes proposed by the other from being carried into execution, but by giving his single vote against them, without being able to explain to the House his reasons for so doing. The case is similar in assemblies of a smaller scale—as town councils, committee meetings, trade associations, discussion classes, and other meetings, in which volubility of tongue, readiness of apprehension, and steadiness of countenance, often carry against profound and correct reasons, and important considerations.

True, what is to be gained, in a pecuniary point of view, by skill in the Art of Speak-

ing, may not be a sufficient inducement or reward to repay the indefatigable diligence exercised by a Demosthenes, a Pericles, an Eschines, a Demetrius Phalerens, an Isocrates, a Carbo, a Cicero, a Marc Anthony, an Hortentius, a Julius, an Augustus, a Peel, or a Cobden. Notwithstanding this, it is advantageous to *all* young men, for whose benefit these papers are specially prepared—those whose station places them within the pale of a polite education—to be sufficiently qualified to acquit themselves with effect, when called to speak in public. In short, a competent address and facility, not only in finding matter, but also in effectually expressing it, is what, we doubt not, many a gentleman would willingly acquire, at the expense of half his other accomplishments.

Why are many lectures so thinly attended? Why do ministers complain of the remissness and inattention of their congregation? Why so little effect on the moral mind of the public from preaching, praying, and lecturing? Why, it is sometimes asked, are theatres, and other places of fiction, crowded, while places of worship are sometimes left nearly empty? Because the fault is in the speakers or preachers. Their delivery is mostly between a *singing* and a *saying*. Their oratory is defective, often offensive; their thoughts are delivered with such coolness and indifference as to leave the audience nothing to do but fall asleep. Let speakers exert themselves properly, and they may defy their hearers to fall asleep, or for a moment to withdraw their attention. Indifference and infidelity may well prevail. It is not possible to persuade the careless to leave their follies and vices, by lolling twenty minutes upon a velvet cushion, and reading to them a learned discourse. Did speakers labour, with unremitted zeal, to acquire a masterly, or even a respectable, mode of delivery, places of public instruction would be crowded, as places of public diversions are.

The reader may say, that all who have received a good education are not able to become Orators. Granted. Some, nay, many, have natural defects in their speech. We should not advise such to be brought up to professions requiring elocution. Notwithstanding this, we have instances of natural defects being surmounted, and the unfortunate men becoming eminent speakers. For instance, Demosthenes could not, when he commenced studying rhetoric, pronounce the first letter of his art. And Cicero was long-necked, and narrow-chested. But diligence and consecutive labour surmounted all natural difficulties, and they became immortal Orators. We are frequently disgusted by public speakers lisping and stammering; speaking through the nasal organs, and pronouncing the letter R as a guttural or throat-sound, instead of the tongue, the letter S like TH—some screaming above, or croaking below, all natural pitch of the human voice; some mumbling, as if they were conjuring up spirits; others bawling as loud as the vociferous vendors of provisions in London streets; some tumbling out their words so precipitately, that no ear can catch them; others dragging them out so slowly, that it is as tedious to listen to them as to count a great clock; some have a habit of shrugging up their shoulders; others of see-sawing with their bodies, some backward and forward, others from side to side; some open their eyes frightfully; others keep their teeth so close together, as if their jaws were set;

some raise their eyebrows at every third word; some shrivel all their features together into the middle of their faces; some push out their lips as if they were merry-andrews for the audience; others hem at every pause, and others smack with their lips, and roll their tongues in their mouths, as if they laboured under a continual thirst. Of all these bad habits they ought to have been broken in early youth, or placed in those spheres of life in which they would have offended, at least, fewer persons. All these disagreeable habits we hope to correct in our readers who observe the rules that will appear in these articles on Speaking.

A correct speaker is not seen to make any movement of limb or feature, without a sufficient reason. If he speaks to his fellow-creatures, in common company or in larger and congregated audiences, he does not do it without looking round upon them. If he addresses heaven, he looks upwards. The spirit of what he says appears in his looks. If he expresses amazement, or would excite it effectually in others, he lifts up his hands and eyes. If he invites to virtue and happiness, he spreads his arms, and looks benevolence. If he threatens the vengeance of an angry Deity against vice, he bends his eyebrows into wrath, and menaces with his arm. He does not needlessly saw the air with his arm, nor stab himself with his finger. He does not place his right hand upon his breast, unless he has occasion to speak of himself, or to introduce conscience, or something sentimental. He does not start back, unless he wants to express horror or aversion. He does not step forward, but when he expresses solicitation. He does not raise his voice, but to express something peculiarly emphatic. He does not lower his voice, but to contrast the raising of it, which gives more effect to matters of great importance. His *eyes*, by turns, according to the humour of matter he wishes to express, *sparkle* fury; *brighten* into joy; *glance* disdain; *melt* into grief; *frown* disgust and hatred; *languish* into love; or *glare* distraction. Each of these movements and passions will be more fully directed and illustrated.

We presume that enough has been said in these cursory remarks, by way of introduction, to induce our readers to settle in their minds the utility of a series of papers that shall not only instruct the young speaker, but also reform the more experienced, but yet incompetent orator.

People's Instruction Society, Birmingham.—The Annual Meeting of this Institution was recently held in the School rooms, New-Meeting-street, M. D. Hill, Esq., Q.C., Recorder of Birmingham, in the chair. After the usual business had been transacted, the learned gentleman, in acknowledging a vote of thanks, spoke as follows:—"He quite agreed with a previous speaker in the opinion, that however valuable lectures might be, yet, that a collection of books which gave to each individual the opportunity of following those studies which his inclination enabled him to master, was of greater benefit. He was not so much afraid of the spread of superficial knowledge as some were. All that could be done was to give an opportunity for obtaining knowledge, and though, as compared with profound knowledge, superficial knowledge was not to be desired, yet, as compared with profound ignorance, it decidedly was. They could only put into a man's hands the key of knowledge, and let him use his own diligence in unlocking the casket, and profiting by its contents. They could not subject those persons for whom these institutions were intended, to the discipline of colleges; and when they read the histories of self-taught men, they would find an advantage possessed by self-acquired knowledge over that which, so to

speak, was poured into the individual. That which he himself gained was much more profitable to him than a much greater amount gained in any other manner. Much had been done in this way by accident. The celebrated mathematician Maclaurin was attracted to the study of mathematics by finding a book on the subject on his father's shelves; and Professor Lee, of Cambridge, commenced the study of Hebrew while a journeyman bricklayer, having met with, and being interested in, a Hebrew bible he found whilst engaged in the repairs of a synagogue. And though these accidents could not give the desire, and still less the ability, yet they determined the course of action, and this might be determined by reading a book in their library, which ought to be well supplied, lest some might reject it—not because it did not contain much excellent food, but because it did not contain the books to suit their taste." After glancing at the position and working of the institution, Mr. Hill remarked, that "it was a noxious error for institutions which were self-supporting, to dictate to those who studied in them the way in which they should study. There was no making a man happy in our way; he must be made happy in his own. This was the way in all human learning, and especially when we had not the usual control over the pupil as in the higher classes was possessed by the parents or teachers. They could not train men as in a college, but must invite them to the acquisition of knowledge. He would exhort them to do their best to put knowledge within the reach of all. If our country was to be preserved from the scenes of bloodshed which had spread over other countries during our own time—he had almost said during the last few months—it must be by the spread of knowledge; and it must be learned, that one class could not be happy without another, but that all classes must suffer alike; and they were best labouring for the welfare of our social institutions by supporting institutions like the one they were met to support. . . . He felt very much obliged to them for their kind reception of him, and much more obliged for the kind manner in which they had received the names of two relatives—the one a venerable man, now verging on his eighty-seventh year, and who had preserved through life a character which made it grateful to his posterity in hearing his name mentioned, and made them proud of being descended from him. The other name was that of one not more closely allied to him in blood than in friendship, that of his brother, Mr. Rowland Hill. He believed that the benefits of penny postage were as yet but little known, compared to what they would be in after time. They were not alien to the present meeting, because they bore upon the great question of knowledge. He could imagine that nothing would more extend education than the enabling of cheap communication between persons of the same family—between those who needed knowledge, and those who had it to communicate. Reference had been made to sacrifices made by him in attending the present meeting: but he felt bound to make sacrifices in this matter, for what was the object of an enlightened Government in establishing ministers of justice but to prevent crime? But the prevention of crime by punishment was not to be compared to the prevention of crime without punishment—by education. By this he meant not the learning of school lessons, or particular questions, but all that tended to make men wise and good, and tended to keep them from the bar of justice; and those who were engaged in imparting that education were rendering him great assistance, by keeping from his court those who never should come there. He, therefore, felt it his duty to make sacrifices in such an object as this, and especially when he saw that there was nothing sectarian about it—for being by his office invested with authority over the whole town, he was compelled to look upon all things with an equal eye; but he was glad to find, that in the institution which held its meetings in that room, there had never been anything sectarian; but it had among its members men of all creeds, who could unite in the education of the people, and were free from that worst of all jealousies—but which was, he hoped, becoming extinct—the jealousy of giving the people knowledge. The distribution of wealth was naturally excepted, because it was limited; but of knowledge they could not say this, for the man who imparted knowledge actually gained and perfected knowledge while he was imparting it. The fear that men should grow wiser was a vain fear in all who desired the public good. It might in one sense be reasonable in those who only desired the good of their own class; but these desires could not be enjoyed without harm to others, and without injury to the public." Having again thanked the audience for their kind reception, the learned gentleman concluded an eloquent address by expressing a warm interest in the welfare of the society, and a hope that he should again meet its members on a future anniversary.

AN ORATOR AT A DEBATING CLUB.—"'When I was at the Temple,' says Curran, 'a few of us formed a little debating club. Upon the first night of the meeting, I attended, my foolish heart throbbing with the anticipated honour of being styled 'the learned member who opened the debate,' or 'the very eloquent gentleman who has just sat down.' I stood up, trembling through every fibre; but, remembering that in this I was but imitating Tully, I took courage, and had actually proceeded almost as far as 'Mr. Chairman,' when, to my astonishment and terror, I perceived that every eye was turned upon me. I became dismayed and dumb. My friends cried, 'Hear him!' but there was nothing to hear; my lips, indeed, went through the pantomime of articulation, but I was like the unfortunate fiddler at the fair, who, upon coming to strike up the solo that was to ravish every ear, discovered that an enemy had maliciously soaped his bow! So you see, sir, it was not 'born with me.'"

LEDBURY CONTROVERSIAL SOCIETY.—A GOOD EXAMPLE.—The Honorary Secretary of the Ledbury Controversial Society has great pleasure in submitting to the Editors of "The Controversialist" the following copy of a resolution passed at one of its recent meetings:—"That the Secretary be requested to communicate to the projectors of 'The Controversialist' this Society's cordial approval of their design."

TRUTH.—In every investigation be actuated by a love of truth; to truth swear an allegiance, and deem it too sacred to be broken; confess her where she is present, and seek for her where she has not yet been found; neglect her, and the results of your industry will be nothing worth; deformed either by some despicable prejudice or

unworthy motive, they will disgrace their parent. Truth is the exposer of everything that is vile, the beautifier and companion of all that is excellent: in triumph she is not elated, and in adversity she is not depressed; she has more firmness than anything, for she has most reason to be firm—more hope than anything, for she deserves the most. Without her, there can be no real religion, no pure morality, no certain science.

The Inquirer.

[We intend to appropriate a portion of each Number to the consideration of questions not deemed of sufficient importance to be entered as distinct subjects of discussion. Here the youth, struggling with doubts and difficulties, will find an opportunity of inquiring what solution can best be offered, and what books will most assist him, in his search for truth. We shall ever feel pleasure in recording the inquiries of earnest minds, and in soliciting replies on their behalf from our more intelligent readers.]

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

1. Jephthah's Daughter.—How can the murder of Jephthah's daughter be reconciled with the mercy and justice of God?—P. R.

2. If the indestructibility of matter could be proved, would it be fatal to the Christian religion? —J. M. S.

3. What is the best course to pursue in order to obtain ease and elegance in public speaking? —A. C. C.

4. Could any of your readers draw out a course of reading suitable to a young man who has had but few opportunities of improvement, but who is very anxious to obtain acquaintance with the standard literature of his country? If the persons who recommend books would have the kindness to state the price of the cheapest editions, they would confer an additional favour on—A Young Man.

5. What are the best books to read in order to obtain a general acquaintance with the currency question?—N. P.

6. What is the best course to pursue to obtain a correct pronunciation of those French words and phrases that are frequently used by English authors?—L. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

1. *Jephthah's Daughter.*—It is the opinion of many commentators, that Jephthah's daughter was not put to death, because human sacrifices were alien to the spirit of the Judaic ritual, but that she was condemned by her father to perpetual virginity; thus virtually sacrificing her and his own race. Hence she is said to "bewail her virginity;' and it is said of her, "she knew no man." The word in the 40th verse of the 11th chapter of Judges, translated in our version "lament," ought, according to these critics, to be translated "talked with." We have no direct intimation of her death. On the supposition of her being sacrificed (murdered we think rather a harsh term), it may be reconciled thus: "God's mercy and justice" is generally calculated to promote the "greatest good" of his creatures; that the circumstance is calculated to show the folly of rash vows; that the fulfilment of our earnest wishes does not always bring happiness; that God is not gratified by the "promise of a recompence" for the exertion of his goodness. The whole forms a striking protest against idolatry, as existing in the nations around. I may mention, that it is generally believed that this incident, varied by the genius loci, is the origin of the tradition of Iphigenia.—S. N.

The murder of Jephthah's daughter is very properly denied by many Bible critics; and, I think, that if the eleventh chapter of Judges be read with care, it will be seen that there is nothing there to substantiate the common opinion. Jephthah was not at liberty to kill his child; and if he had done it, he could not have offered her as a sacrifice, because he was not a priest, but a soldier, and no priest of the tribe of Aaron dare offer up a human victim in sacrifice to God. The vow which Jephthah made was, that if he returned from the battle in peace, the first thing that met him "should surely be the Lord's," or (as it is rendered in the margin) "he would offer up a burnt-offering." In the original there is no word for "it."

Jephthah returned triumphant, and his own daughter was the first to meet him; and it is recorded, "her father did with her according to his vow," "and she knew no man." She was devoted to the service of God in a state of perpetual virginity.

But if it could be proved that Jephthah caused his daughter to be put to death, how this would affect the mercy and justice of God, I am at a loss to conceive. It would only show that Jephthah made a rash and foolish vow, and was weak enough to carry it out in professed service of Him who had said, "Thou shalt not kill."—A. C.

2. *Indestructibility of Matter.*—No. For Christianity is a soul educator, and however the question be settled, the difference between the soul-entity and the corporeal-entity would still exist, and equal need be felt for the guidance of its precepts, and the incitements of its hopes. Everything around us is framed according to some purpose, and for some definite end. Why should the hopes and aspirations of the soul be the only exceptions to this rule?—S. N.

3. *Public Speaking.*—The first thing necessary is to obtain clear and well-arranged thoughts on the subject under consideration, then to clothe those thoughts with proper language, and afterwards to be prepared to give utterance to them in a suitable manner. I presume it is on this last point that A. C. C. particularly seeks advice. The great difficulty that young speakers labour under is want of confidence, and this can only be removed by practice. Exercise in speaking aloud in some "secluded spot" will help them, or taking part in the proceedings of a society will greatly assist: but confidence in public will only be secured by practice in public. Endeavour to

overcome the fear of numbers: remember that the wisdom of a meeting is not concentrated, but distributed among individuals like yourself. In your manner of speaking, aim at simplicity; speak in public as you do in private. Blair says:—"If one has naturally any gross defects in his voice or gestures, he begins at the wrong end if he attempts at reforming them only when he speaks in public. He should begin by rectifying them in his private manner of speaking, and then carry to the public the right habit he has formed. For when a speaker is engaged in public discourse, he should not be then employing his attention about his manner, or thinking of his tones and his gestures. If he be so employed, study and affectation will appear. He ought to be then quite in earnest, wholly occupied with his subjects and his sentiments, leaving nature, and previously formed habits, to prompt and suggest his manner of delivery."—A. C.

Gain a perfect mastery of your subjects by diligent study; read the standard authors for style; digest your remarks in order; accustom yourself by speaking alone in your "private apartments," to the sound of your own voice; avoid intense anxiety for display; attend a good debating society; study the papers on "The Art of Speaking" in THE CONTROVERSIALIST; and by this means you will acquire ready wit, confidence, ability, style, and matter, all of which are essential to "ease and elegance."

4. *A Course of Reading.*—History.—Tytler's General History, 7s. 6d., or White's General History, 8s.

Biography.—Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties, 3s.; Biographical Sketches of the Poets, 1s. 8d.

Fiction.—Brambletye House (Colb.), 6s. 6d.; St. Leon, by Godwin, 5s.; Cooper's Novels, 1s. per vol.; Bulwer's do., 1s. 6d. per vol.; Corinne, by de Stael, 5s.; Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life, Prof. Wilson, 2s. 6d.; Mansie Waugh, by Dr. Moir, 2s. 6d.; Scott's Novels, especially Waverley, Guy Mannering, Rob Roy, Antiquary, Heart of Mid Lothian, Bride of Lammermoor, Legend of Montrose, Kenilworth, Pirate, about 3s. each; Vicar of Wakefield, 6d.; Cottagers of Glenburnie, 8d.; Hall's Stories of the Irish Peasantry, 1s. 9d.

Poetry.—Burns, 2s.; Fergusson, 8d.; Grahame, 5d.; Crabbe, 6d.; Campbell's Poetical Works, 2s. 6d.; Milton's Poems, 1s.; Shelley, 15s.; Spenser, 10s.; Byron, 12s. 6d.; Shakspere, 1s., parts; Thomson's Seasons and Castle of Indolence, 1s.; Wordsworth, 6 vols., 3s. each; Keats's Poetical Works, 2s.

Physiology.—Combe's Constitution of Man, 1s. 6d.; Dr. Andrew Combe's Physiology, 2s. 6d.; Southwood Smith's Philosophy of Health, 4s.

Politics.—Wade's Working Classes, 3s. 6d.; Guizot's Civilization, 2s.; Political Economy, 2s.; Sanitary Economy, 2s.

Science.—Readings in Science (Parker), 5s.; Nichols' Architecture of the Heavens, 10s. 6d.; Paley's Natural Theology, 1s. 2d.

General Literature.—Chambers' Cyclopædia of English Literature, 14s.; Craik's Sketches of Learning and Literature in England, 6s.; Seymour's Poets and Poetry of Britain, 6s.; Chambers' Information for the People 16s.; Addison's Essays, 2s. 8d.

Periodicals.—Hogg's British Instructor; Controversialist; Scottish Christian Journal.

Religion.—THE BIBLE.

NOTICES OF BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, &c.

Essays on History, Philosophy, and Theology. By Robert Vaughan, D.D. 2 vols. London: Jackson and Walford.

Dr. Vaughan is no novice in literature. He has given to the world several valuable works that bear his name. History was his first theme, and years ago he laboured at this subject under the auspices of "The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge." His principal attention has of late been given to the "British Quarterly Review," which he established and still edits. The essays now before us are selected from his contributions to this work, and have done much to raise it to that position which it now occupies. Dr. Vaughan is here seen as the scholar, the philosopher, and the divine; and whatever may be thought of his sentiments, all will acknowledge his literary power and admire his catholic spirit. These Essays display great depth and fulness of thought, and are written in a vigorous and accomplished style.

Favourite Song Birds; being a Popular Description of the Feathered Songsters of Britain. London: W. S. Orr.

"The Feathered Songsters" are universal favourites, for they are nature's loveliest choristers, and their notes are as sweet as if stolen from angels' lyres. To listen to them with advantage we must not go near the "caged prisoners" of the town, but rather to some spot where we can hear the wild-wood songs of the free. It is where nature holds an undisputed sway, and when from some leafy orchestra the warbling minstrels seem to pour forth their very being in "melody and song," that they possess such a magic charm, and exert that indescribable influence over us which stirs the deep feelings of our hearts. No wonder that poets have delighted to revel in such scenes as these, for they are congenial with their tastes and suggestive to their minds. Hence some of the sweetest pieces of poetry in this and every other language have had for their theme objects or scenes of natural loveliness; and hence the abundance of the materials for such a work as that now before us. We have here not only an account of the haunts, habits, and characteristic traits of British birds, but a compilation of choice passages from the poets in which reference is made to them, and indeed we have thought that in some instances the prose has been made merely to suit the poetry. But it is not always so, for the work contains much interesting information, as well as numerous poetic quotations. Each monthly number contains a coloured illustration, and the whole twelve will form a very elegant and attractive volume.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. II.

PERCEPTIVITY.

> "So build we up the being that we are—
> Thus deeply drinking in the soul of things
> We shall be wise." WORDSWORTH.

WHEN we look around us on the world in which we dwell, we find ourselves encompassed and surrounded by a multiplicity of objects possessed of the power of originating impressions in our minds, through the instrumentality of our organs of sense. When we introvert our thoughts, examine the ideas which are formed in our souls, and flit continually through their chambers, and observe how the mental powers operate upon them, we become capable of discerning the several states into which the mind successively enters. By these two investigative processes—the former of which is called Sensation, the latter Reflection—we gain the *matériel* from which the Understanding eliminates Truth; by these we acquire a knowledge of those objective, *i.e.*, external, and those subjective, *i.e.*, internal impressions, which the sensorial powers had communicated to, or originated in, the thinking principle. This capacity of mind is what we call Perceptivity, and the method in which it performs its functions is twofold—corporeal and mental. We do not, however, intend to restrict our consideration to what a mere literal interpretation of the term might imply, but to view, in conjunction, its corporeal operations and their mental results. To accomplish this properly, we shall classify our remarks into the following departments—viz., Sensation, Perception, Ideas, and Names—each of which we purpose, in the briefest possible manner, to bring under your notice.

SENSATION signifies that series of corporeal impressions or influences which external objects and internal feelings produce on Man, and by which all our knowledge of Phenomena, *i. e.*, the outward appearances of things, is conveyed to the mental percipiency. Before any representation of phenomena can be imparted, there are certain *media* through which it must pass, in order that it may be rendered cognoscible by the Intellect. The object in which the phenomena inhere must either be in contact with the sensational organ, or with some intervening agent by which the sensative power may be informed—*e. g.*, the pulsations of air, the rays of light, &c.—then follows the excitation of the organism under the appropriate stimuli. This excitement must run the course of the nervous circuit, till it reaches the sensorial centre—the Brain—and, lastly, the brain must, in some unknown and mysterious way, "report progress to the upper house"—the Mind. Properly speaking, the greater part of the above steps belong rather to the Physiology of Man, than to the Philosophy of Mind. But all knowledge is interwoven; and it were vain to attempt the explanation of our subject, by exhibiting the mind, like an immense picture-gallery, ready furnished, without striving to show, at least, part of the process by which this mental *Daguerreotypy* is effected. We shall therefore proceed, succinctly, to consider the *modus operandi* of the senses.

The Senses are the avenues to the soul, and the routes by which Knowledge arrives at the Mind. All our ideas of external things are derived through our sensational organs: of these, that of sight is by far the noblest and most useful, as it conveys to the sensorium the greatest amount, variety, and diversity of impressions; it pictures there the world, with all its beauties and sublimities, the varied aspects of humanity and the operations of the laws of the natural world, whilst, since the introduction of the art of printing, it almost supersedes the ear as the receiver of communicated knowledge. Now, we think it is self-evident that, if we possess sensations at all, they must be originated by substances possessing a sensation producing power, and although we readily grant that *noumena* or the *essence of things* is inappreciable by our faculties, yet we cannot well conceive of qualities being developed from that in which they are not resident. Be the essence of external objects, however, settled as it may, we cannot for a moment doubt that we are surrounded on all sides by myriads of objects which are not ourselves, but which, by impinging their effects upon our perceptive organs, convey impressions to our minds and realize in them ideas—the germs of thought and action. For if it be maintained that mankind are idealogists, and dwell only in a theatre of shadowy and unreal phantasies, self-begotten in the intellect, and upbuilt only with the unsubstantial architecture of the imagination, it will be evident that a part, that is, a sensation, cannot contain the whole, that is, sensations; if the eye be only a sensation, it cannot surely contain and realize within itself all visible sensations. Now let this sensation-recipient be shut out from the contact of anything external, and let the mind, the idealogic portion of man, strive to re-paint the landscape upon which the eye has erewhile gazed, and how faint and inadequate will be the portraiture! Reflection upon the idea slightly indicated in the foregoing sentence will, we think, convince any man that there are *beyond* and *without* him objects other than himself, which possess a sensation-imparting power, and that he himself is a sensation-recipient. If these perceptions be imparted by an outward agent, then that agent must be possessed of the quality of which, in the arcana of the intellect, it produces an impression. Do not let it be imagined that we are here arguing for the identity—the *self-sameness* of the qualities of objects with our sensations. We only assert that objects impinge upon our sensational organs impressions of certain qualities of which the perceptions in our minds are the signs, and these signs are the evidences to us of the *inherency* of that quality in the objects thus presented to us. For how can there be a sign without a thing which is signified thereby? If this be not so, why do we, on perceiving the round shadow which the earth throws upon the moon during an eclipse, predicate the rotundity of the globe? Do we not here infer, from the sign of the quality, the existence of the quality itself? Sensations constitute the inarticulate language in which nature converses with the soul. And as words do not present to us the qualities or objects about which speech is employed, but are a series of symbols indicative of these qualities and objects, so sensation does not produce the quality in our mind, but indicates its existence.

Sensation is of two kinds—special and common. Common Sensation is that ordinary Nervile power which is distributed through all the parts of the human

framework, charged with the general conservation of the body. By this power we gain the ideas of heat and cold—pleasure and pain—hunger and satiety—exhaustion and lassitude—and perhaps, motion and rest—and other similar general impressions. This power of ordinary sensation may, for the sake of distinction, be called Nervility. Special Sensation is that felt by those *foci* of peculiar nervous ramifications, called the Senses. These are but particular sensational organisms, appropriated to the reception of more peculiar impulsions than those of which Common Sensation takes cognizance, and are commonly reckoned five, viz., Smell, Taste, Touch, Hearing, and Sight.

Smell is that sense by which we receive information of the odours of external objects through the action of scent-yielding effluxes upon the olfactory nerves. The part which this sense plays in the drama of sensation is comparatively insignificant, though, as a conservative instrument, it is very valuable. The perception of those odorous emanations doubtlessly introduces new ideas of the properties of bodies into our mind: and the exquisite pleasure which it thus yields us seems to entitle it to this brief notice of its doings.

Taste is a faculty of the Sensational agency, whose peculiar duty is—so far as our present purpose is concerned with it—to impart to the soul a knowledge of certain qualities of bodies, comprehended under the general term *Sapidity*. The organ by which it conveys these sensations is the upper surface of the tongue, which is possessed of a papilaceous structure, somewhat resembling the pile of velvet, through which the nerve of taste is distributed. The knowledge-imparting power of this organ is feeble, and of little moment.

Taste and smell are chemically-acting senses, and are excited by the action of certain volatile particles of bodies upon the secreted mucus which lubricates the surfaces of these nervous networks. The other senses of which we have to speak are mechanical, operated upon by the pressure of bodies upon the Nervile fibres, and thus stimulated to action.

Touch is one of the chief knowledge-imparting senses. By it we gain our ideas of most of the physical properties of the material universe. The whole Nervile network, which diffuses itself through the human frame, is, in some measure, endowed with this tactual perceptive power; but the chief seats of this faculty are the tips of the fingers, the lips, and the tongue. The ideas which this sense communicates are such as hardness or softness—roughness or smoothness—solidity or liquidity—regularity or irregularity—distance or nearness—figure, magnitude, and viscidity—and, perhaps, motion or rest.

Hearing is the sense by which, through the agency of the ear, we receive the knowledge of sounds. The sensorial impression felt by the auditory nerve is essentially the result of an exquisitely minute and delicate action of the power of touch. There are certain undulatory vibrations of air, occasioned by the percussion of elastic bodies, which, being conveyed to the complicated mechanism of the ear, and concentrated therein, impinge their impulsions on the auditory nerves, and thus produce the sense of sound. To this sense we are indebted for the refined gratification arising from Music, whether sung in "wood-notes wild" by the maiden

of our love, the partner of our joys and sorrows, or in the exquisite warblings of the "Swedish Nightingale,"—piped by instruments of varying harmony—sounded by the high-pealing organ, the warlike drum, the piercing fife, the resonant trumpet, or the sounding flute. The rich, delicious melody of the Summer's unhired songsters—the lofty diapason of the thunder—the lay of the loud-resounding sea —bring into exercise this organ of the soul. But the chief value it possesses is its enabling us to listen to those sounds, indicative of thought and feeling, which constitute Language, by which we are enabled to transmit, through posterity, the accumulated treasures of wisdom which the genius of man has discovered or acquired.

Sight is the last, and most important, of the general classification of the senses. The organ of sight is the eye, the retina of which is, as its name imports, a network expansion of the optic nerve. The rays of light, which are reflected from all objects, passing through the eye, come in contact with the retina, and paint thereon a picture of the objects from which they proceed; the impression thus made is conveyed to the nervous centre—the Brain—and thence mysteriously into the mind. The sensations obtained through this organ are, the external, visible appearances of things, such as superficial extension, shape, apparent magnitude, colour, shade, relative position, distance, &c. As light is the intervening medium through which the sense of sight receives impressions, and as the reflections of light are modified according to the diversity of the texture and material qualities which substances possess, so there is an almost infinite diversity in the sensations which we feel through it. We learn, by habit, the actual magnitude and solid dimension of objects from their distance, and the disposition of light and shade in the objects which we behold; and we discern distance by the comparison of the apparent magnitude with the known size of bodies, concerning which, either tactually or otherwise, we possess a previous knowledge.

The pleasure as well as the knowledge which we derive from this organic function is incalculable. By it the beauty, sublimity, grandeur, and magnificence of the surrounding world are made ours. We gaze upon a landscape—and the light, greatest of artists, pictures it in our eye, and engraves it on the memory. The giant mountain, with cloud-piercing summit, clad with trees, heath, herbage, and overspread with cattle—the river flowing statelily, bearing upon its breast vessels of every imaginable size and burthen—the peaceful rural hamlet built upon its brink—the towering battlements of some hoary castle—the level meadow—the wooded dell—"the smiling cot, the cultivated farm"—the milkmaid and her swain —the ponderous waggon with its sleeky team—the blue sky and the flower-enamelled grass—with ten thousand other objects of beauty, grace, and grandeur, are instantaneously imprinted on the nervous network in the most delicate tints, and with the most admirable proportion of parts and harmony of colouring. By this sense we examine the productions of nature, scale the heavens and measure the starry host which light them—perceive a world of life and joy and motion in a tiny flower, or a myriad of minute creatures in one liquid water-drop. By it we determine and guide our peripatetic wanderings, glean wisdom from the pages of genius, whether of our own or other countries and times, and gather knowledge

from the wide-open beauty-written hieroglyphs of Nature. As Dr. Brown eloquently remarks, "It is not a small expanse of light which we perceive, equal merely to the narrow expansion of the optic nerve. It is the Universe itself. We are present with stars which beam upon us at a distance that converts to nothing the whole wide diameter of the planetary system. It is as if the tie which binds us down to the globe belonged only to the other senses, and had no influence over this, which, even in its union with the body, seems still to retain all the power and unbounded freedom of its celestial original."

By the conjoint agency of these sensation-receiving faculties, we gain our knowledge of external objects. The intellectual powers exist implicitly or unmanifested, sensation develops them and calls them into action. As the acorn possesses the capacity, when light, heat, proper soil, and the other appropriate stimuli are applied, of producing trunk, leaves, branches, &c., so the mind is endowed with the capacity of eliminating perception, thought, &c., as the result of the operation of external existences upon the sensitive organs. So far is it true, that Sensation is the *educer* of thought, that we have no ideas prior to the reception of sensations, and have not even perception coeval with them. Our senses require *education*—development. Though light impresses the retina by its radiations, though pulsations of air vibrate on the auditory nerve, though tactual contiguity be established between our nervous powers and exterior objects, there is at first only a vague, indefinite imprint produced: this becomes more and more distinct, definite, and precise, as repetition *educates* the sensorial agency. Much exercise and excitement, many times repeated, must be undergone before such a feeling be produced as the same object will always excite in the organ of sense. Sensation, therefore, is the *result* of external impressions made on the *educated* senses, and conveyed to the sensorium, the nervous centre, the brain.

PERCEPTION. The subsequent step in the attainment of ideas is the excitement of the intellectual faculties by sensation. The feeling thus produced is called Perception. Sensation is the *corporeal*—Perception the *mental* impression. How this mental *ébranlement*—motivity—is brought about, is inscrutable to us. Yet that it is a fact we can scarcely doubt, for we know that sensations are frequently made upon the organs appropriated to their reception, which, nevertheless, communicate no perceptivity to the *intellection* within, as in the case of any one diligently pursuing his studies or engaged in meditation deep, unwitting of the clock's time-telling voice. The mind, on being excited by the imitations of the senses, immediately becomes *conscious* of the sensation conveyed. This *Consciousness* of the mind causes it to exert its various faculties and powers in different ways, according to the qualities of the object perceived; as, for instance, desire, hatred, fear, willing, believing, doubting, thinking, &c., which are all acts of the mind set in operation by the telegraphic communications of the sensorial powers. The faculty by which we perceive the mind's acts is called Reflection. From the above we see the natural process by which knowledge is acquired. We can have no perception of our own mental acts till they are excited; they cannot be excited unless the perceptive powers are furnished with sensations by which they may be

stimulated; these sensations can only be attained through the sensorial avenues which form a part of the animal frame. When, however, the mind is furnished with these representatives of external existences, it proceeds to recal, examine, arrange, combine, and modify them: thus it becomes acquainted with its own operations, creates, so to speak, new objects of thought, and augments indefinitely the sum of its ideas. By the comparison of those ideas, and by combining them in such a manner as shall best suit the object in view, the human understanding is enabled to proceed from the proximate to the remote, until it learns the truth of facts far beyond the reach of man's sensational ken. This exertion of mind, which results in the formation of ideas, we call Perceptivity. "Strange process!" by which Sensation "is converted into thought as the mulberry leaf is converted into satin!"

Ideas. Thus we have seen that the *corporeal* impression produced by external objects is called Sensation—the *mental* notion originated by this is called Perception—and the mind's consciousness of its own doings is named Reflection—that these, conjointly, constitute Perceptivity, and are the sources whence the intellectual powers derive the elements of thought—Ideas. When an idea conveys to the mind a sense of the present reality of an object, it receives the name of Perception; but when it is accompanied by a sense of remembrance, imagination, or expectancy, it is called a Conception. The word idea, however, in the sense in which we will use it, includes both of these, and signifies—*That apprehension of an object or mental state which is raised in the mind either by perception, memory, or imagination, by and upon which the operation of thought is or may be performed.* Ideas are of two kinds, Sensible and Mental—Sensible Ideas are those gained by the Perception of exterior objects, as of a house, a horse, a tree, a man, &c. Mental Ideas are those which we receive through reflection, as fearing, hating, loving, braving, &c., and those Ideas of *relation* which sense cannot apprehend, but which the mind perceives as *implied* in the sensuous impressions it receives, as space, time, distance, causation, &c. Sensation can only inform the mind of *things*. It can correctly represent to the mental percipiency the *thing* upon which another stands, and the *thing* standing upon it; but the idea, which we may take the liberty of calling *uponness*, not being an object of sense, can only be the result of a comparison and judgment instituted, instinctively in many cases it may be, by the powers of the understanding, and hence "every kind of relation is a pure idea of intellect, and can never be apprehended by sense." The mind being furnished with these ideas in the manner already described, the Logician proceeds to classify them into simple and complex—distinct or indistinct—adequate or inadequate—abstract or concrete—particular or general, &c.

A Simple Idea is one which is conceived in the mind as existing unically, *i.e.*, which can be considered only as *one*, being indivisible and without distinct parts. Such are most of our ideas of qualities, as hot, cold, black, white, round, smooth, hard, soft, &c.; many of our notions of tastes and sounds, as bitter, sweet, loud, low, &c.; and many of our ideas of the operations and feelings of our minds, as desire, hunger, pain, perceptivity, thinking, &c. Simple Ideas are incommunicable

to any one who is destitute of the organic function or faculty empowered to perceive them. A man born blind cannot gain ideas of light and colour, however minute and vivid the description given may be. Neither can an individual, deaf from birth, have any notion of sounds. No ability of the understanding can supply this connate deficiency, for there can be no cumulation of simpler elements by which such an idea might be communicated; and if it were possible to find a man who had never been sensible of thought, will, or desire, the only way in which these ideas could be *educed* would be to excite them in himself.

A Complex Idea is made up of, or contains, two or more simple ideas, into which it may be divided or subdivided, and each of which is *individually* capable of being thought upon, as the idea of a watch, which is made up of many simple ideas combined in one. Most of our ideas of Virtues and Vices, as truth, justice, deceit, &c., all our ideas of figures, as squares, cubes, circles, parallelograms, &c., and of substances constituting what are commonly called "the three kingdoms of Nature," are complex, *i.e.*, made up of simple ideas which the mind is capable of *individualizing*.

A Distinct Idea is one which is so separated and distinguished from others, that we can form a full, clear, and perfect comprehension of *it*, as contradistinguished from others nearly similar—one, of which we can as clearly discern the boundaries and dissimilitudes as if it were a mathematical figure. An Indistinct Idea is the reverse of this—one which we are unable obviously to discern and accurately to perceive, and distinguish as dissociated and apart from those bearing a resemblance to it. In Geometry, Arithmetic, and the other mathematical sciences, our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct; we can with certainty discern the points of agreement and disagreement between them; but in philosophy, religion, business, morals, art, &c., our ideas are in general indistinct to a greater or less degree. In proportion to the distinctness of our ideas is the certainty of our knowledge.

An Adequate Idea is an exact and complete representative of the object originating it; the external object being the prototype or model, the idea, to be adequate, must be its antitype, or precise and corresponding likeness. An Inadequate Idea is not a correct and perfect representation of an object—is one in which *all* the parts and properties of an object are not comprehended. An idea may be distinct and yet inadequate. We may have a distinct conception of all the *parts*, and yet not have an adequate idea of all the *properties* of these parts; thus, we can have a clear idea of a triangle, although our perception of the *properties* of a right-angled, isosceles, or scalene triangle, each of which *implies* peculiar properties of sides and angles, may be exceedingly inadequate. A distinct idea differentiates, an adequate one informs us what is involved and implied in that indication of differences.

Abstract Ideas are formed by comparing any number of objects in two points of view, viz., the coinciding portion, or quality, and the differing one or ones. When we have found that in which they coincide, we abstract or withdraw *that* from the objects in which it inheres, and give it a name, as height, roundness, length, wisdom, &c.; then this becomes an idea transferable from one object to another,

one on which the mind can think independently of an object. Concrete Ideas are those which express an abstract quality as inherent in or belonging to some object.

Particular Ideas represent individual existences; as they are seen in nature unclassified and individuated, they are symbolized by proper names, as Socrates, Victoria, Athens, London, &c., &c.

General Ideas are those which comprehend several classes of individuals under one general representative cognomen, as man, tree, flower, house, &c. Language would be infinite, and communication impossible, were the mind compelled to give every individual object a distinct name; fortunately, however, it is endowed with the power of generalization, by which it affixes to each class of similar ideas a specific name, which may be applied to any one object comprehended in that class, and distinguishes individuals only when it is necessary for the sake of perspicuity. By this expedient, language is rendered much more easy of acquisition, and more convenient for use. But this subject will be more fully elucidated in our remarks "On Names and Objects able to be named." The utility and advantage of these distinctions will become more obvious as we proceed in our analysis of the processes of thought.

The universe, from which much of our knowledge is obtained, and by which our mental powers are called into action, is an Academic hall, whose portals are never shut, and whose teachers are never unwilling to impart information to the ardent-souled student. And what a glorious body of instructors are there! The sun, in its mid-day glory; the moon, with her meek and chastened smile; those myriad dwellers in the city of splendour—the stars; the mighty ocean, the green-clad earth, the towering mountains, the expansive forests, the nestling vales, the foaming cataracts, the glacial ice-peaks, the majestic river, the murmuring brooklet rambling through the glade, the lightning's electric current, the Borealic coruscations, the comet in its apparently eccentric orbit; those spring-scattered daughters of beauty—the flowers, the glory-hued firmament, the seven-coloured arch of heaven, and all that is rich, rare, lovely, magnificent, and sublime. But man is nature's sole interpreter—the translator of the symbolic language of those son educators, and it becomes him to beware lest he allow any sinister motive to interpose between their teachings and his perceptions. Every organic function places us in a definite relation and connection with these our *natural* instructors, but self-deception is frequently a favourite pursuit of humanity, and we are too apt to misconstrue the most evident precepts of nature to our own hurt, wherefore it is of the utmost importance that we should guard against prepossessions and prejudices.

From these considerations we take the liberty of prescribing the following practical rules, which are founded upon the foregoing explication of the origin, perception, and classification of ideas.

1st, Endeavour to gain accurate ideas.

Our ideas are inaccurate chiefly from two causes—carelessness in the observation of the objects which produce them, and negligence in acquiring the precise meaning of the words used to denote them. Hence this rule implies carefulness in the comparison of objects with ideas, and of ideas with the words which are used

as their signs. Much space need not be occupied in enforcing this rule. If accuracy be not obtained, time, trouble, investigation, are thrown away. If a house be erected upon an unstable foundation, or if it have any *radical* defect, it had better not have been built; so if ideas be formed in the mind which are not coincident with their object, we had better not have had them, for any deductions based upon them will be erroneous, and ignorance is preferable to error. The ignorant man needs only to be instructed, but the errorist must unlearn and relearn. Besides, the possession of erroneous ideas leads us to imagine ourselves well informed when we really are not so; we are thus exposed to the disagreeable feeling of humiliation resulting from detected error, and all those harassing misconceptions of wilful imposture to which this gives rise. Negligence of this rule causes ambiguity of expression, which is the chief cause of debate and controversy. All that is required is patience, attention, and diligent investigation; if we give these to the task, we shall soon reap the rich reward of accuracy of thought, strength of judgment, and mental superiority.

2nd, Gain as many ideas upon every important subject as possible.

If we are correct in our opinion, that soul education is the great object of human existence—if we are right in believing that the universe is expressly and admirably adapted for the *eduction* of thought and the invigoration of the mental powers, the appropriateness and relevancy of this rule will be evident. Knowledge is the sunlight of the world; it is that which beautifies by its rays, illumines by its brilliance, and vivifies and strengthens by its universal pervadency. The world was not wholly formed to nourish the vegetable products which grow upon its surface, to feed the animals which course along its plains, or yield the necessaries of life to the members of the human race. No! it was the design of Providence, that every human soul should hold the germ of wisdom. The soil which produces the fragrance-breathing children of the valley, or the beauteous dwellers on the sun-gilt hill, is not more adapted to its purpose than is the world of which we are the inhabitants, calculated to draw forth the energies latent in the soul, and give them life, vigour, and vitality. As well might the eye see in the absence of light, or the ear hear without the vibratory motions of the air, as the human mind be healthy without knowledge. By this the Astronomer scans the star-decked dome of heaven, and counts therein a multitude of worlds; the Geologist lifts a pebble from the shore, a shell from off the beach, and tells the secrets of the earth when history was dumb. By this we cross the trackless ocean, and wind along the mighty seas which girdle the earth, learn the products of every clime, hear the records of nations long since buried from the human eye, trace the history of the past, observe the aspect of the present, and anticipate the future, watch the progress of humanity, witness its struggles for freedom, its strenuous striving after mental illumination, see the cities men have built, the customs they observed, the hopes they entertained, listen to the noblest sentiments, the most eloquent orations, the highest resolves, and the almost angel-voiced songs of the "monarchs of mind." We should, therefore, seek to gain as many ideas on science, art, nature, society, business, manners, laws, morals, philosophy, religion, as is within our power, and

strive to gain great and comprehensive views of men and things. Oh, how dark is that man's soul who has not thus striven after knowledge! Nature is a mass of hieroglyphs, unmeaning and illegible, upon which he gazes in mysterious awe and wonder. Such an one may fittingly employ the melancholy and sublime lamentation of the mighty-soul'd Milton—

> "Ever-enduring dark
> Surrounds me—from the cheerful ways of men
> Cut off—and for the book of knowledge fair
> Presented with a universal blank
> Of nature's works, to me expunged and razed,
> And wisdom, at *its* entrance, quite shut out."

Religion.

IS WAR, UNDER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE, OPPOSED TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In the following observations, it is my intention to convey to the reader, as briefly as possible, my reasons for believing that war, under every possible circumstance, whether offensive or *defensive*, is opposed to the principles and teachings of morality and Christianity. Many persons hold that War is certainly an evil, but that it is a necessary one; and that defensive War and standing armies, in time of peace, are absolutely indispensable, but I differ, *in toto*, from them. It cannot be denied that defensive War is War, to all intents and purposes; and as to its being necessary, I cannot admit that; for, if all offensive war were to cease, then defensive war would be no longer required. Reason is stronger than cannon; and if we strive to enforce our rights by argument and arbitration, we shall succeed better in the end than by wholesale murderings of our fellow creatures. I do not think it proper or necessary to quote Scripture in defence of my argument, because persons of different opinions interpret texts differently; and secondly, because it must be admitted that all Christians should follow the precepts and doctrines of Him who came on earth to teach and preach love, goodwill to all, and who was Himself a pattern of meekness, simplicity, benevolence, and affection. War is a remnant of that dark age of superstition and tyranny when the poor were treated as slaves; and, to me, it sems strange that men have not seen the folly of killing each other long before our time. What does our great bard, Shakspere, say?—

> "Let it not disgrace me,
> If I demand, before this royal view,
> What rub and what impediment there is
> Why that the *naked*, poor, and mangled *Peace*,
> Dear nurse of arts, plenties, and joyful births,
> Should not in this best garden of the world,
> Our fertile France, hold up her lovely visage?"

Then it is well known that the great "Hero of a hundred fights" has said, "There is nothing more dreadful than a victory, except a defeat." These words have great weight, coming from the lips of such a warrior. And what says Byron?—

> "Hark! heard you not those hoofs of dreadful note?
> Sounds not the clang of conflict on the heath?
> Saw ye not whom the reeking sabre smote,
> Nor saved your brethren ere they sunk beneath
> Tyrants and tyrants' slaves?"

Easily might I add quotation upon quotation; but I forbear. It is my earnest hope that the time will soon arrive when we shall not see human beings arrayed in force against each other, but shall rather see them turning their muskets and swords into ploughshares and pruning-

hooks, while their owners enjoy peace, and exercise love and affection towards their fellow men.

We will now look at the subject in its bearings upon Christianity, and in doing so we must notice one of its great churches, the Church of England. That this church, which professes to teach the doctrines of its Heavenly Master, should encourage its members to pray every Sunday that "Victory may be given to our armies"—that its ministers should be employed in dedicating the *Banners of war to God*—that the sacred walls of churches should be desecrated by having trophies of war placed upon them—that thanksgiving, and other days, should be set apart for the special purpose of offering up praise for deliverance, and exulting in victory over our fellow creatures, and chanting *Te Deum*, when *Te Diabolum* would be much more appropriate; —that all this should be done by a church professing to follow the footsteps of a beneficent and peace-loving Saviour, is, in my opinion, inconsistent and disgraceful.

Is it not astonishing, and worthy of a notice far beyond this passing one, that our different ministers should, at the Universities, have placed in their hands works recording the horrid deeds of ancient heroes and soldiers, thus leading them, in their youth, to glory in scenes of tyranny and oppression, instead of impressing on their minds and hearts the benevolent precepts of their Divine Lord, whose servants and ministers they ought to be? Surely this practice requires alteration. It is unaccountable that, professing so much morality as a nation, we should not see that licentiousness and drunkenness are carried to a great extent amongst the officers and men of our army. What scenes of dissipation, at the country's expense, might be witnessed! Men brought up to a life of idleness, or, at least, to an unprofitable and useless activity, are a heavy burden upon honest labouring men, who are willing to earn their bread, but who have it thus taken out of their mouths. I ask, then, Is it not a disgrace to morality and Christianity to keep an army in peace, or to fight for any country for a petty grievance which could be amicably settled by Arbitration? Let us strain every nerve to rid the world of this practice, which has made many a child fatherless, and many a wife a widow. It is War which has been the great repressor of education, the great obstacle to the progress of knowledge and truth. Yes! it is War, sanctioned by Religious men, that prevents the Artist, the Poet, and the Philosopher, from earning their just dues—it is War which checks the Merchant and Manufacturer's spirit of enterprise—it is War which drags the labourer from his peaceful and happy home, to die, unpitied, in a foreign country—it is War which loads us with enormous taxes, and often prevents us from earning that food which is necessary for the sustentation of our bodies. By War, men are made machines and hired assassins; in War, officers become tyrants, and powerful instruments for retarding the progress of civilization, freedom, and universal education. I do not like to see this serious subject made the object of that satire, frivolity, and ridiculous contempt, with which it has been treated in some of the leading articles of our newspapers. The subject is a serious one, and is open for free discussion, and I hope to see both sides ably advocated in the pages of the CONTROVERSIALIST. Let us divest our minds of all prejudice on a question so important to the whole civilized world.

A. B., JUN.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

I SHALL endeavour, in the present paper, to show that War, under certain circumstances, is not incompatible with the principles of Christianity.

Of course we mean defensive war:—for it will hardly be expected that we shall attempt to support the pretensions, or palliate the crimes of the aggressor; of whom poetry and history have made a desolated world to boast:—to boast that "Darius" was "great and good;" Alexander and Napoleon "godlike," noble, and generous; Charles XII. disinterested; and Nicholas—what is he?

The eagle and the lion are noble, and the serpent beautiful; but, notwithstanding, we would rather that their numbers be few, and that they remain in the wilderness, far from the haunts of men.

We could wish that defensive warfare were as easily dispensed with: but it is our conviction that, in the present moral and social condition of the world, its consistency, both with Christianity and reason, may be safely asserted, and proved in the following manner:—

1st. The laws of Christianity, which bear upon this question, refer to individuals, and cannot be applied to nations.

This will appear, if we trace the purposes of those laws. God is impartial in his regard for mankind; his designs for human happiness are uniform and universal; and had we maintained our allegiance, our social condition would, doubtless, have proved that all have an equal share in his benevolent regard. But man has revolted from his Creator; the equilibrium of human happiness is lost; and human misery has a scale of degrees which reaches down to perdition. Christ, in the fulness of time, comes forth with a plan, by which, with our co-operation, the happiness of our former allegiance is restored and equalized throughout the race. This is the simple history of Christianity; it is the origin and end of all its laws. All the laws of Christianity tending to the equalization of human happiness—those which regard our bearing towards our enemies must, therefore, whatever be their aspect, seek the same end.

In such laws as require that we "resist not evil," but "when smitten on the right cheek," that we "turn the other also," there must then exist a purpose worthy of this great design of the Gospel:—a purpose beyond that of simply teaching the absurdity and wickedness of revenge, though that is intelligibly taught;—a purpose beyond that, also, of sparing our enemy an evil which is permitted to us, which, nevertheless, may be designed. What, then, is that purpose! It can be nothing short of this:—Our enemy is an intelligent being, and capable of moral impressions: our passive endurance, therefore, is calculated to win him to Christ: thus, rather than resisting evil, "overcoming evil with good." Here, as we cheerfully resign the petty interests of time to make another happy for eternity, the ultimate purpose of the law becomes fulfilled in him and in us; for we share in the joy of angels, and have the honour to work with God in the promotion of universal happiness.

Now, if this be allowed to be the object of such laws, this object could not be gained by their application to nations; for the analogy supposed to exist between individuals and nations is defective—no nation being truly Christian. Were a nation, therefore—suppose it our own—so influenced by the Christian portion of it as to assume, before its enemies, the position of the suffering Christian, so far from resembling the individual Christian in his yielding a lesser good to secure a greater, it would be sacrificing its highest interests in the remote and uncertain prospect of gaining for another nation but that, at best, of which it dispossesses itself. Civilization, with all its moral fruits; religious institutions, more valued than our lives; and the inestimable interests of unsaved souls, would all be laid, an easy prey, at the feet of a capricious foe; and all this but the beginning of sorrows, should we refuse, on the same principles, to add to these spoils our physical aid in wresting them from others.

However we may dispose of such considerations, we believe they were respected by Christ when he declared, "My kingdom is not of this world, *else would my servants fight.*"

2nd. The absolute necessity of national defence may be pleaded on the ground that no adequate substitute, of a moral nature, has yet been afforded. A noble substitute for physical defence has recently been offered to the world by some of "the excellent of the earth." We rejoice in this, as an omen of better times; and even as a present *amelioration* of an evil which it cannot, however, finally *abolish.* That Arbitration may, in many instances, avert War, is readily allowed; but that it can be permanently substituted for physical defence, or that

it is any security for the peace of the world, is disputed, and for the following reasons :—

Military power is a necessary constituent in the present organization of nations. Without some great physical power to protect constitutions, of whatever kind, that have been *deliberately established*, such is the moral condition of the world, that all would be ceaseless change, anarchy, and confusion. What, under any form of government, would be the authority of rulers, or the force of laws, in the absence of military support? Its alienation and withdrawment became the fall of the late dynasty of France; while its presence and support were, in a similar case, the preservation of that of England. It is a power that may serve in any case, it is true; and that cause which gains the ascendancy under its auspices, depends, for its support, upon the loyalty of an army, rather than upon that of the people. But as an army is generally but a mass of ignorance, and destitute of the self-moving power of political opinion—a mighty machine moved by an external impulse, and naturally attached to the source from whence its direct support is derived—its tendency is rather to *preserve* the existing government of a nation, than to *alter* it.

There is no wonder, then, that existing dynasties are so tenacious of military power. And, indeed, if peace, law, and order are in themselves desirable, and preferable to anarchy, havoc, and perpetual change—a standing military force becomes necessary as a drag upon the wheels of revolution, so long as the elements of disorder are in the people, and their revolutionary movements are sudden and self-destructive.

Till, therefore, the world has become so morally changed, that standing physical-force institutions shall be no longer needed for civil purposes, they must continue; and so long as they continue, will they keep awake throughout the nations that jealousy and hostility from whence proceeds the war spirit, burning for occasion, which now holds the world in arms.

It is true, Arbitration is calculated to remove many of the usual occasions of War, but it has many difficulties to encounter. Notwithstanding its peaceful aspect, and its fair promise of success, in its way lie the pride of power, the vanity of ambition, together with national dissatisfactions and misunderstandings, so that it is likely to have an eventful history. Yet do we bid it "God speed;" for we regard it as an angel of mercy sent to *mitigate*, though it cannot *finally remove*, the evils of war. We have the credible assurance that moral force will eventually govern the world; but the golden reign of that benign power waiting for the moral renovation of the world, we can only hope that our posterity may know. At present, while military institutions necessarily exist—while their suspicious and dangerous character renders them self-productive and universal—while they tend to divide and insulate national interests, and to engender national pride and antipathy—while they offer facilities to robbery and ambition—while these threaten the safety of all we would preserve, and must exist till their own proper remedy is found, our duty is manifest: we verily believe it would be nothing short of SIN to lay down arms.

J. F.

Philosophy.

IS BEAUTY A QUALITY INHERENT IN OBJECTS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

Mr. Editor,—Amid the practicality, the positivism, and the materiality of the present age, it is well occasionally to leave the every-day tracks of life, to

evade the bustling realism and money-changing in which we are immersed, and reflect upon nature, recline on her bosom, and drink in, by every avenue, the pleasure-giving sensations which in her every aspect she is fitted to impart. To wend our way far from the troublous mart, the crowded city, the office of labour, and look upon each

> "Meadow, grove, and stream,
> The earth, and every common sight,
> Apparelled in celestial light—
> The glory and the freshness of a dream."

Now, sir, you have given us the opportunity of transporting ourselves, by the "shaping spirit of imagination," into the very heart of nature. The green fields, the ever-changing sky, the balm-breathing air of the "merry month of June," hast thou placed before us, and when our souls were enraptured with the loveliness around, thou hast propounded the question—

> "What and wherein it doth exist,
> This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist,
> This beautiful and beauty-making power?"

We formerly ventured to lay before you a few scattered and indigested thoughts on this subject, which you did us the honour to insert in your magazine. We know not whether you will excuse us for requesting permission to continue the subject, and again to appear before the intelligent "Council of Friends" whom, we understand, you have collected around you. We would not wish to be thought intrusive, but with humble submission to your *dicta*, will withdraw ourselves to our former obscurity, should you think fit to remand us hence. I cannot, however, withhold the expression of my high delight at the calm, gentlemanly, philosophical, and perspicuous manner in which your contributors have conducted the several departments to which they have addressed themselves, and I am convinced that in no other periodical can the same logical, mild, and impartial consideration of these subjects be found. But I am afraid you may consider me too digressive, and will, therefore, proceed to the fulfilment of my intention of appending a sequel to my former letter.

In reflecting upon

> "The radiant beauty shed abroad
> On all the glorious works of God,"

we have been led to entertain the opinion that Beauty is not a quality inherent in objects, and are desirous of adducing some confirmatory arguments for the truth of our belief, that your readers may be able to decide on their force and accuracy. Our mental faculties are endowed with the capacity of being educed or called into action by the operation of outward objects upon them, and this activity of mind produces pleasure because it fulfils the end of our being. The mechanism of the mind, so to speak, is complex and intricate, and when impressions are received from the existences beyond us, though the perceptive powers alone are primarily excited by them, yet these impressions do not cease their operations when the objects are withdrawn, but, having been depictured to our consciousness, they become the pabulum of Memory, Reflection, and Volition. Now we wish to call especial attention to this circulative process of impressibility, for we are too apt, by our heedlessness and inattention to the processes of thought, to suffer them to pass unmarked through several stages of transmutation, and are thus led to suppose that the phenomena of mind are much more easily understood than they really are. This circulative impressibility, however, is the basis of that singular faculty of the mind, Association, to which we are so much indebted, but to whose operations we pay so small a portion of attention. Now, we are of opinion that this associative power is a fundamental item in the "emotion of the Beautiful;" that nature does not possess an *inherent* beauty apart from the percipient mind; that the soul has the power of clothing external objects with a mantle of radiance, or shrouding them in murky gloom, as the mind is stirred by joy, moved by grief, or excited by wrath. This suggestive power of our mental nature, by which, on the reception of new ideas, with a swifter than telegraphic speed they rush along the circulative course, awakening into new life and

action thoughts long since consigned to the rich treasure-house of memory, appears to us a chief ingredient in the emotion of which we now speak. Beauty is not a mere sensational excitement; it cannot be so, for each sensation excites other faculties than those by which perception is conveyed to the mind. Hence, we think, that Beauty is a series of pleasing emotions passing within our own mind, but, of course, primarily originated by an external object; not that the qualities inherently possess the capacity of educing these emotions, but that in the circuit of the mind's action, harmonic ideas are recalled to it, and this harmony of thought we denominate the Beautiful. This may be illustrated thus —let a person ignorant of geometry see the diagram by which the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid is proved to the sight, and what would he observe in it worthy of attention, but so many intersecting black strokes and angles intermingled? But let the same diagram be presented to a person who has studied that science, and it will awaken thought; he will run over the demonstrations, see its dependencies, and its consequences. Out of seeming disorder, harmony, wisdom, and reasoning will be brought, and he will pronounce it a beautifully demonstrated proposition. But, perhaps, another illustration may be necessary to show your more unlearned readers the relevancy of this fact. What is the difference which a literate and illiterate person finds in a book? To the mind of the one, nothing appears on the page except certain black impressions, incapable of educing any idea. To the mind of the other, the blue sky, studded with stars unutterably bright, the green earth, clad in many-hued profusion, profound philosophy, and elegance of language will reveal themselves, although to both the same characters have been presented. Instead of this imaginary book, let the wide-open volume of nature be perused by them, and how different will be its legibility to the "mind's eye!" They look upon the earth-o'erarching rainbow, the meek-eyed "silken sisters of the field," the setting sun, down-sinking in a sea of crimson light, the evening vault, when "large and bright the stars are round the crescent moon," the river, threading its sun-gilded way through long avenues of blossom-apparelled trees, green, shady woods, sylvan cots, and antique mansions, and what do they perceive? The one, an intermixed assemblage of figures and colours evoking no ideal brilliance-dyed mental portraiture. The other is filled with a thousand varied thoughts of the primeval loveliness of creation, the deluge, the mercy of God, the laws of light, the immortal Newton, the fragile tenure which we have of life, the hopes of immortality, the wide immensity of the universe, the wondrous revealments of the telescope, Dollond, the starry-eyed Galileo and his woes, the ebb, flow, and unceasing on-sweeping of all human life to that bourn whither all are hastening, of the decay of all held sacred by the human race, the pleasures of retirement, home joys, home griefs, and hopes of purer gratifications in sunnier lands, where all are mingled in a Paradise of bliss, in happier climes than human thought is able to conceive, of poetry, philosophy, morality, religion; and, dropping reason's curbing rein, the mind speeds her wild flight "through unimaginable realms of faëry." Do, then, the objects which they view possess the inherent power of outleading and exciting this emotion of the beautiful, or is it vain to strive

> "From outward forms to win
> The passion and the life, whose fountains are within?"

A few lines above we have mentioned the rainbow, and we do not suppose there could be a more convincing proof of our negation. Here is the most symmetrical proportion of form, the most harmonious interblending of colours. But where is the *inherent* Beauty? We do not here question the reflexibility and refrangibility of light, nor the angular incidence of its rays, for these are the grounds and basis of our argument; but the inherency of the Beauty: for it follows from the laws by which it is formed, "that if we change our position while looking at a rainbow, we still see a bow, but not the same as before; and hence, if there be many spectators, they will all see a dif-

ferent rainbow, though it *appears* to be the same." Here, then, we have beauty of the most fascinating sort, a loveliness of unapproachable perfection, gracefulness of form, brilliancy, diversity, and harmony of colour, of which Campbell exclaims—

> "How glorious is thy girdle, cast
> O'er mountain, tower, town;
> Or mirrored in the ocean vast,
> A thousand fathoms down!"

But it surely will not be affirmed that the quality of Beauty is inherent in the "sacred span." And why not? simply because it has no essence in which it can inhere. All the qualities by which this lovely *spectrum* is produced may be inherent in matter and continuous in their operation; but these qualities can have no beauty *in themselves*, although we can easily admit that the idea, notion, or image of the "heavenly symbol" is a product of our organization, physical and mental, acted upon by the laws of light.

Let us also observe that power by which Memory, Hope, Friendship, Love, &c., have the power of permeating the objects around us, and making the common scenes of waking day refulgent with loveliness, and radiant with unnumbered charms. This is the principle in which, in our apprehension, the emotion of the beautiful originates. We have all some latent memories of joy, hopes of future delight, bright fancies and illusive dreams, imagination of the sweetness of retirement, competence, and serenity, the pleasures of friendship and reputation, the bliss of affection. Whatever tends to agitate the mind with such thoughts, and ideas similar to these, are said to have the quality of Beauty. And what are painting, poetry, and sculpture, but the means by which we register these emotion-educing objects? The best part of a poem is that which is unwritten, but which is suggested to us by its perusal, which details the emotion-producing objects, and thus excites them in our bosoms. So of a picture, so of a statue. That which cannot revive memory, excite will, stimulate hope, engage affection, and thus lift us on the wings of imagination, can have no beauty for us. It is this quickening, alluring, animating power which, interfusing itself with our perceptions, renders us susceptible to the sweet delight, the holy joy which we receive from outward existences; a smooth flowing stream, a serene sky, a vernal field, an ivy-clustered cottage, a vine-clad hill, a window-lattice, intertwined with jasmine and roses, a linnet warbling on a blossom-clad tree, a peaceful hamlet, a band of merry children, with rose-tinged cheeks and dew-bright eyes, "every flower the summer wreaths," the rich clouds, in the golden sunset lying, "the purple moon's transparent light," the crystal depths that sparkle in the tremulous sunbeam, a star hung bright above a loved-one's dwelling, a meek-eyed maiden verging on her "golden prime," all possess the power of captivating imagination, and evoking fancy's fairy train, and decidedly prove, that before we can be charmed by the "emotions of the Beautiful,"

> "From the soul itself must issue forth
> A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud
> Enveloping the earth."

I am, &c.,
PHILOMATHOS.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

MR. EDITOR,—The perusal of the two papers on this question in the first Number of the *Controversalist* has been productive of much gratification to me, and I believe they will have the effect of attracting the attention of your readers to the subject now before us, and awakening in the minds of many a sense of its importance. The question as to the nature and derivation of Beauty is fraught with far more significance and general interest than a superficial glance would lead us to believe; and a short consideration will convince us that it is by no means so easily answered as would at first be supposed.

This can hardly be called a question of facts; it is something more than a mere matter of opinion; it becomes, indeed, a true metaphysical inquiry, demanding careful investigation and concentrated thought; but at the same time it is

attended with far more satisfaction and sustained interest than is to be found in most studies of a like nature. This question has given rise to much controversy among the learned at various periods; some of the brightest names in the philosophic page could be quoted in support of one side or the other. Mr. Alison was the first, I think, in our own day, who directed attention to this important subject, and his ideas were repeated in a much more simple, lucid, and generalized form by the late illustrious Lord Jeffrey, whose essay on "Beauty" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* is considered a masterpiece of brilliant metaphysical reasoning. It may be mentioned at the same time that the Poets appear to have adopted a position on the opposite side, and almost invariably speak of Beauty as a quality existing in the objects described. Let us proceed, however, to the consideration of the subject. The question, Is Beauty a quality inherent in Objects? would, by a person who has given the matter little attention, be in nearly every case answered in the affirmative: but when he is asked, why Beauty, unlike other qualities and properties of bodies, as form, size, colour, &c., is not alike perceptible to all, he is obliged to reconsider his answer, and to explain wherein this Beauty, if existing and inherent in objects, differs from these other *indisputable* qualities which have just been named. We will return to this part of the subject, but meanwhile let us consider for a little the theory of "the association of ideas" advanced on the opposite side of the question. As far as I can understand this theory, I must say it does not appear to be very definite or comprehensive. I will endeavour to glean the intended meaning from the excellent paper by "Philomathos." "Our senses," he says, "when excited by the various objects composing any scene, produce associative chains of thought, feeling, or desire, either of an accordant or discordant nature. If these be such as accord with each other, we call the feeling produced the emotion of the Beautiful; if the reverse, they suggest the idea of deformity." Now, what is the nature of the "associative chains" here alluded to? and what is meant by their being accordant or discordant? Are these chains of memory recalling the experience and feelings of the past? Do they connect our present sensations with similar sensations formerly felt, or with sensations formerly inspired by a similar object? If this be the meaning of the phrase, I doubt what is herein advanced. In most cases the perception of Beauty is far keener when the object admired is the FIRST of the kind we have seen; on the recurrence of a similar object, the beauty is equally perceptible, but the excitement of novelty which the first occasioned is no longer felt. Supposing I had never seen a waterfall, and were transported to the side of Niagara's foaming torrent, I could have no former ideas, except perhaps those of anticipation, to associate with my feelings on beholding this stupendous cataract; nevertheless I should be immediately sensible of its sublimity and grandeur. Such illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely. In Book VIII. of "Paradise Lost," Adam thus describes his first meeting with Eve:

> "Under his forming hands a creature grew,
> Manlike, but different sex, so lovely fair,
> That what seemed fair in all the world seemed now
> Mean, or in her summ'd up, in her contained,
> And in her looks, which from that time infused
> Sweetness into my heart, *unfelt before.*
> * * * * * *
> Grace was in all her steps, Heav'n in her eye,
> In every gesture dignity and love."

We all feel that the sensations thus described by Adam are perfectly natural under the circumstances, and yet *he* had no previous idea of a similar kind to associate with his feelings on beholding the peerless Eve. Whence, then, his emotions and sense of the beautiful, if they were not inspired by the contemplation of that transcendant loveliness firmly impressed by the hand of Divinity upon our common mother, the last and fairest object of creation?

Again, the "associative chains" of thought which "Philomathos" alludes to cannot have any reference whatever to the useful, interesting, or remarkable qualities of objects. The elephant renowned for its sagacity and strength, and the camel for its patient endurance

and untiring fortitude, no one would call beautiful; whilst the ferocious tiger, the screaming peacock, and the tiny butterfly, at once inspire the sensation. A woman whom we unite in pronouncing beautiful, may be one of the most ignorant and wicked of her species, whilst another, endowed with every virtue and accomplishment that can elevate human nature, may be almost entirely destitute of the quality of Beauty. But my strongest objection to the theory of "association of ideas" is, that it is contrary to all experience; when we are admiring an object as beautiful, we are sensible of no "associative chains of feeling, thought, or desire," being formed in our mind, and I can scarcely conceive of such being present without our being at the same time sensible of their existence. I believe that no such process of mental analogy takes place as that indicated by the advocates of the opposite side of the question: the perception of Beauty is in most cases *instantaneous*, and, we may almost say, *instinctive*.

I have thus far endeavoured to show that the *ideal* theory of Beauty is neither consistent with reason nor experience, and it remains for us to substantiate our own position; that is, to prove Beauty to be a quality inherent in objects. And I would say, in the first place, that the very difficulty there is in giving a satisfactory definition of Beauty, and in telling exactly wherein it consists, far from forming an argument against us, rather goes to strengthen the position which we hold. Ask a person why he calls a certain object, say, a rose, beautiful, and in all probability he can give you little explanation beyond saying that it *is* beautiful, and that his senses inform him of the fact. And what further reason can he give for his perception of the colour of the rose, and for his belief that *it* is an inherent quality? In both cases he puts faith in the evidence of his bodily senses. But here we are again met by the question, How is it that every one does not admit the beauty of the rose, while *all* who are possessed of the sense of seeing in a healthy state, unite in pronouncing its colour — red? Were this question satisfactorily answered, and the difficulty here introduced removed, I conceive that little more would be wanting to establish the position we have adopted, and to demonstrate thoroughly the inherent nature of Beauty. Let us see how S. N. meets the objections. "Perceptive power," he says, "differs in different individuals. All men are not similarly endowed. We observe this fact every day, not only in Beauty, but in Taste." There can be no doubt but that this beauty-perceptive power requires cultivation for its due development, and that there are in the world blockheads enough, who, after yawning in a sort of disconsolate terror along the banks of Loch Lomond, enlarge with much admiration upon the beauty and grandeur of Finsbury-square. Now, I admit that Beauty, although an inherent quality in objects, must differ somehow in character from such simple and universally admitted qualities as form, dimensions, or colour, *because* its perception is *not* universal. With reference to material things, it embraces in fact all of these, and has been well defined by S. N. as that "*colour, or harmonious blending of colours, and symmetrical proportion of parts, which superinduces pleasure in the beholder.*" But this pleasure is not superinduced in every beholder by the observation of a certain object, on account of "perceptive power," as your correspondent remarks, differing in different individuals. The perception of Beauty, indeed, depends upon many things, upon intellectual capacity, habits of life, disposition, education, national feelings, and a thousand other accidental circumstances. The manifestations of the quality are numberless,—so are the varieties of the human mind, and there is no man but can point to *some* objects which command his admiration and awaken in his soul the perception of the beautiful. When in a state of illness, exhaustion, or bodily pain, our perception of Beauty is lessened because the derangement of the physical organization interferes with the free and healthy action of the mental faculties. On the approach of old age, also, the "beauty-perceptive power" is one of the first which becomes deadened: whereas, were the "associative theory" the true

one, this power should increase in keenness and activity as we advance in years, because of the number of *new ideas* which experience and observation are continually awakening within us.

It is necessary in our investigation of this subject that we make a proper distinction between Beauty and TASTE. The meanings I attach to these terms are by no means synonymous; and what is true of the one may be quite erroneous when applied to the other. The consideration of Taste, indeed, would open up a field of thought as wide as that upon which we are now engaged. It will be advisable, however, to confine ourselves at present to the matter in hand, and I only mention the subject for the purpose of observing that in my opinion most of the illustrations advanced by "Philomathos" in support of the opposite side, could be explained by reference to the nature of Taste and the circumstances by which it is regulated. I have not thought it necessary to enlarge upon the *process* by which the quality of Beauty becomes perceptible to the mind, as I think S. N. has already explained this in a manner at once lucid, satisfactory, and comprehensive.

It will be observed, that like the openers of this debate, I have spoken only of the beauty of material objects, or that which is made known through the medium of the eye. To treat of the subject in all its branches would, indeed, require a volume for its thorough elucidation. The opinion I have formed on this question is for general application, and in saying that I believe Beauty to be an *inherent quality*, I include the beauty of music and of poetry, as well as that which manifests itself in physical objects.

I could have wished to have spoken much more fully on this fertile topic, but space will not permit, and I would just say in conclusion, after considering the subject with some care and circumspection, that the doctrine of *inherent Beauty* appears to me to be the safest, the most elevating in its tendency, and at the same time quite in accordance with our ideas of "Nature and Nature's Laws." Yours,

Dundee. C. C. M.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY MONARCHY PREFERABLE TO AN ELECTIVE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE question under consideration is one of considerable moment, especially when it is considered that something analogous to a revolution would be needful to render our own monarchy an elective one, in the sense in which the term is used in the question before us. There is, however, a certain sense in which all monarchs are elective.

All monarchs are dependent, to a greater or less extent, upon their subjects. The power which every monarch wields is the power of his subjects; and consequently, the extent to which he can be either useful to his friends, or formidable to his enemies, depends upon the power of his subjects and the extent to which he is able to concentrate that power in himself. If his subjects are numerous, intelligent, and wealthy, and he is able to gather their combined power to a focus, and that focus is himself, he is powerful. If not, in proportion as he fails, he is weak. And if some other person is able to bring the mass of that power to bear against him, he will fall, and another will take his place.

These remarks are true of all monarchs, whatever is the title by which they hold the throne. The power they wield is the power of the subject. The subjects can withdraw it at pleasure.

If the subjects see that their influence, and wealth, and power, are used against themselves, so far as to remove their objections to a revolution, or to render a

revolution more desirable than the continuance of the present state of things, they will withdraw them from the reigning monarch, and either seek another, or change the form of government altogether.

In the former case, though the reigning monarch may be an hereditary one, the people can divest him of the power he possesses, and confer it upon another. In other words they possess the elective power.

From the foregoing it will appear, that if a monarch be permitted to reign, it is because the people choose that he should do so: he is the choice of the people; and as such, is as really elective as though he had in the first instance been formally chosen.

The question now appears to be one of expediency, and might be put in the following words:—

Is it better or more expedient that the heir of a monarch should be permitted quietly to ascend the throne as his successor, or that a successor should be formally chosen?

We think the former course the better one,

1. Because the election must be attended with serious evils. How many are the evils which have attended the election of members of Parliament in many of our cities and boroughs! For a considerable time before and during the election, they have been the scene of the greatest excitement. All the interest has been directed to the coming election. Agents have been busily engaged in persuading, bribing, intimidating, and coercing electors. All sorts of means, fair and foul, have been adopted, that were calculated to answer party purposes. Drunkenness, debauchery, and riot have been rife; street fights, between conflicting parties, common; imposition and duplicity have been practised with the utmost skill; property has at times been wantonly destroyed, and even life itself endangered.

All this has been done in order to gain the ascendancy of a party, and answer party purposes, and that only for a comparatively short period, after which the same evils have been repeated. With facts before us which fully justify all we have said of elections, what might we expect if the person chosen were to fill the throne, wear the crown, and possess the title and influence of royalty? Might we not expect at times the suspension of law, civil war, with its attendants—bloodshed, rapine, and famine, and all the evils arising from a cessation of trade and want of confidence? Nay, might we not expect, in some cases, and perhaps not unfrequently, that a general war would depend upon the result of an election? And if so, would an election be a desirable thing? Certainly not.

Besides, the introduction of a formal election would answer no purpose at all commensurate with the risk involved. The monarch is as strictly elective now as he would be were he personally chosen at his accession. Though he ascends the throne by virtue of birth, he does so by Act of Parliament, not by Divine right.

Victoria, our present sovereign, was as really chosen when the House of Hanover was called to the throne, as though she had personally canvassed for votes, and been formally chosen. She would never have reigned had not the House of Stuart been set aside.

Nor is a sovereign so chosen more capable of opposing the voice of the people than an elective monarch would be. A monarch of Great Britain could not with impunity refuse to accede to the Acts of Parliament. It is in Acts of Parliament that their title is found. The power which gave the title can, if needs be, annul it.

2. An Elective Monarchy would be less fitted to govern upon equitable principles than an Hereditary one.

No one will deny that it is desirable that a monarch should, as far as possible, be in a position to govern equitably the whole of his subjects. That an hereditary monarch is in a position to do so as far as his title is concerned, is clear, for he owes his title to the nation as a whole, and not to any party in particular. Hence, if he have any gratitude to show, it is to the nation as a whole, and not to a part of it merely. Not so with regard to the elective monarch: he owes his throne to a part of the nation, not to the

whole. It may be that he owes it to a very small part of it; perhaps to some solitary, but crafty individual, who has already bargained for his share of the plunder, and who, in case of disappointment, is ready to turn traitor, and involve the nation in all the horrors of a civil war. The ire of such a man has been more fearful to kings than that of half their subjects; and it by no means follows that such men are always found on the side of progress.

But should no one man be found to possess sufficient influence to make a king, still there would be a number of influential persons connected with the successful competitor who would expect and obtain "solid pudding" at the hand of the monarch; while persons with equal capacity, more patriotism, and less success, would become marked men, and perhaps be treated as outlaws; even common justice would be denied them.

By this means the nation would be divided into parties. All offices, from the throne downward, would be occupied by parties favourable to the reigning monarch. Justice would cease to be performed; heinous offences, on the one side, would be slightly passed over, while, on the other, small ones would meet with undue severity. Not that we intend to assert that no injustice prevails at present in our criminal courts—far from it; on the contrary, we have seen a prosecutor, and principal witness, take his seat on the bench during the trial of his case, and have heard him give his evidence from the bench, though he was not, at least in our knowledge, a magistrate. All that we intend to maintain is, that such cases are not necessary fruits of an Hereditary Monarchy; while we believe that they would be the natural fruits of an Elective one, in consequence of the prevalence of party interest.

Nor would the prevalence of a party spirit add to the security of the nation. Parties in the House of Commons have their uses. There the feeling may run strong without, to any sensible extent, affecting the security of the country as a whole. But when the executive is a party, and the laws of the land are executed in a party spirit, it becomes a very different affair. A nation divided against itself is not in a position to resist the aggressions of a foreign power; for, far from this, internal division is the most powerful auxiliary to an enemy, and the almost certain presage of a falling state.

Thus we have seen, that while nothing is gained by formally electing a monarch, much is lost, and infinitely more is risked; that our own monarch is as really elective as though she had been formally chosen; that an election is attended with many necessary evils; that an elective monarch is not so capable of serving a state as an hereditary one; and that, whilst the tendency of an Elective Monarchy is towards disunion, that of an Hereditary one is to union.

In conclusion, we would remark, that it is not against the principle of elections that we contend. On the contrary, we admit that nations have a perfect right to elect their governors. What we object to is, the perpetual exercise of this right on the ground of expediency; expediency, however, involving the best interests of a nation.

W. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

The assumption made by S. N. that the change from Hereditary to Elective Monarchy could only be made violently, and would be a change so great as to effect a complete revolution in the relations, habits, and modes of thought of the people, is, in my opinion, a perfectly gratuitous one. That it would be a considerable change, I am prepared to admit; but that "it would be equivalent to an entire subversion of our established forms and customs," is, I think, saying too much; for consider, if this change ever be effected, it will be from *without;* first, the people must become in favour of the change; secondly, they will obtain it; it will be a change which the people will win for themselves; *not* a change forced on them without their concurrence.

But supposing we admit that the change must of necessity be a violent one, and in its first consequences dis-

astrous, this is no argument for or against such a change; for if the Elective Principle be the best, then must it inevitably conquer, and the question is only changed to a matter of time; whether now or at some distant period the change is to be effected; we are thus brought back to the original question.

S. N.'s first argument is, that monarchy (query, does S. N. mean Hereditary Monarchy?) is adapted for a selfish, conceited, ostentatious people. Admit this statement as true, and, of course, it will follow that the form of government advocated by S. N. is quite unadapted for this country, for I cannot suppose that S. N. considers himself and fellow-countrymen "selfish, conceited, ostentatious, and thinking more of self than of virtue." I am not deeply versed in history, but what little I know of the history of my fatherland makes me differ from the statement that the people "strive to gain court favour by illustrious actions, useful alike to the state and monarch." I always fancied that truckling, cringing, intriguing, were the chief avenues to court favour. S. N. goes on to attack the evils which elections entail, but unfortunately for his case he attacks *not* the elective principle, but the evils which sometimes arise in its administration, most of which may be oviated. Besides, his arguments will apply to the elections of M.P.'s, and others. Does my friend wish us to have hereditary parliaments, judges, &c.? But finding theory somewhat slippery ground, S. N. turns to experience, and selects as his field of illustration—Poland! Poland, a country surrounded by autocracy, the people in a state of feudalism, with a mock-elective monarchy—(the suffrages not coming direct from the people but from the palatines)—this is called "the *fairest field!*" But my respected antagonist oversteps the mark, for he shows that the Poles were in a state of the greatest degradation by his extract from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, paragraph 8.

In reply to the extracts from the "History of Poland," made to prove the disadvantages of Elective Monarchy, I will refer to some facts of the history of England—not remote nor isolated facts, but such facts as can be found in almost every chapter of that history. To begin:

A.D. 1066. Harold and William the Conqueror decide their *right* to the throne by war.

A.D. 1087. William Rufus and Robert of Normandy carry on intrigues against each other respecting the hereditary right.

A.D. 1100. Henry I. and Robert of Normandy quarrel and commence war respecting the *right divine.* (Henry is admitted to be a usurper.)

1135. Civil war betwixt Stephen and Matilda.

1155. Henry II. came to the crown; and if Becket and Fair Rosamond had never been his victims, he *might* have been thought a good man.

1190. Richard I. plunged the nation in continual war.

1198. John murdered his nephew with his own hands.

This, certainly, is a good beginning: had we space we might continue the series through almost every reign; but suffice it if we but remind the reader of the Wars of the Roses, the civil war, and the innumerable wars which have sprung from the unjust system of Hereditary Monarchy.

Examine also the *character* of our monarchs, several of them murderers (either murdering with their own hands or by proxy); many of them dissolute, and leaving behind them many proofs of this. Not a few of them were cruel, capricious, and arbitrary, others weak, effeminate, and unfit to govern, and nearly all utterly destitute of principle. What are the *best* of them? Edward the Sixth was a mere child, of whom nothing more can be learned than that he was a good boy; and Elizabeth, so often lauded—who does not now admit that she was at best a proud and selfish woman? Our present queen, the best, undoubtedly, who ever sat on Britain's throne—can her warmest admirers (of whom I am one) do more than admit that her chief virtue is, that she does *nothing* as a queen, and acts nobly as a woman? that, in fact, by maintaining her present position, she makes Britain virtually a republic.

But, perhaps, some will think I have dealt too largely on our comparatively ancient monarchs, and have said nothing of our more recent ones. I will, therefore, point to three of the Georges; and if, from the Newgate Calendar, you can select three names more disgraceful to humanity than theirs, I will grant that I have overrated their vices.

One more argument, and I have done. The education which is bestowed on the heir-apparent is alone sufficient to unfit him for ruling; no wonder that our rulers know nothing of the people, when they belong, as it were, to a different race of beings. If there is to be a head to the executive, let that head be chosen from the people. EXCELSIOR.

Social Economy, etc.

OUGHT CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS TO BE ABOLISHED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

MR. EDITOR,—Allow me to assign two or three reasons for thinking that Capital or Death Punishments ought not, at present, to be abolished in the case of wilful murder, for in no other case would I, for a moment, defend them.

1. Justice demands their continuance. If a man injure another, and he be obliged to make amends, he is only obliged to do that which is just and right. The act, when completed, is an act of justice, inasmuch as the injury is completely obliterated by the amends made. But it is obvious that the criminal must suffer more than he inflicted, in order to meet the claims of justice; for he has not only to cover the original damage, but also the expense of the prosecution, &c.

It is evident, however, that the murderer cannot cover the original damage he has done, for he has taken away human life. The damage is infinite. All other sins, against individuals, are as nothing compared with this. No amount of property, no amount of suffering, can ever cancel the damage done; and yet justice demands that it should be cancelled. If a man rob his neighbour, he may make *good* his trespass by his property, if he have enough, and if not, by the sacrifice of his liberty—*i. e.*, in ordinary cases—and even should this be impossible, justice demands all that he can do towards making good the breach. And this all may extend to everything except life. For, according to the law of God, under a former dispensation, a man might be sold into captivity for theft, provided he were unable to pay double by other means. We have already noticed that, in the case of murder, it is impossible to repair the breach. Nor is it even possible to do anything towards it: no percentage can be paid.

Seeing, then, that this is the case, Is the murderer to go free? Human nature answers, No. The Bible says, "If a man comes presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from mine altar, that he may die," Ex. xxi. 14; and further, "The land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it," Numb. xxxv. 33. Now, if God required of his own people that they should put to death the murderer, and on no account spare him, since He required them to do nothing but what was just, we think we are at liberty to say that justice requires his death.

2. The security of society demands the death of the murderer.

The law of God, and the law of the land, allow of a man being condemned to perpetual slavery for stealing. If the murderer be not punished far more severely than the thief, is it not probable that the thief will become the murderer in numerous cases where life is at present held sacred: especially if by that means he thinks he can secure his escape?

Again: If the murderer be not put to death, he must be confined for life in some way or other. Now the man who has perpetrated one murder, will not, if a sufficient inducement presents itself, scruple to perpetrate a second? And what inducement would be so likely to bring about this result as the chance of escape? That no such opportunity would present itself during a man's lifetime, who is prepared to say? And that no keeper would fall by the hand of his charge, we think few will assert.

Further: It is a well-known fact, that men, in general, look upon an offence as heinous, very much in proportion to the punishment that is awarded to it. Poaching, for instance, is considered by many sensible men, almost, if not quite, as bad as sheepstealing; just because the man who has killed a hare has, in many cases, been as severely treated as the man who has killed and stolen a sheep.

Again: In a time of war, privateering has been considered an honourable vocation, whilst the pirate has been discarded; and yet, setting aside the fact, that Government has licensed the former, it would be exceedingly difficult to know the one from the other.

With such facts as these before us—and they are by no means the only ones—is it not fair to conclude, that if the punishment of murder were assimilated to that of any other crime, the crime of murder would be considered on a level with the crimes similarly punished; and that, owing to this circumstance, murders would increase very much beyond their present number? We think it is; and hence we say that the security of society demands the death of the murderer. W. D.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It is always desirable for a people to understand the great social questions which are the necessary concomitants of a progressive and civilized community. The subject of *punishment* is one which has long commanded the attention of many of our greatest, wisest, and most benevolent men, and it deserves the attention of all; for punishment presupposes crime, and crime of any kind is a great social evil. The once prevalent idea, that the ends of punishment were attained, if persons who *had* committed offences were disposed of, is now fast losing ground; for it is seen to be far more desirable to *prevent* the commission of crime, than simply to provide means for its punishment after it *has been* committed. Hence the old maxim, "Prevention is better than cure."

The class of punishments now under consideration we propose first to endeavour to show *unnecessary* and *inexpedient*, reserving it to a future paper to consider their *justifiability* or otherwise. We may premise, by observing that we do not dispute that, in the earlier stages of our country's history, Capital Punishments may have been *advisable*, because in those times, there did not exist the facilities for the proper disposition of criminals which we now possess. Nor do we deny that, under the Jewish dispensation, they were sanctioned by Divine authority. But we wish to speak more particularly of our own time, and to show that, under the existing state of society, they *ought to be abolished*.

Properly to establish our position, we must understand what are the *objects of all punishment*. With other writers upon this subject, and, indeed, by common acceptation, we believe them to be three:

I. The reformation of the offender;

II. Remuneration to the injured; and,

III. The prevention of future crime—not only by those who *have* offended, but by others who might follow in their steps.

These being the objects of punishment, let us see whether Capital Executions secure them, or whether society would suffer by the abolition of such punishments, and we can then judge of their NECESSITY.

First, The reformation of the offender. This object is certainly frustrated by death punishment; for by taking away the life of the criminal—which generally occurs very speedily after sentence is passed—all chance of reformation is cut off. Reason says, "The greater the offence, or the more depraved the criminal, the greater the necessity for time

and opportunity to work out his reformation." But the advocates of Capital Punishment virtually, if not avowedly, oppose this truth, by depriving the criminal of the time and means for reformation, and hurrying him before his Maker, "with all his imperfections on his head." "True," they may say, "but the murderer had no consideration of this kind for his victim." Our reply is, with a previous writer, the law recognises *justice* only, and not *vindictiveness;* therefore the actions of the murderer form no just precedent. The taking away the life of the criminal is then, we believe, decidedly opposed to the *first* object of punishment.

Second, Remuneration to the injured. Now, the killing of one man cannot bring back the life of another: consequently the hanging of the murderer cannot, in any respect, remunerate (so to speak) the victim already murdered, any more than it can make proper recompence to the surviving relatives, or to those who were dependent upon him. For it frequently happens that, by the commission of murder, great injury is inflicted, either directly or indirectly, on persons connected with the deceased; and for this the law, in its present state, offers no provision; indeed, only extends the evil, by rendering destitute also those dependent on the murderer. Were a milder and more humane system of punishment adopted, the criminal could be made to employ his time (while yet under punishment) profitably, and thus contribute, at least partially, to the support of those whom he had injured. Thus *some* remuneration would be made; and the desired opportunity would also be afforded of working the criminal's reformation. We cannot be expected here to detail the means by which these objects could be accomplished; nor are we so presumptuous as to suppose there are no difficulties in the way; but we say the plan is at least worthy of a trial: it has the plea of humanity on its side, and might be productive of great good.

Third, Having seen that, in the first two cases, the infliction of death punishment defeats the ends (even its advocates must admit) which all punishment should have in view, we now proceed to our third consideration—the prevention of future crime—which, as we have before said, is by far the most important object to be attained, and will require a more lengthy investigation.

The supporters of Capital Punishments, in maintaining their necessity, put much stress on the influence which executions have by way of *example*, in preventing others from committing crimes alike punishable. That the influence of example has not fully succeeded, is self-evident, or murders would have ceased long ago. If, then, this influence is only partial, let us see what is its extent. The most reasonable way of arriving at this point, is, we conceive, to ascertain whether those crimes which were once punishable with death, but for which more lenient punishments have of late been substituted, have *increased* or *decreased* since the abolition of the death penalty. Should they in the majority of cases have *increased* since the abolition, then the fair and just assumption would be, that the influence of example in this respect was beneficial; should they have *decreased*, we shall consider the opposite conclusion the correct one.

In the reign of George III. there were no less than one hundred and sixty offences punishable with death, but that penalty has now been repealed in all but one or two cases, and indeed is now inflicted only for murder. With what success this alteration of the law has been attended, the following results, obtained from returns made to Parliament down to 1838, will show. They may be found more amplified in the publications of the Rev. Thomas Pyne, and Mr Fred Rowton, relative to death punishment.

For *Horse-stealing* there were executed in the nine years ending December, 1829, forty-six criminals; the number of committals being sixteen hundred and twenty-six. In the next nine years, ending 1838, *no executions* for this crime took place, and the committals were reduced to fifteen hundred and sixty-five.

For *Burglary* and *Housebreaking* there were executed in the six years ending December, 1832, fifty-six persons; the committals during that period being five

thousand one hundred and ninety-one. In the next six years, ending December, 1838, there were but three executions for this offence, and the committals fell to four thousand six hundred and twenty-one, a diminution of ten per cent., notwithstanding that Lord Wynford had predicted that if the capital penalty for this offence were repealed, "we should all be murdered in our beds!"

For *Robbery* there were thirty-six persons executed in the five years ending December, 1833; and the commitments were one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine. In the next five years, ending 1838, there were five executions, with one thousand six hundred and thirty-four commitments, or sixteen per cent. diminution.

For *Arson* there were in the *two* years, ending December, 1836, nine criminals executed, and one hundred and forty-eight committed; and in the next two years, ending December, 1838, there were *none* executed, and only eighty-six committed—a diminution of forty-one per cent. in the crime.

For *Forgery*, in the ten years ending December, 1829, sixty-four criminals were executed, and seven hundred and forty-six committed. In the next ten years, ending 1839, there were none executed, and only seven hundred and thirty-one committed.

These facts need no comment. So far as the cases to which they relate, they are conclusive; and we could adduce similar results relative to almost all other crimes for which the death penalty has been abolished.

But in the face of all this we sometimes hear persons say, "Ah! but the case of murder is different from all other cases: it is the greatest of all crimes, and therefore should be the most severely punished." Now if severity of punishment was the ONLY object, doubtless such reasoning would embody some truth. But we have before shown that it is not so: policy and justice are our leading strings; and we must trace all things to their true source. Murder, like other crimes, proceeds from depraved passions; anything tending to excite those passions will be likely to *increase* crime, while measures possessed of a contrary effect will be likely to decrease it. The following statistics furnish results equally striking with those before given, and relate exclusively to the crime of murder.

Referring first to the county of Middlesex alone, and taking thirty-two years, ending 1842, and dividing them into two periods of sixteen years each, we find that in the first, all who were convicted of murder, thirty-four in number, were executed; and notwithstanding this unyielding rigour, one hundred and eighty-eight murders were committed. In the second period clemency prevailed; out of twenty-seven persons convicted, only seventeen were hanged; and yet there were but ninety persons committed for the crime during the whole sixteen years. Thus with only sixty-two per cent. of executions instead of one hundred per cent. the offence decreased more than one-half.

Next, taking *England and Wales*, we find that the years 1815, 1817, 1818, and 1819, witnessed the execution of *all* who were convicted of murder, sixty-six in number; and in the four years immediately following these eras of severity the crime of murder *increased* twelve per cent. In the years 1836, 1838, 1840, and 1842, only thirty-one were executed out of eighty-three condemned, and in the succeeding years the crime of murder *decreased* seventeen per cent.

The same parliamentary paper (says Mr. Rowton) shows, First, that, from 1834 to 1841 (inclusive), in the counties where *all* who were convicted of murder were executed, the number of murders remained in the following years as nearly as possible the same. Secondly, that in the counties where the commutations of the extreme penalty took place (and a different punishment was substituted), during the same period, the years following exhibited a diminution of thirty-five per cent. in the crime. Thirdly, that in the counties where a large proportion of the persons committed were acquitted on the ground of insanity (and treated accordingly), the commitments *decreased* thirty-two per cent. in the succeeding years; and, Fourthly, that in counties where there were commitments and *no*

convictions at all, the commitments in the following years were fewer by twenty-three per cent.

Again, in the three consecutive years, 1834, 1835, and 1836, *no* executions whatever took place in England for any kind of crime, and these are *the only* years in the annals of Britain in which there have been *no convictions for murder*.

Inasmuch as figures speak louder than words, we have preferred giving a few statistics in the above form to relying merely upon our arguments. Such results as they give are not confined to our country, but the experience of many countries on the Continent confirm their truth, and if space permitted we could readily cite them. The celebrated charge of Sir James Mackintosh to the Grand Jury at Bombay, and the Grand Duke Leopold's account of the effects of the abolition of death punishment in the duchy of Tuscany, will recur to the reader as among the instances to which we refer.

The facts already before us, we conceive, tend clearly to establish our proposition, *that Capital Executions are not necessary for the suppression of crime;* for they show us that just in proportion as executions have become rare, the periods immediately following have been attended with a LESS number of murders: while, on the other hand, when executions have been more frequent, and the public mind consequently more brutalized, crime, not only of murder, but of nearly every other description has *increased*. Are we not, then, justified in believing that if Capital Punishments were *altogether abolished*, the crime of murder would materially decrease?

A common objection urged against these facts, and which must here be noticed, is, that diminution of crime is rather to be attributed to our *educational progress*, and our *increased morality*, than to other causes. We wish for our country's sake this was the correct solution, but a little careful inquiry will be sufficient to convince the most sceptical that it is not. It would indeed be "passingly strange," if these *were* the governing influences, that crime should fluctuate in the manner we have seen it does!

We now come to speak of the *inexpediency* of Capital Punishments. In the ordinary course of things, and, perhaps, more particularly in these days when the *philosophy of utility* is so much thought of, to show anything to be *unnecessary*, will also be to show it *inexpedient*. In this case, however, there are several other considerations involved, which we purpose to consider distinctively, though briefly.

While we have seen that Capital Executions *do not* operate as a warning to deter others from crime, we cannot but have seen that their tendency *is* to stimulate *to crime*. Some modern writer has asked, "Who ever heard of a person being prevented from crime from a fear of the gallows?" and there is much reason in the inquiry, as the following facts will testify. The Rev. Mr. Roberts, of Bristol, ascertained that out of one hundred and sixty-seven capital convicts, no fewer than one hundred and sixty-four, or all but three, had been present at executions, and some frequently. It is also a known fact, that *Wicks*, who was executed for murder in 1846, made a point of being present at public executions on every possible occasion, and it is said he used to hire a place where he could see comfortably! Charles Dickens, "the friend of progress," has lent a powerful hand to the putting down of *public* executions. We are also pleased to observe, that the writer of the Negative Article on this question in the first Number of the *Controversialist*, strongly condemns them. This is a step in the right direction.

Another reason against the expediency of Capital Executions, is the great *uncertainty* with which their infliction is attended; and which thus renders punishment so much a matter of chance. From the extreme severity of the penalty, attempts are often made to screen even those whom there is too much reason to fear are guilty: this evidently has a bad tendency. Knowing that a manifestation of sympathy will be raised, and that not confined to the lowest classes of society, who can wonder that a mind so depraved

as that of a murderer should derive an unwholesome stimulus therefrom? This feeling of sympathy is sometimes carried so far, that the real victim—the murdered man—is lost sight of, and the more enlarged feelings of commiseration become extended towards the *murderer*. Reader, reflect for a moment upon the natural, the inevitable result of this! How different would the case be were a milder system of punishment adopted! There would then be no exhibition of the sympathy we have just described. The *guilty* would be viewed with the proper feelings of detestation: punishment would become certain: and *certainty* of punishment would exercise a powerful influence in the suppression of crime.

But the last, and most important reason we have to urge against the expediency of Capital Punishment, is the liability of human judgment to err, and the consequent liability of the *innocent* suffering for the guilty.

In the absence of the ability to judge unerringly between right and wrong, between the guilty and the innocent, man should not exercise the power of life or death over his fellow. Better, we think, that ten guilty men escape *this world's* punishment, than one *innocent* man suffer. What reparation can be made for the injured feelings of the relatives of a man executed for a crime of which he is innocent? Or what recompence to the injured man himself, cut off, perhaps, in the prime of life, and, may be, in the midst of his hopes and aspirations? And yet how many such cases have occurred! How many mothers have wept over the judicial sacrifice of sons in whom their hopes were centred! How many wives have been made widows, and children orphans, by the operation of this cruel and barbarous law! By it the scales of justice have been perverted, and the avenue of revenge, duplicity, and hatred made more dreadful! But we shrink from the prosecution of a theme so horrifying, and pray that the light of *better days* may banish, and, in some measure, compensate for the dark doings of the past.

We have now endeavoured to show that Capital Executions are both *unnecessary* and *inexpedient*, inasmuch as they do not in any manner promote the attainment of the proper objects of punishment, but, by a variety of means, either direct or indirect, militate *against* their attainment, and we therefore affirm that they "ought to be abolished." We purpose resuming the subject on the grounds of their justifiability, and we now conclude with the following picture of the painful effects of death punishment:—

"I defended," says the late Mr. Daniel O'Connell, in a speech delivered at Exeter Hall, London, "three brothers of the name of Cremen, within the last ten years. They were indicted for murder—the evidence was most unsatisfactory—the judge had a leaning towards the crown prosecution, and he almost compelled the jury to convict them. I sat at the window as they passed by after sentence of death had been pronounced upon them; there was a large military guard taking them back to gaol, positively forbidden to allow any communication with the three unfortunate youths. But the mother was there, and she, armed with the strength of her affection, broke through the guard. I saw her clasp her eldest son, who was about twenty-two years of age—I saw her hang on the second, who was not twenty—I saw her faint when she hung on the neck of her youngest boy, who was but eighteen. And I ask what recompence could be made for such agony? They were executed—and *they were innocent!!*"

C. W., Jun.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. II.

Nature has uniformly bestowed upon every emotion of the mind its proper or legitimate outward expression, in such a manner, that that which suits one

age, sex, or circumstance, cannot by any means be accommodated to another. *Anger*, for instance, when unrestrained, is expressed with great agitation ; but that of an old man, of a woman, and of a youth, are distinctly different from each other, and from that of a man in the vigour of his age. A hero may manifest fear, timidity, or sensibility of pain, but not in the same manner as that in which a girl would express those sensations. *Grief* may be manifested by reading a melancholy story, or seeing a calamitous event in a room. It may be acted upon the stage; it may be dwelt upon by a pleader at the bar—which has often a great effect upon the jury, the judge, and the listeners in the court; or grief may very judiciously have a place in a sermon. The passion is still the same. But the manner of expressing it will naturally be differently manifested if the speaker or hearer have any discriminating judgment. Nature, we acknowledge, must ever stand in the foreground, and it is not possible for the best rules of art to surpass her. Children of three or four years of age, for example, express their grief in a tone of voice and action of limbs altogether different from those manifested in the action and moment of their anger. They give utterance to their *joy* in a manner very different from both their grief and anger. Nor do we ever see them mistake or apply one in the place of another. Emotion is the *primum mobile*. Hence, from nature is to be deduced the whole art of speaking. What we mean does not only depend upon the words which we use, but upon the *manner* in which we utter them ; accordingly, in life, the greatest attention is paid to *manner*, as expressive of something of which mere words give no direct indication. Thus, nature fixes the outward expression of every true intention or sentiment of the mind. *Art* comes in as an accomplished accessory or abettor, and gives both power and gracefulness to what nature furnishes. Nature has determined that man should walk upon his feet, and not upon his hands, and in comes Art to teach him to walk gracefully.

Delivery, as other imitative arts, has its true, sublime, and telling powers—in the *manner* as well as in the matter of that which the orator delivers : this should never be forgotten. The accent, the pitch of voice, emphasis, the rising and falling inflections, parenthesis, exclamation, and other cultivated departments in delivery, must be attended to.

For the sake of *young* readers, we will take a short glance at the interpretation of these requirements.

Accent is the expression of *one* syllable in a word with greater force of voice than any other, and is to be clear and articulate; every syllable stands off from that which is next to it, so that each syllable might be discriminated and numbered as the speaker proceeds. The speaker must accommodate his voice to fill the room in which he speaks. The inflections of the voice must be accurately suited to the matter, so that the humour or passion may be known by the sound of the voice alone. The variation must be like the swelling folds of the drapery in a fine picture or statue—bold and free, harmonious and forcible. *Emphasis* is the force of voice, which is placed on any particular word or words in sentences, to distinguish the sense. Yet, remember, there is nothing more pedantic than too

much stress laid upon a *trifling* matter. Nor can any errors be more ridiculous, than those which are occasioned by the emphasis being placed incorrectly. Such was that of a certain curate, who, when reading our Lord's sayings to his disciples, —"O *fools* and slow of heart to *believe* all that the prophets have written concerning me,"—placed the emphasis on the word *believe*, as if Christ had called them fools for *believing*. Upon being found fault with by his vicar, he placed the emphasis upon *all*, as if it had been foolish for the disciples to believe *all* that the prophets had written. The vicar again blamed him for misplacing the emphasis upon the word *prophets;* the next time, he read it as if the *prophets* had been in no respect worthy of *belief*. Cicero very justly directs, "That a public speaker *remit*, from time to time, somewhat of the *vehemence* of his action, and not utter every passage with all the force he can, in order to set off more strongly the more *emphatic* parts, as the painter, by means of shades, properly placed, makes the figure stand off bolder. For if the speaker has uttered a weak passage with all the energy of which he is master, what is he to do when he comes to the more pathetic parts?" The energy, or *pathos*, with which a speech is to be properly delivered, must increase as the speaker proceeds. The orator must increase in warmth by uniform degrees, and not commence in a pathetic strain, because the audience is not prepared to go along with him.

The VOICE must be well managed, and must generally fall at the end of sentences, avoiding all particular whine or drawl. *Monotony*, or the holding one uniform humming sound, must be carefully guarded against. The natural inflection of voice must also be carefully attended to in a speech. *Cant* is a strain made up of a few notes rising and falling without variation, like a peal of bells, let the matter change or consist in what it may. The chant in which the prose-psalms is half sung, half said, in cathedrals, I do not admire, and anything like this must be avoided in speaking. This style is unnatural, because the varying strain of matter necessarily requires a continual varying series of sounds to express it. Chanting in cathedrals—psalmody in parish churches—ballad music, put to a number of verses, differing in thought and images—cant, and monotony, in expressing the various features of a discourse, do not, in the least, *humour* the *matters* to which they apply, but, on the contrary, confound them. Young speakers in *questions* must let their voice *rise* toward the end of the sentence, contrary to the manner of pronouncing most other sentences; because the emphatic word, or that upon which the stress of the voice is needed, is frequently the last in the sentence. For instance, "Can any good come out of *Nazareth?*" Here the emphatic word is *Nazareth*. Although this is a general rule, there are apparent exceptions. For example, "By what *authority* dost thou these things? and *who* gave thee this authority?" The emphatic words are *authority* and *who*. In all interrogatory sentences, the emphasis must be placed upon that word, or those words, which signify the point or subject about which the speaker inquires. For instance, "Is it true that you have seen a noble lord from court to-day who has told you bad news?" If the inquirer is desirous to know whether the person *to whom he speaks*, or some *other person*, has seen the supposed great man, he will

put the emphasis upon *you*. If he wants to know whether the man has been seen to-*day* or yesterday, he must place the emphasis upon *day*. If he knows that the person addressed has seen a great man to-day, and only wants to know whether he has related any news, he must put the stress of voice upon *news*. If he knows the rest, and wishes to be informed whether the news heard was bad, he will put the emphasis upon the word *bad*. We are afraid of being too prolix for our readers, else we might give more examples. The following general rules must suffice: 1st.—Questions commenced with pronouns or verbs, end with the *falling* inflection; as, "Who are the persons that are the most apt to fall into peevishness and dejection?" But when an exclamatory question commences with a pronoun or adverb, then it claims the *rising* inflection; as, "Will you, for ever, Athenians, do nothing but walk up and down the city asking one other, What news—what news?" 2nd.—Questions asked by verbs require the rising inflection; as, "Does the law which thou hast broken denounce vengeance against thee?" But if the sentence is very long, or concludes a paragraph, it may then end with a *falling* inflection; as, "The brigantines, even under a female leader, had force enough to burn the enemy's settlements, to storm the camps, and, if success had not introduced negligence and inactivity, would have been able entirely to throw off the yoke; and shall we not, untouched, unsubdued—and struggling, not for the acquisition, but for the continuance of liberty, declare, at the very first outset, what kind of men Caledonia has reserved for her *defence?*" 3rd.—When the interrogation affects two objects, taken *disjunctively*, the former has the rising and the latter the falling inflection; as, "Are you toiling for fame or for fortune?"

The matter contained in a *parenthesis*, or between *commas* instead of parenthesis, must be pronounced with a lower voice, and with more rapid delivery than the rest of the sentence, and with a short stop at the beginning and end, and must also conclude with the same pause and inflection as that which immediately preceded it, that the hearer may perceive where it was broken off and where resumed; as, "For God is my witness, *whom I serve with my spirit in the gospel of his Son*, that, without ceasing, I make mention of you always in my prayers, making request—*if by any means now at length I might have a prosperous journey by the will of God*—to come unto you." We may here remark, that all parenthetical sentences will be better understood by being cut off by a *dash* or *hyphen*, as in the latter part of the above example.

Energy, in expressing pathetic language, is necessary. It is amazing how many public speakers utter strong and pathetic expressions in a cold and unanimated manner. This is a fault, perhaps, more in reading than in speaking. We have often heard the miraculous conquest of the five kings who rose against the people of Israel read in such a loose, unanimated way, as to lull a whole congregation to sleep. How degrading to hear a clergyman read, "Open the mouth of the cave, and bring out those five kings to me out of the cave," with as little concern and animation as he would say to his footboy, "Open the chamber door, and bring my silppers, that I may put them on." Let the speaker avoid such apathy and indifference, even in circumstances of minor importance.

In the delivery of a perfect orator, there is not a faculty unemployed, not one that he possesses but is exerted to its highest pitch. All his internal powers are at work; all his external testify their energies. Within, the memory, the fancy, the judgment, the passions, are all busy: without, every muscle, every nerve is exerted: not a feature, not a limb, but speaks.

The Liverpool Literary and Philosophical Society.—A meeting of the members of this Society took place at the Royal Institution, Monday evening, April 20th, J. B. Yates, Esq., the president, in the chair.—Mr. Smith exhibited some curious insects of a new species, collected two years ago, 900 miles up the river Amazon; and Mr. Archer, surgeon, showed a curious shell.—Dr. Inman, the secretary, read a paper "On the limits of the animal and vegetable worlds."—Mr. A. Higginson, surgeon, in reference to a conversation which arose at the last meeting, exhibited some ears of barley which had sprung from oats. From a memorandum which accompanied it, it appeared that the oat-seed had been sown in June, 1848, and the plant cut green in September; the consequence was, that it shot up the barley produced, which was cut in August, 1849. A discussion followed on the subject, in which Dr Dickinson, the chairman, and other gentlemen, took part.

Romsey Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—On Tuesday, May 7th, the last Lecture for the session was delivered by Mr. W. M. Williams, on the 'Philosophy of Sport.' This was the third lecture Mr. Williams has delivered, and was by far more interesting than any that had preceded it. A great many experiments were introduced, explaining the cause of many things of daily occurrence, the result of which nearly every one is acquainted with, but few know or think of the way in which they are procured. Many conjuring tricks were shown; among others, a decanter of wine being emptied (or apparently so) into glasses two or three feet distant, and also of pouring different kinds of wine, milk, different coloured inks, and water, all out of the same bottle. The causes of these things were fully explained, and many who before were much mystified at such exhibitions are now surprised at their simplicity. Not the least useful part of the lecture was a clear and lucid explanation of Dr. Clarke's discovery of purifying water, and rendering hard water soft.

Manchester (Rusholme Road) Young Men's Improvement Society.—Since the establishment of this Society, in 1843, its prosperity has been gradually increasing. It numbers now about fifty members, growing in mind and intelligence. It is conducted by the following officers: President, Treasurer, Secretary, Librarian, and Reporter, with a Committee of six members to transact the business of the Society. Perhaps you will be somewhat surprised that a Society such as ours should need a reporter; such, however, is the case: his duty is to make a condensed report of each speech, together with the essays, in phonography. They are afterwards transcribed in a book provided for the purpose. We have about a dozen members who are able to write phonography, though perhaps not more than half that number are competent for the duties of reporting. The meetings are opened with prayer, the minutes of the last meeting are then read, after which, members are proposed and received; questions for discussion proposed; and whatever ordinary business there may be, is transacted. The president then calls upon the affirmative essayist to introduce the question for discussion, after which the negative; he (the president) makes a few remarks thereon, and the discussion commences. Since we have adopted the method of having two essayists, a larger amount of interest has been excited; there has been less lack of speakers, and the president has not had, but on very few occasions, to make use of his prerogative of calling upon members to express their opinions. The essays are generally of from ten to twenty minutes' duration, probably the two occupying half an hour. The meeting concludes at a quarter to ten.

Birmingham Young Men's Christian Association.—His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin, as an expression of his "hearty satisfaction in the excellent object" of the Birmingham Young Men's Christian Association, has just presented to the library of the Institution the whole of his works.

Working Men's Association.—On Tuesday evening, May 14, a meeting was held at Cambridge, for the purpose of forming a Society to promote the study of Literature, Philosophy, &c., amongst the Working Classes.

Mr. Coleman was unanimously called to the chair. In opening the proceedings, he dilated at great length upon the advantages the Working Classes would derive from such an Institution, and concluded a powerful address by earnestly recommending to their notice a new Magazine having a strong claim on public patronage and support—*The British Controversialist*, in which they would find much that was instructive and truly edifying; and, perhaps, had it never been published, that meeting would never have been held.

Tho Rev. J. W. Hamilton rose to propose the first resolution,—

"That it is highly desirable that a united effort be made to establish in Cambridge an Institution whereby the means of intellectual improvement and extensive information may be afforded to the Working Classes."

The resolution was seconded by Henry Bewick, Esq., and agreed to.

Mr. John Lawrence proposed, and Mr. C. Rand seconded, the following resolution—

"That an Institution be now formed, to be named the 'Working Men's Association,' embracing the following objects:—A public Reading Room; a Laboratory and Workshop; a Lecture Room: the arrangements for the whole of which shall be entirely uninfluenced by political considerations."

A Committee and Officers were then appointed.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

7. Which is the best system of Short-hand? I have heard much of Phonography; can any of your readers speak to its value from experience? —J. W. S.

8. I think the Course of Reading in your last is not complete, or it would have contained the title of at least one book on Natural History. I am much in want of a good and cheap one that shall take in the whole of the animal kingdom; can any of your Correspondents recommend one to me?—B. A, jun.

9. If war be opposed to the spirit of Christianity, how can we account for Christ's conduct in commanding his disciples to sell their garments and buy swords?—Luke xxii. 36—One much interested in the "War" question.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

4. *A Course of Reading.*—Mr. Editor,—Will you allow me to suggest another, and, in my opinion, an improved course of reading for a young man. The one given in your last contains far too much of the light and fictitious. I am myself a young man, and my experience teaches me that there is too much of the real and valuable in literature for us to be justified in wasting our time on the imaginary and trifling. But I must check myself in making these remarks, as I know I am on dangerous ground, and as I see that the propriety of perusing works of fiction is proposed as a subject for discussion:—

History.—Rollin's Ancient History; Tytler's General History; Macaulay's History of England.

Biography. — Plutarch's Lives; Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties; Biographical Sketches of the Poets.

Travels.—The Universal Traveller; Kohl's England and Ireland; Humboldt's Works; Buckingham's Travels.

Poetry. — Milton's Works; Thomson's Seasons; Cowper's Works; Pope's Homer's Iliad and Odyssey; Selections from Shakspere; Kirke White's Remains.

Physiology.—Dr. Southwood Smith's Health; Dr. Johnson's Life, Health, and Disease; Bentley's Health made easy for the People.

Politics—Smith's Wealth of Nations; Political Economy; Sanatory Economy.

Science.—Parker's Readings in Science; Paley's Natural Theology; Mudie's Seasons; Natural Philosophy, by the Useful Knowledge Society.

General Literature—Addison's Essays; Chambers' Cyclopædia of English Literature; Chambers' Information for the People; Tract Society's Monthly Volumes, &c.

Periodicals.—British Quarterly Review; North British Review; British Controversialist; Christian Treasury; Hogg's Instructor; Chambers' Journal. &c.

Religion.—Paley's Evidences; Keith on Prophecy; Dr. Cumming's Is Christianity from God? Butler's Analogy; Barnes' Notes; THE BIBLE.

I fear that many of your readers may be in a position only to obtain a few of these works, but they may secure all for perusal by subscribing to a good library.—C. A.

5. *The Currency.*—Taylor's "Catechism of the Currency," and the letters of Aladdin, which appeared in Douglas Jerrold's Newspaper, now published in a separate form for 1*s.*, will be found to contain much valuable information on this subject.—E. B.

6. *Pronunciation of French Words and Phrases.* —Pinnock's Catechism of the French Language, 9*d.*, contains a system of French Pronunciation very nearly approximating to the French standard, which, if carefully read and studied, would give a good general idea of the true sound; but as this subject will doubtless possess considerable interest in the estimation of many of your readers, I will endeavour to give a more extended and satisfactory reply in future numbers of this Magazine.—S. N.

7. *Short-hand.* — I have studied Harding's Short-hand, and think it admirable. I do not approve of Phonography. There is a small work published at 2*d.*, Mackenzie's Short-hand, which contains a very simple and plain system. Perseverance, constant practice, and care, are essential requisites in the attainment of any system, and with these any system will be advantageous. —S. N.

I have been acquainted with Phonography for seven or eight years, during which time I have used it every day. I am, therefore, in a position to speak confidently as to its merits, and I can heartily recommend it to J. W. S., and all your readers. It is superior to every other system I have seen.—L. S.

8. *Natural History.*—Chambers' Information, recommended in the course of reading, contains a very complete view of this science, extending through Numbers IX. to XII., inclusive.—S. N.

NOTICES OF BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, &c.

Facts and Opinions for Churchmen and Dissenters. By a Schoolmaster. London: Partridge and Oakey.

The object of the author of this little volume is to refute the notion that the ancient fathers are safe guides in the interpretation of the Scripture. This he attempts by giving a sketch of the events in each century of the Christian era, and notices of the religious men who principally figured in it. He writes with perspicuity and earnestness. Whether he accomplishes his object or not, his readers will determine.

"Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter."—The Ultimatum: or, What saith the Scripture? By John H. Hinton, M.A. London: Houlston and Stoneman.

This is a pamphlet on a subject that is attracting much attention; the writer is undoubtedly a man of clear apprehension and vigorous thought.

The Vegetarian Advocate. London: William Horsell.

The design of this monthly periodical may be learned from its title. It is conducted with considerable ability; and in addition to the advocacy of its peculiar principles, it contains a large amount of interesting and instructive matter.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. III.

PERCEPTIVITY.

NAMES, AND OBJECTS ABLE TO BE NAMED.

"The reader who would follow a close reasoner to the summit of the absolute principle of any one important subject, has chosen a chamois hunter for his guide. He cannot carry us on his shoulders; we must strain our sinews, as he has strained his; and make firm footing on the smooth rock for ourselves, by the blood of toil from our own feet."—*Coleridge.*

"La langue est le tableau de la vie; c'est l'assemblage de toutes les idées d'un peuple, manifesté au dehors par le sons." *— *Thomas.*

NAMES.—Hitherto we have considered Man merely as a knowledge-recipient, not as a thought-expositor. We have shown how ideas are acquired, we have now to explain how they are communicated. Thus, a new object lies before us, a new current is given to our speculations. The ideas which may enter the mind are numerous and diversified, yet without Language they remain invisible, unexpressed, and incomprehensible to any but ourselves. Everything in the multiplicity of objects which surrounds us, and by which we are impressed; every feeling of the sentient powers, and every operation of the intellectual faculties, when brought under the cognizance of our Consciousness, seeks to be invested with a name, that it may be enabled to pass from the domain of pure thought to the territory of communicable knowledge. Without Language men would be locked-up boxes of experience, knowledge, and thought, destitute of the power of

"Painting in sound the forms of joy and woe,
Until the mind's eye *sees* them melt and glow."

We have all a thought-treasury of our own, acquired by intercourse with existences around and without us, and operations continually progressing within: but we have social relations to fulfil which require the interchange of this mental wealth. We are not formed merely for acquisition and niggardly hoarding, or miserly avariciousness, but for intellectual commerce. Hence we are endowed with lingual powers, which capacitate us to symbolize our thoughts in sound, and thus represent them to the minds of others; that is, to originate within their minds, by the action of sounds on the auditory nerves, ideas similar to those which occupy our own. These marks or signs being once fixed, by a process of mental association, hereinafter to be explained, produce and reproduce each other; that is to say, the view of the object naturally suggests the sign, designation, or name; and the hearing of the name as naturally recalls our conception of the object to the percipient agency. Words are the vehicles of thought-transference, the instruments by which we catalogize and registrate our knowledge, and convey it to the minds of those with whom the social compact places us in relation. Oh, how glorious an endowment is this which we possess, Language! By this have the wisdom-revealments of Socrates, Plato, and Euclid been transmitted to us; by this has old Homer's soul-exciting Epic been given to immortality; by this the

* Language is a picture of life; it is a collection of all the ideas of a people—exhibited outwardly by sounds.

thunder-toned eloquence of Demosthenes electrified the Athenians to new life, energy, and struggle; by this did the "Bard of Avon" teach us what he had learned from the many-paged book of human life; and Newton disclose the marvellous secrets which he decyphered on the star-written scroll of the evening sky. Language is the medium through which Science, History, Poetry, and Religion, transmigrate from breast to breast, and originate in men those refined and refining influences which they are so admirably adapted to do; and through the agency of words the Thoughts-men of all ages have transfused the brightest, best, and most ennobling portion of their thoughts into the souls of their contemporaries and posterity. Words afford a magical facility for the expression of

> "All thoughts, all passions, all delights,—
> Whatever stirs this mortal frame;"

and the communication of those luxuriant trains of thought which "sweep across the mind with angel wing." By them the dim-descried vistas of the intellectual Dreamland of ancient sages are registered, and by the subsequent explorations of future adventurers, in the long course of ages, become the certainties of the future, and are catalogued as *knowable.* By them the irrational puerility of tradition and surmise is exchanged for precise historical detail and demonstrated scientific truth. They are the messengers of thoughts, feelings, and information from man to man, and between the inhabitants of every clime and country. Words are the current coin of mental commercialists, the representatives of the real or acquired intellectual riches of the land of their adoption, and, like the baser circulatory medium to which we have compared them, they must be carried to the exchangers before they can acquire a currency in any other district of the universe. The power of intellection is the same *in kind* in the whole human race; all the objects in the external world coincide in their main characteristics, and impress the mind in a manner somewhat analogous and identical, but the representational media which the different nations of the earth have adopted, as expressive of the ideas originated by them, are diverse; hence, we see that though Languages differ, yet the purposes which they serve are the same, and that though our observations are necessarily confined to our own language, as the vestment of thought, yet the principles which we shall elucidate will be such as must, from the constitution of the human mind, be equally applicable to all languages.

Names are vocal sounds, conventionally attached to, and expressive of ideas, the signs or marks which we employ to denote those objects which excite our Perceptivity, and which, being pronounced, or written, produce similar ideas in the minds of others. By this power of imposing names on our ideas, we are able to marshal the several objects in the universe, and pass them in review before ourselves or others. We can bring to our remembrance those friends who have a place in our affections, those parties of whom, from station or intimacy, we find it necessary to converse, and those defaulters who have excited our indignation; everything that may have moved us to pity, awe, or love, that may have instructed or amused us, or been in any way connected with us in the constantly-recurring or ever-varying scenes of life. Thus we register our ideas of all that we have seen or been affected by ourselves, of all that we

have heard of or believe on the testimony of others; of all we wish, hope, fear, or doubt. The ever-active mind of man, impressed by everything around, and influenced by everything within, is necessitated to definitize the objects brought within the range of its cognition. Hence man's lexicon of names is vast. The mountain, lifting its snow-clad summit to the ether above, the hollow-sounding, unfathomed, and mysterious main, the illimitable expanse of the many-hued sky, the newly-risen sun, the clouds garmented with beauty, or blackened with storms, the "Queen of Night," the space-careering stars, the foam-crested cataract, the crashing avalanche, the eye-deceiving mirage, the smiling cornfield, the smooth-shaven lawn, the forest, the garden and the grove, the palatial hall, the far-spread demesne, the rustic village, the mazy, many-streeted city, the instruments of labour, the fruits, the flowers, the trees, the myriad species of the animal kingdom, the destruction-winged tempest, the death-dealing pestilence, the lightning's vivid flash, the thunder's loud reverberation, "the dome of thought, the palace of the soul," the criminal, the depraved, the talented, the good, the great, and ten thousand times ten thousand thought-educing objectivities around and within, are all commemorated and marked by *Names*. Not only so, but man can imagine objects such as never have existed, and give them a cognomen; can designate a number of objects as if they were individuated, and speak of qualities as if they formed separate existences, and were endowed with essentiality. All this is done by Perceptivity, each act of which results in the formation of a thought; each such thought the mind naturally seeks to vesture with a name.

It is needful, for a proper understanding of our subject, to bear in mind, that all our knowledge is perceptual. Of *noumena*, *i. e.*, the essences of objects, we know nothing. Of *phenomena*, *i. e.*, appearances, all our knowledge is made up and composed, and although there is a continual objectivizing of our thoughts,—a continual inference of their *withoutness* and externality; yet, what knowledge we possess is really subjective, and essentially idealogic. Hence it results, that Names are not marks designative of objects themselves, but of the *conceptions* produced in our mind by them. In saying this we do not deny the existence of external objects, but predicate our incapacity to attain to a knowledge of things in their *essence*, and assert that we perceive existences as quality-possessors, as appearance-yielding, not as essentiative, not as disclosing their quality-indwelling parts. Names, therefore, are the exponents of our ideas; but were every individuated objectivity to receive a distinct name, words would be indefinitely multiplied, and the purposes of speech be wholly frustrated. Indeed, it would be impossible to give a particular name to everything capable of impressing our sensorial organs or our mental consciousness. Such an effort would far transcend the utmost powers of human ingenuity. Even if it were possible, it would be undesirable, for before we could communicate our notions of anything, we should require to teach the person to whom we spoke the cumbrous machinery of Language which we had constructed; even after this point was attained, and his memory gorged to the full with individual designations, it would be unavailable, for, as Aristotle says — "Of particular things there is neither definition nor demonstration, and, consequently,

no science, since all definition is in its nature universal." From this difficulty the mind is enabled to disembarrass itself in a way and by an expedient which we shall here endeavour briefly to explain.

The perceptive powers of the mind, on being called into exercise by a number of external objects or inward operations, possess the ability to observe their resemblances, differences, and relations. This capacity of discovering the identities, dissimilarities, and relations of perceptions and ideas, is the elemental power from which science originates. Observation furnishes the mind with ideas. Generalization classifies them, and we attach names to them when classified. We have spoken of Generalization, we doubt, as if its function were generally understood; but as it is right, in every one assuming the Didactic, to take for granted the ignorance of the majority of his readers—else, Why the necessity of instruction?—we shall take the liberty of detailing more at large the important office which Generalization fills in relation to the imparting of names to the objects of cognition. We have seen before that our sensorial and perceptual powers are in want of education: while this educative process is going on, everything appears unconnected, detached, and disunited, but when it is completed—when the isolated sensations and perceptions are reduced to uniformity and coherence, we begin to identify and generalize, to perceive ideas definitely, to compare carefully, to recognise their similarities, to abstract their disagreeing parts, to arrange those which are accordant in their essential peculiarities, and attach names to those which coincide in the production of similar phenomena. This principle it is which assists us in the intricacy, bewilderment, and confusion through which we must grope in our investigative processes. Sights, sounds, feelings, tastes, appetites, odours, jumblingly and inextricably mixed, are primarily impressed on our sensorium; these we gradually begin to disentangle and unwarp, arrange, classify, and name. Thus we reduce the mass of our impressions into similar groups. This systemizing and colligation of ideas is of vast importance in rendering our knowledge perfect, useful, and communicable. In the natural objects which surround us, in the processes of thought, and in the artificial products of human ingenuity, there is much scope for *identification.* Amid almost infinite diversity in the minor peculiarities, or accidental forms and attributes of bodies, there is a vast amount of similarity and resemblance. When, therefore, we examine one object minutely and accurately, and obtain a knowledge of its form, properties, relations, &c., we have much knowledge of all similar objects acquired; for though some of them may be defective, and others superabundant in the accidental peculiarities of their nature, yet our knowledge of these objects, so far as similitude is possessed by them, is certain, and we have now only to ascertain in what their differences consist, to have gained a knowledge of them also. These similar objects Generalization colligates, classifies, and names after the following manner:—Having observed that a number of objects are possessed of some common properties or attributes—in other words, make a somewhat similar impression on the mentality—the mind seeks to indicate this similitude by anatomizing the impression; thus it discovers the various conceptions of which it is made up,

or into which it may be analyzed; it then gives a *name* to the common part, regardless of the differences, and thus are originated what logicians denominate Common Names, or General Terms. This may be instanced thus—Men perceive the Oak, Elm, Beech, Birch, Palm, Fir, Cedar, &c.; observe that they are tapering plants of considerable height, covered with bark, divided into branches, bearing foliage, and producing seed. These may be called the coinciding points. All plants agreeing in these common qualities are called *Trees*, however they may differ as regards size, internal structure, and substance, colour, bark, peculiarity of branches and leaves, and the nature and properties of their seed-bearing parts, &c. Again, the ancient philosophers discovered that *Electron* (Amber), when rubbed or excited, had the power of attracting or repelling small bodies; subsequent inquirers found that other substances, as gumlac, resin, sulphur, talc, glass, the precious stones, silk, the fur of quadrupeds, the atmosphere, &c., were possessed of a similar property; no new name, however, was sought expressive of this wide-spread agency, but the word Electricity, which etymologically signifies *Amberness*, was, and is, indiscriminately applied to that property by whatever body displayed. Here it will be observed that the mind being fixed upon the one distinguishing and coincident quality overlooks all differences, and designates the property common to all these objects by one common name, and this class of objects by one general cognomen, Electricals. Shakspere gives a specimen of Generalization in the address of *Macbeth* to the murderers of *Banquo:*—

> "Ay! in the catalogue ye go for *men*,—
> As hounds, and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs,
> Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves, are called
> All by the name of dogs."

Thus it will be seen, that a Common Name may be defined as a word which may be employed, in the same signification, to denote each individual of a class of objects, as Man, River, Horse, Tree, &c.*

Some other distinctions of *names* may be mentioned as in common use among logicians, upon which, however, we do not intend to dwell longer than merely to give a brief but comprehensive definition of each. 1st. Proper Names are designative of those individual objects which from our social relations we find it necessary to mark out more distinctly than can be done by common names. They consist, for the most part, of Names of Persons and Places, as Plato, Newton, Athens, London, &c. 2nd. Universal Names are such as consist of a single word indicative of an object or attribute, as Star, Bright, &c. 3rd. Multiverbal Names are made up of more than one word expressive of the same object, as,—an equilateral triangle; "The blind old bard of Chios' isle;" Victoria, by the grace of God, Queen

* "Man is capable of being truly affirmed of John, Peter, George, and other persons, without assignable limits; and it is affirmed of all of them in the same sense, for the word Man expresses certain qualities; and when we predicate it of these persons, we assert that they all possess these qualities. But John is only capable of being truly affirmed of one single person, at least in the same sense; for though there are many persons who bear that name, it is not conferred on them to indicate any quality, or anything which belongs to them in common, and cannot be said to be affirmed of them in any sense at all, consequently not in the same sense."—*Mill's* "Logic," Vol. I. p. 33.

of Great Britain, &c. 4th. Collective Names are such as indicate a whole class Unically, *i.e.*, taken as an individual, as Clergy, Army, &c. 5th. Abstract Names are those which are the signs of abstract ideas, as Fineness, Sweetness, &c. 6th. Names which can be applied to only one class, or the individuals comprehended in that class, are called Invariable, as Man, Star, Plant. 7th. Those which can be used as signs of different classes, or the individuals comprising different classes, are called Variable. They comprehend what Grammarians call pronouns; thus *He* may be employed as the sign of Father, Brother, King, Friend, Lion, Horse, Eagle, &c. 8th. Names of qualities are called Convertible; that is, susceptible of being interchanged from object to object, without altering their truth, as *bright*, which may be truthfully applied to the Sun, a Star, precious stones, metals, and pictures.

Objects able to be Named.—We have already said that Perceptivity enables us to become acquainted with the qualities and relations of objects, and the operations which these objects superinduce in us. We purpose now to explain and illustrate what is contained in that assertion, and thus, by a classification of those things capable of impressing our *Consciousness*, be enabled to perceive what Goethe calls the "limits of the Knowable." Farther than the impressions made upon Consciousness and the inferences logically deducible from them, man's intellect cannot extend its search. All that we can positively *know* is that which we perceive and that which we infer. We cannot transcend Consciousness—cannot overstep the limits of our nature—cannot *know* that which lies beyond the circle of our intellectual ken. That which does not exist within, or tangentiate upon, that circle, transcends our knowledge—lies beyond the bound of our cognitive powers, and cannot be grasped by our mind, or comprehended in our catalogue of "Objects able to be known." All the knowledge which we possess *immediately*, that is, without any intervening agent, consists of ideas. Ideation is the result of our organic powers, whether physical or psychical, called into action by objectivities which either lie without us, or are supposed to do so. Upon our being placed in certain relations to externalities, our Consciousness becomes excited, and perception is the consequent. This being the case, then, it becomes of importance to know what can excite our ideative powers: thus we shall be able to determine what are the knowable and nameable objects which are capable of impressing our Perceptivity. These may be classified thus:—

1st. Consciousness gives us a knowledge of our sensations, thoughts, desires, will, memory, and all those mental conditions which the phenomena of the intellection presents. Of these the thinking part of our nature has the most immediate and decided knowledge; hence, Consciousness is the most trustworthy basis of certitude. Concerning that which we feel operating within us, and are irresistibly led to observe, we have the most accurate knowledge, and on that we can place the greatest dependence. These form the first great class of knowable and nameable things which our nature is capable of perceiving.

2nd. Those phenomena which Consciousness reveals must inhere in some existence possessed of a susceptibility of being thus impressed—this we can infer; and

we denominate this impressible, thought-comprehending power — this rational faculty,—Mind.

3rd. We have asserted that all knowledge consists of ideas; and it will, perhaps, sound strange and paradoxical in us now to class External Objects as the third great series of objects able to be known and named. Yet we think it will not be denied, that although we have no *immediate* knowledge of objects extrinsic to ourselves, yet we are led by the irresistible laws of our intellectual nature to objectivize our ideas; that is, to suppose our thoughts to be originated in us by objects beyond and external to us. Nay, we think that the existence of external things is susceptible of proof inferential from the facts revealed to us by Consciousness. If it be not so, is thought self-germinative? Is the mind endowed with self-excitativeness? Can it originate thought by innate or connate activity? If it be not self-excitable anterior to thought-eduction, it must be excited by that which lies without. If it be self-excitable previous to the origination of thought, by what strange process did it *think of beginning to think!* Are we to be driven back to the vague, but beautiful and poetic doctrine of Plato,—Reminiscence? Or shall we admit that *mediately*, by the intervention of Consciousness, we have a knowledge of external objects? We accept the latter, and yet adhere to our former assertion, that all knowledge *to us* consists in ideas. For instance, we have an idea of heat, of burning perhaps, and of flame; these are the elements of our knowledge—these we objectivize—these we infer resulted from some causative agent; but are our conjunct ideas ot heat, burning, and flame, indicative of the essence, or the attributes of fire? Of the attributes assuredly; and if of the attributes, whence do we gain our knowledge of objects? By the laws of our mind we are necessarily led to *infer* the existence of an object on the perception of its attributes. External objects, as the originators of thought, as the educators of the mind, fulfil an important end in the economy of Nature. They are capable of impressing our perceptivity as wholes and in their several parts; of these we can form conceptions—to our conceptions we can give names; and thus they take their rank in our catalogue of nominable objects.

4th. The existences which surround us are variously related to ourselves, and to each other; these relations coming under our cognizance originate ideas, and are thus "Objects able to be *named*." The principal relations are Coevality and Succession; Similarity and Dissimilarity; Position and Quality.

Of these four classes of objects are the knowable and nameable composed; other than our feelings, our minds, the ideas resulting from external objects, and their relations, we cannot *know*, for these only can reach the cognitive sphere of finite mortals such as we are. In these all knowledge is comprehended; from these all latent truth may be elicited; and upon these the rational faculty has ample scope to build huge columns of inferential truth. On these as a substratum, a basis—

> "That wondrous force of thought, which, mounting, spurns
> This dusky spot, and measures all the sky,"

has "ample room and verge enough" to construct the bright edifice of science.

Excited by the pleasure imparted through this knowledge, the mind widens its speculative track, and

> "Learns, by a mortal yearning, to ascend
> Towards a higher object."—*Wordsworth.*
>
> "For from the birth
> Of mortal man, the sovereign Maker said,
> That not in humble nor in brief delight,
> Not in the fading echoes of renown,
> Power's purple robe, or Pleasure's flowery lap,
> The soul should find enjoyment—but from these
> Turning disdainful to a *greater* good,
> Through all the ascent of things enlarge her view,
> Till every bound at length will disappear,
> And infinite perfection close the scene."—*Akenside.*

We shall have occasion to enter more fully into the errors resulting from Language when we come to treat of the "Idols of the Intellect;" meanwhile we will close our present paper with a rule which we consider necessary for the proper conducting of speech regarding "Names, and Objects able to be named:"—

Always use your words in the proper sense, or at least in the same determinate sense.

By attention to this rule, many, if not all, of those disputes about words, without any distinction of meaning, which have disturbed, deranged, coteried, and sectarianized society, might be avoided. Human life is, surely, far too short to be thus wasted and frittered away in idle logomachy and word-war; hence we should use every effort not only to gain correct ideas, but also to acquire a correct method of expressing these ideas in communicating them to others. As we have already said, there cannot be any communication of simple ideas, it will be evident that our only liability to error will be in the use of words denoting those which are complex; those which involve more than the mere mental operation of perceptivity. When, therefore, we use complex designatives, we should exercise the utmost diligence and caution to sum up in our minds, as accurately and completely as possible, *all* the component ideas of which they are the ordinary signs; and when we find that the conclusions, or inferences, at which we arrive, are incoincident with, or different from, those deduced by the authors whom we read, the friends with whom we converse, or the parties whom we controvert, we should pause, reflect, and re-examine the words used, and the ideas involved in them, and we shall most frequently find by this reflection and re-examination the cause of the disagreement, dispute, or controversy. If you write or speak, define your terms—let their import in your mind be understood by those whom you address. This you are bound to do; for if your conception of the meaning of a term differs from that entertained by those whom you seek to convince by your argumentation, how can you expect they will agree to the inferences which you make? How happy would it have been for man had this simple rule been attended to! How much has human happiness been destroyed—how much has human progress been retarded—how much has the advancement of knowledge been impeded by misapprehension and mistake, resulting from the neglect of a rule so obvious and utile! Never seek to

deceive, strive never to be deceived by words; scrutinize, examine, and re-examine them. Let no means be left untried to find the true import of a term. Endeavour to find out the meaning attached to words, the ideas of which they are the signs. See that no forgery, no imposition, is practised upon you—that each expression used is genuine. By this means the veil of sophistry will be rent—the equivocation of double-dealing hypocrisy be discovered—the gloss of partizanship, and the colouring of sectarianism, be abraded. The demagogue, the schismatist, the quack, whether medical, moral, social, religious, philosophical, or political, will be unmasked. Then truth, accompanied by Love, and followed by the Graces, will rule a happy world—

> "And man, at whose creation God rejoiced,
> No more in darkness of the spirit dwell,
> But with a bright, recovered soul appear."

Religion.

IS WAR, UNDER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE, OPPOSED TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In the First Number of this periodical there are two papers on the above subject. With J. T. Y., the writer of the affirmative article, I have nothing to do. The arguments he has brought forward are, to my mind, of such force, that had I previously had any doubt on the subject, I think I should have been convinced by his reasoning. There is, however, another article, signed W.W., and it is with this writer I propose to enter the lists.

Christianity, as a system, is revealed in the New Testament; its sacred principles are there enunciated—its laws distinctly and definitively laid down: and as they are fixed and unalterable, admitting of neither extension nor limitation, every question, viewed in its bearings on Christianity, must be submitted to this standard. This particular feature in the discussion W. W. seems to have lost sight of. His arguments are not derived from this sacred Book; and whatever weight or power they possess is certainly not obtained from this Divine source; *expediency*, rather than the high, holy, and inflexible nature of New Testament Christianity, forms, in my opinion, the basis of his remarks; as, except in a solitary instance, not one argument which he has advanced in defence of the war system is derived from "the Scriptures of truth:" and this one (the case of Meroz, Judges v. 23) only exhibits the character of the earlier dispensation, and has no bearing whatever on the subject under discussion. Christianity is essentially a religion of *peace*, love, and mercy; while the dispensation which preceded it was a religion of strict and impartial justice—"An eye for an eye" being the characteristic of the one, while "love your enemies" is the benignant motto of the other. But to follow W. W. a little more closely through the line of argument he has pursued:—In his first sentence he says he has arrived at the conclusion that circumstances will justify a Christian in taking up arms; here we join issue. That "circumstances may arise," and not unfrequently do, in which men, both as individuals and as communities, find it necessary to act on the defensive, I readily admit: but that any circumstance will render it the impera-

tive duty of the Christian to "take up arms," I am prepared to deny. As already stated, Christianity "is essentially a religion of love, and admits of no vindictive principle: it suffers none of its disciples to strike a blow, or inflict an injury, *not even in self-defence:* but explicitly says, 'Vengeance is mine: I will repay: saith the Lord:' its great Founder, the Lord Jesus Christ, is styled in the emphatic language of prophecy the 'Prince of peace'—his gospel is designated the 'gospel of peace'—and the pæan which resounded through the vault of heaven, on the occasion of the advent of the world's Redeemer, was 'Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, goodwill toward men'—the ministers of the gospel are 'ministers of peace;' its heaven is described as 'the Kingdom of peace,' and the antepast of that heaven enjoyed by the believer while here on earth is 'righteousness, *peace*, and joy, in the Holy Ghost.'"

One great principle laid down by W. W. is that "Selfishness is the leading characteristic of man," and that "almost all the frightful evils which abound in the world may be traced to the operation of this great motive principle." I think so too: and thus we have common ground to start from. But so far from this justifying even defensive war, I contend that the gospel is designed to eradicate to a great extent, if not entirely, this selfish principle from the minds of men. What says its "very chiefest apostle"? "Charity (or love, as the margin renders it) seeketh not her own; is not easily provoked" (some critics say this should be, "is not provoked at all"); "thinketh no evil." And in another place, "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth." The principles of Christianity are as much opposed to selfishness as "good to evil, light to darkness, Christ to Belial." But further.

Another great principle laid down by W. W. is, that "Man possesses the right of self-defence." To a certain extent *this* also is true. But how far this right extends, is the very point in dispute; not, I conceive, to the taking away the life of an individual. But admitting that it does, will this argument apply to War? *Not at all!* Let us take a case (one of those selected by W. W.), and see how far the analogy holds good—Rush, for instance. He murdered his victims—he took away the lives of two human beings, and expiated the offence at the sacrifice of his own. *One* life, in this case (in the eye of the law), atones for the destruction of *two*, and *that* life the life of the culprit. But is it so in War? Thousands of lives are usually sacrificed to atone for one offence. The persons slaughtered are *not* the culprits (in most instances they escape, and oftentimes not a hair of their heads is injured), and the offence, perhaps, is the invasion of a few feet of disputed territory, or some such trivial matter. Again, *War is a lottery*, and the chances of success are with the strongest and best disciplined. The result, therefore, can never determine the point of right or wrong. And if it did, "What then?" Is it not a christian injunction, "Dearly beloved, *Avenge not yourselves*, but rather give place unto wrath?" The principle of self-defence, then, whether in an individual, a community, or a Government as the representative of a community, extends thus far, and no farther—to the establishment of means for the protection of life and property from depredation, *to repel and resist the invader*, but *on no account* to punish the offending party *to the extent of deprivation of life*, seeing that He *alone*, who originally gave the command "to live," has the right to revoke that edict. If there be that force in the Noachic command, for which the advocates of capital punishment contend, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," it applies equally to the blood-stained band of "hired assassins" who ply their slaughterous vocation on "the field of battle," as to the cold-blooded villain who stealthily murders the innocent in his bed; or, presenting a pistol to his brain, in the highway or on the common, boldly, and with open effrontery, demands "his money or his life."

But further. "A strictly defensive war is a palpable absurdity." Such a war was *never waged*, and in all probability

never will be; it is utterly inconsistent with reason, and the most strenuous advocates of the defensive, when closely pushed, will yield the point. Where is the nation, Christian or otherwise, who, having repelled the invader from their coasts, would not feel perfectly justified to push the victory further; and, having achieved a complete triumph, to render the offending party tributary, or appropriate to itself some portion of the conquered nation? *All war is aggressive!* —more or less—it ever was, and ever will be. Our national defences are our national disgrace! They show that, while we profess, as a nation, the loving religion of "the Prince of peace," we, by our naval and military armaments, distrust His willingness, and deny His power to guard, protect, and save. "Some trust in chariots, and some in horses, but we will delight in the Lord our God."

Again. War, "under every circumstance, is opposed to Christianity," because it blunts the best feelings of humanity, robs the Christian of his love, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, and meekness, which are, according to St. Paul, "the fruits of the Spirit;" and in their stead fills him with "strifes, seditions, envyings, murders," &c., which, if we believe the same authority, are the "works of the flesh." What is the evidence of those who have been famous in the annals of War? Listen to two of them. The Duke of Wellington says, "No man, with any scruples of conscience, is fit for a soldier;" and Napoleon, "The religious man has no business in the field of battle." With Channing we think—"War is the concentration of all human crimes, it turns a man into a beast of prey."

But "Christianity, as a system of religion, is perfect." It is not like anything of mere human device, capable of emendation and improvement, but what it was in the day when it was first promulged, it is now, and will ever remain. Its founder is "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever." All Christians believe that a day is coming when this system shall be the universal religion of man, that "the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea." And what is to be the special glory of *that* Millennial era? Hear the conclusion of Isaiah's beautiful description: "They shall not hurt, nor destroy, in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord." I would ask W.W. whether Christianity is not designed as effectually to save its professors in the present age, as when a great voice shall be heard in heaven, saying, "The kingdoms of this world have become the kingdoms of our God, and of his Christ?"

"After a careful investigation of the subject under consideration," the writer hereof "has arrived at the conclusion that circumstances" *cannot possibly* "arise in the present," or any other state of society, which can "*in any measure*" justify, much less "render it the imperative duty" of the Christian man to take up arms.

"The drying up a single tear has more
Of honest fame than shedding seas of gore."

J. P. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In attempting to prove the position which I have taken, I shall address myself to the arguments used by J. T. Y. in the first Number of the *Controversialist*. But before doing so, I will just premise that I am as sincere an enemy to war as the writer referred to; but it does not follow, because a man hate a given thing, that the thing itself is wrong. We can have no doubt but that all war is hateful in the sight of God. But why is it hateful? Because it is a consequence of the fall of man. The question then arises, Is it lawful for any one to be engaged in a thing that is hateful in the sight of God? Now War, abstractedly considered, is a hateful thing; but who can deny that God did often command his peculiar people to go forth to battle against their enemies? When God gave those commands, did he love war? surely not, but he allowed his people to engage in it for their own defence. The opponents of all war can tell us that the spirit of Christianity is altogether different from that of the

Old Testament: assuming, for argument's sake, that it is, it does not follow that God is changeable. We see most clearly that God hates war; that he has ever done so, and yet, in his Word, he commands armies to go forth to battle, and tells a people that they may fight in the defence of their homes and country. The Bible emphatically declares that God changes not. If, then, God changes not, how is it to be proved that it is now contrary to his will, that man should now defend his home from the invasion of a foreign foe?

We now proceed to examine the first question proposed by J. T. Y.—

"Ought a Christian ever to take, or risk the taking, the life of a fellow-creature, in national, social, or personal defence?" To this he intimates that the following words of Christ give a negative: "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you." And then crowns the whole by asking, "Can a man shoot one whom he loves?" I fearlessly affirm that a man may shoot another without feeling anything but compassion or Christian charity towards him. Are men's actions always an index of their minds? Are we to judge of the character of God by his dealings with wicked men? I might just as well accuse God of malignant feelings for casting sinners into hell, as to insinuate that a soldier necessarily hates those whom he slays. What is it that draws God's vengeance upon man? It is his crimes. And what is it that God hates? Is it man himself, or his deeds? God loves all men, but he hates their crimes. Now, a Christian man, when fighting in defence of his home and his country, may be filled with Christian love towards those who are striving to take away his life and destroy his nation, and at the same time oppose their wicked actions. Let us follow out the import of the suggestion of J. T. Y., and it must follow that to inflict any pain or suffering upon our fellow-creatures, is a proof of hatred. Such an idea is absurd. Are all our courts of justice occupied by malignant beings, who sit on purpose to carry out the hateful feelings of the English nation? Do we not know that to resist the evil deeds of men is the readiest and the kindest way to act towards them? Is it not kindness to oppose the drunkard, and, if we can, hinder him indulging in his baneful habit? Is it unkind to inflict corporeal punishment on the young thief, and to do all we can to stop him in his wrong career? In a word, if it is cruel and hateful to oppose men by force of arms, when engaged in spoiling states and nations, it is equally cruel, and even more cruel and hateful, to prevent men from committing lesser crimes. If we are to depend only on God's protection to preserve life, surely we ought never to combine to protect and defend property, which is of far less value than life. A man may fight in defence of his home and his country, without infringing upon the law of love. If a Christian allows a horde of barbarians to overrun his country, rather than fight to prevent them, what becomes of his love to his wife, his children, and his own people? Is it a part of the law of love to leave those who are committed to our care undefended, and at the mercy of barbarous men? St. Paul says that he who neglects his family is worse than a heathen.

Can we cease to defend our own homes, and not neglect our families? Is the life of a barbarian, or a ruffian, to be more respected than the life of a wife, a parent, or a child? Are we to sacrifice all the kindly charities of our homes, because it seems a dreadful thing to hurry a sinner into eternity! Let us banish such a morbid philanthropy! It is not the man who kills, defending the right, that hurries the sinner into eternity; it is the crime of him who dies. What a world would this be if the lawless passions of men were permitted to expend themselves without any opposition! We, therefore, infer that a man can shoot a fellow-man, and at the same time love him as a fellow-creature.

It is admitted on all sides, that murder is a great crime; and that he who stands by and sees another commit murder without an effort to prevent it, is a partaker of the guilt. If it is wrong to

commit murder, it is equally wrong to permit others to do it, when we have the power to prevent them. Self-murder or suicide is one of the blackest crimes ; and being so, it follows that those who do not take proper precaution to preserve their life, are guilty of self-murder. We are commanded to do no murder, not to lay violent hands upon ourselves. Are we, then, permitted to neglect that sacred boon, life, so as to let another take it from us ? I trow not. If I am not permitted to take away my own life, I cannot be permitted to allow another to take it. I ask in all sincerity, if I should not be a self-murderer were I to stand and be shot, rather than risk the life of my assailant, to prevent such a catastrophe ? I may be told that God can deliver me from all dangers : it is true that he can, but am I to wait for a direct interference from God, when the means of defence are in my own reach ? If I am, then I argue that I have as much right to expect God to cure me in sickness, without using remedies, as that I should trust only to him when assailed by my fellow-man. It is said that the New Testament gives no direct command either for or against "defensive war." But it is affirmed that its spirit is entirely against it. We will direct our attention to a few facts which, to our mind, seem to prove that the spirit of the New Testament does sanction, or at least allow, defensive war.

In the history of St. Paul, as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, we find him, on one occasion, in danger from his own countrymen ; he was rescued by the Roman soldiers, and placed in safe keeping. While confined in the stronghold, the Jews conspired to take his life : the fact was made known to Paul, and, through his interference, divulged to the Roman authorities in the place. What were the consequences flowing from this revelation ? why, St. Paul placed himself under the protection of a band of pagan soldiers. (See the twenty-first and twenty-third chapters of the Acts.) It may be answered that no lives were lost on that occasion. True, no lives were lost, but a principle was confirmed : St. Paul plainly indicated that it is lawful to use arms to defend oneself from the murderous treachery of his fellow-men. Neither will the objection be valid, that St. Paul himself does not appear to have taken arms. He availed himself of the protection afforded by the arms of the Romans. Did St. Paul imagine, when he placed himself under the protection of the Roman soldiers, that they would allow the Jews to take him without bloodshed ? I think not. He knew well that a Roman army would not quietly allow any person to oppose them. But was St. Paul devoid of true faith ? Did he not believe that God could deliver him without the use of soldiers ? He fully knew this, but he also knew that as God had made known to him his danger, it would be presumptuous on his part not to avail himself of those means of defence which, as a Roman citizen, were at his command. If, then, defensive war is contrary to the spirit of Christianity, and if I may not make use of arms and risk the life of my fellow-creature in my own defence, could St. Paul know what he was doing when he placed himself under the protection of the Roman soldiers ? J. T. Y. seems to lay much stress upon the following text of Scripture, as a proof that all War is contrary to the spirit of the gospel : "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves : vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord." It appears to me that he does not fully comprehend the meaning of the passage he quotes : unfortunately for his argument, the passage in question has no reference to defensive war. The apostle is exhorting us not to be revengeful ; but, when we have suffered a personal injury, to bear it patiently, and as Christians to leave the vengeance to God. Now, what connexion is there between revenge, and a man's endeavour to prevent another committing a fault ? The apostle is telling us how to act after an injury is done ; by no means can he be made to say, Do not attempt to hinder a man from taking your life or your property. J. T. Y. speaks about the illegality of taking the law into our own hands ? Is, then, the act of opposing a crime taking the law into our own hands ? What law, human or Divine, do men

take into their own hands, when they resist the invasion of a foreign foe, or the attempts of a midnight assassin? Surely all will admit that there must be a vast difference between acting so as to prevent a crime, and attempting to punish it when committed. If, then, I act only in self-defence, I am striving to prevent murder. Should I kill my assailant, I am not taking the law into my own hands, I am simply doing what every man ought,—I am preventing the crime of murder.

The spirit of Christianity, then, forbids revenge; but it does not forbid defensive war. I fear that J. T. Y. has been led astray by his own good feelings; and that he has too hastily come to a conclusion, when he affirms that the maxims of Christianity "involve the condemnation of War in every form and guise." The spirit of the gospel must be gathered from the sayings and examples of those who wrote the New Testament.

Now, it so happens that the Gospel of St. Luke contains advice to those whose duty it is to fight in support of law and order.

John the Baptist was questioned by soldiers as to what they should do. Now, did he teach them that their profession was contrary to the mind of God? He did nothing of the kind; but intimated, in my opinion, that a man may take up arms in defence of right; and that the profession of arms is not unlawful or unholy. His answer to the soldiers was, "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely, and be content with your wages." Here John plainly tells them to continue to accept the wages of war, but not to addict themselves to its excesses. I ask, Was John uninformed as to what was the nature of that work which a soldier performed before he was entitled to his wages? John knew that a soldier was paid to fight. Strange that he should tell soldiers to content themselves with the wages of war, if all war is contrary to the spirit of the gospel. It may be urged, that John is not so true a guide in these matters as Jesus Christ. But can any deny that the words of John form a part and parcel of the gospel of Christ? St. Luke did not write this passage till long after: and surely he would not have inserted such advice if it was contrary to the spirit of Jesus and his gospel. It is written as with a sunbeam, that men may be soldiers and receive the wages of war, providing they never fight excepting in a righteous cause. I have adduced the example of St. Paul, and the words of John the Baptist, recorded by St. Luke; which, taken as they stand, in their grammatical sense, allow men to fight in the defence of life, liberty, home, and country. Having thus answered by Scripture, I think, the arguments of J. T .Y., I will, in conclusion, offer a few remarks upon the method proposed for adoption by those who deny the legality of defensive war. They would have us offer no physical opposition to the invasion of either a foreign foe, or the no less dangerous and destructive ambition of a domestic enemy. The only weapons they deem lawful are prayer, faith, and persuasion. Now, all these ought to be used before physical force should be tried; but when the foe still comes madly on, we should then present to his front the rampart of steel. It is not our business that he will run upon instant death. God has decreed that nations and governments should defend the territory he has committed to them, from the devastation of a barbarous horde. What would now be the state of Europe if it had never resisted the fierce and despotic Turk? Was it agreeable to the will of God that those barbarians should turn back the tide of freedom and civilization, and cover the fair fields of Europe with a dark superstition and tyrannical rule? We, who enjoy the rights purchased for us by the blood of our ancestors, have no fair reason for saying that God requires we should consider them worthless as compared with the blood of those who attack them. It is not religion that requires to be defended by the force of arms. If it was our religion that was attacked, we ought then to stand by and see the work of the Lord: but it is civilization, the progress of the human species, and social ties, that are at stake. Now, if we are not to

fight for Christ and his kingdom with carnal weapons, which I admit, nowhere can it be shown that we are not to defend civilization, human progress, and social ties. Prayer for our homes would be mocking God, if we left them undefended, at the mercy of a wild and savage horde. If we have not the means at hand whereby to defend them, we may leave the matter in the hands of God; but if we are a large community, what mockery, what presumption to suppose that God will defend us, when we refuse to use the means he places in our hands! This is an age when prayer and faith must be evidenced by works. We must, in the matter of defensive war, imitate the example of the Jews building the walls of Jerusalem—never leave off our duties to attack our foes, but if attacked, then throw aside for the moment the implements of peace, that we may resist the efforts of those who would rob us of our blessings. If the principle of defensive, and only defensive war, were adopted, there would then be universal peace. It is folly to suppose that war will end until the nations learn righteousness; and it is greater folly to suppose that will be brought about by civilized nations allowing their uncivilized neighbours to overrun them. Our duty, then, is to use our most strenuous efforts to spread far and wide the gospel of our God. That gospel will teach all, that murder, rapine, and war, are contrary to the real interests of men, and the true fear of God. But, until the nations adopt that gospel, it behoves those who have received it, to be on their guard, and never to let the barbarian turn back that flood of civil and religious privileges which they enjoy.

Gosport. W. T.

Philosophy.

IS PHRENOLOGY TRUE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

Phrenology (from φρεν and λογος) signifies a discourse upon the Mind; and is applied to that science which teaches that, from the conformation, size, and relative proportions of the cranium, or skull, the ability, dispositions, peculiarities, and nature of the mind may be discovered. The principles upon which it is based,—the "fundamental facts" from which it originates, are these:—1st. The brain is the *organ* or mental manifestation. 2nd. That as it is a law of organic being that no function is performed but by its appropriate organ; and different functions are never executed by the same organ: so each faculty, or power of mind, must have its own distinct and peculiar organ. 3rd. Every mental act must, therefore, produce a peculiar effect upon its own cerebric instrument; and as, by the natural law of all organisms, action produces development—so, 4th. This cerebral development will be the guage of mental activity and power. 5th. The perfection of the cranial periphery will be relative to the perfection of Mind. 6th. Therefore the study of the cerebral organism is the study of the mind, *so far forth* as it is cognoscible by us. We think this is a candid and unbiassed statement of the *specificalities* of this science—at least we have not *knowingly* set up a "man of straw" for the purpose of securing an easy victory. We wish merely to give a plain, concise, correct synopsis of what we believe to be the axiomata of Phrenology, in order that, if we have been mistaken in deducing its falsity from these premises, the faulty premises may be immediately detected and pointed out, and ourselves, as well as those who believe with us, may be enabled to correct our inference, by the amendment of the premises from which it was derived. In the part which we shall bear in the present controversy, we do not intend to involve the argument with quips and quillets regarding

the *minutiæ* of the science. We will leave to some "abler pen" the anatomical and materialistic confutations to which it may be obnoxious; and shall not, at least in the present stage, embarrass the question by any debate concerning the accuracy of the organology most generally adopted. The objection which we intend to advance goes deeper than this, is more fundamentally a portion of the science. It concerns itself with what we consider the "chief corner-stone" of the edifice. We most frankly admit that, when we read the principal treatises on this subject, and conversed with one of its ablest expounders, we found much to captivate and charm us in the apparently easy method by which they proposed to unloose the Gordian knots of Metaphysics, and the seemingly lucid and accurate explanations of the thought-formative powers. In the repository of facts which they have thrown open to inspection, we fondly imagined that a true and ready solution of the intricacies of metaphysical inquiry could be found. We thought "the winter of our discontent" was now about to be "made glorious summer" by these metaphysics for the million; but our expectations were soon proved futile, our hopes, like early spring blossoms, soon withered. We soon learned that superficiality and apparency were the characteristics of this system of mental philosophy; and that, in truth, it was not what it seemed. It is this point which we are about to set ourselves to prove. In doing so we are not necessitated to express our belief in any particular school of *soul-science*, or to enter into any contention concerning any mode of cranial mapology. We do not require to hint whether we have been under the pupilage of Kant, Reid, Spinoza, or Berkley, nor engage in making a catalogue of the differences of classification between Gall, Vimont, and Combe. We know that Metaphysicians are frequently styled, and perhaps not without some reason,

"Gens ratione ferox et mentem pasta chimæris."*

We, if successful in our attempt, will show that the Phrenologists are, at least, in an equal predicament, and that "those who live in glass houses should not be the first to throw stones." But enough of prelude!

Phrenology has for its object the establishment of a *fact*, viz.—That there is a means of discovering the mental nature of individuals by the external formation of the brain. It asserts that the brain being the organ of the mind, the greater the amount of action imposed upon it by the exertion of the mind—*i. e.*, thought—the greater will be its development. Hence, all other things being equal, the best developed brain is the index of the most powerful mind; the instrument of mental action, the more nearly it approaches perfection, will the more readily give manifestation to the thought-power within. Phrenology does not employ itself with considerations regarding the *actor*, but the *means of action*—inquires what are the outward indications of mind which lead to a knowledge of an individual's mental nature—is engaged in ascertaining the certitude of a theorem—a hypothesis that each faculty of mind has a particular organ, through which it manifests itself—where that organ is situated—what are the evidences of its prominence or deficiency. Phrenology assumes the existence of a material universe, capable of producing sensations—an organ, the brain, for the reception of these sensations—individual compartments of that brain possessed of exclusive power to receive particular impressions — and from the development of these receptive organs judges concerning the dispositions, peculiarities, and activity of the internal intellectual resident. Psychology begins at the reverse point, it consults consciousness, finds therein evidence of the mind's existence—a power in the human being which takes cognizance of outward impressions, and is excited to action by them. Here, then, we signalize the dilemma of Phrenologists: materialism—meaning by that the cerebral manifestation of mental exertion—is the point of inquiry on which Phrenology throws light. Spiritualism, *i. e.*, the ideative-thinking power, is the object upon which the mental philosopher expends his ex-

* "A race fierce for logic, and feeding on absurdities."

ertions. Phrenology interrogates the organization of man as to its *physical* capacity to receive impressions, and manifest thought; Psychology questions the cognitive powers themselves. The former is incapable, upon its own premises, of yielding a sufficient solution to the inquiries of the student regarding thought, and its component parts; it is able to lead us to the sensation-receptive organ, but here its mission ends. Another guide is required to lead us into the arcana of mind. The latter accepts this office by the aid of consciousness; it watches the impinging of the sensation, marks the effect which it produces, and describes the process of intellectual action. Here, then, is the dilemma. If the brain be the *organ* of the mind, and Phrenology be engaged in investigations regarding the manifestive power of that organ, can it be a system of mental philosophy? Either the mind is the *result* of the physical organization, or it is not. If it *is*, Phrenology may be a science of mind, if it *is not*, it cannot be so; for it cannot give information regarding *that* concerning which it makes no inquiries. With regard to *physical* thought-receptive and thought-manifesting power, it may give information, but regarding *mental* operations and ideation, its instructions are plainly irrelevant. The premises predicate nothing concerning mind: any conclusion, therefore, regarding mind, is a clear "*non sequitur*," and the whole science is not only false, but is plainly a misnomer. Craniology may be true, may teach the relation between mental endowment and cerebral perfection; but this is not Phrenology, is not mind-knowledge, it is only a knowledge of the *instrument* of mental manifestation. But upon every principle except materialism—in its ordinary sense—the instrument, and that by which the instrument is used, are different, not identical. I am not charging Phrenology with materialism, but explaining the fallacy of the assertion that *Phrenology* is the *only* accurate exponent of mental philosophy, by proving that it cognosces the *material organ* of mind, not the mind itself; and hence it cannot be the philosophy of that concerning which, so far as it is a science, it takes no cognizance, and can gain no knowledge. We do not write to make unjust aspersions, or by raising prejudices to gain a point—we are not emulous of victory, but desirous of attaining truth; we wish to show that there is a flaw in the inference on which Phrenology founds its present claims, by showing that these claims are incorrect. When we prove its assumptions false, we are warranted in asserting that Phrenology is untrue. Either thought, reason, belief, volition, are the results of man's exquisite organic perfection, or there must be a distinct entity, of which these are the phenomena. If, as physiologists assert, the heart and brain of a frog and a philosopher are composed of similar muscular fibre and nervous matter, intellectuality must either reside in the brain, as the result of its organic superiority, or there must be an invisible, immaterial agent which manifests it. So far as organic qualities, Phrenology, as a branch of physiology, may inform us: but concerning mind, it is, and must be dumb. Materialism or spiritualism!—Choose between them. One you must adopt. If the former, there being no mind, Phrenology cannot be a philosophy of mind; if the latter, mind not being the object investigated, all predications concerning it are irrelevant, and Phrenology cannot be a philosophy of mind. Craniology can elude this dilemma, by confining its pretensions solely to a knowledge of the cerebral physical functions; Phrenology cannot, for it aims at establishing itself as the only true mental philosophy—the philosophy of that which comes not under its cognition!! S. N.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

I AM by no means disposed to go to the full extent to which some Phrenologists have proceeded; and while I am decidedly of opinion, that there is much truth in the science, I cannot but believe that the minute *nomes* or districts into which they have mapped the head (and which, too, in many instances, seem

gratuitous and fanciful) expose their views to ridicule and suspicion. This, however, is an *abuse* not legitimately chargeable on the science itself, which seems to be based in truth as far as my observations have been carried. Truth may suffer very materially by injudicious opposition to what may, in due time, be established on the surest inductive grounds. Phrenology may or may not fall; if it be true it never can.

But if Phrenology involves either *materialism* or *fatalism*, I should not hesitate on its instant rejection. A legitimate Phrenology says no more, in my opinion, than the Scriptures have already taught us, and what every man must feel, viz., that there do exist evil propensities, but amid the ruin of fallen nature, there is still sufficient evidence in the existence of better principles—intellectual faculties which are living legends that incontestably prove "God made man upright, though he has sought out for himself many inventions," that though "the gold has become dim," there seems to have been a period in history when man walked with God amid the garden of creation, enjoyed his favour and held converse with his great Benefactor. What do these propensities prove, but that "when we would do good, evil is present with us?" Had there been no manifestation of better principles of action, which were sufficient to counteract these adverse and evil propensities, there might have been some pretence for the charge of fatalism—there might have been some pretence for the charge of fallacy; as the case however stands, there is none whatever.

I really can discover no grounds for the charge of evil against Phrenology. The mind, distinct from matter, and altogether an independent, immaterial being, proclaims its existence by the manifestation of distinct organs; and what does this teach? simply that mind can put its impress on matter, and is, therefore, superior to it in power. These manifestations prove that we are richly gifted by God: whether the boon bequeathed by the Divine "Giver of every good," be improved or not, does not affect the question. The creature becomes chargeable with a dereliction of duty by suffering these talents to run to waste, and is responsible for their non-improvement. That mind should operate on matter, is only a proof of its independence of, and superiority to it, and may be safely admitted. Phrenology seems to require no more. The organs of *benevolence*, *veneration*, and other kindred organs, will keep in check and subordination the inferior principles and propensities; and even these last, when touched by the re-moulding influence of the Holy Spirit, can be turned into a happier channel, and act in a new direction. Thus affected and operated upon, the organ of "combativeness" may employ its powers "to fight the good fight of faith," the Christian warfare. Paul offers us an admirable example of this description. In the early part of his remarkable history, by his own account, he bitterly persecuted the first Christians, being "exceeding mad against them:" in his noble defence, before Agrippa and Festus, he said, "I persecuted them even unto strange cities." Arrested at length in his career, we perceive this noble genius contended for "the faith which he once laboured to destroy." How are we to account for this remarkable change, which really seems equal to a new creation, and of which those who are at all conversant with the world, must have seen numerous examples—when even the man is a miracle to himself? By the principle of Phrenology the solution does not seem difficult. The existence of evil propensities is proved, and they are made to operate in a way altogether at antipodes with their former tendency, demonstrating the control of a power possessed of opposite attributes altogether superior to, and infinitely above them: this is a demonstrated fact; it is not special pleading that I employ. I might extend the same principles of reason to the other organs, such as *acquisitiveness*, which might be changed to seek that "wisdom which is from above;" and of *cautiousness* be superinduced a fear lest we "sin against God." Thus too with others.

There are some who would degrade our species to a level with quadrumanous animals, and view man as a kind of

polished ape or enlightened baboon. I am, therefore, free to confess that in Phrenology, such as I understand it, I can discover nothing that opposes the sublime principles of revelation, but rather the reverse. My opinion has not been founded on slight grounds, and I am not in the habit of thinking by proxy.

Phrenology teaches a knowledge of the works of the Creator; and as his works are wisely and perfectly made, the legitimate presumption is, that those who see danger in a knowledge of them, are mistaken in their views. If Phrenology is false, human ingenuity might certainly discover and point out the evil consequences to which it would lead: but if it be TRUE, no human intelligence ought to condemn it.

Cambridge. G. R. C.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY MONARCHY PREFERABLE TO AN ELECTIVE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It will be perceived, that the first paper which appeared in the *Controversialist* on the negative side of this question, was pervaded by the fallacy that monarchy and despotism are terms of synonymous import; by the supposition that the whole executive functions are vested in the king alone; by the assumption that the sovereign is "intrusted with the uncontrolled guidance of an empire." S. N. pointed out the distinction in the significance of these words, showing the unlikelihood of two such principles coexisting as election and despotic power, and explaining how the whole argument *necessarily* involved the control and limitation of the power of the potentate. No bargain could be made, no compact could be agreed to, no contract could be ratified, no covenant could be entered into, without mutual and specified agreement, without reciprocal stipulations. Now, election distinctly implies a contract; a contract is limitative in its nature, a contract is alien to despotic power; consequently, the only tenable position upon which the argument can be conducted is that of a limited monarchy. In such a government no uncontrolled guidance can be accorded, for it is exactly this item of control which constitutes its specific difference. In such a government the executive functions are not vested in the king alone, but in the supreme magistrate, and the elected functionaries who surround his throne, aid him with their counsels, and assist him in the performance of the multifarious round of duties which devolve on him as the recognized head of the body politic. In such a government no "insolence or oppression towards those who are styled his subjects," can be inflicted, for those laws by which the empire is governed are fixed, established, and sanctioned by parties other than the king—require to go through several steps, and come before a number of individuals—in all of which processes, and by all of which persons, they may be searched into, examined, and scrutinized; by these means their purposes and intentions may be discovered, and may be rejected or sustained as those parties may see fit. Safeguards are thus interposed between the despotic tendencies of the wielder of an empire's sceptre and those who own his sway. Precautions are thus taken to secure the honour of the crown and the privilege of the subject. Unity of action, with multiplicity of counsel, are thus secured, while individual oppression and unintervented malice are as effectually prevented. In S. N.'s quotations from the "Encyclopædia Britannica," article Poland, paragraphs 8 and 53, we have examples which establish the reverse of the assertion made by C. A., when he says,

"by an Elective Monarchy that individual may be secured to fill the highest offices of the state who, in public opinion, possesses the highest qualifications for it."

S. N. made the "entailing of candidateship for the vacant honour" a ground of objection to Elective Monarchy. C. A., with a considerable amount of truth, remarks that "this objection might be made to all elections." To a certain extent, with considerable limitations, all must admit the relevancy and power of this point. Yet, on a closer view, we shall find that the difference in degree in the honour sought almost nullifies its force. For when we reflect on the mighty stake suspended on the issue of the game, we cannot but feel that the temptation to dishonesty, atrocity, and crime, is inconceivably increased. How sweet a thing is it for the ambitious mind to wear the "golden circlet," to display the all-potent badge of sovereignty, to stretch the sceptred hand above the heads of millions, to sit upon a dais in a gold-adorned throne, to dwell within a regal palace-hall, the rooms of which are decorated with richly tinted broider-work, many-hued tapestry, damaskeened carpets, articles of use, luxury, and pomp, in confusing prodigality—all that is precious, rare, costly, much coveted, or highly prized—all the sumptuousness of opulence, and all the elegances which art, talent, and genius can produce; to be personally adorned with stars, garters, and other insignia of wealth, station, rank, and royalty; to be surrounded by the noble, served by the high-born, fawned on by the great, flattered by the fair; to be encircled by minions, myrmidons, and obsequious serfs; to be looked upon with awe, fear, wonder, and reverence by the populace; to be obeyed at every motion, beck, or nod; to have every worldly wish gratified, every sensual pleasure at command, every hour of dalliance undisturbed, every time of *ennui* wiled away by song and dance, and instruments of every varied note; to look upon a vast empire submissive to each behest, and foreign potentates striving to bask in the sunshine of a favourable smile; to revel in almost untold wealth, banquet in unrivalled magnificence; to be apparelled in gorgeousness, surrounded by splendour, bred by pleasure's every blandishment and each delusive snare; to possess equipage unemulatable, a numerous retinue, unsurpassed in elegance, grandeur of unapproachable stateliness, and indisputable supremacy! What sacrifice could appear too great, what crime would be unjustified, what villany unworthy of being resorted to, what scheme too low, mean, or despicable to be employed in the endeavour to attain this, the summit of societarian, social-earthly greatness? To the ambitious man, to him who hungered and thirsted after power, None! See the madness of the gambler—what frenzy is in his eye, what demon is in his heart, what hell-born abortion tugs so fiercely at his soul? and yet he plays for a paltry sum that would not pay the setting of the diamonds in a crown. Imagine, then, what fearful play of passion, what fierce demoniac energy and eagerness, what fiendish cupidity, what uncontrollable contention of soul, what unrelenting pitilessness, what crooked-cunning finesse, what insatiate gloating, what iron-soul policy, would ebb and flow, rage, agitate, and overwhelm society, were the monarchy thus free to competition. Why! what a demon is Pride, lust of Dominion, Sovereignty-desire? Let Alexander, Marius, Cæsar, Hannibal, Attila, Ghengis Khan, Tamerlane, Napoleon, be the answerers. Let blood-dyed war, the Crusades, the Inquisition, Massacre, and Persecution, be called as witnesses. What has swept the earth with "the besom of destruction," furrowed it with the ploughshare of devastation, peopled it with graves, filled it with "groanings that cannot be uttered?" Ambition. And are we to give loose rein to this impetuous, fury-driven, mad-eyed monster, by fostering, cherishing, and rewarding it? No! all other elections are amenable to law, justice, order; this can bear no parallel; if successful, he can defy revenge and brave punishment—if defeated, "he has set his life upon a cast, and he will stand the hazard of the die," and suicide will be the natural avenue of escape. Since, there-

fore, no other election can confer the same power, present the same temptation, hold out the same inducement, produce the same results, the same objection cannot be made to all elections.

Another principle which ought to be borne in mind in such a dispute as this is the power of habit. That principle of adaptiveness by which custom familiarizes us to the circumstances in which we are placed, and renders us comparatively insensible to the peculiarities of our situation; that acquired disposition of the intellect by which frequency of occurrence begets indifference and superinduces carelessness regarding the objects which surround us. From this principle we think we are warranted to infer that those whose "life from their life up" has been passed in scenes of regal pomp, wealth, and luxury, would be less assuming and usurpative, less tyrannical and oppressive, less arrogant, haughty, and ostentatious, than any one who might be elevated to a station of unexperienced pre-eminence, temptation, opulence, and grandeur. As the chamois-hunter scales the icy avalanche-crowned Alps, climbs to the summit of their rocky acclivities, stands, unawed, on the verge of the deep abysmal ravine, overleaps the gaping chasms and yawning clefts, and crosses the precipice's edge with fearless step and practised eye, proud mien, and daring heart, though the hollow-sounding winds rage round the grey brotherhood of rocks, and the rushing of distant torrents diffuse their fearful murmurings all around, when another's heart, who was unaccustomed to such things, would quake with inward dread, and palpitate with mind-o'er-mastering terror; so custom and habit familiarize those who move in the "higher circles" with the peculiarities of their position. It is not so, however, with upstart greatness. Marius, Sylla, Cæsar, Rienzi, Tomaso, Aniello, and Napoleon, are sufficient evidences of this;—of the inclination to overrate the power, the influence, the state, to which, by ambitious means, they have attained; of the tendency which the proud soul feels to assume tyrannic sway; to clothe itself with pompous decorations and magnificent gewgaws; to inspire awe, terror, reverence, and slavish dread in all within their influence. The excitement, the novelty, the exaltation, the unprecedented supremacy, all combined, must produce a strange tremour, a singular disturbance of the mental equilibrium, a sudden unbalancing of the intellectual powers. This is surely an argument well worthy of consideration in the discussion of the present question. For if it be the tendency of the hereditary enjoyment of high station to render the impressions of elevatedness commonplace, and of the elective enjoyment of aggrandizement to increase the ambitious desire, and fan the unholy flame of power-lust, then the affirmative of the question will be strengthened, and the probabilities of the truth of our opinion be materially approximated to correctness, and we shall be brought a step nearer the proper solution.

Hereditary Monarchies have their authority settled, established, and confirmed, by a long ancestral line, by connexions, alliances, treaties, and confederacies in foreign lands; by the possession of wealth, by the dependence of many in their own land, who sue for favour, who share in the government, and, through the military and other avenues to fortune, seek for glory, advancement, wealth, and reputation—by the sacred force which custom has over the multitude, and by the habit of obeying which the majority of men contract. In elective sovereignties, on the contrary, here are no such antecedent supports of power: unless by a lucky occurrence in the "Chapter of Accidents," these advantages are never conferred on an elected monarch. On the contrary, at each election, the people would exert themselves to the utmost to prune, lop, and diminish the vested prerogatives of the crown. It is worthy of remark, too, that the nobility, who, under an Hereditary Monarchy, are united, and comparatively unintriguing, must in an Elective one be a continual obstacle, stumbling-block, and nuisance; for as each one would have a chance of arriving at the much longed-for distinction, each would be engaged in fawning upon the popu-

lace, cringing to the middle class, flattering the prejudices of the mere mob. Largesses, bribery, and bounty would be scattered with unsparing hands, and the depravity and corruption of the nation be speedily completed. The art of gaining popularity would be more studied than the art of making a people happy. Each would put up some pretension to the crown on the occurrence of a vacancy, and those who were defeated would employ themselves in plots and counterplots to attain the coveted object. Hence at home there would neither be union, which is strength, nor contentment, which is great gain. Abroad there would neither be friendly powers, nor allied nations; and who can tell the anarchy which would prevail!

But leaving theory, let us draw from the armoury of facts our weapons for this controversy. In Rome's earliest years the government was electively regal. Romulus was the institutor of the state, the framer of its laws, and the first wielder of the sovereign power in the "mother of nations." He died without issue; and, after a year's contention between the Romans and Sabines as to who should be his successor, Numa, a Sabine, was called to occupy the vacant regal seat, and exercise supreme authority. "Tullus Hostilius, the third king of Rome, a man of warlike disposition, subdued the Albans, Fidenates, and other neighbouring states. The Sabines, now disunited from the Romans, were among the most powerful of their enemies. Tullus reigned thirty-three years, and is *said* to have been struck dead by lightning."* "Ancus Martius, the grandson of Numa, was elected king on the death of Tullus, was a good king, and reigned gloriously twenty-four years. Tarquinius, a citizen of Corinth, popular from his wealth and liberality, was elected to the vacant throne. Ancus being dead, and the kingdom, as usual, devolving on the Senate, Tarquin used all his power and art to set aside the children of the late king, and to get himself elected in their stead. For this purpose, upon the day appointed for the election, he contrived to have them sent out of the city, and in a speech to the people, in which he urged his friendship for them, the fortune he had spent among them, and his knowledge of their government—he offered himself as a candidate for the throne; this harangue had the desired effect, and the people with one consent elected him as their sovereign. Tarquin was not content with a kingdom, unless he were also dignified with the ensigns of royalty. In imitation of the Lydian kings, he assumed a crown of gold, a sceptre with an eagle on the top, and robes of purple. It was, perhaps, the splendour of these insignia of royalty that first raised the envy of the late king's sons, who had now for above thirty-seven years quietly submitted to his government. His design, also, of adopting Servius Tullius, his son-in-law, for his successor, might have contributed to inflame their resentment. But whatever was the cause of their tardy vengeance, they had, however, resolved to destroy him, and at last found means to effect their purpose, by hiring two ruffians, who, demanding permission to speak to the king under the pretence that they came for justice, struck him dead in his palace, by a blow from an axe."† "The next king was Servius Tullius, a person unknown, but supposed to be, as indicated by his name, of servile origin, that is, a slave, or the son of a slave. He had married the daughter of Tarquin, and secured, by his own address and the intrigues of his mother-in-law, his election to the vacant throne. Servius, after a reign of forty-four years, was assassinated by his daughter (by riding over him with her chariot, after his having been wounded by her husband), who was married to Tarquinius Priscus (that is, the first Tarquin). By this atrocious action he paved the way for his own elevation to the throne. The government of this second Tarquin, surnamed the Proud, was systematically tyrannical. His son, Sextus, ravished Lucretia, the wife of

* Tytler's "Elements of General History," page 137. Black. 1848.

† Goldsmith's "History of Rome," page 143. Oliver and Boyd. 1836.

Collatinus, who, unable to survive her dishonour, stabbed herself in presence of her husband and kindred. This roused their vengeance, and procured by their influence the expulsion of the tyrant and the abolition of the regal dignity at Rome, 509, B.C."*

These facts require no comment: they prove that anarchy, instability, intrigue, criminality, atrocity, are the result of Elective Monarchies. That villany, ambition, bribery, cunning, dissension, with all their myriad train of evil consequences, are naturally produced by them. That instead of increasing the happiness of the subject—instead of creating an anxiety to promote the well-being of the people—instead of gaining the most respected person for a monarch, it has introduced, and necessarily does introduce, misery and distress amongst the populace, tyranny in the ruler, and vile intriguing and uncontrolled ambition amongst those who aim at rule, supremacy, and regal power. We have shown that contrary tendencies are evoked by Hereditary Monarchy—habit reconciles the people to subjection—makes the occupiers of elevated stations indifferent to its honours and dignities. We have shown that foreign states would not ally themselves to an uncertain government. That they would endeavour to gain a favourable settlement for some of their offshoots on its throne; and that all the million evils of cupidity and ambition would be called into exercise. Do you not think, then, that an Hereditary Monarchy is preferable to an Elective one? P. H.

* Tytler's "Elements of General History."

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

The question which we are now debating is, undoubtedly, one of vast importance in itself, and one, too, in which every member of society is interested. For, as it may be taken as a self-evident truth, that a government of some kind is indispensable, so it is an equally undeniable proposition that the *better* the government, and the more solid the foundation upon which it is based, the more surely will its purpose be attained in the happiness and prosperity of the people. Bearing this in mind, I have little hesitation in adopting the negative side of the question at issue. From reflection on the principles involved, I am led to conclude that an Hereditary Monarchy is *not* preferable to an Elective one, and the perusal of the historic page confirms me in this belief. Instances are not wanting in ancient and modern history to show the evils which have resulted from Hereditary Monarchies. I could point to the Israelites, the chosen people of God, who merely from the desire to be like their neighbours, cried aloud for a king, until one was given them, not as a blessing but as a curse. Saul was the individual called to rule over this fickle and turbulent people, and for a time contentment seemed to be restored. But his accession to power appeared to alter his character; formerly brave, generous, and honourable, he now became suspicious, treacherous, and cruel, and ultimately losing all peace of mind, he fell by his own hand, after sustaining a defeat in battle. On the death of Saul, David was appointed to occupy the throne. He reigned long, but not altogether happily. He was succeeded by his son Solomon, under whose sway the Hebrew nation reached the zenith of its glory, and became very powerful and wealthy. On the death of Solomon, however, a division took place, the two kingdoms of Judah and Israel being the result, and from that period the people seldom enjoyed a season of uninterrupted tranquillity. Domestic broils, vicious habits, foreign aggression, and, more than all, a line of weak and iniquitous monarchs, combined to bring about the fall of the Hebrew nation. It received its final blow at the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, after which the miserable remnants of this unfortunate people became scattered far and wide upon the face of the earth. Let us turn now to another once mighty State—the former Mistress of the World—Rome. Her first king, Romulus, the founder of the city, was elected by the voice of the people. He instituted the

Senate, consisting of a hundred of the principal citizens of Rome, "whose age wisdom, or valour, gave them a natural authority over their fellow-subjects," and thenceforth every new king was nominated by the senators, their choice being ratified by the whole body of the people, or *vice versâ*. This state of things continued for two centuries, during which time Rome rapidly rose in prosperity, wealth, and importance. The last king appointed in the manner described was Servius Tullius; and he, after a useful reign of forty-four years, was assassinated through his son-in-law, Tarquin, who immediately usurped the throne. Tarquin was an artful and treacherous man, but after having ruled twenty-five years, an event occurred which effected a great change in the government. This event was the dishonour, by the king's son, Sextus, of Lucretia, the lovely and amiable wife of Collatinus, a noble Roman, and her subsequent self-destruction. The incident brought into notice Junius Brutus, who, previously reputed an idiot, now showed himself able to sway the feelings, and to supply the wants of the people. The Senate passed a decree banishing Tarquin and his family from Rome; and shortly afterwards, Brutus, "the deliverer of his country," with Lucretia's husband, Collatinus, were chosen first consuls. Various forms of the supreme power were subsequently adopted, such as "First Dictator," "Tribunes," and the "Decemviri." The system of appointing consuls, however, for longer or shorter periods, was resumed and continued until six hundred years after the building of the city, when Sylla took the first step towards the ruin of the Commonwealth of Rome, by assuming the title of "Perpetual Dictator." Shortly after the death of Sylla, the first Triumvirate, consisting of Crassus, Pompey, and Julius Cæsar, was established. Crassus was slain in the war against the Parthians; Pompey, for a considerable time, carried on a bloody war against Cæsar; but at length his army was totally defeated, and he, seeking refuge in Egypt, was treacherously murdered by order of the Government. Cæsar was now free from rivalry, and his brilliant victories, his moderation, and his ability in consolidating and adding to the power of Rome, won the favour of the people, who named him sole Consul, and perpetual Dictator, and even invested him with the title of "Emperor." It was rumoured, however, that he wished to assume a name which the people regarded with aversion—that of king. There appears to have been no foundation for this; but a conspiracy was formed against him, and, as every reader knows, he was assassinated in the senate-house. After this, there was a long and sanguinary warfare between the armies under Brutus and Cassius on the one side, and those of Antony and Augustus on the other. But I need not weary the reader by details with which he is, doubtless, well acquainted; it is sufficient for our present purpose to say, that Augustus, having subjugated all his enemies, was unanimously proclaimed Emperor of Rome—that during his reign the empire attained the pinnacle of its power and grandeur—that the hereditary system became to a great extent engrafted on the Constitution—and that then Rome gradually *fell*. I need not speak of the twelve Cæsars—the absolute power which they wielded—and the barbarous use to which they applied it; nor of Nerva, Trajan, and the rest of the "five good emperors of Rome"—under whose sway a slight revival took place—or of the subsequent history of this once all-powerful State. Rome *declined and fell*. And it appears to me, from a slight perusal of her history, that this decline commenced when the principle of an hereditary and too-potent monarchy was introduced.

I will not multiply examples, for, after all, a question like this is not to be *decided* by illustrations, however authentic in detail, and pointed in application. If our friends who take the opposite side can *prove* that an Hereditary Monarchy is preferable to an Elective one—that it contains better principles, and is founded on a better basis, I will admit that such instances as I have given carry little weight, and that the facts pointed out must be traced to some other cause not involved in the main question.

Let us proceed, therefore, to consider the question abstractedly. I object to an Hereditary Monarchy on the following grounds:—I. Because it is unjust in principle. II. Because it *cannot* invariably, nor even frequently, answer the purpose for which government is ordained. III. Because it promotes an unsound and artificial state of society. IV. Because it is very expensive.

In the first place, then, I contend that the *principle* of an Hereditary Monarchy is not a good principle. C. A. writes, "There are few, we suppose, in the present day, who believe that there is anything *sacred* or *absolutely right* in Hereditary Monarchy as a form of government." Whether this be "believed" or not, I cannot say, but certainly, in one or two kingdoms that could be mentioned, appearances would lead us to conclude that it *is*. That "A king is but a man," is a threadbare truism, and yet it appears to require frequent repetition. But why should a king, merely because he *is* a king, be treated with adulation bordering upon worship? This is not admiration of intellectual greatness, for he may be a fool: it is not homage to morality and virtue, for of these he may be utterly destitute: it cannot be gratitude for being well-governed, for *he* may have had no hand in the government at all: it is not allegiance, for that feeling requires no such manifestations. Where we owe allegiance, let us show it as it ought to be shown; not in setting up an idol, but in upholding and defending, if need be, any part of the Constitution of the country which requires and deserves it. This would bear little resemblance to that king-worship which I am now condemning, the consequences of which must be so pernicious to both parties. The monarch, hearing flattery, and witnessing blind submission, if not restrained by a well-regulated mind, cannot but become arrogant and overbearing; while the subject lowers his own status, by offering such incense at the shrine of his fellow-creature. I consider, then, that an Hereditary Monarchy is unjust in principle, because it bestows upon one man titles, privileges, and claims, that no mere mortal ought to possess, and demands from others a certain sacrifice of those feelings of equality and independence which are implanted in every human breast.

In the second place, I object to an Hereditary Monarchy because it cannot, from its very nature, invariably answer the purpose for which government is ordained. C. A. observes that "the great object of all government, and all governors, should be the promotion of the general good, by the preservation of peace, and the protection of life and property. To do this efficiently, knowledge, wisdom, and moral worth are required; and he who is destitute of these is unfit to hold office in the state." A king who does not possess such qualities is clearly unfit for the position he holds, unless it can be satisfactorily shown that the mere *name*, or some circumstances connected with the office, are sufficient to counterbalance the want of the qualities in question. "Like father like son," is one of those absurd dogmas which are rapidly being exploded, and it is surely unnecessary to attempt here to refute such a palpable absurdity. Physical conformation, and some diseases, are hereditary, but mental or moral qualities are by no means so. A parent may be wise and virtuous, and his son quite the reverse; while the offspring of another parent, who combines the qualities of a knave and a fool, may possess every grace and accomplishment that can elevate or adorn humanity. If it be *indispensable*, then, that a king should own such and such qualities, how inadequately does an Hereditary Monarchy provide the desideratum! Nay, more: physiologists inform us that frequent inter-marriage taking place among members of a single family tends of itself to vitiate the race. But some will tell us that we can appoint such institutions as may be sufficient to govern the country, without the intervention of the sovereign, so that, although *he* should be deficient in firmness, wisdom, prudence, or virtue, the state may not suffer thereby. I would reply to this by simply asking, what is the use of such a king? If he cannot lend any assistance

in the government, or, what is worse, if he can only interfere that he may injure it, he has no business there, unless it can be shown that the *name* constitutes the *necessity* for the institution. If the reader wishes to know whether these remarks are corroborated by *instances*, he need not go far from home to be convinced; let him just take a glance at the history of England, and I would then ask him how he likes some of England's former sovereigns; what thinks he of Henry VIII., for example, as a Model Hereditary Monarch?

Again, I think Hereditary Monarchy engenders an unsound and artificial state of society. This is nowhere more strongly exemplified than in our own country, although I am happy to think that the evil complained of is beginning to be somewhat mitigated. In such a state of society as this, genius and moral worth are held in comparatively little estimation; but let a man be able to show that he is descended from one of the Norman robbers who "came over with the Conquerer," and honour and emoluments are his. In such a state of society, "aristocratic blood" holds the first rank; professors of war by land or sea, the second; millionaires, the third; and when these are served, possibly your men of genius, virtue, and philanthropy, may be thought of. "And how should it be otherwise," writes Thackeray, perhaps the most racy and piquant author of the day, "in a country where Lordolatry is part of our creed, and when our children are brought up to respect the Peerage as the Englishman's second Bible?" Then there is the Court Circular, containing the most absurd details and uninteresting relations. Did it inform us of those acts in the domestic and social life of a beloved Sovereign which shed a lustre over her character, it would be warmly welcomed; as it is, however, it is simply ridiculous.

My last objection to an Hereditary Monarchy is grounded on the enormous expense it entails upon the country. This, though one of the least of its evils, is nevertheless a heavy one, as a glance at a paper I have before me shows. There is exhibited in detail the annual cost of the British Executive, independent of course of yearly pensions, salaries to Ambassadors, Bishops, Judges, &c. &c., and that cost exceeds £800,000, while the annual expense of the American Executive only amounts to £15,000 sterling! It is no wonder reformers wax indignant when speaking of the money thus required to sustain what has been truly called "the barbarous pomp of the Crown," and it is no wonder John Bull complains grievously under the pressure of such a heavy burden.

I have thus far stated my decided objections to the hereditary form of monarchy, and shall now briefly consider the advantages which its advocates claim for it. I do not see the drift of S. N.'s remarks, when he says, "In this, self-interest gains its gratification; ostentation and vanity gain their ends; and round this point trade and commerce revolve." Is it necessary that self-interest, ostentation, and vanity, *should* gain their ends? Is it not of infinitely greater importance that the interests of the people at large should be impartially considered? I cannot admit, either, as S. N. wishes us to do, that *one* instance from the page of history, viz., the case of Poland, is sufficient to settle the question, and to prove that an Elective Monarchy is essentially a bad one. I might, with as much reason, point to the case of Rome, and contend that *it* establishes beyond dispute the evils of an Hereditary Monarchy.

It is maintained that an Hereditary Monarchy possesses greater stability, but such apparent stability is often false, and is either kept up by physical force, or it rests upon a basis more glittering than solid. That an Hereditary Monarchy has the advantage of *securing* the appointment of the Sovereign I admit: although there is no theoretical advantage here, yet in practice it is certainly desirable so far, to avoid the agitation and excitement which a national election might occasion. At the same time, observe with what ease the Presidents of the United States are elected, and with what little disturbance Louis Napoleon was appointed to rule the destinies of France. I *oppose* an Hereditary Mon-

archy on four points, and on the same four points *reversed*, I support an Elective one.

I. Because it is just in principle; as it is essentially right that the people, who in fact constitute the real power of the State, should have a voice in the election of their ruler.

II. Because it fulfils the object for which every government is or ought to be instituted. Settle the qualities which the monarch should possess, and apply the criterion, until an individual be found with sufficient "firmness, wisdom, prudence, and virtue," to enable him to govern for the good of his country.

III. Because it would elevate the general tone of society. Under such a government it is most probable that genius and moral worth would become passports to fame and honour more readily than aristocratic birth or accidental riches.

IV. Because, in a pecuniary point of view, it would be so easily maintained. This point requires little substantiation; we have already given one strong instance of its truth—that of the United States of America.

We may be told that, under an Hereditary Monarchy, Great Britain has become a wealthy, sound, and prosperous country. I admit the fact, but believe that it is to be attributed not so much to her boasted "glorious Constitution" as to the national character of her people. I believe in national characteristics; and those of the English appear to tend to preserve the stability of the nation, and to increase the general prosperity, although they by no means refine or elevate the individual.

Undoubtedly an Elective Monarchy can only be introduced with advantage at a certain era in the history of a country. Whether we have yet arrived at this era or not, I cannot say; but it is surely full time that the *people* of Great Britain had a somewhat larger share in the appointment of those legislative institutions whose laws they are bound to obey, whose rights they are expected to defend.

Dundee. C. C. M.

Social Economy, etc.

OUGHT CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS TO BE ABOLISHED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Having already spoken of Capital Punishment as *unnecessary* and *inexpedient*, we come now to consider their Justifiability; and in so doing we wish to view the subject in as extended an aspect as its importance deserves. We have occasionally found it to be not sufficient to prove a thing both unnecessary and inexpedient, so long as it may have the plea of justifiability, or even antiquity on its side; but we shall attempt to show that death punishments are *unjustifiable;* and that the plea of *antiquity*, sometimes set up for them, is erroneous; firstly, because it originates in the wrong understanding of the ordinances of a peculiar dispensation, long since passed away; and, secondly, because it would apply measures to our own day only suited to the rude barbarism of our forefathers. We may here remark, that after what has of late been written upon the question we feel some difficulty in our attempt to treat it originally, although we hope to make clear to our readers, both our own views, and the views of those we may have occasion to cite.

The justifiability of death punishments has generally been considered under two heads, namely—

I. The Human Right to take away life.

II. The Divine Authority to do so.

In order to constitute a positive right, we apprehend it may be necessary that those claiming it should prove that such right is *inherent* to them, as the right of freedom and speech in man; or that it

is derived from the positive and unmistakeable command of the Supreme Ruler. We say positive and unmistakeable command, in order to guard against anything which may be only prophetic or partial, that is, partaking rather of a warning than a command, or relating only to a particular period or people. The former of the rights we have referred to would be of the class called *Human* rights, the latter would be a Divine right, as originating out of Divine authority or command. And there may be another, which is an *assumed human right*, as where the object sought to be attained, (being in itself a legal and proper one,) cannot be so effectually accomplished by any other means, and this for distinction we shall term the *Right of Expediency*.

First, let us inquire into the existence of the Human right to take away life, and see from whence it has been derived. The individual right over life (except in the most urgent cases of self-defence) is, we believe, universally denied among Europeans; indeed, not only has man no right over the lives of others, but he also has none over his own life; for, as Blackstone forcibly says, "This natural life being the immediate donation of the great Creator, cannot be legally disposed of, or destroyed, by an individual, neither by the person himself, nor by any other of his fellow-creatures, merely upon their own authority." If, then, man, as an individual, has no right over his own life, nor that of his fellows, we are at a loss to understand how society, which is composed only of a number of individuals, "united for their safety and convenience, and intending to *act together as one man*," can have any right over life. It is generally held that this governmental right over life is obtained by *delegation;* but whence does the right proceed, since governors and governments derive their authority from individuals? We need hardly remark, that, in the first stages of society, everything is performed upon individual right. But as civilization progresses, it becomes expedient to appoint some person or persons, in whom the individuals collectively may vest their rights, and who, by virtue of the power thus received, shall protect the rights and possessions of those so vesting them; and such rights "being thus conferred by universal consent, give to the State exactly the same power, and no more, over all its members, as each individual member had naturally over himself and others." Thus, it is clear, that Government can have no more right over life than was originally possessed by man before he subjected himself to governmental authority!

With respect to the assumed human right over life, or, as we have termed it, the "right of expediency;" it has not been an unusual occurrence, either in this or other countries, for *policy* to assume the garb of Justifiability; that is to say, for the real justice of a measure to be overlooked, and for it to be judged to be right to do such and such an act, because it suits *present* convenience, conduces to the furtherance of men's prejudices, or exhibits some other of the usual claims of expediency. For ourselves we enter a protest against such a policy. Where a measure has justice on its side, although in itself severe, and is still supported by policy or expediency, then there is reason for its adoption; but where a measure has *not* justice on its side, but is opposed to it, and is only supported by some one or more of the many pleas of expediency, we can in no way approve of it. In this opinion we are borne out by the great jurist before cited, "for though," he says, "the end of punishment is to deter men from offending, it never can follow from thence that it is lawful to deter them at any rate, and by any means, *since there may be unlawful methods of enforcing obedience, even to the justest laws.*" Thus far for the Human right over life.

Secondly, We have now to direct our attention to the *Divine* authority to take away life, upon which some who are not advocates either of the necessity or expediency of Capital Punishment take their stand, looking upon it as a matter of *duty;* and consequently believing the gallows, if an evil, to be a necessary one! To such we address ourselves.

Of the several passages in the Old Testament usually pleaded in justifica-

tion of death punishments, the one most relied on is that from the 9th chapter of Genesis — "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." Now, after giving the matter our careful consideration, and consulting several of the best authorities on the subject, we are forced to the opinion that the meaning intended to be conveyed by this passage is involved in considerable doubt. From the peculiar structure of the Hebrew language, in which the Scriptures were originally written, it is extremely difficult to say whether the passage should have been rendered in a prophetic sense, merely as a prediction, or otherwise. The Rev. Mr. Christmas (a clergyman of the Church of England), who has spent much time in the investigation of the subject, contends that the passage contains no necessary *command*, and says, "It may be a prophecy, it may be denunciation, but I think it scarcely a sufficient warrant for execution, even as it stands." He then goes on to say, that the correctness of the words, "by man," which occur in the passage, are also a matter of very great doubt. He cites five important translations, in which they do not occur at all, viz., those of Calmet, John Frederick Osterwald, the Vulgate, the Septuagint, and the Spanish version of Scio, to which he also adds the authority of Wycliffe. We are fully aware that, in ordinary cases, the propriety of questioning the authorized version of the Scriptures may be open to objection; but where it is a matter of life and death, we think nothing short of a clear and unmistakeable authority should be required. It is the custom of the English legislature, in all matters touching the guilt of a party, or the authority for the punishment of such guilt, to give the accused the benefit of any doubt that may arise, and this is a proper course. But in order, if possible, to remove all doubt, we will endeavour to find something which shall assist us in coming to a conclusion. Our mind reverts to the case of the first murderer, CAIN. We find from the 4th chapter of Genesis, that after he had murdered his brother Abel, his conscience smote him, and he was fearful that those who found him would slay him, which fear he intimated to God, and what was the reply? "And the Lord said unto him, Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold. And the Lord set a mark upon Cain, *lest any one finding him should slay him.*" Now, notice the wisdom of the punishment. The mark set upon him, while it prevented any person from slaying him, also pointed him out as a murderer, and therefore acted as a punishment to himself, and caused others to shun him. Where must be the reflecting powers of those, who, after considering this Divine example, will still advocate Capital Punishments on Scriptural authority.

Of the remaining passages of the Old Testament touching the infliction of death for murder — occurring between *Exodus* and *Deuteronomy* inclusive—we may remark that they relate exclusively to the Jewish dispensation, and, therefore no better reason can be assigned for their not applying to us than that we are not *Jews*, nor are we regulated by the same form of government as they were. The governmnet of the Jews "differed from all others that ever have existed, or ever will exist. It was of Divine original, or what has been properly termed a *Theocracy*. The supreme legislative power was vested in God himself, who alone could enact and repeal laws." Thus, the government being directly in the hands of the Almighty, the *intention* as well as the *actions* of men were known, and the difficulties and dangers arising from the liability of human judgment to err at once obviated.

An objection occurs also at this part of our inquiry which must not be overlooked. It will be observed that, first, with regard to the passage in Genesis, it makes no distinction "either as to intention or degree;" it reads, "*Whoso* sheddeth man's blood," &c., therefore it must apply to "manslaughter" and "involuntary homicide," as well as to murder, for they are implied in the shedding of blood. And, secondly, with respect to the Jewish Code, *it* embodied many other offences which were punish-

able with death, as Sabbath-breaking, adultery, idolatry, man-stealing, disobedience to parents, blasphemy, &c., &c.; and, therefore, if its authority be now binding upon us in one case, it must be equally so in each of the others; we can have no right to say in one instance, because it suits our views or convenience, "We construe this to be in accordance with Divine authority, and will act upon it;" and in another, "This does not meet our views of right or expediency, and therefore we shall not acknowledge the authority;" or, as better expressed in the words of Pope—

"Why charge we Heaven in those, in these acquit."

The Jewish Code must now be looked upon as either entirely repealed, or as fully in force: there has been no *partial* repeal of it. Assuming it to be in force, we must *then* be wrong in not having acted *fully* up to it; and a large class of persons who believe that the "abolition time will some day come"—that is, we presume, when the world gets better—must be doomed to perpetual disappointment, because, so long as the Bible is our "text-book and our guide," that which is now enforced upon us will remain so. For ourselves, however, we are of those who believe that the harsh, and (so to speak) vindictive passages, which occur in the Old Testament, were intended to be entirely repealed by the mild and peaceful doctrines of the New Testament. We could adduce many passages in favour of this conclusion, but let one suffice. "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you that ye resist not evil." . . . Such is the law of love which the right understanding of the Scriptures is calculated to infuse into our hearts.

In quitting this subject, we venture to express our earnest hope and firm belief, that the time will soon come, when Justice, Wisdom, and Mercy, shall so far prevail that Englishmen will rise as a nation, and pray for the abolition of the gallows, as unworthy of the greatness of their country and the character of the present age.

C. W., Jun.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. III.

Every part of the human frame speaks intelligible language that cannot possibly be misunderstood—each expresses the passion and emotion of the mind, indicates what is passing therein, and demonstrates the real state of its affections.

The head is sometimes erect, sometimes hangs down as in shame, sometimes shows by a nod a particular person or object, sometimes draws suddenly back with an air of disdain; gives assent by a gentle nod; denies by a shaking aside; threatens by one sort of movement, opposes by another, and expresses suspicion by a third.

The face may be considered to be a legible representation of the mind, giving every observer the same idea, consequently it may be philosophically considered as the index of the mind. The change of natural colour shows by turns *anger* or *shame*, sometimes by redness, and sometimes by paleness. Every feature contributes its legitimate share. The mouth in admiration opens, and in another state of the mind it shuts, and in another the teeth gnash. The forehead has justly been denominated the "Gate of the Soul"—the temple of modesty; the forehead smooth, eyebrows arched and easy, demonstrate *tranquillity* or *joy*. Mirth opens

the mouth towards the ears, and half-shuts the eyes. The front wrinkled into furrows denotes *fury.* In short, whatever there is in corporeal dignity or beauty, in the majesty of the face, in the grace of action, in the piercing glance or fiery flash of the eye; whatever there is in lively passion, strong emotion, fine imagination, wise reflection, or irresistable reasoning; whatever of excellence in human nature, all that the benevolent hand of the Creator has impressed of his own image upon the noblest creature with which we are acquainted—all appear in the consummate speaker to the highest advantage. And whoever is proof against such a display of all that is noble in human nature must be void of eye, of ear, and have neither passion, nor imagination, neither taste, nor understanding.

Both the ARMS are sometimes engaged, sometimes only one, which must be the right arm. Sometimes they are raised as high as the face, by which we denote *wonder:* sometimes held out before the breast, this manifests *fear;* spread forth with the hands open to express *desire* or *affection;* the hands are clapped in surprise, also in sudden joy or grief; threatening is shown by the right hand being clenched, and the arms brandished; both arms set a-kimbo to express contempt or courage. With the hands we solicit, we refuse, we promise, interrogate, admire, reckon, confess, repent; we express aversion, fear, shame, joy, grief, confession, doubt, penitence. With the hands we describe, and point out all the circumstances of time, place, and manner of what we relate; we excite the passions of others, and soothe them; we approve and disapprove; gladden and astonish; permit or prohibit; admire and despise; astonish, and indicate silence, and so on; all which actions must uniformly attend and keep pace with the tongue. In short, the hands serve us instead of many sorts of words, and in many instances where the language of the tongue is unknown, that of the hands is understood, being universal, and common to all nations and tongues.

The LEGS advance or retreat to express desire or aversion, love or hatred, courage or fear; the stamping of the foot expresses earnestness, anger, and threatening; and leaping, exultation or sudden joy.

After giving the young speaker a general idea of the use and action of the most significant members of the body, we shall proceed to enumerate the principal passions, humours, sentiments, and intentions, which are to be expressed by speech and action; and I doubt not it will be allowed by the most observing, that it is nearly in the following order that nature expresses them:—

1. Tranquillity.
2. Cheerfulness.
3. Mirth.
4. Raillery in sport.
5. Buffoonery.
6. Joy.
7. Delight.
8. Gravity.
9. Inquiry.
10. Attention.
11. Modesty.
12. Perplexity.
13. Vexation.
14. Pity.
15. Grief.
16. Melancholy.
17. Despair.
18. Fear.
19. Shame.
20. Remorse.
21. Courage.
22. Boasting.
23. Pride.
24. Obstinacy.
25. Authority.
26. Commanding.
27. Forbidding.
28. Affirming.
29. Denying.
30. Differing.
31. Agreeing.
32. Exhorting.
33. Judging.
34. Reproving.
35. Acquitting.
36. Condemning.
37. Teaching.
38. Pardoning.
39. Arguing.
40. Dismissing.
41. Refusing.
42. Granting.
43. Dependence.
44. Veneration.
45. Respect.
46. Hope.
47. Desire.
48. Love.
49. Giving.
50. Wonder.
51. Admiration.
52. Gratitude.
53. Curiosity.
54. Persuasion.
55. Tempting.
56. Promising.
57. Affectation.
58. Sloth.
59. Intoxication.
60. Anger.

61. Peevishness.
62. Malice.
63. Envy.
64. Cruelty.
65. Complaining.
66. Fatigue.
67. Aversion.
68. Commendation.
69. Jealousy.
70. Dotage.
71. Folly.
72. Distraction.
73. Sickness.
74. Fainting.
75. Death.

The above are simple, pure, or unmixed passions, humours, vices, virtues, or feelings. There are others beside the above which a reader or speaker may accidentally have occasion to express. But we have enumerated the principal ones. And any other casual feeling may be made up of two or more of these. *Pity*, for example, is composed of grief and love. This can be well managed by the speaker's looks and gestures, and by the pitch and tone of voice, expressing both grief and love, and so of the rest.

Lower degrees of every passion are to be expressed by more moderate exertions of voice and gesture, as every public speaker's discretion will naturally suggest.

THE PASSIONS EXPLAINED AND EXEMPLIFIED.

1. TRANQUILLITY, or quietness; a calm state, or *apathy*, is manifest in the natural blandness and composure of the countenance, the general repose of the body and limbs, without the apparent exertion of any single muscle. The countenance open; the forehead smooth; the eyebrows arched; the mouth all but closed; and the eyes passing with an easy, uninterrupted motion from object to object, but not dwelling long together upon any one. We cannot exemplify by words this simple state of the whole frame.

2. CHEERFULNESS, a state of moderate joy or gaiety, adds a smile, opens the mouth a little more than Tranquillity. This state of the frame is exemplified in Mirth or Humour.

3. MIRTH, or *laughter*, opens the mouth still more than the foregoing, and towards the ears; crisps the nose; lessens the aperture of the eyes, sometimes fills them with tears, shakes the whole frame; giving considerable pain, which occasions holding the sides.

4. RAILLERY, to treat with satirical merriment, but in sport, without any feelings of animosity, is dressed in the attire, or wears the aspect of *cheerfulness*. The tone of the voice sonorous, but sprightly. With *contempt* or *disgust* it casts a look asquint, at intervals, at the object; and relinquishes the *cheerful* aspect for one made up of an affected grin and sullenness. The upper lip is drawn up with perfect disdain. The arms are bent, the hands on the hips, and the elbows standing from the side; the right hand now and then thrown out toward the object, as ready to strike a slight back-hand blow. The pitch of the voice rather loud; the tone sneering; the sentence short, but satirical, mixed with mock praise. We will give an example from 1 Kings, chapter xviii., and especially the 27th verse, where Elijah ridicules the prophets of Baal:—"And it came pass at noon, that Elijah mocked them and said, Cry with a great voice: for he is a god: either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is on a journey; or peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked," &c.

5. BUFFOONERY consists of pranks, which are composed of humour and mirth, assuming an arch, sly, leering gravity. It continues its serious aspect, though

all should laugh. This command of voice is somewhat difficult, though not so much so as to "weep with those who weep." Fortunately this expression of feature is not often called for, and less frequently needed.

6. JOY is composed of many simple pleasurable feelings; as, satisfaction, hope, and confidence. When sudden and violent, it must be manifested by clapping of hands and exultation. The eyes must open wide, sometimes fill with tears; often raised to heaven, especially in devout transports. The countenance must smile, not composedly, but with features aggravated. The voice must rise to very high notes at times. Here is an example to be exercised by the young speaker:—

"Of *fruit divine*
Sweet of *thyself*, but much *more* sweet thus *cropt;*
Forbidden here, it seems as only *fit*
For *gods;* yet able to make *gods* of *men:*
And why not *gods* of *men*, since *good*, the *more*
Communicated, *more abundant* grows,
The Author *not impair'd*, but *honour'd more?*"

The words in *italics* are emphatic, and must be spoken as directed in page 64, on "EMPHASIS."

7. DELIGHT is made up of satisfaction, pleasure, joy and pleasure; or ravished with music, painting, oratory, or any elegancy—must show itself by the *looks*, *gestures*, and *utterance*, as in *joy;* but more moderate.

8. GRAVITY, or seriousness, is a mixture of attention and concern. When this impression of the mind is made manifest, the eyebrows are a little drawn down, cast down or shut; or the eyes are raised to heaven; the mouth shuts, and the lips are pinched close. The posture of the whole body is composed, and almost void of motion. The speech, if any, is slow and solemn; the tone unvarying, as in "monotony." We find it necessary to exemplify this, and again we recommend the speaker to exercise, in a room by himself, the following illustrative quotation from Dr. Young's "Night Thoughts:"—

"The *clock* strikes *one*. We take *no note* of *time*,
But by its *loss*. To give it then a *tongue*
Is *wise* in *man*. As if an *angel* spoke,
I *feel* the *solemn sound*. If heard *aright*,
It is the *knell* of my *departed hours*.
Where are they? With the *years beyond* the *flood*.
It is the *signal* that demands *dispatch*.
How *much* is *still* to *do!* My *hopes* and *fear*
Start up alarmed, and o'er *life's narrow verge*
Look down—on *what?*—A *fathomless abyss*."

We conclude this paper, trusting that the reader will study it, for it will prove of value to him who wishes to be able to deliver himself properly, when he may be called upon to speak before an audience. We have not furnished many examples for exercise on the foregoing, for the simple reason that they are not needed.

THE ADVANTAGES OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

MAN is a social being. That this is a truth, requires no lengthened argumentation to demonstrate, for it is clearly founded on his nature, and fully developed in his history. It is this social principle that is the basis of those domestic affections which have influenced man in all ages and countries; and it is this principle that

not only binds him to his family, but unites him with his friends in the pursuit of common objects, in the carrying out of common purposes. On this principle men in an uncivilized state combine for mutual protection or ruthless plunder, and on this principle we unite for objects of science and art, benevolence and religion. This is the foundation on which those societies for mutual improvement are raised, that have been the means of imparting so many important advantages to their members. To the specification of a few of these advantages we will now address ourselves.

1st. They stimulate to study by affording example for imitation, and by rousing a feeling of self-respect and "the desire to excel." Man has been described as "an imitative being," and certainly the epithet indicates a prominent feature in his character. It is universally acknowledged that example is more powerful than precept. If example were personified, it might with propriety be called the teacher —the great teacher of mankind. Its influence is not only powerful in degree, but universal in extent. The best illustration of the power of example that we can adduce, is that of gravitation; and this is but an imperfect one, as all comparisons between physical and metaphysical principles must of necessity be. Gravitation influences all material bodies, example all sentient beings. The force of gravity is in proportion to the size of the body in which it resides. Bodies of equal sizes influence each other mutually to an equal extent, but a large body will naturally control a smaller one. Thus, too, it is with example. The example of one man will influence another, but the example of a number of men will generally direct him. A man in such a condition is under the influence of a principle as powerful, and almost as certain, as gravitation itself. In mutual improvement societies the example of all the members is brought to bear upon each individual. A person joining a society of this kind soon feels the influence of the other members, and it leads him to study and application. The cares of life are so numerous, and the calls of business so pressing, that the man must know little of them, or be possessed of an unusual degree of fortitude, who does not suffer his resolutions sometimes to be broken. This is especially the case when those resolutions relate only to himself; but when they concern others, he has many motives urging him to carry out his purposes. The opinion which others may form of him, as well as his own interest in the matter, will be considered, and he will make a vigorous effort, and generally, a successful one. Taken thus far, by example and self-respect, another principle ere long is aroused in his breast, which prompts him to greater and more self-denying effort; we mean, "the desire to excel." This desire is natural to man, and associate bodies are admirably adapted to develop it, for he must be destitute of self-repect, and devoid of laudable ambition, who does not in such a position manifest it. But it may be asked, Is there any necessity for these stimulants to study? We reply, Undoubtedly there is, for such is the changing character of man, that the noblest resolutions formed, and the purest desires cherished, will soon be forgotten, unless those resolutions are frequently renewed, and those desires constantly fed. It is so in reference to everything else, and it will be so with respect to study, unless a person connects himself with a society in which those influences shall be brought to bear upon him that we have specified.

2ndly, Mutual improvement societies are excellent mediums for the conveyance of knowledge, and afford ample opportunities for healthful mental exercise. It is impossible for an individual to attend their meetings, whether those meetings are occupied with lectures or discussions, without obtaining knowledge—and such knowledge as it is most important he should have. Not only do men differ in their amount of knowledge, but they differ in their aptitude for taking it in. Phrenologists have mapped out the head into a number of divisions, to each of which they assign a particular faculty, and they maintain that the power of these faculties is as diversified as is the shape of skulls! Now, whatever may be our opinion of their theory of localising the faculties of the mind, we must all admit the difference in the strength of these faculties in different persons. This is a matter of every-day observation. Take, for instance, a number of men to hear a popular preacher; one, from the peculiar caste of his mind, is particularly struck with the preacher's elocution, while another admires the systematic arrangement of his subject, a third his cogent reasoning, and a fourth the deep-toned spirituality that pervades the whole. How various are the mental effects produced by one cause! Now, bring these individuals together, and let each give expression to his thoughts, and what advantages will they all derive!—the impressions and knowledge they have received in the aggregate will become the property of each individual. This is but a common-place illustration, but it will make plain our meaning, and show on what principle mutual improvement societies are so beneficial, and how they follow nature, that safe and unerring guide. We sometimes hear of the "currency of speech"—and the expression is an apt one, for as it is only by circulating capital that it can be increased, so it is only by an interchange of thought and feeling that our stock of the first will be enlarged, and the quality of the second will be improved.

But we have said, that mutual improvement societies afford ample opportunities for healthful mental exercise. This statement, we presume, will be self-evident to our readers. Who of them can have been connected with such societies for any length of time, without marking the rapid improvement of the *active members*, and without being conscious of improvement themselves? Were the records of these societies to be examined, they would be at once conclusive on this point. We should there find enrolled upon the list many a name that is not now "unknown to fame;" and if we were to inquire from their contemporary members respecting their first efforts in public, we should hear of trembling limbs and stammering tongues, although thousands now "hang on their lips" with joy, and multitudes are charmed by the force of their eloquence. The pulpit, the bar, and the senate, have all received from these societies occupants of whom they may well be proud, though the connections of such men with these societies have too often been *forgotten*, or overlooked. In such cases our societies, like the coral-island builders of the Southern seas, have often been unnoticed from their diminutive character, amidst the magnitude of their achievements.

In concluding this brief paper, we cannot but congratulate the members of mutual improvement societies on the establishment of a magazine, which will devote con-

siderable space and attention to their interests. We trust that they will so support it as to enable its Editors to carry it on with vigour. If, in addition to sending reports of the proceedings, secretaries would give the state of their societies, and plans which have proved successful in throwing interest into their meetings, we doubt not that their communications would be acceptable to the Editors, and the publication of them would be the means of invigorating many societies now in a languishing condition. Might not writers of superior papers be requested by vote to forward them for publication in the *Controversialist?* C. A.

Dundee Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society has been in existence only for about two months. But during that period the members have been diligently engaged in prosecuting the objects for which it was established.

The first discussion its members engaged in was that which occupies so much of public attention—"Ought Capital Punishments to be abolished?" On the negative side, the arguments brought forward were the "Justice of these punishments, their Bible authority, and their beneficial effects by way of example." On the affirmative side, the principles of humanity were urged; the appearance of Christ as the signal for the abolition of the Jewish dispensation, and the establishment of the milder dispensation of Christianity; and it was held, their example, so far from being good, was decidedly pernicious.

On the 30th ultimo, the president, in an able essay, gave an outline of the history of the drama. illustrated by numerous extracts from its "great masters," detailed its peculiar characteristics at different times, and with just but generous criticism reviewed the works of the different writers in this class of literature.

The third subject which has occupied attention, and which has been debated for three successive evenings, is, "Ought Railway Trains to run on Sundays?" There seemed to be an opinion that the Lord's-day, so far as practicable, should be handed down to posterity pure and uncontaminated, as it has been received from our predecessors. At the same time, the advocates of the affirmative side strongly maintained, that there was such an urgent necessity for the running of at least a morning and evening train, that they felt themselves bound to support the view, that railway traffic on Sunday, to a limited extent, is a "necessary evil." R. B. M., *Secretary.*

Manchester (Cavendish street) Mutual Improvement Society.—This society has only been in existence since November, 1849. It consists chiefly of youths from fourteen to twenty years of age, who are connected with the school or chapel. Its management is vested in the following officers:—president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, and a committee of six members. Since its commencement, its numbers have steadily increased, and its prosperity has exceeded the utmost expectations of its originators. It numbers about thirty members, many of whom are now searching diligently after knowledge. A visible improvement is manifest in those connected with it; and we feel assured that the existence of all such societies must be productive of much good.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

10. Your philosophical papers having attracted my attention, a desire arose to study for myself a subject tending in so great a degree to brace the mind and strengthen the thinking powers.

Could you in your next furnish me with a short list, in order, of the works on Mental Philosophy which you would recommend as those from which the principles of the science would be most correctly and perspicuously drawn? R. M.

11. I am studying English Grammar, and am at a loss how I can correct Parsing Exercises. Kindly inform me in your next.—A PRIVATE STUDENT.

12. In your last there is a Course of Reading recommended for a young man, in which I find Macaulay's History of England mentioned; whether it is the best book on that subject, or not, I cannot say, but I want a good history of England. I should be glad if some of your friends would be kind enough to recommend one to me, along with the price.—G. W. T.

13. Will some of your Correspondents inform me which they consider the *best* dictionary of the English language, containing the etymology, pronunciation, and derivation of every word? and if they could add the edition, publisher, and price, they would confer a lasting favour upon E. O. N.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

9. "*The War Question,*" Luke xxii. 36.—The question is, whether Christ literally "commanded his disciples to sell their garments and buy swords." In speaking to them he sometimes employed metaphorical language. which, at the moment, did not appear obvious to their apprehension, and he gently reproved them. This direction appears to have been used as a proverbial form of expression to provide against impending danger. The Saviour had, in an extraordinary and wonderful manner, protected them, while in obedience to his command they had gone forth without purse, scrip, or sword; but now he was about to withdraw from them this kind o

protection. He was himself shortly to die, and be taken from them. His work would soon be accomplished. Hence, when they had lost his presence and protection, as hitherto they had enjoyed it, they would have need of the greatest circumspection and prudence, and to be well prepared for their exposed and unprotected condition. Hence it is as though he had said, "Take now great care, and provide well for yourselves against the dangers which are now gathering thickly and darkly around you, and with which you will soon have to contend." They supposed he spoke literally, and replied, "Lord, behold, here are two swords." He did not think fit to rectify their misapprehension, but replied, "It is enough," as a mild and humane master would to a servant of great stupidity—"It is very well; quite enough has been said on the subject."—T C.

10. *English Grammar.—Parsing* Exercises, we presume, should need no correction; therefore you may well be at a loss to know how to correct them. Parsing is the process of resolving speech into its elements, in order to show the bearing of each upon the other, and, therefore, the sentence given for analysis should be perfectly grammatical. Parsing is the same as analysis. And, "to resolve any complex whole into the elements of which it is compounded, is the meaning of analysis."

What you wish to correct, we suppose, are the exercises on syntax. You wish to know how to ascertain when they are correct, and how to go about it. Two ways are open to you. First, to purchase a key to the book you are using. Secondly, and much better, go to a teacher. Find out a thorough master of the art, and place yourself under him, and it will be much better than trusting to your own ability. We would not discourage you from trying your mental powers, but try them upon subjects where you can better proceed alone. English grammar is not to be studied for its own sake, but as an introduction to other studies. It is the key by which the vast stores of literature, science, and philosophy are to be opened. Without grammar, no great or certain progress can be made; and hence the necessity of getting it as *surely* and as *accurately* as possible

We have known many young men commence this study (and young men of good abilities too), but ultimately give it up in disgust, simple as it may seem to those who have passed this *pons asinorum*, when, if they had employed proper teachers, they might have occupied different positions, as students, from those they now hold.

However, taking it for granted that you wish to study it alone, if you have no particular book, we should recommend you to procure, first, "Grammar made intelligible to Children," by George Darnall, price 9d. Though the title, at first sight, may seem simple, it is the best little book for self-instruction, as well as for making the subject "intelligible to children," that we are acquainted with. After that you may take Lennie's, M'Culloch's (1s. 6d. each), or Walker Connon's, 2s. 6d. The last mentioned is "founded on the Philosophy of Language," and is a most admirable book. A volume of exercises, as a companion to it, was announced; whether it has appeared or not, we cannot say. We would then advise you to read Paine's "Elements of Language," 2s. 6d., from which you will get enlarged philosophical views on the origin, structure, and power of language, besides a large amount of information.

We, of course, could easily increase the list; but these books, thoroughly studied, will put you in possession of means to choose for yourself. —E. B.

11. *Mental Philosophy.*—Works on Mental Philosophy, in the order of study:—Outlines of Mental and Moral Philosophy: Payne's Elements of Mental and Moral Philosophy; Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy (Rev. F. D. Maurice); Encyclopædia Metropolitana (new ed.); Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding; Dr. Reid's Works; Hamilton's Works (Sir W.), new edition; Dr. Stewart's Works; Dr. Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind; Abercrombie's Philosophy of the Intellectual Powers; Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric; Beattie on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; Berkeley's Theory of Vision, and Principles of Human Knowledge; Hume's Treatise on Human Nature; Hartley's Observations on Man; Tatham's Chart and Scale of Truth; Stewart's Diss. on the progress of Metaphysical Philosophy; Mackintosh's Diss. on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy; History of Philosophy (Knight's). I would have mentioned the chief German and French Philosophers, but I am not conversant with any good translations of them. Plato and Aristotle are to be had in Bohn's Library.—S. N.

NOTICES OF BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, &c.

The Baptismal Controversy. By the Rev. R. Montgomery, M.A., Oxon.

This is another publication on the question involved in the "Great Gorham Case." The writer takes the opposite position to that maintained by Rev. J. H. Hinton in the pamphlet noticed in our last. We are glad to find him protesting "with all Christian earnestness" against the tone of acrimonious dogmatism which both parties too frequently adopt in their controversial assaults on opposite theories. Bitterness of spirit can add no force to argument.

Popular Catechisms. By Edward and Emma Matthews. London: Houlston and Stoneman.

We are much pleased with these catechisms, which take up the subjects of English History, Geography, Useful Knowledge, Arts and Sciences, and Old and New Testament History. They are well written, and are remarkably cheap. We are glad to learn "that others are in progress."

Voices from the Provinces. London: Strange.

A peculiar feature in the literature of the present day is not merely the number of new periodicals, but the number having a special object, or a local interest. The one now before us is intended as a medium for the expression of the thoughts of provincial writers, and is edited and printed in Sheffield, although published in London. The idea of such a magazine is new, and we trust it will be well worked out. We are pleased with the specimen number before us, and we hope that our weekly contemporary will be successful in gathering and widely disseminating the ennobling thoughts of many a talented wayside wanderer and provincial genius.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. IV.

JUDGMENT.

"The truth is, there could be no such thing as art or science, could not the mind of man gather the general natures of things out of the numberless heap of particulars, and then bind them up into such short aphorisms or propositions, that so they may be made portable to the memory, and thereby become ready, or at hand, for *Reason* to apply and make use of, as there shall be occasion."—*Robert South, D.D.*

Thus far have we proceeded in our consideration of this important subject. We have investigated the action of objects upon our bodily organs—the impressions made by them upon Consciousness—the origination of ideas in the mind through the operation of the perceptive powers. We have dilated upon the necessity and advantage of speech—the method which the mind pursues in the attaching of "Names" to the objects of perception, and, by arranging under appropriate heads the "Objects able to be named," have pointed out the line which bounds the knowable. In all this, however, we have only been employed upon preliminaries. We have been engaged in showing the materials upon which the "Art of Reasoning" is exerted, and the manner in which these materials are obtained. We have not yet been able to do more than give a few general rules, by which accuracy of perception may be promoted, and by which the mind may be aided in its early attempts in the acquisition of Knowledge, and in its initiatory steps in the search for Truth. With mere receptivity, however, the mind cannot long remain satisfied. It is naturally endowed with activity, and a thirst for information, and cannot, without difficulty, content itself in unprogressiveness, *i. e.*, with the unexerted passivity of its perceptual faculties. In the much-complicated, confused, and chaos-like minglement of mental impressions which the mind receives, the ideative powers begin to operate. The "Spirit of order" proceeds to exert itself, it collects, arranges, compares, and colligates the ideas which are being continually educed by objectivities. In so doing, it quickly notices that some of these sensational representations are alike, and some unlike — that some of these mental operations agree in certain modes of action, and some disagree. By this means the mind is enabled to observe all those perceptions and intellectual functions which are coincident, and all those which are incoincident, and can predicate agreement or disagreement regarding them. Whenever we correctly understand the properties of an object, or the characteristics of a mental act, Judgment can be performed with intuitive certainty, for each perception is necessarily possessed of a *specificity* of impression—that is, the power of producing a particular idea. As soon, therefore, as two perceptions are conveyed to the mind, the very fact of their power of specific impressibility irresistibly leads to the mental process of determining their likeness or dissimilarity. This act of the mind is called Judgment; and we have already defined it as "that power by which we compare two distinct perceptions, and by this simple comparison predicate agreement or discordancy between them."

It is in this affirmational process that our liability to error begins to develop itself. Perceptions, as perceptions—that is, as representations of the impressions made upon Consciousness by matter or by mind—are necessarily true *to us;* for as they appear, we perceive—and that which we perceive is the only ultimate ground of certitude *to us;* but when we begin to affirm or deny anything of these appearances, Error may mingle with our assertions. Hence it will appear, that though error may *result* from inadequate or incorrect ideas, yet so long as nothing is predicated of these ideas, Error cannot be *developed.* It is in our affirmations or denials, therefore, that we are to look for the earliest perceptible germination of error and falsehood. If our perceptive powers be defective, this defect will lead to error, but the impressions received by them will be truth *to us;* and it is not until we make an assertion that the divergency can be discovered, or the contrariety found out. For instance: To an individual afflicted with Daltonism (*i. e.*, an affection of the eye, by which it is incapacitated to perceive or distinguish certain colours), it is truth that these colours do not exist. But when he, as Dalton did, asserts that the bright scarlet of a Cambridge Professor's gown, and the leaves of the evergreens which grow in the outer court, are alike in colour, the error becomes manifest. It becomes plain, that what is truth to him, is not the truth of things. So also when the ancient philosophers perceived that the sun, and the other heavenly bodies, *appeared* to move round the earth, it was truth *to them* that they did so move. But when modern philosophy has proved the impossibility and absurdity of this, it is no longer a portion of the truth it had been. It will be seen from this, that error may underlie appearances, and that though perceptions, as perceptions, are true, yet they may not be the absolute truth; and that in our affirmations, or negations alone can the latent error be revealed; and hence the necessity of care, examination, and caution, prior to the performance of an act of judgment. This wariness, circumspection, and accuracy, cannot be attained except by attentive observation, watchful experimentation, and a wide Inductive survey of the impressions made by the thought-educing objectivities about which our inquiries are concerned. Of the methods by which this may be accomplished, we shall, in a subsequent paper, treat more fully under the head "Induction," contenting ourselves, in the meantime, with signalising the fact, that Induction is one mode in which Judgment operates.

In common parlance, the word "Judgment" is used synonymously with penetration, prudence, sagacity, intelligence, opinion; and when thus employed denotes, not a particular operation of the mind, but the appropriate, correct, and harmonious exercise of all its faculties. It is also made use of in courts of justice technically to signify a decision. To the latter signification the term in the manner in which it will be employed by us nearly approximates; for as a Judge, by the examination of the evidence adduced, sums up the arguments on each of the opposing sides, and announces the decision at which he has arrived, so does the mind sit as umpire over its perceptions, and by comparison ascertain what is correct, truthful, and exact.

The characteristic of that mental act which logicians denominate Judgment, is

that it compares two perceptions or ideas, so as to arrive at a conclusion regarding their similarity or incoincidence. Its operations may be variously subdivided, according to the method in which the comparison is conducted—as Analytical, Synthetical, Intuitive, or Inferential.

Judgment Analytical signifies the *unloosing* or *separating* of any complex idea into its component parts—"the resolution (to borrow a phrase from chemistry) of a compound into its elements." In this act we add nothing to the ideas which employ our Intellect, but merely decompose them—merely make a transcription of those simple conceptions which, united, form the complex whole: thus, when we say "an equilateral triangle is one which has three sides equal," we make an analytical judgment; in other words, we compare the ideas, triangle, and *equalsidedness*, and find that they agree in, make up, and harmonize with, our idea of an equilateral triangle. Analytical Judgments form Definitions.

Judgment Synthetical imports the *placing together* and *combining* of two separate ideas, the conception of one of which does not *necessarily* involve the idea of the other, in such a manner as to predicate that the one is a constituent element in the mental conception of the other; as when we assert that "Every equilateral triangle is also equiangular." Here we place together the ideas of *triequilaterality* and *equalcorneredness*, the latter of which does not necessarily involve the former, but is common also to a square, &c., and find or decide from this comparison that these, compounded—synthetised—make up and are contained within our notion of an equilateral triangle. Synthetical Judgments, when expressed, are termed Propositions.

Judgment Intuitive is when by merely *looking at* any two ideas and without any effort of the mind, we can predicate their agreement or disagreement; as when we assert that "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time," it is evident that, if we fully understand the signification of the terms, we can, at a glance, perceive the accuracy of the proposition. And although Hegel has enunciated the startling proposition, that "being and non-being are the same" (*seyn und nichts ist dasselbe*), we do not think that any sane individual will hesitate in granting, that if the terms being and non-being are properly understood, the incoincidence of the ideas must be manifest, and the truth of the prior proposition clear and admissible.

Judgment Inferential is when we deduce the agreement of one idea with another, through the medium of a demonstration; thus, when it is affirmed that "rights and duties are reciprocal," it does not appear evident until it is shown, proved, demonstrated, that these are correlative terms; then it becomes plain that if the relate is not granted, the correlate is undemandable, and *vice versâ*.

The two latter distinctions may be in reality regarded as mere modifications of Synthetical Judgments, yet they are not without their use in showing the line of demarcation between truth based on the certitude of the mere operation of the mental powers, and truth founded on the basis of search, inquiry, and demonstration.

DEFINITION.—The expression of an analytical judgment is called a Definition,

from the Latin *Definitio*, the laying down of a boundary, and is, in logic, a sentence which explains any term so as to separate the idea which it expresses from every other, as a boundary does a field. Sounds and characters,—which are the constituent elements of language, whether spoken or written,—when compounded, form words, and these, as we have before said, are the signs of our ideas; but it is quite evident that these signs, though primarily they may have been natural, are now arbitrary: for in different languages diverse marks are employed as designative of the same thought. But, from the necessities of our social state, it is requisite that we should possess, in some degree, the power of mutual intercourse; hence nations of men have found it expedient to adopt a language which, by its power of inducing uniformity in idea-communication, may lead to ease and readiness in the mutual commerce of thought. This purpose must be entirely frustrated and nullified when this uniformity of signification is not rigorously attended to and enforced. Definition, therefore, becomes necessary as an auxiliary to accuracy of thought and communication, by explaining in what sense any term is used, and thus enabling men to perceive whether they attach a similar signification to the same word. Were we always attentive to the thought-process in our own minds, cautious in the observing of our mental impressions, and rigid in the transcription of our ideas into words, much indistinctness might be avoided. But men are by no means so circumspect on this point as they should be: the application of terms is made in a confused, disorderly, and inconstant manner. This want of care leads to much embarrassment and division, for men frequently imagine that there are serious differences between them, when in reality, were their terms properly defined, the difference in meaning would appear quite trivial, or the result of an unconscious extension or contraction of the signification rightly embodied and involved in the terms employed.

Words have a triple reference, and may bear relation—1st, To the ideas which we ourselves entertain. 2nd, To the ideas entertained by others. 3rd, To external objects. When men engage in conversation, writing, lecturing, &c., it is generally for the purpose of being understood: the words which they employ, therefore, ought to be such as, according to their own ideas, best serve to explain their meaning, and give expression to their thoughts: here words have reference to our own ideas. But unless we adopt such phraseology, and converse in such terms as are either originative or representative of similar conceptions in the minds of those whom we address, we shall most certainly be misunderstood: and thus, so far as they are used for thought-communication, words bear reference to the ideas which are entertained by or originable in others. Again: from the power before explained of objectivising our conceptions, men are in the habit of applying the signs of their ideas to that which originates them, and thus our words are made to bear reference to external existences. We have before proved, that we have no knowledge of things as they are in themselves—no knowledge of the essentialities of objects; hence we may be able to perceive the erroneousness of the distinction which logicians commonly make between *nominal* and *real* defini-

tions; for if, as we think we have demonstrated, *things* be inappreciable by our minds, there can be no definition of any kind except that which expresses the meaning which we intend shall be understood as affixed to the word which we have chosen as the sign of our mental conception. All definitions are, therefore, in reality, nominal—of the name; not real—of the thing. In observing a fact, law, or thing, we receive an idea. On the reception of this idea, a new impression is made on the mental powers. This new impression requires a name. When this name is originally imposed by us, it cannot pass current until we have explained the component ideas of which it is made up in such terms as shall excite a like notion in the mind of others. Hence definitions can only express in words an analysis of the items comprehended in the complex idea which the word defined implies. The importance of definition may be readily perceived by reflecting that in the interchange of ideas, if there be a difference in that which is comprehended in the symbols of thought, mistake, misunderstanding, and division must arise regarding the conclusions deducible from them.

Definition depends on the observation of identity and diversity—similarity in the Genus, variety in the Species. In defining a term, all that is exuvial in thought is thrown off; all that is inconstituent and non-essential—all that is merely accessory and accidental, is disregarded. Things are explained by the explication of their names; experience is reduced to laws, and these laws, constituting ideas, receive names and become explainable; individuals are generalised, and the ideas comprehended under or involved in these things, experiences, and individualities, are alone considered, by the mind. Every idea which we have, must, to constitute it an idea, have the power of presenting a peculiar appearance to the mind, by which the distinction between it and every other idea may be perceived. In attempting to convey this idea into the mind of another, it is necessary that we present such an analysis of that idea, as shall convey *it* most clearly and unmistakeably; and in so doing we must describe and unfold the precise conception which the use of language attaches to a term, or that idea which we choose shall be affixed to the word employed. A word is the sign of an idea—our business in definition is to explain what compound of simple ideas shall be, or is, involved in its signification; that thus we may indicate, precisely, the quality which distinguishes it, and with how much *that* is to be conjoined. In order to do this effectually, we must make an accurate survey and examination of the idea itself—search into the process of its formation in our own minds, and distinctly observe and mark out the elemental perceptions from which it takes its rise, and of which it is composed—attend to the manner in which these are classified, arranged, and joined together—which are primary and which are subordinate, or secondary; and when in this manner we have anatomized the impression, we have only to transcribe, in their order, these various component simple ideas, and the conception will be excited in the mind of the reader or hearer. But the mental powers are very circumscribed in their range of action, and are unable to retain in their grasp a numerous group of disjointed and detached ideas; hence we are under the necessity of proceeding by gradational advances. We associate

them into groups and arrange them into classes; these groups or classes we re-arrange into new combinations, and form conceptions of them; and thus we can proceed, conjoining our ideas, and generalizing our conceptions, until, by habit and practice, the mind gains a facility in thinking of them somewhat in the same light as simple ideas, and can use them as component parts of higher and more refined generalisations. We advance from individuals to species—of these species we compose genera—these genera we unite and colligate by some essential and distinctive quality common to all; they then become the species of a new generalisation:—thus we have genera, remote and proximate; and a perfect logical definition consists in the pointing out of the proximate genus and the specific difference: such a definition will always be adequate; but it will not always and necessarily be clear, for the genus may require definition as well as the species. From this it appears that before an idea be unfolded or explained, it may be necessary to define not only the term which we are about to use, but also, as a preliminary step, to define some term which may be involved in the idea of which we are about to give an explanation. Let it here be noticed, also, that occasionally a definition will not fully answer the purpose of communication, nor suffice to satisfy the wants of the mind; for if men be not acquainted with the simple ideas which are comprehended in the complex term employed, these will require to be excited and educed. This may be done by the use of diagrams, description, enumeration, or any other means calculated to originate the desiderated idea.

Diagrams, models, &c., are employed for the purpose of eliciting those ideas which are needful for the understanding of our terms, for the simplification of the acquirement of complex conceptions, or for the explanation of any peculiar ideas which lie at the foundation of any theory or hypothesis.

Description is the definition of an individual, and consists of the genus, specific difference, properties, and accidents; a recapitulation and detail of the parts, properties, and peculiarities of the object described or spoken of.

Enumeration is a recital and particularisation of *all* the simple subordinate ideas which are involved and included in the formation of a complex notion.

Description is generally employed to explain the complex idea originated by, and arising from, objects which are perceivable by the organs of sight. Enumeration is ordinarily used when we do not feel called on to mention the Genus of an object, but are desirous of merely pointing out what we consider may be comprised in the term. Definition is made use of in the explication of complex ideas of every kind, whether they are the symbols of external objects, or internal operations—whether they emanate from matter, or originate in mind. A good Definition consists of two parts, by the former of which we denote the generic part, or the quality which any object possesses in common with others; by the latter we indicate the specific portion, or that which characterizes and distinguishes the object defined from every other of a similar kind.

In Definition proper we regard the term employed as the sign of some idea or conception which has been excited within us, to which idea or conception that sign has been annexed either by the custom of the language which we speak, or by

our own express choice; and then the duty which falls upon us is to explain that idea or conception in such a manner as shall either excite or re-excite it in the minds of others. To do this effectually we must—

1st. Take an exact and precise view of that idea or conception, reduce it to its simplest elements, and note attentively all the several simple perceptions which form its constituent elements.

2nd. Consider carefully the manner in which these several simple perceptions are conjoined in the idea or conception, and the order which they assume in the mind.

3rd. So transcribe the revelations of Consciousness as to exhibit distinctly the number and order of the primary elements of our idea or conception.

It is evident that as Definitions are merely expositions of the *contents* of ideas, that definition which truly and accurately enumerates, in their proper and precise order, the several simple constituent perceptions in any given idea, must necessarily be perfect of its kind. Logicians, however, do not find it requisite to insist upon our giving verbal expression to each and all of these, but because several objectivities unite in the possession of somewhat resemblant properties, and the mind has a natural tendency to classification and generalisation, it seldom happens that any idea is so solitary as to have no class in which it may be arranged, and no genus with which it may be conjointly thought, or of which it may not be thought, as a part, they consider it quite sufficient, in giving a definition, to do as we have already said, viz., indicate the Genus and specific difference. It is obvious, however, that although this is all we *express*, it is not an exhaustive detail of the whole thought-process of Definition. That must be carried on as above described, in order that we may really and correctly *know* the genus and specific difference.

The commonly-received distinctions of definitions are the following: viz.—Nominal and real; accidental, physical, and logical. The two former relate to that which the definition *does*—whether it explains the meaning of a word, or informs us of the nature of the thing. The three latter refer to the method taken to accomplish this—whether it enumerates or describes the accidental, or non-essential qualities, the physical attributes, or the generic properties of objects.

A NOMINAL DEFINITION explains the signification of a term—the idea which we intend shall be expressed by it: *e. g.*, Thermometer, an instrument for measuring the heat, and ascertaining the temperature of bodies; Algebra, the science of quantity in general, and the art of computing by symbols.

A REAL DEFINITION is one which informs us what is the essence and nature of a thing.

We have before given, we think, ample proof of man's incapacity to gain a knowledge of noumena, essences, the nature of things; we shall here quote a passage or two from Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding," Book IV. cap. i., corroborative of our opinion that *ideas*, and not *things*, are the objects of human *knowledge*:—"Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them." "It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of ideas it has of them."

"Knowledge, then, seems to me nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any one of our ideas." This being our opinion of the case, we hope we may be excused for not giving an example.

AN ACCIDENTAL DEFINITION is one which details the properties and accidents of an object, or describes its causes, appearances, qualities, and effects; as, Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, a Greek philosopher, whom the Athenians, on a charge of immorality and impiety, condemned to drink hemlock.

A PHYSICAL DEFINITION expresses the parts and qualities which make up our idea of an object; as, Tree, a tapering plant, consisting of root, trunk, branches, leaves, seed-vessels, &c.

A LOGICAL DEFINITION distinguishes one thing from another by its generic qualities and its specific diversity.

The following six rules for securing the accurate and proper use of definitions, will, if attended to, be found of some value and utility:

1st. *Definitions must be adequate;* that is, they must give a complete idea of what is contained in the term; and if the term be the name of a genus or species, it must be sufficiently wide in its signification to comprehend or include all the species of individuals of which these consist, and so exact as to exclude everything which ought not to be comprehended in it. It must not be too narrow—for that will exclude something which is employed in the term. Not too extensive—for that would be to include something which the term is not meant to express. Thus to define a bird as a feathered animal possessed of the power of flying, would be too narrow: for some birds, as the ostrich, do not possess the power of flying. Again, to define the same word as denoting all those animals who are possessed of wings, would be too extensive, for that would include insects,—a division of the animal kingdom which is not usually expressed by the term employed.

2nd. *Definitions must indicate those characteristics which are properly and peculiarly denoted by the term.* It is the very fundamental principle upon which definitions are based, that they should enable us to discern distinctly the difference between ideas; if therefore we use our words so loosely that the idea meant by us is not, in its own proper and peculiar nature, expressed in the explanation which we give, of what use can our definition be?

3rd. *Definitions must be clear and plain; i. e.*, they must not be expressed in obscure, figurative, or ambiguous language. If there be any word or words used in our definitions which are less easily understood, or as much in need of definition as the term itself, our explication will evidently be unsuitable for its purpose. It behoves us, therefore, in defining our terms, to use no word in which there is any difficulty; or if it be absolutely necessary that such should be employed, let us graduate our definition by explaining the words which we are about to use, as a preliminary proceeding to the definition of the term with which our subject is concerned. Unless we attend to this rule, we cannot make ourselves intelligible to those whom we address. The following definitions, we humbly depone, sin against this canon. The former was jotted into our note-book from one of those cheap publications in which "Knowledge for the Million" is vended; the latter is *ver-*

batim et literatim from the Dictionary of the Great Lexicographer: 1st. Snuff, a certain heterogeneous mixture of odoriferous particles, chiefly composed of granulated or comminuted tobacco, whose use is to produce a titilatory and sternutative effect on the olfactory nerves which lie distributed along the interior of the nasal organ of the human frame; sometimes medicinally used as a detergating and defecating agent. 2nd. Network, anything reticulated or decussated at equal distances.

4th. *Definitions must consist of the concisest possible appropriate expressions,*—alike free from embarrassing brevity, and tautological prolixity. The chief object which men should have, being to make themselves understood, any want of conciseness will have the tendency of increasing the difficulty of comprehension; while the repetition of the same idea more than once—unless for the purpose of securing variety to suit a miscellaneous audience, to whose minds access can only be attained by the employment of judiciously-varied phraseology — will be equally prejudicial.

5th. *Definitions must not comprise either the same or synonymous terms.* This would evidently be no aid to the understanding of the term, for the reiteration of the term would communicate no knowledge regarding the object of thought; while, if the synonymous term is understood, and the term used by you is not so, you are evidently in the wrong, to multiply words which do not necessarily indicate a distinction of thought.

6th. *Definitions ought never to be negative when they can by any possibility be made affirmative.* All positive and definite conceptions ought to be capable of affirmative definition. Privative conceptions cannot, of course, be defined otherwise than negatively.

The importance of definition consists in this—that before we can know a thing we must be able to demarcate and distinguish *it* from all that is *not it*. In this process we do two things; to show what the thing is, we (1) draw a line of limitation round the idea, and by so doing, we (2) point out what it is not. Thus our thoughts are kept free from intertanglement or confusion. We separate the particular thought which we wish to express, from the multitude of other thoughts which lie latent in the mind. But we must avoid the error of supposing that definitions are capable of informing us of *things as they are in themselves* (*per se*). The explanation of *terms* is not at all equivalent to the explanation of *things*. The terms we can explain, for we ourselves know all that is employed in their composition and formation; but of things how can the mind explain the essence—that essence of which it has no cognizance? Ideas we may expound, for of ideas our knowledge is composed; of things—of externalities as regards their essence, we *know* nothing, however much we may *believe*. The logical use of definitions is to guard against the use of any term in more than *one* definite and particular sense. Whatever definition effects this purpose is logically correct. Whenever terms are used without definitions, they are to be understood according to the common use of language.

The following are the laws by which Definitions may be made serviceable in general reasoning, viz.—

1st. To whatever objectivity the definition may be applied, with that the objectivity defined must agree, and *vice versâ*.

2nd. With whatever objectivity the thing defined agrees, to that also may the definition be applied.

In our next we shall treat of Propositions, and will then show the reason which inclined us to diverge from the "use and wont" of logicians, by considering definitions as a part of the operation of "Judgment," rather than of "Perceptivity," and point out the distinction between Propositions and Definitions.

For the dry disquisitional style of the present paper we can offer no apology; abstruseness is necessarily inwoven with our subject. If we speak, as we hope we do, to earnest, vigorous-souled inquirers, no such thing will be needful. They know well that it is vain to hope to pluck a rose without a thorn; they can feel and act upon the energy-exciting lines of the American poetess—

> "There is a charm in knowledge best when bought
> With vigorous toil of mind and earnest stretch of thought."

Religion.

IS WAR, UNDER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE, OPPOSED TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I HAVE read the papers in the previous Numbers of the *British Controversialist* on this question with great interest. Indeed, everything which relates to this subject is of deep interest to me. My individual opinion, however, is at present in favour of the affirmative view. The reasons by which I am led to its adoption, differing somewhat from those urged by your talented correspondents, I should feel much obliged by your kindly allowing me to submit to them, and your readers generally, the following considerations:—

The question having reference directly to Christianity, it strikes me should be discussed *upon Christian principles only*. I am, therefore, disposed to place out of view all considerations of mere natural right and political expediency. If the appeal be to Christianity, it would appear that the only point to be determined is, What saith Christianity on the subject? By her teachings alone, I apprehend, with Christian men, is the question to be settled.

But Christianity leaves all mere human institutions and governments as she finds them. These are not her subjects. She propounds precepts and laws to her disciples diverse from, and infinitely superior to, all those of mere human device and invention. Christianity is a system of order and peace. Requiring no human law or authority for its establishment, or protection, it makes no sanguinary or penal provision for their enforcement. It prohibits retaliation, and demands submission to wrong when practised upon its professors. It requires not, but discountenances and forbids, all physical and sanguinary resistance. Its precepts and laws bind all Christians, personally and collectively. They speak alike, and with equal authority, to the person and to the community. The precept forbidding resentment of a personal injury binds universally the whole body, and likewise precludes resentment of wrong done to a brother. The precept is, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despite-

fully use you and persecute you." No provision is here to be found for resenting a wrong done to a brother, any more than for an injury done to one's-self. Love to an enemy is incompatible with taking vengeance upon him.

It were, indeed, a strange doctrine, that the command which binds a community, and its individual members, should, nevertheless, sanction its breach by one person on behalf of another. By what rule shall it be made to imply that the Christian is only to love and bless his personal enemies and persecutors, and hate and curse those of his brethren? The command, both in spirit and letter, contemplates the regulation of his conduct and practice, with respect as well to his own enemies and persecutors, as to those of the whole body to which he belongs. What, therefore, he owes to his personal enemies, he owes likewise to those of his brethren, viz., love, and non-resistance of injuries.

But we are called upon to consider the Scriptural passages adduced in support of the contrary opinion; namely, that "The powers that be are ordained of God," and that "Whoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God," and that the officer of justice is designated "the minister of God." It is the decided conviction of the writer of this Article, that in these passages the apostle simply enforces upon Christians submission to civil authority. They are to be good subjects of the community in which they reside. They are not at liberty to set the just laws and regulations of the State at defiance. They are to live honest, sober, and blameless lives. The institutions of civil government, which God permits men to set up for their temporal advantage and well-being, he orders and regulates for the accomplishment of his own purposes. Christians, therefore, are not to set them at defiance. If they infringe the just laws of the State, they incur the penalty of so doing, and Christianity makes no provision to screen them from its infliction.

Well, then, it may be objected, if the State require the aid of their services in time of war against invasion, or unjust aggression, they are bound to render those services.

We submit that neither the passages of Scripture under consideration, nor the connexion to which they belong, nor any other passage in the New Testament, though requiring submission, demand of Christians the exercise either of legislative or executive functions. From that their great Charter and Statute Book, they have neither right nor authority either to make laws or enforce them —either to make war, or to take up arms in defence against it. For, though they must submit to the just laws of men, they are free from obligation to render obedience to such as are opposed to the principles of the Christian religion. Their allegiance to Christ, as their only Lawgiver and King, is supreme. No law, though enstamped with the highest human authority, if opposed to His precepts, is binding upon His disciples. In this regard they are absolved from all obligation. If the principles of Christianity bind its disciples to peace and love, no human enactment requiring them, on any account, or in any extremity, to take part in bloodshed and strife, involves obligation, but is unjust. In things *lawful* they must submit; in things *unlawful*, *on Christian grounds*, they must *not* act. If, for non-conformity, they are visited with the infliction of human punishment, they must endure it, or remove to some other place. The direction in such cases is, "When they persecute you in one city, flee ye unto another."

The affirmation that Christians are not to abide by their principles because they are not universally prevalent, is an absurd proposition. It is equal to the assertion, that because some men are not honest, the rest ought to be knaves.

The principles of Christianity bind equally all its professors—not only one Christian man personally, but the whole body of Christians collectively. The precept which requires a Christian to "love his enemies," binds not only in reference to an injury done to himself, but also in respect to those done to his brethren. It prohibits his resistance of

evil, and taking vengeance for wrong done to them as to himself.

Christianity is, therefore, "pre-eminently a system of right," and, we must add, of benevolence too. But as it does not require, so will it not sanction, either force, war, or strife, in its maintenance or defence. In the prevalence of its principles, wrong forms no element. In proportion as it prevails, wrong must cease. If all men were actuated by its spirit fully and uniformly, there would be amongst them no wrong to redress. Its principles go to the utter extinction of war and of wrong. All evil works are incompatible with its nature. When, therefore, "it entered the world," forbidding fighting, bloodshed, and strife, instead of being "a signal for right to flee," it was the signal and pledge of its final extension and triumph — the harbinger and earnest of ultimate, uninterrupted, and endless peace.

By the principles of his faith, then, the Christian is forbidden to levy war, act unjustly, or resent wrongs done either to himself or his brethren. When wronged, they leave only two, or one of two, courses for him to pursue—viz., submission or escape.

According to these views, therefore, War is, under every circumstance, opposed to Christianity.

T. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

Mr. Editor,—In your last Number I find a paper by J. P. C., in which he endeavours to deal with the arguments of W. W., in your first. The principal charge which is brought against W. W. is, that "his arguments are not derived from the Bible." If the arguments of W. W. are not derived directly from the Sacred Word, they at least appear to me to run parallel with it.

If I understand him, he endeavours to show that the mass of the evils under which mankind groan are to be attributed to selfishness; that the principal means which have tended to check these evils is government; that this government is founded upon the defensive principle, and that this principle is in accordance with the will of God. Under this last head he shows that even the officer of justice is denominated "the minister of God." But J. P. C. goes on to say that Christianity is essentially a religion of peace, love, and mercy, while the dispensation which preceded it was a religion of "strict and impartial justice." Does our friend mean to assert that the former dispensation contained no elements of mercy, while the latter contains no elements of justice? If so, how will he explain the following passages—Prov. xxv. 21, 22; Ex. xxiii. 4, 5; Prov. xxiv. 17; Matt. v. 21—23? Other passages might be quoted, of similar purport, which would tend to show, that while the New Testament dispensation, as compared with the Old, is pre-eminently a system of love, it is not the less a system of inflexible justice. In other words, the equity of Christianity as far outshines that of Moses, as the mercy of Christianity outshines the mercy of Judaism.

In the succeeding lines our friend admits that both individuals and communities may find it necessary to act on the defensive, but he cannot admit that the Christian part of a community ought to do so. If it be not the duty of a Christian to uphold government, when its destruction is threatened, by taking up arms, since government is supported all along by arms, it is evidently his duty to surrender as far as possible all connection with government; so that if he be attacked in property, in person, or in character, he has no right whatever to appeal to government for defence. If, however, government be an ordinance of God, and the officer of justice be God's minister, the Christian certainly must be right in upholding the one, and in sustaining the other.

As regards the subject of vengeance, after what W. T. has said, and said so ably, it is unnecessary that I should offer any remark.

Our friend admits that "Man possesses the right of self-defence," but denies that this extends to the taking of life. To say that communities have a right to repel invaders, but have not

the right to deprive the invader of life, when all other means have failed, appears to me to be a "palpable absurdity." What community would ever dream of repelling an invader with constables' staves or blank cartridges? Or, what invaders would be thus repelled? Certainly no disciplined army would think of turning back from such weapons, except it might be from a feeling of compassion, founded upon the conviction that the men were mad. My opinion is, that it would be not only foolish, but cruel, for any government thus to attempt to repel an invader—cruel not to the enemy, but to its own army and people. There is a case of which I have somewhere read, of one Col. or Gen. Whitelock, who commanded a portion of the British army during the late war, apparently upon this principle. As an officer, it was his business to provide stores. He led his men into the field, and when there they found that the cannon-balls were too large to be used, and they were obliged to offer merely a passive resistance; in other words, they had to stand to be shot at! But what became of him? His case was tried by court-martial, but having made his escape, he was declared to be an outlaw. And he deserved it.

Our friend appears to think that there is no analogy between the punishing of individual offenders, and opposing the aggression of other communities; and intimates, that since the death of Rush atoned, in the estimation of the law, for two murders, it must be unjust to visit comparatively minor offences with the death of thousands in battle.

It is no part of our business to justify the wars which have been entered into at different periods of the world's history. No doubt many have been unjust. We should rejoice as much as our friend to see the end of all war.

But to the point at issue. What is the principal office of a government? We think, and our friend seems to coincide with us, that it is to defend the interests of the community which it represents. If so, it is evidently the duty of government to take the nearest and the best course for the accomplishment of this object. When the Government caused Rush to be arraigned, tried, condemned, and executed, it adopted the best course at its command to prevent a repetition of the same evil, and effectually prevented the murderer from acting over again the same tragedy. It was, in fact, defending the community. Certainly, in the constable who was delegated to take the offender, we do not at first sight see anything which looks analogous to an army drawn out for battle. But why was not an army sent to apprehend the culprit? Simply because the occasion did not require it. There was no army to defend him. Had the people of the neighbourhood sympathized with him, and determined to protect him, soldiers would no doubt have been called out to oppose them, and to obtain the person of the murderer. It is even possible that blood would have been shed. This blood would not, however, as our friend supposes, in any sense have atoned for the original offence. The blood of the murderer would have been still required for *that.* The person slain would have been slain in opposing the course of law. But it must be seen that in so doing they would be actually abetting the murderer, and becoming themselves guilty of murder, just as the abettors of any criminal are as guilty as the criminal himself.

So in a really defensive war, the thousands of the enemy, who may be slain on the field of battle, may not be guilty in the first instance of the original crime. They only stand between the injured party and compensation.

Whether it is proper in any government to risk life for a merely pecuniary compensation, is I think questionable. The responsibility of any government who go to war is very great; and I am inclined to think that nothing short of personal danger, on the part of the subjects of any government, can justify even defensive war.

Our friend asserts "that a strictly defensive war is a palpable absurdity." I do not think so. I allow that it may be difficult to stop within the bounds of of defence; and what J. P. C. states,

proves no more than that it is extremely difficult.

The fact of its being difficult, however, does not render it absurd. It is difficult to pursue a virtuous career; but who will say that virtue is absurd? In proportion as virtue is easy, a defensive war would be easy, for the truly virtuous man would rather stop within the bound, than pass it. G. N.

Philosophy.

IS BEAUTY A QUALITY INHERENT IN OBJECTS?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE analysis and discussion of intricate questions—the proposing of philosophical queries—inquiry and examination into recondite and abstruse subjects—the pointing out of subtle distinctions, is natural to the human mind. To penetrate the mysteries with which it feels itself surrounded—to dissipate the darkness which conceals the sources of its sweetest and deepest feelings and emotions, is a task in which the soul enthusiastically engages; and by the very constitution of its nature it is necessarily compelled so to occupy itself. But it is in an age when Civilization has achieved her proudest triumphs—in which the reflective faculties are most highly perfectioned—in which the senses are but the ministers of the higher powers and qualities of the soul—in which Taste is widely diffused and extensively developed—in which the ingenuity of man has been successfully exerted in securing the means of placing the necessaries of life within the reach of the vast majority of a people—in which Painting, Sculpture, Poesy, and Music—sister arts—have made the epoch peculiarly their own, that such speculations have the greatest charms, and are most avidly pursued. And such an era is the present. The necessaries, conveniences, comforts, elegances, and luxuries of life are plenteously dispensed among our population. Taste has been improved, Intellectuality increased, and Advancement gained thereby; while along with these have come Curiosity, Inquiry, Research, Speculativeness, and Contemplation. Hypotheses, theories, probabilities, are mooted, published, debated, and controverted; and the consequence of this contact of mind with mind, this collision of opinions, is like the striking of flint and steel; the sparks of Truth are elicited, and yield their enlightenment to all future ages. Hence it is that such a periodical as that for which I now write—*The British Controversialist*—is an express result of the "tendencies of the age." It may be that its appearance is too early for due appreciation; but who does not love the snowdrop for its very earliness? Still there are a few standing on the mountain-tops, gazing anxiously for the dawn of the new day, who hail with joy this herald of the coming brightness—this morning star, the forerunner "of the glory yet to be revealed," and will not willingly let it fail in accomplishing its mission—the placing before men a specimen of calm, charitable, deliberate, and dispassionate discussion, and demonstrating that polemics is not necessarily productive of trick, sophistry, chicanery, "envy, wrath, and all uncharitableness."

But we had almost forgotten that, by the heading of our paper, we had undertaken the task of considering one of the most abstruse and difficult of philosophical problems. We formerly attempted to give a solution to the above-stated question, which we have seen controverted with great beauty of language, power of thought, and aptitude of illustration, by a writer who styles himself "PHILOMATHOS." We are bound, in common honesty, to acknowledge the pleasure which the perusal of his two papers has given us. Despite, however, of the poetic haze which he has thrown

upon the subject, we have not been convinced. Upon the principles of Association — the operations of Taste — he has most eloquently and correctly descanted, but upon the origin and primary production of the "emotion of the Beautiful," we opine he has gone entirely beyond the question. He has, in our opinion, mistaken the *results* of the beauty-emotion for the emotion itself. He has not analysed the feeling with that precision which might have been expected from the general acumen which his papers manifest, or he would have seen that the originating element of thought, and the associations which result from that origination, are perfectly distinct. The *inherency* evidently dwells in the emotion-producing agent, or how could the idea find entrance into the mind? If there be objects existing, *without us* at all, and upon our viewing them the idea of Beauty be developed, most unquestionably the quality of producing that idea is inherent in these objects. Fancy may cast her thousand haloes round an object—Association may heighten the agreeability of it—Imagination add her all powerful enchantment, but the *Sensational* pleasure derivable from the fair forms which Nature so profusely spreads before us, are not surely to be confounded with these intricate mental emotions? These emotions are perfectly accidental, perfectly adventitious, mere appendages, — subsequent processes to that sensational agreeability which the objects we behold are calculated to produce. Sensations are not merely neutral; they are positively endowed with pleasure production. Let any one look at the geometrical diagrams of a circle and a square, and he will immediately perceive the superior pleasure superinduced by the circular form. The homely-feathered lark, and the gaudy-plumaged peacock—which has the sweetest associations, and which is the most beauteous? Does the argument of "Philomathos" bear the *experimentum crucis?*

There is a principle in the mind which we believe is very distinctly opposed to the theory of Beauty, which makes that emotion only the result of associated trains of thought—viz., that habit, which is powerful to create, is likewise potent to destroy. If, therefore, habit—*i. e.*, associated trains of thought—be "the great elementary and rudimental substratum of the Beautiful," the same power exercised in an opposite manner would become the basis of the idea of Deformity. Can we, then, alternately consider the same thing as the paragon of beauty, and the perfection—pardon the expression—of ugliness? And if not, then "Beauty is a quality inherent in objects." Besides, the longer we were acquainted—the more we became accustomed to the sight of objects, the more beautiful would they become; for we should have a greater number of associations to connect with them. Now, objects do not become more beautiful by lengthened converse with them, however much their agreeability may be improved. "Philomathos" has presented his opinions in such a glowing style of eloquence, that the logical inferences of the doctrine are almost entirely lost sight of and concealed. But other advocates have not been so dexterous, or have been less cautious. For Addison, discoursing on this subject in the *Spectator*, has given currency to the following sentiment: — "We are everywhere entertained with pleasing shows and apparitions. We discover imaginary glories in the heavens and in the earth, and see some of this imaginary Beauty poured upon the whole creation; but what a rough, unsightly sketch should we be entertained with, did all her colouring disappear, and the several distinctions of light and shade vanish! In short, our souls are delightfully lost and bewildered in a pleasing delusion, and we walk about like the enchanted hero of a romance, who sees beautiful castles, woods, and meadows, and at the same time hears the warbling of birds, and the purling of streams; and, upon the finishing of some secret spell, the fantastic scene breaks up, and the disconsolate knight finds himself on a barren heath, or in a solitary desert." This is the conclusion legitimately deducible from the premises of "Philomathos." But who has ever awoke, and found the spell of

Beauty broken? Who has ever been able to discover that beauty is deceptive and illusory? What! are the grace of form and brilliancy of plumage of the choristery of summer — the delicate tracery, the interblending of azure, vermilion, and gold, the symmetrical and involuted shape of the ocean's myriad of shells—the radiance-tinted waves of a moonlit sea—the fantastic frost pictures which winter delights to paint—the spiral tendrils of the woodbine—the gracefully-bent lily—the poetry of motion—the umbrageousness of trees—the clouds which sail so tranquilly across the ocean of the sky—the rosy face of morn—the dewdrops gleaming in the sunshine — the vigil-keeping stars — "The flowers which dot the green braes gloriously with spots of living light," and make earth holy with their fragrancy—the bright, sparkling rivulet, dancing ever on, and murmuring in its gentle eddies over the pebbles of its bed—stately trees—rich woods—spires, towers, and cottages—fields, streams, and gardens—the immense and seemingly boundless distance where the green earth appears to join itself to the blue heaven—the love-light "of a dark eye in woman," and all that is brightest, fairest, most enrapturing in creation's ever-shifting panorama, but a scenic representation—a mere mirage of the mind—nothing more than the product of Fancy's enchanting wand—a gorgeous deceit? If it be so, then Beauty is not inherent in objects. But if, as we believe, Beauty is real, is an *inherent* quality, this dilemma is escaped. We can look upon Nature's face as on the face of a friend, in whose smiles we can trust. As the wisdom graven on the eternal monuments of Egypt is there, although we have not the power of reading off its valuable lessons, because we have not caught up the significance of its symbolisms, so may it be with Beauty: some may be unable to perceive it, or only partially capable of observing the beauties which are spread around, and feeling the rapture they bestow. To believe that Beauty is not an inherent, permanent quality in Objects, is repugnant to the most palpable intimations of the senses. To believe that its perception depends upon the re-opening of the joy-founts of our youth, or the unlocking of Imagination's treasury of images and reminiscences, is plainly contradictory to the general healthy perceptions of men. Beauty is not a name for agreeable impressions of any kind, but of a particular sort of pleasurable feeling. To *this*, association, imagination, hope, fancy, love, desire, may *add* an indefinite series of emotional pleasures; *this*, neither of these, nor all combined, can ever originate or educe.

Who can wander through a long avenue of trees—woods of mossed oak, "where sleepy twilight dreams the summer-time away"—the solemn pomp of groves, and glades, and lawns, that lie outspread in sheets of glorious verdure —recline in the bosky dell, where, "low doon amang the broom,"

> "A willow keeps
> A patient watch over the stream that creeps
> Windingly by it;"

or gaze up into the evening sky, and see

> "The clouds, in heaven's loom,
> Wrought, through varieties of shape and shade,
> In ample folds of drapery divine;"

or look upon the cold snowdrop expanding its chaste white blossoms in the lap of winter; or roam by the silver links of a river, along its green banks, fringed with willows, oaks, and elms—now skirting round a slope of cattle-clad pasture-land, again undulating along a piece of "daisy-pied" park-scenery, and then seeming to lose itself in the dim-blue hill-country which bounds the view, and has not *felt* that these are beautiful? Who has been abroad when

> "Earth
> Looks as if lull'd upon an angel's lap,
> Into a breathless dewy sleep. * * *
> The lakelet, now no longer vext with gusts,
> Replaces on her breast the pictured moon,
> Pearled round with stars,"

and has not asked himself the poet's question—

> "How can the beauty of *material* things
> So wind the heart and work upon the mind?"

Go to the green lawn, the sloping upland, by the well-trimmed hedges, on moor or fen, or on the wide heath-clad mountain, when the clouds lie in strange-shaped masses athwart the sky, and the

last rays of the setting sun are streaming in floods of gold and crimson, suffusing the air with misty light, which as it falls upon the dark yew, the yellow-blossomed laburnum, the broad-leaved oak, casts deep shadows on the secluded walks, while, in the deep-shaded sky, the pallid moon fills up the glory of the firmament —go forth, and look; then feel that "Beauty is a quality inherent in objects;"—feel how truly Wordsworth has spoken, when he said:—

> "The sounding cataract
> Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
> The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
> Their colour and their forms were then to me
> An appetite: a feeling and a love
> *That had no need of a remoter charm*
> *By thought supplied, or any interest*
> *Unborrowed from the eye.*"

S. N.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

Mr. Editor,—I am fond of the epistolary style, as it does not cramp me up to such undeviating formality, as a more studied paper does; but affords latitude for a more easy, familiar, and unconstrained expression of opinion. It frees me from the strict necessity of attending to grace of composition, elegancy of expression, and elaborate accuracy of diction, which the daring feat of writing an article imperatively demands. It allows me to imagine myself rather as your own friend than as a contributor to the literary delights of others; and thus my notes are in some measure withdrawn from the critic's eye, for I much fear otherwise their doom would be speedily fixed. I can, however, feel the impolicy of my plan when I compare my own letters with the studied grace and elegant style which S. N. has imparted to his contribution. There is a decision and maturity of view, an accurate knowledge of the point at issue, and a delicate play of fancy which adorns, but does not overburden, the subject observable in it. He comes accoutred as a knight, armed "*cap-à-pie*" to engage in the tournay of truth. I am not so impanoplied. To say the truth, the lucidity, acuteness, and perspicuity displayed in his paper made an impression on me which will not speedily be effaced; indeed, when I read it, a suspicious feeling began to cross my mind that my philosophic reading and research had profited me but little. On further reflection, however, I became reassured; and although sensible of my *relative* deficiency in all the qualities which so distinguish my opponent (if by the laws of controversy I *must* use so harsh a term); yet, trusting to the *electicism* of your readers, I am desirous of enabling them to judge of the accuracy of the arguments which may be adduced on either side of the question, more by the juxtaposition of the reasonings than by the quotation and contradiction of the opposition views. I know that I have had the advantage in this debate by being permitted to follow up my train of argumentation in successive Numbers; and knowing this, I will eschew, as far as possible, the censorial course which I might have adopted had S. N. single-handed conducted the discussion. I have no means of ascertaining how far he endorses the paper of C. C. M., and therefore dare scarcely hold him responsible for the opinions contained in it. I may, however, mention, in passing, that C. C. M. has made an admission (p. 51, 2nd col.) which implies all that I have argued for:—"The perception of beauty, indeed, depends upon many things, upon intellectual capacity, habit of life, disposition, education, national feelings, and a thousand other accidental circumstances." Could there be a more express admission that Beauty is not a quality inherent in objects? If the perception of Beauty depends on the afore-mentioned casualties, how can we predicate its inherency? We do most readily admit that appearances are against the theory of Beauty which we advocate; but we will endeavour to show that *that* is no valid argument against any theory. The apparent motion of the sun in the sky is the result of the movement of the earth—a movement which we cannot feel; so may the "emotion of the Beautiful" be the result of a change in us unapparent to ourselves, yet objectivised to that which lies without us. At least this analogy shows us that *apparentness* is

not *inherency*. There are many mental processes so co-operatively performed as to appear one operation :—the perception of distance by the eye, which is the result of a judgment drawn from our former experience of tangible objects, conjoined with visuality; the operation of walking, in which we unconsciously perform mathematical problems in regard to momentum, distance, height, &c. May not Beauty be one of them? I cannot see how Beauty can be inherent in objects, seeing it is a fact, that no form, or colour, or modification of these, can be pointed out in them as uniformly found in those which are beautiful. How well do we all know that the brazen bauble, the tin sword, the gilded toys, which, in our boyhood, were unmatchable for beauty, no longer delight our manhood! In a kaleidescope we have representations of form and colour indubitably beautiful; but is this beauty inherent in the forms which meet our eye? The mirage of the Egyptian sandplains—the *Fata Morgana* on the Calabrian shore—the gossamer-winged visions which haunt a love-sick maiden's pillow—beautiful, yet evanescent,—Is Beauty a quality *inherent* in them? Why do we think the violet, the snowdrop, and the primrose more beauteous than the tulip and the dahlia? C. C. M. appears to think that the perception of Beauty is instantaneous, and he adds, we may almost say instinctive; but when did instinct ever act in a manner so contradictory? S. N.'s opinion that Beauty is a sensational emotion, is open to the same objection: the eye informs all men of the existence of an object—*that* is the sensational function; but it does not inform every man of the beauty of the object which he perceives, for we know that men, looking on the same object, differ in opinion regarding its beauty. All men have not the power of perceiving the beautiful. Of some we may truly say what Wordsworth said of "Peter Bell:"—

> "A primrose on the river's brim
> A yellow primrose was to him,
> And nothing more."

But to those who look upon nature, and the myriad of objects which lie outspread before our eyes, with any ray of intelligence at all, can they fail in recalling

> "Some apprehension,
> Some steady love, some brief delight,
> Some memory that had taken flight,
> Some chime of fancy, wrong or right,
> * * Or stray invention?"

The savage roams through the vast extent of prairie-ground, the thick foliage-darkened bush, and the almost primeval forestry, in the midst of the sublime and beautiful, and sees and feels it not. The rustic lout whose whole knowledge is sensuous, if not sensual, who reads not, and knows not how to think, can look with lack-lustre eye upon the glory hues of the most brilliant of summers. The rank-dizened *ennuyé* can view the lands which have been the themes of the poet's raptured lay, the orator's eulogium, the painter's enthusiastic enconiums, unthrilled, unblest, and unimpassioned—can leave the mystic blue of an Italian sky—the star-domed, verdure-floored, beauty-blazoned temple of nature, for the base haunts of baser vice, or the oil-lighted, tobacco-fumed gambler's hell. The eye is but the instrument of observation, the mind and the affections are the beauty percipients. In this same merry month of joyous summer when the trees are festooned with foliage and blossomry—the gold-tasseled laburnum, the snow-white hawthorn blossoms, the bright chesnut bloom—when earth is bedecked in all her richest tracery—when the heavens are clothed with surpassing glory in roseate-clouds, with yellow hazed extremities and spaces, "deeply, darkly, beautifully blue"—when the sward is besprinkled with the wildling flowerets, which summer scatters, and the hillside is brilliant with soft green grass-broom, gold blossoms, and heather—when moorland, and upland, and lawn are full of the gifts of Flora—when varied lights, and shades and colours surround us—when the very air seems dreamy through pure happiness, and bathed in the sun's transparent light; the fields and woods, far distant villages, and lofty-roofed mansions seemed fairer than their wont—when, as we loiter along, we become forgetful of the flight of the silken-footed hours, and a quiescent

influence, gaining on the heart, brings back sweet thoughts from the memory-pictured past, and all around conspires with all within to make one feel that it is

> "A perfect season of delight,
> The very bridal of the earth and sky"—

the truth becomes forcibly apparent, that Beauty is not a quality inherent in objects.

The common earth, the sea, the sky, the sun, the space-filling stars, and the sky-cleaving mountains, afford materials for the dullest conversation, for speculations on the weather and the crops, to some, while to others they appear as suffused with Eden blissfulness—and, wandering 'mid such scenes, their minds drink deep of inspiration—their imaginations become filled with reverie and raptured thought—vague, undefined, but exquisite fancies present themselves, and they revel in an ineffable deliciousness of calm mental excitement; and therefore, I am a doubter in the *inherency* of beauty in objects. I am supported in this opinion by Spenser, who says,

> "All that is good is beautiful and fair;"

and the author of "Festus" says,

> "The volume of the world
> Is legible alone to those who use
> The interlinear version of the light
> Which is the Spirit's, and given *within ourselves*."

I am yours, &c.
PHILOMATHOS.

Philosophy.

IS PHRENOLOGY TRUE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

S. N. in his able article has, to our mind, properly and clearly shown that Phrenology is not a science of the mind. He has reduced it to a simple science, whose object is to discourse about the machine that is thought to locate the mind; or he has proved it worse than this, pure Materialism. Phrenologists must choose either horn of this dilemma. They must admit that they discourse either upon Craniology or Materialism. To us it matters little whether of the two they choose: one they must adopt.

We purpose to show that Phrenology in its assumptions is diametrically opposed to the divine oracles of God. If we can do this: if we can prove that Phrenology contradicts the plain statements of the Word of divine inspiration, then it must be demonstrated to be false. Nothing can claim the title of Mental Philosophy which sets itself in opposition to the declarations of Holy Scripture concerning the mind of man. Phrenology assumes that the human family present upon the cranium certain organizations, which are the effects of certain qualities of the mind. It assumes that the mind of man is a mixture of good and evil, and that both principles alike manifest their existence in his mental part, by certain organs surrounding his brain, which are the developments of their power. These organs are distinguished by names which represent the phrenological terms given to the qualities naturally existing, according to the assumptions of that science, in the mind of man. Some of these qualities, and the organs which represent them, are termed Benevolence, Veneration, and the like. Now from these facts we learn that Phrenology teaches that man is born a compound being, a mixture of good and evil. But farther: the science, as it is termed, teaches that the cultivation of these good organs, or qualities of the natural mind, will enable the individual to resist and conquer the impulse and power of the bad qualities that he finds form a portion of his mental nature. To controvert these statements, let us see what are the qualities of the natural mind, as stated by unerring truth; and we remark that these qualities are not possessed by a few of the human race, but they are what

characterize every son and daughter of Adam—"Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like." "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked, who can know it?" "The thoughts of the heart are only evil continually." Now these facts, stated by God, directly oppose the facts assumed by Phrenology. Phrenology professes to be able to teach what is in the heart or mind of man. It professes to be able to denote by the examination of what it terms the cerebral, what are the good and bad qualities of each individual mind. It professes to tell the man examined by the light of its truths, what are the inherent qualities of his mind. And, in following out its pretensions, it has the temerity to tell one man that he has largely developed the organs of benevolence, veneration, &c., and it tells another that he possesses these organs in a very slight degree, but that the organs of destructiveness, &c., are very prominent. In fine, Phrenology arrogates to itself the power of determining the character of the mind by the investigation of a man's cranium. It professes to be able to disclose what are the secret workings of that mind which God has said is "deceitful above all things." Snch are a few of the pretensions that Phrenology asserts its claims to: but we deny them *in toto*. We take the Bible for our standard, and we take it for our guide when we wish to know what are, and what are not, the qualities of the human mind. Now Jesus Christ tells us, that man "must be born again, before he can enter the kingdom of God." St. Paul says that the "carnal mind is enmity against God;" and David says man is "conceived in sin," and that there is "none that doeth good, no not one." God himself says that the "thoughts of man's natural heart are only evil continally." But Phrenology steps in and contradicts all these; and says, Here is the organ of benevolence: cultivate this organ, and it will enable you to overcome that other organ of malevolenec. In fact, Phrenology teaches that the natural mind of man has such inherent qualities which, if properly cultivated and trained, will enable their possessor to act in a way that is positively right. Now we ask, How can such a declaration be squared with the foregoing quotations from Holy Writ. Is it according to the teaching of Holy Truth, that man inherits, by nature, any principles that are capable of leading him to do good? Is it in accordance with the revelations of God that man's mind is so constituted naturally, that it may be wrought upon without being entirely changed, so that the evil may be overcome by the good? We trow not. St. Paul says that in the "natural man dwelleth no good thing:" and yet Phrenology says that in man's mind dwell benevolence, veneration, humility, and in fact the germs of every good thing. And more than this,—Phrenology teaches that the evil principles of man's mind are capable of such cultivation, that they may be made to do good. In fact it tells us that all the mind requires is, that it should be properly cultivated, and then it is capable of every virtue. Need we say that such doctrine is entirely subversive of the doctrines of God? The Bible teaches that until man's nature is completely changed, it cannot bring forth any good. Christ says, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." He also teaches that before man can do any good, he must be changed by the influence of the Holy Spirit. We hold it impossible to teach anything so awfully delusive, and so tremendous in its consequences, as is the notion that man's mind naturally contains the elements of virtue, and that all it needs to bring it to perfection is cultivation. Nothing can cultivate the natural heart of man so that it can be compelled to do good. It is the truth of God, that man must receive a new heart, or be renewed in the spirit of his mind, before he can be fitted to do anything that partakes of the nature of virtue. These, then, are some of the reasons why we conclude Phrenology is founded on error. But, throwing aside all the weight of the foregoing, let us admit that Phrenology is not contrary to the Word of

God: we then say, it is a useless science. Why? Because the Word of God is the best guide to show every man what are the qualities of his own mind. The Bible is the best guide to instruct a man how he may be able to counteract the evil principles he finds within him, and to enable him so to act, that he may be virtuous, holy, and happy. Assuming, then, that Phrenology is true, it is not less useless, as it only pretends to do what the Bible is the best fitted to accomplish, that is, enable a man to know and regulate himself.

Gosport. W. T.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

The science of Phrenology has, in these "latter days," received a considerable share of attention, and its pretensions have been from time to time submitted to a tolerably impartial sifting: yet hitherto it has suffered but little from the hands of its enemies, while, under the auspices of its friends, it has made notable advancement. Notwithstanding that there have been many objections urged against it, and these by a variety of writers, there have been few who would not allow that it had, at least, *something* "reasonable" about it; while others have even admitted it to be exceedingly "captivating and charming."

The writer of the *Negative* Article on this subject in the last number of the *Controversialist* lays down certain premises touching the principles upon which the science is based, some of which embody all that the most strenuous of its advocates could desire: while others seem to possess a degree of mysticism at present beyond our apprehension. We therefore prefer laying down our own premises, or rather such as have occurred to us during the perusal of the best authorities we have been able to consult.

Those who are advocates of the truthfulness of Phrenology contend:

I. That the *Brain* is the organ of ALL the propensities, sentiments, and faculties.

II. That the idea of certain metaphysicians, that the brain is composed of *one mass*, and the whole therefore necessary to every act of feeling or thinking, is erroneous; but that,

III. The brain is composed of as many parts or organs as there are propensities, sentiments, or faculties differing essentially from each other.

It is now so universally admitted that the brain is the seat of the mind, that the offering of any proof would be superfluous. We shall therefore proceed to notice the reasons or grounds upon which the fundamental principle of the science —the plurality of organs in the brain —is based; and they may be thus enumerated:—1. It is a law of organization that different functions are *never* performed by the same organ. 2. That as there is no vision or hearing without their respective organs, the eye and ear, so there is no thinking or feeling without their respective organs in the brain. 3. The mental powers do not come *all at once*, as they would were the brain one indivisible organ; but they appear successively, and the brain undergoes a corresponding change. 4. There are different degrees in which, in the same individual, the several mental functions are manifested: hence an excellent painter is often no musician, or a clever and acute observer deficient of profound reasoning powers. 5. Because in partial idiocy and partial insanity, some faculties are greatly deficient or deranged, while others are powerful and healthy, which could not be if all were dependent upon one organ. 6. Because partial injuries of the brain do not equally affect all the mental powers, which they would do if the organ of the mind was single. Often, parts of the brain are injured without impairing the intellect. 7. In dreaming, one or more faculties are awake while others are asleep; and if all acted through the instrumentality of the same organ, they could not be in opposite states at the same time. 8. That upon the examinations of the brains of individuals remarkable for some peculiar propensity or talent, a constant correspondence has been found in the development of a certain portion of the brain. 9. Pain has sometimes been felt in an organ when the faculty with which it

is presumed to be connected has been greatly excited: or when a faculty has been morbidly manifested during life, disease has sometimes been found to have affected a corresponding portion of the brain. 10. That if the brain were only one organ, there could never be that internal conflict of feeling which must be familiar, more or less, to us all, as constantly prompting us to do *good*, when "evil would be present with us."*

So much, then, for the establishment of the truthfulness of the principles of Phrenology; but now as to their application. S. N. (the writer before referred to) is correct in stating that Phrenology has for its object the establishment of this fact—"That there is a means of discovering the mental nature of individuals by the external formation of the brain;" and again—that "all other things being equal, the *best developed brain* is the index of the *most powerful mind*"—the latter principle being one so clearly laid down by Combe, viz., that *cæteris paribus*, *size* is the measure of *power;* and that, therefore, the larger the development of the entire brain, or any particular portion of it, the greater the mental power, either entirely or partially, as the case may be. And the advocacy of this principle by no means lays Phrenology open to the objection often urged against it—"that persons with small heads must be inferior to those possessing larger ones."

The term *size*, in Phrenology, is used only in a *relative sense*, unless preceded by the qualification of all things being equal. Phrenology takes cognizance of *quality*, as well as *quantity*, and can as well estimate the mental capacity of a small head, as a large one. It compares the size of an organ, or of any class of organs, with the size of the antagonistic organ or class of organs, in the same individual, and hence draws its conclusion. Thus of two men, one possessing a small head, well developed in the intellectual region, and the other possessed of a much larger head, but the principal development being in the region of the animal propensities, the amateur phrenologist would pronounce the smaller head to be possessed of the greater intellectual power; or, what is the same thing, of the strongest mind. And so to arrive at any more minute results, only a closer application of the system is required. We do not conceive it to be by any means necessary to show that the present system of *Organology*, or the classification of the organs of the brain, is strictly correct, in order to prove the truthfulness of the general principles of Phrenology, any more than we deem it necessary to pit phrenology against psychology or physiology, to see which of them may possess the most truth, our object being to inquire into the truthfulness of one only. These sciences are at present in their infancy, and doubtless all embody error, more or less. But with reflecting minds, partial imperfections will never call forth general condemnations. If half the pains had been taken to perfect the system of Phrenology which have been employed to overthrow it, it would probably have appeared in a far more matured state than it now does. It is not like many sciences which have sprung into existence with a sudden bound, and become at once matured, and generally received. Its nature did not admit of such expedition. It could arise out of nothing but the attentive observations of great and powerful minds; and from such a source it dates its origin. The names of Gall, Spurzhein, George Combe, Andrew Combe, James Simpson, Dr. Cox, and many other individuals little less remarkable for their powers of observation and ardent search for truth, are indissolubly associated with the science. We should have been glad to have noticed certain modifications to which Phrenology is subjected—perhaps almost more than any other science—arising either from physical influences, deficiency of education, disease, or other causes; but space forbids. So long as we have the power of using the pen (unless clearly convinced to the contrary), we shall be ready to support and defend the truthfulness of Phrenology. All animal nature seems to add its testimony to our position,—from the reptile crawling on the ground, to the higher-de-

* See Combe's "Elements of Phrenology;" and other works; "Chambers' Information for the People;" and the "National Cyclopædia."

veloped and more rational quadruped; until, ascending the scale, we come to the noble creature, MAN, made after "God's own image," and bearing the attributes of his Divine origin impressed upon his noble forehead, and glancing forth as sunbeams from his intelligent eye.

C. W., JUN.

Politics.

IS AN HEREDITARY MONARCHY PREFERABLE TO AN ELECTIVE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

IN all debate, conducted for the purpose of gaining a knowledge of the truth, it is of the greatest possible advantage that no fallacy may *knowingly* be allowed an entrance into the disquisitions of either party, and that no arguments be employed which are void of relation to the truth, or falsehood, of the topic at issue. Of this nature is the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, of which "Excelsior" makes use when he "cannot suppose that S. N. considers himself and fellow-countrymen selfish, conceited, ostentatious, and think more of self than of virtue." For although, out of respect, I might hesitate to wound the feelings of "Excelsior" as a fellow-countryman, by inserting him in this category, that would not at all affect the relevancy of the argument employed by me (p. 20), that "different forms of government are suited to the varied dispositions, culture, and circumstances of different nations," and the subsequent application of that axiom to the proposition before us, in which I attempted to show, that to a nation constituted as ours is, an Hereditary Monarchy is preferable to an Elective one. No part of that chain of demonstration has been impugned or disproved, and until "Excelsior" or some one else can prove that all the inhabitants of this empire are guided by the dictates of virtue, that argument remains irrefragable, and must be retained as revelant. So far, however, is this from being capable of proof, that the axioms, upon which governments are based, are the reverse, viz.: "Laws must be framed to meet and counteract the vicious propensities of human nature;" and "The whole system of polity and government is a compromise betwixt what is perfect in theory, and what is practicable in execution. Human nature cannot be radically changed; we must, therefore, frame institutions according to what it is, not according to what it ought to be."

With regard to C. C. M's example from ROME, it appears from a collation of the abridgments of P. H. and his own: 1st. That Romulus, being the founder of the Empire, was not an elected monarch. 2nd. Romulus being deducted, there were six kings who gained the crown by election, *two* of whom were good, the remaining *four* were almost worthy of being called the refuse of humanity, which leaves a majority of two in favour of those who advocate an Hereditary Monarchy as preferable to an Elective one—besides the triumphant proof which P. H. has given of the inevitable evils of Elective Monarchy, which distinctly and emphatically refute points II. III. and IV. of C. C. M's summary of arguments.—*Nomina rerum perdidimus, et licentia militaris libertas vocatur.**

I shall next address myself to a few mistakes into which "Excelsior" has fallen:—1st. He would have us believe, that "William the Conqueror" was an *hereditary* monarch!! For unless he be so, what has his reign to do with the question? 2nd. He falls into the general popular error, that our early monarchs were hereditary. *They were*

* The names of things have deceived us, and military misrule is called freedom.

not so. In proof of this assertion, I may be allowed to make the following quotations—"The reign of Henry I. is one of the most curious and instructive parts of our ancient history. Modern authors stigmatize this prince as an usurper, though he owned his crown to the most legitimate of all titles, the free choice of his people, founded on their knowledge of his personal merits, and of the notorious incapacity of his competitor."* It is idle to apply our present notions of hereditary descent in the crown to the age of Henry I. There was at that time no fixed law or established usage on the subject. Birth was one ground of pretension — the testamentary disposition of the last monarch was another; but both were subordinate to the choice or consent of the military tenants of the crown, who may be considered as the virtual representatives of the nation. It is a curious remark of Baron Maseres, and a striking proof of the unsettled laws of succession in the eleventh century, that consent was not only of importance in giving a just title to the crown, but in regulating the succession of subordinate fiefs. From the researches of that learned and judicious critic, it appears that in France the sub-tenants of the great feudatories had a voice in the selection of the superior lord, to whom they were to pay homage; and from numerous instances in the history of our own country, he concludes that, in England, "the election or will of the nobles or great landholders of the kingdom was the best title, or rather the only valid title, to the crown."† In those rude and turbulent ages, valour and ability were necessary qualities in the character of the sovereign. Birth did not always afford these requisites; and where kings were not always selected for their merit, they were often degraded for their incapacity.

It is the happiness of a civilized nation, and of a limited monarchy, to be independent of the virtues of its chief.‡ Regarding the coronation of King John, in a letter of Prince Lewis to the Monks of Canterbury, it is expressly said, that in putting the crown upon his head, Archbishop Hubert publicly declared, "*Quod non ratione successionis sed per electionem, ipsum in regem coronabat.*"* Henry IV. was called to the throne by both houses of Parliament.† The quotations prove that Elective Monarchy was the usual custom of our ancestors, so that the arguments drawn by "Excelsior," from the ancient sovereigns of England, are not only "null and void," as arguments against Hereditary Monarchy, but recoil with all their weight against the phalanx of those who have used them. Now we are dealing in criticism, and correcting mistakes, we may notice, with reference to C. C. M's closing observation, that the Monarch's is not a *legislative* but an *executive* function.

Gibbon truly says — Of the various forms of Government which have prevailed in the world, an Hereditary Monarchy seems to present the fairest scope for ridicule.—Is it possible to relate, without an indignant smile, that, on the father's decease, the property of a nation, like that of a drove of oxen, descends to his infant son, as yet unknown to mankind, and to himself; and that the bravest warriors and the wisest statesmen, relinquishing their natural right to empire, approach the royal cradle with bended knees and protestations of inviolable fidelity? Satire and declamation may paint these obvious topics in the most dazzling colours, but our serious thoughts will respect a useful prejudice, that establishes a rule of succession independent of the passions of mankind; and we shall cheerfully acquiesce in any expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal, power of giving themselves a master.

Any cause which has a combinative influence upon the minds of the people, which has the tendency to produce feelings of a common interest, common hopes, and common sympathies—which can inspirit all the inhabitants of a country with the same enthusiasm, and fasten

* Gulielm. Neubrig., p. 11.

† Notes of Baron Maseres on "Excerpta ex Orderic." Vital, p. 294—296.

‡ "Edinburgh Review," June, 1816, p. 385.

* "Fœdera" i. 140. That he crowned him king not by right of succession, but by election.

† "Edinburgh Review," June, 1816, p. 348.

their affections upon the same object, from the same motives, has the effect of making that people more united, more harmonious, more unanimous—produces a unicality, or oneness of feeling and desire; and hence their strength, power, and resistive force will be increased and rendered more efficient. Any custom, law, or circumstance, which has the power of educing the susceptibilities of the people in the same direction, and of entwining and interweaving their hopes, ambition, and prosperity, round one object, draws out more effectively the feelings necessary for the preservation of the social compact, and the consolidation of a civil polity. This combinative influence, by producing union, makes a nation strong; and the people who are most strongly and sympathetically knit together, will oppose external power, or internal innovation, most vigorously and successfully: whereas, one in which combinative influence is weakened or destroyed, whose unition-bonds are easily severed and broken, and whose units are easily repelled from each other, cannot long withstand internal revolution or decay, and external violence and assault. Hereditary Monarchy effects the former, the latter necessarily results from the election of a sovereign. Therefore, an Hereditary Monarchy is preferable to an Elective one.

It is absolutely necessary, for the safety of society, the peace of the world, and the progress of man, that there should be an overruling sentiment of respect for the laws, and submission to the constitution of government, implanted or originated in the minds of the great multitude of the inhabitants of any country. It is only by this that obedience can be secured to those authorities and powers which are vested in parties, not naturally superior to the bulk of their compeers, but rendered conventionally so by the forms of government, and those public acts which are from time to time found needful for the preservation of the State. The people, knowing the definite amount of freedom of speech and action left them, and the precise sum of legal control to which they are liable, can never be despotically ruled. Thus, perfect confidence is infused into each breast; and, although party rage may spread itself, and the bitterness of a public contest for offices may be felt, yet from the fact of the definiteness and continuance of the Executive, each one feels constrained to yield obedience to the forms of the constitution, because he knows his opponents, equally with himself, must submit to the laws. There is here a co-existence of enlightened freedom and needful restraint, which must work well for the stability of society, the security of government, the peace of nations, and the diffusion of the blessings of civilization throughout the world. This feeling, which political writers have denominated "constitutional morality," can only be properly educed when the executive power is continuous and uninterrupted. Where there is a will, at whose disposal the enforcing of the law is placed, unfettered by the influences which a derivative power must impose, and superior to the vicissitudes of change and fickleness upon the part of the people, to which elective offices must be liable, a despot cannot depend upon submission except the submission of fear—there is no definitude of laws in his empire—his individual will is the only law. In Elective Monarchies, the interruptions which would at intervals necessarily occur—the immenseness of the prize attainable by the bursting of the law-built barriers of Conduct—and the fact, that a power derivable from the people, to impose the obedience of laws upon them, cannot be executed with that strictness and rigour, that inflexibility and impartiality, which the peace of Society demands.—The prevalence of partizanship—the desire of rewarding those who aided in the success of the emprise, and punishing those who had opposed his haughty strides to the imperial seat—the impossibility of the unsuccessful candidate for a throne becoming a peaceful and subordinate subject, and the consequent entailment of intrigues, broils, assassinations, stratagems, and civil wars, would all interrupt the development and operation of this feeling. If this feeling can exist at

all, and it is proved that it cannot coexist with despotism, and that Elective Monarchy is inimical to its development and operation, it will follow that Hereditary Monarchy is the only form of government by which it can be educed, and therefore Hereditary Monarchy is preferable to an Elective one. How stands the matter, then?—that Elective Monarchy is most disastrous in its results, and most debasing in its influence, has been proved from the examples of Poland and Rome, of Masaniello and Rienzi. If further evidence be sought of the evils of Elective Governments, the history of Sweden and Denmark will afford examples—the archons and thirty tyrants of ancient Greece; the Decemviri and Dictators of Rome, and the recent election of Otho, to fill the throne of the glory-eclipsed modern Greece. Our French neighbours will show how the bedazzlement of military glory can blind a nation to its true happiness, and how insatiable is the power-avarice of the human soul when the path to advancement is open; how it can walk through streams of gore, on stepping-stones of human skulls, and heap around it a hecatomb of mangled sacrifices in its mad dominion-lust. In our own country, since the Hanoverian succession, the advantages of Hereditary Monarchy have been plainly displayed, it needs no comment on our part. The glory, the renown, the power, the progress, the prosperity, the influence of Britain fully attest them. May Heaven forfend that we should peril our present condition for the precarious eventualities of Elective Monarchy; that we should open the flood-gates of foreign aggression and intrigue, civil slaughter, corruption's every evil, war, havoc, and mad ambition, fury-eyed onslaughts on our liberties, our happiness, and peace! I am convinced that we had better

> "Bear the ills we have,
> Than fly to others which we know not of,"

and that an Hereditary Monarchy is preferable to an Elective one. S. N.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

As one of the openers of the debate on this question, I gladly avail myself of your excellent rule which allows me the privilege of offering a few remarks by way of reply. And here I cannot but express the deep interest with which I have perused *all* the papers that have appeared on this subject, and also the high gratification that I have felt in observing not only the ability of the writers, but their calm and gentlemanly bearing. To me this is an augury of the success of *The British Controversialist*, as well as a testimony to the excellence of the plan on which it is conducted. But I have not only been interested and gratified, I am free to confess that my views, though not *materially altered*, have been *somewhat modified*. I have learnt what can be said in favour of an Hereditary Monarchy—how many objections can be brought against an Elective one, and I feel more than ever the importance of the good old rule, "*Audi alteram partem.*"

The principal positions which the advocates of our views have maintained are these, that an Elective Monarchy is just in principle; that it is adapted to secure the great objects of government; and that its influence on the tone of general society would be beneficial. The gentlemen who have taken the opposite side of the question have expended their energies in opposing an Elective Monarchy, rather than in advocating an Hereditary one. When they have advanced a few words in favour of the "time-honoured institution," as in the case of S. N., they have put in no claim for its basis on *nature* or *justice*, but they have laid its foundations in the sands of expediency. That it "best suits" a certain state of society is one of their strongest allegations—an allegation which, were we inclined to admit, would still leave it a question whether we ought not to seek to improve a state of society which made such an unreasonable institution as Hereditary Monarchy suitable—a state, according to S. N., where "virtue is less powerful in its operations than self-interest," and "where love of gran-

deur and ostentation is highly developed."

The principal objections that have been made to an Elective Monarchy have been grounded on the dangers and inconveniences which it is supposed would attend the election. It has been said, with considerable force, that many evils attend the election of members of parliament, and that these would be vastly augmented in the election of a supreme ruler of the nation. But to this we would reply, that what is morally right cannot for long be politically inexpedient; that many of the evils mentioned may exist only in imagination, and that others, by modifications in the *modus operandi*, might be greatly reduced, if not entirely removed. It is not necessarily included in the idea of an Elective Monarchy that the sovereign should be *directly* elected by the people on universal suffrage principles. I am inclined to think that all the good pointed out might be secured, and many of the evils avoided, if the election of the monarch was by the parliament. It might be that our representatives would not discharge in a proper manner the duties devolving upon them, but I think we should have some guarantee for their doing so in the fact of their being dependent upon our suffrages, and this question would occupy a prominent position when a general election took place. Presuming that the members of our legislature are among the most intelligent men of the nation, they would possess more information, and be in a better position to judge of the suitability of the several candidates, than the majority of the populace by any possibility could be.

With respect to "the armoury of facts," from which our opponents have so freely drawn, they appear to forget the weapons which it places at our disposal, of which C. C. M. and "Excelsior" have so readily presented samples. But I forbear to use them myself, believing that they are not to be depended upon in a conflict like this, for where is the boasted "progressiveness" of the present age if our political questions are to be settled by a reference to Roman history? If, Mr. Editor, it be true, as stated in your first number, that "force, wealth, fraud, and prejudice, are losing their supremacy, and intellectuality is steadily advancing and becoming dominant;" are we not justified in believing that there would be fewer difficulties connected with elective monarchy now than formerly? I think so; what think my readers?

To me it appears that the whole question may be compressed into a few words. Knowledge, wisdom, and goodness ought to be possessed by a king, these are not hereditary; therefore the office ought not to be hereditary in which they are required. It is in vain for W. W. to assert that an Elected Monarch would be less fitted to govern upon equitable principles than an Hereditary one; for the Hereditary Monarch may not be fit to govern at all, as he may be absolutely destitute of mental ability or moral rectitude.

We leave, then, this question with confidence as to the verdict that will be pronounced, and rejoice in the opportunity which has been afforded of having it so fully discussed, believing that the truth on this, as upon every other subject, will ultimately triumph. C. A.

Social Economy, etc.

OUGHT CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS TO BE ABOLISHED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Mr. Editor,—Having read, with interest, the preceding papers on both sides of this question, and seen no reason to quit the negative side, I am induced to follow those who have taken the affirmative, and to attempt a refuta-

tion of their arguments, with the conviction that something may be added in favour of Capital Punishments to the excellent arguments already advanced.

The first of these writers, L. S., after premising that punishment should be either reformatory or preventative, argues, that Capital Punishments cannot be reformatory "because they place the criminal where reformation is impossible;" and next denies that they can be preventative, as not only do a number of authorities, ancient and modern, concur in denouncing them, but the testimony of history, afforded in a contrast drawn between the times of Alfred the Great and those of Henry VIII., decides that "as an example to others they have utterly failed."

The second writer, C. W., also taking as the first object of punishment the reformation of the offender, shows in the same manner that "the taking away the life of the offender is decidedly opposed to the first object of punishment." His second object of punishment is "remuneration to the injured," which he also proves to be equally frustrated. Having thus successfully overcome two supposed sentinels, he reaches the citadel, where he finds the force of the enemy concentrated; and this, by the help of a ladder of statistics, he manfully scales, but with what success we shall presently see.

Before we attempt to oppose these writers on their own grounds, let us inquire whether punishment has always in view the objects they state.

If we take a wide survey of nature, in the operations of instinct in all animals, from insects up to man—we shall find that a system of punishment universally prevails, having as its first and last objects, *simple retribution*. If we take a higher survey of nature, in the dealings of God with man and superior creatures, we shall find the same law prevailing, and with apparently the same simple object. In these latter cases we do not deny that the utter ruin of angels who sinned may have been set forth for an example to man; and that the fall and ruin of man may operate as a preventative upon other parts of the universe: but who, for a moment, believes that this was God's primary object in the punishment of angels and men, and that if sin had been universal, and there had been no further evil to prevent, the existing evil would have gone unpunished? Are we to suppose that, but for the prevention of future evil, the wrath of God would never have been kindled, or that it would have burned only to consume itself? The death of his Son is a sufficient denial of this, and affords a true idea of the justice of God. This event, of all others, declares most eloquently its purely retributive character. His inflexible justice is here turned by his wisdom upon a willing substitute, that his boundless mercy may flow to man.

We therefore believe, that retributive justice is a principle in nature, and an unchangeable attribute of God—that it is universally the first object of punishment; and that the three objects on which "C. W." has based his opposition, are always secondary considerations in the administration of justice.

It is desirable to make the best use of a necessary evil—to contemplate as many good objects in the infliction of punishment as we may rationally hope to attain; but it is by no means necessary that Capital Punishments should answer all the usual objects of punishments; and if we grant that the three objects given are the only objects they can answer—and grant also that Capital Punishments can secure but one of these, if any—that one may be sufficient to justify their continuance, and needs not the numerical strength of the rest. If they only secure the prevention of murder—that is an object so vast, so desirable, that it demands their continuance. Granting, then, that Capital Punishments do not reform the offender, and that they do not remunerate the injured, we contend that it has not been shown that they have failed as a preventative, and we shall endeavour to show in what way they have proved a source of crime.

Both writers have brought the facts of history to show that crime has prevailed in proportion to the prevalence of Capital Punishments. The facts of history we

cannot deny; neither can we deny that their evidence is of the utmost value in a question of this nature; but we are not a little surprised to see them arrayed in opposition to Capital Punishments, and that the conflagration of crime has only raged more fiercely as these chilling waters have poured more copiously.

How does any punishment act as a preventative but by its influence upon men's fears? And what do they, who fear at all, fear more than death? And is it naturally to be expected that a violent and ignominious death should be least dreaded—least influential in checking crime, nay, actually productive of it? Both writers have granted us a solution of this difficulty. "What," says L. S., "is there preventative in death punishment except upon the individuals who suffer it? As an example to others it has utterly failed. Witness the horrid levity displayed by the spectators both before and after an execution," &c. "C. W.," closing his list of statistics, says, "They show us that just in proportion as executions have become rare, the periods immediately following have been attended with a LESS number of murders: while, on the other hand, when executions have been more frequent, and the public mind consequently more brutalized, crime, not only of murder, but of nearly every other description, has *increased*. Are we not, then, justified in believing that if Capital Punishments were *altogether abolished*, the crime of murder would materially decrease?" He afterwards says, "While we have seen that Capital Punishments *do not* operate as a warning to deter others *from* crime, we cannot have helped seeing that their tendency *is* to stimulate *to crime*." He follows this with the fact that out of one hundred and sixty-seven capital convicts, no fewer than one hundred and sixty-four, or all but three, had been present at executions, and some "frequently." We can understand clearly now to what these statistics serve:—their terrible force is spent upon the *mode* of inflicting these punishments, which we rejoice to see brought with such "hideous ruin and combustion down;" but in all this, the question remains untouched.

A more demoralizing scene than a *public* execution we cannot imagine. The display of a deed of destruction would, we conceive, so absorb the attention of the spectators, that little regard would be had to its moral purposes; and that, accordingly, the only effects wrought would be the excitement and development of a destructive propensity. Also, much of the solemnity of death is lost by the public exhibition of it; an evil is always more dreaded when it is shrouded in obscurity, or totally concealed. An execution, which, by exposure, becomes contemptible, would be awfully solemnized by the "mystery of the prison walls." So completely do we coincide with the above writers in their abhorrence of *public* executions; and in the conclusions they draw from their statistics, that they are, and have been *thus* made productive rather than preventative of crime. But the statistics afford us, in the fluctuations of crime, additional proof that it is the *publicity* of executions that has marred their influence. Throughout the periods they comprehend, the penalty of the law remained the same; it was never forgotten by any one, that death was the consequence of capital crimes; and where crime is found to diminish, the influence of the law in deterring from crime would naturally strengthen as crime gave way, by operating upon the vicious directly and purely, and not through the corrupt medium of a public execution.

Two more objections are brought by "C. W." against Capital Punishments, both of which show the uncertainty which sometimes attends the administration of justice. The first is, that the severity of the law often creates a morbid sympathy on behalf of the criminal, which tends to encourage crime and to frustrate the ends of punishment: the second is, that from the liability of the human judgment to err, the innocent often suffer for the guilty. To these plausible objections our reply is—of two evils let us choose the least. The removal of the fear of death from the murderer's mind would, we contend, be productive of greater disasters. The merely temporary suspension of this deterring motive, for

the sake of giving the world a trial, would be an uncertainty of a more threatening character.

The moral nature of an action is best seen in its consequences; and therefore, punishments should bear a just proportion to crimes, and furnish the scale of their relative magnitudes. Should not murder, then, which is allowed to be the greatest of all offences, be followed by a punishment which is applied to no other —which measures its magnitude, and which is even suggested by the crime itself?

J. F.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. IV.

THE PASSIONS EXPLAINED OR EXEMPLIFIED.

9. Inquiry, *Interrogating* or *Questioning*, is the next feature in Oratory to be contemplated and directed. Inquiry into an obscure subject *fixes* the body in a position, for the head to be a little stooping, the eyes poring, and the eyebrows drawn down. This is simply and easily performed, but to do it efficiently we recommend the young aspirant at oratorical eloquence to read on the governance of the voice in *questioning*, and also practice on the following exemplification of Inquiry:—

"Does *greatness* secure persons of rank from infirmities either of *body* or *mind?* Will the headache, the gout, or fever, spare a prince any more than a subject? When old age arrives and lays *heavily* upon him, will his *engineers relieve* him from the *load?* Can his guards and sentinels, by doubling and trebling their numbers and their watchfulness, *prevent* the approach of *death!* Nay, if *jealousy*, or even *ill-humour*, disturb his happiness, will the cringes of his fawning attendants *restore* his *tranquillity?*"

10. Attention to an esteemed friend, or a superior character, has much the same aspect, and requires silence; the eyes often cast placidly down; yet sometimes fixed in the face of the speaker; but not impertinently; especially in imperative directions, commanding address, or instructive dictations. Attention mostly comprehends, and combines with respect, a feeling which ought then to be exercised; also reverence, which kindly feeling must be judiciously manifested. Only a brief example for exercise is needed:—

"All were *attentive* to the *godlike man*,
When from his lofty couch he thus began—
'*Great Queen!* what you command me to relate,
Renews the sad remembrance of our fate.'"

We may here remark that *narration* claims just the same manifestations of feature as inquiry, and requires no more of the emphatic than merely relating facts and desires, and the speaker must briefly, but clearly and distinctly, state those which are connected with it. Example:—

The *Trojans*—if we may believe *tradition*—were the *first* founders of the *Roman Commonwealth;* who, under the conduct of *Æneas*, having made their *escape* from their own ruined country, got to Italy, and there for some time lived a *rambling* and

unsettled life, without any fixed place of abode, among the *natives*, an *uncultivated* people, who had neither *law* nor regular *government*, but who were wholly *free* from all *rule* or *restraint*. This *mixed multitude*, however, *crowding* together into *one city*, though originally *different* in *extraction*, *language*, and *customs*, united into one body in a *surprisingly* short space of time. And as their little state *improved* by additional *numbers*, by *policy*, and by extent of territory, by which they seemed likely to make an important *figure* among the nations, according to the *common course* of *things*, the appearance of *prosperity* drew upon them the *envy* of *neighbouring states;* so that the princes and people who *bordered* upon them began to seek occasion of *quarrelling* with them. The *alliances* they could form were but *few;* for most of the neighbouring states *avoided embroiling* themselves on the account of others. The Romans, seeing that they had nothing in which to trust, besides their *own conduct*, found it necessary to *bestir themselves* with great *diligence* to make *vigorous preparations*, to excite one another to face their enemies in the field, to hazard their lives in defence of their *liberty*, their *country*, and their *families*.

11. Modesty.—This feeling is a combination of submission and humility, to manifest which the body of the speaker must be bended forward; the eyes levelled to the breast; sometimes to the feet, if addressing a superior person. The voice should be low, but placid and musically sonorous; the tone submissive; and the words few, but pointed, and the sentences perspicuous. Whatever of gesture, or exertion of voice, the speaker uses in modesty, he ought to appear plainly to be drawn into by the importance, spirit, or humour of the matter.

12. Perplexity is made up of anxiety and distraction, the latter, according to the intensity of fear and uneasiness, is shown by a sudden contraction of the features and limbs; the arms are resting upon the breast; except sometimes when one of the hands covers the eyes, or rubs the forehead, to soothe down the fever working on the intellectual portion of the brain; the eyes are shut, with the eyelids quite close; the mouth is shut also, and the lips are pinched and sometimes bitten by the teeth. Then, immediately the whole frame is vehemently agitated. The individual walks busily about; stops abruptly, talks to himself, or makes grimaces. Should he speak to another, he makes long pauses; the whole tone of his voice is unvarying; his sentences are abruptly broken, expressing half, and retaining half of what arises in his mind. The following lines, on the "Horrors of War," illustrate Perplexity, intermixed with slight Trepidation—the third and fourth lines exemplifying this passion:—

> "Now had the Grecians snatch'd a *short repast*,
> And buckled on their shining arms with *haste;*
> Troy roused as soon; for on that *dreadful day*
> The fate of *fathers*, *wives*, and *infants* lay.
> The gates, unfolding, poured forth all their train,
> *Squadrons* on *squadrons* cloud the dusty plain;
> *Men*, *steeds*, and *chariots shake* the *trembling ground*—
> The *tumult thickens*, and the *skies* resound!"

13. Vexation is the state of being troubled occasionally by some real or imaginary misfortune, under the effects of which the whole frame is agitated.

Besides expressing itself with looks, gestures, restlessness, and tone of perplexity, it has concomitant complaining, fretting, and lamenting. The young orator must observe in what manner any one expresses himself who is under the power of this strong passion; and he will find his language unaffected and simple. This mode of procedure must be exactly copied when he wishes to show vexatious feelings, and give utterance to complainings of an excitable character. We here give an example, for exercise, from *Hamlet's* soliloquy:—

"To *be* or *not* to be!*—that is the question—
Whether 'tis *nobler* in the mind to suffer
The *stings* and *arrows* of *outrageous fortune*;
Courage.—Or take *arms* against a *host* of *troubles*,
And by *opposing end them!*† But to *die*—
To *sleep*—no *more*—And by a *sleep* to *end*
The *heartache*, and the *thousand* natural *shocks*
That *flesh* is *heir* to—'Tis a *consummation*
Devoutly to be *wish'd*. To *die*—To *sleep*—
To *sleep*—Perchance to *dream!*—A *startling thought!*—
For in that *sleep* of *death* what *dreams* may come,
When we have *shuffled off* this *mortal coil*,
Must give us *pause*. There's the respect
That makes *calamity* of so long life.
For who would *bear* the *whips* and *scorns* of *time*,
The oppressor's *wrong*, the proud man's *contumely*,
The *pangs* of love *despised*, the *law's delay*,
The *insolence* of *office*, and the *spurns*
That *patient merit* of the *unworthy takes*,
When he *himself* might his *quietus* make
With a *bare bodkin?*" * * *

14. PITY is a mixed passion of love and grief; and these passions must be studied previously to this. Pity looks down with uplifted *hands*, but falling eyebrows; *opens* the mouth, and draws together the features. The *looks* and *gestures* are expressed like those in Suffering, slightly modified, inasmuch as the painful feelings are only sympathetic, and therefore just removed, as it were, more distant from the feelings of the soul than what one feels in his own person:—

"The thoughts of glory past, and present shame,
A thousand griefs shall waken at the name!
May I lie cold before that dreadful day,
Press'd with a load of monumental clay!
Thy Hector, wrapt in everlasting sleep,
Shall neither hear thee sigh, nor see thee weep."

THE NATURE AND USES OF POETRY.

THE end and aim of Poetry has commonly been said to be, the "giving of pleasure." Hence from a mistaken apprehension of what is really meant by this term, many have looked, and do look upon even the greatest works of the poets, as something designed more for ornament than use; something, which, like the tracery upon a service of plate, may be dispensed with, without much

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* *Anxiety* is here manifest, and this emotion is compounded of the two last passions; namely, Perplexity and Vexation. In the words, "To *be*, or *not* to be!" the thought at length would run thus, "Is *death* the total *destruction* of *consciousness!*" "Or do the *dead* still continue to *think* and *act*, though in a different manner from that of the present state?" The thought in the second line is different; namely, "Whether is it truly *heroic* to put an *end* to *life* when it becomes *irksome!*"

† *Deep thoughtfulness* is made up of *Anxiety* and *Concern*—"But to *die* — To *sleep*—no *more!*" The pauses must be equal. The sense at length being, "Is dying only falling asleep?"

detriment to the articles themselves; something, in short, that forms a toy for the amusement of elderly blue-stockings, and those "fine feeling" people that pique themselves upon an acquaintance with literature. We indeed confess that Poetry gives pleasure, but we deny that it does so in the common meaning of the word, viz., sensual enjoyment. We claim for the gratification derived from the study of Poetry, whether in its material or formal state—*i. e.*, whether as it is seen in the radiance of the solar orb, in the changing hues of the clouds, and in the wavings of the breeze-agitated forest; or as it is contemplated in the "Iliad," the "Paradise Lost," or the "Ancient Mariner;"—a higher name than that given to the momentary enjoyments of sense. We claim for it a function inferior only to that of religion, which is also a "giver of pleasure," in that it gratifies and exalts the higher nature of man.

For the framework of the following investigations we are indebted to that admirable work, Morell's "Philosophy of Religion," by which they were suggested, but its particular application to POETRY is wholly our own.

In considering the subject, it is necessary, first, to give a short synopsis of the faculties of the human mind in order to form a basis for our theory,—second, to consider what is the peculiar essence of Poetry,—and third, to describe the functions exercised by it, in the elevation and development of the human faculties.

1st. In inquiring into and observing the operations of the mind, we are conscious of the existence within it of different feelings, emotions, and ideas. We are conscious of being placed in immediate communication with the phenomena of nature around us; we perceive the grassy carpet underneath our feet, the majestic hills rising in the distance, and the profound concave over our heads, either studded with stars, or filled with the pure light emanating from the great centre of our material world. From all the varied and innumerable objects which surround us, impressions are carried through the media of our senses to the mind, and this we call perception.

Again, we are conscious of certain desires, arising we know not how within our minds; we feel a craving for food, for property, &c., and these are denominated propensities,—or, because they originate through our corporeal nature, and are enjoyed in common with the inferior animals,—animal feelings.

But further;—on the intellectual side of our nature; we observe in ourselves the capacity of forming and retaining in our memories, certain notions representative of objects perceived, which notions we also find ourselves more or less capable of classifying, arranging, comparing; and, when one part of an arrangement is presented to us, of inferring the remainder; and this is commonly designated reflection; or, as it is sometimes styled,—the logical consciousness. Moreover, we are conscious of desiring the love and approbation of others, and of a feeling of self-satisfaction towards ourselves, which may be designated the social feelings. But there still remains a numerous class of emotions to be accounted for,—a still higher and nobler part of our nature,—the *moral sentiments*. These, with force proportioned to their development in the individual man, for ever point

upwards to that heaven, where dwell the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. In their nature and mode of action, they partake chiefly of the character of feelings. Who that possesses a rightly constituted mind, has not felt the sweet emotion of pity and universal benevolence, the glowing images of the beautiful, the satisfaction of having fulfilled the dictates of duty, and the awe-inspiring sense of a Supreme Being, upon whom we are absolutely dependent?

We have said that the moral sentiments in the mode of their operation, resemble the *feelings;* we have now to add, that in contemplating the objects to which they are directed, they assimilate to the perceptive faculties. The perceptive reveal to us, *directly* and *presentatively*, the material existences, forms, and qualities, which are external to our minds, and these the reflections render into *abstract* forms, or *representative* notions, capable of being contemplated in logical sequence.

The moral sentiments stand in a similar relation to the reflective powers of the mind. They, in like manner, bring us into the immediate and *concrete* presence of those higher elements of Beauty,* Truth, and Goodness, which exist in the visible universe, and which, by a sublime synthesis, lead us at last to contemplate, in their loftiest impersonation,—the Deity.

It has been already said, that the moral sentinents stand in a similar position with regard to the reflective faculties, as the perceptives. It now remains to illustrate this relation. It has been observed, that while the perceptives reveal to us those intuitions of individuality, size, colour, &c., which go to make up the sum-total of our impressions of external objects; still, before we act from definite notions, or ideas *representative* of those impressions, it is necessary that they undergo the process of reflective realization—that they become wrought up by the logical consciousness into distinct ideas, capable of being linked together in harmony with the laws of thought, and coupled with their appropriate symbols.

In like manner, while the moral sentiments, or, as they are styled by Morell, the intuitional consciousness,—present us with the concrete impressions or intuitions of beauty, goodness, and truth; these must be realized reflectively, before we can form them into abstract and intellectual ideas. Let us endeavour to exemplify this. We have heard children before they were capable of distinguishing a single note, as written in the music-book;—nay, even before they could speak distinctly;—sing simple musical airs with correctness. Now, to what was this to be attributed? Evidently, we think, to the strength and early internal activity of the musical faculty or organ, which thus prompted and facilitated its exercise.

But before these children could have understood the music-book, it would have

* In the theories of Beauty we have hitherto seen, we think sufficient attention has not been paid to the examination of the question in a *subjective* form. For, if we regard the sense of beauty as a faculty, (which to us appears the only feasible view), and if from the investigation of the faculties of the human mind, we discover that each faculty is placed in immediate relation to a certain object, then it follows, that this particular faculty must also have its object. It is perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the existence of a God, that there exists universally in the human mind, a disposition to worship and fear a Supreme Being. If, then, the one sentiment affords a powerful proof of the actual existence of an objective reality, with which it stands related; why may we not then infer the existence likewise of an objective beauty from the other? If we acquire our ideas of Beauty through association, why may we not derive from the same source, our ideas of God and morality? Thus the association theory tends to a shallow Atheism.

been necessary that they should have realized reflectively, or by the aid of the logical consciousness, the laws and principles of harmony, and the arbitrary signs with which they are connected.*

In the same manner it follows, that however gifted an individual may be with regard to his capability of perceiving the *concrete* existence of beauty, goodness, and truth; it will be necessary for him to realize these into formal notions or intellectual ideas, before he can produce a speculative system of theology or ethics, or a poem like the "Excursion," or the "Paradise Lost."

Having thus endeavoured to develop a scheme of the human faculties as a ground-work for our argument, we now come to the second section of our discourse,—viz., the particular essence, or central phenomena, of Poetry in the human mind.

In our attempted analysis of the mental faculties, there were three distinct modes of operation recognized by the human mind.—1st, the Intellect, consisting, (as is generally admitted,) of two distinct powers or modes of action,—viz., the perceptive, and the reflective, of which the former places the individual in relation with external or objective existence generally; the latter realizes, representatively, abstract notions, or ideas, of those existences revealed by the perceptive and other faculties.

2nd. Another mode of mental action recognized, is that of pure feeling, consisting of those desires and instincts necessary to man as an animal, and an animal not of a solitary, but of a social nature.

And 3rd., those higher emotions denominated either the Moral Sentiments, the Intuitional Consciousness, or the Moral Sense. These, by a kind of higher perception, bring the man into conscious relation with the Good, the Beautiful, and the True; which trinity, in their highest vision,—their loftiest synthesis, bring us into the immediate presence of a Divine Personality, A ONE,—an I AM, in whom is realized, and from whom flows, as from an ever-boundless and inexhaustible source, the elements of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, to fill and supply Nature, animate and inanimate.

Leaving now the vast synthesis thus presenting itself to our view, we descend to one of its elements—to the consideration alone of the Beautiful. The sense of this—the faculty by which it is cognosced, is one and the same with that which is commonly termed the Imagination. This faculty, according to Schlegel, takes precedence, and we think rightly, of the logical or reasoning powers. Imagination is the pioneer of Reflection, going out into the illimitable; it appropriates new tracts and regions to be afterwards cultivated by the plough and harrow of Reflection. In Art, Reason supplies the hard indispensable outline; Imagination, the soul and life.

The Imagination, then, or Sense of the Beautiful, is the subjective essence of Poetry in the human mind. A capacity of seeing, enjoying, and describing the

* For a more detailed account of the distinction between the moral sentiments, or intuitional consciousness; and the reflective faculties, or logical consciousness, see Morell's "Philosophy of Religion," chap. II.

Beauty that shines in Nature, animate or inanimate, is the necessary qualification of the Poet. As the prophet is an individual whose perceptions of the spiritual have been heightened to an extraordinary degree, in order that he may be able to understand the deep things of God, so is the Poet a man gifted with an extraordinary capacity for discerning the Beautiful.

The Poet is, however, not merely a seer of the Beautiful, he is also a prophet of Beauty, and delivers its messages to men. Hence, the excellence of his prophecies will depend, to a great extent, upon the development of his intellectual nature; for pure feeling being beyond verbal communication, and all intelligible language requiring more or less logical form and coherence, it follows that every great Poet must also be a great Philosopher,—a truth worthy of the enunciation of a Coleridge.

Welling up from the fountains of his being, emotions come to the Poet "too deep for words," as he contemplates this wondrous universe; surrounding him, with its resplendent shows; varying from the microscopic moss, to the star-lit empyrean with its innumerable galaxies.

But the Poet does not stop here. Upward through the glittering sun-beams of eternity, he wings his daring flight, until, at length, he arrives in the presence of the Absolute, who, amid the awful magnificence of eternity and infinity, sits enthroned, a Triune Being, combining in his very essence, the highest and purest elements of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth.

Having thus arrived at the highest synthesis of the Beautiful, we shall retrace our steps, and endeavour to characterize a few of its forms. It was affirmed that the Deity is an impersonation of Beauty in its highest forms. The next subordinate forms are those pure spirits which doubtless surround his throne; for, shall a chain of being stretch from man to the bounds of inanimate nature, and not from man upward into that infinitude that separates him from God?

Coming down, then, we know not through how many ranks of being, we at length arrive at this little point in the world of existence,—*Me*. We will now endeavour to analyze that beauty of which we know most—the beauty of the Spirit of Man. The highest form of Beauty is that of Mind,—that which is visible when the soul acts in accordance with the laws of virtue, and no jarring arises to interrupt its natural and healthy action. The laws by which mind is, or ought to be governed, are the principles of Truth. Truth, therefore, is equivalent to morality, or Spiritual Law. Again, the embodiment of this Divine Law into action;—this is Goodness. What then is Beauty? I answer, that celestial calm, that not fabulous "music of the spheres," which distinguishes the continual passing uninterruptedly of truth into action, or life; for life is action. The glory of ancient art consisted in the free and unconstrained obedience of the artist to the laws of form. In like manner, the more approaching to perfection will the revelation of beauty be in the human soul, in proportion as the truth finds a more or less ready embodiment in the life. In corroboration of this, it may be remarked, how frequently we see in actual life, this mental beauty triumph over even physical deformity. On the other hand, mere physical beauty becomes, by the interruption

of the truth in the process of being embodied into life, deteriorated; its flowing lines become harsh and defined.

But while mental beauty by its reflex action upon the physical organization thus discovers itself, it is, nevertheless, more or less modified, as intellect, passion, or sentiment, is most predominant in the individual mind.

When the intellect possesses the ascendency, there will be a certain hardness of form perceptible; when passion is predominant, the tendency will be sensuous: but when the intuitional consciousness or moral sentiments exist in greatest development, then will be visible a certain majesty—the image of the Deity originally implanted in man.

But the equally balanced development of passion, intellect, and sentiment, is that in which Beauty arrives at its fullest expression. We shall now briefly recapitulate—

Beauty is an element which issues—as light from the solar orb—for ever from the "Father of Light, with whom there is no variableness, nor shadow of turning;" which, streaming abroad throughout the material and spiritual universe, marks the presence and meeting of Goodness and Truth, and which may therefore be termed their Shekinah, or visible symbol.

But what is Poetry? I answer, the embodiment of beauty in ideas, by the help of the logical consciousness.

In the first section, it was said that all impressions, whether of perception or intuition, must become *formal* or *notional* before they are capable of communication.

The Poet or Prophet of the Beautiful is, then, an individual, possessed of a deeper intuition of this element in Nature, and who reveals the same to his fellow-men by the aid of the logical consciousness. Hence the truth of Coleridge's maxim, that every great Poet must likewise be a great Philosopher. For the former, to be understood, must possess a command over the logical faculty, which is peculiarly the province of the latter.

Beauty is thus an element in a trinity, but a trinity as closely blended into unity as the three elements which compose the solar rays. How strangely close the analogy! Truth,—does it not, like heat, warm and expand the human faculties? —Goodness, like the chemical principle, nourish and purify the soul?—and Beauty, similar to the principle of colour, attract to the mind, by its variegated tints, its thousand happy, yet changeful aspects? But again we say—Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, however they may exist apart, are nevertheless, in their natural order, essentially blended into a unity. What, then, is the relation subsisting between those conjoined, yet distinct principles?

Truth, it was said before, is the abstract law—Goodness the embodiment of that law into life—while Beauty is the harmony which accompanies, and renders *visible*, this transition of the eternal law into action. Light, to employ our former illustration, is the visible element which, on being analyzed, is found to exist in conjunction with heat and actinism; Beauty, in like manner, is capable of being resolved into Goodness and Truth. Beauty is thus the *manifestation*, or external symbol, of the two latter principles.

We shall now discover its uses as a visible manifestation of these principles.

The picture-book leads the child to unlock the treasures of learning;—the virgin loveliness of her, the fairest of her sex, leads the youth to the—if rightly performed—ennobling duties of husband and father: the gorgeous robes, the Urim and Thummim, the purple and fine linen, the golden cherubims and mercy seat, the pillar of cloud by day, and fire by night,—above all, the sublimities of Sinai lead the world to the glorious truths of Christianity. By this phantom of Beauty we are allured onwards to Goodness and Truth. Ah! that stillness which sleeps on the summer cloud—those tinted hues which fall on the western hill—that glory which plays beautiful as evanescent around the setting sun—are they not the voice of God calling to us through nature, "Come unto me all ye ends of the earth?" Does not the beholding of such scenes—the sweet moments we pass in communion with nature, and through nature with God, awaken in our souls—it may be an unconscious apprehension—yet not the less an apprehension of a future and glorious state of existence?

Of such a nature are the offices of true Poetry; she is the handmaid of religion—the priestess of Truth. From the first dawn of existence, the prospect presented to our view is replete with dazzling imagery, charged with which we rush to seize the tempting object; but alas, it eludes us, and appears seemingly as far distant as ever. But not in vain has the effort been made: we have, in spite of our disappointment, secured some little doctrine, some fragment of Truth. Again a brighter landscape appears to us—again forgetting our disappointment we rush forward in the chase, but again are we doomed to the same experience. This is the education of Nature and Providence. Thus, in the words of the poet,

> "The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
> The fair humanities of old religion,
> The power, the beauty, and the majesty
> That had their haunts in dale, or piny mountain,
> Or forest, by slow streams, or pebbly spring,
> Or chasms, or watery depths,"

all combine to lead the docile mind up to Truth and God.

HAROLD.

Colchester Literary Institution.—The members of the Discussion Class, in connexion with the Colchester Literary Institution, recently made their summer visit to that delightful watering-place, Walton-on-the-Naze, and closed a day of the most agreeable recreation with a dinner.

Colchester Mechanics' Institute.—The members of the Mutual Improvement Class, in connexion with this institution closed their first session last month, on which occasion an appropriate address was delivered by the honorary secretary of the institution, Mr. J. B. Harvey, before the members and their friends. Mr. J. L. Stevens occupied the chair.

Manchester (Rusholme-road) Young Men's Improvement Society.—We have received a communication from the Secretary of this society, from which we take the following extract:—"In addition to our regular weekly meetings, there are others of a more interesting character, which supply a want felt by all such societies, where there are none but ordinary meetings to foster a spirit of friendship and unity among the members. We have our quarterly coffee-parties, to which ladies are admitted, and when interesting and instructive questions are discussed. Quarterly recitation-meetings are also formed equally interesting,

> 'When such a medley strange of pieces both didactic,
> Grave and sentimental, comic and dramatic,'

is poured forth, in styles as different as that of the sober matter-of-fact Joseph Hume, and that of the fiery-eloquent Disraeli. These meetings, together with our annual excursion in spring, to some fair spot within twenty miles of the unceasing din and never-ending smoke of the good city of Manchester, have brought about that prosperous condition at which the society has arrived."

The "Aberdeen Mutual Improvement Association" met for the first time on the 8th of May, 1850; since which time it has gone on increasing in numbers and influence. Essays in rotation are delivered once a month. The number of members in attendance averages twenty. Essays have been read on the following subjects:—"Popular Events," the "Crusades," "Memoirs of those great Men who have risen from obscurity." The subjects which have already been discussed are, "Whether is a republican or a monarchical form of government best calculated to administer justice, and attend to the rights of the people?"—"Whether the study of biography or geography is most calculated to improve the mind of youth;" the subject for the present month is, "Has eloquence or music the most effect upon the human feelings?" The office-bearers, viz., chairman, secretary, and treasurer, are elected monthly.

Southampton Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society, which has been in existence scarcely eighteen months, is another practical illustration of the growing desire for knowledge which is extending amongst the labouring classes generally. Established in Feb. 1849, the Society now numbers one hundred and fifty members, with French, Elocution, and other classes, weekly meetings for lectures and discussions, a Library, with most of the popular periodicals and standard works.

On the 4th ult. the question of Capital Punishment was publicly discussed by four of the members, at which the respected mayor of the borough, R. Andrews, Esq., presided; the subject was thoroughly debated, and reflected great credit on the Society, in addition, it is hoped, towards leading many reflective minds to consider the justifiability of this great and momentous question. The meeting was closed with some really valuable remarks from the chairman, expressive of his approval of these and similar societies.

It is no insignificant fact, that through the individual exertions of the members alone, upwards of £15 have been collected during the last month, towards the increase of the library. May this be an encouragement to other societies.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

14. In Judges, chapter v. verse 24, Jael the wife of Heber is extolled by Divine inspiration for taking the life of Sisera, "which," says Newman, in his "Phases of Faith," "we would condemn as an act of perfidious murder." Would any of your Correspondents have the goodness to show how the above can be reconciled with the Divine probity and benevolence.—W. B. J.

15. Should the ch in the words Batrachia, Brachiopoda, Branchiæ, &c., be pronounced hard or soft?—J. C.

16. If any of your friends could inform me of a good History of France, I should feel obliged. Michelet's is only carried down to the reign of Louis XII. I should like a good, but concise one.—E. T.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

6. *French Pronunciation.*—There are twenty-five letters in the French language, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, y, z.

Of these the following six are vowels, a, e, i, o, u, y; the remainder are consonants.

VOWEL SOUNDS.

A has two sounds; when uncircumflexed, it has the sound of *a* in English, cat, rat; when circumflexed (â), it is like *a* in calm. Sound first: mal, *evil, ill;* capital, *capital.* Sound second: âme, *the soul;* âge, *age;* château (shât-o), *a house;* the final syllables, *as* and *at*, are pronounced as sound second when they precede a word beginning with a consonant.

E has four sounds; with the acute accent (é) as *a* in base or day, as cle*f*, *a key;* danger, *risk;* vérité, *truth.* When the grave accent (è), as in met, bet, as vale*t*, *footman;* respect, *regard;* jet (zhăy) *a throw, a shot.* With the circumflex (ê), as in there, where, as fête, *a feast;* même, *the same;* arrê*t*, *arrest, seizure.* At the end of monosyllables, and in the composition of words like *u* in the word muff, je (zhuh), I; devoir, *duty.* E mute, as in table, as ordre, *rank.* This *e* gives a sound to a final consonant, which otherwise would not be sounded, as charmant, charmante (charmangh, sharmant), *bewitching;* bon, bonne (bongh, bonn), *good.* Pronounce the terminal syllables er, ez, ai, ais, ait, as sound first, acute é, Ei and ai. in first and medial syllables; et and oit, in final ones, as sound second, grave è. Aie, aix, ois, oient, ets, es, as sound third, circumflex ê; *ent* is silent in the third person plural of verbs, as elles dans*ent*, they dance.

I has the sound ee in bee, sleep, as visible (vee-see-bl-), *evident;* mari, *a husband;* fil*s*, *a son.*

O has two sounds: first as *o* in not, spot, as in devoté, *pious;* bro*c*, *a vessel in which liquor is held.* Second, as in ore, more, door, as nor*d*, *north;* orme, *an elm tree;* mor*t*, *death.* As first *o* sound, pronounce *au* at the beginning and end of polysyllables; as second *o* sound, pronounce os, ots, and aux, also au in monosyllables.

U has a sound peculiar to itself, and is one of the difficulties of French pronunciation. It very nearly approximates to the sound of oo in cool—(there is, however, a greater protrusion of the lips in the pronunciation of the French vowel than in the sound generally given to our *u*)—as in tumulte, *a riot, a disturbance;* piqûre, *a sting;* tribut, *a tax, a subsidy.* In the same manner pronounce *ou* as joûte, *tilt*, &c.

Y, by itself, or between two consonants, and in words derived from the Greek, has the same sound as *i*, as in lyre (leer), *a small harp;* yeux (ee-oo), eyes. When it does not begin a syllable, or is placed before a vowel, is has the sound of *ii*, as in pays (pa-ee-ee), country; joyau (zhoa-ee-o), *jewel, gem.*

All the letters printed in italics in the French words are silent.

N. L.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. V.

JUDGMENT—PROPOSITION.

"All philosophy is reducible to a few principles, and these principles are comprised in a few propositions. . . . . These are the *apices rerum*, the tops and sums, the very spirit and life of things extracted and abridged, just as the lines drawn from the vastest circumference do at length meet and unite in the smallest of things—a point; and it is a very small piece of wood with which a true artist will measure all the timber in the world.—*South*.

A NEW moon's radiant crescent has begun to gild the broad expanded arch of the beauty-shaded heaven, and, as a signal, summons us to resume our didactic labours. We know not how these papers have been appreciated by our readers, but for ourselves we can say that

> " Mid the din
> Of towns and cities, we have owed to them,
> In hours of weariness, sensations sweet
> Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart;"

and that our thoughts have been full of anxiety that we might be able aright to inform the mind how to cultivate and improve

> " That apprehensive power
> By which it is made quick to recognise
> The moral scope and aptitude of things."

Thought is a mysterious agency, whose processes are so subtle that it is difficult to follow the track of its progress, or investigate its swifter than electric evolutions; but we must not give up as inexplicable any department of inquiry of which we possess the means of solution, however difficult, abstruse, or recondite it may chance to be. And as we have confessedly the means of prosecuting this study within our own grasp, even in our own mentality, it seems preposterous to yield, and acknowledge ourselves baffled, defeated, overcome by the arduousness of the undertaking. Great minds are shown in great deeds, and become manifest by their daring. Weak minds alone can dream of failure. Earnestness is *the* essential to success. Every truth lost is a motive lost; therefore let us search for truth that we may increase motives, and let no difficulty daunt us in the search. If anything should incline us to adherence to a belief, or incite to the performance of an action, it should be truth; and we may rest assured that however occult or mystery-enwrapped it may be, persevering investigation will reward our toil, either by unfolding the hidden scroll upon which the hieroglyphics of nature are inscribed, or informing us of the futility of the attempt. There are many even of the material effluences of nature which are enveloped in obscurity, or which operate with so much more than magical speed, that the acutest scientific eye has hitherto failed to penetrate into the secret of their working; *e. g.*, light, heat, actinism, electricity. If such be the subtlety of these matter-affluent properties, —if such be the secrecy of their action, how far more transcendentally swift and inappreciable must the processes of thought be! Let this short signalizing of the intricacy of such inquiries certiorate our readers of the necessary abstruseness of our subject, and free us from the charge of dull companionship. We must perforce enter those "metaphysic depths" which lie before us on our way. We shall,

however, "thread the labyrinth" with caution, still keeping our eye fixed on the rich, ripe fields of thought, of which we desire to gain a nearer view. Let those who are inclined to relinquish the study in despair and disgust, because of the "lion in the path," remember that it is the firm foot that gains firm footing, and that difficulty is only a finer name for our weakness.

In our last paper we promised to explain our reasons for diverging from the usual practice of logicians in treating Definitions as the products of Judgment rather than as the results of Perceptivity, and to point out the distinction between Definitions and Propositions. This promise we shall, in a few brief sentences, endeavour to redeem. We crave pardon, while for this purpose we make a succinct *résumé* of some of our former observations, and from this summary show in what manner they affect the point at issue. When an object is placed in certain relations to the perceptual faculty, it makes an impression on that faculty, and thus originates an idea in the mind. If this idea is complex, it is capable of sub-division,—of being resolved into two or more simpler ideas, of being analyzed. This analyzation is very simply performed, as it results from the fact that objects possess the power of producing distinct ideas of the attributes by which they become known to us,—a power which we have denominated specific impressibility. This specificality of impression-production we employ as a thought-solvent, and by it we are enabled to perceive the component elements of which complex ideas are made up. So far Perceptivity alone is concerned, and here Definition begins its operations. *We* require no act of judgment to inform us of the simple ideas excited in us by objects. Before, however, we can impart to another the ideas which have been educed in us, a process of thought-analysis must be gone through. We must proceed to define, by comparing two or more simpler ideas together, and predicating their conjoint agreement in one complex idea, to which complex idea we give, or have given, a definite name. We assert that these two or more simpler ideas conjointly fill up the complement of the complex idea which we seek to explain; that when in one idea-originating object these simpler ideas (which in definition we mention or enumerate) are unitedly discoverable, it bears, or shall bear, a certain given designation. For instance, when *we* see a thermometer, we perform a mere act of perceptivity, but if we desire to explain what we mean by the use of the term, we must analyze the idea which the object produces in us; on so doing, we find that "instrument" and "heat-measuring" are the simpler ideas which it originates: comparing these we perceive that in conjunction they compose the elicited idea, and our definition flowing from this exertion of the judgment is, "Thermometer, an instrument for measuring heat." Thus Dr. Whewell is perfectly correct in asserting that "a proposition is always *implied* along with the definition," and we are justified in considering definitions as the results of the operations of the judgment. They are the transcriptions of our experience, the *writing out* of what we have perceived; and the judgment is necessary to decide upon the accuracy of the expression as compared with its antecedent and correlate—Experience. *A name* is the sign of *an idea;* a definition is the explanation of *a name;* a proposition is the verbal expression of *a fact.*

From what has been said in the foregoing paragraph, we hope it is obvious that we have not causelessly left the beaten track. It will be more easy to point out the distinction between definitions and propositions. Before doing this, however, it will be necessary to inform you what a proposition is.

A proposition may be logically defined as a predicative sentence. A sentence consists of any number of words conveying complete sense. Predicative means asserting, but as we may either assert that a thing *is* or *is not*, predicative signifies affirming or denying, and the more extended definition of *a proposition is, any number of words expressive of an act of judgment in which an affirmation or denial is made regarding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.* It is worthy of remark, however, that the word "agreement" is employed, logically, in a somewhat uncommon signification; nay, that it does not always and invariably convey the same notion. In regard to numbers, figures, and dimensions, agreement denotes equality; in natural philosophy, property; in moral philosophy, politics, religion, &c., congruity; indeed, it appears to signify any sort of relation which ideas can bear to each other. Disagreement, of course, is the reverse. "A proposition is a portion of discourse in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject. A predicate and a subject are all that is necessarily required to make up a proposition; but as we cannot conclude from merely seeing two names put together that they are a predicate and a subject, *i. e.*, that one of them is intended to be affirmed or denied of the other, it is necessary that there should be some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention,—some sign to distinguish a predication from any other kind of discourse. This is sometimes done by a slight alteration of one of the words, called an *inflection*, as when we say '*Fire burns.*' . . . . But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word *is*, when an affirmation is intended; *is not*, when a negation."* From this the distinction between definitions and propositions may be readily perceived. Definitions are explanatory, propositions assertive. A definition conveys a new conception or notion, or a more accurate idea than that which we previously possessed: it is a description and expression of an idea, made after a comparison of those things to which it bears an affinity; an effort of the intellect to transfer its own perceptions to the minds of others. A proposition is an affirmation—is the assertion of some principle, or the negation of some relation. A definition refers to a *term*—"gives information only about the use of language." A proposition concerns itself with the expression of matters of fact. The explication of *one* idea makes a definition—the due connexion of *two* ideas constitutes a proposition. A definition shows the elemental parts which *coexistently* enter into the formation of the idea conveyed by a *single* complex term. A proposition indicates the relation which the ideas conveyed by two terms bear the one to the other. A definition is to be *understood* merely. A proposition is not only to be understood, it is also to be *believed* or *doubted*—is employed to influence the mind by its truth or falsity.

A proposition is the vocal expression of a deduction mentally inferred from the

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* Mill's "Logic," Vol. i. p. 85.

juxta-positional comparison of ideas. When thought is embodied in propositions, it becomes truth or falsehood, and gains what may be called mental tangibility; its exactitude may be tested, its certainty or uncertainty inquired into, its practicability experimentalized upon; its conformity with or dissonance to known truths, its onleadings to higher, more generalized, important, and recondite inferences and principles, become perceptible. By observing the concatenation of events, the conjunction of attributes, the colligation of circumstances, the interamalgamation of things and qualities, the mutuality of relationship in objects, the permanent sequences or coincidences of nature, we gain knowledge, for *knowledge* is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. When this knowledge is correctly expressed in words it becomes truth, for *truth* is the agreement of words with ideas. When, therefore, we assert or deny, we place before the minds of those whom we address a subject of belief or disbelief. Belief is a preliminary to action; it is a motion-excitant, and must necessarily be educed before action can result. Propositions, therefore, are expressive of those believable or doubtful consociations of which man's experience informs him, and are at once the *fulcra* and levers of action. They are not vague, meaningless *formulæ*, but vigour-inspiring, action-educing faiths; as such they are the motor-powers of mind. If we consider how much of our conversation, our reading and discourse, are composed of assertions regarding particular objects or classes of objects, of statements regarding occurrences, and affirmations concerning different subjects, we shall readily perceive the importance of an accurate acquaintance with the theory of propositions. How great a portion of language, of human speech, is made up of them! The results of the inquiries, experiments, cogitations, and actions of the greatest, the wisest, the best, and most renowned of men are all embodied in propositions, and they become the inheritance of their successors. From this acquired knowledge we can glean an acquaintance with all the inquiries to which the men of the past have applied their powers, and learn which of these have been satisfactorily answered: we thus become the inheritors of the experience of the world's thoughtsmen, almost without trouble, anxiety, or toil. We can act on it, trust to it, as if we ourselves had undergone the fatigues, the difficulties, the dangers which they encountered, passed through, braved and overcame. The mental wealth of sages, experimentalists, travellers, historians, moralists, and poets, thus expressed and bequeathed to us, how rich!—how surpassingly valuable! Such are the speculations of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, Brown, and Mill; the scientific revelations of Galileo, Newton, Brewster, and Faraday; the otherland descriptions and discoveries of Columbus, Bruce, Park, and Cook; the recitals of Herodotus, Livy, Hume, Mitford, Niebuhr, Gibbon, Grote, and Alison; the moral theories of Cudworth, Butler, Paley, and Bentham; the world-famous and immortal strains of Homer, Virgil, Tasso, Dante, Milton, Racine, and Shakspere.

Since everything of which we can think or talk may be expressed in propositions; since, in fact, the whole series of our thoughts are but interdependent, consecutive chains of propositions; since, as J. S. Mill says, "all truth and all error lie in propositions," it seems plain that a complete knowledge of propositions would

materially aid us in the attainment of an adequate and accurate theory of the "art of thinking." We know that there are some who impugn this opinion—parties who stickle for facts, and pin their faith to the poet's oft-quoted line that "Facts are stubborn things, an' winna ding," as if facts were perfect oracles of wisdom, as if they could produce incontrovertible belief. This is one of the multiform and multiplex "cants of the day." The great facts of physical science have remained the same since creation's natal hour. Still does the sun "rule the day, and the moon rule the night; still does the former exert its planet-tractive force—still do the stars whirl in their vast ellipses through the celestial pathway, and lighten midnight with their glory—still do the Pleiades rain "sweet influences"—still does "Mazzaroth" come "forth in his season"—still "the bands of Orion" are unloosed, and still "Arcturus, with his sons," requires no human guide: as in the "days of old," do they now wheel through the "dominions of heaven;" and yet, how has astronomy changed! Open to the inspection of all, the operations of nature are so free from mutation that men can rectify chronology by their calculations of the solar eclipses. Her processes are unchanged, unchanging, uniform; her sequences are invariable—yet how varied have been the theories to which these have given rise! Facts, then, do not produce irrefragable, unmistakeable truth. They become only the irreversible criterions and bases of truth when looked upon in the light of a judicious hypothesis; this hypothesis is expressed in a proposition, and from this scientific *axiom* truths are deducible which facts do not yield, but by which facts may be brought to light. Can we illustrate this better than by a reference to the discovery of the planet Neptune? In propositions past-discovered truth is found—in them present-found facts must be embodied; therefore a knowledge of the elements and uses of propositions must be advantageous and important.

From observations formerly made it will have been observed that a proposition necessarily requires that two things be mentioned—the *something* of which we speak and the *something* which we may say regarding it. But although this is done, it is not enough, for there is an assertive symbol still required—something by which the colligation, the agreement, may be indicated; so that in all there are three parts in a proposition,—the Subject, the Predicate, and the Copula, which we will now proceed to explain:—

1st. Subject. That concerning which we make a statement, either by affirmation or denial—the thing spoken of—the word denoting the idea concerning which we make a predication. This may consist of any of the classes of names, except the convertible; it must always consist of what grammarians denominate substantive nouns, or their equivalents; as, *Wine* is stimulating; *the horse* is swift; *Sir Isaac Newton* was the inventor of fluxions,—in which the italicized words indicate the subject.

2nd. Predicate. The word expressive of the idea which we wish to indicate as bearing a relation to, *i. e.*, as agreeing or disagreeing with, the subject—that which we say of the subject—the notion which we assert to be contained in the subject, or otherwise conjoined to it. This may be composed of any one of the classes of names except the abstract, although most frequently con-

sisting of the convertible; as, Iron is *useful;* Cunning is *the ape of wisdom;* Food is *nourishing*—in which the italicized words point out the predicate.

3rd. Copula. That word in a proposition which informs us that the subject and predicate are to be connected or disjoined; that by which colligation or asunderness is signified—that which expresses affirmation or denial. In an affirmative proposition, it may be considered as conveying sometimes the same meaning as the algebraic sign =, equivalence or identicality, and at other times that of +, more. In a negative proposition, it may be looked upon as representative of —, minus, less, or generally as ∽, the sign of inequivalence; thus, Cæsar + dead, Cæsar *is* dead; Cæsar — dead, Cæsar *is not* dead. The Duke of Wellington = a man; the Duke of Wellington *is* a man. The exhibition of such a *formula* is rendered necessary by the fact that the generic verb, "AM," is a *relative* word, which conveys not only an assertive force, but occasionally superadds the conception of existence. It is worthy of observation also, that the copula is not always a separate word, but is, in our language, variously combined with the assertion-significant—the verb—for the convenience of succinctly expressing time, will, manner, duty, &c.; thus the sentence, "The sun shines," is equivalent to "The sun is shining." *Is* is called the Affirmative copula; *is not*, the Negative copula; and one or other of them must necessarily be either expressed or implied in every proposition. It is likewise a rule in "Logic" that in every negative proposition the negation must affect the copula; for instance, of the two sentences, "No man is perfectly happy," and "Man is not perfectly happy:" the former is considered an affirmative proposition, the latter a negative one, because it alone conforms to the above-mentioned rule.

The subject and predicate are called the terms of a proposition, because they form its *termini* or boundaries. It is to be remarked that either the subject or predicate may consist of one or more words; but that, however many words may be used, there can only be one thing spoken of, and one thing said about it in each proposition; however numerous the accessories of the idea may be, one, and but one, idea can become the subject of a predication, and one, and but one, idea can be predicated of it. If there be more than one word used to express an idea, it is called a multi-verbal name; if there be more than one subject or one predicate employed, it constitutes a compound proposition, and is capable of analyzation. It is not the number of *words*, but the number of ideas with which "Logic" concerns itself; hence in some languages the whole three parts of a proposition may be found in one word, as in the Latin "*legit*," he is reading; the Greek τρέχει, he is running; the German "*Lebe*," I am alive.

As propositions express the relations which objects bear to each other; and the chief ideas of relation of which man has any conception are, as we have already noticed in a former paper, coevality and succession, similarity and dissimilarity, position and quality; it follows that the chief ideas which propositions can express may be classed in one or other of the foregoing categories.

Of all the higher abstractions Existence appears to be the most generalized and

the least complicated: to express the mere possession of *this* quality, one object only may be sufficient, as when we say, "The world exists," although strictly speaking, this may be reduced to the three logical elements, and be considered as equivalent to "The world is an existence."—This may be very learnedly and acutely controverted; but with regard to the other great mental abstractions, there can be little doubt but that they imply plurality—as the very essence of Coevality, Succession, Similarity, &c., is the existence of some two or more objects which may bear such relations.

IDEAS OF COEVALITY relate to coexistence in time, and are very numerous. Of such propositions History and Chronology are almost entirely composed.

IDEAS OF SUCCESSION are such as bear reference to order in time or place. Of these Geography and History will furnish almost innumerable examples.

A very peculiar series of successions are denoted by the word CAUSATION. Natural Philosophy, Anatomy, Physiology, and Medicine depend upon this idea for their existence. Unless by some means the conception of causative agency could have entered the mind, how barren would all our speculative sciences have been! Yet upon no one philosophic topic has there been more debate and contention; and though the idea itself be perfectly well understood, it seems strange that no definition and analysis have yet been universally agreed upon. The most general idea of Causation which we have been able to evolve, may be thus expressed—*The action of the attributes or properties of one body or object upon those of another.* In this idea there are three elements,—antecedence, power, and sequence; in any process in which these *three* elements may be *jointly* perceived, or known, or inferred to be, or to have been, in operation, there, we conceive, a true case of Causation is found. If any one of these be wanting, then, in our opinion, Causation is not predicable.

IDEAS OF SIMILARITY are perfectly distinct from co-existence in time, or contiguity of situation or occurrence, both of which we have already noticed. The ideas of likeness or resemblance are very numerous; and the method of their attainment was pretty fully discussed, and their use pointed out in a former paper, when we were engaged in explaining the operation of the generalizing faculty. The highest and most complete Similarity is called IDENTITY. .Ideas of similarity imply their opposite. The mathematical sciences are wholly based upon our ideas of similarity and dissimilarity.

IDEAS OF POSITION differ from ideas of successive order in place, from their being more absolute. Geography, Astronomy, and Geology are filled with propositions of position.

IDEAS OF QUALITY are exceedingly numerous, and denote a peculiar species of coexistence: in propositions resulting from them, we assert that certain objects are possessed of certain properties; these properties may either be essential or accidental. Natural Philosophy, the Fine Arts, indeed everything which exists upon the globe's wide surface, may yield instances of, and propositions concerning, qualities.

We do not, by any means, assert that the foregoing is an accurate analysis and

perfect classification of all the ideas of relation which the mind is able to evolve. If it be but an approximation to such a generalized view of them as shall enable us more readily to apprehend the nature of propositions, and shall render us more capable of accuracy of thought, we shall be pleased, and, we hope, our readers will be satisfied. In our paper "On the Nature and Sources of Evidence," we shall recur to this topic, when it will be seen the few observations here made are neither "barren nor unfruitful."

Propositions are variously subdivided: as regards their *matter*, they are *true* or *false;* their *substance*, they are *categorical*, or *hypothetical;* their *quantity*, they are *universal* or *particular;* their *quality*, they are *affirmative* or *negative.*

A TRUE PROPOSITION is one in which the expression coincides with the reality of things—one in which the words exactly indicate the concord which the mind perceives between the ideas denoted by them; as, Electricity is excited in bodies by a change of temperature.

A FALSE PROPOSITION is one which does not accurately state the actual coincidences of subject and predicate. Error is an involuntarily expression of that which does not accord with the certain and genuine agreement or disagreement of the ideas mentioned in it. Falsehood is "a voluntary spoken divergence from the fact as it stands, as it has occurred, and will proceed to develop itself,"* *e.g.*, "All animals are rational," is a false proposition.

A CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION is a simple, pure proposition—one which makes an absolute, direct, positive, and express assertion; as, *Ice is cold; Fire burns; Iron is malleable.*

A HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITION is one which makes a contingent predication; one which stipulates a condition in conjunction with the affirmation or denial, on the presence or absence, the fulfilment or non-fulfilment, of which the verity of the assertion depends; as, "*If you persevere in your studies, you will succeed.*"

A UNIVERSAL PROPOSITION is one in which we assert that the predicate agrees or disagrees with the *whole* subject and its various significates; *i.e.*, with *all* the ideas which can be comprehended in the term; one in which the assertion is understood to be as general as the idea which the term expresses, and which, indeed, gains all its extension and generality from the wideness of the generalization which the term indicates; as, *Spain and Portugal form a peninsula; Planets revolve round the sun.*

A PARTICULAR PROPOSITION makes a predication in such a manner as to denote that a *part* only, and not the whole of the significates of the term, is affected by the coincidence or incoincidence which it expresses;—is one in which the predicate does *not* agree or disagree with the *whole* universal idea denoted by the term, but in which some of the individuals comprehended in a specific name, or the species comprehended in a generic one, according as the name is that of a species or genus, bear the peculiar relation indicated by the predicate. It is a proposition affecting only a *part* of the subject; as, "*Many men are prudent;*" "*Some students are eminent for perseverance.*"

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* Carlyle's "Stump Orator," p. 36.

An affirmative proposition is an averment or assertion regarding the accordancy, conformity, or agreement of a subject and predicate; as, *All intelligent beings are responsible agents.*

A negative proposition is a sentence which denotes the repugnance, incoincidence, or disagreement of subject and predicate; as, *Compassion is not a primary moral motive.*

It may be observed, by a glance at the illustrative examples given at the end of these several definitions, that there is no variation of form by which one may unerringly distinguish the class to which a proposition belongs; and it will be equally evident, that this classification is not one by which an individual may ascertain the *one* category in which any given proposition may be included; on the contrary, any *one* proposition may be arranged under, and comprehended in, more than one of these categorical distinctions. The *sense*, however, and not the *form*, must be chiefly considered in classifying any proposition under these heads. There are, however, a few distinctions of proposition, according to their form, which it may be advisable to mention: they may be comprised in the following enumeration; viz., simple, compound, conjunctive, disjunctive, comparative, and causal.

A simple proposition has only one subject and one predicate; as, "*The sun is a luminous body.*"

A compound proposition has more than one subject, or more than one predicate—it may either be conjunctive or disjunctive.

A conjunctive proposition asserts that the same predicate agrees with one or more subjects conjoined, or that one or more predicates conjoined, agree with the same subject; as, "*Queen, Lords, and Commons constitute the Legislature.*"

A disjunctive proposition asserts either that the same predicate may be denied of each of the subjects, or that each of the predicates may be denied of the same subject, or that either one or other of the predicates may be asserted or denied of the same subject, or the same predicate of one or other of the subjects; as, "*Neither the Queen, Lords, nor Commons can of themselves pass laws;*" "*That mountain is either Ben Macdhui, or Ben Nevis.*"

A comparative proposition asserts that a higher or lower degree of the predicate belongs to the subject—"*Ice is harder than snow.*"

A causal proposition is one in which a reason or cause is assigned—"*Ice is harder than snow, because it is colder.*"

Ere closing this paper, suffer one remark. Let not the above be looked upon as technical puerilities, as inutile and harassing distinctions. Did they serve no other purpose, they would still be valuable as tending to accuracy of thought and correctness of expression. Beattie somewhere says, "The aim of education should be to teach us rather *how* to think than *what* to think—rather to improve our minds, so as to enable us to think for ourselves, than to load the memory with the thoughts of other men." In endeavouring, therefore, to show how accuracy of thought may be best cultivated, we think that exercise in making subtle distinctions of thought and expression is a great step in progress. It conduces to

the orderliness of the intellect, aids the power of arrangement, and acts as an auxiliary in the acumenation of the judgment. Classification, arrangement, generalization, and the power of analyzing and distinguishing, are rare endowments, even among the higher order of intellectualists; and any means by which any advance may be made in their attainment should be welcomed, studied, and perseveringly practised. How necessary is it to discipline the mind!—to quicken its perceptions by exercise, to stimulate and incite its activities by continuous, well-directed, and constant application! To introduce order and clearness into the chaos-like intermingleiment of facts, hypotheses, suppositions, superstitions, credibilities, falsities, theories, and chimeras which hold a lodgement in the human mentality, is surely desirable! To winnow the chaff from the wheat, to separate the dross from the true ore, to pick out, uproot, and destroy the weeds which overgrow the uncultivated soul, one would suppose must be "a consummation devoutly to be wished." This, however, is only to be done by caution, watchfulness, careful discrimination, and accurate distinguishment. Hence *one* great advantage of the mental training to which the attending to minute subdivisions and classifications of thought, as expressed in propositions, must lead. But they have other and higher advantages, as we will hereafter show. Meanwhile, reverting to an assertion made in a foregoing portion of this paper, "Every truth lost is a motive lost," let us couple this with the fact, that man is as his thoughts are, and how valuable will propositions become, as thoughts expressed! Propositions, too, are the latent containers of much truth not virtually and verbally expressed in them. If this is doubted, may we ask, Are not all the close-reasoned deductions of mathematics virtually, though latently, inherent in the *axiomata* which it lays down as its foundation-facts? Did not the proposition, "Electricity manifests itself by conduction and the emission of sparks," virtually contain within itself, involved in its significance, the discoveries of Franklin, and the subsequent progress of our knowledge of that wondrous power by which "thought is transmitted, not only with the speed, but by the power of lightning"? * Did not the proposition containing an expression of "the law of gravitation," involve all the mighty, astonishing, and grand results of modern astronomy? so that even now it may be farther generalized into the poet's stanza—

> "That very law which moulds a tear,
> And bids it trickle from its source—
> That law preserves the earth a sphere,
> And guides the planets in their course."

It is ever so—

> "Nothing in this world is single,
> All things, by a law divine,
> In one another's being mingle."

Our intellectual powers are goaded on to higher and higher achievements by the instinctive yearning which we feel to unravel the mystery of our being, and the relations which we and nature bear to each other. When we attain to the disen-

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* Prince Albert.

tanglement of one fact from another, there is given us in that a clue, a hint, a connecting link; some analogous fact starts to our recollection or evolves itself in our experience, to direct our steps to farther advancement. When we attain the object sought, we not only perceive something beyond it, but also gain a notion of the path. That which we proposed to ourselves as an *ultimatum* is now seen to be but the primary link of a vast chain, which, link by link, we must examine and verify. Thus are we led on and on, ever and ever progressing towards the temple of truth, by a beautiful, pleasing, and variegated pathway, gaining pure delight and valuable knowledge at every step, having the tedium of the way beguiled by the innumerable diversities observed around us, to excite our curiosity and gratify our souls, panting for truth and knowledge, yet finding as we go, that

> "All experience is an arch, where through
> Gleams that untravelled world, whose margin fades
> For ever and for ever as we move."

Religion.

IS WAR, UNDER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE, OPPOSED TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

Mr. Editor,—In offering, with as much brevity as possible, a few words of final reply, allow me to express the gratification I have felt at the excellent spirit with which the present discussion has been conducted. I have no desire to have the last word. But were I not to avail myself of the usual privilege, I might seem to be indifferent to what appears to me important truth.

J. F., in No. II., has employed two arguments in favour of Defensive War. 1st. "The laws of Christianity which bear upon the question refer to individuals, and cannot be applied to nations." With this statement I fully concur. But the question at issue, as I view it, is not, whether a so-called Christian nation ought to wage Defensive War; but whether a real Christian, a Christian in the scriptural sense of the term—*i. e.* one who yields a conscious, implicit obedience to the authority and commands of Christ, and entertains a confident persuasion, that if death should be the direct or indirect consequence of that obedience, he would be immediately and eternally blessed in the presence of Christ—ought to fight. The disuse of arms is a practically logical inference only from such obedience and such a hope; and apart therefrom it would be an inconsistency. For one who is not a Christian to use arms is wrong, so far as not to be a Christian is wrong.

The second argument is, that "no adequate substitute" for military defence, "of a moral nature, has yet been afforded." This is true: and no less true of civilized and so-called Christian nations than of barbarian and pagan tribes: and true *because* they are *not* Christian. No nation or individual is in a position to abjure all recourse to arms that does not habitually refrain from all aggression on the rights of others, and maintain an habitual intercourse of equity and benevolence.

Your correspondents, W. W. and G. N., have argued the duty of the Christian to bear arms in his country's defence from the protection which his country has afforded to him. But where a man's refusal to bear arms is the result, not of cowardice or of a mere intellectual theory, but of enlightened principle, and is in

harmony with his whole character and course of conduct, he may confidently acquit himself of the charge of ingratitude. His principles and their fruits have conferred a greater benefit on his country than his country's sword has conferred on him. If he will not throw away his life, or take the life of others on the field of battle, for his country's good, he will devote his life, while it lasts, to that end; and if needs be that he meets death in the passive defence of his principles, he will benefit his country by his death.

With the same courtesy with which W. T. has replied to my article, I would endeavour to meet the arguments which he has advanced.

I will premise that what he has called my "first question," is a definitive statement of the question to be discussed: which, as I have before said, has reference not to governments, but to individual Christians and Christian societies.

The oft-repeated argument drawn from the wars of the Jews, as waged under the Divine sanction and authority, proves too much for W. T., who disapproves of aggressive war, and of war in defence of religion: inasmuch as they were both aggressive and religious: so that if they furnish a precedent for war of any kind, they may be employed to justify the knight-errantry of the crusades, the propagandism of the Spaniards in South America, and even the burnings of the Papal Inquisition. The same may be said of John's advice to the Roman soldiers, to be content with their wages. For if this implied an approbation of their employment, then the similar exhortations of Paul to slaves implies his approbation of slavery. "It is written as with a sunbeam, that men may be soldiers and receive the wages of war, providing they never fight excepting in a righteous cause." But were the soldiers of the Roman army at liberty to discriminate between the righteousness and unrighteousness of the wars in which they fought? or, if it were written as with a sunbeam that the cause was ever so unrighteous, were they at liberty to say their consciences were their own? That there were conscientious and humane men amongst our forces in the Chinese war, it would be most ungenerous to deny. But to suppose that their consciences approved of the cause, would be to suppose them not conscientious, or that they had succeeded for the time in stupifying their moral sense by an opiate more powerful than the drug for which they fought.

The case of the Apostle Paul, I confess, presents some difficulty. But this is not the only instance in which an inability to meet a difficulty to an opponent's, or even to one's own satisfaction, ought not to be allowed by itself to militate against a principle otherwise well supported. Yet I would suggest in the first place, that although W. T. and myself may consider an appeal to the civil power for protection as equivalent in principle to the personal employment of physical force, it does not necessarily follow that the apostle so judged of the particular case alluded to. And, secondly, if he did, we have yet to learn that his example in every particular afforded a precedent, binding on our imitation.

For though the greatness and excellence of his character is, probably, without parallel, save in that of his Divine Master, he would himself have been the last to arrogate perfection, or to maintain that he had released, even in mental conception, much less in actual embodiment of character and conduct, the full development of Christianity. He had learned, and it was a part of his teaching to others, that they who have made the greatest moral attainments are yet but on the way to perfection: and that in direct proportion to the moral advancement of the individual, or associated Christian mind, will the Divine Being progressively reveal himself. If the apostle had actually employed the sword in his personal defence, I ought not to deem myself bound slavishly and blindly to imitate his example, but to judge what he said and what he did according to the standard by which he regulated his conduct and by the same moral sense by which he judged himself and others. Even the example of Christ, though perfect in its principle of action, and complete in the manifestation of that principle to the extent in which circumstances called for

the manifestation, was not designed for our mechanical or servile imitation. To do what he did, would, in some cases, be wrong for us, and in any case would be nothing worth, unless at the same time we *are* what he *was;* and perform a similar action because we are impelled by a similar spirit. The outward is but a means to help us to the conception and personal realization of the inward, and thence to the reproduction of the outward from the inward by a necessary causation.

The moral growth of humanity, in the race as well as in the individual, is progressive. It is the Divine will that it should be so: and his providential and religious dealings with mankind have been regulated accordingly. Though the germs of the largest truths were contained in the earliest, and in every subsequent revelation of his will and character, his revelation has been partial and gradual. And in his governmental administration he has sometimes *appeared* to sanction what his laws condemned; and has employed sin to correct sin and to lead to holiness,—as the physician corrects disease by disease, in order to the recovery of health. He has taught men, and actuated them to the performance of his will, "as they were able to bear." For as in the sphere of the intellect we proceed from the known to the unknown, and discern the unknown by its relation to the known; and in imparting instruction we do not attempt the immediate refutation of every error, but aim at its general eradication by the expulsive power of gradually-imparted truth, and even in some cases correct one error by another existing in the same mind; so it is in the moral world. No moral attainment can be reached without a previous moral preparation. The realized must precede the unrealized; and even moral evil prepare for moral good.

Thus may we suppose the Divine Being sanctioned war amongst the Jews, without intending in this a sanction to Christians to fight; and that this very mode of procedure on his part was a designed preparation for the completer revelation of the Gospel, as a doctrine forbidding all war, and its subjective realization in Christians as a spirit which restrains from any appeal to arms.

J. T. Y.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

In attempting to reply to some of the objections to Defensive War, we would observe that, whatever may be the views that are expressed by the respective writers, we do not notice any who object to Government. All virtually acknowledge that Government is an ordinance of God, and that rulers are God's ministers.

Nor does it appear to be questioned that the design of Government, in its establishment and maintenance, is defence—defence against domestic as well as foreign invasion. If any particular government can be shown to have originated in the *aggressive* principle, it does not materially affect the case. That principle would not serve as a sufficient ground for its continuance. When aggression ceases, the Government must cease, unless the defensive principle comes forward to the rescue. The defensive principle, and that alone, can form a lasting and sure foundation. If this be wanting, the Government must fall. Perhaps this is questioned. A case or two, however, may tend in some measure to remove the doubt.

Suppose a foreign aggressor to make his appearance—say the Emperor of Russia —with a determination to annex England to his dominions. The Government very calmly informs him that it cannot think of opposing him, as it has come to see that the defensive principle is not in accordance with the Bible. Hence, it immediately resigns its power into his hands, or quietly allows him to take it. Thus the Government would cease, because the defensive principle—the only sure foundation—had been discarded.

Again: Suppose the Government shall cease to make provision for the punishment of criminals—that the whole band of thieves shall be permitted to carry on their business unmolested, and that insult, robbery, and murder shall meet with no attention—what would be the result? Would not the intelligent por-

tion of the community immediately, in one unanimous voice, call upon the Government to reconsider its decision, or else resign and make way for better men? Would they not say that Government had mistaken its mission? that it was entrusted with the sword of the public in order that it might wield it for the benefit of the public; and that unless it could conscientiously perform its duties it ought to retire? and in case of refusal, would not means quickly be set on foot to compel it? We think they would. And if so, our position still remains firm, that the defensive principle is the only sure and lasting foundation of Government.

It may be objected, that such an invasion as that referred to in the former case, is very improbable; and that if it were to occur, the adoption of a course of non-resistance would be calculated to soften the enemy, so that he would return without doing his work.

As to the first part of the objection, direct proof is, of course impossible, as the experiment has never been made. But reasoning from analogy, we think it extremely improbable that such a door, once opened, would not be used. Is it not a fact that, in our own land, through the faulty wording of a law, a road has been left admitting of the escape of a rogue. And was there *ever* such a hole through which a rogue *never* escaped? Have not all means, calculable and almost incalculable, been devised to escape the sentence of the law with impunity? Are monarchs better than other men? Have not their vices generally been of the larger growth? And if so, would it be wise to set open the door and inform them that if they rob us, we will not oppose them. Might not such an intimation be construed into an absolute surrender? Besides, is it not a fact, that Englishmen, owing to their liberal institutions, have a more liberal way of thinking than men in general? It appears very improbable that any despot would willingly allow any people, with impunity, to spread principles which are opposed to his system of government, and which, if allowed to spread, must, sooner, or later, bring it to an end. It is said of the Emperor of Austria, that the person who described Sir Humphrey Davy's safety-lamp to him, represented it as the discovery of an English philosopher, who had produced "a revolution in science." "*Revolution!*" said the Emperor; "The King of England should not suffer that man to remain in his dominions, or else have him under surveillance. The man that will produce a revolution in science is very likely to produce one in politics." No doubt when the Emperor uttered these words, he uttered his own convictions, and the convictions of the whole fraternity of despots; and if so, if the existence of *one philosopher* in a kingdom be considered so dangerous to society, what must the existence of a *free nation* like Britain be to the world! Would not despotic monarchs regard that as a most auspicious circumstance which should place it in their power to curtail its privileges?

"Oh!" it is said, "but the moral influence would be so great that it would make an invader ashamed of himself; so much so, that he would return without accomplishing his purpose."

Between one man and another this might be the case; at any rate, the risk would not be so great in making the experiment; but between nations, the case would be altogether different. Between individuals, however, the patient suffering of one person does not always produce the desired effect. In families, how often does it happen that one member encroaches upon the rights of patient, unresisting members of the same family —brothers upon the rights of sisters, and even husbands upon the rights of their wives—solely because they do not stand upon the defensive! And if this occurs in families where there is generally affection, what would be the case between nations, who look upon one another as foreigners, and possessing nothing in common!

But it is objected that in this controversy it is not upon the principle of defence that we are at issue. It is acknowledged that man has the right to defend himself to a certain extent; but the point at issue is said to be, To what extent does he possess this right? The

persons alluded to do not believe that he possesses this right to the extent of depriving his enemy of life.

From this it follows that man's right of self-defence is governed by a sort of sliding-scale. In proportion as danger increases, the right becomes less. You may defend yourself against small matters absolutely, for no enemy will risk much for the purpose of committing a petty offence; but if life be in danger, you may not defend that, lest the enemy's life should be forfeited.

This certainly was not the way in which the Apostle Paul understood the matter, when forty Jews were sworn neither to eat nor drink until they had slain him. To have acted consistently with such a view, he ought not to have caused the matter to reach the ear of the chief captain, lest these men, in the performance of their oath, should perish.

It will probably be said that expediency, rather than the high, holy, and inflexible nature of New Testament Christianity, forms the basis of these remarks. Be it so. Since we are pleading for the foundation of Government—the foundation upon which it has always rested, and without which it cannot exist, and since Government is recognised in the New Testament as an ordinance of God—believing, as we do, that every institution that is worthy of such a name is calculated to promote the happiness of man, and not incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel, we think we are not far from the mark, when we stand forward to defend the foundation upon which it rests.

We quite agree with one of our friends, that "Christianity is a system of right, and benevolence too;" though for our own part, we can see no right in demanding the privileges of citizens, and at the same time rejecting a citizen's duties. To say what Christianity would do if all men received it, appears to us a mere begging of the question. All men have not received Christianity, and until they do, we have an ordinance of God which, with all its imperfections, is calculated to curb men's evil tendencies, to be a protection to the weak, and a terror to the strong. It behoves us, therefore, to use this ordinance as the Apostle Paul used it, until He whose right it is shall take to himself his great power and reign.

But Defence is for ever and anon classed with Revenge, whereas the two are perfectly distinct. On this point I think W. T. is sufficiently explicit.

Nor is a Defensive War necessarily opposed to a spirit of love. It may, indeed, exhibit a preponderance of love to a particular community, or it may show a preference to a particular cause merely, irrespective of any attachment to the parties as such. By engaging in such a war a man may merely declare his attachment to right in opposition to wrong. The Bible nowhere informs us that we are to love wicked men better than good ones. Nor are we anywhere enjoined to desert a righteous cause, lest wicked men should suffer.

If, as our friend T. C. seems to intimate, we are merely to pay taxes to prevent collision with Government; why, then, we are not at liberty to demand protection of Government, and, consequently, the Apostle Paul did wrong when he claimed the privileges of a Roman citizen. But if we are to recognise ourselves as citizens, like other men, and to claim our privileges as others do, why, then it is evidently our duty to perform the part of citizens; and if anything is opposed to our principles to endeavour to correct it.

But the very design of citizenship is Defence; and Defence implies War, when it is required—opposition to aggression. Hence it may be the duty of a Christian citizen to take up arms.

W. D.

When once a concealment or deceit has been practised in matters where all should be fair and open as the day, confidence can never be restored, any more than you can restore the white bloom to the grape or plumb that you have once pressed in your hand. How true is this, and what a neglected truth by a great portion of mankind! Falsehood is not only one of the most humiliating vices, but sooner or later it is most certain to lead to the most serious crimes.

Philosophy.

IS PHRENOLOGY TRUE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Truth is consistent with itself, whether we can see it or not. Phrenology, however, cannot be said to be so.

It is to some of its inconsistencies that I shall endeavour to call the attention of your readers on the present occasion.

Phrenology professes to adopt a new method of ascertaining character and qualifications; while the fact is, the Phrenologist is necessitated to adopt the same course which has been in use for the last three thousand years, or perhaps from the creation.

Let us, then, inquire what is the course which Phrenology adopts, and then compare it with that which the world adopts, and then we shall be able to see whether the *two* courses are not identical.

There are three things which it is necessary that the Phrenologist should know, irrespective of the head, which the brain, or rather the skull, will not furnish. 1st, The temperament; 2nd, The state of health of the brain; and, 3rd, The exercise which the brain has been subject to.

By the former is meant the constitution in general, whether capable of continued labour, or whether fitted for active service or not. It is evident that in the mental as in the physical constitution of men, there is great diversity. Some are hardy, iron-like; others are more soft and effeminate. Some are fitted for active contest in the field; others for the more retired walks of life. This difference in constitution was particularly remarkable in the two Wittenburg reformers. But has not the world always taken constitution into account in judging of suitability for any given work? What king or government would choose a general of very acute susceptibility to command an army in the field of battle? It is evident that such a man, whatever he might be fit for, would be unfit for such an office.

Again: As it regards the health of the brain, which, if I understand aright, means neither more nor less than the sanity of the mind—who would think of employing a madman in any important undertaking? Soundness of mind has, no doubt, always been an important consideration in judging of character.

The *third* thing which it is necessary for the Phrenologist to know, and which the brain will not furnish *without the aid of the tongue*, is the exercise which it has been subject to. In order to ascertain this, the Phrenologist must know two things—the education which the person has received, and the company which he has kept.

The education the person has received. One would think, if the brain really enlarged in proportion to the exercise which it received, that the Phrenologist might be able to gather this from the cranium; but it is not so. He must learn it from the lips of his patient, or seriously err.

Education. What may not be learned of a man's capabilities from this one item, education! We know that the Phrenologist professes to inquire after this in order that he may learn the exercise of particular organs. But what will be the difference in the final estimate, whether there be any such organs of the brain, or whether the names merely represent certain faculties of the mind which are developed by means of the brain as a whole? We are inclined to think, not much. In the matter of education, how much may be discovered of the natural bent of the mind, by the comparative progress made in different branches of study! Is a boy particularly attached to language? In Phrenology this must be referred to the organ.—To numbers? The organ of numbers is larger or very active.—To mathematics generally? It must be immediately ascribed to causality, and perhaps, comparison. To drawing? Form, size, and colour, must be largely developed; and so on for the rest. The world, however, instead of judging of the size or activity of

the organs by particular tendencies, would say, "The boy has a turn of mind for a particular kind of study," and hence would judge of his capabilities by his education, *i. e.* by the incidents, as well as the kind and extent of his education. So that in this respect, the phrenologist does precisely the same thing, though not in exactly the same way, as the world at large.

If education furnishes a means by which we may discover the capabilities of the mind, companionship certainly furnishes an undoubted clue as to character. How much of a man's character is known when his company is known! The wise man said, "How can two walk together, except they be agreed?" It is certain that, in order to companionship, there must be agreement. If a man keep company with the wise and good, he must himself be wise and good. The opposition between good and evil is so great, that persons who are attached to the one must repel those who are attached to the other. So long as these attachments are ardent, and in proportion as they are so, there must be disagreement between the parties. They *may* not quarrel, they may not be brought into sufficiently close contact for that; but they will not be companions. They cannot be. And has not the world judged of character by companionship, from the time of Solomon downward? "He that walketh with wise men shall be wise, but the companion of fools shall be destroyed," is certainly a proof of this.

Thus we have seen that Phrenology professes to do what the world cannot do, viz. to judge of character, and point out qualifications, by means of the cranium, while it only does what the world has always done, viz., judged of character and qualifications by means of temperament, education, and companionship. Hence it will appear that, in as far as it follows the ordinary track, it is true; but inasmuch as it professes to do otherwise, it is false.

L. I.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

We have been induced to take up our pen on a subject which we had hitherto deemed unassailable, by a few remarks in the *Controversialist* on the subject of Phrenology, signed W. T., which we have just seen.

We are fully aware that every subject, whether literary or scientific, is debateable; but we had hoped that Phrenology had received its share, and a bounteous one too, of opposition, and that a reaction had commenced which would enable it by slow, but steady strides, to take its place with the sister sciences. There are always persons who are ready to take up the literary cudgels in behalf of some chimerical ideas of their own; but we never before met with such a lath-and-plaster defence as the one before us. The writer's arguments, like the elephants of Pyrrhus, instead of charging with effect the enemy's lines, can be with little trouble driven on their own ranks, and so totally overthrow a defence otherwise precarious.

W. T. has a certain vague and mystical manner of stringing together scriptural allusions, which, doubtless, in the estimation of many good people, doubly fortify his position, but which we are afraid, on closer inspection, will totally annihilate all his arguments. And we would premise, for the benefit of those worthy persons who may be shocked at the idea of our seemingly attacking a writer whose positions are sanctified by such holy testimonies, that we would by no means wish to incur the imputation of atheistically objecting to the truths of revealed religion; far from it, there is nothing that we could more sincerely desire than that the proofs in every polemical discussion should, if possible, be adduced from that word which was given to man as "a lamp unto his feet and a light unto his paths."

Our opponent has kindly left the adherents of Phrenology on what he is pleased to denominate the horns of a dilemma; we will endeavour to demonstrate that he has been misled in forming his opinions by looking too superficially at the subject, and trusting too implicitly to the statements of others.

He begins by saying, "It (Phrenology) assumes that the mind of man is a mix-

ture of good and evil, and that both principles alike manifest their existence in his mental part, by certain organs surrounding his brain, which are the development of their power." This is true enough in one sense, but not in another. Phrenology does, doubtless, affirm all that the above quotation states, but then it is only relatively speaking; these organs are not intrinsically good—it is only by comparison with those qualities which antagonize them, that they are thus denominated. Bishop Butler was a good man, a very good man; but then he was far from perfection: his outward life and character were less blameable than those of many of his unhappy fellow-creatures; but does it follow that we are sinful in calling him a good man? We know that there is none good save God; it is, therefore, clear that man cannot be intrinsically good, it is only by comparison. Our first parents ate of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and we, as their offspring, must and do share in the good as well as in the baneful effects of that forbidden fruit. Surely W. T. does not mean to assert that the malevolent qualities are concentrated in all the descendants of Adam, whilst the benevolent deeds, on the contrary, have all vanished into empty air. True it is, that until the regenerating and sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit has descended like the gentle dew upon the sterile soil of man's heart, there must and will proceed from that pestilential slough, evil thoughts, lyings, blasphemies, &c., and all that defiles beside: there is nought intrinsically good.

W. T. asserts further on: "The science, as it is termed, teaches that the cultivation of these good organs, or qualities of the natural mind, will enable the individual to resist and conquer the impulse and power that he finds form a portion of his mental nature." This we are quite willing also to acknowledge. But unless we are mistaken, W. T. will find that these said qualities, undoubtedly bad, at the worst only affect the social character of man, such, for instance, as combativeness, acquisitiveness, self-esteem, love of approbation, &c. Is it, then, presumptuous to suppose, that man, who is endowed with such amazing powers of mind, should be able to exercise some coercion on those of his mental qualities which ill affect the social position of his fellow-creatures; that he should, by his innate strength, endeavour to train aright those tender shoots, which may one day bring a hundred-fold return; that he should remove with bitter stripes or tenderest affection in his infant children that poisonous weed which is planted in the centre of human happiness, and whose withering influences eat out, like the canker-worm, the heart of what looks so fair and promising without? We do not thus read the maxim of the preacher, "Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it;" we do not thus appreciate his fatherly advice, when he says, "Whoso loveth his son chasteneth him," and "He that spareth the rod, spoileth the child." If W. T.'s statements are true, what is the use of *education?*—we say education, as opposed to *instruction*, and not in the commonly-received import of the term. If there are no comparatively good qualities existing, how absurd to attempt to educate or develop them! if Phrenology be true, how beneficial must education be!

No small number of the mistakes which W. T. has committed arise from the want of discrimination between the words "heart" and "mind." For instance, "Phrenology professes to be able to teach what is in the heart or mind of man;" again, "It professes to be able to disclose what are the secret workings of that mind which God has said is 'deceitful above all things.'" Now, according to our ideas of these words, which W. T. has so egregiously confounded, there is a vast difference existing between them. He cannot, surely, intend to assert, that the mental faculties and the feelings of the heart have the same origin, and tend to the same results. How does he read that passage of Scripture, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God?" Has the peculiar import of the word *heart* ever struck him? We will adduce a short quotation from Dwight's admirable lecture on this text, which we think peculiarly apposite:—

"There are still men of considerable

numbers, and of no small ingenuity, who profess themselves Atheists, and who thus prove *that Atheism has its seat in the heart, and not in the understanding.* Nothing can be more evident than that these opinions can never have been embraced from argument or conviction, or by an unbiassed understanding. They were certainly adopted under the influence of the heart, and believed only because they were loved, or because God was dreaded and hated." If it were necessary, we could quote many other instances to prove that the difference between the heart and the understanding is as absolute as it is indissoluble. The former we conceive to be the peculiar seat of the feelings, as love, joy, peace, hope, &c., all that can increase man's happiness or misery for this life, or confirm that for the world to come; which are co-existent with his birth, and perish not but at death. The latter to embrace all those varied intellectual faculties which tend to heighten the pleasures and diminish the pain incidental to human life, and which are susceptible of gradual development, beginning with the blade, then the ear, and then the full corn in the ear, and which shine more and more until the perfect day. The last of W. T.'s statements needs no refutation; for although the Bible abounds with ensamples of life, and instruction in holiness, it is silent on the mental attributes of the human race.

We should be very sorry if any of our remarks have given the slightest pain to W. T., or his adherents; nothing could be farther from our intentions. It must needs be that the tenants of adverse opinions should sometimes enter the lists and break a friendly lance, else the cause of truth would be unsupported, and the argumental sword would rust from neglect. We only hope that W. T. will give a little serious consideration to this subject, and re-model his opinions on truths that must eventually prevail. F. B.

WHICH MOST DESERVES THE ESTEEM OF MANKIND, THE POET OR THE LEGISLATOR?

THE LEGISLATOR.—I.

The object of the present paper is to investigate and compare the claims of two very important classes of men to public esteem.

No one, we think, will question that we are greatly indebted to our poets. They have done much to adorn our language. What a choice selection of words suited to the expression of almost every variety of idea and emotion do they furnish! The entire imagery which pervades our language, which renders conversation on even common subjects frequently interesting and exciting, is borrowed from the poet. To him we also owe much of our civilization. A people with a very defective language can never rise high in the scale of civilization. We not only correspond, but think in words; and in proportion to the fitness and variety of our words for the expression of thought, will be the accuracy of the thoughts themselves. Since, then, the Poet has not only done much to furnish words, but also expressions suited to the elegant clothing of thought, and since even the very act of thinking itself depends so much upon such words and expressions, we cannot but acknowledge our obligation to him for our civilization. Further, the Poet has furnished thoughts that are of the utmost value to the happiness of man, and which are calculated to endure as long as man exists. Besides, these thoughts have been clothed in such beautiful language that they have become on that very account doubly attractive. By this master-power vice has been rendered hateful, and virtue has been rendered lovely, attractive, and beautiful. Like the diamond, which, under the hand of the lapidary, is delivered from the grosser matter by which it is surrounded, and made to reflect the glorious light in all its pristine purity, virtue, under the master-hand of the Poet, has reflected the glory of her heavenly Author, and appeared in all her native loveliness.

He has done much to elicit a high and intelligent admiration of the works of God. He has done much to lay the foundation of that glorious system of natural science so admirably adapted to lead man through nature to the study of nature's God.

Ready, however, as we are to acknowledge our obligation to him, we cannot forget that his work has been of a mixed character. If he has done much to direct the mind to high and noble objects, he has also done much to divert it from them, by clothing objects in themselves mean and sinful in gorgeous array. Ambition and murder have severally taken the place and adopted the name of love, greatness, and glory.

It may perhaps be questioned, whether, if we could form a just estimate of the evil which the Poet has done on the one hand, and the good which he has effected on the other, and could strike a just balance, we should find that the world would have been much worse if poetry had never existed.

We now come to consider the claims of the Legislator to public esteem. Doubtless even he has not been perfect. He may have lacked the moral courage to sacrifice personal good for the public weal, and from personal motives may have sustained a system which he has known to be opposed to the public interest. This we are ready to grant, and we would not attempt to justify him in it. All that we ask is, that by men he should not be looked upon as a *god*, but as a *man*.

There are, doubtless, crimes that might be laid to the charge of the Legislator, with errors of a minor character, each of which would of itself be sufficient to bury any single name in infamy. But when we are speaking of *the Legislator*, and not of any individual minister of any country, it behoves us not to look at individual cases merely, but at the class, and to compare the evils which have been averted with those which have been induced, and then to say where the balance lies. What, then, has the Legislator done to promote the happiness of man? What to stem the torrent of human passion? What to destroy the grasping influence of avarice? to dry the tear of human suffering, or to add to the comfort of the domestic hearth?

It may be said that the Legislator has done much to bring mankind into a state of bondage—that states once free have had their liberty curtailed through his influence. It may, however, on the other hand, be questioned whether any state ever lost its liberty that deserved to retain it. A people morally and intellectually free, it appears impossible to enslave, or if enslaved, their bondage could not long endure. It may, perhaps, further be questioned, whether the Legislator who should, under certain circumstances, by a bold step, restrict the liberty of the subject, would not on that very account, deserve the esteem of his countrymen; and if so, the very things which are laid to his charge as his greatest crimes may be placed among his fairest laurels.

If however, on the one hand, the Legislator has deprived the subject of liberty, on the other, he has done more than any other person to secure that liberty, and to fit the subject for its enjoyment.

It may be said that the Legislator has done much to sustain superstition, and thus has enslaved the minds of men. Since, however, we are comparing his claims with the claims of the Poet, it must be borne in mind that the Poet has performed his part in blinding the mind of the Legislator as well as that of other persons. But what do we owe to the Legislator? or, rather, what do we not owe to him? Do we not owe to him our existence?—for without law there is reason to believe that ere this our race would have been extinct. We owe to him the security of our dwellings, the safety of our persons, the protection of property, together with all the happiness which such security ensures. In our own country we have especial reason to esteem the Legislator for his work's sake. If it be said that he has picked our pockets, it will be admitted he has at least secured to himself the monopoly of robbing us, and he is ready to question the right of any other party who may put in his claims.

Thus we think we have shown that

the claim of the Legislator to public regard preponderates over that of the Poet—that while the Poet possesses a very doubtful claim to the esteem of mankind, the Legislator possesses an undoubted one. G. N.

THE POET.—I.

It will be necessary, at the outset, to show in what light we intend to regard each of these great characters; and also to determine upon what grounds they claim the esteem of mankind.

As it is probable we shall not obtain a perfect idea of "the" Poet and "the" Statesman from any particular *individuals*, however distinguished in our literature or history, we shall adopt the general idea of both which the question suggests—an idea to be derived from a class, and by which all the individuals of a class may be tested. This treatment of the subject is such, we believe, as the question anticipates, and provides for a fair comparison.

Next, the common ground upon which they demand the esteem of mankind is their public usefulness. Mere intellectual greatness, unproductive of good to man, cannot be entitled to esteem; though the mere display of genius has too readily secured the homage of depraved humanity. It is only as the interests of man are sought and secured, that the world is laid under obligation to genius. We shall, therefore, follow the Poet and Legislator only so far as they are found to sustain the character of public benefactors.

Taking, then, first, the Poet, we shall attempt, under one or two propositions, to show that, while he adorns society, he has much to do with its well-being, and, as its benefactor, largely deserves its grateful esteem.

1st. *The effusions of the Poet are adapted to the wants of the uncivilized, and poetry is necessarily the first agency in operation on the mind of man, where civilization dawns or spreads.*—In the history of civilization we can often trace poetical agency where we cannot find the name of a poet. Thus, in the early history of our race, it is believed that thought was communicated in a poetical form. This seems to be confirmed by the character of the literature of those times—the most ancient portions of the world's most ancient book being the most poetical. And if we consider that knowledge was limited to a few simple facts and obscure conjectures, and that language was as scarce as knowledge, we may readily conceive how they who sought to increase knowledge must have been forced to the abundant use of tropes, figures, and all the poetical media of thought. Poetical fervours and aspirations being common to man in an early stage of mental development, they at once discover a universal susceptibility in human nature to poetical influence, and, at the same time, point out the first agency to be employed in the advancement of civilization. They are Nature's efforts to supply the place of the Poet where he is absent, and where she cannot well advance without him; but they are intended no more to set him aside, or to lessen his value, than the light which chased away primeval darkness from our world, and served for the work of creation, was intended to prevent the subsequent need of sun and moon; nor than the mist which watered and preserved Eden while as yet Adam was undistinguished from its dust, was to supersede the needful labour of man.

It will, therefore, be our object to bring out the importance, and plead for the honours of the Poet, while we dwell a little on the condition of the uncivilized mind, with the hope of discovering how far poetry, regarded in the abstract, is calculated to meet its wants.

Civilization is the happy result of the diffusion of knowledge. It does not break forth simultaneously throughout the masses of mankind: it is the work of mind upon mind: an influence radiating from individual minds of superior power and originality, who may derive an impulse from Heaven, or from the force of their own energies, but all are constrained, from the condition in which they find humanity, to work in the same way, and use the same materials.

Though all the elements of human

knowledge are received, by perception, from the external world, yet that knowledge which is to elevate the mind is not gathered in a prepared state from the scenes in which man is cast: it is that which reason has wrought out of simpler elements, and is of an abstract nature. This knowledge cannot be received by the taught in a purely abstract form, as it is possessed by the teacher. Before an abstract thought can be transferred to an uninformed mind, that mind must find within it all that is necessary to compose the thought; but it has not these materials for abstract thought, and it cannot avail itself of the materials of the teacher; therefore it is for the teacher to give his thought such an aspect as it may easily assume, in the mind he addresses, from the materials with which it is furnished. In illustration of this fact, let us suppose an intelligent man addressing a mixed multitude, brought together out of different scenes and circumstances, and varying in intelligence from the most erudite to the most barbarous. How many different versions of the speaker's address would exist throughout that multitude! No two of his hearers would possess the same copy of his thoughts. And the reason of this would be, that each would have to furnish his own materials for the thoughts addressed to him, and each would be differently provided with such materials. In the intelligent hearer every element of thought would probably be at hand, and an abstraction would be as easily received as an image; but in the ignorant, abstract thoughts would find no place, unless conveyed through the medium of the imagination; for the knowledge they possess, if it deserve the name, consisting only of a mass of ideas and impressions, crude as received through the senses, the reasoning powers, which use other materials, must necessarily be dormant; and the imagination, that power which takes them as they are, combines them in the readiest manner and with the most unlimited freedom, must necessarily be the first awakened—the first available medium of instruction.

This may be illustrated in the case of children, in whose dawning intellect the imagination—that gay aurora—a fair array of earthly glories—is first displayed. What access to the understanding of a child may truth of any kind hope to gain if it present itself in the form of cold and colourless abstractions? But let truths and virtue take but some familiar form from the external world, so as to become mentally visible, and they may enter the mind in triumphal procession, and take up their abode there. Here the teacher must become a Poet, or, rather, the Poet must become the teacher.

As, therefore, it is the province of the Poet to discover these analogies between *ideas* and *notions*, and to reason to the judgment and the heart by means of the pictorial imagery of the imagination, and as he thus puts the mind in possession of thoughts, and the heart in possession of feelings which they could not otherwise possess—thoughts and feelings which elevate mind and manners, and distinguish the civilized from the barbarous—the world, for the blessings of civilization, must be deeply indebted to poetical agency, and the Poet must deserve a place among the first of its benefactors.

2nd. *The influence of the Poet pervades society, and tends to the perfecting of civilization.*—We have been seeking to establish the important fact, that poetry is adapted to the wants of the uncivilised, preparing the way for the diffusion of knowledge. We must now show that the Poet has a wider sphere of usefulness, and still higher honours to receive. Among the most enlightened of mankind the influence of the Poet is most powerfully manifested; and the brightest and most practical men are generally the most imbued with his spirit. The civilized world is his intellectual kingdom, and his manner of government resembles that of the Statesman; he has a host of leading minds under his control, and these receive his influences and shed them on the people. We should be entering a field of immeasurable extent, did we attempt to show how much the great of every age have drawn from the Poets. Artists, philosophers, statesmen, historians, philanthropists, religious teachers of every age and nation, have all glowed around the Poet, brightening in his beams, and

serving as satellites to reflect his light to the earth. But though the Poet works through so able an instrumentality, he looks beyond it for the vast result; for

> "He has heartily designed
> The benefit of broad mankind;"

and he sees, on the dark plains of the world of mind, where, swiftly clearing many a wide area, the light of intelligence is revealing his plans as they rise into stately reality, within the range of which, and on the ancient sites of desolation, he has not only designed and finished many a fair structure, but even amassed magnificence.

The facts of history, if taken together, will not fail to confirm our plea for the honours of the Poet. In the ancient world the power of the Poet was such, that every other power which affected the condition of man was under his control. It is to be lamented that his influence was then, upon the whole, morally injurious. Though it undoubtedly elevated the intellect of Greece and Rome, it made their kings ambitious of heroic fame, and taught the aspiring spirits of those times that "the field of combat is the sphere for men." Hence cruel wars overspread the world as a flood, and nearly all that the Poet had done for the intellect of man was lost in the old world's relapse into her ancient barbarity. But the ancient poets were immortal, and they lived to elevate the intellects of after ages, when a moral power they did not possess—a power that came from Heaven—possessed the hearts of men. And now the ancient poets serve in the establishment of a civilization which rests on an immovable basis. They serve both in person and by proxy, being traced in nearly all the modern poets. "Homer," says Addison, "has raised the imagination of every Poet that has followed him." How much, indeed, has he done for Milton! and how much has Milton done for the world! "Yet, of all the borrowers from Homer," says Johnson, "Milton is the least indebted!" The misapplication of poetry to the decoration of war is an error from which the poets are now recovering; and the model or general idea of a Poet, which we have endeavoured to set forth, is being realized and perfected by the rightly-directed and philanthropic spirits of modern times.

A brief glance at yet another phase of the Poet, and then we shall place him at the side of the Statesman.

3rd. *By far the most important service which the Poet renders to man is that of assisting his conceptions of spiritual things.*—Nothing can be more certain than that all our conceptions of the eternal worlds are utterly erroneous—that is, they cannot have any resemblance to the reality. For, as we have already intimated, all our ideas are originally received through the senses, and, consequently, our conceptions of spiritual existences are derived from the world of matter: and matter must be altogether different from spirit, as the latter comes not under the cognizance of the senses. Now, if the unseen worlds were material, even then our conceptions of them must be widely wrong; for the infinite change they will make in man's condition leaves us at a loss to conceive the scale on which they are created. But when we consider them *essentially* different from our present condition, and that they must be different that they may be superior, and fitter to last for eternity, there is nothing left upon which we can found an analogy, or from which to form a true conception.

Now, unless we have *some* conception of these our rewards and punishments, they cannot serve, as they are designed to do, as motives of sufficient power to regulate our conduct. As, therefore, we have no true ideas of a spiritual mode of existence, it must be right and wise *to form the best idea we may* of these tremendous objects of thought, from the sublime or the terrible in material nature. But, as we are variously capacitated to conceive and imagine scenes and objects that will affect the heart, rouse the passions, and stimulate to duty, we require the aid of those who are stored with the noblest ideas, and who have the greatest command over the imagination and the heart. This aid the Poet supplies; and here he approaches the climax of true greatness, attaining an eminence from which he regards the Statesman in the dust.

If we now turn our attention to the Legislator, we shall at once see that we have not to unveil his character, or trace his influences through the obscure pathways of the mind; we need not seek to correct any misconceptions of his importance in society, or attempt, as we have on behalf of the Poet, to vindicate his claims to esteem. His prominence and adornments at once bespeak his importance, and at the same time show that the share of esteem he enjoys can hardly be less than he merits. We may, therefore, leave the comparison, with its issue, to the judgment of the reader, only bidding him beware of imposing appearances, lest his judgment be affected by the outward display of political eminence, lest reason be drowned in the applause of the multitude, and lest, under such influences, he should be led to set him, whose part, great indeed, it is to guard our persons, liberties, and estates, in higher estimation than him who has travelled creation around to gather for us the imperishable riches of the mind. Such, indeed, is the discrimination displayed by this superficial world, that men, like children, are prone to prefer that species of greatness which has most of physical extent and splendour. Hence we find the world arranging its worthies in something like the following order:—first, heroes; next, statesmen; then, men of genius; last and least, religious men: but we are inclined to believe that, were the world less the dupe of appearances, the order would be reversed—"the first would be last, and the last first."

J. F.

Politics.

IS UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE JUST OR DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It will appear to every reflecting mind that, at the present juncture such an inquiry as this is beset with difficulties. Our position in the *world's age* is a bad one for the inquiry. Before the great revolution burst over France and the whole of Europe, we might (as did the French philosophers) have argued the question from given premises to just and admitted results. In a hundred years hence, perhaps, the deductions of reason may be made from the experience of the present. But we live in the age of revolutions. It is the century of political wonders. We crowd the events of a generation into the history of a day. We are now making the experiments in political science which will be either the landmarks or the beacons of posterity. There is scarcely an opinion which does not seek to obtain universal prevalence; a creed which has not its earnest propagators; or a form of government which has not been, in the rapid current of events, alternately established and swept away.

This very question of the Suffrage is the one which has convulsed to its centre, and is still agitating, European society. It was the Suffrage which sent the throne of Louis Philippe tottering to the dust—that kindled the flame of revolution, which has since contagiously disseminated itself over the whole of Europe. People arose and demanded to be entrusted with the Suffrage—kings refused and fell. The dynastic epoch seemed to have ended by a universal consent, only, however, to commence again with increased chances of duration. These events, however, have given to the question of the Suffrage a startling reality. It is the absorbing subject of the day. Kings consider it, nations are engaged in discussing it. How much of it *must* we bestow? is the language of the one—How much have we power to demand? is that of the other. It is the grand issue between tyrants and their people. From a purely speculative problem, Universal Suffrage has in France, at least, become a legislative fact. It is recognised by the law, it is practised at

the elections, and protected by the ballot-box. It is now on its trial before the face of the world. The time for metaphysically theorizing upon the Suffrage is fast passing away, and we shall be called upon in future to view it in its practical effects upon society. We have to contend against the disadvantages of a transition state. We have no ground on which to stand. While our experience is not complete, a whole train of reasoning may be destroyed by the occurrences of to-morrow. The idea of taking the suffrages of the whole people has ceased to belong to the philosopher; it has not yet been cordially adopted by the statesman. We are in the stage of inquiry; and the conclusions at which we arrive from passing events, being in part prophetic in their character, may be, most likely will be, erroneous. We do do not occupy the exalted position of calm inquiry which will belong to the writers of future times. We cannot see the panorama which is moving around us. There are but few of us who do not look upon Universal Suffrage just as it affects our views upon French, Italian, or English politics. The light may be clear enough, but every man will tint its rays with his own coloured glass. But although we are, in some respects, less competent to arrive at just conclusions upon this subject now than in past or future times, it is more imperatively necessary that we should do so. It seems, by some singular ordination of events, to have fallen to our lot to make the practical trial of the Suffrage Question, by which with the generality of the world its merits will be decided. How essential, then, is it that we should examine minutely the bearings of the question before we attempt to act; that we should, apart, as much as possible, from the political influences surrounding us, view the subject on its inherent merits, lest we should rush into the conflicts of parties with our eyes blinded by prejudice, and should at last unhappily find ourselves to have been the inveterate advocates of error! There is not a more pitiable and unworthy character to be imagined than the man who has so absorbed and wrapped up his being in the party passions of the hour, as never to cast a glance into the future effect of measures and opinions upon the happiness of mankind. And yet this is a character common in society. We are confined too much in the leading-strings of party politicians. When we have classed ourselves under the banner of some political chief, we preserve a sort of unity, not only by the liberal concession of things indifferent, but frequently by the absolute surrender of our principles. How many men, if they would isolate themselves for a time from their political associations, would find that they sacrificed their principles to their party—had placed themselves in political tutelage; and, having merged their right of judgment in that of others, had, in fact, bestowed their sanction upon measures totally adverse to their own private opinions! Thus we have the strange anomalies of progressive Conservatism and retrogressive Liberalism. By this it is that we see such strong inconsistencies in whole parties—not the noble inconsistency of retracted error, but a constant variation according to the movements of the heads of parties. We have of late done much to promote man's freedom, but it yet remains to emancipate *individual opinion.* This will only result from the determination to think for ourselves—to reason to conclusions instead of taking them for granted; and then, having formed our opinions with care, to make them the only rule of our conduct, and never to abandon them except upon conviction. It was recently remarked by an independent Member of Parliament, that although he had been engaged in public life for forty years, and had never taken the slightest care as to the manner of expressing his opinions, he could defy his enemies to point out any inconsistency of which, in that long period, he had been guilty. Knowing what his principles were, and having seen no reason to change them, he had never feared that his conduct would be inconsistent. The best corrective, then, for the evils of party spirit is to be found in a recurrence to first truths, and a continual discussion of the principles upon which our political systems are founded. It is by liberal controversy we learn the arguments both opposed to, and in favour of, our own

views. We are taught to respect the opinions of our opponents, while our own articles of belief are no longer supported with the blind dogmatism of ignorance, but defended with the more courtly and polished weapons of truth and argument. It is in a spirit of fair discussion, with the earnest desire for the attainment of truth, which is the highest and only proper object of all controversy, that we approach the question of Universal Suffrage;—having a full remembrance of the differences which, upon this subject, have agitated the most comprehensive and enlightened minds.

I. In the inquiry, Whether Universal Suffrage is just, it is natural that we should seek any intimation upon the subject that can be gleaned from the natural laws which the great Governor of the universe has impressed upon his creation. Without seeking at all to insist upon the conclusions of the sacred writings, in connexion with the rights and duties of man, it yet will be acknowledged that it is our duty to ascertain what were the relations which Providence intended to subsist between his rational and accountable creatures. The first fact which we gather from the natural history of man is his *universal equality*. By equality we do not mean similarity of physical advantages or mental powers: still less should we venture to compare the untutored savage with the powerful being whose nature has received additional lustre from the refinements of civilization. The equality of which we speak is that which subsists in the species; and is entirely independent of the minute shades which always distinguish the various members of *every* species. Men are equal—that is, they possess the same attributes of being, enjoyments of sense, faculties and perceptions of the mind: their conduct is influenced by the same motives; their passions are swayed, and their judgments are convinced in the same manner. They are capable of performing the same mental and moral actions—and they have all, in common, the same grand aspirations of their immortal being. The qualities of man's nature may be modified by external circumstances; but they universally exist, whatever may be the degree of their development. It is true men may be produced who appear, in almost every particular, the perfect contrasts of each other; but it would be nothing to the argument, unless it could be shown that different circumstances would not have changed their relative positions. Transplant the savage infant to a civilized country, and see how susceptible he is to all the influences which operate upon him. How entirely his habits, character, and tastes are fashioned and moulded according to those of his adopted country!—indisputably evincing that he is the creature of his education, not of his birth. Thus, the *temerity* of the chieftain becomes the tempered courage of the brave commander; the ferocity of revenge is mellowed down into a love of justice; the senseless love of his tribe becomes the patriotic attachment to the institutions of his country; and his whole being presents a different phase, not indeed as to the original, inwrought qualities of his nature, but in the form and direction which they take.

The recent investigations of physiologists have fully proved that the most debased of the human family are capable, even in their own persons, of a great amount of improvement. In the South Sea Islands, men who had for years existed in the practice of the most criminal and depraved actions—who had, in the violence of revenge, sacrificed, with the most remorseless cruelty, hundreds of their enemies; and whose whole lives could not be contemplated without horror and disgust, have been so changed in the course of a few years, under the combined influence of religion and civilization, as to abandon all their vicious habits, and to become in every sense different characters. Thus, then, we see the general equality of men exhibited as much in their liability to improvement as to deterioration.

The equality of men is presented to us in a still more striking light, when we institute a comparison between man and the lower orders of creation. We shall find that all men, however diverse their immediate conditions, possess those acting, mental powers, which, for some in-

scrutable reason, have not been bestowed, in anything like a proportionate degree, upon the brutes. Where the bounteous Author of nature has intended to establish inferiority, he has drawn the boundary-lines so strongly and clearly, that no room has been left for doubt or speculation upon the subject. One of the first laws of nature and revelation declares, that man is lord paramount over all inferior creatures of the Divine hand. Without seeking presumptuously to assess the amount of intelligence which has been bestowed upon the beasts, which are said to perish, we can at once perceive that they are destined to occupy a lower position in the scale of being than man. The capacities of man are generally far greater in physical power—always so in reference to the mind. The actions of man are controlled by a reasoning power which has reference to their future effects; he has likewise the means of conveying the results of his own mental labour to the minds of his fellow-men. From a state of utter helplessness, man, by his own progressive energies alone, can subdue nature to his control, make the elements the ministers to his pleasure, vanquish all the difficulties which impede his onward march, and obtain for himself all the grand and imperishable results of an advanced civilization. Who that contemplates the stupendous monuments of his intelligence and power,—who that reflects upon the vast legacies which human intellect left, thousands of years since, to be enjoyed by the present occupants of the world,—who that takes the most cursory survey of the growth of human knowledge, and the gradual, but ever-accumulating principle by which it has acquired its present magnitude, but sees in this the title of man's pre-eminence over all other creatures! Man, too, only possesses the power of moral direction. Were he to abdicate the government of the visible creation, there would be neither order nor government in it. For, being the superior intelligence, he could never be controlled by one inferior to himself, and he must either, therefore, secure the mastery over the brutes, or become their prey. How broad and distinct, then, are the delineations which indicate inferiority when it exists! We have, however, no standard by which we can draw a line of inequalization between different orders of men. Some have, it is true, endeavoured to argue, from adventitious circumstances, the natural and fatal inequality of some kinds of men. Man must be equal or unequal. If there is a radical inequality, there can be no reason why the superior race should not render the inferior one entirely subservient to its direction. Accordingly, we find that it has been attempted; and that white men at one time, and black men at another, have been enslaved on account of their colour. We have had, however, to recognise the principle of man's equality in the manumission of *our* slaves; and in countries where this act of restitutive justice has been denied, we have known the slaves assert their equality by freeing themselves and punishing their oppressors. It is readily conceded that, by promoting ignorance and crime among a class of men, you may produce an artificial inequality, which, from selfish motives, you may attribute to their race or colour; but once let intelligence convey to the minds of these debased creatures a knowledge of their power; once awaken within them the desire to exercise their Divine faculties; raise them one step above the most brutish state of degradation, and they will dissipate your selfish dreams, and prove themselves *men* by assuming the responsibilities of the character.

The fact that almost every people in the world have in turn exercised supremacy, and that all nations have furnished their quota of great men, proves the equality for which we contend. The slaves of our own possession in the West Indies—considered, but a few years ago, as beasts of sale, or at best but an inferior order in creation—are now discharging all the honourable duties of life; acting in almost every capacity in which human ingenuity and talent are required; daily acquiring wealth, receiving education, and gaining for themselves, as a body, that exalted position which, but for our cruelty, they would long since have possessed. The island of Hayti, inhabited almost entirely by revolted

slaves, has produced men who have adorned her brief annals—inscribed for themselves an honourable place in the history of the world; and shown themselves capable of performing the most important acts of war and statesmanship. While the individual gifts of Providence are different, yet they are so justly and abundantly bestowed as to produce a general equality. No man can justly determine his fellow-man to be inferior to himself, since it is not his province to determine. In some qualities one man will excel, while in others he will be deficient. In a rude and barbarous state of society, where strength of body is chiefly required, he will doubtless be esteemed the best who possesses great physical power, while the man of rich intellectual endowments will be considered as useless, and to possess, in fact, scarcely the qualities of manhood. In an age and country like the present we are inclined to think too little of men, as such; and, property being regarded as the chief good, we exclude all those from interest in the government who do not possess the required amount of worldly possessions.

It appears, then, that all men are equal in the sight of God and by the laws of nature; and, of course, in virtue of that equality, entitled to the same amount of political right. It, then, remains to be seen whether the relations into which man enters in a state of civil society can alter or invalidate the natural equality we have supposed him to possess. Society is but a combination of individuals for the establishment of order, law, and government. The great object of government, and consequently of all human society, is the happiness of man. How, then, is the happiness or welfare of society to be determined except by the judgment of its individual members? Happiness is, itself, but the sensation which is produced by surrounding objects upon our minds. But if the government should be the work of a minority, most likely the opinions of the unrepresented majority will be neglected; and the great end of government, so far as it has reference to them, will have been sacrificed. Society is simply an agreement between a certain number of individuals for mutual aid and protection. Every man, no doubt, agrees by it to resign a certain portion of the liberty he would have enjoyed in a state of nature. Thus many acts which were lawful when he was his own governor, become illegal and punishable when they are done in a state of society. But no one can suppose that because *all* are called upon to relinquish some rights in order to obtain civil advantages, that some should be called upon to give up *all* the rights of which they were before possessed. Society offers no greater blessing to one man than to another; and cannot, therefore, demand liberties from one without their corresponding value, while it awards to another the full rights of citizenship. It is impossible almost to suppose an individual agreeing with society, to subject those rights, which belong to him as a human being, to restriction, without securing the power of protecting the civil rights he may acquire. The state of nature, in which equality reigns universal, is no doubt preferable to a state of society where that equality is destroyed; since man, as long as he remains without the pale of civil society, is not precluded from entering some community in which he will secure the means of protecting his rights, and be placed upon an equality with his fellow-citizens. What are the benefits of government, but security for life, freedom, and property? But the man who has no electoral existence may have his liberty destroyed, his property confiscated, or his life decreed away, without any power to prevent it, except by the extra legal right, unrecognised by society, of resistance to its unjust decrees. We find in all the ruder and more primitive forms of society, that the whole people are joined in public affairs, and in voting in the popular assemblies. It is only in a more advanced period of a nation, when wealth and military power have acquired influence, that true equality is destroyed. Then it is that one man becomes a hero, and another a slave—then it is that the rich man bribes the poor to silence, while his liberties are being filched away; and that the power of legislation becomes

confined to the favoured few, and is exercised by them entirely for their own benefit. Man cannot, by his entrance into society, forfeit the right which he once possessed of taking part in the government of *himself* and his fellow-men. But if, for the temporary purpose of the argument, we were to admit that any man could extinguish, in his own person, every right which he possessed, and resign his liberty of action into the hands of another, we cannot suppose that such a renunciation of his rights as a man, would reach his posterity. Should one man sell his own liberty and labour, and bargain even for that of his successors, he would be doing what he had no right and no power to perform. For every man has a right of judgment for himself; and any law or argument which binds him to servitude without his consent is against the very nature of things, and is constantly liable to invasion. No one who had enjoyed the blessings of British institutions would ever contend that we have a right, in the most limited sense of the term, to give away the liberty of our children. For if so, the present occupiers of the world, although but a few hundred millions, would be able to sell into slavery all the future inhabitants of the earth, to the very end of time. That a man has not this power will be almost universally admitted: but if he has not the ability to *enslave* his posterity, how has he the power to deprive them of civil rights? It is from the same principle that deprivation of civil rights and of absolute slavery receive their sanctions. It will be inquired upon what foundation the laws rest, if no man is bound by institutions to which he did not consent? The answer is, that every law remains in force until repealed by the tacit consent of those whom it binds. But the law which deprives men of the suffrage does not destroy that right which subsists in the person of every man to enjoyment of every civil right. Thus we deny the right of slavery, but the fact of slavery nevertheless exists; nor do the unhappy victims of the system forfeit their right to be free by their inability to assert that freedom. No man would counsel a rebellion of slaves, unless expediency justified it; no one would think it necessary, so long as, in any country, moral agencies can effect a political purpose, to attempt to obtain it by other instrumentality. Mankind have, then, at any moment, a right to assert their full participation in the rights of citizenship; and their temporary endurance of a wrong is not to be taken as a justification of it; nor are they to be said to delegate their rights to the electors when their consent has never been asked, nor any opportunity for the expression of their opinions afforded.

While, however, the original compact upon which society is supposed to be formed shows the independent position of every man, and his perfect right to exercise every political privilege; yet, when we institute an inquiry into the actual working of government, we shall perceive that, by the social duties which he is called upon to perform, it is just that he should have the Suffrage. The primary duty which government requires of every man is obedience to the laws, and, however opposed to his conceptions of justice, if he does not submit, he will be punished. In our own country, at the present time, we have one-seventh man making laws for the government of the remaining six-sevenths; or, in other words, the present electoral body is a large oligarchy, carrying on the government totally irrespective of the great mass of the people. "It is a mockery," says Sir William Jones, "to call a man free whom you deprive of a voice in making the laws he is called upon to obey." In the effects of legislation alone there is the most perfect equality among the different subjects of the State. All men are called upon simply to obey the laws for their government, and this is a duty which one man is deemed capable of performing as well as another. If, then, we deem a man sufficiently qualified always to act in accordance with the complicated system of legislation under which countries far advanced in civilization are governed, has he not a right to determine whether those laws are just, before he is called upon to obey them; or, at least, to have the benefit of mak-

ing his opinion felt in the councils of his country through the electoral urn? Were any system of government to be devised to present in itself every absurdity, none could be better adapted for the purpose than that which, while professing to rest its power upon the people, yet excludes the immense proportion of them from any interest in it. Not only is the duty of obedience to the laws one which is made obligatory upon every man, but it is by the contribution of *all* that the operations of government are carried on. It is true that some men, whose wealth is great, contribute more than those whose means are contracted—that the large *millionaire*, or the colossal landowner, pays the State more than the humble and toiling son of labour. But it must not be lost sight of, that the one, in return, requires greater protection from the State than the other—that he has guarantees for the preservation of his property which the other has not. If every man only claimed from the State protection for his *person*, no doubt upon a sound principle of social economy, all should be taxed alike; but if, besides the safety of person, he requires the State to insure the security of his property, it is right that wealth should bear the burden that it creates. It is sufficient, in order to perform the duties of a subject, that every man should contribute according to his means. The great wealth of governments—the means of defence and attack—the sinews of war—the powers of patronage, and everything that contributes to the grandeur of a country, is obtained from the people—is the production of their industry. Without the masses—who, for all the purposes of government but that of taxation, are overlooked—government could not proceed for a day. The large amount of taxes paid by the wealthy, is but as a feather in the balance, compared to that contributed by the working orders of the community, many of whom are without any electoral power. Every man should surely be the trustee of his own funds: no one should have his money taken from him without giving him some power to see that it is well expended;—since the coercion to pay money to which in no way he has given his consent, is a violation of the rights of property, as much as would be the alienation, to the public service, of a nobleman's estate, or a merchant's fortune.

The natural effect of rendering amenable to taxation those not admitted to representation is, that the rich pay less, and the poor and the unrepresented more, of the public taxes than their fair share. The first principle of political economy is violated: and the struggling masses have to bear the weight of the taxation which belongs, properly, to the wealth of those who, unfortunately for the community, are the makers of the laws. When you deprive a man of the means of looking after his own property, you leave its disposal to the caprice and avarice of others, who will have but little motive to protect it. We all know the history of the probate and legacy duty in England, by which the smallest pittances of industry are subjected to a heavy tax, while the most colossal landed estates are exempt. The income tax in England shows the same tendency to relieve the property of the legislator, and to subject that of the general community to taxation. In England, however, it must be admitted that some degree of regard and moderation has been shown in the imposition of taxes upon the unrepresented; but this has arisen chiefly from a sense of the danger that would ensue in trifling with the national patience beyond a certain point. In France this power was not exercised so moderately; and the state of extreme and desperate poverty into which the people were plunged by the exactions of the Court system, is thus described by M. Thiers (in such a case an impartial judge), as one of the great superinducing causes of the Revolution.

"Burdens," he says, "pressed upon one class alone. The nobility and clergy possessed nearly two-thirds of the lands; the other third, held by the commons, paid taxes to the king, a multitude of feudal dues to the nobility, and tithes to the clergy. Articles of consumption, being heavily taxed, were enhanced in price, and injuriously affected the people.

The burgher class, industrious, enlightened, enriching the kingdom by industrial labours, and illustrating it by eminent talents, possessed none of those immunities to which it had so undoubted a right."

It was the refusal of the French people, during the year 1848, to be taxed for the support of a corrupt system, that led first to the demand for the Suffrage, and afterwards to the entire change of government.*

Having shown that Universal Suffrage is just, we shall endeavour to prove in another paper that it is desirable. EILO.

* The government of Louis Philippe, for war expenses, cost the nation more than Napoleon's government after the Russian invasion; and in civil expenses, amounted to three times as much. The taxes paid by the electors were less than the twentieth part of the contributions levied on the people.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

FROM the time when the biped, man, was created to occupy this sublunary sphere, there have ever sprung from his prolific loins certain over-wise and egotistical individuals, whose existence has being spent in trying to persuade their less highly-gifted companions, that it was their honoured lot to make known a panacea for all their ills. Antiquity, with its hoarse, but much despised voice, proclaims how zealously certain men—"philosophers" (?)—propounded dogmas which, they said, if acted upon, would not fail to make all men happy. But alas! in the days of old, as in these modern times, man was an unbelieving animal; he would never be persuaded that one of his fellow-men could have within him a concentration of all the wisdom requisite to re-adjust all the physical and moral elements which distress the progeny of Adam. But still quackery has ever been a staple commodity since man left Paradise. There have been moral, medical, and political quacks. But it is not our present purpose to write a paper upon quacks; though we shall select one of the numerous offspring of that fruitful family as the subject of our present cogitations.

Universal Suffrage is a splendid and rare specimen of political quackery: as such, it is our determination on the present occasion to consider it. Having, then, boldly avowed to friend and foe, our opinion of Universal Suffrage, and further, confessing that we believe its advocates to be nothing more than political quacks, we shall proceed to give a few of the reasons which have compelled us to arrive at such a conclusion.

The first thing that convinces us that Universal Suffrage is quackery, is the fact that it promises more than it can perform. Those who make it their watch-word and battle-cry, tell us that it would make legislation perfect; that it would effectually put a stop to all species of tyranny; that it would redress all social and political grievances: in a word, that it would, as by the magician's wand, transform the whole social aspect of our land, giving food to the hungry, clothes to the naked, and an abundance of employment to the industrious classes. We have heard certain orators declare, that all which now afflicts the people of this realm could be plainly traced to the want of this immaculate law. Common-sense says, Universal Suffrage promises far more than it can perform: hence its quackery.

The second reason why we consider Universal Suffrage to be quackery is, the simple and plain fact, that it is a physical impossibility. While England remains an empire such as it now is, thousands, and tens of thousands, of her sons will ever be unable to use the suffrage. The oceans and seas of every clime are white with the sails of laden barks, the property of this realm: those barks contain thousands of men, whom circumstances will ever prevent from recording their vote; and why, we ask, should all the rest of England's sons send a representative to the legislature of this land, while the sailor is left totally unrepresented? No law can be passed which will enable every Englishman to use the privilege of a vote. Universal Suffrage is, then, impossible.

The third reason why we conclude Universal Suffrage to be quackery is the

fact, that there are hundreds of thousands of Englishmen to whom such a boon would be a curse, instead of a blessing. As man is too often circumstanced in this world, it becomes a charity to deprive him of certain privileges, which, when abstractedly considered, are every man's right. Common-sense has long ago declared that it is right to prevent a madman from doing what he likes with his own. Once prove a man insane, and his goods and chattels, and his own person even, are handed over to the safe keeping of some more prudent person. Wisdom teaches us not to allow maniacs the use of weapons, as well for their own good as ours: it also teaches us not to place the young and the ill-formed in such situations as shall expose them to sudden temptation and unknown danger. A blind horse requires a skilful and watchful rider. But what has all this to do with Universal Suffrage? Man learns to infer from analogy. If, therefore, he finds that it is possible to do right, and yet take from another certain privileges, he learns to believe that political privileges may be rightly withheld from those who cannot make a right use of them. England, we assert, contains thousands, yea, hundreds of thousands, who, if they were permitted to legislate for themselves, would soon deprive each other of the few remaining comforts they enjoy. What laws would the ignorant think it right to demand of the lawmakers of their own choice? The whispers of "equality" we sometimes hear echo an answer. These poor, ignorant creatures would have all classes placed upon a level with themselves, and, to use their own words, have an equal distribution of all property—thinking that such a crisis would make them unchangeably happy. Now we ask, in all sincerity, whether the franchise in the hands of such would be a blessing or a curse? We believe that the wisdom which prohibits liberty to the madman, denies the suffrage to this class of individuals.

But it is not only the "equality" men who are unfit to receive the franchise; those who are ignorant, those who think by proxy, never ought to be permitted to enjoy it. Is it not absurd to bestow a precious jewel upon a being who can have no idea of its worth? And yet, Universal Suffrage would fain persuade us that the fool, because an Englishman, ought to have a vote. The drunkard, the man who ruins his family to gratify a depraved appetite, cannot morally claim a right to take part in framing the laws which are to regulate a great empire. But Universal Suffrage would enfranchise all that host of English drunkards, who would gladly vote for the man who could give them the most beer. Bribery with drink sends even now far too many improper persons into the legislative hall: but who would say that the number would not be tenfold under a system of Universal Suffrage? The present system of the Suffrage affords far too easy an opportunity for the ignorant and the vile to take a part in the government of the land, to think of widening its gates in those quarters.

What right can a man possess to send another to legislate upon a given set of questions, the bearing of which he is entirely ignorant of? We always thought that proficiency was the only thing which gave a man the right to claim a privilege. Prove a man unfit, and who will dare to say he still possesses a right?

England, unfortunately for her prosperity, expends annually half a million of money upon convicts alone. These convicts spring from a great mass of our countrymen, who live solely by putting their hands into other people's pockets. Now, is it advisable to offer the elective franchise to this motley crew? Should we say to that class which is now so liberal in its supply of useless labourers to our dock-yards and arsenals, "My friends! you are Englishmen. You have proved yourselves friends of the State, and well worthy of a vote; here is the franchise; send as your representative a Dick Turpin, to promulgate your own peculiar opinions in the council-chamber of our common land?" These individuals, who have "no abiding city;" who plunder here to-day and there to-morrow, according to the Solon-like wisdom of Universal Suffrage, ought

to receive without delay the privilege to vote! Was there ever wisdom so transcendent as this? Because the present law unhappily shuts out some well-deserving men, we must open the gate wide and admit all. So says the wisdom of this essence of political quackery.

Wise laws can only be framed by wise men, and wise men will not enter St. Stephen's unless they are sent. They will not be sent while their selection is in the hands of the ignorant and depraved. If we wish to know the character of a constituency, we judge by that of their member. Find us a free, an intelligent and enlightened constituency, and we will show you, as their representative, a man of worth, and a man of sense. We do not intend to mention names; we only hint: look, and see.

Universal Suffrage arrogates for itself the selection of none but the honest, enlightened, and free, to represent the nation in Parliament. But, unfortunately for this assumption, England presents an array of stubborn facts, which, with stentorian voice, assert that, under existing circumstances, with Universal Suffrage, such a thing is impossible.

As are the electors, so will always be the elected. If, then, England contains a vast number who are ignorant, besotted, anarchical, and dishonest, how is it possible that Universal Suffrage could give us a pure House of Commons? We know, from a peep at Paris, what Universal Suffrage can do towards refining a nation's legislative hall: and when we set about purifying our own it must be by a widely different process.

To hear some talk, one might be tempted to imagine that the act of framing just and equal laws was as easy a thing as the process of taking our daily meals. To be born an Englishman is, with many, a sufficient reason why they should be qualified to legislate. But we dissent from any such illogical conclusions. We hold that nothing but character and intelligence can give a man a claim to take the least part in the government of this land. We have had many specimens of the ability of mushroom legislators, and we are free to admit that we would rather live subject to the laws of a *wise* despot, than the ready-made laws of some of your popular legislators. Law making is a science requiring the profoundest application. It is an easy thing to overturn the institutions of a country, but a very difficult one to raise a solid fabric upon their ruins. The people of France have, as often as any, tried their hands at this strange work. They are undoubtedly a great, glorious, and free people! (*free?*) How many codes of law have they not abolished at one fell swoop? But how stand matters with them after all their ingenious contrivances? To uphold their tottering state, they have but lately passed a law which virtually nullifies the law which created those that passed it. So easy a thing it is to legislate, and so conducive to the happiness of a community is Universal Suffrage, according to the united opinions of a vast majority of those French law-makers who are elected by it.

Those, then, who are fighting in favour of Universal Suffrage, are fighting for a victory which will place the honesty, the intelligence, the virtue, and the property of this realm at the mercy of the anarchist, the dishonest, the licentious, and the ignorant. In all elections, the majority rule. We affirm that, in England, the classes we have last named form a considerable majority. How can we, knowing this, put pen to paper in favour of so suicidal a measure? We ask those who advocate its claims not to be caught with its speciousness, but to examine it in all its consequences, to reflect upon the classes to whom it will entrust a power for evil, who show, by their present actions, that they will not choose the good. If it could be proved that Englishmen were generally intelligent, honest, and free, then we would not say one word against Universal Suffrage; but while vice holds such a prominent station in the land, we feel it our duty to lift up our voice to prevent the passing of such an outrageous and ill-judged law.

It is quite a specious argument to advance concerning Universal Suffrage, that it is every Englishman's birthright.

There are many things which, abstractedly considered, are every Englishman's birthright. Liberty is a birthright all can claim, but it is not a right all are allowed to enjoy. That iron-handed despot, law, says to the felon, You are not permitted to enjoy your birthright while you cannot keep your hands out of your neighbour's pocket. A man's own conduct often deprives him of many things he would otherwise enjoy; so it must ever be with regard to the Suffrage. Some test must be administered to prevent those who are unfit from becoming the possessors of so momentous a privilege. It is not for us to determine, on this occasion, what that should be. We simply say, that is the best which excludes the greatest number of rogues, and admits the greatest number of honest, intelligent men.

Universal Suffrage is quackery, because it is wrong in principle. It confounds virtue with vice, setting the rogue upon the same pinnacle as the honest man, and telling the worst characters that their conduct is not a sufficient reason why they should be excluded from a voice in the government of the State. Universal Suffrage opens the portals of anarchy and desolation, telling the fierce passions of the lawless and profane that they have a perfect right to enjoy for themselves their own peculiar tastes and pleasures, and that to keep them within decent bounds is tyranny and despotism. It is unjust, inasmuch as it tells the lawless that, if they can only obtain a majority, they may place themselves above all law, because, forsooth, the franchise is every Englishman's birthright! It shows the anarchist how he may destroy all the time-honoured institutions of his country, making the wealthy man, the commercial man, and the honest artisan to be dependent upon the will and the wild caprice of an ignorant and depraved majority. We might enumerate many more of the follies of Universal Suffrage, if we were to quote from the page of history, but the foregoing may suffice.

Condemning, as we do, this chimera, we are not prepared to maintain that the existing law is worthy of our land. We are free to admit, that if we had the power to act, we would make great alterations in the electoral franchise. We should strive to exclude thousands who prostitute their privilege, and admit thousands who, under the present law, are excluded. But, if our choice were between Universal Suffrage and the present, we boldly affirm that we should not hesitate one moment to exclaim, "By all means, retain the present." We know that a very ill use is made of the franchise in many parts of this realm, and that thousands who are governed without possessing a vote, would use it more wisely than many do who have it. Still, Universal Suffrage would only swell the ranks of the former, while it would add very little strength to the latter. We, therefore, feel content to await with patience the working of wise and practical reform, being well assured that as the community advances in intelligence and honest worth, it will be impossible for our rulers to withhold from the deserving the right to vote. But never, we trust, will our aid be lent to that cause which, in its impatience to get justice for the few, would indiscriminately bestow a sacred privilege upon the virtuous and the vile. Universal intelligence, and universal worth, will bring Universal Suffrage; but so long as these are wanting, Universal Suffrage would put it into the power of might always to overcome right. Such being our sincere conviction, we ask all rational Englishmen to consider well their doings, and, above all, never to let their minds be carried away by "*ad captandum* speeches" concerning the rights of Englishmen, as Englishmen can ever obtain their rights when they have sufficient wisdom to perceive and esteem them. W. T.

What sculpture is to a block of marble, education is to the mind.

Social Economy, etc.

OUGHT CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS TO BE ABOLISHED?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

As one of the openers of this important debate, I may be permitted to offer a few remarks at its conclusion, regretting only that space will not allow me to notice the opinions advanced, so fully as I could wish. I think the subject has been well treated on both sides, and that the various arguments have been advanced with an ability and force at once creditable to the writers, and worthy of the solemnity and interest of the question at issue. Pope has truly observed, that "A man ought never to be ashamed to own he was in the wrong;" which is just saying, in other words, that "he is wiser to-day than he was yesterday." Agreeing, as I do, with the proposition here advanced, I hope I shall not be accused of bigotry or prejudice when I say that, although perfectly ready to alter my views as soon as their fallacy has been demonstrated, I have not yet seen good or sufficient reason for changing them on the subject now before us.

It will be remembered that I defended Capital Punishments on three grounds, all of which have been taken up by one or other of the writers on the opposite side; yet I could have wished that, in accordance with the commonly-recognised laws of debate, not only my general positions, but the various arguments by which these were supported, had been met and answered. The first reason I gave in advocacy of death punishments was, that they are commanded by God. Now, although I do not consider this to be the *principal* argument for their continuance, yet, I think it is a point of no small consequence, and it is one I am not disposed to relinquish, until it be proved that the sentence of Scripture on which it is based, is not what I have held it to be; namely, a most distinct, impressive, and enduring commandment. L. S. has attempted to refute the argument, with what success the reader may judge. After some other remarks on the sentence, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," he says, "It seems designed as a prohibition against man taking the life, and *eating the flesh* of his fellow-man; and many critics regard it as predicting the evil that would follow from such a course rather than enjoining it." Who the "eminent critics" in question may be, I know not, but if their eminence results from their having held such opinions as this, I am afraid it rests upon a very sandy foundation. C. W., Jun., has also gone over the Scriptural argument at considerable length, and has shown what interpretations *might* be put upon the sentence above quoted, but I do not see that he has shaken in the least the meaning commonly attached to this Divine injunction. He also cites the punishment inflicted on Cain for the murder of his brother, as evincing a contradiction of the command; but, apart from the fact that this event took place many centuries before the command was given, the circumstances of the case are in all respects so singular as to preclude it from being considered in the light of an example. Believing, however, that on such matters as this complete unanimity is not probable, I will leave religious, and take secular grounds, considering, as I do, that the propriety of death punishments can be sufficiently upheld on principles of justice and necessity. The former point L. S. boldly disputes. He would have us admit that "punishment should be either reformatory or preventive." This doctrine I cannot agree with. Laying aside all considerations of reformation, necessity, or expediency, there is an abstract principle of justice which, in my opinion, should ever be recognized in dealing with offences committed by one man against another, or against

society at large. C. W. has also adopted a singular groundwork: and in neither of his papers does he admit the principle of justice at all, and far less does he assign it that position to which we consider it entitled; namely, the great primary motive for punishments or rewards, and indeed for the regulation of all dealings between man and man. We utterly repudiate the idea of vindictiveness. This is *not* justice. As I remarked before, the spirit of vindictiveness is completely at variance with the administration of justice; as much opposed to it as vice is opposed to virtue; but while holding that revenge is among the blackest of human vices, I contend that pure and impartial justice is one of the cardinal virtues. Let it be proved, then, that death for murder is a just penalty, and we have established a strong ground for its continuance. Nay, more, let the justice of Capital Punishments be demonstrated, and we may argue with safety their defensibility in other respects; for what is good in principle, cannot be altogether bad in practice. I think we have already shown that the punishment of death for murder is in accordance with justice;—at least our arguments on this point have neither been refuted nor opposed; and since imprisonment or transportation is considered a just punishment for an infringement of the rights of property, it would be strange to assert that a wilful outrage against human life, constituting as it does a crime of infinitely greater magnitude, requires no greater punishment. Regretting the limited space allotted to me, I now turn to the remaining part of the subject — the *necessity* of death punishments as preventive of crime. C. W. gives some very excellent statistics, to show that a great number of offences have diminished in frequency since they ceased to be attended with the penalty of death. But does C. W. mean to infer that they have so diminished *because* milder, and infinitely more just, penalties have been adopted? These offences have become less numerous, not on this account, but because of the greater difficulties attending their commission, owing to the more efficient means which have been put in operation for the security and protection of property. L. S. denies that death punishments are preventive; and tells us that "as an example to others, they have utterly failed," but I look in vain for any proof of this assertion. It is true, they have not prevented wilful murder in many cases, but, as I have already said, are we not justified in believing that they have prevented it in many more cases, of which we have no cognizance? There is, however, as both of the writers on the other side have observed, one object of punishment which that of death fails to answer, viz., the reformation of the offender; and so far I agree with the remarks of C. W. But when he says, "Were a milder and more humane system of punishment adopted, the criminal could be made to employ his time (while yet under punishment) profitably, and thus contribute, at least partially, to the support of those whom he had injured," I totally dissent from such a proposition. It would be an additional pang to the heart-broken widow, or the sorrowing orphans, did they receive subsistence from the individual whose ruthless hand had deprived them of their natural protector. I intended to have entered into other points connected with the subject, and more particularly to have reviewed C. W.'s argument as to the judicial right to take away life, but space forbids, and I hasten to conclude. I am glad to observe that we are all of one mind in denouncing *public* executions; and I quite agree with J. F. when he says, "It is the publicity of executions that has marred their influence." That executions, whether public or private, are painful and revolting scenes, I readily admit; and I wish I could believe that the state of society was such as to justify and demand their discontinuance. Indeed, I should like to see the experiment made. And were the result such as the opponents of death punishment anticipate—though my opinion of the *justice* of the punishment might remain unchanged—I should rejoice to think that I had been mistaken in believing it to be *necessary* for the prevention of the most heinous crime which can degrade human nature. C. C. M.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

We cannot conceive of any position more worthy of laudable ambition than that occupied by the opener of an important debate, when, after his opponents have expended all their force against his reasoning, he sits down to reply, strong in the conscious justice of his cause, without a doubt to darken his mind, or a fear to trouble his heart. Shall we be acquitted of the charge of vanity, if we lay claim to this position, as one which we believe belongs to us on the present occasion? In this result we rejoice, because it may be regarded as a proof of the strength and justice of the principles by which not merely the interest of our fellow-men is affected, but on which the life or death of some is dependent. But some of our readers may dispute our claims, and think that the arguments, brought forward by the friends who have so ably taken the opposite side, are unanswerable; we therefore solicit a little space for their consideration.

1st. There is the theological argument. This we believe has great weight with many excellent individuals, who, but for it, would be numbered among the opponents of Capital Punishments; and yet how inadequate are its premises—a single passage of Old Testament Scripture, upon the purport of which learned men are not agreed! The commandments respecting death punishments given to the Jews are not binding upon us, for we are "not under the law but under grace;" and the passage before referred to — "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed"—is, with much reason, thought to be a prophecy, and not a command. Of this we may be sure, that it was not intended to be understood *literally* as a command in every case of blood-shedding; for in what way could the punishment be inflicted, seeing that we should be as much bound to avenge the death of the executed upon the executioner, as that of the murdered upon the murderer? For if this, as a literal law, means anything, it means this—that every murder, whether perpetrated by the public executioner or by the midnight assassin, forms a shrine at which another human sacrifice must be offered; so that we might go on in a progressive series—murder and retribution, retribution and murder, *ad infinitum.* The treatment of Cain, the first murderer, and the sparing of his life by the Almighty himself, must surely have a significance; and the conduct of our Divine Master on the cross, where he prayed for the forgiveness of his murderers, cannot be unworthy of our imitation. Let us endeavour to put away all prejudice, and go to the New Testament, and try to learn the spirit which it inculcates. And if we do err, let it be on the side of mercy, and not on that of severity or revenge.

2nd. We have the judicial argument in favour of Capital Punishments; and this branches off first in the direction of justice, and afterwards in that of expediency. And what is understood by justice? C. C. M. quotes Barclay as saying that "It is the virtue whereby we give every one his due, inflict punishment on those who deserve it;" and he thinks that "according to this definition, to put a man to death for murder is an instance of as true and impartial justice as our laws can render."

While this definition is fresh upon our memory, we prefer consulting another, and a *higher* authority, and we find it written, "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil." "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; *that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.*" The spirit of this, and of every precept of our Lord, is, "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you;" the spirit of the principles which C. C. M. advocates is, Do unto others as they *have done* unto you.

With such opinions as these, we are surprised to find our friend admitting, in the same paragraph, that "we must temper the decrees of judgment with

mercy;" yes, with that mercy for which *we* plead.

W. D. also considers that justice demands the continuance of these punishments; and why? Because "the criminal must suffer more than he inflicted, in order to meet the claims of justice." But he sees that this is impossible in the case before us, and he asks, "Is the murderer to go free?" Certainly not. No such thought ever entered the mind, much less ever found expression with the tongue. The first object of the criminal law ought to be the reformation of the offender, not his death;—

> "To repress his power
> Of doing wrong, that so his future life
> Might remedy the evils of the past,
> And benefit mankind."

The opinion so ably expressed by J. F., that *simple retribution* appears to be the object of the punishments inflicted by God, we will not attempt to controvert, presuming that, if his point were established, it would not be a precedent for us; for we remember who has said, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay."

Seeing, then, that Capital Punishments are not enjoined by Scripture, that they are not called for by justice, it only remains for us to inquire, Whether they be necessary for the security of society? If they were, the long experiment which has been made with them would prove conclusive. Vice would have been seen decreasing, and the people becoming more moral and virtuous at each execution. But the very reverse of this has been the case. Unclasp the ponderous tomes of history—read the records of by-gone days—read of

> "The lifted axe, the agonizing wheel,
> Luke's iron crown, and Damien's bed of steel;"

the blazing pile, and the shrill, horrid shrieks of tortured victims; the gibbetted felon festering in the putrid blast; the scaffold saturated with human gore; and ten thousand other atrocities that have made "e'en angels weep;" and you will find that in all ages and countries where Capital Punishments have been the most frequent, crime has raged the fiercest.

The statistics which have been brought forward must, we think, be conclusive on this point. Our opponents seek to break their force by asserting that the "*publicity* of executions has marred their influence," while it is plain that it can only have made their influence more evident. That which strikes the eye makes a deeper impression upon the mind than that which merely falls upon the ear; and if the effect of private executions would be good, the effect of public executions would be much more so. Secresy may diminish the influence of a deed, but it can never change its nature or its tendency. The advocates of Capital Punishments who now admit that public executions do harm, thus give up one of the principal arguments previously brought forward in their favour—viz., their preventive influence — and they leave them to rest upon those arguments which we have already examined, and we think demolished. L. S.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. V.

THE PASSIONS EXPLAINED AND EXEMPLIFIED.

15. Grief is a combination of Anxiety, Anguish, and Vexation—which emotions of the mind the student is recommended to study. *Grief* is the pain of mind produced by loss, misfortune, injury, or evils of any kind; sorrow; regret; in short, the sense is pressure or oppression. Grief, sudden and violent, manifests itself by sometimes beating the head, often by rending the garments, tearing the hair; peeping or screaming aloud, stamping with the feet, repeatedly lifting the

eyes to heaven; hurrying to and fro, running distractedly, or fainting away, sometimes without recovery. Sometimes violent grief produces a torpid, sullen silence, resembling total apathy. It may be exemplified in a multiplicity of ways, which precludes us from giving adequate examples. However, we subjoin a few lines of illustration:—

> "I wept to see the visionary man,
> And whilst my trance continued, thus began:
> O light of Trojan * and support of Troy,
> Thy father's champion, and thy country's joy!
> O long expected by thy friends! From whence
> Art thou so late return'd to our defence?
> Alas! what wounds are these? What new disgrace
> Deforms the manly features of thy face?"

16. Melancholy is a *fixed grief*, a gloomy state of the mind, depression of spirits induced by grief; it is sedentary; that is, of some continuance, or habitual; motionless. It is generally expressed by the falling of the lower jaw, by the paleness of the lips, the eyes half shut and cast downwards, the eyelids livid and swollen, with tears trickling silently down, which often remain unwiped; together with a total inattention to everything passing around. Words, if any, are few, and those dragged out rather than spoken: the accents inaudible and interrupted, with heavy sighs breaking into the middle of words and sentences.

17. Despair.—This passion or emotion of the mind is often attempted to be manifested in the pulpit, but frequently egregiously misrepresented. In a condemned criminal, and also in one who is persuaded that he has lost all hopes of salvation, despair draws the eyebrows downward, bringing contortions in the muscles of the face, such as darken the forehead; the eyes roll frightfully around; the mouth opens towards the ears; the sufferer bites the lips; the nostrils widen, and the unfortunate recipient ferociously gnashes with the teeth. The heart is too stupidly hardened to allow any profusion of tears to flow; nevertheless the eyeballs will be reddened and inflamed like those of a rabid animal. The distracted head hangs down upon the heaving breast. The arms are bended at the elbows, while, at the same time, the fist is hard clenched; with inflated veins and swelled muscles, the whole surface of the skin becomes livid; while the entire fabric of the patient is strained and violently agitated; words are not very frequent, but groans are uttered, which do not fail to exhibit inexpressible inward torture. If feelings find utterance, the words are very few, interrupted, and expressed with a sullen, eager bitterness; the tone of voice is sometimes loud and furious. A speaker cannot overact this passion, as it frequently leads to distraction, and too often to self-destruction. As this passion is a mixture of *fear*, *apprehension*, and *horror*, we shall direct the student to study the examples and illustrations of those emotions.

18. Fear is to be in apprehension of evil; to feel anxious on account of some anticipated evil. When violent or sudden, it causes the eyes and mouth to open wide simultaneously, by which means the eyebrows are drawn downward, giving the countenance a bewildered appearance; the face is pale; the elbows

* "*O light of Trojan*," &c., to be spoken with *open arms* as in the action of welcoming. The above is a quotation from Dryden's Virgil, lines 365—376, in his second Æneid.

recede parallel with the side, and the shoulder-bones come in contact; the hands are open, and lifted up to the height of the breast, so that the palms face the dreaded object, as shields to oppose it. One of the feet is drawn behind the other, so that the body seems shrinking from the danger, and the whole attitude of the body represents a posture for flight. The heart palpitates hurriedly, and the inspiration of the breath is short and quick, while, in fact, the whole body is thrown into a universal tremour. The voice is tremulous, the sentences are short, and the meaning confused and incoherent. When the danger is imminent, the timorous person will shriek, without any articulate sound of words, and sometimes irrecoverably confounds the understanding, causing faintings, which are often productive of death.

> "The Trojan strikes the skies,
> Then Jove from Ida's top his horror spreads;
> The clouds burst dreadful o'er the Grecian heads:—
> Thick lightnings flash; the muttering thunder rolls,
> Their strength he withers, and unmans their souls.
> Before his wrath the trembling hosts retire,
> The god in terrors, and the skies on fire."

THE USE OF BOOKS.

THE following is a brief outline of a lecture recently delivered by Professor Watts, of Spring Hill College, to a literary society in Birmingham, and from the interest with which we feel sure our readers will regard the subject, we have been induced thus to present it to their attention:—

It has been said, that the value of anything may be determined by the attitudes and positions you can place it in; and, secondly, in how many different aspects you may regard it. If we judge by these rules, man must be a very important being. Suppose, for instance, we compare man with an oyster—you may say some things of the latter, but many more of the former. In how many various attitudes may man be regarded? Look at him in his position in creation; view him nationally, physically, and professionally. View man in connection with his habits of thought and study; and, to lower the circle, look at him in relation to books, and there we have the book-buyer, the book-seller, the book-maker, the book-printer, the book-binder, &c. It is my object to-night to show the connection of man with books, and to give a few hints that may assist in their selection and right use.

1.—The selection of books. I remember reading a letter of Dr. Doddridge's, in which he speaks of his favourite authors as personal friends; and such is their true character. It has been said, that "writing is speaking at a distance, and reading hearing at a distance;" if our friends are far away, they may communicate with us by letter as a substitute for personal intercourse. Books perform the part of friends to us. Some friends we go to for assistance in the necessary purposes of life, others because of their refinement of manners and interesting conversation, and others, again, because of their cheerfulness of disposition; and so it is with books. First class books are those which will be of service to us with respect to the necessary purposes of life. And here we must first mention the Bible, which is designed

to prepare us for the life to come. With respect to other religious books, those are most valuable which tend to illustrate and enforce the truth and authority of the Scriptures. Then there are those books which belong to our professions, but to these I need only refer. There are some books which are necessary for us as men—necessary for the cultivation of the faculties which God has bestowed upon us.

A knowledge of ourselves is very important. I dare say you have seen the advertisement of a book bearing the singular title of "The House I Live in;"—it means our body. We ought to know something about that, not merely that we may admire the wisdom and goodness of God, but also that we may rightly use the creature, and not pervert it from the purposes for which God gave it being. I wish we had more books on this subject, popularly written. Dr. Carpenter's work on Animal Physiology deserves honourable mention.

It has been said that Logic is a subject with which all should be acquainted, and certainly it will be of great value to you. Among other important subjects is a knowledge of the elements of science. It is desirable that you should know something about the earth on which you live, and something about this country as well as other lands. The knowledge of political geography is important in this day, when every one reads the newspaper, but physical geography should not be overlooked. Rising a step higher, we form an acquaintance with natural history, which is full of interest to all. I consider these subjects to belong to the higher class, which no one ought to neglect.

I come now to books which admit of a large amount of what may be termed the "literary element." Many of these refer to history, with which, as a lower species, biography is connected. History has been described as "philosophy teaching by examples;" much, therefore, depends upon the truthfulness of the historian. Sir Robert Walpole disregarded all history, and when he wished his History brought to him, he would say, "Bring me my liar," and certainly many historians cannot be depended upon for their veracity. Perhaps the history which comes nearest to ourselves is the history of our own country, and to this we should give attention. Hume's History is beautifully written, but is very partial in its statements, and very defective in not exhibiting its evidence. Smollett's is sprightly, but has too much of the dash and sketchiness of the newspaper style. Sir James Mackintosh's history is a work well begun, though marked by all the qualities of the lawyer. Next to the history of England is that of France, the most celebrated writer on which is Bossuet; but the principal works in French on this subject cannot properly be called histories, but memoirs, personal histories, or contributions to history. Passing by ancient history, I come now to speak of poetry. There are few minds not capable of receiving refinement from poetry, and to impart this, and not instruction, is its great object. There are few first-rate didactic poems. True, we have Akenside's "Pleasures of the Imagination," and Armstrong's "Art of Preserving Health," but it is only in a secondary way that the main characteristics of poetry may be said to belong to them. The true use of poetry has been described by De Quincy as producing "the consciousness of power." I think it does us good only when it causes us to feel that we are better for it, that our thoughts are nobler

and our aspirations purer. The poetry of the affections appeals to all, and is appreciated by all. The highest kind of poetry has in it so much of the imaginative as to be creative, and to arouse in those minds which are imbued with it the faculty of creating images, which they otherwise could not do.

Books are distinguished from each other not only by the subjects on which they treat, but by their quality. There are three kinds of bad books which I would have you leave untouched—1st, Those which are immoral in their tendency; 2nd, Those which would lessen our reverence for the Word of God; and 3rd, Those which are characterised by a false style.

II. We have now briefly to consider the right use of books. I suppose you all to have a small library of your own, and a large one to which you have access. First, you must proportion the amount of any particular class of reading to the time you have at command. If you have little time for reading, a greater part should be given to books calculated to improve the mind, but if you have a greater amount of time you may read, with a feeling of propriety, books which are calculated to amuse and cultivate the mind. But the question may be put, How should I read? Read with attention—with *great* attention at first. I recommend you, if you would read with profit, to read with a pen in your hand for the purpose of noting down anything that may strike you. It is well to have a common-place book by your side, for the purpose of making extracts. An index rerum, as recommended by Todd, will be of much service to you; it will aid in fixing in your memory the things which first strike you. Making analyses of books is very useful, the only condition being that you should use this method with good books, and not with worthless ones. Another improving method is that recommended by Dr. Dwight,—namely, to read what is well written, lay it by, and afterwards to endeavour to re-write it from memory, and compare what you have written with your author. First efforts should be short ones; and if you fail in them, do not be discouraged—the man who has never failed has never succeeded. I do not recommend late reading, because it is important that you should preserve your eyes; early reading is much better—it is good for the whole body as well as the eyes. If now and then you read in an evening, do so with the intention of putting down what you can remember of it in the morning. I strongly recommend those who wish to learn the art of expressing themselves well, according to good models, to adopt this plan, they will find it very serviceable to them.

HINTS ON STUDY.

Previous to our directing the reader's attention to the desultory remarks which we are about to present to his notice on the subject of "Study," it may not be considered altogether out of place should we attempt to preface them by a few words on what is meant by, or implied in that term. There is a common phrase in the Liturgy of the Church which we consider as exactly comprehended in, or synonymous with the word Study: viz., "read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest." Such we conceive to be in their very order, and that, too, with metaphysical accuracy

the constituent elements of that idea. But having thus given a prosaic definition, we are almost tempted to quote a brilliant explanatory passage in Bailey's "Festus," which, to our mind, admirably conveys the characteristic qualities--industry, assiduity, order, aspirativeness, and mind-excitability—which we consider as the universal marks of the true student. It is not to be expected that every one to whom our hints are at present addressed can adequately fill up the portrait of student-life therein depicted, but the *spirit* of it must be felt and acted upon by every one who is deeply penetrated with *the desire to know.* We find we cannot resist the temptation, and therefore the beauty and aptness of the extract must be our apology for so lengthy a quotation :—

> "All mankind are students. How to live
> And how to die, forms the great lesson still.
> I know what study is ; it is to toil
> Hard, through the hours of the sad midnight watch,
> At tasks which *seem* a systematic curse,
> And course of bootless penance. Night by night
> To trace one's thought as if on iron leaves,
> And sorrowful as though it were the mode
> And date of death we wrote on our own tombs ;
> *Wring a slight sleep out of the couch, and see*
> *The self-same moon which lit us to our rest ;*
> *Her place scarce changed perceptibly in heaven,*
> *Now light us to renewal of our toils.*
> * * * * * * *
> Fruit soon comes
> And more than all our trouble pays us—powers ;
> So that we joy we have endured so much ;
> That not for nothing we have slaved, and slain
> Ourselves almost. And more it is to strive
> To bring the mind up to one's own esteem :
> * * * It is to think
> While thought is standing thick upon the brain
> As dew upon the brow—for thought is brain-sweat—
> And gathering thick and dark, like storms in summer,
> Until, convulsed, condensed in lightning sport,
> It plays upon the heavens of the mind—
> Opens the hemisphered abysses here,
> *And we become revealers to ourselves.*"
>
> —*Festus.*

Having thus remarked on the definition of our term, it may not be amiss to mention that we do not wish our student to be a mere bookworm—learned in other men's opinions, in the facts which they have gathered, and the conclusions they deduce from them. We wish to inoculate our readers with the truth that mere *reading* is not study, it is but the food of thought, and that, too, of an artificial kind. *Thinking* is the grand generic idea, the *sine quâ non* of study. Every thing should be unto us as a book. When night has set her silver lamp far up in heaven's blue sublimity, and spreads her star-studded curtain over sleep-indulging mortals, then should the student's anxious eye seek from the heavenly orbs themselves their evidence to astronomic truth. Each little herb which grows high on the mountain's top or in the tangled wilderness, each flower which blooms in garden bed, in forest depth, or on the plain which sleeps beneath the "witchery of the soft blue sky," should whisper in our ear of Botany. "The spring-water welling its way through flowers," the winding river hurrying on so dancingly into the all-absorbing sea—the sea itself, with its foam-crested waves, should be interrogated for their wisdom. The rocks contain within their rugged breasts, and exposed

upon their thunder-splintered or volcano-reft sides, most marvellous tales of worlds which bloomed in times pre-Adamite; and even the tiny pebble or the many-lined shell which strew the ocean's edge, can teach some lessons man were wise to learn. Then there are the changing seasons, with all their vicissitudes and all their multiplied series of causes and effects. The habits, peculiarities, and forms of the animal kingdom, from the polype or "the cricket on the hearth" to the mail-ribbed cayman, the strong-hided rhinoceros, or the probosced elephant. The tornado, the hurricane, and the simoom; the ice-sheeted ocean, the snow-peaked mountain, the geyser, the volcano, and the earthquake; the fire-flashing electric bolt, the borealic lights, and the unimaginably distant nebulæ, are all ready to instruct us. Yea, vast creation's wide space-filling domain, far as the eye can reach or the telescope extend, and minute as the microscope can bring before our gaze, is filled with knowledge and replete with wisdom. But all this is not to be gathered up and hoarded for mere curiosity-gratification; it must be applied to some useful purpose, else is the great purpose of study unaccomplished. Hence it is that each new knowledge-attainment has resulted ultimately in some beneficial measure for the race; as Franklin's electrical experiments, Black's discovery of latent heat, Watt's steam-engine, the electric telegraph, and gutta-percha. Nature is anxious to reveal herself and her secrets for our use, while at the same time each mental exertion increases our mental power.

"Crescit enim cum amplitudine rerum vis ingenii." *

Hint 1st—Strive to acquire a knowledge of your own mental nature.

Self-knowledge is of all study the most important, though perhaps that which is most seldom engaged in. It is the root from which all really successful study should take its rise. By it we gain a knowledge of our aptitudes, our capacities, and our deficiencies. Hence we are enabled to gratify these aptitudes, to exert our capacities, and—what is of even greater importance—supply our deficiencies, and make up the wants of our mentality. This latter is an important consideration: it has been too much the custom to educate only on the side of our tastes and capacities. This is unfair treatment of the mind. Is it because one eye is blinded that no means should be employed to couch it and "make it whole even as the other?" Why should we keep the mind thus cultivated one-sidedly, thus lame, thus imperfectioned? As each faculty is in activity, and each activity exercised is a pleasure-producer, it follows that we lose those mental joys which lie within our reach. This mind-knowledge which we desiderate for the self-instructionist, is to be acquired by meditation, by watchfulness, by the careful observance of what passes through his mind in the hours of thought, by an earnest exertion of attention and consciousness to discover the peculiarities of his own individuality. This is the foundation of all properly conducted education, of all mental independence, of all originality of thought, and therefore it is of too great importance to be neglected by the truly ardent student; and by student here we do not only mean one whose

* For the strength of the mental faculties increases with the greatness of the things which exercise them.

whole time is spent in acquiring wisdom, but any one who thinkingly employs his leisure hours in the cultivation of his intellect, the elevation of his nature, and the gratification of the higher tastes and sensibilities with which he is endowed.

Hint 2nd.—Endeavour to gain an accurate idea of the nature, object, and uses of each study.

A general idea of the nature, object, and uses of any study must be of great advantage in showing the mind how much it may do for its gratification, for the furtherance of its views, and for the advancement of the general interests of the individual. Without this we do not think it is possible to engage in any study with that energy, ardour, and intensity which is necessary as the complement of our ideal of what true study is. Unless we enter upon it with that mental appreciation which stimulates the mind to diligence by offering an object to its hopes and inspirations, and promising to contribute to the fulfilment of its desires, we shall never pursue any study with that eagerness and avidity, that yearning anxiety to *know*, that invincibility of resolution, and indefatigability of exertion which are the forerunners and the earnests of success.

Hint 3rd.—Let every study be pursued in a thorough-going and persevering manner.

Nothing is, perhaps, more common among young men who are desirous of improving themselves than that which has been aptly designated "mental dissipation;" a disposition which inclines them to change the subject of their study frequently, to hurry on from one science to another before any definite progress has been or can be made; to become wearied and fatigued with the mental exertion required, and so to hop from one study to another; not like a bee, from flower to flower, which sips the nectar from each one as it goes, but like a grasshopper, skipping about for want of other employment. Such an individual may have dabbled in the whole "circle of the sciences," the languages, and history, to boot, and yet have received scarcely one definite and useful idea from his vast range of studies; or, if he has, his mental stores are but a series of "shreds and patches," consist merely of a few "excerpta," but have no consecutive order, no unity, no definitized wholeness. No part of the student's duty is so difficult of accomplishment, no one of his acquisitions costs so much trouble in its attainment, or, when attained, is more valuable or more essential than the habit of persevering attention. Without this, nothing really useful can be done; with it, almost everything may be accomplished. We do not wish to be understood as asserting that all knowledge is attainable by the student. What we mean is, that while there will always be some determining consideration which will lead to the adoption of some particular study or range of studies, every one should aim at having a correct and properly generalized and classified view of human knowledge. As in Geography, the inhabitants of each country study their own peculiar little spot with greater care, accuracy, and attention, yet take a general survey of the other constituent countries of our globe, so should we, in our survey of the chart of human wisdom, seek to gain especial acquaintance with the department or departments which use, convenience, prospects, or tastes have determined us chiefly to

pursue, but at the same time to acquire a correct idea of the other great branches of human study, what they teach and what are their uses.

Hint 4th.—Accustom yourselves to express your ideas on the study you pursue, both verbally and in writing.

This exercise will be of great service to you in stimulating your attention, increasing your acquaintance with the facts and modes of expression which are peculiar to your studies, enabling you to analyse any topic, begetting conciseness and readiness of expression, and imparting regularity, order, and accuracy to those laws, phenomena, hypotheses, and theories, which form the object of your study. It will, moreover, greatly assist in reviewing your labours, having them thus reduced into small compass, and readily arranged in your thoughts.

Hint 5th.—Let the best hours of the day be appropriated to your chief study.

It is a most important consideration to take for your hours of study that time at which the mind will be least inclined to wander away in aberration, or become inattentive and erratic. Now in the evening, with the numerous cares and occurrences of the day crowding upon a mind jaded, fatigued, and incapable of much exertion, the glowing reverie, the dreamy, listless inactivity of thoughtlessness, the stirring excitement of romance, or any other "drowsyheaded" or exhilarating occupation has, according to the temperament of the individual, generally far greater charms than the strong tension of the mental powers required in study. We would, therefore, however vainly, advise the morning hours as the most appropriate and fitting for mental application. Then the mind is fresh, vigorous, active, and powerful as a "giant refreshed by slumbers:" the lethe of sleep has washed from remembrance the occurrences and cares of the past day, and her "poppied wings" have charmed away the exhaustion and *ennui* under which we laboured. Even to those who, at the matin hour, long ere the sun has blessed us with its beams, require to go forth to early labour, we would earnestly recommend the adoption of morning study hours. Such health-bringing habits are easily acquirable by sternness and inflexibility of will and purpose. It is easy to retire earlier to repose, and arise betimes to useful, mind-improving, studies. It will be found, if steadily persevered in for any length of time, that more real knowledge is gained, more mental power acquired, greater pleasure in study excited, and less vitiation of mind and body undergone than in the burning of the "midnight lamp." Not that *this* is by any means to be despised; the *desire to know* is honourable and praiseworthy, and, however followed, brings many gratifications to the mind: still we do think that, by an appropriation of the severer studies to morning, and the less mind-bracing to the evening,—such as music, drawing, and elocution; besides light reading, and home amusements,—it would be found that the great objects in view would be much more advantageously effected.

Hint 6th.—Change the study, and alter the position of your body when you feel either fatiguing.

It is strange, yet true, that the mind and body exercise a reciprocal and reactionary influence upon each other, and whatever annoys or innocently gratifies

the one, communicates a part of that annoyance or gratification to the other. It is in consequence of this fact that the present hint is given. No study should be pursued until it jades the mind; neither should any position of frame be persevered in until it becomes fatiguing. Not that we are to be over-indulgent to our minds, so prone as they are to procrastination and levity; or to our bodies, which are so luxuriously and indolently inclined; but that we should give them every reasonable indulgence. All flightiness of disposition, all habits of heedlessness, all mental unsettledness, and insolidity, as well as all bodily restlessness, over-refinement and torpidity, must be strenuously opposed; and with all the might of will resisted. But the real calls of health, or mental exhaustion, should never be unheeded. In fact, a large endowment of natural good sense is requisite in the student to distinguish between the imperious voice of nature, and the claimant annoyance and persistency of our own too-much uncurbed desires. In all things, moderation is desirable, and not less in study than in any other occupation.

These "hints" have already extended to greater length than we at first intended, and yet we feel desirous to add to their number; this, however, we will not do, as we believe that if these be followed in their spirit, the minor details will best be left to be arranged as is convenient to each party. Let no one, however, even the least favoured in that respect, deceive himself with the idea that he has no time for study.

"Nihil est aliud magnum quam multa minuta." *

And a few minutes even, properly employed, each day, might accumulate a great deal of information on the general principles of science, and give food for much thought and intellectual exertion. To any one truly imbued with the desire, earnest, craving, and irresistible, as every such pure desire is, the means and opportunities of study will not be lacking. In the most unpropitious circumstances, some of the world's great men have nurtured themselves to greatness and renown. Their high estimate of the value and pleasures of knowledge, their industry, and perseverance, their indomitable resolution and invincible energy, should urge us on to higher efforts and more noble achievements. Let us, therefore, resolve firmly, exert ourselves energetically, and labour perseveringly, in the advancement of ourselves in wisdom, and in the increase of our knowledge,

"Till all is ours that Sages taught,
That Poets sang, or Martyrs wrought."

S. N.

VERSIFICATION.

The value of rhymed verse depends entirely upon the thought or thoughts enshrined within it; it is but the setting, to add lustre to the gem; and as the sculptor cannot, by any labour, give the marble, however mutely life-like, a living, breathing spirit; so, no more can any poetaster, by the most perfect arrangement of syllabic quantity, elevate *mere* verse above a "sorry mechanism," which may, and does, sometimes, "tickle the ear," but cannot charm the soul. To the true poet, verse is an instrument not essential, often undesirable and embarrassing; for the conceptions of his intellect frequently lose rather than gain by the

* No other thing has as great a power as an aggregation of little things.

restraint of rhyme; and to him it is nothing but an "exterior form," an added grace, not an essential beauty.

To the dilettanti poet, whose ear is sufficiently good, and whose command of language is extensive enough to fabricate rhythmical quantity, the faculty of versifying is but the "echo of true poetry;" and like the fabled youth of old, who fell in love with his own watery self, he is in danger of mistaking his own artificial vapidities for the bubblings of the Castalian fount.

But to the aspirant for poetical honours, without the qualification above named, who makes a quantity of verse without rhythm, without quality, without sense,—to him verse becomes a "lying self-assertion:" for unendowed with a single essential for poetical composition, he has cheated himself into the belief that his productions (because they are in some sort a jingling approximation to rhyme), are the utterance of a poetical spirit, when, in fact, they contain ample evidence of inability for writing even prose.

Verse, then, in the hands of others than those gifted with discretion and ability, is either a dangerous or stultifying vehicle. And to this class of persons we would say, examine your own mental conformation, your usual and most frequent course of thought; for poetry is but the flowering into thought of the best and truest emotions of our inner being. You will, therefore, do well to try your poetical efforts by the thought—have I given expression to those emotions, does my effusion contribute to my own innate sense of the poetry of the subject I have chosen to write upon? If it does this, well and good; if it does not, burn it. And it must be borne in mind that fondness for poetry, even if it amount to love, and deep reverence for its higher manifestations, does not, by any means, indicate the ability necessary to write poetry. The liking you have for poetry is nothing more than a cognate faculty with the power which enables you to criticize a painting, or appreciate a statue, and a mere relish for poetry will do as little towards the writing of a sonnet, as the possession of the critical faculty alone will enable you to draw a cartoon, or carve an image. The power to do is the product of the discernment; but the possession of the latter by no means implies the other qualification.

Study, and a keen perception of the beautiful and true, in nature and art, coupled with a depth of feeling that no cultivation will give, if not naturally bestowed, are necessary elements in a poetical character, and be assured that, if these are wanting, any attempts at verse making will prove either a waste of time or self-deceptive.

Stockport Sunday School Young Men's Improvement Society.—The Stockport Sunday school is supposed to be the largest in the world, and accommodates about six thousand scholars of both sexes every Sabbath-day, exclusive of about five hundred teachers, male and female. It is patronised by Protestants of every denomination. The first class (male) has three hundred and eighty scholars, with about twenty teachers and a visitor; the teachers are principally gentlemen of standing in the town, and lately a magistrate of the borough was one of the first class teachers. Some two years or more ago the young men felt the desirableness of forming a mutual improvement society; the subject was entered into with much spirit, and the above society commenced. For a time all went on well, for the subscriptions were small; a library exclusively to the society was in their minds' eye; a gentleman was chosen secretary; a manufacturer of the town had kindly consented to act as president; and numerous subjects for discussion were placed on the books. All these indications of improvement soon passed away, for a *want of interest* has been manifested

by some of the members, owing principally, in my opinion, to the following cause—the protracted character of the debates. We refer thus plainly to the evil, in order that other societies may avoid it.

Bedford Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society was formed on November 24th, 1849, when a few young men met for mutual improvement, and adopted several rules for their guidance. Its meetings are now held on Monday and Thursday evenings. The Monday evening is devoted to essays and discussions. Thursday evening was formerly set apart for the reading of Chambers' "Matter and Motion," but now to Combe's "Constitution of Man." This work creates a great deal of interest, and occasions some animated discussions There have been eighteen essays read, as well as discussions held, on Capital Punishments, Vegetarianism, Novel-reading, &c.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

17. In reading the numerous and excellent articles in *The British Controversialist*, I have been struck with the acquaintance displayed by many of the writers with our standard authors, and the beauty and aptness of the quotations made both in prose and poetry. Will some of the gentlemen referred to have the kindness to recommend a plan to enable writers to collect quotations and make them readily available?—J. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

6. *French Pronunciation.*—In fulfilment of the promise made in our last, we proceed to resume our directions for the acquisition of a tolerably accurate pronunciation of the French tongue. It is necessary, however, to recollect that all that can be expected of us is to give an approximate representation of the various peculiar French sounds. Indeed, in learning French this is all that can be reasonably desired; for it is a fact that as many differences of intonation may be heard in the streets of Paris, and even in its most polite and refined circles, as in our own metropolis. So that, although our pronunciation may not be quite *a la mode*, yet there will be little danger of our not making ourselves understood.

When two vowels meet, and a coalition of their two sounds from one syllable, it is called a diphthong, and if there be three, a triphthong (from δις, twice, τρις, thrice, φθογγος, sound). It will not be necessary for our present purpose to attend to the distinction of diphthong and triphthong, our duty and intention being to place as succinct a classification of *sounds* as occurs to our memory or meets our eye during our researches.

Pronounce ai, eai, uai, ée, like ay in English day; as j'ai (zhay), I have; mais (may), but; changeai (shangh-zhay), changed; armée (armay), army.

Ei, something like e in met; seigneur (sênywhr).

Aî, aie, and sometimes oi, like e in there, where, as maître (mêtr), master; haie, hedge; paroître, to appear.

Ea, ua, like a in calm, car; as Jean (zhangh), John: changea (shangh-zhâ), changed; iê and iè, like the word yea in English; pitiê (pee-tyea) ,compassion; lumière (loo-miyear) light.

Ie, terminational, and ui preceded by g or q, like ee in see, amie (â-mee), a (female) friend; guide (geed), a conductor; quittance (kee-tangse), receipt, discharge.

Eu, iew, sometimes like e in her; as peu-à-peu (pŭha-pŭh), by degrees; honteux (hongh-tŭh), shamefaced; adieu, good-bye; monsieur, (mongh-sieu), sir, master. Iou in alpiou and chiourme takes the same sound.

Io, like yo in English yore; as piolé (peo-lay), speckled; pionnier (peo-nyay), a pioneer; lion (leongh) a lion.

Oua, oa, oi, generally, and oy, like wa in wag; as pouacrerie (pwâ-kru-ree), slovenliness; rouage (rwazhe), wheelwork; joaillerie (jw-eel-yu-ree), jewelry; poisson (pwa-zongh), fish; loi (lwa), law; joyeux (zhaw-yew), joyful.

Oué, oe, like the English word way; as roué (rway), a rake, a profligate; jouet (zhway), a toy, sport; poète (pwayt), a poet.

Oui, ué, uè, uei (we), yes; bouillotte (boo-eel-yott), a teapot; rouelle (rwel) a lane; ruisseau (rwe-so), a rivulet; huître (weetr), an oyster; curiasse (kwee-rass), a breast-plate; cercueil (ser-kuh-ee), a coffin.

Eau sounds like ō; as veau (vo), calf; peau (po), skin; chapeau (shâp-o), hat.

Ueu, and eue, like the English pronoun you; as, gueux, (gŭh), poor; queue (kŭh), tail.

Ao sounds like o in Sâone, a river in France; aoriste, the perfect definite tense; taon, an oxfly; and a in Loan, a town in France.

Au will be found in our last notice, under o.

Ou, œu, like o in do; as, bouquet (boo-kay), a posy; rouge et noire (roozh-ay-nwar), red and black.

Sœur (sir), sister, like i in sir.

We are sorry space will not permit us to enter upon the consonant sounds in this Number. In our next we will endeavour to overtake the whole of what remains to be done. Careful discrimination, long practice, attention to enunciation, and constant reference to the sounds indicated and the examples given, will enable the student who perseveres to master the pronunciation of the French tongue in a tolerably correct manner in a short time.—N. L.

13. *The best Dictionary of the English Language.*—We can confidently recommend the "Imperial Dictionary," published by Blackie and Son, as being the best. Indeed, no *student* should be without a copy of it. It gives the pronunciation and etymology of every word, where it is possible, beside explanations, not only of the simple, obvious meaning, but of almost every *shade* of meaning that can be attached to a word; and where this cannot be accomplished by written explanations, engravings are given; of which, throughout the body of the work, there are dis-

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* G hard.

tributed about two thousand. Besides these advantages, there is an "Introduction" of great value; containing "A brief account of the origin and progress of the principal languages, ancient and modern, that have been spoken by nations between the Ganges and the Atlantic Ocean." The portions of the "Introduction" containing the remarks on the subjunctive mood, and on the common error of using a passive, instead of an active, *intransitive* verb are not only practically useful, but exceedingly interesting. We should like to notice the work at greater length, did space permit.

However, we will give a specimen or two, taken at random from the body of the work, by way of recommendation. No doubt we could find *better* examples for the purpose, were we to search for them; but we prefer taking them as they come. First, then: "DESIRE, *n.* (s as z). [F. *desir;* It. *desio;* Arm. *desir.* Qu. W. *dais.*]

1. An emotion or excitement of the mind, directed to the attainment or possession of an object, from which pleasure, sensual, intellectual, or spiritual, is expected; a passion excited by the love of an object, or uneasiness at the want of it, and directed to its attainment or possession. *Desire* is a wish to possess some gratification as a source of happiness, which is supposed to be *obtainable.* A *wish* may exist for something that is or is not *obtainable.* Desire when directed solely to sensual enjoyment, differs little from appetite. In other languages, desire is expressed by longing or reaching toward [Gr. ορεγω, Lat. *appeto*], and when it is ardent or intense, it approaches to longing; but the word in English usually expresses less than longing.

We endeavoured....to see your face with great *desire*, 1 Thess. ii.—Thou satisfiest the *desires* of every living thing, Psa. cxlv.

Desire is that internal act, which, by influencing the will, makes us proceed to action.—*Elements of Criticism.*

2. A prayer or request to obtain:—

He will fulfil the *desire* of them that fear him, Psa. cxlv.

Hyper'bole, n. (hyperbo'ly.) (Fr. *hyperbole;* Gr. ὑπερβολη, excess, from ὑπερβαλλω, to throw beyond, to exceed.)

In *rhetoric*, a figure of speech which expresses much more or less than the truth, or which represents things much greater or less, better or worse, than they really are. An object, uncommon in size, either great or small, strikes us with surprise, and this emotion produces a momentary conviction that the object is greater or less than it is in reality. The same effect attends figurative grandeur or littleness, and hence the use of the hyperbole, which expresses this momentary conviction. The following are uses of this figure:—

He was owner of a piece of ground not larger than a Lacedemonian letter.—*Longinus.*

If a man can number the dust of the earth, then shall thy seed also be numbered.—Gen. xiii.

Ipse arduus, altaque pulsat Sidera.—*Virgil.*

He was so gaunt, the case of a flagelot was a mansion for him.—*Shakspere.*

These two examples, we think, will be sufficient to recommend the work to the notice of students; and if they will examine it for themselves, they will agree with us that it is sufficient for most purposes. Of course, where fuller information is required, a Cyclopædia should be consulted.

The work here noticed is published in two imperial octavo volumes, price £4 4s., with a short supplement; and is also issued in parts at 2s 6d., and divisions at 10s.

H. G. Bohn has published a very excellent edition of Webster's Dictionary, which is a very handsome volume, and really a very fine work. The price, we believe, is £2 2s.

14. *Jael and Sisera.*—The attempt to reconcile the divinely-inspired approbation of "perfidious murder," with the divine justice and benevolence, is to attempt an impossibility. But happily the attempt is as needless as it would be fruitless, till Professor Newman shall have first reconciled his view of the action referred to with the recorded facts of the case, together with the judgment of one who had a completer knowledge of the facts and the attendant circumstances than we can have. The facts, as far as we are acquainted with them, are these: Sisera had for twenty years "mightily oppressed" Israel, till by the heroism of Deborah, and the bravery of Barak, with such forces as he could collect against the apathy begotten by oppression, the preponderating army of the Canaanites was overthrown. Before they were completely destroyed, Sisera, fleeing before his enemies, and from his friends, seeks refuge in the tent of Heber, between whom and Jabin peace had obtained (for what length of time or on what conditions we are not informed; or whether Jael, possibly herself a proselyte, might not secretly have favoured the cause of Jehovah and his people, and longed for the period when the idolatrous yoke should be broken). That she, beholding him thus forsaking his followers, and thereby adding treachery and cowardice to his former cruelty, should proffer him succour and hospitality, with the secret intent of delivering him up to his approaching victors; and, on finding him asleep, should, in the disordered state of things, anticipate the sword of Barak, and prevent future oppression and bloodshed by inflicting a speedy and less painful death, whatever view we *may* take of her conduct, was surely not to merit the epithet of a "perfidious murderess." A virtuous indignation against crime is commendable. But when, through prejudice, or neglect of sufficient inquiry, it is directed against innocence, it becomes a criminal indignation against virtue. This compendious summary of facts may suffice in defence of the character of a calumniated woman,—we should rather say of calumniated women. For if Jael was a perfidious murderess, then Deborah was the eulogist of perfidious murder, which whoever is prepared to affirm, ought first to be prepared to prove.

If it be objected that we have conjoined unwarranted suppositions with our statement of facts, we reply that it rests with the accuser to prove their improbability; as the present is not a simple inquiry into the fact of taking away life, but into the *character* of the action; and the defender has as much right to suppose commendable motives and legitimate considerations as the accuser has to suppose the contrary.—J. Y. T.

15. *Pronunciation.*—Ch is sounded hard in the words Batrachia, Brachiopoda, Branchiæ.—L. S.

16. *History of France.*—Moir and Bussy's "History of France" (2 vols.) is a very good work, and would, I think, suit E. T. It was published at £3 3s., but may be had at about 15s. from Messrs. Cornish.—L. S.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. VI.

JUDGMENT.—NATURE AND KINDS OF EVIDENCE.

"Know that the human being's thoughts and deeds
Are not, like ocean-billows, blindly moved;
The inner world, his microcosmus, is
The deep shaft out of which they spring eternally;
They grow by certain laws, like the tree's fruit;
No juggling chance can metamorphose them:
Have I the human *kernel* first examined?
Then do I know the future will and action."
Wallenstein—Coleridge's Translation.

"Fail by any sin or misfortune to discover what the truth of the fact is, you are lost, so far as that fact goes. If your thought do not image truly, but do image falsely the fact, you will vainly try to work upon the fact. The fact will not obey you, the fact will silently resist you, and ever with silent invincibility will go on resisting you till you do get to image it truly instead of falsely. No help for you whatever, except in attaining a true image of the fact. * * * *That* is the one thing needful; with that it shall be well with you in whatever you have to do with said fact."—CARLYLE.

"THE world is too much with us—late and soon,
Getting and spending we lay waste our powers;
Little we see in Nature that is ours,
We have given our hearts away—a sordid boon."

Hence it is that in an age like the present,—which idolatrizes materiality, utilitarianism, and tangibility,—depreciation and vilification are profusely vented against any study which, to the question, *cui bono?*—what use is it?—cannot answer by quoting a fair per centage of profit-production, and money-getting. Is it to be wondered at, then, that an inquiry into anything so *immaterial* as the human mind should attract notice, or have any attention bestowed upon it? Is it matter of surprise that, in this universal vassalage to Mammon, when education itself is matured and systematized only upon the ground of its gainfulness—the pursuits of Logic, Psychology, &c., should languish neglected—that the imperishable dignity of the human intellect should be forgotten, and the great and important problems regarding its nature, operations, and destiny, should be passed by unheeded amid a multitudinous group of studies of less importance and minor moment than the *one* all-absorbing mania of this "*golden age?*" Positivism contemns the "Philosophy of Mind" as improgressive,—twits "Logic" with the jocular definition that it is "*l'art de s'égarer avec méthode*"—the art of going astray by rule—and plumes itself upon its own conquests and advancement. We have no desire to retaliate these "railing accusations;" but surely this almost deification of positive, and scorn of mental science, is nearly equivalent to the assertion that the dwelling-place of the soul should be more cared for, and more luxuriously treated than the semi-divine resident therein. We do not despise the wondrous discoveries and inventions of Physics. We are rather gratified by the fact, that mind

is possessed of such mighty powers and gigantic capabilities; and this serves to show us more and more the utility of spreading a knowledge of the "Art of Reasoning." Lord Bacon has most justly observed, that "abstract contemplation, and the construction and invention of experiments, rest upon the same principles, and are brought to perfection in a similar manner."* Yet there is one great distinction between Physics and Metaphysics, which we think may be justly regarded as accounting for the apparent comparative unprogressiveness of the latter, viz., the greater invariability of the objects upon which they respectively occupy themselves. Discoveries and inventions in Physics, once made, require no renewal or repetition, but descend, with all their advantages, to posterity. The printing-press, the steam-engine, the power-loom, the spinning-jenny, and the electric telegraph, &c., lack no second inventor. The truths of geometry, the facts of chemistry, the circulation of the blood, the law of gravitation, the method of fusing metals, of preparing dye-stuffs, of manufacturing porcelain and glass, the revealments of astronomy, &c., stand in need of no new discoverer. The Pyramids, the sacred bull of Nineveh, the Colossus, have borne witness of the art and physical science of man for thousands of years. The Parthenon, the Coliseum, and the temples of Memphis, attest, even in their ruins, the marvellousness of human skill. Canals, bridges, aqueducts, roads, and railways, machinery, and scientific apparatus, &c., bear evidence of the fertility of his genius. The sculptured monument, the life-resembling statue, the elaborately chiseled specimens of architecture, the pictured landscape, the accurately mimicked scenic representation, the gorgeous historical *tableau*, and the carefully outlined portraiture, display the might and delicacy of his inventive powers, and executive dexterity. In all these, ideas have been incarnated into works, and are become permanent memorials and certificates of what human ingenuity has effected and can accomplish. Everything here is stable, firm, and enduring. Every succeeding generation starts from a higher eminence in civilization than the last. The results of some thousands of years of thought, inquiry, experimentation, and invention, become the inheritance of the earth's future inhabitants. With mind it is far otherwise. Mental Philosophy is not cumulative as Natural Philosophy is. No one can here repose with confidence upon the results of the labours of his predecessors. Self-knowledge can only be attained by self-search. Each succeeding student brings in himself the "raw material," upon which, by experimentalization, scrutiny, and self-examination, he must build up for himself a knowledge of his mental nature, must free himself from doubt, confusion, and intellectual bewilderment, ascertain for himself the *criteria* of belief and action, and gain an acquaintance with the powers of his own mind, and the limits of his own understanding. Hence we believe that, however much physical science may spread improvement abroad throughout the world, there will still be much to be done by mental philosophy, much in the acquisition of self-knowledge, the analyzation of the intellectual faculties, the devising of superior educational methods, and in perfecting our acquaintance with

* Impetus Philosophici, p. 682.

the nature and kinds of evidence upon which our beliefs and actions must necessarily rest.

Evidence is that which elucidates truth, which renders the facts of a case clear, plain, obvious, and manifest; that which proves the accuracy of our thoughts, opinions, and hypotheses, and on which the mind can rely, as the ground and foundation of its beliefs; which enables us to ascertain the certainty and correctness of that which passes on within the mind, or is impressed upon it from without. What, then, is that which can give us this certainty? What is that upon which we *must* rely, as the ultimate ground of certitude? This is an all-important question. To one whose reliance must be so frequently based upon *data* beyond his own power of attainment, who must trust in the testimony of friends, confide in the avouchments of strangers, credit numerical calculations, prepare for or against contingencies, discriminate between appearances and realities, believe that upon the occurrence or recurrence of a given cause, a given effect will follow; risk life and fortune on the faith of observation, and the deductions which may be drawn from it; hazard his happiness and well-being on the correctness of an inference; nay, endanger his "eternal all" on the validity of proof; that science which seeks a compass that will guide his way, and attempts the discovery of the pole-star of Truth, ought not surely to be overlooked, or glanced at lightly, and thrown aside as frivolous and futile. Yet it is passing strange, that he who discovers a new, and hitherto unchronicled star, amid that unnumbered host which deck night's coronal of jet, or stand as friendly beacons at heaven's open gate, should gain eternal honour, while he who maps the intellectual hemisphere, and deciphers the true reading of the supersensuous mentality, is passed by unheeded and disregarded, or stigmatized as a mystic, a visionary, a metaphysical jargonist. To demarcate the bounds which separate the true from the false, to distinguish the apparent from the real, to ascertain the difference between inadvertency or error, and certitude or correctness, is a noble aim, and lofty aspiration; and if there be a possibility of discovering the "Nature and sources of Evidence," and classifying these into specific grades, dependent on particular operations of the mind, a great advantage shall be gained, were it but in the knowledge which it would yield of the capacities of the intellection. For Locke truly remarks, "Were the capacities of our understanding well considered, the extent of our knowledge (—*acquiring powers?*) once discovered, and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark part of things; between what is, and what is not, comprehensible by us, men would, perhaps, with less scruple, acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other." * Some such attempt we will now essay, in the hope that, imperfect as it is, it may be found useful in the realization of the object at which we aim.

When we employ ourselves in scrutinizing the stupendous chaos of phenomena with which we find ourselves surrounded, we cannot fail to perceive that each generically different existence is endowed with peculiar qualities or attributes, which

* Essay, Chap. I.

mark out the distinction between *it* and every other species of object; that some phenomenal specificity differentiates existences, and indicates the point of dissimilitude between them; and that each object is possessed of the power of appropriating that—and that only with safety to itself—which will develop and mature the individuality of its nature. The "law of vitality" in plants and animals, is the *primordium* from which their developing powers arise. Each germ in either of these classes has impressed in its very constitution the power to be that *one* thing, and nothing else. It may be, in plants, that the soil is unfitted to yield the proper nutriment in proper quantities; that the atmosphere is ungenial, and the sunbeams scanty. This will produce a stunted, dwarfed, and deformed specimen of the plant, but it will not alter the radical and constitutional qualities with which it was originally endowed. It may be, in animals, that the climate is insalutary, the food-elements insufficiently produced, and extraneous circumstances unpropitious. This will not change the inherent attributes of its nature, though it will impede and injure its development. So it is with man. There is a differentiating element—the mind—within him; and this mind is endowed with a specificality of nature no less essential and constitutional, no less definite, precise, and determinate, than those which appertain to surrounding objectivities. Upon this *uniqueness of structure*—if we dare use the expression—depends the peculiarity of product for which he is remarkable—thought. As

> "From the root
> Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
> More airy, last the bright consummate flower,"

so thought, belief, science, and action are developed from the intelligential germ. We do not wish to be understood here as asserting that ideas are either innate or connate. No! Man is born with *mind*, not with *thought*. This mind possesses a potential capacity of receiving impressions, and thence eliminating ideas. This capacity exists in an infant at birth, undeveloped and inactive, but competent of being impressed, excited, and developed in accordance with the laws of its being. From this it will be seen, that not ideas, but the power of idea-eduction, is innate, and that the thoughts which are excited within the mind are regulated by the opportunity afforded it for exercise and cultivation, and the necessary laws and modes of operation under which, by its very constitution, it is compelled to contemplate all external objectivities and internal operations.

"Man," says Emerson, "is that noble endogenous plant which grows like the palm, from within outward;" and again, "Man is endogenous, and education is his unfolding." This is the theory of mental evolution. Consciousness is the germinal which, by its indwelling energy, operates upon the impressions of which sensation informs it, and thus gradually builds up within itself the edifice of knowledge. The senses are but the nutriment-seeking filaments by which the mind strives to acquire materials fitted for building up its intellectual being, and evolving that idea of Nature which we call—Science.

Consciousness is to the mind what *nervility* is to the body—the general informant, or rather recipient, of impressions. It is that singular power which the

mind possesses of knowing all that passes on within it, or exerts itself upon it, by which the whole series of sensations, ideas, emotions, volitions, and actions which operate in or upon the human intellection, is revealed and held up to view. It is not one single faculty or exertion of mind, but that by which the mind becomes privy to the phenomena of the mentality. This may be proved from the fact, that when men are earnestly excited, they lose all consciousness, and are hurried on by the irresistible power of the activities of the mind; while it is not until the excitement subsides, and calmness returns, that consciousness is capable of re-exerting itself. "We no more feel or know it (*i. e.*, a recent mental emotion) than we feel the feet, or the hand, or the brain of our body. The new deed is yet a part of life, remaining, for a time, immersed in our unconscious life. In some contemplative hour it detaches itself from the life-like ripe fruit, to become a thought of the mind."* "The series of states in which the mind exists, from moment to moment, is all that can be known of the mind; and it cannot *at the same moment*, exist in *two different states*, one of consciousness, and one of some other feeling wholly distinguishable from it."† Were we discoursing on the laws of mental growth, we should feel ourselves justified in dwelling longer upon the peculiar nature of consciousness. All that we, however, require to prove is, that the mind must grow from an internal principle, not from external accretion; must put forth its own energy to select, separate, and absorb, in order that it may afterwards recombine, synthetize, and change. Knowledge is not an accumulation of facts and particulars, but these facts and particulars entering into and being absorbed by the mind, originate the ideas of law, truth, and duty. If this be accepted as truth, our task is easy; for Consciousness will then be proved to be the ultimate *criterion* of truth to each individual of the human race. And how can it be otherwise? Can we overstep the limits of our nature? Can we have any ideas which have not entered into the mind? Or can we have any ideas in the mind of which consciousness does not take cognizance? If not, then consciousness must be able to give us information of all that passes in the mind. By watching its operations, we may gain a knowledge of its laws, and of the power of those faculties which we are called upon continually to exert. That there *are* such laws, may be seen in the fact, that by no possible educative agency can the mind be brought to believe that the toothache is the beating of a drum, that an elephant could grow on a rose-bush, or that a triangle is a circle. No, there are necessary laws—modes of operation under which the mind is necessarily compelled to contemplate external objectivities—as truly impressed upon the constitution of the mind, as the "laws of vitality" are upon the infant animal, or the germinating plant; and it is only by the power of introversion, or self-seeing, which consciousness enables us to exercise, that we can gain a knowledge of the forms of thinking, and the principles on which our intelligential activities exert themselves.

The human consciousness gains knowledge from two diverse sources; the one direct, unintervented, immediate—giving us information regarding the mental

* Emerson's Oration before the A. B. K. Society. † Brown's "Physiology of the Mind."

operations in their intuitional capacity; the other, indirect, intervented, and mediate —teaching us, by inference, of exciting objectivities. The one occupies itself in regard to all that passes on in the mind, explains the operation of its powers, the method of its excitement, the results of the impressions made on it, and the general workings of the understanding. The other employs itself in watching the impinging, the tangentiation of objects upon the mentality, strives to look beyond the circle of its finity, from the effect, thought, it wishes to glean information regarding the thought-excitant, and, by inference, attempts to detect the *outlying* impressibilities which produce such wondrous results upon the mind. These twin-powers of consciousness must proceed in accordance with the conditions of the human intellect, without which thought cannot be evolved. These conditions are called laws: law, in this sense, meaning the uniform *modus operandi* which has been impressed upon mind by its Author. This distinction between the intuitional and logical consciousness—the *διανοια* and the *νους*—it is of great importance to apprehend clearly; for every process of Reasoning takes for granted certain fundamental principles, without which no reasoning could proceed. It is the intuitional consciousness which reveals these to men. Not that the ideas are innate, but that the mind is so framed that, when once called into action, these ideas must as necessarily and inevitably arise within it, as the acorn, when placed in proper circumstances, must become an oak. "Truth, in the intuitional sense, is *being*—being manifesting itself to the human mind—being gazed upon immediately by the eye of the soul."* It cannot, therefore, admit of demonstration. Like the axioms of mathematical science, intuitional truths are the results of simple and internal knowledge, which, although primarily excited to action by external objects, precede all acquired information. Their extraordinary clearness, not their obscurity, renders them incapable of proof. Their self-evidence is not a defect, but a perfection. Upon these alone can we rely, as absolutely and irrefragably inconvertible. They are so inwovened and intertextured with the mind that no development of thought can be educed without calling them into being.

Having premised this on the question of General Consciousness, we shall now be in a condition, without prejudice to that great fact, to render our explanation of the "Nature and Sources of Evidence" more simple and easy, by considering the several great streams from which Consciousness gains its knowledge, as separate sources of evidence, each contributing its own individual sort of information and certitude to the mind, under the following heads:—Intuition, Sensation, Memory, Analogy, Testimony, Probability, Induction. We will, however, defer the consideration of these items for another paper.

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* Morell's "Philosophy of Religion."

Religion.

OUGHT THE CHURCH AND STATE TO BE UNITED.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It has always been the aim of the enlightened part of mankind to seek for truth, under whatever garb or disguise she may have been previously concealed; and to sift to the bottom the flimsy foundations on which many of the opinions which we encounter in everyday life, are too often based. But the example of Pilate is, alas! too frequently followed by those who enter at first with avidity on the search for truth, and whose ardour is abated either by the natural aversion which the human mind feels, to have its pre-conceived and long-cherished ideas overthrown and trampled in the dust, by the rudeness of some literary opponent, or from an innate apathy to the pursuit of what may not immediately interest or affect it.

But the subject which we have now to discuss, if it does not involve the deepest interests of the human race, must, from its forming an essential part of the political economy of every community, interest each intellectual member of that community.

In order more clearly to define the various relations in which the Church and State, or rather the religious and political principles, of a nation, have at different times existed, we will endeavour to trace, from the earliest eras, the rise and progress of these two principles.

It will, doubtless, be conceded by our antagonists, that the primary condition of Government was paternal; and, to substantiate our position, we may be permitted to quote the masterly delineation of Dr. Russell, who says, "As the first social connexion is that of husband and wife, so the first civil superiority is that of a father over his family. Nature, therefore, directs us to patriarchal rule as the original government among men. For although a father has no natural right to govern his sons, after they have attained the years of manhood, they will find it necessary to recur to some person for the arbitration of their common differences. And who so likely to be chosen for that purpose as their common parent?" His counsel is sought, and to him they are led to appeal, not only from a persuasion of his superior wisdom, but from a conviction that his decisions will be just, because he is equally concerned in the welfare of all. To him, as their common head, his offspring look up; and he exercises, during life, the joint offices of governor and judge." Now, we think that, upon these premises, it is only necessary to show that the administration of spiritual affairs is contingent on temporal government, to prove our position, viz., that it is incumbent upon a Government, which is or ought to be paternal, to provide, either directly or indirectly, for the spiritual welfare of its subjects. We will deal with the expediency of the case afterwards.

We may allude to the Patriarchs and Samuel in scripture, to the priest-kings of Peru, and to the Grand Lama of Thibet; in all of whom the spiritual and temporal administration were combined. And it seems to us to require no great exertion of the imagination to discover the necessary combination of these two principles in the primeval eras. Who, we may ask, so fitting to guide and direct the youthful minds of a community, as he to whom they have been accustomed to look, from earliest infancy, for those rules which may guide them in the affairs of every-day life; whose advice is clothed with the garb of sanctity which both age and superiority throw around it? "The priesthood was anciently exercised by the chief or monarch; but as an empire became extensive, the monarch exercised this office by his delegates; and hence an additional source of veneration for the priesthood. The priests were the framers and administrators of the laws."* We know that it may be

* Tytler's "Elements of History," p. 5, sec. 5, of "Ancient History."

urged that this form of government was only fitted for the primeval condition of the world, and that now, when science is advancing with such gigantic strides, and the harvest of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and *evil* is being gathered in, the spirit of the age recoils at regulations which would now be absurd, if not absolutely injurious. We deny this *in toto*. The objection is irrelevant, and the argument fallacious. For however the practice may be changed, the principle still holds good. It is not directly as individually serving the sacred office of priests, but indirectly as encouraging and upholding the popular form of religion, that we would have the Government exist. And even should we entrench on the grounds of expediency, what, we would ask, must be the inevitable results of the disunion of Church and State? There are only two that we can discover. Either the Government must stipend off the clergy, as they do in France—no very encouraging example—or the latter must be driven to a precarious subsistence on the voluntary principle. Here is the choice; and we wish our antagonists success in extricating themselves from the dilemma. In the former case, the professors of all religions would be equally entitled to claim a remuneration for their services, which would lead to an interminable expense; while in the latter the clergy must either starve—as is too frequently the case—or preach those doctrines which are the most acceptable to the ears of their congregation.

But we would argue the question on still higher grounds. What, we would ask, must be the end of a nation who virtually rejects religion, who casts it to the winds, and says, "We will have none of it?" or the policy of a Government whose members are of every hue and shade, from the Protestant to the infidel? "Whoso honoureth me I will honour," is the declaration of Him who never spoke without fulfilling his word; and who adds, "He that despiseth me shall be lightly esteemed." And this applies with as much force to a nation as to an individual. For what is a nation but a collection of individuals? We recognise the personality of a people when we talk of national faith, national honour; but we, unfortunately, too often lose sight of it in religion. The principle, that what is everybody's business is nobody's business, applies here; for a Government which countenanced the religion of all would profess the religion of none. May we never live to see the day when a nation of scoffers, and an infidel Government shall tell the tale of England's apostacy from the faith of her fathers.

One word more: We know that there are many good men who advocate the separation of Church and State on conscientious principles, and that there are, too, many bad men who do so from personal motives. We would advise the former—for with the latter we have nothing to do—to consider well the consequences of the step which they are advocating, which, when once taken, there is no retrieving, and which would be rife with troubles to England; for we firmly believe that on the day when England casts off her allegiance to her God, her sun of glory will set for ever. The ill-omened clouds are gathering thick and dark over the horizon, which has hitherto been clothed in spotless azure; and although England has yet escaped the taint which has affected the whole of the continental states, producing those fearful convulsions which have shaken to their foundations most of the thrones of Europe, we know not what may be laid up in store for her hereafter. We do not claim infallibility for our Church; she has, doubtless, her imperfections—for what human fabric has not?—but the world is full of institutions which, however dissonant they may be with our present ideas, should not be rudely thrown to the ground.

We have done: and it only remains for us to say, that we part from our opponents with no ill-will or malice, and only hope that they and all our readers will give the subject that impartial consideration which it deserves. F. B.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

SUCH a question as this, from the nature of the elements concerned, is of immense importance, one element having to do with man in relation to time, the other in regard to eternity. Thus man's entire interests are concerned in this discussion. At the present time, from the position both of those without and those within the pale of the Established Church, the subject is invested with great interest to men of all classes, and hence I rejoice that it has been chosen for discussion in the pages of the *British Controversialist.*

Perhaps the best method of solving this problem will be—

1st, To ascertain the nature of each institution.

2nd, To endeavour to discover from the Scriptures the will of God respecting their union; and—

3rd, To trace the history of that union, and mark its effects.

The Church is not a material building, Acts vii. 48, but a spiritual one, 1 Cor. iii. 16; it is composed of the whole body of believers, of whom Christ is the head. The officers of the Church were formerly of two sorts, Bishops and Deacons, Phil. i. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 1—8; Titus, i. 5, 7. The members of the Church, in primitive times, stood alone in the world, a distinctive class, possessing certain qualifications, and being in a certain condition of mind, not common to the world, and not originally possessed by themselves. The term Church was frequently applied to a section of the whole body of believers assembling together in one place, as "the Church at Jerusalem," "the Church at Corinth," "the Church in the house of Nymphas," &c. The objects of such Churches were, the social worship of God, the commemoration of the Lord's death, and mutual sympathy and succour.

The State is the institution which takes cognizance of the secular interests of a nation, and its province is to keep in order the whole national machinery, making or repealing criminal, sanitary, commercial, and political laws. In its rightful operations it regards man not as religious or irreligious; not in his relation to God, but merely in his relation to his fellow-men. Springing as the State does from the necessities of the community, it has only to do with those necessities. Hence all have an interest in its working, but none can claim its patronage or favour. The Christian cannot rightfully claim a jot more of protection than another man, nor one sect of the Church than another sect; toleration and liberty of conscience are alike the right of all.

2nd, Let us endeavour to discover from the Scriptures the will of God respecting this union. In Matt. xxii. 21, I think we have a caution against confounding our obligations as Christians and as citizens: 1 Cor. vi. 15; Eph. v. 7; Jas. iv. 4; Rev. ii. 14, 15; 2 Cor. vi. 14, 18, all bear more or less upon this question. I think that upon a fair and impartial examination of these passages, it will be seen that the Church was intended, by our Lord and his Apostles, to be intact, and kept aloof from the spirit and schemes of the world, not to associate itself, in its collective capacity, with secular matters, but rather to busy itself in works of faith and labours of love, evincing its heaven-born spirit by its charity to those without and its love to those within.

We will briefly trace the history of the union of Church and State, and mark the effects of this union.

We find that, in the second and third centuries, Christianity retained its virgin simplicity and unambitious humility; but "in the early part of the fourth century Constantine took up the profession of Christianity, and multitudes followed the royal example. Imperial favour shone upon the ministers of Christ, wealth and honours were largely heaped upon them, and a profession of Christianity being the principal path to preferment, persons of rank sought its dignities and emoluments, and a hierarchy was framed, corresponding with the civil government, and consisting of many orders of ministers unknown in former ages of the Church. Corruption

in every form, both of doctrine and worship, increased among the Christians. From the period of their ecclesiastical union with the State under Constantine, ceremonies superseded the Scriptures in the public worship of the sanctuary, and men of speculative or worldly minds were promoted as ministers of Christ."

Arius and Pelagius propounded their errors, which spread with more than pestilential rapidity. The light of pure and undefiled religion became dim. The lamp of God's truth was put under a bushel. Intellect, the twin sister of Religion, became paralyzed, and the character of "the Dark Ages" will throughout all time proclaim the baneful effects of that moral upas-tree, a State-fostered Church.

About the close of the fourteenth century, the worse than Egyptian darkness which covered the earth was pierced by the rays of the morning star of the Reformation. A faithful few showed their attachment to Christ and his cause by patiently suffering persecution and laying down their lives for him. At length Luther arose, armed with a power not his own: he shook the kingdom of darkness, and awoke the Church from her long slumber. Had the Church now emancipated herself from the shackles which had so long bound her, happy would it have been; but alas! she still clung to an arm of flesh, and under the enervating influence of courtly smiles, she relapsed into somewhat of her former state. The spirit of persecution found a home in her midst, as the "noble army of martyrs" to a *Protestant Church* testify. From Edward VI. down even to the present day, persecutions, imprisonments, acts of intolerance and bigotry, mark the history of the Established Church of this country; and now, in the seclusion of many a country village, petty deeds of persecution are done that never find their way to the public ear, and priestly intolerance, with bribery and threats, often exerts itself to counteract the well-intentioned efforts of the agents of other denominations.

Thus, in my opinion, the testimony of history goes to prove that this unholy alliance has a tendency to deaden the vital energies of the Church, and to change Christianity into a matter of mere form and name. The page of history shows the ruinous consequences of the Church forgetting her high vocation and stooping to take a bribe from the world.

What can be a greater anomaly than a professedly Christian Church receiving its laws and its liturgy from the world—its creed, its rites and ceremonies being dictated by a mixed body, whose component parts represent every sect in the empire? Atheist, Pantheist, Catholic, and Protestant, all have a voice here. Can we expect any very spiritual design, in beauteous harmony with the will of Christ, to emanate from such a source? With such a constitution we need not be surprised at the scene which the Church presents at the present day, with a "Popish liturgy, a Calvinistic creed, and an Arminian clergy."

The reciprocal influence of this unseemly alliance is traced in the history of ages, lying in the back-ground of antiquity, as well as in the passing events of our own day. The influence of the Church upon the world in unnatural relationship is recorded in crimson lines, for it is admitted by all parties that the most sanguinary wars on record have been those waged in the name of religion. A dominant sect, having its interests interwoven with those of the State, has ever been ready to sanction with its smile the enterprises undertaken by that State, while the Government in return has ever been ready to support with its power the selfish schemes of a corrupt priesthood. In the present time the influence of this union is seen in the manner in which the Church withstands every enlightened and onward movement, and in the vexatious pertinacity with which she brings forward various schemes to further her own interests. The effrontery with which she compels Christians of all denominations, and even infidels, to render her pecuniary aid, is a violation of that inherent sense of justice which is implanted in every human breast.

The influence of the world upon the Church has been of a most pernicious

character. From the moment of its alliance with the State under Constantine, we read of wealth and honours being bestowed upon it, changing the ministry into an office of emulation and gain, making it a comfortable retreat for the younger members of the aristocracy, and an object of ambition to those who covet a life of respectability and literary ease. According to the axiom, "Evil communications corrupt good manners," we see the elements of worldly-mindedness introduced into the Church, and there like leaven leavening the whole lump. Hence we have spheres of useful evangelic labour regarded as merchandise, and actually sold to the highest bidder. Hence, too, we hear of pluralities, sinecures, fox-hunting parsons, Puseyite bishops, &c.

As Scripture condemns this union, as reason pronounces it to be unjust, and as history records its baneful effects, I believe that the Church ought at once and for ever to be separated from the State. W. G.

Philosophy.

IS PHRENOLOGY TRUE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

Mr. Editor,—Perhaps you will permit me once more to enjoy the "lettered ease" which I formerly so much extolled, while calling your attention to a few facts which, in my opinion, strongly militate against the possibility of the truth of Phrenology. We grant the "something reasonable" which C. W., jun., remarks "there have been few who would not allow." This, however, is but a small matter, for what system of false philosophy has ever arisen without the amalgamation of some truth in it? It is this "something reasonable" which gives to error so long a life; it is this very minglement of "two grains of wheat in a bushel of chaff" which makes it so difficult to come at the truth which the matter contains. Hence Astrology, Augury, Palmistry, Oneiromancy, Physiognomy, and the thousand and one other methods of divination, have had upon the globe their "birth and their forgetting." C. W., jun., aware that "minute changes in principles lead to mighty changes in effects," has laid down for himself a summary of Phrenological axioms; these, therefore, our "facts" must controvert, else our present letter will be of no effect and vain. We do not intend to criticise these "premises" *seriatim*, for that would be tedious, and, besides, we have not the requisite works at hand which would enable us to engage in a consecutive refutation. "Such as I have, give I unto you." The sixth data which C. W., jun., postulates in proof of Proposition III. asserts, "that partial injuries of the brain do not equally affect all the mental powers, which they should do if the organ of the mind were single." One instance in opposition to this occurs to our memory. The case is related by Sir Astley Cooper; the circumstances are these:—A sailor, while his ship was cruising in the Mediterranean, fell from the yard-arm to the deck. This fall caused a small portion of the cranium to press upon the brain; the man's intellect was instantly and entirely obliterated. The functions of life, and these alone, operated, for they require neither will nor consciousness to assist them in the performance of their duties. In this insensate state the man existed thirteen months. His vessel then arrived in England; he was taken to the hospital, the contusion was operated upon, and the bone raised. The man's intellectual faculties recommenced their suspended operations, and the first question which he asked was regarding some circumstance which had taken place in the ship immediately before the accident.

It is a "fundamental fact" amongst

phrenologists, that there is no general organ of Memory, but that each faculty collects the impressions made upon itself —in fact, "minds its own business." It appears to me that the following case, which Mr. Green, in his Lectures at King's College, as reported in the "Medical and Surgical Journal," thus recounts, is conclusive in opposition:— "I remember seeing a patient in St. Thomas's Hospital who had an injury of the head. During his illness he began suddenly to speak in a language which nobody in the ward could understand; very fortunately, in one of the most voluble moments of this patient, the milkman of the hospital was passing through the ward, and, listening to the sick man, instantly recognised the Welch language. A freer communication immediately took place between the parties, and it appeared, according to the account delivered by the milkman, that the patient spoke English very well, but that in consequence of the accident, that language had been completely knocked out of his head." Now, if there be an organ of language, expressly appropriated to that one departmental study, why did it not recollect the English as well as the Welch? Or is there an organ for each language? Absurd! Either, then, there is no organ of Language, or there is a general memory—which horn of the dilemma is accepted.

But we are told, in "reason" 3rd, that "the mental faculties do not come *all at once*, as they would were the brain one indivisible organ." Which of our faculties is *all at once* perfectioned? The eye is one indivisible organ—does it exert the power of accurate distinguishment *all at once?* The ear, does it *all at once* correctly discriminate sounds? The stomach, can it digest "all and sundry" the materials which might be pressed upon its uneducated powers? The legs, do they at once acquire the power of walking, running, dancing, &c.? The vital functions do, indeed, I grant you, all at once operate, but they are involuntary, and act without the aid of consciousness or will; all the other powers of body and of mind begin to act with difficulty, and it is not until a long course of laborious training is undergone that they attain their full perfection. Every one who has studied a handicraft knows, that although the hand is "one indivisible organ," it cannot "all at once" gain the requisite nicety, skill, dexterity, and peculiarity of action which is necessary for the successful prosecution of the trade. Why should it be otherwise with the brain? Does its progressive acquirement of ability necessarily and inevitably indicate that the brain is not one indivisible organ, but a congeries and aggregation of individualized and distinct organs? It is stated by phrenologists that the greater the bulk of the brain the more powerful will be the mental manifestations; if, however, there be such a thing as *quality* in brain-matter, the coarser *it* is, the greater will be its bulk, but the less powerful its capability of sensational excitability. How is this knowledge to be obtained? By external signs or internal examination? Again, the cranium or brain-case is not always of uniform thickness or density in different parts of the same individual's skull, and it differs more widely still in different individuals. How is the thickness of the cranial *ostea* to be discovered? Can it always and invariably be found out, whether the brain uniformly fills up and occupies the whole of the intercranial space? "Non semper ea sunt qua videbitur"—things are not always what they seem. We have all bought nuts, when boys, and have found this maxim illustrated to our great discontent when, on breaking a goodly-sized shell, we found a diminutive, bedwarfed kernel. May it not be something similar with brains? We at least have seen no anatomical work which has asserted that the brain *uniformly* fills up the *whole* cranial cavity.

When Phrenologists say, as C. W., jun., does, that "all animal nature seems to add its testimony to the truth of our position," they would lead us to infer that, as is the bulk and weight of the brain relatively to the bulk and weight of the body, so is the relative intellectuality of animals to each other. This, however, is not the case in regard to weight, at least, as the following ratios

will abundantly testify. A canary's brain is 1-14th of the whole weight of its body: a man's, 1-28th; a dog's, 1-160th; a horse's, 1-400th; an elephant's, 1-500th. So that canaries ought to be more intelligent than men. The brain of Lord Byron, whose skull was extraordinarily thin, weighed 58 oz.; that of Dr. Chalmers, whose cranium, on the contrary, was excessively thick, was 53 oz. in weight. Baron Cuvier's weighed 64½ oz.; Dr. Abercrombie's 63 oz. Given these facts, which was the greatest genius; and does the answer accord with Phrenological *axiomata?* It is worthy of mention, also, that the cranium is composed of separate pieces of bone, eight in number; that these are articulated, or joined together in various ways; at their junction, the cranium is generally thicker than in their central portions. Three of these articulations are squamous, *i. e.*, overlapping each other like the scales of a fish. How can we be certain that these sutures or joinings are obliterated in the party whose cranium is being *read?* Dr. Leach examined the immense collection of *crania* in the catacombs of Paris, and discovered that in one out of each eleven some parts of the sutures were unobliterated. The cemetery at Hythe has been examined with like results.

In dissection of the brain it is found that it consists of two kinds of matter, white and grey: on the exterior surface of the brain, in some parts the white, in others the grey was seen. The grey matter, when looked at through a microscope, is found to abound in little globules, to each end of which tenuous filamentary fibres are attached; those fixed to the one hemisphere receive intelligence, those fastened to the other convey commands; all these grey-matter globules combined, form the organ of intellect, the avenues through which the mentality is awakened and informed, and by which it reacts on the outer universe. These are the results of the latest experiments of German physiologists, and have been verified by eminent British anatomists. Now these globules are not found in every part of the external surface of the brain. How, then, can they make external cranial prominences by which their presence may be manifested? Again, in the conglomeration of convolutions which forms the human brain, these globules are to be found winding down through the fissures with which it abounds, especially down the side of the dividing septum. Nay, in a horizontal section of the brain, layers of white and grey matter are found alternately. How, then, can the grey globules mark the cranial periphery, seeing that they do not manifest themselves *alone* on the exterior of the cerebral globosity? Surely Phrenology cannot give us information of the operations which these interior grey strata execute? And, if not, what is the inference?

Another remark, and we will close our letter. The minute subdivisions of mental powers which Phrenologists make is, in my opinion, absurd. What is the radical *differentia* between Combativeness and Destructiveness? Can you combat a thing without wishing to destroy it, or destroy it without combating? Are not Time and Tune but different modifications of Order? To calculate time and to keep tune appear to me to be attending to successions, and the attention to these constitutes, so far as I can judge, mere peculiar manifestations of the "spirit of order." Is Secretiveness a *positive* quality? Is it not rather a prudential exercise of Cautiousness? Ought there not rather to have been an organ of Talkativeness, and Secretiveness a deficiency in organic manifestation? When one feels the pangs of remorse, does it immediately originate a volcanic upheaving of Conscientiousness? A similar analysis of others would yield like doubt-producing results.

We think that the foregoing facts amount to serious probability that Phrenology is untrue. It must be admitted as true that a large cranium is, in general, a fair guage of the sensation-receiving and information-bringing powers which the mind has at its disposal, just as a huge muscular arm betokens strength, or a broad chest a large amount of lung: but to parcel out the brain and its external case, the cranium,

into distinct self-governing territories; to demarcate them as provinces, to draw boundaries round small portions of the cerebral surface, and name them as the seats of any individual species of mental manifestation, appears to me absurd; contradictory to all the teachings of the Anatomist, the discoveries of Physiologists, the experience of men, and the results of the spirit-inquisitions of metaphysicians.

I will not occupy your space in remarks on the materialism to which Phrenology so inevitably leads, as S. N., my former antagonist, has ably contended that point, and the masterfulness of the argument may be seen in the fact that in your last Number no mention of his *argument* was made. This is the key to the whole question—Can we gain a knowledge of *mind* by looking at its instrument? Can I estimate correctly the *whole* intellectual power of a workman by an examination of his implements of labour? Besides, any one acquainted with the law of "permutations" must know, that as there are thirty-six organs, so they may be simultaneously excited in billions of different ways. How great a certainty, then, can be attached to the "practical inferences" with which Phrenologists favour, I will not say dupes, but credulous persons? *verb. sat.* Hoping the foregoing may serve to elucidate the truth in this matter, I am, yours, &c., PHILOMATHOS.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THE following beautiful thought, uttered by the Son of Sirach, a thought upon which was raised no less a superstructure than Butler's far-famed Analogy—may be taken as a basis of a few remarks upon Phrenology:—"All things are double, one against another, and God hath made nothing imperfect."

If we could contemplate the visible frame of the universe with the virgin eye of one born blind, but who, by some means, obtained his sight, our first impression would doubtless be, that all things were composed of solid matter. The blue dome above our heads would seem, judging by its analogy to the green carpeted earth beneath our feet, to be an immense vault, supported upon the verge of the horizon.

But as the reflective faculties of man are more largely developed, he becomes gradually acquainted with the existence of a loftier, deeper universe. The *spiritual*, with its overpowering thought-awakening tendencies, becomes apparent, and, as he ascends higher, and widens his range of vision, in this illimitable region, his ideas expand, and he comprehends with a clearer eye the uses of matter. The infinite variety of objects perceptible to his senses, now show themselves to be merely the alphabet of the spiritual—a hieroglyphic alphabet it is true, but one not altogether difficult to be understood. From this, man discovers those harmonious and unvarying laws which regulate the material world—laws evidently calculated to produce the greatest common happiness to the sentient beings by which the world is inhabited. From this he derives the noblest inference—the greatest truth that his mind can conceive—the existence of an All-wise, All-powerful, and All-good Being—the Creator and Preserver of all things.

Thus, it appears man has something tangible set before him, whereby he is enabled to discover the intangible—something known, to lead him to the unknown. Nature, God, matter, mind, body, soul—the visible and the invisible—each is the exponent, the co-efficient of the other. If from the visible we form our ideas of the invisible; if from the voluntary action and motion of organized matter, we are able to discover the workings of mind; if from nature we are led up to God; why should not a similar relation exist between our bodies and our souls? God has given a physical and moral law, and is it not probable He would also give us a law for the regulation of the organizations He has bestowed upon us? Such a law exists, as is proved by the improvement of nations in physical and intellectual conformation, in proportion as they cultivate their faculties. Observe the difference of feature and cranium (the

deterioration of both beauty and intellect) of the natives of Connaught, in Ireland, where the country has so long been in a state of semi-barbarism, compared with those of Scotchmen or Englishmen who have received an education, and whose ancestors have been so long under a sort of imperfect training. Does not this fact prove, beyond contradiction, the existence of an intimate relation between the mental and cerebral conformations? But I have already trespassed too long by way of introduction, and shall now proceed to discuss the truthfulness of Phrenology?

S. N., I think, states the doctrine of the science pretty fairly; I shall, therefore, do battle with him on his own ground. The first inquiry then is, Is the brain the organ of the mind? or, in other words, Are thought, volition, and memory, the action of an immaterial being, working entirely independent of cerebral organization, except so far as using it as the instrument to transmit its decrees by means of the nervous system, to the members of the body?—or, Are the cerebral organization and the soul so intimately connected that the latter cannot (as at present constituted) think, will, or remember without the other? Let it be borne in mind, that the question is not, Can the soul exist in a separate state? but, Does the mind, as at present constituted, act independently of brain? If the soul thinks, wills, &c., without the aid of brain, how can we account for the phenomenon of a dreamless sleep? How would concussion of the brain produce insensibility? How would drinking alcoholic liquors (a material substance) cause a temporary insanity, or disease of a mind independent of matter? And how could insanity, or disease of the mind (as those opposed to Phrenology call it), be transmitted from generation to generation, in the same manner as family features? Can it be supposed that the Almighty would implant in the living spirit, which he infuses into the infant, a poisonous seed, destined, like a upas-plant, to prey upon, and ultimately destroy, the ethereal substance? Is it not much more rational to suppose that the parents, by their infringement of the organic laws, have induced cerebral disease, which, by a universally recognised law, they transmit to their children, as they likewise do consumption and other diseases? We cannot account for the gradual decay of mental power, induced by old age and disease, otherwise than on the hypothesis that the brain is so closely connected with the mind, that the health of both is requisite for the manifestation of thought, volition, &c. The noble intellect of Robert Southey, by his overtaxing his mental faculties, was completely destroyed.

Now, if mind acted independently of brain, this could never have been the result. How, in the nature of things, can we suppose that a purely immaterial existence would have its faculties injured by over-exertion? According to the Phrenological doctrines, this can easily be accounted for, on the ground that the brain, like other parts of the body, may be injured or destroyed by too much excitement. If the brain were only the medium by which the soul controlled and directed the physical system—then, in cases of cerebral disease, or in old age, the soul would only lose its power over the body,—its power of thinking, remembering, &c., would remain vigorous as ever. But such is not the case. A slight pressure on the brain immediately produces insensibility; or, if it is attacked by disease, the mind, which was immediately before engaged in threading the mazes of metaphysical speculation, becomes a wreck, a chaos of raving emotions, or merges into complete imbecility.

With respect to the second doctrine of Phrenology, that each faculty has its appropriate organ; this, I think follows from the former. If the brain be the organ of the mind, then, as "order is heaven's first law," a part of the brain would be allotted to each particular faculty of the mind. The general doctrine of Phrenology regarding this, is admitted to be true, by the unanimous voice of man. The Greeks and Romans formed their statues of the gods with a lofty forehead, betokening their belief in the doctrine that a large frontal de-

velopment of brain is connected with great intellectual power. But in the statues of prize-fighters, the forehead is low, and the head generally small, thus showing that they, copying from nature, have borne witness to a truth with which they themselves were unacquainted.

No observant Phrenologist will assert, that the lines of demarcation between the different organs can be settled with mathematical precision; yet almost all are satisfied of their general correctness. If in examining the craniums of one hundred individuals the exercise of a certain faculty is always found associated with the prominence of a particular part of the skull, then, although the hundredth might appear to militate against the truth of the doctrine that the faculty is connected with the organ, yet the ninety-nine cases would be quite sufficient to prove its truth.

The following facts may serve to corroborate the above statement. In the portraits of twenty actors, I observe a remarkable prominence of that part of the skull where Phrenologists say the organ of Imitation is situated. In a society consisting of twenty-two members, the one who is distinguished by his command of language and fluency of expression, possesses the most prominent eyes.

The third doctrine of Phrenology, viz.: that, *cœteris paribus*, size of brain accompanies development of faculties, is a necessary sequence, if we admit the truth of the two former doctrines. For if, with the prominence of one part of the brain be associated the power of exercising a particular faculty, it naturally follows, that a large development of all the organs will give a corresponding extent of power to the mind. It is true there may often occur facts seemingly opposed to this, such as the large development of an organ unaccompanied with a corresponding exercise of a faculty; but it can be easily explained by the fact, that faculties may exist in a dormant or inactive state. Phrenology has not yet arrived at maturity, hence we may expect apparent anomalies as well as in other sciences.

A few remarks, before closing, upon S. N.'s objection to Phrenology and advocacy of Psychology.

How far can the mental philosopher extend his investigations into the world of mind? How broad is the foundation on which he builds his theories? Does his philosophy take cognizance of mind in all its varieties? or is it "cabined, cribbed, confined" within the narrow bounds of his own personal experience?

Here exists the difficulty of Psychologists. They examine their own minds, write a description of their modes of action, divide them into imaginary powers, and then lay down this as the basis of a universal philosophy. This mode of procedure might do, were all minds alike; but they are not.

"Shall only man be taken in the gross?
Grant but as many sorts of mind as moss."

The Phrenologist, on the contrary, taking his system as the base of his observations, watches the action of his own mind—reduces that, which before was a chaos of contradictory experiences, into beauty and order, and has certain data by which he is enabled to extend his researches beyond the narrow bounds of personal consciousness, and explore mind in all its endless varieties. Hence the superiority of Phrenology as a system of Mental Philosophy. It universalizes the study of mind.

S. N. endeavours to prove that the science is a "misnomer." Now, I wish he would render the "clearness" of his "*non sequitur*" a little "clearer," for I cannot understand why we may not investigate the cognitive powers themselves, taking Phrenology as the basis of our investigations. If he means that Phrenology cannot teach concerning the essence of mind, then I answer, neither can Psychology—neither can physical sciences concerning the essence of matter; neither can Theology concerning the essence of God. Take away from mental philosophy the phenomena which Phrenology can explain—Mental Philosophy, minus Phrenology, and what is the remainder?

The vital spark defies as much your attempts at amalgamation or definition as the essence of Deity itself. Phrenologists do not deny the existence of the

entity—mind; they merely assert, what all experience corroborates, that brain is necessary for its manifestation. The absurdity of endeavouring to quash Phrenology by metaphysical reasoning, is apparent. Let us suppose that a person born in a flat country is taught the astronomical truth concerning the globosity of the earth. Let us further suppose that he travels into foreign countries, and sees Mont Blanc. If unable to understand the compatibility of the doctrine he previously entertained, with the existence of the mountain, would it not be absurd to dispute the fact of a mountain being there at all, merely because it is irreconcilable with the former truth. Those who endeavour to disprove Phrenology by arguments drawn from the dim misty region of metaphysics, are in a similar dilemma.

Phrenological organs either do or do not exist; if they do exist, the attempt to reason them away is as absurd as trying to demolish Mont Blanc with a pickaxe of moonshine.

A MEMBER OF THE LEITH YOUNG MEN'S SOCIETY.

WHICH MOST DESERVES THE ESTEEM OF MANKIND, THE POET OR THE LEGISLATOR?

THE LEGISLATOR.—II.

IN entering upon a consideration of the question thus put forth for discussion, it will be proper to state, that when we speak of esteem deserved by the Poet and the Legislator, we shall be understood to mean, not that particular kind of esteem which is the reward alone of personal excellence, and which *both*, in common with all men, may, or may not deserve; but strictly that which they merit from mankind in general, *by virtue of their vocation or mission;* and we would also remark, that in striking the balance between the two, and awarding to the one a greater amount of esteem than to the other, we do not determine the superior worthiness of the other in *every individual case*,—in other words, that every Poet is more worthy of esteem than the Legislator, or every Legislator more worthy of esteem than the Poet, inasmuch as the esteem of the world is infinitely more due, on the one hand, to a Milton than to a Robespierre; and to a Peel than to a Byron, on the other.

The question, then, is this: Which of the two, in the true and faithful fulfilment of the duties of his capacity, deserves most of the esteem of mankind? Our decision is given in favour of the Legislator, and, as our reason, we would in the first place submit:—That his services are of greater value to the community than are those of the Poet. Superiority of value universally commands superiority of esteem, where esteem can be commanded. That the services of the Legislator exceed in value those of the Poet, is proved by the fact, that the former are indispensable, while the latter are not. The Poet's calling may be a high and holy one, and his kindled soul may glow with the consciousness of its own nature and capabilities. His may be a noble destiny, and his resources boundless as the universe itself. The past, the present, and the future, may be his. He may re-write the chronicled records of ages, strip them of their false disguises, uncover their hoary errors, and win for their excellencies a juster appreciation. He may linger among the tombs of the mighty, and teach living monarchs how brief a thing is earthly power. He may dip his pen in battle-streams, and write the emptiness of the warrior's glory. He may show to the ambitious man how lordliness has brought its own downfall;—to the designing and nefarious, how craft and chicanery have wrought out their own destruction. He may lay bare the veiled chambers of the priest's temple, professedly God's. He may unmask mystery, miracle-mongering falsehood, and sacerdotal jugglery; and he may have lent no mean aid in the restoration to life of a pure Christianity. He may sing the dirge of abrogated laws,

absurd as atrociously cruel. Opinions current immemorial with an honest jingle, he may dare to pronounce intrinsically worthless; and rescue from the interdiction of bigotry and conventionalism the veritable issues of the mint of Truth. He may make and maintain his claim to be a world's teacher. He may give a complexion to his own times; influence popular customs and character: his songs may be received where sermons would be rejected; and their choicest beauties treasured as household words in every family. He may do battle for right against the encroachments of power; deal deadly blows at monopoly and exclusion; and hold up to contempt and scorn, to the test of religious principle and common humanity, the hollowness of cheap-shirt and gas-light civilization. He may encourage to noble deed and manly action, to continuance in well-doing, and patient endurance of suffering. And his prophetic spirit may ascend the watch-tower of faith and hope, and herald the approach of a long-wished day of glory. These, and more than these, are the Poet's claim to esteem; and insensible, indeed, must he be who would withhold it. But however glorious the Poet's service, it is not indispensable. He may lie in the tomb, his lyre be beside him, and his mantle fall on no successor, and the world, though a loser, would escape ruin. There would, it is true, be a dull, unsatisfactory void, which nought could supply. Mammon would gloat with greater delight over his gold,—Care brood darklier on the brow;—Intellect would have less lore, and Happiness would lose a fountain; but there would be no stoppage of the vast machinery which society creates and keeps in constant motion. The hum of industry would not be hushed, nor the busy mart deserted. The engine would still set time and space at defiance; the telegraph speed its message; the ploughshare cleave the soil, the sickle reap the grain; and the printing-press symbolize thought. Justice and Order would still maintain their supremacy. To many of his neighbours the absence of the Poet would be but the absence of a useless dreamer, for whom feminine companionship, or perpetual confinement to the fabled regions of the Muses, were a fitter portion than the society of bustling men. And even to those who hold in opposite and just estimation the Poet's worth, and who would feel that no adequate compensation could avail for his loss, there would be this mitigation of the calamity—that *poetry* still remained: poetry finding utterance from every leaf and flower, in every object of nature, and in every phase of human experience. Poetry would still smile upon man from every direction, inwreathe her associations with every circumstance of his existence, would light his path with the star of heaven, and cheer his heart with the charms of earth. She would paint bright visions to enchant his youth, weave rosy garlands for his bride, and softly radiate the summer's evening of his declining years. Bereft of her high priest, Poetry, though unexpressed, would make herself intelligible, and man would not fail to be her interpreter.

Turning from the services of the Poet, how differently must we speak of those of the Legislator. His are, indeed, indispensable. He must be ever at the post of duty. If he leave it but for a moment—if he loose his hold of the helm, the vessel of State drifts swiftly to destruction. His very vacillations are fraught with imminent peril. It is only while with steadfast hand he remains faithful to his trust, that there is felt to be any security for a nation's interests. From the monarch who has a crown at stake, to the peasant, whose only wealth is its progenitor,—labour,—he is regarded by every man as the protector of his rights, the conservator of equity and good order, the guardian of cherished institutions, and the guarantee of the capital, the credit, the commerce, and the correspondence of the country. The public creditor knows that without the Legislator his bonds will be dishonoured; the shareholder that his scrip is but waste paper. The Legislator establishes dynasties, directs armies, and equips fleets; in short, he is the directing, and virtually, the ruling power of an empire, and no empire can exist without him. Dispense with whom you will, you cannot dispense with the Legislator. The Laureate may

be gathered from his honours to his fathers; the Court consign his office to the same oblivion with that of its jester; but it cannot thus dispose of the Minister. His indispensableness proves his greater value, and his greater value establishes its claim to superior esteem.

If it be objected here, that in the maintenance of our argument we must be prepared to admit a further application of the principle that the indispensableness of one kind of service proves its superiority over that of another;—that we shall have to place the Poet in an undignified and unfavourable comparison with every class which renders a necessary service;—that we shall have to acknowledge the inferiority of his service to that of the trader, the police-officer, and even of the servants of our household, whose offices we cannot dispense with; or that we must discard our principle altogether,—we decline to commit ourselves to so disagreeable an alternative, and that because there is no occasion for it. We conceive of two kinds of service; the one, that which, while it serves others, has for its primary object the satisfaction, gratification, and aggrandizement of self, interested, mercenary,—the other, disinterested, philanthropic, in its nature; like sun-rays, outgoing, diffusive. The latter is just as much above the former in its character as it is in the motive which induces it. This, combined with great talent and correct principle, forms the highest degree of service which can be rendered by one man to another, or to a country. Mere talent, however great, commands no esteem. It may be admired, but it is only so far as united with generous motive, with effort for usefulness,—only so far as it is consecrated to serviceable and benevolent purpose, does it meet with esteem. When exalted intellect, consummate genius, profound philosophy, are thus made subservient to the benefit of mankind, then, doubtless, does their possessor render the highest conceivable service. To this class of service belongs that of the Poet and of the Legislator. In inquiring which of these two deserves most of the esteem of mankind, it is obvious that we have to determine the relative value of their services; and we think it will be granted that, to arrive at a decision on this point, the indispensableness of the Legislator is a fair ground of argument in his favour; and that, therefore, in this respect, his claims to our esteem preponderate.

We next submit that the Legislator is more worthy of esteem than the Poet, because his services are more arduous in their nature, and involve more of self-sacrifice. The extent of an obligation is enhanced when the conferring of the same has been attended with difficulty or sacrifice of any kind to him who confers it; and it is well known of the human mind, that it recognises this fact, and awards esteem proportionate to such difficulty or sacrifice, or feels that it ought to do so. Now, amidst what ease, and even luxury, of circumstance does the Poet transmit the inspiration of his genius. Who that loves retirement and quietude,—rest for the soul from the ceaseless turmoils of life,—does not covet his existence? He shares, indeed, in the common troubles incident to human life; but they, in so far as they have not their origin in the difference which makes him a Poet, belong to the *man*, and not to the Poet. Amidst the comforts of home, in the seclusion of his study, he fulfils his duty. He fulfils it in the far-off woods, where no interruptions mar his communings. He pursues his contemplations on a lonely sea-rock, and writes the praises of a morning whose glories come to him only through his chamber window. We do not, however, maintain that his immunities are enjoyed without abatement. Criticism, unfair as unfeeling, may, at the very zenith of his ambition, select him as the object of its attack; and his own generation, whom to serve would be the consummation of his happiness, receive his pretensions with contempt and scorn. His motives may be calumniated; his efforts ridiculed as pitiable futilities. It may be his lot to be termed a presumptuous innovator; a designation he will be sure to receive if, in conformation of mind and development of power, he chance to differ from his predecessors, and deviate from established rules of poesy. It may be also his to be denied recompense of a pecuniary nature; his immortal works may not be

marketable commodities, and, precluded by his devotion to the Muse from seeking, as other men do, for subsistence, he may suffer the pangs of poverty and want. All these drawbacks must be borne in mind if we would calculate rightly the Poet's service. But he has his remedy in some of them, and in others his compensation. If the shaft of criticism hit, his own quiver is stored with ready arrows. If his own times persist in refusing his claims, posterity will render restitution. If he suffer want, disappointment, sickness of heart,—the result of "hope deferred,"—his recompense is in the hidden springs of delight which every devoted poet possesses, and which are peculiarly his. And it is proper to be borne in mind that if the faithful expression of his thoughts would endanger his personal safety, the Poet may protect himself by secrecy, and incognito vex his enemy. Allowing that every true poet must be an earnest man: that his energies must be in constant and active exercise; that his life will be *a work*,—a mighty, magnificent, and imperishable work; he still remains exempted from onerous and costly duty. Laurels cluster thickly on his brow, and appropriately, too; for, in his case, they are rewards of high and illustrious service; but many of these honours have been easily won; their acquirement has subtracted little, in the general, from the amount of his personal ease and convenience.

If the foregoing be denied of the service of the Poet, or, at least, to the extent to which we have stated it, we believe the *greater* arduousness and self-sacrifice involved in the Legislator's service will not. Put the service of the Poet at what point you will within the truth, it is obviously exceeded in the present respect by that of the Legislator. Regard our remarks as proceeding from a gross want of appreciation in this particular, or from palpable ignorance, the thing is undoubtedly true as far as we require its use. There *are* Arcadian bowers, if the poets are worthy of belief, where it is their peculiar privilege to dwell; but where are those of the Legislator? He lives and acts in the arena of party-strife and factious turbulence. He is no mere spectator; he is a chief and constant actor in that scene of endless conflict. Interests, principles, opinions, prejudices, passions, at enmity with each other and with him; class against class, creed against creed; Church, Queen, and "glorious Constitution," on the one hand; the six points on the other; with an intermediate family of familiar cognomen; these share largely in the constitution of his position, and we will leave it to the combatants themselves to decide what are the difficulties which beset their leader. Then, again, there are disaffection at home; jealousy abroad; destitution and famine among the people;—treason in the Court; disunion in the Cabinet; unruliness in the colonies; and all these rough and incongruous elements he has to contend with, to control and combine for the common advantage. He must be prepared, for his country's sake, to forego friends, favours, and fortunes; to bear undeserved charges of infidelity, tergiversation, and deceit; to live persecuted, and die despised by the very party whose interests have longest been served. Where is sacrifice like this demanded of the Poet? His monument of fame, once erected, endures for ever, despite the puny critic of his day; but who can restore the Legislator—the idol of yesterday, the stricken-down statue of today—to his lost position of dignity and honour? And this unequalled difficulty, this precariousness of power, this sacrifice of self, are not the mere accidents of a stateman's existence: they belong to his very being, as easier and more gratifying duty belong to the Poet: take them away and the Legislator disappears with them. There is no privilege of choice in his lot; it must be taken as a whole, or altogether rejected. He enters upon his career with a full knowledge of this fact; he knows that what has been the fate of others may shortly be his own: he knows that to be open to conviction will be to lose friends; that to legislate for the commonwealth will be the way to incur the enmity of a clique. He sees, too, on every side, the wrecks of former greatness; nations mismanaged and lost; and he knows not that his courage and skill will be sufficient to keep his own

bark from the rocks on which others have stranded. He is called to duty, perhaps, at some important crisis of his country's history; inherits, with his uncertain tenure of office, enormous liabilities and wasted finances; commerce is paralyzed; revolution and anarchy loom gloomily in the distance. But we find the faithful Legislator ready to meet the emergency. With the height of difficulty rises his determination to compass it; and though the whole storm should centre its fury in his own person, he will either place his charge in safety, or himself perish in the attempt.

We are willing to rest our case here, believing we have given two sound reasons why we should esteem the Legislator more than the Poet. How strikingly, we may add, have our views been illustrated in the history of that distinguished individual—the poet-statesman of France. In which capacity did he most to win for himself that profound esteem with which he is regarded by all men? Was it not in his capacity of Statesman, when in the hour of his country's need, he, with words of eloquence alone, held spell-bound the passions of her infuriated populace, and did better service in a single day than he had done through half a century as a poet? When had the most effective of his poetry wrought so mighty a work for the salvation of a nation? When had it exposed *him* to equal danger? It is true, he escaped unscathed; but his fate might have been different, and no wonder felt; for who would guarantee the safety of a defenceless man surrounded by armed insurgents mad with the fumes of wine and riot, however mighty the principle to which he trusted, and likely to serve when heard by reason and sobriety? That he did escape was, perhaps, owing to his being a poet. The Poet shielded the Statesman. The safety of the one provided against the danger of the other. As in the case of Milton, who, if he had not been a poet, would in all human probability, for political offences, have ended his days on the scaffold. B. W. P.

THE POET.—II.

SOCIETY has its upper and its lower servants—its butlers, its footmen, its lady's maids, its cooks, its tutors, its governesses, and its servants-of-all-work. Each of these is as justly entitled to his or her modicum of wages, the one as the other; but all do not receive an equal amount of reward. Though the estimate and importance of the offices which an individual fulfils in his relation to society depend very much upon the age in which he is born, and the state of his people, as civilized or uncivilized; yet, undoubtedly, there is essentially a difference in the deserts of men, and hence a difference in the right they have to the regard of their contemporaries, or posterity. The modification produced in the estimate of a man, through the influence of his age and country, may readily be accounted for. The age forms the man, not the man the age. A man may indeed modify his age, but it is not before the age itself has placed him on an Archimedian standing point, that he can perform this great exploit.

A Napoleon must have been born amidst the clash of swords, the thunderings of artillery, and the shoutings of armies, otherwise he would have proved no disturber of the peace of Europe. Out of that storm in history, the French Revolution, he might have ended his celebrated story by the same words with which he began it—"A Lieutenant in the regiment of La Fere."

But the age favourable to the development of one man's genius is adverse to that of another. As the melody of the birds, and the sighings of the groves are unheard amid the storms of winter, so the "still small voice" of Philosophy, and the vocal warblings of her twin-sister, Poetry, are drowned by the confused noise of the warrior. Thus the contemporaries of a great man form their estimate of him, not according to the intrinsic value of his works, but according to their marketable price. But what has been, what is, and what will be, the valuation set upon the Poet?

In the earlier state of society, low, indeed, was his standing, nor could it by any means have been otherwise. The

dealer in the unseen—the abstract, could not but have appeared to the rude and earth-loving faculties of man-primitive, inferior to the more tangible realities of the hunter, the fisherman, or the warrior.

It is true that in a later age he became the companion of kings, but his company was only sought as the purveyor of flattery, the giver of fame.

As to the proper office of the Poet, I am afraid that we are very far from its true estimation, even in the present age. As the poor man in the tale is made to carry the found diamond to the goldsmith, so must we carry the Poet to a future age. But who is the Poet? What is his office? Is he merely the manufacturer of rhymes, the gilder of language, the creator of beautiful—but to all practical purposes, useless—fancies? Doubtless many there are, sternly wedded to what *they* consider the practical and real, that would not even hesitate to pronounce such a verdict. But no! a thousand times, no! The Poet is the painter, the popularizer, of virtue; the Prometheus, with fire from heaven, re-animating the cold and dead forms of morality; the evolver of moral light;—in fine, the spirit of development resting upon the abysses of human nature. True it is that he deals in what some style the fanciful, but which is properly the imaginative. Of a verity it is that Poetry, divine as in its nature it is, partakes also of the gross and the earthy. But is not this essential to its nature, as the poetry of fallen and *depraved*, not of *perfect* human nature.

But how is the Poet the evolver of moral light? First, in his character as a philosopher and a thinker. In this capacity he unfolds those relations which bind together in harmony the different parts of the universe, spiritual and material, and presents them to his fellow-men in the form of doctrines. Secondly, as an illustration. The knowing or intellectual faculties of man possess but little control over the will of man, compared with the feelings or instincts of his nature. He may reason accurately, and arrive at a perfect, logical conclusion, but still, with the broad light of day thus streaming down upon his head, leap into the pit at the blind cravings of his instinctive desires. But here the imagination comes to the rescue with its vivid pourtrayals; and, embellishing with its magic pencil the scanty outlines drawn by the reason, calms and subdues the passions. This, then, is the office of the Poet: to teach, to illustrate, to deck out abstract and ethical Truth in the garb of Beauty, and send her abroad into the world to conquer and ravish the hearts of men with her seraphic loveliness.

What nobler office is there than this? We make bold to say, none. Is not he—the Poet—the Priest of Nature—marrying in harmonious union the seen and the unseen, the material and the spiritual? Does he not thus throw a flood of light, a perfect noon-day, upon that which otherwise is cold, and high, and abstract; and develop that first, and loftiest, and most divine of man's faculties—the Moral Sense.

What shall we say of the Legislator? That *his*, indeed, is a noble employment, to curb, to keep in due subordination the animal nature of man; and to guard from its attacks the rights and well-being of society. But how does he stand in comparison with the Poet? The Legislator must found his laws upon ethical principles, recognised by the society for whom he legislates: consequently he only affirms something already received. And except the principles or precepts of morality, on which law is founded, be visible to a people through their Moral Sense, it is obvious that their obedience will not be conceded to that law, except through constraint.

Hence the superiority of the Poet to the Legislator. The Poet is the revealer; the Legislator is the establisher of his revelations. The Poet speaks in the indicative mood, the Legislator repeats his words in the imperative. Thus, as the architect is superior to the mason, the author to the printer, the thought to its symbol, so is the Poet superior to the Legislator.

HAROLD.

Politics.

IS UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE JUST OR DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

HAVING then, in some measure, endeavoured to show that Universal Suffrage is just, it remains to view it in the light of expediency. It seems, indeed, after having arrived at the conclusion respecting the justice of Universal Suffrage, somewhat singular to inquire, "whether it is desirable" to do what is just! It may be, and doubtless is, a necessary question in the present state of society, so far as it regards the safety of those who, having long retained the power in their own hands, have unfitted the rest of the world to use it. But there is no thief who might not refuse to restore the stolen property on the same ground; viz., the incapacity of the owners to exercise it properly. It will, however, be necessary clearly to apprehend the ground which we desire to take on this part of the subject. Believing Universal Suffrage to be just, it will at once be seen that we look forward to its final and complete establishment. Any writer, with doubts of the right of the suffrage, would advocate the desirability of partially extending the franchise; and would thus quit the argument. It appears to us, in a general sense, that Universal Suffrage is desirable. It must not be understood that we would at once instal every man as an elector. We should certainly not advocate the suffrage being immediately made universal in a country like Russia, which, in intelligence, civilization, and all that constitutes moral or intellectual greatness, is a century behind the rest of Europe. We do not wish to intrust the functions of government to an entirely ignorant population. It is true that the people of Russia have as much right to demand the government of their affairs as the people of England; and, even were they to assume it, they would, perhaps, not administer worse than does the despotic Czar. Yet we may, as a matter of mere expediency, desire to see them qualified for the change of their destinies. Making those extreme exceptions which will occur in every rule of politics and of morals, we entertain the opinion that there are but few countries in which Universal Suffrage is not desirable. In England we make no doubt that Universal Suffrage should be immediate; and that it would be, at all events, far preferable to the system of government under which we at present live. It has of late been much the habit to speak of popular violence, to represent the people among whom we daily live in tranquillity and peace as creatures raging for bloodshed and anarchy. Such statements are greatly exaggerated as applied to any country whatever. We are led by the writers of the day to look too much at the faults of multitudes of men suddenly admitted into the exercise of privileges which they had scarcely hoped to obtain; and to gloss over those appalling crimes by which kings have built up their decaying thrones. We talk of the love of anarchy among the mob, and the loss of trade, the injury to commerce, and the irretrievable ills caused by the movements of the people on the Continent against their kings, without ever considering that there is scarcely a person who takes part in a rebellion who does not risk his life and injure his material interest. Men do not act without some motive; and it is not too much to suppose that revolution is chosen as the lesser evil; and that it is by the tyranny of crowned heads that people at last prefer to make a wreck of all worldly prosperity and happiness, rather than any longer brook a despotism which converts life at once into a curse and a disgrace. Were we to search deeply for the causes of the late revolutions, we should find them to be concealed under the thrones that they had so nearly overturned. The kings of Europe were the first revolutionists, and the people became so in self-defence. The kings

conspired against freedom—the people combined to protect it. No one who looks at the late movements on the Continent in a liberal spirit, but must see how little was there, on the part of the people, of that violence which was predicted, and which is now said to have taken place. It is fashionable to be horror-struck at the name of Revolution, and then to stigmatize every attempt at electoral reform as having a tendency to promote the dreaded evil. We have in our own annals an event which we term the "Glorious Revolution," and which every Englishman is prone to think was the great salvation of his country's liberties. Surely we can have no just right to complain of the Germans and Italians now demanding from their tyrants those liberties which we, centuries since, wrung from ours? There is no crime in revolting against despotic authority—there is no crime in seeking to "render vacant" the throne of a thrice-perjured king, in fighting in defence of the most ancient liberties, and in freeing a people whose glorious deeds live not alone in tradition, from the domination of ecclesiastical power, the horrors of the political inquisition, and the shame of being ruled by a priest whose sympathies are with the superstitions of his faith instead of being interwoven with the happiness and welfare of his people. The people are not lovers of violence—it is their necessity, not their choice—it is the only means of protecting themselves against hireling armies and tyrannical rulers.

It must be owned by every one, however opposed his opinions to the increase of popular power, that the people of Europe presented a sublime spectacle of heroism and moderation. It would, however, be more difficult even to *excuse* the ferocity of those rulers who returned the forbearance with which they were treated, with the greatest cruelty—who sacrificed to the feelings of revenge the lives of their subjects. One of the great arguments against Universal Suffrage is the ignorance of the people. "What!" it is said, "bestow important political rights upon men who are ignorant of the common duties of society, who have never been taught the first principles of morality or religion, and who, in their very conduct, appear to have lost all that is most ennobling in the character of man?" This is a serious and important question. This country, famed as it is in arms and arts, having arrived at almost the highest pinnacle of national greatness, yet conceals in the very midst of it a vast population who have received no benefit from the morality and happiness around them; who live, in the very centre of civilization, as barbarians, without the blessings of knowledge or religion, or even the more material comforts of life; and who are ever ready to disorganize the society that has so little regarded their sufferings, and left them a prey to every description of human misery. Many, too, of our labouring population, who have to bear the alternations of extreme poverty and comparative comfort, are, it must be acknowledged, in a state of great ignorance. Such being admitted as the circumstances prevalent in England, we should expect, even if statistical information did not prove it, that other countries are, *most* of them worse, and but few better. We lose sight of the fact, however, that, as the neglect of the condition of the vast populations of the countries of Europe has been the crime of Governments, so it is now their punishment. By a long career of oppression and neglect whole parts of the community are become vitiated; but the fault surely is not that of the unhappy victims, but rather of those who have neglected their high and sacred trusts. Property owed duties to poverty which it never performed; and now it fears the evils of its own creation. The Suffrage is claimed for men in the high development of these faculties; and, surely, if the moral and intellectual capacities are dwarfed and stunted by a vicious state of society, it is the fault of that system which promotes such fatal results. By the want of that large and comprehensive sympathy with the wants and welfare of the people, we have physically deteriorated, and morally ruined, large masses of them. We have by the thousand physical evils which attend extreme distress,—by the ravages of disease, and the noxious influences of

bad habits, which we have suffered rapidly to increase among the poor of our country, prevented them from enjoying the rights of their existence; those rights which society ought to bestow upon every man, by which he should be enabled to acquire the greatest amount of physical and mental good of which his nature is capable. The vice which at present reigns among some of the lower orders of the people is no more inherent in their natures than in those of other classes of the community. Why is it that the middle classes are not so depraved in their habits and character as the poor? Simply because they have been better taught. It is out of the same raw commodity of humanity that society manufactures its good and worthy citizens, and its hardy, outcast villains. If, as moralists tell us, there is a well-spring of evil in the human heart, at least it does not follow that it should pour forth its bitter waters in greater plenitude over the poor than the rich man's actions. It is a question of too great moment for us to attempt the solution, as to what combination of causes has led to the present condition of the poor in this and other countries: but one thing may safely be asserted, that, had they possessed the Suffrage, they would never have been reduced to such a state as to make them a terror to the rest of the community. Society would have done, from self-interest, what it has neglected from the same cause. If all men had been held as entitled to vote in the elections, it would have become a necessity that they should be instructed how to exercise the franchise properly; and, as there is nothing in labour to incapacitate a man for the exertions of the intellect, we should now have beheld the pleasing spectacle of the working classes as well qualified to decide upon the men fit to be their representatives in Parliament, as those to whom the power is now delegated. It is in this light that we consider the Suffrage as a great social question. The possession of power on the part of the people gives them a security for that care and attention which it is their right to expect. How slight is the sympathy created by the sight of the poor man's child left uneducated, now, to what it would be if we knew that important powers centred in his person, which would, hereafter, have to be exercised in reference to our own property and condition! Were the Suffrage to be granted, all those who feared the so-called Democratic power would, for the protection of themselves, rush, with an alacrity which philanthropy cannot alone inspire, to the aid of their fellow-men. We should have such a purification of the lowest dregs of society as would soon advance the triumphs of virtue; impart on every hand the blessings of knowledge, and bestow a scarce-hoped-for happiness upon the suffering millions of our country. The most permanent security for property is to be found in the universal sense of justice among men; and that desire for the protection of their own possessions which makes them afford a similar security to those of others. The most dangerous enemy to order, good government, and property, is the man without rights. The more you invest a person with the responsibilities and duties of citizenship, the more you call into vitality that principle of self-esteem which has so large a share in all human actions, and which, first teaching a man to respect himself, afterwards leads him to respect others. For, upon what ground does the right of property rest, but upon the general consent of mankind that each individual should be left in the enjoyment of what he has, by any just means, acquired? It has been thought, it is true, that, by contracting the elective franchise and the employment of military, property may be protected; but no one will contend that the consent of an enlightened people to the arrangements of wealth, would not be preferable to means, at the best, but precarious; and which, when the people become exasperated at the injustice they have suffered, cease any longer to be effectual. In reference to this part of the subject, the refusal of Universal Suffrage has been justified by a writer of some talent; but more remarkable for his pedantic singularity of expression and of thought:—"The few

wise will have, by one method or another, to take command of the innumerable foolish: and that having taken, they must keep it, and do their god's message in it, and defend the same, at their life's peril, against all men and devils."* The same mystical character which predominates in the works of the writer may be seen in this passage; and it is somewhat difficult to bring his concealed and covert expressions to the light of day for inspection. If by the above assertions it were only meant that, in all societies for government or human action, the wisest men will acquire power, no one would deny so palpable a truism, and so beneficial a fact. But, on the other hand—which is obviously the writer's meaning—upon what principle of justice is a wise man to assume to himself the prerogative of depriving another of his right who is not so wise? The proposition is fallacious, in taking for granted that those who at present exercise political power are wiser than those who do not. If we had some unerring guide by which we could detect those on whom Heaven had bestowed wisdom, perhaps the "innumerable foolish" might be inclined, by courtesy, to give into their hands the power. But no man has any power to declare himself more wise than another, and, upon that assumption, to dispossess him of his political privileges. There is a total distinction between the rights of man and his wisdom. He is called upon to perform duties: and if he possesses sufficient wisdom for the performance of these correctly, he has likewise enough for the due discharge of the corresponding rights. The tax-gatherer takes the penny of the poor man as readily as the sovereign of the rich: no compunction is shown in considering him too poor; no allowance is made, in the system of taxation, to his want of wisdom. Thus, those who are called upon to serve their country in the militia, to work for and pay its taxes, to obey scrupulously its intricate and cumbrous laws, are told when they require the fair rewards of their actions, that they are not wise enough to be intrusted with their rights. The fear of any immediate bad results from the extension of the Suffrage in England, is, however, entirely groundless. We have many who are suffering deeply from the present state of our social relations, but those who would overturn them are few. Were we, in England, to make the Suffrage universal, we should admit more property and intelligence than we have at present, with a less proportion of vice and discontent. The effect would be to give immediate satisfaction to many who have now well-grounded cause of complaint; and the disaffection to the institutions of the country would be far less felt in the representation than it is now. That the people of England are fit to be intrusted with the Suffrage is sufficiently attested by the fact, that although at the time of the continental revolutions they had many grievances to complain of, yet they preserved a peaceful demeanour, showing how well, generally, they were acquainted with the duties of their position, and how well qualified they were to enter upon the enjoyment of those privileges, from which, so far, they have been excluded. It is an undeniable fact that those countries in which the power of the people was most fully recognised by the law—where the Government did, in some measure, adapt itself to the wants and wishes of the people—were not affected by the storms of revolution raging around them. England, America, and Belgium preserved a profound tranquillity, simply because the popular voice had, in those countries, more power than in any of the others. Tyranny is the grand fomenter of revolutions; and where the people have no means of making their will known by the law, they will revert to those first rights of nature which teach them to protect their liberties from the aggressions of arbitrary power. Governments should rest their power upon as broad a basis as possible—that of the whole people. By doing so the laws are better obeyed, since every man feels bound to render homage to the laws of his own making. The great object of dispute between

* Carlyle.

rulers and their people would be removed by the concession of the Suffrage; and there would be but little cause of quarrel respecting the favours of Government when the substantial power of making the laws was enjoyed. With regard to our own country, the recognition of Universal Suffrage would be the best and grandest political act which her legislators ever performed. It would recognise every man as equal before the laws—it would strengthen the patriotic sentiment in the minds of those who reaped the benefit—it would remove the bitterness that keeps different classes of society apart from each other, by teaching them how much their interests are identified—it would raise the poor to comfort of body and of mind, and would be most likely to give us a happy, contented, and moral population. No man who enjoyed under this form of government so much well-regulated liberty, would ever seek to change it; and the institutions of our beloved country, the dignity of the throne, and the liberty of the people, would, as far as can be said of sublunary affairs, be immortal. This is the only stone wanting for the completion of the edifice of British liberty; and then she shall be universally acknowledged to be the greatest nation that ever existed, in ancient or in modern times—greatest in wealth, learning, commerce, literature, and in military power; and above all, in that one characteristic in which consists all true national glory—she shall be greatest in the freedom of her people.

EILO.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

REPUBLICAN in principle—loving all things that tend to liberty and the emancipation of intellect, it will be thought somewhat of an anomaly that I should oppose Universal Suffrage. But this I most conscientiously do; for, while I believe it, as an abstract principle, to be just, I think that at the present time, and in this our country, it is not desirable. The general intelligence of the people is not such as to guarantee that no evil would result from it. To prove this would, indeed, be an easy task. A reference to the Registrar-General's Reports, showing the state of education throughout the country would be sufficient. I am well aware that many of the advocates of Universal Suffrage consider the illiterate and uneducated man quite as capable of exercising the privilege of voting for representatives in Parliament as the better-informed and more liberally educated. It may be that these individuals are themselves uneducated, or that they are bigoted in favour of a principle which they would like to see in full action: and that, to obtain their ends, they are willing to sacrifice all truth and honesty, and to uproot the very foundations of established things, without once stopping in their mad career to inquire whether they are doing good or evil. Be this as it may, they cannot be intelligent, rational, and far-seeing men. It is a settled conviction in my mind, that, other things being equal, the educated man must be better qualified to judge of the merits or demerits of a candidate, than it is possible for an uneducated man to be. If it be not so, of what use is that education, which, of late years, has caused such a clamour in the world? and if it be so, it follows, as a matter of course, that the man who possesses the most knowledge and the clearest comprehension, is best fitted to select a representative. Universal intelligence not having arrived at a proper standard for the exercise of a privilege such as this, I feel justified in saying, that it is not desirable that Universal Suffrage should become a law of our land.

That there are numbers of educated men whose moral character unfits them for discharging their duties as voters, I do not deny; but still it is a fact that needs neither comment nor proof, that they do not constitute so great a proportion as the same characters do amongst the uneducated. To whom do our bribery agents go when they wish to secure the election of a nominee? To the rich, and, therefore, probably educated? No. It is to the poor, and, therefore, probably uneducated. And

why? Because it is considered that they will be the more easily persuaded, duped, or frightened, to act as their tools. And where must we seek a remedy for this state of things, except in the gradual and steady progress of education and enlightenment? By such measures as these we shall scare the giant, Ignorance, away, or throw a light upon his countenance to let men see how much to be detested he is; and soon a better state of things will be brought about. Rest assured, that no Government can long resist the demands of an intelligent people: Governments cannot long stand, if they do not in reality keep ahead of the people whom they govern. But when I look around me, and see five-sixths of the people of these realms wallowing in the mire of ignorance, it does appear to me that even our Government is very far in advance of the general intelligence of the nation;—not that I sympathize with all now done by way of legislation; on the contrary, I should be glad to see much more liberal measures pass our Parliaments.

But while I object to Universal Suffrage, for the reasons before stated, I would not be understood as advocating any of the modes of electing representatives now in use. All of them, even the most liberal, are very far from that perfection which I desire. What, then, it may be asked, is the *modus operandi* that you advocate? It is a "Suffrage based upon the intellectual attainments of men." In explanation of this principle, I may be allowed a few remarks. I think that, in the first place, all Governments ought to give to their people a good secular education; that, in other words, nearly all schools should be under the care and direction of Government. If this were the case, it would be very easy for us to ascertain whether men were possessed of the proper qualifications for voting for the election of members of Parliament. It would not be necessary to fix the minimum of education at so high a point, but that all might attain it by the time they left the public schools. A certificate should be given to each qualified pupil, enabling him to vote when he had attained to his legal majority, if then untainted by crime. To ascertain this latter point, it would only be necessary for each claimant to fill up a form setting forth his qualifications, the truth of which should be attested by two respectable (I do not mean rich) men, who should, by fine or otherwise, be made, in some measure, responsible for its statements. This would do much good, inasmuch as it would have a direct tendency to suppress crime, and show to men, that they lost more than a temporary advantage in doing wrong. The educational clause would also have a good effect on the nation, inasmuch as it would stimulate the people to attain to that point of intelligence requisite to qualify them as voters; and having once tasted the delicious draught, they would not cast the cup from them. Once arouse man's intellect from the dreamy state in which it seems to lie, and it will tower aloft, and show itself a very giant in stature and in strength; it will burst the bonds of the dungeon in which it has been confined, make for itself a destiny noble and glorious, such as has not been seen from the grey dawn of time. Even with present appliances, the scheme I have attempted to divulge might be fairly and fully carried out. Let every schoolmaster and teacher have it in his power to give educational certificates, and, as an additional guarantee, let these certificates be signed by one or more respectable parties, and even now the scheme might be put in operation. As to expense, I am decidedly of opinion that it would cost less to carry out this plan than our present one, with its cumbrous law-courts, &c.

I have now laid before you all that I intend at present: should it be necessary, I will hereafter enter more fully into the matter. Such, then, is the scheme which I advocate: that it is capable of improvement, I do not doubt; but it is the principle that I contend for. It will be seen, that as this scheme would not for some time embrace *all men*, it could not be called an Universal Suffrage; but as men increase in knowledge, and as the irrigating stream of intelligence flows on, men will gradually

emancipate themselves from the mire and clay of ignorance, and attain to perfect political freedom and equality. Then will a glorious era commence: the days of the past will be dim and lustreless, compared with the splendour of the then present; and the knowledge now thought so vast will, by contrast, be sunk into insignificance. With this dawn of intellectual splendour there will exist an equal moral splendour. It will be a natural and necessary consequent: the one will as surely follow the other, as light doth follow darkness. G. B.

IS IT DESIRABLE THAT THE REVENUE OF THIS COUNTRY SHOULD BE RAISED ON A SYSTEM OF INDIRECT TAXATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

The present question is an important one and cannot but be interesting to all who have given any considerable amount of thought to the subject.

To persons who are acquainted with the workings of society in our own country, and who have watched the steady increase of Taxation, even during recent years of peace, it appears desirable that some method should be adopted to put a stop to our prodigal expenditure, especially when it is remembered that this expenditure presses with considerable weight upon the labour of the poor.

Among a variety of questions which have been propounded with this design, is the one under consideration. Abstractedly considered, there can be no doubt that a system of Direct Taxation has many features which commend it to our attention and render it at least worthy of careful consideration before it is opposed. Whether as a practical measure it would accomplish all that it professes, is matter for further consideration. We say it is worthy of consideration. There is much that may be said in its favour. There is something about it which appears reasonable. When we consider all men as equal in the sight of God, and in natural rights, it appears reasonable that they should know the exact amount of obligation which they owe to the community in which they live, and the exact amount of taxes which they are called upon to pay: this under a system of Indirect Taxation is extremely difficult. It also appears reasonable that they should be able to judge with some degree of exactitude of the honesty or dishonesty of their public servants; and a system of Direct Taxation would furnish them with data on this subject; for if every man had to pay directly to the officers of Government, his contribution to its expenses, he would be able to judge not only of the general economy or extravagance of the Government, but also of the equity exhibited by Government in the manner in which it apportioned each man's burden to the advantage which he derived; or, what is about the same thing, to his means. We need not state that an Indirect System of Taxation does not so readily furnish these data. Besides this, it is but reasonable to suppose that if the Government had to collect the taxes directly from the people, this very circumstance would furnish them with a strong inducement to make their expenditure as light as possible, consistent with efficiency.

It is no part of our business to controvert any of the positions which we have intimated as favourable to Direct Taxation, but rather to show that whilst a system of Direct Taxation is theoretically the most perfect, practically it is incapable of being carried out in anything like either an equitable or a satisfactory manner, in a complicated state of society like our own.

One primary law in political economy is, that all Taxation should be paid out of income. If in private life a man lives upon his capital, he is considered a spendthrift, and not without reason. So also in a state. Wherever a state is brought to such a pass in financial matters that the Government is obliged, to any considerable extent, to tax the capital of the

country as a whole, the end of that state draws nigh; for it is by capital that labour is employed, and by labour that wealth is produced; consequently it is from labour and capital combined that the state derives its revenue. Hence if the capital of a country be taxed, the means of future income are proportionally curtailed. If it is impolitic to tax the capital of a country in the mass, it must be unjust to tax the capital of any class of subjects in particular; for if the country as a whole, does not pay taxes upon capital, no class of subjects ought to be called upon to pay such taxes.

A Legacy Duty, examined by this light, will be found to be unjust, inasmuch as it is a tax not upon income but upon capital. Now a Legacy Duty is a Direct Tax. No doubt it was laid because it furnished a ready method of raising a considerable amount of money with little expense. It is however not the less unjust on that account. It will appear not less unjust when tried by another test. "A Tax should be regarded as the purchase money of value received." Now the money value of governmental protection to any one person, must be measured not by the capital which he possesses, but by the income which he derives from it. A Tax upon Legacies however is a Tax upon capital, and consequently cannot be regarded as the purchase money of advantages derived from Government. Thus the Legacy Duty is an evidence of the difficulty of levying just Direct Taxes. We need not state that the same remarks will apply to the Probate Duty.

Since each person is interested in the protection of the state, to the extent of his income, and since income alone can be justly and wisely taxed, the simplest and most equitable mode of taxation would appear to be that which after assessing the annual income of each person, arising from all sources, should take from him, directly, a certain portion of his income, as his share of the general contribution. Practically, however, even such a scheme abounds with inequalities. For a Tax to fall equally upon all, the assessment must be equal. But how is this to be accomplished? Either by the voluntary statement of the individual, or by investigation and proof. If it is effected by the former the equality of the tax must depend upon the honour of parties under strong temptation to dishonesty; and thus the dishonourable part of the community would be lightly taxed, while the more conscientious portion would bear the principal part of the burden. If it is to be effected by the latter, that is, by investigation and proof, still the dishonest would have the advantage, for some sources of income being capable of direct assessment, are not capable of being concealed, while other sources are known only to the possessor, upon whose statement reliance must be placed.

Supposing however that by proof, or by declaration, or by both combined, a fair assessment could be made, mere income is, after all, a most unfair criterion by which to judge of a person's ability to bear taxation. One man has a freehold estate, or money in the funds, producing an income of £1,000 a year, which will descend to his children after him; another, by an uncertain profession, obtains a similar amount, dependent not only upon his life, but upon his health, and a thousand accidents. The annual incomes of these two men are alike, but how different are their circumstances! For the latter to occupy a similar position to the former, he must not only have £1,000 a year at his disposal, but his income must be sufficient to permit him at the same time to insure his life for a sum which at his decease would produce £1,000 a year for his family. And even then his position would be more precarious than that of the proprietor of land or funded property; for should his health fail, and he be unable to pay the necessary premium, this advantage would be lost. Unequal however as would be the position of these two men, they would be assessed alike, and be charged with an equal amount of taxation.

Suppose however that the professional man should save half his income, instead of insuring his life, he would still be charged upon the whole, and thus his *capital* as well as his income would be taxed, which would be unjust.

Again, the case of annuitants may be mentioned as one of undoubted inequality. Here is a person who invests his money in permanent securities, and who retains his capital. He derives from it a small income, and therefore pays a small amount of tax. Another purchases an annuity, but parts with his capital. As his income is larger proportionally than that of the capitalist, he pays a higher tax. The first pays a tax upon the net interest which he derives from his capital, and his capital remains untaxed; the second receives interest for his capital, but in addition to this he receives back annually a portion of his capital, which together with the interest goes to make his income, and which evidently ought not to be taxed.

The strongest objection to an Income Tax, however, is the inquisitorial nature of the investigation into men's affairs which it renders necessary. By the mass of contributors this is considered by far its worst feature. Supposing the exposure of a man's affairs would do him no injury, yet it is an offence to his feelings; and as such is attended with no small amount of hardship. Some persons are anxious to conceal the amount of their wealth. It is probable that such would find but few who would sympathize with them. There is another class of persons, however, with whom most would sympathize,—those who do not like to expose their poverty. And how many men are there who, feeling that to do this would be to degrade themselves in the estimation of the world, tug on by means of the most untiring industry, and the hardest economy, to retain their position! How many a man, thus situated, would rather submit to an unjust impost, than allow his circumstances to be fully disclosed!

Apart from matters of feeling, such an exposure of men's affairs as a strict Income Tax implies is calculated in many cases to produce real injury. Men of business, often from a dread of competition, take pains to conceal from others, especially in the same trade or calling, the application of their capital, the rate of profit realized, their connexions and their credit, all of which must be disclosed, perhaps to their serious injury, when there is an investigation of their profits.

From the foregoing it is evident that while an Income Tax is, in theory, one of the most perfect taxes of a direct nature which can be made, practically it is incapable of equitable adjustment.

Further, Direct Taxation in any form is unpopular. People do not like taxation of any sort, but the more direct the taxation, the more unpopular does it become; in consequence of this, "indirect taxes," or "taxes upon merchandise" have been in favour with most Governments. These taxes "are least felt by the people, because no formal demand is made upon them. They are so wisely contrived that the people scarcely know that they pay them. For this end it is of great consequence that the seller should pay the tax. He knows well that he does not pay it for himself: and the buyer who pays it in the end, confounds it with the price." It is a great merit in a system of taxation that it is popular, inasmuch as it is but a part of the general government. But this is not the only merit of Indirect Taxes: they require not that minute inquiry into men's affairs which is essential in a system of Direct Taxation: and then they may be so levied as not to interfere to any considerable extent with the productive power of the country, by being placed upon articles which are commonly called luxuries. Such taxes become to a great extent optional, are paid willingly, and realize a very large amount of revenue; as, for instance, the duties on tobacco and spirits.

But it is said that Indirect Taxation, from the very facility of collection, is liable to abuse. Granted. But is there no method of avoiding the abuse without losing the great advantages which the system confers? Would not a more complete representation of the different classes of the people in that House which grants the taxes, do somewhat in this way? If so, would it not be wise to make that for the present a principal object sought to be attained?

L. I.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

EVERY man is interested in the system of Taxation adopted by his country, because every man is more or less affected by it. There is, however, an old adage that "what is everybody's business is no one's," and certainly in the matter of Taxation its truth has been most amply verified. When considering the subject we have sometimes wondered at the great ingenuity displayed by former legislators in devising a system of Taxation, at once so complicated and diffusive as to embrace within its range almost every necessary of human life, and yet withal so disguised as in many cases to assume the appearance of a "protective agency," rather than stand in its true character of a fiscal burden upon the industry and necessities of the people! Still more, however, have we been surprised that our forefathers should have remained blind to the inevitable consequences of an unchecked continuance of this evil!

We know, indeed, that in former times there was a great hatred to TAXES, when so called. Hence legislators were encouraged to work under a mask; and in lieu of a *direct* tax of *Ten per cent.* they would make an *indirect* one of 50 *or* 100 *per cent.*, "because it pleased the people better." Things have now changed. We all know that the revenue must be kept up, and although the task may be "grievous to be borne," it is only in accordance with the principles of Englishmen to look evils fully and fairly in the face, and, whatever their magnitude, to grapple with them, and, if possible, by fair and direct means, to remedy or overthrow them.

We look upon *Taxation* as an evil—coming, indeed, strictly within the catalogue of "necessary evils"—but still none the less an evil; and therefore our aim should be to keep it, as much as possible, within compass, upon the principle ingeniously laid down by M. Say (the French political economist), that the "best of all the taxes is the *least*."

Adam Smith, the father of our highest political economists, bequeathed to us a code of principles regarding Taxation, from which few, if any, subsequent writers on the subject, have shown much desire to depart. They may be thus briefly stated:—

1st. That the subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the Government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities, *i. e.*, their income.

2nd. The Taxes which each individual is bound to pay ought to be *certain*, and not arbitrary; and the time of payment, the manner of payment, and the amount to be paid, ought to be clearly understood by each individual.

3rd. Every Tax ought to be levied at the time and in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.

4th. Every Tax ought to be so contrived as both *to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public Treasury.*

How far a system of *Indirect* Taxation can be made to accord with these fundamental principles, we shall see in the progress of our inquiry.

We should, perhaps, here state, for the benefit of our numerous juvenile readers, that Taxes are said to be *direct* when they are taken from income or property, and *indirect* when imposed upon the articles on which the income or property is expended. Of the numerous Taxes of the present day the *Income and Property Tax* is the most *direct*, and if simplicity instead of complexity had been studied by its promoters, it would have been one of the least objectionable.

Now, looking at the system of *indirect* Taxation, as at present in force in this country, one of the first points which strikes us is its inequality of pressure upon the different classes, or even the individuals of the same class. The fact is obvious. The Taxes are levied upon the *expenditure* of the people. The poor labourer who receives his eight or ten shillings per week, and immediately expends it for the support of his family, pays perhaps 30 per cent. or about one-third of the whole amount towards the revenue in some shape or other: but the rich merchant or trader, with his ten

thousand per annum coming in, *expends* perhaps not more than one-fourth of his income and escapes three-fourths of his quantum of taxation; while he could a thousand times better afford to pay it than the poor labourer we have spoken of. Where then is the equity of such a system? Or how far is it in accordance with the principles above quoted?

Again; with an indirect system of Taxation there is no certainty as to the *amount* each individual shall pay, any more than as to the time and manner of payment. These matters are left to *chance*, and determined accordingly. If a person purchase a pound of sugar for sixpence, he pays threepence, or one hundred per cent., upon the actual price of the commodity, for duty. If he purchase a pound of 3s. tea, he pays 2s., or two hundred per cent. duty! If, however, he choose to purchase 4s. tea, then he only pays one hundred per cent. duty; or for sugar at 9d. per pound he only pays fifty per cent. duty. Thus upon the cheaper commodities the duty is disproportionately heavy, to the detriment of those whose limited incomes compel them to make such purchases. Hence the inequality and inequity of which we have spoken! Many other instances similar to the above might be given.

Another serious objection to Indirect Taxation, or to raising the revenue by imposing Taxes upon different commodities, is that it leads to *smuggling* and contraband dealing, by which the fair dealer is undersold, and, if not completely ruined, made at last a victim of his own uprightness and honesty, while those less scrupulous prosper. This is not a mere assertion. Those extensively engaged in trade can too well testify to its truth; while those interested in the social progress and welfare of the people mourn the tide of moral degradation, which is constantly flowing from the present state of the Customs and Excise Laws!

Perhaps, however, now that the test of *Economy* is beginning to be applied to public, as well as private matters, (and why not?) we may better succeed by drawing attention to *the great saving to be effected* by a direct, instead of an indirect mode of Taxation. We must keep before us Adam Smith's principle of *taking* out, and *keeping* out of the pockets of the people, as little as possible over and above that which is brought into the revenue. What is the machinery at present in operation in the revenue department? Throughout the length and breadth of the land, our eye meets one continued body of revenue officers. Every inch of our coast is guarded by men in custom-house garb, whose bounden duty it is, "even at the bayonet's point," to prevent the free introduction of those bounties in which other climes and other countries are so rich. Every town, yea, every village and hamlet is subjected to the almost daily supervision of excise officers. Every shop-keeper is, in point of fact, a tax-collector; for he collects of his customers the duties imposed upon the articles they purchase; while assessors, supervisors, surveyors, receivers, and comptrollers, constitute the higher branches of the service, and inflict a fearful "sweating" upon the "gold-dust" which, by virtue of their office, they handle. The actual and direct expense of collecting the revenue of this country, at present, is estimated at £3,000,000 per annum. And if we could only form a cash estimate of the further *indirect* loss, by restrictions to trade, preventing some persons from purchasing in the cheapest market—others from selling in the dearest—and all from that freedom of production and barter which in a great commercial nation like our own is so desirable, the figures would look even more serious. How different the case were a direct and uniform system of raising the revenue adopted! At one sweep, at least a moiety, and perhaps three-fourths of the present staff of paid officials might be dispensed with—their salaries retained in the pockets of the people, and their energies, now in a manner wasted, directed into a channel, not only profitable to themselves, but conducive of increased national prosperity! The sum to be annually saved by such a course, Mr. Revans (a gentleman who has bestowed much attention on the subject, and sometime since published an interesting pamphlet thereon) estimates at no less than *two millions and a half;* while all

obnoxious interference with matters of production and commerce might be avoided, much personal inconvenience spared, and moreover, every subject made to contribute, not by chance, but by equitable calculation, his proportion towards the support of the government and the state.

One other objection only shall we now urge against the present system of Indirect Taxation; and that is, its tendency to discourage habits of prudence and forethought among the people. Let one example suffice, and let that one be the subject of duty upon *Insurances against fire.* Common sense says it is prudent to establish institutions for the protection of persons from the ruinous consequences of fire. Our legislators say, "Well, at least, you shall pay for your prudence;" and accordingly, a duty of 3s. per cent. is imposed upon the gross amount of all insured property,—except agricultural farming stock, which is specially exempted. It was, no doubt, thought advisable to humour John Bull a little in this particular. Now it is a notorious fact that this duty amounts, in many cases, to 300 per cent. upon the premiums at which Fire Offices are willing to take upon themselves all risk of damage and loss. Can Englishmen much longer submit to a tax upon their own prudence? Where is the course of inconsistency to end—and that of consistency to begin? Shall the stamp upon each fire policy, and the red blot on the corner of each newspaper, much longer deride us for our supineness? Or shall our preachings for cleanliness be mocked at by a duty on soap? These, and a hundred other similar annoyances, compel us to take our stand on the negative side on the present occasion.

But to conclude. We have deemed all tortuous argument and lengthened reasoning unnecessary to the present inquiry, and have therefore merely strung together the above simple, yet obvious considerations, by which we have been led to the following conclusion:—That an *indirect* system of taxation has these disadvantages:—

1st. Unequal pressure upon the different classes of the community;—taxing the poor to a proportionably greater extent than the rich.

2nd. That it is alike uncertain the amount each individual shall pay, and the time and manner in which the payment shall be made.

3rd. It affords direct encouragement for illicit and contraband dealing,—sacrificing therefore the interests of honest traders, rendering them victims to their own uprightness, and the trickery of others,—promoting thereby much immorality.

4th. Causing an undue and injurious interference with trade and commerce, and, moreover, in this country, wasting some *two and a half millions* annually of money drawn from the pockets of the people.

5th. Discouraging habits of prudence and forethought by the imposition of impolitic duties and restrictions upon the means employed for the furtherance of these ends; and, finally, operating in almost every particular, contrary to the principles laid down, and acknowledged, respecting Taxation and Revenue.

We, therefore, assert it to be *inexpedient* to raise the revenue of this country upon a system of *indirect taxation;* and if the question extended so far, we should be prepared to show the advantages resulting from a *direct* system—these indeed will be surmised from what has been here necessarily said thereon;—and we now leave the question to the Jury—our readers—merely asking them to set aside all pre-conceived prejudice and partialities, if any such they have; to look fully and fairly at the merits of the case, and from facts and sound references to draw their conclusion—*alike* whether it be adverse to, or confirmatory of, the views we have here stated.

C. W., Jun.

All who have meditated on the art of governing mankind have been convinced, that the fate of empires depends on the education of youth.

Social Economy, etc.

IS THE MODERATE USE OF ALCOHOLIC DRINK INJURIOUS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THERE is no christian man but must deplore the extent to which drunkenness prevails in the world, and especially among the working-classes of our own country. In the drunkard, we see the man degraded to the mere drinking-machine, brought to a level with the mere gin-cask or beer-barrel. All the tender sympathies of the husband or the father are swallowed up in this all-absorbing appetite for drink. No matter that his children are unclothed, uneducated, or even unfed; that the days of his wife are buried in poverty, and her nights in sorrow; or that the grey hairs of a father or mother are brought with sorrow to the grave;—if he can from time to time satisfy the cravings of his unnatural appetite, he is content. To class drunkards with brutes, is a libel on the lower animals; for there is no beast but knows the extent of its necessities, and can stop when nature is satisfied.

But we must be careful not to reason against the use of a thing because of its abuse. Everything is abused, more or less, by some. Some men abuse the razor. Ought we, therefore, not to shave? Others abuse fire-arms. Shall they, on that account, never be used? Persons have injured their health by the abuse of carriages. Shall all carriages, therefore, be set aside?

Self-preservation has degenerated into selfishness, and trade into swindling. Ought no steps, therefore, to be taken to preserve life, and no trade to be conducted? It is true that persons have retired from the world, in order to get beyond its evils; it is true that they have gone into cloisters and monasteries; that they have taken up their abode in forests, among rocks, or in the desert, in order to evade the temptations to which man is liable; but who is prepared to assert that they were justified in so doing? Truly does Armstrong say:

> "Know, whatever
> Beyond the natural fervour hurries on
> The sanguine tide, whether the frequent bowl,
> High-seasoned fare, or exercise to toil
> Protracted, spurs to its last stage tired life,
> And sows the temples with untimely snows."

The desire for stimulants is universal. There is scarcely a nation upon earth in which some stimulant is not in use. From the Red Indian, who sells his food to obtain the fire-water, to the sedate Chinaman, who, in opposition to the laws of his country, purchases opium at the hand of the British merchant, all desire to possess a stimulant.

It is said, however, that this is not a natural appetite; that men have no desire for intoxicating drinks before they taste them. Perhaps it would be difficult to name any kind of food which man does naturally desire, except it may be that which is the peculiar food of infants. We know that the greater part of our wants are created. The Indian has fewer wants than ourselves, but we are not certain that his case is the happier. Tables and chairs, sofas and pianofortes, are not things of nature; still we are in the habit of supposing them to add to our comfort.

But it is objected, Alcoholic Drink has been the ruin and death of many. Granted. But if Alcoholic Drink has been abused, so has almost everything else. What has been abused more than the art of printing? How much trash is brought weekly from the press! How eagerly is it devoured! But where is the man who would set aside the press on that account?

But it is said, Alcoholic Drink is unnecessary either to the existence or happiness of man.

It may be questioned whether, in the artificial state of society in which we live, if the use of Alcoholic Drink be not essential to the existence, it is not necessary to the happiness of man. When a man has toiled all day in the shop, the study, or the counting-house, his mind naturally becomes oppressed. The fagging influence of exhaustive thought, close attention to business, and jading speculation, tend materially to depress the spirits;

and no sooner do the duties of the day cease, than the entire system is unnerved, a general lassitude ensues, and the want of some stimulant is felt.

The immediate effect of such stimulant is the diffusion, throughout the whole system, of a gentle and gratifying feeling; the lassitude and weariness depart, and a pleasurable idea of warmth, renewed energy, self-command, and tranquillity, succeed. The countenance becomes animated, for the heart is glad. In consequence of the free circulation that is going on, the relaxed muscular system is renewed; the nervous system is agreeably affected; conversation becomes free, spontaneous, and lively; mirthful sallies, quick repartee, and acute remarks, are heard and appreciated; carking care and morose anxiety are laid aside; the counting-house, with its arithmeticalities, are laid aside for the time; and cheerfulness and good humour prevail.

This excitement is agreeable to nature, conducive to health, and calculated to promote the happiness of man.

We say it is agreeable to nature. This, we think, will hardly be questioned. If it were not, it would not be so general for men to seek after it. Indeed, the very fact that excitement tends to make men forget their cares for a time, and introduces pleasurable emotions in their stead, substantiates this.

It is conducive to health. What tends to shorten life more than corroding care? or what to lengthen it more than ease of mind? How often have we seen persons whose energies were taxed to obtain a subsistence, or to improve their position in life, wasted to a mere skeleton, through anxious care! We have seen the same persons in a few years, on attaining to a position of comparative ease, look healthy, strong, and happy; and when we have asked the reason of the change, we have been informed that it was the effect of a change in circumstances.

Since, then, the entire absence of care is so conducive to health, and since Alcoholic Drink, when taken in moderation, tends to divert the mind from care, is it not reasonable to suppose that the moderate use of Alcoholic Drink is conducive to health?

But the moderate use of Intoxicating Drink is calculated to promote the happiness of man.

It is calculated to foster the social affections.

What is there that tends to damp the ardent love of a wife like coldness on the part of the husband? or what tends to damp the love of the husband so much as indifference on the part of the wife? Love is a jealous thing, has a quick eye, and notices very little things. It is very sensitive, too, and easily offended. If, then, the husband be from day to day, through cares with which his partner is unacquainted, unfitted for social intercourse; if the time which he is able to devote to the society of his partner be taken up with complaints, fretful murmurings, or sullen taciturnity; is it not likely that coldness on his part will produce a corresponding coldness on hers? and may not the flame of love be thus well nigh extinguished? Would it be surprising if it were to die quite out? Would it not rather be surprising if it continued to burn?

We say the *moderate use*, in contradistinction to the immoderate use of the drunkard. We are not quite certain that the term is a correct one. The *use* must be *moderate*, whether it be of Alcoholic Drinks or anything else: and immoderation is synonymous with *abuse*.

So far from the excitement produced by the use of Alcoholic Drinks rendering a man oblivious to what is passing around him, it quickens his senses, gives a healthy tone to his system, and fits him for the enjoyment of the domestic hearth, the society of his wife, and the gambols of his children. The things which, in his debilitated state, tend to irritate his nervous system, agitate his temper, and render him unhappy, under such circumstances, add to his comfort, and through him to the happiness of those about him; and thus, instead of that jarring fretfulness which too commonly succeeds the business of the day, pleasure is seen in every eye; instead of the presence of the husband and father being dreaded, it is looked forward to as the highest earthly joy; and, instead of the wife perpetually seeking for excuses in order to be absent from the company

of her husband, and the children fearing to approach their father's knee, we see the one perpetually desirous of enjoying his society, and the others basking under the sweet influence of a father's smile.

If, then, the moderate use of Alcoholic Drink is capable of driving away, for a time, the cares of life, giving elasticity to the mind, and a sensation of rest to the body; of making the man happy in the company of his family, and the family happy in the company of the head, and of inducing that domestic communion which is so eminently calculated to make home happy; surely, we are not assuming too much, when we assert that the moderate use of Alcoholic Drink is calculated to foster the social affections.

But it is objected, that alcoholic drinks have produced just the opposite effects to those above named. Granted; but this has happened when it has been abused, and not when it has been used with moderation. Most things, when abused, produce the opposite effect to what they produce when properly used. The moderate use of food makes a man strong to labour. Its abuse unfits him for labour. The moderate use of relaxation prepares a man for renewed exertion; its abuse induces habits of idleness. The moderate use of study strengthens the mind, and prepares it for battling with the world. Its abuse enervates the mind, and unfits it for the conflict of life. So the moderate use of drink fits the man, who has been fagging all day at business, for the society and converse with his friends, whilst its abuse renders him only a fit companion for such as himself.

But it may be objected that the tendency of moderate drinking is to produce drunkenness. We deny it. The tendency of any habit is to reproduce itself.

"Man is a bundle of habits."

Habits are the product of a succession of acts, whether they relate to the body or the mind. A man determines to do a thing to-day, — he repeats it to-morrow, and the next day, at a particular time, and after a certain manner. If he continues that act, at that particular time, and after the same manner, for two or three weeks, the probability is, that it will become a habit; in other words, he will feel a sort of necessity to perform the same act at the same time, after the same fashion. An example or two may illustrate the matter. One man has accustomed himself to retire early to rest. He will have a desire to go to bed when the time arrives. Another habituates himself to early rising: he feels uncomfortable to lie beyond his time. A third uses himself to sitting to a late hour; hence he cannot sleep if he retire early; whilst a fourth is in the habit of lying in bed late; and therefore finds a difficulty in rising before the usual time. Thus, the very opposite effects are produced in men by habits. Once let a habit be formed, and it is difficult to break through, whether it be a good one or a bad one. Hence, a habit of the moderate use of intoxicating drink cannot, by possibility, produce drunkenness. The habit of drunkenness is the result of a succession of drunken acts, just as the habit of moderation is the result of a succession of acts of moderation.

L. I.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It is important for us occasionally to direct our thoughts to matters connected with our social well-being. The "philosophy of life" is too often lost sight of in the all-absorbing attention which is given to the mere "business of life;" or, in other words, worldly pleasures, and present gratification, are pursued, even at the certain sacrifice of health, and ultimate happiness. Temperance is one of those questions which, until lately, has been regarded as an unimportant one, although it is intimately connected with the destinies of the human family.

The object of the present inquiry is to ascertain, if possible, how far the *moderate use* of alcoholic drink is injurious, or otherwise. We presume it will be admitted by all that their immoderate use is injurious, ending generally in the total prostration of the powers of body and mind.

It is a law of nature that all unnatural excitement is invariably followed by a corresponding degree of depression, and this alternation greatly increases the wear and tear of the system: therefore whatever has a tendency to produce it, whether it be over-eating, drinking, smoking, working, &c., must be injurious, and calculated to shorten life.

This process of reasoning we may apply to the use of Alcoholic Drinks by the aid of the following syllogism: All artificial excitement is injurious, because it is invariably followed by a corresponding degree of depression. Alcoholic Drinks have a direct tendency to create artificial excitement. Therefore Alcoholic Drinks are injurious.—This we shall now endeavour fully to prove.

We have taken it for granted that all persons who have paid any attention to the *modus vivendi*, or manner of life, admit that excessive indulgence in Alcoholic Drinks is injurious. But it is important to our present inquiry that we should briefly trace the way in which injury is produced.

We put the case in this simple form. Every person is endowed with a certain amount of *vital energy* or *life-sustaining principle*, which it is out of his power in any way to *increase;* although by incautious use, or extravagant demands, he may exhaust the supply much sooner, than the ordinary wear and tear of the system would. But the most important consideration yet remains; and it is, that from the moment the complete exhaustion of this vital energy takes place, *life must cease*, for there is no longer anything to sustain it. The system becomes impaired by the first application to Alcoholic Drinks, the pleasure they afford wears off, you seek to renew it by a further application, and the system becomes further impaired. Constant repetition constantly produces similar results. The process is almost imperceptible, but it is no less certain, and, finally, life may be sacrificed.

Have our readers never known one who in early life lived freely, kept up a constant excitement of the system by the application of alcoholic stimulants, and when depression of spirits (the reaction) was felt, applied to these stimulants again? And have they marked the result, and seen how the victim has been cut off by death, even before the impress of manhood had been firmly set upon his brow? Such instances are recorded in abundance upon the note-book of Time, but from their very abundance we regard them not! Our great bard had a correct knowledge of the evil influences of stimulating drinks upon the system, and at the same time a fine perception of the advantage of abstinence, when he made *Adam*, the old servant to *Oliver*, say—

> "Though I look old, yet I am strong and lusty.
> For in my youth I never did apply
> Hot and rebellious liquors to my blood,
> Nor did I with unbashful forehead woo
> The means of weakness and debility;
> Therefore my age is as the lusty winter,
> Frostly, but kindly."

If, then, *à priori*, Alcoholic Drinks are *essentially* antagonistic to longevity, and the proper enjoyment of life, it can no longer be doubted that, *however taken*, they *must be injurious.* The infringement of nature's laws is attended by one unvarying result—certain retribution on the offender. There are no half measures nor partial results. The certainty of the result is removed beyond the pale of doubt; although that result may be modified by previously existing circumstances. The certainty of injury being established, the consummation of it resolves itself into a mere question of time. If large quantities of Alcoholic Drinks be often indulged in, the effect will be speedy; if smaller quantities be taken, and not so frequently, the result will be more protracted, and less perceptible, although by no means less sure.

But in the face of all this we shall be told that many "moderate drinkers" have lived to a considerable age, and enjoyed excellent health; indeed, that the adaptability of nature is such, that she will put herself out of her usual course to conform to the customs and usages of society; further, that the force of habit is so great, that even poisons the most deadly may be taken without any apparent injury by those who have been accustomed to their use; and that

therefore the "experience" of society is against us. We are by no meens unmindful of the great and beautiful adaptation of nature, nor can we deny that many of the class termed "moderate drinkers" have lived to a considerable age, and enjoyed comparatively good health. But the *mere* act of living is only one part of the consideration: idiots and madmen live—that is, exist; but they fulfil not the true mission of life, which is to be useful, not only to ourselves but to our fellows, to do something to leave the world better than we found it. Anything which tends to impede this usefulness not only proves injurious to man, but is opposed to the will of the Creator. Who will say that those men whose powerful constitutions enabled them so long to withstand the influence of Alcoholic stimulants, would not have been greater and more useful had they abstained from their moderate potions? Inquire into the many instances of longevity which are recorded, and see if, side by side with the most remarkable, the fact of great abstemiousness is not noted. Search among the lives of those who have rendered themselves conspicuous for sound judgment, literary greatness, and correct moral principles, and take especial notice of the simplicity of their style of living. Let the names of Franklin, Dr. Johnson, and Lamartine, suffice, as a few hastily selected from an immense number.

Finally, we are prepared with authorities in support of the conclusion we have arrived at. One of the greatest physiologists of the present day, Silvester Graham (American), speaking of the common notion, that Alcoholic Drinks and other stimulants do not produce any ill effects, because they are not immediately made visible, says, "We know that the vital economy of the human body will so accommodate itself to circumstances, that the deadliest poisons may be habitually taken, and slowly destroy the constitution, and cause ultimate death, without producing any symptoms which are so determinate and unequivocal as to compel the sufferer to know that he is injured by those poisons. . . . But correct physiological science teaches us the indubitable and irrefragable truth, that the living tissues of the human body cannot be continually irritated, and functions of the vital economy habitually disturbed, without impairing health, creating disease, and shortening the duration of life." And, again, referring to the erroneous notions entertained by many respecting the virtues of Alcoholic beverages, he says, "Nothing can be more false than the abominable proverb, that 'wine is the old man's milk.' *It is always the bane of every man that drinks it;* and the old man has less power to resist and repair its deleterious effects, than one in the vigour of meridian day; hence, if a man has used it ever so long, when he begins to approach old age, if he would prolong his life in health and serenity, and the possession of all his faculties, and have his last days his best days, *he must abandon every intoxicating drink and substance.*"

Dr. O. S. Fowler, another eminent American physiologist, confirms our views of the influence of stimulants upon the nervous system. He says, "All condiments, all stimulants, act mainly upon the nerves, and re-excite, and still farther disease them. Hence, all Alcoholic Drinks, wine, beer, ale, or other fermented liquors, *are fire to them*, and should be wholly avoided." Again, speaking of their influence in reference to insanity, he remarks — "Alcoholic Drinks often induce derangement, even when there is no hereditary predisposition to it: much more will they develop a latent susceptibility already existing." Of English authorities we could produce a numerous array, did we deem it requisite. One or two must suffice. Dr. E. Johnson, the talented author of "Life, Health, and Disease," while comparing the digestive powers of other animals with man, and showing wherein they agree and differ, draws the following analogy:—"The only reason which can be given why water and a vegetable diet are most conducive to the health of the *horse*, is because these are his *natural* drink and his *natural* diet. And seeing that there is no essential difference between the living economy of the animal

horse and the animal man—seeing that, in this respect, they both belong to one class—it follows, that if the natural drink of the one be the best for that one, so the natural drink for the other must be the best for that other. For they are but two individuals of one class. Whatever is true of a class, is true of each individual of that class. If, therefore, it be true, that the drink which nature has provided for animals is the best they can have, it is equally true, that the drink which she has provided for man (water) is also the best which he can have—he being (in all that concerns his physical constitution) but a different individual of the same class. If nature had provided wine for him, then wine would have been (necessarily) the best possible drink for man, for the very same reason that water is the best possible drink for horses." And, to return for a moment to Graham, he emphatically declares his belief that, "The only drink that God has made for man, and therefore the only drink that man can ever use in perfect accordance with the vital properties and laws of his nature, is, *pure water*." Dr. Carpenter, in his recently published Prize Essay on Temperance, speaking upon the effects of Alcoholic Liquors on the duration of life, adduces statistics, first, to show that the rate of mortality taken in connexion with Life Insurances Offices generally, is *below* the average mortality of the whole population of the kingdom; the latter (taking the age at forty years) being thirteen per thousand, whilst among the lives insured in Life Offices it is about eleven per thousand; and this he attributes to the fact, that "No life office will accept an assurance on an individual whose habits are known to be intemperate." But he carries his investigations still further, and it is here that he proves our point. The average mortality (of England), for all ages between fifteen and seventy years, he states to be about twenty per thousand; whereas, in the "Temperance Provident Institution" (*where all the insurers are total abstainers*), after an experience of eight years, and with several lives above seventy years, the average mortality had only been six per thousand, up to the past season (1849), when the *cholera* epidemic had slightly increased the number; and he further states it to be worthy of remark, "that, although many of the insurers in this office are of the poorer class, whose condition and employment expose them much more than the middling classes generally to the endemic causes of *cholera*, no more than eight had died of this disease out of the total of about 3,500 insurers." To us this evidence is conclusive.

The nature of the subject of the present inquiry is such, that, for its complete elucidation, nothing short of an extended physiological investigation would suffice. This would be out of our power to furnish. We have been content, for the most part, to lay down general principles, which we think will commend themselves to the judgment of our readers. If, then, we have shown that Alcoholic Drinks are, from their nature, essentially antagonistic to the vital energy, to the perfect enjoyment of life, as well as the proper performance of its duties, then, however taken, they *must* be injurious—the extent of the injury varying only with the extent of the indulgence, or with the constitutional strength of those indulging.

C. W. Jun.

The Societies' Section.

MUTUAL INSTRUCTION AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.

The hope of the future is in the young. They must one day become the arbiters of the weal or woe of nations. The destiny of the world must be entrusted to them. But a few short years, and those who now are light of heart and gay will have

anxiety-troubled minds and care-wrinkled brows. We have seen of late the great lights going out. Poets, of whom the world is proud, have been consigned to the common resting-place of mortal man. Statesmen have been snatched from us before the full harvest of their fame had been gathered in. Nobles have gone the way of all earthly things. Inventors, mechanicians, and philosophers, have been called from this diurnal sphere, and have left vacancies in the roll-call of humanity;—the young must supply their places. This is a somewhat trite, but withal an important common-place. How many of those who now fill our offices of trust, honour, and emolument, have passed the meridian of life, and must soon be called on to retire and give place to a new generation! Who must construct our enginery, erect our dwellings, level our pathways, guide our locomotives, supply us with apparel, till our fields, manage our factories, conduct our mercantile transactions, extend our trade, consolidate our banking system, traverse the wide-spread ocean, and ransack the globe for new products which may be converted into new appliances for our comfort, use, or consumption? Now that the age is parturient with unimagined changes, when great events are struggling into birth, and powerful agitations are rolling their waves over the souls of men, who must interpret "the signs of the times?" Who must watch the flux and reflux of circumstances, be prepared for every exigency, and pilot us in safety through the fearful upsurgings of human passion, pride, and selfishness? Who must be our successful speculatists, our unmatched mechanicians, our sage journalists, our popular authors, our world-famed painters, our orators of note, and our honoured clergymen? Who must cogitate upon, and carry into effect, laws calculated to benefit society, favour the progression of man, and foster freedom? Who must write nicely-discriminative critical disquisitions, establish, endow, and trustworthily govern our institutions of practical philanthropy and labour for the demolition of the Moloch wrongs, under whose malign influence the world "groans, and is weary?" Who must cross the ocean-highway to civilise nations, and promote the peace, the happiness, the brotherhood of men, or "excavate" our home-heathen and bring them from gregarious barbarism to knowledge, virtue, and refinement? Who must bring new intelligence from the starry sky, the strataed earth, the abysmal ocean, to bless mankind, and bid them glory at the mention of their names, "interrogate nature," and learn the secret of her laws, or write their names on history's emblazoned page? Who must possess the firm nerve, the far-seeing eye, the sagacious mind, the boldly-conceptive thought-powers, and the untremulous hand, which will be necessary to hold the helm which shall guide the world in its future progress? Who must scathe corruption's ravenous brood, untrammel the beliefs of men, snap asunder the rusty manacles of prejudice and superstition, negotiate for the freedom of mind and limb, wake men from the lethargy of centuries, upraise the beacon-light of Truth, to dissipate the darkness of ignorance and vice, and tell where the haven may be found? Who shall make despotism tremble, and give freedom to the slave? In a word, whose mission is it to aim at, and accomplish, the emancipation and regeneration of the world? *Those who are now young.* If such be the fact, is it matter of slight moment how you are prepared, or preparing, for the task? Is it not well that this

fact should be kept continually before your eyes? Is it not right that we should urge you to gird up your loins, and qualify yourselves for vigorous exertion and manly activity? And who can tell what part in the drama of futurity you may be called upon to play? Did Shakespeare, when he fled precipitately from his native town, imagine that he would one day become "the cynosure of every eye?" Did Dante, when he wandered a grief-stricken exile, foresee the halo which would one day surround his name? Did Burns feel the evergreen garland encircling his brow, as he dressed his flax in Tarbolton? Watt could not precognise the eternal honour which is now cheerfully accorded him, as he struggled with the difficulties of his early lot. Bunyan, a tinker in prison, has made himself famous for all time. Cromwell, a brewer's son, has wielded the British sceptre. Samuel Lee, a charity-school boy, and a carpenter, occupies the chair of Oriental Languages in Cambridge. Newton, Faraday, Davy; Gifford, Jeffrey, Scott; Hall, Chalmers, Foster; Howard, Washington, Peel, which of these foresaw, even in prophetic fore-shadows, the renown which would attend their names, the reward which their exertions would meet, or the advantages the world would reap from their labours?

The idea which the previous paragraph was intended to excite in you is, that great and noble doings are to be achieved, sublime thinkings are to be educed, good laws promulged, and the future scene of the world materially altered and improved by the young. Is it, therefore, immaterial whether you are right or wrong, wise or unwise? Is it a matter of little importance, whether we permit ourselves to be hurried along in the current of events supinely or unstruggling, or buffet strenuously with the waves, and perhaps swim in triumph o'er their ridgy tops? Men have already subdued portions of the natural world, and made them ministrants to human use. Where this has been found impossible, they have, by diligent watching, careful experimentalisation, and judicious scrutiny, foreseen danger, and guarded against its pernicious effects. This knowledge they have bequeathed to us. And shall we be ungrateful for the boon, and strive not to extend still wider the horizon of intelligence, endeavour still more arduously to understand the laws of nature and the complications of society, and try more energetically and intelligently the interesting problem, How may the condition of the human race be most permanently bettered? But we obviously cannot do this unless we improve ourselves. Hence one of the chief duties which man has to perform upon the earth is, Self-improvement. Upon any other supposition, the whole constitution of the globe would be an intricate and insoluble enigma. Man's instinctive curiosity, his possession of reasoning powers, and desire for mental excitement, his being surrounded by so many inducements to inquiry, so many motives to act worthily, so many incitements to "aim higher," appear to us conclusive evidence of the above proposition. For this purpose it is that we are endowed with societarian instincts, aspirative tendencies, and emulatory desires. If it be not so, how is it that we feel such pleasing sensations upon the discovery of new objects, hitherto unperceived qualities, and unnoticed relations? Whence results that delicious thrill which the true student feels when his exertions—albeit they are difficult—are crowned with success? Why does the heart of the investigator dance within him for joy on per-

ceiving that he has not only been able to cope with, but to overcome, the obstacles which opposed themselves to his intellectual progress? Whence that ecstatic tremour of delight which we feel when we gain some new acquisition, or successfully extend our observation beyond the present knowledge-limit of our race? These queries, we presume, admit of but one answer; namely, that the expansion of our faculties, the exertion of our mental powers, the due cultivation of our whole intellectual nature, is one of the chief conditions of our happiness and well-being. As man has laboured to accomplish this end, we find that new pleasures awaited him, and that each step in intellectuality which he advanced brought within his view sources of new pleasure, well-springs of joy, and increase of comforts, convenience, and luxury. Much, however, as his faculties have been developed, his knowledge advanced, or his intellectual status elevated, we are far from believing that the progress of man has been at all commensurable with the original power of his mental nature, or the aspirations of the ardent soul. We cannot look upon the past without a pang of sorrow and regret, as the sad conviction is pressed upon us; that a vast amount of human enterprise has been misdirected; a vast amount of intellectual power has been dissipated or mis-applied; intellectual power which might have been highly conducive to the promoting of human happiness, and have contributed greatly to the moral and mental elevation of our species. And such, we foresee, shall be the case, until each individual unit of humanity shall learn to be faithful to himself, shall comply with the requirements of his being, and shall fulfil the important task of self-improvement. "Every human being is intended to have a character of his own, to be what no other is, to do what no other can do." But how can this be except by mental culture?—mental culture, which unlocks the gateways of the soul, and cultivates a visiting acquaintanceship with nature;—mental culture, which calls into activity and usefulness the most precious endowments of humanity; mental culture, which unveils the mighty maze of enchantment and wonder which is to be found in the gorgeous amphitheatre of creation—which enables us to note the transcendently superior power which has been, and is, exercised by the creative mind—which capacitates us, in intellectual triumph, to outspeed the bounds of individuality, sit "upon the circle of the heaven," and see the simple, yet grand, machinery which is employed in moving the immense masses of the planetary orbs and the eccentric comets, and which always secures us a prize when we earnestly struggle with difficulty. Why should our minds repose in dormancy and lethargic imbecility, when the whole vast realm of knowledge is yet unexplored and untraversed—a realm which we must all conquer and subdue for ourselves, and over which each may rule without detriment to another's interest, or hindrance to new competitors? That is an encounter in which each gains a crown, or is enriched with trophies in the measure of his exertions to attain them. Truly valuable, however, as are the acquisitions which knowledge enables us to make, they are as nothing when compared to the subjective or mental benefits which it confers upon us. The mind is receptive of impressions from without. This leads to reflection within. We learn the nature and properties of objects, and can apply them to uses to which they were formerly inapplicable. We study

their relations, their connexion, their significance, and in these studies have a pleasure unknown to the intellectually blind, or the mentally debased. This activity of intellect frees us from the discomforts, the weariness, the torturing expedients for whiling away time; the grossness and unreflectiveness which the ignorant must feel, and to which they must submit. It does all this, and more. It gives a greater facility to our acquiring correct notions of duty, and capacitates us for a better performance of it. It empowers us to look into the past, and learn experience there; to calculate regarding the future; to foresee the consequences of our actions; and thus we are capable of distinguishing the utile from the inutile, the good from the evil; and can decide accordingly—eschew the latter, and engage resolutely in the prosecution of the former. There is no situation in life in which mental culture fails to do good. It can add lustre to the loftiest position; it can cheer the lowest hut; it can increase a hundredfold the pleasures of prosperity, and in adversity it will not forsake; it can enhance the purest enjoyments, and solace and mitigate the most cheerless misery; it can adorn the rich and noble, and refine and elevate the poor and the despised. True are the words of the poet:—

"Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros."*

The love of knowledge is an instinct native to the soul. And how happily are our instincts and our well-being pre-adapted to each other! Our faculty of curiosity will not suffer our mental powers to slumber or sleep. If we rejoice to look upon the meridian sun, or fix our gaze on the innumerous stars, and the mild face of heaven's midnight queen, *this* urges us on and on till the mighty revelations of Astronomy are our reward. If we feel pleasure in watching the gambols, evolutions, habits, and transformations of animated nature, *this* will not give us pause, until we have elucidated the science of Natural History. If we feel rapture and delight from viewing the beauteous forms with which the Summer decks her blooming brow, *this* importunes us to proceed till botany becomes a science. If we are stricken with terror at the lightning's sudden and terrific flash, and the stunning peal of the repercussive thunder, *this* intensifies our watchfulness, quickens our apprehensions, and prompts our investigations, until its laws are understood, its operations are known, its pernicious effects are guarded against by the Science of Electricity; and so of the other sciences. Thus it is that knowledge grows from a small seed into a vast tree, with far-spreading branches, bearing evergreen leaves and perennial fruits. Thus is it that Nature calls out the energies latent in the soul, and gives them life, vigour, and vitality—thus it is that one germ planted in the human mind ramifies through all its faculties, and gathers nourishment from all—thus it is that the man of cultivated intellect, on the groundwork of his instincts, affections, and fears, is necessitated to build up the fabric of science—and thus, by the irresistible coercion of curiosity, are we led on to make those acquisitions in knowledge which are so refining, so pleasure-giving, and so grand. As an agent in civilisation, too, mental culture is of the highest value; as society is but an aggregate of individuals, it will follow that, as is the intellectuality of the individuals of which it is composed, so

* It makes the manners more gentle, and permits not men to be barbarous.

is its tone, elevation, and intelligence. As much as each man has striven to exalt his character, improve his heart, cultivate his intellect, and extend the scope of his rational faculties, so much also is society benefited. If such be the importance attachable to mental culture—if it is calculated to cheer, to brighten, beautify, and bless—if it is a means of increasing happiness, gratifying the earnest longings of the soul, augmenting man's well-being, severing the bonds which fetter him to earth and earthliness, elevating his mental nature, introducing a taste for new, higher, and more sublime delights, and preparing him for greater and more ennobling achievements over the material world, and his own sensualising propensities, surely it must be of vast importance. And if of such weighty concernment, how needful that every means which can be employed, every inquiry which can be brought into action for the accomplishment of so great a purpose, should be prominently brought forward, its advantages explained, its objects pointed out, duties in relation to it enforced, and an earnest invitation be given to each individual to add his influence, his power, his wealth, his energy, his intelligence, to the success of means upon which so much of importance and beneficiality depend! Let no one deride the instrumentality by which such objects are accomplished, and from which such results are to be expected; least of all, let a scoff or word of disdain be uttered against the self-help institutions by which young men seek to train, improve, and restrain their Understanding. Let the *aim* of the mental cultivationist rescue his weak efforts from ridicule. Let no sneer curl on the lip of folly regarding the seeming ineptitude of the means to the end. Let the impulse, the impetus, be given, and who can tell how the desire may work its way into development? Would Michael Angelo have been known as the architect of St. Peter's, or would the Vatican have become art's sacred place of pilgrimage, had he been scared by the imperfections of his early attempts with the chisel or pencil? Would Raphael's name have been eternally illustrious, had his first rude draughts been greeted with contempt, and had he succumbed to derision? Would Mozart have poured forth his soul in those melodious strains which are the admiration of the world, had he not, by hard and resolute labour, progressed from weak and feeble efforts, to almost seraphic strains? Would the world have been enriched with Milton's "Paradise Lost," had difficulties had power to conquer, misfortune to subdue, or persecution to vanquish, the dauntless will and the unconquerable resolve of this "honourable one of the earth?" No! Small endeavours are often the beginnings of great events. If the aim be noble, and nobly pursued, we need not fear for the result. The aim of "Mutual Instruction and Debating Societies" is noble, is worthy of all honour. Mental culture! How much is contained in these two words! How vast their import! How significant the phrase! Is it not to unfold the faculties of the soul, and by that expansion to gain unmixed delight, and unfailing pleasure? Is it not to acquire dominion over nature, and make her submissive to our will? Is it not to unlock the treasuries of creation, and to enrich ourselves with the untold mines of mental wealth which they contain? The attainment of Knowledge! What is implied in that? How much has been accomplished by striving after that already! How much has been already tried and achieved! It were vain to

attempt the enumeration. Look at what Knowledge has done, and say, Is not the aspiration full of nobleness and grandeur? It has covered the barren desert, and the "waste, howling wilderness," with grand cities, stupendous palaces, magnificent cathedrals, gigantic aqueducts. It has cut canals, erected bridges, established manufactories, and ribbed the earth with railways. It has clad the unmeasured prairie, and the unfruitful wold, with waving plenty. It has tamed or exterminated the ravenous prowlers in the primeval brakes, woods, and forests, and the insidious denizens of "the solitary places." It has dug into the crust of the earth, and thence brought wealth. It has opened the rocks, and, as in a book, read the history of preadamite existence. It has gone down through ocean's wind-scooped depths, and made them tributary to human necessities. It has "unwound the eternal dances of the sky," measured the distances, magnitudes, and orbits of the heavenly bodies, weighed their densities, and estimated their *momenta*. It has entered the caverns of the earth, blasted the seemingly-eternal hills, and dug into the cycle-aged strata of the earth, and learned in its journey the forms, natures, and sizes of creatures which had peopled this world long, long before it had become the temporary residence of humanity. The globe has been circumnavigated, the air weighed and measured, the ocean fathomed, eclipses calculated, the return of comets foretold, and the subtle element of light submitted to analysation by it. It has pierced the bosom of the mountain for a highway, bridged the horrid chasms which separated the chaotic, craggy, and volcano-reft granitic rock-piles, and trained the most terrific and awe-inspiring power in nature—Steam—like a tamed behemoth, to do its bidding. The sea has become its beast of burden, the winds of heaven its charioteer, the sun its artist, the swift-winged lightning its messenger. States have been formed, governments established and adapted, laws framed, justice administered, and order preserved by it. Verily, knowledge is power! Should the attainment of this power be neglected? Is the attempt to gain it despicable? Far from it. But if we neglect to attain this, there is another, and more frightful power which must acquire ascendency—ignorance. The mind cannot be long shut up in a pent-house. No! If it be left untutored and untrained, it will, like a gigantic maniac, revel in idiotic sensuality and vice, and, perchance, bursting the barriers of civilisation's constraints, spend its excited and embruted force in mad-eyed, fury-urged rebelliousness. Which shall we choose? Knowledge, or ignorance? Let us, by all means, extend the possibility of intellectual culture, incite to emulative contest in mental superiority, urge upon the ignorant the pleasures and advantages of knowledge—knowledge which can seduce a man from the haunts of dissipation, save him from moral and intellectual shipwreck, snatch him from ruin and wretchedness, rescue him from brotherhood with beggary and contempt, and make him more than a muscular, sinewed, nerve-gifted, life-moved piece of mechanism; make him a talented, expert, exact, and scientific artisan—knowledge, which can fit him for any emergency in which he may be called to act, by teaching him the natural principles according to which the world is constituted; acquainting him with the *rationale* of daily-labour routine, and filling his mind with thoughts more brilliant than enchanter's wand could ever bring before a mortal eye

—knowledge, which is the glory of man; the power employed in the attainment of which is the highest element in his nature, and the most wondrous God-subordinate agency which manifests itself throughout the universe. It is as auxiliaries in the promotion of this grand object that Mutual Instruction and Debating Societies are established. The advantages which they afford for this purpose it is now our intention to explain. The benefits derivable from them it is our intention to enumerate.

S. N.

(*To be continued.*)

ESSAY ON HISTORY.

NOT without philosophic accuracy, as well as exquisite grace of fancy, did the ancient Greeks, in those pleasing, beautiful, and wisdom-pregnant *mythi* by which they gratified the enthusiastic poet-feelings of their nature, and with which they have at once adorned and enriched the world's imaginative literature—fable that Mnemosyne—Memory—was the mother of the Muses, and that Clio—History—was their eldest sister; for although one could "speak with the tongue of angels," or with the volubility of "thousand-voiced Rumour," and yet had not *facts* as the basis of his narrative, then would the eloquence of the gifted fail, and the verbosity of the garrulous cease to interest. Even Fiction, to be pleasing or useful, must possess a seeming-actuality; how much more then is it necessary that History should be the record of the *real?* It must have truth for its basis, and human experience for its matter. "History," says Victor Cousin, "is a glorious poem, the drama or epopee of the human race." Schelling calls it "an Epic conceived in the Spirit of God; its two parts are the movement by which humanity leaves its centre to expand to its utmost development, and the movement which effectuates the return. The former is the Iliad of History, the latter its Odyssey; the prior movement is centrifugal, the posterior centripetal." "History," remarks Alexis Monteil, "is the narration of what *has been done;*" and Cicero eloquently describes it as "the testimony of time, the light of truth, the messenger of antiquity, and the school of life;" while Miss Strickland asserts, that "when truthfully told, and philosophically considered, it is the noblest school of Ethics, replete with moral teaching." It is a "descriptive catalogue" of the most brilliant achievements—the most renowned deeds of heroism—the most glorious instances of patriotism, and nation-benefitting self-sacrifice—the most honour-worthy transactions, and the most illustrious examples of human virtue, as well as an abridged account of the basest perfidiousness and villany—the most sordid profligacy—the most infamous deeds of crime—the most despicable cowardice and fraud—and the most execrable instances of human folly, vice, depravity, and guilt, of which our world has been the theatre. It is at once the recorder of almost angel-virtues and nearly demon-crimes. On the same broad manuscript will be found detailed the magnanimous, fame-deserving, high, and holy heroisms, nobilities, and upward aspirings of the human race, as well as the cunning intrigues, the diplomatic trickeries—the sinister springs of action, the court and cabinet duplicities—the subtle self-sophistries—the

craftily-contrived enginery of fraud and mind-oppression—the impotent attempts of antiquated power to hold its gewgaw sceptre in its convulsive death grasp—the soul-debasing influences of vice, sloth, and sensuality;—and thus, with all the eloquence of truth-utterances, are we informed of the causes of the upward and onward tendencies of our race, at the same time that we have explained to us the germ-seeds of our misery and woe. In the same vast volume we can at once descry the glory-blazonments of virtue, and the dark hell-tints of criminality. Therein are detailed the principles of conduct,—the laws, the usages, the policy, the crimes, the miseries, the projects, the failures and successes, which singly or conjoined, led the nations on to bless, or were the means of their decay. The rise, the progress, the culmination, "the decline and fall" of empires are described; the upsurgings of insurrection, the fierce brutalities of contentious war, the sad soul-apathy of the despot-ruled, are depicted; and the characters of the world's heroes, worthies, and demigods, her vice-stained and villanous earth-demons are graven with "an iron pen" in her many-topic'd page. History is the mirror of man's progress, and the panorama of our world-life. In it we see the bygone ages, as in a telescope we can see the far-distant stars. It is the connecting link of *the long ago* with *the now*, as well as our road-guide for *the future*. It teaches us at once to grieve over errors done in "Time's youthful days"—to strive to rectify them in "the age we live in"—and look to the *to come* with such

> "Hopes as even the angels might look on and bless."

Were we inclined to give the rein to our imagination, we might fancy the muse of History driving

> "Her pearly and pellucid car,
> * * *
> Through the midst of an immense concave,
> Radiant with million constellations, tinged
> With shades of infinite colour,
> And semicircled with a belt
> Flashing incessant meteors,"

and rapidly gaining upon swift-winged father Time, until she at length overtakes him, and with her sunniest smiles, wins the garrulous old man in his more communicative moods to reveal

> "The secrets of the immeasurable past."

the reminiscences of his youthful years which we mistakenly imagine to have been mere "creeping centuries of sameness;" but which to us seem so, only because so many have been the strange and wondrous things which have passed before his eyes, that even his memory is confused, and he finds it difficult to steady before his mental vision the fleeting images of fact which, "with the mild magic of reflected light," ceaselessly depict their airy being to his gaze. But we have little leisure to expend in elaborating such an allegorical sketch, and therefore will not venture on the tempting labour. Let it suffice, at present, to conclude our introductory remarks on this topic with the wise words of Owen Feltham:—"History is the resurrection of past ages; it gives us the scenes of human life, that by their actings we may learn to correct and improve. What can be more profitable to man than

by an easy change and a delightful entertainment, to make himself wise by the imitation of heroic virtues, or by the evitation (avoidance) of detected vices?—when the glorious actions of the worthiest treaders on the world's stage shall become our guide and conduct, and the errors that the weak have fallen into shall be marked out to us as rocks that we ought to avoid. It is learning wisdom at the cost of others; and, what is rare, it makes a man the better for being pleased."

Hitherto we have however spoken of History in the ideal which we form of it, in the abstract, and without reference to the mode in which it has been executed through humanitarian agency. We are sorry that the same glowing panegyric which we have passed upon the muse and her labours cannot be unqualifiedly bestowed upon those whom she has gifted with her inspiration. History, as it has been generally written, has been too frequently stained with reprehensible factional and national partialities—has been too often made the vehicle of incorrect or distorted views,—has been too commonly disfigured either by religious or rather sectarian predilections or infidel tendencies. Truth, candour, honesty, and accuracy, ought to be the characteristics of history; for by these alone is it distinguishable from fiction. But such is the weakness of the human mind, such the frailty which so easily besets it, that men are frequently biased in their views, while they are entirely ignorant of it, and often incorrect when they know not of it; for rash generalization, hasty acceptance of premises, illogical deduction, and indolence, are frequently too strongly rooted in our minds by habit to be readily detected or easily rectified. In many cases, therefore, it is impossible to err unwittingly; but it is to be feared that fancied interest leads to the distortion of facts and to the suppression of the real motives of the actors in particular scenes, or the documents from which a true account of actions might be gleaned. We are glad however to observe that these error-sources will soon be invalidated; for as each party and nation is now possessed of men qualified to be their own historians, the person desirous of securing an impartial knowledge of the facts will be able for himself to compare the differing statements, and thus *eclecticize* the Truth.

History* literally signifies a detail of facts ascertained by diligent research and ocular examination. In this sense it may be applied to the recital of any series of truths; and hence we may speak with strict accuracy of a "History of Animated Nature," a "History of English Literature," a "History of Philosophy," a "History of Astronomical Discoveries," &c., as well as a "History of Greece, Rome, British India," &c. But though these are all legitimate uses of the term, yet in its more usual acceptation it is employed to designate a general view of the occurrences which have marked the several phases of human life, in its various societarian combinations. The origin, progress, and decline of nations—the emigrations and immigrations of races—the most interesting events which have happened in each commonwealth—the actions of the most renowned of their inhabitants—the various relations in which the several states of the earth stood to each other—the several great questions which agitated or stimulated society—the principles or pas-

* From the Greek *ἱστορῖα*, and that from *ἵστημι*, to place, to set, and *ὁράω*, to see, to look.

sions which actuated each political community—the manners, customs, laws, usages, &c., of the nations—the most distinguishing characteristics of their several peoples—the mutual action and reaction of each state upon the other, whether beneficially or injuriously—the progress and state of science, literature, and art amongst them, arranged in such a manner as shall impress upon the mind of the reader the most vivid and correct idea of the several forms of society, the causes of their prosperity or decay, and the influence, for good or evil, which the peculiar legal, political, moral, or religious usages and opinions exerted upon the advance or downfall of each several state,—are a few of the topics which ought to be prominently brought forward in the historian's page, and which should engage the attention of the student in that department of literature. It will be seen from the above enumeration of how much importance the task of the historian is ; and if he unite the due qualifications of patient research, unbiased intellect, careful narration, philosophic acumen, and honesty of purpose,—of what inestimable value ! And if such qualifications are necessary for the author, somewhat of the same nature is requisite in the reader. Some young men seem to imagine that mere receptivity—the capacity to hurry, with almost railway speed, through a given number of volumes on any given subject, is quite sufficient for the attainment of knowledge. This *cramming system*—this overgorging of the memory—this unthinking accumulation of the materials of knowledge, we cannot too much decry. Intellectual pabulum, like the food of the human frame, to be valuable, must be digested. It is not, therefore, the only duty incumbent on the young student of history to read a regular and prescribed course of celebrated authors in that department ; it is also necessary that earnest thought, patient reflection, diligent and careful comparison, and clear, cool, and calculating discrimination, should be exercised. There can be little doubt but that there may be much pleasure and pure amusement derived from the perusal of historical works ; but those who read merely that they may be hurried on by the excitement of the narrative—enraptured by the brilliancy of the writer's diction—or are led captive by the glare and glitter cast on the alluring page—have totally mistaken the lofty object which ought always to be held before the view in study. The rhetoric-gemmed periods may mislead while they delight ; the hues of glory may be thrown around actions intrinsically unworthy of them ; the errors, follies, madness, and wickedness of men may be garbed in beauty, and their moral hideousness carefully concealed from view by the melodramatic light under which they are presented to the eye ;—the narrative may be artistically tricked out, artificially be-ornamented, and skilfully heightened in its colouring, and thus may lead on the passions with tumultuous emotions ; and if sober thought and cultivated moral taste be not called in as arbitrators, an erroneous impression may be made upon the mind. If history be read merely because of the amusement which it can yield—if its facts be stored up in the memory in disorderly heaps, without regard to their importance, or without an accurate perception of their antecedents and consequents—its chief advantages are yet to be gained ; its most precious fruits have yet to be reaped : it throws no illuminating rays upon the present ; it casts no magic light upon the future. Rightly regarded, history is the autobiography of the human

race—the grand instructor of mental, moral, and political science; the only adequate evidence of the progressiveness, the essential greatness, and glorious capacities of the human race. The true lessons which history ought to read to humanity, have been nobly enunciated in Longfellow's "Psalm of Life"—

Tell me not in mournful numbers,
"Life is but an empty dream!"
For the soul is dead that slumbers,
And things are not what they seem.

Life is real! life is earnest!
And the grave is not its goal;
"Dust thou art, to dust returnest,"
Was not spoken of the soul.

Not enjoyment, and not sorrow,
Is our destined end or way;
But to act, that each to-morrow
Find us farther than to-day.

Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And, departing, leave behind us
Footprints on the sands of time;

Footprints, that perhaps another,
Sailing o'er life's solemn main,
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother,
Seeing, shall take heart again.

Let us, then be up and doing,
With a heart for any fate;
Still achieving, still pursuing,
Learn to labour and to wait.

S. N.

Crewe Mechanics' Institution.—There is a discussion class in connexion with this Institution, which is open to all the members, free of any additional charge. It has been in operation since the 16th October last, and the various discussions have been entered into with considerable spirit, varying, however, with the interest taken in the subject. The questions that have occupied the most attention are Capital Punishments and Phrenology. Two other questions created very animated debates; namely, Is Machinery beneficial to the Working Classes? and, What is necessary for the Regeneration of Ireland? both of which occupied several meetings. It is gratifying to learn that this class is progressing so well; a marked improvement is visible in all who take any interest in the debates. Were societies of a similar nature formed among all classes of the community, a great amount of good might be done. D. M.

Ulverston Mutual Improvement Society.—The Annual Meeting of this Society was held on Thursday evening, August 22nd, Mr. A. B. Salmon in the chair. From the Report, read by the Secretary, it appeared that there were, in connection with the Society, classes for grammar, elocution, singing, arithmetic, writing, and reading. Lectures had been delivered, during the year, on English Composition, Milton's "Paradise Lost," Thunder-storms, Sanitary Reform, Drawing, and Electricity. Fortnightly meetings had also been held for discussions, recitations, essays, &c. The Reading-room and Library had proved very attractive. The number of members on the books was one hundred and fourteen. The Report concluded with the following appropriate remarks:—"Every one who has the welfare of the Society at heart ought resolutely to exert himself, and endeavour to promote a full development of the power of combined effort for good purposes. And while each is, in this manner, aiding the Society, he is at the same time expanding, strengthening, and improving his own capabilities and powers, approaching nearer to the standard of perfection, and creating a love for the good, the true, and the beautiful. The spirit of never-ending progress still bids us march onward and upward through life, and points further to an eternity so vast, that we strive in vain to comprehend it. But without toil, energy and unshrinking perseverance, we advance not. Our watchword must be 'Perseverance,' and untiring zeal in good works the response."

West London Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society was established in the year 1846, for the purpose of promoting the intellectual improvement of Sunday-school Teachers, and Senior Scholars, by means of Lectures, Essays, Discussion-classes, a Library, &c. During the four years the Society has been in existence, it has steadily progressed, and it now numbers one hundred and sixty members, with an average attendance of seventy-five. To render the Society more generally useful, it is proposed to raise a fund for erecting, or otherwise obtaining, a suitable place of meeting. This spirited effort deserves encouragement.

Aberdeen Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society recently held a Social Meeting for the promoting good feeling among the members. After a distribution of fruit, addresses were delivered on the "Ravages of Time," "Emulation," and "Love."

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

18. What is it that causes decomposition, and so unfits the flesh of slaughtered animals for domestic uses; and how is the cause to be removed, so as to retain the original nutritious properties of the food?—J. C.

19. Would you have the kindness to inform me what course I should pursue in order to become acquainted with Grammar, Composition, and Geography?—J. W. J.

20. I should feel obliged if any of your friends could inform me of a good Ecclesiastic History. —J. J. W.

21. What course of study should a young man pursue who has entered in earnest upon the work of self-education? Among the questions recorded in the "Inquirer," I do not find this, which is a most important one to young men who cannot clearly see their intellectual pathway. A "full and complete" reply would greatly oblige yours gratefully, W. O.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

6. *French Pronunciation.—Consonantal Sounds* —When we began to answer the question of L. S. on this topic, we had no intention of saying so much; yet, when we maturely considered the subject, we saw that to do less would be utterly valueless, while to do more would have required more time and labour than we could spare from other pressing avocations, and have occupied more space than could warrantably be expected in a work of such a nature as the *British Controversialist.* We shall be very happy if in our attempt to respond to his query, we have been of any service to L. S., or may have incited any one of the numerous and intelligent readers of this Serial to devote a little time to the gaining of an acquaintance with the French Language.—*Mais il faut avancer.*

There are nineteen consonants in the French Language: these may be divided into five classes, according to the parts of the vocal organs by which they are pronounced; viz., 1st, Labials (formed by the lips): B, P, F, V, and M (initial), 2nd, Dentals (formed by the teeth); S, C, Z. 3rd, Linguals (formed by the tongue); D, T, N (initial), L, R. Nasals (formed by the issue of breath through the nostrils); M and N (medial and final). 5th, Palatals, or gutturals (formed by the palate or throat), G, J, K, Q, H.

It is to be premised that, in our opinion, a consonant is not the sign of a *sound*, but of a *position*, of the organs of speech, in which the vowel and diphthongal sounds are to be uttered.

It will be seen, as we advance, that the sounds indicated by each *class* of these signs are interchangeable; but that, in no case, does the sign of one class indicate the sound of a different class.

The French consonants, B, D, F, K, L, M, and N (initial); P, R, T, V, and Z, have the same sound as in English; subject to the following exceptions:—

Before a vowel or silent H, D is pronounced like T: as grand orateur (grangh-tor-a-teur), a great orator; second occasion (se-gongh-to-ka-syongh), second opportunity.

Before a vowel or silent H, F sounds like V; as, neuf enfans (nŭ-vangh-fangh), nine children. It is mute in clef (key), éteuf (tennis-ball), chef-d'œuvre (a masterpiece).

L and Ll preceded by i, ai, ei, eui, uei, oai, take a liquid sound, in which l, y, and e are conjointly heard; as, gli, in seraglio; except in words in which *ill* is initial, and a few others; thus, fille (feelyĕ), a daughter; cercueil (serkŭ-ee), a coffin.

T has sometimes the sound of S, when followed by I and another vowel; as in ambition (angh-bee-syongh). It is mute in respect and aspect.

C sounds like K before a, o, and u; as cabaret (kă-bă-ray), a tavern; coton (ko-tongh), cotton; cul (kōō), a breach; like g hard, in second and its derivatives; as secondaire (sĕgōnh-dāre), secondary: like s, before e and i; as, ceinture (sêngh-tūr), a girdle, a belt; cime (seem), top, ridge: and when a cedilla is appended (thus, ç), it is pronounced as s, even before a, o, and u; as, façade (fă-sâde), front; garçon (garsongh), boy.

G is pronounced hard (as in the English word gay) before a, o, u; like zh before e and i; and, when final, and the next word begins with a vowel, like K; as gage (gazhe), pledge, token; un long hiver (ungh-ōlngh-kee-ver), a protracted winter. Gn (medial and final) has a liquid sound, which somewhat resembles ny; thus, vignoble (veen-yo-ble), a vineyard; champagne (shangh-pâ-nyĕ), an excellent wine.

H is in some words mute; in others, aspirate. No rule can be given for the pronunciation of words commencing with *h:* a grammar or a dictionary must be consulted.

J like zh; as in Jardin des Plantes (zhâr-dăngh-day-planght), Botanical Garden.

M and N, in the syllables am, an, em, en; en, aim, ain, eim, ein, im, in; om, on; um, un, eum; whether initial, medial, or terminational, are pronounced with a very gentle nasal sound, in the formation of which it is necessary to be careful that the tongue does not touch the roof of the mouth; nor should the mouth be allowed to close; if either of these be done, the sound will become so guttural as to be quite alien to the genius of the French tongue: we have therefore striven to represent it by the letters ngh, placing the h after it for the purpose of indicating the *softening* required. The words *ang*le; *leng*th; *cong*ress; *hung*ry; respectively contain the *nearest* English, representative sounds to those contained within the respective semicolons, which we know.

Q sounds, generally, as K; as in qui vive (kee-ve-v), who goes on the look-out?

S is pronouced, in medial syllables, like Z, or the s in rose; thus, transaction (trangh-zak-syongh); vraisemblance (vray-vangh-blanghse), seeming truthfulness.

X sounds like ks, gs, ss, and z; as in expert, exil (eggs-ell); soixante (swas-saught), sixty; dix-écus (dee-zay-coo), ten crowns,

As a general rule, when one word, ending with a consonant, precedes another commencing with one, the final consonant of the former word is elided—*i. e.*, left unpronounced; but when it precedes a word beginning with a vowel it is sounded.

We have now finished our instructions on French Pronunciation. If any difficulty remains unsolved, the Editors will, we are sure, gladly undertake the office of "Inquirer," and gain an answer to the querists. For our own part, any

humble mite of information which we can give, will always be at the command of the readers of the *British Controversialist.* We cannot more appropriately conclude our present lesson, than in the words of Chateaubriand,—"*Personne ne doute que la science ne soit le fruit du travail.*"—"No one can doubt that knowledge will be the reward of persevering industry."—N. L.

14. *Jael and Sisera.*—The task set by your correspondent is, I think, not the impossible one which he, from his tone, seems to consider. The unsoundness of the premises supplied by his author disposes, without argument, in my opinion, of the question thereon raised. Because "the taking of the life of Sisera" *is not* "extolled by Divine inspiration," therefore, "the Divine probity and benevolence" are *not*, in any degree, compromised.

Our friend may be aware that the inspiration of the Bible, *as a whole*, though not of every minute portion, is the belief of many who acknowledge its Divine authority.

Of the composition in which this praise of Jael is found, I do not know that it partakes of inspiration further than verse 23 may be said to do; and this, on examination, will be found to be merely a declaration of a past denunciation. The whole I take to be simply a triumphal ode, the joint production of the victorious leaders in the events it celebrates—of Barak, the warrior, who is known to us only as such, and of Deborah, the then ruler of Israel, who was also a prophetess. If this latter circumstance should be urged as giving the "song" a strictly inspired character, I reply that here is not the only place where one so gifted has spoken in the distinct capacities of seer and ordinary mortal. Let 1st Kings xiii. 18 be contrasted with the 20th and two following verses of the same chapter. I choose this instance out of others, because the non-prophetic statement there is stained with immorality to a degree that no severity of judgment can bring home to the case before us.

I answer, then, that the praise in question, forming part of the utterance of human beings, under circumstances of a peculiarly exciting nature, must be taken as man's approval of Jael's conduct, looking only at it as a link in the chain of that deliverance which is the burden of the song. The Divine connection with the death of Sisera, the whole analogy of Scripture teaches me was simply *permissive*—the Almighty Ruler visiting upon his and his people's foe deserved vengeance through the voluntary treachery of a fellow-mortal. Yours respectfully, E. W. A.

16. *History of France.*—Histoire de France, Racontée à la Jeunesse, par M. Lamé Fleury. By J. Christison. Edinburgh: Myles Macphail. —Is a very good abrégé of French History, and for a learner of the French language it is simple, interesting, and idiomatic.—PHILOMATHOS.

17. *Quotations.*—The principle on which I have acted for a number of years in the acquirement of extracts suitable for quotations, is constant, careful, and extensive reading; the adoption of a system of "Notation" to express my opinion of any passage, and the use to which it may be applied either in controversion or defence of any subject. The employment of a note-book indexed like the front of a ledger, in which I enter, under appropriate titles, the books, passages of books, &c., in which any particular subject is treated. By this means, I am furnished with an extensive series of authorities, pro and con, upon almost every point of human inquiry. The labour of such a plan is at first immense, but subsequently the saving of time and research is much greater. If a quotation on any subject is necessary, I have only to turn up one or two of the books of reference to which my index directs attention, and choose. There is a dictionary of quotations, I think, by Hugh Moore; this, however, I have never seen.—Author of "Art of Reasoning."

Quotations, especially poetic ones, serve to embellish an article, but they should not be used too often, nor be too much sought after; I would commend to the attention of J. S., and your readers generally, the following weighty remarks of an anonymous author:—"Thought engenders thought. Place one idea upon paper—another will follow it, and still another, until you have written a page. You cannot fathom your mind. There is a well of thought there which has no bottom. The more you draw from it, the more clear and fruitful will it be. If you neglect to think for yourself, and use other people's thoughts, giving them utterance only, you will never know what you are capable of. At first your ideas may come out in lumps, homely and shapeless, but no matter! time and perseverance will arrange and polish them. Learn to think, and you will learn to write. The more you think, the better will you express your ideas."—C. A.

18. *Decomposition of Animal Substances.*—Decomposition is the resolution of a compound into its constituent parts. All organic bodies, whether plants or animals, undergo spontaneous decomposition on the extinction of the vital principle. Their tissues are immediately acted upon by the chemical agencies around them, and are subjected to those changes which finally resolve them into their original elements, and the organized structure passes, sooner or later, into decay. The rapidity with which this decomposition is effected, depends, 1st, On the nature of the organic body. 2nd, On the circumstances under which it takes place. Temperature, moisture, and the presence or absence of decomposing agents, greatly affect the time and extent of this process. By regulating or preventing the operation of these causes, the period which substances will last and be useful, may be extended, and many things, which would otherwise be valueless, become of the highest importance and service. Those chemical substances which preserve organic bodies from putrefaction or decay are called antiseptics, and the method by which that is performed, Antiseptic processes. Any substance which will coagulate the albumen, such as alcohol, oil of turpentine, or any other volatile acid, if the substance be steeped in them, will effect this. The earthy salts are all antiseptic, but common salt, saltpetre, sal-ammoniac, &c., are most generally used for the purposes of preservation. Putrefaction goes on most rapidly at 70 deg. or 80 deg., but ceases at the freezing point; hence fish and animals may be preserved any length of time if frozen; this is the method of preserving food in the arctic regions. Putrescence may be prevented by the thorough drying of the substance, which may be done in 120 deg. to 140 deg.; for the abstraction of oxygen gas will effectually preserve flesh meat. The manner of doing this is quite simple; enclose the flesh in tin cases, in which only a small hole is left in the lid, all other parts being closely shut; dip the case in steam for a minute or so, then quickly drop a

little solder on the hole, to prevent the re-entrance of the air. Liebig's Chemistry will afford any other information required.—S. N.

19. *Grammar.*—Consult the article in No. III. of our Magazine, to which you were referred, on the subject of your first question. After having gone through the course there indicated, you would do well to read, for further instruction and sound views upon the subject (for even Grammar is not a subject to be given up after having run through a book or two), a selection of the standard works on Language, such as Harris's "Hermes," Horne Tooke's "Diversions of Purley," Stoddart's "Universal Grammar," Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding," more particularly the 3rd Book; Latham's "English Language," &c. Of course you need not read all these; one or two would give you a good knowledge of the subject, after having been carefully read over three or four times. One book, read three times, is worth six books read once.

Composition.—Upon this subject no definite rules can be given. In fact, if they were, after a time nothing would be rule but the variations.

No man can expect to compose well who is not, in the first place, thoroughly acquainted with the principles of English grammar: who does not understand the language he uses; who cannot analyze every sentence he has written, take it to pieces, and put it together again, to express the same sense in many different ways; in short, who cannot play at tennis with his mother tongue.

Secondly, no man will ever compose well who is not an intelligent man, well read in some department of literature.

He must be what Bacon denominates a "full man;" which a person can only become by constant and methodic reading and thought.

One good practice for beginners in the study of Composition is, to select sentences from good authors, take them to pieces, see how many ways they can express the same sense, and still preserve the beauty of the sentence. If you wish to get a style in writing, take some sterling work as a model; read it till you almost know it—till you can think in the same strain. Then try to write an essay, either upon the same subject as your favourite author, or a different one. When you wish to express an idea, think how your model would utter it, what dress he would put it into; then try to do the same. You may not succeed well at first, but time and patience, with perseverance, will accomplish the desired object.

There may be some objections raised to this mode of acquiring a style. First, it may be said, it makes you but a mere copyist, a servile imitator; dresses you in borrowed plumes.

Andrew Fuller says, "Never be an imitator;" another, that "imitation is the characteristic of the monkey tribe."

All this we will readily concede, nay, more—that an imitator often gets nothing but the faults, peculiarities, and even the vices, of his model, for his labour. But whose fault is this? How many tried to imitate Byron! But did they get any of his magic sweetness? Could they use the wizard's wand, and command the spirits of Earth and Air to burden every bough with song; to tell the secret of the spirit-world, with that wild, weird tone, that could chain the ear of mortals with a spell that none but the wizard's power could break asunder! No! his votaries were too earthy, too fond of the slime, and therefore gained nought but the poison from the sweet-scented flowers that strewed their path. Nought but the dregs of the bright wine could they touch! The living light of the heaven of genius was too bright for them. And they only suggest to us the "beast Caliban," instead of the "fine apparition" Ariel—the creature who "will dig us pig-nuts;" not the being who will "ride on the curled clouds."

The fault was in the copyists. They wished for nothing but show, and they got it. They were not in earnest. They strove to wear the mask of a spirit; it became that of a noisome corpse. There was no vitality below, no healthful flow of the blood to keep the cheek ruddy; nothing but paint, tinsel, and gaudy trappings of external show.

These will always perish! Be in earnest! imitate only greatness; aim high, but let the highest aims be the purest. For your purpose of composition, take some work known for its purity of style, morality, strong nervous utterance of its message. Read and study it as Demosthenes did Thucydides. Eight times over he wrote that celebrated history to acquire a style; and, need we say, with what success? So great was it, that even Cicero tells us he had always, in him, an example worthy of being followed. He who can render another author's thoughts with accuracy and power, will soon acquire power of his own.

We need not repeat, that a man must study, must acquire a vast amount of knowledge, to compose well. He must be a thinking man. Nothing less than this will ever give him ease and perspicuity in writing. What is not perfectly clear to himself, he can by no mechanism whatever make clear to the understandings of others.

Learn to trust in your own powers, to express your own convictions, then will you be true to yourself and to others. This may be perfectly compatible with the course we have laid down.

We do not wish you servilely to copy the idiosyncrasies of others, but to read and study others, and so gain life and strength of your own. Grapple with a giant, you shall come off none the weaker.

We need not give the names of works for this exercise: there are many worthy of it. It will suffice to mention the names of Milton, Burke, Macaulay, Johnson, Addison, Gibbon, Hume, &c.

For the simple signs used by authors, any grammar will supply them. Of course, punctuation is highly necessary. Not merely the theory, but the thorough practice, so that you might take a written manuscript in hand and point it for the printer.

This, too often, is deemed by authors of no consequence. Perhaps it may not be for many of the countless host, inasmuch as their meaning may be discovered as easily one way as another; if you cannot understand one sentence, try the next!

For the purpose of getting a knowledge of this excellent art, we would recommend that part of Walker's "Elements of Elocution," entitled "A General Idea of the Common Doctrine of Punctuation." It consists of about six pages, yet, if well studied, it will answer every purpose.

E. B.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. VII.

JUDGMENT.—NATURE AND KINDS OF EVIDENCE.

"What I find to be truth shall be welcome to me, let it sound as it may. I will *know*: and should this be impossible, this much at least will I know, that it is not possible. Even to this result will I submit, should it present itself to me as truth.—*Fichte.*

The human mind has two different spheres of speculative inquiry—the one, the inner intellectual world revealed by Intuition—the other, the outer material universe made known to it by Sensation. In the former, by a self-seeing power peculiar to the human mentality, we gain evidence of all the feelings, volitions, states, and affections of the mind. In the latter, the senses are the *media* through which proof of the external world is gained. In both of these fields of investigation, it is necessary that the mind should learn to determine regarding the validity of the evidence of its beliefs. The obvious tendency, however, of the philosophic spirit of the present age is towards the External, and the sense-shown, rather than the multiplex revealments of thought and affection which Intuition brings before the mental vision—it concentrates itself more upon the upbuilding of positive science, the acquirement of a mastery over nature, and the attainment of a knowledge of the laws of the material world, than upon what is generally regarded as the shadowy speculations of a fanciful, vain, and unsubstantial science, a science which treats of the mind alone, and requires the continued exercise of thought-introversion. Man has purchased his superiority in physical science, in invention and discovery, in sense-gratification, at the price of the relinquishment of the intuitional sphere of knowledge-attainment,—the loss of one-half of his mental empire. And thus, while positive science has risen like a giant-built pyramid, mental philosophy has been allowed to crumble into ruins, by neglect; yet, when we calmly reflect that truth is not granted to those who merely desire to become possessed of it, but to those who earnestly strive for its attainment; that it cannot be gained but by the full and consentaneous exertion of *all* the mental powers, we shall see the advantage of that department of inquiry, whose method and means of speculation raise up the faculties of the soul into strength, and which, in the very act of self-analysis, enables us to improve the whole inward world of our thoughts and affections, and gain an immense treasury of facts upon the most momentous subjects on which the human mind can exert itself.

We have, in the following pages, to show how the mind operates in the acquisition of knowledge, by considering, as briefly as possible, the various kinds of evidence of which we made mention in our last paper: viz., Intuition, Sensation, Memory, Analogy, Testimony, Probability, and Induction. Before doing so, however, we may premise, that although Logic is founded on the laws and principles of the human mind, it does not undertake to say "why" they exist, or to explain the "wherefore" of our confidence being so trustingly placed in them. It undertakes to describe the fundamental principles of thought, but all it can assert as to their

origin is, that they are interwoven with our mental constitution; *why* they are so is beyond our ken. Who can tell why attraction exists in matter? why some chemical substances possess an affinity for others? or, why life exerts itself in opposition to chemical and mechanical laws? These are "fundamental facts" to which our knowledge cannot extend. The *why* is known alone to the Eternal.

INTUITION is that power which the mind possesses of *looking at* itself, by which it becomes acquainted with its own existence, modes of operation, and powers of thought. When the intellect is excited to any course of action, this self-perceptive power enables it to discern its own state or condition under the excitement, and it thus becomes acquainted with the threefold fact—of its own being, the method of its own working and counter-working, and the ability of its several faculties: by this means we gain a knowledge of the constitution of the mind, of its powers of sensibility, understanding, and volition—of the agency of imagination, and the workings of our passions, emotions, and desires. By this self-introspective faculty we become impressed with an irresistible certainty that we perform the various functions of physical and mental life; that we suffer and act, think and remember, feel and reason. Intuition reveals to us the basis and groundwork of all thought. No process of reasoning is needful to convince us of those primary truths which it makes known. So soon as the mind becomes impressed it becomes sensible of the impression; and this sensibility is the constitutional fact which makes the intuitional revealments of our nature peculiarly self-evident. Of that which we see and feel passing within us we cannot rationally doubt; and as we have always the means of experimentalizing upon the operations of our own mind, upon our powers of perception and will, upon our feelings of pleasure and pain, upon our ideas of unity or plurality, power or inefficacy, cause and effect, there seems no reasonable inlet to doubt concerning the truths of our mental intuitions. If, for instance, I assert that all men are sensible to appeals made to their sympathies in behalf of the wretched and oppressed, or, that all men are convinced of their own existence, I express in words—in the one case, a moral, in the other, a mental intuition—that which *I feel* within myself as Truth. If any one denies the truth of either of these propositions, all I can do is to collect examples of the actions of others, for these are the product of their thoughts, and maintain that these prove that the general intuitions of men agree with mine; and if these fail to satisfy, I must come to the conclusion, that the person whom I address either mistakes his own consciousness, or that his mind is differently constituted from mine: no arguments can avail when men's intuitions, if they ever do so, differ. We do not, however, maintain, that all individual intuitions are absolute truth. We admit that one person's mind may be ruled by sense, another's by imagination, and that of a third by intellect, and that education and circumstances have much power in distorting the appearance of those objectivities which are placed before the mental eye. Yet it is evident, that if the general intuitions of humanity, as manifested by their words and actions, are similar, we have good grounds for receiving *them* as facts of consciousness. This, however, does not annul the general law of mentality, that the individual intuitions of men's minds are Truth to the persons

in whose minds they arise. These are *to them* irrefragable and valid grounds of conviction. No certainty of demonstration can gainsay *these* soul-sprung verities; *to them* they are irresistible and inoppugnable. The hypochondriac and the monomaniac are impregnable to all reasoning, for they have the evidence of Consciousness that they are right. How, then, are we to decide what Truth is? This is the dilemma in which men find themselves. To the individual his experiences are true. Each person's Experience differs. What, then, is truth? We can only answer, that in our present state the *absolute* truth is unattainable regarding anything except *our own* Experience; but when that experience coincides with the general experience of our "fellow co-heirs of mortality," we may warrantably conclude that we are in possession of the Truth. This, we suppose, is what is meant by the truism of an appeal to "Common Sense." This appeal to "Common Sense," however, is not necessary to decide *all* truth, but only to decide upon those grand primal truths which grow up in each soul as constitutionally as flowers spring from their seeds—what Jacobi calls "those certain, immediate, simple, and positive principles of Judgment which do not derive their authority from any process of reasoning, but rather preside over all reasoning." We believe, with Fichte, that "every seeming truth, born of thought alone, and not ultimately resting on Intuition, is false and spurious." We may, therefore, conclude this department of evidence by saying, that Intuition informs us by the mere act of thought-introversion of the *laws* or *forms* of thought, not of the *matter*; of all that relates to the powers, processes, and states of mind,—not of the truth, but of the facts which excite and impress it. The following appear to us a few of the chief Truths which Intuition reveals:—1st, A belief in *our own* existence as sentient and intellectual beings. 2nd, A firm faith in the evidence of our own senses. 3rd, A confiding reliance on the uniformity of the operations of Nature.—If we are asked for proof, we can only ask in return, Who was ever deemed sane that doubted them?

Sensation, as we very fully explained in a previous paper, is the result of a pre-adapted relation between the organs of sense and the external world. When this result passes onwards to, and impresses itself upon the mind, Perception ensues. Of course, we include the conjoint actions of these two powers under this head of evidence. Each sensational organ conveys its own peculiar series of impressions to the mind, and originates its own peculiar succession of ideas in it—hence, each of the five senses constitutes one of the avenues by which a knowledge of the outward material universe is communicated to the intellection, and one of the causative agents by which the faculties of the soul are excited to activity. Mind is the germ, the senses the nutriment-bringers, thought the fruit. Hence, Sensation is the only inlet to Knowledge, though not the only factor in the production of it. The mind has a definite constitution upon which Sensation operates, and which it develops. All the faculties of the mind exist in it *potentially*; but they require to be excited to action by Sensation. This may be proved by the case of the blind, the deaf-mutes, &c., whose minds necessarily lie dormant for lack of the excitation of sensations, — Laura Bridgman and James Mitchell, for exam-

ple.* Mind possesses certain properties; so do the objectivities around us: when the one is placed in communication with the other, ideas are as necessarily and inevitably produced, as an acid and an alkali combined will produce a precipitate; and as certainly as arsenite of potash mingled with sulphate of copper yields an apple-green precipitate, so certainly will the view of an external object produce the special and peculiar idea of that object. On this certainty of specific idea-production the ground of our reliance on Sensation is placed. "Thought succeeds thought, idea follows idea incessantly. If our senses are awake, we are constantly receiving sensations of the eye, the ear, the touch, and so forth, but not Sensations alone; after sensations, ideas are perpetually excited of sensations formerly received; after these ideas, other ideas; and during the whole course of our lives, a series of these two states of Consciousness is constantly going on;"† and yet, during the whole of these successions of sensations, if the sensational organs are healthy, we never find any two essentially different objects impressing the mind in a similar manner so as to produce the same objective ideas in the mind. This sentence requires explanation to divest it of a slight degree of ambiguity which we know not how otherwise to obviate. The sight of an overhanging mountain, and the view of a flash of forked lightning, are two essentially different objects which impress the mind in a similar manner, viz., producing the idea of fear and sublimity; but they do not impress it so as to produce the same objective idea—*i. e.*, the lightning can by no healthy power of sensation be thought a mountain, and *vice versâ*. From this specificality of idea-production we are led to rely on the accuracy of our sense-derived information, and so long as each object continues to convey exactly the same *one* objective sensation, we need not doubt the fact of its external existence; for we have no reasonable motive to doubt until we know what it is to be deceived.

It is most true, as some will be ready to suggest, that our sensations often inform us of appearances which cannot be substantiated by an appeal to the reality of things, such as the results of vision through a light-refracting medium; the effect of distance in diminishing the apparent magnitude of objects; or, to take individual instances, the deceptive appearances of a stick in the water; the difference between the real and apparent magnitude of the stars, &c. In the first place, we may observe that in all these cases the senses informs us correctly as to the *fact* of their existence: the only difference being in the *circumstantialities* of the fact. In the second place, as it is the senses which enable us to correct the erroneous impressions which they primarily gave us, they are honest faculties after all, although not quite so attentive to their observations as they might be. Having thus the means of detecting the true from the false, and the power of discovering the general laws which prevent us from receiving accurate sensations in certain given cases, we have proof sufficient that Nature is not one huge deception, and that, in general, the "evidence of the senses" is worthy of the dependence

* See Dickens' account of Laura Bridgman in "American Notes for General Circulation;" and Dugald Stewart's of Jas. Mitchell, in "Some account of a Boy born Blind and Deaf." Edin., 1812.

† Mill's "Analysis of the Human Mind," p. 52.

usually placed in it. Perhaps it is worthy of remark in this place, that with regard to form, size, distance, and motion, sight and touch may each be our informants, and hence may be reciprocally employed to correct each other, while with regard to odour, taste, colour, and sound, we have no other evidence than is afforded us by that one sensational organ which has been appropriated to the reception of each of these species of sensation.

There are some philosophers who believe in "necessary truths;" for our part, we believe that all truths are "necessary," with this difference—that there are some truths which are absolute, *i.e.*, whose truth cannot possibly change, while others are mutable and contingent. Of the former sort are the primary facts of science. The sun moves on its axis, the earth revolves round the sun—two and two make four—the whole is greater than its part—two straight lines cannot enclose a space—vitality resists, to a certain extent, the laws of chemistry and mechanics, &c. Of the latter kind are the facts of history, of political geography, of every day life, some of the propositions of moral, mental, and political science; the tenets of criticism, and the incidental conversations of men, &c.—as, Queen Victoria reigns—Malta is a British possession—the weather is unsettled—all men naturally act from selfish motives—every one enjoys poetry—stocks are up to-day, &c. The former, however, are equally with the latter the dictates of experience, and are no other way distinguishable from them than by their greater invariability. The little boy who desires a piece of bread has no innate or necessary idea of the truth of the whole being greater than its part, but he readily perceives by experience that the whole loaf from which his piece is cut is greater than the part which he receives; and it is no more an innate or necessary truth, anterior to experience, that two and two make four, than that the wires of a voltaic battery, if immersed, without communication with each other, into a cup of water, will decompose that water—the hydrogen being separated at the negative, and the oxygen at the positive pole—only that the latter is farther removed from our experience, and less frequently observed by us. Sensations as sensations are true, although they are not always the absolute truth of things; *e. g.*, I leave my house, which may be about sixty feet in height; as I depart, it gradually lessens to the view; does it really diminish as I withdraw? I cannot believe it, for when I return it is of the original size. I hence form the idea that distance diminishes the apparent magnitude of bodies, and by applying this idea to the other objects which lie at a distance from me, I find it correct, nay, that it holds good through the whole range of creation; and it is from the perception of this fact that men are able to measure "these mighty spheres that gem infinity" with the same, if not greater, accuracy than the corn-field opposite my cottage.

Memory is that peculiar power of retentiveness by which ideas, feelings, volitions, &c., are kept as possessions in the mind, so that they may be recalled and reviewed by it, without reference to their originating causes. When our thoughts recur involuntarily, it is called Remembrance; when they are brought back by an effort of the will, it is denominated Recollection.

Memory, when properly exercised, supplies the Reason not only with materials,

but also with the means of constructing accurate judgments—it prepares for the use of the thought-powers a correct *fac-simile* of Experience, and is hence a principal source of the mind's *data* in reasoning.

It records and preserves the impressions conveyed through the organs of Sensation and Consciousness. Sensation concerns itself merely with what is immediately present. Memory, seizing upon those impressions—which would otherwise be evanescent—daguerreotypes them for ever for the use of the mind, and thus enables us to employ our past Experience as a guide to the present and a light to the future. The Logician, when he is desirous of discriminating, classifying, arranging, and operating upon his ideas, must, in a great measure, rely upon memory for his materials; and the accuracy of his inferences materially depends on the correctness of his former sensations, and the fidelity with which memory retains the impressions of them.

Intuitions and sensations might pass and re-pass in uninterrupted successions through the mind, yet, were man destitute of memory or retentiveness, there could be no permanency in his knowledge, no generalised expressions of facts, no sure and stable basis of experience. The mind would resemble a *camera obscura*, which now receives an image, and immediately it is effaced by the introduction of another; and when the whole series of which it is susceptible has been pictured on it, the whole disappear, and there is no power of recalling them, except by the operations of the same causes which originated the picture-world we saw. Intuitions and sensations inform us of our present feelings, &c. Memory refers to those that are past. The former thought-powers tell us what we *do* feel, think, or will: the latter, what we *have* felt, thought, or willed, or by which we *have* been impressed. Any one who has engaged in self-retrospection, who has looked backward into the past experiences which Memory has laid up for him in her vast fact-treasury, will find little difficulty in admitting that Memory is one of the chief "sources of evidence." It is not, of course, so worthy of credit as Intuition or Sensation, for they have their facts present to the mind, whereas Memory can only recal former ideas to the mental view. Memory, too, is the criterion by which we judge the future: as we have found the operations of Nature, so do we still expect to find them. We do not require an innate *knowledge* of the proposition, "Like causes will produce like effects," to make us believe that the future will resemble the past. For instance, a child who has once tasted sugar, and appreciated its sweetness, does not make use of this learned phrase mentally: sweetness is the child's experience of sugar, and it can know nothing else except its experience; it therefore confidently expects the same result on a repetition of its former experience. Men do not hesitate to confide in the intimations of Memory; nay, they cannot do it; it is part of their personality. Without the evidence which this faculty yields, whence could the idea of our personal identity arise? Intuition and Sensation give us information of the impressions received in a succession of *points* of time. Memory colligates each present sensation with all that is past, conjoining them in the idea of Self; and this colligation of past and present constitutes our personality; and, in conjunction with consciousness, originates the notion of *egoism*. Why Memory should be

thought so trustworthy, we have already said we cannot explain. It is one of the forms or laws of thought; farther than this we know nothing.

ANALOGY is a term employed to denote that peculiar feeling which is originated in the mind when it perceives a resemblance or similarity between objects as to their circumstances, relations, or effects, when the objects are dissimilar; or *vice versâ*, a resemblance of objects when their circumstances, &c., are incoincident. When one system of events, relations, or appearances, is observed and known, and another series of circumstances resembling them, but less known, occurs, and we reason that the causes are the same in each, we are said to reason analogically. Upon our ideas of similarity the force of analogy depends; and the more striking the resemblance, the more reliance do we place in the truth of analogical reasoning: instances of the value of analogy as a "source of evidence," and a ground for reasoning, may be gleaned from every page of the history of the sciences. Newton's discovery of gravitation; Franklin's discoveries in electricity; and the discovery of Neptune, &c., will readily occur to the reader's memory. "Let science bear witness," said the poet Campbell, "how many of her brightest discoveries have been struck out by the collision of analogy, and by original minds bring out one part of their vast information to consult and co-operate with another. For a single study is apt to tinge the spirit with a single colour, whilst expansive knowledge irradiates it, from many studies, with the many-coloured hues of thought, till they kindle by their assemblage, and blend and melt into the white light of inspiration. Newton made history and astronomy illustrate each other, and Richter and Dalton brought mathematics to bear upon chemistry, till science may now be said to be able to weigh at once an atom and a planet." When we know that certain phenomena result from certain causes, and perceive that similar phenomena result from unknown or undiscovered causes, we are led to infer that the causes are alike; or when we know the facts in one case resemble, in great part, the facts observed in another, we naturally conclude that the whole circumstances coincide. The greater the coincidence, the stronger the proof; the less the similarity, the less probability is there of its truth. Arguments from analogy should be used with caution. Unless the resemblance be very striking, and the conclusion can afterwards be subjected to experiment, it can never rise to certainty, but must ever remain in the "dim inane" of conjecture. One great use of analogy is to disarm prejudice by showing that the opinions which we intend to introduce are no more liable to objection than others whose truth is already unquestioned. The best instances of the uses of analogy are to be found in Butler's "Analogy of Religion," and Archbishop Whately's "Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte."

TESTIMONY is, in general, the evidence which other persons give on any point—the relation of the experience of others. Our belief in Testimony is founded on the reliance which we place in the general honesty of men. History, geography, biography, many of the facts of science and literature, and all our information regarding the general occurrences of human life, the actions of men, the state of business, morality, religion, &c., must all be believed in on Testimony. Our courts of law, our "commissions of inquiry," &c., recognise Testimony as a "source of

evidence." Did the virtuous sentiments and moral affections of men possess the supremacy which they ought, were their intellectual powers able to keep in check the depraved propensities of their nature, Testimony would be as infallible a criterion of truth as personal experience. But this, unfortunately, is not the case; and hence we are admonished by every-day occurrences to look with a jealous eye on the affirmations of men, lest sinister motives influence them, and give them a fancied interest in practising deceit. We are thus necessitated to guard against being imposed on by deceptive testimony, and to use every precaution in acquiring a knowledge of the laws which are to be observed in judging regarding it.

Man, in his most perfect state, naturally desires to speak truly. It is difficult to speak falsely, and at the same time to steer clear of all probability of discovery. Truth is easily told. But it is long before the mind can acquire that incrustation of habit which enables it to utter falsehoods with the easy indifference of truth. The necessity of truthfulness is so impressed upon the minds of men, that they have, with one consent, agreed to brand the possessor of "lying lips" with every mark of ignominy. Despite, however, of this, we daily experience the need of some general rules for the purpose of guiding us in our judgment concerning testimonial proof.

Each individual, endowed with the average powers of humanity, has the capacity to understand the general physical and moral occurrences which take place around him; but as there are peculiar studies which fit men more readily for observations regarding particular phenomena, it is obvious, that the better the individual is acquainted with the peculiar phenomena concerning which he affirms anything, the greater is the validity of his testimony. But, considering that an average endowment of "common sense" capacitates us to judge with sufficient accuracy regarding the facts of ordinary cases, the sincerity or disinterestedness of the party is what is most liable to doubt, so that the greater the honesty of an individual in the common affairs of life, and the less his interest can be influenced by the point at issue, the more trustworthy is the testimony which he offers; and *vice versâ* misrepresentation can only proceed from two causes, inadequacy of observation, or intention to deceive. Want of general intelligence will produce the one; the love of falsehood, the hope of benefit, or the fear of injury, will occasion the other. If one or both of these causes can be reasonably supposed to be operating, or to have operated on the mind of the attestor, his evidence must be considered invalidated in a ratio with the probability of his disingenuousness.

When the honesty and ability of any set of witnesses is presumable, it is quite evident that the greater their number, the more infallibly trustworthy will be the proof. Nay, even when the number alone is gained, there is great probability of the truth of their statements, provided there may have been no collusion amongst them; for even though each may be more likely to speak falsely than truthfully, yet it is much more improbable that they should all lie alike, than that the circumstances should not have occurred. The time, too, which may have intervened between the event and the deposition, ought also to be taken into account; for the strongest memory is liable to forgetfulness by the lapse of time. The constant

impression of new ideas on the mind tends to diminish the certainty with which old ones are retained. In matters of *fact*, honesty is the only requisite; in matters of *opinion*, whether relating to literature, morality, religion, or science, ability must be superadded. Great as may be the certainty attainable by testimony, it is, however, less worthy of reliance than our own experience. It may be almost laid down as a law, that the greater the accordance of the evidence with experience, the more likely is it to be true. Not that our experience always is to be the criterion, for that would be to make the likelihood of the truth of facts be diminished in a ratio with our ignorance. When the testimony fulfils the above requirements, it may, in general, be considered worthy of belief, even although it transcend experience. Bruce, the Abyssinian traveller, was doubted, because his relations transcended our experience; subsequent inquiry, however, established their accuracy. From the above remarks it will be seen that in judging of Testimony, the four following things, with regard to the attestors, are to be observed:—

1st. The capacity of the witnesses to make observations, and give evidence. 2nd. Their character. 3rd. Their number. 4th. The time elapsed since the occurrence of which they speak. Regarding the facts concerning which they make attestation, we more readily place reliance if they have been, 1, possible; 2, patent to observation; 3, well known; 4, operative in the production or modification of future events.

PROBABILITY refers to the likelihood of an occurrence. The more numerous the causes which operate for and against the production of a certainty, the more difficult it is to discover the probability. When, however, the causes are ascertainable, they may be balanced, and the probability computed. If certain similar effects proceed from an unknown cause, and the majority of the effects are traced to one cause, it is probable the whole are the product of that cause. The uncertainty does not depend upon the absence of *a* cause, but from our want of knowledge of *the* cause. The grounds of probability are, 1st, The accordance of the circumstance with our knowledge or experience; 2nd, The reliability of testimony. Anything may be called improbable, if the chance of its occurrence is less than $\frac{1}{2}$ (one-half). If one premise be probable, and another certain, the conclusion will only be probable. If both premises be probable, the conclusion is not necessarily probable, but depends upon the probability of each premise. Supposing the premises of an argument to possess much more than one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) of probability, the conclusion will not be in every case probable; for to state the case in its strongest light against ourselves, let each premise have seven-tenths of probability, the conclusion will be improbable; thus, $\frac{7}{10}\times\frac{7}{10}=\frac{49}{100}$. This uncertainty would increase with the improbability of each premise added.

I give you leave (says Erasmus) to adopt war, if it shall not appear, on a fair calculation, that you are in pursuit of an uncertain profit, at a certain loss not to be estimated; in pursuit of a profit, not only less in amount than the certain loss, but also doubtful whether it will ever be obtained at all.

Religion.

OUGHT THE CHURCH AND STATE TO BE UNITED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

RESTLESS, unceasing movement is the chief characteristic of the present age. Boldness, rising almost to hardihood, marks the footsteps of the triumphant march of man. We rejoice that we live in such an era; that we have lived to see so grand a scene in the great drama of human life. No longer does the "wisdom of our ancestors" greet our ears, as the final answer to all demands for improvement. Old, time-venerable institutions have been changed, antiquity-honoured customs have been abrogated, century-moulded, parchment-inscribed laws have been annulled or amended, superstition has fled before the sober eye of reason, and the world is visibly improved by the change. Feudal tyranny, religious persecutions, trade restrictions, revenge-gratifying punishments, and murderous war, have passed, or are passing, from reality to history. Change! Change is the great watchword of the men of the present day. Agitation after agitation rises up, and sends forth its great tidal pulsation through every city, town, village, and hamlet, in this mighty hive of industry. Many are the monster evils which have "fallen, fallen, fallen from their high estate," in this mighty upsurging of opinion. Many a sand-founded enstonement of error has been crumbled in the elemental contention. Many more are rocking to and fro, only awaiting the regurgitation to be swept away from amongst the things that *are*, to mingle with the things that *were;* and so far as their future influence is concerned, they soon will be oblivionized. But surely in this flux and reflux of opinion, in this whirlpool of agitation, all that *is* will not perish, all that we hold dear, and fondly cherish, will not be submerged and destroyed. In human affairs, we are no advocates that

"Whatever *is*, is right."

But surely if there be one thing of which permanency may be predicated, if there be one institution of which it may be said, that it will stand "immortal amid ruins," it may be said of the Church. Trials, vicissitudes, aggressions, inward contentions, and external assaults, she must suffer, endure, and, by enduring passively, resist; for such is the fate of all that is good, and pure, and holy. It is not given to her to be perfect, for she is but a humanly wrought instrument, though of Divine contrivance. Schism will divide, sectarianism attack, heresy disturb, infidelity assail, and the banded hordes of the vicious, the immoral, and the depraved, oppose; but, like the God-lighted bush on Sinai's sacred top, it will not be destroyed. Its motto, even when the knell of Time is rung, will still be, *Nec tamen consumeretur*. Like a light set on a hill, it will not be hid. Mists may obscure it, storms may swelter round it, *ignes fatui* may delude those whose eyes are eagerly desirous of beholding it; some may even shut their eyes, and say they see it not; still it will blaze until all eyes are brightened by its beams, and every heart is gladdened by its joy-giving resplendency. — But I am declaiming where reasoning is required. *Pardonnez moi.* As the earliest government was patriarchal, so also was the early church. Fathers of families were the primal priesthood. And when, at a later date, God chose a people from among the nations, and resolved in it to plant his church, he consigned the care, government, and superintendence of it to the civil authorities;—to the Judges first, so long as Palestine was a Republic, and afterwards to the Kings, when Israel, by choice, became a Monarchy. The whole Jewish economy was founded upon the unition of Church and State. And thus we find that, by the express order and appointment of the unchangeable God, such a union was consummated. Besides, as all the religions of the earth are supposed to have originated from the faint remembrances of God-revealed truths,

which men bore with them in their immigrations, so we shall find that, like the great Original from which they sprung, each religion was connected with the State. So it was in Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Mexico. So it is now in China, Thibet, Persia, Japan, and amongst the desert-roaming Red-Indian worshippers of the "Great Spirit." Furthermore, we are told (Isaiah xlix. 33) that "kings shall be nursing fathers, and their queens nursing mothers" to the Church. And what does or can this mean, except that the Church is to be nourished, supported, guarded, upheld, and directed by the State? To follow out the plans of Jehovah, and to aid in the fulfilment of his prophecies, cannot be sinful; therefore, the union of Church and State cannot be sinful.

Were religion a thing which appealed to the passions, prejudices, or worldly necessities of men; did men feel the same craving for it, the same eager desire for its attainment, religion might be left free to the operation of the same laws as regulate all other commodities. But it is a lamentable fact, that those who most require the guidance, the lofty inducements, the fearful threatenings, the sublime morality, the infallible leadership of religion, feel the least want of its quickening influence, its restraining power, its rich consolations, and its noble and ennobling teachings. Men feel more readily the want of corn, than that "bread which perisheth not." Men naturally possess a greedier desire for the pleasures and enjoyments of this world, than of that which is "unseen and eternal;" have a keener relish for the "pleasures of sin," than of "whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely, or of good report:" and hence it is necessary that some means should be taken by which they may be supplied with inducements to partake of that for which they have too little relish, and to which they are too naturally disinclined. Hence the advantage of a State Church. It is "the voice of one crying in the wilderness." But what voluntary ever attempts to "cry," where the golden response cannot be given? And we do not blame them, for they must live. Still, how can "the people hear without a preacher?" And how can a preacher live without his stipend? Who would reduce the minister of God to a demi-pauper? Who would leave him to make his appeal to the worldly-mindedness, the gold-grasping avariciousness of men? And should we leave our most sacred institutions to the bare chance of the "voluntary and free-will offerings" of those whose love of Christ may be lukewarm or feigned? We do not distrust the providence of God over his church in saying this. We are commanded to use the means; and these means should be the best within our power, to secure the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom. And who does not see that the abolition of a State Church would put a mighty inducement in the way of evil-doers? For all such as "cared for none of these things" would be released at once from the attendance on religious ordinances, and from contributing to the preservation of peace, order, and morality. Infidelity would be exempt from requiring to subsidize the State, in its endeavours to teach its people righteousness; and the holy, the just, and the good, would alone be taxed for the promotion of godliness, and the prevention of evil. Then would the sceptic be at liberty to utter his foolhardy blasphemies unchecked; then would the godless worldling be able to riot in licentiousness; then would the profane have a bounty placed on their iniquitous doings; then would the ignorant and the depraved be permitted to wallow in their own "slough of despond;" for then there would be an annual saving of so many pounds sterling by being irreligious. Those who really desired to see "righteousness abound in our streets" would feel the burden oppressive, and would thus be more readily inclined to faint and grow weary. The clergy themselves would feel their dependence so keenly, and their living so precarious, that they would find it to their worldly profit to gloss over the precious truths of the Word; would find it necessary to exercise the utmost caution in their denunciations of sin—to avoid all allusion to the particular sins to which their chief patrons were addicted. Those clergy would be chosen

or retained who suited their doctrines to the wants of the times. Corruption and degeneracy would palsy the efforts of Christianity to benefit men, until, at last, it would become a byword and a scorn to the continually increasing multitude of the ungodly. And hence, to dissolve the connexion of Church and State, would be equivalent to bestowing a reward and a token of encouragement to those who are already too eager to be released from all christian importunity to "newness of life."

But it is argued, it is unjust to make those support an Established Church whose consciences do not approve of it. It is equally unjust to tax a member of the Peace Society for the support of war forces, a Chartist to defray the expenses of a Monarchy, an Arbitrationist to remunerate our judges, a thief to maintain a crime-preventative force, an anti-capital-punishmentist for the wages of "Jack Ketch," or a poacher for the maintenance of a game law. This would never do. To tolerate error, without supporting truth, would be, in reality, to wage an exterminating war against truth; for "men love darkness rather than light." It would be to make "true and undefiled religion" an "airy nothing," and to give to error a "local habitation and a name." Bear witness, Johanna Southcote, William Courtenay, and Joseph Smith.

"Whatever may become of the higher orders of mankind, who are generally possessed of collateral motives to virtue, the vulgar should be particularly regarded, whose behaviour in civil life is totally hinged on their hopes and fears. Those who constitute the basis of the great fabric of society should be particularly regarded; for, in policy as in architecture, ruin is most fatal when it begins at the bottom."* Now, as the majority of our countrymen are unfit to judge what doctrines are taught in accordance with Divine truth, they must be led by those reputed wiser than themselves. But they are naturally inclined to listen to enthusiasts, fanatics, demagogues, and visionaries, rather than those whose conduct is characterized by decency, sobriety, and modesty of demeanour. Can we hesitate in giving our preference to the latter, by the establishment of such men as the instructors of the people in righteousness? An established system of faith, too, is one which has been carefully drawn up by the wise, the good, and reverend of the age. It is chosen by many men of highly superior endowments. Dissent, in many cases, is the opinion of one or two individuals, set up in opposition to this, and by dint of iteration and reiteration, impressed on the minds of those who can scarcely be supposed to understand the whole range of considerations involved in the controversies which these parties have excited. Witness the many divisions in the Methodist body. It is obviously advantageous, in circumscribing the fiery glow of controversy, to have the Church and State united.

An Established Church is placed in such circumstances, that it makes Christianity respectable and fashionable; and as hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue, it becomes fashionable to attend the church; but this brings men within the range of the Gospel, and they cannot fail in some measure to profit by it. It thus becomes a converting agency, a source from which Christianity may emanate and spread. A Dissenting congregation can only attract those who have already been brought under Gospel blessings.

But it may still be argued, Voluntaryism is best. We ask, in reply, What has Voluntaryism done? Have we not seen Educational Institutions fail, charitable designs abandoned, improvements neglected, for lack of voluntary liberality? And how many of our institutions drag out a miserable existence, by the semi-extortion of charity, or the still worse, bribing men by advertising their donations in the public prints! Who would reduce "the Church of God planted in our midst" to such base issues? I, for my part, sternly oppose it, and give my countenance to the union of Church and State.

One word more, and I have done. I do not deal here with anything except the abstract question, "Ought the Church and State to be united?" Are the present State Churches the best constituted christian bodies? is quite a different

* Goldsmith, Essay xvii.

topic of discussion. Nothing, therefore, drawn from the present Established churches has any force against the principle for which we contend, viz., that Church and State should be united.

SALINE.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In this enlightened age men are ever and anon asking the why and wherefore, the utility and expediency of everything; but more especially is this spirit of inquiry manifested when any subject of questionable bearing is brought under consideration.

The question, "Ought the Church and State to be united?" has often been discussed; weighty reasons, *pro* and *con*, have been produced, but the question still remains. Without, therefore, presuming to advance any unanswerable arguments, yet as firm believers in the expediency of their disunion, we beg to offer the following remarks:—

Leaving the history of former years—from which might be gathered materials that would furnish evidence the most clear and conclusive in support of the view we have taken of this subject—we will confine our remarks to what we conceive to be the abuses necessarily springing from the union of the Church and State, as displayed in our own times.

1st, The monarch's supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs is a *postulatum*, the basis of which is not found in Scripture. The religion of Jesus Christ needs not an earthly monarch's power to defend it, or to give it prominence in the world. Its Divine origin, and its adaptation to the necessities of mankind, are in themselves sufficient recommendations; so that, were the Church and State immediately separated, the interests of religion could not in any degree suffer. The evils necessarily attending the monarch's supremacy are sufficiently obvious when we consider his prerogative in appointing Bishops to the various sees of the realm.

In the Thirty-seventh Article of the Church of England it is expressly said: "Where we attribute to the Queen's Majesty the chief goverment, by which Titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended; we give not to our Princes the ministering either of God's Word, or of the Sacraments; but that only prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly Princes in holy Scriptures by God himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil-doers." Is this the only prerogative the monarch exercises? Let us see.

Facts speak a different language, for the appointment of every one of the Bishops is entirely in the hands of Royalty. The Queen's minister recommends such a one to the Queen as eligible for the office of Bishop in such a diocese:—it may be because he is a good scholar, or that he is his son's tutor; or he may be a relation; but one thing is certain, that unless the premier is a God-fearing man, he is not likely to discharge this duty with a "single eye" to the glory of God and the good of man. Then, when the Queen adopts his recommendation and gives it to the clergy, that recommendation has the force of law.*

The consequences of such a course are plain to every impartial mind. The Bishop so appointed has the ordination of a multitude of inferior clergy; and if he be destitute of that which should be a *sine quâ non* for his elevated position, and by which alone he is competent to judge of the suitability of others to minister in holy things, how can we expect our pulpits to be supplied with efficient and evangelical pastors? But the evil does not stop here. A young man, either in search after preferment, or because he or his friends attach considerable importance to the clerical profession, or because there is a good living of which he is certain, or, it may be, aspiring to a seat in the House of Lords, he sees too many attractions in such an establishment as that of the Established Church, not to catch at the gilded bait. The fitness or piety of the

* *Vide* the case of Dr. Hampden, Bishop of Hereford.

individual is only a secondary consideration, if, indeed, it is taken into account at all. True, the ordination service is gone through, and the aspirant to "holy orders" is required to answer certain grave questions affecting his moral character—his call to the ministry—his belief in the doctrines of the Church—and to promise that his subsequent conduct shall be of a nature consistent with the requirements of the Gospel. But how often is this a mere farce! When secular interest is the only motive which induces a man to enter the ministry, he can subscribe to anything that would enable him to realize the *desideratum*. He does not come in through the "door," but clandestinely climbs over the "wall:" he puts on the garb, and assumes to himself the character of a pastor! But, alas for such a shepherd, and for the flock under his care! No wonder that results disastrous to the cause of truth follow, when men of spotted chracters and sinful lives enter the sacred office of the ministry.

Be it far from us to include all in one indiscriminate censure, for it gives us pleasure to acknowledge that there are many worthy, pious, and devoted men, in the Church of England; but their system is one of corruption, and against that system we wage war.

If we look for a moment at our Universities, we see the Heads and resident Fellows of the colleges having the recommendation of persons for the ministry—for almost every Bishop requires college testimonials from the person who comes to him for ordination—and what do they affirm? Why, that the person referred to has lived "*honestly, soberly, and godly*," during his residence at college. Now, how do those testimonials agree with the characters of many who have received them? The very reverse of those three excellent qualities has marked their course of living; they have been notorious for profaneness, debauchery, and riotous living! while it can be proved that testimonials have been withheld from others, in all respects properly qualified for the work of an evangelist. Here, then, is corruption, perpetuated, too, by those whose duty it is to preserve the purity of the church.

Aristocratic patronage is another abominable assumption of prerogative, sanctioned, it is true, by law, but diametrically opposed to the spirit of Christianity. Here we have patrons—noble Dukes, Earls, Marquises, Lords, &c.—at whose disposal are numerous lucrative livings. The Duke of Beaufort is patron of twenty-nine livings! The Duke of Bedford, twenty-seven! The Duke of Cleveland, eighteen! Earl of Abergavenny, eighteen! Marquis of Bristol, twenty! The details of a host of others might be given, but they would occupy too much space. Can these patrons say that in the fear of God they dispose of these livings to men in every respect qualified to have the care of souls? Let conscience answer.

Another set of patrons who have livings at their disposal, and whose care it has ever been not to leave their friends and relations unprovided for, are the Bishops. The Archbishop of Canterbury has one hundred and forty-nine livings! The Archbishop of York, sixty-two! The Bishop of London, ninety! The Bishop of Durham, forty-seven! The Bishop of Winchester, sixty-two! and so on, in a similar proportion, with the remainder. Their enormous revenues is another consideration worth noticing: some of them enjoying from £10,000 to £27,000 a year, exclusive of salaries derived from other sources! What man, placed in such a position, can escape corruption? If, when he entered the church, his views were unambitious, and his thoughts did not extend to high things, yet when, through interest and other means, he obtains a bishopric, it is almost impossible for his purity to be preserved.

We shall not occupy further space by going into the minutiæ of Church benefices, but will briefly glance at one revenue of the Church, which we consider to be a disgraceful extortion, viz., church rates.

A man who, for conscience sake, dissents from the polity, and some of the doctrines of the Established Church, who receives no instruction from her ministers, and derives no benefit from her services, is compelled by the law

of the land to contribute towards her support, or, in the event of refusal, his property is sold, or his person incarcerated! Can anything be more unscrupulously unjust? Can we wonder at the strong feeling of Dissenters on this subject, when we consider that in effect their families are robbed to support an Institution which they hold in detestation?

When will the people of England rise as one man and protest against this demoralizing union?—a union that is eating away the very vitals of Christianity! Truly does the Hon. and Rev. B. Noel observe: "The State being the world, it (the union) is a close alliance between the church and the world, which Christ has forbidden. History abundantly condemns it, as uniformly hostile to spiritual religion; and it is condemned by the provisions of the Mosaic economy, by the language of the Hebrew prophets, and by the express declarations of Christ and his apostles."

J. E. P.

Philosophy.

IS PHRENOLOGY TRUE?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

The power of Custom in influencing the popular beliefs of men has never been duly estimated. Truth is one and permanent, Error is multiple and mutable. Men delight in variety and change, and are ever too ready "to run greedily" after any "new move" which may be put on the *tapis*. Hence it is that they love Error rather than Truth. Opinion, not Truth, is with them an omnipotence. Error—that many-visaged and false Florimel—under how many new phases have we seen her appear! How readily does she adapt herself to the popular mind, which is proverbially "to one thing constant never!" Truly we ought to use great precautions in the adoption of opinions, when we know how assiduously the agents of Error are engaged in the distribution of fruits which are

"Rank at the core, though tempting to the eye."

Bear witness, Experience, how many

"A talisman or spell,
By which the magic art of shrewder wits
Has held the unthinking multitude in thrall,"

the contemptuous critic — Time — has seen producing wondrous effects upon human minds. Amongst these falsities, which Error is so prolific in engendering, I have not scrupled to place Phrenology; and you will allow me to make a quotation from one of the ablest "disciples of Gall," in self-justification: — "The great objection to the prevailing metaphysical systems is, that *none of their positions can be proved*, and that scarcely any two writers agree on any particular point. The disciples of Gall, on the other hand, *assume* that his system, having ascertainable facts to illustrate it, is, at all times, susceptible of demonstration, that *nothing is taken for granted*, and that the inquirer has only to make an appeal to nature to ascertain its fallacy or its truth."* How logical! They *assume*, yet *nothing is taken for granted!* And to show you that this is not a mere *lapsus styli*, but a radical and constitutional defect, you may listen to the same gentleman again ("Introduction to Phrenology," p. 30):—"May an organ be well developed, and yet incapable of manifesting its faculty in a powerful degree?—This may occasionally happen in consequence of a general or partial want of energy in the brain. It is most likely to occur in persons of a lymphatic temperament, where the cerebral circulation is carried on with little vigour. Sometimes a *single* organ becomes apathetic, while the rest are healthy." And again, in the same work, p. 41, "Does Phrenology admit of ex-

* Macnish's "Philosophy of Sleep," p. 8.

ceptions?" *It does not.* A *single* exception would entirely overthrow whatever part of the phrenological doctrine it should be at variance with. When an apparent exception does occur, it must be attributed to ignorance on the part of the observer, or to a want of health in the brain." And also Dr. Combe ("System of Phrenology," p. 48):—"The brain, like other parts of the body, may be affected with certain diseases, which do not diminish or increase its magnitude, but yet impair its functions. The Phrenologist ascertains the health by inquiry. In cases of disease, great size may be present, and very imperfect manifestations appear." The spirit of the above extracts is also found in the article of a Member of the L. Y. M.'s Society, p. 188, where he says, "It is true there may often occur facts seemingly opposed to this (*i. e.*, that prominence of organ is index of power of faculty), such as the large development of an organ unaccompanied with a corresponding exercise of a faculty; but it can be easily explained by the fact, that faculties may exist in a dormant or inactive state." Hearken to this, spirit of Bacon, mighty father of Inductive Philosophy! How accordant with the laws of thy philosophy are the Scientific researches of Phrenologists! They *assume* that their hypothesis is a nature-verity; they proceed to proof. One exception, according to their own showing, would subvert their premises. The exception occurs, and they coolly tell us that "it *must* be attributed to *ignorance* on the part of the observer," or the apathy or disease of the exceptional organ, and thus do not even beg, but take by storm, and with insulting language, the very principle which it was their duty to demonstrate; and yet *nothing is taken for granted! Risum teneatis!**

"The ocean hath his chart, the stars their map;"

and so, according to Phrenologists, has the brain; and they can lay their learned fingers on each demarcated *nome*, and tell unerringly what part of

"The faculty divine
Is chain'd and tortured—cabin'd, cribb'd, confined,
And bred in darkness"

there; and can thence learn the "nature, disposition, and talents," which each individual respectively possesses. This, we humbly depone, is an impossibility; "for Phrenology regards not merely the form and size of the brain, as is often ignorantly supposed, but also *the diversified causes which affect its activity and vigour, the laws according to which these causes operate, and, in general, every circumstance tending to influence the mental power.*"* Who can undertake, with anything like precision or exactness, to calculate the influence of all these various agencies? This demands a full and complete knowledge of Physiology in all its ramifications and departments; a perfect acquaintance with mental and moral Philosophy, a thorough understanding of the principles of that little cultivated science, Sociology, and many other recondite truths, which have not even yet dawned on the intellectual horizon.

There are thirty-six organs, each of which is possessed of twenty degrees of developing-power; each organ may, therefore, differ in capacity from zero to twenty; each variation of organ must, therefore, be ascertained; then must these variations be compared, the proportions of power which they respectively possess must be discovered, and their influence upon each other must be found. But this is not all. The *quality of brain*, the *temperament*, the *apathy* or *activity*, the *health* or *disease*, of each organ; the *education*, or exercise and cultivation which each prominence has received; the influence of *example*, and the power of law, custom, and authority, must next be discovered, estimated, and determined. How can all this be done? What intricate arithmetical processes does it demand? How can we gain a knowledge of "every circumstance tending to influence the mental powers?" It would be an easier task to take the "map of Europe," and from the size, figure, &c., and "every circumstance tending to influence the *ruling* powers," predict the occurrences, and

* Can you restrain your laughter?

* Macnish's "Introduction to Phrenology," p. 199.

write a narrative of the next ten years of "European History."

> "I am no angel, nursed in the lap of light,
> Nor feed on milk immortal of the stars,
> Nor golden fruit, grown in the summer sun,"

and yet I had as lief attempt the latter, as undertake the former.

The argument of G. R. C., that Phrenology does not teach infidelity, is, that the most depraved organism, "when touched by the re-moulding influence of the Holy Spirit, can be turned into a happier channel, and act in a new direction." This *we* believe, but where then is the truth of Phrenology? Does the operation of the Spirit alter and improve the cranial development? Are there no Christians—none "touched by the re-moulding influence of the Holy Spirit," but such as have

> "Hyperion's curls, the front of Jove himself!"

Is a faultless organism or a faultless life the true characteristic of a Christian? Of what use is Phrenology, if the Spirit amends the heart, directs the thoughts, restrains the passions, purifies and refines the intellect, unless it also squares the organization with the dogmas of Gall and Spurzheim? It can only tell what the natural man *was*, not what the spiritual man *is*; and therefore it cannot give us, what its name implies—"a knowledge of mind."

A member of the L. Y. M.'s Society (how disagreeable such long signatures are!) admits, "That no observant Phrenologist will assert that the lines of demarcation between the different organs can be settled, with mathematical precision, yet, almost all are satisfied of their general correctness." Now we assert that, unless mathematical precision is attainable, the *degree* of power which each organ wields cannot be discovered. If it cannot be found out, the relative influence which it has upon other organs cannot be ascertained, and thus the science is seen to be altogether vain and futile. Given the temperament, position in society, educational advantages, company, and "every circumstance which tends to influence the mental powers," and a statement remarkable for its "general correctness" may be easily drawn up regarding any man, without the aid of Phrenology at all. The same individual wishes me to render the "clearness" of my "*non sequitur*" a little "clearer." I shall have the greatest pleasure in acceding to his wish. But I must first premise that there are three departments of inquiry in Phrenology, viz.:—Craniology, or a knowledge of the distinct and individual organs of which the brain is a congeries; Cranioscopy, or the part of manipulation, by which the manifestation of the organs, *i. e.*, the degree of their prominence or deficiency, is observed; Phrenology, the knowledge of the relations subsisting between the size, conformation, &c., of the brain, the temperament, social position, education, health, or disease, &c., of the human being, and the power, variety, and nature of the individual mind. This last is the department in which its metaphysical pretensions are made. It is in this that it arrogates to itself the dignity of a new and superior mental philosophy.

The reasons which induce me to believe that Phrenology is a "misnomer," and a "*non sequitur*," are shortly these: —The brain, Phrenologists say, is the organ of the mind; and the organs of the brain are the *signs* of the mental faculties. They thus gain—if the truth of Craniology be admitted—a knowledge of the *signs* of mental power, not of the mind itself. That I may not be accused of "making a point," I will tire the patience of my readers with another extract:—"If the brain be the organ of the mind, it will follow that the mind does not act independently of its organ; and hence that every emotion and judgment of which we are conscious is the result of the mind and its organs acting together; secondly, that every mental affection must be accompanied by a corresponding state of the organ, and *vice versâ*, every state of the organ must be attended by a certain condition of the mind; and, thirdly, that the perfection of the manifestations of the mind will bear a relation to the perfections of its organ. These propositions appear to be incontrovertible, and to follow as necessary consequences, from the simple fact,

that the mind acts by means of organs. But if they be well founded, how important a study does that of the organs of the mind become. *It is the study of the mind itself, in the only condition in which it is known to us!* and the very fact that, in past ages, the mind has been studied without reference to organisation, accounts for the melancholy truth that, independently of Phrenology, no mental philosophy, suited to practical purposes, exists."* The proposition contained in the italicised sentence, we distinctly deny. Mind is known to us by Consciousness, and by Consciousness alone. Hence that science which seeks to gain a knowledge of mind by cerebral conformation, &c., cannot be a Phrenology, although it may be a Craniology. And the difference is not merely verbal, but radical; for no one can doubt the intimations of his consciousness. Yet there may be unbelief, most justifiably entertained, as to the interpretation of the cerebral *signs* which Phrenology studies. In short, Phrenologists study a *material* and disputed organology, and then assert that "it is the study of mind itself, in the only condition in which it is known to us." Mental Philosophers investigate the mentality itself, and study the operations of the *mind*, by carefully watching its transitions from one state to another.

We may push our argument one step farther, and show that, so far from being an improved system of mental science, Craniology is its only distinguishing feature, and Cranioscopy merely an empirical mode of pretending to demonstrate it. Whence do Phrenologists gain a knowledge of the human faculties? Do they determine, *à priori*, the human mind must be endowed with such and such powers? or do they, by interrogating their own consciousness, and the outward manifestations of thought in others—speech and action—acquire an acquaintance with the primal faculties of the soul, and then attempt to conjoin some organic sign, as the concomitant of the thing signified? If they employ this latter inductive method, as they say they do, in what point does their new philosophy of mind differ in its means of attainment from the old Psychology? In nowise, except in the invention of a new nomenclature, and the system of organology. This latter is the new philosophy. But surely it is anything but a philosophy of mind!! It can, at best, be but a contribution to physical science. How great is the room for doubt as to the truths of Craniology and Cranioscopy, has already been fully discussed—nay, is by themselves granted. It surely becomes us to exercise great precaution in the adoption of a system of Philosophy which reduces, practically, the human mind to a series of material phenomena,—a science, one of whose early advocates—Brousais—says, "The time has now arrived when the wall of brass set up by absurd metaphysicians between man and the brute creation should be broken down?" and some of whose present believers teach, that "man's acts are the result of his organisation. His organs are made for him; therefore the responsibility of his actions rests with his Maker."* In all human opinions, Time is continually winnowing the chaff from the wheat, and throwing the chaff contemptuously aside. I have no doubt but that Phrenology will be in the latter heap; for when I ask myself the question, "Is Phrenology true?" reason replies in the negative,

"And feeling staggers back, and answers 'No!'"

S. N.

* Combe's "System of Phrenology," vol. i. p. 21.

* Zoist.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

A GREAT man (Swedenborg) has said that all material objects, or existences, are merely symbols of corresponding spiritual doctrines. Proceeding upon this theory, methinks we can perceive in the BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST the *beau-ideal* of a tilt-yard, where the wandering cavalier or knight-errant may appear in arms to do battle—either in behalf of some distressed damsel, or to win applauding smiles from his "ladye-love"—against dragons, griffins, or gigantic

knights, armed *cap-a-pie*, in "complete steel;" the said fierce and unearthly antagonists being, in this case, represented by Protæan-formed Error; and the distressed damsel, or "ladye-love," by Divine ethereal-eyed Truth.

In pursuance of this noble warfare, we, though but as yet an humble squire, and "unknown to fame," do intend to buckle on our armour, and manfully betake ourselves to the combat, in behalf of that noble, virtuous, and much-maligned damsel, Phrenology—hoping, in the said combat, to win the golden spurs of knighthood. But not light will be the contest. First, we have to encounter the sinewy arm of S. N., who wields a Damascus blade, and is arrayed in Spanish steel-coat; then, should we survive the attack of this redoubtable champion, we have to meet him of Gosport, who, if not heavy-armed with logic, will, with his Scripture-text cross-bow bolts, much annoy us; and, lastly, should we choose to come, with no mortal wounds, out of the double fight, again must we measure swords with L. I., and show that he indeed has signed himself in proper form.

But let us set ourselves seriously to the examination of the subject.

That able and discriminating writer, S. N., has attacked Phrenology on the following grounds:—

That, because Phrenology affirms concerning mind, not from inspection of the mind itself, but from the physical organisation with which it is connected: and, as he judges, that the mind, if immaterial, cannot be identical with its physical instrument or organ, and, therefore, cannot be known through its agency!—therefore Phrenology is not what it professes to be—mind-knowledge, but head-knowledge. Further, he endeavours to fix it in a dilemma thus:—If by the instrument we can judge of the actor, then they are the same—*i. e.*, the brain and the mind are identical—if identical, then mind is material: and if material, then not mind at all; wherefore, if there be no mind, but merely material brain, there can exist no philosophy of mind; hence, Phrenology is a misnomer. And then again:—If mind be immaterial, it is impossible to predicate concerning it from a material brain; and, therefore, Phrenology cannot be a philosophy of mind.

These, if we mistake not, are substantially the arguments used by S. N. Now, the first fallacy apparent in the above argument is, that Phrenologists found their system wholly upon observations of the cranium and cerebral structure, to the neglect of personal consciousness. This we deny. Phrenology also investigates through the medium of personal consciousness, but it does not, like the Psychological school of mental philosophy, wholly ignore matter, but asks, *Is there in this creature man, in which matter and mind are so closely and intimately blended together, a relation by means of which we can predicate of the latter through the medium of the former?* It is not necessary to ask, Why, or how, this relation exists? The question is, Does it exist? If a traveller sees a palace built in the finest style of architecture, and furnished in a most sumptuous manner, he directly concludes that it belongs to a rich man. But how can he judge of a person from inanimate things, such as the walls of a building, or its furnishings? "Simply," he would answer, "because it is a general rule established by experience that only rich men live in palaces." In like manner, if in a greater number of individuals, presenting, in other respects, peculiarities of character widely different, the marked exercise of one particular faculty or power of mental emotion is found conjoined with a large development of the brain and cranium, then, if a sufficient number of cases be not brought forward to prove the contrary, it follows, that this relation between the mind and the cerebral structure is an established fact.

This is the ground on which Phrenology must be assailed, and not by fine-spun metaphysical arguments, or deduction resting upon preconceived notions; and until overthrown on this basis, she shall rise, Galileo-like, from the battering of a futile logic, and exclaim—It still exists!

Space forbids us from following the arguments of S. N. further; but as the above fallacy lies at the bottom of, and runs through them all, by refuting it,

the weight of his arguments is substantially destroyed.

In reference to W. T., his reasoning is of such a loose nature, and deals in such vague contrasts, that it is scarcely possible to reduce any remarks upon it within the small space to which we are confined. By quoting mutilated passages of Scripture, he endeavours to show that man is a demon; and by setting this in opposition to what he asserts is the Phrenological doctrine, he endeavours to place Scripture and Phrenology in the position of antagonism. In reply, we maintain, first, that the word Σαρξ, flesh —of which the Apostle tells us the catalogue of sins quoted by W. T. are the works—is never used in the New Testament to signify all the powers of the mind taken collectively, but only those which Phrenologists term propensities. (In relation to this, see Rom. vii. 14-25, and Gal. v. 19.) Secondly, Phrenologists recognise no such doctrine as that any of the faculties bestowed by God upon man are "evil." Thirdly, so far from Phrenology diminishing, it greatly increases the importance of Christianity, by showing that it *alone affords a perfect means of moral cultivation.*

In answer to L. I., we say—first, that temperament is as capable of recognition on the head as any other parts of the body;—secondly, that the disease of brain being only another term for insanity of mind, a person, whose brain was diseased, would be mad, and, consequently, no fit subject for Phrenological inquiry. Thirdly, that as Phrenology professes to judge only of tendency or capacity, it does not necessarily take exercise into consideration. Fourthly, that the world has not been distinguished for that discernment of character for which L. I. gives it credit. Witness all history.

Since writing the above, we find that "Philomathos," whom we imagined had soared so far into cloud-land as to have gone quite beyond the sphere of the earth's attraction—

> "And leaving land far out of sight had skimm'd
> The ocean of eternity,"

has actually descended upon terra firma! The length of his flight will, doubtless, account for the unsteadiness of his gait upon the solid earth of facts.

In his attempted refutation of C. W., jun., the facts he employs, like wounded elephants, may be made to turn upon his own ranks.

His first fact, in my opinion, completely establishes that the brain is the organ of the mind; and though he endeavours to turn it against another doctrine, yet he can by no means legitimise his inference by showing that the injury was not sufficiently serious to affect all the brain. Philomathos has saved us the trouble of quoting a fact to show the contrary, by immediately subjoining the one required. By his second fact he proves that "injuries of the brain do not equally affect all the mental powers;" for, in this case, the organ of language, we are led to believe, was alone affected.

Regarding the inference we would draw from the second fact quoted, viz., that each faculty has not its own peculiar memory, we shall accept what he believes to be a *reductio ad absurdum.* The brain is composed of fibres, springing up from the root of the ear, and terminating in the cineritious or grey matter: then, there must be a great number of fibres in each organ; and if the brain be the organ of the mind, and each faculty has its own appropriate organ, what absurdity is there in supposing that each fibre may have its own particular function? But, setting aside the absurdity, or non-absurdity of this, and taking Philomathos on his premises—that the memory is "general"—to what conclusion shall we come, reasoning from the fact under consideration? Why, that an injury of a certain portion of the brain causes the loss of a single *part* of the memory; hence, that each department of the memory is related to a certain part of the brain; and thus, in either case, we come to a conclusion favourable to Phrenology.

But Philomathos has omitted to mention that the individual was a native of Wales; and therefore it is reasonable to suppose that, as the impressions of youth fix themselves most deeply on the memory, his own language would remain, when the injury of the organ had obli-

terated all trace of that acquired later in life.

In reference to the other objections, most of them, such as that founded on the exterior of the brain not corresponding with the interior of the cranium; that on the varieties of thicknesses in skulls; that on comparative Phrenology, and the presence of the cineritious matter in the interior as well as on the exterior of the brain, are brought forward in manifest ignorance of the organic laws, or an acquaintance with the teachings of Phrenology; and hence, from our limited space, we pass them over.

In conclusion, we would say, in behalf of Phrenology—Men who may court comparison with the advocates of any other science, as to their talent, probity, and intellect, have spent their lives in establishing, by rigid induction and observation among all nations, a relation between the mental faculties and the cerebral development; and we challenge our opponents to disprove this relation, not by picking holes in the system, and conjuring up imaginary difficulties, but by means of experimental reasoning and personal investigation.

HAROLD.

WHICH MOST DESERVES THE ESTEEM OF MANKIND, THE POET OR THE LEGISLATOR?

THE LEGISLATOR.—III.

It might well make a mere child at arms turn pale to see an opponent like J. F. stepping into the arena. To have such a person for an opponent is calculated to make us look to our footing to see that all is right below, or to make us half suspect that we have chosen the wrong side. But when we have such a friend as B. W. P., who is so great an adept at the lance, stepping in to the rescue, it is calculated to restore one's equilibrium, and lead us to imagine that all is not exactly lost, even yet.

In the very able production of J. F. there occurs the following remarkable passage:—"If we turn our attention to the Legislator, we shall at once see that we have not to unveil his character, or trace his influences through the obscure pathways of the mind; we need not seek to correct any misconceptions of his importance in society, or attempt, as we have on behalf of the poet, to vindicate his claims to esteem. His prominence and adornment at once bespeak his importance, and, at the same time, show that the share of esteen he enjoys can hardly be less than he merits." We have quoted thus largely, that we might not be charged with unfairness— a charge which, in the present case, we should be exceedingly sorry to incur.

From the foregoing, then, it appears to be the opinion of J. F., that the claims of the Poet are far more liable to be misunderstood than those of the Legislator. Nay, we think we ought to have expressed ourselves more strongly. We ought rather to have said, that the claims of the Poet are never thoroughly understood and appreciated, while those of the Legislator are not liable to be misunderstood.

1. Is it a fact that the claims of the Poet are never thoroughly understood and appreciated? Our friend himself informs us that there was a time when his claims were appreciated. "In the ancient world the power of the poet was such, that every other power which affected the condition of man was under his control." Surely this was according to the Poet his full quota of esteem. This surely would be all that the Poet could wish for; and rather more, we think, than he deserved. In this opinion J. F. seems to concur; for he says, "It must be lamented that his influence was then, upon the whole, morally injurious." And yet it cannot be denied that it was in the time of the "ancient world" that some of the best effusions of the Poet were given forth —effusions, which to the present day are generally held to be unsurpassed.

From the older portions of the Bible, and also from the works of Homer, it is pretty evident that the art of Poetry was, at a very early period, in a high state of perfection. It is also evident, at least in our friend's estimation, that then the Poet was really esteemed as high as, or a little higher than, he deserved. At the present time, however, he is not esteemed so highly as he was then, nor so highly as our friend thinks he has a right to be. In other words, during the last four thousand years the Poet has lost, from some cause, either in himself or others, a portion of the esteem which he then had. Our friend acknowledges that the Poet's power was then, on the whole, abused. We incline to think that it has been, on the whole, abused ever since. We know that plain and prosy truth, without the aid of Poetry, would commonly not find admittance to the ear, much less to the mind and heart of man. But we also know that the Poet has done more to palm upon the world falsehood as the "veritable issues of the mint of truth," than any other power besides.

The Poet's sphere has been the imagination—a noble sphere, indeed, when kept in subservience to, and under the control of, the judgment. But the cause of the Poet, we think, losing a portion of the esteem which he once enjoyed, is, that he has not kept the imagination sufficiently under the control of the judgment. That men, from other sources, have learned to use the *intellect* as well as the imagination, and, in proportion as they have done so, they have discovered the incapacity of the Poet entirely to guide them. An image may, indeed, be useful when it is found to represent a living reality; but an image, a mere image, without a living, active spirit, and which represents no actual existence, is, to say the least, a useless thing. And yet these are the things which the Poet has been principally engaged in constructing these four thousand years. He has made images in abundance; but the reality has yet to come. He has constructed models, drawn plans, executed paintings, beautiful, indeed, to the eye, captivating to the taste, and delightful to the imagination. But it is no part of his business to construct the building which he has so beautifully planned. This, men have discovered; and hence it is that he has lost their allegiance. Instead, therefore, of attributing the fact that the Poet has, to some extent, lost the esteem of mankind, to the circumstance that his claims are not understood, ought we not rather to attribute it to their being understood *too well?*

2. Are the claims of the Legislator not liable to be misunderstood? J. F. asserts, "His prominence and adornments at once bespeak his importance." Is this the fact? How is the Legislator generally looked upon? Some regard him in a similar light to that in which they regard the tax gatherer. Others take a higher view. Like "Harold," they hold his employment to be, to curb and to keep in due subordination the animal nature of man, and to guard from its attacks the rights and well-being of society. But is this the status of the intelligent, disinterested, and philanthropic statesman? By no means. His is a higher,—a nobler work. True it is that these form a part of his business:—true it is that he has to conserve the interest of a nation or an empire. But these important, as on all hands they are acknowledged to be, are only a part. He has other, higher, because more difficult, hazardous, and noble duties to perform. He, like the Poet, has to enter the regions of the ideal. He has his images to construct, not, as in the case of the Poet, that they may remain images; but that they may imbibe the breath of life, and so become living realities! He also has his models to construct, not, indeed, to please the fancy or gratify the taste, but with a view to the rearing of the stately structure—that structure under whose shelter the family of mankind will rejoice to dwell. He, too, like the Poet, has his plans to construct; but not like those of the Poet—constructed for the world to admire. They are for the most part kept from the world until they are well-nigh executed. Then, indeed, men admire, but not a thing of paper, or a castle built in the air, but a reality, which will bear the test of common sense, and which is calculated to promote the welfare of the

world at large. The work of such a man cannot be understood until it is completed; nor is his importance known till he is lost.

But the Legislator has derived much of his materials from the Poet. Granted: yet which is the greater—he who makes an image, or he who gives it life? He who draws a plan, or he who builds a city? He who receives an idea, or he who makes that idea a living reality? Unquestionably the latter. Besides, though the Poet may have furnished the thought, it has been the Legislator who has had to seek for means to carry it out. These means have not been furnished, not even suggested, by the Poet. They lay not in his province. They belonged not to the region of the imagination, in which the Poet lives and moves, but to that of men and things as they really exist in every-day life.

Thus we think we have succeeded in showing that the work of the Legislator is far more extensive than is generally supposed, and that it is not altogether superfluous to attempt to remove "misconceptions of his importance in society."

In conclusion. Though we are ready to acknowledge that the Poet is worthy of esteem of no mean kind, inasmuch as he has aimed at, and secured, very important benefits to society; yet we think the Legislator more worthy of esteem, inasmuch as his work has been of a more extended and decisive character; has been attended with greater hazard to himself, and consequently required more self-denial; has been more complicated, and, therefore, required more tact and intelligence; has been attended with greater obstacles, and, on that account, required greater perseverance. In the work of the Poet, Imagination has played the more important part; in that of the Legislator the Intellect. The Poet has dreamed what the Legislator has realised.

G. N.

THE POET.—III.

This is an elevated discussion; it deals in elevated thoughts and elevated actions. The mighty doings of ancient and modern heroes, in politics and literature, appear in the antagonistic arena, and give it an aspect of respectability: the deeds of a Wilberforce, a Washington, a Cobden, and a Kossuth—the outpourings of a Milton, a Shakespeare, and a Cowper, shed around it a lustre of exaltation, and dispel from it all triviality. But the difficulties to be solved are as great as the subject is highborn. We therefore approach it in a respectful attitude, not with dogmatical confidence, but with a desire to add our humble mite for the elucidation of a subject so pleasing and so grand.

The physical, intellectual, and spiritual nature of man divide the vast field on which all the ameliorators of our kind are actively employed. Their comparative importance is fully understood, and we have been taught to esteem those the more who give attention to the more important of these; ever thinking that *they* deserve the most gratitude, who render service of the most valuable kind. God exercises a fatherly care over the whole of these; but his attention to our spiritual nature is the more marked, because He only can attend it. With our physical nature Legislators have legitimate concern; and for our intellectual, there is a noble class of intellectual trainers, amongst whom we unhesitatingly rank Poets. This is one reason why we award to them an intense admiration; their work is more precious, more valuable, in our eyes, than the work of the Legislator, and therefore we esteem them more.

Mind may be compared to a piece of metal which is not worth much unless polished, but which, when polished, serves as a mirror in which are reflected the beauties of Nature, of reason, of revelation. When this mind-metal is revealed, what fields of intellectual pleasure, of exalted enjoyment, and refined comfort open to our view, and invite us to tread their flowery pathways! These fields can be cultivated—this mind-metal can be sublimated—aye, sublimated, until it seems to copy the nature and reflect the glory of that great spirit-fountain from which it was cast off like a spark from a forge or a resplendent meteor from an

upheaving volcano. To be classed among those who give this value and beauty to mind, Poets have an undoubted right, and for this reason have they solemn claims upon our gratitude and sympathy. What a blank would there be in our being, did their angel-breathings bid us farewell! Where would be the hallowed feelings, the melted affections, the more than earthly thrills of pleasure, which their poetic fires call into existence? Can the work of the Legislator be compared to their sublime work? Can the catering for our physical wants outweigh in importance the brightening and refining—the supplying the wants, and feeding the high desires—the softening, the soothing—the making glad of our intellectual being? If not, then give to the Poet the greater meed of praise.

It may be said that Legislators can assist in doing this. They may assist;—they may order that in every parish there be a school, in every district a church; they may unfetter the press, and make literature accessible to all; they may establish schools and colleges, and foster and cherish learning; but all this is but "the form without the power,"—the carcass without the spirit—the shell without the kernel. These things are means to a great end; and the same originating energy which provided the means, whether by legislative instrumentality, or by more natural and efficient agency, must accompany these means and make them effectual. They are channels designed to convey from the fountains of original thought those vitalizing streams which alone may clothe with verdure, enrich with fruitfulness, and brighten with beauty, the waste places of society.

But not only in our estimation are the works of the Poet more precious and more to be esteemed than those of the Legislator, but the *manner*, also, in which he must work, and has worked, is more to be admired. The statesman's achievements are more the creations of circumstances, and interminable chains of causation, than the individual and independent exertions of one mind, while the Poet's work is necessarily the production of an original mind, individually working, and, to a great extent, independent of existing circumstances. Let us but attentively consider the great practical reforms which have transpired during the last fifty or sixty years, and it will appear that they have been rather wrung from those in power than presented as a free gift—asked more as a right, than as a blessing which Legislators could give or withhold. We all know the fierce opposition which the advocates for the abolition of British slavery had to withstand before their cause was victorious; the difficulties which had to be overcome, before the Reform Bill became a British law; and to come nearer our own times, the inveterate opposition which the never-to-be-forgotten champions of Free-trade had to encounter before their salutury measures prevailed in British legislation. No doubt master minds moved in all these; but would they have moved alone, had not the united voice of a mighty nation responded to their call, and making an army, of which they were the leaders, to fight for, and win, these great and glorious reforms?

Legislators may conceive, but without the aid of others their conceptions are of little value. Even the most praiseworthy Legislators,—the most upright, well-meaning, and sincere—require the support and help of those they wish to benefit; hence their work is not an individual work, therefore their honours are more scattered. Perhaps their laurels are as numerous as the Poets', but too many heads have to be crowned for any great amount resting on one; after that the lesser and auxiliary spirits have paid their honours, there is no splendid halo encircling the greater. With the true, the philanthropic Poet, it is not so. He acts individually and originally, when he intends good. He neither courts the popular hydra, nor adulates for kingly smiles. For crowned heads he cares not: princes influence him not: the assistance of none he seeks: he works, and works alone. The inspiration he requires cannot come from them: he needs nobler aid than they can give: he pleads not for our vote, our countenance, or our money. He has

"A soul exalted above earth,"

and disdains the aid ordinarily given by

mere mortals; to the wandering spirits of the ancient muses he must appeal, and evoke their inspiration; their midnight haunts he must frequent; the recessfull wood, the dusky glen, the rugged mountain's side, the moonlit lake, the castle ruin, the monumental pile, the radiant streamlet, and the shady bower; and in such scenes hold high communion with Nature, and the departed great, and assimilate his spirit to theirs. Nay, more: wafting himself to the classic grounds of the ancient bards, "he must clamber up the steeps of Parnassus, and scale the summit of Mount Helicon; he must enter into the city of Delphi, surrounded by its cloud-capt precipices; he must penetrate within its two lofty rocks, its inmost penetralia, and drink the pure Castalian fount as it oozes from the rock frequented by the Pythian priests; he must even enter the Corycean cave, sacred to Pan and the kindred nymphs, and enjoy communion with the genii of the place." But enough; while the Poet has soared above earth and without its aid, too often has he soared with loaded wings, and care dragging at his heel. The poverty with which the majority of the poets had to contend while producing some of their most sublime works; the uncongenial and unsympathizing spirits with whom they came in contact, who helped not, nor pitied, because they could not understand; and the little hopes they had of reaping honour or benefit, give them additional claims upon our esteem and admiration.

Allow us, before closing, to notice briefly the candid paper of G. N., in this number, in favour of the Legislator. We say candid; for he does justice to the Poet in a manner we must admire. He is, indeed, very frank; but we conceive he has fallen into the error of supposing the good the Legislator does, he does of himself. He says, "Do we not owe to him our very existence; for without law there is reason to believe that ere this our race would have been extinct? We owe to him the security of our dwellings, the safety of our persons, and the protection of property;" while, perhaps, this very writer plays no mean part in assisting the Legislator to do all this. Should he not have more honest pride, than pay so much homage to any one for doing that which he himself helps to do?

B. W. P., also, in an able paper, has given us, he says, "two sound reasons why we should esteem the Legislator more than the Poet." These are, that his services are of greater value to the community than are those of the Poet; because, in the first place, those of the Legislator are indispensable, while those of the Poet are not. Secondly, "because his services are more arduous in their nature, and involve more self-sacrifice." If we are to understand that the services of the Legislator are indispensable to the safety of "the state," then we may grant that "the vessel of the state" may sail securely without the Poet. But it may sail as securely without religion,—yes, history shows us that human wisdom may keep the state afloat, and steer it clear of danger, at least for a time; yet, will this writer maintain, that because religion is not so indispensable to the safety of the state as legislation, that it is therefore less valuable? And again: "The services of the Legislator are more arduous in their nature, and involve more self-sacrifice." Is this correct, have not nine-tenths of the privations, sufferings, and sorrows of the Poets arisen from their attachment to the muses, and their zeal to serve their race? How much happier and longer would have been their lives had the same master-spirits followed the world in its pursuit of wealth, or even taken hold of the helm of the state!

Dundee. W. H.

Authorship is, according to the spirit in which it is pursued, an infamy, a pastime, a day labour, a handicraft, an art, a science, a virtue.—*Schlegel.*

History.

DID CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY THE EXECUTION OF KING CHARLES I?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"A *divine* right to govern ill is an absurdity: to assert it is blasphemy."—*Bolingbroke.*

"A brave and haughty monarch (Chas. I) had failed in his efforts, by policy or force, to establish absolute power on the ruin of all popular rights. With long-suffering patience the popular leaders had striven to restore to his hand the sceptre, under such restrictions as should prevent its ever becoming a despot's rod; and when all faith in his promises and intentions became hopeless, they judged him, and doomed him as a traitor to the laws—well-knowing that a very small minority of that *sovereign* people, in whose name they acted, dared to sympathize in such a deed."—*Daniel Wilson, F.S.A.S.*

THERE is no duty more obnoxious to the feelings of a faithful and impartial historian, if the attainment and recordance of truth be his sole object, than that of handing down to posterity the misdeeds of our own monarchs, yet I question whether it is not more painful and harassing to the critic when it falls to his lot to disinter those records, and to expose them to the scrutinizing eyes of an enlightened, civilized, and progressive community. Historians who have recorded "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," are rare, and there is, unfortunately, quite as much misrepresentation on this subject as on that of the character of Oliver Cromwell. The reason is easily explained. Charles endeavoured to make despotism supreme in England; Cromwell, on the contrary, legislated for the public good, and asserted full and entire liberty, whether civil, social, or religious. By these endeavours, he succeeded in raising to himself a monument, "which," to quote the language of his biographer, "it has been the fortune of few kings to erect," and which will remain to the remotest generations of time. Historians, in days of yore, wrote to gain court favour and precedence, and this simple fact at once removes the mystery respecting the counter statements which have been recorded of the English Revolutions of 1640 and 1688. From the consideration of the subject before us, as in all cases where history is to be consulted, two very important and useful lessons may be derived, viz., that when monarchs resort to illegal means to obtain and extort that which is unjust or contrary to human reason or right, they will eventually incur the vengeance of those over whom they wish to tyrannize, and failing to take warning as Charles did, after having provoked a spirit of rebellion to his unlawful demands, they may terminate their career by meeting a violent death. On the other hand, so long as kings appeal to the intelligence and integrity of their countrymen, as to the truth and justice of their desires, confidently relying on them for an appropriate response, they will assuredly secure their love, confidence, and assistance, and more than this, the people will ever be ready and willing to sustain them when emergencies arise. From the unhappy catastrophe which took place in front of Whitehall, on the 30th January, 1649, as well as from the events of the preceeding 25 years, an invaluable lesson may be derived by kings and rulers anxious to extend their own power and prerogative in opposition to right or reason. The moral suggested, for aught we know to the contrary, may have been well considered by those whose lot it has been to govern since that direful period, and one example of the folly and madness of endeavouring to grasp, and so exercise undue power, may have effectually prevented others from pursuing a similar course. But notwithstanding this example there are monarchs who now assume despotic power, and depend only on the bayonet and the sword for protection against the assaults of their depressed and insulted people. Let us cherish the hope that kings and queens will henceforth learn to govern their subjects by those principles which are most in accordance with human

nature, that they may touch those secret springs of thought and action, which will endear their people to them, and at the same time elevate them socially, morally, intellectually, and religiously.

My motive for the foregoing is to prepare the reader for the recital of a series of conflicts, long and unpleasant, between an unfeeling monarch and an oppressed people. My feelings cannot be conceived to be of a pleasant character; concerned as they are with—

> "Scenes of strife and blood, and hideous roar,
> and fiends' shouts."

It is necessary to state before proceeding directly to the consideration of the question, that Elizabeth and James I. both assumed unlawful power, but neither carried their despotic acts to the extent which Charles did. James was the father of the last named prince, and educated him in the same pedantic notions he had himself imbibed. His ideas about "Divine right" were monstrously absurd. He contended that his will was God's, and that no person had the least authority to question his acts, or dictate to him. He was qualified to command, they to obey and to be in subjection to his "Divine right and will." Charles speedily imbibed these extravagant sentiments. The result, despite the good education he had received, gradually developed itself, and ended in rebellion, and the loss of its unfortunate parent.

I will now proceed to give a summary of the illegal acts which Charles committed; at the same time I would have it distinctly remembered that for some few of them he was not wholly responsible, his prime minister, Buckingham, having assisted in recommending the commission of several despotic and ill-timed deeds. After the death of his coadjutor, Charles was his own prime minister; he was consequently then responsible for all legislatorial transactions. Although often warned of the nature of many of his proceedings, and of the misery and woe they would entail on the people—the probability being that he would be the sufferer—and although oftentimes entreated by his best friends and political supporters to desist and retrace his steps, he shrunk not from carrying into execution all schemes that coincided with his feelings and wishes. Charles was responsible (in conjunction with Buckingham) for the levy of tonnage, poundage, and ship money; for the sale of the offices connected with the State, and the extortion and extraction of forced loans, termed "benevolences." It is worthy of note, as showing the shifts to which Charles was driven, that he instructed the clergy to preach the doctrine of "passive obedience" to the king's demands; or, as a popular writer quotes the exact words, I will give them likewise:—"They were to show *illimitable* obedience to the king on pain of *illimitable* damnation."

All of their illegal acts were proceeded with against the leaders of the popular party. John Hampden, the illustrious patriot, who refused to pay the assessment of 20s. ship money, as well as Sir John Elliot, Sir Thomas Wentworth (afterwards the apostate), John Pym, Sir George Catesby, were all thrown into prison for their refusal to pay the required sum. Upwards of 100 gentry shared the same fate. The lower class of people were sent to work on the king's ships, &c.

Another proof of the vacillating conduct of Charles was his consenting to sign the death warrant of the unfortunate Sir Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford. This ill-fated nobleman had previously espoused the people's cause with great earnestness, but he deserted the party he had fondly loved, and joined the imbecile king in his tyrannical government of Ireland, &c. Being impeached by the Commons for high treason, Charles solemnly asserted "that not one hair of Strafford's head should suffer." On the news of the signing of the warrant by Charles being communicated to him, he exclaimed, with uplifted hands and eyes, "Put not your trust in men, *neither in* PRINCES, for in them there is no salvation." There never was a time in which the truthfulness of these words was more emphatically realized than in the present instance; nor is there an example on record of a sovereign exhibiting a greater want of firmness and courage than Charles evinced on this momentous occasion.

Seeing from these, and numerous other

acts, that the least confidence could not be reposed in the king, and that he was determined to try all unlawful means which could be devised to oppress the people, the Commons and Lords passed the famous "Declaration of Rights," which was a renewal of Magna Charta, and intended to curb the Monarch's despotic power. The bill prescribed, amongst other things—1. That no freeman ought to be restrained or imprisoned unless some lawful cause of such restraint or imprisonment be expressed. 2. That the writ of *habeas corpus* ought to be granted to every man imprisoned or restrained, though it be at the command of the king or privy council, if he pray for the same. 3. That when the return expresses no lawful cause of commitment or restraint, the party ought to be delivered or bailed. 4. That it is the ancient and undoubted right of every Englishman that he hath a full and absolute property in his goods and estate, and that no tax, loan, or benevolence ought to be levied by the king, or his ministers, without consent of Parliament.* Sir Thomas Wentworth thus spoke on the bill. He had not apostatized at the time referred to:—"We vindicate what! a new thing? No, but our ancient, legal liberties, by enforcing the laws made by our ancestors by setting such a seal on them that no libertine spirit shall dare hereafter to disregard them." The earl little thought that, in a few months, he should be as antagonistic to the sentiments he then uttered, as he was hearty in supporting them at the time. His subsequent conduct and political career afford a melancholy comment on the above-mentioned enunciations, and at the same time prove him to have been unworthy of that cause which he had formerly supported and graced by his eloquent and forcible orations. He proved himself to be as great a despot as his royal master; and the exclamations that he made, on hearing of the signing of his death warrant, are as applicable to his own case as to that of the unfortunate monarch; and no extenuation of the punishment he suffered would have sufficed for the enormities which he perpetrated during his administration.

The declaration thus passed was presented to the king. He came to the House, and instead of announcing his assent in the usual way—viz., "Loit droit fait comme il est desiré,"* he said, "The king willeth that right be done according to the laws and customs of the realm, and that the statutes be put in due execution that his subjects may not have any cause to complain of wrong or oppression contrary to their just rights and privileges, wherein he holds himself bound in conscience as well as obliged in his own prerogative." The difference between the two replies is marvellously evident, and is at once detected. "According to their just rights and privileges" saith the king. But what were their "just rights and privileges" was a matter of mere construction. The Commons were not to be deceived by such evasive and crafty answers, but immediately summoned the Duke of Buckingham, accused him of being the author of this and other evils, and impeached him of high treason. Here is one of the numerous instances, evinced by the Commons, of wisdom, moderation, and good sense. They laid the axe to the root of the evil by impeaching the prime minister, not the king. And yet there are historians, and would-be philosophers, who cavil at the "injustice with which Charles was treated, and the unconstitutional legislation of his parliament." Had the parliament merited such contempt and contumely as these have endeavoured to cast upon them, they would have accused the king of the crime which was imputed to his minister. But the king interfered with the impeachment by giving legal assent to the "declaration."

The bill passed, twelve subsidies were granted, amounting, according to various accounts, from £150,000 to £500,000. The Commons afterwards voted that "whosoever should henceforth levy ton-

* Commons' Journal. To shew the validity as well as the justice of these demands, it is worthy of remark that they *now* remain the same as when passed, with one exception—viz., the 2nd. This is left to the discretion of the judge, and is seldom refused.

* "Let right be done as desired."

nage, poundage, or ship money, without consent of Parliament, would be adjudged guilty of high treason." News was immediately received by the House that Charles was coming to seize five of the most popular members. In the interim he had set his seal on their goods, papers, and documents. The Commons thereupon ordered the seals "to be broken," and the person who had affixed them to be brought before them. Charles went down to the House, escorted by 300 soldiers, took the speaker's chair, and demanded that he should tell him where the five members were (who had recently left by command of the House, in order to avoid bloodshed). The speaker, on his knees, declared that "he had neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak but as the House directed." Looking at the places usually occupied by the absent members, he exclaimed, "Since I see the birds are flown, I expect you will send them to me, otherwise I must take my own course to find them." Cries of "privilege, privilege," resounded as he left the hall. A gross breach of privilege had been committed; the Magna Charta, two months before assented to, had been unwarrantedly set at defiance. The five members were brought to Westminster in triumph, escorted by the people, the militia, and even the Thames watermen. On Charles hearing this, he exclaimed, "What! do these water-rats, too, forsake me?" Yes, all had forsaken him, finding that no dependence could be safely reposed in him. This was the commencement of the revolution—this last act was the harbinger of civil war. The ruin of the throne was inevitable; liberty was endangered, as well as life and fortune, if Charles was left to ride rampant and roughshod over a depressed miserable people;—a people, too, who would be the first to protect the monarch from insult if he were unjustly assailed;—a nation which, had the position of king and people been reversed, would have fallen down at the feet of their king and entreated for mercy and forgiveness. Charles acted illegally by his rapid and violent dissolutions of parliament, and by reigning without *one* for eleven years. His perfidy and depravity are further exposed by the two remarkable documents, which were found among his private papers, taken at the battle of Naseby, and afterwards published. It appears from these (his private letters) that at the treaty of Oxford he had secretly registered in the council book his protest that, in calling the Lords and Commons together at Westminster a parliament, he did not acknowledge them as such, but that he looked upon them as "banded traitors," to whom he owed neither forgiveness nor good faith; that he termed his own followers of both Houses assembled at Oxford, a "base," "mutinous," "mongrel parliament!" that he designed bringing into England an army of Roman Catholics from Ireland, and a foreign army under the Duke of Lorraine, a popish prince, contrary to his express and solemn word.

The last document I shall quote is the one that was sent by the Earl of Glamorgan (Charles the First's secret agent) to Charles II. He says, "One army of 10,000 men was to have come out of Ireland through North Wales; another of a like number, at least under my commander-in-chief, have expected my return in South Wales, which Sir Henry Gage was to have commanded as lieutenant-general, and a third should have consisted of a matter of 6,000 men, 2,000 of which were to have been Liegois, commanded by Sir Francis Edmonds, 2,000 Lorrainers, to have been commanded by Col. Browne, and 2,000 of such French, English, Scots, and Irish, as could be drawn out of Flanders and Holland." * * * The maintenance of this army of foreigners was to have come from the pope, and such Catholic princes as he should have drawn into it, having engaged to afford and procure £30,000 per month, out of which the foreign army was first to be provided for, and the remainder to be divided among the other armies. "And for this purpose had I power to treat with the pope and other Catholic princes, with particular advantages promised to Catholics for the quiet enjoying their religion without the penalties which the statutes in force had power to inflict upon them. And my instructions for this purpose, and my powers to treat and conclude

thereupon, were signed by the king under his pocket signet, with blanks for me to put in the name of the pope or princes, to the end that the king might have a starting hole to deny the having given me such a commission; if excepted against by his own subjects; leaving me, as it were, at stake; who, for his majesty's sake, was willing to undergo it, hasting to his word alone."

From the numerous proofs which I have adduced of the depravity of Charles' heart, and his utter abandonment of governing by law established, I will leave it to the candid judgment of the reader to say whether Charles was, or was not, guilty of treason of the highest and most flagrant character, and, therefore, worthy of death. The last quoted extract evinces the desperate and infamous measures to which he vigilantly and unscrupulously applied himself in order to achieve his fiendish purposes, as it discloses the perfidious, corrupt, and depraved state of his heart. After laying a well-organized scheme for the destruction of the people's constitutional liberties, he resorted to the basest and most subtle means to fasten the guilt which he had incurred upon a second party, in order that he might escape the vengeance of the people. Had not the Parliament succeeded in reducing its enemies, and taking the life of Charles, the latter would in all probability have succeeded in his deeply conceived plans, and caused still further bloodshed. After these transactions, will any rational person, acquainted with the facts, contend that Charles did not merit the death he met? If there be such persons, what are the facts on which they build their case? Are the foregoing true, or are they false? If true, there is at once an end to the controversy, for no one will deny that the acts amounted to high treason;—if false, let them prove them to be so. Happy shall I be for one should they succeed. To me the attempt appears futile and hopeless. Should my opponents succeed in proving the falsehood of the extracts quoted, and also that Charles was a good, and wise, and benevolent prince, as Goldsmith reports him to have been, there is no apology which I would not make as an atonement for the strictures contained in this article; nay, more, it will be consolatory to my feelings to know that when our continental neighbours take up the future History of England to examine those traits of statesmenship which have distinguished her kings and protectors, they will find the personal qualities and policy of Charles I. portrayed in characters of more pleasing and commendatory terms than those in which I have felt it my duty to represent them.

Cheetham, Manchester. J. G. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

In taking the negative of this question, I am aware that I occupy an unfavourable, because an unpopular, position, but I believe it is in accordance with the principles of justice and humanity; and such a one as my theoretic opponents would themselves actually take, did similar events occur in our own day.

Before we can be prepared to pronounce an intelligent verdict, we must be acquainted with the facts of the case; and it will be well for us to mark the bearing and conduct of the Parliament towards the King during the whole of his reign, as well as the character and conduct of the King himself.

When Charles ascended the throne, he manifested great impatience to summon the Parliament together, and his ardour little liked the necessary delay. When the members met, he addressed them in a speech marked by simplicity and cordiality. He lightly mentioned the occasion he had for a supply of funds, but left the matter to their generosity. It soon appeared that his confidence was misplaced, for they only granted him a sum of money so small, that many regarded it as only a cruel mockery, rather than as a serious design of supporting him. The fact is, on the accession of Charles I., the Commons had determined to reduce the power of the King, and they commenced by keeping him short of cash! No wonder that an act like this poisoned, at the fountain head, Charles's generous flow

of feeling towards his Parliament and people; and no wonder that the frequent repetition of this act led him at length to attempt, however unwisely, to govern without a Parliament. When that attempt failed, and he was compelled to call a new Parliament, so far from lending him aid, it constituted itself his judge, and raised armies to battle against him. It would be vain to attempt here to record the various encounters between the King and his Parliament, much less to trace minutely the whole course of the civil war; enough for us to say that, after a continuation of some years, it terminated favourably to the Parliament; that Charles placed himself in the hands of the Scotch, and was by them delivered up to his enemies —the Parliamentary leaders. But their reign was of short duration; for no sooner had they subdued their sovereign, than their own servants rose against them. The army, becoming dissatisfied, took possession of the person of the King, marched against the Parliament, and subdued it—excluding some of its members, and making others tools to perform their purposes. The King now offered to resign his power into their hands for his lifetime, provided it should revert to the crown at his decease. This offer was rejected, and four propositions were made to the King, to which he felt bound not to accede. A remonstrance was then drawn up by the leaders of the army, requiring the punishment of the King for the blood spilt during the civil wars!

To this course the Commons at first refused to be accessories, and passed a vote tending to accommodation with the King. The soldiers excluded the majority of the members by force, and influenced the others entirely. "The Lords unanimously rejected the proposition that the King should be brought to trial. Their house was instantly closed. No court, known to the law, would take on itself the office of judging the fountain of justice. A revolutionary tribunal was created. That tribunal pronounced Charles a tyrant, a traitor, a murderer, and a public enemy; and his head was severed from his shoulders before thousands of spectators, in front of the banqueting hall of his own palace."*

Such, then, was the execution, the justice of which we are now called upon to consider, and concerning which our opinion will be gathered from the following remarks:—

I.—We maintain that it was contrary to the laws and institutions of the country. The King acted rightly in refusing to plead before his judges, for the constitution of England did not recognize the crime with which he was charged, nor any court by which he could be tried. Where were his "peers" to form his tribunal, or why was a privilege, conceded to the meanest subject, to be denied to the King? If his enemies deemed the law in this respect defective, why did they not seek its emendation? But instead of doing that, they acted in opposition to the law, placed themselves above it, and were thus guilty of no mean crime themselves in attempting to punish what they considered a crime in another.

Here it may be said—"True, the laws did not provide for such a case, but the people, who are the source of all power, declared that the King ought to die." This we deny, and contend,

II.—That the execution was unsanctioned by the people. The representatives of the people, who constituted the House of Commons, refused their sanction to the ulterior measures against the King, but the leaders of the army, irresponsible men, had determined upon his death, and in one night, by the celebrated *Pride's Purge*, they excluded 160 members of Parliament from their places, in order that their own partizans might pass certain desired resolutions, which after doing, they determined that those who were absent and would not agree to their resolutions, should no longer be considered members of the House! We presume that even our opponents will not attempt to defend the injustice, nor admire the craft, of a course like this. But it may be asserted, that the House of Commons ought not

* Macaulay's "His. England," vol. i., p. 127-8.

to be taken as the *real* representatives of the feelings of the people, and that the true expressions of these feelings must be sought among the people themselves. Let us then adopt this course and turn to the historic page, and what is the result? *Hume* says, "It is impossible to describe the grief, indignation, and astonishment, which took place, not only among the spectators, but *throughout the whole nation*, as soon as the report of this fatal execution was conveyed to them. * * * All men united in their detestation of those hypocritical parricides, who, by sanctified pretences, had so long disguised their treasons, and, in this last act of iniquity, had thrown an indelible stain upon the nation." But if the testimony of Hume is objected to as that of a partial witness, we will cite Thomas Babington Macaulay, the favourite historian of our opponents' school. He says, "The military saints resolved that, *in defiance of the old laws of the realm, and of the almost universal sentiment of the nation*, the King should expiate his crimes with his blood. * * * His memory was, in the minds of the great majority of his subjects, associated with those free institutions which he had, during many years, laboured to destroy: for those free institutions had perished with him, and, amidst the mournful silence of a community kept down by arms, had been defended by his voice alone."

Here we leave our case, although we might have carried it a step further, and shown that the execution of Charles I. was contrary to the principles of justice; but we abstain from this, lest it should be said that we trenched upon forbidden ground. Enough has been advanced for the purposes of justice, and the refutation of our opponents. It will be perceived, that we have not attempted to justify the whole of the conduct of the King, much less to claim for him the honours of "Saintship" or "Martyrdom;" we are aware of his faults, and regret them; but we maintain that his punishment was greater than his crimes, and was administered in an unlawful and unjustifiable manner. JUSTITIA.

Politics.

IS UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE JUST OR DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE disposition evinced by the writers of the various articles which have appeared in *The Controversialist*, both *pro* and *con*, to sustain their several positions by argument alone, is, to my thinking, one of the most pleasing features in the conduct of that journal. Eschewing the dangerous weapons of ridicule and abuse—*dangerous*, as they can invariably be turned against whoever makes use of them—the champions on either side have, for the most part, been content to trust their cause to calm and dispassionate reasoning. I say for the most part, for I regret to notice in the September Number a paper which, if my memory serve me not treacherously, is the first to break through this very wholesome rule. I refer to W. T.'s article on the Suffrage—an article which, void of anything like real argument, and containing more than one contradiction, attempts to make up for these radical defects by ridiculing the advocates of Universal Suffrage. I think, could W. T. have known what sort of an article would have preceded his, he would have penned his remarks in a somewhat different spirit. Having said thus much—and I could not well say less—in condemnation of the spirit of W. T.'s article, I will apply myself to the task of answering his *objections*,—I cannot call them *arguments*.

"*Universal Suffrage promises more than it can perform.*" I say flatly, No! It promises to every man of legal age, sound mind, and untainted with crime, a

voice in the making of the laws he is compelled to obey. And *that* it can perform. W. T. must not blame Universal Suffrage because he has heard some of its advocates claim for it the ability to bring about all the good he mentions. It is only another added to the many existing proofs, that the best cause may be damaged by the advocacy of indiscreet friends, or, *perhaps*, secret foes. I believe many of those good results would follow its adoption; but it is sheer absurdity to say that Universal Suffrage *promises* them. It can do no such thing.

"*Physical Impossibility.*" To say that Universal Suffrage is a physical impossibility, upon such grounds as W. T. has adduced, is simply ridiculous. If those who advocate the adoption of this scheme of enfranchisement obtain the *right* of voting for every man, as well as the adoption of such regulations as shall render the means of exercising that right as facile as is consistent with safety, surely it is not their fault if obstacles intervene to prevent some men from using this privilege. And here I would remark, that I consider the term used, *Universal*, an unfortunate one. It has evidently led to the above objection, as well as to one in another part of W. T.'s article. But, then, is it just on the part of W. T. to found objections upon this word because it does not express *literally* the meaning of those who use it? The mere substitution of the word *manhood* would effectually remedy this difficulty.

"*Universal Suffrage would be a curse instead of a blessing.*" After taking more trouble than necessary to show what every one admits—*i. e.*, that madmen ought to be taken care of—W. T. asks, "But what has all this to do with Universal Suffrage?" Ay! what indeed? We repeat the query, and echo answers, "What?" Because it is necessary to restrain a man who is not accountable for his actions, however foolish or dangerous they may be, *ergo*, it is proper to deprive a responsible man of the right to vote; and that, too, because he is what W. T. is pleased to call "ignorant." "Most lame and impotent conclusion!" I conceive that there is much misapprehension as to the connection which exists between the use of the franchise and ignorance. There are many men who can neither read nor write, and who are yet as well able to discriminate between right and wrong—which I hold to be the chief thing required in the exercise of the Suffrage—as many who have received a college education. If the franchise is to be withheld from the masses until they are educated, what is to be the amount of education necessary to entitle them to it? Will the mere ability to read and write suffice? Or must they add to this a knowledge of arithmetic, grammar, and geography? Or, going still farther, is it required that they should have mathematics at their fingers' ends, be able to solve a problem in Euclid, and have a smattering of the dead languages, to say nothing of the living? In short, *What is education?* And what *amount* of education is necessary to render a man fit to use the Suffrage? And *who* is to be the *judge* as to whether a man possesses the requisite amount of the qualifying agent? When these questions are satisfactorily answered it will be time enough to discuss the proposition,—Whether the want of education *ought* to deprive a man of the Suffrage?

At this point of his article, W. T. deserts the hitherto orderly arrangement of his objections, which I have followed, and proceeds to denote several classes of men who ought not to possess the franchise, amongst whom he mentions "those who think by proxy"—(Let none but *original* thinkers be entrusted with the franchise, and how many electors would there be in the United Kingdom? Perhaps W. T. can tell)—and "drunkards." "The man who ruins his family to gratify a depraved appetite, cannot morally claim a right to take part in framing the laws which are to regulate a great empire." Now, I detest the drunkard as much as W. T. can; but this does not blind my eyes to the facts of the case. If drunkenness is to be held as a disqualification for the franchise, then I contend that it equally disqualifies a man for the proper management of his personal or family affairs, or the numerous duties which devolve upon him as a member of society. But is W. T. prepared to push his argu-

ment to this extent? Will he prevent the drunkard from marrying? or vest the disposition of his property in the State? I trow not. Then I submit that he has no right to deprive him of the franchise.

W. T. then asks, "What right can a man possess to send another to legislate upon a given set of questions, the bearing of which he is entirely ignorant of?" Now if this is to be taken as the ground of qualification for the franchise, I again inquire, How many electors would the United Kingdom possess? "Prove a man unfit, and who will dare to say he still possesses a right?" But you have got to *prove* the man unfit; and *what* and *who* shall do this?

The inquiry, "Was there ever wisdom so transcendent as this?" in reference to Universal Suffrage giving a vote to those "who live solely by putting their hands into other people's pockets," is an objection founded merely, as I have before noticed, upon the word *universal*. The provisions made by the advocates of *Manhood* Suffrage will deprive these classes of the right of voting, when shown to be such; and the laws of this country wisely teach us, that a man is innocent until the contrary be proved.

W. T.'s reference to "wise laws," and Universal Suffrage arrogating to "itself the selection of none but the honest, enlightened, and free, to represent this nation in Parliament," is a mere assumption. The real friends of this measure do not claim so much for it; but this they do believe, that under such a system we should get better representatives than we do by the present *money* qualification, which encourages the admission into the British Legislature of men than whom the working classes could find scores more suitable for the office. On this point we say, with W. T., "We do not intend to mention names; we only hint: look and see."

The argument against Universal Suffrage, which W. T. draws from France, if it proves anything, proves too much for him. It shows that the people of France, using the power which the Revolution of '48 placed in their hands, have returned a House of Representatives which has deprived a portion of them of that power, which is anything but destructive, and is now plotting to alter the constitution of the country. Is this a proof that "Universal Suffrage will place the honesty, the intelligence, the virtue, and the property of this realm at the mercy of the anarchist, the licentious, and the ignorant?" Surely not!

I much regret that W. T. has so poor an opinion of his countrymen as to "affirm that, in England, the classes we have last named form a considerable majority." I do not believe anything of the kind. My convictions are strong, that honesty, virtue, goodness, and detestation of anarchy, are only some of the many good qualities possessed by a large majority of my fellow-countrymen; and, believing this, I should not be afraid to invest them with the suffrage to-morrow.

As to Universal Suffrage being an Englishman's birthright, W. T. objects,—"There are many things which, abstractedly considered, are every Englishman's birthright." "A man's conduct often deprives him of many things he would otherwise enjoy; so it must ever be with regard to the suffrage." Exactly. But W. T. seems to have forgotten, that the masses have *not* forfeited their right to the suffrage—their birthright—by any action of their own. It has been withheld from them by might. Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage; and he paid the penalty. But, in the name of justice, do not taunt the unenfranchised with bartering that which they never possessed. Give them their rights, and then, if you will, deprive them of them as a punishment for the commission of crime.

I fully coincide with W. T. that "some test must be administered to prevent those who are unfit from becoming the possessors of so momentous a privilege;" and I have, in a former part of this reply, hinted at what I think this should be.

I have thus replied to W. T.'s objections to Universal Suffrage. Considerations of space have caused me to do so very cursorily in many instances. This, however, has not been so much a matter of regret, as I conceive no one who reads

his article can fail to be struck by its many weak points, to which their own common sense will easily suggest an answer. In conclusion, I will, as summarily as possible, give my reasons for believing that *every* man, under proper regulations, is entitled to the suffrage.

I hold, that as every man is, necessarily, a member of society—seeing that society will not permit him to return to a state of nature; that he is compelled to pay taxes for the government and support of society; that he must obey the laws of society, or be punished for his disobedience; that, at its birth, the child of the meanest peasant is as good as the offspring of the proudest monarch; that they are both alike subject to the common laws of nature, and must both yield themselves helpless victims to the power of that universal conqueror, Death—I hold that, for these considerations, every man is entitled to an equal voice in the framing of the laws for the government of that portion of society in which Providence has been pleased to place him. It is rank intolerance on the part of any class of men to assume to themselves the right to deprive him of this privilege.

Believing, then, most firmly in the *justice* of the case, I consider it unnecessary to discuss its *desirability*—although it might be demonstrated by such a mass of argument as I think could not be gainsayed—it being my opinion, that when we have once arrived at the *right* upon any matter, we have nothing to do with *expediency*. "*Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum!*"

S. H. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

The arguments which have been brought forward by the supporters of Universal Suffrage may be reduced to three, all others being but modifications of them. These we propose to mention and remark upon. First:—It is maintained that it is the indefeasible right of every person yielding obedience to the laws, and contributing to the support of government, to have a voice in the making of those laws and the disposal of those contributions.

Now, with regard to this, we cannot see, if there be an indefeasible right in the governed to have a voice in the government, on what principle of justice we can exclude females, infants, and felons from a share in the formation of those laws which bind them equally with others. All that can be said by the friends of Universal Suffrage, for the exclusion of these classes, is either that they are incapable properly of exercising the right of voting, or that, by a violation of the present laws, they have forfeited all claim to assist in making others. The first reason, which can be the only one used to justify the denial of the Suffrage to females and minors, at once prevents us from considering it as an indefeasible right, for it then becomes merely necessary to prove the incapacity of any other class of persons, to find a sufficient reason for debarring them from electoral privileges. But it may be asked, Why the possession of property should be considered as the test of an individual's character? and why, if there is to be any test at all, it should not be founded on superior moral and intellectual qualifications? To this we would answer, that the possession of property, though a very imperfect test, is, perhaps, the best we can have. If man's judgment were unerring, if it were never liable to be clouded by prejudice, corrupted by interest, or swayed by passion, we might be able to judge fairly of the existence of such qualifications by their own evidence, without having recourse to any fixed, and consequently often imperfect rule. But constituted as we are, it is obvious that to leave the competency of any individual to be decided by others, upon vague and general grounds, would be in effect to erect a tribunal with supreme authority.

That the supporters of Universal Suffrage, in some instances, place an arbitrary limit to its extension, is an admission of the necessity of some undeviating standard, for it cannot be denied that many women are far more fit to exercise the franchise than their husbands. Now, if there is to be an arbitrary rule at all, we do not see why property should not be

its basis, not only because its possessor has a larger stake in the prosperity of his country, but because we may infer that he has time to give attention to public matters, education to judge of them wisely, with an exemption from those undue influences to which the people are exposed.

It is said that laws made by the majority of the population would have a greater tendency to promote the welfare of the majority. This we think is questionable for several reasons, and first, their ignorance. Let it be remembered that it has been shown, by official documents, that, in this present year, there is in these islands one-third of the population unable to read or to write their own names, and we cannot but shudder at the thought of entrusting to the wild and reckless passions of such men the responsible task of directing, in all its vast and varied ramifications, the government of an empire, and of acting as the conservators of its riches. What easy and pliant tools would such a populace be in the hands of crafty and designing men! How easy for a Danton or a Robespierre to persuade them that "all property is robbery," and that every one richer than themselves is an oppressor and a tyrant! But even if the masses were better educated, they do not possess sufficient leisure to attend to politics, and they would be, consequently, unfit to pronounce an enlightened judgment upon them. Occupied continually in a hard and toilsome struggle for existence, wearied with labour, and anxious respecting the supply of their daily bread, how can it be expected that the working man should be able to give serious thoughts to affairs which concern him but indirectly, and to the alteration of which his influence can contribute but little? We all know how prone we are to procrastination, how ready to say, when we ought not, "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof." So situated, would not the working man be rather inclined to promote in legislation the convenience of the passing hours, than to pass measures the benefits of which could only be appreciated by posterity? This is not mere fancy—it is borne out by history.

In Athens, it was mainly owing to the short-sighted avarice of the Democracy, incited by designing demagogues, that her insular colonies were lost, and time wasted in discussing questions of petty economy, which ought to have been employed in opposing Philip of Macedon. In vain was it that the fiery eloquence of Demosthenes urged that fickle populace, before it was too late, to succour the Olynthians, then manfully contending against Philip, and thus to place a check to the increase of that power which threatened to overwhelm themselves; they listened rather to the paid adherents of the Macedonian, who told them that, if they granted the asked-for aid, they would have to go without their customary annual games! How ready, too, were the Romans to hearken to the suggestions of those so-called patriots, who promised them a re-division of lands, an abolition of debts, an equality of honours and offices, and the realisation of the other dreams with which, in every age, the people have been amused. We might multiply facts *ad infinitum*, but we think enough has been said to show that, if we reason from analogy, we may conclude that the measures of a government founded on Universal Suffrage will ever be short-sighted, weak, vacillating, and capricious.

We will now consider the third argument, viz.:—

That Universal Suffrage would render the framework of society safer, by enlarging the basis on which the government rested, since, as every man would have a voice in the formation of the laws, no one would have a right to complain of improper legislation, and thus the risk of civil war would be greatly diminished, if not entirely extinguished. It is a well-known fact, that if the value of any object, and the facility of acquiring it, be simultaneously increased, in proportion will the scruples of mankind decrease as to the mode of obtaining it. We all remember the railway mania. Vast fortunes were made and lost—gold seemed to be had for the picking up. But how much honesty was destroyed; how many characters, hitherto respectable, were blasted; how many breaches of trust

were committed by persons unable to withstand the temptations presented to them! What relentless avarice, what blind credulity, what wanton extravagance, were displayed during that period of mad infatuation! Increase the stake and the number of competitors, and the demoralisation will be increased also. In a country where not only wealth, but power, applause, honour, the exultation of triumph, the gratification of revenge, are the rewards of successful agitation, will bloodshed be improbable? When to the premiums of success is added its facility, how greatly will the temptations to civil strife be augmented? On the one hand, a people discontented, credulous, vain, restless, and ignorant, enraged against each other by mutual opposition at the hustings, and therefore the more disposed to the conflicts of the field; on the other, the hopes of ambition and the desires of cupidity, the example of Napoleon to cheer them on the path of military glory, or that of Augustus, to unlimited autocracy. France and Rome are indeed placed as monuments for our admonition. The former, after having endured for ages the most absolute despotism, at once passed to the opposite extreme. It was a government based on Universal Suffrage, which sent thousands upon thousands of innocent persons to the scaffold for no other reason than their possession of rank and wealth superior to the generality of electors. It was such a government that directed the wholesale butcheries at Lyons, and the massacres of September; and had the attempt to re-establish it in 1848 succeeded, the same awful tragedies would probably have been re-acted. And let us remember that man, whether in England or in France, is essentially the same, possessing the same passions and actuated by the same motives.

What Englishmen want is not Universal Suffrage, but such an alteration of the existing laws as shall enable every man possessed of an amount of income sufficient to render him unbiassed and independent of all undue influences, to have a share in the government of his country. Make the franchise less than this, and it becomes a mockery; extend it farther, and you hand over life and property to the mercy of the fickle crowd.

S. A. J.

IS IT DESIRABLE THAT THE REVENUE OF THIS COUNTRY SHOULD BE RAISED ON A SYSTEM OF INDIRECT TAXATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

The affairs of a great nation, like our own, can never be carried on without great expense; and in order to meet that, there must be taxation. The proper theory of taxation is undoubtedly, as far as possible, to tax each man in proportion to his ability to pay, and to the interest which he has in the country to be protected. To do more than approximate to this, will always be impossible. But the question is, whether Direct or Indirect Taxation will provide the most equitable and economical system of collecting the revenue. In writing in favour of Indirect Taxation, I am far from thinking it advisable that the whole of the revenue should be raised in that manner. In fact, so far as the income and assessed taxes are concerned, I see no objection whatever to Direct Taxation. But a great proportion of the revenue is derived from the sale of such articles as intoxicating liquors, tobacco, and snuff; the use of which contributes greatly to the injury and demoralization of society; and it could scarcely be advisable to give an impetus to their consumption by abolishing the customs and excise duties. It seems to me most conducive to the general weal, to place such restrictions on them as may limit their sale without going to the opposite extreme, where the law defeats itself by the production of smuggling. If Indirect Taxation were abolished, the duties on all obnoxious articles must be removed, and, in consequence, a great injury would be inflicted on society. Surely no philanthropic in-

dividual can advocate a policy which would give to the labouring classes of this country greater facilities for demoralizing themselves; and, in fact, cheapening their own ruin. I know there are some who seem to think that little increase in the consumption of such injurious articles would take place by the abolition of the duty; they talk as though people drank for fashion's sake, rather than from appetite. But every-day experience will disprove this. The result of such a change would be to substitute the use of spirits for beer amongst the great bulk of our population,—a change certainly not very desirable. Were there no other argument in favour of Indirect Taxation, I, for one, should consider this quite sufficient. But I think it may be shown that many of the advantages, which the advocates of Direct Taxation claim for it, will vanish on a close scrutiny.

It is a common argument amongst them, that Taxation, as at present levied, presses unjustly on the labouring classes. Now I think it may be shown, without much difficulty, that the labouring man is not heavily taxed unless he indulge to a considerable extent in tobacco or intoxicating liquors. In that case I grant working men pay largely towards the revenue of the country; and many of them will often spend as much in intoxicating compounds in the course of a fortnight, as they would otherwise pay in Taxes during the whole year. Food, clothing, and necessaries of life, excepting one or two trifling articles, are duty free; and if these trifling duties are abolished, you exempt a man entirely from Taxation so long as he abstains from luxuries. This would be scarcely just; for all, rich and poor, must contribute to the revenue in proportion to their means, as we all equally share the protection and advantage which our country and our laws afford. The labouring man, though he possesses no landed property, has still his labour and his liberty, which are his capital, and for the maintenance of which he is bound to pay a share of the Taxation of the country.

Another favourite argument of the advocates of Direct Taxation is, that the present is a more oppressive and expensive method of collecting the Taxes than a system of Direct Taxation would be. How they make this out, it is somewhat difficult to imagine. At present, the duty is levied in the port or warehouse, and the consumer, who actually pays the Tax, is spared the annoyance of the tax gatherer's visits, which would not be the case if all Taxes were levied directly on the individual. People are accustomed to look upon the tax gatherer as a very great nuisance, and the advocates of Direct Taxation clamour loudly against this; but were their system adopted, he would become a much more regular visitor at our doors than now. We should be painfully reminded of every penny we paid; and though the amount of taxes were no more than we now pay, the manner of levying them would be much more disagreeable.

Then consider the trouble and expense of collecting these taxes from the spendthrift or the drunkard. The collector would have to be armed with full power to levy immediate distraints upon all offenders, which would create great discontent, and, in the end, be as expensive as our present system of excisemen and custom-house officers. Besides this, we should be quite as far from an equal adjustment of the burdens of state; for if we established a tax of so much a head, the man with 15*s.* a week might have to pay as much as the man with 25*s.* a week; and the continual fluctuations of wages would present an effectual barrier to the solution of the difficulty. The amount of taxable articles which a man consumes is, perhaps, the fairest index of his ability to pay taxes, excepting always the amount spent in intoxicating compounds. It is true that those who consume great quantities of these last-named articles pay a greater share than others to the revenue of the country, while they are generally least able to afford it. But it is also true that the system which they thus support makes the greatest demand upon the revenue of the country; and the drunkard, when his intemperance has thrown him upon society, often receives back the amount he contributed to the revenue in more prosperous times.

J. N. F.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It must, I think, afford sincere satisfaction to every reader of *The British Controversialist*, to observe the kindly feeling manifested by most of the combatants who have entered into this literary arena, and the spirit of candour with which they have acknowledged the force of opposing arguments, and the strength of offensive positions. I was much struck with this in reading L. I.'s able paper in the October Number, where he acknowledges the theoretic consistency of Direct Taxation, while he contended for the practical superiority of Indirect Taxation. He is evidently open to conviction; and if I can show that his objections to a well-matured system of Direct Taxation are weak or futile, I may win him, and many of my readers, over to "my way of thinking." This hope now induces me to take up "the thought-tracing quill."

The first, and, in my opinion, the weightiest objection which L. I. brings forward against a system of Direct Taxation, is the practical difficulty of obtaining a just assessment either by voluntary statement, or investigation and proof: he forcibly remarks, "If it is effected by the former, the equality of the Tax must depend upon the honour of parties under strong temptation to dishonesty; * * * if by the latter, still the dishonest would have the advantage" through some sources of income being capable of concealment. While this objection does little honour to the political morality of my fellow countrymen, it must be confessed that, under present circumstances, it would apply to a numerous class, for there are many who now think it but a slight deviation from the path of rectitude to evade the claims of Government. But it may be inquired how this state of feeling has been produced; and we reply, plainly by that wanton waste of public money in which our rulers have indulged. Were a stricter economy pursued, which we believe Direct Taxation would render *necessary*, many a man would cheerfully pay his quota towards the public expenditure who now either pays reluctantly, or, possibly, not at all. To show that this opinion is not Utopian, I may mention a few instances of public virtue which were cited many years ago by that able political economist, Jeremy Bentham:—"The canton of Underwald, in Switzerland, is frequently ravaged by storms and inundations, and is thereby exposed to extraordinary expenses. Upon such occasions the people assemble, and every one is said to declare, with the greatest frankness, what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly. At Zurich, the law orders that, in cases of necessity, every one should be taxed in proportion to his revenue, the amount of which he is obliged to declare upon oath. They have no suspicion, it is said, that any of their fellow citizens will deceive them. At Basle, the principal revenue of the state arises from a small custom on goods exported. All the citizens make oath that they will pay, every three months, all the taxes imposed by law. All merchants, and even inn-keepers, are trusted with keeping, themselves, an account of the goods which they sell, either within or without the territory. At the end of every three months they send this account to the treasurer, with the amount of the Tax computed at the bottom of it. It is not *suspected* that the revenue suffers by this confidence." Upon this the writer referred to observes, "It is true, indeed, that a great revolution behoved to take place in the sentiments of the people, before the happy events, at which I have now hinted, could take place in this country. But this revolution, great as it may appear, would certainly take place *in consequence of a change in the system of Taxation.* A system of moderate Taxation, like everything else, would foster and promote itself. Under its mild regulations and laws, the unreasonableness of smuggling would appear. The people would soon have less prejudice. They would venerate the revenue code; and this would enable and inspirit the minister to go on in reformation."

The next objection of L. I. to a system of Direct Taxation is, that "mere income is, after all, a most unfair crite-

rion by which to judge of a person's ability to bear Taxation." This assertion is based upon the fact of the sources of income being so various; as illustrated by the instances given. But our friend appears to forget that even now, persons whose incomes exceed £150 per annum are required to state the various sources of that income; and that one of the easiest things imaginable would be to fix upon rates of Taxation according to a just and recognized scale.

With respect to the supposed case of a professional man saving half his income—£1,000—and the inference drawn that it would be unjust for him to be charged upon the whole, and thus his capital be taxed, we surely need only remind our friend that the charge upon the £500 would be made upon it as *income*, and not upon it as capital. If a man who could afford to lay that sum by annually ought not to be taxed, will L. I. tell us who ought?

The objection founded on the case of annuitants is similar to that respecting the various sources of income, and may be satisfactorily answered in the same way.

We now come to our friend's "strongest objection"—viz., the inquisitorial investigation into men's affairs, which Direct Taxation would render necessary; but this we believe would be more imaginative than real. The same objection was loudly urged against the enactment of Sir Robert Peel's income tax, and many were the dire effects that were to flow from it. At present, they are still to come. We have heard of no honest, but under-water-tradesmen ruined by the exposure of their circumstances, nor of the hopes of any aspiring families being blighted by the public disclosure of their real circumstances. In fact, there has been no *ex*posure, nor any *dis*closure, beyond the "*commissioner's*" *sanctum*, and there they have been made with a definite object in view. If such have been the results of the experiment as tried upon a small and imperfect scale, we have nothing to fear from its repetition or extension.

If L. I.'s objections remained undiminished in their force, they would yet be weak compared with those which have been brought against a system of Indirect Taxation, which must always bear unequally upon the poor. An Indirect Tax, to be productive, must be levied upon some article of general consumption, or some necessary of life, and, therefore, must fall upon all classes alike, apart from the amount of their income, which is very unequal justice. Take, for instance, the following items:—For every 20*s.* which the working classes spend for tea, they pay 10*s.* duty; for every 20*s.* they spend for sugar, they pay 6*s.*; for every 20*s.* for coffee, 8*s.*; for every 20*s.* for soap, 5*s.*; for every 20*s.* for beer, 4*s.*; for every 20*s.* for tobacco, 16*s.*; for every 20*s.* for spirits, 14*s.* Now, the working classes spend a much larger portion of their income upon these articles than the upper classes do, and consequently this Indirect Taxation presses most heavily upon those least able to bear it. Ponder the following case:—"On the 18th February, 1842, the case of Wm. Gladstone, a labourer, was laid before Parliament. He received 11*s.* for a week's wages, 7*s.* 7*d.* of which he spent in necessary articles of consumption, as follows. (It is presumed that the brandy was necessary on account of sickness). Tea, 1 oz.; coffee, 2 oz.; sugar, 8 oz.; flour, 8 lb.; ale, 7 pints; brandy, $\frac{1}{4}$ of a pint. The cost of these articles, duty free, was 2*s.* 4$\frac{3}{4}$*d.*; the duties were 5*s.* 2$\frac{1}{4}$*d.*; showing 5*s.* 2$\frac{1}{4}$*d.* paid for taxes out of an income of 11*s.* per week! Can any nobleman or gentleman in the land show that, like this poor labourer, he ever paid so nearly one-half of his income in Taxes?" We trow not.

Space and time forbid us now to pursue the subject farther; but perhaps we have said enough to awaken thought in our readers, and to merit a reply from our opponents.

L. G. G.

He hath riches sufficient who hath enough to be charitable.

Social Economy, etc.

IS THE MODERATE USE OF ALCOHOLIC DRINK INJURIOUS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

Among the many evils by which this country is afflicted, and under the oppressive burden of which our progress is materially delayed, that of Intemperance is, perhaps, the greatest. This terrible vice not only prostrates the energies and blights the happiness of the individual whom it has ensnared, but its pernicious consequences are deeply felt by society at large. To it must be attributed a vast proportion of the poverty, ignorance, misery, and crime which exist to such a lamentable extent around us; it furnishes our gaols, our poorhouses, and our lunatic asylums with a large proportion of their unhappy occupants; and the heavy taxes levied upon the community for the support of institutions like these, only adds one more to the many evils which follow in its train. It is not a little remarkable to hear well-meaning, although superficial people, talking complacently of "our great civilisation," "our national refinement," "our rapid progress towards millennial perfection," while the demon of Intemperance stalks abroad, contaminating the social atmosphere, and raising up some of the strongest barriers to moral and intellectual progress. However blessed a country may be in its political constitution, however rich in natural resources, however advanced in the useful application of scientific discovery, so long as this most prolific vice exists to such an extent as at present among the people, all their boasted enlightenment is little better than a mere name; and their so-called civilisation, notwithstanding its apparent brilliance, can be likened only to

> "A goodly apple rotten at the core."

But, if the effects of Intemperance are so apparent on society; if it be, as we have seen, the canker-worm which affects the sap of the social tree, so that nearly every branch feels its withering influence, how much more bitter are its fruits, how much more destructive its consequences, when we search out the evil itself and observe the condition of its devoted victims! Let Intemperance once take a firm hold of a man, and his domestic happiness is destroyed, his constitution shattered, his intellect impaired, his character irretrievably ruined, and his fairest prospects blasted, perhaps, for ever. Nor does he alone suffer; all connected with him reap the bitter harvest of the seed he has sown. The wife of his bosom drinks deep from the cup of sorrow; the glowing aspirations she was wont to cherish have died away; the dreams of her cloudless youth, the brilliant pictures of domestic endearment which she once so fondly imagined and so ardently longed for, have vanished from her grasp, and

> "Left not a rack behind;"

but misery, degradation and a broken heart, have taken their place. His children, too, what an unhappy lot is theirs! Reared in an abode from which peace and comfort have fled,—perpetually experiencing the sorrow that flows from domestic discord, neglected and spurned by their natural guardian,—with no one to guide their infant footsteps, or to lead them in the path of moral rectitude; how strong the inducement to sin! how slight the attraction towards virtue and religious purity! Such is the drunkard's HOME! such is a specimen of those dark plague spots so thickly strewn upon the fair face of our native land, and the number and virulence of which constitute, as we have said, one of the most degrading and cheerless features of our age.

But, *revenons à nos moutons;* let us see where we are, what we have done, and what remains to do. The question we have to deal with is not disposed of; and from what has been said, perhaps, the reader may think that I have mistaken my side. Such is not the case, however,

for I shall now proceed to grapple with the question at issue, viz., "Is the Moderate Use of Alcoholic Drink Injurious?"

While claiming credit for as strong an antipathy and detestation towards Intemperance as our friends of the opposition can feel, I nevertheless object to the principle of total and universal abstinence, believing that in this, as in other matters, the evil which results from the abuse of a thing does not thereby prove that the thing itself is *inherently* pernicious. To support my opinions, of course I am not provided with columns of figures and pages of statistics, but I have stronger testimony than these to offer—observation and experience; the best teachers. These lead me to conclude that the moderate use of alcoholic drink is *not* injurious, and that it is in many cases positively beneficial. Many total abstainers affirm that alcohol is a poison, and that its use, in whatever quantity, must therefore have a pernicious effect; this I deny, in spite of medical testimony or chemical analysis.

It argues little to give the analysis of things and attempt to prove that they cannot do this or that. The moderate user of alcoholic drinks avows that he is improved by them. Analyses of the action of substances, or living tissues, are not infallible. Take, for example, a rump-steak, which will have eulogium from Soyer downwards, and who but a cannibal would eat of its constituents? A little fleshy fibre, some serum, a coagula, a little gelatine, with some adipose, would be nearly the components of a rump-steak, when analysed. These could not be eaten without exciting repugnance, and even vomiting; but, as nature has blended them, they prove nutritive. The moderate man we think to be the *model* man. He avoids the Scylla of Intemperance, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of ascetic abstinence on the other.

It is not moderation, but *excessive* indulgence—in a word, Intemperance—from which flow the evils we have already described. As *Cassio* bitterly exclaims:—"Every *inordinate* cup is unblessed, and the ingredient is a devil." Can we name anything, however important, useful, or necessary, in moderation, but is liable to be carried too far, and so to be productive of positive injury? And, other circumstances being similar, why should the *use* of alcoholic drinks be made an exception to the general rule? But, exclaim the teetotallers, other circumstances are *not* similar; spirituous drinks are bad in every respect and in every degree, except, perhaps, as required medicinally. Although, in the terms of the question, we are not called on to show that the use of alcoholic drinks is in any degree advantageous, in the present state of society, yet it is not difficult to do so.

If man, as in the earliest ages, was free to roam o'er hill and dale, seeking his food in the chase, or river, as the case may have been, with his mind unannoyed by the price of stocks, or of railway-shares, it is very probable that he would not have required any other stimulant than the air he so plentifully inhaled in these occupations. But, alas! how is society changed! The Bourse, the desk, the shop, now claim the prime efforts of the majority of our race; and fresh air, the first tonic in the world, is but very little enjoyed; hence the lungs, the heart, the nerves, suffer from this sad deprivation, and collapsed man requires to be met with something to exhilarate and to refresh him. These are to be found in the various diet-drinks of different countries, and their adaptation is commensurate with their service. When jaded with intense interest in mercantile affairs, the stomach rejecting almost every solid, and every nerve unstrung, how grateful is one glass of bland sherry, or of good port! and, by parity, the mechanic, whose manly frame and muscle both tell the fatigue of a day and quarter's application to his duties, how refreshing the one tumbler of ale, or of beer, is to the moderate man on these occasions! Whether ideal or real their sense of lassitude, it is the *una voce* admission that they are the better for it.

When partaken of temperately, such liquors have a bracing and stimulating

influence. They revive exhausted strength and infuse additional vigour. They do not, as some assert, injure digestion; if properly used, they improve it. They are of great service in numerous complaints, and are thus often productive of material benefit when other means are not so readily available; and, lastly, they enhance the joys of social intercourse, and thus tend to promote individual felicity. These are the effects of *temperance*, which is not to be confounded with total abstinence, and which is at the same time quite opposed to what we call Intemperance, or excess. That moderation, in a countless number of cases, ends in such excess, is, alas! too true. What the nature of the infatuation is which lures so many victims into its toils, I know not. Whether it be that they are ignorant, or blinded to the consequences of the course they are pursuing; whether they are weighed down by a heavy load of misery or discontent, and wish to "drown it in the bowl;" or whether the true cause is to be found elsewhere, I cannot tell; indeed it appears to me, as *Hamlet* shrewdly observes, that "there is something here more than natural, if philosophy could find it out." But one thing I certainly believe, that, knowing the consequences of Intemperance, both to himself and others, there is a decided *want of principle* about the man who could wantonly plunge into such a vicious and dangerous course.

I would now make a few remarks on total abstinence. I am far from wishing to say anything in disparagement of a numerous body of worthy individuals, who are the representatives of a great social movement, whose motives are pure and elevated, and whose disinterested efforts in a righteous cause are deserving of much praise; but I do think, that, by taking the pledge, a man sacrifices, to a certain extent, his mental independence. If he has sufficient moral courage and strength of purpose within himself to lead him in the path he believes to be right, a pledge is utterly useless; if he does *not* possess these, no bonds, however stringent, can adequately supply their place. How many pledges are broken, how many solemn vows unfulfilled! and how many perjured drunkards thus sink to a still lower *status* than before! Is there no other means, I would ask, by which the Temperance movement can be advanced, and the widely-spread evil of drunkenness rooted out from the land?

With these observations, I leave this important question, trusting that the discussion may be continued on both sides with fairness and impartiality. I hope that those who patronise exclusively

> "The cup that cheers, but not inebriates,"

and those who think with me, that "good wine is a good familiar creature, if it be well used," will alike pursue this controversy in the spirit of good fellowship—without intolerance, and without prejudice.

Dundee. C. C. M.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

Sir,—In entering upon the consideration of this question, allow me, in justice to my opponents, to say that I am a total abstainer from intoxicating drinks, though not a pledged one. I come to this discussion with opinions and views deep seated in my mind; for, after impartially weighing all the evidence I have been able to collect on this subject, I have found the balance decidedly in favour of total abstinence. I have been a total abstainer about four years, and having previously resided at an inn (the house of my father) eighteen years, I have, therefore, had ample opportunities of observing the effects produced by the "flowing bowl," and I can conscientiously affirm, that those effects have not in any one case left a favourable impression upon my mind. I have seen men in all the stages of drinking, and I have witnessed all the scenes, in high and low life, that the drinking customs of our country present; and, amidst all their splendour, their allurements, and their varied disguises, I have found it easy to detect the canker-worm beneath.

In discussing the question before us,

we will regard it under three aspects, namely, physically, intellectually, and morally, and endeavour to prove, that however moderate be the use of alcohol, in any form, it exercises a deleterious influence, and that alcoholic drinks are "in every instance, as articles of diet, pernicious."

To commence with the physical effects. It is often asserted that wine and other intoxicating drinks nourish the body, and, in fact, for this reason, many physicians administer, or at least allow it—that is, if they be sincere in their representations, which, however, I am inclined to doubt, believing that they generally limit the quantity as much as possible, without risking their connection. Upon this point, Dr. Edward Johnson says, "Does it nourish the body? We know that it does not, for the life of any animal cannot be supported by it. Besides, whatever is capable of nourishing, must be susceptible of conversion into the solid matter of the body itself. But fluids taken into the stomach are not capable of being transmuted into solids, but pass off by the kidneys, as everybody knows. If, indeed, the fluid-drink contains solid matters suspended in it, then these solid matters can be assimilated to the solid body, and so are capable of nourishing it; as in the instance of broths, barley-water, &c., but the fluid in which these solid matters were suspended must pass out by the kidneys. Nothing, therefore, can contribute to the nourishment of the body which is not itself solid, or in which solids are not contained. Milk, the moment it reaches the stomach, is converted into curds and whey; the whey passes off by the kidneys, the solid curd nourishes the body. If, then, it be said, that although wine is incapable of nourishing the body wholly and by itself alone, it may yet contain some nourishment, it is clear that this nourishment must depend upon whatever solid particles are suspended in it. Now, if you evaporate a glass of wine on a shallow plate, whatever solid matter it contains will be left dry upon the plate, and this will be found to amount to about as much as may be laid on the extreme point of a penknife blade, and a portion—by no means all—but a portion of this solid matter, I readily concede, is capable of nourishing the body, a portion which is about equal to the flour contained in a single grain of wheat. Then why not eat a grain of wheat instead of drinking a glass of wine, from which grain of wheat you would derive just as much nourishment as from the glass of wine, and would avoid the mischief which must necessarily be inflicted upon your stomach by the glass of wine? Wine, therefore, possesses no power to nourish the body, or at least, in so minute a degree, as to make it as an article of nourishment wholly unworthy of notice." These views are so perfectly in accordance with my own, that I have irresistibly gone on quoting sentence after sentence, until space compels me to desist.

If I may be allowed to cite another witness, it shall be Sylvester Graham, the eminent American physiologist, who, speaking of the uses of drinks, says, "The normal purposes for which water is required in the living animal body are —1st, To serve as a menstrum to the animalised or assimilated matter of the blood, in order to give it sufficient fluidity to enable the vital economy to effect the general purposes of circulation and nutrition, or, in other words, in order to make it sufficiently thin to pass freely through all the arteries and veins and all the minute vessels of the system in which the principal changes take place, and which are concerned in nourishing the several structures and forming the several secretions of the body. 2nd, To supply the aqueous portion of the secretions of the system. 3rd, To be the source of all the serous exhalations by which the internal organs and parts are continually moistened; and 4th, To dilute, and as it were, to flood off, in the form of pulmonary exhalation, cutaneous perspiration, renal secretion, &c., the worn-out or decomposed matter of the system, and whatever foreign and impure substances may be absorbed in the vital domain; and also, when necessary, to afford a serous excretion to the mucous surface of the alimentary cavity, to dilute and flood away any irritating or

disturbing substance that may by any means find its way into the stomach and intestines.

"It is now a perfectly well-ascertained physiological truth, that no other fluid than pure water will answer these purposes of the vital economy. Every other substance in nature, or that can be produced by art, which is either a fluid itself, or capable of being kept in a fluid state by aqueous solution or mixture, if introduced unchanged into the general circulation of the animal body, is more or less a cause of excitement, irritation, and disturbance to the living tissues and organs with which it comes in contact, and, therefore, always more or less injurious to the physiological interests of the system."

Dr. Beaumont, in his experiments upon Alexis St. Martin, found that when pure water was taken into the stomach no perceptible effect was produced, the water being absorbed by the capillaries; when milk was taken, the curd and whey were separated, the former digested and the latter absorbed; when intoxicating drinks of any kind whatever, in however small quantities, were taken, the stomach became inflamed, and a secretion, like the mattery substance from an ulcer, seemed to exude from every part affected by the alcoholic fluid.

From the quotations here given, I think it cannot be denied that Alcoholic drinks do excite and irritate the stomach, and through it, the whole of the organs of the body, and whatever causes this irritation, tends to weaken and destroy life. The blood contains about ninety per cent. of water, and if the chief purpose of drink be to dilute the blood, it appears to me, that there can be nothing so well adapted to this purpose as water. If water be best adapted for supporting us in health, it follows that the use of any other fluid must do injury. It matters not however small the quantity taken, it must be in its ultimate effects deleterious. Another reason why it is not well to use intoxicating drinks, even in small quantities, is, that stimulating drinks have the effect of making those who use them exhibit a greater degree of thirst, and the more they have the more they wish for. Not that these drinks are absolutely required for the well-being of the vital economy, but that their organs have become depraved and are in want of the customary stimulation. Does not this prove that it is unsafe to be a moderate drinker? Appetite is regularly drawing such nearer and nearer to the state in which they will be considered drunkards; for drunkenness is not so much dependent on the will as is sometimes supposed, but it is the natural result of a depraved appetite, every gratification of which only tends to lure the fated victim nearer to his fearful destiny.

Having thus spoken of the physical effects of a moderate use of intoxicating drinks, I will now speak of others. The blood, as I have before stated, contains about ninety per cent. of water, and the brain nearly as much. Alcohol, not being a solid, is absorbed and taken into the blood, and thus aids in the structure of the body: so much is this the case that this spirit has often been found in the brain, and cases of spontaneous combustion from its presence are by no means rare. But if what has before been stated be true, then the presence of Alcohol or any other irritating fluid or substance in the brain, or any other part of the human body, must of necessity cause an excitement unfriendly to the interests of vitality and subversive of the health of the individual. If the brain, the seat of man's intellectuality be injured; then must intellectuality itself be also injured; injured directly, too, in addition to the sympathetic injury inflicted upon it through other organs.

The brain may or may not be the sole throne of man's moral nature — conscience may or may not wield its power from the same seat as reason; but it does not, therefore, invalidate the assertion, that if man's physical and intellectual natures be injured, his moral nature will be injured also. Conscience can only tell a man to do right: it has no power to say what is or is not right—conscience can only warn us to avoid doing wrong —reason must tell us when we are doing so. Conscience never decides what is morally right and what is morally wrong,

but always appeals to reason, and whatever reason gives as a decision, conscience is not only bound to take as truth, but has no mode of testing it. Therefore, consequently, if reason be at all impaired, conscience and morality must be impaired to a proportionate extent.

I think I have now said sufficient to prove that even a moderate use of intoxicating drinks is injurious, physically, intellectually, morally; and this applies not only to Alcoholic Drinks, but to the narcotic beverages so much in use. The whole evidence of physiology seems to urge upon man to approach towards a simpler dietary, and to endeavour to find in the simple productions of nature the necessaries of life, and thus it appears he will be able to secure far more health and enjoyment than he is now able to boast of.

G. B.

The Societies' Section.

MUTUAL INSTRUCTION AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.

1st. They lead to the improvement of time.

Of time, says Seneca, it is a virtue to be avaricious. And quaint old Owen Feltham, in his "Resolves," remarks, that "in all the actions which a man performs, some part of his life passes. We die while doing that for which alone our sliding life was granted. Nay, though we do nothing, Time keeps his constant pace, and flies as fast in idleness as in employment. Whether we play or labour, or sleep, or dance, or study, the sun posts on, and the sand runs." This is indeed most true; and yet how much time do young men generally misspend in frivolity or idleness! How much in what is worse—vicious indulgences! How frequently are those hours passed in the tavern; frittered away in smoking, gaming, riotous and ribald conversation, or sheer indolent lounging, which ought to be devoted to the pursuit of knowledge, and the attainment of business habits! How many occasional hours and half-hours do we spend in dozing, dreamy listlessness and semi-somnolency! How often does the loud clock-chime inform us

> "That moments, hours, have glided by,
> And borne no record on their wings."

This is not as it ought to be. Every hour should be appropriated to some useful purpose. We should be as niggardly of time, as the miser of his hoarded treasure. We should remember that things which may individually be trifling and apparently valueless, acquire importance by accumulation. We should make every hour gain something which might be made available for future use. Let us reason closely, if we cannot reason long. If time is not ours for lengthy meditation, at least let us think deeply and attentively. If we cannot afford long seasons for study, let us systematize it. Let us divide it into manageable portions, and consider time the more precious, the less we have of it to spare. If we feel a thirst for improvement, a longing after something higher, nobler, better; if our mind craves development, why should not its aspirations be gratified? Why should not our life match itself with our ideal? And what hinders it? Is it not our own weakness of purpose, and inertness? Why was the desire implanted,

but that it might spur us on to its realization? We have said the hope of the future is in the young; and shall we be guilty of crushing these hopes

"In the sweet blush that betokens their ripeness?"

No! Activity, progress, improvement, shall be our aim, and onward our watchword. We will not suffer sloth—that rust which consumeth souls—to encrust the machinery of our thoughts. We will accept the "signs of the times" as oracular; and in the midst of the intense activity of our own day, we, too, will be active. The question is this—Shall we endeavour to make ourselves valuable members of society, efficient business men? Shall we be active, industrious, and persevering? or shall we be valueless to the community, worthless to ourselves, and pass our lives as something inferior to the common run of humanity; unendowed with their ambitions, unexcited by their praise, unstimulated by the hope of doing good, and nerveless for all intellectual exertion? If it be true, that

"He that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To rust in us unused;"

surely we shall be unpardonable if we neglect any means by which this great object of our being may be attained. "Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies" will assist in this. They will place before us subjects upon which our thought may be continually exercised. Vacuity of mind, sloth, and listlessness, will thus be proscribed. Our minds will be no longer loose, wavering, and undetermined. A purpose shall be interfused into us, and we shall become mentally vitalized and active. An aim having been supplied, the grand viaduct to indolence is destroyed, and rapid improvement may be safely predicted. Let each young man who values himself, his character, his time, his intellect, the progress of society, and the advancement of his race, join himself to one of these societies. Let him not grudge to trim the midnight lamp, to con "the treasured wisdom of all bygone ages," or neglect to rise with summer's earliest sunbeam, to glean from Nature health and knowledge. Let him remember that his attendance should be regular, his preparation extensive and exact, his thoughts well arranged and methodized; and he will soon find that such societies lead to the improvement of time. But I shall be told this labour is prodigious. And who that has been great, has been so without immense labour, and diligent improvement of time? Was it Shakespeare? His glorious thought-filled plays were written before he was fifty, amidst unceasing occupation. Or Milton? Even blindness could not make him remit his industry. Or Michael Angelo, or Raphael? Look at their works, and they will answer you. Or Chatterton, Dante, Handel, Burns, Byron, Davy, Hogarth? No! Activity was *one* of their prominent characteristics. It required an immensity of labour, hard, resolute labour, previous to the incarnation of their ideas into their works, to overcome all the obstacles which interpose between the creation of the mind, and the intellectual triumph which secured their victory.

Some one will say, We cannot all be great. No! But we can all *aim* at greatness. The higher our aim the more lofty will be our acquirements. Every new truth we gain, every phenomenon with which we become acquainted, every

new acquisition we make, every new difficulty which we overcome, every step we advance, will invigorate us, and capacitate us for climbing "higher still and higher." We will not allow besotted ignorance to occupy that position in our mind, which the might and majesty of intellect ought only to assume. We will not heedlessly and uselessly misspend that time, in which we may taste so many rational and ennobling pleasures. Let us not acquire too great an affection for our pillow. Let us not yield ourselves to reverie or castle-building, to trivialities or procrastination; but let us uniformly persevere until success has crowned our efforts, until the victory is won, the triumph gained. Let us be in earnest in our desire, and we must succeed. Kirke White, Scott, Horner, Jeffrey, Brown, Stewart, Mackintosh, Sidney Smith, and a host of others, have been members of such Societies, have *aimed* at greatness, and *attained* it.

2nd. They create or encourage a love of Reading.

The curiosity of the human mind, once excited, is insatiable. These Societies, by placing various subjects before us for our consideration, act as mind-excitants, incline us to form ideas concerning them; to search for and gain arguments in support of the opinions we espouse. To do this effectually, we must employ books as our auxiliaries, and arm ourselves with facts from the immense stores which "the kings of thought" have accumulated for the behoof and improvement of all future ages. And thus, by a sort of gentle and irresistible necessity, we are enticed to those fountains of knowledge of which the mind may drink such copious draughts. We gain a taste and an attachment for books, a thirst for knowledge; and that which began in necessity, is continued through choice, until it becomes a habit, and gradually acquires the character of a pleasure. To speak or write on any subject requires thought. To think availably, reading is necessary to furnish us with proofs, stimulate us by hints, or inform us regarding principles. Hence it is that these Societies create or encourage a love for reading; and this constitutes one of their great advantages. Davenant calls a Library—

"The assembled souls of all the world held wise."

How quaint, and yet how true! Books truly contain the quintessence of the ideas which have passed through the minds of earth's noblest inhabitants. How valuable! How truly advantageous is it, then, to acquire a love for such occupations:—a love which introduces us into the company of the great, the good, and the intellectually famous; which refines, elevates, and purifies the mind; which excites to emulation, to intellectual daring, and to earnestness in the pursuit of knowledge; which makes us acquainted with the grand truths of science, the mighty inventions of art, the charms of literature, the speculations of moralists, and the God-inspired teachings of religion; which qualifies us for the worthy occupation of our allotted stations in society, fits us for advancing from one situation to another, and enables us to improve ourselves, and in the betterment of those less highly favoured; which preserves us from the contamination and base influences of temptation, and nourishes the soul with the power-giving manna of Truth.

It is one grand and characteristic feature in connection with mental em-

ployments, that their fruits are enduring. Of all the works of man, the products of thought alone gain immortality. Sensual pleasures pall upon the appetite by repetition: mines of wealth become exhausted; the carefully reared flower fades; mansions, built with nicest care and skilfullest art, crumble beneath the noiseless, though destroying tread of Time; and

> "Nations melt
> From power's high pinnacle, where they have felt
> The sunshine for a while, and downward go
> Like lauvine loosen'd from the mountain's belt."

But the song of Homer, the "tragic muse" of Sophocles, the history of Herodotus, the speculations of Plato, the inventions of Archimedes, and the geometrical acquirements of Euklides, for how long a period have they delighted and instructed mankind? Were the world destitute of these thought-revealments which the mighty in intellect have bequeathed to us in books, how limited would have been the progress of man! Dim, unsatisfactory, oral tradition would have been the only medium through which knowledge could have been transmitted. Man, and ages of men, would have been isolated. Dying, they could have left no chart to tell the regions of truth which they had explored; no sign of the difficulties which they had encountered on their way; no record of the valuable fruits which they had gathered in their course. Nor could they have set up a genius-lighted beacon to warn others of the dangers which had befallen them while sounding on their perilous path through Error's shoreless sea. Science, Poetry, History, Fiction, Biography, Morals, Religion, where would they have been? The accumulated wisdom of ages—could it have been ours, had not a means of perpetuating knowledge been found in books? Without these, an old author remarks, "God is silent, justice dormant, physics at a stand, philosophy lame, letters dumb, and all things involved in Cimmerian darkness."

Carefully considered, a prudent course of reading has many advantages. It imparts knowledge, cultivates the judgment, supplies the place of experience, stimulates to intellectual exertion, suggests new and important ideas, corrects erroneous impressions, modifies our thoughts, and teaches us the graces of composition.

Who will undertake the endless task of enumerating the different branches of study, of cataloguing the myriad discoveries of Science, the millions of Art's successful inventions; of detailing the wondrous revelations of Psychology, the marvels of Chemistry, the mind-confusing calculations of Astronomy, the pleasures of Poetry, and the delights of Botanical Knowledge; of recounting the stories of garrulous History; the thousand strange and wayward fancies of Mythology, and the curiosity-exciting recitals of Travel? and yet, before a knowledge of the advantages of reading could be nearly realized, all this, and more, we would require to do. We dare not attempt the superhuman task. But surely we may infer that if such and so vast be the stores of Wisdom which reading can reveal, any means which can direct, excite, encourage, and sustain us, in attempting the acquisition of even a small part of these, is useful and advantageous. Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies do this. May each young reader, then, join such a society! May he improve the privileges which it affords him! and may a taste for reading

be created and encouraged within him, until he can use the words of Fletcher, in all the spirit of their soul-felt enthusiasm!—

> "The place that does
> Contain my books—the best companions—is
> To me a glorious court, where hourly I
> Converse with the old sages and philosophers;
> And sometimes, for variety, I confer
> With Kings and Emperors, and weigh their counsels—
> Calling their victories, if unjustly got,
> Unto a strict account; and in my fancy
> Deface their ill-placed statues. Can I, then,
> Part with such constant pleasures, to embrace
> Uncertain vanities? No! be it your care
> To augment a heap of wealth: it shall be mine
> To increase in Knowledge.—Lights, there, for my study!" *

(To be concluded in our next.)

THE DECLINE OF ELOQUENCE.

The era of British eloquence appears to have passed. The senate and the pulpit, which once rung with the inspirations of genius, are now silent; and the bar, from being the nursery and school of orators, has ceased to be remarkable for an ordinary amount of the "art of speaking." The days of Erskine and his splendid forensic orations have become the traditionary legends of the courts, while the impassioned brilliancy of Brougham excites admiration, but does not stimulate emulative exertion. The bar seems satisfied to wear the faded laurels of past triumphs; to boast in having once had orators; and to remain in disgraceful inactivity. The present position of the bar would credit the belief that the highest altitude of eloquence had been attained, that all the mines of human thought had become exhausted, and that man, satiated with his conquests, had returned again to a rude and half barbaric mode for the expression of thought. That we have not now at the bar any example of the highest order of eloquence, will be universally acknowledged. The appearance of such men upon any stage of oratory is but seldom, and their outbursts of eloquence are but rare and fitful. While such superior minds may enhance the value of the age in which they live, may give models of their divine art to their contemporaries and posterity, and become the admired of the world, it will be contended, and justly, that their displays are adverse to the undeviating course of justice, and dangerous to men having to perform deliberative functions. It is better that juries should not be electrified into acquitting the guilty, or condemning the innocent, and that judges should preserve their serenity of mind and correctness of judgment; and, although such eloquence may procure admiration, the effects of it are evil, and consequently, it should not be too much encouraged.

But let us inquire whether or not the bar of the present day can lay claim to that judicial eloquence which is so immediately adapted to the circumstances of legal argument, and which should be one of the great aims of every member of the bar to obtain. When we say judicial eloquence, we mean the eloquence of the

* "Elder Brother," Act i., Scene 2.

judgment, in contradistinction to the eloquence of the feelings; clear, correct, and logical; embodying the discussion of legal principle in concise and elevated language. Such was Lord Erskine's in the case of the Dean of Asaph, displaying the the greatest preciseness and beauty of arrangement; the language being sufficient to sustain, but not remarkable enough to detract from the attention to the arguments, and the whole managed with the most admirable address. Even at a later period, some of Lord Campbell's speeches partake of this description of what may justly be considered as bar eloquence. At this time, however, it is impossible to point to any man at the bar who may be said to possess it. The requirements for it are a considerable amount both of legal and erudite learning, and a sound discretion in the application of both. And it should be remembered that this discription of oratory, not depending so much upon the imagination, but more upon the exercise of the memory and the use of the reflective powers, may be more easily acquired than such as rests for its force upon the variations of the mind and the intensity of the conception. There are, indeed, but few men who may not, by study and perseverance, perhaps imitation, acquire a nervous and dignified style of expression, and an appropriate use of language; and by strengthening their recollective and concentrative faculties, arrive at some degree of proficiency in this branch of the oratorical art. While this is more easily obtainable, it is regarded with much greater favour by the judges than even the higher order of eloquence; for a "florid style and a sparkling manner never fail to make the speaker be heard with a jealous ear by the judge; they detract from his weight, and always produce a suspicion of his failing in soundness or strength of argument. The characteristic of this style of oratory may be summed up in the advice of Quintilian—"*Cura sit verborum; solicitudo rerum.*" To seize the leading points of the argument, to corroborate or destroy them by sufficient evidence, and to add chasteness, power, and boldness of expression, are the chief requisitions for a description of oratory highly esteemed by the judges and by the bar; and admirably designed for appealing to the judgment of men whose duty it is to decide unbiassed by feeling or passion. This eloquence, we believe, may be attained by labour; but we not only aver that our bar is destitute of this sort of it, but we will take one step further, and say that there are but very few gentlemen of the bar who are moderately correct or elegant in their style. The Superior Courts of Law, when the judges are presiding for the hearing of appeals, and the reversal of judgments, in which only a select body of practitioners appear, and, in which, therefore, eloquence should be cultivated, are remarkable for the total absence of anything which can aspire to that name. If the pleader is well skilled in his technical law points, he has gained the only object which he sought, and cares nothing about the inaptitude of his expressions, or the want of clearness in his argument. Not only is such the case, but even those adventitious adornments which nature has afforded unlimited opportunity for improvement, seem entirely neglected; the modulation of voice, the strength of utterance, and grace of attitude and action, serve to render even a poor or barren speaker, passable, if not attractive. The orators of olden time thought no labour too intense, no extent of time too much, to gain these desirable

advantages; but the gentlemen of the bar seem to consider them as scarcely worthy of their notice. There is some reason for believing that Walpole and the orators of his time gained their ascendency over the minds of their hearers as much by the gracefulness of their delivery and the propriety of their deportment, as by the power of their eloquence.

But if the address is slovenly, the matter ill-arranged, and the most extraneous subjects and precedents dragged into arguments upon which they have no bearing, in the courts of judgment and appeal; the style of speaking at *Nisi Prius* and in the criminal courts is still lower. In the former the same defects exist which we have before noticed, in a more eminent degree; and the business falls to the lot of men of less experience, who appear as little to have cultivated a just manner of expressing their thoughts. The criminal bar, while, in some degree, liable to the faults we have referred to, is chiefly chargeable with another, in fact, more dangerous to the growth of true eloquence. It is a kind of spurious eloquence, coarse, violent, and declamatory; attracts some attention, and passes with the vulgar for that of which it is only the base counterfeit. This style, though repressed by the judges, is yet upon the increase; and as but the smallest amount of talent is requisite for its acquirement, it seems to recommend itself to the attention of those who are desirous of making a display with as little real industry or oratorical powers as possible.

It must be a matter of regret that the bar of our country has ceased to be distinguished for its eloquence, and it becomes important to inquire into the causes which either positively prevent or negatively do not encourage a taste for this noble art. The inns of court, although well endowed with revenues, have long since ceased to recognize any responsibility in the legal or intellectual advancement of their students. They cause them to be assembled, it is true, at stated periods in Term time, but not either for the purpose of instruction, or the formation of associations which might promote the science, but only for the pleasure of conviviality. The student, after having wearied himself by his day's employment at the chambers of a pleader, dines at the hall of which he is a member; and the little converse which he enjoys with his fellow-students is confined to the courtesies of life, but does not extend to the reciprocation of studies and opinions. Were the students, while in their novitiate, brought into constant collision, a spur would be given to their activity; they would mutually refine their manners, aid the learning, and strengthen the powers of each other. Why should not the inns establish lectures upon oratory, give scholarships for success in its attainment, encourage the attendance and the efforts of students, and make eloquence one of the great branches of legal education? Why should not the public halls be opened as the usual resort of students of law and barristers, and devoted to the holding of moot courts and discussion clubs? Under the presidency of some able lawyer, such courts might be rendered almost as important as addressing the judges; and while the principles of law would be acquired, the mastery of eloquence would not be a subordinate object. Westminster Hall ought not to be the first theatre on which a man displays his ability in speaking, but he ought to be well and severely trained

before he delivers himself in the presence of the judges of the land. It ought to be an imperative necessity for every barrister to have delivered a certain number of speeches at the hall of his society, before he is permitted to rise in court; and, were such a system adopted, we should soon gain for the bar the reputation of sound reasoning and manly eloquence, while we should save the judges from the annoyances and impertinences to which they are subject. The want of a proper superintendence on the part of the inns, renders it necessary for the students to place themselves in the chambers of pleaders; and there, without any counteracting influence, they become absorbed in the intricacies of the statute law, and the technicalities of pleading. They do not acquire large and extensive views of the origin and foundation of laws, or an intimate acquaintance with the common law, but narrow their pursuits to a conversance with the peculiar acts of Parliament, which affect our own jurisprudence: they drink from the many tributary streams, but never from the fountain head of law.

Another cause of the present discouragement to oratory, must be found in the culpable negligence of gentlemen preparing for the bar. When students of law, with time upon their hands, neglect to promote a taste for oratory; barristers are little likely, with less opportunity, to attempt it. The forensic clubs, which formerly served to supply the place of a national institution, to prepare the minds of youth for the professional conflicts of after age, are, many of them, closed: and in this age of universal movement, eloquence alone seems despised.

Much may be done by every individual, intending to make the bar his profession, by a determination to excel in this necessary art; and, if every student, feeling that the honour of his profession and his country was, in this respect, committed to his keeping, would mature his capacities for speaking, by the study of British eloquence, and the habit of committing to writing legal arguments, the style of oratory at the bar would soon show symptoms of improvement. We refer to students, in these remarks, because, from them alone, must be expected the future greatness of the bar; and we would willingly see them join in an attempt to revive its past fame.

EILO.

Manchester (Rusholme-road) Young Men's Improvement Society.—The Seventh Anniversary of this Society was celebrated on Wednesday, October 2nd, 1850, in the school-room adjoining the chapel, on which occasion upwards of three hundred friends, male and female, sat down to tea. The room was beautifully decorated with flowers and evergreens, with the mottos, "Onward," "Excelsior," "That the soul be without Knowledge is not good," "Buy the Truth, and sell it not," and, in bold relief at the entrance of the room, "Welcome!" In the absence of the Rev. James Griffin, who was detained on account of indisposition, the chair was ably filled by Dr. Henry Browne, who, after a few appropriate remarks, called upon the Secretary to read the Annual Report, from which it appeared, that the institution contained fifty-eight members, all striving to improve the higher and nobler faculties of their being. Upwards of forty questions, political, scientific, and religious, had been discussed during the last twelve months, many of them of vital importance, questions agitating the public mind, and upon which it is absolutely necessary that the young men of the present day—they who will wield the destinies of the future—should be well informed. It was also stated, that since the formation of the Society more than one hundred and fifty young men had been connected with it, many of them now being in different quarters of the globe, scattering the knowledge they had obtained. After the Report was read, the President called upon the Treasurer, Mr. H. H. Tubbs, who remarked that the institution had been in existence seven years, and under the kind protection and presidency of its founder (Mr. George Darling), it had gradually developed itself and attained to its present prosperity. To one to whom the Society was under such deep obligations, that was thought the most fitting moment to attest the same, by a

token of respect due to such indefatigable exertions. The speaker then read an address, signed by about fifty of the members, and concluded by requesting his acceptance of the same, together with a beautifully finished writing desk, upon which was inscribed—

"To Mr. George Darling, President of the Rusholme-road Young Men's Improvement Society, from its Members.

"Manchester, October 2nd, 1850."

Mr. Darling, who was much affected, accepted the testimonial, firmly believing that the lines presented with it were expressive of the feelings of the members. His desire was, that it might be their ambition to go higher and higher still in wisdom and excellence, until they had attained that knowledge which was life eternal.—During the evening able and appropriate speeches were delivered by members and friends on the following subjects:—

The importance of seeking after wisdom when young—the power of knowledge—its advantages in the present state of society—the evils consequent upon reading the trash which emanates from the press, and the counteracting influences of the cheap moral literature—the advantages of Mutual Improvement Societies, their antiquity, the Societies established under Socrates, Plato, &c.—the illustrious examples which modern times have furnished of individuals connected with such institutions, Chalmers, Robert Hall, Walter Scott, Burns, Playfair, Mackintosh, Jeffrey, &c.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

22. Although the discussion on the war question is concluded, may I be permitted to inquire how the friends of peace would overcome the difficulty which the example of the apostle Paul supplies? To me this has been a perplexing point.—W. M. R.

23. As I am wholly unacquainted with the range of topics taken up by Mental Philosophy, perhaps some of your readers who understand the subject would favour me with an outline of the course of study it implies.—S. F. M.

24. Is the art of Phrenotypics advantageous in the acquisition of the Latin and Greek languages, and if so, which are the best works on the art? Should I save time by learning Latin before commencing Greek?—A Subscriber.

25. Can you inform me what is the best work on the subject of Botany, and what work contains the best directions for the preservation of botanical specimens, particularly as it respects COLOUR. I also wish to know the best way of obtaining skeletons of leaves.—"a."

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

17. *Quotations.*—Perceiving that one of your readers wishes to know how he may collect quotations from standard authors, allow me to recommend "Todd's Index Rerum" for this purpose. By making an entry in this book of anything he reads worth remembering, he will be able to refer to it at any time with very little trouble.—T. V. W.

"J. S." wishes to be informed of a plan for enabling writers to collect quotations, and to make them readily available. Extensive reading and a good memory are, I think, among the principal requisites. Of all writers, whether ancient or modern, Shakspeare stands unrivalled for the number and aptness of the quotations which may be culled from his pages. Nearly every line is a text in itself.—C. C. M.

19. *Elocution:*—

"Speech is the golden harvest that followeth the flowering of thought;
Yet oftentimes runneth it to husk, and the grains be withered and scanty."—*Tupper.*

"Elocution, which anciently embraced style and the whole art of rhetoric, now signifies manner of delivery."—*E. Porter.*

The subject of Elocution has been one of great attraction in all ages and nations, and to all conditions of men. Communities have been swayed by the orator, roused to deeds of bravery they would have shrunk from, but for the burning words of some master mind, poured out in musical cadences, "liquid as melted from the hot heart;" appeal, poured out in pathetic strains, melting the soul to pity; imagery, uttered with the fiery zeal of a prophet, calling up the imagination, till it sees visions of the future "streaming like meteors in the wind;" bears the voices of the dead borne upon the blast, sighing, in mournful strains, in answer to the invocation:—"We come! we come! 'tis but the living that are dumb!"

In all times men have appeared capable of swaying the multitude by the power of words. Oratory, in ancient times, was considered to be the grand climax to which an educated man could attain. Whatever a man had to utter, must have been done with grace and eloquence, or it lost its effect. And this was as it should be. That which is really great in conception, ought to enjoy all the embellishments of art. How many men fail to produce any effect on the public mind, not so much from the absence of merit, as from the want of a good delivery. The veriest tyro may, for a time, take the lead with the multitude, simply from possessing an energetic mode of speaking. Yet the MERE power of words is not a high quality; nay, rather it is the lowest, and will soon fail. The multitude are not to be cozened for any length of time by a mere claptrap—only till the true man come can he gain an audience; he must then bid adieu to his "fellow-sufferers in the cause of the truth" (?): "half gods go when the gods arrive." The true man must be uppermost. However annoying it may be to hear a man utter golden thoughts in ill-chosen words, it is still more so to hear a verdant sprig candidate for public honour proclaiming, in pompous, inflated terms, as the last new birth, that said grievance is not to be borne, that the masses are rising in intelligence, and that HE (!) can see the day dawning when not a tyrant's foot shall disgrace our native soil; winding up with a grand peroration of gas, the substance of which is simply, "Admire me, call me an excellent stump orator." Of the two, we prefer the diamond in the rough, to a highly polished sham, mere GLASS, a thing to be seen THROUGH, and NIL ADMIRARI.

Yet, because of this class, oratory is not to be cast aside. That power which can shake a nation to its centre, rouse a multitude to arms, and again allay the fury of its passion; that can stand fearlessly before the Parisians in arms, as lately done by Lamartine, and induce them by persuasion, not only to destroy, but to protect public security—this, we say, is not lightly to be thrown away.

Yet reading and speaking are not taught in our colleges and seminaries as they should be. The old rule, Read as I do, is still adhered to. And it is no uncommon thing to hear a poem or speech barbarously delivered by those who OUGHT to read better. Poetry gets the same treatment as a prosy account of the last debate in Parliament. Truly the divine art deserves better usage. Is not the beautiful to be cultivated? "Our primal source is beauty, and we pant for it ever and again."

"God, the undiluted good, is root and stock of beauty,
And every child of reason drew his essence from that stem.
Therefore, it is of intuition, an innate hankering for home,
A sweet returning to the well from which our spirit flow'd,
That we, unconscious of a cause, should bask these darken'd souls
In some poor relics of the light that blazed in primal beauty,
And, even like as exiles of idolatry, should quaff from the cisterns of creation
Stagnant draughts, for those fresh springs that rise in the Creator."

The class of people who talk of poetry as they would of sugar-cane—think it exceedingly nice, ticklish to the palate, but to be used as sparingly as the said article of confectionery more especially by grown people, lest they should be thought sentimental, or classed with those who have not outgrown their youth's apparel—is happily now very limited, though not quite extinct. There are those who still look upon a reader of poetry as upon one utterly lost for all other intellectual acquirements. This is true only of those who are fond of "EASY pieces," volumes of "fugitive verses, written in the hours of leisure" (after dinner, hence so morbid). But let readers of poetry apply themselves to Milton, Shakespeare, Coleridge, Dante, Goëthe, Bailey, &c., and they will find intellectual employment of the highest kind, and but little to gratify that morbid taste which requires mournful, melancholy ditties, "written in the hours of affliction." The poet's office in the world is beginning to be better understood; he is taking his station as something higher than a mere jingler of bells. We begin to acknowledge that the true poet is the highest expression of humanity, the apex of the possibilities of human life, the nearest the divine; that he views nature face to face; that she works through him. "The old Eternal Genius, who built the world, has confided himself more to this man than to any other." He listens to the warblings of the spirit-world, hears the harmonies that are in heaven, holds converse with the spirits of other realms, and brings down a few faint tones to cheer hard working, groping humanity. But, alas! few and faint they are! They sound but like the last "dying day-hymn" of another sphere; "they come like shadows, so depart." And though the poet gives us glimpses of the upper world, yet "his" full, "bright" visions are not to be told to the ear of mortals. He descends to earth to tell his mystic tale, and the shining countenance is gone, the visions "have all melted into air, into thin air," and we get but an incrustation, bright though that be, of the secret told in heaven.

Let men begin, then, to STUDY poetry, not use it as a mere amusement, to be cast aside like a child's toy when tired of. We know that a great difficulty, to all appearance, exists with regard to the reading of poetry, to give it all the expression of beauty it is capable of receiving from a good reader.

Austin says, "In just articulation, the words are not to be hurried over, nor precipitated syllable over syllable; nor, as it were, melted together into a mass of confusion: they should not be trailed, or drawled, nor permitted to slip out carelessly, so as to drop unfinished. They should be delivered from the lips, as beautiful coins newly issued from the Mint, deeply and accurately impressed, neatly struck by the proper organs, distinct, in due succession, and of due weight." All this, we know, will require time and study to be accomplished; yet it may be done by one determined; every one may improve in this, as in other things. We are aware of the difficulties, but we are also acquainted with that which is better, the advantages.

Perhaps no department of study requires greater care and attention than that of Elocution. None is there that seems so imperatively to require a tutor, for the reason that there are many little shades of pronunciation that might be improved, many bad habits to be corrected, that would altogether escape the beginner; whereas, by having a master, you are supposed to have a model before you, as you would in the sister art of painting; where you never think of painting an ideal, a new creation, before having copied from a model. Of course we cannot undertake to point out teachers; this would be to make distinctions, which we would avoid. But search for yourselves, find a MASTER of his art; no matter if he charge a little higher than others, that is not the question. A physician will heal you before a quack.

Yet, though we advise the employment of a tutor, we will point out the course a person determined upon self-instruction may take, as far as he can go.

Of course no person will attempt the subject of elocution till he be thoroughly acquainted with English Grammar. The next thing is Punctuation (for which see No. VI. of *Controversialist*, article "Composition"); Prosody will then engage the attention, which will explain the structure of English verse; this may be found in any English Grammar. There is a short and concise explanation in "Darnel's;" also in "D'Orsey's Grammar," part 2, published by Chambers; and Smart's, in which there are exercises both in punctuation and scanning. Then, for reading, take "Walker's Elements of Elocution," and his "Rhetorical Grammar." The first is the best book; indeed, the latter contains a great portion of what is given in the former, yet there are many things in it which are of use, not given in the first-mentioned work.

Other standard works are:—"Blair's Rhetoric, and Belles Lettres;" "Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric;" "Whately's Rhetoric." We need not increase the list farther, as we easily might do, because we should suppose few persons would have the hardihood to undertake the reading of

more than these. Did the limits of this Magazine allow, we might be tempted to offer an epitome of the subject; yet, for the present, we must be contented merely to point the way, leaving a further development to a future time.

In conclusion, we beg to offer the following extract for the serious consideration of our readers:—

WAGNER.

"Forgive me; but I heard you, sir, declaiming.
Pray were you reading a Greek tragedy?
It now-a-days is useful. I have heard
That a good player can instruct a priest.

FAUST.

Yes! if the priest aspire to be a player;
A circumstance that may occur.

WAGNER.

Alas!
When one is so coop'd up within one's study,
And hardly can enjoy a peep, except
Upon a holiday,—and then at distance,
As through a glass,—of the external world,
How can one hope to lead it by persuasion?

FAUST.

In vain you seek for what you do not feel,
It must flow forth spontaneous from the heart,
To overpower all hearts resistlessly;
You may sit gluing phrases, and re-cooking
The morsels you have snatch'd from others' feasts,
To all eternity,—may coax a flame
In your small heap of ashes,—may attract
The admiration of some puny apes,
If you have that ambition, but not touch
A single heart, your own remaining cold.

WAGNER.

The secret of the orator's success
Is Elocution. I have much to learn.

FAUST.

How seek the goal of eloquence? oh, then,
Take my advice, and do not fasten bells
Upon your harness,—reason and good sense
Get better on without it. What need to hunt
For words, if you have anything to say?
Your fine orations, that are so bedizened,
(Gold-leaf in which you fold mere nothings up,)
Are unreviving as the wind that sighs
Through the dead leaves of autumn."

E. B.

NOTICES OF BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, &c.

The Philosopher's Mite to the Great Exhibition of 1851. London: Houlston and Stoneman.

The poet has asked, depreciatingly, "What's in a name?" but our "philosopher" appears to think that there is much, and hence the very taking title which he has given to his production. Few can read its advertisement without having their curiosity awakened, and many will be led to purchase for mere curiosity's sake. This pamphlet is a warning address to Prince Albert, as the principal promoter of the Great Exhibition, against the evils of "plague and pestilence," which the writer considers will be attendant upon the over-crowding of London with visitors from all parts of the world. These evil forebodings are grounded, for the most part, upon the following proposition:—"Great sudden human gatherings, domiciliated in a confined space, are liable to be followed by pestilence in the compound ratio of the sources from whence they come, the diversity of breed, habits, and diet, and the length of their sojourn in such given confined space." This our author maintains is one of "Nature's Great Laws," and he brings many illustrations of its working from ancient and modern history. Now, few will dispute the truth of the proposition, though many may doubt its applicability to the case in question. We think he has over-estimated the probable number of visitors from a distance, and lost sight of the great extent of the metropolis; but still, if this "mite" should be the means of drawing greater attention to the importance of providing proper accommodation for strangers, it may be among the *least*, though not the *least useful* of the contributions to the "Monster Exhibition of 1851."

The Pew and its Rent? or, the Practice of Christian Churches compared with the revealed Word of God. By Samuel Richards, of King Street Baptist Church, Bristol. London: Hall, Virtue, and Co.

This is an elaborately argumentative tract on the scripturality of a compulsory payment of seat rents in places of Christian worship. The author shows that the question is one of much importance in its bearing upon the progress of the gospel and the propagation of vital Christianity. It is a subject which deserves consideration; and the little tract whose title we quote above contains a clever *exposé* of the evils of the system, in a plain, unpretending, and simple style, which adds much to its impressiveness. We recommend its perusal to the friends and opponents of the "seat-rent system."

The Young Teacher; or, Friendly Hints to those who have recently commenced the work of Sabbath school Teaching. London: B. L. Green, 62, Paternoster-row.

This little work is admirably suited to the parties for whom it is written. Its congratulations are good, its counsels simple, and its cautions judicious. The tone is earnest, although approaching to enthusiasm. Every young teacher should purchase it.

Peace Lyrics. By H. G. Adams. London: C. Gilpin.

This able little production fully entitles Mr. Adams to the distinction of poet laureate to the Peace movement. Earnestness in the cause of man's progression, and nobility of purpose as well as refinement of thought and expression, are its general characteristics. Among the singers of the "good time coming," the author will occupy no mean place. Great thoughts and noble aspirations "married to immortal verse" are always welcome, and by all who value these this tiny tome will be readily purchased. In his own words we dismiss him:—

"Go, scatterer of the seeds of peace;
Go, but return full soon;
We shall look for thee when the flowers increase,
And the winds breathe all of June.
We shall listen for the tidings good
Which thou to us wilt bring,
Of the spread of peace and brotherhood,
All to God's glorying."

The Art of Reasoning.

No. VIII.

JUDGMENT—NATURE AND KINDS OF EVIDENCE.

"Science consists of general propositions inferred from particular facts or from less general propositions by Induction; and it is our object to discern the nature and laws of Induction in this sense." —*Whewell.*

INDUCTION is the term now universally employed to designate that systematic observation of any series of phenomena by which we are enabled, after careful verification, to deduce general inferences from the facts of experience. As a source of evidence, it depends upon the intuitional principles which the operations of the external universe develop in the mind. In looking upon Nature with an intelligent eye—in observing her processes—and carefully examining the reports which the sensational organs bring to the percipient faculties, men naturally perceive that of all the mighty mass of individualisms from which the mind receives impressions, many influence it in a similar manner. This leads the mind to observe the resemblances and dissimilarities of objects, to investigate their coherence, coexistence, and derivation; and thus the work of unification begins. As facts multiply their impressions on the mind, similar and concomitant series of phenomena are remarked and classified, and by this means gain prominency in the intellect; generalisation perceives the essential *oneness* of nature which coexist in many of them, apparently diverse and incoincident though they be; experimentalisation is employed—the law of their colligation begins to dawn on the mind—and is, at last, evolved from the vast multitude of special facts in which it lay latent. Then "the memory disburdens itself of its cumbrous catalogue of particulars, and carries centuries of observation in a single formula."

The whole universe—that vast amplitude in which we dwell, and which affords so much scope for the exercise of our curiosity, research, and investigation—presents itself to us, primarily, as an immense concourse of objectivities in almost continual fluxion and change; despite, however, of this multiplicity and mutability, a wondrous sameness of appearances, uniformity of procedure, and coincidence of phenomena, are evident to the intelligent eye. It is in the careful inspection of these that Induction employs itself—"Human knowledge does not consist in the bare collection or enumeration of facts; this alone would be of little service, were we not to attempt the classification of them, and to educe from such classification general laws and principles. The knowledge which consists in individual truths could never be either extensive or definite, for the multiplicity which then must crowd in upon the mind only tends to confound and perplex it, while the memory, overburdened with particulars, is not able to retain a hundredth part of the materials which are collected. To prevent this, the power of generalisation comes to our aid, by which the individual facts are so classified under their proper conceptions, that they may at the same time be more easily retained, and their several relations to all other branches of knowledge accurately defined. The colligation

and classification of facts, then, we may regard as the two first steps which are to be taken in the attainment of truth."* From the position which he occupies in this terrestrial compartment of the Temple of Creation—from his dependence upon the mutations to which nature is subject, for health, life, sustenance, and comfort —and from the special constitution of his intellectual powers, man has an irresistible tendency to exert himself in the study and pursuit of the truth of things—has a direct interest in becoming acquainted with the antecedences, concomitants, and consequents of the several states and conditions of objects—and finds it absolutely necessary to learn the modes of the occurrence and recurrence of the various and diversified contingencies which take place around him. Hence it is that Philosophy has always been an object of pursuit. Hence it has resulted that the process of Induction has had so many charms for the intellectual of the human race.—In this brief chapter we purpose to furnish the reader with a succinct outline of the Inductive Method, chiefly as it is propounded in the works of Lord Chancellor Bacon, and the "Logic" of John Stuart Mill.

The universe, whether mental or material, is a vast storehouse of facts. The great duty and interest of man, with regard to it, is to discover the Truth, to learn the cause or causes of each effect, and the effects of each cause. For this purpose he must, by assiduous and careful study, become acquainted with the arrangement, connection, and systematisation which reign in Nature. The objects which Induction renders necessary are primarily the two following:—1st, The investigation of facts preparatory to the formation of a general law; 2nd, The inferring of a general law from the facts thus investigated. To fulfil these requirements efficiently, three processes are needful.

I. To observe with attention and accuracy the great variety of objects of which the universe is composed, and to gain a knowledge of their several properties and qualities.

II. To group these various and multiplex objectivities, or series of phenomena, according to their several relations, coincidences, and properties, and arrange them, in conformity with their importance, into ordinate and subordinate classes.

III. To note the successions in which phenomena occur, the order of the events which result from them, for the purpose of discovering the bond of causation by which they are colligated into an endlessly-ramified chain of inter-related antecedence, coexistence, and consequence.

To perform these processes aright will require the earnest application of the whole of our percipient faculties, for "man, the servant and interpreter of Nature, does and knows so far as he has, either in fact or thought, observed the order of Nature: more he can neither understand nor perform."† In such circumstances it becomes of importance to know in what manner this investigative process may be most accurately performed. Now, "there are two ways of searching after and

* Morell's "Hist. Spec. Phil.," Vol. I. p. 34.

† Homo Naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de Naturæ ordinere vel mente observaverit; nec amplius scit aut potest.—"*Novum Organum.*" *Liber Primus.—Aphorismus I.*

discovering truth: the one, from sense and particulars, flies upwards to the most general axioms, and from these principles, and their never-questioned truth, judges of and discovers intermediate axioms. The other, from sense and particulars, collects axioms ascending in a continuous and gradual manner, so that the most general axioms are arrived at in the last stage."* It is the latter of these methods with which we are at present concerned. By the conducting of investigations according to this—the Inductive—method, we gain a knowledge of external existences and their properties, the causes which are operative among them, the changes they undergo, and the effects which the exertion of these properties produce on other objects. In the former case, we acquire information of, and are warranted in making propositions concerning, the existence and properties of the objects only. In the latter, we perceive the reciprocal causative agency which bodies are capable of exerting upon each other. In the prosecution of these different departments of inquiry, Induction proceeds in a systematic manner, and guides its studies by a definite plan, which it will now be our duty to explain.

When we are desirous of elucidating the truth regarding any series of phenomena, the first step which we should take in the prosecution of our design should be to write down the *data* upon which our speculations are to be founded. These will consist of a complete catalogue, or, at least, an extensive enumeration of the facts of experience in the order of their occurrence, and in all their modifications of manifestation. Great caution and care must be exercised in ascertaining the accuracy of the facts, or the validity of the proof on which we rest our confidence of their correctness. Experiments should be made, and accurately noted; doubtful incidents, while not actually thrown aside and discarded as valueless, should yet have their uncertainty estimated and allowed for. This narrative, carefully revised, all extraneous or unnecessary matter expunged, and the facts it contains properly arranged, form the materials of philosophy, and the elements of the superstructure of science. This Natural History of any given class of phenomena being prepared, we are now to proceed, by a judicious comparison of the collated facts, to discover the *form* or essence of these appearances;—that which is convertible with the quality for which the object is noticed, and which exists wherever that quality is found: for this purpose we are to consider which of all the qualities possessed by these diverse bodies must be excluded from any participation in the *form* or essence. In pursuance of this inquiry we must discard all those properties which are in the several objects merely accidental and essentially dissimilar; this will considerably widen our generalisation, but will materially limit the bounds of our investigation, in so far as we shall have ascertained that in these certain discarded qualities the *form* need not be sought. We next consider whether we can abstract any other of the coinciding properties of the objects of our inquiry, and thus demarcate and set

* Duæ viæ sunt atque esse possunt ad inquirendum et inveniendum veritatem. Altera a sensu et particularibus advolat ad axiomata maximè generalia, atque ex iis principiis eorumque mimota veritate judicat et invenit axiomata media; atque hæc via in usu est. Altera a sensu et particularibus excitat axiomata, ascendendo continentur et gradatim, ut ultimo loco perveniatur ad maximè generalia; quæ via vera est sed intenta.—"*Novum Organum.*" *Liber Primus.—Aphorismus XIX.*

aside what is diverse and multiple, from that which is invariable in its nature: the multiplex and variable constitute the qualities, the unical and immutable constitute the *form*;—that property of which, if things were destitute, they would cease to be what they are.

The observations which occur in the foregoing paragraphs may be succinctly comprised in the three following laws, viz.:—

1st. Since nothing exists isolatedly in nature, it is necessary that we should multiply our observations and vary them by experiment, in order that we may succeed in perceiving the precise and actual constituents of any given phenomeua, *i.e.*, so to disentangle the accessory from the essential, the purely accidental from the express essence, as shall enable us to perceive—distinct from the thousands of accompanying properties of any phenomena—the determining cause or condition of its existence.

2nd. Not only must we clearly and precisely perceive the point or points of coincidence and essentiality, but we must, at the same time, and by the same means, acquire au accurate knowledge of the points of differentiation and accidental attribution.

By these two laws we are able to classify, in ascending progression, individuals into species, and species into genera, and *vice versâ*, descendingly.

3rd. We must diligently and particularly observe whether the properties which we perceive in individual phenomena manifest themselves in different proportions in different circumstances, and whether those proportions differ according to any general rule or rules, and if so, what this rule or these rules are.

After the exclusions of which we have spoken in the previous paragraph have been made, it may so happen that some few properties may remain, in the possession of which the whole series of objects may coincide. Should this be the case, one or other of these remanent properties must be *assumed* as the cause, and, if possible, by experimentalisation or otherwise, examined as to its power of accounting for the phenomena concerning which we are prosecuting our inquiries; and this process must be repeated with each, until we discover that *one* individual property—on which alone the production of the events or appearances depends; for the motto of Inductive science is—"*Prudens interrogatio est dimidium scientiæ.*"* This, however, can only be accomplished by that careful and orderly classification of "instances," of which we shall describe the method immediately after the few following parenthetical sentences.

Subordinate to this investigation of *forms*, and frequently conducing much to the discovery of them, are the inquiries into the latent process (*latens processus*), and the latent schematism (*latens schematismus*). The former of these signifies that succession of events which occurs intermediate to the application of any change-causing instrumentality and the operation of the change, *e. g.*, the processes which intervene betwixt the application of a match, the explosion of a train of gunpowder, and the blasting of a quarry-rock, or the striking of the strings of a guitar

* "Prudent questioning is the half of science."

and the impinging of its sounds upon the ear. The syringe-match, by which the doctrine of latent heat is so fully proven, presents a favourable instance of such inquiries reduced to experiment. The latter refers to that secret or hidden structure of bodies on which any of their properties depend, *e. g.*, the internal structure of plants. The investigations of chemistry regarding the component elements of bodies, and the consequences deducible from them, especially in that department which illustrates the doctrine of "*definite or multiple proportions*," afford many examples of the advantage of inquiring concerning the latent schematism.

But to have done with parentheses, and to revert to the process which we were describing in the paragraph antecedent to that we have just penned, we shall find, in the prosecution of our inquiries regarding the various facts of which we wish to know the *rationale*, that there is a very great dissimilarity in their value, so far as the result at which we aim is concerned. Some contain the quality in a simple, others in a compound state. Some exhibit less of it, others more. Some are easy of interpretation, others difficult of solution. Some flash instantaneous conviction on the mind, others gain radiance by juxtaposition and comparison, and by their combinedly converging to the establishment of one law. This consideration led the illustrious Lord Bacon to adopt and propose a classification of the instances in which any phenomenal speciality occurred, according to their value, under the designation of prerogative instances (*prerogativæ instantiarum*), or those cases which ought to possess the chief claim to our regard in endeavouring to interpret any series of facts. His intention in this department of his *opus magnum* is to describe what are the most necessary or essential particulars with which we should concern ourselves in any investigation, or what instances, in any series of phenomena which Nature presents to our observation, should be most especially regarded and attended to, in our attempts to discover the law by which their coherency and concatenation are secured in the vast system of the universe. Of these he enumerates twenty-seven sorts. Were we to name, define, and illustrate the whole of these, our readers will easily perceive that we should run the risk of becoming tediously prolix. We will only, therefore, mention a few of the most important of them, as specimens of the *modus operandi* which he proposes :—

I. *Instantiæ solitariæ*—solitary instances. These are of two classes : 1st. Those in which the objects differ in all qualities except one. 2nd. Those in which the objects agree in all points but one ; thus, were the inquiry concerning electricity—A hare's skin and a piece of rough glass, both excited by a metal, would both become positivised, and would form *solitariæ instantiæ* of the first sort ; while two pieces of quite dry ribbon, the one white and the other black, excited by a similar agency, would be instances of the latter kind.

II. *Instantiæ migrantes*—varying instances. Those properties of bodies which are observed changing from a greater to a less degree ; as, objects undergoing the process of electrical excitation, &c.

III. *Instantiæ ostentivæ*—forth-showing instances. Those facts or objectivities which display the quality in question in its highest degree. A voltaic battery would be an *instantiæ ostentivæ* in electricity, and a barometer in pneumatics.

IV. *Instantiæ conformes*—analogous instances. Occurrences or things between which analogies and resemblances may be traced in some individual points, however divergent in others; thus, a *camera obscura* is an analogous instance to the *eye*, and the water-works of a city, to the *heart*.

V. *Instantiæ comitatu atque hostiles*—companion and inimical instances. Qualities which invariably accompany each other, as heat and flame; and those which are unceasingly dissimilar and never discovered in conjunction or alliance, and which thus appear to be at war with each other, as malleability and transparency; the positive and negative poles of electricity.

VI. *Instantiæ cruciæ*—crucial instances. Those in which we, as it were, by experiment, apply the thumb-screw to nature, and compel her to confess her secrets; or, perhaps, those instances which point out the true path, as the ancient crosses did when two divergent roads occurred, for it will bear either interpretation, and is used, we believe, in both senses. Franklin's experiments in electricity would be instances of the former sort. Newton's discovery of gravitation was an instance of the latter sort, settling for ever the true theory of astronomy, and deciding demonstratively the superior truthfulness of the Copernican system over that of the Ptolemaic.*

With regard to such methods, "it has always appeared to us, we must confess, that the help which the classification of instances, under their titles of prerogative, affords to inductions, however just such classification may be in itself, is yet more apparent than real. The force of the instance must be felt in the mind before it can be referred to its place in the system; and before it can be either referred or appreciated, it must be known; and when it *is* appreciated, we are ready enough to weave our web of induction without greatly troubling ourselves whence it derives the weight we acknowledge it to have in our decisions. . . . No doubt such instances as these are highly instructive, but the difficulty . . . . is to find such, not to perceive their force when found."†

Coinciding, as we do, in the just remarks of the great natural philosopher above quoted, we had intended to remark on the inefficiency of induction *alone* to discover truth and to revert to the proof of the assertion made in a former chapter, that "induction is one of the modes in which Judgment operates." As, however, a future opportunity will present itself for that, when we are treating on "Syllogism," it may suffice just now to indicate our opinion that Induction is an investigative process, the results of which are propositions; these propositions become

* We may here state that, besides the "Opera Francisi de Verulamio," we have been materially assisted in this abridgment by the following works, to which we may at once refer our readers for further information on the topic now before them:—Playfair's "Dissertation on the Progress of Physical Science," Stewart's "Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy," in the Encyclopædia Britannica"—Hoppus's "Account of Bacon's Novum Organum," Craik's "Bacon: his Writings and his Philosophy," Napier's Essay on "Bacon," in the Edinburgh Philosophical Transactions, Deleyre's "Analyse de la Philosophie de Bacon," Macaulay's Bacon, Ed. Rev., July, 1837, and paper, "Bacon," in "Le Dictionaire des Sciences Philosophiques," &c., &c.

† Sir John Herschel's "Discourses on the Study of Natural Philosophy," in Lardner's Cyclopædia, art. 192.

premises, and the sources of the *data* from which our conclusions are inferred. Should our Induction be false, our conclusion is nullified; and if our conclusion lead to the contradiction of any sufficiently established known truth, or the admission of an absurdity, our induction is incorrect. Facts carefully collected and considered give rise to hypotheses. These hypotheses are subjected to investigation; and if the phenomena which are being inquired into arrange themselves naturally and uncontradictorily in the manner which the *subtration* had *à priori* fixed upon, the hypothesis is considered proved, and takes the rank of Theory: *e. g.*—Phrenology was first originated by the observation of a few facts: a hypothetical explanation was adopted; this hypothesis is in process of verification,—when that is done (if it can be done),* it will become a science, for then theory will be found to be in accordance with natural phenomena. A mere knowledge of facts is cumulative in a ratio with the existence and experience of man; we are not so destitute of facts as principles—principles which the master-minds of our species are alone fitted to discover and apply—principles which genius alone can elucidate from the dry catalogue of age-accumulated facts, and which are only discoverable by the "far-darting glance" of the mighty in intellect among men.

This appears to us all that is necessary for a brief analysis of the Baconian Method of Induction. This method has, however, been reduced with masterly ability to more generalised formularies, by J. S. Mill. We will now go on to give a very concise summary of these.

The four laws of Inductive Inquiry of this able author, are the Method of Agreement, the Method of Difference, the Method of Residues, and the Method of Concomitant Variations ("Logic," b. III. c. viii.)

Preliminary Axioms. — (1st.) "Whatever circumstance can be excluded, without prejudice to the phenomenon, or can be absent notwithstanding its presence, is not connected with it in the way of causation." (2nd.) "The unessential circumstances being thus eliminated, if only one remains, that one is the cause of which we are in search: if more than one, they either are, or contain among them, the cause; and so, *mutatis mutandis*, of the effect." (3rd.) "Whatever antecedent cannot be excluded without preventing the phenomenon, is the cause, part of the cause, or a condition of that phenomenon." (4th.) Whatever consequent can be excluded, with no other difference in the antecedents than the absence of a particular one, is the effect of that one." (5th.) "Those antecedents and consequents which are mutually present and mutually absent are causes (or effects) to each other, or are connected with each other by causation." (6th.) "Anything on whose modifications, the modifications of an effect are invariably consequent, must be the cause (or connected with the cause) of that effect." A cause "is the sum total of the conditions positive and negative taken together—the whole of the contingencies of every description—which, being realised, the consequent follows."

I. Method of Agreement. When we compare different instances in which the fact concerning which our inquiries are made, or our investigation is

* See, for a debate on this topic, "British Controversialist," vol. i.

undertaken, with each other, and invariably find that the same phenomenon results from the same specific circumstantialities, we are irresistibly compelled to believe, that, in these circumstances, the law of causation may be found; *e. g.*, Arsenite of potash, when compounded with the sulphate of copper, invariably produces an apple-green precipitate, and when steel-filings are cast into a mixture of oil of vitriol and water, the steel-filings dissolve, and a sulphurous fume is emitted. When we have seen these experiments, resulting in the same manner in frequent repetitions, we are led to conclude that, in the combination of the respective bodies experimentalised upon, the causative agency exists. The *canon* of this method is this: "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the phenomenon."

II. METHOD OF DIFFERENCE. "Instead of comparing different instances of a phenomenon, to discover in what they agree, this method compares an instance of its occurrence with an instance of its non-occurrence, to discover in what they differ." When we compare instances in which the observed fact happens with instances which coincide in every particular except the one which we seek to investigate, we are warranted in concluding that in that exceptional particular the cause (or effect) resides—*e. g.*, A stick of sealing-wax, unexcited, coincides with one in all points similar to itself: let now the one be frictionised, and a change will have occurred, and new manifestations will be given forth. We are here perfectly entitled to ascribe the causative agency to the friction, so far at least as the manifestations are concerned, and *vice versâ*, that the manifestations were the result of the excitation. The following is the formulary of this method: "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur have every circumstance except the one in common, that one occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which they alone differ is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon."

III. METHOD OF RESIDUES. When we know all the antecedents of any effect, and some part of the causation-antecedents, we may conclude, with confidence, that the remaining antecedents are the causative agents in the production of the remainder of the effect. A consideration of the centrifugal and centripetal forces will afford an illustration. The formula is thus expressed: "Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known, by previous induction, to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents."

IV. METHOD OF CONCOMITANT VARIATIONS. This has a very close resemblance to Bacon's *instantiæ migrantes*; it refers to those natural agents whose phenomena we can observe, but which so intimately co-exist and interblend themselves with other objectivities, that we are unable to isolate or individualise them—*e. g.*, Heat is a quality so generally interfused through material bodies that we cannot abstract it entirely from them, neither can we so experiment

upon it that we may separate and disconnect it from those things in which it inherently abides. To know, then, the laws by which its operations are guided, we must observe what series of phenomena increase as its power becomes greater, and what effects diminish in a ratio with its decrement, and thus we are guided to judge of its phenomena-educing properties. The law for investigating such subjects is thus given: "Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it by some fact of causation."

Religion.

OUGHT THE CHURCH AND STATE TO BE UNITED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

We have carefully read the paper contributed by W. G., wherein he tries to prove that the Church ought not to be connected with the State. When we began, we hoped to see the subject argued upon its own merits. We thought he would have attempted to prove that it is detrimental to the cause of holiness, and the spread of truth, for those in power to lend their influence to the cause of religion. But our hopes were doomed to a bitter disappointment. W. G. flies off in a tangent, and drags before our notice a certain string of Scripture texts, which, to our limited comprehension, are entirely foreign to the subject. We ask the impartial inquirer, How is it possible to twist the following passage into an argument against the union of Church and State? Whatever may be the cause of our dullness, we really are at a loss to imagine how such words as these are construed by W. G. to afford to his acute mind an argument, nay, a demonstration, that the union of Church and State is wrong:—"Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ, and make them the members of an harlot? God forbid." Our friend must have a wonderful capacity for squaring texts to suit his own opinions, if he can see in the above words any proof that a union of Church and State is wrong. To our mind, the passage offers not a single iota in support of his argument: and when we say this, the same is applicable to the whole of the passages he adduces. But we cannot refrain from offering a stricture upon the absurdity he is guilty of, in comparing the State to a harlot, and a State-churchman to a member of a harlot. We have heard the members of the Government called "old women;" but W. G. must have the honour of discovering that our State is a harlot; that it is composed exclusively of those upon whom cometh the wrath of God; that they are the enemies of God; that they hold the doctrine of Balaam; the doctrine of the Nicolaitanes; and that they are a pack of unbelievers, the children of Belial, a herd of infidels, worshippers of idols, a filthy compound, making an unclean thing. We repeat, that W. G. has a title to the honour of having discovered that our State is so detestable a thing. But we beg to differ from his conclusions: we do not judge so uncharitably of the State. We cannot imagine that our English Government — the Queen, Lords, and Commons—are worthy of all the foul aspersions cast upon them.

We will not offer more upon the Scriptural wisdom and erudition displayed by W. G., but shall proceed to notice some other features which distinguish his most remarkable paper. He says, that the State, "in its rightful operations, regards not man as religious or irreligious; not

in his relation to God, but merely in his relation to his fellow-men." We beg to dissent from such a conclusion. The duty of a State is, we believe, to do its utmost for the best interests of its subjects. If the temporal happiness of man is worthy of the regard of the State, by what process of reasoning can it be shown that his eternal happiness should have no part of its concern? If the less is worthy of attention, by what system of logic can it be demonstrated that the greater should be totally disregarded? We have nothing to do with the assertion, that "States are incompetent to judge of eternal things;" we are arguing for a principle: we are striving to learn why, if it is the duty of a Government to care for the temporal felicity of the governed, it is absolutely wrong for the same Government to be anxious about the eternal welfare of its own subjects? If W. G. had used his talents, which seem of a high order, to explain this matter, his paper would have been of much worth. If we have any correct ideas about good government, they lead us to imagine that to be the best which places in the reach of its subjects the means to attain to the highest felicity. How can a Government or a State do that which totally disregards the eternal well-being of its subjects? If Governors are totally negligent about the souls of their subjects, it appears to us that they fail in the performance of their grand duty. To hear some men talk about Governments and States, one would imagine that they looked upon the human race as mere material beings, creatures of a day, whose existence stopped when the death of the body occurred. If it is a fact that men have souls, what process of reasoning can make it apparent that a State does wrong when it provides competent means to teach men how to attain to eternal salvation? If it is wrong in Kings, Queens, Lords, and Commons, to offer religious knowledge to their subjects, it is equally wrong for parents to do so to their children. The rulers of a people only fill, or ought only to fill, the places of parents to the community. Their duty is to look after the morals of their people; and no State ought to punish its subjects unless it has afforded them ample opportunities for learning their duties; and neither can any rulers fulfil their high avocation until they have done their utmost to provide for the religious instruction of those whom they govern. And here we will mention, that we are not defending any particular religious party, as best deserving the patronage of the State; we are simply endeavouring to demonstrate, that it is the duty of all States to provide religious instruction for their subjects. It is no argument against the principle we maintain, to say, that in the present State Church of England there are great and flagrant abuses. We know, as well as most persons, that abuses are in the Establishment; but the abuse of a thing is no argument against the thing itself.

It seems to us, that many who write against the Union do not understand much about the matter. The State of England only attempts to afford the subjects a knowledge of the Bible, which men of all creeds allow as necessary to salvation. In doing this, the State has availed itself of the services of a body called the English Church. That Church, through its members, is compelled by the State to minister only those truths contained in the Bible. If any of its ministers teach false doctrine, they are liable to be punished by the State: and to say that the State makes the doctrines of the Church, is to utter an absurdity. The Bible is the only standard of doctrines. One party,—that is, the Church—has to inculcate them; the other party—that is, the State—takes upon itself to see that the Church does this duty, for which it receives its patronage. Such is, briefly, the meaning of what is called "Church and State." Will any one be bold enough to affirm, that the Government does wrong in hiring men to teach the nation the truths of the Word of God? Again, will any man affirm, that religious men do wrong in receiving money from Government to teach the truths of God's Word to the people? We do not profess to have very enlarged views of men and things; but it certainly seems to our mind, that to receive money from Government to preach the Gospel, is as honourable and right as to receive the hard

earnings of a toiling mechanic for the same purpose. If it is right to receive money from any party for preaching the Gospel, then it is as lawful to accept the Government as paymaster, as any other party or parties. The grand consideration is, not who pays, but, What is it I am expected to do? If a State wishes the Gospel to be promulgated, any Christian does right to receive the pay of that State as a preacher. At least, so we humbly conceive.

Much of the opposition to Church and State arises, not from spiritual-mindedness, but from petty jealousy. Many Dissenters cannot brook the idea, that any other party should receive more patronage than themselves. They make a loud outcry about the Establishment, and profess to see in it a great obstacle to the spread of the Gospel. They go about to search out all the abuses they can find in the Church, and then parade them *before men* as so many arguments why the Government ought not to trouble itself about the religious instruction of its people. Such a proceeding is not dignified, it is not honest. Dissenters have first to show that it is wrong for Government to care for the eternal welfare of its subjects; and then they may point to the abuses in the Church, and say, See! here are the reasons why this Church is incompetent to perform its allotted work.

To hear many speak who find fault with the Union, a stranger would imagine that Dissenters could not do anything for the spread of the Gospel, because of that incubus, Mother Church. They often talk of what Voluntaryism would do, if they could get rid of the Union. Now, to such we simply say, Show us what Voluntaryism can now do. Dissenters can build as many chapels as they please; they can ordain as many preachers, and send out as many teachers, as they can find funds to pay. There is nothing in the Union which prevents Dissenters from doing the utmost their zeal can dictate. If there were any laws which prevented Dissenters from preaching, if there were any penalties for making converts to their particular opinions, enforced by the Church and State, then we would admit that the Union prevented Dissenters from doing their best to evangelize the country. But while there is nothing of the kind, how can it be shown that the Union interposes a rampart against the spread of Dissenting truth? If the Dissenters have the truth, and the Church has it not, it is a want of courage on their part to clamour for the severance of the Union, before they have done their utmost to spread that light which, from its nature, must dispel every form of religious gloom. When the Apostles first promulgated the Gospel, they did not go about praying for the severance of the temporal power from the pagan polity. No! They steadily and zealously preached the Gospel, knowing that it was the only weapon that could overturn any or all of the mere institutions of men. Dissenters, too many of them, forget this important truth—that if the Union of Church and State be of God, it cannot be overthrown; if it be of men, it must come to nought.

It seems to us, that Dissenters forget their high vocation when they say it is impossible for them to spread the Gospel while the Union exists. Is the Union a greater obstacle to modern Christians, than the hatred of the Jews and the ferocity of the pagans were to the Apostles? The Apostles did not wait to get rid of their antagonists before they ventured upon their grand design. They preached Christ in the teeth of all opposition, and success crowned their efforts. Dissenters! Does the Union prevent you from preaching Christ? It does not. How, then, can the Union of Church and State be said to offer an obstacle to the spread of the Gospel in this land? But we could easily show, did space permit, that the Union positively helps forward the cause of God in the realm. We might point to many, very many, parishes where the Gospel is well known, and that through the instrumentality of the State preachers. We challenge any one to deny, that the Church of England has contained, and does contain, some of the best Christians that England has ever produced. Here, then, are two arguments, to show that State-paid preachers are not enemies to the cause of God. They do not prevent others from preach-

ing Christ, and they positively preach Him themselves.

But W. G. falls into a grand error when he attributes the decay of true religion to the patronage of men in power. The error is very common among those who know but little of Church History. We recommend W. G. to read a little book lately published by Partridge and Oakey, "Facts and Opinions for Churchmen and Dissenters," to learn that he is mistaken, when he attributes the decay of true piety to the patronage of those in power. In the times of the Apostles themselves, this decay began in the Churches; and long before the time of Constantine, heresy, schism, spiritual and worldly pride, were rampant in all the Churches.

Constantine never did any harm by his patronage of true religion: it was his patronage of superstition which did mischief. It is absurd to say true religion can suffer when it is adopted and supported by kings. If Constantine had found the simple Gospel, and had patronized it, the Church would have received much good from his conversion. But it was a corrupted religion which Constantine embraced. Will any one say that religion suffered when Sergius Paulus embraced the truth? Will any one say that Christianity would have been injured if St. Paul had not almost, but entirely persuaded Agrippa to become a Christian? Did St. Paul imagine that that king would not patronize the Gospel if he had been converted? St. Paul knew that the Gospel is able to sanctify power, law, and wealth, and therefore he strove to convert the great, even as much as he did the humble.

If it is wrong to receive the patronage of States, it is equally wrong to receive the patronage of any person in power. Dissenters should carry out this principle to its legitimate length, and refuse countenance from any who have a tithe of power above their fellow-men. But such conduct would be absurd; and to us it seems equally as absurd to deny to States the right to patronize religion, and to help forward its sacred claims.

But it is urged that no State can favour religion without favouring some one party, to the detriment of another. This is true: but it is no reason why Government should not countenance and promote true religion. No private person can be religious without joining himself to some body of Christians. He must be a Baptist, a Wesleyan, an Independent, &c., &c., if he will be a child of God. And so we infer the State must act. While there are so many parties in the Christian Church, the State selects the one it most approves, using the privilege claimed by every private person: and to our mind we can see nothing objectionable in such a proceeding. It will be observed that we are not defending the Church of England: we are simply arguing for a principle. We hold it right and just that the State should be joined to some Church: and that State patronage, when given to true religion, can never prevent the extension of piety among the people. To us it seems as reasonable to say that medicine, when given by the hand of an unlearned man, cannot do so much good as though it were administered by the hand of a physician. If a State will countenance true religion, religion will prosper just as well as though it were patronized by any one else. We must never lose sight of a principle by letting our minds be blinded by the dust of abuse. We have nothing to do with worldly parsons, Puseyite bishops, or Arminian doctrines. What we contend is, that there can never be any injury wrought to the cause of Christ, when a State allies itself to a Church that holds and preaches the doctrines of Christ.

Before we conclude this paper, we shall offer a remark or two upon W. G.'s most prominent argument. He says that the Church is not a material building, but a spiritual one. Now we grant this: but the Church on earth is obliged to accommodate itself to circumstances. If W. G. means to say that the visible Church contains only true believers, he virtually contradicts the teaching of Jesus; who shows that in the Church militant there will ever be, until the end of the world, hypocrites and false brethren. There can be no polity invented which will keep out such charac-

ters. There is no such thing as a purely spiritual community, or Church, on earth. So then W. G.'s remark comes to nought. But W. G. lays much stress upon the fact, that the primitive Churches had no patronage from the State. Surely he would not have us believe, that because they had no State patronage, it follows that it must now be wrong to receive the countenance of Kings and States! Does he forget that when the Gospel was first promulgated, it had to oppose the established religion of every State under the sun? How then could the primitive Church receive the patronage of any State? To bring forward the condition of the primitive Church as a proof that State patronage is wrong, seems to us absurd. Before we can derive any argument from the conduct of the first Christians in this respect, it must be shown wherein and when they ever refused the countenance of any State. If any nation or government had been persuaded by the apostles to abolish its established religion, and had offered to endow and patronise the Gospel the apostles preached, and had been refused by the apostles, then he would at once admit that the case was settled. But when we remember that until the time of Constantine all States were opposed to the Gospel, whence can we draw the inference that the primitive Christians held it wrong to receive the patronage of those in power? We might go on and show from Scripture, both from the Old Testament and the New, that it is lawful for kings, rulers, and governments, to endow and support the cause of God; but space forbids us. We therefore leave the subject, offering the foregoing remarks in all kindness to the attentive consideration of W. G., and all those who, with him, have jumped to the same ill-considered conclusions.

Gosport. W. T.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

If there is one anomalous feature in the political constitution of Great Britain at the present day, it is that invidious connection we find existing between the Church and the State. Proceeding from what we think erroneous principles, this union seems only tolerated because of its antiquity, and because the national mind is not yet ripe for its dissolution.

Before, however, bringing forward any argument bearing upon this question, I may be allowed shortly to consider the remarks of the affirmative opener of this debate.

The justice of the union of the Church and State is first attempted to be proved, and for this purpose F. B. has wizarded up the long-exploded argument of the continental Absolutists. It is this: that because "the primary condition of Government was paternal," and because in the patriarchal and theocratic states the offices of father of a family, priest, and magistrate, were all conjoined in the first, and the two latter in the second of these states,—it follows that this is an undeniable law of nature, and positive proof of the truth of the hypothesis, "that the administration of spiritual affairs is contingent on temporal government." Now, no one can deny that the patriarchal was the first of social states, and that the theocratic was the next in political order; but few will be prepared to argue from this, that it is only in these two solitary states that political, social, or religious truth is to be found. The theory here brought forward is the same as that of the celebrated Charles Louis d'Haller, who argued (and called it an idea communicated to him from Heaven!) "that the father being the natural ruler of the children, the master stands in the same relation to his slaves, and the prince to his subjects. He says there is no foundation for the notion, that princes were made for their subjects, but both are *correlative*—a very logical deduction, certainly, from the original condition of men! . . . . As if the laws of architecture applied to the erection of the stately cathedral were chimerical, because architecture began with the construction of miserable huts! As if grammatical writing were nonsense, because language began with inarticulate sounds! As if the laws of war, by which its horrors are mitigated, were un-

founded, because war began with common murder!"* And it is difficult to conceive how, from these far-fetched premises, F. B. can prove the *political* far less the *religious* justice of a union of Church and State.

The position of F. B., that "it is incumbent upon a Government to provide for the spiritual welfare of its subjects," I cannot agree with, for how are we to know that the Government is competent to tell what is for the spiritual welfare of its subjects? When I remember that the Liturgy of the Established Church, which was composed by men just merged from Romanism, and obviously worded to meet the views of Protestants and Catholics, has never been altered, it appears to me a plain proof of its incompetency. While there is such a diversity of opinion about the great truths of religion, to say that it is the duty of a Government, composed of persons of all classes and every diversity of opinion, to tell the people what they ought to believe, seems to be an absurdity.

F. B. inquires what would become of the clergy if the Church were separated from the State, and thinks they would be driven to a precarious subsistence on the voluntary principle; but I would ask, Is there not wealth enough among the members of the Establishment to support their own ministers? Does it not number within its pale the great majority of our noble and wealthy families? To say that their ministers would be left to a "precarious subsistence," does not argue much for their religion, but seems to say that it has very little vitality. The voluntary principle is frequently sneered at by many, who seem ignorant, or forgetful, of the number of institutions and places of worship which have been erected, and are sustained, by free-will offerings of the people; and when it is remembered that this has been done chiefly by the poorer classes, we can only come to the conclusion, that this is a mighty principle, and capable of accomplishing vast results. Those who treat it with ridicule should recollect that Dissenters, besides supporting their own denomination, are *compelled* to pay for the maintenance of the Established Church; were they not taxed for this, they would have more to give to their own cause. When F. B. speaks of the results of a separation, and says that the clergy must either starve, or preach those doctrines most acceptable to the ears of their congregations, he seems to forget that the present condition of many of the poor curates (who do most of the work) is little removed from starvation, and that there is much to tempt them to preach "those doctrines most acceptable to their hearers." The curates of many village churches, who know that the living is in the gift of the squire, will generally be found anxious to gain his favour, and not likely to reprove his follies or his sins.

"What," asks F. B., "would be the end of a nation which virtually rejects religion?" He seems to think that God accepts a mere profession, an external form; but Scripture declares that He regards the heart. That religion may be professed by the most wicked and depraved, clearly demonstrates that mere profession can never make a people religious or moral. I believe that if the connection between the Church and State were dissolved, the cause of real religion would be benefited, for the Church would then show that it was not of this world. It would then be shown that Christianity does not depend on the will of any government, that it is not so weak and powerless that it cannot exist but by act of Parliament, but that it is a great and mighty principle. When the twelve poor fishermen went forth to proclaim it to the world, it showed itself in all its grandeur and power; it proved itself superior to the malice of all its enemies, and triumphed over all its foes. Christianity is from God, and does not depend on human power. There is a passage in the speech of the Earl of Chatham, in the House of Lords, May 19, 1772, which I may be allowed to quote here. Replying to one of the Bishops, he said, "There was a college of much greater antiquity, as well as veracity, which he was surprised he never

* "Popular Encyclopædia," Vol. III., p. 97, Art. *Estates*.

heard so much as mentioned by any of his Lordship's fraternity; and that was the college of the poor, humble, despised fishermen, *who pressed hard upon no man's conscience*, yet SUPPORTED THE DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIANITY BOTH BY THEIR LIVES AND CONVERSATIONS, SUPERIOR TO ALL; but, my Lords, probably I may affront your rank or learning by applying to such simple antiquated authorities; for I must confess there is a wide difference between the Bishops of those times and the present."

If the established system be right, it has accomplished scarcely anything commensurate with its opportunities. When we think of the Church, with its two Archbishops, its twenty-six Bishops, and its twenty thousand clergy, what a mighty influence for good might we expect to find exerted upon our people! but, alas! though this vast machinery has existed for centuries, it has done very little for the poor and degraded population of our country: they have been too much left to themselves to die in ignorance and vice, to fill our prisons and penal settlements; and but for the exertions of Dissenters, their condition would have been far worse than it is at present.

The reason that England has not experienced the convulsions which so lately visited the other nations of Europe, is not because she has an Established Church, but because she enjoys more freedom than continental countries, being already in possession of many of those privileges for which they were fighting; and this liberty the Nonconformists of former ages won for her at the price of their blood.

I trust the time is coming when the voices of Englishmen, both in and out of the Establishment, will be heard ascending together, demanding the separation of the Church from the State, and saying, with respect to the State-bound Church, "Loose her, and let her go."

Bristol. R. E. L. Y. T.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

AGREEABLY to the privilege accorded to the openers of a debate, in the *British Controversialist*, of issuing a rejoinder to the objections of their opponents, we now do so, not because the subject has at all lacked able and forcible writers, but rather because we think that a brief article on the question at issue, comprising most of the arguments in its favour, would not be altogether unacceptable to our readers.

Perhaps the simplest way of considering the subject is, by dividing it into two separate heads, viz.:—

I. Ought there to be connected with the State a religious principle, guiding and moderating it? and,

II. Does the constitution of the Established Church best fit her to occupy that position?

The first of these *theses* is undoubtedly the most important, since, when it is proved, the second becomes merely an argument of comparative excellence; there are a few objections of our opponents, with which we will deal afterwards.

I. It is an acknowledged axiom amongst philosophers, that the most effectual way of demonstrating a proposition is, by reducing it, as much as possible, to the abstract—taking sufficient care that we do not, in any way, lose sight of the teaching of truth and experience.

There exists in the mind of man, implanted by an allwise Creator, together with his motive and reasoning powers, a natural perception of right and wrong, a knowledge that deviation from the path of rectitude is productive of evil, and that obedience to its precepts has the contrary effect; thus is always present, though, perhaps, he disregards it, a religious principle, guiding his feet into the paths of virtue, and restraining them from wandering into devious ways. This is doubtless the ἰδεα, or abstract conception of ruling principles; but still we maintain, that there do exist, in close juxtaposition, self-government and a religious influence. To carry out the argument: there is no one who will deny the personality of a nation; and that the duties and responsibilities are equally binding with those of an individual; that it is equally culpable in God's eye when

disregarding his injunctions, and equally liable to punishment with the meanest person upon earth so acting. Why, then, should not the same rule hold good with a nation as does with an individual? We have seen in the one the two rudimentary principles in action—why should they not be fully developed in the other? What is possible, and actually true in the minor, must also hold good in the major. It is only necessary to analyze a cupful of the water of the ocean to tell its constituent parts; we need but prove the duties of an individual to predict those of a nation: the ocean is composed of cupfuls of water, a nation is made up of multitudes of individuals.

We will suppose, for the sake of argument,—though God forbid it should be the case—that there existed a government of Atheists, a Government whose members openly denied the truths of revealed religion, or who at best so perverted them, that it were mockery to call them aught else; what would be the most probable conduct of such a Government? They could not act upon any broad principle of benefiting their fellow-men—at least in the character of Atheists, they acknowledge none; they are only actuated by self-interest,—they draw no motives from religion,—they abhor its precepts. Take now, on the other hand, a nation whose rulers are men of probity and virtue, who show, at least, an outward regard to religion, respect its principles, and uphold it in their decrees: what a contrast do they present to the actors in the other scene! The very ideas of order and irregularity strike one as connected with them respectively. We may see the practical working effect of a case not very far removed from the former of these two, in America, whose Congress upholds the right of man to enslave his fellow-creatures; and another in France, where one of the greatest infidels that ever lived, and whose works are calculated to effect greater ruin than the sword of Alexander, holds a seat amongst the representatives of the people.

We will now turn to the consideration of the second question, viz.

II. Does the constitution of the Established Church best fit her to occupy this position?

This point, though of importance, does not involve nearly so much the interests of a people as the other. There is an old adage, that "Possession is nine points of the law." The Church of England is at present united with the State; we have before shown that some church ought so to be; if she is not fit to occupy that position, what other church is? Her ritual was formed by men whose lives bore witness to the sincerity of their profession. She can rank as her votaries men whose names have gone out into all the world as devoted servants of their God; she can (for those who wish it, not that we think it any great acquisition) prove her title to respect by her direct apostolical succession; she has more missionaries and teachers in the islands of the Gentiles and the dark places of the earth, reclaiming to their forsaken God the recusant children of paganism, than any other religious sect; and her bishops are, for the most part, men of piety and virtue. What sect of Dissenters can advance such claims as these? They may urge her imperfections; many, doubtless, she has. Abuses there are in her, and crying evils, that need the knife to prune them off; but then, what human institution is perfect? Should the experiment of substitution ever be tried, we have not the slightest doubt of its entire failure. Let well alone, and let us remember what was said of the demoniac of Scripture, that the last state of that man was worse than the first; and the predicted punishment of the Laodicean Church, who forsook her first works, and followed not her first love. We would have a word or two with our opponents; they deny the implied contingency of a government to provide for the spiritual welfare of its subjects, as proved from the argument of the primary condition of government, because they say that the primitive states are not the only ones which we are obliged to take as models of our present constitutions. Now we think that we shall be able to show the contrary. The whole superstructure of the Patriarchal form of Government, to which God first gave his manifest approval, is built upon

the foundation of implicit obedience—of obedience exacted by a father from his children, by a master from his servants. This must have been the very first state which existed from the creation of more than one human being. Eve was commanded to obey Adam, and, no doubt, the same precept was instilled into her children. This social constitution was not only indirectly instituted by God, but has received his sanction in the person of Abraham: "For I know Abraham, that he will command his children and his household after him," &c., Gen. xviii. 19. Thus, there cannot be the slightest doubt of the Divine origin of the Patriarchal form of government; and the case of a Theocracy needs no comment. And, although it may not be expedient, and is besides impossible, that either of these constitutions should be re-established in the present age of the world, still all arguments, as to the religious condition of those constitutions, cannot but hold good, as no other forms of government have received God's approval.

Space does not allow us to enter into the details of the question; but there is one subject which seems to require our notice: it is with regard to the profession which a nation makes when allying itself with some established form of religion, provided always that religion possesses the semblance of truth.

There are numerous instances in the Bible of God receiving the profession of persons whose subsequent lives betoken that their repentance was insincere — Jehoahaz, for instance, and Ahab; with regard to the latter of whom God said to Elijah, "Seest thou how Ahab humbleth himself before me? because he humbleth himself before me, I will not bring the evil in his days: but in his son's days will I bring the evil upon his house." Here are proofs of God's respect to profession. Can we doubt that the case of a nation will be otherwise? Of what avail are our national prayers in times of pestilence, famine, or any other calamity, if this fundamental doctrine be destroyed? What, but a solemn mockery? Why did such abundant blessings follow our days of humiliation, except upon such a supposition? We may depend upon it, that although profession does not necessarily imply vital religion, yet without profession there is no blessing.

VINCLUM.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

In combating a principle which has been in operation for ages, and has laid hold of men's minds with the strong force of deep-rooted prejudice, we may expect our positions to be assailed, and any points apparently weak and untenable, stormed. Just so has it been in our case; but with all kindliness of feeling towards W. T., we hasten to meet him in the friendly "tournay," lest he should too soon entertain feelings of self-gratulation and conquest; space will only allow of a few brief thoughts, or willingly would we encounter him in every step and turn of his wandering.

W. T. intimates that if our propositions had been demonstrated in the way he dictates, all would have been right. In justice to ourselves, we must say that the consecutiveness of the reasoning, and the filling up of the outline, was somewhat, but unavoidably, interferred with. One passage of Scripture quoted, and dwelt upon by W. T., may require some explanation. The Church, in many parts of Scripture, when she has tampered with her high position, and made confederacy with the world, is represented as a harlot—(see 57th of Isaiah); and the passage in question may be taken as a warning against the Church bringing herself into guilty association with the world. With reference to W. T.'s most sophisticated conjuring up of a difficulty about our idea of a church, we briefly say, that we understand by the term "Church" either the true universal Church on earth, or a body of men assembling in a certain place, who are members of the Church of that locality by virtue of giving creditable evidence of a regenerate heart. Are all the members of our national Church members by the same kind of evidence? To the readers of these articles we speak "as unto wise men: judge ye what we say." To the

same judgment we leave the contribution of "Saline," whose transparent fallacies and superficial reasoning induce us to pass him by.

We will now come to the question before us, treating it as we had originally intended to have done in a second article, *i.e.*, taking up one aspect of it, confessedly a most important one — the effects of this Union on the spiritual interests of mankind. Here we would acknowledge the fact that, in the pale of the episcopate, our favourite writers of divinity, and some of the best and brightest of sainted men, have lived and died. It is not against episcopacy that we wage war, but against episcopacy as representing a portion of the Church in dangerous and disobedient alliance with the world.

Such a connection creates and multiplies obstructions to the Gospel; one of which is, the Church being in that position in which it receives patronage and favour from the world, the very mention of which suggests a host of things inimical to the cause of Christ. Standing in that relation to the world, the Church must compromise somewhat of her distinctiveness. The laws, which render her special patronage and support, are enacted by the wealthy, and for this they must have some equivalent.

To the lordly aristocrat, and the wealthy commoner, therefore, *the poor man's church* gives the power of choosing ministers; and while her curates are overburdened and ill-paid, the sons of rich and of noble families receive princely incomes, and live in splendour. Worldly, immoral, and even atheistic men, may, by purchase, hereditary right, or official position, become presentees or patrons. W. T. makes much of patronage, but as he understands it, and as the State Church has it, it is ignominy to the Church. What does the Church of Christ want with the patronage and unrighteous favours of the world? If a rich man, a noble, or a ruler, be a Christian, he will consider himself as a steward, and will transact his peculiar duties in the same spirit as the humble Christian, assisting the cause with his purse, looking upon his high position and great influence as requiring him to walk perfectly before men, and making his position and influence subservient to the glory of God. But what sort of men are the patrons of a State Church likely to take by the hand and set over it? Can the patrons made by mere circumstance of family or office, judge of the gifts and graces necessary to fill the pastor's office? But not only here, but in every office in connection with the Church, the avenues are wide through which the worldly may pass; and to the literary, the necessitous, the ambitious, and the indolent, State-Churchism is a temptation and a snare. This is not the misfortune of a good principle abused, but the fault of an evil principle, whose influences do tell most disastrously upon the spiritual condition of the world.

Another evil of the class of equivalents is one partly acknowledged by W. T., viz., that, in return for patronage and pay, the State will expect to take cognizance of the Church, and exercise some sort of control over it. Think of a worldly body exercising authority over a christian Church, and by the willing acquiescence, too, of that Church!

The Union of Church and State obstructs the usefulness of the former, because the Church can do little for Christ and religion, compared with what she otherwise might. Our rulers, if Christians, should in their private capacity bestir themselves, and be anxious for the spiritual welfare of their fellow-men; but to meddle with the subject, in their official and civil capacity, is unjust to others and injurious to religion. The members of Government are such, not on account of their religious qualifications, but because of others, which are supposed to fit them for that position: and until a millennial age, many of them will be destitute of religion. By what reasoning, then, can it be shown that these men ought to co-operate with the Church? Let the Church rest any of its responsibilities upon this mixed body—the State—and what ensues? A loss of practical value and efficiency. Upon the Church as an aggregate, and upon its members as individuals, Christ has devolved the care of the Gospel;

and whilst there is one man in the Government who is not a Christian, he is a living protest against the Union. The responsibility is generalized, nationalized, and destroyed. State-Churchism has a tendency to take away that feeling of individual responsibility which, of all men, Christians ought to have, and which is a stimulus to earnest, energetic, healthy action. In the connection with the State the Church loses its innate vigour, decay is originated, articles of subscription are set at nought, and false doctrines propounded. W. T. says he can point to very many parishes where the Gospel is well known through the instrumentality of State preachers. We could point to many more where the spiritual and mental darkness is almost that of heathendom, and to yet more the condition of which would be similar, but for the exertions of the Voluntaries, whom "Salme" despises.

Again: The Union is inimical to man's best interests, because the Church in that position prevents the activities of Christians unconnected with her. W. T. asks, "Dissenters! does the Union prevent your preaching Christ?" That it does not openly, we reply, is owing to the efforts of Dissenters themselves; theirs has been a hard and long-fought battle, and it is not yet over, nor will not be until this unrighteous Union is dissolved. State-Churchism prevents the conscientious efforts of other religious bodies to the utmost of its power. Think of five-mile and conventicle acts! consider the virulent and determined opposition made to every legislative effort promotive of religious toleration and freedom of opinion; remember the persecutions of those active servants of God, the Lollards, the Quakers, and the Methodists!

Oh, for a graphic and powerful pen vividly to portray all the deadly evils of nominalism, in and out of the Establishment — that nominalism which overspreads this land, and is the direct and genuine result of State-Churchism!

W. T. quarrels with us for noticing the abuses of the Establishment; we notice them because they are the inseparables of this connection, spread over all its history. To think of a State Church without abuses, and abuses of a specific nature, is ultra-Utopian: they are its indigenous fruits; and to prove that these abuses are not mere matters of place, as they are known not to be of time, think of the religious state of the Continent at the present hour. The sectarian jealousy and bitter malice of the Church at Nice; the criminal opposition to light and knowledge in Italy; the mental and social slavery in Portugal; the heretical clergy of orthodox Geneva; and the sluggish, contented condition of State-endowed Protestantism in France! Taking, then, these abuses into consideration, we say that the principle is evil from which they proceed. One or two of the instances I have cited may be, by some, adjudged to the influence of Popery, but State-Churchism is a prominent feature and essential element of Popery. Extinguish the principle of State-Churchism, and he who wears the triple crown, and fills the so-called chair of St. Peter, will soon be hurled from his position, and the doom of Popery irrevocably sealed. Weighty reasons, then, from these different quarters, tell us that, for the sake of man's highest good, this union ought not to be continued. W. G.

History.

DID CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY THE EXECUTION OF KING CHARLES I?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"Charles died a martyr,—not to the Church of England, as it is testified in the Rubric,—not to the people, as it was declared by him on the scaffold,—but to the right and perpetuity of tyrannic power in the kings of England."—*Right Hon. Sir James Mackintosh.*

"The question, then, is this, had Charles I. broken the fundamental laws of England? If there be any truth in any historian of any party, who has related the events of that reign, his conduct from his accession, to the meeting of the Long Parliament had been a continued source of oppression and treachery. * * * Posterity has estimated Charles's character from his death rather than from his life."—*Macaulay's Essays, vol.* 1, *page* 35 *and* 177.

"For those who demand what law could justify the trial of the King, this other question remains to be answered. Was the King any less bound than his subjects to observe the laws solemnly assented to by himself and his predecessors? The King had rejected all government by law, the only means by which irresponsibility could be secured to him, and having striven in vain to trample on all law, its asserters saw no wrong in meting to him the same measure of justice that had been awarded to many of his abettors."—*Daniel Wilson, F.S.A.S.*

MR. EDITOR, Monarchs are subject to, and affected by, the same controlling influence and passions as mankind generally. They likewise inherit the same qualities, whether good or evil, and although they may be called upon to occupy positions, and to discharge duties with which we are unacquainted, still they are in no manner changed in their moral character. It behoves them, therefore, to set examples to their subjects, of which they themselves may not be ashamed, and which, when tested by the standard of truth and morality, may result in satisfactorily proving that they possess a share of those important attributes. Kings, with but few exceptions, have disregarded this rule, and have, as a necessary consequence, committed acts which they would have condemned in others had they stood in different positions, as being unsuited to a reasoning people, and as unworthy of a place in historical record.

These remarks are applicable to the subject before us, as seen in the career of Charles I. They are alike applicable to the historian, as it is on his evidence that the result of this discussion depends. What a melancholy picture is presented to the mind of him who contemplates the scenes between king, parliament, and people! Need I say that there is no period in history which will parallel the one before us. The period from 1625 to 1649 presents a continued series of conflicts, threatenings, imprisonments, civil commotion, &c. The sensitive reader's mind is hurt and distracted with the contests which occurred between despotism and liberty, but the confused and rambling statements which historians have given—the marvellous discrepancies, the falsehoods which they relate, together with the attempts to palm that off for truth which is a fabrication, and to defend those deeds at which an honest man would revolt, are sufficient to make him distrust his own senses.

The foregoing observations apply more particularly to the historian of the period referred to—viz., Hyde, Earl of Clarendon. He was a weak, licentious man, careless about the truth of the statements he recorded respecting the quarrels between King and Parliament. He was placed in a situation which would have been speedily denied him, if he resolved to publish statements condemning the policy of the King, or censuring the illegal measures which he pursued. In his official capacity, he was employed by Charles as a spy, to inform him of the transactions which occurred in parliament—so that as soon as any business had commenced, which had for its object the vindication of the law, the protection of the interests of the people, or the reduction of the power of the Sovereign, it was instantaneously communicated by Hyde to the King, and the latter at once squashed it while only in embryo. This will be seen by Charles's hasty passage to the House on several occasions, either for the purpose of arresting the progress of the Commons, or by granting them something by which their design was to be baffled. To show that no reliance can safely be placed on his history, it only remains to be stated that he accuses Cromwell of being "ridiculous" and "contemptible," because he refused to join in licentious living. Although he pleaded in the strongest terms on behalf of the policy of Charles, and although he endeavoured to transmit a good character of that monarch, yet so disgusted was Charles II. with his character, and moreover with the commission of a deed, which will for ever be ineffaceably imprinted on his memory, that the latter (Charles II.) banished him the realm,

and he died in France (although prohibited from visiting that territory). If such be the character of this historian, how can we expect truth from such a source?* The result of Clarendon's slanders is, that a great proportion of the histories of the present day are copied from his work, with slight alterations, so as to impart to them a show of originality.

The first assertion which I would refute in the article of "Justitia," is that the parliament of Charles I. was niggardly in its supplies. If "Justitia" had had the candour to relate the whole story, he would have discovered that the money which the Commons voted to the King was spent in a manner quite different from that for which it was voted. One instance will give an idea of the frauds he practised. I refer to the French Squadron. Sir J. Mackintosh says, "During the late reign (James's) an arrangement had been entered into for the hire of English vessels by the King of France, to be employed against *Genoa*, the common enemy of France and England. Charles, however, ordered the ships to proceed against Rochelle, where the Huguenots or French Protestants resided. The sailors, on discovering the imposture, refused to proceed, and stated that they would rather return home to be hanged for disobedience, than fight against the Protestants. The address, in which the remonstrance was contained, was placed between the leaves of Charles's Bible, so as to catch his eye. The defence he made was that he contemplated the employment of the English ships according to their original destination,—against Genoa. There is no instance in which his falsehood is more manifest than in this. After the design upon Rochelle became manifest and avowed, he sent Pennington his orders to place the squadron at the disposal of the French, and, if necessary, compel the obedience of the crew by extreme means—"even to sinking." What can "Justitia" plead in answer to this grave charge? But how were the numberless grievances which the people suffered to be redressed? After such gross invasions of their rights as those mentioned in my former paper, and repeated infringements of the law, by what bond of fidelity could Charles be controlled? Will "Justitia" answer the question? Another example of his treachery was shown by his violation of the Petition of Rights. That law he had promised to observe, and in return he obtained from parliament their thanks and a subsidy. He kept the subsidy, but broke the promise, and the parliament was thus left without any security from the King. Finding that the various illegal means which he employed to fill his coffers did not succeed, he had the hardihood and the effrontery to assure them that he only convened them in order to allow them an opportunity to grant him money, and that he should allow no business to proceed—would receive no addresses—hear no complaints—redress no grievances, until they met his wishes. When these were satisfied, he treated them, as before, with the utmost scorn, and associated uncivil and unbecoming terms with the names of the popular leaders. Such conduct justly deserved the contempt of the Commons, and the latter acted in a proper manner in not yielding to the King's demands when a deaf ear was turned to their appeals, advice, and legislatorial transactions. If "Justitia" had made himself acquainted with the quarrels which ensued between the King and Parliament, he would not have been surprised that they were "niggardly."

The next accusation made by "Justitia" is, "That the Parliament constituted itself Charles's judge, and raised armies to battle against him." This is a monstrous perversion of the truth. If "Justitia" means that the Parliament was the first to appeal to arms, I deny it. I say this distinctly, though respectfully. On perusing the assertion a second time, I could not but think that there was a mistake on the side of the printer, or that "Justitia" had reversed the true order of the words. Had the sentence been, "Charles called another parliament, of which he constituted *himself* the judge,

* The extracts given in this paper are collected from unimpeachable sources, viz., "The King's Cabinet Opened," and the Archives of London, Oxford, Edinburgh, &c.

and *he* raised *armies* to battle against it," he would have been decidedly right. Let us suppose that the sentence is true; still "Justitia" has, by this single avowal, given indisputable evidence that he knows little about the subject. Any one acquainted with the facts will know that if the assertion be true, the words should be reversed, viz., "They raised armies to battle against him, and then constituted themselves his judges." According to my friend's theory, "They *first* judged him, *then* battled against him." The injunction, "Catch the bear before you sell his skin," has been evidently set at nought by "Justitia." Is it not much more probable that the Parliament, having secured Charles, would then bring him to judgment? This appears to be the only sensible course, and the one which the Parliament adopted.

But I repudiate the allegation that the Parliament battled against Charles before that monarch had set the example. Has "Justitia" forgotten the unwarrantable act which Charles committed when he endeavoured (with the assistance of 500 armed soldiers) to seize the persons of the five Members of the House of Commons? The Parliament, conscious that right and justice were enlisted on its side, refrained from retaliating. Even though invaded by the soldiery, headed by the King, the Commons remained peaceable. What have those pedantic historians to say to this conciliatory, but wise and judicious step of the Commons? What can they plead for the King, and what for themselves—when they are anxious to defend a rebellious monarch, and to calumniate, slander, and vilify an intelligent and honest body of representatives, who, conscious of their ability to govern, legislated nobly and fearlessly, unmindful of the threats of the King, or the terror of his courtiers? The second time that Charles raised the standard of war was at Nottingham, and it was there that he appealed to the demagogue to come forward and to espouse the unrighteous cause of destroying a nation's liberties. Then it was, and not till then, that the Parliament, followed by the people of England, took up arms in self defence, to protect their rights and liberty.

"Justitia" refers to the four propositions rejected by the King. I will give them, in order that my readers may see if there was anything in them unworthy of the acceptance of King Charles. They are as honourable in their provision as they are to the party from whom they emanated. The proposals were—1. That a bill should pass for settling the militia of the Kingdom. 2. That all oaths and declarations made against the Parliament and its adherents should be rescinded. 3. That the Lords made by the *counterfeit* Great Seal at Oxford (the Parliament which existed while one sat at Westminster) should not be eligible to sit in the House of Peers thereby. 4. That the two Houses may have power to adjourn as they may think fit.—Is there anything in the foregoing which the most sensitive king could reject with any show of reason? Charles would accept nothing which did not restore to him his ill-begotten power, his arrogant demands, and the boasted rights, honours, and dignity of the crown. "I can turn the scales which way I please," was his rejoinder, when the propositions were presented to him. Ashburton, one of his chief favorites, replied, "A crown so near lost was never recovered on easier terms." The answer of Charles was characteristic of the man. The same haughty, proud, and imperious spirit ever dominant in his heart was not disturbed by his fallen situation, and he possessed, unchanged, the high opinion of his judgment which he had received in his education. His fallen state affected him but little, and he imagined that, although in the hands of the Parliament, his position was unaffected, and that nothing connected with the affairs of Government could be transacted unless "his sovereign will and pleasure" were first ascertained.

In justice to the Members of Parliament, whom "Justitia" has impeached, I will quote one authority to prove that they were well fitted for the important duties they were called upon to discharge. It is as follows:—"But a cause more powerful than all these—a principle of higher order animated the Commons of England in the first Parliament of

Charles I. * * Public opinion was represented in the House of Commons by men whose public virtue and political genius would have qualified them to figure in the proudest senate of antiquity;—that noble growth of public men which was perpetuated in full vigour from the accession of Charles I. to the Restoration, and degenerated thenceforward to the Revolution, when it became extinct. From the glory of their virtues, their talents, and their achievements, proceeds whatever of light and interest may be found in the succeeding pages. It may be proper to name a few of the leading patriots in the three short Parliaments, so abruptly and fatally dissolved by Charles in the first four years of his reign. Among them were, Sir John Elliott, Sir Edward Sandyor, Sir Dudley Digges, Sir Francis Seymour, Sir Robert Phillips, Sir Robert Collon, Seldon, Pym. * * These men, thus eminently endowed with the qualities of statesmanship, were further animated by zeal for the Protestant religion. * * * They formed themselves into a compact for defining and fixing the uncertain limits of the prerogative, and guaranteeing by clear and strict legislature the precarious liberties of the people." The preceding acts of which Charles was the author admit of no doubt that he was guilty of High Treason. It is a difficult task to discover in what relation the King stood with regard to law and justice, the parliament and the people. Charles virtually destroyed the Constitution, set Magna Charta at defiance. and attempted to subvert the Rights of Englishmen. That there was *no* law by which he could be tried for these henious crimes *cannot* be *denied*. So far I coincide with "Justitia," but no further. He denies that Charles's crimes merited that punishment; I, on the contrary, assert that the punishment by no means exceeded the offence. At the same time it must be admitted that no just and tangible cause can be shown why there should not be a law to meet particular and isolated cases, like the one before us. I repeat it,—Charles was guilty of High Treason; *this* the statute book *admits*, and *this* "Justitia" cannot deny. High Treason is defined to be "an offence committed against the *dignity* and *majesty* of the *Commonwealth*." The enormities I have related with reference to Charles prove that there never was a king or queen of England who committed more flagrant and diabolical acts than those referred to. There was no prime minister after the death of Strafford. Charles assumed that position, and consequently made himself responsible for all misdeeds. He incurred, by so doing, the same risk of punishment as if he had acted under the advice of another.

A brief summary of what has been advanced will not be unimportant. I have endeavoured to show that Charles, from the commencement of his reign, endeavoured, by policy or by force, to establish an absolute and despotic sovereignty, in lieu of a free and limited government. He essayed to sweep away all vestiges of governing by law, and to destroy those enactments which secured to the people the right of nominating members to represent them in Parliament. He next laboured to deprive the House of Commons of those privileges which they possessed, and attempted to influence their debates either by his own speeches to them, or by deputy, both of which were unlawful. He then determined to order the levy of unjust taxes. Finding by experience that the Commons were not to be duped by his promises, intimidated by his threats, or governed by his dictates, he dissolved them, and even while they sat he registered in the council book "that he did not acknowledge their jurisdiction." Reigning without Parliament, not being so successful in raising supplies as he desired, he convened other parliaments, and candidly assured them "that he had assembled them together to give them an opportunity to give him supplies, and that no business would be allowed to proceed till the aforesaid subsidies were given." Finding that the popular members were honourable, straightforward, and independent men, he endeavoured to seize their persons by *force of arms* (thus giving the first signal for war), and took their documents, goods, and chattels. The Parliament still continuing as

obstinate as usual to his demands, he counterfeited another Great Seal, convened another Parliament (while the other remained at Westminster, transacting business), created a number of *pseudo* peers, and, in return for their advice, branded them with harsh, mean, and reproachful epithets. Thus guilty of holding an opposition Parliament, and becoming cognizant of the fact that he could not succeed in obtaining the gratification of his ambition, and also that the people were almost on the point of revolting against him, he sounded the tocsin of war for the second time, and after a series of battles he was reduced, and refusing to accede to the most favorable propositions, which his own friends considered as magnanimous offers on the side of Parliament, he was tried as a traitor to the laws and constitution of England, condemned, and executed on the 30th Jan., 1649. It is worthy of remark that a lineal descendant of Charles I., a peer, declared in the House of Lords, that he would never attend church on the 30th January, because he thought that his ancestor had suffered justly.* Immediately on the rejection of the propositions, the Lords and Commons, by *unanimous* resolution, voted "that they would make no more addresses or applications to the King; that no person whatsoever should make address or application to him; that whosoever should break this order should incur the penalty of High Treason; that they would receive no more addresses from the King; and that no person should presume to bring any to either House, or any other person." The Lords (January 8th) resolved "that whatsoever King of Engshall hereafter levy war against the Parliament and people of England, shall be guilty of High Treason, to be tried in Parliament." (*Parl. Hist.*, 18*th vol.*, *p.* 501.) The House of Commons resolved also, "that the vote of June 30th, 1648 (which concurred with the Lords, that the vote of January 3rd, 1647, forbidding that all addresses to or from the King be taken off), was highly dishonorable to the proceedings of Parliament and destructive to the good of the kingdom." The Lords voted on the same day "to make no more addresses to the King, and that the revocation of the votes about non-addresses, and that the vote of July 28, 1648, for a treaty with the King, were highly dishonourable, and destructive to the good of the nation." According to these votes, how could they justly regard him but as a criminal, liable to punishment, or at least as a prisoner of war, surrendered at discretion, and thus holding his life at the mere pleasure of the victors?

To maintain, therefore, that because there was no law applicable to the King, he should be unpunished, is to maintain that monarchy should ride rampant and rough-shod, unpunished, unmolested, and uncontrolled, over a progressive people. The cause of humanity denies that this should be the case, civilization revolts at it, and liberty, the birth-right of Britons, would never more be seen were this to be the order of the day. While, therefore, I contend that the punishment which Charles suffered was just, I hold that life is sacred, and that it is not the jurisdiction of man to take that which he cannot give. The sentence which was carried into effect upon Charles, I uphold only so far as this, that it was justified by the deeds which he committed. I believe that it was expedient to take his life, for, had he been exiled, he would not have failed to obtain all the aid possible to recover his lost possessions. Bloodshed would have followed; a second and a fiercer revolution would have been the result; famine, destruction, poverty, and death, would have completed the scene by the irrevocable destruction of England. Taking these premises into consideration, I believe that the policy pursued by the Parliament (although necessarily harassing and disagreeable) was the most suitable for the emergency, and that it was calculated to avert those evils to which I have just referred.

I have now discharged an unpleasant duty,—that of laying before my readers an epitome of the life and career of King Charles the First. I have not shrunk from exposing his misdeeds, nor the motives which prompted him to commit

* Burton's Cromwellian Diary, vol. I.

them. I am aware that many of his acts may be attributed to his nature, education, and the peculiar character of the times in which he lived. While some extenuation is made for Charles, let us not grudge it to those to whom he was opposed, for they too were influenced by the same controlling power. Doubtless there were faults on both sides, grave and serious ones. Let us hope that neither party was so culpable as has been represented. A rigid inquiry into history, and a strict investigation into documentary evidence, will alone determine which party was the most reprehensible. Truth *will* develop itself, and expose falsehood, for TRUTH, and not VICTORY, is the aim of the historian, and TRUTH is the daughter of TIME.

J. G. R.

Cheetham, Manchester.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THAT size is not an infallible indication of power, will be admitted by all our readers; and if they would see a striking illustration of it, we would refer them to the two Historical papers in the last number of this magazine, where J. G. R. occupies four and a-half pages in proving just nothing; and "Justitia," in less than two pages, establishes several propositions which we apprehend our *Cheat 'um* friend will find it difficult to overthrow. It should be distinctly understood, that the subject of debate is not whether Charles I. was a wise or foolish king—a good or bad man; but whether circumstances justified his execution. None, we apprehend, will attempt to justify every step which he took; and few, perhaps, will admire the course that he adopted; and yet many will deprecate the end which he suffered. He might entertain monstrous ideas about "divine right;" but these had been instilled into his mind by others, and were generally prevalent in that age. He might be led, as he thought, in self-defence, to commit acts contrary to the laws and constitution of these realms; but then he had been taught that "a king can do no wrong," and this he firmly believed. Nor was this belief confined to himself: it had long been held by the common people, and was only now beginning to give way; and who wonders to find that its stronghold in the king's heart remained unshaken? especially when we remember that that king was the only son of the pedantic James I., and proved himself "a worthy son of an *un*worthy sire."

It is singular that, although J. G. R. is fond of narrating some of the circumstances which preceded the execution of Charles I., he does not attempt to estimate their natural effect upon the character and morals of the king. He appears to forget that Charles succeeded to a crown whose prerogatives had been largely asserted, and seldom disputed; to a scanty revenue, and to a popular but expensive war, in no way honourable to the nation, in its cause or conduct. The history of his reign is that of a series of errors and faults on all sides, so that an impartial spectator would have been perplexed to decide whether the king and his ministers, or the parliament and the army, were the most reprehensible, or which party had given the greatest provocation, and thereby afforded most excuse for the conduct of the other.

It should be borne in mind, that though the system of Charles's administration was arbitrary, the revenue which he raised by extraordinary means was not greater than what would have been readily granted him in the ordinary course of government: it was not squandered away, but applied in a manner suitable to the interests and honour of the kingdom, which, for twelve years, in the words of Lord Clarendon, "enjoyed the greatest calm, and the fullest measure of felicity that any people, in any age, for so long time together, have been blessed with, to the wonder and envy of all the other parts of Christendom."

That Charles was influenced by a sincere though mistaken conviction of the rectitude of his course, appears evident from many documents which he left behind him. And perhaps we may be permitted to quote from one of his letters, as so much has been made, in late years,

of the letters of his great antagonist, Cromwell. In writing to Prince Rupert, during the progress of the civil war, he says: "I cannot flatter myself with expectations of good success more than this, *to end my days with honour and a good conscience;* which obliges me to continue my endeavours, as not despairing that God may, in due time, avenge his own cause. Though I must avow to all my friends, that he that will stay with me at this time must expect, and resolve either to die for a good cause, or, which is worse, to live as miserable in the maintaining it as the violence of insulting rebels can make him."

Surely they who are so loud in the condemnation of the king ought not to pass in silence the conduct of the parliament: for they adopted towards him a course of conduct similar to the one he unfortunately pursued towards them. "One of the most unpopular acts of the king had been the levying of ship-money without the consent of parliament,—an impost then only of doubtful legality, yet equally levied, excellently applied, and so light in itself that the payment which Hampden honourably disputed was only *twenty shillings upon an estate of* £500 *a year.* The parliament did not scruple, without consent of the king, to demand the twentieth part of every man's property in London, or so much as their seditious mayor, and three other persons, as seditious as himself, might be pleased to call a twentieth part, to be levied by distress if the parties refused payment: and if the distress did not cover the assessment, then the defaulter was to be imprisoned where and so long as a committee of the House of Commons should think proper; and his family was no longer to remain in London, or the suburbs, or the adjoining counties. With an impudence of slander which would be incredible if anything which would serve their purpose were too bad to be believed of thoroughly factious men, they accused the king of exciting the massacre in Ireland, and fomenting the rebellion there; and they themselves employed the money and the means which were prepared for quelling the rebellion in carrying on a war against the king at home."*

If, then, these things were so, may we not presume that those who defend the execution of Charles I. would also have defended the execution of the parliamentary leaders, had that taken place? We do them the honour to believe that they are the friends of *equal* justice, and that they would not tolerate crimes in subjects which they would condemn in kings. But if they shrink from a conclusion to which their own opinions lead them, they ought to abandon those opinions as erroneous, and seek others more consonant with truth and righteousness: and such, we venture to affirm, are contained in the paper of "Justitia." His two simple, but incontrovertible, propositions, viz., that the execution was—1st, Contrary to the laws, and 2nd, Unsanctioned by the people—must, in our humble judgment, for ever settle the question; and we rejoice that they settle it in favour of humanity and the sacredness of human life.

L. G. G.

* "Quarterly Review," vol. xxv., p. 296.

Politics.

IS UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE JUST OR DESIRABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

In concluding the debate on Universal Suffrage, we shall principally direct our observation to two articles which have appeared in its condemnation. We refer to those signed W. T. and S. A. J.

We shall pass over the first of these with little notice. The writer has been summarily, but properly dealt with by S. H. W. If we had written the first reply to W. T.'s article, we should have

felt bound to have administered a sound reproof for his really unjust remarks upon those who differ from him. We hope our friend *now* sees that there was an impropriety in denouncing the advocates of Universal Suffrage, *en masse*, as "political quacks." S. A. J. is above this injustice, and his article is one of considerable ability. We hope, however, to succeed in satisfactorily answering it.

W. T.'s first statement, that Universal Suffrage promises more than it can perform, has been shown to be a misrepresentation. Its rational upholders are not responsible for the indiscretions of zealots. Supposing that we were wrong in our belief that its adoption would be an advantage to the nation, our main reason for urging its claims would still remain: viz., the *right* of the people to its exercise, which no anticipated result can invalidate.

The objection of "physical impossibility" has been justly termed by S. H. W. "simply ridiculous." But he allows W. T. an excuse in the term *Universal* Suffrage. We do not, however, see why he should. There can be no mistaking of the term; everybody knows its accepted meaning, that it is a Suffrage *within* the bounds of possibility, and not without. It might, perhaps, be more accurately represented as manhood Suffrage, but there certainly is not in the other phrase any just foundation for W. T.'s objection. We might ask W. T. what common sense objection could be offered to the sun being called a Universal light, though from "physical impossibility" it cannot shine throughout the year in Greenland; or if he would deny the universality of the principle of gravitation, because so long as an apple hangs on a tree there is a "physical impossibility" to prevent it from falling? We are to have, next year, a "Great Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations." No, says W. T., it is a "physical impossibility," because *all* nations cannot unite in the undertaking.

To what S. H. W. has written in reply to the next objection, that "Universal Suffrage would be a curse instead of a blessing," we would add the following piece of advice to our friend. Whenever you have a charitable feeling to gratify, be quite sure you choose for its exercise a proper sphere. If, for instance, you would charitably withhold men's rights, as you would liberty from the maniac—your complimentary analogy—do not use your virtue promiscuously, but select suitable objects. Now, if instead of the unenfranchised of Britain, you had chosen the spendthrift, and withheld from him his due because he would be *sure* to abuse it, there would have been no danger of your charity being misdirected. But, of course, you shrink from this, your good sense revolts at it as an unwarrantable proceeding; how much more should you hesitate to withhold the rights of the unenfranchised, in whose case there is *much uncertainty* as to the need of your benevolent principle! Do you doubt the *uncertainty?* Then seek acquaintance with them. They are not men of confusion and blood. There is amongst them that which you have not given them credit for; and if you will investigate, with unprejudiced mind, we believe you will find them to be, as a body, quite as worthy of the franchise as the present constituency.

But we must pass to the article of S. A. J., which is an examination of the arguments in favour of Universal Suffrage, reduced to three propositions.

He remarks upon the first of these, which claims for those who render obedience to law, and contribute to the support of Government, the Suffrage as an "indefeasible right," "that there is no principle of justice upon which we can exclude females, infants, and felons; that all that can be said by the friends of Universal Suffrage, for the exclusion of these classes, is, either that they are incapable of properly exercising the right of voting, or that, by a violation of the present laws, they have forfeited all claim to assist in making others." Now, with respect to females, we are quite sure that the friends of Universal Suffrage would say neither the one thing nor the other. We think with S. A. J. that "many women are more fit to exercise the franchise than their husbands;" and we would not sully the fair reputation of our countrywomen by charging them with crime. Then

why not admit them to the Suffrage? we shall be asked. We respond, Why not? Is there a "principle of justice" upon which they can be excluded? It is by no means our present business to show that there *is not*, we merely ask if there *is*. We may smile at the idea of woman taking a part in politics, but more visionary ideas have become sober realities. It is, perhaps, a problem to be solved by a future generation, how far she has attained her true position. Before, however, we demand for her political rights, we may allow her to *prefer her claim* to them. When she does, she will probably succeed. Then, as to infants, by which term we understand those whom the law regards as not of age. These have violated no law to incur forfeiture, why then would we exclude them? It must be, as S. A. J. says, because "they are incapable properly of exercising the right of voting." The Suffrage, the liberty of choosing, pre-supposes the existence of the ability to choose; in other words, a mature and sound judgment is essential to the proper exercise of the franchise. This is the possession alone of manhood. Years must have given experience, experience wisdom. Common consent has decided that *the man* commences at a certain period—law has added its sanction. Presuming that this decision is not far from right, we adopt it in our practice. If, however, maturity of judgment be attained before that period, in the general, or if the diversity of human powers be such that no arbitrary rule can be strictly just, call for an alteration in the law, and we will cheerfully submit to a more truthful arrangement. *We* make no arbitrary distinctions, but we ask that *every man* shall be enfranchised who breaks not the laws.

Next come those who break the laws. Upon what principle of justice can you exclude them, asks S. A. J., if the Suffrage be an indefeasible right? With a slight substitution of words, our friend's remark would read thus: "We cannot see, if men have an indefeasible right to freedom, upon what principle of justice you can exclude the felon from sharing it." We would not make S. A. J. say this, because its palpable foolishness would be unjust to his intelligence; but it is not so to his reasoning; for, be it remembered, a man would hold his liberty and his franchise, as rights, on the same tenure. If he assists in making laws, he binds himself to obedience, or the consequences of disobedience; if, therefore, he break the law, he, by his own act, incurs its penalties, and makes it imperative on his fellow-men to enforce them. Under the system of Universal Suffrage, the felon would be the subject of a law which *he himself had made*, and the same justice that demanded the forfeiture of his freedom would require also that of his franchise.

Upon the reasons which S. A. J. gives for preferring the property qualification, which he allows is "very imperfect," we would just remark that it is far from being a general truth that the possessor of property has "a larger stake in the prosperity of his country" than those who own none of the soil. The professional man, for instance, without property, has more at stake than the mere forty shilling freeholder. Nor is it always the case that the possessor of property "has more time to give to public matters" than he who lives by his profession or labour; less frequent is it that "he has education to judge wisely;" and as regards his being "exempted from undue influences," if his property render him independent, it exposes him, on the other hand, to the *worst possible influence*—that of his own selfishness—and in proportion to the extent of his preponderating interest in the country, is the danger of abuse.

The second proposition, that "laws made by the majority would tend to the welfare of the majority," S. A. J. considers questionable, for several reasons. "The majority are ignorant—one-third of the people cannot read or write,"—and he is appalled at the thought of legislation being entrusted to the "wild and reckless passions" of these unlearned beings. We cannot see the connection between inability to read and write, and wild and reckless passions. Is the schoolmaster the sole progenitor of the mild and gentle in demeanour? Is man born to be the victim of destructive passions,

and are the only antidotes reading and writing? We regard *this* as very "questionable." It is true, "wild and reckless passions" manifest themselves among mankind, but they are confined to no class, and are not so much the consequences of an *untaught head*, as of an *unrestrained heart*. Nor is the ignorant man alone the "pliant tool." The *pliancy of principle* of his educated neighbour is far more dangerous than the pliancy of ignorance. But it seems that "if the masses were better educated," they have not "sufficient leisure to allow attention to politics." The masses themselves are the best judges of this. It is very certain they do take an interest in politics, that they think seriously, and, for the most part, correctly, upon them, and that they demand the franchise to give effect to their thoughts; and why tell them they possess not sufficient leisure?

That laws made by the majority would tend more to the welfare of a whole people than laws made by a minority, is no guestion with us. A section will always legislate for a section—*meum* first, *tuum* second—both in the senate and the shop. Who but a few would have devised a system of taxation which presses most heavily on those least able to bear it? Who but a few would have surrounded loyalty with useless pageantry, lucrative sinecures, and pensioned favourites, which, while they endanger the ruler, impoverish the ruled? Now, we do not believe in the perfectibility of government any more than in that of human nature which directs it, but we cannot, looking at existing evils, think that the Government is incapable of improvement. How, then, is it to be improved? Leave the matter with the few, and they will do as they have hitherto done. Reform will follow only from enlarged infusion of the popular element. Impartial legislation, which can alone tend to the welfare of a community, must be sought for from a representation embracing the *greatest possible* number of interests.

S. A. J. is obscure on his third point, but we take his meaning to be, that Universal Suffrage, instead of diminishing the risk of disaffection and civil commotion, by giving to every man a share in legislation, and thereby leaving him no cause of complaint, would rather augment the danger; that it would serve as a facile instrument of agitation in the hands of designing men, for the acquirement of "power, applause," &c., &c.; and that a "discontented, credulous, and ignorant people," would be found too ready to assist in schemes of strife and bloodshed. In support of this and previous objections, S. A. J. cites examples from history, which he states he might "multiply *ad infinitum*;" how easy it were to adduce facts in conformation of an opposite doctrine: viz., how that civil wars have had their origin in kingly quarrels, and in the vile attempts of a tithe of mankind to keep the rest in bondage; and how that discontent has prevailed as a natural consequence of *exclusion from* the constitution! But we do not see the bearings of our friend's "facts" upon the question of Universal Suffrage; they have certainly none upon the Suffrage he confines himself to, *i. e.*, an *English* Suffrage. He would "reason from analogy;" but he must see that there is not the slightest analogy between Greece or Rome—divided into factions, sunken in sensuality—and England of the present day; and that from calamities which overtook those nations no argument can be drawn against the results of a broadened legislation in this nation. The same applies to the case of France. If the present condition of this country bore any resemblance to that of France at the period referred to; if it had as corrupt a court, as oppressed a people; if justice were as much perverted, religion as much dishonoured, infidelity as widely spread; *and if, by some inconceivable transmutation, all these evils could become Universal Suffrage*, then might we reasonably fear to enact it: but since they cannot, since Universal Suffrage is not chargeable with the crimes thus produced, and since they have no parallels in the state of this country, let us not be scared by groundless apprehensions. What is S. A. J.'s doctrine? That expansion of the constitution is danger. Then contraction is safe—abso-

lutism the acme of safety. If he object to the extreme, where will he fix the point of safety? At the present limit? The entire nation repudiates it, and the Legislature will shortly demonstrate, by enlargement, that its continuance would be dangerous. But enlargement is danger. Then it seems we are between two dangers; and as we must encounter one, let it be that on the side of justice.

One correspondent, G. B., recommends a franchise based on the "intellectual qualifications of men." It sounds well, and, for the election of a college master, would exactly suit; but for the election of a representative of the multifarious concerns of an empire, the qualification founded merely on a "teacher's certificate," which is what G. B. contends for as a "principle," is utterly inapplicable. It would at once disqualify every honest yeoman unlearned in syntax, however great might be the amount of his general knowledge and apprehension of men and things.

We have been interested in the discussion of this question, and during its progress have had many new thoughts suggested to our mind; but we have met with no arguments to alter our judgment, and we arrive at the conclusion with the conviction with which we started confirmed—that Universal Suffrage *is* both just and desirable. B. W. P.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

It is with feelings of pleasure I again take the pen to record my sentiments upon the subject now before us. I am somewhat sorry that our friend S. H. W. has charged me with a want of that proper spirit which has characterised the writers who have displayed their powers in this most useful and admirable journal. But I can only say that if I have transgressed, I do beg the reader's pardon. I was battling with opinions, not with men, and, therefore, nothing personal was intended. But, while the spirit of my remarks may be thought a fit subject for animadversion, I cannot allow the force of my conclusions to be carried away by the flood of declamation poured upon them by S. H. W. He says that I adduced no arguments, but only an array of objections. Be it so. But an objection often carries with it far more power than the clearest argument. The reader will see by the paper contributed by my worthy opponent, so thickly studded as it is with "W. T.," that he found quite enough in my objections to occupy all the force of his ingenuity to gainsay. But I cannot allow this discussion to close, without drawing attention to the somewhat singular admission made by a friend of Universal Suffrage. I attacked the system upon its own merits, and, strange to say, S. H. W. cries out, "Hold! we do not wish for Universal Suffrage: What we mean by the term is, a Suffrage for Manhood." So then we have discovered that those who talk of Universal Suffrage have admitted that they use a term which does not express their meaning. They do not want Universal Suffrage, but the Suffrage for Manhood! Let us stop, and inquire whether such a thing would be more just than Universal Suffrage. Is it not perfectly obvious, that some who have attained the age of manhood are less capable of exercising rightly the franchise than those who have not attained their majority? What reason can S. H. W. adduce why men should universally vote, while the privilege is denied to women? I have been accused of entertaining too low an estimate of my countrymen. I do not know whether my estimate be too low; but S. H. W. can, if he will, soon perceive that a very great mass of Englishmen are totally unfit to think for themselves upon many questions most important for the welfare of this realm.

S. H. W. thinks that I made a mistake in adducing France as an argument against Universal Suffrage. Now, with all due deference to what he says upon that point, I maintain that the present condition of France is an unmistakable proof that it is both unjust and unwise to make every man a voter. Why is the right taken away from so many of the voters in France? Strange to say, our opponent wishes to make it appear, that because the Assembly of France has curtailed the Suffrage, therefore Universal

Suffrage is not destructive! But, surely, our friend has lost sight of the all-important truth, that France rejected Universal Suffrage, because she saw it was a volcano which was constantly throwing the scum and dregs of society to the highest stations in the land. France saw that there could be no peace for her people, nor stability in her laws and institutions, so long as the worthless and the ignorant were privileged to vote. Where, then, is the force of our opponent's argument, in saying that Universal Suffrage, as it was in France, is a proof that the masses are fit to be entrusted with the franchise? Our first paper is before the reader, and so is S. W. H.'s refutation. We are content to leave them to fight their own battle, and shall briefly advert to the masterly articles written upon the subject by Eilo. We cannot help thinking what a pity it is that so much power should be expended in such a wrong direction. Not one of his conclusions, elaborate though they be, are founded upon truth. He has written much to prove what was well known before, viz., that all flesh is one: but the conclusion drawn from that fact is to our mind quite erroneous. If the mere fact of being a man entitles me to a vote, then am I equally entitled to everything else enjoyed by any of my fellowmen. I repeat, that if I am entitled to the franchise just because I am a man, then who can deny, by the same process of reasoning, that I am entitled to an equal portion of the wealth enjoyed by my richer neighbour?

It has been said by Eilo, that every man ought to have a voice in the framing of the laws which govern him. Such a conclusion is very high-sounding, and apparently liberal; but look at the sense of it. If I am entitled to have a voice in making all the laws which govern me, and if I cannot rightly be called upon to pay any tax which I have not helped to impose, then it follows that all the laws which were enacted before my birth are not morally binding upon my conscience. Carry out the doctrine to its legitimate length and it immediately becomes necessary that there should be a fresh code of laws for every new generation—for why, let me ask Eilo, should this generation be called upon to obey the laws which were made by their forefathers?

Those who argue for Universal Suffrage speak and write as though there were a law which made it impossible for many Englishmen to obtain a vote. The truth is just the contrary. The law says, "Do this, and you may enjoy the franchise." What that is, and how it may be accomplished, both in counties and boroughs, the hard-working Reformers of our day have ably demonstrated. It is quite certain that a test is administered, and a test there always should be. I am not contending that the present test is the best that could be devised, but most certainly it excludes far more of the unworthy than the test of manhood possibly could do.

Eilo has told us, that if we had Universal Suffrage, we should soon have the people better taught. Where he obtained that information, I am at a loss to conceive. History gives him no encouragement to make such a declaration. Some of the Republics of Greece had Universal Suffrage; but were all the people well taught? Did not designing demagogues often so act upon the popular mind, that the very best Grecians were driven from their country by the votes of the people? Who does not know that the "immortal Socrates," as he is styled, was sentenced to death by an ignorant and fanatical rabble? Why, then, does Eilo jump to the absurd conclusion, that Universal Suffrage must lead to universal intelligence? Does it not commend itself to the mind as the very height of folly, to give a man a privilege and afterwards teach him how to use it? Men do not generally act so inconsistently. If a merchant wants a clerk, he does not take a man ignorant of accounts, and place him at the desk to learn all that is needful to qualify him for his duties. Such a proceeding would be madness. And yet Eilo would fain persuade us that men may be law makers, and get the knowledge necessary to guide them after they have received the privilege! We cannot see the profundity of such reasoning: it appears to our mind the very height of absurdity.

Eilo may not be a visionary, but we must protest against the visionary hopes he entertains of Universal Suffrage. He tells us that Universal Suffrage would cause "such a purification of the lowest dregs of society as would soon advance the triumphs of virtue, impart on every hand the blessings of knowledge, and bestow a scarce-hoped-for happiness upon the suffering millions of our country." If such could be accomplished by Universal Suffrage, a partial Suffrage must produce a part of these results: but, unfortunately for Eilo's cause, we can point to thousands of electors who have long enjoyed the franchise, but who are now ignorant, besotted, and cruel. If, then, a partial Suffrage is powerless to reform those who enjoy it, where does Eilo derive his proof, that Universal Suffrage would accomplish such great results? We must protest against such "*ad captandum*" assertions. Sober reason refuses, while the facts of history and the light of experience are before her, to receive for truth such conceptions of a kind but enthusiastic mind. If space permittted, we might adduce an army of stubborn facts, proving that, to extend the franchise before men are qualified to use it, is a suicidal action. The last revolutionary hurricane which swept over the Continent has shown what bloody deeds follow upon the track of the franchise, when entrusted to an ignorant and besotted rabble. Large towns in a state of siege, a popular Assembly attacked by a ferocious mob, and streets running red with the blood of the slain—all have lent their voice to proclaim that Universal Suffrage is neither just, nor desirable, with the present mental condition of mankind. Let those in authority and power do all they can to enlighten the masses of mankind: let Christians throw aside their minor differences, and resolutely do battle with bigotry and sin, carrying the softening influences of the Gospel into every home of our land; then, and not till then, will Universal Suffrage be either just or desirable.

Gosport. W. T.

IS IT DESIRABLE THAT THE REVENUE OF THIS COUNTRY SHOULD BE RAISED ON A SYSTEM OF INDIRECT TAXATION?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

Of modern sciences, the most universally important is Political Economy. But till of late years, its progress has not nearly been commensurate with its merits. One consequence, however, of its principles becoming known beyond the politician's closet, is a wide-spreading appreciation of their truth; but even yet the popular mind is more sensibly affected by the popular "pocket," than by all the treatises and doctrines of Adam Smith and his followers combined. Thus, Free Trade has been rendered more than abstract theory; and *Taxation* bids fair, in a short time, to attain the nearest practical conformity to political justice.

Advocating Indirect Taxation, we yet look upon the tax controversy as indicative, not merely of the faults and inconsistencies of the present system, but of an accession of spirit and numbers to fiscal reformers. That the agitation will be popular and keen, may be inferred from the question coming, as we have said, so close to "mens' business and bosoms." There are two sides to the question, however, and it would be well for the British tax-payer to hesitate before allowing a too headlong desire of change to put his liberty, his convenience, and his money, at a disproportionate hazard.

Political reformers are divided as to the most suitable mode of Taxation. Agreeing, necessarily, that taxation ought to be derived from revenue or income—that it should not press heavily upon capital or industry—that its imposition should be *equal*, *certain*, *convenient*, *light*, and *economical*—the two sections of fiscal reformers yet differ as to the manner of

assessment. Confessedly the Direct system would be the most just, and, therefore, the most *desirable*, could it be conformed in practice to the above fundamental requisites. C. W., Jun., has already pointed out where, apparently (not *really*, as shall be afterwards shown), the Indirect mode of assessment, at present in use, is inconsistent with the just principles of imposition; and his opponent, L. I., has performed, and more successfully, a similar duty with the system of Direct Taxation. While the latter supports Indirect Taxation as the best substitute for an impracticable theory of Direct assessment, the former, on the contrary, scouts the Indirect mode as "inexpedient," but without showing how a system of purely Direct Taxation is to work advantageously. Both systems appear faulty in operation; but while Indirect assessment is comparatively reformable, Direct Taxes seem entirely beyond fiscal equalization or political justice.

Looking to antecedents, there has been no plan of Direct Taxation in this country, as yet, but what has been a signal failure. In 1798, in the heat of an intense European war, when Britain maintained, almost single-handed, the war against France, the first Direct Tax upon income was imposed. An extraordinary imposition, the birth of a great exigency, it created along with it extraordinary evasions. As with Indirect Assessment, the fair tax payer must be protected; so the new system brought along with it an intricate commissariat machinery for eliciting fair disclosures. In each county and town commissioners were appointed, who, assisted by surveyors, &c., had the power of instituting rigorous and minute investigations into the private affairs of individuals. Although the tax was grossly inquisitorial, yet from the duties of commissioners being performed leniently, the interests of the honest tax payer were sacrificed to the *liberty* of the equivocating trader. In 1802, the first peace thereafter, Direct Taxation was repealed; but in the succeeding year, with a renewal of the war, there came a renewal of the "Property Tax." By this tax small incomes were heavier rated than large—annual incomes of £60 paying 3d. per £1; every succeeding £10, 1d.; up to £150, which paid one-fifth! This tax, it is true, brought an accession to the revenue; but the increase was purchased by an assessment operating in direct opposition to the four maxims of Adam Smith. Unequal, arbitrary, inconvenient, heavy, and uneconomical, the Direct Tax of Mr. Pitt was tolerated in a great emergency; but, had the commissariat duties been fully and honestly discharged, a tax rebellion would have been a likelier result than complete equalization. And the existing "Income Tax" is no less a failure; since a large amount of income, not reached, although nominally assessed, by the direct method, is taxed by an Indirect imposition upon articles of enjoyment. Those curious as to how the Income Tax Commissioners' duties are discharged, will find, from recent disclosures before a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, that numerous well known cases of gross evasion have wilfully been allowed to pass, even after troublesome investigations into private concerns. Can C. W., Jun., therefore, tell us how income, so successfully saved from the pocket of the State, would be assessed were his so-called "inexpedient" mode of Indirect Taxation entirely repealed?

The only practicable basis of a Direct Tax is a rate proportioned to the net incomes of individuals, or the net produce of land. But, as acutely shown by L. I., individual income is not always a criterion of tax-paying ability; for the annuitant and professional man are so circumstanced, that though of equal income with individuals whose property is permanently invested, and though, therefore, rated equally, yet the circulating capital of the one (his annuity), and the fixed capital of the other (his industry and skill), would be most inequitably taxed. And with the net produce of land, such a rate would be as manifestly unjust. When a landlord is taxed, it ought only to be as *owner of land;* when in his capacity of *producer*, *i.e.*, as an investor of capital on buildings, improvements, drainage, &c., he ought to be exempt from taxation. Tax him as a producer, and the means of production will be con-

tracted, the price of labour and food would be heightened, and the consumer would be the severest sufferer. The landlord, when taxed for his rent proper, *i. e.*, the sum given him for the use of the soil, is assessed as proprietor of the land; when taxed for the interest of capital expended on improvements, &c., he is taxed in his capacity of producer. But how are these two items to be separated from the gross rent of the land? Further, when the soils of two landlords bringing the same income, and equally rated, are disproportionately favoured by nature—the one barren, and engrossing much capital, the other fruitful, and requiring little or no outlay—the laws of fair competition are violated. But how can a Direct Tax be so framed as completely to avoid this injustice?

We thus see that, according to its fairest manner of imposition, a Direct Tax is dissonant with equity. Looking at the tax in its most favourable aspect, its advantages are small and very questionable. C. W., Jun., asserts, that were Direct substituted for Indirect Taxation, the nation would be benefited economically to the extent, annually, of "a million and a half." But here we are not enlightened as to how it can be accomplished. Were we to abolish, at one swoop, the Customs and Excise of this country,—for that course a purely Direct Taxation requires,—and tax the subject at once, his net income being the arbitrary test of ability, we should fly to inequalities already experienced, and to "others that we know not of."

Before concluding, we will briefly examine the Indirect system of Taxation. This system is so devised, that the incomes of individuals may be assessed indirectly, by the imposition of duties upon those articles of enjoyment, which may be employed or consumed for either use or luxury by the subject. It is a tax upon expenditure. That this mode is the most advantageous is apparent, when we recollect that in civilized society individual expenditure keeps pace with individual income. The miser, who hoards his gold, and gives it no opportunity of accumulating, by aiding the great work of production, must be a compound of idiocy and insanity. A philosopher once asked—

"High-built abundance, heap on heap, for what?"

and answered—

"To breed new wants, and beggar us the more."

And to the same question the British tax payer, Indirectly assessed, may well give the same answer. Indirect Taxation, however, is only in its infancy of reform; and were reformation more studied than revolution, it would speedily be more acceptable to the taxative burden-bearer.

Minor inequalities yet exist in the working of the present Indirect system; and C. W., Jun., has set them prominently forward. "Minor inequalities" we call them, for the Fire Insurance Duty, as a tax upon "prudence and forethought," stands insignificantly beside the oppressive burdens upon professional industry and skill, resulting from Direct Taxation. And the so-called "encouragement of illicit and contraband dealing" in commodities, is more insignificant still, besides a numerous, high-standing race of conscience-selling, perjured men, the necessary fruit of a tax inquisition. But does not C. W., Jun., blunder when he characterizes an Indirect Tax as *uncertain?* A knowledge by the tax payer of the time and manner of payment, and amount to be paid, is what constitutes a certain and unarbitrary tax. Now, with an Indirect Tax, the time and manner of payment is a *voluntary* effort of the tax-payer. When he purchases a commodity, it is of his own will, and, therefore, the time and manner being a self-dictation, the tax can only be paid with a clear knowledge that it is so. Can the time and manner of paying a tax be more unarbitrary or certain? Again, as to the *amount* to be paid, C. W., Jun., gives examples which, while proving that sugar and tea are heavily taxed, show at the same time, that the amount is of comparatively easy ascertainment. What can be more simple than to ascertain the tax upon a commodity,—or what more easily calculated than the amount paid on its purchase? How different were the corn growers' income directly taxed, so as to limit his means of production! How difficult, then, to calculate the con-

sumer's loss in the purchase of his bread!

But the great blunder of C. W., Jun., is confounding an *apparent* inequality with a *real.* He should know well that the money paid by the labourer in the purchase of commodities, and so Indirectly Taxed, is one form of Indirect assessment upon the moneyed class. The price of labour is regulated by the cost of the labourer's subsistence, and, consequently, an Indirect Tax upon wages is drawn indirectly from the employer's capital. If the labourer of 14s. a-week expends 13s. on food, clothing, and lodging, 4s. of which is absorbed in taxes, he is in no worse position than if receiving 9s., and untaxed. Thus, though the labourer may appear to be taxed to a third of his wages under the Indirect assessment, while the capitalist is assessed one-fourth, it is because, unlike the latter, the labourer has no surplus income to facilitate production or benefit the consumer. In reality, therefore, the argument of C. W., Jun., is neither valid nor sound.

In conclusion, we do not anticipate that the tax payer will accept of taxation so utterly opposed to the principles of equity, and so destructive of the liberty of the snbject, as a Direct system. To accept such a system in lieu of Indirect Taxation, would be to purchase a *heavy* for a *light* tax; since, though an increase of revenue to the State may follow a Direct levy, it still leaves much income untaxed. And, therefore, if buoyancy of trade, and political justice, is to be the study of fiscal reformers, we look to a unanimous affirmation of the *desirability* of Indirect Taxation. R. L. G.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

Subjects of great public interest can never suffer by being freely canvassed by that public whom they interest; indeed, they become strengthened thereby, because their several merits are more extensively known, while their imperfections are remedied or avoided. In submitting, therefore, the question of the comparative merits of Direct or Indirect Taxation to our readers, we did so under the full conviction that good, and not evil, would result; and that if we were correct in our views we should meet with support; while if we were treading npon wrong ground, or had assumed incorrect premises, the "error of our ways" would be fully and fearlessly pointed out. Starting with such views, we had everything to hope, and nothing to fear; and, *en passant*, we may remark that, if all questions affecting the interests of the public were subjected to the ordeal of fair and candid *consideration* before some impartial tribunal, many of the evils which now afflict society might, to a great extent, be remedied, or, perhaps, altogether removed.

But to proceed. What is the result of the present inquiry? Two writers have entered the ranks against us—both of them treating the subject with intelligence, and, without doubt, actuated by the desire to arrive at conclusions founded upon truth. The first of these writers (L. I.) tells us fairly, and without disguise, that *Direct* Taxation is "theoretically the most perfect, but, *practically*, most difficult in its application or adaptation to the present position of society." This is a plain acknowledgment that the system we advocate is *correct in principle*, —the obstacle being to carry it out. Now we have heretofore led ourselves to believe that whatever is correct in principle is capable of being practically, and, more or less perfectly, realized. Trifling difficulties and *minor* considerations should never thwart us in carrying out that which is otherwise good and true. In this country, we have had many illustrations of the practical embodiment of principles which were "theoretically perfect," yet surrounded with every variety of difficulty in their attainment. Let one or two instances suffice. When the theory of *locomotion by steam* was first propounded, there were plenty ready to exclaim, and no doubt in earnest, "your theory is good, but how are you to carry it out? In order to the practical adaptation of steam locomotion a level surface is required, whereas, our country is one continued hill and dale, and, therefore, however true the principle of steam locomo-

tion may be, we must still make ourselves content with stage coaches, because the new principle cannot be practically carried out." Well, notwithstanding all such objections, which then *seemed* reasonable, the theory HAS been reduced to practice —hills have been levelled down—valleys filled up—and steam locomotion has now become a "great fact." One other, yet more striking, example. The theory of telegraphic communication with distant parts was discovered a few years since. The truthfulness of the principle was pretty generally admitted; yet there arose the objection, that "it must be limited in its practical application because of the intervention of oceans, which divide the countries and places with which communication is desired." However, the principle was good and true — it was theoretically perfect—and what is now the fact? A medium of telegraphic communication HAS been extended across the British Channel (upwards of twenty miles) to France, we are now within one instant's whisper of its capital, Paris! and, in a few weeks, we shall have completed a medium of communication with all the chief continental cities and ports from whence such communication is necessary or desirable. Aye, and but yet a little longer, and the great *Atlantic* itself shall be spanned by the thought-conducting medium of electricity! Wherefore, then, do we soften down our desires for that which is correct, because it may *seem* impracticable? Why is the cry of "impossible" ever raised, after what England and her sturdy sons *have* accomplished? Alike the sound and the meaning of the word should be banished from our vocabulary. That which is *true* is *possible!* That which is possible and desirable may, by energy, determination, and intelligence, be reduced to practice.

We dispose, then, of our "friendly opponent," L. I., by expressing our belief that, by a system of Direct Taxation, all the advantages to which he refers may be secured; while most, if not all, of the disadvantages which he apprehends may be obviated. We are glad that he has been able to discover no more serious objections than those stated.

With the next writer, J. N. F., we shall be likely to enter into protracted discussion, for he candidly says, "in writing in favour of *Indirect* Taxation, *I am far from thinking it desirable that the whole of the revenue should be raised in that manner;*" and he goes on to state his opinion, that all *intoxicating commodities* and *luxuries* should be subjected to some imposts: the former with a view to limit the evil effects resulting from their too prevalent use—the latter, that those whose affluent circumstances enable them to indulge therein, may contribute some greater proportion to the maintenance of the State than their less wealthy neighbours. Now, with respect to the first proposition. If it were *certain* that increased immorality would result from the abolition of duty on intoxicating commodities, there would be ample grounds to induce us to "stop and consider." We are, however, by no means sure that this would be the case. We have not space, here, to enter into any lengthy consideration of the motives or causes which lead men to acts of moral depravity. We surmise, however, that persons habitually giving way to depraved habits and tastes, seldom stop to "count the cost;" their desires must be gratified even at the certain risk of the starvation of their wives and families. Any considerations as to the probable effect of the changes we are speaking of, on characters so morally depraved, must be at random: our only hope would be that, by being enabled to satisfy their desires at a less cost, a greater surplus would be left for more worthy purposes. Happily, such characters, however numerous, form but a small minority of our entire population; and, therefore, upon the principles of common fairness, the majority ought not to suffer because of the existence of such a minority. But the principle upon which we are advocating a system of *Direct* Taxation in preference to the present system of Indirect Taxation, with all its attendant evils, claims to be admitted to a standard far above mere pecuniary considerations. It claims to be one of those elements of reform which, if properly carried out, is destined to raise the moral tone and character of the whole people. It claims

to be that standard which seeks JUSTICE in the place of mere political expediency; and if the two cannot be combined, will make a firm stand for the former at all risks. It seeks to remove the evils which at present beset the world, by promoting sound education, rather than by placing restrictions upon commerce, which, at the least, make but a slight approach to the desired end, and have no sound foundation to fall back upon. The only monetary consideration which we would admit into the question is, that the amount now annually wasted in raising the revenue, by reason of the present defective and complicated machinery, would be available for the purpose of forwarding the education of the people, and otherwise promoting their social comfort.

As to the question of a duty upon luxuries, we may differ in opinion from many. Confining ourselves principally to natural products, we look upon them as being sent by a bountiful Creator, alike for the use and enjoyment of ALL his creatures. Now what is the effect of a duty upon them? Why, that the less wealthy portion of the community, who have an equal right to them, are unable to obtain them by reason of the increased price. We hold, as a broad principle, that none of the natural or spontaneous productions of the earth should be taxed. Beyond the price necessary for producing them, nothing additional should be charged; then all parties, so far as the principle goes, would be on an equal footing: and this would tend, in some measure, to alleviate the keenness of poverty. Property will always command its full share of privileges and enjoyment; and it may, and should, be made, by *Direct means*, to contribute its full quantum of payment for the advantages it confers.

We shall not pursue the question further in its present form. L. G. G., in the last number, answered most of the points raised by our opponents, which we have not here referred to. We have only to add that we perceive, in the movements of society, and in the course of our every-day life, a determination to effect an adjustment in the matter of Taxation. It may be that the progress of this feeling is slow, but we predict that it is nevertheless sure, because it is earnest. In proof of this assertion, let us glance at the political movements of the past six or seven years. Taking for our starting point the abolition of the Bread Tax—a tax, by the way, (whatever were its claims on the score of policy,) coming within the pale of our condemnation, as being one upon natural produce. We have, next, the abolition of the Duty on Bricks — a matter of considerable importance in relation to the improvement of the dwellings of the poor. This was followed by an alteration in the Stamp Duties, by means of which a great step was made in equalizing their pressure. And, lastly, we have a repeal of the Window Duty, which, in relation to our sanitary improvements and progress, is almost of incalculable advantage. Similar other, but minor changes have been effected within the same period, all showing that the arm of true Reform is potent, and destined to sweep away the systems which error and prejudice have founded, and build up others upon the immutable foundations of justice and truth. That which has already been done is but an earnest of that which will hereafter be accomplished. At the next stroke of this mighty arm, we expect to see destroyed the Duties upon Paper and Newspapers, *alias*, the barriers to "education made easy." While the Duty on Fire Insurances, the Soap Duty, and many other similar annoyances, are awaiting the same certain fate.

We now close the question, pleased with the consideration which it has received.

C. W., JUN.

"Despise not any man, and do not spurn anything. For there is no man that hath not his hour, nor is there anything that hath not its place."

Social Economy, etc.

IS THE MODERATE USE OF ALCOHOLIC DRINK INJURIOUS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

BURKE was guilty of a foul libel on humanity when he said, "The age of chivalry is gone." Never was there a more unjust sentence pronounced by any one aspiring to be thought a genius. We boldly proclaim our belief that this mighty statesman was in error, and that the spirit of chivalrous enterprise, Quixote-like, is continually on the alert, ever ready to throw down the mailed glove, and to wield "the dazzling fence of controversy" against the myriad evils which the lynx-like sharpness of its vision never fails to discover rampantly careering through the midst of society. The spirit of the present age is far more accurately expressed in the Old Play, thus—

> "All your ancient customs
> And long descended usages I'll change;—
> You shall not eat, nor *drink*, nor speak, nor move,
> Think, look, or walk, as ye were wont to do,—
> For all old practice will I turn and change,
> And *call* it *Reformation*."

Hence alone can we account for the many, nay, the innumerable, *anti*-associations which, Pallas-like, have sprung, without a procreating cause, full armed, from the prolific brains of the movement originators of our day. Learn, O ye bibacious of the human race! that a crusadic agitation has been sometime afoot, yclept "The Anti-Drinking Usages Movement," or "Teetotalism." Against these antagonists, doughty, bold, and well armed though they be, I, although unknown in the Heralds' Office of our great metropolis, present myself, with great humility, as your defendant. The point which we intend to advocate, as briefly as may be, is, that the *moderate* use of alcoholic liquors is not injurious. And, first, it is pleaded on the opposition that all indulgence in these liquors is *excess*. Now, this is a mere evasion of the question, for, by its very terms, it pre-supposes the possibility of a moderate use; but when they are pressed a little further, they say, "Habits grow; and if you begin with the moderate use, you will infallibly run the risk of running into the abuse." Not to mention the fact that thousands use these liquors moderately, and yet do not abuse them, we may state that if this reasoning suffices for the advocacy of this point, there are ten thousand other absurd movements which may be upheld by the same process of argumentation. Thou shalt not eat, for "habits grow," and if you begin with the use, you *may* end in gluttony. Thou shalt not seek "a competent portion of the good things of this life;" for habit is a weed of such luxurious growth, that no trimming and pruning can keep it from becoming a great tree, and overshadowing the whole mind with its baleful darkness—and you may become avaricious and miserly. Thou shalt not study; for habits progressively acquire an irresistible mastery over the mind, and you *may* become a book-worm, unheedful of the troubles of life, and careless of its duties. Thou shalt not feel the warm glow of youthful affection; for habit will inflame your heart, and you may become a sensualist and a debauchee. Thou shalt not stretch forth thy hand in charity; for, from the nature of the human mind, actions frequently performed become habitual, and the desire to perform them increases in proportion to the frequency with which they are committed, and you may become lavish and profuse—you may encourage indiscriminate vagrancy, you may entail ruin on yourself and your connexions, and may even ruin the industrious and well-doing, to whom, in your charitable zeal, you extended your beneficence. Thou shalt not be religious; for the tendency of the soul is to repeat itself incessantly, until it becomes impossible to resist the acquired craving which it gets of running to excess with everything, and you may become a wild and dreamy enthusiast, a violent and

irrestrainable fanatic, a vulgar superstitionist, or a Claverhouse-like fiery persecutionist. These, in my opinion, are as valid processes of reasoning as that which total abstainers employ regarding the growth of habits in the soul. And, secondly, it is asserted that "the use of these beverages is unnatural:" a laborious and intricate process of preparation must be employed upon them before they are fitted to go out on their fearful, soul-ruining, and pernicious mission; and then, "if you put the prepared alcoholic beverage to the lips of infants, you will find that they reject it with loathing." Now, is it not a fact that children reject with loathing almost every new substance which is applied to their organs of taste, because, being opposed to their former experiences, they have no power of judging concerning it? And is it not also true that the processes of cookery, the manufacture of jellies, &c., the operations for the preservation of flesh, fish, and fruits, and the preparation of the ingredients of "the cup which cheers, but not inebriates"—tea and sugar—are laborious and intricate. Now, if the total abstinence argument above cited is valid, our having established the same premises for the total abstinence from cooked food, jellies, &c., preserved flesh, fish, and fruits, tea and sugar, will necessitate the same conclusion, viz., that we ought totally to abstain from them.

Let me now, having disposed of the two main props of the teetotal agitation by a *reductio ad absurdum*, show further the consistency of their argumentation. G. B., page 91, in quoting Edward Johnson, M.D., says, "Fluids taken into the stomach *are not capable of being transmuted into solids;*" and again, "*Nothing, therefore, can contribute to the nourishment of the body which is not itself solid*, or in which solids are not contained;" he also observes, "Alcohol, *not being a solid*, is absorbed and taken into the blood, *and thus aids in the structure of the body.*" We do no more than point to the disagreement, and observe that in all things, even in moral agitation, it is a bad thing to have "two strings to one's bow." C. W., Jun., makes a lengthy extract from the same authority, in which the argument appears to me to be this—Whatever is true of a class is true of each individual of that class. A horse and a man are of the same class; therefore, whatever is true of the one is true of the other. Whatever is true of one individual of a class (so far as the qualities contained in the class are concerned) is true of the other. It is true that a vegetable diet and water are most conducive to the health of a horse; therefore, they are most conducive to the health of a man. If, then, we may further reason, man uses anything except water and a vegetable diet, he ought immediately to become an abstainer therefrom. Further, if he must drink pure water alone, unprepared and unadmixtured, but freshly "bubbling from the mountain brook," he should, by parity of reasoning, eat his vegetable food uncooked and raw, snatched from the nearest forest bough, cut freshly from the smiling mead, or newly dug from the fruitful earth. If we must use that alone which is natural, how mighty a *reform* of all our habits, customs, and associations, will this necessitate! and why call for a *resumpsit* of natural habits in one point and not in all others? If the juice of the grape, the product of the malt and the "barley bree," are henceforth to be forbidden, why should not the juice of the maple and the sugar-cane be interdicted to the palates of the human race?

Furthermore, if we are to drink nothing but water, can they guarantee that it shall always be flowing, limpid, and crystalline, that it shall never be ice-bound, and that no alluvial or night-soil shall mingle with its stream?

No, no! this will never do! the arguments are totally invalid,—for they prove too much; they prove that man should revert to his barbaric state if he would exist in the state of nature.

The effects of alcoholic liquors on the animal frame arise from their stimulant power. It cannot be denied that, in the present state of civilization, harassing care, over-exhausting toil, fatigue, weariness, and depression of spirits, are too prevalent; that in such circumstances the animal economy is so constituted as

to need a stimulus; that to suffer these sad effects of our condition to remain unremoved, is to encourage disease: *e.g.*, to take nourishing food into an exhausted frame would only load the nervous powers and superinduce *dyspepsia*. In this langour, feebleness, and lassitude, the effect of alcoholic liquors, moderately employed, is most grateful and pleasing—the heart no longer seems as if ready to faint in the execution of its duty—the muscles no longer feel dull, heavy, and immobile—the nerves no longer feel that uneasy sensation which is so very uncomfortable—the mind is no longer peevish, fretful, and depressed—the nerves become braced—the muscles become capable of exertion—the heart beats with a more genial activity—the mind becomes tranquil and complaisant, and the digestive organs are fitted to perform their gastronomic functions with success. In supposing that moderationists believe that such beverages are nourishing, the teetotallers entirely misunderstand the subject; they believe, and with accuracy too, that these beverages sustain the flagging powers of life and fit them for the appropriation of nourishment—that their gentle stimulation supplies the place of exercise to their jaded frame and inspissated juices—that it quickens the flow of feeling and reanimates the heart—in all this there is a decided benefit; and although we are not, by the terms of the discussion, bound to do any more than negative the arguments of opponents, yet, confident in the goodness of our cause, we throw ourselves beyond the bounds assigned, and, by proving their beneficiality, amply demonstrate that their moderate use is not injurious.

This question has peculiar reference to the present season; we cannot allow "Old Father Christmas" to be robbed, unrepining, of his "jolly cup of ale." We could not have him visit us in the cold ungenial weather in which he comes, and offer to his chilled heart and freezing lips a mere "cup of cold water." No! we would cheer the old man's heart, and irradiate his smiles with a somewhat more glowing and benevolent liquid.

It is not "Total Abstinence" our age requires—it is no mere *itemal* reform—it is no fractional modicum of virtue-attainment. It is an ennobling of the whole moral man—it is an entire revolution of our ignorance and crime-causing institutions. This cannot be done by any petty vice-abandonment, but by a great *normal* change in the nature and characters of men. We require men heedless of externalities and human applause—men of "sterner stuff" than to be bent by these. We require men of stubborn will and stern resolve, capable of appreciating the right and steadfastly persevering in the performance of it. The soul requires to gain strength, resistancy, impenetrability, and this can only be attained by action. What is virtue, but strength of principle—resistancy to temptation—imperviousness to either internal or external inducements? What is it to be virtuous, but to possess a mind firmly built—full of strength to repair injuries and capable of pruning the sin-buds which grow up in its secret places? That gold is not pure which has not passed through the refiner's fire, neither is that soul virtuous which has never been tempted. Who talks of contamination? The greater the temptation the stronger will the soul become, if its resistancy be properly cultivated: as the muscles of the body gain strength by exercise, so does the soul acquire vigour by the firm resolve and the unyielding will. We do not say, Rush into sin; we do say, Yield not to it—do not confess the weakness of your mind by flight—wrestle, struggle,—overcome bravely, but not foolhardily—not unprepared—not unaccoutred—but fully armed with moral-resolution: thus alone can the soul become self-energized, and imperviability to the assaults of temptation be gained. We must become men who can love poetry and music without dipping their celestial pinions in the hell-formed dyes of vice and depravity. We must love religion without breathing out a demon's spirit in its name; we must use the world and all that is in it, as not abusing it. Our life must still be a strife, a battle, a warfare, and there must be no cowardly and effeminate desertion from the conflict.

In conclusion, we may be allowed to translate a few lines from a German poet.

(We beg pardon for the rough unmeasured manner in which it is done.)

"Mighty are the world-destroyers, conquering in warlike strife—
More noble are the sin-victors who subdue their souls in life.
Mighty are the fearless heroes, who the earth can overawe;
Mightier still the soul-reformer who obeys the God-made law.
Mighty is the sceptre-wielder who controls a state with art—
Mightier the passion-thwarter who can govern his own heart."
P. H.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

This subject has become, of late years, so fearfully important, that men have been forced to take it seriously into consideration and to give the question a calm and patient hearing. We have no doubt that its discussion in the pages of this magazine will be productive of much good.

C. W., Jun., has set in a very clear light the physiological bearing of the question, and its happy effects as regards "Life Assurance;" to his excellent remarks we can add nothing, but perhaps we may be permitted to offer a few strictures on the article by L. I.

The principal argument advanced by this writer, though it is the last stated, consists in the affirmation that moderate drinking does *not* tend to produce drunkenness. This he attempts to substantiate by stating that "the tendency of any habit is to reproduce itself." No doubt this is true, and strikingly so as regards such habits as early rising, &c. But the analogy does not at all hold with regard to stimulating liquors. It is unquestionable, that the habitual use of any intoxicating beverage creates for it a morbid taste; and as this becomes every day greater, by reason of the continual stimulation and reaction, the tyrant must, sooner or later, be the master of the man. It is of no use to meet this with a denial, for the voice of experience cannot be contradicted. We may even illustrate this point by habits of the kind specified by L. I. The habit of early rising, for instance, is not formed at once, but gradually the prisoner releases himself from the toils of Morpheus, and steals from his couch many precious hours; until, at last, by perseverance, he reaches a point at which both mind and body receive due attention. So with study; the wandering mind cannot suddenly fix itself upon a dry, tedious task, but every day, by exercise, it is more and more trained, till, through persevering application, it can accomplish mental operations which before it never dreamed of mastering. Thus the habit not only reproduces itself, but it also gains ground and works with greater and greater activity. To this extent the analogy holds good—but while here the mind has the power of stopping at any point, it not being artificially excited, and gradually, as it progresses, imparts more and more enjoyment to itself, as the necessary concomitant of improvement and healthy exercise;—on the contrary, under the influence of stimulating drink, it is urged irresistibly forward, by means of its craving and diseased appetites, until, in sorrow and disgrace, the poor victim sinks into a wretched and dishonoured grave!

Let it be remembered that drunkards are supplied from the ranks of the *moderate drinkers*; were it not for *moderate* drinking there would and could be no *immoderate* drinking. Men are not born drunkards, neither do they become so suddenly, but by degrees. Who ever heard of a young man, a taster of ardent spirits, who dreamed of himself ever becoming a besotted drunkard? We fear that, in their hearts' pride, there is too much vaunting and boasting about being "a man," and "strength of mind." Poor deluded mortals, they little think that courting temptation is the sure way that leads to ruin!

Again, L. I. states that the "desire for stimulants is universal," and argues from this that therefore it should be indulged. In the same way we might say that every vicious desire which is "agreeable to nature," ought to be gratified; but who so bold as to make the assertion? Here our friend gives as an instance the American Indians; he might blush to do so, for upon our nation rests the scandal of having ruined these untutored children of the forest, with the infernal

"fire-water;" and some of the civilized tribes put us to shame by indignantly refusing the "accursed thing!"

L. I. next avers that Alcoholic drinks are conducive to happiness. Let the thousands of ruined souls testify—let broken-hearted mothers, and anguish-racked fathers, tell their tales of woe—let several family ties and cheerless homes, and the victims of want, lend their vices—let the brazen tongue of crime sound her piercing notes, and let the grim scaffold echo a thundering response!

L. I. would have the mind-oppressed student, the world-harassed merchant, and the toil-worn artisan, refresh their wearied energies by a draught of fire! He would have their jaded spirits revived by an artificial stimulant, which but cheers to destroy and promises to deceive. He very glowingly depicts its immediate effects, but he hints not of the after-pain, or the reactionary suffering.

In connexion with this we may take his affirmation that this "elixir of life" "is calculated to foster the social affections." Could there be anything more subversive of true virtue and sound morality? Could there be anything against which a more steadfast wall of evidence can be built up? There is a great difference between "*fostering*" these affections, and *momentarily exciting* them; there is a broad line of demarcation between the qualities of a sickly plant reared in a hothouse and one nourished by the pure air and genial showers of heaven. What a hollow artifice, what a disgraceful sham would affection be in that family where it could only be sustained by intoxicating drink! What a "honeymoon" of bliss would there be where the dying embers of love could only be kept alive by a slow working poison; where the stupid smile of partial inebriation must continually mantle on the cheek—how sweetly *then* domestic peace, love, and happiness would bloom! And this transitory feeling of bliss is to be gained at the risk of sacrificing soul and body—of becoming settled down into the drivelling idiocy of intoxication. How many have been ruined by this false courage, and luckless temerity! Rather than see such a state of things exist, let the holy ties of family be for ever dissolved! When the husband and wife cannot freely share each other's joys and sorrows, when the realities of life have to be shut out by mental oblivion, when moral strength is so far gone that a calm view of worldly prospects cannot be taken, and when consciousness must be drowned by the cup of inebriation—then "a long, a last adieu," to happiness and peace!

L. I. affirms that moderate drinking is healthy; but we trust that G. B.'s article has altered his opinion.

We had almost forgotten to notice the way in which he endeavours to set aside the argument, that the use of ardent spirits "is unnatural," by saying that, "perhaps it would be difficult to name any kind of *food* (is alcohol *food?*) which man does naturally desire, except it may be that which is the peculiar food of infants." He then goes on to state that "the greater part of our wants are created." Though this may be true so far, yet it certainly is *unnatural* to meet the demands of nature with something that *injures*. The desire for food is "*natural*," and its first manifestation is in the case of infants; but it is not *impossible* to bring them up upon other food than their mother's milk: this shows that it is not merely the *food* which is "*natural*," but the *craving for it*, which of course must be satisfied with a *nourishing* food. The distinction, then, is quite clear that it is "*natural*" for man to make corn into *nourishing* bread; but it is, on the other hand, quite "*unnatural*" to waste that valuable product by turning it into *stimulating*, *hurtful* drinks.

In conclusion: There is within man a never-dying principle of activity, a something which ever urges him on to search for happiness. If this heart-void be not filled up with that which is ennobling and purifying—if it be not directed in the right course—it grovels in the dust.

"Man must soar,
An obstinate activity within,
An insuppressive spring, will toss him up
In spite of Fortune's loads.

And why? Because immortal as his Lord;
And souls immortal must for ever heave
At something great—the glitter, or the gold—
The praise of mortals, or the praise of Heaven."

And why should this "obstinate activity" be exerted on pursuits unworthy of humanity? why should it not be directed to "something" truly "great?" To spend precious time and money on stimulating liquors is indeed disgraceful, instead of applying them to that which will improve the mind and bring it nearer to the great "object of life." What is worth living for? Is it to frequent the dram shop—to be continually half stupified—to sacrifice health and happiness at the shrine of Bacchus? No! away with this, away with all such time-killing, mind-degrading things! As certainly as the mind is uncultivated, so will its energies be wasted in ruining itself. To prevent this fatal error, break up its barren soil; plant in it seeds of virtue and "everlasting life;" lead it to rise superior to everything "that is of the earth," to "heave at something great," and to make a happy and well-spent life the foretaste of a blissful, never-ending eternity.

M. G. M.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

In replying to the argument of C. W., I may be allowed to state that he really, though perhaps not intentionally, takes for granted what is actually the point at issue.

Near the middle of his paper he says —"If then *à priori* (from a necessary cause) Alcoholic Drinks are essentially antagonistic to longevity, and the proper enjoyment of life, it can no longer be doubted that, however taken, they must be injurious."

It will be observed that our friend first asserts—for, as we shall presently show, he nowhere proves — that Alcoholic Drinks are essentially antagonistic to long living; and then he concludes from this that they are injurious. Thus he takes for granted the greater to prove the less. Grant that Alcoholic Drinks are essentially antagonistic to a long life, or, in other words, to the natural constitution of man, and you grant that they are injurious, taken in whatever quantities. But we do not grant that Alcoholic Drinks are naturally antagonistic to longevity, and hence we do not grant the other. So that if the thing taken for granted be not itself the point at issue, it at least includes it.

We have now to show that it is taken for granted, *i. e.*, that it is not proved, that Alcoholic Drinks are essentially antagonistic to longevity. Let us examine the argument. It is a law of nature, that all unnatural excitement is invariably followed by a corresponding depression. Well, suppose we grant all this, what then? Our friend tells us, that whatever has a tendency to produce it, must be injurious, and calculated to shorten life. This argument would certainly look well, provided we were living in a state of nature; then we might have all things natural; but we live in an artificial state, and not a natural one, and the labour which many of us have to undergo is anything but natural; yet pernicious as it is to health, it is better than none at all—for it is by it we live.

But amidst these unnatural labours there is a great deal of unnatural excitement, which we are willing to allow, with our friend, is injurious to health, and which is, in a particular manner, succeeded by a corresponding depression — a depression which, perhaps, more than any other, tends to undermine the constitution, impair the faculties of the mind, and destroy life. Under such depression, which being the effect of unnatural excitement, *i. e.*, an excitement not experienced by man in a state of nature, but produced by an artificial state of existence; but which, by-the-bye, is not the less needful because it is artificial,— under such a state of depression it is certainly not wonderful if something else that is artificial is found to counteract it. The depression that has been induced by the excitement of business, may, in some measure, be alleviated by the artificial excitement, it may be, of cheerfulness, and this cheerfulness may be induced by the moderate use of Al-

coholic Drinks. "Wine maketh glad the heart of man."

Nor is such an arrangement remarkable. How many things are there in the world, which, if separate, are pernicious—if blended, useful!

The case of the young man who has kept his spirits in a perpetual state of excitement, is certainly not calculated to prove our friend's point. Certainly such a youth must not be classed among moderate drinkers. Such a person will often drink more than one who passes for a drunkard. Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that we consider him to be a moderate drinker. Is our friend acquainted with a single young man, kept in a state of constant excitement by the application of intoxicating drinks, who does not practise habits far more baneful in their effects upon the constitution than the use of intoxicating drinks is ever considered to be, even by teetotallers themselves? If not, it may be that the evils which he has been accustomed to trace to the essentially antagonistic principle of intoxicating drink, may have their origin in some other source. We do not, however, acknowledge such persons as moderate drinkers, and consequently the case is not to the point.

In the foregoing we think we have been able to show that our friend has failed to prove that Alcoholic Drinks are essentially antagonistic to longevity, and that the moderate use of Alcoholic Drinks, under the present state of society, are calculated to counteract the baneful influence of that depression which results from the excitement incident to town life. L. I.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It now devolves upon us, as one of the openers of this question, to review all the arguments which have been adduced, to weigh them carefully, sum them up, and see if we are still justified in maintaining the position and views with which we started. We are not proof against conviction; and, indeed, we have sometimes prided ourselves upon being able to overcome our own prejudices, and give due acknowledgment to the superior arguments and reasoning of others. We, therefore, enter upon our task, with the hope of arriving at the right conclusion.

First, reverting to the principle upon which we started,—it was, that alcoholic stimulants were essentially antagonistic to the vital energies of the human system, and *therefore* their tendency was injurious, although the extent of the injury would be at all times dependent upon the extent of the indulgence, and the constitutional strength of the parties indulging. The fact of only small quantities of anything which is injurious in its tendency being taken, is by no means conclusive that injury does not result, although such injury may be slow in its outward manifestation: the reason of this being, that the counteracting properties of our system are better enabled partially to suspend the evil effects. In a word, if large quantities be injurious, small quantities must be proportionately so, unless, as in the case of medicine, there be some specific result to be accomplished. Such was our opinion on opening the discussion—such it will remain until we are convinced by proof of the contrary.

L. I. commenced the discussion with us, and took the negative side. In the early part of his paper, he earnestly repudiates the evils attendant upon drunkenness, correctly stating it to result from the abuse of Alcoholic Drinks. He then, by a series of comparisons, shows that many other useful things are also liable to abuse. Some men, he says, abuse the razor—by cutting throats is probably meant—but he asks, Are we therefore not to shave? The printing-press prints a deal of trash, but ought it on that account to be set aside? Now, with all due deference to the writer, we submit that these comparisons are in no way applicable to the present case. It is not *essential* to razors that they cut throats, or to the printing-press that it print trash; but *it is* (if the authorities we have quoted are to be relied on) in the *nature* of Alcoholic Drinks to impair the vital energies, and thus produce injury:

hence the difference between the two cases, and hence the failure of the comparison! The quotation which L. I. gives from Armstrong tends to support the same view of the case as that given by us from another poet, and is of itself sufficient to overthrow all the reasoning which this writer has adduced. Alcoholic Drinks, whether taken in large or small quantities, do hurry on the "sanguine tide," and produce that "excitement" to which he refers, and which he looks upon with so much satisfaction. For ourselves, we do not so favourably regard this excitement: we have before said, that we believe that all excitement artificially produced is injurious, because it is invariably followed by a corresponding degree of depression, and this alternate action and reaction accelerates the wear and tear of the system; nor would we give much for the companionship of a man who has recourse to intoxicating beverages to arouse those social endearments which ought to spring up spontaneously when in the presence of those he dearly loves! Besides, if "to drive dull care away" be the chief inducement to partake of Alcoholic Drinks, why not at once resort to smoking, or even opium, either of which would probably produce the desired effect more readily! As to the concluding argument of L. I., that habits only reproduce habits of the same order, or, in other words, that habits once formed remain *stationary*, the experience of the world is so decidedly opposed to this conclusion, that we need give it only a passing notice. It is now pretty universally admitted, that nothing in the world remains stationary: everything either advances or retrogrades, and habits are not exceptions to the rule. A man who commences smoking one pipe *per diem*, will soon feel to want two; in a short time, perhaps, six during the same interval will hardly be too many for him; and finally, every available opportunity is seized upon for a "whiff." Again, the man who commences with one glass of grog in the evening, will be very likely soon to find the habit increasing upon him, and, unless he be upon his guard, his *quantum* will soon increase to two or three glasses: so rapidly do these habits steal upon us! Habits of abstemiousness are far more likely to remain fixed—*their* tendency to extend themselves being already in the *right* direction. It may be, as the writer remarks, that "man is a bundle of habits;" but if such be the case, he should endeavour to shake off those that are bad.

C. C. M. follows in the last Number on the same side. He also makes a just estimate of the evils resulting from drunkenness, and appears conscious that his readers may imagine him to have taken the wrong side. He, as his predecessors, advocates the use of Alcoholic Drinks, to promote and foster the social affections, and awaken the exhausted energies. Dangerous ground this to tread! The application of the bellows to the sinking fire will soon arouse it to glowing brightness, but at the expense of what?—why either of the more hasty consumption of the fuel, or of a corresponding degree of dullness afterwards! Notwithstanding these drawbacks, however, the writer in question is still of opinion that Alcoholic Drinks "are of great service," although he is not provided with "columns of figures and pages of statistics," to prove his case; and I fear the "observation and experience" of which he boasts, will, upon further examination, turn against him. Towards the conclusion of his paper, he appears to recognise to some extent the difficulties with which his view of the case is surrounded, and is then led to admit (quite contrary to the reasoning of L. I.) "that moderation, in a countless number of cases, ends in excess;" but "what the nature of the infatuation is which lures so many victims into its toils, he knows not." We think we can assist him a little in solving the mystery. The irritating effects of Alcoholic Drinks (even when taken in small quantities) upon the mental faculties and the nervous system, tend almost imperceptibly to weaken our natural energies and powers of self control, and thus to render us increasingly more susceptible of the influences of habit. It is a fact not to be passed over, that those men who have been most remarkable in the world's history for firmness of character and resolution of purpose, have been men of

careful and abstemious habits—let a few modern instances, as Franklin, Washington, and our own Wellington, suffice. Thus it would seem that this "luring infatuation" is the almost necessary effect of the indulgence we are opposing.

The negative writer upon this subject in the present Number, also puts much stress upon the effects of alcoholic stimulants, in tending to "cheer the social hearth." But when we remember the thousands and tens of thousands of "happy homes" where the "dangerous cup" is never introduced, we can but feel that this point is a little overstrained! We can hardly bring ourselves to believe that any thoughtful, reflecting wife can take pleasure in seeing the "partner of her hopes and joys" resorting to such external aid to prepare himself for her "sweet companionship!" Must she not know that but another step and he will reach the brink over which thousands have fallen and been ruined! The charge of our wishing to deprive society of all those things which tend to contribute to our "material happiness," is so foreign to our present inquiry, that we pass it by.

This much for our opponents. We have now to say a few words upon the subject generally. After a careful estimation of the whole question, we are decidedly of opinion, that we have not only the belief, but the *actual practice* of society at large, in our favour. With the increasing intelligence of the age, there is growing up an improved feeling on this subject. Let any person impartially view the present state of society, and compare it with that of fifty years ago, and he will find that the *drinking customs* are fast dying out, and that habits of sobriety are taking their place. This voluntary abandonment of old usages speaks for us, even louder than the most powerful arguments—we say voluntary, because it cannot be said to be the result of the "Temperance," or any similar movement, although these may have contributed much to its advancement. But this movement was discernible before temperance societies had obtained maturity; and perhaps *they* owe their origin to the progress of this improved feeling. We could adduce numerous authorities on the subject of this change, but one will suffice: it is that of Crabbe, and his remarks may be supposed to represent pretty accurately the state of society in his time:—

"See Inebriety! her wand she waves,
And lo! her pale—and lo! her purple slaves,
Sots in embroidery, and sots in crape,
Of every order, station, rank, and shape;
The king who nods upon his rattle-throne,
The staggering peer, to midnight revel prone;
The slow-tongued bishop, and the deacon sly,
The humble pensioner, and gownsman dry;
The proud, the mean, the selfish, and the great
Swell the dull throng, and stagger into state."

But we have said this state of things is passing away: the world is becoming wiser and better than it once was, more ready to reject the evil and confirm the good; and those who now differ from us may yet live to bless the day when these improved habits took their rise!

For the reasons assigned we see no cause to alter the views with which we started. C. W., JUN.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. VI.

19. SHAME arises from a sense of our having rendered ourselves ridiculous or despicable to others. It covers the countenance with blushing, averts the face from the spectators, hangs the head, inclines the eyes earthwards, wrinkles the forehead, occasionally renders the person speechless, and always impedes the power of utterance; a constrained appearance of ease is put on, which only tends still more to show how bitterly the individual winces under the censorious glances which he supposes must be constantly aimed at him.

In the tragedy of "Jane Shore," many examples of this passion may be found.

20. Remorse:—

> "Remorse is as the heart in which it grows:
> If that be gentle, it drops balmy dews
> Of true repentance; but if proud and gloomy,
> It is a poison-tree, that, pierced to the inmost,
> Weeps only tears of blood."

It is a self-consciousness of guilt which dries and shrivels up the heart, till it becomes a loathsome plague-spot, and the man feels himself a "jarring and a dissonant thing" amid the harmony of Nature.—In its external expression, it makes the countenance dejected, and overspreads the features with anxiety, corrugates the eyebrows, beats the breast with the right hand, and the teeth are gnashed with anguish. The whole frame is racked and agitated, and the voice is slow, guttural, and interrupted by sighs. Should sorrow, heightened into contrition, succeed this fearful passion, the eyes are doubtingly and timidly raised on high to sue for mercy, but a strong sense of demerit almost instantly casts them to the ground. Then the "big round tears begin to roll," the knees are bent, or the body is thrown flat upon the earth, the most humble suppliant posture is assumed, and with a mingling of sighs, groans, and tears, the tones of deprecation are poured forth with trembling, hesitation, and apprehension. Coleridge's tragedy of "Remorse" will amply exemplify this.

21. Courage is the contempt of any imminent and unavoidable danger. It nerves the whole frame, erects the head, inflates the lungs, widens the nostrils, and imparts gracefulness and nobility to the mien. The voice is clear, sonorous, and unhesitating; the countenance is open, and the right hand is occasionally thrust out as if in defiance of threatened danger.

> "My voice is still for war;
> Gods, can a Roman senate long debate
> Which of the two to choose, slavery or death?
> No! let us rise at once, gird on our swords,
> And at the head of our remaining troops
> Attack the foe, break through the thick array
> Of his thronged legions, and charge home upon him."
> *Sempronius*, in Addison's Cato.

22. Boasting is the affectation of courage, and, like all affectation, betrays itself by overdoing what it attempts. The voice is loud and overweening. The whole demeanour is characterized by blustering and braggadocio. The eyebrows are knit, the eyes stare, the features are reddened with exertion, and the mouth is pursed. The arms are now set a-kimbo, and again the right fist is brandished in a fiercely menacing manner; the strides are long and rapid, the feet being put down heavily, and the right foot occasionally stamped with fury. "Captain Bobadil's method of destroying an army" will give an illustration.

23. Pride is an overgreat feeling of our own importance. It assumes a lofty look. The body is held erect and stiff; the step is measured, stately, and imposing. The lips protrude, but are contracted. The eyes are open and the eyebrows arched. The words are uttered in a pompous, bombastic, and formal manner, especial emphasis being laid on the first personal pronoun.

> "But I have lived, and have not lived in vain.
> My mind may lose its force, my blood its fire,

And my frame perish in conquering pain;
But there is that within me which shall tire
Torture and time, and breathe when I expire:
Something unearthly, which they dream not of,
Like the remembered tone of some mute lyre,
Shall on their softened spirits sink, and move
In hearts all rocky, now the late remorse of love."—BYRON.

24. OBSTINACY is a combination of pride, anger, and malice (which see). It is an unyielding determination to do or not to do anything—to stick resolutely to one's own purpose, be it right or wrong. It imparts a dogged sullenness or a surly snappishness to the manner.

(*Continued in Volume II.*)

MUTUAL INSTRUCTION AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.

(*Concluded.*)

3rd. They incite us to cultivate our intellectual faculties.

The world is full of thought-excitants, and youth is the season in which *the desire to know* is most active. The knowledge of these two facts—the capacity of mental excitation which the universe possesses and the knowledge acquisitiveness of the young mind—is the basis of all educative exertion; and it is from these two facts that "Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies" take their origin. It is of importance, then, that young men should know that in such Societies as these the yearning wish of the soul for knowledge may be gratified—the fallow ground of the mind may be subjected to culture, and the seeds of thought may be sown, which will ultimately ripen into the glorious fruitage of truth. Dr. Johnson truly says, that "He who enlarges his curiosity after the works of Nature, demonstrably multiplies the inlets to happiness;" therefore, we should cherish ardour in the pursuit of useful knowledge, and remember that a blighted spring makes a barren year, and that the vernal flowers, however beautiful and gay, are only intended by Nature as preparatives to autumn fruit. It behoves us all, therefore, to improve the spring-time of our life-year in acquiring habits of patient investigation, close, logical, and consecutive thinking, decision of judgment, and energy of mental power. To think, however, is not to be merely receptive of the traditionary lore and legendary science of our instructors, or the silent, though pure influences of Nature—it is not to make the mind a mere reservoir of all that may be poured into it—a vast *collectanea* of isolated and unassorted facts, or a cyclopædia of heterogeneous and unorganized aphorisms, incidents, and laconisms—

"Crudis, indigestaque moles;
Nec quicquam, nisi pondus iners; congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum." *

No! Thought vitalizes the universe, and makes it subserve man's needs, while it gratifies his sympathies. To think, is to unseal the fountain which wells

* A rough, unsystematized heap; nothing but an inactive load; and the discordant seeds of things not well connected, all huddled together in the same place.

up continually in our own soul, and to add its waters to the mighty tide of thought which has flowed from similar sources into "the vast ocean of truth." To think is to digest the material facts in the soul, and thence elucidate a new product —Truth; it is to take up the diverse threads of particulars and weave them into a beauteous, consistent, and harmonious whole, in which design is clearly manifested. Thus do new truths, discoveries, inventions, improvements, dawn on the mind, and aid in the betterment of the universe. Thought enriches humanity, for thought is labour, and labour is the philosopher's stone which transmutes the basest material into wealth. The thinking man is never merely receptive; he gives as well as gets. Of him it cannot be said—

> "Ten thousand great ideas fill his mind,
> But with the clouds they flee, and leave no trace behind.'

To him, the mountains, so sublimely grand—"the multitudinous sea"—the rapid-running rivers—the rock-o'er-rushing cataract—the sky's blue look of summer clearness—the meridian glory of the sun's bright beams—the beautiful wan face of the "ladye moon"—the stars that sparkle in the cloudless skies—the broad verdure-clad meadow—the beauty-decked inhabitants of the garden—the autumn "lea rig" —the woodland with its mass of intertangled branches—the hoarse howlings of tempests—the eruptive lightning flash—the earthquake, with its mighty jaws agap—the combinations of the elemental atoms—the myriad tribes of "animated nature" and "the vegetable kingdom"—

> "The very glory of the grass and splendor of the flower"—

do each and all suggest the question, *How?* and *Why?*—do all incite him to attempt to disentwine the complicated maze of the phenomena which he perceives around him, and tend to lead out his faculties to the acquirement of knowledge and the attainment of mental power. It is in this important crisis of a young man's life that such Societies proffer their aid. When the novelty, the interest, the freshness, and the beauty of the world first become fully revealed to the mental eye—when the mind for the first time strives to raise its new-fledged pinions, and to seek mental nutriment for itself—when the fear of authority begins to fade in the soul, and the heart first heaves at the hope of yet scaling the empyrean of Truth for itself—when the widened range of the more discursive eye tempts to intellectual daring, and the mind becomes covetous of amassing the rich treasury of knowledge, —the need of some means for attaining these objects becomes evident to the expanding intellect. When the hitherto slumbering thought-powers have newly awakened, and imagination and hope are unitedly adorning the scene of life—when the intellect receives the primal faint conception of its capacities, and is eagerly seeking an object commensurate with its ability on which its exertions may be spent—when enthusiasm first rushes impatiently and impassionedly forward, determined to run with "hot haste" until the goal be gained—these Societies place before him at once the highest object on which the soul can exert itself, and the means by which these exertions may be profitably conducted. When, perhaps, the young man is just embarking on the ocean of life, charterless and compassless—

> "Youth at the prow, and pleasure at the helm"—

such Societies, by the presentation of nobler objects of pursuit, strive to win him, "all unweeting of his perilous way," from the prosecution of his purpose: persuasively do the words of old Dekker proceed, as it were, from them:—

> "If thou kiss Wisdom's cheeks, and make her thine,
> She'll breathe into thy lips divinity;
> And thou, like Phœbus, shalt speak oracles;
> Thy Heaven inspired soul, on Wisdom's wings,
> Shall fly up to the Parliament of Jove,
> *And read the statutes of eternity,*
> *And see what's past, and learn what is to come.*"

In offering these inducements, they but show their confidence in their thirst for knowledge, which the instinct of curiosity matures and increases. The love of knowledge is the grand gravitating power by which the coherency of Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies is maintained. They are constituted on the assumption, that "the pleasures and advantages of knowledge" recommend themselves to the human mind; that in the acquisition of it full scope may be given to the highest powers of the most exalted genius; and that there are pleasures felt in its attainment far surpassing the short lived, evanescent joys which the gratification of our animalism can yield—"Nam divitiarum et formæ gloria fluxa atque fragilis; *scientia* clara æternaque habetur."*

We must not, however, allow ourselves to be misunderstood. These Societies do not so much instruct as exercise the mental powers. They do but give direction to the knowledge-appetite, and stimulate it to useful and continuous exertion. They do not enlighten the mind upon the validity of facts, but upon the accuracy of opinions. A subject is placed before the mind for contemplation, concerning which an opinion is to be formed; but the facts concerning it, and the opinion which a consideration of these facts suggest, are to be gained in hours of study—are to be acquired by investigation and thought. The facts must be diligently accumulated, and accurately estimated; the opinion formed with deliberation and circumspection; viewed upon all sides and compared with the facts upon which it is based. Then in the meeting-place it is to be calmly, cautiously, and vigorously expressed, supported by facts, adorned by allusions, and defended from assault. As, however, each individual has his own peculiarity of mind, the subject will be treated by each in his own special style, and thus the rays of light passing through the *media* of their several intellects will be concentrated into a *focus* upon the subject concerning which inquiry is made. It must, by this complete irradiation, this viewing it in so many different lights, acquire greater clearness; and the power of judging with accuracy regarding it must be increased by the vividness of the light thus thrown around it. Here, however, there is need for great discrimination, to distinguish the apparent from the real—the thing in its objectivity from the same thing subjectively viewed—to detect the exact amount of *tinge* which the subject receives from each speaker—to ascertain the precise view-point from which each has looked—to judge of the correctness of the facts adduced in confirmation of any opinion, and their applicability to the "question"—to perceive the crookedness of

* For the splendour of riches and beauty is fleeting and frail; knowledge is excellent and everduring.

sophistical argumentation—to learn to unwind the fair-seeming clue till you can point out the defect—and to acquire such a mastery over our own views as shall enable us to avoid all inconclusive reasoning on our own part, as well as to discern it in the exercitations of others. All this is discipline to the intellect—all this is incitement to cultivate our thought-powers—all this is an aid to the acquisition of a discriminating mind, and an active and vigorous capacity for argumentation. When we have been employed thus for awhile, we shall find that thought is productive of thought—that ideas seek confirmation from facts—facts induce investigation—effects incite to the attainment of a knowledge of causes—that each impulsion made on mind communicates its share of excitement to each of its varied powers; and thus the progress of man's intellectual life is provided for. It must be remembered that the well-cultivated mind can alone be great; and that the great mind alone can be the fit habitation of great thoughts. Mighty inventions, intricate discoveries, and world benefiting improvements, can only originate in mighty minds. Vast conceptions may float hazily through the imaginations of uncultured men, but can only come to fruition and practicality through the intellect of one who has been at some pains to mature his judgment, improve his reasoning powers, and amass the materials upon which his faculties may employ themselves. Exercise strengthens the mental faculties, inures them to hard labour, accustoms them to diligence and activity, and capacitates them for still mightier achievements; and the mind, once awakened to a perception of the real pleasures which knowledge brings, is stimulated to higher deeds and nobler daring; and yet, for lack of this very awakening, this stimulation and up-stirring—

> "How many a rustic Milton has passed by,
> Stifling the speechless longings of his soul
> In unremitting drudgery and care!
> How many a vulgar Cato has compell'd
> His energies, no longer tameless then,
> To mould a pin or fabricate a nail!
> How many a Newton, to whose passive ken
> Those mighty spheres which gem infinity,
> Seem'd but as specks of tinsel fix'd in heaven,
> To light the midnight of his native town!"

In "Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies," too, all are teachers and taught in turn; each is an educator and pupil at the same time, and "we are equally served by receiving and by imparting;" and thus we are fitted for every station in ciety—to command or to obey, or receive or to communicate; to glow with the inspiration of genius, and lighten the world with bright thoughts, nobly and sweetly spoken, or to appreciate the power and mission of the great spirits who "tabernacle midst humanity." The world is multiplex in its requirements, and the best method of preparing ourselves for whatsoever it may demand of us is, to cultivate the whole of our intellectual faculties; and so far as such Associations contribute to this great end, they are truly beneficial and advantageous. Let us, then, give due diligence to the duties which our respective Societies give to us to perform. Let our study of the various subjects proposed for our consideration be complete, perfect, and orderly, our opinions formed by extensive generalisation, close-thinking, and ardently-sought knowledge of the minor subdivisions into which they ramify

themselves. Of all qualities, mental excellence is the most difficult of attainment: yet by industry even this may be acquired. "Excellence," says Sir Joshua Reynolds, "is never granted to man but as the reward of labour. To well-directed labour nothing is denied—nothing is to be obtained without it." Let us, then, labour that we may gain excellence; and let us labour resolutely, that we may not fail in its attainment.

4th. They cultivate in their members the power of eloquence.

"Optimus est orator qui dicendo animos audientium et docet, et delectat, et permovet,"* says Cicero,—no mean authority on such a subject. If this be accepted as true, and the foregoing topics on which we have spoken be considered as proved, how great are the advantages which such Societies bestow on their members, and how thorough is the training which they are qualified to give in this important art! And surely in such a state of society as that in which we live, this is no trifling accomplishment or worthless acquisition.

"Yes! Fame to generous minds is dear;"

and any means, by which true fame may be gained, deserves not to be slighted; yet even were fame left entirely out of view, the benefits derivable from the cultivation of this quality might form argument sufficient for earnest application and persevering industry in the prosecution of any means by which advancement in it might be gained; for truly has the poet Young said:—

"Thoughts shut up want air,
And spoil like bales unopen'd to the sun;
Had thought been all sweet, speech had been denied:
Speech ventilates our intellectual fire;
Speech burnishes our mental magazine—
Brightens for ornament, and whets for use."

In such Societies, rapidity of thought, brilliancy of diction, propriety of style, grace of manner, smartness of reply, aptness of retort, clearness of perception, and closeness of reasoning, are acquired in the best possible way—*by practice;* and these constitute the chief elements of that which we understand by the term "eloquence." It is speech bursting from the depths of the heart, under the leadership of Reason. It is the expression of thought in all its height, and almost limitless vastness. It is a painting of the opinions which we hold, adorned by the bright hues which imagination delights to lavish on the children of the intellect. It is the manifestation of mind in its highest intellectuality, combined with the inextinguishable glow which the ripe, passionate heart alone can feel and express. The highest species of eloquence is ever most intellectual; in it the reason ever retains its sovereignty; and though it stirs the feelings to their depths by thrilling pathos, or the tempestuous agitations of passion, Reason still holds the sceptre of dominion. What Emerson says of Plato may be applied to the true orator: "Nothing can be colder than his head, when the lightnings of his imagination are playing in the sky." The power of the really eloquent over the human soul is, indeed, immense: it can rouse the mind by terror, then allay the fear-fever in the heart, and quicken it with hope. It can stimulate the intellect to almost overpowering action, then shed a

* He is the best orator who, in speaking, instructs, delights, and animates the minds of his hearers.

hallowed calm through all its faculties. It can bend the stout heart underneath a load of sorrow, then cheer it into transports of rapture and delight. It can educe the gentle tear of pity, or awaken the scorpion-demon, jealousy. It can gild the poison cup of enmity with most insidious sophistry, or quicken the throbbing of the earnest patriot's heart. Men are neither Cynics nor stoics, that they should stand unmoved under the influence of a master-mind, while wielding the whole armament of logical subtlety and rhetorical skill. Their reason cannot remain unimpressed when the true orator strives to stamp the image of his thoughts upon their mind, nor can their feelings continue unmoved, when the impulsions of veritable genius are applied to them. Demosthenes, by fierce war-breathing invectives, moved the hearts and nerved the arms of the Athenians to earnest conflict with Philip, their invading foe. The eloquence of Cicero stirred alike the Senate and the mob of Rome to action. Peter the Hermit cast an electric shock of enthusiasm into the midst of Christian Europe, and the Crusades were the issue. The thunder-voice of Luther shook the Vatican to its centre. Napoleon's short, emphatic, but passionate outbursts of oratory blinded his soldiers to the fear of danger. The graceful tact of Fox, the earnestness of Wilberforce, the forceful persuasiveness of Whitfield, the full, round, sonorous periods of Burke, the enthusiastic glare of Curran, the stately gravity and impressiveness of Chatham, the giant-launched invectives of O'Connell, the sublimity and power of Chalmers, the manly sobriety of Peel, the brilliant declamation of Cobden, and the gracefully-adorned ratiocination of W. J. Fox, are sufficient proofs of the power and efficiency of eloquence to move the heart and stimulate the mind.

Let us add one word of caution to our young friends who aspire after oratorical excellence. The basis of effective eloquence is Truth. As Emerson observes, "Eloquence must first be plainest narrative or statement; afterwards it may warm itself until it exhales symbols of every kind, and speaks only through the most poetic forms, but at first and last it must still be, at bottom, a statement of facts." If you be armed with the talents fitted for success in oratory, beware that you use them not in misleading mankind. There is a great temptation for one who loves reputation rather than true fame to do so; but if true and enduring fame be your desire, cherish the unsullied inward honour of the soul, keep your heart pure and stainless, that when your voice goes abroad among men, their ears may listen with pleasure, their intellects follow in acquiescence, and their hearts give a gratified approval; that the charm which your powers exert over society may not be lurid and destructive, but elevating and pure; that the "pleasantness of your voice" may not be forgotten when the atmosphere of the lecture-room is left, but that it may abide in the heart, affect the life, and aid in the advancement and progression of those who listened to you while discoursing to them—

> "Words which rob the Hybla bees
> And leave them honeyless."

Let pure morality, ardent patriotism, spotless integrity, and ceaseless endeavours to aid in the upward and onward tendency of the human race, inspire you, and you cannot fail: then will the world bless your efforts; and you yourself will remember

with delight the advantages which such societies bestowed upon you in your early endeavours to acquire the fame which you will then have deservedly won.

As a general summary of the benefits resulting from Institutions such as those of which we speak, we quote the following from a quaint old author:—"Often conference and private debate are of great advantage, for thereby are the wit, the memory, and the tongue, very much furthered and holpen, and a man is made more ready and bold for public matters, and the truth, which is the work of study, doth more easily appear. And when the mind, by long reading, is fraught with many thoughts, the wit and the understanding do clarifie and break up in the communicating and discussing with another. He who so doth, tosseth his thoughts more easily, and marshalleth them more orderly, and he seeth how they look when turned into words. Finally, he waxeth wiser than himself, and getteth more by an hour's discourse than by a day's reading." Milton also speaks to the same purpose:—"Because the spirit of man cannot demean itself lively in this body without some recreating intermission of labour and serious things . . . *civilise, adorn, and make discreet the mind* by the learned and affable meeting of frequent academies, and the procurement of wise and artful recitations, sweetened with eloquent and graceful enticements . . . that the call of WISDOM and VIRTUE may be heard everywhere."

The world is preparing for a great crisis—the universal emancipation of the human intellect from the slavery of ignorance. *This* is the silent, steady, but sure revolution which is working in society: and it is upon those who are now young that the conducting of this mighty movement will devolve. If, then, you would be true to yourselves and humanity—if you would consult aright your own weal and the happiness of your race, you must seize every opportunity of improvement within your reach—you must employ every hour which can be spared, with due allowances for attention to the laws of health, to the cultivation of the intellect. Let the question with you be, Shall I use the highest and most ennobling faculties with which the Creator has endowed me, or shall I abuse them? Shall I strive to elevate myself to the highest point of which my nature admits, or shall I permit myself to wallow in worse than brutal ignorance? Shall I, as some inferior creature in creation's scale, skulk from the highways of life, and strive to forget and be forgotten? or, shall I, big with emulation, attempt to out-distance my compeers in the race of progression? We speak not now of the matters of eternity. The serious appeals of Religion it belongs not to us to employ. We speak as secondaries to the pulpit ministrations, else would we more impressively urge the duty of self-culture. By all means let us endeavour to live at an intellectual elevation commensurate with the nobility of our nature and the opportunities our situation has afforded us, ever remembering that self-help is the only efficient aid, and that it must be by our own toil, struggle, and upmarching, that we shall eventually reach the height of our aspirations; that it is by resolute, untiring diligence, unintermitting study, and unconquerable perseverance, that we are enabled "to bring the mind up to our own esteem;"—that "Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies" afford facilities for the accomplishment of these grand ends, we hope we have

already fully proved. Let us remind you, then, that harmony should ever reign in your Societies—that preparation for your meetings should never be neglected—that accuracy, care, and study, should always be observable in your exertions—that emulation should ever be zealous amongst you—that lukewarmness must be altogether eschewed—and that the lofty aims which we have striven to place before your minds should constantly animate you. Endeavour to learn for life; to seek knowledge in the love of it, and to make the acquisition of Truth your chief aim. With the anxious desire that the foregoing essay may be useful to the reader, and act as a stimulant to the young, we conclude with the hope that each one may follow the example of that

> "Youth who bore, 'mid snow and ice,
> A banner with the strange device—
> **'EXCELSIOR.'"**

S. N.

LAWS OF DEBATE.

Debate is the mighty alembic which men have consented to employ for the separation of Truth and Error in that highly sublimated and subtle article—opinion. Through this, Facts, Hypotheses, Theories, Maxims, "wise saws and modern instances," are, with similar impartiality, made to pass, and by this they are subjected to the same process of elimination. Debate is the assay master, by whom the coin of opinion is tested, as to whether it is worthy of being admitted into the currency;—the balance in which thought is weighed;—the refiner's fire in which the gold ore and the dross are disunited;—the winnowing process by which the chaff is sifted from the wheat:—in short, the means by which the mind is enabled to discriminate verities from falsities—the real and permanent from the unreal and evanescent. It is of some importance, then, that those who engage in the attempt to expurgate the false and seeming from the true and real—to distinguish between the "fine gold tried in the fire," and the "baser dross"—between the counterfeit and the genuine,—should follow some definite plan for the direction of their conduct, and some settled rules for their guidance in the management of this mental process; and it is our purpose, in the present paper, to supply the untrained mind with some general hints on "the conduct of the understanding" in this important department of intellective exertion. We respectfully request that we may be pardoned the presumption which the endeavour implies, for the motive which leads us to make the effort—the furnishing of the members of Debating Societies with a few directions which, if duly attended to, will, we think, materially advance the purposes for which such associations have been instituted.

Debate, it will be seen from the preceding paragraph, has, in our opinion, a lofty purpose to subserve, not only in its power of exciting and testing the mental activities, but also on the destiny of humanity; for if Truth be the all-sufficing requisite of human happiness—be the grand promoter of those enjoyments which arise from the due exercise of our purer nature—be the indisputable "liege lord and sovereign" of the soul of man; and if Error be the well-spring of misery and

woe—the chief agent in the demonizing of our race—and the usurper of a throne on which a happiness-dispensing power should sit, then, any means by which the advancement of the one might be furthered, and the progression of the other retarded, should be highly esteemed and worthily employed. We protest, then, against that perversion of this grand instrument for the effectuating of such mighty purposes, in which logical subtility, and skill combined with sophistical chicanery, would seek to prove that

Nought is everything, and everything is nought.

We think that honest conviction should be the basis of every debater's theme, and that in all sober earnestness and reality he should then nerve himself with all his powers of acquiring knowledge and mental acumen, for strenuous and unflinching wrestling for the inner-lying Truth of his intellection. In our succeeding remarks we will suppose the debater to be animated with the love of Truth, and to speak the convictions which he feels tugging at his soul for utterance, and panting for a vent.

At some future period we may, perhaps, occupy our reader's attention with the subject "Debate," in which we will detail more at large its nature, uses, and advantages. At present, our object is confined to one particular point—the elucidation of the "Laws of Debate"—to a brief notice of which we now devote our space.

1st. All the essential terms involved in a debate should be carefully defined.

This is necessary to the clear understanding of the point at issue. Unless this be done, we may pass our time and expend our strength Don Quixote-like, in valorous attacks on windmills, but we shall neither storm the citadel of Error, nor advance the cause of Truth. The definition of terms enables us to discriminate at once the amount of difference existing between us and our opponent; it erects a common ground on which we can both meet, and a central point from which we may set out in the prosecution of our researches. It prevents all ambiguity of meaning, and all dishonest attempts at what is vulgarly, but significantly, called "shuffling"—all endeavours to unwind ourselves out of any difficulty in which we find ourselves, by tampering with the signification of our terms. There is the greater necessity for this, because most of those terms which are used to express debatable ideas are of an abstruse nature, and are frequently employed with so much vagueness as to render it difficult to keep the meaning fixed and uniform. By following this rule, however, the dilemma is escaped, and the opponents of any opinion are able to "charge home" upon their adversaries with effect, for their camp is rendered stationary, and they have been obliged to "nail their colours to the mast;" there is no flying from the one, nor deserting the other, without defeat and disgrace. It frequently happens, too, that seeming diversities, like equal magnitudes, viewed at different distances, disappear on closer and more accurate inspection, while not unfrequently, apparent agreements, as some stars in the jewelled canopy of night appear single although binary, upon a more attentive view show themselves dissimilar. It is by definition alone that clearness and accuracy of argumentation can be effected. The chief subjects upon which debate can occur are those in which words have a vague, loose, and indeterminate signification;

this at once, and distinctly, exhibits the points in which that divergency of ideas, which creates the necessity of debate, consists. It is quite evident that any error in the early stages of discussion—any neglect of the means by which particularity and definitude may be given to the opinions which we have espoused, or those which we oppose, will lead to greater perplexity in the subsequent steps, and render the final unravelment of the subject more complex, intricate, and involved than before. If we have Truth upon our side, or the love of truth in our heart, we shall consider definition essential to the perfect discussion of any question. Those only who are in error, and love it, or who wish to entangle us in the meshes of sophistry, will eschew definition. Definition should convey exactly the whole of the intended meaning, and neither more nor less. For further information on this topic we cannot do better than refer our readers to our remarks upon it contained in Chap. III. of "The Art of Reasoning."

2nd. All personalities should be carefully avoided.

Nothing so much tends to blind the judgment, and pervert the reason, as the awakening of the rancorous passions of our nature. They hurry us on, with the force of an unrestrained current, until we drift far out of view of the object which we sought to gain, and spread a misty, vaporous veil before the mental eye. If Truth be our aim, *ideas*, and not *persons*, are the just objects of attack. Anything affecting the appearance, qualifications, &c., of an opponent cannot, in the least, affect the truth or falsehood of the proposition he affirms; so that any personal reflections which may be cast out do not impugn the accuracy of the opinions he entertains, or the principles he advocates; and there is much more honour in refuting the arguments of an opponent than in defaming his character. Some people seem to take as a maxim in discussion, "throw plenty of mud, some is sure to stick,"—as if there was no distinction between the man and his opinions. How true is the saying, that "no orator can measure in effect with him who can give good nicknames." So far as a man's opinions are concerned, the only way in which you can successfully convince him of his errors is, not by showering ridicule on his physical defects—loading his name with opproprious epithets or sly insinuations—raining wrath-torrents of invective against the character of his party or sect—or treating his position in society with scorn; but by carefully analyzing, carefully refuting, or calmly objecting to, and arguing against, the principles which he espouses, and the reasonings with which he defends them. Never meet undeniable truth with the rebuff, that the person who utters it is unworthy of notice. It is our duty not to notice *him*, but to reverence truth.

3rd. Egotistical expressions should be studiously eschewed.

There is a sort of repellant feeling which springs up in the minds of hearers, which inclines them to be disgusted with, and to resent, any arrogation of superiority. No one, however he may tacitly admit the superiority of another, is gratified by that super-excellence being brandished in his face; and hence all phrases of self-sufficiency have the effect of supervening a prejudice against the person who employs them, and making them unwilling to admit his opinions to be true, even when they are so. If you address an audience, remember that for the

time being they are a jury by whom your opinions are to be judged ;—if you insult their judgment by arrogance, will they not avenge it by neglect. The true art of conciliating an audience is to place them on a footing of perfect equality—nay, to allow them a conventional superiority. Besides, such expressions must excite the egotism of your opponent, and, instead of a warfare for truth, Debate is apt to degenerate into a mere trial of personal skill in the art of wielding the weapons of a wrangling, sophistical, strategetical logic. To speak egotistically is, as it were, to give a verdict in our own favour :—there is a want of true dignity and confidence displayed in it—it has more of the appearance of browbeating and prejudgment—more of a disposition to maintain one's own infallibility, than a sincere desire for truth-acquirement. It wants that appearance of dispassionateness and impartiality, which has so great an influence on the popular mind. No man can be esteemed an honest Truth-seeker, whose interest, station, fame, or egotism are so preposterously obtruded into the debate.

4th. The consequences which we deduce from the opinions of an opponent should not be charged against him.

It is a very common error amongst debaters to make their own deductions from the premises laid down by an opponent, and by hunting them into absurdities concocted only in their own brain assert their ridiculousness, pass them unanswered, and thus overwhelm him with ridicule, leaving his reason unconvinced. In a mere contest for victory, this might be excusable; but in discussion originated with the ostensible object of honest investigation, it is obviously inadmissible. There is doubtlessly great force in witticism—immense power in a *double entendre.* A sly insinuation—an arch remark—a keen sarcasm—or a jocular *argumentum ad hominem vel verecundiam* can raise a laugh at the expense of an adversary, but it can neither prove the truth nor falsehood of any fact, theory, or principle. It is a double-edged weapon, which cuts equally well on whichever side it is employed. The consequences which we may deduce from any set of principles may be, and very often are, such as the originator of those principles, or the supporter of them, has neither seen nor would admit. As well might we ascribe all the inventions resulting from the discovery of any law of Nature to the discovery of that law, as ascribe all the consequences of any opinion to the person who suggested or upholds it. These consequences may exist *potentially* in the premises which he asserts; but as he has not inferred them, they ought not in justice to be charged against him—*e. g.*, the principles a man espouses may, when carried out to their utmost logical results, be favourable to infidelity, atheism, or licentiousness ; but if *he* has not so carried them out, it is most unjust to charge him with being an infidel, an atheist, or a licentious man. In arguing, it is quite legitimate *to prove* that they may lead to such results, and thus confute the principles which our adversary maintains, but to insinuate that his personal character is tainted by these principles, is an unjustifiable stretch of the freedom of speech.

5th. Our opponent should never be accused of acting from wrong motives, and all his arguments ought to be answered, whether we consider him sincere in the utterance of them or not.

To act thus, is to forsake argumentation and betake one's self to invective—is to distract the mind from the truth of his assertions, and by the aid—it may very likely be—of calumny, to darken the mental vision of the hearers,—is to give up rationality, and employ aspersion. It may be very advantageous for one who has the wrong side of the question, and knows so, to debate after this fashion; but he who is "armed with truth and honesty" needs no such weapon, and will not stoop to the employment of any such artifice. To do this is not to reason, but to recriminate. Our business is, not what are the motives of the man, but are his assertions true or false?—his reasoning valid or invalid? To intermix motives and opinions in one mass of verbiage is not argumentation—leads not to the elucidation of truth, but tends to introduce confusion and difficulty into our inquiries; and with regard to the audience it is like stirring up the sand at the bottom of a fountain before inviting your friends to drink:—it is not a purifying but a defiling process. Diatribes, volubly uttered, in well-rounded phraseology, may deceive the vulgar, but cannot make men wiser, or impart more accurate opinions on any topic. If the above opinions be correct, it will naturally follow that each argument should be fairly, honestly, and candidly met, and calmly, yet clearly answered. A respectful tone and gentlemanly demeanour should be preserved,—Billingsgate should be eschewed, and everything savouring of the "fancy" should be carefully and sedulously guarded against.

These, we think, are the chief laws which should be kept in view while engaged in controversy. The *minutiæ* of debate is generally settled by the mutual agreement of the respective parties, or by the rules of the societies which are established for this purpose. We would willingly enlarge upon the advantages which may result from well-conducted discussion, in aiding the mind to form correct opinions, and to detect erroneous ones—in increasing the power of thought and the acumen of the intellect—in forming decision of judgment and readiness of expression—in calling forth the mental capacities, and inclining men to engage in intellectual pursuits, and thus furthering the advancement, elevation, and gradual improvement of our race. To do so, however, would lead us beyond the limits assigned us, and add another heavy page to the tedious infliction with which we have this month wearied our readers. We cannot, however, conclude, without recommending to them the aspiration of the poet-philosopher—Xenophanes—

"Oh! that mine were the deep mind, prudent, and *looking to both sides*."

S. N.

RULES FOR MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

In an early No. of this Magazine we requested the Secretaries of Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies to forward to us copies of their laws, and promised that we would endeavour to compile a "model" code from those received. We have now to thank numerous friends for their prompt compliance with that request: and, at the earnest solicitation of several correspondents, we proceed this month to fulfil our promise.

Time, and a desire to be practical, forbid us attempting to scatter the flowers of Rhetoric around this subject, or to present an essay on that "order" which

is "Heaven's first law." Nor is this necessary; for the importance of good "rules of action" will be admitted in all associated bodies. Indeed, error has generally lain in the opposite direction—of attributing to rules too great a potency, and expecting from them too much. When the prosperity of a society is waning, it is frequently the practice to call in question the propriety of the rules, without considering the spirit and manner in which those rules have been carried out; forgetting that while rules may direct energy, they cannot create it; and that they never will supply the lack of earnest men.

The first matter which claims attention in framing a code of laws for a society, is the object at which it is to aim; clear and definite ideas on this point are essential to the order and propriety of what is to follow. A consideration of the objects will suggest the name,—which should always be *short* and *expressive*. Long names are objectionable, and high-sounding ones ridiculous.

The next subject for consideration will be the means to be brought into operation for securing the objects of the Society. These will, in some measure, depend upon its size and general character; but if it be established for mutual improvement,—discussions, essays, and lectures, should all be contemplated. The lectures, if of an interesting character, may be thrown open to the public, on a small charge for admission. A Library of standard works is very desirable, and in addition to this, or as a substitute for it, a Reading Club should be commenced, for the purchase and circulation among the members of new books and expensive periodicals, such as reviews, &c. We say, *expensive periodicals* advisedly, and maintain, on general grounds, that persons interested in any cheap magazine ought to purchase it themselves, both for the sake of themselves and from the fact that such a magazine requires an immense *sale* to make it self-supporting.

With respect to the admission of members, few restrictions will be found necessary. A desire to join a society for the improvement of the mind is a strong testimony in favour of those who possess it; and if the applicants are known to the members, their general impression will be sufficient to enable them to come to a wise decision. The amount of the annual subscription required may easily be determined by calculating the probable expenses of the society, and the probable number of those who will have to bear them. While low rates of subscription are fashionable, it is important that a society should not be crippled in its resources.

Again: the size and circumstances of a society should determine the number of its officers. If there be a man of influence connected with it, or even known to be friendly to its objects, he may be solicited to become the president. He should preside at the annual, and some of the other more public, meetings: his name will give the society a local standing which it otherwise would not possess. In such a case, a vice-president will be needed for taking the chair when the president is absent. But if the society cannot find such a man for president, as we have referred to, it should elect one of its own members to perform the same duties, under the more humble title of "chairman." This should be an individual well acquainted with the order of business, and exhibiting *suaviter in modo* and *fortiter in re*. A

treasurer and secretary will be indispensable, and upon the latter much will depend. He should be a man known to have the interest of the society at heart, and possessed of general intelligence and the "pen of a ready writer." If there be a library, a librarian will, of course, be required. A society having less than twenty-five members might manage its own affairs without a committee, or have a committee of three individuals, in addition to the officers; three to form a quorum. A society of forty members might elect six committee men, five forming a quorum. Large committees are not generally found to work well — the business is left to a few active men, who ought to have all the honour, as they have all the labour.

The frequency of the meetings must depend on the engagements of the members, and the time of opening and closing upon their convenience; only let what is fixed by law be strictly adhered to, except when otherwise determined by vote. We think that such societies as those we are treating upon, should meet *at least* once a fortnight, and where it is possible, once a week. We are acquainted with some that meet monthly; but they are very ineffective, and are, what some of our contemporaries would delight to designate—"great shams." In addition to the ordinary meetings, opportunities should be given at stated periods, for friendly intercourse and enjoyment. The social element in human nature has been too much overlooked by the promoters of these societies; this we believe to be a principal cause of their frequent dissolution, and more frequent decline.

To maintain societies in a healthy state, it is essential that the members regularly attend the meetings; in order to secure this, fines for absence, in some instances, have been enacted. We can say little of their practical effect, as we have rarely seen them enforced. We incline to the opinion that where interest will not draw a person to a meeting, the fear of a fine will not drive him. But when members agree to enact fines, we should say, *in every instance enforce them.* Laws that are not maintained are powerless for good, and productive of evil. It is important for a society to know at any time who are *boná fide* members, and hence there should be a rule for dissolving the connexion of those who have been absent for a given period, without assigning a satisfactory reason. It may also be necessary in a society where discussions are carried on, to have as a proviso, a rule authorizing the expulsion of any disorderly member; but for the honour of human nature, we with pleasure record the fact, that in a somewhat lengthened experience, we never met with an instance in which this penalty was required to be inflicted.

In conclusion, it is well to guard against change, and minister to stability, by adding a rule, prohibiting the alteration of the preceding ones, without due notice; or the dissolution of the society except by general consent.

We now append a set of rules framed in accordance with the suggestions that we have offered.

RULES.

Name.—I. That this Society be designated "The —— Mutual Improvement Society."

Object.—II. That its object shall be to promote the intellectual improvement of

its members, and to facilitate acquaintance and fellowship with individuals of similar views and character.

Means.—III. That periodical meetings be held, for the discussion of questions, the reading of essays, and the delivery of lectures.

Members.—IV. That all persons desirous of being admitted to the Society shall be proposed and seconded by two members, at an ordinary meeting, and that their admission be decided at the next meeting, by ballot, in their temporary absence.

Subscriptions.—V. That each member subscribe not less than —— per annum, to be paid quarterly, in advance.

Office-Bearers.—VI. That the affairs of this Society be conducted by a President, Vice-President, Treasurer, Secretary, and Six Members, who together shall form a committee of management, and meet at least once a month; five to form a quorum.

Duties of Committee.—VII. That it shall be the duty of the committee to undertake the general business of the Society; that questions for discussion, and subjects of lectures, be first approved by them, and that they make the necessary arrangements for all meetings.

Ordinary Meetings.—VIII. That the ordinary meetings of the Society be held ——, to commence at —— o'clock and close at —— o'clock, unless a majority of the members present wish to continue the business.

Annual Meetings.—IX. That the Annual Meeting of the Society be held in the month of ——, when the Secretary's Report and Treasurer's Account (being duly audited) shall be presented, and the Officers and Members of the Committee shall be chosen by ballot, for the ensuing year, and such matters considered as may affect the interest of the Society.

Social Meetings.—X. That the Committee arrange once a quarter for Social Meetings of the Members and friends, at which tea shall be provided, and business of an interesting character introduced. At these meetings Ladies shall be invited to attend.

Members' Privilege.—XI. That Members may introduce friends, by tickets, to the ordinary meetings of the Society, but such Visitors shall not be entitled to take part in the proceedings.

Non-Attendance.—XII. That in case any members absent themselves from three successive regular meetings, the Secretary shall communicate with them, and if no satisfactory reason be assigned, and they continue absent from the next three meetings, their connexion with the Society shall cease.

Expulsion.—XIII. That any member refusing to obey the decision of the Chairman, or violating the laws of the Society, may be expelled by the Committee; but such member shall have the right of appeal to the Society at an ordinary meeting; the decision (by ballot) of a majority of the members then present shall be final.

Alteration of Rules.—XIV. That no rule of the Society be altered or rescinded but by a majority of the members present at an Annual or Special Meeting; a month's notice having been given of such proposed alteration: and that the Society shall not be dissolved, or its meetings suspended, except by the consent of two-thirds of the members.

We cannot close without recommending to all our readers the countenance and support of these societies. We would urge as many as can to become members; and where there is no society existing, with these rules, and the information given from time to time in our pages, we do not see why any young man should hesitate to propose the formation of one. To such we shall be happy to give any further assistance in our power: and it will afford us sincere pleasure to have an opportunity here of recording their success. As an example to others, we cannot but add a letter which has for some time been lying upon our table:—

"Gentlemen,—In the month of August last I called a meeting of all my acquaintances (young men) in this town, and proposed to establish a debating society, which was unanimously agreed to, and a committee appointed to frame rules, &c. The society was commenced with spirit on Sept. 3, and on our next night of meeting, which was a public night, one of our members delivered the opening address to the society, before a numerous and highly respectable audience. The members now number 19; and I have been appointed secretary and treasurer.

"In a conversation with one of my friends, he mentioned your journal, when I at once ordered the last No., with which I was so well pleased, that I ordered a complete set. And if my testimony to the value of your much-wanted publication will be of any service, you are at liberty to add it to those you have already received. "I am, &c.,

"Wigtown, Oct. 23, 1850." "J. C."

West London Mental Improvement Society.—This Society has sustained a great loss in the unexpected death of the much-esteemed vice-president, Mr. Edward Hanks. The great interest he had taken in the welfare and instruction of the young for *thirty years*, will endear his name to the memory and affections of all who knew him. On Saturday, November 9th, his remains were deposited in St. John's Wood Burying-ground; and the unsought demonstration of feeling displayed upon that occasion most fully proved the great esteem in which he was held. About two hundred persons (mostly young) were present.

Dunmow Literary Institution.—After several futile attempts to establish a class for Mutual Instruction, in connection with the above Institution, an Essay Class has been formed, and on Thursday evening, the 7th of November, it met for the first time, when a very instructive and interesting Paper was read by Mr. Barfield, the Secretary of the Institution, and for which he received the unanimous thanks of the class.

Stourbridge Mechanics' Institution.—On Monday evening, September 30th, the members and friends of this institution held a *soiree* at the New Corn Exchange. About three hundred persons sat down to tea. The chair was subsequently taken by J. H. H. Foley, Esq., M.P., who opened the meeting with a suitable address. The Hon. and Rev. W. H. Lyttleton next addressed the meeting, and in the course of an interesting speech observed that much had been said by him against novels, but he must concede that some might be read with pleasure and profit, and he here instanced the work entitled "Mary Barton," which had been written by the wife of a Dissenting minister, of Manchester, while watching the lingering illness of a little child. He, however, preferred works on history, the arts and sciences, and exhorted the mechanics and working men present to devote their spare time to the perusal of such. Mr. Akroyd remarked, that working men were never so enlightened as at present, and this he attributed in part to the efforts of such institutions as theirs. The meeting was afterwards addressed by the Rev. J. Hossack and Messrs. Thompson, Yeomans, &c.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

26. Would some of the readers of your valuable Magazine inform a young man who has a great taste for Mathematics, the best course to pursue in order to become acquainted with that science? I have Chambers' Algebra and Geometry, and a box of instruments.—T. J. B.

27. What course of study would you recommend a young man to pursue who is desirous of obtaining a thorough knowledge of the Latin Language without the aid of a master?—J. R.

28. Will some of your readers inform me what amount of knowledge is necessary to obtain a diploma of B.A. or M.A.?—T. J. B.

29. I should feel greatly obliged if you would recommend to me a good book on dyeing woollen cloth, stating price, &c., and where obtainable. Could you put me in communication with any of your friends upon this matter? For any information received, I would readily recompense. Some hundreds of ends pass through my hands weekly. I can tell when the colours are not right; but when anything is wrong, I want to know the *cause* which has produced the effect.—H. R. S.

30. I am a young man, in the upper class of a public school, and am most unfortunately troubled with considerable hesitation of speech, which is both annoying to myself and distressing to those who hear me. I must tell you that this is so much the effect of *nervousness*, that I have no difficulty in reading or reciting anything when in a room by myself. If you, or any of your kind correspondents, could give me good advice, as to what plan to pursue for the removal of so obvious a defect, I should ever feel the deepest gratitude, as my present situation precludes any chance of obtaining academical honours.—E. T.

31. Will you allow me to ask, through the medium of your columns, if any of your readers can recommend me a few good, though not expensive works on Composition and Punctuation?—F. R. Y.

32. I would not trouble you with this request, were it not that the information sought may be of service to more than myself, and that I encourage the hope, from your ardent desire to assist any who are striving after knowledge, that you will be pleased to afford me the desired information. The time which is not consumed in my employment, I wish to use in gaining that knowledge which will be of the most service to me and of power to benefit my fellow men. The sciences I wish more particularly to study are,—Astronomy, Grammar, Arithmetic, Geography, Algebra, Geometry, Geology, Chemistry, Mechanics, and Optics, but, above all, the Art of Reasoning, the desire for which has been much strengthened by reading the beautiful articles relating to it in the *Controversialist*. Will you inform me what books I should purchase on each science, and how far in each study it would be needful to go, to obtain a good, sound, and practical knowledge of all, as my habits, tastes, and feelings, incline me to seek for proficiency in them all rather than to be great in one exclusively. The many Mutual Improvement Societies existing in the kingdom, with the undoubted good they are the means of conferring, the rapid spread of knowledge, which the *Controversialist* so nobly aids, and the importance of cultivating our talents, all urged me to the decision I have come to and which prompts me thus to address you. With my earnest wishes for the continued success of your laudable undertaking, and with all respect, I beg to subscribe myself, Yours, very faithfully.—T. S.

(*Answers to these Inquiries will be found in Vol. II.*)

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

19. *Geography.*—Of all the branches of knowledge upon which the intellect of man has been brought to bear, there is not one perhaps, which is of greater importance or from which greater results, physical and otherwise, have been obtained than from the inquiries which have been instituted upon this subject. Whether we follow in the path of history, unfolding the buried secrets of nations, revealing the mainsprings of that power which has called nations into existence, bidden them flourish for a time, and then, alas! suddenly buried them in one common ruin, left them nought but awful silence—"silence how profound!"—their arts, sciences, laws, all buried in that long night of ages which seems to have no morrow. Gone are the voices of their sages, their poets, their minstrels, even as the sounds of those thrilling chords that awoke to strains of harmony and mirth. Gone, like the warlike prince and the courtly dame; silent are they now, even as their palace walls. There lie those palaces in awful oblivion, so still that the spirit of nature seems brooding there; the very stones seem to have ears and eyes, but no tongue. And yet, what may one not hear there? May we not hear the voice of time warning us of evil days. The echoes of buried centuries sighing upon the blast amid the crumbling ruins of decay; bidding us—

> "Learn the lofty destiny,
> Which restless time prepares
> For every living soul?"

History, which bids us profit by experience, teaches us to shun the quicksands and shoals that have sunk so many noble barks—brings forth the light of all antiquity to guide our devious course—places us face to face with the men of the past, the heroic warrior, the lofty statesman, the suffering or the victorious patriot—bids us hear the murmurs of a groaning people oppressed unto death, sounding like the roar of ocean's surge on the distant shore. Or if we follow the track of science, with its sublime teachings, its utterances of spiritual things—for we contend that science should be studied for its teachings, not for its facts merely: that its revelations are inferior to few; that the temple of nature ought to have its high priest, equally with the temple of Judaism—here, too, will it be seen that the subject of Geography is of paramount importance. Whether we take one or other branch—the history of plants, animals, or of man—all are in a great degree dependent upon this; it is the centre of gravity around which they revolve. Even the study of Literature depends upon this, as greatly as that of Philosophy. For literature cannot be studied to advantage without a knowledge of history; and it is evident from what has been said before, that this depends, for a proper understanding, upon Geography. "Geography and Chronology," it has been well said, "are the eyes of History."

This branch of knowledge is divided into three sections,—mathematical, physical, and political. The first of these departments treats of the magnitude, figure, and motions of the earth; its relation to the system of the universe; the motions, distances, &c., of the different planets of the solar system; the divisions of the earth's surface into hemispheres, zones, degrees of latitude, longitude, &c. The second division is that which treats of the characteristics of the globe which we inhabit—whether of the height of its mountains, the depths of its valleys, or the coast line of its continents; its winds, tides, atmosphere, &c.; with the

distinguishing features of the various countries of the earth. Of either of the three branches into which Geography is divided, this, perhaps, is the most invigorating, since it opens to the mind such expansive views of the world we inhabit,—

> "From the most gloomy glens
> Of Greenland's sunless clime,
> To where the golden fields
> Of fertile England spread
> Their harvest to the day."

Or it will conduct us to the sunny land of Italy, the "Land of Song," where the waves

> "Play glad with the breezes;"

show us its fertile valleys, its matchless flora, its lovely fields of richest pasturage. Or it will lead us where

> "Beside the eternal Nile,
> The Pyramids have risen;"

or

> "Where the wandering Arab's tent
> Flaps in the desert blast."

It will teach us the physical conditions which have been most favourable to the development of the human mind—lead us to the wonders of Geology, which have upset many a worn-out theory, the speculation of a by-gone age—or to the vegetable and animal kingdoms, where the link is drawn so close that no one can detect the subtle division, if division there be of the two: no one can tell where animal life ends and vegetable life begins, so close is the mysterious web of creation spun. So wondrously small are the members of the animal kingdom, that there are supposed to be species which it is beyond the power of the microscope to detect; hence comes that witticism of Byron's, where he says, "The *smallest* animals have *still smaller* to torment them."

The third and last division of Geography is political, and treats of the arbitrary divisions of land and water, whether by conquest or treaty; of the population of towns, cities, countries, &c. This, of course, has its value, and must be studied before any sound political views can be obtained.

As to the requisites for studying this subject, they are, as others, exceedingly numerous. If, however, the student will make a judicious selection, he may get a good knowledge of the subject with an expenditure of a few pounds, and of course a tolerable share of the other requisite, namely, close study; for it is the key to everything.

We will give a selection of different works which may be judiciously studied. Yet here we tread with fear, lest we should be misunderstood. For some we know will say, Why omit to mention such and such works? others, Why not tell us how to get a speedy and easy knowledge? while a third party will say, It is not thorough enough. To such we would say, that this Magazine does not profess to teach these subjects, but merely to point the way which a student may travel with profit to himself. Well, in the first place, we beg those of our readers for whose benefit these papers are written to get rid of the notion that to be able to repeat by rote the names of a few towns, the different divisions of countries, &c., is that expansive science Geography—it is nothing of the kind. The miserable pittance doled out at many seminaries is worthy of no such name.

In the first place, to commence the study, a good atlas is indispensable. There is an admirable one published by Orr and Co., "Milner's Descriptive Atlas of Astronomy, Physical and Political Geography," price 25s. unbound in parts. The quantity and quality of this work render it one of the cheapest it has been our lot to see. It consists of three fine maps, with letterpress in each 1s. part. There is also a nice portable one published by H. G. Collins, under the title of the "College Atlas," about 12s., but it contains no physical maps. Then there are the splendid atlases published by Blackwood, and one by Black—two of the former publisher's are entirely physical, at £10 10s and £2 2s., the one being an abridgment and smaller edition of the other. The latter is under the title of the "Imperial Atlas," £2 2s., a very fine work. But the first mentioned work will answer every purpose for general students. Then for works of Letterpress, treatises on Geography, Malte Brun's system is considered the best, but it is very expensive, £7 15s. the ten vols. But there is a work founded on this, 30s. Bell's Geography is a good one, six vols.; it is now being republished. There is a fine treatise on Physical Geography in the "Gallery of Nature." Somerville's "Physical Geography" is also a very fine work, in two vols., 12s. Any of these works read with care will give a vast amount of information.

Smaller books are—"Goldsmith's Geography, improved by G. N. Wright," 3s. 6d.; "Gilbert's Outlines of Geography," 4s.; "Hughes' Outlines of Physical Geography," 3s. 6d. Sullivan's Geography, written for the Irish National schools, is one of the best little works we have seen for some time; it contains many new and popular illustrations of the figure of the earth, its relation to the solar system, &c., 3s. 6d.

The young student should cultivate the habit of consulting his atlas as he would his dictionary; not to guess at the locality of a place, but to be sure. This habit will amply repay him. A gazetteer also should be kept for reference, which generally contains just the concise description you require when reading. Blackie is now publishing an admirable one with engravings, as a companion to the "Imperial Dictionary," which was noticed at page 192 of this Magazine; it is called the "Imperial Gazetteer," in 2s. 6d. parts, and divisions, we suppose, the same as the former work.—E. B.

20. *Ecclesiastic History.*—I would recommend to J. J. W. the following works, in the order given:—Mosheim's, Milner's, and one by the Tract Society. To obtain a general view of the different centuries, I would recommend a little book reviewed in the second number of the *Controversialist*; "Facts and Opinions for Churchmen and Dissenters." London: Partridge and Oakey.—W. T.

Allow me to recommend to your readers a work entitled "Universal History on Church Principles," five volumes. London: Bagster and Sons. "Timpson's Church History" presents a comprehensive outline, sufficient for general purposes. I believe it is published by Snow. A. C.

21. *A Course of Study for a Young Man.*—The first thing, I conceive, which should receive the attention of a young man, "in earnest upon the work of self-education;" is the Grammar of his native tongue; then he may take up the various branches of knowledge mentioned in the "Course of Reading" recommended in the first and second

Numbers of the *British Controversialist;* after this, he should commence composition, as pointed out in the valuable paper contained in your September Magazine. That article, and the one on Grammar, W. O. will do well carefully to study, as well as the others on Elocution, Geography, &c —A. C.

22. *The War Question:—the Example of the Apostle Paul.*—On an attentive perusal of the whole narrative, I confess it appears difficult to me to discover any difficulty in it. How stands the matter? Paul is a prisoner in the custody of the Romans; the Jews conspire to kill him; his kinsfolk become acquainted with the murderous intention; his nephew brings him tidings of the diabolical compact; he sends that nephew to inform the chief captain; the request made is, that he may not be delivered up to the infuriated Jews, upon their request on the morrow to be murdered by them. What is there in all this to countenance the practice of war? what protection asked inconsistent with peace? The prisoner is in the power of the Romans. To acknowledge this is but the acknowledgment of a fact. He prefers so to remain, rather than be delivered up to the Jews. Instead of inciting to war, he asks that blood may not be shed. He recognises the power of the Roman Government, but does so in perfect consistency with the principles of the gospel of Christ. His object was evidently to prevent the Jews becoming guilty of murder. He accomplished it in a perfectly legitimate and peaceable manner, and saved the Romans and Jews from collision and strife. He gives a prudent example to Christians, in trying and difficult circumstances, to seek for peace.—J. C.

23. *Mental Philosophy.*—Perhaps the following outline of this science may be of service to your correspondent S. F. M., and others.

Understanding.

1. Primary.	2. Subordinate.	3. Creative.
1. Sensation	1. Attention	1. Imagination
2. Reflection	2. Conception	2. Taste
3. Memory	3. Association	3. Genius
4. Judgment	4. Abstraction	
5. Reasoning	5. Generalisation	

Will.

1. Animal principles of action:—	4. Affections
2. Self love	5. Passions
3. Desires	6. Conscience

1. Sensation. An effect produced on the mind by an external object, through the senses.

2. Reflection. The action of the mind in thinking on sensations.

3. Memory. The power of retaining and recalling sensations or reflections.

4. Judgment. The act of comparing ideas, *i.e.*, sensations or reflections.

5. Reasoning. The act of deducing conclusions from given premises.

I. Attention. The power of retaining ideas for due consideration.

II. Conception. The power of apprehending knowledge previously acquired.

III. Association. The power of linking ideas together by real or fancied connection.

IV. Abstraction. The power of analysing sensations.

V. Generalisation. The power of combining ideas into species and genera.

First, Imagination. The power of recombining sensations into new forms.

Second, Taste. The power of appreciating beauty and sublimity.

Third, Genius. The excellence of all the mental powers: it is creative.

1. Animal principles of action. The senses when acting as appetites.

2. Self-love. The principle which inclines us to seek for happiness.

3. Desires. The principles which lead us to *wish for* an object.

4. Affections. The principles which inspire us with inclinations towards others.

5. Passions. The affectionate principle in undue action.

6. Conscience. The power which enables us to distinguish virtue from vice, right from wrong, good from evil.—S. N.

24. *Phrenotypics.* I have studied several systems of phrenotypics, but have been somewhat disappointed with all. The most service they have rendered me has been in connection with chronology, especially in fixing in my memory an "Outline of History," by *localising* the centuries. I think a knowledge of phrenotypics would not be of much advantage in studying Latin and Greek. Sometimes, while complicated instruments are being prepared, the work might be done; and just so, we conceive, it is with phrenotypics. The answer to "A Subscriber's" second question must depend upon the time which he has at his command. If it is not a great deal, he should take Latin first; but if otherwise, he may study Latin and Greek simultaneously.—A. C.

NOTICE OF BOOKS.

History of France from the earliest times down to the present year. Edited by H. White, B. B. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd.

This is an interesting history of an interesting people. Though designed for the use of schools, it will be very acceptable to many whose school days are past. We commend it to the attention of those readers who are in want of such a work.

CONCLUDING ADDRESS.

EVERY period of the year, like every season of life, appears to have linked with it peculiar duties, as well as special privileges. The closing weeks of one year, and the opening days of another, have ever been regarded as most appropriate for the work of retrospection and preparation. The old Romans expressed this idea in their mythology, by placing at the threshold of the new year a two-faced god, who thus at one time was made to contemplate the past and to look towards the future. The wisdom of the ancient sages will not be decried by the men of modern days; for the duty which they thus indicated is practically acknowledged by us, both in our individual relationships and in our more public functions—whether these be performed in the "sphere of business" or in the "world of letters." Hence the closing year ushers in the so-called *prefaces* from editorial pens, which might with more propriety be denominated *affixes*, being written last, and designed to tell of what has been accomplished, rather than of what is contemplated.

The range of our operations as Editors of the *British Controversialist* has been somewhat limited as to time, and therefore our record need be but brief. Long familiar with the periodical literature of our country, and deeply interested in the many grave subjects therein debated, we had marked how every journal was the organ of some party, or the pledged advocate of certain principles, and the idea occurred to us that a Magazine was wanted for the *impartial* discussion of great questions—a Magazine in which the *pro* and *con* of every question should be presented—a Magazine truly open to all, but devoted to none. That idea, like one of the fabled *genii* of antiquity, followed us in our intellectual wanderings and presented itself ever and anon to our mental gaze. At length we took the first step towards giving the idea a practical embodiment; and in the month of January, 1850, published a prospectus of our Magazine, stating the want we ourselves had felt, and setting forth the manner in which we thought the want might be supplied. In that prospectus the following paragraph occurred:—"Such, then, is a general outline of the project to which public attention is drawn, and on which an expression of opinion is solicited. The promoters of this scheme are not anxious to *thrust* themselves into the literary world, but if it be thought that the course which they have thus indicated may be pursued with advantage, they will not shrink from entering upon it. They therefore solicit all who approve of the proposition at once to communicate with them: and on the nature of the response given will the existence of the Magazine depend."

The proposal thus made was hailed with the warmest expressions of approval in numerous communications received from men of all shades of opinion, in every part of the United Kingdom. The call so unmistakably given was readily obeyed. We at once addressed ourselves to the work, and the first Number of the *British Controversialist* was published in the month of May following. Various were the

impressions produced upon the public mind by our first issue. The novelty and ingenuity of its plan was acknowledged by all, and admired by not a few; while as regarded our ultimate success, strong were the doubts of some, and many the fears of others. Without any undue concern on this point, we pursued our course with a firm step and an unwavering purpose—every month extending the range of our action, and widening the circle of our influence—and now we rejoice that we can say we have received conclusive evidence, not only that we have gained a large share of public favour, but that, in many quarters (to use the terms of a friendly critic), "hesitation" has given place to "confidence," and confidence been increased to "perfect satisfaction."

The spirit which pervades our controversial department will, we think, be regarded as unexceptionable. Bitterness, that bane of controversy, we have sought to repress, and endeavoured to present an example of earnest men of different sects and parties, seeking to aid each other in the acquisition of truth. With respect to our own position in debatable matters, we believe we have maintained, to the satisfaction of all, the strictest impartiality. We have never presumed to decide a question, but, having placed the evidence before our readers, we have left them to pronounce their verdict. In pursuing this course we have avoided prejudice, while we have rendered service to truth, and done homage to reason.

Another and most interesting part of our operations is that in which we have sought to give suitable instruction and advice to young men who are entering in earnest on the work of self-education and mental improvement. With such we strongly sympathize, and for them we cheerfully labour. We know the fears which agitate their hearts, as they think that they have

> "——— much to learn. That art is long,
> And life how short!"

To such we offered our services; these were promptly and gratefully accepted, and the labour thus imposed on us has been our joy, and its usefulness is our reward. The papers on "The Art of Reasoning" are the result of much careful reading and concentrated thought; and it has proved labour not misspent, for they have won "golden opinions from all sorts of men." The mysterious operations of mind have been made plain, the secret processes of the truth-acquiring faculties have been brought to light, and the acquisition of self-knowledge has thus been facilitated. The writer of these articles has laid us and our readers under deep obligations to him for these products of his pen. "The Inquirer," which was originally expected to do little more than occupy a vacant corner, has greatly increased in importance—every month giving utterance, in pressing questions, to the deeply felt wants of many youthful students, who have been bewildered in the labyrinths of learning, or who were unable to discover their pathway amid the mists of ignorance which enveloped them. Nor have they sought advice in vain: *every question put has been or will be answered;* and with respect to the character of these answers, the volume itself will speak. But this much we may say, that the advice herein addressed to a few, has been heard and appreciated by many.

"The Societies' Section" has enabled us to manifest our interest in those varied

institutions which are designed for the intellectual and moral elevation of man, and especially such as are founded upon the mutual-aid principle. Considering the importance of their objects, and the value of their healthful operation, it is to be regretted that in so many instances their prosperity, and very existence, has been of such an ephemeral character: and in so far as this is to be attributed to their isolated position, to their lack of collective intercourse and well-weighed counsel, we hope to do something towards its removal, and to assist in their more efficient management. We are much pleased in learning that the papers already inserted, notwithstanding the limited space allotted to them, have been of service in this respect; the advice given has been taken, and the examples recorded have been imitated. These first-fruits of our early efforts encourage us to persevere with increased zeal and unremitting ardour in this department of our labour, and this we hope to do during the coming year—the jubilant year of Mechanics' Institutions.

We have endeavoured to make every department of our Magazine not merely attractive, but useful—for we have sought not to amuse, but to elevate—but as we now stand and contemplate the whole, to be able to say that our ideal has been perfectly developed in the execution, would be more than human, while not to have strong confidence that the future will excel the past, would be less than natural. Our experience would be meagre indeed, if it suggested no new course nor onward movement. That such has not been the case, we may refer with confidence to the announcements of 1851, made elsewhere, and to the forthcoming Numbers themselves.

In closing these remarks, it would be inexcusable if we did not acknowledge, with grateful emotions, the ready support which we have received from all classes of our readers. Never, perhaps, in the history of periodical literature, has there been a more striking example of good feeling between editors and readers, and active efforts for mutual welfare, than is presented in our own case. To all who have in any way aided us, and especially to those who have written for our pages, we present our sincere and warmest thanks, and would commend to them and to all the motto which we ourselves have taken for the new year—"Onward, right on!"

And here we cannot but express our strong hope that in the coming year—a year so full of excitement and importance—we shall receive the countenance and support of those earnest friends whom we have already gathered round us; for it is mainly from the continued exertions of our readers that we confidently expect a large increase to their number; and we assure them that every addition thus made will be as new strength to our hands and fresh encouragement to our hearts, enabling us to go on adding improvement to improvement, until our Magazine becomes one of the "great facts" of the age, and the most popular organ for the unbiased consideration of all important questions which agitate the bosom of Society.

END OF VOL. I.