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THE  
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OF  
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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OF  
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY

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## THE CAUSAL FACTORS OF JUVENILE CRIME.

BY CYRIL BURT.

## SOURCES OF DATA.

(1) *Delinquent Groups.*

I PROPOSE to present, chiefly by a series of tables, a preliminary analysis of the causation of juvenile delinquency. The children and young persons, guilty of criminal conduct and examined for this research, fall into three broad groups: first, cases referred to me for investigation by magistrates, organisers of children's care, head-teachers, parents, and secretaries of associations dealing with juvenile delinquents; secondly, a somewhat smaller group encountered in an educational survey of a representative borough<sup>1</sup>; thirdly, a still smaller selection, studied during occasional visits to remand-homes or industrial schools, when recent entrants and representative samples were specially tested and reviewed.

A psychologist is always apt to receive an undue proportion of cases where the issue is not simply the cause of delinquency, but rather the determination of mental subnormality. Accordingly, I have endeavoured

<sup>1</sup> This survey had for its primary object an enquiry into the distribution of intelligence, with special reference to the incidence of backwardness and mental deficiency; but a watch was also kept for cases of delinquency and so-called moral defect. The proportion of delinquents thus discovered among the general school population was, for boys, 0.9 per cent., and, for girls, 0.6 per cent. But these figures comprise for the most part only the graver cases known to head teachers; and, therefore, particularly among the boys, must form a gross under-estimate. To the few thus ascertained must be added the many whose delinquencies are known to none but their parents, and the still greater number, whose delinquencies are never detected until later in life, or, being perhaps transitory, remain for ever unknown except to themselves. For the type of offences here contemplated and during the ages here reviewed, the proportion of occasional delinquents, among the total population for the same years, cannot be less than 5 per cent. for girls, nor less than 10 per cent. for boys and youths. But, by pressing the definitions for such offences as the infringement of police regulations or for such delinquencies as those connected with sex, and by including isolated petty thefts at home, one could expand the percentage up to any magnitude below one hundred.

to eliminate from the statistical analysis all children notified solely for psychological diagnosis; and, among the submitted cases, have retained only those sent to me either as a matter of routine or for general advice upon treatment. In the three groups investigated, the proportional incidence of the several causative factors proves to be approximately the same; and I am disposed, therefore, to infer that the whole series forms a fairly typical selection of delinquent children and young persons.

The total number comprises 123 boys and 74 girls, approximately two hundred cases in all. Since I have limited my analysis solely to those instances in which I have procured full evidence for all the conditions reviewed—family history, personal history, physical characteristics, and psychological characteristics—the numbers are inevitably slender. The average age of the individuals dealt with is 12·6 years for the boys; and slightly higher, namely 13·1 years, for the girls. The entire series ranges from 18·0 years, the age at which industrial school cases cease to be under the supervision of the managers, down to 7·0 for the girls, and 5·0 for the boys. Just over half of the cases, however, fall within the years 12- to 15-. Their distribution over the various age-groups is shown in Table I.

The offences committed by these children are of the usual type: stealing, truancy, wandering, damage, common assault, indecent assault, soliciting, or being beyond parental control. Of the nature and number of delinquencies I have given a detailed description elsewhere<sup>1</sup>.

TABLE I. *Distribution of Ages.*

Age last birthday	5-	6-	7-	8-	9-	10-	11-	12-	13-	14-	15-	16-	17-	Total
Percentage of boys in each age-group	4·1	3·3	4·1	4·9	5·7	5·7	9·0	10·6	12·2	14·6	16·3	6·5	3·3	100
Percentage of girls in each age-group	—	—	2·7	6·8	9·5	8·1	5·4	13·5	12·2	10·8	14·9	9·5	6·8	100

(2) *Control-Groups.*

General considerations suggest, and my investigations into other forms of mental subnormality strongly confirm, the supreme necessity in all such studies of a parallel inquiry among relatively normal individuals. To state, for example, that 19 per cent. of one's cases come from

<sup>1</sup> *Psyche*, Vol. II, No. 4, pp. 342-3, Table I, where the figures given refer to the same groups as are here described. It should be remarked that, in addition to the crimes punishable in an adult by penal servitude or imprisonment, there are certain other offences which only children can commit—notably non-attendance at day schools and being beyond parental control.



drunken or vicious homes<sup>1</sup>, or that 8 per cent. are mentally backward and subnormal<sup>2</sup>, or that 4 per cent. have no parents at all<sup>3</sup>, means nothing, until one has assessed the frequency of drunken or vicious homes, of backwardness, and of orphanhood among the general law-abiding population. A control-group is essential. To this end I have endeavoured to make identical studies of children of the same age and of the same social class, who may be regarded as morally normal. In the tables below I have added throughout percentages for these parallel cases<sup>4</sup>. In compiling such figures I have made use chiefly of case-histories got during two separate surveys—an investigation into the causes of backwardness, and a later enquiry upon the possibility of vocational guidance. In order that the age-distribution should be precisely the same, it has been further necessary to make a special examination of a few additional individuals, chiefly infants under seven and young persons over school age. In all I have taken 200 non-delinquent boys and 200 non-delinquent girls, carefully selecting them so that the percentages in the several age-groups and the proportions in the several social classes should be identical with those obtaining among the delinquents. The non-delinquents have all been tested, medically inspected, and reported upon by teachers, by parents, and by social investigators, according to the same general scheme<sup>5</sup>.

To gain trustworthy data upon the temperamental qualities of four hundred children would, it was found, consume an impracticable deal of time. Such observations as were furnished by parents or teachers differed widely in their fulness, in their accuracy, and in the standards upon which

<sup>1</sup> W. Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, p. 134. Although in what follows I comment from time to time on slight divergences from the views of this writer, it is impossible to mention his model investigation—so unlike the innumerable surveys that preceded it—without a tribute of gratitude and esteem to a work so admirably thorough upon a subject so incredibly complex.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> W. D. Morrison, *The Young Offender*, p. 134.

<sup>4</sup> A similar procedure has been adopted by me in the study of the causes of backwardness in school children. See *Report of an Investigation upon Backward Children in Birmingham*, City of Birmingham Stationery Department, 1921.

<sup>5</sup> For a few special medical examinations both of delinquent and non-delinquent cases I have been indebted to Dr Jessie Murray and to my sister Dr Marion Burt. I am also under a special obligation to the physicians and medical registrars of various hospitals, through which several of my cases have passed, for their kindness in granting me detailed notes of conditions observed.

I should add that my plan of study and my schedule or 'psychographic scheme' are, in their main outlines, the same for the delinquent as for the backward and the defective; they were, indeed, based upon those originally elaborated for the latter. Comparability has thus become easier to secure, and, I hope, safer to rely upon.

they were based. With the delinquents the more important facts respecting temperamental constitution were gathered, not from the first statements of the teachers, parents, or care committee visitors (though these were often invaluable), but from long intercourse with the children themselves, during out-of-school hours, in simple but varied social situations. Accordingly, for comparison a similar approach was sought to one hundred of the normal boys and fifty of the normal girls. For example, when calling upon, or offering an invitation to, one of the delinquent children, a second call or invitation was extended to a non-delinquent child of the same age and of the same school, dwelling, as a rule, in the same locality and street. Comparable pairs were thus studied side by side<sup>1</sup>. No attempt, however, was made to ascertain the working of psycho-analytic mechanisms among the control-groups, since this would have entailed an indefinite number of interviews with each child singly.

Such a twofold enquiry renders the whole procedure slow, and restricts the inferences drawn to a small and limited group. On the other hand, could all investigators adopt the same principle and pursue the same method, trustworthy results and tenable conclusions would be speedily achieved. Where, for instance, the assessment of certain factors is necessarily a matter of subjective impression—as in such vague conditions as alcoholism, poverty, and temperamental qualities—the percentages for the control-groups immediately afford a clue as to how the investigator is interpreting his terms. And, in the absence of any such control-enquiry, what is actually a characteristic of the general population, may be wrongly mistaken for a peculiarity of the criminal.

#### TABULATION OF DATA.

The conditions observed in both delinquent and non-delinquent groups are tabulated in detail in Tables V to VIII. The descriptions

<sup>1</sup> By repeated interviews I have made myself personally acquainted with every one of the 347 children in question. I am also indebted to many voluntary collaborators who have helped me, often at considerable cost of time and money to themselves, along similar lines; more particularly to Miss V. G. Pelling, Miss W. Charles, Miss D. Miller, Miss P. Woursell, Miss J. Kenwick, Mr Eric Farmer, and Mr Raisley Moorsom; and to a group of residents and workers associated with the Passmore Edwards Settlement. To head-teachers and to class-teachers, to organisers and visitors for children's care committees, my obligations are too numerous to specify. To Miss M. Alston and to Mr F. R. Hoare I am especially grateful for reports and detailed after-histories of children examined by me for the Sysonby Colony for Juvenile Delinquents; and to Miss Rawlinson, welfare-worker for the Committee for the Moral Welfare of Children (Islington and Finsbury), for similar notes upon others of my cases that have passed through her hands.

employed for the most part explain themselves<sup>1</sup>. The figures are shown in the form of percentages: and indicate the number of times the item specified was observed per hundred cases. The averages given for the delinquents are weighted averages, that is, they are based upon the total number of cases taken regardless of sex, not upon the simple arithmetic mean of the two percentages for boys and girls.

It will be at once perceived that an immense variety of adverse influences may, in a larger or smaller measure, provoke or pre-dispose to delinquency in children. In all, over 170 distinct conditions have been encountered, and are enumerated in the tables, every one of them likely to affect the child unfavorably. Seventy different conditions have been noted as forming, in one instance or another, the principal cause of a given child's criminality.

Thus, at the very outset, in studying delinquency, as in most other fields of individual psychology, we are confronted with the fact of multiple determination. Crime in any given person proves nearly always attributable, not to some single all-pervading cause, but to a converging multitude of alternative factors; and the nature of these factors, and of their varying combinations, may differ widely in different individuals.

#### DISTINCTION OF MAJOR AND MINOR FACTORS.

Amid all the tangle of contributory causes, some single condition not infrequently stands out as the most prominent or the most influential<sup>2</sup>. Often it can be definitely established that the individual in question showed no delinquent tendencies until the year of some unfortunate event. An illness, a friendship with some base acquaintance, the death or the re-marriage of a parent, the emergence within the growing child himself of some fresh interest or instinct—some dated crisis of this kind has often ascertainably preceded, and has perhaps plainly provoked, the first delinquent outburst. At times, with the same abruptness, so soon

<sup>1</sup> Some, it is true, are extremely vague. But in a brief preliminary review it seemed hardly worth while to define or discuss each condition at length. For the vaguest of all—the psychological factors—a fuller explanation will be found in a series of more popular articles recently published on "The Causes and Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency," *Psyche*, Vol. II, Nos. 3 and 4, and Vol. III, No. 1.

<sup>2</sup> This seems to have been the experience of other investigators; see *e.g.* Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, p. 162. We ourselves started with a fourfold classification of factors: (1) the principal or most conspicuous influence (if any); (2) the chief cooperating factor or factors; (3) minor predisposing or aggravating conditions; (4) conditions present but apparently inoperative. This subdivision, however, proved too elaborate for so small an array of cases; and, for the present preliminary account, it has seemed advisable to reduce the classification to the simpler twofold distinction as above described.

as the untoward condition has been removed, the child's misbehaviour has diminished and his outbreaks have ceased. In other instances some salient quality of the child's mind, existing from birth or inherited from his parents, at once explains the misconduct: a strong sex instinct, a weak and suggestible temper, or a general deficiency of intelligence. But in many cases to discover any one predominating factor is a more doubtful and precarious business. Here, to reduce the effect of personal preconceptions, each individual child has been discussed with other investigators who had equally a first-hand knowledge of his case; and an opinion has been passed only when an agreement has been attained. In a few rare instances, two or more factors seem to have exercised an influence that was almost equal; neither element alone, it would appear, could have precipitated the delinquency: it is the mutual reaction of the two which, by a kind of psychological chemistry, has generated the ultimate explosion. In such an event I have allowed the same weight to both cooperating factors by counting the equivalent of half a case to each. Last of all, there remains a distinct proportion, which, whether from the nature of the circumstances, or from the incompleteness of the analysis, have baffled all efforts at assigning any paramount factor. These last have been recorded under a separate heading of their own. In the rest of the cases the contributory causes have been separated into major factors and minor.

A summary of the numerous conditions, classified under fifteen heads, is shown in Table II. Major factors seemed discernible in about 95 per cent. of the cases, leaving about 5 per cent. (rather less in the case of the girls) with the major factor undetected or unassigned. In addition, subordinate factors<sup>1</sup> were recorded about 900 times per hundred cases—rather more with the girls, rather less with the boys. On an average, therefore, each delinquent child is the product of nine or ten adverse circumstances, one as a rule predominating, and all conspiring to draw him into crime.

The type of condition noted, however, is by no means peculiar to delinquent families. The same circumstances were observed in the non-delinquent cases 300 times per cent.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in children of the same social class similar conditions may coexist—on an average, about 3 per case—

<sup>1</sup> Many of these are, of course, but aspects or consequences of other factors; thus the death of the father may lead to poverty, weak discipline, re-marriage of the mother, and a step-father complex with two or three different elements, all separately enumerated in the tables. In this section of the text, hereditary conditions, existing in the parents and relatives, have not been reckoned as additional to the corresponding condition in the child.

<sup>2</sup> This figure does not include complexes, which were left unexplored in the control-group.

TABLE II. *Summary of Conditions.*

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent		
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor				
I. <i>Hereditary conditions:</i>								
A. Physical	2.4	48.9	4.2	51.5	53.1	30.5	33.2	31.8
B. Intellectual	4.0	34.2	1.4	30.1	35.6	8.5	8.0	8.2
C. Temperamental (with pathological symptoms)	11.3	26.1	15.0	35.4	42.2	24.0	15.5	19.7
D. Temperamental (with moral symptoms)	8.8	117.1	12.4	168.0	145.9	32.5	41.5	37.0
Total	26.5	226.3	33.0	285.0	276.8	95.5	98.2	96.7
II. <i>Environmental conditions:</i>								
A. Within the home:								
1. Poverty	3.2	82.2	—	78.4	82.5	78.5	74.0	[51.2] <sup>1</sup>
2. Defective family relationships	5.7	111.4	12.3	143.5	131.3	38.0	32.5	35.2
3. Defective discipline	8.9	82.9	8.2	51.7	79.5	12.0	11.0	11.5
4. Vicious home	3.2	39.8	7.0	70.4	55.5	10.0	9.5	9.7
B. Outside the home	8.9	54.6	5.5	46.1	59.7	22.0	19.5	20.7
Total	29.9	370.9	33.0	390.1	408.5	160.5	146.5	128.3
III. <i>Physical conditions:</i>								
Total	11.2	135.9	9.6	176.3	160.8	79.5	101.5	90.5
IV. <i>Psychological conditions:</i>								
A. Intellectual	11.4	61.0	6.8	54.1	62.8	25.0	24.5	24.7
B. Emotional:								
1. General	13.0	43.2	17.6	52.8	61.2	12.5	23.0	17.7
2. Specific	10.5	94.5	12.3	78.7	99.5	23.5	16.0	19.7
3. Interests	7.3	56.9	4.2	37.8	55.7	16.0	14.5	15.2
4. Complexes	11.2	128.3	13.7	162.9	152.6	—	—	—
Total	53.4	383.9	54.6	386.3	431.8	77.0	78.0	77.5
No major factor assignable	5.5	—	2.8	—	—	—	—	—
Grand total (II, III and IV only <sup>2</sup> )	100.0	890.7	100.0	952.7	1001.1	317.0	326.0	296.3

<sup>1</sup> See footnotes (1) and (\*) to Table VI.<sup>2</sup> Hereditary conditions, enumerated under I as occurring in the family history, have not been included in the grand totals, since presumably they have already been reckoned, as occurring in the children themselves, in headings II, III and IV.

without plunging the child into a criminal career. It must, as a rule, therefore, be either the number of factors or the particular combination of them, that renders delinquency a probable result.

## ERRORS OF SAMPLING.

With groups and group-differences so small as those here studied, it is needful to bear always in mind the degree of error which the narrow range of cases inevitably permits. Consider, as an illustrative instance, the effect of a sexually immoral home upon boys and girls respectively. Among the delinquent girls there were six living under such conditions; among the delinquent boys there were only three—half the number in a group nearly twice the size. Is this difference significant? May we validly deduce from it that an immoral mother contaminates her daughters more than she corrupts her sons? Or may the slight divergence of figures be, after all, nothing but a chance fluctuation due to the small numbers thus compared? The point can be settled by a simple statistical check. Computed by the customary formula<sup>1</sup>, the standard error of sampling for the difference observed proves to be 3·5. The difference between the two percentages is itself  $2\cdot4 \sim 8\cdot2 = 5\cdot8$ —less than twice the sampling error. Accordingly, it is highly possible that a difference relatively so slight might have arisen by pure accident. When, however, we turn to the larger groups, and compare the percentage for the entire set of delinquents (4·6) with that for the entire set of non-delinquents (0·25), the sampling error, in virtue of the larger numbers, now sinks to 1·5; the difference observed is almost three times this figure. Here, therefore, there is little danger that we may be dealing with some accidental discrepancy; and it becomes legitimate to infer that an immoral home definitely favours crime.

I shall not burden the reader with a “probable error” for each isolated figure. Where the statistical precisian requires it, the margin for inaccuracy due to sampling can be roughly gauged from the abbreviated table below (Table III). It will be seen that, in comparing the main groups of delinquents and non-delinquents, the differences in the body of the table can seldom be significant, unless the one percentage is three or four times the size of the other; in the totals, an addition of about half as much again may be suggestive. Thus, pairs like 0·5 and 5·0, 2 and 8, 6 and 14, 24 and 36, begin to indicate a genuine difference. In comparing the smaller groups, however—for example, the delinquent boys with the delinquent girls—little weight can be attached to the numerical differences, without further argument in their support.

<sup>1</sup> G. Udny Yule, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* (2nd ed.), p. 269.

TABLE III. *Standard Errors of Differences.*

Groups compared	Number in groups	Percentages in the neighbourhood of					
		1	3	5	10	20	30 %
All delinquents	197 }	0.9	1.5	1.9	2.6	3.5	4.0
Large control-group	400 }						
All delinquents	197 }	1.1	1.8	2.3	3.2	4.3	4.9
Small control-group	150 }						
Delinquent boys	123 }	1.1	2.0	2.5	3.4	4.6	5.3
Large control-group for boys	200 }						
Delinquent boys	123 }	1.5	2.5	3.2	4.4	5.9	6.7
Delinquent girls	74 }						
Delinquent girls	74 }	1.8	3.1	4.0	5.5	7.3	8.4
Small control-group for girls	50 }						

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

In this brief review, with data so slight and cases so meagre, I shall not venture to examine in concrete detail the mode and the direction in which every traceable condition may be presumed to have exercised its influence. My purpose is simply to submit a first preliminary survey; to emphasise the complexity of the problem and the variety of the issues; and to criticise one or two of the sweeping generalisations still current, for which the data here brought forward may be expected to supply some rough and tentative test.

The final upshot of my analysis is shown in numerical form in Table IV. The figures measure the degree of association between juvenile delinquency on the one hand, and the various types of condition observed, on the other<sup>1</sup>. With the loose data inevitable in sociological enquiries, statistical coefficients must not be too zealously pressed. Broadly speaking, however, the averages suggest the following deductions. All the conditions enumerated in the table are positively correlated with delinquency; but none to a very high degree. Extrinsic or environmental conditions, and intrinsic or psychological conditions, have about equal influence. Of psychological conditions the intellectual are rather less important than the emotional. Of environmental conditions those obtaining outside the home are far less important than those obtaining within it; and within it, material conditions such as poverty, are far less important than moral conditions such as ill discipline and vice. Physical conditions have roughly but half the weight of psychological and en-

<sup>1</sup> For the value in psychology of the coefficient of association, and for the formula used, I may refer to Appendix II of my book on *Mental and Scholastic Tests*. As with the coefficient of correlation, unity indicates complete interdependence; and zero, absence of all connection.

TABLE IV. *Coefficients of Association between Delinquency and Conditions Observed.*

	In relatives generally	In parents only
I. <i>Hereditary conditions:</i>		
A. Physical ... ..	·13	·22
B. Intellectual ... ..	·36	·44
C. Temperamental (with pathological symptoms)	·19	·26
D. Temperamental (with moral symptoms) ...	·33	·37
Average ... ..	·25	·32
II. <i>Environmental conditions:</i>		
A. Within the home:		
1. Poverty ... ..		·14*
2. Defective family relationships ... ..		·34
3. Defective discipline ... ..		·46
4. Vicious home ... ..		·42
B. Outside the home ... ..		·26
Average ... ..		·32
III. <i>Physical conditions</i> ... ..		·16
IV. <i>Psychological conditions:</i>		
A. Intellectual ... ..		·25
B. Emotional:		
1. General ... ..		·31
2. Specific ... ..		·40
3. Interests ... ..		·28
Average ... ..		·31

\* In calculating this coefficient the percentage used for the control-group is that for the amount of poverty obtaining in the general London population, not the 200 non-delinquents. See Table VI, footnote (1).

vironmental; and, while hereditary factors might seem to bear the same importance as these two latter, it is not certain, without further data and discussion, that the influence of an inheritable condition works through inheritance only, and not also through the environmental situations and psychological reactions which it may incidentally set up.

In the following pages I shall briefly comment on the effect of these several factors, one by one, and examine the evidence of the detailed tables as succinctly as I can.

### I. HEREDITARY FACTORS.

Whether there is such a being as a born delinquent, and whether criminality as such may be inherited, have for long been favourite topics of dispute among criminologists. For the psychologist they seem already to have passed into the region of those speculative questions which the



popular theorist loves to propound, but which the scientific investigator hesitates to answer, not merely because his evidence is insufficient, but because the alternatives implied are not to his mind entirely exclusive. A sharp and absolute distinction between what is instinctive and what is acquired can in psychology no longer be sustained. Nevertheless, the issue is by no means purely fanciful and abstract. It receives an eminently practical bearing from the introduction into the Mental Deficiency Act of the concept of "moral imbecility." The definition of the "moral imbecile," or at least the construction put upon that definition by many magistrates and certifying officers, plainly assumes that vicious and criminal propensities may be innate, and so beyond all hope of training or cure<sup>1</sup>.

Upon the supposed hereditary nature of what may be termed "the criminal diathesis," the figures in Table V may be expected to throw some light. The headings contain a list of all the characteristics recorded of the delinquent's family, which might be supposed to be inheritable, and at the same time to have disposed him towards the commission of crime<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The ablest exposition of this clause—a clause, it would seem, which is now felt to be satisfactory by no psychological writer—will be found in Dr Tredgold's admirable textbook on *Mental Deficiency*: consult, more particularly, his discussions both of "primary moral deficiency" (2nd ed., p. 320, where he cites the figures of Gruhle, discussed below) and of the "habitual criminal type" (*loc. cit.* p. 326, where, accepting with some modification the views originated by Lombroso, and popularised in this country by Maudsley and Havelock Ellis, he aims at a more exact description of the moral defective: "They commit crimes," he says, "not because they are deficient in will or are passionate and excitable, but because they are either possessed of ineradicable anti-social propensities, or really cannot appreciate the difference between right and wrong. They are, in fact, fundamentally lacking in moral sense, and this...causes them to be absolutely irreformable. The condition is in-born"). See also the same writer's lucid article on "Moral Defectives" in *Studies in Mental Inefficiency*.

I myself have argued that, whatever interpretation be put upon the phrase "mental defect" in the clause in question, whether it implies only defect of intelligence or may cautiously be taken to include temperamental deficiency as well, all so-called "moral imbeciles" would seem to be certifiable under the clause dealing with the so-called "feeble-minded"; and, in any case, a diagnosis of "moral imbecility" should only be made, if ever, in the most exceptional cases and with the utmost circumspection (*Studies in Mental Inefficiency*, i. iii. p. 51 and iv. pp. 69 *et seq.*).

<sup>2</sup> The condition has been recorded as a major factor only when it appeared to have been transmitted to the child directly, in the same or in some closely allied form, and then to have contributed to his delinquency as the predominating cause. In these instances, and in these instances alone, the major factor has been entered twice, first in a table for hereditary factors as a peculiarity of the parent or relative, and secondly in one of the later tables as a peculiarity of the child himself. The letter 'f' denotes that the condition was observed or reported of the father, 'm' of the mother, 'r' of relatives of a remoter degree—among whom, however, I have included only brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, and

TABLE V. I. *Hereditary Conditions.*

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent			
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.	
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor					
<i>A. Physical:</i>									
Tuberculosis	f.	—	3.3	—	5.4	4.1	2.5	5.0	3.7
	m.	—	4.1	—	2.7	3.5	4.0	3.0	3.5
	r.	—	10.6	—	16.2	12.7	13.0	10.0	11.5
Rheumatism	f.	—	3.3	—	4.1	3.5	1.5	0.5	1.0
	m.	0.8	7.3	1.4	5.4	8.1	—	1.5	.7
	r.	—	9.8	—	2.7	7.1	8.0	10.5	9.2
Syphilis	f.	—	1.6	—	—	1.0	—	—	—
	m.	—	0.8	1.4	2.7	2.0	—	—	—
	r.	—	4.9	—	6.8	5.6	0.5	—	.2
Epilepsy	f.	1.6	—	—	—	1.0	—	1.2	.6
	m.	—	0.8	—	—	0.5	—	—	—
	r.	—	2.4	—	1.4	2.0	—	1.5	.7
Chorea	f.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	m.	—	—	—	—	—	1.0	—	.5
	r.	—	—	—	2.7	1.0	—	—	—
Hyperthyroidism	f.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	m.	—	—	1.4	—	0.5	—	—	—
	r.	—	—	—	1.4	0.5	—	—	—
Total		2.4	48.9	4.2	51.5	53.1	30.5	33.2	31.8*
<i>B. Intellectual:</i>									
Mental deficiency	f.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	m.	1.6	—	—	—	1.0	—	—	—
	r.	—	3.3	—	4.1	3.5	1.0	—	0.5
Dulness <sup>1</sup>	f.	1.6	3.3	—	2.7	4.1	—	—	—
	m.	0.8	5.7	1.4	2.7	5.6	1.5	2.5	2.0
	r.	—	8.1	—	8.1	8.1	2.0	3.5	2.7
Illiteracy or backwardness <sup>2</sup>	f.	—	1.6	—	1.6	1.6	—	—	—
	m.	—	5.7	—	4.1	5.1	1.5	—	0.7
	r.	—	6.5	—	6.8	6.6	2.5	2.0	2.2
Total		4.0	34.2	1.4	30.1	35.6	8.5	8.0	8.2*

<sup>1</sup> Presumably congenital; mental age apparently below 12.0 when adult.<sup>2</sup> Reading and writing apparently below Standard V when adult.

\* The minute discrepancy between these totals, and the sum of the figures as printed in the column above them, arises from the omission, from the body of the table, of all decimals of the second place.

grand-parents: for each of these I have endeavoured to get positive information in every case, having them specially visited whenever possible. Too often, indeed, the information available was imperfect; in some instances there were no records of the grandparents or other remote relatives; and in one or two cases, where the parent was dead or the child illegitimate, the characteristics even of the father himself could never be traced; for similar reasons, partly too because the information at times came chiefly from the mother, the maternal history is apt to be fuller than the paternal.

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent			
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.	
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor					
<i>C. Temperamental (pathological symptoms):</i>									
Insanity	f.	—	—	2.7	1.4	1.5	—	0.7	
	m.	1.6	—	—	—	1.0	—	—	
	r.	—	5.7	—	8.1	6.6	3.5	2.5	3.0
Minor neuropathic or psychopathic symptoms	f.	1.6	4.9	1.4	1.4	5.1	1.0	3.5	2.2
	m.	2.4	5.7	4.1	2.7	7.6	5.5	2.0	3.7
	r.	—	3.3	—	6.8	4.6	6.0	4.0	5.0
Temperamental deficiency	f.	3.3	0.8	4.1	1.4	4.6	1.5	—	0.7
	m.	2.4	1.6	2.7	4.1	5.1	2.0	1.0	1.5
	r.	—	4.1	—	9.5	6.1	3.0	2.5	2.7
Total	11.3	26.1	15.0	35.4	42.2	24.0	15.5	19.7	
<i>D. Temperamental (moral symptoms):</i>									
Sexual irregularity	f.	—	3.3	2.7	4.1	4.6	2.0	—	1.0
	m.	0.8	13.0	4.1	21.6	18.2	5.0	3.5	4.2
	r.	—	2.4	—	16.2	7.5	2.5	6.0	4.2
Violent temper; cruelty	f.	1.6	9.0	1.4	6.8	9.6	1.5	—	0.7
	m.	—	3.3	1.4	4.1	4.1	0.5	1.0	0.7
	r.	—	6.5	—	4.1	5.6	—	—	—
Acquisitiveness <sup>3</sup>	f.	2.4	3.3	—	2.7	4.6	—	2.0	1.0
	m.	—	0.8	—	4.1	2.0	—	—	—
	r.	—	11.4	—	9.5	10.6	3.5	1.5	2.5
Wandering <sup>4</sup>	f.	2.4	3.3	1.4	2.7	5.1	—	2.0	1.0
	m.	1.6	0.8	1.4	—	2.0	—	—	—
	r.	—	13.8	—	8.1	11.7	—	1.5	0.7
Suicide	f.	—	2.4	—	4.1	3.0	—	—	—
	m.	—	—	—	1.4	0.5	—	—	—
	r.	—	0.8	—	2.7	1.5	1.0	—	0.5
Idleness (extreme)	f.	—	5.7	—	2.7	4.6	1.5	3.0	2.2
	m.	—	1.6	—	4.1	2.5	—	—	—
	r.	—	8.1	—	14.9	10.6	1.0	5.5	3.2
Alcoholism	f.	—	12.2	—	16.2	13.7	4.5	7.0	5.7
	m.	—	7.3	—	20.3	12.2	4.0	2.5	3.2
	r.	—	8.1	—	17.6	11.7	5.5	6.0	5.7
Total	8.8	117.1	12.4	168.0	145.9	32.5	41.5	37.0*	

<sup>3</sup> Chiefly convicted for theft.

<sup>4</sup> Migration (gipsies, tramps) and emigration among adults. Truancy and wandering among children.

\* The minute discrepancy between these totals, and the sum of the figures as printed in the column above them, arises from the omission, from the body of the table, of all decimals of the second place.

It will be observed that defective conditions, presumably hereditary, were encountered in the family histories of the delinquents over 270 times per cent., but in those of the non-delinquent cases less than 97 times per cent.; and, further, that these conditions seemed directly contributory

in some 26 per cent. of the delinquent boys and some 33 per cent. of the delinquent girls. Not all the inheritable conditions were themselves criminal qualities; but qualities apparently criminal bulk larger than the rest. What are termed, indeed, in the table "temperamental disturbances with moral symptoms" recur far more frequently than any other family defect. They were found over 145 times per hundred delinquent cases. But, on referring to the figures for the non-delinquent group, we find that the same conditions re-appear there too with unexpected frequency; and the resulting coefficient of association proves to be only .33.

From the foregoing percentage it might be concluded that on an average each delinquent child has between one and two relatives guilty of moral lapses. The commonest of these transgressions, however—alcoholism, suicide, minor sexual offences, and minor outbreaks of temper—are hardly to be classed as typical crimes; and, whether venial or grave, the larger portion of them tends to be concentrated in a relatively small number of families. As many as four-fifths of the children could plead no history among their various relatives of any definable crime.

Out of all the cases only 7.6 per cent. had fathers or mothers ascertainably convicted of a criminal offence<sup>1</sup>. In addition another 6.6 per cent. had parents guilty of similar offences, though never judicially convicted. Again, 14.2 per cent. had brothers or sisters guilty of flagrant delinquencies, among whom 6.1 had been sentenced; and 9.1 per cent. had remoter relatives guilty of such offences, among whom 6.6 had been sentenced. There were in all 10.6 per cent. whose relatives had been sentenced for crime, and 19.3 per cent. whose relatives, whether sentenced or not, were known to have committed some gross offence<sup>2</sup>.

It will be seen, therefore, that the number of criminal children who

<sup>1</sup> Chiefly stealing, embezzlement, burglary, assault, and soliciting. Suicide, and being drunk and disorderly have not been accounted criminal.

<sup>2</sup> The statistics on this subject differ enormously in different investigations. For example, in Baden, Gruhle (*Die Ursachen der jugendlichen Verwahrlosung und Kriminalität*, 1912, Table XVI) found that the parents had been sentenced in 71 per cent. of his cases. In Hanover, Mönkemöller (*Zeitschr. f. d. Erforsch. u. Behandlung d. jugendl. Schwachsinn*, 1897, Vol. iv.) found that 48 per cent. of his cases came from criminal parents. In Westphalia, Rizzor (*Ibid.* 1910, Vol. III, p. 119) found the percentage was only 23. In Sweden, Lund (*Über d. Ursachen d. Jugend Asozialität*, 1918) found, in the two groups investigated by him, percentages of 11.0 and 17.1 respectively. Healy (*loc. cit.* p. 153) states that, in his group of 668 juvenile delinquents at Chicago, 40.6 per cent. had no record of prior criminalistic tendency in their families; among the remainder 36.7 per cent. of the total were epileptic or mentally deficient; only 22.8 per cent. had other criminalistic members in their family, without themselves being mentally subnormal; but here a detailed investigation revealed many other causal factors, which in Healy's view seemed more significant.

themselves possess criminal parents or criminal relatives is, after all, comparatively few. And, even here, small evidence exists to establish that the criminal propensities of the family have been transmitted to the offspring by direct biological inheritance. Other causes, less hypothetical in character, more obvious in their mode of operation, could, in my own cases, often be elicited; and their removal was followed, in not a few examples, with immediate and entire success. Many of these provocative conditions—bad companions, bad neighbourhoods, bad discipline, and a bad example at home—were manifestly due to the moral laxity of the parents themselves, the degeneracy of the family thus operating indirectly through the resulting environment, instead of directly by hereditary transmission. The only cases in which the vices of the child stood in a direct and apparently hereditary relation to the vices of the parent, belonged to specifically limited types—namely, sex-delinquency (by far the most frequent), and a few instances of wandering, violent temper, and impulsive stealing. Of these every one may be accounted for by a simple assumption—by supposing that certain human instincts, which by their very definition are acknowledged to be inherited, may be inherited in differing degrees of natural strength. But even here the instinct is not itself inevitably a criminal one; and once it is afforded some legitimate outlet in social activities or wholesome recreation—through marriage, wage-earning, emigration, or the pursuits of the football field or the boxing club—its manifestations can be diverted from illicit enterprises, and directed into lawful channels.

It seems, therefore, that we can regard the hereditary constitution of the criminal as having at most but an indirect influence. The family temperament, first manifested in the lawlessness of his parent, is not, of necessity, a specifically criminal endowment, hereditary as such, but a more general condition, analogous rather to the congenital enfeeblement of intelligence or physique—extreme degrees of common weaknesses to which we are all more or less susceptible in a minor measure; such weaknesses, when excessive, may favour moral lapses in later life; they in no way constitute a fatal or inexorable impulse towards them.

Figures for these other infirmities, presumably inheritable, are given in the same table (Table V). The most marked is that of hereditary intellectual disability. This was recorded as a direct contributory among 4 per cent. of the boys, but among only 1.4 per cent. of the girls. Either as a major or a minor factor, it appeared altogether among the delinquents generally nearly 36 times per cent., but only 8 times per cent. among the non-delinquents. Calculated from these two percentages, and

measured by a coefficient of association, the connection between intellectual weakness in the relatives and delinquency in the children rises to .36, a figure higher even than that obtained in the case of moral weakness. As with moral infirmity, so with intellectual: in none but a few exceptional examples is the association thus measured attributable exclusively to true biological inheritance; the faults and limitations of the father or the mother operate quite as much through the social environment they engender; and the dull parent, like the depraved, inevitably creates a home in which discipline is weak, and in which delinquency is only too readily fostered. The two remaining groups of inheritable conditions—namely, physical infirmities, and temperamental defects involving pathological symptoms—show comparatively small coefficients<sup>1</sup>.

The problem of the born criminal, however, is not answered and ended by a survey merely of hereditary conditions. What is inherited is necessarily inborn; but what is inborn has not necessarily been inherited. It is quite conceivable that a child may be afflicted with congenital propensities, without those propensities having first emerged in the previous history of his family.

To gain light upon this broader problem, I have endeavoured to separate all cases in which the factors, whether principal or accessory, were of a congenital type. Under this rubric I have included all such physical conditions as appeared to be directly inherited, all intellectual conditions that are now generally assumed to be innate (as mental deficiency and general dulness), all instances of general emotionality not due to adolescence, and all instances of a natural over-development of a primary instinctive disposition; examples of mere educational disability, instances of repressed complexes and of defective or undesirable interests, I have excluded. We have thus a division of cases and causes into those predominantly congenital and those predominantly acquired. I must insist once more that such a distinction is, and can be, nothing but a rough and somewhat speculative one.

Altogether, congenital factors, whether major or minor, are found

<sup>1</sup> The four coefficients cited in the text are calculated from the frequency of the specified conditions among all the nearer relatives of the children. If we base the coefficients upon the appearance of the conditions among the parents only, the association is somewhat higher (see second column, Table IV). It will be noted that for physical conditions the coefficient is nearly doubled when we restrict our data solely to the parents. This, however, but confirms the suspicion that the working of such a factor is not entirely through direct biological inheritance. In many of these cases the parental condition, though often showing itself as some hereditary weakness in the child, also conduced to poor discipline in the home.

some 259 times per cent. among the delinquents, but only 92 times per cent. among the non-delinquents. Non-congenital factors are entered 208 times per cent. among the non-delinquents and among the delinquents 746 times, or, if we omit the psycho-analytic complexes (which were uninvestigated in the control group), 593 times. Thus congenital factors have been recorded among delinquents 2.8 times as often as among non-delinquents; and non-congenital factors 3.8 times as often, or, omitting complexes, 3.6. The major factor proves to be of a congenital type among 35.7 per cent. of the boys and among 40.9 per cent. of the girls. Thus, *in well over one-third of the cases, but in rather less than one-half, some congenital weakness is the preponderant factor.*

The share of congenital conditions in the production of delinquency is thus undoubtedly considerable. These are, indeed, the cases that are likely to be the most obstinate, and to be most in need of curative rather than punitive measures. But it would be a gross misconstruction—a mistake too commonly deduced from current fatalistic theories—to depict them as hopeless victims of their inborn nature. And at the same time it will be perceived that there still remains a large balance of delinquents—between 50 and 60 per cent. of the total—who owe their delinquency predominantly to the difficulties of their environment or to the events of their own past life.

The distribution of principal causes into congenital and non-congenital reveals proportions very dissimilar in my own cases to that announced by previous investigators. Among Healy's recidivists<sup>1</sup>, environmental influences formed the cardinal factor in only 25 per cent. of the cases and a subsidiary factor in as many as 76 per cent.; on the other hand, mental abnormalities and peculiarities, for the most part presumably innate, played a major part in 55 per cent. and a minor part in only 16 per cent. From these proportions we might be induced to argue that the prime causes of delinquency were, in the majority of instances, inborn psychological characteristics; and that the environmental factors were, as a rule, only accessory. Healy, however, has taken into account chiefly the more extreme psychological conditions—as feeble-mindedness, hysteria, "epileptic mentality," markedly neurotic and psychotic states; and it would seem that the cases submitted to him, partly, no doubt, because they consisted of older, more hardened, and more habitual types, and partly perhaps because they were singled out by the court as in special need of examination at a psychopathic institute, comprised a number disproportionately large of gross aberrations of this kind.

Gruhle, in a small enquiry often cited, has attempted, on lines similar to the foregoing, to divide his cases into congenital and environmental types. The figures given by him, based upon the histories of 105 youths, strongly favour the importance of inborn constitution. His proportions are the following: congenital cases 40.9 per cent., environmental cases 9.1 per cent., congenital and environmental factors being

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.* pp. 130-132.

equally balanced in 40.9 per cent.<sup>1</sup> Lund's data, on the other hand, emphasise rather the power of environment; his figures are as follows: in one investigation, the congenital cases numbered 23.4 per cent., and the environmental 65.7 per cent., environmental and congenital factors being equally balanced in 10.9 per cent.; in a second series, the congenital cases numbered 21.1 per cent., the environmental 64.9 per cent., the factors being again equally balanced in 11.9 per cent.<sup>2</sup>

In one significant feature this and most foreign studies of recent date seem broadly in agreement. Whatever may be our various theories upon the relative importance of the two factors, most cases of juvenile delinquency are, after all, admitted almost universally to be the joint product of social environment and congenital constitution, working together and playing the one upon the other. Gruhle, for example, so often cited in favour of the inborn factor, nevertheless recognises a "mixed type" of criminal, neither purely congenital, nor purely environmental, comprising practically 70 per cent. of his cases. Lund makes a similar concession, though to a less generous extent; in one of his investigations 36.0 per cent., and in another 39.8 per cent. belonged to this mixed type. Both writers, it is true, claim, even within this blended group, to discover now environment, and now constitution preponderating; but, as just remarked, they still find an appreciable proportion in which the two tributaries are so equally balanced that not even this distinction can be hazarded.

I personally should hesitate to recognise any "pure types" whatever. The practical test of a pure congenital type, is, I suppose, that, no matter how perfect the environment found for them, in the most comfortable of homes, in the best disciplined of institutions, they still evince propensities to crime. By this criterion 18 per cent. of my cases show hopeless and inradicable delinquency. Their irremediable condition, however, I incline to attribute less to original endowment than to long-standing habit. They are, nearly all of them, old offenders. But I suspect that, detected and treated at an early stage, and provided with a suitably adjusted environment, were it only the environment of a segregated colony, the worst and dullest of them might yet have been rescued, and converted into quiet workers and law-abiding members of their own little community.

## II. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.

In the child's environment the adverse conditions noticed have been grouped under five main heads (Table II). Of these, defective home discipline seems the one most vitally connected with juvenile crime. Between this factor and delinquency the average coefficient of association (Table IV) is .46. A vicious home atmosphere is almost equally detrimental. Defective family relationships, and undesirable surroundings outside the home, exert a smaller, yet still an appreciable, effect. The pressure of poverty, with its more immediate concomitants, seems, at any rate in its direct relation to delinquency, of comparatively slight significance.

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.* p. 23. The cases here classed together as congenital he has sub-divided into a purely congenital and a predominantly congenital group; and similarly with the environmental.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.* p. 233.



A glance at the particular features classed under these five headings (Table VI) reveals still further differences within each broad category.

TABLE VI. II. *Environmental Conditions.*

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent		
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor				
<b>A. Within the home:</b>								
<b>1. Poverty and Concomitants:</b>								
Home circumstances <sup>1</sup> : very poor (A & B)	1.6	19.5	—	14.9	18.7	21.0	15.0	8.0
poor (C & D)	—	35.8	—	37.8	36.5	36.0	38.0	22.0
comfortable (E & F)	—	[39.9]	—	[44.6]	[41.7]	[39.5]	[44.5]	[54.0]
well-to-do (G & H)	—	[3.3]	—	[2.7]	[3.0]	[3.5]	[22.5]	[16.0]
Overcrowding <sup>2</sup>	—	16.3	—	20.3	17.7	13.0	14.5	13.7
Absence of facilities for occupation and amusement at home	1.6	10.6	—	5.4	9.6	8.5	6.5	7.5
Total	3.2	82.2	—	78.4	82.5	78.5	74.0	51.2*
<b>2. Defective family relationships:</b>								
Father dead	1.6	9.0	1.4	13.5	12.2	13.5	11.5	12.5
deserted, separated, or divorced	—	6.5	2.7	10.8	9.1	0.5	—	0.2
absent <sup>3</sup>	3.3	15.4	—	12.2	16.2	8.5	7.0	7.7
Mother dead	0.8	9.8	4.1	14.9	13.7	3.5	4.5	4.0
deserted, separated, or divorced	—	5.7	1.4	6.8	6.6	—	—	—
Both mother and father dead or deserted	—	[1.6]	[1.4]	[5.4]	[3.5]	[0.5]	[1.0]	[0.7]
Prolonged absence from parents:								
with friends or relatives	—	10.6	—	17.6	13.2	1.0	0.5	0.7
at institutions	—	13.0	—	18.9	15.2	0.5	—	0.2
Step- (or foster) father	—	7.3	—	14.9	10.1	5.5	4.5	5.0
Step- (or foster) mother	—	12.2	2.7	17.6	15.2	2.0	2.5	2.2
Illegitimate <sup>4</sup>	—	6.5	—	9.5	7.6	0.5	1.0	0.7
Only child	—	15.4	—	6.8	12.2	2.5	1.0	1.7
Total	5.7	111.4	12.3	143.5	131.3	38.0	32.5	35.2

<sup>1</sup> The classification used is that suggested by Charles Booth (*Life and Labour in London*, Vol. I.

Pt. 1, pp. 33 *et seq.*). His categories are as follows:

A. Occasional labourers; loafers; street-sellers; the criminal and semi-criminal. (In my cases, 7.3 % of the boys, and 5.4 % of the girls came from homes of this type.)

B. Irregular earnings; casual labour.

C. Intermittent earnings; seasonal labour.

D. Small regular earnings.

E. Regular standard earnings; artisans; small shop-keepers (with no assistants).

F. High class labour, well-paid; foremen; best-paid artisans.

G. Lower middle class; shop-keepers; tradesmen; small employers; clerks.

H. Upper middle and upper classes; servant-keeping class.

The grouping of the categories in pairs, and the titles for the composite categories, are Booth's.

Since the non-delinquent children were definitely selected as belonging in the same proportions to the same social classes, the percentages would be the same as for the delinquents. In the last column, therefore, I have given instead Charles Booth's estimates for the relative proportions of the whole population of London comprised in the several groups. The borough in which my survey was made shows, according to his tables, almost exactly the same proportions as London taken as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> Tenements with more than two occupants per room.

<sup>3</sup> Chiefly, absent for a long period upon military service; in some instances, recently returned. Also includes illegitimate cases where the father is not living with the mother.

<sup>4</sup> Includes also the few cases born out of wedlock where the mother and father afterwards married, or lived together as married.

\* Figures in brackets are not included in the totals. The discrepancy between the totals for the boys and girls and the average total is accounted for in footnote (1).

		Delinquent					Non-delinquent		
		Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.
		Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor				
<i>3. Defective discipline:</i>									
Indifference (no attempt at discipline)	f.	—	3.3	—	1.4	2.5	—	—	—
	m.	0.8	6.5	—	4.1	6.1	0.5	—	0.2
Weak discipline (due to moral or intellectual weakness)	f.	—	9.0	—	4.1	7.1	1.0	—	0.5
	m.	2.4	24.4	1.4	16.2	23.4	3.5	2.0	2.7
	g.	—	—	2.7	1.4	1.5	—	—	—
Weak discipline (due to physical weakness)	f.	—	2.4	—	1.4	2.0	—	0.5	0.2
	m.	3.3	6.5	1.4	5.4	8.6	1.0	3.0	2.0
	g.	—	1.6	—	1.4	1.5	—	—	—
Weak discipline (due to absence of parent at work)	f. <sup>5</sup>	—	2.4	—	4.1	3.0	—	—	—
	m.	0.8	7.3	—	2.7	6.1	3.0	0.5	1.7
Over-strict discipline	f.	1.6	13.0	—	1.4	9.6	2.5	3.0	2.7
	m.	—	1.6	2.7	2.7	3.0	0.5	2.0	1.2
	r.	—	—	—	2.7	1.0	—	—	—
Disagreement about management of child		—	4.9	—	2.7	4.1	—	—	—
	Total	8.9	82.9	8.2	51.7	79.5	12.0	11.0	11.5
<i>4. Vicious home:</i>									
Sexual immorality at home <sup>6</sup>		—	2.4	1.4	6.8	4.6	—	0.5	0.2
Molestation <sup>7</sup>		—	—	—	2.7	1.0	—	—	—
Irregular unions <sup>8</sup>		—	4.1	—	9.5	6.1	0.5	1.0	0.7
Drunkenness <sup>9</sup>		—	6.5	—	10.8	8.1	2.5	3.5	3.0
Quarrelling		—	5.7	—	8.1	6.6	1.0	0.5	0.7
Ill-treatment	f.	—	2.4	—	5.4	3.5	0.5	—	0.2
	m.	0.8	—	1.4	2.7	2.0	—	1.5	0.7
	g.	—	1.6	1.4	4.1	3.0	—	—	—
Neglect		—	4.1	—	5.4	4.6	5.0	2.5	3.7
Criminal encouragement		0.8	0.8	1.4	—	1.5	—	—	—
Bad companionship (within the child's home)		—	3.3	1.4	2.7	3.5	—	—	—
Bad companionship (in institutions or other residences away from home)		1.6	2.4	—	4.1	4.0	—	—	—
Vicious or criminal conduct at home (not included in foregoing) <sup>10</sup>		—	6.5	—	8.1	7.0	0.5	—	0.2
	Total	3.2	39.8	7.0	70.4	55.5	10.0	9.5	9.7

<sup>5</sup> There being no mother.<sup>6</sup> Not included under preceding or following headings.<sup>7</sup> Sexual; by relatives in the home.<sup>8</sup> Chiefly parents (or foster parents) living together unmarried.<sup>9, 10</sup> In this section only present or recent misconduct in the child's own home is included; the figures given under "hereditary conditions" include also offences committed in the remote past or away from the child's own home.<sup>10</sup> Chiefly stealing or habitual gambling and betting.

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent		
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor				
<i>B. Outside the home:</i>								
Molestation <sup>11</sup>	—	0·8	1·4	4·1	2·5	—	—	—
Corrupted by adult companions or strangers	0·8	—	2·7	1·4	2·0	—	—	—
Indulged by adult companions or strangers	—	3·3	—	2·7	3·0	—	0·5	0·2
Bad companions of same age <sup>12</sup>	3·3	16·3	1·4	13·5	17·7	1·0	—	0·5
Companions of same age, not actively bad <sup>13</sup>	1·6	7·3	—	5·4	7·6	3·5	2·0	2·7
Special facilities for amusement <sup>14</sup>	2·4	7·3	—	9·5	10·6	10·5†	12·0†	11·2
Defective facilities for amusement <sup>15</sup>	—	4·1	—	1·4	3·0	4·0†	4·5†	4·2
Uncongenial school	0·8	4·1	—	2·7	4·1	0·5	—	0·2
Uncongenial work	—	4·9	—	2·7	4·1	1·5	—	0·7
Out of work	—	6·5	—	2·7	5·1	1·0	0·5	0·7
Total	8·9	54·6	5·5	46·1	59·7	22·0	19·5	20·7

<sup>11</sup> Sexual; by persons outside the home.

<sup>12</sup> Engaged in, or encouraging, delinquency, whether working in gangs or only in pairs.

<sup>13</sup> Only indirectly or unwittingly by encouraging delinquency, *e.g.* wealthier companions associating with poorer delinquent.

<sup>14</sup> Chiefly the presence of new or gaily advertised cinemas, music-halls, restaurants, or sweet-shops; entered as a major cause only when the delinquency began with their opening, ceased with removal from the neighbourhood, and was directly connected with the facilities in question, *e.g.* stealing to go to the cinema; entered as a minor cause when the delinquency increased or decreased with opening or removal, or was connected with the facilities in a more indirect fashion, *e.g.* meeting undesirable companions at a restaurant.

<sup>15</sup> No neighbouring parks, playing fields, or recreation grounds.

† Children selected as living in the same street as the corresponding delinquent cases.

Through the lax discipline they induce, intellectual or moral weaknesses in the mother, are evidently apt to foster crime<sup>1</sup>. Overstrictness on the part of the father operates, quite as frequently, as an active irritant. Illegitimacy, the presence of a stepmother, the absence of the true father or mother through death, desertion, or divorce, residence away from home in institutions or with relatives—these several circumstances appear, on comparing the corresponding figures from the control group, to recur with exceptional frequency among the young criminals. On the other hand, drunkenness, overcrowding and general neglect—conditions which in this connection have been so repeatedly stressed—seem less distinctive; prevalent though they are in delinquent homes, they prove unexpectedly common among non-delinquent families belonging to the same social class; and it is plain that, as contributory factors in the production of crime, they are far less provocative than quarrelling, sexual irregularity,

<sup>1</sup> It must be remembered, however, that the weaknesses of home discipline are less open to detection where the children are non-delinquent, and therefore comparatively easy to manage.

and vicious behaviour among the members of the child's family. Outside the child's home the main demoralising influence comes evidently from his own bad companions in the streets.

In the totals for the environmental factors (Table II) the sex-divergence is but slight. Taken as a whole, external influences, it might seem, weigh almost equally upon boys and upon girls. Yet, studied in detail, their specific working differs somewhat with the difference of sex. Weakness of discipline within the home, and pernicious companionships and interests outside the home, bring graver consequences with the boys. On the other hand, defects in family relationships, and, above all, vice in the home itself, seem conspicuously disastrous with the girls<sup>1</sup>.

### III. PHYSICAL FACTORS.

Physical defect appears somewhat commoner among the delinquent girls than among the delinquent boys. Its real influence, however, lies chiefly in its indirect reaction on the mind. Anything that weakens health tends to weaken self-control; anything that heightens irritability tends also to heighten liability to anti-social outbreaks.

Measured by the coefficient of association (Table IV) the connection between delinquency and physical defect in general, seems relatively small. Nevertheless, a few of these disabilities stand out significantly (Table VII)<sup>2</sup>. Conditions that lower self-confidence and reduce efficiency in daily work—defects of speech and hearing, poor and undersized physique, and the commoner weaknesses of health and body generally—

<sup>1</sup> The conclusions here offered are based not only upon the figures in the tables, but also upon first-hand observation of the interplay of the factors enumerated, and upon concrete impressions gathered during actual interviews, which bear out the slighter and more abstract indications of the statistics.

<sup>2</sup> The figures for *encephalitis* are somewhat high owing to a recent epidemic. For the after-effects of this disease, I may perhaps refer to my review of Dr Paterson's enquiry in the last number of this *Journal*, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 237. On the whole, my investigations, particularly among normal children generally, seem to indicate that the direct and deleterious influence of gross nervous disease—meningitis, epilepsy, and so forth—has been by medical writers far too readily assumed. I am inclined to say the same of congenital syphilis, except possibly where it has been productive of intellectual deficiency. Goddard, indeed, believes (*Juvenile Delinquency*, p. 106) that "a surprisingly large proportion of delinquency is due to this disease." But where, in my own cases, it was encountered or suspected, there usually existed in the parents markedly uncontrolled instincts and emotions, which, inherited by the child, are quite as likely to be responsible for his depravity. The small percentages for syphilis in Table VII as compared with those in Table V suggest that, had it been possible to use more precise methods of determination, a larger proportion of the children might have exhibited positive evidence of a mild infection.

TABLE VII. III. *Physical Conditions.*

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent		
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor				
Over-developed (physically)	—	4.1	—	4.1	4.0	—	2.5	1.7
Over-developed (sexually <sup>1</sup> )	0.8	3.3	2.7	6.8	6.1	—	0.5	0.2
Delayed puberty	—	0.8*	—	2.7†	1.5	—	0.5†	0.2
Menstruation (accompanied by psychic disturbance)	—	—	—	4.1	1.5	—	1.0	0.5
Attractive appearance	—	3.3	—	13.5	7.1	1.5	3.5	2.5
Undersized	0.8	7.3	—	2.7	6.1	1.0	0.5	0.7
Malnutrition, (a) slight (b) marked	—	17.1	—	10.8	14.7	15.0	13.5	14.2
Rickets	—	4.1	—	2.7	3.5	3.0	2.5	2.7
Anaemia	—	7.3	—	2.7	5.6	5.5	4.0	4.7
Chronic catarrh	—	4.1	—	6.8	5.0	1.5	3.0	2.5
Enlarged glands, tonsils and adenoids	—	17.9	—	16.2	17.3	9.5	5.0	7.2
Hyperthyroidism	1.6	12.2	—	6.8	11.2	10.5	13.0	11.7
Syphilis, (a) congenital (b) acquired	—	—	1.4	2.7	1.5	—	0.5	0.2
Tuberculosis	—	—	—	1.4	0.5	—	—	—
Pre-tubercular conditions <sup>2</sup>	—	1.6	—	2.7	2.0	—	—	—
Acute rheumatism	—	2.4	—	4.1	3.0	2.5	0.5	1.5
Rheumatic conditions	—	4.1	—	5.4	4.6	0.5	3.0	1.7
Chorea, (a) definite (b) suspected <sup>3</sup>	—	8.1	—	9.5	8.6	2.0	8.5	5.2
Epilepsy, (a) grand mal (b) suspected <sup>4</sup>	0.8	—	1.4	—	1.0	—	—	—
Encephalitis; meningitis	—	4.1	—	8.1	5.6	—	1.5	0.7
Recurrent headaches	0.8	—	—	—	0.5	—	—	—
Minor nervous defects	[4.1]	—	[1.4]	—	[2.0]	—	—	—
Defective vision, (a) slight <sup>5</sup> (b) marked	2.4	1.6	2.7	—	3.5	0.5	—	0.2
Squint (marked)	—	6.5	—	12.2	8.6	2.5	5.5	4.0
Defective hearing, (a) slight <sup>5</sup> (b) marked	—	4.9	—	9.5	6.6	0.5	1.0	0.7
Defective speech	—	8.1	—	12.2	9.6	10.5	13.5	12.0
Lung defects	0.8	4.1	—	10.8	7.1	8.5	9.0	8.7
Heart defects	—	0.8	—	2.7	1.5	—	—	—
Local irritation <sup>6</sup>	—	3.3	—	4.1	3.5	2.0	5.5	3.7
	1.6	—	—	1.4	1.5	—	—	—
	0.8	0.8	—	—	1.0	0.5	—	0.2
	—	—	—	1.4	0.5	1.0	1.5	1.2
	—	2.4	—	1.4	2.0	—	2.0	1.0
	0.8	1.6	1.4	4.1	3.5	—	—	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>135.9</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>176.3</b>	<b>160.8</b>	<b>79.5</b>	<b>101.5</b>	<b>90.5</b>

<sup>1</sup> Including premature puberty (*i.e.*, commencing at 13.0 years with boys, and 12.0 years with girls).<sup>2</sup> Including suspected tuberculosis.<sup>3</sup> Including mild or sub-choreic conditions.<sup>4</sup> Including 'psychic' and 'masked' epilepsy. Diagnosis suggested by medical examiner, but unsupported by subsequent information. Figures not counted in totals.<sup>5</sup> For definition see *Report upon Backward Children in Birmingham*, pp. 19-20.<sup>6</sup> Pruritus vulvae, Herpes praeputialis, etc.

\* Voice unbroken and no signs of pubescence at 17.0 years.

† Menstruation not commenced at 16.0 years.

are somewhat more prevalent among the delinquent boys. Conditions that touch the emotional life—chorea, hyperthyroidism, petty nervous defects, excessive or premature sexual development<sup>1</sup>—states, on the whole, somewhat exceptional in their nature, are to be noted principally among the delinquent girls. In general, however, physical defect is far less prominent in the criminal groups here analysed than in the populations examined in prisons and reformatories by earlier investigators. Further, it should be observed, that, to be operative as a contributory factor, a physical condition need not necessarily be an abnormality or a defect. Such gifts as a vigorous physique, good looks, deft fingers, and keen senses, may prove definite assets in a career of crime, particularly to the weak-minded; and may often assist the young culprit, not only to perpetrate his delinquency, but also to avert suspicion and escape arrest.

Stigmata, numerous or well-marked, were present in 7·6 per cent. of my delinquent cases and in 2·5 per cent. of the non-delinquent. But the excess in the former group was due almost exclusively to the disproportionate number of defectives, of the temperamental as well as of the intellectual type. There was no evidence whatever that the delinquent child, otherwise normal in mind and body, is specifically distinguished by anomalies of anatomical development.

#### IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS.

A crime is a conscious action. Hence, its immediate if not always its main cause, must be a psychological one. And it is not surprising to find that, in the table, psychological causes figure as by far the most numerous (Table VIII).

But in all this long list of psychological pre-conditions is there any that is fundamental and all-pervading? Is there any inborn factor, simple and central, underlying the manifold forms of criminal activity, analogous to those central factors now held to underlie all intellectual activities on the one hand, and all emotional activities on the other? Plainly, there

<sup>1</sup> I connect the prevalence of mild or suspected choreic conditions with the prevalence of rheumatism; and the prevalence of rheumatism with the recurrence of chronic catarrh. Doubtless other toxines have similar effects upon the nervous system; and the cases of hyperthyroidism suggest a causal relation between delinquency and the disturbances of endocrine balance. This, and the conditions alluded to in the preceding note, indicate suggestive fields for future research. Meanwhile, it must be noted that my own conclusions respecting physical factors apply only to the more obvious defects, such as are observed during an ordinary medical inspection in the school.

TABLE VIII. *IV. Psychological Conditions.*

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent		
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys		Av.
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor		Boys	Girls	
<b>A. Intellectual:</b>								
<i>a. General:</i>								
Mental deficiency <sup>1</sup>	5.7	2.4	2.7	4.1	7.6	1.0	1.5	1.2
Natural dullness <sup>2</sup>	4.1	[22.8]	4.1	[25.7]	[27.9]	[10.5]	[9.0]	[9.7]
Educational backwardness <sup>3</sup>	1.6	40.7	—	37.8	39.6	11.0	10.5	10.7
Superior intelligence <sup>4</sup>	—	3.3	—	1.4	2.5	9.0	8.0	8.5
<i>b. Specific:</i>								
Special disabilities:								
Reading and writing	—	3.3	—	—	2.0	0.5	—	0.2
Arithmetic	—	2.4	—	5.4	3.5	—	2.5	1.2
Miscellaneous <sup>5</sup>	—	1.6	—	2.7	2.0	—	—	—
Special abilities:								
Verbalist	—	4.9	—	2.7	4.1	1.0	2.0	1.5
Manual dexterity	—	2.4	—	—	1.5	2.5	—	1.2
Total	11.4	61.0	6.8	54.1	62.8	25.0	24.5	24.7
<b>B. Emotional:</b>								
<i>1. Inborn:</i>								
<i>a. General:</i>								
Temperamental instability	4.9	27.7	5.4	31.1	34.0	8.5	10.0	9.2
Temperamental deficiency <sup>6</sup>	6.5	3.3	8.1	1.4	9.6	0.5	1.0	0.7
Adolescent instability	1.6	—	2.7	—	2.0	—	—	—
Markedly repressed type <sup>7</sup>	[1.6]	[13.0]	[5.4]	[21.6]	[19.3]	[4.0]	[8.5]	[6.2]
Markedly unrepressed type <sup>8</sup>	[4.1]	[3.3]	[6.8]	[5.4]	[9.1]	[5.5]	[4.5]	[5.0]
Day-dreaming imaginative	—	7.3	—	16.2	10.6	2.5	9.5	6.0
Emotional apathy <sup>9</sup>	—	3.3	—	1.4	2.5	1.0	2.0	1.5
Dementia praecox	—	—	1.4	—	0.5	—	—	—
Minor psychopathic conditions	—	1.6	—	2.7	2.0	—	0.5	0.2
Total	13.0	43.2	17.6	52.8	61.2	12.5	23.0	17.7

<sup>1</sup> All feeble-minded cases in the sense of the Defective and Epileptic Children Act: mental ratios being between 40 and 70 per cent.,—usually nearer the latter (or upper) limit.

<sup>2</sup> Marked inborn retardation in general intelligence not amounting to mental deficiency: mental ratios between 70 and 85 per cent. All the dull are also backward.

<sup>3</sup> Marked retardation in educational attainments: educational ratios of 85 per cent. or less. The numbers for dullness are included in those for backwardness; but backwardness is only entered as a major cause where dullness was not a major cause.

<sup>4</sup> Mental ratio over 115 per cent.

<sup>5</sup> Marked defects of memory or attention, without corresponding defect of intelligence. Marked defect of manual dexterity.

<sup>6</sup> Extreme emotional instability, existing from birth or an early age.

<sup>7</sup> So-called introverts. Also entered under Instability and Temperamental Deficiency. This group includes cases of mild neurosis—chiefly compulsion-neurosis, anxiety-neurosis, and anxiety-hysteria. (Figures in brackets are, as usual, not included in totals.)

<sup>8</sup> So-called extroverts(?). Also entered under Instability and Temperamental Deficiency.

<sup>9</sup> Including 'constitutional laziness.'

	Delinquent					Non-delinquent		
	Boys		Girls		Av.	Boys	Girls	Av.
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor				
<i>b. Specific:</i>	1.6	9.0	6.8	17.6	15.7	2.5	1.0	1.7
Homosexual	—	4.1	—	1.4	3.0	0.5*	2.0*	1.2
Bad temper	0.8	8.1	2.7	13.5	11.7	1.5	2.5	2.0
Acquisitiveness	1.6	12.2	—	6.8	11.2	4.5	1.0	2.7
Wandering	3.3	10.6	1.4	5.4	11.2	2.0	0.5	1.2
Self-assertiveness	—	13.0	—	8.1	11.2	4.5	1.0	2.7
Suggestibility	2.4	1.6	1.4	4.1	4.6	3.0	4.5	3.7
Affection	—	[2.4]	—	[4.1]	[3.0]	[2.5]	[6.5]	[4.5]
Timidity	—	[3.3]	—	[5.4]	[4.0]	[2.0]	[4.0]	[3.0]
Sorrow	—	[1.6]	—	[2.7]	[2.0]	[0.5]	[3.0]	[1.7]
Unsusceptible to sorrow	—	4.1	—	5.4	4.6	2.0	0.5	1.2
Unsusceptible to pain	—	3.3	—	1.4	2.5	0.0†	0.0†	—
Gluttony	0.8	10.6	—	4.1	8.6	1.5	0.5	1.0
Incontinence:								
Urinary (present)	—	2.4	—	2.7	2.5	—	1.0	0.5
(past)	—	4.9	—	4.1	4.6	1.0	1.5	1.2
Faecal (present)	—	4.1	—	1.4	3.0	—	—	—
(past)	—	6.5	—	2.7	5.1	0.5	—	0.2
Total	10.5	94.5	12.3	78.7	99.5	23.5	16.0	19.7
<i>2. Acquired:</i>								
<i>a. Sentiments, Interests and Habits:</i>								
Obsessive imagery	—	1.6	—	2.7	2.0	—	—	—
Obsessive habits	—	6.5	—	4.1	5.6	—	—	—
Passion for the cinema	0.8	6.5	—	1.4	5.1	3.5	—	1.7
sweets	—	3.3	1.4	5.4	4.6	2.0	5.5	3.7
money	2.4	1.6	—	1.4	3.0	1.0	—	0.5
clothes	—	—	—	6.3	2.5	—	3.5	1.7
adventure	3.3	15.4	1.4	2.7	13.2	5.0	—	2.5
various forms of pleasure and amusement <sup>10</sup>	—	4.1	1.4	4.1	4.6	0.5	1.0	0.7
a particular person of the opposite sex <sup>11</sup>	—	2.4	—	1.4	2.0	2.5	4.5	3.5
Open hatred for a particular person	0.8	—	—	—	0.5	—	—	—
Lack of affection for relatives or friends	—	12.2	—	6.8	10.1	1.5	—	0.7
Lack of cultural interests <sup>12</sup>	—	3.3	—	1.4	2.5	—	—	—
Total	7.3	56.9	4.2	37.8	55.7	16.0	14.5	15.2

<sup>10</sup> With boys—fun-fairs, travelling in trams, toys, sport, theatres, etc. With girls—restaurants, theatres.

<sup>11</sup> Petty love-affairs having no relation to delinquency are not included: figures for normals, therefore, are hardly comparable.

<sup>12</sup> Only noted in children of at least average ability.

\* No actual homosexual practices encountered.

† Not tested experimentally.



	Delinquent				
	Boys		Girls		Av.
	Major factor	Minor factor	Major factor	Minor factor	
<i>b. Complexes:</i>					
<i>Auto-erotic complexes:</i>					
Genital <sup>13</sup>	—	3.3	—	2.7	3.0
Oral	—	2.4	—	4.1	3.0
Urethral	—	0.8	—	1.4	1.0
Anal	—	8.1	—	2.7	6.1
<i>Self-regarding complexes:</i>					
Narcissistic:					
Self-love: personal vanity	—	1.6	—	9.5	4.6
With homosexual aspect	—	0.8	—	1.4	1.0
Frustrated mother-fixation (starved affection) <sup>14</sup>	—	3.3	—	8.1	5.1
Continued mother-fixation (chiefly over indulged during convalescence)	—	4.1	—	2.7	3.5
Belated mother-fixation (partial struggle against dependence)	—	7.3	—	4.1	6.1
Self-assertive (authority-complex)	1.6	10.6	—	5.4	9.6
(wish for power; sadistic?)	—	3.3	—	—	2.0
<i>Inferiority complexes:</i>					
(a) Physical	1.6	3.3	—	1.4	3.5
(b) Mental	—	2.4	—	4.1	3.0
(c) Sexual <sup>15</sup>	—	—	—	2.7	1.0
<i>Parental:</i>					
Attachment to father	—	2.4	1.4	12.2	6.6
Antagonism to mother	1.6	1.6	2.7	9.5	6.6
Attachment to mother	—	12.2	—	10.8	11.7
Antagonism to father	2.4	14.6	—	8.1	13.7
<i>Parental, with transference:</i>					
Antagonism to step-father	—	0.8	—	—	0.5
Attachment to step-mother	—	—	—	2.7	1.0
Antagonism to step-mother or foster-mother <sup>16</sup>	0.8	6.5	2.7	6.8	8.1
Attachment to elder brother	—	—	—	4.1	1.5
Antagonism to elder brother	—	4.9	—	1.4	3.5
Attachment to elder sister	—	3.3	—	—	2.0
Antagonism to elder sister	—	0.8	1.4	2.7	2.0
Attachment to younger brother or sister	—	1.6	—	2.7	2.0
Antagonism to younger brother or sister <sup>17</sup>	1.6	2.4	1.4	4.1	4.6
Attachment to step-sister	—	1.6	—	—	1.0
Antagonism to step-brother or step-sister	—	2.4	—	4.1	3.0
Attachment to female cousin in the same home	—	1.6	—	—	1.0
Antagonism to teacher	1.6	5.7	—	5.4	6.6
<i>Conflicts about parentage:</i>					
(a) warranted <sup>18</sup>	—	4.9	1.4	13.5	8.6
(b) unwarranted	—	—	—	5.4	2.0
<i>Sexual complexes<sup>19</sup>:</i>					
Actual heterosexual experiences	—	1.6	2.7	4.1	3.5
Actual homosexual experiences <sup>19</sup>	—	3.3	—	1.4	2.5
Repressed sexual temptations	—	0.8	—	2.7	1.5
Birth problems <sup>20</sup>	—	1.6	—	4.1	2.5
Obsessions <sup>21</sup>	—	2.4	—	6.8	4.1
Total	11.2	128.3	13.7	162.9	152.6

<sup>13</sup> Masturbatory, with guilt.

<sup>14</sup> Includes sense of being an "unwanted child" (often justified).

<sup>15</sup> Castration-type.

<sup>16</sup> Including female relatives or guardians acting in that capacity.

<sup>17</sup> Chiefly jealousy of infant children; but includes one instance of jealousy of a petted older brother dating from time he was crippled.

<sup>18</sup> The child being actually illegitimate or a step-child.

<sup>19</sup> Repressed experiences only; unrepressed experiences are not included.

<sup>20</sup> Includes one pubescent girl with morbid fear of pregnancy.

<sup>21</sup> By obscene words or stories heard; or obscene pictures or conduct witnessed.

is none<sup>1</sup>. Apart altogether from the varying background of bad heredity, bad environment, and bad physique, each at times quite independent of the rest, the psychological defects are themselves most diverse—sometimes intellectual, sometimes temperamental, in some cases congenital, in others acquired. The criminal is far from constituting a homogeneous psychological class.

#### (A) INTELLECTUAL FACTORS.

States of general intellectual weakness are, beyond question, of great importance in the causation of crime. Mental deficiency, together with natural dulness not amounting to definite deficiency, stands among the commonest of all the major factors. Of the delinquent boys nearly 10 per cent. owe their delinquency primarily to one or other of these conditions; and, in a further 25 per cent., dulness or deficiency appears as a subordinate factor. Nevertheless, the defectives alone form no very large proportion; and the coefficient of association is much higher between crime and educational backwardness than between crime and mere deficiency<sup>2</sup>. Specific intellectual disabilities seem quite unimportant; indeed, they are perhaps as often the consequence as the cause of youthful laxity.

The totals for intellectual abnormalities are, with the present groups, slightly higher among the male delinquents than among the female. Had the majority been, not school cases, but after-school cases, the incidence of intellectual deficiency, like that of intellectual dulness, would doubtless have fallen more heavily upon the girls. And it is suggestive that, in almost every feminine case where dulness or deficiency was the predominating factor, the girl was an adolescent, and the offence a sexual misdemeanour. In comparing the effects of intellectual weakness among the boys and girls respectively, a difference emerges similar to that remarked in the case of physical weakness. The dull, the defective, and the backward

<sup>1</sup> If there is any central factor underlying criminality, it is neither simple nor inborn. Examined by the usual statistical procedure, criminal tendencies appear to be correlated positively one with another, and the table of coefficients shows some approximation to a hierarchy. But any central factor that may be thus implied must be a highly composite one, and dependent quite as much upon environmental influences as upon innate, and quite as much upon extrinsic factors as upon psychological.

<sup>2</sup> For a fuller discussion of the connection between intellectual weakness and delinquency, see *Mental and Scholastic Tests*, pp. 184–190; and *Psyche*, *loc. cit.* Vol. II. No. 3, pp. 233–243. It is to be noted that the average association coefficient (Table IV) for the intellectual conditions enumerated in the detailed table (Table VIII) is reduced by the negative correlation between delinquency and the presence of supernormal intelligence.

boys suffer largely by being unfitted for their work; the dull girls, by offering less resistance to their own emotional impulses and less opposition to the corrupt persuasions of others. The difference, however, is only one of degree. Instances of either type are to be found among both sexes.

### (B) EMOTIONAL FACTORS.

The various factors which I have broadly termed emotional<sup>1</sup> are by far the most numerous of all (Table VIII). Viewed, too, in the light of

<sup>1</sup> A note is needed to indicate very briefly how the elusive task of temperamental assessment was approached.

The strength of the specific instincts and emotions was estimated according to the standard-deviation scale described in my report on the *Distribution of Educational Abilities* (p. 50). To secure as high a degree of comparability as was possible with different assessors, the several grades were defined in two ways; first, abstractly, in terms of the percentages to be expected for each grade out of a random group of a hundred; and more concretely, in terms of typical individuals picked out as borderline specimens, upon lines now familiar from the American Army rating-scales.

The highest grade in the five-fold scale—the “A” or “+ 2 S.D.” group—was originally defined as including all who diverged above a line drawn at +1.5 S.D., approximately 7 per cent. of the total distribution. But, in dealing with delinquents, it was found useful to split this (and other) grades into two, by the use of plus and minus signs: thus all who diverged above +2.0 S.D. (that is, in a normal distribution, the highest 2.3 per cent.) were marked “A+,” the remainder of this grade (those between +1.5 and +2.0 S.D.) being marked “A-.” The cases enumerated in Table VIII (B. 1b.) as suffering an excessive development of a specific instinct or emotion, consist of those marked “A+” for that particular quality—of those, that is to say, who deviate above the average of their group by more than twice the standard deviation.

The diagnosis of instability or temperamental deficiency was founded partly upon the average of the gradings of the separate emotions, and partly upon a distinct assessment. A “temperamental defective” was defined as one who, without being also intellectually defective, exhibited from birth or from an early age, the same degree of control over his instincts and emotions generally, as would be exhibited by an average child of half his chronological age or less, or (in the case of an adult) by an average child under eight; this roughly coincides with those marked, for general emotionality, “A+” (above +2.0 S.D.), after those defective in general intelligence (a large proportion) have been eliminated. An “unstable” was defined as one who, in the middle of his school career, would appear retarded in the development of emotional control by about two years, or, more generally, retarded at every age by over 15 per cent. of his chronological age; this group broadly corresponds with those marked “A-” (above +1.5 S.D.) for general emotionality. Special precautions, however, were needful to avoid missing the repressed or sensitive types of instability, whose feelings are often so masked that to a first superficial glance they appear unemotional and even phlegmatic. It would seem that, in general proportions, these two groups—the unstable and the temperamentally deficient—roughly correspond, upon the emotional side, to the two groups designated, on the intellectual side, respectively as dull and as defective.

Psychologically, temperamental deficiency is simply an extreme degree of inborn emotional instability; socially, it comprehends all those who, upon temperamental grounds, need supervision or custodial care for their own protection or for that of others; clinically, just as the intellectually defective comprise a small proportion of definitely pathological

the average association-coefficients (Table IV), delinquency depends much more closely upon emotional conditions than upon intellectual conditions, although it is the intellectual status of the delinquent that has hitherto monopolised the main interest of criminal psychology. The correlation is greatest in the case of specific instincts and emotions. For these the calculated coefficient is among the highest in the table. For the more general emotional conditions, and for the presence of defective or undesirable interests, it is also significantly large. For the influence of repressed complexes no statistical assessment can be offered, since no analysis of such mechanisms was attempted with the non-delinquents. It will be noted, however, that there are, among the delinquents, three times as many "repressed" personalities (often neurotic or psycho-neurotic) as among the law-abiding children.

The total figures for major factors of the several kinds (Table II) reveal at once the high predominance both of general emotionality, on the one hand, and of specific instincts and emotions, on the other. Specific instinctive tendencies—chiefly those of sex, anger, wandering, acquisitiveness, and suggestibility<sup>1</sup>—and general emotionality—chiefly in the form of instability, either adolescent or inborn—together constitute nearly one quarter of the major factors among the boys and nearly one-third among the girls. If to these we add all instances where the major factor was a repressed emotional complex, we have accounted for the principal causes among nearly one-half of the entire delinquent group.

The totals for all factors, principal and subordinate (Table II), exhibit emotional conditions as more prevalent among the delinquent girls than among the delinquent boys. This difference, however, springs mainly from the greater frequency of general instability and of repressed complexes among the girls. On the other hand, the delinquent boys seem characterised rather by defective or undesirable interests, and by the over-development of specific instincts. In these respects sex-differences

types. so also a prolonged study will at length disclose that many of the temperamentally defective are undoubtedly "psychopathic,"—a term by which I understand congenital cases of borderline or incipient insanity, the line between amentia and dementia, being, in my view, far less rigid, at any rate upon the temperamental side, than is commonly assumed. The "neurotic" (those suffering from one or other of the recognised neuroses) fall, with this classification, under "repressed unstabiles." A few constitutionally excitable children, popularly dubbed "hysterical," have been grouped under the uninhibited or "un-repressed" type.

<sup>1</sup> Suggestibility itself is perhaps not strictly classifiable as an instinct, but in children at any rate it seems chiefly to arise from a well-recognised instinct, namely, that of submissiveness. The transference of emotion from a complex, however, usually operates as well.

of a somewhat similar nature are to be discerned among the normals. As to particular instincts and emotions, the delinquent girls are marked by an inborn liability to outbreaks of sex and bad temper; the delinquent boys by an excessive liveliness of the migratory, the acquisitive, and the self-assertive instincts. In both sexes a disproportionate percentage of the delinquents seem singularly insusceptible to the inhibitory feelings—pain<sup>1</sup>, sorrow, fear<sup>2</sup>, and affection.

#### COMPLEXES.

Repressed complexes are perhaps not so much themselves the causes of crime, as part of the mental machinery through which the ulterior causes operate. I have classed them as principal factors whenever the delinquency was at length cleared up by a protracted analysis, or whenever the child showed a visible amendment after removal from a source of current conflict. Many of the "complexes" are indeed complex; and that in the highest degree. Their varying elements and distinguishable aspects are exceedingly numerous; and each is recorded separately under a separate heading in the table. Thus, though the cases analysed are few, the total entries are considerable. In spite of this, the figures shown for the frequency of such mechanisms still yield, in all probability, a gross under-estimate. Analytic treatment could only be undertaken when there seemed a reasonable likelihood that it might issue in a practical benefit, or at least cast a gleam of theoretical light upon the genesis of the moral trouble; and even then, from the exigencies of my work, it was impossible to push home the analysis in every case with ideal completeness. With the delinquent boys, in particular, this mode of approach proved difficult and slow; and here, most of all, the percentages may be too slender.

Complexes similar to those discovered among delinquents and neurotics could, with sufficient exploration, be discovered among normals. Indeed, in spite of all the thorough work by the various psycho-analytic schools, it still remains something of a mystery why complexes, apparently identical, should produce abnormal symptoms in one person and

<sup>1</sup> The seeming insusceptibility to pain often amounts, in these self-offered little martyrs, to a definite and perverse pleasure in pain (masochism). Pain, like every sensory stimulus, is in a mild degree pleasurable to all. But, with some, the borderline between pleasant and unpleasant pain is abnormally high; and even an intense smarting is welcomed as delightfully pungent. The bearing of this upon corporal punishment is too obvious to be indicated.

<sup>2</sup> Many of the younger delinquents, however, are not fearless, but timid (see Table); and so by nature secretive.

none in another. With delinquents various factors seem to further this unfavourable development; defective family relationships obviously give the usual parental complexes a very unusual form; an over-strict or an over-indulgent discipline—particularly when the two alternate within the same household—alike make the conflicts more acute; general instability, and the excessive strength of certain instincts—sex, anger, self-assertion and pleasurable disgust—intensify the lack of emotional balance; other instincts—timidity and unpleasant disgust—make for increased repression. Delinquents, too, manifest a disproportionate number, or at least a disproportionate strength, of certain more primitive complexes—particularly the auto-erotic, the self-regarding, and the more primitive phases of the parental; they often seem to have undergone an arrest or a fixation at these more infantile levels. Finally, innumerable events in the outer and inner life of the delinquent child—removal from home, quarrelling at home, immorality at home, and their secret effects upon his mind, pernicious companions or painful experiences outside the home—all serve to give a special trend to his unconscious emotional development<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> From the standpoint of treatment it may be noted that, with children, and especially with delinquents, psycho-analytic mechanisms differ in their mode of action from those met with in the case of neurotic adults. In the first place repression seems seldom so complete. It is true that most of my delinquents who suffered from complexes belonged to the repressed or sensitive type; but similar mechanisms were from time to time discernible among those who were of a nature eminently unrepressed. Partly as a consequence, the analysis of young cases is, as a rule, accomplished with greater speed and fewer hindrances than a similar analysis in a neurotic adult. Nevertheless, with delinquents the method brings with it special difficulties of its own; their word is not always to be relied upon; their confidence is at first often difficult to gain; and their desire for treatment and their eagerness to be cured is neither vigorous nor voluntary. With all but the oldest and the brightest, too, the analyst must pursue a somewhat different line from that usually taken with adults; there may, for example, be less talking, less confession, less discussion of dreams and fantasies, more attention to the child's conduct during recreation, and more observation of his natural responses to test-situations, both casual and arranged. My inferences as to the working of complexes of various kinds are thus often derived, not from an actual unravelling of them by a full and systematic exploration, but rather from recognised complex-symptoms noted incidentally in the course of general interviews and everyday behaviour. Fortunately, with children of school age, the most delicate motives of all—active sexual complexes, in the *narrowest* sense of the adjective 'sexual'—seem relatively unimportant; and, unless a child of these tenderer years, by private avowal or by overt acts, spontaneously admits the presence of such conflicts, the cautious analyst will be exceedingly chary of trying to probe for their presence. Sexual problems, sexual conflicts and sexual temptations undoubtedly arise during this so-called 'latent' period; but, sometimes because they are less repressed, sometimes because the repression is for the time being more successful, they cause less worry and lead to less misconduct before the onset of the pubertal epoch. Hence, during the school period, without urgent reasons for entering upon these sensitive issues, the psychologist will, as a rule, be wiser if he prefers discretion—

## SUMMARY.

1. Nearly 200 cases of juvenile delinquency, and, as a control-series, 400 normal cases, have been individually investigated in parallel enquiries; and the various adverse conditions, discoverable in their family history, in their social environment, and in their physical, intellectual, and temperamental status, have been ascertained and tabulated for each group.

2. The tables show a lengthy list of contributory causes. Delinquency in the young seems assignable, generally to a wide variety, and usually to a plurality, of converging factors; so that the juvenile criminal is far from constituting a homogeneous psychological class.

3. To attribute crime in general to either a predominantly hereditary or a predominantly environmental origin appears impossible; in one individual the former type of factor may be paramount; in another, the latter; while, with a large assortment of cases, both seem, on an average and in the long run, to be of almost equal weight.

4. Heredity appears to operate, not directly through the transmission of a criminal disposition as such, but rather indirectly, through such congenital conditions as dulness, deficiency, temperamental instability, or the excessive development of some single primitive instinct.

5. Of environmental factors those centring in the moral character of the delinquent's home, and, most of all, in his personal relations with his parents, are of the greatest influence.

6. Psychological factors, whether due to heredity or to environment, are supreme both in number and strength over all the rest. Emotional conditions are more significant than intellectual; while psycho-analytic complexes provide everywhere a ready mechanism for the direction of overpowering instincts and of repressed emotionality into open acts of crime.

if he foregoes the uncertain benefits of ruthless exploration rather than risk the surer perils which may arise when these troublesome interests are stirred up. After puberty the case is changed; but the utmost circumspection must still be exercised.

## THE INFLUENCE OF AFFECTIVE FACTORS ON THE MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE.

By C. A. RICHARDSON.

THE first decades of the twentieth century have witnessed the rapid growth of two new developments in psychological science, namely the analytic method in psychotherapy and the testing and quantitative assessment of intelligence. The growths of these two movements have been curiously parallel in some respects; neither attracted any marked attention before 1900, each made immense strides during the war. While independent in origin and inception, both have now advanced to a stage at which we are compelled to consider whether each may not afford us information bearing on the theory and practice of the other.

Briefly, the kind of question that is now being asked is this: May it not be possible that the *apparent* intelligence of an individual is in part conditioned by affective inhibitions which conceal his *real* grade of intelligence? Is not a low grade intelligence due in some cases to the action of such inhibitions, and might it not therefore be possible, by analysis directed to the removal of the latter, to increase appreciably a person's mental efficiency?

So far as the measurement of intelligence is concerned, the practical issue to be decided is whether the performance of children and others in mental tests is affected by inhibitions of the kind referred to. Evidently this question could only be settled decisively by testing a number of children and then retesting them after analytic treatment. But, in the absence of such an interesting experiment, it is yet possible to arrive at a provisional, and probably reliable, conclusion, on the basis of considerations relating firstly to the nature of the tests themselves, and secondly to the results of the tests.

No doubt everyone would agree that, even when all disturbing factors are eliminated, children differ very considerably from one another in degree of intellectual capacity. It is unlikely that anyone would be prepared to maintain that, with sufficiently appropriate and complete psychotherapeutic treatment, all could be brought to the same level of intelligence. We may therefore assume that fundamental differences do exist. In other words, it is theoretically possible to rank individuals



in order of intelligence. This implies that for each individual there is a numerical index, constant for that individual, which expresses his position in the hierarchy of intellect. Mental testing will therefore be directed to the discovery of that index, and the question we have to consider is whether such testing does in fact disclose the real index, or merely an apparent value of the latter modified by the influence of affective inhibitions which interfere with the subject's performance in the test. In what follows we shall exclude from our consideration definitely pathological cases, such as those manifesting epilepsy, hysteria, or dementia.

In discussing the effects on a child's performance which the tests exercise by their very nature, it is necessary to distinguish between *general* mental inefficiency and inability to pass certain *specific* tests which may be widely separated in the scale. Affective inhibitions, as opposed to natural dulness or defectiveness, are unlikely to produce general inefficiency unless they are so extreme in character as to verge upon the pathological. Accordingly the important point for our present purpose is the nature of specific tests; and here again we must distinguish between individual tests and group tests. We may leave the question of general inefficiency till we come to consider the results of the tests.

The majority of individual scales in use at present are based on the Binet scale or on one of the numerous revisions thereof. A glance through the questions in these scales will be sufficient to make it clear that by far the larger proportion of them are noticeably lacking in any element which might, for particular individuals, constitute affective or emotional tone in any degree worth considering. It is true that a few of the Binet tests deal with matters which tend to acquire for most persons some marked affective tone, but even in such cases the matters are of a kind calculated to produce far less emotional effect on children than on adults. But apart from these comparatively few and isolated instances the affective tone of the tests is almost entirely neutral.

The reason for this is not far to seek. Intelligence tests being directed to the discovery of the child's innate mental ability as opposed to his acquired knowledge, are so constructed as to call into play relatively fundamental elements in intelligent process. This results in a type of simplicity in marked contrast to the characteristics of ordinary educational tests and of those external conditions which in part determine the progress of the child in his everyday school work. It is a simplicity consisting in a lack of complication by widespread and elaborated associations which, by their assimilation to the matter in question, may

give to the latter a very marked emotional tone, and hence lead to affective inhibition where it is concerned. Doubtless this accounts for the fact that some children who do well in an intelligence test may be making progress in school at a slower rate than their success in the test would lead one to expect. These considerations reveal a merit of the intelligence test which makes it one of the children's safeguards. The writer numbers among his own cases examples both of specific and of general inefficiency in school work which investigation showed clearly to be due to causes of an affective character. Yet the intelligence test penetrated these inhibitions and revealed the true grade of mental capacity to be superior to that manifested in school.

In addition to the inherent nature of the tests themselves, it is necessary to consider for a moment the conditions of their administration. The individual tests are given to one child at a time, and, in general, no one else is present but the examiner. Evidently, such conditions may in certain circumstances, and with children of certain temperaments, be conducive to the setting up of inhibitions. The removal or prevention of inhibitions arising in this way depends for its success almost entirely on experience in the general technique of administering the tests; and the skilled tester (who, it need hardly be said, should be a sufficiently trained psychologist) will quickly recognise symptoms indicating the presence of inhibitions and will know how to deal with the latter. It may safely be said that, with a tester who understands his work, any serious effect due to affective inhibitions arising from the conditions of administration of the tests can be practically eliminated.

When we turn to consider group tests, however, the case is somewhat different. It is true that, among the large number of items which go to make up a group test, there may perhaps be a few which possess marked affective tone for certain children. There seems no reason to suppose that the effect of this, if it exist at all, will be more than slight; and, in any case, the very multitude and variety of the items is likely to ensure that any affective consequences will average out among the different children so as to leave unaffected the reliability of the norms of performance as a basis of comparison.

More serious, however, in the case of group tests, are the possible effects of the conditions of administration. In the majority of group scales the separate tests are given out at intervals, each, after brief verbal instructions from the examiner, being carried out under a strict time limit. The possible effect on certain types of child (e.g. the 'nervous' or 'anxious,' or even 'cautious' child) of this state of affairs can easily

be imagined, and the conditions of the test necessarily render it impossible for the examiner to eliminate disturbing factors by dealing with the children individually. It does not seem possible to get rid altogether of the influence of such factors in a group test; yet, on the other hand, the results of the tests show that the *mass* effects produced by the disturbing elements are negligible, though, of course, injustice may be done to individual children. In the case of individuals, the effects are probably reduced to a minimum in those scales in which the tests are not timed separately but only as a whole, the child being left to work quietly through the questions by himself, without interruptions at intervals by the examiner<sup>1</sup>.

It will be clear, then, that an examination of the tests themselves reveals but little in their nature to warrant the conclusion that affective factors may frequently militate to a serious extent against a child's performance. But evidence of a more definite, and therefore more decisive, nature is found to be available when we turn to a scrutiny of the results of the tests. In considering these results we should expect to find the influence, if any, not only of specific inabilities with regard to particular tests arising from specific inhibitions, but also of general inefficiency due to affective factors of a more far-reaching type.

It was pointed out at the beginning of this paper that, when disturbing elements are eliminated, individuals will differ in their respective grades of mental capacity, intelligence tests being directed to the discovery of the index, constant for a given individual, which expresses his particular grade of intelligence. A child's degree of intellectual *maturity* is expressed as a 'mental age.' As intelligence develops with increasing age, so will the mental age increase. But the child's intellectual *rank* can only be expressed by comparing him with the 'average' child, and the result of this comparison is termed the 'mental ratio' (i.e. the ratio of the child's mental age to his actual age) or 'intelligence quotient' (I.Q.). There now arises the question whether the I.Q. can be taken as that constant index which denotes the child's grade of intelligence.

Let us suppose that the influence of affective inhibitions frequently and markedly interferes with children's performances in the tests. How could this be detected in the results of the tests? Evidently by re-testing the same children after various intervals of time, some of the intervals being of considerable duration. We should then expect to find

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for example, Dr Godfrey Thomson's *Northumberland Mental Tests* (Harrap), and the present writer's *Simplex Group Intelligence Scale* (Harrap).

that the results of retests of the same child differed much from one another; for we could hardly suppose that the effects of the inhibitions were so nicely proportioned quantitatively as always to produce the same proportional (not absolute) effect at any age (thus leaving the apparent I.Q. constant so far as they were concerned), especially in view of the fact that at later ages a child is tested by questions wholly or partly different from those employed at earlier ages. On the contrary we should expect the interference of the affective factors to be quantitatively unequal, and more or less arbitrary, and hence to find irregular variations in the I.Q.

What is found in practice? The very opposite is the case. There is a large and growing amount of data which shows that the I.Q. of a particular child, as measured by the tests, remains practically constant within the limits of experimental error. Retests have been conducted under varying conditions, by different examiners, and after varying intervals of time (some of several years' duration), and all go to reinforce the conclusion that the tests give a nearly constant I.Q. for each child<sup>1</sup>. There are no signs (except in markedly pathological cases) of the irregular variations which would inevitably arise from affective interference by inhibiting factors of the kind we are considering. Retesting therefore shows, not only that the I.Q. is at least a close approximation to the constant index aimed at, but also that affective inhibitions have at most but a negligible influence on the children's performances both in specific tests and in the scale as a whole.

We are thus bound to conclude that there is nothing in the nature of the tests themselves or in the results of their application which could warrant us in believing that affective inhibitions seriously interfere with the measurement of intelligence. At the same time we must end as we began by pointing out that finally conclusive evidence can only be obtained by retesting children after psychotherapeutic treatment. It is to be hoped that this important experiment may be carried out in the near future. Allied experiments of equal interest might consist in the application of mental tests during hypnosis, and also in cases of dissociated personality. In dissociations of the co-conscious type the comparison of the results of mental measurements made on the different personalities would be particularly interesting.

<sup>1</sup> The only general exception to this statement occurs with mental defectives (especially the lower grades) where a noticeable drop in I.Q. seems to occur with increasing age.

## SUGGESTION.

BY J. CYRIL FLOWER.

THE confusion which exists in psychological theories of Suggestion is due, no doubt, to a number of causes, chief among which is the fact that there is no common agreement as to the principle upon which definition is to be made. One method is to lump together certain kinds of reaction which are obviously similar, and to refer them without more ado to the capacious pigeon-hole labelled 'Suggestion.' This method is the carrying over of the rough and ready classifications of common sense into the field of psychology. What we mean in ordinary speech by suggestion is actually a group of mental operations and reactions which appear, as effects, to resemble one another. Thus if *A* in perplexity asks the advice of *B*, his question probably is, "What can you suggest?" And *B* is regarded as having made a suggestion, good, bad or indifferent, either (1) if he offers definite ideas, or (2) if by gesture, silence or other means, he insinuates something, vaguely or definitely. So a book or a play is said to be 'suggestive' either because it communicates fresh ideas and stimulates the thought and imagination of the public, or because it hints in veiled language at things which are more attractive in the disguise of innuendo than in the everyday garb of direct expression. The common element in these phenomena which are thus classed together as suggestion is the influence by one person or group of persons upon another person or group of persons which is exercised without recourse to physical force. Obviously if everything which comes under this broad heading is included under one term, the term will be so general as to have little or no value. A word that means too much may serve in common speech, where it can always be more nicely defined by its context, but it can only lead to hopeless confusion in science. If, therefore, the term is to survive in psychology, it must be defined by something which penetrates deeper than mere external resemblance. Accordingly there is a second method which proceeds by psychological analysis, and which aims at defining suggestion by reference to the psychological mechanism or mechanisms involved. But although psychologists are commonly agreed on the necessity of this exacter method, they are by no means agreed that its application leads to one precise and adequate definition

of Suggestion. Nor is the reason for this far to seek. Psychology is not a science of phenomena which can be isolated and studied as a self-contained group of interacting elements. Psychology has to deal with mind and its manifestations, and mind cannot be temporarily detached from the world while it submits to analysis and experiment but has to be studied in relation to the world upon which it acts, and which acts upon it. Thus psychological analysis depends for its results upon the point of view from which it is made. The academic psychology which largely held the field till recently was primarily interested in mental processes so far as they could be described and formulated by the methods of introspection and observation, the assumption being that what appears to be the character of a mental process for an intelligent observer, is its character. This whole assumption, however, was challenged by the application of the idea of evolution to mind, and profounder results were at once obtained by the comparative method, which substituted for the mere personal approach, the biological approach to the problems of psychology. A further contribution of vast importance has come from the study of mental disease and irregularity. The situation, therefore, is that psychology can hardly be looked upon as an independent science, but rather as a handmaid to the sciences. 'Pure' psychology is an abstraction; real psychology is as various as are the fields of experience in which mind is involved. Every psychologist must, that is to say, deal with mind in the concrete, in relation to some definite situation or set of conditions, and the point of view from which he approaches the subject will necessarily influence all his conclusions. Thus the philosopher who studies man as a 'rational animal,' the biologist who studies him as the most recent phase of an evolutionary process, and the mental specialist who studies him as a complex of forces which may easily get out of order and have to be set right again, will inevitably analyse the psyche and draw inferences concerning it from points of view so different and with interests so diverse, that it is not surprising that the resulting 'psychology' is not always coherent. The whole topic of suggestion is hedged around with precisely these difficulties. Rationalistic psychology does not much relish the facts of suggestion, and accordingly it dismisses such facts as it cannot otherwise dispose of to the realm of 'the abnormal'—one of those vague terms which covers a multitude of ignorances. Biological psychology welcomes suggestion, because it likes to discover how very irrational man is, and how nearly related therefore he is to the ape, the dog, the tiger and the jackal, and accordingly it gives the widest possible scope to the operation

of suggestion as a non-rational process. Psychotherapy knows the practical value of suggestion as a method of mental healing, and accustomed to the relation between physician and patient it tends to regard the essence of suggestion as being the conscious and intentional communication, with some measure of authority, of an idea or ideas by someone possessing prestige to a subject capable of being thrown into a receptive state by this means. When the systematic psychologist comes along and tries to present a synthetic view by combining the particular contributions of these various schools the result is practically a return to the common sense usage which is too vague to be helpful—what Dr Rivers described as “a tendency to make the scope of suggestion so wide as to include nearly every process by which one mind is acted upon by another mind, by an object of the environment, or even by itself (autosuggestion)<sup>1</sup>.”

It is obvious that the facts of suggestion are far older than any psychological account of them; the existence of the word in common speech is sufficient evidence that they were at least in some measure recognised. In his contribution to the Symposium<sup>2</sup> on “The Relations of Complex and Sentiment” prepared for the Meeting of The British Psychological Society in Manchester, July 1922, Dr Myers wrote: “In order to reach greater precision, psychologists have attempted to change the meaning of these and other words in common use, but without paying enough attention to their current meaning or to the route by which they have come to acquire that meaning. It is too generally assumed that popular usage annihilates meaning. This is an error: it is always possible to define the words of common parlance, and it is of considerable psychological interest to study their significance.” To re-discover what may be called the nuclear meaning of the term suggestion in common speech would probably put us on the way to discovering what is the real and essential meaning of the word, which is what psychology as a science seeks. A deeper analysis of the common usage reveals at once the fact that the more intelligent or rational signification is secondary, and that the primary element refers to something surreptitious. The veiled hint, the ambiguous phrase or gesture, the tone of voice and manner of address vaguely intimating something behind the obvious, the symbolic act or representation—these and similar indirect modes of conveying influence are commonly regarded as the

<sup>1</sup> W. H. R. Rivers, Article “Psycho-therapeutics,” *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

<sup>2</sup> *British Journal of Psychology*, XIII. 2.

characteristic vehicles through which suggestion operates. And the result of successful suggestion in this sense is the stirring up in the recipient of activities or tendencies which are not rationally conditioned. The influence is carried in under the walls of the citadel and escapes the watchful eye of the sentry. Religious ritual, for example, does not make its appeal to reason, but to what is sometimes called "the aesthetic sense" which means that it is suggestion acting through the senses directly upon organised conative tendencies built out of primitive instinctive material. This evasion of the critical reason is the outstanding mark of suggestion. How then does it come about that at the same time the word is used in common speech for processes which are of a definitely rational character? Why do we, when asked for an opinion, frequently call the ideas we elaborate a 'suggestion'? Why is almost any contribution, short of an authoritative enunciation of a truth which is by common consent beyond dispute, nearly always offered as a suggestion? The value of the term in these and similar contexts is in its tentative nature. We 'suggest' possibilities; while we issue instructions, and we declare demonstrated truths. Thus however sure we may be in our own minds that what we have to offer is right and true we frequently do not wish to give the impression that we are too sure. "I tell you this that you may read, mark, learn and inwardly digest it" is the attitude of the self-assured teacher to the disciple. "I suggest this to you...take it for what it is worth, and let it influence you as much as it may have power to do" is the attitude of the more tentative adviser or fellow inquirer; and the fact is that the more tentative communication often has the bigger effect, and it is probably popular insight into this fact that has led to the common use of the word in what seems at first sight to be so different a meaning. There is something more involved, in other words, than is obvious in the form in which the communication is made. We may roughly sum this up by saying that the popular use of suggestion implies that it is the method by which indirect mental influence is exerted. Direct mental influence is aimed at in the endeavour to convince through reason, and is successful when conviction is logically implanted. Indirect influence means that which passes through channels other than or additional to the channel of reason.

Most psychological discussions of suggestion start from this general conception, but very different conclusions are reached regarding such questions as the extent of the phenomena which may rightly be subsumed under the general heading, and what exactly are the mechanisms



involved in the process. It was chiefly through the therapeutic application of hypnotism, first by Braid, and still more by Liébeault, that suggestion became a matter of serious scientific investigation. Sir Francis R. Cruise<sup>1</sup> records the fact that Liébeault told him that as a young practitioner he had been greatly impressed by the influence upon patients of the expression of a very decided opinion by the physician, and he set about to discover how this influence might be exercised more directly and specifically. In the course of investigation and trial he discovered that in artificially provoked sleep, or hypnotism, the suggestibility of a patient was immensely increased. Accordingly Liébeault made use of hypnotism in order to facilitate treatment by suggestion; and this process was of course, the deliberate passing into the mind of the patient of beneficial ideas by the physician. These ideas, passing into the mind of a hypnotised person without reference to his rational volition, undoubtedly operate in a manner wholly different from that in which they behave if merely presented to and accepted by the logical reason of a person in the normal state. The idea of being better from some pain, when lodged in the mind of a person in a hypnotic state tends to bring about, more or less permanently, the condition of being better, just as the idea of inability to move a certain limb or of insensibility in a given region brings about the corresponding functional disability. From these and similar facts, combined with the theory of ideo-motor action, it was a natural conclusion for the therapeutic school that suggestion consists essentially in lodging in the mind of a patient an idea or ideas which shall be free from interference and inhibition by other ideas. Thus Janet says<sup>2</sup>: "In suggestion, each idea seems to develop to the maximum, to give all it contains in the way of images, muscular movements, and visceral phenomena. This *complete development* of all the elements contained in an idea is an essential characteristic of the phenomenon." For a normal person the development of his ideas depends on the exercise of attention and personality, but "In order that there may be suggestion, it is precisely necessary that all these normal causes of development should be wanting, and that the *idea should seem to develop to the extreme, without any participation of the will or of the personal consciousness of the subject.*" On this view we get a sort of penny-in-the-slot theory of suggestion. We put a penny into the machine, and if it is in good working order, and not already choked by

<sup>1</sup> Foreword to *Treatment by Hypnotism and Suggestion, or Psycho-Therapeutics*, by C. Lloyd Tuckey.

<sup>2</sup> Pierre Janet, *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, New York, 1907, pp. 282, 284.

other peoples' pennies, we shall draw from the machine our penny's worth of chocolate, or what-not. So if we put an idea into the mind of a patient, and this idea is free from competition with others, it automatically sets in motion the psychological and physiological machinery which issues in action. The same conception is expressed by C. Baudouin<sup>1</sup> in his account of the New Nancy School in the following words: "Suggestion is the putting into operation, by ourselves or by another, of the ideo-reflex power which exists in us all," and again by G. A. Coe<sup>2</sup>: "In deliberation there is mutual inhibition of two or more competing ideas....Suggestion, on the other hand, implies the absence, or relative lack, of such competition, inhibition and pause. All that is necessary is that attention should be withheld from some of the ideas appropriate to the given situation, and focussed, or 'narrowed down' to some one idea or coherent chain of ideas." According to this view suggestion depends upon (1) ideo-motor action—that is to say the theory that every idea naturally tends to pass into action; (2) the absence or inhibition of all other ideas which might interfere with or counteract the idea which is to be enacted. Now with regard to these two conditions Prideaux<sup>3</sup> has already pointed out that "The term 'ideo-motor action' is a relic of the old psychology of ideas; for example, for Hegel, 'an idea is a force, and is only inactive in so far as it is held in check by other ideas.'" Analysis shews that it is not ideas that are active, but the affect which ideas may be the means of stirring up. In other words it is only such ideas as link themselves to interests or conative tendencies, which are emotionally toned, that tend to issue in action, and these interests and conative tendencies are capable of stimulation by other means than ideas—unless the word 'idea' is to be so extended in its meaning as to cease to have any specific reference. All definitions of suggestion, therefore, in terms of the communication of ideas are too narrow. They express at best only those features which are of interest and importance to the psychotherapist. Further, to quote Prideaux again on the second condition: "Suggestion has no capacity for inhibiting ideas, but, if we speak in terms of inhibition, is rather the consequence of the inhibition of inhibiting forces normally involved in volition." This is true only if suggestion is defined in terms of communicating ideas. If the process of suggestion is the setting in motion of conative ten-

<sup>1</sup> Charles Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, 1920, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> George A. Coe, Article "Suggestion," *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

<sup>3</sup> E. Prideaux, Article "Suggestion and Suggestibility," *British Journal of Psychology*, x, March 1920.

dencies, whether through ideas or otherwise it is obvious that an essential part of the suggestion is the calling up of the conative tendencies in sufficient power to bear down the opposition of contrary influences. Unless this be done, the suggestion does not take place. But as against the point of view of the theory we have been dealing with this criticism of Prideaux is important. Ideas as such do not necessarily inhibit other ideas, but may merely complicate the mental content at any time, and therefore the mere success in communicating an idea to the mind of another will fall short of having the value of suggestion, unless that idea is, by reason of its content or associations, the spark that ignites the explosive charge of conative tendencies. Janet relates the following complaint of a patient, which admirably illustrates the point<sup>1</sup>:

"A patient has sometimes answered me in a vulgar but quite characteristic way: 'Sir, I do not know the reason, but the thing did not take.'

'What do you mean? You did not understand what I said?'

'Yes, I understood quite well.'

'Then you do not wish to do that, you do not accept?'

'I accept all you please. I am quite ready to obey you, and I will do it if you choose; only I tell you beforehand that the thing did not take.'"

It is interesting to note that Binet and Féré<sup>2</sup>, while sharing the ideational view of suggestion, yet lay emphasis on the secondary nature of the idea. "*La suggestion est une opération qui produit un effet quelconque sur un sujet en passant par son intelligence. Toute suggestion consiste essentiellement à agir sur une personne par une idée; tout effet suggéré est le résultat d'un phénomène d'idéation; mais il faut ajouter tout de suite que l'idée est un épiphénomène; prise en elle-même, elle est seulement le signe indicateur d'un processus physiologique qui seul est capable de produire un effet matériel.*" And "*la conclusion générale qui ressort de tous ces faits et de toutes ces expériences, c'est que la suggestion consiste à introduire, cultiver et renforcer dans l'esprit du sujet en expérience—une idée...elle consiste dans le renouvellement psychique d'une excitation périphérique que le sujet a déjà éprouvée. Dès lors on comprend sa puissance; l'idée, à proprement parler, n'est qu'une apparence; mais derrière elle se cache l'énergie développée par une excitation physique antérieure.*" We are not concerned to discuss the relation of mind and body, and therefore may leave aside the question whether "a physiological process alone can bring about a material effect,"

<sup>1</sup> P. Janet, *Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, pp. 284-5.

<sup>2</sup> Binet et Féré, *Le Magnétisme Animal*, Paris, 1887, pp. 128, 135-6.

but it is entirely in harmony with the point of view being developed in this paper to insist that the function of ideas in suggestion is to act as signals. But signals rather for what is essentially an instinctive process; and not all ideas are capable of this function, and, further, it is not only *ideas* that can set the instinctive machinery in motion.

Of the definitely therapeutic school of psychologists Freud<sup>1</sup> comes probably nearest to the social and biological point of view, in his doctrine that suggestion is transference, or more accurately stated, that "suggestibility is nothing else but the tendency to transference." Transference, which is "the radiation of Libido towards other persons in object-investment" is a natural capacity in all persons, and therefore suggestibility is normal and potentially universal. The way it works (as positive) is to endow the person to whom the transference is made with authority; it "transforms itself into faith in his findings and in his views." And "faith repeats the history of its own origin; it is a derivative of love and at first it needed no arguments." Consequently the person on whom the libido is fixed is a perpetual and prolific source of suggestion to the subject, precisely because his reason is in abeyance, and his instinctive tendencies are in a state of heightened activity. There are two points that call for comment here: (1) Freud's use of the term 'libido' as equivalent to 'sexuality,' which might seem to be artificially limiting the range of those conative tendencies which are the ultimate power-house of suggestion. This point is of no great importance, however, if we remember that Freud practically means by 'sexuality' the whole range of instinct energy, and not merely 'adult sexuality.' Jung, of course, definitely uses the term for psychic energy, or force, which flows along the channels of the special instincts<sup>2</sup>. (2) Freud lays strong emphasis on 'faith' as the characteristic element in suggestibility. It is perfectly true that faith does increase suggestibility (or at least may do so), but it is not true that faith and suggestibility are the same. Faith is characterised by a conscious mental activity (whatever other elements enter also into its constitution) which is conspicuously absent in suggestion, and the process of suggestion as such does not necessarily involve faith at all. Faith, which is to be absolutely distinguished from blind credulity (which may probably be the result of suggestion) is a conscious and intelligent state of mental activity; suggestion essentially is an unconscious and instinctive reaction to certain kinds of stimulus.

<sup>1</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, translated by Joan Riviere, 1922. pp. 372-3.

<sup>2</sup> C. G. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, translated by Beatrice M. Hinkle, 1919, ch. II.

McDougall<sup>1</sup>, though he approaches the problem from the social point of view, makes the same mistake. His definition, which is perhaps the best known and most widely accepted, is: "Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance." There is not necessarily any question of conviction involved in a process of suggestion at all. It would not be correct to describe the state of mind of a hypnotised subject whose right arm has been rendered anaesthetic by suggestion as 'conviction' about anything—the state of mind is really one of domination by an influence outside the range of consciousness. It is, indeed, very largely the fact that there is an absence of conviction and of the power to have convictions, that constitutes suggestibility in this case. What McDougall presumably means is that the subject of suggestion behaves in regard to what is suggested as other persons might behave if they were deeply and profoundly convinced. It is quite possible to recognise that there are no adequate grounds for the acceptance of some article of religious faith and yet to determine to believe that article of faith because you would rather it were true than false, but such acceptance is not the result of suggestion. Religious faiths do actually get accepted by suggestion, but the people who are most suggestible are those with few settled convictions, and what results in their minds cannot be called conviction; it is obsessional opinion. You only have a feeling of conviction about something which has involved some measure of mental effort to gain; what arrives through suggestion is beyond all feelings of this character: it is altogether taken for granted, rooted in the ultimate reality of things. While in this direction McDougall is too wide in his definition, in another he is too narrow, just as the psychotherapists tend to be. Suggestion is very frequently a process of communicating propositions, but it is not only this. Indeed proposition would seem to be narrower than *idea* which has already been criticised as inadequate. The trouble with all the theories so far considered is essentially that they look upon the problem not only from a purely human point of view, but from a partial human point of view, emphasising those aspects of suggestion which most naturally lend themselves to the conscious manipulation of the physician.

Once it is realised that suggestion is not a rational process it is natural to conclude that it is not a merely human phenomenon, and that when physicians or others make use of suggestion for therapeutic purposes they are really setting in motion a mechanism which has or has

<sup>1</sup> William McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. 1909, p. 97.

had some biological function to play in the evolution of mind as part of life as a whole. If so what is essential in the process will be that which is common to lower forms of mind and the human, not what is characteristic of the human, complicated as that inevitably is by the presence and operation of free ideas and reason. Dr Rivers, approaching this and other psychological problems from the point of view of a happy combination of the therapeutic and the anthropological interests, definitely attempted to account for suggestion in terms of its biological function, and this led him to define it (so far as he regarded it as 'definable<sup>1</sup>') as 'a process or mechanism of instinct<sup>2</sup>.' In *Mind and Medicine*<sup>3</sup> he said: "I use the term for a process which belongs essentially to the instinctive side of mind. It is the representative in Man of one aspect of the gregarious instinct, the instinct which makes it possible for all the members of a group to act in unison so that they seem to be actuated by a common purpose. According to this view it is a process which differs essentially in nature from those mental processes which produce uniformity of behaviour by endowing the members of a group with a common idea or a common sentiment. Its activities lie definitely within the unconscious sphere, so that when the physician employs suggestion consciously, he is using in an artificial manner an agency which belongs properly to the region of the unconscious." Accordingly "...it is convenient to use the term suggestion...as a comprehensive term for the whole process whereby one mind acts upon another unwittingly<sup>4</sup>." The gregarious instinct, Rivers maintained, is one which came into existence "in order to produce and maintain the cohesion of the group" and "the essential function of the gregarious instinct is that it shall lead all the members of a group to act together towards the common purpose of furthering the welfare of the group<sup>5</sup>." Thus just as the sex instinct acts within a given individual in such a way as to make it peculiarly sensitive to the presence of an individual of the opposite sex of the same species, and to stir up feeling and activities which normally end in union, without there being any definite idea of sexual union, so we are to suppose that the gregarious instinct acts within any

<sup>1</sup> W. H. R. Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*, 2nd ed. 1922, p. 93, says: "As soon as we recognize that suggestion is essentially a process of the unconscious, and that its different aspects also have this nature, we have to renounce the clearness of definition which is possible in the case of the processes and products of consciousness."

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>3</sup> *Mind and Medicine*. A lecture delivered in the John Rylands Library on the 9th April, 1919, 2nd ed. 1920, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 91.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90

individual of a species in such a manner as to render it peculiarly sensitive to the presence of the group as a whole, and to stir up feeling and activities which normally end in action of that kind which is in the interest of the group as a whole. This sensitiveness to the group presence and the tendencies to common or harmonious action which are initiated is suggestion in its essence, unqualified by the various additional factors which arise from the operation of free ideas and reason.

The same view is accepted and worked out by W. Trotter<sup>1</sup>. For him suggestibility is essentially sensitiveness to the voice of the herd, a characteristic which is indispensable to the homogeneity of the herd. Every member of the herd tends to follow the lead of other members, and in turn to act as leader; but the leader who is most representative of the normal will be the most followed. Looking at this, so far as possible, from within, and assuming a species thus instinctively endowed and also self-conscious, it is clear that "impulses derived from herd feeling will enter the mind with the value of instincts—they will present themselves as '*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort needing no proof but their own evidence<sup>2</sup>.'" This feeling will not be limited to specific acts, but will be characteristic of *any opinion derived from herd suggestion*. We are thus led to see that suggestion is not a peculiar process which happens only when we are dealing with abnormal people, but as we know it, in its various forms, it is still the same essentially instinctive mechanism which operates throughout the wide field of animal mind, only modified and artificialised by the interaction with it of other and later developed mechanisms of mind. The physician, the priest, or the orator who communicates ideas or stirs up feeling and action through suggestion is stimulating the psychic traces of the gregarious instinct in those upon whom he practises, though he may also be skilfully combining other methods of influence with that which is rooted in instinct. The growth of intelligence indeed renders it difficult to present a case of pure instinctive suggestion, for in all experiment, whether in therapy or in a laboratory, the process is no longer of the unwitting character which it is in its simplest and most elementary form. Even the widespread phenomena of herd suggestion to which Trotter points in the everyday life of modern society do not display the process in the quite unwitting form; there is a good deal of witting manipulation on the part of 'leaders' of public opinion, and a good deal of 'faith' on the part of many who are the subjects of suggestion.

This interpretation of suggestion will be found to cover all the actual

<sup>1</sup> W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 30.

facts of suggestion as they appear in human society, and also to link these facts up with that larger range of facts which is involved in the thoroughgoing application of the doctrine of evolution to mind. It is impossible to attempt to demonstrate this in detail within the limits of this paper, but reference may be made to one outstanding question which is frequently discussed, but which cannot be answered by reference to any objective standard on the merely therapeutic or abnormal theories of suggestion. Why are there the remarkable variations which experience presents us with in suggestibility? In view of all the facts the reply that it is a sort of mental disease or weakness is no reply at all. We are all suggestible, more or less. The majority of us are far more so than less. If we judge by mere numbers and apply the term 'abnormal' at all those who are most indifferent to suggestion are the abnormal people—which only shews, incidentally, as Trotter has insisted, how futile the term is as ordinarily used. But once the essential fact is grasped that suggestion is an original mechanism of the mental equipment, it becomes simply a matter of psychological analysis to trace the course by which this original mechanism is overlaid and modified by the growth of intelligence, and the building up of instinctive and emotional raw material into organised sentiments. The tendency is for suggestibility in general to decrease in proportion to the increase of general education. In the language of Freud the more the libido is directed towards objects which form a rational system, so that mental energy is being usefully and intelligently expended, the less libido is available for being side tracked by suggestion. But there are few who can claim that the whole of their mental activity is satisfactorily engaged upon a completely rational system of ends or purposes, and therefore there are few who are not in some measure, and at some point liable to suggestion. The variation of suggestibility in different persons thus depends upon two main factors: (1) the amount of instinct energy with which they are endowed, (2) the extent to which this energy in any person is under the guiding control of organised sentiments and rational purposes. The ordinary person is only rational in some few more or less specific directions. He may be rational in his business, but wholly irrational in politics, religion and so forth, and consequently suggestible in these directions. Consequently the only way to eliminate suggestion altogether would be to eliminate ignorance altogether. Until such time all members of the human herd will be suggestible in varying degrees, the variations depending on the extent to which reason is actually and continuously at the helm.



## FREUD'S THEORY OF WIT.

BY J. Y. T. GREIG.

It is my purpose to examine certain opinions on wit set forth by Professor Freud in his masterly *Wit and its relation to the Unconscious*<sup>1</sup>. His theory, like most of his other contributions to psychology, has been misrepresented, not only by hostile critics, but by friendly interpreters as well. It is a theory very easy to sum up in a catch phrase, and the temptation to sum it up in this way has been too strong for one at least of the Freudians, Mr E. B. Holt, who, in the attempt to be bright and interesting to the general reader, has succeeded in being grossly inaccurate. Writing in *The Freudian Wish*, he says: "After reviewing the long list of theories and definitions of humor, which is as dense a jungle of misconception as anywhere exists, Freud caps them all with his simple formula that *every form of wit or humor* is nothing but a means of 'letting the cat out of the bag<sup>2</sup>.'" A mere glance through Freud's book should have been enough to make it clear that his distinction of wit, the comic, and humour, one from another, is fundamental, that 'letting the cat out of the bag' is not a suitable formula for his views on either of the two last—though Holt speaks of 'every form of wit or humor'—and, what is more, that if it is a suitable formula at all, it can be applied only to what Freud calls tendency wit, and not to what he calls harmless wit. We are not concerned here with Freud's conclusions on the comic and on humour, but only with his theory of wit. But in view of such misrepresentations as that of Holt it is important to make clear at the outset what his theory of wit is not. It is not a theory of laughter, or of the comic, or of humour; it is exactly what it sets out to be, a theory of wit.

Freud classifies wit under two main headings, harmless wit and tendency wit. Harmless wit is its own end; it serves no purpose beyond itself; it is not aimed; it manipulates thoughts or words for the mere pleasure of such manipulation. This pleasure Freud concludes to arise from economy of psychic expenditure. A detailed examination of the techniques of wit—an examination that cannot be followed out here—leads him to the

<sup>1</sup> All quotations are from the English translation, by Brill.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 17; italics mine.

idea that the common factor in them all is economy. "A compressing or—to be more exact—an economic tendency controls all these techniques<sup>1</sup>." Even harmless wit, however, is not the first stage, for in harmless wit which would be recognised unmistakably for what it is, as distinct from mere play or jest, the thought expressed has been fortified in some degree, as Freud puts it, "against the impugment of the critical judgment<sup>2</sup>." To be effective at all, a harmless witticism must say, or appear to say, something a little out of the ordinary. Nevertheless—and this is the point in Freud's theory on which I wish to fasten—it is a mistake to look for the source of the pleasure in the content of the witticism; "we are forced to connect the feeling of pleasure with the technique of wit<sup>3</sup>," with technique, that is to say, the characteristic of which is economy.

Wit of the second kind, tendency wit, makes use of the same techniques as harmless wit, and thus depends in part on the same sources of pleasure. But in addition it is enlisted into the service of more or less repressed tendencies, sexual or hostile, which succeed in getting past the censor by its means and so obtain indirect satisfaction. The pleasure of tendency wit is thus doubly conditioned; on the one hand by technique, and on the other, by the sexual or hostile tendency it satisfies. Tendency wit is aimed, at a person, or at a group. At the same time, the principle of economy reappears in a new form. Psychological expenditure is saved by the removal or the eluding of moral or social inhibitions which would have prevented the tendency from coming to expression in any but a witty form. Holding fast to this principle, Freud, at the end of his book, sums up his theory of wit in a sentence, "It has seemed to us that the pleasure of wit originates from *an economy of expenditure in inhibition*<sup>4</sup>."

That is the theory of wit in outline, as I understand it.

Now since there is much in this theory with which I am in serious disagreement, it is well to say frankly at once that I am in almost complete agreement with what I take to be the most important part of it, namely that dealing with tendency wit. Working at the same subject from another angle, I have come to certain conclusions in relation to laughter which I do not mean to discuss at present but which have at least this merit, that they fit well enough into Freud's theory of tendency wit. I believe it is incontestable that tendency wit is always serving either a hostile or a sexual impulse—using the term 'sex' in the broad

<sup>1</sup> Freud, *op. cit.* p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 211.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 135.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 384; italics in text.

sense in which Freud uses it. But I do not intend here to make any attempt to prove this belief. I have nothing to say that Freud has not already said much better.

The trouble lies further back. The whole conception of harmless wit is elusive, and in the last resort, I conjecture, untenable. Is there any such activity? Can we give any proper psychological meaning to the notion of words and thoughts being manipulated for the pleasure of such manipulation? Is not harmless wit, like tendency wit, aimed, even though vaguely and uncertainly? These are the first questions to be asked, and they all arise ultimately from suspicion of the manner in which Freud, and still more the Freudians, use such terms as 'pleasure,' 'fore-pleasure,' 'the pleasure mechanism,' 'the pleasure principle,' and so on. For the purposes of psychotherapy the vagueness with which the psycho-analysts speak of pleasure and pain (displeasure) may not greatly matter; it matters for the purposes of what may be called pure psychology. We all know, from the recent writings of Dr Jung and his followers, to what lengths—I nearly said depths—initial vagueness in conception may lead in the end; and it is much to be desired that the concepts of pleasure and displeasure,—and still more the concept of 'affect,' which is hopelessly confused—should be given more precision in the writings of Freud and Jones and Brill.

In the next place, suppose it to be granted that the technique of wit depends on economy of psychic expenditure: why should this be pleasant? Can we ever get pleasure out of not-behaving? But is there any such economy to be observed in the behaviour of wit? Does the technique not actually force us to the exact opposite of economy, increased expenditure of psychic energy?

Pleasure, it may be shortly said, is the feeling equivalent of successful behaviour, displeasure the feeling equivalent of unsuccessful (obstructed) behaviour. But how are we to tell successful from unsuccessful behaviour, apart altogether from the feeling which values it? Admittedly it is no simple matter. Successful behaviour is that which is moving, comparatively without impediment, towards its end-result, which is contributing towards the purpose we have found by observation that such behaviour is designed to serve, or, at least, does actually serve. To be able to attach the adjective 'successful' in any particular instance, we must obviously have first classified behaviour into kinds, marked down an end-result for each kind, inferred its purpose from that end-result, and referred the particular instance to its appropriate kind. Everything depends on the classification we start with; this may be made, so to speak, in plan

or in cross section. The older psychology made it in plan, and chose a top floor. On such a classification there was nothing palpably absurd in the notion of 'thinking' providing its own 'end,' and being productive of pleasure on its own account. The relics of this classification are still evident in the works of many psychologists who have ostensibly given it up in favour of a classification in cross section, a classification that begins with instincts, instinctive tendencies, or whatever other class-name may happen to be selected, and that marks out these native ways of behaving in the form, as it were, of pillars and buttresses, with the whole structure from basement to roof staying itself upon them. One result of the modern classification is to change our ideas of 'thinking.' 'Thinking' ceases to be an activity functioning in its own right, and becomes a 'form' which any native impulse may take, on the upper floors. It is then no longer accurate, in psychology, to speak of thought being an end in itself, or of thought bringing pleasure on its own account. The end of thought is the end or purpose of the particular instinct, or combination of instincts, of which it is for the time being the behaviour, and the pleasure of thought is the pleasure of the successful functioning of that instinct, or combination of instincts. Thinking about love, for instance, is love behaviour in the form of thought. It is love behaviour on an upper floor, no less certainly than seizing and embracing a woman is love behaviour on a lower floor. There may be a great deal more to be said of it than that, but it is of the utmost importance, both theoretically and for the practice of psychotherapy, that we should recognise the fundamental identity of the more primitive with the genetically higher behaviour.

Coming back to our starting point, harmless wit, we can now say bluntly that manipulation of thoughts for their own sake is a mythical activity. It is as mythical as playing a competitive game for the sake of the game—a supposed ideal which some sentimentalists urge on unresponsive schoolboys. Thoughts are manipulated for the sake of achieving some purpose recognisably identical with the purpose of instinctive behaviour on more primitive levels. So far as wit is concerned, the purpose is generally an aggressive one.

Manipulation of words is similar. Words are bandied about because of what they stand for, because they are substituted stimuli of behaviour.

It may be objected that all this is purely speculative. Let us take an example, then, from Freud, of supposedly harmless wit. It is difficult to find one that is not manifestly aimed *at* somebody, but perhaps the following is less obviously aimed than the others.

“Commenting on the saying, ‘Never to be born would be best for mortal man,’ the *Fliegende Blätter* remarked, ‘But hardly one man in a thousand has this luck.’”

Let us attempt to analyse our behaviour on first reading this witticism. Arrived at the end of it, we have a moment of puzzlement, and either re-read or recall the initial statement that elicited the editorial comment. We now realise, what we almost certainly failed to realise in the first hurried reading, that this initial statement, this supposed apothegm, for all its solemn air of melancholy wisdom, is specious and absurd. The editorial comment has shewn it up, just as the editorial comments in *Punch* shew up instances of ‘Commercial Candour.’ Now it is worth while to note in passing one subordinate effect of the *Fliegende Blätter’s* exposure, which has, I suspect, some part in the total effect of the witticism. ‘Born’ is a word rubbed so smooth with constant use that it slips easily past us without inducing us really to think of the act of birth. The editorial comment throws us back to it, fixes our attention to it, if only for an instant, and compels us to realise more precisely what ‘being born’ means. In other words, our attention is momentarily directed to a sexual fact, previously slurred over. It is only momentary; but it counts. The next movement of thought, however, is more significant. If we happen to know who was the author of the wise saw, we immediately think of him; if, as is more probable, we do not know who he was, we immediately become conscious of a passing wish to know. The question, ‘Who said it?’ may well remain unspoken, yet it is a hundred chances to one that it will frame itself in the mind. This seems to indicate that we are, in however vague and uncertain a fashion, trying to *aim* the witticism. It is aimed at a dim and composite figure, made up out of our previous experience of would-be philosophers of life, and we should be glad to be able to give this dim, composite figure a clearer outline by naming him. We are all made uncomfortable by the abstract; we tend to provide it with at least a skeleton, if not always with flesh and blood. And never more noticeably than in the activities of wit. Other things equal, we relish a witticism better if it is attached somehow to a person or a group of persons we already know something of, and, if our knowledge is incomplete, we do our best to supplement it by lending to the victims enough vital qualities to give them the appearance of life. The difference between harmless wit, so called, and tendency wit, is a difference only in the degree of precision to which we are able to bring our behaviour. In the former, the hearer has more to do on his own account, in the latter, the author helps the hearer out by choosing as the victim of

the witticism a personal acquaintance, an historical character, or an easily recognised professional or social type.

The second group of questions we asked above, related to the alleged economy of psychic expenditure, the common result, on Freud's view, of all the techniques of wit. According to the theory of pleasure already hinted at, pleasure is the feeling of, or in, relatively unobstructed, positive behaviour, and it is impossible to understand therefore how pleasure can ever result from the absence of behaviour, from not doing something which might have been done. The term 'economy,' in fact, is unfortunately chosen. There is no pleasure whatever to be got out of the mere saving of £100; what is pleasant is the positive behaviour of spending or hoarding, actually or prospectively, the £100 saved. Present economy of psychic expenditure, if it is legitimate to speak in this way at all, is valuable only in so far as it prepares for, or makes possible, future psychic expenditure. It is the future expenditure which may—or may not—be pleasant and, apart from *that*, and from the anticipation of *that*, the mere saving of the expenditure *now* is absolutely indifferent. It is not behaviour; it is the absence of behaviour.

Nor has it ever been suggested, so far as I know, by Freud or anyone else, that the secret of the enjoyment of wit *now* is really anticipation of something that will be done *in the future*.

The truth is that there is no such economy of psychic expenditure in wit. Words are economised, certainly, but there is no such correlation as Freud supposes between the one kind of economy and the other. He himself admits that the economy is often more apparent than real. It reminds him "of the manner in which many a housewife economises when she spends time and money to reach a distant market because the vegetables can there be had a cent cheaper<sup>1</sup>." Exactly; the comparison is apt, and it virtually cancels out all the rest of what Freud has to say on economy of psychic expenditure. Take, for example, the play on words. Here one word does duty for two ideas, or, to speak more accurately, two words with the same sound are merged into one. Freud's best example, a very good one, is the famous witticism levelled at Napoleon III, when, immediately after coming to the throne, he confiscated the estates of the House of Orleans; someone said of this act, 'C'est le premier vol de l'aigle.' Now it is to be remembered that Freud insists on the independence of the wit technique, as a source of pleasure. In the present instance he would say, apparently, that we obtain pleasure not merely from the satisfaction of the hostile tendency against Napoleon III,

<sup>1</sup> Freud, *Wit and its relation to the Unconscious*, p. 52.

but also from the form into which the witticism is cast. The bridge of the witticism is the word 'vol,' and, so far as I can make out, Freud would argue that by means of this bridge we pass easily, 'economically,' from the idea of flight to the idea of theft. But examination of our behaviour does not bear out this argument. The witticism was made for people accustomed to French as their native tongue, that is to say, for people speaking and hearing French words almost automatically. Now the fact is that adults, in ordinary conversation and still more in reading, normally hear words of their own language without really listening to them. They have got the habit so firmly set of making straight for the meaning of the words, and fixing their attention there, that the sound of the words practically escapes attention. The sound is acted on, but not attended to. And if, for any reason, we deliberately attend to the sound of the words—if, for instance, we are phonetists, like Higgins in Mr Shaw's *Pygmalion*—it is probable that we shall allow the meaning of a great many of the words to escape attention in the same way. To attend to both sound and meaning at approximately the same time requires effort, sometimes considerable effort, as we quickly discover when we are listening to a conversation in a foreign language in which we are not very fluent. And the characteristic thing about the play on words, as about all forms of wit which depend in some measure on the sound of words, is just that we *must* attend, at approximately the same time, to both sound and meaning. It is not enough to attend to sound alone, since, manifestly, wit must always be *understood*.

It would seem, therefore, that the exact opposite of what Freud maintains is true of wit; instead of economising psychic expenditure it demands additional psychic expenditure. And this is in accord with the fact, sufficiently notorious, that wit is unusually fatiguing. There is no more exhausting companion than the novelist who is always scintillating.

Freud has confused brevity with economy. Wit must be brief and 'to the point,' not in order that we shall be saved labour, but, on the contrary, in order that our labour may be increased. The witticism is compressed in order that it may be rather more difficult to understand. Ordinary speech has regular ways, to which we grow accustomed, of marking the connections between ideas. In wit these connections are not regularly marked, and we have to make good the deficiency ourselves. Strictly, that is equivalent to obstructing our behaviour, and therefore a cause, not of pleasure but quite definitely of displeasure. And if the compression is so severe that the witticism fails to be understood in the end, it remains a source of displeasure. But the final understanding of

the witticism saves us from this fate. Pleasure and displeasure are complementary feeling elements; without displeasure there is no pleasure; and pleasure increases in intensity in proportion to the amount of displeasure (the result of obstruction) it has to overcome, provided it does overcome it. If the understanding of a witticism, within a reasonable period of time—undue delay allows interest to be dispersed—enables us to satisfy some sexual or hostile impulse, then the more effort we have had to put forth in the process to get over obstructions, the greater will be the feeling of pleasure in the total behaviour. But pleasure comes from effort, not from the economy of it.



## ONE HYSTERIC AND "MANY PHYSICIANS."

OR

## AS OTHERS SEE US.

[The following letter, the authenticity of which is vouched for by Dr Millais Culpin, was received by a lady in England from a friend in Canada. A few passages referring to private affairs have been deleted. What is here printed conveys a lesson to all who have to do with those patients who, more than any others, suffer much at the hands of many physicians. ED.]

Feb. 6th, 1921.

My dear —,

I came home from camp in August 1919, feeling that recovery was not far away. I am not sure what happened, but the news of Mr —'s death in September seemed to start a backward trend—not apparent perhaps to every one, but to me it seemed the very best thing in my life had suddenly gone. His letters kept up a living touch, and I just longed to get home and see him again. However, from then I had the most terrible time; in the November Dr H. said he could not bear to see me for three minutes, much less go through with it as I was, week after week. It was then we started to use chloroform for the attacks, and oh, the relief!—Here was something which acted instantly, whereas morphine took at least  $\frac{3}{4}$  of an hour, besides which, knowing the tendency of morphine, I only dared take it when life itself was threatened.

From then on I could not get out of bed; excessive trembling, cramping, and heart thumping almost to suffocation; but comparatively easy in between if I remained in bed and just whiffed chloroform if I had to see folk. In March 1920 I had another terrific attack, so violent that I simply tore J.'s waistcoat etc., as the cramps twisted and turned me. Well, he thought I was going home, that time. And the nervous shock knocked him up; for three weeks he was in bed. Since then I have never been without chloroform and morphine at my bedside.

Then came the moving, through which I got fairly well, except that in going a few steps from the auto to the house I once more almost died. I had whisky in one pocket and chloroform in the other, and as J. was trying to carry me up the stairs, perfectly upright and stiff as a tree trunk, I could not breathe and tried to whisper "Whisky"; instead of which a spasm sent it out with a yell, "WHISKY," which, as we were then in a prohibition town, had its funny side.

However, I eventually got landed indoors and into bed, and have not been down the stairs since, except for an ambulance trip, to which I am leading up.

Now dear —, do not, for one moment, imagine me a poor suffering piece of humanity, but think of me very much as of yore; saying the most atrocious things and having a good deal of funny times, but with such a subconscious self always at work that I might make the most absurd joke, and go perfectly

rigid, and have chloroform, all within two or three seconds. Once, after a very bad attack, while J. and Dr X. were watching so anxiously (but I know the second the worst is over, by the relaxation) I said, "Doctor, what will you call this on the death certificate?" He looked startled, and said, "Why," so sympathetically anxious. "Well, because I have just read that Cromwell died from Tertian Bastard Ague, and I don't want anything like that." Well, in a second we were all laughing. "But," said Dr X., "No, I call it Decimated Sclerosis of the Spinal Cord"; so there you have it, up to Aug. 24th, 1920.

Then some of our doctors from overseas came back, and once more Dr X. got busy trying to find someone who might know more about it. First we had a germ specialist, and had a blood test—everything negative. So there was no tuberculosis, or any trace of disease. He said, "Muscular, absolutely,—will probably leave her as suddenly as it came." I forgot to tell him it had been a long time on the way.

He, in turn, was so much interested that he wanted another returned doctor, at present President of the ——— Medical Society, to see me. He came (Dr B.) and put me through all nervous tests, chloroforming whenever I was too bad. He was inclined to Dr X.'s view of the spinal cord, but would say nothing, as none of the nerves seemed worn out,—even to the extremities of the toes they responded all right when I was lying down; but neither doctor attempted to stand me up, although I told them that I could, if they weren't there. Well, Dr B. had met XYZ. overseas, and had invited him to ——— (Consultant Neurologist to ———. Practically the highest authority on nerves in the realm). He was sure XYZ. would be interested, as it was so extraordinary. In a few days I went to the hospital in the ambulance, just chloroforming all the way. I couldn't pretend to tell you the horror of the nurses at my daring to have chloroform, and they walked the bottle away, but how they came back on the double quick with it, and how all the doctors left me to it! They did not know who I was; at first I was entered as Dr B.'s patient, and when I tried to explain that I was not there for ordinary treatment, but was privileged as XYZ.'s patient, they all thought I was more than a little touched.

However, Dr B. came in that afternoon, and I was left in peace until Dr X. brought in XYZ. next day. Well, all the morning I almost prayed Dr B. would be with them—but he was so afraid that I should be a little more at ease with him, and he wanted me at my worst, so he stayed away, for which I was *very very* thankful afterwards. Dr XYZ. shook hands, I put on my very nicest smile and said, "Good morning, doctor. It is very good of you to spare your valuable time to bother with me." "Not at all, Mrs P., if I can do you any good." By this time my sweetest smile was gone, and I was panting like a dog on a summer's day, and jerking away up the bed. Dr B. had purposely refused to give Dr XYZ. any history, so that all his diagnosis would be quite unbiassed. "Tell me, Mrs P., how long have you been like this?" "Five years."—"Five years you have been like this, but not like this all the time?" "No ———, only if I see people, or if I attempt to do certain things; for instance, if I go to make a cake I can put all the ingredients together, but immediately I go to mix it I go perfectly rigid and cannot move; or perhaps for weeks I can walk about the bedroom, but if I go to step outside the bedroom (even though I count 20 steps across the bedroom and say, 'Well, if I can do 20 steps in the bedroom I can do it in the hall') I cannot; I go into these attacks. And this is nothing; as a rule I tighten so that life itself is threatened." (All this between gasps and spasms

at about a word a minute.) "Tell me the first time this happened—had you not some sort of serious illness or trouble? No?—now Dr B. this is brain storm. Tell me, Mrs P. just what happened." "Well, I was going down the road and passed, or rather saw, two men walking on the sidewalk; I went perfectly rigid and could not pass them. They saw I was ill and asked me into a store, but I said I thought it was just cramp. By that time I was better, and so walked on to the doctor's office. I told him what had happened, and he brought me home in his car. Since then I have never seen anyone without going perfectly stiff when up, and jerking and twisting like this when in bed." "And do you mean to say that you were perfectly all right when this happened?" "Yes." Once more I went through every kind of nerve test. Then he turned to Dr C. and asked for a nurse. "Now Mrs P., do you think you could stand up?" "Perhaps I could, if I chloroform, and get this attack quiet." "No, we want to see you as you are. Nurse, take everything off Mrs P., put on just a triangular bandage....Now, Nurse." Well, it was a free fight for all to get me off the bed, but when I was partly raised he swung my feet to the floor, he taking one arm and the nurse trying to get the other.

I was knotted from head to foot; every muscle to its utmost. The head and trunk forwards, knees turned right in, knock-kneed and strained up, with only the two big toes touching the ground. As to move, it was impossible; I clutched his tie and waistcoat, and he forced me all along the private ward (this took about 20 minutes for 20 yards). "Dr B., this is absolutely the typical *up-on-the-toes* of shell-shock, you have seen the men like this,"—pointing to muscles here and there. When we made no progress he would slip his foot behind my leg and try to kick it forward with his full strength. It would advance about 2 inches. Then I began to scream—not me consciously—but an unconscious shriek like a drunken woman.—"Reflex hysteria." Eventually I got back to bed. The relief was so great that I relaxed instantly, and looked up to say something, but I saw XYZ's face simply streaming, soaking wet, and *his* clothes all over the place (the water had been trickling all down my chest and back in streams from the exertion). He was patting my shoulder, so I forgave him and once more smiled. "Doctor, I am so sorry, it has made you as hot as it has me." "To be sure it has," he said...."Now, Mrs P. I must tell you you will get well. This is brain storm, exactly the same as shell shock. Not brain disease, mind you, in any shape or form." I told him about the lordosis (spinal curvature) making the doctors think it was sclerosis of the cord. "No, the curvature can't be helped, of course, but the cord is *quite* all right. Treatment along the line of suggestion, etc. Take her out there and treat her the same as the men; let her see hundreds of people, and she will be well in no time." (I don't know where *there* was.) "She is a sensible woman, it is not like treating an ordinary woman, she is extremely sensible and well controlled."

"Doctor, if you call this control"—"Yes, but Mrs P., all this is subconscious; you cannot help this. It is incredible that a woman like you should go under." I thanked him.

Later, Dr B. came, and when I told him he laughed and laughed. He imagined a typical high-brow, and thought Dr C. would have all the fuss, and XYZ. look on and comment. "What did Dr X. do?" "He just stood with his hands behind him, against the wall; so did Dr A."

Well, that night there was to be a clinic of seven patients, two hundred doctors and nurses. I was to be one. Can't you imagine what I thought, and

every now and then the nurse would come in to know if I had had word. It came at last; they thought I had been through enough for one day: I need not go to the clinic—the *Te Deum*.

Now, what was gained? Well, just that the danger to the spinal cord being eliminated I could force myself to do things, and having the chloroform at hand, even if a severe attack was induced, I could soon get it under. So I made a little headway, getting round the house.

Next for suggestion. A very typical French doctor was doing splendid work at the hospital, so Dr B. interested Dr F.

He came—imagine the pictures in the comic press! Pinched suit, violet hued tie, shirt and socks perfumed, marble glazed forehead and French beard.

"Now, Mrs P., you know what is the 'Heepnosis'—I shall send you to sleep, but you must give yourself to me entirement—you must be willing to do just what I say, you must make your mind a perfect blank and follow only what I say—are you willing to do this?"

With some idea that I was getting married over again I nearly said "I will." I caught J.'s eye twinkling and pulled myself together in time to get in a few questions; then J. was ordered out of the room.

"Look at me, keep your eyes fixed on me, don't think of anything, let your mind be a blank, look at me, you are going to sleep a deep sleep, you are getting drowsy, so drowsy, you are going to sleep, sleep, sleep, sleep, a sweet sleep, a deep sleep."

Twenty minutes of it, and he never once blinked an eyelash—*Nor did I*.

"A hard case, a very hard case": J. came in. "She is a very hard case, but I will come again. Next time she will be more prepared; she is like the publick, she is what you call him"—he meant incredulous. J. got the twinkle in my eye this time and volunteered the word—"frivolous." "Yes, she is the frivol, but I shall conquer."

Again he came. "I shall use the other methods if you do not give yourself in abandonment this time." "On my dignity Doctor, I am not fooling or incredulous. I should not ask you to come if that were all." (I had no idea but that it might be 50 dollars or so a time, so you can guess I wasn't fooling.)

"Sleep, sleep, you're sleeping so quietly, so peacefully. You are going to sleep." Twice he tried it—fast and slow, persuasive, compelling. Nothing doing.

Once more he came. "Sleep, sleep." (In between he had met Dr B. and told him that I was a very hard case—a fine but hard intellect, and Dr B. has joked me on this hard intellect ever since.)

Sleep, sleep—but sleep slept on, nor would she come at his bidding. Then I suggested I should have some chloroform to quiet the jerks, and that he should try to catch me just as I emerged from the chloroform; I woke clean up. I had taken 15 grains of sodium bromide in the morning, and so I looked up and said: "I was feeling awfully sleepy Doctor, until you came, I think if you had not come I should have gone to sleep." That finished him.

He told Dr B. he was fitting an office in the city with crystal glasses, batteries and so on, and would try me down there. But Dr B. says I scared him; he won't come back.

Now I could fill you sheets more of the funniest happenings: Christian Science visitors; Apostolic Faith; Auto-suggestion; the Presbyterian minister who asked if he could read to me, and started off on 'the fig-tree that was cursed'; the Church of England woman who advised cold cream for the nerves

and said whenever she heard a nonconformist minister pray it sent cold shivers all up and down her spine; the woman who sent me tracts on 'The menace of the movies.' Oh dear, what a life it is!...

Yours — — .

P.S. I really dare not write a bit tense or emotional, or I shake from head to foot and can't write at all.

You will understand no blame can be attached to my doctor as not one of the hospital doctors or nurses had ever seen or heard anything like it. As to seeing hundreds of people, in the general struggle to say anything at all I forgot to tell XYZ. that I had persevered for a couple of years going to town etc., and seeing people, which is what really made the enrvature. So mnch straining of the muscles. But I was privileged to have an hour of his time and a private examination when he was only a day in ——— and saw only those at the clinic. This is well on in the seventh year—perhaps the seventh will end it.

## CRITICAL NOTICE.

*First Report of the Miners' Nystagmus Committee.* London: published by His Majesty's Stationery Office. pp. 64. Price 1s. 6d. net.

A survey of the facts collected by the Miners' Nystagmus Committee leaves one in no doubt as to the wisdom of including amongst the members of the Committee some one versed in psychological investigation. The possibility of a psycho-neurotic factor in the disease had been suspected by many observers, and Dr H. W. Eddison was appointed to enquire into this aspect. The desirability of doing so becomes abundantly clear when the data collected from many sources are examined, and the compilers of the Report are to be congratulated upon placing before the public so clear a picture of a widespread and costly industrial disablement.

The facts are remarkable. What is to be considered of such an array as the following? Nearly 1,000,000 men are employed as miners in the United Kingdom. In 1908 the total number of cases of nystagmus was 460; in 1920, 7028. In 1908 the cost of all industrial diseases was £13,000; in 1920, £343,000, ninety per cent. of these sums being due to miners' nystagmus. Yet the number of men employed had risen only from 783,000 to 978,000, whilst it is noteworthy that in the same period the output in tons per man per year fell from 334 to 235. In a typical Yorkshire pit employing 2000 men, 25-38 per cent. (according to the grade of employment) of all men over the age of twenty-one working underground showed oscillation of the eyes, and every one of these men could obtain a certifying surgeon's certificate and be legally disabled. In the north of France, Dransart estimated the frequency as 15 per cent., but 99 per cent. of these were unaware of the condition and were not incapacitated.

The disease varies greatly in different districts and in different pits of the same district. It is more prevalent in the dark winter months, and among the night shift workers. Slack trade causes an immediate increase of cases certified as disabled. When a lump sum is paid in settlement as compensation, the men are more likely to resume work. A man with nystagmus "can always allege that he is unable to work even on the surface, and to ask an employer to prove a man's fitness is simply asking an employer to attempt the impossible." Although every class of worker is affected, 81.5 per cent. of all cases come from the coal face. The direction of the gaze is not an essential factor in the production of the disease. The skilled workmen are the most affected.

It is possible to 'infect' a pit, hitherto free from certified cases of nystagmus, by the introduction of a few bad (nystagmus) cases. Alcohol in large doses lessens and even arrests the oscillations of the eyes, but the prognosis in an alcoholic is not so good as in an ordinary individual. The average age at the time of failure is forty-two. An accident to a man's eye tends to precipitate the disease. There is a tendency for several members of one family to be affected. There is a great difference of opinion as to the influence of a purely ocular condition such as an error of refraction. Compensation has reduced the rate of return to work. A hopeful attitude on the part of the doctor increases the chances of cure. Finally, according to Dr W. H. R. Rivers, "it may now be accepted with confidence that the affection is primarily due to defective illumination."

The recital has a familiar ring to those who have come into contact with the psycho-neuroses produced by the recent war, and it is clear that Rivers' experience therein was of service in dealing with the information obtained by Dr Eddison. A critical examination of the above summary leads inevitably to

the opinion that the study of miners' nystagmus requires a broad view of the worker and his reaction to his environment, and one reads Rivers' personal report with a sense of relief that a beginning has been made, and a feeling of disappointment that the investigation of the psychological aspect has not gone very far. This implies no reproach to the Committee or Dr Eddison. The field for research is enormous; every one of the facts extracted from the Report fills one with wonder as to its significance in the life of the miner. Before speculating on this, it is worth while to see how far the psycho-neurotic miner resembles other sufferers.

After some years of work in the pit, the miner begins to feel eye-strain, followed by a difficulty of concentration of the sight on the object looked at, and a fear of harming, or being harmed by, his fellow workmen. Then follow loss of self confidence, and a fear of light. Such a history can be obtained every day from dozens of out-patients in every ophthalmic department in the country. Unfortunately the out-patients limit their spontaneous complaints to the 'straining.' For reasons unknown to themselves they omit all reference to other symptoms with the sole exception of headache, and, unless the oculist has the perspicacity of Dr Eddison, he is content to attribute the symptoms to the error of refraction which is almost invariably present, and to prescribe glasses. Specialism rarely stops to distinguish between *post hoc* and *propter hoc*.

Following the photophobia come blepharospasm, headache and giddiness. Turning again to ordinary hospital experience, 80 per cent. of ophthalmic out-patients who seek relief from other than inflammatory conditions suffer from headache and 60 per cent. from giddiness. The types still correspond closely. As the miner's disease progresses, disordered action of the heart, excessive sweating and dilated pupils may be noted; corresponding disturbances of the sympathetic nervous system are found among the out-patients. Depression and insomnia and fearful dreams are common in miners; they are also very common in the ordinary run of hospital out-patients.

Taking a broad view of all these facts, the necessity for further psychological investigation becomes apparent. What is the peculiarity associated with the miner's occupation which distinguishes it from practically all others? He is an average kind of man working far down in the bowels of the earth, in very poor light (the illumination of the coal face is sometimes reduced to  $\frac{1}{100}$  foot candle), in considerable danger (in 1913 there were 195,000 accidents recorded), and it is found that he tends to become affected with a disease almost as easily as a child becomes afraid of the dark. Increase the illumination and the disease lessens much in the same way as a child's terrors diminish in the comfort and assurance of a night light. Even the fact that he is on a night shift affects him adversely, and like so many nervous children he becomes photophobic. Introduce to the small apparently healthy herd a few bad examples, and a small stampede occurs with startling ease. Encourage the man to give way to his difficulties by granting compensation, and the incidence increases still more. With cheerful confidence encourage the sufferer to get well, and he improves. Diminish the healthy man's sight still further, if only temporarily, by an accident to his eye, and he gets a definite percentage of increase in the risk of becoming nystagmic. Make him forget his troubles by large doses of alcohol, and the nystagmus may disappear, whilst the man who has made it a habit to drown his troubles in drink and failed, cannot be cured. Let him go on working until he begins to get on the down grade in vitality at the age of about forty-two, and he throws in his hand. Bring him back to safety and sunlight, and the sufferer has a reasonable chance of pulling himself together, especially with

the aid of a lump sum settlement, and eventually of trying his luck once more down below. It is the disease of a creature with a mind: pit ponies do not suffer from nystagmus. The higher his mental grade—the more skilled he becomes—the more likely the worker is to be incapacitated. Surely these are not unfair inferences to draw from all the statements in the Report! The psychologist may claim that his department has not been unduly represented in the investigations, and that the disease is worthy of further examination along his own lines, especially when such prominence is given to the dictum by Llewellyn that "the eye has a greater influence on the mind than has any other part of the body." The opposite view, that is, the expression of mental states by eye symptoms, might be inquired into with advantage to ophthalmic science. To emphasise, for example, the need of a careful refraction of the miner's eyes, and not to press for further exploration of the miner's mind, would betray a sad lack of a sense of proportion. The disease should pass from the hands of the oculist. Take away the oscillation of the eyes, and nothing is left but a complex psycho-neurosis which is costing £300,000 in actual disbursement, £1,000,000 directly and indirectly, and an incalculable amount of misery to the miners and their families. What is the remedy? The Report fails lamentably at this point. Beyond recommending better illumination it is practically silent. The environment is to be altered; the man is merely to be cured when damaged. The Manager feels that more insecurity of compensation may have a salutary effect. The Owner is inclined to cut his loss.

The collected data of the actual eye lesions show nothing new, nor are the explanations attached to them impressive. Faithful to the prevailing notion that severe nervous symptoms can follow directly upon the presence of an error of refraction, many observers have sought the solution of the problem of causation in this direction. Thompson, Romiée and Nieden lay stress on defects of vision; Snell and Dransart think the factor of no importance. Dransart says 90 per cent. are emmetropic, Norman found error in upwards of 90 per cent. This amazing discrepancy alone is sufficient to make specialism suspect in official quarters. Ohm, who appears to have brought to the study of the subject great breadth of view and a really scientific mind, attached no importance to the factor of refractive error, since the proportion of occurrence is not greater than among the general population. On the other hand, Anderson, the most recent writer on this subject, makes error of refraction the chief factor in the disease. The Report does not show how this is to be harmonised with the fact that it is rare to find a perfectly emmetropic person in the general population, and that in any case every man after his early forties is out of focus by reason of presbyopia. That reliance must not be placed upon any ophthalmic surgeon's deductions until his personal equation is known is illustrated by the recent statement of a well-known oculist that he had cured a case of 'shell shock' by prescribing so weak a lens as  $\cdot 125D$  cylinder for astigmatism. Equally efficacious has been the hypodermic injection of plain water instead of morphia to bring sleep to the restless. Is it in a similar way that "correction of refractive error gives relief to symptoms although it may not bring about cessation of oscillations"?

Ohm alone of all the observers seems to have thought that heterophoria may be one of the important predisposing factors. He offers no opinion as to the cause of the heterophoria, and so perhaps misses an important clue to the origin of the nystagmus. In this direction the oculist should be able to give invaluable help, and Mr Pooley's report may throw some light upon it. There is abundant evidence to be got in the ophthalmic departments that heterophoria is associated with a 'neurotic' state. Unlike errors of refraction, which



are usually regarded as congenital, heterophoria is acquired and may be found to be directly due to emotional stress in a large proportion of cases. Indeed the influence of emotion on ordinary concomitant squint is so common and profound that it may be suspected as a factor in most cases of disordered muscle balance. Here then, if Ohm is right, may chance to be one of the items of a formula regulating the employment of men in the various occupations in mines.

With regard to the nystagmus, it may well be, as Rivers says, that it plays a part in the production of the psycho-neurotic symptoms. From the evidence adduced, however, such can be only a secondary part. Hundreds of men suffer from nystagmus, without obvious mental symptoms or incapacity. It may be present one day, and obtained only with difficulty the next. In some cases "after prolonged absence from work, well marked neurotic and even hysterical symptoms may appear; in these cases although almost all objective signs have disappeared, the subjective symptoms remain well marked." It is highly probable, therefore, that the nystagmus and the mental symptoms have a common origin, and that the type of patient determines whether the psychical or the physical symptoms shall predominate.

It is surprising that Rivers did not suggest combined psychological investigation and treatment along the lines adopted for the 'shell-shocked' victims of the war. The good results obtained are indisputable, notwithstanding the varying calibre of the medical men engaged therein. As a preliminary measure why not engage half-a-dozen capable psycho-analysts to make an exhaustive examination of the psycho-neurotic symptoms from which the men suffer? The cost of the disease would justify this. The cost per case per year varied in 1920 from £32 in one district to £112 in another. The results of analysis could be collated, and the prospects of cure on a large scale discovered or at least conjectured. The disease might even be prevented by the discovery of a formula showing the likelihood of 'infection' in any particular case, thus allowing suitable men to be apportioned to the various classes of surface and underground work. Judging by the photographs in the Report of several men affected with the disease, the type likely to suffer should not be difficult to recognise even without applying a formula.

A secondary result of a psycho-analytical enquiry into a disease which by common consent is intimately associated with working in light sometimes so bad as to amount practically to darkness would be a gain of information regarding the mentality of the blind or nearly blind. The application of this knowledge to such problems as the education of blind children might prove so beneficial as to make the expense worth while, whatever the effect upon the disease under review.

Since the publication of the Report an important case, described in the Press as being the first of its kind under the Compensation Act, has been tried in the County Court, wherein the widow of a man sued his employers for £300 compensation. The man had been certified as suffering from miners' nystagmus. Previously he had been strong and healthy, but afterwards his interest in life failed, and he drowned himself. The Judge, who was advised by a Medical Assessor, found sufficient relationship between the disease and the manner of death to decide in favour of the applicant.

Both the tragedy and the possibilities following upon this judgment make it still more desirable that the nature of miners' nystagmus should be fully probed, in the interests of the community generally.

W. INMAN.

## REVIEWS.

*Fundamental Conceptions of Psychoanalysis.* By A. A. BRILL, M.D. George Allen and Unwin. pp. vii + 344. Price: 12s. 6d. net.

English readers who are not conversant with the German language owe Dr Brill a debt of gratitude which should, of itself, ensure a friendly reception of any book written by him; for it was through his translation of Freud's earlier writings that such readers acquired their first knowledge of the doctrines of Psycho-Analysis. But good wine needs no bush, and this book can well afford to be judged on its merits, irrespective of any feeling of indebtedness towards its author which on other grounds we may entertain.

It may perhaps be thought that Dr Brill has chosen too big a title for a work which is elementary in its contents and popular rather than technical both in exposition and in appeal. We might have supposed that the fundamental conceptions of psycho-analysis provided a theme which lent itself to a highly technical and formal treatment of the essentials of psycho-analytic theory, and that some critical or expository reference to Freud's more recent speculative hypotheses would have here been forthcoming. But the introduction to the book allays such expectations and disarms such criticism as might legitimately have been made if this work had been addressed primarily to professional students rather than to "those who are occupying themselves with problems of education and psychology."

The material of the book is taken from lectures given by Dr Brill at an elementary course in the department of pedagogics of the New York University. The author has therefore tried to avoid technical expressions as much as possible and has "not taken the trouble to clutter this volume with a lot of references, which a book intended for professional people would necessarily demand." But anyone who knows of Dr Brill's activities realizes that all his work is built on Prof. Freud's foundations and is referred to the work of the master for more detailed and more technical information.

Perhaps no more attractive introduction to the whole subject of psycho-analysis has been written than that contained in Dr Brill's first two chapters. He treats historically the development of psycho-analysis from the "cathartic method" and deals in an illuminating manner with "The Symptom: its Nature and Function." Then follow chapters on "The Psychology of Forgetting"; "Psychopathology of Every-day Life"; "Wit: its Technique and Tendencies"; "The Dream: its Function and Motive"; "Types of Dreams"; "Common Forms of Insanity"; "The Only Child"; "Fairy Tales and Artistic Productions"; "Selections of Vocations."

On all these topics Dr Brill writes with a sure touch and not the least part of the charm of his exposition is due to the wealth of original observations and the appositeness of the illustrations which he brings forward in support of his contentions. A third of the whole volume is devoted to the subject of Dreams, and in this connection the author makes some interesting observations on the production and analysis of artificial dreams, and on the cognate "problem of lying."

The chapters on "The Symptom: its Nature and Function," and on "Common Forms of Insanity" will be specially useful to non-professional

readers, for Dr Brill's psychiatric training leads him to present the findings of psycho-analysis in a broader way than is common to writers who have in mind chiefly those morbid states in which psycho-analytic treatment is most useful, namely, the transference neuroses; and thus the reader is enabled to envisage in a truer perspective the bearings of psycho-analytic theory on all the problems of normal and abnormal mental life.

The chapters on "The Only Child" and "Selections of Vocations" will be helpful to those whose chief desire is to know the practical applications of psycho-analytic teaching. A widespread knowledge of the difficulties in adjustment to life which beset the pathway of the only child, and a clear realization of the folly of attempting to choose for another human being the vocation which he or she should follow, may have profound effects on the health and happiness of future generations.

If we try to discover from Dr Brill's book what the fundamental conceptions of psycho-analysis really are, we may be inclined to reduce them to two: (1) all behaviour is based upon unconscious mentation, and (2) all unconscious mentation is motivated by the wish. These two conceptions come to light in the examination of all those forms of mental and bodily activity which are considered in this book: the symptom, forgetting, the slips and blunders of every-day life, wit, dreams, fairy-tales and artistic productions; and, indeed, they may perhaps be truly regarded as the most fundamental conceptions of psycho-analytic theory.

T. W. M.

*Sex Problems in Women.* By A. C. MAGIAN, M.D. London: William Heinemann (Medical Books), Ltd, 1922. pp. 219. Price: 12s. 6d.

This book is a series of discursive essays on various aspects of feminine sexuality. The title is misleading as no problems are either formulated or discussed. The book is actually, as the author himself states in the Preface, a compilation from standard works. No original contributions are made to the subject, and the evidence which professional experience has brought the writer is most sparingly adduced. The promise of the introductory chapter, that an attempt will be made to elucidate various problems such as "why a woman should cherish a love-passion for the man who ill-treats and abuses her, etc." (p. 1), is not fulfilled. It can hardly be held that the inference that a woman loves her cruel husband because cruelty causes her sexual satisfaction, affords any explanation of, or insight into, the problem of sex for that type of woman, but no other elucidation is forthcoming. This example is characteristic of how the subject-matter is treated throughout. Some of the ethnological statements succeed in conveying false impressions; thus the 'rite' is transformed into the 'right' of defloration (p. 46). Again, the sacred prostitution practised in Babylon is referred to as a 'penance' (p. 140), whereas it was a propitiatory sacrifice to ensure easy child-birth and general fertility. Some points of treatment seem open to criticism such as the use of local irritants as a cure for masturbation (p. 100), or of marriage for mild cases of nymphomania (p. 76). It is interesting, too, to find valerian still considered an active therapeutic agent. Though abnormal sexual conditions and impulses are acknowledged to be "the active agents in the production of the most diverse forms of mental disease and neurasthenia" (p. 1) the references to psycho-therapy are of the most meagre. To the psycho-pathologist this book can be of no service.

As a whole this is a readable, fair-minded, superficial presentation of well-recognized facts. but it is no more if it is no less. It is, however, baffling to understand why the author should consider that 30 pages of anatomy and physiology—surely unnecessary for the medical readers to whom the book is explicitly addressed —“place the matter on a scientific basis.”

JANE I. SUTTIE.

*The Psychology of Misconduct, Vice and Crime.* By BERNARD HOLLANDER, M.D.  
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. pp. 220. Price: 7s. 6d. net.

This book contains the author's reflections on his experiences of moral derangement in the course of 25 years' practice as a physician specializing in nervous and mental disorders. We are told in the Preface that “it is written from the standpoint of the ‘new psychology,’” but it is difficult to find any justification for this statement. There are so many ‘new psychologies’ nowadays that we may well be in doubt as to what particular brand is favoured by any writer who is enamoured of this term. Ordinarily, its use implies some reference to the changes introduced into the study of the mind by the work of the psychoanalysts and we are naturally led to expect that any book “written from the standpoint of the ‘new psychology’” will show at least some understanding of, if not sympathy with, psycho-analytic theory and practice. It is evident, however, that Dr Hollander does not use ‘new psychology’ in this sense. It is true that he uses words such as ‘repression’ and ‘sublimation’ and insists that “mental analysis can, and should be practised by every medical psychologist”; but although he sometimes uses the terms of psycho-analysis, the concepts to which he applies them belong to an older psychology. “The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.”

Starting from the fact that “there are a number of elementary instincts and feelings which we possess in common with animals,” the author tells us that “these instincts in man do not act blindly as in animals. They are reduced in him to obscure impulses which urge him in certain directions, but leave him to choose the itinerary of his course. Instincts, in man, therefore, are sometimes spoken of as *propensities*.”

The various forms of misconduct are described and correlated with the propensities to which they are due. Drink and drug habits are the result of the propensity to eat and drink; aggressiveness, ill-temper and violence are the outcome of the combative propensity; morbid suspicion, cunning, and deceitfulness arise from suspicion, which is “a protective propensity and hence a necessary quality”; theft is due to the propensity to acquire and hoard; sexual crime is due to “the sexual propensity.” On all of these topics the author writes in an easy, popular, style and conveys a considerable amount of information which may prove interesting and instructive to the non-professional reader; but the student will find here hardly any reference to what at the present day we understand by the psychology of misconduct, vice and crime.

Throughout the book an inordinate importance is ascribed to the part played by the intellect in the determination of conduct. Thus we read: “The greater the intellect of a man the greater the check upon his motives and passions” (p. 22). Again we are told that some people “though endowed with considerable intellect, still have not enough of it to resist their propensities” (p. 29). “The better furnished his intellect, the greater the check on his actions” (p. 179); “it is the highly developed intellect of a man which changes the innate

animal propensities into glorious faculties" (p. 169). Another and a different set of values seems implicit in the following quotation: "a lack of ethical feeling is often an advantage. Some of our most successful public men would not be in the position they now occupy if they were too tender-hearted. On the other hand, a lack of intellect is always a drawback" (p. 162).

The last chapter is devoted to the treatment of moral failings. Stress is laid upon the physical basis of many moral defects and the importance of physical treatment in such cases is pointed out. On the psycho-therapeutic side Dr Hollander advocates suggestion, mental analysis and re-education. He considers psycho-analytic treatment to be a risky procedure for the physician (because of transference) and dangerous to the patient if undertaken by a layman. His attitude towards psycho-analysis may be judged from his comments on the following passage which he quotes from Stekel; "women who have not the courage to commit a sin against morality will steal some article which is of no value to them, as the symbolic fulfilment of a forbidden action, whereby the symbolic significance of the stolen article very often reveals the true nature of the instinctive action." Dr Hollander says: "We may well defer our opinion on this explanation until a psycho-analyst of the ultra-Freudian kind, who sees 'sex' in every abnormality, will give evidence in defence of a lady kleptomaniac. We shall then hear what the judge will have to say on the defence that the article stolen symbolically gratified the lady's sexual longings" (p. 199). A strange ground, truly, on which to base a scientific judgment!

T. W. M.

*Studies in Psychoanalysis.* By CHARLES BAUDOIN. Translated by E. and C. PAUL. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. pp. 326.

"Monsieur Baudouin is already well known to the English public as the author of *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, in which he acted as the evangelist of Coué. His new book *Studies in Psychoanalysis* is put forward as an attempt to show that the method of suggestion as set forth in his previous treatise may advantageously be combined with psychoanalysis, in the treatment of nervous disorders. He claims to have found from his personal experience that "a great deal of time and trouble is saved by the use of suggestion in conjunction with psychoanalysis."

Baudouin, however, is careful to point out that there is suggestion and suggestion, and while certain forms are incompatible with analysis others are commendable adjuvants. Thus the suggestion which increases repression is to be avoided. The latter he terms the 'vade retro' method of dealing with a symptom and recognises that it cuts off the shoots without touching the root of the evil; it is the 'ça passe' exorcism of Coué. The other form, what we might call positive suggestion, is termed by Baudouin the 'Veni Creator' method; it corresponds to Coué's formula "day by day in every way I get better and better." It is to this form of suggestion that Baudouin looks for help. He applies it to the overcoming of resistance, and to the guidance of the patient both during and after a course of analytical treatment. Though this is the gist of Baudouin's thesis he has a great deal more to discuss and many will find other of his points of greater value. The book is divided into two sections; the first, a theoretical exposition, occupies rather less than one-third of the volume. The second contains case histories of twenty-seven patients. The case histories

are clearly written and show as admirably as an elementary presentation well could a selection of common neurotic dispositions and how these are illuminated by psychoanalysis. They do not, however, give us any inkling as to how the author applies his method. One learns from them nothing of that unceasing collaboration between autosuggestion and psychoanalysis which is assigned as the *raison d'être* of their publication. The reviewer also failed to gain any more precise information than is given in Part I when visiting the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute, attending the clinic there and conversing with Monsieur Baudouin early this year (1922).

In Part I Baudouin defines his aim as the production of a record of his own work which might interest experts, not the writing of a popular treatise for beginners. Yet he admits that the French as a nation are most backward in psychoanalytical knowledge and therefore feels it incumbent upon him to deal with general principles as most of his readers are in fact beginners. For this we may well be grateful since it has induced Baudouin to give us what is a most stimulating and suggestive discussion on several points. He tritely remarks that however tolerant and kindly psychoanalysts may be to their patients they seem to take a positive delight not only in violently upsetting the smug prejudices of the world in general, but also in clothing their theories in obscure neologisms. Certainly Baudouin himself is free from this reproach, for though he never lacks courage his statements are put forward with no less delicacy than force. After commending Victor Hugo for his frankness in the poem "Boaz endormi" he remarks "I find the idea that all poetry, all glory, all holiness have this (instinctive) lowly origin no more offensive than I find Darwin's idea (now generally admitted) of the descent of man."

Therefore, although addressed to so-called experts, Baudouin's book will fill a useful rôle in introducing some of the conclusions arrived at by analytical methods to the more intelligent of the laity without giving them an unnecessary mental dyspepsia. Baudouin's treatment of condensation and displacement in particular is stimulating. He regards symbolism as the natural outcome of the interaction of the laws of condensation and displacement, yet he finds the concept of the censor one of the most valuable contributions of Freudian psychology. Once these mechanisms exist they are at the disposal of the censor for disguise and may have yet other functions. Freud himself has said "that which is to-day linked under the form of the symbol presumably constituted at the outset a conceptual and verbal unity." Once we agree that the dream is a regression to an archaic mode of thought we may anticipate disguise even though disguise is not purposive. Again the mechanism has a further utility in that it is the essence of creative imagination. For just as intelligence ensures our adaptation to the real so does imagination ensure the adaptation of the real to ourselves.

Baudouin would agree with Claparède in assuming for dreaming the same function as has Groos for play, namely, the exercise of certain activities which have a prospective value to the individual. Thus though Baudouin is sympathetic to Freudian psychology he seeks to discover a wider basis and utility for certain mechanisms.

This he expresses poetically by likening the dream to an orchestra in which a number of instruments are playing. The ear can, at will, follow the notes of one instrument or another, and various interpretations are possible. Only we must never lose sight of the plurality of meaning, never cease to attend to the orchestra as a whole.

The crux of Baudouin's thesis is the transference. He considers that psychoanalysts by admitting the transference have adopted suggestion willy-nilly and that they would be wise to recognise this and attempt to guide their suggestions. That the transference is the meeting place of psychoanalysis and suggestion has long been recognised and the whole question has been rather fully treated by Dr Ernest Jones (*vide his Collected Papers*) and others. It is therefore not necessary to enter into this matter here nor to confute the statement that transference itself takes the form that is imposed upon it by suggestion. In the course of his general exposition Baudouin briefly appraises the value of the tendencies of Adler and Jung. The attempted synthesis of the latter he regards as philosophical rather than scientific. He considers that the time for synthesis has not yet arrived, rather is further analysis first required. Each instinct requires to be studied separately and the utmost done to trace all its possible metamorphoses in the human psyche. This offers an interesting perspective to investigators and if it is undertaken we may expect a series of monographs upon the different instincts. Already we have Trotter's study of the herd instinct and Pierre Bovet's account of the combative instinct. Each instinct will, in Baudouin's opinion, be found to undergo a religious sublimation and he is interested to trace the history of their avatars. A general synthesis should only be undertaken as the crowning result of such researches. Looking at things in this light Baudouin may be said to view Adler's work as a monograph upon the *Ichtriebe* of Freud, while he tends to regard Freud's work as too exclusively concerned with the *Sexualtriebe*. In a footnote he says it is amusing to note that the names of these two men of science are symbolical of their respective theories: for *Freude* signifies joy (the pleasure principle), while *Adler* signifies eagle (will to power). Whatever our view may be there is no occasion for pessimism. All instincts have a rightful place in our make-up; the neuropath is out of harmony with the real only because he has become obsessed by one principle only. Fortunately, the other instincts are, like sexuality, capable of undergoing sublimation. On the whole Baudouin's outlook is sympathetic towards psychoanalysis, indeed he seems to fear that he may be accused of being a pan-sexualist. Possibly this attitude is influenced by what he knows of the readers to whom his work is addressed, yet his constant endeavour to weaken the sexual motive appears also as the expression of a personal need. The book, however, forms interesting reading and indicates the path along which the Latin mind is groping towards an understanding of psychoanalysis. There is a useful glossary and an adequate index.

ALFRED CARVER.

*The Psychology of the Criminal.* By H. HAMBLIN SMITH, M.A., M.D. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. pp. 182. Price 6s. net.

This book is a valuable contribution to clinical psychology and may be recommended to all who are interested in social science as well as to professional students of Law and Medicine. It is an attempt to apply to the study of the criminal the new conceptions introduced into psychology by Freud and his followers, and the author's main contention is that the intensive investigation of individual offenders in the light of psycho-analytical theory is the road to the solution of the problem of criminality.

According to Dr Hamblin Smith "crimes are, from the legal point of view,

acts which, in the opinion of a particular society, at a particular time, are considered to deserve punishment by that society...a crime is an act which is legally wrong, and which is, essentially, an infringement of the criminal law. The question as to whether the act is 'morally' wrong does not come in" (p. 2).

A review of the various theories of punishment leads the author to a consideration of the thorny problem of responsibility. He avows himself to be a thorough-going determinist and declares that "the metaphysical theory of the 'freedom of the will'" has no place in any scientific scheme. He rejects the idea that responsibility is something intrinsic to the individual, but regards it rather "as expressing the idea of the reaction of Society to a given act" (p. 10).

In what he says regarding the relation of Society to the criminal, Dr Hamblin Smith illustrates the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of trying to adhere to strictly deterministic terminology when dealing with the facts of human conduct. He says: "If Society chooses to decide that under special circumstances its normal reaction to some act will be modified, it is, of course, at complete liberty to do so" (p. 10). Yet, surely, to claim liberty of choice when we are speaking of the reactions of Society is even less defensible than when the reactions of the individual are in question. It would perhaps be well if it were more generally recognized that 'determinism' is just as much a metaphysical theory as the 'freedom of the will' and that with metaphysical theories the scientist *quá* scientist has no concern. Determinism is a postulate of all scientific inquiry, and whenever we doubt the validity of its application to any problem we are doubting the possibility of solving such problem by the methods of science.

The various theories of punishment that have, at one time or another, been put forward are here reduced to three: Retaliatory, Deterrent and Reformatory. The author believes that the comparatively unsuccessful result of reformatory punishment has been due to a failure to investigate fully the mind of the individual offender; and in such full investigation he sees the hope of the future.

Inquiry into the mental states of offenders is a very specialized matter, and this book contains Dr Hamblin Smith's experience in this direction. He hopes that his work may be of practical use to his fellow-workers who are engaged in the study of offenders, to magistrates and others whose daily work lies with offenders, and to social workers, teachers in schools and others.

The author insists on the importance of a complete physical examination of the offender before the investigation of his mental state is entered upon; but he does not labour this point and the greater part of the book is devoted to the methods employed in the investigation of the offender's mind. A broad division is made between the examination of the conscious mind and of the unconscious mind, and the methods employed in each respectively are described in some detail.

Not the least valuable part of the book is the description given of the mental tests used by the author himself in his examination of criminals. He believes the Binet and Terman schemes to be useful for work in Children's Courts, but in his own Court work he has to deal with no children under the age of 16 years and with comparatively few offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 years. He has therefore devised a series of tests, suitable for adolescents and adults, and he invites reports from any workers who give a trial to this scheme.

In entering upon his account of the investigation of the offender's unconscious mind the author prepares his readers for the standpoint from which the topic is viewed by stating at the outset that "this book is written, so far as



the subject of psycho-analysis is concerned, from the Freudian position." He makes it plain that, as a rule, modifications of Freud's views promulgated by others are regarded as resting upon "a fundamental and irreconcilable difference from the views of Freud." Yet on some points there is evidence that he has not been uninfluenced by some of these innovations. His description of what we are to understand by the terms conscious, preconscious and unconscious is not as clear as we should have desired; and a predilection for the term complex, which is unfortunate in the present state of uncertainty regarding the most appropriate use of this word in psychology, leads to a blurring of some of the finer points related to the theory of repression and to the elements on which repression essentially bears.

On page 70 it is stated that "a complex may become repressed into the unconscious. The unconscious into which this repression takes place is regarded as being, in some respects, distinct from the primary unconscious.... It has been termed the 'secondary' or 'Freudian unconscious.'" We should have been glad of the reference to Freud's works where this distinction is made. It is reminiscent of Tansley rather than of Freud.

On page 73 we are told that "A repressed complex may escape into consciousness by taking the form of a physical symptom. In this case we get what is known as a 'neurosis' or a 'psycho-neurosis.'" This is, to say the least, misleading, and the layman may be led to suppose that in every psycho-neurosis there must be physical symptoms.

The brief reference to 'symbolism' on page 74 seems to the reviewer far from satisfactory. The disguise afforded by symbolism is here ascribed to the censorship; and to evade this activity it is said that "emotions, thoughts and memories strive to get into consciousness by clothing themselves in symbolic shapes." But this is not Freud's teaching; he explicitly states that symbolism is "a second and independent factor in dream-distortion, existing side by side with the censorship" (Introductory Lectures, p. 142).

Dr Hamblin Smith's chapter on "The Various Classes of Offenders" is very helpful and suggestive, especially in regard to the group of mental defectives. Recognizing the serious and far-reaching results of certifying a person as being mentally defective, he inclines towards giving the offender the benefit of the doubt whenever such doubt arises in the examiner's mind. He strikes a necessary note of warning of the danger of deciding on the results of mental tests alone. He does not believe that the mere failure to attain any particular standard of 'mental age' is, *per se*, enough to bring a person under the heading of mental deficiency. In every doubtful case we have to weigh all the factors and not that of intelligence alone.

But this relegation of the intellect to its proper place in relation to conduct appears to be forgotten by the author when he comes to deal with Moral Insanity and Moral Imbecility. He asks the question, "Is there such a thing as a 'moral sense,' apart from the intellect?" And he states his view that there is no such sense. He thinks that the doctrine of psychical determinism, to which he repeatedly avows his allegiance, renders any such position untenable.

If, as would seem to be the case, Dr Hamblin Smith is using the term 'moral sense' as it was used by the English Moralists of the eighteenth century, then it may be conceded that few at the present day would disagree with his conviction that 'there is no such sense.' But if he implies that there are no forces in the mind which are determinants of conduct other than those derived from the intellect, then there are good grounds for disagreeing with his con-

elusions. Indeed, such a view is totally opposed to the findings of psychoanalysis (quite apart from all other considerations that may be put forward), for no other psychological discipline has more strongly emphasised the importance of affective factors, and the relative unimportance of purely cognitive or intellectual ones, in the conduct of life. Moral judgment is a function of intelligence only in so far as it is a process of classifying acts as 'right' or 'wrong,' but moral judgments to be effective in conduct must be prompted by the emotions and based upon the sentiments. It may be true that all moral imbeciles are primarily abnormal intellectually, but this does not carry with it the proof that their moral imbecility is the direct consequence of their abnormal intellect. There may be a concomitant faulty development of the emotional life and an absence of the 'moral sentiments,' and it may be these rather than the intellectual defect which determine the moral imbecility.

In his final chapter Dr Hamblin Smith is chiefly concerned with the reaction of Society towards crime. It is not necessary, he says, that the reaction of Society should for ever take the form known as 'punishment,' and he declares that "this book will have been written in vain if the author has not impressed upon his readers this one moral—not punishment but treatment." Throughout his work he maintains the scientific attitude towards the offender which psychoanalysis requires from those who practise it in the treatment of the neurotic patient: not praise or blame but dispassionate inquiry into the contents of the unconscious. Just as only by finding out where the libido development has gone astray can we solve the problem of neurotic illness, so "to find out why a man does wrong is the only true solution of the problem of delinquency."

The study of individual offenders will reveal to Society its own shortcomings and thus provide an opportunity for reform, for "faulty reaction on the part of an individual to Society may mean that Society has handled him incorrectly." Thus, in Dr Hamblin Smith's opinion, "the study of the offender leads not to despair, but to an enlightened optimism." He believes that the day has come for a re-examination of our penal system and of its bases, in the light of our newer and fuller scientific knowledge and in the hope that we might devise something better."

However this may be we can heartily recommend this book as a propaedeutic to all who have the reformer's spirit towards the many problems provided by the relations of Society and the criminal.

T. W. M.

*Psychoanalysis and the Drama.* By SMITH ELY JELIFFE and LOUISE BRINK, A.B. Nervous and Mental Diseases Monograph Series, No. 34. Washington, D.C. 1922. \$3.00.

There is little to recommend the publication of these papers in the form of a book. It is a collection of ten essays of quite unequal merit, mostly reprints from medical journals, which lose by being brought into juxtaposition. No doubt the few valuable ideas, which are presented over and over again, in relation to different plays and different problems, are impressed by this means on readers to whom they are new.

The first paper originally bore the title "The Physician and Psychotherapy." It stresses the idea that the drama, because it deals with deep human problems, is very helpful to psychological understanding, and further of course, that Psychoanalysis is helpful to a deeper understanding of the drama. The writers

deplore that the ordinary physician knows so little of psychology, and recommends attendance at the theatre as a means of enlightenment upon the obscure problems of the soul.

Not only is the drama recommended for physicians but also for patients. "The hours at the theatre should greatly relieve the strain of repression and... furnish food for thoughtful speculation." It is difficult to see how the drama, *per se*, which is almost as old as man, and in which it is not easy to discover a "*growing* intellectual and artistic value" can teach man more than it has ever taught him. In the fourth century B.C. Aristotle spoke of Tragedy as a "catharsis through pity and fear." Again, if Sophocles could not of old time impress upon man the importance of his problem not only with the gods, but with the mother, will the drama of to-day do it more effectually? Is not the expectation that insight will arise from attendance at the theatre a putting of the cart before the horse? Much of the enjoyment experienced at the theatre is the satisfaction that comes from unconscious identification, an automatic process of doubtful psychological value. Undoubtedly pleasure, especially pleasure from the drama, ministers to our well-being; but in the technical sense it cannot remove repression, and the removal of strain is merely through distraction from the problems which press for understanding and solution. While not denying a therapeutic value to the theatre, it is strange that analysts should be at pains to impress these reasons upon the profession and the public, who already avail themselves of them. What psychoanalysis has pointed out is why such tactics generally fail of their aim, and that what is essential is not distraction but analysis. It is a question of making the unconscious conflict conscious to the individual concerned, and it would seem as if the writers consider this a probable or possible result.

The reviewer contends that a person who is unawakened to unconscious processes in life will be very unlikely to detect them in the drama; that physicians will not learn psychology from it if they have not begun to learn it outside the theatre; and that the theatre is no place for our patients to study psychological pathology. Any insight shown in the discussion of the plays enumerated in the book before us comes from a self-conscious study of personality which is derived not from the drama, but from psychoanalysis.

CONSTANCE E. LONG.

## NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS.

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psycho-Analyse*, Vol. VIII, part I, 1922.

Dr Imre Hermann contributes an article entitled "Marginal notes on the compulsion to repetition." The compulsion to repetition, a conception first elaborated by Freud in *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1920), is treated by Dr Hermann in the following aspects:

- (1) its 'meaning' in the mental structure;
- (2) its relation to the pleasure principle;
- (3) the 'manner' of the repetition.

(1) In order to find the 'hidden meaning' of a mental phenomenon, we ask ourselves the questions: "Whence is it derived?" "What purpose does it serve?" That is to say, that the objective criteria of 'meaning' in such a phenomenon, *e.g.* a dream or a symptom, are the representation or reproduction of a former situation and the serving of a purpose. Now repetition and purpose secure the continuity of the single psychic individual (personality), and the most primitive method of securing this continuity is that of the compulsory repetition of previous situations. In order that this principle of continuity may be preserved in the case of the instincts with their purposive, yet irrational, character, Freud conceives of the instinct as a force within the living organism, urging it to reproduce an earlier state. This necessitates the extension of the idea of continuity from the individual to the race, and upon this phylogenetic continuity (typical symbols) depends such correctness of interpretation as is possible in the analysis, by means of the subject's own free associations, of the products of other minds.

(2) It is in relation to pleasure-pain as elements of consciousness that the writer considers the compulsion to repetition. According to the Breuer-Freud theory, the question is one of the increase or decrease of excitation in the perceptual (W.; Bw.) and object-memory (Er.) systems. The effect, painful or otherwise, is discussed of simultaneous and repeated stimuli; in the case of the latter the effect varies with the intervals between the repetitions.

(3) Dr Hermann shows that the compulsion to repetition which, as belonging to the primary process, has no regard to time or place, encounters a function of the pre-conscious system belonging to the secondary process, a function which he terms 'Ordinanz' (will to order). In both the race and the individual, 'Ordinanz' develops in the service of the reality principle and would appear to be connected with morality, being conspicuously lacking in morally defective children. He suggests that light may be thrown on this connection by a study of pathological manifestations of the primitive compulsion to repetition (faulty development, regression, morbid attraction of anal and urethral erotism).

Dr S. Feldmann's article "On Blushing" is a contribution to the psychology of shame. The first part of the paper is an account of the analysis of a young man, whom he treated for this symptom of blushing, and shows how it was successively found to be related to the patient's 'beauty-complex,' to exhibitionism with urethral erotism, and finally, to the castration-complex, accompanied in this case with repressed homosexual tendencies. Certain significant points emerged in the analysis: the symptom tended to be less troublesome or to disappear, when the patient practised onanism; when this was discontinued, the symptom again became acute. The nose was to him an erotogenous zone; moreover, he endeavoured to motivate his blushing, of which he was painfully conscious, by rubbing and vigorously blowing his nose. From dreams and other evidence it was clear that, by the mechanism of displacement, the face (nose) was standing for the genitals (penis). Deeper analysis revealed at the bottom of all the castration-complex. The patient suffered from a sense of inferiority in respect of the size of his penis and from a dread of castration. Dr Feldmann be-

lieves that self-confidence "crystallises itself around the penis" and that "social shame" arises from feelings of inferiority in connection with that organ.

In the second part of the paper, he discusses certain observations of Darwin, Gerson, Havelock Ellis and others on the phenomenon of blushing and concludes that the mechanism of blushing is similar to that of conversion hysteria, that it manifests itself like a compulsion neurosis and that it is an autoerotic libidinal function of the skin. Freud has shown that one of the sources of self-confidence is the remnant of childish narcissism, and this primary narcissism is intimately connected with intactness of the genital organs. In the Unconscious the ego may be identified with the penis (in dreams, folk-lore, etc.). We know also from Ferenczi that there is a universal identification of the ego with the face. Thus blushing (= erection) is a compensation for the injury to self-confidence.

Dr Paul Schilder (Vienna) gives a detailed account of a psychosis following on an operation for cataract. The patient was a woman of fifty-three, whose naturally timid and nervous disposition was accentuated by the disturbance of her sight. Two days after a successful operation for cataract, she became greatly excited and suffered from visual and auditory hallucinations. As time went on, her delusions took two principal forms: that those around her were about to murder or mutilate her, and that birds or beasts were in the room or the bed, attacking her or soiling the bed-clothes, etc. These terrors continued for seven weeks, after which a hypomanic condition set in but gradually abated and finally disappeared. Dr Schilder shows that the operation upon the eye (a frequent symbolic representative of the genitals) roused the patient's castration-complex, which he believes to play an important part in post-operative psychoses. Further, he is of opinion that the resolution of a complex may lead to hypomanic states, as in the case of this patient, a view which he has elsewhere put forward. ("Preliminary studies for a psychology of Mania," *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Neur. u. Psych.*, 68, 1921.)

In a paper on the psycho-analysis of a case of homosexuality, Dr M. Nachmansohn (Königsberg, Pr.) traces the influence of the innate and the acquired factors in a severe case, the analysis of which (lasting in all over  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years) was conducted in three separate periods, in which it went through three distinct phases. In the first phase, the development of the perversion was traced, its innate character being given special prominence. In the second phase, the incest-complex was revealed as the root of the disease and manifested itself with great force. In the third phase, by means of 'active' therapy, the completion of the cure was effected.

Besides these original articles, this number of the *Zeitschrift* contains the following communications:

"The Oedipus-dream of a schizophrenic," by Dr Arnold Stocker.

"Father-rescue and father-murder in neurotic phantasies," by Dr Karl Abraham.

"Bride symbolism and the Don Juan legend," by Dr S. Ferenczi.

CECIL M. BAINES

## EDITORIAL.

THIS Journal will appear henceforth under the title of *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*. The change of name has been forced upon us by various circumstances. The old title has been found too cumbersome for purposes of reference, and a failure by authors to distinguish clearly between the *General Section* and the *Medical Section* of *The British Journal of Psychology* has sometimes led to doubt in the minds of their readers concerning the place where certain contributions to our pages may be found. It has further proved difficult to convince some publishers that the *General Section* and the *Medical Section* of the *Journal* are two separate publications and these publishers have consequently been reluctant to send two copies of a book for review to what they considered to be one journal. It has been and will continue to be our custom to review in the *Medical Section* many books which are noticed, from a different standpoint, in the *General Section* of this *Journal*; and it is hoped that the change of title of the *Medical Section* will obviate the need for repeated assurance to publishers and others that the *General Section* and the *Medical Section* of *The British Journal of Psychology*, although both organs of the British Psychological Society, are nevertheless two entirely separate and independent publications.

## THE "REALITY-FEELING" IN PHANTASIES OF THE INSANE

By HENRY DEVINE.

### I.

AMONGST chronic asylum cases are always to be found a number of those who believe themselves to be of exalted or royal birth. In cases of acute confusion or general paralysis in which the higher psychic functions are involved the occurrence of such delusions is readily explicable. In those patients, however, in which no defect of judgment or intelligence on ordinary matters is manifest, and the memory is intact, it is difficult to understand how delusions so manifestly absurd and so devoid of any foundation in fact could be seriously maintained. From the knowledge we have of our mental states it is more or less possible to enter into the feelings of a melancholic. Everyone is apt to feel inadequate, retarded, unworthy or vaguely apprehensive at times; but though it is easy to over-estimate our own importance, it is hard to actually *feel* the attitude of a person of humble birth and position who believes himself to be (say) the Shah of Persia. The attitude of a patient with a belief of this kind is so inconsistent. His behaviour in the asylum may be that of a normal person; he is quite aware of the actual facts of his past life; he adjusts happily to his environment; employs himself usefully in the garden or elsewhere; exhibits pleasure with little gifts or vexation at some real or imaginary slight—and yet holds tenaciously to fantastic views of his own personality which are contrary to that common-sense which he is quite able to apply to any subject but his delusions. Unfortunately most paraphrenic patients are unable or unwilling to give any information to enable us to understand how they could have acquired such strange beliefs about themselves; they content themselves with mere assertions as to their imagined position in life and tend to resent any form of question which seems to cast any doubt on the correctness of their statements. I have recently had under my care, however, a case in which it was possible to observe the development of delusions in their earlier stages; and as the whole subject of insane beliefs is so obscure and difficult, I thought it might be of some value to give a brief outline of

this case, and to suggest in what respects it seems to afford us some insight into the processes of delusional formation as a whole, and to indicate some reasons why patients believe in the reality of their phantasies.

## II.

The history of the case is briefly as follows: Mr J. is a married man, aged 38. He was the youngest child in a large family and his mother's favourite. The parents belonged to the artisan class and lived in one of the poorer London districts. The father was somewhat addicted to alcohol, but the home was respectable and the children brought up as well as the means of the parents would permit. Mr J. grew up a shy, seclusive, dreamy and clever boy. His studious tendencies enabled him to acquire a good secondary education, and he eventually gained a position in the Civil Service. His industry has enabled him to raise himself above the station in which he was born, and he has achieved a position of moderate comfort. He is happily married and has two nice children.

The first signs of mental disturbance occurred in 1915 when he developed 'neurasthenia' attributable to worry and over-work. Some time later he created a good deal of friction in the family by making ridiculous assertions in regard to the morals of his mother-in-law, and subsequently a paranoid attitude developed. As Mr J. himself describes it, "I gained a general impression that people were against me; a kind of excitement was stirred up against me; nasty insinuations, suggestions and remarks were made; there was a sort of under-current when I appeared." All this time he kept on with his work, but after some trouble with a friend whom he imagined had made reflections of the morals of his (the patient's) mother, he broke down for a time and was sent to hospital. He appeared to recover, however, and resumed his work until shortly before coming under my care. He had then been sleeping badly, had alarmed his wife by muttering to himself and gazing strangely about him, had been sitting about for hours with a vacant expression, and had complained of going into trances and having visions.

The patient was an intelligent and pleasant man who talked freely of his case, but he tended to be solitary and seemed more interested in his own thoughts than anything else. And this was actually the case; he explained that he was constantly disturbed by visions of his past life and he could not concentrate on reading or the ordinary affairs of life because these experiences were so compelling. He did not merely think



of the past; the memories came freely and of their own accord and they were not like ordinary thoughts because they were forced into his mind and he could not control them. They were so vivid and real that it was just as if he were at the cinematograph. It was as if he were actually living his past life over again; he felt surrounded by the whole atmosphere of the past—the same sights, smells, voices and feelings. He was vague as to whether these experiences were actually due to external influence or not; he thought it all very strange and inexplicable, and though his memories were very amusing, exciting and interesting, he wished he were not troubled in this way because he could not carry on his work.

When asked whether these memory visions referred to any particular experiences of the past the patient replied in the negative, and asserted that anything which had happened to him might be revived in the manner described. This reply was somewhat disappointing because I had come to believe that hallucinatory experiences were associated with some particular theme or trend, and that they were not general and indifferent in content as the patient told me they were in his case. One day, however, I asked him how far back his memories extended and received the astonishing reply that, while until his illness in 1919, when he was in hospital, he could only remember events in his life from the age of four years, since then, memories had come back to him from the age of two onwards. He then explained, with some hesitation, that the memories that were now coming to him in the form of visions referred to experiences that he had entirely forgotten and which had been obliterated from his mind altogether. The experiences, he said, were of such an extraordinary character that he had hitherto refrained from describing them as he feared they would not be credited and he would be regarded as insane. He had no doubt whatever that the visions actually referred to events in which he had taken part; he *felt* they were his own experiences; they seemed to belong to himself, as it were, and made everything clear in his past life that he had not previously understood. His personality had been a dual one, he said, and the memories which had been driven from his mind were now being restored.

The nature of these 'memories' may now be briefly described. His first recollection was of being, at the age of two, at Balmoral. A group of persons including King Edward, himself, and his real parents (the Earl and Countess of X—) was being painted in the garden by a famous artist. The patient now remembers that this picture was reproduced in a weekly paper though he did not recognize when he saw it that it included himself. In the next vision he sees himself at Windsor. He

was behind a tree with a nurse and King Edward and his parents rode by on horses. The whole experience is so vividly and faithfully reproduced that he can see and actually feel himself stumbling over a branch as he walked forward to watch the distinguished group ride past.

At the age of three the patient now remembers having been through a series of highly dramatic and complex experiences, all of which he can describe with a wealth of detail. He journeyed to Egypt with his parents; met Gordon and was in Khartoum when he was killed (chronologically impossible); travelled over great mountains, sometimes on camels at others on elephants; explored Central Africa; was attacked by fierce hordes of barbarians but escaped; nearly died of thirst in the Sahara, but managed to survive by drinking camel's blood; and eventually after tremendous adventures reached England. The next 'recollection' is of being handed over to those whom he had always regarded as his real parents until these obliterated 'memories' had emerged. He was taken to London by Queen Alexandra in a cab, submitted to a process by his enemies which served to blot out all memory of his past, and handed over to his foster parents.

In addition to these revived 'experiences' which refer to the life of the patient before the age of four, a mass of 'memories' have emerged which refer to his life until quite recently. Thus in vision he sees himself in Paris learning to fence under the tuition of the most famous fencing masters in Europe. One of them fences with great fierceness and the patient realises that an attempt is being made upon his life under pretext of giving a lesson. In another 'memory' the patient sees himself killing this man at Osborne. At the age of 14 he 'remembers' being attacked by three bulls and a woman with a poisoned dagger. He killed the three bulls and made his escape. A wealth of such 'memories' might be given but these will suffice for the present purpose.

As the outcome of these forced 'memories' the patient now exhibits a delusional attitude similar to that occurring in so many asylum cases. He is hostile to his wife whom he believes to be in league with his enemies to deprive him of his rights, he is repellent and haughty to those around him, he writes letters to cabinet ministers on familiar terms as if they were old friends, and signs himself "Rex Imperator, Swordsman, Aga Khan." He believes himself to be the son of exalted parents and the heir to the throne. Having been abducted in childhood and been brought up by foster-parents, he is under the impression that from time to time he has been rendered unconscious and taken from his humble home in order to resume his rightful position. During these periods he has been

the hero of a number of fantastic adventures from which he has emerged victorious, but all the experiences he has been through have been obliterated by a magical process and it is only recently that he has been made aware of them in the manner described. During these forgotten periods he has been trained and educated as a prince; has had numerous attempts made on his life; and has been closely involved in matters of high political importance. In states of unconsciousness he has been brought back to life by sexual intercourse with a number of princesses, and his children born as the outcome of these unions are now ruling in various countries. Thus indirectly he has control of vast territories, and though apparently only a civil servant he exerts an influence all over the world. He is the man behind the scenes—a hidden source of energy. Thus the patient is a typical paraphrenic with the conventional delusions assuming the forms of megalomania, persecution and eroticism.

### III.

In this case the familiar foster-parent phantasy in which the real parents are replaced by imaginary ones of exalted birth finds expression in a delusional form. Otto Rank has shown how frequently this theme occurs in mythical stories and also in the day-dreams of children; here it occurs in an intelligent adult and not merely as a phantasy, but as something believed in and acted upon. The manner in which this delusion developed may now be considered.

Amongst older psychiatrists it was customary to regard the megalomania of paranoid conditions as secondary to delusions of persecution. Thus ideas of greatness have been described as following on ideas of persecution in consequence of the abnormal exaltation of self-feeling which results from protracted conflict with imaginary persecutors; or, more crudely, it was suggested that a person comes to the conclusion that he is great because of the unwelcome attention he receives. The foster-parent delusion itself has been ascribed to a process of rationalisation. Thus a person who believes himself to be a king finds his admittedly *bourgeois* extraction is incompatible with his delusion. The notion, therefore, grows up that his parents, as he supposes them to be, are really only foster-parents. This process in which subjectively assured data are transformed so as to harmonise with an incompatible delusion has been described as "retrospective explanatory insanity."

A superficial knowledge of the psychoses suffices to show that such explanations are inadequate to account for the occurrence of delusions. Apart from the fact that megalomania is not necessarily preceded by

ideas of persecution, insane delusions do not develop by processes of reasoning and deduction; a patient does not "come to conclusions" about himself but conclusions are forced upon him. Though comparisons between the mode of development of every-day beliefs and extravagant beliefs of the insane are not without value, the beliefs of the latter cannot be understood by regarding them as merely an exaggeration of the normal. When an otherwise sensible person (as in the case described) entertains grotesque and untrue opinions about his personality, we may be quite sure that the processes of which they are the outcome have but little or no relationship to those occurring in the normal person. Even though modern psycho-pathology, based as it is in a great measure on the study of the psycho-neuroses, has enabled us to understand our insane cases in a manner which was previously impossible, there has perhaps been a tendency to over-emphasise the resemblances between the psychoses and psycho-neuroses, and to neglect the very important differences between them.

A child or neurotic might indulge in a foster-parent phantasy similar in structure to that exhibited by our patient; and in all three cases it would be correct to describe the phantasies as instances of wish-fulfilment. Here, however, the resemblances cease and a vital difference emerges, namely, a difference in attitude or feeling towards the phantasy on the part of its subject. In the child or neurotic the phantasy, though lived-through intensely and thoroughly enjoyed, is known to be imaginary, whilst in the insane it is believed to be real. Why should a phantasy be invested with a belief-feeling as to its reality in some cases (psychoses), and not in others (psycho-neuroses)? The subject is obscure, but we may proceed to consider it in the light of the facts observed in the case of Mr J.

As has been shown, the patient now believes himself to be Thomas Rex, Swordsman, Aga Khan, though he is actually Mr J., a civil servant, a fact of which he is at the same time equally cognisant. The problem to be considered is why he should believe himself to be, rather than merely picture or imagine himself to be, these personages. Fortunately we are not here hampered by a patient who confined himself to dogmatic assertions; he was able to give some description of the manner in which his delusions developed, and he made it clear that they were the product of false-memories. Why then should the images which surged into the mind of the patient have been regarded by him as a revival of episodes in which he had personally taken part—as actual events in his life-history. The question is all the more difficult because normal memory has never yet been completely analysed or explained. The most recent

attempt is that made by Mr Bertram Russell in his *Analysis of Mind*; and he himself states that he regards his analysis as probably extremely faulty though he does not know how to improve it.

The images which constitute the phantasy are of course, in one sense, memory-images. They are reproductions of things the patient had read, been told, observed and imagined. The phantasy has psychic characteristics similar to those observed in dreams and other products of the imagination. Thus the lady with the poisoned dagger is a composite figure in which the patient's sister, Queen Alexandra, and a woman who used to go about sticking hat-pins into people, are fused into one person; and the bulls included in this episode owe their immediate origin to a memory of a bull-fight which excited the patient a great deal. In this particular case it is more than probable that the foster-parent phantasy is a massive revival of similar phantasies in childhood. Apart from the fact that the general life-situation of the patient as a child would make its occurrence almost inevitable, the fact that the father himself believed (perhaps correctly) that he was descended from a noble family, and boasted of this to his children, would of itself tend to promote this form of day-dreaming. Thus neither the occurrence nor structure of the phantasy constitute its abnormal character; rather is it the feeling with which it is invested—the feeling or belief expressed in the words "this happened to me." The error of the patient was not due to a defect of judgment or dementia. He was neither confused nor demented and, in any case, the reality-feeling which accompanies a memory-image in normal people is not a matter of judgment—it is just a belief-feeling which escapes analysis. This difference between phantasy and delusion or between imagination and belief is as important as it is elusive; and in our patient it is just that vague quality which invests his phantasy which makes us regard him as insane rather than merely neurotic.

One factor which tended to make these false-memories seem real to the patient was their vividness and intensity. "Seeing is believing"; and when a person observes continual pictures of himself at various ages, and of a character which he likens to the cinematograph, we can quite understand that he should believe that he really did the things which appear before his eyes. Under normal conditions images have a certain vagueness and scrappiness, but here every detail was portrayed in such a manner that he could see, hear, feel and smell what was happening. The images had all the liveliness and pungency of sensational experience; the patient was enveloped in images; and he would seem to be living through these adventures with every fibre of his being.

The pathological intensity of the images would scarcely be sufficient of itself, however, to account for the belief in their reality as past experiences. It is conceivable that an artist might picture in his mind in a very vivid way events which he knew were purely imaginary. Other features of the phantasy must therefore be considered, before we can account for the belief-feeling with which it is invested. Now the ordinary day-dream is a volitional activity. A person engaged in this pursuit is definitely doing something which he can discontinue when he pleases. In the case of our patient, however, it would obviously be incorrect to suggest that he indulges in, invents or creates a phantasy. The delusional story occurs, develops, wells-up, or emerges of itself, and the patient is powerless to prevent what is taking place. He does not *do* anything, but something *happens*; he plays a passive rôle and may almost be described as an interested spectator. In discussing the psychology of the psychoses of which this case is a characteristic example, I would stress particularly the non-volitional character of the images which come into the mind. The patient cannot be described as "retreating from reality" as one might perhaps do in the case of the 'situation' psychoses or a neurotic phantasy, and as far as we can ascertain his illness is quite independent of the immediate circumstances of his life. There is no reason to suppose that the patient wished to be anything but what he was; he did not wish to be great, "greatness was thrust upon him." Neither does it seem correct to explain the occurrence of these delusions by a relaxation of 'higher control' with consequent emerging of inferior modes of mental activity. There is no evidence which would lead to the assumption in this case that the higher psychic functions were disturbed at the outset of the illness, and the lack of capacity exhibited by the patient in regard to his work and so on, was only that which would occur in any individual who was submitted to experiences of a particularly distracting type.

I think in these paraphrenic cases we may account for the symptoms they present on the basis of a persistent and active impulse from within. The individual is forced into an insane attitude by some inexorable force the nature of which he does not understand. Such patients, of course, often express themselves as being controlled or in the grip of something and what they describe is actually the case. They do not exhibit the attitude of a passive retreat from real life into phantasy; they are aggressive, persistently maintain their point of view, are blatantly self-satisfied, and brook no contradiction. They show no lack of energy, but rather an excess of energy expanded in futile activities. It is certainly

very strange how a connected story in the form of visions can emerge into consciousness apart from the volition of the patient; but the strangeness is somewhat diminished if we take the view that the impulse, of which the visions are no more than the expression, finds its source in the primitive instincts of the patient. The evolution of these delusions is similar in nature to the unfolding of an instinct in animals. Instinct is defined by James "as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance." This definition can scarcely be improved upon. Clear examples of pure instinct are observed in activities concerned with reproduction and the rearing of the young. Birds mate, build a nest, lay eggs, sit on the eggs, feed the young birds, and care for them as long as necessary. Nothing could be more mysterious than this, and yet it happens. An impulse from within impels the bird to perform this series of extremely complex activities, though it can obviously have no knowledge of why it is behaving thus or any prevision of the ends to be attained. The development of a delusion is similar to the birth of an instinct. The patient feels a sense of discomfort, anxiety, tension, restlessness or vague persecution, the reason for which he cannot explain. Such feelings are analogous to those which a bird would experience if he were denied the opportunity of making the movements to which its instincts impel it. In the case of the psychoses the uneasiness does not, as in the case of birds and animals, issue in a series of complex movements which ultimately lead to a state of tranquillity: images, phantasies or hallucinations emerge which are symbolic of the actions the actively aroused instinct would impel the patient to perform if it were possible. Though at times disguised, the content of the delusions of the insane indicates their origin in the instinctive life of the organism. Such delusions always reveal, openly or symbolically, the working of unmoral primitive impulses—normal or perverse sexuality, omnipotency or cruelty. In the case of our patient it suffices for the purpose of this paper to point out that his delusions express concretely in primitive and fairy story form the abstract notions of omnipotence, boundless egotism and self-love. The causes which determine the development of an instinctive tendency at a late stage in the evolution of the personality are most obscure. Such a development may be inevitable and the product of an inherent tendency. We do not know that this is so, however, and a pessimistic outlook is neither profitable nor desirable in view of our scanty knowledge of causation in the psychoses. I do not propose to discuss this, but wish merely to point out that the delusion which

emerges, greatly to the surprise of the patient, does so after the manner of an instinct in animals, and is the outcome of a similar process. It unfolds itself.

It must next be observed that the development of a delusion often leads, as in this case, to a cessation of tension, and is associated with a feeling of tranquillity and certainty which the patient had not hitherto experienced. A study of the past history of these cases creates the impression that the whole life had been converging to its solution in the psychosis in an inevitable kind of way. When the delusion emerges doubt and uncertainty are dispelled: and as the patient looks back on his past life he feels that the delusion explains all that to him had been mysterious and strange. It is not infrequent for a patient to say that his whole life had been like a dream and that he now feels awake for the first time. The delusion is, as it were, an inspiration for which he has always been waiting; the life becomes endowed with a certain richness and meaning which is felt by the patient to be in striking contrast to the ineffectiveness and restraint which he had hitherto felt. Evidently in these cases the delusion supplies some fundamental need.

In order to make the argument clear, I would like to refer to another case. A man, aged 39, who had always been somewhat inadequate, some five years ago, shortly after his marriage (possibly here a causal factor), developed a severe anxiety state. Though insisting he was quite well he walked about in a state of restless agitation, picked himself, and could not concentrate. After a time the curious delusion crystallized out that he could fly, and this delusion has persisted unchanged ever since. At the present time his general intelligence and memory are perfectly normal, and he can converse quite sensibly upon any subject within his knowledge and experience. He never seems really interested in what he is talking about, however, and he gives the impression that he finds it rather a nuisance and has more important matters to attend to. The instant the conversation ceases the patient will mutter to himself, curse himself for a fool, and exhibits a number of jerky movements which betray an obvious difficulty in sitting still. He is a solitary man, and having been given his parole, he likes to hide away and indulge in a number of strange antics without the restraint or hindrance which the company of others imposes. He poises himself for flight, inflates his chest, makes all kinds of hissing noises, and persistently abuses himself for not soaring into the air. He dislikes talking about his delusion and turns the conversation into other channels as far as he can. He seems ashamed of it. I have spent many fruitless hours trying to penetrate



below the surface. Often the patient shuts up like an oyster and merely mutters, and the usual responses when he is communicative consist of fragmentary and jerky sentences hissed out between his teeth. Typical instances are as follows: "I could do it if I tried—it is possible—I'd better do it too—it comes from the brain—I could do it with my brain—my whole body will go through the air—its the only thing worth living for—I am a fool—Why don't I do it? Its the only possible thing to do—I must be a man and buck up and do it." The most important facts elicited from the patient which afford some insight into the meaning of the symbol of flying are (1) that he believes himself to be the only man who can fly in virtue of a peculiar force within him, and (2) that when he succeeds in doing so he will be endowed with universal knowledge. Thus the delusion is certainly the expression of omnipotence and I believe it to be the expression of a definite sexual urge. The crises through which the patient passes and the pose his inner impulses impel him to assume give a strong sexual colouring to the case. As regards the patient himself, however, all he knows is that he can fly if he makes sufficient effort, and that is what he wants to do. It is regrettable that more facts cannot be elicited about this symbol; and from the therapeutic point of view it is certainly most trying that such an apparently simple case is utterly inaccessible and resistive to any form of treatment.

Here then is a man who is impelled by a remorseless and persistent force to carry out a preposterously impossible task. He is not demented or stupid: he is a very intelligent man. It is true that he exhibits apathy in respect to matters which most people find important and interesting. He is indifferent to the fact that he is in the asylum: he has no desire to return to his home: and he shuns all social contacts. But this emotional apathy is due to the fact that he has only one thing to live for; all his energy is absorbed in a futile task, and the patient just wishes to be left alone to carry out his life work.

Why then does one of our patients believe himself to be Aga Khan and another think that he can fly? We may perhaps here quote a famous passage of William James: "Now, why do the various animals do what seem to us such strange things, in the presence of such outlandish stimuli? Why does the hen, for example, submit herself to the tedium of incubating such a fearfully uninteresting set of objects as a nestful of eggs, unless she has some sort of prophetic inkling of the result? The only answer is *ad hominem* Why does the maiden interest the youth so that everything about her seems more important and significant than anything else in the world? Nothing more can be said than that these are

human ways. It is not for the sake of utility they are done...not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner ever thinks of utility. The connection between the savory sensation and the act it awakens is for him absolute and *selbverständlich*, an '*a priori* synthesis of the most perfect sort.'" And thus it is with our deluded patients. From the moment when Mr J. had his first vision and his 'broken memories' began to emerge, he was never in doubt that the experiences so vividly portrayed were actually his own; they filled his whole past life with a new meaning and reality. In the same way when after a period of tension and anxiety the phantasy of being able to fly crystallised out, the patient became infused with a new sense of power and purpose as if he had made a great discovery. He made no attempt to justify his belief; it was "an *a priori* synthesis of the most perfect sort," and any suggestions casting doubt on his unique gift were to him mere flippancies. His attitude is much as we might imagine a hen to exhibit if it were told that it was silly to sit on eggs. These grotesque beliefs are real to their subjects because they are the expression of a real instinctive need. Such patients are quite aware of their past and very like ordinary people in regard to the daily affairs of life; they like courtesy, comfort and attention, and can guard their own daily interests. They are often quite aware, also, that their beliefs about themselves are regarded by society as insane beliefs; but nevertheless their opinions are more real to them than anything else because they represent an actual biological need—a physical impulsion or necessity which actually exists, and for which their whole organism craves.

#### IV.

Thus in paraphrenic and paranoic cases, we observe individuals who are impelled by elementary and instinctive forces to assume what is regarded as a delusional attitude. In these cases there is a defective evolution of the personality, and the delusions and hallucinations symbolise or openly reveal the nature of the elemental cravings which seek expression. The conscious personality has nothing to do with the development of these delusions and can do nothing to control them. Unfortunately, also, it is impossible to control, dissipate, or prevent the development of these trends by any known therapeutic means. This is much to be regretted because the primitive instincts which control the patient are often of a most painful and terrible character. A sadistic impulse may express itself by the formation of an hallucinatory personality which controls every action of the patient; or it may appear

in delusional form. Thus a mild and kindly man after a period of anxiety and fear will suddenly know himself to be the devil; he will feel himself dominated by some supernatural force and realise that he is the embodiment of all evil who is called upon to destroy humanity with inconceivable cruelty. Naturally his life is one of intense horror at the fate to which he feels himself condemned. Then there is the homosexual impulse so manifestly revealed in the paranoiac. As an instance, a man who has served the state and led a life of high endeavour, after a period in which he feels himself to be the victim of imaginary blackmail, becomes haunted by visual hallucinations of a grossly homo-sexual type; and then a formless black figure materialises and follows him wherever he goes. Examples might of course be multiplied.

In these cases then we observe the influence on the personality of a perverted or over-developed instinctive trend. It is not of merely academic interest to localise the morbid process in this way. It is true that it is impossible to control the primitive craving which exercises such a disastrous effect on its subject, and we do not know why the instincts should develop so unevenly and inharmoniously; but we can at least understand the behaviour of our patients, and recognise it as the logical outcome of their biological inferiorities. Thus when a patient expresses some grotesque delusion, we know that in a sense he is making an assertion which is perfectly true. The delusion is the symbol of an abnormality which actually exists, and it indicates what is really wrong with the patient. The paraphrenic is quite right in adhering to his beliefs; he knows and feels that they are true, and he has more reason on his side than the psychiatrist who would persuade him to the contrary. From the therapeutic standpoint it is often definitely helpful to the patient when he finds the psychiatrist is sympathetic to his point of view and takes it seriously. It is a relief to him to find there is at least someone who believes what he says—and who not merely asserts in a soothing but manifestly insincere manner his agreement with the patient, but who, in the sense described, actually does believe that he is expressing in his own way something that is a fact about himself. It is for this reason that the community life in an asylum sometimes adds to the happiness of a patient. For the first time in his life he finds himself in an atmosphere in which his eccentricities are not regarded as such, and his delusions are not the subject of criticism. He again becomes a member of a social group, and he finds friends, occupation, amusements and interests from which his affliction debarred him at home, where everyone was kept in a state of ill-concealed tension and he could not

fail to realise that his behaviour was disturbing to others. If a man believes that he is annoyed by spirits, it is good for him to be able to get up at night and bang his mattress to drive them away. His action is perfectly logical, and he finds it helpful that it is recognised to be so, and that no objections are made to his behaviour. He finds himself in an atmosphere where public opinion regards his abnormal beliefs and behaviour as normal, and where even his fellow patients make no attempt to criticise his conduct.

## THE ONTOGENESIS OF INTROVERT AND EXTROVERT TENDENCIES

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IF we consider the primal psychic force as an undifferentiated *élan vital*, it soon becomes apparent that a differentiation occurs into two main streams which Freud has called interest and libido respectively. Interest is the psychic force which motivates the ego-instincts, branching out and becoming differentiated as the mentality of the child develops. The emphasis lies on the cognitive and conative side, though as in all psychic forces, cognition, affect and conation are involved. The libido is the mainspring of the sexual and parental instincts; it, too, becomes differentiated and develops. Here the emphasis is on the affective, and conational side. Feeling urges to action and cognition is so little developed, that a transfer of libido from one object to another can occur without the subject being aware that the emotion felt is not due to the present object but has been transferred from a past object: this underlies the phenomena of transference in psychotherapy.

Jung has suggested that the biological forerunner of his distinction of extrovert and introvert types lies in the two fundamentally different ways of adjustment in nature. The one way is increased fertility accompanied by a relatively small power of fighting and duration of life in the single individual. The other is the equipment of the individual with many means of self-support and relatively small fertility. For Jung this biological antithesis is not merely the analogue but the general foundation of the two psychological modes of adjustment. In man the adaptation to life and the continuance of the species are tending towards the latter method of increasing individual powers of subsistence with relatively small fertility. That is, it is tending towards a predominance of the ego-instincts over the sex instincts, or in Jung's terminology, towards introversion rather than extroversion. Obviously if individual development is carried too far so that the sex instinct falls into disuse, the method of adaptation has overshot its goal and the race is sacrificed to the individual and therefore dies down. In order to avoid this it seems as if nature had endowed man with more libido, with a stronger sex

instinct, than is necessary for reproductive purposes when individual life is so prolonged; as if the development of the ego-instincts were superposed upon the primitive prolific fertility, rather than replacing it. There is thus in the individual a conflict between the two. The relative proportions vary in different individuals, but conflict there must be for all. Freud states that the conflict is between the ego-instincts and the sex instincts: Jung that it is between the introvert and extrovert modes of reaction, postulating that if introversion is the conscious mode of reaction, extroversion compensates for it in the unconscious and *vice versa*. Both make the conflict universal.

In both cases if one factor is relatively strong a one-sided development will occur with an easy victory for the strong factor and a repression of the value of the other. The balance of the two, with keener conflict, which leads to the psychoneuroses, is also the condition that leads to a well-developed personality if the outcome of the conflict is successful.

In connection with Freud's concept of libido it is necessary to keep in mind that this is not the physical side of the sex instinct, not the physical sexual energy, but that libido is essentially psychic force, mental energy. It can be aroused by inner physical stimulation, and it can induce the physical activity suitable to its needs, but it is not that physical force. It is not at first even focussed on the sex organs necessary to fulfil the reproductive instinct, but is more diffused, only later becoming attached to genital activity in a specially intimate way so that reciprocation between physical stimuli and mental desire is established. Thus being psychic energy *ab initio*, its sublimation into non-sexual channels after its diversion into physically sexual ones, becomes explicable. Similarly we have the normal sublimation from say five to twelve years old, when almost the whole force can be led beyond the physical and bring about mental development naturally, combining with the ego-interest to give rise to emotional and intellectual development.

Both Jung and Freud have worked out theories in their own terminology, which though differing in many fundamental respects, yet prove on closer examination to have more in common than the difference in terminology would lead one to expect.

Jung differs from Freud in considering the primary psychic force as sexual, only becoming desexualised secondarily, but he considers that desexualised primal libido can never be restored to its original function, though sexual libido may still be sublimated or may regress. Since Freud and Jung both agree to this distinction between a sexual force, capable of sublimation or desexualisation, and a force which is *innately*

desexualised, or, according to Freud, non-sexual (which he calls interest, retaining the term libido for the sexual component) and believe that they are not mutually convertible forces, it is scarcely permissible to trace the origin of both of them to one of them as Jung does. The primal force, whatever its nature, should be capable of developing into one or the other. It is like the *Anlage* of the gonad which is neither testis nor ovary, but is that from which either testis or ovary (not both in normal individuals) can develop according to certain other conditions. It cannot be identified in principle with either component, though the development of that component can be traced from its undifferentiated source. The analogy may be carried further since in abnormal cases the *Anlage* of the gonad may attempt to develop partly into testis, and partly into ovary. In such a case neither can develop to maturity since part has developed into the other; hence there is a conflict between the two, so that neither sex is matured. So the primal force, at first developing predominantly into sexual force or libido, was also capable of developing into a non-sexual force when suitable conditions arose. The history of evolution is the history of the conflict between the non-sexual individualising derivative and the sexual undifferentiated reproductive force. So the evolution of man from infancy to maturity repeats the conflict. Jung and Freud agree here in spite of their different terminology. Each factor strives to fulfil itself, to follow out its own evolutionary plan, but the presence of the other factor conflicts, and since both are within one individual, there results compromise in some form. Either one-sided domination is evolved, as in the intellectual individualist who has repressed his emotions (introvert), or as in the frankly sensual, pleasure loving, emotional individual who satisfies his feelings at the cost of his intellectual development (extrovert), each thus repressing one factor. Or, where both are too evenly matched for any decisive victory for either one, we have on the one hand the neurotic, in whom the compromise is a failure both from the individual and reproductive point of view (comparable to the physical hermaphrodite who is neither man nor woman); and on the other the development of a socially useful compromise through the sublimation and fusing of interest and libido in an altruistic synthesis. This latter is the highest product of evolution so far, a personality built up through the interaction and progressive development of the differentiated psychic energy into a harmonious unity, not of simplicity but of integrated complexity, in which all the energy becomes available for adaptation to life (which includes reproduction). So far only a few outstanding personalities have ap-

proached this level adequately; there is still a long evolutionary process necessary if we judge by the majority of us. Possibly psycho-analytic knowledge will shorten this as scientific knowledge has produced the apple from the crab-apple.

Since neither the individual nor the race is to be sacrificed, the compromise must be a new product, differing from either egoism, or sexuality, yet including both components. This product is altruism. Through it personality is evolved, since personality is essentially a social product, the relations of the egoistic self to the environment (including other selves). This concept differs from Freud's and Jung's, though it is an extension of Freud's methods to the analysis of the Ego. It differs from Freud's because he considers the libido can never be altruistic, calling the projection of interest on to objects, which I should call object-interest (corresponding to object-libido), the only altruism. In this he ignores the fact that mature libido is the mainspring of the race preservation instincts, and hence must play its part in altruism. It seems then preferable to call interest focussed on objects, object-interest (which springs from ego-interest), and to reserve the term altruism for the higher sublimation of both interest and libido. For this, the term sublimation would have to be extended from 'the deflection of sexual energy into non-sexual social channels,' into '*the deflection of the energy motivating any instinct, into social instead of egoistic channels.*' This is nearer to the common use of the word, and agrees with Jung's use of it. De-sexualisation of libido can be thoroughly egoistic, and thus fall short even of the Freudian definition of sublimation, whereas sexual energy can be thoroughly social. Thus the wider definition suggested, coupled with the prefix 'desexualised,' when necessary, would probably prove more valuable.

The Freudians have worked on the deeper layers underlying Jung's introvert-extrovert distinction, and their findings support Jung's differentiation into the two biological modes of adaptation, one emphasising individuality, the other prolific fertility as the basis of the introvert-extrovert antithesis. Neither school seems to have recognised the complementary nature of their views. However, the introvert-extrovert conflict seems to be the conflict between narcissistic libido and object libido dominating syntheses of libido and interest with different direction of libido, emphasis being on ego and object aspect respectively. Jung finds that if the introvert attitude dominates consciousness, the extrovert attitude compensates in the unconscious. But he does not make it at all clear how this antagonism results in one opponent becoming



unconscious and relatively undeveloped. Freud postulates the conflict between ego and sex, interest and libido. For him the two undergo development side by side, the ego striving to adapt itself to the libido development or to adapt the libido development to itself. If the stage of libido evolution is incompatible with ideals incorporated with the self, it must be either sublimated and thus utilised by the ego, or it becomes repressed, the ego refusing to recognise its presence. Ego-instincts have repressed the sex instincts and the conscious reaction is introvert. If the ego fails to repress or to utilise its libido in sublimated channels, then the object libido moulds the ego, depletes the ego, and adaptation is through feeling, the conscious reaction being extrovert. In both cases however the opposite tendency is repressed into the unconscious. There is still conflict between the two since both thought and feeling, self preservation and race preservation instincts, are deeply rooted and, for balance, both must be developed. The third alternative mentioned above is that instead of ego repressing sex, or sex repressing ego, the ego utilises its libido in sublimated (*i.e.* social) channels, thus satisfying and harmonising both, developing both thought and feeling to maturity. In this way individual development is better balanced and at the same time the race preservation libido is fulfilling its true function, of which actual physical reproduction is only a part. In this case both introvert and extrovert reactions will be in consciousness, coming into play according to the needs of the situation. The self becomes a social self, *i.e.* a self in relation to other selves, not an egoistic self; both interest and libido are synthesised within a single sentiment (McDougall's self-regarding sentiment seems the result of this synthesis), and personality as we know it develops. The repressing force thus seems to be, not egoistic interest alone, but narcissistic libido and interest focussed on the ego-ideal which strives to keep out of consciousness anything incompatible with it. Conscience or the 'censorship' thus seems to me to derive its driving force from interest and libido fused within, or to adopt Pear's term 'embodied'<sup>1</sup> in, the ego-ideal which has been raised in the mind through interaction with the environment. It is thus a social product<sup>2</sup>.

In the normal individual the possibility of identifying the self with the ego resulting from any of the three alternative solutions to the

<sup>1</sup> *Remembering and Forgetting*, London, 1922, 165 f.

<sup>2</sup> This is supported by the fact that Freud states that without a strong sex instinct there can be no great power of sublimation. He thus recognises implicitly the part played by libido in repressing or controlling less mature forms of itself, instead of being repressed or controlled by ego-interest alone. It is however desexualised libido that thus joins with interest to repress the sexual libido, as is shown by the ontogenesis of the ego ideal.

conflict is present. Environment and innate constitution decide which shall become dominant. The others become repressed as potential modes of activity or adaptation that can come into conscious interaction with the environment. They upset the balance if external circumstances either weaken the dominant ego or stimulate intensely the repressed impulse. Disintegration and even multiple personality may follow. The self identifies itself with another aspect, remaining unaware of previous memories in which that aspect had played no part, thus accounting for amnesia coupled with a different mode of reaction. Neuroses seem to be due to the relative fixity of libido in narcissistic and object love not allowing free interplay, *i.e.* in relative fixity of introvert or extrovert reactions, which, as incompatible, never meet.

To educate for the prevention of neuroses the aim must be to develop that kind of personality in which intellect and emotion balance each other: so that both self and race preservation instincts may work together through the channels of herd instinct, which seems to be the source of conscience and a social self. Freud traces out the repressed libido which has been cut off from the consciousness, and hence from control, of the self. Adler traces out the repressed interest that has been similarly withdrawn from the control of consciousness, but neither sees that in all social selves, both egoistic interest and libido become repressed as antagonistic to the socialised interest and libido fused to form an ego ideal. The analysis of the unconscious brings up both interest and libido separately, but each analyst sees in it only that which he has first seen in himself. Hence Freud's cases continue to support his views that the libido is the pathological factor, or rather that the conflict between it and the ego proves pathological when the libido development is abnormal, while Adler still finds the feeling of inferiority and its compensating will-to-power as of primary importance. Adler however does not recognise that the Freudian analysis is complementary, that the feeling of inferiority arises from a still earlier, possibly innate libido fixation, one which prevents libido reaching maturity in adequate economic proportion, whereas Freud does admit that the ego-psychology remains as yet comparatively unexplored. He has traced out the most perturbing repressed factor (since the emotional sex life is most intimately connected with the glands and secretions which rapidly affect the whole organism), but owing to technical difficulties in getting into touch with the narcissistic neuroses in which the ego-disturbances are greater, comparatively little has been done in connection with the ego development.

In my analysis<sup>1</sup>, the order of bringing into consciousness self-repressed material was first libido repressions and regressions, then interest, after which the nature of the repressing forces became clearer and within range of future investigation.

In connection with the interchange between ego and object libido, before the concept of ego and object libido was known to me, in fact when I had very little technical terminology at my disposal, I made what seemed an important discovery through my analysis; I found that in the process of breaking down the transference, the ideal of the object was identified with the self, before the transference was completely broken down and the energy involved freed. This happened several times with successive transferences. There were thus two stages, one the formation of an idealised image of the object, which resulted in the detachment of the libido from the object to the ideal. This corresponds with the transference neuroses in which libido withdrawn from reality is involved in phantasies or ideas of the object, *i.e.* introversion in the Freudian sense. Secondly, there was an identification of the ideal with the self, which was then even more completely independent of the object. This corresponds to the introversion of the psychotic who narcissistically introjects the object. It was only after this conversion of object libido, through phantasy, into ego-libido, that the libido involved was freed completely from its attachment to the former object and became available for adaptation to life.

The Freudian theory seems to throw more light upon the nature of that 'God-Almightiness' which Jung rightly considers as the real danger of any analysis carried far enough. Jung does not seem to have grasped the phenomena adequately, judging by his accounts of freeing the individuality from the collective psyche at this stage, and up to the present, I have not come across any Freudian account of it at all. That such a stage does result when analysis is carried far enough, I can vouch for from personal experience, but it is not necessary to postulate a collective unconscious, or the dissolution of the mask Jung calls the 'persona,' to account for it. It seems quite explicable as the result of the two stages between the freeing of libido from external objects no longer desirable: first the continuance in phantasy of the idea of the object, libido satisfying itself in what I have suggested might be called object-phantasy; secondly the more complete narcissism resulting from almost the whole

<sup>1</sup> An account of my illness which produced dissociations of personality will be published shortly. The analysis of these dissociations provided the material on which the following paragraphs are based. A. G. I.

libido turning from phantasy of objects, into ego-libido, *i.e.* focussed on the self alone. The God-Almightiness seems to correspond to an advanced stage of narcissism; one is supremely content with oneself and one's powers, refusing to take any external considerations into account. One believes in all seriousness that the impossible phantasies of what one can do (ego-phantasies) are possible. For example I was prepared to take to pieces God, the universe and myself all at once, and felt quite confident of being able to put them together again. One approaches closely the infantile 'omnipotence of thought' stage. Following this comes the dissociation of self-consciousness, whereupon one seems to be a conscious, intelligent, unselfconscious automaton, with the belief that all personality is a delusion, that there are no 'I's' to think. that thoughts and actions do themselves. This seems to correspond to Jung's dissolution of the persona. It resulted in this case from an investigation into the nature of the conative and affective trends in my infant life before consciousness of self had developed, after memory had been retraced personally to within the first year of life. All the infantile impulses preceding this in analysis (*i.e.* later ontogenetically) had been re-experienced in consciousness. I had not realised beforehand how completely consciousness of self could be lost for the time being through allowing the libido to regress below the level of self-consciousness; or rather, how the unselfconscious self could retain mature cognition and intelligence coupled with infantile conation and affect. This produced a delightful feeling of irresponsibility and no desire to put itself together again, as a self, since all went on automatically without any possibility of conscious control or interference. There appeared to be no feeling of responsibility for thoughts or actions, since they just came and did themselves, until the stability of the dissociated, previously organised, self-regarding sentiment swung the balance back spontaneously as it had been relied upon to do. There was no conscious interference either from within or from without. Thus the persona, instead of being a mask simulating personality, seems to correspond to the development of self-consciousness from the consciousness in the infant (or other animal) before an idea of the self as subject and object, *i.e.* object for itself, has arisen. Libido freed from higher levels through analysis regresses to its earlier forms progressively before the intention to sublimate and use it as personal suffices to direct it into social channels.

Janet's recognition that neurotic symptoms are the expression of subconscious ideas forms the link between his work and the psycho-analytical views. The subconscious or, as Freud would call them, un-

conscious ideas, dynamically seeking expression and satisfaction, produce the symptoms as compromise formations between the unconscious forces and those on the side of the conscious personality which are maintaining the incompatible ones in a state of repression. But instead of the patient desiring the anxiety which seems the most real affect he feels, what the patient really clings to, according to Freud, is the substitute satisfaction for the unconscious impulse, which is removed by the destruction of the symptom. He believes that part of him really wants something incompatible with the conscious ideal, and the anxiety results from the fear that the thwarted impulse will prove stronger, also that when this fear is experienced the method of dealing with such impulses has failed. The two conflicting desires are, one, to satisfy the impulse from the unconscious, the other, to prevent the impulse reaching consciousness. The neurotic symptom is an expression of the failure of both.

Since it requires an output of energy to prevent an impulse entering consciousness, the psychic force available for adaptation to life is diminished in proportion as the unconscious impulse is strong; for not only is the energy seeking expression withdrawn from conscious control, but that inhibiting it is not available for any other purpose. This may explain Janet's "weakening of the psychical synthesis," inasmuch as so much energy is tied up and rendered useless in conflict, that that available for synthesizing and co-ordinating mental activity is seriously depleted. The hysteric, likewise, is one in whom the conflict has been so far successful that consciousness has prevented the impulse from reaching itself, and has repressed it to go its own way in the unconscious. The choice of hysteria (corresponding to conversion hysteria) or psychasthenia (corresponding to anxiety hysteria) is dependent upon several factors, hereditary tendencies and early environmental conditions.

As Janet says, the girl with obsessing erotic phantasies in all probability is not receiving any physical sexual satisfaction; but it does not follow that she does not want it. She has simply refused to admit to herself that she has straightforward sexual desires. The result is that these, receiving no satisfaction in reality, are repressed into the unconscious and emerge as veritable obsessions, having regressed to earlier immature methods of satisfaction in phantasy, as a substitute for mature satisfaction in act. Libido, thwarted *and* repressed, inevitably regresses to any stage which had provided it with temporary satisfaction in infancy. These outlived stages are repugnant to conscious thought, hence the conscious horror at the obsession, and the unconscious clinging to it as the sole satisfaction available. Regression of course is not the

only outcome of thwarting sexual desire, but it is the inevitable outcome of thwarting it from without, and then refusing to recognise its unsatisfied presence. Once repressed, regression follows. Suppressed<sup>1</sup>, and held in consciousness, it finds its own channels of sublimation in time. Sublimation is an unconscious process<sup>2</sup>, which however can only deal with impulses in the preconscious; it cannot affect impulses in the unconscious proper. Freud has also recently formulated this antithetical inhibition of sublimation by repression, confirming the conclusion reached by me independently through personal experience.

The 'depersonalisation' of Janet is probably due to a considerable portion of ego-libido having been drawn away to reinforce object libido in order to overcome some obstacle to the satisfaction of the latter. Another portion is used up in preventing this satisfaction as incompatible with the ego-ideal. This leaves a very much smaller proportion of ego-libido attached to its normal object. There is a corresponding shrinking of self respect and finally, in extreme cases, even of the sense of personality, though probably, in conjunction with this, part of the libido regresses to the pre-personal stage.

<sup>1</sup> Suppression refers to the inhibition of an impulse in action, repression, to the inhibition of the affect associated with the impulse as well, which involves a lack of awareness of the impulse.

<sup>2</sup> The sublimation of conscious impulses can occur, but even here the process appears to function unconsciously, although the intention to sublimate is conscious.

## THE RELIABILITY OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC FINDINGS

By GIRINDRASHEKHAR BOSE.

IN every department of knowledge it is sometimes desirable to examine the foundation on which it rests. The different sciences do not all stand on equally solid grounds. The fundamental assumptions in Physics and Chemistry for instance are capable of much better experimental verification than those in medicine. Absolute certainty—except perhaps in logic and mathematics—is an impossibility in any department of knowledge. So long as we are dealing with observational facts we are on comparatively sure grounds, but directly we attempt an interpretation of such findings our position becomes much less secure. The real business of science is, however, interpretation. The same facts may be explained on the basis of more than one supposition and the warrant for any particular interpretation is really a question of probability. Curiously enough when an interpretation has been in the field for a sufficient length of time it is apt to lose its real significance and is mistaken for a fact. As an illustration I might mention the theory of the earth revolving on its own axis to account for the diurnal motion of the sun. At the present day very few people would be inclined to take it merely as a theory. The majority would look upon it as a fact. It must be remembered here that what we call facts may psychologically be designated as perceptions. The apparent motion of the sun round the visible portion of the earth is the 'fact' here. In former times we believed in the real motion of the sun to account for the perception and when the theory of the revolution of the earth was brought forward it was hotly contested. But this theory was finally accepted because it explained many other associated facts, *e.g.* the nocturnal movement of the stars etc. in much simpler a manner than the other theory. This theory has been so often stated that at the present time we have forgotten its real position as an interpretation and are likely to mistake it as a 'fact'. In Physics we have been so much accustomed to mistake the Newtonian interpretations as 'facts' that the theory of Einstein has come as a shock to many of us. It is highly desirable therefore that we occasionally take stock of our

knowledge and sift facts from theories so that progress may be unhindered. In this paper I have attempted such an investigation in the department of Psycho-analysis. I must mention that this is not a new effort in this line. Ernest Jones in his book on Psycho-analysis has discussed this problem in the section entitled "Warrant for Interpretations" (see *Papers on Psycho-analysis* by Ernest Jones, 1918, p. 87). The subject is so important from the scientific standpoint that I do not hesitate to go over this field again even at the risk of some repetition. Critics very often condemn psycho-analytic interpretations as fanciful and unscientific and there are psycho-analysts who do not hesitate to dogmatise on their findings and regard them as 'settled facts' even when the analysis has been of a very cursory nature.

Psycho-analysis is concerned with the unearthing of unconscious elements of the mind and as such it labours under certain peculiar difficulties which are not apparent in other sciences. The very nature of the unconscious elements is such as to resist their emergence into the conscious sphere and even when they have been unearthed the tendency is to disown them. Emotional factors very seldom stand in the way of acceptance of any physical theory, but not so in psycho-analysis. Psycho-analysis brings to light those tendencies of the mind which are being suppressed in the course of evolution; it drags us back to the past which we would all like to forget. We are therefore apt to underestimate the value of such findings. On the other hand there is a certain type of mind which takes peculiar pleasure in dwelling on things shunned by the majority and to such persons all psycho-analytic conclusions assume an exaggerated significance. In the face of these contradictory tendencies of the mind it is extremely difficult to maintain an unbiassed attitude and to evaluate the findings on a strict scientific basis. Some sort of criterion is therefore all the more necessary in psycho-analysis to judge the relative value of the assertions of different workers.

In some laboratories students are required to keep a record of their work under three headings, viz. (1) Experiment, (2) Observation and (3) Inference. This classification although somewhat old-fashioned is useful as it serves to emphasize the different functions of a science. The aim of experiment and observation is the collection of facts and the aim of inference is to help in the formulation of a theory. It will be seen that in psycho-analysis the field for experiment is not very great. Observation certainly plays a very important part. A chance symptomatic action sometimes gives the physician a direct clue to the understanding of a complicated symptom. It is necessary therefore that the



psycho-analyst should have a very comprehensive survey of the patients' activities in every possible sphere. The importance of such observations will be fully realised in the interpretation of symptoms which are not merely isolated occurrences in the patient's life but form integrate portions of his whole personality. The importance of inference in psycho-analysis cannot be over-rated. The satisfactory interpretation of the symptoms is not a mere scientific pursuit but on this depends the cure of the patient. The cure however is not an absolute evidence of the correctness of the findings; on the other hand cure may not be established even when a symptom has been correctly interpreted.

Psycho-analytic interpretations must always be of the nature of theories. They must not be confounded with 'facts.' Psycho-analysis concerns itself with processes in the unconscious level of the mind and as such they can never be matters for direct perception, *i.e.* they can never be facts in the sense we have defined the term. A 'complex' is a matter for psycho-analytical investigation so long as it is unconscious. Directly it becomes conscious it ceases to be of interest to the psycho-analyst. The psycho-analytic physician does not concern himself much with conscious motives for action. It is extremely difficult to prove the correctness or otherwise of a factor which cannot be directly appreciated. Since a psycho-analytical interpretation must necessarily be of the nature of a theory it can never be directly proved. Its correctness can only be determined in terms of degree of probability. One interpretation is more likely than another but no interpretation is absolutely certain.

In judging the accuracy of an interpretation we ought to be guided by exactly the same principles as are employed in the formulation of a theory in any other branch of science.

I should like to emphasize some of these principles here. The first principle that should guide us in the selection of a theory is what is known technically as the 'economy of hypothesis.' According to this principle we should prefer a single and simple explanation to a multiple and complicated one; or, in other words, when a fact may be explained on a simple supposition there is no justification in explaining it as due to multiple factors. In actual practice this principle may not be valid in every case but this is the only safe guide from the standpoint of probability. I shall illustrate this by an example. Supposing I observe a branch of a tree swaying along with other branches and that a light wind is blowing at the time. I would naturally ascribe the movement of this particular branch to the influence of the wind but it may be quite possible that this movement is due to the manipulation of an

invisible string tied to the branch by some concealed person. Here the principle of the economy of hypothesis will not allow us to formulate any other explanation besides that of the wind and we would be only justified in bringing forward another explanation if the movement be different from that of the other branches which are being moved by the wind. Theoretically of course the movement must necessarily be different to some extent, but it may be quite impossible to notice it. In spite of such apparent fallacy however this principle is our only safe guide. If we stick to this principle we will be more often correct in the long run than if we assume all possible explanations to be valid. In all cases however we ought to be alive to the possibility of other explanations besides the one we assume to be true.

The theory of the string is therefore rejected as being more complicated than the theory of the wind. But supposing now I actually see the person manipulating the string the explanation ceases to be a theory and becomes a fact or direct perception.

The next principle may be described as the principle of familiarity. Of two theories the more familiar one is the more likely. When a fact may be explained by a known law of nature there is no justification in postulating an unknown force as an explanation. There is again a fallacy in accepting the principle as a certain guide. An explanation is not necessarily true because it is familiar.

The third guiding principle is the principle of extension. The more extended the application of a theory the greater the chance of its being true, *i.e.* the greater the number of facts that could be explained by a theory the greater is the chance of its validity. Supposing we have several series of occurrences and a different theory to account for the facts under each group and supposing we find a theory which would explain all the facts of the different groups taken simultaneously; under such circumstances we are certainly justified in accepting such a theory as valid. The possibility of individual explanations however is not absolutely excluded. It is quite likely that a particular occurrence is the result of simultaneous functioning of several factors each one of which is capable of bringing about the result acting independently. In such cases of multiple functioning or 'overdetermination' as it is technically called we must have independent evidence for each; otherwise the principle of economy of hypothesis is violated.

The fourth principle is the principle of analogy. When a theory has been proved to be valid in a large number of cases it is likely to be true also in any other similar case. The validity of a theory can only be

conclusively proved by direct appreciation, *i.e.* at the point when it ceases to be a theory. We know that fevers of the tertian type attended with rigor are due to malarial infection. This has been proved in a large number of cases by actual verification under the microscope. So that when we get a case of a similar type we are justified in bringing forward the theory that it is due to malarial germs.

A scientific theory is to be evaluated on the basis of the four general principles enumerated above, viz. (1) the principle of economy, (2) the principle of familiarity, (3) the principle of extension and (4) the principle of analogy. Even when a theory has conformed to all the above conditions it must not be taken to be absolutely true. It may be regarded only as highly probable.

Every psycho-analytic interpretation is usually met by another explanation by the patient. There is a tendency in every one of us to find out a cause of our actions and when the motive is unconscious some sort of rationalisation is almost always evident. The psycho-analytical interpretation thus always stands as a rival to some other explanation put forward by the patient. To assert its validity the following conditions therefore ought to be fulfilled:

(1) It must explain the action in a better and simpler manner than the explanation put forward by the patient.

(2) The interpretation ought to fit in with other events of the patient's life for which separate explanations are necessary from the conscious standpoint.

(3) The nature of the explanation should be more or less familiar in other spheres of life.

(4) The trustworthiness of the interpretation would be greater if it serves to explain dreams, myths, rituals, etc. and if it is supported by philological and other evidences.

(5) The explanation becomes very probable if it has been proved to be accurate in case of similar symptoms in other patients.

(6) The interpretation gains decided support in case of symptoms when such symptoms are removed after analysis.

(7) The interpretation may be admitted as true by the patient. The value of such admission is not always very great. When positive transference is very marked the patient is often willing to admit anything coming from his physician: this may bring about a cure in some cases but the truth of the interpretation is not necessarily proved. There is a type of intelligent patients who are willing to believe an interpretation because it happens to be supported by psycho-analytical authorities.

This belief in authority is not limited to patients but is shared by us all. We believe in many scientific doctrines on this ground. The value of admission by the patient is of course very great when such admission is the result of direct appreciation of the truth of the interpretation. But in such cases the interpretation ceases to be an interpretation and becomes a question of fact.

(8) All rival explanations ought to be less satisfactory than the given interpretation. If a conscious explanation is as good as the psycho-analytic interpretation we have no right to urge the acceptance of the latter. Of course in such cases the truth of such interpretation is not necessarily excluded.

As in the domain of bacteriology Koch's postulates must be fulfilled before an organism is definitely declared to be the causal factor of a disease, so in psycho-analysis an interpretation is correct only so far as it fulfils the above conditions. The place of free association in psycho-analysis requires to be indicated in this connection. Some psycho-analytic workers are under the impression that since we arrive at an interpretation by the method of free association it must necessarily be correct. This is an erroneous assumption. The free association method is a process which enables us to arrive at the correct solution of a symptom. It is not a proof by itself. The solution may as well be arrived at by other methods. The special value of free association lies in the fact that it not only serves to indicate the correct explanation where none is forthcoming by the ordinary methods, but acting as a bridge between the conscious and the unconscious planes of the mind it helps the patient to realise the nature of his symptom and the correctness of the interpretation. A patient may be logically convinced of the correctness of the interpretation but it is of very little use to him so long as direct appreciation is wanting, and free association has a much greater effect towards such realisation than any amount of logical argument. I shall now try to illustrate my remarks with reference to an actual case. Although the analysis was not deep sufficient material was gathered to illustrate the principles enumerated above. The case has the further advantage of being a comparatively simple one.

Mr S. C., a friend of mine, aged about 30, married, of an easy-going, happy-go-lucky temperament and showing occasional fits of temper is the subject. He is a member of a joint family. S. C.'s father suddenly developed an apoplectic stroke and remaining in a moribund condition for a few days died of the attack. During the whole period of his illness I had very good opportunities to observe S. C. The father's sudden

illness completely upset S. C. and he was rendered quite unfit to attend to the patient. S. C.'s two brothers did all that was necessary for the patient's comfort and S. C. could not be persuaded to render even simple services to the father on plea of incapacity. His excuse was that he had lost his head completely. S. C. was terribly anxious about his father's illness, more so than the other brothers, and would run to the attending physician several times a day with alarming reports about the patient's condition. He was continually apprehensive about his father's death. Twice he prevailed upon the attending physician to come and see his father whom he reported to be gasping and at the point of death. The physician on arrival could not find any such symptom and the other brothers reported that S. C. had been unduly nervous. On the last day of illness the attending physician came and pronounced his opinion that the patient was not expected to live more than three hours. On hearing this S. C. was eager to make all arrangements to carry the dead body to the crematorium and was on the point of sending for the bier when his brothers intervened and rebuked him for the indecent haste. When the father actually died he was loudest in his lamentations and was quite unconsolable. He accompanied the body to the crematorium and suddenly expressed a desire to throw away the costly ring he had on his finger into the adjoining river. When asked about this strange behaviour he said "What is the use of all this finery when the father is dead." His brothers tried to dissuade him but in vain and he did not even agree to make a gift of it to some poor person. Amidst protestations from everybody present he threw it into the Ganges. Within a week of his father's death he regained his normal mental balance—much sooner than was the case with his brothers. S. C. passes as a normal individual in society and regards himself as such. So we have no right to consider him as a patient. His somewhat queer behaviour during the period of his father's illness attracted my attention and I proposed an analysis about two months later. At first he would not agree but finally I prevailed on him to submit to an examination. As there was no symptom to be removed the purpose of the analysis was purely scientific.

The first thing I did was to ask him to give me a number of his dreams. He could not remember any and all efforts in this direction proved futile. After about a week he told me that he could remember a dream that he had dreamt about five or six months before. "He was walking barefooted with a shawl wrapped round his body." This was all that he could remember and he could not offer any explanation for

this dream. The free association method brought out certain interesting features. The childhood memories when he used to run about barefooted were first evoked. His father was then at some muffusil station. The death of a near relative which caused his father to leave the place was then recalled and last of all was the association brought forward that a person goes about barefooted when his father or some other near relation dies. The subject next remembered that in the dream he seemed to be in mourning.

The last association, viz. the fact that he was in mourning, formed really a part of the dream and was completely forgotten. The free association method brought it back to memory.

To the psycho-analyst the meaning of the dream is clear. The subject wished for the death of his father. I did not inform S. C. of this interpretation at this stage.

I next asked the subject to recall the incidents in connection with his father's death. I wanted to find the reason of his peculiar behaviour. The subject remembered everything but failed to notice anything out of the ordinary in his conduct at the time. I then pointed out the peculiarities I noticed and asked him to explain them. I mention these in serial order together with his explanations:

(1) Incapacity to render any service to the father.

S. C.'s explanation was that he was completely unnerved owing to the sudden and grave illness of his parent. When I pointed out to him that he was not incapacitated for other work he at first could not offer any explanation but added later on that he could not endure the sight of anyone suffering. Against this I pointed out to him that he nursed his child quite efficiently when he was ill and to this he could only reply that the case was different.

(2) Extreme anxiety about the father's condition.

S. C. told me that it was all natural. I pointed out to him that his brothers were not so apprehensive and he replied that it was so because he loved his father best. He could not however mention any instance where he showed his love in his behaviour.

(3) His exaggerated report to the physician.

S. C.'s explanation was that he was extremely nervous and afraid and thought that it was necessary to report everything to the physician so that he might take the necessary steps. When questioned about the exaggerations he said that his father's condition seemed to him to be really critical and he did not exaggerate anything. I told him that his brothers were not unduly nervous but to this he did not reply.

(4) S. C.'s indecent haste about the bier.

S. C. told me that he was confused and after all when death was really approaching it was not such an indecent affair as it seemed.

(5) His behaviour about the ring.

S. C.'s explanation was that when the father died the whole world lost its attraction and it seemed sinful to wear fineries. When questioned as to why he did not give it to any poor man he could not offer any explanation but simply said that the ring appeared quite valueless to him and he did not think that it would do any good to anybody.

(6) The rapid recovery of mental balance.

S. C. thought that perhaps his mental strength was greater than that of his brothers but when I pointed out to him his utter helplessness during his father's illness he remained silent.

When we analyse S. C.'s explanations we find that he had to give different reasons for the different items and that some of the explanations were mutually contradictory. An analysis of the material of the dream coupled with our knowledge of other cases enables us to interpret the subject's behaviour as due to a repressed unconscious hostile attitude towards the father. Now let us find out how this interpretation tallies with the facts. Such an unconscious wish would be resented by the conscious personality and could only attempt fulfilment in indirect ways. We would also expect defence attitude against such a wish. Now supposing this explanation to be correct we would expect the subject to develop exaggerated love in conscious life towards the father to keep his hostile attitude in check. Because this love is opposed by hatred it would be futile and we actually find the subject professing anxiety for the father but incapable of helping him. This incapacity was in evidence when there was the chance of the father's death so that the unconscious wish had an opportunity for fulfilment. The unconscious wish not only prevented the subject from helping his father but actually made him expect his death every moment and he fought against this by running to the doctor on the slightest excuse. The death wish caused the subject to look at the symptoms of his father in an exaggerated perspective. The incident of the bier would be very satisfactorily explained as due to the promptings of the unconscious hostile wish which caused the subject to anticipate the death. When death actually came the unconscious wish had its satisfaction but since this wish was under the ban of the conscious personality a sort of guilty feeling of having committed a sin came up in the subject's mind, and caused him to look upon the wearing of the ring as something improper. The throwing away of the ring into

the river had a double significance. It enabled him to get rid of the feeling of guilt which had attached itself to the ring and at the same time the loss of the valuable property was a sort of expiation for the moral offence.

The quick recovery of the mental balance of the subject naturally follows if we accept the theory of the unconscious wish to be correct. There was not really such grief at the father's death as the subject's love towards the parent was opposed by a contradictory feeling of hostility. The theory of the unconscious death wish further makes it easy for us to explain the dream of the subject and the free-association in connection therewith. It will be seen that the word 'father' occurs more than once in the free association and there is also the idea of the death of a near relation such as father. In the dream the subject seemed to be in mourning.

If we now apply our postulates to this case we find that our theory of the unconscious hostile wish directed towards the father explains the facts in a better and simpler manner than the multiple and somewhat contradictory explanations offered by the patient. This explanation fits in with the other events in the patient's life as manifested in his dream and his quarrels with his father to be mentioned presently. The fact of bearing ill will towards the father is not a very unfamiliar thing in actual life and numerous instances can be cited where the son has killed the father. The death wish towards the father has been the theme of many a myth and drama from the earliest time up to the present day and hostility of the father and the son is a biologic fact throughout the animal kingdom. Psycho-analysts will also testify to the correctness of this interpretation as it has been proved by direct appreciation in many other similar cases. How far there was appreciation of the truth of the interpretation by the subject remains to be described. After I had obtained all the information detailed above from the subject I explained to him the nature and genesis of unconscious wishes and told him that he harboured death wishes towards his father in his unconscious. He was at first indignant and would not proceed any further with the discussions. A few days later his indignation subsided and he told me that he had been furiously thinking. He recalled to mind many instances of violent quarrel with his father in the course of which he sometimes actually wished for his death in a conscious way. The subject was ultimately fully convinced of the truth of the interpretation. I might mention here that the direct appreciation of an interpretation is not possible in every case. There are some wishes which can never be brought



into the conscious sphere. Their existence is always a matter of inference. I propose to restrict the use of the term 'unconscious' to these wishes. For those wishes which can be brought up to the conscious level by analysis I would use the term 'subconscious'; the 'foreconscious' wishes are such as can be directly appreciated when the attention is directed towards them but which are not ordinarily present in the consciousness. All the three above types of wishes have got to be tackled by the psycho-analyst.

Now reverting to my case I should like to point out here that the theory of the unconscious death wish satisfied all the postulates I enumerated before and no other rival explanation could be put forward which would explain all the facts in a satisfactory manner. It is not always that we are so fortunate with a psycho-analytic interpretation. When the wish is of the unconscious type, as in many symbolisms, it can never be directly appreciated and even wishes of the subconscious type may not be made available to consciousness owing to difficulties of analysis in individual cases.

It is on such evidence as mentioned above that the whole fabric of psycho-analysis has been built up and I would urge hasty critics to pause and consider carefully the nature of the evidence before they venture to condemn psycho-analysis. To workers in the field I would press for an unbiassed mind and would urge them to weigh the evidence very carefully before asserting anything definitely. It is unfortunate that this warning should be necessary as there are evidences in current literature of personal and race bias masquerading as psycho-analytical interpretations.

## PSYCHONEUROTIC ASPECTS OF MINERS' NYSTAGMUS

BY H. WILFRED EDDISON.

UPON the kind recommendation of the late Dr W. H. R. Rivers I was appointed by the Medical Research Council to undertake a study of the psychoneurotic aspects of Miners' Nystagmus during the six months Dec. 1920-June 1921, and subsequently given permission to publish my results independently.

The investigations were carried out at Tredegar in S. Wales (75 cases), Newcastle in Staffs. (185 cases), and at Sheffield in Yorks. (50 cases).

It is my intention here to give only a brief résumé of the information obtained and the conclusions arrived at, and to omit long descriptions of individual cases.

The majority of the symptoms are admirably described in T. Lister Llewellyn's *Miners' Nystagmus, its Causes and Prevention*<sup>1</sup>.

Among those symptoms, in addition to nystagmus, to which most attention has been paid, are: tremors of the head, headache, photophobia, blepharospasm, unsteadiness of the field of vision and strained attitude of the head and eyes. These I have called "symptoms secondary to the nystagmus" in contradistinction to other symptoms of a neurotic nature to which I have paid special attention.

### *Review of the Symptoms.*

*Headache.* This is usually the first and frequently the most severe symptom. It is also the most persistent, often being the last to clear up when improvement occurs as the result of rest from work in the pit.

In a few cases the headache was hemicranial in distribution and appeared to be hysterical in origin. In other cases a relationship existed between waking up with a headache in the morning and being troubled with anxiety dreams the night before.

*Giddiness.* Almost invariably present and at first secondary to the nystagmus. But giddiness can also be elicited under the same conditions which formerly brought on the nystagmus in those cases where nystagmus can no longer be elicited. That giddiness is, in such cases, psychically determined seems probable, as in numerous patients who complained

<sup>1</sup> Llewellyn, *Miners' Nystagmus*, Chap. I and p. 22.

that it was induced or aggravated by excitement, being startled, surprised or annoyed while sitting quietly at home often proving sufficient to induce an attack.

When one examines a patient as to the effects of stooping, one is often struck by the exaggerated display of the effects of giddiness. The patient usually knows where to grasp a convenient chair to save himself from falling; if there is nothing to catch hold of he sways in a most alarming manner but does not fall. Further, several of the patients, on being directed to turn their eyes upwards, complained of giddiness even before they tried to look up. After firm, gentle persuasion they were quite surprised at the range of elevation of the eyes of which they were capable without experiencing giddiness.

*Orbicularis spasm, Photophobia, etc.* These are frequently present in some degree. All the symptoms of this group are considerably more marked under examination or when the patient's attention is drawn to his ocular condition. The orbicularis spasm may appear as rapid intermissions in the form of winking movements, or as a fine eyelid flicker, only perceptible when the patient is directed to close his eyes. Combined with these signs there are usually a strained manner of holding the head, over-action of the frontalis with wrinkling of the forehead or elevation of one eyebrow to a higher level than the other. All these signs are exaggerated whenever the patient experiences change of illumination.

The association of these symptoms with tremors of other parts of the body is very often noted.

Of the cases who suffered from these spasms and tremors the majority no longer exhibited nystagmus even where the latter had been previously present.

*General Muscular Rigidity* is a prominent feature in the majority of cases both during exertion and at rest.

*Anxiety Symptoms* are present in the vast majority of patients, and in no way differ from the various symptom groups of the anxiety neurosis and anxiety hysteria. Phobias are chiefly those of darkness, closed spaces or of escape being cut off.

*Pupillary signs.* These occur as in the anxiety state. In some cases the pupils were dilated but reacted to light and convergence, while in a few one pupil was found to be larger than the other. In two such cases a unilateral blepharospasm was observed, being, in both cases, on the side of the larger pupil. Anxiety symptoms were present in both.

There seems to be no relationship between the state of the pupils and the duration of the disease.

	Wales	N. Staffs.	Yorks.
	%	%	%
Sleep deranged ... ..	82	78	74
Anxiety dreams ... ..	32	38	12
Headache... ..	100	96	80
Morbid anxiety ... ..	20	21	12
Phobias ... ..	12	6	0
Irritability, etc. ... ..	48	51	34
Shaky on excitement or exertion ... ..	16	17	38
Palpitation on excitement ... ..	0	1.5	0
Sweating on excitement ... ..	22	12	12
Concentration, etc., impaired ... ..	12	12	12
Paraesthesiae ... ..	32	16	12
Pupils dilated ... ..	0	4	6
Pupils transient dilatation ... ..	16	12	0
Knee jerks brisk... ..	30	30	24
Knee jerks sluggish ... ..	8	10	8
Tremors ... ..	100	51	48
Pulse 100 or over ... ..	56	33	24

*Two further ocular symptoms are:*

(1) When the man fixes his gaze upon an object for a minute or two his vision becomes blurred. If the eyes be examined during such fixation no nystagmus or other ocular movements can be made out in men in whom nystagmus can otherwise be elicited by other methods.

(2) Giddiness on trying quickly to accommodate vision to change of illumination.

*Tremors* vary in their distribution but are of very frequent occurrence. They are, as Llewellyn says, frequently met with as a rotatory tremor of the head. Those about the eyes have also been mentioned. Tremors of the hands are very common, and usually bilateral, but in unilateral cases examined the right hand was the one most commonly affected.

The association of nystagmus with tremors of other parts of the body suggests an etiological connection. For instance, in one case in which nystagmus and spasms of the orbicularis, frontalis and eyelids occurred together, experimental aggravation of the nystagmus induced a fine rapid tremor of the right hand.

#### *Mode of Onset.*

The order in which the symptoms come on varies much in different localities, and appears to be considerably influenced by the mental type of the patient.

The usual story is that the man goes to work cheerfully, thinking of little else than his work. As years pass, however, he begins to feel that he is straining his eyes, and that the coal-face or other object of his attention appears to be nearer or further away than it really is, and he experiences difficulty in focussing his eyes upon it. He can no longer see, for instance, the exact spot which he is trying to hit with his pick, nor

can he fix his eyes definitely upon any particular mark on the coal-face, with the result that his eyes tend to move irregularly over a wider and wider area, with nothing very definite to fix. Further, he may be obliged to guard against approaching within harmful range of other men's picks, or injury to himself or others with his own pick—another reason for taking his eyes off the already widened point of fixation. This stage may last for several months or years before the disease becomes what Llewellyn calls "manifest".<sup>1</sup> The usual subjective symptoms, described by Llewellyn, now make their appearance, and the man becomes apprehensive of his condition. His inability to fix objects in the pit renders him apprehensive of danger, which in turn causes him to be easily startled and lacking in self-confidence. He frequently has to stop work to rest his eyes, he screws up his eyes when he looks around him, and then finds that the lamps dazzle him and appear to dance irregularly or to revolve rapidly in small circles. When he first observes this he screws up his eyes still more and so comes to the surface of the pit. Here he finds himself dazzled by the daylight. This latter factor, aggravated by fear as to the fate of his eyes, and incidentally of his income, all serves to keep the ocular condition at the focus of attention.

In other cases the onset is more insidious, and the condition may only be discovered accidentally while the eyes are being examined for some other condition. In many such cases no subjective symptoms are complained of whilst in others mild anxiety symptoms and signs are found.

The manner in which the varieties of mental types of miners influence the clinical picture is as follows: in Yorkshire the men tend to be somewhat stolid and unimaginative, and to scorn to think about or admit the existence of "nervous" symptoms such as anxiety, irritability, phobias, etc., while the Welshmen, on the other hand, are more excitable and pay more attention to the psychic aspects of the disease. The Staffordshire miners appear to be intermediate in this respect. The corresponding variations in the symptomatology are shown thus: in the case of the Yorkshiremen the symptoms usually appear as the anxiety neurosis with the addition of nystagmus. With the Welshmen the onset is more of the nature of anxiety hysteria plus nystagmus. The Staffordshire men occupy an intermediate position, though approximating to the actual neurosis rather than to the psychoneurosis.

There are, however, many cases of undoubted hysteria and anxiety hysteria in which the symptoms closely simulate those of miners'

<sup>1</sup> Llewellyn, *Miners' Nystagmus*, p. 3.

nystagmus without nystagmus ever having been noted after careful expert examination.

Only a very limited examination by the psychoanalytical method was possible in the limited time available, but it showed that the symptoms in all cases so examined formed an integral part of the mental make-up of the patient. The following case illustrates some relationship between the man's symptoms and his life in the pit. He was not, however, analysed. His eyes showed irregular nystagmoid movements. He stated that he occasionally had fainting attacks in which he usually lost consciousness, but sometimes retained some awareness of his surroundings. During the first examination he had a severe attack of generalized tremors, nystagmus and internal strabismus of both eyes, rapid shallow respiration, pulse 120 and a facial expression of marked anxiety. He stated that the fainting attacks commenced with a "rising sensation" in the abdomen closely resembling the sensation experienced while going down in the cage. A feeling of giddiness was next described similar to that felt on stooping or looking at a lamp in the dark galleries. At this stage he would fall. On coming to he would have general tremors with a subjective sensation which he said was like that previously induced by exertion and later by excitement at any time. These resemblances were all pointed out by the man himself. The fainting attack appeared to be, then, a reproduction of the various subjective sensations experienced first in the pit and later above-ground under conditions which reproduce those of the pit.

Nystagmus may have a sudden onset. Such occurrences have made themselves felt during influenza and other lowering affections<sup>1</sup>, and such necessities for psychic re-adaptation as a bereavement, also after accidents and local injuries to the head or eyes, or even accidents to remote parts, for instance, blows on the back or limbs. Events of this sort frequently serve as determining causes for the outbreak of a neurosis, so again creating a point of resemblance between nystagmus and the neuroses.

#### *Summary of Observations.*

(1) Injury sustained to the head, eyes or other part of the body, severe illness or mental anguish may be followed by severe trains of neurotic symptoms and nystagmus may be observed on examination<sup>2</sup>.

(2) Injury to, or a foreign body in one eye aggravates both the subjective symptoms and the objective signs, in cases where nystagmus already existed, for some time after the attendant conjunctivitis has cleared up.

<sup>1</sup> Llewellyn, *Miners' Nystagmus*, p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 98-101.

(3) The effect of directing the patient's attention to his symptoms is to aggravate the symptoms.

(4) Symptoms of nystagmus may first be observed at the time of onset of a neurosis.

(5) When neurotic symptoms intervene in a case of hitherto pure nystagmus, the symptoms secondary to the nystagmus are incorporated amongst those of the neurosis.

(6) The nystagmus group of symptoms passes gradually, without line of demarcation, into the anxiety group. Tremors of the hands follow those of the head which latter are secondary to the nystagmus, and these tremors are apt to become general on excitement or exertion. Finally tachycardia, hyperidrosis and other anxiety symptoms follow.

(7) In those cases of nystagmus which are combined with an obvious neurosis the ocular oscillations are experimentally inseparable from the tremors and other neurotic signs.

(8) A few cases, in the course of analysis, became greatly agitated and suffered great exacerbation of their symptoms, including the nystagmus. In other words the nystagmus took part in an abreaction.

(9) In certain cases physical re-education of the eye movements, which really amounted to treatment by suggestion, favourably influenced the nystagmus as well as the subjective sensations.

(10) The actual nystagmus itself did not appear accessible to analysis, and, therefore, seemed to be of the nature of an actual neurotic rather than a psychoneurotic symptom.

(11) The course of the cases under treatment is a good example of the dependence of the patient upon the physician, so characteristic of hysteria.

(12) The patient exhibits resistance against the removal of his symptoms, of which resistance he is quite unaware, and over which he has no control. For instance, several of the men stated that their state came on or got worse whenever they started off for the clinic, sometimes causing them to turn back and go home. This sudden exacerbation of the symptoms occurred too often under these and similar circumstances to be a coincidence and seemed to be a definite feature of the disease.

In conclusion I wish to express my keen appreciation of the great kindness and assistance which I met with at the hands of the late Dr W. H. R. Rivers, Dr T. Lister Llewellyn and Mr G. H. Pooley of the Miners' Nystagmus Committee, and of the Managers and Staffs of the collieries which I visited in Tredegar, Newcastle-under-Lyme and Sheffield.

## DESCRIPTIVE NOTICE

*Psychological Types or the Psychology of Individuation.* By C. G. JUNG. Translated by H. GODWIN BAYNES. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. Pp. xxii + 654. Price 25s. net.

The task of reviewing a work of the first magnitude must always bring the reviewer face to face with his limitations, but when, as in the present case, the range of the book embraces the profoundest philosophical and psychological speculations, this consciousness may amount almost to disability. To offset this critical disability the present writer can only claim a very special intimacy with the work, which gives him a certain justification for discussing or rather describing its contents.

The ground-theme of the book is the basic psychological antithesis which the author has termed extraversion and introversion. In previous contributions he had identified extraversion with feeling and introversion with thinking; but this point of view, though genetically correct, proved true in practice only when the concept of feeling was limited to the objective relation, and that of thinking to the particular kind of thinking which is abstracted from the object. Deeper investigation, therefore, proved the necessity of relinquishing the criterion of function and of describing the fundamental type antithesis in terms of libido-mechanisms. In extraversion the habitual tendency of the libido flows from the subject towards the object, so that in this type the objective factor always tends to predominate. Whereas in introversion the libido flows from the object to the subject and the subjective factor becomes the paramount consideration.

In every individual the two mechanisms are constantly present, at least potentially (Jung compares them with the systole and diastole of cardiac activity), but one mechanism, whether from inborn disposition, milieu influences, or profound physiological causes as yet unknown, tends to find greater favour than the other and gradually becomes the predominant or habitual attitude. The fundamental differentiation represented by these opposite mechanisms has its physiological as well as its psychological manifestations, and the author draws attention to the fact that homologous phenomena can easily be demonstrated throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms. I use the term "homologous" advisedly because what Jung is here describing are general attitudes or preconditions of psychological differentiation, hence something that is just as radical as the differentiation of sex. The extraverted and introverted he calls general attitude types, by which nothing more is said than the words imply, namely, a general tendency of the libido to follow either an outward or an inward course.

His further typification is based upon the particular basic function with which the individual is mainly identified for purposes of adaptation. The four basic functions which constitute, as it were, the ground-structure of the psychological house are *thinking, feeling, intuition* and *sensation*. The first pair are rational functions and, when directed by the will, conform to definite rational criteria. The latter pair are irrational or arational functions and have no relation to rational judgment. The author can provide no rationale for his



choice of these four basic functions. They simply emerge as psychic elements and, as is also the case with physical elements, their sole justification is experience. The author regards them as four cardinal points of the psyche, equally necessary for psychic orientation as are the corresponding points of the compass for the purposes of terrestrial orientation. The nature of consciousness demands this fourfold differentiation, and everyone who has had any practical experience of dream-analysis must long since have recognized this fourfold principle, which almost invariably appears in one form or another whenever the need for further individual differentiation or a new psychic orientation begins to manifest itself.

Any one of the four basic functions may become the main function of adaptation, and in each event a characteristic psychology will result. There is also the further possibility that each function-type can be either extraverted or introverted, so that we arrive at eight typical classes of individuals, among which we may find every possible variation of the general type. In Chapter X Jung has portrayed the general characteristics of these eight typical psychologies with incomparable subtlety and skill. The particular character of the leading function, *i.e.* whether rational, *viz.* thinking and feeling, or irrational, *viz.* intuition and sensation, provides yet another classification into rational and irrational types.

As we might suppose, the incidence of extraversion and introversion has no sort of relation to sex, social level or parental types. Apparently the distribution is entirely accidental. But with regard to the function-types Jung finds that the feeling types occur more frequently among women, while the thinking types are more common among men.

The general attitude produces such profound modifications in the character and aim of the various functions that it is not to be wondered at that Jung was at first misled in his earlier descriptions of the types. For example, thinking in the extraverted attitude, occupied as it is with objective facts and data, presents an entirely different aspect to the thinking of the introverted attitude, the character of which is entirely determined by the subjective factor. In both cases it may be true thinking, *i.e.* governed by the laws of logic, yet its whole aim and quality is so profoundly influenced by the underlying extraverted or introverted attitude that the same rational function will commonly lead men of opposite types to diametrically opposite conclusions. Similarly with feeling, intuition, and sensation. In practice, therefore, it is essential that the general-attitude type should first be considered in order that the character of the main and auxiliary functions should not be misunderstood.

The author lays stress upon another very essential difficulty in function and type-analysis, which arises from the fact that in no individual do we find all the four basic functions at the same level of differentiation. Were such an individual possible he would be in a state of suspension, since no orientation would be possible at all unless one function were given capital value. But the result of this most-favoured-function tendency of the psyche is that the two functions which participate in the activity of the consciousness become relatively developed, while the two which remain more or less unconscious are not only relatively inferior but acquire certain of the negative and primitive characters of repressed elements generally.

Jung's delineation of the negative character and subtle subliminal influence of these repressed and, therefore, inferior functions is a psychological *tour de force*. In these portraits there is a mastery of cunning line and suggestive

shading which not only reveal an astonishing intuitive insight but also a great artistry in the selection and use of the intuitive material.

It may well be asked why, if the four basic functions are inherent in the structure of the psyche, should two of them normally exist in a state of relative repression. It is, of course, only another expression of the radical duality of the psyche that the basic functions should also be grouped into pairs of opposites. The rational pair are thinking and feeling, the irrational intuition and sensation. Thinking that is differentiated and true to its own principle is essentially incompatible with feeling. Feeling values must be rigorously excluded if thinking is to be pure thinking. And thinking values are equally prejudicial to pure feeling. Hence an attitude that is orientated by either of these values must necessarily tend to repress the other. Intuition and sensation are similarly opposed. Sensation is focussed upon the concrete superficies of the object, while intuition is constantly peering through or beyond the external appearance of things to glimpse the further possibility that lies beyond. Hence a sensational attitude will tend to exclude intuition and *vice versa*.

The rational and irrational functions because they are different in nature can, however, co-operate harmoniously together, wherein one becomes the main or decisive function while the other serves as auxiliary. These combinations produce familiar and characteristic psychologies, as, for instance, where thinking is combined with intuition in the speculative philosopher or scientist, or intuition with feeling in the poetic and artistic temperaments. Where the artist is influenced more by the quality and texture of his medium than by the possibilities contained in his creative vision we may find the combination of sensation and feeling. Where sensation is the primary function the thinking or feeling associated with it has always a very concrete and substantial quality and shows the greatest difficulty in appreciating the nature of an abstraction.

It will perhaps have been perceived that Jung gives to the function he calls feeling a very definite meaning, which does not wholly correspond with the sense in which we commonly use the term. In his acceptance of the term, feeling is a directed and rational function. It is a function of judgment which refers to a definite criterion of value. Feeling-values are related to an absolute principle just as much as thinking values. Furthermore every dynamic collective idea, such as justice, fatherland, God, etc., is just as much feeling as thought.

I have dealt at some length with this aspect of the book because, although it is not its most absorbing or most essential content, it is nevertheless on the basis of this typification that the main theme must be discussed.

Jung's investigation of the type-problem has already inspired other writers who have worked under him to elaborate the same theme from the angle of their own type. Dr Beatrice Hinkle's article on Psychological Types, reviewed in this *Journal*<sup>1</sup> by Dr Constance Long, is a very good extraverted elaboration of Jung's system of types, and is, of course, derived from his ideas.

The main body of the book is devoted to an exhaustive investigation of the type problem in all its various manifestations throughout the whole range of human culture. He shows that the type problem has always had a certain subjective appreciation by leading minds in every cultural epoch, but that until objective psychology (which is only of recent growth) came into existence the problem of types could never be apprehended as an objective problem.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. II, part iv, p. 329.

The author begins the book with a study of the great Gnostics, Tertullian and Origen.

Tertullian is the introverted type whose intellectuality was so ardently inspired by a passionate zeal for Christianity that the intellect, his chief organ, eventually became his worst enemy. Schultz writes of him: "The passion of his thinking was so inexorable that again and again he alienated himself from the very thing for which he would have given his heart's blood." Tertullian's subjective appreciation of the fanatical one-sidedness of his type led him to the "sacrificium intellectus" just as Origen's appreciation of his extraverted compulsion towards the sensuality of objective experience led him to the "sacrificium phalli." Tertullian's sacrifice enabled him to realize the sheer irrational *dynamis* of his own soul, while Origen's self-mutilation gave him a release from the daemonic bondage to the object and enabled him to yield himself unafraid to the riches of Gnostic thought.

The author then proceeds to show that the theological disputes of the Early Church also originated in a fundamental psychological antithesis, and that behind the assumptions upon which the battle of dogmas spent itself lay this same problem of types.

In the classical age the type problem is revealed in the antithesis between the Cynic-Megarian philosophy on the one hand, and the Platonic world of ideas on the other. To the introverted standpoint the reality of the idea represents the reality of the subject, while to the extraverted standpoint generic concepts or universal ideas are merely "nomina." To the Nominalist the generic concept was merely a "flatus vocis," and the derision expressed in this epithet is a striking indication of the typical extraverted valuation of a subjective reality. For him it lacks everything that is tangible, concrete, and real, and hence is "nothing but sound and smoke." The underlying difference of standpoint has existed since the beginning, and whether we are speaking of the Cynic versus the Platonist, or the medieval Nominalist versus the Realist, or the present-day Realist versus the Idealist, it is at bottom always the same problem. The man with the extraverted attitude must, by his very nature, interpret the nature and meaning of life in terms of objective reality, while the man with the introverted attitude is equally constrained to interpret it in terms of subjective reality.

"If," as Jung points out, "the opposition between Nominalism and Realism ('esse in re' as against 'esse in intellectu') were merely a matter of logico-intellectual compromise it would be incomprehensible why no terminal solution other than paradox is possible." But since it is a question of psychological opposition a one-sided intellectual formulation must always end in paradox, simply because the intellect, as representing only the rational side of the psychic duality, is thereby incapable of providing the mediatory formula which could do justice to the real nature of both the opposing psychological attitudes. A formula derived from the side of the abstract must be altogether lacking in the recognition of concrete reality. For the solution of this antithesis a third intermediate standpoint is needed, the "esse in intellectu" lacks tangible reality, the "esse in re" the mind.

"Idea and thing come together, however, in the psyche of man which holds the balance between them. What would the idea amount to if the psyche did not provide its living value? What would the objective thing be worth if the psyche withheld from it the determining force of the sense impression? What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an 'esse in anima'?"

“Living reality is the exclusive product neither of the actual, objective behaviour of things, nor of the formulated idea; rather does it come through the gathering up of both in the living psychological process, through the ‘esse in anima.’ Only through the specific vital activity of the psyche does the sense-perception attain that intensity, and the idea that effective force, which are the two indispensable constituents of living reality.”

I have quoted these passages because they constitute the essence of Jung’s contribution to philosophy. Herein lies the conclusive argument that the division can never be resolved by a discussion of Nominalist and Realist arguments (or however the typical opposition may be styled) but only in that peculiar activity of the psyche which Jung terms “creative phantasy,” wherein the actual and tangible and the abstract and eternal are merged in a perpetually creative process.

We are forced to conclude therefore that the heterogeneity of the psyche is basic; accordingly it must demand a plurality of principles for its interpretation. Hence the explanations of every psychological formula which is based upon the assumption of psychic uniformity will be lacking in general validity, just as much as a one-sided philosophic standpoint must fail to provide a statement of reality that can gain universal sanction.

The systems of Freud and of Adler are criticized from this point of view. Both systems entirely ignore the problem of types and assume the existence of a basic psychic uniformity, which assumption leads the authors to interpret every other possible psychic process in terms of their own. The explanations of the one are sensed as a violation of the fundamental principle of the other, and the acute antagonism existing between the two standpoints is convincing evidence of the fundamental heterogeneity which both so strangely ignore. The one system in reducing all psychic activity to the element of sexuality, and the other to the element of power merely express and represent the typical psychologies from which they respectively spring, and the validity of either system is thereby restricted to individuals of the same type.

An important chapter is devoted to a discussion of Schiller’s ideas as revealed in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* and of Schiller’s own conflict between the poet and the philosopher in himself. Schiller’s deep sense of his own personal conflict gives a particular value to his attempt to find a solution of the problem.

Then follows the most significant chapter in the book. It is based on an analytical study of Spitteler’s *Prometheus and Epimetheus* in which the type antithesis is presented in a luxuriant mythological setting and where the attempt at solution is symbolized in the jewel fashioned by Pandora, the soul-figure of Prometheus, who represents the creative introverted element existing, potentially, at least, in every individual. This mythological presentation of the problem is compared with analogous conceptions in the religious systems of India and China. The author shows that the aim of all these systems is, through the exercise of a conscious technique, to release the disciple from the conflict of the opposites, and that in every case the efficacy of the redeeming symbol, whether it be Brahman, or Rita, or Tao lies in its power of reconciling the conflict of opposites. From these conceptions Jung returns to the West and discusses the relativity of the idea of God in Meister Eckehardt, and shows how this medieval German mystic had a purely psychological conception of God. Jung also discusses the Grail legend (a survival from the Middle Ages whose potency for the world of to-day is demonstrated by the impressive appeal of Wagner’s *Parsifal*) and he relates the significance of this legend to

the whole Chivalric tradition and the growth of the worship of the Virgin. This analysis leads him to the conclusion that the religious significance of woman is due to the fact that woman embodies the soul of man. She is the personification of his unconscious. Hence the service of woman is the service of the soul. Having thus brought the religious conceptions of East and West into harmony with the concepts of modern psychology the author returns to a discussion of the significance of the reconciling symbol in Spitteler's poem, and he is now able to show that notwithstanding its classical mythological setting, the problem which the poet's intuition has seized is essentially the religious problem. It is the poet's unconscious response to the world's need.

It is quite impossible to make an objective judgment of this inspiring contribution to the most urgent problem of our time. As far as my knowledge goes it is the first serious attempt to bridge the gulf between psychology and religion. As long as science is wholly confined to the world of objective facts, and religion to the realm of subjective experience, an impassable gulf must divide them. To bridge this gulf both science and religion must relinquish their absolute claims. The acceptance of the relativity of the idea of God inevitably involves the relativity of the claims of empirical science. To empirical science the religious problem is a closed door, because it denies to subjective reality the same validity it gives to the world of concrete facts. Psychology, if it is to deserve the name, must advance beyond the limits of empirical science and enquire into the nature of man as a subject. The idea of God, or "supreme psychic value," is a psychological fact which demands a psychological formulation. This extension of the realm of science does not necessarily mean an encroachment upon the essential values of religion. Science is knowing, religion is being, and these are for ever incommensurable states. What the religious emotion may be in itself is as much beyond the limits of intellectual cognition as is the essence of feeling. But the religious process, regarded merely as a process should fall within the range of science, and Jung's formulation of the "*transcendent function*" is the first attempt to embrace the religious process in a scientific concept. With this concept nothing mysterious is intended, but merely a combined function of conscious and unconscious elements or, as in mathematics, a common function of real and imaginary factors. In religious symbolism it is expressed as the God-renewal emerging from the conflict of the opposites. Bergson expresses the same idea when he says "the idea arises from the edge of conflict." Jung regards this function as a basic psychological principle by which successive transformations of the libido take place. The result of the conflict between a conscious and unconscious antithesis finally emerges as a new attitude. But this can only take place when the ego stands resolutely detached from either side, for when it becomes identified with either side the opposite is again repressed and the conflict begins again, albeit on a new level.

In Chapter VI Jung discusses the type-problem in psychiatry with special reference to Otto Gross' hypothesis of the primary and secondary functions and the two corresponding types or personalities which Gross describes.

Chapter VII is devoted to a discussion of the type-problem in aesthetics particularly with regard to the two typical attitudes described by Worringer as "feeling into" and "abstraction."

In another chapter a work by Fourneauux Jordan is analysed (Character as seen in Body and Parentage) from the point of view of typical characters and the whole question of the criteria of judgment is carefully discussed.

The Apollonian-Dionysian antithesis elaborated by Nietzsche in his "Birth

of Tragedy" is the subject of another chapter and throughout the book there are numerous references to Nietzsche's psychology and ideas. Nietzsche as the advocate of power, and Wagner as the advocate of love are clearly figures of immense significance for minds of the present epoch, for the clash of these two elemental forces represents in a very special degree the problem of our time.

Pragmatism and William James' characterological classification are the principal themes in the chapter on the type-problem in modern philosophy. James' characters are seen to fall broadly within the categories of extravert and introvert but they are criticized as being conceived too exclusively from the intellectual standpoint.

The chapter on the type-problem in biography deals principally with the biographies of famous scientific investigators as treated by Ostwald, who succeeds in establishing two distinct types, the Classic and the Romantic, which are shown to correspond with the extraverted and introverted attitudes.

But it is in his general description of types that Jung's amazing psychological finesse is most in evidence. With absolutely sure touch he draws in the general character while omitting the particular and individual. From thousands of individuals he has selected just those characters which are typical. Every feature of these Galtonesque portraits bears witness to a range of psychological experience and an intuitive capacity that is surely unique in the literature of science.

In every type-portrait the conscious attitude is tellingly contrasted with the attitude of the unconscious. The conscious man is, as it were, distinguished from his shadow, and so completely has Jung taken into account his own psychological disposition that it would be hard to tell from these portraits to which type he himself belonged. This fact is itself the best evidence for the whole argument of the book which the author eloquently summarizes in his conclusion, wherein he reasons, that in view of the basic heterogeneity of the psyche no common ground of understanding can be reached in any sphere until the problem of types has been generally recognized. Not only is the recognition of this problem essential for the purpose of regulating acute differences in standpoint, it is also the pre-condition of any general comprehension of that immense query, alike in medicine as in every other branch of knowledge, which we vaguely term the "individual factor."

Not the least valuable contribution of this great work is the final chapter containing fifty-seven comprehensive definitions of the principal psychological concepts employed by the author. This is an example which other writers in this sphere would be wise to follow, especially in view of the fact that a great deal of the literature has to undergo the process of translation, thereby inevitably introducing an added element of ambiguity and doubt as to the exact meaning of the author's original concept.

This work is an important departure from the general view-point of psycho-analytical literature, which tends to regard the psychic process from the standpoint of the basic uniformity of its elements, and to disregard the equally essential heterogeneity of the differentiated psyche. It is an attempt to consider the psyche as a whole and not merely the elementary mechanisms into which psychic activity can be resolved. The book has a range of view and a wealth of thought which is liable to evade the grasp of a specialized mentality. Like every great work it is proof against every superficial attempt to glean its content, the essence of which may indeed require the lapse of many decades for its full significance to be generally appreciated.

H. G. BAYNES.

## REVIEWS

*Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.* By Prof. SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D.  
 Authorised English Translation by JOAN RIVIERE, with a Preface by  
 ERNEST JONES, M.D. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. pp. 395.  
 Price 18s.

In giving us this translation of Freud's *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, Mrs Riviere has done a signal service to psychology and conferred upon English readers an inestimable boon. Not a little of the misunderstandings which have accompanied the spread of Freud's views in English-speaking countries may be traced to the faulty and inadequate translations of psycho-analytical literature which have often been offered to English readers. This volume is one of the few translations of Freud's works which make us feel that the translator is at home in both languages, and the consequent ease in understanding what the author means is very welcome.

This translation has been before the public for over a year and is no doubt well known to most of our readers. Both to the beginner and to the advanced student it has proved the most helpful single work of Freud; for not only does it present, in the first and second sections, an incomparable account of the foundations on which psycho-analytical practice and theory have been built up, but, in the last section, it brings to our notice the most recent developments of the science in its application to the treatment of the neuroses. Here also we find adumbrations of some of those more speculative hypotheses which of late years have set the seal on Professor Freud's reputation as one of the profoundest thinkers of our time.

It had originally been our intention to review this book in the ordinary way, as we might review any other volume issuing from the press. But a little consideration made it plain that this would be an almost impossible task. A merely descriptive notice would have been an impertinence to our readers, for all the fundamental conceptions contained in the book have been known to us for many years through the earlier works of Freud himself and those of other psycho-analysts. On the other hand, a critical notice would have been an impertinence to Professor Freud, for all that is new in the book is for a time exempt from criticism; and until what is new has been put to the test of experience we may ask, in the author's words, "Of what use is the most excellent judgement where there is no knowledge of the subject under debate?"

T. W. M.

*Remembering and Forgetting.* By T. H. PEAR, M.A., B.Sc., London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1922. pp. xii + 242. Price 7s. 6d. net.

"It was necessary to compress into a few lectures enough information about ordinary remembering and forgetting to enable officers of the R.A.M.C. to estimate the abnormality of these functions in their patients. It might have been better if the book had appeared in that shape" (p. vii). We are inclined to agree. Additions—made, at least partly, to help the uninitiated, interest the general reader and "appeal to the athlete, the mathematician, the musician and the writer" (p. xii) "have naturally obscured the original outlines of the

book" (p. vii). Lectures framed to supply in minimum time the needs of war-time officers of the R.A.M.C. might possibly have been made the foundation of a useful contribution to medical psychology: their use as the basis of a popular account of remembering and forgetting is hard to understand.

The body of the book is divided into nine chapters of which the first deals with the question "What is memory?" and the last is entitled "How we forget." In between are three chapters on mental imagery, "the apparatus of the memory," and four on dreams. The discussion of mental imagery is continued in an interesting appendix of four chapters that stamp in the impression that, for the book, a better title than "Remembering and Forgetting" would be "Imagery and the Dream." The study of memory is often side-tracked into the image-hunt, but four chapters on the dream in a short work on memory needs explanation. Part of that explanation is the peculiar interest of the dream in psychopathology; but there is another reason. In "the structural study of the dream" the author sees "another way of studying the relation between image and meaning which has not been given the attention which it deserves" (p. 66).

Visual imagery forms the basis of discussion and illustrations drawn from the author's own experience of this form of imagery are particularly interesting. The mutual intolerance of people who use different forms of imagery is noticed in several places and is dealt with at some length in the appendix on "The Intellectual Respectability of Muscular Skill" (pp. 220 f.). Outstanding work on "Varieties of Mental Imagery" is mentioned and the monograph of Dr Mabel Fernald<sup>1</sup> is specially commended (pp. 21 f.). Kinaesthesia is dealt with at some length, the author dwelling on and apparently accepting Professor Washburn's conclusion that kinaesthetic imagery is in reality "movement sensation resulting from the actual slight performance of movements" (p. 26).

Considering the function of imagery we find "the chief function of imagery seems to be the conveyance of *meaning*" (p. 44) and "the image plus its meaning is nowadays generally known as the *idea*" (p. 48). This leads to a discussion of "the relative independence of image and meaning" (p. 48) and ends in consideration of the important question of "imageless awareness" which for the author would seem to be "awareness with the minimum of imagery" (p. 58 n.). Washburn's theory is apparently accepted: "Imageless thought would occur when the problem set... was comparatively easy... the thinker though actually solving a question the apparent difficulty of which would impress the non-philosophical outsider, might do so without being clearly aware of the mechanisms which he employed though actually these might be the movements of speech muscles or of those used in gesticulation... Possibly the professional thinkers who acted as subjects in the experiments which are claimed to have established the existence of imageless thought were so accomplished that the problems set them had been half solved months or years before they appeared in the thought experiments. On the theory which we are considering the movements which accompanied such 'imageless' thoughts would have been feeble, and, like all kinaesthetic experiences, difficult to localise and to name" (p. 65). References are given to several discussions of the question, the last mentioned being that of Professor R. S. Woodworth<sup>2</sup>. Now,

<sup>1</sup> "The Diagnosis of Mental Imagery," *Psychological Review*, Monograph Supplement, No. 56.

<sup>2</sup> "A Revision of Imageless Thought," *Psychological Review*, 1915, xxii. 1-27.



to prove a negative is impossible. Hence in the long run the 'imageless' thinker must be content with the definite declaration: I am aware of the presence of meaning unaccompanied by any awareness of necessary accompanying imagery; and remain an unbeliever in the doctrine of the necessity of the image until the exponents of the doctrine can convincingly convict him of error. It is possible that in essence the *idea is meaning*; that this meaning may or may not be accompanied by imagery and that, instead of the image being essential for meaning, it may be but tentative experiment in ways and means of conveying the idea (*i.e.* the meaning) to another, or of using it in some other way. Such a supposition would seem to receive inconsiderable support from experiments such as those of T. V. Moore<sup>1</sup> in which the reaction time for awareness of 'simple meaning' is found to be considerably shorter than that for awareness of imagery.

In 'imageless thought' meaning is, at least, the dominating partner, and imagery, if present, is highly elusive. At the opposite pole stands the dream with its vivid imagery and elusive shifting manifest meaning, sometimes, possibly always, screening a more elusive latent meaning. It is to the dream that the author turns in his search for the relation between image and meaning. "Perhaps... the wildest, maddest dream is merely a conglomeration of actual memories" (p. 69). "Freud goes so far as to say that all dream images, whether recognised as composite or not are in reality made up of memories and that not only is their combination effected according to definite principles but that in the dream the combination itself performs definite functions of great biological importance" (p. 79). The facts and theories relating to these 'definite functions' are set aside as outside the scope of the book, but we are shown the difference between directed and free association and invited to accept the doctrine that in 'free' association "unconscious directive tendencies take over the function of guiding our thoughts and that in this way by freely associating from any part of the manifest content of our dream we can discover the underlying latent material of which it is the representative in consciousness" (p. 80). A method of dream analysis is outlined and introduces a short account of psycho-analysis.

The stimulus theory of the dream is dealt with as the only alternative to Freud's theory and is dismissed as inadequate. In many cases where a stimulus is clearly recognized on waking the stimulus had been present for many nights before the particular one on which it 'caused' the dream: it "usually does little more than to ignite a train previously laid" (p. 75) and, quoting from Nicoll, "the physical disharmonies do not in themselves explain the dream. They act as sensitizers" (p. 76). The argument is not conclusive. The question is not: What is the material used in shaping the dream? but: Would there have been this dream if there had not been this stimulus? It seems reasonable to conclude that dreams obtained by experimental means such as the "tensors" and "detensors" of Cubberley's work<sup>2</sup> would not have occurred in the absence of the stimulus and that the nature of the memory revived in the dream is controlled by the nature of the stimulus. At the other extreme there are, possibly, dreams in which the stimulus is from within the mind and all material

<sup>1</sup> "The Temporal Relations of Memory and Imagery," *Psychological Review*, 1915, xxii, 177-225.

<sup>2</sup> "The Effects of Tensions of the Body Surface upon the Normal Dream," *British Journal of Psychology* (Gen. Sect.), 1923, xiii, 243-65.

used in elaborating the dream is mental: the nature of the memories revived being *wholly* controlled by the nature of the mental stimulus. Possibly the true 'wish' dream and the true 'physical stimulus' dream are not irreconcilable alternatives but extreme cases of the dream in which both internal mental stimuli and external physiological and physical stimuli act upon the complex 'retent' in mind and conjure up a jumbled memory having hallucinatory vividness.

In Chapter VI we have the familiar summary of Freud's theory of 'dream work' and in Chapter VII some account of "Rivers's view of the dream." "The undisguised and terrifying dream of battle...the nightmare and the undisguised sexual dream...led Dr Rivers to contest at several significant points Freud's explanation of dreams, more particularly at those concerning the censorship, the alleged sleep preserving function of the dream and the wish fulfilment theory...As Rivers views it the dream arises out of mental conflict and is an attempt...to solve a problem" (p. 102). With Rivers's criticisms and his doctrine of levels of experience the author appears to be in agreement. He also throws in his lot with those psychologists who deny that "the dream work" is, in any essential, different from activities of the ordinary everyday waking consciousness. He writes: "It is sometimes claimed that the processes of the dream work are unique, that they have no parallels in waking life. This is inadmissible. Freud's view: 'It is condensation that is mainly responsible for the strange impression of the dream, for we know nothing analogous to it in the normal psychic life accessible to consciousness,' is expressed too absolutely" (p. 109). He then argues that in the 'generic' image, 'portmanteau-words' and the cartoon we have waking examples of condensation; that dramatization is common in waking life: "many visualizers attempt the solution of almost all difficulties which require forethought by picturing different actions and their results" (p. 114); that "secondary elaboration is only the customary manner of interpreting any object or thought which has been imperfectly apprehended" (p. 114), a fact that has been demonstrated over and over again in experimental work on perception and on memory, and concludes—"the dream, therefore appears to be a mental structure the constituent mechanisms of which are not different in kind from those which characterize the mental events of waking life. It is the reciprocal interplay of these mechanisms, the altered emphasis which each of them receives, and their comparative freedom from the dominating directive tendencies of the day time which combine to make the dream the *enfant terrible* of the well ordered personality, and the delight of the modern psychologist."

Coming closer to the problem of remembering and forgetting, in Chapter IX, "How we forget," we find the "older psychology," including the work of Ebbinghaus, treated very briefly and somewhat cavalierly and then the part played by the affect in forgetting is considered at length. Freud's doctrine of repression and Rivers's discrimination between 'witting repression' and 'unwitting suppression' are dealt with, while Rivers's attempt to indicate a physiological explanation of forgetting by analogical comparison with facts and theories associated with epieritic and protopathic sensation, the cerebral control of the optic thalamus and the 'mass-reflex' of the divided spinal cord is favourably reviewed, subject to a note that "the validity of [Rivers's interpretation of the facts] is not granted by all physiologists" and a reference to Metcalf's paper<sup>1</sup>. Finally, replacing Rivers's idea of the fusion of memories by

<sup>1</sup> *Psychological Bulletin*, 1921, xviii. 4, 181-202

the idea of 'embodiment,' the author puts forward the following as a provisional classification of forgotten experiences:

1. Embodied  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a) \text{ Apparently insignificant.} \\ (b) \text{ Significant but completely congruous with} \\ \text{the personality.} \end{array} \right.$
2. Exiled
3. Superseded

Forgetting of Class 1 (a) "may conceivably be due to physiological decay" (p. 166), but if all experience is indefinitely retained this explanation must be rejected. The author however is a little sceptical of the doctrine of complete retention and writes "in a collection of my own dreams I have found memories of very early experiences of childhood. . . but I have not discovered any which did not prove to be part of the associative fringe of some very significant incidents. And it may conceivably prove to be true that only those incidents which for some reason are disembodied. . . form the material for the hypnotist's striking performances" (p. 167). In Class 1 (b) we have the "obliterating effect of congruity upon past experience." Class 2 comprises the 'repressed' experiences of psychopathology and Class 3 obsolete memories that "do not appear to be held out of consciousness by an ever present resistance. . . [but] are seldom invited to enter" (p. 174).

Except in Chapter I and portions of Chapter IX the author has written of imagery and the dream rather than of memory. The imagery used in recall is of far less importance in the study of memory than the reliability and amount of the recall, while to classify the dream as memory would seem an error unless 'memory' is to be made co-terminous with *thought*. There is a sense in which the dream is memory, but in exactly the same sense the falsehood "I visited Sirius last week and discussed the matter with Julius Caesar" is memory. The author has expressed it thus: "The statement [that it is memory] is true rather of the material and the constituent patterns than of the main design of the dream" (p. 69). We would suggest that it is essential that classification of the dream should not exclude this main design. If Freud is right and dreams are 'wish' fulfilment they would seem to rank with the free associative, imaginative thought of 'day-dreams' and 'castles in the air.' If Rivers is right and they are attempts to solve a problem they would seem to rank with the directed, selective thought of constructive imagination. If, further, there are dreams that fit neither theory they would seem far more closely allied to hallucination than to either the free associative thought of reminiscence or the controlled, critical thought of recollection. Memory is tinged with a temporal signature that places the actuality in the past: the temporal signature of the dream is *now*. As an *experience* the dream has more in common with the percept than with memory, but its relation to reality is not that of the percept. As its relation to time is not that of memory and its relation to reality is not that of the percept, the dream can scarcely be classified as either the one or the other, and would seem to be much better placed either as hallucination or as imagination. The author was very close to this view when, in discussing the processes of dream-work, he wrote: "The evidence, indeed, makes it extremely probable that they are operative not only in fashioning the dream but in the work of the waking activity of creative imagination" (p. 87).

R. J. BARTLETT.

*Group Tests of Intelligence.* By PHILIP BOSWOOD BALLARD, M.A., D.Lit., London. Hodder and Stoughton, 1922. pp. x + 252.

Dr Ballard is one of those who have firmly grasped the indubitable fact that "intelligence tests" have come to stay. Once or twice in the course of a generation there emerges in the conduct of human affairs a factor which, in spite of all hostility and suspicion, calmly and inevitably develops, leading eventually to a complete overhauling of the principles and methods applicable in the field to which it belongs. The procedure of testing intelligence on the basis of age-performance by methods such as those described by Dr Ballard in this book (and in his previous book, *Mental Tests*) is such a factor. There is little doubt that it is destined ultimately to revolutionize our ideas on education and on the fitting of the child to bear his share in the national life in the position most appropriate to him by reason of the type and grade of his native mental ability.

Criticisms of intelligence tests are mainly academic and *a priori* in kind. They are usually based on the appearance of the tests, and not on their results. Yet it is their results as empirically observed, which determine for the psychologist the applicability and suitability of his tests, and by their results the tests must be judged. The only thing which really matters is whether the tests do in fact perform successfully their task of grading children (and others) accurately according to their capacity for being educated and for applying what they have gained by education. Though by no means perfect, the tests are already performing this task well (far better, indeed, than any other method of the past) and, as Dr Ballard points out, they are performing it better every day.

The book under consideration falls into four well-defined sections. Dr Ballard first gives an account of the standard types of group tests derived from the American experiments (notably the wholesale testing of the American Army). He then passes on to a general survey of group testing in England, and in particular, of the types of tests which he himself has used. There follows a discussion of the nature and limits of intelligence. Finally, there is a valuable section dealing with the elements of the statistical technique necessary to a proper collation and interpretation of the results of the tests.

Dr Ballard's account of the development in England and America of methods of measuring intelligence is clear and interesting, and forms what is perhaps the most useful summary of these methods at present obtainable. The chapter on Dr Godfrey Thomson's well-known "Northumberland Tests" will be of particular interest to English readers; while the account of the author's own tests provides valuable and suggestive additions to the armoury of diagnostic weapons now available.

The chapter on the nature of intelligence affords material for what will always be a source of keen discussion. As Dr Ballard makes clear, the question is, of course, mainly of academic rather than practical interest so far as "intelligence tests" are concerned. All who are familiar with the practice of them will agree that the tests measure something, but the ability to frame a precise definition of this "something" is irrelevant to the question of the practical value of the tests, which can be decided only by their capacity to perform the task to which attention has been previously drawn, namely the selection of children according to their educability.

With Dr Ballard's remarks on the limits of the growth of intelligence the

present writer is in full agreement. It has always been a source of much surprise to him that so many people find great difficulty in accepting the now demonstrable conclusion that the growth of "intelligence" (in the significant, if not precise, commonsense meaning of that term) ceases at a comparatively early age. He suspects the existence of a "complex" lurking at the root of this difficulty. But, in any case, he can see no reason, quite apart from the experimental evidence, for the alleged *a priori* difficulty in supposing that we do not get any better at reasoning as we grow older. The simple fact seems to be that, through acquired experience, we get more data, as we grow older, on which to base our reasoning, and are therefore able to meet more successfully the various situations with which we are faced.

The closing chapters of the book on the statistics of correlation cannot fail to be useful. For there are many hidden perils awaiting the mental tester when he comes to interpret and apply his results; and if the latter are to lead to a successful re-organization of educational methods on lines similar to those briefly considered by Dr Ballard in his final chapter, it is of the first importance that experimenters should be warned of these perils in advance, in order that they may exercise the vigilant and critical scrutiny necessary to avoid them.

C. A. RICHARDSON.

*Methods and Experiments in Mental Tests.* By C. A. RICHARDSON, M.A.  
London: George Harrap & Co., 1922. pp. 94. Price 3s. 6d. net.

This small but useful book does not purport to give a general account of mental tests. There is a brief introductory reply to some of the common but ill-informed criticisms of tests, but the book is mainly concerned with a discussion, on the basis of the author's own experiments, of the reliability of the Stanford-Binet scale as an index of educable capacity, the derivation of mental age from scores in a group test, methods of estimating the 'true' intelligence quotient of adults and adolescents, and the reliability of the group intelligence test as an index of educability. These problems, and the research material which the author has to contribute, are clearly and directly set out, without any waste of words, and in such a way as to be readily understood and appreciated by the interested but non-technical reader for whom the book is intended.

As evidence of the value of the Stanford-Binet scale as an index of educable capacity, the results of an investigation into the correlations between the intelligence quotient and attainment in arithmetic and composition with five groups of twenty children are given. The correlations were high, and an analysis of the deviations showed them to be due to not more than about 15 per cent. of the children, with assignable causes. For the whole group of 100 children the degree of scatter of the E.Q. (educability quotient) was markedly less than that of the I.Q., probably indicating insufficient elasticity of promotion for the brighter children. The suggestion is made that the S.B. scale might well be applied to children twice during their school life, namely at seven and eleven years of age.

For the derivation of the mental age of individual children from a group test score (which in itself yields nothing more than the relative intelligence of the members of the group), the formula  $y = \frac{2}{3}x + 110$  is offered, where  $y$  is mental age in months, as estimated by the S.B. scale, and  $x$  the score

in the group test. It is considered, the author's reasons being clearly shown, that this formula gives with some accuracy the correspondence *in general* between true mental age and score in (Terman) group test; but it is pointed out that errors may occur in individual cases mainly because the two tests do not cover exactly the same ground, the group tests so far standardized not being yet sufficiently comprehensive.

The factors in the problem of estimating the true intelligence quotients of adults and adolescents are well shown. Two methods of estimating the I.Q. in these cases are suggested, one of which, a percentile rank method, was set out in a note in the *British Journal of Psychology*, April 1922. The other method works with the formula

$$\frac{\text{effective mental age}}{\text{effective age}} \times 100,$$

where the *effective mental age* is the age at which the score made by a subject would be reached by him if his intelligence continued to grow indefinitely at the same rate as in childhood, and the *effective age* of a subject is the age at which the *average score* corresponding to his actual age would be reached if intelligence continued to grow at the same rate as in childhood.

The reliability of the group test as an index of the quotient of educability is approached by the indirect method of comparing the results of group and individual intelligence tests, with conclusions already noted; and by the direct method of comparing the results of a group test with those of an ordinary written examination in arithmetic and English. This comparison was made with some 500 children, and, allowing for certain defects in technique, the correspondence was very close, strikingly so in a considerable proportion of cases, confirming the general conclusion that tests of the group scale type are useful and sufficiently accurate means of estimating educability. But "this reliability is likely to be increased when our tests are so devised as to probe the child's intelligence from as many directions as possible."

Whether the detailed methods and results of the author stand or fall, there can be no doubt that the book is of much interest and importance to those who are becoming aware of the educational significance of mental tests. Perhaps there is too little reference to the work of other investigators; the chief value of the book undoubtedly lies in its admirable exposition of the character of the problems arising out of the practical application of mental tests, and of the methods by which these are to be approached.

S. S. BRIERLEY.

*The Psychology of Self-Consciousness.* By JULIA TURNER, B.A. (Lond.). Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. pp. xii + 243. Price 6s. 6d. net.

The author has given us a very interesting hypothesis of the development of self-consciousness as a resultant of life-hunger and fear when confronted by an awesome 'Not-I.' These blend to give anxiety, which not only creates, but dominates human life. For sanity and health the 'power sense,' or 'will to live' must balance the 'expiation tendency,' or conscious fear of and desire to propitiate superior agencies. To the reviewer these seem to correspond closely to McDougall's instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement, which, under analysis, are found to arise at the level of self-consciousness in much the same way that the author has suggested as probable. They do not, however,

account for as much of the conceptual life as the author would have us believe. Freud, Jung and Adler all allow for the same antithesis, in their differing terminology, which obscures much of their convergence while accenting their divergence. The author's addition to the already much reduplicated terminology is a little unfortunate. If she would work out her power-expiation antithesis in terms of Freudian theory, she would throw some light on the ego-psychology, which would be more easily co-ordinated with known facts, than the present terminology allows. The author thinks she is in opposition to Freud much more frequently than is actually the case owing to her misinterpretation or ignorance of much of Freud's later work. For example she states that according to Freud there is only one dynamic principle in the unconscious, the sexuality wish. She adds that he ignores the fact that "there is already conflict in the unconscious, the self-condemnatory motive is as truly and fundamentally endo-psychic as the self-pleasing one." She in turn, ignores the fact that Freud postulates conflict between the ego and the sex instincts, the depths of the ego being for him in the still little explored unconscious. Further, the 'self-condemnatory' motive is one of these ego-instincts. Freud has recently found it necessary to transpose this 'masochistic' tendency from its earlier supposed position among the libidinous impulses, to a place among the ego-instincts. He concludes now that it is primary, not secondary as he held previously<sup>1</sup>. The reviewer had also been led to make the same transposition independently a few months before Freud's work on the subject appeared. The author would do well to master Freud's metapsychology, which she would find more illuminating than she anticipates.

Similar examples of misconstruction of Freud can be multiplied indefinitely. The author, however, has reached many conclusions supported by the 'well-known and rightly to be dreaded' Freudian doctrine; though she frequently thinks she is refuting the latter.

In dream analysis, as is well known, the analyst sees only through complexes he has unravelled previously in himself. This may account for the fact that the author deals only with one kind of dream out of the many kinds Freud and others have discovered.

Her treatment of transference, symbolism, the Oedipus complex and the introvert-extrovert antithesis does not seem adequate or even accurate. Perhaps a fuller acquaintance with the work of others on similar lines, much of which she has not grasped, would have been of benefit to the author in the development of her original and interesting ideas.

Alice G. Ikin.

*Our Unconscious Mind and How to Use It.* By FREDERICK PIERCE. London, 1922. Kegan Paul & Co. pp. 323. Price 10s. 6d.

Mr Pierce has accepted, with an enviable facility, the theories of psycho-analysis, auto-suggestion, and endocrinology. Those of us who are perturbed by the claims of rival schools may, or may not, find all doubts settled when we read (p. 133) that the psychology of the unconscious is "based soundly on the physiology of the autonomic system, the involuntary and voluntary muscular systems, and the endocrine chemistry," and the clinician must in some respects admire the man who without a word of doubt—or even explana-

<sup>1</sup> Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 70.

tion—diagnoses “pituitro-thyroid variation” or “pituitary variance and adrenal sufficiency.” Even the magisterial bench, from which there still occasionally comes, in reply to a psychological plea, a variant of the well-worn phrase “Yes, that’s the disease I am here to cure,” may hope to carry out its therapeutic duties if it will follow the lead given by Mr Pierce when he writes that “Pathological lying and stealing, for example, are frequently associated with pituitary or thyroid excess or insufficiency, and correction of these glands may result in a tractable, happy child, with fine mental ability.” But perhaps there is a subtlety here, for the writer does not tell us how the pituitary is to be corrected, nor how thyroid excess is to be clinically dealt with. In the absence of this knowledge his statement bears the same relation to actuality as does the nursery jest about holding up a guinea-pig by its tail.

If the reader shares Mr Pierce’s mood of certainty and optimism he will be exhilarated by the preliminary list of subjects, which starts with “control and operation of the will,” includes “growing abler in place of growing older” and “raising successful children,” and ends with “replacing personal opinion with exact knowledge, in merchandising, advertising and selling.” With these aims there is no time to be wasted, and the reader must take in his stride the explanation that suggestion proceeds within the individual and is therefore finally auto-suggestion (one is tempted to apply this reasoning to the process of digestion, but it leads to physiological confusion), and that its working processes must be operative at the unconscious level which “from a nerve standpoint is synonymous with the involuntary system” (p. 103). He will, however, find himself away from the beaten track of accepted definitions when he gathers (pp. 115-6) that the wish for beauty is an unconscious affect of the Ego Maximisation group. An apparently easy by-path leads round a difficult subject on page 168: when the child has “actually acquired habits of getting autistic pleasure from improper handling of its body” one should begin with “thorough enlightenment” and finally “implant frequently and regularly a series of progressive suggestions, and teach the child reflective autosuggestion.” But we should be careful “not to emotionalize the situation or implant exaggerated fear”; the implantation of a modicum of fear seems permissible.

The final chapter on ‘The New Psychology in Selling’ opens out an appalling prospect, but provides a few hints for the defence such as: “Many a salesman has unwittingly ‘wasted his sweetness on the desert air’ by trying to sell his wares to a husband when he should have sold them to the wife.” And the man (technically known as an ‘automobile prospect’) who does not own a motor-car may profit by reading of the subtle ways in which he is to be attacked.

The writer is plainly a shrewd American business man, but one hopes that the English public will not regard as final his presentation of the uses of our unconscious mind.

MILLAIS CULPIN.

*Conditions of Nervous Anxiety and their Treatment.* By W. STEKEL. Authorized translation by ROSALIE GABLER. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. pp. 435. Price 25s. net.

Dr Stekel tells us in his preface to the English edition that this is the first volume of a work entitled *Disturbances of the Impulses and the Emotions*, of which seven volumes have already appeared in German. The completed work will comprise ten volumes. He states that this book was the cause of his



differences with Freud and explains that he split from him on the grounds of not being able to accept his differentiation of actual neurosis from psycho-neurosis. Stekel states that *every* condition of morbid fear is psychically determined and also that he was unable to find the so-called neurasthenia of Freud at all.

The reader is struck by the enormous mass of clinical material Dr Stekel produces and perhaps one accustomed to the lengthy analytical technique is a little bewildered. He tells us, it is true, that much of the material was taken from private practice in general medicine, but in spite of this it is apparent that many of these extremely interesting cases have been cured by psycho-analysis, or psychanalysis as the author prefers to spell it. If the other nine volumes are to contain a corresponding amount of clinical matter, our conclusion that the pace has just been a little forced is perhaps not merely captious.

These little criticisms disposed of we are bound to say that the book is admirable from the general practitioner's standpoint. Much space is devoted to the commonplace diagnosis of organic conditions which the author has so frequently found to be the result of mental conflict.

Following the description of a case of agoraphobia cured during a single consultation, we find on p. 9 this significant and rather plaintive statement:

"After six months I heard from his family that he had given up his position and was entirely cured of his trouble. I do not know whether I shall ever see him again. And that is the strange thing about psychic cures; whereas in other successful cures the patients praise the doctor and are only too glad to recommend him to others, they preserve the strictest secrecy as regards their psychic cures, which they owe to the psycho-therapist."

On p. 11 Dr Stekel likens the psycho-therapist to a sympathetic priest and insists that he must be of priestly chastity and earnestness of purpose; but personality surely counts more than a code of morals in the practice of psycho-therapy. On p. 218 we see something of Dr Stekel's psycho-analytical technique: "The physician...must sacrifice part of his personality, in that he confides in the patient and by making, in a sense, confessions of his own, facilitates confession for the patient." On p. 62 a case of neurotic dyspepsia is quoted as showing the necessity of correcting the origin of the anxiety or abnormal *vita sexualis*. The author gives this as not the only case in which brilliant results have been gained by such energetic procedure. The following is an extract from a short conversation in which, incidentally, no mention is made of any abnormal *vita sexualis*: "Will you promise me to follow out my directions accurately?" "Naturally, I always follow the doctor's orders scrupulously." "Good. Your hand upon it!" "Yes. Here is my hand!" "...for the next few weeks eat just what you have a fancy for, without troubling about any kind of diet." Dr Stekel describes his surprise and joy when the patient appeared four weeks later and showed such great improvement that at first he was not recognized.

Another case of hysterical vomiting is stated to have been cured at one sitting by psychanalysis (p. 92). It is, of course, superfluous to remark that such cases as these should not be advanced in support of even the technique known as psychanalysis.

In disputing Freud's libido theory Stekel believes the Great War to have proved conclusively that all neuroses are not merely disturbances of the sexual instinct (pp. 113, 320). He thinks that the war neurosis is always a matter of psychic conflict between self-preservation and military duty.

In Chapter xv, dealing with anxiety neurosis in children, the author gives

some very sound advice on sexual education and hygiene. He cannot accept the Freudian Oedipus complex *in toto*. Chapter xxxii is devoted to the psychic treatment of Epilepsy. It is stated that psychogenic epilepsy shows repressed criminal tendencies and that the fit is a substitute for crime, or for a sexual act; he finds that it may also symbolize guilt, punishment and dying.

In Chapter xxxvi occurs a curious contradiction regarding the necessity for passivity in the analyst: "We must not cross-examine the patient" (p. 408); but from his reports of cases it appears that Dr Stekel forgets his own advice. And on p. 423 we are told that the physician must not conduct the Freudian passive analysis, but that he must energetically correct false notions in his patient; synthesis must follow analysis. Six lines below this appears the following inconsistent remark: "The more passive the physician remains during the cure the greater the success." At the bottom of the same page the author says that in spite of successful psychoanalytical treatment many patients complain to other doctors of its failure; he attributes this to the patients' desire for revenge on the physician who has not met their erotic demands. To the psycho-analyst this would appear to be special pleading to excuse the physician's failures which have probably resulted from his own too didactic method.

The author repeatedly affirms that neurosis is potential criminality and is a reaction from sinful desires.

In spite of many mistakes in translation and spelling the book is fluently written and makes most interesting reading.

ROBERT M. RIGGALL.

*The Omnipotent Self.* By PAUL BOUSFIELD, M.R.C.S. (Eng.), L.R.C.P. (Lond.). Kegan Paul & Co. pp. vii + 171. 5s. net.

It is possible that popular exposition, in small space, of some profound and complex theme, is always difficult to justify, and more certainly so if the ground has already been covered in a more adequate way. Dr Paul Bousfield's volume, *The Omnipotent Self*, hardly seems to serve any particular purpose, decidedly not the purpose put forward by himself in his Preface, since that is one incapable of fulfilment: "The first object I have in mind is that the work shall be lucid, concise, and readily understood by any person of ordinary education, so that he may gain an insight into the essential causes and growth of some of his abnormal characteristics *without undue complication of ideas*" (p. vi) (italics are Reviewer's). It cannot be too often or too strongly maintained that things which are complex and complicated do not cease to be so merely by ignoring the complications and complexities, and that persons who have little or no scientific training, especially of a psychological kind, are hardly likely to "gain insight into the essential causes and growth" of their abnormal characteristics (a procedure, be it noted, over which such a genius as that of Freud himself has spent years of laborious study) by the reading of a small book which is often inaccurate, partial, and dominated by a benevolent "anyone can understand this" atmosphere. The curious concluding sentence, "without undue complication of ideas" creates a suspicion that the author is aiming at an undue *simplification* (hence, a falsification) of ideas, for how is it possible to dispense with "complication" when such is inherent in, and inevitable to the ideas themselves? The spread of inferior and superficial education, with the assistance of a still more inferior and superficial Press,

has most regrettably influenced what should be serious work in inducing writers, too often, to popularize and stultify their work—perhaps with a mistaken benevolence towards those who are not yet adequately equipped for the comprehension of a true presentation. Dr Bousfield's book demonstrates this false simplification abundantly, especially in the first section entitled 'The Omnipotent Self,' which is sub-divided into nine chapters, dealing with such themes as 'The Unconscious Mind,' (Ch. I), 'The Forces Shaping Character' (Ch. II), 'Determinism' (Ch. IV), 'Narcissism' (Ch. V), 'Identification' (Ch. VII), 'Rationalization' (Ch. IX), etc.—very important and interesting subjects, but the value of these chapters is much minimized by the amount of loose and inaccurate statement contained in them. On such matters as Intuition, Sex-differences, Identifications, Determinism, Phantasy, we get most curious statements, thrown out without any attempt at proof. Take for example the following: "Unconscious reasoning or intuition is found chiefly in those who have not been trained in subjects which induce and train logical conscious reasoning" (p. 17). (In passing, it might be recalled that the greatest scientists, men subjected to the highest and most systematic logical training, have always been conspicuous for intuition whereby they have evolved their scientific hypotheses—such as Galileo, Darwin, Newton, *et al.*) Again: "On the whole women are more narcissistic than men...their Narcissism is encouraged...until differences of temperament are produced in the adults of the two sexes which in no way belong to nature but purely to our conventional and somewhat barbaric standpoint" (p. 81). One wonders how, if these differences "in no way belong to nature," they got themselves produced, since it is not to be supposed that a modern scientist like Dr Bousfield, believes in the agency of the Supernatural. Yet again we read: "The ordinary fairytale should be swept from the nursery: here the child does nothing but identify himself with the hero or heroine in the most impossible of situations of a purely phantastic type" (p. 71). The author of this statement should recall, firstly, that he himself proceeds later to a chapter on Identification in which he shows the *necessity* to the child for this process, and secondly that he claims to understand the complexities of the psyche and therefore should realize how inaccurate the above is: in phantasy-making many forces are at work, many impulses seeking gratification, and the account given above ("the child does nothing but identify himself") is wholly inadequate. The handling of such themes as Phantasy, Identification, Determinism, seems to show little grasp of the real facts, as is also the case with some strange definitions given. Concerning Determinism we are told: "Determinism is the doctrine that all things, including the will, are determined by causes" (p. 41), which hardly seems enlightening, and further, that in all the examples of determinism given in 'The Psychopathology of Everyday Life' "one could not conceivably utilize free will in any case"—a matter Freud "appears to have overlooked." The confusion of thought here revealed is apparent in many other instances. The second part of the book, 'Practical Applications,' contains some good and sensible advice, applied to *conscious* ideas and impulses, expressed in a bright and easy manner. If Dr Bousfield had set out to write the whole book on this level—as a manual of common-sense precepts from an experienced physician—a more satisfactory result would have been achieved.

BARBARA LOW.

*Glands in Health and Disease.* By BENJAMIN HARROW. George Routledge & Sons. pp. xvi + 218. Price 8s. 6d.

An eminent physiologist has recently stated that the rapid growth of organotherapy is largely due to the appalling ignorance which exists in the minds of the laity as to their own anatomy and physiology. He was referring, no doubt, to those developments which did not meet with his approval; but he spoke disparagingly of the standard of education which exists in the average man where matters medical are concerned.

In the little book which Dr Harrow has written, presumably his object is to remedy this state of ignorance, at all events in so far as the ductless glands are concerned. He tells us in the preface "there is a crying need...of simple, yet clear statements of scientific work to which the layman can refer." This point is, at least, debatable, for it is sometimes contended that the less an individual knows about the workings of his organs the better. Certainly in so far as their pathology is concerned, there is a good deal of truth in this; for out of a little knowledge, much morbidity is capable of springing.

Dr Harrow has written a clear account of the endocrine glands, and has delivered up his message in language understandable by all. His descriptions in popular language of such differentiations as internal and external secretions; of vitamins and hormones, and his accounts of the normal and abnormal actions of such glands as the thyroid, are intelligible to all. One wonders whether, in a book such as this, which has no purpose save the enlightenment of the ignorant in such matters, there is any good purpose served by the lengthy and highly technical footnotes on physiological and chemical experiments.

The thyroid gland is described, and its work in health and disease discussed; a section being devoted to exophthalmic goitre. To describe the treatment of this distressing complaint in a book of this kind seems unnecessary if not undesirable.

The parathyroids and tetany are described; but the fact now widely recognised that this latter name is not a disease but merely a term to connote a state which may arise from a multiplicity of causes, is not made clear. Moreover, while the theory that tetany is due to guanidine is referred to, no mention is made of other theories, at least equally well supported, as, for example, that its symptoms are due to an alkalosis.

The footnote on page 49, in which the word 'anterior' is defined as "any part nearer the head than another part is anterior to the latter; if farther away it is posterior," leaves much to be desired in the matter of accuracy and clarity. For while anterior is used in this sense in zoology, it is not so employed in human anatomy, owing to the cogent fact that man is not a quadruped; and it should be made clear that this definition does not apply to human anatomy.

In the chapter on the Pancreas and Liver, the medical reader will be puzzled as to the reason for describing, for example, the Allen treatment for diabetes. It seems to us, that anyone desirous of obtaining such information, would best do so by consulting his physician, or alternatively a text-book on metabolism. Justice cannot be done to the value of such a therapeutic procedure in two paragraphs.

In the chapter on the nervous system and the ductless glands (which, by the way, consists of over thirty pages), a large amount of space is given up to

a consideration of the difference of opinion existing between physiologists on highly technical points, such as the action of adrenaline. It is possible that these differences will interest the lay reader, but, frankly, we doubt it.

The book contains an adequate Bibliography and a good Index. Despite the tendency to insert technical descriptions into a book not intended for the technical reader, Dr Harrow has produced a clearly written description in simple language of the endocrine glands and the utilisation of their products in the treatment of disease. For anyone desiring an introduction to more serious study, we can recommend this volume.

I. GEIKIE COBB.

## NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psycho-Analyse*, Vol. VIII, part II, 1922.

In an article entitled "Castration complex and character" Dr Franz Alexander contributes a study on the so-called *passagere Symptome*, symptoms which make a transitory appearance during an analysis: "a kind of laboratory products of the analytic work," which are explained as manifestations of the resistance.

Alexander prefaces his detailed description of the analysis of a 'neurotic character' with some observations on the dynamics of the process by which, in such characters, unconscious tendencies find outlet in irrational conduct in life, rather than in symptom-formation. Such conduct affords a real gratification, deprived of which the neurotic character will develop neurotic symptoms. Deprivation may result from external circumstances or, as in the case in question, may ensue upon the subject's becoming conscious during analysis of the tendencies underlying his irrational conduct. The transitory symptom then makes its appearance in what Freud calls the fresh neurosis of the transference.

There follows the account of the analysis of a patient whose neurotic character manifested itself in his conjugal and social relations. The unconscious tendency, arising out of fixation to the mother, to degrade the wife to the level of prostitute drove him to pay his wife in material gifts on each occasion of intercourse. His social relations had this peculiarity: that he was repeatedly in the situation of being cheated and robbed by his associates, while his own business dealings were marked by a scrupulous honesty.

Analysis showed that the core of the formation of his character was the castration complex. The sense of guilt resulting from the incest-wish transformed the active desire to castrate the father into a passive castration-wish, represented by passive kleptomania and passive homosexuality, which latter tendency produced in the transference situation certain of the *passagere Symptome*.

The impulse to pay for sexual intercourse by gifts originated in the passive castration-wish, in the sense of "anal castration" (faeces = money). In an exceedingly interesting passage Alexander shows that the human being learns from the two primary 'castrations' (loss of the nipple, or oral castration; loss of the faeces or anal castration), that the price of every pleasure is the loss of the pleasure-giving bodily part. This experience produces an affective state in which the fear of castration readily attaches itself to onanistic activities. This fear therefore is not necessarily to be accounted for by an actual threat or phylogenetically.

In a concluding section the writer shows that behind these primary castrations there lies the original traumatic experience of birth, which to the Unconscious is equivalent to castration. In various hypochondriac symptoms (sense of strangulation etc.) we see a compromise between the incestuous desire to return to the mother's womb and the punishment-wish of castration.

The case of writer's cramp described by Dr Robert Hans Jokl in his article "On the psychogenesis of writer's cramp" was also found to originate in the castration complex. The symptom first made its appearance on an occasion when the patient was required to sign his name to a document, in the presence of a business-superior. The occurrence of the symptom coincided with the breaking-off of a love-relation which had gratified his homosexual tendencies, in that, although the love-object was a woman, it afforded him an opportunity for certain practices which represented homosexual activities of his early days. This deprivation of real gratification caused the libido to regress to the infantile fixations.

Analysis revealed a strong fixation to the father, characterised on the one hand by the desire to observe and to touch the penis of the latter and, on the other, by the sadistic wish to castrate the father-rival. The sense of guilt gave rise to the fear of castration, manifesting itself in later life as a sense of inferiority (with reference to

his own potency), in which he himself felt the parallel to his 'impotence,' due to writer's cramp, in the pursuit of his calling.

The castration-fear expressed itself in anxiety when he was required to write in the presence of a business-superior (= the father), the holding of the pen symbolising the forbidden homosexual desires. It is clear that the hand, the guilty member with which he had carried on auto- and homoerotic activities, thus became the object of his impulse to self-punishment.

In this paper, Dr Jokl raises several interesting considerations, supported by the findings of the analysis under discussion. These considerations, he thinks, should be borne in mind in analytic research, though he warns the reader against premature generalisations.

He is inclined to think that in certain obsessional neuroses urethral erotism may preponderate over the anal-crotic tendencies which belong to the same pregenital phase of libido development. He found, in several cases in which writer's cramp was one of the symptoms, a certain agreement, in that sadistic homosexual tendencies were based upon a marked urethral erotic disposition.

In the analysis of this particular case, the distinctive form of the transference—an excessively strong father-transference—enabled him to infer the peculiarity of the libido-tendencies. But he thinks that there are not sufficient grounds for regarding this phenomenon as a universal one.

Dr Helene Deutsch contributes an article on "The pathological lie" (pseudologia phantastica), in which she institutes a comparison between pseudologia and other mental activities. Pseudologia bears a resemblance to day-dreaming, in that the content of the products of both represents the fulfilment of ambitious or erotic wishes, originating in the Unconscious, the subject being the centre of the phantasy. But an important difference between these two activities is that, whereas the day-dreamer, conscious of the unreality of his phantasies, keeps them secret, the pseudologist is driven by an urgent impulse to impart them to others in the guise of reality. Poetic creation, which, as Freud has shown, is intimately related to day-dreaming, aims at aesthetic enjoyment, an element lacking in day-dreaming and pseudologia alike.

From the analysis of a young girl in whom this symptom manifested itself at the time of puberty, Dr Deutsch was able to conclude that here the pseudologia represented a compromise resulting from the attempt to divert the libido from phantasy to a real object. A repressed infantile experience (which caused a fixation to the patient's brother) was reactivated in a purely imaginary relation to a youth whom she knew only by sight, the content of phantasies which she recounted as facts being thus directly derived from a *repressed reality*.

Two points are specially noteworthy: first, that the patient incurred blame and punishment by telling of a relation with the hero of her phantasies, the actuality of which was not at first doubted by her relatives. This is in accordance with an observation Dr Deutsch has had opportunities of making, namely, that the pseudologist tells his 'lies,' acting on an inner compulsion and without any regard, primarily, for the effect they may produce on his audience. And secondly, the young girl, far from seeking to realise her desires, avoided all opportunities of doing so. The explanation is that the object to which her libido directed itself in puberty was identified with the incestuous object of early childhood. The incest-prohibition occasioned a flight from reality, for which the formula, as represented in the pseudologia was as follows: "Since this is already reality, there is no need for it to become such."

The writer then compares the mechanism of pseudologia to that of hysteria. In both there is the return to a repressed infantile experience and the fulfilment of a forbidden wish, and in both repression has failed. In conversion hysteria, the repressed idea is expressed in bodily symptoms, while the affect disappears; in anxiety hysteria, the repressed idea is displaced and the affect is converted into the painful one of anxiety; in pseudologia, the repressed material returns, related to a new and permissible object, to which the original affect is attached, thus securing gratification. Pseudologia then represents, in such a case as that under discussion, a compromise-formation, designed by its adaptation to reality to deliver the subject from the burden of a repressed recollection.

The last of the original papers in this number is by Siegfried Peine and deals with the problem of the thirst for change (especially in the sexual life), which, passing through various degrees of neurotic intensity, may end as fully developed 'Don Jnanism.'

The author suggests the following root-causes of this peculiarity:

(1) The discrepancy between an abnormal 'hunger' of the libido and the amount of available gratification, giving rise to unsuccessful attempts at repression and a constant restless craving.

(2) A 'pseudo-infantilism,' by virtue of which the neurotic 'plays' with pleasure, manifesting a childish inconstancy and variability.

(3) The entertaining of an exaggerated ideal of the love-object. The contrast between reality and phantasy leads to perpetual disappointment and a renewed search for the unattainable.

(4) Fixation to the situation of wooing.

(5) A sadistic tendency, showing itself in the impulse to play the part of conqueror and to cause pain by the subject's lack of constancy.

(6) A lack of determination of the subject's real sexual feeling, making him incapable of a lasting relation (e.g. an oscillation between homosexual and heterosexual love).

Throughout this study the writer works out Freud's parallel between the sexual character of the individual and his general character as shown in his attitude to life as a whole.

The journal includes, besides critical notes and reviews, the following short communications:

A contribution to the problem of the act of waking, by Dr F. Künkel, a comparison of 'hypnagogic' and 'hypnopompic' phenomena, with reference to Freud's hypothesis of regression and the  $\psi$ -systems<sup>1</sup>.

"The psyche as an organ of inhibition," by Dr S. Ferenczi, being notes on Dr Alexander's "Metapsychological Observations" in an earlier number of the *Zeitschrift*<sup>2</sup>.

Two papers on Freud's "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse," the one by Dr Ferenczi on the advance in the psychology of the individual, and the other by Dr Róheim on that part of Freud's book which deals with the psychology of nations.

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psycho-Analyse*, Vol. VIII, part III, 1922.

This number of the *Zeitschrift* opens with a short paper by Professor Freud on "Some neurotic mechanisms in jealousy, paranoia and homosexuality." He distinguishes three kinds or 'strata' of jealousy: normal or competitive jealousy, projected jealousy and delusional jealousy, and, in discussing the part played by the last in paranoia, compares it with the delusions of *paranoia persecutoria* and demonstrates that it is a defence-reaction against an excessive homosexual tendency.

Normal jealousy is made up of the following components: pain caused by the supposed loss of the object and the blow to the narcissism of the subject, hostile feelings towards the rival and a measure of self-criticism, which blames the ego for the loss sustained; such jealousy is ultimately derived from the Oedipus complex or the relation to brothers and sisters during the earliest period of sexual activity.

In projected jealousy an unconscious mechanism is at work by which the subject attributes his own tendencies to unfaithfulness to the other person. Such jealousy may be of an almost insane character, but the unconscious phantasies underlying it may be brought to light by analysis.

Paranoia for the most part resists such investigation, but Freud was able to gain a certain amount of fresh insight into the subject from the study of two cases. In the first, he found that the victim of delusional jealousy was concentrating an abnormally close observation upon the unconscious tendencies of others, about which he drew exaggerated conclusions. In an analogous fashion, patients suffering from delusions of persecution will seize upon the most trivial actions of others, construing in-

<sup>1</sup> *Traumdeutung*, 4 Aufl., S. 420 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Intern. Zeitschrift*, vol. VII, p. 275.



difference as hostility. Now just as the jealous paranoiac recognises the unfaithfulness of others rather than his own (for in delusional jealousy all three 'strata' are present), so in delusions of persecution the element of hate in the ambivalent feeling causes the patient to suspect the person most dear to him.

The second patient might not, at this stage of his illness, have been classified as suffering from *paranoia persecutoria*, nevertheless analysis showed that delusions of persecution were present in him, though he himself attached no importance to them but derided or rationalised them. Freud draws the significant conclusion that the qualitative factor is of less practical importance than the quantitative, *i.e.* that what matters is the degree of investment of existing neurotic formations. Once more, our attention is drawn to the *economic* aspect.

The dreams of the second patient had an obvious paranoia content, while those of the first were free from delusion and had suggested to Freud the question whether paranoia can penetrate into dreams. He shows that this question implies a faulty conception of the dream. For such terms as 'hysterical' or 'paranoiac' are inapplicable to that which is repressed; it is the other part of the dream material, namely the preconscious thoughts, which may take on the character of hysteria or paranoia. That which was repressed entered into the dreams of both patients, but those of the second, who in waking life derided his own delusional ideas, had a paranoia content. But Freud notes that no general rule is necessarily to be inferred from these facts.

In the section on homosexuality Freud recapitulates the psychic factors recognised hitherto: fixation to and identification with the mother; the tendency to narcissistic object-choice; the high estimation of the male organ, leading to disparagement of the woman; the castration complex (fear of rivalry with the father) and early fixations resulting from seduction. He now shows that to these must be added the factor of jealousy, for the reaction-formation against this tendency gives rise to tender feelings towards the once hated rival (*e.g.* the elder brother). In Freud's opinion this is an exaggeration of the process by which the individual develops social impulses<sup>1</sup>.

The first three sections of Dr Ernest Jones' work on "The Theory of Symbolism" have appeared in a previous number of the *Zeitschrift* (vol. v, p. 244). The last two sections, "Functional Symbolism" and "Review of Conclusions" are contained in the second original paper in this number. English readers are referred to Dr Jones' book: *Papers on Psycho-Analysis* (Baillière, Tindall and Cox), chap. vii, pp. 58 ff.

In a paper entitled "Psycho-Analysis and organic diseases" Dr Felix Deutsch discusses the part played by psychic factors in the aetiology of organic disease. It will, he says, be commonly conceded that pleasure and pain exercise an influence upon the bodily processes, the former affect causing expansion, and the latter contraction, of the peripheral vascular system. Such a disturbance in innervation may lead, by way of functional change, to organic injury. The organism aims primarily at maintaining a condition of equilibrium (= pleasure) by mastering excessive stimulation (= pain); thus, every change in the organic processes indicates the working of instinctive impulses, which is as much as to say that by means of psychic mechanisms organic changes can be brought about.

Dr Deutsch puts forward certain conclusions to which he has come as to the connection between the organic symptom and the psychic processes. He believes that the constitutional factor in disease is often over-rated and that what is taken to be the hereditary inferiority of a particular organ may really result from the mechanism of identification, producing functional disturbance, though it is true that a repressed tendency will choose the path of least resistance (*i.e.* will avail itself of the constitutional disposition) for symptom-formation. Organic injury may ensue simply from long-continued psychic over-stimulation of an organ, or some exogenous injury may occasion the symptom for which such stimulation has prepared the way. The mental conflict can express itself in morbid changes of organs over which the patient has no conscious control, and the same organic symptom may be motivated by the most varied unconscious tendencies<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> v. *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*, 1921.

<sup>2</sup> These remarks apply to such organs as receive their innervation from the vegetative nervous system.

When organic illness has developed from some exogenous cause, the repressed tendencies may all take advantage of the weakened state of the ego, so that, as the writer puts it, "every organic illness acts in a certain sense as the provocation of a neurosis in little."

He maintains that, in different nations as well as in different individuals, the same disease may display different symptoms, and that particular symptoms may represent certain mental characteristics (*e.g.* the symptom of constipation may indicate the anal character). Following this line of thought he concludes that a number of the symptoms in organic diseases are psychically determined.

Discussing "the mysterious leap from the psychic to the organic," Dr Deutsch suggests that less psychic expenditure is required for the formation of an organic, than for that of a psychoneurotic, symptom; the formation of the one or the other would depend upon the *quantity* of libido which has to be mastered.

An organic symptom may be determined not by one psychic motivation only, but by many, and the Unconscious can make use of any organ the more easily in proportion to the extent of anatomical change which has taken place from long-continued psychic excitation.

Often the psychic cause may remain hidden, because there is an adequate physical explanation, but, even in such cases, the writer would confidently look for concealed psychogenic sources.

He illustrates his points by cases which have come under his own notice and ends his paper by raising the question whether psycho-analytic treatment of organic changes is possible. Such treatment, he observes, must suffer two limitations: on the one hand, where an irrevocable organic injury has taken place, it is only possible to remove the psychic superstructure with its conversion symptoms, while, on the other hand, where a double treatment by a physician and an analyst has to be carried out, the former is hampered by the necessity of not disturbing the transference to the latter.

In his theory of the "masculine protest" Adler maintains that the aetiology of neurotic illness is to be sought in organ inferiority, the individual endeavouring, throughout life, to compensate for such inferiority by asserting his "will to power." In an article upon "The part played in a neurosis by an organic superiority" Dr C. P. Oberndorf describes the case of a patient of his own, whose 'superiority' lay in the unusually large size of his penis, and shows that the true basis of the symptoms was the sexual impressions and external happenings of early childhood, and that in later life the patient *displaced* the neurotic conflict upon the 'superior' organ. Marciniowski has demonstrated<sup>1</sup> that in cases of organ inferiority also the feeling of inferiority arises later, when the child has suffered disappointment in his sexual life. This is in accordance with Freud's view that the impulse of aggression is not in itself sufficient to account for the majority of neurotic symptoms, the true origin of which is the conflict with repressed infantile sexual tendencies.

"A dream of a homosexual" is the second of Dr Felix Boehm's contributions to the psychology of homosexuality<sup>2</sup>. He discusses the unconscious phantasy of certain homosexuals, according to which the woman possesses an immense, concealed penis which is a source of danger to the male organ.

Besides critical notes and reviews this number contains seventeen short communications. Of these four are on the subject of 'errors,' two on birth-dreams and two on the female castration complex. Professor Freud relates that he was recently visited by "Little Hans" whose analysis was published in 1909. He is now 19 years old and free from psychic disabilities or inhibitions. Freud notes as a curious instance of amnesia that Hans has lost the recollection of his analysis.

CECIL BAINES.

<sup>1</sup> G. Marciniowski: "Die erotischen Quellen der Minderwertigkeitsgeföhle." *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, iv, 12, 1918.

<sup>2</sup> "Homosexualität und Polygamie" appeared in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. vi, No. 4.

*Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique (XIX).*

No. 3. March 1922.

*La méthode dans l'étude des dessins d'enfants.* (G. H. LUQUET.)

A critical summary of method in the study of child drawings.

Three classes of enquiry are described: (i) the method of enquiry, (ii) the method of direct observation, (iii) study of street drawings. The first method, which is that used by Lamprecht in 1904, consists in obtaining, by the aid of various correspondents, principally teachers, a number of child drawings. It yields a large amount of material and enables comparison to be made of work of different children on the same subject; but the children are working under artificial conditions, their efforts being not spontaneous either as to occasion or material. It is impossible to secure equality of interest, aptitude and method of procedure from the various collaborators; the classification by age in years is too coarse and the application of statistical methods leads to the elimination of points of real psychological interest. In the third method attempts are made to copy and trace the origin of street drawings. These drawings are entirely lacking in personal information, are almost always anonymous but occasionally bear a title, while some of the most interesting are unintelligible. They have been executed apart from all suggestion by those in authority but there may have been suggestions from companions and the influence of drawings already present can sometimes be clearly seen. All the drawings however are not the work of children. In the second method, which in the opinion of the author is the best, the child is observed by one with whom he is quite familiar but should be unaware of the particular interest of his work for the observer and his work should be quite spontaneous. While giving a sound basis for the formation of hypotheses it does not supply sufficient data to permit of generalisation with certainty and in consequence the other methods must be called in to determine average standards of performance. Finally, attention is drawn to the necessity of seeking for drawings which exhibit significant evidence on various points and the possibility of obtaining these under experimental conditions is discussed.

*Essai sur la multiplication logique et les débuts de la pensée formelle chez l'enfant.* (J. Piaget.)

An enquiry into the circumstances under which and age when formal reasoning appears in the child and of its development, conducted by means of five series of test problems, the solution of each involving certain logical processes.

*Notes sur les troubles de l'évaluation du temps chez les aliénés.* (G. Halberstadt.)

Cases from the work of Virchon, Bechterew, Rosenberg, and from the author's own observation, of abnormal estimation of time among sufferers from dementia praecox and other maladies. Intervals of time may be greatly shortened or lengthened in the estimation of the sufferer.

*L'évolution contemporaine de la psychiatrie et son passage de la psychologie à la biologie.* (André Barbé.)

The study of mental troubles, originally purely psychological, came to embrace general and anatomical pathological methods as well as clinical observation. These have led to the recognition of the part played by intoxications and infections. Encouraging results have been obtained from the study of the cerebro-spinal fluid. Investigations on the blood of the insane are still in the experimental stage and the study of the glands and internal secretions is worthy of attention. Functional modifications of the circulatory, respiratory and digestive systems are important, and radiography, especially of the skull, may yield information. At the same time clinical study of the nervous system, (1) as regards intellectual functioning, (2) physical study of reflexes, etc., must proceed.

*De l'utilisation de la méthode comparative comme critère de la positivité des faits psychologiques.* (P. Masson-Oursel.)

Paper and discussion of the *Société de Psychologie* at its Meeting of 8th December, 1921.

No. 5. May 1922.

*Tendances et faits psychologiques* (1). (Fr. Paulhan.)

The writer would seem to argue for a form of psychological atomism: the mind being conceived as a plurality of "tendencies." Tendencies are the simplest elements of mind. They can excite other tendencies and form groups. Tendency is the essential fact of mental life but a tendency can only be precisely defined by its end. The total of the acts determined by a tendency gives information about it. All tendencies are not psychological; some are physiological. The psychologist is concerned only with those affecting mental life. Tendency is anterior to psychological facts: the latter only exist by virtue of the system of which they are a part. Tendencies come in contact with exterior reality; they also react on one another. Thus are produced the psychological phenomena ('facts'). Percept and idea like emotion have only real participation in mental life through the tendencies which they serve or through the systems of tendencies to which they belong.

*Reflexions sur la paramnésie*. (M. Déat.)

The writer criticises Bergson's views, examines the facts in some detail and enunciates the hypothesis: paramnesia occurs when a present position of consciousness gathers together on one hand a superficial, imaginative, natural element, and on the other hand, deeper down, an organic, affective, motor content; and when these different states are joined, not by an intelligible correspondence already worked out in fact or attachable to other analogous experiences, not by the unity of an undivided act where all *rappport* remains eminently synthetic, but by a symbolic link and transfer, made sensible through a commencing dissociation which they also hold together, a link of which the immediately seized certainty does not give us the key.

*Genèse de la métaphysique*. (F. Sartiaux.)*La peur de l'action (résumé préliminaire)*. (P. Janet.)

No. 6. June.

*Signification et valeur de la psychophysique*. (E. Bonaventura.)

Whether Weber's Law be rejected, modified or accepted, there remains the question of what is really measured in the so-called psychophysical researches. Fechner held that what is measured is the relation between sensation, a psychical fact, and the external agent, a physical fact. Taking mass as an example: muscular sensation is compared with visual sensation, in reading the movement of the pointer of the balance. There is no justification for regarding this visual sensation as a physical fact, and therefore Fechner's interpretation cannot stand. The author considers the view put forward by M. Bourbon (*Revue philosophique*, LXXXVIII, 1919, pp. 119-121) to be in close agreement with the facts, but believes that the theory must be extended.

There are four means of comparing two sounds of equal pitch but differing in intensity, (1) by hearing, (2) by touch: the vibrating reeds giving different sensations distinguishable only with great difficulty, (3) by sight (direct): the vibrations being seen confusedly, and (4) by sight (indirect): when a graphic record is taken. This last is by far the most delicate. Similar consideration of the other senses shows that sight is the means to the most accurate comparison of sensations, and sight is therefore used as the standard.

In order to estimate the accuracy of judgments as to the measurable characters of things (intensity, extensity, protensity) it is necessary first of all to decide on one class of judgments as "true." The criteria for the choice cannot, as such, be rational: experience can be the only guide. The class chosen is that of visual judgments of space. This allows of superposition which enables us to carry precision to the limits of sensory acuity; for visual acuity is 300 times greater than tactual or motor acuity.

In general we look on the visual presentation of space as the direct revelation of external reality and it was by overlooking the fallacy in this that Fechner fell into error. M. Pradines (*Rev. Philos.*, xc, 1920, 393-431) is also criticised. Visual spatial

presentations are the standard for sensorial judgments, because we possess no more perfect perceptual instrument. They do not necessarily always reveal reality without error; only we have no means of control. The subject does not give us information of things but only of his own nature, and it is this fact that makes the problem of psychophysics one proper to psychology.

Thus regarded, it has two principal tasks. (1) To establish the experimental laws which express the normal relation of accuracy between the judgments founded on visual space and other sensorial judgments. (2) To determine the physiological and psychological conditions which modify these relations.

(1) We require to know, firstly, the size of the errors in sensory judgments, with reference to visual spatial judgments, and, secondly, if that accuracy is constant for all variations in the measurable characters of things. We are not *à priori* obliged to believe all the phenomena governed by a single law. Experience shows that the logarithmic law applies best to hearing. In sensation of light an exponential law has been found. In the case of muscular sensation an attempt to apply a parabolic law has been made. If it is wished to advance the hypothesis that one of these laws is fundamental it can only be that which has from the psychological as well as the mathematical point of view the widest significance: that is the exponential law, which is the law of all the so-called critical phenomena.

(2) It is also necessary to determine the conditions which modify the normal values of the differential threshold. The most fruitful psychophysical methods, the method of "right and wrong cases" and the method of "mean error," are statistical methods. This means that the values of the threshold taken as bases for the different laws are those most frequently found. But all the values differing from these must have their reasons and it is the task of psychophysical analysis to discover these.

*L'esthétique fondée sur l'amour.* (Ch. Lalo.)

The origin of personal decoration, according to Yrjö Hirn (*Origins of Art*, London, 1900) is not to be sought only in sex. There are other more important origins for primitive peoples. It serves as a tribal distinction, having a political significance. All primitive peoples take pride in wearing trophies of war and the chase. It is not proved by historical arguments that art is a product of sexual selection.

The aim of art is to excite affective states, and the erotic impulse being the most intense, it is natural that a developed (conscious) art should make use of it. At the beginning of evolution, and at its end, however, the relations of the sexes awaken different feelings and if art derives much of its development from sex, it does not owe its origin to it.

For Nietzsche and his school everything in art comes from instinct; reason merely builds on its foundations, and without sex there can be no art. But it is by the Freudian school that the erotic basis of art receives greatest stress. Art is a "sublimation" and the artist is one who has great power of sublimation, but little power of repressing the impulses arising within him. This is unjustifiable generalisation: the method of psychoanalysis must be retained but its obsession for sex must be abandoned.

*Tendances et faits psychologiques* (2). (Fr. Paulhan.)

*L'imagination objectivante et les hallucinations visuelles vraies.* (M. Mignard.)

True visual hallucinations are simply the result of the unbalanced exercise of a normal function. Creative imagination is a psychological function which serves as a complement to perception. In sleep, the suspension of controlling functions, necessary to adapted action, allows this function to proceed abnormally with dream vision as a result.

*Un Cas de brusque variation dans la forme des crises d'origine émotive.* (H. Wallon.)

*Sur la sincérité de certains délirants.* (F.-L. Arnaud.)

Two papers read before the *Société de Psychologie*, each followed by a *discussion* from P. Janet.

R. J. B.

*Annales Médico-Psychologiques* (Series XII, vol. I.), No. 5, May 1922.

*Chronique: Les Aliénés en liberté.* (M. Henri Colin.)

Recites crimes committed by mentally affected; indicates ways in which law of 1838 could be amended so as to provide treatment, without unnecessarily irritating official control.

*La réforme de l'inspection.* (M. Legrain.)

Continues criticism of M. Grinda's scheme, particularly of the proposal to establish 25 inspectors, who are to report to the authorities on such topics as legitimacy of detention, mode of treatment, and hygienic conditions of such treatment.

*Encéphalite épidémique.* (M. P. Beaussart.)

Note on the cases treated "à l'Asile d'aliénés de la Nièvre." Observations on nine cases are recorded and then discussed critically.

*À propos d'une Cas de paralysie générale infantile.* (MM. Hamel et P. A. Merland.)

A case discussed, which "Appears to us interesting above all because of the indications which it furnishes in favour of the syphilitic nature of progressive General Paralysis."

*Quelques Considérations sur le développement des psychoses systématisées par processus symbolique.* (MM. Sorel, Riser and Gay.)

Records a case of a man, who, whilst thrusting aside all hallucination, yet interprets words, gestures and acts in a purely symbolic manner.

"The interest of the case resides in the richness of the Symbolism in comparison with the complete absence of hallucination or interpretation. . . . One day, passing over a bridge he walks between a bearded man, who is on his right, and a woman who is looking at the cemetery. His conclusion is that he will be 'whiskered' if he goes to the right whilst if he goes to the left he will be obliged to look at death."

Many illustrations, as above, are given and the authors suggest that the case is one of auto-intoxication.

*Société Médico-Psychologique.* April Meeting 1922.

(1) *Traitement de l'état de mal épileptique.* (MM. Toulouse et L. Marchand.)

Describes the two methods of treatment which had given the best results.

(2) *Sur la psychopathogénie des hallucinations (à propos d'une hallucination gigantesque).* (M. Mignard.)

Records the ideas of the sufferer which in the opinion of the writer will throw light on the development of certain gigantic hallucinations and also on the "Lilliputian" hallucinations recorded by Leroy.

(3) *Quelques réflexions sur la morphinomanie.* (M. R. Dupony.)

Describes a series of observations on drug-takers.

R. J. B.

DELINQUENCY AND MENTAL DEFECT (I)<sup>1</sup>.

BY W. NORWOOD EAST.

It is proposed in this paper to deal briefly with a few points concerning criminal actions in association with mental deficiency. At the outset it should be recalled that for a considerable time past the fact has been recognised that in dealing with criminals, individual consideration is essential before any hope of success in treatment can be anticipated. This is appreciated by the judicial and prison authorities, no less than by others. From time to time one comes across passages in the writings of medical men and persons interested in sociological problems, which show that the authors still believe in the old legend that judicial authorities generally have in mind the desire and intention to inflict punishment on offenders indiscriminately, whereas in fact, punishment by means of imprisonment is usually, in modern times, the last resource of those who in a judicial capacity are responsible for the safety of the community. The writer, who has no reason to suppose his experience is uncommon, is frequently asked when in the witness-box what is, in his opinion, advisable in the best interests of a prisoner whom he cannot testify is insane or mentally defective, and for whose future the best provision is not obvious. And this question is put in the highest criminal courts as well as in courts of summary jurisdiction, and may refer also to the length of imprisonment under medical observation which seems desirable. To anyone in constant attendance in criminal courts the inclination to utilise the knowledge and experience of mental diseases acquired by the medical witness is obvious, a fact well known to many offenders, who at times enter prison with a psychological diagnosis ready to hand. Such was a case recently under observation and upon whose mental condition the court called for a report; the accused was retained for a series of impudent and skilful frauds, and when arrested hoped to escape punishment, and deportation to his own country, because he informed me a medical man abroad had told him he was anti-social, which he was, and paranoidal which he was not.

<sup>1</sup> A contribution to the Symposium presented at the Joint Meeting of the Educational Section and the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, April 25th, 1923.

For years the work of the prison officials, administrative and medical, was hampered, as no means of dealing efficiently with the feeble-minded prisoners were available. Classification and special consideration and treatment apart from the other prisoners was carried out, and some defectives of the more stable type were so dealt with not entirely unsatisfactorily, but the unstable type with marked emotional and characterial defects became a burden to themselves and to those responsible for their welfare. Now, the duties of the prison medical officer relative to this class of prisoner become more and more limited to those of accurate diagnosis, and as accommodation for defectives increases one may hope that in the not far distant future this will constitute his sole duty towards them. Controversy has frequently arisen concerning the number of deficient or inefficient among the prison population. In the evidence given before the Royal Commission the estimate varied from the 3 per cent. given by the Medical Inspector of Prisons of that day—Dr now Sir Herbert Smalley—to the 18 per cent. to 20 per cent. given by an experienced prison medical officer, and the 18·9 per cent. and under of the Medical Investigators. It is probably a matter of general agreement at the present time, that these larger figures are inaccurate. Of 8392 prisoners received during a recent 12 months for trial or on remand, 755 were sent specially for medical observation and report as to their mental condition. Of these, 120 were found to be insane, 67 certifiable under the Mental Deficiency Act and 103 were considered to show lesser and uncertifiable degrees of mental disorder and defect, a total of 290. That is, of 8392 prisoners received on remand or for trial, 290 or 3·4 per cent. were mental inefficients. This figure should be slightly higher as no reports are called for or sent in some borderline cases, and a more accurate estimate for unconvicted prisoners would be I believe 5 per cent. Amongst convicted prisoners the figure should be less, as the remand prison sifts out the bulk of those suffering from mental disorder or defect, but it must ever be borne in mind in this connection that there still remain in prisons mental inefficients who are not certifiable under the Lunacy or Mental Deficiency Acts. A certain number of these cases are undoubtedly feeble-minded persons of middle age, in whom the absence of an early history prevents a certain diagnosis being made, others are mentally inefficient from bodily disease, syphilis, alcohol, privations, a past attack of insanity and the like.

The majority of defectives are dealt with of course by courts of summary jurisdiction, and the judicial authority acts on the medical and other evidence before him; but in those cases where more serious offences



have occurred, or where doubt as to the prisoner's guilt may exist, the trial may take place at Quarter Sessions or Assizes before a jury. Unlike cases of insanity, in whom the petty jury judge as to the existence of mental disease or not in the prisoner on the medical evidence put before them, and sometimes in spite of it, the state of mind of the defective prisoner is not a matter for their consideration. The Royal Commission and the whole body of judges recommended that no such verdict as "guilty but mentally defective" should be given. During the trial at Quarter Sessions or Assizes evidence may fall from witnesses for the prosecution, or the defence, suggesting mental defect on the part of the accused. Should he be found guilty, and if he has been on bail before trial, sentence may be postponed so that he may be under the observation of the prison medical officer, whose opinion may be given later. If the accused has been in custody whilst awaiting trial and defect has been diagnosed, the court is informed before trial of the medical officer's opinion, and he is called as a witness, usually after the verdict, if one of conviction has been returned. The court is then able, if satisfied, to act on the medical evidence and in sentencing the prisoner order his detention in a defective institution, but not for any specified time, instead of imprisonment for a definite period, this applying to all offences except treason and murder in whom the only sentence, unless insane, is death.

The assessment of mental deficiency on medical evidence in high grade cases would present in not a few cases some difficulty to a jury, should it be their function to return a verdict of "guilty but mentally defective." Their conception of mental disease and defect may lack both knowledge and experience. Not long since I gave evidence that I considered a prisoner to be insane because he believed a well-known London surgeon, his house-surgeon and the chaplain of the hospital where the prisoner had been treated, were conspiring together to make him a prostitute, that advertisements were inserted in the press to get him, by false representations, into a nursing home where he would be made a prostitute, that people followed him from town to town and spied upon him, that his persecutors tried to poison him and prevented him earning his own living, that I considered these were genuine insane delusions and the accused to be too confused to enable him to be fit to plead and stand his trial. His conduct and statements in court supported my opinion, and the jury returned a verdict that he was insane and unfit to plead; but a jury-woman-in-waiting was heard to remark that if she had been on the jury she would not have acquiesced in such a verdict, as delusions were not insanity. It is a fair inference that this lady would have had

some difficulty in appreciating the medical evidence in a case of high grade feeble-mindedness, and for this and other reasons, justice to the defective offender and public safety is better ensured, at least in my view, as the law stands at present, than if a verdict of "guilty but mentally defective" were permissible. In other words, the experienced judicial authorities of the criminal courts are in a better position to appreciate and assess defectiveness, than a petty jury who would probably have more difficulty in arriving at an accurate decision in cases of mental deficiency, than in insanity. Even with reference to insanity, the standard required on this ground to establish irresponsibility and excuse the offender from the full penalty of a crime varies. In a court of summary jurisdiction the generally accepted standard is that of certifiable insanity. At Sessions or Assizes this is insufficient, there the test is one of two. Either the accused must at the time of his trial— independent of his mental condition at the time of the offence—be so insane as to be unfit to plead, that is, the insanity from which he is at that time suffering must be such that he is incapable of knowing the nature of the charge against him, or of understanding the procedure in court, or of examining witnesses, or of giving instructions for his defence, or generally of appreciating what is going on at the time. Or, if fit to plead, the mental condition of the accused at the time of the offence— independent of his mental condition at the time of trial—must be such that as a result of disease of the mind he was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act, or that it was wrong. And with reference to the phrase "nature and quality of the act," it has been argued by medical men in the witness-box and counsel for the defence in the Court of Criminal Appeal, that by 'nature' of the act is meant the physical aspect of the act, and that 'quality' refers to the moral aspect of the act, that is to its criminal or non-criminal nature. But the text-books, individual judges, and the Court of Criminal Appeal (*Rex v. Codere*—murder. Lord Chief Justice Reading, Mr Justice Atkins and Mr Justice A. T. Lawrence, Feb. 28th, 1916) have held that the "nature and quality of an act" refers only to its physical character.

Further, with reference to the phrase "know that it was wrong" medical men are tempted in some cases to construe this as meaning morally wrong, but it has been held to mean only wrong in law, that is, an act which a person ought not to do, and an act against the law. It is probably clear from the above that criminal irresponsibility due to insanity even within the narrow limits of the existing law is somewhat technical, it can hardly be denied that criminal irresponsibility if

acknowledged in the cases of feeble-mindedness or moral imbecility would cause much confusion to juries. It is well to remember that it is not only the welfare of the prisoner that has to be considered at a criminal trial, but also the safety of the public; a fact the medical witness appears sometimes to lose sight of when one considers that a person has been stated by a medical man to be a moral imbecile, when the only evidence of defect, as far as I could ascertain, was one charge of indecent exposure. The existing procedure for the trial of defectives whilst making for the safety, as far as possible, of the public does no injustice to the defective. It is, of course, self evident that all feeble-minded prisoners are not as responsible as the normal individual. Some such thought was apparently in the mind of a judge at Assize before whom a youthful somewhat high grade defective was on trial for carnal knowledge of a young woman of his own age and physique, and against whom the chief evidence was the statement he had made to the police. After evidence as to the mental defect of the prisoner had been given, the judge instructed the jury that they should not attach as much weight to his statements as they would to those of normal persons, with the result that the prisoner was acquitted. This limited responsibility is reflected in the sentence of detention in a defective institution provided by the law, but a precise and definite opinion as to the *degree* of responsibility which, as I have stated, would cause, in my view, much difficulty to the jury as well as to, at times, the medical witness however expert, is not required.

It would, however, seem desirable that the question of criminal responsibility in defectives should not be lost sight of by medical men dealing with such, for cases occur in which insanity and mental deficiency are combined in a person accused of a serious crime, and whilst certain features of the offence may suggest irresponsibility they may be due to the defect and not to the psychosis, and unless the medical witness has clearly made up his mind as far as is possible which are the points indicating irresponsibility from insanity, he may find himself in the witness-box suddenly faced with an awkward problem.

As with disease so with crime, adequate treatment depends upon accurate diagnosis; but the diagnosis of mental defect may be rendered extremely difficult in prison work on account of the inherent nature of the case, or its surrounding circumstances, or from insufficient history, or malingering, or from the defect being combined with malingering, psychosis, psychoneurosis, or a combination of these.

Inexperienced workers in this field may be led astray by the nature of the offence. Other offences due to adolescent instability, to conflict,

to undeveloped insanity, may to the unwary appear due to defect. I need not refer to other possible causes of error under this head, suffice it to say that whereas the nature of the offence, that is the actual charge, has no diagnostic value, the method and circumstance with which it is associated may have a considerable bearing. Of 200 consecutive male cases the offences were:

Stealing, embezzlement, false pretences, etc....	57
Sex offences ... ..	49
Vagrancy ... ..	36
Suspected person, loitering ... ..	10
Housebreaking, burglary, on enclosed premises	14
Murder, wounding, assault ... ..	12
Insulting words and behaviour... ..	7
Threats ... ..	3
Cruelty to animals ... ..	2
Wilful damage ... ..	3
Arson ... ..	5
Cutting off girls' hair ... ..	1
Bastardy arrears... ..	1

These offences varied from the gravest to trivial ones and in general it may be said the defective may commit any variety of crime. I have no accurate statistics on the matter but it is probable that in dealing with defective delinquents, acts of dishonesty are liable to appear at an earlier age than other criminal actions. Only too frequently the criminal offence is not an isolated event in the defective's career; in many case-histories one finds a career of petty delinquency before actual police arrest.

The difficulties not only of diagnosis but of procedure dependent upon the inherent nature of the case is well shown in the trial *Rex v. Emery*. The prisoner came before Mr Justice Channell at Stafford Assizes on a serious charge, the method and circumstances of which suggested mental disorder or defect. He was a deaf mute who was unable to read or write, lip read or finger talk. No means were available whereby precise insight into his mental condition could be obtained, and none whereby he could be communicated with for the purpose of his trial. The medical officer of the prison who had had accused under observation was, when the case came on for trial, first sworn to testify whether the prisoner was mute of malice, or mute by the visitation of God, and when the jury had returned a verdict that the accused was mute by the visitation of God, the doctor

was again sworn to express his opinion as to whether the accused was fit or unfit to plead. On his evidence the jury found the accused incapable of pleading to, or taking his trial upon the indictment, or of understanding and following the proceedings by reason of his inability to communicate with, or be communicated with by others, and thereon the judge passed sentence that accused should be detained until His Majesty's Pleasure be known. The doctor had given his opinion that the prisoner was probably not insane, and counsel for the defence took the case to the Divisional Court hoping to have the sentence upset, but the Court consisting of the Lord Chief Justice, Mr Justice Darling, and Mr Justice Jelf upheld the sentence of the Assize Judge; the Lord Chief Justice stating that inability to understand the proceedings of a trial was, in point of law, insanity. The case occurred in 1909 but even now, assuming the prisoner was an imbecile, in a similar case the same procedure would almost certainly be adopted. And it may be remembered that in criminal law two classes of mental alienation are usually recognised:

1. Dementia accidentalis, or adventitia—insanity as we know it.

2. Dementia naturalis, or nativitate—in other words “absence of understanding from birth without lucid intervals.” And “a person deaf and dumb from birth is by presumption of law an idiot, but may be shown to have some use of his understanding.”

Insufficient or entire absence of history is well recognised as a bar to accurate diagnosis and has no more particular applicability to criminal than to other cases, except that a history of the criminal offence itself may be of such importance that certification, or not, may depend upon it. Thus there should be usually no hesitation in certifying a defective charged with a sexual offence because of the danger to the community, and the almost certainty that the offence will be repeated if the offender retains his liberty. But a defective of equal grade charged with a common assault may have received such provocation as would have caused a normal individual to retaliate, and such a defective if in a suitable environment and able to maintain himself should not, in my opinion, be certified.

Difficulties in diagnosis due to malingering mental defect may be very real and require all the examiner's skill to elucidate; they fall into three main groups:

1. The ordinary criminal assuming mental defect.
2. The mental defective assuming mental defect.
3. The mental defective assuming normality.

In the case of the defective assuming mental defect one does not expect to find any insight into his mental condition, but he does appreciate his liability for punishment, and the defect is assumed to evade the consequences of his offence. When the defective assumes normality and tries to hide his defect he has, generally speaking, some insight into his condition and sometimes some experience of defective institutions, and may hope to receive by his deceit a short sentence of imprisonment rather than an indeterminate detention in a defective institution. In neither of these cases is the medical problem as a rule formidable, but when a clever criminal assumes defect one's diagnostic capacities may be considerably exerted; the following case is fairly typical of its kind:

Case 350/22. Single, aged 26, remanded for report as to his mental condition, and charged with an indecent assault upon a girl aged 5. His own statement was as follows. He went to a special school, as an ordinary school would not have him, and between 10 and 16 was in several hospitals and had an operation on his brain. He could not remember the operating surgeon's name, but mentioned the hospital. Soon after this he was sent to an asylum for 12 months and then joined the Army in 1914, and after 12 months was discharged without a pension through a mental hospital where he remained 12 months and was in a padded cell. He then on discharge went to Canada and in 3 months was sent to an asylum and deported to England and then remained at home till turned out because he would not work. He added that recently he had had pleurisy and pneumonia and was subject to fits, but could give no description of them except that he woke up at night with his mouth full of blood. When questioned as to the offence he first denied all knowledge of the case, then said he took a little girl to Liverpool Street station, and bought her a ticket and gave her in charge of the guard, and that was all he knew. At a later interview he said he had been living with a woman for three nights in lodging houses, and she sent him into the country to fetch a little girl, which he did, and when he got back to the lodgings he could not find the woman and after 5 days looking for her in vain, sent the child back. On examination he was in poor physical condition but showed no bodily organic disease. He was slovenly in appearance, sullen in expression and hostile in demeanour; in the ward he appeared unable to carry out quite simple instructions and at first alleged deafness. He appeared to lack initiative and capacity for concentrated effort, to be apathetic and he was indolent; he did not occupy himself at all and seemed quite unconcerned as to his future. He appeared to be ignorant on matters of ordinary interest and common knowledge, not to know the value of

money, to be unable to sum, but could read and write, and used words of some complexity in conversation. He could tell the time but alleged inability to do so with the clock hands reversed. He appeared unable to tell how many days or weeks there were in a year, not to know the King's name, said Lloyd George was the Home Office, and apparently had no idea who Kitchener was. He knew the war started in 1914 but did not know when Armistice day was. He alleged he did not know when Christmas or New Year's day fell and when asked the capital of England said he did not know what was meant. Asked the name of the river in London said there were several, when asked the width of the Thames which he had seen frequently said it was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles. He apparently saw no difference between the wrongfulness in stealing food when hungry with or without money in one's pocket. With the Binet tests he only answered 3 of the 7 years tests and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  of the 8 years tests and none after. He got other prisoners to write his letters for him in which he made varying inconsistent statements. It was clear from the examination that he was untruthful and unreliable; it was noted that he appeared to make attempts to read the entries made by the officer in the ward observation book. There were factors in the case suggestive of mental deficiency, others indicated the possibility of the after effects of an attack of insanity complicating mental deficiency, others pointed to malingering and it was necessary to decide which was present of these, singly, or in combination. And here corroboration and collaboration which assist in the detection of the malingerer were utilized, corroboration whether he was telling the truth, collaboration with various people who might be able to assist one by their knowledge of the accused. The hospital in the Midlands where the alleged operation on the brain had been performed was communicated with, they reported the accused had been an in-patient about the time he stated but no operation had been performed on his head. His step-father from the Midlands reported the prisoner's father had died in an asylum, that the prisoner had had a somewhat severe fall on his head as a child—hence the scar on the scalp—that he had shell-shock in the Army and was afterwards in an Asylum for 4 months—not 12 months as prisoner stated. Enquiries of the local Voluntary Association were negative as they could not trace him, but the police report showed that 2 years before he had been convicted of an indecent assault on a boy, and at that time a young woman who served in a Y.M.C.A. hut remembered him as a frequenter who cadged money from other soldiers when he had more in his pocket than they, and she described him as a lying scoundrel. From further enquiries into the nature of the present charge

it was learned that a woman advertised for her illegitimate child to be adopted and the prisoner wrote her several letters well put together saying he was an engineer with one child, living in a London suburb and earning good wages, that he and his wife would like the child and that his wife who was a milliner could make its clothes. He then made an appointment to go down into the country to receive the child describing how he would be dressed, and asked for the child's fare to be paid. In the meantime he had engaged a room in London saying he was a widower and was going to bring his child with him. On obtaining possession of the child he took her to his lodgings and there indecently assaulted her causing injuries. About the fourth day the child became ill and he apparently got frightened, took her to a hospital and subsequently to the railway station where he bought her ticket and put her in charge of the guard, having previously written for the child to be met. It was clear that this information coupled with the inconsistencies in the case, and further observation and examination demonstrated that the ignorance, mental confusion, apathy, failure to give better results with the Binet tests, and his other mental symptoms were assumed, and at my last interview with him I told him I was reporting to the court that he was a malingerer. He received a sentence of 6 months during which the medical officer under whose care he then was informed me he showed no further symptoms of malingering, and no indication of insanity or mental deficiency.

It should be noted in this case that although the accused was untruthful and made varying inconsistent statements, they all were directed to a definite end, and were clearly not of the nature of pathological lying which when first met with may wrongly suggest malingering.

Probably in prison work at any rate, the cases which are most difficult to diagnose are those of mixed mental deficiency and insanity. The cases as seen are generally of the feeble-minded type, but moral imbecility and insanity combined have caused the writer anxiety. Not only are these combined cases the most difficult but from the medico-legal point of view the most important, for the defect does not affect the responsibility of the accused, whereas the insanity may, and before satisfactory evidence can be given in such cases experience is desirable not only in cases of mental deficiency, but also in cases of mental disease. In difficult cases such as defect combined with mild confusional or paranoidal states, toxic psychoses, and the like, every means at one's disposal to arrive at an accurate diagnosis must be utilised. And I would in this connection



refer to three points which I have sometimes found of assistance. In working out the mental age of a patient by intelligence tests if there is an abrupt ending to correct answers at, say 9 years, one is probably dealing with defect, if for a year or two after an occasional test is answered satisfactorily one is also probably dealing with defect, but if the occasional correct answer extends to the late years of the test series, or is scattered throughout or preponderate in the late years, acquired mental disorder or malingering is suggested. Again it is well recognised that the mental age as shown by intelligence tests corresponds usually very closely with the mental age as shown by the vocabulary test, but if there is a wide divergence between these two results the condition under review is probably mental disease or malingering and not defect, provided one is not dealing with a verbalist. To these considerations I would add a third: when a prisoner shows evidence of the defence reactions of repression, rationalisation, dissociation, or projection it may be assumed that certifiable mental defect, other than moral imbecility, is not present. It is, of course, quite impossible to dogmatise on these three points, but I believe that in bearing these in mind some assistance in the differential diagnosis between defect and disease may be obtained<sup>1</sup>.

Generally when mental defect and mental disease co-exist and evidence has to be given in court, or a certificate be written in a criminal case, it should be dealt with as insane, as this may affect responsibility, and in such a combination the offence is usually, but not always, due to insanity and not to defect. It may, however, be necessary to act conversely as in a recent case where the facts indicating insanity were, although undoubted, only those observed by others, and the evidence of defect could be testified by myself.

A difficulty in forming an accurate diagnosis is sometimes raised by a high grade feeble-minded or moral imbecile when he desires his relations to be kept in ignorance of his arrest. But, cases may arise where it becomes necessary owing to the jeopardy in which the absence of such knowledge may place the prisoner, to insist on communicating with relations; for instance in cases of murder it is imperative that all available mental history should be adequately considered by the prison medical officer before trial.

<sup>1</sup> At one time I hoped that some assistance in the differential diagnosis might be obtained from the Wassermann test, for the syphilitic psychoses are a fairly definite group and if these could be eliminated an indication of defect might be suggested by a positive reaction. But I have found no help in this direction, for of 128 bloods sent for examination taken from male defectives diagnosed as such by us in prison, 9 were positive, 17 doubtful, and 102 negative.

The defective as seen in prison is generally of the feeble-minded type, the idiot is of course never met with, the imbecile and moral imbecile, rarely<sup>1</sup>. Whatever the variety of defect the accused is generally found to have acted alone, and this for the obvious reason that his defect renders him a dangerous partner in a crime. Occasionally he may be utilised to pick the chestnuts out of the fire for an astute criminal who has taken precautions to protect himself from blame if detection results; but this, as far as my experience goes, is quite uncommon. I have elsewhere referred to a case of theft in which two defectives were concerned together, and this is, I believe, a quite unusual occurrence, but it is of some medico-legal importance, as two insane persons have been known to conspire together to commit a serious criminal offence, and the existence of such a conspiracy in two persons similarly affected mentally may be suggested by the prosecution as evidence contra-indicating mental disease or defect.

In those defectives in whom conduct is an important feature, diagnosis in any institution may become difficult by reason of the regular and simple life there led, and probably most people will agree that the mental patient usually appears to be less abnormal in an institution than he really is. In those high-grade cases who remain under observation for some considerable time, and who before reception have been subjected to exposure and privation, there may result such improvement that whereas at first certification was easy and necessary, later it becomes difficult or unnecessary. Similarly, a defective may be received who has been living under favourable conditions up to the time of admission with consequent insufficient evidence to justify certification, but may be again received at a later date having undergone recent privations, and then certification may present no difficulties.

In the diagnosis of moral imbecility a very detailed history, in prison work, is of course essential. I may recall that some, like myself, consider that in moral imbecility there need be no intelligence defect, others assert that some defect of intelligence always exists, some go as far as to say that they have never seen a case of moral imbecility. In my own experience it is a rare condition to meet with in prison, but I have no doubt that it exists, and that the diagnosis is more difficult and requires more thought and care than in any of the other forms of mental deficiency. The older the individual, the longer and more intimate the history, the more probability is there of an accurate opinion being formed. It will

<sup>1</sup> Of 200 consecutive cases of male defectives seen in prison, 180 were diagnosed as feeble-minded, 15 as imbeciles, and 5 as moral imbeciles.

probably be admitted by most observers, that a good many cases of alleged moral imbecility in young people are due to mental conflicts, and if these can be remedied there is some prospect of normal conduct resulting. The knowledge or suspicion of a person that he is illegitimate, or that in some way the relations of his parents to one another are unlike those belonging to others, or some sex, occupational, or environmental conflict may result in a course of anti-social conduct. But when these cases have been eliminated as far as is practicable, we find persons who throughout a long career commit criminal acts which are unnecessarily detrimental to their own welfare, to whom the criminal action can bring no profit, in which they run perilous risks themselves, jeopardising their own and the lives of others and even committing murder for a totally inadequate reason. The inducement to commit crime in these cases is totally out of proportion to what is required to cause even a weak character to succumb, there may be in fact no temptation at all in the ordinary acceptance of that word, but in carrying out a crime they may show skill, cunning, and determination. The delinquencies are frequently not restricted to one class of offence in the career of the moral imbecile. The differential diagnosis between the habitual criminal and the moral imbecile may be difficult; the earlier the delinquent career commences, the more the offences seem to result from temperament and not temptation, to be uninfluenced by environment, to lack precaution and foresight, to exhibit a wanton character, to demonstrate inability to profit by experience, and the more they appear to be committed for a purpose which when achieved is disregarded, the more probability is there that the condition is due to moral imbecility. Of fundamental importance in the diagnosis is the fact that the moral imbecile does not take elaborate precautions to hide his crime, or avoid punishment. Those cases of so-called irresistible impulse, which are uncommon in prison practice, exhibit usually symptoms indistinguishable from Impulsive Insanity, and it is under this diagnosis they are usually dealt with, as all the requirements necessary to meet the definition of moral imbecility are not available. The condition of irresistible impulse to crime does undoubtedly exist, as in the case of an elderly man of the labouring class who, after reaching adolescence, had on very numerous occasions snatched a bottle of scent off a chemist's counter and run away with it. He could not tell me why he had ever done it, he had no use for the article, and he had been repeatedly punished for it without effect. In the still rarer cases associated with violence the diagnosis tends to be arrived at earlier in the history of the case, on account of the more striking features met with

in those instances. But whether cases of this nature be regarded as impulsive insanity, or moral imbecility, it behoves the medical witness to form definite ideas concerning any particular case before he goes into the witness-box, or a similar fate may befall him as that which was experienced by a medical man, unversed in mental conditions, who expressed the opinion that a very deliberate and premeditated murder was due to an uncontrollable impulse. He was asked by the learned judge how he would in that particular case distinguish between an uncontrollable impulse, and an impulse which the prisoner did not wish to control, and was unable to supply the answer.

I may perhaps here refer to those most difficult cases to deal with, the young prostitute. Much controversy arises about this class of offender. Some people, as is known, hold that the offence in itself is an indication of mental defect, but prostitution was recognised as a profession many centuries before Christ, and I believe I am right in stating that of the numerous references to harlots in the Bible none mention anything which could be construed as indicative of mental disorder or defect in these women. The histories of other countries also contain the names of women of intelligence who have been prostitutes, and probably very many medical men in the course of their practice come across women of this class of decided intelligence. A consideration of the after career of some of these seem to indicate that their sex delinquencies were due to adolescent instability; some are due to nymphomania, early insanity, drug habit, but the majority to indolence and vanity; others to overdevelopment of physical and sex characteristics, abnormal, perhaps not very uncommon, but not defective or insane. A few are, I believe, undoubtedly moral imbeciles, and others feeble-minded. But there is in my opinion reason to suppose that people of both sexes who have up to a certain period led sexually moral lives may, when once they have gratified by legitimate or other means the full sex instinct, experience for a considerable time such difficulty in dealing with their newly-aroused sensations and emotions, that they fail to control themselves; and I believe I have seen examples of this in both sexes, and that some lives of immorality and prostitution so arise. When any case comes up for consideration some help in determining whether any mental disorder or defect is present, or not, can be obtained, if the origin and circumstances of the first sex delinquency can be ascertained. The frequency of the immorality should also be considered, as an occasional lapse in a woman does not seem very different from a similar lapse in a man, and when it occurs in that sex it is not usually considered due to mental

disorder or defect. The most helpful fact in forming an opinion as to whether certifiable defect or not exists, apart from marked co-existing evidence of feeble-mindedness or moral imbecility, may be the age at which the delinquency commences.

Each case, of course, requires individual consideration, but it does seem advisable that these points, with others, should be considered before arriving at an opinion whether defect is present or not.

In bringing these somewhat disjointed remarks to a conclusion, I should add that I have made no attempt to bring to notice any original work in this important field. My main concern has been to express some views I have formed in the light of my own experience. But interesting enquiries are being conducted at the Borstal Institution, by Dr Methven, regarding the prognosis as to the future success of those youthful offenders under his care in relation to their mental ages; by Dr Grierson of Holloway Prison in connection with prostitution and mental ages, and by my colleague Dr Rixon concerning the mental age of the ordinary remand prisoner.

## DELINQUENCY AND MENTAL DEFECT (II)<sup>1</sup>.

BY CYRIL BURT.

DR EAST'S suggestive paper raises many problems of great interest and importance to the educational psychologist. My own tentative views upon them are derived from an experience limited almost exclusively to juvenile cases. The chief issues, likely to be discussed at this meeting, turn, mainly (I think) and at bottom, upon the definition of the phrase 'mental deficiency.' What do we mean by the term 'mental'? And how deficient must a person's mind be before he can be considered technically 'defective'?

'Mental' is the adjective of 'mind'; and to the psychologist 'mind' includes not only intelligence, but also temperament and character. Therefore, so far as psychological usage is concerned, mental deficiency is applicable, not only to defect in intelligence, but also to defect in temperament and character, if such can be shown to exist. It would appear, indeed, that those who framed, and those who administer the Mental Deficiency Acts, have had chiefly in view defect in intelligence; but the addition of moral imbecility to the other three categories seems to imply that temperament or character is also included within the scope of the Act.

### I.

I may deal first, and most briefly, with defect in general intelligence, mental deficiency in the narrower and more familiar sense.

Here a further difficulty arises. The definitions inserted in the various Acts give a different significance to the term 'deficiency' as used of children and of adults. With children a mental ratio of 70 per cent. is the generally accepted borderline for defect in intelligence, although it cannot be too often repeated that a mere quantitative limit of this nature provides only a rough guiding principle, and is by no means the sole criterion upon which diagnosis must be based. Children whose intelligence falls below this level appear to be "permanently incapable of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in ordinary schools" at any rate as organised at present. Were adequate provision made for the 'merely

<sup>1</sup> A contribution to the Symposium presented at the Joint Meeting of the Educational Section and the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, April 25th, 1923.

dull and backward,' were special classes established for these intermediate grades in accessible elementary schools, it is possible that the upper limit for special school cases might be placed a little lower. Certainly, when the child's condition is reviewed towards the age of leaving school a lower criterion is accepted. Adults seldom "need care, supervision, and control for their own protection and for the protection of others" on the ground of mere defect of intelligence, unless their level is considerably below that which is accepted in the case of the school child.

The few figures I have to offer are based almost entirely upon enquiries among children under sixteen. Hence, when I use the term 'mentally defective,' I shall be including not only those who will be still recognised as defective even when adult, but also all who are, or should be, in a special M.D. school. Nevertheless, even with this higher limit and wider definition, I still feel very strongly that the importance of intellectual deficiency as a contributory factor in crime has been gravely exaggerated in the past. The percentages given by American investigators—particularly those using the Binet tests under the inspiration of Dr Goddard—are far in excess of anything I have found in London. On making a review of all the juvenile delinquents that I have examined, I can discover only 7 per cent. who are mentally deficient in the sense I have defined; and in barely one-third of these cases could the defect be regarded as the main contributing factor. Among younger delinquents mental deficiency seems to be more common among boys than among girls. At and after puberty, however, more girls than boys are simultaneously defective and delinquent. If it be remembered that the borderline I am using is appreciably higher than that which would be adopted in the case of adults, it will be seen that my percentage agrees far more closely with Dr East's figure of 5 per cent. than with the earlier American figures which fluctuated broadly about an average of 50.

Upon the intellectual side, it is dulness or backwardness, rather than actual deficiency, that characterises the criminal child. Over 30 per cent. of my cases are 'dull,' and over 40 per cent. 'backward' educationally. And it is my firm belief that the institution of special classes for the backward child would rapidly be followed, and would largely pay for itself, by immense diminution in crime.

## II.

I turn now to the more difficult problems of deficiency in temperament or character. Here I am entirely in harmony with Dr East's view that "in moral imbecility (so-called) there need be no intelligence defect."

So that, theoretically at least, the two conditions may be discussed as separate and distinct species of the same wider genus.

Medical and legal text-books, where they touch upon the matter, seem still to assume the existence of an innate moral sense; and the moral defective is apparently regarded as one who is innately defective in this innate moral capacity. The doctrine is a popular legacy of what was at one time a leading school of English philosophy—the Cambridge Platonists; but nowadays, I doubt whether even the most retrograde philosopher would dream of reviving it as serious scientific doctrine. “Should one,” says Shaftesbury (its best-known exponent); “who had the countenance of a gentleman, ask me, ‘Why I would avoid being nasty, when nobody was present?’ I should...answer, ‘Twas because I had a *nose*.’ And...‘What if I had a cold?’ I might answer ‘That I cared not to *see* myself nasty.’ But what if it were dark? Why, even then, though I had neither nose nor eyes, my *sense* of the matter would still be the same.” And so he postulates what he calls the moral sense, an inborn intuition perfectly on a par with the other inborn faculties—the sense of smell, of vision, and of taste. Thus, according to these moralists, the criminal is ‘nasty,’ because he is born without an ethical nose.

Psychologists have long ago abandoned such a short and easy metaphor. Morality does not rest upon a simple intuition; but is a highly complex quality acquired after birth by slow and painful processes. It consists of memories, sentiments, and habits, associated ways of thinking, feeling, and acting, which are not inherited or inborn, but are built up afresh, by experience and training, during each individual's lifetime. The foundations of character, it is true, rest upon certain innate tendencies; but character itself is not innate.

Now the term ‘deficiency’ as used in the Mental Deficiency Acts refers to a defect which is at once permanent and demonstrably existing from an early age. In most cases where the defect is intellectual, this means that the deficiency is inborn. I take it that the same construction should be put upon the term deficiency in considering temperament or character. If this be granted, it follows that there can be no such thing as a moral defective in the strict interpretation of the phrase, since strictly speaking a moral defect must be a defect of acquisition. It is noteworthy, too, that in the Mental Deficiency Act, the definition of the moral imbecile turns, first of all, not on the mere absence of a moral disposition, nor yet on the mere presence of immoral impulses—of “strong vicious or criminal propensities on which punishment has little or no deterrent effect”—but primarily upon the existence from an early



age of some permanent mental defect with which these moral imperfections must be 'coupled.' In other words, the moral imbecile, besides being vicious and criminal, must also be feeble-minded in the sense contemplated by the previous clause.

This seems to be the view even of those medical writers who do not accept the current psychology of character. Dr Tredgold, for example, writes<sup>1</sup>: "I quite agree with Dr Maier...that an individual may be intellectually normal and yet devoid of *moral sense*" (his italics); but considers (and rightly I think) that, though in theory this distinction may be made, in actual practice a slight intellectual impairment is usually present, and concludes that "persistent misconduct of the primary form is merely a special variety of primary mental deficiency."

Similarly Lapage<sup>2</sup> states that "moral defectives...are often mentally (*i.e.* intellectually) very little below the average child. They are nevertheless feeble-minded."

If then so-called moral deficiency is simply a special variety of mental deficiency, the addition of a special clause giving the moral imbecile a separate definition and a separate name seems hardly necessary. The clause as it stands seems extremely confusing. Confronted with a suspected case of moral imbecility the plain man, whether doctor, magistrate or teacher, ignoring the subtle issues raised, is apt to infer that he must prove, first, a defect in intelligence probably amounting to actual imbecility, and then demonstrate by actual punishment that such punishment is of little or no use.

It is then the essence of my contention that mental deficiency or feeble-mindedness is not to be limited simply to deficiency in intelligence. Although morality is not inborn, it rests upon an inborn basis. The foundations of character, we are now generally taught, consist in certain inherited instincts and emotions. These inherited instincts and emotions vary considerably in their strength from person to person and from child to child. In many instances it can be shown that the strength of these inherited tendencies is itself hereditary; hence it seems logical to recognise the existence of a congenital basis disposing the child to immoral habits, though these habits are not themselves inborn. Elsewhere<sup>3</sup> I have tried to show that nearly all the activities that constitute crime and naughtiness in the young are simply the outcome of natural instincts, inherited by all mankind in common with the higher mammals. Stealing, destruc-

<sup>1</sup> *Mental Deficiency*, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> *Feeble-mindedness in Children of School Age*, p. 76.

<sup>3</sup> "The Causes and Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency," *Psyche*, II. iv. 341-344.

tiveness, personal violence, sexual misbehaviour, wandering and running away, these are simply manifestations of the half-dozen instincts described by writers like James, McDougall and Shand—manifestations, but little modified by experience, of such recognised impulses as the instinct of acquisitiveness, the instinct of sex, the instinct of anger or destruction, the migratory instinct, and the instinct of flight. Where simple defect of intelligence is accompanied by vicious or criminal propensities, these propensities are merely the expression, not of a perverse or criminal disposition, or of an absence of moral sense, but of universal human instincts which the defective intelligence is too weak to control.

Where there is a lack of balance between instinct or emotion, on the one hand, and intelligence and that moral control which results from the intellectual organisation of these tendencies, upon the other, there a condition of 'instability' ensues. An extreme degree of emotional instability, due to inborn factors, I term 'temperamental deficiency.'

I would propose, therefore, to recognise, besides what I have termed intellectual deficiency, and in place of moral imbecility, a second form of deficiency, which I shall call temperamental deficiency. The difficulty now is to define the temperamental defective so that a diagnosis can be made upon a just, equitable, and uniform criterion.

(1) To begin with, just as I believe there is a central factor underlying all intellectual capacities, so I believe it can be shown that there is a central emotional factor underlying all emotional and instinctive tendencies. This general emotional factor I may speak of loosely as temperament. First of all, therefore, I should deem no child to be temperamentally defective unless the defect affected, not one instinct or emotion only, but all, or at least several, of his instincts and emotions in a greater or a less degree. Thus the over-sexed child, the bad-tempered child, or the acquisitive child, in whom some single instinct was so strong that he was led into sexual immorality, violence, or theft, according to that instinct's nature, I should not term temperamentally defective, unless other emotions showed a similar excessive strength.

Here, then, I think I am in perfect accord with Dr East and opposed to the views of many social workers. Dr East observes that the vicious impulses of the so-called moral imbecile, unlike those of the mere professional criminal, are "frequently not restricted to one class of offence"; and, taking the prostitute as the common illustration cited in such discussions, he maintains that an habitual and even an instinctive tendency to sex-delinquency is of itself insufficient to constitute a case of mental defect.

First, then, the emotional abnormality must be more or less general, not limited to single instinctive impulse.

(2) Secondly, the temperamental defect must be innate. Here there are three acquired conditions, which may at first sight suggest temperamental deficiency, but which I should consider as separate and distinct.

(i) *Adolescent Instability*. About the period of puberty general emotionality is apt to be much increased. And it so happens that this very period is the time when a large proportion of juvenile delinquents are brought for examination, and many criminal careers are commenced. It therefore becomes extremely important to distinguish the child who is simply unstable for the time being from the child who has shown excessive emotionality from birth or from an early age, and who is likely to show such excessive emotionality permanently, after the crisis of adolescence is past. In other cases improvable instability (accompanied by delinquency) may follow *encephalitis*.

(ii) *Neurosis*. Many delinquents are also neurotic—in my own cases, as many as 7 per cent. In a few instances, the disturbance is so severe as to resemble an incipient or borderline case of insanity: these latter cases I should call psychopathic rather than neurotic; but, in juvenile cases before puberty, the distinction is difficult. At all events, neurosis is then far commoner than insanity; and, since it may have existed from an age comparatively early, is far more likely to cause confusion in a diagnosis of temperamental deficiency. A neurosis I regard as in itself an acquired condition, although it may be and usually is built up upon an inborn basis or neuropathic taint; and in some instances the inborn basis may be so extreme as to constitute a temperamental deficiency. In some cases the neurosis has only an indirect connection with the crime; in other cases it is more direct. Many children are sent to me who have been already labelled by a medical man as suffering from ‘kleptomania.’ Numerous similar ‘-manias’—nymphomania, dromania, pyromania—are recognised; and such cases are often described in text-books under the heading of moral imbecility. Sometimes almost the sole basis of the so-called ‘-mania’ is simply an unusually intense instinct; these cases of ‘instinctive criminality’ I have already discussed. But where the suffix ‘-mania’ has any justification at all, it implies a morbid impulsion to commit the act described, without any obvious motive, and without any obvious gain or pleasure resulting. Such impulses, where they can be genuinely established, are simply forms of a compulsion-neurosis; and the victims of them should no more be designated temperamentally defective than any other neurotic patient. Dr East, I gather, would

class them under the heading of 'impulsive insanity'; and deal with the sufferers as insane. Yet it is now well recognised that such obsessive impulses are often easily curable, being due simply to conflicts of the type Dr East has enumerated—"the knowledge or suspicion of the person that he is illegitimate, or that in some way the relations of his parents are unlike those belonging to others" (for example, I suppose, the fantasy that one of the parents is a step-parent, a foster-parent, or sexually immoral), and again, "some sexual, occupational, or environmental conflict." A few sympathetic interviews with the child, a few suggestions to his parents or teachers, temporary removal from the scene of conflict (even without a thorough psycho-analysis), may be sufficient, at any rate in a young person, to remove the neurosis.

Besides, however, a definite compulsion-neurosis, other forms of neurosis (or psycho-neurosis) are sometimes present in delinquents—conversion-hysteria, anxiety-hysteria, anxiety-neurosis, neurasthenia, and so forth. It may seem that these—and the graver psychopathic conditions sometimes found at a later age—constitute the very cases which should be dealt with, not by punishment, but by some form of institutional treatment. But, again, since the condition is so often curable, and is precipitated primarily by accidental shock or environmental stress, it is to my mind important not to certify the patient as temperamentally defective, unless the neurosis is combined with definite insanity or else is a mere outgrowth of temperamental deficiency in the sense in which I am defining the term. The available modes of dealing with the neurotic criminal are to my mind unsatisfactory in the extreme.

(iii) *Repression*. Without the presence of definite neurotic symptoms, much delinquency is the outcome of what are now popularly termed 'repressed complexes.' Here again the mental and emotional state of the child may seem 'defective' in the superficial sense of the popular writer; and, even to the expert, an accurate diagnosis may be a matter of extreme difficulty without a case-history so elaborate as to amount to so-called psycho-analysis. But once more I consider that these cases are not to be regarded as temperamentally defective, unless the 'complex' is due, less to emotional disturbances originating outside the child's mind, than to the abnormal strength of conflicting instincts. Dr East emphasises the existence of this group, and agrees that it is to be distinguished from moral imbecility; but does not, I think, tell us how the prison authorities deal with such cases.

(3) Having successively ruled out the possibility of adolescent instability, of definite neurosis, and of repressed complexes without neurotic

symptoms, it still remains to determine whether the child's inborn emotional instability is so severe that he can be legitimately considered temperamentally defective.

Most juvenile delinquents—more than one-third of my own cases—are emotionally unstable; but not all emotional instability in my view is to be termed deficiency. Otherwise we might also find ourselves bound logically to certify an enormous proportion of the law-abiding population. No definition to my mind is acceptable which would certify as temperamentally defective a second and a larger percentage than is already certifiable as intellectually defective.

I would propose, therefore, the following criterion. A temperamental defective is one who, without being defective also in intelligence, exhibits, permanently, and from birth or from an early age, less emotional control than would be exhibited by an average child of half his chronological age; or, in the case of an adult, of the age of seven or less. In such cases, I am convinced, it may be genuinely said that there indubitably exists "a mental defectiveness so pronounced that they require care, supervision, and control, for their own protection or for the protection of others."

Where intellectual dulness, too slight of itself to constitute intellectual deficiency, coexists with emotional instability, too slight of itself to constitute deficiency in temperament, I should incline to take both aspects into account; and would still class the double sufferer as mentally deficient if the double retardation added together amounted to the degree defined. But these quantitative criteria are only rough guides. They can have even less significance in the case of temperament than in the case of intelligence.

We have no tests of general emotionality which are trustworthy and of general application. Tests certainly exist—the Pressey tests, the Downey tests, and the psycho-galvanic reaction—and further research seems urgently needed in this direction. For the time being, however, the examiner must trust to his own personal observations and to the detailed histories supplied to him by careful and conscientious observers. He should acquaint himself with the normal emotional reactions of children of different ages; and he can thus keep at the back of his mind a rough standard of emotional development which may act as a guiding criterion.

I would propose, then, that the conception of temperamental deficiency be substituted for the conception of moral imbecility. The new phrase is not altogether satisfactory, since the trouble usually arises from an excess

rather than from a defect of the human emotions; and often, as very obviously in the case of the sex-instinct, the emotional development is not retarded, but precocious. Further, it must be granted that the division between intelligence and temperament can never be too closely pressed; it is a relative rather than an absolute intensity of emotion that is the real cause of the condition; the child's capacity for controlling his impulses—for organising them into sentiments and so 'sublimating' them (as the current phrase goes)—must depend to some extent upon the strength of his intelligence, as well as upon the mildness of his emotions. It is, however, convenient to retain the term 'deficiency' simply to indicate the generic class to which these cases belong.

Using the criteria I have described, about 9 per cent. of my delinquent cases would be classifiable as temperamentally defective in the sense thus defined. For the law-abiding population I have no satisfactory figure; it would certainly be well under 1 per cent. 34 per cent. of my delinquents suffer from milder degrees of temperamental instability. Among these, 19 per cent. of the whole group are markedly repressed, with or without neurotic symptoms of a more or less definite kind. Adolescent instability occurs only in 2 per cent. of my cases, since by far the majority are referred to me before the school-leaving age.

Temperamental deficiency is thus by no means the commonest emotional condition predisposing the child to crime. Further, if the certification of a temperamental case as one of mental deficiency simply meant transferring him to a special M.D. day school or to a residential institution with children defective only in intelligence I should hesitate to recommend it.

My discussion has been largely a theoretical one. For practical purposes I believe that our means of diagnosis are at present so slender, and our modes of dealing with these cases when diagnosed so limited and unsuitable, that I consider that a diagnosis of temperamental deficiency should only be pronounced with the utmost caution. To this extent I agree with Dr East that what he terms "moral imbecility" is a comparatively rare condition; and to some extent I even agree with those who have told him they have never seen such a case. 'Moral imbecility' is, in my view, a psychological misnomer; and I would plead very forcibly for a different nomenclature and a different definition from those which the terms of the statute suggest.

## III.

It may be convenient, by way of conclusion, to attempt a summary of the chief points upon which all four contributors to this symposium seem, explicitly or implicitly, to be at one<sup>1</sup>.

1. In dealing both with deficiency and with delinquency, every contributor appears to regard the intellectual aspect and the moral aspect as forming each a relatively separate problem. In particular, all have been forced to recognise that delinquency is something more than a mere matter of defective intelligence; and to repudiate the traditional attitude of earlier medico-legal writers, as based upon a psychology which was excessively intellectualistic.

2. In discussing the first of these two aspects, namely, the intellectual, and in attempting to define deficiency in intelligence, all seem generally to assume that a different criterion and a lower borderline is requisite for adults as distinguished from children of school age. This is especially clear in Dr Shrubbsall's figures: and I am in entire accordance with the proposal that it might be preferable, in the case of the high-grade special school children, to use the phrase 'educationally defective' rather than 'mentally defective.'

3. My borderline is for children a mental ratio (or "I.Q.") of 70 per cent., and for adults one of about 50 per cent.; Dr Shrubbsall's borderline appears in either case to be at least 10 per cent. higher. The discrepancy, however, is more apparent than real. It arises, I suspect, mainly from the fact that our measurements are based upon different age-assignments for the same tests. My revision of the Binet scale, like that of Terman, finds that for the younger years the original age-assignments were too easy. Thus, a child who gets a mental age of seven with the old arrangement (upon which, I understand, Dr Shrubbsall's figures are founded) scores with me a mental age of only 6—though, of course, in either case he is passing or failing with precisely the same individual tests. A child of 9, therefore, who has a mental ratio of 70 with my standardisation (or Terman's) would appear as having an I.Q. of a little over 80 with Binet's original version<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the foregoing portion was written, and circulated as a basis for discussion, before the two succeeding papers were received. It was thus, in the main, an entirely independent expression of opinion. The following and final section was added after a study of the remaining contributions.

<sup>2</sup> Dr Stoddart's mental levels are, I presume, suggested by the earlier American formulations. A borderline of 12 years for a 'high-grade imbecile' and of 15 years for a 'backward' individual can hardly refer to mental ages obtained by intelligence-tests as more recently standardised.

4. With intellectual deficiency thus defined, we are all in absolute harmony upon the central issue of the discussion: namely, that *the proportion of intellectually defective cases among the delinquent population is far lower than earlier investigations maintained*. The true proportion is in the neighbourhood of 5 per cent., not 50.

5. Turning next to what I have provisionally called the moral aspect, we evidently concur in the view that morality as such is not innate but acquired; and accordingly, there being no inborn moral sense, there can be no inborn moral defect.

6. Dr Stoddart and myself have both argued that the real innate basis of most juvenile delinquency is to be found in the primitive instincts which we all inherit in common. Dr Shrubsall also insists upon the importance of instinctive tendencies; and Dr East upon at least one such instinct, namely, that of sex: but, possibly because they are thinking more of adults than of children, the connection between instincts and delinquencies is by them less explicitly stressed.

7. All of us appear to recognise an important group of cases where most of these instincts and their correlated emotions are inherited with an excessive strength; and all of us emphasise the especial significance of general emotional instability in its varying degrees.

8. Our combined experience is that, in most instances of delinquency, inadequate intelligence is combined with excessive emotional instability; but that, in a small proportion of cases, excessive emotional instability may be found without intellectual retardation.

9. We seem to be unanimous that a diagnosis of deficiency on grounds other than that of inadequate intelligence is only to be made with great rarity and care. Dr Stoddart's experience seems almost entirely "against the existence of 'moral imbecility.'" Dr East finds moral imbecility "a rare condition," many alleged instances being simply "due to mental conflicts"; but he has "no doubt that it exists." His emphasis, however, upon "temperament and not temptation" suggests that his moral imbeciles would usually be identical with my "temperamental defectives." Finally, Dr Shrubsall agrees that it is "usually" (as he puts it) "far easier" (and, I would add, theoretically more sound) "to deal with the individual as feeble-minded than as a moral imbecile."



## DELINQUENCY AND MENTAL DEFECT (III)<sup>1</sup>.

BY F. C. SHRUBSALL.

THE first questions that would seem to demand answers are, What are the manifestations of mental deficiency as legally recognised? and What are the proportions of defectives in the general and the delinquent population respectively?

In all places and at all times, certain persons have been noted by a majority of their fellows as showing an all-round inefficiency and irresponsibility of behaviour and from very early days it has been recognised that in some the condition dated from infancy, while in others it came on gradually or suddenly in later years of life. In early English legal writings we find the idiot or 'natural fool.' "He that hath had no understanding from his nativity" carefully distinguished from the 'lunatick' or idiot 'a casu et infirmitate,' "One who aforetime hath had his wit and memory and happening to fail of his wit." Present day legislation deals with the defective as one who from mental causes from birth or an early age is in need of care and control for his own protection or the protection of others; thus following the ancient custom.

Before a mentally defective person can be dealt with by means of institutional treatment or guardianship, it is necessary to show by means of definite *evidence*:

- (1) that he actually displays serious inefficiency in his daily life;
- (2) that this disability is primarily of mental origin and is not due merely to the effects of physical disabilities or to an unfavourable environment;
- (3) that the mental defect has existed from birth or an early age and is not due to subsequent degeneration;
- (4) that the individual can be placed within one of the four classes of defective persons defined by the Mental Deficiency Act;
- (5) that he is subject to be dealt with by reason of conforming to certain conditions which may be briefly summarised by saying that he is either neglected, delinquent or inebriate.

<sup>1</sup> A contribution to the Symposium presented at the Joint Meeting of the Educational Section and the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, April 25th, 1923.

While, therefore, the main basis on which action is taken depends on the behaviour of the subject in the nursery, the school or the world, this behaviour must be proven the result of mental defect by the personal observation of medical practitioners.

Insufficient data exist for an estimation of the total number of defectives in the population, but in 1922 there were known to be 11,000 mentally defective children under the age of 16 belonging to the County of London, or 1.3 per cent. of the population at the school ages. The figure is perhaps a little low since some of the lower grade who showed dangerous propensities may have been dealt with under the Lunacy Acts without coming to the notice of the education authority. The figure is, however, larger than that of the defectives as above defined in that it includes those who only display or need special educational methods, a rather different criterion to the need for special control. On an average of the last few years, 360 children per annum have been referred from the education to the control authority in London or approximately .6 per cent. of the annual crop of children. Bearing in mind that certain individuals have an adequate mental equipment to maintain a low place in ordinary schools yet fail to float under the conditions of social life it may be estimated that the true figure for adults lies somewhere a little under 1 per cent., diminishing as time goes on owing to the differential death-rate being against the defectives.

The proportions among delinquents may perhaps be estimated in the case of children from a consideration of the numbers in Industrial Schools; of these at the end of 1922, 2162 were in ordinary industrial schools and 85 in special industrial schools for the mentally defective. According to this 3.8 per cent. of the delinquents were defective, a proportion which agrees sufficiently well with Dr East's figures.

Chronological age	Average mental age	
	Non-delinquents	Delinquents
8	5.7	6.0
9	6.1	6.2
10	6.6	7.2
11	7.1	7.0
12	7.5	8.1
13	8.0	8.1
14	8.4	8.7
15	8.9	9.2

The next question, How far delinquent defectives are a random sample of the total defective population? may be investigated by a comparison

of the intelligence as estimated by intelligence tests in the two groups. The preceding table compares the average mental age of children in the day (M.D.) special schools with those in the special (M.D.) industrial schools for each chronological age of school life.

The delinquents thus show a slightly greater average intelligence than the mass of day special school children, *a fortiori* they would be above the general population of defectives including the imbeciles and idiots who do not attend these schools. In the case of adults the average mental age of the general population of defectives is 7.9 and of defective delinquents 8.5. It should be noted that the estimates of mental age in adults are not entirely comparable with those in children, since in the case of the former the tests have not been confined to the Binet-Simon series and its modifications.

Another method is to compare the percentage distribution of intelligence quotients in the respective groups, as in the following table:

*Percentage Distribution.*

No. examined... I.Q.'s	Delinquents		Non-delinquents	
	Children 100	Adults 415	Children 8737	Adults 1870
00--09	—	—	0.4	0.2
10--19	—	—	2.0	1.7
20--29	—	1.0	5.4	1.9
30--39	—	6.5	5.8	7.5
40--49	3	10.4	8.5	16.5
50--59	15	47.6	15.8	49.6
60--69	56	24.6	23.8	20.2
70--79	21	8.2	28.9	2.2
80--89	5	1.2	8.5	0.2
90--99	—	0.5	0.9	—

From this it again appears that the delinquents are above the average of the other defectives, but not, at any rate in the case of the children, to an extent which excludes the possibility of random sampling, and further data are needed to answer the question. Probably the differences are more temperamental than intellectual.

As has been pointed out by Dr East, a defective may commit any type of offence and show defence reactions of the usual type such as fluent lying and attempts to incriminate others instead of themselves, but especially in the case of children and of adults of the lower mental grade the offences are often committed in a simple or stupid manner. A comparison of the percentage frequency of different offences which have

resulted in the children being sent to ordinary or to special industrial schools illustrates the point.

*Percentage Frequencies.*

Offence	Defectives		Non-defectives	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Wandering	15.9	41.9	5.0	12.1
Begging	5.2	3.2	4.3	3.5
Beyond control	17.4	22.6	5.1	13.4
Stealing	51.6	19.4	74.3	34.4

Of these offences it was noted that wandering provided the maximum number of lower grade cases.

In the case of adults, *i.e.* those over the age of 16, the average mental age has been calculated for each class of offence in a series of 234 men and 81 women. These are shown in ascending order of mentality as estimated by tests.

Men					Women		
Wandering	...	...	...	7.4	Wandering	...	7.5
Common assault	...	...	...	7.8	Stealing	...	8.4
Indecent exposure	...	...	...	7.9	Sex offences (soliciting)	...	9.3
Begging	...	...	...	8.3			
Drunk and disorderly	...	...	...	8.3			
Gross indecency	}	...	...	8.3			
Unnatural offences							
Stealing	...	...	...	8.6			
Indecent or criminal assaults on women				9.0			

Wandering is often due to failure of orientation and lack of ability on the part of the subject either to ascertain his whereabouts or to take the necessary measures for returning home. Many of the cases of indecent exposure are due to sheer lack of appreciation of their surroundings and of ordinary social conventions rather than to any deliberate desire to give offence. That the women charged with soliciting should show a relatively high mental age for defectives falls in line with Dr East's observations.

An attempt has been made to ascertain the relationship between the nature of the offence and the emotional stability of mentally defective offenders by grading them into four classes in accordance with the general evidence of their behaviour without attempting to consider the respective qualities of specific instincts or emotions.

*Degree of Emotional Stability.*

Nature of offence	Stable	Slightly or at times unstable	Moderately unstable	Very unstable	Total
<b>Women</b>					
Wandering and begging	—	2	5	5	12
Stealing ... ..	—	7	6	8	21
Sex offences ... ..	—	5	10	23	38
Total, all cases ...	—	15	21	45	81
<b>Men</b>					
Wandering and begging	9	6	19	27	61
Stealing ... ..	9	19	18	56	102
Indecent exposure ...	3	3	3	9	18
Indecent assault ...	2	5	2	8	17
Gross indecency ...	1	2	4	6	13
Total, all cases ...	25	42	52	115	234

The unstable classes are in the majority, especially in the case of women offenders; some of the offences of the men who from the results of enquiries into their conduct in other respects might be regarded as stable may be in part due to recent conditions of the labour market. This would apply in particular to such offences as begging, stealing and possibly to desertion. As a check on these possibilities it seemed desirable to extract from the records the evidence as to the regularity of the past employment of the offenders. They were therefore grouped under three heads, regular employment, occasional employment and unemployable, but as it appeared that a small number were still attending some form of school or had only just left and had not yet been in any place, a special group was made to record these.

*Employability.*

Nature of offence	Unem- ployable	Occasional employ- ment	Regular employ- ment	Still at school or just left	Total
<b>Women</b>					
Wandering and begging	3	7	2	—	12
Stealing ... ..	2	8	9	2	21
Sex offences ... ..	12	17	9	—	38
Total, all cases ...	22	34	23	2	81
<b>Men</b>					
Wandering and begging	25	24	8	4	61
Stealing ... ..	26	43	24	9	102
Indecent exposure ...	7	5	4	2	18
Indecent assault ...	4	6	7	—	17
Gross indecency ...	4	8	1	—	13
Total, all cases ...	73	97	48	16	234

From this it appears that in men the greater number of cases of stealing arise among the unemployable or those with very irregular employment, while in the women the largest figure is for those in regular work. While I can present no figures as to the relative frequencies in those offenders who have not been suspected of mental deficiency, I have an impression derived from cases heard while waiting in the courts of first instance that much the same conditions would be found, that men more often steal for reasons of necessity and women to procure accessory amenities of life. This is certainly the case with many youthful offenders who expend the proceeds of their crimes on sweets, cigarettes and the cinema.

It has appeared that emotional stability and working capacity have relatively less relation to mental age than to one another.

*Relation between Capacity for Employment and Stability.*

Employability	Emotional Stability.				Total
	Stable	Slightly or at times unstable	Moderately unstable	Very unstable	
<b>Women</b>					
Unemployable ... ..	—	—	6	16	22
Occasional employment ...	—	3	10	21	34
Regular employment ...	—	11	4	8	23
Still at, or just left, school	—	1	1	—	2
Total ... ..	—	15	21	45	81
<b>Men</b>					
Unemployable ... ..	7	7	12	47	73
Occasional employment ...	7	17	25	48	97
Regular employment ...	9	15	8	16	48
Still at, or just left, school	2	3	7	4	16
Total ... ..	25	42	52	115	234

The relation between lack of employment and emotional instability is evident and bears out the general observation that an employer particularly for rough and poorly-paid work will put up with a good deal of stupidity but not with outbursts of temper. Those who combined emotional stability, nearly amounting to apathy, with little capacity for employment were of the lower intellectual grades, the unstable who were regularly employed were for the more part of the higher grade. The offences of the more stable and employable were either stealing or of a miscellaneous character such as cruelty, assault or desertion.

As has been pointed out, defectives may commit any crime and may show cunning in eluding detection, yet on the whole their offences like their other performances, bear the hall-mark of inefficiency. Many are committed under circumstances leading to inevitable detection, others are of so simple and fatuous a character as scarcely to deserve the title of crimes. An extreme example is the case of a young adult man who

had been incapable of completing his education in a special school and who had a mental age of 5 on intelligence tests had, by reason of a good disposition and a certain willingness, been able to keep a place for a long time where the work was of a simple and invariable nature. He was the sole support of a widowed mother and had been accustomed to carry home his weekly wage in a small wallet. One day he noticed an apparently simple method of earning money, as he saw certain ladies holding up bags to passers-by in the streets who placed coins therein with every sign of satisfaction. He went home, fetched his wallet, took it to the main road of the district and in his turn held it out to passers-by as he had observed the others do, only to be arrested in a few minutes for the fraudulent pretence of collecting money for a flag day; a thing he had never heard of or, more correctly perhaps, had never understood. In such cases the very circumstances of the offence serve to indicate the mental status yet the rest of the history may indicate an absence of any need for institutional care.

In the bulk of the cases which have come to notice a deficient mentality as estimated by ordinary intelligence tests has been combined with evidence of emotional instability and an incapacity for securing or keeping employment. Such offenders have been certified as feeble-minded or in the lower grades as imbeciles. There have, however, been a few who showed responses to tests little if at all below the average of their class with a good working capacity when they chose to exert themselves but who presented evidence either of a general emotional instability or an excessive development of some instinctive tendencies and subsequent habits with limited powers of inhibition, exhibited from an early age. Some whose offences are of a limited and specialised character often carried out under conditions such that a successful result could be of no profit to the individual may be the victims of a psycho-neurosis, though it is only occasionally that they can be distinguished clearly from the foregoing class especially as it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a compulsion and a habit. Others, especially at the period of adolescence, have temporary lapses of inhibition. Some, however, throughout life show a consistent failure to recognise the rights and susceptibilities of others even of their nearest relatives and friends.

Mr Burt suggests a definition of temperamental defectives for that of moral imbeciles but his proposal would cover only the class described by Guthrie as having the unstable emotional temperament: the very instability takes them out of the legal category of "Moral Imbeciles" since they are too vacillating to have *strong* propensities. In the true

moral imbecile the defect is not so much lack of inhibition as lack of feeling; the emotions are too neutral. Ordinarily instinctive behaviour is controlled both by intellectual and emotional factors; in the moral imbecile the instincts remain functioning and the intellect intact but the mind is deprived of the normal affective guidance. The individual who does not feel strong emotions will not comprehend them in others and perhaps will not even recognise their existence. He may superficially obey the dictates of fashion but will not develop altruism. Such an one can pursue an intellectual end undisturbed by the views of those around him but is incapable of feeling moral ideas though intellectually able to render lip service thereto. His conduct remains amoral but it is only when he violates certain taboos in a specified manner that he can be legally certified.

The Moral Imbecile is one who from an early age has displayed some permanent mental defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities on which punishment has had little or no deterrent effect.

The word 'permanent' excludes any temporary instability or misconduct resulting from repressions which might be relieved by psychotherapy or which as in many adolescent cases might be outgrown. 'Early age' excludes so-called moral insanity or obsessions or compulsions arising in later life. It is true that the exact limits of the term have not yet been determined by the High Court but from decisions in the lower courts it is unlikely that it would be extended to include the period of adolescence. Also it has been laid down by a Justice of the High Court that there must be real evidence as to early age in any case dealt with under the Mental Deficiency Act, an opinion of the certifying medical practitioner based on his observation of the conditions found in later life will not suffice. It must also be noted that the definition runs: permanent mental defect coupled with vicious etc. propensities, not defect shown by such vicious or criminal propensities. In this connection the legal attitude is perhaps shown by a direction to the jury by a master of the High Court in a case involving the civil capacity of an alleged imbecile: "They (the jury) must be satisfied that the respondent was incapable of governing himself and his affairs by reason of unsoundness of mind, mere weakness of character, mere liability to impulse or susceptibility of influence, good or bad, mere imprudence, extravagance, recklessness, eccentricity or immorality—no, not all these taken together would suffice unless they believed themselves justified on a review of the whole evidence in referring them to a morbid condition of intellect."

To come under the definition then there must be evidence of mental



deficiency apart from the conduct complained of and this evidence must be consistent largely in the personal observation of the certifying officer, mere history will not suffice. Answers to the so-called ethical test questions sometimes applied afford little assistance, for the true moral imbecile has a perfect appreciation of verbal morality as applied to others; his difficulty is not to answer questions but to order his life honourably and harmoniously. Sometimes the responses will show a lack of normal appreciation but more often the subject will weave a web of words to explain all situations and to show he has been misunderstood and the victim of mischance. An innate mental basis as apart from habits derived from the social environment must be proven. Nevertheless in certain cases the certifying officer by going over the past history in conversation with the subject may be able to show that the state of his mind is such that he was not, is not and is never likely to be able "to understand what is for his profit and what for his loss," the definition suggested by a legal commentator of some centuries past. It is quite clear, however, that law has an intellectual bias and comprehends better failures in reasoning power than in emotional inhibition.

Lastly, the punishment must have been real and appreciated as such by the subject, too often in such cases the early life has been one of indulgence with punishment confined to threats. Under these conditions it is usually far easier to deal with the individual as feeble-minded than as a moral imbecile.

In dealing with cases in which the main evidence to be considered is anti-social behaviour and the reasons assigned for such, it is very necessary fully to consider the matter of early environment and to disentangle innate and permanent tendencies from acquired and possibly avoidable habits. In this task, the certifying officer must review his decision at the bar of his own conscience, considering on the one hand, whether he under such circumstances could have acted differently, and on the other, whether he may be projecting on to the subject any of his own personal prejudices and beliefs, always remembering that "if every man had his deserts, who should 'scape a whipping?"

## DELINQUENCY AND MENTAL DEFECT (IV)<sup>1</sup>.

BY W. H. B. STODDART.

THE word 'delinquency' originally meant a crime or misdeed of some kind; but psychologists have for some considerable time extended its meaning to include "a tendency to commit crimes or misdeeds" and, in such psychological discussions as the present, delinquency refers to the tendency only and not to the misdeeds themselves; and for the purpose of this symposium I take the term Mental Defect to mean Intellectual Defect or Defect of Intelligence.

Having adopted these meanings we may say that the topic of our symposium is "Moral Defect and Intellectual Defect" and our object is to discuss the relationship between the two, if any exists. We are justified in supposing that it does exist because we are familiar with the fact that Mentally Defectives, especially low grade imbeciles, steal, fight and lie like troopers.

Having thus orientated ourselves, let us consider the normal:—Morality and Intelligence. My predecessors in this symposium are all agreed that Morality is not innate but acquired after birth. For practical purposes and for the most part I agree with them.

Learning is also acquired after birth, so let us begin by noting this similarity: that morality and academic learning are both acquired during the life of the individual. Moreover, the essentials of both are acquired during the first twelve years or so, but normally both continue to grow to some extent throughout life. So far as academic learning is concerned this is obvious, and I will justify the statement respecting morality by a short digression to explain its nature.

Every normal child is born into the world with certain latent instincts which, if allowed free uncontrolled play, would prove anti-social and their owner would be an immoral selfish beast; but, partly from an innate tendency to comply with the wishes of his fellows (herd-instinct) and mainly from training and association with moral, ethical and conventional beings, he learns to control his instincts and thus to become a

<sup>1</sup> A contribution to the Symposium presented at the Joint Meeting of the Educational Section and the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, April 25th, 1923.

moral, ethical and conventional member of society. The instincts to which I refer are of course those of self-preservation, sex, their subdivisions and variations. Morality is just this control of the instincts. It is responsible for what Freud has called Repression and, although this Repression occurs mostly during the first twelve years or so, it continues through life so that the instincts normally tend to become more and more repressed.

However this may be, our conclusion is that both academic learning and morality are mostly taught, the former mostly by education at school, the latter mainly by example and precept in the family circle; and just as the children of barge-dwellers and van-dwellers never acquire much learning because they do not attend school, so the children of thieves and drunkards do not achieve a high degree of morality. The lad Jacoby, who was executed for the murder of Lady White, was a recent example of a youth whose delinquency was due to absence of moral training. He had no father and his mother was a drunkard; but he had received an ordinary education at school and was perfectly intelligent. A comment by Dr East on the fact that the law makes no allowance for such a person should prove interesting.

The natives of Uganda see no wrong in murdering a person in order to acquire his property and they are incapable of appreciating the point of view of an Englishman who tries to teach them otherwise; but if a native child were brought to this country and placed in the care of moral foster-parents, there is little doubt that he would grow up a decent member of society.

Similarly, a negro can be brought to this country, receive an University education and obtain a degree, while his countrymen at home remain uneducated.

Now in Psychiatric practice we find, as you are all aware, that there are many children who, from injury to the head at birth, fevers and other diseases during early life, morbid affections of the brain or perhaps merely hereditary tendencies, are not capable of growing up intellectually. Some remain helpless babies all their lives and are known as idiots, others attain somewhat higher mentalities and are called imbeciles (low grade if they are of a 7 year old mentality, high grade if they achieve the learning and intelligence of a child of 12). If their mentality gets past this age, but not past the standard of a 15 year old child, we say that the patient is backward.

In a normal child, the tendency to do the right thing grows at the same time, so that it ought to be possible to devise tests for morality

corresponding with the Binet tests, were it not that children indulge in all sorts of peccadilloes and indecencies, when unobserved by adult eyes, which their elders would never suspect. The responses to and results from set psychological morality tests would therefore prove to be far too high.

Now in the mentally defective my experience is roughly this: that the patients of the lower mentalities (idiots and low grade imbeciles) have much less control of their instincts and are much more immoral (I use the word in its widest sense) than normal children of the same intellectual level and that the moral tone of high grade imbeciles and backward children is well up to or even in advance of that usually found in normal children of their own intellectual mentality. At most, their delinquency is less marked than their mental defect. If the experience of others in this matter agrees with mine it is a very strong argument against the existence of 'moral imbecility,' which means innate delinquency with little or no intellectual defect.

Respecting motherhood occurring in high grade imbecile girls I ought to say that I do not regard their fall as a serious sexual delinquency, so much as an inability to take care of themselves by reason of intellectual defect.

In psychiatric practice we meet, on the other hand, patients who have at one time been perfectly normal individuals, but owing to all sorts of adverse circumstances they have fallen from their high estate, so that their academic knowledge has regressed towards that of a child or their power of reasoning has become distorted or the control of their instincts has become diminished, in some instances to such an extent as to cause them to fall into the hands of the police; but the degree of dissolution in the two departments (moral and intellectual) is not necessarily the same. Indeed one of them is usually in advance of the other.

I need not remind members of this audience that in every one of us there are unconscious forces at work, which are constantly striving for expression—unrecognised and unacknowledged instincts which we are unwilling to admit to ourselves. Normally they succeed by being sublimated into some social or academic channel; but in some instances these forces are so strong that they escape the repressing forces and appear in some symptomatic guise which causes people who are not psychologists to call such patients 'lunatics.'

In other cases the person remains normal so long as he is in good physical health, but should he be attacked with fever or other disease,

intoxication by alcohol or some other drug, mental or physical shock or exhaustion, or organic brain disease, his repressing forces become weakened and his words and actions similarly become those of a lunatic, for examples the delirium of fever and drunkenness, whose manifestations vary from patient to patient.

In diseases in which there is progressive degeneration of the nervous system, such as general paralysis, the patient gradually loses all the academic knowledge he has ever acquired in the reverse order of its acquisition until his knowledge and perception become that of a new born child. At the same time, he loses control of his instincts in exactly the reverse order of the acquisition of that control. From being careful about his financial position, he becomes a spendthrift; then he loses control of his sexual passions, and sexual crimes may occur; next his acquisitiveness becomes uncontrolled and he may become a thief; then his destructiveness, then the instinct of combativeness and cruelty to others and lastly he loses the habit of cleanliness in relation to his evacuations, which he originally acquired at the age of 2 years or perhaps earlier. For the purpose of brevity I have mentioned only a few of these stages by way of illustration; but those who are familiar with the development of children, and I suppose there are few among my present audience who are not, will observe that the control of the instincts, which is synonymous with morality, is lost in the reverse order of its evolution, the last control to come being the first to go. In this disease we can definitely state that intellectual and moral degradation proceed *pari passu*.

Now let us return to a consideration of these cases in which we find that a perfectly intelligent child is a delinquent. He comes to our notice when he has reached the age of 10 or 12 years, and seldom before. The reason for this is that, although he may previously have been guilty of misdeeds common enough in childhood, his present delinquency is of such a nature as to lead the parents to consult a doctor. In other words it is recognised by the parents to be a symptom of mental disorder. The usual misdeeds are stealing, lying and destructiveness; and, on psychoanalysis, we find that it is no accident that the symptoms have appeared at puberty, for these crimes invariably have an unconscious sexual meaning. In both sexes the objects stolen have phallic significance—are symbolic of the male organ, and the thefts refer to the castration-complex—invariably in my experience. In the three cases of destructiveness (all boys) I have investigated, the objects destroyed were always ‘containing objects,’ such as the mother’s jewel-case, dressing-table or

drawers, which are womb symbols. The destructiveness therefore symbolises sadistic attacks upon the mother (mother-fixation). Lying is, in some cases, merely an attempt to escape punishment; in other cases, the lies are fabrications symbolising unconscious sexual wishes, usually—in my experience—of a perverse character, in some cases indicating that the child has an unconscious desire to be a member of the opposite sex<sup>1</sup>.

These cases, then, are psychoneuroses and they can usually be cured by psychoanalysis; but not always, because in some cases the resistances are so strong as to cause the patient to break away from the treatment by various devices. The point I wish to make, however, is that these are *not* cases of intellectual defect.

Our conclusions may thus far be summarised as follows:

(1) In both evolution and dissolution of the mind, moral and intellectual defect run parallel; but there is no evidence of inter-relationship except in the case of motherhood, when the real delinquent is the other party to the crime.

(2) Delinquency may occur in intellectually normal children from an absence of moral training.

(3) Delinquency may be a psychoneurosis occurring in an intellectually normal child, curable by psychoanalysis. In this connection, the question may arise whether defectives are more liable to psychoneuroses than normal children. My opinion is quite the reverse, viz. the psychoneurotics are mostly found among the educated intellectual classes; but, in order to stabilise this opinion, I consulted the Lady Almoner at St Thomas's Hospital and she informs me that, if the patients sent to my department for mental deficiency and organic brain disease be excluded, my patients are above the average intellectual status of the patients in other departments. My interest in this aspect of the subject was especially stimulated by a paper recently read by our President before the Psychiatric Section of the Royal Society of Medicine, in which he gave an account of two patients who had become mentally defective in consequence of a psychoneurosis (psychical traumata, if you like) occurring in early life.

I submit that these are the three causes of delinquency in childhood. Dr East's contribution justifies me by precedent for adding a few words to include adult delinquency, including habitual criminality, although this is outside the scope of this Section of the Society.

Alcoholism is itself a psychosis and many crimes are moreover the

<sup>1</sup> I am not here referring to cases of *Pseudologia Phantastica* occurring in early adult life.

result of alcoholism. Paranoia and allied paranoid states are responsible for many crimes. Both alcoholism and paranoia being psychoses, I must add that some delinquency in adults is of psychotic origin.

Hence our final conclusion is that delinquency, whether in the adult, the child, the mentally defective or the insane, invariably results from one of these four factors:

- (1) Moral defect coexisting with intellectual defect.
- (2) Moral dissolution accompanying intellectual dissolution (including psychosis).
- (3) Absence of moral training.
- (4) Psychoneurosis.

Of each factor there are numerous degrees and this must be taken into account when we think of the crimes committed in cold blood which lead to the many noted trials at the Assizes. Here the lawyers seek and find only such factors as motive, temptation and opportunity; but the motives, temptations and opportunities, of which we read in any great trial, are such as occur to hundreds of people who do not commit crime. We must therefore take into consideration peculiarities in the psychology of the criminal himself. The four psychical factors above-mentioned are sometimes sufficient in themselves to provoke delinquency. I submit that the three legal factors are insufficient to do so by themselves, but they may be sufficient when they act upon a person already predisposed to delinquency by one or more of the psychical factors.

It always seems to me that the motives, temptations and opportunities assigned by the lawyers at any of the criminal trials, which receive so much notice in the Press, would not be sufficient to induce me to commit the same crime and I hope, for your own sakes, that you are of a corresponding opinion. On the other hand, the public interest taken in the recent case of Bywaters and Mrs Thompson seems to reveal that an enormous number of people unconsciously (or consciously) identified themselves with those criminals.

One of my reasons for rather wandering from the point at issue is that this symposium has suggested to me, as an Officer of the Society, that the formation of a Criminological Section would result in much work being done for the State in general and for this Society and Psychology in particular.

# THE NATURE OF AUTO-SUGGESTION<sup>1</sup>.

BY ERNEST JONES.

FROM time to time in the course of the past fifty years or more a fresh wave of interest has been aroused in the subject of auto-suggestion. These waves fall into four or five fairly well-marked periods, but it is not proposed to give any historical description of them here. On reviewing the literature produced by these different periods one does not, I am afraid, get the impression that the last half-century has seen any serious addition to our knowledge of the subject, which remains much as it was in the days of Baragnon<sup>2</sup>, seventy years ago, who discussed it under the name of *automagnétisation*.

That being so, it would be tempting to seek elsewhere than in scientific curiosity for the source of the interest that periodically continues to be taken in the subject, and one might in this connection throw out the following suggestions. Assuming that there really is a phenomenon of auto-suggestion, and that its therapeutic value can compare with that of the usual suggestion treatment, then it is clear that the use of it presents two features that are bound to make a wide appeal. In the first place, the idea caters to the universal desire for 'free will' and flatters the narcissistic sense of omnipotence by according with its favourite conception of the ego as a self-sufficing and self-acting agent, independent of the outer world and able to gratify all its wishes by the incantation of magic verbal formulæ<sup>3</sup>. In the second place, it specifically delivers the patient from the most dreaded form of outer dependence, namely the sexual transference which psycho-analysis has shown to underlie what must for the sake of convenience be termed hetero-suggestion<sup>4</sup>. The motives just indicated probably apply to the physician as well as to the

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, March 22, 1923.

<sup>2</sup> *Étude du magnétisme animal*, 1853, pp. 198 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> On the narcissistic importance of words see Ferenczi, *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1916, pp. 194 *et seq.*

<sup>4</sup> I cannot refrain from remarking here on the very imperfect acquaintance with psycho-analytic writings displayed by McDougall in his statement that this theory of transference is "based *merely on the fact* that some subjects show signs of erotic excitement when in hypnosis, and on the Freudian prejudice, etc." ("A Note on Suggestion," *Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology*, vol. I. p. 4.)



patient, for in treating numbers of patients *en masse* by 'auto-suggestion' he can gratify the hypnotist's sense of power without needing to become aware of the accompanying personal (and sexual) dependence of the patients. The medical dread of this transference relationship is well known, and I surmise that we may also attribute to it the fact that so many hypnotists have during the past forty years insisted on their preference of "suggestion in the waking state" to hypnotism proper; one need only instance the names of Bernheim, Bramwell, Forel, Van Renterghem and Vogt.

Leaving aside these questions of popular fashion and motive, we may turn to consideration of some of the still unsolved problems relating to auto-suggestion. In proposing discussion of these problems I am further moved by the consideration that so far they have received no attention from the standpoint of psycho-analysis.

The first problem of all is of course whether there is such a thing at all as auto-suggestion, *i.e.* whether there is any endopsychic process showing the characteristics that distinguish what we ordinarily call suggestion. When I raised this question in opening the discussion on auto-suggestion at a recent meeting of this Society my remark was evidently taken in jest, but I noted that both the reader of the paper (Dr William Brown) and all the other speakers confined what they had to say to the subject of hetero-suggestion, so that my question cannot be regarded as unjustified; incidentally, McDougall has expressed a similar scepticism<sup>1</sup>.

It is impossible to proceed, therefore, without first coming to some understanding about what are the essential characteristics of suggestion in general. Here, unfortunately, there is a lack of agreement in some important particulars<sup>2</sup>, and it is easy to see that the view adopted by a given author in these respects determines his attitude towards the problem of auto-suggestion. The difference of opinion mainly exists over which should be regarded as the most important and characteristic of the processes comprising suggestion. It is generally agreed that these can be grouped under three headings. In the first place there is the emotional *rapproch* existing between the subject and the operator, the state determined by Durand (de Gros)<sup>3</sup> hypotaxia and by myself<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> See Bernard Hart, "The Methods of Psychotherapy," *Proc. Roy. Soc. Med.* (Psych. Sect.), vol. XIII.

<sup>3</sup> Philips (a nom de guerre), *Cours théorique et pratique de Braïdisme*, 1860, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> "The Action of Suggestion in Psychotherapy," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1910, Vol. v. p. 219. Reprinted in my *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, Third Ed., 1923, Chapter XIX.

affective suggestion. This is indubitably the stage that precedes any other process, and on its existence the later processes depend. Secondly, there is the acceptance of the idea suggested, the process termed by Durand<sup>1</sup> ideoplasty and by myself<sup>2</sup> verbal suggestion. Thirdly, there is the ultimate effect realised by this idea after it has been incorporated into the personality.

I will now quote four of the most notable definitions that have been given of suggestion, and it will be seen that they fall into two groups, according as the main importance is attached to the second or third of these processes respectively. Bernheim<sup>3</sup> gave the broad definition of suggestion as "l'acte par lequel une idée est introduite dans le cerveau et acceptée par lui." McDougall<sup>4</sup>, with evidently the same point of view, has rendered this more precise in the statement that "Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition *independently of the subject's appreciation* of any logically adequate grounds for its acceptance." In contrast with this attitude stands Janet's<sup>5</sup> conception of suggestion as the "développements complets et automatiques d'une idée qui se font en dehors de la volonté et de la perception personnelle du sujet." Similarly Th. Lipps<sup>6</sup> regards suggestion as "die Hervorrufung einer psychischen Wirkung, die normaler Weise nicht aus der Weckung einer Vorstellung sich ergibt, durch Weckung dieser Vorstellung" ("the evocation, by arousing an idea, of a psychical effect which normally would not result from the arousing of such an idea"), and he further<sup>7</sup> insists that "nicht die Weckung der Vorstellungen, sondern diese weitergehende psychische Wirkung ist das Charakteristische der Suggestion. Diese psychische Wirkung ist das eigentlich Suggestirte" ("it is not the arousing of the ideas, but this further psychical effect, that is the characteristic of suggestion. This psychical effect is what is really 'suggested'"). There can be little doubt that the emphasis laid here by Janet and Lipps on

<sup>1</sup> Philips, *op. cit.* p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.* The only exception to this is with Moll's *Stumme Hypnose* in which not a word is spoken, and this affords one of the many interesting transitions between hetero- and auto-suggestion.

<sup>3</sup> *Hypnotisme, Suggestion, Psychothérapie*, 1903 édition, p. 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> *État mental des Hystériques; Les Accidents mentaux*, 1894, p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> "Suggestion und Hypnose," *Sitzungsbericht der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft*, 1897 (1898), S. 394. It is a matter for regret that this essay, doubtless because of its relative inaccessibility, is not more widely known, for it contains the most searching discussion of the subject yet provided by any psychologist.

<sup>7</sup> *Idem, op. cit.* S. 392.

the further effects or action (*Wirkung*) of the suggested idea represents a definite advance on the intellectualistic conceptions of Bernheim and McDougall. Even if the latter would maintain that they too have in mind a psychical effect of the idea introduced, it is plain that their definition refers chiefly to one effect only, namely, disturbed judgement, and does not take into sufficient account the other abnormal effects, such as hallucinatory sensations, influence on bodily processes, etc.

Lipps made two further steps in the nearer definition of the psychical action or effect (*Wirkung*) in question. In the first place, he points out<sup>1</sup> that what is remarkable in connection with suggestion is not the actual nature of the effects, which can all be produced by other means, but the *way* in which they are produced. It is the conditions under which the effects follow an idea that are peculiar to suggestion, for these effects would not follow the idea under other conditions. The characteristic of these conditions he sees in a special combination of intact psychical energy with diminished psychical excitability<sup>2</sup>. By the latter phrase he means an inhibition of the counter-ideas which normally would oppose the action of the suggested ones. This inhibition is, of course, related to the contrasting freedom with which ideas are accepted from the operator, and is thus the secondary result of the state of *rappont* mentioned above. He therefore includes these two additional conclusions in his final definition of suggestion, which is<sup>3</sup>: "Die Hervorrufung einer über das blosse Dasein einer Vorstellung hinausgehenden psychischen Wirkung in einem Individuum, durch Weckung einer Vorstellung seitens einer Person oder eines von dem Individuum verschiedenen Objectes, sofern diese psychische Wirkung durch eine in ausserordentlichem Masse stattfindende Hemmung oder Lähmung der über die nächste reproducirende Wirkung der Suggestion hinausgehenden Vorstellungsbewegung bedingt ist." ("The evocation in an individual, through an idea being aroused by another person or an object distinct from the individual, of a psychical effect that goes beyond the mere existence of this idea, provided always that this psychical effect is conditioned by an extraordinary inhibition or paralysis of the ideational movement which passes beyond the proximate reproductive effect of the suggestion.") He explicitly included auto-suggestion in this definition in a way which will presently be noted.

The actual phenomenology of the effects of suggestion are too well known to need recounting here. Concerning their nature Lipps has shown

<sup>1</sup> "Zur Psychologie der Suggestion," *Zeitschr. f. Hypnotismus*, 1897, Band VII. S. 95.

<sup>2</sup> *Idem*, "Suggestion und Hypnose," *op. cit.* S. 520.

<sup>3</sup> *Idem*, "Zur Psychologie der Suggestion," *op. cit.* S. 117.

in detail that all of them, even the eliciting of hallucinatory sensations, represent the normal logical consequences of the suggested ideas, differing only from the usual consequences of the same idea in that, through the inhibition of the criticising ideas customarily operative, they are allowed to proceed to their logical termination without hindrance. We may therefore conclude that the characteristic of suggestion lies in the free development of the effects of communicated ideas, the forces usually hindering this development being neutralised by the presence of the *rapport*, or concentration on the idea of the operator. It is generally agreed that this *rapport* consists of an emotional bond; as is well known, psycho-analysts consider the bond to be sexual in nature and due to the re-animation of an infantile attachment to a parent.

Our formulation of the three processes thus runs in order: *rapport*; inhibition of all mental processes except those suggested; free development of the latter. We are now able to reduce the difference of opinion noted above to differences in the view held of the way in which the *rapport* operates; all are agreed that it is in this that the operative force resides. From this point of view the two schools of thought may be contrasted somewhat as follows: according to one, the main thing is the remarkable influence exerted by the operator, or hypnotist; granted this and the rest follows, the ideas developing to their logical conclusion by the sheer force imparted to them. According to the other school, the main thing is the subject's peculiar attitude towards the operator; it is this which neutralises any critical ideas inimical to his. Psycho-analysts may certainly be classed as belonging to the latter school. Some thirteen years ago, for instance, I wrote<sup>1</sup>: "We can no longer regard the subject as a helpless automaton in the hands of a strong-willed operator; it is nearer the truth to regard the operator as allowing himself to play a part, and by no means an indispensable one, in a drama constructed and acted in the depths of the subject's mind."

From what has been said, it is not astonishing that the two views just described lead to contrasting attitudes towards the subject of auto-suggestion. Those who expound the former of the two views tend to decry the importance of auto-suggestion or else to deny its existence altogether, to depreciate its practical value, and to attribute most of its phenomena, whether therapeutic or pathogenic, to some more or less disguised form of hetero-suggestion. In this group of authors may be mentioned Baragnon<sup>2</sup>, Camus and Pagniez<sup>3</sup>, McDougall<sup>4</sup>, and Grasset<sup>5</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 220.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> *Isolément et Psychothérapie*, 1904, p. 57.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> *L'Hypnotisme et la Suggestion*, 1904, p. 131.

the last-named of these goes so far as to hint that auto-suggestion is in most cases the result of previous hypnotism. Janet<sup>1</sup> would appear to take up an intermediate position; he ascribes at least a great many pathological processes to auto-suggestion, apart from the intervention of an idea from without. Forel<sup>2</sup> also holds that "Jede Suggestion wird durch Autosuggestion des Hypnotisierten ergänzt und modifiziert" ("every suggestion is added to and modified by auto-suggestion on the part of the hypnotised person"). At the other extreme there is Baudouin<sup>3</sup>, the leading exponent of auto-suggestion, who holds the diametrically opposite view that "hetero-suggestion, even during induced sleep (*i.e.* hypnosis), is still an auto-suggestion." Similarly Levy-Suhl<sup>4</sup> maintains: "Jede Suggestionwirkung beruht letztthin in einer Autosuggestion" ("every effect of suggestion rests ultimately on an auto-suggestion").

We thus return to the problem of what phenomena, if any, are to be classed as belonging to auto-suggestion. The matter is certainly not to be settled by simply asking whether the operative ideas have originated from within or from without. In the first place, this is often very hard to determine, and in a certain sense it might even be maintained that all ideas take their ultimate source from the outer world. Secondly, the question does not touch the essential part of the problem, for clinical psychology no longer regards ideas as active agents in themselves; any activity they may exhibit is due only to their being representatives of some impulse or other. We must therefore concentrate our attention on the nature of the dynamic factors at work, and in this way seek to determine whether two classes of them can be detected, corresponding with hetero-suggestion and auto-suggestion respectively. Several writers, *e.g.* Baudouin<sup>5</sup>, insist that the ideas produce their effect only through acting outside the field of consciousness, but being unfamiliar with what goes on in this unconscious layer of the mind they were unable to throw any light on the nature of the forces operative in the transformation of the 'idea' into its effect, *i.e.* the 'realisation' of the idea. Lipps<sup>6</sup> holds that in auto-suggestion, just as in hetero-suggestion, there is a general inhibition of mental excitability, particularly of ideas antagonistic to the ones being 'suggested.' In hetero-suggestion this is brought about through a high degree of psychical investment of the idea of the operator;

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> *Der Hypnotismus*, 11 Auflage, S. 122.

<sup>3</sup> *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*, Engl. Trans., 1920, p. 204.

<sup>4</sup> *Die hypnotische Heilweise und ihre Technik*, 1922, S. 33.

<sup>5</sup> *Idem*, *op. cit.* p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.* S. 117.

in psycho-analytical terminology, a hyper-cathexis of the idea of the operator is correlated with a hypo-cathexis of all ideas in conflict with his. Now is there a group of phenomena, to be called auto-suggestion, in which there is a corresponding hyper-cathexis of a given idea to account for the general hypo-cathexis that Lipps maintains to be present, and, if so, what is known of the nature of this idea? The only suggestion he makes in this connection is<sup>1</sup> that the part of the ego communicating the idea is to be regarded as a foreign object to the part that receives it, but he throws no further light on this remarkable splitting of the personality. Baudouin<sup>2</sup> repeatedly insists also on the essential importance of relaxation in the practice of auto-suggestion, and it is evident that this relation is identical with the inhibition of mental excitability described by Lipps. Baudouin's<sup>3</sup> conception of the concentration of attention necessary in addition to the general relaxation—the two features which in his opinion comprise the essentials of the practice of auto-suggestion—corresponds further with what we have called hyper-cathexis of a particular idea, but he never mentions any idea to which this applies except the idea which is being 'suggested.'

It might be supposed that psycho-analysis, adhering as it does to the second of the two schools described above, the school that lays stress on the part played in the depths of the subject's mind, would at once lend countenance to auto-suggestion as a phenomenon which obviously supports the view in question. On the other hand, it would appear to contradict the psycho-analytical view concerning the significance of the idea of the operator, at all events unless it can be shown that in auto-suggestion there is a hyper-cathexis of another idea which is equivalent to that of the operator.

It is time to turn from this general discussion of the problem and consider the actual data bearing on it. It must be said, however, that it is by no means easy to ascertain these. To begin with, McDougall's<sup>4</sup> criticism that in so many of the examples cited of auto-suggestion one cannot exclude the operation of hetero-suggestion is evidently justified; it obviously applies to a great part of Coné's performances. Indeed, this factor has also to be taken into account when a person practises 'auto-suggestion' after reading a book of instructions, for the idea of the authority behind this book must often play a considerable part. McDougall further objects to the wide application of the term 'auto-suggestion' to such phenomena as the ready acceptance of propositions which are con-

<sup>1</sup> *Idem*, *op. cit.* S. 96.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* pp. 131, 132, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *Idem*, *op. cit.* pp. 27, 141, etc.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 9.

gruent with any strong conative tendencies; that the wish is father to the thought is comprehensible without invoking any such special process as 'auto-suggestion.' Lipps<sup>1</sup> makes a similar protest, one which would seem to apply to a large number of the examples quoted by the various writers on the subject, Baudouin<sup>2</sup>, Bonnet<sup>3</sup>, Parkyn<sup>4</sup>, etc.

If we now attempt to exclude these two groups, a task not easy to carry out, what phenomena have we left that may serve our purpose? They would seem to reduce themselves to two. In the first place there are the descriptions of experiments carried out on themselves by various medical investigators. We have many such accounts, from Cardan<sup>5</sup>, in the sixteenth century, who is said to have cured himself of gout by this means, to Liébault's<sup>6</sup> self-cure of migraine. The best accounts are perhaps those given by Baudouin<sup>7</sup>, Birot<sup>8</sup>, Bléch<sup>9</sup>, Lagrave<sup>10</sup> and Lévy<sup>11</sup>. On reading through these and other accounts one may learn something about the effects that are to be produced by means of 'auto-suggestion,' but very little indeed on the point at present under consideration. Practically no idea is mentioned on which the mind is concentrated except the particular ones to be 'suggested.' This evidently does not provide us with the motive force for which we are seeking, so one would infer that the hyper-cathexis in question must take place entirely in the unconscious. The inference should not be astonishing, for it will be remembered that the same is to a great extent true of hetero-suggestion and hypnotism.

The second set of phenomena are those known under the name of auto-hypnosis. They should be more promising, for more reasons than one. I agree with Freud's<sup>12</sup> view—in contradistinction to Bernheim's—that the state of suggestibility is simply a *forme fruste* of hypnosis. In any case there would seem to be better prospect of elucidating the psychology of either suggestion or auto-suggestion by studying the state in which the manifestations are magnified. It was for a similar reason that in my previous study of suggestion<sup>13</sup> I largely confined myself to the problem of hypnotism.

Phenomena that come into consideration from the point of view of

<sup>1</sup> "Suggestion und Hypnose," *op. cit.* S. 392.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> *Précis d'auto-suggestion volontaire*, 1911.

<sup>4</sup> *Auto-Suggestion*, 1916.

<sup>5</sup> *De Subtilitate*, 1550, lib. XXI.

<sup>6</sup> *Du sommeil provoqué*, 1866.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> *Annales du Magnétisme*, 1815, t. II, p. 253.

<sup>9</sup> "L'auto-suggestion comme moyen thérapeutique physique et moral," *Rev. de l'hypnotisme*, Fév. 1897.

<sup>10</sup> *Quelques expériences d'auto-hypnotisme et d'auto-suggestion*, 1890.

<sup>11</sup> *L'éducation rationnelle de la volonté*, 1898.

<sup>12</sup> *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Engl. Transl., 1922, p. 100.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*

'auto-hypnosis' are met with in four circumstances: (1) Mediumistic trances. (2) Hysterical dream states. (3) Religious and mystical ecstasies. (4) A miscellaneous group in which states of exaltation are indulged in more or less as a habit, either in connection with narcotics or not.

The first of these has to be excluded on the ground that in the accounts given of them attention is devoted almost entirely to the messages purported to be delivered in this way, the mental state itself of the subject being a matter of only subordinate interest. The second state has been studied analytically by Freud<sup>1</sup> and Abraham<sup>2</sup>, and the latter author specifically draws a comparison between them and hypnosis. The conclusions arrived at by these studies which interest us most here are that the dream states in question represent substitutive gratifications of day-dreams which formerly ended in masturbation. The earlier phases of the state are pleasurable, but the culmination, which replaces the sexual act once indulged in, is usually accompanied by considerable degrees of anxiety. The intense concentration of attention (which Abraham terms *Besetzung*, *i.e.* cathexis) or self-absorption, which—just as in 'auto-suggestion'—is the counterpart of the withdrawal from the outer world, is exclusively concerned with the more or less conscious sexual phantasy. It is known that phantasies preceding or accompanying masturbation are predominantly incestuous in origin, hence the feeling of guilt attaching to them, so that we are led to the same conclusion here as is reached from the study of the ordinary hypnotic *rapport*, namely that the essential feature of such states is the revival of the infantile repressed idea of the parent. Indeed, Abraham<sup>3</sup> points out that these hysterical states may either occur spontaneously or be induced through the presence of some person by whom the subject feels himself to be 'hypnotised.' Two features therefore stand out here, the importance of auto-erotism and of incestuous attachment to the father. We also note once again the great difficulty of distinguishing between hetero- and auto-suggestion, and this must incline us to the conclusion that either there is only one process concerned in all the phenomena grouped under these two names or else, if there are two, they must be extremely closely related.

In the third set also, the religious ecstasies, it is difficult to exclude the possibility of an important part being played by the idea of an

<sup>1</sup> "Allgemeines über den hysterischen Anfall," reprinted in his *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften*, Zweite Folge, 1909.

<sup>2</sup> "Über hysterische Traumzustände," *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse*, 1910, Bd. II. S. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Idem*, *op. cit.* S. 30.



external person, namely God. This is, of course, more evident in the trances of Christian saints than in those of other mystics, but it is worthy of note that even in the Indian form of mysticism the word yoga is defined as "the experimental union of the individual with the divine<sup>1</sup>." This fact need not lead us immediately to exclude the group in question from the category of 'auto-hypnosis,' but it is one to be borne well in mind when discussing the possible relation of hetero- to auto-suggestion. I do not propose here to enter on a discussion of religious ecstacy, especially as the material exists in a readily accessible form<sup>2</sup>. I need only remind you of two of its most characteristic features. The first is that a sexual under-current is plainly in evidence in all the accounts given by saints and mystics themselves, and that, as Pfister<sup>3</sup> has shown in his interesting study of Von Zinzendorf, the sublimations often enough undergo regression into the crudest sexuality. The second feature is the extraordinarily intense feeling of union that characterises the most exalted states. I will quote only one illustration of this, from Saint Teresa<sup>4</sup>, the greatest expert in this field of experience. "In the orison of union, the soul is fully awake as regards God, but wholly asleep as regards things of this world and in respect of herself....She is utterly dead to the things of the world and lives solely in God....I do not even know whether in this state she has enough life to breathe. It seems to me she has not: or at least that if she does breathe she is unaware of it.... Thus does God, when he raises a soul to union with Himself, suspend the natural action of all her faculties. She neither sees, hears, nor understands, so long as she is united with God....God establishes Himself in the interior of this soul in such a way that when she returns to herself it is wholly impossible for her to doubt that she has been in God and God in her." It would seem that in such orisons object-love tends to revert to the more primitive stage of identification, a point which we shall see to be of some importance. The same is apparently true for the milder states to which Catholics refer under the name of 'recollection.'

An even closer resemblance to 'auto-hypnosis' is presented in the well-known yoga system of the East<sup>5</sup>. The two preliminary states of *prâtyâhâra* and *dhâranâ* correspond with the relaxation and concentration respectively which are the essentials in the practice of auto-suggestion.

<sup>1</sup> William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> Görres, *Christliche Mystik*, 4 Bde, 1836-1842; Ribet, *Mystique Divine*, 1890.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Frömmigkeit des Grafen Ludwig von Zinzendorf*, 1910.

<sup>4</sup> *Œuvres de St Teresa*, Bouix édition, t. III, pp. 421-423.

<sup>5</sup> On the resemblances see Kellner, *Yoga: Eine Skizze*, 1896.

The final state, called by the Vedantists *samâthi* and by the Buddhists *dhyâna*, has been thus described<sup>1</sup>: "Then we know ourselves for what we truly are, free, immortal, omnipotent, loosed from the finite, and identical with the Atman or Universal Soul." We see here a regression to the most primitive and uncritical form of narcissism. Some years ago I had the good fortune to treat a patient who had graduated highly in the yoga hierarchy. In the psycho-analysis of his case, which I published at length<sup>2</sup>, two features were specially prominent in this connection, and these were the same two as we noted above in respect of the hysterical dream states. The part played by the idea of God-father in the auto-hypnotic state was unmistakable, and, further, the patient manipulated to an extraordinary extent the various yoga instructions in terms of what Sadger has called secondary auto-erotism.

The task of isolating a pure form of auto-hypnosis, and of distinguishing it from ordinary hypnosis, continues to elude us, but we will try our luck once more with the fourth set of phenomena indicated above. In the cases of this class collected by William James<sup>3</sup>, he attaches considerable importance to mystical states induced by various narcotic drugs, particularly alcohol, nitrous oxide and chloroform. This is worthy of note, for we now know the close dependence of such states on repressed homosexuality, and further the nearness of the latter to narcissism. Of the instances he quotes of sporadic and apparently spontaneous trance states the most perfect account is that given by John Addington Symonds, and those familiar with the writings of this author will remember what a part is played in them by repressed homosexuality. Symonds' own description of the state contains the following passages: "In proportion as these conditions of ordinary consciousness (*i.e.* space, time, sensation, etc.) were subtracted, the sense of an underlying or essential consciousness acquired intensity. At last nothing remained but a pure, absolute, abstract Self. The universe became without form and void of content. But Self persisted, formidable in its vivid keenness, feeling the most poignant doubts about reality." It was typical of his states of trance that they ended in an anxiety attack, just as the dream states described by Abraham. In them we get hardly any hint of the idea of an outside being; the whole of consciousness is confined to the idea of self. On the other hand, the curious personal experiences described by the Canadian alienist, Bucke<sup>4</sup>, have clearly a reference to the outer world. In them

<sup>1</sup> Vivekananda, *Raja Yoga*, 1896; cited by James, *op. cit.* p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse*, 1912, Band iv. S. 564.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.* pp. 387 *et seq.*

<sup>4</sup> *Cosmic Consciousness: A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind*, 1897.

he came to realise that the universe is "a living Presence," and became conscious in himself of eternal life. The account he gives of his union with what he terms the cosmic consciousness is probably only an attenuated form of what a more strictly religious person would have felt to be union with God.

What inferences may now be drawn from consideration of the data at our disposal? The first conclusion I think we are justified in coming to is that it is extraordinarily difficult to draw any sharp line between hetero- and auto-suggestion. The relationship is so very intimate as to make it probable that the agents operating in the two cases are merely variants and not distinct forces. This conclusion has more far-reaching consequences than might appear at first sight, so I will briefly review the evidence for it. It is both clinical and psychological. Clinically every physician who endeavours to teach his patients how to use auto-suggestion, as I did myself some twenty years ago, will probably be able to confirm my experience of finding how very hard it is to estimate the importance of the part played by the idea of the physician in the patient's mind, and to distinguish between this and the other factors at work. The gradation between hetero- and auto-suggestion in such situations seems to be quite imperceptible. The same is true of the hypnoid states of hysteria, which may occur either in the presence of another person by whom the subject feels himself to be influenced or else quite spontaneously. Even in the cases of religious trances we have noted the inter-relation between intense self-absorption on the one hand and concentration on the idea of an external person on the other. Then, again, the actual manifestations of the two conditions are quite identical. They may be said to include all the effects that mental functioning can potentially bring about in both the mental and the physical fields, from the most complete delusional and hallucinatory formations in the former to the gravest interferences with all kinds of bodily functions in the latter, and in rare cases even with life itself. Psychologically the two conditions are quite identical but for one single point. In both there is a hyper-cathexis of one train of thought with hypo-cathexis of most others. The state of relaxation, or—to use Lipps' more accurate terminology—of psychical inhibition, is doubtless the reason why the judgement of external reality can be so profoundly affected, and with this is also lost the criticism of endopsychic ideation, including repression. It will be noted that these two latter functions are two out of the six with which Freud credits that part of the ego which he terms the ego-ideal. In hetero- and auto-suggestion there is equally the consciousness of

surrender of the sense of will and feeling of effort. The one point in which the two conditions differ is in respect of the idea on which concentration has taken place. With hetero-suggestion we know that this is the idea of the Father imago<sup>1</sup>, which has been aroused through contact with a suitable substitute. With auto-suggestion all the evidence points to the idea being that of the actual Self.

I next propose to sketch a theory that shall take into account the preceding considerations. If I am right in concluding that the unconscious hyper-cathexis is of the idea of the Father in hetero-suggestion and of the Self in auto-suggestion, then we must search for some point of intimate contact between these two ideas. A clue in this direction is afforded by Freud's<sup>2</sup> formula that the hypnotist replaces the ego ideal. For if we enquire into the nature and origin of the ego ideal, we discover that it is compounded of two constituents, derived from the Father and the Self respectively; so that here we have a nodal point connecting the two ideas.

It will be remembered that the original (primal) narcissism of the infant becomes in the course of development distributed in four directions, the actual proportion in each of these varying enormously with different individuals. *One* portion remains in an unaltered state attached to the real ego; this is probably the one concerned in the genesis of hypochondria. A *second* portion is deflected from any direct sexual goal and becomes attached to the idea of the parent, leading to adoration, devotion and general over-estimation. It is important to bear in mind that to begin with this process is much more a matter of narcissistic identification than of any form of object-love. A *third* is transferred on to an ideal ego and is one of the constituents of the 'ego ideal.' The *fourth* is gradually transformed into object-love. Now the second and third of these commonly fuse during the latency period of childhood or even earlier. The form assumed by the resulting ego ideal is largely derived from the ideas and mental attitudes of the father, the bond being effected through the second portion of narcissistic libido mentioned above, that attached to what may be called the father ideal. On the other hand, the energy that gives the ego ideal its significance is wholly derived ultimately from narcissistic libido. There are three routes for this: (1) directly from the original narcissism of the primary ego (Third portion mentioned above); (2) *via* the attachment to the father ideal (Second portion);

<sup>1</sup> For the sake of simplicity, and also because it is the more important in this connection, the idea of the Father alone is referred to instead of that of both parents.

<sup>2</sup> "Group Psychology," *op. cit.* p. 77.

(3) *via* the regression to narcissistic identification with the father that often takes place after a disappointment at the lack of gratification of object-love (Fourth portion).

When the hypnotist, as Freud says, takes the place of the ego ideal, what happens is presumably this: the thought of him becomes identified in the unconscious with that of the father, and in this way the constituents of the ego ideal which were built up in connection with the idea of the father—its form and two out of the three narcissistic components enumerated above—are re-animated. Perhaps, incidentally, this is the reason why it is so difficult for the hypnotist to give effective suggestions that obviously conflict with the father ideal, such as criminal and immoral suggestions.

Leaving for the moment this question of the mechanism whereby narcissism becomes re-animated, a matter to which we shall presently return, I wish to say a little about the effects of the process. Many clinicians are inclined to divide the effects of 'auto-suggestion' into two groups, which might be called pathogenic and therapeutic respectively. To take the pathogenic ones first: the notion is that 'auto-suggestion' may create various neurotic symptoms by allowing certain 'morbid' ideas to realise their full effects unchecked by others which normally would counteract them. Perhaps as good an example as any is the case of the oft-quoted medical student who imagined he was acquiring every disease except housemaid's knee. I would recommend that we should not use the term 'auto-suggestion' for this class of phenomenon, for the following reasons. The essence of such symptom-formation consists in a conflict between repressed libidinal wishes and the repressing force exerted from the side of the ego, particularly of the ego ideal. From one point of view the symptom might roughly be called a punishment inflicted on the personality by the ego for the striving towards gratification on the part of the repressed forbidden wishes. The fears of our medical student, for instance, represent the threat of castration (disease) as a punishment for repressed Oedipus wishes (incest with the mother and castration of the father). The morbid ideas that were allowed to develop during the reading of his text-books merely afforded suitable material that could be used by his ego for this purpose. So that to refer to the whole process as one of 'auto-suggestion' is to confine attention to one aspect of the process, and not to the most important aspect. The resultant symptom is only *in part* ego-syntonic, *i.e.* in harmony with the ego, the repressed wishes being not at all so, while the term 'auto-suggestion' should surely be applied only to mental processes that are wholly ego-

syntonic. Further, one misses here the note of omnipotence so characteristic of the typical forms of 'auto-suggestion.'

What we have called the therapeutic effects of 'auto-suggestion,' on the other hand, differ in both these respects. They are marked to begin with by a belief, more or less profound, in the omnipotence of thought. The catch formula "Every day in every way I grow better and better" means, if it means anything, "I have only to *wish* to become stronger, handsomer, cleverer, self-confident and free from any suffering, and it will be so; my wishes are all-powerful and brook no obstacle." Then, in contrast with 'pathogenic auto-suggestion,' the therapeutic tendencies in question are throughout ego-syntonic.

Successful auto-suggestion presupposes harmony even between the narcissism of the ego ideal and that which has remained attached to the real ego. It is the conflict between the ego ideal on the one hand and the real ego with its associated allo-erotism on the other that is responsible for neurotic states. How fraught the union is with consequences we know from Freud's<sup>1</sup> studies of mania. The two states in which man's sense of power over both himself and his environment, and often his actual power, is at its maximum are, first, acute mania, and, secondly, the exaltation that follows on sudden conversion to a significant idea, most often a religious one. In both these cases, however, there has previously been a specially deep cleavage between the actual ego and the ego ideal, so that the reconciliation between the two results in a tremendous accession of energy through the release of the primary narcissism from the tyranny of the ego ideal. Yogi are reputed to display something of the same sense of power and self-content, which in their case is due to a union brought about by the more gradual process of auto-suggestion.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations I would formulate the following theory. SUGGESTION IS ESSENTIALLY A LIBIDINAL PROCESS: THROUGH THE UNIFICATION OF THE VARIOUS FORMS AND DERIVATIVES OF NARCISSISM THE CRITICISING FACULTY OF THE EGO IDEAL IS SUSPENDED, SO THAT EGO-SYNTONIC IDEAS ARE ABLE TO FOLLOW UNCHECKED THE PLEASURE-PAIN PRINCIPLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIMITIVE BELIEF IN THE OMNIPOTENCE OF THOUGHT. *Such ideas may either develop to their logical goal (beliefs, judgements, etc.) or regress to their sensorial elements (hallucinatory gratification). The essential part of the unification in question is that between the real ego and the ego ideal. The condition under which it takes place is that the repressed allo-erotic impulses are to be renounced. This is made possible by a regression of their libido in the direction of auto-*

<sup>1</sup> *Idem, op. cit.* pp. 107, 108.

*erotism, which results in a further reinforcement of the narcissism. If the primary narcissism has been released and re-animated directly, by concentration upon the idea of self, the process may be termed auto-suggestion; if it has been preceded by a stage in which the ego ideal is resolved into the earlier father ideal, the process may be termed hetero-suggestion.*

If this view proves to be correct, then the old question of whether most hetero-suggestion is really auto-suggestion or whether most auto-suggestion is really hetero-suggestion must be regarded in another perspective. It is, in the first place, a much less important problem than has often been thought, for that the essential agent in both is narcissism is a more fundamental consideration than the question of the particular way in which this has been mobilised in a given case. It is highly probable that the process of re-animating narcissism may proceed to varying depths in different psychological conditions: that suggestibility varies greatly in different persons is of course well known. The fact that primary narcissism is more fundamental than the father ideal itself, and our clinical experience that the chief part even in hetero-suggestion is played by agents within the subject's mind, are considerations which incline one not to contradict Baudouin's opinion that more weight must be attached to auto-suggestion than to hetero-suggestion, though one should add the modification that perhaps the latter process may prove in most cases in practice a necessary stage in the evocation of the former.

Freud<sup>1</sup> thinks that the uncanny and enigmatic qualities that cling to the idea of hypnosis can be accounted for only by assuming that the regression to the infantile conception of the Father re-animates the inherited attitude towards the primal Father of the horde in savage times. The view here expressed could be brought into accord with this by supposing a similar re-animation of the well-known enormous narcissism of primitive man, with his absolute belief in the magical omnipotence of thought.

The theory here propounded perhaps throws some light on two further problems, the relation of hypnosis to sleep and to 'will-power' respectively. That the hypnotic state is psychologically exceedingly akin to sleep is well known, and is indicated in the very word itself. The fact has given rise to much speculation, but it should become more comprehensible when one recollects that sleep is the most complete expression of narcissism known, *i.e.* of the state which we here suppose to underlie that of hypnosis.

Without wishing to embark on a discussion of the nature of will,

<sup>1</sup> *Idem, op. cit.* pp. 95-99.

I may briefly state my agreement with Lipps<sup>1</sup> view that the sense of will, and of striving or effect altogether, really emanates from a consciousness of inhibition, or—put in more modern language—an intuition that in respect of the idea in question the conscious ego is inhibiting other, unconscious, mental processes. At all events it is plain that the will is specially connected with the conscious ego, and particularly the ego ideal. Most authors lay great stress on the practical importance, in both hetero- and auto-suggestion, of avoiding so far as possible any sense of effort, exercise of will-power or even of forced attention, and this might well be correlated with the view here expressed of the necessity for suspending the activity of the ego ideal. The exhortations of a patient's relatives that he should 'use his will-power,' or his 'self-control,' succeed only when the strength of the ego ideal is definitely greater than that of the repressed libidinal wishes, as it is in the normal. It is natural that the relatives should ask for this desideratum, but they overlook the fact that the very existence of neurotic symptoms shows that in all probability the two sides of the conflict are more evenly matched than they hope. It is only rarely that much can be accomplished by simple methods of reinforcing the ego ideal, *i.e.* the repressions.

Finally, the theory here advanced leads me to attempt some re-statement of our formulations regarding the mechanism of mental healing in general. The essential problem is the fate of the repressed allo-erotic (usually incestuous) impulses which conflict with the ego ideal and constitute the important dynamic factor in every neurotic symptom. Only a part of them can be directly sublimated, a solution which the patient has already tried, though, it is true, under unfavourable psychological conditions. Now it would seem that all possible means of dealing with the situation therapeutically reduce themselves ultimately to two, and to two only. Either the libidinal energy of these impulses can be, more or less completely, re-converted into the narcissism from which they proceeded, this being effected by a regression in an auto-erotic direction, or else the assimilative capacity of the ego ideal can be raised. These two principles are, as will be shown in a moment, mutually contradictory and therefore to a large extent incompatible with each other, and this explains why it is fundamentally impossible to combine the two methods of treatment based on them, those of suggestion and psycho-analysis respectively. One may lay down the dictum that if the patient is not treated by psycho-analysis he will treat himself by means of suggestion, or—put more fully—he will see to it that he will get treated by means

<sup>1</sup> "Suggestion und Hypnose," *op. cit.* S. 428, 472.



of suggestion whatever other views the physician may have on the subject.

When a neurotic patient comes for any kind of treatment he will soon transfer unconsciously on to the idea of the physician various repressed allo-erotic tendencies, *i.e.* he will take the physician as a love-object (provided, of course, that the treatment continues long enough). If the treatment is not psycho-analysis one of two things will happen. The patient may become aware of affection for the physician. Then probably symptoms will improve, libido being withdrawn from them and transferred to the idea of the physician. I suspect, however, that in these cases true educative treatment by suggestion or any allied method is rarely successful. What usually happens is that the improvement is dependent on continued contact with the physician, and even this has to be of a specially satisfactory kind. When the physician's attention is withdrawn the symptoms tend to reappear. The alternative to this course of events is that the allo-erotism regresses to the stage of narcissistic identification with the physician, that is, the father ideal. The educative suggestions then made are more likely to have a lasting effect, the reason being that the stage to which the patient's libidinal organisation is reduced approximates closely to that of true narcissism, so that when he leaves the physician he still has himself as a love-object. This is certainly the direction that most neurotics spontaneously take, for it spares them the suffering of symptoms, the distress at having to recognise their repressed allo-erotism, and the pangs of disappointed love. It is the great reason, as I hinted at the outset of my paper, why auto-suggestion is so widely preferred to hetero-suggestion, with all its potentialities of allo-erotism. The practical drawback to auto-suggestion clinically is that it is in so many cases harder to mobilise the narcissism in this way than by means of hetero-suggestion. The drawback to any form of suggestion is that what peace of mind it gives is purchased at the expense of an important part of the personality being impeded in development, with consequent lack of stability; the allo-erotism that should progress to object-love, altruism and the various sublimations of life regress towards auto-erotism, with all its stultifying potentialities.

In psycho-analysis, on the other hand, the aim of the treatment is to effect some reconciliation—or at least tolerance—between the ego ideal and the repressed allo-erotism. As in other forms of treatment, the allo-erotic transference tends to regress to a stage in which the analyst is identified with the father component of the ego ideal, *i.e.* with the father ideal, and this tendency has to be carefully watched by the analyst.

When the ego ideal begins to raise serious protests against accepting the repressed tendencies that are being brought to light by the analytic procedure, the well-known state of resistance ensues. Now the most securely entrenched form of resistance<sup>1</sup>, one to which there is a tendency in all analyses, is that in which the patient identifies the analyst with his real ego, projects on to him his own repressed mental processes, and then severely criticises him from the standpoint of his ego ideal. This situation is the most formidable met with in psycho-analytic work, for all object-relationship between analyst and patient may be suspended, and the analyst cannot proceed until this is re-established. As it is characteristically accompanied by such manifestations as arrogant conceit, the analyst often says that a limit has been set to analytic possibilities by the patient's narcissism, overlooking the vital consideration that the narcissism is not a primary one, but has been secondarily resorted to as a defence against repressed allo-erotism. It may be said, therefore, that the success of an analysis depends very largely on the extent to which the analyst can manage to preserve an object-relationship to himself in the patient's mind, for it is just this relationship that has to be brought to consciousness and harmonised with the ego ideal.

It will thus be seen that the aims of the hypnotist and the analyst are diametrically opposed. The former really seeks to strengthen the patient's narcissism, the latter to divert it into more developed forms of mental activity. The psychological situation (narcissistic identification) most favourable to the one aim is fatal to the other.

I have considered here the contrast between suggestion and analysis in its therapeutic aspects only. It is probable, however, that it is applicable over far wider fields. The contrast between auto-erotism and allo-erotism on which it rests, *i.e.* between infantilism and adult life, may be correlated with the whole difference in outlook and conduct between the mental attitude of introversion and exclusion of reality, on the one hand, and adjustment to the world of reality on the other: between what may be called the Eastern and the Western methods of dealing with life.

<sup>1</sup> An excellent description of the manifestations of this is given by Abraham, "Über eine besondere Form des neurotischen Widerstandes gegen die psychoanalytische Methodik," *Internat. Zeitschr. f. Psychoanalyse*, 1919, Bd. v. S. 173.

# ON THE RELATION OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY TO POETIC ART<sup>1</sup>.

By C. G. JUNG.

NOTWITHSTANDING its difficulty, the task of discussing the relation of analytical psychology to poetic art provides me with a not unwelcome occasion for defining my standpoint in regard to the much debated question of the relation between psychology and art generally. In spite of their incommensurability, both provinces are doubtless closely inter-related, and these connections cannot remain uninvestigated. For they originate from the fact that, in practice, art is a psychological activity, and, just in so far as this is the case, it can and, indeed, should be subjected to a psychological consideration. Art, like every other human activity proceeding from psychic motives, is from this angle a proper object for psychology. This conclusion, however, also involves a very obvious limitation in the application of the psychological viewpoint: *only that portion of art which consists in the process of artistic form can be an object of psychology, but that which constitutes the essential nature of art must always lie outside its province. This other portion, namely, the problem, what is art in itself, can never be the object of a psychological, but only of an aesthetico-artistic method of approach.*

A similar distinction must also be made in the realm of religion; there also a psychological consideration is permissible only in respect of the emotional and symbolical phenomena of a religion, wherein the essential nature of religion is in no way involved, as indeed it cannot be. For were this possible, not religion alone, but art also could be treated as a mere subdivision of psychology. In saying this I do not mean to affirm that such an encroachment has not actually taken place. But whoever trespasses in this way clearly forgets that a similar fate can easily befall psychology, whose specific value and essential quality is entirely destroyed as soon as it is regarded as a mere brain activity, thus aligning it with other glandular activities, as a mere subdivision of physiology. In actual fact, this, as we all know, has actually occurred.

<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache und Literatur, in Zurich, May, 1922. Translation by H. Godwin Baynes.

Art, by its very nature, is not science, and science is essentially not art; both provinces of the mind, therefore, have a reservation which is peculiar to them, and which can only be explained from themselves. Hence when we speak of the relation between psychology and art, we are only treating of that portion of art which without encroachment can be submitted to a psychological manner of approach. Whatever psychology is able to determine about art will be confined to the psychological process of artistic activity, and will have nothing whatever to do with the innermost nature of art itself. It is as powerless in this respect as is the capacity of the intellect to present or even apprehend the nature of feeling. Moreover these two things could have no kind of existence as separate entities, had not their essential difference long since challenged recognition. The fact that in the child, the "war of faculties" not yet having declared itself, we find artistic, scientific, and religious possibilities still slumbering tranquilly together; or that with the primitives dispositions towards art, science, and religion still maintain an undifferentiated co-existence in the chaos of the magical mentality; or that, finally, with animals, no trace of "mind" can as yet be discerned, but merely "natural instinct." All these facts hold no shadow of evidence for that essential unity of nature in art and science which could alone justify a reciprocal subsumption, or in other words, a reduction of the one into the other. For if we go far enough back in the state of mental development for the essential differences of the individual provinces of the mind to have become altogether invisible, we have not thereby reached a deeper principle of their unity, but merely an earlier evolutionary state of undifferentiation in which neither province can be said to have a separate existence. But this elementary state is not a principle from which any conclusion regarding the nature of later and more highly developed states might be inferred, notwithstanding, as is indeed always the case, that a direct descent can be demonstrated. The scientific attitude will naturally and constantly tend to overlook the nature of a differentiation in favour of a causal derivation, and will strive to subordinate the former to an idea that is certainly more general, but at the same time more elementary.

These reflections seem to me not inappropriate at the present time, for there have been frequent demonstrations of late, how poetic artworks in particular may be submitted to an interpretation that corresponds precisely with this reduction to elementary conditions. Granted that the determinants of the artistic creation, the material and its individual treatment, can, for instance, be traced back to the personal

relations of the poet with his parents. Yet nothing is, thereby, gained for the understanding of his art, since we can perform the same reduction in every other possible case, and not the least in cases of pathological disorder. Neuroses and psychoses are also reducible to infantile relations with the parents, as are good and bad habits, convictions, qualities, passions, especial interests and so forth. But we are surely not entitled to assume that all these very different things must, therefore, have one and the same explanation; for were this so, we should be driven to conclude that they were in actual fact one and the same thing. Thus, if a work of art and a neurosis are explained in precisely similar terms, either the art-work must be a neurosis, or the neurosis a work of art. As a paradoxical play upon words such a *façon de parler* might pass muster, but a healthy human reason must assuredly revolt at the notion of art-work and neurosis being placed within the same category. To take the most extreme case, only an analysing physician viewing a neurosis through the spectacles of a professional bias could come to regard it as a work of art. But it would never occur to a thinking lay mind to confound art with a morbid phenomenon, in spite of the undeniable fact that the origin of a work of art must confess to similar psychological preconditions as a neurosis. This is only natural, since certain psychic preconditions are universally present, and furthermore, because of the relative similarity of human conditions of life, these are constantly the same, whether in the case of a nervous intellectual, a poet, or a normal human being. All, doubtless, have had parents, all have a so-called father and mother-complex, all have the onus of sexuality and, therewith, certain general and typical human difficulties. That one poet is influenced more by the relation with the father, another by the tie to the mother, while a third reveals unmistakable traces of repressed sexuality in his works; all this can be said equally well not only of every neurotic, but also of every normal human being. Hence nothing specific is thereby gained for the judgment of a work of art. At most our knowledge of the historic preconditions will have been somewhat broadened and deepened. The school of medical psychology inaugurated by Freud has certainly tended to inspire the literary historian to bring certain qualities of the individual work of art into relation with the personal and intimate life of the poet. But thereby nothing more has been said than what the scientific treatment of poetic works had long since revealed, viz. the presence of certain threads, woven by the personal and intimate life of the poet—whether with or without conscious intention—into the fabric of his work. But the works of Freud may conceivably enable a more

penetrating and exhaustive demonstration of those influences, reaching back even as far as earliest childhood, which may affect the artistic creation.

When employed with taste and common sense, such treatment often provides an attractive general picture of the way in which, on the one hand, the artistic creation is interwoven in, while, on the other, it re-emerges from the personal life of the artist.

To this extent the so-called psycho-analysis of art-works is in no essential way distinguished from a penetrating and skilfully shaded psychologico-literary analysis. The difference is at most a question of degree, although it may occasionally astound us by indiscreet conclusions and references which a rather more delicate touch, or a certain feeling of tact might easily have avoided. This lack of delicacy in dealing with the all-too-human element, which seems to be a professional peculiarity of medical psychology, was perfectly understood by Mephistopheles: "So may you finger everything and welcome, round which another prowls for years and years"—although unfortunately not always to their own advantage. The possibility of daring conclusions may easily lead the way to regrettable lapses. A little touch of scandal often flavours a biography, but a little more becomes nasty inquisitiveness, a catastrophe of good taste beneath the cloak of science. Our interest is unwittingly diverted from the work of art and gets lost in the mazy, labyrinthine confusion of psychic preconditions; the poet becomes a clinical case, even serving on occasion as a curious example of psychopathy sexualis. But therewith the psycho-analysis of the art-work has also turned aside from its objective, and the discussion has strayed into a province that is as broad as mankind, and not in the smallest degree specific for the artist, and, hence, possessing even less relevance to his art.

This kind of analysis brings the work of art into the sphere of general human psychology, whence everything else besides art may proceed. An explanation of a work of art obtained in this way is just as great a futility as is the statement "every artist is a narcissist." Every man who pursues his own line to the limit of his powers is a "narcissist"—if indeed it is at all permissible to use a concept so specifically coined for the pathology of neuroses in this wider application—hence such a statement says nothing, it merely surprises in the manner of a *bon-mot*. Because this kind of analysis is in no sense concerned with the art-work itself, but is always striving, with the instinct of a mole, to bury itself as quickly as possible in the murky back-ground of the human psyche, it always finds itself in that same common earth which unites all mankind.

Accordingly its explanations possess an indescribable monotony—that same tedious recital, in short, which can daily be heard in certain medical consulting rooms.

The reductive method of Freud is purely a method of medical treatment, having for its object a morbid and figurative product. This morbid creation has taken the place of normal accomplishment, and hence must be broken down before the way can be cleared to a sound adaptation. In this case the process of leading-back to a general human basis is entirely appropriate. But when applied to the work of art, this method leads to the results depicted above. From beneath the shimmering robe of art it extracts the naked commonness of the elementary *Homo sapiens*, to which species the poet also belongs. The golden semblance of sublime creation we were about to discuss is blotted out, for its essence is lost when we try to seize it in those same hard-etched lines with which we depict the deceptive, phantastic products of hysteria.

Such a cross-section is, of course, interesting, and might conceivably possess an equal scientific value with a post-mortem examination of the brain of Nietzsche, which might certainly teach us the particular atypical form of paralysis from which he died. But what has this to do with Zarathustra? Whatever may have been its subterranean background, is this not a world in itself beyond the sphere of all-too-human imperfections, beyond the world of migraine and cerebral atrophy?

I have spoken hitherto of Freud's reductive method without stating with any particularity in what the method consists. It has to do with a medico-psychological technique for the investigation of morbid psychic phenomena. This technique is exclusively occupied with ways and means for circumventing or peering through the conscious foreground in order to reach the so-called unconscious, or psychic background. It is based upon the assumption that the neurotic patient is repressing certain psychic contents from consciousness because of their incompatibility or inconsistency with conscious values. This incompatibility is regarded as a moral one; accordingly, the repressed contents must bear a correspondingly negative character, namely, infantile-sexual, obscene, or even criminal. It is these qualities that render them so distasteful to consciousness. Since no man is perfect, it is clear that everyone must possess such a background whether the fact be admitted or not. Hence it can be disclosed in all cases if only we apply the technique of interpretation elaborated by Freud.

I cannot, of course, enter here into the details of the technique. A few intimations as to its nature must suffice. The unconscious background

does not remain inactive, but betrays itself by certain characteristic effects upon the conscious contents. For example, it creates phantasy-products of a peculiar quality, which are in most cases easily referable to certain subterranean sexual representations. Or it effects certain characteristic disturbances of the conscious process, which are likewise reducible to repressed contents. A most important source for the knowledge of unconscious contents is provided by dreams, which are direct products of the activity of the unconscious. The essential factor of Freud's reductive method consists in the fact, that it collects all the circumstantial evidence of the unconscious backgrounds, and, through the analysis and interpretation of this material, reconstructs the elementary, unconscious, instinctive processes. Those conscious contents which give us a clue, as it were, to the unconscious backgrounds are by Freud incorrectly termed *symbols*. These are not true symbols, however, since according to his teaching, they have merely the rôle of *signs* or *symptoms* of the background processes. The true symbol differs essentially from this, and should be understood as the expression of an intuitive perception which can as yet neither be apprehended better nor expressed differently. When, for example, Plato expresses the whole problem of the theory of cognition in his metaphor of the cave, or when Christ expresses the idea of the Kingdom of Heaven in his parables, these are genuine and true symbols, namely, attempts to express a thing, for which there exists as yet no verbal concept. If we were to interpret Plato's metaphor in the manner of Freud, we should naturally come to the uterus, and we should have proved that even the mind of Plato was still deeply stuck in the primeval levels of "infantile sexuality." But in so doing we should also remain in total ignorance of what Plato actually created from the primitive antecedents of his philosophical intuition; we should, in fact, carelessly have overlooked his most essential product, merely to discover that he had "infantile" phantasies like every other mortal. Such a conclusion could possess value only for the man who regards Plato as a super-human being, and who is therefore able to find a certain satisfaction in the fact that even Plato was also a man. But who would want to regard Plato as a god? Surely only a man who is afflicted by the tyranny of infantile phantasies, in other words, a neurotic mentality. For such an one the reduction to universal human truths is profitable on medical grounds. But the real meaning of the Platonic parable is completely beyond his grasp.

I have purposely lingered over the relation between medical psycho-analysis and the work of art, because I want to emphasize the point, that this kind of psycho-analysis is, at the same time, also the Freudian



doctrine. Freud himself by his rigid dogmatism has seen to it, that the two fundamentally different things should be regarded by the public as identical. Yet this technique may be employed with benefit in certain medical cases without any corresponding necessity to exalt it to the level of a doctrine. Indeed against this doctrine we are bound to raise vigorous objections. The assumptions it rests upon are quite arbitrary. In no sense, for example, are the neuroses exclusively based upon sexual repression, and the same holds good for the psychoses. There is no foundation for saying, that dreams merely contain repressed wishes whose incompatibility requires them to be disguised by a hypothetical dream-censor. The Freudian technique, in so far as it remains under the influence of its own one-sided and therefore erroneous hypotheses, is patently arbitrary.

Before analytical psychology can do justice to the work of art, it must entirely rid itself of medical prejudice, for the art work is not a morbidity, and demands, therefore, a wholly different orientation from the medical. The physician must naturally seek the prime cause of a sickness in order to eradicate it, if possible, by the roots, but just as naturally must the psychologist adopt an entirely contrary attitude towards the work of art. He will not raise the question, which for the art-work is quite superfluous, as to its undoubted general antecedents, its basic human determinants, but he will enquire into the meaning of the work, and will be concerned with its preconditions only in so far as they are necessary for the understanding of its meaning. Personal causality has as much and as little to do with the work of art, as has the soil with the plant that springs from it. Doubtless we may learn to understand some peculiarities of the plant by becoming familiar with the character of its habitat. And for the botanist this is, in fact, an important component of his knowledge. But nobody will maintain that therewith all the essentials relating to the plant itself have been recognised. The personal orientation which is demanded by the problem of personal causality, is out of place in the presence of the work of art, just because the work of art is not a human being, but is essentially supra-personal. It is a thing which has no personality, hence for it the personal is no criterion. Indeed the especial significance of the genuine art-work lies in the fact, that it has successfully rid itself of the restraints and blind alleys of the personal and breathes an air infinitely remote from the short-winded perishableness of the merely personal.

I must confess from personal experience, that it is no light matter for the physician to lay aside his professional spectacles in presence of the

work of art, while at the same time clearing his judgment of the current biological causality. I have learnt, however, to understand that a psychology with a purely biological orientation can with a certain measure of justification be applied to men, but never to the true work of art, hence still less to man as creator. A purely causalistic psychology is only able to reduce every human individual to a member of the species *Homo sapiens*, since its entire range is limited to that which is either transmitted or derived. But the art-work is not only transmitted and derived—it is a creative reorganisation of those very determinants to which a causalistic psychology must always reduce it. The plant is not a mere product of the soil, but a living creative process centred in itself, the essence of which has nothing to do with the character of the soil. In the same way the art-work must be regarded as a creative formation, freely making use of every precondition. Its meaning and its own individual particularity rests in itself, and not in its preconditions; in truth one might almost say, it is a being that uses man and his personal dispositions merely as a cultural medium or soil, whose forces it disposes according to its own laws, while shaping itself to the fulfilment of its own creative purpose.

But here I am anticipating somewhat, since I have in mind a particular class of art-work, which I have first to introduce. For not every work of art is produced under this constellation. There are works, verse as well as prose writings, which proceed wholly from the author's intention and resolve to produce this or that effect. In this case the author submits his material to a definite treatment that is both directed and purposeful; he adds to it and subtracts from it, emphasizing one effect, modifying another, laying on this colour here, that there, with the most careful weighing of their possible effects, and with constant observance of the laws of beautiful form and style. To this labour the author brings his keenest judgment, and selects his expression with the most complete freedom. In his view his material is only material, and entirely subject to his artistic purpose; he wills to present *this* and nothing else. In this activity the poet is simply identical with the creative process, whether he has willingly placed himself at the head of the creative movement, or whether this has so entirely seized upon him as a tool or instrument that all consciousness of the fact has escaped him. He is the creative process itself, standing completely in it and undifferentiated from it, with all his aims and all his powers. There is no need, I think, to bring before you examples of this identity, either from the history of literature or from the poets' own confessions.

Doubtless, also, I tell you nothing new when I speak of the other class of art-works which flow more or less spontaneous and perfect from the author's pen. They come as it were fully arrayed into the world, as Pallas Athene sprang from the head of Zeus. These works positively impose themselves upon the author, his hand is, as it were, seized, his pen writes things that his mind perceives with amazement. The work brings with it its own form, what he would add to it is declined, what he does not wish to admit is forced upon him. While his consciousness stands disconcerted and empty before the phenomenon, he is overwhelmed with a flood of thoughts and images which it was never his aim to beget, and which his will would never have fashioned. Yet in spite of himself he is forced to recognize that in all this his Self is speaking, that his innermost nature is revealing itself, uttering things that he would never have entrusted to his tongue. He can only obey and follow the apparently foreign impulse, feeling that his work is greater than himself, and therefore has a power over him which he is quite unable to command. *He is not identical with the process of creative formation*; he is himself conscious of the fact that he stands as it were underneath his work, or at all events beside it, as though he were another person who had fallen within the magic circle of a foreign will.

When we are speaking of the psychology of a work of art, before all else we must bear in mind these two entirely different possibilities of the origin of a work, since much that is of the greatest importance for psychological judgment hangs upon this discrimination. This antithesis was also sensed by Schiller; he sought, as we all know, to embrace it with the concept, sentimental and naïve. The choice of his expression is probably based upon the fact, that he had mainly the poetic activity in view. Psychologically we term the former kind introverted, the latter extraverted. The introverted attitude is characterized by an upholding of the subject with his conscious ends and aims against the claims and pretensions of the object; the extraverted attitude, on the contrary, is distinguished by a subordination of the subject to the claims of the object. In my view, Schiller's dramas give a good idea of the introverted attitude to material, as also do most of his poems. The material is mastered by the aim of the poet. For the opposite attitude the second part of Faust gives us a good illustration. Here the material distinguishes itself by its refractory obstinacy. A still more striking example must be Nietzsche's 'Zarathustra,' wherein the author himself observes how "one became two."

You will perhaps have sensed from my way of presenting the matter,

that a considerable displacement of psychological standpoint has taken place, for now I am no longer speaking of the poet as a person, but of the creative process which moves him. The accent of interest has been shifted to the latter factor, while the former comes into consideration, as it were, only as a reacting object. When the consciousness of the author is not identical with the creative process, this is at once clear, but in the first-mentioned instance the opposite appears at first to be the case; here the author is apparently the creator himself, of his own free will and without the smallest compulsion. He is perhaps fully convinced of his own freedom, and will not be disposed to allow that his creation is not also his will, from which, in conjunction with his knowledge, he believes it to be exclusively derived.

Here we encounter a question which we are quite unable to answer from what the poet himself tells us about the manner of his creating. It is really a scientific problem which psychology alone can solve. For it might also be the case, as indeed I have already lightly hinted at, that the poet who while apparently creating consciously and spontaneously out of himself, producing only what he intends, is nevertheless, in spite of his consciousness, so caught up by the creative impulse, that he is as little aware of any other will, as the other type can be said to have any direct appreciation of his own will in the apparently foreign inspiration, and this notwithstanding the fact that it is manifestly the voice of his own Self. In this case his conviction of the unconditioned freedom of his creating would be an illusion of consciousness—he fancies he is swimming, whereas an invisible stream bears him along.

In no sense is this doubt an airy phantasy; it is founded upon the experience of analytical psychology. For analytical investigation of the unconscious has disclosed an abundance of possibilities where consciousness is not only influenced by the unconscious, but is actually led by it. The doubt therefore is justified. Yet where may we find evidence for the possible assumption, that a conscious poet may also be taken captive by his work? The proof may be of two kinds, direct or indirect. Direct proof would be found in those cases, where the poet, in what he believes he is saying, says, either more or less obviously, more than he himself is aware of. Such cases are none too seldom. Indirect proof would be found in cases, where behind the apparent spontaneity of the production there stands a higher "must," which reveals the imperative nature of its demand whenever a voluntary renunciation to the creative activity takes place, or where difficult psychic complications immediately intervene in the event of an arbitrary interruption of the artistic production.

Practical analysis of artists invariably shows, not only the strength of the creative impulse springing from the unconscious, but also its splenetic and arbitrary character. We have only to turn to any of the biographies of the great artists to find abundant evidence of how the creative urge works upon them so imperiously, as actually to absorb every human impulse, yoking everything to the service of the work, even at the cost of health and common human happiness! The unborn work in the soul of the artist is a force of Nature that effects its purpose, either with tyrannical might or with that subtle cunning which Nature brings to the achievement of her end, quite regardless of the personal weal or woe of the man who is the vehicle of the creative force. The creative energy lives and waxes in the man, as a tree in the earth from which it exacts its nourishment. It might be well, therefore, to regard the creative process as a living thing, implanted, as it were, within the souls of men. Analytical psychology calls this an *autonomous complex*, which, being a detached portion of the psyche, leads an independent psychic life, withdrawn from the hierarchy of consciousness, and, in accordance with its energetic value or force, may appear as a mere disturbance of the voluntarily directed process of consciousness, or the ego as a super-ordinated authority, may take it bodily into its service. The latter therefore would be the poet who is identified with the creative process, who at once acquiesces whenever the unconscious "must" threatens. But the other poet, to whom the creative element appears almost as a foreign power, is a man for whom some reason or other is unable to acquiesce, and is, accordingly, caught by the "must" unawares.

It might be expected that this heterogeneity of its genesis would also be felt in a work of art. For in one case we have to do with a purposeful production, accompanied and directed by consciousness, to the making of which every consideration as to the form and effect intended has been freely given, while in the other we are dealing with an event proceeding from unconscious nature, something which effects its aim without the smallest contribution from human consciousness, sometimes, indeed, arbitrarily imposing its form and effect in spite of the latter. Thus we should expect in the former case, that nowhere would the work transcend the limits of conscious understanding, that its effect would, as it were, be spent within the framework of the author's intention, and that in no way would its expression exceed the author's deliberate purpose. In the latter case we should have to conceive of something of a supra-personal character which transcends the range of conscious understanding in the same degree as the author's consciousness is with-

drawn from the development of his work. We should expect a certain strangeness of form and shape, thoughts which can only be apprehended by intuition, a language pregnant with meanings, whose expressions would have the value of genuine symbols, because they are the best possible expressions of something as yet unknown—bridges thrown out towards an invisible shore.

These criteria are, on the whole, decisive. Wherever it is a question of an admittedly intended work with consciously selected material, it should correspond with the first-named qualities, and similarly in the latter case. The familiar example of Schiller's dramas, on the one hand, and the second part of *Faust*, on the other, or better still Zarathustra, should illustrate what has been said. I would not, however, pledge myself to classify the work of an unknown poet into either of these classes, without previously having made a rather searching enquiry into the poet's personal relation to his work. The knowledge as to whether a poet belongs to the introverted or to the extraverted type of man is not enough, since both types have the possibility of producing, in the one case in the extraverted, and, in the other, in the introverted attitude. In particular this is to be observed with Schiller, in the difference between his poetical and his philosophical works; with Goethe in the contrast between his perfectly formed poems and his obvious struggle in the shaping of his material in the second part of *Faust*; with Nietzsche in the difference between his aphorisms and the coherent stream of Zarathustra. The same poet may have quite different attitudes towards his various works, and the particular standard to be applied must be made dependent upon the particular relation prevailing at the time of production.

This question, as we now see, is infinitely complicated. But the complication is still further aggravated when our judgment must also embrace the above mentioned considerations, concerning the case of the poet who is identical with the creative impulse. Should it chance that the conscious and purposeful manner of production, with all its apparent consciousness and purposefulness, is nevertheless a mere subjective illusion of the poet, then his work will also possess the same symbolical qualities, passing into the indefinable, and thus transcending contemporary consciousness. But in this case these qualities would remain hidden, for the reader would, likewise, be unable to reach beyond the limits of the author's consciousness, which are themselves fixed by the spirit of his time. He, too, moves within the confines of contemporary consciousness, with small hope of availing himself of some Archimedian point outside the orbit of his world, by which he could raise, as it were,

his contemporary consciousness from its hinges. For nothing short of this would enable him to recognise the symbol in a work of this kind; the symbol being the possibility and intimation of a meaning higher and wider than our present powers of comprehension can seize.

This question, as we remarked, is somewhat delicate. Indeed, I am raising it only that the possible significance of a work of art might not be fettered or restricted by my typification, even though apparently it intends neither to be nor to say anything except what it obviously is and says. Nevertheless it commonly happens, that a poet long dead is suddenly rediscovered. This happens when our conscious development has reached a higher level, from which standpoint the ancient poet can tell us something new. It was always present in his work, but it remained a hidden symbol, that only a renewal of the spirit of the time permits us to read and to understand. It demanded other and fresher eyes; just because the old ones could see in it only the things they were accustomed to see. Experiences such as these should caution us to be circumspect, since they give a certain justification to the view I developed above; whereas the admittedly symbolic work does not demand this subtlety. In its intuitive language it almost seems to say: "I am really meaning more than I actually say, my meaning carries further than my words." Here we may lay our hand upon the symbol, although a satisfying solution of the riddle still escapes us. The symbol remains a perpetual reproach to our subsequent thoughts and feelings. Surely this explains the fact, that the symbolical work is more stimulating, drives, as it were, more deeply into us, and therefore seldom permits us a purely aesthetic enjoyment of it; whereas the work that is manifestly not symbolic appeals much more vividly to our aesthetic sensibility, because it offers us an harmonious vision of fulfilment.

But, you may ask, what contribution can analytical psychology make to the root-problem of artistic "creation," *i.e.* the mystery of the creative energy? All that we have spoken of hitherto is in fact merely psychological phenomenology. Since "no creative mind can penetrate the inner soul of Nature," you will surely not expect the impossible from our psychology, namely, a valid explanation of that great mystery of life, which we immediately feel in the creative impulse. Like every other science, psychology has only a modest contribution to make towards the better and deeper understanding of the phenomena of life, but it is no nearer than its sisters to absolute knowledge.

We have spoken so much of the significance and meaning of the work of art, that one can hardly suppress the theoretical doubt, whether in

fact art does "signify." Perhaps art itself does not intend to "signify," contains no sort of "meaning," at least not in the sense in which we are now speaking of "meaning." Perhaps it is like Nature, which simply *is*, without any intention to "signify." Is "meaning" necessarily more than mere interpretation "secreted" into it through the need of an intellect hungry for meaning? Art—one might say—is beauty, and therein finds its true aim and fulfilment. It needs no meaning. The question of meaning possesses nothing productive for art. When I enter the sphere of art I must certainly submit to the truth of this statement. But when we are speaking of the relation of psychology to the work of art, we are standing outside the realm of art, and here it is impossible for us not to speculate; we must interpret, so that things may acquire meaning, otherwise we should be quite unable to think about them. We must resolve life and happening, all that fulfils itself in itself, into images, meanings, concepts; thereby deliberately detaching ourselves from the living mystery. As long as we are caught up in the creative element itself, we neither see nor understand; indeed we must not begin to understand, for nothing is more damaging and dangerous to immediate experience than cognition. For the purpose of cognition we must detach ourselves from the creative process, and regard it from without; only then does it become a picture that expresses meanings. Then we not only *may*—but indeed we *must* speak of "meaning." And in so doing, what was before pure phenomenon becomes something which, in association with other phenomena, means something; it plays a definite rôle, serves certain ends, brings about effects fraught with meaning. And when we can see all this we get the feeling of having understood and explained something. And thus is the need of science recognised.

When, just now, we likened the art-work to a tree growing from the nourishing earth, we might with equal justice have chosen the still more familiar metaphor of the child in its mother's womb. But there is a certain lameness about all comparisons: in place of metaphors, therefore, let us make use of the more precise terminology of science. You will remember that I described the work existing *in statu nascendi* as an autonomous complex. This concept is used merely to distinguish all those psychic formations which, at first, are developed quite unconsciously, and only from the moment when they attain threshold-value are able to break through into consciousness. The association which they then make with consciousness has not the importance of an assimilation, but rather of a perception; which means to say, that the autonomous complex, although certainly perceived, cannot be subjected to conscious



control, whether in the form of inhibition or of voluntary reproduction. The autonomy of the complex reveals itself in the fact, that it appears or vanishes when and in such guise as accords with its own indwelling tendency: it is independent of the option of consciousness. The creative complex shares this peculiarity with every other autonomous complex. It is, moreover, at this point that the possibility of an analogy with morbid psychic processes presents itself, for the latter class (and mental disorders in particular) are especially distinguished by the appearance of autonomous complexes. The divine frenzy of the artist has a perilously real relation to morbid states without being identical with them. The analogy consists in the presence of an autonomous complex. The fact of such a presence, however, proves nothing either for or against the morbid hypothesis, since normal men also submit either temporarily or permanently to the tyranny of autonomous complexes. This fact is simply one of the normal peculiarities of the psyche, and for a man to be unaware of the existence of an autonomous complex merely betrays a higher degree of unconsciousness. For instance, every typical attitude, that is to a certain extent differentiated, shows a tendency to become an autonomous complex, and in the majority of cases actually becomes one. Every instinct too has more or less the character of an autonomous complex. In itself, therefore, there is nothing morbid in an autonomous complex, only its stored-up energy and disturbing appearance on the scene involve suffering and illness.

How does an autonomous complex arise? From some cause or another—a closer investigation of which would at this point lead us too far afield—a hitherto unconscious region of the psyche is thrown into activity; this activation brings about a certain development and extension through the inclusion of related associations. The energy employed in this operation is naturally withdrawn from consciousness, unless the latter prefers to identify itself with the complex. But where this is not the case there results, what Janet has termed an “*abaissement du niveau mental*.” The intensity of conscious interests and activities gradually fades, whereupon, either an apathetic inactivity—a condition very common with artists—or a regressive development of the conscious functions takes place, *i.e.* a descent to their infantile and archaic pre-stages, hence something akin to a degeneration. The “*parties inférieures des fonctions*” force themselves to the front, the instinctive rather than the ethical, the naïvely infantile instead of the deliberated and mature, the unadapted in place of the adapted. This also is shown in the lives of many artists. From the energy thus withdrawn from the conscious control of the personality the autonomous complex develops.

But in what does the autonomous creative complex consist? Of this we can know next to nothing so long as the completed work offers us no insight into its foundations. The work gives us a finished picture in the widest sense. This picture is accessible to analysis, just in so far as we are able to appreciate it as a *symbol*. But in so far as we are not able to discover any symbolic value in it, we have thereby ascertained that, for us at least, it means no more than it obviously says—in other words: so far as we are concerned it is no more than it seems. I use the word “seems,” because it is conceivable that our own bias forbids any wider appreciation of it. At all events in the latter case we can find no motive and no point of attack for analysis. In the former case, however, a phrase of Gerhart Hauptmann will come to our minds almost with the force of an axiom: “Poetry means the distant echo of the primitive word behind our veil of words.” Translated into psychological language, our first question would run: to which primordial image of the collective unconscious can we trace the image we see developed in the work of art?

This question demands elucidation in more than one respect. As I have already observed, the case here assumed is that of a symbolical art-work, a work, therefore, whose source is not to be found in the *personal unconscious* of the author, but in that sphere of unconscious mythology whose primordial images are the common heritage of mankind. Accordingly, I have termed this sphere the *collective unconscious*, thereby distinguishing it from a personal unconscious, which I regard as the totality of those psychic processes and contents which in themselves are not only accessible to consciousness, but would often be conscious were they not subjected to repression as a result of incompatibility, and, therefore, artificially suppressed beneath the threshold of consciousness. From this sphere also art receives tributaries, dark and turbid though they be, and when paramount they make the work of art more a symptomatic than a symbolical product. This kind of art might conceivably be left without injury or regret, to the Freudian purgative method.

In contrast to the personal unconscious which is, in a sense, a relatively superficial stratum immediately below the threshold of consciousness, the collective unconscious is under normal conditions quite incapable of consciousness, and hence by no analytical technique can it be brought to conscious recollection, being neither repressed nor forgotten. In itself, the collective unconscious cannot be said to exist at all; that is to say, it is nothing but a possibility, that possibility, in fact, which from primordial time has found expression in the definite form of mnemonic

images or anatomical structure. It is inherited in the structure of the brain. It does not yield inborn ideas, but inborn possibilities of ideas, which also set definite bounds to the most daring phantasy. It provides categories of phantasy-activity, ideas *a priori*, as it were, the existence of which cannot be determined without experience. In finished or shaped material it appears only as the regulative principle of its shaping, *i.e.* only through the conclusion derived *a posteriori* from the perfected work of art are we able to reconstruct the primitive foundation of the primordial image. The primordial image or archetype is a figure, whether it be daemon, man, or process, which repeats itself in the course of history, wherever creative phantasy is freely manifested. Essentially, therefore, it is a mythological figure. If we subject these images to a closer investigation, we discover that they are, in a sense, the formulated resultants of countless typical experiences of our ancestors. They are, as it were, the psychic residua of numberless experiences of the same type. They depict millions of individual experiences in the average, presenting a kind of picture of the psychic life, distributed and projected into the manifold shapes of the mythological pandemonium. These mythological forms, however, are in themselves themes of creative phantasy that still await their translation into conceptual language, of which as yet there exist only laborious beginnings. Such concepts, for the most part still to be created, could provide us with an abstract, scientific understanding of the unconscious processes which are the roots of the primordial images. Each of these images contains a piece of human psychology and human destiny, a relic of suffering and delight which has happened countless times in our ancestral story, and, on the average, follows ever the same course. It is like a deeply graven river-bed in the soul, in which the waters of life, that had spread hitherto with groping and uncertain course over wide but shallow surfaces, suddenly become a mighty river, just when that particular concatenation of circumstances comes about which from immemorial time has contributed to the realisation of the primordial image. The moment when the mythological situation appears is always characterised by a peculiar emotional intensity; it is as though chords in us were touched which had never resounded before, or as though forces were unchained of whose existence we had never dreamed. The struggle for adaptation is a laborious matter, because we have constantly to be dealing with individuals, *i.e.* atypical conditions. It is no wonder then, that at the moment when a typical situation occurs, either we are suddenly aware of a quite extraordinary release, as though transported, or we are seized upon as by an overwhelming power. At such moments

we are no longer individuals, but the race, the voice of all mankind resounds in us. The individual man, therefore, is never able to use his powers to their fullest range, unless there comes to his aid one of those collective presentations we call ideals, which liberates in his soul all the hidden forces of instinct, to which the ordinary conscious will can alone never gain access. The most effective ideals are always more or less transparent variants of the archetype. This is very noticeable in the fact, that such ideals have so great a liability to allegorisation, *e.g.* the motherland as the mother, wherein of course the allegory contributes not the smallest motive-power, which finds its source in the symbolic value of the motherland-idea. The corresponding archetype in this case is the so-called "participation mystique" of the primitive with the soil on which he dwells, and which alone holds the spirit of his ancestors. Exile spells misery.

Every relation to the archetype, whether through experience or the mere spoken word, is "stirring," *i.e.* it is effective, it calls up a stronger voice than our own. The man who speaks with primordial images speaks with a thousand tongues, he entrances and overpowers, while at the same time he uplifts the idea he is trying to express above the occasional and the transitory into the sphere of the ever-existing; he exalts personal destiny into the destiny of mankind, thus evoking all those beneficent forces which have enabled mankind to find rescue from every hazard and to outlive the longest night.

That is the secret of effective art. The creative process, in so far as we are able to follow it at all, consists in an unconscious animation of the archetype, and in a development and shaping of this image till the work is completed. The shaping of the primordial image is, as it were, a translation into the language of the present, thus enabling every man to be stirred again by the deepest springs of life which would otherwise be closed to him. Therein lies the social importance of art; it is constantly at work educating the spirit of the age, since it brings to birth those forms of which the age stands most in need. Recoiling from the unsatisfying present the yearning of the artist reaches out to that primordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to compensate the insufficiency and one-sidedness of the spirit of the age. This image it seizes; and while raising it from deepest unconsciousness brings it into relation with conscious values, thereby transforming its shape, until it can be accepted by contemporary man in accordance with his powers.

The nature of the work of art permits conclusions about the character of the period from which it sprang. What was the significance of Realism

and Naturalism to their age? What was the meaning of Romanticism or Hellenism? They were tendencies of art which brought to the surface that unconscious element of which the contemporary mental atmosphere had most need. The artist as educator of his time—that is a subject about which much might be said to-day.

People and times, like individual men, have their peculiar tendencies or attitudes. The very word "attitude" betrays the necessary one-sidedness which every definite tendency postulates. Where direction is, there must also be exclusion. But exclusion means, that such and such psychic elements which could participate in life are denied their right to live through incompatibility with the general attitude. The normal man can endure the general tendency without injury; hence, it is the man of the by-streets and alley-ways who, unlike the normal man, cannot travel the broad high-way, who will be the first to discover those elements which lie hidden from the main streets and which await participation in life.

The artist's relative lack of adaptation becomes his real advantage, for it enables him to keep aloof from the main streets the better to follow his own yearning and to find that thing which the others unwittingly passed by. Thus, as in the case of the single individual whose one-sided conscious attitude is corrected by unconscious reactions towards self-regulation, art also represents a process of mental self-regulation in the life of nations and epochs.

I am aware that I have only been able to give certain intuitive perceptions, and these only in the barest outlines. But I may perhaps hope, that what I have been obliged to omit, namely, the concrete application to poetic works, has been furnished by your own thoughts, thus giving flesh and blood to my abstract intellectual frame.

## CRITICAL NOTICE

*Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* By SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D. Authorized translation from the second German edition by C. J. M. HUBBACK. The International Psycho-Analytical Press. pp. 90. Price 6s.

The theory of Psycho-analysis has been built up on the assumption that all mental process is dominated by the pleasure-principle. States of pain and of pleasure are correlated with states of tension and relaxation in the psychic life, and the psychic apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation as low as possible or at least constant. It is obvious, however, that the pleasure-principle does not entirely dominate psychic processes for many of these are not accompanied by pleasure. All that can be maintained is that there is in the psyche a strong tendency towards pleasure which is, however, often frustrated by opposing forces or circumstances.

In examining the conditions which may lead to frustration of the pleasure-principle Freud draws mainly on psycho-analytical experience and enumerates (1) the coming into action of the reality-principle, (2) the conflicts and dissociations during the development of the ego, and the pain caused by the return of the repressed material into consciousness, (3) pain of a perceptual order, perception of the urge of unsatisfied instincts or of something in the external world which may be painful in itself or may arouse painful anticipations. It is in the investigation of the psychic reaction to external danger that he finds the new material which leads him to infer the existence, in the psychic life, of a tendency more primitive and more fundamental than the pleasure-principle.

The necessity for postulating something "beyond the pleasure-principle" would seem to have become urgent when psycho-analysts were confronted with the most striking peculiarity of the "battle-dreams" so common in the traumatic neuroses of war. In these dreams the patient goes through again the terrifying experience which led to his break-down; and analysis fails to reveal any kind of wish-fulfilment in the dreams or to provide any evidence that the pleasure-principle has been at work in their formation.

Freud has suggested that the absence of the wish-fulfilment tendency may perhaps be explained by supposing that the dream-function suffers dislocation and is diverted from its usual ends, or by relating the painful nature of these dreams to the masochistic tendencies of the ego. But such explanations are obviously unsatisfactory and Freud looks around for other examples of mental process with which to compare the repetition of painful experiences so characteristic of dreams in the war neuroses.

He finds a tendency to repetition exemplified sometimes in the play of young children. He tells of a game, invented by a boy of eighteen months old, which he had an opportunity of studying. This child was deeply attached to his mother, yet he never cried when she went out and left him for hours at a time. The game he played consisted in flinging into the corner of the room, or under the bed, his toys and other things that he could lay his hands on. This

frequently repeated action was accompanied by a long drawn out exclamation which was interpreted as meaning "go away." On one occasion he was observed to fling away a wooden reel, which had a string attached to it, and then pull it back by the string, greeting its reappearance with an exclamation of joy. This Freud regarded as the complete game: disappearance and return; and he thinks it was connected with "the child's remarkable cultural achievement—the forgoing of the satisfaction of an instinct—as the result of which he could let his mother go away without making any fuss."

It does not seem as self-evident as Freud supposes that there was any connection between the game and the experience of the mother's departure and return; but, accepting this interpretation, he asks: "How does it accord with the pleasure-principle that the child repeats this painful experience as a game?" Not because of the pleasure of the return, because the first act, the going away, was played by itself as a game and far more frequently than the whole drama. Various conjectures are put forward in reply to the question, but a decisive answer is postponed until some further examples of the repetition of painful experiences are examined.

One of the best illustrations of such repetition is to be found in the course of psycho-analytical treatment. In the transference situation the patient repeats, as a current experience in relation to the analyst, those past experiences which are under repression and unable to get into consciousness as recollections. Although what is repressed has suffered that fate because of its painful nature, and its revival in the form of repetition in the transference brings pain to the conscious, it none the less, as a rule, brings pleasure to the unconscious system, and the pleasure-principle is not contravened. But it is a remarkable fact that the tendency to repetition brings up from the past, amongst other experiences, some which could not, at any time, have been satisfactions, even of impulses afterwards repressed.

The early blossoms of the infantile sex life "perished in most painful circumstances and with feelings of a deeply distressing nature." Frustration of impulses, disappointment, jealousy and failure in the sphere of the affections were the lot of childhood, but notwithstanding the pain which accompanied them, these experiences are repeated in the transference with the same unpleasant consequences. It is as if there were a *compulsion to repetition* which annuls or displaces the pleasure-principle, and necessitates a reproduction of the distressing situations of days long past. A similar compulsion to repetition may be observed in the lives of many normal persons. Psycho-analysis has long maintained that the "fate" which seems to dog the footsteps of some people throughout their lives is, for the most part, of their own making and is determined by influences in earliest childhood.

This, then, is what Freud finds "beyond the pleasure-principle": a repetition-compulsion, "more primitive, more elementary, more instinctive than the pleasure-principle which is displaced by it" (p. 25). To this compelling force he relates the dreams of 'shock' patients, the play impulse in children, the transference phenomena of repetition and what may be called the "destiny-compulsion" of normal people; but he guards against ascribing too much to the operation of this repetition-compulsion and reminds us that only in rare cases can we recognize its workings in a pure form, without the co-operation of other motives.

It may be questioned whether the evidence adduced by Freud is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the compulsion to repetition is an essential

characteristic of psychic life. The repetition tendency in the play of children may be of the same nature as that which lies behind habit formation. It may be merely an instance of the drainage of nervous energy into paths already open. In the other examples given the repetition tendency is related to the activity of repressed, dissociated, mental material, and it may be that the compulsion to repetition is a characteristic of dissociated states rather than a fundamental property of psychic life as a whole. Many "battle-dreams" appear to be little more than a hallucinatory reproduction of the traumatic experience and it may be even questioned whether they ought to be regarded as true dreams at all. As Freud himself says, in discussing "Dreams and Telepathy," "a dream without condensation, distortion, dramatization, most of all without wish-fulfilment, surely hardly deserves the name<sup>1</sup>."

The 'shock' or 'battle' dream often reminds us of those hysterical attacks in which some dissociated experience is lived over again in a somnambulism, and the tendency of such dreams to repeat themselves night after night may be no more than the tendency of all repressed material to get back into consciousness as soon as the resistances are diminished or removed.

What many will regard as the most cogent evidence brought forward in support of the hypothesis of 'repetition-compulsion' is the 'repetition' observed in the transference situation of psycho-analytical practice; and it is interesting to notice that Freud describes this phenomenon in words that are very appropriate to the description of battle-dreams or of hysterical somnambulisms: in both of these conditions as well as in transference repetition, the patient seems "to repeat as a current experience what is repressed, instead of ...recollecting it as a fragment of the past" (p. 18).

We may thus be tempted to conjecture that in shock dreams, in the repetitions in the transference and in the "doggings of fate" in more or less normal people, it may be the ever-recurring "return of the repressed" that simulates a compulsion to repetition. But if this were so we could not ascribe 'repetition' to something "more primitive, more elementary, more instinctive than the pleasure-principle," nor could we say that the pleasure-principle was displaced by it; and it is just its relation to the pleasure-principle which is Freud's chief concern. In the consideration of this problem he allows himself to indulge in a series of brilliant speculations which form the greater part of this little book.

The speculative part of this work sets out with a metapsychological expression of the nature and characteristics of psychic processes. It was an early conclusion of psycho-analysis, derived from investigation of the unconscious, that consciousness cannot be the most general characteristic of psychic processes, but merely a function of "a particular system which may be called Bw." Since consciousness furnishes perceptions of excitations coming from without and feelings of pleasure and pain originating within the psychic apparatus, "we may allot the system W-Bw (= perceptual consciousness) a position in space."

This may seem a hard saying, for we are not accustomed to think of psychic processes in spatial terms. Moreover, we are not helped by Freud's declaration that "in this assumption we have ventured nothing new, but are in agreement with the localizing tendencies of cerebral anatomy, which places the 'seat' of consciousness in the cortical layer, the outermost enveloping layer of the central organ" (p. 27). We may remind ourselves that when he first described

<sup>1</sup> *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. III, part 3, p. 294.



his conception of psychic systems which "maintain a constant spatial relationship to each other" he added that "strictly speaking, there is no need of assuming a real spatial arrangement of the psychic systems" (*Int. of Dreams*, trans. p. 425).

At this point Freud again raises a question which he discussed in *The Interpretation of Dreams*: the question whether the W-Bw. system can retain any lasting trace of excitation, or if its sole function is to enable the excitation to become conscious. He has always held that if the excitations left behind any memory-trace in the conscious system, the latter would soon become unfitted for the registration of new impressions. His conclusion would seem to be that in the conscious system the process of excitation does not lead to any alteration which would leave a memory-trace but that its energy is dissipated in the phenomenon of becoming conscious. In the translation this conclusion is set forth in the somewhat ambiguous pronouncement that "*consciousness arises in the place of the memory-trace.*"

The ambiguity of this phrase reminds us of a similar controversy which at one time occupied the attention of "physiological psychologists." The question of the relation of consciousness to excitation and memory-trace was then asked in reference to localisation in the brain rather than in psychic systems. It was assumed by Ziehen, for example, that sensation and idea depend upon different cortical elements. On the other hand modern psychology has hardly wavered from the belief that "the renewed feeling occupies the very same parts and in the same manner as the original feeling."

It can hardly be gainsaid that Freud's use of spatial metaphors in his description of the functions of the psychic apparatus, while it leads to facilitation of the exposition of his views, is none the less a source of danger to those who are inclined to believe that we have any extensive knowledge of the correlation of mental and cerebral functioning. The tendency to make psychological process conform to what we know of cerebral anatomy is liable to be fostered by Freud's comparison of the Bw. system with the cortex of the brain, and in the further exposition of his views regarding the peculiar effects of stimuli on the conscious system as compared with the other psychic systems, the difference between mental process and its physical analogues or concomitants seems often to be forgotten or disregarded.

He imagines the living organism in the simplest possible form as an undifferentiated vesicle of sensitive substance the surface of which serves as an organ for the reception of stimuli. Owing to the constant impact of stimuli on its surface a rind is formed as a result of a lasting alteration of its substance, and in time this rind becomes incapable of any further modification. Moreover, it has, in the course of this alteration, "been so burned through by the effects of stimulation that it presents the most favourable conditions for the reception of the stimuli." It is not very clear why this should be so.

Although the rind of the vesicle is said to become incapable of any further modification, Freud describes another, and a totally different, modification to which it, or part of it, must submit. For this living vesicle with its receptive outer layer floats about in an outer world which is charged with most powerful energies, and it would be destroyed by the stimuli from this world were it not provided with a shield against stimulus. Such a shield is acquired through the outermost layer ceasing to retain the structure of living matter and becoming to some extent inorganic, so that it serves thereafter as a special integument or membrane capable of withstanding stimuli. That is to say, it

brings it about that the energies of the outside world pass with only a fraction of their intensity to the next layers which have retained their vitality. In highly developed organisms the receptive outer layer has become withdrawn into the depths of the body, forming the nervous system of the organism, but, beneath the shield, it has left behind, as outposts, certain portions which form the various sense organs.

Freud applies his speculations about this "primordial, protoplasmic, atomic globule" to the development of those psychical systems whose functions he first described in his work on the *Interpretation of Dreams*. And it is here that his tendency to mix up the one set of speculations with the other, and to imply that what is true of the physical organism is also necessarily true of the psychical organism, becomes most disconcerting.

The conscious system of the psychic apparatus is regarded as the homologue of the receptive outer layer of the primordial vesicle. Just as the 'rind' of the vesicle becomes incapable of any further modification as a result of the constant impact of external stimuli, so the elements of the conscious system are not susceptible of any further alteration, because they are already modified to the uttermost in that respect; but in some unexplained way this insusceptibility to modification is accompanied by, or the cause of, a capacity for giving rise to consciousness.

He assumes that excitation, in its transmission from one element to another, has to overcome a resistance and that this diminution of the resistance itself lays down the permanent trace of the excitation; but in the conscious system (Bw.) "there would no longer exist any such resistance to transmission from one element to another," and it is apparently in the absence of this resistance, with the consequent impossibility of forming a memory-trace, that he finds the conditions favourable to the appearance of consciousness.

It is interesting to compare this speculation with the hypothesis put forward by McDougall<sup>1</sup> in regard to the correlation of consciousness and its cerebral substratum. The latter writer has suggested that consciousness arises just because of, and in proportion to, the amount of resistance encountered by the nervous impulse in bridging the synapses of the cortical neurones. In the one hypothesis we are given the absence of resistance to excitations in a psychical system, in the other the presence of resistance in a system of neurones, as the immediate cause of the phenomenon of consciousness.

In the distinction which he draws between excitations of the conscious system from without and excitations from within, and in the necessity for the formation of a shield or barrier against those coming from without, Freud finds a means of relating the traumatic neuroses to the neuroses that arise in the absence of any definite trauma. In the traumatic neuroses the excitations which lead to disaster are derived from the outside world and produce their effects only when they are of such mass or intensity that they break through the shield against stimuli provided by the integument of the organism and the special protective mechanisms of the sense organs. In the non-traumatic neuroses, on the other hand, the excitations which give rise to economic disturbances are derived from the primitive impulses or instincts against which no defensive barrier exists.

A breaking through of the shield against stimuli (trauma) leads to a pro-

<sup>1</sup> *Physiological Psychology*, p. 60. *Body and Mind*, p. 278.

found disturbance of the workings of the psychic energy. "The flooding of the psychic apparatus with large masses of stimuli can no longer be prevented: on the contrary, another task presents itself—to bring the stimulus under control, to 'bind' in the psyche the stimulus mass that has broken its way in, so as to bring about a discharge of it" (p. 34).

In various writings Freud has made considerable use of Breuer's distinction between quiescent (bound) and free-moving investment energy in the elements of the psychic systems. According to Breuer there are "two ways in which a system may be filled with energy, so that a distinction has to be made between a 'charging' of the psychic systems (or its elements) that is free-flowing and striving to be discharged and one that is quiescent" (p. 36). Freud conjectures that the binding of the energy streaming into the psychic apparatus when the shield against stimuli has been broken through, consists in "a translating of it from the free-flowing to the quiescent state."

The relation between 'binding' and 'discharge' is not quite clear. We are told that only free-flowing energy is capable of discharge and that the binding of the stimulus mass that has broken in is a translating of it from the free-flowing to the quiescent state; yet we are also told that the binding of the stimulus mass is effected "so as to bring about a discharge of it" (p. 34). Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the statement that "the pleasure-principle is to begin with put out of action here." The control of the stimulus must be effected "before the pleasure-principle can begin its sway."

When the excitations from without are strong enough to break through the barrier provided as a shield against stimuli the first task of the psyche is to bind the stimulus mass and so bring it under control. This is done by a drainage of 'charging energy' from all the other psychic systems, and the setting up of a 'counter-charge' around the breach in the defences. The fulfilment of this task is one of the main functions of anxiety or apprehension. A danger that is apprehended or anticipated gives rise to a psychic preparedness which consists in an over-charging of the threatened system, so that if the shield against stimulus is broken through, the binding of the incoming excitations is more readily effected. The traumatic neuroses result from situations in which danger, not being anticipated, is accompanied by fright rather than by apprehension.

In the value of apprehension as a means of setting up a counter-charge capable of binding the excitations, Freud sees the primary function of those dreams, met with in the traumatic neuroses, which take the dreamer back, night after night, to the scene of the disaster. "These dreams are attempts at restoring control of the stimuli by developing apprehension, the pretermission of which caused the traumatic neurosis" (p. 37). They are not wish-fulfilments, but, "in the interests of the psychical binding of traumatic impressions follow the repetition-compulsion" (p. 39).

Thus the control of the stimuli, "the psychical binding of traumatic impressions," takes precedence of the pleasure-principle in the functioning of the psychic apparatus; and it may be supposed that the source and meaning of the repetition-compulsion are to be found "in the interests of the psychical binding of traumatic impressions." That is to say, we may suppose that the repetition-compulsion comes into action only when there is a need for the psychical binding of impressions. This seems to follow from the considerations brought forward by Freud in regard to those inner excitations, derived from the instincts, to which no shield against stimuli is opposed. These are assumed

to be of the nature of 'free-flowing' as opposed to the 'bound' forms of psychic energy. Moreover, their mode of activity conforms to the 'primary process,' and Freud is inclined to identify the 'secondary process' with changes in the bound or tonic charge. Thus the task of the secondary process would be to bind the mobile excitations, derived from the instincts, which conform to the primary process. If this binding of instinct excitations fails to be effected the consequences will be similar to those produced by external excitations which have broken through the shield against stimuli when, owing to the absence of apprehension, no counter-charge of the psychic elements assailed has been set up.

There seems to be some inconsistency in Freud's statements concerning the traumatic neuroses. He appears to relate the incidence of these neuroses to the breaking through of external excitations and the over-charging of the psychical systems with 'unbound' energy. Yet he admits that a physical trauma lessens the liability to neurosis because of the narcissistic counter-charging of the injured part which occurs. But apart from the impressions from without which cause the physical trauma, what other excitations play a part in the causing of the neurosis? Are they not those impressions from without that arouse the instincts of self-preservation or induce the sexual excitation which, according to Freud, is set free by the mechanical force of the trauma? If this be so, apart from the overflow of traumatic impressions which the narcissistic counter-charge had failed to bind, the pathogenic excitations in the traumatic neuroses would always be derived from within and the actual traumatic impressions themselves would tend towards protection from neurosis. The occurrence of traumatic or 'shock' neuroses in the absence of any bodily injury shows that the physical trauma plays no essential part in their causation; and if this be so, it is not necessary "to regard the ordinary traumatic neurosis as the result of an extensive rupture of the barrier against stimuli"; for it would then be due to an excess of stimulation from those instinctive excitations to resist which no shield against stimuli has been provided.

If the repetition-compulsion has arisen in the interest of the psychical binding of impressions, the need for it exists in respect of all the workings of the psychic apparatus that conform to the primary process—that is, to all the workings of the unconscious system; whenever unconscious processes are in question the need for psychic binding is present, and whenever psychic binding is necessary the repetition-compulsion may be invoked.

Although such a conception would provide a wide field for the activity of the compulsion to repetition, Freud, in following up his speculations, ascribes to it a still more far-reaching rôle and finds it to possess, in a high degree, an instinctive character; not only so, but he finds in it something peculiar to all instincts—perhaps to all organic life—something in terms of which instinct may be defined or, at least, described. In bringing instinct into connection with the compulsion to repetition, Freud describes instinct as "*a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition*" (p. 44).

This description, however, would apply to all mental processes the course of which "is automatically regulated by the pleasure-principle." The transformation of an unpleasant state of tension into one of relaxation may be described as being due to a tendency towards the reinstatement of an earlier

condition. Such a tendency may be, as Freud says, "the manifestation of inertia in organic life." It is thus too general a conception to have any special value in the definition of an instinct: instinct would be but a particular case of the general tendency.

If all organic instincts are strivings towards an earlier condition they must ever tend towards regression, and, as Freud here says, "we are obliged to place all the results of organic development to the credit of external, disturbing and distracting influences" (p. 46). This is just the opposite of what he said in his paper on *Instincts and their Destinies*. He there said that we may certainly conclude that the instincts and not the external stimuli are the true motive forces in the progress that has raised the infinitely efficient nervous system to its present high level of development. He added, however, that there is nothing to prevent our assuming that the instincts themselves are, at least in part, the precipitates of different forms of external stimulation which in the course of phylogenesis have effected modifications in the living substance. So, also, in these later speculations, Freud declares that "in the last resort it must have been the evolution of our earth, and its relation to the sun, that has left its imprint on the development of organisms" (pp. 46-7). But now he adds: "The conservative organic instincts have absorbed every one of these enforced alterations in the course of life and have stored them for repetition: they thus present the delusive appearance of forces striving after change and progress, while they are merely endeavouring to reach an old goal by ways both old and new" (p. 47).

At this point the trend of Freud's thought becomes apparent. The old goal, towards which all organic striving tends, is death—"that ancient starting-point which the living being left long ago, and to which it harks back again by all the circuitous paths of development" (p. 47). Adopting a mechanistic view of the origin and nature of life Freud sees in the animation of inanimate matter nothing but the arousing of a tension which immediately strives to attain an equilibrium. The first instinct of life is a striving to return to lifelessness: equilibrium can be attained only by a return to the inanimate condition.

Freud supposes that at first the return to the inanimate was easily accomplished and that the course of life was determined by the chemical structure of the young organism. He thinks that deviation from the original path of life to death was enforced upon the organism by external influences, although he does not specify what the influences are which compel the living substance to more complicated and circuitous ways to death. Whatever changes in the life-course are thus brought about, they are conserved in succeeding generations and these more circuitous routes to death become the phenomena of life as we know it.

According to this view the instincts which we regard as directed towards the preservation of the life of the individual are merely instincts which try to secure that death shall come only in the way laid down in the previous life-history of the race—"to secure the path to death peculiar to the organism and to ward off possibilities of return to the inorganic other than the immanent ones" (p. 48).

It is hard not to feel that there is something wrong in thus ascribing death to an instinctive force. We are so used to regarding instincts as manifestations of forces making for life, that much evidence would be required to convince us that anything corresponding to what we understand by instinct plays a

part in the onbringing of death. Merely because all life as we know it seems to end in death, we need not suppose that death is a goal towards which life strives, or that its consummation is, in any sense, a direct consequence of the activity of forces peculiar to life, as the instincts are. Death may be at all times a frustration of these forces rather than the attainment of their goal. Life is, as Bergson says, "riveted to an organism that subjects it to the general laws of inert matter. But everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free from these laws" (*Creative Evolution*, p. 259).

Freud's sombre analysis thus far of the course of life, ending as it does on the note of "dust to dust, ashes to ashes," is here, no more than in the burial service, the whole of the story. In the phenomena of reproduction we meet with immediate refutation of the view that death is the only goal of life. When sperm cell and germ cell meet we see a new beginning of an old cycle of which not death but everlasting life would seem to be the goal. By this expedient for securing the continuity of the germ-plasm, by the freeing of the reproductive cells from the encumbrance of the soma which threatens to drag them to destruction, the life-process, for a time at least, declares its victory over death. There must, therefore, be something in the nature of living organisms that makes for life and not for death, and through the reproductive cells the continuance of life is assured from generation to generation.

But the continuance of life is dependent upon the safeguarding and the ultimate bringing together of the male and female reproductive cells; and in order that this may be brought to pass the individual is endowed with a group of instincts—the sexual instincts—which Freud says may rightly be called "life-instincts." The final aim of the life-instincts is the union of two cells, and Freud, if he is to adhere to his conception of instinct as a tendency to reinstatement of an earlier condition, is confronted with the question, Of what previous happening is conjugation a repetition; What former condition is reinstated in this union?

The difficulty of answering this question is so great that Freud is tempted to give up the whole enquiry on which he has been engaged and to be doubtful about the conclusions at which he has arrived regarding the repetition-compulsion and the opposition between ego-instincts and sexual instincts. These conclusions were based on the assumption that all life must die from internal causes; that is to say, from some inherent quality of living substance. He, therefore, turns back to examine this assumption in the light of biological science.

All the most important work that has been done during the past forty years on the biological problems of life and death has been relative to the views first put forward by August Weismann in 1881. At the first glance it would seem that in Weismann's distinction between the mortality of the soma and the potential immortality of the germ-plasm there is a striking corroboration, from the biological side, of Freud's hypothesis of death-instincts and life-instincts. But according to Weismann death is a late acquisition in the development of living beings: death happens only to multi-cellular organisms, the protozoa are potentially immortal; in Freud's hypothesis death-instincts are from the beginning inherent in the very nature of life, and the germ-plasm no less than the soma, the protista no less than the metazoa, contain within them the seeds of death.

The validity of Weismann's theory has been put to experimental test by various observers, and although the results arrived at are inconclusive, the

evidence as a whole points towards the view that the protozoa die natural deaths only when they are not protected from the products of their own metabolism; and this is death due to external influences, not to a death-instinct inherent in the living substance.

Freud somewhat naïvely disregards the results of these experiments, as well as the cogency of Weismann's arguments, and declares that "if we abandon the morphological point of view for the dynamic, it may be a matter of entire indifference to us whether the natural death of the protozoa can be proved or not. With them the substance later regarded as immortal has not yet separated itself in any way from the part subject to death" (p. 62). That is to say, Freud assumes that although the death-instincts of the protozoa find no morphological expression (produce no corpse), they are there all the time as forces making for death, although the influence exerted by them is obscured by the effects of the forces tending to preserve life.

Even if the biological evidence had been more conclusive than it is, it might still be maintained, as is done by Freud, that biology does not "entirely put out of court any recognition of the death-instincts"; for it is always open to us to suppose that death-instincts may be present although they give no sign of their activity. But if such evidence as may be found is to be entirely disregarded, then indeed it may be asked "whether any good purpose has been served in looking for the answer to the question as to natural death in the study of the protozoa" (p. 61).

Along the line of biological investigation Freud finds little to support his conception of death-instincts, and at the end of his enquiry he simply returns to his assumption that they do exist and proceeds to a further examination of their nature and of the relation in which they stand to the life-instincts. In doing so he enters upon a fascinating speculation regarding the action and reaction of the life- and death-instincts pertaining to the individual cells of which the body is composed, and reveals to us, in the interrelation of these bodily units, a new and unexpected application of his theory of the Libido. He supposes that the life-instincts active in every cell take the other cells for their 'object' and, by partially neutralizing the death-instincts of those cells, help to prolong their lives. "Thus the Libido of our sexual instincts would coincide with the Eros of poets and philosophers, which holds together all things living" (p. 64).

There are two glaring gaps in the continuity of Professor Freud's argument. Dominated by his belief that a tendency to repetition is a primordial characteristic of living matter, he seizes upon this tendency and makes it the fundamental basis of all the instincts. Repetition is a reinstatement of an earlier condition and the first instinct of living substance must be a tendency to return to the inanimate from which it sprang. If this be so it should be possible to point to some recognised instinct in operation the activity of which tends towards the death of the organism endowed with it. But this Freud fails to do. The only example he puts forward in support of his contention is the sadistic impulse which aims at 'injury of the object' rather than at self-destruction. His way out of this contradiction is to assume that sadism is "a death-instinct which is driven apart from the ego by the influence of the narcissistic libido, so that it becomes manifest only in reference to the object" (p. 69).

He anticipates the criticism that this conception of a displaced instinct is

“far from being evident and creates a frankly mystical impression,” by reminding us that such an assumption is no new one, for he had made a similar one in a previous work. Clinical observation had led him to believe that masochism is to be understood as a recoil of sadism on to the ego. He gave this “turning against the subject” as one of the destinies which await the instincts, and he maintained that masochism is actually sadism turned against the subject’s own ego—a change of object without a change of aim. He regarded sadism as the primary impulse and he did not then believe in the existence of a primary masochism, not derived from sadism.

He appears to justify his new assumption by asserting that “a turning of the instinct from the object to the ego is...essentially the same thing as a turning from the ego to the object” (p. 70). From one point of view—that of mere mechanism or process—this is no doubt true; but from another point of view it is obviously false. As regards the result, the displacement is not essentially the same but essentially different. Masochism is now declared to be primary and the so-called turning of the instinct against the self is in reality a regression—a return to what obtained before the death-instinct was “driven apart from the ego by the influence of the narcissistic libido.” This change of standpoint, so far as we are told, is not based upon clinical observation as was the earlier view of the sadism-masochism relation, and we are led to suspect that the new formulation derives its cogency from its congruity with, and the support it accords to, the hypothesis of death-instincts.

The second gap in the argument comes at the other end of the series of speculations by which Freud defends his thesis. The conception of a repetition-compulsion pointed the way to the conception of death-instincts, but the recognition of life-instincts brought to light a difficulty in relating them to the repetition-compulsion. The final aim of all the life-instincts is “the union of two germ cells which are specifically differentiated.” If the sexual instincts are subject to the repetition-compulsion and if they reproduce primitive states of the living being, then, as has been indicated on a previous page, it must be asked: “Of what important happening...in the process of development of the living substance is sexual reproduction, or its forerunner, the copulation of two individual protozoa, the repetition?” (p. 54). Science fails to provide an answer to this question and Freud is forced to seek elsewhere for a hypothesis which will satisfy the demand that this instinct, like all others, arises from the necessity for the reinstatement of an earlier condition. Such an hypothesis he finds in the myth told by Aristophanes in Plato’s *Symposium*—the myth of the round men whom Zeus cut in two. In this way it has come to pass that every human creature, being a counterpart, is always seeking his other half. Are we to assume, Freud asks, “that living substance was at the time of its animation rent into small particles, which since that time strive for reunion by means of the sexual instincts”? (p. 75). And there he leaves the matter. “I think,” he says, “this is the point at which to break off” (p. 76).

Save in regard to the establishment of a repetition-compulsion beyond the pleasure-principle Freud frankly acknowledges the speculative character of this book. He declares that he is neither convinced himself nor does he seek to convince others of the truth of the views he here sets forth. He asserts the right to give oneself up to a line of thought and follow it as far as it leads, simply out of scientific curiosity. But he also declares his belief that in dealing with ultimate things “everyone is under the sway of preferences deeply rooted



within, into the hands of which he unwittingly plays as he pursues his speculation" (p. 77).

The pessimism which hangs like a cloud over the whole of this essay is perhaps the inevitable outcome of a belief, however achieved, in a mechanistic theory of life; and perhaps the criticism which will, in the end, invalidate Freud's arguments, may come, not from those who dispute the accuracy of his deductions, but from those who question the fundamental assumption on which all his reasoning rests—the assumption that all the phenomena of life and mind can be interpreted in terms of the physical sciences. Freud has invoked the myth of Aristophanes in aid of his speculations; is it permissible to appeal to the other myth in the Symposium, the Discourse of Diotima? "What then is Eros?—is he Mortal? Nay, Mortal he verily is not."

T. W. MITCHELL.

## REVIEWS

*The Evolution of the Conscious Faculties.* By J. VARENDONCK, D.Litt., D.Sc.  
London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1923. Pp. 259. Price 18s. net.

This essay, as the title implies, is a genetic study of the conscious faculties, based on a biological conception of the problems of psychology. The author holds with Baldwin that the original type of all psychic process is the simple cycle: outer excitation—inner process—reaction to the outer world; he starts from this formula, and constantly returns to it as his argument develops.

His first two chapters deal with his distinction between *reduplicative* and *synthetic* memory, and with the latter as an element in perception. Reduplicative memory is the most primitive aspect of retention, and lies at the root of the preservation of the primitive organism. It is an anticipative process, although in itself only of use in relation to situations which have already been experienced. Repetition is not essential to its functioning; and it is an automatic function, for "the mind registers without the intervention of volition and...some remembrances come back uncalled for, nay, when we should better like not to recollect at all." It is utilised at the higher levels of conscious life, as well as by the primitive organism; the products of synthetic memory being in their turn subject to the reduplicative process. Synthetical memory is the "function which registers a selected classification of experience," or, again, may be defined as "an accumulation of mnemonic elements apt to become causative; that is, provoking the conception or the awakening of reduplicative memory." It involves not merely the positive selection of elements of experience, but also the negative aspect of the same function—the inhibition of irrelevant recollections. An illuminating parallel is drawn between reduplicative and synthetic memory on the one hand, and the protopathic and epicritic systems of sensibility of Head and Rivers, on the other. Varendonck shows further how both forms of memory are drawn upon in conceptual processes; synthetic memory makes it possible to use similar mnemonic elements from different situations, but reduplicative memory makes it possible for us to *test* our premeditated actions by unrolling the "film" of similar situations in the past. He emphasises the normality and genetic significance of the reduplicative form of memory, and evidently feels that this is his special contribution to the problems raised. As he remarks in the final summary, "At the lower stages of mental evolution reduplicative memory is responsible for automatic and reflex behaviour, but it is still of the first importance for the intellections at the top of the ladder."

Having shown that both forms of memory function in perception, the author develops his view that perception and conception are the same phenomenon, both releasing an automatic flow of memorial elements; in the first case, however, memory is set moving by an external excitation, whereas in the second the excitation is internal. He then turns to the problem of unconscious movements, offering some interesting examples of these. Human automatisms, he holds, are not fewer than those of simpler organisms, they are, rather, more varied and mobile. An acute discussion of the intimate relations of movement and perception, and movement and thought, follows, and the view is

developed that repression of movement is a fundamental condition of thought, such repression being, of course, automatic and unconscious. Here the support of Ribot and Janet is invoked. The author might well have drawn also upon everyday psycho-analytic experience to illustrate his view that "the tendency towards movement diminishes when thought operates with word-symbols instead of images of objects," and have shown that this tendency further diminishes when the word-symbols are abstract and technical rather than concrete and colloquial. It is comparatively easy to refer to banned topics in general or scientific terms; resistances are much more powerful against familiar, concrete terms, since these lie much nearer to the original divide between primitive gesture and formal symbolism, and are, indeed, felt to be a form of behaviour rather than an instrument of thought. Varendonck has, however, been strongly influenced throughout his study of the conscious processes by psycho-analytic method, and for this reason he is able to go on to the view that "the fore-conscious ideas which are not allowed to cross the threshold, and which repression does not succeed in sending back into the deeper layers of the unconscious, find their way to the muscular system, which is another way of saying that, for affective ideas and reduplicative recollections, the passage into motility is one alternative, whereas access into consciousness is the other."

The discussion then proceeds to the problem of consciousness, a problem which, for Varendonck, is the question of how consciousness, which, in the lower animals is momentary and discontinuous, a mere flash, becomes almost continuous, and dominant, in man. He finds his answer in the multiplicity of human desires which are "so abundant that there are but few moments in the course of a day when sensations of objects come to him without immediately arousing a corresponding wish, which puts the psychic mechanism on the move." This leads him to the view that "will is constituted by all the wishes of man tending towards adaptation," a definition which we confess we find more than a little tantalising, since it would seem to hold a good deal more psychology than the author actually brings out. Unfortunately the definitions offered are the weakest aspect of the essay, the power to focus an important and valuable movement of ideas in a clear, vivid and concise sentence being evidently wanting. We may instance the definition of *intelligence* as consisting in "the whole of the psychic operations, which in their turn consist in reviving certain recollections under the stress of wish or will most often to re-associate them—and to repress others which are not useful to the end in view." And that of *consciousness* as "that part of intelligence which is organised for the reaction against the outer world, for the adaption to the non-ego." The argument is, however, of more importance than the form of its summary, and it is clear that Varendonck in this volume emphasises some aspects of the biology of consciousness and intelligence which have not yet been fully worked out.

Some reference to the work of Stout and Hobhouse, as amongst the most important English students of genetic psychology, would have been in place. And we should like to see Varendonck's view of perception and conception (as, for example, that "perception includes an unconscious judgment"), brought into relation with Stout's analysis of the "perceptual process," and Hobhouse's "practical judgment." Neither of these authors would agree that perception and conception are the *same* phenomenon, differing only in exciting conditions, although both Stout and Hobhouse would be at one with Varendonck in emphasising the *continuity* of the two processes.

It is, however, very suggestive to note the fertilising influence on genetic psychology of the facts which the psycho-analytic method has made available. Varendonck brings out very clearly, for instance, the general genetic significance of the process of *repression*, in the evolution of the conscious faculties.

An interesting point is his view that in the evolution of mind "the psychic accent has passed from the object to the conscious subject." He bases this on the considerations that "conception is a synthesis in which the psychic accent bears on the mind—whereas in perception it carries on the outer world"; moreover, "wish, and then will, mark the initiative of the ego as definitely taken over from the non-ego"; and, finally, with self-consciousness, "the ego as cause becomes more important than the non-ego." This is, of course, the same phenomenon which other students have described as the progressive *integration* of mind, which is the special characteristic of the human organism, and which leads to the "gradual independence from the objective reality"; in other words, to the mechanical control of Nature.

S. S. BRIERLEY.

*Conflict and Dream.* By W. H. R. RIVERS, LL.D., F.R.S., with a Preface by G. ELLIOT SMITH, F.R.S. pp. xi + 195. Price 12s. 6d.

*Psychology and Politics* and other Essays. By W. H. R. RIVERS, LL.D., F.R.S., etc. pp. vii + 181. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1923. Price 12s. 6d.

From these two volumes we are in a position to estimate the value of Dr Rivers' cautious, methodical approach in the more problematical regions of science. To every question that engaged his mind he brought an attitude of austere doubt. As one reads his guarded, over-careful statements of facts, whose general acceptance would seem to raise them above the sphere of controversy, one cannot but receive an impression that Rivers was putting an almost violent check upon his own ardent and adventurous spirit. His attitude was the product of the logical empiricism of the natural science method of his day. He was in a sense wedded to science, and the human element of faith that was necessarily excluded from his scientific investigations found expression in a strong belief in and loyalty towards the scientific method of which he was so eminent an exponent.

Anyone who has ever had the privilege of personal contact with Rivers must have had a sense of almost tense eagerness, a spiritual radiation, as well as a quick personal sympathy, which gave a meaning to his words greater than their actual content. His personality glowed with a splendour that his reason could never express, and these works, behind their meticulous reasoning and sometimes almost finicky detail, reveal the same ardent spirit and the same deep sense of conflict.

It is, therefore, not without significance that the standpoint which Rivers selected as a basis for the interpretation of dreams was identified with the idea of conflict. The assumption that a dream is the expression of conflict is, of course, an *a priori* condition of its existence as a natural product, since everything in Nature arises from the conflict of opposing forces. As a spontaneous happening, arising independently of the will, the dream must be regarded as a process of energy, *i.e.* something emerging from a dynamic opposition, just

as a co-ordinated muscular movement presupposes a certain degree of tension between opposing muscle-groups. Hence the hypothesis which Rivers sets out to prove, and which his dreams naturally bear out, is really granted *a priori* as a metaphysical postulate. Similarly the wish-hypothesis of Freud is an inadequate restatement of Schopenhauer's "metaphysical will," since libido is constantly 'willing' new forms of expression. But this energy being unconscious and, therefore, wholly independent of conscious will, is at once deprived of its own independent character when interpreted as a wish, *i.e.* something definitely related to the ego.

It would follow, therefore, that as soon as the dream is recognised as a product of Nature (for it is certainly not the product of human will) both the hypotheses which Freud and Rivers have laboured so well to prove are already granted in the very nature of our existence as natural beings. But it by no means follows that the interpretations based upon these hypotheses are therefore valid. For unconscious 'willing' or tendency may have a quite different objective from that of the conscious, and a state of conflict in the unconscious is not merely an attempt to provide a solution for some problematical situation in the external world. Similarly when Freud relates unconscious tendency to the ego by calling it a 'wish,' he thereby disregards the whole *raison d'être* of the unconscious as a compensatory function to consciousness.

It would seem that both these standpoints err in attempting to interpret the unconscious product in terms of the conscious function. The unconscious 'standpoint' is not only compensatory but quite often antagonistic to that of the conscious, so that when it is interpreted as a mechanical product of repression, its possible positive value for life is obscured by its obvious negative value for the ego. The wish-hypothesis, therefore, is bound to ignore the possible validity of the unconscious 'standpoint' as such, since it assumes its contents to be merely a disguised and distorted rendering of aborted conscious motives. Similarly in *Conflict and Dream* there is an assumption that the dream (a product be it remembered of elemental subjective forces) is exclusively concerned with objective events, which clearly belong to the province of consciousness, and the possibility of a subjective interpretation in which the objective factors appear merely as symbols of certain subjective tendencies is entirely disregarded. It is, of course, not disputed that the dream can also bear an objective interpretation, but to ignore the other possibility means a denial of any other reality than the world of objective facts, which is absurd.

Accordingly, neither of these hypotheses can develop an interpretation of the dream which really adds anything of importance to the previous content of consciousness. The explanations are ingenious and often piquant, but they leave us unsatisfied. The dream obviously signifies more than the interpretation. But directly it is conceded that the unconscious individuality might have a point of view and a purpose which are at least as valid as the aims of the ego-complex, the task of relating the conscious standpoint to that of the dream becomes even more important than the effort to make the dream tally with a chosen hypothesis. The former would also appear to be the more scientific attitude. For the latter seems to regard the dream as an interesting specimen to collect and classify, just in so far as it can be shown to bear out the particular hypothesis, whereas the former perceives a living value in the dream, seeking to understand its nature, sense and purpose as a naturalist seeks to comprehend the living thing in relation to its own individual world. That the dream-experience is manifestly a living process can hardly be denied, since the denizens

of the dream possess spontaneity and individual vitality in a very high degree, and these qualities cannot be explained as mere derivatives or residua of objective experience. The whole question of interpretation would have small significance for us, were it not the expression of a profound human need to relate our conscious experience to that of the dream. To regard the dream, therefore, not as a living experience but as a mechanical product, is to rob it of its essential character, *i.e.* as an expression of the creative activity of the living process.

The dream-denizens are natural phenomena like the skylark or the alligator, and although we may learn a lot concerning the structure of these creatures by a process of scientific analysis, yet much may also hang upon the way in which we relate our existence to theirs.

A considerable part of Rivers' book is devoted to a careful and damaging criticism of the Freudian formula, but he was himself so conditioned by his own psychological type, that he failed to perceive that the formula he proposed to put in its place is just as arbitrary and one-sided. It is the product of a psychic process which, though certainly gifted with keener powers of criticism, is equally conditioned by a one-sided empiricistic attitude that precludes any appreciation of the prospective or symbolic significance of the dream.

This attitude is a product of the absolutist tendency in science which assumes that absolute cognition is attainable by the empirical route. The more modern school of psychology headed by Jung is based upon the principle of relativity, and maintains that any but a relativist attitude to the psychic process must inevitably lead to a chaos of conflicting hypotheses whose partial validity can be maintained only by fanatical dogmatism.

In his other book, *Psychology and Politics*, Rivers is on surer ground, although here again his empiricistic standpoint leads him constantly to overvalue the behaviourist method of approaching social and political problems. To take an obvious example, an immense concourse of people lashed into fury by the eloquence of an orator presents a phenomenon whose real nature is not adequately explained by comparing their behaviour with that of a flock of sheep, or by enumerating crude biological analogies in which the conduct of the herd is determined by that of the leader. It is undeniable that such analogies exist, but it is evident that Rivers did not apprehend the inevitable implications of his own argument. For if the analogy holds good, it means that the great collective ideas by which the orator sways his audience have their roots in the deep instinctive levels of the psyche, *i.e.* in the primordial images of the collective unconscious whose existence Rivers denies. The concept of suggestion upon which he lays so much stress, merely denotes the factor of transmission, and is, therefore, wholly inadequate to account for a process of energy. But in order to account for the inexhaustible reserves of energy which, as we observed during the war, reveals itself in manifold forms whenever the fundamental collective ideas are deeply aroused, he would have been driven to adopt the concept of the collective unconscious, an intuitive acceptance wholly ungenial to the behaviourist point of view. This concept not only embraces the primordial images (or function-engrams) but it also denotes the energy latent in these images which comes to the surface whenever the corresponding ideas are actively constellated.

The behaviourist method of approach is certainly useful for describing the 'how' of the political organism, but its value is biological rather than psychological, since it fails altogether to respond to the irrepressible 'why.' There is

a certain tragedy in the fact, that in spite of his rooted distrust of analogies Rivers permitted himself to consider the complex factors of human politics as analogous to cruder biological organisations.

His own allusions to Jung's concept of the collective unconscious show that it was quite foreign to his point of view, and, consequently, he entirely misunderstood its signification. It is not based, as Rivers believes, upon ethnological arguments in the narrower sense, and, therefore, is not in the least affected by Prof. Elliot Smith's migration-hypothesis. It rests upon the fact that certain collective ideas, *e.g.* the idea of God, are as universal as mankind, that they appear as ground-themes in the mythology of all races, and that these themes are expressed in images which by virtue of their immense antiquity dispose of incalculable energy. In so far as the theory of migration has any relation to this concept, it is concerned merely with the various forms in which these primordial images may appear. When, for instance, migration brought Christianity to these islands it certainly effected an exchange of an ancient tribal image for a more differentiated concept of God, but the same primordial image underlies both.

There is a regrettable note of petulance in Prof. Elliot Smith's remarks about this concept which prompts one to conclude that his eagerness to defend his own theory preserves him from the possibility of adequately understanding the views of others. There is in fact no incompatibility between his migration theory and the concept of the collective unconscious, and if Prof. Elliot Smith had informed himself of Jung's very careful definition of the symbol and the primordial image, he would have discovered that these were purely psychological conceptions whose validity is not in the least dependent upon ethnological controversy.

The loss to British psychology in the untimely death of Dr Rivers is all the more to be deplored, since he was clearly feeling his way to an independent psychological standpoint, and it is impossible to believe that he would have remained wedded to the narrow psychological outlook of the objectivist and the behaviourist points of view.

H. G. BAYNES.

*Primitive Ordeal and Modern Law.* By H. GOITEIN. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. xvii + 302. Price 10s. 6d. net.

This book is an attempt to apply psychological and psycho-analytical conceptions to the problem of the origin and nature of law, and a very interesting and attractive attempt it is, with its pleasing exterior and get-up on the one hand and its agreeable style, varied and suggestive content and confident but moderate tone of optimism upon the other.

The author starts with an inquiry as to the nature of law. He rejects as hopelessly crude, from the psychological standpoint, the position that law is based on force, fear or convention. (This is on a par, he suggests, with the view that we like Homer or *Hamlet* merely because convention has so decreed—a view which psychologists have shattered “by means of discoveries in the very front rank of importance.”) The view of the other school for whom law is morality is also rejected, as depending on a psychology which, though perhaps not inconsistent with the facts, is yet inadequate to explain them. The author himself takes a strictly pragmatic view of law as growing out of procedure,

as a body of generalisations from decisions on practical affairs, on actual matters of dispute. If this view is correct, we must turn to the contemplation of the action at law, if we would learn more about the essential nature of law itself.

The action at law, the author endeavours to show us, has developed from the Ordeal. The Ordeal is a primitive but widespread institution, which involved a *judicium Dei*; it combined the three processes of detection of guilt, trial and punishment. An examination of the various forms of Ordeal (particularly those connected with the sea and water) suggests that the Ordeal, and therefore the action at law which subsequently developed from it, involved a regression of *libido* to the mother, in consequence of a failure to carry out the normal social adjustments, in face of an unusual situation. Like the analogous process of expiation, the Ordeal constituted in one of its aspects a symbolic death and rebirth. Themis herself, the personification of Right, was an emanation from earth (p. 99). The primitive prison is a womb symbol (it was underground in Mother Earth) and the infringement of tribal custom could only be atoned for by a process of symbolical rebirth.

The judicial process differs from the Ordeal chiefly in two respects—in its dependence on reason rather than emotion and in the institution of the human judge. The former change came about as the result of general mental and social development; particularly, it is suggested, through the application to social disputes of the powers of enumeration and generalisation and through that conscious recognition and approval of habits which is involved in custom. The human judge replaced the supernatural element of the Ordeal, probably to a large extent through the influence of the oath, through which he acquired some of the psychological significance of the supernatural element.

Next followed the era of codification, in which customary habits were formulated as rules—rules which permitted of extension and further application by analogy.

The characteristic mechanism involved in the Ordeal and the appeal to law is an inhibition (and consequent displacement) of the desire for immediate and complete revenge; an inhibition brought about through conflict with other instinctive tendencies (*e.g.* fear—especially of the blood feud, with its often prolonged and terrible social consequences). The cruder tendency to strike the offender dead gives way to the more moderate demand for punishment on the talion principle, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Following Ferenczi, the author sees here, in the talion principle, the influence of the castration (here called 'mutilation') complex. The motives that drive a man to law may be summarily described as Depreciation (of his good name or reputation) or Deprivation (of his due), and the origin of the burning sense of injustice and embitterment characteristic of the litigant is again to be found in the castration complex.

This complex the author, here following Stärcke, believes to be closely allied to the mother complex, so that the two main complexes revealed by the analysis are thus brought into relation with one another. The operation and satisfaction of these complexes constitute the ultimate psychological reason of the efficacy of the law, and justify the hope that law will continue to play a progressive part in combating many of the social evils which threaten humanity—especially perhaps in the at present comparatively undeveloped sphere of international law.

This brief indication of some of the principal arguments of the book must inevitably fail to convey any satisfactory impression of its interest and



suggestiveness. Though admittedly only sketching the rough outline of a psychological treatment of law—a treatment which will require much patient research before the full details can be fitted in—the book undoubtedly constitutes, through its suggestiveness, a valuable contribution to this hitherto but little cultivated branch of applied psychology.

J. C. FLÜGEL.

*The Psychology of Laughter and Comedy.* By J. Y. T. GREIG, M.A. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. pp. 304. Price 12s. 6d. net.

The keynote of Mr Greig's theory of laughter is given in the formula on p. 110: "love behaviour, interruption, overcoming of the interruption." In the early chapters of the book the author records the observations of various writers on the laughter of infants and shows that the personal element is essential to the situations which provoke such laughter. Now laughter is a development of the smile and Mr Greig holds that the infant's earliest smile, which Freud and others have associated with the act of sucking, is a part of the as yet ill-coordinated behaviour of the instinct of love stimulated by the 'nursing embrace.' If this love behaviour be interrupted a quantity of psycho-physical energy is mobilised to overcome the obstruction and, when the latter is weakened or removed, the surplus energy may be carried off in the laugh. The remainder of the book is devoted to testing this conclusion in relation to the laughter of adults and the art of comedy.

The writer admits that he has misgivings in choosing the term 'love'; the alternative 'sex' he rejects as too heavily loaded a word. 'Love' as he uses it seems to correspond closely to the Freudian *libido*. Hostility, which obviously enters into many laughter-provoking situations, is included in love behaviour, since hate is secondary, a derivative of love. In ambivalent behaviour, according to the theory of interruption, laughter is ready made (p. 92) but where hate is so violent as to exclude love there is no place for laughter. This point is developed in the chapter on derision, satire and irony; in the last of these devices "ambivalence is reduced to a technique" (p. 185). Certain stock jokes, e.g. those on women, depend on this ambivalence: on it rest "both the mother-in-law taboo of the savage and the mother-in-law joke of modern man" (p. 86).

There follows an analysis of the laughable, contained in chapters v-viii. Laughter at the sexual proceeds from the conflict of our perennial pleasure in it and our cultural resistance to it. Children do not laugh at nakedness or natural functions, until a sense of shame or disgust has wakened in them. The writer distinguishes between the obscene and the indecent as having reference respectively to the directly sexual and the indirectly sexual (excretory) processes.

In his chapter on laughter at the physical Mr Greig disputes Bergson's 'mechanical' theory and that of those writers who see in such laughter only a malicious joy at the degradation of others. True, physical deformities and personal violence contain an element of surprise (interruption), but surprise does not necessarily result in laughter. The question is: what is the nature of the behaviour within which the interruption occurs? The author endeavours to show that it is love behaviour. For example, the laugh raised by the knock-about of the circus clown is due to the unconscious stimulus to sexual behaviour given by physical violence.

Many of Mr Greig's conclusions are based on psycho-analytic theories and the chapter on "The Physical" contains an interesting section on symbolism. He shows that laughter may be provoked through the arousing of sexual behaviour by means of unconsciously perceived symbols. He gives the classical example of Punch, whose nose, hump, hat and stick are all phallic symbols, and suggests that in certain street mishaps such as a fall or the blowing-off of a hat there is a symbolic element.

The author next turns to the consideration of comedy. He defines the comic as "the laughable raised to a higher power and made fit for the uses of art" (p. 70). He discusses certain comic devices, e.g. the 'peep-bo' situation with its offshoots the disguise and the mistaken identity, and, while agreeing with Bergson that they owe much to childhood associations, he disputes that their laughter-provoking character depends on the principle of mechanism. He disputes further the intellectualist theory of laughter but admits that the laughter of high comedy, as typified in French classical comedy, is far less emotional than the laughter of the romantic comedy of Shakespeare.

Chapter IX contains a discussion on humour, the humorist's laughter being brought under the writer's formula by way of Walter Pater's definition of humour as the amalgam of mirth with pity; "for pity is love obstructed by sympathetic displeasure" (p. 197).

Perhaps one of the least convincing parts of the argument is the explanation of the displeasure felt by the person who is made the object of laughter. It is not easy to see exactly what is meant by the statement that, although the trivial interruption is within the behaviour of the laughter, the triviality passes over to the person at whom the laughter is aimed, making him 'feel small' (p. 187). Nor does the equivocal character of the laugh, the confusion of feeling resulting from its lack of a thorough-going hate, seem to account very satisfactorily for its sting.

In the chapter on "Wit" the author takes as his text Freud's *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious*. While accepting the central thesis of the book Mr Greig makes three main criticisms of Freud's views: (1) with Rivers and others he would prefer to express the idea of the counter-forces within behaviour by some physiological parallel rather than by the conception of the endopsychic censor; (2) he disputes the notion of 'harmless' wit and maintains that all wit is, however remotely, 'tendency' wit; (3) he questions Freud's conception of the economy of psychic expenditure which is effected in wit. "The misconception of wit," we read on p. 216, "as economising psychic expenditure arises through confusing speed with force." And again, on p. 214, he quotes Freud's own question which he considers is never satisfactorily answered: "Is not the economy in verbal expression more than abrogated through the expenditure of intellectual work?" (Freud, *Wit*, p. 53, English translation). With Freud he sees in wit a 'compressing' tendency, but he considers that such compression, far from resulting in psychic economy, forces us to cover the same ground, as it were, several times in order to catch first one and then another meaning of the words and then to realise the compression which has taken place (p. 215). This, he says, involves additional psychic expenditure, breaking as it does the 'habit pattern' of the adult mind which pays attention to the meaning rather than the sound of words.

Further (and this is one of Mr Greig's objections to the idea of harmless wit) he denies that either children or adults treat words as mere sounds, finding pleasure in the manipulation of them as such. Even the pun, "that poor

relation in the family of wit," requires us to attend to both sound and meaning.

Now Freud himself (*Wit*, p. 56) repudiates Kuno Fischer's classification of the pun as 'sound-wit.' "The word," he says, "serves only as a sound to which this or that meaning attaches itself." He does, however, hold that the child naturally takes pleasure in playing with words until, as the power of reason exerts pressure on his mind, his delight in nonsense gradually manifests itself less freely.

To return to the question of economy. On the last page of *Wit* we read: "The pleasure of wit originates from an *economy of expenditure in inhibition*, of the comic from an *economy of expenditure in thought*." Does not Mr Greig's criticism confuse between the two kinds of economy indicated in these two formulæ? According to Freud the economy effected in wit is of the nature of an alleviation. In tendency wit the psychic expenditure necessitated to maintain an inhibition is abrogated; in harmless wit there is an alleviation from the pressure exerted by critical reason and our intellectual up-bringing (*Wit*, p. 194).

The latter conception seems to Mr Greig to be the more difficult to grasp. If, however, as he holds, all wit is tendency wit and if he would concede that the removal of a repression does away with a certain psychic expenditure, we need go no further to justify Freud's assertion that there is economy of expenditure in *inhibition*. Freud does not maintain of wit, as he does of the comic, that there is an economy of expenditure in *thought*.

CECIL BAINES.

*Character and the Unconscious*. By J. H. VAN DER HOOP. Authorized translation by Elizabeth Trevelyan. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1923. pp. viii + 233. Price 10s. 6d. net.

The chief criticisms that the author brings against Freud's psychology and therapy are (1) the non-recognition of special creation in any sphere of life, (2) the inapplicability of this psychology to the normal human being, as it is derived entirely from a study of abnormals, (3) the non-guidance of the patient by the treatment as to his or her ethical position and selection of a method of life.

Dr van der Hoop states but does nothing to develop the arguments in favour of or against the moulding of the universe under the influence of external conditions; he simply asseverates his conviction that this hypothesis is unsatisfactory, whilst he seems to regard the hypothesis of creative evolution, of a vital impulse, as much the jollier. The author's parsimony in argument makes it unsuitable for the reviewer to have the fun of engaging him in battle. Dogmatically he will merely record: the influence of environment being the minimum hypothesis for the construction of the universe it has, upon the principle of Occam's razor, the maximum claim.

The validity of knowledge gathered from the abnormal for an understanding of the normal rests, in psychology, upon the same basis as for scientific method in general. The physiology of the brain, the characteristics of hydrogen, the behaviour of electrons are founded upon experiment that is abnormal upon brains, hydrogens and electrons.

Dr van der Hoop hardly makes it sufficiently clear that Freud and his followers do not, consequently, regard psycho-analysis as a course to be fol-

lowed by the ordinary happy man or woman, unless indeed it is for professional purposes, when it becomes indispensable. After a family tiff one is not to be sent round for treatment to the nearest analyst.

Jung and his disciples from their point of view would, as the author points out, submit everyone to a course of the "synthetic method," to be repeated whenever there is an individual or family jar. Dr van der Hoop seems alive to the dangers of the synthetic method (p. 106) leading the patient to accept the analyst's views and opinions and to mould his life upon experiences which are not his own. The analysis complete, Freud would have his patient build up his own life; ideally he is free to pursue his own path once the blinkers have been removed; Freud would have too much respect for the individual to seek to interfere with the regulation of another life.

The dream analyses which the author gives are rather marked instances of the dangers and futility of the synthetic method. It is surprising that so experienced an analyst can accept so banal an interpretation of a dream as that given on page 123—where he vaunts the absence of all associations; again he would surely on reflection not insist that the dream analysed on page 109 is an instance of the solution of an intellectual problem in a dream. In both cases the interpretations come near degenerating (to use the author's own criticism of the synthetic method) into "washy mysticism or superficial moralising."

Dr van der Hoop is generally so unbiassed in his exposition of Freud's views that one may ask him whether it is quite fair to leave the reader under the impression that Freud regards the sexual impulse as solely accountable for art and religion. A few similar misstatements might well be corrected in the next edition.

The first three chapters with their dullish account of psycho-analysis seem unnecessary, as does Chapter V on psychological types. In the one case Freud's Introductory Lectures serve the purpose better: in the other Jung's own book is more readable. Anyone not convinced by Jung's work (the position of the reviewer), will certainly not be converted—an appropriate term—by Dr van der Hoop's chapter.

The reconciliation which the author is supposed to effect between the views of Freud and Jung is not attempted in the body of the book.

The translation is probably accurate enough, there has been no opportunity of testing it. There are several errors in the references to the bibliography, e.g. p. 143, xxxiv should be xxvi; p. 112 xxxvii should be xxvi.

M. D. EDER.

*Heredity and Child Culture.* By HENRY DWIGHT CHAPIN, M.D. London: George Routledge and Sons. 1923. Pp. 189. Price 6s. net.

This is a sound and very hopeful book. Nothing relevant to the subject has been omitted and every aspect of child culture receives sympathetic consideration.

Dr Chapin believes that heredity seems to be more important as an influence in the lower organisms than in man, and while granting the truth, on the biological side, of Weismann's theory, "that every child is moulded solely by inherited tendencies which cannot essentially be altered," he feels we have the possibility of a wide and splendid social heritage which may do much to shape life's currents and even compensate for some defects of organic inherit-

ance. His own experience as director of a Children's Village Settlement for incorrigible boys, in the United States, leads him to the conclusion that a bad social inheritance was responsible for their downfall. When this was corrected, a favourable result nearly always followed.

The expectant mother is the object of careful study, and due weight is given to all conditions necessary for the production of a healthy infant. The high mortality among infants of one month old may, it is considered, be reduced by education and careful supervision of the mother during pregnancy. The unfortunate results arising from neglect of the child of pre-school age are well brought out. At this most susceptible period when the foundations of health and character should be firmly established, a relaxation of parental attention frequently takes place. Among the better off the child may pass from the skilled hands of the nurse to those of an ignorant if well meaning attendant. The poorer child, once it has "found its feet," is regarded as more or less adapted to the habits of adult life. "A careful oversight of the infant's bottle gives place to a later laxity of feeding. As result various forms of malnutrition and even deficiency diseases may ensue." Measles, whooping-cough, and early tuberculosis may lower resistance and, by their sequelae, handicap the future life of the individual. "Grief, worry, anger, fear, apprehension and emotional shocks may become fixed and form the early beginnings of what will eventually lead to individual and social maladjustments." The seeds of these mental weeds can be freely planted where the mind of the child is unguarded.

A thoughtful consideration is extended towards the school-child and the problems of adolescence. The author rightly deprecates the crowded state of the school time-table as working in every way against the true function of education. While the child should early be taught to think, and think straight, premature forcing may lead to a later reaction in which the child pays up for impressions crowded too soon upon an immature mind. Dr Chapin would lessen the number of subjects taught and shorten school holidays. He is uneasy about the physical results of higher education upon girls. At the time of maturing the body is more important than the mind, yet this is just the time when the girl is pushed hardest in her educational career, if she expects to pursue a course in high school or college. His remedy is that the girl should be educated with the idea of becoming a wife rather than a school teacher.

While there is grave reason to suspect an intellectual education which is proved to cripple the body while only partially training the mind, surely a solution of the problem is not to be found in specialised training for a vocation which the person so trained may never be called upon to fulfil. The difficulty is great. But the need is rather to lighten the burden of celibacy for the maternal woman, to whom social conditions deny the exercise of her natural functions.

The future of the child rendered dependent by death or poverty of parents, or by illegitimacy, is handled with very real sympathy and insight. The author has devised and set working a practical scheme of boarding-out and adoption which has been enthusiastically received by international authorities. But if the child is above all things to be protected from emotional storms, one is inclined to protest against the adoption of dependent waifs as a way of salvation for "neurotic wives and neurasthenic spinsters." "From him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath"?

Clear and interesting diagrams and tables are used as illustration, and the whole book proves itself "the work of a man of sense raised to a high point of

sensitiveness." One may hope that the "supervision" of family life which is so largely recommended will be only temporary and educational. And one might doubt the stability of a society which demands for its protection such drastic steps as the permanent incarceration of "all tramps and cranks." "All tramps," in a land where there is a whole continent to tramp in? And "all cranks"! Is there no housing shortage in the States?

LORNA YARDE-BUNYARD.

*The Constitutional Factors in Dementia Praecox.* By NOLAN D. C. LEWIS, M.D. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, New York and Washington, 1923. pp. 134. Price \$3.00.

This work embodies the results of an extensive research into the morbid anatomy of Dementia Praecox. The author excludes Dementia Paranoïdes for reasons which he will explain in future publications.

From a study of over six hundred autopsies on cases of Dementia Praecox, the author shows that the heart and circulatory system are undeveloped in this disease. In 75.5 per cent. of the cases of Dementia Praecox the heart was below average weight, the nearest approach to this proportion in other insanities being 59.1 per cent. in General Paralysis; but it would appear that the heart is below average weight in all the insanities. In Dementia Praecox, however, even the lumen of the aorta is strikingly small.

The author naturally sought an explanation of his discovery by examining the endocrine glands. This he did thoroughly in 22 of his cases and he found histopathological changes (aplasias, atrophies, scleroses and patchy hyperplasias), not only in the gonads as Sir Frederick Mott has described, but also in the thyroid, adrenals and (in six of the cases) the pituitary.

These changes "are as universally present as are the characteristic mental symptoms in the clinical picture of a case." They "do not depend on age, duration of psychosis, or the association of physical disease." Dr Lewis's considered conclusion is that the function of the glands has suffered during the development of the personality. From this and other passages in the book we gather that the author is willing to accept the view that the morbid anatomical features he has discovered are not primary, but secondary to mental factors; and that dementia praecox is of purely psychical origin.

W. H. B. STODDART.

*Psychoanalysis and Suggestion Therapy.* By Dr W. STEKEL. Authorized translation by JAMES S. VAN TESLAAR. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd. Pp. xi + 155. Price 6s. 6d. net.

Fortunately the eulogistic description of the author on the jacket, which might be regarded as mere advertisement, is confirmed by a reading of the book itself. Dr Stekel leaves no doubt in the minds of his readers, through a proper reiteration of his merits and through the avowal, with the modesty of true greatness, of occasional errors in diagnosis and treatment (these generally little ones and at any rate having occurred a long while ago—excuses familiar to most doctors) that he is the world's greatest psychotherapist.

In the handsomest manner Dr Stekel admits that Freud has, or rather had his value; more in sorrow than in anger he demonstrates that Freud's decline began with his refusal to accept the lightning strokes of the world's greatest, etc. Dr Stekel complains that his cured patients evince so little gratitude; he, however, insists almost to wearisomeness that whoever does not get well under treatment by Dr Stekel has only himself to blame through his "will to illness," that the cured perhaps not unfairly claims his recovery as due to his own efforts, to his "will to wellness"—alone I did it might say both the cured and uncured.

"I assumed a bellicose tone" Dr Stekel states in one ease; he always seems to be assuming a bellicose tone, to be tyrannizing the unfortunate person who does not respond to treatment by making the sufferer entirely responsible for the failure. The reviewer is reminded of the insight he once obtained into the methods of a Christian Scientist who for years ministered to a man suffering from progressive muscular atrophy. When the only progress the patient made was towards a bulbar paralysis the practitioner turned round and abused, in a most unchristian way, the wife and the other members of the family. It was their want of belief, the atmosphere of evil thinking, that was killing the patient. The poor wife was distracted to frenzy by her attempts to believe that her dying husband was getting better every day; self-accusations and mental torture evoked the compassion of a non-Christian Scientist. Dr Stekel's abusive methods, though less cruel, for they are only directed towards the patient, are not dissimilar.

However, no one would wish to have a real disagreement with Dr Stekel; it is hard to conceive of a serious discussion on psychotherapy with him as it would be to have a serious discussion on, say entomology, with *Morpho Adonis*. The existence of that brilliant butterfly is its own justification as is the existence of Dr Stekel with his possession of the born journalist's mind: the journalist's mind is an excellent and valuable article for a journalist; for the scientist?

With most of Dr Stekel's opinions there will be substantial agreement among psychologists: they are the commonplaces of the literature.

Perhaps Dr Stekel in the book he is now publishing or writing (he seems to have discovered the secret of perpetually finding publishers to publish the same kind of thing under another title) will correct the remark about Jung's method on p. 5.

The translation is an excellent piece of English; 'facetiously' on p. 8 would be better rendered 'half humorously.'

M. D. EDER.

*Dreams*. By H. TASMAN LOVELL, M.A., PH.D. Published by the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, Sydney, N.S.W. pp. 74. Price 2s. 6d.

This monograph by the associate Professor of Psychology in The University of Sydney is an attempt to expound the main features of Freud's theory of dreams and to make a critical examination of some of the more important of Freud's principles.

The author does not pretend that his treatment of the subject is exhaustive and he tells us that he is conscious of the defects that are present in the critical

section of his work; but he exercises the right which, he thinks, "every psychologist may claim, of expressing his views upon principles which are the subject of controversy, and of attempting to reconcile traditional psychology with what is apparently incontrovertible in the invaluable system evolved by Freud." We may well demur to this claim on the part of "every psychologist" until he can show that he has an adequate acquaintance with the principles he is expounding or criticising.

Dr Lovell is apparently at that stage of criticism of Freud's doctrines where judgment is influenced by the affects connected with the subject of sex. We have all probably passed through the phase in which we feel that "there is something out of focus in this psychology" and that "there is an over-emphasis put upon the sex interests which does not accord with the facts of spiritual life as many good men and women actually lead it." We have also perhaps experienced a glow of satisfaction when the happy thought has occurred to us that "perhaps this over-emphasis may be due to the fact that the great majority of the dreams upon the analysis of which the theory was founded were the dreams of neurotic patients."

For so small a book there appears to be an inordinate amount of quotation. We have here whole pages of letterpress embraced by inverted commas. The authors chiefly drawn upon are Freud, Jung, Maeder and Rivers. Such liberal use of authors' own words should tend towards accuracy of exposition; but Dr Lovell frequently goes astray when he takes his eyes off the book. He says that Freud used dreams in his analytic search of the patient's mind and that "he claims to have been so successful that he calls dreams the 'royal road' to psycho-analysis." But, alas, Freud has told us of no 'royal road' to psycho-analysis; what he has told us of is the 'royal road' to the Unconscious.

It seems as if Dr Lovell has not yet found this road, for he says he "has felt for some time past that it is unscientific and mystifying to regard the unconscious as an entity of diabolical cunning and intelligence, which is ever at work repressing and dissociating this, resisting the rise, disguising, or altering the emphasis of that, until the hope of explanation seems to be denied any fulfilment."

This monograph is dated 1923.

T. W. M.

*Multiple Sclerosis (Disseminated Sclerosis)*. An Investigation by the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Diseases. New York: Paul B. HOEBER. pp. xvi + 241. Price \$3.75.

Of all organic diseases of the nervous system none is, in one sense, of greater interest to the psychotherapist than Multiple Sclerosis. In its early stages it is easily mistaken for hysteria and there are probably few psychotherapists of experience who have not been at some time asked to treat cases of this incurable disease; for even the most expert neurologists are sometimes at fault in making the differential diagnosis between the two conditions. This book should therefore be of interest to those whose work lies in the field of the functional neuroses, for an accurate knowledge of the general and special symptomatology of Multiple Sclerosis may some day save them from bringing discredit on the art of psychotherapy.



The mental manifestations of Multiple Sclerosis are presented in this volume by Drs Sanger Brown and Thomas K. Davis, and some emotional and psychological factors bearing upon the development of this disease are discussed by Dr Smith Ely Jelliffe.

Drs Brown and Davis think that in probably 90 per cent. of cases there are mental alterations which warrant the meaning commonly granted to the term "mental symptoms," but these are so overshadowed by the physical symptoms that they have very commonly been disregarded. The mental states enumerated here are Euphoria, Mental Depression, Mental Deterioration and Hallucinations.

Dr Jelliffe discusses the psychological symptoms from the standpoint of the offending focal lesions and examines the compensating psychological manifestations which the patient builds up in the face of the disease. He also seriously questions whether psychological factors may not be conceived as playing an important, if not determining, rôle in producing some special types of Multiple Sclerosis. He believes a study of unconscious factors in organic disease to be of paramount importance.

T. W. M.

## NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse.* 1922. Part 4.

In a paper entitled "Perversion und Neurose" Dr Otto Rank has followed up the analysis of the phantasy "Ein Kind wird geschlagen" (A child is being beaten) in which Freud showed that the phantasy is based on a phase of the Oedipus situation which has undergone repression. Those who have studied psycho-analysis are familiar with the view that neurosis may be regarded as the negative of perversion. In this paper Rank expresses the relation rather differently when he describes neurosis as a kind of half-way house on the road of development of certain libidinal tendencies the ultimate destination of which, if they pursued their way unchecked, would be perversion. The word 'tendencies' is used deliberately because, as Rank shows, a perversion is a mechanism by which satisfaction is obtained not for a single libidinal tendency only, but for several. The manifest form of the perversion, like the manifest content of the dream, may be the product of processes of condensation, displacement and secondary elaboration.

Perversion is then essentially the result of a complicated libido-development, which is best studied by means of the analysis of neurotics in whom there is no manifest perversion, the process having stopped short at symptom-formation. When the unconscious preliminary phases are thus brought to light, we see that they lie between an infantile phase of the libido and the full-blown perversion which is at once the remotest offshoot of, and a return to, the said infantile phase.

From this point of view Rank discusses the unconscious roots of exhibitionism, using the analysis of an hysterical patient to illustrate his thesis. He shows that her latent exhibitionism belonged to a repressed beating-phantasy, associated with a scene in early childhood when her elder sister was beaten by her father. This phantasy, as well as her recurrent exhibitionist dreams, expressed a conflict between narcissistic and object-libido. Analysis revealed on the one hand the wish to have a child by her father, in accordance with the infantile theories of coitus as a sadistic act and birth as taking place by the anal orifice, and on the other hand a narcissistic cathexis of the genitals with return to autoerotic satisfaction. (Anal exposure is regressively substituted for genital exposure.)

The writer points out that the definition of perversion as a form of libidinal satisfaction outside the normal sexual goal is illuminated by the understanding (which we owe to Freud) that in perversions there is regression to infantile phases of sexual development—phases in which the child neither differentiated between the sexes nor recognised the normal sexual goal, for he knew nothing of the sexual act. During the period of infantile sexual activity children of both sexes do, however, recognise a sexual goal, namely that of receiving like the mother a child from the father.

What happens then to this desire for a child, a desire which Rank says becomes a libido-symbol for the unconscious? Owing to the impossibility of realising his desire the child's tendency to identify itself with its parents is frustrated and its ego develops. The normal person defers the realisation of this wish to maturity and in the latency period substitutes for it the ego-ideal, but the pervert, while renouncing the infantile libidinal goal and avoiding the sexual act, gratifies in narcissistic fashion (fellatio, paederastia) the component instincts which originally subserved that goal. The neurotic on the other hand retains the infantile wish but connects it with the component instincts, so that the genital function is excluded. His symptoms represent fulfilment of the wish in extra-genital ways and his feeling of guilt is attached to repressed phantasies with this content.

One of the sections of the paper is devoted to a discussion of masturbation. This practice represents a compromise between autoerotic and reproductive gratifica-

tion, as well as a transition to the primacy of the genitals. Premature repression of the physical autoerotic components may result in neurosis; perversion follows when they usurp the place of the reproductive libido.

Rank emphasises the importance of the *sense of guilt* attached to onanism. It is upon the fate of this sense of guilt that the fate of the whole infantile libido depends. Normally, this feeling serves a useful biological and social purpose, but in neurosis there is an excessive 'free-floating' sense of guilt, and just in so far as the patient can be free from this excess is there a possibility of cure. Perverts on the other hand appear to lack the sense of guilt in gratifying the component instincts to the exclusion of the reproductive libido. On this showing masochism must be regarded as an unsuccessful perversion-formation. But Rank shows that, if analysis of a true perversion goes sufficiently deep, the sense of guilt will be reached, and that the way to cure then lies through a neurotic phase in which that sense becomes connected with libidinal and ego-tendencies.

At the conclusion of the article the writer brings the principal perversions into relation with the sense of guilt and the mechanism of defence against it, showing that in each case there is a return to infantile sexual theories. Only instead of desiring to *have* a child, the pervert, in respect of his perverse tendencies, *is* a child: the homosexual ignores the difference of sex, the exhibitionist takes an infantile delight in self-display, while the masochist places himself in the situation of being beaten like a child.

Dr Stefan Hollós contributes an article on "The time-feeling" (Das Zeitgefühl). This feeling he distinguishes from the *sense* of time, *i.e.* the capacity for estimating intervals of time, and the *consciousness* of time by which we orientate ourselves in time. Both these faculties belong to the conscious system. In this paper he discusses a third faculty, which is unconscious and which he calls the 'time-feeling.' He shows that it is subject to pathological disturbances, even when the conscious time-faculties are operating undisturbed. These disturbances may take the form of the complete neglect of an interval of time (as when a patient suffering from psychosis gives his age as that at which he entered an asylum), or that of the sense of having passed through many years in what is actually a short space of time.

As regards the former disturbance it might be suggested that it is an instance of wish-fulfilment, the patient translating himself to a happier period, or else that with his withdrawal of libido from the outside world he has withdrawn it from dates and the passage of time. When the disturbance in the time-feeling takes the latter form, it might be due to an increase of external perception. (Even the hallucinations of mania and delirium are *apparently* perceptions from without.)

Dr Hollós, however, puts forward another explanation which is briefly this: that the unconscious time-feeling is based on the rhythmic discharge of stimuli and that this rhythm is a repetition of a reaction in the protoplasm to cosmic stimuli.

Here he follows August Stürcke's description of the evolution of psychic mobility. Stürcke distinguishes certain phases in which the discharge of accumulated stimuli is successively tonic, epileptic, rhythmic, of the nature of a reaction, and finally the phase of thought in which there is deferred reaction. Hollós goes on to show that in every phase, even the highest, there is the impulse to rhythmic discharge, that like all impulses this must have been originally a reaction to some external stimulus. The stimulus here he believes to be cosmic, and especially solar, influences *e.g.* phases of the sun and moon, revolution of the earth on its axis and above all the succession of day and night. Even in the highest organisms certain organs, for instance the heart and lungs, reproduce this primitive rhythmic discharge of stimuli, whilst the higher discharge in thought, arrhythmic and seeming independent of cosmic influences as it is, is yet regulated by the rhythm of these organs. Moreover there is a certain rhythm in the direction of our attention, and periodically (in sleep) we withdraw our libido from the outside world.

Since, then, the time-feeling depends on this unconscious rhythm, the writer defines it as "an endo-psychic perception of the fluctuation of libido-distribution, related to somewhat analogous real cosmic changes."

Dynamically the time-feeling is conceived of thus: a stream of energy seeks

discharge by two opposing outlets, (1) at the *stable*, phylogenetic, rhythmic end, which is timeless and unconscious, and (2) at the *labile* end, which is variable and subject to time. The *labile* discharge may be affected by an increase in resistance, which results in an increased libidinal cathexis of the lower methods of outlet, or by a decrease in resistance, in consequence of which there is over-investment of the actual libidinal discharge and a diminution in the regulating influence from the *stable* end. The former disturbance would lead to narcissistic states and the latter to hallucinations.

Thus Dr Hollós arrives at the conclusion that pathological alteration in the time-feeling is due to a change in the distribution of libido in respect of its discharge in motility.

The third original article is by Dr E. Weiss on the analysis of a case of nervous asthma. He shows that the asthmatic attacks of the patient had a mechanism very similar to that of a phobia and were a reaction to separation from the mother. Besides a strong mother-fixation the castration complex and anal-erotic tendencies played their part in the neurosis.

There are four short communications in this number: (1) Notes on Dr Alexander's paper "Kastrationkomplex und Charakter" (*Int. Zeitschr.* 1922, 2) by Dr Wilhelm Reich. The writer discusses two contrasting narcissistic types, in the first of which there are manifest feelings of inferiority and latent narcissism, the subject deriving gratification from the ego-ideal, while in the second manifest narcissism compensates for latent feelings of inferiority, and gratification is obtained from the real ego; (2) the analysis of an obsessional symptom by Dr M. J. Eisler; (3) a paper on the spider as a dream-symbol, by Dr Karl Abraham; (4) a case, communicated by Monroe Meyer, of a dream six times repeated, illustrating Freud's statement that the form of a dream or the manner in which it is dreamt may represent part of the latent content.

The Journal contains reports of the 7th International Psycho-Analytical Congress held in Berlin last year and of the work and organisation of the Psycho-Analytic Clinic in Berlin.

CECIL BAINES.

*Annales Médico-psychologiques* (Series XII, vol. 2).

No. 1. June 1922.

*Chronique—Le Centenaire de la Thèse de Bayle (1822—1922).*

The centenary was celebrated in Paris on May 30th and 31st, 1922. The discussions were based on seven papers under the general title "La Paralytic générale (Maladie de Bayle)." Summaries of the papers and discussions are given. The papers are:

1. The forerunners of Bayle, by Laignal-Lavastine and J. Vinchon.
2. Bayle and the Work of the Charenton School, by René Semelaigne.
3. General Paralysis after the times of Bayle, by F. L. Arnaud.
4. Etiology and Pathogeny, by F. Paetet.
5. Pathological Anatomy, by Jean Lhermitte.
6. Clinical and Medico-legal Study, by R. Charpentier.
7. Treatment and Assistance, by V. Truelle.

*Séquelles d'encéphalite léthargique* (Drs André Collin, Tobolowska, Requin).

Particulars of three cases in which the malady seems to be an acquired state.

*Un Cas d'encéphalite épidémique à évolution chronique et à forme pseudo-bulbaire* (MM. Mourlon, Henri Colin and J. Lhermitte).

Report of a case. No evidence of pyramidal lesion. The suggested cause—lesion of corpus striatum. Most successful treatment—cocodylate of soda and scopolamine.

*Crises d'anxiété paroxystiques chez un obsédé avec délire de doute métaphysique* (Prof. Henri Claude and A. Borel).

Case of a man who had always been of an unstable, emotional, doubting disposition and suffered a severe shock at 50 years of age. He became subject to attacks of anxiety accompanied by doubt as to the reality of things which approached conviction.

*Mélancolie consécutive à une fracture du Crâne* (MM. H. Colin, Lhermitte and G. Robin).

A man of 42 (normal and having no traceable hereditary disposition) was wounded in fronto-parietal region. Four months later he suffered from delirious melancholia and attempted suicide. Ultimately, after about six years, he scarcely moved and refused to eat except under great pressure. Post-mortem examination showed a scar in the fronto-parietal region the lesion being not of an evolutive nature.

*Les séquelles psychiques de la guerre* (M. Henri Colin).

A man of 49 twice wounded, the second time in the left temporal region. He became more and more apathetic and automatic as time passed.

*Action de l'adrénaline sur certains états dépressifs avec hypotension artérielle* (M. G. Naudoscher).

Results are always similar for any given person whether extract of or synthetic adrenalin be used and irrespective of mode of administering, provided the strength be constant. Hypodermic injection is more speedy in action. Feeble doses have no effect on dementia praecox but a rapid rise usually follows in case of melancholia and other depressed states at commencement of general paralysis. Suggestions are made as to use of this method for detecting certain disorders.

*Note sur le fonctionnement du centre de psychiatrie de la 18<sup>e</sup> Région pendant la guerre* (M. Molin de Teyssiew).

A tabular analysis of 4679 cases.

#### No. 2. July 1922.

*Une question de doctrine psychiatrique; la psychose délirante dégénérative aiguë* (Dr G. Halberstadt).

The classification of these cases is discussed, and the history of theories concerning them given in some detail. It is important to separate from out the chaos of psychoses, the autonomic mental diseases, of which this is one. It has nothing in common with dementia praecox, of which the early conception was too wide, and it is important to observe that many conditions wrongly called dementia are curable.

A certain relationship between all acute degenerative conditions seems undeniable. The one under consideration is an autonomic disease but its limits cannot yet be sharply defined.

*Aperçu historique sur le régime des aliénés* (MM. J. Raynier and H. Beaudouin).

This is an introductory chapter to a complete work on the insane and asylums for the insane from the administrative and legal point of view.

*Délire systématisé et inversion sexuelle* (Dr P. Quirand).

Notes on a case.

*Deuxième statistique complémentaire* (Dr Calixte Rougé).

Completes the record of cases admitted to the asylums at Limoux, suffering from insanity consequent on the war, 1914-1918.

*Les méthodes objectives de psycho-diagnostic clinique et phrénoscopie* (MM. Bonhomme and Stephanoti).

Description of a technique for investigation of the unconscious, based on examination of the respiratory movements. Four cases are cited. Criticised adversely by MM. Tonlouse, Colin, Thignard.

*Quelques remarques générales sur les états psychopathiques qui apparaissent dans la vie individuelle et ceux qui se répètent à travers les générations. Essai d'une classification psychiatrique biologique* (Dr Piltz).

A memoir on the subject by M. Piltz will appear in *Annales Médico-Psychologiques*.

*Troubles psychiques à caractère spécial au cours d'une encéphalite épidémique* (M. Pierre Kahn).

Notes on, and discussion of, two cases.

*Hallucinations lilliputiennes et paludisme* (M. Hikary).

Following on a previous paper by M. Leroy, the author sends notes of a personal experience of lilliputian hallucinations during marsh fever.

#### No. 4. November 1922.

*Chronique. L'Expertise psychiatrique et les médecins non spécialisés* (G. Demay).

Discusses the question of the mental examination of persons under arrest and argues that this should be in the hands of specialists.

*Sur deux cas d'auto-accusation pathologique* (Dr August Wimmer).

Detailed notes on two cases, brought forward as a contribution to the study of "sincerity" or "insincerity" in self accusation.

*Abcès de fixation et examen du fond mental* (Dr C. Pascal and Fernand Laurent).

The various methods of exploring the mental background are handicapped by the fact that fundamental signs are apt to escape attention amongst the secondary signs. It has long been noted that the onset of an infectious disease during the course of a mental disease, may produce, if not a cure, a more or less prolonged arrest of the morbid process, together with disappearance of secondary troubles. Various attempts have been made to use this fact. The authors give notes of five cases in which they have used *l'abcès de fixation* with success from the point of view of diagnosis.

*Sur le langage "anatomique"* (M. Querey).

Remarks on a case followed by discussion.

*Psychoses associées. Onirisme et symptômes maniaques* (M. Louis Parant).

Notes on a case, presenting an unusual combination of symptoms.

#### No. 5. December 1922.

*Chronique.*

Discusses the policy of the Ministry of Hygiene in converting part of the Maison Nationale de Charenton into a Maternity Hospital.

*L'évolution de la méthode des tests Binet-Simon en Amérique* (O. J. Roher, Mlle G. L. Lowden and M. A. Brousseau).

A short historical article ending with the following conclusions:

1. From American experience it appears that the Binet-Simon Tests although of high general utility, are insufficient

- (a) for lower ages, where they lack precision;
- (b) for higher ages, where they were too complex;
- (c) in the general classification of the tests.

2. The necessity for remedying these defects produced, in America, numerous variants which were characterised in general by the elevation of the intellectual level of the adult from 12 to 16 years.

3. The war again changed opinions on the point and the mental age of a normal adult was lowered to the neighbourhood of 13 (12 or 14).

4. Three fundamental defects actually remain:

(a) There are no special tests for superior adults.

(b) Other tests are necessary for illiterates and for those who are not well acquainted with the official language.

(c) We need a particular method of appreciation of the intelligence of those whose thought is expressed concretely.

5. The great practical value of the collective tests has been demonstrated; nevertheless their employment in industry is still insufficient.

6. Massachusetts has special legislation concerning the education of backward children.

7. Several American cities have psychiatric services attached to the judicial service.

*Psychopathie syphilitique chez un prédisposé* (M. René Targowla and Mlle L. Pezé).

Detailed description of a case.

*Le secret professionnel en matière d'aliénation mentale dans la pratique du service libre* (M. Roger Dupouy).

Discussion as to whether it is a violation of professional secrecy to use the information given by a patient as a basis of information to the police to secure his being placed under restraint.

R. J. B.

*Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique* (XIX).

No. 9. November 1922.

*La rééducation auditive chez les sourds-muets et chez les autres sourds* (H. Marichelle).

After a brief summary of the history of the question he explains the methods by which deaf mutes should be tested and classified for teaching. He advocates throughout the use of ordinary speech sounds and natural grammatical forms and shows the close connection between the processes of speech and hearing. Improvement in deaf mutes is psychological rather than physical and is confined to improvement in the pupils' "differential hearing."

*Genèse de l'art figuré. II. Les origines de l'art figuré paléolithique* (G. H. Luquet).

The origin of painting and sculpture is not to be found in the decorative lines with which primitive man ornamented his cave and belongings but in pure chance. The chance impression of a hand on a soft mud wall led to prehistoric "hand" drawings. The chance resemblance to some familiar object in rock or other natural formation inspired primitive man to complete the picture. Many examples are given and an interesting comparison is made with the present day work of children.

*Sur l'origine commune du langage verbal et du langage musical* (L. Dauriac).

*Les catégories esthétiques et le problème de l'art* (C. Schuwer).

No. 10. December 1922.

*Psychologie de la psychose hallucinatoire systématique* (G. Dumas).

An enquiry into the psychology of the psychosis of systematic hallucinations. Hallucinatory ideas of persecution and of grandeur which typify this psychosis also occur in paranoia from which it must be carefully distinguished. The natural tendency at certain periods of normal mental life to ideas of persecution and greatness are repressed by the normal adult intelligence but tend to reappear and dominate the mind in various derangements such as the psychosis discussed.

*Les fonctions propres de l'écorce dans le mécanisme des réceptions sensibles* (H. Picron).

Distinguishes between the functions of the cortical and subcortical centres. In general the thalamus is the centre for affective reactions to sensory stimuli and the cortex for differentiation and discrimination. Head's theories on cutaneous sensibility are accepted with some reservations and criticism.

*Anticipations des principes de la psycho-analyse dans l'œuvre d'un poète français* (J. Pérès).

These "anticipations" are found in the writings of Laforgue published before the principles of psycho-analysis were public property.

R. J. B.



"NARCOLEPSY"<sup>1</sup>

BY C. WORSTER-DROUGHT.

As the name implies (Gk. *νάρκη* = stupor *λαμβάνειν* = to seize), narcolepsy is a condition which is characterised by recurrent states of sudden and profound sleep.

The condition appears first to have been described by Gélinau (9) in 1881, under the name of 'la narcolepsie'; he considered it a rare neurosis in which the outstanding feature was a sudden and irresistible desire to sleep, the period of slumber being usually of short duration. Gowers (10) considered the term best applied to a condition in which the patient showed recurrent attacks of apparent sleep, varying in duration from a few minutes to a few hours, and from which he or she could be roused with comparatively little effort; on the other hand, he distinguished 'trance' and 'lethargy' from narcolepsy in that the sleep of the former states was more prolonged and the patient could be roused only imperfectly and with extreme difficulty, while 'catalepsy' was accompanied by that plastic state of the limbs known as 'flexibilitas cerea' or katatonia. The distinctions between these closely allied conditions, and especially between narcolepsy and lethargy or trance, is somewhat artificial, as in many cases which otherwise fulfil the definition of narcolepsy, the patient cannot be roused during the attack; similarly many examples of so-called trance have a recurrent tendency. Later authors—Ballet (3), Féré (7), Lamarcq (16), Achard (2), and others—have employed the term narcolepsy to include all states of paroxysmal sleep, and it is in this sense that I am using it in the present communication.

*Symptoms.* The characteristic feature of narcolepsy is the occurrence of paroxysms of diurnal sleep in the midst of whatever occupation the patient may be engaged. The attack may occur suddenly under any conditions, seizing the patient while walking or eating, while actively engaged in mental work, conducting business, or playing at a game. One of Robin's cases—a medical man—often used to fall asleep when walking, while in the daily press of March 22nd, 1921, there was reported an inquest on a man aet. 60, held at Newport, Mon., at which the evidence

<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society on May 23rd, 1923.

showed that he used to fall asleep when walking or eating. He worked in a farmyard and had frequently been seen to fall asleep in the midst of his meal, the cows eating the remainder of the food out of his hand. He had apparently fallen asleep in the roadway when he was run over by a cart and died as the result of his injuries. Fééré(7) records an instance of the patient falling asleep while standing as soon as she leaned against a piece of furniture, and P. Stewart(19) that of a man who would fall asleep while playing the piano or at a game of cards, during the latter especially if he held a losing hand. Oppenheim(18) mentioned the case of a schoolmaster who was obliged continually to prick himself during his teaching in order to prevent himself from falling asleep. Carlill(5) records the case of a young man, who, for as long as he could remember, was liable to fall asleep at any time of the day without feeling tired and had never been free from the attacks for longer than a week at a time. He had fallen asleep on the tail-board of a cart and had been thrown off, and also on the top of a van when he was caught by an archway and swept off. He had been found asleep while scrubbing the floor, with his arm immersed in the pail of water, and had also been observed asleep while walking about.

Various influences may induce the actual attack; thus, conversation on any unpleasant subject (Weir Mitchell's case) or, as in a case described by Gowers(10)—that of a man who suffered from a nasal fistula; whenever a probe was passed down this fistula the patient promptly fell asleep. The attacks are seldom associated with any feeling of fatigue although they show an increased liability to occur during phases of mental depression. In most of those cases which are not associated with organic disease, the attack—as we shall endeavour to show later—is initiated by a complex of psychical origin.

In the majority of cases the attack occurs quite suddenly without premonitory signs, although headache is an occasional prodromal symptom. As a rule the patient suddenly feels drowsy, the eyelids droop and he is soundly asleep in a few moments. A few cases actually sink to the ground should the attack occur when standing or walking, but usually the attack takes place when sitting down. Only a minority of cases—as we shall see later—have any recollection of what occurs during the sleep, and generally the patient remains quiet. Dreams occasionally occur—for instance, in one of Gowers' cases the patient experienced vivid dreams during the attack but was unable to recollect the actual details. Also, in a case recorded by L. Guthrie(11), that of a boy aged 12, a form of 'night-terror' occurred. The boy would fall asleep in the midst

of a meal or while dressing or undressing. At first the sleep appeared natural, but later was disturbed by mutterings and screaming, and finally by violent struggling.

Occasionally the sleep can be induced voluntarily—by auto-suggestion—as in a case mentioned by Gowers<sup>(10)</sup>; in one attack so induced the patient died. Voluntary induction is common in the so-called ‘trance’ of spiritualistic mediums and in devotees in the East.

In some cases the patient can be readily awakened at any time, but in others he can be aroused only with extreme difficulty or not at all.

The duration of the attack varies from a few minutes to several hours, the patient awakening spontaneously at the end of this period. Marduel records the case of a soldier who slept 70–80 hours on six occasions in two years. In most of the cases which I have encountered, the sleep lasted from 10–20 minutes. The actual frequency of the attacks varies from four to five a day (Gowers’ case) to one or two a year. In some cases the attacks are more frequent and of longer duration after deficient sleep, and the leading of an active life, or the fact of being on holiday, tends to lessen their intensity and frequency. In one type of case the patient may keep off an attack with a strong voluntary effort, but feels uncomfortable and will stretch and yawn continually.

*Clinical forms.* Cases of narcolepsy may be divided into two main groups:

(1) Those in which the attack is symptomatic of definite organic disease.

(2) Those in which no evidence of organic disease can be discovered.

#### I. CASES IN WHICH THE NARCOLEPSY IS SYMPTOMATIC OF DEFINITE ORGANIC DISEASE.

In dealing with any particular case of narcolepsy, we have first to exclude all possibility of organic disease. The attacks may depend upon any of the following morbid conditions:

(1) *Cerebral tumour*, particularly of the frontal lobes and region of the third ventricle and sylvian aqueduct (mesencephalon). For instance, Stewart<sup>(19)</sup> has recorded a case of cystic growth involving the floor of the third ventricle in which the chief symptoms were paroxysms of overpowering sleep. In a case recently under my care, that of a clerk aged 40, the complaint of his employer was that he continually found the patient asleep at his work, leaning over his typewriter or across his desk; he could always be aroused without difficulty. At the time there were no definite signs of organic disease, but gradually he developed

some weakness of his right arm and leg of an extra-pyramidal type, and later the signs of cerebral tumour were quite manifest. At the autopsy, a tumour was found appearing at the under-surface of the brain between the root of the olfactory tract and optic chiasma to the left of the mid-line and apparently developing from the region of the basal ganglia. (The brain is in the process of hardening and has not yet been cut.)

(2) *Encephalitis lethargica*. Increased drowsiness with a tendency to spontaneous somnolence and attacks of diurnal sleep is often a feature in the early stages of encephalitis lethargica, particularly when the main lesion is in the neighbourhood of the basal ganglia and substantia nigra.

(3) *General paralysis of the insane*. After a preliminary period of insomnia in the early stages of this disorder, there is a liability for the patient to fall asleep at any time of the day and during whatever business upon which he may be engaged. This disappears as the disease advances and is replaced by motor activity.

(4) *Cerebral arteriopathies*. In the subjects of cerebral arteriosclerosis and atheroma, there is a tendency to fall asleep at all times of the day and particularly after meals. The sleep is often deep and persistent and in the later stages of senility may reach the degree of true coma. As a result of the vascular disease, haemorrhage or thrombosis may occur.

(5) *Trypanosomiasis*. Associated with the chronic meningo-encephalitis and perivascular infiltration of the cerebral vessels in this disorder, spontaneous attacks of sleep may occur.

(6) *Pituitary gland disorders*. In almost all forms of dyspituitarism, increased drowsiness is a feature and often narcolepsy occurs. Several cases of relatively large pituitary cysts associated with paroxysmal sleep have been recorded. When the proximity of the pituitary gland to the region of the third ventricle is considered, it appears quite likely that it is not the pituitary disorder *per se* that gives rise to the narcolepsy, but that the condition depends upon the disturbance caused in the region of the third ventricle by the upward pressure of the pituitary enlargement. In this connection, the recent work of Camus and Roussy (4) is of interest; by experiments upon dogs these observers have shown that all the symptoms ascribed to dyspituitarism—Frölich's dystrophia-adiposogenitalis syndrome, polyuria, etc.—can be produced by a lesion of the base of the brain involving the nuclei of the tuber cinereum in the floor of the third ventricle.

(7) *Thyroid gland disorders.* Attacks of diurnal sleep may occur in myxoedema and even in simple hypothyroidism. Mongour has recorded the case of a man who invariably fell asleep when reading and, incidentally, slept throughout the medical examination; he was relieved by taking thyroid extract.

(8) *Obesity.* The occurrence of spontaneous sleep in obese subjects is well known. The condition has been ascribed to a disorder of the endocrine glands. The obesity—especially in young subjects—may be due to dyspituitarism, on which the narcolepsy may depend. It will be remembered that the fat boy in *Pickwick* was always falling asleep. In other cases the obesity is a result of hypothyroidism.

(9) *Liver disorders.* Narcolepsy has been noted as occurring in diseases of the liver, such as cirrhosis and gall-stones, by Levi, Graves and Murchison. J. Thomson<sup>(21)</sup> has also recorded a case in which narcolepsy occurred during the first six years of life in a boy with an enlarged liver.

(10) *Blood disorders.* In diseases of the blood, such as chlorosis, pernicious anaemia, and leukaemia, paroxysmal attacks of sleep may occasionally occur. In a case recently under my care, that of a man aged 45, narcoleptic attacks were so frequent and pronounced that it was thought that he was suffering from encephalitis lethargica. At the time there was nothing in his appearance or his symptoms to suggest pernicious anaemia, but later pallor and signs suggesting early subacute combined degeneration of the spinal cord developed, and blood examination confirmed the diagnosis.

(11) *Renal disease.* Brissaud and Lamy have mentioned narcoleptic attacks occurring in connection with chronic interstitial nephritis.

(12) *Diabetes.* Spontaneous diurnal sleep may also occur in the subjects of diabetes; coma is the usual termination.

## II. CASES IN WHICH NO EVIDENCE OF ORGANIC DISEASE CAN BE DISCOVERED.

In this group are included types of narcolepsy that have been classed as neuroses, the mechanisms of which will be discussed subsequently. This form of narcolepsy appears to be somewhat uncommon and the recorded cases are by no means numerous. Briquet, for instance, met with only three cases in a large number of hysterics, and Gowers<sup>(10)</sup> only encountered four examples. As would be expected, the condition is usually met with in early adult life and—apart from treatment—may pass off in a few months or a few years, but the attacks have been known to persist throughout life.

On investigating the actual nature and causation of these narcoleptic attacks, we are somewhat handicapped by the fact that we are in almost complete ignorance regarding the physiological mechanism of normal sleep. It has been said that "sleep is a habit which should be jealously maintained," but at least the habit is congenital and the means by which it should be maintained are by no means clear. Various hypotheses have from time to time been propounded regarding the physiology of normal sleep. The most important of these I will discuss briefly in order to ascertain their possible relationship to narcolepsy.

(1) Retraction of the dendrons of the cells of the central nervous system by a species of amoeboid movement, which results in an interruption in the transmission of nervous impulses, the nerve cells being temporarily isolated. This theory depends upon the observation of Demoor and others who found that in animals in which deep anaesthesia had occurred, the dendrites of the nerve cells exhibited moniliform swellings and were retracted.

Against this view is the fact that recent histological observations suggest that the neuro-fibrillae are continuous from cell to cell, that is, from synapse to synapse. Further, it is open to question if the unconsciousness of a deeply narcotised animal—due to the action of a poison—is any criterion of what occurs in normal sleep or even in narcolepsy.

(2) Lugaro takes a precisely contrary view as he was unable to discover the moniliform enlargements referred to by Demoor; his hypothesis is that the interlacing of dendrites is much more intimate during sleep than in the waking state. It has been suggested that Lugaro's failure to find the moniliform swellings was probably due to his not having maintained the anaesthesia long enough in his dogs.

(3) Chemical changes occur in the cerebral cells as a result of the action of waste products of metabolism, or as they have been termed 'fatigue products.' These have been believed to act as narcotics; Obersteiner, indeed, considered the soporific substances to be acid in nature, while Preyer went so far as to state that the product was lactic acid. There is, however, no evidence of the existence of such a soporific fatigue-product, and sleep, far from being an incident in the general phenomena of fatigue, is often impossible under circumstances of extreme exhaustion. Further, sleepiness and the subjective feeling of tiredness, though often associated, are by no means identical.

(4) Sleep and awakening is controlled by a certain focus or centre in the mid-brain very near to the centre for ocular movement. The assumption for the existence of such a centre is a reasonable one if only

on the analogy of other controlling centres for physiological processes—vaso-motor centre, micturition centre, heat-regulating centre, etc. The increased opportunity that has occurred in recent years for studying clinically and pathologically cases of encephalitis lethargica has led certain authors—notably Economo<sup>(6)</sup>—to advance this view. Encephalitic lesions in the region of this focus result in changes in the rhythm and duration of sleep. Similarly, neoplasms in the neighbourhood of the third ventricle, as we have seen, are frequently accompanied by attacks of narcolepsy. Economo<sup>(6)</sup> goes so far as to assert that as certain so-called cataleptic conditions have been found to be associated with an organic lesion of the ganglia situated between the thalamus, corpora geniculata and pineal body, a disturbance in this region will be found as the basis for many sleep-like states hitherto termed ‘functional.’

As sleep and allied conditions are invariably accompanied by a diminished blood-supply to the brain—as will be shown in the next section—it is certain that cerebral anaemia must play some part in their production. It is possible, however, that the activity of such a sleep-controlling centre—being stimulated by certain afferent impulses or even complexes of psychogenic origin—initiates the vaso-motor mechanism for diminishing the cerebral blood-supply that actually results in sleep. In the infant, the sleep centre would necessarily act automatically, but with increasing psychical development the function of sleeping—as with other bodily functions—becomes more complex.

The definite interference with such a sleep-controlling centre would account for the narcolepsy met with in connection with encephalitis lethargica, general paralysis of the insane, trypanosomiasis, dyspituitarism, and those cases of cerebral tumour we have mentioned. It is to be remembered, however, that relatively large neoplasms in the region of the mesencephalon, third ventricle, or pituitary gland, are liable mechanically to compress the arteries forming the circle of Willis and cause a certain degree of cerebral anaemia.

(5) Diminished blood-supply to the brain and consequent cerebral anaemia. This hypothesis has much experimental evidence in its favour, and there can be no doubt that a relative cerebral anaemia accompanies normal sleep.

That during sleep the blood-supply to the brain is diminished is shown by:

(a) Depression of the anterior fontanelle in infants and of trephine holes in adults during sleep, the volume of the brain being reduced by general vaso-constriction.

(b) Pallor of the optic discs, the retinal arteries being narrowed.

(c) The relative weights of the upper and lower part of the body is different in sleep, from that when awake; if the body is balanced in a horizontal position in the waking state, the feet fall when sleep ensues, the inclination appearing proportional to the depth of sleep. A sudden sense stimulus increases the blood-supply to the brain, the feet rising and the head falling.

(d) Plethysmograph records from the arm of a sleeping man show a diminution in volume every time he is disturbed even though the disturbance be insufficient to awaken him—presumably a general diminution in the volume of blood of the body and a corresponding increase in the blood-supply to the brain.

The changes in the cerebral blood-supply that occur during sleep have been referred to the action of the vaso-motor centres. The existence of an effective vaso-motor mechanism in the cerebral blood-vessels is very problematical. If changes occur in the cerebral blood-pressure and rate of flow, therefore, they are mainly secondary to those which are produced in other parts of the body; for instance, general vaso-dilatation in the trunk and particularly of the splanchnic area will lead to a diminished cerebral blood-supply. This fact no doubt accounts for that drowsiness following a rather heavy meal that is so frequently met with in people of middle-age and after. In large eaters, this post-prandial somnolence is very pronounced, and tends to become progressive. We have no doubt all experienced a certain difficulty in applying ourselves to mental work after a heavier meal than usual. The hyperaemia and general vaso-dilatation of the splanchnic area necessary for the purposes of digestion leads to the diminished cerebral blood-supply which gives rise to the somnolence.

The relative cerebral anaemia would account for the narcolepsies of cerebral arteriopathies and disorders of the blood such as pernicious anaemia. Whether it is the cerebral anaemia *per se* or the relatively poor blood-supply to the possible sleep-controlling centre, thus causing a disturbance of its function that leads to the narcolepsy, is difficult to say. If the latter view be correct, the disordered metabolism that occurs in hypothyroidism, diabetes, hepatic and renal disease, and in association with obesity, would also explain a similar disturbance of the centre leading to a derangement of sleep.

(6) Sleep is a form of auto-hypnosis and is a purely psychical phenomenon. Although even the most ardent advocate of the view that psychological phenomena depend upon a purely psychical mechanism would



hesitate to ascribe normal sleep merely to auto-hypnosis, it must be admitted that the relationship of sleep to the hypnotic state is unmistakable. Liébeault, indeed, stated that the former could be distinguished from the latter only by the fact of the connection between the sleeper and the hypnotist. All influences which bring on sleep are also adapted to induce hypnosis—the relaxation of attention, the absence of strong light, quiet, a monotonous voice (as in church drowsiness), etc.; further, sleep usually appears at definite habitual (*i.e.* auto-suggested) hours, and it is not uncommon for an individual to wake at an hour desired and suggested prior to his falling asleep. It is also significant that the depth of sleep, as with hypnosis, cannot really be measured by the intensity of sound required to awaken; for instance, as Forel points out, an anxious mother awakens at the slightest noise of her child while she is not disturbed by a snoring husband or other accustomed noise.

Further, the physical signs of sleep and hypnosis are almost identical: The pulse and respiration are slowed.

The muscles generally are relaxed, but the flexor of the fingers and orbicularis palpebrarum show increased tone.

If the eyelids are passively raised the eyeballs are found to be rotated upwards.

If a patient be hypnotised with a plethysmograph *in situ* on the arm, the changes in blood-supply behave exactly as in normal sleep. This I have been able to show in a hypnotised subject.

It is quite probable that with increasing psychical development from the infantile stage, sleep is actually initiated by a process of auto-suggestion. The habitual hour, the sight of somebody yawning, the bedroom, undressing, etc., have gradually associated themselves to form a concept of sleep—or sleep-complex—by means of a mutual opening up of paths. If one of the sensations associated with this concept appear at a later date in response to a stimulus, the others will follow as the excitability will spread along the paths that conduct well.

Further simultaneous associations then lead to a connection in the tracts between the concept of sleep and the lower centres producing sleep—such as the sleep-controlling centre. This tract becomes such a good conductor—it being generally acknowledged that the excitability of a given centre increases by repeated conduction towards it when no stronger excitability acts as a deflection—that ultimately it is the concept of sleep suggested by associations with external agents which gives rise to sleep. Fatigue and exhaustion assist the onset of normal sleep in that they tend to lessen the activity of the cerebral cortex and

so reduce the possibility of other associations acting by deflection. The sleep-controlling centre then brings about reflex closure of the eyes, and initiates the reduction in the blood-flow to the brain—probably by action on the vasomotor system—that brings about sleep.

In the manner that has been described, the concept of sleep acquires a purely motor character—which is really only a special instance of a general law dealing with the development of brain mechanisms. In the same way all voluntary movements developed originally from involuntary ones by the sensation of reflex movement becoming the causal conception or the impulse of the will. Consequently, in most cases of narcolepsy, apart from those which depend upon organic disease in which the psychical paths, as it were, are cut out by a short circuit, we can say, as of normal sleep, that the sleep-process is initiated by suggestion or auto-suggestion—or occasionally can be even voluntarily brought about, the probable mechanism being that which we have described.

Of those cases of narcolepsy which are independent of organic disease and which might be termed ‘functional,’ the cases I have encountered lead me to believe that there are several varieties, each corresponding with a different psychological level ranging from superficial to deep until a form is reached, the reaction of which occurs at a purely physiological level. These different forms of narcolepsy can best be illustrated by analogy, comparing them with the various ‘fits,’ from hysterical to frankly epileptic.

An ordinary hysterical convulsive attack is a type of reaction that takes place at a comparatively high psychological level, the symptoms of psychical origin being converted into physical manifestations which comparatively little effort will bring under conscious control. Two varieties of this type of hysterical seizure can be distinguished: (*a*) that in which the patient can remember all that has taken place during the attack, and (*b*) that in which there is amnesia for the period of the seizure; the former reaction most probably occurs at a slightly higher psychological level than the latter. Similarly with narcolepsy; one meets with (*a*) cases in which the patient apparently falls asleep but can remember all that takes place during the attack and states afterwards that although he knew all that was going on about him and understood all that was said to him, he felt incapable of moving or of making any attempt to reply. The disturbance of consciousness in such a case is very slight, and amounts to little more than inhibition on the motor side. This form of narcolepsy is often associated with reverie and hypnagogic hallucinations. The patient sits or lies apparently asleep, the face normal in colour, the eyes closed, limbs relaxed, and pulse and respiration slowed.

As with the early stages of normal sleep—probably owing to simplification of the reflex arc—a tendency for motor expression may be exhibited and the patient can easily be roused. (b) The second variety—in which the patient is amnesic for the period of the attack as far as consciousness is concerned—presents similar characteristics, with the addition that the respiration is mainly diaphragmatic, the masseters and flexors of the fingers often contracted. The eyeballs are seen to be directed upwards and to the side if the eyelids are raised, and occasionally transient katatonia may be demonstrated. The latter is interesting in view of Liébeault's contention that one can produce katatonia in a certain stage of normal sleep by repeatedly raising a limb. The patient is rather more difficult to rouse than in the first variety, but stimulation of any hyperaesthetic zone will awaken him. Both the above varieties of narcolepsy may occur in the same subject—as in a case of my own—and I regard them as forms of conversion hysteria. (c) A third type of narcolepsy occurs at a lower point in the scale of psychological levels than either of those already described, and, to pursue our analogy, is comparable to the psychasthenic convulsions of Oppenheim (18) or the compulsion neuroses. These are manifestations of a more severe grade of nervous disturbance, but the reaction occurs still within strictly psychological limits. The patient feels an irresistible impulse to sleep and although for a time he may resist the somnolence, yawning and stretching during his effort, he finally succumbs and is speedily asleep. Although the appearance is that of deep sleep, the muscles are often not fully relaxed, and the patient either cannot be roused at all or can only be roused by means of forcible and unusual stimulation, *e.g.* the faradic current, flicking with a wet towel, etc. Stimulation of hyperaesthetic zones, however, will often provoke defensive movements without rousing. Attempts to raise the eyelids are often resisted but food placed in the mouth may be swallowed. (d) We next have a type of narcolepsy which one may compare with the so-called affect epilepsies of Bratz and Lembusche, *viz.*, a reaction provoked by a purely psychological situation, but with physical manifestations which place the reaction almost within the scale of physiological levels, that is, it occurs at the lowest psychological level. As with the Bratz epilepsies, the condition usually represents the reaction of the patient to a situation that is absolutely intolerable and to which no other adjustment is possible. In this group fall many of the cases of so-called catalepsy, the alleged resemblance of which to death has rendered noteworthy. The face is usually normal in colour, but may be livid, pulse and respiration are markedly slowed, and, according to French and

German authors, respiration may even cease (hysterical suspended animation). In a case of Pfendler's quoted by Binswanger, no sign of life could be detected for 48 hours and everything was prepared for the interment. There is usually complete anaesthesia to all stimuli and the superficial reflexes—including the corneal—are abolished. The deep reflexes are usually retained. The attacks in duration may be very prolonged; Achard<sup>(2)</sup> mentions the case of a woman aet. 25, who lived in a little village on the Aisne, in whom an attack persisted for several years. Some writers have regarded this cataleptic form as closely allied to stuporose states. (c) Lastly, we have a form which is comparable only with true epilepsy, and indeed, as Westphal and others have considered, may occur as the 'equivalent' of an epileptic attack. We thus reach a physiological level in our scale of gradations. Although these latter narcoleptic attacks may alternate with ordinary epileptic seizures, they are in no sense attacks only of 'petit mal.' They differ from this form of minor epilepsy in that there is no pallor, they are of longer duration, and there is a perfect resemblance to normal sleep both in their onset and character. I have met with one example:

L. F. B. aet. 25, was first seen in May, 1920. There was a history of 'fits' in childhood but they ceased at the age of 10, and no further attack occurred until August, 1913; at this time he was serving in the Army. About four weeks after the above attack he fell asleep whilst cleaning his buttons and could not be roused for several hours. Since this time he has had 24 such attacks; they have occurred at any time, under all conditions, and often in perilous situations. In duration they have varied from two hours to two days. He states that he sleeps quite soundly at night, even though he may have had an attack during the day. Three fits—description suggesting true epilepsy—have occurred since 1913. In January, 1919, he was seen towards the end of a narcoleptic attack. The face was normal in colour, pulse and respiration slowed, the corneal reflex feebly present, the eyes rotated upwards with slight lateral nystagmus, the optic discs pale, the right abdominal reflex absent, and the left sluggish, the left plantar reflex extensor and the right indefinite, and the deep reflexes sluggish. He could not be roused even by forcible stimulation, or by pressure on hyperaesthetic zones, although the latter gave rise to slight defensive movements.

The time has now passed when we were content merely to have diagnosed a condition as hysterical; we now have to learn something further regarding the mechanism of the patient's so-called hysteria, for purposes of both accurate diagnosis and treatment. Even a superficial

analysis will often reveal that a particular attack served a purpose in enabling the patient to escape from a painful idea or responsibility—to avoid some necessity for adaptation. Some painful experience or unpleasant idea is repressed, and the emotion, which appertains to the dissociated complexes and to which there has been no reaction, manifests itself in the attack of sleep, and in this way the affect of the dissociated complex is weakened. The complex is robbed of its affect, which is the real object of the conversion, and hence its value to the individual. This mechanism can best be illustrated by reference to a case which recently came under my observation.

L. L. aet. 27, a schoolmaster, complained that from time to time he had 'attacks of sleep' of several (4-6) hours' duration. They invariably occurred in term time (never during the holidays) and always developed soon after he woke up in the morning and before he got out of bed; he would then sleep until 4 or 5 o'clock, all attempts to rouse him being futile. He had no recollection of what occurred during his sleep, nor of any of the efforts to awaken him, but would often swallow food if placed in his mouth. He insisted that he was very keen on his work, and desired no other form of occupation. A psychological investigation, however, soon revealed that this was not the case, there being an unconscious resistance to teaching, and that the mechanism in his case was as follows:

L. L., having repressed his distaste for teaching, finds on waking up that he has to go to school; the work is irksome, consequently his necessity for escaping reality and seeking pleasure are in conflict and results in his falling asleep. He does not go to school, therefore, his own desire is gained, and at the same time his herd instinct (or employment demand) is satisfied by the attack of sleep, which is an acceptable excuse, and the painful recognition of his own selfishness is converted into sleep.

In other cases the occurrence of the narcoleptic attacks depends upon a tendency to the revival by association of certain painful experiences that have been repressed from consciousness.

The actual starting-point of an attack is usually by an association-complex which probably acts upon the sleep-controlling centre in the manner already described. In some cases there is a tendency to fix the gaze on some small object immediately prior to the attack.

*Treatment.* It is beyond the scope of the present communication to deal with the treatment of the organic forms of narcolepsy, for the relief of which therapeutic measures must be directed towards the cause. As regards the psychogenic forms we have the following methods of treatment at our disposal:

1. Simple explanation and encouragement.
2. Hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestion.
3. Preliminary psychological investigation with the revival in a hypnoidal condition of the emotional experience on which the attacks depend.
4. Complete psycho-analysis.

It is very rarely that simple explanation has the slightest effect, and in my experience hypnosis and post-hypnotic suggestion is equally unsatisfactory. Although this method may abolish the attacks, such relief is, as a rule, only temporary. In this connection Myers<sup>(17)</sup> points out that it is a well-established fact of experimental psychology that one process does not destroy but can at most merely inhibit an antagonistic process, and that other things being equal the older process tends to outlast the later acquired activity.

The forms of gross suggestion that have been employed in the attempt to relieve narcoleptic attacks (*e.g.* false operations, trephining (as in Carhill's<sup>(5)</sup> case), without impugning the purity of motive of the physicians concerned, cannot be too strongly condemned.

I believe the most satisfactory of the shorter methods of treatment to be (1) a preliminary modified 'psychoanalysis' with a detailed investigation into the history of the onset of the attacks, and of the individual, followed by (2) reconstruction of the origin of the narcolepsy, or of the emotional experience giving rise to the condition, under light hypnosis. It is well known that a light degree of hypnosis is most effective for the process of reassociation, and its value, for the elicitation of memories which one is unable to revive in a waking state, is undoubted. The following is an example of a case of narcolepsy which responded favourably to this form of treatment.

F. L. T. aet. 21, was first seen on March 22nd, 1920, the diagnosis being one of traumatic minor epilepsy.

*History.* No illness of any importance prior to war service; no previous fits or nervous disorders. His mother suffers from Graves' disease; family history otherwise negative.

He enlisted in the R.A.F. in March, 1917, was commissioned in December, 1917, and proceeded to France in April, 1918. Having made several successful observations and bombing flights soon after arrival, he was acting as observer on one occasion during May, 1918, when his aeroplane came under the fire of enemy anti-aircraft guns at fairly close range; one shell exploded underneath the machine, whereupon his pilot lost control and a crash resulted. F. L. T. was apparently thrown upon

his head and lost consciousness; he 'came round' about an hour later in a dressing station, and while he was still an inmate there was bombed by enemy aircraft. He felt very nervous but immediately fell asleep; these attacks of sleep recurred almost daily even after he was evacuated to England. After a few months the attacks averaged three per week. Finally, he was discharged from the Army in much the same condition in February, 1919.

*Condition on admission.* He states that all attacks are diurnal and are preceded by no warning whatever. He was unable to assign any causes to individual attacks. Following the attacks, he occasionally became emotional and also suffered from intense headache. He was depressed, somewhat irritable, and stated that he was too nervous to go to sleep at night; dreams were few and far between and were not of a startling character. He had a definite fear that he would become insane. At this time, owing to erroneous diagnosis of epilepsy, he was taking 30 grains of potassium bromide a day, and two drachms of paraldehyde at night, and was not allowed to go about alone.

The physical examination did not reveal any evidence of organic nervous disease; he appeared very apprehensive, and exhibited slight general tremors. He said the last attack of sleep had occurred on the previous day, quite suddenly while he was talking to a nurse; he recollected sinking down but remembered nothing further until he found himself in bed with an intense headache. He related the history of the crash and the development of the nervous disorder quite clearly and without any sign of increased emotion.

*Progress, etc.* Following a detailed investigation of his case history, the first step was to bring about the omission of the paraldehyde and a rapid reduction in the amount of bromide he was taking. As a result there was no appreciable increase in the frequency or severity of the sleeping attacks, and after three weeks bromide was stopped entirely. A further discussion of the experiences of the crash, and an endeavour to revive in the waking state the emotions associated with it, did not meet with any success. In the meantime he was encouraged to go about alone. At his next visit, he was lightly hypnotised and the 'crash' experience again revived. After a few preliminary suggestions that he was in the air, over the enemy lines, and was apprehensive of crashing, he went through the whole experience without any further exhortation, and exhibited all the emotion that one would associate with such an experience. He trembled, sweated, and clung to imaginary stays, and finally finished by shouting, "We are going to have a hell of a crash."

Incidentally I ascertained that a thought of a crash or similar accident had immediately preceded his attacks of sleep. From that time, which was in June, 1920, he has had no more attacks, has quite lost his fear of insanity, and has worked continuously as an election agent, passing through the stress of a general election.

C. S. Myers (17) has also recorded a case which was much relieved by the revival under hypnosis of a repressed incident in which the patient was face to face with an orang-utang and had to shoot the animal. In this case there was no emotional abreaction during the return of the lost memories, and from this case and others Myers concludes that for a successful result an emotional 'abreaction' during the revival of the dissociated memories is not essential. He believed that it is not the emotional component of the experience that is primarily repressed, but the 'unpleasant' component (cognitive experience) and that the resistance against revival expresses the inability to admit the unpleasant, not the inability to face the emotion. Of the veracity of this latter view I am not entirely convinced, as I have seldom been fortunate enough to obtain a satisfactory result in any form of neurosis by a mere revival of a repressed experience in the absence of an emotional component.

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## PSYCHO-ANALYTIC VIEWS ON SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF EARLY INFANTILE THINKING<sup>1</sup>.

By KARL ABRAHAM (BERLIN).

PSYCHO-ANALYTIC interest is focussed on the question of the origin of psychic phenomena. In terms of psycho-analysis the problem is this: By what instinctive forces, conscious and unconscious, are these phenomena determined? The analysis of psychological products regularly reveals in them the combined workings of the 'ego-instincts' and the 'sexual instincts.' Psycho-analysis attributes to the latter a far wider significance than that ascribed to them by other schools of thought. It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to enter upon a discussion as to whether psycho-analysis is right in this respect; the task before us is a more general one.

Psycho-analysis took as its starting-point the investigation of neurotic symptom-formation. But the more thoroughly was the psychogenesis of a symptom explored the more definitely did the associations of the patients lead back into the past, and ultimately to early childhood. In this way certain necessary hypotheses suggested themselves with reference to the instinctive life, and especially the sexual life, of the child, which were in opposition to the traditional views. These hypotheses were confirmed by direct observation of children, and thus we attained new points of view about the psychology of childhood. Amongst other results we came to know that thinking in early childhood is in a special degree under the influence of the instinctive life. My intention now is to show how certain phenomena of infantile thinking are determined by peculiarities, with which we are familiar, of the instinctive life of the child. As the title of this paper indicates, I do not pretend to give an exhaustive account of the subject; I am conscious of the fragmentary character of my essay.

Thinking is the intellectual side of our relation to the outside world; it is based upon sense-perceptions, the experience of the individual. At the earliest period of our lives the contact with the outside world which is of the greatest practical significance is made by means of

<sup>1</sup> Read before the International Congress of Psychology at Oxford, on July 31st, 1923. Translation by Cecil Baines.

the mouth. The twofold importance of the mouth as an organ of nourishment and an erotogenic zone is a matter which, as I have said, I do not propose to discuss here. Without passing any judgment, therefore, as to the correctness or otherwise of that psycho-analytical conception I will merely lay stress upon the fact that at this earliest period of life the instinct of sucking is the most powerful one that there is. At a rather later stage the instinct of biting acquires a similar importance. It is only gradually that the child apprehends the outside world by means of eye and ear. The tendency to put every object into his mouth and chew it with his teeth, with a view to completely incorporating it, becomes strikingly evident from the moment that his hands have the power of grasping. To the child at this stage the outside world consists of all those objects which delight him and which he would like to incorporate in himself but has not as yet so incorporated. The ego and its interests are more important than the object-world. At the stage of the primitive pleasure in biting there is as yet no inhibition to check the destruction of objects: the child is still wholly without adaptation to the outside world. In the realm of the ego-instincts egoism is wholly dominant, as is narcissism in that of childish sexuality. Thus we see that the child's primitive attitude towards objects is a simple matter of pleasure or pain. The outside world is regarded purely subjectively according to its effect, pleasurable or painful, upon the ego. This is true to a considerable extent with regard to the thinking of adults as well, but there is nevertheless a great quantitative difference in the two cases. In adults the function of consciousness has a moderating and regulating influence upon the instinctive life; consciousness has the power of confronting the impulses with criticism and applies to our desires the standard of reality.

Thus the psychic attitude of the young child towards objects is determined simply and solely by the pleasurable or painful effect produced upon him by those objects. Side by side with this important fact of the infantile mental life let us hasten to set another phenomenon which is closely related to it. I refer to the discovery that, when two objects arouse in the child similar feelings of pleasure or of pain, he proceeds unhesitatingly to *identify* them. The critical mode of thinking by which we compare and *differentiate* is wholly absent at this early stage. A few examples may serve to illustrate this mode of thinking by identification which belongs to early childhood.

A little girl of eighteen months was somewhat afraid of dogs. If she saw one she would cry out in alarm: "Bow-wow bite!" ("Wau-wau

beit"). When winter came and the house was heated she once went too near the stove and burned her hand slightly. She began to cry, saying "Bow-wow bite!" The fact that a dog that bites and a hot stove both hurt was enough to make the child identify the two. Because the hot stove hurt her it was a bow-wow.

Another baby, about two years old, spent much time by the cage of a canary which she kept on calling by its name "Hans." One day she called a feather dropped by the bird "Hans" and after that she gave the same name to all feathers and before long to one of her mother's hats which was trimmed with feathers, to her mother's hair and to her own, to a soft cushion and so on. Everything which felt soft was in her language "Hans." To the adult, whose thinking differentiates, a canary and a woman's hair are two very different things. Thought which differentiates will ascribe to both the same quality 'soft,' but in so doing it will not neglect the more important differences between the two objects.

We find analogous thought-processes amongst primitive peoples. The primitive form of thinking persists moreover in the symbolic mode of expression as we meet with it in myths and fairy-tales of different races and in the dreams and other phantastic creations of individuals. As the child grows older he finds great scope in play for thinking by the method of identification, though of course he has by this time become conscious of the imaginary character of his play. One example will suffice to illustrate my meaning: A boy of seven years old, when out for a walk, removed some scattered pieces of paper from the pavement with a stick, saying as he did so: "I am the old general!" A retired general did as a matter of fact live near the boy's home and made it his business to keep the street tidy. In his play the child identified himself with the general simply on the strength of the imitation of this habit of his. To adult thought a vague analogy of this sort is trivial and could never be made the basis of an identification of two persons.

Owing to this peculiarity of infantile thinking it is possible for any person who acts in the same way as another has done previously quite easily to take the latter's place in the child's mental life. A little boy had lost his father in the War. An uncle took charge of him and gave him much affection, and it seemed as if the child was on his side much attached to his uncle. In about a year's time the latter died, whereupon another relation appeared on the scene with the intention of taking charge of the little orphan. It happened that the child was asked if he were sad because his uncle had died. The boy, who was four years old

at the time, answered: "Oh no; you see we have the other uncle now and he gave me a piece of bread and marmalade twice."

It is only gradually that differentiation in thinking establishes its claims. An important motive in this process is the child's tendency to emphasize points in which he is superior and thus to contrast himself with the outside world. A two-year-old boy was asked if he liked his new baby-sister. The child, who was not yet able to frame connected sentences, answered quickly: "No teeth...red...smelly!" It is easy to see that the leading motive in this typical way of comparing himself with little brothers and sisters is the child's narcissism.

Another and particularly interesting instance of identification should be mentioned here, and that is the substitution of animals for people in the animal-phobias of children. Psycho-analysis succeeded in proving that in these cases there is regularly an identification of the father or mother with an animal. Here the psychological process is clearly exactly analogous to the phenomena of the animal-totemism of primitive peoples. Originally the prevailing tendency in the child's relation to objects was the desire to incorporate them in itself. Gradually this aim is replaced by another, namely the craving to possess and master the object. "I want, I want!" ("Haben, haben!") is the phrase with which the child reacts to the sight of any object. This attitude towards the object includes a tendency to preserve and protect it and this is the first step in the direction of adaptation to the outside world; it is on this basis only that *the adaptation of thought to reality* is possible. We cannot follow out this process of adaptation in detail here.

Even at this stage of intellectual development the child is still far removed from adult modes of thinking. The influence of narcissism on his thinking is still paramount and is seen particularly in his ideas of his own power. He ascribes to his desires and thoughts an unlimited omnipotence which can so operate on the outside world as to effect changes in it. Only gradually does his critical faculty teach him the bounds which are set to his influence upon that world. To follow out this process further would be a tempting task and, if we did so, we should be able to convince ourselves that in its later stages it is intimately connected with the child's attitude towards those with whom he has the closest relations. Here we enter the sphere of the 'Oedipus complex' which embraces the most important phenomena of infantile sexuality.

In this paper it is not possible to do more than indicate briefly the subsequent fate of the child's ideas of omnipotence. They become dis-

placed on to some being who is endowed with peculiar authority (father, God).

To return once more to the manner in which thinking in early childhood is dominated by the pleasure-principle, I want further to call attention to the fact that free thinking, unadapted to reality—that is to say, phantasy—is in itself an important source of pleasure. Children play with thoughts as with toys and just on that account logical thinking, in accordance with reality, replaces only gradually this pleasure-giving play.

Thus we see that, in childhood, thinking is far more influenced by the instinctive life than in riper years. The regulative factors which are derived from the repression of the instincts have not as yet been brought to bear upon it.

Psychology has busied itself much with the development of the intellect in children, but it has generally treated the subject from points of view very different from that of psycho-analysis. Either the interest has been focussed on purely quantitative processes, as, for example, the number of words that a child learns within a given period, or else only formal phenomena have been taken into consideration—for instance, the child's capacity for expressing his thoughts in the form of sentences. These problems are deserving of the greatest interest, but the development of infantile thinking includes a number of questions which are not generally regarded but must take the chief place in our discussion.

Psycho-analysis urgently calls attention to the importance of infantile instincts in the evolution of thought. Our justification for laying so much stress on them must be that in the evolution of both the individual and the race the instincts are earlier than thought. Psycho-analysis therefore takes the position that it is impossible to give a correct account of any mental phenomenon without thoroughly analysing its instinctive determination.

# A NOTE ON SEX DIFFERENCES, FROM THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC POINT OF VIEW

By S. S. BRIERLEY.

## I. *Introductory.*

THE psychological problem of sex differences shares with other psychological inquiries, in contrast to the problems of the physical sciences, the essential difficulty that the very facts under discussion, the particular trends and mechanisms at issue, may themselves colour our observations and influence our judgments. These inherent difficulties would seem to be unusually great with this problem, for a study of both popular and quasi-scientific literature on the subject gives one the impression that there is nowhere a greater confusion between what is and what 'ought' to be the truth, what is and what we should like to be the truth. To the psycho-analyst, this is scarcely surprising; for it is clear that the question of sex differences must be peculiarly liable to affective judgments, since from its nature it lies so close to the major elements in the unconscious life of both men and women. Indeed, a study of the unconscious factors in opinion and belief on this matter would indirectly be, in large measure, a psycho-analytic study of the sex differences themselves. One knows that no one is exempt from these influences; but one has, nevertheless, to press forward with at least the intention of objectivity, and with the hope that awareness of the nature of some of the pitfalls in one's path may somewhat lessen the risk of falling into them.

The total differences between the sexes in the human species may be divided, for the purpose of this discussion, into three groups, (*a*) the primary anatomical differences, (*b*) the secondary sex characters, and (*c*) the psychological differences. These three groups are by no means independent of each other, but the relation between them is highly complex and to some extent variable. I refer to the primary distinction between male and female as 'anatomical,' for a good psychological reason. The strict definition of maleness and femaleness is in physiological terms, a female being any individual organism producing egg-cells or ova which, after uniting with cells of different character derived from a male, give rise to new organisms. Normally, however, this egg- or sperm-producing power is accompanied by the appropriate external

genitalia: and these constitute for the ordinary mind the gross physical distinction between male and female, awareness of which is the fundamental and primitive content of specific sex consciousness, reverberating profoundly, as psycho-analysis has shown, throughout the mental life as a whole.

The second group of differences, those known as the secondary sex characters, covering differences in the skeleton, musculature, rate of growth, skin, hair, voice, gait, and the other obvious or more subtle physiological sex characteristics, are now, as is well known, attributed to the internal secretions of the essential reproductive organs, acting in conjunction with the secretions of the other ductless glands. They are, in fact, an expression of the total and highly complex metabolisms of the male and female. Here, however, as both common and more exact observations show, we do not find the sharp distinction between male and female which normally occurs in regard to primary maleness and femaleness. As might, perhaps, be expected from the number of variables which enter into the determination of these characters, we find, within the range of normality, an indefinitely graded series passing over from the typical male to the typical female, the great majority of actual men and women lying somewhere in between the completely feminine female and masculine male. This, again, is a fact of considerable psychological importance. It is so directly, since our third group of sex differences, the mental, are in their turn determined, at least to some extent, by the action of the endocrine secretions, and would for many purposes be included in the secondary sex characters. This is generally held to be true of emotional and temperamental characteristics, at least. And the serial gradation of actual men and women between the typical male and female, so easily to be observed in the more obvious differences of outward structure, affords a strong presumption that there will be no sharp line of difference in the case of the subtler emotional and temperamental characteristics, but that every degree of difference will be found. A study of the experimental evidence suggests that the gradation is even smoother in the latter than in the former respects. In any case, it is clear that any thorough study of the problem involves not merely the identification of the sex groups, for purposes of comparison, with the mean difference found rather than with the extreme case, but also a reference to the actual curve of distribution, to the degree of scatter of the differences.

This fact of the gradation of the secondary sex characters, including the emotional and temperamental, and the contrast of this gradation

with the sharp primary distinction of maleness and femaleness, is also of importance indirectly, for it will have to be kept in mind at a later stage of the discussion, when the question of predisposing factors in the 'castration-complex' has to be raised. We may content ourselves at this point with suggesting that some of the psychological differences actually to be observed between grown men and women must be, not so much *secondary* sex characters, as *tertiary*, the offspring of the self-consciousness of sex, of the intense primitive awareness of the primary sex distinction. We are here in contact with the problem which most students of sex differences have kept in mind, viz. how far the observable differences are innate and how far acquired, being in the latter case the result of suggestion, custom and tradition, and, psycho-analysts may add, an expression of the 'castration-complex.' To take an example, how far the generally acknowledged imitativeness of women, their readiness to follow a plan laid down for them, their comparative lack of initiative and originality, are innate, or due to the effect of a tradition of sexual modesty and submissiveness. This is an obscure issue, and one which experimental methods have so far been unable to decide. Neither is the psycho-analytic method yet able to give a full answer. It does, however, throw some valuable new light upon the problem; and that, mainly because this question of sex differences is essentially a *genetic* problem, and must in the end be approached from the standpoint of a genetic psychology. In this respect there is a striking parallel between the history of this study and that of criminology. Not so very long ago, criminology was a mere accumulation of facts about adult criminals. It was what one might call a fortuitous concurrence of atomic facts; and it was this condition which made the Lombrosian theory possible, the theory being an attempt to substitute a speculative evolutionary dynamics for a concrete individual history. The science did not begin to move until it shifted its attention from the adult to the child, and the individual genesis of the criminal was studied. So with our present problem; a static enumeration of mental differences between the adult man and woman has only limited scientific value. What is needed is a genetic study of the individual boy and girl. And the psycho-analytic method is essentially genetic. The time would thus seem ripe for a brief review of the new facts as to sex differences which psycho-analysis has been able to bring together in the pursuit of its individual studies.

There is a further reason for looking to psycho-analysis for important contributions to this problem. It is becoming increasingly clear to students of sex differences that those differences are greatest in the



region of emotional and temperamental characteristics, and that the factor of *interest* is the key to such intellectual differences as are found in practical life. The experimental studies of sex differences<sup>1</sup> in the cognitive processes, while scantier than one could wish, and sometimes based upon too few or too unrepresentative cases, are on the whole convergent in tendency. That tendency is to minimise the extent and significance of sex differences. There appears to be little or no difference in the mean level of general intelligence and the higher mental functions; where any has been shown, it has been negligible in comparison with the extent of individual variations. Differences with regard to specific mental functions, particularly those on the lower mental levels, appear to be somewhat greater in degree and general significance; but even here the range of individual variation is too wide to allow the sex group difference any great weight. (The range of individual variability itself appears to be the most striking sex group difference found, being, on all counts and with regard to most measurable qualities, greater in the male than in the female.)

It is, however, in those tests in which the detailed nature of the task to be performed is prescribed by the conditions of the experiment, those designed to measure quantitative differences in one or two determined qualitative processes, as for instance tests of controlled association, memory and reasoning, that the sex differences turn out to be minimal. Where the task given is less rigidly fixed by the conditions of the experiment, and subjective factors have free play, as in experiments on free association, positive and significant sex differences appear, in the form of divergent 'interests.' And interest is the bridge between the cognitive processes and the emotional and temperamental aspects of the personality. Following on this hint, and led by the recent general development of the psychology of emotion and instinct, the student of sex differences has seen the focus of attention shift from the intellectual processes to the conative and affective. It is in this field however that the psycho-analytic method is an indispensable instrument of research, and we must therefore turn to it for any specific contributions it has to offer to the problem of sex differences.

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance: (1) Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, III (Columbia University, 1914). (2) Burt and Moore, 'The Mental Differences between the Sexes' (*J. Exp. Pedagogy*, 1911). (3) Burt, *Mental and Scholastic Tests* (King and Son, 1921). (4) Burt, 'The Development of Reasoning in School Children' (*J. Exp. Pedagogy*, v). (5) Jastrow, in *Psychological Review*, III. (6) Thompson, *The Mental Traits of Sex* (University of Chicago Press, 1903). (7) *Report on Differentiation of Curriculum between the Sexes* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1923).

It is not hoped to do more in this brief note than to state the nature of the problem from the psycho-analytic point of view, and to hint at possible specific lines of inquiry.

## II. *Analysis of genetic problem.*

An analysis, from the genetic point of view, of the problem of sex differences leads to the following necessary lines of inquiry: (a) What are the primitive and specific differences between male and female in the nature of the sex impulse itself? (b) Are there any differences as regards the relation of the sex impulse to the ego trends? (c) Are there any psychological mechanisms characteristic of male and female? (d) What differences are there in the external relations of the male and female child, and in the problems of adjustment set for each by these external relations? (e) Finally, what are the relations between all the foregoing factors and the observable differences in the general mental life of adult men and women? It is important to distinguish these aspects of the problem, although it is hardly practicable to keep them quite separate in the discussion, since they are so closely interwoven in the facts.

(a) With regard to the nature of the sex impulse, it is clear that we must take into account not only the normal sex reactions of the adult, but infantile forms of sexuality also, since we are making a genetic study. The classic writers on the subject of sex differences, and all pre-psycho-analytic students have dealt only with the mature sex impulse. Speaking of this first, there can be no doubt as to a specific difference between male and female in the nature of the impulse, as regards the essential sex act and the fore-pleasures preparatory to it. The male impulse is from the nature of the case relatively active, the female relatively passive; and this complementary activity and passivity are in part an expression of the sadistic-masochistic components of the impulse, and in part of the greater freedom of the object-libido in the male, and the greater narcissism of the female. This distinction as to activity and passivity is not, of course, an absolute one, and it refers to the form or aim of the impulse, rather than to its inner character, since the libido, as Freud points out<sup>1</sup>, is in one sense always active. It is, however, a sufficiently deep distinction to justify us in speaking of the male sex impulse as predominantly active, and of the female as predominantly passive, as far as the act of coitus and the immediate preparatory stages are concerned. These are not the whole of the sex reactions of the

<sup>1</sup> Freud, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, p. 79.

adult; but as soon as we leave them for the region of what we may usefully call the courting phase (using this term not in the narrow sense of a specific social custom, but in the biological sense, as covering all the phenomena of the preliminary stages of sex attraction), we find ourselves already very far from pure impulse, and at the point where the question of innate and 'acquired' differences arises. We already have here what we described as *tertiary sex* differences, which are not so much the direct spontaneous expression of the essential metabolisms of male and female, as of the interplay of these with the self-consciousness of sex. Moreover, we are not here dealing with the sexual trends alone, but with complex psychological formations in which the ego-ideal is a considerable determining element. The whole ground is so complex and obscure that I shall not attempt to cover it, but will content myself with a brief reference to some of the factors entering into female modesty, as illustrative of the difficulty of disentangling inherent differences between male and female from conscious and unconscious sophistications.

We cannot doubt that there is an organic element in female modesty, that in so far as it is what we may call a relative sex inertia, a passive waiting for stimulation by the active approach of the male, it is a secondary sex character, and is intimately bound up with the profound cycle of the reproductive processes in the female, contrasted with the biological freedom of the male. And even where modesty passes over into actual coyness, into a withdrawal at the first signs of pursuit by the male, it may still be regarded as a simple secondary sex character, because of its obvious biological values, serving to heighten the excitement and efficiency of the male in the sexual act. These aspects of modesty in the human female are shared with infra-human creatures, and we must regard them as direct expressions of innate sex difference.

This organic core of sexual inertia and reticence is liable, however, in the human female, to undergo various degrees of reinforcement and exaggeration, until, as we know, it may even reach to an entire unawareness of sexual desire and an entire ignorance of the facts of intercourse and reproduction, in otherwise highly informed women. But, apart from such pathological exaggeration, a more normal modesty and reticence still appears, on psycho-analytic evidence, to be in part an expression of what we have called the self-consciousness of sex, acting through the familiar 'castration-complex.' The shame of having no penis, of bearing only the wound which is itself a sign of having been spoiled of the phallus, and of enduring the menstrual flow, which is in turn for unconscious fantasy a confirmation of the wound theory

of the female genitalia, this shame is a powerful element in female modesty. It receives further reinforcement from the disgust arising from the proximity of the excretory apertures to the sexual centre, a disgust attaching itself also to the menstrual flow, which commonly tends to be thought of as an excretion. This disgust is, of course, itself a reaction barrier to primitive excretory and 'perverse' interests, the strength of which reaction is the outcome of human self-awareness. Since, however, the excretory processes occur in the same relation to the organs of sexual pleasure in men, this cannot be the differentiating element in female modesty, save that there is the additional source of disgust in the menstrual flow in women. The main differentiating factor would undoubtedly appear to be the castration shame. And in the castration shame the ego trends, or at least the libidinous components of the ego, are inextricably interwoven with the more strictly sexual elements. The pride of possession and the pride of power on the male side, envy and chagrin at the supposed loss of these on the female side, are unmistakably egoistic trends, and indeed, from one point of view, the castration-complex might well be said to be an expression of the instinct of self-preservation. The prototypes of castration, the loss of faeces and deprivation of the nipple, undoubtedly have both libidinous and egoistic values, and the genitalia themselves must lie at the very heart of the bodily and social self. I shall presently raise more fully the question of the relation of the sex impulse in male and female to the ego trends, and at the moment am only concerned to point out the egoistic elements in female modesty, which will have some bearing on that further discussion.

Turning now to infantile sexuality, it would not appear that the normal differences in reaction between male and female are here so marked. In the pregenital phases, oral and anal conditions would appear to be the same in boy and girl. The one important difference is with regard to urination. The differences in structure must from the beginning carry with them corresponding differences in organic sensation, characteristic of each type of urinary experience; and we have ample evidence of the great personal significance assumed by the process of urination as soon as visual attention and comparison can be directed to it. Urination, in its characteristic form in the two sexes, is of importance not only because of its direct libidinous value, and its direct organic contribution to the primitive ego, but also because of its role in infantile fantasies of love and power. Moreover, it introduces a difference in the earliest phase of genital sexuality, since the genital zone and the urethral

coincide in the male, whilst in the female they are relatively distinct. Apart from the urethral elements, however, the earliest phase of genital sexuality would seem to be little differentiated as between boy and girl, since the main genital centre in the girl child is the clitoris, the homologue of the penis, rather than the vagina, its complement. The girl child under four or five years of age is not noticeably less positive, active, sadistic and exhibitionistic than her brother, and knows little of the modesty and passivity of the normal adult woman. She is, in fact, characterised by what we may call the clitoral attitude. There are, of course, individual variations here as elsewhere; but there is no marked group difference in the nature and direction of the sexual impulse in the earliest years. There is, indeed, no very great divergence as regards activity and passivity before the onset of adolescence, but the first hint of difference occurs during the first great period of object-love, from two to seven years. This would appear to be in part organically conditioned, since recent physiological research has shown that there is a period of activity of the interstitial glands of the reproductive organs during these years, which is later followed by a phase of quiescence, until the time of full ripening in adolescence. This organic stimulus must bring with it the first predisposition to the characteristic sex attitude of male and female; and probably also conditions the psychological tension of interest in the problems of sexual relations and the facts of birth, which we know is characteristic of the period. Then comes the first action of what we have called the self-consciousness of sex, and the pride of possession and power in the male child is set over against the envy and sense of loss in the female. The evolution of female modesty appears to begin here, a process which is not complete until the chief centre of sexual excitability has passed over from the clitoris to the vagina, carrying with it the appropriate change in mental attitude.

The normal passivity and reticence of the adult woman is thus seen as a goal to be reached by normal development, rather than as a condition inevitably given in the primary fact of femaleness. Indeed, we know that it is a condition which a not inconsiderable portion of women fail to reach, who remain in the clitoral attitude of the girl child, and are anaesthetic to vaginal stimulation. Yet although characteristic femininity is not irrevocably given in the female constitution, but is rather the end result of a long process of development involving the interplay of many complex factors, we cannot doubt that there is an organic predisposition to it, a tendency to the organisation of those factors under the dominance of the primary condition of femaleness.

If this account of the history of differentiation in the nature and direction of the sexual impulse is sound, it would almost appear as if that differentiation were chiefly on the female side, as if in the course of development the female had to turn aside at various points from the more or less straight line normally kept by the male, from infancy to maturity. There is certainly a good deal of evidence that the sexual history of the female is in some respects more complex than that of the male; and this, I think, will be still more clear with regard to the relation of the sexual impulse to the ego trends, which we may now take up.

(b) We may put the problem in this way—how far are the activity and passivity of the sexual impulse in male and female necessarily characteristic of the mental life as a whole, in each? Does the deep and pervasive physiological and psychological differentiation of sex go down to the very roots of the ego? Is the female ego essentially different from the male? Is it penetrated with the passivity characteristic of the female sex impulse? This is a view which common observation would make foolish, and one which, so far as I am aware, has not been explicitly held by any serious writer, although there have been many whose mode of statement of sex differences has verged, perhaps unintentionally, towards this. I might instance Mr Walter Heape, and to a less degree Professors Thomson and Geddes, and even Havelock Ellis. Thomson and Geddes, as is well known, hold that in a profound biological sense, maleness *is* activity, and femaleness *is* passivity. Starting from the striking difference in the size and motility and physiological characteristics of the sperm and the ovum, interpreted in the light of the evolution of sex from unicellular organisms onwards, they base their theory of the essential nature of sex on a primary and fundamental differentiation, towards katabolism in the male and anabolism in the female. It would be of great interest in our present connection to attempt to bring this widely accepted view into relation with Freud's recent reflections on the katabolic death instincts. It would lead us to the conception of the male as the representative of the individual, of the soma, which dies; and of the female as the representative of the life of the race, of the immortal germ plasm. It is tempting to develop this, but to do so would lead us off the main path of this note, which is to unravel the concrete psychological problem of the detailed development of male and female—or, rather, to suggest the directions in which this may be possible. It is clear that the generalisation just suggested, or even the emphasis which Thomson and Geddes place on male activity and female

passivity, can only have any truth so long as it is stated in the form of an abstract *tendency*: it becomes ludicrous if pressed too far, and is methodologically unsound if it is allowed to obscure the contradictory elements, and to draw us from the detailed study of the concrete facts. It is, I think, certain that the full psychological truth is much richer and more complex than has yet been made clear, owing to the pre-occupation of those who have theorised about the problem of sex differences with this generalisation as to the activity of the male and the passivity of the female. We have, in our final statement, to account for the anomalies of development, and to find room for the fact to which we have already referred, the fact of the range and smooth gradation of sex differences as actually observed, which we are quite unable to do if we over-simplify our problem from the start by the lure of this great generalisation.

I would suggest that the real psychological situation is something as follows: The ego trends, whether in male or female, are inherently and always, in themselves, positive, active and katabolic. In the male however, they harmonise in nature and direction with the sex impulse; whereas in the female they are in essential and perpetual conflict with the latter. (I am, of course, here speaking of conflict, not in the general sense in which the sex impulses as such are in conflict with the ego trends as such; but in a special sense relating only to the character of activity and passivity of the sex trends in male and female.) It is not that the female ego is inherently and from the first permeated by sex characteristics, nor indeed that the male ego is so; but rather that the essential characteristics of the ego are in the one case reinforced, in the other strongly modified and limited. And, as we have already seen in our discussion of female modesty, this reinforcement in the one case and limitation in the other is partly a physiological process, due to the direct action of the endocrine secretions, at various periods of normal development, on the general somatic and nervous tissues; and partly also a psychological process, moving in the paths familiar to us as psycho-analysts. Hence the possibility of the anomalies which occur, of the masculinoid woman and the feminoid man, and of all the more normal range of individual differences to which we have already referred. If the feminine ego were inherently and from the start feminine, there clearly could not be any conflict between the demands of the individual life and biological destiny, in the female. There would be no need for an '*ideal*' of femininity or modesty, no question of what are desirable qualities in a woman, or suitable occupations and recreations for her.

And there could certainly be no such thing as a 'castration-complex,' in which, as I have suggested, the ego trends play such an important part. In every case, the woman would accept herself and her destiny without knowing that there was anything to accept. As indeed, the larger proportion of women actually do; but the anomalies and exceptions have shown that this is by no means a simple inherent state, but is, as we have put it, the end-result of a long and complicated process of development. And it is the details of this development which we have as psychologists to inquire into.

On this view, then, briefly, the male and female infant are alike in the general character of the ego trends, and at first hardly differentiated in their sexuality. The little girl is almost as positive, active, sadistic and exhibitionistic as her brother, inevitably showing in her earliest love situations the clitoral attitude, as we have called it, rather than the reticence and modesty of her elder sister. But presently, towards the end of the first period of object-love, a hint of the divergence of the sexual and egoistic trends is seen in the girl child and of their convergence in the male, a phenomenon repeated more dramatically and on a much larger scale, with the onset of adolescence. And throughout the period of development there is a complex interplay, on both physiological and psychological levels, of the egoistic and sexual components of the personality.

The basic biological facts have often been stated, that the reproductive functions of the female set very definite limits to the development of her individuality, keeping her closer to type than the male, in whom, as we have seen, there is a greater range of individual variability. On the psychological side, it means that in the woman the reproductive functions and the qualities of femininity itself have to be taken up into the ego-ideal, so as to transform the initial power elements of the ego trends, in harmony with the character of the sex impulse and biological destiny. It is clear that the problem of reconciliation of the ego and sexual trends is more complicated for the female than it is for the male. Male sex activity becomes, indeed, the prototype for all activity, for the ego trends themselves. The penis is the organ of power and of knowledge; and in the fantasy of male and female alike, the first actual power experiences, the possession and expulsion of the faeces, are later equated to the male organ. Castration fantasies are not, of course, peculiar to the female mind; the essential difference is that the female ego has *in reality* to become reconciled to what is expressed on the unconscious level as castration. There has to be a reconciliation to the



loss of the penis, to the limiting of the direct expression of the power tendencies, to the transformation of the ego functions. And, as we know, this transformation is brought about, not only by the incorporation of femininity into the ego ideal during the formative period, but, at a much deeper level, by the unconscious identification of penis—faeces—child. The loss of faeces *is*, for the unconscious mind, the birth of a child; and to bear a child, especially a man child, *is* to recover the penis. This is the egoistic element in the self-forgetfulness of mother-love. Or, for other women, the possession of a lover, or of many lovers, is the possession of a penis; and power becomes the power to attract and hold the desire of a man.

Castration elements must thus be present in the unconscious mind of all women, although they are not necessarily pathogenic, nor so marked as to deserve the name 'castration-complex.' They undoubtedly play a large part in the genesis of that state of total repression of sex interest and sex knowledge in highly educated women, where there is present a strongly marked ego development with a complete repudiation of even the existence of sexual facts.

This would raise for us the question of what are the predisposing conditions to the development of a castration-complex, in women. (I confine myself here to women, because I am inclined to think that the genesis of the complex in men is related much more to the Oedipus situation, than it is to the question of sex differences—although there are of course important common elements.) I would suggest that the predisposing conditions fall into four groups. (1) Circumstantial; which I mention first, not because I think them the most or the least important, but because there is so little to say about them. We do not yet know what they may be, although we cannot doubt that they are operative. In discussing the external relations of the child presently, we shall come near to this issue. (2) The fact, to which I am inclined to attach a good deal of importance, that the *awareness* of the primary sex distinction comes to the child well before there is any marked development of the appropriate secondary sex characters. To put it simply, the little girl discovers that she is short of what her brother possesses (for, of course, to the child and the primitive, it is a matter of the mere presence or absence of a single positive organ, as there can be no knowledge of the real complementary organs and processes of the female), long before the characteristically feminine emotions and impulses, conditioned by the endocrine secretions, have come into play to any extent, and long before the development of the breasts, the equivalent of the penis in

unconscious fantasy. (3) The fact that the secondary sex characters, including the emotional and temperamental, natively present every degree of difference from individual to individual. It will clearly be less easy for a girl child who is near the middle region of differences as regards type of energy, and instinctive and emotional endowment, to accept the supposed loss of the phallus, and effect the normal feminine transformation of the ego. The castration fantasy will in such a case tend to be pathogenic, for the conflict will be greater. Where there is from the beginning a more typically feminine organic and emotional setting, the psychological problem will be less acute. (4) We may consider also initial differences in anal and urethral erotism, which are unmistakable elements in the complex, and are, as we have already noted, closely connected with the power aspects of the ego trends. Wherever we found strongly marked anal defiance and obstinacy in the girl child, we should, I think, expect to see hints of a castration-complex; and, conversely, wherever we found a well developed castration-complex, we should expect to find strong anal interests and dislike of interference in connection with the process of evacuation. (The most marked case I have observed of the castration-complex in a girl child, A., showed this very clearly. From the period of infancy onwards there was always a refusal to evacuate at the required time and place, the process being postponed as long as possible with every show of defiance and obstinacy, traits which were excessively developed in every direction. She was an unusually questioning, 'naughty' and unhappy child. In her second and third years, she developed the habit of drinking her bath water, and was on one occasion found drinking the water in which tadpoles had been kept. When about four and a half years of age, she persuaded her brother (eighteen months her senior) to cut off her hair, remarking "Now I am a boy." And was presently discovered in the act of swallowing some large object with great difficulty, an object which turned out to be her brother's whistle; her comment was "I didn't like the noise, so I hid it in myself.")

(c) We may now turn to our third question, that of whether there are any psychological mechanisms peculiar to or more characteristic of either male or female, a question which will occupy us only a few moments. It is, I think, probable that there is only one specific sex difference here, viz. that women show a greater tendency to *reaction-formation* than do men. We might take as examples, the greater frequency in women of over-devotion, over-conscientiousness, over-cleanliness and prudishness. But when we have called these reaction-formations, we

cannot leave the matter. Further analysis is required before anything very significant can be said. It is clear that two of our examples, viz. over-cleanliness and prudishness, are related to the processes we discussed in our last section, and two, viz. over-devotion and over-conscientiousness, to the problem we are to take up next, that of the external relations of the boy and girl. Over-cleanliness is probably the simplest case of reaction-formation; it is a strong disgust barrier erected against strong interests in the excretory processes; and, as one might expect, includes a marked masochistic element. The situation is more complicated in the case of prudishness, which is not a simple reaction barrier to a simple primitive tendency. It includes a pure reaction element, against the active sex curiosity and exhibitionism of the clitoral phase in the girl child; but it is more than this. As we have seen, it is in part the outcome of the castration-complex, a repudiation of the female role, and of the limits which this imposes upon the direct expression of the power elements in the ego trends. By denying sex, the childish interest in sex, and the fact of femaleness, are at one and the same time repudiated.

In addition to this specific fact of the greater frequency of reaction-formations in women, it is also clear that the total degree of repression appears to be greater, and more widely diffused, over the sexual life.

(d) We may now consider differences in the external relations of boy and girl, and in the problems of adjustment which these relations dictate. We may leave on one side the relations with brothers and sisters, since the situation varies so greatly with the number and relative ages of these; and content ourselves with a brief survey of the phases through which the boy and the girl travel in their relations with parents and parent surrogates.

The first phase, covering the intra-uterine and suckling periods is, of course, exactly similar for boy and girl. Both are sheltered in the mother's womb, both suffer the first great trauma of birth, both find nourishment and pleasure at the mother's breast, and have to endure the loss of the nipple at the time of weaning. Thus, for both, there is a stage when child and mother are one; and for both, the mother first means shelter, warmth and tenderness. And in each case the first interferences and discipline come from the mother, interferences with anal and urethral powers and pleasures; the mother is thus the first and most intimately personal authority, for both boy and girl. She is also, however, for both, the first object of love. When, in the child's second year of life, the growing ascendancy of the exteroceptors and the power of active exploration of the world establish more active relations

with the persons around him, there develops the gradual awareness of them *as* persons, and the movement of the libido outwards. The mother, with whom the child has had physical union, and who has served his most intimate personal needs, then forms the natural bridge between the phase of complete auto-erotism and that of developed object-love; she, as the first source of pleasure, is the first natural focus for the outward-flowing libido, whether in boy or girl. The child's first attitude to the mother is thus ambivalent; she is the first love, and the first hostile force, the emphasis on one or other of these aspects varying with the child and the characteristics of the mother. Behind the intimate figure of the mother is that of the father, more remote, more powerful, vaguer, and larger, coming and going more mysteriously and independently. And presently, with the gradual widening of experience and growth of intellectual power, he becomes linked with the great power symbols of the child's world, with the policeman, the soldier, the tram-conductor and engine-driver. He thus early becomes the more impressive figure of authority and power, an image which must be made immensely vivid and compelling where the young child is allowed to be witness of the marital embraces of the parents, as is most usually the case. This, again, must be true for both boy and girl.

During this same period, however, the sexual preferences of the parents, whether they find conscious or unconscious expression, begin to act upon the young child. The father is more easily indulgent and demonstrative with the girl child, the mother with the boy; the father is more ready to find fault with and to check the waywardness of his son, the mother to restrict and correct her daughter. This differentiated reaction of the parents must be the earliest stimulus to the differentiation of the sex object in the child: but very presently it is reinforced by the organic stimulus of the first functioning of the interstitial glands of the reproductive organs, bringing the earliest hint of secondary sex characters, and of differentiation in the sexual impulse, as we have already noted. And thus the sex preferences of the child himself are established. From this point there is an important difference between boy and girl, in external relations. We may follow out the boy's development first.

For him, the first infantile love-object, the mother, who drew his budding affection in the transitional period between complete auto-erotism and differentiated object-love, remains as the true and normal centre of his sex interest, and the prototype of all normal love-objects for him. The early discipline situations with the mother, her interference with excretory pleasures, are then sexualised, the faeces and urine

becoming love-gifts to her. And the father becomes the sexual rival, sexual hostility fusing with and heightening the ego-assertiveness of the boy child against power and authority. A normal condition of tension in relation to authority is thus set up in the boy, which is a constant stimulus to individual development. Thus, we have the same convergence of the sexual and egoistic trends with regard to the normal relations of the male child to his parents as we found to be the case with the internal nature of the sex impulse.

This, then, is the normal situation. Normality, however, is not a fixed and static condition or relation: it is a moving equilibrium, a broad balance of many complex tensions. And the normality we are considering may be disturbed in either of two directions. The normal Oedipus situation may be, as it were, either under- or over-stated; and we may usefully give brief attention to the resulting distortions of the boy's development, for comparison with that of the girl. Where, in the first instance, the mother is of a more dominating type than the father, or the father is withdrawn because of death, illegitimacy of the child or other circumstances, the mother remains the centre of authority, and the initial and infantile ambivalence to the mother is perpetuated. She becomes the love-object, but rather the undifferentiated love-object of the transitional phase than the normal heterosexual love-object; and the infantile hostility of response to her interference with oral, urethral and anal pleasures remains untransformed, and intensified. The original nuclei of the castration-complex, the compulsory loss of faeces and withdrawal of the nipple are reanimated, and the male castration-complex develops, castration in this case by the mother. The initial and of course inevitable assumption that the mother has a penis like the boy's own is retained and reinforced in fantasy: and since the external object is undifferentiated, the internal impulse remains so; the boy, "tied to his mother's apron strings," fails to develop normal masculinity of sex impulse or disciplined and effective ego assertiveness. He retains the submissiveness proper to the infantile phase, an outcome of the first narcissistic identification, along with the infantile hostility. The ground is thus prepared for later impotence, the pathogenic element being the fantasy of castration by the mother. Here, the normal Oedipus situation has never been developed, the divergence from normality taking place at a level below this.

When, however, normal development is carried further, to the point of the Oedipus situation, difficulties may arise from a too stern and unyielding attitude of authority, or too great unconscious hostility on

the part of the father. This may lead to the fantasy of castration by the father, with the resultant identification with the mother, and homosexual tendencies. The pathogenic element here is mainly the incest tendencies, with the guilt attaching to these, and the fantasy of castration as a punishment; but the resulting regressive movement of the libido may here again reanimate the more primitive anal and oral nuclei of the castration fantasy, connected with the mother: there is then a markedly ambivalent attitude to both parents. The identification with the woman, although it may take origin at the level of the Oedipus situation, is regressive, a return to the earlier undifferentiated state, in which the equation of the penis and the breast and the fantasies of giving birth based on the process of defaecation are normal to the small boy. A small boy of four years gave a clear instance of the naive identification of the penis and the nipple, on an occasion when a large dog approached and sniffed at the genital region, remarking, "Oh, he wants to suck." For the boy, as well as for the girl, the possibility of neurosis is bound up with the existence of the relatively undifferentiated infantile phase of the sexual impulse and of the emotional relations, coupled with the peculiarly human fact of the self-consciousness of sex.

Turning now to the development of the external relations of the girl; with her, after the period of transition from auto-erotism, when differentiated object-love appears, the object-libido has to change its object as well as its mode, the mother being displaced by the father, who is already the major focus of authority, and now becomes also the normal centre of sexual interest. For the girl, thus, authority is an authority that indulges, that rules by love, that dominates in order to satisfy, that calls out sexual passivity rather than ego-assertiveness. Submission to authority in the person of the father and his surrogates is sexualised, and hence there is little stimulus to defiance and adventurous challenge. The normal castration element in femininity has reference primarily to the father, who takes the penis only to give the child, subdues only in order to love. The conception of the deflowering of the woman as a castration, fantasies of rape, and of the death-symbolism of coitus are linked with this aspect of sexual development in the woman. This is the normal movement of the libido in the girl child; and it is reinforced by the primary narcissistic identification with the mother, which normally persists in the girl child, whereas it has to be broken down for normal development in the case of the boy. The girl child is allowed, in the language of fantasy, to remain in the mother's womb; and this narcissistic identification with the mother adds its quota to the transforma-

tion of the power trends into harmony with the sexual and reproductive functions of the female.

We may consider for a moment some of the deviations which may arise in the girl owing to a disturbance of normality in the relation of the parents to each other and to the child. As in the case of the boy, so with the girl, where the mother is the dominating parent, ruling by power rather than by love, the castration fantasy is referred to her, the oral and anal disciplines of the earliest phase consequently retaining an emotional over-valuation. Hostility to the mother is then very strongly developed, the sadistic component of the sexual impulse rather than the masochistic becomes accentuated, and the power elements in the ego trends remain untransformed and intractable. A marked identification with the male is apparent, with a persistence of the clitoral attitude. As with the boy similarly situated, the normal differentiation of the sex impulse on the one side and of the sex object on the other fails to occur. In the later analysis of such cases, masculine and feminine symbols appear to be interchangeable and almost fluid. In the case of B., a young woman with a castration-complex so heavy that she is unable to pursue any interest or occupation for more than a short time, this is very clear. In early childhood there had been great difficulty with the control of urination, and the mother had commonly stood over the child with a stick, to make her observe the time and place. In her present fantasies the 'Hound of Heaven' is unmistakably a mother symbol, and there is a frequent image of B.'s sister "riding on a bull, and a hound pulling her off." Where, in these cases, the normal Oedipus situation does develop the resulting sexual hostility to the mother may then reawaken the over-developed resentment regarding interferences with anal and urethral pleasures, so that the two fuse into an almost inescapable hatred of the mother.

I may perhaps, at this point, be allowed to guard myself against the misunderstanding that I am attempting to explain the castration-complex and homosexuality, in terms of the external stimulus of the personality of the parents, only. I am very much aware that the problem is by no means so simple, and that the obscure organic factors and innate psychological predispositions to which I have made no reference here are probably more important. I am not, of course, attempting to give an account of the genesis of the castration-complex and homosexuality, but only to ask what relations can be found between these problems and the question of sex differences. Moreover, the organic determinants and psychological predispositions are not here relevant,

since they appear to be individual rather than sex group differences. I should, however, like to suggest very tentatively, that there is a sex difference as regards the genesis of the castration-complex, viz. that in women it springs primarily from the anal and urethral levels, and is mainly a function of the ego trends, being connected with the incest trends only secondarily; whereas in the male, it is more intimately connected with the incest tendencies, and with genital auto-erotism. If this distinction holds good in any measure, it is, of course, entirely a matter of emphasis and degree and of the immediate point of origin, since all these elements are common to both sexes and to all individuals.

A further word may be added as to the relation between the inner and outer factors. It is clear that in some cases the weight is thrown on the inner conditions, and in others, on the outer. There is no doubt, for instance, that an over-dominant and interfering mother does produce a tendency to the castration-complex, with its ambivalence and failure of differentiation, in both boy and girl. I have had occasion to quote the case of a woman as an example of this, and have known a very similar case in a man. Yet it is equally clear that where the anal interests in a girl, for instance, are natively very strong, a mild and gentle mother may be *felt* as hostile and interfering to an exaggerated extent. This was strikingly true in the case of A., whose mother was mild to the point of weakness. The matter of defaecation, however, was, I should judge, the point in which she was most tenacious of discipline and persistent in attempts to control the child—doubtless for reasons both conscious and unconscious. And, in a child in whom the anal-sadistic tendencies were so strongly developed, this particular recurrent conflict would inevitably count for more than any ease of discipline elsewhere.

### III. *Summary and Conclusions.*

It may now be possible to draw together some of the threads of our discussion; this can, however, only be done in the most tentative and partial manner, for I have not hoped to do more in this note than to suggest how relevant and important to the problem of sex differences psycho-analytic material is.

It is clear that the observable mental differences between men and women are the result of a highly complex interplay of three groups of factors, viz. (*a*) the organic differences springing directly from the primary fact of maleness and femaleness, (*b*) the accompanying innate psychological characteristics, which vary in degree and *ensemble* from one individual to another, and (*c*) the awareness of the fact of sex; this latter functioning not merely through the subtle operation of tradition



and social pressure, but also, as it has been left for psycho-analysis to show, through the acute awareness, in the mind of the little child of the possession or non-possession of the phallus.

In the case of certain of the mental differences of sex, it is possible to trace a direct relation with psycho-analytic facts, or, at least, to show how some of these differences hang together.

That group of temperamental differences which includes the greater social submissiveness of women, their relative lack of initiative and greater willingness to follow a convention, or to work along lines laid down for them by others, these are clearly connected with a group of physiological and psychological conditions which includes (1) the fundamental organic conditions of the reproductive functions in the female, involving the lesser range of variability and closer approximation to type; (2) the specific nature of the sex impulse in the female, with its passive and masochistic colouring; (3) the fact that the sex impulse and the ego trends diverge in the female, while converging in the male; and (4) the fact that the father is normally at one and the same time the object of the first sex impulse, and the major, more impersonal focus of authority. It would thus appear that the characteristics in question are, at least to a considerable degree, an inevitable accompaniment of normal feminine development; but it is equally clear that they are considerably heightened by an over-development of the fantasy of castration by the father; and that, if social conditions are such as to call for greater freedom of initiative and greater independence on the part of women, the point of educational attack must be the early period when that fantasy is developed.

It is likely that the supposed greater gregariousness of women is a function of the same conditions. There is little evidence that women seek each others' society more than men, either in primitive or civilised communities, and it would seem unnecessary to postulate the presence or absence of a specific instinct of gregariousness to account for the greater individualism of the male, since the physiological and psychological conditions referred to are already ample.

The much greater frequency of juvenile and adult delinquency among males is but another and more strongly marked expression of the same group of conditions, and particularly connected with the relation of the sexual and egoistic components of the personality, and the distinctive functioning of the Oedipus complex in the boy and girl respectively.

The fact that, on the whole, women show a lesser degree of scientific curiosity is undoubtedly to be correlated with the greater degree of

repression typically occurring, as a general condition; and with the castration-complex as a specific determinant.

In concluding, we may give a moment's attention to practical considerations, particularly as regards the educational bearing of sex differences. It is hardly possible for the psycho-analyst to subscribe to the view taken by some psychologists that because intellectual differences between the sexes, as tested by laboratory experiments, are practically negligible in degree, educationists need take no account of sex differences as such, but need only insist on ample individual opportunity irrespective of sex. We must agree with this latter; but the problem does not, on the findings of the psycho-analytic method, cease there. We should rather agree with those who hold that the emotional and temperamental differences between the sexes, and the long-run effect of these upon the mental life as a whole are of considerable educational and social importance. The educational problem for both boy and girl is that of reaching the goal of normal sexuality in a balanced relation with the individualised ego; but the emphasis is different in each case.

A word needs to be said as to what is meant by normality of development, since we have used this concept here, and in speaking of the reconciliation of the ego trends with the female sexual impulse and biological functions. It is clear that our conception of normality must itself be governed by the 'reality principle,' and have reference to the actual social and economic conditions of the world in which we live. The population problem is perhaps more relevant to the question of what is the desirable balance of individuality and biological function in women, than any male infantile fantasy of the all-perfect mother. Nor, it must be further said, is the castration-fear of the male, when it impels him to deny intellectual power and personal independence to the woman, any more trustworthy guide than that of the woman herself, when it drives her to the refusal of her feminine functions. External conditions in an industrial and highly individualistic civilisation demand the most delicate adjustment; and we might well have added to our enumeration of the predisposing factors to the castration-complex in the woman, the changing and conflicting demands of modern life. Like any other neurosis, it is largely a function of the discrepancy between the demands of our top-heavy civilisation, and our native resources; and relief does not come by way of turning from the reality of those demands to a woman-imago.

We may perhaps end on a note of paradox, and say that, from the psycho-analytic point of view, neurosis occurs because sex differences are so deep—and yet is only possible because they are not deep enough.

# THE WAR ANXIETY NEUROTIC OF THE PRESENT DAY: HIS 'DIZZY BOUTS' AND HALLUCINATIONS

BY H. SOMERVILLE.

IN a previous contribution to this subject<sup>1</sup> it was stated that the principal mental symptoms of a war anxiety neurotic were exhibited in 'dizzy bouts' or attacks of vertigo with their accompaniments, in a chronic condition of poorly suppressed fear accentuated and defined in the dark, terrifying dreams in which the patient is being attacked or killed and, in a smaller number of cases, in hallucinations. An attempt was made to explain this fear in the dark of being pounced upon by an enemy by tracing it back to fear of the father resuscitated owing to the regressive effect of terrifying war experiences—the fear taking on a childhood form or rather associating itself with the fears of childhood.

Concerning dizzy bouts anyone seeing a man in a dizzy bout or even reading a description thereof is immediately struck by the similarity between one of these seizures and an acute attack of extreme fear. The correspondence is complete, and so we feel inclined to say that a dizzy bout *is* an acute attack of extreme fear, the cause of which, however, in the absence of any obvious external danger, is not at once apparent.

In a good many cases I have been able to trace the stimulus occasioning a dizzy bout to a transference of the affect from a previous occasion on which a similar feeling of fear was experienced. It often happens that patients on being questioned as to what they were doing at the moment when an attack came on are able to help one out a bit by almost at once realising a superficial, apparently trivial, connection between a present and a previous occasion. Thus for example a patient told me that he generally got a dizzy bout when squatting on his hunkers in the mine getting coal out. A single question elicited the information that this was an attitude he often perforce adopted in the trenches when taking shelter. Several men got dizzy bouts when stooping, much in the same way as they had to stoop in France taking cover from shells. Drinking a cup of tea was often the occasion of a dizzy bout with another man. He had

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Mental Science*, April, 1923.

been disturbed by shells or raids several times when he was having tea in the trenches. A good many of my patients got dizzy bouts when in the act of turning round to look—a movement of frequent occurrence not only in war time but now at home—to see if there is anyone there. Sudden happenings, especially sounds, are a very common cause. In all these cases it is reasonable to suppose that the starting of a dizzy bout is due to the transference of the affect of fear from a previous alarming war experience to the present occasion. It is well to note that the memory of the experience itself is not necessarily brought into consciousness—hardly ever in fact—but only the affect and this fact accounts for the man's inability to divine the cause of his dizzy bout.

That a transference of the affect from a previous traumatic to a present innocent occasion is a factor in the causation of a dizzy bout may, I think, be accepted as a fact. It is in accordance with all our experience of the passing on of an emotional tone from one occasion or incident to another which in any way arouses feelings similar to those attached to the previous situation. But that this transference is the complete cause of such an extreme attack of terror as that characteristic of a dizzy bout is exceedingly unlikely and in fact hardly credible considering the severity of these attacks. What I think really happens is that the affect of the transferred fear is added to that of a more deeply seated and long repressed similar affect attached to a complex the like of which is to be found in the unconscious of everyone. It must be remembered that dizzy bouts are practically of universal occurrence in anxiety war neurotics and it is difficult if not impossible to explain how it comes to pass that different traumatic incidents can give rise to exactly similar symptoms in different persons without hypothesising a similarity in the mental make-up of these persons. These dizzy bouts then I take to be sudden attacks of extreme fear originating in an affective transference from a war incident or war incidents to a present occasion, amplified by a fusing of this affect with that attached to a deeper strongly repressed complex the like of which is present in the unconscious of everyone—a complex in which the father is the central figure.

Another and very useful view to take of a dizzy bout is to look upon it as an exacerbation of the patient's general condition of chronic poorly suppressed fear. Our justification for taking this view lies in the fact that by psychotherapy we are very often successful in alleviating the condition of chronic fear and when this happens the frequency and severity of the dizzy bout become diminished at the same time. The facts would appear to be that in the general condition the fear of something

dreadful happening and the expectation that it may happen at any moment are always present either consciously or unconsciously. In the dizzy bout *it* (as a mental process) has happened. The dreaded occurrence has come to pass and at the same time there is a sudden sharp discharge of pent-up affect—the old affect attached to the deep complex plus the new affect floating about the more recently acquired superficial complex.

The mode of production of a visual hallucination is somewhat similar to that of a dizzy bout, though the manifestations are quite different in the two cases. In these visual hallucinations there is also a sudden sharp discharge of affect attached to a complex or complexes and the mental conflict is one of terrible intensity. There is an effort—a supreme effort of an exacting conscience to keep back or repress a memory whose recollection causes intolerable pain—a pain the intensity of which probably no one can realise except the subject of it. It was the kind of pain that Macbeth felt when he cried out in his agony:

Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,  
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,  
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,  
And with some sweet oblivious antidote  
Cleanse the stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff  
Which weighs upon the heart?

In default of our being able to realise this pain subjectively the next best way to get a clear notion of it is to study the mind of a man experiencing a hallucination, observe him while he is actively hallucinated and get his confessions on the subject afterwards. I do not consciously as a rule hypnotise my patients but many of them when I get their whole interest engaged are in a condition allied to the hypnotic. At any rate they become dissociated and in this state exhibit their hallucinations.

I give a few examples in illustration.

The patient had been a sergeant. He had a peculiarly mild or gentle expression and his eyes were eyes of fear. During the sitting while I was reviving memories suddenly his gaze became fixed and the look of fear in his eyes became profound. When I spoke to him he took no notice. He was evidently dissociated. All the while he was trembling and in a state of terror. The incident that originated the hallucination was this. He was in charge of a number of men—a raiding party. Returning from the raid they heard cries for help coming from a small shell-hole that they were passing at the time. On looking they saw a wounded soldier in the shell-hole. His leg was nearly off. He appealed to them for help. Their orders were not to stop to pick up wounded but to leave them for

the stretcher-bearers, so they left him with a scornful look on his face and bitter words on his lips. The impression left on the patient's mind was that he thought them cowards. That was the scene my patient was looking at. He was no longer in my consulting-room but was back again in France looking at the wounded man sneering at him. He had been seeing that hallucination often two or three times a day for the previous two years and had never told anyone about it before. After a few sittings the man began to lose his hallucination and has now been free from it for four months. It will be well to examine this hallucination a little more closely. In the first place it is clear that it arose out of a mental conflict. A memory complex of the incident was formed in the mind of the patient. Attached to this memory complex was a charge of affect at varying potential to borrow a well-known term from the science of electricity. The psychic energy of this affect represents its tendency to discharge. Opposing this discharge is the force of repression closely associated with the man's conscience. Tendency to discharge may be supposed to increase by an accumulation or rise in potential of the affective charge on the one hand or by any weakening of the repressive forces on the other. Some stimulus happens—some associative idea appearing suddenly in consciousness, some excitement increasing the potential of the charge or some depression relaxing, may we say, the watchfulness of the censor, causing a weakening of the repressive forces. There is a sudden violent discharge of psychic energy and out comes the hallucination as a substitute formation of the conflict—a visual representation in consciousness of the memory images of the complex.

It may be supposed that the whole of the energy of the discharge is not used up in the visual appearance but that in some way some of it is responsible for the trembling and other bodily manifestations which appear throughout the hallucination and continue for some time after the vision has gone (compare the residual charge in a Leyden jar).

The fear exhibited by the patient during the hallucination is, in a way, neither more or less difficult to understand than any other fear but its intensity was probably greatly increased owing to a deeper psychic traumatic cause frequently found in war neurotics suffering from visual hallucinations. It arises out of the fact that the patient unconsciously identifies himself with the subject of the hallucination. The process is a very simple one. When a soldier witnesses the death of anyone close to him on the battlefield or sees anyone in a desperate situation like that of the poor fellow in the shell-hole the first hardly conscious thought that flashes through his mind is: "It might have been

me," or "my turn next." In this way he is mentally identifying himself with the person killed or in dire straits. This repressed thought gives rise to another complex, an ego complex and so the total affect is an accumulated one, viz. that attached to the wounded man complex plus that attached to the ego or self-preservation complex. It may be supposed, too, that the greater part of the fear arises out of the ego complex.

Visual hallucinations appear to be always started by some association in consciousness acting as a stimulus and bringing out the affect attached to the unconscious conflict. Thus in the case just described the recall of memories during my examination brought on the hallucinatory attacks. In other cases the association is accidental and not noticed by the patient as having any connection with the attack. A striking example of this is the following. The scene was in the trenches. Patient with several unarmed comrades was having tea. There was an unexpected raid by the enemy. Cups were dropped and there was a general stampede. Patient jumped into a sap just in time to miss the blow of a descending weapon and so escaped. Subsequently he hallucinated the whole scene frequently. He could see himself running and the big German after him. When telling me the story he remarked: "It is very curious how often this comes to me when I am having a cup of tea." How important it is for the patient to get him to understand the connection between the association and the attack can be readily appreciated. Another good example may serve to emphasise the point. A patient saw his dearest friend blown to pieces and subsequently hallucinated the scene. Every time he did so he fell down in a 'fit.' When I asked him to tell me what he was doing on the occasion of his last attack he replied: "I was having a lark with a friend in the day-room." I said, "Does this remind you of anything?" Whereupon he immediately replied: "Yes, it makes me think of the larks I used to have with Jack"—the man who was blown to pieces. And so it always happens that a hallucinatory attack is started by some association generally of the most trivial nature and practically always unnoticed by the patient.

A curious fact I observed in a few visually hallucinated patients was that they seemed, after they had been hallucinating for some time (perhaps two years or more), to acquire a facility for hallucinating.

What I mean is best illustrated by an example. The case is far too long to describe in detail so I give an abstract only. The patient was having several visual war hallucinations, the principal one being that of a death-scene in which his dearest friend, mortally wounded, died in his arms. Besides this he hallucinated two other war scenes, saw two faces—

those of a man and a woman looking in at night at the window. He hallucinated his mother, and later on his wife having connection with a man whose face he could not see but whom he associated with a suspected person. During treatment progress was slow and he contemplated suicide by cutting his throat with a razor. Accordingly he began to hallucinate the razor. Several times in my consulting-room he saw the razor flash in front of his face. After six months' treatment his hallucination disappeared. Three months later he returned to work at his own request but took to drink, began to hallucinate again and was returned to hospital, this time with fresh hallucinations. His war complexes seemed to have disappeared and with them his war hallucinations. One of his new hallucinations was interesting but awkward. He saw himself with a razor in his hand chasing me along the corridor with murderous intent (incidentally an excellent example of a negative transference, though I stood for the father also. He had an exceptionally strong mother complex). He got well again and during the second course of treatment towards the end had a hallucination of a quite trivial kind. One day he was playing cards in the day-room. The game I do not know but it was essential in order that he should win that someone should play the seven of Clubs. No one played it and he lost the game. That night while lying awake in bed he saw the wanted card in front of him (wish-fulfilment in hallucination). He was rather amused than frightened by the hallucinated card.

In two other instances patients showed a progressive tendency to hallucinate or rather a progressive facility for hallucinating, but I cannot give any better example than that described.

In this and the two other cases the Oedipus complex was very strongly marked. Mere statements, however, are not always convincing, and so I give a dream of one of these patients which for simplicity and useful illustration can hardly be excelled. The dream was:

"I was going to work and there was a nurse dressed in black. She stopped me. There were two men with the nurse. Each man had a lighted candle in his hand. I thought the nurse gave me a candle. I went to light it from another fellow's candle but it wouldn't light. The candle just melted in my hand and wouldn't burn. The nurse said to me, 'If your candle won't light you must dig a grave.'"

On going over the dream with the patient it came out that the nurse was his sister with his (deceased) mother's face. The grave was his own. The man was single and was suffering from psychosexual impotency. A masturbation complex was clearly present. Furthermore it came out



that he often dreamt of having intimate relations with his sister. This dream distressed him terribly. Owing to lack of time I did not find out who the two men were and unfortunately the patient only remained a short time in hospital. He had previously been in a mental hospital. His facility for hallucinating was extraordinary. He apparently could hallucinate at will any scene or person connected with his intimate life. So could the second man but he complained that doing so gave him a violent headache and he got angry when invited to repeat exhibitions of his powers. Accordingly I had to desist.

And now the question arises: What does this facility for hallucinating mean? What does the mechanism involve? It bears some resemblance to the formation of habit. There is evidently an increasing tendency to dissociation of consciousness. Does it mean that recently formed complexes become associated with deeply repressed complexes of high traumatic potentiality and through affinity with these acquire a high importance and become surrounded with an affect of high potential?

In the cases given there was marked mental instability and there was also evidence pointing to a decline into the psychotic state. The underlying corresponding physiological change points to diminished synaptic resistance in the association fibres but this does not help us much from a psychological point of view. Anyhow the facts seem to me to be sufficiently interesting to deserve notice and I have not seen any previous mention of the condition among the hallucinatory cases of war anxiety neurotics. The incidence of aural hallucinations is relatively rare. It is significant that the opposite is true in asylum patients among whom the proportion of aural to visual is about the inverse to that which obtains in war anxiety neurotics—the inference being of course that aural hallucinations are more closely associated with the psychotic condition than those of the visual type. This inference is strengthened by the fact that aural hallucinations are very persistent whereas, as has been mentioned, in the great majority of cases visual hallucinations disappear under treatment. I have had cases suffering from visual hallucinations of three, four and even five years' standing, clear up after a comparatively short course of psychotherapy. In the few cases where this does not happen the retardation is generally due to one of two causes—a want of intelligent co-operation on the part of the patient or a tendency to fixation, that is, a tendency to psychosis. Both causes may, of course, operate in the same patient. Very different is the rule with aural cases. They do not easily clear up, not even when the patient appears to have

an insight into his condition and realises the subjective origin of the voice or voices he is hearing, or even when he recognises the voice as that of someone he knows or as his own. The fact that aural hallucinations are persistent and difficult to remove is, I think, more or less common knowledge among psychiatrists but I am not aware of any explanation having been put forward. The following observations apply to the relatively few cases that have come my way.

Among my dozen or so aural hallucinatory cases it happened more frequently than not that the hallucination consisted in the man hearing his own name as if someone were calling him. This struck me as being peculiar and naturally I tried to fit in the fact with the other symptoms and with the whole mental make-up of the patient. It will be best to give briefly a few cases.

One man who was frequently hearing his name called presented the classical signs and symptoms of recurrent melancholia. He was also having a dreadful dream night after night. He dreamt that he was a prisoner and that a tall German officer was, as he himself expressed it, "using me as a woman." The dream was very vivid and the patient experienced sensations that may be supposed to accompany the act. Another young man, also hearing his name, recognised the voice as that of a bosom friend with whom he had been in close companionship before the war, during the war and after the war. This information the patient volunteered and impressed on me that the friendship was an exceptionally close one. In another case the patient recognised the voice calling his name as that of his eldest brother who stood to the patient *in loco parentis*. It is in the first case certain, in the second case almost equally certain and in the third case highly probable that there was a homosexual complex. In all three cases the patients were quite unaware of the existence of any tendency to homosexuality. Is one justified in the suspicion that the voices were voices of invitation? In another case the hallucination was different. The patient was hearing the death-agony cry of a comrade whom he saw disembowelled by shrapnel. In this case the man was an undoubted unconscious homosexual and almost equally certainly in an early stage of paranoia. He was aggressive and threatening to other patients. He accused two patients of practising homosexuality (projection)—there being no foundation for the charge and he was a single man of thirty-five who was not attracted to women.

If now it be admitted that in these cases the deep complex to which the aural hallucination gave expression in consciousness in camouflaged form was the homosexual complex the reason for the persistence of the

hallucination is fairly evident. It lies in the fact that this complex is both by internal repressive forces and by social and ethical interdict most strongly repressed.

It is true that the older complex—the Oedipus complex—is, in its full significance also strongly repressed, but the mother-love and father-fear in the ordinary sense are very close to consciousness if not actually in consciousness and most people not swayed by sentiment have little difficulty, by introspection, of acknowledging the existence of the complex, of realising its effect on their mentality and, very often, in determining or influencing the course of their lives in the matter of love and marriage especially: whereas the thought of the homosexual tendency as having any place in one's own mind is to the vast majority of men very repulsive. It is a very deep-seated complex, very strongly repressed, and hence the persistency of hallucinations associated with this complex. It will be observed that this theory to account for aural hallucinations being so persistent and being intimately associated with psychotic cases fits in with the doctrine, enunciated by Freud and Ferenczi and now widely accepted, that all cases of paranoia have their origin in a homosexual complex.

In the cases mentioned and in a few others not recorded, according to the patients' accounts the voices did not appear to be hostile. In other cases, however, the voices were offensive, abusive or threatening. One of my patients was hearing voices addressing him in very insulting language, telling him he was no use and challenging him to fight. Another was hearing depreciatory and insulting expressions without the challenge. In another case the voice was telling the patient to cut his throat as he was no good for anything. Another was hearing my voice at night whispering outside his door that I would put him in an asylum. Now it might be argued that if friendly voices pointed to a homosexual complex hostile voices must be accounted for in some other way. It must be remembered, however, that in the evolution of man's sexual life, according to Freud, whose findings are confirmed by subsequent observers, man's unconscious attitude to man passes through two phases that may be called respectively the 'I love him' phase and the 'I hate him' phase, and that fixation may take place at any stage of evolution. In this way an inviting voice may be associated with the 'I love him' phase and a hostile voice with the 'I hate him' phase. One does not wish to labour the point overmuch or to insist upon it too strongly, but at least the theory is worth testing and further investigation may lead to interesting conclusions both from the point of view of research and also of therapy.

The incidence of hallucinations among war neurotics is in my experience a good deal higher than it is generally supposed to be. Of the patients in my wards at present more than 25 per cent. are hallucinated and of the hallucinations from which they are suffering about a quarter are of the aural type. In the list vague hallucinations such as 'shadows' are not counted nor the very frequently occurring footsteps of the pursuer and, in fact, only cases where the patient sees a distinct figure or scene or hears a voice or voices speaking are included. I have omitted, too, tactile, gustatory and olfactory hallucinations, the former being almost altogether represented by the tap on the shoulder, an occurrence of considerable frequency, and the latter by hallucination of taste and smell, these appearing in three instances only.

It will be observed that my studies among war anxiety neurotics have led me into speculations extending beyond the limits of the subject. In addition to those already advanced I would put forward a few other matters on which so far as I am aware there is at present no definite consensus of opinion—no pragmatic pronouncement. Arising out of my clinical experiences among these unfortunate men I am concerned and in some doubt on the important question as to whether or not a psychoneurotic patient as such can pass into a psychotic condition. I am inclined to believe that he can. For some of these men the struggle has been too severe and too long. They feel as Cain did when he cried out: "My punishment is greater than I can bear." The combined effects of their internal mental conflicts and (arising out of these) their inability to face reality—not from want of trying, for they have tried and been beaten back again and again—leaves them in a critically unstable condition in which it does not require much more to topple them over. Anyone who has to do with a war anxiety neurotic will find it interesting and instructive to study Macbeth. He will find in Macbeth a predisposed man exhibiting all the symptoms of a war anxiety neurotic with visual and aural hallucinations. In this instance, however, the man passes beyond the borderland—a fate from which our men, with remarkably few exceptions are spared. Their hallucinations and suspicions—the stepping-stones to delusions—tend to clear up under active, encouraging and sympathetic psychotherapy so much so that if anything has become transparently evident in the course of a long experience of these war cases it is that hallucinations by themselves and unaccompanied by signs of fixation are not to be taken as indicating a psychosis. On the other hand, if there is evidence of fixation the outlook is not so good. I have a case in point at present under my care. The circumstances are

these. The patient, a young man (of moderate intelligence) bayoneted a German and left him, as he believes, only wounded. He now sees a man, dressed as a tramp, following him. He believes that this man is the German in disguise come to England awaiting his opportunity to have his own back. The hallucination and accompanying delusion appear to be fixed. There seems good reason to think that if the case had been taken early the hallucination might have been dispelled and the delusion removed. As matters stand it would appear that a condition originally psychoneurotic may have become psychotic. Up to the present attempts to give him an insight into his condition have failed though I am not without hope of ultimate success.

# M. COUÉ'S THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTO-SUGGESTION

BY CAVENDISH MOXON.

THE present study is based upon the explanation of Suggestibility by Dr S. Ferenczi in terms of Freud's libido theory<sup>1</sup>. From this it is evident that suggestibility depends on the repressed libido. The affects connected with the parental complexes, being incapable of free discharge, undergo neurotic displacements until they can be transferred to a parent-substitute who shows signs of sympathy and healing power. Dr Ferenczi's paper was written before the present widespread popularity of the New Nancy School of auto-suggestion under the leadership of M. Emile Coué. At that time the method of suggestion by hypnosis prevailed, but M. Coué and his school dispense with hypnosis and claim that their method of induced auto-suggestion, being free from the objections raised against the older methods, is the best way of treating the symptoms of neurosis.

It is the purpose of the present paper (*a*) to state M. Coué's theory and practice of auto-suggestion in psycho-analytic terms; and (*b*) with an understanding of the mechanisms involved in the technique, to weigh the claims that are being made for its superiority as an almost universally applicable aid to psycho-physical health.

Mr Harry Brooks' popular manual contains a statement of the essentials of the theory and method written in a manner that M. Coué, in the Foreword, regards as "simple and clear<sup>2</sup>." The theory is based on the power of the unconscious, but the term is loosely used in a sense that seems chiefly to cover the psycho-analytic concept of the pre-conscious. The power of the unconscious is seen to consist in an acceptance of conscious thoughts and a consequent realization of them either in healthy or in unhealthy states of mind and body. It is significant that Prof. C. Baudouin in his more technical book on *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion* uses the vague term 'sub-conscious.' The acceptance of the psycho-analytic concept of the unconscious is incompatible with M. Coué's claim to heal all neurotics by a method which only attacks symptoms and pre-conscious 'outcroppings.' In harmony with the technique based on verbal formulæ, M. Coué's theory makes pre-conscious products in

<sup>1</sup> S. Ferenczi, *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *The Practice of Auto-suggestion*. New York. Dodd, Mead & Co. 1922.

the form of verbal imaginations take the primary part in the causation of health and disease. What Prof. Baudouin calls the law of 'reversed effort' is thus stated by M. Coué: "When the Imagination and the Will are in conflict the Imagination invariably gains the day<sup>1</sup>."

Since the conflict here described is waged between pre-conscious or conscious verbal images and the repressive forces of the moral consciousness, M. Coué is satisfied when he has replaced a pre-conscious morbid thought by its opposite. Because M. Coué regards a good verbal auto-suggestion as a cure for morbid thoughts, it seems possible for him to believe in a bad verbal auto-suggestion as their source, and to ignore the unconscious source of neurotic symptoms. In harmony with M. Coué's emphasis on words, Mr Brooks has much to say about the power of thought to modify the unconscious, and thereby the bodily health. The only obstacles to this exercise of verbal imagination appear to be the conscious attention and will, which cause doubts and fears that counteract the power of thought.

Mr Brooks sums up M. Coué's theory of suggestion in these words: "The whole process of Auto-suggestion consists of two steps: (a) The acceptance of an idea; (b) Its transformation into a reality. Both these operations are performed by the Unconscious. Whether the idea is originated in the mind of the subject or is presented from without by the agency of another person is a matter of indifference. In both cases it undergoes the same process: it is submitted to the Unconscious, accepted or rejected, and so either realized or ignored. Thus the distinction between Auto-suggestion and Hetero-suggestion is seen to be both arbitrary and superficial. In essentials all suggestion is auto-suggestion. The only distinction we need make is between spontaneous auto-suggestion, which takes place independently of our will and choice, and induced auto-suggestion, in which we consciously select the ideas we wish to realize and purposely convey them to the Unconscious<sup>2</sup>."

This explanation is in harmony with Psycho-Analysis in so far as it asserts that, in Dr Ferenczi's words, "in hypnosis and suggestion the chief work is performed not by the hypnotist and suggestor, but by the person himself<sup>3</sup>," who was looked on by previous theorists as merely the object of the intrusive activity. While not denying the part in his method played by hetero-suggestion, M. Coué nevertheless seems to minimize unduly its importance. In his reaction against the old view of the hypnotist as the active agent in causing a dissociation without which the

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Harry Brooks. *Ibid.* p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Ferenczi. *Ibid.* p. 50

suggestion is impossible, M. Coué writes at times as if the method can wholly dispense with the transference of libido to an authority. In the Foreword to Mr Brooks' Manual M. Coué maintains that "the instructions given are amply sufficient to enable any one to practise auto-suggestion for him or herself, without seeking the help of any other person<sup>1</sup>." There is probably no auto-suggestion free from all hetero-suggestion, because no one can be wholly removed from the influence of the parents and their suggestive substitutes. It is at any rate clear that hetero-suggestion plays an essential part in M. Coué's method. Every person who uses his formulæ must have some knowledge of the ability of M. Coué or his followers to remove the symptoms of ill-health. Both in the clinic at Nancy, in M. Coué's own manual and Mr Brooks' book, the personality of M. Coué and his healing powers are impressively manifest. The ignorant regard M. Coué as a worker of miracles: and Mr Brooks makes clear the resemblance to Christ when he writes of M. Coué's "great goodness of heart" that caused him to place his whole life at the service of others at any time, and to refuse any fee for his treatments (p. 41). Mr Brooks declares that this is a method demanding faith; and faith in the method cannot be had without faith in the authority who spreads the good news. There is clearly a transference of libido to a parent-substitute as well as a verbal formula.

The two factors in the removal of symptoms are paralleled by the two factors at work in their production.

(1) Hetero-suggestibility or the capacity for transference. Dr Ferenczi thinks this varies in proportion to the libido fixation upon the parents. The neurotic is therefore extremely sensitive to all authorities, human and divine, and in his loneliness he is ready to accept a new sympathetic parent-substitute to satisfy his hunger for love.

(2) Auto-suggestibility or the discovery by the repressed libido (connected with the parental and other complexes) of the maximum outlet compatible with conscious renunciation<sup>2</sup>. These two factors—the search for parent-substitutes and the creation of neurotic outlets for unsatisfied impulses—are powerfully stimulated by the environment in the most highly civilized nations at the present time.

Among the strongest stimuli to fear may be mentioned:

- (a) the economic dependence of a large majority of the people upon the will of a powerful minority, and
- (b) the disintegration of the traditional creeds.

<sup>1</sup> *The Practice of Auto-suggestion*, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. E. Jones. *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 325.



A transference of libido to human and divine parent-substitutes is thereby hindered: the masochistic tendency towards death<sup>1</sup> is increased by the loss of sadistic and aggressive outlets: and the feeling of impotent inferiority is induced by the lack of proper narcissistic sublimations.

(c) The moral conscience, by constantly increasing prohibitions, tends to produce a morbid intensity of guilt and fear.

Knowing that the will-drill method of cure tends to increase the doubts and fears upon which the attention is fixed, M. Coué relies on the power of verbal imagination to avoid the conflict with the will and to attain the end he desires. The auto-suggestive technique is simple. The subject repeats morning and evening, when as nearly asleep as possible, the general formula, "Day by day, in every way, I am getting better and better." This may be supplemented by particular formulae for specially desired alterations in mental and bodily functions. As an aid to the effortless use of the formula, a string with 20 knots is passed through the hand to mark the 20 repetitions that are required to insure the impression of the words.

The emphasis laid on words and acts is most significant for the psycho-analytic understanding of this method and its popularity. When a woman consulted M. Coué, he asked her to make no arduous search for the repressed desires that made her speech "a flood of complaint." "Madame," he interrupted, "you think too much about your ailments, and in thinking of them you create fresh ones." The technique tends to revive the infantile use of magic words and gestures, which accompany the slightly qualified belief in the child's omnipotence. Mr Brooks seems to realize this when he follows M. Coué in advising "the infantile mode of repeating the formula" which "puts one in touch with deep levels of the Unconscious where the child-mind still survives" (p. 84). This certainly harmonizes better with the primitive processes evoked than Prof. Baudouin's advice to repeat the formula in the manner of adult piety with all the words separately stressed.

We conclude that what distinguishes this method from other forms of suggestion is not the absence of transferred object libido, but the subordination of this to a large increase in the expression of narcissistic libido. With the revival of infantile narcissism goes an indulgence of negative hallucinations such as mark the period before the development of the reality principle. The imagination is used to promote the belief that all is well and that pain and suffering will disappear.

It seems possible to state more exactly in terms of libido quantities,

<sup>1</sup> Freud, *Jenseits des Lust princips*, p. 54.

the way in which the transference of parent libido makes possible the conscious increase of narcissism. On p. 82 of his recent work on *Massenpsychologie und Ich Analyse* Freud shows that falling in love exercises an important influence upon the ego-ideal and consequently upon the conduct. When the love-object takes the place of the ego-ideal, the lover ceases to criticize not only the loved object, but also his own deeds done for the beloved. Acts that the lover could not or would not do without this motive, now seem possible and lawful. A quantity of the lover's libido is released from the censorship of the ego-ideal when a person is found for its embodiment. So long as the ego-ideal was largely a personal imagination, the ego was in constant fear of losing it by unworthy acts: when the ego-ideal is transferred to another person, the ego needs a smaller quantity of sado-masochism to chasten and control the repressed desires. The first love objects in the family could only be loved with much renunciation of crude desire; the new love object may allow a direct outlet of genital sexuality in the lover. While the initiator of an auto-suggestive process does not allow an outlet for uninhabited adult sexuality, he does allow an outlet for infantile narcissistic omnipotence and inattention to evil. The traditional divine parent-substitutes in this way work wonders for their sons; the new substitutes who authorize auto-suggestion enable the followers of their instructions to work wonders for themselves. The hetero-suggestions of modern civilized society allow an abnormally small amount of positive libido to find direct and sublimated expression. Consequently too much force is consumed in the work of building defences against illegitimate love and hate; and neurotic symptoms are the almost universal result.

The initiator of auto-suggestion who receives the transferred object-love is an authority who, unlike the childhood authorities, wills the power and the pleasure of his pupil, and therefore breaks his pupil's habit of masochistic renunciation, adopted as an expiation for rebellion in the past. The suggestor not only removes the quantity of libido used for masochistic and anxious barriers against narcissistic expression: he also draws off a part of the masochistic libido upon himself in the form of loyalty. For, as Dr Ferenczi remarks, in confirmation of Freud's view, "the hypnotic credulity and pliancy take their root in the masochistic component of the sexual instinct," which takes pleasure in obeying the parents<sup>1</sup>. By a reduction of the fear and the sado-masochism, which are the chief weapons in the neurotic war upon health and life, the symptoms tend, at least for a time, to disappear.

<sup>1</sup> Freud, *Jenseits des Lust prinzipts*, p. 68.

On the basis of the foregoing sketch of the libidinous forces involved in consciously induced auto-suggestion, it is possible to judge the value of this method of prophylaxis and psychotherapy. It is necessary first, however, to be sure of the meaning of the practice to be judged. Both the terms 'imagination' and 'auto-suggestion' seem to be ambiguous and even to refer to widely different mental processes. We cannot therefore be satisfied with M. Coué's sincere purpose to replace wrong imagination by right thought, unless we are sure that the 'right' is also the psychophysically healthy. It is best for our purpose to avoid ethical terms, and to consider the auto-suggestive imagination in its action upon the libido.

Sometimes and in some persons auto-suggestive imagination is a repressive force in the service of the conscious ego-ideal with its inhibitory action upon the libidinous impulses. The effect of auto-suggestion in this sense is to increase the ego-dominance. At other times and in other persons auto-suggestive imagination is used as an expressive force in the service of the unsatisfied libido of auto-erotic and allo-erotic complexes. The effect of auto-suggestion in this sense is to increase the libido dominance.

Referring to auto-suggestions that produce symptoms similar to the neuro-psychic inhibitions of hypnosis, Dr Ferenczi inclines to assume a far-reaching analogy between the psychical mechanism of these auto-suggestions and the mechanism of psycho-neurotic symptoms<sup>1</sup>. This analogy seems to be true of auto-suggestion in the first, but not in the second meaning I have given above. The auto-suggestion which removes the alcoholic indulgence of unconscious homosexuality must increase the neurotic repression; whereas the auto-suggestion that removes the fear of indulging exhibitionistic libido on the stage must reduce the neurotic repression.

It is clear then that auto-suggestion cannot be recommended as the best aid to health, if it is either of the repressive kind or of the expressive kind when this is used (*a*) to promote regression to infantile narcissism, (*b*) to weaken the reality principle, (*c*) to replace the search for the hidden causes of ill-health by an ignorant removal of pain and incapacity, and (*d*) to encourage the delusion of omnipotence, for which such words as 'difficult,' 'impossible,' 'I cannot,' will disappear<sup>2</sup>. Indeed it cannot be recommended at all as a substitute for Psycho-Analysis where this causal treatment can be had. The danger of the repressive kind of auto-suggestion is most manifest precisely in its educational application, as proposed by Mr Brooks on p. 107. The parental suggestions for good behaviour

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* p. 72.

<sup>2</sup> Harry Brooks. *Ibid.* p. 26.

whispered into the ears of sleeping children, and the imposition of moral taboos by unanalysed teachers would greatly increase the amount of neurosis in the future. It is equally unsatisfactory as a method of dealing with moral delinquencies in ignorance of the unconscious impulses expressed therein.

Induced auto-suggestion can be most safely used (*a*) for the removal of the slight neurotic symptoms that occur in approximately normal persons under exceptional conditions of strain. The most permanent results of this method are probably secured in civil cases that resemble the war cases in so far that neither the constitutional nor the infantile factors in neurosis would cause an unbearable repression unless unusually severe shocks or accidentally harmful suggestions occurred in adult life; (*b*) for the involutory cases that preserve the relics of a bygone conflict by the habit of repetition, and (*c*) for un-analysable persons.

The chief value of the suggestion movement, is to draw attention to the fact that, in modern civilization, the social, economic, and moral restraints cause an increase of sado-masochism, depression, envy and fear, that play an important part either in the formation or in the neurotic complication of almost all disease; and that immunity to psychical and physical infection from without, depends on the removal of the unconscious causes of inefficiency within.

## CRITICAL NOTICE.

*Second Report of the Miners' Nystagmus Committee.* London: published by His Majesty's Stationery Office. pp. 33. Price 9d. net.

The Second Report of the Miners' Nystagmus Committee confirms some of the findings enumerated in the First Report without elucidating them. Its chief value lies in the fresh evidence collected by Mr Pooley, who is responsible for the whole of it. He has made a laborious research into the possible relationship of nystagmus and errors of refraction, and his results should settle finally that such a relationship does not exist. This was anticipated in a critical notice of the First Report, for reasons therein given, and a convincing proof is now forthcoming.

The first part of the Report is devoted to Mr Pooley's survey of the disease generally. He mentions the astonishing difference in the incidence and effect of nystagmus on the Continent and in Great Britain. It is worth while summarising once more some of the observations made. In France, Belgium, Germany and England the number of men affected by the disease amounts roughly to about a quarter of the total number of miners employed. "In America, where no compensation is given, little is heard of incapacity due to nystagmus, or indeed of the existence of the disease." In Germany the incidence of claims was 0.3 per cent. from 1905 to 1913. In the latter year a decision was come to that only serious cases of nystagmus were entitled to compensation; the percentage then fell to 0.18, and has fallen since the War to 0.03. In Belgium, where the method of compensation has been unaltered throughout, the incidence has remained at 0.2 per cent. (Stassen), 0.05 to 0.03 per cent. (Coppez). In France Dr Dransart in 1913 gave the incidence of severe cases as 0.15 per cent. In Great Britain the disease was made a ground for compensation in 1907, and a level for fresh claims was reached in 1911. In 1913, a new official definition of the affection was made, excluding the necessity for oscillation of the eyeballs to be present in the diagnosis. The effect was to include cases claiming compensation for psycho-neurosis. Claims for incapacity immediately rose, and have continued to rise especially during the War. Such an increase of fresh claims has not occurred in other countries.

In the face of this astounding fact, it hardly seems worth while for Mr Pooley to have spent so much time and energy upon the investigation of the relationship of errors of refraction to miners' nystagmus, unless there be some national or racial difference in the shape of the eyeball. Such a difference has never been suggested, at any rate between ourselves and our nearest Continental neighbours, notwithstanding the fact that in France, for instance, the wearing of glasses for eyestrain is very uncommon as compared with England. But Mr Pooley's work has a much wider application than he claims for it, and the time will come when his results will be quoted effectively by those who believe that the present method of trying to cure a round score of psycho-neurotic symptoms by means of glasses is unworthy of a scientific profession.

Under the heading "Conclusions" he classifies the cases into two groups. (1) Severe cases of the type recognised as incapacitating in France and Belgium. This group has not increased in these countries in recent years, and appears even to have diminished as safety lamps have improved. (2) Cases in which the psychological element largely predominates. This group is the one which has increased the reported cases.

In view of this important fact, which seems to be indisputable, one looks eagerly for an indication of the Committee's intention to turn its energies to the task of solving the psychological problem, but in vain. In the Introduction the Committee state that they are continuing their work and have some investigations in view which will deal further with the physiological problems involved, but from all the evidence contained in their report it would appear that a psychological investigation would be more fruitful, and surely the best way of perpetuating the memory of their former colleague, Dr W. H. R. Rivers, who was deeply interested in the psychological aspect of the disease, would have been to appoint a competent psychologist to find out the significance of the symptoms, ocular and otherwise, which make miners' nystagmus such a mystery. And this brings one to the question as to the meaning of the actual nystagmus, the oscillation of the eyeballs. The official definition of the disease allows the diagnosis to be made in the absence of oscillation. It follows either that nystagmus is an unimportant physical eccentricity, or it is a part of a psycho-neurosis. All the evidence points to its not being a cause of the nervous symptoms. The Committee appear to have neglected the opposite point of view, that nervous stress may produce the nystagmus. The latter, as has been already stated, occurs very frequently amongst miners generally. If it be granted that it is a psycho-neurotic symptom, a first stage in the development of the disease, one can easily understand the great difference in the relative incapacitating influence in Great Britain and Continental countries. In the latter the man must "get on or get out." In the former he gets compensation, and having first been persuaded officially that he is unfit, he accepts the suggestion, and actually becomes so. The same process has been observed constantly by medical officers attached to the Pensions Boards. A wrong diagnosis in the first instance, followed by a pension, ends in permanent disability, the difficulty of getting work at the present time assisting the neurotic trend. One wonders what would happen if nystagmic miners were paid handsomely to return to work instead of being paid to refrain from it. Apparently the course adopted in Germany and elsewhere has had a strikingly beneficial effect.

One cannot understand the Committee's persistence in classifying the cases according to the severity of the physical signs when throughout their Report such emphasis is laid upon the psycho-neurotic factor. After all, their function is to elucidate the nature of the disease, and thereby enable the country to avoid the waste of a million of money and to avert the secondary consequences of illness and incapacity in the men themselves. It is admitted on almost every page that no single physical sign can be taken as a guide to the severity or incapacitating effect of the disease. Nystagmus itself, in this respect, is summarily excluded on p. 19, where it is stated that "We are of the opinion that a test which encourages examination by the movements of the cornea only is unsatisfactory." Yet no effort is made to establish a formula dealing with the one great incapacitating part of the affection, the psycho-neurosis. The evidence in favour of doing so is overwhelming. The point was conceded

in 1913, when the official definition of Miners' Nystagmus was altered to include the words "whether the symptom of oscillation of the eyeballs be present or not." The Continental authorities still deal with it as a local disease. At home we have gone further practically only as far as compensation is concerned. Our scientists still cling obstinately to the idea that the nystagmus is the chief thing to be considered, and show the limited vision of the vast majority of the medical profession, who, for instance, regard asthma as a disease of the respiratory system because there is some difficulty in breathing under certain conditions. It is difficult to understand why this should be so, in the face of the facts collected. The result of the unsympathetic, but in practice very satisfactory attitude of the Belgian, French and German authorities towards the psychical symptoms has been alluded to. Abroad the latter are disregarded and not compensated, with the result that the disease is stationary or tends to diminish. In Great Britain they are compensated, and not investigated, with the result that the disease has steadily increased. On p. 18 one finds that "Indemnity Companies point out that the death-rate of those in receipt of compensation for miners' nystagmus is high, and ascribe the mortality to other intercurrent disease." Surely the natural inference to be drawn from this is, that a man who cannot face the stress of life below ground, presumably owing to low vitality, sooner or later accepts the easier conditions of life offered by compensation, gets into a backwater, and is more likely to suffer from literally any disease under the sun! This is nothing new. It is merely stating a fact familiar to everyone who has given a thought to the theory of immunity. The great questions to be solved are—Why do the British become incapacitated more than the Continental races, why do some British suffer and not others, and what has compensation to do with it?

A stimulus to tackle the problem from the point of view of the man and his reaction to his environment should have been forthcoming from one statement alone. On p. 21 one finds that out of 650 incapacitated men, 17 per cent. were over sixty years of age, though the normal proportion of men over sixty working underground is 3-4 per cent. Fifty-one of these men showed no physical signs, the symptoms being merely alleged. Again "the percentage of men not at work was found to increase with the age of the cases," and, "the duration of incapacity was found to lengthen with advancing years." In other words, it is a disease of old age, either actual or premature. A man may retire from the struggle of life at a very early age; no matter what his years, his reaction is senile.

A highly suggestive table is that given on p. 22, dealing with the relation between duration of incapacity and the presence of physical signs. It shows that the number of men disabled for two to five years was much higher than for any other period, that there was a gradual rise from a one to three months' incapacity until the two to five years' period was reached, and then a pronounced fall for the longer periods. Taking the percentage of cases showing oscillation, head tremor, and lid spasm in the same men, Mr Pooley shows a steady fall in incidence of the first condition, but a rise in the second and third from the six to twelve months' incapacity until the two to five years' incapacity is reached, and then a fall to zero. It is interesting to note that the latter two physical signs were more frequently present in those cases whose incapacity had run for two to five years, and that such cases were the most numerous in a body of 650 men investigated. In the great majority of these cases the illness had lasted from one to five years. Compare this with the Continental

evidence. Dr Stassen with his wide experience in Belgium has seen only three cases incapacitated for more than six months—"these men returned to work before the end of twelve months." The table in question shows that the longer the duration of the illness, the more definitely psycho-neurotic in character it becomes. Whatever may be the significance and origin of the oscillation of the eyeballs, one may fairly safely insist upon the neurotic nature of lid spasm, and with some show of reason, of head tremor also. In cases up to twelve months' duration oscillation of the eyeballs is the commonest sign noted, its occurrence being in the proportion of 65 per cent., as compared with head tremor 35 per cent., and lid spasm 19 per cent. But in the cases lasting one to two years, the proportions change respectively to 42, 46 and 30 per cent., and in those lasting two to five years, to 22, 32 and 15 per cent.

When the Committee state that the view taken of miners' nystagmus on the Continent is, on the whole, correct and that "The great majority of cases benefit by returning to work within from three to six months, and by continuing to work for at least six months before making a fresh claim for compensation," they are in effect admitting the psycho-neurotic basis of the disease. It would seem that they are a little inconsistent in declaring that a stricter standard based on *physical* signs should be adopted, in determining claims for compensation, whilst their evidence goes to show that these physical signs themselves are mere indications of a disease affecting the whole organism.

It is true that the Committee themselves have not come to any decision as to whether the psycho-neurotic symptoms themselves are an integral part of the disease. They tell us that "The standard of physical signs which is in vogue in this country for deciding whether any case should be certified as suffering from miners' nystagmus, too readily admits psycho-neurotic cases," but if claims for compensation are to be determined by physical symptoms alone, what is one to make of the fact that "Several men with the most marked oscillation of their eyes, which they cannot keep still, even when looking down in daylight, refuse to stop work, and say they hate holidays, as they are more comfortable when working. One of these men plays cricket for his colliery." If oscillation is the crucial sign, should not such men as these be compulsorily retired? If not, what are the physical signs determining incapacity? Does not it all really amount to this, that physical signs are present in varying degree in large numbers of miners, only some of whom declare themselves to be incapacitated? In other words, the subjective symptoms are all-important to the medical man in coming to a decision.

As the Committee favour strongly the Continental practice of restricting compensation, on the ground that the incidence of nystagmus is thereby greatly reduced, it would be interesting to know whether Continental miners thus saved from nystagmus remain healthy men. It is a common observation in psycho-neurotic cases that the cure of one symptom frequently leads to the emergence of others, and it is conceivable therefore that on the Continent, whilst the incidence of nystagmus is reduced, there may be a rise in that of diseases classified under other names. On this point we have no information. One cannot cure a neurosis simply by driving the sufferer back to the environment which produced it. Would not it be possible to discriminate between cases mainly due to temporary stress, whether above or below ground, and those in which the man's vitality has been so far sapped that he will never be fit for underground work again?

Were further argument necessary to convince the Committee that it has



a long way to go, if it persists in attaching so much importance to physical signs, it is to be found on p. 22, where it is stated that "A pronounced divergence was found between the work which was being done and that which the men appeared to the examiner capable of doing when they were assessed on the basis of the amount of physical signs of miners' nystagmus present." The actual figures are too striking not to be quoted.

	Present Condition	Assessed Condition
Not working	468	270
Working on surface	162	154
Working underground	20	226

The precise meaning of these figures is not clear, but it is evident that the miner and the examiner were far from being of the same mind.

"Means should be established for re-assessing periodically the amount of incapacity present; this is purely a medical question, which should be in the hands of those who possess special experience of the disease" (pp. 23, 24). Did one of them make the above assessment? No wonder the legal profession and legislature are bewildered when they turn to the medical profession for guidance in compensation cases!

In a paper on Miners' Nystagmus read before the Medico-Legal Society recently, a barrister spoke of the great confusion of mind produced by the first report, and pleaded for greater clarity of thought in medical pronouncements. The reproach must be accepted.

W. INMAN.

## REVIEWS.

*An Outline of Psychology.* By WILLIAM McDUGALL, F.R.S., Professor of Psychology in Harvard College. Methuen & Co., Ltd. Pp. xvi + 456. Price 12s. net.

It would be difficult to overestimate the value and importance of this volume. Designed to introduce the student to his science, to furnish him with a profitable line of approach and a fruitful way of thinking of psychological problems, with a terminology as little misleading as possible, it admirably achieves this aim. But it does more than this, in spite of its author's disclaimer, and presents a compact yet lucid summary of the generally accepted facts and laws of normal psychology, which makes it a reliable text-book of the science. Its most characteristic feature, that which distinguishes it from most if not all other text-books, is the thorough-going consistency with which it adheres to one guiding principle, the principle that "purposive action is the most fundamental category of psychology." In an interesting introduction Prof. McDougall summarises in a masterly way the chief historical systems in psychology, such as the psychology of ideas, the atomistic or mosaic psychology, the fusion of the two with more recently acquired facts of brain physiology which constitutes so-called physiological psychology, and the thorough-going mechanical reflex theory which is modern "behaviourism." He indicates their respective short-comings, and persuasively argues the claims of purposive psychology to be a more accurate statement of the facts.

Conformably with this view, his opening chapters do not present the time-honoured sequence of Sensation, Perception, Mental Images and Ideas, etc., but are devoted to a detailed analysis of the behaviour of the lower animals, the insects, the vertebrates, including fishes and birds as well as the mammals and man. These make extremely interesting reading and give overwhelming proof of the pragmatic value of his central principle. Prof. McDougall enumerates the following seven marks of "behaviour," viz.: (1) a certain spontaneity of movement, (2) the persistence of activity independently of the continuance of the impression which may have initiated it, (3) variation of direction of persistent movements, (4) the coming to an end of the animal's movements as soon as they have brought about a particular kind of change in its situation, (5) preparation for the new situation toward the production of which the action contributes, (6) some degree of improvement in the effectiveness of behaviour, when it is repeated by the animal under similar circumstances, (7) a total reaction of the organism, as distinct from the partial reaction of reflex action. As regards mark (6), he writes: "No doubt, when such improvement may be observed, it provides the surest criterion; but, without this sixth mark, we may infer mental activity from the other five." (He is not considering mark (7) in this passage.)

On this basis, he proceeds to demonstrate the mutual implication of instinct and intelligence in all purposive activity. He also shows the necessity of distinguishing instinctive activity from the various motor mechanisms through which it may be manifested, and brings forward further arguments for his

well-known theory that emotion is the subjective side of instinct. He now gives a list of thirteen primary instincts and emotions as at the base of human behaviour.

The chapter on "Perceptual Thinking" does not appear until half-way through the book, and gains greatly in clarity by its late position. The discussion of space-perception, often so confused and confusing in introductory textbooks of psychology, is particularly clear and illuminating.

But the full strength of Prof. McDougall's position shows itself when he comes to deal with the problems of character and volition in the closing chapters of the book. Here we have a clear statement of the doctrine of the sentiments, and of the way in which the sentiments become organised to form the structure of character: and also the most complete psychological theory of volition hitherto given, viz., McDougall's theory in terms of the working of the self-regarding sentiment.

In the final chapter the author summarises his view of purposive striving in the animal kingdom as a continuously graded series from the lowest to the highest forms of life in a paragraph so concise that I feel constrained to quote it in full. Within this graded series of the evolutionary scale the following stages may be distinguished: "(1) The vague, almost undifferentiated striving of the animalcule in pursuit of his prey. (2) The strivings of animals in which the instincts are sharply differentiated and directed towards specific goals that are vaguely anticipated by the creature. (3) The instinctive strivings of primitive man toward goals more fully imagined and anticipated; the strivings of instinctive desire. (4) The strivings of men prompted by desire for instinctive goals, but directed also to goals which are conceived and desired only as means to the instinctive goal. (5) Conduct of the lower level; that is, instinctive desire regulated and controlled, in the choice of means, by anticipation of rewards and punishments. (6) Conduct of the middle level; that is, the same instinctive impulses regulated in the choice of goals and of means by anticipation of social approval and disapproval. (7) Conduct of the higher level; that is, striving regulated in the choice of goals and means by the desire to realise an ideal of character and conduct, a desire which itself springs from an instinctive disposition whose impulse is turned to higher uses by the subtle influences of organised society embodying a moral tradition."

Two general criticisms occur to one after a re-perusal of this book. In the first place, the author appears to have done but scant justice to modern physiological psychology, a branch of psychology upon which he himself has written so persuasively in the past and to which the work of Dr Henry Head and his collaborators has contributed so much of permanent value in recent years. He does indeed refer to this work, and with approval, but he makes no use of it in his general account of behaviour. Secondly, his strongly critical attitude towards the theories of Professor Freud appears to have prevented him from finding anything of value for normal psychology in the literature of psycho-analysis. But he promises us a second volume, on abnormal psychology, in which this omission may perhaps be made good.

In spite of these general criticisms one must admit that *An Outline of Psychology* is the most important introductory text-book on Psychology hitherto written. No serious student of the subject can afford to be without it.

WILLIAM BROWN.

*Primitive Mentality.* By LUCIEN LÉVY-BRUHL. Authorised translation by LILIAN A. CLARE. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 458. Price 16s. net.

To every civilised approach, whether commercial, scientific or religious, primitive mentality has always presented an insoluble problem. Not that this precludes the possibility of a good working understanding between the representatives of such opposite racial types. There exist, on the contrary, abundant records of loyal and cordial relationship which seems to be based on a very genuine rapport. And yet the evidence is equally clear that personal relations always remain on the instinctive level, practically never advancing to any real understanding of that immense difference which characterises the workings of the two mentalities.

The practical conclusions of the two types are often identical, but the ways in which they are reached are poles asunder. This metaphor suggests the clue to the enigma which Prof. Lévy-Bruhl has set out to solve. The principle which rules the magical mind of the primitive is the psychological antipodes of the rational principle of civilised consciousness. With us the concept represents our mental currency, whereas to the primitive it is quite uncongenial. At the slightest attempt at any abstract ideation the primitive immediately succumbs. His mind declines to venture outside the magic circle of his intuitive representations.

When we remember that the concepts, time, space and causality, which form the very matrix of our experience, belong essentially to our conceptual reality, and are, therefore, outside the purely perceptual limits of the primitive mind, we can begin to realise the incommensurability of these opposite worlds of experience. Whereas we immediately infer natural or secondary causes behind the phenomenal world, the primitive only sees mystical, invisible forces at work. If a crocodile seizes a woman at the water's edge, this does not proceed from any natural appetite on the part of the crocodile, but is the manifestation of magical power directly attributable to some human agent.

The immediate convictions or certainties which underlie the whole complicated system of magical procedures and primitive beliefs are termed by Lévy-Bruhl "collective representations." This is an extremely valuable term, since it accurately describes both the character and the force of these pre-logical forms of mental activity. Like his term *participation mystique* it embraces the real quality of primitive psychology, *i.e.* its group character.

As soon as we have recognised the fact that the individual savage has not yet attained a psychological existence distinct from that of his family or tribe, we have in our hand a key which can give us access not only to the magical mentality of all primitive races, but also to the unconscious mental processes of civilised man. We might go even further and say that until we can begin to understand the entirely irrational group character of primitive mentality we can form no true conceptions of our own unconscious processes. A sympathetic study of the one is the royal road to the other; for they are, in a sense, identical. In both cases we are dealing with states of mental activity which precede abstract ideation. Abstract ideas depend upon the possibility of an individual mind distinguishing itself in thought from its environment. Theoretically, conscious individuality, and with it the whole possibility of conceptual experience, came to birth at the moment when the first man perceived himself as an object, *i.e.* as an entity distinct from the rest of the world. The differentiation of a conscious objective function introduced a principle

that was directly opposed to the previous state of mystical participation with the environment. For an act of objective judgment immediately distinguishes subject from object, and the principle of objective causality, as distinguished from the magical causality of primitive beliefs, can consequently be inferred. This separation of the subject as a distinct entity also provides him with the power of interfering with the customary operation of objective causality. He can, in fact, will. He can also begin to think. As long as he was in a state of identification with the mentality of the group we can only say that experience was 'represented' to him in definite and unalterable ways. He was completely at the mercy of the archetypal processes of the collective mind, whose immediate, unquestioned authority over his own mentality was quite untempered by individual criticism. But as soon as he feels this other law of his own being, he possesses the power of criticising from a new standpoint. He has crawled up out of the primeval swamps of the collective psyche, and feels beneath his feet the rock of individual experience and judgment. The first queries he flings at the world from this isolated vantage-point might be regarded not only as the first sprouting of science, but also as the first religious experience.

However fantastic this hypothetical individual may seem (since, manifestly, the differentiation of individual consciousness did not happen overnight) we may none the less condense the evolutionary process, for the sake of convenience, into some such mythological figure. For it is the strangely amphibious nature of our own psychology which, while allowing us a deep instinctive rapport with the primitive, at the same time occludes any reasonable comprehension of his mentality.

Our objective conscious function is a function of individual orientation. Its whole quality is, as it were, terrestrial. It provides us with definite concepts concerning terrestrial reality, but the oceanic processes of the unconscious take place beneath a refracting surface which deflects the direct rays of conscious insight. Our cognition of unconscious processes is, therefore, limited to fitful, indirect and oblique discernments, which have that same ambiguous and questionable quality that Lévy-Bruhl discovers in the white man's conceptions of the primitive.

The author has reconstructed the primitive mentality from varied fragments gathered from the most diverse races, and the picture gains enormously in depth and meaning from the fact that the author, for the most part, allows the material to speak for itself. The further we read into the book the more are we impressed by the sense that here is a picture of our own psychic background. We cannot fail to perceive that collective representations, homologous with those of the primitives, are continually operating with the same unquestioned authority in our own collective mentality.

The real significance of the collective unconscious as a dynamic psychological background has nowhere received a more vivid and telling representation than in this picture of the ever-present, invisible forces which operate upon the primitive mind with absolute ascendancy. From this point of view we might also regard the collective representations of the primitive mind as homologous with the primordial image in our own psychology.

This book, in my opinion, is a work of very great value, and it has particular importance at the present juncture, when science is struggling to advance from a purely analytical and empirical attitude to a more synthetic conception of human psychology. The author presents his material with an almost austere detachment and permits himself no conclusions that are not abundantly

borne out by trustworthy evidence. If a certain speculative latitude has become noticeable in the foregoing reflexions, this only testifies to the wealth of associations liberated by the book's perusal, and must in no way be attributed to its distinguished author.

H. G. BAYNES.

*Problems in Dynamic Psychology. A Critique of Psychoanalysis and Suggested Formulations.* By JOHN T. MACCURDY, M.D. Cambridge and New York, 1923. Pp. 383. Price 12s. 6d. net.

It is a task of no small difficulty to write a closely reasoned criticism of the work of a great original mind, and to bring about thereby a clearer understanding on the part of the reader of the profound significance of the work so criticised. That Dr MacCurdy has succeeded in this task is due to the fact that he brings to the undertaking the highest of all qualifications—sympathetic insight, in addition to expert knowledge and practical experience of the problems, and a really exhaustive study of Freud's own writings. This book, with its careful, critical reasoning, and its constant reference of theories and interpretations back to observed facts and immediate deductions therefrom, will probably do more than any book hitherto published in English to enable every intelligent person who really desires it to form a just estimate of the contributions made by Freud to Dynamic Psychology.

Dr MacCurdy warns his readers that the first part of his book (which consists almost entirely of minute and exhaustive criticism of Freud's formulations) "is unquestionably hard reading." This is true, and while it was largely inevitable that it should be so, it is a question whether some difficulties might not have been eased if Dr MacCurdy had incorporated at least a hint of his constructive alternatives with his extremely lucid but definitely destructive criticisms. In the one connection (Chap. x, "Dreams") in which he has adopted this method, it is far easier to follow the line of Dr MacCurdy's argument, and to appreciate the significance of his criticism.

The book is divided into four parts, the first of which consists entirely (with the one exception just noted) of criticism of Freud. Part II is entitled "The Relationship of Psychoanalysis and Suggestion." Dr MacCurdy includes Hypnosis under the general heading of Suggestion, which he agrees with Jones in regarding as being "based dynamically on unconscious sexual attraction between the patient and physician" (p. 120). Towards the end of the book, however, he amplifies this account (Pt IV, p. 375). Admitting that "suggestion bulks largely among herd phenomena," he adds, "Perhaps the only safe view to take of the matter is to assume that group suggestion is a utilization and overdetermining of an earlier sex mechanism."

Part III contains a careful and critical outline of the "Preconscious Phase," largely based on the work of Ferenczi and Burrow. The most valuable chapters in this section are those on "The Origin of Symbols," and "The Meaning of Auto-Erotism." Symbols, according to Dr MacCurdy, originate in feeling, and any object that reinstates a feeling of the preconscious stage is likely to become a symbol. It seems, on this theory, that symbolization is a characteristic activity of regression. "In the stage of mental development to which return is desired no accurate perceptions of the environment is (are!) possible, even

feelings cannot be formulated consciously; they can only be felt. Perception, consciousness, verbal thoughts come later and when they come, certain experiences that can be registered are dowered with an attractiveness and a feeling of similarity which they owe to resemblance to the experiences of the preceding stage when consciousness was larval. It is only these later experiences that can be remembered, they stand symbolically for the enjoyment of the past. But—a most important point—since the valuation of the past is a retrospective falsification, the wish did not develop till the symbols appeared, and hence that wish can be expressed only in symbols" (p. 167). There is obviously a great deal more to be said about the origin, development and function of symbols than is indicated by Dr MacCurdy, but he disarms criticism by admitting that "the discussion of this chapter is from one angle only, that of psychopathology." Auto-erotism is interpreted in biological terms; it is a process of education, both for objective orientation in general, and more specifically for adult sexuality.

Part IV, on "Instincts and their Classification," opens with a detailed and appreciative criticism of the theories of Rivers in *Instinct and the Unconscious*. We can only regret once again that the untimely death of Dr Rivers prevented his reading this chapter, and presenting his own views of the questions under discussion in fuller detail. Dr MacCurdy's critical brilliance is as much in evidence in this chapter as in Part I; for while he ruthlessly exposes the weaknesses and inconsistencies of many of Dr Rivers's theories, he never lacks in appreciation of the extraordinary fruitfulness of the method of approach and the setting of the problems.

The remaining chapters of the book are of a definitely constructive character, and they shed a backward light upon the critical work which has preceded them. It cannot be said, however, that it is all illumination in these chapters. There are two problems—both of them fundamental—which seem to elude even the careful attempts at formulation which Dr MacCurdy aims at. They are the problems of (1) Psychic Energy, and (2) the Relation of Instinct and Instinct-motivations to Intelligence. Dr MacCurdy is very insistent that instinct itself is not energy. "It is often assumed, I think erroneously, that instincts have energy in themselves. But they are simply modes of behaviour in the presence of generic situations. Faced with a certain type of emergency, the organism responds in accordance with its instinct pattern. A pattern has no energy; the latter comes from the organism. An instinct directs energy; it does not create it" (p. 263). To be demonstrable, he argues, energy must work against resistance, and accordingly Dr MacCurdy finds that only unconscious motivations are capable of directing energy, for they work against resistance and "assume the form of some substituted symbolic outlet"; thus, "the all-important dynamic elements are unconscious ideas charged with instinctive energy, *i.e.* unconscious instinct-motivations." But, on Dr MacCurdy's own theory, there is a time in mental development when there is no unconscious ("it is probably incorrect to think of the mentation of the child at this age as either conscious or unconscious. He has only a larval consciousness and imagination," p. 174), and it is the spontaneous repression of the Oedipus trend, together with similar processes, that actually creates the unconscious for the first time (p. 295). Either, then, there must already be mental energy involved in repression and the creation of the unconscious, or else this is a purely non-psychological process. In the former case it cannot be only "unconscious ideas charged with instinctive energy" which are the dynamic elements, and in the

latter case a surrender is made to a non-psychological method of interpreting all phenomena of repression. It would seem that behind instincts and instinct-motivations there is the "fundamental energy supply" which Jung formulates as "Libido" (p. 46). (Incidentally Jung definitely disavows in *Psychological Types* the interpretation which Dr MacCurdy puts upon Libido as a "general vital force, an *élan vital*." In his definition of Libido Jung states: "Neither do I understand libido as a psychic force, a misunderstanding that has led many critics astray. I do not hypostatize the concept of energy, but employ it as a concept denoting intensity or value.") In that case it is incorrect to speak of "unconscious sex energy" (p. 371) and of "any one of the instinct groups as the source of this energy" (p. 372). That which directs energy, but has none in itself, cannot be the source of energy. Dr MacCurdy cannot have instinct as "a pattern" which "has no energy," and at the same time maintain that "unconscious ideas charged with instinctive energy" are the "all-important dynamic elements." Indeed, on Dr MacCurdy's definition of instincts, they clearly belong to structural, and not dynamic, psychology; and the dynamic problem in connection with instincts would be to determine whence and what the energy is that urges libido in greater or less intensity into the channels of the instincts.

The second problem must be only briefly referred to. An 'instinct-motivation'—which is Dr MacCurdy's alternative to the Freudian 'wish'—arises when man makes use of abstract thought, ideas, as tools with which his instincts can work (p. 259). But how comes it about that the instincts find "abstract thought and ideas" lying ready to hand, much as the simians find sticks or stones? They differ from tools or instruments in being the fabrication of the same mind that is the operator through instinct; they are not provided *ab extra* to facilitate the development of instincts into instinct-motivations. We are forced to the conclusion that Dr MacCurdy's formulation of instinct as a 'pattern,' devoid of energy, and apparently also of cognitive elements, is treacherously simple. Unless instinct is both tendency and, at least potentially, apprehension, it seems to be a term which might be usefully omitted from psychology. Indeed, the fruitfulness of Dr MacCurdy's discussion in this last section is largely due to the fact that he disregards his own self-denying ordinance, and treats instincts as dynamic psychic units.

J. CYRIL FLOWER.

*Psychology and Morals: An Analysis of Character.* By J. A. HADFIELD. Methuen & Co., Ltd. Pp. vii + 186. Price 6s. net.

No one could be better fitted than Dr Hadfield to carry out the task he has attempted. The object of this book, as stated in the preface, is "to set out facts and principles revealed by modern psychology, especially in its application to nervous disease, some knowledge of which is of vital importance to all who, like parents, teachers, clergy, and general practitioners, are called upon to give practical direction and advice to individuals in regard to actual problems of life and conduct." Dr Hadfield has done this with directness, with lucidity, with that indefinable attractiveness which differentiates the readable book from the dull book, and with, at times, the redeeming savour of a very pretty wit. He has written a book which will be frankly unacceptable to the con-



ventional. The conventional moralist will wish that he had made it less acceptable to the psychoanalyst; and the conventional psychoanalyst will regret that it is not more unacceptable to the moralist. This latter consideration is perhaps irrelevant, as no psychoanalyst considers himself conventional.

Dr Hadfield classifies failures of conduct as 'nervous' disease, moral disease and sin. He discusses the influence of 'self-phantasy' on behaviour, the action of 'the Ideal as Stimulus of the Will,' self-realisation, sublimation, and other kindred topics. As those who are familiar with his lectures and writings would expect, the author's point of view corresponds mainly to the advanced wing of academic psychologists, as represented by McDougall. Dr Hadfield repudiates rigid ethical conceptions of good and evil—"the 'flapper' of fifty is an evil woman," is one of the jester's touches—he describes evil as "mis-directed impulse": but throughout the book, despite these pronouncements, there is the undercurrent of a certain moral absolutism. The following extract from the chapter on "The Ideal as Stimulus of the Will" gives the keynote of the whole volume:

The will, we have observed, can be aroused by an ideal to fulfil that ideal. There are thousands of ideals presented to the mind every day, and it is out of these that the self "chooses" those which it thinks potent for its purpose. What we call "choice" is the judgment, after deliberation, as to whether this ideal or that will be most conducive to our completeness. Our choice is always determined by this end, but the deliberation and judgment as to the best means to that end gives us the sense of freedom. Choice is thus concerned with means to an end, which is an activity of the intellect. Choice is then primarily an activity of intellect, reason, and judgment, not of the will. It is our judgment that decides which of the multitudinous ideals, true and false, will provide us with the means to satisfy that craving for fulfilment which impels us, like every organism, to seek its completeness—our ultimate end. The self having deliberated and chosen, we are under ordinary conditions free to pursue our ideal. Indeed, this is the only thing we are free to pursue; it is the only thing that can stimulate us, for it is the only thing that ultimately appears likely to produce happiness.

But it is obvious that these facts can be stated as well in terms of determinism as of freedom. The will is free to seek its completeness, it is free and usually able to move towards the ideal by which it may achieve it. At the same time, it is determined by the ideal and by the craving for fulfilment and self-realisation, which nothing but that ideal can satisfy. If the will is not aroused by such an ideal, it falls victim to the dominance of the impulse of the moment (p. 80).

In a book so full of value and interest, there is only room for criticism of a secondary nature: or perhaps we should say that serious criticism will come from extremists in either camp. We may, however, take up a few minor points.

Dr Hadfield is a little vague in his application of moral criteria. For instance he talks (p. 44) of "sin in a more strictly psychological sense." It is obvious of course that conflict may and frequently does involve the individual's ethical standard: but it is difficult to see how the term can be used in any but an ethical sense. Or again we are told that "Primary impulses are good"; surely the psychologist should resist the attempt to apply ethical values to the instinctive life? It is not enough to infer that primary impulses cannot be bad. It is necessary to state categorically that they are a-moral, or at any rate outside the range of ethical values.

In his discussion of phantasy the author seems to have introduced a good deal of ambiguity by a somewhat arbitrary limitation of the term. To most of us "The Ideal" should be classed as a phantasy—progressive and inspiratory, no doubt, but none the less a phantasy. To Jung, as we all know, phantasy

is the mother of possibilities. But to Dr Hadfield phantasy is the antithesis of the ideal—an exclusively regressive factor, consisting of compensatory and Narcissian elements only. On p. 53 we read: "This early conception of ourselves which tends to be of an extravagant nature, is therefore repressed and forms a complex which we call a phantasy." And this brings us to the author's use of the term complex. On p. 25 we read: "When the complexes are recognised and are consciously inhibited from expression in *conduct*, we call it *restraint*: we speak of *suppression* when the complex is psychologically repugnant and voluntarily inhibited, when the process of inhibition is unconscious, we call it *repression*. It is important to recognise that repression is an unconscious process." Surely the day has passed when it is necessary to describe a complex as 'repressed'! The tendency among academic psychologists to widen the connotation of the term complex invariably leads to regrettable confusion. The real fact of the matter is that the academic psychologists prefer the short and simple word to their own more clumsy nomenclature 'mental dispositions,' 'constellations of ideas,' etc., which refer to conscious processes, and should not therefore be confused with complexes. Further ambiguities of terminology are connected with 'transference,' 'neurasthenia' and 'alcoholism.' In Chapter 14, we read: "The process described as re-birth may be otherwise described in terms of transference." Despite a footnote referring to the usual analytical significance of the term transference, this unduly wide use of it seems unfortunate.

Still more regrettable is the use of the term 'neurasthenia.' If this term is to be tolerated at all in scientific language, and if it is to have any nosological value, it can only be as the label for a syndrome sometimes described as hypoadrenia, and sometimes as toxic neurasthenia; but never as the description of an anxiety neurosis. Yet Dr Hadfield says on p. 27: "In *neurasthenia* the complex is deeply and effectively repressed...." The patient "sleeps profoundly, but without refreshment, and gets up in the morning more tired than he went to bed." Whereas to anxiety neurosis he attributes symptoms of "anxiety, tremor, sweating, distress of mind and terrifying dreams."

With regard to 'alcoholism,' the author uses the term as apparently synonymous with dipsomania: the antithesis to which is not chronic inebriety, but 'the drunkard.' The need for an aetiological and psychological classification of the various forms of alcoholism prompts us to protest against this very loose terminology. There is a special need for accuracy here, and some such classification as Coriat's should be adhered to, rather than arbitrary meanings applied to commonly used words.

Dr Hadfield has much to say on the important subject of Sublimation: but the point of most importance to the moralist, he seems to slur over. At the beginning of Chapter 21, he defines sublimation thus: "The process by which instinctive emotions are diverted from their original ends, and redirected to purposes satisfying to the individual and of value to the community." This is a much narrower definition than the Freudian one, which merely lays down "approved by society." Thus there remains a great range of human activity excluded from Hadfield's definition, but included in the other. The author has support in many quarters for his narrower conception of the function; but he does not adhere to it, for on the next page he describes the play of the young as a sublimation, and further proceeds to remark "Any kind of activity may serve as a sublimation." We would wish a clearer and more consistent pronouncement on this theme from one so competent to give it.

The analysts will protest against the author's condemnation of dream interpretation. They will say—and we sympathise with them—that Dr Hadfield's picture of *ex cathedra* interpretation is a caricature. If it is not a complete travesty the fault lies with certain analysts that we wot of, and not with the method itself. Would the writer be prepared to dispense entirely with the study of dreams as a means of contact with his own unconscious? The question "expects the answer No," but it is justified by the unreserved nature of his criticism of the use of dream material.

The volume ends with a succinct conclusion based on the three cardinal counsels: Know thyself; accept thyself; be thyself. It is a book which should challenge and stimulate every reader who is not impenetrably swathed in an accepted system of psychology or morals.

H. CRICHTON MILLER.

*Our Phantastic Emotions.* An attempt to suggest a fresh standpoint from which to view human activities. By T. KENRICK SLADE, B.Sc., with a Foreword by Dr S. FERENCZI. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. Pp. xii + 179. Price 6s. 6d.

This book consists essentially of an attempt to consider the bearing upon our emotions of psycho-analytic views concerning infantile 'omnipotence' (or, as the author prefers to call it, 'supremacy'), with particular reference to Ferenczi's exposition in his paper on "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality" (published in his *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*, translated by Ernest Jones). It is in certain respects an excellent piece of work and shows its author to be possessed of acute psychological insight. Nevertheless to in experienced readers (and we gather that it is to such that it is primarily addressed) it is likely to be a source of confusion and misunderstanding as well as of enlightenment. The author's almost exclusive preoccupation with the "Unconscious Phantasy of Supremacy" (it is because of their relation to this phantasy that our emotions are spoken of as 'phantastic') is, of course, legitimate enough in itself; and the work is undoubtedly of value as an attempt to trace the influence of this phantasy (if we call it such) throughout the development and structure of the emotional life. But since appeal is made "to a rapidly increasing audience" for whom "no intimate knowledge of modern psychology is necessary," it should have been explicitly stated that the subject matter is treated only from one point of view and that there are other aspects of equal importance that are here left untouched. As it is, the only adequate indication of the limited standpoint here adopted is to be found in the Foreword by Ferenczi; it is to be hoped that readers will carefully note this warning and thus prevent some serious misconceptions with regard to Psycho-analysis, which the book might otherwise produce upon those who are not already familiar with the subject.

The chief defect of the book in so far as it aims at "relating the fundamental conceptions of analytical psychology with the established facts regarding 'biological' man" (it is true that here—but here only—the author makes the qualification "more especially with regard to the bearing upon our emotions of the Unconscious Phantasy of Supremacy," p. 6), is its lack of anything approaching adequate consideration of the sexual tendencies in the psych o

analytic sense. It is significant that the Oedipus complex is only mentioned once, almost on the last page of the book, that the words 'Father' and 'Mother' are absent from a fairly complete index and that even when certain acute and illuminating remarks are made on the influence of sex, there is a failure to point out the deeper significance of the unconscious factors; as when on pp. 122, 123 in rightly emphasising the sexual elements in the lure of large towns, the author passes by in silence the—to the psycho-analyst—obviously important significance of the word 'metropolis.'

This serious deficiency of the book as a general treatment of 'analytical psychology' has seemed worth stressing because of the indubitable ability shown by the author when on the more congenial ground of the 'supremacy phantasy.' We suspect, moreover, that he is not really aware of the magnitude of his omission and that he, to some extent, suffers from the same misconceptions as those which his work is likely to induce in the unwary reader; for he is in general rather prone to pass over important differences in a somewhat airy way, as when he seems to think that whether we are to explain a certain phenomenon by telepathy (Flammarion), "primitive sympathy" (McDougall) or "herd instinct" (Trotter) is really little more than a question of the "vocabulary we may prefer to use" (p. 91).

By way of more constructive criticism, we would like to question whether Mr Slade is right in supposing that "the prototype of all adult curiosity is to be found in the infant's instinctive search for fresh stimuli, when it is bored" (p. 57), or that "the mere fact of a new mode of functioning would in itself be pleasing" (p. 88). These statements may perhaps be true in certain ways, but it is clear that if taken in any ultimate sense, they conflict with the main tenor of psycho-analytical teaching, according to which the organism is endeavouring in the last resort to attain a stimulus-free condition. Nor do they perhaps harmonise quite easily with Mr Slade's own (psycho-analytically sound) views with regard to the primitively hostile attitude of the infant to its environment (p. 35).

If the limitations of the book as here indicated are borne in mind, it will serve a useful purpose as constituting a more complete and systematic study of the ego-trends than has been available hitherto in English. The processes by which the primitive egocentricity of the infant gradually gives place to the relatively socialised outlook of the adult are traced in a lucid and illuminating manner. Interesting sidelights are also constantly being thrown upon dark places by the way. Even the author's bolder flights of speculation, as when he regards artistic appreciation as an adult form of the phantasy of universal possession (pp. 40 ff.), though they may not compel immediate consent, are full of suggestiveness. His more modest contributions to theory also have much to recommend them. As examples of these we may take his explanation of the dislike of loneliness (attributed by Trotter to the operation of the herd instinct) to the fact that the absence of older human beings—particularly, we may suppose, the mother—makes the infant's 'magic gestures' (to use Ferenczi's term) inoperative, so that a connection becomes established between loneliness and impotence (p. 27). Again, there is an interesting suggestion which may throw some light upon the mysterious phantasies of intra-uterine life. "It is a not uncommon experience to awake to a realisation of a degree of comfort that we have just lost; tranquil happiness is often most strongly appreciated only after some factor has arisen which has deprived us of our content. In some such way the unconscious memory of inter-uterine comfort may stimulate the infant

without any necessity for supposing the existence of consciousness during the period" (p. 33).

In general, with certain important qualifications, the book is to be recommended as a useful and suggestive treatise on the subject of the emotional life from the developmental point of view.

J. C. FLÜGEL.

*The Elements of Scientific Psychology.* By KNIGHT DUNLAP, Professor of Experimental Psychology in the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Illustrated. St Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1922. Pp. 368.

However sceptical one may be as to the motivation of the word 'scientific' in the title of this new textbook, he will be forced to admit that the volume helps on the flow of soul, gushing perennially from American psychologists, scientific or merely opulent. "So many men, so many minds," and each with the more or less successfully repressed impulse to put it in a book, until books shall be only museum curiosities!

The 'regular' psychologist will see occasion to give thanks that our present author defines psychology as the study of the totality of conscious adjustments or conscious processes (= mind), and the present reviewer, tired of seeing social physiology pretend to be psychology, knows not where a better definition may be found. The book is designed, says its author, for the specific purpose of introducing the student to the elements of psychology, and this and more it readily accomplishes. Deliberately omitted are discussions of learning; of child, animal, social and abnormal psychology; of sleep and dreams; and of applications to education, and the arts and industries; and the author hopes that the readers of his book will "have available a volume or a series of volumes prepared by specialists in these topics, and presenting them from the scientific point of view. No such volume or series of volumes exists at present (!) but we may well expect it in the near future." Here again, it is plain, we see exposed to the more or less vulgar view Prof. Dunlap's little complex whose symbol is 'scientific.' We shall greet his scientific volume or series of volumes with great heartiness.

Like not a few other textbooks of psychology, this one seems to use up relatively too much space discussing sensation in its various relations. Only 56 pages are devoted to the thought-process and the feeling-process combined. Four pages are all that the author requires to set forth an introduction to the empirical self or 'me,' which is nearly a quarter less than the space used in the description of the living cell. Chapter iv, 17 pages devoted to the somatic, visceral and labyrinthine senses, is an excellent summary of up-to-date information on this interesting matter. The illustrations are only 31 in number but what there are are satisfactory for the most part.

The book is unusually well printed on good paper, and measures seven by nine and three-quarter inches.

Altogether the work is a credit to its author and merits wide use as an elementary textbook.

GEORGE VAN NESS DEARBORN.

*The Common Neuroses—their Treatment by Psychotherapy.* By T. A. Ross, M.D., F.R.C.P.E. London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1923. Pp. xi + 256. Price 12s. 6d. net.

Our feeling after reading this book is that there may be much to criticise but perhaps in the end little to quarrel with. As Dr Ross says in his preface, it is written for general practitioners not for specialists, and for those to whom it is addressed it is a good book. However much the specialist in psychological medicine may criticise some of the main premises on which Dr Ross bases his description of the common neuroses, the methods of treatment advocated will, if adopted by the general practitioner, make for increased sanity and understanding in the handling of neurotic patients; they are methods which, apart from theoretical consideration, provide a broad base upon which all intending specialists may build, although the resulting edifice will vary according to individual attitudes towards psychological problems.

The book is written by a successful, and rightly successful clinician, a man of great personality, great enthusiasm and great gifts of understanding and sympathy; and the criticism is probably a just one, that because of these very qualities, he has produced theories of the psychological meaning of the neuroses which will seem to many of us so wide meshed that many of the baffling and difficult problems have slipped through. Is it unfair to say that the theories are perhaps too much based upon the interpretation of the meaning of the successes, and too little upon the meaning of the failures?

For Dr Ross the emotional reaction and the conditioned reflex are sufficient to account for all the phenomena of the neuroses. Surely it would be truer to say that these are labels which may be applied to the phenomena of the neuroses, and true also to say that the real meaning of the symptoms is not necessarily inherent in the label.

The neuroses are classified according to the mode of faulty reaction to the difficulties of life:

(1) "Over-reaction gives rise to those symptoms which have in the past been labelled neurasthenic....Of late the tendency has been to call them anxiety neurosis or anxiety hysteria."

(2) "Meeting difficulties by under-reaction or by failure to react at all gives rise to those symptoms which were formerly called hysterical, and which now in the Freudian terminology are called conversion hysteria."

(3) "Meeting difficulties by attempting to ignore them gives rise to obsessions and compulsions; and the collection of symptoms so produced may be called the Compulsion Neurosis" (pp. 25-26).

Again, surely theories with a very wide mesh! Having in mind the hundreds of weary hours spent in trying to unravel the problem of the compulsion neurotic, it will seem to many of us too big a blow to our intellectual pride to accept "meeting difficulties by attempting to ignore them" as an adequate interpretation of the symptoms of this hydra-headed neurosis.

Although avowedly a disciple of Déjerine, Dr Ross still admits much that is Freudian in his interpretation of symptoms. For him psycho-analysis is not so much wrong as inexpedient; his main difficulty in accepting the Freudian position as regards theory is the dynamic conception that energy is bound up in the repressed complex and through analysis released for more useful purposes. Dr Ross, however, advocates the inculcation of faith and hope as the

sheet anchor of treatment. The value of faith and hope to the neurotic is surely evidence for, and not against, the dynamic conception of Freud.

To repeat, there may be and is much to criticise in the book, but little on the practical side to quarrel with. It is a book which will help many to an understanding of their neurotic patients and to wiser dealing with them, and even in carping, criticising fellow specialists it may help to counteract that tendency to myopia with which we are always threatened.

MAURICE B. WRIGHT.

*Insanity and the Criminal Law.* By WILLIAM A. WHITE, M.D. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923. Pp. ix + 281. 8vo. Price \$2.50.

"For a long period, for ages, the criminal was a man who *did* a certain act.... Now it is realised that in order to commit a crime a certain particular state of mind is necessary" (p. 265)—and, we read in this book an excellent series of cases which show how blind the Law (or rather legal procedure) can be to the importance of these 'particular states of mind.'

Out of his large experience the author makes certain proposals for amending the procedure in cases where insanity is put forward by the defence. The suggestion that will commend itself to the layman as the simplest, and one that should have been adopted long ago, is that empowering the judge to call expert witnesses who may prepare written reports which are to be read in court and on which the experts may be cross-examined and the expert witnesses must examine the accused. This gives the expert witness a chance of making an uninterrupted statement of his view of the case and would tend to eliminate the 'hypothetical question,' which in fact is no hypothetical question at all. Considering the unfairness of the present system "the astonishing thing is not that the medical expert testimony is so bad, but that it is so good" (p. 58).

On the topic of Responsibility the author thinks that the standpoint of the Law is considered too exclusively and the delinquent is not considered enough (p. 96). At first one is inclined to agree with him but on reflection things are not so bad as they at first appear. The most important attribute of the Law is its certainty, if unconscious motives can be put forward in the Courts regularly and with success the criteria would become too complicated for the popular judgment, the Courts would lose the popular confidence they now enjoy and the neurotic satisfaction in Order, till then enjoyed by civilised society, would give way to an anxiety which might lead to graver instability. Unconscious motives cannot be regarded as other than uncertain by the public.

So long as man nourishes a sense of unconscious guilt so long will punishment be demanded by the public; but as a lunatic asylum is regarded as a prison the decision to certify instead of to hang is not likely to meet with insurmountable opposition. The question whether the Courts will realise the importance of the 'states of mind' is another matter. The author does not stress the danger of apparent arbitrariness in decisions if individual considerations are taken into account. In spite of these rather theoretical objections the practical value of the book stands on its own merits; the case histories are detailed and the discussion of them practical.

JOHN RICKMAN.

*Talks on Psychotherapy.* By WILLIAM BROWN, M.A., M.D. (Oxon.), D.Sc., M.R.C.P. (Lond.): University of London Press, Ltd. 1923. Pp. 96. Price 2s. 6d. net.

In these "talks," originally given as extempore addresses at King's College, London, "an attempt is made to sum up in broad outline the present-day position in psychotherapy" (p. 5).

The author sees in *analysis* but the necessary stepping-stone to more important *synthesis*. Mental analysis recovers the lost past, transference—"the emotional *rapport* which springs up between patient and physician" (p. 38)—often assisting. Intellectual and ethical difficulties arise and the physician then by "psycho-therapeutic conversations" seeks through auto-gnosis a re-synthesis of the patient's mind. Intellectual conviction and emotional acceptance of the new or regained knowledge are not necessarily accompanied by full power to live anew, but suggestion treatment, including auto-suggestion, now applied, will often supply the needed impetus to the patient to take his stand, consciously or unconsciously, upon the "general belief in a friendly universe" and to add self-control to self-knowledge (pp. 86-93).

Suggestion should be given in "a waking or semi-waking state... treatment by *hypnotic* suggestion is a bad method of treatment" and should be used only in "special situations... where every other method has failed." Yet for "reassociation and the recovery of lost memories," especially in hysterical cases, hypnosis is valuable; while abreaction, secured through hypnosis, results in complete recovery provided due care is taken to re-associate the recovered memory with the waking consciousness of the patient (pp. 26-35). The method of abreaction, originally used and described by Brener and Freud, is now but seldom mentioned in Freudian literature, and the present tendency is to explain the beneficial effect of abreaction in terms of transference. A case is given in which cure by abreaction resulted when there was no possibility of transference and the author restates his conviction that "abreaction by itself has therapeutic value due, no doubt, to the reassociation of the mind and of the nervous system which it involves (pp. 36-41).

Turning from these more practical considerations to theoretical bases, we find psychology defined as "the science of the mind which considers the mind as a sequence of mental processes in time." In the swing back to the definition enshrined in the name *psychology* the present tendency is to replace "mind" by something "mental." How the mind works, rather than what the mind is, is the immediate problem. Further, "mental processes," unqualified, is too broad a basis, for "mental processes have *values*: logical values, aesthetic values, ethical values. And these values, although they have reference to mental processes in time, are themselves out of time, and in dealing with them we have to pass beyond the condition of causality itself—we have to pass into metaphysics." Here the free-will dilemma confronts the medical psychologist. Psychology as a science necessarily holds to the postulate of determinism but "this merely shows how inadequate psychology is as a complete explanation of mental process." Here too we have "one fundamental difference" between Freudian "psychoanalytic" psychology and Jungian "analytic" psychology. "Freud is a determinist... Jung is not. Jung considers that mind as such is prospective; it does not work in a merely mechanical or deterministic way." Our author, while finding himself more often in agreement with Freud than



with Jung, here finds Jung in the right, but considers that "he has not gone far enough," and adds: "In his writings there is a vague mixture of science and philosophy which can only be satisfactorily replaced by a more thorough-going metaphysical investigation or treatment" (pp. 76-84). From which we gather that to a sound knowledge of medicine and psychology the mental specialist must add metaphysics or at least a working philosophy of life founded upon free-will. In agreement with this the book closes with a section on "Psychotherapy and the re-education of the Will" in which the author argues that the *will* of M. Coué, that loses in the conflict with *imagination*, is not "will" at all but only "wish"; for in "true or complete volition there can never be such conflict, since belief is an essential constituent in true volition" (p. 95).

On the other hand, the author seeks to travel as far as possible—perhaps a little farther—on the well trodden road of explanation in terms of matter and motion. In criticising the term "functional nervous disease" he argues that whenever there is functional disturbance there is always structural disturbance, in the form of altered synaptic resistance or changed molecular structure. This is probably good scientific explanation, but we find difficulty with the verdict: "It is absolutely inconceivable that any system...so complex as the human brain can remain structurally normal and function abnormally"; for, if mind be not matter in motion but something apart from and behind the chemical and physical changes of nuclear protoplasm in cerebral neurons, it is, we feel, quite possible to conceive a disordered or diseased mind that fails to use aright a perfectly ordered and physically and chemically fit nervous system (pp. 17-26). Further, while it may be convenient for psychotherapeutic practice to see in "mental and spiritual healing...but...different aspects of the same thing," it is possible that "the mind contains the spirit in itself" (p. 14) is only true in the sense that brain, being apparently a prerequisite for mind as we know it, may be said to "contain" mind. It is still tenable philosophically that the body-mind duad with its "psycho-physical powers" (p. 23) is but the tool of an immaterial extra-mental being whose failure in the use thereof sends him to the doctor as patient. It is possible that clothing, body, mind are successive sheaths shielding and obscuring a real being known to ancient philosophy as Spirit and to modern psychology as the pure Ego. All of which goes to show the difficulty of keeping psychotherapy within the bounds of medicine and psychology and the truth of our author's contention that "just as, on the one side, psychology is closely allied to biology and physiology and cannot be adequately studied without reference to all that we know in biology and physiology of the instructive basis of behaviour, so, on the other side, we cannot do full justice to the mind unless we are prepared to pass beyond psychology to philosophy and to consider the implications of knowledge, of aesthetic appreciation, of moral obligation or responsibility" (p. 81).

R. J. BARTLETT.

*Suggestion and Mental Analysis.* By WILLIAM BROWN, M.A., M.D. (Oxon.), D.Sc., M.R.C.P. (Lond.). Third Edition. University of London Press, Ltd. 1923. Pp. 176. Price 3s. 6d. net.

That this "elementary and non-technical account of the relation between...suggestion and auto-suggestion on the one hand, and mental analysis

(including the special Freudian system of psycho-analysis) on the other," has already reached its third edition would seem to indicate that there was real need of such an introduction to the voluminous literature of psychopathology and psychotherapy and that the author's contention "that a sound system of psychotherapy should satisfy the more moderate claims of both modes of thought" has been well received.

The first edition consisted of nine chapters on the treatment of the psychoneuroses by mental analysis, suggestion and hypnosis, and three, on "the philosophical background" containing a critical exposition of Bergson's philosophical views. In the second edition a chapter entitled "The Practice of Psychotherapy" was added "to emphasize the fact of the incompleteness of present theories of suggestion and the need of further unbiased investigation, and also to make clear the need of specialised training in neurology and psychiatry for the practice of psycho-therapy." In the third we find the always welcome addition—an index.

R. J. BARTLETT.

*Some Contributions to Child Psychology.* By MARGARET DRUMMOND, M.A.  
Edward Arnold & Co. Pp. viii + 151. Price 4s. 6d. net.

In this book Miss Drummond has set herself the important task of showing parents and teachers how to help young children to adapt themselves to the life of the community into which they are born. She states in the preface that she owes much to the work of Freud, Jung and others, and this is evident from her treatment of the subject. Impressed by the fact that a neurosis is ultimately an escape from reality and that the foundation for it is laid in early childhood, she considers that "psychologists and educationists should reconsider the whole question of the nature of imagination in childhood and the best means of training it." In this book Miss Drummond is concerned with the training of the imagination rather than with its nature. She points out the importance of providing suitable occupations for a child and suggests that 'self-enclosed' activities should be discouraged as far as possible. "To be of value, imagination must be in vital contact with reality" (p. 82). Fairy tales are undesirable partly because they put wrong ideals before the child, partly because they hinder him in his instinctive search for the laws which govern his world. "In the early years the pull of magic is backwards not forwards" (p. 117). "The child from the first stands for the principle of reality....By our false education we lead him to worship false gods; we give him fairy stories when he asks for truth; we encourage him to find in phantasy a satisfaction which we basely tell him reality can not give" (p. 120). And when we ask why we feel the child needs fairy tales, we are told: "It is we who want the fairy tales, not the children. In their credulity we find vicarious satisfaction" (p. 112).

The book is, moreover, not confined to the training of the imagination. It also contains sound advice on a number of other problems, such as the self-assertiveness and the baseless fears of little children. In all these the results of modern psychological investigations are freely used and sufficient quotations are given to show the reader where he can go for more information. Here and there one feels that definitions are badly needed. This is particularly the case with terms like imagination and phantasy which easily lend themselves

to inconsistent interpretation. A bibliography would also have been helpful. These are, however, minor points. Like its predecessors the book makes very pleasant reading. It contains few technical terms and each point is illustrated by anecdotes from the personal observation of the author. It has not much to offer to the specialist, but should be a real help both to the parent and to the young teacher.

I. B. SAXBY.

*The Mind in Action.* A Study of Human Interests. By GEORGE H. GREEN. University of London Press. 1923. Pp. 168. Price 3s. 6d. net.

In the preface of this interesting attempt to deal popularly and briefly with "the dynamic conception of mind" the author lays it down that "what you cannot explain in everyday language you do not know." Anyone who has listened to Professor Eddington endeavouring to explain "in everyday language" the concepts of physics in the light of the theory of relativity will probably have had occasion to doubt this plausible assertion. And from the other point of view, anyone who has listened to the popular explanations of political, social and economic issues that are so fluently given in "everyday language" may, without undue cynicism, have come to the conclusion that it is precisely what you do not know that you can most easily explain "in everyday language." Interesting as this little volume is—in spite of its breathless style—it suffers all through from the over-simplifications that are necessary in the attempt of the author to live up to his self-imposed test of knowledge. For example, the notion that instinct is a form of active interest may be usefully maintained, and valuable deductions may be drawn from it. But the notion becomes misleading when it is utilised for such plausible but inaccurate statements as the following: "When the dinner gong sounds while you are making a speech, you know that you may as well end your speech at once. All the interest that was directed towards you is now flowing in another direction altogether" (p. 26). Nevertheless the book is a genuine and not altogether unsuccessful attempt to give an outline of the mind at work in the simplest possible terms, and as an introduction to psychology for those who are wholly unaccustomed to the psychological point of view it may well be found helpful and suggestive. The inevitable danger is that the confident simplifications of mental processes which are required by the author's aim will tend to give the impression that a pictorial and notional representation of the mind in action is a much more accurate and reliable account of the extremely complex thing itself than is actually the case.

J. CYRIL FLOWER.

*Mother and Son.* By C. GASQUOINE HARTLEY. London: Eveleigh Nash and Grayson, 1923. Pp. 318. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This volume does not claim to be a scientific contribution to the complex subject of the 'Parent-Child' relationship; but neither is it merely another of the many compilations flung on the market by writers whose *flair* for expository opportunities is entirely journalistic. For Mrs Hartley has written

thoughtfully and independently on this and allied topics before the so-called New Psychology disturbed the minds of advanced discussion circles; and her books have, in addition, been characterised by a wide range of familiarity with the work of contemporary authorities.

Indeed the main flaw in the present volume may be ascribed to her effort to maintain this same standard of far-flung eeclecticism in matters psychological. Her obvious solicitude to omit no reference bearing on the theme discussed, has blinded her to the fact that fundamental divergencies in psychological opinion cannot be composed by the simple expedient of textual dovetailing and that the result is likely to be rather bewildering to readers who are hardy enough to follow up the numerous references to authorities holding strongly conflicting and often mutually incompatible views on the problems in question.

Mrs Hartley shows every sign of being able to think for herself and she would have been better advised to settle the question of her own psychological affinities and restrict her references to accessible passages from original authorities rather than to load her Bibliography with second-hand and often inferior presentations of their views.

Careful sub-editing of her book from this point of view would greatly enhance its value as a spirited piece of popular exposition written in an idiom which will appeal to the class of readers for whom it is designedly written.

JAMES GLOVER.

*The Birth of the Psyche.* By L. CHARLES BAUDOIN. Translated by Fred Rothwell. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1923. Pp. xxii + 211.

In his Preface to the English edition of *The Birth of the Psyche* M. Baudouin warns the reader that the book is "anything but a learned treatise on psychology or psycho-analysis." It is "just a tiny corner of the heart, a little music of a very intimate nature." The author desires to appear in the rôle not of the scientist but of the poet, and he devotes several pages to the discussion of "the marriage of art and science."

In the twenty-four sketches which make up the book and which, he tells us, were jotted down just as and when they came, he has tried to revive impressions of his early childhood. He gives us glimpses into the mind of a sensitive, egotistic child, happier in the life of phantasy and the warm intimacy of the home (he was a much-loved only child), than in the company of other boys, from whose rough games he shrank, though his vaulting imagination enabled him to take the lead when muscular prowess was not required of him.

Several of the chapters contain impressions of his earliest school-days; in others we see him leading his procession of paper ducks through the rooms of his home, dressing up in the faded silks and ribbons of the lumber-room, or frightening himself with the shadow of his own head in the lamp-light. He has not forgotten that childish days were not all golden but were clouded by mysterious fears. In "The Terrors of Sleep" and "Steam Rollers" he expresses something of the agony of dread which a little child may go through in silence. M. Baudouin says that in writing these sketches he has "forgotten what psychology and psycho-analysis have taught him," but he admits what is indeed obvious, that this knowledge has influenced his vision. Those familiar

with psycho-analytic theory will read much that is significant between the lines of every chapter, even where it is less directly conveyed than in those on "Parricide" and "The Anguish of Love." We see the child's sense of omnipotence as he watches the snow-flakes, "the little white souls" (he is already a poet!), "See, there's one which is now in America. . . . Its name is Camaralzaman; I call it by name and it comes and settles on my finger." Or again, to what superstitious practices of the race is this laughable, yet pitiful, scene a parallel: "I had got into the habit of crouching down like a toad, and jumping about the room. Whenever I played this game, I was sure my father would tell me to stop, after a few leaps. And so, no sooner had mamma gone out and I had begun to feel anxious, than I decided mentally that I would pretend to be a toad and would count my leaps. If my father protested before the twelfth leap—or the fifteenth—this would mean that mamma had got run over. If I went beyond the fatal number. . . . then she was safe" (p. 210).

It is perhaps inevitable that something of the charm of the original should be lost in the translation of a book of this kind. In Mr Rothwell's translation a somewhat stilted turn is given at times to the sentences, which weakens the impression of naive childish thinking. Such words as 'revivescence' or 'droplet' strike strangely on an English ear. Possibly also some English readers may regret the occasional lapse of the author of the book into rather obvious sentiment—a certain tendency to dot the i's and cross the t's of a pathetic or edifying reflection. But they will appreciate the atmosphere he conveys, the insight into the child's mind and the delicate humour that plays over the book.

CECIL BAINES.

## ABSTRACT.

*Eine Teufelsneurose im siebzehnten Jahrhundert*, by Sigmund Freud.  
(*Imago*, 1923, No. 1.)

In this paper Freud discusses in the light of psychoanalytic theory a case of "possession by the devil," the record of which has been put into Freud's hands by Dr R. Payer-Thurn, Director of the Fideikommissbibliothek in Vienna. This record is contained in a manuscript which came from a place of pilgrimage named Mariazell, and tells the story of an artist, Christoph Haitzmann, who made a compact with the devil and was released by the aid of the Blessed Virgin at the chapel of Mariazell in the year 1677. The manuscript consists of a Latin compilation by a monk, giving an account of the case and its miraculous cure, and a fragment of the artist's German diary. A coloured title-page shows the scene of the compact and of the release, and on another page are eight coloured pictures of subsequent apparitions of the devil. These pictures are affirmed to be copies of Haitzmann's original paintings.

The record states that on September 5th, 1677, Christoph Haitzmann came to Mariazell, seeking to be set free from a compact with the devil which, he said, he had made nine years previously and written in his blood and under the terms of which he must shortly pass, body and soul, into the power of the fiend. He was sent to Mariazell by the priest of Pottenbrunn who related in a letter how the artist had been seized with convulsions while in church and had confessed, upon examination, to having made the diabolical compact. (In passing, Freud comments on the possibility of this examination having 'suggested' the idea of a compact.) At Mariazell Haitzmann prayed and did penance, and on the 8th of September, the birthday of the Virgin Mary, there appeared to him in the Chapel the devil in the form of a dragon and gave back the deed written in blood, which the artist duly delivered to the monks who were present but to whom the devil was invisible.

Feeling himself to be set free he went to Vienna, to his sister's house, but on October 11th his seizures returned, and he was again tormented by visions and temptations by the devil. In May, 1678, he presented himself once more at Mariazell and confessed to having made a still earlier compact written in ink, and likewise binding him to the devil. Once more the Virgin came to his help; he was released, and the agreement was returned to him. This time he felt that all was well and he was received into a religious Order in which he died at peace in the year 1700. We learn, however, that, even after the second exorcism, he was at times tempted to give himself again to the devil but, by the grace of God, he resisted.

Such is the story of Christoph Haitzmann, artist and neurotic.

In giving his analytic interpretation Freud observes that he is writing for those who believe in the psychoanalytic theory. To those who do not his explanation is likely to appear improbable and unnecessarily subtle. Further, he is careful to state that he believes in the good faith both of the monks who made the record and of the artist himself. The fact that the latter doubtless wrote the two compacts and took them to the Chapel while in an abnormal mental state does not imply that he was a dissimulator

The motive of the compact is first considered. There is no indication that Haitzmann was influenced, as others who made similar agreements are said to have been, by a thirst for power, wealth or the pleasures of the senses. We learn that he made the compact when in a state of depression, following on his father's death. He found himself falling into melancholy and inhibited in the pursuit of his calling, so that he was in a condition of destitution. The terms of the agreement are peculiar: it simply says that he affirms himself to be the son ("leibeigener Sohn") of Satan and that in nine years' time he will deliver himself to the devil, body and soul. There is apparently no mention of what the devil is to do for him in return. Freud conjectures that for the space of nine years he was to take the place of the patient's father, to act, that is, as a father-substitute. He argues that, just as the idea of God is, according to the psychoanalytic doctrine, derived from the figure of the father as he appears to the child, so the notion of the devil springs from the hate side of the ambivalent relation between parent and child. The record of a case such as this shows, in clear relief, mental processes which can only be reached in modern times by the analysis of neurotic symptoms and the free associations of patients. The conjecture seems to be borne out in the case of Haitzmann by the fact that we are expressly told that after his father's death he fell into a state of melancholy. Freud has shown elsewhere ("Trauer und Melancholie," *Sammlung kl. Schriften*, IV) that melancholia has its origin in the ambivalent conflict following upon the loss of the loved object.

If it be assumed that this was indeed the meaning of the compact other points in the record may be analysed. The sexual motive Freud holds to be represented in the number 9 (the compact for nine years), which is the number of months in the period of gestation, and by the fact that the devil frequently appeared in the male form but with the breasts of a female. In this apparition Freud sees a reaction against a repressed phantasy of the artist's, namely, that of bearing a child to his father—a phantasy arising out of a *feminine* attitude towards the father such as is often met with in the analysis of male patients. The reaction against the phantasy is due to the fear of castration (for the abandonment of the male rôle carries with it the loss of the male organ) and expresses itself in a new phantasy by which the feminine rôle is forced upon the father. In Haitzmann's visions this is symbolised by the female breasts upon the male figure. This feature may be over-determined and indicate a displacement of love from the mother to the father and a previous mother-fixation. It is to the Mother of God that he turns in his distress, and it is on her birthday that he is released from his compact.

The fragment of the artist's diary contains the account of the second phase of his illness, the period between the first and second exorcisms. He was once more tormented by apparitions, sometimes of the tempter, sometimes of Christ and the Virgin: all of these he regarded as manifestations of the Evil One.

Having emerged from his state of melancholy after the first deliverance, he became a prey at first to worldly and sensual visions; on rejecting these he was bidden by the heavenly visitants to forsake the world and become a hermit, the command being accompanied by promises of bliss and threats of damnation if he refused. Later, a sexual phantasy obsessed him, after which he fell into a trance, endured the torments of hell and heard a voice which told him he was being punished for his wicked thoughts. Some months later he returned, as we know, to Mariazell, was finally released from his compact and became a religious

This was the solution at once of the moral conflict and the problem of his material necessities. He had been unable to pursue his calling; possibly, as Freud suggests, the inhibition indicates remorse and self-punishment, or even a tardy obedience to his father who may have opposed his artistic career. It is probable that he belonged to that class of persons who are always dependent on others for their maintenance because of a fixation to the infantile situation at the mother's breast. But material necessity alone, without the inner conflict arising out of his relation, would not have driven him to sign his pact with the devil—in other words, would not have resulted in neurosis.

CECIL BAINES.



## NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS.

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Part I, 1923.

Prof. Freud contributes notes on the theory and practice of dream-interpretation. He touches on the technical question of how to set about collecting the dreamer's free associations in analysing a dream. The various elements in the dream may be taken according to their actual sequence, or some striking feature may be picked out and the dreamer required to give his associations to it, or he may be questioned about the events of the previous day which occur to him in connection with the dream, or, if he has some acquaintance with the technique, he may begin his associations at any point he likes.

The degree of resistance encountered in analysing a dream is of great importance. When the resistance is very strong, the analyst has to content himself with suggesting some symbolic interpretations. When it is less, the associations usually diverge widely from the manifest elements, only to converge again on the latent thoughts.

Freud distinguishes between dreams from above and dreams from below. The latter are due to the force of a repressed wish which seeks to break through from the Unconscious; the former, though reinforced by unconscious material, are rather of the nature of waking thoughts or purposes. In the latter case analysis generally aims at bringing the latent thoughts into line with those of waking life without paying attention to the unconscious factor.

In some analyses there is at times a curious cleavage between waking and dream thoughts, so that the dreams form a kind of continued story analogous to the workings of phantasy.

In interpreting dreams it must be remembered that they have first of all to be translated and judgment must be suspended till this is done. It is, says Freud, like reading a chapter of Livy: we must first find out what he relates, before we consider whether the narrative is historical or legendary. The analyst is warned against a "too great respect for the 'mysterious Unconscious,'" for the dream is a thought like any other, but reinforced from the Unconscious and subject to the dream-work which, as we know, includes distortion and secondary elaboration.

Freud mentions the so-called 'recovery dream,' which may indicate a hopeful adjustment on the part of the patient, but may be simply a 'convenience dream' expressing his desire to escape the painful analytic work.

When a conflict between ambivalent feelings is going on in the patient's mind, it is rash to jump to a conclusion from a single dream, or the dreams of a single night, as to the victory of one feeling or the other. Only by taking into consideration the whole situation, including the waking thoughts, can we guess how the battle is going.

Freud discusses the question: how far are dreams influenced by the 'suggestion' of the physician? This is a point frequently raised by sceptics in order to cast doubt on the results of analysis. As regards the *manifest content* it is obvious that, since the treatment belongs to the impressions of waking life and since these give rise to dreams, the dream is influenced by the analytic treatment. The *latent thoughts* also are susceptible to influence in so far as they consist of preconscious material which may contain the patient's reaction to the analyst's suggestions. The *mechanism* of dream-formation is however inaccessible to external influence and with regard to the unconscious wishes (which combine with the preconscious thoughts in the latent content) analytic experience shows that they cannot be suggested by the analyst. It may happen that in an analysis dreams which have reference to past situations in the dreamer's life appear only after certain analytic constructions have been put upon his symptoms and associations. Such dreams seem to confirm these constructions, but it is objected that, even when the patient believes that he is recalling actual experiences, he may be mistaken and they may have been suggested to him. It is

true that recollections carrying conviction are generally lacking, for that which is repressed comes only gradually into consciousness and moreover we may be dealing not with actual facts but with unconscious phantasies. Yet Freud's experience has led him to believe that these 'confirmatory' dreams are not produced simply by suggestions made in the analysis. The analysis is like a picture puzzle in which different pieces have to be fitted together and both patient and analyst have to wait and see how the constructions or recollections, taken together, yield the solution of the whole complicated problem. Moreover, patients may recollect dreams dating from before the analysis which lead to the same results as the dreams during treatment. It is however likely that repressed material comes to light more plainly in dreams in the course of analysis. In order to explain this we must look for some unconscious force which serves the purpose of the treatment. This force Freud believes to belong to the parent complex: the patient's docile attitude towards the parents is repeated in the transference. Freud has never disputed the part played in the transference by 'suggestion' in this sense and it in no way invalidates his conclusions.

Dreams which occur in traumatic neuroses and repeat the traumatic situation are probably the only exception to the rule that the dream is a wish-fulfilment. 'Punishment' dreams *seem* to be an exception but a closer scrutiny shows that they are a reaction against the latent thoughts and are due to an intervention of the censorship. This is really an extension of the familiar process by which a single element in the latent thoughts is represented in the manifest content by its exact opposite.

In his final note Freud touches on the fact that the ego can appear in more than one figure in a dream. This is due to the secondary elaboration and is an attempt to represent the many sides of the dreamer's personality. Freud does not, however, believe that *every* person in the dream represents some aspect of the ego.

In a paper on "The genesis of the castration complex in women," Frau Dr Horney, writing from her own experience in the analysis of women patients in whose neuroses this complex was prominent, seeks to penetrate to its true origin. Much has already been written upon the forms in which the castration complex manifests itself in women and it has been traced to the little girl's envy of the penis. Dr Horney thinks that, though this explanation may seem obvious to male narcissism, it is unsatisfactory both from the point of view of female narcissism and of biological thought that half the members of the human race should be dissatisfied with their sex. She admits that the forms in which the complex manifests itself are largely *conditioned* by the envy of the penis, but she does not see in it the alpha and omega of the complex.

In the first part of the paper she discusses the reasons for such envy and shows that the little girl is *in reality* at a disadvantage with the boy in the gratification of certain instinct-components of great significance in the pregenital phase of the libido. That is to say, the little girl's envy of the penis is connected with the desire to urinate 'like a man' and that she is debarred from gratifying her urethral erotism, her active and passive observation impulses and her wish to manipulate her genital organs, in ways which are open to the boy.

Dr Horney then passes to the second part of her paper and tries to penetrate beyond the envy of the penis to a deeper motivation of the castration complex. The results of her analysis of certain female patients have led her to conclude that the question of the pathogenic effect of the penis-envy complex is intimately bound up with the Oedipus complex.

The little girl passes from her auto-erotic narcissistic desires by taking the father as her love-object and identifying herself with the mother. The desire for the penis is then transformed into the womanly desire for the man (= the father) and for the child (from the father). In the cases Dr Horney has in mind the attachment to the father was so intense that the incestuous phantasy had all the force of reality. The inevitable disappointment left deep traces in the neurosis, amongst them a disturbance in the sense of reality resulting in doubts (*e.g.* of the reality of other love-relations). Moreover, feelings of guilt proved to be really reproaches against the father, turned against the subject, as well as being due to hostile impulses against the mother. The desire for the child was of the greatest significance and was related to the penis-envy complex in two ways: (*a*) the maternal instinct received unconscious reinforcement from the auto-erotic desire for the penis; and (*b*) after the disappointment with the

father there was regression to the old desire which in its turn was reinforced by the womanly wish for the child.

The father was then abandoned as love-object and, in accordance with the Freudian mechanism, the object-relation gave place regressively to *identification*.

In this *identification with the father*, accompanied by regression to a pregenital phase, Dr Horney sees one root of the castration complex in women.

Now Freud has shown that identification with the father is a basis of manifest homosexuality in women. In the cases under discussion Dr Horney concludes that the love-relation was not wholly repressed nor the identification complete. The patients did, however, without exception, show a tendency to homosexuality.

The second root of the female castration complex the writer holds to be the phantasy of having been castrated through the love-relation to the father. The patients felt that they were not normal, or had sustained some injury, in the genital region. Their phantasy of intercourse with the father caused them to attribute to him this injury. Here we have an intimate connection between castration-phantasy and repressed womanliness, a connection which seems to account more satisfactorily than does the simple penis-envy for revengeful feelings against men. Freud has shown how deforation may arouse such feelings. It would appear that in the act of deforation the unconscious sees the repetition of the phantasied intercourse with the father and the affects which belong to the latter situation are repeated.

Moreover, feelings of guilt attach themselves more easily to the idea of castration through an incestuous act with the father than to the envy of the penis.

Dr Horney concludes that just as the male neurotic whose fear of castration conceals the desire to be castrated (to lay aside the masculine rôle) identifies himself with the mother, so the female neurotic, who suffers from the castration-complex has identified herself with the father.

In the introduction to his article on "Anal Character" (*Ergänzungen zur Lehre vom Analcharakter*) Dr Karl Abraham refers to the work of Freud, Ferenczi, Jones and Sadger on the subject of anal erotism. In Freud's view the obsessional neurosis originates in a regression of libido to a pregenital phase of organisation in which the anal and the sadistic component instincts are prominent. Abraham hopes at some later date to throw light on the problem of the connection between sadism and anal erotism. In this paper he deals not so much with the symptoms which originate in repressed anal erotism as with certain typical 'anal' character-traits. Freud, in his first description, specified three such traits: self-will, a tendency to economy and a love of order, qualities which in their exaggerated forms appear as obstinacy, miserliness and pedantry.

Abraham describes some of the ways in which these characteristics manifest themselves in neurotic persons and relates them to infantile tendencies and experiences connected with the function of excretion. When a child is trained to habits of cleanliness, compelled, that is, to renounce his gratification in the products of excretion and his self-will with regard to the process, his narcissism sustains a blow but in general he is able to conform to the training through object-love, his desire to please his mother or nurse. If this training is forced upon him too early, the libido may undergo narcissistic fixation and the capacity for object-love suffers. This is the explanation of a type of character in which, underlying a marked outward docility and correctness, there are rebellious impulses and obstinacy. The conscious resignation and self-sacrifice of such persons conflicts with unconscious impulses of revenge.

It must be remembered that the infantile narcissistic feelings are clearly bound up with the excretory function. Abraham states that, just as the child in one stage believes in the omnipotence of his wishes, so at a still earlier stage he sees in his excretions the expression of his omnipotence. Hence the significance of the early training in cleanliness for his psycho-sexual development. In certain patients nervous constipation is accompanied by feelings of impotence. Here the libido has been displaced from the genital to the anal zone. Closely connected with this primitive feeling of omnipotence is the pride characteristic of certain neurotics in their own supposedly unique powers and possessions.

Self-will which has its origin in anal erotism may appear as a dislike of any kind of interference, an unwillingness to conform to the systems of others, combined with a strong desire to make rules and systems for oneself, or as a reluctance to yield to

the requests of others, a tendency to dole out necessary payments in small instalments, etc. (cf. the behaviour of the child who resists defecation). Such obstinacy may, however, develop into the useful quality of perseverance.

The writer passes to the discussion of the opposite type which, he says, has received much less attention. Persons of this type lack all initiative and demand that their difficulties shall be smoothed from their path. When undergoing analytic treatment they wish the analyst to do all the work for them; the obstinate patient, on the other hand, wants to go his own way and refuses to give his free associations. Abraham's experience has led him to believe that the patients thus lacking in initiative resisted defecation in childhood and were then helped over the difficulty by means of medicines and enemas.

Where there is regression in males from the genital to the anal-sadistic phase there is invariably a diminution of productive activity in every sense, not merely in that of physical reproduction. Moreover, the sadistic component which, properly sublimated, plays so valuable a part in the man's attitude to his love-objects and the interests of life, is as it were paralysed by the ambivalent conflict in his instinctive life. The result may be an excess of complaisance which is a reaction to hostile impulses and must not be confounded with true object-love.

Another characteristic of diminished productive activity is procrastination, sometimes combined with the tendency to break off every undertaking as soon as it is begun, and sometimes with an inability to leave off when once a beginning is made. Abraham draws the parallel to the infantile pleasure in retention on the one hand and in excretion on the other.

In proportion as productive activity is diminished the interest in *having* is increased. This is seen in the attitude towards money, an attitude which may easily pass into avarice. This aspect of the 'anal' character may manifest itself in many ways; sometimes in a passion for collecting, or for hoarding rubbish or in a horror of wasting time. Or there may be the opposite trait of prodigality in expenditure, which is equivalent to a pouring-out of dammed-up libido. In jealousy, too, there is an anal as well as a sadistic root, but Abraham believes that these are secondary and that the primary root may be found in the earlier, oral, phase of the libido development.

Another 'anal' characteristic is a love of order and cleanliness, of exactitude and symmetry. In some neurotics a surface cleanliness is combined with concealed untidiness or dirt. Abraham says that to the Unconscious of these persons an untidy drawer represents the intestine packed with faeces, an allusion he has frequently met with in the analysis of dreams.

He has noticed certain facial peculiarities which he believes to be typical in some cases of the 'anal' character. It is, he says, as though these people were continually smelling something and he traces this peculiarity to the primitive coprophiliac pleasure in smelling.

In conclusion Abraham states his conviction that a thorough investigation of the pregenital phases of libido development is necessary for the understanding of the manic-depressive states.

Amongst the shorter communications is a paper by Dr Stefan Hollós on traces of psychoanalytic thought in psychiatry previous to the work of Freud. He quotes from various writings, nearly all of the 19th century, in which certain psychoanalytic doctrines are as it were foreshadowed. The connection between insanity and sexual love was, he says, early recognised and the ideas of repressed gratification leading to mental pain (anxiety), of infantile curiosity returning later in obsessional questionings, of the analogy between neurotics and primitive people—all these are touched upon by different writers. It is in a work of Ludwig Meyer in 1889 (*Über Inventionspsychosen*) that there is the fullest approach to the analytic mode of thought, when he writes about phobias, symbolic actions, perversions and unconscious impulses which force their way into consciousness.

Dr Emil Simonson contributes a paper on Schleich's psychophysics and Freud's Metapsychology, and there are various short communications from analytic practice. Several of these have to do with the eye as a genital symbol and blindness as standing for castration.

The journal contains many reviews of German and English psychoanalytic works.

CECIL BAINES.

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## L'ATONIE ET L'ASTHÉNIE PSYCHOLOGIQUES

PAR PIERRE JANET.

LES auteurs du symposium ont courageusement posé la question de l'énergie mentale: nous avons été tous d'accord avec eux pour admettre qu'il y a lieu de concevoir une force, une énergie mentale et qu'il faut commencer par la déterminer en termes proprement psychologiques avec l'espoir d'arriver plus tard à la mesurer. Nos successeurs pourront probablement un jour exprimer par un chiffre l'énergie mentale d'un homme comme on détermine son poids et sa taille. Cela ne supprimera pas les différences individuelles à toutes sortes d'autres points de vue, mais ces dispositions particulières seront mises en œuvre avec une certaine énergie bien déterminée. Nous avons vu également que c'est dans les actions de l'homme, dans la manière dont ces actions sont exécutées qu'il faudra chercher les caractéristiques de cette énergie. Entendons-nous par là qu'il faudra apprécier *l'efficience de l'action*, la valeur de ses résultats, la puissance avec laquelle cette action transforme le monde extérieur: il serait bien intéressant d'étudier cette efficience et ses relations avec l'énergie mentale. Mais pour le moment cette efficience nous semble bien compliquée, elle paraît dépendre de bien des choses indépendantes au moins en partie de l'énergie mentale elle-même. L'action d'un homme peut tomber juste sur un filon précieux ou peut frapper l'amorce d'une torpille, elle peut devenir le point de départ d'une œuvre énorme sans avoir manifesté une grande énergie mentale. Une autre action qui se perd dans des circonstances désavantageuses peut arriver à de bien minces résultats malgré une grande énergie. Sans doute tout cela est assez discutable: le choix des circonstances, l'intuition des points d'application de l'acte doivent être également considérés et font partie de l'énergie mentale, mais on ne peut nier que le hasard ne joue ici un grand rôle et jusqu'à présent on ne peut pas utiliser uniquement l'efficience de l'acte pour caractériser l'énergie. C'est dans l'étude de l'acte lui-même et de ses propriétés qu'il faut chercher actuellement les données du problème. Je crois que les observations pathologiques en nous montrant divers troubles de l'action nous permettent de reconnaître en elle des propriétés susceptibles de degrés qui font entrevoir des aspects différents de l'énergie elle-même.

## I.

La maladie mentale met en évidence d'une manière brutale une notion que l'observation de la vie normale nous suggérait déjà, c'est que toutes les actions ne sont pas comparables et équivalentes. Un individu atteint de manie aiguë qui court, qui hurle, qui casse tout semble faire énormément d'actes: peut-on dire que ces actes soient égaux à ceux d'un homme qui travaille tranquillement? C'est fort douteux, surtout si nous remarquons que cette agitation s'accompagne de nombreux signes de faiblesse. Il est évident que tous les actes, quoique plus comparables entre eux que les phénomènes de conscience hétérogènes, ne sont cependant pas tous identiques.

J'ai eu souvent à discuter ce problème à propos des auteurs qui parlaient sans cesse des contradictions de la conduite chez les malades. On traitait ceux-ci de simulateurs ou de malades imaginaires parce qu'ils se déclaraient épuisés, incapables de faire une action et que cependant ils en accomplissaient beaucoup d'autres en apparence aussi grandes. Cette femme, disait-on, ne peut plus faire une heure de classe à des enfants et elle lit des romans toute la journée, cet homme est incapable de faire une visite et il se promène dans un parc toute la journée. J'ai été amené à montrer que nos actions ne sont pas toutes du même niveau, qu'il y a des actions plus élevées hiérarchiquement les unes que les autres et que l'élévation de la tension psychologique consiste dans la capacité de faire des actions d'un niveau plus élevé<sup>1</sup>.

Il y a des maladies caractérisées par *l'atonie psychologique*, qui consiste essentiellement dans l'abaissement de la tension, dans la disparition d'une forme d'activité supérieure, tandis qu'une forme d'activité inférieure plus simple, plus ancienne subsiste seule avec exagération. Dans une réunion intéressante des philosophes anglais et des philosophes français réunis en décembre 1921 à la Sorbonne et au Collège de France, j'ai eu l'occasion de discuter à ce propos une observation très remarquable d'une jeune femme âgée de 36 ans que je désignais sous le nom de Sophie. Cette jeune femme pendant la plus grande partie de sa vie était une obsédée aboulique et douteuse qui se posait à chaque instant des problèmes religieux et moraux sans parvenir jamais ni à les résoudre, ni à les abandonner. "Était-elle pudique ou immodeste? Était-elle propre ou sale, honnête ou grossière, etc.?" Cette conduite d'interroga-

<sup>1</sup> *Les médications psychologiques*, 1920, II, p. 18; cf. La tension psychologique, ses degrés, ses oscillations, *The British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section*, October, 1920, January, July, 1921.

tions mentales et de discussions appartient au niveau de la conduite réfléchie. Sans doute elle indique une réflexion troublée et insuffisante mais elle montre encore un exercice de la réflexion. A de certains moments, pendant de longues crises dont la dernière a duré plus de deux ans, Sophie tombe dans des états délirants qui sont tout à fait différents. Elle affirme avec violence, elle exécute brutalement l'une ou l'autre de ces idées qui la tourmentaient dans ses doutes: elle devient obscène, sale, violente. Ce qui est frappant, c'est que dans ce délire psychasténique, comme je l'ai appelé, elle n'a plus jamais aucune doute, aucune hésitation, parce qu'elle n'a plus aucune réflexion. Comme je l'ai montré, elle est retombée au niveau de l'assentiment immédiat, de la volonté et de la croyance primitives, telles qu'elles existaient chez les peuplades inférieures dont nous parlaient Durkheim et M. Lévy Bruhl, telles qu'elles existent encore chez les débiles mentaux.

D'autres malades, par exemple ceux qui sont atteints de confusion mentale, ceux qui présentent certains troubles du langage, descendent à un niveau encore inférieur, celui de l'intelligence élémentaire, celui de l'imbécile. Ils ont, comme l'a très bien montré M. Head à propos des aphasiques, des troubles de l'orientation intelligente, de la direction, de l'appréciation des grandeurs, en un mot de ces opérations relationnelles qui caractérisent l'intelligence élémentaire. Diverses démences nous amèneront plus bas encore, aux fonctions sociales élémentaires, aux fonctions perceptives ou sensitives.

Il est bien probable que ces divers niveaux de conduite, surtout les inférieurs, correspondent au fonctionnement de certains appareils nerveux déterminés et distincts, la moelle, le bulbe, les lobes optiques, les ganglions de la base, l'écorce, mais il ne faut pas tout de suite mêler les problèmes et la psychiatrie doit de son côté déterminer la hiérarchie des conduites pendant que l'anatomie pathologique détermine la hiérarchie des appareils et des fonctions: nous verrons à corriger ces déterminations les unes par les autres. La seule chose que je retiens pour le moment, c'est que cette hiérarchie de fonctions mise en évidence par l'étude des atonies psychologiques doit être bien connue avant que l'on ne parle d'actions comparables de même niveau et que l'on apprécie leur force ou leur faiblesse.

## II.

Il existe d'autres troubles pathologiques presque toujours mêlés aux précédents, quelquefois assez distincts, qui soulèvent plus nettement le problème de la force psychologique, ce sont les faiblesses proprement

dites que l'on pourrait appeler des *adynamies* ou des *asthénies psychologiques*. J'ai déjà employé le mot psychasténie d'une manière générale pour désigner les diminutions de l'activité psychologique qui se manifestent dans les troubles mentaux des obsédés, des phobiques, des abouliques, des douteurs. Il me semble nécessaire d'employer d'autres mots, ceux d'*atonie* et d'*adynamie* ou d'*asthénie* pour désigner certaines formes particulières de diminution d'activité qui porte particulièrement soit sur la tension psychologique soit sur la force. Autrefois on négligeait beaucoup l'étude de la force et de la faiblesse, quand on bornait la psychologie à l'étude de la pensée consciente où les degrés de la force et de la faiblesse, bien réels cependant, peuvent en partie se dissimuler; il faut aujourd'hui s'en préoccuper davantage, quand la psychologie devient l'étude de l'action toute entière qui est évidemment tantôt fortifiée, tantôt affaiblie. L'étude de ces malades dont le trouble principal est une faiblesse d'action sera particulièrement utile: cette étude est souvent embrouillée par la confusion de ces malades avec les précédents. Avec un peu de précision dans l'analyse psychologique on arrivera à faire ici un diagnostic dont l'importance est assez grande au point de vue du pronostic sur l'évolution de la maladie.

Je n'indique que les caractères essentiels de ces adynamies psychologiques; il faudrait pour les préciser de longues observations. La plupart des actions semblent conservées, c'est-à-dire qu'elles restent possibles, qu'elles apparaissent toutes de temps en temps dans diverses circonstances, quand le malade fait un grand effort ou qu'il ne tient pas compte des conséquences. On ne se trouve plus comme dans le cas précédent en présence d'une suppression permanente d'un certain nombre d'actions les plus élevées: les adynamies même graves ne doivent pas être confondues avec des aboulies, des délires ou des confusions. Mais ces actions conservées ne sont exécutées que rarement, elles restent le plus souvent incomplètes, réduites dans leur étendue et surtout dans leur durée. Le malade peut marcher, manger, parler, raconter des souvenirs, croire, discuter des croyances, réfléchir, raisonner logiquement. Mais il fait tout cela le moins possible et il cesse toujours son action après peu d'instant. La marche est arrêtée après peu de pas, la parole cesse vite et le malade semble muet ou aphone; après quelques instants de discussion correcte il semble ne plus comprendre ou se désintéresser de la question. Toutes les tendances semblent capables de s'activer mais elles épuisent extrêmement vite leur provision d'énergie. L'automobile paraît de construction perfectionnée, mais son réservoir à essence est à peu près vide et ne se remplit jamais qu'à une très petite hauteur.



Cet arrêt des actes très caractéristique est en rapport avec plusieurs faits importants. D'abord il coïncide avec l'apparition de troubles physiologiques de plus en plus pénibles qui se développent gravement si l'action est continuée trop longtemps. Les plus fréquents sont des troubles de la respiration, des angoisses, des troubles cardiaques surtout sous forme de palpitations, des spasmes intestinaux et vésicaux de toute espèce. Je n'ai pas la prétention d'étudier ici ces troubles viscéraux qu'on a rattachés de nos jours à des phénomènes de vagotonie ou de sympathicotonie. Je désire seulement faire remarquer qu'ils sont en rapport avec une diminution des fonctions supérieures qui laissent émancipées les fonctions inférieures du sympathique (escape of control de Sherrington et de Head). Dans un cas remarquable que j'étudie en ce moment il suffit d'exciter l'attention, de forcer la malade à écouter et à répondre avec réflexion pour que les palpitations cessent momentanément et que le pouls passe de 140 à 90. Chose curieuse, le pouls revient à 140 dès qu'on permet à la malade de s'abandonner à son inertie et de ne plus répondre; mais il remonterait également, si on continuait pendant plus d'un quart d'heure à exciter l'attention, car elle s'épuise et ne répond plus à l'excitation.

Cet arrêt de l'action dépend encore plus d'un autre phénomène très intéressant et très caractéristique, de la disparition complète du désir, de l'élan, de l'intérêt qui nous pousse à agir et à continuer une action. Ces malades sont étonnants à ce point de vue; ils n'ont besoin de rien, ils ne désirent rien, ils ne craignent rien; à tout ce qu'on leur propose ils répondent: "à quoi bon." Les choses qui les passionnaient auparavant semblent avoir disparu de leur esprit: des mères qui se sont épuisées dans les soins donnés à leurs enfants ne se soucient plus du tout de ceux-ci, ne demandent plus de leurs nouvelles et comme elles ont conservé leur intelligence elles sont stupéfaites elles-mêmes de leur indifférence. Quand il y a des phénomènes d'atonie qui se surajoutent à cette adynamie, c'est souvent à propos de ce syndrome que prennent naissance les obsessions et les délires.

Un phénomène très curieux qui se rattache à cette absence de l'intérêt et des désirs c'est la disparition totale du sentiment de l'ennui. Ces malades qui restent indéfiniment sans rien faire, quoiqu'ils aient conservé toutes leurs facultés, nous paraissent inoccupés et à chaque instant nous avons envie de leur demander s'ils s'ennuient, si nous pouvons faire quelque chose pour les distraire. Ils répondent toujours qu'ils n'ont besoin de rien, parce qu'ils n'ont aucun sentiment d'ennui. Ce n'est que bien tard aux approches de la guérison que ces malades

commencent à s'ennuyer, quand ils commencent "à avoir envie de quelque chose." L'ennui se rattache aux phénomènes d'agitation dont nous aurons à parler tout à l'heure, aux activations incomplètes des tendances qui ne peuvent pas parvenir à la consommation.

J'ai dit que ces malades ne craignent rien, ce n'est pas tout à fait exact. Ils ne craignent aucun événement extérieur, mais ils ont peur de quelque chose, ils ont peur de l'action. J'ai déjà insisté sur cette peur de l'action dans une communication à la Société neurologique américaine au congrès d'Atlantic City<sup>1</sup> et dans une communication à la Société de psychologie de Paris. Cette peur de l'action joue à mon avis un rôle de premier ordre dans la genèse des syndromes névropathiques, et j'ai essayé d'indiquer son rôle dans mon dernier livre sur "la médecine psychologique," 1923, p. 150.

Quand ces précautions qui ont pour but l'économie de l'action deviennent encore plus grandes elles déterminent des symptômes qui ont un aspect pathologique. Un grand nombre de phobies semblent porter sur certains objets ou sur certaines situations; les malades semblent avoir peur d'un couteau, d'une plume, d'un appareil télégraphique ou de la rougeur de leur visage. Ce n'est qu'une apparence car la phobie porte toujours en réalité sur un acte et le malade a peur de reprendre les outils de sa profession ou de se montrer en public. Les phobies de la fatigue nous présentent une répulsion plus générale pour toute action. Il est bien probable que beaucoup de ces phobies ont leur point de départ dans la constatation du danger que présente l'action pour le malade épuisé.

La renonciation à telle ou telle activité, aux pratiques religieuses, aux beaux-arts, aux études, aux sentiments de l'amour que l'on observe si nettement chez certains malades sont des actes d'économie qui résultent du sentiment exact de la pauvreté. Les manies de liquidation qui sont souvent fort curieuses déterminent des ruptures brusques, des abandons d'une situation, des sacrifices inconsidérés....

Certains sentiments que les malades éprouvent à propos de leurs actions sont du même genre. Les uns ont au plus haut degré le sentiment du sacrilège: "J'insulte ma mère si je mange comme vous le demandez...je torture mon père dans son tombeau, je marche sur son cadavre si j'avance dans cette allée..." À un degré moins grave les actes paraissent seulement laids, sales, vulgaires: "Dès que j'avance la main vers un objet celui-ci paraît laid, mes mouvements sont gauches et ridicules...les fleurs se fanent si je les regarde...je ne puis désirer une chose sans qu'elle devienne répugnante au même moment..." Enfin une forme plus répandue de ce sentiment est la pensée catastrophique: "Si je pense à louer un appartement dans cette maison il me semble que la porte belle et monumentale sera très convenable pour y placer le cercueil de ma femme....Si vous me faites attendre la visite de ma mère, je vais me représenter qu'elle vient en grand deuil à cause de la mort de mon père, de mes frères, de toute la famille....Si je mets cette chemise neuve, des puissances occultes vont amener des cataclysmes dans tout Paris."

Ces singulières représentations de l'action ont un rapport étroit avec les manies de perfectionnement, de recommencement si fréquentes chez les névropathes. S'ils ne sont pas amenés à supprimer complètement l'action, comme dans la forme précédente, du moins sont-ils conduits à faire des efforts pour transformer cette action, la rendre moins laide et plus morale: c'est là une des origines des plus importantes des manies de scrupule. Dans les cas extrêmes l'effort pour transformer l'action répugnante détermine une tendance à s'en écarter et une impulsion au moins apparente vers l'acte opposé. Des malades font de vains efforts pour arriver à une conduite pudique qui les satisfasse sentant en elles-mêmes des impulsions épouvantables vers les pires

<sup>1</sup> "The Fear of Action," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, June 1921, p. 150.

obscénités. On se souvient du vieux mystique Bunyan qui, au moment de faire ses prières, était forcé de tenir sa mâchoire à deux mains, pour que la bouche ne s'ouvrit pas et ne hurlât pas des blasphèmes.

Tous ces phénomènes se rattachent à la peur de l'action qui dépend d'un trouble dans la force et la tension de notre activité à ce moment. Dans une activité normale l'énergie mobilisée pour activer la tendance est suffisante et même surabondante. Après la consommation de l'action, les forces inemployées dérivent vers les autres tendances et jouent un rôle important dans la gaieté, la joie qui couronne l'acte. C'est cette répartition des forces mobilisées d'une manière surabondante qui constitue le triomphe après l'acte, l'intérêt et le désir avant la consommation. Si les forces mises à la disposition de la tendance sont diminuées au point d'être juste suffisantes pour les frais de l'action, la disparition de ce superflu et de cette gratification supprime le triomphe, l'intérêt et le désir et rend l'exécution de l'acte indifférente. Si les forces à la disposition d'une tendance donnée sont franchement insuffisantes, l'acte est exécuté avec parcimonie, avec une sorte d'avarice; les degrés supérieurs de l'action ne sont plus atteints et l'acte perd les caractères que lui donnaient la réflexion ou les tendances érgétiques. Pour un homme accoutumé aux formes supérieures de l'activité un acte de ce genre est aussi désagréable que de concher sur la terre nue quand on est habitué à un bon lit. Un acte qui a perdu les caractères de l'acte réfléchi paraît dépourvu de tout ce qui constituait sa sécurité: c'est comme si on nous demandait de marcher sur un sentier dangereux avec les yeux fermés. Bien plus, cet acte nous paraît épuiser nos dernières ressources, il nous révèle notre misère et éveille la pensée de la banqueroute morale: c'est là ce qui provoque toutes ces réactions de recul et de terreur.

Ce sont ces études sur la peur de l'action, et les attitudes d'économie de l'action, sur l'avarice psychologique dans les asthénies de toute espèce et sur le gaspillage psychologique dans les hypersthénies qui m'ont conduit à une interprétation particulière des sentiments de tristesse et de joie. Je suis en train d'écrire un volume intitulé "L'Extase et la Joie" à propos d'une malade très curieuse atteinte de délire mystique, qui présentait alternativement des périodes de torture pendant lesquelles elle était dans l'enfer et des périodes d'extase où elle jouissait des joies ineffables du Paradis. On a déjà fait remarquer et M. Piéron l'a signalé dans son article intéressant de la *Revue générale des sciences*, 30 Juin, 1923, que la douleur elle-même n'est pas une sensation comme les autres; je voudrais montrer que la souffrance et la joie ne sont pas non plus de simples sentiments passifs, mais que ce sont des formes d'action particulières, des attitudes spéciales susceptibles de diminution ou d'augmentation indépendamment de leurs causes extérieures, capables de disparaître sans raison extérieure ou de s'exagérer jusqu'au délire. Ce sont des réactions de l'ensemble de l'organisme en rapport avec la quantité de force disponible au moment de l'action. ce sont des réactions à l'asthénie ou à l'hypersthénie manifestées par des modifications de l'action elle-même. Mais je n'insiste pas aujourd'hui sur ces études: il me suffit de montrer que les modifications de la force transforment le ton des sentiments et que leur étude permettra de faire pénétrer la psychologie de l'action dans une région, celle des sentiments, qui paraissait lui être interdite.

Il serait fort intéressant surtout au point de vue thérapeutique d'indiquer le peu que nous savons sur l'origine de ces asthénies. La quantité disponible des forces psychologiques dépend d'une foule de choses et nous sommes bien loin de pouvoir les énumérer toutes. Des conditions sociales comme la richesse pécuniaire ou la pauvreté influent plus qu'on ne le croit sur nos forces psychologiques. Un individu pauvre dépense une grande partie de ses forces dans l'acquisition de son pain de chaque jour, dans le souci de son avenir; que cette dépense soit plus ou moins appréciée consciemment peu importe, elle influe toujours sur la quantité d'énergie qui reste à sa disposition. L'intelligence elle-même, l'étendue du nombre de nos connaissances, la variété des tendances qu'un individu a acquises et qu'il garde prêtes à fonctionner disséminent et gaspillent les forces. Comme je l'ai montré, une tendance prête à agir a toujours une certaine charge et elle ne subsiste même à l'état latent qu'en conservant en réserve des forces retirées de la circulation. L'étendue de l'activité psychologique prédispose à l'asthénie, c'est pourquoi le rétrécissement est une réaction de protection dans beaucoup de névroses d'épuisement. Mais je veux surtout rappeler l'importance des causes physiologiques dans ces modifications des forces psychologiques. Il est bien probable que dans les grandes asthénies il ne s'agit pas de lésions, ni même de troubles proprement cérébraux. C'est par une illusion de fausse science que l'on rattache tous les faits psychologiques à des modifications de l'encéphale. Ce qui est psychologique c'est le comportement de l'organisme, de l'individu tout entier, et le cerveau, cet assemblage de commutateurs, n'est pas tout l'individu. M. Head vient de nous montrer que, chez les blessés dont la moelle a été sectionnée ou chez l'animal décérébré, l'étendue, la systématisation, la perfection même des réactions diminuent dès qu'il y a une infection quelconque ou un trouble de la santé. La diminution des forces psychologiques chez le névropathe est en rapport étroit avec des maladies intestinales, des entéro-colites, des coli-bacilloses, des infections du sang par le *bacterium coli*, certaines modifications leucocytaires et surtout avec des affections du foie. Je n'ose continuer car j'indignerais les neurologistes en disant que le foie est aussi important pour la pensée que le cerveau. Ces études nous entraîneraient aujourd'hui trop loin de la conception psychologique de la force à propos de laquelle nous avons encore un problème important à signaler.

### III.

Il y a en effet une difficulté, qui empêche de parler correctement de la force psychologique à propos de l'asthénie, c'est la difficulté d'établir

*des relations entre la tension psychologique* dont nous avons parlé à propos des atonies *et la force* dont les asthénies nous montrent l'importance.

Ces deux groupes de syndromes, les atonies et les asthénies présentent les rapports les plus étroits: c'est dans les familles d'asthéniques que l'on rencontre les malades obsédés, délirants ou confus avec un véritable abaissement des fonctions psychologiques. Les mêmes individus présentent souvent les deux troubles à la fois à des degrés différents et c'est là ce qui donne naissance aux diverses formes des maladies mentales: il y a des délires mélancoliques et des délires maniaques qui sont en réalité au même niveau psychologique, mais qui diffèrent par la réduction ou par l'augmentation de la force disponible.

Ce qui est le plus curieux c'est que le même individu peut présenter isolément et successivement ces deux formes de la maladie et qu'il prend alors des aspects fort différents. Dans mon livre sur "les obsessions" j'ai longuement décrit une malade sous le nom de Lise que j'observe depuis une vingtaine d'années. Dans la plus grande partie de sa vie d'une manière régulière Lise est une grande obsédée scrupuleuse, incapable de réflexion correcte et de décision quand il s'agit d'un problème moral ou religieux. Elle est continuellement tourmentée de la façon la plus cruelle par des obsessions, des crises de doute, des manies de pactes, etc.; mais elle paraît se porter physiquement assez bien et elle mène une vie assez active. Pendant un an et demi, il y a quelques années, à la suite d'une crise de lithiase biliaire, il est bon de le remarquer, elle est tombée dans un état d'asthénie profonde tout à fait différent, avec suppression de presque toutes les actions, immobilité à peu près complète et toutes sortes de troubles intestinaux et cardiaques. Mais pendant toute cette période elle n'a plus eu aucune obsession, ni aucun doute et ses décisions réfléchies ont été parfaitement correctes. Je publierai un jour, je l'espère, une autre observation que je trouve également curieuse, celle de Flore, jeune fille de 28 ans qui est au contraire depuis son enfance le type d'une grande asthénique. On pourrait étudier sur elle comment l'asthénie congénitale modifie toute l'évolution et transforme en les aggravant toutes les maladies. Depuis des années cette malade est presque continuellement couchée, incapable de marcher, de manger seule, souvent même de parler: elle présente suivant la règle des troubles des sentiments avec les indifférences, les peurs de l'action, les tristesses, etc., mais elle n'est ni obsédée, ni délirante et elle garde un jugement et une croyance à peu près correctes. Pendant six mois seulement il y a quelques années et de nouveau tout récemment elle a changé complètement d'aspect, elle est devenue en apparence assez forte, capable de

rester levée toute la journée, de marcher, de reprendre une vie extérieure normale, mais elle a eu l'esprit tout à fait troublé par des obsessions scrupuleuses, des doutes interminables, des incapacités de réfléchir et de choisir.

Non seulement ces troubles apparaissent chez les mêmes malades, mais ils semblent déterminés par des circonstances analogues. Les mêmes maladies viscérales, les mêmes actions épuisantes par leur complexité, leur rapidité, leur durée, les mêmes émotions analogues à des dépenses épuisantes peuvent déterminer suivant les dispositions des sujets des asthénies simples ou des atonies avec abaissement de la tension psychologique.

Malgré ces analogies les relations de la force et de la tension sont peu connues et je rappellerai seulement deux notions que j'ai essayé d'établir à ce sujet. "Quand un phénomène psychologique est supérieur à un autre, la force qu'il exige pour se produire pourrait être suffisante si on l'employait autrement pour produire cent fois le phénomène inférieur<sup>1</sup>." En un mot, l'acte de haute tension paraît très coûteux, il semble exiger une dépense de force bien supérieure à celle qui serait suffisante pour un acte inférieur. J'ai essayé d'établir cette notion par l'étude des dérivations en montrant qu'à un phénomène supérieur supprimé se substituait une quantité énorme de phénomènes inférieurs. Cette conception semble se vérifier par les études sur l'épuisement où nous avons vu que des actions supérieures, une décision, un travail, un triomphe épuisent nos malades infiniment plus que les agitations inférieures les plus violentes et les plus prolongées<sup>2</sup>. Les atonies semblent dépendre d'épuisements plus graves qui prennent une forme particulière quand ils ont dépassé certains degrés.

Une autre remarque qui me paraît pouvoir amorcer des études intéressantes peut être faite à propos des agitations psychologiques en général insuffisamment étudiées. "Chez un malade déprimé l'augmentation des forces ne suffit pas toujours pour rétablir l'activité normale. Quand cette affluence de forces se produit seule sans un relèvement simultané de la tension, on observe le phénomène de l'agitation, on constate les troubles dont on voit un exemple dans l'ivresse, une surabondance de conduites inférieures exagérées et inutiles sans organisation, ni perfection<sup>3</sup>...Le phénomène inverse est encore plus intéressant. Il s'agit de l'amélioration apparente de la névrose par les affaiblissements

<sup>1</sup> *Les obsessions et la psychasténie*, 1903, I, p. 559.

<sup>2</sup> *Les médications psychologiques*, 1920, II, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 94.

profonds de l'organisme qui diminuent les forces, l'affaiblissement semble être une condition de l'amélioration mentale, c'est ce qui explique le phénomène si curieux de la décharge<sup>1</sup>." Pour résumer ces observations qu'il est actuellement difficile de comprendre j'ai présenté ces quelques réflexions:

Il est probable que dans la conduite normale, chez des individus bien équilibrés une certaine relation doit être maintenue entre la force disponible et la tension et qu'il n'est pas bon de conserver une grande force quand la tension a baissé, il en résulte de l'agitation et du désordre. Une comparaison permet d'illustrer cette loi peu connue: des individus qui n'ont pas l'habitude de l'ordre et de l'économie ne savent pas se conduire et font des actes dangereux s'ils ont entre les mains tout d'un coup une grosse somme d'argent. "Si je me suis abominablement enivrée, me dit une pauvre femme, c'est la faute de mon patron qui m'a remis à la fois 70 francs, je ne peux tolérer à la fois que 25 francs, que voulez-vous, 70 francs je ne sais pas qu'en faire, alors je les bois." La tension psychologique, grâce à l'exécution des actes élevés qui sont coûteux et avantageux, grâce à la mise en réserve qui résulte des derniers degrés de l'activation permet d'utiliser de grandes forces disponibles. Mais quand cette tension est faible, il vaut mieux ne disposer que de petites forces et par conséquent il est dans certains cas avantageux de les dissiper d'une manière quelconque, de manière à rétablir la proportion entre la force et la tension qui permettra une activité inférieure sans doute, mais plus correcte et moins dangereuse. Telle est l'idée générale de la décharge qui doit jouer un rôle important dans l'interprétation de beaucoup de phénomènes pathologiques.

Ces réflexions peu précises nous montrent la complexité du problème, mais elles nous permettent d'entrevoir de quelle manière nous pourrions apprécier la valeur des conduites malgré la différence des actes qui rend très difficile l'application d'une commune mesure. La recherche des relations entre le degré hiérarchique des actes et la force psychologique élémentaire qui peut être appréciée dans les actes les plus simples permettra peut-être un jour de réunir ces deux notions en une seule et d'aborder avec quelque chance de succès le problème de la mesure psychologique. Les études de la psychologie pathologique sur les atomies et les asthénies contribueront peut-être à donner un sens précis et scientifique au concept de l'énergie mentale.

<sup>1</sup> *Les médications psychologiques*, 1920, II, pp. 292, 298.

# FORTSCHRITTE DER INDIVIDUALPSYCHOLOGIE

VON DR. ALFRED ADLER (WIEN).

IN der Verfolgung unserer Forschungen gelangten wir im Laufe der letzten Jahre zu einem immer stärkeren Ausbau unserer Standpunkte, die nunmehr der Öffentlichkeit und ihrer Ueberprüfung übergeben werden sollen. Dies gilt in erster Linie von der Grundanschauung der Individualpsychologie, nicht die im Seelenleben auffindbaren Kräfte und Phänomene, wie sie experimentell erschlossen oder analytisch gefunden werden, ergeben ein Verständnis für eine Person. Das Individuum kann sie verschiedentlich benützen oder unbenützt lassen. Was wir den anderen Richtungen der Psychologie und Menschenkenntnis entgegenzuhalten hatten, war die Feststellung, dass sie uns bestenfalls etwas aussagen über die vorhandenen Kräfte, nicht aber über deren Gebrauch und Verwendungsart, nichts über die Richtung. Das Seelenleben aber ist kein Sein sondern ein Sollen. Durch diesen Zwang zu einem auf ein Ziel gerichteten Geschehen kommt in das ganze Seelenleben ein Drang nach vorwärts, und in diesem Strom des Geschehens erfahren alle vorhandenen seelischen Kategorien und Kräfte ihre Form, Richtung und Modellierung.

Der Ausbau des menschlichen Seelenlebens geschieht unter Zuhilfenahme einer fiktiven Teleologie, durch Aufstellung eines Zieles, unter dem Druck einer teleologischen Apperception, und so erweist es sich am Ende, dass wir in allen seelischen Erscheinungen den Charakter der Zielstrebigkeit wiederfinden, dem sich alle Kräfte, Instanzen, Erfahrungen, Wünsche und Befürchtungen, Erfahrungen, Defekte und Fähigkeiten einordnen. Daraus ergibt sich, dass ein wirkliches Verständnis für ein seelisches Phänomen oder für eine Person nur aus einer teleologisch begründeten Zusammenhangsbetrachtung gewonnen werden kann.

Daraus geht hervor, dass jedes Individuum handelt und leidet nach Massgabe seiner individuellen Teleologie, die wie ein Fatum wirkt, solange es sie nicht verstanden hat. Ihre Ursprünge führen bis in die erste Kindheit zurück und zeigen sich fast immer irrtümlich beeinflusst durch körperliche und seelische Schwierigkeiten, durch Gunst und Ungunst der ersten Situationen in der Kindheit.



Durch diese Betrachtung wird die Bedeutung der Kausalität für das Verständnis des seelischen Geschehens soweit eingeschränkt, dass wir sie wohl voraussetzen, dass wir sie aber als ungenügend erkennen bezüglich der Aufhellung eines seelischen Rätsels und gar zur Vorhersage einer seelischen Stellungnahme.

Das Ziel des menschlichen Seelenlebens wird so zum Dirigenten, zur *causa finalis*, und reisst alles seelisch Bewegliche in den Strom des seelischen Geschehens hinein. Hier ist die Wurzel der Einheit der Persönlichkeit, der Individualität. Ihre Kräfte könnten woher immer gekommen sein,—nicht woraus sie entstanden sind, wohin sie gehen, auf was sie hinauslaufen macht ihre Eigenart aus. Ein Beispiel soll dies erörtern: Ein 40jähriger höherer Beamter leidet seit seiner Kindheit an Zwangsimpulsen. Von Zeit zu Zeit muss er mit peinlicher Pedanterie die kleinen Aufgaben, die er sich stellt, sorgfältig auf einem Zettel niederschreiben. Dabei entdeckt er ein heimliches Lustgefühl, das er sich nicht erklären kann. Bald wird dieses aber abgelöst durch ein heftiges Reuegefühl, wie er die Zeit mit solchen Dingen verträdeln könne. Und nun gibt er sich die Schuld, dass er durch diese Abhaltungen sein Fortkommen im Leben verhindert habe. Nach kurzer Zeit wiederholt sich dasselbe Spiel.

Nach dem heutigen Stand der individualpsychologischen Erfahrung sind derartige Rätsel auf den ersten Blick lösbar. Wir sehen diesen Mann statt auf dem Wege der Gemeinschaft, anstatt mit der Lösung seiner Probleme beschäftigt, in unverständenen Schwierigkeiten verwickelt. Bei dieser Gelegenheit aber umgeht er wie ein Deserteur die ihm gesetzten, gesellschaftlich notwendigen Aufgaben. Seine Schuldgefühle, weit entfernt, seine und seiner Umgebung Lage, seine bisherigen Fehler zu verbessern, tragen zur Verschlimmerung bei, weil sie ihn noch weiter von seiner Arbeit abziehen. Sind also weitere, richtige Mittel zur Desertion. Seine bewegte Klage endlich, wie ihn sein Leiden im Fortkommen störe, entbehrt nicht des Lichtblickes, weil sie gleichbedeutend ist mit der Feststellung: "was hätte ich alles geleistet, wenn ich dieses Uebel nicht gehabt hätte."

Wir sehen in das Arrangement eines Nebenkriegsschauplatzes, dessen Zweck und Ziel es ist, den Hauptkriegsschauplatz auszuschalten. Und alle vorhandenen seelischen Phänomene, Zwang, Lustgefühle, Schuldgefühle, Logik und Lebenswandel, spottend jeder Interpretation ihres Ursprungs und ihrer ursprünglichen Bedeutung, gehorchen ausschliesslich nur der einen Aufgabe: im Vormarsch des Lebens der Lösung der realen Fragen auszuweichen, eine sichernde Distanz zu ihnen zu gewinnen und

den Schein einer tröstenden Reserve zu erobern: "was ich alles hätte leisten können, wenn . . ."

Neurose und Psychose sind die Ausdrucksformen entmutigter Menschen. Wem sich diese individualpsychologische Erkenntnis entschleiert hat, der wird es füglich vermeiden, mit entmutigten Menschen langwierige Exkursionen in mystische Felder der Psyche zu unternehmen. Selbst beiläufig richtige Mutmassungen über primäres psychisches Geschehen würden immer nur willkommener Ausweg sein sich von lebenswichtigen Fragen zu entfernen. Was immerhin wirksam und förderlich dabei zustande kommen kann, ist wie bei der Suggestiv- und hypnotischen Therapie die Ermutigung, die unverstanden (unbewusst?) aus der menschenfreundlichen, geduldigen Beschäftigung des Arztes erfließt.

Diese Form einer teilweisen Ermutigung genügt in den seltensten Fällen, ist niemals auch gleichzusetzen unserer Methode, die unabhängig und selbständig macht, weil sie die wirksamen Ursachen der Entmutigung behebt.

Also legt die Individualpsychologie doch auch den Ursachen einer seelischen Erscheinung Gewicht bei? Wohl denen des zu behebeden Grundphänomens, nicht aber denen, die als Ausdrucksmittel der Entmutigung immer nur ihrer Zweckmässigkeit halber Anwendung finden, eigentlich richtig am Platze sind, solange die Mutlosigkeit anhält, oder auch durch andere ersetzt werden können.

Um also von den Ursachen der Entmutigung zu sprechen: sie sind immer irrtümlich. Einen völlig zureichenden Grund zur Entmutigung gibt es nicht! Nur dieser Irrtum berechtigt uns, eine radikale Therapie der Neurosen in Angriff zu nehmen. Im obigen Fall war es der hochmütige, herrschsüchtige Vater, der den Jungen schon in seiner Kindheit bedrückte und ihm systematisch die Hoffnung auf ein gedeihliches Fortkommen raubte. Man wird einwenden, ob denn jedes Kind entmutigt werden könne? Nun, ich traue diese Kunst jedem Erzieher bei jedem Kinde zu, insbesondere weil die ganze Menschheit zur Entmutigung neigt. Freilich ist die aufzuwendende Kraft in jedem Falle verschieden und kann durch körperliche Minderwertigkeiten gefördert, durch günstige Umstände gehemmt werden. Das Ziel dieses Kindes aber war den Vater zu übertreffen. Da es sich dies in offenem Streben nicht zutraute, unterfing es sich den Schein der Ueberlegenheit zu retten, suchte Umwege und fand einen Ausweg und mildernde Umstände in seiner Zwangsneurose.

Wer ist nun der wirkliche Dirigent, der vielleicht nur dort, wo es

ihm passt, andere Ziele als das seine (Selbsterhaltung, Hunger und Liebe, Lustgewinnung) vorschiebt, sie gelegentlich auch vertauscht? Der in allen Phänomenen sein Spiel treibt, alle Ausdrucksformen, seelische wie körperliche, beherrscht und in seinen Dienst stellt? Ist es nur einer? Sind es mehrere? Ist es vielleicht denkbar, dass ein Individuum, ein Unteilbares, das wir als Einheit empfinden und verstehen, von der wir, was als einziges Kriterium des Verständnisses Wert besitzt, vorhersagen können, wie es sich in einer bestimmten Lage benehmen wird, mehreren Zielen nachstrebt? Wir haben es nie gefunden. Aber das *double vie*, die Ambivalenz? Sind hier nicht zwei Ziele zu sehen? Das Schwanken, der Zweifel?

Immer weist uns das Geltungsstreben, im allgemeinen Sinne das Wollen, darauf hin, dass in allem seelischen Geschehen eine Bewegung im Gange ist, die von einem Minderwertigkeitsgefühl aus ihren Lauf nimmt, um zur Höhe zu gelangen. Die individualpsychologische Lehre von der seelischen Kompensation weist darauf hin, je stärker das Minderwertigkeitsgefühl ist, umso höher das Ziel der persönlichen Macht.

Ist aber das Geltungsstreben mit seinem Ziele der Ueberlegenheit jene richtende Kraft, die alle Bewegungen der Menschen lenkt, dann dürfen wir sie uns nicht etwa als belanglosen Faktor vorstellen. Dann ist sie mit unserem gesamten Leben verbunden, dann stellt sie ein Streben vor auf Leben und Tod. Und in der Tat: sie ist imstande unseren Selbsterhaltungstrieb, unser Lustverlangen, unseren Wirklichkeitssinn, unsere moralischen Gefühle zu stören oder aufzuheben. Sie findet im Selbstmord einen Weg zur Durchsetzung, sie lenkt unsere Freundschafts- und Liebesgefühle, sie lässt uns Hunger und Durst ertragen und macht uns Schmerz, Trauer, Qualen zu Etappen unserer Triumphe. Nichts, was der Mensch genießt oder empfindet oder tut, empfängt er mit Unbefangenheit. "Schön ist hässlich, hässlich schön," singen Macbeths Hexen. Und: "Der Verstand ist listig," erklärt Hegel. Als Sokrates einst einen Sophisten im durchlöcherten Mantel sah, rief er ihm zu: "Jüngling von Athen, aus den Löchern deines Mantels guckt die Eitelkeit!" Bescheiden und eitel zugleich! Ist hier eine ehrliche Ambivalenz vorhanden? Oder ist es nicht eine Finesse, mit zwei statt mit einem Pferd zu fahren, auch durch Bescheidenheit zu glänzen? Im *double vie* unterstützen sich beide Rollen, um das Ziel der Ueberlegenheit erreichen zu helfen. Sowie ein Börsenspieler je nach Bedarf, das eine Mal in der Haltung des Haussiers, ein andermal als Baissier auftritt, beides, um Geld, das heisst Macht zu gewinnen. So antwortete mir einmal ein reichgewordener, alter Geschäftsmann auf meine Frage, warum er noch verdienen wolle, da er doch alles

kaufen könne, was käuflich sei: "Wissen Sie," sagte er, "das ist die Macht, die Macht über die anderen!"

Ich könnte als Psychologe auch andere Wege gehen. Ich könnte den psychologischen Wurzeln nachforschen, warum jener Sophist eine Vorliebe für zerrissene Mäntel hatte, um seine Bescheidenheit zu demonstrieren. Dann aber käme ich auf ein dem Sophisten erwünschtes Nebengeleise. Ich hätte seine Eitelkeit aus den Augen verloren. Ich muss vielmehr ergründen woher seine Eitelkeit stammt.

Ob er dabei im Sinne des Vaterideals vorgeht, wenn er sich in Lumpen hüllt, oder im Sinne des sogenannten Oedipuskomplexes, oder vielleicht in beider Sinn, oder in keiner von diesen Richtungen, ist wohl recht belanglos. Auch die uns bekannten Tatsachen, dass einer dem Vater nachahmt oder ihm zuwiderhandelt, haben durch eine derart mystifizierende Beleuchtung keine Bereicherung gefunden.

Hier schliesst sich unser Verständnis für die psychologische Struktur des Zweifels an. Auch beim Zweifel bestehen nicht etwa zwei verschiedene Ziele, sondern ein einziges. Stillstand! Die gleiche Ueberlegung gilt für alle sogenannten nervösen Symptome. Wie eine verschleierte Bremsvorrichtung greifen sie in die Bewegung des Fortschrittes ein, lenken sie auf ein Nebengeleise und hemmen die Erfüllung von oft selbstausgesprochenen Forderungen.

Auch in diesen Fällen finden wir als Dirigenten die Eitelkeit, die sich vor Verletzungen fürchtet.

Das Ziel der Ueberlegenheit, bei Nervösen, ausserordentlich hoch angesetzt, formt die Individualität des Einzelnen, modifiziert seine Logik, Aesthetik und Moral und drängt ihm die zugehörigen Charakterzüge, Intelligenz, Energie und Affekte auf. Die leitende Idee seiner Persönlichkeit verhilft ihm zu seiner eigenartigen Gangart und Bewegungslinie, die wie eine ewige Melodie sein ganzes Leben durchzieht. Wer diese Bewegungslinie kennt, versteht erst den Sinn jeder einzelnen Bewegung. Reisst man ein einzelnes Phänomen aus diesem Zusammenhang, so wird man es immer misverstehen. Die einzelnen Töne sagen uns nichts, wenn wir die Melodie nicht kennen. Wer aber die Bewegungslinie eines Menschen kennt, für den beginnen die einzelnen Erscheinungen zu sprechen.

Daraus folgt auch: Die richtig verstandenen seelischen Phänomene können als Vorbereitungen für ein Ziel der Ueberlegenheit aufgefasst werden.

Ueber den Ursprung des Geltungsstrebens sind wir durchaus nicht im Unklaren. Die Dürftigkeit und Hilflosigkeit des Kindes führt regel-

mässig zu einem Minderwertigkeitsgefühl, das nach Erlösung drängt. Schlechte Erziehung, ungünstige Situation, angeborene körperliche Schwäche steigern dieses Minderwertigkeitsgefühl und damit auch die Sehnsucht des Kindes nach Geltung und Macht. Das Kind findet in seinen ersten Jahren die Schablone für seine Stellungnahme zum Leben, entsprechend seiner Situation, seiner Umgebung, seinem Lebensmut und seiner Findigkeit. Im Trotz oder im Gehorsam, immer strebt es nach der Höhe.

Dabei ist entsprechend der Unreife des kindlichen Geistes und Verständnisses reichlich für Irrtümer Platz. Ja wie werden, da das menschliche Wirken Stückwerk ist, eigentlich niemals den Irrtum vermissen. Nicht in der Einschätzung der eigenen Lage und nicht in der Wahl des Zieles. Dazu kommt noch, dass bei ehrgeizig Strebenden niemals Konflikte, Rückschläge und Niederlagen ausbleiben, da sie sich von der Logik des menschlichen Zusammenlebens, von der absoluten Wahrheit, also vom Gemeinschaftsgefühl allzuweit entfernt haben. Damit aber stellt sich die Entmutigung ein, die immer Irrtum ist, in ihren verschiedenen Graden und arrangierten Sicherungen abermals zu zahlreichen Irrtümern Anlass gibt. Wir haben festgestellt dass alle Nervöse entmutigte Ehrgeizige sind, und dass die Entmutigung der Kinder und Erwachsenen vielleicht auf 90 % der Menschen verteilt ist.

Die Aufgabe der Erziehung ist es, die Schablone des Machtstrebens zu verhindern und die Entfaltung des angeborenen Gemeinschaftsgefühles zu fördern. Die individualpsychologische Behandlung der Nervösen, der entmutigten Ehrgeizigen, geschieht durch Aufdeckung ihrer Irrtümer, durch Abbau ihres Machtstrebens und durch Hebung ihres Gemeinschaftsgefühls.

Man könnte geneigt sein, in unseren Anschauungen den Bestand einer Schablone zu suchen und könnte glauben, es genüge die Kenntnis dieser Schablone, etwa des Minderwertigkeitsgefühls und seiner Kompensationen, um nun alle Räthsel des Seelenlebens lösen zu können. Da vergesse man nur nicht der Unsumme von Kunstgriffen und Listen, deren Buntheit nicht kleiner ist als das Leben selbst. Einen Leitfaden, einen sicheren Führer, nicht mehr bedeuten die Grundanschauungen der Individualpsychologie. Jedesmal muss der Weg selbst gegangen werden, das Dunkel erhellt werden, bis wie durch eine Eingebung dem Suchenden und Untersuchten der Zusammenhang klar ist. Es ist durchaus nicht auf den ersten Blick einzusehen, wo im Falle der Depression, der Melancholie das Ziel der Ueberlegenheit wirksam sei. Wir wollen es an einem Falle von "Manisch-depressivem Irresein," nachzuweisen versuchen.

Ein 40jähriger, athletisch gebauter Mann mit langgezogener Nase und eiförmigem Gesicht klagt, dass er derzeit bereits zum 3. Male in einen Zustand der Melancholie verfallen sei. Alles widere ihn an, er könne sich mit nichts beschäftigen, sein Schlaf sei seit Beginn der melancholischen Verstimmung vor 8 Monaten wieder wie in den andern 2 melancholischen Phasen vollständig gestört. Er trauere den ganzen Tag und die Nacht dahin, finde an nichts Gefallen und sei erotisch völlig unempfindlich. Alles komme ihm wie Mist vor. Im Jahre 1918 sei er an Manie erkrankt. Wie ein Champagnerrausch sei es über ihn gekommen. Er dachte, er müsse sein Vaterland retten, er sei dazu auserkoren, müsse Reichsverweser werden; er habe auch versucht Verhandlungen anzubahnen, hatte grosse Entwürfe für Kolossalbauten ausgearbeitet, bis ihn seine Familie in eine Irrenanstalt sperrte. Einige Wochen nachher verfiel er in einen Zustand der Depression, der 9 Monate währte und ganz wie der gegenwärtige verlief.

Kaum fühlte er sich besser und dachte wieder an eine regelmässige Arbeit, als die Manie wieder eintrat, ungefähr die gleiche Zeit wie das erstemal dauerte, um dann der melancholischen Phase Platz zu machen. Fast unmittelbar an diese reihte sich das 3. manische Zustandsbild, welches von der gegenwärtigen Melancholie abgelöst wurde.

Die Ausdrucksform der völligen Entmutigung dürfte kaum zu übersehen sein. Der Lebenslauf dieses Mannes bot genug Verlockungen dazu und Bestätigungen dafür. Er war das Kind einer reichen Familie und hatte zum Taufpathen einen höchsten Würdenträger des Staates. Seine Mutter, eine ehrgeizige Künstlernatur, erklärte ihn fast in der Wiege schon als unvergleichliches Genie und stachelte seinen Ehrgeiz in unerhörtem Masse. Er wurde seinen andern Geschwistern weit vorgezogen. Seine Phantasien in der Kindheit gingen daher ins Ungemessene. Am liebsten spielte er Feldherr, trommelte eine Anzahl Jungens zusammen und errichtete sich einen Feldherrnhügel, von dem aus er die Schlachten leitete. In der Kindheit schon und später in der Mittelschule empfand er es tief schmerzlich, wenn ihm nicht alles leicht und glänzend von der Hand ging. Von da an begann er seinen Aufgaben auszuweichen und vertrödelte die Zeit hauptsächlich mit Tonarbeiten. Wir werden sehen, wie diese Spiele der Jugend zum Ausgangspunkt seiner Berufswahl wurden. Er ging später zum Militär, verliess aber bald seine Stellung, um sich der Bildhauerkunst zu widmen. Als er auch da nicht gleich zu Ruhm und Ehren gelangte, sattelte er abermals um und wurde Landwirt. Als solcher verwaltete er die Güter seines Vaters, liess sich in allerlei Spekulationen ein und stand eines Tages vor dem völligen finanziellen

Zusammenbruch. Als er wegen seiner waghalsigen Unternehmungen als verrückt gescholten wurde, gab er das Rennen auf und zog sich zurück.

Da kam die grosse Geschäftskonjunktur der Nachkriegszeit,—und alle seine waghalsig begonnenen, schon verloren geglaubten Unternehmungen begannen aufzublühen. Geld strömte ins Haus und überhob ihn jeder Sorge. Auch sein Prestige schien gerettet. Nun hätte er sich wieder nützlicher Arbeit widmen können. Da brach sein manischer Anfall aus und verhinderte jede Tätigkeit. Die gute Zeit traf ihn bereits im Zustande gänzlicher Entmutigung.

Aus seinen Jünglingsjahren erinnert er sich an ein starkes Prädestinationsgefühl. Selbst Gedanken der Gottähnlichkeit wagten sich an ihn heran. Seine Zimmer waren über und über mit Napoleonbildern geschmückt, die wir als Beweis seines Strebens nach Macht gelten lassen dürfen. Als ich ihn einst zur Illustration seiner Bewegungslinie darauf vorwies, dass er einen Helden in seiner Brust trage, den er seit seiner Entmutigung nicht mehr auf die Probe zu stellen wage, erzählte er mir betroffen, dass er über der Türe seines Arbeitszimmers einen Spruch Nietzsches angebracht habe, der folgendermassen lautete: "Bei allem was dir heilig ist bitte und beschwöre ich dich: wirf den Helden in deiner Brust nicht von dir."

In einer der Hauptfragen des menschlichen Lebens, in der Berufsfrage, sehen wir deutlich seine fortschreitende Entmutigung infolge seines unerfüllten und unerfüllbaren Ehrgeizes. Wir können sie, wenn auch nicht billigen, so doch begreifen. Wie war es mit der zweiten Hauptfrage, mit der socialen Verknüpfung von Mensch zu Mensch? Man konnte leicht vorhersagen, dass er auch hier scheitern musste, dass sein Hochmut ihn kontaktunfähig machen musste, so dass er im Grossen und Ganzen niemandem zu Lieb und niemandem zu Leid in einer isolierten Stellung verharrte. Selbst seine Geschwister und seine Kameraden wurden ebensowenig in seiner Nähe warm wie er in ihrer. Nur zuweilen zeigte sich im Beginne einer neuen Bekanntschaft ein anfängliches Interesse, um bald wieder abzuflauen. Er kannte die Menschen nur von ihrer schlechten Seite und hielt sie ferne. Dies und sein Ziel der Ueberlegenheit zeigte sich auch in seinen satirischen, scharf zugespitzten Pointen.

In der dritten Hauptfrage des Lebens hatte er schwer Schiffbruch gelitten. Er hat wohl niemals geliebt und kannte die Frau nur als Objekt. So kam es, dass er in jungen Jahren an Lues erkrankte, an die sich unvermerkt eine Tabes mit leichten Erscheinungen schloss. Dies trug nicht wenig zu seiner weiteren Entmutigung bei. Jetzt sah er sich von allen Triumpfen ausgeschlossen, die er sich sonst im ersten Ansturm

bei Frauen, beim Preisfechten, Wettschwimmen und bei Hochtouren geholt hatte.

Wie er die Menschen sich entfremdet hatte, stand er nun selbst als Fremdling in diesem Leben, das ihm nirgends einen Kontakt bot. Seinen Irrtum einzusehen, zu verbessern war er nicht fähig. Sicherlich hinderte ihn auch sein Stolz, der Held in seiner Brust daran. So fand ich ihn als einen Menschen, der nach einem glänzenden, ja fanatischen Auftakt immer nachgelassen hatte, sobald sein Ehrgeiz zu fürchten begann.

Sobald ich den Rythmus seines Lebens, wie er unter dem Druck seines ehrgeizigen Strebens zustande gekommen war, erkannt hatte, wusste ich auch, dass alle seine seelischen Leistungen im Sinne dieses Rythmus verlaufen mussten. Um die Probe darauf zu machen, liess ich mir seine Schriftzüge zeigen.

*Fest gemauert ist der Erde  
 Liegt die Form aus Leben  
 gebrannt*

Man sieht auch hier, und zwar ohne graphologische Deutungskunst, den starken Auftakt und das ständige Schwinden in der Grösse der Buchstaben in jedem Wort.

Ebenso sinnfällig äussern sich die entfernten Pole seiner Bewegungslinie in der Wahl seiner Stoffe, die er plastisch gestalten wollte. Einen Sonnenanbeter wollte er schaffen, der mit ausgebreiteten Armen nach dem Höchsten greift, und die Trauer, die tief zur Erde gebückt ein verlorenes Glück beweint. Doch nicht einmal an die Vorarbeiten ist er geschritten. Sein Ehrgeiz lebte weiter, war aber ohnmächtig geworden und verbarg sich.

Alles was dieser impotent gewordene Ehrgeiz noch gestalten konnte, zumal der Kontakt zur Aussenwelt verloren gegangen war, sah man in der Darbietung seiner Psychose. Sie beginnt mit dem manischen Auftakt, der brüllend den Mut zur Leistung beweisen will, gerade aber durch sein Ungestüm und durch seinen Widerspruch gegen die Logik und die Entnützigung verrät. Im Rausch seiner Machtlüsternheit rast er dahin und zwingt die Umgebung zur Korrektur, zur Obsorge und zur Hemmung, die der Kranke selbst nicht aufbringen darf, weil sein verwundeter Ehrgeiz keine Handlung im Sinne des common sense duldet.



Nun folgt das Schwinden des Kraftaufwandes im Zwange seiner Lebenslinie. Die Entmutigung in der melancholischen Phase liegt klar zutage. Wo steckt nun der Ehrgeiz? Alles ist schal. Nichts kann ihn bewegen, ihn erfreuen, nichts wirkt auf ihn. Allem steht er kalt und fremd gegenüber wie annähernd schon in seinen jüngeren Jahren. Die Nichtigkeit alles Irdischen, die Wertlosigkeit aller Menschen, aller menschlichen Beziehungen ist die Rache seines verwundeten Ehrgeizes, mit der er sich jeder Wirkung und Kraft der andern entzieht, indem er sie leugnet.

Und je mehr er über diese Entwertung klagt, umso deutlicher stellt er sie fest. Statt sich zu erhöhen, erniedrigt er die andern. Dem irrtümlich allzu hoch gesteckten Ziel seiner frühen Kindheit bot die Wirklichkeit unlösbare Schwierigkeiten. Nur im Rausch der Phantasie und in leicht und rasch erworbenen Triumphen genügten sein Mut und seine Ausdauer. Nach individualpsychologischen Massen gemessen war er immer ein Typus des Entmutigten. Sein manisch-depressives Irresein ist der Ausdruck einer stärkeren Entmutigung bei gleichbleibendem Rythmus seiner Bewegungslinie.

Zum Rätsel des cyklischen Verlaufes dieser Erkrankung sollen in einer späteren Arbeit noch einige Aufklärungen folgen.

## PROGRESS IN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

BY ALFRED ADLER (VIENNA).

WITHIN the last few years, in the course of our analytical research, it has become possible to develop our particular points of view with increasing clearness. It is now time that they should be published and submitted to public scrutiny. This is true above all of our fundamental conception of Individual Psychology; it is not from the various forces and phenomena which may be revealed in the mental life, whether they be empirically arrived at or discovered by the analytic method, that we learn to understand a personality. Different individuals may use these forces and phenomena in different ways or may make no use of them at all. What has brought our line of thought into contrast with those of other schools of psychology and of the study of humanity is our postulate that from them we can at best learn something of the forces which exist, but nothing of their application and the manner in which they are employed, nor yet of their trend. Now our mental life is not a matter of simple existence but is subject to certain impulsions. It is through this urge towards processes directed to a given end that the whole mental life receives an impetus in a forward direction, and in this stream of processes all the categories and forces belonging to our minds receive their mould, their direction and their characteristic form.

The development of the mental life of man is accomplished with the help of a fictive teleology, through the proposing of a certain end, under the pressure of a teleological apperception. Thus it finally becomes evident that in every mental phenomenon we discover anew the characteristic of pursuit of an aim and with this characteristic all our powers, faculties, experiences, wishes and fears, defects and capacities fall into line. It follows that a true understanding of a mental phenomenon or of a personality is attained only when we take a comprehensive view, the basis of which is teleological.

From this we conclude that every individual acts and suffers in accordance with his peculiar teleology, which has all the inevitableness of fate, so long as he does not understand it. Its springs may be traced to his earliest childhood and nearly always we find that they have been

<sup>1</sup> Translation by Cecil Baines.

diverted into false channels by the pressure of physical and mental difficulties and by the favourable or unfavourable nature of the earliest situations in the child's life.

This view to some extent limits the importance of the principle of causality for the understanding of what takes place in the mind. That is to say, we do indeed assume the validity of that principle, but we recognize that it is inadequate to solve a mental problem and even to enable us to predict the adoption of a particular attitude of mind.

Thus the aim of the mental life of man becomes its governing principle, its *causa finalis*, and sweeps every motion of the mind into the stream of mental happenings. Here we have the root of the unity of the personality, the individuality. It matters not what may have been the source of its energies: not their origin but their end, their ultimate goal constitutes their individual character. I may make this clearer by an illustration: A forty-year-old official of high standing has suffered from childhood from obsessional impulses. From time to time he is under the compulsion to write down on a piece of paper, carefully and with painful exactitude, the trivial tasks which he sets himself. In so doing he notices that he has a feeling of mysterious pleasure, for which he cannot account. Soon, however, this gives place to a sense of keen self-reproach for wasting time over such things. And then he accuses himself of having hindered his own advancement in life by interruptions. After a short interval the whole performance repeats itself.

With the knowledge we now have of Individual Psychology problems of this sort may be solved at the first glance. We see this man, instead of occupying himself in social activities or tackling his own problems, involved in difficulties which are incomprehensible to him. By this means, however, he escapes like a deserter from the real tasks which society requires of him. His feelings of guilt, far from helping to improve his position and that of those around him or to correct his former faults, make matters worse in that they withdraw him still farther from his work. That is to say, they are only additional means designed to assist him in his deserter's attitude. Again, the meaning of his passionate lament that his affliction hinders his progress in life is not at all obscure; it amounts to saying: "What great things I should have done if I had not had this handicap."

We are not without insight into this staging of a secondary conflict, the aim and object of which is to do away with the main struggle. And all the mental phenomena which are present in this case: compulsion, feelings of pleasure and of guilt, reasoning and mode of conduct, eluding

as they do all attempts at interpretation of their origin and original significance, serve one single purpose, namely, the avoidance of the solution of real problems in the course of life and the setting of them at a safe distance, whilst making sure of an illusory but comforting reserve force: "What great things I could have done if..."

Neurosis and psychosis are modes of expression for human beings who have lost courage. Anyone who has acquired this much insight into Individual Psychology will thenceforth refrain from undertaking with persons in this state of discouragement tedious excursions into mysterious regions of the psyche. Even such conjectures with regard to primary psychic processes as may chance to be correct would only serve as a welcome way of escape from the consideration of vital problems. It is true that a powerful and helpful effect may be produced by this method, but, as in treatment by suggestion and hypnosis, this is simply the encouragement derived by the patient in a manner not wholly comprehended (unconsciously?) from the humane and patient work put in by the physician.

Only in the rarest cases is this form of partial encouragement sufficient; it can never be compared with our method, which makes the patient independent and able to stand alone, in that it removes the true causes of the discouragement.

It would seem then that, after all, Individual Psychology too attaches importance to the causes of a mental phenomenon? Certainly, to the causes of that which underlies the whole, but not to those which simply serve as appropriate means to express the state of discouragement, which are really natural so long as the lack of courage persists, or which can be replaced by others.

Let us then consider the causes of discouragement: they are invariably erroneous. There is no such thing as a perfectly adequate reason for discouragement! It is only because this erroneous idea exists that we are justified in attempting a radical treatment of the neuroses. In the case I quoted above it was an arrogant and domineering father who oppressed the boy's mind even in his childhood and systematically robbed him of the hope of a successful advancement in life. The question may be raised whether I mean that every child can be reduced to such a state of discouragement. Well, I believe that anybody who brings up a child may produce this effect upon him, especially as all men are naturally prone to discouragement. Of course the force necessary to produce it varies in every case: physical disadvantages may contribute to it and favourable circumstances prevent it. Now this child's aim was

to excel his father and, since he had no confidence that he could do so by open endeavours, he attempted to preserve the semblance of superiority, tried roundabout ways and found in his obsessional neurosis a way of escape and at the same time alleviating circumstances.

What then is the true governing principle which may prefer other aims (self-preservation, hunger and love, the achievement of pleasure) to its own, or even on occasion substitute them for it, only when they suit it? Which in all phenomena plays its own game, controlling and subordinating to itself all modes of expression, mental as well as physical? Is it a single principle? Or are there several? Is it at all thinkable that an individual, an indivisible entity, which we feel and understand to be a unity and of which we can predict (and this must be esteemed the sole criterion of understanding) how it will behave in a given situation—is it thinkable, I say, that such an individual strives after several goals? We have never found it to be so. But what about *double vie* or ambivalence? Do we not in this case discern two aims? Do we not see vacillation and doubt?

We are constantly reminded by the striving of human beings to make themselves felt, that is, in a general sense, by the fact of the human *will*, that in all mental processes there is a movement going forward the tendency of which is to proceed from a sense of inferiority to a position of elevation. The doctrine of mental compensation which forms part of Individual Psychology goes to show that the stronger the feeling of inferiority the higher is the aim of personal power.

Now if this desire to make oneself felt—a desire whose goal is superiority over others—is the guiding force which directs all human activities, we must not imagine that it is a more or less negligible factor. For if such be the case this force is bound up with our whole life and its strivings are nothing less than a life and death conflict. And indeed this force is powerful enough to disturb or to annihilate our instinct of self-preservation, our craving for pleasure, our sense of reality and our moral feelings. It finds in suicide a path to its accomplishment, it directs our feelings of love and friendship, it nerves us to endure hunger and thirst, it converts pain, grief and affliction into stages in a triumphal progress. Nothing that man enjoys or feels or does is accepted by him without a bias. "Fair is foul and foul is fair," sing the witches in *Macbeth*. "Man's understanding is a trickster" (Der Verstand ist listig), says Hegel. Once when Socrates saw a sophist with his robe full of holes he cried out to him: "Young man of Athens, your vanity peeps from the holes in your robe!" Unassumingness and vanity side by side! Have we here an

honest ambivalency? Is it not rather a ruse to drive with two horses instead of one, to distinguish oneself even by that very unassumingness? In the *double vie* these two rôles reinforce one another to compass their aim of excelling others. Just so does a speculator on the Stock Exchange sometimes act the bull and at other times the bear, as the occasion may require, in either case his object being to gain money, that is, power. In this spirit an old business man who had made a fortune answered my question as to why he wanted to go on making money when he could already have anything that money can buy: "You see," he said, "it is power, power over other people."

There are other paths I might pursue as a psychologist. I might seek for the psychological roots of the sophist's preference for demonstrating his unassuming character by means of the holes in his robe. This, however, would take me down a side-track very agreeable for the sophist. I should have lost sight of his vanity. Rather, I ought to find out the origin of it.

It is quite unimportant whether his conduct is influenced by the father-ideal, when he wraps himself in rags, or by the so-called Oedipus complex, or possibly by both or by neither. Even the familiar facts that a man imitates his father or acts in an exactly opposite way may have gained nothing from so mystifying an elucidation.

Here comes in our understanding of the psychological structure of doubt. Even in doubt there are not two different goals proposed but a single one. But stay! The same reflection is true of all so-called nervous symptoms. Like a hidden brake they put a check on the forward movement, they side-track the advance and inhibit the fulfilment of demands which have often found spontaneous expression.

Even in these cases we find that the governing motive is vanity which fears lest it should be wounded.

The aim of excelling others, which in neurotics is pitched extraordinarily high, moulds a man's individuality, modifies his logic, his aesthetic perceptions and his morals, imposes on him the appropriate character traits, stamps his intelligence, energy and affects. The guiding idea of his personality determines for him his own peculiar mode of progression and the trend which is evident throughout his life, like a constantly recurring melody. Only when the general trend is known does each separate movement become intelligible. If a single phenomenon is taken out of this whole context, that phenomenon will invariably be misunderstood. The separate notes mean nothing to us if we do not know the melody. Only when one knows the trend of a human life does one begin to understand the meaning of its separate manifestations.

Hence we may draw the further conclusion that mental phenomena when correctly understood may be regarded as leading up to an end which consists in establishing the subject's superiority.

We are by no means uncertain as to the origin of the endeavour to make oneself felt. The needs and the helplessness of the child regularly give rise to a sense of inferiority from which he urgently requires to be delivered. A bad upbringing, unfavourable conditions or congenital physical infirmities increase this sense of inferiority and therewith the child's longing to be important and powerful. In his first years then he receives the impress which moulds his attitude towards life, according to his situation, his surroundings and the courage and resource he brings to life. Whether by defiance or obedience, he is ever striving to raise himself to a lofty position.

When the immaturity of the child's mind and understanding is considered, it is obvious that in this process there is ample scope for mistakes. Indeed, since human effort is but imperfect, there must really always be mistakes, whether it be in the subject's estimation of his own position or his choice of an end. Moreover, those who are urged on by their ambition are never exempt from conflicts, reverses and defeats; they have departed too far from the logic of human life in common, from absolute truth, and therefore from social feeling. This gives rise to discouragement which is always erroneous and which, in turn, in its different degrees and the artifices by which it seeks to reassure itself results in countless mistakes. We have proved that all neurotics are ambitious persons who have lost courage and that this discouragement amongst children and adults probably affects 90 per cent. of the human race.

It is the task of education to prevent the mind from receiving the stamp of this striving after power and to promote the development of the innate social feeling. The treatment of neurotics (*i.e.* ambitious persons who have lost courage) according to the principles of individual psychology consists in revealing their mistakes, demolishing their striving after power and raising their social feeling.

We might be inclined in ourselves to look for the persistence of a particular mental stamp and might think that if only we know of that stamp, possibly that of the sense of inferiority and its compensating manifestations, we can solve all the riddles of the mental life. Only let us not forget the countless artifices and subtleties—as great a medley as life itself. The principles of Individual Psychology cannot act as a clue or a certain guide here: the path must in each case be followed out and the obscurity illuminated, until as though by a revelation the whole connection becomes clear both to him who is investigating and him whose

mind is the subject of investigation. It is not at all easy to perceive at the first glance where the aim of superiority comes in in cases of depression and melancholia. Let us try to show it in a case of 'manic-depressive insanity.'

A man forty years of age, of an athletic build and with a long nose and oval face, lamented that for the third time he had fallen into a state of melancholia. Everything was distasteful to him, he could occupy himself with nothing, and for the past eight months, since the 'black' mood set in, his sleep had completely deserted him, as it did on the other two occasions when he had suffered from melancholia. All day and all night he was wretched, nothing gave him any pleasure and, erotically, he had no sensibility whatever. Everything appeared to him as dirt. In the year 1918 he had had a phase of mania, which came upon him with the intoxicating effect of champagne. He then thought that he must save his country, that he was chosen for this purpose and was to become ruler of the realm. Moreover, he attempted to pave the way for various negotiations and had worked out huge plans for colossal buildings, until his family placed him in an asylum. Some weeks later he fell into a state of depression, which lasted for nine months and ran exactly the same course as his present state.

No sooner did he feel better and begin once more to think of regular work than mania set in again for about the same period as the first attack, to be succeeded by the melancholic phase. Upon this there followed almost immediately the symptoms of the third manic phase and this in its turn gave place to his present condition of melancholia.

It was hardly possible not to see in this history a manifestation of complete discouragement. The man's life-story gave ample temptation for such a condition and afforded sufficient confirmation of it. He was the child of rich parents and his god-father was a high dignitary in the State. His mother who had an ambitious, artistic temperament, when he was barely out of his cradle declared him to be a genius, head and shoulders above everyone else, and goaded his ambition to a preposterous extent. Great preference was shown to him above his brothers and sisters, and thus his childish phantasies were altogether extravagant. He liked best of all to play at being a general, when he would summon other boys together by beating a drum, and he made a hillock on which he stood as general and directed the battles. Both in childhood and later in the secondary school which he attended he was deeply wounded if he could not do everything brilliantly and without effort. From that moment he began to shirk his tasks and frittered away his time, chiefly with clay-



modelling. We shall see how these games of his young days determined his choice of a profession. Later on he entered the army, but soon left it in order to devote himself to sculpture. When he found that in this profession also he did not immediately win honour and glory he once more changed his mind and took up farming. In this capacity he managed his father's estates, embarked on all manner of speculations and one day found himself faced with complete financial ruin. On being blamed for his foolhardy undertakings and called an idiot for entering upon them, he threw up the sponge and went into retirement.

Then came the great turn in trade after the War and all the undertakings which he had entered upon so recklessly and had believed to have failed began to look up. Money poured in and put him beyond the reach of any care. It appeared, too, that his prestige was re-established and he could once more have devoted himself to useful work, but again he was attacked by mania which put a stop to all his activities. When the good time came it found him already in a state of complete discouragement.

He remembered that in his youth he had a strong feeling of predestination; he even entertained presumptuous thoughts that he was like the Deity. The walls of his room were plastered with pictures of Napoleon, which we may regard as evidence of his striving for power.

I once suggested to him as an illustration of the trend of his mind that he bore in his breast a hero whom, since he had lost courage, he no longer dared put to the test; whereupon he was quite taken aback and told me that he had a saying of Nietzsche's put up over the door of his work-room and that it ran as follows: "Bei allem was dir heilig ist bitte und beschwöre ich dich: wirf den Helden in deiner Brust nicht von dir." ("By all that thou holdest holy, I implore and conjure thee that thou reject not the hero in thy breast.")

In one of the chief questions of a man's life, namely, that of his profession, we can see clearly the progressive discouragement which sprang from his unsatisfied and insatiable ambition. And even while we disapprove of it we can yet understand it. How was it with the second main problem in life: the social ties between man and man? It is easy to predict that here again he was bound to come to grief, that his arrogance must make him incapable of contact with others, so that on the whole he led an isolated existence without affecting anybody in one way or another. Even his brothers and sisters and his companions were as cold towards him as he was to them. Only at times, when he made a new acquaintance, he showed a certain amount of interest at first, but

it soon evaporated again. He knew only the bad side of his fellow-creatures and held himself aloof from them. This fact and his aim to be superior to others showed in his satirical and cutting remarks.

In the third main problem of his life he had been badly shipwrecked. He had really loved nobody and woman was to him merely an object. Thus it came about that while still young he contracted lues and, without his noticing it, this was followed by slight symptoms of tabes. This contributed in no small degree to his further discouragement. Now he saw himself cut off from all the triumphs which at other times he had won in his relations with women, in boxing, swimming contests and climbing.

Just as he had alienated himself from his fellow-men, so he now felt himself an alien in life, with which he could find no point of contact. He was not able to perceive his error or to correct it. Certainly his pride, the 'hero in his breast,' hindered him from doing so. Thus I found in him a man who, after attacking a situation in a brilliant, even fanatical, fashion, had invariably let go as soon as his ambition took fright.

When once I recognized the rhythm of his life—how it had been produced by the pressure of his ambitious striving—I knew also that all his mental performances would necessarily display the same rhythm. To test this I asked him to show me his handwriting:

*Test genauort in der Erde  
 Liegt der Form aus Leben  
 lebhaft*

One can see here again, without being an expert in interpreting handwriting, the strong attack and the consistent diminution in the size of the letters in every word.

No less striking is the evidence of the two opposite poles in his mental trend as afforded by his choice of subjects for his sculpture. He wanted to represent a sun-worshiper with outstretched arms reaching after the highest, and Grief bowed to the ground and mourning her lost happiness. But he never even reached the preliminary stages of his work. His ambition continued to live, but it had become impotent and hid itself.

The picture of his psychosis showed what this impotent ambition could still bring about, particularly when contact with the outside world

was lost. The disease begins with the wave of elation in mania, the shouting aloud, as it were, of his courage in action; the very impetuosity of it, however, and its illogical character betray discouragement. In the intoxication of his lust for power he goes madly on his way, compelling the people around him to correct his errors, to look after him and to check him, none of which things he may do for himself because his wounded ambition cannot tolerate any course of action according to the dictates of common sense.

There follows the dwindling of his expenditure of energy at the compulsion of the governing principle of his life. In the melancholic phase discouragement is plainly revealed. What has happened now to his ambition? Everything is stale, nothing can move him or give him pleasure, nothing has any effect upon him. His attitude to everything is cold and alien, much as it began to be even in his earlier years. The nothingness of all things earthly, the futility of all human beings and of all human relations—these are the reflections with which his wounded ambition takes its revenge and with which he withdraws himself from every sort of influence or power belonging to others, denying the very existence of such power.

And the more he laments over this loss of values, the more clearly does he establish it. Instead of raising himself he brings down others. Reality opposed unsurmountable difficulties to the aim of his early childhood—an aim pitched all too high. Only in transports of phantasy or in moments of easily and rapidly won triumph were his courage and endurance sufficient. According to the standards of Individual Psychology he was always a type of the discouraged. His manic-depressive insanity is the expression of a profound discouragement whilst the rhythm of his guiding principle remains the same.

In a later work I propose to give some further explanation of the cyclic course of this disease.

# PRIMITIVE MENTALITY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS<sup>1</sup>

BY H. G. BAYNES.

THE point of view I propose to bring before you is liable to cause misunderstanding because it impinges against certain fundamental assumptions, which have been taken over from the physical sciences without any question as to their validity in respect to psychology. I would ask you, therefore, not to prejudge the issue by applying to my arguments certain criteria to which they do not attempt to conform.

To what extent we are agreed that primitive mentality provides us with a model of our own psychological background we shall doubtless see later. But at the least it will be admitted by all, that there exists *some* analogy between the representations which move the savage mind and our own unconscious processes.

My object, then, is to try to discover whether that insight into the mind of the primitive, which anthropological research has put into our hands, can help us to a more sympathetic understanding of the complicated problems of our own amphibious psychology; whether, in short, we are entitled to form synthetic or intuitional conceptions of the unconscious, based on analogies with primitive notions and behaviour.

A common feature that seems to link the primitive psyche to our own unconscious processes is a certain prelogical or irrational character. This fact is responsible for the almost insuperable obstacles in the path of a rational appraisal of primitive ways and views of life, or a scientific evaluation of our own dreams. On the one side the credulous ignorance of the savage, or the inconsequent irrationality of dreams may provoke our intellectual disdain. On the other side, like the spiritualists to the rather low-grade libido-phenomena of the séances, or like Savanarola to the incoherent utterances of his imbecile dwarf, we may be tempted, by the eternal enigma of the unconscious, to ascribe to dreams or primitive beliefs, a kind of heaven-sent wisdom which it would seem invidious to criticize.

It would take us too far away from our path to discuss the psychological causes of this ambivalent attitude towards prelogical psychic activity. It is enough for my purpose to point out that the customary

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, Jan. 23, 1924.

behaviour of rational mentality in this regard has an essentially irrational character. We must, therefore, be on our guard, lest, by an air of intellectual superiority we become, like that "monstrously clever fellow" Jurgen, the mere sport of elementary spirits, or, by a culpable naïveté, make of the unconscious a god.

The point of view I want to present in this paper is based upon two postulates:

(a) That the myth, as the psychological currency of the prelogical psyche, can be fully understood only by an intuitional or prelogical attitude.

(b) That mythological formations being adaptation-survivals, gradually elaborated by the psyche through countless ages, are an invaluable guide in the shaping of our instinctual attitude to experience.

This, as you are aware, corresponds to the standpoint of the Zürich school which maintains that beneath the stratum of the personal there exists the impersonal or racial unconscious; so that, through the complicated problems of the personal struggle, there is woven both the wisdom and the blind authority of the ancestors. It seems to me, that unless we can accept the theory of the effective survival of racial inheritance as a constant source of unconscious motivation, the analogy with primitive mentality can have little or no significance.

Quite independent of this psychological view-point Lévy-Bruhl has come to a rather similar view in his own very clear-sighted investigation of primitive mentality.

In his recent book on this subject<sup>1</sup> he attributes the primitive's deep distaste for abstract or "discursive operations of thought," his entire lack of intellect as a function of cognition, and his immediate and ineradicable belief in invisible agencies, spirits, souls, mana, etc. to the influence of inherited group ideas which he has termed "collective representations." The immediate certainty and binding authority of these representations spring from the fact, that they express the accumulated experience of the race. The hypothesis that these representations are ancestral survivals is born out by the primitive's well-known identification of the protecting spirits inhabiting the trees, streams, mountains, and even stones of his native land with the spirits of his ancestors. Behind his customs, his beliefs, his magical rites, his inordinate fears there loom perpetually the spirits of the dead. It is literally true to say that the primitive is lived by his ancestors, and it is, I think, impossible to understand the mind of the primitive without this key to the enigma.

<sup>1</sup> *Primitive Mentality*, Lévy-Bruhl.

These "collective representations," which not only motivate the primitive's behaviour, but at the same time provide him with fully prepared interpretations of every unusual or accidental occurrence, are essentially mythological formations. To the prelogical mind a mythological statement is immediately convincing, whereas a rational inference would seem quite beside the mark.

So far as it is possible to determine no inferential step is made between perception and conclusion; hence these group-representations provide a sense of finality and conviction which leaves no margin of interest for further explanations.

The perception of the occurrence and the mythological interpretation of it are synchronous events, so that no thought is demanded. The occurrence is self-explained.

Not long ago I came across an example of this mythological interpretation among our own people. After a thunderstorm of great violence, when unusual phenomena were alleged to have been seen, a Norfolk peasant was overheard asking his neighbour, "Did you see the black horse in the sky?" The black horse is evidently a mythological projection, which carries the notion of destructive energy in a much more emphatic and picturesque way than the paraphrase I have just used. It fulfils a two-fold purpose. Not only does it mark the perception of an unusual occurrence, but gives it, at the same time, an appropriate dynamic or symbolical interpretation. The synthetic value of this mythological or intuitional statement is obvious. A purely intellectual understanding of the matter would at once dissect the experience into categories. We should speak of an outer electrical process taking place in the atmosphere, and an inner physiological coefficient involving the stimulation of certain neuronic elements associated with the concept horse, and the predicate black. The greater economy of the intuitional statement has a two-fold origin. On the one hand, it employs a symbol, which contains within itself associations fitted to express the total psychological reactions; while on the other, it entirely disregards the subject-object distinction and the whole causative sequence which supply the problem for the intellect.

This illustration raises two questions which, in my view, are of paramount importance. In the first place, has the symbolical statement a validity as regards subjective or psychological reality, equal to that of our rational conclusions relating to so-called objective reality? Secondly, is the indifference of the prelogical psyche to the nature of objective reality apparent or real?

I propose to deal with the second question first, coming back to the more important problem at a later stage.

Perhaps the most striking feature in all forms of prelogical functioning is a quite irrational indifference to the real nature of objective facts. We might almost conclude that objective reality was important merely for the purpose of calling forth the appropriate mythological formation. This, however, is not the case, since the primitive has in many ways a contact with his environment of a refinement and subtlety that is more than a match for civilized brains.

Lévy-Bruhl has provided us with yet another psychological concept which helps us to understand this riddle. In his earlier work, *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures*, he laid especial stress upon the law of participation considered in relation to the principle of identity, and he termed the primitive's state of identity with his environment and tribal group *participation mystique*.

This concept is, I think, of great psychological importance, because, on the one hand, it explains the amazing cunning and instinctive sensibility of the primitive and, on the other, it helps us to understand his curious indifference to objective reality *per se*.

From the point of view of this concept the primitive is not yet distinct psychologically from his race, his ancestors, or the world in which he lives. He is continuous with his environment. Theoretically the possibility of psychological objectivity, *i.e.* the power of apprehending an object relatively uncontaminated by subjective contents, only comes into existence when the subject is able to appreciate himself as an object, *i.e.* as something distinct from the world.

Primitive man in the state of mystical participation has not yet achieved this individual orientation. Hence he has no feeling of injustice when arbitrarily arraigned to expiate some crime of which he is entirely innocent. Because a sense of justice is based upon an appreciation of the rights and claims of oneself as an individual distinct from society; and this the primitive still lacks.

On the other hand, this state of participation gives him an instinctive understanding of all natural objects in so far as they are able to affect his welfare. It is an understanding achieved not through a purely objective interest in the thing in itself, but through a spontaneous projection of libido into objects, to which he possesses an archetypal relation. The almost mystical relation existing between the primitive and the objects of his environment springs, therefore, from a subject-object identification, by which he is intuitively informed of the nature

of objects without the intervention of the rational process of cognition. The whole basis of objective reality rests upon an appreciation of the world as something distinct from ourselves. That is to say, it is a process of abstraction. To perceive a thing as it is, we abstract, as far as possible, ourselves from the thing. We let the object appear before us in its own right. To the prelogical mind of primitive man this feat of abstraction is not feasible. The world he lives in is entirely determined by his subjective representations. Objects cannot speak to him on their own account; but are immediately translated into their appropriate mythological setting. This does not mean of course that the primitive has not a very clear appreciation of his own interests, in so far as these are merely questions of perception. His perceptiveness, on the contrary, is extraordinarily acute. But a primitive in the state of mystical participation can neither contemplate himself nor anything else objectively. He has not yet achieved an integrated psychological organization.

Being psychologically merged in his group, he does not yet possess an individual judgment which could enable him to draw objective conclusions. All his conclusions are given from *a priori* representations whose pre-connections are rooted in ancestral or tribal experience.

Since, therefore, the prelogical or primitive psyche is, as it were, precluded from an objective appreciation of reality, we might try to discover whether its mythological formations correspond to some other kind of reality having no immediate relation to empirical fact.

Let us, for example, in the light of Lévy-Bruhl's concept examine one or two of the typical and widespread myths.

A glance at the various agencies claimed by legends to produce *supernatural birth* might perhaps give us a clue to our problem; since legends dealing with magical impregnation provide the frankest possible affirmation of the mystical connection we are trying to investigate. In the few examples I have chosen I would call your attention to the extraordinary range and variety of symbolified objects.

Bacchus, the son of Jupiter and Proserpine, was said to have been torn in pieces by the Titans, but his heart was pounded up and given by Jove in a drink to Semele, whence he was born again of her. This legend harmonizes with the practice among certain cannibal tribes of eating the heart or other organs of their foes for the alleged purpose of acquiring their virtues. In other myths the mere touch of the magical substance is enough to produce conception. From the blood of the mutilated Agdestis a pomegranate tree sprang up. Nana the nymph gathered and laid some of the fruit of it in her bosom, and hence Attis was born. Danae also



conceived Perseus through the shower of gold. Caeculus the founder of Praeneste was conceived by a spark that leaped into his mother's bosom. The Todas tell how an eagle fertilized a woman by sitting on her head. Medieval painters used to represent the Holy Ghost as entering the Virgin's ear in the form of a dove, or else hovering over her while the babe is carried by a ray of the sun towards the Virgin. Similarly Buddha entered his mother's right side, in the form of a white elephant. The wind and the sea are frequently endowed with fertilizing power in the birth of gods and heroes. Hera, for instance, conceived Hephaistos by simply inhaling the wind. Wenona quickened by the west wind brought Hiawatha to birth. Some of the Algonkins trace the lineage of mankind from two young squaws, who were impregnated by the foam of the sea and produced a boy and a girl. Fishes, flowers, jewels, pieces of bone from a dead man, or particular trees, stones, wells, herbs, etc. also figure largely as instruments of impregnation.

It is not necessary to extend the catalogue. The examples I have quoted are sufficient to show the wide range of libido-symbols<sup>1</sup> which can become invested with magical fertilizing power. Some of these symbols, *e.g.* fish, bone, hand, etc. are frankly phallic, some, *e.g.* sun, wind, sea, etc. are general symbols of power or fructifying energy. But many have such a local particularity, *e.g.* certain traditional stones, wells, animals, herbs, etc. that we are driven to conclude that their magic is derived from particular ancestral associations, by which the subject-object relation receives a tributary from an organized racial complex.

The life-giving release of libido invested in these subjective racial images can only be likened to the birth of some heroic figure, since, as we know, the activation of ancestral libido from its, hitherto, latent condition possesses unconditioned potentiality demanding an unconditioned mythological expression.

The point I want to bring out here is that the principle of participation operates selectively, so that we might almost liken the unconscious psyche to a pyramid whose base would represent such universal symbols as the sun, wind, sea, trees, etc., while the converging lines of the cone would suggest the increasing particularity of symbols linked up with particular tribal experience, *e.g.* totem animals, etc. This graphic figure representing the historical stratification of the unconscious would in the individual psyche have the personal unconscious as the apex of the pyramid.

I would now like to consider another class of myths, where the notion

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Jung.

of some mystical function taking place between subject and object takes a more elaborate form. I refer to the myths of transformation and metempsychosis.

There is an ancient Egyptian story of the hero Bata, which tells how, being betrayed by his wife, who had become the king's mistress, he is put to death by her machinations. Bata's brother, however, restores him to life in the form of a great bull possessing all the sacred marks. In this form, he is still able to make himself known to his wife, who thereupon asks a boon of the king in the shape of the bull's liver to eat. As the bull is slain two drops of his blood are splashed upon the door-posts of the king's house, where, forthwith, two mighty persea trees begin to grow. One of these trees accuses the king's mistress of her crimes, explaining, "I am Bata, I am living still, I have transformed myself." Whereupon she persuades the king to cut the trees down: but while she stands watching a splinter flies off, and, entering her mouth, renders her pregnant. In due time she gives birth to a son. This is none other than a new manifestation of Bata, who eventually succeeds to the throne, and has a reckoning with the woman who has been both his wife, his mother, and the instigator of his various transformations. I will not attempt to deal fully with the subtle symbolism of this myth, since its main features are enough for my purpose. It is clear that Bata is less an organized personality than a transforming and fertilizing essence.

The state of subject-object identity has become linked up to an heroic figure, whose magical superiority to the disasters brought upon him by his wife is derived from his power of transforming himself as the occasion demands. Let us examine the myth from this point of view.

It matters little whether we relate it to a single individual or to a tribe, since if it has any validity at all, a myth must depict a typical vital process which, according to their respective curves, is equally representative for both cases. The *dramatis personae* might be represented then as follows. The hero Bata personifies the positive, progressive libido, while the wife with whom his whole destiny is so intimately joined is the negative, regressive tendency. It is the conflict between this fundamental pair of opposites which brings about the necessity, and, at the same time, provides the energy for the transforming process. The brother, who restores the hero to life in the shape of the bull, would personify the mediating function of the will which works towards a reconciliation of the opposites.

As with Kundry in the Parsifal myth, the woman beautifully embodies the ambivalent negative principle which, through its efforts to destroy

the positive antithesis, provides the very means for the latter's transformation and re-birth. The sacred bull is the first step in the process. As in the Europa myth, the bull is frequently identified with supreme, god-like power. To the idea of fecundity it links associations of immense energy and power. His overpowering reserves of energy, though normally latent, may suddenly be loosed with terrifying force. Hence, the bull is a supreme expression of the positive, masculine principle of power.

It is, however, an extreme and unilateral phase. Proportion and synthesis demand a corresponding manifestation of the more stable and passive feminine principle. Therefore the transformation into the two guardian trees is the next step. Having experienced to the full the two antithetic libido principles, the time becomes ripe for the further transformation of the hero, whose magical re-birth takes place in the womb of that same figure of destiny who had consistently aimed at his destruction.

Space forbids a more adequate treatment of the psychological content of the myth, since the theme I am trying to develop is the question of the psychological significance of the subject-object identity which is an underlying pre-condition of all such formations.

I referred just now, to the selective operation of this principle, by which certain objects bearing particular ancestral associations became libido-symbols. It will be evident, I think, that a mind guided by purely rational or utilitarian considerations would never have selected such objects as the bull or the tree as objects of especial veneration. We may conclude, therefore, that the prelogical psyche has a totally different attitude to life from that of rational consciousness. The selective principle of the prelogical psyche does not apparently select objects on any rational grounds. It would seem as though an *a priori* relation of identity were established, purely because an essential character of the object corresponded in a vivid way to a specific need or urgency of the subject. Specific symbols, therefore, point to the existence of specific psychological needs which can be realized only by a feeling-into relation with specific objects. From this point of view certain selected objects of the environment become, as it were, functions of the psyche, since there is a relation of interdependence between subject and symbolified object which can only be described as a process of energy. That is to say, when the phase of individual or racial development arrives which demands the dominating, bull-like attitude, the subject-object relation to the bull becomes identified with the main racial or individual complex. Thus the natural significance of the bull becomes enormously enhanced, finally developing into a sacred and revered symbol. The winged bulls of the

Assyrian Empire are a perfect illustration of this process. When, on the other hand, the need of stable and well-rooted consolidation becomes paramount, the introverted symbol of the tree will acquire magical significance. This whole conception of a process of energy between subject and object, whereby certain objects of the environment come to operate as functions of the psyche, is in striking harmony with certain recent biological views.

In a lecture on the Fundamental Conceptions of Biology, delivered at King's College last February, Dr J. S. Haldane formulated a biological standpoint of relativity which entirely accords with the thesis I am here to support. He says: "From the biological standpoint organism and biological environment, structure and activity of structure, parts and other parts, are not things separable in thought from one another, but existing only in their relations. If we attempt to separate them from one another, they become from the biological standpoint just as meaningless as is motion or the passage of time in an empty universe." In another place he says: "Structure depends on environment and environment on structure; and if we attempt to separate living structure from its active environment we simply fail. Form, composition, activity and environment are inseparably bound up together." He goes even further and declares: "The environment is not something outside of life, and acting on it from without. Nor is life something localized within the living structure of an organism. Life is an organic whole without spatial boundaries, and hence cannot be localized definitely. What we *can* localize in relation to one another are only its manifestations, such as special organic structures or aspects of living activity. There is no more warrant for localizing life within the structure of an organism, than for localizing consciousness in the brain."

Dr Haldane also perceives that if we adopt an attitude of relativity in our biological or psychological conceptions we are immediately faced with the question of the teleological or purposive character of living processes. "If," he remarks, "we attempt to resolve the life of an organism into a number of separate processes we reach no intelligible result....The wholeness in the phenomena of life is not merely externally imposed, as in the case of a machine; and if we neglect the inherent element of wholeness we are also neglecting life itself....By studying the responses of renal excretion, of respiration, of circulation, of blood composition, of the nervous system, and of every other organ and tissue in the body, to changes in environment, we can discover how each organ or tissue plays its part in life as a whole, but if we leave out of account *life as a whole*

because this consideration *savours of teleology*<sup>1</sup>, we reach nothing but an unintelligible jumble of unconnected observations. On this point I most emphatically mean what I say.”

I have quoted Dr Haldane's words at some length, because the point of view I am trying to outline is essentially the same, and carries, as you see, far-reaching, philosophic implications. These implications go right down to the fundamental assumptions upon which the physical sciences rest. This, however, is too large a subject to enter upon in this paper. I will, therefore, confine the issue to two considerations. In the first place Dr Haldane postulates an unanalysable relation between the living organism and its environment, which is in striking harmony with Lévy-Bruhl's concept, "*Participation mystique*." Secondly, he is prepared to face the whole teleological problem as a necessary factor in the study of vital phenomena.

I would like at this point to discuss the collective representations of the primitive from the point of view of their teleological value.

Primitive psychology is orientated chiefly by motives of fear. Tibullus said, "*primum in mundo fecit deus timorem*," and in saying this he not only asserts fear to be the commanding force of the primeval world, but suggests that it is also closely identified with creative energy itself. It is impossible to study the mind of primitive races without being profoundly impressed by the way in which fear dominates their whole mentality. Associations of fear cling to everything that is unfamiliar or unknown. It would, therefore, follow that the primitive's relation to objects that are known, and have become interwoven by long habit and ancestral veneration into their lives, will acquire an enhanced or magical significance. Thus, in certain primitive languages objects of habitual use have a gender denoting 'alive,' known as the suffix of the 'thing living.' The whole theory of mystical participation involves a process by which subjective contents are projected into or merged with objects of the environment. This process is rooted in the magical importance of the subject, which in the primitive means, of course, the group or tribe. By this projection of the subject into the environment a psychological fortification is created, which is able to withstand the inroads of the unfamiliar.

In the absence, then, of an objective function of cognition, the primitive psyche, through ages of instinctual adaptation, has elaborated a system of collective representations which, operating without thought or volition, serve to bring about a magical reinforcement of the subject

<sup>1</sup> The italics are mine.

in a world governed by fear. This animation of objects by projection of subjective contents has been called animism. The primitive lives in a world of experience that is spontaneously blessed or banned by his own psychology. Undistracted by any of the problems which harass our rational or objective consciousness, his perceptions of what, in reality, are psychological transactions is extraordinarily acute. His perception of souls in the things around him, his sense of invisible forces at work, of the spirits of the dead, etc. are sensitive figurative statements of the psychological state of affairs. We are therefore entitled, I think, to draw the conclusion that this mythological activity of the prelogical psyche is concerned, not with objective facts *per se*, but rather with the shaping of attitude or behaviour towards external events. An harmonious attitude is often the crucial factor in commanding a situation, and a savage who is able to confront experience, equipped with a system of representations by which events are, as it were, already self-explained, will have an instinctual relation to the situation which carries the guarantee of his whole ancestral lineage.

The same teleological function may be noticed very clearly in many of the fertility rites. In the Panjab, for instance, the following method of obtaining issue is practised. "On the night of the feast of Diwali—always a night in the moonless half of the month—the husband draws water at seven different wells in an earthen pot, and places in the water leaves plucked from seven different sacred trees. He brings the pot to his wife at a spot where four cross-roads meet. She must bathe herself with the water unseen by anybody, and then put on new clothes, discarding her old ones." There are many other equally suggestive rites, but space forbids me to expand unduly this aspect of my theme. A brief analysis of this example must, therefore, suffice. The numbers seven and four figure so persistently in myth and dream formations, that we are almost permitted to infer a basic psychic structure or pattern corresponding to these numerical principles. Seven is of course the number associated with the legends of creation, and four, through its identification with the four quarters of the globe is linked up to the idea of orientation and individual differentiation. Thus two fundamental psychological principles are set as the ground-work of this fertility rite. Then the water from the seven wells with the leaves from the seven trees are clearly the expression of a mystical identification with the fertilizing water and the venerable fruit of the earth. The baptism at the cross-roads suggests a fresh merging or contact with the energies of life at a spot pregnant with the notion of new beginnings. The donning of new

clothes and the discarding of old ones are the frankest possible symbol of the acceptance of a new attitude and is clearly the climax of the ritual ceremony.

This idea of pregnancy being largely conditioned by psychological attitude is very widely diffused. Ovid tells how, after the Rape of the Sabines, the wives acquired by the Romans remained barren. Juno, being consulted in her sacred grove on the Esquiline, replied: "Italidas matres sacer hircus into!" An Etruscan augur interpreted the oracle as follows. He offered a goat in sacrifice; then at his command the women exposed their backs to blows from thongs cut from the hide of the goat. The happiest results followed.

It seems evident that something more drastic and thorough-going than intellectual apprehension is required for the education of the instinctual attitude. This is borne out by our experience in the analytical process, where we find that intellectual appreciation alone is never enough to bring about any lasting change. The labours of the heroes, the tortures and crucifixions of the founders of religions, the self-mortifications and mutilations of saints and ascetics in Eastern as well as Western religions, the tragic and bloody rituals of expiation and sacrifice are not explained by the glib use of descriptive terms such as masochism. We have neither understood nor correctly described these profound urgencies by a purely intellectual approach to them. We merely assert that we have recognized their existence. It is true that when we have admitted sacrifice as a law of life we have *said* little more; but at least this admission means that we have observed a general law to the operation of which we also submit.

The transformation of libido is a natural process, to which the habitual inertia of the unconscious provides a constant obstacle. No transformation can take place without the unavoidable sacrifice of something previously valued. Hence, the theme of transformation is always accompanied by the symbolism of sacrifice. The winged possibilities of the imago call upon the larva to forego his extraverted mobility, his plentiful appetite, his fine green skin, and to submit to the introverted restrictiveness of the pupa for what, to him, would seem a very problematical hereafter. The very frequent occurrence during analysis of dreams relating to animals and insects, in whose life-history metamorphosis is a serial event, surely points to the fact that corresponding processes of transformation are an integral part of psychological development. The term sublimation is, to my mind, unfitted to describe this process. Rather does it denote the process by which crude libido, being occluded from its natural expression, becomes deflected into a more sublime or social useful

channel. The channel is altered but the libido itself is unchanged. Its quality remains the same; whereas libido that has undergone transformation is essentially altered in the sense of achieving a new and more advanced integration. It is not a mere arbitrary canalization into a more civilized channel.

Normally, as we know, libido undergoes a radical transformation at birth, puberty, the climacteric and death. But these are only the principal landmarks, and in an individual who confronts life with an unconditioned attitude (*i.e.* an attitude of unreserved submission to the fundamental laws of his own being) it is true to say, that the process of libido-transformation never stands still.

Since, however, the tendency to regression and to death is very nearly as strong as the effort towards progress, the process of transformation is in constant conflict with the psychic inertia that blindly fights against every change. If, in their youth, any of my hearers have experimented in the breeding of insects, they will bear me out when I observe that the various phases of metamorphosis are accompanied by considerable mortality. Of a brood of fertilized moth's eggs, a certain percentage refuse to hatch, at every change of skin there is a certain number of reluctant larvae who fail, at the phase of pupation a certain number of full-fed larvae shrivel and die, and of the total number of healthy pupae only a certain number emerge as moths. The long road is strewn with individuals who drop out at the different milestones. In the total evolutionary procession a vastly greater number of species have regressed into extinction than have progressed towards their evolutionary goal. There exists, I think, a striking parallel to this biological history in the incidence of neurotic conditions, notably at the changes of puberty and the menopause: which seems to argue that what we term the regressive tendency in the neuroses is allied to the reluctance we find in all living things to undergo the ordeal of transformation life demands of them. Presumably the rites of initiation in the religions of the antique world and the puberty rites of primitive peoples have their *raison d'être* in this same biological fact. Hence also, the ritual scourgings in the fertility rites.

The Arthurian form of the Grail legend affords an unequivocal illustration of the mortal significance attached to the idea of the right attitude. In the Quest of the Grail it is no chance adventure befalling one individual knight, but a formal undertaking in which all participate under certain fixed rules of time and procedure—a courtly quest is for a year and a day, the knights must ride separately or in pairs, and on their return make public recital of their adventures—and the fulfilment is



closely connected with the ability to fill uninjured a vacant seat at the Round Table (the perilous seat) fraught with direst peril to whomsoever shall *wrongfully occupy it*.

From the various considerations I have submitted to you are we not justified in concluding, that an essential function of the unconscious mythological activity is the shaping and transforming of the instinctual attitude to life? From the point of view of the Zürich school, the main purpose of the analytical process is to recognize and consciously assist this process as it gradually unfolds and declares itself through dreams. For the transforming activity of the vital process has also its counterpart in psychological development. We remarked that the biological fertility of woman was found largely to depend upon a sound instinctual attitude, and experience shows that psychological fertility is also subject to the same law.

But what is the nature of this harmonious instinctual attitude which seems to be the necessary basis of human development? What do we mean by the term 'adaptation to reality'? The answer to these questions lies, I believe, in the quality of that relation between the subject and the objects of his environment, which I just now described as a process of energy. From the standpoint of energy the relative adequacy of this process in the individual case must depend on the relative plasticity, power, and differentiation of sexuality.

From the psychological point of view sexuality is the basis of the reality-function. It colours the inner and outer world of objects with a selective stain of interest and desire. By its eager, centrifugal urgency it uproots the subject from his fortified seclusion, where he tries to ward off the encroachments of the unfamiliar by an existence of lifeless monotony. It throws him into new and unexpected situations to which he must, perforce, adapt. The psychological challenge, which these new situations make, evokes an unexpected liberation of libido from the unconscious which, in its turn, calls for greater responsibility and self-control. Thus sexuality through its phantasy-play upon objects sets a man a problem, the solution of which puts the greatest test upon his character and challenges all his capacities.

A beautiful picture of this process is to be seen in Flecker's play, "Hassan." Hassan is ruthlessly uprooted from his little confectionery shop in the bazaar by an irresistible longing for Yasmin, whose real character is entirely unfitted for the moving intensity of Hassan's passion, which she ridicules. His sexuality tears him from his safe roots and blows him down the wind like thistledown, landing him, after many vicissitudes, in the intimate favour of the Caliph. Here at the Caliph's

court his basket is filled to the brim. The Caliph gives him a rich pavilion, where he finds Yasmin, the heartless but skilled harlot, already installed in his bed. He has to experience the rational cruelty and loveless friendship of the Caliph. He has to witness the damnable torments of Pervaneh, the ecstatic devotee of love. Finally convinced that a state, wherein a rational tyranny of power permits no mediation with the mystical tyranny of love, can hold no further promise, he sets out on the "golden road to Samarkand" to seek a more fitting key to the riddle of life. The moral passion, which breathes through the whole fabric of this play, clearly has its source in the conflict aroused by sexuality.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that sexuality has cut such a prominent figure in the analytical handling of the neuroses. A neurosis is an encysted condition, whereby the subject contrives to bring life, as far as possible, to a standstill. Even where his sexuality is apparently in active play it is infantile in character, and dissociated from the integrated will of the personality. Thus the whole problem of effective relationship to the world seems to hinge upon the awakening and release of the deep energies vested in the sexual complex, and the harmonious integration of these libido claims within the total personality. In reality, therefore, there are two aspects of the problem, in which sexuality represents, so to speak, only one side of the coin. The first problem of the skier is certainly to learn how to gain momentum, but the second and more difficult problem is that of controlling and directing the momentum he has gained. And herein lies the whole moral problem of analysis. It is necessary to observe that the foregoing picture is valid only for the extraverted attitude. For the introverted types the problem is constellated chiefly by the motive of power.

With this new insight let us return, for a moment, to the transformation myth of the Egyptian hero Bata. Are we not justified in interpreting the bull as the embodiment of the overwhelming force of sexuality? This phase would correspond to the extraverted problem of gaining the world, whilst the tree would symbolize the later and more difficult problem of consolidating and assimilating the experience gained through extraversion into an harmonious and fruitful expression. Thus the differentiation of sexuality must always involve a corresponding development of power and self-control. This fact is born in upon us every day in the analytical transference. The infantile dependence of the transference is very quickly established, but the transformation of this dependence into a relationship of mutual respect and responsibility is in the truest sense of the term a moral problem. The symbolic character of the analytical relationship brings naturally into the foreground the inferiority of the

patient's instinctual attitude, and the gradual education of the libido from the state of subject-object identity to more or less complete integration represents the therapeutic value of analysis.

In this case the analyst becomes the most important object in the patient's environment; the constellating symbol, as it were, through which new possibilities of life may be realized. That the energetic process taking place through the transference is the essential factor is proved by the fact, that whenever the transference is broken or is not submitted to unconditionally, the analysis fails to bring about any permanent results.

The conclusion to be drawn from this fact is that the intensity of the energetic process, taking place between the subject and the symbolified object, is directly related to the process of moral reintegration which is the objective of the analytical experience.

You may have observed how the whole argument of my paper either leads up to or revolves around the concept 'attitude.' From the point of view I am putting before you this is the pivotal factor. For the attitude of an individual towards an objective situation is the expression of the character and intensity of the total process of energy taking place between subject and object. Attitude denotes therefore a characteristic state of libido tension, by which a certain dynamic relation is established between subject and object. It will be obvious that the character of this relation must determine the total reciprocal effect of subject upon object and object upon subject. This concept not only covers the relation between subject and external object, but also includes the relation to internal objects. That is to say the quality of relation to one's own thoughts and feelings, to one's personality in whole or in part, is in many cases of greater importance than the relation to the external environment. Hence we are entitled to speak of a psychological or inner environment, just as much as an objective or outer environment. Furthermore we may define a general attitude, founded on fundamental views or convictions, and a particular attitude, expressing merely the quality of relation to a particular object or situation. Lastly, and herein lies the key to the whole problem, in so far as the total instinctual attitude of the subject is unconscious, it is determined by ancestral or archetypal representations as we saw in the primitive mentality. But in so far as we are able to appreciate and consciously realize these archetypal determinants, the instinctual attitude becomes relatively subject to the control and direction of the will. Having said this we have practically stated the whole problem of individuation.

In conclusion I would like to draw your attention to the fact that

throughout the paper I have used the term 'prelogical psyche' as a comprehensive term covering both the primitive psyche and civilized unconscious mentality. I am unable to discover any essential difference between these two forms of psychic activity. If we disregard the difference of content, we find precisely the same character and the same spontaneous, a-rational mode of activity. The superior differentiation of civilized mentality is certainly represented in the unconscious by a subtler elaboration of material and in general organization. But these are questions merely of degree. It is in the conscious function that the enormous difference lies. The conscious, however, only represents the apex of the pyramid. There is an increasing depersonalization of content the further we recede from the threshold of consciousness; so that the main character of the unconscious is impersonal or collective. Moreover, every instinct has two tributaries, of which the deeper and more determining is always the impersonal.

The point of view I have attempted to outline to-night is concerned with man, not as a more or less isolated unit moved by typical mechanisms, but as an individual leaf, so to speak, of the tree of life; yet a leaf whose real nature cannot be understood until it is also viewed as a function of the whole. The attempt to formulate the integral psychological relation between the individual and his total inner and outer environment necessitates the use of concepts whose implications are not readily grasped by a purely intellectual consideration. Concepts such as the collective unconscious, mystical participation, collective representations, and the like are essentially intuitional. They are admittedly provisional, since the phenomena they embrace are still to a large extent unexplored. General psychological concepts, which can embrace the totality of the individual with the infinite range and complexity of his ancestral and impersonal determinants, have very largely still to be made. But if we were to shrink from this necessity, which lies directly in our path, because of the extreme difficulty and complexity of the problems involved, we should be condemned to that same neurotic inferno from which we daily try to extricate our patients.

A purely intellectual or analytical approach, which can only see life piecemeal, is obviously incompetent to perform this task. But fortunately we have also at our command the synthetic function of intuition, and it is my belief that we shall never possess a psychology worthy of the dignity of man, until we are able to confer upon our intuitional conclusions the same authority that we give to our rational deductions.

I am fully aware that this step would involve the final overthrow of the mechanistic conception of vital phenomena, and the establishing of psychology as an independent science. All honour to Jung for laying the first axe to this relic of nineteenth century materialism.

But it would be a mistake, I think, to regard this as merely a question of the relative value of the views of Jung, or Freud, or Adler, or Rivers or whoever it may be. It is a question of the fundamental assumptions upon which the science of psychology can be soundly built. No more fitting conclusion to this evening's paper could be found than the words of one of the most impartial and critical minds of the day. In his summing-up of a fine review of Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Dr T. W. Mitchell makes this weighty criticism: "The pessimism which hangs like a cloud over the whole of this essay is perhaps the inevitable outcome of a belief, however achieved, in a mechanistic theory of life; and perhaps the criticism which will, in the end, invalidate Freud's arguments, may come, not from those who dispute the accuracy of his deductions, but from those who question the fundamental assumption on which all his reasoning rests—the assumption that all the phenomena of life and mind can be interpreted in terms of the physical sciences. Freud has invoked the myth of Aristophanes in aid of his speculations; is it permissible to appeal to the other myth in the Symposium, the discourse of Diotima? 'What then is Eros? is he mortal? Nay, Mortal he verily is not'." In these words our president cuts down to the very marrow of the problem, where constructive criticism must always strive to reach. But Freud after all, is not the originator of this fundamental assumption. It is, indeed, doubtful whether, until quite recently, he even stopped to examine it. It is an inheritance naturally adopted from the physical sciences, and for this reason a certain ancestral magic clings to it. By following the purely empirical and analytical method of the older sciences we have produced an unparalleled dismemberment of the human organism. We have regarded man from the embryological, anatomical, morphological, physiological, pathological, histological, biological, and sociological points of view and have amassed a prodigious aggregation of physical data, which certainly extends our knowledge but has not, correspondingly, deepened our wisdom. Is not the time ripe when these immense, but rather sterile labours of the intellect should become integrated in a new and living synthesis? And by what spiritual force will science be moved to a comprehensive understanding of man as a totality, if not by the breath of that Immortal whom the ancients called Eros?

## CRITICAL NOTICE

*A Critical Examination of Psycho-Analysis.* By A. WOHLGEMUTH, D.Sc. (Lond.). London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1923. Pp. 250. Price 10s. 6d.

Dr Wohlgemuth differs from most other critics of psycho-analysis in that he is whole-hearted in his condemnation. With him there is no question of qualified approval or disapproval: psycho-analysis does not err merely through 'exaggeration,' 'one-sidedness,' 'far-fetchedness,' 'over-emphasis of sex,' or any of the similar attributes which form the burden of so many criticisms; for him the whole doctrine is, rather, utter nonsense from beginning to end; it does not possess a single redeeming feature which should entitle it to a moment's consideration or toleration at the hands of scientific psychologists. In his exposure of "the inherent absurdity of Freud's teaching," Dr Wohlgemuth takes the view that "ce n'est que le ridicule qui tue" and consequently adopts deliberately as his most cherished weapon the *reductio ad absurdum*. But this does not mean that we are not to take his criticisms seriously. Dr Wohlgemuth feels very strongly on the importance of exposing the frauds that have been so impudently practised in the name of science, and he expresses his feelings with such vigour that the book is very far from being the "dispassionate examination" that the publishers' cover announces it to be. But what it may lose in dignity from this cause it certainly makes up in force and liveliness, so that, whatever may be its qualities or defects in other directions, Dr Wohlgemuth's criticism has undoubtedly the merit of being very readable. In certain respects too the book undoubtedly forces the reader to get to grips with some of the main problems involved in the acceptance or rejection of the results of psycho-analysis; problems which are very probably destined to play a large part in the history of psychology in the near future. Dr Wohlgemuth approached psycho-analysis as a student of experimental psychology—a branch of science in which he has done work of a high order—and his judgment of psycho-analysis probably gives expression in an extreme form to doubts and difficulties that are felt in some degree by many others whose activities have lain chiefly in the field of experimentation; doubts and difficulties therefore which are worthy of careful consideration, especially by those who would like to see a *rapprochement* between the psychologists of the laboratory and those of the consulting room.

Dr Wohlgemuth's chief and constantly reiterated complaint is that in the writings of psycho-analysts he can find only 'assertions,' never any 'proofs.' It is to be regretted that he does not indicate more clearly what he would be prepared to regard as valid proof of the contentions of the psycho-analysts. There is here undoubtedly a very real difficulty—one to which Freud himself has clearly drawn attention in the first of his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* (a work which, like nearly all the more recent contributions to psycho-analysis, Dr Wohlgemuth has not thought it worth his while to read). Psycho-analysis is, it must be granted, in a singularly disadvantageous position with regard to furnishing evidence that can be easily collected or evaluated. It is admitted that conviction is most easily obtained by carrying out analyses—in

the capacity, first of analysand, and then of analyst. But conviction obtained in such a way is, Dr Wohlgemuth maintains, quite worthless, as by the time that assurance is reached, the investigator has been subject to a long and subtle process of suggestion. There is of course, as Freud points out, the alternate method of auto-analysis. Dr Wohlgemuth has tried this method and gives us some of his results—largely, it would seem, with a view to producing the effect of a *reductio ad absurdum*. But in these he in his turn will certainly fail to convince the psycho-analysts. In the first place it would seem pretty clear that the motive of discrediting psycho-analysis was a factor in Dr Wohlgemuth's mind at the time of undertaking the analysis (similar motives are of course not unfamiliar to analysts in the case of actual patients) and such absurdity as there may be in the analyses here recorded may be due to the unconscious operation of this motive. Secondly it is evident that—again perhaps under the influence of this motive—Dr Wohlgemuth has often failed to abandon the conscious control of his thoughts; and has furthermore failed to distinguish the results obtained under conscious guidance from those obtained by free association in the psycho-analytic sense. This is strikingly the case in dealing with Silberer's treatment of symbolism in folk-tales. After criticising Silberer's 'analytic' and 'anagogic' interpretations, he himself contributes two further, as he claims, "more complete and more thorough-going" interpretations of his own, the "oneirocritic" and "creopolic" interpretations, and adds:

If any of my readers is suffering from ennui and his time hangs heavily on his hands, instead of solving the chess problem in his Sunday paper, let him try another interpretation of the story, according to his tastes; it may be a 'cricketecritic' or a 'footballic' interpretation. He will be delighted with the ease with which it can be done, and he may be sure it is correct, for are we not told over and over again that such a solution is a proof in itself of its correctness, and that such an agreement cannot be due to chance? (p. 143).

The last sentence shows clearly enough that he has failed to keep in mind the above mentioned all-important distinction between 'free' and 'consciously controlled' associations. Associations carried out with the avowed intention of providing an interpretation of a particular kind—'cricketecritic' or other—belong of course to the latter category. If the reader endeavours to carry out a real psycho-analysis by the free association method, it is probable that he will be very far from being "delighted with the ease with which it can be done." On the contrary, it will then turn out that the interpretation of the simplest dream is often a task of extreme difficulty requiring much patience and perseverance in the face of obstacles; if successful however the auto-analyst will be rewarded by discovering some motive which he did not recognise before as operative, at any rate as operative in the particular case under consideration. A perusal of his book is calculated to make one doubt whether Dr Wohlgemuth's analyses have ever been sufficiently whole-hearted to enable him to experience a discovery of this kind. Most analysts have encountered patients who produce consciously elaborated dream analyses similar to the interpretations here attempted by Dr Wohlgemuth. They have learnt to treat such conscious elaborations as an upper stratum which must be circumvented or worked through before the analytical work proper can begin. They know too, that these elaborations often serve as resistances to the exploration of the unconscious, in much the same way as Dr Wohlgemuth uses his interpretations to prove the futility of further preoccupation with analysis.

Another feature of Dr Wohlge-muth's analytic methods is also familiar to analysts through clinical experience, namely the desire on the part of patients to exchange rôles and turn the tables on the analyst by becoming far more interested in the personality of the latter than in their own concerns. Thus Dr Wohlge-muth advises his readers to have no hesitation in telling their dreams; the interpretation will afford "a sure indication of the type of mind of the interpreter" (p. 95).

The root of Dr Wohlge-muth's unwillingness to see anything of value whatsoever in psycho-analysis lies, it would seem (so far as it permits of formulation in purely intellectual terms), in his inability to understand or use the concept of the Unconscious. His objections to the Unconscious follow the lines adopted by most previous critics. Having defined the psychic as the conscious, it is easy for him to show that the 'Unconscious'='Unconscious consciousness,' which is absurd. He does not show however that it is necessarily absurd to suppose that the conscious is not co-terminous with the psychic, and yet, since many eminent thinkers have adopted this supposition quite independently of psycho-analysis, it is to this point that any sound criticism of the 'Unconscious' should really be directed. It would be itself an interesting psychological problem to determine why it is that the Unconscious seems quite a permissible and useful concept to some psychologists and quite absurd to others. In Dr Wohlge-muth's case the proximate cause of the attitude adopted would seem to lie in what may not unfairly be called a materialistic bias; to him it seems so very self-evident that, where introspection fails, any attempted explanations must be made in physiological terms. To the present reviewer it does not seem clear why hypotheses concerning neural dispositions are any more scientific than explanations in terms of unconscious processes. Let us attempt both methods by all means; either will be justified in so far as it enables us to understand and control conscious phenomena. For the present it appears to many of us that psychological hypotheses are in many cases the more illuminating. In the future the position may be reversed; but while we are awaiting the hoped for advances in the physiology of the central nervous system, let us see what can be done with the view that the many gaps in consciousness are somehow filled up by processes which, although not conscious, can nevertheless be regarded as in certain important respects analogous to consciousness, so that we can apply to them the terms descriptive of the various aspects of consciousness. In the realm of the functional neuroses at any rate this view has, in the opinion of many students, proved itself the more helpful in the present state of our knowledge; and, after all, it is closely similar to the views of physicists, when they use such concepts as 'atoms,' 'molecules' or 'ether waves'; entities which have never been perceived (just as the Unconscious has never been introspected) but which are regarded as analogous to certain perceptual phenomena.

It would be impossible even in a very long review to deal with all Dr Wohlge-muth's detailed criticisms, covering, as these do, a very wide field which embraces 'Dreams,' 'Symbolisms,' the 'Oedipus Complex,' 'Homosexuality,' 'Method and Suggestion,' 'Numbers,' 'Slips of the Tongue or Pen,' etc. The reader will have to pass his own judgment upon the validity of most of these criticisms. Some indication however of the nature and profundity of these criticisms must be attempted here.

Among the objections brought forward there are some which are very difficult to understand, inasmuch as they seem fairly to play into the hands



of the enemy. Thus the following incidents, apparently quoted as evidence against psycho-analysis seem to cry out for a psycho-analytical interpretation:

Quoting a line from Shelley's *Oedipus Tyrannus* [a friend] wrote: "All is sealed up with the broad seal of fraud."—Freud—Oedipus—Fraud?—When I met my friend the following day, and drew his attention to the *lapsus calami*, he smiled, but declined to be psycho-analysed.

Another correspondent with whom I had discussed the question of Freud's "Anal Eroticism" persistently wrote 'psycho-analists.'

Another friend of mine discoursing upon Sir Oliver Lodge's arguments in favour of spiritualism wrote to me that he considered them quite *Lodgeal* (p. 205).

With regard to these cases we are surely justified in quoting Dr Wohlgenuth himself in another connection to the effect that "comment is superfluous."

In other cases Dr Wohlgenuth's arguments do not touch the real point at issue. Refusing to grant the possibility of the existence of unconscious tendencies, he endeavours to show the absence of the alleged tendencies by appeal to introspection. This is particularly true with regard to his attempted refutation of the supposed existence of latent homosexual tendencies. Relying on the "delicate and powerful instrument" of introspection in a trained observer, he carried out the enterprising and heroic experiment of endeavouring to arouse sexual excitement in himself by the contemplation of men encountered casually in public vehicles and public places. The results were always negative, however pleasing in other respects the objects selected for the experiment. It mattered not whether the attempt was made with "the martial figure of the dashing soldier or the brainy and intellectual countenance of the thinker, the athlete, or the delicate and dreamy artist...in no single case [was he ever able] to discover the slightest trace of libido" (pp. 157, 158). This however (as is indeed admitted at the end of the chapter) proves nothing with regard to those aspects of the mind—should such exist—which are not accessible to the "delicate instrument" employed, and the experiment is therefore irrelevant as a criticism of psycho-analysis, however interesting and illuminating it may be in other respects.

Among other arguments which leave the real issue untouched are those dealing with symbolism. Apart from the remarks on Silberer's 'anagogic' symbols to which we have already referred, most of the chapter on symbolism is taken up in showing that symbols (particularly phallic symbols) may have other meanings than those stressed by psycho-analysts, and that these latter meanings may occur without the accompaniment of the corresponding symbols. Neither of these facts has ever been denied by psycho-analysts and neither of them disproves the existence of symbols in the psycho-analytic sense—*i.e.* where the meaning of the symbol is unconscious—nor the importance of the distinction between these 'true symbols,' as Ernest Jones has called them (the present writer has suggested that they might perhaps be more conveniently termed 'cryptophors'), and other symbols ('metaphors' in Ernest Jones' terminology) where the meaning is readily accessible.

In other cases again, the criticisms advanced, though superficially striking and pointing perhaps to incautious or inexact expression on the part of psycho-analytic writers, scarcely affect the underlying doctrine, except perhaps in so far as they may show the desirability of more precise formulations (and in so far as they do this they have of course some value). Thus, a good debating point is scored when, with reference to the definition of the Censor as "the sum total of repressing inhibitions," it is asked how the Censor can possess certain qualities which have been predicated of it, *e.g.* an "*esprit d'escalier*"

or "an ability to interpose a doubt in the subject's mind" (pp. 84, 85). This certainly seems paradoxical at first sight, but if we regard the inhibitions as active tendencies or 'wishes' (as from one point of view we surely must) there is nothing really absurd in either of these statements concerning the Censor as above defined.

Certain other criticisms of a similar kind are obviously based on misunderstandings, often of a verbal nature, as when scorn is poured on a statement concerning an "objectionable and superficial association" or "a correct and deeper reaching connection" on the ground that

this connection, or association, itself is not a psychical element, although all thought depends upon it. How, then, can this mere connection be objectionable, or superficial, or correct, or deeper reaching? This is perfectly meaningless. The association may be strong or weak, but that is all that can be predicated of it (p. 73).

This is in reality a purely dialectical argument, for it is obvious from the context that what is really meant is an idea called up by association and of such a nature as to throw light on the connection between two other ideas.

As already indicated the *reductio ad absurdum* is a favourite weapon, which is resorted to freely throughout the book and lends itself to some amusing banter. At least one example of its use deserves to be quoted. We may select that which relates to Freud's view of the sleep-preserving function of dreams:

That the "dream is the protector of sleep, not its interrupter!", that the function of the dream, as Ernest Jones says, is to protect sleep by stilling the activity of the unconscious mental processes that would otherwise disturb it, appears to me about as intelligible as if I were told that the function of the bath was to keep the bather dry by letting the water run over him. But, I suppose, I am too simple.

Denn ein vollkommener Widerspruch

Bleibt gleich geheimnisvoll für Kluge wie für Toren,

says Goethe's Mephistopheles. When I went to bed, say, at half-past eleven and hardly had time to switch off the light before I fell asleep in a certain position, and then suddenly—brrrrr—! "Oh! bless it! there is that wretched alarm already!"—I awakened in the same position in which I fell asleep, after seven hours of dreamless uninterrupted sleep, then my poor sleep had not been protected. But when I had turned from being on my back on to the left side, and from the left side I tossed on to the right, when I breathless tried to scale a wall, or to run away from a big red lobster that pursued me, when I flew through the air and expected to drop down every moment, or was sure that I had committed a murder and was going to be arrested and hanged—then I now know that my sleep was protected. I wronged in my ignorance the lobster mayonnaise and falsely accused the cucumber salad of the previous night's dinner. Well, we live to learn! (pp. 63, 64).

To this criticism the psycho-analyst will naturally reply that the assumption of the author's sleep *not* having been protected when it was dreamless or uninterrupted is an unproved one. On Freud's theory it would naturally be supposed that in this case the Censor was working not less but more efficiently, or else that the disturbing stimuli (sensory or orectic) were less intense.

The best *prima facie* case made out by Dr Wohlgenuth is probably that with regard to suggestion, to which, in his view (as of course in that of many other critics) is due all the therapeutic success of psycho-analysis; and through which all the supposed clinical evidence for psycho-analytic views is, he holds, invalidated. He quotes various psycho-analytic writers who admit the operation of suggestive factors in the psycho-analytic technique and who openly state that in the course of an analysis the analyst has always to some extent to supply "to the patient the respective expectation ideas (Erwartungsvorstellungen) by means of which he (the patient)

shall be enabled to recognise that which is unconscious and seize it." He also quotes a portion of the published analysis of 'little Hans' to show that "in practically every extract quoted the little fellow is made to say what his father wants him to say" and that "the boy has been corrupted to afford gratification to the sexual phantasies of his psycho-analysts," concerning whom some very unflattering remarks are made in passing. Now it is pretty generally recognised that the precise nature of the rôle of suggestion in psycho-analysis is a difficult and complex question, one on which it is hard to convince a sceptic that the so-called results are not put into the patient's head by an analyst, who himself has been similarly infected with the psycho-analytic doctrine during his own previous analysis. This is one of the matters in which, it must be confessed, psycho-analysis is, as already mentioned, in a peculiarly difficult position with regard to the furnishing of 'proofs,' and in which it is exceedingly hard to find any common ground of agreement between believers and non-believers. Either the critic is unacquainted with the intimate working of the analytic method (as we tried to show above in pretty clearly the case with Dr Wohlgenuth) and is therefore scarcely in a position to form a sound judgment on an admittedly difficult matter; or else, having undertaken the necessary study of the method, he expresses his belief that the results are not due to suggestion, in which case his testimony is discounted by the sceptic on the ground that he is now himself under the influence of suggestion. It is true that those who have worked by both psycho-analytic and suggestion methods allege, as an argument in favour of the ultimate difference of the factors involved in the two cases, that the therapeutic results obtained by the former method are far more stable and less capricious than those obtained by the latter. But they have published no figures that would convince a sceptical experimental psychologist, and even if they did provide otherwise satisfactory numerical results, these might only be held to show that suggestion in the form of psycho-analysis was more effective than suggestion of a simple and more direct kind.

In view of this deadlock, it is all the more desirable to see whether processes similar to those claimed to have been discovered by psycho-analysts can be discovered in cases where there can be no question of the operation of suggestion. Such cases have been found in demented and paranoiacs who, when studied by psycho-analysts, appear to exhibit much the same mechanisms as those found in normal and psycho-neurotic individuals; although they do not share the suggestibility of these latter. A careful examination of the psycho-analytic findings in these cases should therefore be one of the chief points of attack by those who maintain that the discoveries claimed by psycho-analysts are really only artifacts due to suggestion. Such an examination is unfortunately not undertaken in the present work. Data that are if possible still free from the influence of suggestion are provided also by the study of mythology and folklore, of literature and of the lives of historical personages. These fields of research possess also the immense advantage that the full data are available to the critic as well as to the psycho-analyst himself. Within these fields Dr Wohlgenuth refers only to the symbolism of folklore where, as already noted, he confines himself chiefly to the possibility of other interpretations (interpretations which are not denied by psycho-analysts), and to one case from literature—Freud's interpretation of Jensen's 'Gradiva.' He is very shocked at this interpretation, and holds the view that in this application of his method to literature Freud has himself performed a control experiment

which proves the worthlessness of his dream interpretation, since this interpretation is here applied without obtaining free associations from the dreamer. But surely it is permissible to apply explanations that have been obtained from cases with full data—in this case free associations—to other cases where the data are incomplete, with a view to seeing how far these explanations will work with the limited data available. Such a process is carried out constantly both in everyday matters and in science, particularly in comparative science. Dr Wohlgeomuth would perhaps reply that a real dream and an artificial dream invented by a novelist are too far apart to admit of any valid comparison. But yet both are products of the human mind; certain imaginative writers have admitted that their dreams have not been without influence on their artistic creations; and moreover it has often been recognised even by psychologists untainted by psycho-analysis that good writers of fiction have a fine intuitive knowledge of the workings of the mind. Is there anything necessarily absurd then in Freud's endeavour to see whether the novelist's artificial dreams could be shown to obey the same laws as those which he thought he had discovered in the case of living patients?

From our above remarks on psycho-analysis and suggestion, it may perhaps have been concluded that Dr Wohlgeomuth's critical account is adequate in so far as it concerns the purely clinical material. Unfortunately this is not the case. It is, as we have said, generally admitted by psycho-analysts themselves that the problems connected with the rôle of suggestion in psycho-analysis are far from easy. They have for long been endeavouring to make clearer the nature of this rôle, with results that have thrown light not only on psycho-analytic procedure but also on the nature of suggestion itself. Dr Wohlgeomuth takes no account whatsoever of this work. He makes no reference even to the subject of Transference, which should surely be the central point in any treatment of suggestion in relation to psycho-analysis. He is therefore unable to consider the claims of psycho-analysts that psycho-analysis differs in a most important respect from all other methods of psycho-therapy, in that the factors underlying the suggestive influences are themselves undermined by being made the object of analysis. In the last resort therefore the considerations on suggestion, in spite of their more imposing appearance on the surface, get but little nearer the heart of the matter than do the author's other criticisms.

It is a relief to turn in conclusion to certain points with regard to which Dr Wohlgeomuth would seem to have really provided critical material of some value. In the opinion of the present reviewer, there are two main points of this kind. In his preliminary "Psychological Statement," Dr Wohlgeomuth reviews the experimental evidence with regard to the forgetting of pleasant and unpleasant experiences respectively and adds some further material of his own, obtained by extensive experiments on school children. He appears to make out a good case for believing that, so far as the existing experimental evidence goes, there is, on the whole, no tendency to forget unpleasant experiences to a greater extent than pleasant experiences. This seems to be in genuine contradiction to the views held by psycho-analysts and points to the need for further experimentation, if these views are to be maintained or at any rate brought into harmony with the results of experimental psychology. It seems to the present reviewer that four problems especially deserve consideration in such experimentation as may be undertaken in the near future. These are: (1) the influence and incidence of 'memory optimism,' *i.e.* the

tendency for the memory of an experience to be more pleasantly (or less unpleasantly) toned than the experience itself; (2) the difference between memories of objective events and memories of subjective experiences, so far as these can be separated; (3) the extent to which affective tone influences the *first* recall in experiments, such as those of Kowalewski and of Dr Wohlgemuth himself; (4) the relation to pleasure and unpleasure of Whately Smith's 'positive and negative affective tones,' should be determined, in the event of the existence of these separate kinds of 'affective tone' being corroborated (Dr Wohlgemuth is perhaps rather unduly sceptical as to the value of Whately Smith's experiments).

The other point in Dr Wohlgemuth's book which seems to indicate the desirability of further work arises from the demand for control experiments in such matters as the analysis of numbers; the control experiment taking the form of an attempt to analyse a series of digits determined by chance or selected by some person other than the analysand. It seems clear that free association starting from any number will, sooner or later, reveal the existence of unconscious affects. The question is how far free associations from a chance number will provide an explanation of that number comparable to that provided by free associations from a number selected by the analysand himself. If the explanations work equally well in both cases, the view that the selection of a particular number by the analysand was determined by unconscious factors revealed by free associations must be regarded as unproved, so far at least as evidence from this source is concerned. It would seem that experimental work on these lines might prove very useful and illuminating. But in carrying out such work it will be most important to keep account of the extent to which the associations are really 'free,' *i.e.* undetermined by a conscious endeavour to find an interpretation of the numbers. As we have seen, it is pretty clear that Dr Wohlgemuth has failed to realise the importance of this factor in his own work. Similar control experiments might perhaps also be made with profit in the case of dreams (analysis of other persons' dreams, etc.), though here the conditions are undoubtedly more complicated in a variety of ways; more especially, allowance will have to be made (as also of course to some extent in the case of numbers) for the similarity of associative processes in different individuals (Marbe's 'Gleichförmigkeit des psychischen Geschehens'). Bleuler appears to be so far the only investigator who has realised the importance of work along these lines; but his published experiments are too few and unsystematic to be of much value in themselves. This is eminently a matter which demands the co-operation of the psycho-analyst and the experimental psychologist.

In the course of his book Dr Wohlgemuth has many harsh things to say of psycho-analysts. But 'the most unkindest cut of all' is reserved for his very last paragraph. He here tells us:

That I have not written this criticism before has its reason in this: For psycho-logists, in general, psycho-analysis was stillborn, and has ever been as dead as a door nail. Only when, owing to the propaganda of psycho-analysts in the press, the general public began to take an interest in the subject, but especially when I saw that some medical men, and, worse still, educationists appeared to be taken in by the psycho-analytic confidence trick, did I decide to warn the unwary (p. 246).

It would be interesting to know where Dr Wohlgemuth has come across "the propaganda of psycho-analysts in the press." As far as the present writer can ascertain, psycho-analysts have taken but very little trouble to present their case

in the columns of the general newspapers, and in so far as they have attempted to do so (usually to point out some gross misstatement or to draw attention to some important fact that had been overlooked, *e.g.* the existence of a society in Great Britain, admission to which was confined to those who had shown an adequate knowledge of psycho-analysis), they have frequently been refused a hearing. Meanwhile the press has from time to time been filled with articles and letters—often enough vituperative in tone—on the ‘dangers’ of psycho-analysis. If psycho-analysts have *indirectly* received some little public attention through this press campaign, they can surely not be blamed for the inevitable consequences of the virulence of their opponents. If you pour mud on a man in a public place, you necessarily make him conspicuous, but it is veritably adding insult to injury to accuse him then of trying to advertise himself by appearing in this condition!

Fierce as his attack is, Dr Wohlgenuth does however sometimes give indications of a more friendly attitude beneath the surface. If we are to believe these indications, we may perhaps allow ourselves to suppose that he regards his castigation of psycho-analysts as a sacred but painful duty and that he approaches it in much the same spirit as that in which, according to a conventional tradition, parents undertake the corporal punishment of their disobedient offspring or schoolmasters that of their unruly charges. “I am sorry,” he says, “that I have had to criticise some good friends rather severely. ...However I console myself with the knowledge that my said friends and I labour for the same common purpose, that is, the establishment of Truth.” Perhaps after all, in a more kindly mood, he might have said of the psycho-analyst, as Longfellow’s Recording Angel said of Lucifer:

He too .....  
 .....labours for some good  
 By us not understood!

J. C. FLÜGEL.

## REVIEWS

*Traité de Psychologie.* Par G. DUMAS, avec la collaboration de MM. L. Barat, G. Belot, Ch. Blondel, B. Bourdon, F. Challaye, Ph. Chaslin, Fd. Claparède, J. Dagnau, G. Davy, H. Delacroix, L. Dugas, P. Janet, A. Lalande, J. P. Langlois, L. Lopicque, A. Mayer, I. Meyerson, H. Piéron, G. Poyer, Et. Rabaud, G. Revault d'Alloues, A. Rey, A. Tournay, H. Wallon. *Tome premier:* 1 volume in-8, de viii—967 pages: 40 fr. (Librairie Félix Alcan).

This encyclopedic treatise on psychology which saw the light in 1923, was, in reality, nearly completed in 1914, but its publication was prevented by the outbreak of the Great War. Three of the original collaborators—MM. Lamarque, Barat and Dagnau—gave their lives for their country. Contributions from the two latter, however, have been embodied in the present work. M. Ribot's preface is dated June, 1914: he died in 1916, and this book is dedicated to his memory. Of its object, surely, everyone will approve. The vast field of psychological investigation cannot be surveyed except cursorily and inadequately by a single writer. The twenty-five collaborators who have contributed to this work enjoyed a double advantage. Each could work on a topic for which he was specially competent, and all could work at the same time. So the first but unpublished edition was ready in three years. The great difficulty was naturally to secure some sort of unity in the points of view of so many contributors. M. Ribot warns us that we cannot expect from them "une entente complète," for in psychology the facts are often not definitely established, there are opposing theories without predominant evidence either way, and unity must not be purchased by the sacrifice either of detail or of truth—"La véritable unité de ce volumineux ouvrage est dans son but et sa méthode, dans la conception d'une psychologie expérimentale et autonome." That is to say the point of view is just that which we are familiar with in Ribot's own works. Psychology is taken to be a part of biology and not a part of philosophy, and it is claimed that every problem has been approached by the methods which appeared fittest to elucidate it, "depuis l'introspection jusqu'à la psychologie de laboratoire et la psychologie pathologique."

The present volume begins with an introduction on the object and methods of psychology. In Book I are contained expositions of biological and physiological matters preliminary to Psychology proper. (The place of man in the animal series—the weight of the brain and intelligence—the nervous system, etc.) Book II sets out the elements of mental life; Book III the sensory-motor associations (including, rather strangely, language); Book IV the general forms of organisation, including (of special interest to readers of this *Journal*), "La tension psychologique et ses oscillations," by M. Pierre Janet.

The treatise may be commended to the attention of all psychologists. Pathological psychology will be treated in the second volume.

A. ROBINSON.

*Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis.* By ERNEST JONES, M.D. The International Psycho-Analytical Press. London and Vienna. 1923. Pp. 454. Price 18s. net.

In this volume Dr Jones has brought together some essays in applied Psycho-Analysis which he has contributed to various journals during the last fourteen years. The range of subjects on which he discourses and the extent of the field over which psycho-analytical theory can be applied may be gathered from the observation that the book opens with 'A Psycho-Analytic Study of Hamlet' and ends with 'A Psycho-Analytic Study of the Holy Ghost.' Of the intervening chapters the most substantial are those on 'The Symbolic Significance of Salt in Folk-lore and Superstition,' 'The God Complex,' and 'The Madonna's Conception through the Ear.' In all of these Dr Jones displays a masterly marshalling of the material brought forward in support of his contentions, and a sweet reasonableness in argument which might be supposed to make the most resistant reader exclaim, "almost thou persuadest me." But this is no book for beginners, and if the reader has had no previous introduction to psycho-analytic theory, he will not be convinced. To those, however, who are acquainted with the more abstruse parts of Freud's teaching and have accepted its fundamental principles, Dr Jones's essays will be full of interest and instruction.

Probably the essay on Hamlet is that which will appeal to the widest circle of readers and, outside the ranks of the psycho-analysts, arouse more discussion, if not more opposition, than any of the others. To psycho-analysts, on the other hand, the thesis here sustained with much learning and ingenuity will appear so self-evident that it hardly needs defending. That this should be so is a significant indication of the profound effect on one's whole outlook on life and its problems that is produced by acceptance of the doctrines of Psycho-Analysis. Hamlet's vacillation in the matter of avenging his father's murder has been a riddle to generations of commentators and the explanations given have, one and all, proved unsatisfying. Yet to the psycho-analyst, who has daily evidence of the inhibitions and compulsions arising from the Oedipus situation, the significance of Hamlet's behaviour is clear and unmistakable. No other explanation is possible; none other is necessary.

A similar inevitableness of interpretation produced by psycho-analytical experience is brought out by Dr Jones in his paper on 'The Symbolic Significance of Salt': "the faultless illumination that every detail of the customs and beliefs relating to salt receive as soon as their symbolic signification is recognised, and the impossibility of adequately explaining them on any other basis, are considerations that render it exceedingly difficult to contest the hypothesis here sustained" (p. 200).

The essay on 'The God Complex' is one of which it may confidently be predicted that owners of this book will be found who are 'reading it again.' Like the author's 'Anal-erotic Character Traits,' in his *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, it will provide endless entertainment to those who take delight in 'spotting' the complexes on which the proclivities or peccadilloes of their friends are based. But such a reader will have to proceed warily, for *interest in psychology* is one of the diagnostic signs of the presence of the complex. He will therefore have to keep one eye upon his own character traits while he keeps the other upon those of his friends. He may find it hard that his modesty and self-effacement should be used as evidence against him, but he will pluck



up courage when he finds that "one of the most distressing character traits of this type under consideration is the *attitude of disinclination towards the acceptance of new knowledge*." This at least, he thinks, cannot apply to him; he has always rather prided himself on his openness of mind and his readiness to accept new ideas. But his complacency is short-lived, for, ten lines further on he learns that "men with this type of character talk even more than other men about their capacity to assimilate new ideas, and are sometimes lavish in their abstract admiration for the new." He does however get some comfort when he finds that "one of the most characteristic of all the present series of character traits is the person's firm belief in his ability to *foretell the weather*"; for he knows he has never attempted or pretended to be weather-wise. And this time it does not seem to be a case of 'heads I win, tails you lose,' for, whereas "it is practically pathognomonic of the God-complex when a man maintains that he can invariably foretell a thunderstorm," no imputation seems to rest on the man who protests that he cannot foretell a thunderstorm even when its approach might seem obvious to the meanest understanding.

'The Madonna's Conception through the Ear' is described as a contribution to the relation between Aesthetics and Religion, and the thesis maintained is that the close relation between the two is due to the intimate connection between their respective roots. The main motives of religious activities and rites are traced to infantile interests concerned with incestuous phantasies. Aesthetic interests and artistic activities are held to be reactions against infantile coprophilic tendencies. In the artist's striving for beauty "the reaction against them lies behind the striving, and the sublimation of them behind the forms that the striving takes" (p. 263). Since both infantile coprophilia and incestuous phantasies are forms of infantile sexuality, it is quite intelligible that their sublimated derivatives, even in their most developed forms, should have an equally close relation to each other.

The problem discussed in the final essay—the replacement of the Mother by the Holy Ghost in the Christian Trinity—is closely connected with the research pursued in the essay on 'The Madonna's Conception.' Dr Jones suggests that "the replacement of the Mother-Goddess by the Holy Ghost is a manifestation of the desirability of renouncing incestuous and parricidal wishes and replacing them by a stronger attachment to the Father" (p. 425). The history of Christianity seems to show that this solution was not entirely successful. "The human need for a Mother to worship was too strong, so that She had to be reinstated," as is seen in the return of the Catholic Church to Mariolatry. The Protestant Reformation was an attempt to reinforce the original solution.

Among the shorter papers included in this volume are two on 'War and Individual Psychology' and 'War and Sublimation.' In both of these we get the impression that Dr Jones is not so sure of himself as usual; but this is probably due to the nature of the audiences to which these papers were originally addressed, and the necessity for an ingratiating approach which would not ruffle their susceptibilities and might overcome their resistances.

Finally, mention must be made of an essay, full of sympathetic understanding, on 'The Island of Ireland.' It is put forward as 'A Psycho-Analytical Contribution to Political Psychology.' The nature of the conceptions suggested by a psycho-analytic study of the history and literature of Ireland may be gathered from the following quotation: "I may perhaps be permitted to suggest that possibly history would have been different if England had had more

inkling of the considerations here mentioned and had, instead of ravishing virgin Ireland as though she were a harlot, wooed her with the offer of an honourable alliance" (p. 414).

Although it cannot be said that this volume of *Essays* is as important as the author's *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, it will nevertheless prove of the utmost value to all serious students. The ground it covers is very extensive, touching as it does on "political psychology, aesthetic and literary creation, national and individual characterology, and the study of superstition, history, religion, and folk-lore." Indeed the range of Dr Jones's knowledge and interests is almost oppressive. His gifts of exposition never fail to excite our admiration and envy, but the acroamatic erudition here displayed almost makes us exclaim with Mr Punch's "Small Boy (during 'Nature Ramble' conducted by enthusiastic master): 'I think a fellow that knows the difference between a Great Titmouse and a Lesser Common What-d'ye-call-it ought to have the decency to keep it to himself'!"

T. W. M.

*The Fighting Instinct.* By P. BOVET. Translated by J. Y. T. GREIG, M.A.  
London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 240. Price 10s. 6d. net.

This volume, covering as it does every phase of the fighting instinct, from a schoolboy's squabble to the Salvation Army, well deserves the eulogy of Baudouin, who describes it as a model for those who intend to write monographs on special instincts. The fighting instinct has a peculiar interest in that it subserves both the two great groups of instinct, those of self-preservation and of race preservation, or, as they are now sometimes called, the ego instincts and the sex instincts. For, although Bovet recognises the close relation between the fighting instinct and sex, he obviously regards them as distinct and even contrasts them. The author appropriately opens his book with a description of fights and their stages—the provocation, the first assaults, the scuffle, the anger, and finally the respite. These he illustrates from descriptions of fights furnished by children themselves. As to the causes of quarrels, he distinguishes between contests of hostility, play contests and contests for possession. He nowhere, however, mentions McDougall's view that the pugnacious instinct is specifically aroused whenever any of our other instincts are thwarted, its function being to overcome or remove the obstacle, although this view seems to be supported by all the facts relating to the arousal of the pugnacious instinct and anger.

Play contests may be regarded biologically as fitting the animal, human or otherwise, for the contests of later life, or, it may be explained as coitus play and essentially sexual. On either of these theories can be explained the fact that the fighting instinct is more characteristic of the male animal than the female. But the sexual theory fails to explain the non-sexual play of some animals like the worker ants, or the play contests of cows for the selection of a queen who leads the herd and has the privilege of cropping the best of the pasturage—unless we are to regard these as transformations or sublimation of the sex instinct, previously possessed in the case of the ants.

Teasing is an invitation to fight; "children do not fight because they are teased, but tease in order to fight." This was also Socrates' object in tempting and teasing the Sophists, his pugnacious instinct being sublimated in dialectics.

Bovet lays great stress on the part played by the fighting instinct in the cause of natural selection, and this explains the characteristics of cruelty and Sadism. "If the fight is to serve the race, it is important that neither the actors (the males) nor the spectatrices, should in any way be accessible to pity—it is an advantage that they should be cruel." Masochism especially in its higher forms of asceticism seems to be explained as the satisfaction man enjoys in seeing his soul as the stage of strange feelings.

The fighting instinct is subject to mechanisms similar to those of the sexual instinct—it can be thwarted, repressed, or sublimated. It is thwarted by concurrent social forces, parents, masters, police, or by moral and aesthetic demands—"it is bad to fight," "fighting is ugly."

If it is thwarted it leads to '*cavalisation*,' as in fighting and wrestling contests, in football and fencing; or to '*complications*' by an alliance with all the other forces of the individual, as in intellectual pursuits and leadership: to '*objectification*,' as when we love to watch or describe the contests of others, this last being characteristic of men of mild and pacific tendencies like H. G. Wells, several of whose stories contain detailed narratives of horrible carnage; to '*subjectification*,' in which we subject ourselves to humiliation (as in irony); and in '*platonisation*,' by playing games of chess. Finally we have the sublimation of pugnacity in '*moral pursuits*' such as the fight for ideals, against whatever obstructs the progress of the ideal; and in '*religious pursuits*' which, frequently pacific in nature as in Christianity, is full of martial hymns, songs of victory, and descriptions of the religious life as a battle waged.

It is not to be thought, however, that the book is merely a contribution to descriptive psychology. One of its aims is to help in the practical problems of life, and the chapter on "The Fighting Instinct and Vocation" will be read with interest by educationalists and social workers, as also will be the chapter on "The Fighting Instinct and Problems of Education." Education in chivalry is not simply a canalisation of the instinct, through restrictive rules; it exalts the fight by giving it an altruistic or ideal aim. "And so 'fight,' we shall say to the child; "it is right and proper not to be afraid of hard knocks; but never fight except for the sake of others."

The book is interestingly written, and while it lacks something by way of depth of analysis, its descriptions are accurate and its conclusions convincing.

J. A. HADFIELD.

*An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion.* By ROBERT H. THOULESS, M.A.  
Cambridge University Press. Pp. 286. Price 7s. 6d. net.

Mr Thouless has given us a most valuable book, and the value lies chiefly in the author's genuinely scientific attitude to his subject. In works of this kind, one has learned to expect one of two attitudes. The first is that of the religionist who sets out to make science fit his religious conceptions, and the second is that of the scientist who determines to make religion fit his scientific conceptions. The former is apt to know less of psychology than of religion, and the latter is prone to apply objective reasoning to matters of which he has no subjective experience. The exceptions to this general rule are sufficiently scarce to be notable—names like James and Pratt occur at once to the reader, and Thouless deserves in this respect to be classed with them.

The book represents an immense amount of wide and careful reading: Janet and Freud, Santa Teresa and St Augustine, Coué and Shand, Sadhu Singh and Swearing Tom—these and many more contribute to the subject matter. Throughout the book we feel that the author is attempting to be scrupulously—if somewhat consciously—detached. Mr Thouless gives the key to his own attitude with excellent cogency on p. 85. "Affective grounds can always be found for any opinion, and if that were the end of the matter, we would have to give up writing books or delivering lectures which were anything more than a mere recitation of facts." This is very sound, and if more writers on the psychology of religion apprehended its soundness, we would have less literature on the subject, and would be little the poorer. Indeed Mr Thouless' treatment of affective and rational elements is good throughout.

Naturally the subject of conversion is amply dealt with, and a strong point made of the contrast between adult and adolescent conversions. Analytical psychology has done a great deal to reduce the element of the miraculous in such experiences as James describes so minutely, but Mr Thouless refuses with a truly academic obstinacy to accept the facile explanations that leave some analysts completely satisfied. Chapters XIII and XIV that deal with this subject are specially worthy of consideration.

On mysticism the author has a great deal to say, and still more to quote. It is likely to weary some readers. Modern analytical psychologists tend to lose interest in historical records of phantasy experience, for the excellent reason that they prefer to deal with such material *in vivo* rather than *in vitro*. The associative background of any phantasy has become of such importance to-day, that these documentary phantasies with their necessarily imperfect associations, tend to appear relatively sterile, as indeed they are. From this, it may be inferred that the analytical aspect of the subject is definitely subordinated to the more theoretical and academic. The psycho-analyst will impute to the author a certain measure of *naïveté* that is part of the *odium academicum*, while it is conceivable that others, whose opinion should be respected, will judge otherwise. We can conceive of the former condemning Chapter VII (conscious processes) as fruitless and tedious, while the latter might regret the pages (106 ff.) which describe with necessary inadequacy the views of Freud.

If there is a criticism which can be made with justice, it is that the book fails to focus the real problem on the ultimate origin of that core of religion which is admitted to have considerable social value by all but the stupidest critics. It is easy to discuss the sources of compensatory phantasy, whether religious or otherwise; it is never difficult to set the individual's experience in the form of an equation with conscious factors on one side and unconscious on the other; it is simple enough to reduce to terms of herd influence much that is called religious both in belief and behaviour. What is not so easy, and what we wish Mr Thouless had more definitely attempted, is to seek the *fons et origo* of that which is inspiratory, progressive and socially valuable in religion. He has asked what is the origin of the religious sentiment, but the question is *mal posé*, for progressive and regressive values cannot have the same source. Fear is manifestly a source of much that is called religion, but it is to be questioned whether fear can result in any ultimately useful attitude or reaction. While Mr Thouless makes it quite clear that he values certain elements in religion, and discounts others, he leaves us with the impression that what begets in us "the religious sentiment" is responsible for both alike.

But Mr Thouless has done a difficult piece of work with remarkable success, and his book is one which deserves longevity if not immortality, for it is the work of a trained and critical mind in a field where these qualities are of paramount necessity.

H. CRICHTON MILLER.

*The Unconscious.* By I. LEVINE, M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy at the University College of the South West, Exeter. London: Leonard Parsons. Pp. 215. Price 7s. 6d. net.

This book is described on the title page as an Introduction to Freudian Psychology, and it is not too much to say that, apart from Freud's own *Lectures*, it is the best introduction that has yet appeared. It is one of the few books devoted to the exposition of Freud's work of which it may be said that it would have been better if it had been longer. Although there is no lack of continuity in thought or in treatment, a feeling of discontinuity and jerkiness is conveyed by the division of the text into short paragraphs, separated from each other by 'double spaces.' We get the impression that we are reading a synopsis rather than the full text. And, indeed, the field covered by Mr Levine is so extensive and his treatment of each topic dealt with is so condensed, that his essay might very well be utilized as the basis for a course of lectures or as a skeleton for a much larger book.

Although this essay is not intended to be a comprehensive account of Psycho-analysis, but rather an attempt to study the pure theory on which Psycho-analysis rests, nevertheless a close examination of the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes, such as is here presented, "cannot be isolated from the psycho-analytic setting" in which this hypothesis plays so important a part. It keeps throughout, however, on the theoretical plane. There is little reference to the purely medical or psychotherapeutic aspects of the subject, but there is a valuable chapter on "The Significance of the Unconscious" in the fields of Education, Crowd Psychology, Personality, Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy.

In the opening chapter a brief account is given of the conceptions of unconscious mental process held by a number of philosophers before Freud's time. Besides the outstanding names of Leibnitz, Schopenhauer, Hartmann and Nietzsche, brief reference is also made to Maine de Biran, Fechner, and Samuel Butler. All these writers "have insisted on both the existence and the importance of something they call unconscious," but, "however this conception has been reached, it always bears the marks of vagueness and speculative thought." Mr Levine goes on, in the second part of his book, to consider Freud's conception of the Unconscious, and he says that in passing from the pre-Freudian literature to the works of Freud, "we pass from more or less speculative conceptions to what claim to be judged as scientific inductions."

There follows an admirable exposition of the Freudian doctrine of the Unconscious and an examination of the criticisms to which it has been subjected. A feature of this part of the book, which makes it particularly valuable to English readers, is the extensive use made of many of Freud's writings which have not yet been translated.

Mr Levine devotes the last sixty-five pages of his essay to a consideration of the significance of the Unconscious. The embarrassing wealth of material

which comes up for consideration under this heading constrains the author to confine himself mainly to the significance of Freud's work for the mental sciences. Perhaps the most interesting sections of this part of the book are those in which are discussed the relations of Psycho-analysis to Ethics, to Aesthetics, and to Philosophy. What is said on these topics is as excellent as it is timely. The account given of the true bearings of psycho-analytic teaching on hedonism, moral responsibility and free will, should help to clear up some misunderstandings in the minds of many readers. Mr Levine believes that the hypotheses of Psycho-analysis are very fertile in the sphere of ethics, but he refuses to reduce ethics to psychology: "It is by a combination of the results of psychological analysis and of reflection on moral values and their significance that insight into the ultimate meaning of the moral life can alone be reached" (p. 183); and again, "To trace the psychological antecedents or conditions which determine the direction of an impulse and contribute to the form of expression which that impulse finally achieves is *not* equivalent to the complete appraisal of the value and significance which that final expression possesses" (p. 200)

T. W. M.

*A Manual of Psychotherapy.* BY HENRY YELLOWLEES, O.B.E., M.D., etc.  
A. and C. Black, Ltd, London, 1923. Pp. xv + 247. Price 10s. 6d. net.

This book, addressed to practitioners and students of medicine, and prepared with their needs chiefly in view, is one of the *Edinburgh Medical Series*, published by Messrs A. and C. Black. Part of it is based upon tutorial lectures given at the University of Edinburgh, and it may be conjectured that it will be widely used as a text-book by students of that Medical School. They are fortunate in having so sound an introduction to the principles and practice of Psychotherapeutics. Dr Yellowlees has produced a work which, although not free from defects, is on the whole admirably adapted to their needs.

In his Preface the author says truly that in dealing with such a vast subject as psychotherapy the difficulty of knowing how much to include is very real, and he might have added that the best order of presentation is equally hard to decide. Dr Yellowlees divides his book into three sections dealing respectively with the Principles, the Methods, and the Scope of Psychotherapy. Under the first heading he discusses the Unconscious Mind, Repression, Mental Mechanisms, Instinct and Conflict, Symbols and Dreams. The methods described are Suggestion and Persuasion, Hypnotism, Auto-suggestion and Psycho-analysis. A chapter is devoted to Psycho-analytic Theory and some reference is made to 'Suggestion Theory.'

Section III opens with some remarks on Classification and Diagnosis and there are chapters devoted to Neurasthemia, Hysteria and Anxiety States. The closing chapters deal with Psychotherapy in General Practice and some illustrative cases are recorded.

On the whole this book keeps fairly closely to psycho-analytic teaching, although there is plenty of evidence that on many matters Dr Yellowlees' convictions are only half-hearted. This is very noticeable in his chapter on Symbols and Dreams. He gives a short outline of the nature of 'symbols' in the sense in which the term is used by Jung and his followers and says, "it

will suffice for the understanding of the subsequent chapters on dream analysis." But he adds, immediately afterwards, "the symbols by means of which the unconscious expresses itself in a dream are not to be regarded as quite comparable to the 'symbols' referred to in the earlier part of this chapter. These latter, indeed, would not be regarded as symbols at all by orthodox Freudians...." We can hardly believe that "a clearer presentation of essentials is gained, by a certain amount of latitude in the use of the word in this chapter."

In speaking of repression and mental mechanisms Dr Yellowlees makes a curious use of the word 'physiological.' Any tendency which exists to a certain degree in everyone, he says, "to that extent is to be regarded as normal and physiological." Apparently these two words are used as synonyms. Hence we get the surprising statement that Phantasy is a "mechanism which may be called physiological to a great extent, in that it is a refuge from hard fact which is sought at some time or other by everyone." In a psychological text-book this seems an unfortunate use of the term physiological. In speaking of repression it would be correctly used if the author were referring to such processes as those described by Rivers when he wrote of the 'suppression' of protopathic sensibility or of the mass-reflex. In medical psychology we expect the opposition: physiological—psychological, not physiological—pathological.

In treating of the Methods of Psychotherapy and of its scope in general practice, Dr Yellowlees very properly devotes a considerable amount of space to the various forms of suggestion; and the novice may be surprised to find how little bearing the section on 'Principles' has on the 'Methods' described. The principles outlined in the opening chapters are based on the findings of psycho-analysis, and psycho-analysis, up to the present, has not provided us with any theory of suggestion that is of much help towards the understanding of its protean manifestations. Since, moreover, Dr Yellowlees rejects, or denies the importance of, the one positive contribution of psycho-analysis to hypnotic theory, namely, the part played by transference, he makes the divorce between his Principles and his Methods more complete than it need have been. But the same difficulty will confront anyone who tries to bring the methods of suggestion and the methods of psycho-analysis under one set of principles that can be intelligibly described in five short chapters.

T. W. M.

*The Unconscious Mind.* A Psycho-Analytical Survey. By S. HERBERT, M.D., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., Assoc. Member of the Brit. Psycho-Analytical Society. London: A. and C. Black, Ltd, 1923. Pp. 230. Price 6s. net.

The utility of popular expositions of psycho-analysis compressing a survey of the whole subject into one small volume has always been open to doubt, since few subjects are so liable to be misrepresented in the process of simplification or condensation; but since the appearance of Freud's own introduction to the subject, further volumes of popular exposition can justify themselves only on the grounds of quite outstanding merit in this direction.

Dr Herbert's little volume deals with the Unconscious, the Psycho-Pathology of Everyday Life, Dreams, Nervous and Mental Disorders, the Instincts, rival theories of the Unconscious, Mythology, Folk Lore and Religion,

Wit and Art, and the Unconscious in the scheme of Evolution; and his survey of this formidable assemblage of topics shows evidence of wide reading.

The simple unhampered way in which these complex topics are dealt with will be attractive to the unformed reader, but raises certain doubts in the minds of more advanced students. In Psycho-Analysis the course of true exposition never doth run smooth, and the facility of presentation which glides over difficulties renders the science a questionable service, however well-intentioned it may be. Apart from a number of minor inaccuracies of no special moment there is nothing in the text which calls for special criticism, except the misleading impression of symbolism given in the two chapters on dreams.

A certain superficiality in interpretation is perhaps inevitable in citing examples for popular consumption; but the prominence given to the occasional phenomenon of auto-symbolism, and the absence of any distinctions between this and symbolism in its accepted Psycho-Analytical sense exposes his interpretations to criticism on the grounds of superficiality in which most Psycho-Analysts would join.

In the same chapters too much stress is laid on the manifestations of adult sexuality in the dream and no hint is given of the much more important and more truly unconscious manifestations of the infantile components and directions of the Libido.

In the same connection the impression is given, surely quite inadvertently, that attempts to divert adult sexual wishes into work and other activities constitute 'sublimation'—a misapprehension which seems exceedingly tenacious of life.

The bibliography will be found useful by those who may wish to follow up the author's purely introductory mention of the topics touched on.

JAMES GLOVER.

*The Kingdom of Evils.* By E. E. SOUTHARD and MARY C. JARRETT. With an introduction by RICHARD C. CABOT, and a note upon legal entanglement as a division of evil by ROSCOE POUND. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922. pp. xx, 708. Price 24s. net.

It is perhaps a pity that this volume has received such a title, in that by itself it hardly describes the contents, and may by thus misleading go unread by many who would profit greatly by its study. The evils referred to are—diseases and defects of body and mind; educational deficiencies; vices and bad habits; legal entanglements; and poverty—in their relation to psychiatric social service work. These pages constitute a record of experience of the social service of the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, with lengthy comment on a hundred cases selected because of their instructive features. As stated in the preface—"Such a work might serve several purposes—to suggest ideas to social workers, to reveal to other professional persons the nature of social work, and to throw light upon the problems of mental hygiene for all persons interested in human life."

As psychiatry advances, its scope becomes ever wider, and it becomes increasingly patent that social, domestic, economic, legal, and eugenic factors interlace and must be taken into account when attempts are made to battle with the problem of any individual sufferer. A diagnosis once established, the



physician may be powerless to do anything unaided, and this book in part illustrates how doctor and social worker can co-operate in the care of the mentally deranged and how fruitful such co-operation can be. The former has neither training nor time to bring about the necessary environmental adjustments undertaken by the social service worker. Any psychotherapist of experience in dealing with service pensioners suffering from a neurological disability, must have realized how frequently his therapy was impotent in the face of domestic and economic factors. The authors wisely lay great stress on this point which is by no means adequately borne in mind in this country. "Possibly it is the social problem both superadded to and lying deeply underneath the individual problem that has caused physicians to fail in the past to effect cures in many psychoneuroses, despite the fact that a very perfect individual psychotherapeutic technique was being thoroughly carried out. It is an error of the psychiatrist and the psychologist to rest profound faith in armchair methods of psychotherapy." It would be well for us to grasp the importance and truth of this. This book stands for the individualization of the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric cases.

The first half of the book is descriptive and presents a hundred social cases chosen from varied psychiatric material to illustrate the theory and practice of social work. Every type involving anti-social evils is presented—psychoneurotics, psychopathic personalities, psychotics, drug addicts, delinquents, etc., and at some length and detail an insight is given as to the possibilities of adjustment through social work.

In the second half the relation of social work to sociology and psychiatry is discussed and its various methods amply dealt with. It is fully brought home to us that the study of mental disease must involve "not merely life's inner relations *as such* and life's outer relations *as such*, but also the adjustments of interrelations of the two." A note upon legal entanglement as a division of evil, three appendices, and a full bibliography close this highly important volume.

Those who have adopted a modern psychiatric viewpoint and who have recognized the practical sterility of the older purely descriptive conceptions which looked upon mental abnormalities as disease entities, will welcome these pages. As far as we know it constitutes the first treatise on psychiatric social work which has become a new profession in America for the educated woman. The thoroughness and enthusiasm of many American psychiatrists should stimulate their *confrères* in this country. Economical factors for many years will doubtless prevent our National Council for Mental Hygiene from advancing its cause to any appreciable extent. We have sown the seeds of social work in connection with some out-patient clinics, and it is to be hoped that in the course of time such an organization as depicted in these pages will eventuate in England. Though in the book there is much repetition and much that might be compressed, we hesitate to say anything which might seem to militate against its value. From cover to cover there is nothing but which is of great scientific interest and which demonstrates a masterly grasp of all the factors pertaining to psychiatric problems. As an education for all interested in the wider aspects of mental disease its circulation cannot be too wide. The decease of the part-author, Dr Southard, was a great loss to this branch of medicine.

C. STANFORD READ.

*Psycho-analysis and Everyman.* By D. N. BARBOUR. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 191. Price 6s. net.

Inspired by the desire to "save the coming generation from some of the needless suffering," etc., Mr Barbour has imposed on himself the task of presenting "to the educated public, in clear language, the more important facts" established by the researches of Freud. The author seems to have overlooked the fact that there are already available in English clear and authoritative presentations of psycho-analysis, although his reference to Freud's *Introductory Lectures* shows that he is not unfamiliar with the most admirable of all.

However that may be, it is perhaps not unreasonable to ask that any new book on the subject should, if not improve on previous models, at least justify its publication by giving an accurate account of the more fundamental conceptions. It cannot be altogether need for simplification, which induces Mr Barbour, at an early stage in his exposition to abandon or modify beyond recognition the most essential parts of Freudian theory. His use of the term 'unconscious' is fundamentally opposed to what is implied by this term in psycho-analysis, and it follows that his understanding of dynamic mechanisms must be unsound, even when much of the terminology used has a familiar ring. This is borne out by much looseness in the use of such terms as repression, censorship, transference, resistance, as also in his description of the aims and method of analysis itself. Needless to say the chapter on dreams is not free from blemish in this respect. Moreover, the author abandons the Freudian connotation of 'libido,' with the inevitable result that his use of 'ego-libido' renders the conception of narcissism entirely incomprehensible.

In these circumstances it is unnecessary to consider in detail, the numerous views and expressions of opinion, often emotionally tinged, whereby Mr Barbour makes it clear in other chapters that a more appropriate title for this book would have been *Everyman and Psycho-analysis*.

EDWARD GLOVER.

## NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, part II, 1923.

The first original article in this number of the *Zeitschrift* is contributed by Dr Imre Hermann (Budapest) and entitled "Marginal Preference as a Primary Process." By 'marginal preference' the author means that tendency which manifests itself, as he has found by experiment, in young children to choose from a series of similar objects placed before them that which is at the one or the other end of the row. The same tendency has been observed in animals. In human beings after the age of six years a tendency to choose an object from the middle of the series appears ('Mittelwahl-tendenz'). Dr Hermann believes the former tendency to be a primitive mode of mental functioning—a primary process—and his article shows how it operates in various spheres of thought and feeling, e.g. in the reflex arc, in certain physical expressions of affects, in dreams and the formation of neurotic symptoms. He discusses the relation of 'marginal preference' to the pleasure-principle and concludes that they are closely connected but are not related as the special to the general. In the second section of his paper he cites certain facts, in particular with reference to optical illusions, in support of the thesis that every mental process which reaches consciousness passes through successive stages of more primitive mental organization, a thesis maintained by Ferenczi in the sphere of sex and by Schilder in that of thought.

In a short article on "The Infantile Genital Organization" Professor Freud supplements, and to some extent corrects, his exposition of infantile sexuality in "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex." In that work he said that in the choice of a love-object we have the closest approximation to the final form assumed by the sexual life after puberty and that the primacy of the genitals is only partially, if at all, established during the infantile period. He now speaks of a primacy of the phallus and shows that there is a phase which may be called that of an infantile genital organization in which only the male genital organ plays any part. His account of this phase and of its importance in mental life has reference only to what takes place in boys; the situation in the case of girls is, he says, not yet clear. The boy passes from his first assumption that every person and animal possess a genital like his own to the discovery that it is not everyone who has a penis. He conceives of the lack of this organ as the result of castration, possibly as a punishment for some forbidden activity. Hence he still attributes the possession of the penis to those whom he especially esteems, above all to his mother. Later, when he realizes that only women can bear children, the child is regarded as a substitute for the penis. In the pregenital anal-sadistic phase there is as yet no distinction between male and female, but simply that between active and passive. Before the former distinction is apprehended there intervenes the phase of infantile genital organization in which the basis of the distinction is the possession of the penis and the loss of it through castration.

Dr Hans Sachs (Berlin) contributes a paper on "The Genesis of the Perversions." He takes as his starting-point Freud's doctrine that a perversion implies the persistence of a specially strong instinct-component which does not fall under the primacy of the genital zone ("Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex"). He goes on to consider the relation of the perversion to the Oedipus complex, to the Unconscious and to repression. In his paper "A Child is Being Beaten" Freud showed that the Oedipus complex is, as it were, a lens through which the ray which is the perversion must travel. Dr Sachs holds that this is true of all perversions. Further, while we are familiar with the view that neurosis is the negative of perversion, the pervert, no less than the neurotic, displays amnesia for infantile experiences and his analysis leads to the discovery of unconscious material. In the one case a repressed phantasy manifests itself as a neurotic symptom, alien to the ego, while in the other case it is in agreement with the ego (*ichgerecht*) and is felt as pleasurable. Both neurosis and perversion are exaggerations of some part of normal infantile sexual

life, neurosis arising from the incompatibility of repressed material with the ego. A perversion approximates to neurosis in cases where the perverse gratification is experienced only at the cost of constant conflict or where pleasure is converted into anxiety if certain conditions are transgressed. He postulates a series in which cravings, e.g. for alcohol, morphia, etc., occupy a middle position between neurosis and perversion. Such cravings appear to have the force of an obsessional neurosis but they resemble perversions in that they result in a definite act of gratification, though it may be a surrogate gratification for a repressed pleasure.

In the masochistic perverse phantasy described by Freud in "A Child is Being Beaten" we see that though the persons and the scene of the phantasy change so as to become indifferent, one element (that of being beaten) remains constant through the successive stages and to this factor the pleasure is attached. This fragmentary character of the perverse gratification is found in other perversions and explains their grotesque forms: only a piece of the whole complex has been admitted into consciousness.

In order that a piece of infantile sexual life should thus persist, not only must the predominating instinct-component be peculiarly strong either from constitutional reasons or owing to infantile experiences, but that piece of infantile sexuality must bear a special relation to the ego, if it is to escape repression. In cover-memories the escape is accomplished through the indifference of the content of the memory, and in obsessional neurosis through the separation of the affect from the content to which it really belongs, but neither of these characteristics applies to the perversion. Dr Sachs shows that where an instinct-component is so strong as to be practically insuperable a compromise may be effected, by which one part of the whole complex is accepted by the ego and retains its pleasure-giving character. It is, in fact, taken into the service of the repressing forces in the ego, in order that the rest of the complex may be the more easily repressed. In the perverse beating-phantasies the anal-sadistic component has assisted in the repression of the forbidden genital desire which is part of the Oedipus complex. Perverts are not exempt from neurosis, for, though one element has been taken up into the ego, other elements of the complex may be too strong for successful repression.

The last original article is by Dr R. Brun (Zürich) on "The Theory of Selection and the Pleasure Principle." The writer posits the existence, side by side with and sometimes in opposition to, the Darwinian principle of natural selection (in accordance with the reality principle), of another phylogenetic factor which he terms that of 'libidinal selection.' This latter principle may, he believes, guide the instinctive behaviour of living organisms, solely in accordance with the pleasure principle, even where the end must be degeneration or destruction of the species. His argument is based on experiments carried out by Father Wasmann, who investigated the behaviour of certain species of ants. This number contains the following short communications, as well as critical notes and reviews:

"History of a case of melancholia" (Federn), "Substitute formations for onanism" (Happel), "A voyeur type" (Boehm), "The spider as a dream-symbol" (Bornsztaja), "The dream as the guardian of sleep" (Pfeifer).

CECIL BAINES.

*Annales Médico-Psychologiques* (Series XII. vol. 2).

No. 3. October 1922.

*Chronique: Le Congrès des Aliénistes de Quimper* (1922). (P. Courbon.)

*Réponse à une Critique Allemande: Les Idées de Hoche et de Binding.* (Dr Maurice Brissot.)

Deals with ideas expressed by Professors Hoche and Binding who "declare that certain valueless lives might be terminated, to the great benefit of the community."

These lives are classified as (1) Incurables—either from sickness or wounds, who desire—in full consciousness—death. (2) The incurably insane. (3) Those, sound of mind, yet unconscious through a severe accident or wound, which will inevitably prove mortal.

*En marge des discussions ouvertes devant la Société Médico-Psychologique sur les malades dits "Petits Mentaux" et la création de "Services Ouverts."* (Dr Julien Raynier.)

The Société Médico-Psychologique has received a letter from the Minister of Hygiene asking the Society to define "Petits Mentaux." A Committee was appointed to draft a reply to the Minister. The article adds to the discussion.

*De la subjugation consciente de la volonté dans l'accomplissement de certains crimes ou délits.* (Roger Dupouy.)

Discusses three cases of offences committed by women under the domination of their seducers. Cites two similar cases recently tried in Berlin.

*Désertion en présence de l'ennemi, mélancolie après l'acte.* (R. Benon.)

Analyses some cases of desertion and their effect on the deserters, and among other conclusions decides that it is rare for mental disease to develop after the offence has been committed.

*Annales Médico-Psychologiques* (LXXXI).

No. 1. January 1923.

*Chronique: L'hôpital psychiatrique.* (René Charpentier.)

*Le radotage.* (M. Paul Courbon.)

Two forms can be distinguished: 1. The repetition of past facts and adventures—a regressive involution due to atrophy of the cerebral substance. 2. A repetition of former ideals linked up with the more powerful sentiments of existence—an affective revival associated with the lesions of arteriosclerosis.

*Délire systématisé religieux à évolution chronique.* (M. Privat de Fortuné.)

Deals with a case in which a cultivated, fertile, observant, apparently clear thinking mind built logically on false premises held with conviction.

*Purpura hémorragique, transfusion sanguine et troubles mentaux.* (MM. Henri Colin et G. Robin.)

*Un cas de délire polymorphe à évolution vers le type schizophrénique.* (MM. Claude et Brousseau.)

No. 2. February 1923.

*Chronique: De l'influence de la guerre sur la participation des psychopathes à la vie sociale.* (M. Paul Courbon.)

Draws attention to the necessity of governmental measures with a view to dealing with the increased number of "lunatics at large." These are extraordinarily numerous owing to conditions during the war and after the armistice.

*Impressions psychiatriques d'un séjour à Zurich.* (M. E. Minkowski.)

Impressions of two months passed at the hygienic school of Zurich founded by Jules Klaus—contrasts notions of "schizoidie" and "syntonie" as explained by M. Bleuler—speaks of experiments of "blotches" of ink, inaugurated by late Prof. Rorschach—also draws attention to asylum established in Zurich for abnormal children.

*De la séparation dans les asiles d'aliénés de la Seine des criminels ou délinquants et des malades placés dans les familles.* (M. Rodiet.)

Demands that the municipal authorities shall separate private mental cases from mentally deficient criminals.

*Une forme à éclipses du délire des négations.* (M. Revault d'Allonnes.)

Case of a French lady who denied possession of any bodily organs and looked upon herself as a disembodied spirit.

*Une psychose passionnelle.* (M. Mignard.)

A youth who had been in the habit of drinking heavily renounced all drinking but became passionately fond of melodramatic romance. Seeking to champion the

cause of a young lady whose relatives seemed to treat her unkindly, he was expelled from the house. This brought on mad frenzy of revenge and he gave up all work, became obsessed with the idea of revenge and began to fancy he was being pursued by hostile agencies.

*Un fond mental commun à la base des hallucinations lilliputiennes.* (MM. Bouyer et Perret.)

Three cases of emotional, introspective, imaginative, highly-strung individuals, developing these fantasies.

*Confusion mentale et catatonie.* (M. A. Barbé.)

A shell shock case, showing stereotyped movements, attitudes and gestures.

*Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique (XIX).*

No. 4. April 1922.

*L'écart d'isochronisme dans le rythme.* (P. Verrier.)

Deals with the question of rhythm in music, poetry, and dancing in its relation to the "organic rhythm" of the performer or listener. The paper has three main divisions: 1. The marking of intervals. 2. The classification of intervals. 3. The estimation of the digression from isochronism.

*Les doctrines indiennes de physiologie mystique.* (P. Masson-Oursel.)

Deals with the question under three heads: 1. Vedas. 2. The Brahmans and the Upanishads. 3. The Tantras.

*Revue Générale (psychologie religieuse)—Le renoncement et l'abandon.* (J. Segond.)

A review of four recent books.

*Sur la signification physiologique des lois dites 'Psychophysiques.'* (H. Piéron.)

Argues that Fechner's law is a physiological, not a psychophysical law: that it expresses the relation existing between the physiological effect and physical cause.

No. 7. July 1922.

*L'interprétation du rêve chez les primitifs.* (M. Halbwachs.)

A discussion of the animist theories of Spencer and Tylor, that among savages dreams are attributed to the wanderings of the spirit away from the body, and its adventures with other spirits. These theories do not go far enough, they leave out of account the activities of other spirits, greater and more powerful, who are either attached to the individual or to the tribe as tutelary deities. It is under the guiding and compelling influence of these spirits that the dreams take place; hence the dreamer is placed in direct communication with his gods, through dreams. An examination of the dreams of Greenlanders, American Indians, Zulus, etc., shows these beliefs widespread among primitive races. These dreams are the outcome of their religious beliefs, not, as Spencer and Tylor held, the basis of their religion.

*Une expression organique de la défense psychique.* (M. I. Boas.)

*Auto-observation d'une hallucination et d'une illusion.* (P. Querey.)

*L'adrénaline et l'émotion.* (A. Mayer.)

*Sur le symbolisme délirant.* (Ph. Chaslin.)

A young female patient, suffering from depression, first suffered from the conviction that she was unable to sleep, then that she had lost all sensibility, was no longer a human being, but like a dog. Later she asserts that she is a dog, that she walks on four feet, her neck is bent to horizontal position, and she tears and gnaws her food, and repeats that she is a monster. She has thus passed from symbolism to metaphor, and then to conviction. The symptoms gradually disappear, she is discharged cured, and a few days later her body is found in the Rhone.

The trouble probably began with an unconscious view of herself as a moral monster, which idea gradually intruded itself into consciousness.

Discussion arose concerning the apparent temporary cure. Was the whole illness a hysterical fabrication and the "cure" consciously arranged when the patient grew tired of it; or was the cure part of the malady, a device to secure liberty for self destruction?

*Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique (XX).*

No. 3. March 1923.

*La pensée sans images.* (B. Bourbon.)

There have been grouped under the name of imageless thought a number of obscure intellectual phenomena such as recognition, meaning and belief. Recognition can be associated with representation and yet can be present when representation is impossible. An important phenomenon of recognition is comprehension. Recognition is a specific psychical phenomenon. Meaning is not restricted to words, can have various degrees of vagueness, has a character of unity and is the main object of our attention. The feeling of knowing differs from feeling of novelty and is of the same nature as recognition. The conscious knowledge of relations is of great importance in reproduction.

The term "Mental Attitudes" has been applied to several vague mental phenomena but it is better to restrict its use to certain reactions which are found in perception and representations and the bodily attitudes which often accompany them. Intellectual effort, belief and attention are examples of these reactions. Belief is probably not a specific psychological phenomenon.

Imageless thought then is comprised of several "phenomena" some specific as recognition, the feelings of the known, of novelty and of relations, and others not "specific" as those which constitute meaning and mental attitudes.

Imageless thought plays an important part in our mental life and it is one of the merits of present-day psychologists that they have recognised it.

*Le sens commun et la quantité.* (E. Meyerson.)

*Le schématisme d'après Kant et J. M. Baldwin.* (M. Deat.)

*L'ennui morbide et le narcoïsm.* (E. Christin.)

*Le caractère concret du mot.* (A. Meillet.)

No. 4. April 1923.

A special number devoted to consideration of the works of Renan under the following titles:

*La philosophie écossaise. Son influence sur la nôtre (Pages inédites).* (Ernest Renan.)

*Ernest Renan et le Père Hyacinthe Loyson. Documents inédits.* (A. Houtin.)

*Le cours de Renan au Collège de France.* (A. Loisy.)

*Renan linguiste.* (A. Meillet.)

*La religion de Renan.* (L. Lévy-Bruhl.)

*Ernest Renan, historien des religions orientales.* (R. Dussaud.)

*La pensée philosophique de Renan.* (R. Berthelot.)

*Renan et l'étude de l'humanité.* (R. Lenoir.)

*Renan et la Société Asiatique.* (Cl. Huart.)

*Ernest Renan et les études juives.* (M. Lambert.)

*La crise sentimentale de Renan.* (J. Pommier.)

No. 5. May 1923.

*Le style rythmé du Nouveau Testament.* (A. Loisy.)*Le rêve diffère-t-il de la veille comme l'individuel diffère du social?* (A. Kaploun.)

A criticism of an article by M. Halwach asserting that memory is social, not individual, and that in dreams it is never complete because in sleep the individual is cut off from society. The writer puts forward the view that the whole question is one of intelligence, on which memory rests; and, dealing with memory as dependent on particular, as well as general, ideas of space and time, and considering analogies in the animal world, concludes that memory is necessarily in part individual and natural, not social or acquired through education, and that in dreams memory is broken because individual activity and energy are relaxed.

*Le progrès du langage par l'abstraction.* (P. Verrier.)*Sur un cas d'hallucinations lilliputiennes.* (A. Perret.)

A detailed account and examination of a case which presents certain unique features, viz. the patient sees himself as an actor in lilliputian scenes, also, besides a constantly recurring apparition, actual persons well known to himself, and has hallucinations at first natural size, but merging into lilliputian.

Considering the peculiar allegorical character of these experiences, the writer concludes this is a case of an affective mind re-acting to suffering by taking refuge in the supernatural and mysterious.

*L'esthétique allemande contemporaine.* (Ch. Lalo.)*Le problème des sensations de douleur.* (H. Piéron.)

A discussion of three phases in the history of the study of sensation of pain:

- i. The discovery of pain spots independent of those of other cutaneous sensations.
- ii. Goldscheider's theory of irradiation, in the light of more recent investigations.
- iii. Different kinds of pain sensations; evidence that the sensation of burning is connected with the sympathetic system.

No. 7. July 1923.

*Le développement de la psychologie en Amérique.* (W. B. Pillsbury.)

The foundations of present day psychology in America are found in the work and writings of William James and the pupils of Wundt—Stanley Hall, Cottell, Wolfe, Frank Angell, Baldwin and others. The three main schools of the present are (1) the "structuralists," emphasising introspection and led by Titchener; (2) the "functionalists," largely philosophical in their emphasis, led by Dewey; and (3) the "behaviourists," who disparage the use of introspection and have found in J. B. Watson an able leader.

*Marivaux et l'histoire du cœur humain.* (R. Lenoir.)*Le soupçon.* (L. Dugas.)*Quelques impressions après une commotion.* (E. Lombard.)*La Freudisme.* (Ph. Chaslin.)

A critical review of translations of three of Freud's works: (1) *Introduction à la Psychoanalyse*, (2) *La Psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne*, (3) *Trois essais sur la théorie de la sexualité* and of *La Psychoanalyse des neuroses et des psychoses* by E. Regis and A. Hasnard, and *The Psychology of Medicine* by T. W. Mitchell.

While giving favourable notice of the last-mentioned book—*une bonne introduction à l'étude plus approfondie du sujet*—the writer subjects Freudian theory to severe criticism and cannot understand why these theories are favourably received in Anglo-Saxon countries.

R. J. B.



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## NEUROSES.

By J. C. McKERROW.

## I.

THE view of Life peculiar to myself set forth in "The Appearance of Mind" and "Aberrations of Life" regards all manifestations of life as the interaction of living process and its conditions, the organism and its environment, and dispenses altogether with all "conscious faculties"; I do not use the notions of feeling, sensation, will, belief, knowledge, memory, etc., and if I use the terms, it is only for the sake of convenience. I cannot enter here into a discussion of the steps by which living-activity (emerging from non-living-activity) comes to be manifested as complex organisms, apparently endowed with "conscious faculties." The essential conception in the theory is that of a relation of equilibrium between the living-process and its conditions, analogous to that which exists between chemical action and its conditions, which, as it were, controls the living-process, in that the total situation is constantly tending towards such equilibrium, a change in the conditions being the occasion of a change in the activity. It is clear, since living-activity never ceases, unless, in individual manifestations, it ceases for ever, that this state of equilibrium is not one of rest, of physiological or bio-chemical inactivity. It may be defined as a state (of the whole situation, organism-environment) in which the living-process proceeds normally. The whole environment, external and internal (the bodily activities proceeding normally), is so *right* that nothing more is "desired." It is Nirvana. The intrusion of a "desire," an act of "attention," a "painful stimulus," constitute a disturbance of the equilibrium. This equilibrium I call "viable" equilibrium, and the operation of the tendency to viable equilibrium can be described in three "laws." (1) Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances, (2) Unviable activity tends not to be repeated, (3) Activity tends to occur at its proper period. The First and Third of these laws state the same thing from different points of view, as may be illustrated in the case of "hunger." The tendency to eat may be regarded as occurring in certain (bodily) circumstances, or at a certain period. The Second Law covers all cases of "learning."

The "psychological" tendency is peculiar to animals. It is one which restores viable equilibrium, not by an internal rearrangement, but by the action of the organism as a whole. Its pre-condition is motility, and its first manifestation must have been movement away from unviable conditions.

The environment of an organism is compounded of many kinds of conditions, in respect of any of which disturbance of viable equilibrium may occur. Not only are there external, physical conditions to which and to changes in which the living-process must adapt itself, or stop, *e.g.* temperature, light, air-supply, etc., but also internal, physiological conditions, organic changes such as those which are the occasion of "hunger."

Infinitesimal changes of conditions do not occasion any "psychological" tendency. The amount of difference of intensity of a physical condition, say heat, must be of a certain degree before viable equilibrium is disturbed, *i.e.* before the organism reacts "psychologically." This amount is fairly constant for the species. If an organism reacts to this minimal stimulus, I shall say it has a normal standard of viable equilibrium (for that particular condition; a normal organism has normal standards for all kinds of conditions, all that the species reacts to).

Change of standard of viable equilibrium can be experimentally demonstrated. Let us suppose three organisms, *A*, *B*, *C*, of a species which reacts to light and whose light-ratio is 1:10, *i.e.* they react to a difference of illumination of 10 per cent.; and let us set them in a 20 candle-power environment. The addition or subtraction of two candles (or more) occasions a "psychological" reaction in all of them; in subjective terms, the difference is "perceived." The addition of one candle is not "perceived." Now let us transfer organisms *B* and *C* to environments of 15 and 25 candle-power respectively, and let them stay there a while. Again add or subtract two candles in all three environments. *A* reacts as before, *B* more strongly, *C* not at all. *B* and *C* have had their standards of viable equilibrium altered. This is the essence of the process of "acclimatization." In this case the alteration of standard is the effect of an enduring change of environment. In other cases the change is in the organism; it is born so. In either case we may say, using the word in its widest sense, there is "degeneracy." In subjective terms, *B* is hyper-, *C* is hypo-aesthetic.

In higher organisms other aspects of the total situation have to be taken into account. The external environment comes to have other than merely physical characters, the internal environment becomes more com-

plex and correspondingly more liable to derangement. Thus, what is called an emotional situation occasions a violent reaction, organic and voluntary, of a stereotyped pattern, according to the particular "emotion," the particular kind of situation. ("Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances.") An "emotional" situation is not different from any other except in degree. It is a *massive* disturbance of viable equilibrium, not a particular *kind* of disturbance. A starving man reacts emotionally to food.

Here, then, is another standard to which ideally normal individuals would conform, round which, in fact, individuals vary. Normal men react emotionally in certain circumstances; others react emotionally where the normal do not. Their standard of viable equilibrium is altered in this respect. They are emotionally hyper- or hypo-*aesthetic*. And again, this character of the individual may be innate, or it may be the effect of environmental conditions, say patrolling the North Sea in war-time.

With the development of the gregarious habit, still another aspect of the organism-environment relation is manifested. Gregarious animals react in definite ways to the behaviour of their fellows. In subjective terms, they perceive the "meaning" of such behaviour, and act according to such meaning. This quality of gregarious animals is called Suggestibility, and all normal individuals of gregarious species are normally suggestible, while others are more so or less so. In man, with the development of speech and coincidentally, of the "Thinking-Subject," suggestibility and its variations from the normal become more important, indeed become overwhelmingly important. "Society made man," but it made him and makes him anew every generation through his suggestibility. Normal suggestibility is a function of the authority of the suggester and the "experience" of the suggestee. When these two are one, as in the thinking of an individual, and when the coefficient of suggestibility is abnormal, we have all the mechanism necessary to the occurrence of delusions.

## II.

I am now in a position to put my theory of the neuroses, *i.e.* of the so-called true neuroses, in a sentence. They are the effects of deviation from the normal standards of viable equilibrium, degeneracies, aberrant manifestations of life-activity.

It is not to be expected that, in applying this conception to the various neuroses that have been more or less defined by medical men, I should be able to say that in this one such and such a standard is altered, in that

one such and such. An individual is not so readily dissected by abnormality into his constituent psychological elements. If one standard is widely deviated from the normal, it is *prima facie* likely that others are not normal.

On the other hand, the conception entirely bears out the insight of medical science in differentiating two main types of neurosis, hysteria and neurasthenia. For it is fairly well agreed that the essence of the former is over-emotionality, and of the latter over-fatigability, and these are deviations from the normal standard of viable equilibrium in different respects.

But the view here suggested goes further than merely to endorse a distinction made by clinicians. It suggests a reason *why* it was possible for such a true distinction to be made amid the welter of clinical symptoms, and in the absence of an inclusive theory of the nature of "neurosis." Why do hysteria and neurasthenia present fairly distinctive clinical pictures? Let the reader refer to what was said on the development, the "emergence," to use Prof. Lloyd Morgan's now fashionable term, of new aspects in the organism-environment relation. I said "The external environment comes to have other than merely physical characters, the internal environment becomes more complex and correspondingly more liable to derangement." It is this antithesis to which that of hysteria and neurasthenia adds point. It is in the organism's relation to external (emotional) situations that hysteria arises: while neurasthenia is abnormality in the individual's relation to its own inner environment, its body.

Hysteria, however, is not abnormality of the emotional standard only—at least, such a restriction of meaning would make the term valueless for medicine, and of very little value at all. It is preferable to retain the medical use, but to point out that in the picture labelled "hysteria" by medical men, the hyper-aesthesia to emotional situations is only the most outstanding deviation from normality.

Another hyper-aesthesia is so constant in hysteria that one school of medical science proposes that hysteria *is* excessive suggestibility, rather than excessive emotionality. It would seem that there is some very close connection between the emotional state and the suggestible state, that either an emotional person is therefore suggestible, or a suggestible person is therefore emotional. The latter proposition is really meaningless; the former commends itself at once as true—true of all kinds of emotions, of all kinds of suggestions. The very mechanism of suggestion involves an emotional situation as between suggester and suggestee (this is what

constitutes the just-mentioned meaninglessness), and the suggestibility of the latter increases (or decreases) the more emotional the situation becomes. (It increases if the suggestee is "sympathetic," decreases if he is "antipathetic.") The orator works on the emotions of his audience; the cooler they are, the harder they are to convince. The lover is easily convinced by the flimsiest arguments: he is a believer of the "Credo quia impossibile" type. I am not, therefore, called upon to explain the abnormal suggestibility of hysteria. It would be surprising if it were not so.

Thus in hysteria we are concerned with the relation of the individual to his external environment; that is where the trouble is. In neurasthenia the trouble is in the relation of the individual to his own inner environment, his body. His relation to his external environment is normal. He would like to be about his business, but he cannot; the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak. He tires almost as soon as he has begun. (N.B. I restrict the term "neurasthenia" to abnormality in voluntary neuromuscular functioning.)

Normal individuals tire after a certain amount of application to work, whether muscular or mental. Further application becomes unviable, unnatural, in the bodily circumstances. The appropriate psychological reaction to the situation of "having been long at work" is to stop. But whether this reaction shall occur or not depends upon the "interest" of the individual in the said work. We should run farther and faster for our lives than we do for a train. We are more interested in survival than in punctuality at the office. The spirit, not necessarily the spirit of material self-interest, can whip up the body.

The normal individual feels tired and stops, after a normal amount of work. There are certain individuals who do not know what fatigue is, —a state of affairs as dangerous as not knowing, like the Nelson of legend, what fear is. The neurasthenic is either abnormally susceptible (hyperaesthetic) to the bodily changes produced by activity, or a little activity causes an abnormal degree of physiological change. He either exhibits a psychological reaction (stopping work) to a very slight physiological change (auto-intoxication) or a very pronounced physiological reaction to a small amount of work done, that is to say, the body is working badly, there is a loss of mechanical efficiency. (These are not logical alternatives; both are possible.)

On my hypothesis of an alteration in the standard of viable equilibrium of the neurasthenic as between the essential individual (= his psychological tendencies) and his body, both these factors are concerned. I postulate the former, and apart from the *prima facie* likelihood that the

second would occur independently of the first out of the same conditions as give rise to the first, it is bound to occur in any case, secondarily to the first. For the first involves inactivity, and nothing is so detrimental to machinery, animate or inanimate, as disuse. A vicious circle thus arises between the two factors; the engine more and more losing its mechanical efficiency, and developing less and less power.

The anxiety-neurosis and the compulsion or obsessional neurosis are usually considered to be symptomatic of neurasthenia. It is true they are often associated, but that is simply because they are all effects of "degeneracy." They are obviously not symptoms of neurasthenia, as I have defined it. I might say, they are symptoms of "neurasthenia," only when the term is used in a portmanteau sense, as equivalent to "degeneracy."

The anxiety-neurosis is part of the price paid for reflective self-consciousness. Men look before and after and pine for what is not; we all hope and fear; the anxious-neurotic simply hopes and fears too much, more than the average. He is emotionally hyper-aesthetic, like the hysteric, but in the world of four dimensions.

### III.

Obsessions cannot be dismissed so easily. Let me remind the reader first that "mental" normality consists in appropriateness of reaction, organic and voluntary, to all the various circumstances of life as they arise. "Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances" is the sanction of our organic and voluntary reactions when we meet a lion at large. If then similar reactions, more or less modified, arise in certain individuals when they meet a cat, it is no great matter for surprise. The circumstances are fairly similar. The case is exactly analogous to that of personal idiosyncrasy; it is a psychological idiosyncrasy, a "local" hysteria.

On the other hand, this is not the only possible aetiology of a cat-phobia. For just as we exhibit acquired as well as instinctive idiosyncrasies, so may we exhibit acquired as well as instinctive psychological idiosyncrasies. Many phobias have actually been traced to events experienced by the individual and "forgotten." The organism, as physiological, "remembers" better than the organism, as psychological, the individual "self."

This dissociation of the two "organisms," or tendencies, the physiological and the psychological, is well illustrated by cases of the shell-shock type. The physiological organism keeps on reacting in the appropriate

manner to the circumstances of the original shock long after the circumstances have ceased. The reactions have become habitual. The "memory" of the original shock, on the other hand, has been lost, and this seems to be a condition of the continuance of the physiological reactions, for if, by psycho-analysis, suggestion or other means, the memory is revived, the patient recovers, more or less, from his physiological bad habit. This is not surprising, being analogous to what occurs normally. We cannot control our organic (emotional) tendencies, but normally we are aware of their occasion, and when the unviable occasioning conditions cease (when the *viva* is over), we gradually subside, return to our normal viable equilibrium. The shell-shocked man, being unaware of the occasion of his physiological reactions, does not subside in this natural way; but let his memory of the shock be revived, and it is as natural for him to subside as it is for us when we wake out of a terrible nightmare. The loss of "memory" in these cases seems to be a primary condition of the symptoms; I should not care to be dogmatic as to the conditions of the loss of memory. In cases of concussion they may be physiological; it seems beyond doubt that in some cases they are psychological ("repression").

Other obsessions arise out of the relation of the individual to his ideal world, *i.e.* the world of his ideas—another part of the price of reflective self-consciousness.

This brings us to the phenomenon of repression. I would here emphasize the fact that in my account of this indubitable phenomenon, for the discovery of which, or for emphasizing which, the world is indebted to Freud, I shall rely on laws which I had formulated from the observation of the lower functions and forms of life, long before I came to apply them to the higher, namely, to the human intellectual activities. I mention this because it would undoubtedly seem far-fetched, as an *ad hoc* explanation of the facts.

Repression, then, consists in the operation of my Second Law of Life in the field of the imagination, where it has no business to operate. No ideas ought to be unviable. Where we have repression we have an individual not at unity with himself.

The Second Law ("Unviable activity tends not to be repeated") modifies the operation of the First, in those organisms which have developed *general* instincts, who try all things, many of them, naturally, unviable. It is the chicken's sanction for not always pecking the nasty-tasting worm when it sees it.

But "ideas" are not so easily dropped as tendencies in regard to objects. It is true we forget most of our experience. Experience that

has had interest for us, however, we do not forget, if we are normal, however much we should like to. The unpleasant fact stands out in retrospect, or is brought to mind by present association; we cannot escape it, as we can escape from objects. *Ça y est; ça y reste. Coelum, non animum, mutant, quæ trans mare currunt.*

So much for the normal individual. The abnormal has another way of dealing with past unpleasant experience, the fabled manner of the ostrich. If there is anything he is interested to "forget," he "forgets" it. He is really remembering to ignore it, like the wise chick. In his retrospects he develops a blind spot for this particular experience. (It is probable we all do it.) We call in the Second Law, which normally should have no jurisdiction in the world of ideal experience, to keep us unconscious of what is tending "towards consciousness" through the operation of the First Law, to inhibit a reaction which would otherwise occur. (The occurrence of an idea is a reaction.)

The most typical cases perhaps are those referring to sexual matters. These matters have a primary interest for all, while a prohibition attaches to them secondarily. The natural man is interested in sexual matters; the conventional man is interested to ignore what interests him as a natural man.

The simple repression is just a blind spot in an individual's ideal world, a negative hallucination. But there is another way than the ostrich's of dealing with unviable ideas. We may either be blind to what we would not see, or we may look at something else. The disputant, whose opponent's meaning is ambiguous in form, if not in fact, is at liberty to choose the meaning which best suits himself,—" 'tis a law in disputation."

Consider now the ease with which objects are "associated." Do we not often find it difficult to say how an idea "came into our head," and discover, after much searching and perhaps retraversing, in fact or in imagination, our recent sense-experience, that a certain part of that sense-experience had suggested to us, not the idea of the particular sense-object presented, but the idea of an associated object? We had looked at *A* and thought of *B*, and *A* had never been explicitly in consciousness at all. And this too when we had no interest in ignoring *A*—as far as we can see. Now let *A* be an idea in which the individual (1) is primarily interested (First Law), and which (2) he is interested to ignore, as an unpleasant idea (Second Law). The first condition determines the recurrence of the tendency *A*; the second inhibits *A* and thus allows the substitution of *B*. *B* becomes an obsessive idea. (Freudians will



note that this is "pure Freud," with the substitution of my First Law for libido and my Second for the censorship.)

An obsessive idea is a phenomenon quite analogous to the ease of shell-shock. We can convert each into terms of the other, and say either that the abnormal bodily reactions of the shell-shock patient are physiological "obsessions," or that the obsessive idea is as physiological a reaction as those of shell-shock, only it is a reaction of the higher functions of the organism. The obsessive idea is at the same time a testimony to the superficial plausibility of the automaton theory of mind of the pure materialists, and its obvious condemnation. Physiology in its highest manifestations is still physiology. Normal thinking is not of the type of the recurrence of obsessive ideas.

Hence it is that the cure for both states is the same, the discovery to the patient of the occasion of his reactions. The individual thus becomes at unity with himself; there is a cessation of the aberrant physiological reactions determined by the improper operation of the Second Law.

The same aetiology would apply to certain hallucinations, organic sensations and motor tics. They are obsessions, tendencies not apparently appropriate to the situation. The repetitive nature of obsessions corresponds to the repetitive nature of normal tendencies, of the "normal obsessions," for instance, in regard to food and sex, in a word to the repetitive nature of life. We need hardly point out the *omnium gatherum* nature of the term "obsession."

#### IV.

So far I have dealt with what may be called psychological neuroses, *i.e.* with changes of standard of viable equilibrium as between psychological reaction and its conditions. I have not dealt, except to glance at it in connection with neurasthenia, with the relation of physiological reaction and its conditions. Is there such a thing as a physiological neurosis?

Whatever we may call it, there is certainly in physiological activity a type of abnormality exactly analogous to that which, in psychological activity, is called a neurosis. What is pure idiosyncrasy but a "functional" disorder of the organism as physiological activity? (We say "pure" because idiosyncrasies may be of psychological origin.) Most people can eat shell-fish or eggs without untoward consequences, but some people cannot. Their bodies react to these articles of diet in an abnormal way, find them unviable. Such reactions are physiological neuroses, alterations of the normal standard of viable equilibrium as between physiological activity and its conditions.

The relation between physiological activity and its conditions is not so complex, so various, as that between psychological activity and its conditions, but it is perhaps more baffling. For in the latter case we may consider first the relation of the psychological activity to its external conditions, and thus give a specious simplicity to the relation, which we complicate later by considering the internal conditions, the body. We can as it were distinguish a Soul to be the informing principle of the life-activity, a Conscious Subject which reacts *to* its environmental conditions, and which can be *called* hyper- or hypo-aesthetic. In the former case we cannot. We have a bio-chemical activity in which it is as hard to suppose a Soul as in a chemical reaction. It seems impossible (except for a monadologist) to separate, even in thought, physiological activity and its conditions.

But the appearance of a Soul or Mind or Conscious Subject is simply due to the operation of the tendency to viable equilibrium, the real informing principle of life-activity. And this tendency operates no less in physiological than in psychological activity. When it operates aberrantly, we have the physiological neuroses, which are not intelligible, any more than the psychological, as long as we keep within the circle of material conditions, in our attempts to understand them.

If a physiological process proceed abnormally because of some demonstrable abnormality in its conditions, this constitutes an *organic* derangement, about which no one has any difficulty whatever. But it is also possible for physiological process to proceed abnormally when all the conditions before and after birth are normal (not *appear* to be normal, but *are* normal, a thing we can suppose for the argument's sake) except the internal physiological conditions of the fertilized ovum itself. The individual manifestation of life is degenerate. This is one condition of the occurrence of functional physiological derangement, of physiological neurosis. The organism's physiological standard of viable equilibrium is altered from the normal. Development in such cases proceeds aberrantly, resulting in all the anatomical malformations and disproportions called stigmata of degeneracy. Such mal-development is physiological neurosis. To refer the abnormalities to one another, as when cretinism is referred to thyroid insufficiency, or neurasthenia to loss of muscular tone, shows the medical man as poor a natural philosopher as the people who proposed to live by taking in each other's washing showed themselves poor economists. All the abnormalities present are the effect of the degenerate condition. Families, human and other, can die out; a race can be sick; and the neuroses, physiological and psychological, are symptoms of this racial sickness.

This is by way of apology for my inability to exhibit the physiological neuroses as deviations from various particular standards of viable equilibrium, as I could do with the psychological neuroses. The physiological neuroses are simply departures from the type. For any fertilized ovum the attainment of physiological viable equilibrium is the attainment of the normal maturity of its type; it is a repetition of its parents. And for the mature organism, physiological viable equilibrium is normal working.

It may be said that I myself have not got outside the circle of material conditions, since I refer the physiological neuroses to physiological abnormality in the germ-cell. The objection would show a misunderstanding of my position (and incidentally a poor opinion of my intelligence, but to this I am accustomed). I have no ambition to explain material phenomena as the effects of immaterial causes. I can meet the objection equally well on the ground of normal living processes, developmental or otherwise, for in these also the notion of viable equilibrium (or some such notion) is essential to our understanding of them. Given a fertilized ovum and a suitable environment, something else is still required, or why should one ovum become a fig-tree and another a thistle? A definite tendency towards a goal is required, a tendency, I say, towards viable equilibrium, determined by the past history of the life in question. (Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances.) It is in recognizing this tendency, this "law" of life, that I get outside the circle of present material conditions. But the living-process is unthinkable without its material conditions, just as is physical activity. I have no wish to divorce life-activity in any of its manifestations from its material conditions. A "law of Nature" is the way things happen. Apart from the happenings, it is nothing.

So with the phenomenon of acclimatization, which is acquired "degeneracy" or change of standard of viable equilibrium. I have no wish at all to deny that, in the case of the organisms *A*, *B* and *C* aforementioned, a super-physiologist would be able to find physiological conditions in *B* and *C* different from those of *A* and from those of one another. What I deny is that such physiological abnormality is the *cause* of the degeneracy.

The same applies, of course, to the psychological neuroses. The super-physiologist would be able to detect the physiological conditions of hysteria.

## v.

The manifestations of psychological tendency (the "self") occur only in respect of physiological change, not in respect of the changes and situations of the external physical world. The individual is not in direct contact with the world. His body is interpolated. Of any given change we cannot know whether it is in the world or in ourselves. "The world is grey." "No; you are growing old." Hence the illusion of the *laudator temporis acti*.

This fact gives rise to ambiguity as to the "site" of the disturbance in certain functional disorders. For they may arise either in the relation, psychological reaction—physiological conditions, or in the relation, physiological reaction—conditions.

Take, for instance, hypochondriasis. In the former case it is properly described, in subjective terms, as "the arrest of attention on the bodily sensations" (H. Rayner). But it is also possible that the individual's bodily changes are actually of such abnormal intensity that, occurring in any of us, even the most normal (psychologically), they would compel our attention to them. The visceral neurasthenic has a *right* to be hypochondriac.

Take the individual whose physiological processes find eggs unviable. How many of these unfortunates have been bullied by well-meaning people who have regarded the affair as psychological, as a case for having "the nonsense knocked out of them"? And again, this may be the right diagnosis sometimes. (I say nothing as to the treatment.)

So with neurasthenia, as I pointed out in discussing it. The physiological machine may be working so badly that any of us would quickly tire of driving it. We are all neurasthenics by bedtime. Or the machine may be well enough, originally at least, but the driver too easily tired.

Organs and systems have their neuroses also, their hyper-aesthesia to such bodily changes as those occasioned by emotional conditions. When a wife can tell "how business is" by the history of her husband's heart or stomach, the physician labels these organs "neurotic."

In the relation of the individual to his *external* environment, no ambiguity as to the "locality" of the neurosis can arise. The observer simply notes the intensity of the physical change or of the emotional situation and judges whether or not it is sufficient to occasion a reaction in a normal person. And his measure is himself. The phlegmatic thinks a great many people hysterical.

## VI.

Neuroses, whether physiological or psychological, and in the latter case, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, if I may so distinguish the hysteria-type from the neurasthenia-type, are not necessarily innate. The abnormality of the conditions which determines the abnormality of the individual manifestation of life may either have been in the past history of the race or it may occur in the history of the individual born, or, to be more accurate, conceived, normal.

The innate origin of neuroses I need not linger over. It presents no difficulty to thought. It would be stranger that the child of degenerate parents should be normal than that it is, in fact, abnormal, physiologically or psychologically.

The broad type of acquired degeneracy has already been exhibited in the case of our organisms *A*, *B* and *C*. I say the "broad" type, because in this particular instance, the "degeneracy" of *B* and *C* as compared with *A*, is degeneracy only in a logical sense. The adaptation of *B* and *C* to their altered conditions is effected perfectly, because the change of conditions is not actually unviable, prejudicial to life, but only unviable in the sense that any act of "attention," any "perception," is the effect of an "unviable" change, a disturbance of viable equilibrium.

Yet the example is a perfectly good illustration of acquired degeneracy. It exhibits a change of standard of viable equilibrium as a result of an enduring change of conditions. We have only to make the change a really unviable one in order to have a case of acquired degeneracy. When conditions are really unviable, though short of being fatal, it is clear that *perfect* adaptation is incompatible with normality of life. If we use the word "viability" for the perfectness of normality of living-process, we may say, and it is obviously a truism, that in really unviable conditions the viability of the organism is diminished. We cannot, for instance, adapt ourselves perfectly, without loss of viability, to half-rations. The horse whose owner tried to adapt it to living on nothing a day could adapt itself to the altered conditions only by dying, the last "adaptation" possible. Similarly, we cannot be subjected to long-continued or often recurrent emotional strain without loss of viability, without suffering a change in our standard of emotionality. In this connection it is important to notice that "emotions" may be divided into two kinds, those in which the disturbance of viable equilibrium is only relative, and those in which it is actual, the same distinction as that which we made in regard to "perception" and "pain." Thus the emotion

of a lover is not actually unviable; it is natural and appropriate in the circumstances, and the circumstances are not unviable actually. From our point of view there is only one really unviable "emotion," as pain is the one really unviable "feeling," namely, fear. These two are the subjective aspects of real unviability of conditions, the former of physical conditions, the latter of particular (dangerous) situations. When we speak of "emotional strain" it is of "fear" we are speaking. Among humanity, of course, fears are multiplied a hundred fold; though we no longer, for the most part, go in fear of our lives, we pay dearly for the immunity. Nietzsche has probably said that we are afraid to live.

For cases of physiological acquired degeneracy I need only refer the reader to the text-books of pathology, which is the study of physiological reactions to abnormal conditions. Here also within certain limits physiological adaptation implies no loss of viability. The organism of the manual worker differs obviously from that of the mental worker, yet both may be healthy, viable organisms. But if an organism is subjected to a really unviable condition, say, for instance, alcoholic toxaemia, its viability is to some extent diminished, however healthy it may appear to be, as mortality statistics show.

#### VII.

Am I bound to try to apply my theory of the neuroses to particular clinical signs and symptoms?

In respect to hysteria, I submit, I am not. For the same reason that science (psychology) declines to discuss the alleged phenomena of "psychical research"; it is not worth while, as long as the objectivity of the phenomena remains in doubt. A hysterical fit is perhaps more than an "alleged phenomenon," but it is not a purely objective phenomenon. There is a "person" in the case, by general admission an abnormal person, and "persons" are not objective. Usually a woman, too.

As to neurasthenia, there does seem to be more justification for the demand—I feel the demand—to come down to cases. Here the "person" is not so clearly abnormal as in hysteria. It seems that we are dealing with physiological abnormalities of the organism, which, however recalcitrant, are capable of discussion, if not, in time, of discovery.

Certainly, but when these abnormal physiological conditions shall have been described with the utmost exactitude, we shall still be as far as ever from the *cause* of neurasthenia. We shall then still be discussing the physiological *effects* of neurasthenia, in no better case in fact than when we were discussing its very grossest, most palpable effects. And

the demand to come down to cases is a demand to show how my theory is causally related to particular clinically-observed phenomena.

An experimental pathologist introduces abnormality into the conditions of a living-process, and observes what happens. From his, quite legitimately, restricted point of view the abnormal condition is the cause of what happens. This is the very type of the aetiology that satisfies medical men in regard to what are called organic derangements. But in functional derangements the method is simply not applicable. The abnormal condition in the above case is simply the *occasion* of the happening; we are entitled to ask why it happens thus and not in some other way. Upon which the pathologist tells us not to be silly; all his concern is to observe *what happens*.

This is precisely my case in regard to functional derangements. They happen, in the abnormal conditions of the particular individual manifestation of life. They are the effect of this and of nothing less—an aetiology too large to be satisfactory to the pure scientist—in this instance, as pathologist or physician.

But if our aetiology is unsatisfactorily large, so is his clinical picture. I say, roughly, that "neurosis" is "anything going *naturally* wrong." Anyone who feels this to be unsatisfactory and goes to a text-book of medicine for something more definite will find that anything going wrong without an "organic cause" is "neurosis." This is a perfectly fair epitome of the picture given in medical text-books. We find cerebral, spinal, cardio-vascular, visceral and uro-genital forms of neurasthenia, and the only interest such a very inclusive description—as a description of "neurasthenia"—leaves us is the question why there is no respiratory neurasthenia. Probably because the simplicity of structure of the respiratory system, reminiscent as it is of the Irishman's description of a net as "holes tied together with string," leaves little scope for functional derangement, while its one very definite functional disorder, asthma, has long had a name and a place of its own in text-books of medicine.

The loss of muscular tone in both voluntary and involuntary muscle, to which the name "neurasthenia" more especially applies, is the bad working of those organs—the bad working natural in the circumstances. Normal tone is not a material, physiological condition. It is a function. It is the way a normal muscle works, or let us say, to avoid ambiguity, the way a normal muscle exists—lives and has its being.

I do not suggest that the most naïve pathologist is content to regard neurasthenia as the effect of loss of tone. I do suspect him of hoping to find the *cause* of the loss of tone by a more and more minute investigation

of its material conditions. My case is that however useful such more minute knowledge of material conditions may be, for instance, with a view to curative measures, it is logically impossible to arrive in this way at the *cause* of the neurosis. The pathologist I have supposed is still taking life for granted, never asking if it itself can be normal and abnormal, as though even in the most degenerate organism he ever saw, the life-principle could be doing no wrong, but in the nature of things must itself be perfect and the degeneracy the effect of abnormal material conditions, as though "form" were necessarily perfect, however imperfect its "matter." But the principle of life is merely "the way that living-process works," and the process proceeds aberrantly, badly, in bad, *i.e.* actually unviable conditions. Nothing less, therefore, than a theory of life is adequate to explain the functional derangements of life, a theory according to which these will be manifestations of less perfect life, or as I say, of diminished "viability."

I would again emphasize, however, that no hard and fast line can be drawn between functional and organic derangement. This dualism, the medical analogue of that of mind and body, disappears in my theory along with the latter. In organic derangement the pathologist never demonstrates anything but the *occasion* of physiological abnormality. And for a super-pathologist, who should be able to demonstrate the abnormal physiology of a hysteric, the distinction of "functional" and "organic" would cease to exist. But as long as he remained *mere* pathologist, concerning himself only with the material, physiological conditions of life, he would fail to understand the true nature of a neurosis, however exactly he might be able to demonstrate its physiological conditions. In the same way a physiologist deeply misunderstands life, if he thinks he can explain it in terms of physiological conditions *alone*, as bio-chemistry. He requires more than physico-chemical activity to animate his clay; he must invoke other laws than those of physics and chemistry to explain his animation, normal or abnormal.

#### VIII.

*Summary.* Life is a continuing physico-chemical activity whose manifestations cannot be described in terms of physics and chemistry only. The equilibrium towards which it tends, the adaptation to change of conditions which it exhibits, is not merely that of physical or chemical activity. It tends towards viable equilibrium, and this equilibrium must clearly vary in individuals according to the conditions in which their lot is cast.



Normal individuals are such as are of normal stock and have lived under normal external conditions, intra-uterine and extra-uterine, physical, emotional and social. They react normally, physiologically and psychologically, to physical changes, emotional situations, suggestions and bodily changes. Their standard of viable equilibrium, in respect to all possible relevant conditions, is the normal one for the species.

In neuroses the standard of viable equilibrium is altered from the normal.

## PRIMARY IDENTIFICATION AND MYSTICISM<sup>1</sup>

BY ALFRED CARVER.

THE subject of this study, whom I will call *D*, was a well-educated single man aged 38, the only son of conventional middle-class parents. Ever since his university days he had been addicted to alcohol, taking this drug regularly rather to excess with occasional dipsomaniac orgies of about a week's duration. It was on account of the loss of various positions as a result of this failing that he was persuaded by friends to submit to psychoanalysis.

At the first interview *D* stated that he took alcohol deliberately to drown pessimistic thoughts and to overthrow something that prevented him from mixing happily with his fellows. The orgies were however followed by a profound sense of inferiority and self-loathing. He had also cultivated a mystical pantheism which enabled him at times to feel in harmony with nature, which he personified as "The Earth Angel."

The history which unfolded itself during analysis was as follows. As an infant *D* had been weak, sickly and backward and on this account was unduly coddled and fussed over. Though he had certain vague memories or rather feelings regarding this period his earliest definite recollection was the birth of a sister when he was nearly three. He regarded the new-comer with mixed interest and resentment, but she only survived a few days so that *D* was not troubled by her. His mother was ill for some while after the event and *D* one day entering the room suddenly surprised his father drawing off her milk with a breast-pump. This sight seems somehow to have disgusted *D* yet it stimulated his curiosity, for from that time he began to interest himself in secondary sex characters and differences in dress between men and women. He noticed disapprovingly the various artifices, pads, corsets, etc., of which his mother made lavish use to enhance her secondary sex characters. Once, about a year later, he was in his mother's bedroom when she was going to take a bath there. She enjoined upon him not to look. Naturally he made the most of the opportunity, but what he saw again only disgusted him. He got the impression of "a skinny uncomely form, flaccid breasts and red inflamed nipples." His mother's over-solicitousness for him, which as an infant had been acceptable became as he grew older hampering

<sup>1</sup> Read at a meeting of The Birmingham Medical Psychological Society 14th Feb. 1924.

and unwelcome. Instead of showing him encouragement she continued to treat him as a baby and to thwart his childish impulses on the pretext of his delicacy; but more than this she behaved as though everything he did was naughty. *D* early resented her interference with his excretory functions, particularly her practice of dragging him from bed to make him urinate. She tried to overcome his obstinacy by squirting water from a little syringe into the commode as a suggestion, but even so the child was not to be cajoled. Feeling himself persecuted by his mother's efforts to educate him *D* sought to escape from the sphere of her influence to the kitchen where the environment was more propitious. Hunted from this refuge, however, he was thrown back upon himself.

*D* was early the subject of night terrors, which according to his recollection took two main recurring forms. In one an old hag, or witch, seemed to be bending over him with intent to harm him. A variant of this theme was that a large spider hung over his cot ready to devour him. In the other nightmare the ceiling of his bedroom became crowded with black shadowy hands clutching and crawling as though to inflict some awful doom upon him. In addition to fear the latter nightmare was associated with a worked-up sensation; his whole body becoming stiff as though something queer were about to happen within him. *D*'s method of escape from these unwelcome disturbers of his peace was to snuggle up in the bed and completely to bury himself under the clothes. Once he ventured to speak of them, but was so discouraged by the reception he met with that he thereafter kept them to himself.

Already, at the age of 4 to 5, *D* gained a certain pleasure from putting a strap tightly round his waist when in bed. His mother discovered this and tried to break him of it, but he persisted in the habit until years later, his mother intuitively perceiving that he got some sort of auto-erotic pleasure from it warned him against masturbation, saying that such practices led to madness. As years went on *D*'s conscious dislike for his mother steadily increased. He sensed in her not only lack of understanding and hypocrisy, but actual enmity. It is not easy to be sure how far this estimate by *D* corresponded to anything actually present in his mother, but we must note that his parents had married late in life (over 40) and many things suggest that his mother did not wish to be burdened with children but to devote herself exclusively and platonically to her husband, who was already failing in health. Her gush over and excessive fondling of her baby may have been compensatory to a lack of real love for him. Perhaps also she later realised his auto-erotism and was by harsh behaviour attempting to put a stop to it. In any case

her early exaggerated solicitude and her later detachment from *D*'s real interests, while at the same time keeping a strict restraint upon him, were objective phenomena.

*D* hardly ever saw his father, who was absent all day and engaged in literary work upon his return home. Only six times in his life does *D* remember his father taking any notice of him. Once he promised to take him fishing when *D* was as high as the mantlepieee, but this promise was never fulfilled. Altogether *D*'s father ignored him and did nothing to develop his virility either directly or even by way of stimulating rebellion. The father thus stood for a dull if lofty intellectualism, which *D* vaguely admired but disdained as being too remote.

When *D* was 8 his father's health so far failed that a move from the suburbs to a country place became necessary. For *D* this meant leaving the dame school at which he held the record for absenees and the gaining for the first time a certain amount of freedom from home restrictions as he was allowed to wander off and play in the eountry, a thing which previously had been prohibited. His attention now turned to natural history and in spite of his mother's objections he managed to spend a good deal of time by the river. Here he found companions of his own age but with very few of them did he become at all intimate. He delighted in everything connected with water, and became passionately fond of swimming, although this, the only form of sport he ever attempted, was forbidden by his mother as dangerous. He also made a little aquarium and studied with deep interest the habits and movements of fish and water-beetles; so things went better for a time.

At age 13 his father's health broke down completely and the family moved to an inland spa. *D* was "overwhelmed with desolation"; his outlets were again closed. He was sent to a local school where from the first he mistrusted and feared his school-fellows. His feeling of inferiority became more noticeable and his only method of defence was a refusal to enter into competition. During his first term he obtained a medical certificate excusing him from playing games and contrived to make it last out all his school days without getting it renewed. His mother's attention was now absorbed by the father and *D* was almost completely ignored by both parents. Only on Sundays did his mother interfere with him by driving him, against his will, to attend church. *D*, who had always considered his mother's religion as hypocritical, now came to regard it as a cloak for eruelty. The only means of escape from the hated school and domestic situation was solitary rambles in the country during which he began seriously to interest himself in entomology. He studied par-

ticularly bees and wasps, but had a morbid horror of spiders, which embodied for him "malignant cold cruelty."

At age 15 *D* became aware of vague sexual promptings. He revived his attention to secondary sex characters, particularly the breasts, sought out books likely to bear on coition and began to masturbate. The latter practice afforded most gratification when he put on a pair of corsets. A sense of guilt and shame, however, followed the performance, and his secretive asocial behaviour left him with the idea that he alone indulged in such practices. Throughout these years *D* was not only unsociable but definitely antisocial. He regarded the society of the place and its conventions with positive abhorrence and sought companionship with nature not with humanity. He happened, however, upon his wanderings, to make the acquaintance of a Bohemian artist and novelist from whom he acquired a good deal of sophistication. "This man was the first good sportsman he had ever met and the only one who talked to him frankly as an equal." *D* received both encouragement and knowledge from this man and stayed with him on several occasions.

At age 18 it was decided that *D* should go to university, and his mother tried hard to persuade him to take Holy Orders. This he resolutely declined, and congratulated himself the more over his refusal when he later surprised his mother into the admission that her main reason for so urging him was the idea that he was neither strong enough nor clever enough for other careers. On going up to university *D* made a determined effort to overcome his feeling of inferiority and isolation. He discovered that alcohol helped him greatly towards this and called it "the breaker of barriers." By its aid he became popular with a certain set and "managed to amuse his company."

When he felt inadequate in a situation he resorted to buffoonery as a means of ingratiating himself. For a time he almost enjoyed life, though he "regretted the habit of masturbation and longed to realise a woman"; but whether drunk or sober he proved impotent. In other ways both at sports and in his studies he was well up to the average and manifested no objective signs of inferiority. Before leaving university *D* made the acquaintance of a lady some 20 years older than himself in whom he found for the first time sympathy and helpfulness. She opened up to him new worlds of literature and art and comforted him in his moods of depression and self-hatred, which he called "fits of blue devils." The relationship between them became almost that of mother and son with platonic love on both sides. Without her, *D* was prone to doubts as to his virility, mistrust as to his capabilities and regrets over the past, but her presence and encouragement always sustained him.

Upon leaving university, where he had obtained 2nd class honours in history, *D* became a schoolmaster. For a time he derived pleasure from venting his animosity against suburban conventions and humorously parading his eccentricities. Soon, however, he contracted a liaison with a demi-*vierge* in a neighbouring resort, which for a year or so ran a tempestuous course and included most things except actual coition. The girl, however, desired a more virile mate and broke off the relationship leaving *D* more than ever distrustful and angry with his own virginity. He now turned to nature for solace, and "rejecting a dualistic conception of a creator external to the universe moulding it from without he groped towards a pantheistic or monistic philosophy." He wished to be closer to the Earth-angel, to feel with her, to achieve some sort of mystic union. And, "in rare moments he seemed, like Richard Jefferies, to sink into the earth, to feel some peculiar power passing into him and to be on the brink of some strange revelation." This he called "sensing"—a term also used by W. H. Hudson—since to attain the experience he had to relax until his senses became blurred and blended into one. Then through this single channel he obtained "direct throbbing communion with his mystical Earth-Angel." Alcohol helped him towards this Gnosis, but the presence of man upon a landscape seemed to defile it and prevent communion. In his own words, he "continued to use alcohol not only to gain the fellowship of man, but also to further kinship with nature. The actual taste of spirit did not attract him;—the dreams were better than the drink." He quoted, as applicable to himself, Hardy's description of inebriated peasants returning from a fair, "they followed the road with a sensation that they were soaring along in a supporting medium possessed of original and profound thoughts, themselves and surrounding nature harmoniously and joyously interpenetrating one another." This phase lasted some years, during which he remained a schoolmaster, but grew increasingly restless. Then by a stroke of luck he managed to secure an appointment as entomologist in the tropics. On the voyage out he indulged in a serious flirtation, but "certain scruples prevented him from obtaining complete satisfaction," although he judged that the woman would have yielded had his attack been pressed. In the tropics he plunged into work with vigour and success, enjoying his new-found freedom: yet his addiction to alcohol increased. Few women were available and these were so greatly in demand that he "lacked confidence to enter the lists and avoided them instead." Then the war broke out and when it became apparent that all hands were needed another conflict arose in *D*'s mind. He had no wish to join up and many excuses for not doing so, yet he

feared that he would be despised and unable to face people if he held back any longer. Under this added strain *D* increased his consumption of whiskey to a bottle a day and began to attract unfavourable notice. Eventually he insisted on war-leave and returned to England.

At first, as private and N.C.O., he was kept so busy and had so little money that he only indulged in occasional mild alcoholic orgies. As an officer with more money and leisure he became restless and apprehensive. "Self-distrust drove him to freakish escapades and heavy drinking." In the army of course his social environment was exclusively masculine and unusually intimate in character. He got out to France without coming into conflict with the authorities, but in France several times got into serious trouble on account of drunkenness and was only saved by the attribution of his "attacks" to malaria.

Upon demobilisation he was warned that his "old failing" had reached the ears of and greatly annoyed the higher authorities and that unless he had overcome it he had better not return to his job. He nevertheless went back, but found himself even more than before unable to settle down reasonably. His addiction rapidly became worse and he was soon compelled to resign.

*D* was now in the depths of despair and his feeling of inferiority and isolation made life seem not worth living. Many times indeed he contemplated suicide, to which he referred humorously as a "going back to the land." Through the influence of a friend he was offered another entomological post, but lost the opportunity by appearing for medical examination in an intoxicated state. Having in this way cut himself off from entomology he was driven to seek employment in his old line as a schoolmaster. In this capacity he managed to hold several positions for short periods, but through ill-timed orgies invariably lost them. During this swift débâcle he tried various methods of struggling against drink. He coquetted with catholicism, strove to regain his earlier mysticism and produced a pantheistic philosophy, but all in vain.

In giving this historical outline I have used as far as possible the patient's own words and phrases.

The outstanding features in *D*'s life-history, upon which I wish to concentrate attention to the exclusion of many other points of secondary interest, are his attitude towards his mother and his mysticism. The deeper interpretation of these two correlated phenomena is, in my opinion, illuminated by a thesis for which we are indebted to Burrow<sup>1</sup>. This

<sup>1</sup> Trigant Burrow, "The Genesis and Meaning of Homosexuality," *Psychoanalytic Rev.* vol. iv, No. 3

author contends that the condition of harmony existing between mother and foetus while the latter is still *in utero* persists in but slightly modified form during the early period of infancy. The larval consciousness, which then obtains is undifferentiated, intensely subjective and tends towards a close consolidation and welding together of the infantile ego and the mother-*imago*. "This subjective continuity; this organic mental bond" Burrow calls the principle of primary identification. It is the same phase of existence which Ferenczi<sup>1</sup> has described as the stage of "magical hallucinatory omnipotence." The condition which may result from an undue prolongation of this resembles that met with in Melancholia, though differing in mechanism in that whereas the melancholic has withdrawn his libido from an object which it once invested and has then secondarily set up the object within the ego itself *D* never reached the stage of object-investment but continued fixed in the subjective mode of primary identification with the mother. We note that *D* was in consequence of his delicacy as a baby, and possibly other causes also, excessively coddled, while later circumstances combined to render adaptation to reality unusually hard. At the time when the primary mother-self identification should have been superseded by the development of object love and when in most children the Oedipus situation is in process of formation *D* was repelled by his mother's behaviour and instead of love, disgust and hatred towards her were called forth. The process of weaning in the larger sense of the word should be and usually is gradual; the infant being led to objectivation and adaptation slowly and kindly. With *D* the demand appears to have been made abruptly and ruthlessly, in consequence of which he refused it. He thus came to hate his mother as he found her at that time, but since his own ego was identified with her *imago* he by the same means came to distrust and despise himself. This must be conceived of as taking place at the transition period between the stage of primary identification and subjectivity and that of objectivation, *i.e.* just when *D* should have been developing an individuality of his own. Unfortunately he received no help from his father, either at this critical period or later, for his father held entirely aloof from the situation. Yet in later years his father's very aloofness and "sardonic intellectualism" did contribute towards the formation of *D*'s ego-ideal, giving rise to what *D* termed his "intellectual snobbery and highbrowism."

The most important consequence of *D*'s primary identification with the mother and his adoption of a feminine ego was that it motivated in him unconscious homosexual trends of the passive variety. Now the

<sup>1</sup> S. Ferenczi, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*. Trans. by Ernest Jones.



Freudian<sup>1</sup> explanation of homosexuality is well known and is undoubtedly correct, from the mechanistic standpoint, in a large number of cases, but Burrow has argued that genetically unconscious homosexuality arises as a consequence of primary identification and the latter hypothesis seems more fully to interpret the facts met with in *D*'s case. According to Burrow the subjective unity with the mother causes the infant in his first attempts at objectivation to follow the lines of his mother's solicitude, namely himself. His own body thus becomes the focus of his interest—which is auto-erotism. "Now auto-erotism or the love of one's own body is the love of that sex to which one's body belongs and this in psychological interpretation is precisely homosexuality<sup>2</sup>." We note, further, that *D*'s homosexuality was of the feminine or passive variety, that is to say, he tended to adopt the receptive rôle in life and acted as female both in masturbation phantasies, in his behaviour with women and in feeling himself recipient of mysterious force when "sensing" nature. I would explain the passive type of his unconscious homosexuality as being due to the identification of his ego with the maternal ego. That is to say, his real ego, psychologically though not physiologically was feminine. Now the ego-ideal is particularly resistant to the implied inferiority of complete sexual inversion much more so than to aggressive homosexual cravings. Kempf<sup>3</sup> in his studies of the social and sexual behaviour of infrahuman primates suggests that "probably the irrepressible sexual craving to assume the female rôle in the sex act causes so much distress because the individual's other wishes, namely to be 'manly,' 'strong,' biologically as potent as others are so seriously conflicted with and belied." *D* certainly felt inferiority and anxiety in the presence of other men, was quite unable to account for such inadequate feelings and sought to remove them by means of alcohol. He also constantly railed against the shams and pretences of suburban life although, or just because, he was held in bondage by them. His mother, as epitomising such things, always received the strongest mead of his contempt and hatred, for until analysed he had not perceived that she was the external counterpart of the tendencies he so much disliked in himself and that in abusing her he was indulging in projection. Consciously he vainly sought to establish virility towards women although despising them and fearing their domination. He was, however, unsuccessful in this because unconsciously he craved to adopt the feminine receptive

<sup>1</sup> S. Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*.

<sup>2</sup> Burrow, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

<sup>3</sup> E. J. Kempf, "The Social and Sexual Behaviour of Infrahuman Primates," *Psychoan. Rev.* vol. IV, No. 2.

rôle himself. Hence he never achieved more than mutual masturbation with women and this left him disappointed and angry. The libido being unable to obtain gratification with either men or women, *D* turned to nature with a vague feeling that there he could find harmony and experience something which was forbidden to him elsewhere. His earliest essay in this direction was at age 8 when he escaped to the river. His joy in swimming, so contrary to his attitude towards other sports, is noteworthy. In water he found himself (again) bathed in a delightful, stimulating supporting medium and experienced feelings analogous to those attributed by Hardy to the happy peasants returning from a fair. He also envied fish, which are not expelled by a cruel fate from their native element; and watched with passionate interest their movements in this congenial enveloping medium. In this connexion I may remark that skin (tactile) and muscle erotism were highly developed in *D*. Theoretical considerations lead me to infer that these two systems constitute the primary prenatal erotogenic zones. Tickling, which sometimes reached an unendurable pitch—equated with the worked-up sensation of his childish nightmares—occasionally accompanied veiled erotic dreams during analysis. Again, the strap and corsets had as one motivation the cutaneous sensation which they induced. Next the complexities of insect life attracted *D* in place of the more usual boyish preoccupations. He selected the hymenoptera as the favourite objects of study, but had an uncanny aversion to spiders. It may be recalled that in his early night-terrors a spider often replaced the threatening old hag. Spiders also figured in some of his dreams during analysis. On two occasions a crab and on one occasion a vampire was substituted for a spider. *D*'s association to bees was "what is sweeter than honey and what is stronger than a lion." He considered the sweetness of honey as cloying and by surfeit leading to disgust. Honey (coddling) originally had cloyed him. The bee, which gave honey proved on closer acquaintance to conceal a sting. Sting immediately gave the association penis, which corresponds to the assumed virile or lion-like aspect of the bee. Yet the worker-bee, though possessed of a sting, is not troubled by sex. "It is a castrated female; of neuter gender." It appears also to be, in a marked degree in harmony with nature—with the "mother hive" in which it lives. Just as fish remain always in their native supporting medium so do bees continue through life with their queen in the matrix of the hive. *D* himself reacted resentfully to his expulsion and to enforced objectivation in a hostile world, where in place of a diffuse caressing stimulation pleasure and power seemed to be centred in the penis and each was forbidden.

The sting—penis—power—of others was too overbearing for him: he could not use his own, but was compelled to submit to the domination of others. Originally the domination had been exercised by his mother, to whom, prior to any sophistication, *D* had attributed a penis, which he equated with nipple. In earliest postnatal days his appetite had been sated with food (honey) from the nipple, but later this was denied to him and he came to regard the red inflamed nipples of his mother with aversion. They were sour grapes, unconsciously desired, consciously hated. Gladly would *D* have been of neuter gender (castrated) and have returned to his matrix as do bees to theirs. If only he could solve the riddle of the bee all might come right. The only magic he could attempt to this end was imitation of their muscle activity and environment. In the case of the bee this imitative magic took the form of vigorous rambles over the countryside, just as in the case of fish it had consisted of swimming and bathing. Bee and wasp thus stood as an over-determined symbol for the mother, self and mother-self-combination.

To spider *D* associated "the evil power of nature." "Spiders are the embodiment of malignancy. They have fixed, hard, calculating eyes and cruel claws. They wrap up their prey until it is like a child bound up in hampering clothes. The female spider is bigger and more powerful than the male and often eats him." Spider thus represents female sadistic qualities and stands for the cruel mother who separated herself from him and, dissolving the close subjective bond once uniting them, treated him objectively and harshly. The mother of his babyhood had cloyed him with fussiness, the mother of his childhood emasculated him. What he craved was the mother of the original mother-self combination not an objective mother at all. Space does not permit me to recount the numerous dreams in which *D* amplified the above theme. To get back to Nirvana; "to the estuary of a great river where things had been lost," and so on was a constantly recurring theme in his dreams.

During the period of puberty the solitary study of insects served not only as an excuse for fleeing the distasteful society of other boys and evading competition in games, but actually afforded him a compensatory feeling of superiority in that he felt himself possessed of certain deeper knowledge which the others lacked. The Bohemian novelist with whom *D* came in contact at this time gained his confidence by complimenting him upon his knowledge of natural history and by praising the endurance and keenness which he displayed upon his long rambles. This novelist was the only man, who had displayed an encouraging paternal type of interest in him. *D* had often felt that his father ought to have done

something for him and paid the same attention to him as to the mother. From the response *D* made to the kindly overtures of the novelist one may surmise that his life-history would have been very different had the father vouchsafed any interest in his son's upgrowing. We may notice that in *D*'s later theophany the importance or existence of a father is implicitly denied by the repudiation of a creator external to the universe. Thus did *D* avenge the slight inflicted upon him by his father's neglect.

Upon going up to university *D* did make a very strenuous effort at adjustment. He began by refusing the overt domination of his mother in declining to take Holy Orders and he strove desperately to gain an equal footing with men. His unconscious homosexuality, however, prevented him from entering into friendly relations with them unless he overthrew the barrier by means of alcohol. There remained only one other method of establishing himself and that was by intellectualism. It was in accord with his ego-ideal and followed his father's one strong trait. Compensation for his inferior virility was thus to be gained by a hypertrophy of the head or intellect, which is a special instance of what Freud has termed displacement from below upwards. This had been foreshadowed by the superiority he felt at school in the possession of knowledge not shared by his fellows. To this way he turned again, now with the help and encouragement of an intellectual woman, who, being childless, adopted him as son. With her help thrown on to the side of his ego-ideal the balance was partially redressed and he succeeded in keeping the "blue devils" in control by humorously parading his eccentricities and rebellion against what he termed "suburbia." Had he been able to transfer his original identification to this new mother and then work through it to a secondary objective relationship his ego and ego-ideal would have ceased so violently to conflict, but the primary fixation proved too strong. When removed from the immediate influence of this lady, *D* fell back into an auto-erotic liaison with a woman, which ended in mutual dissatisfaction and brought about a return of the repression. The renewed anxiety drove him back to nature with a quasi-religious fervour far more intense than he had previously exhibited. He now conceived of nature as a mysterious all-pervading force, personified as the Earth-Angel, and strove to attain ecstatic throbbing oneness with her. We may here recall *D*'s early nightmare in which he pictured hands stretching out towards him and had that strange worked-up sensation as if something queer were about to happen within him. During analysis he associated this with the curious expectation of a strange revelation upon the brink of which he hovered in moments of "sensing nature." The

tense throbbing sensation, the sinking into the earth and the drinking in of mystic power evidently betoken an erotic stimulation, which was unable to reach to the pitch of orgasm. More deeply considered this throbbing oneness, experienced when his consciousness merged in the universal, represents an extreme regression to prenatal "organic memories" modified retrospectively by later developments. In early days the tense sensations, the outstretched hands and the threatening old hag filled him with dread. Possibly during sleep there was actual forbidden manipulation of the genitalia, for about that time he already constricted his waist with a strap—the forerunner of corsets, which he later deliberately used to enhance the pleasure of masturbation. At the time of ecstatic union with the Earth-Angel sexuality suffered temporary complete repression, and in its sublimated form disguised erotic sensations were permitted pleasurable recognition. After the experience however *D* always felt irritable, exhausted and depressed. Schroeder<sup>1</sup>, in reporting a case of mysticism in a woman, presents a study of hypothetical prenatal psychisms, which is in agreement with the already referred to thesis of Burrow; though he does not mention the latter. According to either of these authors we may view *D*'s strivings for mystical oneness with the universe as a regression to the undifferentiated subjective phase, which obtains *in utero* when there is complete organic harmony and union with the universe as then experienced, namely the mother. Here, however, one can hardly avoid the question as to how far a neurosis is to be regarded as sexual even when, as in *D*'s case, a disturbance in the sexual sphere is one of its most obvious contents. The sex instinct, or instincts, seem to be doubly motivated; one urge, and that primitively the most powerful, is entirely appetitive and egoistic, aiming as it does at sensuous satisfaction to the ego without any external reference. It is, if we may for a moment speak anthropomorphically, this sensuous satisfaction, for which the ego is already conditioned during the primary subjective phase, that nature later uses as a bait to lure the individual to the purposive function of sexual propagation. The second motivation, union with a suitable mate, is reactive and introduces potentially altruistic relationships. As a child begins to objectivate his attention is drawn most towards the people in his environment—usually his parents. He soon finds that his cravings can only be fulfilled by getting into rapport with them. Hence there is a tendency for him to modify his earlier purely egocentric auto-erotic attitude and to enter into reciprocal relations with others. Society

<sup>1</sup> Theodore Schroeder, "Prenatal Psychisms and Mystical Pantheism," *Internat. Jour. Psychoanal.* vol. III, part 4.

always frowns upon the continuance of auto-erotism and encourages the development of objectivation with its biologically useful potentialities. If by misadventure the psychic progress of an infant is arrested at the primary subjective stage, which is pre-sexual, subsequently attempted sexual relationships prove a source of conflict; but are we therefore wise in speaking of the resultant neurosis as sexual? The question is academically interesting, though perhaps of no great pragmatic importance.

The theses of Burrow and Schroeder while in no way negating the psychological mechanisms, which Freud has shown to be at work in symptom formation seem to me valuable in carrying the matter further back and giving us a genetic foundation, to which our interpretation may advantageously reach. Although interpretation carried to this level may appear fanciful *D* in his "sensing" did practically revert to the type of prenatal psychism postulated by Schroeder. Thus with a well-educated subject like *D* the analyst is almost in the ideal position of studying a foetus or infant, who yet is capable of assisting directly in the interpretation. Of course the law of recapitulation requires qualification when applied, as here, in the psychic no less than in the somatic sphere. The main, though unavoidable, difficulty arises from retrospective falsification. In a case like the present, however, the process of thought is equally of interest as the content of thought.

My purpose in relating *D*'s case was not to give another example of the well-known connexion between latent homosexuality and alcoholism, but an endeavour to trace the unconscious motivation of his mysticism. This, I contend, is most readily understandable as a regression to that stage of existence described by Burrow as the stage of primary subjective identification; but through retrospective falsification sexual factors play a conspicuous part in the developed neurosis. The cause of regression to the point of original fixation, indeed, appears to be the inability of the libido to gain satisfaction in any other way tolerable to the ego-ideal. *D*'s cultural development as also his upbringing precluded him from achieving a sublimation within the folds of any religious sect and pre-disposed him towards an idealistic philosophy of his own elaboration. Upon this he wrote a book, which though unpublished was of service during analysis. Even philosophy, however, did not provide a satisfactory sublimation of the cravings, hence the analysis of which I have attempted briefly to set forth the essential data with their interpretation.

# THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IDEA OF DEATH IN THE NEUROTIC MIND<sup>1</sup>

BY E. H. CONNELL.

THIS paper is based on clinical observation of persons suffering from Psychoneuroses and Psychoses, and since the terminology in medical Psychology is somewhat chaotic at the present time, it will be useful to define certain terms and to indicate the sense in which they are used in the following pages.

The term Libido is avoided and the expression "instinct interest" is used, this being the affective and conative elements in instinct experience, which give meaning to that experience and influence the reactions. The notion advanced by C. Spearman in his book on *The Nature of Intelligence*, that conation can and does control the intensity of cognition, is adopted and extended. The view of J. Drever, that it is the affect in the instinct experience of an animal organism that gives primary meaning to that experience, and that a secondary meaning is added by cognitive elaboration, is adopted. The term "Regression" is freely used to express a common phenomenon in Psychopathology and refers to the passing back from a higher to a lower level of Mental function, that is to say, from complex, rational, noesis, to the less complex, non-rational and more affective function operating in children and primitive people; or, further back, to the simple reflex instinctive behaviour level. In psychopathological regression, cognition is weakened and there is abundance of phantasy. This may proceed to failure of cognition, absence of the time and space conceptions, and uncontrolled impulsive actions. The term "Narcissism" is used to mean that state of mental function exhibited by the young child, in which the affect is attached to the self, to the body, and to phantasies of the self, which occurs in development before the stage of transcendence of the self to the conception of the not-self. Narcissism is characterised by self-love rather than self-interest, pleasure-feeling rather than personal advantage. The only other terms used which may be unfamiliar or have other implications than those intended here are the Reality Principle and the Pleasure Principle. These are terms

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Scottish Branch of the British Psychological Society at Edinburgh on Feb. 2nd, 1924.

freely used by Freudian psychoanalysts: where used in this paper the Reality Principle refers to a mode of mental function which neglects, postpones or suppresses affective ends and directs itself to purposive ends or objects; the Pleasure Principle, on the other hand, is the more primitive mode of function which neglects purposive ends in favour of pleasurable affect.

Let us now consider the Significance of the idea of Death in the Neurotic mind. It is striking to notice the absence of this idea in the minds of those physically ill, and the frequent presence of it in the minds of neurotics. The writer assisted in the bacteriological and microscopical examination of 2600 dysentery stools of soldiers in the 3rd British General Hospital on the Shat al Arab in 1915, 1916 and 1917, and personally visited and talked with nearly all of these patients: it was part of his duty to get answers to a questionnaire, the main objects of which were to ascertain the source of infection, to detect the carriers, and to prevent the spread of dysentery, so that the talk was more than a cursory question, but in no case did a patient mention death or show any conscious preoccupation with it, although many were extremely ill and some died in the hospital. Amongst those 2600 patients there were some neurotics, but it appeared as though physiological preoccupation in resisting organic disease diverted attention from the idea of Death.

In melancholia there is an impulse to self-inflicted death, so that melancholics have to be sequestered and guarded for their own protection. It has been frequently noted that the mental state of the melancholic is greatly improved by the occurrence of physical disease. When suffering from bacterial invasion, or severe injury, the melancholic who has been monotonously and with agitation accusing himself of being a sinful, unworthy man, ceases to do so and may soon recover completely; it is as though the occupation of energy in physiological resistance to disease relieved a psychic tension. The death idea in melancholia seems to be associated with self-hatred or loathing, and we have now to enquire whether this is a real hatred or an affective tension 'rationalised' by the melancholic as personal unworthiness.

Freud explains the impulse to death in Melancholia in these words: "As with Paranoia, so also with Melancholia (under which, by the way, very different clinical types are classified) it has been possible to obtain a glimpse into the inner structure of the disorder. We have perceived that the self-reproaches with which these sufferers torment themselves so mercilessly actually relate to another person, to the sexual object they have lost or whom they have ceased to value on account of some fault.



From this we concluded that the melancholic has indeed withdrawn his Libido from the object, but that by a process, which we must call 'narcissistic identification' he has set up the object within the Ego itself, projected it on to the Ego....The Ego itself is then treated as if it were the abandoned object; it suffers all the revengeful and aggressive treatment which is designed for the object. The suicidal impulses of melancholics also become more intelligible on the supposition that the bitterness felt by the diseased mind concerns the Ego itself at the same time as, and equally with, the loved and hated object. In Melancholia, as in the other narcissistic disorders...ambivalence comes markedly to the fore; by this we mean a directing of antithetical feelings (affectionate and hostile) towards the same person<sup>1</sup>." Freud then would explain the death impulse in Melancholia as the result of three processes.

1. Abandonment of the sexual object.
2. Regression of the mind to narcissism.
3. Projection of hatred from the abandoned object on to the self, resulting from identification of the self with the object.

The Freudian interpretation of the death impulse in melancholia is attractive as a simplification by analogy with paranoid mechanisms, but the fact that melancholics recover is against the supposition that projection of hatred on to the Ego occurs; and an even more weighty psychological reason for the rejection of the Freudian interpretation is that such projection *does not* achieve psychic ease or comfort for the melancholic. He is agitated, restless, self-accusatory or stuporose, and continues to experience impulses of self-destruction. It may make this point, as to whether projection occurs in melancholia, clearer if the series of psychic events in paranoia and melancholia are compared.

In paranoia a mental conflict has occurred between the self-regarding sentiment and an impulsive desire to do something inconsistent with that sentiment. This conflict is solved by repression of the desire, and the impulse and its affect are then attributed to another person; the paranoiac thus achieves freedom from self-blame and self-accusation, but at the expense of a delusion. But impulse and affect remain unsatisfied and they activate the delusional system; the paranoiac is rational apart from his delusion, but his self-regarding sentiment is eventually influenced by the delusion: he may injure, kill or flee from the person to whom he has projected his desire with its affect, but whatever he does the person "persecutes" him by unseen agency and countless imaginary devices. The impulse and affect are unsatisfied in reality and

<sup>1</sup> S. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (Eng. trans.), pp. 356-357.

when regression occurs within the delusion the paranoiac is inflated, as it were, by the withheld affect and the self-regarding sentiment is enhanced so that the delusion is now one of self-sufficient grandeur, power and importance. It must be noted that from first to last there is no impulse to self-destruction, and this is comprehensible from the nature of Projection.

Now the melancholic in some cases has experienced a real loss of money, position or love, but more often the situation is that there are infantile characteristics in his mental functioning and there is a disillusionment in his experience of life; he ceases to attend to reality and complains that everything seems flat, dull and "wanting in life," and he occupies himself with the "might have been." What is called by psychiatrists "depression," which is acute unpleasure, is the predominant affect; his attention is apparently devoted entirely to painful ideas; the continuation of this state of unpleasure feeling is accompanied by dreams usually of a fearful or accusatory character; the withheld affect unable to achieve real expression and unable to find occupation in phantasy by regression, is felt as a great and pressing emotion unpleasant in tone which now breaks into the self-regarding sentiment and the melancholic monotonously accuses himself of having sinned beyond redemption, and he blindly and desperately or sometimes cunningly seeks death; suddenly all is changed, he recovers completely, depression lifts, interest in the objects of perception is normal and as it was before the first insidious onset. He can tell of his experience only in terms of feeling, that it was all dreamlike, like the horror of nightmare, and that although he knew who he was and where he was and why he was under care, he felt cut off, hopeless and as though he never would be well again; he says the impulse to self-destruction was beyond his control, all he felt was he must end the "pain" and at once.

If we regard affect as instinct interest, which gives meaning to perception or to the objects of perception: if we accept the view that affect withheld from conative expression becomes emotion, and that emotion is bipolar, pleasurable in so far as it is moving towards its ends and objects, unpleasurable in so far as it is moving away from its ends and objects; then in paranoia by projection the way has been cleared for the affect to invest the Self and that Self is exalted by an enhancement of the self-regarding sentiment, so that the affect reaches an object, although it is one that has been substituted for the real object. In melancholia the affect remains unpleasurable because it is dammed back from expression in Reality and does not succeed except in chronic cases in getting

dispersed in phantasy; it remains as a tension, and this produces the impulse to death.

In a regressive psychosis such as dementia praecox, there is a stage when the death impulse is compulsive. This stage occurs only in some cases, and as a rule early in the development of the psychosis. The psychoanalytic interpretation of this phenomenon is that cases of dementia praecox disposed to suicide are individuals who *have* developed to the object love stage, at least to the stage of taking their parents as love objects; their instinct interest adheres to the parent object, but at puberty when there is an increase of libido they fail to invest objects other than the parents with instinct interest. This involves such cases in so many real difficulties that intrapsychic regression occurs, but because there has been investment of real objects, namely the parents, with instinct interest, this withdrawal of affect from the parents by repression produces *temporarily* the same feeling of unpleasurable tension as is seen in melancholia, and sudden impulses to self-destruction.

In other cases, and much more commonly, the instinct interest regresses to phantasy and the sphere of the Pleasure Principle, and this repression reaches a degradation of psychic function in which even primary meaning disappears from the objects of perception. In such cases there is no tension from withheld affect and no impulse to self-destruction. The interpretation of the extraordinary fact maintained here that the idea of death is absent from the mind of the individual physically ill but present as an impulse in the melancholic and precocious dement is that it is due to intrapsychic tension from affect withheld from conative expression, and unable to attach itself by regression to imaginative phantasy. The excitement is suspended, as it were, between the two psychic realms of Reality and Pleasure Pain, between the Reality Principle function and the Pleasure Principle function. According to the *amount*, which really is equivalent to the *intensity*, of the affective tension or excitement, there is present, the idea of death, a tendency to death, or an impulse to death.

The *impulse* to death in melancholia and dementia praecox has been discussed, and we have now to examine the significance of ideas of death and tendencies to death in the psychoneuroses.

There is a tendency to death in anxiety hysteria. This psychoneurosis is characterised by an affective state of dread—by unreasonable anxiety, not about real problems or dangers but about the ordinary affairs of life—that from the midst of a blue sky a bolt is about to fall. Anxious hysterics think they are ill, have headaches and pains in the

epigastrium, pelvis and lumbo-sacral area, are bad sleepers, talk suicide and may attempt it in a half-hearted way. If asked why they wish to end their lives they may say that "they have been ill so long they cannot endure the agony any longer"; they may say their "heads are all wrong," that "something occurred inside their heads," that "everything went round and got mixed up together"; that "something came down and covered their brains and they have no feeling about anything at all"; that "they know that they will end in the asylum," that "they must end their lives before they are 33." If the agitation be extreme and topophobia be present, a spectacular attempt at suicide will almost surely be made, but generally speaking the more talk there is of death the less likely is an attempt. In conversion hysteria the patient frequently speaks of death but is careful not to make even a half-hearted attempt at self-destruction. When asked why they wish to end their lives they may say because their "illness makes life not worth living." Cases of phobia and of obsession speak of death and making an end of it all because of their difficulties, but they do not talk of death convincingly; they toy with the idea.

The anxious hysteric is the most dangerously near to suicide of all the psychoneurotics, and cases are frequently cited of poisonous doses of drugs being taken, and drowning attempts made, but these patients differ from the truly impulsive suicide in telling about what they have taken. The self-preservative instinct asserts itself, and it is noticed that drowning attempts are made when people are there to save them and often in shallow water. Anxiety hysteria is, as we know, due to psychic conflict, and the measure of agitation present is an index of the tendency to death and corresponds to the agitation in melancholia, only on a higher plane, that is to say in a more complex, highly-evolved, inhibited and controlled field of mental function. There has been no regression to Narcissism in anxiety hysteria, but the conflict and repression prevent, by conative deviation, the investment of objects with *sufficient* instinct interest. Nevertheless the hysteric has a large narcissistic element in his make-up, or, more precisely, he has an abnormal proportion of instinct interest deviated to phantasies of himself, and so there is reduced intensity in cognition of objects. This is what C. G. Jung implies by the word 'introverted.'

The idea of death present in obsessions does not become a tendency to death because the obsession is, like the physical symptom in conversion hysteria, a compromise by displacement or a solution of a conflict; and, moreover, the obsessional neurotic has very much the same zest in life

as the normal individual, except that his experience of life and reality is impoverished by the affect transferred to an act or a thought which is cut off and unassociated with his other acts and thoughts. It is probable that his talk about death is attributable, therefore, to the same fundamental cause which has been assumed to be the basis of the other psychoneuroses, but in obsessions it is not a strong or persistent idea.

Reference has been made to a tendency to death in agitated anxious hysteria, and it may be asked can this tendency become an impulse? It can and does if regression occurs. Anxiety hysteria tends to pass to conversion hysteria, or, if regression occurs, to manic depressive insanity; and in the latter event in the depressed phase the tendency becomes an impulse.

If then the facts are that in the psychoneuroses death is present as an obsessive idea, and sometimes as a tendency, and in certain of the psychoses there are impulses to death; and if the idea of, tendency to, and impulse to death arise from unpleasure, from tension of accumulated affect:—what is the significance of death to these patients?

It has a totally different significance to that which it has to a normal individual functioning in the Reality Principle. For the latter it is the inevitable end of human life. To the neurotic it is equivalent to quiescence, a quiescent resolution of the affective excitement; he does not consider its consequences for other people, or in any way confront it objectively. It is an alternative solution of the problem of how to dispose of excitement from dynamic instinct.

Death is envisaged by the neurotic as a sleep and a forgetting, an escape from what he calls "the pressure of life," and the meaning of it as connoting the total extinction of the individual's activity is not envisaged at all. So that to the neurotic death is like sleep, and the tendency to it is an effort by the organism to restore the quiescent equilibrium; in other words, it has no reality for the neurotic but is an activity of the Pleasure Principle.

The physiological changes that accompany these psychological states are not marked so far as clinical observations can detect them. There are changes in the function of the endocrine glands, both in the activity of secretion and the relation between the autocooids one with another. Experimental proof of the nature of these changes is difficult. There has been repeated experimental proof by Pavlov and others that psychic influences promote or inhibit physiological secretions, for example, the flow of gastric juice; that the thymus gland and the pituitary body influence the development of the sexual glands, that under psychic

influences the suprarenal bodies increase the secretion of adrenalin into the circulation. Nearer to our purpose, it is known that a hyperactive thyroid gland produces a syndrome resembling anxiety hysteria, except that in this syndrome of exophthalmic goitre the death tendency is not present, whereas in anxiety hysteria it is. Then apart from experimental proof there has been a good deal of speculation recently on the influence of the endocrine glands on individual behaviour. Dr Crichton Miller at the Glasgow meeting of the British Medical Association, in 1923, sought to associate the activity of certain endocrine glands with types of personality; a hyperactive thyroid with the creative artistic type, the hyperactive pituitary body with the will to power individual of the Napoleon type, the hyperactive suprarenal with the extrovert man of action of the British Naval Officer type. He did not speculate on the correlation between hyperactive sex glands and any type; had he done so we might have expected lovers, lunatics, and poets, to have been correlated! Physiologists now assume that the internal secretion of the interstitial cells of the testes and ovaries works against or is balanced by the internal secretion of the thyroid gland and suprarenal capsule. The presence of sex gland secretion has not been detected in the blood. As regards the evidence afforded by the nervous system, evidence by no means clear or complete, it is supposed that a hyperactive sex gland secretion acts on the vagus nerve and produces the condition of vagotonus. And the question arises, is the hyperactivity of the sex glands and the condition of vagotonus in the physiological sphere definitely related to psychic repression and the death tendency? On this subject I will quote from Eppinger and Hess.

“In subjects sensitive to pilocarpine, the tone of the whole autonomic system is raised, clinically this constitutional hypertonicity gives rise to gastric hyperacidity, physiological bradycardia, slight respiratory arrhythmia, eosinophilia, spastic constipation, a tendency to hyperidrosis and salivation. This condition is vagotonia and readily passes beyond physiological limits. Vagotonia gives rise to the lymphatic, arthritic and exudative diatheses in children, and to vaso dilation.”

I will also quote from Dr David Orr's appendix to the public Morrison lecture, 1920, by Dr R. G. Row: “The vagus nerve is closely related to the thymolymphatic system. Resection of the vagus is followed by acute yellow atrophy of the thymus, especially of its cortex, by atrophy of the lymphatic follicles of the spleen, atrophy of the cortical substance of the ovaries and testes and by lymphatic leucopenia. Hence the internal secretion of these organs is in a great measure regulated by the vagus.”

Again "Emotion is a most important factor in the genesis of the sympathetic neuroses; and even within physiological limits psychic states can determine changes in the endocrine-sympathetic mechanism. It is common to observe after fear or mental suffering the rapid development of chlorosis, Addison's Disease, hemicrania, renal neurosis, nervous diabetes, hyperidrosis, angina pectoris, angio-neurotic eruptions."

Now the opposite condition of vagotonia is characterised by tachycardia hyperthermia, rapid metabolism, gastro-intestinal atony, diminished secretion of sweat and saliva and vaso-constriction: the psychoneuroses and manic-depressive insanity present a mixture of these two groups of symptoms, but undoubtedly depression and the death idea is associated most markedly with vagotonic symptoms. It has not yet been experimentally proved that these symptoms are correlated with an over-secretion of the sex glands. There has been no isolation of the sex gland autocoid from the circulation. Clinically there is observed apparent deficiency in, and so overpowering of, the compensatory secretions of the adrenals, thyroid and pituitary, or of some of them, producing the condition named vagotonia; and vagotonia is observed to occur in some individuals at certain epochs in their life history, namely at prepuberty and at the climacteric. It is at these epochs that the psychoses, dementia praecox and melancholia, occur respectively, and these psychic states are associated with impulses to death: these epochs are also associated with an increment of sex impulses, and if there be no satisfactory discharge of the activity of these increased impulses a psychic state of dread or anxiety arises; if the organism fails to adjust its balance of function, it tends to a pathological state.

We observe the idea of death, the tendency to death and an impulse to death present in these states and ascribe it psychologically to tension from unexpended excitement or withheld affect, and physiologically to an alteration in the secretion of the endocrine glands.

It may be profitable now to consider this remarkable phenomenon of an organism seeking its own death from the standpoint of Biology.

Some recent experiments on the unicellular organism by Woodruffe and others have demonstrated the facts (*a*) that the unicellular organism will live indefinitely and continue to multiply indefinitely if the nutrient medium in which it lives is periodically renewed; (*b*) that if the nutrient material is not renewed the organism dies, apparently from the products of its own metabolism.

These demonstrated facts, which are inconsistent with the theory of Weismann that the unicellular organism and its products are immortal,

place the unicellular organism in line with the multicellular organism with a sexual cycle, and from them the inference may be drawn that there is a natural tendency in protoplasm to death except in that plasm modified as germ plasm; if so modified, the plasm tends to union with a similarly modified plasm and there follows from this union a fresh growth of plasm, a new generation, containing within its organism both soma plasm with a life-death rhythm and germ plasm with a reproductive rhythm.

Biology only admits two great harmonic drifts or tendencies in the organism, one to self-preservation, the other to reproduction, if both these tendencies are satisfied the individual lives a complete biological life. If it succeeds in preserving its own life for death at the normal period of the life rhythm of the species, then its germ plasm together with the soma plasm dies; if it reproduces, its soma plasm dies but its germ plasm lives.

From the biological standpoint the individual who has an impulse to death is no longer activated by one of the two "hormonic" drifts, namely the self-preservative, and is therefore activated by the other only, the sexual or reproductive.

This conception of the death tendency in neurotics may be now resumed in terms of Psychology, Physiology and Biology; psychologically as a psychic tension from failure of investment of the objects of perception with instinct interest, and failure of instinct interest to invest psychic substitutes for perceived objects, so that the excitement cannot find outlet in real ends or in substituted or imagined ends; physiologically as a change in the balance between the hormones or autocoids, which acting through the nervous system keep the organism adjusted to external and internal stimuli; biologically as a failure in the activity of one of the two great tendencies in the animal organism, a tendency essential to life and to adjustment to the environment.

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- EPPINGER and HESS. D. Orr's appendix to the 1920 *Morrison Lecture*.  
 R. G. ROW. *Morrison Lecture*, 1920.  
 J. DREVER. *Instinct in Man*, p. 140.  
 S. FREUD. *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 356.  
 D. ORR. Appendix to 1920 *Morrison Lecture*.  
 C. SPEARMAN. *Nature of Intelligence*, p. 135.  
 C. G. JUNG. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 37.



## POETRY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

By J. C. HILL.

ONE of our students at Chester Training College, a boy of nineteen, fell in what appeared to be an epileptic fit and was taken to bed. A prefect was detailed to look after him. When the student recovered he was quiet but obviously distressed, and asked the prefect what was the best way to occupy one's mind when one was worried. The prefect was a musician, and said that he usually composed at the pianoforte, or tried to write poetry. The sick student tried all day to write a poem, but only produced a few lines on the back of an envelope. The prefect saw the poem and considered it doggerel.

During the night, the prefect was awakened by the sick student reciting poetry with dramatic gestures. He was sitting up in bed, sometimes addressing the stars, and by his fixed gaze was apparently asleep. The prefect listened for a time and suddenly realized that the poetry was original. He got out a pencil and paper and tried to note some of it. Several fragments were noted, of which the following two are fair specimens:

- (1)                   Come rack and pain, minions of absence,  
                          What shalt thou gain by tearing us apart.  
                          Each hour of pain stabs in the heart.
- (2)                   Why do they live?  
                          Can they not die  
                          All but you and I?  
                          Nought matters else.

The prefect had sympathised with the student in one of his half-conscious lamentations, and had been told of a love affair with which the student's people were interfering. This fact threw considerable light on the fragments quoted above.

A few nights later the student was found going down the dormitory stairs reciting poetry, and obviously sleep-walking. He was taken to his own home, and we heard no more of him until next term.

During the vacation he had written in a note-book several remarkable poems, one of the earliest being the following:

O Heart o' mine, heart o' mine, didst hear that sigh?  
 O Joy of life, joy of life, didst hear that cry?  
     From bloodless lips 'tis surging  
     From longing heart love purging  
 Of one once true  
 Who once was you  
 Heart o' mine.

O Lips o' mine, lips o' mine, didst feel my kiss?  
 O Breath of life, breath of life, retain that bliss  
     Or heart cease beating.  
 Stop memory fleeting  
 Of lips so red  
 That are e'en dead  
 For me, Lips o' mine.

I asked the student if he had read much poetry. He had read little. The only poems which had interested him had been poems of action. He had regarded poetry as "soft stuff." The above poem was produced without any effort, and was written down, exactly as it stands, in a few minutes. He was not quite clear in his own mind what it was all about.

The following poem was the result of a deliberate effort to write a poem on "Spring." He had shown some of his poems to friends at home who had said the poems were very good but that he should try to write "something more cheerful."

Laugh you winds, Spring is here,  
 And sparkling sunbeams, winter drear  
 Are chasing away.  
 See a-waving in the breeze  
 The boughs of joyous trees  
 All budding with the green.  
 Hark to the birds a-chirping in the mead  
 As with little lively eyes they seek a feed  
 While warbling a sunny lay.  
 There lambs are gambolling, frisking gaily  
 Taunting, watching mothers féely  
 A-cropping grass new-green.  
 Folk from the city dancing come  
 Weared by the eternal hum  
 Of traffic's droning day.  
 Children leap and will abandon scream  
 For winter's past, and winter's dream  
 At last, at longéd last is seen.

In this production, in which his best efforts were put forth, the obscure symbolism is absent, and the poem is entirely lacking in "inspiration."

The next poem in his book was the following:

Die, ah die—sweet rarity,  
 Too rare for me.  
 I cannot hold thee  
 And thou must cold be  
 Now and for eternity.  
 Mad I was to wildly hope  
 To be thy home,  
 Through darkness to the dome  
 Of Life I'll weakly roam  
 Or for light in death numb'dly grope.

Here we return to the true poetic quality. This poem was also composed and written in a few minutes without any effort. The student said he understood the poem when he wrote it, but that now he did not know what it meant. "*Sweet rarity*" puzzled him, but affected him emotionally so that he wanted to write more whenever he saw or heard the words.

The following extract is from a long poem which was written down as the words came, no thought being given to the construction, rhyme or meaning, and no corrections being made.

Blares the trumpet, twangs the taut string,  
 Chaotic melody a-dinning,  
 Swirl the bodies, swinging, singing  
 Faster, holding, drunken, spinning:  
 Sweeps the strings and wine is red  
 Life is laughter and God is dead.  
 Living, living, taking giving,  
 Mistress, man and maid.  
 Glories, stories, leaping, telling,  
 Diaphanously limbs arrayed,  
 Moon is waning, gleam is fading,  
 Fiddle wailing ends its scaling:  
 Minds a-faltering, sense invading  
 Melts the host in dawn a-paling  
 Music's day is done.

I asked the student to try to describe in prose what it was all about. He could not. I made an attempt at a prose translation. He said it set his "teeth on edge." "Do you understand it?" "Yes, I see it all." "As mental pictures?" "Yes." "Do you see all your poems as mental pictures?" "Yes." I turned to the poem beginning "Die, ah die, sweet rarity" and pointing to "*Sweet rarity*" said "What do you see now?"

"Oh! you've brought it all back to me," he exclaimed; "its Eileen" (his sweetheart). Later he was not so sure it was.

About three weeks later he brought his manuscript book to show me some further efforts. My attention was taken by the following remarkable poem:

## SOMEWHERE.

Through the curling shadows of sombre eve  
Looms a misty crater of things forgot,  
A saw-like edge of fading red,  
And fume vapours swelling heave,  
A scented stench of rebellious rot  
Lifting slowly from memories dead.  
  
Crawling round the ragged steep  
Are grinning wraiths of passions lost:  
Probing down midst the gruesome mass  
Are forked eyes that sentinel keep.  
Embittered souls see hopes embossed  
Then fading in murk hopes wanly pass.

I asked the student if he could explain what it meant. He said he was describing a succession of visual images in words which came quite spontaneously. "But what is it all about?" He did not know. He had shown it to Eileen who said she "hated it." It gave her "a creepy feeling."

I asked for a copy of the poem. It reminded me of the visual imagery of the Rev. George Henslow which Galton quotes in *Inquiries into Human Faculty* (Everyman Edition, pp. 115-118). No one with any psycho-analytic experience could study these descriptions with the accompanying diagrams and avoid coming to the conclusion that the symbolism was sexual, although the idea that the visions had any general meaning does not seem to have occurred to Galton.

Some time later the student asked me why I had asked for a copy of the poem. I said it interested me.

"Do you think it has anything to do with sex?" "I don't know; do you?" "I'm sure of it," he said. "What makes you sure of it?" "Well, it's obvious, and the conditions under which I wrote it make me quite sure. I hate to think I am so much dominated by sex."

The student was unable, however, to interpret the symbolism for me, nor would he accept as satisfactory any interpretation I offered. Apparently it was as impossible for him to express the meaning in prose as it would be to express the pathetic line, "I am an old man, a very old man" by, say, "Man, aged 70."



(2)

There a sighing lane is turning  
 As a snake with drowsy coil  
 It probes into the ~~vaguies~~ shadows  
 As though seeking rainbow spoil.

In the first example we have "soft and low" written to rhyme with "whispering low." According to Robert Graves such rhymes seem quite satisfactory when one is in the hypnoidal state in which, according to him, true poetry is first produced. It is when the poem is read later in a critical way that these false rhymes are noticed and corrected. In the case quoted the original line "Hear I words soft and low" is better, apart from the false rhyme, than the corrected line "Hear I words, sweet they flow."

In the second example we have a word ("vaguies") coined by the poet. It is a beautiful word, suggesting much more than the English word "shadows" which he substitutes for it.

The poet gave the following free associations from "vaguies."

*Vaguies.* "Shadows, the lane at home, trees, two of us walking along, talking—(pause)—that's about all I think."

He quarrelled with his sweetheart during a vacation and letters ceased. The following fragment was written soon after his return to College:

Man be love to me;  
 Companionship hold me;  
 Woman now mocks me;  
 Take her away.

The student was now taking an active part in the College sports. He had seldom any inclination to write poetry. The poem beginning "Die ah! die—sweet rarity" now seemed to him "to be soft": it "bored" him.

After a few weeks, correspondence with his sweetheart was resumed. There was less enthusiasm however.

On seeing one of his College chums burning his love-letters and apparently depressed over the breaking off of his love affair, the poet wrote the following:

#### THE BURNING OF THINGS.

Fulsome smoke and flame ye are well fed  
 As in greedy wantonness ye drink  
 The blood of life, lightly shed.  
 Friend, let me kiss thee,  
 And in my love, lose thou thine agonies.  
 Hurt me not with simple bravery,  
 But fill a kindred emptiness  
 With the right of common sympathy.

Fulsome smoke and flame, ye are well fed:  
 A heart of love feedest thee well.  
 It emptieth its veins once rich, once red,  
 Pours forth excess, burns hopes, fine dreams,  
 Starves memories and in their stead  
 Sees smoke and flame and hell.

Prostrate thyself, O, Friend, in ghastly grief!  
 Welcome thy misery and mourn  
 Till bruised heart shall fail  
 Its beating. When, tired and forlorn  
 'Twill sleep. Then, rested, waken to hail  
 With smiles the advent of rhythm new.

Worn and winning heart, the dew  
 Of flowers, the tears of earth  
 And blood of friendship true  
 Have filled thee with the peace of love.

And so of joy and truth there comes a heaven's birth  
 While to dark passions, hot stinging things,  
 Thou biddest thy last adieu.

He showed this poem to his chum who had burned the letters, and asked what he thought of it. The poet told me he "nearly dropped" when he was asked what it was all about. The emotions which the poet had described were *his own* emotions, and evidently were not experienced at all by his friend.

When giving me some account of his early life, the poet told me that when a child he was greatly interested in fairy tales. I asked what were his favourite stories. "The stories about King Pippin and Queen Mab." "What were these stories about?" "About killing giants. I sometimes felt a little sorry for the giant." I asked if he saw the relation of that interest to the first dream he had told me (about killing his father). He did, now that I suggested it to him.

The main conclusions may be summarised as follows:

(1) This student's best poetry is a product of the Dream mind (the Unconscious). The poetry which he writes by conscious effort has not the true poetic quality, and conveys to the reader nothing which could not be equally well conveyed by prose.

(2) The presence of a "complex" on the subject, seems to be an important factor in the production of a poem, and in the appreciation of a poem.

(3) The poet does not always understand the meaning of his own poetry, although it has meaning.

I append several quotations which tend to show that much of the best poetry is produced in the same way.

1. Many poets of my acquaintance have corroborated what I have just said and also observed that on laying down their pens after the first excitement of composition they feel the same sort of surprise that man finds on waking from a "fugue," they discover that they have done a piece of work of which they never suspected they were capable; but at the same time they discover a number of surface defects which were invisible before.

ROBERT GRAVES, *On English Poetry*, p. 27.

2. THE AUTHOR'S APOLOGY FOR HIS BOOK.

When at the first I took my Pen in hand,  
 Thus for to write; I did not understand  
 That I at all should make a little Book  
 In such a mode: Nay, I had undertook  
 To make another; which, when almost done,  
 Before I was aware, I this begun.  
 And thus it was: I writing of the Way  
 And Race of Saints in this our Gospel-day,  
 Fell suddenly into an Allegory  
 About their Journey, and the Way to Glory,  
 In more than twenty things, which I set down:  
 This done, I twenty more had in my crown,  
 And they again began to multiply,  
 Like sparks which from the coal do fly.  
 Nay then, thought I, if that you breed so fast,  
 I'll put you by yourselves, lest you at last  
 Should prove ad infinitum, and eat out  
 The Book that I already am about.

JOHN BUNYAN, *The Pilgrim's Progress*.

3. The Author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at least of the external senses, during which time he has the most vivid confidence, that he could not have composed less than from two to three hundred lines; if that indeed can be called composition in which all the images rose up before him as *things*, with a parallel production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of effort. On awaking he appeared to himself to have a distinct recollection of the whole, and taking his pen, ink and paper, instantly and eagerly wrote down the lines that are here preserved. At this moment he was unfortunately called out by a person on business from Porloek, and detained by him above an hour, and on his return to his room, found, to his no small surprise and mortification, that though he still retained some vague and dim recollection of the general purport of the vision, yet, with the exception of some eight or ten scattered lines and images, all the rest had passed away like the images on the surface of a stream into which a stone had been cast, but, alas! without the restoration of the latter.

COLERIDGE, Note to the first edition of *Kubla Khan*.



4. O, how that *Name* inspires my style!  
The words come skelpin, rank and file,  
Amaist before I ken.

ROBERT BURNS, *First Epistle to Davie*.

5. The reason for your complaint lies, it seems to me, in the constraint which your intelligence imposes upon your imagination. I must here make an observation and illustrate it by an allegory. It does not seem beneficial, and it is harmful for the creative work of the mind, if the intelligence inspects too closely the ideas already pouring in, as it were, at the gates. Regarded by itself, an idea may be very trifling and very adventurous, but it perhaps becomes important on account of one which follows it; perhaps in a certain connection with others, which may seem equally absurd, it is capable of forming a very useful construction. The intelligence cannot judge all these things if it does not hold them steadily long enough to see them in connection with the others. In the case of a creative mind, however, the intelligence has withdrawn its watchers from the gates, the ideas rush in pell-mell, and it is only then that the great heap is looked over and critically examined.

FRIEDRICH SCHILLER (letter of December 1, 1788),  
quoted by Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams*, p. 85.

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOUTH IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS<sup>1</sup>

By EDWARD GLOVER.

FROM the psycho-analytic point of view, mouth activities can be classified into three main groups. The first of these, and by far the most completely understood of the three, is comprehended in the familiar phrase—the oral stage of *libido* development. The second includes the laying down of certain mechanisms which determine and help to delimit the corporeal ego, afterwards providing a basis for character formation. We might say that these activities constitute the oral stage of *ego-development*, were it not for the fact that throughout a large part of the period involved it is scarcely accurate to talk of a distinct ego-formation. The difference between the second and first group can be expressed more clearly if one thinks of the play and interplay of self-preservative and libidinal impulses.

Of the nature of the third group we can only say here, that it coincides with the significant period of mouth activity after birth, but cannot be immediately distinguished by direct observation. It includes the isolation or fusion through preservative or libidinal channels of the impulses to destruction which, as Freud has shown, represent one side of the primary instinct antithesis of life.

Roughly speaking, then, libidinal activity, self-preservative activity (including orientation) and mechanisms for fusing or diverting primary instincts form the functional groundwork of the mouth or oral stage.

The necessity for division into stages was born of empirical investigation of libido development. It will be remembered that Freud's division of libido organisation was based partly on his isolation of the component sexual impulses and partly on the dynamics of choice of a love-object. So that the first division was between an autoerotic stage where these component impulses found gratification of an 'anarchic' type, as Ferenczi<sup>2</sup> has aptly said, on the body itself without reference to a definite object, and a stage of genital primacy, when the component impulses are subordinated to the purposes of reproduction. Freud's study of paraphrenia then led to the recognition of a narcissistic stage where a definite

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, April 30, 1924.

<sup>2</sup> Ferenczi, *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1924.

object is chosen, but one coinciding with the self. The analysis of obsessional neurosis resulted in a delimitation of a third stage, when component impulses are directed towards an outer object, but not under genital primacy. The primacy involved is rather one of anal-erotic and sadistic impulses. Still later, in a reprint of the *Three Contributions to Sexual Theory*, he sketched out the earliest stage of libido organisation, giving it the name of oral or cannibalistic stage<sup>1</sup>.

Before turning to a study of this early oral stage, some preliminary consideration of the term 'stage' will perhaps serve to tone down what must otherwise appear a too dogmatic and rigid handling of the subject. The subdivision is obviously an artificial procedure of descriptive and diagrammatic value, one, however, which sacrifices realistic continuity to impressionism. More important, since in the last resort all analytic and other scientific findings can be woven into the texture of individual complexes, it may give rise to a kind of 'conceptual fixation,' in which the importance of one stage can be magnified beyond all measure.

In considering, then, the deeply sedimented and remotely accessible stages of oral development, it is highly necessary to follow the pharmaceutical device of introducing into any mixture certain correctives or adjuvants. In the present instance the most important of these is the idea of *relative primacy* of any one zone. We have to keep in mind that the erotogenic zones, mouth, anus, skin, musculature, etc., represent points of concentration of libidinal energy but that the whole organism can also be regarded as a reservoir of libido generally distributed. In the case of the mouth the association of preservative needs, not clearly distinguished as such, serves to accentuate the gratification of combined hunger and erotic tensions. At the same time, however, other gratifications of organ pleasure, especially of the muscular system, are in full swing: even in genital primacy, where a centralisation of libido into a common 'accumulation and discharge' system has taken place<sup>2</sup>, this accumulation is only relative, and even the most indifferent parts of the body are to some extent erotically autonomous, and are capable in times of stress of taking over centralising functions, as can be seen in conversion

<sup>1</sup> This development can be traced in the following of Freud's publications: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, 1st to 5th editions (1905-1922), Deuticke, Wien. "Eine Kindheits Erinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci" (1910). "Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Paranoia," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 3te Folge. "Zur Einführung des Narzissmus"; "Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge, 1918. See also "The Infantile Genital Organisation of the Libido," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, April, 1924.

<sup>2</sup> See Ferenczi's views on genital function, *op. cit.*

hysteria when genital primacy is denied and a backward displacement to the organic libido systems occurs.

The early primacy of the mouth is then purely relative, and this fact in turn gives rise to the question of periodicity: Is there in the case of pregenital primacies a general or individual period necessary for the sufficient working out of gratification? Apart from biological speculations as to periodicity (Fliess) and views on the influence of race history on individual development, there seems to be little question that, especially with suckling gratifications, there is an *optimum* period with individual variation, the shortening or prolongation of which constitutes either a traumatic experience, or a situation of fixation. I should be inclined to say that shortening of the period is almost invariably traumatic, whilst the effect of lengthening depends on the stage of ego development reached in the civilisation concerned, since we find that in certain more primitive races (*e.g.* in Serbia, Macedonia) suckling is sometimes carried on right into childhood (5-9), is associated with smoking in its later stages but given up when wine drinking is permitted (*e.g.* plum-brandy).

For the present we must content ourselves with one special consideration; if we assume that an insufficient or over-great gratification of an earlier primacy *can* take place and can give rise to an individual oral *disposition*, or *character*, how may this affect later primacies, such as the pregenital anal or phallic primacies? Normally it would seem that the primary gratification of one stage becomes subsidiary in the next, until under full genital primacy these are all represented in the preparatory fore-pleasure of coitus. May there not then come about in abnormal cases a struggle on the part of the earlier primacy to retain its dominating influence, thereby inhibiting the free working out of the next primacy by continuous archaic modification, *e.g.* may the oral impulses not seek displaced and condensed 'working out' at the anal level, giving rise to cumulative inhibition all along the pregenital series? Here again, it would seem that, although in the normal case gratification of a later stage seems to compensate for renunciation of an older pleasure, some such cumulative disturbance does take place in those constitutionally or individually fixated. How then does this disturbance take effect? Here we are faced with alternative possibilities. The first and most familiar implies the use of certain mechanisms of displacement and condensation, whereby libido energy is withdrawn from one point to invest another, in the case of regression, to reinvest another. This is the *quantitative* point of view and would account for the recurrence of suckling characteristics in other erotic, *e.g.* urinary, situations as an overflow occurring at some point in

common which permits or stimulates unconscious identification. Ferenczi<sup>1</sup> has recently put forward another view, that the 'handing on' is not only quantitative but *qualitative* and sees in the genital act itself a merging of certain pregenital characteristics, for which he has coined the term 'amphinixis.' The rhythm of coitus, for example, is regarded as an oral blending, eating during defaecation an oral-anal blending, etc. In either case, quantitative or qualitative, it has to be remembered that the primacy of the genital provides a partly effective but by no means complete centralisation of erotic tension, and that component impulses still continue partly autonomous, although in a sufficiently camouflaged state to evade the critical attentions of the ego-ideal.

Whichever point of view one takes, the facts of experience and analytic investigation can only be understood on the basis of *some* kind of displacement, and that, not only forwards but backwards, *i.e.* regressive. Displacement and regression form the keystone to all oral investigations.

It would seem reasonable to suppose therefore that to understand and explore oral development we have only to work back with the help of ordinary exploratory methods. Unfortunately the matter is not quite so simple. In the first place the system of word presentation essential to direct psychical remembering is not developed until the primacy of the mouth is over<sup>2</sup>. Hence, with the exception of visual, olfactory and plastic representation, we can know nothing of the primary mouth situations, except by repetition through later situations akin in some way to the first. The early mouth positions are not only deeply sedimented and compressed, they are layered over by later deposits. More important still, in these later stages the ego is becoming more formed and is about to receive the final character imprint of the Oedipus situation. Imagine for a moment what this means; the barring of all uninhibited erotic impulses towards the parent, the repression of the anal-sadistic organisation together with all contemporaneous infantile sexual theories, that is to say, the very stages from which we might hope to gain information as to the significance of the mouth form a battle-ground of guilt-conflict, following which all primitive systems can gain expression only in disguise. Any view of the oral stage is not only blurred as seen through opaque glasses, it is more or less boarded off by this intervening repression, and

<sup>1</sup> Ferenczi, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> For the relation of 'word' and 'thing' presentations to the (Pre)conscious system see Freud, "Das Unbewusste," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge; also "Das Ich und das Es," I.P.V. 1923.

our main source of information remains a study of abnormal states, as it were an oblique reflection from a distorting mirror.

Now the influence of relative primacy and of repression are more matters of internal economy, and leave out of account a dynamic function of mouth activity which is perhaps more easy to appreciate since it concerns the 'stage setting' in which the drama of suckling is enacted. Just how far the abrupt termination of intrauterine life by the act of birth has been underestimated in conscious thinking can be gathered by a study of the opposite point of view contained in a recent treatise by Rank<sup>1</sup>. Apart, however, from the validity of such speculations or their possible application, we have to note three main considerations. First that by the act of birth the antithesis of pleasure-pain has been established; second that a trauma requiring psychical fixation or binding has taken place<sup>2</sup>. The oral stage commences with certain prescribed functions to perform, to sweeten the pill of existence and to afford repetition situations, such as the ever repeated gratification and privation of suckling and hunger whereby the catastrophic primal experience of birth is worked through. Both of these serve a third purpose, *viz.* to link the subject more and more to the outer world. The first is the libidinal, the second the repetitive and the third the reality function of oral development.

We may now proceed to review certain details in the actual process of suckling, the full significance of which is made apparent when they are encountered during post-oral stages of development. The pictorial setting must obviously depend on the method of feeding and especially whether bottle feeding has been adopted from the outset. Even with breast feeding there is wide scope for variety of experience owing to varying physical and mental characteristics of the mother. In all cases, however, the smell of the mother's body especially of the armpit, of exhalations from bed and body clothes, warmth of skin and the rhythmic movements of maternal respiration provide the atmosphere of the mouth stage. In breast feeding there is a gradual appreciation of a dome-shaped pillow with an especially sought-after projection, an exquisite pleasure centre vaguely orientated but having continuity *in experience* with the prenatal pleasure self. Later comes the mystifying appreciation of two domes each like a face with an eye in the middle, together with the intervening gulf, chasm or cleft. With increasing visual appreciation

<sup>1</sup> Rank, *Das Trauma der Geburt*, I.P.V. 1924.

<sup>2</sup> On the function of the repetition-compulsion, see Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, International Psycho-analytical Library, No. 4.

there gradually resolve out of chaos certain more definite impressions, a circumambient whiteness, a cosmic vantage point of brown, the areola, and a red or pink-tipped organ from which warm sweet whitish fluid can be extracted. On suitable treatment by the mouth this organ is erected and responds to rhythmic jaw-pressure with increased supplies. It is rough, and is studded round with pimple-like excrescences, calling for the erasing ministrations of tiny finger-nails. At times when the nipple is cracked there is mingled with milk a taste of blood, a reminder of the first blood-scented experience of the outer world at birth. It is easy to imagine how significant must be the wide variations in physical shape of the breast in different mothers, the size, degree of projection and erectility of nipples, the firmness or flaccidity of the mammae, and the ease with which breasts can be exhausted. This varies with different mothers and in the case of the first-born with the same mother. The technique of suckling, too, varies from the incorrect introduction of the nipple alone to the correct offer of the pendant breast.

We must remember that although the suckling reflex is in all probability present prenatally, the child has often to be taught to take the nipple, indeed sometimes has the nipple forced upon it. Quite apart from the fact that children injured at birth and those with nasal obstruction suck with difficulty, a broad distinction can be drawn as to the manner of suckling, from a purely passive torpid reaction to active and distinctly aggressive jaw activity. During suckling some peculiar movements of the body occur, a slow stretching and bending of the upper and lower limbs, a crooking of legs and drawing up of toes which are seen again in life during recumbent masturbation, during the recumbent lover's kiss and in the privation stages of restlessness with drug takers. During and towards the end of the process urine is frequently voided, and regurgitation may take place from oversatisfaction or faulty technique. The change over from breast to bottle produces reactions of varying intensity from easy acquiescence to violent protest, and in accordance with the teat used can favour a more passive type of suckling. The bottle lends itself to grasping activities but is deficient in other erotic respects. During the first year whilst jaw-pressure is constantly used, sucking and swallowing predominate, biting is more especially associated with dentition, and mastication does not usually date till premolar eruption (end of second year). It is important to note that whilst miniature weanings are constantly taking place, the final weaning occurs at a time when the biting apparatus is definitely developed. Ferenczi<sup>1</sup> holds that the eruption of

<sup>1</sup> Ferenczi, *op. cit.*

teeth is largely responsible for weaning and with certain exceptions this seems to be the case. At any rate, quite apart from the reaction to pain caused by fissured and inflamed breasts, it is certain that many of the initial slaps administered to the baby are associated with aggressive biting at the nipple. In other words, weaning ends in an atmosphere of punishment or at least loss following aggression. Erotic play with the nipple during actual suckling is a significant feature and equally so sadistic irregularity on the part of the mother, or the definite association of suckling as a means of stilling pain. Indeed, the complicated reactions of the mother particularly in the direction of erotic gratification or aversion during suckling are of the utmost consequence for future instinct modification: these, together with the side tracking of erotic play by the infant to dummy and thumb would require a lecture in themselves. One particular drama deserves more than passing attention, it occurs with increasing frequency when night feeds are discontinued and suckling is preceded by partial undressing. At the critical moment a crack or gap appears in the unbroken curve of the mother's body from which protrudes a large white organ with a brown centre and a pink tip, tiny hands clutch upwards from the immeasurable distance of the lap and the child climbs magically. After a pleasure eternity the baby is once more at a distance, the protruding organ disappears and the chasm closes up, leaving the curve of the body again unbroken.

So much for the individual experience of suckling: only for family Benjamins, however, does the matter rest here. For the others, at a time usually coinciding with the anal-sadistic phase, there is in store the mortification of discovering that from another unbroken maternal curve another organ with a red poll appears—the rival baby, during the suckling of which by the fickle mother oral memories are reactivated, although on this occasion with a clearer perception of objects and a more complicated emotional valuation on the part of the jilted baby.

Inadequate as these pictures are, they may help us to form certain generalisations. The first has been put very suggestively by Ferenczi<sup>1</sup>, viz. that the child at this stage behaves as a direct ectoparasite, the mother's body constituting the first nutritive material. The second is the close relation of suckling followed by sleep to prenatal absolute narcissism, and the third that the nipple provides a point of focus for aggressive and libidinal impulses, a focal point which is ultimately beaten out into a path towards the outer world. This last generalisation really

<sup>1</sup> Ferenczi, *op. cit.*



follows from the first two and brings us to the relations between Instinct-development and Object-formation, the purpose served by the object in instinct economy and part of instinct deflection in object formation.

To begin with, we must remember that instinct tensions are continuous and are only altered by some form of discharge, hence they can be contrasted with stimuli from the outer world from which flight can provide suitable relief. It is this contrast which gradually conduces to separation of the outer world from the self, but the only reality involved is the reality of pleasure and pain. The most urgent of these inner tensions, hunger, is precisely that which brings about the most intimate connection with the nipple object which is, however, not distinguished as an object but as part of the pleasure self. Now whilst these hunger tensions recur constantly, developing an increasing erotic tone, gratification does not follow the same course: it becomes more arbitrary or at least is associated with certain motor expressions such as crying. Even this becomes in time less effective, and the displaceable part of the tension, the erotic part, is side-tracked and gratified autoerotically on the fingers or toes, thereby founding an additional criterion for the outline of the subject, the self—in the sense that one pleasure centre partly refuses to obey the omnipotent will, whilst other centres do obey unconditionally. Here is an enormous step forward: a part of the pleasure self is recognised as detachable, is associated with pain and thwarting. Moreover, it supports the fiction that all sources of inner tension (unlust, pain) can be attributed to outside sources. We can see in this gradual separation of a pleasure ego from a painful outer world the play of mechanisms of projection and introjection whereby inner and outer, originally one, are distinguished, although at first inaccurately. We might say that self-preservative instincts, at first fused with erotic components, have become isolated into hunger gratification and erotic gratification, whilst owing to lack of differentiation of a real ego, libido has been attached, as it were, by mistake to the object, which becomes progressively more distinct and more multiform. A path has been found for love. At the same time the original destructive instincts of the organism have, in the form of mastery instincts, become tinged erotically, *i.e.* a fusion has taken place which is ultimately represented by the sadistic component of sexual gratification. A path has been found for hate. This again might be said to have been deflected by mistake on the part of the self. Nevertheless these misapprehensions serve a useful function in that they widen the interests of the self in the outer world. The child seems to find in the outer world a pleasure-pain system, which can be identified with the pleasure and pain of instinct gratification and tension.

It is easy to see how such considerations are of more than theoretical importance. We have only to remember that the fusion and separation out of ego and sex instincts is a gradual continuous process throughout this stage, to realise how a *libidinal* regression to oral stages at a later period is capable of lighting up the *ego* point of view appropriate to the earlier period, more particularly the old pleasure-pain point of view of what is outer and what is inner<sup>1</sup>.

We must now consider the relation of the mouth to the fully formed ego-characteristics. This can be expressed simply in the series incorporation, introjection, identification. It will be seen that the primary autoerotic objectless stage contributes that feeling of unalterable conviction which is the basis of all future identifications. It is the unconscious character of such identifications that the objects identified *are* the same: in the first instance the subject and all objects *are* the same for the child. We have seen that following this unity of self and outer world the isolation and investment of objects commences with the breast, so that, as Freud puts it, in the primitive oral phase, object investments and identifications can scarcely be distinguished from one another<sup>2</sup>. Moreover the manner of dealing with the object is unique in that the object is actually taken into the mouth, a process of incorporation which has its psychical analogue in the introjection of objects into the ego. That this is something more than a mere resemblance has been shown by Freud in his study of cannibalistic activities and totemistic ceremonials<sup>3</sup>. Here we find a phylogenetic link which helps to fill the gaps in observation of child development: the swallowed food is believed by the primitive to bring about an alteration in the character of the subject, actual introjection has been followed by psychical identification. These primary identifications are of a somewhat different nature from the identification of the child with parent which occurs later when these parent objects and certain of their qualities are more definitely recognised, but they contribute enormously to the strength of these later *complete* object identifications. In a similar way the oral stage may be regarded as moulding

<sup>1</sup> For a clear understanding of instinct modification and the polarities of instinct, reference should be made to Freud's fundamental essay, "Triebe und Triebschicksale," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge; also to his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and *Das Ich und das Es*. In addition, see Ferenczi, "Introjection and Transference" and "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality," *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*; see also *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, same series.

<sup>3</sup> Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, English edition. [See also Ferenczi, "A Little Chanticleer," *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*; Markuszewicz, "Beitrag zum artistischen Denken bei Kindern," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, vi, 1920.]

all subsequent object relations by fusing love and aggression towards one and the same object. At the mouth stage an inner tension, hunger, is dealt with aggressively by muscular movement towards and incorporation of what ultimately proves to be an outer object. But the fact of gratification makes this object a love object: as Freud puts it, at the oral stage of libido organisation amorous possession is still one and the same as annihilation of the object<sup>1</sup>. In this sense, whilst the nipple provides a path both for love and hate, we can also say that hate precedes and finds a path for love. Keeping in mind, then, the close connection between this archaic ambivalence, introjection and identification at the oral stage, we are better able to appreciate what may happen when, in the course of *later* identification of *complete* objects, a sexual striving leads to the formation of love choice towards the complete object of the opposite sex, in other words, we can trace the influence of oral development in the Oedipus situation. In the first place, the erotic striving towards the parent of the opposite sex leads to a hostile attitude towards the parent of the same sex—so that, as Freud puts it, the ambivalence implicit in the original identification becomes manifest<sup>2</sup>. The second oral contribution occurs when later this erotic striving is abandoned. A tendency then exists to regress to the oral method already mentioned of introjection and identification, the boy adopting feminine characteristics, the girl masculine. In this description we have obviously singled out special aspects of the Oedipus situation to illustrate oral mechanisms, but we might add that in Freud's view all other abandoned object investments are dealt with in this way: it is, as he says, a kind of regression to the oral phase, and to it is due in large part the formation of character<sup>3</sup>.

It must be clear, of course, that other erogenous zones influence this ambivalent attitude towards objects in addition to playing a part in character formation, and it is essential for us to consider how far these can effect mouth mechanisms. Take, for example, the relation to anal activity. In its primary form mouth gratification consists in swallowing and retention, anal gratification in expulsion. Later on we find a significant change: retention has become one of the anal pleasure features and, although less notable, rejection either in vomiting or breast refusal one of the modes of expression of the mouth. Both are associated with a more definite appreciation of the object and both can express ambivalence towards the object. In the mouth, however, the association of aggression with the eruption of teeth serves to mask this fusion of anal

<sup>1</sup> Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

<sup>2</sup> Freud, *Das Ich und das Es*.

<sup>3</sup> Freud, *op. cit.*

characteristics, so much so that Abraham<sup>1</sup> divides the oral stage into an earlier purely autoerotic suckling stage, when there is no object and no ambivalence, and a later narcissistic cannibalistic stage, when ambivalence is expressed for the first time in total incorporation and destruction. As Abraham points out, such divisions are arbitrary in nature and although ambivalence obviously implies the existence of an object, differences in jaw activity from birth would suggest that in the first stage strong dispositions exist which help to determine the degree of later ambivalence. Here again Abraham<sup>2</sup> makes the interesting suggestion that the retention activity of the anal sphincter muscles is largely contributed to by the repression of oral ambivalence, or more correctly, of the sucking components.

We have seen that thwarting of the mouth zone from without leads to increased interest in other zones at first more independent or autoerotic in nature. It is easy to understand that the act of urination, especially for the male child with his nipple-like penis, provides many compensations for oral loss: here is an organ which produces precious fluid to command. Not only is this product equated with mother's milk, but, in common with other bodily secretions and excretions, it plays an important part in the infantile sexual theories, especially in the theories relating to baby-manufacture. Hence the urinary stage not only provides both direct and regressional autoerotic compensation, but, by the process of identification, continuity between suckling and the ejaculation of semen is established. The oral compensation in ejaculation is more obviously regressive in the case of the male, more in keeping with introjective identification with the mother: insemination provides the woman with direct compensation by the equations: penis = nipple; semen = milk. As far as my observation goes, in cases of *ejaculatio praecox* where emission is not only premature but lacks the usual spasmodic quality, there is in addition to strong urinary interests, a marked oral disposition; it is in this respect a reaction of oral 'impatience.' Other displacements of oral activity are to be found in the fore-pleasure stages of coitus: the kiss, the playful bite, the embrace, the enfolding represent a repetition with varying ambivalence of the swallowing or incorporation stage. In the technique of coitus, the immission of penis, perineal contractions which produce vaginal sucking, the ejaculation of semen and its retention or partial ejection, we have again mouth-nipple parallels which permit direct compensation of oral loss in the case of the woman and regressional identifica-

<sup>1</sup> Abraham, *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido*, I.P.V. 1924.

<sup>2</sup> Abraham, *op. cit.*

tion compensation in the case of the man. Moreover in the act of suckling, whilst the man can only obtain vicarious satisfaction in viewing the act, the woman has a double source of satisfaction, identifying with the mother and again, this time regressively, identifying with the father by the same penis-nipple equation.

We have now to consider the relation of oral activities to component impulses. It is perhaps simpler to regard these as forming a kind of ring, on the analogy of the ring formulae of organic chemistry, where the ultimate compound is determined by the nature of concentrations at one or more points in the ring. It has already been noted in describing the oral pictorial setting that touch, taste, sight and smell are more closely associated with the mouth than with any other erotogenic zone. Now, with the exception of auditory channels, these comprise the full set of instruments of projection and object formation. Thus the earliest act of viewing associated with instinct tension and gratification is the gradually increasing apprehending of the contours and colours of the breast area, whilst later on the elaborate ritual of uncovering the breast is sufficient to stamp the action of uncovering with pleasure memories. Here the association with touching is very close, and one has only to recall their equally intimate relation in sexual fore-pleasure and in the perversions, *e.g.* the pleasure in viewing, handling and punishing those other twin cupolas the buttocks, or again the satisfaction of the boy (and envy of the girl) aroused by the somewhat obstetrical ceremony of being assisted to urinate by his mother; or again the early forms of sexual assault at puberty by 'feeling.' Here we are encroaching on the territory of the sadistic-masochistic couple.

In early infancy the expression of aggression and mastery through special parts of the musculature, the jaw and hands is combined with stimulation of other highly erogenised tissues, the mucous membrane and skin, and is associated in particular with certain smell memories including sweat and blood. Moreover, whilst suckling provides erotic gratification for the mother, evidence in itself of the child's mastery over the object, scratching and biting especially at fissured nipples or inflamed breasts, give rise to maternal reactions which, although confirmatory evidence of mastery, are in striking contrast to pleasurable acquiescence. The immediate result is some degree of restraint which may end either in withdrawal of the nipple or actual retaliation on the child or both. At all events there is an association of loss (tension—'unlust'—pain) which is heightened where biting has had no relation to the supply of milk but has been rather an aggressive play. Teething and painful mouth affections

help to fuse erotic gratification with the infliction and enduring of pain, a fusion which is being at the time reinforced by experiences at the anal aperture. As has been said, Abraham<sup>1</sup> holds the view that biting constitutes the original form of the sadistic impulse.

If we now correlate these two developmental activities, viz. the displacement of interest between one erogenous zone and another, and the association and mutual modification of different component impulses we are in a position to understand, *not* the causal mechanism in perversions but what helps to determine the end product. It is useful to remember here that at the oral stages feeling is directed not so much towards the whole object as towards part objects—also that in regressive identification the part can be taken to represent the whole. In fellatio, for example, in addition to the later regressive displacement of interest from vagina to mouth, we have a mother-child situation where, in accordance with previous dispositions, biting, sucking or both these activities can be gratified on a magnified nipple. In cunnilingus, in addition to the proximity of the breast-like buttocks and the secretions and odours of the parts, there is a special sucking interest to which we will shortly have occasion to refer. The method of flight from incest phantasies represented in the perversions brings us naturally to consider the castration complex. And here we find yet another more direct link between oral development and the Oedipus complex. In birth we have the prototype of situations where a state of pleasure is followed by loss and tension, later this is repeated constantly in suckling and defaecation at a time when objects are in reality only part objects. Especially in the later stages this loss has a suspicious resemblance to punishment. Now the castration complex by definition represents the nexus of phantasies with associated effect relating to loss or injury of the phallus as a punishment for incestuous wishes. Hence weaning is one of the important factors in forming the precastration disposition. The essential difference is that in the castration situation a complete object is involved whilst the injury to the subject is either apprehended or phantasied: in precastration situations the loss is a real loss connected with a part object inside or outside the self (faeces-nipple). In orally fixated cases the loss of the penis-like nipple can colour the true castration complex to the extent of obscuring the essential guilt situation behind the latter<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Abraham, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Although the technique of psycho-analytic treatment does not come within the scope of this paper, it may not be out of place to emphasise how understanding of the early stages of ego and libido development are necessary for effective handling of 'resistances.' The anxiety of castration is to be understood as one of the manifestations of incest-guilt; to

Study of the oral pictorial setting sheds much light on the formation of castration theories. It explains in large part the firmly rooted belief in the 'woman with the penis,' with its modifications, 'the woman with the hidden penis, the disappearing penis and the reappearing penis.' It adds an additional motivation to the sucking activities in cunnilingus (*i.e.* to recover by suction the hidden phallus) whilst a passive reversal of a sadistic oral impulse, together with a projection on to the female genital of destructive mouth impulses can be traced in the fear that the female genital will, during coitus, tear away and suck in the male genitalia<sup>1</sup>. Again the duplicate breasts give unconscious reality to the compensatory reassurance of polyphallic symbolism<sup>2</sup>. Continuing the study of flight reactions, we are inevitably faced with the problem of homosexuality. We are already familiar with one of the main mechanisms involved whereby renunciation of the incestuous object is dealt with by introjection on the oral pattern, the boy adopting female, the girl masculine characteristics. Another factor contributed from oral sources is the degree of activity or passivity standardised in suckling technique. In the case of passive technique we have direct continuity with the attitude of the male passive homosexual. Again, active homosexuals of both sexes are able to represent in their object relations an identification with both suckling mother and suckled child. In both these situations the atmosphere of jealousy and rivalry has an additional historical setting where suckling of the rival brother or sister has been observed. Finally in reference to the narcissistic valuation of the penis in homosexuality, we have only to remind ourselves of the original carry-over from suckling, *via* urination to the penis. When this carry-over has been fixed in the narcissistic stage of object love (*i.e.* self + penis) the influence of the mouth has at any rate left a strong imprint on the situation, where it is represented in some degree of fear of, contempt for and anger against the absence of the penis in the woman.

regard it merely as an expression of penis-envy is to underrate its use in defence or assuagement of guilt. A further stage of defence exists where castration reactions are expressed entirely in terms of oral loss or grievance. On the other hand, an actual regressive expression of 'oral' guilt is a factor of the utmost importance in cases bordering on a manic-depressive state: hence it is essential to have some idea as to whether an oral fixation applies solely to libidinal organisation or has affected the process of ego-development (see further: Horney, "On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Women," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, Jan, 1924; Abraham, *op. cit.* and James Glover, "Notes on an Unusual Form of Perversion," *International Psycho-analytical Congress*, April, 1924).

<sup>1</sup> See also Boehm, *Zeitschrift für arztliche Psychoanalyse*, VIII, 3, 318.

<sup>2</sup> See also Flügel, "Polyphallic Symbolism and the Castration Complex," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, April, 1924.

The same sequence of events, *viz.* carry-over from oral to urogenital interests plays a large part in the technique of masturbation, which has to be considered not only biologically but as a flight reaction from Oedipus gratifications. A situation of oral revenge is often observed in masturbatory technique, whereby the penis is punished by the act itself: the elusive nipple is at last at the mercy of the one-time baby: it is driven to produce milk and its ultimate collapse after orgasm is regarded at the same time as a just punishment. A reversal of this situation is seen in cases such as one described by Abrahám where cessation of masturbation was followed by depression and extensive sweet-eating.

Finally no reference to the psycho-dynamics of the mouth would be complete without mention of various infantile theories. One need hardly mention the most vital connection, *viz.* the theory of impregnation and delivery by the mouth. Again the nexus of phantasies of watching parental coitus, has had the soil well prepared where suckling of the new baby is carried out before the chagrined rival.

I propose now to refer as briefly as possible to the more systematic description of abnormalities in which the mouth plays a part. It will be well to remind ourselves again that an oral fixation may refer to purely libidinal activity or to the stage of separation of ego from outer world which exists during the height of mouth gratification. In both instances the development of psychic mechanisms is rudimentary, and motor discharge is the easiest way of dealing with tension. Further, such psychic recalling of experience as exists has that quality of reality which is experienced in hallucination. In the case of conversion hysteria, we can see that the ego development has proceeded satisfactorily, hence that object investment, too, has been effective. Indeed, it has been carried forward to the genital stage and even in the most marked regression the subject-object relation is not really broken. The outstanding feature of these cases is the disorder of libido development. It is obviously difficult to disentangle from the advanced libido mechanisms involved in hysteria, the factors which are due more essentially to mouth disturbance, but the influence of a purely libidinal oral fixation can be easily understood. Moreover, we have only to reverse the libido path from mouth to genital to see how in regressive reinvestment, genital expression can be easily attained at the mouth end of the body, the more so that this displacement upwards serves to avoid implicating directly the anal-sadistic pregenital stage. It will be seen, too, that the part played by the mouth in infantile sexual theories of birth gives wide scope to the series



of conversion symptoms which affect the upper part of the alimentary tract.

In the obsessional neurosis, the primacy of the anal-sadistic organisation and the play of ambivalence determine the familiar formations, and it is not hard to see how oral difficulties which are exquisitely ambivalent will serve to sharpen this ambivalence in a cumulative sense. But it is specially interesting to note that whilst the disturbance in obsessional neurosis is mainly libidinal, the subject object relation is also affected. The attitude to the object has never been really that of *love of a whole object*, but is rather one of part-love (as Abraham terms it<sup>1</sup>); that is to say, it is reminiscent of the early stages of object development when parts of the self, faeces, or parts of the object, nipple, contributed to the pleasure-pain organisation. Here we have a critical point in the development of the individual—another step back and we are amongst the psychoses. Indeed, it is to Freud's<sup>2</sup> penetrating study of melancholia and the elaborate investigations of Abraham<sup>3</sup> that we owe most of our understanding of mouth mechanisms. The two primary factors to be recognised are a constitutional increase in mouth erotism and a special fixation of libido at the oral stage of development. Here again we have a disturbance of early ego-relations to the object, but one infinitely more grave. By far the greater part of object investment has remained at the stage of part-love, whilst the remainder has been attached to the whole object on a narcissistic basis (*i.e.* the self as object). Hence it is not surprising to find that when in addition an infantile narcissistic love injury has been reactivated by some later love injury, the slender narcissistic threads tend to snap and the object is lost. But not entirely lost: the same mouth mechanism which found the object in the first instance by way of cannibalistic love, helps to retain it now, but at the ransom price of identification. The object is incorporated into the ego and once inside the ego is subjected to hostility and criticism in keeping with the full blast of primary oral ambivalence. It is in this sense that we must translate the self-reproaches, viz. the castigation of the object in the self, as well as the self-reproach for the intolerable cannibalistic wish, which latter is expressed in a more dramatic form in the refusal of nourishment.

<sup>1</sup> Abraham, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Freud, "Trauer und Melancholie," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge.

<sup>3</sup> Abraham, "Die psychologischen Beziehungen zwischen Sexualität und Alkoholismus," "Ansätze zur psychoanalytischen Erforschung und Behandlung des manisch-depressiven Irreseins u.s.w.," "Untersuchungen über die früheste prägenitale Entwicklungsstufe der Libido," *Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse*, I.P.V. 1921. These earlier researches are amplified in his *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido*, I.P.V. 1924.

Passing on to the mechanisms of paranoia, we can only note a recent formulation by Abraham that whilst the libido development has never got beyond the anal-sadistic stage, the relation of ego to object has not passed the stage of part-love, and that in the paranoid regression a part-introjection of the object, penis, faeces and probably breast, takes place as compared with the complete introjection of melancholia. At any rate we can readily imagine that as object relations have never been stable in these cases, the formation of the ego-ideal must necessarily be even more unstable, and indeed we can see in the delusional formations, how the ego-ideal has deteriorated and crumbled until criticism is once more heard as the voice from without.

This deterioration of the ego-ideal leads naturally to the consideration of an interesting group of conditions, where there is no psychotic appeal to the mechanism of projection but where, nevertheless, normal introjection of the criticising instances has not been completely effected. The voice from without, however, is a real voice and the punishment no less real, in the one instance social obloquy and in the other the ministrations of the penal code. The most fascinating examples are alcoholism and drug taking, and in no conditions can we find greater wealth of illustration of mouth influences in development. Needless to say, here as elsewhere the root of the matter lies in the overcoming of traumatic experience at the Oedipus stage, but the venue of the conflict has been widely displaced, and a factitious integrity of the genital system has been preserved by flight to socially infantile regressions whilst unconscious guilt is appeased by social criticism, ostracism or punishment. Indeed, if we go back to the ancient codes, we can see punishment reflecting an unconscious appreciation of the infantile structure behind these habits. A Chinese Edict of 1100 B.C. institutes the death penalty (symbolic castration) for drunkenness, and in the Laws of Manu it is said, "any twice born who has intentionally drunk the spirit of rice (*sura*) through perverse delusion of mind, may drink more spirit in flame and atone for his offence by burning his body: or he may drink boiling hot, until he die, the urine of a cow or pure water or milk or clarified butter or juice expressed from cow dung<sup>1</sup>."

It is curious to note that whilst in both conditions a flight from homosexual impulses plays a large part in determining the nature of the habit, in the case of drug-taking by mouth, there is, as far as my observation goes, a deeper repression of the active impulses and a corresponding increase in the heinousness (or naughtiness) of the habit. In both instances

<sup>1</sup> *Institutes of Hindoo Law: Ordinances of Manu* (Wm Jones). Allen & Co.

there is an exceedingly strong oral libido-fixation, and as a consequence a strong precastration setting. It is interesting to observe how frequently in the series of adolescent tabus, the mouth plays directly or indirectly a constant part: masturbation, of course, stands by itself in this respect, but the series of adolescent prohibitions roughly runs in the order, swearing, smoking, drinking, gambling and direct sexual intimacies, the earliest of which are kissing and hugging (pseudo-incorporation). Smoking itself forms an interesting transition study, not only on account of its special technique but because in the judgment of modern society adult indulgence stands midway between alcoholism and some other mouth gratifications, such as tea-drinking and sweet-eating which are either regarded as normal or when excessive as indications of at the most a neurotic character. Here, again, there are distinctions within the habit. Like all other gratifications, it provides condensed expression for libido-formations arising at other erogenous areas and dating from more advanced stages of development, but special habit forms may be contributed largely from one special zone or stage. Thus whilst cigarette, cigar and pipe-smoking obviously mingle gratifications of an anal type with displaced genital representation, tobacco-chewing is much more subject to an anal-sadistic tabu. Once more we find an ascending series from the point of view of social criticism; viz. cigarette, cigar, pipe and chewing quid. Even in the colour and scent of tobacco there are expressed reaction-formations varying from an appreciation of fine bouquet to apprehension of 'lowness' associated with the consumption of black twist. The same can be said of the shape and size of smoking appurtenances, from the delicate innuendo of the, now old-fashioned, ladies' midget cigarette to the frankly phallic 'chest-warmer' pipe<sup>1</sup>.

Considerations of this sort add to the difficulty of distinguishing between neurotic or perverted formations associated with the mouth and the neurotic mouth characteristic, which itself shades off gradually into mouth character traits. Theoretically the distinction can be drawn by a consideration of the instinct mechanisms involved<sup>2</sup> together with an appraisal of the degree of ego-ideal formation. Thus in alcoholism we find evidence of miscarriage of repression, together with a strenuous attempt to prevent the 'return of the repressed,' whilst the ego-ideal formations, as has been suggested, are unstable and tend to seek reinforcement from without. At the same time, by overstepping what are

<sup>1</sup> See also Brill, "Tobacco and the Individual," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, III, 1923, and Hiller, *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> Freud, "Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge.

socially regarded as the necessities of the case, they clearly place themselves in the category of abnormal states. We may say roughly that what distinguishes the neurotic character from these more severe conditions is the fact that whilst the *libidinal* gratification of impulses is direct and real, it is seldom recognised as such by the individual, whilst the punishment situation is less directly associated with social blame and more with individual consequences. The dynamic situation, however, is essentially the same: repression, reaction-formation and sublimation have not been entirely effective, whilst the ego-ideal exhibits some degree of instability.

In the case of oral neurotic character, as with all other neurotic character formations, there are two main streams, one in which the gratification is in the 'thing' itself, activities associated with the self or object, and one where gratification is obtained through 'word'-presentations. A very brief study of speech formations will serve to show that in the colloquial and formal use of words, wide gratification is permitted the oral subject. Indeed, they are capable of loose subdivision in accordance with developmental instinct activities. The oral sadist not only adopts incisive speech to eat up his victim but revels in the use of words which describe the biting process: his sarcasm is biting, he flavours his sharp-tongued speech with corrosive wit, a process which usually ends in feeding-up his opponent. Less aggressive types chew the cud of reflection, whilst others, still more passive, prefer to drink in the distillations of wisdom. In Isaiah the word of God is likened to wine and milk<sup>1</sup>. We assimilate and digest information or, according to taste, eschew and spue it out of our mouth; too voracious reading ends, as we are accustomed to hear, in mental indigestion. We might note, too, an interesting example of 'word-amphimixis' in one of the innumerable colloquial equivalents for coitus, viz. 'a cut off the joint.'

It is impossible to do more than mention the multiformity of gratifications in action; they penetrate into every nook and cranny of our daily life. One generalisation, however, can be made; all gratifications are capable of distinction in accordance with the satisfaction of active or passive aims: they stamp respectively the biter or the sucker. Study the mouthpieces of pipes, the stub ends of pencils, offer your friends chocolate caramels, ask them if they like new bread or stale, dry or buttered toast, time them over an inhospitable piece of steak, observe the degree of partial incorporation of the soup-spoon, the preference for jam or jelly, for apple or orange, for cutlet and saute or sausage and

<sup>1</sup> Isaiah, lv. i.

mashed potatoes, and in a few minutes you will be able to hazard a guess as to instinct modification after birth which may require the deepest analysis to bring home to the individual. Even in the melancholic atmosphere of the vegetarian restaurant, you will find the conscientious biter at his nut cutlet, the sucker at his instant postum; there is but one striking difference, a cannibalistic tabu reigns supreme over the heavily burdened unconscious of the hungry ones. Small wonder they are advised to think happily whilst they eat.

To the next stage in classification of oral characteristics we have already alluded in the more exaggerated form of alcoholism: there is, however, a minor degree of indulgence in eating and drinking, the feature of which is that whilst not notably neurotic, it does not conform to the mere necessities of self-preservative appetites. Here, as has been suggested, we will find the café frequenter, the diner-out, the theatre addict who, like the baby, combines viewing with sustenance, although in this case not milk but chocolate cream. There is just a trace of compulsion in their make-up, and around the public houses of a Sunday evening, one can invariably find a small crowd in a minor state of optimistic impatience, whose nursery battle-cry 'want a dink' once rent the fretful watches of the night. Amongst the third group, where mouth habits bear no relation to self-preservative appetite, we can include artists whose activities are confined to the stub-end of the pencil, paper chewers and blanket suckers, transatlantic gum masticators, and a horde of other miniature mouth perverts.

We have the key here to one other generalisation about mouth traits, viz. that the necessities of self-preservation and the toleration extended to ceremonial eating provide a screen behind which purely erotic activities can take cover and defy the censoring attentions of the ego-ideal. An immediate consequence of this is that there is not so much necessity for displacement on to a psychical plane, such as exists with the anal and urethral impulses which, being more definitely under suspicion and infinitely less tolerated, must attain gratification in the disguise of psychical character traits. But oral psychical traits do exist and have been neglected merely because they so closely resemble the so-called urinary character. Indeed we can add quite definitely that the same intermingling of erotogenic influences from mouth, urethra and anus takes place in character trait formation which we have already noted in neurotic mechanisms. Impatience, envy and ambition constitute the oral triad: a sense of immediate urgency, a necessity to 'get the thing over' (one thinks of the throat), an accompanying motor restlessness, an

envy of the achievement of others, a desire to climb (one thinks of the dizzy height of breast and lap), a hankering after the plums, and yet behind it all a feeling that the silver spoon is or ought to have been in the mouth. This fact, indeed, does help to distinguish oral from urethral ambition. As Abraham has pointed out<sup>1</sup>, the ambition of the oral erotic always tends to security and regularity; in the case of the permanent official we see one who quietly, calmly and diligently sucks at the regularly proffered nipple of the public purse. There is, moreover, an echo of the old oral omnipotence to be traced in the ambition of the oral erotic. If the worst comes to the worst, it is, he conceives, his inalienable claim on society to be supported. He is in that sense an optimist; something is bound to turn up and doubtless he clings in the secret recesses of his mind to the magic formula, "Table! Cover thyself." But there is another side to his character; let reality come too perilously near, if he but guess that society is prepared to let him go wanting, that the nipple he confidently anticipated is only a dummy, immediately the sponge is thrown up; he turns his back on the unfaithful bosom and drifts into that irresponsibility which borders on primal narcissism. Or, again, he may turn in a rage on society and seek to get his rights by force or rapine, as once on a time he furiously elawed at his mother's bodice. Even in the absence of dire necessity this aggressive reaction can be noted, and oral impulses are seen to emerge in the less urgent gesture of kleptomania.

One more mode of oral representation demands our attention, the autoplactic, or, to limit it to one variety, the physiognomic<sup>2</sup>. Abraham has remarked on the surly expression of anal erotics, the raising of the upper lip and contraction of the nasal wings as if in the act of smelling. Oral physiognomy need hardly go beyond the lips and jaw musculature. At this point the stern-jawed hero of romance comes into his own and testifies to a lifelong steadiness of oral purpose in striking contrast to the darling of the music-hall with his slack jaw and loose bibulous lips. These, indeed, speak louder than words, and in their firm or loose line, pursed or tremulous set, pout or pucker, moistness or dryness, bear silent witness to the instinct tendencies of life as they existed in the first few months after birth.

<sup>1</sup> Abraham, "Beiträge der Oralerotik zur Charakterbildung," *International Psycho-analytic Congress*, April, 1924.

<sup>2</sup> Abraham, "Ergänzungen zur Lehre vom Analcharakter," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1, 1923.

NOTE. In addition to the references given throughout this paper, the following may be consulted. Forsyth, "The Rudiments of Character," *Psychoanalytic Review*, viii, 2, 1921; Sadger, *Die Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen*, Deuticke, Wien, 1921; Hug-Hellmuth, *A Study of the Mental Life of the Child*, Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co.; also various shorter communications on oral manifestations or their modifications by Ferenczi, Spielrein, Eisler and many others in recent volumes of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*.

With the exception of one reference to Freud's *Totem and Tabu*, no mention has been made of the researches of applied psycho-analysis on the present subject. These will be found to provide a series of interesting ethnological and other parallels to many of the mechanisms described. The researches of Reheim are particularly interesting, e.g., "Naeh dem Tode des Urvaters," *Imago*, ix, 1, 1923; as are those of Jones, "The Symbolic Significance of Salt," "The Madonna's Conception," *Essays in Applied Psycho-analysis*, 1923. Other references to the subject are to be found in Rank, *Beiträge zur Mythenforschung* I.P.V. No. 4, 1922, Riklin, *Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen*, 1908 etc.

## CRITICAL NOTICE

*Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, von Dr S. FERENCZI. Internationale Psychoanalytische Bibliothek. Band xv, 1924. Pp. 128.

In the first of the three sections into which this work is divided, Dr Ferenczi, starting from the position reached by Freud in his *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, attempts a further analysis of the act of coitus itself, which, as he says, has been rather neglected in subsequent work. In the processes leading up to ejaculation he recognises the co-existence of the discharging and retaining factors associated by psychoanalysis with urethral and anal erotism respectively, and describes coitus as an 'amphimixis' of urethral and anal erotisms. In this description the *specific* nature of genital erotism hardly receives sufficient emphasis. The term amphimixis, which was given by Weismann to the complete mingling of the gamete nuclei in conjugation, is not happily applied to a process in which we may indeed trace the effect of the earlier erotisms, but which is certainly not constructed solely by them, as the zygote nucleus is constructed solely by the gamete nuclei. The whole section contains, however, very many illuminating observations and reflections—too numerous to mention in detail—which certainly deepen considerably our knowledge of the psychology of coitus. Among these may be mentioned the fundamental importance of the psychical identification of the individual with the penis, and then with the semen and spermatozoon, which permits the vicarious satisfaction of the striving to return to the body of the woman; the function of genital erotism in 'draining off' libido from other organs of the body and thus freeing them from libidinal tension for their functions of utility in the individual life; and the analysis of the development of the sense of *erotic* reality parallel with the author's earlier treatment (1913) of the development of the 'sense of reality' at large, in which he dealt with the progressive adaptation of the non-erotic psychical relation to environment.

The second section deals with 'phylogenetic parallels' to the process of coitus, and with the development of a theory of psychical regression to the aquatic life of the remote ancestors of the higher vertebrates, represented in the life of the individual mammal by the foetal liquid environment of the amniotic sac. As a starting point for his phylogenetic considerations, Dr Ferenczi takes the widespread 'fish symbolism' which



appears in myth and folklore as well as in the dreams and fantasies of the individual. In this the fish is equated to penis and to child, the sea (or water) to vagina and to uterus. The swimming fish is thus the symbol both of coitus and of the foetal situation, and Ferenczi's theory is that this symbolism implies an actual psychical reminiscence of the aquatic life of the lower vertebrates. He calls attention to the fact that among the vertebrates only the higher (terrestrial) groups have a specialised copulatory organ, indications of which are already found among the amphibians; and that the same terrestrial forms possess an amniotic sac which encloses the embryo in a liquid medium during its development—among reptiles and birds in the egg, among mammals in the uterus of the mother. Thus the act of hatching in the former groups, and of birth in the latter, represents the transference of the organism from a liquid to an aerial environment, corresponding phylogenetically with the transition from aquatic to terrestrial life. This event is a 'catastrophe' which the race once experienced, and which every individual higher vertebrate experiences during its own lifetime. The ontogenetic trauma of birth is identified with the phylogenetic trauma of forced adaptation to aerial life consequent on the emergence of land from the sea. The psychical symbolism which psychoanalysts interpret as a striving to return to the mother's body also represents a striving to return to the aquatic life of remote ancestors which existed before the 'catastrophe.' From this point of view the act of coitus itself is a parallel striving, since the individual identifies himself with the penis, and also with the semen or with the individual spermatozoon.

In regard to the actual causes of evolution (phylogenesis) Dr Ferenczi rejects the 'Darwinian' explanation of the accumulation of 'chance' favourable variations leading to adaptation to new conditions in favour of the 'more psychological' mode of thought of Lamarck, which claims a place for impulses and strivings as factors in evolution. Here he seems to neglect the trend of biological discovery and thought during the past quarter of a century, which has robbed that old controversy of most of its actuality. The modern biologist treats the causation of new characters as an independent problem from that of survival. We know a great deal more about the detailed causation of organic structure than we did in Darwin's time, though still very little compared with what there is to know. The modern biologist has no prejudice against accepting the reality of effects of somatic processes on the germ plasm leading to an alteration of the soma of the next generation, so far as such effects can be demonstrated. There is no doubt evidence which seems to establish

such effects in some cases, but certainly not enough to justify the wholesale adoption, as a general theory of evolution, of the view that 'impulses and strivings' of the individual higher animal, initiated by new factors of the environment, can be transferred to the germ plasm so as to reproduce such impulses and strivings in subsequent generations independently of the persistence of the external cause, or so as to produce an increasing effect on organic structure. Nor is it at all clear that psychoanalytic theory really demands such an assumption. In rejecting the origin 'by chance variation' of the amniotic sac as a protective organ for the delicate embryo in just those animals which at no time of their extra-uterine life breathe through gills, Dr Ferenczi writes of the belief that the amniotic fluid represents an 'introjected sea' in the body of the mother as corresponding better with the psychoanalytic sense for the determination and motivation of all biological and mental processes (p. 75). This line of thought represents a false antithesis. The doctrine of determinism is not a monopoly of psychoanalysis but a necessary postulate of all science, nor has 'chance' any meaning in biology in which it can be opposed to that doctrine. It is certainly true, however, that the cause of the appearance of a character may have no direct reference to its ultimate use. That is the meaning of Herbert Spencer's old distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' adaptation. There are plenty of well established cases of indirect adaptation in biology. It can never be too strongly insisted that what biology is concerned with is the knowledge of the *causes* of organic phenomena, whether these are initiated by physical or by psychical relations. And as to that we should keep a completely open mind, judging of each case on the evidence.

On the biological facts the amniotic fluid is certainly a substitute for, and in that sense 'represents,' the sea—or, if we like, is a sea introjected into the body of the mother. Psychoanalysis is not necessary to tell us that. Whether, as Dr Ferenczi suggests, the strivings of the adult individual to restore or maintain the primitive environment of its embryonic life was the cause or any part of the cause of the origin of the amnion, is another question. It is not easy to see how it could have been, nor does our author concern himself with the way in which such causation would actually work. And whether the human psychical symbolism in which a fish is equated with the embryo and the sea with the mother has any direct connexion with the evolutionary story is still another question. Similarly with the equivalence of the phylogenetic origin of the conjugation of unicellular organisms with fertilisation (*i.e.* conjugation of gametes) in the higher organisms. That has long been accepted biological

doctrine. The formation of gametes is the return to the primitive unicellular type, as it was in the simplest multicellular organism and has been ever since. The parallelism of the original formation of unicellular organisms from supposed pre-existing indefinite living substance with the escape ('birth') of ripe sexual cells from the sexual glands is more fanciful, for, after all, the ripe gametes (sexual cells) have other cells as ancestors, and the original unicellular organisms, by hypothesis, had not. Dr Ferenczi would have done better to compare the last divisions of the sperm mother cells to form spermatozoa and the corresponding divisions of the unripe ovum (formation of 'polar bodies') with those *divisions* of unicellular organisms, which may be supposed (on the basis of good evidence from the life-history of existing forms) to bring them into a condition in which conjugation is necessary as a prelude to further division. Instead of this he compares the 'ripening' of the gametes—a term applied to the divisions just mentioned—with the 'production of organic life'! The author's biological parallels, so far as they are sound, are therefore already well known (with the exception of the comparison of birth with the change from aquatic to aerial environment). Their phylogenetic psychoanalytic interpretation must remain open to doubt.

The essence of the author's general standpoint is the carrying over of the psychoanalytic methods into biology, and their thoroughgoing application to animals, organs and tissues. This 'psychomorphism' is defended by the example of Freud, who, in his *Sexualtheorie*, reconstructed, according to Dr Ferenczi, a whole department of biology by applying ideas gained from the study of the psychoneuroses. That Freud illuminated the whole problem of sexual ontogeny by boldly ignoring any artificial line between biology and psychology is indisputable. But it would be truer to say that, with the psychoneurotic material as a guide, he applied biological methods of thought to the problem of the development of the psyche. The physicist, says Dr Ferenczi, can only make physical processes intelligible by comparing them with 'attractions,' 'repulsions,' 'inertia,' etc., things of which we have our primary knowledge in our own psyche. In seeking for the meaning (Sinn) of a process, one looks, he says, for analogies in other branches of science. And he concludes that phenomena must be measured by a scale taken from a different branch of knowledge. In the case of biology and psychology he boldly formulates the statement that everything physical and physiological finally needs a 'meta'-physical (psychological), and everything psychological a meta-psychological (physical) explanation (p. 4).

The comment is inevitable that physicists do not 'explain' physica

processes by referring them to attractions and repulsions, nor by any other 'metaphysical' means, and that no amount of the most successful 'seeking of analogies' will ever 'explain' phenomena scientifically. That can only be done by stating phenomena of a certain degree of complexity in terms of simpler ones, and showing that the laws which apply to the simpler apply also to the more complex: as for instance when we find we can explain part at least of the behaviour of living protoplasm by referring it to physical and chemical processes which obtain also in non-living substances; or again when the interaction of chemical substances is explained by the theory of ionisation, or the specific behaviours of the elements by the electronic theory of the constitution of matter. In all such scientific explanations more complex processes are explained in terms of simpler ones, biological processes by reference to physics and chemistry, chemical processes by the discovery of physical processes on which they depend. No one has gained any useful scientific result by attempting to 'explain' simpler processes by more complex ones, or phenomena belonging to a 'lower' plane (*e.g.* the biological) with the help of phenomena belonging to a 'higher' one (*e.g.* the psychical). Such attempts belong to the pre-scientific period, and so far as they have been used in science they have done nothing but mislead. Yet that is what Dr Ferenczi asks us to do when he says that everything physical and physiological finally needs a 'meta'-physical (psychological) explanation.

Up to a point the behaviourists have successfully dealt with psychological phenomena in terms of biology, but it is generally held (except by members of that school) that their method of approach cuts them off from the phenomena which depend specifically on self-consciousness. In this sphere the psychoanalytic methods and conceptions have had great success, precisely because they can interpret many phenomena of behaviour and of conscious psychical activity in terms of something simpler, the impulses (*Triebe*) of Freud's Unconscious—many of which we have in common with the other higher animals—and their reactions with consciousness. In this task, as it seems to the reviewer, psychoanalysis has been considerably hampered by want of an adequate terminology. Freud borrowed conceptions and terms from the psychology of consciousness and applied them to the simpler processes of the unconscious mind, often with a strange unreal effect which accounts for part—though doubtless not the largest part—of the opposition to psychoanalytic theory. This handicap does not, of course, affect the validity of the results, because the phenomena he deals with are real phenomena. It simply means that they are rather misleadingly named. Freud, however,

except in one or two of his latest works, deals always with the psychical, and his success has been achieved by interpreting the complex in terms of the simpler *on the same plane* (*i.e.* the psychical), the special in terms of the general, neurotic symptoms, character traits and the like in terms of primarily unconscious impulses and affects. And if his use of such words as 'sex,' 'wish,' 'pleasure,' for instances, inevitably carrying with them the mass of conscious and half conscious connotations which they have acquired in their popular uses, have a strange and bewildering effect when applied to the undifferentiated and largely unconscious impulses for which Freud employs them, still the derivation of the differentiated from the undifferentiated forms of these impulses, and the essential unity of all the human impulses dealt with under each concept, are sufficiently clear. But when we pass out of the sphere of the human mind, conscious and unconscious, and apply the same conceptions to the organic, and even to the inorganic, their unsuitability—to use the mildest possible word—becomes glaringly apparent. Finally this method leads Dr Ferenczi to wonder (p. 127) whether Nietzsche was not right when he said that "all inorganic matter is derived from the organic, it is dead organic material!"

We would not for a moment be supposed to cast doubt on the unity of the organic world, or of nature at large. That the same principles which are at work in the human mind are at work in the simplest forms of life and in the inorganic world is clear enough. But their elucidation must be begun from the other end. We cannot go back on the whole method of science. Dr Ferenczi's bold and adventurous mind has produced a work full of ingenious suggestion and speculation, and much of it may be of considerable heuristic value. But he has got hold of the stick by the wrong end.

A. G. TANSLEY.

## REVIEWS

*Psychology and Primitive Culture.* By F. C. BARTLETT, M.A. Cambridge University Press, 1923. Pp. ix + 294. Price 8s. 6d.

To a certain extent the title of this book is misleading. The word "primitive" as applied to man and society implies pre-historic, but no attempt is here made to re-construct the psychology of any imaginary group that could be called "primitive" in this sense. The cultures to which reference is made are all modern and can only be called "primitive" on the assumption that the modern savage is a living representative of "primitive" man. "After all," R. R. Marett reminds us in his volume *Anthropology*, "the Australians, or Tasmanians, or Bushmen, or Eskimo, of whom so much is beginning to be heard amongst pre-historians, are our contemporaries—that is to say, have just as long an ancestry as ourselves."

The fact is that Mr Bartlett has a very much wider and deeper interest in view than would be involved in an attempt to psychologize about primitive culture in the sense of that which is supposed to be the original form of culture—which must always be an ideal construction. His concern is with psychology and *culture as we know it*, on the assumption, both legitimate and necessary if there is to be any scientific inquiry, that culture, present, past or future, is always and everywhere the product of the interaction of certain elements in human nature and the environment. He treats of the culture of social groups which have a different civilization from that to which we are accustomed in the West because they are more elementary, and the general conditions are simpler; consequently the responses which are inevitably involved in all social groups can there be observed and traced to their essential conditions with more precision and accuracy than is possible in the direct investigation of the complex social groups of highly civilized communities. These instances of culture are called primitive partly for want of a better term, partly to indicate the greater simplicity of the situation, and partly also on the ground that the fundamental determinants of response, which can more clearly be discerned here than in highly civilized society, must be conceived to be genuinely primitive. In a word, it is the responses which are involved in there being any culture at all, not in a particular type arbitrarily called "primitive" as opposed to "modern," that Mr Bartlett is trying to distinguish and classify. His book, therefore, is in effect a careful statement of a programme or method for social psychology—and indeed for psychology in general, and as such it is of first-rate importance. It is a very definite and significant contribution to psychology, for it both offers real explanations and sets forth a method which is capable of very wide and fruitful application.

The scheme proposed may be thus outlined: The psychological study of society, to be scientific, must be objective; it must aim at explanation with the help of as few fundamental assumptions as possible. Behaviour is objective and observable, and it is to be accounted for as the result of human "tendencies" on the one hand, and material provided by the environment on the other. The fundamental psychological problem, then, is to indicate and give some account of the "tendencies." In the first instance they are to be distin-

guished from anything which is necessarily involved in individual consciousness. They are in the nature of a *bias*, which it is not possible (or necessary) to analyse into anything simpler, and their expression in particular types of behaviour is affected by their mutual relations, such as conflict and inhibition, co-operation and reinforcement. "In any case the important thing is not merely to obtain a list of the tendencies but to study the relationships which in given cases they bear one to another, and to elucidate the effects of these relationships." Mr Bartlett distinguishes four classes of tendencies to response which must be taken into account in social psychology. 1. The fundamental social relationship forms of "primitive comradeship, assertion and submission." 2. Certain other responses having a specifically social reference, in particular "the tendencies towards conservation, and the social form of constructiveness." 3. Certain individual instincts which have a social significance, largely determined by their relation to the fundamental social relationship forms. 4. "Group difference tendencies which cluster about the social institutions and conventions of a particular community, and exercise a relatively direct influence upon the social behaviour of the individual."

Granted the "tendencies"—which are no more and no less invented than are the atoms and electrons of physics—there is no need, Mr Bartlett maintains, for the social psychologist to concern himself, in the first instance, about personal attitudes, beliefs, etc. Indeed the significance of these cannot be estimated until an adequate objective study, along the lines of the suggested scheme, has been carried out. There is no doubt whatever that Mr Bartlett is right: and his demand for a more scientific, and less literary and artistic approach to the psychological problems of society is timely. The conception of man as an active agent in nature is fruitful only if we can determine what are the springs of action. All attempts to account for man, especially in society, on the assumption that he is primarily rational, and that he is social because of a rationally devised "social contract," or even because he critically accepts a social tradition, or environment, have failed to account for anything: all they have achieved has been a rationalization of some existing social order or theory. In point of fact, individual self-consciousness and critical reason are probably refinements which could only have arisen under the protection of a fairly developed social life (as Trotter pointed out in his *Instincts of the Herd*) and they remain subsidiary elements, and have never reached the status of primary determinants. The primary determinants are, in the psychological sense, unconscious; and the only hope for any intelligent modification or development of social life resides in the endeavour to discover the real conditions of social response—the fundamental social and individual tendencies and their inter-relation which underlie all behaviour. What psycho-analysis has done for individual psychology, in making clear the interaction of psychic factors which belong to much deeper and more "primitive" levels than that of rational self-consciousness, needs to be done for society at large; and the task, which McDougall may be said to have initiated in his *Introduction to Social Psychology* in 1908 has been advanced in a notable degree by Mr Bartlett in the present work.

J. CYRIL FLOWER.

*Mnemonic Psychology*. By RICHARD SEMON. Translated by BELLA DUFFY. With an Introduction by VERNON LEE. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 344. Price 14s. net.

This is a translation of Semon's *Mnemische Empfindungen*, the introducer having "altered the title from 'Mnemonic Sensations' to 'Mnemonic Psychology,'" and having "ventured to suppress...the sub-title 'First Continuation of Mneme.'" These changes have been made, avowedly, to shield the work from the attacks of those biologists who, not agreeing with "Semon's contention that memory and heredity are two aspects of the same organic function," dealt unkindly with his earlier work on *Mneme* (pp. 11-13). In fleeing one foe, however, the flank has become exposed to another, for while modern psychologists might welcome the work under the less pretentious title, the day when an atomistic senso-associationism might hope to win general acceptance as a complete psychology would seem to be past. "As we see a certain colour or a certain figure again and again, we do not go on accumulating images or representations of it, which are somewhere crowded together like shades on the banks of the Styx<sup>1</sup>." "The sole serious rival to the doctrine of separate faculties is that which, far smaller in both number and eminence of its advocates, has tried to resolve all knowing ultimately into sensation, and all thinking into nothing more than associative reproduction. But this senso-associationism, although indeed holding out an unmatched promise of scientific simplicity, breaks down by reason of flagrant conflict with the actual facts. In any case it certainly lacks the character of modernness; its associationist constituent goes back at least a couple of centuries, whilst the sensism, is co-ancient with the doctrine of faculties itself<sup>2</sup>." The error in tactics, however, is not the author's, who had no illusions as to the completeness of the work and, while promising further instalments, carefully insists that all enquiry in this "first continuation" must be subordinated to the chief aim—the study of mnemonic sensations which "spring from [the] individually acquired, not from [the] inherited engram-store" (p. 58)—and with disconcerting *naïveté*, without any attempt at definition, uses *attention*, *volition* and *voluntary effort* as foundation, fundamental concepts on which to build with assurance. He has added a valuable chapter to the attempt to enmesh perception and recognition in mathematical formulae but has unwittingly acknowledged the inadequacy of his scheme as a complete psychology by making free, uncritical use of the "commonsense" psychology of the physical and biological sciences.

Commencing a summary of his first chapter, the author writes: "We recognise as...elements of any given contents of consciousness only *sensations*, and we consider what are called feelings not as specific elements but only as shades of sensation. These sensations we divide...into original and mnemonic sensations." The original sensations are the *sensations* of ordinary psychology. The mnemonic sensations are the *images* of ordinary psychology and are classed as sensations because the only criterion of differentiation between sensations and images is an indirectly ascertainable one—"the manner in which they are produced and preserved." "The directly ascertainable distinction of greater or less vividness" breaks down in borderland cases (p. 69). Original sensations, for the author, are reactions to original stimulation "received directly and observed introspectively" and correspond to original excitations

<sup>1</sup> Ward, *Psychological Principles*, 1918, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> Spearman, *The Nature of Intelligence etc.*, 1923, pp. 26-7.



which are indirectly inferred (p. 57). "Excitation and sensation [are not] cause and effect [but] merely...the same objects taken in from different stand-points" (p. 63). Now excitation of material sense organs and original sensations being but the same 'objects' from different standpoints and mnemonic sensations being identical with original sensations from one of these standpoints, the other standpoint is assumed to demand an excitation of material "stimulable substance" as the correlate of mnemonic sensation and this is found in the ephory of an engram.

"The engram is a lasting, latent change in the organic substance" (p. 171). "The ephory of an engram should be understood as being its passage from the latent to the active state or, in other words, the arousing of a condition of excitation (= sensation), which has remained as a permanent, though locally dormant, alteration in the sensitive substance of an organism" (p. 179). The processes concerned and the dependence of mnemonic sensation on original sensation are set out in two mnemonic principles:

I. The principle of engrapthy: "All simultaneous excitations (manifested in our case by sensations) within our organisms form a connected simultaneous complex of excitations which, as such, acts engrapthically, that is to say, leaves behind it a connected and, to that extent, unified engram-complex" (pp. 159-160).

II. The principle of ephory: "An ephoric effect upon a simultaneous engram-complex is obtained by the partial return of the excitation-complex which on its side has deposited an engram-complex, and this return must take the form either of original excitations (produced by an original stimulus) or of mnemonic excitations (produced in the second instance by a mnemonic process)" (p. 181).

Stimulation of a sense organ results in original excitation (sensation), the excitation outliving the stimulus and dying down, at first rapidly and then more slowly. The phase of excitation (sensation) coterminous with the stimulation is termed the synchronous phase: the succeeding phase, which again may be subdivided, is termed the acolutic phase. The synchronous phase and acolutic phase together make up an original excitation (sensation). An isolated simple sensation is never experienced: we are ever the victims of simultaneous complexes of excitations, some in synchronous phase and others in all stages of the acolutic phase and each simultaneous complex leaves its engram impress in "some still blank portion of the stimulable substance" (p. 258). The 'simultaneousness' must have duration for "every process of excitation in our organic substance, even the briefest, must take a measurable time" (p. 170), and as in each duration block the acolutic phases of excitation from past stimuli are mingled with the synchronous phase of excitations from present stimuli and will carry over, with new acolutic phase excitation from present stimuli, into the next duration block we have an organic basis for the 'specious present' and all 'forms of association' can be reduced to simultaneous association (Ch. X).

In the engram complex left by a simultaneous excitation complex, in addition to the engrams from original excitations, there are engrams from the mnemonic excitations present and also "a ground pattern left by the cyclically recurrent organic sensations...making a sort of background on which all other engrams are embroidered." In this 'sort of background' is found the explanation of the non-reversibility of mnemonic succession, for when the complex is ephorised "these mnemonic breathing and circulation excitations (= sensations)

are prevented from reversing their course by the inevitable presence during every epoch of original sensations of breathing and circulation" (Ch. XI).

Two forms of localisation of the engram store are recognised—one the *topogenous* localisation described at length in *Mneme* and corresponding to the "special topographical configuration in the central organ" (p. 261), the other *chronogenous* localisation introduced to account for the fact that "our individually acquired store of engrams is always at our disposal in chronological strata" (p. 171). The author is satisfied that the basis of each form of localisation is a material change in the stimulable substance but criticises the more common physiological explanations of facilitation and declares that to follow this material change "into the molecular stage [is] a hopeless undertaking at the present stage of our knowledge" (pp. 154, 259, 328).

The concept of homophony, confined to mnemonic homophony in *Mneme*, is extended and used to explain *abstraction*, increase in *vividness*, and "differentials of sensations" such as "sensation of depth" and *recognition* in a way that compels careful consideration, and, whether we can accept his foundation assumptions and agree with his conclusions or not, arouses regret that the author was unable to give to us "that further application of the general modes of thinking and the special methods inaugurated in his *Mneme* which [he] proposed making in a future work" (p. 338).

In the interesting introduction we are given a warm appreciation of Semon's work in the form of "Notes on some applications of *mnemic* principle in recent psychological literature."

The translator has given us a very readable edition of a difficult work, but a few errors that have been missed seem to call for a correcting slip.

R. J. BARTLETT.

*The Unstable Child: An Interpretation of Psychopathy as a Source of Unbalanced Behaviour in Abnormal and Troublesome Children.* By FLORENCE MATEER, A.M., Ph.D., Formerly Psycho-clinician in the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research. New York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1924. Pp. xii + 471. Price \$ 2.75.

This book is a rather important, because constructive, contribution to our understanding of constitutional personality-defect. It materially helps us to clarify a little our more or less indefinite notions as to this greatly important branch of psychiatry. It does this all the better because it discusses the beginnings of psychopathy, namely in children. Personality, the individuality of mankind, is so uniquely complex and various, so incommensurable and irrelative, that every discussion and real description must receive especial welcome from those who pursue "the proper study of mankind" as man.

The author comes to her work well prepared by both 'education' and experience. After graduation from the Pennsylvania State Normal School at West Chester and five years of classroom teaching in the grades, Dr Mateer was for three years research assistant to Dr H. H. Goddard at the Training School for the Feeble-Minded at Vineland, New Jersey. Three years of graduate work at Clark University were followed by two years as psychologist at the Massachusetts Institution for the Feeble-Minded. The next three years were spent as psycho-clinician in the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research. Thereafter

Dr Mateer established at Columbus a private school for corrective treatment of psychopathic children in which her present contribution has grown and been tested. It is doubtful if a medical course would have added much to her adequacy in this constructive writing, however much it would advantage her in the actual handling of the children.

Psychopathy stresses the badly-functioning aspect of personality-defect, just as mental deficiency, 'ameutia,' 'oligophrenia,' as Bleuler poorly calls it, stands for a native or acquired lessening proper of intelligence abstract, social, or mechanical, or all of them at once. This book emphasises the humanness, so to say, and the curability of much of the psychopathy of childhood: "The world in which we live is a world full of people who show tendencies toward such traits as excessive talking [*sic*] (so-called verbalism), mutism, irrational anger, extreme irritability, or ease of acquiring a 'grouch,' too easily aroused optimism ['aroused optimism' is a fine bit of cynicism too], incoherence, irrationality, automatic habits, perseverative conversation on the same subject, too great interest in the subject of sex, over-inquisitiveness, solitariness, lying evidently for the joy of it. One-half of the world is constantly wearing out and using up energy needlessly because of the irritating inconsequences of the other half. It is not obvious, glaring lack of intelligence that exasperates one so frequently in everyday life, but the 'peculiarities,' 'mannerisms,' and 'oddities,' too small to resent, too great to accept without actual nerve-strain.... We are all more or less psychopathic. The determining factor is the degree of our malfunctioning.... Only when such an individual's variation, or a group of such variations, makes an individual's behaviour deviate so definitely from what is done by the social group to which he as an individual belongs that it is impossible for him to live as a member of that group, without definite discomfort to the group, or without violating the social code in such a way as becomes a menace to human progress, may we say that his condition is definitely psychopathic."

The criterion of psychopathy, then, for Miss Mateer, is more or less local custom, and a psychopath in Massachusetts would be normal or superman even in sight of Mount Albert Edward in Papua. But for practical purposes, however inadequate in theory, this definition works out very well. The psychopathic child is a child maladjusted to highly-civilised communities.

Perhaps the best way of suggesting the range and the contents of this thoughtful book is to quote the thirty-one chapter-titles. They are divided into two groups, respectively relating to theory and to practice: "The Origin of Clinical Psychology; Recent Tendencies in Clinical Psychology; Problems of To-day; The Future Laboratory of Clinical Psychology; The Clinical Psychologist, Himself; Means and Methods; Verification of Results; Results So Far Obtained; A New Angle: Psychopathy; Methods of Determining Psychopathy; Serepta, a Psychopath; The Delinquent as a Deviate; A Practical Study of Delinquents; Children Under Six Mentally; Children Six to Nine Mentally; Children Ten to Twelve Mentally; Normal, but—; Intelligence Plus Delinquency; Generalisations; Congenital Syphilis; Conclusions." And there is a good index as well as an adequately-orienting preface.

As is the common recent practice (often overdone) in this kind of a work, almost half the book is taken up with case histories and a somewhat detailed analysis in mental age groups of the cases studied at the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research. This includes an excellent brief discussion of the delinquency of childhood and of early adolescence.

"It is wrong mental *function*—psychopathy—that explains unbalanced behaviour when mental age, heredity, environment, physical condition, and education give no clue." "There is no such thing as a bad child. Either he does not know any better or else he cannot help it." "Pure cussedness," the intuitive slogan of so many parents and guardians, has no obvious place as a reality in the neopallium of Dr Mateer.

"The psychopath is a chance waste-product of our attempts at civilisation. [One wonders if the author be a socialist at heart.] He will not grow less numerous. He is with us to stay. It is our duty and our privilege to study and to help him. He feels intensely, lives exceedingly. He is a bundle of contradicting desires, abilities, and defects. He has potentialities. *What he needs* is early detection, long years of training, supervised parole without stigma, and a chance to make good."

Such optimism does the author, a young woman, credit. Surely it will not be her fault if the years show that the optimism be extravagant—for the problem is one of the most basal and difficult in the whole vast range of humanity's amelioration and evolution.

NEW YORK.

GEORGE VAN NESS DEARBORN.

*Abnormal Behaviour: An Introduction to the Study of Abnormal and Anti-Social Behaviour.* By IRVING J. SANDS, M.D., and PHYLLIS BLANCHARD, Ph.D. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1923. Pp. viii + 482. Price 16s. net.

The writers of this book have sought to give a general summary of recent work upon abnormalities in human conduct. To contribute new data or original views is not their purpose. What they have aimed at is a sane and systematic presentation of current views, without emphasising any one theory or aspect at the cost of the remainder.

The first portion of the book consists of a description of the emotional, intellectual and physical bases of human behaviour. In discussing the emotional basis they accept McDougall's view that each human emotion is correlated with a special instinctive tendency, and that these instinctive tendencies, together with the emotional energy which their excitement releases, form the main-springs of human conduct. The list of instincts offered by the writers differs a little from that familiarised by English psychologists. It comprises the following: (1) the food-seeking instinct, correlated with the feeling of hunger; (2) the instinct to escape, correlated with the emotion of fear; (3) the instinct to fight, correlated with the emotion of anger; (4) the reproductive instincts, correlated with sexual emotion; (5) the parental instinct, correlated with parental emotion; (6) the tendency to manipulate, correlated with the feeling of curiosity; (7) the instinctive and emotional activities designated by the term play; and, finally, (8) the gregarious tendencies and emotions, by which is understood the impulse to act like other members of the herd. Other instincts sometimes recognised, such as those of self-assertion, self-subjection, and disgust, are passed over. They are (somewhat singularly) considered as of relatively small importance for the problems of human behaviour. In discussing emotional conflicts as causes of disorders of behaviour, the writers

lay chief stress upon the sexual instincts. But they also believe that feelings of fear and feelings of inferiority may cause analogous disturbances.

Intelligence they define as 'innate intellectual capacity'; and, after a short account of the more familiar tests of intelligence and a brief discussion of individual differences in regard both to general intelligence and to special abilities, they examine at considerable length the importance of mental deficiency as a contributory factor in the production of anti-social conduct.

The human organism is then described as a physical rather than a psychical mechanism; and a short outline is given of the structure of the body and the functions of its several organs. The writers explain what is the influence upon conduct both of physical development and of physical disease; and offer a clear and careful summary of what is known about the glands of internal secretion in their relation to mental abnormality.

They then return to the methods of psychology and psychiatry. They describe the better known rating-scales for the description of personality; and give short delineations of what they term 'personality-types'—the manic-depressive type, the neurotic type, the 'shut-in' type, and the ego-centric type.

Three chapters are devoted to the part played respectively by psychoses, by psycho-neuroses, and by epileptiform disturbances in producing disorders of conduct; and two additional chapters are devoted to the more special problems of suicide and of drug-addiction.

The volume concludes with a section of a more practical bearing, dealing in separate chapters with the problems of education, vocation, and criminality. Much stress is rightly laid upon maladjustment, both in school and in business, as a factor in anti-social conduct. The treatment of these topics, however, is somewhat narrow. In dealing with educational maladjustments the writers are thinking chiefly of the epileptic, the syphilitic, and the mentally defective. Milder and commoner defects of temperament and intelligence are touched upon but lightly. The problem of the neurotic school-child, however, receives due recognition. In discussing vocational maladjustments, they are again interested in the rarer problems of mental deficiency and of insanity, more than in the more ordinary causes of inefficiency and discontent. The large amount of work done on vocational guidance for more normal individuals hardly receives sufficient recognition. In discussing modern methods for the correction and prevention of delinquency they take a broader standpoint. They still emphasise the bearing of recent psychiatric knowledge upon the treatment of delinquency. But they recognise that disorders of intelligence and temperament of a milder kind equally need diagnosis and treatment.

In the main, the survey is admirably eclectic. All the more important lines of contemporary research and speculation are duly but not disproportionately noticed. The whole of the discussions are rendered admirably concrete by the introduction of nearly a hundred and forty brief case-studies to illustrate the main points made. Each chapter has attached to it an excellent bibliography for supplementary reading. The book is written in non-technical language; and thus forms an admirable introductory volume, not only for the student of psychology and medicine, but also for the parent, the teacher, the magistrate, and the social worker.

C. BURT.

*The Nature of Laughter.* By J. C. GREGORY. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1924. Pp. 241. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Mr Gregory has written a pedestrian book. He keeps the middle of the way, and is not to be enticed from it by any will o' the wisp of theory or woodland sprite of the imagination. To write on laughter is something of an adventure. One is for ever being invited to mount on the back of a wild hypothesis and go for a gallop over the country-side at the risk of one's scientific neck. But Mr Gregory, if he was ever tempted to escapades so undignified as that, has manfully resisted the temptation. Secretly we may suspect that he was never tempted.

And this is the more surprising perhaps, because consciously or unconsciously he has tried to model his style on that of Meredith, who had a wicked, elvish spirit. Mr Gregory's sentences spring into life on their own, by a kind of spontaneous generation and with little help from those kindly midwives of literature, conjunctions and connective phrases; and having sprung thus boldly into life they frequently die before their time in exhaustion and obscurity. The result is that his book is quite unnecessarily difficult to read. It calls for continuous effort, and the effort, to be frank, is not always worth while.

But Mr Gregory's worst vice is the vice of quotation. His book is a galimatias of other people's sayings. Indeed it would appear sometimes as though he were too weary to compose more than two sentences out of three entirely without assistance. His page is hideous with inverted commas.

The book opens with a chapter on *Some Varieties of Laughter*. It is a promising beginning, for we welcome a writer who has the courage at the outset not to minimise the seeming chaos which it will be his duty to bring into some kind of order in the sequel. Mr Gregory notes the laughter of triumph, which is the most crude, brutal and primitive form of all laughter, the laughter of scorn, contempt, superiority, self-congratulation, the laughter of greeting and of play, the laughter of amusement (eomic laughter, the sense of the ludicrous), and the laughter of humour, and he admits that there may be further varieties also which he has not enumerated. Follows a chapter on *The Humanization of Laughter*. Laughter seems to have begun by being altogether cruel, "original laughter may have been wholly animosity" (p. 13); yet it probably contained from the first "the germ of future kindness." From what source this germ came Mr Gregory does not explain, but he proceeds to trace its growth and development as man becomes more civilised and less brutally disposed towards his fellows. In the third chapter we come on the central idea of the book, the idea of relief, which in the author's opinion serves to bind all forms and varieties of laughter into something like unity. All situations in which laughter occurs are in some measure situations of relief. "A survey of the occasions of laughter discovers always...the common element of relief" (p. 25). "Relief is the constitutive element in the physical act of laughing: laughter, physiologically, releases the body from a necessity for exertion and relieves it of secretions. The characteristic of one variety of laughter seems to be a pure sense of relief. In many other varieties relief is too obvious in the associated emotions to be mistaken. When it is less obvious it can still be observed. An element so pervasive of laughter, so deeply penetrative into so many of its varieties and so characteristic of its physical expression, can hardly be other than the common, fundamental ground-plan of all laughters, the centre or source from which they all spring" (p. 29).

Here is no revolutionary theory. It is just, sober, and competent, but not new. Nor in what follows, in the chapters treating of laughter in its relation to tickling, to social life, to wit, to incongruity and the sense of the ludicrous, to instinct, and to aesthetic values, is this central thread held anything but loosely in the author's hand. We lose sight of it for long periods, while Mr Gregory, as his eclectic manner is, ranges widely through the literature of the subject, snapping up a thought here and a thought there from writers as diverse as Bacon and Mr Carveth Read. In these later chapters there is much sound wisdom. Discussions by the way also, parentheses relevant and irrelevant, often bring together much useful and pleasant information. Mr Gregory has done a service to students of literature in tracing the gradual degeneration in meaning which the word *wit* has undergone. But on the more important topics for psychology—*e.g.* the relation of laughter to instinct—and for aesthetics—*e.g.* the position of laughter in comedy—it is astonishing how little he has said that is memorable. Laughter is admittedly one of the most baffling phenomena in human conduct and experience, and it is incredible that a man of Mr Gregory's unmistakable erudition and judgment should have been able to write a long book on this topic without throwing some new light on our psychological ignorance. But so it is. If he had any valuable contribution to make he has buried it too deep under his indiscriminate borrowings from other people.

J. Y. T. GREIG

*Psychoanalysis and Aesthetics.* By CHARLES BAUDOIN. Translated from the French by EDEN and CEDAR PAUL. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1924. Pp. 328. Price 16s. net.

In their preface to this study of poetic symbolism, as illustrated in the works of Emile Verhaeren, the translators remark that Baudouin is peculiarly fitted to bring the newer psychological knowledge to bear upon aesthetic criticism, seeing that he is "in one and the same person, both poet and psychologist." What Freud has done for the dream and Varendonek for the day-dream Baudouin has attempted to do for artistic creation as exemplified in this poet of the modern symbolist school. Baudouin maintains throughout the book the following two theses: (1) "that the imagination is wholly guided by the affective life," and (2) "that the symbol is the language of sensibility itself" and, as such, is not merely permissible but essential in poetry.

In the very interesting Introduction the writer deals with the origin of symbolism in general. He defines the symbol as a result of condensations, displacements and repressions. He quotes Ribot's description of the phenomena of condensation and transference, showing the importance of the affective factor as a link between separate representations. It was this factor which was ignored in the earlier psychology, which recognized chiefly association by contiguity or by similarity in the intellectual sense. Baudouin then passes on to consider the conceptions of condensation and displacement as formulated by Freud. Throughout this book its author shows a reluctance to accept the Freudian position—at least without considerable modification. His conception of the symbol would appear to be rather that of the post-Freudians than that defined with such precision in Dr Ernest Jones' paper on "The Theory of

Symbolism<sup>1</sup>." According to Baudouin it may be the *affect* which is symbolised, for he writes: "A dream landscape, resulting from the condensation of several real landscapes whose memories are tinged with a common affect, is a symbol of that affect" (p. 24). Or again, a complex 'symbolizes' an idea: "The amazing thing is that a complex dating from earliest childhood should have come to symbolize the idea of a march forward." To the lay reader the conflicting senses in which the vocabulary of the new psychology is used is a thing scarcely less amazing. Again, Baudouin's 'symbols' display very prominently the individual conditioning factor, whilst they can apparently represent at one stage in the subject's life, ideas invested with a repressed affect and at another stage the 'sublimated' modification of that affect. Other points in which Baudouin's position differs from that of Freud are the importance of the sexual determinants in repression (p. 23), his concept of regression (p. 47) and of the Oedipus complex (p. 208) and his belief in the possibility of repressing a sublimated instinct (p. 90). Yet, though Baudouin here and there shows a certain reluctance to lay stress upon the sexual, we read on page 111: "We need not veil our faces when we discover in the human imagination, and even in the imagination of a man of genius, that which is the pendant of the caudal vestige in Plato's skeleton. We have merely to recall that the evolution of one thing from another does not mean that the two things are identical—a fact which is forgotten by those who are scandalized at the reasoning of a Nietzsche or a Freud. We do not say that Plato was himself a monkey, or that this or that poetical or religious manifestation is itself sexuality."

After the introductory chapter the plan followed by the author is to trace the course of development of the poet's mind and the expression of that development in his works. The progress is that from marked introversion, through a crisis of physical and spiritual break-down, to the establishment of equilibrium between extraversion and introversion. The part played by certain images which persist in all Verhaeren's work is discussed at length. Chief amongst these images are clock-towers and trains, both invested with feeling through experiences of childhood, both becoming tormenting to the point of madness in the three years of moral chaos, and the second image (that of the trains) acquiring a tragic significance through the poet's death by falling under a train. In this connection Baudouin refers to Freud's view that deaths apparently due to accident are frequently the result of unconscious complexes which urge the victim to involuntary suicide (p. 146).

It is impossible to follow in detail the evolution thus traced. Briefly, the stages are as follows: Early impressions (*Les tendresses premières*), loss of faith and paroxysm of sensual pleasure-seeking (*Les flamandes* and *Les moines*) Already a certain macabre note is struck and we become aware of an algolagniac tendency. Both of these features are intensified in the period of crisis (*Les soirs*, *Les débâcles*, *Les flambeaux noirs*). In this period we note the phenomenon which Baudouin terms 'autophilia,' by which he means a process of introversion of the sexual instinct. He states on p. 111, that, in this process, desexualisation of the instinct takes place. But it is not easy to see, in the passages quoted immediately afterwards, how he succeeds in denying the presence in them of crude sexuality in no disguised form. Together with this autophilia there are manifestations of asceticism which Baudouin recognizes as proceeding in part from the will to power. There follows the period of conversion and deliverance, the recovery of balance following on the freeing of unconscious forces. In

<sup>1</sup> *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, Chap. VII.



Verhaeren's case 'conversion' meant the turning outwards towards the world and humanity and it was effected through his love for the woman whom he married. We note the revival of interest in life, the need for action, the awakening of pity, and a tendency to a more objective art (*Les villages illusionnaires*, *Les campagnes hallucinées*, *Les villes tentaculaires*, etc.). Baudouin comments on the 'symbols with two faces' which appear in these works. We have, for instance, the picture of the country-people's exodus to the towns, which is the objective aspect, whilst the subjective aspect is the poet's emerging from the 'garden' of introversion to the 'factory' of extraversion. Chapter VI is headed 'Life in all its ardour' and contains an account of some of the poems of the final period of equilibrium (*Les forces tumultueuses*, *La multiple splendeur*). In particular we notice the development of a pantheistic love of the world and a movement (paralleled in the works of Goethe) from the more subjective, romantic to the objective, classic form of art. The chapter entitled "An Oedipus Trilogy" contains an analysis of Verhaeren's three dramas: *Le cloître*, *Philippe II* and *Hélène de Sparte*, in each of which the poet's Oedipus complex finds clear expression.

The concluding chapter outlines a psychology of art. Baudouin holds that, while psychological criticism cannot replace that which is artistic and literary, yet it may be a valuable aid. "It may," he says, "...furnish the critics with a more objective outlook. Aesthetic appreciation will probably remain a subjective thing. It is no less subjective than physical pain. But when physiological science tells us positively that such or such a pain corresponds to such or such a lesion we are given an objective basis for physical suffering.... This is the way in which we may hope to see psychology aiding criticism" (p. 294). He shows further that those poems which give expression to the deepest emotions will react most powerfully upon the reader, though neither author nor reader need be conscious of the real object of the emotions. In an earlier chapter Baudouin pointed out that the rhythm of poetry induces a slightly hypnotic condition, a dream-like state, in which the mind responds specially readily to the artist's feeling (p. 26).

Finally, he reminds his readers of William James' distinction between 'existential judgments' and 'propositions of value.' The latter, he says, remain the prerogative of criticism. "Psychology will do well to keep to the 'judgment of fact'" (p. 299).

The book contains a portrait of Verhaeren and a facsimile of the MS. of a poem, as well as a beautiful and hitherto unpublished prose poem: "Ce soir."

The decision of the translators to give the French version of the poems, followed by as literal a translation as possible, is to be commended.

CECIL BAINES.

*The New Psychology and the Parent.* By H. CRICHTON MILLER, M.A., M.D.  
London: Jarrolds, Ltd. Pp. 255. Price 6s.

Dr Crichton Miller is a sturdy idealist and, more fortunate perhaps than many of us, is able to find his idealism inherent in the so-called New Psychology. Although Dr Crichton Miller is not responsible for the term, the label "New Psychology" is surely to be deprecated; it savours too much of a revelation or a cult, of which there are too many about just now, and too little of a science

which can never be wholly or even mainly new, but, if it is to be trusted at all, can only be the expression in each generation of a growth in which the newest shoots of knowledge are in vital unity with the experience and observation of the past.

Although some of us may differ from Dr Crichton Miller in many directions, there can be no doubt that the book under review contains much good common-sense advice to parents, and as it is to them the book is addressed, it has fulfilled its purpose if the advice is good and not bad. Good parents will get help from the book, bad parents probably will not read it; but, after all, the instincts of parenthood are older than the New Psychology, and can perhaps be trusted to make a fair average of successes in the business. I do not write this flippantly; this book and many others of the same kind do undoubtedly contain much good advice, but there is a real danger of making the whole business of parenthood and childhood too self-conscious an affair altogether.

Although his conclusions are sometimes adapted and modified in order to fit in with his fundamental conceptions of the meaning and purpose of life, Dr Crichton Miller is in the main a disciple of Jung in his interpretation of psychological mechanism. In this book, as in so many others of a similar character, we are often reminded of the advice given by Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch in his lectures on the Art of Writing; speaking on the difficulties of this art, he advises his students always to call spades spades and be prepared always to double and redouble spades. This advice is very applicable to much of the psychology of Jung; in the first instance, spades may be called very clearly, but when in the progress of the game difficulties arise—difficulties generally inherent in the temperament of the psychologist—then, often with much erudition and great ingenuity, the original spade call is shifted to another and more attractive suit. It is very fascinating, but it is not the game.

Dr Crichton Miller gives a very interesting example of this in his book. Speaking of the interpretation of dreams, he says: "Sexual symbolism has been from all time a racial symbol of the interpretation of character. Our primitive man has always looked upon sexual life as a test, so to speak, of character; potency, virility and sexual relations have been taken as the symbols of human communion from all time. Therefore a great many pictures that appear in our dreams, which on the face of them are grotesquely sexual, have no narrow or physical sexual meaning at all, but refer to factors of character growth—spiritual factors, moral factors and so on—and do not really refer to actual creative sexuality." This seems to me a good example of changing suit in the middle of the game. If parents interpret the dreams of their children on these lines, they will tend to bring up more prigs than saints, and certainly more prigs than clear thinking men and women, taught to face reality as it is.

Apart from all questions of the clash of different schools of Psychology, I find it difficult to reconcile some of Dr Crichton Miller's statements with my own experience and that of many other clinical psychologists; for instance, in speaking of the emotional development of the girl, he states that the normal girl does not psychologically discover her father until between the age of 15-18; if this is true, then in my experience the normal girl is a very rare bird. Again, in discussing homosexuality, Dr Crichton Miller states that he has known a boy become homosexual as a result of a severe rebuff in his first attempt at a heterosexual attachment; that such a rebuff could be a true cause of homosexuality is contrary to all modern theories of inversion, and the case stated

like this may add a really needless terror to parents watching the developing mating instinct in their sons.

This book is not intended in any way to be a scientific treatise, but there is plenty of good psychology in it, as well as plenty of wise advice based on wide clinical experience and on an attitude towards life which can only make for sound altruism and high purpose.

MAURICE B. WRIGHT.

*Opening Doors.* By JOHN THOMSON, M.D. Oliver & Boyd, 1923. Pp. 20. Price 1s. 6d.

This excellent little book deals with the special needs of blind, deaf, or crippled children. The subject-matter is divided into seven sections, each of which is defined by clearly worded headings. The author describes the signs which accompany the infant's growth in mental power, and urges the importance of early treatment when there is any marked absence of the usual activities of a normal child.

Considerable emphasis is laid on the formation of good habits, stimulation and training of the will, and the encouragement of voluntary effort. A timely warning is uttered against stressing any difference from other children which arises from the infirmity of the baby, and a wise reminder is given that no indulgence must be permitted which leads to the shirking of irksome duties on the plea of illness.

*Opening Doors* can be recommended to all Welfare Workers, and it should be read by every mother whose child, by awkwardness or slowness in development, gives cause for anxiety about its mental or physical capacity. The delicate understanding shown by the writer in the arduous task of the mother will serve to encourage her in that patience and perseverance which he so strongly inculcates. Even the boredom and irritability of the baby under training meets with sympathetic consideration. This recognition of the infant's point of view is as welcome as it is unusual.

I. YARDE BUNYARD.

## NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1923. Part 3.

The third number of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* for 1923 is a special one in celebration of Ferenczi's fiftieth birthday, and contains, besides his portrait, a list of his scientific works and an editorial notice acknowledging his many services to the psycho-analytic movement.

Dr Ernest Jones' paper on "Cold, Disease and Birth" has been published in English in the third edition of his *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*. He believes that the idea that cold air induces disease is connected, by false symbolic associations, with the initial experience of birth (regarded as an injury analogous to castration).

Dr Josef Eisler (Budapest) contributes a paper on hysterical uterine phenomena, in which he considers the possible effect of hysteria upon (a) the mucous membrane and (b) the muscles of the uterus. Where no biological failure in development can be detected the conditions of amenorrhoea and dysmenorrhoea have been labelled "nervous" by gynaecologists. Eisler endeavours to show that amenorrhoea may be a manifestation of the masculine complex, a conversion-symptom motivated by the desire to be a man, the organ in question refusing to perform its function. A possible complication is that of "vicarious" menstruation in which there is periodic bleeding from some other organ (haemoptysis and haematemesis). This connection has been recognized by French gynaecologists. It indicates displacement from the genital to other erotogenic zones. He shows further that psychical factors may cause irregularity in the menstrual periods—*e.g.* the subject's desire to protect herself against her husband. As regards the muscular system, data are insufficient. Eisler gives two examples, however. The first is that of spontaneous miscarriage where no organic factor can be detected. He believes that in two cases which he quotes the psychical factor was the motive of revenge for neglect by the husband, a motive cherished by "nervous" women of the Medea type.

The second illustration is that of a case in which parturition was unduly delayed, labour lasting for four and a half days. A subsequent analysis of the patient revealed strong anal erotism and, in accordance with the familiar equation child = faeces, Eisler concludes that we have here an instance of the effect upon sexuality of repressed anal erotism.

Dr J. Hárník (Berlin) contributes an article on the destiny of narcissism in men and in women. He shows that, in the latter, the primary narcissism is displaced at puberty on to the idea of physical beauty, whilst in males it remains focussed on the genitals, though it may undergo partial displacement on to the general idea of manly strength. (A translation of this paper has appeared in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.)

Freud has shown that in hysteria "genitalization" of specific parts of the body may take place, whilst in poetic and artistic talent the organ used, *e.g.* the mouth or hand, may similarly undergo a heightening of libidinal cathexis. In his paper "Organ-libido and Talent" Dr Imre Hermann (Budapest) attempts to formulate a theory of the psychogenesis of artistic talent, his idea being that, whereas as a rule the "peripheral" processes of drawing and speech become subordinated to the "central" (conscious, logical) processes, the peripheral processes are not so subordinated when there exists an increased libidinal cathexis of the particular organ. He believes that it is this libidinal stress which can be inherited rather than the specific artistic gift. He quotes examples to show the existence of the "personal beauty" complex in artists and the "seer" complex in poets and scientists, and endeavours to establish a connection between pain, the heightening of the libidinal cathexis of the brain (as the main centre of narcissism) and the intellectual achievements of great thinkers. Thought, he argues, may act as a defence against pain, receiving the charge of ego-interest which the subject withdraws from the pain itself.

"From the Pathoneuroses to the Pathology of the Neuroses" is the title of an article by Dr Stephan Hollós (Budapest). The materialistic psychiatry of the nineteenth century has been succeeded by psycho-analysis, which avoids on the one hand the pitfall of attributing psychic phenomena directly to anatomical sources and on the other that of transcendental speculation. Freud's theory of the instincts establishes the thesis that they form the link between the somatic and the psychic, and the aim of psycho-analysis should be to find a unity in organic and mental phenomena. This unity is illustrated in the conversion symptoms of hysteria, and instinctive impulses have their effect on the beating of the heart, the irritability of the sympathetic system, etc.

Ferenczi in his work on the pathoneuroses concludes that any injury to, or morbid change in, a bodily organ which is especially strongly invested with libido or easily identified with the whole ego (*e.g.* the face, the genitals) may give rise to narcissistic neurosis, where narcissism is constitutionally very marked. In Ferenczi's and Hollós' joint work on paralysis they went on to show that a "pathopsychosis" may ensue from a cerebral lesion. In this case, however, the organic injury or morbid process is not directly consciously perceived, nor is interest consciously concentrated upon it, as in the pathoneuroses. Such diseases of the brain result particularly from toxic processes with their accompaniment of fever, in which a constant *struggle* goes on (between toxic and anti-toxic agents). Hollós suggests that this struggle reflects endopsychic processes by which an attempt is made to effect a secondary cathexis of the cells from which libido has been momentarily detached by the injury, and that this heightening of the cathexis of the injured part is a necessary condition of recovery. Similar phenomena of rhythmic struggle or effort occur in psychogenic diseases, and their significance is the same; in delirium the struggle is acute, in paranoid diseases it is chronic. The writer stresses the fact that psycho-analytical theory admits no sharp distinction between organic and non-organic bases in disease, and that even in functional psychogenic disease there must be a concrete pathological basis. He draws an analogy between the rôle of the cerebral lesion in organic diseases where there is a rich psychic content apart from the phenomenon of struggle and that of the somatic stimuli in dream-formation; that rôle is, to excite psychic processes which bring into play infantile fixations. In the functional psychoses it is to be assumed that the brain (the ego-organ *par excellence*) is in some way pathologically affected, possibly as a secondary consequence of the effect produced on the endocrine secretions by failure to "bind" the libido.

Melanie Klein gives a series of examples to illustrate the libidinal determination of school and lessons in the minds of children. (A translation of this paper will appear in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.)

Dr Siegmund Pfeifer analyses the speech of Mercutio in *Romeo and Juliet* (Act I, Scene IV) to show that the conception of Queen Mab is derived from the mother-imago in both its tender and terrible aspects. The first part of the speech describes wish-fulfilling dreams and the second anxiety dreams. Both are inspired by Mab, *i.e.* behind the anxiety dream lies the latent wish which repression converts into anxiety.

Dr Sándor Radó (Budapest) contributes the analysis of the dream of a patient during a course of psycho-analytical treatment.

Aurel Kolnai (Vienna) discusses the position of psycho-analysis in the history of thought, comparing and contrasting it with various modern intellectual movements. He touches on the services rendered to determinism, positivism and rationalism by psycho-analytical theory in reducing to scientific formulae much that was hitherto mere nebulous speculation and by the psycho-analytical method in dealing with phenomena without a preconceived system of values. On the other hand, psycho-analysis, through its theory of the unconscious and of the instincts, has struck a blow at physiological materialism. The writer refers to the gulf between suggestive-hypnotic therapy with its blind faith and yielding to authority and psycho-analytical therapy, the aim of which is to make possible a critical self-direction. Instead of attempting to combat individual phenomena, *e.g.* alcoholism, psycho-analysis seeks to comprehend the whole mental structure, and, by recognizing the infantile fixations upon which

such phenomena are based, to bring about intensive changes in the psyche. In contrast to modern occult theories, *e.g.* Christian Science, analysis does not demand antecedent belief in the result of given procedures. Such belief is evidence of the idea of the omnipotence of thought and of subordination to the pleasure principle. Psycho-analysis seeks to extend the field of consciousness and to recognize, but not to give free rein to, the unconscious. The psycho-analytical theory has made popular beliefs more comprehensive (*e.g.* in symbolism), giving a scientific interpretation of ideas affectively determined. As regards its relation to ethical thought, Kolnai points out that psycho-analysis, by the loosening of repressions, makes possible the conscious acceptance or rejection (leading to sublimation) of instinctive impulses, while the reality principle takes the place of the pleasure principle. The dissection of the concept of sexuality helps to show the true meaning of certain disguised sources of pleasure and to enable the individual to form ideals which are in accordance with facts. The writer concludes his paper with a comparison between the place occupied by psycho-analysis in the intellectual realm and that of the theories of Marx in the sociological realm.

Dr Géza Róheim (Budapest), in an article on Sacred Money in Melanesia, offers a contribution to the phylogenesis of the interest in money.

Dr Géza Szilágyi (Budapest), in a paper entitled "The Young Spiritist," gives a psycho-analytical study of an abnormal personality.

CECIL BAINES.

## V E R A

## A STUDY IN DISSOCIATION OF PERSONALITY

By ALICE G. IKIN.

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## INTRODUCTION

No serious discussion of the nature of the self can ignore the rapidly increasing mass of evidence which relates to the dissociation of personality and the birth of multiple personality.

This article is based on the analysis of a dissociation during delirium of a personality into ten pseudo-personalities. Each of them was capable of recognising itself as a self, each knew nothing of the existence of the others, each reacted in its own way towards the environment.

All of these, however, were synthesised later in the normal personality whose memory was continuous with that of the self which had preceded the delirium. This personality included the memories of all the fragmentary pseudo-personalities which had alternated in consciousness during the delirium.

Few patients who have suffered such extensive dissociations and delusions as those to be described retain the memory of their psychotic experiences; though Janet states that in such cases, in order to bring about a complete cure, the memories of the secondary personalities should be reintegrated. Since he has never found a patient who remembered, he infers that he has never cured one completely. In the present instance, however, with the recovery of the memory of

personal identity, the patient, who will be referred to as 'Vera,' spontaneously remembered the experiences of the various pseudo-personalities. She recorded the life-history of the various dissociated pseudo-personalities as soon as she could write (while still in bed) in order to have accurate accounts of her unusual experiences before they were distorted by later ones. These notes are given in Chapter II and have provided the material upon which this article is based.

After recovery she proceeded to acquire sufficient technical skill and knowledge to analyse the deliria, of whose nature and origin she was ignorant. In this way she hoped to be able to throw some light upon the nature of mental disorders and thus to alleviate the sufferings of others.

During the latter part of the analysis she attended the psychology courses at the University of Manchester and obtained an M.Sc. degree.

The notes recorded by Vera<sup>1</sup> immediately after her delirious dissociations of personality were analysed in a similar way to that of Freudian dream analysis. Vera supplied free associations from various points or ideas in the experience recorded. The apparent ravings of delirium, however, were not intelligible until a psycho-analytical research into the earliest stages of Vera's mental development was prosecuted. The partial analysis of the delirious pseudo-personalities is therefore only a fragment of the analysis actually conducted in order to obtain this fragment. The delirious experiences seem to have resulted from a disintegration so complete that nothing short of a radical analysis, enabling the very earliest mental tendencies to be traced out, could enable even a superficial analysis of any one episode to be made.

The only assumption made by Vera when commencing her analysis was that free associations would be relevant to the point from which they started; an assumption that was verified over and over again during the course of analysis, through the release of the concomitant emotion when the associations had led to an elucidation of the dream fragment or portion of delirium concerned. It must be borne in mind that the suggested interpretation of the recorded facts of delirium resulted from the bringing into consciousness of previously inaccessible memories, impulses and emotions, which then became facts of subjective experience, as valid as those of the delirium itself. The relations between the previously recorded facts which were the manifest content of the delirium, and the second series of subjective facts experienced later (latent content) during attempts to systematise and organise the former, are of

<sup>1</sup> Except in chapter II, which was written before the analysis of the deliria was attempted, Vera is referred to throughout in the third person. This distinction between Vera and the present writer is maintained in order to differentiate the views, experiences and behaviour before analysis from those which followed it. It must be borne in mind, however, that when referring to Vera the writer, through being herself patient and analyst, has a more peculiarly intimate knowledge of her thoughts and feelings than usually falls to the lot of any analyst when describing a patient.



course personal interpretations or inferences and thus liable to error. Nevertheless the two orders of subjective facts, each equally real when consciously experienced must be related in some way to each other and to the personality as a whole. In this article their relation to the personality as a whole has been investigated rather than their relation to each other.

An outline of Vera's disintegrating illness is given in Chapter I. Chapter II contains Vera's original notes including a brief life-history of her dissociated pseudo-personalities and her account of the stabilisation of the resultant personality. A brief analytical account of her experience at the approach of death is given in Chapter III. Phases A, B and C of Vera's personality are described in Chapter IV. The method of analysis adopted is outlined in Chapter V. Selections from the analysis of the various personalities in Chapter VI are followed by a review of the delirium as a whole in Chapter VII, in which the inter-relations of the dissociated pseudo-personalities are described. It also includes a brief account of their constitution and of the transition between them and the normal self, together with a review of the delirium analysis.

#### CHAPTER I

##### OUTLINE OF VERA'S PREVIOUS HISTORY AND OF HER DISINTEGRATING ILLNESS

VERA was apparently very strong and healthy until she was three years old. At that age an attack of measles was followed by acute pneumonia. An operation was necessary and pus was drained from the left lung for six weeks. Ill-health dogged her footsteps during the next few years. In addition to the usual childish ailments, rheumatism made its appearance when she was seven. This, however, yielded to treatment. At the age of twelve, nervous headaches occurred, which could not be easily alleviated. Vera was away from school for a whole year as a result of this. Her school career did not include more than three years all told, with long absences throughout. She, however, always went on in the form she would have been in if she had not been away, simply missing out the work done by the others in the meantime. In spite of this she was usually at the top of her form, although the youngest in it. Her mental progress was thus very rapid.

When she was just fourteen she developed what was said to be rheumatoid arthritis in both knees. At the age of seventeen she had headaches, which were recognised to be of nervous origin. She was working hard at chemistry, physics and mathematics at this stage. The

result of overwork with sleepless nights of physical pain, brought on a 'nervous breakdown'.<sup>1</sup>

During the greater part of the year, from seventeen and a half to eighteen and a half, she felt that she was attempting more than she could manage, but her father, not knowing her struggle against pain and insomnia, thought she was quite capable of gaining various open scholarships that year. At times her fear of failure was intense, though she was working hard. She found herself making stupid little mistakes, found that if she went to fetch one chemical from the store room, she would forget what she wanted before she got there.

Finally, during an examination, Vera entirely lost a year's memory of her work. She read through her paper (Conics and Calculus) thinking she could do well on it. Suddenly she found the symbols strange and meaningless. She had no recollection of having seen the paper before, though she remembered having read it. Amnesia for Conics and Calculus was complete. This gave her a big shock. Fortunately she had done well enough in her earlier Mathematics paper to get through without the second one which was an extra one. In spite of this she went on taking one examination after another, having to pass on the work she had done before the year for which she had lost her memory. This naturally did not help her already diminished confidence. Her doctor gave her a draught to take before each paper to clear her head. A few weeks later she gained an open University Scholarship, though taking her practical chemistry and physics examinations with hands so shaky that she could scarcely manipulate the apparatus. In spite of having lost the memory of her last year's work she seemed quite clear about all that had been learned before.

During each paper she concentrated her mind on it to the exclusion of everything else, and inevitably everything else so shut out overwhelmed her in between times. She spent most of her nights pacing her room, often afraid to get into bed at all. At times she would be suddenly overwhelmed by fear, fierce, insistent, unreasonable, overmastering fear of she knew not what, impelling her to take a flying leap on to the bed and bury herself under the bed clothes. When she did sleep, she had fearful nightmares, in all of which she was finally aroused by someone or something knocking in the back of her head. She experienced every possible kind of accident in this way, always seeing the danger coming, yet being powerless to avert it or to escape in any way.

<sup>1</sup> These were not the only factors. Analysis showed at a later stage that the repression of libido at that time played a very large part in producing the breakdown, the factors mentioned here being merely contributory.

In spite of this she passed all her examinations successfully and commenced her college career three months later (October 1914). One doctor warned her that if she did so in that condition she would be in an asylum before the end of the year. She thanked him for the warning and, though admitting the danger, said that now she was warned she would not break down that way. Her own doctor, knowing her character better, and thinking the disappointment of missing that for which she had worked so hard and paid such a price might produce worse effects than carrying out her plans, sanctioned the risk, so long as she did not overwork again.

Vera's doctor attributed her neurotic temperament and troubles to an over-development of intellect at the expense of sex. This he discussed with her. Her attitude towards men up to that time was apparently sexless. Her ambition was to show them she could do as well as they could on their own ground. This she achieved, but after her breakdown she decided that health was too big a price to pay for success. Hence though going to college, her old ambition seemed dead.

Vera changed her plans completely, determining to bend all her energies towards the development of the feminine side of herself until it had caught up with her intellectual development. She did so quite successfully, making many friends, going boating as much as possible, filling her time with social activities, and only doing the minimum of work necessary to enable her to get through her Natural Science Tripos. She was still, it must be remembered, suffering from acute insomnia, anxiety dreams and severe headaches. None of her casual college acquaintances, however, suspected it; only one or two girls whom she knew well were told a little. She was always ashamed of physical inefficiency and tried to conceal it as much as possible.

Under this changed regime, however, her health steadily improved and in 1917, a week after passing her Tripos examination, she was fit enough to take up a post in a district in which she experienced many air raids. Yet she enjoyed her life and work there and was apparently little affected. Further, as she was so inured to insomnia, the enforced lack of sleep had less effect on her than on other people there.

During this time Vera's attitude towards men had changed completely and early in 1918 she became engaged. Since she was better in every way than she had ever been before, it seemed as if her doctor's association of retarded sexual development with neurotic symptoms was correct. With a more normal sexual outlook, neurotic symptoms were greatly reduced.

Vera was even strong enough to stand the loss of her brother and, within three days of this, the termination of her engagement, without the development of any neurotic symptoms. Shortly after this she went home to take care of the house for her mother, who was very much upset by the death of her son.

In spite of all these trying circumstances she managed successfully. A few months later (1918) she declared that she had never been so fit in her life and that at last she was going to make up for all her past weakness.

Vera suffered from influenza in 1918<sup>1</sup>, recovered to some extent, but later had dental trouble, the cause of which was not apparent. Nearly a year later, this developed into severe neuralgia, for the relief of which morphia was injected daily for five and a half weeks. Towards the end of this period doses of three-quarters of a grain were injected twice a day. Her teeth were extracted and bacteriological examination showed the presence of streptococci, not only in the swab from the sockets, but actually penetrating the dentine, as a section of a tooth showed. An autogenous vaccine was administered and the morphia supply simultaneously withdrawn.

A period of delirium followed during which various dissociated pseudo-personalities alternated, and it was thought that the patient would not survive. She however did so and as soon as she could write ('having at first to concentrate on each letter so formed in order to co-ordinate hand and mind) she recorded her experiences, not only of the dissociated fragments of herself, but also of the whole personality which became reintegrated when at the point of death.

It seems clear that the effects of streptococcal infection were increased through a lowering of the body defences still further by morphia and had produced a definite disturbance of the central nervous system. This declined as the vaccine removed the toxic foci in the teeth. The dissociations were thus the result of physical brain changes, yet the actual mental disturbances have proved analysable and have been brought into relation with the personality as a whole. Memory of occurrences while the brain conditions were abnormal has been retained since they became normal.

It must be borne in mind when considering the nature of the ravings of delirium and their analysis, that the predominantly sexual tone may have two causes; one the stimulation of sexual interest supposed to follow the withdrawal of morphia, the other that the greater part of the impulses repressed as incompatible with the ego ideal, burst through and took possession of consciousness when the control exerted through the associative areas of the brain was lessened by the toxæmia.

<sup>1</sup> Many toxic psychotic cases occurred during this epidemic. In the *Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology*, 1, 94, Devine gives an abstract of an article, by K. Hitzemberger, entitled "Psychosen nach Grippe" (*Monats. f. Psychiat. u. Neurol.* 1919, XLVI, 267) in which the symptoms of this fever delirium are given as confusion, terror, psychomotor excitement and delusions of persecution and poisoning. The majority of these sufferers were men. Eighty per cent. of the cases so attacked ended fatally. In view of the relatively small number of psychoses in a widespread epidemic, Hitzemberger concluded there must have been an unknown causal factor in these cases.

## CHAPTER II

## DISSOCIATION

THESE notes include particulars of the following pseudo-personalities: I. Girl. Nursing Home in America. Vague. II. Gwendoline. On board ship going to Canada. III. Old Lady. IV. Middle-aged man. V. Ancient Egyptian Priestess. VI. Breton Peasant Girl. VII. Gerald, a boy of 16. VIII. Girl. IX. Elderly American man. X. Girl in America.

## (1) DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATING PSEUDO-PERSONALITIES

## Vera's Original Notes

*Beginning of delirium*

My last recollection of things as they were was about 9 p.m. on Saturday December 20th, 1919. Dr D..., Mr P... (dentist) together with nurse were there, an inoculation was due—then I remember no more clearly—only a vague confused memory of many nurses flitting about (only one really present) and no memory of anyone else.

Next morning I saw father sitting in a big arm chair and nurse near him. I laughed, saying, "that's a dirty trick, fancy not telling me you were taking me to a nursing home—Oh yes, I'm quite glad to be there—but you might have told me first. It's funny though—that looks like some of our furniture, yet it *is* the nursing home<sup>1</sup>, my room is 34, I heard a patient in the next room. Nurse, please, you will let me have a few visitors, won't you?"

## PSEUDO-PERSONALITY I. GIRL

*Scene—Nursing Home in America*

After this, I did not know I had either father or mother. The nursing home seemed to be in America, it was arranged like a very large hotel. Hot water taps seemed to be just outside my room. There was a lot of rushing about, nurses everywhere in the corridors—once I remember seeing my father come in, in a dark grey overcoat; but I took him for a stranger, thinking he had come to the wrong room by mistake. Apart from that I only saw my nurse, being quite oblivious of the presence of anyone else. During the nights the nurse and I used to slip out in dark cloaks and wander mysteriously round strange streets. Several times we came up from the same subway which was surrounded by green shrubs and round the back of a big building.

## PSEUDO-PERSONALITY II. GWENDOLINE

*Scene—On board ship en route for Canada*

The scene changed. I was travelling to Canada on a big steamer, dressed in a green tweed costume. Another girl seemed to be with me

<sup>1</sup> Actually Vera was still in her own home.

in great trouble over something, but it was rather vague. I did not reach Canada. A horse and some rabbits had something to do with each other and with me. The ship was not a very up-to-date one. I wondered why I had gone on such an ancient affair. There were many people on board—one a horrid man. I had no living relatives left. I think my name was Gwendoline.

## PSEUDO-PERSONALITY III. ELDERLY LADY

*Scene—Unknown City*

I was an elderly lady (about 70) with white hair, lying in bed in a bay window facing on to a square with huge columns towering up, with a specially large one in the centre. Many roads diverged from the square, each thronged with company after company of men marching along solemnly, silently through the night. The stream of men seemed endless, all in black uniform, their faces shining out a ghastly solemn white under the light of an uncaunty moon. I wondered what these countless thousands of men portended and could only think it meant a fresh war. So I tried to warn people, but no one would pay much attention to my warnings which upset me so much that I lost my memory and became unconscious again.

[Two lines from "The Deathless Army"<sup>1</sup>

"Solemnly, silently through the night,  
Grim set faces and eyes so bright."]

## PSEUDO-PERSONALITY IV. MIDDLE-AGED MAN

*Scene—A Workshop*

I was in a workshop, a man of about 45 years old. Five other men were present in a very excited, jubilant state, whereas I was very angry. We had prepared a new explosive and found its power was terrific, far beyond our expectations, a grain or two being sufficient to blow up a whole factory. I wished to destroy what had been prepared and to burn the complicated formula without which we could make no more, since I said it would overthrow the balance of the world if any men held such power in their hands. The others would not listen to me, they wanted power at any price, so I snatched the treasured paper, thrusting it into the fire, determined that at least they should make no more.

All five men naturally attacked me and though I fought hard I was soon felled to the ground with my head beaten in, apparently dead. In reality, I was fully conscious, yet in that state in which I could give no sign of life. In order to make sure that I was really dead the men tested me in various ways, a red hot poker against my feet, red hot needle on the palm of my hand and also on the left eyeball, but even this

<sup>1</sup> Recorded in original notes as indicating origin of strange appearance of the men in this episode, which when she recovered from the delirium was attributed by Vera to memories of this song.

intense agonising pain could bring no response. I remained absolutely immobile, so they were satisfied that I was dead, though I felt all and heard their discussion.

Their next problem was the disposal of my body. Finally they decided to pack me in a bale of gun-cotton, which would go out with other similar ones next day. This they did, half stifling me. Still in severe pain I was smothered in gun cotton and stacked up amongst other bales. As they carried me out, I heard one say, "No one else must lift this bale, Its weight will give the show away." The van carrying the gun cotton travelled some distance, and then went through an archway over cobble stones, jolting horribly so that I feared an explosion any moment. The bales were then stacked in a warehouse. After a time I recovered my power of movement, and struggled to get out to warn people, since I heard muffled explosions and knew my mates were blowing up all the works they could. After a time someone came in through a skylight. I made a terrific effort and rolled the bale over. Whereupon the visitor came to investigate, the bale was opened, and I was safe.

PSEUDO-PERSONALITY VI<sup>1</sup>. BRETON PEASANT GIRL

I was lying in bed in a lonely cottage in the wilds of Brittany racked through and through with pain, calling for help, pleading for nurse to do something to ease the agony. My nurse, in pale blue uniform, white cap and apron, was queen of a tribe, who, while in human form in the daytime, could travel anywhere in the form of a cat in the night. After a time she felt she could bear watching my suffering no longer, so with pity in her heart she called up two clever doctors from her tribe, by mystic signs and words, though by so doing she voluntarily exiled herself from her tribe. They came as two black cats at her command; directly I opened my eyes however all I saw was the two cats disappearing over the foot of the bed, so I realised I must keep my eyes shut if they were to help me. I also knew that if I voluntarily touched one he would have to stay in the room as a man, and be unable to rejoin his tribe. Therefore I exerted tremendous control in order to stay motionless, hearing and feeling the soft patter of their feet while they prepared wax images of St Anthony with head to scale with my own. Then it seemed as if I could bear no more, for, to cure me they jabbed red hot needles through each nerve of the wax image in turn, intending by burning it out, to prevent it hurting again. The agony was fearful; nerve by nerve they proceeded, sometimes having to make several jabs before one was frizzled beyond further feeling, but as each one was destroyed it ceased to hurt, so in a scarcely audible voice I began to try to give directions, telling them if they had not quite paralysed any particular nerve; but the strain of lying still was very great and every stab felt as if the red hot needle had gone through my head instead of that of St Anthony. Yet I was prepared to suffer anything so long as it held out the prospect of relief in its train. The cat doctors of course realised

<sup>1</sup> The description of pseudo-personality V is omitted for personal reasons.

my suffering; but they always performed their operations in that way, since it left no external wounds, and whatever they did to the effigy the effects were as if performed on the patient.

When the operation was over and the pain had gone I dropped into a brief sleep while nurse and doctors worked hard to clear away the debris before morning. When I awoke [actual] I saw nurse looking very flushed and tear-stained also many odd bits of cotton wool on the hearthrug, but I knew I must not make any remark about anything unusual or the doctors would not be able to help me when the next attack came. This happened that night and I took nurse's hand, longing to say I was sorry she had exiled herself for me, but only said, "you will help me as you did last night, won't you nurse?" The same procedure was repeated and after the pain had subsided a horseman galloped up to the cottage to see nurse, who seemed strangely perturbed and tried to avoid him. Then I fell asleep for a few minutes and don't remember what happened as he had gone when I woke up.

[Legend of St Anthony interwoven with witchcraft tale of a tribe who could travel at will at night in the form of cats<sup>1</sup>.]

#### DELIRIUM TREMENS<sup>2</sup>, CONCURRENT WITH PSEUDO- PERSONALITIES. VII AND VIII

Delirium tremens. Snakes twining in and out of curtains and curtain poles—gibbering faces, animal and grotesque caricatures of human beings glaring at me from all sides—men standing in corners staring at me fixedly with glassy eyes so that I cannot escape their gaze and am overwhelmed with shame when nurse attends to me as if no men were there. Fantastic swaying dancers who change from fairy to snake and back again—horrors in corners, snakes with human heads, with eyes showing the utter blank of idiocy, some wearing a straw hat. I think I am mad and in a mad house—I see heads of people I know opening and shutting mechanically to show a red gory tuft inside instead of brains and I realise that in trying to get me out of this awful place they have lost their brains, and had to stay too. Caves full of slimy prehistoric monsters through which I had to pass, ichthyosauri, dinosauri, ugly many-headed reptiles—octopuses stretching out their ghastly tentacles to grip me—all ugliness possible, all loathsomeness—all moved, shook and seemed to double or treble itself—nothing was still—snakes swarmed all over,

<sup>1</sup> Inserted by Vera in original notes as an explanation of the partial episode.

<sup>2</sup> The delirium described here was considered to be 'delirium tremens,' and to be comparable to that of the drunkard, not only by Vera when she had recovered from the delirium entirely, but also at times by one of the delirious pseudo-personalities (Gerald) who attributed it to morphia and other drugs instead of alcohol. It was different from the rest of the delirium. One of the most striking features of it was the way in which nothing remained still, everything seeming to vibrate rapidly enough to appear to be doubled or even trebled. Vera assumed on this account that 'tremens' was the appropriate word by which to qualify this phase of her delirium.



even my own fingers turned into snakes and bending back twined themselves with cold slimy bodies round my arms. I knew then I was mad, for were not my own fingers snakes and only a definitely insane person could possibly have snakes for fingers. I cried out with this culmination of horror—the other things fearful as they were, were outside myself, but these snakes were a part of myself. I then lost consciousness of the room, sinking down again into those ghastly eaves of loathsome reptiles and antediluvian monsters, trying to run the gauntlet between them. Then back to my room to find streams of blood corpuscles chasing each other in orderly rows round the ceiling—masses of suppurating matter all over the ceiling and a regular medical cinematograph of my inside with all the bacteria at work—staphylococci, streptococci and the cholera bacillus mainly—leucocytes swallow them up, yet still they swarm, up and down, sometimes agglutinating, then multiplying again with increased prodigality. It was indeed chaos supreme—the horror of it proved too much for me and I became like a little child of two, wandering through lovely gardens, passing oak groves of tremendous height, with streams here and there and gentle breezes to temper the sun's heat. I came to a garden where every perfect flower grew. I played with them, patting them gently—picking some and noting the glorious colours. I wish, and the flowers re-arrange themselves and grow at my will. All I seem able to do is to play like a baby, yet I am fully grown and some part of me wonders what Mummy and Daddy will say if that is all the brain power I can bring back to them, knowing I have lost the rest with the memory of the untellable horrors I had gone through before reaching these gardens.

Next I am in my room, and in the mirror I see a man with two women beside him. He seems to be a Viking, with long flowing beard. He changes to a lamb, and the women to ducks, all glowing, iridescent. I try to describe all the rapid kaleidoscopic changes to nurse, but they changed so rapidly I could not manage clearly. I would not let her cover the mirror up as they were so pretty. Next one woman twines her arms round the man's neck and he turns his back on the other and as he does so this other woman changes to an ethereal beauty, while the man and the other woman are a weird unknown animal with the woman's body arranged like that of a horse, with the man's head instead of her own. This then becomes a lamb. The other woman then claims him while the first one who had previously been incorporated with him into one creature, wept and implored in vain. I am one of these women, but try as I may I cannot determine which I am.

[A medical cinematograph had been seen eighteen months earlier. Effects of Jules Verne's *Journey to the Interior of the Earth* also apparent<sup>1</sup>.]

<sup>1</sup> Inserted in original notes as partial explanation of origin of the hallucinations in 'delirium tremens.'

## PSEUDO-PERSONALITY VII. GERALD

*Scene—Hotel at Port Said and Steamboat*

I was a curly haired boy of sixteen called Gerald returning from India with my father—a retired Colonel, and a nurse, as I was ill. The boat stayed two days at Port Said, so I was carried ashore for a change. During the night I was aroused by a sharp prick on my forearm similar to that caused by a hypodermic injection and found nurse in a trance. A voice proceeded from the chandelier in the centre of the room saying I had had a dose of cholera bacilli injected, that for one minute afterwards I could speak about it, but if I exceeded the minute I should receive a fresh injection to increase the virulence of the disease at 11 a.m. the next day, and after that other diseases would follow. The speaker was a Hindu using the chandelier as a telephone.

For a moment I was panic stricken and became delirious, seeing streams of my blood corpuscles chasing round and round the ceiling, staphylococci, streptococci and the cholera bacillus at work, on the walls; leucocytes were engulfing them, yet still they multiplied with extraordinary rapidity. Millions of cholera bacilli ran down the drains to spread the infection, the ceiling was thick and sticky with infectious suppurating matter. At last I aroused nurse from her trance, and at that moment my father came in. Hastily I told them I had cholera, imploring them to warn people in the hotel to avoid all chance of spreading the disease<sup>1</sup>. The old colonel, my father, refused to take any notice, saying we would sail as arranged next day. My minute was up, yet still I implored, but father remained firm, assuring me that I had not got cholera. Then I begged them to look after themselves which, to pacify me, they promised to do. I explained that I had been inoculated with the cholera bacillus, whereupon they declared no one had been in to do it. I said in that case, it must have been done hypnotically, but I could not say I had incurred a stronger dose by speaking beyond my time limit. Finally, exhausted by my unavailing efforts to make them take precautions against the spread of the disease, I stopped talking.

At 11 a.m. I was again aroused by a prick, to see nurse once more entranced. Hastily I called "nursie, nursie," and told her I had had a fresh injection. I heard voices outside in the street saying that two rats had been found dead of cholera and that after 6 p.m. that night no one would be allowed to leave the town. My father came in and I called out "For God's sake go and warn the people the cholera is here." At the end of my minute I felt so ill that I dared not risk another injection by exceeding it, so signed for paper and wrote in a weak, almost illegible scrawl, though I could only express part of what I wanted to through physical weakness.

<sup>1</sup> Vera really warned everyone she saw and implored them to warn others.

*Copy of what was thus actually written<sup>1</sup>*

Remember I won't die

To speak means waste of a minute  
in battling the cholera germ.

Inquire all boats leaving after 6 p.m. to-night

Are in quarantine for a time

Can you hear them call in the street

I guarantee cholera bacillus 40 cases.

Excitement increases temperature.

I guarantee I'll keep mine down if its possible and

Warn in God's God's warn

I dare on speak further and ask to see  
particulars downstairs.

I'll pull through here if you take the others.

I can but not so bad for the others

I can't speak for a time  
—time

I love you

When I found my father still determined to go, delirium again supervened. I saw pictures of the ship we were on ploughing its way across the sea, calling at fresh ports; and at each port numerous rats carrying thousands of cholera and plague germs swam ashore and whole towns were nearly wiped out by disease while the old Hindu laughed and chuckled at his diabolical revenge upon the white man.

The next thing I became conscious of was that I was once more on board and that all the symptoms of cholera were fully developed. Again a prick and with a mocking laugh a voice said "plague this time."

I remembered I had made a promise to someone that whatever happened I would not die, though I did not remember to whom I had made it, and for a moment I wondered how I could keep it with so many different germs at work, but only for a moment. Then I knew that my will power would enable me to keep my word, though the price of life was terrific suffering. But I was afraid for the others who would not so will themselves to live.

Soon my arms and legs were covered with suppurating sores, my hands and wrists grew rainbow hued, purples, blues and greens predominating. My face of course I could not see. Everything inside me seemed upside down—my head was absolutely on fire. All this time the medical cinematograph was still running, but as my confidence in my power returned the bacteria began to clump and I knew I should beat them.

To my horror my father came in absolutely livid with a great sore on his temple, so I knew he had got the plague too. Again I exceeded

<sup>1</sup> Original paper kept by Vera's father and handed to her later.

my limit, imploring my father to send for proper remedies for himself and for nurse, assuring him they could not kill me, but would kill nurse and him. Finally to pacify me he said he had a remedy and would take three drops<sup>1</sup>, and would give nurse some too, since I saw signs of plague commencing in her.

So I struggled on. The old Hindu continued re-inoculating me with many germs because I always exceeded my time limit by trying to convince and save others. Each time I saw a fresh batch of germs at work, only to 'clump' once more as I willed to live; but I felt very weak and ill and exhausted with the effort and wished heartily I'd never made the promise that was taking so much keeping.

That night I thought nurse's pulse was very slow, so begging her to hold my hand and sit in a little chair beside me, I (though so weak I could scarcely move, and in agony) tried to increase her pulse rate by forcing the blood along about one beat in ten faster through exerting all the pressure on her wrist I could<sup>2</sup>. I hoped thus to keep it going so that she should not die.

Soon my own pain [neuralgia] grew too intense, and I was fighting agonisingly for self-control, so nurse brought a dose of a sleeping draught that I had been taking; but at last I realised that the delirium tremens was caused by morphia I had had before and by this draught [chloral and bromide]. So, rather than make my brain worse, I refused the draught that I knew from experience would give me relief from pain in sleep, saying I would fight it through unaided and would not be beaten. Nurse said, "You can't, you can't go on suffering like that and live, it will kill you to go on as you are. Do take it and get relief or you'll die"; but I stood firm and fought the harder, and slowly the night wore on.

As my brain, drunk with drugs, cleared, so the pictures on the walls ceased their rapid motion. The snakes and grinning faces stopped squirming and grinning. The stream of corpuscles slowed down and stopped. The clumps of bacteria remained clumped instead of splitting up again. I no longer went down through a mixed-up scene of horrors in the nether regions where antediluvian monsters roamed around. Horrid prehistoric reptiles ceased their attempts upon my life. So my refusal of the draught was justified and I asked that it might be taken out of the room altogether, so that I should not have the terrific struggle of refusing it when pressed upon me<sup>3</sup>.

Then father came in and tried to convince me that the cholera and plague were entirely subjective too and on the same plane as the delirium tremens, and at last got the fact home [actual]. I, seeing and feeling my arms and legs still suppurating said, "Well, if my brain has created

<sup>1</sup> Vera's father actually took three drops of something.

<sup>2</sup> Later nurse told Vera that she had patted her wrist gently for some time. The utmost strength Vera had been able to exert had not amounted to much, though measured subjectively by effort it seemed great to her.

<sup>3</sup> Vera asked this because she could not trust her nurse not to press it upon her when the pain was at its worst, as she had done the previous night.

all these symptoms and pains it can destroy them again. Give me three days and I'll have clear skin again." I concentrated my mind on the disappearance of all signs of the imaginary disease, and the next time I felt the prick of a fresh inoculation and saw nurse entranced, I simply ignored it and realised nurse was asleep. The second time inoculation was due it was not given, my skin cleared (it had been clear all the time of course) and soon I announced myself cured of all the delusions<sup>1</sup> I had had, being left only with the fearful neuralgia from which I had been suffering so long.

*'Atila' episode*

Suddenly a dazzling light shone out from the centre of the chandelier and a voice spoke saying it had come at my bidding. Then I remembered I had seen an advertisement saying that a 'spirit' would be sent which would materialise at a certain time and date, or, in default of this £350 would be paid to the applicant. I had written arranging time and date, and then forgotten about it until so reminded. I (Gerald) asked who was there. "Atila," was the reply: and the figure of a lovely woman in a black lace evening frock, tiny at first, but expanding until it reached full size on touching the ground, floated down from the light. A soft voice said, "I have come to help you in any way possible." I said, "Ease this awful pain. Help me to get well."

Atila then approached the armchair in which nurse sat and I realised nurse was in a trance. She then deliberately sat on nurse's knee, whereupon nurse's clothes just emptied themselves of nurse, remaining limp and flat just where they were. Atila reclined gently on top of the empty clothes, sank into them, filled them out appearing clad in nurse's garb, rose and came to me. I felt her bare arm finding it firm round flesh; she put her arms around me to soothe me, promising to help all she could [this was nurse, of course]. She returned and sat pensively looking into the fire. A moment later I heard a voice saying, "Evil is present in the room, beware!" I knew the voice was subjective and put it down to telepathy from some other friendly spirit. Atila heard nothing. So, thinking she was a good spirit who had come to help me, I said, "Atila, beware, it is time you went before harm comes to you." She poked the fire, smiled a farewell, sank back in the chair, rose to a sitting position, clad in her own black dress once more, leaving nurse's empty clothes behind, rose to her feet and nurse filled out her clothes

<sup>1</sup> "This did not remove the delusion that I was Gerald and on board ship, since I had taken it for granted that I was a boy (in spite of the fact that I was menstruating at the time, a fact which did not enter consciousness). Throughout this I implored them to fetch Dr D, as *he* would believe I had cholera, plague, etc., and would cure these diseases. I wrote several notes to him begging him to come, but when he did I rarely saw him, for frequently at the time of his visit, one of the other personalities which did not know him had temporarily appeared on the scene. Whenever he came when I was Gerald I knew him and had long discussions with him." [This was written by Vera in brackets in her original account.]

again. So for a moment I saw nurse in a trance, with Atila, erect but ethereal, beside her, before Atila floated up and was not.

Only after Atila's disappearance did it strike me that the warning might have been addressed to me on my own behalf, that Atila might be an evil spirit whose help I had accepted. However, I felt too weak and ill to be able to decide whether she were good or evil, though I wanted her help, but not if she were evil. Next day I sent for the Vicar, telling him the whole episode, asking if I should accept her help or not. He, with solemn face advised me to have nothing to do with her<sup>1</sup>. I promised I would not, saying I would see she never came again, adding proudly, "I *can* prevent her materialising again."

Next night I was alert just before the time I expected her, and made the sign of the Cross round myself, nurse and the room. The light flashed *outside* the window, a medley of spirits raved and gibbered at me from outside, but none could get in because of the power symbolised by the sign of the cross. So I knew they were evil. For a night or two they still attempted to break through, heralding their approach, hours before, by thin red and gold spider webs spun from window poles to chandelier. Webs that no one but I could see or feel, yet if anyone walked through they seemed covered with the broken threads. The webs were immediately remade after anyone had thus broken through them, but the top two sections were unfinished in every case. I had many arguments with my father who, materialistic old colonel as he was, denied the reality of the webs, the spirits and Atila, which were so obvious to me. However the spirits soon realised their impotence against my faith and gave up the attempt. At first I had made the sign of the cross with wide sweeping movements of both arms, so that nurse should not realise what I was doing. Later I became bolder, even asking anyone present to go round the room and make the mystic sign for me, to keep the spirits out. Atila never appeared again.

[Probably due to a mixed idea of Maskelyne and Devant's challenge to reproduce 'faked' spirit phenomena, and the materialistic spiritualism with which I do not agree<sup>2</sup>.]

#### PSEUDO-PERSONALITY VIII. GIRL

##### *Scene—South America*

I was fighting a terrific battle against tremendous odds. My foes the spirits of fire in every shape and form, my only defence my faith and will power. The attack commenced by a long tongue of flame shooting out from a picture of two bonny little children standing in front of the fire after a bath<sup>3</sup>. This shot through my head and set it on fire inside. I insisted at once on nurse burning the picture so that the spirit could not shoot again. As it burnt I saw an evil face gleam malevolently out from the burning embers.

<sup>1</sup> The Vicar really so advised Vera.

<sup>2</sup> Original interpretation included in Vera's notes.

<sup>3</sup> This picture was really seen as described, and the nurse burnt it to pacify Vera.

After this a crowd of Patagonian Indians hovered round the window shooting one fire-tipped arrow after another at my head—most of which reached their mark. Again and again, I put up my hand to feel if my hair were on fire, yet the fire those Indians used burned without consuming, like the burning bush of Moses. Hour after hour the gibbering faces bent over their task—getting more and more furious when they found they could not ignite my hair. Yet every dart felt as if they had succeeded, shooting red hot through my brain. With wily strategy I shook my fist at them, trying to laugh at their apparently impotent efforts in the hope that they would cease in disgust and stop torturing me. Though my laugh was often twisted in agony yet in the end it prevailed. The Indians retired saying "To-day we can't make fire to live and burn you. We go to learn a better way. Then we shall come back again and kill you."

Once again the fierce burning pain shot through me and I opened my eyes to see whence the new attack came. This time from every knob on the bed, from the bed rail, flashed out the fire flame, out and through me. From the fire itself leaped out great tongues of flame. Even these failed to set me on fire, though as before I felt as if my head were enveloped in flame that burnt without consuming.

Next, electricity was harnessed against me; in the globes of the chandelier I saw the presiding demons of fire shooting off, with all too true an aim, miniature thunder bolts through my head and eyes in all directions. Usually there were two demons in each globe, the elder dressed in a grey small check suit with white cuffs and having a diabolical smile, the younger one dressed in black engineering overalls. There was a complicated system of levers in the globe which they manipulated in order to shoot me. This went on, shot after shot, until I lost consciousness. While unconscious I saw a vision of myself undergoing a new torture devised by the spirits of fire. The reflection of the chandelier showed in a mirror and I saw my head inserted between the globe and the metal connection so that the full force of the electric current passed from ear to ear. I only saw my face and head so reflected, white to the lips, my mouth open as if crying out, but otherwise undistorted as if the pain was so intense that immobility had resulted again. My hair was brushed smoothly back from my forehead, its darkness accentuating the deathly pallor of my face. This vision came directly after I had felt a fearful pain from ear to ear and had called out that both ear drums had burst<sup>1</sup>. This occurred again, again followed by the vision, so the pain and the vision which explained it alternated until I thought I would go mad or die. But I still remembered my promise not to die, so still defied the fire spirits to do their worst, prepared to endure all rather than give in.

All this happened several times; but somehow during the deeper unconsciousness which ensued, my soul, almost severed from my body, learned the tremendous power of faith. Little by little it forced this

<sup>1</sup> Vera actually called this out.

conviction up to consciousness. So by degrees I held the spirits at bay by the sign of the cross. The spirits seemed innumerable and each had to be disposed of separately, so it took a long time. After every pang I looked to see where the spirit who had caused it was, pointed a small silver cross which I held in my hand at it, willing with all my might, secure in the power behind the cross, that that spirit should be destroyed. With a pop each spirit collapsed in turn, leaving a headless facsimile of whatever form it had assumed when overtaken by destruction, while its head was seen in the fire, ugly, malevolent, raging at its impotence against my faith. Soon the room was strewn with these facsimiles, yet still many fire spirits were left, but the hordes outside were powerless to enter in face of the cross. They pleaded and implored me to let out those left inside instead of destroying them, but I did not trust them. So the remaining spirits hid in all sorts of out of the way places, in flowers, behind cushions, everywhere, still shooting off their red-hot darts when I was not looking. One by one I found them and soon the fire was full of these faces, robbed of their power. The flowers in which they had hidden died at the same moment. Finally the king of the fire spirits exposed himself to shoot me. Fixing him with the cross, I willed his death, his black evening suit fell limply over the chair back, a great explosion resulted, coals of fire fell out of the grate, even burning the carpet<sup>1</sup> as his head entered the fire. With his death all the other fire spirits, both inside and outside, lost all their power and fled. So I was left in peace for a while.

[Reversion to primitive animism in which the untutored savage interprets a spirit in trees, water, fire, etc., so I interpreted the burning pain, actually very intense, as due to spirits of fire and flame<sup>2</sup>.]

#### PSEUDO-PERSONALITY IX. ELDERLY AMERICAN MAN

*Scene—Boat, then New York fifty years ago*

There is a large steamer crowded with people. Most are indistinct. Amongst them a tall man with brown check suit limps slightly, but declares nothing is wrong with him. Although this man is up and I am in bed, yet I seem to be him. Both my feet seem to be cut off and I feel matter and blood draining away. So I know this man has really no feet or legs below the knee, but just an immaterial appearance of them so that no one realises he has lost them. From loss of blood, however, he gets weaker and weaker until he takes to a bath chair. At this stage I am the man, not just seeing him and feeling identified with him, but completely the man himself. New York is reached, I am wheeled down a broad street, vainly trying to remember it. I seem to be in New York as it was fifty years previously, and fashions are different. Many small dirty shops are where I expected large emporiums. I feel sadly bewildered, wondering if my brain is weakening through loss of

<sup>1</sup> A piece of coal really shot out and burnt the carpet.

<sup>2</sup> Vera's original explanation of this episode.



blood. I send out an S.O.S. signal to a friend (K.) telepathically. He hears and understands that it is blood I need. Next I see a picture of an eye bleeding copiously and at the same time the flow from my own legs ceases, and strength begins to return. I am horrified, for I realise that to save me my friend is losing an eye. I send round frantically to one of the tiny shops I had seen, to get a prescription made up that would save him from the consequences of his quixotic sacrifice. But the only man who knew the prescription can't be found. He is seen coming in at the door, but disappears before he can be spoken to, simply vanishing into thin air. All seems hopeless. My friend will soon be blind, his other eye has started to bleed too. I race. I try to find the man who alone could cure him. Having recovered the use of my legs, I rush round wildly. Even the shop has gone. All is changed. The chemist dashes up in a motor car to the hotel in which I am, but instead of speaking to him I find myself talking to a lady in motoring attire. A lot of sailors appear. I go back to the boat utterly bewildered, fearing the worst for my friend. Again and again I seem on the point of catching the elusive chemist, again and again he is not, just when I feel certain of success. I am puzzled since neither people, place nor time are consistent. People disappear when I want them. I feel I am living fifty years previously. The shops change even as I watch. I cannot make out what is wrong.

## PSEUDO-PERSONALITY X. GIRL

*Scene—America*

I am in bed in rooms, with a crusty landlady and my nurse. I want K. . . and telepathically send him messages asking him to come out to me in America. He sets out, bringing a very clever doctor with him, who will cure me. I see a cinematograph of his journey. The boat leaves Southampton Water, passes round the green shores of the Isle of Wight, out into the ocean, but it does not follow the normal route. Somewhere they land. K. seems both to be and not to be himself. I know it is K. I am watching, he looks very like him, yet not absolutely like him. The two, K. and the doctor, have got separated, and one of them rides madly on a camel over the desert to Beirut to catch the train, if possible, since there is only one a month. There is a race between camel and train. I get very excited watching. Will he do it? Yes, just. The train comes nearer, larger and larger, with a big Canadian Pacific engine, and pulls up and waits. The camel rider dashes up. Someone greets him from a tent, but it is all vague again after the vivid presentation of train and camel race; but the train is caught. Again a rush, this time to catch a steamer at Valparaiso. A girl in green costume has something to do with it. She waits for train to arrive, meets K. and I am vaguely disturbed by her. I see no more of their journey, but keep telling nurse that K. will soon be here, and that I've stupidly given him directions to come down the chimney of the seventh house in the row, and am afraid he'll get black. So I keep sending nurse to look out for him. Then

I see him dropping from roof to window, performing impossible gymnastic feats, but still have the same feeling that it is and is not K. At the same time I think he has landed on a verandah above my room, but nurse declares he has not.

Every time I am left alone for a moment I hear voices. Rough wild men seem to try to rush in and I am afraid of being left alone on this account. I feel they do get in, but keep my eyes shut in the hope that they will go away when ignored. Nurse comes back declaring no one has been and that she has heard nothing, but I know better and think she is only kidding me to enable her to slip out again. She knocks on the wall, making very secret sigus to confederates, and leaves me again, but I could not decide who it was she was so anxious to meet. Every time nurse left me these threatening voices were repeated, so to avoid being left I tried to keep nurse too busy with little things to give her a chance, but directly my attention wandered for a moment, she was off again. Finally I overcame the voices by lying still and thinking the sign of the cross, and the voices were stilled.

I think the landlady is going to turn nurse and me out into the street penniless since we can no longer pay her. Naturally I am worried since I'm too weak and ill to get up. If only K. would come; why did I tell him to come down the chimney?

Nurse is busy washing me when a figure in a dressing gown enters<sup>1</sup>. "Why, there's Mummy," I call out, greeting her with a loving smile as if she had been away a long time. Then, rather wildly, "But if that's Mummy who am I? For God's sake tell me who I am, or *am* I mad?"; more slowly, "Why I'm..." A moment later, "Tell me who I am, I know I remembered it a minute ago, don't let me forget it again." Again and again I had my name repeated until I really had got it fixed. Then "Where am I? I can't be in America after all. Why I'm in B... and this must be home. Where have I been." Then memory filtered back and I knew all I had been, and had done. And I was wildly excited.

## (2) STABILISATION OF REINTEGRATED PERSONALITY

### *Explanatory Note*

The following notes describe some of the stages between the recovery of memory, after the dissociations of delirium, and the recovery of comparative health and mental balance. They were made by Vera prior to taking up psychological research into the fundamental phenomena underlying the dissociation, but later than the records of delirium. The extracts included below show how a disorganised mind readjusted itself, groping its way through experiences unknown to it before, finding its own way under the impulsion of great necessity, and, helped by the stability and organisation of one sentiment which was able in time to

<sup>1</sup> Vera's mother.

dominate and reintegrate much of the rest of the mind in accordance with it, building up a more stable personality.

The period of delirium occurred at Christmas 1919. A relapse followed and Vera was in bed until the end of May. The rate of recovery from the crisis in May (described later) to the experience on June 17th, 1920, when Vera felt to a great extent her old self again, was extraordinarily rapid, physically and mentally. From that time progress has been steady.

### Vera's Post-Delirium Notes

The feeling of horror attached to everything was very great, as all the memories of the past experiences kept pouring back into my mind; especially as I at once realised that I, and I alone, was responsible for their origin, and that all the different personalities were simply split off parts of myself.

In order to lose the horror I realised I must talk about my experiences and pull them to pieces as far as possible. At first everyone tried to stop me talking, urging me to forget. For the time being practically nothing else could claim my attention. All my thoughts were filled by attempts to find the origin of the various delusions and hallucinations. Within a week I had tracked down enough of them to lose a great deal of my horror; for I realised how simple, apparently unrelated, things had been associated together and that many of the experiences were due to an attempt, distorted by the disordered function of my brain, to interpret the cause of the pain. I determined to make records of these experiences as soon as possible, before any other ideas had come to the fore to distort my memory, partly as a safety valve, because as I wrote the horror lessened, partly because I thought they would make good material for a book. Knowing nothing previously of delirium, I seemed to have made tremendous discoveries with regard to the working of the mind, so took care to write up accurately all I could remember. Much, I knew, was forgotten, but much remained and for some time odd things brought up fresh associations.

At times, when physical pain was worst, I found that dissociation still occurred, but in these post-delirium associations I myself was fully conscious of all the dissociated system was thinking, though it knew nothing of anyone but itself. For example, one night I became conscious that what seemed to be a complete personality was struggling with a dark man who was enveloping her in a thick black cloak which was suffocating her. She thought "What a fool I am, I must have left my bedroom door unlocked," and went on struggling futilely and was terrified. I myself realised that I had locked the door and that therefore this man could not be there. From this I knew part of my mind was playing tricks again. But this part of my mind did not know what I was thinking, though I knew its thoughts and feelings and actually felt them and yet I was not identified with this part. So a dual struggle

ensued; one part struggled to escape from the toils of the black cloth and the man, the other strove to break through and convince the first part that cloth and man were illusions<sup>1</sup>. Finally I succeeded, whereupon the dissociation ceased. During the weeks that followed another splitting up of the mind took place with regard to suicide. A part of myself for which I disclaimed responsibility wanted to escape through suicide, being blind to all else but its hopes that death meant cessation of suffering and struggle. At times I feared I should be powerless to keep it in check, and that in spite of myself I should commit suicide, though I knew that by taking life and death into my own hands I should defeat my own ends, since during the period of delirium I had definitely elected life, knowing the suffering involved. Yet just because the suicidal system was driven back because opposed to my conscious aims, at times it burst through to the surface with such force that it filled the whole of consciousness and I feared would materialise itself in action—action for which I most certainly would not be responsible. During the height of what I called the ‘attack’ of suicidal impulse I could not get any opposing thoughts into consciousness except a blind determination to hang on and not surrender my will, not to cause by my own act the death that both I myself and the suicidal system desired. I was oblivious of all save that I would not be beaten by the rest of me, would not allow part of me to act in a way of which all of me did not approve. It was almost as if it were a fight between body and soul. I myself *was*, apart from all the thoughts and feelings, and I prevented their actualisation,—or so it seemed to me after each such conflict,—but I was woefully afraid of failure. This part with which I identified myself as opposed to the suicidal system, was tremendously reinforced by an appeal made to it when it was in possession of the field of consciousness. I was describing to the Rev. F. Paton Williams the intensity of the suicidal impulse which at times rendered me completely unconscious of my surroundings and of my reasons why it should not do as it wanted. He said there seemed to be a wave of suicidal and murderous tendencies rife in the world at the time and everyone who gave in to it strengthened its power for others, and that God was trusting to me to hold the line to drive back and weaken this tendency, adding earnestly, “For God’s sake don’t let Him down.” This appeal to something on a wider scale than my own little conflict, supplied a motive for trying not to kill myself when there seemed nothing personal left to live for, which strengthened my resisting power tremendously. Such dissociation became less frequent as time went on, though it still occurred at intervals for several months. I determined that since I must fight to live, I must somehow or other make myself want to live, must find something to make life worth while; but though realising the necessity of this, it was some time before I succeeded.

During this time a dream of great vividness put me on the track of using my dreams as a gauge of my unconscious thoughts and tendencies.

<sup>1</sup> This should be ‘hallucinations,’ not ‘illusions,’ but at the stage when this was written Vera had no technical knowledge.

This dream showed clearly that dreams carried on the activity of the unconscious and that therefore they indicated its state and impulses at the moment. I did not know anything from outside sources with regard to the nature and function of dreams. I had, however, learned from the study and pulling to pieces of my deliria that experiences and thoughts, of which one was unconscious at the time, could erupt into consciousness and drive out normal consciousness into temporary oblivion; moreover that only a very small portion of mental activity was normally available for consciousness at any time. I had also experienced many different layers of unconscious activity, or so they seemed to be, each functioning in a different way, each involving different allegorical symbols; I felt as if I had relived my whole life in allegorical form, in spite of the fact that I was not capable of interpreting it fully. Much seemed quite clear, since I had often in earlier days represented various mental states and tendencies allegorically; therefore I assumed the rest must be interpreted on similar lines. It was the realisation of this that enabled me to throw off the natural inevitable horror at the apparent objectivity of the various hallucinations, and to welcome them as the phantasies of my own mind, instead of being horrified at their origin. I also realised the heightening of my imagination, always vivid, as a result of morphia, and I felt confident that there would be no relapse into delirium again. I said it would be very difficult for me ever again to mistake phantoms from my own imagination for external reality, now I had realised a little more of their nature. I also realised that the most trivial details which had ever reached consciousness directly, had a great effect on the form in which the unconscious erupted and became conscious.

The dream which first put me on the track of utilising my dreams was as follows:

"I had taken poison and killed myself. Then I stood beside my dead body and wondered how to remove the traces of poison so that no one should suspect it was due to suicide. I straightened out the distorted limbs and removed the bed jacket from my corpse, then gave it a dose of castor oil. I thus removed all traces of poison. I left everything undisturbed and went to tell my doctor what I had done, so that he would not be surprised. I asked him to keep any suspicion of suicide from my people, declaring he would find no trace of poison left. He was not at all surprised to see and hear me after I was dead, and agreed to my desire to be thought to have died naturally."

I told the doctor of this dream next day. This dream showed clearly the wish to kill myself and not to let anyone know it was suicide, together with the lack of compunction which was typical of the system which from time to time forced its way into consciousness almost to the exclusion of everything else, so that the 'I' which was determined to hang on, feared defeat at its hands.

Thus it seemed to me that if a dream could represent so clearly the activity of an unconscious system, of whose existence and nature I was

aware through its occasional eruption into consciousness, dreams could, and would, indicate the nature of other unconscious activities of which, perhaps owing to their lesser strength, I was not aware. Months later I told the doctor my mental state was much better as the type of my dreams had changed and was changing.

Often I realised the significance of certain dreams only after the type had changed. The previous presence of certain abnormalities was clearly recognised by me in many cases only by the fact of their absence. Therefore each change represented progress or retrogression. *If I found I had gone back to an earlier type of dream, I realised something had gone wrong* and that I must find out why I had relapsed instead of continuing to progress.

After a further relapse on leaving home<sup>1</sup>, the physical pain got worse, though I had thought that impossible. It raged for hours with fearful intensity, and even between the completely immobile attacks, the left side of my head and face felt rigid and paralysed, and I could only speak slowly. I realised a crisis of some sort was approaching, hoping no effort to live through it would be powerful enough to succeed, yet I could not relax my efforts and slip through. I had to will to live against my desire, to keep that oft-regretted promise.

Finally the pain increased to its limit, the pressure on the vital centres at the base of the brain was felt at the time to be so great that I thought if something did not happen quickly, if it increased as it was doing, I should slip through and die. Suddenly the tremendous pressure relaxed, seemed to rush away and disperse, leaving my head full of a 'white emptiness,' and in less than three minutes I was asleep, the first time for over thirty hours. The crisis was over. During the above crisis I was in a state of immobility in which I had spent the greater part of the previous week, and since nothing could be done for me then, I was alone, and powerless to ring for anyone as I felt it approaching. An hour later I awoke, knowing the die was cast and my face set towards life, not death, and that therefore there was some work in life for me to do. From that time, though the facial neuralgia continued, the pain at the back of my head which had maddened me so, never returned. So I was able to devote my energies to recovering emotional equilibrium.

The effects of my second great effort to sink all personal desire and leave the issue absolutely in the hands of God were very great. From this time progress was very rapid, the doctor being "absolutely flabbergasted," to use his own words, at the rate at which I improved during the next fortnight. I was allowed to leave the nursing home since I begged so hard to do so, though he fully expected I should have to return in a few days. I wanted to get out of the atmosphere of invalids and nurses, to my friends, and my desire was justified by its results.

I went steadily ahead mentally and physically, still very excitable and talkative, but gradually acquiring more control, and trying to widen

<sup>1</sup> Vera had been taken to a nursing home at this stage in order to be in the neighbourhood of K., the friend who occurred in the manifest content of part of the delirium.

the range of conversation. I could not get fresh interests by reading, since everything was too blurred for me to see to read. I looked at everything as if it were a badly blurred cinematograph film. However my sight improved as I did. The fact that I realised a little of my mental state then, showed I was on the way to recovery. I decided that beyond trying to check my foolish laughter and to take an interest in other people's affairs too, the quickest way to recover mental equilibrium was to set out to regain physical strength, which would enable me to go out and get change of scene, after being confined for the greater part of eight months in bed in a darkened room. Also I allowed myself to cry my eyes out at night instead of sternly suppressing my tears as before, though I did not reach the stage of breaking down when anyone was there. Each day I set myself a definite amount of something to be achieved and, whatever the cost in physical pain and exhaustion, I did it, each day doing a little more. Four days after leaving the nursing home, I refused a bath-chair and very, very shakily rode a bicycle, a few yards further each day. At that stage I could just stagger across the road and back on foot; while on a bicycle, though I wobbled a good deal through going so slowly, I could go further.

Since then progress has been steady, much to the surprise of doctors and nurses, who feared chronic invalidism or even insanity, a likely fate for one in such a state of nervous exhaustion. Progress has been won, not by waiting till I felt I could do various things, but by doing them under great difficulties until they became easier. On June 5th, a fortnight after leaving the home, three weeks after the crisis, I cycled alone down to the home two miles away. On June 9th, the last attack of pain culminating in immobility occurred, though the pain was still very severe. About ten days later, to the doctor's amazement, I started to swim in open air baths, in spite of the neuralgia. Thus I rapidly extended my activities, all of which helped me to throw off the engrossment in my own thoughts.

Finally, in the heart of the New Forest, I found peace again, on June 17th, 1920, after cycling seven miles to reach the place.

[Abbreviated transcript of notes written the day after this event, phrasing unchanged.]

I entered once more into my heritage of the open air, the trees, the wind and all the life about me, became a living part of it again, not only felt the beauty and glory of nature, but became incorporate in Her and God, just feeling, and so the joy of life came back to me, brought by the angel of Peace. I realised that all my cry and longing for death were not for death really, but for the change I had only been able to conceive of as coming through death, a change which would bring me back to my old-time feeling of being in touch with God, that could bring peace and joy in spite of pain. . . . Thus the suicidal impulse was laid to rest for ever, transformed since there was no longer the desire for death. So with the cessation of conflict, I received a fresh lease of life. I was stimulated to continue my efforts to recover, not to sit down

content with having achieved so much more than anyone had thought possible: realising that having gone so far already, there were no limits to future progress. The force was there in myself, either to run riot again in conflict and neurotic symptoms as it had done in the past, or to be employed in some useful activity that possessed sufficient interest to keep me happily employed. I realised if I had put half the energy into curing that I had put into enduring the apparent physical suffering which had dogged my footsteps for years, I could have saved myself a great deal. I did not intend to repeat my mistake."

The first channel into which I directed all my energies was to revel in open air life in order to bring physical strength up to a standard compatible with mental work. Also, since excessive mental activity had been the cause of insomnia for many years, I tried to exert a check on this by trying to make my mind a blank for a time, every night. I relaxed completely, trying to prevent any thoughts whatever from entering consciousness. At first ideas kept intruding, but I persisted in my endeavour, yet thought followed thought in spite of my desire. Soon I found I could cut them off half way through, instead of letting them finish expressing their meaning, when I had been unable to stop the thought showing itself altogether. Gradually by practice mental control became more complete, until I could keep my mind absolutely blank with no realisation of time, or thought, knowing nothing. This carried on regularly, day by day, has helped mental control a great deal. In adopting this procedure I had two aims in view. One, and that the more obvious, was to diminish the excessive mental activity which kept me awake, and to bring it under control. The other was the realisation that on the two occasions on which I had shelved my personal desires, merging them in a Higher Will and so eliminating conflict, a great renewal of strength had occurred. Conscious effort so often seemed to defeat its own ends that it seemed logical to relax conscious effort regularly, for a short time, to give the forces within a chance of achieving something instead of neutralising each other. It was an attempt at the control of mind employed by the contemplative in all religions, an emptying of the conscious self temporarily, to let the Higher forces within or without, work unimpeded.

### CHAPTER III

#### ANALYTICAL ACCOUNT OF THE APPROACH OF DEATH

During the lifetime of Gerald it became very doubtful whether Vera would survive. Life at one time was thought to be extinct; then, however, it slowly reanimated the organism. Later, without knowing this, Vera described how she had almost died, and how, when at the point of death, she had become herself, remembering not only her past life, as Vera, but also her delirious personalities. The notes on this experience were



the first that Vera recorded. Instead of inserting them in full, however, a short summary will be given here which will outline the facts of her experience without the somewhat rhetorical style in which they were originally expressed.

*Synopsis of Vera's original notes on the 'Approach of Death'*

Vera, as she put it, seemed to sink through many planes of consciousness or unconsciousness, as one sinks under an anaesthetic. Each such plane brought its own pain and hallucinations. While unconscious of the external environment, Vera regained her memory and knew who she was. After a time she lost all consciousness of sensations so that she felt as if she had left her body completely behind. She thought she travelled a long way over trackless desert land until she reached a dreadful blackness in which nothing seemed to exist except herself. Even God seemed to have deserted her. She felt absolutely isolated and was terrified by the loneliness. She struggled on blindly, then found herself surrounded by evil influences which tried to lure her from a track she could neither see nor feel, yet which she knew was there. Their evil presence brought the belief that though still cut off from his presence yet God *was*, and when she thought of the dreadful isolation when nothing existed for her but herself, she felt that nothing else mattered and defied the forces of evil. She still struggled on, till she felt the limits of endurance had been reached. Then the borders of life and death seemed to approach and the sense of God's presence came back to her. Pain and drugs seemed to have no effect; time ceased to exist for her, and eternity was felt. Vera became fully conscious of all that had just happened in her delirium. She remembered all the pain of body and mind, and longed for respite in death. She feared that life would mean confirmed invalidism or insanity or both. She also realised a great and implicit belief in God's power and in her own through Him. Further she remembered her promise, often regretted, not to die, but to live.

In what seemed to be this space on the borderland between life and death, both paths were seen and known. Death seemed to be only the entrance to a better life, but not to the life on earth that she had promised. For what she described as a long 'timeless time,' Vera stayed on the 'fringe of a glorious nothingness,' and slowly began to sink through. She realised that when she had passed through that 'nothingness' which was a state, rather than a space, the memory of all the pain and loneliness of getting there would be forgotten, but that the characteristics acquired through suffering would be indistinguishably fused into herself, her

character, good or bad. There was no fear of death, only joy and the knowledge that whatever the agony passed through, it ceases before death and that unclouded by its previous agony the soul can face its future sanely and unafraid.

On the other hand not only was there a promise to be kept, but also the belief that, though she thought the physical pangs of death were over and longed to sink further into that state of merciful oblivion and restoration, if she willed completely enough, regardless of the cost, she could take the harder way and struggle back till the consciousness of physical things was regained. Vera believed implicitly that because she had said, "I will not die," though she longed to do so, God not only could, but *would* bring her back to life if she willed to live. She seemed to have had all the time necessary for the full realisation of both courses. Then while hesitating as to which to follow she sank further into the 'nothingness,' the memory of pain began to fade, and rest and peace surrounded her.

Suddenly Vera realised that if she waited any longer to make a decision, there would be none to make, since the memory of that broken, or nearly broken promise, was fading and would soon be gone. So to be true to her better self, to keep her word, she felt she must make the effort at once. In that flash Vera deliberately turned her back on all she longed for, determined to take the harder course whatever the cost, believing without the faintest shadow of doubt that God would bring her back.

Following this decision and belief, Vera gradually regained consciousness of her bodily sensations and external environment. She suffered what she said might be called 'the pangs of re-birth,' physically and mentally. Hosts of malignant spirits seemed to hover round, trying to drag her back, to make her give in instead of struggling to live. Horror filled her, but strengthened by belief in God she went on until she felt a glory around her, felt herself in the Presence of God Himself, a glory which was too great for vision but which seemed to enfold her with a feeling of joy and approval. From that glory Vera sank into a natural sleep. She had kept her word.

Life was actually at a very low ebb during this experience, the account of which was given independently, without the suggestion being given from outside that death had been imminent. It seems as if there was a progressive withdrawal of libido from the bodily functions

producing a complete anaesthesia for all sensations. The libido seemed to be gathered up into the self, until a state of complete introversion resulted, in which nothing but Vera herself seemed to exist; a blackness and isolation which was beyond description.

It is probable that the blind struggle, motivated by terror of the loneliness and isolation, was the beginning of a process for which I propose to use the term 'altroversion<sup>1</sup>.' The intense desire that something should exist as well as herself, prevented introversion remaining fixed, and enabled the introverted libido to flow out again after having been withdrawn into the egoistic self. The first presences of which Vera became aware, I regard as projections of the evil in herself, felt as evil influences trying to pull her back; but with their presence came the certainty that though she could not feel His presenee, yet God is. She feels no longer alone. Other beings are real too, and she struggles on, seeking one she loves. Gradually the filling of consciousness with the introverted libido apparently so withdrawn from the body, seems to have lessened as the libido reinforced the dominant sentiments through altroversion—if it can be called altroversion when still within the self. Yet, since at first it was in the egoistic isolated self, by flowing into and reinforcing the sentiments of the socialised herd self the libido seems to be definitely altroverted, that is in reciprocal relation to others. The field of consciousness which had been previously restricted to isolated fragments, seemed under these conditions to include all the memories which had forced their way into consciousness during delirium, together with the memory of her past life. This latter memory involved Vera's own identity and relations to other people. Memory seemed to embrace, and the mind review and feel, very much more than under normal conditions. Awareness of anything that had been in the preconscious of any self being available at will, the barrier between the preconscious and consciousness seemed to be removed, and the dissociations of the preconscious to be overcome. Owing to the recency and vividness of delirious experience, painful memories predominated. Vera felt at one stage that all she had to do was to sink through what she called a 'fringe of nothingness,' in order to forget all that was painful. The awareness of the 'fringe of nothingness' seems to me to have been an implicit apprehension of a stage in the process whereby painful memories become

<sup>1</sup> By 'altroversion' I mean the process whereby libido or interest is synthesised within the social or herd self, instead of expressing itself in purely egoistic channels. In altroversion psychic energy is not consistently directed inwards or outwards as in introversion and extraversion, but can flow freely either way according to circumstances.

automatically repressed and dissociated from consciousness. All that was necessary in order to forget, was to relax the effort to remember and allow the unconscious forces to do their work. On the other hand, a definite effort was thought to be necessary to prevent them shutting off those memories since they were so painful.

Vera felt too, that once that merciful oblivion for which she longed was gained, she would find the death, which to her meant only fuller life unhampered by pain, for which she so longed. Yet though she thought death was within her grasp and its attainment seemed to her to require no active effort but just a letting go, whereas life and memory demanded a very active effort, she felt death was the lower way. For her the harder way was the one she should follow. Though she could shut out the memory of pain and live without it in the next world, yet, since to do so entailed the breaking of a promise to live, she would be falling short of the highest.

Vera felt that if she willed unselfishly with her whole self to live and remember, she would do so, because with no bodily sensations, the power of thought and belief seemed to transcend that bounded by the senses. This belief, meeting no trace of disbelief, no conflicting ideas, inevitably realised itself in action, as far as the limits of the organism allowed it to respond. Thus instead of dying Vera lived, and as she had refused to forget, since both death and forgetting were bound up together, memory remained as well as life.

I think this accounts for the filtering back of memories in their right perspective later, instead of, as is more often the case, the delirious period being a confused medley or blank. Somehow by turning her back on the more cowardly forgetfulness, whole-heartedly electing remembrance and its consequent pain, Vera remembers now all the different selves which were parts of her, and also can get into touch with the unconscious a little more easily than most people. This has greatly helped the analysis of the deliria, because the repressing forces are now more fully under the control of her will, since they have once been controlled consciously.

If Vera had taken what she felt to be the lower way and not attempted to keep her promise, it is possible that she would have died as she wished. The motive force behind that promise was great and it seems probable that if she had not bent all her energies towards keeping it she would never have recovered. The 'will to live' in many cases turns the balance in favour of life, when without it it might so easily swing the other way. If on the other hand she had ignored her promise and had lived

in spite of that. I think the result might have been permanent mental disorder. She would never have felt the power of belief translated into action, which, through all that followed seems to have been the most potent cause of her recovery. I believe that by determining to be true to her better self, even at the cost of insanity, she avoided the insanity that would probably have resulted from taking the lower way had she lived. So she regained the health and balance she was prepared to sacrifice if necessary, in order to keep her word.

The mental dissociations seemed to be over when the libido was apparently so detached from the organism that life was almost extinct, and touch with the outer world through the senses was lost. Personality thus became more completely integrated and synthesised as death approached; more capable of acting as a whole; more capable of bending its forces towards the fulfilment of one aim in spite of desires which opposed it.

Dissociation and delirium continued after this owing to a certain amount of toxic degeneration of the central nervous system, yet more and more of the better self forced its way into consciousness with time, until Vera was able to hold the whole series of dissociated selves within her grasp; thus synthesising all their memories as one personal memory instead of ten. The personality which now resulted, approximated, more nearly than at any other time, to that of the better self in 1914, before it had been repressed by the triumph of an agnostic and later antitheistic self. The synthesis involved in this, which determined the mode of reaction as a whole, has subsequently proved strong enough to dominate and include all the rest. The temporary overthrows experienced, and the relapse that followed, were due to under-estimating the strength of the forces which were being suppressed.

Later, through being brought into consciousness during analysis, the synthesis of extravert and introvert sides in harmony with the spiritual or introverted self has become more complete. The feeling that she could throw in her lot with one or the other, but not with both, has gone. Vera is both, or rather, she can switch on both modes of reaction at will, or they come into play spontaneously according to requirements, and she is equally herself as introvert and extravert. Thus the synthesis has not destroyed old characteristics. It has enabled them to work harmoniously, or more harmoniously, since neither has won the day by repressing the other, but each leaves the other free to play its own necessary part.

## CHAPTER IV

VERA'S *A*, *B*, AND *C* PHASES

Vera's deliria followed a toxic infection. But for this circumstance it seems justifiable to assume that there would have been no psychosis. She had adapted herself successfully to the ordinary conditions of life, and had moreover taken a university degree.

In conjunction with the toxic infection, however, there were earlier predisposing factors. Her health seems to have been weakened by earlier repressions. Since the resistances to which I attribute the fact that much of her libido remained unconscious or 'inaccessible' have been broken down during analysis, many environmental handicaps have been destroyed, thus lessening her susceptibility to future disturbances. Before proceeding to the analysis of the deliria a brief outline of the nature of three alternating phases of personality is necessary.

Vera's adolescence will first be considered. Certain partial dissociations found to be present during adolescence will be traced through analysis, to infancy. Lastly the mental synthesis eventually made will be briefly sketched.

Vera's personality at the age of 17, as it appeared to someone else, is suggested by a passage written by K. in 1914, two years later.

He writes that Vera is different from any other girl he has ever known, because in her there seem to meet two apparently irreconcilable elements—the eternal feminine love and wonder of woman, with the clear thinking coolness supposed to be man's great adjunct, and that Vera seems to have this and the feminine nature both unspoilt. . . . On the third side Vera appeared to K. as one of nature's own wild things.

Allowing for the over-valuation apparent in this passage, it remains clear that to an outside observer there appeared to be a partial dissociation into three incompatible trends of character. This division was accepted by Vera, who also accepted the names 'Lilith' and 'Eve' given by K. to two of them.

Lilith represented the clear thinking side of Vera's personality which came to be regarded as the 'male' side, known as '*B*' for purposes of analysis. It co-existed with the womanly side Eve, known as '*A*.' The third side '*C*' simply burst its way up to consciousness from time to time, sweeping all before it in the sheer irresponsible joy of living. In 1913 Vera writes in her diary mentioning her 'dual' personality, but referring to all three phases. She speaks of herself as Lilith, thus accepting that phase as the dominant one:

"For some time past I have been steadily casting my dredger into Lilith's heart, but I have not sounded it completely yet. Her curious dual personality baffles me. The person who suffers so much (*A*) seems almost a totally different being from the one who experiences such a joy in living (*C*) and again the person whom the world at large sees, is a rather phlegmatic commonplace girl (*B*)... I think her real personality is pretty well masked, and I think it is as well, though sometimes it is hard to find which is her and which is what you might expect her to be."

Two years later her diary again refers to the three irreconcilables, but by that time *C* has to some extent replaced *B* as dominating her attitude, as is shown by the following quotation:

"I am quite mad, I believe, yet would not be different. In some things I am a woman, a woman who wishes in all things to be true to her sex, to be a womanly woman. In others I am a wild tomboy, doing things against my woman's nature, shocking and outraging it, yet rejoicing<sup>1</sup>. There are two irreconcilable parts in me, each is real and sincere, and they alternate rapidly, and I would not give up either. It would not be me if I were tamed as one man suggested I needed. Tamed! no, by Jove, imagine a meek and mild colourless image supposed to be me. I'm too much alive to be tamed as he meant it... I want to remain wild, I would not give up my love for, and enjoyment of, the clean simple things of nature for anything. I would not be sober and sedate. Yet I want learning, I want to study, to prove I can do as well as a man, to do a man's work. Yet too, more than anything, I want to be a woman, and a woman wants love... a man to love and be loved by, to care for and by whom to be cared for; and most of all I want a little child. How reconcile these three parts? I don't know. They all exist, yet which will in the end swallow up the other two. I do not know. Yet I'm not ill content as I am. Their continual clashing affords some interest even to myself."

In these notes Vera shows that she realises the impossibility of developing all three sides adequately, feeling she can be any of them, but not all at once, and that some day one will 'swallow up' the others. In the following notes she indicates that she does not know which it will be.

"I am perfectly sincere in what I say and do at any particular time, the difficulty is there are so many different sides to my character that I lay myself open to the charge of being fickle, since one part of me thinks one thing and another part the opposite, and what I say depends on which part predominates at any instant. My head and my heart, colloquially speaking, are in continual conflict and being fairly well

<sup>1</sup> Cp. this with Sally in the Beauchamp case, described by Morton Prince in *The Dissociation of a Personality*.

matched, the struggle is often a keen one. In other words my reason and my feminine feelings or emotions are always at loggerheads. I have no idea which will eventually come out top dog. I suppose it depends on a man. It is hateful to think so, but I do. If I meet someone I think is the exception that proves the rule, I believe I'm fool enough to throw all reason to the winds and in spite of my ravings against men, marry him."

All through Vera's diary the same recognition of conflicting systems, and the acceptance of all as herself, coupled with ignorance as to which will dominate at any time is shown. In 1915, however, the third party of the trio was more explicitly recognised than it had been in 1913.

In 1914, the time of acutest conflict, a 'nervous breakdown' had occurred. Owing to the fact that the 'male' intellectual *B* was the dominant partner of the trio until then, the libido stimulated by *K.* was repressed as incompatible with *B*'s outlook. I attribute the breakdown to this reinforcement of dissociated libido. So complete was the dissociation of the physical aspect of love that only the psychical was experienced in connection with *K.*, though, as will be shown later, the repressed physical aspect expressed itself in the delirium of 1919. The conflict in 1914 produced nervous disorders, which seem to me to be the result of tying up so much mental energy. After the breakdown, which was then attributed to overstudy, the intellectual side was suppressed for a time. Vera determined to develop 'Eve' rather than 'Lilith' for some time to come. This, however, led to the predominance of *C* later on, owing, so far as I can see, to Vera passing through an agnostic stage, which led to a partial repression of Eve as well as Lilith, and to the fact that the sexual nature of *C* was less known to Vera then.

Health was gradually recovered after this breakdown as the feminine, pleasure loving, emotional side became more stably organised. During the years 1918-19 it seemed as if Lilith's long suppression (1914-18) had brought her to an end. She showed no signs of life, the conflict seemed to be over in favour of *C*. Nevertheless *B* was only dissociated, not destroyed, as her later resurrection demonstrated.

Thus when in 1919, disease and drugs together caused a toxic disturbance of the central nervous system, there was already conflict and dissociation sufficient to bring about much more severe mental disturbances. The ten dissociated pseudo-personalities which appeared in the delirium knew nothing of each other. They are believed to be the result of ego-regression of the three main synthesis *A*, *B*, and *C* respectively, with projections from different libido levels. The delirious progression from the feminine, pleasure loving ego, through the 'male'



intellectual ego, to the womanly one which was felt to be her real self, brought about a more complete readjustment, a more stable balance, than when either male *B* or female *C* had been on top. On tracing these out analytically, it was found that the dissociation into *B* and *C* had occurred quite definitely at the age of two. *B* was an introvert, *C* an extravert. *A*, the main personality, combined some of the characteristics of both *B* and *C*, possibly through co-existing in consciousness with each alternately. It also seemed as if when *B* was in consciousness, *C* developed unconsciously, and *vice versa*. What appears to be a split between introvert and extravert had occurred, so that each went its own way independently, but could not gain control of the whole organism on account of the other. A reversal of the unstable equilibrium was invariably brought about by external circumstances. Only after the delirium, when *A* reappeared with more of *C* in her than before, owing to the long spell *C* had had in control, was more stable equilibrium established. The complete synthesis, however, only occurred later through analysis. *A* finally combined *B* and *C* in a working unity.

#### *Development of the Dissociation*

As a result of analysis dealing with the earlier years of Vera's life it seems as if at the age of two, self-assertion, acquisition and curiosity combined with infantile clitoris libido (auto-erotic) in the formation of the wish to be a man, and that this clitoris libido retained its more active masculine characteristics even when detached from the physical plane through sublimation. For a year this wish expressed itself in dreams and phantasies which became progressively more elaborate. Then Vera contracted pneumonia, during which time the birth of a brother occurred, and after which the memory of the wish to be a man was forgotten and was replaced by the wish to have a baby of her own. Though the maternal instinct developed in consciousness, the results of analysis support the belief that the repressed wish remained dynamic in the unconscious, forming the nucleus of the male introvert *B*. Further that at the same time that the wish to be a man developed in consciousness, the tender emotion focussed on the father became associated with the sexual libido and was repressed. Presumably this libido formed the mainspring of *C*, the extravert side, in which heterosexual feeling predominated.

At the same time the third side *A* was developing psychically. Apparently libido and interest alike were drawn off from the ego through love and interaction with the environment, and were sublimated or

'socialised' by acting through the channels of the herd instincts<sup>1</sup>, incompatible components being repressed. In *A* both self-abasement and self-assertion seem to have combined in the self-regarding sentiment forming the basis of the more stable personality. The self was recognised as in relation with others, chiefly the parents. The instinct of curiosity was found to have played a large part in this synthesis, together with the psychical aspect of love or tender emotion which was the forerunner of the maternal libido. The sexual aspect, owing to its association with the physical expression, had been repressed and thus dissociated.

At the age of three, the maternal libido was strongly developed through the birth of a brother, and apparently sufficiently so to cause the repression of the wish to be a man. The wish to have a baby of her own, recognised as a woman's prerogative, proving stronger, the incompatible wish was forced into the unconscious. There it appears to have developed out of touch with reality. *A* held the field temporarily, *B* and *C* being repressed, but independently.

In *A* the constructive instinct was closely associated with the maternal libido. The emphasis was on the conational side of the mode of reaction typical of *A*. Pleasure lay in doing. In *B* pleasure lay in thinking, the cognitive aspect being most developed, whereas in *C* the pleasure lay in being, the affective aspect predominating. Very soon the forces which had synthesised to form *B* were too strong to be repressed. The wish to be a man did not reach consciousness in its earliest physical form, but the active intellectual introvert tendency had to find expression through sublimation.

By the age of five, Vera had developed enough to be able to read the New Testament. Keen pleasure was taken in reading and in being read to. The world of thought was already becoming important, and most of the simple Bible stories were familiar. The self-regarding sentiment was being built up in *A* as a self in relation to God, whose loving presence was very real to *A-B*. This possibly prevented the complete introversion that *B* alone would have developed. Pleasure in reading grew and in it sympathy and admiration were always for the man. The reader

<sup>1</sup> I have suggested the use of the term *altroversion* for the socialisation of either the introverted or the extraverted types, which gives rise to a social self, with balance between the self and the environment, neither being over-estimated as in introversion or extraversion. The personality which thus combines introvert and extravert reactions in a working unity, synthesising interest and libido in a well balanced sentiment, can be conveniently called an '*altrovert*' in the same way that the personality resulting from a one-sided synthesis of interest and libido, with over emphasis on ego and object respectively, is called an introvert or an extravert.

became identified with the hero. Soon the wish to be a boy re-emerged into consciousness and the maternal libido was diverted from the wish to have a child. This was repressed, leaving unchanged the tender emotion focussed on God and others.

A period of tomboyishness followed (from ten years onward), adventurous boys' books being the model. From puberty onwards psychoneurotic symptoms developed, probably owing to the reinforcement of the libido repressed in *C*. This seemingly came into conflict with the now developed introvert mode of reaction which disdained emotion as weak and feminine, which took pleasure in thinking, and in which thoughts of its own mental development took precedence over thoughts of reproducing the species.

The personality was saved from complete egoism and selfishness, however, by the co-presence of *A* in consciousness, and it would seem that the maternal libido, now diverted from the wish to have a child, was forming a channel of extraversion for the herd (*i.e.* altroversion) through love of God. Possibly the struggle to keep the sensual pleasure loving side (*C*) out of consciousness robbed the whole personality of much of its force, and since repressed and repressing forces were so evenly balanced (owing to the physiological increase of the sexual libido at puberty, which consciousness would not admit), neither could win the day, and a psychoneurosis resulted. After a time, however, adjustment to the physiological changes became more adequate. Health improved, *B* and *A* still remained in control, but *C* from time to time burst through in wild, emotional outbursts in which ecstatic union with nature occurred. The sexual libido was being sublimated, but, since it was dissociated, it could only express itself by gathering sufficient force to displace temporarily, the sober, sedate introverted girl, thus assuming complete control. There was no amnesia for the outburst. Once *C* could force her way into consciousness, *A-B*, when it resumed control, accepted the responsibility for the behaviour due to *C* as proceeding from a part of itself, though it did not recognise its source. Naturally, the more that *C* came thus into touch with reality the more organised and developed feeling became, and the puzzled self the more recognisable as a trio of irreconcilables. After a nervous breakdown in 1914, resulting in the loss of a year's memory so far as intellectual work was concerned, the equilibrium changed; *C* and *A* controlled the conscious behaviour, *B* being suppressed, but not repressed, that is, *B* was not driven out of consciousness, but it was not allowed to dictate the mode of reaction of the whole.

The introverted and intellectual blue-stocking of the few years preceding this, gave way to a happy-go-lucky, pleasure loving, essentially feminine extravert, and at the same time the maternal libido previously involved in the wish for a child became reintegrated with *A*, *C*. Thus a womanly woman developed, the love of dress, repressed so long in *C*, came to the fore and for the first time an interest in feminine occupations, for example, sewing, was felt. The balance had swung from the intellectual to the emotional sphere. After a time *C* enjoyed life so much that much of *A*'s more introverted attitude became incompatible with *C*'s. Finally, realisation of the sexual evils rampant in the world proved too much for *A-C*'s belief in a good God. Since the relation towards God was the most strongly developed and organised sentiment in *A*, after much conflict this religious sentiment also became repressed (1915-16). The ideational content was not repressed, but the actual beliefs and their driving force were repressed and only able to influence consciousness indirectly. This occurred in the same way that the driving force of *B* was repressed, though its memory was not repressed. Thus the third member of the trio came into its own, and dominated the mode of reaction. Each member of the trio was thus capable of reacting as a unitary personality in turn, but equilibrium was inevitably unstable owing to the organisation of the others in the unconscious. All were parts of a bigger whole.

#### *Adult Synthesis*

Following this in 1919 came the toxic psychosis during which much of the previously repressed affect abreacted itself. This swung the balance back finally in favour of *A* as the dominating personality; but combining within itself the still incompatible modes of reaction of *B* and *C*. Since both were in consciousness, however, *A* was able to choose the mode of reaction, to choose, more freely than before, whether *B* or *C* should influence the action. *C* was kept severely in check, though not repressed, for some time, and *B* resumed activity under the direction of *A* until, through an auto-analysis, *C*'s co-operation proved essential. A channel of sublimation was thus found and *B* and *C*, working harmoniously at last within the self-regarding sentiment of *A*, ceased their independent or semi-independent existence. The memories of *A*, *B* and *C* were all in the preconscious and available for use by the real self resulting from their fusion. As a result both thinking and feeling became differentiated.

The conflict in general was solved, so far as I can see, not by the victory

of one opponent but by the mutual development and interaction of both. Thought and feeling both inspire to activity. Adaptation can be made in both ways at will, coming into play automatically according to the needs of the situation. Introvert and extravert balance, or in Freudian terms (or my extension of them), the ego instincts and the sexual instincts have found an altruistic channel in which both can gain satisfaction. Both self-preservation and race-preservation instincts, in my opinion, have joined to build up a self-regarding sentiment through the herd instinct, in which instead of the egoistic self with whom all the instincts were bound up primarily, the self is a social self in relation to others. The self-regarding sentiment is, for me, a synthesis of the relations between the self and the object, and therefore the basis of personality.

This case supports Jung's view that the extravert-introvert distinction is based on the two biological types of adaptation. The extravert side was found to be motivated mainly by the sexual energy projected outward as object libido, whose urge was reproductive; while the introvert side was motivated by ego interest combined with libido which did not leave the self, and was not projected outwards for reproductive purposes, but turned within for the development of the individual.

The pathological factor in the case does not seem to be the relative proportions, but the relative fixity, of the narcissistic and object libido respectively. Each pursued its further development independently, instead of there being free play between object and ego libido so that their development could keep pace with one another. Apparently the fixation occurred through the close association of libido with certain ego impulses to form an independent unit capable of developing and interacting as a whole with the rest of the mind, but not allowing independent interaction of the components. The underlying basis of introversion thus seems to me to be a narcissistic fixation of libido. If this dominates consciousness then the extrovert tendencies are in the unconscious. If the narcissistic libido suffers repression first, extravert tendencies develop and the introvert ones are in the unconscious. In either case a one-sided attitude results. If, however, the two tendencies are of almost equal strength, sometimes one will force its way into consciousness, and sometimes the other, under environmental influence, and a certain amount of interaction will occur, a third group of tendencies including some of each being formed. This gradually brings about a synthesis of the dissociated ego and object libido, combining the qualities of both.

Where this is successful, where energy can flow freely from within

outwards as well as from without inwards, we get an approach to Trotter's 'ideal mind' which combines the sensitivity of the unstable mind with the energy and resolution of the stable mind. The neurotic is, so far as I can see, the one in whom the solution of the conflict has failed to satisfy either opponent adequately, in whom the dissociation has not been re-synthesised, in whose mind is therefore perpetual conflict, leaving only a relatively small psychic force with which to adapt himself to the environment or to reproduce his kind.

#### CHAPTER V

##### OUTLINE OF METHOD OF DELIRIUM ANALYSIS

The analysis was carried out with the co-operation of the Rev. F. Paton Williams. An attempt was made to combine the advantages of auto-analysis and ordinary analysis in which transference plays an important part, and to eliminate some of the disadvantages of either when used alone. This collaboration made analysis more rapid than under usual conditions, for Vera could give much more time daily to the recovery of repressed memories than if she had been dependent upon an analyst's convenient times. Furthermore through transference, forgotten emotions were re-experienced in the present and could be tracked to their source in the past, in a way that would be impossible in a mere auto-analysis.

During the auto-analysis Vera sat as comfortably as possible, with muscles relaxed, having pen and paper in readiness. Then starting from a single idea taken either from the record of a delirium or a dream, she suspended all conscious criticism or selection of thoughts. She prepared to write down freely every thought immediately it emerged into consciousness, without trying to trace its connections in any way. She allowed her mind to play freely around the selected starting point, recording both thoughts and feelings as passively as possible. This, of course, is the conventional method of 'free association.'

At first it was difficult not to criticise or to censor the somewhat disconnected thoughts, but after practice Vera soon found that she could obtain material in a quicker way. After choosing a starting point she made her mind completely blank as described in Chapter II, p. 204, until the more relevant<sup>1</sup> (often seemingly irrelevant) associations forced their way into consciousness.

<sup>1</sup> Affective relevance, not logical relevance, is meant here, hence the seeming irrelevance which refers to the intellectual estimate of their importance. The significant factor in this method is the affective nexus.

The length of blank depended upon the strength of the resistance to be overcome, and thus probably upon the completeness of the amnesia. This preliminary making of the mind a blank, in which repressing forces were consciously directed to keep all thought out of consciousness, made selective repression much more effective; only the memories affectively relevant to the starting point were allowed to enter consciousness when obtaining free associations. It also served to increase the passive relaxation and to eliminate conscious criticism and control more completely<sup>1</sup>.

At first Vera simply wrote down her free associations in this way, taking them once a week to the Rev. F. Paton Williams for interpretation. That is to say she did not consider her free associations critically except when with him, but merely obtained them uncritically. This, however, proved too slow and at the end of a fortnight, it was arranged that Vera should also interpret the dreams from which she was obtaining the associations at the time, submitting the free associations and interpretations to her co-operator for later criticism. From this stage Vera's free associations changed in type. Because she was acting as analyst and subject simultaneously, only those memories relevant to the point in question emerged. The problem as to what that point meant seemed to inspire every link in the chain of free associations. This pre-consciously organised the partly dissociated memories as soon as a sufficient number of them had entered consciousness. At first Vera thought she was mixing conscious attitudes with pre-conscious ones, since every series of free associations led sooner or later to a series of attempts at interpretation. Each such attempt was based on the material just brought up, and was modified as fresh memories emerged. In spite of not understanding the pre-conscious mechanism involved until much later, there was no mistaking when she had broken down the resistance because the affect liberated was so intense.

Vera's wish to break down the various resistances, and to face the contents of the unconscious unaided, in spite of temporarily unpleasant consequences, had to be stronger than the strongest repressed affect. In the earlier stages, however, she found that at times a whole series of dreams, when analysed, expressed the same wish. Having intellectually accepted the presence of this wish Vera thought she had completely broken down the resistance to it, but several times she found it still coming up disguised in fresh ways. I interpret this to mean that it had not been accepted emotionally; that her analysis had unearthed only

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter VI for illustrations of method of interpretation, through free associations and transference. Dreams were treated in the same way as the deliria analysis there given.

the ideational content, and had not liberated the affect connected with it.

On this matter the help of the Rev. F. Paton Williams was sought. He was able to confirm the relevance of the ideational content and to make Vera realise its affective significance which was transparent to him. Her emotional resistance to accepting the latter was often very great. However, this intense resistance, coupled with the fact that she was aware of the ideational content, seemed to indicate that he was right. When this further stage towards the realisation of the affect was followed shortly after by the full force of the repressed affect surging up and filling consciousness, there was no mistaking its significance. The resistance was broken down completely. Almost invariably this abreaction of affect occurred *after* their discussion, not during it, emerging as soon as Vera relaxed her mind in free association, which she did only occasionally when working with him, in order to elucidate some minor point.

The joint work consisted in going through the analysis Vera had done. This helped her to appreciate the affective significance of an association if she had found only its intellectual meaning. Mr Williams often selected as starting points for the next week's work what she thought trivial, irrelevant associations, though he rarely gave any clue as to what he expected her to find, leaving her to discover what had made her think the point in question trivial. As Vera gained more experience indications of the lines to be followed became less frequent; she often carried out whole sections unaided, he seeing the material and the results of its analysis only after an interval of several weeks, by which time she was dealing with fresh material. The fact that it was to be checked later, however, acted as an incentive to analyse as honestly as possible, since Vera preferred to abreact the emotions whenever possible before going through the work with him. She could thus discuss the experience more easily and was less biased by the affective accompaniments.

Further, owing to the longer intervals of time between the interviews, Vera had not time to wait to be helped, necessity spurring her on to find her own way. She made full use of her extravert tendency to feel her way into a situation. She found out how to do anything necessary by doing it, and discovered afterwards by means of introvert tendencies the way in which she had done it. Vera had no idea of the difficulties involved in analysing the deliria, but having started, each difficulty, hitherto unsuspected, came into sight as the one preceding it was overcome. My opinion is that the deliria were the expression of regression to many different levels; thus Vera could understand and interpret them



only by living through these levels again, by experiencing the impulse of each dead and gone self to action not as towards past, but towards present situations.

One main problem was how to relax conscious inhibition sufficiently to enable every trend or tendency, repressed as incompatible with the ideal self, to come into consciousness with its full impulse to action, and yet to be able to inhibit its activity until a method could be found of harmonising the conflicting forces through sublimation. It involved the retaining of motor control by the normally conscious personality, when at certain times it deliberately relaxed its attention to external reality and turned it towards material of which it had previously been unconscious.

While thus writing down passively every thought or feeling as it emerged, Vera experienced the corresponding affective and impulsive aspects of the meaning which had been repressed. That is to say, she experienced the way in which it tended to affect her behaviour, without becoming aware at the same time of the critical judgment or cognitive aspect of the meaning which had led to its repression as incompatible with her ideals. In other words, Vera identified herself temporarily with her unconscious, and therefore experienced directly the meaning which she had unconsciously attached to the repressed material.

Vera's attention while obtaining free associations was directed more particularly to the conative and affective aspects of the repressed material, since cognition, as a selective and judging function was suspended temporarily in favour of feeling. The meaning so apprehended affectively was therefore only a part of its full significance. Nevertheless it was an essential factor in the real meaning as it affected her as a whole.

Once she had become aware of this aspect of the meaning and had recorded it, Vera interpreted it in the light of consciousness as well, apprehending intellectually instead of affectively. She was then able to realise the significance of the repressed material, through recombining the affective and conative aspects of meaning with the cognitive aspect which seemed to have become dissociated through repression.

These complementary aspects of meaning seem to me to correspond to the differentiation of psychic energy into *horme* and *mneme*<sup>1</sup>. Intellectual apprehension can only grasp the *mnemic* aspect, affective apprehension the *hormic* aspect. Both are essential to the real meaning. Repression can refer to either *mnemic* or *hormic* aspects separately, or to both together.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. T. Percy Nunn: *Education: Its Data and First Principles*, pp. 21-22.

This must be borne in mind in connection with the free associations reproduced in Chapter VI. Since the sequence is an affective one, not a logical one, it is difficult to be convinced of the validity of the connections without the actual experience of the subjective elements accompanying them. It is just the elements which bring conviction to the subject that are impossible to convey adequately to another individual.

Throughout the analysis conscious direction has been minimised. Vera started from a point in the delirium, which seemed to stir up the level of the unconscious concerned, since this induced dreams, the analysis of which brought up previously inaccessible material. She became aware of one problem after another as more material was apprehended in the way I have just described.

The most primitive levels of the unconscious were discovered almost entirely through transference. That is to say, the projection of the primitive impulses on to the analyst gave rise under analysis, to an implicit apprehension of their nature, which could then be made explicit through the critical differentiating attitude of the conscious self. The full realisation of their nature only occurred when thus made explicit, but it seems probable that in infancy they were undifferentiated as when first implicitly apprehended during analysis. Their significance for the infantile self would thus not be the same as their significance for the mature self. Memory was carried back to within the first year of life, making clearer the development of conative and affective trends through their various stages to maturity.

Vera found that sublimation of the repressed libido was possible only when the incompatible desire, whatever its nature, had been made fully conscious, both intellectually and affectively. It had to enter the "personal focus of consciousness" before it could be sublimated. This confirms Freud's statement: "It is possible that sublimation arises out of some special process which would be kept in the background by repression<sup>1</sup>." The actual sublimation takes place unconsciously if the desire for it is strong enough and that which requires sublimation is fully in consciousness, analysis showing afterwards where and when it took place. Resistances were broken down in the same way. Once the problem to be investigated was presented to consciousness, the actual method of solving it and of breaking down the resistances which hindered that solution, was elaborated unconsciously. The motive force in both cases was supplied by the intensity of the desire to make the fullest use of the painful experiences of delirium for the alleviation of the sufferings

<sup>1</sup> *Internat. Jour. of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. 1, p. 374.

of others, which to achieve its end was able to draw upon the whole instinctive force synthesised within a strongly developed religious sentiment.

Through following out the technique which is described above, the assumption of self-preservation and race preservation instincts which differed in kind seemed necessary and enabled a more comprehensive explanation of the facts to be suggested. These seemed to correspond closely to Freud's division into ego instincts and sex instincts, motivated by interest and libido respectively, though the former were elaborated somewhat, he having left them comparatively undifferentiated. The resultant hypothesis was then adopted provisionally. It is of course merely a probable inference from the facts; ego-interest and libido are merely useful hypothetical conceptions behind the facts. They are, however, hypotheses as valid as the three assumptions made by Irving Langmuir with regard to the arrangement of the groups of negative electrons round the positive nucleus of the atom, from which assumptions he could account for the inter-relations between different elements, and was able to predict the properties and atomic weights of elements as then unknown. Neither hypothesis can be a fact of subjective or objective experience, yet both hypotheses render the relations between large systems of facts intelligible and allow a fuller interpretation than was previously possible and prediction of facts falling within the realms in which they seem to be valid. Therefore I claim the validity of the assumptions made in this article as working hypotheses, which may have to be revised and modified in the light of further knowledge, but which do enable a less inadequate interpretative account of the abnormal mental phenomena here considered to be given, than is possible without them.

With the nature of the vital energy which motivates these groups of instincts this article is not concerned. Psychology here branches into metaphysics, but before a metaphysical superstructure can be raised on sound foundations, the facts of experience must be organised into a systematic whole, which is as far as pure science can go before handing on the material it has organised to be incorporated in the wider realm of philosophy.

*(To be continued.)*

## ON THE PHYSIOLOGY OF TREMOR IN RELATION TO THE NEUROSES

BY R. G. GORDON.

THE occurrence of tremors and incoordinations as physical symptoms amongst neurotic patients is so common, that they have often been passed by as too obvious to require comment. Sometimes however the careful investigation of such obvious symptoms throws light on more obscure problems. The subject of neurotic tremor has received a good deal of attention from those masters of clinical observation the French. Thus Roussy and Lhermitte (1) describe two varieties, atypical and typical. The former they regard as expressions of the emotion of fear and Meige (2) in extreme cases has pointed out that they may form part of an obsession characterised by a phobia of tremor, in which the greater the phobia the more intense the tremor. The latter variety of tremors which resemble those typical of various organic nervous diseases are regarded as imitative. Meige, during the war gave a bad prognosis as to their curability and argued therefrom that they were due to definite organic changes within the central nervous system. Roussy (1) and Hurst (3) however deny the former contention and discredit the latter because of the possibility of cure by Psychotherapy.

Janet (4) describes hysterical incoordinated movements under three heads: expressive movements which include gesticulations which would properly belong to some emotional experience; "Professional" movements such as those of reiterated piano playing or drum beating, and imitative movements which may be of any variety. He points out that all these tremors involve the more or less coordinated functions of several groups of muscles and never of single muscles and therefore that the disturbance is at a high level of the nervous system. Also that the patients are quite conscious of these movements, but seem to have lost the feeling of liberty and volition with regard to them. Dejerine and Gauckler (5) note the variety of types of tremor but consider that they are of emotional origin as evidenced by the fact that emotional crises will initiate or exaggerate them. They suggest that they may be phobic in origin and represent a persistent recoil from an action which is constantly being attempted. In other cases they suggest that the tremor

is a constant effort to correct a vicious attitude. Amongst English authors who have considered the subject Hurst<sup>(3)</sup> suggests that the tremor is always due to incoordinated hypertonus of antagonistic muscles and attributes this to the suggestive effect of emotional states. Mott<sup>(6)</sup> regards tremors as "due to defective innervation and an involuntary spread of nervous impulses to antagonistic groups of muscles, and this defect is of high central origin." The originating factor is the suggestion conveyed by fear and possibly of cold. The fine tremor he considers similar to that of chronic alcoholism, Graves' disease and general paralysis are due to fatigue, the coarser tremors are due to suggestion and imitation. Personal investigations into the genesis of neurotic tremor have revealed a variety of pathogenic factors, but the initial influence is emotional and the particular emotion involved would seem to be fear. Such tremors may be grouped under two heads. Those which persist for a certain time as neural habits with little or no emotional accompaniment except that induced by the tremor itself. These were common enough in the war and are met with in civil life to a less extent. In such cases a condition of simultaneous hypertonus of antagonistic muscles is revealed and treatment consists in teaching the patient to relax these and re-establish the proper reciprocal tonic action. Such hypertonicity and tremor are most often the sequel to a painful wound or other pathological condition in the limb which induced a fear of movement, but the painful condition having passed away, the emotional accompaniment has passed except in so far that some anxiety may exist in view of the uselessness of the trembling limb. The removal of the tremor will be sufficient to cure the condition since there is no abnormal emotional reaction behind it. The other group comprises those cases in which there is a definite affective mental accompaniment of fear or anxiety. The extent to which this affective accompaniment is conscious varies. There may be a consciousness of *the* object of the emotion or of *an* object, though on investigation it is found that this is not the true object. As for instance in a case of obsessional cleanliness associated with tremor in which the latter symptom was accentuated by the fear of contamination by any real or imaginary dirt. Needless to say the speck of dirt which was apparently the object of the fear was not the real object. This turned out to be connected with illicit sexual practices. In other cases there is no apparent object but simply abstract panic. In certain cases the fear is associated with and conditioned by some other emotional disposition which may modify the localisation and character of the tremor. Thus a case of tremor of the right hand was found to be

associated with fear of masturbation and its imagined results and the nature of the object of the fear undoubtedly modified the character of the tremor. Similarly in those cases of Adlerian neuroses when the organic inferiority of a limb engenders various fears and anxieties in respect of it, a definite localisation and modification of the tremor may occur. With regard to the so-called imitative tremors, the nature and distribution of the tremors may be determined by the source of the imitation, but there seems little doubt that these imitative symptoms are only initiated when the patient is already in a state of anxiety and fear. Let it be admitted then that the tremors of the neuroses are expressions of and are derived from affective conditions of fear or anxiety. The object of this paper is to discuss the nature of this affective reaction especially from the physiological standpoint, to suggest why tremor is such a common physical accompaniment and to investigate the physiology of the persistence and ultimate cure of the symptom.

The emotion of fear is a primary affective disposition which is a purposive reaction to certain stimuli. The purpose is a very definite one and a very important one, namely to protect the animal against dangers to health and life. In its simplest form the stimuli which initiate the response may be of great variety, any noxious influence at all being capable of setting off the reaction. With increasing integration the stimuli become more specific as the individual learns to neglect certain stimuli which he has learnt by experience are innocuous. This learning by experience to discard certain stimuli is a process of conditioning comparable to the classical experiments of Pawlow, but we may express the process as a negative rather than a positive conditioning. At first any noisy object approaching sets off the fear response in a young horse in a field, but after repeated experience that the motors passing along the road beside him do not cause him any hurt, the reaction is so conditioned that he no longer responds to this particular stimulus. This discrimination is a cortical function for as Bianchi(7) has shown, when monkeys who have learnt to discriminate between apparent and real noxious stimuli are subjected to ablation of their frontal lobes they become subject to uncontrolled panic in the presence of stimuli which are usually quite inadequate to induce reaction. This shows that the localisation of the primitive reaction is subcortical and Head(8) has shown that those cases of thalamic syndrome which are characterised by uncontrolled reactions to painful stimuli also act in an uncontrolled manner in response to other affective stimuli. We may justly presume therefore that the localisation of the principal integration of the primitive response to

noxious stimuli is in the thalamus. This response involves a special differentiation of painful affect which we recognise as panic, or if of weaker intensity and more prolonged as anxiety. The motor response will vary according to the species of animal, and in the case of higher animals and man according to circumstances. Rivers<sup>(9)</sup> distinguishes five modes of reaction, flight, aggression, manipulative activity, immobility and collapse. With the exception of the last any power of discrimination between these various types of reaction depends on cortical function and is not part of the primary response. In addition to these responses there are certain involuntary activities such as dilatation of the pupil, acceleration of the pulse, dilatation of the bronchi, mobilisation of blood sugar and inhibition of digestive function, together with sweating and erection of hairs whose purpose it is to prepare the animal for instant action. All these activities are the result of the activation of a series of neurones arranged as a specific engram. The term engram was introduced by Semon<sup>(10)</sup> to describe a series of neurones which were habitually activated together. The researches of Cannon<sup>(11)</sup> and others have shown that the engram, in addition to the central nervous system neurones comprises those of the sympathetic system which are also called into play, their activities being reinforced by the outpouring into the blood of suprarenal secretion. The latter factors indeed determine the accompanying involuntary activities, which we designate as characteristic of fear. In addition to these strictly purposive reactions however unless the reaction is perfectly controlled and discriminated certain useless reactions ensue, the most characteristic of which is tremor. Perfect control and discrimination are the functions of the cortex while as will be seen later tremor is essentially a subcortical reaction. The work of Sherrington<sup>(12)</sup> and later of Wilson<sup>(13)</sup> has shown that the engraphic activity on which the bodily changes depend does not have as its mental correlate the full affective experience which probably depends on higher thalamic integration. The latter in his research on involuntary laughing and crying definitely proved that this was not accompanied by corresponding affective experience. He places the centre for these bodily affective expressions in the upper pontine region and as there is evidence that affective experience is associated with thalamic function we may take it that the James Lange theory is not adequate. That is to say that affective experience is not simply the mental correlate of the bodily changes but involves a higher integration through cells in the thalamic grey matter. The primary reaction of fear then is dependent on an engram integrated at the thalamic level and exhibits the characteristic

all or none reaction of this level. Under ordinary circumstances in man and the higher animals this primary reaction is under cortical control whereby discrimination is possible.

Our next task is to discuss the physiology of tremor. Crouzon<sup>(14)</sup> distinguishes the various types of tremor as follows:

1. The so-called physiological tremor described by Lamarek and Pitres in 40 per cent. of 1000 normal people examined. This occurs especially in intense muscular effort and when the subject strives to find a position of equilibrium. Similarly in the normal person tremor may occur under stress of emotion, especially fear and at the onset of fever when doubtless it may be classed as a transitory toxic tremor.

2. Tremors associated with organic nervous disease. The intention tremor of disseminated sclerosis is not a pure rhythmical tremor such as occurs in sub-thalamic lesions when support is withdrawn from the affected limb, as Birley and Dudgeon<sup>(15)</sup> have pointed out since it is more marked when a voluntary effort is made. This condition is a mixture of tremor and incoordination. In the opinion of these authorities it is due to a lesion of the cerebello-rubral fibres and certain other cerebellar connections in addition.

Interference with the afferent tracts of the cerebello spinal connections are also seen in Friedreich's ataxia and in cerebellar lesions, but these also partake of incoordinations rather than true tremors.

The tremors of paralysis agitans and that which occurs as a sequel of encephalitis lethargica are of a more typical type but are slow and coarse compared to the tremors which more specially concern us. As a rule they can be controlled voluntarily to a certain extent and cease on voluntary movement and for these reasons Buzzard and Greenfield<sup>(16)</sup> consider them to be due to a release of lower nervous activity by removal of control. The lesions found in those cases which have been examined are chiefly in the cortex, in the optic thalamus and corpus striatum. The work of Wilson and others have shown that lesions in the globus pallidus will produce similar tremor. Vogt considers that the variations in the type of tremor depend on varying degrees of disintegration of the corpus striatum, but de Lisi<sup>(17)</sup> considers this explanation unsatisfactory and attributes such varieties to lesions of other structures in the midbrain. D'Antona<sup>(18)</sup> found lesions in the putamen and globus pallidus and also in the locus niger and dentate nucleus and concludes that the syndrome is due to removal of control of the striatum system, the putamen and caudate nucleus, over the globus pallidus and lower centres. Similarly in a case of hepato-lenticular degeneration characterised by coarse tremor in all four limbs, Hadfield<sup>(19)</sup> found marked



degeneration of the putamen and globus pallidus and also of the ansa lenticularis.

The tremor of general paralysis is more typical and consists of a regular rhythmic movement. The lesion in this condition is general throughout the higher levels of the nervous systems but especially affects the cortical connections.

Of a similar nature is senile tremor and in both these conditions demonstrable changes occur in the cortical neurones. The rare hereditary tremors may be classed here as having an organic basis.

3. Toxic tremors. The tremor of Graves' disease is probably of this nature and like others owes its effect to a more or less permanent throwing out of the functions of cortical cells, though there may be no demonstrable organic change. The tremors of alcohol, lead, mercury and that of fatigue have a similar origin and nature.

4. The hysterical tremors. These have the character of rapid regular vibrations, but may be modified by imitations of other tremors.

From this study we may see that the incoordinations depend on interference with the afferent side of the cerebello nucleus ruber or prespinal arc. The intermediate coarse tremors such as are seen in paralysis agitans depend on interference with the next arc or more specifically with the control exercised by the striate system over the lower centres in the midbrain. Finally the fine tremors depend on interference with cortical control over the basal ganglia. It is of importance to notice that in all examples of the last group there is a marked loss of control of affective reactions. The case of Graves' disease, of alcoholism, the G.P.I. and the over fatigued person are all easily moved and the same is true of the Parkinsonian, though his peculiar rigidity makes it impossible for him to express these affective states. In all these cases then we have a diminution of cortical control over basal ganglion activity, both affective and motor and when released from control the affective thalamic centre exercises a marked influence over the corresponding striate function. Thus Coppola (20) referring to the localising influence of emotion on the various pathogenic influences responsible for the Parkinsonian syndrome remarks that the exaggerated functional activity of the thalamus resulting from the emotion of the war was able so to influence the lenticular nucleus that it created a locus minoris resistentiae to noxious external agencies. Further from the evolutionary standpoint the thalamus and the corpus striatum at one time represented the high water mark of nervous development and anatomically a very large body of association fibres between these centres is demonstrable.

In a general review of the neuroses as a whole the conclusion to which most people arrive at is that there is a want of adaptation both in respect of the environment as a whole and of the particular aspects of the personality. Such adaptation essentially depends on the establishment of cortical function at its highest level and neurotic symptoms unquestionably correspond to an interference with this function. These highest functions may be summarised as control, integration, discrimination and reference in time and space, all these are noticeably deficient in the neurotic. I believe that in the production of these symptoms various factors are responsible. In the first place there is a constitutional factor which may be expressed in Janet's terminology of a lack of psychological synthesis. For descriptive purposes this term could scarcely be bettered but it has been much criticised on the ground that it gives no explanation and is merely defining a condition in terms of Greek words. Such failure of proper integration of the engrams into stable entities may be due to temperamental influences especially in relation to the ductless gland secretion. Secondly having started with the constitutional factor in a greater or less degree the pleasure principle or the pursuit of gratification of inherent primitive impulses can less readily adapt itself or overcome the reality principle since there is a less stable and less integrated inherent pattern to oppose to reality. This leads to conflict and with conflict the continual arousing of fear in its most primitive form. It is clear that people differ in the degree of constitutional abnormality. At one end of the scale are those who can cope with no conflict between pleasure and reality principles and at the other those who only succumb when this conflict is of the most intense and insoluble nature. Although many of these conflicts involve the sex impulse this does not alter this contention, for in ultimate analysis the true root of the conflict is found to be in the most primitive or regressed type of sex activity namely, Narcissism. In this latter state the sex feeling being directed to the individual himself, a thwarting of sex is equivalent to, if not identical with, a threat to the individual and one result of this latter type of stimulus is the experience of fear or anxiety. This seems to be the explanation of the occurrence of fear or anxiety as the emotional accompaniment of conflicts which are palpably of a sexual nature. Thirdly as a result of these unresolved conflicts fatigue is engendered and this will still further interfere with cortical function and so intensify the symptoms.

To return to the normal engram which subserves the fear reaction, we have seen that this is a complicated arrangement involving both the central nervous system and the sympathetic system. The function of

the latter is to prepare the body in every way for instant action, in many cases flight. In the well-organised engram which is not interfered with or conditioned by other engrams responding to simultaneous stimuli, such flight or other activity will immediately ensue. Even in normal subjects however when this immediate action is impeded by the activity of another engram say that subserving curiosity, there would appear to be a failure of discrimination and control and higher cortical centres being in abeyance there is a short circuiting at the level of the basal ganglia so that uncontrolled activity in the shape of tremor occurs. In this condition we find both agonist and antagonist muscles held in increased postural tone ready for action, but in the absence of cortical discrimination function, neither relaxes to allow the other to act. It is suggested therefore that the muscular rigidity is rather a concomitant than a causal factor of the tremor. When cases are cured by mere re-education in relaxation of the muscles we are probably dealing with a condition of phobia of the tremor as described by Meige and when the muscles are relaxed by the restoration of cortical discrimination there is also a re-establishment of control over the striate centres so that the tremor ceases and the phobia is removed. In the ordinary neurotic the fear reaction is not subserved by a well-organised engram ready for prompt response as we have seen because of his constitutional temperamental qualities, hence the cortical control is never at its best and the establishment of the short circuiting thalamic-striate, fear-tremor response is easy and frequent.

The nature of the tremor will depend on the levels unmasked in the devolutionary process of removal of control. Where cortical control only is in abeyance whether from the fear reactions in the anxiety states or from fatigue in the true neurasthenic, there will be a fine tremor simulating the toxic tremors. When striate control is removed there will be coarse tremors as in the pseudo-Parkinsonian syndrome, not uncommon in hysterics. Where still lower controls such as those of the cerebellum are removed, there will be incoordinations such as occur in organic interference with the afferent side of the prespinal arc. In addition to this however tremors will be modified by the process of conditioning. For example in the masturbatory tremor referred to above. At first two separate engrams were involved. In the first a sexual stimulus, probably ideational, set off activity in an engram which subserved certain muscular movements of the hand in contact with the genital organ accompanied by sexual feeling and finally orgasm. Secondly, orgasm acted as a stimulus to a fear reaction which being poorly organised

easily became a fear-tremor syndrome. From being consecutive in their activity these engrams became coincident and the sex stimulus set off activity which subserved a fear feeling rather than a sex feeling and the motor activity became a masturbatory tremor. This analysis is superficial for the sake of clarity, for it omits the regression to narcissism which undoubtedly occurred.

In this way it would seem all neurotic tremors may be explained as to their nature, but the step in the argument which has not been touched upon is, what is the factor either hereditary or acquired which is responsible for the ease with which cortical control is inhibited and the thalamic striate short circuit allowed to develop? Any effort to explain this must be highly speculative, but it is suggested that irregularity in the suprarenal secretion is the factor responsible. Inhibition is generally held to be due to some biochemical change at the synapses and if we are to explain the variations in inhibitions and facilitations we must postulate a specific action of the biochemical inhibitive agent on certain synapses. Such specific action is familiar in pharmacology through the well-known actions of drugs on nerve endings. In the fear reaction it has been experimentally shown by Cannon that there is a large output of adrenalin into the blood, if this is excessive the secondary reactions of fear depending on sympathetic activity are excessive and uncontrolled and at the same time tremor occurs. This is at least suggestive that excessive suprarenal activity may result in inhibition of certain cortical control and so account for the symptoms. It may therefore be that the "failure in psychological synthesis" in the constitutional neurotic depends on an excess of suprarenal secretion in the temperamental balance and both this asynthesis and the Freudian conflict may be dependent on this, rather than the former be dependent on the latter. This may also explain the somewhat anomalous results of those who depend on exhibition of suprarenal and other extracts in the treatment of the neuroses. It is clear that if there is an inherent irregularity in this secretion there are likely to be periods of failure and over-secretion and consequently occasions when the exhibition of the extract itself or of its antagonists may work wonders in restoring cortical control. However in the present state of our knowledge there is bound to be somewhat of a hit or miss process and more exact knowledge is required as to when and for how long such extracts should be administered. Finally as to the process of cure of tremors. In general the cure of neurotics involves a restoration of full cortical function. They are enabled to discriminate, so that their table of values is re-established, they are enabled to control

so that their reactions are adapted to circumstances instead of always being of the all or none type. They integrate their experiences so that the tendency to regression and devolution is overcome. They regain the power of reference in time and space so that the affective reactions are properly oriented and are referred to actual occurrences at such and such a time and in such and such a place. In the same way in the motor system cortical control may be re-established so that striate mesencephalic and cerebellar centres are again brought to subservient function and agonist and antagonist muscles are again regulated in reciprocal activity. How this is done will depend on the case and on the pathogenesis of the tremor. Where simple fatigue is the predominant factor in the true neurasthenic rest may effect the cure. This will be the case when the patient is suffering from pure overwork or where there is a temporary conflict between the individual and a transitory modification of his environment. Shelter from his trouble till such modification has passed away may be all that is necessary. Similarly where tremor from incoordinated muscles and fear of tremor are the only abnormalities, re-education in relaxing the muscles will be all that is required. But when there is endopsychic conflict, where the personality is divided against itself then these simple methods are not enough and an emotional re-adjustment is necessary by suggestion or better by analysis and re-synthesis. The essence of the cure however is the re-synthesis on the cortical level. This may be done by the patient himself after analysis has freed him so that he is given clean bricks with which to rebuild if this analogy is permissible. Or he may require assistance in his rebuilding, but it is necessary first to make sure that his bricks are clean. At present all that can be said of endocrine therapy is that it may be a useful adjuvant in re-establishing cortical function, but so far our knowledge does not allow us to dogmatise, in spite of the handbooks which instruct us how to cure all diseases by the appropriate hormone. Perhaps it is fortunate that most of them are inert.

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# THE RESPONSE OF EPILEPTIC CHILDREN TO MENTAL AND EDUCATIONAL TESTS

By J. TYLOR FOX.

A SERIES of mental and educational tests has recently been applied to school children at Lingfield Epileptic Colony. The ages of the children varied from 5 to 16 years. The average number of children resident at the Colony is over 160, but the complete series of tests were applied to 150 children (99 boys and 51 girls), and only the results obtained in these cases are considered in this paper.

The age groups of these 150 children, taken about the middle of the period over which the tests were spaced, were as follows:

Years	Boys	Girls	Total
5-6	1	1	2
6-7	1	1	2
7-8	2	—	2
8-9	—	—	—
9-10	8	2	10
10-11	10	5	15
11-12	8	6	14
12-13	7	8	15
13-14	16	8	24
14-15	23	12	35
15-16	19	8	27
16-17	4	—	4
	99	51	150

## TYPE OF CASE.

An important preliminary consideration is the type of child who finds his way to Lingfield. On the Colony application form it is stated that applicants must be "capable of some education and occupation," and those who are defective within the meaning of the Mental Deficiency Act are ineligible for admission. That cases coming within such definition are not, in point of fact, always excluded becomes abundantly clear in the results obtained in the tests set forth below. There are, no doubt, several children at Lingfield "permanently incapable by reason of mental defect, of receiving proper benefit from the education in ordinary schools," and who are, therefore, properly classed as "feeble-minded." Such children would, if it were not for their epilepsy, be relegated to day

special schools for Mental Defectives, and to a large extent the Lingfield education resembles that of such schools. All the children attending school are also certified as epileptics in the following form (Defective and Epileptic Children Act 1889):

I, \_\_\_\_\_, a duly qualified practitioner, approved by the Board of Education, certify that \_\_\_\_\_ not being an idiot or imbecile, is unfit by reason of severe or frequent epilepsy, to attend an ordinary public elementary school.

It might appear from the wording of this certificate that only the worst cases of epilepsy are sent to a special residential school. But in practice, I believe, this is not so, and that certifying medical officers and local education authorities are more enlightened than their rules, and that the words "severity" and "frequency" are made a little elastic to allow of the admission of cases who would obviously benefit by institutional treatment. The continuance of a child's stay at Lingfield depends upon his being able to profit by the instruction given in our school. This means that from time to time children at the lower end of the intelligence scale are removed.

No doubt there is a large number of intelligent epileptic children whose fits are so few or so slight as not to interfere with their education at ordinary elementary day schools, but there are also many very low grade epileptics who are ineducable, and are permanently retained in institutions under certificate. On the whole it is probably fair to claim that results obtained on our children at Lingfield will approximate pretty nearly to the average that would be obtained, if a large group of epileptic children of all grades were investigated. The average intelligence of our school children is somewhat above that of adult epileptics in colonies generally.

#### SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

Any attempt to investigate, by standard tests or otherwise, the intelligence or educational attainments of an individual epileptic is prejudiced by the variability of response that may be obtained from time to time. To a still greater degree, any attempt to group together the responses of a large number of epileptics to mental or scholastic tests is prejudiced by the extraordinary variety of types that are found to be suffering from "epilepsy."

These two handicaps to our investigations require a little further consideration. That a child is frequently dull after he has had one or



more epileptic fits is well known. Less recognised is the fact that mental changes may often be observed before fits, or quite irrespective of the occurrence of fits. Such periods of mental change, which not infrequently show a pretty definite rhythm, affect the emotional or temperamental responses of the patient more obviously than his intelligence. But I believe that the intelligence does suffer as well, and that the memory, power of concentration, and other faculties will often show pretty wide variations. Moreover, it is unreasonable to expect the optimum response from a child who is in an irritable or even "negativistic" phase.

But apart from these rhythmic mental variations from day to day, or from week to week, there are graver, more fundamental changes in progress in the brain of an epileptic. In the vast majority of children, the mental ratio remains pretty steady throughout their school career. Once the pace has been set, the rate of mental development does not alter. This applies to mentally defective as well as to normal children; though, as Burt has shown, there is, among the former, a tendency for the ratio to get a little lower in the later years of school life. But the case is different with epileptics, the characteristic of whose complaint is mental deterioration, and a progressive narrowing of the mental horizon. In some cases this becomes manifest early, in others it is very long delayed; in some cases it is rapid, in others very slow; in some its progress is regular, in others erratic. As a generalisation it is probably correct to say that it varies with the fit incidence, but to this generalisation there are definite exceptions.

One may, perhaps, regard the mental progress of an epileptic child as the resultant of two forces. On the one hand, there is the *vis a tergo*, the push towards development and expansion that he shares in common with all growing things; on the other hand, there is the retarding and narrowing force associated with the disease. The former acts continuously and evenly, but the latter may be erratic and dependent upon fits, or other physical occurrences in the nervous system. The mental progress resulting from the operation of these two opposed forces is therefore often irregular, and, in an epileptic child, there may be wide variations in the mental ratio. This is well illustrated by the following table, which shows the alteration in the ratios obtained by the Binet Tests on 130 epileptic children in two successive years.

The table shows the wide variations in the ratio, the general tendency towards deterioration, and the very marked deterioration in over 8 per cent. of the total. Those cases showing rapid deterioration are among the most striking, and at the same time, most distressing that occur on an

epileptic colony. They are, I imagine, only comparable with those that occur as a result of encephalitis lethargica or other organic brain disease.

MENTAL RATIOS (Normal—100).

Comparison of results (1922 and 1923), obtained by Binet tests.

Gained over 10 points ... ..	1
„ from 6 to 10 points ... ..	9
„ „ 3 to 5 „ ... ..	19
Stationary or showing a gain or loss of not more than 2 points ... ..	53
Losing 3 to 5 points ... ..	25
„ 6 to 10 „ ... ..	12
„ over 10 „ ... ..	11

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In endeavouring, then, to group together the results of tests upon a large number of epileptic children with a view to any general deductions, we have to realise that among the children will be some whose mental progress is following a very erratic course. Thus there will be children who have developed fairly normally up to a certain age, and who are now rapidly going down hill; others, who have been kept from school on account of their complaint, but who are now making up arrears and showing an increasing mental ratio; others, whose mental ratios show see-saw variations dependent on groups of fits at long intervals; and so on.

Moreover, it is probably more correct to regard epilepsy as a disease group, rather than as a single disease. It is hardly reasonable to expect to obtain the same type of response from a child whose disease is manifested by frequent momentary attacks of petit mal so slight that they almost escape observation, as from a child who is subject to periodic groups of severe major attacks followed by profound mental and physical exhaustion. The improbability of a uniform type of response is increased by the extraordinary diversity of the etiological factors. Thus, in patients the commencement of whose epilepsy was associated with a cerebral birth trauma, or with local inflammatory or vascular lesions in early life that gave rise to a concurrent hemiplegia, one would not expect the same type of variation, whether in intelligence or temperament, from the normal, as in those where a clearly marked double neuropathic heredity was obviously the predominant factor in the causation of the disease. Yet among the 150 cases under consideration in this paper, there are several children in both these groups, and others where such diverse events as scarlatinal nephritis, air raid shock, or digestive disorders at any rate figure very largely as causative factors. This aspect of the disease could easily be further developed; but, for the present

purpose, enough has been said to show how the diversity of the etiological factors, and of the clinical manifestations of the disease, together with the variability of its course, are likely to be handicaps in such an investigation as the present one.

#### THE TESTS APPLIED.

These were as follows:

1. Binet-Simon Test.
2. Reasoning Test.
3. Portens' Maze Test.
4. Reading as a Mechanical Art.
5. Reading as a Means of Acquiring Ideas.
6. Spelling.
7. Addition.
8. Subtraction.
9. Multiplication.
10. Division.
11. Oral Addition.
12. Oral Subtraction.
13. Arithmetical Devices.
14. Arithmetical Problems.

#### METHOD OF EXPRESSING THE RESULTS OF THE TESTS.

The result of every test was expressed in figures as a mental or educational ratio, obtained by dividing the mental age gained by the application of the test, by the physical age (in years and months) of the child at the time. The mental ratio of the "normal" child is, of course, in every case 100.

In each test, the mental ratios were then arranged in serial order, and the median figure was selected as expressing the average response of the 150 children to that test. Many children either made no correct response to a test, or such a small correct response that no mental age could be assigned to them. The determination of a mental ratio was, in such case, therefore, out of the question, and a mean figure, taking into account all the children tested, could not be arrived at. A median figure was therefore chosen, with the result that every child tested, whether a mental ratio was obtained for him or not, had an influence in its determination.

## Test I. BINET-SIMON.

The Binet-Simon Tests were put to the children along the lines described in Mr Burt's book, *Mental and Scholastic Tests*. An endeavour was made to adhere to the general instructions, and to the specific directions for each test, as closely as possible. The limitations in some of the tests are undoubtedly more precise than in those in general use, with the result that, although more accurate comparisons are possible between one child and another, or between the responses of the same child at different times, the mental ages work out rather lower than would be obtained by most observers.

Among the 150 children tested in this investigation, the median mental ratio for boys is 71, and for girls 65.

The order of difficulty of the various tests was not quite the same as the standard order. Following Mr Burt's lines (*Mental and Scholastic Tests*, p. 143), a new order for epileptics was drawn up. The difference in position occupied by the individual tests in this order, as compared with the standard, were then indicated by figures, + 2 indicating that the last had moved up two places in the scale and was relatively harder for epileptics, - 3 indicating that it had moved down three places and was relatively easier. Owing, however, to the small number of children in the younger age groups, the negative results obtained in the tests for ages up to and including age 6 (tests 1-31) were so few, that any new positions assigned to those tests were unlikely to be accurate. When they have been deleted, the following table shows the differences in the order of difficulty for normal and epileptic children:

41	Six numbers	...	...	...	+6	65	Difference. President and King	0
33	Add 3 pennies and 3 halfpennies				+5	43	Nine coins	...
35	Dictation	...	...	...	+5	54	Rhymes	...
40	Change	...	...	...	+5	62	Abstract differences	...
52	Seven numbers	...	...	...	+5	64	Re-statement	...
50	Difficult questions	...	...	...	+4	51	Gives sixty words	...
59	26 syllables	...	...	...	+3	60	Defines abstract terms	...
39	Date	...	...	...	+2	61	Folded and cut paper	...
49	Absurdities	...	...	...	+2	34	Difference of concrete objects	-3
58	Problems	...	...	...	+2	53	Sentence	...
36	Reading	...	...	...	+1	38	Counts backwards	...
47	Sentence	...	...	...	+1	48	Draws two designs	...
63	Reversed triangle	...	...	...	+1	57	Resists suggestion	...
44	Reading and recollection six items				0	45	Definition superior to use	...
46	Five weights	...	...	...	0	32	Missing features	...
55	Mixed sentences	...	...	...	0	42	Months of year	...
56	Interpretation	...	...	...	0	37	Easy questions	...

Tests which epileptics find relatively harder include those where immediate memory is concerned (41, 52, 59), where written language is especially involved (35, 36), where there are difficult abstract questions

to be solved, calling for concentration and reasoning (50, 49, 58), and finally where the use of coins as in everyday life is tested (33, 40). The comparative failure under the last head is no doubt partly because our children, in an institution, do not come into frequent contact with money, as children do in ordinary life.

At the other end of the test we discover that epileptics find it relatively easier to deal with easy questions, especially where the definition and differentiation of concrete objects are concerned (37, 45, 34). Their sense of form is not so impaired as that of most of their faculties; hence their relative success in the missing feature test (32), and also in their reproduction of two designs (48), even though, in the latter case, they are handicapped by deficient immediate memory. Older memories of things learned by rote (42) seem well established, while they appear resistant to suggestion (57), though it is, to say the least of it, a little doubtful how far this test is really a measure of suggestibility. The ability to face a new situation, and count backwards from 20 to 1 comes rather as a surprise.

These differences in the difficulty of the various tests for epileptics, as compared with normal children, approximate pretty closely to those found by Mr Burt among children attending the M.D. Special Schools.

#### Test II. REASONING.

The whole series of Burt's graded Reasoning Tests (Ballard's *Mental Tests*, p. 90) was applied. One mark was given for each test correctly answered, but fractions of marks were not awarded. Tests are provided for each year from 7 to 14, and if a child were successful in the whole series his mental age would be 15. There are seven tests for age 7, and each correct test was therefore counted, in the determination of the mental age, as one-seventh of a year. For each subsequent year there are six tests and each test was therefore counted as one-sixth of a year. The maximum mental age in this and all subsequent tests is 15.0, and therefore in estimating the mental ratio, the divisor (physical age) was taken as 15.0 for all children who had passed their fifteenth birthday.

Six boys and nine girls failed to give a correct response in any tests. Taking these into consideration the median mental ratio for boys is 76 and for girls 67.

#### Test III. PORTEUS MAZE TESTS.

These tests were given in accordance with the instructions in Burt's *Mental and Scholastic Tests*, pp. 242 *et seq.*

Two boys and ten girls failed to do even the simplest test for a child

of 3 years old, and for them therefore a mental ratio could not be determined. The median ratio for boys works out at 77, and for girls 71.

It has frequently been asserted that the Porteus tests are a fairer guide to "Social Efficiency" than any other intelligence tests. It has been pointed out that temperamental deficiencies and instabilities count for a good deal in the performance of these tests. Carelessness or impulsiveness prove a heavy handicap; while alertness, the ability to plan, and to profit by mistakes are qualities that are given scope to pull their full weight. The understanding or construction of written language is ruled out altogether, while the whole test can be successfully carried out without the necessity for the child to translate a single idea into speech.

Now it is generally conceded that pure intelligence tests are of less value in estimating the social value of epileptics, than of other groups, because it is in virtue of his temperamental deficiencies and abnormalities rather than of his intellectual failure, that the epileptic finds it so difficult to take his place in society. If this is so, we should expect that this series of tests would be of especial value with epileptic children. An attempt was therefore made to compare the "social efficiency" value of Binet's tests, Burt's reasoning tests, and the Porteus maze tests. It was considered that the best judges of the social efficiency of the children would be those members of the staff who actually live with them for the longest number of hours each day. They see the children at their meals, at play, at domestic duties in the home; and cannot but notice how they behave when under discipline, and also when they imagine themselves to be free from observation and restraint. In almost all the cases, the opportunity for observation has lasted for not less than several months; in many of them it has been prolonged over years. Accordingly the following question was put to the sister in charge of the home in which each child lived:

Supposing this child never had any more fits and continued to attend school, into which of the following groups would he fall at the age of 16?

- A. Able to earn his own living under ordinary conditions, and manage his own affairs.
- B. Not so good as A, but able to live outside an Institution, and make a fair contribution, under favourable conditions, to his own support.
- C. Requiring Institutional treatment; but could do useful work in an Institution.
- D. Requiring permanent Institutional treatment, and unable to render any useful service.

[In answering this question, no account to be taken of physical defects, *e.g.* paralysis.]

As an outcome of these questions, the 150 children were divided into four grades of social efficiency with an accuracy, I believe, that is unlikely to be surpassed by any series of tests. Errors of temperament, whether slight or grave, defects of intelligence, and variability, whether of emotion or intellect, will of necessity have had their place in determining the class to which each child is assigned.

The median mental ratio of the children in each group was then determined for the Binet tests, the reasoning tests and the maze tests, and also the mean deviation from the median figure in each case. If the sisters' grouping is assumed correct, the criteria of accuracy for the three sets of tests will be (1) the orderly progression downwards of the median figures of the four groups, and (2) small and approximately constant figures denoting the mean deviations. Of these two criteria the latter is much the more important.

The results, which are striking, are shown in the following table:

Class	No. in class	BINET-SIMON		BURT'S REASONING		PORTEUS	
		Median mental ratio	Mean deviation of mental ratio	Median mental ratio	Mean deviation of mental ratio	Median mental ratio	Mean deviation of mental ratio
A	57	77	8.7	84	15.6	82	10.9
B	37	65	9.2	70	14.6	72	23.3
C	33	65	11.1	68	15.4	64	12.1
D	23	47	9.4	61	19.9	32	26.0

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It seems quite clear that the Binet tests are easily the most effective of the three in determining social efficiency, and that the Porteus maze tests are not so reliable even as the reasoning tests.

The classification by the sisters is least likely to be accurate in the case of the younger children, and, as a matter of fact, it is among them that the greatest deviations from the mean mental ratios occur. This becomes evident in the following table, from which the 45 children under twelve have been eliminated: the general conclusion, however, remaining unaltered:

Class	No. in class	BINET-SIMON		BURT'S REASONING		PORTEUS	
		Median mental ratio	Mean deviation of mental ratio	Median mental ratio	Mean deviation of mental ratio	Median mental ratio	Mean deviation of mental ratio
A	39	77	6.5	84	7.8	81	7.2
B	29	65	9.3	70	10.6	68	17.4
C	26	61	8.5	67	15.5	64	11.2
D	11	42	9.8	61	4.1	30	21.8

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*These figures seem to shew, without any doubt, that the maze tests are not nearly so reliable as the Binet tests in measuring social efficiency.*

**Test IV. READING AS A MECHANICAL ART.**

(Ballard's *Mental Tests*, p. 135.)

In this test the child reads aloud, as fast as he can, a standard series of common words, starting with words of two letters, and going on to words of three, and then four letters. There is no connection between the words; the test being designed to measure the "bare mechanical art of reading" only. The result of the test is expressed in the number of words correctly read in a minute. Ballard gives separate norms for boys and girls at the ages of 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14 years. The average between the norms for the two sexes was taken as the standard figure for  $6\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $7\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $8\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $9\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $10\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years respectively. A graph was then drawn so that a mental age for this particular test could be determined, corresponding to any particular number of words correctly read in one minute. The highest mental age obtainable was taken as 15.0 years (123 words). A child who correctly read this, or a larger number, was therefore given a mental age of 15.

Ten girls and twelve boys were unable to read, and consequently gave no mental ratios in this test. The median is 69 for all boys tested, and 70 for the girls. This is the only test in which the figure for girls is higher than that for boys, and it is interesting to note that Ballard also found, among normal children, that girls excelled in this test.

**Test V. READING AS A MEANS OF ACQUIRING IDEAS.**

(Ballard's *Mental Tests*, p. 147.)

A story is read silently for three minutes, and the identical story is then put before the child with a number of words left blank. The child has to fill in as many of the missing words as he can. The test, therefore, measures both understanding and memory.

Ballard gives norms for children for each year from 9 to 14. These were taken as for  $9\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $10\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $11\frac{1}{2}$ , etc., years, and a graph drawn with a maximum mental age of 15 (22 correct words). Unless a child obtained four correct words (mental age 9.0), he was not placed in this test; and it was found that 51 out of 99 boys and 30 out of 51 girls could have no mental ratios assigned to them, because they only got three or less of the missing words. In each case therefore the median figure fell among those for whom there was no mental ratio. A graph of the ratios obtained was then made, and the curve extended downwards so that the figures assigned to the fiftieth boy and twenty-sixth girl respectively could be found. Determined in this way, the median for boys is found to be 59, and for girls 58.



**Test VI. SPELLING.**(Burt in Ballard's *Mental Tests*, p. 157.)

A list of one hundred words is provided, graded in ten groups, each group corresponding to a year's mental age from 5 to 14. Thus if a child gets all the words correct his mental age is 15, if he gets 47 correct, it is 9.7, and so on. 11 boys and 11 girls failed to give a mental ratio in this test; the median ratio being 66 for boys and 62 for girls.

**Tests VII—X. ADDITION. SUBTRACTION. MULTIPLICATION. DIVISION.**(Ballard's *Mental Tests*, p. 161.)

The principle and method of application of these four tests are the same. The child is provided with a series of sums written out on a piece of paper, in one of the four processes to be tested; and one mark is allowed for each sum completed correctly in three minutes. Ballard's norms for  $9\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $10\frac{1}{2}$ , and up to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years were transferred to a graph, and a corresponding mental age determined for each number of marks. In these tests, mental ages less than 9 were not counted. Thus in addition and subtraction no mental age was assigned unless two marks were obtained, but in multiplication and division one mark gave a mental age of 9.2 or 9.5 respectively. The number of children for whom no mental ratios were obtained in these tests was large, especially in the case of girls, viz.:

				Out of 99 boys	Out of 51 girls
Addition	...	...	...	47	32
Subtraction	...	...	...	57	37
Multiplication	...	...	...	52	36
Division	...	...	...	54	37

The medians had therefore to be obtained by graphs; and while the figures for boys may be taken as approximately correct, those for girls are obviously not nearly so reliable. The median mental ratios are:

Addition	...	...	...	67	54
Subtraction	...	...	...	58	49
Multiplication	...	...	...	60	48
Division	...	...	...	65	46

**Tests XI AND XII. ORAL ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION.**(Ballard's *Mental Tests*, p. 187.)

A standard series of very simple sums in addition or subtraction is put to the child orally. The second sum is given as soon as the correct answer for the first is obtained. The number of sums correctly answered in one minute gives the score.



<i>Educational Tests:</i>	Boys	Girls
4. Reading as a mechanical art. A series of unconnected words read for speed and accuracy. (Ballard) ... ..	69	70
5. Reading as a means of acquiring ideas. Understanding and remembering the words and ideas in a narrative read silently. (Ballard) ... ..	59	58
6. Graded spelling test. (Burt) ... ..	66	62
7. Addition (silent): number of correct processes in three minutes. (Ballard) ... ..	67	54
8. Subtraction: ditto. (Ballard) ... ..	55	(49)
9. Multiplication: ditto. (Ballard) ... ..	60	(48)
10. Division: ditto. (Ballard) ... ..	65	(46)
11. Oral addition—no reading required. No. of correct processes in 1 minute. (Ballard) ... ..	73	66
12. Oral subtraction: ditto. (Ballard) ... ..	70	63
13. Arithmetical devices. Test for knowledge of rules and methods. (Ballard) ... ..	63	(57)
14. Applied arithmetic, <i>i.e.</i> , problems. (Ballard) ... ..	76	50

Some guesswork has been involved in arriving at the figures in brackets, and they are consequently of less value than the others.

In view of the considerations brought forward earlier in this paper, it is important to avoid laying too much stress on these figures. There are certain deductions, however, that can obviously be made:

1. The general superiority of boys, especially in arithmetic and tests where reasoning is required (2 and 14). The only test in which the girls are superior (4) is largely a mechanical one.

2. The tests for general intelligence (1–3) give better results than educational tests. Many of our children have, before admission, had long periods without attendance at school; and the type of education at Lingfield is less “bookish” than in ordinary elementary schools.

3. The marked difference between the results in tests 4 and 5 shews the failure in concentration and recent memory.

4. It is lack of concentration, too, that probably accounts for the poor results in written arithmetic (7–10) as compared with oral arithmetic (11 and 12).

5. Generally speaking the failure follows the same lines as that which occurs among mentally defective children; an observation which is confirmed by the analysis of the responses to the Binet-Simon tests.

Beyond these generalisations, it is probably unsafe to venture. Further investigations into the response of epileptics to intelligence or educational tests should probably follow one of two lines:

1. The comparison of the response of different groups of patients, classified according to etiological factors or the clinical manifestations

of the disease. For such a comparison to be of value, a very large number of patients would be required.

2. The study of the progress of individual cases over a prolonged period of time. This would give the opportunity of seeing how far it is possible to correlate the mental progress with the course of the complaint.

## A CHILD STUDY

BY M. N. SEARL.

WE believe that close study of any one child and more superficial study of many will clearly demonstrate to the unprejudiced the existence of those factors and mechanisms for calling attention to which the world has not yet forgiven Freud. But it does occasionally happen that a particular child as a result of particular qualities, whether innate or developed by circumstance, will exhibit with unusual clearness and quite unmistakably what in others will only be discovered by careful investigation. This careful investigation is to the critical always open to the objection, however unwarranted, that a certain amount of suggestion or misinterpretation has been applied by the investigator; therefore cases in which this has been demonstrably absent and which yet give the same results have an especial value. Of course any such case will be open to the further objection that it may be an exception, or the child abnormal; and since a definite standard of normality is out of the question, this can be made an almost unassailable refuge for the unwilling-to-be-convinced, only to be weakened objectively by the steady accumulation of confirmatory results from children whose normality would not otherwise be called in question.

It was my good fortune to come into rather close contact with such a child for some weeks; and while to those acquainted with analytical theory I can offer nothing in any way new or unexpected, the clearness of material in one or two directions may prove of interest even here.

Any question of giving anything in the form of analytical treatment, even to the mild extent of dealing with childish ignorance and curiosity as to the facts of birth, was ruled out for two reasons: first, that I happened to know that the mother wished herself to give the child all the information she deemed necessary, and was intending to do so shortly; secondly, and this a very considerable drawback, neither the child nor I could speak the other's language, and our communications had to be in the medium of a third imperfectly known to us both. I felt incompetent to deal with delicate subjects, however simple might seem the opening, where I might at any moment be held up for lack of a word, or worse still, give a wrong impression by choice of a wrong one. This

fact enables me to vouch more definitely than is usually possible for the entire spontaneity of the material. But in another direction there was no such gain to balance the loss. This was in connection with the child's wealth of phantasy about gifts, getting a baby, cruel treatment, saving the mother by providing her with money, etc. While in an ordinary conversation I could follow without any fear of misunderstanding, it was another matter when she was mastered by the joys of narration and poured out her little soul in a quick stream of phantasy-production; further, though this was of far smaller importance, want of familiarity with her literature made it impossible for me to tell to what extent the tales she had been told provided the form of her phantasies, or had been worked over and elaborated by her. Thus to my great regret I had to leave practically alone one of the most promising fields one could wish for enquiry into the treasures and working of the child-mind.

T. was a very quickly intelligent little 6-year-old Scandinavian of good family, whose delicacy of feature, fair hair and blue eyes gave some promise of the later beauty she so ardently coveted, and which her 18-year-old step-sister possessed in such high measure. Jealousy of this sister, spontaneously charming and carefully admirable in all her ways, was a big factor in little T.'s psychology, well hidden as it was at first. She of course enjoyed an intimacy with the mother denied to the small child, and equally important, the big sister's father was still living, though they only saw each other occasionally, while T.'s had died when she was only three years old. (This fact of her mother's divorce naturally added to the difficulties and complexities connected with "marriage" and "husband.") In contests with the sister for the attention of the mother and of desirable visitors little T. always came off second-best. It was after a stormy fit as the result of such a failure that she recounted to me how once a beautiful angel had come to visit her in a garden and had said "Little T., I have come to see you because you are such a good little girl." On enquiry, the detailed description furnished of the beautiful angel provided a most accurate picture of the big sister. The circumstances made the conclusion irresistible that a beautiful sister as an angel away in heaven, paying only occasional visits to earth, and then in order to commend the small child, was a much more manageable conception than the actual state of affairs. This ambivalence of feeling is, of course, a far from negligible factor in the formation of all heavenly hierarchies.

But in spite of occasional outbursts, storms of tears and temper nearly always similarly provoked, T. was markedly a happy good child,

content to play for hours by herself in a rather lonely type of existence, with very scanty outlets for her quick eager faculties. Indeed, if normality be a result of a power of adaption to reality, whatever that may be, T. was quite outstandingly "normal." For one of these rebellious fits there were scores of times when after a series of delicately persistent attempts to attract the attention so ardently desired, she would recognise their futility, and turn definitely and happily away to other more promising fields, in another room or the garden. Unfortunately, this seldom meant the possibility of turning to other people or children, but a constant throwing back on herself. This was even more marked in the mornings, when in order not to disturb her mother in whose room she slept and who at that time seldom rose before 11-12 o'clock, she was obliged to busy her little mind with phantasy if she would keep herself good and quiet. After such late rising it was natural that sleep would not come at her 7 o'clock bed-time, and once again activity of thought-processes had to take the place of the forbidden motility. I do not think this almost enforced over-occupation with her phantasy-life can be held to be the only reason why in her case the setting in of the latency period seemed delayed—there were certainly others. But one can plainly see how the strength of the ego-ideal (she tried so hard to be "good" in these directions where her charming mother was closely concerned) made the phantasy-life a necessity—it was the only possible compromise between reality and wishes.

I have never met a child more eager to learn—she was happy as long as she could be gaining fresh knowledge, which also meant gaining in the process the attention of some grown-up. Her already keen interest in speech was fostered by the fact that her chief opportunities for learning were in connection with languages, and of these she made full use. Here again additional factors were concerned—those connected with emulation of the mother and step-sister, who spoke many languages, and at times used a foreign tongue to keep their conversation private from the quick ears of the small child: not only must she know as much as they in this one direction of speech, but also she must by knowing make of no avail their means of preventing her from acquiring other knowledge they shared in common. How frequent and how powerful a concomitant of other factors is such a situation in developing a love of languages has already long been evident to those whose study of the adult mind is genetic in character. Indeed, the whole question of vocation and its connection with infantile traits and opportunities for their sublimation was brought vividly to the foreground with this child; more especially

so in connection with the provision of opportunity at the *right moment*; and tantalisingly so since one could, of course, never say with certainty what would have been the difference had this provision been made. For us, mere impressions are of slight value, but certainly in quite a few months I thought I detected an alteration in the direction of her interests. When I first knew her, one of her keenest wishes was to go to school, of course as much for the companionship she lacked as for instruction. Once, for 4 or 5 days in succession she fed me each afternoon with detailed accounts of her introduction to school life for an hour or two each morning—told, and illustrated with drawings, street, direction, time, what they did, who was there; in fact, built up a complete picture of school-hours in which children learnt by means of games, were taught by a kind lady who insisted that they should call her “sister,” and who rewarded them with cakes and sweets—interesting facts for educationalists. It was, of course, plain that phantasy was playing a large part in all these accounts, but I confess that at first I had no suspicion of the true state of affairs—that from beginning to end there was phantasy and only phantasy, and no question of going to school at all. The place of phantasy in the service of the wish needs no emphasis here. But the point to which I do want to draw attention is my impression that only a few months later the keen edge of the wish to learn facts was somewhat blunted, and that her interests and phantasies were more closely connected with physical self-display than formerly; now she wanted to be trained as a dancer, and her phantasies ran thus: “A man stopped me in the street and told me I had the most beautiful hair he had ever seen”; a phase probably, and a natural one where her looks were noticeably improving, and she was actually gaining more notice than ever before from her sister’s many admirers: but it opens up this query among others—whether with all children there may not be a high-tide of sublimation-possibilities for particular trends, which, if opportunities are then lacking, will never again so easily reach their full development. In any case the shifting of the picture was interesting enough; one felt the disappearance of the likelihood of a scientific career, and if one ventured on the hazardous path of prediction, one would say that her intense and prolonged absorption in the phantasy world could only work out satisfactorily and be socialised in the sharing of it with the world as a fanciful writer of some description. But life with its enormous possibilities is apt to make short work of such predictions—they have no value beyond the suggestive.

This desire of the child’s to “know” was in clear connection with



her intense interest in birth, marriage, etc., as, of course, was its converse, her phantasy-life: the transition from the one to the other being made with the greatest possible ease and frequency. She knew no letters and I had no time to teach her, but she would busy herself for half an hour at a time picking out of a mass of unintelligible printing one small word such as "und" with which I had made her familiar. To that would follow some such incident as the following, when she turned to examine, not for the first time, a small mole on my neck. "Baby," she suddenly enunciated. I asked why, and she proceeded to tell me a long tale as to how it must be powdered every day, and it would grow and grow, and at last one would scratch it off, and in the end it would be a real baby. For reasons already given, my only comment to this was that I had always had the mole, and had never had a baby. She said: "No, it wasn't quite the right sort, it ought to be bigger," and dropped the subject<sup>1</sup>.

As I have before indicated, T. offered extraordinarily rich material in her long involved tales about how to get a baby—sometimes it would be by the uttering of magic words by a particular tree, when an angel would appear and promise her a baby as a reward for being good. At other times there would be stories of wanderings in a forest, of finding a big basket full of all sorts of nice things, generally with some suggestion of a baby at the end, but unfortunately I can only give the general trend.


In this same connection one would put her great longing for presents, which not even her desire to be good could always keep in bounds—presents of any and every sort and description, from a half-dead flower or a pretty leaf to the baby she so often mentioned. Here is an incident which throws that and other traits into strong relief: she had often begged me to give her my engagement diary, to which she had taken a great fancy. One evening I came in and missed it, was of course suspicious, but searched everywhere. T., in bed but awake, hearing me, began a shouted conversation through the closed door between the two rooms, and at length informed me that she had stolen a book of mine. I went in, told her that books must not be taken out of my room while I was away, that of course I shouldn't scold, but that I must have it. She said she had hidden it, and we turned the finding of it into a game of "hot and cold" into which she entered enthusiastically. In the middle she brought out a phantasy of a man who had once made her a present of

<sup>1</sup> For the connection between scratching and production of a baby, this time from a berry, cf. *International Journal*, vol. III, Pt 2, "A Child's Birth-Myth Story," by S. Herbert.

all. *all* his books and everything—a man, be it noted. The book was found with her in bed, as I expected. As I took the book away she was laughing, and I kissed her goodnight—an unusual caress between us: she was very undemonstrative to women, very demonstrative to men. Probably, after the phantasy about the man, this was too much a mother-attitude on my part; in any case, it loosened the springs with extraordinary suddenness, she began to cry stormily, seized the cup on the table, made as if she would throw it at me or on the ground, then insisted vehemently that I should take it and put it on the floor, and, still crying bitterly, told me to go away. The anger against the mother for taking away the phantasied gift of the father could hardly be more plainly shewn than in this seizing of something so symbolical as a cup—which we shall find later used with equally clear symbolism. Seeing the intensity of the struggle and the partial success of the effort of self-control, I went. In two minutes she was again calling out to me, and telling me she had something else of mine. She poured out a long tale, which I believed pure phantasy, of having picked up from under the wash-stand a ring of mine which she had kept. I said, very well, it could wait till morning, and then we would talk more about it—and made a move to leave. For once coming to the end of her phantasies, in a frantic effort to find other means of keeping me, she dashed to the bed-table, asked if I had “gross gemacht” on the “toilette” to-day; if not, I must have two of these little black things, shewing me a box of pills; she pressed them on me with the greatest insistence, in spite of my assurances, and again I left her. In another minute she was calling out to me that she had taken something else of mine—a half-dead hyacinth from my wash-stand, which I had supposed removed by the maid. So that the tale of the ring did cover an actual small theft, and was apparently told in order to draw down a reprimand. This, if given, would in all probability have satisfied her sense of guilt, and the real incident have remained untold. Further, it was the approach to actual fact which stopped the imaginative flow. The mechanism of a compulsion to phantastic lying on the one hand and kleptomania on the other could hardly be clearer, and are in complete agreement with the work that has been done on this subject. One notes too the possibility of the identification with the mother, in her insistence that I should be treated as she was, just as soon as some of the negative to the mother had been abreacted—that identification with the parent of the same sex which is the regular method of overcoming the rivalry situation, and which is perhaps only possible when the burden of repressed negative is not too great. In fact, this seems

to me one of the most illuminating points of the whole incident—the possibility of the change from the “I-instead-of-you” attitude with its attendant anger and guilt to the “You-and-I,” “I-like-you” attitude with its reconciliation.

The diary incident had not yet reached its end. When I came in next day, at a time, when I had promised to have T. in my room, I saw at once, and she herself drew my attention to the fact, that she had again taken my diary; she added “and your birthday book too.” The latter



was untrue but significant. Reminded of what had been said last night, in a quite unusually demonstrative manner she threw herself across my lap face downwards, and without the least sign of repentance asked me to “smack her on her popo.” Previously, when asked why she had taken my book again, she had said “because you are so funny,” which vanity or something else made me believe to mean “because you don’t scold as I expect.” I took up her demand, and said “she wanted to make me cross with her, didn’t she?” “Yes,” at once. “But I wasn’t cross

because I knew how badly she wanted the book," etc. As an outcome of this conversation, she walked quietly out and brought me back the book without a word and without the least embarrassment. This attempt to establish relations with a love-object on the basis of her masochistic tendencies and anal-erotism was repeated on another occasion.

The fuller meaning of the dash to the bed-table, of her interest in the daily functions, of the cup symbolism, when the object she desired as a gift was taken away out of her bed, is shewn in the accompanying unusually clear drawing. I was too busy one day to give her the attention she wanted, but she contentedly borrowed pencil and paper, left my room, and came back a little later with the drawing. I, of course, looked at it with interest, asked what was this, that, and the other thing, and began writing the names she gave by the side. She seized the pencil herself, drew the rough squares by the cup and the hare's head, and told me what to write inside. Description is really redundant. The cup of chocolate on the bed-table, the chamber inside, the egg inside the chamber, with marks on it indicating her own name (whether here signifying identification or possession, probably both) the Easter hare who has just laid the egg and who is labelled again with her own name and the added remark "born in K." give a child's phantasy of birth, faecal birth, as plainly as could be desired.

It is noticeable that the hare is drawn without a tail—surely some indication with which other traits well agree, that the child had at that time no big quarrel with her femininity, whatever her other difficulties.

Her attachment to the father-*imago* was intense; as I have said before, the situation was complicated by the fact that while her own father died when she was three years old, beautiful big sister had a father, and further, numerous father-substitutes in the way of men-friends and lovers. Quite pathetic were the efforts of the child to attract these latter to herself, and her joy over any small gifts they made her. Undemonstrative to me and all other women, for them she was all tenderness and cajolery and caress. Once while playing in my room, she cut a figure out of paper; I saw her making it kneel, and asked what it was praying. "God, that my father may not die," she burst out with a fervour in strange contrast with her play, before and after. The intensification of the father-*imago* uncorrected by a reality situation was clear in all the strength of longing for and varied talk about a father—probably increased by reaction to unconscious negative.

I cannot better end this short sketch than by giving a child's presenta-

tion of the Oedipus situation in a form that might, one would think, make it lose its worst terrors for even the most prudish. . . .

"You are married, aren't you?" T. asked me one day.

"No."

"But you *are* married?" with intense surprise.

"No."

"But you were *once* married"?, with an air of certainty.

"No."

"But," triumphantly, "you have a father, and that *is* being married."

## REVIEWS

*Ethics and some Modern World Problems.* By WILLIAM McDougall, F.R.S., Professor of Psychology in Harvard University; Formerly Reader in the University of Oxford. Methuen & Co., Ltd. Pp. xv, 240. 1924. Price, 7s. 6d.

This book, Professor McDougall tells us in his preface, may be regarded as the ethical supplement to his well known earlier psychological study of *The Group Mind*. In some ways also it continues the line of thought initiated in his more recent *National Welfare and National Decay*. Psychology, however, plays only a minor part in the present volume, which does not therefore strictly call for any very extended notice in this journal (especially since *National Welfare* has already been reviewed at length, vol. 11. p. 313); representing as it does, however, the ethical and sociological views of one of the foremost English speaking psychologists, some indication of its contents will assuredly be of interest to our readers. Starting from the position that it is inadmissible to draw any sharp distinction between ethics and politics, McDougall develops as his main thesis the view that our civilisation has developed on a dual ethical basis—the system of Universal Ethics and National Ethics respectively. (In the interests of philosophical clarity, it is to be regretted that the relationship of these two systems to certain other important ethical or political systems—such as those of Aristocracy and Democracy, and those of Egoism and Altruism—is not considered more in detail.) These two systems have never been harmonised: they are rather in perpetual conflict with each other. Moralists have, with a very few notable exceptions, advocated the former system, while politicians nearly always act upon the latter. The plain man gives lip service to Universal Ethics, but acts according to “common sense,” which in many vital respects (especially in the field of politics) coincides with National Ethics.

The great need for political and sociological thought at the present moment is a synthesis of the two systems; for it is clear that a perpetual moral struggle between two widely divergent tendencies is no more healthy for communities than for individual minds; the failure to recognise the inevitability and (within certain limits) the perfect ethical justifiability of the tendencies expressed in the system of National Ethics is in many respects comparable to the inability to appreciate the existence of deeply implanted instincts that is found in mental disease. In both cases a partial and only moderately successful repression of those aspects which do not harmonise with the explicitly accepted standard of morality may lead to upheavals—upheavals which in the case of societies take on the ever increasingly disastrous form of war. The peril to civilisation that may come from a temporary or exclusive predominance of National Ethics has been made sufficiently clear by the Great War. That a similar predominance of Universal Ethics (could it be consistently applied) would in the end be equally disastrous is a proposition which is perhaps not so immediately obvious, but which—McDougall believes—is capable of satisfactory proof, and a portion of his work is accordingly devoted to indicating how all attempts at a consistent and exclusive resort to Universal Ethics are found to lead to the degradation and eventual break up of civilised society.

The consistent application of Universal Ethics logically implies a replacement of the present independent nations either by anarchy or by a cosmopolitan state. Anarchy being dismissed as obviously unworkable (the reader who has any doubts on this point is referred to *The Group Mind*), it is maintained that a cosmopolitan state is inferior to a number of independent national states (1) in that it is too big and heterogeneous either to permit of easy identification of the interests of the state with the interests of its component members or to admit of satisfactory government by the methods of representative democracy, (2) in that it lacks the stimulus of competition, and the advantages afforded by variety and specialisation.

These disadvantages of the cosmopolitan state spring from the very nature of man as a social being and must be admitted to exist even though we hold the dogma that "all men are created equal." But as a matter of fact this dogma is very far from being true, and the most severe indictment of Universal Ethics is that it would tend to increase the proportion of less able members of the population. The argument here follows on the whole the lines adopted in *National Welfare and National Decay*, with the important substitution, however, of an international for a national point of view—a substitution which makes this portion of the book of great interest even to those who are already well versed in eugenic theory.

Since therefore the claims both of Universal Ethics and of National Ethics must be taken into account, what steps are possible towards the production of a satisfactory synthesis of the two systems? In the light of the previous discussion it would seem that any acceptable suggestions towards this end must give due recognition to two essential conditions, (1) the persistence of nations as the bearers of culture, (2) the maintenance at a high standard of the native qualities of each nation. Bearing this in mind, two main "precepts" are enunciated; (1) that democracy must be of the representative type, *i.e.* government must be carried on by an aristocracy representative of the best tendencies of the democracy and responsible to the whole people; (2) that Internationalism rather than Cosmopolitanism is the desirably world order. Coming to more definitely concrete proposals, it is suggested that the citizens of any state shall be divided into two main categories—the *A* class of those who have the rights and duties of full citizenship, and the *C* class of unenfranchised citizens, the latter comprising the mentally deficient, convicted criminals and the illiterate.

This expedient would, McDougall thinks, solve many of the more strictly political problems of democracy. To deal with the eugenic problems it is proposed either that intermarriage between the *A* and *C* classes be prohibited, or (and this seems the preferable and more practicable course) that an intermediate *B* class be instituted. The children of *A* couples would then belong automatically to the *B* class until such time as they had qualified themselves for admission to the *A* class. The children of *C* couples would first have to qualify for admission to the *B* class, and would be eligible for entry into the *A* class only after a further period of probation. Objectionable as these suggestions might seem to those imbued with the ideals of "ultra-democracy," McDougall maintains that they are more just and more reasonable than the franchise restrictions (based on race, age, sex, etc.) such as actually exist in many countries.

In this book McDougall is more definitely Malthusian in attitude than in *National Welfare*; he is fully alive to the great importance of the purely quantitative aspects of the population problem, and considers that each nation

will have seriously to undertake the task of the deliberate restriction of its population. Unfortunately he does not give us any concrete proposals as to how this restriction is to be effected. "It is obvious," he says, "that a wise social regulation would aim at and would know how to secure through the agency of custom, of social institutions and, if necessary, of legislation, a restriction of reproduction among the citizens of the unenfranchised class—a restriction as severe as the circumstances of the time may demand." This is hopeful, but too vague to be very helpful. Perhaps, however, in a future work McDougall may be induced to treat the quantitative problems with the same thoroughness as he has already treated the qualitative (eugenic) problems in *National Welfare*. These problems abound in difficulties both of a sociological and of a psychological order, as the present reviewer has endeavoured to show elsewhere in this journal (vol. II, pp. 225 ff.) and are well worth careful and detailed consideration at the hands of the social psychologist.

What is at once the most novel and the most daring of McDougall's proposals is reserved for an Appendix—an appendix which is very boldly entitled "Outline of the One and Only Practicable Plan for Bringing about the Disarmament of Nations and the Reign of International Justice." It is here maintained that the two chief obstacles to the successful working of the League of Nations (or any other similar body) are (1) the question of how the different nations are to be represented, (2) the question of how the League is to be provided with adequate sanctions. The first of these difficulties may be met, McDougall suggests, by allowing representation to each nation on the basis of its expenditure on education (which is indicative both of its cultural and economic status). The second and greater difficulty could be met by an international agreement to prohibit all national ownership of aircraft. A small but highly efficient international air force under the sole control of an international authority could then, without difficulty, enforce the decisions of that authority upon any recalcitrant nation. The scheme is fascinating in its simplicity and daring, and undoubtedly deserves careful study. It is earnestly to be hoped that, as McDougall suggests in his preface, even those readers who do not care for the philosophical discussions contained in the earlier part of the book, may nevertheless be interested in the practical suggestions contained in this appendix.

A second appendix is devoted to a consideration of post-war Anglo-French relations; the attitude of France being sympathetically dealt with. The book ends on a sinister note, calculated to enforce the great and immediate urgency of the problems that have been treated. "Thus Labour and Finance," we are told in the concluding words, "are combining to create in France a state of feeling which at any moment may send a thousand air-planes to destroy a defenceless London."

J. C. FLÜGEL.

*The Appearance of Mind.* By J. C. MCKERROW. (Longmans, Green and Co. Pp. xv + 120.) Price 6s. net.

*Aberrations of Life.* By J. C. MCKERROW. (Longmans, Green and Co. Pp. 107.) Price 6s. net.

In these two books the author develops what is really a theory of the behaviour of organisms. The first book contains an account of the theory and the



arguments supporting it; while, in the second, the theory is applied to the consideration of certain physiological and psychological abnormalities.

Briefly, the author attempts to show that "Mind," *i.e.* the "Subject" of psychological theory, is not a reality, but must be replaced in our conception of reality by an "Immaterial Principle" as he terms it, though it is really a law (in the scientific sense), namely, "There is a tendency (in organisms) towards Viable Equilibrium" (p. 4). "Viable Equilibrium" is explained as meaning the equilibrium existing between a bio-chemical reaction (*i.e.* the reaction of an organism) and its conditions. "Viable" = "able to live" (of the organism), and "supporting life" (of the conditions).

I think that, with this definition of "viable," the law of tendency towards viable equilibrium is little (if anything) more than a tautology. But, if we grant that it has a more significant content than this, it becomes necessary to determine whether the author has really succeeded in substituting it for the concept of "Mind" or "Subject" and in showing the latter to be devoid of reality.

The argument proceeds in a somewhat rambling fashion; but, if the original premises were granted, many of the succeeding statements would be true. Unfortunately, however, the author appears to confuse throughout his work two very different things, namely the ability to *describe* the behaviour of organisms without explicit reference to a "Mind" or "Subject," and the ability to dispense altogether with the concept of mind in a theory of the ultimate nature of the universe in which the behaviour of organisms is one type of manifestation.

For example, in a discussion of the association of ideas it is asserted that two ideas are "made contiguous, associated, not by a Thinking-Subject, but in accordance with law." But to say that two ideas are associated "in accordance with law" is merely to say that, as a matter of fact, two ideas which have once occurred in contiguity frequently occur again in contiguity. This does not help us much—it gets us no further than the observed fact, and it is quite irrelevant to the question whether this fact is rendered more intelligible, both in itself and in its relation to other facts, by the hypothesis of a "Thinking-Subject."

The subject may or may not exist, but you certainly cannot dispose of it by saying that the facts which it is called upon to render satisfactorily intelligible take place "according to law."

I do not, of course, wish to imply that there is nothing more in the author's argument than this, for quotations torn from their context are always liable to give a false impression of what they were really meant to convey; but I do mean that the author is far too ready to dismiss respectable psychological (and metaphysical) concepts by facile reference to "tendencies" and "laws" which, unless we are content to regard them as mere descriptions, themselves raise just the kind of difficulties which these concepts have been employed to surmount.

In criticising the reasoning of Descartes (which, if valid, would be fatal to his theory) the author takes refuge in that fact which seems to afford such curious comfort to many modern thinkers who are trying to get rid of mind from the scheme of things—the fact that, if we look for a Knower or Thinker, *i.e.* an Agent, we cannot find it, we can only find Activity. But the plain answer to this is that if there be an Agent it is, *ex hypothesi*, not the kind of entity which could be discovered by searching, *i.e.* by careful observation of phenomena. The fact that it cannot be so discovered is therefore irrelevant to the question of its real existence, which can only be settled by the consideration of quite a different order of facts which it is unnecessary to discuss here.

The author's position is really summed up in a statement which appears on page 28 of *Aberrations of Life*. He says here that "organisms are not Persons attending to what they are interested in, they are bundles of appropriate tendencies-in-respect-of changes, 'objects,' 'signs.'" This position is not a new one; and it comes to life at intervals though it has frequently been flogged apparently to death. The question is whether the existence of tendencies in such remarkably unified "bundles" can be made any easier to understand by means of some such concept as the "subject." It is so very difficult to give any meaning to the notion of a mere "tendency" *per se*. Surely there must be some entity which *has* the tendency; and you cannot replace this entity entirely by the tendency in a substantial explanation (as distinct from a description of the facts).

I have not considered these two books in detail. There is much in them that is interesting, and few people would be disposed to quarrel with most of the author's descriptions of psychological and physiological facts. But detailed consideration is unnecessary here, for the author's main contention stands or falls on general grounds; and, as I have attempted to show, I do not think he has in any way succeeded in establishing the thesis which he set out to demonstrate.

C. A. RICHARDSON.

*Love in Children and its Aberrations.* By OSKAR PFISTER. Translated from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1924. Pp. 576. 24s. net.

The intention of this large volume is to "make the assured and fruitful results of the modern study of unconscious mentation, and of the importance of the unconscious in mental development, accessible to the general reader...in as popular a vein as the subject permitted....It is intended to show the general relationships of the development of love, to explain how desirable ends can be attained, and how necessary changes can be effected. My aim is to induce parents to conceive their educational tasks in a very different way from that demanded of them by the exponents of the traditional science of education." The author rightly says that this is a difficult task on which he has embarked; and we in our turn can say that it is a task on the whole well achieved. Although popular, it is weighty and serious in presentation, and shows very clearly how difficult the business of getting properly educated is, and how complicated and delicate the process of normal emotional development. We are introduced to the subject by a survey of the history of the problem of love, and of love in children as treated in educational science; and then carried on through a study of the normal and abnormal development of love, of formative forces and experiences, to the training of love in children and the treatment of love's disorders. The author's wide and varied experience as an analyst and a pastor are drawn upon for a wealth of illustrative material at every point, and the discussion of the educational aspects of the problem reveals his practical wisdom. It would perhaps seem an ungrateful task to offer criticism of so solid and dignified a popular volume; and yet we could wish it more solid, from the point of view of psychological science.

For it undoubtedly suffers on the theoretical side, not merely from the limitations imposed by its popular character, but from the almost passionate desire of the pastor to make clear the ethical value and significance of psycho-

analysis. We are constantly hearing of "higher interests," and "higher powers," but we are not shown what is their source, nor their relation to the "lower" sensual desires. After all the broad discussion of "Love" we remain clouded as to what relation "love" bears to sexuality, and "parental and filial affection" and "the love of God" to sexual love, no use being made of the concept of erotic impulses which are 'inhibited in their aim' (zielgehemmt). Although we are given a clear summary of much of Freud's sexual theory, with verbal approval, we cannot help feeling that it has not been fully assimilated into the inner texture of the pastor's thought about love relationships. We are expressly told that "psycho-analysis does not claim that it is competent to remedy all the aberrations of the love sentiment"; and we have the impression that the over-anxious repetition of apologetics of this type are an index of failure to deal with the "higher" impulses in strictly psychological terms.

One other serious criticism must be made. Reading through the case after case described so dramatically to illustrate the various points of the discussion, one would undoubtedly get the strong impression, if one did not already know better, and know that the author must know better, that the mechanism of the psycho-analytic cure was to "make clear the meaning of" the symptoms. Such a passage as the following shows an altogether too intellectualistic interpretation of the therapeutic processes, an interpretation that is only too misleading to the general public, and leads not only to misunderstanding, but to malpractice. "The aim of the analysis was to show the patient the historical origin of his symptoms;...to show him what in his youth he was giving expression to and aiming at; I had to disclose to him the nature of his hostility to the teacher, the unwholesome and cruel attitude of mind that led him to call up the haunting spectre of this teacher as the devil. But also I had to prove to him that his anxiety, which led him to play the timid child, had as its aim to save him from the energetic utilisation of his powers, and thus to secure a gain out of illness. I had to bring into light these unethical manœuvres against the teacher and himself. When this had been done, the patient's own moral judgment set to work, and made him abjure such conduct..." That this is the author's general view of the dynamics of the cure is the impression one gains, an impression which is not lessened by the direct discussion of "The Concept and Aims of Psychoanalysis" on pp. 513 *et seq.* Not until later, p. 533, do we come upon any important recognition of the function of the transference in the process of analysis. On p. 534 Dr Pfister straightforwardly admits that in his earlier writings and his earlier practice he did lay too much emphasis upon the intellectual interpretation of symptoms, and overlooked the analytic significance of the transference. One cannot but respect such honesty and elasticity of mind; and yet, even the statement here is not entirely adequate to the matter under consideration. Even in a popular book, it should be possible to make clearer the detailed psychological processes that occur during the course of analysis, leading to the "cure"; and especially, the all-important function of the transference, since it is with regard to this that so much misunderstanding is found, not only among the people who have just heard of psycho-analysis, but also among its serious critics, and especially among semi-qualified practitioners. It is, moreover, a matter of first-rate importance for all educational problems, since, as the recent work of Freud has shown, it affords the key to the formation of the "ego-ideal," and therefore to all "moral" development and social psychology.

SUSAN ISAACS.

*The Daydream. A Study in Development.* By GEORGE H. GREEN, B.Sc. (Lond.), B.Litt. (Oxon.). London: University of London Press, Ltd. Pp. 304. With Diagrams. Price 6s. net.

Mr Green's previous contribution to educational psychology is such as to demand the most respectful consideration and to justify high expectations.

"It is customary to say in these days that we are just beginning to know the minds of children. We probably boast too much. We forget, as we reach one stage, what the former was like. And such forgetting is necessary to progress, which must look to the future rather than to the past; considering that all of the past that matters is embodied in the present. We are perhaps learning that if we want to understand children—something that is perhaps not really necessary, except in the case of parents and teachers—we must go to the child himself and consider his acts and sayings apart from our own prejudice" (p. 289). This possibly indicates the point of view from which Mr Green approaches his subject.

In the *Daydream* Mr Green studies phantasy, both in the child and in the adult, as a typical product. He rightly regards as the chief determinant of the phantasy the stage of emotional development of the dreamer. He offers a very valuable formula for the recurring theme—"by the help of persons who admire me, and who are placed in a position to assist me, I am placed in an advantageous position."

Any one who has studied phantasy at all extensively will realise the very frequent applicability of this formula. In Chapter III the excellent schema of a typical fear phantasy is set forth:—

Darkness (in which I can do nothing properly, and where I run into things and hurt myself)	} HUMILIATION (my feeling when I am helpless)
Laughter (of adults at my mistakes)	
Jumping at me (I am caught unawares, and cannot know at once what to do)	
Bigness (I am helpless in the presence of big things)	
Discovery (I am sometimes seen doing things, which I did only because I thought I could not be seen)	

At the same time Mr Green seems to have gone rather far in regarding phantasy as reducible to constant types. Discarding the method of Varendonck, he has rather gone to the other extreme.

Some will think that Mr Green is not quite wide enough in assessing the factors which determine the actual content of the daydream. It is obviously true that the daydream fills the gap between aspiration and reality for the dreamer, and for a large range of daydreamers we may take the aspiration and reality as being respectively typical. But this does not cover an important minority of cases in which either the dreamer's aspirations are exaggerated, or the actuality of his situation is abnormal. For instance, the girl's phantasy of becoming a boy is not one that can be recorded merely as a product of a certain stage of development. It is essentially a product of the girl's environment—one in which for some reason the male sex is more highly valued or privileged. Similarly, the phantasies that emerge from physical abnormalities, e.g. gigantism, dwarfism, etc. have little relation to the stage of development. In short, the author tends to slur the compensatory value of the phantasy and regards it more as a normal concomitant.

Mr Green throughout this volume shows himself a confirmed Freudian, but

it is always refreshing to find in his writings the critical recognition of other points of view, notably those of McDougal and Rivers. Freudian literature partakes so much of the closed circle that one welcomes every attempt to reinterpret the concepts of Freud in terms of other psychologists, and in this particular direction Mr Green has, it seems to me, a very valuable contribution to make. It is also refreshing to follow his serious attempt to reinterpret Coué's law of reversed effort. Some of us may doubt whether this particular psychological conception is capable of restatement in any satisfactory way, but that is a different matter. The author's attempt to do so is in itself helpful.

Mr Green lays much emphasis on the different determinants of manifest and latent content. This is very necessary and valuable. One of the best chapters in the book is on the imagination, and contains a field of phantasy that always rewards exploration. The chapter on the group is interesting, but here again one would venture to submit that Mr Green fails to recognise the direct relationship between the phantasy on the one hand, and the discrepancy between aspirations and reality on the other. Aspirations of group emanate essentially from situations in which group adjustment is unduly difficult, and we doubt whether they are as universal as Mr Green takes them to be.

In general the book is one that can be very warmly commended, and is stimulating and illuminating throughout. The reader has the feeling that the author is not writing second-hand opinions, but has studied his subject extensively and conscientiously and set forth the results in a most useful volume.

The book is pleasantly got up. It is commendably free from misprints (though we observe one on p. 14), but we were a little astonished to see the *Psychology of Fantasy* attributed to Jung instead of to Dr Constance Long, who is represented as the Translator.

H. CRICHTON MILLER.

*Modern Theories of the Unconscious.* By W. L. NORTHRIDGE, M.A., Ph.D., with an introduction by Prof. J. LAIRD, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd. 1924. Pp. xiii + 194. Price 8s. 6d. net.

Exactly one-half of this little book is devoted to theories of the subconscious, of the subliminal self, and of the unconscious prior to Freud; little new light is thrown upon the relationship between these various theories. It seems a pity that with the scholar's equipment possessed by Mr Northridge he should have contented himself with this sketchy performance; many outlines already exist and yet there is room for a serious and detailed study. If the theories of Leibniz are worth considering at all surely it is a scandal to dismiss him to-day in four pages. His monad theory, the differentiation between monads, beginning with *monades nues* when perceptions are at a minimum, is a dynamical doctrine of mind requiring a full exposition.

Mr Northridge is the first critic, I think, to point out that Myers used the term subliminal with two very different connotations,—“the subliminal as a region of the mind built up in the course of individual experience”; and that ‘profounder faculty’ or ‘soul’ which inhabits a metaetherial environment. The author makes no use of the studies of Schopenhauer, von Hartmann and others that have appeared in the psycho-analytic journals. He omits all reference to Samuel Butler who nearly half a century ago claimed that “all the main

business of life is done thus unconsciously, or semi-consciously" and whose "Way of all Flesh" was only too obviously a study of the unconscious.

Many a tribute is paid to Freud's work; it "has enabled us to understand and explain life to an extent that was not previously possible"; "the originality and uniqueness must in all fairness be conceded."

It does not seem however that the writer is quite at home in the theory (we do not suggest this is a reason for these tributes). Thus in relating on p. 183 a personal fugitive experience and its later return to memory he states that according to Freud the entire experience must in the meantime have been contained in the unconscious; on p. 126 he gives a correct description of the preconscious.

In contrasting Freud's and Jung's methods of dream interpretation he considers Jung's views as more satisfactory than Freud's because "every element in the dream symbolism ought to receive special interpretation since the 'background of the mind' is never the same in any two individuals." Not only is it not the same, in the Freudian view, in any two individuals, but it may not be the same for the same individual on different occasions.

In describing repression the author concludes that it is the affect which is repressed: this is misleading. There is displacement of affect but the 'Freudian wish' is repressed. Take the case of the queer miser, related by Abraham, who went about with his trousers unbuttoned in order that the buttonholes should not wear out too quickly. There was no repression of affect, but of its underlying origin in the miser's anal eroticism; a displacement of affect. Freud pointed out long ago that the affect in a dream is a sure clue to its interpretation; the affect itself had not to be interpreted.

Since this is the best of all possible worlds it is presumably all to the good that every new reader of Freud writes a book explaining where he agrees and where he differs. Occasionally one would like to read something that ventured a fresh explanation; the gaps are so big and so few are engaged in reducing them.

Doris Fitcher on pp. 43, 49 and 54 should be Fischer.

M. D. EDER.

*Psychotherapy.* By JAMES J. WALSH, M.D., Ph.D., Sc.D. Revised Edition. Pp. xxix+846. New York and London: W. Appleton & Co. 1923. Price 30s. net.

This is not a book that anyone can read through, not so much on account of its bulk, but because it has one theme and one only, and this theme is played over and over again without variation. Nevertheless it is well that some one should have lived who was sufficiently self-disciplined to write it, and while it is probable that no one will ever read it from cover to cover in its entirety, it is a book which all doctors in general practice might possess with advantage; they would find in its pages something to help them in the management of almost all those chronic diseases which give rise to so much despair in the minds of both doctor and patient.

The tune which is played is the tune of hope. Over-solicitude over symptoms makes patients worse, hope makes them better. There is truly nothing more than this in the book, and yet it is worth having. For though one may grasp that general principle and consider it easy to apply, and though most doctors

are well aware that they should employ it constantly in all manner of diseases, few are able to continue to do so over long periods: and when one has exhausted both the pharmacopœia and one's patience, it is cheering to read something of this kind: "The famous case of the Siege of Breda in 1625 is often quoted. The city was about to capitulate because so many of the soldiers were suffering from the disease (scurvy). The Prince of Orange, however, sent word that a new and powerful remedy had been discovered that was sure to cure the affection, and that he had secured some of it, and it would not be long before they would all be well. What he sent was a remedy that had been used with indifferent success for scurvy when taken in large doses. He could send only enough to give a few drops to each patient. This small dose was wonder working in its effect and proved to have the healing virtue of a gallon of the liquor. Most of the patients got better and surrender was put off."

There can be no doubt that in treating organic diseases many doctors take too gloomy a view, and preach fear when they should be preaching hope; they inculcate timidity when valour would be better and are in general more interested in the pathological scheme of damnation than in the therapeutic one of salvation. Consultation on the part of doctors every few months with this volume would prove a valuable corrective; and read in this way, a few pages every few months, the book will last for years.

The book is divided into twenty sections and several appendices. The first few sections deal with the history of psychotherapy, the principles of hope and its opposite, the general principles on which hope may be instilled and so forth. Ten sections deal with the regions of the body and the remainder deal chiefly with the psycho-neuroses. Each section is split into chapters. It may be stated with confidence that by far the strongest part of the book is that dealing with the psychotherapy of organic disease. There is here no quarrel with other kinds of therapy. All the same physical remedies are upheld. Psychotherapy is extolled as an adjuvant, a most important one, sometimes as the only thing needful; but nowhere is there any scouting of well tried remedies. But the sections dealing with the psycho-neuroses are weak. It is likely enough that for very many of the psycho-neuroses hope is the only thing wanting, but in a large number it cannot be used in the crude way which Dr Walsh suggests. One cannot but feel as one reads the pages devoted to these disorders that for Dr Walsh the psycho-neuroses are merely figments of the patient's imagination. He appears to have no sense of the difference between a normal and a pathological dread; he does not seem to realise that to the patient himself the latter is a ridiculous thing and that it is therefore a work of supererogation to impress upon him that it is absurd. True, at the end of this chapter he does refer to forgotten memories being causal; but this is clearly, in Dr Walsh's mind, not very important, and he does not give a technique for the restoration of these memories. There does not seem any recognition anywhere that psycho-neurotic symptoms have a meaning.

There are some odd contradictions and misunderstandings of which two may be given. Speaking of subconscious obsessions, the author says "in some of these cases hypnosis is necessary" (p. 476). Elsewhere he says "Hypnotism is induced Hysteria. Hypnotism was the greatest medical delusion of the 19th Century" (p. viii).

Here again is a curious sentence: "They (artefact skin lesions) can only be prevented by changing the patient's state of mind, though this is scarcely what is ordinarily thought of in psycho-therapy."

Notwithstanding these criticisms the reader will find many useful hints in these chapters on the psycho-neuroses. The author is full of ingenious methods for overcoming difficulties, and his bland optimistic certainty must have a very reassuring effect on patients.

But it must have been a dreadful book to write.

T. A. Ross.

*Clinical Studies in Epilepsy.* By DONALD FRASER, M.D. Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingston. Pp. 243. Price 7s. 6d. net.

The author of this little book is a disciple of Hughlings Jackson, who, he claims, has given us the only scientific conception of the nature and mechanism of the epileptic process. He accepts without reservation Jackson's theory of the essential unity of all forms of epilepsy, including focal and idiopathic epilepsy and migraine, and regards the simpler (*i.e.* focal) forms as experiments, illustrative of the more obscure (*i.e.* idiopathic). With such an approach to the disease, it is not surprising that he is quite out of sympathy with modern views as to its psychological origin and nature. Pierce Clark's picture of the fit as a regressive phenomenon is quoted to be repudiated. To regard epilepsy as a psychosis is a cardinal error. The psychology of epilepsy is solely the psychology of post-epileptic conditions, *i.e.* the psychical effect of damage done to nerve cells by the fit. This would seem to apply to what are commonly termed psychological equivalents, for the statement of Hughlings Jackson that automatism is always post-epileptic is quoted with approval. Confronted with a case of epilepsy, in which there was an amnesia without apparent relation to the fit, he goes so far as to assert that the amnesia, having a psychogenetic origin, is not epileptic in nature, but adds the rather curious comment that the epilepsy may have predisposed to it!

The author himself is quite convinced that there is a metabolic basis to epilepsy. In focal epilepsy there is a toxin produced in the damaged cerebral cells themselves, in idiopathic epilepsy it may be the expression of defective cerebral metabolism, or possibly general metabolism. Wherever or however produced, the toxin acts on the capillary (not arterial) tone in certain areas of the cortex, and, by exaggerating the normal capillary contraction and dilatation, initiates the fits. In support of this theory he quotes cases of epilepsy with hypopituitarism, where the fits were due to loss of capillary tone associated with defective pituitary secretion, and disappeared when pituitrin was administered. He would also allow reflex irritation to play a secondary part in the causation of epilepsy. Investigations into the maintenance of cerebral capillary tone, and into the nature and origin of the toxins or hormonal defects should lead, in his opinion, to the understanding and rational treatment of epilepsy.

We cannot say that the book is a very convincing one. The psychological aspect of the disease, in particular, demands much fuller treatment. We need not accept the more advanced views of the modern school, but we must recognise the enormous importance of mental factors in the actual causation of the disease in certain cases, and in the determination of fits in very many cases. To say that all the mental phenomena of epilepsy are directly due to the fits is as absurd as to claim that all cases of epilepsy are psychogenetic in origin. The problem is not a simple one, and in the treatment, as well as in the



investigation, of epilepsy, physical and mental factors must be considered together, for they most certainly act and re-act on each other.

The book is loosely written, and it is often difficult to find out exactly what the author means. It contains many words not in ordinary use, such as 'outwith,' 'organon' and 'skilly'; and at times we come across statements that stagger us. Thus on the very last page we find that Dr Fraser endorses Hughlings Jackson's view that the artery of *petit mal* is the anterior cerebral, and the artery of epileptiform attacks (presumably motor focal fits) is the left middle cerebral, and goes on to express his own opinion that the artery of idiopathic epilepsy must be mainly the posterior cerebral, though it would be difficult to exclude some branches of the middle cerebral!

J TYLOR FOX.

## NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Part IV, 1923.

In the first original article of this number Dr Otto Rank endeavours to throw light on the development of the libido during the process of psycho-analytic cure. The paper falls into two sections, in the first of which he discusses the question of 'psychic potency.' He quotes from the cases of four men whom he personally observed and shows that in each a determining influence was exercised upon the subject's psychic potency by the processes of repression and identification. Further, he touches on the part played by the mechanism of identification in the normal sexual life. The second section deals with ideal-formation and object-choice as seen at work during psycho-analysis. Dr Rank shows that the task of analysis is (a) by means of the transference to release the repressed primal libido and (b) to enable the patient to proceed to a fresh object-choice based on new and useful ideals.

Dr Kielholz contributes an article on the genesis and dynamics of the mania for invention. His illustrations are taken from cases of schizophrenia and show that the inventions of these patients (and the same holds good, though less obviously, of all inventors) stand in symbolic relation to their psycho-sexual complexes.

A translation of these two articles will appear in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.

The third original article is by Dr Felix Deutsch and is entitled *Experimental Studies in Psycho-Analysis*. The writer describes some experiments he made with the intention of illustrating a certain aspect of psycho-analytical theory, namely, the part played by the unconscious in the genesis of organic disease and by various psychic mechanisms in the formation of neuroses which affect bodily organs.

Taking as his starting-point a statement of Freud's to the effect that psycho-analysis is a science for which an organic basis must be established, Dr Deutsch suggests three experimental methods which may assist towards this end: (1) the inducing of organic alterations in the internal secretions and the observation of the effect upon the whole personality of the subject; (2) the analysis of paralytic mental disturbances; (3) the bringing about of psychic alterations and the observation of the organic and psychic results which ensue.

The third method was that undertaken by the writer, in the belief that organic, no less than psychic, symptoms have a meaning and purpose which can be traced to a psychic source and that, if the source be discovered, the meaning will become clear. For the purpose of experiment he employed the method of hypnosis as follows. He suggested a certain experience to the subject in hypnosis and gave the command that in the waking state the experience should be forgotten but the affect belonging to it should be reproduced at a given signal—the exhibiting of a handkerchief by the hypnotist. At the given signal the patients showed uneasiness and in many cases experienced distressing bodily sensations, all of which symptoms disappeared when the handkerchief was put away. The parts of the body chiefly affected were the head, the heart and the intestines. Dr Deutsch points out that some people experience organic sensations when they repress an unconscious phantasy and that these sensations may persist as permanent symptoms. When the affective disturbance passed from uneasiness to marked anxiety, the physical sensations were no longer mentioned. In such cases the anxiety was far greater in the post-hypnotic state than whilst the experience was being suggested in hypnosis. The subjects displayed no signs of neurotic anxiety except at the given signal.

Dr Deutsch was thus artificially setting in motion the familiar mechanism by which in real life the affect belonging to a repressed experience is converted into anxiety. In some cases the patients stated that they felt no anxiety; nevertheless, a change in the heart-beat was registered.

A further stage in the experiment was undertaken when the command was given in hypnosis that the patient should (1) reproduce the affect belonging to the forgotten experience, when the handkerchief was produced and (2) recall the experience, when the handkerchief was dropped. Sometimes the experience was recalled calmly and the affect, having been abreacted, did not reappear when the handkerchief was shown again. In other cases, where powerful infantile complexes were brought into play, the affect continued to reappear as often as the handkerchief was shown. Dr Deutsch drew the conclusion that, in general, this indicated that a certain amount of repression remained. Sometimes bit by bit the memory connected with the complex was finally recalled in full. He points out that in just the same way the symptoms of a neurotic patient remain unchanged if he is told in the first analytic hour that they are due *e.g.* to the Oedipus complex, for the repressed material, together with the affect belonging to it, have not been brought into consciousness by recollection and free association.

This number contains several short communications. In the first of these Dr Felix Boehm records observations he has made on the phenomenon of 'transvestitism,' *i.e.* the impulse to assume different clothes, for example, for men to wear feminine dress. In the male cases which the writer observed the subjects were found to have a strong masochistic tendency combined with latent homosexuality. He traced the masochistic phantasies and activities of these men to the anal-sadistic phase, in which the Oedipus and castration complexes play a large part. In the female disguise the man was not only himself but (by identification) the mother and was thus enabled to gratify at one and the same time his sadistic and masochistic tendencies.

Paul Schilder records a case in which at times the patient lost the consciousness of his own personality. He alleged that this first occurred when, as a child, he witnessed parental coitus. The writer regards the symptom as indicating a powerful repudiation of the rôle of spectator.

Dr Hitschmann has noted that when persons who were accustomed to sleep together as children find themselves in the same situation in later years there is a ready regression in their dreams to infantile complexes. He suggests that an experiment of this sort might form part of an 'active' therapy, as a means of facilitating the bringing to light of repressed material.

Ludwig Binswanger discusses at length the 'Psychodiagnostik' of the late Hermann Rorschach, who introduced an experiment in which the subject was required to 'interpret' the shapes of ink-smudges which the experimenter displayed to him. The writer says that this experiment, undertaken at first in play, became in Rorschach's hands a highly subtle scientific instrument and threw light on many secrets of personality.

The number contains various critical notes and reviews, an account of the International Psychological Congress held at Oxford in July 1923 and of the Italian Psychological Congress, held in Florence last October. It also contains reports from the different Societies belonging to the International Psycho-Analytical Association.

CECIL BAINES.



## VERA

## A STUDY IN DISSOCIATION OF PERSONALITY

*(Continued)*

BY ALICE G. IKIN.

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## CHAPTER VI

## SELECTIONS FROM ANALYSIS OF DELIRIOUS EPISODES

## INTRODUCTION

THE dissociated pseudo-personalities are referred to by their numbers, I to X, except in the case of 'Gerald' who is more frequently referred to by name than as VII.

The three apparently irreconcilable characters which were recognised by Vera as aspects of herself before the delirium, are now recognised as three conflicting attitudes towards experience. *B* and *C* are egoistic, one adapting through thinking, the other through feeling. *A* is altruistic, but is capable of utilising the adapted function developed through *B* or *C*. *A*, *B* and *C* represent altovert, introvert and extravert types respectively.

Analysis indicates that the ten dissociated pseudo-personalities had resulted from ego-regressions at different stages of these three main syntheses. Each had different libido levels producing hallucinations. The delusions resulted from the attempt of a much regressed ego to account for, or rationalise, the evidence, hallucinatory or otherwise, of his or her senses. I say his or her, because any delirious self whose ego-consciousness was due to regression of the *B* synthesis, thought it was male.

The partial analysis which follows includes extracts from free associations. The latter illustrate methods of interpretation and give enough of

the material so obtained to enable a psycho-analyst to reconstruct much that is omitted. In the free associations, the length of the dash between words or phrases gives a rough indication of the interval which elapsed when there was no thought in consciousness. Phrases from the original delirious experiences which were reproduced during the course of free associations are in italics. Where visual imagery occurred the fact is noted in every case, since verbal imagery was employed almost exclusively by Vera in ordinary life, and in the majority of her free associations. The exceptions usually refer to early life<sup>1</sup>. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind when interpreting the free associations. These usually sprang up ready clothed in words. This enabled Vera to give a verbal representation more adequate than if visual imagery had predominated and had had to be put into words in order to be recorded.

Wherever an omission was made in a series of free associations, the fact is noted in brackets, so that the broken sequence is apparent. Usually the omissions consisted of personal details necessary to lead up to the next association quoted, whose relation, however, to the one preceding the omission is usually apparent without the insertion of the intervening links. Where big resistances were encountered, which entailed many such personal reminiscences before their significance became apparent, a summary or outline of them is substituted, giving their substance, but not their form.

## PARTIAL ANALYSIS OF DELIRIUM

### Extracts from Analysis.

#### I. GIRL IN NURSING HOME IN AMERICA—VAGUE

Recorded on p. 185.

The partial analysis of this episode may be indicated best by giving extracts from free associations to find why the home was in 'America.' These were obtained on 25th July 1921 and were as follows:

*America* . . . . . across the water, over a barrier—the other side—death living afresh . . . . . the life beyond the veil . . . . . seems all right only a little too simple. I might have thought of that before—go a little deeper, must be some other reason why America should represent the promised land . . . . . (omission) . . . . . pampas, undulating plains—leatherstocking tales by Feumore Cooper—delight in Red Indian tales and ambition to emulate their wild escapades when 10–13 years old. (Several reminiscences from tales of Red Indian life including girl in green tweed costume, with whom apparently I was identified as she was

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. H. R. Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*.

living the adventurous life I had longed for) . . . . . Lake of a thousand isles—the Water-witch—schooner—pirates—Treasure Island, three men on a dead man's chest—for a long time I thought all sitting on dead man, took chest as part of body—seal on lion's den with Daniel, thought of this seal as an animal when a kiddie—where am I getting to? it's a far cry from America to Daniel in the lion's den . . . . . Oh I see, substitution of one meaning for another, old forgotten desire to go to America and desire to go to heaven as the other side, both represented by America, as chest and seal have two meanings—wonder if there's any more? . . . . . (Reminiscences from Hiawatha) love for poem of Hiawatha—appeal of wild free forest life, life of nature—longing to throw off all trammels and conventions and live freely, one with nature and all its wild things—in those days (12) America with its vastness and wildness a refuge from reality—blood stirred by hairbreadth escapes, amongst Red Indians of north, and also rich luxuriance of Southern Brazil . . . . . but why on earth didn't all this come up freely to consciousness? I could remember no interest in America, no reason why I should have been there so much in delirium, until I got these free associations, some from a long way down judging by the way they came half formed and I had to wait for them to get through, but I can't see why they should have got lost so—why they should have been repressed—must find out (omission) . . . . . It's tantalising, memories surging all round yet can't get through and I don't know why—repression of male adventurous side with arousal of sex—always the struggle between the two, always will be, and I'm d. . . if I know now which will win—(omission of two pages of memories from books leading to a forgotten dream the next association to which is)—A huge emporium in New York—sale day—girls overworked—and expected to please foreman or go. Why was I called Gwendoline? and I have not fathomed the deep water yet, why 'deep' it's been 'big' till now?—Niagara Falls, often wished to see them—magnificent sale of natural forces—don't know why I missed c out in scale, turns it into prostitution and I was not thinking of that—oh, I suppose it signifies what emporium was for, I thought it was for everything, not that. I found in delirium certain emporiums I'd expected to find in New York were not there but replaced by many small dirty shops and I am bewildered (omission) *G*. . . *K*'s wife—believe that's it alas—why do I keep miswriting words? I meant to write 'at last' and found I'd written 'alas.'—There are depths within depths here apparently and the result is that escape from one level gives the other away. *G*. . . often wore green, and as I wanted it in delirium it looks as if I'd gone back to earlier stages in which I unconsciously loved him—and found a certain unconscious satisfaction in a disguised identification with his wife, whom he had not met when I knew him first; must get 'big water' now.

*Big Water* . . . . . Minneha-ha—the rustle of leaves—the flood of the shingle (puzzled) the surge of the ocean, the throb of the heart, the throb of a steamer—bringing *K* to me—*K* and I always fey where water is concerned—passionately fond of water.

*Explanatory Notes*

America in which so much of the delirium was laid thus seemed to represent a two-fold wish, one for freedom by death—a conscious wish of Vera's immediately prior to delirium—the other for freedom from the conventions binding a woman, freedom to fulfil the wild adventurous 'male' side, that is, to be a male. This wish to be a man had emerged into consciousness from time to time during Vera's life from its first conception at the age of two. It was repressed, following the birth of her brother when she was  $3\frac{1}{4}$  years of age, which aroused a longing for a baby of her own. All later revivals in consciousness of the wish to be a man have apparently resulted from environmental checking of the developing libido which then regressed to the earlier stage in which the desire to create was directed towards the creation of male from female instead of the creation of a child. Since this wish seems to be almost universal with girls at some stage, while the reverse is rarely if ever the case with a man, there must be a common biological difference giving rise to it. This seems to me to be due to the fact that infantile sexual sensibility in the case of girls is focussed on the clitoris, the homologue of the penis, whereas the mature feminine sexual libido is focussed more internally, sensibility shifting from clitoris to vagina. In the normal male there is no such change. Thus libido associated with the clitoris may always retain a characteristically masculine attitude which, when freed from its physical association by sublimation, will activate the wish to be a man, its physical origin being repressed.

Normally the transition from this infantile clitoris libido to mature feminine heterosexual libido should take place at puberty, producing its effects mentally as well as physically. The narcissistic libido springing from the feminine libido gives rise to the desire to dress well, a sublimated exhibitionism. Similarly analysis supports the belief that the narcissistic clitoris libido motivated the desire to emulate boys, carelessness of dress, pride of strength, wildness and freedom, the desire to excel, to beat a boy or man at his own game, a narcissism of a very different kind. If, however, the libido aroused at puberty is checked, the clitoris libido is apparently augmented either auto-erotically or narcissistically, that is, physically or mentally. In the case under discussion it was evidently narcissistic clitoris libido which was reinforced, since it was well developed. This led to the domination of the introvert attitude towards experience which seems to have resulted from the fusion of this libido with ego-interest during several years. The libido associated with the physically



dominant feminine sex was repressed, and remained unconscious or 'inaccessible' while the other part of the libido developed and matured through its interaction with the environment.

Sexual symbolism, which was homosexual in this case, was transparent in the manifest content of pseudo-personality I, *e.g.*, *Nurse and I used to slip out wrapped in dark cloaks and wander mysteriously round strange streets—several times we came up from the same subway, which was surrounded by green shrubs, and round the back of a big building*<sup>1</sup>.

Free associations from this seemed to indicate unmistakably that object-homo-erotic libido, not subject-homo-erotic libido, was expressing itself<sup>2</sup>; that is, in this case, normal heterosexual libido with object inversion<sup>3</sup>.

This fragmentary pseudo-personality was the only one in which analysis showed that object-homo-erotic libido, coupled with anal libido, was expressed. This indicates that there had been no considerable fixation on that level, as material from other infantile levels proved quantitatively much greater. Development to heterosexual object appears to have been complete.

## II. GWENDOLINE

Recorded on pp. 185–186.

So far as can be seen from analysis this pseudo-personality results from a revival of two wishes, both frustrated by reality in the past, and still frustrated in this delirious episode. One appears to be an expression of the sexual libido unconsciously focussed on *K* years before, the other an expression of maternal libido, not in connection with *K*. Sexual and maternal libido were thus from different levels, and were not jointly projected. Some details of the manifest content gave free associations leading entirely to *K* and to the relation unconsciously desired with him; others dealt with the wish for a child from another definite period. Vera's travelling to Canada<sup>4</sup> seemed to express the dual wish fulfilment, her not reaching it expressing the frustration of both. The name Gwendoline apparently expressed a thinly disguised identification with the wife of *K*.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> This is Ferenczi's differentiation as described in a collective review in the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, Vol. II, p. 435, by F. Boehm on Sexual Perversions. "Zur Nosologie der Männlichen Homosexualität." *Int. Zeitsch. f. Psa.* II, S. 131.

<sup>3</sup> This differs from subject homo-eroticism in which the subject inverts the mode of sexual activity, the man becoming passive, the woman active respectively, the man feeling as woman towards man, the woman as man towards woman.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 185.

## III. ELDERLY LADY

Recorded on p. 186.

The libido in this personality, if such she can be called with so brief a life history, was very active, and of great intensity. All free associations led sooner or later to the very beginning of the development of infantile oedipus libido, when oral, anal, and urethral libido components fused to form heterosexual libido. This also appears to have fused with the maternal libido, and both expressed themselves in the preconscious material available, which seems to have consisted of memories from "The Deathless Army<sup>1</sup>," dramatised to express the wish for a child. Since this was infantile oedipus libido, not the mature heterosexual form, it appears to have been subject to greater repression and aroused more fear than mature libido would have done. The social self *A*, from which the repressing forces were drawn, was presumably powerless to keep it out of consciousness completely, and so attempted to diminish the fear through giving rise to the delusion of old age which would effectually prevent the material satisfaction of the libido involved. The fear proved too intense to be inhibited completely in this way owing to the strength of the libido involved. The old lady reacted to the manifest content thus projected which she took literally, with fear. The real fear, however, was not due to the manifest content at all, but to the latent libidinous one. The fear experienced was disorganising enough to terminate the existence of that fragmentary pseudo-personality in consciousness. It never resumed physical control again.

The translation from manifest content to latent content will be apparent to any psycho-analyst with the above summary of the libido levels involved. The whole appears to have been a resultant of the pregnancy-wish and the repressing forces. One detail of reversed symbolism should be mentioned, namely, that the moon here was shown to be phallic, instead of as usual, feminine. The delusion of being an old lady thus sprang from the repressing forces. All the other details of experience were libidinous.

## IV. MIDDLE-AGED MAN

Recorded on pp. 186-187.

The first free associations obtained on 3rd May, 1921 were all concerned with chemical interests. People with whom Vera had worked and details of laboratories showed that the workshop<sup>2</sup> of the delirium was a composite of four laboratories. Associations then led to air raid

<sup>1</sup> See note on p. 186.<sup>2</sup> See p. 186.

experiences, with the bombardment and noise of guns, also to the repressed fear of being buried alive in a dug-out. This in turn led to an actual episode as a child, when an uncle frightened Vera by shutting her up in a drawer. After a long pause associations as follows led into the libidinous level.

Free associations: (3rd May, 1921) "Some novel in which a man discovers a submarine which will revolutionise naval warfare. He brings it to England declaring that with that in her hands she will be supreme—she dilly-dallies with his offer, in spite of his saying he will take his invention elsewhere if she won't accept. . . . balance of power—research for aids to keep balance of power on our side, work on T.X.T. etc. complicated organic formula—nitrogen derivatives—dyes, azo-dyes—salvarsan—carsavan—elixir of life."

The next free associations were not obtained until three months later, after a considerable amount of analysis had been carried out, and after the greater portion of mature libido, freed from the past by means of transference, had been turned into work which seems to have been narcissistically identified by Vera with herself. Extracts from the associations starting from an attempt to identify the five men<sup>1</sup> are given here, all omissions being noted. Previous attempts had given two series of five men connected with Vera's work, which did not convey much to her or throw light on the latent content of the delirium.

Free associations (17th August 1921): "Five men . . . . . (omission) . . . . . five men in a boat . . . . . K..A... d... it all what are those five men, apparently they are not men at all<sup>2</sup> (great annoyance for some as yet inexplicable reason) . . . . . (omission) what could prevent him—the five senses—ye gods—the domination of the senses—left the *me* that wanted to play straight, for dead—repressed the better self into the unconscious where it could give no sign of life however stimulated and tortured, yet felt every pang. Though powerless to show itself it was aware of all in itself—projection of the senses as men and symbolic representation of driving the better self that would endure anything to attain its ideal (omission) into the unconscious, with wish fulfilment that it should finally be reborn (*travelled some distance through an archway, jolting horribly and expecting an explosion any moment*) away from the senses, *i.e.* live on a plane beyond the physical (die) where its former mates would no longer influence it—*Who was the visitor that opened the*

<sup>1</sup> See p. 186.

<sup>2</sup> With reference to this sudden realisation that the men are not standing for themselves it should be noted that as early as 1913 phantasies recorded then by Vera show similar representations of subjective aspects of herself in concrete form. She was aware then of the significance of the concrete symbols she was using allegorically. In the delirium she was no longer aware that the symbols were other than they seemed, subsequent analysis being necessary in order to elucidate them. See reference to this on p. 201 of Vera's original notes.

*bale?* 'visitor' common name for menstrual period—birth involves free flow of uterine blood—bale—body—reborn self (baby) emerged safely, *i.e.* better self came to life again through death and rebirth."

Salvarsan and carsavan are used in connection with syphilis. This tends to confirm the sexual significance of the first batch of free associations which led from T.N.T. through complicated organic formula to the elixir of life. The explosive manufactured appears to have been equivalent to sexuality. This was supported by the physiological accompaniments of these and other free associations connected with this explosive. The libido could only seize upon the preconscious material, here mainly chemical, in which to express itself. The second batch show that the conflict was between the intellectual side (personified as male) and the senses through which sexuality has developed. The senses were probably projected as men because no women seem to have been present in the preconscious to represent them. Since the sexuality they had produced (explosive of great intensity) was feminine (heterosexual and maternal combined) it would thus seem to have been a conflict between male and female sides, or between introversion and extraversion, since *B* and *C* respectively have been traced out as male and female, or introvert and extravert attitudes towards experience. That the manufacture of explosives exceeded in strength all anticipations, is an expression of the ambition to make discoveries in chemistry, a preconscious wish fulfilment, as well as an expression of the libido wishing to dominate the intellectual side, which in turn strove to repress the sexual side. The actual experience appears to have been a compromise between them. First one was successful in moulding the manifest content to satisfy itself, then the other. Since the intellectual side held the field of consciousness it must have functioned as the repressing force. The libido could then only express itself symbolically. The ego which was identifying itself with the repressing forces was afraid of being overcome by the libido and determined to destroy it, since it wished to be male.

No further work was done in connection with this episode until January, 1922, some months later. By this time the libido had been traced back analytically to its earliest forms, and childish beliefs in connection with it remembered. Transferences had also been broken down through resolution into their components. Free associations obtained on 24th January 1922 were as follows:

*I snatched the treasured paper and thrust it in the fire determined that at least they should make no more*<sup>1</sup>. . . . . at least they should make no

<sup>1</sup> See p. 186.

more children . . . . . treasured paper than a prescription for making children, *i.e.* sexual desire is thrust in fire and destroyed (cf. fire as potent against evil), sexuality is sacrificed rather than upset the balance of power by its strength, though all the senses straightway attacked me in fury at being thus thwarted—leaving me for dead . . . . . at 45 power of having children would be over, intellect could then rule undisputedly—but the senses objected to this and are represented as thinking they were victorious while the male side is still alive and finally reborn outside their jurisdiction. Thus each side of the conflict thinks it has won. I hear explosions in the distance and realise *my mates are blowing up all the works they could*<sup>1</sup> (omission) with the explosive they have manufactured—apparently symbolises dissociation between ‘male’ and ‘female’ side—each is to go its own way freed from the other—but male side remains in the focus of consciousness as personal and hears the activity of the other side in the distance. The middle-aged man is the isolation of part of the personality, developing from the wish to be a man, triumphing over the part formed by the sexual and maternal instinct, which can only enter consciousness in terms of the preconscious belonging to the male side. Its continued activity, however, is shown by explosions (births) being heard after man was reborn on his own.

The middle-aged man is also taken to be the expression of the desire to be strong and virile, a compensation in phantasy for the painful reality. The actual pain sensations were too intense to allow this fiction to remain and had to be accounted for in terms of the limited ego-consciousness. The libido seems to have seized upon the somatic sensations and to have woven them into the texture of the phantasy. The manifest content supported the masculine delusion, the latent content satisfied the libido<sup>2</sup>.

This is, of course, only a partial analysis. All the associations showing that mature libido was involved have been omitted for obvious reasons, just as, in the case of the old lady, the associations showing that infantile oedipus libido was involved were omitted. The selection of associations given indicates the line followed, which, together with analytical remarks, may be sufficient to make it clear to an analyst. Wherever anything has been omitted from a string of free associations, the fact is noted in brackets.

#### VI. BRETON PEASANT GIRL—PARTIAL ANALYSIS

Recorded on pp. 187–188.

The first free associations in connection with this episode, which are recorded below, were obtained in May 1921 with great difficulty, word

<sup>1</sup> See p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Rivers' dream as resultant of two conflicting wishes, rather than fulfilment of one.

by word, and very slowly at times. All seemed connected with the pre-conscious material in which libido had to express itself, all were held together by the uncanny occult bond of interest.

Free associations: "*Black cats*<sup>1</sup> . . . . . sinuous, a wall, R. H. Benson, supernatural phenomena, cats and dogs recognise presence of ghostly entities—blood rites for calling up the dead—long tunnel through which elemental fire followed to mummy and scarab replaced on her . . . . . elemental fire leaves a track behind, burns its way through woods, out-houses, etc. . . . . Set, visual image of evil incarnate pointing a long finger at girl who is being held back forcibly from following him. He was called up in Egypt by the breaking of an amulet and girl under his influence has one foot outside the magic circle, from E. F. Benson's *Image in the Sand*—Elementary force, of evil incarnate—finally defeated by devotion of girl's Arab servant and confidant in spiritualistic affairs, who gives his life deliberately in grappling with someone who has controlled Set and desires to get the girl into his power, and forces him over a parapet into the river, never relaxing his grip and both drown together—Arab's name Abdul . . . . . love, again stronger than evil—devotion of nurse who exiled herself from her tribe to help her patient—she is queen of tribe described by R. H. Benson<sup>2</sup>, which travel anywhere at night as cats and even in the day time move with sinuous feline grace—they have many supernatural powers—a man enters her village and is puzzled by the stealthy movements—the impression of feline yet powerful forces around, the way in which he feels everyone is watching him, yet can never catch them at it, they seem to observe him out of the corner of their eyes—he feels they are reading through him, there is a wall under his window and at night he sees a cat who reminds him of the girl at the little hotel he is in—he is puzzled—strong feeling of the proximity of the mysterious and uncanny, of latent powers before which he is powerless, which may turn and rend him, or may help him . . . . . The spirits of the trees, Seven Sisters (Blackwood or Maurice Hewlett's Lore of Proserpine) one man carries off one of these spirits and marries her, in that neighbourhood many other fairy wives—fairy offspring with qualities of both parents—are the black cat tribe similarly sprung from wizard or supernatural cat and woman, thus having, like Proserpine, to divide their time between cat form and human form, as Proserpine did between earth and the underworld—wizards and witches used models of St Anthony in wax in order to cast a spell over people, any injury done to the effigy took effect on the person thought of at the time—Image of shadow cast on wall by a bucket, the handle of which with foreshortened shadow gave a rough likeness to St Anthony with his staff—this was seen a few days after recovery from delirium and recognised as the St Anthony originator . . . . . idea of burning out nerves to stop pain due to old time remedy for toothache by cauterising the tooth with red hot knitting

<sup>1</sup> See p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> Should be Algernon Blackwood. Vera made a mistake in authorship here.

needle (omission) . . . . . nurses mystic invocation of her fellow tribesmen — ritualistic superstitions of peasantry, belief in witchcraft, evil eyes, etc. The Passionate Crime by Temple Thurston — (omission) atmosphere of intense credulity, and belief in fairies, hobgoblins, all uncanny mysterious fancies in wilds of Ireland.

*Explanatory Note*

These associations are given in full as illustrating how one affective tone can thus hold together a series of memories from very different times. Vera had read the books from which all or most details were taken at different periods. The above series of free associations took about three hours to obtain, the memories of the books having been previously forgotten and only coming through slowly, yet without any marked change of direction such as usually accompanies free associations which jump about in an apparently irrelevant manner. Two similar series were obtained within the same week. In one the bond was chemical interest, the starting point being 'a terrifically high explosive' from episode IV. The other was held together by love of the East, all eastern memories appearing in connection with episode V. There certainly seemed in these three cases to be a much closer segregation of memories held together by means of a common affective tone, independently of the date or manner of acquirement, than any other free associations gave. They came up directly, not disguised, though with much difficulty. The particular selections thus made from the memories in question, is another matter; they have another meaning as well as the surface one. Later analysis indicated that they were selected to fulfil the combined sexual and maternal libido of C. It was this clear distinction between the three series obtained from IV, V and VI, with no mixing of the three different kinds of memories brought up (two obtained on the same day) that led to the conclusion that the pseudo-personalities were the result of consciousness being in touch directly with only one such memory-aggregate at a time. All experience had then to be accounted for in terms of that memory-aggregate alone. The clear cut dissociation was, in part at least, toxic in origin.

Later after finding Freud's concept of preconscious and unconscious a useful one, the dissociated memory-aggregates were termed the pre-conscious of each secondary personality based upon them, all the rest of the mind being the unconscious and unable to enter consciousness directly. The change of terminology illustrated another feature in the work. Often finding no concept or ready-made word in which to express my results, owing to inadequate knowledge of the subject, I used my own, and later when I found I was expressing a concept which someone

else had previously formulated, and which I had only rediscovered, the original formula was substituted. Thus though many technical psycho-analytical terms are employed, there are none taken over unquestioningly. Only those were adopted which fitted concepts independently confirmed as useful approximations to the facts. This also explains the use of terms from other than the Freudian school where that seemed necessary. In the main, however, if the Freudian terminology proved inadequate, I have tried to express it in an extension of this, rather than in a different way, in order to attain a more consistent terminology. The terminology finally employed is very different from that in which the same things were expressed originally, terminology and theory being obviously mutually implicated.

Three months later, on August 30th, 1921, Vera's free associations commenced as follows:

The predominant affect in consciousness was produced by acute physical pain—and this delirious episode seems to be an hallucination to account for a specially severe attack motivated by a wish to represent it as a final accentuation of pain that should produce relief. Interpretation in such fantastic terms was due to awareness only being in touch with the level of the foreconscious that contained memories connected with witchcraft and uncanny psychic phenomena, as shown by previous free associations. This accounts for it but does not explain the exact meaning of the symbolism since, however physically stimulated, the mental content must be considered apart. Why *two black cats*?

Vera's free associations continuing from this point were very different from the series quoted previously as starting from the same point three months before. Many resistances having been broken down in the meantime, the latent content was obtained from the manifest one. The symbolism was strongly over-determined. According to these associations the two black cats formed the junction of several different levels. The cats seemed to stand for several different pairs of people simultaneously. These were traced by free associations which showed their composite nature. The rest of the symbolism then fell into line. The evidence for this cannot be given as it would lead to the identification of the 'cats.' The hallucinations were the expression of mature hetero-sexual libido, infantile oedipus libido, and combined mature heterosexual and maternal libido; that is, wish fulfilments of infantile and mature sexual desire and the wish for a child were expressed in phantasy.

So far as I know while Vera was actually pleading with nurse to help her and ease the pain, she saw the two black cats disappearing over the bed rail. The rest was a rationalisation to account for them and for the severe pain which was getting worse. The black cats appear therefore



to have been projected as hallucinations because the preconscious contained no memories relating to the various people and things for which they stood, and the impulses and desires connected with them used such material as they could find in the preconscious in which to express themselves. The waking consciousness (delirious) took the cats to be real and wove an ingenious phantasy to include cats, nurse and pain in a rational whole. Accordingly the rationalisation was considered to be the resultant of the libido levels from which the cats had been projected, and the waking consciousness. The latter adapted itself through feeling. The ego consciousness reacted to the hallucinations accepted as literal, producing rationalisations to account for them. These rationalisations were in part projected as fresh hallucinations, and in part became delusions which modified the reaction of the ego towards further experiences. It was not through reasoning that the Breton peasant girl knew that she must keep her eyes closed<sup>1</sup> if she wanted the cats to help her because they disappeared if she looked, she just felt she must keep them shut. Similarly she felt she must not say anything to nurse or nurse would be unable to help her again<sup>2</sup>. This was a typical extravert reaction. There was no question about it. The feeling carried the conviction that there was only one thing to be done, and she did it.

Free associations from St Anthony<sup>3</sup> and those in search of the delusion of being a Breton peasant showed very great resistances. St Anthony was interpreted as a wish fulfilment from the social self *A*, a projected identification with the self, the only effect that much-repressed self could produce in this episode. The delusion of being a Breton peasant girl was considerably over-determined, the resistance presumably being due to infantile oedipus libido being involved.

Later associations showed that the mysterious attraction of occult phenomena, and strange psychic phenomena, were further cloaks for libido, just as were the love of the East and feeling of its glamour. These were a contrast to the third preconscious series of associations which was held together by a bond of interest. The difference is clearly shown by the fact that in V and VI where the bond was predominantly libidinous, the resultant personality was a feminine extravert, whereas in IV where the bond was chemical interest, the ego was a male introvert. Analysis indicates that libido and interest were combined in all, but in V sexual libido seems to have predominated, with some maternal libido; in VI sexual and maternal were combined, and in IV desexualised narcissistic clitoris libido was the libidinous mainspring of the ego-consciousness.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 188.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 187.

Thus the Breton peasant girl and her life history are taken as being the resultant of a dissociation of a portion of the preconscious held together by mature maternal and heterosexual libido which had found its satisfaction in the occult and mysterious psychic forces to which it is akin or with which it is identical. This relationship is indicated again in connection with the Atila episode. (It should be noted that Vera at one time possessed certain mediumistic powers, and that it seems to have been a similar psychic energy that enabled her to carry out this analysis. She could not use it for both purposes, and has lost all mediumistic powers now.) Further, the facts indicate that there was ego-regression to the stage wherein belief in these possibilities is fixed, forming an ego-consciousness, which reacted through its emotions to the experience presented to it through its senses; moreover, that this included hallucinations from infantile oedipus, heterosexual, and combined heterosexual and maternal libido levels. Rationalisations were produced to render the whole consistent and intelligible. *The personality was thus considered to be the system of relations between the isolated ego and its environment. Both were essential to its existence. Its memories, however, retained their personal identity when the isolated ego and its environment ceased their independent existence.*

#### VII. GERALD

Recorded on pp. 190-194.

The analytical account of the nature of Gerald which follows is based in part on free associations which are not included here except in the case of the 'Atila' episode<sup>1</sup>. The nature of the facts revealed by analysis is indicated, together with the inferences drawn from them, giving my interpretation of these facts, an interpretation which is supported by the whole of the rest of the analysis.

In this episode identification with Gerald, a boy sweetheart (aged 10), and Gerald O'Connor, a character in "Lost in Egypt" whose father was a Colonel coming home from India, is represented. The ego-consciousness was seemingly due to the male intellectual side; the continuation of the wish to be a man which had evolved into a complicated introvert nature. All memory of Vera's past life which would have conflicted with this was dissociated. As Gerald most of Vera's intellectual knowledge, however, was within reach. Gerald was capable of carrying on abstract discussions on philosophy, medicine, and spiritualism, with father, nurse, doctor and the vicar respectively. Thus there was no ego-regression,

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 193-194.

intellectual development seemed to be mature. A much larger portion of Vera's mind was integrated here than in earlier episodes. Apparently hallucinations were the result of dissociated parts forcing themselves up to consciousness in distorted fragments, the delusions being Gerald's rationalisations to account for the evidence of his senses. These rationalisations were often thoroughly sound, intelligent ones, assuming the false premises from which he started. Naturally since the male intellectual introvert was alone in consciousness and in touch with the corresponding preconscious memories, beliefs, and knowledge, one would expect much of the symbolism employed to represent the sexual side since it was the feminine sexuality that was unconscious then. This was only able to express itself in terms of the preconscious material available, more variety of hallucinations being possible than in other selves through the wider range of the preconscious mind. This is borne out by the facts. But the libido concerned appears to have regressed to many of its infantile egoistic components, very many libido levels being projected independently. The disintegration of emotional development seemed very extensive and the integration of intellectual development appeared fairly complete, though dissociated from the emotional side in its cruder forms. The extravert side had suffered disintegration into its constituents which strove for satisfaction independently because, perhaps owing to domination of the intellectual side, the libido involved in it was blocked and turned away from reality. Gerald reacted to the manifest content produced as hallucinations, and being aware of their incompatibility, he thought he was going mad. He suffered more psychically than did any other dissociated pseudo-personality. He was capable of sound reasoning from the sense presentations experienced hallucinatorily, but could not refuse the evidence of his senses. He was not aware of incongruities and inconsistencies such as sending for his own doctor at Port Said<sup>1</sup>, and again on board ship, and also for the Vicar<sup>2</sup>, yet he had sufficient intelligence and control to keep to the point he sent for the Vicar to elucidate<sup>3</sup>, realising that it was the latter's job to differentiate good from evil. He also showed desire to help others<sup>4</sup>. His anxiety with regard to cholera<sup>5</sup> (manifest content) was always for others, father and nurse<sup>6</sup>, then for all in the hotel and town<sup>7</sup>. This was accompanied by a tremendous determination to keep at all costs his promise not to die. He thus had a fairly high moral as well as intellectual development.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 193.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 194.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 194.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 192.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 190.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 190-192.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 191.

The better self, presumably motivated by socialised libido and interest, seemed to have partly fused with the introvert reaction to form an altrovert whose dominant function was thinking, developed not only for the pleasure of thinking, but making a real attempt to help others by means of it<sup>1</sup>. This was the stage of development corresponding to that of 1915-16, at which time though *A* modified *B*, yet the vital beliefs of *A* were unconscious. Later this allowed *C* to swing the balance over and to develop freely, suppressing *B* in turn. Thus the most vital part of *A* was unconscious in Gerald too, only gradually gaining an entrance to the preconscious as more and more experience became synthesised within the memory of Gerald. The common channel seems to have been that of the most mature socialised maternal libido which was projected from *A* and remained within the synthesis, though unrecognised, its energy adding itself to that of Gerald. Other libido was apparently from *C* not *A*<sup>2</sup>, but it was that from *A* which helped *B* to repress that from *C* again and to inhibit the delusions and hallucinations produced by it and which proved strong enough to refuse to be beaten, to refuse to die, in spite of *B*'s natural desires. The motive force of that determination may be regarded as the socialised libido from *A*, which, though unable to enter consciousness directly, was too strong to be kept out completely, and finally reintegrated the scattered strands through becoming associated with more and more of them.

Gerald produced fresh rationalisations when his first delusions were contradicted by father or doctor<sup>3</sup> and he could grasp the fact. The apparent facts of his experience had to be accounted for in some way, and if one solution proved untenable he found another.

The choice of symbols was often determined by the somatic factor, physical sensations stimulating the libido associated with the organs affected when the actual cause of the sensation was not present to consciousness. Thus Gerald, who knew that the pain in his head was due to streptococcal infection, did not attempt to account for it. The other

<sup>1</sup> The term 'intellectual altrovert' is probably the most convenient term to represent the altroverted thinking type. Similarly 'emotional altrovert' will be used in future to designate the altroverted feeling type.

<sup>2</sup> Libido from *C* seems to have certain characteristics which differentiate it from libido from *A*, in much the same way as memories from personalities I to X retain their personal identity, even when embodied in the whole self. This is probably owing to its modification through association with different ego impulses. Free associations show which libido is involved partly through the recognition of this feeling tone, as well as through the actual associations. Vera can recognise libido from *C*, as distinct from libido from *A*, even now (1924) when some stimulus excites *C* and not *A* or *vice versa*.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 190.

selves, who felt the pain without knowing its cause, sought to find a cause in terms of their limited knowledge. Gerald's desire to find a cause for everything had thus a different direction from that, for example, of VI and VIII. As Gerald, Vera sought to account for internal sensations resulting from very free evacuation of which she was actually unaware, by postulating inoculation with cholera germs<sup>1</sup> as the cause. The somatic stimulus appears to have increased the activity of anal libido and to have drawn some of the more mature libido down to that level again without altering the maternal libido associated with it. The rationalisation to account for the internal sensations was the resultant of the anal and maternal libido, which seized upon the preconscious knowledge of the nature of cholera possessed by Gerald, and Gerald's desire to account for his illness. The heterosexual libido had regressed to anal libido through the nature of the somatic stimulus, thus determining the symbol most suitable to express the wish for a child from the repressed feminine side. The manifest content expressed Gerald's desire to account for the cause of his symptoms. The latent content I regard as having fulfilled the wish for a child in phantasy, since it was denied expression or fulfilment in reality. The symbolism of the inoculations with the various germs needs no further elucidation. The Hindu<sup>2</sup> was founded on Pharos the Egyptian who, in a novel which Vera had read, inoculated a boy with plague, then having cured him brought him all over Europe, by boat and train, leaving plague behind him everywhere and chuckling diabolically at his revenge on the white man for having taken a mummy from its tomb. Some details of the manifest content were obtained from this book. The vision of the boat carrying him across the sea, with rats leaving at every port carrying plague germs<sup>3</sup> with them, was recognised by Gerald at the time as a visionary warning of what would happen if his father persisted in taking him on board and continuing the journey. Really it must have been a revived hallucinatory memory image from this book, the details selected, however, being chosen to represent latent content as well as manifest content. Rats leaving the ship carrying germs did not occur in the book and seemed to be a highly intelligent addition to explain how plague or cholera was transmitted from boat to port, of which Vera was quite proud when she recovered from delirium and recognised it. She had then no idea of the latent content which it also expressed equally cleverly, or she would not have been so pleased.

The material from the 'delirium tremens'<sup>4</sup> which was concurrent with Gerald's period of life seems to have been definitely psychotic and could

<sup>1</sup> See p. 190.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 190.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 191.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 188-189.

be most easily accounted for in terms of racial memories. Jung holds such lowest levels are stored in the collective unconscious which can be reanimated by libido regression. Yet deeper analysis showed that they were personal memories (admittedly in unique combinations and not as experienced). The details of the manifest content of the 'delirium tremens' were capable of being reductively analysed into personal memories which could never have been done had they been racial ones. This leads one to think that possibly a more exhaustive analysis of the collective unconscious of Jung's patients, would have the same result and would probably show that the experience falling within the life history of the individual was sufficient to account for all the material brought up to consciousness in cognitive garb, without postulating the inheritance of ideas, as well as feelings and impulses. The devil dominants, for example, which he states become apparent at certain stages of analysis, seem to me to be merely a form of negative transference in which the hatred and loathing for some impulse which led to its repression, becoming freed by breaking down the resistance, is projected on to the analyst to save the patient feeling hatred for the impulse in himself. During the phase of positive transference this hatred, being incompatible with it, is repressed. As each fresh resistance is overcome, this unconscious hatred is swelled by the forces which had maintained the resistance, until as the positive transference wanes through being traced to its sources, the negative hate transference becomes apparent. This is often of great intensity, owing to the accumulation of all the repressed hate from a life time, thus giving rise to what Jung calls a demoniacal hatred, the result of stirring the devil dominant into activity. So far as I can see he simply tries to calm it down by repressing it anew, instead of recognising it as transference and breaking it down completely by tracking it to its source, in the same way that one breaks down a positive transference. It may be a demon of the underworld, but it is a thoroughly personal one, capable of resolution, not a racial demon with whom one must compromise. But there are big resistances to be overcome before the patient can be led to realise the hatred for himself, and frequently for a dead self, since the impulses giving rise to it have been modified previously through transference. But once in consciousness, fully experienced and its sources thus destroyed, the 'devil dominant' dies a natural death, there is no need to compromise with it, and consequently energy is not required to repress it.

The 'Atila' episode<sup>1</sup> to which reference will be made again later, represents the fulfilment of the mature wish for a child, expressing itself in terms of a spiritualist ego-level of Gerald's preconscious.

Evidence from analysis indicates that infantile auto-erotic as well as infantile oedipus libido were expressed in the 'delirium tremens'—further, that object-homo-erotic libido was projected on to nurse as mother substitute, since no memory of Vera's real mother was present, hence the anxiety for the nurse's health.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 193-194.

Thus Gerald was fairly complex and the results of analysis support the view that this particular ego-consciousness was that of a mature socialised introvert, or an intellectual altrovert, who included socialised libido as well as the narcissistic love of its own mental development, the curiosity, the desire for power and the acquisition of knowledge from the interest side which had developed the introvert reaction. The libido involved in *C* was apparently disintegrated into its components and dissociated. Hallucinations were found to be the expression of infantile maternal anal level, infantile oedipus level, auto-erotic, object homo-erotic, mature heterosexual, and mature maternal libido levels respectively. Each functioned independently and, on account of its strength, aroused fear on the part of the socialised libido of the ego-consciousness, which strove to repress it.

Gerald wondered how he was ever going to keep his promise not to die, against so many odds, fearing unconsciously the sexual side so projected would prove too strong and dethrone intellect, but he refused to give in<sup>1</sup>.

The delusions were, so far as can be seen, the resultant of the interaction between the ego-consciousness and the hallucinatory and illusory experience presented to it. Thus the personality of Gerald may be regarded as the system of relations between the ego-consciousness and its environment synthesised into a unity of experience, the memory of which remained as a personal one when both ego-consciousness and environment were changed, both ego and object being destroyed. When Gerald ceased to exist as a pseudo-personality through being synthesised within the wider whole which is Vera, Vera retained the memories synthesised into a personal unity as her own, yet distinct from other series of similar dissociated pseudo-personalities, and from her past life. Each synthesis survived the death of the individual ego concerned in its production, or rather survived the differentiation into subject and object aspects necessary for finite existence as a conscious self. The actual relation now exists without self-consciousness.

#### *Atila episode*

Very little more interpretation of this episode is required than that indicated by the extracts from free associations given below. These are dated to show the different levels which came to the surface spontaneously at the different periods after certain resistances were broken down through transference.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 191.

The first free associations in May 1921 were an attempt to find why the materialised spirit who appeared to Gerald, as described on pp. 193-194, was called Atila and were as follows:

Atila<sup>1</sup> . . . . . try it backwards<sup>2</sup>—Atila, Lalitha, Lilith—transformation of Lilith into Eve—Lilith stands for introvert, Eve for extravert in myself; in the terminology I would have employed then (1914) Lilith stands for my thinking powers, typified as masculine, Eve for my feminine intuition and nature.

Bright light—Atila—black lace—spiders webs—activity producing visible results—Hun—brute force—Attila—Boadicea (omission) visual image of Britannia instead of Boadicea in her chariot (omission). Now latter (Eve or feminine side) is mature, I can emphasise one or other at will—Atila's transformation went both ways. Atila (Lilith) materialised into Eve spontaneously, the transformation in reverse direction was initiated by me. The subjective apprehension of evil present led from Eve to Lilith. Later the evil was attributed to the Eve part, doubt was solved by calling in the Vicar. Then since evil was exorcised by power of Cross, sex finally gave up the futile struggle against the only force that could subdue it.

Extracts from free associations on 13th September 1921 are given below:

When she appeared in a blaze of light<sup>3</sup> (I think the light actually came on, as it had a habit of doing so spontaneously at times through a faulty switch) then I perceived the projection of myself as real and immediately rationalised to account for it, by 'remembering' I'd asked for this demonstration before and forgotten, not believing it would be genuine, but hoping to get £350. Yet until I saw Atila I'm sure I never thought of it, it simply served to account for her appearance. As Gerald I discussed the whole episode many times, being convinced at last of the reality of spirit materialisations, for had I not felt her arm? I was doubtful, however, as to whether she were good or evil until the Vicar, to whom I appealed, advised me to have nothing more to do with her. Nothing that was said threw any doubt on the reality of what I'd seen so far as I was concerned, but though neither the Vicar nor I knew, his assurance that she was better left alone obviously strengthened the side that was consciously struggling to overcome sex. This, however, might have had the disastrous result of fixing 'Gerald' and leaving the 'woman' or rather the animal in the unconscious, since I prevented her materialisation again. Until one knows what the hallucination stands for, it may do more harm to repress it than to let it out . . . . . The name Lilith had been given originally in sarcasm by a man who only knew me as a

<sup>1</sup> See p. 193.

<sup>2</sup> Until this curious reversal occurred here the name 'Atila' had been meaningless to Vera. Once reversed its significance became apparent. 'Lilith' and 'Eve' were very real parts of herself to Vera.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 191.



'mental being' not a woman<sup>1</sup>; hence it was used consciously to denote my masculine side, in spite of the fact that the original Lilith was supposed to be very passionate<sup>2</sup>.

Extracts from free associations on 1st February 1922 were as follows. Why £350<sup>3</sup> in Atila episode?

£350 . . . . . 350 + 20/- 7000/- . . . . . then would give 7000/- if child not born, if spirit not materialised—100 × 70 convinced of reality of materialisation since they stood to lose so much if it did not come off (omission) certainty of power to materialise a spirit—to provide a child with a body—looks like a wish for a child. I refused to disbelieve what I'd seen because I wanted a child so much. All my arguments with father failed to convince me it was hallucinatory because the unconscious wish for child was so strong—and though to ego-consciousness it was a proof of spirit materialisation which I'd previously thought impossible, to the unconscious it was a creation in flesh and blood of the child I wanted and I refused to be robbed of that consolation (omission). How did the transformation take place?—spiritual ethereal Atila emerged from chandelier<sup>4</sup>—grew to full size, sat on nurse's knee, who vanished leaving limp clothes, into which Atila sank, filled out and became clad in flesh<sup>5</sup>—a transformation of nurse's flesh into the materialised Atila . . . . . am I identified with nurse? and spirit or life from chandelier enters, fills out my clothes, draws flesh and blood from me, and a child is born—on warning Atila evil is present the reverse occurs, she returns the vitality she was drawing from nurse and in spirit form returns whence she came—reality prevents the fulfilment of my wish . . . . . then if nurse = the feminine side, Atila emerging from the chandelier is connected with Attila the Hun who stands for male, brute force, virility (omission) which awakens the sleeping (trance) woman into life, into a woman of flesh and blood, awake and alert, spirit and flesh hypostatized, intellect and heart fused into woman. That makes the materialised figure, whose arms I felt and found to be firm sound flesh, myself—the woman I wanted to be formed by the fusion of the intellectual and feminine side—as well as the child I wanted—identification of self and child.—Perhaps since fusion seemed so impossible, since head and heart were each so strong the only possibility of satisfaction lay in giving birth to a child in whom both should be combined, i.e. in being reborn . . . . .

'*Evil is present in the room, beware!*' recognised as subjective and put down to telepathy from some friendly spirit<sup>6</sup> . . . . . latter part a rationalisation to account for subjective voice, since, though recognised as subjective, it was not recognised as originating from my own mind. From which

<sup>1</sup> This was not K. Lilith was christened thus independently by K and another man within the same year (1912-13) to personify Vera's 'male' or intellectual side.

<sup>2</sup> This renders it particularly appropriate to represent this side of Vera's nature, as Attila the Hun is thus equivalent to Lilith, as is shown in later associations.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 193.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 193.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 193.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 193.

level did it come? . . . . in the room, Atila, evil (omission) no right there (puzzled tense brows, most unexpected)—heralded approach by red webs—menstrual flow precedes birth (omission) . . . . words from level that was repressing desire—ego-consciousness took the symbol literally but some part, recognising what it stood for, though it could not eject the ego-consciousness, could project its warning as a subjective voice, from the same level as that which held Atila at bay by the sign of the cross<sup>1</sup>. This warning being confirmed by the Vicar, the ego-consciousness, by throwing its weight on the side of keeping Atila out, was allying itself to the part that had issued the warning, which therefore had a chance of influencing behaviour more directly and of becoming integrated with the ego-consciousness in part. The impulse to keep Atila out through the power of the Cross was not felt as subjective or external, but as expressing the belief of ego-consciousness. The combination prevented further materialisation—thwarted the libido again, but did not enable the latent content to reach consciousness, the latter acting towards the manifest content as reality.

#### *Explanatory Note*

The way in which the repressing forces from the socialised self *A* gradually forced their way into the ego-consciousness, and extended it, is illustrated by these selections from free association. The same process took place even more completely in the later personalities, until *A* became dominant. Other associations showed that the wish for a child seemed to be the expression of mature libido, not infantile. Interpretation on the objective level was the wish for a child, on the subjective level was the wish for rebirth as the whole self—combining both sides.

#### VIII. GIRL

Recorded on pp. 194–196.

The actual pain in Vera's head and eye in this episode was very severe—a burning pain—and attempts to account for it were made, since all memory of its cause was dissociated. Intellectual development was very immature. The ego had apparently regressed to an animistic stage of belief wherein a spirit directly controlled and initiated the forces of nature. Since separate spirits were responsible for each different kind of force, innumerable spirits were postulated—spirits which in this case were malevolent since they produced pain and gained their satisfaction by trying to acquire power through the dominance of pain over the mortals who opposed them. The fire-spirits are considered to be projections of sadistic impulses directed against the self. Analysis showed that the

<sup>1</sup> See p. 194.

association between the algolagnic<sup>1</sup> impulse and maternal libido had taken place by the age of two and was then repressed. From the age of two up to the time of the delirium this masochistic level produced phantasies and dreams which were never remembered in waking life, until revived by analysis. When thus recovered and analysed they could be dated by means of the day remnants involved. A complete series of dreams motivated by the wish for a child were thus traced out over a period of 24 years.

These were expressed in algolagnic terms, since a fixation of algolagnic interest had occurred, associated with immature maternal libido capable of evolving to maturity, while associated with the fixed masochistic interest<sup>2</sup>.

This delirious episode, not then analysed, was found to be an expression of the same level that had produced those dreams. The manifest content was determined by the burning pain sensations which seemed inexplicable except in terms of fire, and animistic rationalisations were produced to account for the activity of the fire.

This appears to be another example of the determination of the form in which the wish for a child is expressed by somatic factors. (Compare with the cholera episode.) The analysis of the series of dreams and phantasies showed that the infantile libido synthesised with the masochistic interest had developed during those 24 years of unconscious activity.

In this delirious episode projections were from libido levels successively as each was thwarted in turn, the masochistic factor remaining constant throughout. In the first episode the pregnancy wish is seemingly fulfilled by the *flash of flame setting Vera's head on fire inside*<sup>3</sup>. In the next episode elaboration occurs: *many Indians shoot fire tipped arrows at her head*<sup>4</sup>. This appears to represent sexual desire apart from impregnation, since the arrows are to set Vera's hair on fire, not to enter her head. The repressing forces, inspired by the unconscious ego-ideal, refused to give in to desire and the Indians retired defeated, though declaring they only go to find a better mode of attack.

The ego is here fighting physical pain, striving to account for it, and at the same time fighting unrecognised sexual desires. These are projected in terms compatible with sense experience and the stage of belief. In the third episode, initiated by another paroxysm of pain, *the cause of which Vera sought*<sup>5</sup> and found in the reflection of the *fire* in

<sup>1</sup> Algolagnic interest includes both sadistic and masochistic impulses. The sadistic impulse strives to increase the power of the ego at any cost, and seems to spring from the will to power (or the instinct of self-assertion); the masochistic one seems to be a turning of the sadistic impulse against the self through association with self-abasement or self-depreciation.

<sup>2</sup> Since writing this, in which I postulate sadism and masochism as originating from the ego-instincts and only becoming associated with the sexual instincts secondarily, basing this on careful analysis, I find Freud has also been led to modify his views. He now suggests (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*) that the sadistic impulses are not primarily sexual but take root among the ego or death instincts, as he now calls them, not among the sexual or life instincts.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 194.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 195.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 195.

the brass knobs of the bed, she saw the *fire flame leap out* directly towards her head which felt as if *enveloped in flame which burnt without consuming*.

Vera's head was burning. The pain was excruciating and fire was postulated to account for her sensations. Practical experience showed her hair was not burnt as she kept feeling with her hand to find out, and this had to be accounted for, as in the first episode, by likening the fire to that in the burning bush which burnt without being consumed. Two contradictory sense experiences were present, one that Vera's head was on fire, and the flames from the fire, fire-tipped arrows, etc. were projected to account for this, the other that her hair and head were not burning away in spite of this. This manifest content seems to be the resultant of the wish for a child which was thwarted in reality, and of that part of the self which was striving to suppress sexual desires, the latter proving victorious.

The fourth episode appears to have carried the same ideas further, just as in earlier phantasies a sequence ever more elaborate arose as fresh elements were integrated with the old ones. So here, electricity was now called in to explain the pain felt. Vera looked up at the electric globes and felt a burning stab of pain at the same time. Hence the two became associated. The involuntary wince which caused movement of the eyes, was seen as a flash of light from the bulb. On looking up again the shadows and wires were perceived as demons, since electricity could not direct itself but had to be guided by spirits of fire who had already tried many modes of attack. Identification of the two demons through free associations showed that mature libido was expressed here (cf. two black cats). Further free associations which led to other phantasies showed that the libido in this episode was in infantile anal form. In the Indian episode infantile oedipus libido found expression.

The promise not to die was remembered here, so the fire spirits were still defied to do their worst. Apparently Vera was prepared to endure anything to attain her end, to keep her word. Though in the manifest content the opposing forces sought Vera's death, in the latent content they must have been her own sexual forces seeking satisfaction. Hence the latent significance of the promise not to die, not to be beaten by them can be regarded as the determination to retain control of her sexual impulses, a refusal to grant them straightforward satisfaction, whatever reinforcements they brought to bear.

As this personality or fragment of Vera became more integrated by the addition of fresh experiences, it gained the run of a larger portion of the preconscious. The part felt to be herself, which refused to give in to

the part projected and not recognised as herself by Vera, grew stronger. It was reinforced by more of the better self *A*, which had filled consciousness at the verge of death, since the repressing forces which refused to allow egoistic libidinous gratification have been previously taken to be part of the socialised less egoistic *A*. The next episode shows the conflict between desire and faith in God. Belief was implicit that nothing could stand in the way of the power behind the Cross and live. Hence each spirit associated with each successive fiery pang, was destroyed in turn<sup>1</sup>. Here is indicated the firm belief that God was stronger than all these malevolent spirits, but insufficient intellectual development to know that the spirits of fire were hallucinations. They were seen and felt and the evidence of Vera's senses carried the day, but one by one they were destroyed. Belief proved strong enough to defeat them, but intelligence too weak to recognise their nature (either manifest or latent content).

The nature or constitution of the ego-consciousness which held all these impulses at bay, finally defeating them in the power behind the Cross, must be considered briefly. It looks as if faith and its powers do not lie in the intellectual sphere, since this had regressed to primitive animistic beliefs, nor in the libido, since this was rejected and defeated. Yet in the limited ego-consciousness at the very beginning it proved strong enough to defy the power of the Indians in spite of the terrific pain actually experienced. The promise not to die was remembered, though how, why or when given, the fragmentary self did not know. At first it simply endured blindly, and defiantly. Gradually, however, it opposed active measures instead of passive ones. Instead of simply refusing to give in, it proceeded to destroy and render powerless its foes, relying on a power superior to any the fire spirits could draw upon, which had only to be focussed upon them in order to affect their destruction. What is this power which proved so efficacious in fact? Was it by determining to keep its promise at all costs that the real self found an opening, a way of making its presence felt? That promise dominated the ego-consciousness in several personalities, inspiring resistance to the apparently overwhelming external forces which were not recognised as the projections of internal ones.

The strength of the impulse behind the promise not to die, was due to love for the one to whom it was given. It was an altruistic love which was capable of sacrificing itself for the sake of the object of its love and is attributed neither to libido nor interest alone, but to the love arising

<sup>1</sup> See p. 196.

from their fusion. In the so-called better self *A*, analysis indicated that libido and interest had both become socialised through synthesis within the herd instincts, in which both could gain satisfaction instead of being thwarted by the conflict between libido and interest in egoistic channels. The maternal libido which is the libidinous mainspring of altruistic love apparently joined with interest from the instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement, or the will to power and the feeling of inferiority. These are terms expressing an attitude towards other selves which comes into play according to the nature of the environment, both being essential in a social animal as soon as self-consciousness is attained. So far as I can see this seems to have formed the nucleus of the main personality, *A*, which was strong enough to repress the infantile egoistic trends as they arose. In the first place, this occurred through the influence of love of Vera's parents, components being isolated in the unconscious that should have been integrated within the self-regarding sentiment, or synthesis of relations between ego and object. These seem to have continued their development independently, from time to time causing serious trouble when external causes weakened the repressing forces, through illness, for example. Since, however, the will to power was strongly developed within this system, it would allow no weakness of the self to prove stronger than itself, and built up a firm ideal of self-control. Various external conditions led to a very early independence and self-will, the instinct of self-abasement being apparently the weakest of the trio, until the self became more balanced by complete submission to the will of God, but satisfied the will-to-power by owning no other jurisdiction. Since the God to whom *A* thus submitted, gaining independence in so doing, was conceived as a God of Love, the maternal libido could also be satisfied. All three components were welded into a closely-knit religious sentiment, the keynote of which was love—a sentiment which, with strong instinctive forces thus integrated, had more power behind impulses aroused within it than any solitary impulses could put forth. Yet owing to the dissociation occurring in infancy, egoistic impulses appear to have had large unconscious reinforcements which made conflict inevitably severe when external stimuli aroused the impulses not integrated within it. Thus in this delirious episode, for example, the projection of repressed impulses caused acute suffering, but the purely altruistic love that inspired the determination to keep a promise which was often regretted, was presumably able to draw upon the organised instinctive forces within the religious sentiment, the power of which was greater than even the intensely stimulated libido not integrated with it; the power of altruistic

love proved stronger than passion, or egoistic libido. It was a remarkable fact that in spite of the suffering involved, there was no fear felt by this self, the will-to-power organised within the religious sentiment refusing to admit any power superior to it, except that of the God with whom it was working in harmony at the moment. Further, by recognising that the power to overcome the malevolent spirits was not its own, but the power behind the Cross, the power of love, the instinct of submission was brought into play. This allowed the altruistic libido to spend itself freely in conjunction with the will-to-power inspiring control, whatever the cost to the ego, weakened through physical illness as it was. Since feeling rather than thought predominated, the attitude towards experience was that of the extravert *C*. This analysis suggests that the ego-consciousness was that of a feminine extravert in an animistic stage of belief, which, containing mature libido (*i.e.* sexual and maternal fused) was able to draw upon more and more of the forces synthesised within the religious sentiment of the better self *A* as its experience became more integrated. Sexual libido would thus be included within *A* instead of being dissociated independently and robbing *A* of part of her forces. The intellectual side *B*, however, was still cut off from consciousness. This ego-consciousness, being unaware of any impossibilities in it, reacted to the manifest content of the hallucinations which seem to have been projected from the various algolagnic levels, producing rationalisations in animistic terms.

## IX. ELDERLY AMERICAN MAN

Recorded on pp. 196-197.

In this fragmentary pseudo-personality confusion and bewilderment were felt. The man could not accept as natural the projections from the unconscious, though he could not deny the evidence of his senses. Consciousness was also extended over a wider range, though much less closely held together than the more limited preconscious content of other pseudo-personalities in which dissociation and regression were more complete.

*K* entered undisguisedly into this episode<sup>1</sup>. He played a part when the intellectual side predominated, doing much to arouse and develop the repressed feminine side and above all the better self—the woman in whom the three irreconcilables join. Thus more external reality was cognised than in the preceding dissociations. *K*, however, also served as a cover for *L*. Much of the confusion experienced consciously was the

<sup>1</sup> See p. 197.

result of this condensation. There was no knowledge of *L*'s existence in the preconscious of this self. Impulses associated with him were projected from the unconscious on to *K*, causing horror and confusion as incompatible with feelings for *K*.

All the projections seem to have been from one libido level, the mature heterosexual. The various rationalisations from stage to stage increased the confusion. This was expressed by the projection of changing scene and time, until IX thought he was mad. Whereupon sailors came to take him back to the boat where he could be kept safely, since he had lost his reason and could not adapt himself to the external world. Free associations showed that the sailors represented angels, who took him back out of the world, thus fulfilling in phantasy the wish for death.

The results of analysis indicate that the ego-consciousness was part of the male introvert phase. It fulfils the desire to be a man, who, as elderly, would be doubly beyond the capacity to fulfil the woman side of Vera's nature. Projections from this give rise to horror. Fear is more pronounced in the male characters than in the female ones, partly owing to greater intellectual development, partly owing to more complete antithesis between male consciousness and feminine libido.

All the male characters resulting from Vera's dissociation seem to have had a higher cognitive development, independently of the stage of development of their libido, than the feminine ones had. The feminine pseudo-personalities had evidently undergone much more complete ego-regression, with varying degrees of libido-regression, than the masculine ones.

#### X. GIRL. SCENE IN AMERICA

Recorded on pp. 197-198.

The first free associations obtained in connection with this pseudo-personality on 31st May 1921, seemed to stir up the levels of the unconscious concerned and to induce the transference dream which necessitated analysis. They were as follows:

Valparaiso (omission) . . . . . *Rocks of Valpre*—hero after carrying girl with sprained ankle over the rocks, returns and then finds himself cut off by the tide. He climbs the cliffs, but the top edge overhangs, and it takes every ounce of strength and skill he has, trained athlete and strong man as he is, to raise himself up and swing himself over the top (omission) great obstacles to be overcome requiring all his strength and skill which would not have arisen had he not helped the girl or had she not needed that help. Hero and *K* identified? (omission) is it conquering of self by *K*?—he having learned to care through helping the girl, then



had to bend all his efforts towards desexualising that love, which was done without the girl ever realising it had sexual roots, the highest type of love.

No more free associations in connection with this self were obtained until 1st December 1921, during which time Vera's early life had been explored analytically and the analysis of the other pseudo-personalities attempted, so that most of the resistances involved had been broken down. Analysis of this pseudo-personality then led back to the first transference dream which had arisen from the associations quoted, enabling a more complete interpretation of it than was possible seven months earlier. This completed the cycle from 'Valparaiso' to the same episode. In the meantime it had been necessary to go through the whole life history of the dissociated pseudo-personalities and Vera's main personality in order to elucidate the nature of the pseudo-personality concerned in this episode.

Extracts from the free associations obtained on 1st December 1921 were as follows.

This girl has more of the normal me than the others, though still delirious (omission). I want *K*, thinking I'll get well if only he comes—memory of longing for him when ill 1914 (nervous breakdown), cinematograph of journey good example of projection of images as hallucinatory percepts. Why does boat not follow normal course but land somewhere<sup>1</sup>? Why did our love not develop as one would have expected from such close affinity spiritually, which at different stages included unconscious or conscious love on each side? It should have matured normally, yet though I loved, 1912–14, I did not realise it. But I no longer loved that way in 1916 (omission) and though he still remains my most intimate friend, yet it is not love including anything physical. . . . *K* seems to both be and not be himself<sup>1</sup>—typical fusion or identification of two people into one, as in dreams—who is the other person? . . . . . *L* (omission) Dr was *H*. . . but he gets lost on the way—one of them rides madly on a camel over the desert to Beirut to catch the train, if possible, since there is only one a month<sup>1</sup>—obvious reference to menstruation<sup>2</sup>—riding madly—sexual, to catch train = to impregnate. I get excited at race, will he do it? yes, just—camel rider dashes up, someone greets him from a tent, but it's vague again, but train is caught<sup>3</sup>. Vagueness to disguise details (omission) straightforward pregnancy-wish fulfilled in phantasy since denied in reality—confusion as to who camel rider is—only stated to be one of them, then found to be *K* who really wasn't *K* but *L* (omission). Next rush to catch steamer at Valparaiso, girl in green<sup>4</sup> is *G* (*K*'s wife) and I'm vaguely disturbed by her, she waits for train to arrive and I see no more of their journey<sup>5</sup> (omission). Again veiled in vagueness. Vera's associations from

<sup>1</sup> See p. 197.

<sup>2</sup> Since this occurs once a month.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 198.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 197.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 197.

having told *K* to come down the chimney<sup>1</sup>, which worry Vera because he'll get so black, are omitted. She also sees him dropping from roof to window doing impossible gymnastic feats. The interpretation of this is straightforward. It must be borne in mind that the sexual significance refers to *L* and not to *K*. The figure in this episode is a condensation of *K* and *L*.

Next episode, while still vaguely conscious *K* is on verandah, but having given up any hope of getting him in, nurse leaves me and I hear a buzz of voices, rough wild men<sup>2</sup>, cowboys, toughs, try to dash in<sup>2</sup> and I'm terrified, they make a lot of noise and are all armed to the teeth with revolvers and knives. I hear them first fighting in the adjoining saloon, and directly I'm alone they dash in and up the stairs to my room. I call nurse, but she tells me no one has been near, but I know better and think she's trying to get out again—entrance of wild armed men to my room (again projection of libido). When the evidence of my senses is denied by nurse, I think she is in the plot and see her making signs to someone through the wall<sup>2</sup>, (rationalising to account for her contradicting Vera's terrifying experience). Since I never saw her meet anyone I was curious to know whom she kept slipping out to see, and every time she left me the threatening voices were heard. Naturally I tried to keep her too busy to leave me<sup>2</sup>, since I could not trust her to stay because I wanted her<sup>3</sup>, directly my attention wandered she was off again—obviously her disappearance was a negative hallucination, possibly her absence was actual the first time, then when voices were associated with her absence, every time they appeared, I thought she must have left me, so did not see her. Finally every time the threatening voices came, I, though absolutely terrified, refused to look to see where they were, though it took an awful effort to keep my eyes shut and trust to the power of the Cross to keep them from me when I could hear them shouting and fighting round me. After many such efforts their voices sounded further and further away, fainter and fainter until they were gone (again conflict between libido and ego-ideal) and the ego, terrified, won by simply ceasing to try and thinking the sign of the Cross, secure in the power for which it stood.

#### Explanatory Notes

The belief in the power of the Cross first reached consciousness during the life-time of Gerald when at the point of death, but it was first put into action after this experience by VIII<sup>4</sup>. In both VII and VIII the power required to be focussed in a magical objective symbol in order to be recognised. The cross was directed towards the foe or the sign of the

<sup>1</sup> See p. 197.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 198.

<sup>3</sup> I wonder if similar motives underlie the querulousness of delirious or insane patients when they are never satisfied with what is done and they want to keep their attendant continually doing something.

<sup>4</sup> The pseudo-personality who woke up after the brief recuperative sleep following the return to life was VIII not VII, alternation of VIII and VII being frequent.

cross made. In X the sign of the cross was only *thought*, not made objectively. This showed a great advance, as in the earlier cases the repressing forces, which appear to have been those welded into the religious sentiment, were drawn upon as if external. In X the power was recognised implicitly as psychical. This indicates that much more of the beliefs of *A* were in the preconscious of this pseudo-personality and could be drawn upon directly rather than indirectly through a symbol. Instead of forcing its way from outside, the power was within, from whatever source ultimately obtained. Faith within the religious sentiment had made that power its own and the ego-consciousness was in touch with it directly at last. Very shortly after this, the dissociated memories became reintegrated and the real self was in conscious control again. This followed the recognition of Vera's mother, which brought back her own identity. Memories then flowed back with great rapidity, not only of past life as her whole self, but of the fragmentary lives of the dissociated pseudo-personalities.

The ego-consciousness here seemed to be at first a fragment of the social self *A* which was as it was in 1914, when its longing for *K* was most intense, though the libidinous aspect was unconscious. Memory was more comprehensive, *K* actually being at . . . . The wish for him was fully conscious, but since unfulfilled in reality, he was represented as *en route*. The manifest content of this episode was the resultant of the conscious wish for *K* and the unconscious one for *L* expressing the old desire for a child. When, however, reality does not bring *K* from the verandah on which he is thought to be, the libido apparently seizes upon fresh material from the more comprehensive preconscious content, in which to express itself, using cowboys, wild men, etc. in keeping with the American environment, as suitable objects on to which to project itself in order to enter consciousness. Many details of this were reminiscent of nightmares from 1914 wherein desire for *K* was unconscious though strong enough to induce a breakdown. It was probably the same force that kept them unconscious then which finally proved capable of repressing them in delirium and of resuming control. If, as the evidence indicates, the same force, disguised or otherwise, had similarly resumed partial control in the case of Gerald, the girl in VIII, and now in X, both *B* and *C*, introvert and extravert tendencies, would have become associated with it, so that X could merge imperceptibly into the whole self, which included within it the dissociated fragmentary selves, bringing ego and libido up to the same level. This transition actually occurred<sup>1</sup>, aided by

<sup>1</sup> See p. 198.

the cessation of the toxic effects due to streptococci, morphia, chloral and bromide. Thus introvert and extravert modes of reaction, intellect and feeling were synthesised within a self which was equally itself as either, bringing the dissociations to an end. The real self was in conscious control at last.

#### CHAPTER VII

#### THE CONSTITUTION AND INTER-RELATION OF THE DISSOCIATED PSEUDO-PERSONALITIES

IN Chapter IV it was shown that the three main characteristic modes of reaction prior to the dissociations of delirium were the introvert *B*, the extravert *C* and the altrovert *A*; further that some dissociation had occurred about the age of two, such that the narcissistic libido joined with interest to form a synthesis capable of developing independently up to maturity. Object libido (sexual) had joined with interest similarly, giving rise to a developed extravert mode of reaction or attitude towards experience: and the altroverted libido (maternal) had gone its way as the libidinous mainspring of the better or social self *A*. Each developed to some extent independently, but *A*, as containing the most mature libido, contained the possibility of synthesising within it the earlier modes of reaction. *B* and *C*, each containing one component of less developed libido, fixed so that interplay was impossible, developed independently and one-sidedly, each having what the other lacked and each incapable of developing into the other. Another difference between *B* and *C* was that the self-assertive instinct was predominantly embodied in *B*, and the instinct of self-abasement in *C*. Both, however, underwent sublimation in the course of time, that is, they developed beyond the physical, though retaining the characteristics of their respective libido components.

Immediately prior to the toxic effects of streptococci and morphia, the dominant mode of reaction was that of *C* who seems to have been a mature feminine extravert. The heterosexual libido was directed outwards completely, self-consciousness and thought being a minimum, adjustment to the environment being by means of feeling, an egoistic functional extraversion, since the pleasure of the ego was sought more than the pleasure or good of others. For some time, however, *A* had been trying to force its way back into consciousness, influencing *C* somewhat, but giving rise to conflict, gaining strength, however, as the sexual libido in *C* developed into maternal libido, thus including both. Since the maternal libido was strong in *A* it could now get into the preconscious

and swell that of *C*. The result of this in time would probably have been complete fusion into an emotional altrovert instead of an egoistic extravert, if it had not been for the co-presence of the developed introvert *B* who had similarly partly fused with *A*, progressing from egoistic introversion towards what but for *C* would have become an intellectual altrovert.

The difference between the intellectual or emotional altrovert whose adaptation is by means of their most differentiated function, namely thought and feeling respectively, and the egoistic introvert and extravert, seems to me to be that the activity resulting from either mode of adaptation issues through the channels of the herd instincts (of which the parental libido with its impulse to render service to the object of its love seems to be the libidinous mainspring, giving rise to altroversion). This modifies the one-sidedness of either alone. In egoistic introversion or extraversion the development of the self or the pleasure of the self is sought with a correspondingly slight development of the herd instinct. The complete development of egoistic introversion would approach dementia praecox, a simultaneous development of a secondary extraversion through herd channels, that is to say altroversion, being the only safeguard, whereas complete egoistic extraversion approaches the hysteric, whose value to society is very dubious. Again altroversion, the fusing of libido and interest on objects for the sake of the objects, for their service, not for that of the ego, proves the safeguard. When the extravert adapts himself through feeling for the benefit of the community, not for his own convenience; when his feeling urges to action for the welfare of the race, then the one-sided extraversion is partly balanced, and altroversion has developed<sup>1</sup>. In both cases for altroversion a third instinctive channel is necessary. It may be considered as that of the herd instincts or the parental instinct (the family being the primitive herd for the developing child). But from the analysis made it seems more probable that libido associated with the parental instinct joins with interest from two of the ego-instincts, the self-assertive or 'will to power' and the self-depreciative or 'feeling of inferiority,' to motivate the third instinctive channel, the herd. The herd instincts would on this hypothesis not be primary instincts but, combining interest and libido synthetically in harmony instead of in conflict, would be the root of altroversion and would seem to be the basis of personality, which is a social product that has evolved through the interaction of the egoistic self and the environment, the self being considered in relation to others.

During the period of delirium each fragment of the self which filled the ego-consciousness in turn knew nothing of the other pseudo-personalities, but took itself for granted as a personality, seemingly unaware of its apparent springing into existence without a memory of its past history. Each such pseudo-personality developed independently through interacting with the environment. In environment must be included hallucinatory or illusionary projections from the other dissociated parts of the mind which apparently were not in the preconscious belonging to each ego-consciousness, but in the unconscious proper in the sense of being unable to reach consciousness directly. The activity of the whole mind was very great, and the withdrawal of morphia had heightened

<sup>1</sup> Genuine heterosexual love in which interest and libido (both sexual and parental) join in a reciprocal relation to the love object is probably the normal method of altroversion. This forms the foundation of the family and differs from the egoistic passion which results from sexual libido alone.

sexual interests, increasing the libido activity which had presumably been regressively satisfied by the morphia. The libido not recognised as its own by any of the fragmentary pseudo-personalities, was projected, producing different hallucinations in each case, which is attributed to the fact that it could only express itself in terms of the limited preconscious available for each dissociated pseudo-personality. There was, however, a certain amount of overlapping preconsciously, so that one or two ideas or impulses were common to most of the pseudo-personalities, *e.g.* the promise not to die, and the name of Vera's doctor. When one ego-consciousness was repressed the one which replaced it knew nothing of it, therefore the preconscious belonging to the one which was repressed must have become a part of the unconscious of the other. Alternation of some of these pseudo-personalities was frequent. Each, however, went on where it left off before, oblivious of the temporal gap and, so far as I know, there was no projection from one of these pseudo-personalities when it was in the unconscious. Projection of libido seems to have taken place from levels not synthesised into these fragmentary pseudo-personalities, the barrier between each of these seeming more impenetrable than that between the rest of the unconscious and the ego-consciousness at any moment. On this account anything which passed into consciousness directly or indirectly, that is as a thought or feeling, or projected as hallucination, illusion, or as a delusion, seemed to have become a permanent part of the preconscious belonging to the ego-consciousness which was dominant at the time. Each such preconscious and ego-consciousness remained apparently unchanged until it forced its way into consciousness again with a change of personality. Each continued from the point at which consciousness had been lost when previously repressed. As the delirium continued, more and more of the contents of the secondary unconscious, containing all the repressed tendencies and emotions of a lifetime, seemingly passed into the preconscious of the various selves, and there became synthesised into a series of dissociated centres of experience, which are considered to be a series of relations between the ego-consciousness and the object<sup>1</sup>. Each such synthesis of relations between the ego-consciousness and the object was unique, and formed the nucleus of a secondary personality which became more integrated the longer it managed to remain in consciousness, probably because it was then able to interact with the environment. Some of these were very fragmentary indeed and as others became more integrated these frag-

<sup>1</sup> Object including the projections hallucinated as well as much of the actual environment of which each self became aware through the senses.

mentary ones were unable to swing back into consciousness to continue their development. Alternations occurred between some of the different pseudo-personalities, but not between those very far apart in the sequence which progressed from I to X. Thus I and X did not alternate at all. I finished her brief existence as sole conscious self long before X made her appearance in consciousness as a self, although both were girls in America; whereas IX and X alternated frequently, as did other selves adjacent in the progressive series from I to X. The 'delirium tremens' ran concurrently with VII and VIII, VII being sufficiently developed intellectually to be able to grasp eventually the fact that the fearful visions were products of his own imagination, though it was not easy to get the fact home. The others, however, were incapable of grasping it at all. It is rather interesting in this connection that more libido levels were projected to delude VII by their incompatibility, even apart from those projected in the 'delirium tremens,' than in any other self. Thus a more comprehensive synthesis than that apparent in the other selves seems to have occurred as more and more experience became associated with that self. Incidentally Gerald's (VII) sufferings were proportionally severe. The physical suffering was equally great in several of the selves, but the mental suffering was greatest in VII and IX owing to the partial realisation of the mental nature of the delusions. The others were only aware of the manifest content as external reality. Negative hallucinations were as frequent as positive ones. That is, persons and things actually present were neither seen nor heard. Between these came illusions when persons or things present were misperceived and transformed to fit in with the delusory experience of the moment. The various ego-consciousnesses or selves are attributed to the isolation of several attitudes towards experience, or modes of reaction; some being introvert, some extravert, some egoistic, some altrovert in various combinations. Seemingly each self was built up of the relations between a momentary ego-consciousness reacting in its own way towards the experience presented to it and its environment. Each retained and developed its own mode of reaction as more experience became incorporated within it.

The first free associations obtained from any starting point in the life of each pseudo-personality seemed to refer entirely to the limited portion of the preconscious available to the dominant ego-consciousness. For example, in IV<sup>1</sup> all free associations produced at the first sitting referred to chemistry, chemical laboratories, people met during that kind of work, etc. The workshop of the episode was a composite of four

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 186-187.

laboratories in which Vera had worked. In VI<sup>1</sup> the first batch of free associations produced reminiscences from many books connected with occult phenomena, witchcraft and the uncanny in general. The same thing was shown in connection with other pseudo-personalities.

It seemed as if complexes or sentiments held together by a common affective bond were isolated so that consciousness was only in touch with one at a time. Any impulse from the rest of the then unconscious mind would only express itself in terms of the isolated material which also determined the mode of reaction towards its experience of the ego-consciousness in touch with it.

The bond in IV was chemical interest. Adaptation was made through thinking, not feeling; IV thought such power would upset the balance of the world, and therefore tried to destroy it at any cost. The mode of reaction may be regarded as typically introvert.

In VI the common bond was the attraction towards the weird, the mysterious, the uncanny. All memories thus grouped were isolated so that, though when previously formed they were recognised as interesting feats of the imagination, they seem now to have been accepted as realities. For example, belief in the transformation of men into animals found no intellectual development capable of doubting it or conflicting with it, therefore it was accepted as fact. It is presumed that the ego had regressed to the infantile stage wherein belief in fairies, witches, etc. had been vivid, though at the same time the preconscious in touch with that ego-consciousness must have retained similar memories acquired after that belief was lost. These the ego treated in the same infantile way as if they were realities.

VI may also be regarded as typically extravert, feeling rather than thought predominating. An attempt was made to account for the pain (physical) experienced in terms compatible with the witchcraft stage of belief; libido evidently also seized upon the same material in which to express itself. The resulting delusions satisfied both.

In contrast with VI very little ego-regression seemed to have taken place in pseudo-personality VII<sup>2</sup> whereas its libido had apparently regressed to its earliest infantile forms, the projection of which caused much suffering to the more intellectually developed ego-consciousness. Since the different levels were themselves incompatible, the hallucinations they produced were so too, requiring more and more rationalisation to account for them.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 187-188.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 190-194.



In VIII<sup>1</sup> libido from the masochistic level was projected. The ego-consciousness here was extravert and feminine, but at a different stage of belief from that of VI. The ego had regressed to a primitive animism which postulated a spirit in trees, rivers, fire, etc., interpreting all activity as thus due to spirit agency. Here, too, was the attempt to account for the intolerable burning pain in the head. This was ascribed to spirit agency, and enabled the masochistic level to express itself too. Indians were brought in as agents corresponding to dreams at the age of 12, in which the same level had expressed itself.

In IX<sup>2</sup> the introvert reaction was illustrated. Thought was more developed, and analysis indicates that the preconscious of IX must have included many more disconnected ideas, that is, ideas not held together so closely by an affective bond, giving wider scope for activity than had those of IV, V, VI, VIII. Integration, however, was so loose that the incompatibilities proved puzzling. The one libido level projected seems to have expressed itself in terms of each sub-complex thus loosely integrated, with bewildering results.

In this personality the influence of *K* first makes its appearance, though *K* is also a cover for *L* thus increasing the confusion. Much that applied to *L* is incompatible with *K*. *K* is also the common bond between IX and X<sup>3</sup>, aiding the alternation between them, not only in virtue of playing a part in the brief history of both, but because in real life he had played a very large part in moulding *A*, though *B* was dominant when Vera first knew him. Thus in delirium his influence helped to swing the balance from the one-sided part of *B*, which was personality IX, to the more balanced social self *A* as it had developed by 1914 (just as he had done years before personally). From X, which included more in its memory than the other selves had done, the transition occurred to the whole personality which included the memory of Vera's past life and all the pseudo-personalities, which thus once more came into touch with external reality.

This personality, though remembering what had been after 1914, was more nearly like the old social self of 1914 than it had been at any time between. Moreover, recognising that the self of 1914 was a much better self than the later one, and knowing that the best in it was due to the influence of *K*, it was natural that the bewildered self, feeling that it was in a state extremely open to external influence, wanted to get back to the influence that had developed it so far, to be consolidated by *K*'s

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 194-196.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 196-197.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 197-198.

unconscious influence, until strong enough mentally and physically to stand alone once more. Once Vera was in touch with *K* recovery was very rapid and *A* remained mistress of her unruly components.

After free associations thus dealing with the preconscious of some of the pseudo-personalities had been obtained, dreams occurred which had to be subjected to analysis in order to investigate the unconscious of each personality. The rest of the analysis was then carried on by means of transference and dream analysis until the resistances keeping the immature libido levels unconscious were successively broken down. The nature of the conative and affective trends previously repressed became clear through being re-experienced in the present in the guise of transference.

From time to time during this analysis, fragments of the delirious experience became clear, through treating them in the same way as the dreams. They were analysed as soon as the actual pressure of the major analysis slackened enough to allow of this. Every time, however, this served to induce dreams and transferences progressively more infantile, which necessitated carrying out a radical analysis before the meaning of the deliria and their nature could be really elucidated.

For a time the deliria were therefore left alone and the attitudes, feelings and thoughts of the first few years of life were the subject of exploration. Once the tremendous resistances to these were overcome, delirium analysis proved possible. Free associations were concerned with the latent content, instead of as before only with the manifest one. This enabled the different libido levels functioning in each, singly or fused, to be traced out. Resistances, of course, were still encountered but they proved less rigid than before. Persistent free association broke them down without the intervention of dreams or transference being necessary as had been the case previously. It was rather as if most of the required material had entered the preconscious when resistances maintaining infantile amnesia were broken down and thus they became accessible directly and undisguisedly when free associations led to them. This points to the view that the later resistances were between the conscious and the preconscious, the earlier ones between the unconscious and the preconscious, different methods of overcoming these resistances being therefore necessary. No one pseudo-personality was analysed completely and independently at once, but the analysis of several was carried successively further and further. The breaking down of a resistance in one very often served to bring up associations with another in which the same trend had expressed itself in different material. Analysis was then continued from that point until either it was elucidated or free associa-

tions led off to yet another pseudo-personality or, by breaking down a fresh resistance, led back to the former one again enabling it to be carried a little further.

Analysis of many pseudo-personalities thus ran concurrently. All associations, of course, were dated, so that the inter-relations became clear. The amazing thing was that the memories never got mixed up with so much cross-analysis. On recovering from the delirium each memory came up with its personal credentials, so to speak, falling into place with the rest of the personal memory belonging to the same person, being recognised, however isolated, as the memory of one pseudo-personality and not confused with another. In the same way, free associations bringing up the latent content, the unconscious of each pseudo-personality seemed to carry with them their personal identity. Vera feels she is all of them, yet does not mix their memories in the way she mixes memories of years ago. Each synthesis, though gathered up into a larger synthesis which is herself, yet retains its identity as a unitary synthesis isolated from the rest, which reacts in its own unique way towards experience. Each has its own personal memory. The individual libido trends in each, common to most, do not seem personal in the same way. She feels they belong to her but are not she. They only become herself when synthesised to form part of a personal consciousness. As, however, all the different personal consciousnesses drew their energy ultimately from the same source, from the instincts organised into an organic unity through individualisation in one physical body, they were capable of being synthesised into a larger, more developed personal unity, or personal consciousness. Their individual isolated selves were merged in the larger whole, losing their power of individual development. Though having had independent or semi-independent existences as conscious selves, the memories of each such short independent existence remained stamped with an identity of its own, an identity which was considered to be due to the particular affective bond which held cognition and activity together in a unitary experience in each case.

The following is a brief summary of the conclusions reached as a result of analysis with regard to the constitution of the dissociated selves and the transition to the normal self.

I. *A girl in a nursing home in America.* p. 185.

The ego-consciousness here was a fragment of *C*—an egoistic extravert. Projections were from object homo-erotic, and anal libido levels.

II. *Gwendoline. On board ship going to Canada*, p. 185.

The ego-consciousness was another fragment of *C* with projections from different libido levels separately. Projections were from mature heterosexual and maternal libido respectively.

III. *Old Lady*, p. 186.

The ego-consciousness was another fragment of *C*, but here projections were from integrated heterosexual and maternal libido.

IV. *Middle-aged man*, pp. 186-187.

The ego-consciousness was here a fragment of *B* the male introvert side, which had regressed to the stage in 1913 when chemical interest predominated. It was not however a purely egoistic introvert, as in 1913 a certain amount of fusion between *A* and *B* had occurred giving rise to a socialised introvert, or, in my terminology, an intellectual altrovert.

Heterosexual and maternal libido were combined and projections from this gave rise to the consistent hallucinations.

VI. *Breton peasant girl*, pp. 187-188.

The ego-consciousness was due to a regression of the egoistic extravert *C* to stage of belief in witchcraft. Projections were from mature heterosexual and infantile oedipus libido as well as from combined heterosexual and maternal libido, all being in terms compatible with the beliefs of the ego-consciousness.

VII. *Gerald. Boy of 16*, pp. 190-194.

The ego-consciousness was that of the male introvert *B* and a fragment of *A*—*i.e.* a socialised introvert or intellectual altrovert. It was mature, and there was no ego regression. Projections were from many levels of libido independently, without including those expressing themselves in the 'delirium tremens'; anal, auto-erotic, infantile oedipus, heterosexual and maternal libido, all produced independent hallucinations which the puzzled self had to rationalise to account for their appearance. This gave rise to many delusions.

VIII. *Girl*, pp. 194-196.

The ego-consciousness was composed of *C* who had regressed to primitive animism. All hallucinations were accounted for in animistic terms. Part of the way through the better self *A* made its presence felt, and gradually fused the two fragments into an emotional altrovert.

Projections were from the integrated infantile masochistic level in the stage it was at about twelve years old.

IX. *Elderly American man*, pp. 196-197.

The ego-consciousness, with little regression, was a loose integration of the egoistic introvert *B*. Projections were from mature heterosexual libido in many forms owing to the larger preconscious from which it could draw material in which to express itself. Fear and horror were aroused in the ego by it, though it was not recognised as part of the mind.

X. *Girl in America*, pp. 197-198.

The ego-conscious was a fragment of *A* as in 1914, *i.e.* the altroverted or better self including both extravert and introvert tendencies. Projections were from mature heterosexual and maternal libido combined.

From X the transition to whole self (retaining the mode of reaction of X, that is, including extravert and introvert within a loose synthesis) followed the recognition of Vera's mother. Once the memory of her identity was regained the memory of Vera's past life, including all the dissociated pseudo-personalities of the delirium, filtered back. All that had entered the field of consciousness during the delirium appears to have remained in the preconscious. As the more socialised self entered more and more into consciousness it included the other modes of reaction until, when it dominated consciousness, all the memories held together separately by different modes of reaction, which had determined the synthesis of experience, were available for its use. The larger synthesis included the lesser ones, but without confusing them.

Thus although Vera was herself and in possession of the same memories apart from the delirium, before and after it, she had changed her personality or *dominant synthetic attitude towards experience*, from an extra-verted attitude to one combining extravert and introvert tendencies within an altroverted or social one. In other words altroverted reactions became more frequent than extraverted ones.

The delirium had acted as an automatic psycho-analysis on a large scale, steadily swinging the balance over from the dominance of one attitude which prevented the other coming into action, to that of one which included both, incidentally abreacting a great deal of repressed affect.

It was this bringing to the top of the most inclusive self that has helped the actual analysis carried out later to be successful. Fusion of the various libidinous components freed during analysis presumably took place within the main synthesis, which was no longer both extravert and introvert in conflict with each other, but a self which was equally at home in either mode of reaction according to requirements.

If *B* or *C* had come out as dominant after the delirium, the auto-analysis, if attempted at all, which is doubtful, would possibly have swelled the force of whichever was dominant, but would have thus accentuated the one-sidedness of character, whereas with *A* coming to the fore spontaneously, the auto-analysis has strengthened and consolidated it in much less time than it would have taken if left to itself. But it has only hastened, not altered the development of a more stable, less neurotic personality, through furthering the development of the herd instincts in which various conflicting ego and sex instincts are synthesised and work in harmony. Personal experience shows that the more developed this synthesis becomes, the easier it is to control the interest and libido still in their egoistic channels. This diminishes the endo-psychic conflict with its disruptive effects.

*A*, *B* and *C* have each dominated the attitude towards experience in turn, until the balance swung over to one of the others (each seeming equally the self), but only *A*, the one motivated by developed herd instincts or socialised psychic energy, has proved capable of combining the previously incompatible modes of reaction. The others simply repressed the opposing sides in turn. This points to the social self as a higher evolutionary product than either egoistic introversion or extraversion. It also supports the secondary origin of the herd instincts in which interest and libido combine to give rise to altroversion.

#### CHAPTER VIII

#### PERSONALITY

It would seem desirable to outline briefly the nature of personality as deduced from a study of its dissociation and subsequent re-integration in the case of *Vera*, as described in the previous chapters.

Personality implies a certain degree of intellectual and moral development. It applies only to beings of a complex and developed type of psychic life. It is essentially a legal and ethical notion. The human self comes into the world with the capacity to develop up to the level of personality. This development seemingly occurs through the interaction of the slowly developing self with the environment. To this environment it must adapt itself, or die, and it is in this process of adaptation that the modification of the self occurs. Personality is the product of the interaction between the innate psychic constitution, which has become individualised through embodiment in a physical organism, and the environment.

The infant starts life as a bodily self aware only of his own sensations and vague desires (hunger, etc.). The process of education gradually weans him from preoccupation with these; by impressing upon him ideals which he, consciously or unconsciously, strives to actualise. At first this is for the sake of the pleasure which he himself receives from the approval of nurse or parent, and to avoid the pain which results from disapproval; then for the pleasure which the parents themselves receive in being able to give this approval. It will be noted that this shows a progressive love from the self to the parent, and this does not stop here, but develops until it becomes, at a much later stage, a striving to actualise for the sake of the ideal itself. When this stage has been reached he has made that particular ideal a part of his mind. He has identified it with his potential social self. It is thus seen that the development of ideals within the mind is a social product.

If one lived in complete isolation, it is probable that all desires would strive to fulfil themselves. The only barriers would be due to external factors. Living as a social self, certain ideas or impulses are inhibited from within as well. In social life we seek to incorporate the ideals of others with the self and in so doing tend to inhibit anti-social factors.

The actual self may be regarded as conditioned, first by the past; secondly by ideals present in the mind; thirdly by the environment.

I hold strongly that until the child has accepted some standard other than that of his own desires and has made such a standard part of himself, he is not free, but is completely bound by external conditions. Once let him accept any ideal as his own and he becomes free in the only possible sense of the word. Free, that is, to choose a mode of action that will fulfil the ideal, or free to satisfy the earlier tendencies which do not fulfil it. He thus becomes free to choose a mode of action which is self-determined, not imposed from without. Here the possibility of sin and neurosis comes into being at the same time that the possibility of moral progress comes into existence.

For me, the development of personality is the progress from externally conditioned activity, to internally conditioned activity, that is, to self-directed activity. In proportion as he moves from the outer circle of blind reaction to the inner circle of creative vision, does man develop personality. He no longer worships the god of things as they are, but strives towards the god of things as they shall be.

In the earlier stages of development there are many possible characters that may result from the interaction between the ego and its environment. Gradually, however, a more stable nucleus is built up, and around that

nucleus experiences tend to gather, and in so doing lead to the development of one character, rather than many. So far as I can see, this nucleus is the basis of personality. It is a self-regarding sentiment in which the self is not entirely self-centred, but is a social self. In this sentiment libido and interest are synthesised; the self- and race-preservation instincts find satisfaction, and the relations between the ego and the environment are mutual and complementary.

Thus the original unity of the mind, which was organic, becomes mental, and so transcends the bodily self while at the same time including it. In this form it continues its creative evolution, by assimilating more highly developed but similarly evolved personalities. In so doing it increases its own value and theirs, following the same plan as that by which it grew from an egoistic bodily self to a social self. It is thus always changing itself and reacting on others.

In the building up of this system of relations between the ego and its environment, certain dominant attitudes towards experience seem to be evolved. Consequently behaviour becomes fairly predictable providing the circumstances are known. For example the individual can be relied upon not to change with every breath of opinion, and, while he is always interacting with the environment, is able to progress gradually. Only when there are extreme influences from without, such as shock or any other cause of strong emotion, will sudden and radical alterations of personality occur.

This system is capable of surviving unchanged the temporary periods of unconsciousness under anaesthetics. Should there be an alternation of personality as in cases of multiple personality, the system which is out of action remains similarly unchanged until circumstances call it into action again. Even in the absence of self-consciousness, it still persists, because it transcends all distinctions of subject and object.

In my opinion the mental unity so formed may be independent of the physical body through which it developed. This possibility is supported by the fact that more than one such synthetic self can compete for mastery over and expression through one physical body and brain. Since in some cases several selves can be synthesised to form one, it would be expected that if the mental unity were identical with the physical unity, only part of the physical organism would be used by each dissociated self. But in some cases the whole brain seems to function for each dissociated self<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> In the case of Vera all the pseudo-personalities used visual, auditory, verbal and kinaesthetic imagery, and most of them were in direct touch with the environment through vision, audition and tactile sensibility. When at the point of death, the much more



Under more normal conditions a man is able to identify himself with several of his empirical selves. For example, the father who feels equally himself in his domestic life, business life and political life, yet certainly has a different empirical self in each case. In this case each empirical self is dominated by the sentiments necessary to enable it to function.

In cases of multiple personality, instead of this spontaneous interchangeability, certain systems become dissociated in some way so that they cannot enter the same personal focus of consciousness. An intermediate case is that of a man claiming, after he has been drunk, that he was not himself at the time. He feels the empirical self when drunk is not his own self. In more extreme cases he claims to be possessed of a devil or by a devil. In this case one system has become sufficiently integrated to force its way into consciousness apart from his will, and so has become dissociated so that it cannot enter the focus of consciousness of his main personality. It is therefore not felt to be himself and is thus disowned.

In some cases the dissociated system comes into consciousness sufficiently often to become self-conscious. It accomplishes this through interaction with the environment. By differentiating itself from the environment through experience, it becomes aware of itself as self. Multiple personality has then appeared. Two separate foci of subjectivity have been formed. Each focus is capable of developing, but since each can only function through the same brain and body, there is conflict between them as to which shall use the organism.

The longer any such split off subordinate system can remain in consciousness, the more organised it becomes. Just as the personality of the ordinary child develops through interaction, so the split off fragment, under suitable conditions, may develop up to the level of a somewhat one-sided personality. On the other hand it may be a self which never reaches the level of human personality, a synthesis that never becomes conscious of itself as a self, because it is never conscious of its environment. In each case the identity of any such dissociated fragment seems to be due to the particular affective bond which held cognition and activity together in our experience.

The synthesising factors are thus essentially affective and since love is the strongest affective element it is therefore the greatest synthesising

complete psychical integration, after such extensive disintegration, also supports the possibility of the independence of personality from the physical organism through which it had evolved.

factor<sup>1</sup>. Any disturbance of the love life is therefore *a priori* likely to prove more disintegrating to the self than any other external influence. What misdirected love can dissociate, rightly directed love can re-integrate. It is in consequence of this that the religious sentiment may play such an important part in the prevention and cure of neuroses. In proportion as the personality is focussed on the highest type of love does religion accomplish its legitimate purpose.

Personality demands social expression and grows by entering into reciprocal relations with other personalities, until, through incorporating still higher ideals from the environment to which it has then become receptive, it reaches out to another ideal self, still social, until the widest potential self demands an ideal world and an ideal companion as an adequate environment.

<sup>1</sup> This was shown to be the case in Chapter VI, in which it was seen that the motive force of Vera's promise not to die was love, and that this, finding its expression, in a sublimated form, through the religious sentiment, was the most potent factor in her subsequent recovery.

## CRITICAL NOTICE

*Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse.* Von Dr S. FERENCZI und Dr OTTO RANK. Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Leipzig, Wien, Zurich, 1924. Pp. 67.

At the International Psycho-analytic Congress held in Berlin 1922, Professor Freud suggested as the subject for a Prize Essay "The relationship of psycho-analytic technique to psycho-analytic theory," with a view to exploring the influence of technique on theory and discovering to what extent the one may stimulate or obstruct the other. The authors of "Developmental aims of psycho-analysis" who had previously been in collaboration on this subject, endeavoured to re-shape their material in accordance with the more precise requirements of the suggested theme, but, finding themselves hampered in this endeavour, decided to forego the attempt and published their work in its present form. It will be well for the reader to bear these circumstances in mind, lest the title-page should arouse expectations of a detailed clinical and systematic survey of a comprehensive science. Any such expectations will assuredly be disappointed. The book deals with a highly technical subject in a style which is, to say the least of it, extremely condensed, and it assumes in the reader close acquaintance with the most recent theory and practice of psycho-analysis.

An additional difficulty exists when, as in the present instance, two able and independent thinkers deal jointly with matters of theory and tendency concerning which a speculative attitude must in part be adopted. Under such circumstances one is apt to find that points of agreement are thrown into sharper relief whilst possible divergences in outlook are to some degree obscured. To correct this impression one must recall the different nature of the contributions made to psycho-analysis by the two authors. Ferenczi, the '*scharfsinniger Kopf*' of the Hungarian Psycho-analytic Society, with a wealth of psychiatric and other experience behind him and a record of valuable contribution to psycho-analytic theory and practice, seems to have divided his attention in recent years in two directions: (1) the correlation of psycho-analytic and biological findings, and (2) experimentation with technical methods which might aid and possibly shorten the analytic process. Rank, whose honourable record of contributions to applied psycho-analysis needs no mention, has evidently been attracted by the same idea of facilitating and shortening treatment but has approached it through the more academic path of investigating the significance of stages in individual development, paying special attention to the traumatic effect of the experience of birth. Both agree in the determination to give a more fixed form to analysis and to find a theoretical basis on which this can be securely grounded.

Despite the condensed mode of presentation and the occasional

ambiguities and divergences incident to collaboration, the book is one which merits the closest attention of all serious students of psycho-analysis. Indeed one might say that a perusal of the third chapter by those whose concern with psycho-analysis is limited in consciousness to friendly interest would more than repay the mental effort involved. In this chapter a historical survey is given of the development of technique indicating briefly methods of procedure which are incompatible with present-day psycho-analytical standards. Amongst those are to be noted the purely descriptive method of investigating symptoms and the collecting of associations irrespective either of the source of affect or of the motive underlying their selection. The 'mania for interpretation' divorced from any understanding of the psychic state is aptly compared to the deciphering of a difficult passage in which the general meaning of the text is ignored. The actual 'sensing' of the analytic situation gives place here to meticulous accuracy in investigating detail. The analysis of symptoms (with the exception of transitory symptoms) constitutes a mis-direction of energy inasmuch as the task of analysis is to deal with the ego in a way which renders their recrudescence impossible, not to be content with their mere disappearance from the surface. The analysis of complexes became obsolete when the conception of the psyche as a mosaic of complexes gave way to an appreciation of the labile nature of investment charges (cathexis). Whatever its descriptive value the complex has no place in practical analysis: the patient moreover joins with enthusiasm in this complex-hunt, preserving the while his unconscious secrets intact. Concentration of attention solely on actual and infantile sexual material is not only based on inadequate conceptions of conflict but can provide the patient with direct gratification which counteracts the therapeutic effect of any privations imposed. Too exclusive concentration on the castration complex and castration anxiety has led to a neglect of deeper formations defended by the former, and in the same way analysis in terms of stages of development overlooks the dynamics of transference, especially the fundamental fact that affective re-experience of the repressed past must be obtained in the conscious 'present.' Finally the significance of negative transference and of narcissistic resistances are given proper dynamic valuation. The authors have rendered inestimable service by emphasising the actuality of the analytic 'situation' and the necessity of keeping one's finger on the pulse of an actual libidinal process which is gradually unfolding. They have moreover provided a pleasant stimulus for those somewhat misguided 'friends' whose interest in psycho-analysis has not carried them beyond the stage of regarding it as a kind of psychological 'Hunt the Slipper' with which to beguile week-ends and scandalise drawing-rooms.

The principal chapter on the 'analytic situation' requires some brief introduction owing to the fact that the technical articles by Freud on this matter have only recently become available in English<sup>1</sup>. These

<sup>1</sup> Freud: *Collected papers*, Vol. II; Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1924.

were concerned with the actual dynamics of transference, the nature of regression and reactivation with corresponding resistance and the part played by 'repetition' in the transference situation. Freud emphasised the part played by 'remembering' in analysis and was inclined to regard 'repetition' of affective situations as a form of resistance, although one which can or must be given a varying amount of play in individual cases. Ferenczi and Rank regard repetition as not only unavoidable but in certain cases as the only way of reproducing the actual unconscious, as indeed the main agent in technique. They regard analysis as a process within the libido-development having individual form and definite duration and following an automatic course. Disturbance of this course constitutes resistance which must be corrected by the analyst. Where analytic libido-expansion is inhibited it must be encouraged, even insisted upon. The authors first of all divide analysis into phases of resistance and of transference. The preliminary resistances put forward by the ego consist mainly of preconscious memory-material, manifest character peculiarities, etc., which are gradually overcome. In the subsequent transference phase, portions of disturbed infantile development are reproduced: unconscious manifestations are translated into the language of consciousness, and old libido situations which for the most part 'have never been conscious' tend to be reproduced and intensively experienced. The resistance to this process is due to infantile anxiety, the neurotic having an excess of guilt-feeling. Provided, then, infantile libido has been freed from repression and reproduced in the transference it must be separated from the analytic situation. Fresh libido-fixation must be prevented and the patient must be gradually 'weaned.' When the time is ripe the analyst interferes by limiting the duration of treatment and an appointed time is set which must be adhered to in spite of any seeming 'progress' and in face of new ego-resistances.

The real resistances met with in the first phase of analysis do not disturb analytic work: they constitute a means of control of libido movement back to the Oedipus situation. They so to speak regulate libido-dosage. But in addition they are themselves reproductions, and together with transference manifestations show what has actually happened to the Oedipus libido. The castration complex, for example, represents in analysis the negative Oedipus complex. The analytic process represents activation and resolution of the primary neurosis. The ego is first taught to tolerate ideas running counter to its requirements, whereupon infantile development is completely expanded and subsequent 'weaning' is carried on by means of energies from the new ego-ideal reinforced by natural egoism. The patient must be brought up to a painful experience, to the conflict between libido tendencies and the ego-ideal. The provisory ideal established during transference is resisted by the old ideal and this resistance may have to be overcome by actual interference on the part of the analyst. Once these ego resistances are overcome libido expansion goes on until the moment arises when it is made clear that the new libido positions cannot be gratified in reality.

At this stage libido resistances set in and the nature of the transference, which until then had merely been used as an instrument, is explained to the patient. But since affective experience is essential, all these explanations and translations are only a first resource, to be used at the proper time with due judgment. It may at times be expedient to avoid such explanations. In all cases it is the tendency which matters and all expressions have to be read in terms of the actual analytic situation. Abreaction of affect thus remains the important therapeutic agent, but not as before abreaction connected with original experiences: affect is now discharged through and by means of the analyst and analysis. New actual memories are created in place of the pathogenic complexes previously shut off from the rest of the psychic content.

The brief summary given above contains much that is familiar and accepted by all psycho-analysts. The repetitive conversion of a neurosis into a 'transference-neurosis' and the factors involved in its resolution have long since been described by Freud. But the attempt to give sharper outline to different phases has never been made so boldly as by the present authors, and they very properly enter a caveat against too rigid adherence to their outline. Making all due allowance for this, it was nevertheless inevitable that a fixed division of analysis into stages, based mainly on libidinal standards, would involve a more fixed terminal stage. The authors have not shirked this difficulty, and although the clinical indications are regrettably vague they have not hesitated to cut the knot with a stroke of 'active therapy.' And here a tentative criticism falls to be made. The authors seem to have 'taken as read' all previous discussion on activation methods in psycho-analysis. Experimental work on this subject of a highly stimulating kind has been carried out and published by Ferenczi, and here we see the first fruits of collaboration, the inclusion of activation procedure as an invariable accompaniment of analyses. This seems perhaps a little premature. It is of course generally agreed that whilst the usual psycho-analytic therapy is, by contrast with other methods, notably passive, it is not really passive in the strict sense of the term. Interpretation is obviously an active interference on the part of the analyst. But Ferenczi's work on hysteria analysis, coupled with a pronouncement by Freud<sup>1</sup> that "analytic treatment should be carried through as far as possible, under privation—in a state of abstinence," has given the impression in some quarters that all the manoeuvres suggested by Ferenczi are generally applicable. Freud's view was, in fact, couched in much more cautious and conservative terms. The activity was to take the form of "energetic opposition to premature substitutive gratifications," especially "in transference relations." The argument advanced by critics of Ferenczi's position was mainly that indiscriminate use of his methods might induce a 'second fixation' in the transference neurosis; that in the same way as patients seek to force libidinal gratification in the transference, so the use of prohibitions might in certain circumstances provide such gratification. The authors of the present

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*

essay foresee this danger, but hold that it cannot be avoided and that, provided it is properly handled, no real risk exists. At this point the absence of further clinical evidence is an obstacle to effective discussion. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that up to the present most analysts have had their hands full trying out various methods of inducing a general state of privation, and have been sufficiently divided on the more extreme activation methods to warrant further consideration before enshrining the latter in any permanent formulation. One might add that in the essay itself there is considerable ambiguity as to the precise use of the term 'activity.' At one moment it seems to be the activity practised uniformly by all analysts, at another it is quite clearly filling "the role thrust upon him by the unconscious of the patient and his flight tendencies."

Now theoretical consideration of activation methods has turned almost entirely on the part played by ego-instances and their modification during analysis. Much valuable work has recently been done on this subject (Freud, Jones, Alexander and others), but the nature of the mechanisms involved has not been determined with sufficient precision to justify finality of judgment. Ferenczi and Rank have certainly not neglected these factors, but the terms of their definition of analysis as a process of 'individual form' suggests that their classification has been made mainly on a libidinal basis. Indeed the omission of any consideration of ego variation is one of the weakest points of the essay and possibly accounts for the fact that they found precise stages of analysis easy to outline. Although in a large proportion of cases treated a relative integrity of the ego as regards reality function exists, the same cannot be said of that ego-instance which is called the ego-ideal or super-ego. Correction of super-ego function frequently goes hand in hand with re-experience and comprehension of the oedipus situation and its forestages, but in some instances, particularly of neurotic character formation, there seems to be much greater difficulty in attaining this end. Here the idea of fixed duration and of a fixed terminal stage does not seem to tally with clinical experience. At any rate, until processes of character formation and their economic significance have been thoroughly investigated there seems to be some justification for preserving the empirical point of view which has contributed so much to the effectiveness of psycho-analysis.

In this connection we have to consider the authors' views on the relation between theory and practice as presented in the fourth chapter. They draw an all-important distinction between an intellectual 'knowledge' and the deeper 'conviction' born of immediate perception or experience of fundamental infantile experiences, and very rightly hold that this conviction is essential not only for the patient but for the physician. They go on to indicate how on the basis of empirical observation there has been built up a theoretical super-structure which includes more than is actually necessary for therapeutic purposes, to say nothing of the fact that it embraces departments of investigation not bearing on

therapeutics at all. As in the parallel case of clinical research and clinical therapeutics, they believe that in actual analysis only that knowledge should be employed which helps to bring about in the patient the necessary therapeutic conviction. This view is reflected in the previous chapter, where they criticise the tendency to make analysis an intellectual interpretative exercise having as its aim a laborious mapping out of stages of development. etc. In itself this is an exceedingly cogent and timely criticism, but one cannot help thinking that its validity is limited, in the meantime at any rate, to the *faulty* practice of analysis. As applied to the whole process of analysis, the selective principle suggests a somewhat sanguine view of the finality of present-day researches. It is of course true that the authors believe that new practical experience will tend to correct theory, but this mutual correction and stimulation has really been going on all the time and will continue to do so. At all events if, as they agree, theory corrects practice and practice corrects theory, there would seem to be no great hurry to make a final selection from either of these sources of information.

The admittedly speculative tendencies which are developed in the final chapter have a certain claim to be exempt from criticism. Some reference, however, must be made to a particular aspect touched on by the writers, one which is liable to be misinterpreted by those disinclined to the close study of texts. Pursuing their thesis that analysis of the more formal sort based on theoretical appreciation alone must give place to a more applied handling of knowledge in treatment, the authors suggest that analysis may in the future tend to approximate more closely to other forms of psycho-therapeutic treatment or indeed to the therapy of general medicine. In their view the main difference will remain, as now, that the analyst will be more skilled in the timing and dosage necessary for each case. Hypnosis was not radical because its use led to the concealment of the psychic motivations concerned, and its advantages were due to the elimination of intellectual resistances. They go on to say: "It would be an enormous advance in therapeutic efficiency if we could, for example, combine this inestimable advantage of the hypnotic technique with the advantage of possible analytical solution of the hypnotic affect-situation." Apart from its relation to the Oedipus complex, we do not yet understand the specific conditions of the hypnotic state, but, if we did, the analyst might again include hypnosis in his technique without fear of producing permanent fixation. In this connection an earlier pronouncement by Freud<sup>1</sup> must be borne in mind: speaking of a possible adaptation of psycho-analytic therapy to meet the demands of treating numbers of poorer people, Freud suggests that it may be necessary to alloy analysis with direct suggestion or even hypnotic methods. He makes clear, however, that this would be merely an *ad hoc* measure, viz., where an overwhelming demand for the advantages of psycho-analysis could not be coped with by a small company of trained psycho-analysts, adding that in any case the really effective constituent

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*



in any combination of methods would remain, as now, pure psychoanalysis. The speculation of Ferenczi and Rank differs from this in so far as they evidently have in mind a combination of methods which might be applicable to all cases. Admittedly it is couched in the most tentative terms and is buttressed by numerous qualifications and conditions, but it is open to the criticism that here we have the logical development of Ferenczi's activation methods. Should the reader be in any doubt as to the essential difference between the methods of psychoanalysis and those of hypnosis, he would be well advised to study Jones' paper<sup>1</sup> on the nature of auto-suggestion. This should have the effect of resolving any doubt that may exist in his mind and will in any case provide a useful corrective to any tendency to draw unwarrantable conclusions from the general speculation quoted above.

It need hardly be added that, apart from the thorny question of activation methods and the advisability of giving a more fixed form to analysis during the present state of our knowledge, the criticisms advanced here are essentially criticisms of tendency. It would be a manifest injustice to an exceedingly stimulating essay not to pay tribute to the profound insight shown more especially in the critical chapters. The chief obstacle to appreciation of this work on the part of the general reader is the fact that no systematic treatise on psycho-analytic technique has yet been published. Since the appearance in English of Freud's technical papers this gap has to some extent been filled, but there can be no doubt that the author of any future work on technique will be under a debt of gratitude to the penetration shown by Ferenczi and Rank in the present publication.

EDWARD GLOVER.

<sup>1</sup> Jones: "The Nature of Auto-suggestion." *This Journal*.

## DESCRIPTIVE NOTICE

*Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido.* Von KARL ABRAHAM.  
Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Leipzig, Wien, Zurich,  
1924.

The contributions to psychoanalytical research made by the present President of the International Psychoanalytical Association have, in addition to their theoretical importance for all students of psychoanalysis, a characteristic which specially commends them to those engaged in its therapeutic application, namely a happy conjunction of originality of thought with a special gift for clinical observation, both being reinforced by ripe clinical experience. His contributions to psychoanalytical theory remain at all points in closest touch with clinical data, and as those who have discussed theoretical points with him are aware, the clinical illustrations in his text represent only a small fraction of the confirmatory material at his disposal.

In the present volume greater space is given to theoretical considerations than in former essays, but without sacrificing this characteristic fidelity to a rich background of observed facts.

Such a characteristic is especially valuable in attempts to isolate from superimposed layers the earliest phases of infantile life, a task which might be likened to the deciphering of the almost obliterated first inscriptions of a palimpsest, but which is in reality immensely more complicated owing to the difficulty of deciding whether any given phenomena are to be regarded as evidence of a strong fixation at an early phase of libido development or of a regressive flight from a more deeply repressed later phase.

The most casual survey of recent psychoanalytical literature reveals a decided tendency to push enquiry ever further back into the beginnings of the human Psyche in the quest for determining factors in its moulding, a quest amply justified by previous successes, but one which becomes more precarious and speculative when it reaches back to stages of development prior to the "separation of the Ego from the outer world."

Dr Abraham's research into the developmental history of the libido is documented in a fashion which gives the reader the feeling of being on firm ground at every step of his reconstruction of its earliest stages.

Characteristically he begins with a consideration of the light which can be thrown on the pregenital stage of libido organization by his study of manic-depressive states and their affinities with the obsessional neurosis.

The relation of both these conditions to the anal-sadistic stage of libido organization is well known, but in the more serious condition there is both a more pronounced regression and a different attitude to the object. In depressed states object-cathexis ceases, the object is

'given up': in the obsessional neurosis the object is 'retained.' The conclusion arrived at from consideration of the differences in these states is that the previously recognized anal-sadistic stage may conveniently be subdivided into two sub-stages, for both analerotism and sadism prove to have two opposed pleasure tendencies, positive and negative. The positive anal tendency is to keep the object, the negative to reject it.

The obsessional neurotic has a strong positive anal tendency but is threatened with the negative tendency.

In depressed states the negative tendency triumphs. Sadism likewise has two opposed tendencies: (1) to destroy the object, (2) to master it: the destructive impulse of sadism being allied with the rejecting impulse of analerotism, while the mastery impulses of the former are allied with the possessive impulses of the latter. Casting out and destruction are ontogenetically older tendencies and after repression are replaced by mastery and possession.

In the obsessional character are found various interminglings of these four tendencies.

The periods of 'remission' in the obsessional neurosis and of intermission in manic-depressive states are times of successful sublimation of anal-sadistic impulses.

The manic-depressive syndrome is the outcome of regression to the primitive anal-sadistic stage when the tendency is to 'reject' and 'destroy' the object, while the obsessional neurotic regresses only to the later anal-sadistic stage when the tendency is to keep and master the object. In a narrow sense object-love only begins with this later stage, although full object-love is only possible when the genital stage is attained. In this discussion interesting clinical illustrations are given, relevant examples of word usage are quoted and reference is made to the study of primitive customs and ceremonials by Roheim. A point of general interest is that an abnormal passion for cleanliness is shown to be not only a reaction against coprophilia but also an expression of sadism.

The next section compares the happenings following the loss of the object in normal grief and in abnormal psychic states. A case is quoted showing that even after the real loss of an object (normal grief) a temporary introjection of the loved person takes place. Melancholia represents an archaic form of grief, but in the deeper psychic layers of the normal this archaic process may be carried out, the difference being that in the healthy there is *real* loss and a conservative tendency predominates, conscious orientation not being disturbed, while in the manic-depressive there is a fundamental disturbance of the libidinal relation to the object with severe ambivalence and consciousness is overwhelmed.

The writer next correlates the melancholiac's attempt at restitution of the object by 'introjection,' with the oral and the anal-sadistic stages respectively, for the introjection mechanism is patterned on oral activity, and in depressed states regression recedes behind the earliest anal-sadistic stage to a phase of oral fixation. He maintains that in depressed

states the object, rejected on the pattern of the archaic anal-sadistic tendency, is regained on the pattern of 'swallowing' oral tendencies. Several interesting clinical examples are given, the meaning of coprophagia is explained and Roheim's instance is quoted of archaic ceremonial grief in eating the killed. He repeats his view that the depressed patient's rejection of food is a punishment for cannibalistic fantasies.

An important addition to his previous description of the oral stage is its subdivision into two stages: (1) of sucking and swallowing when there is no differentiation of the object, neither love nor hate, *i.e.* no ambivalence; (2) an oral-sadistic stage of biting when the conflict of ambivalence begins. The bite is the first way the child has of disturbing the object. In this stage the tendency is to incorporate and destroy the object if attracted by it. This extreme ambivalence reaches milder forms in the anal-sadistic stage.

Contributions to the psychogenesis of melancholia follow this rather difficult schematization of pregenital phases and their interactions.

The paramount importance of *Ambivalence* in this illness is clearly shown. After the introjection of the object into the Ego, the latter must bear the consequences of this ambivalence, hence we have the characteristic inferiority feeling associated with over-valuation of the self, often in subtle ways (the Greatest Criminal, etc.), *i.e.* a positive and negative narcissism.

Abraham considers that this ambivalence to the Ego renders possible a change from depressed to manic states.

He summarizes the factors leading to depressed states as follows:

- (1) Constitutional increase of mouth erotism.
- (2) Special fixation of libido at the oral stage of libido organization.
- (3) Severe injury of child's narcissism by disappointment in love (early depression symptoms often associated with the impression of being entirely deserted).
- (4) Occurrence of first great love disappointment *before* the mastery of the Œdipus-wish, *i.e.* when the oral-sadistic tendencies are not yet surmounted, hence a permanent association with the cannibalistic stage.
- (5) Repetition of the primary disappointment in later life.

He points out that this illness differs from other abnormal states in that the ambivalence is especially directed against the mother and that the castration-complex refers chiefly to the mother. He considers that this special relation to the mother can be traced to the trauma of weaning (Stareke's primary castration).

He makes an interesting distinction between two forms of self-criticism and self-reproach in this illness:

- (1) Where the introjected loved person plays pathologically the part of conscience (Ego-Ideal) in criticism (a case is quoted in which the patient imitated the tones of his mother's voice in self-depreciation).
- (2) Where criticism is aimed at the introjected person. The usual sequence of psychic events in the illness are disappointment—tendency to cast off and destroy the object—introjection equated with oral devouring, narcissistic identification, sadistic revenge now manifested

against the self. This process lasts till the danger of actually killing the object is over when the object can be safely restored to the outer world.

In a section dealing with mania Abraham accepts Freud's view that this results from the cessation of the cruel exactions of the Ego-Ideal after its overthrowal and dissolution in the Ego and adds several interesting observations of his own. He notes the appearance in this phase of increased oral cravings, and repeats Freud's dictum that mania is a festival celebrated by the Ego (cf. primitive rites described by Roheim). He sees the normal counterpart of mania in the increased sexual desire which sometimes accompanies grief.

Medical readers will be specially interested in his view of the therapeutic outlook in such cases. In order to influence them, some transference is necessary and this is more likely to occur during free intervals. It is sometimes possible to alter the characteristic narcissistic attitude to other persons and in one case the attitude to the female sex was altered. The chief criterion of success is interestingly enough the temporary new formation of neurotic symptoms, sometimes of the obsessional and sometimes of the hysterical type. In an early passage he pointed out that during free intervals evidence of the obsessional character could usually be found. In one case no further genuine depressions occurred. The outlook is more favourable with younger patients.

Part II deals with the beginnings and development of object-love.

He differentiates (after Freud) the sexual aim from the sexual object, recognizing three stages in libido organization with two sub-stages in each (two oral, two anal-sadistic, two genital) and three stages in the development of the relation to the object, the autoerotic objectless, the narcissistic and real object-love, but makes the fresh contribution based on studies of kleptomania, hysteria, etc., of postulating a middle stage between narcissism and object-love of a *partial* object relation. He illustrates this compromise in depressed states in which the oral ambivalence is aimed at part of an object, in paranoia in which as has already been pointed out the scybalum in the rectum is identified with the persecutor, in the perversion of fetichism, in hysteria in which a part (the genital) is excluded from the love-relation.

The following table represents his final delineation of successive stages of libido organization and of relations to objects.

	Libido organization	Relation to object	Ambivalence	Inhibition of instinct
1.	Earlier oral (sucking)	Autoerotism objectless	Pre-ambivalent	None
2.	Later oral (cannibalistic)	Narcissism (total incorporation of object)	Ambivalent	Anxiety
3.	Earlier anal-sadistic	Part-love with incorporation	..	Guilt
4.	Later anal-sadistic	Part-love	..	Sympathy, shame
5.	Early genital (phallic)	Object-love with exclusion of genital	..	Modesty
6.	Final genital	Object-love	Post-ambivalent	Social feeling

The foregoing meagre sketch of a few of the more prominent features of an important clinical study would be hardly worth while writing unless it happily served the purpose of directing the attention of those interested in psychoanalytical findings to the book itself, an English translation of which would, but for unforeseen difficulties, have already been in the press. Its appearance is perhaps especially timely as a corrective influence over against a tendency on the part of some psychoanalytical writers to over-simplify the delineation of human development by seeing in it nothing but a series of reactions to one primal experience (*e.g.* the trauma of birth). It might be argued by some critics that Dr Abraham errs in the opposite direction by refinements of differentiation which introduce unnecessary complexities into the story. On this point judgment can be passed only by those who are grappling daily with the actual complexities of the human Psyche and have taken the trouble to review their problems in the light of these valuable empirical studies.

JAMES GLOVER.

## ABSTRACTS

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1924, No. 1.

In a paper entitled *Neurose und Psychose* Professor Freud employs his classification of the psychic apparatus into *Ich*, *Es* and *Überich* (*Das Ich und das Es*, 1923), in order to arrive at a formula for the genesis of mental disease. He shows that the transference neuroses, narcissistic neuroses and psychoses arise respectively from the conflict of the *Ich* with the *Es*, the *Überich* and the outside world.

(A translation of this paper will appear in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.)

Dr S. Ferenczi, who for some time already has been evolving and applying the principle of 'active' technique in psycho-analysis, contributes a paper on the extension of this principle from the actions to the phantasy-life of the patient. That is to say, he believes that in certain cases the progress of the treatment can be accelerated by the method of 'forced phantasies' (*forcierte Phantasien*), constructed at the direct instigation of the analyst on lines which he himself indicates. Ferenczi considers that sufficient freedom of association is retained to distinguish this method from suggestion, in the particular form in which such phantasies are produced by the individual patient and the fact that they can be discarded or modified, if material subsequently revealed shows them to have been erroneous. He warns his readers that this method is applicable only in special cases and always in the last phases of the treatment, and that great experience in analytical work is required before it can be adopted.

The line to be followed in a phantasy of this sort must be dictated by the material already brought to light. Ferenczi has used this method with reference especially to three types of phantasy: (1) positive and negative transference phantasies; (2) phantasies of infantile recollections; (3) onanistic phantasies. Of these he gives illustrations drawn from cases of patients analysed by himself. The type of patient with whom he has found it desirable thus to induce phantasies is the person who has been 'too well brought up,' *i.e.* in whom the early repressive forces have been so strong as to rob him of the capacity for phantasy. The patient must be brought to a point at which the affects bound up with the phantasies can come into consciousness without taking refuge in onanistic outlets or being converted into hysterical symptoms.

Ferenczi's experience in this field leads him to conclude that a certain amount of infantile sexual experience, affording a real basis for the infantile instinctive impulses, assists in the development not only of normal sexual life but of normal capacity for phantasy, with which is bound up the subject's psychic potency. This is in accordance with Freud's discovery that the pathogenic factor lies not in the actual infantile experience but in unconscious phantasies.

This number contains an article by Dr H. von Hattingberg (Munich), in which he seeks to analyse the analytical situation itself. The first two sections are reproduced from a paper read by Dr von Hattingberg at the Seventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress, 1922. In the first he discusses the

significance of the position which the patient is directed to assume during analysis, whether lying down, with the analyst seated out of sight (according to Freud's original prescription), or sitting face to face with the analyst. The former position tends to emphasise the patient's need for help and the authority of the physician, to facilitate complete relaxation and to preserve the impersonality and objectivity of the analytic situation. On the other hand, the writer thinks that in certain patients it may lead to too great passivity or apathy or to a complete dissociation of the analysis and the relation to the analyst from reality, so that the proceedings are not taken seriously. In the face-to-face position there is a danger that the analysis may be regarded by the patient as simply a form of conversation. This position may occasionally have the advantage of bringing additional pressure to bear on timid or reserved persons.

In the second section Dr von Hattingberg considers certain dangers to which the analyst himself is liable. The writer compares the analyst's situation to the place of refuge (Freud's '*Kloster*') which the patient finds in his neurosis. As the neurotic uses his symptom as a defence in his relations with others, so the analyst may fall back on theoretical abstractions in order to avoid the real difficulties arising out of a deficiency in human interest or in skill. Again, he is exposed to temptations from his ego-instincts (the desire for self-assertion and power) and from his sexual instincts (*e.g.* by giving play to sadistic tendencies or to the desire to obtain a secondary gratification ('*Lustnebenvergnügen*') from over-subtle thinking). In this connection Dr von Hattingberg states that he believes psycho-analysis to be at present in the 'scholastic' phase and emphasises the desirability of the utmost possible simplicity in the interpretation and relation of psychic material.

In the third section he investigates the difference between the situation in 'suggestion' and in psycho-analysis. He shows that the former treatment makes use of the phenomenon of dissociation, whereas psycho-analysis endeavours to bring into consciousness the repressed elements in the mind. He contrasts the 'rapport' of suggestion with the analytic transference, showing that in the latter the relation between physician and patient is brought into full consciousness and both the positive and negative manifestations of feeling are encouraged.

He concludes that the essential feature of the analytic situation is the objectivity which the patient is induced to assume towards his mental processes. "It is," he writes, "Freud's greatest achievement, and that which would infallibly make his name immortal, even if nothing else survived of the proud structure of psycho-analytic theory, that he had the courage for so high a degree of objectivity. For the fruitful mistrust of the intimations of his own consciousness is, for the individual, the beginning of true self-knowledge and, for humanity, the dawn of the era of psychology." To be fruitful, however, this objectivity implies a true inner change: otherwise it becomes a pseudo-objectivity, which merely increases the neurotic isolation.

The patient's resistances will inevitably be mobilised against this objectivity, especially in the 'erotic misunderstanding' of the transference situation. Here it is necessary, first, that the sexual should be fearlessly admitted into consciousness and, secondly, that it should be realised that sexual relations (in the narrow, physical sense) are not an essential mode of expressing love.

The writer concludes with some observations on the part played in mental life by 'sexuality' and by the 'will to power.'



Dr H. Nunberg (Vienna) discusses in the light of the libido theory the phenomenon of 'depersonalisation,' *i.e.* of morbid states in which the subject experiences a feeling of strangeness and alienation in relation to his own ego and to the outside world. The writer shows that this sense of strangeness arises from a partial or complete withdrawal of libido, in some cases from the outside world, in others from the ideal-formations of the ego. He believes that such sensations probably occur in a greater or less degree at the outbreak of every neurosis and that the consequent weakening of the ego tends to enable unconscious phantasies to gain admission into consciousness, which may be succeeded by the appearance of neurotic symptoms. The disposition of the subject determines the issue of such a withdrawal of libido: sometimes no pathological results are observed, whilst in other cases the sequel is a narcissistic or a transference neurosis.

This number contains an account of the American and the French psycho-analytical writings published from 1920-22, as well as other critical notices and reviews and notes on the psycho-analytical movement in different countries.

CECIL BAINES.

*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1924, No. 2.

The first article in this number is by Professor Freud on 'The economic problem of masochism.' Three types of masochism are distinguished and are discussed at length: the erotogenic, the feminine and the moral. Professor Freud then endeavours to determine the relation of masochism to the erotogenic (life-)instincts and the destructive (death-)instincts.

A translation of this article appears in the *Int. J. of Psycho-Analysis*.

The second original article is by Dorothy Garley (London) and is entitled: 'The shock of birth.' The writer discusses the psychological injuries which may be sustained by the individual through the experience of being born. She considers that the feelings and emotions of the infant during this tremendous experience (demanding as it does a rapid adaptation from the blissful intrauterine state to the hard realities of an outside world) have been very insufficiently studied or reflected upon. She quotes Freud's dictum in his *Introductory Lectures in Psycho-Analysis* that the primal anxiety-state is brought about by the separation from the mother and that the act of birth is the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety.

Miss Garley argues that, since for about ten weeks before birth the brain-centres of the foetus are sufficiently developed to receive mental impressions, it is scarcely conceivable that the violent experience of birth (especially when the mother's labour is prolonged and difficult) is not accompanied by a considerable degree of pain and terror in the child. Freud has suggested that prenatal impressions persist and that in sleep we all tend to reproduce the primal state of warmth and darkness and to withdraw from the outside world. Miss Garley goes so far as to think that all neurotic reactions may be unconscious reproductions of pleasurable feelings of the intrauterine period or of experiences during birth.

She considers in detail some of these experiences, amongst them the tremendous pressure on the head of the infant in the normal presentation,

the sudden exposure to a colder temperature and to loud sounds and bright lights, the sense of insecurity and helplessness, especially when the baby is laid on its back, and the necessity for a rapid adjustment of the respiratory and circulatory systems. She thinks that, if more consideration were given to the mental situation of the child, it might lead to certain modifications in obstetric practice. For instance, she believes that the performance of Caesarean section is far more favourable to the child, psychically as well as physically, than delivery by means of forceps, children who are brought into the world by the latter method being peculiarly irritable and sensitive.

Dr Wilhelm Reich (Vienna) contributes an article on the bearing of *genitality* upon psycho-analytic prognosis and therapy. What has to be considered here is the biological and psychological material upon which the analyst has to work in each particular case, rather than the mechanism of the analysis itself.

Dr Reich's experience has led him to conclude that it is of the utmost importance for the psycho-analytical cure that the patient's libidinal development should have reached the stage of genital organization. Even though the genital libido has undergone repression or displacement there is, he thinks, a hope of cure if that libido can be set free, but if development has been checked at a pregenital stage the prognosis is much less hopeful. In cases of this sort he has encountered a paralysis of the affective life and a lack of active instinctive energy which should be enlisted on the analyst's side. Further, genital libido is one of the most powerful agents in overcoming the sense of guilt, which makes cure so difficult, and the other forms of libido which are less compatible with reality. In connection with this last point he asks why it is that in some cases, where there has been only a very incomplete revelation of the unconscious material, the neurotic symptoms have nevertheless disappeared, while others, in which more has been brought into consciousness and explained, remain refractory. He suggests the answer (which he supports by illustrations from his own experience) that in the former cases genital libido has been set free in the analysis and has been strong enough to paralyse the activities of those portions of libido (*e.g.* anal or urethral libido) which are still repressed. If in an incomplete analysis of this sort the other libidinal components are set free first or are exceptionally strong, the symptoms will probably persist. The disappearance of symptoms is not, however, to be mistaken for *cure* in the full sense: this implies complete synthesis of all libidinal components and hence the impossibility of relapse.

After giving examples of cases in which the disappearance of symptoms followed on partial enlightenment Dr Reich considers other cases, in which there was no such foundation of genital libido upon which to work. For purposes of prognosis the important point to determine was whether libidinal development was checked before the genital organization was reached in childhood and whether the injury the psychic life sustained was of a kind altogether to inhibit genital libido. In his first example he shows that development was checked by two traumata when the patient was three years old and his libido was in the phase of narcissistic identification. A cruel beating by his father for bed-wetting and, shortly after, the witnessing of his step-mother's giving birth to a child (castration-trauma) brought about passive-feminine fixation. In a second example there was hypertrophy of pregenital (anal) libido and, although a certain development of genital libido had taken place, it had been as it were overwhelmed by the earlier organization. Analysis

however succeeded in setting it free. Where there is such 'pleasure-hyper-trophy' the danger is of perversion but, says Dr Reich, in psycho-analysis more can be done with a *plus* than with a *minus* of libidinal energy.

In one section of the paper the writer touches on the difficulty of discovering the degree of the patient's genitality. Hints may be gathered from the form in which masturbation takes place and from the kind of phantasies produced. It is possible for the genitals to be invested with non-genital libido: thus Sadger has shown that in the homosexual the penis may stand for the breast and Abraham that *ejaculatio praecox* may be due to urethral erotism.

Endeavouring to define genital erotism Dr Reich enumerates four characteristics: (1) erection, (2) active penetration of a cavity, (3) the longing for the mother's womb, and (4) rhythmic ejaculation. Of these he considers that (2) is the only criterion of infantile genitality, which is further indicated by genital masturbation and exhibitionism in early childhood.

In the concluding section he summarizes the possible relations of genitality to neurosis as follows:

(a) The genital object-love phase may be safely passed through in childhood but later, *e.g.* at puberty, the incest-wish may wake up again and genital libido be repressed.

Analysis has to reveal the incestuous love-object and, through the transference, direct the genital libido to the outside world.

(b) Fixation may occur in the genital Oedipus phase and result

- (i) in displacement (hysterical genitalization of erotogenous zones),
- or (ii) in regression to pregenital positions of the libido.

The prognosis is favourable, but cases of type (ii) are more difficult than those of type (i).

(c) There may be partial fixation in the pregenital stage. Prognosis is doubtful. Repressions have to be removed and genital erotism developed till it can subordinate the pregenital libido.

(d) The genital period may never have had active existence. (The writer is referring to the psychological, not the physical, side of genitality.) There will then have been no genital masturbation, exhibitionism or incest-wishes.

The prognosis is bad, because there is no instinctive energy to oppose to pregenital tendencies and to bring the patient into relation with reality.

This number contains further a detailed report of American psycho-analytical literature from 1920-1922, as well as a few short reviews of some other psycho-analytical works.

In the account of the movement there are sections on the relation of Catholicism to psycho-analysis and on the conflicting opinions of French writers on Freud's work.

There is a notice of the conferring of the freedom of the city of Vienna upon Professor Freud on the occasion of his sixty-eighth birthday.

The account of the Eighth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, held at Salzburg in April, 1924, contains abstracts of the papers read at the Congress meetings and the report given by Dr Eitingon of the work of the Polyclinic in Berlin.

CECIL BAINES.

## REVIEWS

*Le Cerveau et la Pensée.* Par HENRI PIÉRON. Paris: Libraire Félix Alcan, 1923. pp. iii, 326. Prix 10 Fr. net.

*Le Langage et la Pensée.* Par HENRI DELACROIX, Professeur à la Sorbonne. Paris: Libraire Félix Alcan, 1924. pp. 602. Prix 30 Fr. net.

In *Le Cerveau et la Pensée* M. Piéron has given us a work which should be of great value to students of psychology and to all who are interested in the problems of the relation of mind and brain. More particularly, students of the physiology of the nervous system will here find a reliable account of recent work on cerebral localization and the conclusions of an eminent psychologist concerning the correlations of cerebral and mental functioning that may be considered as established. Too often it has happened that writers on the functions of the brain have been inadequately equipped on the psychological side; on the other hand, psychologists describing mental processes have sometimes shown themselves to be insufficiently informed concerning the functions of the brain and the physiology and pathology of the nervous system. But in M. Piéron we have a writer who is both physiologist and psychologist, and every page of this book bears evidence of this happy combination.

On the physiological side the reader will find an adequate, if not very full, account of the anatomical data relative to the sensory-motor and associative mechanisms of the brain. The functions of the cerebral cortex and of sub-cortical centres are dealt with in more detail. On the vexed question of cerebral localization Piéron takes up a position which, in view of much recent work, must be regarded as conservative. This question has always been intimately associated with the problems of aphasia, and it is in his chapter on "La fonction verbale et la pensée" that we find his views on localization most explicitly set forth. As he himself says, it is only when we come to describe the cerebral processes accompanying the use of language and symbolic thought that we can test our general conceptions of psycho-physiology. Piéron does not deny the existence of verbal images, but he points out that to believe in the existence of word-images does not imply the belief that word-deafness and word-blindness are due to the loss of the auditory or visual images of words, nor that there is any special centre in which such images are stored. In disorders of speech it is the mechanism by which these images are evoked that is at fault. We cannot say, however, that these images are conserved although they cannot be revived, for an image has no existence in the absence of the revival of the sensory traces which go to its formation.

Piéron rejects, as do the majority of workers on aphasia, the notion of motor images. He admits the existence of kinaesthetic word-images but denies that their revival is necessary or sufficient to ensure correct articulation. He thinks the problem of motor aphasia (aphemia) can only be solved by postulating a *centre coordinateur* which he localizes in the Broca-Marie region, that is to say, in the region of the insula, in the immediate neighbourhood of the foot of the third left frontal convolution. He says: "Il y a bien là une forme de mémoire qui est touchée, mais ce n'est pas la mémoire des impressions kinesthésiques d'articulation, c'est la constitution mnémonique des

mécanismes associatifs incito-moteurs, constitution que la physiologie nerveuse nous montre impliquer, au cours de l'évolution, l'intervention des centres coordinateurs, par un processus qu'il ne faut pas s'étonner de voir reproduit au cours du développement de l'individu" (pp. 229-30).

Just as he postulates a *centre coordinateur* which presides over the emission of spoken language so he provides a *centre de coordination graphique*, "the site of the lesion in agraphia," which he localizes at the confines of the foot of the second frontal and of the ascending frontal convolution at the level of the incito-motors of the hand. This is practically the site originally described by Exner. So also, on the receptive side, Piéron postulates "*centres de coordination sensorielle*" which correspond more or less closely to the regions affected in word-deafness and word-blindness as described by the classical writers on sensory aphasia. He sums up his remarks on localization in these words: "il y a une correspondance incontestable entre certaines fonctions déterminées et des territoires cérébraux définis, et, si les localisations ont pu avoir à un moment donné une plus grande précision apparente, elles n'ont jamais eu plus de solidité. Il est impossible, si l'on est informé et de bonne foi, de ne pas en convenir" (p. 292).

We thus see that Piéron adheres very closely to the classical conceptions of motor and sensory aphasia and that only in his substitution of 'co-ordinating centres' for 'word-centres' or centres of word-images, with the changed psychological conceptions which this implies, do his views differ to any great extent from those widely held by neurologists and psychologists before Pierre Marie revolutionized the whole theory of the defects of language and speech described by clinicians. He dissents from the views of Marie and Moutier on many points, but it is at first sight surprising that he has not paid more attention to the work of Dr Head. It must be remembered, however, that Dr Head's paper on "Speech and Cerebral Localization" had not yet been published when Piéron was writing this book. He gives a very short summary of Head's division of aphasia into verbal, syntactical, nominal and semantic, derived from Head's writings in 1920 and 1921, and he concludes by expressing the opinion that "en l'absence de documents anatomiques corrélatifs, et avec une analyse psychologique encore insuffisante, il est difficile de considérer actuellement comme utilisable pour notre conception du fonctionnement verbal et du mécanisme cérébral de la pensée symbolique la division de Head" (p. 277). It is far otherwise with M. Delacroix, who finds in Dr Head's views complete confirmation of conclusions regarding the relations of language and thought which he himself has arrived at by independent research on other lines.

*Le Langage et la Pensée* is a work of great erudition in which the psychology of language is based on data derived from linguistic studies. The beginnings of speech in the race and in the individual, the social significance of language, speech as a means of expression of the emotions, animal and human intelligence and its relation to language, the structure of language and linguistic forms, phonetic laws and the changes that take place in the language of a people in the course of time, the speech of children and of adults, the word and the phrase, the order of words, grammatical categories, the acquisition of language and the growth of the vocabulary—all are dealt with in an illuminating fashion.

It is in the examination of the relation of thought to verbal images and to the phrase that the topic of aphasia is first broached, and in the last section

of the work (Book IV) we find a full discussion of this subject as well as of some other matters of interest to medical psychologists. A chapter on "L'Hyperendophasie et les Hallucinations Verbales" is followed by one on the history of aphasia and another on aphasic disorders.

Delacroix prefaces his remarks on the history of aphasia by summarizing the conclusions to which his linguistic and psychological studies, expounded in the earlier portion of the book, have led him. His examination of the origin and evolution of language and the relation between language and thought, has taught him to expect that in morbid states the understanding and production of language may be affected in a variety of ways. He enumerates four main forms of defect which correspond, in almost every particular, to the four forms of aphasia described by Head. The striking concordance between conclusions arrived at by two entirely different methods of approach is valuable evidence in support of the correctness of Dr Head's teaching. It indicates that, as M. Delacroix says, "les théoriciens de l'aphasie ont acquis une vue nette des différentes fonctions qui sont groupées sous l'unité du mot langage, et ils ont appris d'une observation sincère et aussi vite de théorie que possible, à analyser le langage selon ces fonctions" (p. 482).

The history of the doctrines of aphasia is told in an outline which is valuable because of the relatively full account given of the views of modern writers. The classical period is briefly touched upon, but the views of Marie and Moutier, Pick, Head, Mourgue and Van Woerkom are dealt with in some detail. Due credit is also given to the forerunner of these writers, Hughlings Jackson.

In his remarks on aphasic disorders Delacroix does not enter into the question of cerebral localization. He is content to refer his readers to what Head has said on this matter in his paper on "Speech and Cerebral Localization" (*Brain*, Part 4, vol. XLVI, 1923). He is therefore freer from doubts than is Piéron in regard to the applicability of Head's views to many recorded cases of aphasia. Yet Head himself has admitted that the number of his patients in whom the injury was sufficiently limited to be of any localizing value was lamentably small, and that his material, though of great scientific value for determining the forms assumed by disorders of speech, is in no sense ideal for anatomical localization. Hence it follows that many still share Piéron's hesitation in casting away as worthless the data bearing on cerebral localization which has been acquired in the study of aphasia since Broca's time.

Throughout this chapter Delacroix follows very closely the lines of Head's teaching, and indeed throughout the whole book his views on the relations of thought and language and of the nature of speech mechanisms are closely akin to those put forward by Head in his various writings. He closes on a note which has echoed all through the book: "...il est juste de dire que le langage ne se rattache exclusivement et ne se réduit à aucune fonction particulière, et qu'il est l'œuvre de l'homme tout entier."

T. W. M.

*Text-book of Psychiatry.* By Prof. Dr EUGEN BLEULER. Authorized translation by A. A. BRILL, Ph.B., M.D. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. pp. xiii + 635. Price 25s. net.

Perhaps the first reflection which arises after the reading of this book is: "if only one had had the opportunity of having such a text-book on psychiatry

years ago when a student." It is not easy to get away from one's early concepts of a study, and if such a formulation of the psyche in its normal and abnormal phases is put into the student's hands, a sure foundation will be laid for his future work. Professor Bleuler is well known for his special study on dementia praecox and other important contributions on mental disease in which psychopathological material was particularly in evidence. He early recognized the value of Freud's work though he has adopted an independent attitude towards it. Since he says that psychiatry without psychology is like pathology without physiology, the reader will not be surprised to note the stress that is laid herein upon the importance of the psychological aspect of the neuroses and psychoses—an aspect which is deplorably lacking in the majority of current text-books. Certainly modern study will confirm his statement that "the psychology of the affectivity and the unconscious give the key to the understanding of the neuroses and of many psychotic symptoms." Though, on the whole, we think the usual procedure of prefacing a text-book on psychiatry with a few pages devoted to normal psychology is unwise and often harmful, in that the careless student is led to believe that that is all that is requisite for him to know of the normal mind, we must make an exception here, for the psychological introduction is dealt with in such an admirable way that interest will be stirred to read further.

The chapter on general psychopathology is, too, handled in a masterly way and gives the reader an early and by no means superficial insight into what will be applied to individual diseases later. "It is impossible to obtain insight if only the normal is considered and that accounts for the fact that psychology in the past could not only not contribute anything to all these purposes, but was positively a hindrance to better insight." The reverse, of late years, has been very patent, that is, that the modern study of psychopathology has thrown a flood of light upon the normal. As far as possible Kraepelin's classification has been followed, for it was found that the effort to classify on a different basis by emphasizing the various factors participating in the causation, development, and course, had to be abandoned. Nevertheless the individual mental diseases described under their various headings are by no means conceived of as clear-cut entities. In speaking of the mingled reactions of manic-depressive insanity and schizophrenia, Bleuler says, "except in the rare extreme cases we no longer have to ask, is it manic-depressive or schizophrenia? but to what extent manic-depressive and to what extent schizophrenia?" In such mixed forms it may be said that if the schizophrenic components, though distinct, do not definitely follow the paths of dementia, the prognosis is still good, at least as regards the present attack.

As the translator so truly says, this book marks a notable advance in psychiatry in that it emphasizes sharply the contrast between the older descriptive psychiatry and the newer interpretative psychiatry of the present time. Without hesitation we may conclude that such a work as this is an ideal text-book for anyone commencing such a study and will give helpful viewpoints to those of an older school. Though somewhat bulky in volume, nothing is contained within which a serious student can neglect. Dr Brill has rendered useful service in translating it into English.

C. STANFORD READ.

*Medicine, Magic, and Religion.* By W. H. R. RIVERS, with a Preface by G. ELLIOT SMITH. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1924. pp. viii + 147. Price 10s. 6d. net.

This book consists of the four FitzPatrick Lectures delivered by Rivers before the Royal College of Physicians of London in 1915 and 1916, and a lecture on "Mind and Medicine" delivered in the John Rylands Library in 1919.

In this brief exposition of his views on the early history of medicine and the relations between Medicine, Magic, and Religion, we find some expression of two of the greatest interests of Rivers's life. Before his experiences in the Torres Straits expedition turned his mind to the study of Ethnology, he had spent a considerable number of years in the study of medicine and in physiological and psychological research on problems that had presented themselves to him in the course of his medical training. In the FitzPatrick Lectures he brought the fruits of his ethnological investigations to bear on the history of medicine, and, in doing so, shed a new light on the origin and significance of the customs and ritual of leechcraft among primitive peoples.

In these lectures he sets out very clearly the distinction between magic and religion, and how each is related to primitive medicine. By magic he means a group of processes in which "man uses rites which depend for their efficacy on his own power, or on powers believed to be inherent in, or the attributes of, certain objects and processes which are used in these rites." Religion, on the other hand, comprises a group of processes, "the efficacy of which depends on the will of some higher power, some power whose intervention is sought by rites of supplication and propitiation" (p. 4). The beliefs of barbarous peoples concerning the causation of disease, as well as the methods of treatment adopted, fall, in the main, under one or the other of these two categories. Disease is due to the malign influence of some human being or of some non-human spiritual agent. But although such beliefs are accompanied by rites and customs that appear to us foolish and meaningless, Rivers maintained that the chief lesson to be learned from the investigation of primitive medical practices is the entire rationality of the methods employed. The blend of medicine and magic does not indicate any 'mystical dawn' of the human mind; it is the outcome of "concepts and beliefs of the same order as those which direct our own social activities" (p. 28). The study of savage man reveals no evidence of the existence of a pre-logical stage of human thought, such as Lévy-Bruhl describes. Speaking of the rationality of the medical practices of such peoples as the Papuans and the Melanesians, Rivers says: "The practices of these peoples in relation to disease are not a medley of disconnected and meaningless customs, but are inspired by definite ideas concerning the causation of disease. Their modes of treatment follow directly from their ideas concerning etiology and pathology. From our modern standpoint we are able to see that these ideas are wrong. But the important point is that, however wrong may be the beliefs of the Papuan and Melanesian concerning the causation of disease, their practices are the logical consequence of those beliefs" (p. 51).

But not all the practices of savage man are part of a logical system, nor are they always consistent with the beliefs which underlie most of their magical and religious rites. This is true, for example, of those methods of treatment the practice of which is not confined to the sorcerer or priest and may be compared with the household remedies of civilized peoples. The explanation



of this feature of primitive medicine is to be found, Rivers says, in the transformations of belief and practice that result from the contact of peoples and the blending of their cultures.

In the first two lectures Rivers deals with the relations between medicine, magic, and religion from the sociological and psychological points of view. In the third and fourth lectures he takes up the historical and evolutionary treatment of his theme and considers the mechanisms by which these relations have come into being, and the problem how processes, so closely related in one part of the world as are the practices of medicine and the rites of religion, have elsewhere become distinct and self-contained departments of social life. Indeed he says that "the chief aim of this book is, by means of the relations between medicine, magic, and religion, to illustrate the principles and methods which should guide and direct the study of the history of social institutions" (p. 55). Thus it may be seen that the interest of this book and the importance of its doctrines transcend the limits of a history of medicine or of religion; its teachings and its methods are fundamental for the study of all ethnological problems.

The main theme of the third and fourth lectures is the application to the history of medicine of the old doctrine of 'transmission' as the source of similarities of human culture, which has been restored to ethnology in recent years by the work of Elliot Smith, Rivers himself, and W. J. Perry. Before Darwin's time, when it was believed that man came into existence by an act of special creation, it was natural to think that the similarities of custom found in different parts of the world are due to diffusion from some common centre in which they had originated, and that savage and backward peoples generally are what they are because they have fallen from the state in which they were created. With the general acceptance of the theory of evolution, students of anthropology came to believe that the different varieties of mankind had developed their cultures independently, and that the similarities of custom found among widely separated peoples are due to the uniformity with which the human mind reacts to its physical and social environment. Now the pendulum has swung back to the former position, and the modern school is passionately defending the older view that diffusion, the contact of peoples and the blending of their cultures, are the sources to which we must look for all progress that has taken place in the history of civilization.

Transplanted elements of culture take root in a new soil in so far as they are in harmony with their physical and cultural environment. When they do take root they tend to be modified in becoming assimilated by the indigenous culture. Rivers illustrates such modifications of transmitted cultures by reference to the distribution of the medical practices of blood-letting, massage, sweat-baths, circumcision and subincision, and expresses his belief that the hypothesis of independent origin furnishes a very inadequate explanation of the wide distribution of these practices, while the hypothesis of diffusion affords a satisfactory explanation.

The solution of this ethnological problem is of considerable interest to medical psychology, for it has a bearing on the psycho-analytical doctrine of 'typical symbols.' Elliot Smith says that the new teaching in ethnology destroys the foundation of the belief in the reality of typical symbols. But this is to misunderstand the grounds on which psycho-analysts believe in the existence of such symbols.

The last lecture included in this volume deals with modern theories

concerning the part played by the mind in the causation and treatment of disease. Although not strictly a continuation of the topics discussed in the FitzPatrick Lectures, this chapter is directly relevant thereto, and it is of special interest in that it shows the stage in the development of Rivers's views on psycho-pathology and psycho-therapeutics at which he had arrived in 1919, just before he wrote *Conflict and Dream*. He traces briefly here the history of psycho-therapeutics from the time of Mesmer to the present day. He indicates what, in his opinion, are the main agencies utilised by practitioners of this branch of medicine, laying stress especially on the three agencies of self-knowledge, self-reliance, and suggestion. In considering the more important principles which underlie success in the treatment of the neuroses, he emphasizes the importance of Freud's work, "because he, more than any other worker, has emphasized the mental factor in disease and more thoroughly than any one else has based his work on a determinism which is as essential to the progress of psychology and psycho-pathology as determinism within the physical sphere is essential to the progress of the sciences which deal with the material world" (p. 129).

T. W. M.

*The Nervous Patient*. By MILLAIS CULPIN, M.D. (Lond.), F.R.C.S. With a Chapter on "The Major Psychoses" by Dr STANFORD READ and on "Eye Symptoms" by Mr W. S. INMAN. Pp. vi + 305. London: Lewis & Co., 1924. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Dr Culpin has sat on the stool of repentance. He was in charge of surgical cases in France, and among them met with an occasional case of conversion hysteria, which he treated on the then orthodox lines of attacking the prominent symptom. While so engaged he came across a colleague who had accepted Freud's views. Dr Culpin found these views amusing, and could not see that they might have any possible application to clinical actualities. He now asks his colleague to forgive him if ever he reads this book. The experience which led to this change of outlook is extremely instructive. From France Dr Culpin went to the excellent training school established by the War Office at Maghull. Here he was called upon to treat 'shell shocked' men on the lines of bringing back to consciousness repressed horrors of warfare. He even discovered that there was much to be said for the theory of the unconscious. Losses of memory were almost invariable; they could be recovered by appropriate methods; the revival was accompanied by an emotional outbreak, the 'abreaction'; and the symptoms disappeared after the abreaction. In fact the mental processes described by Freud were found in remarkable simplicity; but sex influences in the causation of the condition were absent.

At a later date the author had an opportunity of treating cases more leisurely and exhaustively than was possible in a military hospital, and—it may be surmised—in so far as these were ex-service men a somewhat different type of case, *i.e.* men in whom a pre-war factor played a larger part in the aetiology. Under the method of free association the sex *motif* often came up with startling clearness, bringing to him as much conviction as did the more accessible material of definite war cases. Now, while reserving his judgment on some points and still claiming his right to accept or reject according to his own experience, Dr Culpin expresses his belief that "Freud's theory will rank as one of the important landmarks of human knowledge."

A record such as this places Dr Culpin in a peculiarly favourable position for bringing before the general practitioner, for whom the book is mainly written, his views and experiences in a manner most likely to be convincing and helpful. If we add to this the fact that, before specialising in his present subject, he had fifteen years of general and surgical practice, we may see that he is bound to view with sympathy the outlook of those who, busy with general practice, have little time for detailed investigation themselves and find the modern views strange, incredible and often repellent.

As an illustration of this attitude, mention may be made of the way in which the author carefully considers one by one the non-psychic causes to which the neuroses (or minor psychoses, as he prefers to consider them) are most frequently attributed, and on these his remarks are often shrewd and trenchant.

Taking first the possibility of an organic foundation he shows that in our present state of knowledge, no structural pathological basis can be found for the neuroses. Accordingly, treatment on physical lines has no logical foundation, and this is confirmed by experience. Treatment of hysterical vomiting by dieting or of contractures and paralyses by prolonged massage and electricity, is rarely more than palliative, and indeed may often be harmful by convincing the patient that his symptoms are due to bodily disease. The toxin theory—intestinal toxæmia and pyorrhœa being the conditions most frequently postulated—rests on an equally insecure basis. Many severe and prolonged infective conditions do not bring about 'neurasthenia' and many persons in apparently sound physical health are subject to psychic disorders. At the most toxæmia can only be an occasional precipitating factor. Nor is help to be obtained by attributing the neuroses to 'nervous exhaustion.' The study of the endocrines has established a relation between certain definite pathological states and internal secretions, but the indiscriminate administration of glandular extracts is without scientific justification or practical value; and in speaking of the use of testicular or prostatic extract for impotence or 'sexual neurasthenia' in women, he reminds us of the fact that the Calcutta Zoological Gardens derive a constant revenue from the sale of rhinoceros urine as an aphrodisiac. Throughout the volume he keeps in the forefront the fact that only some form of psychotherapy is likely to relieve the nervous patient.

Some valuable chapters deal with a group of disorders which, though not yet definitely classed with the neuroses, appear at least in many instances to have a considerable psychogenic factor in their causation. These are asthma, hay fever, some forms of urticaria, exophthalmic goitre, epilepsy, dysmenorrhœa, the vomiting of pregnancy, and disturbances at the menopause, on all of which the author's remarks are helpful and stimulating.

In the chapter on treatment, Dr Culpin confines himself to a general survey of the principles and does not attempt to describe the details of psycho-analysis.

For the general practitioner, this book provides an excellent synopsis of modern views and a valuable guide in the diagnosis and treatment of the neuroses. It does not purport to make him a skilled psychotherapist, for this can only result from close study and long experience, but a knowledge of its contents will enable him to avoid faulty and possibly harmful treatment, and will assist him to discriminate between cases which are likely to benefit at his own hands and those which it would be desirable to refer to one possessing more specialised knowledge of psychotherapy. The book is written in an attractive style and merits a large circulation.

W. A. BREND.

*Crime and Insanity.* By W. C. SULLIVAN, M.D. London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1924. pp. 259. Price 12s. 6d. net.

This is an excellent book. It is an expansion of the matter of a series of lectures on "Crime and Insanity" delivered by Dr Sullivan during the last three years, as part of the course of post-graduate instruction in psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital. It is primarily intended for use as a text-book by students of psychiatry and by medical men and lawyers; but since the problems dealt with are of interest to a large section of the educated public the subject is treated in a manner that makes the book suitable also to the general reader.

Dr Sullivan writes in an admirably clear and straightforward style. He wastes little time over purely theoretical discussions or legal subtleties and deals mainly with the clinical facts. He lays stress on the conduct symptoms of mental disease, not merely in their relation to criminal responsibility, but also in themselves, in their nature and origin. The description and analysis of the clinical facts precede and furnish the material for the discussion, in the concluding section of the book, of the special problems of criminal responsibility.

In a chapter on the "Psychological Classification of Crimes" it is pointed out that a general survey of the facts of criminality shows that criminal conduct is not to be considered, *ipso facto*, as evidence of disease or abnormality in the criminal. Only a quite trivial proportion of crime as a whole can be ascribed to insanity, but "the categories of crime in which its influence is most considerable are the categories of gravest social and ethical significance."

The course adopted by Dr Sullivan in the detailed examination of morbid crime is the 'psychiatric method.' Types of criminal conduct are considered under the different clinical forms of mental disorder in which they are apt to occur. Beginning with General Paralysis of the Insane, he then goes on to describe the crimes most commonly associated with manic-depressive insanity, dementia praecox, and paranoia. Succeeding chapters deal with epilepsy and crime, crime in transitory conditions of mental disorder, crime in relation to hysteria, to congenital mental deficiency, and to moral imbecility. All these topics are copiously illustrated by accounts of actual cases drawn from Dr Sullivan's unrivalled experience of the criminal insane.

To the general reader probably the most interesting section of the book is that dealing with Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility (Chap. xiv) and Morbid Crime and Social Security (Chap. xv). In these two chapters Dr Sullivan describes and criticises the present state of the law and the pronouncements of various legal authorities on the relation of mental disorder to criminal responsibility.

In 1843 the acquittal of the lunatic McNaughten, who had murdered Sir Robert Peel's private secretary, "led to an outburst of angry feeling on the part of that emotional section of the community who appear to live under constant apprehension of the designs of the medical profession, fluctuating between a panic fear that doctors want to lock up sane people in asylums and an equally silly suspicion that they are always ready to protect murderers, to the prejudice of public security, by giving them, without adequate grounds, the excuse and privilege of madness." In consequence of this state of public feeling the House of Lords of that time propounded to the bench of judges five questions, all of them necessarily hypothetical, as to the law applicable in cases of alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusions. The answers given by the judges constitute what are known as the rules in

McNaughten's case. Although they have no legal authority, they have always been regarded as having great weight, and, to this day, they are held to formulate the present rules of law for determining criminal responsibility in relation to insanity.

Dr Sullivan quotes, *in extenso*, the five questions put to the judges, and their replies. The essential point in their answers, and that which has given rise to most controversy, is their declaration that "to establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing of the act the accused party was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

Thus we see that "these legal authorities have adhered strictly to the traditional doctrine of English law in making disorder of intellect the sole criterion of responsibility in mental disease" (p. 228). Dr Sullivan maintains that in practice the legal test fails to achieve its purpose, "and the source of its failure is that it is founded on an erroneous conception of the working of the diseased mind. Its radical fallacy is in its implied assumption that, in conditions of mental disorder, morbid conduct is the outcome of morbid thought—an assumption which...is in complete contradiction with clinical fact. Commonly, if not constantly, morbid impulse is the earliest, and may for a time be the only obvious manifestation of developing disorder of mind" (p. 238).

That the rules in the McNaughten case form an inadequate test of legal responsibility in the insane has been widely recognized by medical men and by some lawyers, and the question of its adequacy has been the subject of special inquiry on several occasions since 1843. The latest joint expression of legal opinion on this matter is the report of the Committee appointed by Lord Birkenhead, in 1922, when public feeling was aroused by the case of Ronald True. This committee, which was presided over by Lord Justice Atkin, reported in November, 1923, and their recommendations were embodied in the bill introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Darling in 1924. Lord Justice Atkin's committee recommended the retention of the McNaughten rules and the making of them the subject of statute, but they also declared that "it should be recognized that a person charged criminally with an offence is irresponsible for his act when the act is committed under an impulse which the prisoner was by mental disease in substance deprived of any power to resist."

Dr Sullivan believes that this authoritative expression of legal opinion must ensure its ultimate adoption, but he recognizes that the admission of irresistible impulse arising from insanity as a ground of exemption from punishment for a criminal act, will involve so revolutionary a change in legal theory that it can hardly fail to arouse considerable opposition. That his expectation of such opposition was well founded is shown by the fact that no less a person than Lord Birkenhead himself has publicly expressed his strong dissent from the recommendations of the committee which, as Lord Chancellor, he had brought into being. He closes a weighty letter to *The Times* of May 26, 1924, with these words: "I gravely doubt the wisdom of making, at this time and in this manner, so grave an inroad upon our criminal theory and practice as is involved in this suggested addition to the McNaughten rules."

*Social Aspects of Psycho-Analysis.* Lectures delivered under the auspices of the Sociological Society by ERNEST JONES, JAMES GLOVER, J. C. FLÜGEL, M. D. EDER, BARBARA LOW and ELLA SHARPE. Edited by ERNEST JONES, M.D. London: Williams and Norgate. pp. 240. Price 7s. 6d. net.

As indicated on the title page this book consists of six lectures delivered before the Sociological Society in 1923. As Dr Jones says, in his introduction to the volume, the occasion is noteworthy, for it is "the first time that a Scientific Society in any country has expressed a desire to partake of the new knowledge brought to light by psycho-analysis." It is perhaps unfortunate that those responsible for the arrangement of the course should have felt that "it was necessary to preface any discussion of the application of psycho-analysis to sociology by some account of the former." But it would perhaps have been unwarrantable to suppose that a request from a learned society for such a course of lectures implied that the hearers would know enough about psycho-analysis to obviate the necessity for such preliminary exposition, and that what they desired was only some account of the applications of psycho-analysis to their own branch of science. Although we may regret the absence of the fuller statements of these applications, which the lecturers were so well qualified to give, yet we find compensation for these omissions in a series of excellent expositions of the fundamentals of psycho-analysis, as these have been modified by recent investigation. In this respect, the first three lectures by Dr Ernest Jones, Dr James Glover and Mr Flügel are especially noteworthy. Perhaps Dr Glover's lecture on "Man the Individual" may be singled out as the most concise and informative piece of exposition in the whole series.

The remaining three lectures are in a somewhat different category. Dr Eder's chapter on "Politics" is more discursive and less formal than those which precede it, and contains many apt illustrations and suggestive interpretations of political activities. The last two chapters are the hardest reading; not, it would seem, because the matter dealt with is more abstruse or more difficult of comprehension than that met with in the preceding lectures; but, probably, owing to certain peculiarities of style adopted by the writers. Miss Low describes the bearing of psycho-analysis upon education, and in the course of forty pages she breaks up her sentences by parentheses, in 'brackets,' no less than fifty times, and by 'dashes' about thirty times. Miss Sharpe, writing on "Vocation," spares us the 'brackets,' but in thirty pages gives us eighty 'dashes'!

T. W. M.

*Women Characters in Richard Wagner.* By LOUISE BRINK, Ph.D. New York: Nervous & Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1924. pp. xv + 125.

A commission, years ago, to translate Wagner's socio-political writings left me one afternoon overwhelmed by the composer's exuberance; I do not remember how many pages of the British Museum Catalogue he filled, whilst the whole world seemed to be shovelling books on Wagner into Bloomsbury. To-day there must be an enormous library on and about the Master. So it seems at first sight rather bold to add to these lives, letters, critiques, but Dr Brink rightly enough insists that her essay does not displace explanations that Wagner himself, his friends or his enemies have given of his life and work; her psycho-analytic survey is a supplement to other interpretations.

A psycho-analytic study of the artist seeks to grasp something of his genius by a sympathetic understanding of his life and works as products of his unconscious. Applied to Wagner we find ourselves at the outset met by perplexing and fascinating problems. Was Wagner aware of the libidinal sources of the tumults and conflicts which filled his life? He has assumed the Oedipus situation to be a natural one. Oedipus and his mother, as he has expressed it, "acted according to natural instinct." "In the family the natural bonds between those who procreate and those who are procreated are developed into the bonds of custom, and only out of custom again develops a natural inclination of brothers and sisters towards one another." In his prose writings he again recognised that in Art the unconscious life of the Folk attains to consciousness, but in the composition of his great dramas he is unaware of these conclusions and he claims that this must be so. In writing of the 'Ring' cycle he confesses that "the artist himself stands before a work of art, as before a riddle."

This essay on the 'Ring' dramas, to which Dr Brink confines herself, justifies her contention that we have here the eternally old and ever new story of man's conflict between his ego interests and his libido. Dr Brink brings a delicate and acute intelligence to the interpretation of the symbolism of this father-daughter drama, where Wotan and Alberich represent the two aspects of the father, the Rhine Maidens and Brünnhilde the maiden unawakened and the impassioned woman. It is not merely his own personal unconscious conflicts that Wagner has elaborated in these dramas; as a great imaginative artist, in his projections of unconscious phantasies, in his gods and devils and human characters, he has universalised the personal, he has given us the history of man.

Dr Brink deals skilfully with the intricate question of the two kinds of knowing. Wagner knows a great deal about his own unconscious and that of man's in general, but the knowledge does not avail him in the guidance of his own life and Wagner the composer-dramatist seems unaware of the conscious knowledge possessed by Wagner the sociologist and politician.

The book suffers from two serious defects; Dr Brink sees plainly that Wagner's operatic dramas, above all others, cannot be properly analysed without an analysis of the music and its wealth of unconscious expression; her excuse is that this analysis is beyond her capacity. This is an explanation, but insufficient as an excuse.

The other defect is that much of the book is written in no language known to me; it reads like a bad English translation of some unknown foreign language. I have spent half an hour puzzling out the meaning of a short sentence. It seems unwise to present a literary subject in this baffling guise. I have persevered to the end through the interest of the subject matter, but the effort is more considerable than most readers are likely to bestow.

M. D. EDER.

*The Nature of Intelligence.* By L. L. THURSTONE, M.E., Ph.D., Professor of Psychology in the Carnegie Institute of Technology. With ten illustrations. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1924. pp. xvi + 167. Price 10s. 6d. net.

The title of this book does not sufficiently indicate its purpose, which appears to be no less than a re-orientation for Psychology as a whole. "Stated

in a nutshell, my message is that psychology starts with the unrest of the inner self and it completes its discovery in the contentment of the inner self" (p. xvi and p. 167).

This 'message' is expanded by an attempt, laudable enough, to harmonize psychiatry, academic psychology, and behaviourism. "These three schools of psychological interpretation form a continuum, in that conduct originates in the self as studied by *psychiatry*, it takes partial and tentative formulations in conscious states as studied by *academic psychology*, and it completes itself into behaviour, as studied by the *behaviourist school*" (p. xv).

Professor Thurstone is an engineer and a psychologist; what evidence of his knowledge of psychiatry does the book afford? The first paragraph of his preface contains the following: "Psycho-analytic theory is strange and extreme....But there is an underlying truth in the psycho-analytic literature which can be extracted from the strange context, and which has not been adequately noted in the more established scientific studies of mind." Professor Thurstone does not think it necessary to mention any of the psycho-analytic literature from which he has extracted 'the underlying truth.' In fact the only references at all in the book are one to Jennings' "Behaviour of the Lower Organisms." and two to the author's own papers. What is this 'underlying truth'?—"abnormal psychology more often implies that *action begins in the actor himself*," "a psychology that looks to the inner self as the mainspring of conduct and according to which the stimuli of the environment become merely the avenues through which that inner self is expressed and satisfied. It is just this point of view in the interpretation of human nature that psycho-analysis has emphasized." There is no mention of such mechanisms as repression and transference. There are no clinical observations or reports; and nothing that suggests any psychiatric reading beyond the more popular expositions of the 'New Psychology.'

One naturally looks for scientific records of experiments, particularly of intelligence tests. There are no scientific records in the whole book! Moreover the author is not well disposed to scientific psychology which he tends to identify with the study of cognitive processes. He mentions the experiment of learning nonsense syllables: "The experiment is scientifically quite legitimate, but it is trivial in respect of the factors that are most important for mental life" (p. 17); but he goes on to "assert that psychology studies the stimulus-response relation, and we have forgotten the person himself who may or may not want to do the responding. I suggest that we dethrone the stimulus. He is only nominally the ruler of psychology. The real ruler of the domain which psychology studies is the individual and his motives, desires, wants, ambitions, cravings, aspirations." Thus we cannot help thinking that orexis is emphasized and cognition criticized in a way that suggests that the author's unconscious affects are dominating his intellectual formulations.

From cover to cover there is apparently no scientific description of observed behaviour. Suppositions do duty for behaviour, for example, "If I perceive a puddle," "Suppose that you have been aroused to a fit of violent temper against another man," "During the hours of his job a labourer is perhaps ordered about."

In short there is no evidence of wide and deep psychiatric knowledge, no evidence of experimental psychology, and no evidence of the scientific observation of actual behaviour, such as the ambitious aim of harmonization would require for its adequate realization.

We may well ask then what it is that Professor Thurstone has harmonized.



His own too-subjective ideas. "His account of Mind as 'unfinished action'" (quoted from the jacket) coupled with an over-abundant use of the future tense; the frequent use of 'I,' 'my,' 'we,' 'you,' together with his championship of the self-expression formula; his contempt for the academic study of stimuli together with a virtually complete absence of any references, *i.e.* stimuli for his own ideas; the tendency to vague and sweeping generalizations qualified by conditionals; all tend to form the judgment that what is new in the book is neurotic and what is true is a truism. The desire to be free himself from the influence and domination of stimuli, particularly the absence of references, *i.e.* the stimuli afforded by 'authorities,' and the marked insistence upon the self-generation and self-expression of the individual mind, tend to suggest that the book is not uninfluenced by a well-known complex.

The book closes with a few generalizations which indicate the author's views about intelligence. "*The intelligence of any particular psychological act is a function of the incomplete stage of the act at which it is the subject of trial-and-error choice. Intelligence, considered as a mental trait, is the capacity to make impulses focal at their early, unfinished stages of formation.* Intelligence is therefore the capacity for abstraction, which is an inhibitory process" (p. 159). The italics are the author's. "It might possibly come about that the highest possible form of intelligence is one in which the alternatives are essentially nothing but affective states" (p. 163).

The ten portentous illustrations are only naive. There is no index.

*The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method* can hardly be congratulated on the inclusion of this volume among their series. It may form "an introduction to those who are unfamiliar with scientific terminology"; it is of little worth to those familiar with scientific method.

H. D. JENNINGS WHITE.

*Thirty Years of Psychical Research, being A Treatise on Metapsychics.* By CHARLES RICHEL, Ph.D. Translated from the French by STANLEY DE BRATH, M.Inst. C.E. London: W. Collins & Co. pp. xv + 646. Price 25s. net.

The translator of this work does not tell us why the original title of *Traité de Métapsychique* should have been transformed into *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*. The English title is misleading, for the book is not merely a record of Professor Richet's own work in psychical research during the last thirty years, nor is it a record of the progress that has been made in the study of 'occult' phenomena during that time. It is rather, as its proper title indicates, a treatise on a department of scientific inquiry which Richet has named 'Metapsychics.' Since all the subject-matter of the book comes under the category of what in English-speaking countries is known as Psychical Research, the English title might very well have been "A Treatise on Psychical Research," if for any reason it was deemed undesirable to call it "A Treatise on Metapsychics."

In giving to this book the usual form of treatises on physics, botany, pathology and other sciences, Richet says that it was his intention "to remove from facts called 'occult,' many of which are indisputably true, the super-normal and mystical implications ascribed to them by those who do not deny their actuality." "These facts exist," he says, "and are called occult only because they are not understood." Throughout this large volume he endeavours to confine himself to statement of facts and discussion of their actuality, not

only without advancing any theory, but scarcely mentioning theories, for all theories yet proposed seem to him terribly frail. Of the actuality of these facts of metapsychics Richet is firmly convinced, and the main purpose of this book is to bring forward evidence that will establish the facts so that no unbiassed man of science can deny them.

The three fundamental phenomena of Psychological Research according to Richet are (1) Cryptesthesia (Telepathy, Clairvoyance, Premonitions), (2) Telekinesis (movements of inert matter without apparent contact or known forces), (3) Ectoplasm (commonly called Materialization phenomena). In admitting all these phenomena as 'facts of metapsychics' Richet goes much further than many acute students of Psychological Research in this country, some of whom would be inclined to regard him as overcredulous and uncritical. On the other hand, his materialistic philosophy and his physiological training make him profoundly sceptical of any spiritistic hypothesis that may be brought forward in explanation of the facts of observation and experiment. The one hypothesis to which he is inclined to commit himself is that all the phenomena should be ascribed to unrecognized powers in the human organism. But although he is inclined to accept this hypothesis as obviously superior to the spiritistic ones, he does not believe in it very strongly. For he is well aware how frail it is, how incredible, almost as incredible as those he so forcibly rejects. So he tells us that he believes in "that future hypothesis that I cannot formulate because I do not know it."

The cautious attitude taken up by Professor Richet towards the interpretation of metapsychical phenomena, combined with his wholehearted belief in their actuality, may perhaps have the effect of inducing some men of science to adopt a more respectful attitude than they have done in the past towards those who are engaged in the work of Psychological Research. It is of good omen that when Richet had the courage to present his volume to the French Academy of Sciences it was accepted on the strength of his reputation.

T. W. M.

*Psychological Studies of Religious Questions.* By J. CYRIL FLOWER, M.A.  
London: Williams and Norgate. pp. 264. Price 7s. 6d. net.

Books on Psychology and Religion are divided into two groups; those which approach the question from the distinctively religious point of view, and call in the aid of psychology to support their conceptions; and those of a materialistic bent which attempt by explaining religion to explain it away. Mr Flower's book is of the first type. It attempts to find a place, a necessary place, in the scheme of things, for religion. It has its place in evolution, for just as the submarine forms of life ventured on to the land, and the land creatures into the air, so we are making a further venture, the invasion into the realm of the spirit; it is this last adventure we call Religion.

Referring to the opinion of those who would reduce religion to an inferior status by deriving it from instinct, the author maintains that whilst for anthropological purposes the term religion may be used of a chaos of instinctive impulses, the true nature of religion is to be found in the end, not the beginnings.

The reason which directs is as necessary as the emotion which it directs. "It is not instinct that makes us religious; it is we who give religious significance and value to instinct."

Mr Flower does not fall into the temptation of trying to show that psychology helps to prove religion. On the contrary, he says that religion

can come only by way of experience. "What, then, in simple truth is the spiritual world? Who can answer that question save he who has experience of it?" "The objective reality of God is a fact which bursts in upon us not by way of definitions, whether of the finite or the infinite character, but in experience." If however this is pressed it would exclude religion from objective scientific study. There is of course a sense in which we cannot understand what we have not experienced, and therefore have no right to discuss it. But this argument could be used to forbid us studying animal psychology. Religion may be regarded subjectively, in which case the contention above mentioned holds true, but if we are to consider it an object of science, it must be viewed objectively and it should be competent to any scientist to study and criticize it from that point of view. The book deals with psychology from the philosophic rather than the scientific point of view, and as such its studies prove very suggestive to those interested in this aspect of the question.

J. A. HADFIELD.

*The Philosophy of Music.* By WILLIAM POLE, with an Introduction by EDWARD J. DENT, and a Supplementary Essay by HAMILTON HARTRIDGE. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1924. pp. xxiv + 342. Price 10s. 6d. net.

In reading *The Philosophy of Music* by William Pole, which has recently been re-published, it must be remembered that it was written for a different age. Even its title is misleading to-day. As Mr Dent points out, in his introduction, the term 'philosophy' fifty years ago was used in a sense which has since become obsolete. Philosophy was then divided into Natural Philosophy and Moral Philosophy, and Pole deals to a very large extent with purely physical investigations. At that time also, it was generally believed that the construction of music was fixed by natural laws, and this book was written with the object of examining "the general structure of music, in order to ascertain how far it was based on physical data, or how far it had been the result of aesthetic or artistic considerations." The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the material of music, and is practically a treatise on acoustics; the second with the elementary arrangement of the material, resulting in scales, and the evolution of tonality, time, rhythm and form; the third with the structure of music itself, which consists of melody, harmony and counterpoint.

As a result of his investigations Pole came to the conclusion that although the fabric of music has its foundation laid in natural phenomena, which are permanent and unchangeable, yet its superstructure is almost entirely a work of art, which is constantly subject to change. The laws of acoustics in themselves have not altered since they began to be investigated by Pythagoras. On the other hand scales, on which all organized music is built, have varied at different times, and among different peoples—the modern European diatonic scales being totally different from those used by the Javanese, Indians, and other Eastern races. Harmony has been in a constant state of flux and change since its earliest beginnings in the Organum and Descant described by theorists of the 10th to 13th centuries, and even since Pole's time, there has been a breaking away from many of its strictest traditions. Few modern composers would feel themselves bound by the rules of composition laid down in this book, but as a handbook on acoustics and early history of music it may safely be recommended, and the reader of to-day should derive pleasure and profit from it, both for its charm of style and scientific outlook.

B. K. MITFORD.













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