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WE have for some time meditated laying before our readers, in a series of articles, a fuller and more connected account of the Giobertian Philosophy than we have heretofore given or than is accessible to the simply English-speaking public. We shall draw our account or exposition solely from Gioberti's own writings, without reference to the expositions which have been given either by his friends or his enemies. We intended, at first, to precede our exposition by a sketch of the author's life, but have concluded to confine ourselves to a few brief notices, as we have not as yet received the very full and elaborate Biography in three volumes octavo, not long since published at Turin.

Vincenzo Gioberti was born in Turin in the year 1801, and was educated in the University of his native city. His parents were respectable, but apparently not wealthy. They brought up their son for the priesthood, and at a suitable age he received orders, and became one of the chaplains to the king, Carlo Alberto. He was a most diligent student, and devoted himself most assiduously to the study of theology, philosophy, history, and literature, both ancient and modern. At an early age, whether before or after receiving orders, we are unable to say, he had his period of doubt, as

have most young men of generous minds and liberal studies, with sufficient seriousness ever to think in regard to the grounds of their faith, and was induced to study profoundly the foundations not merely of the Catholic Church in whose communion he had been brought up, but of Christianity itself, nay, of all religion. The result of his studies was a firm and unwavering conviction, which never deserted him to the hour of his death, not of the truth and utility of all that passes for religion even among Catholics, but of Christianity, the Catholic Church, and the real Catholic dogmata. He studied the terrible questions raised by his doubts not professionally, as a lawyer studies his brief, but seriously, earnestly, in order to arrive at truth for himself, for his own mind and his own conscience, and with a science, an ability, and a genius for grappling with the profoundest and most abstruse philosophical and theological problems never surpassed, if equalled, since St. Augustine. He has especially investigated the relation of reason and revelation, faith and science, Church and state, religion and civilization, and attempted to determine scientifically the real ground on which the antagonism existing between them disappears and their dialectic harmony is founded and practically preserved. His genius as well as his learning is encyclopædic, and his works may be studied with equal advantage by the scholar, the artist, the philosopher, the theologian, and the cultivators of the so-called exact sciences.

Gioberti was a patriot, an Italian, and, an ardent lover of liberty, though not precisely in the sense of European democrats. He had the indiscretion, one day, to say in presence of a friend, that he thought "the people might, without danger to the State, be admitted to a liberal share in the government." His words were reported to the police, and on that very night he was ordered to leave, within twelve hours, the Sardinian territory. He belonged to none of the secret societies which were then plotting Italian insurrections, and does not appear to have had any political relations with the Italian Revolutionists of the time. He was a student, and an exemplary priest, not at all mixed up with political affairs. But he had in private conversation given utterance to a liberal sentiment. That was enough, and he was exiled. Exiled from his native country, he thought first of going to South America, but was induced by a friend to go to Paris. He found himself a stranger in that centre of the best and the worst influences of the age, poor, destitute of

friends, suspended from his priestly functions, and without means of support, but the scanty and precarious pittance to be gained from ill-appreciated literary labors. He remained not long in Paris, but soon went to Belgium, and took up his residence at or near Brussels, where he remained during the greater part of his exile, finding employment and the means of living as a teacher in a private literary institution. He performed faithfully the duties of an instructor, lived frugally, gave very few hours to sleep, and devoted the greater part of his nights to study and the composition of his works, which, after all, he has left unfinished. Here he composed and published the greater part of all his works published during his lifetime, while living in comparative obscurity, loved and honored by a few friends with whom he kept up an affectionate correspondence, and especially the poor, whose wants he freely and lovingly relieved to the full extent of his means. His works obtained at first only a limited circulation, and, though they secured him the admiration and esteem of the few, they gained him but little public consideration, and failed to make him regarded as the great man of Italy. The first work which obtained him that consideration was his *Del Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani*, published, 1843, under the Pontificate of Gregory XVI., a second edition of which, published at Lausanne, in 1846, in three volumes octavo, is now lying before us, and is the edition we use. This work met with an immense success; its publication was an event in the Italian *Resorgimento*.

In this work Gioberti maintains—which not every one will concede—that the moral and civil primacy of the world was given to Italy and the Pelasgic or Italo-Greek race, and belongs to the modern Italians as the representatives of that race and the old Romans. He maintains that this is the reason why the religious and ecclesiastical Primacy has been established at Rome, and hence is in some sense the right of the Roman or Italian people. The moral and civil primacy of the world was possessed and exerted in the interests of civilization by the old Romans, under both the Republic and the Empire, and by their successors the modern Italians, through the Moderatorship exercised by the Sovereign Pontiffs after the fall of the old Roman world, down to the end of the Middle Ages. But in consequence of the loss of the Papal Moderatorship and the division of the Peninsula into a number of petty States, the most of them dependencies on non-Italian powers, as Spain,

France, and Austria, Italy, having in herself no centre of unity, has ceased for three hundred years or more to exercise the moral and civil primacy which belongs to her. She must now, for her own interest, the interest of both religion and civilization, recover it. As the means of recovering it, the several Italian States must unite and form an Italian Confederacy under the Presidency of the Pope, the several States retaining their respective constitutions and independence each within its own limits and in regard to all internal affairs, whilst all national interests must be managed by the Federal Congress or Government. This plan was adopted by both France and Austria at the Preliminary Peace of Villa Franca, but its execution has thus far been defeated by Piedmontese ambition, and the monarchical and republican Unitarians, demanding not Italian union, but Italian unity, and supported by British diplomacy. The plan was not revolutionary in the least, and would have been admirable had it not been impracticable.

But whatever may be thought of the plan itself, it appealed to Italian patriotism, flattered Italian vanity, and held out a chance for the assertion of Italian nationality. It addressed also the purest and best feelings of the Italian people, and really inaugurated what has been called the *Resorgimento d'Italia*, and at once stamped its author as one of the leading minds, if not the leading mind of the Peninsula. The election of Pius IX., which soon followed, a friend of Gioberti, and himself an Italian patriot, who inaugurated his reign by several bold and liberal measures, looking to Italian resuscitation and independence, gave it new significance, and the introduction of Constitutional Government into Piedmont by Carlo Alberto seemed to open the way for Italian independence and a confederated Italy. Gioberti was recalled from his exile, and restored to his native country. He visited Rome, where he was cordially received by the Holy Father, who gave him his blessing, and permission to celebrate Mass, and where he was honored by all that was distinguished in the city. His journey from Rome to Turin was a succession of ovations. In his native city he was held in the highest esteem; and after the disasters to the King in his attempt to rescue the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom from Austria, and to place its crown on his own head, he was made prime minister, and for a few months wielded the Piedmontese government. In this capacity he refused

to recognize the short-lived Mazzinian Republic at Rome, opposed the intervention of non-Italian Powers for the restoration of the Pope, so as to give them no pretext for interfering in the affairs of Italy, and urged the Italian States themselves to unite and restore him his temporal principality. After the renewal of the war with Austria, which he opposed, but could not prevent, and the disastrous defeat of the Sardinians at Novara by old Radetzki, he left the ministry, went or was sent to Paris, where he remained till his death in 1852.

As a practical statesman Gioberti was not successful. He failed, for he was guided by principle rather than expediency, had a respect for vested rights, and was more Italian than Piedmontese. He flattered no party, and favored the peculiar prejudices of no class or faction. He wished to retain the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, and was opposed to the consolidation of all Italy into a single unitarian state, whether monarchical or republican. His sympathies were Italian, embracing freedom and independence for the Peninsula, but he was no revolutionist, and had no sympathy with the Italian democrats, save in the one respect of rendering Italy independent of all ultramontane Powers. He wished Italy to be independent alike of France and Austria, and to enable her to suffice for herself. He was, therefore, opposed alike, save so far as they hoped to use him, by the respective adherents of France and Austria, by both the monarchical and the democratic Unitarians, who demanded unity, not union. He had for enemies even among the nationals Mazzini, Garibaldi, and the Carbonari on the one hand, and all who, like Count Cavour who succeeded him, aimed simply at making Italy Piedmontese. Lacking the usual Italian suppleness, these proved too many and powerful for him, and his failure was inevitable. It is not as a practical statesman that he will live in the memory of mankind, or even in that of his own countrymen. A statesman as well as the commander of an army to be remembered must succeed. He who fails the world always holds to be without merit. The Piedmontese minister is even now forgotten, though not even Cavour has contributed so much or half so much as Gioberti to the uprising and renovation of Italy; and if he had had his way, Nice and Savoy would not now make a part of France, giving the passes of the Alps to the perennial enemy of Italy. He must live, if at all, as the thinker, the erudite scholar,

the classic writer, the profound philosopher, the acute theologian, the bold Catholic reformer.

After his retreat, exile, or mission to Paris, we know not which to call it, in 1849, he applied himself to his usual studies, and published, in 1851, his *Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*, his last publication during his lifetime. In this work he reviews, in part, his political career, points out the errors committed by the friends of the civil renovation of Italy, and gives his views of the course that should be taken in future to secure that renovation. The work is really his apology for his political doctrines and action. In it he approaches more nearly than he had before done to the republican party, though he gives a most masterly refutation of the false democratic theory adopted by the European democratic party. He had attempted the renovation of Italy through the Princes, and they had failed him, and henceforth he must look to the people. In this work, also, he has a most bitter chapter on Pius the Ninth, not as Pope, but as temporal Prince, in which he accuses him of having deceived and betrayed the hopes of Italy, of having proved false to every one of his pledges; who, having commenced as a liberal Italian Prince, had fallen back under the Austrian *oscurantismo*, and used all his power and influence to defeat Italian independence and the progress of liberty. It is a bitter chapter, in which very little of the Christian or the philosopher is detected. It is unjust. Pius IX., if not a great man, is a good man; and if he has deceived others, it is because he first deceived himself. He is, if you will, a weak man, but he is honest and kind-hearted. His mistake as Prince was in raising expectations that he could not satisfy, in raising a storm that he had not the power to control or to direct. He miscalculated his own strength, or the power in our times of the Papacy. We felt it at the time, and our pages bear witness to our fears that the result would be disastrous. We were not for a moment deceived. Yet there was something grand in the position he assumed on his inauguration, in placing himself at the head of the modern movement, in giving it the sanction of his high office and sacred character, and in attempting to direct, as the Father of Christendom, that movement to the advancement of religion and civilization. The applause he received from the non-Catholic even more than from the Catholic world, so hearty, so enthusiastic, proved that it was not the Pontiff the

world for four centuries had been warring against, but the defender of an obsolete phase of civilization; and that the moment he is seen marching at the head of modern society, all nations are ready to own his authority and follow his lead. But he assumed a position which he was personally too weak to maintain. He was not a Gregory VII., an Innocent III., nor even a Sixtus Quintus. He was unequal to the emergency himself had created, and, instead of overcoming adverse circumstances, was forced to yield to them, and take refuge in mere passive resistance, in the *non possumus*. The system he found established by his predecessors was too strong for him, and he succumbed, and suffered the world he had sought to guide, but could not, to float past him. French arms restored him, re-established him nominally in his principality; but he has been, ever since he returned to Rome, virtually a prisoner of France on parole. Hence we heard no protest from him against the unprovoked war of France on Russia in 1854, or against the infamous Italian Campaign in 1859, directed against him as temporal Prince no less than against Austria. He is the prisoner and the pensioner of France, and there is no power in Europe on whom he can rely to set him free, and sustain his independence. This might have been foreseen, and should have been, and therefore he should not have ventured to raise the storm which he could neither allay nor direct. Still, Gioberti has no excuse for his bitter invectives against him, or for denying his moral worth, his goodness of heart, and his real excellence of character.

Gioberti, in the beginning of his career, while he confined himself almost exclusively to theology and philosophy, met with no serious opposition from the Jesuits—they were even disposed to applaud him; but after the publication of his *Del Primato*, and his Italian and political tendencies became manifest, they seem to have attacked him with great severity, not avowedly, indeed, for these tendencies, but for philosophical and theological views which they had previously commended. This brought out his most terrible work against the Society of Jesus, as reorganized by its so-called Second Founder, the celebrated Aquaviva, their fourth General, the *Gesuita Moderno*, in five volumes octavo. This work we have glanced over, but not read, and can speak of its character only by report. We began it, but we were repelled from continuing it by

its uncalled for severity, and, as it seemed to us, its gross injustice to an illustrious body of men. He charges the Jesuits with having perverted Catholic theology, and with having introduced another Christ than the Christ of the Gospels and the Church. He exposes rudely their philosophy, ridicules their style as writers, and impeaches, apparently on documentary evidence, their honesty and historical veracity. This book sealed his fate. No Catholic writer can afford to have this illustrious order for his enemy, or can survive its enmity. He must not expect to hold his footing in the Church as an author, as a man, hardly as a Christian; and if he is not driven out of the Church into heresy and schism, it will be through no forbearance of theirs. From the date of the publication of his *Gesuita Moderno*, Gioberti lost his standing with the dominant portion of his co-religionists, and it was more than any Catholic's reputation with his brethren was worth to venture to speak well of him even as a philosopher. We might quote Plato, Aristotle, Averrhoës, or Avicenna, any Pagan or Mahometan even, with respect, but must not name Gioberti without an anathema. More disinterested, more self-denying and laborious priests than the Jesuits generally, we have never known, and never expect to find; but like all religious orders and congregations in the Church, they are apt to forget in their corporate capacity, that they have only a human origin, and to proceed against their enemies as if they were founded immediately by God himself, and that they who question their honor as a Society question his. Chiefly through their exertions, and those under their direction, Gioberti has been widely regarded by Catholics as one who dishonored the priesthood, abandoned his faith, and died under the excommunication of the Church. His works, it is said, have been placed on the Index, and we certainly cannot cite them as the works of an approved and unsuspected Catholic author. But we say frankly that we have never found them maintaining any proposition censured by the Church. In his theology he follows the Thomists and the Augustinians much more nearly than he does the Jesuits; but this does not impeach his orthodoxy, though it may his judgment, and, still more, his prudence.

The circumstances attending Gioberti's death at Paris, at fifty-one, in the prime of his life, and the full vigor of his intellect, while engaged in completing works of vast

extent, profounder and more important than any he had published, are variously related, and the exact truth will, perhaps, never be known, or if known, will never be acknowledged. It seems agreed on all hands that his death was caused by a fit of apoplexy, brought on by too intense study and over exercise of his brain, with too little rest, and too little sleep. He is said, by some, to have died suddenly, alone in his room, and without the last Sacraments, or the presence of a priest. This is the more common version. Others report that he so far revived as to receive the visit of his confessor, and the last rites of his Church; and that he finally expired with the most edifying marks of firm faith and tender piety. Which is the true account we know not, although we believe it is conceded that he received Christian burial in consecrated ground, which would seem to imply the more favorable account. He was a man naturally of strong passions, but his life was morally irreproachable; remarkable for his temperance, his purity, and his charity to the poor. He is described to us by those who knew him well, to have been a very handsome man, above the medium size, with head, hair, and features of the English rather than of the Italian type. From a bust executed at Rome, in 1847, which we have seen, and which is said to be a capital likeness, we could not say that the representations of his character by his enemies are necessarily false. The head is large, the features are regular, classical, and finely chiseled, but they lack that open, frank, genial expression that at once inspires confidence and wins the heart. They have the air of a man too conscious of his own superiority, and too well satisfied with himself. It is the bust of a strong man, but of one against whom you feel it is no lack of charity to be on your guard.

As a writer, Gioberti, for classic purity, elegance, clearness, force, and dignity of style, has no superior, if any equal, in the Italian language. His taste is correct and his judgment sound, his diction is pure, choice, and exact, and his style noble, grand, majestic, as much so as that of Bossuet; calm, equal, natural, and graceful, fitted to the grand and lofty subjects on which he writes. He is a perfect master of his own language, and knows the exact value of every word he uses, its exact meaning, even to its finest and most delicate shade; and you cannot change a single word in any sentence he writes without

changing its sense, or take a sentence out of its connection without impairing its meaning, and doing the writer great injustice. Yet he is never dry, stiff, or stilted; he moves with an easy, natural grace, and passes on through the most difficult and abstruse problems of theology and metaphysics without relaxing his gait, without the slightest apparent effort, or consciousness that he is not dealing in the ordinary way with the most ordinary topics. He has never to stop and take breath, is never labored, involved, obscure, or difficult. His march is even, easy, and unrestrained, and if you cannot follow him it is because you have no genius for the topics he discusses, or are fettered by your false training, and have your natural understanding perverted by absurd and incomprehensible systems. He is always master of his language and of his subject, and the Italian is flexible to his purpose, and proves in his hands equal to the expression of the deepest and loftiest thought, and the nicest shades of meaning. He is never obliged to force it into any unnatural or unusual forms, to adopt any unidiomatic or unfamiliar locutions, or to disfigure it by the introduction of new and barbarous terms, as the scholastics were in their use of Latin, and as the recent English and Scottish writers are, or imagine they are, in the use of our own language. The metaphysicians of Oxford and Edinburgh write in a sort of jargon which has only a remote affinity to genuine, idiomatic, and classical English. They are as far from being masters of their mother tongue as they are from being masters of true philosophic thought.

Gioberti may not have the fervid eloquence we meet in the philosophical *Leçons* of our old master, Victor Cousin, nor his genial warmth, but he surpasses him in depth of thought, in ease, in sustained elegance and dignity of expression, and nobility and grandeur of style. He is master of what the French rhetoricians call the "grand style," which we need not say is infinitely remote from the pompous, met with so often in Italian, Spanish, and Irish writers who affect it, and fail ridiculously. Among French writers Bossuet stands first and almost alone as master of the grand or majestic style, and he succeeds only by sometimes forgetting to be French. Even he now and then fails, and gives us mere bathos, as in his famous "*Madame se meurt, Madame est morte.*" Even he lacks the repose, the calm strength, and the easy, natural, and graceful gait of Gioberti. We see, as in his *Eleva-*

tions, or *Meditations, on the Mysteries*, that he does not rise easily and by his native strength to the height he aims at, and is obliged to work himself up, to make an effort, to strain and tug, as if in need of help. Gioberti's strength is always equal to his demands, and he rises easily and without effort to the highest possible regions of human thought, and possesses himself of the sublimest truths revealed to the human understanding. Among philosophers, Plato is the only one with whom, in this respect, it would not be unjust to compare him. He is clearer, more distinct, more exact in his thought and expression than Plato, equally profound and sublime, with a wider field of truth, and a firmer grasp, but is inferior to him in the poetic charm of his imagination. He is as witty as the old Greek, but has less of that modification of wit which the Latins called *urbanitas*, and less of that good natured raillery which exposes the error without wounding its defender, so conspicuous in the Athenian. His wit is apt to express itself in sarcasm, is a little bitter, is too superb, and seldom fails to wound. The Athenian laughs at you, makes you confess yourself a fool, but without offence, or forfeiting your friendship; you love him all the better for it. But if in this respect he has the advantage of the Italian, it is the only advantage. In philosophic genius, in intellectual strength, in the wonderful mastery of language, the Italian yields nothing to the Athenian, while in grasp of thought, in natural grandeur, in science, erudition, penetration, intuition, he surpasses him, and has been able to correct and complete his philosophy.

The great defect in Gioberti's character is an excessive pride, and a manifest lack of what is called the humility of the cross. His private correspondence, and even here and there a passage in his published writings, as well as the testimony of his friends, prove that he did not lack tenderness of heart, and that he was susceptible of sincere and lasting friendship. But in his finished writings his air is too superb, his manner towards his opponents too disdainful. He seems always too conscious of his own immeasurable superiority. But in all this we may misread his real character and do him great injustice. Genuine humility is always unconscious of itself, and what passes under its name is often only the most offensive form of pride. The studious effort which many writers make to conceal pride always betrays its existence. There is often less egotism in using than in avoiding the pronoun I. We know from experience that authors are

accused of exorbitant pride, when that is the last vice with which they should be charged. Christian humility is the root of every Christian virtue, but it does not consist in hanging down one's head like a bulrush, or in proclamations of one's own unworthiness. It has no relation with self-abasement or servility of spirit or manner. It is compatible with magnanimity, nay, is the very basis of true magnanimity of soul. Its manner is always open, frank, manly. The humble man does not depreciate himself any more than he depreciates others; he simply forgets himself, and acts ingenuously, naturally, always according to the true relations of men and things. The humble man is a gentleman from an innate sense of truth and justice, from good feeling and good nature, what others are by artificial training. Still, we should like Gioberti better if he was more human, and less bitter and sarcastic; if the smile on his lips was less self-complacent, less sardonic, more genial and warmer, more evidently a smile of the heart. The irony of Plato charms us and binds us to him as our brother, even when we feel that we are its subject. He is roguish, but not malignant. His wit is playful, good humored, little of the *bon diable*, but never satanic. But Gioberti's wit, though delicate and keen, is felt, and the victim winces under the operation, and grows indignant at the wound it leaves. Yet he may be, after all, really as good natured as the old Athenian, but simply graver and more in earnest, and less conscious of the wounds he inflicts, or the pain he gives.

Since Gioberti's death, his friends have published, at Turin, eight volumes in octavo of unedited manuscripts, consisting of treatises blocked out, but unfinished, and selections from his correspondence. Of these, the *Protologia*, two volumes, *Della Filosofia della Rivelazione*, one volume, *Della Riforma Cattolica della Chiesa*, one volume, are all that we have studied. They were left indeed unfinished, and lack the developments and the last literary touches of the author, but they had advanced so far towards completion, that the reader familiar with his system of thought as contained in the works published during his life, finds little to regret under the point of view of philosophy or theology. Their general system of thought harmonizes with that in his finished productions, but there is to be found in them, here and there, a detached proposition which, it is very possible, is either not his, or if his, would have been modified or stricken out had he lived to complete and publish his works himself. These

begun, but unfinished works, which we feel cannot in every respect be relied on, are necessary to the full understanding of the Giobertian philosophy, and they indicate, on the part of the author, more extended studies and more maturity of mind than his finished productions. What he had published during his life was only an introduction to the study of philosophy, only the prodrome to his system of thought, and these were intended, when completed, to be the system itself. It is this fact that renders the exposition of the Giobertian philosophy so difficult. We have it not as a whole, nor with the author's last developments. It lay as a whole in his mind, he tells us, from the beginning, but we have only fragments of it. What he has left is a magnificent torso, which we are obliged to repair or complete by our own genius, in accordance with the original design of the artist. To do justice to the exposition, one must be in some measure competent to conceive and fill up the original design from his own genius and philosophical knowledge. He needs to be the twin brother of Gioberti himself. We have no pretensions of this sort; and though not an absolute stranger to the subjects he treats, or the order of thought in which he moves, we are far from being able to do more than seize the bases and method of his system, and to present a few of its more salient points. We have neither the genius nor the learning, nor even the books at our command to do more, were we rash enough to attempt more.

The works Gioberti published during his life, with those published in his name by his friends since his death, embrace all science in its principle, method, unity, and universality, whether natural, revealed, metaphysical, theological, cosmological, political, ethical, physical, or æsthetical. But the outlines of his whole system, or sketch of the whole as first conceived in his mind, is in the volume named at the head of this article, the first work he published. He never deviated from his original conception, and no one can hope thoroughly to understand either his system or the growth of his mind without beginning by studying this volume, the driest and least attractive of all his works. Evidently, when he wrote it, though his whole scheme may have been in his mind, he was far from being master of his thought, and still farther from that thorough master of style and language which he subsequently became, and of which the best specimens are the *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*, second edition, Brussels, 1842, in four volumes octavo

and his *Gesuita Moderno*, published in 1847, in five volumes octavo, and his *Degli Errori Filosofici di Antonio Rosmini*, three volumes octavo, 1842. In his *Teorica del Sovrannaturale* is the germ of all he has written, and nothing he has written is superior of its kind to the *Parte Terza*, which treats of the supernatural, of religion, and the Church in their relation to society, the state, or civilization.

The work, however, which must take precedence of the others in studying his Philosophy, is the *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*, only the student must bear in mind, that though extending to four octavo volumes, it is only an introduction, and makes only one book out of eight contemplated by the author. In connection with this, must be studied the controversial work, *Degli Errori Filosofici di Antonio Rosmini*. These works contain his philosophical principles and method, together with his criticisms on the various systems opposed to his own, especially the psychological system placed in vogue by Descartes, the pseudo-ontological theories of the modern Germans, and the French Eclecticism as so eloquently and learnedly set forth and defended by Victor Cousin, an author who must always have a place in the history of philosophy. Yet all that has been published by the author, even the incomplete works edited and published by his friends since his death, must be studied by one who would really master his philosophy in its relation to revelation, politics, the sciences, literature, and art. He will even then find many gaps, and regret that the author died before his work was done.

In endeavoring to give our readers a connected and systematic view of what we shall call the Giobertian Philosophy, we must, however, be permitted to proceed in our own way, and give his views, as we understand them, in our own language. We shall make our own statements of his principles, method, and views, without pretending to support them by textual citations. Those of our readers who have not read his works and have not access to them, will necessarily have to rely to a great extent on our understanding and fidelity for the correctness of our exposition, which will detract not a little from its value. The character of his works is such that we could not pursue a different course without reproducing them entire, and our space, as well as the patience of our readers, is limited. What we propose is really an exposition, not a critical examination, not a defence, nor a refutation. On many of its points we have heretofore given

our views, but we have never attempted to give a general view of Gioberti's philosophy as a system, and to enable our readers to judge of its merits or demerits for themselves. This is what we now undertake, without committing ourselves for or against it.

We know perfectly well that few of our countrymen hold philosophy in much esteem, and fewer still have studied it sufficiently to take an interest in the exposition of the system of even so distinguished a philosopher as Gioberti. The present, too, may be thought a most unfavorable time to call the attention of any class of readers to the examination of metaphysical questions, which requires repose, the mind to be at ease, in a period of peace and public tranquillity. It may be thought that men's minds are now in no fit mood for such examination. When the nation is engaged in a fearful struggle for its existence, and public duties and public affairs tax to the utmost every thought and energy of our Scholars as well as of our Statesmen and the Generals of our armies, who is at leisure for calm and tranquil studies? But times like ours are always times of great mental activity as well as of great physical energy, and the mind wrought up to its highest tension on public affairs must have its occasional relaxation; and there are always in every noble and generous nation minds of a character that find relaxation in a simple change of study, or in passing for but a brief hour from the agitation of public affairs, the excitement of battle, the cares of office or command, to the calm and serene study of philosophy, however severe it may be in itself. It gives relief and allures the mind to rest, although it exercises it severely, for it exercises it in a different way, on a different topic. We ourselves feel the dangers of the country, are agitated in its agitation, and fear some blunder may ruin it, and we should grow crazy, if we could not find distraction in those severe studies which we should, perhaps, shrink from, if all around us were tranquil and peaceful, and our mind found nothing around it to stimulate its activity. We might go to sleep, lie listlessly under a shady beech, or on a green bank, under the soft moonlight, listening to sweet music in the distance. The odds are that our exposition of the Giobertian Philosophy may find more readers now than it would in calmer and less stormy times.

Moreover, never was there a time since America was a nation, when it was more important for us as a people to have a true and solid philosophy; on which the statesman

Similar studies & balances adopted in America in Civil War
Shew do not fully harmonise as seen in late civil war

dialectic constitution to be found in the history of nations. But the written constitutions only inadequately represent it, and the theories on which we have interpreted them are false, or at least one-sided. We have been developing them in the sense of the social-contract theory of Rousseau, or that of pure individualism; and, therefore, in the sense of democracy, which is simply social or civil despotism. The democracy of Jean Jacques Rousseau had its good side, we admit: it asserted the rights of the people, drew attention to the poor, the humble, the oppressed, and brought them into the state. It recognized the manhood of every man; but it failed to recognize the social rights of man, and to secure his manhood in face of the majority. It gave to society no solid basis, and recognized no law prescribing its rights and limiting its powers, but that of the variable will or might of the individual. We have seen its sad effects in the first French Revolution, from 1790 to 1795, and can judge of it by the systems of socialism and communism to which it has given birth. The people are logical in the long run, and they tend constantly to eliminate all anomalies from their social and political systems. In Great Britain there is a strong tendency, on the one hand, to eliminate from the British Constitution the Established Church, the House of Lords, and the hereditary monarchy; and, on the other, to eliminate the democratic element, or to subject it by increasing the power of the throne. The struggle goes on, and may last for a century, should nothing extraordinary occur to hasten a conclusion; but, if it goes on, the stronger party must win the victory; and that party, in Great Britain, is certainly the Commons or the people. If the king and nobility become alarmed, and undertake to prevent any further development of the democratic element, they will precipitate a revolution, and the scenes of blood and terror of the old French Revolution will be re-enacted in the British Isles.

In our own country, we have, as a people, ever since 1801, been eliminating from our State Constitutions every thing we had retained from our English ancestors, or from Colonial times, not in harmony with the false democracy taught by Rousseau, and of which Thomas Jefferson was the American exponent; and we have gone so far, and been so successful, that we have already precipitated the revolution, or the Rebellion seeking to become a revolution. Now, when we have put down the rebellion, what are we to do? Replace the anomalies we have eliminated? That

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rebellion. Popular opinion toward of course in democracy of the
Jefferson and he represented the false democracy of Democracy
and so the aim was to weaken central government. The
rebellion was necessary and what is to be done
How arrange the anomalies of the government
how shape political affairs so that old antagonisms

symptoms
of really
dialectic
constitution
to be found
in the history
of nations
good side of
Social Contract
It recognized
individual
manhood
It failed to
secure this
in face of the
majority

Similar struggle
in England
to do away
with house of
Lords & nobility
on one hand
and on other
to weaken
power of
Commons
or democratic
element

Similar
struggle led
to war of

effect-
social
contract
in French
revolution
1790-1795
and
says
with
to
weaken
power
of
Lords

will not after endures stability of government when
find a permanent basis founded on real order of
things, for the law will be stable enforced -
there will not suffice. The great problem indeed
of all governments is to harmonize individualism and
individual right -

with the
rights of
society or
the state
Both have
rights which
cannot be
suspended
Adopt either
side and
you are
against the
Edw. Bal-
ana me
against the
state as
in England
and I might
say in the
Cmty and
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danger of
friction
the state
of conflict
are in
the very
theory
so the way
is to unite
them -
bring in
the natural

would avail nothing, for the inevitable struggle would
commence to eliminate them anew. Go on in the direction
we have been going, and seek to give a fuller expression
still to the social-contract theory, to the false democracy in-
augurated by Jefferson? We cannot, without running
into anarchy, and being obliged to seek relief in monarchical
despotism, to which too many among us are already
beginning to look. This will never do, for it were a
huge stride backward to barbarism. What are we to do?
Where lies our salvation? Not the mere practical states-
man, nor the empirical philosopher can answer, as the con-
fusion and uncertainty witnessed in Congress and the
Administration amply prove. The Constitution of the state
cannot rest on a mere fact, it must rest on a principle, and
have a dogmatic, not a merely empirical basis. This dogmat-
ic basis or principle must be not an abstract theory which
men weave from their brain, or spin from their own bowels,
as the spider does his web; but must be real, with a real ex-
istence in the constitution of things, and as permanent and
invariable as the law of nature. How are we to arrive at
such a principle or dogmatic basis, and to build on it, with-
out the science that explains to us the laws of the universe
in their political application? And what is this science but
philosophy, the science of reason, or reason knowing and
comprehending itself? If you base your state on individ-
ualism, you establish an inextinguishable antagonism be-
tween the individual and the government, and can maintain
the state only by force; that is, by constant violence to
what you acknowledge to be individual rights. If you
found it exclusively on the social idea, on the assumed
authority of society, you establish despotism, destroy in-
dividual freedom, and the very conditions of progress. If
you found it on both ideas, without the principle that har-
monizes them, you have the British government over again
with its inherent antagonisms. You must, if you would
have it stable, both authoritative and free, conservative and
progressive, preserving society and fostering individual pro-
gress, found your state on both ideas, but on them in their
real synthesis, as they really exist in nature, not arbitrarily
or artificially placed in juxtaposition. The grand defect of all
so-called mixed governments, which have hitherto existed, is
that they have been unscientific, arbitrarily constructed,
not founded on the real relation which nature, or rather
God in nature, establishes between them. They have re-

quires. It is because this has been wanting that
governments have been so unstable, not scientific
not philosophical not reasonable in a word false
artificial and arbitrary being the farther
in political & natural disturbances

cognized the dualism, but not the middle term that unites the extremes in one and the same conclusion. Such governments tend perpetually to dissolution, to simplify themselves by excluding one or the other idea, and therefore to become despotic; for all simple forms, that is, governments founded on one idea, whichever of the two ideas it may be, are real despotisms. Mr. Calhoun clearly saw and illustrated this, but he saw no way of remedying the evil save by a nicely adjusted balance of antagonisms, or in rendering the resistance equal in force to the aggression. Hence his doctrine of Nullification. But no man has so well illustrated this as Gioberti in his *Della Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*, especially in his chapter on *False Democracy*, or democracy as set forth by Jean Jacques Rousseau. The problem is, how to escape the despotism of any of the simple forms of government, and the inherent antagonisms and tendency to dissolution of so-called mixed governments. If our statesmen understand not the solution of this problem, they understand not how to meet the wants of American civilization, and to preserve the original and fundamental, the Providential constitution of the American people. But this solution they cannot understand, if they are ignorant of the *nexus*, the natural copula, which unites the two terms without destroying or distorting either; and they cannot arrive at this *nexus* without a philosophy that presents and explains things as they really exist, which no philosophy as taught in the schools has ever yet done, or can do.

Calhoun saw danger from individualism & success here would oppose my truth often. But they of Nullification

No scientific political natural nexus what is this Nexus

The great bond of social union, and incentive as well as guide to individual progress, is religion, which represents the Idea or Divine element in human life, and the government of human affairs; but not a religion which has no Divine authority, and is itself subjected to the very opinions, passions, and interests it ought to control. No society, no government can long exist where religion is wanting. But here again meets us the same problem we have found in organizing the state, which is as truly a divine institution as the Church, and has, in its own order, just as good a right to exist. The difficulty in all the past has been that the two orders have existed in society as antagonists; and while Churchmen have struggled to subject the state to the Church, statesmen have labored to subject the Church to the state; the former to introduce the pantheistic idea, which denies the distinction between God and creature;

religion the bond - Church & state both flourish in religion

So churchmen are in seeking to subject state to church & statesmen doing contrary. Pantheism then forces both to pantheism - pantheistic Latin nihilism to philosophy which explains reason & this the real relations furnishes this nexus or suggests it -

and the latter to introduce the atheistic idea, which denies both God and creature—pure negation, and really no idea at all. Now here, as elsewhere, the problem is to reconcile the dualism without destroying it; to recognize the divine authority of the Church without losing the freedom and autonomy of the state; the invariability of faith without lesion to human progress; to reconcile the permanence of the Idea with its free and progressive development and application; for it is only on such conditions that religion can give stability and freedom to the state and aid the progress of civilization. Here, again, there is needed a middle term to unite the two extremes; and this middle term can be no human creation, no arbitrary contrivance; but to be a real middle term, and really effective, it must exist in the real universe; and man's business is simply to recognize it, and govern himself accordingly. But this is the work of science, of philosophy, which recognizes and explains the divine order, the real relation between the Creator and his works, what is called theological science, and which in our expositions varies with our philosophical systems. Never were we more in need of that sublime and profound philosophy, which sees and explains things and relations as they really are, than now, when we have to take our reckoning and put the ship of state on its course. We cannot think, then, that we are forgetting the practical duties of the hour in calling the attention of thinking men to the consideration of those great principles, those stable and immutable ideas, as St. Augustine calls them, without which the world of mere facts could not exist, and without a knowledge of which, facts have no significance for the human mind—are absolutely inexplicable.

The first thing that strikes the ordinary reader, on becoming partially acquainted with the Giobertian Philosophy, is its apparent lack of novelty. It seems to be an old acquaintance and substantially what has always been known and held in the schools, only presented in a new suit of clothes. The majority of those who read his works, we suspect, find little, if any thing, new or remarkable in them. Gioberti's solutions of the old problems they will take to be the ordinary solutions, and his principles those which have been generally received. There is some truth in this. Gioberti is not absolutely new and original, and there is scarcely a proposition to be found in the whole of his works to which we can point and say, Here is a propo-

sition never before made. His principles are not new in philosophy, nor is his method of philosophizing. He nowhere breaks with the past, or interrupts the continuity of the higher philosophical tradition from Plato down to our own times. He himself says his philosophy is old, and no new invention of his—a philosophy that has been substantially held by all great philosophers, theologians, and doctors, in every age and nation. He does but renew the chain of philosophic tradition from the remotest antiquity, unhappily broken by that blundering Bas-Breton, René Descartes, since whom there really has been no philosophy in Europe; for the psychological and sensistic systems to which he gave birth, and which can result only in the destruction of both subject and object, or pure nihilism, do not deserve the name of philosophy, not even as developed by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, or Victor Cousin. But, if he accepts the universal philosophical tradition, he has his own way of explaining it; and, to those who understand him, he has presented it in a new light, given it new significance, and made it appear a new thing. His originality is in the new relations under which he presents old and familiar truths, and in bringing out their deeper meaning, and presenting them in their unity and universality, and in their mutual relations in the order of reality. Here he presents much that is new, and which gives a new face to the whole of philosophical science.

The scholastics distinguish between the order of being and the order of knowing, and it is not rare to find them asserting that a proposition is untrue in the order *cognoscendi*, and yet true in the order *essendi*, or really true but logically false. That is, dialectics follow the order of the mind, not the order of things. Hence originates the interminable question of certainty, around which the excellent Balmes says revolve all the questions of philosophy. The *pons asinorum* of nearly all modern philosophers is precisely this question of certainty, or to prove that knowing is knowing. They ask not, *what* do we know, but *how* do we know that we know? As if to know that we know was something more than simply to know! To know equals to know that we know, and if the simple knowing needs confirmation, so does the *knowing* that we know; and as it is impossible to get any thing more ultimate than knowing, or more certain than knowledge, the question of modern philosophers has and can have no other effect than to cast doubt

Handwritten notes:
 How much better than Descartes...
 Descartes...
 But how do we know it...
 This real philosophy is...
 Descartes...
 Giobertian...
 restored the...
 philosophical chain...
 Scholastics distinguish between order of being and order of knowing...
 between order of being and order of knowing...
 some hold that a proposition is false in order of knowing but true in order of being...
 the mind dialectics follow order of mind, rather than that of reality...
 so the interminable question of certainty as to the agreement of our knowledge with reality...
 of philosophers since psychology of Descartes...
 the source of all this confusion...
 distinct from modern physics and...

on all knowledge, and to place philosophy on the declivity to universal skepticism, and absolute nihilism, to which nearly all philosophy since Descartes inevitably conducts. *Cogito, ergo sum*, is, in the first place, a paralogism, for *sum*, I am, is in *cogito*, I think, and that I think is no more evident than that I am or I exist. The one is as immediately a fact of consciousness as the other. In the second place, the pretended enthymeme simply states a fact of consciousness, or an internal affection of the sentient subject, from which it is impossible to deduce any objective existence. Moreover, if the simple knowing is not to be taken as certain till it is confirmed by something more ultimate, the fact of consciousness itself becomes uncertain, for consciousness, or what the schoolmen call the *sensus intimus*, is only *knowing*. How do we know that we know that we have the internal affection? I think, therefore I am. But how do I know that I think? I think I think. But how do I know that I think I think? Thus we go on questioning forever, and can never get beyond the simple fact of knowing. If it be disputed that to know is to know, there is and can be for man no certitude either subjective or objective.

Gioberti finds, in his philosophy, no place for such questions, and does not once raise, or have occasion to raise, the question of the certitude of knowledge. To know is to know, and we either know or do not know. The error of modern philosophers arises chiefly from their discussing the question of method before the question of principles, which compels them to deal with logical abstractions instead of realities, and give us a *mundus logicus*, diverse from the *mundus physicus* or real world. What is not, is not intelligible, is not and cannot be known, for it is simply a negation, and negations are intelligible only in the truth they deny, and hence a universal denial, or the assertion of universal negation, is simply impossible. Descartes begins his philosophy with a Discourse on Method; Bacon's whole science is reducible to methodology; Locke begins his *Essay on the Human Understanding* by a dissertation on the origin of ideas, and proceeds to answer the question how we know, and what we are able to know, before he proceeds to discuss what we do know, or what are the principles of all science. Kant's masterly *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is really a criticism on method, not science; Victor Cousin says expressly all philosophy is in method. Tell me a philosopher's method, and I will tell you his philosophy. Bal-

Methodology since Descartes. How do we know
and how do we know that we know? For which
Descartes. Bacon. Kant. Even Balguy's 70 know
that we know is not knowing and a question of fact
that we know is to ascertain all knowing. It is to the fact
absolutely an error that philosophy who starts with a
one fact

Epistemology
By Cousin
that anything
real connects
to the subject
which
from spirit
the reality of
themselves
is realness
are beyond
the all of
to the being
Edition
Constitution
which
infused
separation
for of we
we know we have the fact of consciousness itself. I want to

ergo to
to know
to know
to know

admitted
this cert to
be seen that
the
that
we know we have the fact of consciousness itself. I want to

But when passing the mind to and beyond
Cousin let us say these philosophers have
had right-ideas & they must start to understand
the real relations of these ideas so build a world
of abstractions they tell you how the mind operates

1864.]

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mes, who is constantly sailing in sight of the coasts of truth, but is always afraid to land, though he discovers many an inviting inlet and safe harbor, begins with method, and devotes his first book to the question of certitude. All assume that the first question to be settled is, How know we that we know? and that their first business is without science to construct a science of science, a *Wissenschaftslehre*. Consequently, they are obliged to proceed blindly, to deal with unrealities, and not only to place their philosophy out of the reach of the common mind, but in eternal opposition to common sense. The philosophy they build up with infinite labor and pains is no science of the living world, of concrete reality, but of logical abstractions, which are purely mental creations, without real existence in nature.

mind to
the real
world
they understand
mental
operations
understand
how mind
works the
laws which
seem to govern
it and from
this conclude
as to principles
so the method
finds principle
they do not
seem to know
that all the
terms they
are using
principles
that without
them the
mind could
not operate
and so then
could be
by
my method
at all

Gioberti differs from them, and places the determination of principles before that of method. The principles give the method, not method the principles. The principles of philosophy are real, not mental abstractions; they are that without which the human mind can neither exist nor operate, without which all science is impossible, and therefore are given, not invented or found by the mind operating without them. Nearly all our philosophers send the mind, assumed to be as yet ignorant of principles, forth to seek them, forgetting that the mind without principles can neither operate nor exist, because the first principles of all science are those which create and constitute the human intellect itself, or man as an intellectual or rational existence, capable of knowing and understanding. The mind, destitute of principles, cannot seek principles, and ignorant of them it cannot recognize them, or know them to be principles. Principles, then, must be given antecedently to all our mental operations, and be constitutive of the human reason or understanding, and therefore given by the Creator himself, and as given by him they are *a priori*, ideal, apodictic, not empirical, contingent, or doubtful, since, as doubt is a mental operation, we could not even doubt if we had them not. What these principles of all science are, and what are their characteristics, we shall endeavor, in a subsequent article, to set forth. Here we restrict ourselves to their objective reality.

Victor Cousin begins with method, and adopting the psychological or Cartesian method, could never attain to any but psychological principles, and hence his great difficulty was to identify what he calls absolute ideas, the ideas of the True, the Good, and the Fair, with being or objective reality.

Principles make method possible & real, so they start wrong
and in consequence or absurdity so knowledge is impossible
without principles, so to thought and doubt. No mental life without
them. They are *a priori* from God in Creation. They are apodictic
not empirical: their apprehension by mind is apprehension
of the apprehension. Coeval with their presentation is intellectual life

Cousin starts with method and seeing the Cartesian
method he has psychological facts several notions
and reaches what he calls necessary absolute ideas
the true de jure de facto. He gets them (abstracted

And hence why
nothing more
is says the
character of
necessity
importance in
these ideas
but it is not
a psychological
necessity and
it is not
can reach
the ontological
or real ideas
and Cousin
he concludes
from them
is not an
abstraction

Cousin comes
near the
truth yet
misses it
by his false
method. He
rightly says
that reason
has constitutive
principles that
it has been
prior to all
reflection

that they are not obtained by reflection, that they
are entirely given, but when he undertakes the
explanation of intention, according to his vulgar psychology,
method he abandons, he ventures forward given up
the real nature of intention, although he still claims
it but really he has pushed back on the Cartesian
method of Bacon and still he pushes back on the Cartesian

Psychological observation and induction may, perhaps, es-
tablish the psychological existence of these absolute ideas,
as psychological facts, though not as ideas, but how from
their psychological existence conclude their ontological ex-
istence or objective reality? Here was his difficulty, and
he has never yet answered the criticism of Sir William Ham-
ilton, published in 1829, in the *Edinburgh Review*. They
are with him mere generalizations, like all inductions of
psychological or even physical phenomena, and therefore
simply abstractions; and abstractions, we repeat, have no
existence, but are simply formed by the mind operating on
the concrete. The mind forms them by abstracting from a
number of concrete objects what is common to them all, and
by considering it apart; but they have no reality, no sub-
sistence, as separate or distinct from their concretes or the
mind that forms them. An ontology based on them is no
real ontology, is only a generalization, without reality. The
character of necessity which Mr. Cousin says inheres in all
absolute ideas, and which he relies on as evidence of their
objective validity, or real ontological truth, avails him
nothing, for that is only a psychological necessity, and can-
not be shown by him to be an ontological necessity. Hence
the God he concludes from them is only an abstract God,
only a generalization, and no real God, no real, necessary,
living Being at all.

Yet Cousin approaches the truth when he asserts that
what he calls absolute ideas are constitutive of the reason,
without which reason could neither exist nor operate.
Whether his account of absolute ideas, and his analysis of
what he calls the objective reason, are to be accepted or not,
or whether he has any right on his own doctrine to assert
reason as objective, or ideas as absolute or necessary, we do
not now inquire. His merit does not, in our judgment, lie
in stating truly the constitutive principles of reason, but in
recognizing and giving prominence to the fact that reason
has constitutive principles, and in maintaining, in opposi-
tion to his psychological method, that the ultimate princi-
ples of human science are given intuitively, not obtained by
reflection. They are in the mind prior to all reflection, and
therefore are not obtained, as his system pretends, by the
Baconian method of observation and induction. So far he
rises to a higher order of thought than his psychology war-
rants, at least apparently. But he falls back into his psy-
chology the moment he undertakes to explain the fact of

intuition. He distinguishes very clearly between intuition and reflection, shows that intuition must precede reflection, for reflection is a voluntary turning back of the mind upon what has been intuitively presented; but he makes intuition itself a psychological fact, making it depend on the spontaneous activity of reason or the intellect, forgetting that reason can no more operate spontaneously than reflectively, without its constitutive principles. Gioberti escapes his error, his contradiction, and confusion, by asserting the principles, the primitive intuition, not as the product of reason, but as really constitutive of it, as creating man, and enabling him to know by giving him *a priori* the faculty and the object of science.

Having settled the question of principles, we may proceed to the question of method. The peculiarity of Gioberti, in regard to method, is that while he holds that the first principles of all science are intuitive and constitutive of intelligence, and therefore objective and real, not merely psychological generalizations, or logical abstractions, and consequently affirming to us the real, not a fictitious world, he in the construction of science uses the *data* given by revelation as well as those given by natural reason. Philosophy, in his sense of the term, is not a science separate from theology, or that can be constructed without the aid of the superintelligible, which we can know only analogically through the medium of supernatural revelation. In his view all true philosophy is Christian and Catholic. Considered in itself there is but one order of truth, and in the higher sense but one truth, which he calls Idea or God himself, considered as the object of knowledge, or as it stands toward the human intellect, and is to us partly intelligible and partly superintelligible. As the intelligible has its root, its source, its essence, in the superintelligible, and has no existence without it, it follows that it is simply impossible to have a science of truth, of being, of things as they are, without the knowledge of that which is to us superintelligible. That knowledge of the superintelligible, of the origin, causes, and end of things which can be known by us only through the medium of revelation, is as essential to science as it is to being or existence. Here he separates from the pure rationalists, who reject revelation, and from the supernaturalists who reject reason, as well as from the Jesuits and their admirers, who, though they accept both rational truth and revealed truth, present them as two orders of truth, not contradictory the one to the other, indeed,

order of truth or one with the Idea, God. This partly to us is
 Clarity partly superintelligible. For man has its root its source
 so can't be known without it. Things can't be known
 latter superintelligible so can't be known without it. Perovronism
 this departs from both rationalists who reject revelation & present
 dualists who reject reason. He also departs from Jesuits who
 accept both orders of truth, natural & supernatural but

from psychology and philosophy. An spontaneous act of
 impression reason. He rights in distinction between intuition
 reflection says former must precede latter indeed latter
 only turning back upon former but his intention is act of
 or spontaneous
 spontaneous reason and reflection and of personal reality
 reason
 He says that
 can't be known
 by any other
 spiritual
 or reflection
 without principles
 how subjects
 differ from
 him

The peculiarity
 of Giobertian
 philosophy is that
 he uses the data
 given in
 revelation as
 well as that
 to natural
 reason in the
 construction of
 science.
 He says that
 philosophy can't
 be constructed
 without aid
 of superintelligible
 which he terms
 analogically
 with aid
 of revelation

but lying one above the other, and without any real or necessary relation between them, constituting a dualism which can never be reconciled and brought into dialectic union, or real synthesis, by a middle term. This needs explanation.

The total separation of philosophy from revelation, and the attempt to make it a purely rational science, or to construct it by our natural light alone, is modern, and dates from René Descartes. We find nothing of the sort in antiquity, Jewish or Gentile. Plato and Aristotle are ignorant of it, and use revelation as they had it, or as the Greek world had retained it in their traditions; and if they fail to attain to a philosophy that truly explains the origin, cause, laws, and end of the universe, it is not because their reason is false or uncultivated, but because their tradition of the primitive revelation is not preserved in its purity and integrity. The early Fathers understand by philosophy the Greek or Gentile wisdom, and some of them seem to take it for granted that the Gentiles had only the light of nature, and that this Greek wisdom is the measure of what man can do without revelation; but none of them ever suppose that philosophy can be complete without revelation, or theology be complete without philosophy, or the order of truth cognizable by the light of nature. They distinguish between Christian wisdom and Gentile wisdom, but never separate reason from revelation. The great Fathers, Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, Athanasius, Basil, the Gregories, Augustine, do not admit that Gentile wisdom is to be taken as the expression of reason isolated from revealed truth, and plainly teach that the Gentiles retained traditions of revealed wisdom. The Word, which is with God, is God, and the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into the world, they would have us believe, did not confine his inspirations and revelations to the Jews only, but in some degree extended them to the whole human race.

The Scholastics coming after the fall of Rome, the breaking up and almost total destruction of the old Italo-Greek civilization, the lapse of the greater part of Western Europe into barbarism, when learning had declined and historical studies had fallen into almost universal neglect, very generally adopt the view that the Gentile wisdom, which with them as with the Fathers is what is meant by Philosophy, was the product of reason unaided by revelation, and hence its defects as philosophy. Exceptions to this statement may be found, but generally the Scholastics either were silent

After fall of Roman empire & scholasticism generally hold that pure wisdom was product of unaided reason. Hence its defects. All scholastics though say that philosophy without theology, revelation is complete. So Venturini said to try to show that for them reason was a translated word. Thomas was a translated word.

hold them separate without union or link in whom the other
It harmonious the attempt to separate philosophy from
theology as a distinct & independent science dates from Descartes
Plato & Aristotle & similar blended philosophy with religion and
faith & certain notions origin, cause, end & of things it is
because of last night of permanent revelation
the philosophy was wrong
because the
nature of revelation
and faith
a many of them
think that
Gentile wisdom
in itself
revelation was
that philosophy
could not
ad faith
look upon
in philosophy
as all that
theology
But the fathers
principal was
Origen, Clement
of Alexandria
Cyprian etc
held that
pure philosophy
was much
indebited to
revelation
The Word, which
enlighteneth
every man
attended in
some way to
human race

in their submission or servitude of philosophy to the (a) few
 factors to state to church political order, to religious and
 world view civil judgements in clerics. The supreme
 power is Bible ^{contains} ~~source~~ revelation interpreted School
 20 Aristotle unless contain some interpretation of

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 Scholastic professors This produced a

on the question, or regarded the Gentile world as abandoned
 to the simple light, or darkness, of nature, and as having
 never received, or if they had received, as having wholly lost
 all tradition of revealed wisdom. But none of them teach,
 not even St. Thomas of Aquino in his *Contra Gentiles*, that
 a consistent and complete philosophy or science even of
 the natural order is practicable with the simple light of
 reason alone; and we may add for what it is worth, that
 the late distinguished Theatine, Padre Ventura, labors to
 prove the Angel of the Schools, as St. Thomas was called,
 was a traditionalist, and held philosophy impossible without
 the tradition of revelation. This in a certain sense is true of
 all the Scholastics, for even the most rigid of the Peripatetics
 never pretended that Aristotle, whose writings were their
 Bible of Science, had given a complete science of the natural
 order, although they held that he had given the last word
 of unassisted reason. In no instance do they separate faith
 from reason, or philosophy from theology, and present the-
 ology and philosophy as two distinct and mutually inde-
 pendent sciences. The error of the Scholastics, which had
 so disastrous effect, grew out of the *clerocratic* tendency of
 their times, which would subject the temporal to the spiri-
 tual, make the Pope, as head of the Church, the universal
 and sovereign lord in temporals, and vest the civil and
 political supremacy in the clerical order, and consisted in
 subjecting reason to faith, and in representing philosophy
 as the handmaid, slave [*ancilla*] of the clergy. They did
 not reject philosophy, but they enslaved it, first, to the
 clergy, and secondly, to Aristotle. As they held and were
 obliged to hold that the Bible interpreted by the Church
 was authoritative in matters of revelation or faith, so they
 held and insisted that all should hold that the writings of
 Aristotle interpreted by the professors, was authority in all
 matters of reason or science. He who departed from Aris-
 totle was treated as a heretic in science, as he who departed
 from the Bible was a heretic in religion. Berengarius
 hardly fares worse than did poor Friar Bacon. Aristotle had
 given and closed the canon of science, as the Bible had that
 of revelation. No new scientific investigations in regard to
 either was needed or permitted, and the only intellectual
 labor allowable was that of the interpreter and the commen-
 tator. St. Thomas scrupulously reproduces Aristotle, whom
 he calls *Philosophus*, the Philosopher, and never in the
 slightest particular deviates from him, unless compelled by

virtually
 mental
 tyranny
 Church and
 state
 professor
 emperor
 In faith
 over reason
 No expansion
 no progress
 in lower
 order
 A reaction
 followed
 the former
 slave
 became
 Master
 reason
 opposed
 and
 disregarded
 faith

Decartes arose at the time of this conflict and resolved
 to set science free from both church and Aristotle. He
 began with the individual consciousness. "Cogito ergo
 sum." Making science a purely rational work.

The naturalists went a step farther and said that revelation
 is not necessary at all, just as Descartes said it was not
 necessary for science, departing from all who preceded him
 who held that philosophy needed revelation

the revealed dogma. The same order was asserted through-
 out, and all was subjected by a merciless logic to external
 authority.

This clerocratic order, as far as it obtained, created an
 intolerable tyranny, allowed no freedom of mind, no intel-
 lectual or social development and progress. It created an
 invincible antagonism between the Church and Society, the
 Pope and the emperor, the clergy and the politicians, the-
 ology and philosophy, revelation and reason. It produced
 a powerful reaction, and the enslaved elements, after a
 long struggle, emancipated themselves, but only to subject
 their former masters, and to tyrannize over them in turn, as
 they themselves had been tyrannized over. Descartes was
 born in this reaction, and he labored to emancipate science
 alike from its subjection to the theologians and to Aristotle.
 He rejected, mentally, all the past, discarded all tradition,
 alike of revelation and of science, and resolved to accept
 nothing as science not obtained by logical deduction from
 the facts of his own individual consciousness. Hence his
 famous *cogito, ergo sum*, as his *primum philosophicum*, or
 first principle in science. He pretended that with reason
 alone, operating on the incontestable facts of individual
 consciousness, without any aid from tradition or revelation,
 it is possible to arrive at a complete philosophy or true
 science of the natural order, or in other words, individual
 reason alone is able, by its own light, by its own concep-
 tions, to attain to a complete scientific system of the uni-
 verse. He thus assumed what had never before been pre-
 tended, effected, in theory, an entire separation of philoso-
 phy from theology, and made it purely rationalistic. The
 rationalists, adopting his theory, go farther, perhaps, than
 he was prepared to go, and conclude that, if our own reason,
 by its own light, operating upon its own conceptions, can
 explain the universe, there is no reason for demanding or
 accepting revelation. Here is the great difficulty in the
 way of the teaching which is generally patronized by the
 Jesuits. They assert the possibility of natural beatitude,
 and the sufficiency of reason in the order of nature, and so far
 are pure rationalists. They found the necessity of super-
 natural revelation on the fact or alleged fact that God has
 created or instituted a supernatural order, above the natural
 order, and by entering which we may attain to supernatural
 beatitude. But, if God had not seen proper to establish a
 supernatural order, man would have been left, without any

Jesuit
 system
 2 orders
 extol
 distinct

that of philo & theol, Reason & faith, without bond
 union no intrinsic or necessary connection Reason
 on its own order complete How then prove revelation?
 This question is irreconcilably answered
 says... and... the...
 reason... people...

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detachment or on the one side and *sophistical asceticism* on the other
 so as have *scholastic* recognizing philosophy a scientific
 tradition but enslave mind to tradition, philosophy to history
 to *Cartesian* set-aside theology as an aid to philosophy
 detriment, to his simple natural light. Reason does not
 herself need or demand such supernatural order, and then
 there is no real or intrinsic relation between the two orders.
 How then prove to reason that the supernatural order really
 exists, or that a supernatural revelation has been made?
 This question is unanswerable, and the Society's teaching
 labors under all the disadvantages of exclusive rationalism
 on the one hand, and of exclusive supernaturalism on the
 other, and the Jesuits have had, in point of fact, the morti-
 fication of seeing the world under them as teachers either
 lapsing into rationalism and treating the question of revela-
 tion with superb indifference, or rejecting reason, discarding
 science; and taking refuge in a one-sided, sophistical, and
 therefore immoral asceticism.

The scholastics recognize philosophy, assert even scientific
 tradition, but enslave the mind to the tradition, and phi-
 losophy to theology; the Cartesian emancipates philosophy
 from theology, and the mind from tradition, but at the ex-
 pense of the continuity of the race, and of leaving all the
 past, all history unexplained, and without significance, thus
 isolating man from God, from nature, and from society, and
 ending necessarily in pure individualism, egoism,—nihilism,
 as history but too clearly demonstrates; Jesuitism accepts
 both rationalism and supernaturalism, rational conceptions
 and traditions, but as unrelated, without any intrinsic con-
 nection, or middle term which converts the dualism into a
 synthesis. Gioberti claims here to have found in the
 original principles of science and of things this middle term,
 which renders the two dialectic, unites them in a real syn-
 thesis, and destroys all antagonism.

There is, undoubtedly, a dualism which all science does
 and must recognize, and it is that of the supernatural and
 the natural, or in other words that of Being and existences,
 God and his works. The asserters of the sufficiency of
 reason and the defenders of the necessity of revelation,
 however, alike misplace this dualism, the only real dual-
 ism, by *confounding the natural with the intelligible*, and
the supernatural with the superintelligible. But the super-
 intelligible is as natural as the intelligible, and the intelli-
 gible as supernatural as the superintelligible. The intelli-
 gible and superintelligible are not two distinct or diverse
 orders; they are one and the same order, and the sole dis-
 tinction between them is in relation to our understanding.
 We know the intelligible by immediate, direct intuition,

can find the *negatives* of 2 orders uniting them on one dialectic
 whole. There is a dualism certain, natural & supernatural
 which all science must admit. The asserters & deniers of
 revelation as *concluded* with science misunderstand this dualism
 & confound natural with intelligible & supernatural with super-
 intelligible. The intelligible & superintelligible are of one order and
 the distinction is to be referred to our minds.

set-aside
 scientific
 tradition
 and start
 with fact-
 of conscience
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 Jesuit accept
 but unrelated
 by 3 terms
 which appear
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 Scholastic
 admitting
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 latter. Cartesian
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 so far as
 scene or *concord*
 and unity
 would philosophy
 on natural
 alone. *Cogito*
 Jesuitism
 theory of order
 but independent
Quod est
 claim to

The intelligible is potentia, made known the supernatural
is so to speak the complement of the intelligible which reasons
light does reach and it is seen supernaturally revealed
I made known & analogies drawn from intelligible
& sensible

but the superintelligible only analogically and as supernaturally revealed; but that which is revealed and made indirectly known to us through the medium of analogies borrowed from the intelligible and the sensible, is but the hidden complement of that which is intuitively apprehended, the part that remains in shadow, and which reason by her own light alone cannot illumine. This holds true with regard to the profoundest mysteries of Christianity. The reality asserted in these mysteries is an essential part of the intelligible reality, and intrinsically, substantially, joined to it, essential to its existence as a whole. God as real and necessary being is intelligible,—in his essence he is superintelligible; but God cannot be without essence, and there is no real distinction between being and essence, as the schoolmen say, between the Divine *esse* and the Divine *essentia*. The essences of things are in all cases superintelligible, even the essences of created or natural things, but there is no thing without its essence, for the essence is that by virtue of which a thing is what it is. From revelation we learn that the essence of God is relation, the threefold relation, expressed in Christian theology by the word TRINITY, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but there is no distinction admissible between these and God, or between these and the Being of God, for they are relations in his being, and essential to him as one living being, or one God.

All the distinctively Christian mysteries are included in the Incarnation. The Incarnation, or the act of assumption by the Word of human nature, is supernatural, but no more supernatural than the act of God creating the cosmos, and indeed is only that act completed. It is teleological, not cosmic, but it is no after-thought designed to meet some unforeseen difficulty, or repair some unexpected damage. It is integral in the original plan of creation, and was as necessary to complete the cosmos, before as after man had sinned. It redeems man from sin, provides the atonement, and thus manifests the infinite mercy of God. It is, as redemption, an act of free, sovereign grace, for God is not obliged to pardon the sinner, and the sinner, who has knowingly abused his free will can do nothing to merit pardon, but it is always necessary to the fulfilment of creation, for never could man attain to the end of his existence, or to his complete beatitude, possible only in the supernatural, without being regenerated in Christ, united to him, and made one with him as he is one with God the Father.

Mysteries supernaturally but not superintelligible
 they are supernaturally revealed, than order not
 really distinct from natural, nor from nature
 former complete latter

The mysteries are supernaturally revealed, because they are superintelligible, but they are themselves no more supernatural than the intelligible itself. The cosmos and palingenesia are supernatural in the creative act of God, and in that act they are identical, and simply the one completed creative act of God. There is then no radical diversity between what is called nature and what is called grace, between the natural order and the Christian order, for the Christian order is simply palingenesiac, the completion of the cosmic or generative, which without it would remain simply initial, inchoate, as is and must be our present life, which has no end, no purpose, no meaning, no reason, if there be not another. The distinction between the two is simply the distinction between the commencement and the completion. Hence Gioberti says man in this life, or the cosmos, is a God that begins; in glory he is consummated, God completed. Through union by nature with the Incarnate Word, creature becomes one with the Creator, and God is all and in all.

The supernatural is God and his immediate act. The natural is what is done, produced, or effected by second causes, operating according to their own laws. Viewed in its origin and end, or the creative act, the created universe is itself supernatural; for neither its origin nor its end is explicable by natural laws, or without the immediate creative act of God. The human race is propagated by natural generation, and its propagation is explicable on natural principles, but Adam and Eve must have been immediately created, and therefore in their origin supernatural. You do not get rid of the difficulty even if you prove, which you are not likely to do, that man has been developed from the tadpole, the chimpanzee, or the gorilla, for wherever you assert development, you must come at length to the commencement of the series, or to that which is not the product of development. You may even prove the gaseous theory held by some physicists, and that the universe existed primarily in a gaseous state, and even go so far as to resolve all the various gases into a single gas; but you have got rid of no difficulty. Whence that single gas itself? You can no more explain the origin of that gas without the creative act of God, than you can that of the universe itself, supposing it to have existed originally in the same state in which we now find it. The universe is, then, inexplicable without creation, and, therefore, without the supernatural.

Supernatural
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 & acts as
 2 causes
 so God is
 supernatural
 so is His
 creation
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 of God
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 propagation
 of Adam & Eve
 is the origin
 supernatural
 is 5 don't
 creation act

So God & His Creation act supernaturally but not
 superintelligible for both God & His Creation act are
 not only intelligible but the cause of the intelligible
 universe and all intelligence
 I don't see how God's Creation act is intelligible
 we can be understood by reason

The distinction between the supernatural and the natural is not that between the intelligible and the superintelligible, for God and his creative act are supernatural, but nothing, as we shall show in our second article, is more intelligible to us than God and his creative act. God is not only intelligible *per se*, but He and His creative act are the source and conditions of all intelligibleness and intelligence.

Now God and his works constitute a real dualism, and are distinguishable one from the other, but not separable. They are distinguishable as Creator and creature; and are never to be confounded one with the other; but they are also united as Creator and creature, joined together in a real synthesis by the creative act; for the act is in the actor, and the effect is in the act, and cannot subsist a moment without the act. Let God cease his creative act, and the universe instantly drops into nothing, and is as if it had not been. The conservation of existences is their continued creation; the creative act and the conservative act are one and the same act, and we have already seen that identical with it is the teleological and palingenesiac act, or the act of consummation or glorification, and hence the Universe in its origin, its medium, and its end, is, to those who can understand it, only the exterior expression of the interior essence of God, of Being itself, asserted in the Christian dogma of the Trinity. Hence, all ages and nations have referred the origin, preservation, and consummation of things to the sacred Triad in some form, and held that in the Sacred Triad, in some form, is the secret of all being and existence, the key to the Universe. As the Universe is dialectically, synthetically, really, united to God in the creative act, and though distinguishable, inseparable from him, it follows that there can be no philosophical science separate from theology, or science of God. Philosophy must explain the Universe in its principles and causes, and as these are in God, it must include the science of Being as well as of existences, of the supernatural as well as of the natural. Humboldt, in his *Cosmos*, gives us much useful information, but he gives us science only in a secondary sense, for science, properly so called, is not in the observation and classification of facts, nor obtained from them either by deduction or induction; for it consists precisely in their explication, in joining them to their principles and causes in which is their true sense or significance. As these principles and causes are to a great extent superintel-

God created things & created them for himself
 so that is not just creation then adaptation to
 God but both ends included in one act - so
 Cosmic & teleological orders the same regarding God
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 without science I see or no philosophy without theology
 Philosophy explains the principle & causes of things
 and as these are not of themselves superintended
 but to an extent superintelligible so no genuine
 full science of philosophy without knowledge of the

Philosophy explains the principle & causes of things
 and as these are not of themselves superintended
 but to an extent superintelligible so no genuine
 full science of philosophy without knowledge of the

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ligible to us, it is clear that no true science, in its higher sense, no real philosophy is possible without revelation, any more than it is possible without theology. Hence, Gioberti unites Creator and creature, reason and revelation in his philosophy. He so unites them because they are united in reality, and the science of the creature is not possible without the science of the Creator, of existences without the science of Being, of the intelligible without the science of the superintelligible, of the cosmic without the palingenesiac. Science is science of things as they really are, in their real principles and relations, not as they are not. As the two series of terms in the real world, are never separable the one from the other, so must they be inseparable in all real science, or true philosophy. This is what is meant when it is said philosophy in its principle and method must follow the order *essendi*, and not what the schoolmen call the order *cognoscendi*, which is merely that of conception or abstraction.

The difficulty which so many feel in accepting revelation as an element in philosophical science, is much lessened, if not completely removed, by Gioberti's doctrine of the supernatural, which distinguishes it from the superintelligible, and unites or identifies the natural and the supernatural in the creative act of God, thus making the supernatural as intelligible to us as the natural. The difficulty has grown out of supposing revelation to be the revelation of an order distinct from, above, and intrinsically unconnected with the order intelligible to our natural reason,—a doctrine of which the Jesuits and their followers are the chief patrons, in the early Fathers, hardly any in the great mediæval doctors, and which has grown out of the misunderstanding of the condemnation of the 55th Proposition of Baius, and the very poorly managed controversy with the Jansenists; or, to be more precisely exact, of the controversy about nature and grace, which arose in the early part of the sixteenth century, between Catholics and Protestants, and in the seventeenth between the Molinists or Jesuits and the Augustinians and Thomists—a controversy which had in the same century its counterpart amongst Protestants in the controversy, not yet ended, between the Calvinists and the Arminians. But by showing that the distinction between truths of reason and truths of revelation is not the distinction between nature and grace, or between

as a part of philosophy
 of the Jesuits
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 revelation

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that revelation is revelation of an order above & distinct from
 that which is intelligible to reason which is the doctrine
 of the Jesuits, Both orders are so to speak part of
 one dialectic whole & God is intelligible in nature
 superintelligible yet same God, finished of latter revealed
 forms, evident in reason, but the evidences they
 superintelligible in wisdom & revelation

The same controversy between Catholics & protestants
in beginning of 16th century similar to that between
Muslims & Jews & Augustinians & Thomists - between
Calomists & Arminians. Nature & grace
This difficulty lessened & removed when it is

known that the distinction between nature
& grace is not
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& superintelligible
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is intelligible
& superintelligible
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objecting. But
nature goes for-
wards making
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of his faculty of superintelligible as he
calls it - This faculty does not seize its object primarily
as other faculties do, but requires it by it we
are aware that there is a reality we know not and cannot
know without revelation Hence the soul longings
for the infinite see this does not come from
the intellect for it is not the intelligible It is not well

natural and supernatural, but between the intelligible and
superintelligible, the difficulty is lessened, because the dis-
tinction is not of orders, but simply that of our mode or man-
ner of knowing. The intelligible and the superintelligible
are not two ontologically distinct and unconnected orders,
but one and the same order. What is made known by reve-
lation is intrinsically one with what is immediately appre-
hended by natural reason, and in fact, the revealed truth
is an essential part of the rational truth. This is of great
importance.

But Gioberti does not stop here. He asserts for the
human mind the faculty of superintelligence, *sovrintelligenza*,
by which the superintelligible and the intelligible
are in some sense identified subjectively as well as objec-
tively. This is developed at length in the volume before
us, and will come under our notice again hereafter; for
much in Gioberti's whole system of science depends on it.
The faculty, which he calls *sovrintelligenza*, and which we
are obliged to translate by the term *superintelligence*, is
unlike our other faculties, in this, that it seizes its object,
the superintelligible, only negatively. By it we know not
what the superintelligible is, but that there is a superintelligi-
ble, a reality transcending not only what we know, but
even what without revelation we are able to know. It
springs from the soul's consciousness of her own potentiality,
and of her present impotence to know and possess all
reality. By it the soul is advertised that she has been
created with powers which are unfulfilled, and for an end,
an infinite reality, which by her own powers alone she is
impotent to possess. Hence, she is satisfied with no finite
knowledge, and however far she may roll back the clouds
of her ignorance and enlarge the field of her science, she
feels that there is an infinitude beyond, which she longs for
as the lover for the absent beloved, and sorrows in her
heart till she finds it present, and sees God face to face, in
his very essence, as he is in himself. Therefore, St. Thomas
and all great theologians maintain that man has the natural
desire to see God in the beatific vision. This is wherefore
the soul can never rest in any finite or created good, but in
the midst of all that creatures can bestow, sighs and yearns
for a good she has not. She hungers and thirsts for an un-
bounded good, and can be satisfied with nothing short of
the infinite Good, the infinite God, who is her supreme Good,
the supreme Good, the Good in itself, to speak in the lan-

It is not what Plato calls love for it is the love
of the infinite & the intellect - It is not what Plato calls love for it is the love

guage of Plato. Now this is not the intellect, for that has for its object the intelligible, and can advertise us of the existence of nothing beyond what is actually apprehended. Whence, then, this undeniable advertisement of the super-intelligible, this assertion of the superintelligible which we know is, but know not, and have no natural means of knowing, what it is? Whence comes this craving for the infinite, and this impotence of the soul to satisfy herself with the finite, noted by all moralists and masters of spiritual life? You cannot resolve it into will, for the will is in itself blind, and follows, not precedes intellect. You cannot resolve it into that supreme affection of the soul which Plato calls love, for, if you mark well, it is the basis and condition of that love. It is not a mere negation of the object, for the soul does not desire or long for an absent good unless aware that it exists, though absent. It is impossible, then, to resolve this faculty into any of our other faculties, and, therefore, it must be asserted as a distinct though a peculiar faculty.

Gioberti has been the first philosopher, as far as we know, to assert a distinct faculty of superintelligence; not, we repeat, a faculty that cognizes the superintelligible, for that would be a contradiction in terms, but which advertises the soul that there is the superintelligible, and that it is necessary to complete or fulfil the intelligible. Advertised of so much, we are advertised that revelation is necessary to complete or fulfil our science or philosophy. This faculty is in the soul a premonition, a forefeeling of revelation, a craving for it, and an aptitude to receive it. It is the psychological basis of faith,—*fides humana*, we add, so as to have no quarrel with the theologians,—that by which man is rendered a creditive subject. By intellect he is rendered an intelligent subject; by the faculty of superintelligence he is rendered creditive or capable of faith; and the distinction between being capable of knowing and of believing is, if we understand the author, the distinction between the two faculties. We know the intelligible; we believe the superintelligible; and all is superintelligible to us that is not the direct object of the intellect, or logically deducible therefrom; consequently, the ordinary facts of history are as superintelligible as revelation, and as little the direct object of our intelligence or logical deductions.

The fact established, that the act of revelation is no more supernatural than the act of creation or our own continued

This fact then counts for much viz that the act of revelation is no more supernatural than the act of creation or our own continued but the matter of revelation is superintelligible yet is integral & complete of which is intuitively apprehended and that of means of

Handwritten notes:
 I have seen it is not a revelation of fact for we can't long for what we don't know
 first sp. is distinct but a peculiar faculty
 And that it is necessary to complete the intellect
 Now we know the intelligible
 I can't long for what we don't know
 But later a made from a profound revelation
 or revelation
 revelation
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 then we have
 the person
 thing of itself
 the fact of history what we
 is revealed in form
 then is revelation but differs in manner from other
 The psychological basis of faith the fact of revelation is no more supernatural than the act of creation or our own continued
 intellect we are capable of knowing the fact of revelation is no more supernatural than the act of creation or our own continued
 the superintelligible and what we don't believe in other facts of history what we believe in testimony and as superintelligible a what is revealed in form
 then is revelation but differs in manner from other

Faculty of superintelligence prepares its for its revelation
then places revelation in same category regarding
some as historical facts & tradition which are believed
with same degree of testimony

existence, and that what is revealed pertains to and is an integral part of what is intuitively apprehended, combined with our faculty of superintelligence, places revelation, in regard to our science, in precisely the same category with all history or tradition, and renders it creditable in the same way and by the same degree of testimony. Gioberti is not a Cartesian, and does not hold it possible to construct philosophy by logical deductions from the facts of individual consciousness, simply, because man does not exist as an isolated individual, and because he is progressive and has a history. He takes man as he finds him, as the theologians say, in the *sensus compositus*, with his memories and his hopes, his reminiscences and his prophecies. Revelation, in relation to the man of to-day, is historical, traditionary, and for the philosopher is in the category of general tradition. It enters into and forms an integral part of the traditionary wisdom of mankind, embodying his past developments, his Ideal, and the law of his future progress. The human race is continuous, and it needs not to begin, and cannot begin *de novo*, to-day, in science any more than in existence. Philosophy must accept and explain the past as well as the present and future, for the whole life of man, past and to come, is but one life, indissolubly united both to God and to nature. It must give us the Divine Idea which the past has been developing, and which the future must develop and complete in the life of the race.

It will, perhaps, relieve some minds prejudiced against recognizing supernatural revelation as an element or condition of science, to know that Gioberti holds that the revelation was made in the beginning, that it is coeval with the race, and was infused into man by his Creator along with language, which is the medium of its transmission, and from which it is taken. Language contains both the intuition of the intelligible and the revelation of the superintelligible. They are incorporated into it in their true synthesis or union, and the human mind has never operated without them both, for it has never operated and never could operate without language of some sort. There never has been a purely rational science, borrowing nothing from revelation; nor a purely revealed science or faith, borrowing nothing from natural reason. There has never been an age, nation, or individual wholly destitute of revelation. The revelation is as old and as universal as language. The Word, the Idea, the Truth, both as revealed and as naturally intelligible,

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all that pertains to life & progress, all is contained
in the divine ideal or completed with it, which man
has been acting out and will act out in the race

This revelation was made like revelation in it
being Both conveyed & language which the
truth imparted to man. Hence when language is
perished or corrupted the truth whether rational or
revelation suffers, is not transmitted, is its integrity

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is universal, but is transmitted in its integrity only when and where language, the medium of its transmission, is preserved uncorrupted. Where language is corrupted and the integrity of speech is lost, the tradition of the truth in its integrity, whether revealed or rational, is corrupted, and comes to us distorted or mutilated; and hence, though all nations have it, all do not receive it or transmit it in its integrity and purity. Since the confusion and corruption of language at the building of Babel, and the consequent dispersion of mankind, the tradition has been transmitted through two channels—the one orthodox, the other heterodox. The heterodox tradition comes down to us through the Gentiles; the orthodox from the Patriarchs, through the Jewish Synagogue and the Christian Church, infallible by the divine assistance in preserving the language of truth in its integrity and free from corruption or confusion. Nevertheless, the philosopher must study the tradition under both its forms, if he would master it and understand the past civilization of the race; as he who would master the Christian dogmata, get at their real sense, must study them in the sects, in their heterodox developments as well as in the infallible speech of the Church. The study of heresy helps us to the comprehension of orthodoxy.

If we have made Gioberti's thought at all plain, it will be seen that, though he combines both reason and revelation in the development of science, he does not, with the French Traditionalists, make the first principles of science depend on revelation; or, with the Scholastics, make philosophy the slave of theology, for theology itself is a human science. For him reason and revelation stand on the same footing, are alike supernatural and divine in their origin and light, and both present to the mind one and the same objective truth. If there is apparent collision, for real collision is impossible, neither yields to the other; for one or the other has been misconceived, and the investigation must be continued till the mediating term that reconciles them is found. The dogma expresses the Idea, which is divine and infallible, but the language in which it is expressed may be misinterpreted, and our theories and speculations concerning it may need revision. The dogma is infallible, but theologians are fallible; and while they have retained the infallible speech in which it is expressed, they may fail to seize its true sense; for, though the dogma is infallible, nothing guaran-

The rational truth
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ties the infallibility of our minds in our understanding and appropriation of it.

But it is time to close this article, already too long. The full appreciation of much that we have thus far advanced depends upon principles and views which remain to be set forth. We have not followed Gioberti's order, but have followed the order which best suited our own convenience. The view we have given is a general view, taken substantially from the work before us, and is, in the main, introductory. In a second article we will give an exposition of his IDEAL FORMULA.

ART. II.—*Reconstruction. A Speech of the Hon. THADDEUS STEVENS, of Pennsylvania, on the Confiscation Bill, House of Representatives, January 23, 1864.*

THE HON. THADDEUS STEVENS, of Pennsylvania, is one of the ablest members of the present, as he was of the last Congress, and we always read his speeches with interest and instruction. He is a clear-headed and a plain-spoken man, who holds all cant and humbug in thorough contempt. He looks at things as they are, and calls them by their right names. He is a statesman, and has little sympathy with that *vulpecular* policy—to adopt an epithet from the rich vocabulary of the late Rufus Choate—borrowed from the Van Buren school of New York politics, of which Mr. Thurlow Weed and the Secretary of State are distinguished masters, and which discards all elevation of principle or nobility of sentiment, and seeks its ends by tortuous courses, by low intrigue, cunning, craft, and the adroit manipulation of men and parties. He belongs to that small class of public men who think, and have the courage to speak and act as they think. In these times of moral abasement, of political weakness and cowardice, effeminacy, tergiversation, falsehood, vanity, littleness, and selfishness, such a man is invaluable, and deserves our profound respect, even if now and then he puts forth opinions not to be accepted without important modifications.

The speech quoted at the head of this article is able, straight-forward, and manly, and disposes in a masterly manner of the miserable pretence that the seceded States are still States in the Union, and still retain their constitutional

rights as Federal States, which its evil genius, in an evil hour, has led the Administration to adopt, to the great detriment of the country. Even the President himself, in his most impolitic and unstatesmanlike Amnesty Proclamation, of which no American statesman can speak without hanging his head, admits that these States are disorganized, that their governments have been subverted, and that there is now no legal authority standing in any of them, except that of the Federal government. If such be the fact, as it undoubtedly is, on what ground can the Administration pretend that they are still States in the Union? Wherein do they differ in their legal *status*, save as they are in rebellion, from any other population and territory belonging to the United States not yet erected into States and admitted into the Union? Nothing is or can be more absurd than to pretend that population and territory belonging to the Union, subject to no legal authority but that of the General Government, are States in the Union. It is strange that any one of ordinary capacity should fail to perceive it. The President's plan of reconstruction assumes for the General Government all the authority in the seceded State that is claimed or exercised by it in the organization and admission of new States. And yet the President, and perhaps a majority of the members of Congress hold that the seceded States are still States in the Union, and have all the constitutional rights of non-seceded States.

Sovereign independent states or nations may lose their political organization, and have all legal authority subverted without losing any of their rights. There is always in an independent nation the right of reorganization, of reconstituting government, when once it has been lost. But the several States in the American Union are not so many independent sovereign nations. If they were, they could secede from the Union, dissolve the compact, and resume at pleasure their free separate nationality. There might or might not be a breach of faith, but there would be no rebellion, no revolution, and a war upon seceding states or the population thereof as rebels would be wholly unjustifiable. Not even the President, or his accomplished Secretary of State, can pretend that the several States are free, sovereign, independent nations, for both assert the right of the Union to enforce its laws over them, and the right of the Union to intervene in the reconstruction of government in them. The Government cannot assert the doctrine of

State sovereignty without condemning the war it is prosecuting against secession as rebellion and attempted revolution.

But if the States are not free, sovereign states, or independent nations, then are they states at all, or bodies politic and corporate only by virtue of their organization and government. The word *state*, as applied to the political societies which are members of the American Union, is not used in its strict and proper sense, as the highest authorities have asserted over and over again, and as is evident to every one who has ever thought of what a state really is. It must, when used under our system, be taken in a subordinate and peculiar sense, and we must be on our guard against being misled by it. What we call States under our system are not states proper, but political societies, original and integral elements of our political organization, or the American state, autonomous, but not free, independent, sovereign communities. They have no existence as political societies outside of their political organization. If, then, the seceded States are still States in the Union, they are not so as an unorganized mass of so-called Unionists, but so under their existing organizations and governments. The seceded State governments must in such case be recognized as the legitimate governments of the respective States, and as still in the Union, for they are the only State governments in existence, and without State organization and government there is no Federal State. It is said the secession ordinances are null and void, because illegal, and that no State has seceded or could secede. Then, as the State is in these governments, and nowhere else, these governments have not seceded, and are still in the Union, legal State governments. Here is a serious difficulty. The Administration says the seceded States are still States in the Union. Be it so. But outside of the political organizations and governments now making war on the Union, they are not States either in the Union or out of it. Then these organizations and governments are States in the Union, and as Mr. Seward, in his letter to Mr. Adams, our minister to England, dated April 10, 1861, expressly maintains, "equal members of the Union," and, therefore, have in regard both to their own citizens and to the General Government all the legal and constitutional rights and powers possessed by any of the non-seceding States. This seems to have been the theory, at least in the beginning, of the Administration. On this theory we are

not engaged in a civil war, and the army and navy are acting simply as the *posse comitatus*. But how then say that the several State governments in the seceded States have been subverted, and that there is at this moment no legal authority in them but that of the General Government? By what authority are you attempting to organize outside of these, and in direct opposition to them, new State governments? Every attempt to reconstruct State governments in opposition to them, or without their authority and consent, is manifestly revolutionary, and indefensible. If your theory is that the seceded States are still States in the Union, you have no more right to reconstruct or to establish a State government in Florida, Louisiana, or Arkansas, than you have in Pennsylvania, New York, or Massachusetts.

Mr. Stevens, being too logical to hold, and too honest to pretend, that of contradictories both may be true, indignantly rejects the absurd theory that the seceded States are still States in the Union. On that theory he sees that it is impossible to defend the Administration, either in the war it is waging or in its attempts at reconstructing governments in the seceded States outside of and in opposition to what on that theory it must concede to be existing legal governments. In both it manifestly invades what its own theory concedes to be the rights of the States. Mr. Stevens sees very clearly that the Administration, on its own theory, is absolutely indefensible, and as one of its boldest and most resolute friends, he insists on rejecting that theory. He understands well that if these seceded States are States in the Union, all their constitutional rights must be respected, and that no political organization within their limits, in opposition to the existing State organization, is admissible; that they have, whenever they choose, the right to elect members of Congress, who, on taking the oath of allegiance, are entitled to their seats, and to choose Presidential electors, whose votes must be counted in the choice of President and Vice-President of the United States; and that we are bound to recognize and defend for them all their constitutional rights in like manner as if they were peaceable and loyal States, while they respect none of the rights of the Union, and obstinately refuse to perform a single one of their constitutional duties. This is unreasonable, unjust, nay, absurd. It is a gross violation of common sense, which tells us that a party, denying that it owes duties and obstinately refusing to perform them, forfeits its rights, for rights and

duties are correlative. Mr. Stevens does not believe that it is logic, common sense, or wise statesmanship.

The Administration doctrine gives the Rebels every advantage, and every thing it does in reference either towards suppressing the Rebellion or reconstructing the seceded States is in direct violation of it. Mr. Stevens, therefore, rejects the absurd doctrine that the seceded States are still States in the Union, with their constitutional rights unimpaired, and takes the ground that by their own act they have placed themselves out of the Union, have become alien to it, and we are making war on them as an alien people; that our rights with regard to them now are the rights of a belligerent, and when we have succeeded, will be the rights of the conqueror. He holds that the secessionists are belligerents, alien enemies, not subjects with or without constitutional rights. He says we have acknowledged them to be belligerents, treated them as such, and when we have destroyed their military power and subjugated them, we should have the right to govern them as conquered territory. They are not in his view domestic, but alien enemies, and we have against them all the rights and only the rights of war.

So far as Mr Stevens asserts that the States are out of the Union, and have no political rights or existence in it, we most heartily agree with him. We agree with him, also, in asserting that we have against them all the rights of belligerents, and that they have against us no constitutional rights whatever. By the act of secession they forfeited, abdicated, or lost all their constitutional rights in the Union, and therefore ceased to be States in the Union. This we have uniformly maintained alike against the Administration and against the Copperheads. But we cannot concede, nor is it necessary that we should concede, that the secessionists are *alien* enemies, or a foreign belligerent power. If alien, that is, foreign enemies, we do not know wherefore we are at war with them. The war we are prosecuting is a territorial civil war, not a foreign war; it is a war against REBELS, and therefore a war against domestic enemies. We are waging not a war of conquest, not a war for the subjugation of a distinct and alien people, but for the reduction of subjects to their allegiance. When we have succeeded, if succeed we do, we shall hold the territory and population not by the right of conquest, nor govern them as a conqueror, but by the same right we held them before

sécession, and by which we hold and govern any other population and territory belonging to the United States, not yet erected into States and admitted into the Union. We are not fighting to gain what is not ours or to make new acquisitions, but to vindicate our right to that which is already ours. The population and territory in rebellion belong to the United States already, and the destruction of the rebel armies will not give us any new right or title to them, or alter in any respect the tenure by which we hold them. We shall only have gained possession of our own.

We honor Mr. Stevens for his manliness and courage, in rising superior to the cant to be heard now and then, even in Republican ranks, about subjugation. "You cannot subjugate the South," it is said. "What! would you subjugate the South, and hold them as a conquered people?" we hear shrieked out on either hand by honest souls, not clad in petticoats, or without beards on their faces. Mr. Stevens does not suffer himself to be moved by shrieks of this sort; but he goes further, it seems to us, than he need go, and further than it is lawful to go, and excites needless terrors. A foreign enemy may be *subjugated*; a domestic enemy can only be *reduced* to his allegiance. There is no subjugation in the case, and we neither can subjugate nor wish to subjugate the South; but we can and must, even in spite of the Administration, if necessary, reduce them to obedience to the laws of the Union, which they are and always have been bound to obey, and which we are as much bound to obey as they are. We bring them under no new sovereign, and seek to establish no new authority over them, but simply to compel them to respect the rightful authority which they have resisted and attempted to cast off. There is no occasion for shrieking. There is no proposition to wrest from anybody any rights he has, or ever had, but simply to force the Rebels to recognize and discharge the duties they have always owed, and from which they never had and never can have any right to absolve themselves. There is no mystery in the case, and there is nothing more alarming in compelling rebels by armed force to obey the law, than there is in rebels seeking by armed force to resist the law. Rebellion is a crime; to reduce rebels to submission to rightful authority is a right and a duty.

There seems to be on all sides a difficulty in understanding how a State can be out of the Union without becoming a foreign State, and ceasing to belong to the United States.

The seceders say they have seceded from the Union, are no longer in it, and therefore are free, sovereign, independent states, or confederacy of states; Mr. Stevens says the seceded States are out of the Union and making war on it; therefore they are alien enemies; the Administration, to escape that conclusion, denies a palpable fact, and maintains that the seceded States are not out of the Union, but still States in the Union. But all three, in our judgment, are wrong. There is another view possible, which meets every difficulty any Union man can feel in the case, namely, *the seceded States are no longer STATES in the Union indeed, but they as population and territory still belong to the Union,* and are bound to submit to its authority. Not all the population and territory of the Union are in the Union. The Union is the sovereign of New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, Dakotah, yet these territories are not in the Union. Should they rebel or make war against the authority of the United States the Union would have a perfect right to send its armed forces against them to reduce them to obedience, as under Mr. Buchanan's administration it sent them against Utah. The seceded States certainly are not States in the Union, for they at present constitute no part of the sovereign people of the United States. But the United States has lost none of its rights in or over them. Taking this view, which is very intelligible, and proved by us again and again to be the true view, it is easy to see that the war we are waging is really a civil war, against domestic, not alien enemies, and a war on the part of the United States not of conquest or subjugation of a foreign people or territory, but simply to vindicate and enforce its own authority against those who owe it obedience and are in rebellion against it. It is not a war to coerce seceded States or to force into the Union those who have no wish to be or to remain in it, but a war against our own rebellious subjects. It is simply the legitimate authority of the nation using its sovereign prerogative to defend itself against rebellion and revolution, to maintain its own life and integrity against that portion of its subjects who have armed themselves to destroy or to dismember it. In this view of the case the action of the Government is plain and simple, and borrows no complexity from the complexity of our political system.

It is the neglect to take this view, and the confused and inconsistent theories asserted or accepted by the Adminis-

tration, as well as by its enemies, that has made our civil war seem more complicated than civil wars in general, and led so many of the citizens of the loyal States to suppose that they can withhold their support from the government or even sympathize with the secessionists without disloyalty. The complexity of our political system has been blunderingly transferred to the war. Nothing seems to us clearer than that the government cannot rightfully make war on States it concedes to be in the Union, for every State in the Union is an integral part of the national sovereignty, and governs instead of being governed. The Administration having decided in the outset that secession being illegal, the seceded States are still in the Union, deprived itself of all ground on which it could legitimately use force for the suppression of the Rebellion, since the Rebels acted not as insurgent individuals, but as States, in obedience to State authority. One time it seemed disposed to defend itself on the ground that the General Government is *per se* the supreme government, and the depositary of the supreme authority of the nation; but this was to offend State rights and to array against it a very large class of citizens, who hold, and justly hold, that the maintenance of the rights of the States is not less essential to our political system than the maintenance of the rights of the Union. The General Government and State governments do not under our system stand in relation to each other as superior and inferior. The Supreme Court of a State is as high a court as the Supreme Court of the United States. The General Government and the State governments are governments of the same grade, stand on the same foundation, and are equally original and supreme, each in its own sphere. Neither is in the full sense of the term sovereign; the powers of each are held as delegated by the political sovereign, or the Convention, which contracts or enlarges them at pleasure. The States are bound to respect and submit to certain powers delegated by the Convention to the General Government, and the General Government is bound, in turn, to respect and submit to certain powers reserved by the Convention to the States. The national authority is not concentrated in either the General Government or the State governments, but is distributed through both, and the nation may be said to govern partly through a General Government and partly through State governments; but it is the one indivisible national authority that governs in both

and in each. So this assumption of the supremacy of the General Government could not warrant a war on States held to be still States in the Union, for, if in the Union, their authority is as national as that of the General Government itself, and they are just as competent a judge of its extent and limitations.

Another time the Administration seemed to rely for its justification on the Constitutional right of the General Government to suppress insurrections in the several States. It took the ground that the insurgents were an insurgent faction in the States, and it simply intervened in aid of the State authority to put them down, as in the case of the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island. The insurrection was an insurrection against the several State governments, not against the General Government, save indirectly. Secession was null and void, because it was the act not of the State, or people of the State, but of a faction that had wickedly usurped the State government, and pretended to act in its name; the General Government intervened simply to liberate the State from that faction, and to enable the people in the several seceded States to resume their rightful political authority. But this doctrine, so beautiful in theory, unhappily, did not meet the case; and like all the doctrines of the Administration, was based on a false assumption. The secession ordinances were not passed by a usurping or insurrectionary faction, but by the recognized political people of the several seceding States, acting through the forms of their respective constitutions. They were in all cases voted by constitutional majorities, and in no case were the secessionists a faction, any more than the Democratic party is a faction to-day in the State of New Jersey. There were in all the States Union men opposed to secession, but these were an inconsiderable minority, and the South has been and is far more united in sustaining secession than the loyal States have been or are in sustaining the efforts of the Administration to suppress the Rebellion. There was and has been no serious division among the people of the so-called Confederacy, and the reports of their disaffection are as fictitious as the reports of their exhaustion and destitution. The prices of the necessaries of life, reduced to a gold standard, save in here and there a locality, are not much higher in the seceded than in the loyal States. The idea of starving the Rebels into submission has been, from the first, ridiculous, and could never have been seriously entertained.

Yet the idea of a great Union party at the South to be the nucleus of reorganization, and the future depositaries of the political power of the Southern States, has been, from the first, and even continues to be the *ignis fatuus* that misleads the Administration and causes nearly all its blunders. In the beginning it was afraid to move, lest it should alienate the Southern Union men, or expose them to the wrath of the secessionists, and its military operations, ever since they commenced, have been conducted more with a view of liberating them and gaining their political support, than with a view of crushing the armies of the Rebellion. To this end it has violated the plainest principles of military strategy, forborne military success, and sacrificed needlessly hundreds of thousands of lives, and wasted more than a thousand millions of dollars, and without bringing them any substantial relief. As far as the Government is concerned it would have been better if there had been no Union men in a single seceded State, and so far as the Union men themselves are concerned, it would have been better if the Government had left them to their fate, and turned its whole attention and directed its whole force to the destruction of the rebel armies. Had it done so, the civil war had been ended long before this, and the Union restored.

We honor the Union men at the South, and among them are some, though few, of the noblest spirits of the nation. We regret the painful condition in which they have been placed, and the sufferings they have been compelled to endure. But that is not our fault, but their misfortune, in being citizens of disloyal and rebellious States. Their case is not harder than that of innocent persons who are found in the midst of a riot, exposed to be killed or wounded by shots fired against the rioters. They cannot separate their condition from that of their State while they remain in it, and the Government owes them no special protection. Besides, they are not themselves wholly blameless. Though they favored not secession, they shared in all the likes and dislikes which led their fellow-citizens to that rash and fatal act. They may have opposed secession when it came, but they aided with their sympathies the movement that led to it, and they would have served us more if they had gone with it. We wouldn't give one Gantt for a thousand men like Parson Brownlow, who for years was one of the most foul-mouthed traducers of Northern men and Northern sentiments at the South.

Misled by the supposition that there was a large Union party in the seceded States on whom it must rely to bring back the South and re-establish the Union, and by the supposition that it owed them special protection, and must as sound policy avoid doing any thing to alienate or irritate them, the Administration started on a wrong track, and has never been able to regain the true and direct road to the suppression of the Rebellion. Having begun with false assumptions, it has never been able to adopt, even if it saw it, a decided, self-consistent, logical, and really defensible policy. It has therefore never been able to guide the public mind or to gain the respect and confidence of thinking men, who are able to look above party to the interests of the nation. The illogical and untenable theories of the Administration, and its vacillating or hesitating policy, have carried more or less of doubt, uncertainty, and confusion into the minds of the people, and even into Congress. What would have been plain and acceptable to all, if it had been distinctly presented in the beginning, before words without wisdom had darkened counsel, before false issues had been made up, or the true issue had been abandoned for innumerable side issues, and ill-advised controversies had enlisted self-love, or excited passion or prejudice, becomes now dark and doubtful, and almost impossible to be presented to the understanding of even the best informed and the most cultivated minds amongst us. Hence the division of honest men and loyal men into hostile parties, and the impossibility of effecting any thing like union or agreement in even so small a body as Congress, or the still smaller body of the President's Cabinet. It is to the false theories and false assumptions of the Administration that we must attribute the reorganization of the Democratic party as an opposition party, and the division of the Republican party into radicals and conservatives.

If the Administration had, in the beginning, shut its eyes to the insignificant minority in the seceded States opposed to secession, taken distinctly the ground that the seceded States ceased by their acts of secession to be STATES in the Union, though they did not cease as population and territory to belong to the Union, and that by forming a separate government they were rebels and revolutionists, and called upon the nation to rally as one man to put them down as such, and to save the majesty of the nation and the Union from permanent dismemberment, it would have taken a clear,

consistent, logical, intelligible, constitutional, and defensible ground, and would have rallied all parties to its support, and united the whole North, with only here and there a dissenting voice, in support of the government. Its fatal error was in assuming that the seceded States are still States in the Union, and in recognizing the handful of Union men in each as the State. In doing so, it, on the one hand, denied the autonomy of the States, and struck a blow at the American system of government, and on the other, the fundamental principle of democracy, that the majority governs. It was a fatal blunder, has ruined the Administration, and it will be through the interposition of a merciful Providence, if it does not prove the ruin of the nation. To us there has been no darker day than the present, since Mr. Seward made his sophomorical speech on the beauties and blessings of the Union in the Senate in the Winter of 1860-61, and proved himself utterly unequal to any emergency that demands courage and manhood. We do not believe the government is as strong against the Rebellion to-day as it was in 1860, and we shall be happily disappointed if the Spring campaign, just opening while we are writing, does not prove the most disastrous since the beginning of the war.

Mr. Stevens contends that the Government has acknowledged the Rebels to be a belligerent power, and therefore an alien enemy. Does he not in this do the Government some injustice? The Government has unquestionably all the rights of a belligerent against the Rebels, but has it ever conceded that they have all or any of the rights of a belligerent against it? It has sent and received flags of truce, exchanged prisoners, and done other things usual between belligerents in civilized warfare, but this it could do from humanity, policy, or expediency, without conceding that the Rebels have any right to demand them. The Administration could waive the exercise of its rights of sovereignty without abdicating them, and it could consent even to treat the Rebels during the war as a belligerent power, without recognizing them as an alien power. This, we suppose, is evident enough, and we are not aware that the Administration, tender and considerate as it has been and is towards the Rebels, has ever gone farther. The faults and blunders of the Administration have been numerous enough without charging it with any it has not committed. There is, besides, no necessity, in order to secure the mode of reconstruction Mr. Stevens approves, to give an extreme interpretation to the acts of the

Government. What he wishes to have understood is, that the rebel States are not *States* in the Union, or that the Rebels are not in the Union with the rights of citizens and under the protection of the Constitution. But this he may maintain by regarding them as domestic as well as by regarding them as alien enemies, and holding the war to be a war, not of conquest or subjugation of alien enemies, but for the reduction by force of rebels to submission to the legitimate authority of the nation.

That the Rebels have claimed as a right to be treated as belligerents is true, and that our Government has suffered itself to be browbeat and bullied by them, shown itself white-livered and weak-kneed before them is also true; but while it has usually recoiled before their threats, and tamely receded from most of its own positions deliberately taken, it has never, we think, been so weak as to concede them the *right* to demand to be treated as belligerents. The fault of the Government is not here. It has been in allowing itself to be driven by the threats of the Rebels from positions which it began by assuming. We are not aware that in its controversies with the rebel chiefs it has ever, unless quite recently, maintained unflinchingly its own ground, or brought them to make a single concession. The concessions have mostly been on our side, and the firmness, the nerve on theirs. It issued a Proclamation declaring rebel ships preying upon our commerce pirates, and subjecting their officers and crews to the penalty of piracy; the Rebels threatened retaliation, and it caved in, and consented to treat and exchange them as prisoners of war. So has it always been, except when it feared to have to account with its own army for its civil cowardice. Suppose the Rebels had retaliated, could not we have retaliated as well as they? Has there ever been a moment when we had not as many of their friends within our power as they had of ours in theirs, and more too? Equal resolution, firmness, nerve on our side with that shown on theirs, would soon have put an end to retaliatory measures, and to rebel threats and bullying. This much we must say for the Rebels, they have made war in earnest, on military principles, with an eye single to military success, while our government has hesitated, vacillated, and apparently been more anxious not to irritate than to subdue them. Mr. Seward declared the intention of the government in the beginning, unless he has been misreported, to be that this war should be conducted as no civil war had ever been before, and prove

that a civil war can be carried on without passion, and without leaving behind it any bitter or hostile feeling on either side. There was to be no accusation of wrongs suffered or done on either side, and nothing was to be left to cause ill-feeling on either side, nothing to rankle in the bosoms of either Northern men or Southern men. It was to be conducted as a joust or tourney in which brave knights might shiver their lances for honor and ladie's love. It was to be a new and exciting amusement for the jaded spirits of the American youth, and hence thousands flocked as spectators to the first battle of Bull Run, as the jaded Romans to a gladiatorial show, in search of a sensation. But it was no joust, or tourney, or gladiatorial show with the Rebels; they were in dead earnest, and simply mocked at the rosewater sentiment of the amiable Secretary of State. They struck the shield with the point of their lance, and challenged to mortal combat. They were prepared and resolved to fight *à outrance*, and to avail themselves of every advantage allowed by the laws of civilized warfare; and they were right, if they were to fight at all. It is idle to suppose that a civil war can be carried on without passion, without rancor, without engendering the most intense and bitter feelings. We must take human nature as we find it, and either not make war at all, or make it in earnest, with the determination to inflict the greatest possible damage, in the shortest possible time, on the enemy. War cannot be waged on Quaker principles, or with Quaker guns, unless a McClellan commands the army, and a Seward conducts the civil administration. The fiercer and more terribly in earnest, on both sides, is the war, the quicker will it be over, and the less bitterness will it leave behind in the bosoms of either the vanquisher or the vanquished. The fear of irritating the Rebels and rendering future reconciliation impossible, which has been from the beginning such a marked characteristic of the Administration, has prolonged the war, and lost us the flower of our population. It has compelled us to pay quite too dearly for the rosewater sentiment of the Secretary of State, or even the pleasant jokes of the President. Still, in spite of all the weakness and nonsense, which have caused our country to bleed at every pore; in spite of all the efforts not to irritate our Southern brethren and fellow-citizens in arms for the destruction of the nation, the Administration has not, that we can discover, recognized the right of the Rebels to be treated as belligerents, any more than it has

claimed, as it might, and ought to have claimed and exercised, all the rights of a belligerent against them. The Government has against rebels, when the rebellion rises to the magnitude of a civil war, all the rights of a belligerent, and all the rights of sovereignty, while they have no rights, not even belligerent rights, against it. While it has the right to insist on the extreme belligerent rights, as well as those of sovereignty against them, they can insist on no right against it, and whenever they fall into its hands they are at its mercy. If it puts them to death they have no right to retaliate. If it puts a rebel taken in arms against it to death, it is an execution; if they, by way of retaliation, put a loyal prisoner to death, it is a murder. We state the law in the case. For reasons of its own the sovereign may relax it, and agree to a cartel for exchange of prisoners; indeed, it may agree, that during the war, it will treat the rebels as if they were a belligerent power, and so far our government has undoubtedly gone, and we hold wisely gone; but in doing so it has not acknowledged them to be belligerents, to be alien enemies, nor has it surrendered in their behalf a single iota of its right of sovereignty over them, or of its right when the war is over to try them in its courts for treason, and to hang them if convicted. We insist then, that though out of the Union, without rights under it or against it, and with no claim to constitutional protection, they are still rebels, not belligerents, domestic, not foreign enemies, and their military subjection is not a subjugation, is not a foreign conquest, but their reduction to obedience to the legitimate national authority, against which they have illegally and wickedly rebelled.

Mr. Stevens's speech was made on the Confiscation Bill, or, rather, on the bill to repeal the Joint Resolution of Congress appended to the Confiscation Bill, which passed both Houses, July, 1862; declaring the confiscation of real property restricted to the life estate of the rebel; in accordance, as it was pretended, with the clause in the Constitution, which declares that "no attainder for treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." Mr. Stevens's purpose was, by showing that the Rebels whose property was to be affected by the bill, were out of the Union, alien enemies—acknowledged to be such by the Administration, and, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of the protection afforded by the Constitution, under which, as alien enemies, they have and can

have no rights. The argument was good and pertinent, from his point of view; though he might, perhaps, just as well have arrived at his conclusion by conceding the Rebels to be domestic enemies, as by contending that they are foreign enemies. The Joint Resolution of Congress, which it was proposed to repeal or modify, was adopted by the two Houses in order to save the Confiscation Bill they had just passed, from the threatened Presidential *Veto*. The President affected constitutional scruples, and gave Congress to understand that, unless they appended to it the Resolution in question, he would veto it, and they knew that they could not pass it over his veto. It was a fine specimen of Executive coercion. Happening to be in the House when the Resolution came up, we said to several members who were gathered around us, "Don't agree to the Resolution; let the President veto it, if he chooses, and let the responsibility rest on him." But the majority of the House thought that, even with the restriction in the Resolution, the bill would be worth something, and so they agreed to it.

But, without entering into the question, whether the usual interpretation of the clause in the Constitution is the true one or not, or offering any opinion whether a law punishing treason by the perpetual confiscation of the traitors' real as well as personal property would or would not be constitutional, we dare maintain, even against the Chief Magistrate, that his constitutional scruples were quite unfounded. The bill was not a bill defining and punishing treason, and had nothing to do one way or another with the constitutional restriction; for it was not a bill passed under or in reference to the constitutional clause in question. It was, simply, a war measure, passed under the rights of war vested by the Constitution in Congress. It was a measure for suppressing the Rebellion by weakening the means of the Rebels, and indemnifying the government for its expenses incurred by the war it was forced by the Rebels to wage. The only questions to be settled were, Is such a measure authorized by the rights of war? and, Is it expedient to adopt it? On the first point there could be no real doubt in the mind of any statesman; and on the second, the Legislature was the proper judge. The President, if he had judged it inexpedient, had the right to interpose his *Veto*, but not on the ground of its unconstitutionality.

But in this, as in many other cases, we see the embarrassment created by the assumption with which the Administration set out—that the seceded States are still States in the Union; that the Rebels are our countrymen and fellow-citizens; and that we have against them only the rights of peace, or the peace powers of the Constitution, which recognizes their right to all the protection afforded by the various guaranties, in favor of liberty, of the Constitution. The fatal assumption, which has not even yet been wholly abandoned, bound the Government by all the constitutional restrictions on its power, and gave the Rebels the benefit of them all. Nothing could be more absurd. Rebels who are in arms to overthrow the Constitution have and can have no rights under the Constitution; and, therefore, in dealing with them, or as against them, the government is bound by no constitutional restrictions. In its measures, so far as they affect loyal citizens, as in laying taxes, borrowing money, raising troops, &c., it must adhere strictly to the Constitution; but, in so far as it respects Rebels or the Rebellion itself, it acts under and is restrained only by the rights of civilized warfare as defined by the *jus gentium*.

Yet, not having perceived this in the outset, and having begun with its absurd assumption, the Administration not only tied up its hands before the Rebellion, but has given a tenable ground against itself, on which the rebel sympathizers and its political opponents in the loyal States have been able to rally a most formidable opposition party fraught with grave peril to the life and integrity of the nation. The policy of “a good enough Morgan till after election,” is seldom, after all, a safe policy, when any thing more than the spoils of office are at stake. The misfortune of the country has been, that for some reason or other, the Administration began with an untenable policy, confused all the real questions at issue, and has succeeded in preventing the real issue from being clearly and distinctly made up, either in Congress or out of it. In fact, the Administration has never had, or if it has had, it has never avowed, a clear, distinct, and defensible policy. The President assured us, personally, that he, and he alone, is responsible for the acts of the Administration, and we know that under the Constitution he is so, but we cannot get rid of the impression, which we have tried to shake off, that the real author of the policy, if policy it can be called, which is so short-sighted

and destructive, is due to the Secretary of State, who never believed much in any thing but speeches and political pamphlets. He and his friend Thurlow Weed early entered into a conspiracy to destroy the Republican party, under pretence of forming a new Union party, composed of conservative men taken alike from the Republican and Democratic ranks, hoping to place himself at its head, and be its candidate for the next Presidency. He did not at the outset, for a moment doubt, we must believe, that before the election of this year should come on, the Rebellion would in some way or other be suppressed, and reconstruction, on terms not unfavorable to the secessionists, be effected. By proving himself a moderate man, the enemy of all extreme measures against the Rebels, especially against slavery, he, apparently, hoped that he should place himself in the position to be the candidate of a national party, and to be elected by Southern as well as by Northern votes. He even hoped to settle the difficulty between the North and the South without any serious war, and wished the government, even after the attack on Sumter, to act simply on the defensive, and give the secessionists time for their sober second thought. It accorded with his plan of a peaceful settlement, or with only defensive military operations on the part of the government, to recognize the seceded States as still States in the Union on a footing of perfect equality with the loyal States; indeed, it was necessary to his political purposes to do so, and he did so without weighing the consequences.

We, therefore, cannot help regarding Mr. Seward as the centre and chief source of all the malign influences which have for over three years rendered well nigh abortive the courage and energy of our armies, the noble and generous sacrifices of our people, and the wisdom and loyal intentions of Congress. We do not believe things would or could have gone so bad, if he had not been able to induce the President to adopt or to force upon him by means and acts the President could not see or suspect, to some extent at least, his own narrow, short-sighted, and selfish policy. Mr. Seward is not a statesman, has not a single element of the genuine statesman in his composition, as is evident from his speeches in the Senate during the dark days of the winter of 1860-'61, and from his voluminous Diplomatic Correspondence, so little creditable to the dignity and majesty of the government of a great nation; but he is a politician,

and especially when aided by his patron Thurlow Weed, a skilful manipulator of men and parties. He never gets an idea, at best gets only the shadow of an idea, and such was his project of a great Union party. Had he caught the idea itself instead of its shadow, he would have taken his stand on a national platform far above all party, where loyal men, of all parties, in earnest to put down the rebellion and save the Republic, could have taken their stand with him, without being required to abandon any honest principle they had ever held, instead of attempting to form a new party, on even a lower platform than that on which he had stood as a Republican. It was no time for the statesman to form new parties, or to destroy old parties, but to enlist all parties in the national cause, and summon all that was wise, living, earnest, and loyal in the nation to the defence of the government. His appeal should have been to Americans, to the highest, noblest, and most heroic sentiments of the American heart, and rallied men, not as conservatives, or radicals, but as Americans, and fired them with a spirit that would have enabled them to march as one man against the enemy. But as it was, he rendered the Administration imbecile, embarrassed Congress, divided the Republican party into so-called conservatives and radicals, and gave the Democratic party an opportunity and a pretext to reorganize on their old ground, as an opposition party, which, in the present state of affairs, is practically a party in sympathy with the Rebellion. Alas! for the short-sighted, narrow-minded, selfish politician! He has done incalculable mischief to his country; but, if remembered, it will be only as is remembered the ambitious incendiary who fired the beautiful Temple of Diana. He must live, if at all, as the Erostratus of the temple of American liberty. William H. Seward may gloat over the ruins of the Republic, but he will never be President of the United States.

Mr. Stevens understands well, far better than we do, this disciple of Thurlow Weed, the manufacturer of "good enough Morgans till after election;" and, if he has gone too far in his speech, it has been in his noble indignation at the disloyal policy the Secretary of State has inaugurated, or forced upon the Government, of treating the seceded States as still States in the Union, under the protection of the Constitution. It is that policy Mr. Stevens combats, not the doctrine that the Rebels are not alien, but domestic,

enemies. He is not willing that the hands of the Government, in dealing a death-blow to rebellion, should be tied, and it bound to extend to rebels all the constitutional protection that can be claimed even by loyal citizens, or that Copperhead and Border State pro-slavery men demand for them. So far we agree with him and honor him. He is not willing to see returning to their former seats in Congress, and with their former pride and insolence, the men who got up the Rebellion and have done their best to dismember the Republic. He wishes the Rebels to be conquered, the Rebellion suppressed, before we proceed to the question of reconstruction, or the reorganization of the population and territory now out of the Union and hostile to it, into States in the Union. Is there a sensible man in the country—not an office-holder, not an employé of the Government, or a contractor, or in some way belonging to, or dependent on, the shoddy aristocracy, that will dare hint that he is wrong? There cannot be, for the American people, if gullible, are not absolute fools or knaves.

On the question of reconstruction Mr. Stevens takes substantially the ground that we ourselves have taken from the first, that when the States that have seceded are reorganized and admitted into the Union, it must be substantially in the same way, and on the same principles, that new States are formed and admitted. Mr. Seward and his friends may intrigue or sneer; men whose only faculty is to say pompous nothings with a grave air, or who, like Turveydrop, pride themselves on their deportment, may look wise and solemn; and even the President, in the simplicity of his heart, may issue Amnesty Proclamations; but this Union will never be restored, and the seceded States resume their old position in our political heavens, till the rebel armies have been annihilated, till the military strength of the Confederacy is gone, and the rebellious population and territory have been governed long enough by Congress for loyalty to return, and a general love for the Union to be rekindled in their breasts. We quarrel with no man about words; we fight for things only. We say, and Mr. Stevens has, in his speech, proved that these seceded States are not States in the Union, and that they have lost for their population all the rights of American citizens, whether the whole of this population has personally approved secession, or not. A Union man in a seceded State has no more right to American citizenship, or to protection under the Constitution, than a rebel,

for this simple reason: he is not the citizen of a State in the Union, nor of a Territory organized by act of Congress. He has no political existence under our political system. It may be wise, politic, and very expedient, to treat him with more consideration and favor than we would a rebel neighbor; but he has no more claim, in right, on the Government. The hope of being able to reorganize the seceded States, with the few Union men in them, is as wise as, in a cold winter's night, to hope to warm one's freezing hands with moonshine. We may attempt it, we may get something we call a State, which may send men to Congress, and even choose presidential electors, so long as upheld by Federal bayonets; but not a moment longer. You can have no real State till the mass of the population have submitted, and have made up their minds to return, as soon as permitted, to the Union. Till then you must hold and govern them by military force, or not at all. The present movement towards reconstruction is a simple electioneering trick, and will prove a delusion and a snare. The real people of the seceded States are now engaged, heart and soul, in the Rebellion, and it is idle to suppose that you can sustain loyal State governments in them in opposition to the rebel population, or without their hearty and zealous co-operation. Let us look at things as they are, and not suffer ourselves to be deceived. Not a single seceded State has as yet been recovered, nor is there a single Slave State, unless it be Maryland, that would not join the Confederacy to-morrow, if the Federal arms were withdrawn and there were no fear of their returning.

ART. III.—*Speech of Wendell Phillips, Esq., at the Annual Meeting of the Anti-Slavery Society, Tremont Temple, Boston, January 28, 1864.*

THAT Mr. Phillips is one of the ablest and most eloquent men in the United States cannot well be doubted; and that he is perfectly honest and sincere in his devotion to the abolition of slavery, and the elevation of the Negro race in the country, is just as little to be doubted. No one can read one of his speeches and not say to himself, Here is

an honest man speaking his honest thought; here is an able man, an educated man, a cultivated man, of large and liberal views, a man of genius, of heart, of soul, devoting all his mind, all his intelligence, and all his energy, to the cause of the poor and oppressed. Such a man, however we may differ from him on this or that point, we are forced to respect and love. He had, and could have, no selfish or sinister motive for espousing the cause of the slave, and giving up his life to the Negro. He started life from a social position, with talents, learning, genius, and accomplishments which could not fail, with ordinary industry, to open to him the doors to the highest professional honors, or to the highest political distinctions his country had to offer. The beaten track was for him, if he chose to follow it, the sure path of ambition, both smooth and easy of ascent. He chose to forego his advantages, to brave public opinion, to bind himself to an unpopular cause, to suffer reproach for it, and to be branded as an incendiary, to be hissed by the mob, and to incur the wrath and hatred of all the sleek respectabilities in both church and state. Such a man does not so expose himself from vulgar ambition, or without being governed by lofty principles, and animated by noble and generous sentiments. He has in him the stuff of a true man.

It has never been my lot to be a co-operator with Mr. Phillips in his special work; indeed, he has found me always one of his most steady, persevering, and determined opponents. Yet have I always loved his noble and genial spirit, respected his humanity, and honored his disinterestedness. I have always regarded him as a genuine man, a living man—one who thinks and has the courage to act out his thought. I have always sympathized with him as to the end he proposed, but rarely as to the means by which he sought to gain it. Mr. Phillips was, and is, a philanthropist—a sincere and earnest believer in the democratic principle, and I am not, and never have been. Philanthropy is a great word; but nature has not made me a philanthropist. I am a Christian, and aim to discharge my Christian duties, both to God and to my fellow-men. But philanthropy is a sentiment, not a principle, and I never suffer myself to build any system, religious, philosophical, ethical, or political, on any sentiment, however generous or noble it may be, for all sentiments are subjective, individual, and variable. Even the religious sentiment, the highest and noblest sentiment in man, cannot be trusted, unless

enlightened and directed by truth, principle, independent of both the human mind and the human heart. Without truth, objective truth—what we call idea or dogma, it becomes a grovelling superstition, or a wild and destructive fanaticism. Love is one wing of the soul, no doubt; but with one wing alone, the soul does not, cannot soar. It must have two wings, and the other wing is intelligence, which grasps a reality which is not soul, but above soul—God; and hence the Apostle reproves those who have a zeal for God which is not according to knowledge.

In democracy, as expounded by Locke and Rousseau, and advocated by Jefferson and his school, we do not believe. We have studied philosophy too long for that. Democracy is the political expression of the materialistic and sensistic philosophy of the last century, which nobody of any brains pretends now to defend. Liberty we love; the equality of all men as to their natural rights we recognize—hold as a part of our Christian faith. We believe in republican government, in the election by popular suffrage of all rulers and magistrates, and dislike all hereditary monarchy and all hereditary political aristocracies. We are not Jews, but Christians. Judaism rested on natural generation, and, therefore, on the hereditary principle; Christianity is palinogenesiac, and under it all goes by election, the election of grace. Every man's philosophy, religion, and politics should unite in a common principle, and every man's does, if he thinks and is master of his thought. We believe in popular suffrage, and so far accept democracy; but we hold that suffrage is a trust, not an inherent and indefeasible right, and so far we reject democracy. The right to vote, and to be voted for is a trust from civil society, not a natural right inherent in every man by virtue of the fact that he is a man. On this point we disagree with Mr. Phillips and all the disciples of Rousseau; and, disagreeing on this point, we naturally disagree, supposing us equally logical, on all the points growing out of it and dependent on it.

Mr. Phillips is an abolitionist; his one primary object is the abolition of negro-slavery. Slavery is an injustice, and no injustice should be tolerated. The right of the man to his freedom is higher than that of any civil constitution or human enactment to obedience. The right of the slave to his freedom rests on the patent of the Almighty; is incorporated into the very charter of his existence by his Creator. Any human enactments or civil constitutions that de-

prive him of that freedom, or prevent me from rushing to emancipate him, are repugnant to the law of God, and may be lawfully resisted or disregarded. Hence, Mr. Phillips subordinates the Constitution of the United States to emancipation, and places the question of emancipation above that of preserving the Union. If the Union abolishes slavery, he sustains the Union; if it refuses to do any thing of the sort, then he is for disunion, so as to be able to wash his hands of the sin of slavery. Now, on this last point, not being a philanthropist, and holding the support of the Constitution as it is, till constitutionally altered, to be a public duty, binding by the law of God on every citizen, I have always held that I must sustain the Union whether it did or not abolish slavery, and seek the abolition of slavery under it, not against it. My duty to the Constitution, to the Union, to the country, I have always held to be, if the two came in conflict, paramount to my duty to free the slave. Here was and is the fundamental difference between me and the abolitionists. If we must choose between the dissolution of the Union, the loss of our national life, and the continuance of slavery, I choose the latter. But Mr. Phillips must bear us witness that the first moment that we were able to demand the abolition of slavery without danger to the Union or lesion to the constitution, I did it, and the echo of my essay on *Slavery and the War*, written in August, 1861, has not yet died away.

We grant slavery is an evil, an injustice, and that it is a sin to continue it a moment after it is possible to abolish it; that is, possible to abolish it without a greater evil, or a greater injustice. Of two evils choose the less; and unhappily in this world, such is the complications of human affairs that often it is not possible to repair one wrong without committing another, and, perhaps, a far greater wrong. I believed slavery, till it rose in rebellion against the Union, a less evil than the dissolution of the Union; and on the principle that we may not do evil that good may come, I separated from the abolitionists. We did so because we acted from principle, not sentiment, or from sentiment guided by principle; not from impulse, but judgment. Whether we erred in judgment or not is another question, which others may answer or not answer, as they think best. But this much we say, and say cheerfully, that the country owes a deeper debt of gratitude to the Abolitionists than it is prepared to acknowledge, or will be during this gene-

ration. Much in their manner as well as in their principles was offensive; and their overlooking the claims of patriotism, or seeing their country only in the negro, and counting every man their countryman and fellow-citizen who went for abolition, cannot be commended. Nothing did more to excite prejudice against them than their affiliation with English abolitionists, and importing George Thompson to help them abuse their own country and countrymen; and we regret to see the same gentleman amongst us again, as we regretted Mr. Ward Beecher's mission to England. We are not cosmopolitans; we believe in nationalities, that God for wise purposes has divided mankind into distinct, separate, and independent nations; and we are so old fashioned as to believe that each nation should manage its own internal affairs for itself. We have not yet accepted the modern doctrine of "the solidarity of peoples;" nor can we even go with our friends of the *Tribune* for national dismemberment in Schleswig, which is not and never was any part of the German empire, and against it in our own Southern States. The cause of Denmark in relation to Schleswig, not in relation to Holstein, is the same as our own in relation to the seceded States. We have no acquaintance with the Hon. George Thompson; he is no doubt an able, a worthy, and eloquent gentleman, but we are sorry to see him here as an abolition lecturer. We are no believers in English philanthropy, and disclaim all solidarity with it; yet we honor those earnest men and women amongst us who have so long and so perseveringly battled for the slave, amid obloquy and reproach, borne calmly being laughed at, sneered at, persecuted, mobbed, stoned by the Pharisees of the day, and we devoutly hope that the freedom they have so bravely, if not always wisely, battled for, will be obtained and secured.

These remarks define well enough my relation with the abolitionists. It is not a relation of hostility, nor a relation of perfect sympathy and agreement. Yet I have read the speech by Mr. Phillips, which we have cited, with deep and thrilling interest, and wish our worthy President would himself read and ponder it. It is a great speech, and while it indulges the hope that slavery is to end, it eloquently expresses well grounded apprehensions that the Republic is in danger, through the readiness of the government, in its haste, to sacrifice the interests and honor of the nation to a sham peace. While we are writing there comes the news

of the election of a civil Governor in Louisiana; and we may before long hear similar news from Arkansas, and from Tennessee, unless the Federal forces are driven out of the latter State before the election can come off. These elections, hailed as triumphs for the Union cause by the journals, we hear of with much misgiving and sadness. They are triumphs only for the vulpecular policy of our accomplished Secretary of State, by which he seeks to transfer the struggle from the control of Generals to that of politicians and demagogues. We are told General Banks favored the election of Michael Hahn, the successful candidate for Governor of Louisiana, and that is proof enough that his election is to be regretted by every friend of the Union; for who knows not that Butler was superseded, because he was in earnest to carry out a straight-forward honest anti-slavery policy, and that Banks was appointed because he was an ally or tool of Seward, and would do what man could do to defeat such policy and to save slavery from utter annihilation, at least for a time. So it will be everywhere else. Mr. Phillips is right. There are grounds for serious apprehensions, for matters have gone so far that it is impossible ever to establish the Union in peace and harmony without the immediate and total abolition of slavery throughout the whole United States and the territories thereof, and that will not be done if it is in the power of the Swards, the Blairs, the Bateses, the Bankses, aided by the weakness, vanity, and timidity, and crotchets of the President, to prevent it.

We believe the President, if emancipated from the influence of the selfish politicians represented by the Swards, Blairs, & Co., would take and consistently pursue an anti-slavery policy, and would not broach the question of reconstruction till he had made sure of abolition; but of such emancipation there is no longer any hope. Perhaps after all, what we wish we shall have to look for from another and an unexpected quarter. Who has not observed of late that a change has come over the Democratic party in Congress and elsewhere? Do they not say slavery is dead? and is it not possible that they are shrewd enough to throw the odium with their own friends, of killing it, on the Republican party, and to secure for themselves the honor of burying it, and saving the nation? Democrats love slavery no more than do the Republicans, and are just as willing to get rid of it as Republicans are, if they can do so without loss of prestige, or if by doing so they can again govern the Republic. Suppose then,

that having discovered that it is political ruin to wed themselves for better or worse to the cause of slavery, they have resolved or are resolving to avail themselves of the opportunity the indecisive and double faced and no faced policy of the Administration affords them, to take the ground that the abolition of slavery is *un fait accompli*, plant themselves on the principle of universal freedom, elect the next President, and the next Congress, and gain to themselves, for their own party, the glory of burying slavery, putting an end to the war, and saving the nation? Why not? They can do it in spite of Seward, Thurlow Weed, and the Blairs, if they choose, and who knows that they will not so choose? It is their wisest and best policy, and if they adopt it, they can carry nearly every State and every loyal man in the Union with them. We are not in their secrets, but are very much disposed to believe that their leaders are already meditating something of the sort.

“But they cannot carry the anti-slavery sentiment of the North with them.” Be not so sure of that. They could not, if the Republican Administration had not trifled with that sentiment, played fast and loose with it, or if it had fairly accepted it, and proved itself capable of conducting the war with spirit, energy, wisdom, and success. Thus far, as a war Administration, as a civil Administration, as an anti-slavery Administration it has been, in public estimation, comparatively at least, a failure. Suppose then, the Democratic party should take the ground that slavery is dead, that it is no longer in question; also take high national ground, such as has been taken by General Dix in his letter to certain gentlemen in Wisconsin, and put in nomination a strong man, a man of character, capacity, untainted with Copperheadism, possessing eminent ability, and high moral and civil courage; who doubts they would carry the next election with a rush, redeem their own political character, and gain a lease of power for another half century?

Taking the ground we have supposed, and putting up such a man as we have described, not General McClellan, Fernando Wood, or Governor Seymour, from the ranks of their own party, they would have no difficulty in securing the anti-slavery sentiment of the country, for it would have more to hope from them, than from Messrs. Seward & Co., or even Mr. Lincoln himself. We recommend no such policy, for we are not of their party; but were we in the

Democratic ranks as we once were, we should recommend it, nay, we would carry it, and believe that we were serving our party and our country in so doing; and even now we care not what party does the right thing, if so be that the right thing is done.

The nation has now the opportunity, without any violation of the Constitution, without any danger to the Union, nay, as the necessary means of restoring and consolidating the Union, of emancipating the slaves and putting an end to slavery; and it makes itself responsible henceforth for the sin of slavery, if it does not. If it did not insist on the absurd theory that the seceded States are still States in the Union, it might obtain a constitutional amendment forever prohibiting slavery in the United States and everywhere within their jurisdiction; but that is not to be hoped for. We hear on every hand that slavery has received its mortal wound, nay, that slavery is dead; but we do not believe it. The Republican party, though opposed to the extension of slavery into new territory, is not and never professed to be opposed to the existence of slavery in the States. There was, no doubt, a strong anti-slavery element in the party, but it was not, and is not the predominant or controlling element. Mr. Seward had been looked upon as an anti-slavery man, and had even been put forward, or had put himself forward as the representative man of the Republican party, but he was opposed to slavery only as a political power, and saw no reason for being opposed to it at all, when he found his party in place without being himself President; and his whole study since the election of 1860 has apparently been to strengthen his party, or himself, by an alliance with the slave interest. Mr. Lincoln was perhaps an anti-slavery man, but opposed to immediate emancipation, and to emancipation at all without colonization, and we are not aware that he has changed his views in the least since he became President. He has from external pressure opposed some anti-slavery measures, but no one with a good grace, as though his heart was in it, and no one that goes far towards immediately or ultimately extinguishing slavery. He has defeated immediate emancipation in Missouri, most likely in Maryland, carefully protected the slave interest in Kentucky, forbore to touch it in Tennessee, and secured to the anti-Free State party the electoral victory in Louisiana. His Emancipation Proclamation we count for nothing. It was ostensibly issued on the ground of military necessity,

and yet, he waited for military success before issuing it; and though one great purpose of issuing it was to deprive the Rebels of the labor of their slaves, he in the very Proclamation itself, advises them to remain and labor for their masters as usual. This looks very little like military necessity. In his Amnesty Proclamation, he consents that the returning States should still hold their slaves for a time, as slaves, although he had proclaimed them free, which time he leaves indefinite. In the oath he requires to be taken, the person taking it only swears to sustain his Emancipation Proclamation *till set aside by the courts or by CONGRESS*, implying that it can be set aside by either. All he pledges himself to is that he himself will not rescind it. We do not ourselves regard, and we presume he does not himself regard it in law, as worth more than so much waste paper. It was one of his jokes. Anti-slavery men thought they had got something and lauded him to the skies; but they will find that they got only fairy gold, except not being obliged to return as fugitives, slaves escaping from States and parts of States included in the Proclamation. But is a slave escaping from Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, or North Carolina into Tennessee or Kentucky, not liable to be imprisoned as a runaway slave, and after a certain time to be sold into slavery to pay the sheriff's fees and jail expenses? It is well to look at things as well as at words. Our President has the reputation of being a confirmed joker.

We cannot with these facts before us concede that Mr. Lincoln has killed or has any disposition to kill slavery; while his plan of reconstruction is, to our apprehension, expressly devised, if not to perpetuate, at least to prolong its existence. Let half a dozen Southern States return to the Union, under the President's plan, and slavery will command a working majority in Congress, and may speedily recover from the wounds it has received. The only really anti-slavery measure of much magnitude that has been adopted has been that of arming the negroes. That is a great measure, and may have consequences. All the others are shams, or of little moment. Suppose the patched up State Governments in rebel States even abolish slavery, what then? It will, when the proper time comes, be the easiest thing in the world to show that those governments and the State organizations under them are illegal, without the slightest constitutional vitality, and that all their acts are null and void from the beginning; for, be it remem-

bered that the Government not only concedes, but maintains, that the seceded States are still States in the Union, and therefore any government set up in opposition to them is revolutionary, and to be treated as *non avenu*. These governments extemporized under military commanders and in presence of Federal bayonets are not States, or State governments, and no court that respects itself will ever pronounce them such. It is idle to praise or blame the Administration for pursuing an anti-slavery policy. It has no policy but that which Thurlow Weed had in anti-masonic times, in making the body of Timothy Monroe look that of Morgan. "But it is not the body of Morgan." "No matter, it is a good enough Morgan till after election."

But this is not the point we intended to discuss when we commenced. Mr. Phillips, and he is a better judge on that question than we are, thinks, after all, that slavery is as good as dead, and that the measures of the Administration will result in its abolition. Perhaps he is right in assuming that slavery is virtually dead, though not in supposing that the measures of the Administration have killed it, but that public opinion, coming round so rapidly and so fully to the conviction that the Union cannot be restored, and peace obtained without getting rid of slavery, it cannot be permitted to survive. Slavery has made us trouble enough, and now our hands are in, let us make an end of it. Such we believe is or is every day becoming the general conviction. This is pretty sure to compel the Administration to adopt measures that will kill it, or if not, compel it to give way for another administration that will. But this is not enough for Mr. Phillips, and he has given us fair warning that he will not be satisfied, unless the negro is not only emancipated, but clothed with the elective franchise, placed on a footing of perfect political and social equality with the white man. The negro is a man; he has the rights natural and common to all men, and what right have you to make any political or civil distinction between him and the white man? It is little you do for the negro in declaring him free. You must go further, and give him the right to vote, so that he may be able to protect his freedom. It is HIS RIGHT. Nay, you must go further still, and cut up the large estates at the South, and give him a farm, so that he may have a home and wherewith to support himself and little ones. So under Abolition lie concealed agrarianism and negro equality.

Let philanthropy once get astride her hobby, and she is sure never to stop till she has ridden it into the ground.

We think the abolitionists might be satisfied with the abolition of slavery, and the recognition of the equal rights of the negro as a man. That is further than any portion of the human race ever yet advanced at a single stride. It is, at least, sufficient for one instalment; for, after all, the negro is not the only man in existence. The white man is a man, and has the rights of a man, and in our worship of the negro we cannot prudently leave him out of the account. He is not very patient nor very fond of Cuffey, and if you undertake to do more than he thinks is about right, he will be very likely to break Cuffey's head, hard as it is, and exterminate the whole negro population of the country. You may induce him to consent to let the negro be free, but if you undertake to incorporate him to political society, and make him an equal member of the civil community with himself, he will revolt and insist on remanding Cuffey to slavery, sending him out of the country, or cutting his throat. There are rough customers—both North and South, both East and West, who liave no special love for the negro, and who will never willingly meet him anywhere on terms of equality. You may philosophize, philanthropize, sentimentalize, moralize, and sermonize as much as you will, but you will never make the mass of the white people look upon the blacks as their equals. Attempt to force them to do it, and you will raise an Anglo-Saxon devil, that you will not be able to exorcise.

We may talk as we will, spin any fine theories we like, praise the negro as we please, and sneer at the boasting Caucasian to our heart's content, but we cannot alter the fact of negro inferiority, or make it not a fact that the negro is the most degenerate branch of our race. This is no reason why we should enslave him, oppress him, throw obstacles in his way, but it is a reason why we should not seek to form one community with him, or seek to mould blacks and whites into one people. The basis, under God, of society, is family, and the basis of family is marriage, and where there are classes between whom intermarriage is inadmissible or improper, they do not and cannot form one common society. Society proper did not exist in the middle ages between the nobility and the serfs, for they did not intermarry. It exists now in France, Italy, and Great Britain, to some extent, because intermarriage between the

nobles and commons has ceased to be infrequent. Between blacks and whites marriage is anomalous and never desirable. Both races suffer by it, because the distance between them is too great to be leaped by a single bound. The mulatto is intellectually inferior to the white man, and as an animal, inferior to the black man. All observation proves that the mixed breed is shorter lived and less prolific than either parent stock. Mixed breeds even in animals, without frequent new crossings, soon run out. One or the other race gets the upper hand, and eliminates the other, as English agriculturists and stock farmers know very well. Whites with abnormal tastes may now and then marry a black, but as a rule, both blacks and whites prefer to marry each with their own color. Even if they inhabit the same country, the blacks and the whites are, and will be too diverse to constitute really one people, one society. We are not, therefore, in favor of placing them on a footing of even political equality. In the Northern States, where there is but a small negro population, the right of suffrage can be extended to them without any serious disadvantage to them, or exciting much hostility or prejudice against them; but in the Southern States, where "the negro vote" would be large and able to decide the election, the case would be quite different, and the whites would not and could not be made to submit to negro suffrage, far less to negro eligibility. The experiment we fear would result in no benefit, but in grave injury to the negro population. We remember when a negro was elected a member of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts and the indignation that was felt even in that anti-slavery and negro-loving State at his taking his seat. He did not occupy it long.

"But do you not wish to elevate the negro?" My dear madam, I am getting to be an old man, and don't believe much in elevating negroes or any other class of men. We are for knocking off the fetters of the slave, recognizing the negro as a man, but not for elevating the negro to the level of the white man, any more than we are for lowering the white man to the level of the negro. We would leave the negro free to raise himself to equality with the white man, and above him, if able, but we have never discovered that we did any man, black or white, any good by elevating him above his natural level. Our romance, my dear madam, has fled with our once dark, thick,

glossy locks, and remains not with our dimmed eye and white hair. We talk no more of elevating the laboring classes, and we believe it would be a great deal better for our country, if we had a much larger class inured to toil, contented to remain an honest laboring class through life, and to earn and eat their bread in the sweat of their faces. All cannot stand at the top of society, for if all were at the top there would be no bottom, and society would be the bottomless pit. The merit of the negro is that as a rule he is not remarkably anxious to accumulate, or over ambitious of rank or place for which he is not fitted. Give him the right of suffrage and eligibility, and make him feel that he may indulge political ambition, and you destroy the simplicity and charm of his character, wake up in him all the base passions of the white man, and make him as restless, as discontented, and as great a nuisance as a Yankee pedlar or speculator. We do not believe that the poorer class even of white men have gained any thing by being entrusted with suffrage and eligibility. They vote as honestly and as intelligently as the easier classes, but their votes avail them little. All is not gold that glistens. There is much philanthropy, madam, that overshoots itself, and aggravates the evils it would cure.

“But it is the negro’s right.” I am not sure of that, sir. The negro has the right to himself, his wife and children, to the free use of his limbs, to his savings, his earnings, to the property he honestly acquires or inherits, the same as you or I. He has the same right to be protected by civil society in his natural rights, his rights of person and property, for he is a man, a free man, and so far the law should recognize no distinction based on color; but when it comes to political rights the case changes. All men are equal before the law, but not therefore does it follow that all men have an equal right to a voice in making or in saying who shall make the laws. I told you, sir, that I am no disciple of Jean Jacques Rousseau. The right of suffrage is not one of our natural, inherent, and inalienable rights, like the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Suffrage confers political power, makes him who possesses it, in a certain sense, a governor, and we cannot concede that any man has a natural right to govern; no, not the king of Prussia, or even the Turkish Sultan. We do not believe in governors, who govern by a natural, inherent, and indefeasible right. All power is a trust, and is amissable. Civil

society does not simply regulate, it confers the right of suffrage,—trusts whom with it she judges it proper, or most expedient. We told you that we believed in election. If the voters elect the rulers and magistrates, society in her own way elects the voters. There is on this point no higher law than that of society, in the exercise of its highest prerogative. So do not talk to me about the right of the negro to be a voter. When and where civil society has invested him with that right he has it, and you and I are bound to respect; but only then and there.

“But he needs it to protect himself against the overbearing insolence and oppression of white men in general, and his former master in particular. With a vote in his hand, he can bid the oppressor defiance.” I beg your pardon. I do not believe quite so much in votes as you do, my democratic friend. In my youth I listened to all these fine theories and said myself some fine things, about the power of the ballot-box. Don't insist upon my believing them now. Many of the things you say, I seem to have heard centuries ago, and it is hard to persuade myself that they are uttered by a living voice to-day in my ears. Is it that our friends have for these many years been asleep, or that I have for the last twenty years been living in quite another world from that in which they have been living and moving? I did not expect to hear a live man of to-day pretending that the vote of a poor man, and that man a poor black man, could afford him any protection, save on election days. His vote may be worth something to you if you are a candidate for office, but precious little to himself. We talk of independent voters. What independence! I had to vote in 1860 for Abraham Lincoln, for Fusion, or throw my vote away. This was all the independence and freedom of choice I had. We manage our elections better than by encouraging or permitting independent voting. Ordinarily, the managers have got the question narrowed to a simple question between your party and mine. I must vote for my party, and you for yours, or else each of us be branded a renegade; and to vote for one's party means to vote for its candidates, very likely about as scaly a set or at least as incompetent a set of scapegraces as can be selected. They are selected on the principle of availability, and the more worthless the candidate, usually the more available he is. This city has Judges of a high court, and Representatives in Congress, that I would on no account shake hands with, or invite to a seat in my

parlor, poor as it is. We cannot understand, then, what protection his vote will give the freedman, for we may be sure that he will not be one of the wire pullers or party managers, and of the candidates presented, it does not matter him a groat which is elected or which defeated. Do not suppose for a moment, sir, that I would, if I could, abolish or restrict suffrage. "It is often," says the sage Dr. Johnson, "misery to lose what it is no happiness to possess." I do not believe that suffrage is an adequate protection, or much of a protection at all, to a poor man, black or white, but I would not take it away from any one who has it, any more than I would a toy from my child. We need through every period of life our playthings, whether as individuals or as nations. Suffrage to those who, aside from their social position, intelligence, profession, wealth, or personal character, have no means of asserting their independence, can afford little or no protection; but it may serve to amuse them, and when they are not all on one side, led on by a few adroit, able, but unscrupulous demagogues, it can do no great harm. So, sir, let suffrage and eligibility remain as they are, and for what they are worth. The objection is not that the poorer and less educated classes make a bad use of suffrage, but that the wealthier and better educated classes make a bad use of them. They are not the poor who bribe the poor; it is quite another class who do it—they who have plans for robbing the Treasury, or compelling the Government to countenance their swindles, or to aid them in their speculations.

Now, my dear friend, let me not shock you, but I do not believe your poor, ignorant, and inexperienced negroes, whose religion is for the most part mere sensibility or animal excitement, and whose moral habits are those of lying, stealing, and cheating on a small scale, are better than white men of a corresponding class, or any less likely to be used by wily and unprincipled demagogues. The gentleness, docility, and even affectionateness, you admire so much in them, are due in the main to the dependent condition in which they have lived, to their habits of deferring to superiors, and consulting only the will of their master or mistress. Free them, give them votes, and put them on the footing of political equality with their former masters, and these amiable qualities, these virtues, if you please, will disappear, and your beloved negroes will become vain, proud, insolent, overbearing, and exhibit the usual vices and man-

ners of freedmen. They are nothing without leaders, and at present their leaders are their preachers; and the demagogues have only to gain their preachers to gain them. These preachers, for the most part themselves very ignorant and vain, can be bought, wheedled or deceived, and gained over to the support of measures any thing but advantageous to their own people. Hence, your "negro vote" will only go to swell the ever-rising tide of political corruption. Do not, my dear sir, flatter yourself that, because negroes have been oppressed, they are all saints, or that because they have been more wronged and degraded, they are more conscientious, more self-reliant, or personally firm and independent, more proof against temptation, or less corruptible than white men of the lower class. You, my dear madam, having made the negro for a long time your pet, and defended him against wrong, abuse, and contempt, have, woman like, come to regard him as faultless. I will not undertake to reason you out of your persuasion, for you would be very sorry to lose it; but he will set you right at the first opportunity.

Seriously, then, we honestly believe that you are doing the negro great harm by your proposal to elevate him above his sphere, and to do for him what no man or society can successfully do for any one. Already have you done him harm by placing him on a footing of equality in the army with white soldiers, and insisting that no distinction shall be made between him and them as to pay and bounties. Some time since, I received a memorial to Congress, for me to sign, praying Congress to make the pay and bounties of negro soldiers the same with that of white soldiers. I threw it into the waste basket. With all deference to the negro-lovers, we do not believe black soldiers are worth as much as white soldiers, and ten dollars a month and emancipation pay them even better than white soldiers are paid. The negro and everybody else would have been satisfied, if nobody had had a pet theory to be crammed down our throats against the stomach of our sense—that of negro equality. Philanthropy shrieked at the cruel injustice of giving a white man a few cents a day more than was paid to a black man, as if it were an unheard of thing in armies, to make a distinction in the pay of different classes of troops. There is no tyranny so relentless or so universal as that of passion or sentiment, and the better the sentiment or the nobler the passion the more galling and universal the tyrau-

ny. A theory based on sentiment instead of reason is the grave of all freedom, and hence it often, nay, usually happens, that those who vociferate loudest in the name of liberty are the greatest despots in power. Does not the world agree to call the reign of LIBERTY, EQUALITY, BROTHERHOOD, in France, the REIGN OF TERROR? The Lord save us from men whose sentiments frame their theories, and whose reason is used only to enable their passions to grasp their victims? Half truths are worse than whole falsehoods, and the best sentiments of our nature, when perverted, are more destructive than the worst. Men will commit infinitely greater iniquity in the name of liberty than they dare commit in the name of tyranny; in the name of justice than in the name of injustice. The great crime of the world is ignorance, and hence all the great theologians make ignorance the origin of sin. Under this pet theory of negro equality, a perversion, as understood and applied, of the Christian dogma of the unity of the race, no discrimination is allowed, but every thing is brought to its Procrustean bed. The government has no freedom of administration, individuals no freedom of action, justice itself no free course, and common sense is cast to the dogs. Pardon me, my dear madam, you know I have the misfortune not to be a philanthropist, and while I say *chaacun à son goût*, I add in plain English, to each one according to his works, and of those works the supreme authority of the state is in relation to suffrage the supreme judge.

But while we protest against many of the positions taken by Mr. Phillips, we do not oppose, absolutely, the recognition of negro equality before the law. The Government has gone so far that to be consistent it must go farther. The General Government having enrolled the negroes, and placed them in its army on a footing of equality with white soldiers, and allowed them to mingle mutually their blood on the battle-field in defence of the country, has naturalized and nationalized the negro. We opposed, till opposition was useless, making negroes soldiers. We took the ground that this is the white man's country, and the white man should defend it. But the Government has overruled us, wisely or unwisely it is needless to inquire or to say. It is enough that it has done so. The negro, having shed his blood in defence of the country, has the right to regard it as his country. And hence deportation or forced colonization is henceforth out of the question. The negro here is as much

in his own country as we are in ours, and the Government is bound to protect him as much as it is us in the right of domicile, and in the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Having placed the two classes in the army on a footing of equality it is but a step to do so in the state, at least so far as depends on the General Government. If the special friends of the negro demand it, we certainly will not oppose them, though what they demand we think will in the end turn out an injury rather than a benefit to their *protégés*.

We are the more ready to yield this point, because we foresee very clearly and distinctly, if we get abolition without equality, we have not got rid of the everlasting negro question. The abolitionists have been agitating the whole country for over thirty years, for abolition, and Mr. Phillips's speech assures us that the same party are prepared to agitate thirty years longer, if need be, for negro suffrage, or negro political equality; and, with the democratic notions generally adopted by our countrymen, they will be able to agitate with effect. We are growing old and irritable; we dislike agitation, indeed never liked it; and we think, since we have gone so far, in order to avoid greater evil and have done with the negro, it may be the wisest and safest plan for the General Government to abolish within its jurisdiction all distinctions founded on color, and, so far as it is concerned, to give the negro a chance to compete successfully with the white man, if he can. We say, therefore, let the General Government, within its jurisdiction, recognize all persons as equal before the law. If this should make negroes and white men equal before civil society, it would not necessarily make them equal in their domestic and social relations, with which the Government has and ought to have no right to interfere. The negro may accompany me to the polls and vote, but I will not be obliged to ask him to visit me, to open my drawing-room to him, or to give his son my daughter in marriage. The chief evil of this will be in the fact that the negro or colored population will constitute a distinct or separate class in the community, that will vote collectively rather than individually, even more so than do the Irish or the Germans. This will be an evil, a permanent evil of no small magnitude, not a mere temporary evil, as in the case of naturalized citizens of our own race, who, after a generation or two, become absorbed in the general population. But, I suppose,

we can put up with it and contrive, in some way, to survive it.

But we confine negro equality within the jurisdiction of the General Government, which extends only to the Federal Courts and Territories not yet admitted into the Union, because the States, each in its own limits, have the exclusive right of settling the question for themselves. The State, not Congress, under our system, says who may or may not be entrusted with the elective franchise. The General Government, in an enabling Act, may indeed define the qualification of voters in the first election under it, but the State in framing its constitution is not governed by the definitions or prescriptions of Congress, and fixes itself the qualification of voters, as it sees fit. It may exclude or include negroes as it judges best, and the General Government has no right to intervene one way or another, even as to the election of President and Vice-President of the United States or Members of Congress. The State fixes the qualification of voters for Members of the General Government as well as of its own, subject only to the constitutional provision that voters in Presidential and Congressional elections shall be the persons qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. If the Government had declared the seceded States no longer States in the Union, Congress could have authorized negroes to vote for delegates to a convention for organizing the State or framing a State constitution, and on the question of accepting or rejecting the constitution proposed by the convention, but there its jurisdiction ends. Having, however, fallen into the absurdity of treating these States as still States in the Union, the question of negro suffrage lies beyond its jurisdiction, and is solely a State question. We have never been willing to change the Constitution for the sake of the negro, and we are not now. The preservation of the States in all the constitutional rights they now have is as necessary to the preservation and free working of our political system as the preservation of the General Government in all its constitutional rights and powers. Beyond the line we have designated, the question of negro suffrage or negro equality is one for the States themselves, for it comes under the rights of peace, not under the rights of war. The rights of war authorize the Government to do whatever is necessary to put down the Rebellion, and secure peace; but they do not authorize it to subvert or change the Constitution,

General or State. It may, as a military necessity, declare martial law and suspend for a time the local civil authorities; but, the necessity passed, they revive, *ipso facto*, and resume their functions, as if there had been no suspension or no martial law declared. All that the General Government can do in the subject is, then, very little, and not worth quarrelling about.

The States can do as they please about negro suffrage. We should be glad to stop all agitation on the subject, but we are not willing to see the General Government attempt to force, without law, negro suffrage upon States opposed to it. That would be a greater evil than abolition agitation itself; nor is it desirable to change the Constitution, even if it were possible, as it is not, so as to prohibit the States from ever making any distinction between its inhabitants based on color. There are some things government can do, and some things the strongest and most absolute government cannot do. We cannot urge upon the States the adoption of negro suffrage, because it is, out of our own State, none of our business. We honor the Old Bay State, and we like many, very many, of the traits of the New England people, but not Massachusetts, nor yet all New England, is the whole Union, and we do not know that if we could, we would Yankeeize the whole nation. We are not fighting in this war for Massachusetts ideas any more than we are for New York ideas, Pennsylvania ideas, or Western ideas. It is as much to us what Illinois or Indiana thinks, as it is what Massachusetts thinks. We live in New Jersey, and are a Jerseyman. If the several States are willing to adopt negro suffrage, we shall not object, and if any of them refuse, we shall not abuse them, or agitate to make them change their mind. We are willing, in view of the circumstances, that the General Government should, within its jurisdiction, abolish all distinction founded on color. We wish the several States, as a means of forestalling agitation, would do the same, providing they do it voluntarily, of their own accord, without any attempt to compel them to do it by external pressure. If forced to do it, especially the Southern and Southwestern States, they would make short work with the negro. Some States have adopted negro suffrage, others will, if let alone, perhaps all will in time. So much we say, lest we should be understood as conceding more than we mean.

As to cutting up the large estates of the planters, and dividing them among the negroes, the agrarian feature of

the plan, rather whispered than strongly urged, and yet to some extent favored by the government operations in South Carolina, we remark that, "to cook a hare, first catch a hare." We have not got the great planting States in our possession yet, and shall not get them without much more hard fighting, even if then. Every military movement this spring, thus far, has proved a failure, and appearances now are that we are to have a most unsuccessful spring campaign. We hope it will turn out otherwise, but we have serious misgivings. The best generals and the best army in the world cannot carry on a successful campaign with an inefficient or uncertain civil administration. But, however this may be, we are not in favor of cutting up the large estates either North or South, Governor Aikin's no more than General Wadsworth's, and are not at all disposed to give negroes farms or homesteads. If the negroes can earn farms or homesteads, or the means to buy them in the market, we are quite willing that they should have the opportunity, and the same protection for their property, when they have acquired it, that white men have. We have no liking for what is called the Homestead Law, and never advocated it, for we never like any law which is enacted for another purpose than that which appears on its face. We like no underhand measures. The Homestead Law was intended to operate as an anti-slavery measure, by parcelling out the public lands among small white farmers, who would cultivate them with their own hands—a democratic policy, if you will, but illusory. For our part, we frankly own, that we are in favor of large estates, of heavy landholders, as an offset to manufacturers and merchants, or what we call business capital and urban wealth. You will need them yet, when you find yourselves in a death struggle with the huge corporations and mammoth monopolies with which you have covered over the whole land. Yet, if the negroes emigrate and settle on the public lands, give them the same rights and advantages you give white men, but no more; and if, as you pretend, they are equal or superior to white men, they need no more. We protest, however, against creating a privileged class, even though that privileged class should be negroes.

Under existing circumstances, and for reasons that we have assigned, and with the reservations we have made, we believe it wisest and best for the country and the Government, General or State, to prohibit slavery, to recognize the equality

of all men before the law, and make no legal distinction founded simply on color. Let the negro have a fair chance, and compete successfully with the white man, if he can. We see no other prudent course now possible. We do not believe him able to compete successfully with the white man, and if we were the special friends of the negro, and anxious to preserve the negro race in our country, we should be very unwilling to expose him to what we regard as so unequal a competition; but as we seek even abolition in the interest of the whites rather than in that of the blacks, and as we believe the gradual extinction of barbarous and inferior races, when they cannot be or ought not to be absorbed by the superior race, is no loss to humanity or civilization, but a gain, we are willing that he should be exposed to it, if those who claim to be his especial friends and to have charge of his interests insist upon it. We do not believe the colored races can, starting with equal chances, maintain equality on the same soil with the white race. Slavery abolished, they will soon be crowded out of the Southern States as laborers, by the heavy emigration from the Northern States and from Europe pouring in. They will live in little huts, cultivate a small patch of ground, and eke out a scanty and precarious subsistence, for a time, by fishing, hunting, trapping, and pilfering. Some will enter the ranks of the army, some the navy; others will drift away to Central America, to Hayti, to the British West India Islands, or to the South American Continent. Hemmed in or crowded out by an ever advancing tide of white population, more vigorous, more energetic, and more enterprising, their numbers will diminish day by day, and gradually the great mass of them will have disappeared, nobody can tell when, where, or how. It will take several generations, perhaps centuries, to complete the process of elimination, but the process is sure to go on till consummated.

Could we have had our way, and had we wished to preserve the negro race in the United States, we would never have emancipated the slaves; we would have changed the form and condition of their servitude, and converted them from chattels into *adscripti glebæ*, or serfs. We would not have made them freemen, but we would have made them in law persons, have recognized for them the sanctity of marriage, family, and domicile, have secured them their moral and religious freedom, but not have released them from their obligation of bodily labor. But we

could not have our way, we could not try the efficacy of our "Morrison Pill," for the South would not have consented to it, and we could not reach the slaves at all except under the rights of war, and these rights know nothing of any emancipation, but immediate emancipation. Moreover, we had, and have no wish to preserve, here or elsewhere, the negro race. Do not be shocked, my dear madam, you know I am no philanthropist, and you must expect me to speak as a reasonable man, who respects things, not fine phrases. I would not wrong a negro any quicker than a white man. I would deal out to him and his far off cousin, the American Indian, the same even handed justice, and discharge towards either, promptly and cheerfully, all the claims of humanity and Christian charity; yet I own that I should joy rather than weep to see both races disappear from our continent, if they should disappear without any wrong or injustice on the part of our own race. Let the disappearance be by the operation of a law of Providence, not by human wrong and oppression, and we shall have no tears to shed over it. We respect the amiable feeling which sympathizes with the inferior races, and dreams of their elevation, but, although I have a mellow spot in my heart, as well as you, my dear madam, in yours, I do not yield to it, for I never allow myself knowingly to attempt the impossible, or to war against the inevitable. I cannot make "a silk purse out of a sow's ear." The inferior races had the same origin that you and I had, but they are inferior, because they have, with or without their fault, degenerated farther from the normal type of the human race than we have. Pray, do not doubt, whatever you think of me, that you, with your tall queenly figure, your graceful walk, your Grecian face, your sparkling eyes, bright golden hair, and bewitching smile, approach nearer to our common mother Eve, than that black, greasy, thick-lipped, flat-nosed, woolly-headed, tub-figured, and splay-footed Dinah. Treat Dinah kindly, speak gently to her, don't despise her, don't turn away disdainfully from her, for she, too, is a daughter of Eve, a creature of God, and has both a heart and soul; but don't ask me to regard her as the type of womankind, and yourself as the one who has departed from it.

The inferior races, the yellow, the red, or the black, nearly all savage, barbarous, or semi-barbarous, are not, my dear sir, types of the primitive man, or so many stages in man's progressive march from the tadpole, chimpanzee,

or gorilla, up to Bacon, Newton, Napoleon Bonaparte, George B. McClellan, and you and me. They mark rather so many stages or degrees in human degeneracy. The African negro is not the primitive man, the man not yet developed, the incipient Caucasian, but the degenerate man, who, through causes which neither you nor I can explain, has fallen below the normal human type, and stands now at the lowest round in the descending scale of human degeneracy, and for him, save by the transfusion of the blood of a less degenerated variety, there is no more development. He has ceased to be progressive, and when a race has ceased to be progressive, nothing remains for it but to die. Get a deeper philosophy, my friend, and read history anew. Why is it that you can rarely get a negro to embrace any thing of Christianity but its animality, if I may so speak, or its exterior forms, and that after generations of Christian worship and instruction, he falls back to the worship of Obi? Why is it that you can scarcely get a single Christian thought into the negro's head, and that with him religion is almost sure to lapse into a grovelling superstition? Why, because he is a degenerate man, and superstition is degenerate religion, and the religion of the degenerate.

Well, my dear friends, I have said my word. An honest, conscientious, outspoken word it is, too, and wiser than you believe; but you will not like it, nobody will like it, because it is not sophistical, flatters no one's prejudices, favors no one's crotchets, helps on no one's party. My word will return to me without an echo. Well, be it so. If a true word it will not die. If fitted to the times, and the times will not hear it, so much the worse for the times, and for those whose duty it is to manage them and shape things to bring about better times. I like, my dear abolitionist, your earnestness, your intensity, your resoluteness, your invincible energy, and wish I could find as much elsewhere in loyal ranks; but not being able to do so, I tell you, either the Federal arms will fail to crush the Rebellion, or you will succeed alike with your good and your bad. Life is stronger than death, and you represent the only living body just now in the loyal States, and Wendell Phillips is bound to carry it over William H. Seward. So much we see; and forced to a choice between the two, we prefer Phillips, for "a living dog is better than a dead lion."

ART. IV.—*The next Presidential Election.—Mr. Lincoln.—The Presidency.—Action of Legislatures.—One Term Principle.—Patronage.—Prolonging the War.—Inability and Vacillation.—“Honest Old Abe,”* &c. 8vo., pp. 8.

THIS powerfully written pamphlet has been sent us through the mail, but by whom, or from what source, we are unable to say. It is intended to warn the loyal people of the United States against enlisting in the premature and suspicious action of several State Legislatures in nominating Mr. Lincoln for re-election, to persuade them to wait the action of the National Convention, [Caucus], which is to assemble at Baltimore early in June next, and to give them a few strong and conclusive reasons, briefly and clearly put, why Mr. Lincoln is not the man that should be our next President. The pamphlet deserves grave consideration. We say for ourselves that we intend now to vote for the nominee of the Baltimore Convention, and, though a preference for Mr. Lincoln was incidentally expressed in our January number, we are not pledged to him, and do not intend to be pledged or committed to any man for the next Presidency, prior to the action of the National Convention.

That Mr. Lincoln is not our free choice for President, that we do not consider him qualified for the position he occupies, that we consider him wholly unqualified, is well known to our readers. We have never been able to discover in him a single quality in any special manner fitting him to be President of the United States at any time, and especially in times like the present; and we have found in him no quality not eminently unfitting him for his high office, except, perhaps, his patience, his good humor, and capacity to labor. He has not the mental qualities, the education, the habits, the manners, the personal presence and dignity, the knowledge of history, philosophy, literature, civilization, men and things, or of the human heart itself, that we demand in the Chief Magistrate of a great people. Of his nomination in 1860, we said in the language of Daniel Webster: “It is a nomination eminently unfit to be made.” There is scarcely a county in any of the States in the Union, which could not furnish a hundred men, any one of whom would be less unfit to be President than he was when inaugurated March 4, 1861. That he is honest, that he is a kind hearted man, well disposed, and anxious to administer

the government well, need not be questioned, though we always suspect a man's honesty who has the soubriquet of *honest*. "Honest old Abe," reminds one of Mr. Clay's address to a former Senator of Massachusetts: "*Honest* John Davis! *Canny* John Davis!" The nickname is always bestowed in irony, as the livery stable man called one of his horses *Spry*, because he could not be made to go more than a couple of miles an hour. It, if it sticks, implies that he is canny, cunning, has, under the appearance of great simplicity, a long head, and will, if you are not on your guard, come round you or overreach you. But be this as it may, be the term applied in good faith or not, honesty without capacity, though it may do very well for a private man who has a competent and faithful steward to manage his affairs, does not answer for the President of a great nation and the Commander-in-Chief of her Army and Navy, especially when her very existence is at stake.

We wish to speak of Mr. Lincoln in terms befitting ourselves and his high position, but we must say that he has proved himself totally deficient in administrative talent. No branch of the government has been well and efficiently administered under him. Much routine work, done by old experienced clerks, may have been done regularly enough; some of the Secretaries have been able men, and have managed their respective departments as well as they could be managed under such a chief; but the Administration in the sense that it must receive its impulse, its spirit and tone from the President himself, has been loose, fluctuating, unsystematic, weak, and inefficient, in all save expenditure of men and money. It has lacked promptness, energy, economy. Its extravagance has been appalling, its expenditures enormous, and little to show for them. Its yearly expenses, when all accounts are audited, will be found to be double those of Great Britain in her gigantic wars with the emperor Napoleon, when she subsidized nearly all Europe, while our resources are far less than hers were at the time. During four years it will have run up a national debt above that of Great Britain, and equal to one-third of the assessed values of the whole Union, according to the census of 1860. And no small portion of this enormous sum has been literally wasted. Vast sums have been expended on expeditions that have come to naught, and on the construction of Monitors, not worth their weight in old iron. Contracts have been made on terms needlessly disadvanta-

geous to the government, and in most of them, if heavy, the government has been swindled, by collusions between contractors and its own employés. The Administration has not known how to inspire its own agents with a sense of duty, or to hold them to a rigid accountability. It has not known how to husband its resources, or to manage its finances with economy, with advantage to the public service. The people gave generously, Congress voted liberally ample supplies of men and money, but nothing has come of it, but an army of suddenly enriched contractors, speculators, and swindlers, who are using all their influence to prolong the war. The Administration seems never to have regarded economy as necessary. The war, it was sure, would be a short war; the Rebellion was always on its last legs, and was sure to be soon put down; and what mattered to so great and rich a nation a few hundred millions a year more or less? Peace would soon return, commerce revive, and the resources of the people reunited would soon extinguish a national debt of any magnitude. Suppose thousands of contractors, speculators and swindlers do fatten on the spoils of the Treasury; are they not sure to be loyal supporters of the Administration and the war?

Mr. Lincoln's military operations have shown an equal want of administrative capacity. The responsibility is not to be shifted from him to the Generals commanding in the field, or to the General-in-Chief, with his head-quarters at the seat of Government. Generals commanding armies are subordinate to the civil power, and though the ablest, having the best dispositions in the world, they can accomplish little under a weak, indecisive, and vacillating civil administration, that has no intelligible purpose, that changes its purpose every other day, or does not insist on its purpose being carried out. It will not do to blame General McClellan for not destroying the Rebel Armies, and suppressing by force of arms the Rebellion, for Mr. Lincoln, early in April, 1861, officially declared to all the world that he willingly accepted the cardinal dogma of the Secessionists, that the Government could not reduce the Rebel States to obedience by force of arms. Did it ever instruct General Scott, General McDowell, or General McClellan, that it wished to do so, or that it had come to believe that it could do so? With Mr. Lincoln's official declaration before him, General McClellan could not suppose the Administration expected or desired him to crush the Rebel Armies, or that

it was not his duty to study "how not to do it." If Mr. Lincoln was sincere in the declaration he authorized Mr. Seward to make, he neither expected nor desired decisive victories, for such victories would have interfered with his manner of suppressing the Rebellion. Moreover, he had authorized the Secretary of State to inform officially, both foreign powers and the Rebels themselves, that the war should be so conducted as not to change the *status* of any person in any of the States. Were Scott, McClellan, Halleck, or Buel, to conduct the war as an abolition war, or in a manner damaging to slavery? Generals after all are men, sometimes reasoning and thinking men, and not mere tools in the hands of the civil administration, and what wonder that they insisted on adhering to the policy originally marked out for them by Mr. Lincoln, or on keeping the pledges he authorized or instructed them to give? Has Mr. Lincoln ever distinctly disavowed that policy? Has he ever distinctly accepted the anti-slavery policy? Is it not notorious that he has done neither the one nor the other? That with the usual cunning of small lawyers he has attempted to hold on to the skirts of both at one and the same time? What wonder then that Generals of high character are disgusted, and content themselves with simply saving their honor as soldiers?

Mr. Lincoln has never told the army what he wanted or expected of it, for he has never known himself. He wanted to put down the Rebellion indeed, but by force of arms? by political manipulation? or by both combined? At first the troops were called out only to defend Washington, and the war was to be purely defensive. Then there came a cry, "On to Richmond." Then an expedition was sent out to gain a few ports on the Southern coast, and then to get a foothold in some rebel State, for political and commercial rather than for military purposes. New Orleans was taken in order to please the shipping interest, and the Mississippi River was left closed for the benefit of the railroad interest. One day attention is momentarily given to military interests, and the next every thing yields to the desire of manufacturing by the aid of Federal bayonets sham States in Rebellom, and securing a few Congressional or Electoral votes for the Administration. What can the military do, liable every moment to be disconcerted by some new trick or crotchet of the Administration? The astonishment is that they have done so much, not that they have not done more.

The Administration has never looked properly after the army. Congress voted men enough, but we have heard constantly the cry that our forces are outnumbered, that we want more men. This cry has indeed not always been true. McClellan's forces outnumbered the Rebels in the battles before Richmond, and Hooker's forces outnumbered Lee's at Chancellorsville, about two to one; but generally we have not had men enough where and when we wanted them. Then we have never had only about three-fifths of the men present whose names are on the muster rolls, and whom the Government is paying. In August, 1862, the President himself told us, that the number of men on the grand roll receiving pay from the Government was six hundred thousand, and yet the number present in the several armies was only about three hundred and sixty thousand! Where were the rest? In hospitals? Some of them were, but the greater part were well and hearty, the President said, at home, tending bar, at work on railroads, or on farms, and a considerable number of them, he might have said, had never been enlisted. But for these absent men, stragglers, deserters, or never enlisted, the three hundred thousand additional volunteers called for in July of that year would not have been needed. The administration of the army is all of a piece with this, and probably the Government has all along been paying for at least one-fourth more men than it has or ever has had in its service. Who dare say that this could happen under a President of even ordinary administrative capacity?

The policy of the Administration in its conduct of the war has been not only expensive, inefficient, but capricious, often unintelligible, to be explained only as one or another influence in the cabinet, or outside, predominated. General Frémont was appointed to the command of the West, head-quarters St. Louis, with the fullest powers the Administration could give him. Unhappily, it had previously conferred blank powers on Frank P. Blair, jun., which it lacked the disposition or the courage to recall, and when Frémont refused to recognize Blair as his superior and commanding officer, a quarrel broke out between them. Blair was abusive, and Frémont placed him in arrest; Scott released him. By incredible exertions Frémont got an army together, armed, disciplined, and appointed, with which he proposed to sweep the Rebel armies from Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana, clear the Mississippi, and take possession of New Orleans,

and open the route to the Gulf, and this he could and would, in all human probability, have done by January, 1862, or soon after, if he had been sustained by the Administration. But just as he was in presence of the enemy, and on the eve of a certain victory, he was relieved, and the command given to another, who marched the army back towards St. Louis, permitted it to scatter, and gave up the greater part of the State of Missouri to the tender mercies of the Rebels. The task which Butler, Banks, and Grant finally succeeded in accomplishing, at a terrible cost, a year and a half afterwards, was too easy of accomplishment at that time to suit the Administration, which seems to have a fondness for struggling with difficulties. Mr. Lincoln sent a fleet, with a land force under General T. W. Sherman, and took possession of Hilton Head, after one of the most splendid naval victories over land fortifications on record. Sherman, aided by the fleet, could easily, at that time, have taken possession of both Charleston and Savannah, but he had positive orders not to set a foot on the main land. Why? We know not, unless Charleston and Savannah were not strongly enough fortified and garrisoned to render their capture sufficiently difficult and costly,—unless it would have too seriously damaged the Rebellion, and been too great a humiliation to the Rebels. Perhaps it would have irritated them. It has been the misfortune of Mr. Lincoln, from the capture of the Arsenal and Armory at Harper's Ferry, and the Navy Yard at Gosport, down to the present, to be never ready at the time, to be always behindhand, or in the wrong place, and obliged to retake at great expense and terrible loss of life what a little forethought, promptness, and energy might have enabled him to keep, or never to have lost. But for the courage and boldness of General Morris, when he first took command of Fort McHenry, the Rebels in Baltimore might easily have taken that Fort, the key to the whole position, and carried away Washington and Maryland in the secession movement, and so secured the Confederacy a prompt recognition as the United States by Foreign Powers, for the Fort, if attacked only with pikes and scaling ladders by the Rebel force then in Baltimore, could have made no defence, and must have surrendered, so destitute had it been left. The President is never ready to strike a home blow, and his measures are generally wrong measures or right measures at a wrong time, or in a wrong place.

So has it been with the slavery question. Mr. Lincoln would take no step towards emancipation till he had wearied out the hopes of the negroes, disheartened them, alienated them, by making them feel that the war was to bring them no deliverance. When his generals took steps to reassure them, he rescinded their orders, snubbed them, then relieved them. After the hopes of the negroes had been sufficiently damped, after their enthusiasm had died away, and their confidence in the Yankees had been destroyed, then he comes out with a threat to emancipate the slaves in certain States and parts of States, but taking care to give the Rebels a hundred days to prepare for it, and to guard against the damage it might do them. He then comes out with his Proclamation, but takes care to confine its operation to slave territory not within our lines, and hemmed in by other slave territory into which they could not escape without being liable to be arrested and imprisoned as runaway slaves. He left Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, slave States apparently, to bar escape, by State laws, to the poor slaves from the States in which he declared them free. Was he afraid that the slave would take him at his word, and get away from his master, and be a free man? If he had adopted the Emancipation Policy immediately after the first battle of Bull Run; or if he had sustained the Proclamation of General Frémont in the Department of the West, the military order of General Hunter in the Department of the South, and quietly instructed Generals Butler, Burnside, Buel, and McClellan, to issue similar orders in their respective Departments, the policy would have encountered no serious opposition in the loyal States, it would have excited great enthusiasm; would have secured the confidence of the negro population, and struck a heavy blow at the very heart of the Rebellion. But no; Mr. Lincoln wan't ready; he must study longer his colored map, and meditate what he should do with the negroes freed by the presence of our armies, when our lines should be driven back, and they come again within the lines of the Rebels; and so the golden opportunity passed away, never to return.

So it has been from first to last. Mr. Lincoln evidently knows nothing of the philosophy of history, or of the higher elements of human nature. He imagines that men act only from low and interested motives, and does not suspect, because he does not feel, the presence of a heroic element, the

element, Carlyle would call it, of Hero-worship, that makes men admire and cling to, and uphold a bold, daring policy, energetically proclaimed, firmly adhered to, and consistently acted on, though in the face and eyes of their interest. His soul seems made of leather, and incapable of any grand or noble emotion. Compared with the mass of men, he is a line of flat prose in a beautiful and spirited lyric. He lowers, he never elevates you. You leave his presence with your enthusiasm damped, your better feelings crushed, and your hopes cast to the winds. You ask not, can this man carry the nation through its terrible struggles? but, can the nation carry this man through them, and not perish in the attempt? He never adopts a clean policy. When he hits upon a policy, substantially good in itself, he contrives to belittle it, besmear it, or in some way to render it mean, contemptible, and useless. Even wisdom from him seems but folly. It is not his fault, but his misfortune. He is a good sort of man, with much natural shrewdness and respectable native abilities; but he is misplaced in the Presidential Chair. He lives and moves in an order of thought, in a world many degrees below that in which a great man lives and moves. We blame him not because he is mole-eyed and not eagle-eyed, and that he has no suspicion of that higher region of thought and action in which lie the great interests and questions he is called upon to deal with as President of the United States. He has done as much as was in his power to make himself, and should be respected for what he has made himself, and the fault that he is not fit for his position is the fault of us who put him there. His only fault is, the misfortune of being unconscious of his own unfitness for his place.

But entertaining these views of Mr. Lincoln's character, his eminent unfitness for his place, and the extreme peril of the country with him in the Presidential Chair, why have you proposed him for re-election? We might reply, it was a blunder. We might say we were very ill when we did it, and were not disposed to be sent to the Old Capitol Prison, or to Fort Lafayette; but we prefer always the fair, undisguised truth. What we said in our January Review, which does not amount to proposing Mr. Lincoln for re-election, unless he should be the candidate of the Union party, was said under the impression that he being determined to be a candidate, it would be like fighting against the inevitable to oppose him, and we must either accept him, or give the

election and the administration for the next four years to the Democrats. We have seen no reason to alter our opinion since. We practise no concealment, put on no political disguise. Mr. Lincoln, in our judgment, is a very unsuitable person to be President. A more unsuitable person we could hardly name, but we look upon him as an unavoidable evil. His re-election, we do not for its own sake or his sake, desire. It would continue in place Seward, Blair, the whole class of politicians that our very soul loatheth, and continue a policy we have elsewhere described as neither fish nor flesh, neither fowl nor yet good red herring. But what is to be done? These politicians have for their own selfish purposes persuaded him to consent to be a candidate for re-election. They have tickled his vanity, and shrewd as he is, he is not shrewd enough to penetrate their motives, or he has not principle and patriotism enough to resist them. He has consented to be a candidate, and is determined to be re-elected, if possible. There is "a little woman" that will be grieved if defeated. So much is certain. Now who can run against him? There are better men enough, but with the Seward and Blair interests, and the whole influence of the Shoddy interest and the officers and employés of the Government on his side, how can you expect to get another candidate nominated? Can we doubt that all the patronage of the Government will be wielded in his favor and against any man who dares oppose him? We believe him strong enough, with his patronage and his demagogical and selfish supporters, to prevent any other man from getting the nomination, or if he gets it, to prevent him from being elected, and we believe him just the man to do so. To us, therefore, the question is simply this: Shall we endeavor to re-elect Mr. Lincoln, or let the election go by default to the Democrats? Let us not deceive ourselves. Mr. Lincoln has the inside track, and is able to keep it. If he is not strong enough to secure his election, he is yet strong enough to kill off any other man in the Republican ranks who shall be his rival.

We have heard Mr. Chase's name mentioned, in connection with the next presidential election. Mr. Chase is a man infinitely superior every way to Mr. Lincoln. He moves in a sphere of thought and integrity of which Mr. Lincoln has no conception. He is morally and intellectually infinitely above the comprehension of Abraham Lincoln. And yet, were they to become rivals, the most that

could result would be that each would kill the other. The names of John C. Frémont, and of Benjamin F. Butler, have been mentioned, either of whom would be infinitely preferable to the present incumbent, we had almost written, *incumbrance*. General Frémont has been politically wounded by Messrs. Lincoln, Seward, Blair & Co., and we fear his chance is not much better than that of Mr. Chase, though it would give us pleasure to see him nominated by the Convention, and if so nominated, we would most heartily support him, for we like him and respect him personally. General Butler has ability, genius, activity, fertility of resource, and would, if elected, make an able, efficient, and popular President. He is, also, a hard man to kill. Of all the men named, he would be the best able to survive a rivalry with Mr. Lincoln. But even he cannot do it. The Government patronage would crush him. There are other men by scores and by hundreds we could name, in Congress and out of Congress, in the Eastern, Western, and Northwestern States, whom we should prefer to Mr. Lincoln, but to what good? Mr. Lincoln having made up his mind to be a candidate, he will suffer no other man to be nominated, if he can help it, and help it he can. This to us is conclusive. Having been foolish enough to make Mr. Lincoln our candidate in 1860, we must accept him as our candidate in 1864, or perhaps do worse, if worse be possible.

We do not like this aspect of the case, for it gives us no freedom of choice. It amounts to suffering Mr. Lincoln to nominate himself as his own successor. The alternative is simply, as it seems to us, Mr. Lincoln or a Democrat. Having resolved to run again, we do not believe the Republicans are able to prevent him from being a candidate. But if a candidate, can he be re-elected? If the Democrats run a Peace Democrat against him, we think he can. If they run a decided War Democrat, like General Dix, for example, a man of ability, energy, and character, we regard it as doubtful, to say the least. Is it better that he should be elected, better for the country, we mean, than a Democrat. Than a Peace Democrat, or Copperhead, certainly; than a War Democrat, we think not. Mr. Lincoln, by persisting in being a candidate for re-election, and thus crippling the Republicans, gives the Democrats the finest opportunity they could ask for, to redeem their own political character, to return to power, and to serve their country.

Whether they will avail themselves of it or not remains to be seen. Messrs. Seward and Weed's policy of dividing the Democratic party, and gaining a portion of it for Mr. Lincoln, on the ground that he is to run on a *quasi* conservative platform, will fail. The Democrats know them, and, though willing enough to use them to break up and ruin the Republican party, they will not trust them. No, not so soon as they would Mr. Sumner or Wendell Phillips. They have no confidence in them, and no respect for Mr. Lincoln, who cannot properly be said to be one thing or another. Nothing is to be hoped for Mr. Lincoln in the coming election from that side of the house, and saving a few politicians who wish to use him, the employés of the Government, office-holders under it, and the army of contractors and their friends, who wish the war prolonged, there is not an intelligent man, woman, or child in the country that wishes Mr. Lincoln to be re-elected, or that would vote for him, except as the lesser of two evils, or if it was felt that he could be opposed without detriment to the Union cause. Save by the classes designated, Mr. Lincoln is now supported only from pure patriotism, because the Government cannot be supported without supporting the Administration, and because without supporting the Government the Union cannot be maintained, the Rebellion put down, and the life and integrity of the nation preserved. Men may not, in general, deem it wise or prudent to say so, but such, nevertheless, is the literal fact. William Lloyd Garrison, we are told, is in favor of his re-election, because he thinks him an anti-Slavery man, we presume; but Wendell Phillips, worth a dozen of him as an index to the real feeling of the abolition party, opposes it. The leading anti-Slavery men of the country, not technically abolitionists, are opposed to it, and wish some other candidate. Witness the movement for Chase. None but such anti-Slavery men as Weed, Seward, Bates, and the Blairs, wish Mr. Lincoln re-elected, and they, it is well known, are among the worst enemies of the anti-slavery cause to be found at present in the Union. It is, therefore, clear to us that, if the Democrats have the wisdom and the virtue to put up a War Democrat, who is willing to let Slavery die and be buried, a man whom loyal Union men can vote for without betraying their Government or endangering the national cause, Mr. Lincoln will stand a poor chance of re-election, if he leaves the election free, and does not

undertake to control it by the military. Hundreds and thousands of loyal Republicans would abstain from voting, and some, most likely, would even bolt their party.

But in case the Democrats run a Peace Democrat, say Governor Seymour of this State, or General George B. McClellan of New Jersey, Mr. Lincoln can be re-elected, and better, we think, Mr. Lincoln than a Copperhead. This is the issue, we supposed last December, when we expressed ourselves favorable to Mr. Lincoln's re-election; and in such an issue we do not think any loyal man ought to hesitate. Mr. Lincoln lacks administrative capacity, lacks knowledge, ability, thought, decision, energy; but he is loyal as he understands loyalty, and means honestly to put down the Rebellion, and bring back the seceded States to their place in the Union. Of this no one can doubt. To this end he is earnestly devoted, and acts with such light, wisdom, and strength as he has. He has learned something,—not much, it is true, but something,—from experience, and is less unfit for his place than when he first occupied it. He is, as a sailor would say, a little lubberly, but he has learned the ropes, and is no longer to be rated as a green hand. It is perhaps possible to carry him another four years, and by "pegging away,"—to borrow his own classic phrase,—to suppress the Rebellion after awhile, to make a final end of slavery, and to get some sort of a peace. We submit, therefore, if it is not better to make him our candidate than it is to run the risk of throwing the Government for the next four years into the hands of such a man as Fernando Wood, Horatio Seymour, or Clement L. Vallandigham, or a man who will carry out the policy of these gentlemen.

There is a reason besides of some weight, for re-electing Mr. Lincoln. The patronage of the Government is becoming enormous, and unless it is diminished, or some measure devised by which the scramble for office can be restricted, the Union will not hold together long, even if restored. Each Presidential election will convulse the nation, and the shock become too great to be borne with safety. As a means of lessening the evil, it is desirable to adopt the one term principle; but a much longer term than four years. We would have the presidential term of office so long, that the office-seekers who fail of getting an office with the incoming administration, shall think it quite useless to begin forthwith to agitate for a change, so as to give them another chance. To every office in the gift of the Government, there are at

least a hundred applicants, and, consequently, ninety-nine disappointed applicants, who are indignant that their merits are undervalued, and their claims overlooked. These, instead of quietly returning home and becoming honest farmers, shop-keepers, blacksmiths, carpenters, attorneys, school-masters, parsons, or day laborers, join with the disappointed of the opposite party, and begin forthwith to agitate in relation to the next presidency, and for a president who as soon as inaugurated, will make a clean sweep of all the offices, so as to be able to reward his loyal and disinterested supporters. The consequence is that the places under government are filled with raw, inexperienced, and, for the most part, incompetent and untrustworthy persons, and a whole army, ninety-nine times more numerous than the office-holders themselves, of lean and hungry expectants are constantly at work to keep the political pot boiling, and the community in a state of political ferment.

Now, as a partial remedy to this we would alter the Constitution so as to extend the term for which the President and Vice President are elected, from four to at least ten years—fifteen years, or during life, would be better, but this is said parenthetically—at least ten years, and to render the President ineligible for a second term. Ten years would be too long a time for the disappointed applicants to keep up their agitation; and they would return home, and after venting their wrath in a few spiteful remarks, would settle down into quiet citizens, and we might hope for a brief interval of peace. Besides, the President being elected for so long a term, there would be more care bestowed in selecting the candidate—more attention paid to fitness and less to availability, that precious legacy left by the Old Whigs to their Republican successors, whence our own present calamity. The people would pay more attention to fitness, and demand the nomination of candidates to whom the administration of the government could be safely intrusted, and for whom an honest man, with a moderate share of intelligence, might vote without sacrificing his self-respect. That would be a comfort and a real advantage. Now such a change can be better brought about under a second term than under the first, for, not likely to dream of a third term for himself, the President can have no interest in opposing it, but would, most likely, lend all his influence to effect it. This is the only positive reason, we know, for wishing Mr. Lincoln's re-election, and we give it for what it is worth.

We have told our thought plainly, our honest thought, without reticence or circumlocution; we have also told some truths not likely to be as plainly told by others. We never allow ourselves to despair of the Republic; but we cannot deny that we feel no little uneasiness at present. Things nowhere look bright and promising; we can discern no blue sky beyond the clouds that lower over our political heavens. We do not share the convictions of those who tell us "the back bone of the Rebellion is broken, and there is to be no more serious fighting." Not more than a few ribs are cracked at most. We find no consolation in the assurances of our anti-slavery friends, that slavery is dead. We hope it is dead, and would it were buried; but that ill consoles us for the loss of our country, the life and integrity of the nation, or its glorious Constitution. We have fought for our country, not for abolition, as a patriot, not as an abolitionist. Abolition has been with us but a means to an end, and that end the salvation of our country. Gain abolition and not the salvation, and you have gained nothing for us. We see not our way clear. But we will not be disheartened. Things may not be so bad as they seem to us. Nay, they may brighten, and assume a hope-inspiring and a love-attracting shape. God grant it may be so, for our poor country's sake, wounded well nigh unto death in the house of her friends, and in still greater danger from the quacks! who undertake her cure. Vigorous and immortal is her constitution, if she survives and feels again the pulses of her young life!

ART. V.—*Very Hard Cash. A Novel.* By CHARLES READE.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1864.

A JOURNAL of some note in the city of Philadelphia rates roundly our last January Review, for giving, while professing to be devoted among other things to General Literature, only 12 pages to that subject, and 116 to politics. Such a preponderance of politics it says will sink any Review. Perhaps so. But it, devoted itself exclusively to politics, should not overlook the fact that Dr. Brownson usually writes as well as edits his Review, and that every article in the number was from the same pen, and the same brain, and

that it is unreasonable to expect as great a variety in one number of his periodical as in periodicals to which there are some dozen or more contributors, each writing on a special topic preferred by his own taste and genius. A man to write any thing worth reading, must write on such topics as he takes an interest in, when his mind and heart are full of them, and he has something he wishes to say on them at that particular time, otherwise his articles will be mere task work, and will want freshness, life, and vigor. Dr. Brownson is but one man, though he regrets that he is not twenty, and can at best do no more than it is possible for one man to do. It is a damage, no doubt, but the reader must indemnify himself for the lack of variety as well as he can by having greater unity of design, greater thoroughness of treatment, and perhaps more freshness and earnestness of style.

Then the calculation of our Philadelphia friend is not accurate. Out of seven articles in the number only two can with any fairness be called political, and these two are national rather than political in the popular and journalistic sense of the term; and does not our Review profess to be national, and is not the present termed *THE NATIONAL SERIES*? Politics in the American vocabulary, as in the mind of American politicians, have ceased to have any reference to the science or philosophy of the state, to the origin, ground, and constitution of government, and are restricted to questions of a secondary order, to administration, to party management, to raising up one party and putting down another, to get or keep ourselves in place, and to get or keep others out. In this sense we rarely meddle with politics, and hardly referred to them. Several of the questions we discussed are political in the old sense of the word, we admit, but not in the present newspaper and popular sense. The questions relating to the Federal Constitution, the right or wrong of secession, the legal and constitutional effects of secession, the constitutional *status* of the seceded States, and the legal or constitutional mode of instituting State Governments in the place of those admitted on all hands to have lapsed or been subverted, are just now really national questions of the most vital importance to the whole country, on which a serious mistake, or the adoption of an erroneous principle, can hardly fail to be productive of grave injury for generations, perhaps for all time, to come. A publicist can at this moment render no more important service to the Republic

or to civilization than by discussing those great questions, without party bias, in the light of a sound political philosophy. They are questions now in the minds of all men who love their country, and on which they all wish and are seeking for light. Under the circumstances, we cannot persuade ourselves that we gave them undue prominence, or devoted to them an undue portion of our space; and we have no doubt the respectable Philadelphia Journal would agree with us, if we had defended instead of refuting the notions and schemes to which it is unhappily committed. We probably gave undue prominence to politics because we opposed Mr. Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation as unsound in policy, unwarranted either under the rights of peace or the rights of war, and a dangerous usurpation of legislative power by the Executive.

But after all, what is literature, and when is an article literary or not? Literature is a broad term, and includes under it writings of every description, whatever their subject or their form. Even legal documents may enter into, and form a part of the literature of a nation, as any one may see who reads the *Antiquitates Italicae* of Muratori. Yet it is customary to divide literature into general and special. Special literature is professional, theological, legal, or medical, or devoted to the particular sciences, and intended for special readers—theologians, lawyers, doctors, chemists, geologists, mineralogists, zoologists, botanists, &c. General literature may treat and usually does treat the same subject-matter as special literature, but in a general way, for the general reader, and usually with more reference to the passions, emotions, affections, and imagination. Yet the lines between the two cannot be sharply drawn, any more than between man and men. There is no man without men, and no men without man. The individual and the race subsist, so to speak, each in the other, and though distinguishable, are inseparable. General literature differs from special more in form than substance, for it must deal with concretes, with realities, or be merely words without sense, like many people's conversation, nay, like many people's writings published in journals, and even in books. The True, the Good, the Fair are in reality identical, and differ only in relation to us, in the aspect under which we apprehend them. Yet, even in the human mind they exist never separately. There is no Good without the True, and no Fair without both the True and the Good, and hence

the true poet, who is the highest and truest artist, is often the best interpreter not of beauty alone, but of truth and goodness,—really the best and most trustworthy teacher of mankind. General literature, then, cannot consist in vague generalities, or abstractions, mere emptiness, whether in relation to the imagination or to the intellect. It must have substance, flesh and bones, life and reality, and, therefore, individuality, in which it becomes in substance identical with special literature.

We suppose no one will pretend that the novel before us, *Very Hard Cash*, belongs to general literature as distinguished from special; and yet it contains a disquisition on disease and the art of healing, on private mad-houses, on the absurdities of English law Courts, on the ethics of bankers, on boat-racing, seamanship, sea-fights, superstition, evangelicalism, cant, moral theology, and a dozen other special topics, demanding of the author special and professional studies to be able to treat them fairly and justly, even if superficially. Now all this belongs to special literature as much as a medical treatise, an essay on law, or on President Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation. We conclude, then, that it is not necessary that an article to be literary should be written on literature, and refrain from discussing any topic that can be treated by a specialist. We suppose it is possible to write as a literary man, and even produce a very rich and commendable literature on philosophy, history, politics, war, and the interests and destinies of nations. To serve the cause of Letters we do not suppose it necessary to avoid all questions in which one's country and oneself feel an immediate and pressing interest—to abstract oneself from the living, breathing, work-day world of one's own time and nation, and keep aloof from every thing that touches a present practical interest or a living reality. Such a literature would be simply emptiness.

All that lives in the literature of the world is produced by earnest, living men, who write or sing with a purpose, and a purpose beyond that of producing a song or a book, or contributing to the production of a literature national or universal. Homer did not sing as the bird sings, or warble his notes for the sake of giving the world an immortal song. Hesiod, Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Pindar, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, all the great authors of Greek literature, whose names are remembered, were great, earnest, and living men, who looked above and be-

yond the simple production of literature. In Virgil and Horace we meet the Roman, the patriot, who secretly wails over the fallen republic, while complimenting him who has overthrown it, and seeks the future glory of his nation. That most beautiful of all modern Italian romances *I Promessi Sposi*, by Manzoni, was written for no purely abstract literary purpose, but to persuade the Emperor of Austria not to restore the feudalism the French Revolution had overthrown. The best of the admirable novels of D'Israeli, *Henrietta Temple*, *Coningsby*, and *Sybil*, are all the productions of a living, thinking, feeling man, whose soul is burdened with the interests of his own times and nation. Take the laughing, scoffing, amusing, old Aristophanes, author of the *Clouds*, you find he was a man terribly in earnest; that his aims were ethical and political, philosophical and religious, not purely literary. He was the great Athenian Conservative of his times, and lashed the innovators, whether they sought to introduce something that had not yet come, or to revive what had become obsolete.

The late Makepeace Thackeray was a literary man, if there is a literary man to be named; yet was he eminently a man of his own age and nation; and his literary career was a crusade against the cant, the hypocrisy, and maudlin sentimentality of our Anglo-Saxon world in the nineteenth century. He has effected a greater and more important reform than has Lord John Russell, or than will effect Messrs. Bright and Cobden, with their declamation about Free Trade and Manhood Suffrage. Even our own writings, unliterary as they are said to be, never produced for a purely literary purpose, may possibly some day be allowed a place in the literature of our country, though our American scholars generally are unaware of our existence, and never dream of recognizing us as a fellow-laborer. Be a thinking man, seize the truth, develop and apply to your own times the great principles on which the intellectual, moral, political, and social universe rests, and you will write for all times and places, and gain a name and a place, if you are anybody, in the literature of the human race. The works of a Wilkie Collins, a Miss Braddon, and the whole horde of sensation novelists, addressing a morbid or abnormal taste, may, for the moment, have their admirers, as the nonsensical "Ticket of Leave Man," appealing to the maudlin sentimentality of the hour, draws full houses, and is commended by your Oakey Halls as containing a

“heavenly moral,” but they will find no abiding place, and be no more read by our grand-children than *Pamela*, *Children of the Abbey*, *Evelina*, *the Mysteries of Udolpho*, *Louisa or the English Nun* are by the present generation; while *The Caxtons* and *My Novel*, and all the productions of Thackeray and Charles Reade will make a part of the permanent and undying literature of the language. They have in them the vitality of truth, and cannot die.

The novels by George Elliot, or Miss Evans, have a purpose, are written to give a poetic and romantic charm to the *Philosophie Positive* of Auguste Comte, but they will not live, because that philosophy is a positive absurdity, and has no vitality. These novels exhibit power, a rich imagination, a masculine thought, and masculine passions too, and are very damaging to the author's own sex, but they are based on an error, and are at bottom a lie, and the first of all Evangels, saith Carlyle, is, that “no lie shall live.” The truth they contain, is denied by the philosophy that underlies them. Neither will the variations by Dickens on *Oliver Twist*, survive. This author's works are ephemeral, for he lacks intellectual ability, grasp of thought, real cultivation of mind, and truthfulness to man's permanent nature. His rogues are unnatural exaggerations, his good people are insipid, his favorites are not human, his comic folks for the most part bores. We are wearied out and out with the Micawbers, and heartily wish something would “turn up” to take them away where we could never meet them again. He has fine powers of observation, plenty of humor, but no taste. He wants strength, manhood, faith. The distance between him and Hogarth is very great, and he owes much of his popularity to the unapproachable illustrations of Cruikshank. But we place, and ever since we read his *Vanity Fair*, have placed Thackeray at the head of English novelists. His knowledge of society is extensive and profound, his wit is as delicate as it is keen, and his hatred of snobbism, cant, hypocrisy, springs from his large loving human heart. His pictures do not flatter, but they are likenesses, his satire is severe but never malevolent. The English-speaking world may well mourn his death in the prime of life; for it will be long before it will look upon his like again. What he was as a private man, in his personal and domestic relations, we know not, ask not; we only know that his heart had sorrowed, and that he was no stranger to that inward grief which overpowers

and crushes some men, but develops, exalts, refines, and strengthens others. No man who had not known sorrow, or having known it, had not mastered it, could have written so laughingly, so lovingly as he did. The eye readiest to melt with sorrow is the readiest to overflow with joy.

After Thackeray comes, though of a different school, the author of the work we have named at the head of this article. *Very Hard Cash* is in many respects one of the very best novels in the English language, and is far superior to any thing the author had previously given us reason to suppose him capable of producing. We have read it as men read a novel, for amusement or relaxation; we have re-read it as a reviewer, with as much self-importance and ill-nature as we could summon up, and we regard it as one of the best models of what a novel should be that we have ever seen; in some purely artistic points of view superior to any single production of the great Wizard of the North. Scott, of course, remains unrivalled, and *unrivallable*, if we may be allowed the term, in the historical novel; but he was not a perfect artist. He had, like Shakspeare, many faults, which only his unrivalled genius could atone for. He had extraordinary descriptive powers, and sometimes used them without mercy on the reader. His descriptions are often too long, and sometimes interrupt instead of helping on the action of the piece. He seldom gains your interest at the opening of his story, and you have to wade through nearly a volume before your attention becomes fairly fixed, and he has the perfect mastery of your soul, and can move you at his will. His heroes and heroines are usually the least interesting and heroic persons he introduces to your acquaintance. The part of the servant is, as in several of Molière's plays, superior to that of the master. Meg Merrilies is the real heroine of *Guy Mannering*, Edie Ochiltree, the king's bedesman, of *The Antiquary*, and Julian and Alice are but pageants in *Pevevil of the Peak*. The real actors are Ned Christian and Fenella, his daughter Zarah. So of all the others, even his last, *The Count of Paris*, where all the interest centres in the Varangian Hereward, and his betrothed, the Saxon maiden Bertha. But in *Very Hard Cash*, the interest of the story centres where it should, around the principal persons, begins with the opening of the book, and is sustained throughout, and never for a moment flags till you reach the end. The management of the story is for the most part natural,

easy; things fall out as they should, without violence; every thing follows in its order, and the conclusion intended is foreseen and reached without any *tour de force*. The author keeps to reality, and preserves the *vraisemblable*. He has no exaggeration, no straining after effect, nothing affected, nothing out of the range of common life.

We have spoken of Scott and Thackeray; we do not pretend that Reade has the original or creative genius, or the ability of either, nor that *Very Hard Cash* is a work of as high an order as *Old Mortality*, *Ivanhoe*, or *The Heart of Midlothian*, as *Vanity Fair*, *Pendennis*, or *The Virginians*. Any of these reveal heights, and a magic beauty to which it has no pretension. Indeed, it does not lie in their time, does not aspire to their heights, or to the kind of interest and beauty for which Scott especially is admired, and always will be; but it is more complete and perfect in its kind, and its kind is by no means despicable, even beside them. Its great merit is in its truthfulness, its realism, and its just and unexaggerated, though not *unideal*, view of life. We meet in it no false sentimentality, no weak or weakening romance, which makes one weary of the world in which he lives, and yet deprives him of strength to gain or even to strive after a better. It never sets us on a wild goose chase after the unattainable. There is love, true and undying love in it, but no wild and ungovernable passion, represented as a warrant for breaking of every precept of the Decalogue, and able to sanctify any amount of crime. The love, which we meet in George Sand, Victor Hugo, and large numbers of inferior French novelists, who inherit the spirit, perpetuate the false sentimentality, and exaggerate the gossamer veiled impurity of *La Nouvelle Héloïse*,—the French School originating with Rousseau, improved upon by Bernardine St. Pierre, and re-enforced from beyond the Rhine, revives in an exaggerated form the heathen worship of the Cytherean Goddess, and elevates Venus not only above Minerva, but far above all the Gods of Olympus, even Jupiter himself. If a young man and woman, though the former has a wife, and the latter a husband, conceive a *grande passion* each for the other, though utterly lawless and forbidden, it is a sufficient excuse for any possible extravagance of conduct, any possible neglect of duty, and the commission of any possible crime, even murder and suicide. The School is not unknown in England nor in our New World. Here it has had grave disciples in bloomers and

out of bloomers, who have defended its tenets not only in light works of fiction, but in grave essays, and not uneloquent public lectures. There is in *Very Hard Cash* true love, we have said, such as a modest Christian maiden may confess, such as an honorable gentleman may cherish without debasing himself or humiliating its object, but no other love is chanted, whether veiled or unveiled. The imagination of the author is as chaste as his words or the conduct of his hero and heroine. If an improper relation is hinted at between some of the characters, it is never dignified with the name of love. The love he recognizes is pure, holy, lawful, the love of persons with quick feelings and exquisite sensibilities indeed, who have hearts of flesh and souls of fire, but is always virtuous, never lawless, and never unsettling the conscience, or leading to sin. It is love, too, that can be realized and enjoyed, which elevates and refines, but never enervates, or creates vague longings for the forbidden or the unattainable. It purifies and embellishes life, but is not the whole of life, or the only thing in it worth living for. Even disappointed love may find consolation in the quiet discharge of duty, and in words of solace and deeds of kindness to the suffering. The author has no faith in the *fatality* of love.

It were useless to attempt to give an analysis of this excellent novel, for probably no one will glance over these pages, who has not read and admired it. The characters are sufficiently marked and well sustained throughout; but we may add that they are not characters that grow on you. They are presented at once full grown and perfect as they ever become. The author presents, he does not develop them; none of them ever surprise you, or do any thing or turn out any thing you do not foresee and expect. This may be an artistic defect, and a defect that is still more striking in Charles Dickens. You know every one as soon as introduced, the way in which he or she will act, and what he or she will do; you understand at once the part or lot of each. As soon as you hear of young Hardie, you know he is to be Julia's lover, and that his love will be returned with interest, and that, after many trials, but without any serious lover's quarrels, they will be married. As soon as Jane Hardie is introduced, you see that she is destined to love Edward, the imperturbable, and he without any ado is destined to return her love, but not to marry her. The elder Mr. Hardie, though introduced as a man of high principle, re-

spectable, upright, honorable, liberal and pious, you see at once is a cold, selfish, heartless man, a hypocrite, and an able and accomplished knave, who to the last will keep up appearances, and retain public esteem and confidence. You know he is the one to make away with the *Hard Cash*. So when the fourteen thousand pounds are mentioned, you know they are to be lost and found; and when Captain Dodd steps on board the *Agra* with Jonah bound close to his breast, you foresee the storm at sea and the fight with pirates. When Captain Roberts comes aboard at the Cape and supersedes Dodd in the command of the *Agra*, you are aware of the wreck and loss of the ship before reaching an English port. Yet though you foresee it all, the story loses nothing in its interest.

The author never overburdens you with descriptive passages, though his descriptive powers are of the highest order, and his command of language marvellous. He has the faculty of making you present at the scene he is describing, and of enabling you to see it as an eye-witness. He does not narrate and describe the boat-race at Henly; he takes you there, and makes you a spectator of it, and a most spirited boat-race it is too, and you come away with a very lively recollection of it. He does not describe the storm at sea; he places you on board the ship, and compels you to undergo it. You are present in the fight with the pirates, take your part in it, neither seeing nor thinking of the author. You do not hear of the wreck on the coast of France. You are wrecked there yourself, and undergo all the anguish and anxiety till you get on shore with the brave Captain Dodd, and look back at the poor ship with her back broken, her ribs dashed in, see her spars and rigging gone and her hull going to pieces, and give a tear to her memory. This faculty of making the reader present, and enabling him to see what is going on, Mr. Reade possesses in a degree seldom surpassed. It is a true dramatic power, and adds immensely to the interest of his writings. This dramatic power Scott had only in feeble degree, and Thackeray, if he had it, seldom displayed it. The genius of each was historical, not eminently dramatic.

The characters are well sustained, we have said, but we ought to add that they are not characters far removed from every day life. They have no extraordinary merits or demerits. The good are not extravagantly good, nor the bad extravagantly bad. Mrs. Dodd, the mother, is a well-

born, high-bred, sensible, affectionate lady, with a slight touch of primness, even-tempered, calm, quiet, gentle, loving her children, making them her companions, and enjoying their confidence. She is wrapped up in them, and in her husband with whom she has fallen in love since marriage, probably because he commands a ship in the service of the East India Company, and is only an occasional visitor at home. Julia calls her Lady Placid, but she has spirit, life, energy, and is no Lady Insipid. Julia is a beautiful, sparkling, impulsive thing, full of life, feeling, good sense, and good intention, and able to appreciate genius and admire heroism, though not precisely heroic herself. Edward, the brother, can excel in any thing that does not require too much brains, or too much close and continued thought. He is born for action, and better with his hands, arms, and heels, than with his head. He is indemonstrative. Julia calls him Sir Imperturbable. He has, however, high principle, a just sense of honor, is generous, unselfish, and warmly attached to his family and friends. Captain Dodd is a good sailor, an excellent skipper, a brave man, and has saved fourteen thousand pounds of earnings for his children, loses his reason when he loses his money, which he has saved for love, not avarice, is sent to a private madhouse, escapes, goes to sea, is drowned, or supposed to be so, counted dead, has the funeral service performed over him, is about to be cast into the sea, is hauled on board again, to be embalmed, and sent home; is found to be not dead, but in a cataleptic fit, is recovered, finds his reason, returns to his wife, recovers his fourteen thousand pounds, and is happy, and so is his wife. The drowning and restoring of Dodd comes the nearest to a *tour de force* of any thing in the book. Old Hardie, we have already described. He is copied, perhaps, from Sir John Dean Paul, but is no uncommon character among bankers, who worship Respectability and Cash, and make their way by an affectation of piety. Young Hardie is a fine, gifted, high-spirited young gentleman, but not uncommonly so; generous, bold, brave, but not a hero of the sensational or melodram style. He belongs to this world, and though he is shut up in a madhouse, he is not at all insane. The Madhouse Doctors are bad enough, but not worse than ignorant, conceited, and vain men usually are, when they have power, and can abuse it with impunity, and without scandal. Mrs. Archbold is a little out of the common order, does not belong to

the author's set. A reformed female rake is not one of his characters, and would better become Barnum's Museum than such a book as *Very Hard Cash*, if still young. The two original characters, each in his way capital, are Dr. Sampson, the inventor of the Chronothermal Theory, and Fullalove, a countryman of ours. Fullalove is a genuine Yankee and no mistake. He is gifted, handy, ingenious, fertile in resources, ready for any thing from the invention of a patent churn, a new sea glass, an improved rifle, raising a sunken ship, acting as common sailor or skipper, fighting pirates, extemporizing a rudder, or bravely risking his life in an attempt to stretch a hawser from the wreck to the land to save his comrades and fellow-passengers. The fault of the author is not that he makes him speak a dialect and adopt a pronunciation unheard in Yankeedom, but one which is never heard from the mouth of one of Fullalove's class. His language and pronunciation are those of a Yankee, if you will, but of a Yankee several degrees below him in education, travel, and social position. Sam Slick is amusing, and exhibits many traits of the Yankee, but he is no genuine specimen of his class. No Yankee of Sam's class ever uses the language and vulgar pronunciation ascribed to him by Haliburton. This by the way. We are willing to own Fullalove for a countryman.

Dr. Sampson is an original, a genuine creation, and uses up the *dox* in fine style. We are not sufficiently instructed in such matters to judge of the soundness of his Chronothermal, or Chronic-Heat Theory, but we suspect there may be something in it. It is very clear to us that the anti-phlogistic treatment is in most cases liable to the objections Dr. Sampson urges; certain it is, that the profession now give stimulants and rich nourishing food with advantage, where they were formerly in the habit of bleeding and purging, and study to build up where they sought to reduce the patient. Dr. Sampson looks for the cause of diseases chiefly in the brain, and finds the cause of fewer in the stomach than is usual with the profession. May he not be right? And may it not be that medical men stop too frequently with the symptoms, or mistake the symptoms for the cause? We are sure the profession have yet much to learn as to the causes of very common diseases, as well as of the *modus operandi* of the medicines they prescribe. We have never been able to persuade ourselves that aside from Chirurgery, in which great progress has apparently been

made, that medicine is any thing in reality more than an empirical science. Yet we may be wrong, and so may Dr. Sampson be wrong in supposing that he *cures* diseases which other doctors only define. Are all diseases cured by applications to the brain, and chloroform the whole needed *materia medica*? Are mineral poisons infallible antidotes to vegetable poisons, vegetable poisons to animal poisons, and animal poisons to mineral poisons? If so, the fact should be known to the public as well as to the profession. The chronometrical character of all diseases, asserted by Dr. Sampson, is a law of nature, universal, and we had supposed was well known and admitted by all the profession. The spasms of gout would soon take a man off, if they had no intermission or remission. At any rate, Dr. Sampson is very entertaining, and his theories may, if they are or are not generally received, be worth looking into, even though set forth in a popular novel, and in a peculiar Scotch dialect.

The exposition of the horrors of private mad-houses, private asylums as they are called, and the facilities they offer to such men as the elder Hardie to get their relatives out of the way so as to possess themselves of their property, deserves the attention of the public and even of the legislature. They are not confined to England, nor are they worse there than here. Time was when to be a member of the medical profession was an evidence of being an honorable and trustworthy man, but it is so no longer. The medical profession, like that of law, has been opened to dishonorable members, and it is not a sufficient reason for trusting a man that he has a diploma in his pocket and M. D. attached by authority to his name. Public insane asylums are not exempt from abuses, but they are far safer than private ones, and persons really sane are much less likely to be confined in them. Doctors' certificates, and certificates of Boards and Inspecting Committees, are worth little. Every lawyer knows he can get medical experts enough to testify to the insanity of any client he wishes to get off on that plea; nay, philosophy has been so unsettled by modern speculation and unscientific theories, by phrenologists, psychologists, and spiritists, that the medical profession have no definition of sanity or insanity which they all accept; and there is in the profession no agreement as to where is to be drawn the line between the two. The old legal definition, insisted on by old fogie judges, is the best

and most scientific that has as yet been given. We recommend the part of the book which details Alfred's experience in the several private mad-houses in which he was confined by his uncle, at the instigation of his father, to the consideration of those who read not for amusement and relaxation alone. Mr. Reade has done a braver deed in his exposure of these asylums than Dickens did by his exhibition of Dotheboy Hall, and he has avoided the manifest exaggeration which Dickens is never able to escape.

We do not pretend that Mr. Reade has given us in this novel any striking original creations. He has kept himself within the region of common life and placed us among every day people, and his great merit lies in his having been able to invest these every day people with all the charms of genuine poetry and romance, without exaggerating or transforming their characters. In this is the power as well as the originality of his genius. His work is intensely interesting, exciting even, but the excitement is a healthy, not a morbid excitement; you rise from its perusal fresh and strong, not jaded and exhausted. Too many novels are or have been popular that make one feel the next morning after reading them as if he had spent the night in debauch. He is weary, oppressed by an indefinable lassitude, unable to fix his mind on any thing, or to apply himself to any pursuit. He is all unstrung, and is worth nothing till opium, a dram, or a new and still more exciting novel winds him up again. Novels like *Very Hard Cash* have no such deleterious effect on the health either of mind or body. They give more pleasure than the other, and leave us fresh and vigorous for our ordinary duties of life.

The moral and religious tone of *Very Hard Cash* is unexceptionable, far superior to that of most professedly religious novels. It is free from cant, from all affectation, strict but not rigorous. Jane Hardie is not approved for her pietistic cant, her resolution to give a word of warning to her friends, whether in season or out of season, and never to attend a party where there are no religious exercises or reading and exposition of the Scriptures. A member of the Christian Commission of her sect intruded himself upon us at the Review of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac, a few weeks since. We spoke of the military ball which came off the evening before as a brilliant affair, and as having been highly delighted with it. He groaned in spirit, and told us it was very wrong, that it would have

been far better if it had been turned into a prayer meeting. You forget, said we in reply, that the good Book tells us that "there is a time to dance and a time to pray." Let every thing be done in its time and place. He understood nothing of this, nor could poor Jane. Yet she is loved and cherished for the striking qualities which she had and retained in spite of her pietistic obtrusiveness. Mr. Reade has a very just appreciation of real religious worth, and one who really loves his religion and seeks to live as a man loving God and doing his will, can always read him with pleasure. His religion is in the life, and expresses itself in deeds, not words. We can, therefore, commend his work as a novel free from nearly every thing that creates a prejudice against novel reading.

We hope our Philadelphia friend will find this a literary article, though, in our own judgment, it is very much of a piece, under a literary point of view, with most of our articles. Yet it may obtain us some grace—it ought to, for it is some self-denial in these times to think of anything but our country and her perils.

ART. VI.—*Rebellion Record*. Edited by FRANK MOORE.
Gen. McClellan's Report. New York, 1864.

GENERAL McCLELLAN stands before the public not simply as a military man, but as a candidate for the Presidency, and his Report is and will be read less as a military report than as an electioneering pamphlet. His friends and partisans read it to find wherewith to support his claims or to dispute the wisdom and justice of the Administration, and his opponents read it to find proofs of his unfitness for the command he held, and wherewith to justify the Administration in relieving him. It is hardly possible for any one in reading it to separate the General from the political aspirant, and not to be influenced more or less in his judgment by his political views and sympathies. In this respect we can trust ourselves no more than we can others, for we have strong political convictions, prejudices, if you will, and hold almost in horror that section of the Democratic party that has named him for the Presidency, for they seem to us to sympathize more thoroughly with the Secession Government

at Richmond, than with the National Government at Washington.

General McClellan has suffered and still suffers more from his friends than from his enemies, or rather he owes it principally to his pretended friends that he has enemies. They unduly praised him in the beginning, and called him "the Young Napoleon," before he had done anything to prove whether he had or had not the genius of a great commander. While he was still engaged in organizing the army at Washington and Alexandria, and had made no movement against the enemy, had won no laurels, except a sprig or two through General Rosecrans in Western Virginia, the journals, especially those of suspected loyalty, began to speak of him as the man who must be our next President. He was thus from the outset placed in a false position, and he must have been more than Napoleon not to have suffered from it. He had to sustain a reputation not won by his deeds, and which the slightest mistake might forfeit, and was exposed to the keen observation and criticism not only of military rivals, but of political rivals, and even of loyal men led by his associations to suspect his loyalty. He could not afford to fail. He must obtain brilliant success, or not only lose the high military character that had been prematurely assigned him, but be accused of complicity with the enemy. A young and inexperienced military commander, whose highest previous military rank had been that of a Captain of Cavalry, was subjected by his friends to a most cruel test, one which only a man of the very highest order of military genius could abide. He needed the most consummate prudence, and the greatest boldness and dash. Owing to his false position, he was almost inevitably led to the side of prudence. He could not afford to run any risk. Had he done so and failed, he would have been set down as a traitor. Forced to be prudent, he became overcautious, let the opportunity for movement or attack pass by, or failed to follow up the advantages he gained. For all these faults which he committed, his injudicious friends are responsible.

For our own part, we have never ranked ourselves among General McClellan's friends, and have never been one of those who believed him a great commander. We found him too much of a rhetorician to have much faith in him, and we have always missed in his orders, proclamations, and reports, the ring of the soldier. We never believed him a Napoleon or in the least Napoleonic, and we were among the first who

urged the Administration to relieve him. But we are satisfied that he has some of the qualities of a great General, and that with the experience he acquired before he was relieved, but for his political associations, he might have proved an able commander, inferior to none that we have had. We regretted, and regret, the act of the President relieving him when he did. We thought and still think that he should have been relieved some six months earlier or not at all. Never had he proved himself so worthy of commanding the Army as he was proving himself when he was relieved, and no man who has succeeded him has proved himself superior to him. There are officers in the Army of the Potomac working their way up who will prove his superiors, but none of them has as yet been placed in command of that Army. He had in the beginning, like all our officers, no experience in commanding and manœuvring large bodies of men, and never was he able to bring all his forces into action or to use them all with advantage. The only exception, was the battle of Malvern Hill, which, unless we have been greatly misinformed, was General Fitz-John Porter's battle. But his want of experience was a defect that he was every day overcoming, and he is reported to have said at Warrenton to a friend, a day or two before he was relieved, "I feel now for the first time in my life, that I am able to command a hundred thousand men." It is not improbable that had he been continued in command that noble army would not have experienced its fearful losses at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. No man has ever commanded that army who has had a juster appreciation of military merit, and we may safely say that the officers promoted to high commands by him or his influence, were among the very ablest in the army, and far superior to those advanced, *proprio motu*, by the President. We do not think the Army of the Potomac ever had an officer superior to Fitz-John Porter. Perhaps he deserved dismissal from the service, but not more than General McClellan himself, General Franklin, and others equally implicated, and all should have been dismissed, or none. It would give us pleasure to see this able officer restored to his rank in the service, and placed in a command commensurate with his rank. Power, to be loved and respected, must be equitable, just, impartial, not capricious, or spiteful.

Under a political point of view, we have always distrusted General McClellan. His view of the policy to be pursued

towards the Secessionists for bringing about a reunion, has never been ours. But it is no more than simple justice to him to say that it was, in the beginning, that of nearly all our general officers, of the greater part of the rank and file of the army, and of the Administration itself. General Frémont was the only officer high in command, who at an early day saw the necessity of liberating the slaves of Rebels and acted accordingly, and he, we know, was neglected, snubbed, and finally relieved by the Administration for it and the popularity it was feared it would give him. The Administration started avowedly on the policy of conducting the war so as to change the *status* of no person in the seceded States, and ordered its Generals commanding Departments to issue proclamations assuring the Rebels that their slaves and private property would be respected and protected. There is nothing in General McClellan's letter to the President from the Peninsula, remonstrating against making the war a war of liberation, against confiscation of private property, and against the arraignment and execution of Rebels for treason, not in strict accordance with the policy which the Secretary of State had proclaimed by authority of the President to be that of the Government.

In the Summer of 1862, after the ill success of the Spring campaign of that year both East and West, the earnest loyal men in Congress and out of Congress pressed hard on the President to change his policy, to regard the war against the Rebellion as a public war, and to adopt the policy of confiscation and emancipation, and he partially yielded, or seemed to yield. But the army believed that it was against his own will, and that the apparent changes he was about to accept were forced upon him by the pressure of the so-called Radicals. So believing, the army assumed an attitude of hostility to the Radicals, for the purpose of sustaining the Administration against them, in the policy it had from the first avowed. General McClellan knew that the President had avowed and acted on a contrary policy to that of the Radicals, and seeing no purely military reasons for a change, he sought to strengthen the President to resist the change which the Radicals, backed by a majority in both Houses of Congress and some members of the Cabinet, were forcing him to adopt. There was nothing wrong in this; no military insubordination, nor any attempt to control the civil Administration.

The error, if any, was on the side of the Administration,

in attempting to retain what was called the Conservative policy while it affected to accept the Radical policy. The difficulty grew out of the weakness of the Administration. The public were divided in opinion as to the proper policy to be pursued. There were two policies, the one treating the Secessionists as insurgents, to be put down by military force simply because, too strong to be put down by the civil officers of the Government, but to be put down under the peace powers of the Constitution, without any resort to the rights of war; the other policy assumed that the seceded States by their act of secession ceased to be States in the Union, though their population and territory remained subject to the jurisdiction of the Union, and that by forming a separate government, they had become rebels and revolutionists, lost all constitutional rights in the Union, and were rendered by the war they commenced, public enemies, and therefore to be dealt with under the rights of war. Under the rights of war the Government at its own discretion could emancipate their slaves and confiscate their property. The Administration had adopted the first named of these two theories, and in accordance with it had called for volunteers, raised its armies, and instructed its commanders. But it did not adopt that policy clearly, distinctly, exclusively, for it proclaimed a blockade of all the ports of the seceded States, and prohibited all intercourse with those States, which it could lawfully do only under the rights of war, and on the supposition that the war was a civil territorial war. This was a manifest departure from its avowed doctrine.

The country saw it, and Congress understood that the Rebellion had assumed such formidable dimensions, and was able to bring such powerful armies into the field, that it could be put down only on the second policy,—not by treating the secessionists as a band of insurgent individuals only, but as public enemies, and bringing into play against them all the rights of war. This policy was pressed upon the Administration, and if it had distinctly accepted it, and acted promptly and vigorously on it, it would have carried the nation and the army with it. But this it had neither the wisdom nor the courage to do. It had not the instincts of statesmanship, but simply the cunning of politicians, and sought to split the difference, and to secure the support of both parties by taking a little of each, and limiting each by the other, and thus pleasing neither, but offending both. Where there are two parties, the real statesman never at-

tempts to steer a middle course between them, but takes a position above both, and constructs a platform on which both can unite and act together, if loyal, without any abandonment of principle,—a thing always feasible for statesmen, never for mere politicians and manipulators of parties. The President offended the logic of both parties, because he asserted no principle which justified his partial adherence to either. He consequently was distrusted by both parties. The Conservative believed him insincere in his adherence to Conservatism, the Radical in his concessions to Radicalism, or *vice versa*.

Now, we have no doubt that the army was ready to support the Government in either policy, for the army was and is loyal to the core. No doubt the majority of the officers in the beginning preferred the first named policy, because it appeared to be more generous to our rebellious countrymen, and the more generous and humane policy is always that which is the most attractive to the soldier. But, if the Administration had distinctly disavowed the first as impracticable, and jeopardizing success, and as distinctly adopted the second, not as forced upon it, by the Radicals, but as necessary to the consistent and successful prosecution of the war against the Rebellion, we do not believe that it would have heard any remonstrance from General McClellan or any other officer of note, in the army. We are not aware even as it was, that after the Emancipation and Confiscation policy was partially adopted, or rather, threatened to be adopted, General McClellan or any other officer refused to obey, on that ground, any military order given him. We do not believe that there were then any political reasons of real weight for relieving General McClellan, at the time he was relieved, although there are now solid reasons enough why he should not be restored to his command, and especially why he should not be supported for the Presidency. We do not believe him disloyal, but we believe not in the loyalty of his associates, of the men who have placed his name before the public as a candidate for the Presidency. We cannot support a ticket which has on it the name of Clement L. Vallandigham, or that of any man who sympathizes with him. Matters have gone too far for that.

The Administration has no doubt a case against General McClellan, and perhaps, General McClellan has a case against the Administration, but by no means so strong a case as has General Frémont. General Frémont has been

most shabbily treated by the Government. We pretend not to judge of Frémont's military or administrative ability, but we have a very strong conviction that it was for his merits, not for his demerits, whatever they may have been, that he was relieved from his command in Missouri. He was too much in earnest and disposed to do too much, for the Administration to be pleased with him, and was too much of a man to be the tool of the Blairs, or to play into the hands of the Secretary of State. The Government is inexcusable, when it appointed him to the command of the Mountain Department, for not furnishing him with the means of doing what it exacted of him; of placing him under the command of a man under whom it was known he could not serve without compromising his honor, evidently for the purpose of compelling him to ask to be relieved; and for promising him another command, informing him late at night that he would be appointed to it, and next day appointing another officer to the same command. Such treatment for political reasons, of an officer then of the highest grade and second in rank in the army, and who had been the chief founder of the party that had elected Mr. Lincoln President, was simply atrocious; and we shall be surprised if he does not yet make its authors bitterly repent it. He may not be elected President, but he has friends, and is not without influence. Even Mr. Lincoln, when it is too late, may discover that he has made a blunder, not merely got off a joke. General Frémont is not politically dead or dying, and he may yet assist at the political obsequies of the men who have sought to kill him. He has great vitality, and he must be reckoned with. We urge not his nomination, for we do not believe any man, except the present incumbent, can receive the nomination of the Baltimore Convention; but we will not do our readers the indignity of saying that we should prefer him to Mr. Lincoln, or to any man that would be acceptable to the Seward and Blair cabal.

Now we are on this subject, we have a word or two to say of another able General of high rank, and in apology for having ventured to express an opinion of his military character with only a partial knowledge of the facts in the case. We allude to General Rosecrans. We were induced to offer a brief criticism on the military character of the late Commander of the Cumberland, because we found our Catholic friends pretending that he was relieved of his

Command because he was a Catholic. We wished to combat that pretension, and by showing that the Government had other reasons for its act. We have found fault enough with the Administration and are not in the habit of sparing it, when we think it in the wrong, but we do not think Catholics have had any reason to believe that its conduct has in any instance been influenced by hostility to Catholics; indeed, we think a contrary charge could be more easily sustained. Favor has been shown to more than one officer in the army that would not have been had he not been a Catholic and an Irishman. Indeed, we think the Administration has gone at times too far in this direction, and sustained very unworthy men because supposed to be favorites with Irish Catholics. But in endeavoring to repel an unfounded and unjust charge against the Government, we went too far, and did, we are assured, injustice to General Rosecrans himself. The terms we used would have been softened if a dangerous illness had not prevented us from correcting the proof of our remarks. But we retract them, and the judgment on the General's military character we expressed, for whether just or not, we expressed it on insufficient authority, and it ought to be a rule with us to express no judgment on the strictly military character of military men. Some of the information we relied on we have since discovered to be incorrect, and the rest may possibly admit an explanation very different from that which we adopted. Our judgment at best was rash, and therefore we regret having expressed it, or any judgment in the case.

We know General Rosecrans well, or did some few years ago. We know him to be an able man, a man of Science, and well versed in his profession; we know him to be a man of high principles, sterling integrity, unsurpassable personal intrepidity and loyal to the core. There is no man in the Army, high or low, that more tenderly loves his country, is more earnestly devoted to the Union, or more ready to sacrifice himself for the suppression of the Rebellion. No one has rendered greater or more valuable services, in the Army or out of it, to the National Cause. His earnest, soul-stirring letters in support of the more radical policy of the Administration have done a service to the country which cannot be estimated. He has carried his heart and soul into the Army with him, and has defended his country not only with the pride and honor of the soldier, but with the affection and zeal of a devoted

son. All this we knew when we wrote our criticism, and nothing of all this did we intend to question or suppose we were questioning. We have long counted him among our warmest and most loyal personal friends, and as such have loved and honored and still love and honor him. We knew him to be a Union man. Knowing him to be such, we should not, unmilitary man as we are, have offered any judgment on his purely military character, and we beg our readers to treat the judgment we offered as *non avenu*, as if it had not been offered, and to judge him as they would in case we had been silent.

We have generally been sparing of *unfavorable* criticisms on our military men, and we should have done better to have been more sparing still. Great evil is done by newspaper correspondents in fastening upon a general officer with little or no military merit, and laboring to puff him into notice and reputation to the disparagement of greater and far more meritorious officers, and as a rule we may set it down that any officer frequently and extravagantly praised by these gentlemen is worthy of no great confidence; but a greater evil is done by unfavorable criticisms upon officers high in command when they meet with a reverse or an unexpected failure. It is hardly possible for us to know all the facts necessary to a full judgment of the case, besides unmilitary men are not always capable of forming sound military judgments. Military men are in general the best judges of military men, as in all professions, professional men are the best judges of the merits of the members of their own profession. We were among those who censured General McClellan for attempting to march on Richmond from Yorktown, instead of by Culpepper and Gordonsville, and covering Washington at the same time, but experience, we think, has justified General McClellan's strategy notwithstanding his failure. An outcry has been raised against General Seymour for his disaster at Olustee, Florida, and some have supposed he failed because unsound on the Negro Question. General Seymour is, and always has been, a decided anti-Slavery man, as he has assured us with his own lips, and is a brave and loyal man, and an able officer. We shall not blame him till we know better than we now do all the facts in the case. As the matter now appears, General W. T. Sherman's late expedition proved a failure, but we know not what was its precise object, nor wherefore it failed, if fail it did. The testi-

mony of all military men who know him is that General Sherman is an able man and excellent officer, and Lieutenant-General Grant, who knows him well and esteems him highly, has recommended him to the Command of the Department which he himself commanded before his elevation to the Command of all the Armies of the United States. We, therefore, ought not to refuse him our confidence or breathe a syllable tending to impair that of the public in him. So should it be in all cases. Our Generals should have no enemies to fight but those in front. Great injustice has been done to excellent officers by outside criticisms. For ourselves, we believe General Buel has been made to suffer unjustly by unprofessional criticisms. He is a loyal man and an able officer, whom the Service can ill spare. He did not carry out the anti-Slavery policy in his Department, but did the Administration ever order him to do so? or would it have permitted him to do so at any time while he was in command of the Department of the Ohio? Cannot his failure be explained by other causes than his disloyalty or lukewarmness in the National Cause? He has, it is said, a Southern wife. So has the President, besides being a Southern man himself.

What we insist upon is, that the reputation of our military commanders shall be treated with consideration, and with a tender regard for their honor. Honor is the soldier's breath of life, and the public should feel that it is so. It is desirable that the Administration should also feel it, and observe, as carefully as may be, the niceties of rank. Our Regular Army is small, but it is the Army proper, and without the slightest disparagement of Volunteers, whether officers or men, no regular officer should ever be sacrificed to a volunteer officer. It is not pleasant to a regular officer, educated in the Military Academy, master of his profession, and who has been twenty years in the Service, to be placed under the command of a brigadier or major-general who, three years ago, was a barber, dancing-master, or the keeper of a toy-shop, and as ignorant of all military matters as we are. It was a fine comment on the way we have been going on when General Sumner objected to a captain of artillery attached to his Corps being made a Brigadier-General, on the ground that he could not spare him from the command of his battery. We are, hereafter, to have a large regular army, and to have it spirited, efficient, it is necessary to respect the honor and the repu-

tation of its officers, from the Lieutenant-General down to second-lieutenant. Not otherwise shall we have soldiers imbued with a high sense of honor and manly feeling. The Regular Army is a permanent institution, a Volunteer Army is only an accident, or a temporary expedient, and never will a Volunteer Army officered by civilians, equal a Regular Army, let us say or do what we will. We wish Congress would understand this, and look more to the permanent organization of the Army, and not fall into the solecism of *drafting* volunteers. If you draft at all, draft for the Regular Army, the only draft Congress can constitutionally enforce. Militia belong to the State troops, and may be called for by the General Government, but can be drafted only by State authority. The mistake is in supposing that Congress can draft militia. It can draft, no doubt of that, but only for its own army, commanded by officers belonging to its own service and commissioned by itself. The army, as far as drafted, presents now the anomaly of United States troops commanded by State or Militia officers, and, often, of Regular officers commanded by Militia officers, that is, civilians. These anomalies should be removed, and the Government understand and act on the principle that there are legally with us only two classes of troops, the regular United States troops, and the State Militia.

But enough of this. The Rebellion took the Government by surprise, and it was obliged to extemporize an army the best way it could. It unwisely calculated on a short war, and has made it cost double what it would had it counted on a long war, and enlarged its regular army to the necessary dimensions. Our people were ignorant of war, opposed to the regular army, unwilling to be regular soldiers, and supposed that the whole work of war could be done up by contract in a few days, a few months at farthest. We do not suppose the Government could have raised a regular army sufficient for the work had it tried. It probably did the best that was possible. But the whole thing is confused and anomalous. The war is not yet ended, and will not end this year or next, and Congress should endeavor to place the army on a proper footing. Receive into the regular army from the volunteer army the best of the volunteer officers, and place all new recruits, volunteers, or conscripts, and as many of the veterans as you can get to reënlist in the regular army and rank all the others, if others you need, as State Militia, and very soon you will have

a regular army equal to your wants. This is practicable and desirable, and will get rid of all existing anomalies.

We have insisted, again and again, on the importance to every nation of cultivating the military spirit. No nation is a living nation in which the military spirit is dead. We have heard all the declamations against war, and the poetic chants of the charms and blessings of peace, and perhaps we love peace as well as any of our neighbors, and are as ready to make sacrifices for it; but we are no sentimentalist, no amiable philanthropist, who sees all things *couleur de rose*, or who is able to see things not as they were, but as he wishes them. Wars, human nature being as it is, are inevitable, and the best way to guard against them is to be always prepared for them. Had even Mr. Buchanan's government had a respectable navy and an army at its disposal of a hundred thousand men, well disciplined and commanded, there would have been no Secession and no civil war. The army would have been loyal, as the great majority of our army and navy officers have been. The greater part of those who joined the Secessionists would have been true to the Union had not the Union come under the rule of a party that had always been prating of peace, declaiming against war, sneering at military men, and seeking to bring the military profession into contempt. The South, in this respect, if less philanthropic, was wiser as well as more politic than the North. The North led or echoed English philanthropy, and suffered its heart to beat in unison with the middle classes, chiefly dissenters, of England. Massachusetts was the American hotbed of American philanthropy, and she had given birth to the Peace Party, and taking upon her the character of Universal Reformer and Redresser of all grievances, had alienated from her no small part of the Union, notwithstanding her many noble qualities and her indomitable energy. But for the sentimental folly of which she was the nurse, very few officers of the army would in the hour of trial have abandoned the national flag.

The maintenance of a respectable navy and a standing army of a hundred thousand men, or even a hundred and fifty thousand men, down from nullification times, would have been a measure of economy even. This war, coming on so unexpectedly and finding us every way so unprepared, has cost the nation already far more than would have been the expense of keeping up constantly an army and navy as

large as we have named. We have had every thing to create at once, and at the greatest possible cost, for delay could not be afforded. All this without counting the high moral and civilizing influence of thoroughly educated military men, and the absorption in the ranks of the army of a large class of men who, excellent as soldiers, are worth little for civil life. We think it of great importance to a nation that it should have an honorable profession open to those of her sons who are not disposed to be merchants or traders, who cannot be gentlemen farmers, and have no vocation to be clergymen, lawyers, or physicians. It is not less the duty of a Nation to open a career to her gentlemen than it is to make provision for her poor and destitute. We know what we are saying is very undemocratic, but we cannot help that. Take universal suffrage and eligibility, if you will, but do not suppose society worth sustaining can subsist on democratic ideas. We quarrel not with political equality, but we tell you that we believe not a word in social equality, nor do you. When it comes to that, you say with the Irishman, "One man is as good as another, and, faith, a great deal better." Why do not you invite Mrs. Jones, your washerwoman, to your grand parties? and why are you so delighted when Mrs. Hauton invites you to hers? Why is it that you consider yourself nobody if your house is not above Fourteenth Street and between Sixth and Fourth Avenues? My dear sir, my dear madam, do I not know your hearts? Now, what you do against your principles, I do in accordance with mine. I own I prefer the society of gentlemen, of educated, well-bred people who give me well-cooked dinners and choice wines, to that of clowns, and I would rather my son should marry your high-bred, well-educated, graceful, modest, charming daughter, my dear madam, than that coarse, dowdish, unbred, ignorant Judy or Sukey, even though Judy or Sukey should have the most money, or bring him the larger dowry. Let us have no democratic hypocrisy on the subject. You sir, you madam, and I are aristocrats, and so would be Judy or Sukey, if she could.

Now we own that we do not believe that any nation is worth much that has no gentlemen, and no class of gentlemen who have an independent position, and are counted gentlemen, not simply because their fathers were successful shopkeepers, or became millionaires by selling grog. We believe it for the advantage of a nation that it should have

a large class of gentlemen of the military profession. They more than pay their way, if not in the shopkeeper's account-book, in that higher account-book of civilization. We want an offset to the aristocracy of trade, of money-bags. All military men are not gentlemen; men may wear shoulder-straps, and yet have mean and sordid souls; but the majority, when trained to the military profession, will be high-minded and honorable gentlemen, and their influence will tend to cherish in the community noble and chivalric sentiments, and to sustain habits of order and discipline. We demand even for the higher interests of civilization an army, and gentlemen to command it. And we demand that the profession of the soldier shall be held in honor and esteem. The world has not been all wrong on this subject, and we, in affecting to be wiser than all who went before us, but betray our ignorance and folly. The tax the nation pays to support an army commensurate with its dignity and greatness, is paid back to it a hundred times over. There is something in this world to live for besides trade and speculation. We despise not, declaim not against wealth, for wealth is a very good thing, and we know by experience, as do most authors, that poverty is a very great inconvenience; but the more avenues you open to distinction where wealth is not requisite, and where it can be obtained by personal merits and exertions, the less wealth in your community will be needed, the less expensive will be even a fashionable style of living. A man of moderate means can now be nobody, because wealth and display are our principal avenues to distinction, and no man can be in the fashion unless he has the command of a fortune, or the appearance of having the command of one. This, in a country where there are no hereditary political distinctions, is a great evil, for there all aspire to the highest round of the social ladder, and almost everybody is tempted to adopt a style of living and a scale of expenditure far beyond his ordinary income. Hence, not only real poverty where it need not be, but a constant temptation to dishonesty, fraud, and crime.

We want a military class for social and moral reasons, and demand it as a moralist and a social philosopher. But we want it, because we cannot hope that wars are soon to cease. There will be, as long as the world stands, wars and rumors of war, and every wise nation prepares for war, while it cherishes peace, and makes any sacrifice but that of

national honor to preserve it. To be always prepared for war we must honor and cherish the military spirit, and honor and respect the military profession. The contrary of this is what we had been doing for forty years before the breaking out of this pro-slavery Rebellion partly provoked by our northern philanthropy and sentimentality. We must correct our mistake, and look at things as they are, not as we may wish them, but cannot make them. Kick not against the goad, thou dull Ox. It will only prick thee the deeper. Let us then respect our military men, honor them, and be tender of their reputation. Remember they endure the privations of the camp, and risk and often lay down their lives for us, that we may sit at our ease under our own vine and fig-tree.

We, in foregoing articles, have said so much against the management of our affairs by the Government, that we are happy to conclude these desultory and not very novel remarks, with applauding it for its new military orders. We know not whether its expectations will be met or not, but we cannot see that it could have acted more wisely than it has done in placing the whole army under Lieutenant-General Grant, head-quarters in the field, and in retaining General Halleck at Washington as Chief of Staff. If the President will now leave the management of military matters to the military authorities, and exert the whole power of the civil Administration to sustain them, and to facilitate their operations, we think there is a reasonable prospect of success. Let General Grant be the real, not merely the nominal, Commander-in-Chief, and let the President be content to regard himself as a civilian, and the Chief Magistrate of the Republic. General Grant may fail, but, if he does, let him bear the responsibility. We have great confidence in him, as we have in General Halleck, who deserves not the unpopularity he seems to have. He is where we wish him, and where he can still render services to the army and the country of the highest importance.

We are glad also to perceive that finally the Government proposes to take measures to create an army of reserve. It should have been done two years ago, but better late than never. We hope the new call for two hundred thousand men will be responded to, cheerfully and promptly, and that there will be no unnecessary delay. If so, we may look forward to the campaigns of this year hopefully, as the last year of serious fighting. We will entertain, at least we

will express, no fears, and trust the country will thank God, and take courage, for we are probably in sight of the Three Taverns. But if the Administration does what it can to sustain General Grant, and leave him to carry out his military plans, we shall not blame it, if our success should not prove commensurate with our hopes.

ART. VII.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The National Debt, Taxation, Currency, and Banking System of the United States. With some Remarks on the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.* By JAMES GALLATIN. New York: Hosford & Ketchum, 1864. 8vo, pp. 61.

FROM 1830 to 1842, we, that is, I, studied the question of finance and currency, especially of currency, as thoroughly and as scientifically as we could, and fancied we understood something of the subject. Since then we have been engaged in the investigation of other matters, and have come to look upon finance and currency as lying quite out of our line, and beyond our understanding. This *brochure* by Mr. Gallatin has, however, revived partially the recollection of our earlier studies, and made us feel that, if we had time and space, we could write something on it not wholly aside from the mark. Mr. Gallatin has satisfied us that "all is not gold that glistens," and that between gold and paper there is a difference.

Seriously, we have been unwilling to express our views of Mr. Chase's system of currency and finance, because we have a high personal regard for the man, and because we feared that we might do something to impair confidence in a system which we had no reasonable prospect of exchanging for a better, and impair more or less the public credit. Yet, with what little knowledge we have on such subjects, and the little reflection we have been able to give it, we must say frankly, that Mr. Chase's system strikes us as radically unsound, and fraught with more danger to the Union than the arms of the Confederacy. Mr. Chase has done his best to demonetize gold and silver, and substitute for money a purely paper currency. Never yet has there been invented a safe system of paper money, and wherever paper has been adopted as money it has proved ruinous. Nothing can be invented or devised to prevent it from depreciating, and the legal tender notes of the Government are already at least 48 per cent. discount. While we are writing, gold is selling 63 cents premium. This premium on gold is the measure of the depreci-

ation of the Government notes. The six per cent. bonds of the Government are really nine or ten per cent. bonds, for the interest is payable in coin. This is not a favorable rate for a government in good credit, and whose ability or good faith nobody doubts. The rise of prices is simply the depreciation of the currency. To pretend that it is gold that rises, not the legal tender notes that are depreciated, is to betray an ignorance of the whole question. Congress, by law, has fixed the standard dollar at a certain weight and fineness of silver or gold, and just so much as lacks the paper dollar of buying in the market that weight of gold or silver or the amount of goods that can be bought with that weight of gold or silver, just so much has your paper dollar depreciated.

We know men, who are supposed to know something of trade, pretend that the high price of gold is artificial, and the work of gamblers and speculators, but this is not so. These may run it up or run it down temporarily, but when the constant and permanent tendency of gold is upward we may be sure that it is not the work of gamblers and speculators, but the result of the depreciation of the currency. This depreciation comes itself from the excess of currency, from throwing into circulation more paper money than is needed for the transaction of its legitimate business, more than is required to settle the balances accruing in its transactions. The business of the loyal States is not greater than it was before the war, and less than two hundred millions currency then sufficed. Now, with the bank notes in circulation, the Government, with its legal tender notes, has increased it to six hundred millions at least, and as soon as it gets its National Banks in full blast, it will run it up to about nine hundred millions. The currency being purely paper and inconvertible, it can find no equilibrium, by stimulating foreign trade, as would be the case if it was in gold and silver, for it is of no value out of our own community. It must, then, depreciate in value, and its depreciation show itself in the rise of prices. This is an inevitable law, and is an unanswerable objection to paper money.

Nor is this all. The evil is one that goes on constantly augmenting itself. As paper depreciates, prices rise, and the Government needs a larger amount for its purchases. This causes a further depreciation, which in turn demands a still larger amount. Thus on, *crescit eundo*, till a thousand dollars will be required to purchase a moderate breakfast for a single man. The depreciation of Mr. Chase's currency has not been so great as that of the Confederacy, but, if no remedy is found, it soon will be, when we see nothing ahead but virtual repudiation. And what is the remedy? We cannot go through the whole system, but as far as we can discover, Mr. Chase proposes no remedy not likely to aggravate the disease. His whole system, as we understand it, is based on a fallacious theory, and violates every principle of currency and finance that

we have been accustomed to regard as sound, or safe. Speedy and brilliant victories in the field may help us somewhat, at least postpone the evil day; but even they, if the system is continued, will not save our finances from collapse. Something might be done by requiring the National Banks to keep on hand a certain amount of coin, more still by funding the Government paper and selling its bonds at a moderate discount in the market, and making its payments to a considerable extent by Treasury drafts on the Banks from which it borrows. But how much, we pretend not to say. We refer the reader to Mr. Gallatin's able Pamphlet for sound and wise suggestions. The Government is good, and there need be no fear but it will ultimately pay all its debts.

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2. *The Life of Edward Livingston.* By CHARLES HAVEN HUNT. With an Introduction by George Bancroft. New York: Appleton & Co., 1864. 8vo, pp. 448.

THIS admirably written Life of one of the greatest and most distinguished men and truest patriots our country has produced, deserves, and shall receive, a fuller notice than we have time or space just now to give it. Mr. Livingston belonged to one of the most distinguished families of the Colonial times of New York, and was its brightest ornament. Mr. Hunt appears to have appreciated his worth, and to have had free access to all the sources necessary to the full understanding of his life and character. He has used his materials well, and has written a Life, not a Panegyric. He writes in a tone of great love and respect for his subject, and usually with praise or approbation, for there was little in Edward Livingston, less than in most men, to censure or to disapprove. He was careless in money matters, and not a first-class business man, and he paid the penalty, but he was strictly honest, high-minded, honorable, gentle, sweet-tempered, amiable, loving, hard-working, capable, learned, and eminently intellectual. He was an orator, a pure, graceful, and strong writer, an able lawyer, a statesman, and a lawgiver, all of the first order. Mr. Hunt compares him to Jeremy Bentham! We cannot forgive him for doing so. Jeremy Bentham had a reputation he never deserved, and we have never been able to get up the slightest respect for his works or speculations on Legislation and Jurisprudence, on Civil or Criminal Law. He doubtless said some good things, as what man living to eighty has not? He may have given some impulse to the movement for Law Reform, but his own ideas are rarely sound. His definition of the end of Government proves that he was no philosopher and no Statesman, namely, "The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number." So, if the greatest happiness of the greatest number can be best secured by the greatest misery of the smaller number, the

legislator may consult that misery! A philosopher and statesman would have defined the end of government to be The greatest *common* good of all. The end of the State is not the greatest private happiness of the greatest number of individuals, but the greatest *common* good of *all*, which forbids the State to sacrifice any individual, however worthless, for the promotion of the private good of any number, however great or small, and requires it to confine itself to that which is *common* to all its citizens or subjects.

We are not familiar with Mr. Livingston's Civil Code, or his system of Criminal Law, but we have heard both spoken of in the highest terms by the most competent judges. For ourselves, we suspect that we should find his penal code a little too mild for our old-world notions. We do not believe in abolishing Capital Punishment for treason or murder, any more than we do in converting our penitentiaries and prisons into palaces. We do not believe much in modern philanthropy, and the only good use you can make of some men is to hang them. We suspect we should have had some quarrel with Mr. Livingston on this subject, had we met him, and had the courage to speak frankly to him. Mr. Livingston believed more in democracy than we do, but he gave Thomas Jefferson a glorious castigation, for which we bless his memory. Moreover, Mr. Livingston's democracy never went so far as to be dangerous or unpatriotic, and he was a true American, and warmly devoted to the Union. We have had few men of whom so much good and so little evil is to be said. The publication of his biography is opportune. We thank Mr. Hunt for the ability, sound judgment, good sense, and good taste with which he has prepared it, and recommend it to the study of all our generous and noble minded American youth.

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3. *Agnes Hilton, or Practical Views of Catholicity. A Tale of Trials and Triumphs.* By Mary I. Hoffman. New York, O'Shea, 1864. 12mo, pp. 477.

WE received this interesting and well written Tale before our last number was issued, but in the severe illness that we were suffering we forgot to dictate a notice of it. It is written, we believe, by a convert to the Catholic Church, and bears all the marks of a writer to whom her faith is as yet a novelty. She sees no faults in her new friends, and finds only saints in our Catholic community. May it never be otherwise with her. For ourselves, we have found very saintly people among Catholics of every nationality, and some who were not saintly, and whose faults were greater than that of missing Mass on a holiday, or of eating meat on Friday. We remember when we looked upon an old Catholic, one who had been brought up a Catholic from infancy, with reverence,

almost with awe, but we have found that human nature is pretty much the same everywhere, and that if the Catholic Church furnishes more and surer helps to a holy life than heterodox communions, as she certainly does, her children do not always make the proper use of them, sometimes no use at all of them, and now and then lead lives less Catholic than are led by some of their non-Catholic neighbors. May Miss Hoffman never discover as much. It is not pleasant, and does one little good. It is better to love and trust, and see the world *couleur de rose*.

We have read *Agnes Hilton* with pleasure. The story is well told, the incidents are natural, the scenes are, some of them, deeply affecting, and the characters, without presenting much originality, are marked and well sustained. The style is chaste, usually correct, somewhat deficient in freedom, natural ease, and grace, but upon the whole, under a literary point of view, this work is equal to the best Catholic novels written and published in the country. The doctrine, we believe, is orthodox, the morality unimpeachable, the controversy with grandfather and grandmother very well managed, and the preaching better than many sermons we hear. All this is much, and yet we feel that it will seem cold and faint to the warm-hearted and enthusiastic writer, who has here poured out so much of her living faith and her divine love. The fact is, the matter of the book lacks for us the charm of novelty. The lesson against Pride, the chief lesson of the book, we have had repeated to us from our directors till we have grown a little weary of it. Then, again, though the alms distributed are abundant and do much good, and we feel how much more blessed it is to give than to receive, we think of that broad field of charity, which lies almost fallow, that of curing instead of merely palliating evils. Indeed, we Catholics are rarely reminded by our directors that any thing more than palliatives for social evils are required of us or are possible, and the *beau ideal* of society presented us is that of noble men and noble ladies with a long train of poor clients whom they daily feed, and of rich convents dealing out bowls of soup to the poor wretches that call daily by hundreds at their gate. All this is charming, but would it not be as well to try and arrange it so that there should not be so many needing to be fed at the convent gate, or so many in need of the charity of my Lord or my Lady? In a word, my dear Lady Hoffman, you have it in you to write something far more original, far more instructive, far more spirit-stirring than *Agnes Hilton*. Your religion, if you dare look at it, trust it, and use it, opens to you far higher, richer, and nobler fields than that you have here chosen to cultivate. Your aim should be not didactic teaching or controversy, which may be bought in any quantity, any day, in any Catholic bookshop, but to embody the rich and living soul of your broad universal faith in creation with which to commune is to expand the mind, elevate the soul, purify and ennoble the heart.