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BULGARIA

An Account of the Political
Events During the Balkan Wars

(Revised Edition)



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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

The Bulgarian Government has published in French under the heading: "The Bulgarian Question and the Balkan States", a long memorandum, evidently intended to be laid before the Peace Conference in Paris, in which the case of Bulgaria as against the other Balkan States is fully and clearly stated. A summary of the political events leading to and during the Balkan Wars, extracted from the Memorandum, with additional *official* data, made public for the first time and relating to the circumstances under which Bulgaria was led into the world-war on the side of Germany, has been published likewise in French. The present is an English translation of this summary.

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BULGARIA

An Account of the Political Events during the Balkan Wars

I.

The Bulgarian political question was put before Europe for the first time in 1876. In that year, in consequence of a rising in the district of Philippopoli, a Conference of the representatives of the Great Powers met at Constantinople, the chief mission of which was to elaborate a special form of government for the Christian populations of European Turkey. The outcome of the deliberations of the Conference was a project, instituting two autonomous Bulgarian provinces, separated by a vertical line:

1. Eastern Bulgaria, with the town of Tirnovo as its capital, embracing on the north the whole of Dobrudja up to the mouths of the Danube inclusively;

2. Western Bulgaria, with Sofia as its capital, the western boundary of which embraced the region of the River Morava with Nish, and extended to the Shar Mountain and the Lake of Okhrida in Macedonia.

In tracing this delimitation of the regions inhabited by Bulgarians, the Conference was guided by the works of travellers relating to European Turkey, and by the reports of the Consuls residing in the provinces. It took also into consideration the territory over which the Bulgarian National Church, instituted in 1870 under the name of *Exarchate*, exercised jurisdiction.

The territory of the Exarchate comprised in 1876,—speaking only of the regions which today are found outside of the Kingdom of Bulgaria—the whole of Dobrudja, the dioceses of Pirot and Nish in the Morava region, and the dioceses of Skopia (Uskup) Veless and Okhrida in Macedonia. The dio-

ceses of Skopia and Okhrida came under the jurisdiction of the Exarchate in consequence of a *plebiscite* ordered by the Turkish Government in 1872, which proved that the orthodox population¹ of these dioceses was almost wholly Bulgarian.

The refusal of the Turkish Government to accept the project of the Conference in 1876 brought about the Russo-Turkish war. The treaty of San Stefano, which terminated the war, created a Bulgarian Principality, the limits of which were fixed on the basis of the principle of nationalities, which had been previously followed by the Conference of Constantinople. However, the political circumstances had brought some modifications to the frontiers of the project of 1876. The treaty of San Stefano detached from Bulgaria two provinces: (1) Dobrudja which was given to Rumania as a compensation for the three districts in Bessarabia retroceded to Russia; (2) the Morava region with Nish, which was awarded to Serbia as a recompense for the part she had taken in the war against Turkey. On the other hand, contrary to the project of the Conference of 1876, which, taking into account the views of English policy, had deprived the Bulgarians of access to the Aegean Sea, the treaty of San Stefano granted to the new Principality a window on the Gulf of Salonika—the town itself remaining in Turkish territory—and, farther to the east, all the seacoast extending from the Gulf of Orfano to Booroo-Geul.

The mistrust of Great Britain respecting the designs of Russia on the East and the Mediterranean, designs of which Bulgaria seemed to be intended as one of the principal instruments in the future, caused the treaty of San Stefano to be submitted to a general revision by the Great Powers. The Berlin Congress, convoked with this revision in view, left of the big Bulgaria, with its ethnographic limits drawn by the Russians, only a reduced principality, comprised between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains. South of the Balkans an autonomous Bulgaria, called Eastern Rumelia, was established. Macedonia was put back under the direct rule of the Sultan and received by the 23rd article of the Berlin Treaty a promise of reforms.

In 1885, in consequence of a *coup d'état* which took place at Philippopoli, Eastern Rumelia was united with the Bulgarian Principality.

(1) i. e. belonging to the Eastern Orthodox (or Greek Catholic) Church.—Translator.

As to Macedonia, its lot, far from being mitigated, grew worse. Its condition kept the Bulgarians of the province in a growing effervescence, Bulgaria in a tension every year more intolerable, and the Balkan States in a competition more and more passionate. This is what has been called "the Macedonian question."

II.

It was in the beginning of the ninth century that Macedonia entered within the limits of Bulgaria. Since then it has not ceased from participating in the life and the destinies of the Bulgarian people. Twice, in the course of the centuries, Macedonia was even the sole refuge of the Bulgarian nationality; (1) at the end of the tenth century, when it formed the nucleus of the empire of King Samuel, while Eastern Bulgaria with its capital Preslav had succumbed under the blows of Byzantium; (2) after the Turkish conquest, when, out of the great wreck of what had been Bulgaria, nothing survived but the Patriarchate of Okhrida, sole center and symbol of the Bulgarian nationality.

The Bulgarian Patriarchate of Okhrida was abolished by the Turkish government in 1767. All the Bulgarian regions then passed under the religious authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and it seemed that henceforth the Bulgarian nationality would be simply a historical reminiscence. But Providence decided otherwise. At the very time of the suppression of the Okhrida Patriarchate the moral movement, called the Bulgarian awakening, began.

It is well known that the spark of the Bulgarian awakening was lighted by a Macedonian monk, Païssi, author of a history of the Bulgarians (1762), which was circulated and read secretly in manuscript in the Bulgarian lands, inflaming everywhere the souls of men. It was also the Macedonians who, in the first decades of the XIX century, composed and published the first books in the modern Bulgarian language.

The first aim of the Bulgarian national movement was liberation from the yoke of the Greek Patriarchate and the constitution of an independent Church. In this direction also the first initiative came from Macedonia. It was in 1829 that the Town of Skopia demanded from the patriarchate at Constantinople a bishop of Bulgarian nationality. A like demand

was formulated by the Town of Tirnovo, the ancient capital of Bulgaria, ten years later.

In the struggle which began since then between Hellenism, represented by the Patriarchate at Constantinople, and the Bulgarian people, Macedonia took the most important and the most difficult part. The Greeks were in fact inclined to make concessions to the Bulgarian movement everywhere, except in Macedonia, which they considered as a geographical annex of Greece and hence an intangible patrimony of Hellenism. In fact, in 1867, the Greek Patriarch declared himself ready to recognize the existence of a Bulgarian national church, provided it did not include the dioceses of Macedonia. The Bulgarians rejected this offer; they demanded for their church a territory delimited on the principle of nationalities. Several attempts at a direct argument between the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarians having failed, the Turkish government settled the question authoritatively, and instituted by the *firman* (Imperial decree) of 1870, the Bulgarian Exarchate.

Of all the dioceses of Macedonia the *firman* of 1870, placed under the jurisdiction of the Exarchate only two, that of Kustendil-Shtip and that of Veless; but the tenth article of the *firman* provided that every diocese, where by the way of a *plébiscite*, the presence of a Bulgarian majority of two-thirds should be established, could by right pass under the authority of the Exarch. The fear of seeing, in a near future, all Macedonia enter by way of a *plébiscite* the territory of the Exarchate, drove the Greeks to a new concession: The Greek Patriarch proposed to the Bulgarians to cede to them the dioceses of Skopia, Veless, Okhrida and the northern part of the diocese of Monastir, on condition that they waived their claims to the other dioceses of Macedonia. This new proposition was likewise rejected, the Bulgarians accepting no solution outside of the principle of nationalities. This refusal determined the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople to summon a local council, which declared the Bulgarians schismatics for having wished to introduce into the Church *ethnophyletism* or the idea of nationality.

In 1876 three Macedonian dioceses, which comprised almost the whole of Macedonia west of the River Vardar, formed part of the Exarchate. At the time of the Russo-Turkish war (1877-78), the Turkish government recalled the Bulgarian

bishops of Skopia, Veless and Okhrida. After that war, the hostility of the government to the Bulgarians was so strong, that many years passed ere the Exarchate was allowed to send Bulgarian bishops to Macedonia. In the end, its resistance gave way under the pressure of the Bulgarian population of Macedonia, which by great popular manifestations demanded the putting in force of the *plébiscite*. Successively, seven Macedonian dioceses were granted Bulgarian bishops, namely, Skopia, Veless, Strumitza, Nevrokop, Monastir, Okhrida and Dibra.

The regions of Southern Macedonia, peopled by a Bulgarian majority as the rest of the province, were unable, in spite of their constantly renewed applications, to obtain bishops named by the Exarchate, because the Turkish government, faithful to its traditional policy, wished to keep up as long as possible the Greco-Bulgarian antagonism. Nevertheless, the progress of the national Bulgarian organization continued in Southern Macedonia just as spiritedly as in the Northern. This progress was particularly remarkable in the districts of Kukush (Kilkich), Yenidje-Vardar, Voden (Vodena), Costoor (Castoria) and Lerin (Florina), where the preponderating character of the Bulgarian element asserted itself in every respect, as the statistics testify. This induced the Turkish government to grant to the Bulgarians of Southern Macedonia also seven bishops' vicars.

Receding constantly before the Bulgarian impetus, Hellenism has retired in the end within its natural limits, that is, within the regions really inhabited by the Greek race. Now, as all foreign travellers, ethnographers, and geographers have affirmed—Pouqueville, Cousinéry, Felix de Beaujour, Ami Boué, Lejean, Elisée Reclus, to cite only the French—the Greeks inhabit in Macedonia a narrow strip, intersected here and there, along the Aegean seacoast, and some isolated points in the interior, which form, amidst the Bulgarian mass, ethnographic islets.

III.

The Bulgarian people of Macedonia had already achieved their emancipation from the yoke of the Greek Patriarchate, when they were suddenly called upon to defend themselves against the unexpected attack of a propaganda organized by Serbia.

The Serbians had always considered Macedonia as part of Bulgaria. In their ethnographic maps, in their historical books, in their school textbooks, Macedonia figured invariably as a Bulgarian country. When the Bulgarian awakening in Macedonia began, it found a most sympathetic echo in the Serbian press. An exalted mind, a certain Miloyevitch, claimed, it is true, in 1866, that there were Serbians in Macedonia; but his claim raised general indignation. In his reminiscences published in 1889, in the Serbian magazine "Srbstvo," he himself says: "I came very near being ostracized or being shut up in an insane asylum." At the same time, another Serbian, Verkovitch, a learned man, published a collection of folklore, entitled "Popular Songs of the Bulgarians of Macedonia." For this collection, in the preface of which he asserted that the Macedonian Slavs were of Bulgarian nationality, Verkovitch was elected a corresponding member of the Society of Serbian Learned Men, which is now called Serbian Academy of Sciences.

Up to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Serbian government also considered Macedonia as a Bulgarian country. Hence, it showed no dissatisfaction when the Conference of 1876 included the greater part of Macedonia, with Skopia, Okhrida and Monastir, within the boundaries of Western Bulgaria. The Serbian government also saw nothing unnatural in the extension of the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church to Macedonia.

"Up to 1885, Serbia had never thought of Macedonia." This sentence was written by Mr. Milovanovitch, late former Minister President of Serbia, and is found in an article published by him in 1898 in the Serbian magazine "Delo." The admission puts logically an end to all controversy about the nationality of the Macedonian Slavs, for if Macedonia had been Serbian, Serbia would not have waited till 1885 to become cognizant of it.

Why, after having so long and so completely shown no interest in Macedonia, has Serbia suddenly made it the principal object of its policy? The explanation is found in one single fact. Up to the Berlin Congress, the Serbian designs for expansion were directed towards Bosnia and Hersegovina. The occupation of these two provinces by Austria-Hungary having shattered their hopes of aggrandizement in that direction, the Serbians fixed their choice upon Macedonia. Vienna

strongly encouraged them in the new policy. In 1882, the Serbian government concluded with Austria-Hungary a secret convention, by which Serbia bound herself not to permit on its territory any agitation on the subject of Bosnia and Hersegovina, whilst Austria-Hungary promised to support the Serbian pretensions to the Vardar Valley.

The serious internal troubles stirred up by the Radical party against the Obrenovitch dynasty in 1883, the aggression of Bulgaria by Serbia in 1885, the political crisis which followed the Serbian defeat and which ended only with the abdication of King Milan, did not allow the Serbian government to carry out immediately its plan of action in Macedonia. This plan began to be put into execution in 1889.

IV.

To oppose the Serbian propaganda was for the Bulgarians of Macedonia a secondary task. Their principal effort, since 1893, was directed towards the political emancipation of the province and its union with Bulgaria. The cultural period of the Bulgarian awakening in Macedonia was followed by a revolutionary period.

The first Bulgarian rising in Macedonia took place in 1879. This insurrection in the Struma Valley was organized, as the English *Blue Book* shows, by Macedonian Bulgarians, who had fought in the Bulgarian *legions* formed by the Russians during the Russo-Turkish war.

This first revolutionary attempt was followed by a certain lull, broken from time to time by local effervescences. In 1893, the revolutionary movement took an organized form. In that year, in the small town of Ressen (Resna), situated near the Lake of Prespa, a secret society was formed, the object of which was the emancipation of Macedonia by force of arms. This society gave being to *the Internal Organization*, which established its committees in all the towns and villages of Macedonia, and constituted a kind of State in the State.

The first result of the revolutionary agitation undertaken in Macedonia was the insurrection of 1895. This insurrection was quite remarkable, but did not attain the end it had in view, namely, the intervention of the Powers. Seven years were spent in preparations for a general uprising. In 1902,

a part of the committees, impatient for action, proclaimed a revolution in eastern and northern Macedonia. The movement was not general, but it was serious enough to bring the Macedonian question to the notice of Europe. Two of the great Powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary, made combined applications to the Turkish Government for the introduction of reforms into Macedonia.

The Austro-Russian intervention took place in 1903, in the month of February. Five months later, the great insurrection broke out. The French *Yellow Book* and the Italian *Green Book* designate as centers of the revolutionary movement the districts of Egri-Palanka, Pekhtchevo, Shtip, Prilep, Monastir, Krushevo, Costoor (Castoria), Lerin (Florina), Voden (Vodena) and Yenidje-Vardar. The English *Blue Book* fixes the number of the insurgents at 32,000.

The exclusively Bulgarian character of the Macedonian revolutionary movement is attested by the English diplomatic correspondence as well as by the *Yellow Book* and the *Green Book*. According to a report from the French Consul at Monastir, the Greeks were hostile to the liberation movement, and systematically denounced the Bulgarian revolutionaries to the Turkish authorities. As to the Serbian propaganda, it held itself, according to the same consular report, in great reserve.

The insurrection of 1903, in which several thousands perished and 127 Bulgarian villages were destroyed, brought about a general intervention of the Great Powers, and resulted in the establishment of an European control in Macedonia. This control, the principle of which was first formulated by France and which, thanks to the action of England, France and Italy, grew broader every year, would have ended in an autonomous regime, especially after Russia had given its adherence to it, had not the Young-Turks' revolution in 1908, put an end to the work of the reforms, and thus brought the Macedonian question back to its starting point.

V.

The Young-Turks' revolution raised great hopes in the idealistic circles of Europe; but it did not take a long time to undeceive all these illusions. The new regime undertook nothing in the direction of liberty; the only thing to which it

devoted itself sincerely was the military power of the empire. The plan of the Young-Turk Committee was really to provoke one by one all the Balkan States, and beat them separately. Bulgaria replied to this program by taking the initiative in the formation of a Balkan Alliance. On February 29 (or March 13) 1912, she signed with Serbia a treaty of alliance, completed successively by three military conventions. On May 16/29, 1912, a treaty of alliance was likewise concluded between Bulgaria and Greece. Into the coalition thus formed and completed, Montenegro, with which Bulgaria established a verbal agreement, was also drawn at the last moment.

Serbia, Greece and Montenegro were not bound with each other; each one of these states had treated separately with Bulgaria. This is the best proof that the initiative for the Balkan Alliance came from Bulgaria and that it formed its nucleus.

The object which Bulgaria proposed for the Balkan Alliance was the introduction into Macedonia of an autonomous form of government. This program did not please at all Greece and Serbia. For these two States the establishment of autonomy in Macedonia was tantamount to the certain loss of the province which, under a free regime, would have spontaneously assumed the physiognomy of a Bulgarian State. Besides, the Serbians as well as the Greeks had always been in favor of a division of Macedonia. In order to facilitate the negotiations, Serbia consented in the end to admit in principle the autonomy, on condition that a provision should be made for a division, in case autonomy should be denied "impossible in view of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalities, or owing to other internal or external causes." In her turn, Bulgaria rejected the idea of a division; but finally she also had to swerve from her point of view. So the treaty was concluded on the following basis, which was formulated in article 2 of the Secret Annex of the treaty:

"Serbia recognizes the right of Bulgaria to the territory east of the Rhodope Mountains and the River Struma; Bulgaria recognizes the right of Serbia to the territory lying north and west of the Shar Mountain."

The territory comprised between the Aegean Sea, the Struma, the Rhodopes and the Shar Mountain was cut by a line starting in the north from Kriva-Palanka and reaching to the Lake of Okhrida. Serbia expressly renounced all claims

to all the territory to the east and south of this line. The exact text of the passage relating to this renunciation reads as follows:

“Serbia binds herself to formulate *no claim* to the territory situated beyond the line, traced on the map hereto attached, and which, starting at the Turko-Bulgarian frontier, at Mount Golem (north of Kriva-Palanka), follows a general southwestern direction to the Lake of Okhrida, passing through Mount Kitka, etc.” (The line is outlined in detail.)

The territory situated to the west and north of the line of Kriva Palanka-Okhrida was to be submitted to the arbitration of the Russian Emperor, who could award it wholly to Serbia or Bulgaria, or portion it out between the two States.

With Greece, Bulgaria concluded no territorial agreement. The political treaty signed by the two States on May 16, 1912, was only completed on September 22d, by a military convention.

While the Balkan States were forming this coalition, their relations with Turkey became more and more strained. At the approach of autumn, the conflagration appeared imminent, and in fact it broke out on October 18, 1912.

By reason of its geographical position, Bulgaria had to bear the principal burden of the war. She had to stand the onset of the bulk of the Turkish forces, which were massed in Thrace in order to defend the approaches to Constantinople. The rapid advance of the Bulgarian offensive, the brilliant victories at Kirk-Klisseh and Luleh-Burgas and the irresistible drive on to Tchataldja, where an armistice stopped the military operations, are matters of common knowledge. In comparison with the great exertions of Bulgaria, the task of Serbia, which fought on a secondary theater of war—the Vardar Valley—was relatively easy; much easier was the role played by Greece.

The peace negotiations entered into by the belligerent States in London having failed, hostilities were resumed on February 3, 1913. Bulgaria found herself again face to face with an overwhelming task. She had to hold, at Tchataldja and in front of Bulair, the whole Turkish army reorganized during the armistice and constantly increased by reserves brought over in all haste from Asia Minor. However, for Greece—aside from the siege of Yanina where a small Turkish

garrison had shut itself up—and for Serbia—aside from the two divisions she lent Bulgaria for the investment of Adrianople—the war was finished. The Serbian and Greek armies, which in the course of the military operations, had occupied Macedonia, divided between themselves the province and installed themselves in it as masters.

The resumption of the war was marked by new Bulgarian successes at Bulair, where a Turkish army of 60,000 men was beaten, and at Sharkeuy, on the coast of the Sea of Marmora, where the twelve battalions of Macedonian volunteers repulsed in a most bloody battle the tenth army corps which had landed there. On March 26th, the fall of Adrianople, captured by assault, closed the cycle of Bulgarian victories. This last resistance broken, peace could not be delayed any longer.

Unfortunately, in proportion as peace was drawing nearer, the relations between the Balkan Allies became more and more strained. Taking advantage of the fact that Bulgaria had to remove troops from the regions east of Salonika in order to reinforce its army against Turkey, the Greeks kept driving back the Bulgarian outposts, and the latter retiring by order, the Greek occupation little by little was extended to the heights of Pangeon that dominate the Gulf of Cavalla. This Greek advance was not made without causing incidents which justly alarmed the friends of the Balkan Alliance.

More serious and more pregnant with consequences was the conflict which arose between Bulgaria and Serbia.

The Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance was signed in February (o. s.) 1912 by the Serbian Minister Milovanovitch; but shortly after this historical event, the eminent Serbian statesman died. His place, at the head of the Serbian foreign policy, was taken by Mr. Pashitch, who did not show in the observance of the alliance the faithfulness which Bulgaria had hoped for. The first breach caused by Pashitch to the bases of the alliance was his circular despatch (No. 5669) of September 28, 1912, addressed to the Serbian diplomatic corps abroad, in which he claimed Prilep, Kitchevo and Okrida, towns situated in the territory to which Serbia had expressly waived all claims in her treaty with Bulgaria. This despatch was sent on the very eve of the war against Turkey. The Serbian army having occupied Macedonia, the proposition of Pashitch not to comply with the treaty of 1912 became more precise. As soon as the armistice with Turkey was con-

cluded the commander-in-chief of the Serbian army, in agreement with the chief of the Government, gave orders to the troops to fortify themselves on a line starting from to Ossogova Mountain and reaching to the heights in front of Shtip. From that moment the Serbian ruling spheres, determined not to execute the treaty of 1912, but to keep Macedonia, foresaw a war with Bulgaria and began to make preparations for it.

While Serbia was taking these military measures, she at the same time was negotiating with Greece for an alliance against Bulgaria. The first exchange of views between these two States took place in January, 1913, according to the revelations published in the Athens newspaper "*Nea Himerá*," over the signature of the Greek publicist, G. Vassilas. The basis of the negotiations was the exclusion of Bulgaria from the larger part of Macedonia and the division of the province between Serbia and Greece. On May 5, 1913, a protocol, containing the principles of an understanding between Serbia and Greece, was signed by Boshkovitch, the Serbian Minister at Athens, and Coromilas, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. This protocol was followed by a treaty of alliance, concluded on May 19 (June 1).

The essential clause of this treaty is the one stated in Article 4, which traces the future frontier between Bulgaria on the one hand and Serbia and Greece on the other. The following is the exact text of this clause, as it appears in the text of the treaty published by Venizelos in the Greek *White Book*, laid before the Greek Parliament on August 17, 1917:

"The two high contracting Powers agree that the Greco-Bulgarian and Serbo-Bulgarian lines of frontiers will be established on the principle of effective occupation and the equilibrium among the three States as follows:

"The Eastern Serbian frontier starting from Gevgeli will follow the course of the River Axios (Vardar) up to the confluent of Bojimia-Dereh, will ascend this stream and passing through the hills 120, 350, 754, 895, 571 and the Rivers Krivalakavitsa, Bregalnitsa and Zletovska, will proceed towards a point of the old Turko-Bulgarian frontier over the Ossogova Mountain, hill 2225, following the line given in detail in the II annex of the present treaty."

From this text, as far as Serbia is concerned, two things stand out clear: (1) to the treaty of 1912, based on the prin-

inciple of nationalities, Serbia was substituting that of equilibrium and effective occupation; (2) the Serbian frontier took in not only the contested zone, on which the Russian Tsar was to arbitrate, but also the larger part of the zone on this side of the line Kriva Palanka-Okhrida, to which Serbia had expressly waived all claims in the treaty of 1912.

This compact against Bulgaria was concluded, as is proven by the protocol of May 5, 1913, before peace with Turkey had been signed, and while the Bulgarian army, relying on the faith of the plighted word, was fighting at Tehataldja and Bulair in the belief that it was battling for the liberation of Macedonia.

But Serbia and Greece were not satisfied with only leaguening themselves against Bulgaria. They endeavored, from the very outset, to draw Rumania into the coalition. They wanted to draw even Turkey into the plot. On June 8, 1913, the Rumanian Premier, in a report to the late King Carol published in the Rumanian *Green Book*, wrote:

“Today at ten o’clock in the forenoon, the Greek Minister, Mr. Papadiamantopulos, came again to speak to me about an alliance with Greece against a too great expansion of Bulgaria, and added that such an alliance could be formed by including also Turkey. I told him that as far as Turkey was concerned, I believed it to be more prudent to wait till its internal situation was consolidated. As to drawing closer to Greece, I put off my reply to a later date, when the Balkan frictions will have become more accentuated.”

While this conspiracy was being woven around Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Government, hoping against all evidence that Serbia would revert to a realization of her obligations, was addressing to Petrograd urgent requests for the emperor to undertake his function as arbiter. The Russian government, however, thought that the Tsar could not assume this role before getting the consent of Serbia. But Pashitch, who, after the signing of the treaty with Greece, considered the question settled in the sense that Serbia was to keep at any rate Macedonia, did not accept arbitration, except on condition that the whole treaty of 1912 be submitted to a revision. Meanwhile, the conflict taking a turn more and more alarming,—because the Bulgarian army had been transferred from Thrace to Macedonia and was facing the Serbians—Russian pressure at Belgrade in favor of arbitration became more em-

phatic. Then, fearing lest Pashitch should give way under the injunctions of Russia, the Serbian High Military Command, in order to cut short the negotiations, decided to let loose the war. The attack was to be made on June 26th. An officer of the French Military Staff, who has written a study of the Second Balkan War according to documents furnished to him by the Serbian Headquarters, has published in the *Revue Bleue* of 1914 the orders of General Putnik, the Serbian Commander-in-Chief, for the offensive. At the last hour, the intervention of Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, put off the conflagration; but the danger was not thereby lessened, for Bulgaria was demanding the execution of the treaty of 1912 with as much insistence as Serbia was showing on violating it.

Extreme excitement, it is true, prevailed in Sofia. The news announcing an imminent annexation of Macedonia by Serbia produced in all hearts a painful emotion. Expecting from hour to hour to hear from Petrograd that the Emperor would pronounce for the arbitration, the Government was opposing by all means the popular current which saw no other issue but war. Unfortunately, the baleful suggestions of certain circles succeeded in taking possession of the spirit of General Savoff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian army, who, without consulting with the Government, ordered on June 29th the Fourth Bulgarian Army to attack the Serbian positions in Macedonia.

It was with an unutterable emotion that the Bulgarian Ministry learned that Bulgaria had been pushed into a war which the Serbians had done so much to render necessary, but which honor and good sense equally condemned. The first action of the Government was to order the immediate cessation of hostilities; at the same time General Savoff was relieved of his office and replaced by General Radko Dimitrieff.

Serbia, though informed in time of the decision taken by the Bulgarian Government, refused to stop on its side the operations. In its turn, Greece entered the war. Rumania which demanded a part of the Bulgarian territory bordering upon Dobrudja mobilized shortly after and invaded Bulgaria. At the same time the Turkish army, breaking the peace, reoccupied Thrace and arrived at the old Bulgarian frontier. The coalition formed by Greece and Serbia attained the end it had set to itself.

Assailed on all sides, Bulgaria asked to come to terms. Negotiations were entered into at Bucarest, where peace was signed on August 10, 1913.

By the treaty of Bucarest, Rumania acquired a whole province of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, with the towns of Silistra, Tutrakan, Dobritch and Baltchik; Serbia and Greece took the whole of Macedonia, except some scraps of this province which were left to Bulgaria. The victors profited by their victory even beyond the limits they had set themselves previously. Thus, Greece, which in its secret treaty with Serbia had pushed its eastern frontier to the Gulf of Elefthera and had consequently left Serres, Cavalla and Drama to Bulgaria, was given by the treaty of Bucarest these three towns. In vain the Bulgarian delegates urged (1) that Cavalla was the natural port of Sofia; (2) that eastern Macedonia, which constitutes the hinterland of Cavalla, is inhabited by an incontestable Bulgarian majority; (3) that outside of Cavalla Bulgaria would have no port really available on the Aegian seacoast. Venizelos' reply was that he for his part acknowledged that Cavalla, of little use to Greece, was indispensable to Bulgaria; but, he added, the formal orders of King Constantine forbade him to sign peace on any other condition.

In the first days of the negotiations, Rumania had interposed to let Bulgaria have Cavalla. King Carol had even told the Bulgarian delegates that this port would be given to Bulgaria. But, at the last moment, Rumania changed entirely her attitude; in the meantime, King Carol had received from Emperor William a haughty telegram in which the latter informed him of his wish that Cavalla should be left to Greece. This intervention, dictated not so much by the Kaiser's sympathies for his brother-in-law as by the idea of depriving Bulgaria of a sufficient outlet on the Aegian Sea and making her economically dependent on Central Europe, was decisive. Thereupon, the Rumanian Premier Majoresco told the Bulgarian delegates that if they did not sign peace without Cavalla, the Rumanian army would enter Sofia.

The Bulgarian delegates, however, signed only after the conference had put on record the declaration of Russia and Austria-Hungary that the treaty of Bucarest would be revised in regard to Cavalla.

Unable to prevent so many Bulgarian provinces from being torn away from the mother country and thrust under a

new thralldom, the Bulgarian delegates tried to obtain for the Bulgarians, who had become subjects of the neighboring States, a safeguard for their nationality. They proposed to the conference the insertion into the treaty of an article guaranteeing, in the newly annexed territories, freedom of schools and autonomy of religious communities. Owing to the opposition of the Serbian delegates, this motion was rejected, although the Greek delegates had previously agreed to it.

The events soon showed how well founded had been the anxiety that had inspired the Bulgarian proposition. In fact, in Dobrudja, as well as in Macedonia subjected to Serbia and Greece, the Bulgarian Church was abolished, the schools closed, the Bulgarian books burned, the name "Bulgarian" forbidden. It was in the part of Macedonia which was subjected to Serbia that the proscription of the Bulgarian nationality was the most ruthless.

This is proven by the Serbian regulations on "*Public Security*" in Macedonia, dated September 21, 1913, some articles of which deserve particular notice.

Article 2. *Any attempt at rebellion against the public powers is punishable by five years' penal servitude.*

The decision of the public authorities, published in the respective communes, is sufficient proof of the commission of crime.

If the rebel refuses to give himself up as prisoner within ten days from such publication, he may be put to death by any public or military officer.

Article 3. Any person accused of rebellion in terms of the police decision and who commits any crime shall be punished with death.

If the accused person himself gives himself up as prisoner into the hands of the authorities, the death penalty shall be commuted to penal servitude for ten or twenty years, always provided that the commutation is approved by the tribunal.

Article 4. Where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels do not return to their homes within ten days from the police notice, *the authorities have the right of deporting their families whithersoever they may find convenient.*

Likewise, the inhabitants of the houses in which armed

persons or criminals in general are found concealed, shall be deported.

The heads of the police shall transmit to the Prefecture a report on the deportation procedure, which is to be put in force immediately.

Article 5. Any person deported by an order of the Prefecture who shall return to his original domicile without the authorization of the Minister of the Interior shall be punished by three years' imprisonment.

Article 6. If in any commune or any canton the maintenance of security demands *the sending of troops, the maintenance of the latter shall be charged to the commune or the canton.* In such a case the Prefect is to be notified.

Article 8. Any person using any kind of explosives knowing that such use is dangerous to the life and goods of others shall be punished with twenty years' penal servitude. * * *

Article 11. Any person who uses an explosive *without any evil intention,* shall be punished by five years' penal servitude.

Article 12. Anyone deliberately harming the roads, streets or squares in such a way as to endanger life or public health, shall be punished by fifteen years' penal servitude.

If the delinquency be *unintentional* the penalty shall be five years. * * *

Article 14. Any person injuring the means of telegraphic or telephonic communication shall be punished by fifteen years' penal servitude. If the act is not premeditated the penalty shall be five years. * * *

Article 16. *Anyone who knows a malefactor and does not denounce him to the authorities shall be punished by five years' penal servitude.* * * *

Article 18. Any act of aggression and any resistance, either *by word* or force, offered to a public or communal officer charged with putting in force a decision of the tribunal, or an order of the communal or police public authority, during the exercise of his duties, may be punished by *ten years' penal servitude,* or at least six months' imprisonment, *however insignificant be the magnitude of the crime.*

Article 19. Where the crimes here enumerated are perpetrated by an associated group of persons, the penalty shall

be fifteen years' penal servitude. The accomplices of those who committed the above mentioned misdeeds against public officials shall be punished by the maximum penalty, and, if this is thought insufficient, they may be condemned to penal servitude for a period amounting to twenty years. * * *

Article 23. In the case of the construction of roads, or, generally speaking, of public works of all kinds, agitators who incite workmen to strike, or who are unwilling to work, or who seek to work elsewhere, or in another manner from that in which they are told, and who persist in such insubordination after notification by the authorities, shall be punished by imprisonment from three months up to two years.¹

(Signed) PETER.

Executed at Belgrade, September 21, 1913.

VI

All its efforts to stop the hostilities, begun with Serbia and Greece having proved fruitless, the Daneff-Theodoroff Cabinet offered its resignation to the King. It was succeeded by V. Radoslavoff.

The Daneff-Theodoroff Cabinet and, before it, the Gueshoff Cabinet, had followed, during all their administration, the general lines of the policy of the Entente, and had sought particular support in Russia. The Radoslavoff Cabinet composed of the three factions of the anti-Russian party, adopted for its program to steer Bulgaria towards Austria-Hungary. It was they who signed the treaty of Bucarest.

This treaty left Bulgarian public opinion depressed and perplexed. The discussion of the events that had brought about the inter-allied war, in which, on the suppression of the censorship, the political parties engaged, made clear these three things: (1) that the order to the Bulgarian Fourth Army to attack the Serbian front in Macedonia had been given by General Savoff without the knowledge of the Government; (2) that this criminal attempt against the policy

(1) The full text of these regulations is found on pp. 160-162 of the "Report of the International Commission to inquire into the causes and conduct of the Balkan Wars," published (1914) by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And these Draconian laws were enacted by the Serbian Government for the administration of Macedonia, the population of which Serbians had proclaimed *urbi et orbi* to be *genuinely Serbian!*—Translator.

of the Government had not been conceived and executed under the influence of any foreign Power, too glad to find in Bulgaria a tool for breaking the Balkan Alliance; but that it had been simply a foolhardy act of the Commander-in-Chief who, exasperated by the refusal of Serbia to carry out the treaty of 1912, believed, in agreement with King Ferdinand, that a short lucky attack on the Serbians would impress them, and make them fulfill their obligations in regard to Macedonia by accepting the arbitration of the Russian Emperor; (3) that the Entente in general and Russia in particular, had incessantly given Serbia urgent advice to respect her treaty and submit to the provided arbitration; but that the fixed determination of the Pashitch Cabinet to keep Macedonia at any price, and the declaration of the Serbian High Military Command that it would oppose with arms every solution which should deprive Serbia of the Vardar Valley, had created a situation, the growing tension of which, in driving the Bulgarian military circles to extremities, had brought about this lamentable issue of the Balkan Alliance.

This examination of facts, pursued with an eager desire to establish the truth, quickened and deepened still more the hostility of Bulgarian public opinion to Serbia. It was proven that at no time had she thought of carrying out loyally her engagements by the treaty of 1912, that from the first months of the war she had entered into negotiations to circumvent Bulgaria, and in placing her before the dilemma of giving up Macedonia or finding herself in a struggle with a whole coalition, she had laid a trap for the Bulgarian army, into which the blindness of General Savoff let it fall. On the other hand, the resentment which on the morrow of the peace of Bucarest the Bulgarians had felt against the Entente, under whose auspices Serbia, Greece and Rumania ostensibly placed the dismemberment of the Bulgarian territories which they had accomplished, calmed down. The enlightened part of public opinion in Bulgaria became more and more convinced that if the Entente had shown itself severe towards Bulgaria, it was due to over hasty inquiries, whereby it had gained the false impression that the Bulgarian Government had made itself against Serbia and the Balkan Alliance the tool of a foreign intrigue.

The legislative elections fixed for the month of October, 1913, gave to the Bulgarian people an occasion to affirm openly its unaltered sympathies for the Entente. These elec-

tions, as it happens almost always after an unfortunate war, had for their slogan the foreign policy of the country. The Radoslavoff Cabinet demanded from the body of electors to approve his policy of a closer union with Austria-Hungary; the Opposition, composed of six parties representing the mass of the people and democratic ideals, declared energetically in favor of the traditional friendship for the Entente. The verdict of the nation was in favor of the Opposition. After having tried in vain to work with the National Assembly or Parliament, Radoslavoff, supported by the King, dissolved it on January 14, 1914, and ordered new elections for the month of February. The new elections were made under great pressure on the part of the administration; the result was, however, a new defeat of the Government. It succeeded this time, it is true, in gaining a majority of 13 votes; but this majority was due solely to the votes of the Turkish deputies who, to the number of 18, were returned from the newly annexed territory. Since then, one may justly say, Radoslavoff ruled against the legal will of the Bulgarian people.

In the meantime, the European war broke out. At that moment, Bulgaria still had full liberty of action. The Radoslavoff Cabinet had parleyed with Vienna, but had taken no engagement. The only tie which up to that time existed between Bulgaria and the Central Powers was the loan which the Government, with the help of Count Berchtold (Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs), had placed in Berlin, after it had made vain attempts at placing one on the Paris market. Even this loan was authorized by the German Government only after it had assured itself at Athens and Bucarest, that Greece and Rumania would not see in it any reason for alarm about the maintenance of the pronounced predilection shown to them for a long time by Germany.

No sooner was the European war declared than the coolness which Emperor William, in order not to displease Greece and Rumania, had shown towards Bulgaria, made way for a strong pressure to draw Bulgaria to the side of Germany and launch her against Serbia. Seeing that the King and the Government held back, he set himself to convince them that Bulgaria's task would be easy, of very short duration, and that her neighbors, all bound in one way or another to Germany, would in no wise molest her. He insisted especially upon the last point. At the very outset, he made it known to the King and Radoslavoff that Turkey had been bound to him

by a formal alliance, and that Greece and Rumania would likewise side with him. King Constantine had in fact telegraphed to the Kaiser—as the Greek *White Book* testifies—that in case Bulgaria joined the war as an ally of Germany, Greece would remain neutral. The Rumanian Government showed itself still more ardent. It informed directly Radoslavoff that as the European war related to things outside of the Balkan combinations, it had broken the solidarity that bound Rumania to Serbia; that the treaty of Bucarest did not interest Rumania any more except in the stipulations which concerned her directly, and that, finally, if Bulgaria should attack Serbia, she could count on Rumania's neutrality.

All these communications had reached Sofia before the battle of the Marne. The advance of the Germans seemed irresistible and their triumph certain. Great was the temptation for the King and Radoslavoff to take back Macedonia from the Serbians at the price of a war, which, as far as could be foreseen then, would have been quickly finished, and which, in view of the attitude taken by the other Balkan States, all devoted at the time to Germany, would have remained localized. The King and Radoslavoff, however, rejected the suggestions of Berlin.

The King as well as Radoslavoff leaned, no doubt, strongly toward an alliance with Germany; the King on account of his old ties and his turn of mind which made him see in the Central Powers the strongest prop of the monarchical principle, and especially on account of the obsession that if Russia should come triumphantly out of the war and establish herself in Constantinople and Thrace, she would not fail to oust him from the throne by reason of the immense increase of influence she would acquire over Bulgaria as a neighboring country; Radoslavoff, because during all his political career, since 1886, he had been an avowed enemy of Russia. Still, neither the King nor his first minister had dared, in spite of their foregone decision, to bind Bulgaria to Germany. They both feared the resistance of the people and the counter-stroke of the Opposition.

At the very beginning of the European War the Opposition had in fact declared for the Entente. The sentiment of gratitude and the moral affinities that bound Bulgaria to Russia; the admiration professed by the educated classes for England and France; the hope that from the victory of these demo-

cratic Powers would come for Europe a new order of things, based upon justice and the respect of nationalities—all this contributed to make the Opposition take an attitude distinctly favorable to the Entente.

The Opposition did not disguise to itself the fact that a new war would not be popular in the country. The Bulgarian people had just come out of two extremely bloody wars. They *seemed* tired. On the other hand, the conduct of Serbia had left in their heart so much bitterness and a distrust so keen, that the idea of going to the aid of Serbia at no matter what promise, seemed to them a new imposture. Nevertheless, the Opposition was convinced that this state of mind was not irremediable. The prospect of being able to realize their national unity could obtain from the patriotism of the Bulgarian people a new effort. As to the distrust of Serbia, it might be overcome by a loyal offer on the part of Serbia to right the wrong she had committed in 1913, and to re-establish the relations between the two countries on the basis from which they ought never to have deviated.

Serbia did not make the spontaneous move which the Bulgarian nation had a right to expect. When the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade told Pashitch that his Government had decided to remain neutral in the war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, the Serbian Prime Minister answered him with a few kind words, but said nothing about reparation. He also did not touch upon the question of military co-operation between the two countries.

During the first weeks of the war the Entente also did not ask for the effective co-operation of Bulgaria; they confined themselves simply to getting an assurance of her neutrality. The entrance of Turkey into the war, by closing the Dardanelles and creating a diversion in the Caucasus and toward the Suez Canal, made the co-operation of Bulgaria desirable, and determined the Entente to make their first offers to Sofia. These offers related to the line of Enos-Midia and to Macedonia east of the Vardar, annexed to Serbia in virtue of the treaty of Bucarest.

The Opposition parties kept advising Radoslavoff to join the Entente without any conditions, relying upon the principles proclaimed by the Entente of the rights of nationalities and trusting to their fairness for the final settlement of the Balkan Question. The Opposition felt convinced that if the

Entente Powers had offered to Bulgaria, as a price for her co-operation, of all Macedonia under Serbian rule only a few small towns situated east of the Vardar, it was due to transient difficulties which would disappear on the morrow of the common victory. The King and Radoslavoff, however, took another point of view. Their objection was that the recovery of a very small part of Macedonia could not justify in the eyes of the people the sacrifices of a new war, and so they replied to the propositions of the Entente by renewing the declaration of neutrality.

The measures taken soon after for the expedition of the Dardanelles prove that the Entente did not count much on the co-operation of Bulgaria, but that they proposed to strike Turkey with their own means. From the end of the month of November, 1914, to the last days of the month of May, 1915, the Entente took no further formal steps to draw Bulgaria into the coalition.

The current in favor of the Entente which had never ceased from increasing in all the classes of the Bulgarian nation had in the meantime acquired special intensity. The ever increasing effect of the victory of the Marne which was deemed to have made fate definitely lean towards the Entente; the quick organization of the British armies; the visible results of the command of the seas; the resumed offensive of the Russian forces, which did not seem to have been affected by the sustained reverses,—all these reasons had shaken the confidence even of the narrow circles, which had been captivated at the beginning by the prestige of German might. The Government itself was seized with hesitation. At the time that the Russian armies penetrated victoriously into the defiles of the Carpathian Mountains and were already bending forward towards the plains of Hungary, Radoslavoff, deeply impressed, discussed in a Cabinet Council the eventuality of immediately joining the Entente. The Dardanelles Expedition caused the utmost uneasiness to the Government. Their emotion did not grow less when they heard that Italy's entrance into the war was imminent. During all this time, Radoslavoff was promising the Opposition that he would enter into an engagement with the Entente, as soon as he should receive satisfactory propositions from them.

In the meantime the Russian front at Dunajetz was pierced and the Russian army in Galicia had to beat a retreat. The

King and Radoslavoff regained confidence. It was then that the Entente took new steps at Sofia. On May 29, 1915, the four Entente Powers—including Italy—handed to the Bulgarian Government an identical note couched in the following terms:

“The Government of the four allied Powers have decided to make to the Royal Bulgarian Government the following declarations, if it is ready to begin operations against Turkey with all its armed forces:

“1. The Allied Powers agree to the immediate occupation by Bulgaria of Thrace up to the line of Enos-Midia, which shall become a Bulgarian possession.

“2. The Allied Powers guarantee to Bulgaria, at the end of the war, the possession of the part of Macedonia bounded: (A) to the north and west, by the line Egri-Palanka, Sopot on the Vardar and Okhrida, the towns of Egri-Palanka, Keuprulu, Okhrida, Monastir being included therein; (B) to the south and east, by the actual Serbo-Greek and Serbo-Bulgarian frontiers. This undertaking is made subject to the following conditions: (2) Serbia will receive fair compensations in Bosnia, in Herzegovina and on the Adriatic coast; (b) Bulgaria will make no attempt at occupying any part whatever of the above indicated territory before the conclusion of peace.

“3. The Allied Powers pledge themselves to use all their efforts with the Greek Government to secure the cession of Cavalla to Bulgaria. As the Allied Powers, in order to do this, ought to be in a position to offer to Greece fair compensations in Asia Minor, the Bulgarian army ought to begin operations against Turkey.

“4. The Allied Powers are inclined to favor the negotiations which Bulgaria and Rumania might desire to open in view of settling the question of Dobrudja.

“5. Finally, the Allied Powers bind themselves to furnish Bulgaria with every financial assistance she may need.”

The new propositions constituted a great step in advance: (1) they embraced the Bulgarian question in its entirety; (2) they came considerably near the principle of nationalities. The King and Radoslavoff did not dare thrust them aside. To the offer of the Entente the Bulgarian Government replied by a note of which the salient passages were these:

“Highly appreciating the confidence with which the Allied Powers have been pleased to honor it, the Royal Government considers it its duty to observe that the propositions stated in the said declarations present certain points not quite precise, of the exact sense and true bearing of which it would like to be made certain, ere it takes the decision which they admit of.

“It would be proper therefore to know if the part of Macedonia, the retrocession of which the four Powers have in view, corresponds exactly with the territory which constitutes the so-called “uncontested zone,” and of which the map is attached to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912. Moreover, the Allied Powers make this retrocession subject to Serbia’s obtaining of fair compensations in Bosnia, Herzegovina and on the Adriatic Sea. Concerning these three regions, the Royal Government would find it expedient to be informed of the limits within which the compensation will be made, so as to create incontestable rights in favor of Bulgaria.

“The Royal Government should likewise have precise information of the same kind in regard to the compensations reserved for Greece in Asia Minor.

“As to the question of Dobrudja for the settlement of which the Allied Powers offer so obligingly their good offices, the Royal Government would be very grateful to the Governments of these powers if they would be so kind as to indicate to it what are in their opinion, the principles which should serve as a basis for the understanding to be concluded between Rumania and Bulgaria.”

This note of the Bulgarian Government was dated June 14, 1915. Up to August 3d, it remained unanswered. This silence did not mean at all that the Entente was at a loss what precisions to give Bulgaria, or that it demurred at the principle itself of its offers. As a matter of fact, the Allied Powers had made use of this delay and taken steps with Serbia, Greece and Rumania for the purpose of winning them to their views regarding a new settlement of the Balkan Question.

Unfortunately, these steps did not have the desired effect. In Greece the ideas of the Entente had found, it is true, an echo in Venizelos; but King Constantine, more and more subservient to Germany and supported therein by the political parties in the kingdom, had replied to the counsels of his first minister by asking him to resign. In Rumania, the influence

of Germany at that time was also great. Strongly impressed by the Russian retreat in Galicia and starting from the idea, *then as since*, that Rumania ought to make her policy subject to the situation on the eastern front, the Cabinet of Bratiano had dropped all parleys with the Entente. Sounded by the Bulgarian Government on the subject of a new settlement of the question of Dobrudja, which had been annexed to Rumania in 1913, he answered without any circumlocution that he would make no concessions, no matter at what price, and that to revert to the question would be displeasing to him. He added, however, that as the claims of Bulgaria had for their chief object Macedonia, he would gladly see Bulgaria retake, by means that seemed best to her, that part of her patrimony. The communication which Bratiano had sent in the month of August, 1914, to the Bulgarian Government that Rumania would remain neutral in case Bulgaria should attack Serbia, all the declarations which he had made since and which were conducive to the belief that Rumania would remain faithful to her traditional policy, made it possible for German diplomacy to make Radoslavoff believe that the ascendancy of the Central Powers remained always intact at Bucarest.

The steps taken by the Entente with the Serbian Government did not also have the results which they had a right to expect. After the Bulgarian note of June 14, 1915, the four Allied Powers had exerted upon Serbia very strong pressure with a view to inducing her to cede to Bulgaria that part of Macedonia, called the *uncontested Zone*, to which the Serbians had waived all claims by the treaty of 1912. This determined attitude of the Entente called forth among the Serbians a storm of indignation. The Press unanimously declared that Serbia would never consent to the sacrifices, which were demanded of her for the triumph of the common cause. Several Serbian newspapers openly remarked that if the Entente needed new allies, they should make concessions from their own territories. Others went so far as to warn Bulgaria that if she should receive Macedonia from the hands of the Entente by diplomatic means, the Serbians would not be long in retaking it from her by arms.

The members of the Serbian Cabinet were not the least eager in this campaign against steps taken by the Entente. On August 15th, the day of the anniversary of King Ferdinand's accession to the throne, Pashitch, having gone to the Bulgarian Legation at Belgrade to offer the congratulations

of the Serbian Government, told the Minister of Bulgaria that Serbia was inclined to enter the path of concessions, but she would accept in no way to restore to Bulgaria Macedonia up to the line of the treaty of 1912.

The following day, August 16th, the Serbian Parliament was convoked at Nish at an extraordinary session. After Pashitch had given an account of the steps of the Entente, the Parliament voted a resolution by which it accepted the principle of a territorial concession to Bulgaria, on condition that the vital interests of Serbia *were* safeguarded.¹

The formula *vital interests* brought the Serbo-Bulgarian question back to the point where it was in 1913, before the inter-allied war, when Serbia refused to carry out her treaty with Bulgaria. In fact by *vital interests* the Serbian Government and Parliament understood in 1915 as in 1913 the possession of the Vardar Valley and a common frontier with Greece. In other words, the Serbian Parliament, as well as Pashitch, refused to restore Macedonia up to the line of the treaty of 1912.

Now, it was precisely this which the four Allied Powers had proposed to the Bulgarian Government by a note dated August 3, 1915. This note contained precisions and guaranties which made the offers of the Entente still more satisfactory. This note was not made public in Bulgaria. The Entente itself had demanded the most absolute secrecy about its negotiations with Bulgaria, because it wished to avoid the emotion which its offers were sure to produce in Serbia and the other Balkan States, and eventually might have hampered either the conduct of the war in the Balkans—voices were being already raised at Nish for a separate peace,—or the ulterior political combinations with Greece and Rumania. Radoslavoff took advantage of the discretion demanded by the Allied Powers, and forbade every discussion in the press of the last propositions made to Bulgaria.

The regime which the Radoslavoff Cabinet had imposed on Bulgaria since August, 1914, made any agitation by the Opposition in favor of its ideas impossible. The newspapers were subjected to a preventive censorship; the state of siege was in full swing. The arrest of Mr. Krusteff, professor at

(1) The above statements dispose of the false assertion made by the Serbians then and since that Serbia had offered to make concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, including even the town of Monastir.—Translator.

the University of Sofia, who was prosecuted for having composed a manifesto, soon covered with a great number of signatures of political, parliamentary, literary and industrial persons, in favor of Bulgaria's entrance into the war on the side of the Entente, showed that the Government would not hesitate in repressing harshly any movement contrary to its views.

In spite of the menace hanging over them, the Opposition made use of all the means at their disposal to turn away Bulgaria from the path into which evil guides were intending to lead her. The parties of which it was composed, the same that constitute the present Cabinet, warned the Government especially against the terrible responsibility which it would assume, if it should commit the crime of pushing Bulgaria into a war against the Entente. Radoslavoff reassured them by telling them that he had entered into no engagement with any Power.

This was true up to September 6, 1915, but on that day he signed a treaty with the Central Powers. The Opposition knew nothing of this, because the King and Radoslavoff surrounded their actions with the greatest mystery. Meanwhile, a general mobilization was ordered. Even after this weighty measure, the King and the Cabinet tried to deceive popular opinion. The reservists were told that they were called under the colors to defend the neutrality of Bulgaria, which was threatened by the near eventuality of an Austro-German drive through Serbia towards Constantinople. To the chiefs of the Opposition, Radoslavoff said, that he had mobilized the army in order to be more ready for a quick action against Turkey, as soon as his negotiations with the Entente should reach an agreement, which secured efficacious guarantees for the achievement of the national unity.

What one saw of the preparations of the Government, however, gave the lie to Radoslavoff's assurances. Soon no doubt was left that we were face to face with a concerted plan with the Central Powers. Then the Opposition parties took a last step; they asked to be received by the King and appealed to his own responsibility. The King appeared to them firm and decided. He imagined that the war was drawing to its end, and that Bulgaria's part in it would be confined to the occupation of the Bulgarian regions under the Serbian domination. The attitude of King Constantine, from whom he had

received a formal promise of neutrality, the blandishing declarations of Rumania, whence likewise a promise of neutrality had reached him by way of Berlin, made him certain that no difficulty was to be feared from the neighboring States. Nor did he believe that the evolution of the war would set him by the ears with the Entente. To the observations that were made to him by several persons, that the Entente Powers would not forsake Serbia, and that instead of a short and localized campaign, Bulgaria would have to wage a war, long and of doubtful issue, against Powers to which he was attached by her traditions, her sentiments and her interests, the King replied with an air of conviction that if such an eventuality were really to be feared, it would stay his hand, but that it was not at all probable. Explaining himself on the subject, he said that a landing at Dedeagatch being, for material reasons, impossible, the forces of the Entente could not get at the Bulgarian army except through Salonica; but this access was closed to them by the decision of King Constantine, who had formally engaged himself to oppose every violation of the neutrality of Greece. The calmness with which the King learned of the mobilization of the Greek army was the best proof of the promises he had received from the Court of Athens.

It was under the sway of this injudicious optimism that the King ordered the offensive against Serbia. The Bulgarian army started on this new war with a heavy heart, but resigned. The High Military Command published a Draconian decree, having the force of law, which added to the cases foreseen by the criminal code more than twenty cases punishable with death. Some hundreds of soldiers, who had refused to obey, and had declared that they did not wish to fight either the Entente or its Allies, were mercilessly shot. All the large units were accompanied by courts-martial which tried cases summarily and executed their sentences without delay. More than six thousand sentences of death, pronounced and executed during the war, bear witness to the terror that weighed upon the army. The terror to which the rear was subjected was not less relentless. For having warned the King that in doing violence to the conscience of the people he was exposing himself to their wrath, Mr. Stamboliski, one of the chiefs of the Opposition, and a member of the present Cabinet, was indicted and condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Other political trials, followed by harsh punishments, showed that

the King and the Government would not shrink at any means to break all resistance to their policy.

Under these conditions—unless a revolution had been made for which they had not the means any more than they could calculate its consequences—the people had to submit. They did so. The army on its part acquitted itself of the task imposed upon it. The prospect of retaking Macedonia which the Serbians had usurped by breaking their plighted word, stifled in the soldiers during the battles the horror they felt at a war in which the Turks were their allies and the Russians their foes. But Macedonia once occupied, the army was seized again with its repugnance to the unnatural alliance into which the Government had pushed it. The necessity in which the Bulgarian soldier found himself to fight on the Macedonian front against four great European nations, of which he had always heard that they were the protectors of Bulgaria, put him in a violent moral crisis. This crisis was transformed into a latent revolt when the United States entered the fray. The newspapers of Sofia had published the fourteen points of the memorable message of President Wilson. The troops which had learned of it—for there are hardly any illiterates among the young classes of the Bulgarian army—began to ask themselves thenceforward with anguish, whether there was any sense in continuing to fight against a coalition towards which they were animated by no hatred whatsoever, and which, through the President of the United States, had proclaimed once again the principles which Bulgaria pleaded in favor of her cause and beyond which she asked for nothing. Thenceforth, the Bulgarian war against the Entente was virtually ended.

The rest is known.