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
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
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# BULGARIA

## *and Her Neighbors*

**An Historic Presentation of the Background  
of the Balkan Problem, One of the  
Basic Issues of the World-War**



By **HISTORICUS**  
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
*Prof. A. L. Kroeber*



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## FOREWORD

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**E**VER since the Balkan War of 1912 the Balkan States—Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia—have been in the limelight of public interest and the object of public discussion. The newspaper and magazine articles and the books which have been published treating of the Balkan situation, are so numerous that one could easily form a voluminous library of them. In these publications the Balkan problem has been approached and discussed from various points of view, both by those who are directly concerned in its solution and by those who treat of it as outsiders and impartial judges.

One would have supposed that with so much and so varied a material on hand, anyone desirous of becoming acquainted with the facts of the Balkan question could do so easily. Unfortunately, this is not the case, especially with the people on this side of the ocean.

It may be that the very volume and variety of the literature extant on the subject serve to befog and confuse the student of Balkan politics instead of enlightening him. Much of what has been or is being written is the product of imperfect knowledge or ignorance, while not a little is tinged with prejudice or partisan passion.

Statements that have no basis in either history or fact, are daily met with in the public press, and go to prove how dangerous a thing a little knowledge is, and what misconceptions there are in people's minds as to the real points at issue in the Balkans. And yet, a clear understanding of the various factors and phases of the Balkan situation is of great importance not only for the right comprehension of the origin of the present European war, but also for the future peace of the Balkan Peninsula and of Europe.

No one can deny that the war that is now devastating Europe was brought about principally, if not solely, by the clash of the political and economic interests of the Great Powers, especially Austria and Russia, in the Balkan Peninsula. The Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and the Bucharest Treaty of August 10, 1913, which upset the previously existing state of things on the Peninsula, intensi-

fied the political tension between Austria and Russia on the one hand, and among the Balkan States on the other. An Austro-Russian struggle for supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula sooner or later was inevitable, and it was due solely to an untoward event—the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne and his wife in June, 1914—that the conflict was precipitated.

The Balkan question has at all times been a serious menace to the peace of Europe, and such a menace it will remain so long as it is not settled in a permanent and satisfactory manner. In what way it will be settled, we do not presume to foretell, but we feel sure that if it is not settled to the satisfaction of the legitimate national demands of the Balkan peoples the Peninsula will again become the arena of political intrigues and ambitions. There will still be a Balkan question, to weigh like an incubus upon European diplomats and disturb their pleasant dreams of a lasting peace in Europe.

Every one who has studied the subject agrees that the Berlin Congress of 1878, which undertook to settle the Balkan question, proved a failure because the European Powers which took part in the Congress faced the question not from an equitable and statesmanlike point of view, for the good of the Balkan peoples, but for the satisfaction of their mutual jealousies and prejudices and the furtherance of their own selfish interests. The Treaty of Berlin of 1878, instead of bringing peace to the Balkan Peninsula, created discontent and disillusionment and left the door open to unrest and intrigue. It is to be hoped that the Peace Conference that will rearrange the status of Europe after this war will prove more farsighted and intelligent than was the Berlin Congress in the settlement of the Balkan question.

Our object, however, is not to discuss the politics of the war but to dispel certain erroneous conceptions about the Balkan situation and to establish facts which seem to be ignored by many who treat that situation.

# BULGARIA AND HER NEIGHBORS

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## I

### Who and What Are the Bulgarians of To-Day?

By the middle of the seventh century A. D., according to the testimony of Byzantine historians, the Balkan Peninsula was settled by Slavs. Their settlements extended almost over the whole peninsula as far south as Epirus, Thessaly, and even Greece. Geographical names of villages, rivers, mountains, etc., retained to this day in these countries plainly show the extent of the Slavic colonization. In the second half of the seventh century (679) a band of warlike *Bulgars* crossed over the Danube into the present Dobruja, quickly subdued the Slavic tribes living there and extended their domination to the east over other Slavic communities. What the numerical strength of these Bulgar conquerors was is not known, but the historians Shaffarik and Iretchek, whose works are considered authoritative on the subject, say that it could not have been very large.

The ease with which the Bulgar invaders conquered the various Slavic tribes, and welded them into a state or kingdom is explained by the fact that these tribes or communities lived a separate existence, independent of one another, each under a petty chief of its own. To what race these Bulgar warriors belonged is still a matter of dispute. Some historians think they were Tartars, others class them as Finns or Turks. One thing is certain: they were not Slavs. The numerical inferiority of these Bulgars to the overwhelming mass of their Slav subjects is plainly proved by the fact that in less than 200 years after their establishment in the Balkan Peninsula, they were completely assimilated and absorbed by the Slavs, leaving nothing behind them but their name to designate the people they had conquered and the state they had founded. The Slavs, who before their subjugation by the Bulgar invaders were designated by various tribal names, became thenceforth known

as *Bulgars* or Bulgarians—a name which they have retained to this day.

What the mutual and social relations between the Bulgar conquerors and their Slav subjects were, cannot be positively determined in the absence of sufficient historical data, but we have enough indirect evidence to show that the Bulgars for a long time after their conquest formed a ruling caste, which could not have had much in common with their Slav subjects. The non-Slavic Bulgar blood was limited mostly to this ruling caste, which in course of time was swallowed up in the Slav majority. How complete this amalgamation was is best proved by the fact that when in 864 A. D. the Bulgarian prince Boris introduced Christianity into Bulgaria, the language of the church was a pure Slav language, without any trace of Finnish or Tartar elements. This church language, which is still designated by many historians and philologists as Old Bulgarian, became also the language of the Bulgarian literature which flourished in the days of Tsar Symeon (873-927) and became the prototype and model for the later Russian and Serbian literatures. Its productions were freely transcribed by Russians and Serbians as composed in a language perfectly intelligible to them. With some slight orthographic modifications that were introduced into it in the course of time in Russia, so as to bring it more in harmony with the Russian language, this Old Bulgarian tongue under the name of Church-Slavic, is still used as the church language by the Slavs (Russians, Serbians and Bulgarians) who belong to the Eastern or Orthodox Church.

“The forefathers of the Bulgarians of to-day,” says Dr. Iretchek in his *History of the Bulgarians*, “were not the handful of Bulgars, who conquered in 679 a part of Moesia along the Danube, but the Slavs who much earlier had settled in Moesia, as well as in Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus and almost in the whole peninsula.” The modern Bulgarian language is not Finnish or Tartar, but a Slavic dialect, akin to Russian, Serbian and other Slavic languages. In its lexicology it is much nearer to the Old Bulgarian or Old Slavic than any other Slavic dialect. The modern Bulgarian literary language, both in phraseology and orthography, is much nearer to the Russian than the Serbian is, and an educated Russian can read and understand Bulgarian newspapers or books much more easily than a Serbian. In their popular beliefs and customs also the modern Bulgarians are close kin to the other Slavs, and are free

from any trace of Finnish or Tartar influences. The name *Bulgar* or *Blugar* (the *u* as in plug) has no connection whatever with the name of the river *Volga*, or with the Latin words *vulgus*, *vulgaris*. The spelling of it with a *V* (*Volgars*, *Vulgars* or *Vulgarions*) is sheer nonsense, due to prejudice or ignorance. In all languages in which the sound of *B* exists both in the present day and in ancient times, the word is written *Bulgar*, *Boolgar* or *Bolgar*. By the Byzantine historians, who wrote in Greek, it is written with the Greek *B*, which is, however sounded as *V* by the Greeks of to-day. To this lack of a B-sound in the Greek language is due the spelling of the word *Servia*, instead of *Serbia*, which has no connection whatever with the Latin word *servus*, a slave.

This ethnographical phenomenon of the absorption of a conquering people numerically small by the conquered, and its disappearance, leaving behind only its name, is to be observed in the history of other nations also. Gaul and the Gauls were subdued by the German Franks, who finally disappeared as such, but left their name to France (German *Frankreich*) and of the French. The Longobards or Lombards, a Germanic tribe, bequeathed the name of Lombardy in Italy, and of Lombard, to the present Italian inhabitants with whom they became amalgamated. A Varingian band of warlike Russ, likewise Teuton in its origin, in the second half of the ninth century, conquered several small Slavic tribes in Russia, welded them into a state, gradually extended their rule over other tribes, and laid the foundation of the present Russian empire. They were soon absorbed by the Slavs, just as the original Bulgars were in the Balkans, but their name still survives in the words *Russia* and *Russian*. A still stranger phenomenon is the fact that the Greeks in Turkey have called and still call themselves *Romei*, by the name of their former rulers, and their language, *Romeica*, although they are no Romans, nor do they speak Latin. It is just as absurd to maintain that the modern Frenchmen, Russians or Italians (in Lombardy) are Germans, or the Greeks are Romans, as it is to assert that the modern Bulgarians are Finns or Tartars, and not Slavs.

## II

### Serbo-Bulgarian Relations Before and After 1878

From 1459, when Serbia was definitely subjugated by the Turks, to 1829, when by the terms of the Russo-Turkish treaty of Adrianople she was constituted into an autonomous province under the suzerainty of the Sultan, the Serbians remained subjects of Turkey. The first attempt made by Serbia to free itself from the Turkish rule took place in 1804 under the leadership of George Petrovitch, commonly known as Kara George (Black George), grandfather of the present Serbian King. But the attempt failed. In 1815 it was renewed under the leadership of Milosh Obrenovitch and probably would have proved unsuccessful in the long run if Russia had not forced Turkey, by the treaty of Adrianople, to recognize the autonomy of Serbia. As an autonomous province Serbia obtained the right of managing its own internal affairs, under its own prince, by the payment of a definite tribute to Turkey. As a visible sign of the survival of the Sultan's suzerainty, Turkish garrisons were left in possession of the fortresses in the country. This arrangement, so fraught with danger to public peace on account of the contingent friction between the people and the Turkish troops, lasted till 1867, when all the Turkish troops were withdrawn from Serbia, without, however, altering the status of the country as a vassal of Turkey. This vassalage continued till 1878, when the Berlin treaty declared Serbia an independent kingdom, and the Serbian ruler assumed the title of "*Kral*" or King.

Of all the Serbian princes of the Obrenovitch dynasty, which ruled the country till 1903, when its last representative was murdered by a band of officers, the most noted was Prince Michael, son of Milosh. Both as an individual and as a ruler, Michael was a high-minded man of noble impulses and intentions, who had at heart the good of his people. Under his wise rule of eight years (1860-1868), the internal administration of the country was improved, the organization of a national army was undertaken, and Serbia began to dream of becoming, as the Serbian press complacently boasted, the Piedmont of the Balkan Peninsula, i. e., the country which was to free the Balkan people from Turkish rule and



unite them, as Piedmont had done in Italy, in one state. All these dreams, however, came to naught owing to the assassination of Prince Michael in 1868, by a band of conspirators, to whose misdeed the family of Karageorge, the rivals of the Obrenovitch dynasty, is said not to have been alien: If this charge of complicity is correct, the present King of Serbia, Peter Karageorgievitch, can claim for his party the credit of having deprived Serbia, in 1868, of its best ruler, and of having put an end, in 1903, to the Obrenovitch dynasty, both done by assassination.

Bulgaria remained a Turkish province without any political privileges up to the year 1878, when by the Berlin Treaty it was constituted a vassal principality, under the suzerainty of the Sultan. This principality was limited to the region between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains, which was known as the Danubian *Vilayet* or Province, while under Turkish administration. The territory south of the Balkan Mountains, bounded by the Adrianople *Vilayet* on the south, was formed into an autonomous province, called Eastern Roumelia, under the sovereignty of the Sultan. In 1885 this province was united to the Bulgarian Principality by a bloodless revolution.

So long as Bulgaria, as a Turkish province, remained under the immediate rule of Turkey, there could be no direct political relations between it and Serbia. The Bulgarians naturally looked with sympathy upon autonomous Serbia and envied her her privileged position. They even cherished the hope that the Serbians, as Slavs, and closely related to them by race and religion, might eventually be of assistance to Bulgaria in her own political emancipation from Turkish rule. This hope grew stronger when, in the second half of the sixties of last century, a movement for liberation was started by the Bulgarians living in Rumania. A Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee was established in Bucharest, the capital of Rumania, which by secret propaganda in Bulgaria and by its revolutionary press in Rumania was working to rouse the Bulgarians to rebellion against Turkish oppression.

The confidence which the Bulgarians placed in Serbia as the country that might help them eventually to regain their political independence, is illustrated by the following fact: On April 17, 1867, a "National Council," composed of prominent Bulgarians living in Rumania, and representing their fellow-countrymen in Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia, held a meeting in Bucharest and

adopted the following resolution: "Between the Serbians and the Bulgarians a brotherly union under the name of South-Slavic Kingdom should be established. This South-Slavic Kingdom shall be composed of Serbia and Bulgaria, the latter to include Thrace and Macedonia. The head of the newly-formed kingdom shall be the reigning Serbian Prince Michael Obrenovitch, with the right of succession."

Two delegates were sent to Belgrade to lay the resolution before the Serbian Prince and his government. The Prince received the delegates in private audience and told them that "the resolution of the Bulgarians was a patriotic act; that he accepted their proposition and would instruct the Minister of Foreign Relations to inform the Bulgarians through the Serbian representatives in Bucharest of the Prince's acceptance." In a letter dated May 22, 1867, and addressed to "the Board of the Bulgarian Benevolent Society," in Bucharest, Mr. Garashanin, Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote as follows:

"I have received your protocol (minutes of the meeting) of April 5-17, 1867, sent to me through the Serbian representative in Bucharest, in regard to some benevolent objects. Having examined the contents of these minutes, I find that nothing stands in the way of these benevolent objects being furthered by Serbia, too. Therefore, in full agreement with the basis of the proposed points we will take steps for action, leaving the details to negotiations for a complete understanding." The use of the expression, "benevolent objects," was obviously only a diplomatic expedient to conceal the true contents of the resolution.

Nothing came of this attempt at a personal union between Serbia and Bulgaria, which, be it said to the credit of the Bulgarians who first proposed it, might have led to a Balkan Confederation. The reasons for the failure of the attempt are to be sought either in the inability of Serbia to carry it through or, which is much more likely, in her deceitful purpose to make use of the Bulgarians as tools for the attainment of her own selfish ends. Mr. Chedomil Mijatovitch, a Serbian statesman, in the article on Serbia in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th edition) says that Prince Michael of Serbia "entered into understandings with Greece, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Albania, for an eventual general rising against the Turks," and that in the beginning of 1867 he formally demanded from Turkey the withdrawal of the Turkish

garrisons from Serbia. Through the intervention of the European Powers his demand was granted. Having secured her object, Serbia turned a cold shoulder to the Bulgarians, forcibly disbanded the corps of Bulgarian volunteers, who had assembled at Belgrade in the expectation of common action, and expelled from the country with them even the few Bulgarian young men who were studying in the University of Belgrade. When in 1868 Bulgarian revolutionary bands crossed the Danube into Bulgaria and tried to raise an insurrection, the Serbians remained passive spectators and offered no help.

Eight years later Serbia showed the same duplicity in her relations with the Bulgarians. In 1875 an insurrection against Turkish rule broke out in Herzegovina and to a certain extent affected the neighboring province of Bosnia. Everyone expected that both Serbia and Montenegro would be drawn into a war with Turkey in defense of their co-nationalists. Under the stimulus of Serbian promises and preparations, an insurrection was started in Bulgaria in the spring of 1876, but Serbia did not move, and the insurrection was quickly quelled in blood. When two months later Serbia did declare war on Turkey, a contingent of Bulgarians, from Rumania and Russia, to the number of about 2,000, flocked to Serbia with thousands of Russian volunteers and fought for her.

The continuation of the Herzegovinan insurrection, and especially the Bulgarian massacres of 1876, finally forced Russia to declare war on Turkey in April, 1877. Serbia took no part in the war, even at the time when the position of the Russian troops who crossed the Danube into Bulgaria, was so precarious that Russia had to ask the military help of Rumania. When on December 10, 1877, the strongly fortified town of Pleven fell into Russian hands, the Turks' power of resistance was practically broken, and within seven weeks the victorious Russians were at the gates of Constantinople. It was not until about ten days after the fall of Pleven that the Serbian army crossed the frontiers into Bulgaria and occupied towns and districts as far as Sofia without any opposition, because the Turks had no troops in them. It is utterly false to assert that little Serbia helped in the emancipation of Bulgaria. Her intervention had not the slightest influence upon the issue of the war, and it was undertaken solely for the purpose of claiming by right of possession territory that was racially Bulgarian. By the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878, Serbia obtained the districts of Nish, Pirot and

Vranya, which were inhabited by a Bulgarian population, and had formed an integral part of Bulgaria or the *Danubian Vilayet*.

Mr. Mijatovitch in his article cited above, tells us that "the treaty of Berlin disappointed Serbian patriots." He is quite right, for by its terms Bosnia and Herzegovina, which on the basis of nationality should have been annexed to Serbia, were given to Austria, while Serbia was not permitted to retain all that she had hoped to steal from Bulgaria. This, then, was what Bulgaria gained by her desire for a "brotherly union" with Serbia, and by the latter's "benevolence" towards the Bulgarians, she lost districts and a population which were Bulgarian and ought to have been included within the boundaries of Bulgaria.

After 1878, when a semi-independent Bulgarian Principality was constituted, Serbo-Bulgarian relations remained apparently normal and friendly; but evidently Serbia had not forgotten the disappointment that the treaty of Berlin had caused her. Bulgaria had to put up with the loss of the districts of Nish, Pirot and Vranya, and no accusation has ever been brought by Serbians or others against her of any attempt at agitation among her lost co-nationalists in order to create any difficulties for Serbian rule there. And yet, Serbian rule was carried on by oppressive measures having for their object the denationalization of the people. The Bulgarian language was proscribed in the schools, Bulgarian teachers and priests who refused to become agents of the Serbian propaganda were expelled from the country, and people were even forced to change their names to Serbian. A special order was issued to the Serbian troops stationed in these districts forbidding them to speak of the inhabitants as Bulgarians.

In September, 1885, the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia proclaimed its union with the Bulgarian Principality. By this act an end was put to the unjust and unjustifiable action of the Berlin Congress, which had separated a people of the same race, language and religion, who should have been united. Every right-minded man had condemned this division as unwise and unwarranted. No interests of any of the neighboring Balkan States were violated or infringed upon by this union, for Eastern Rumelia was practically a Bulgarian province, with no Serbians in it, and with only a small proportion of Greeks and Turks. The interests of Turkey, under whose sovereignty the province was, were the ones that were directly affected by the change. The general expectation

was that the Sultan would refuse to sanction the union and would order his troops into the province to occupy it. Against this contingency the troops of the Principality and the militia of Eastern Rumelia had been concentrated on the Turkish frontier towards Adrianople. While the European Powers were deliberating and negotiating among themselves, and the Bulgarians were daily expecting a Turkish attack, Serbia, without the slightest provocation and without even a formal declaration of war, invaded Bulgaria. The reason given for this treacherous attack was the flimsy pretext that by the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia the "balance of power" in the Balkan Peninsula had been disturbed. The Bulgarian troops, left without any officers—for Russia, which disapproved of the union, had withdrawn her officers who served as instructors in the Bulgarian army—met the Serbian attack, drove the enemy out of Bulgaria and crossing the frontier captured the town of Piro. The Serbian army was thoroughly beaten and demoralized, and had not Austria threatened Bulgaria with armed interference, the victorious Bulgarians would certainly have pushed their advance into the interior of Serbia. A treaty consisting of only one article, which declared that peace was reestablished between Serbia and Bulgaria, was signed by the two warring nations. Serbia escaped scot-free after precipitating the war and Bulgaria did not obtain even a pecuniary indemnity.

The failure of this attempt to seize additional Bulgarian territory; the mortification of having been defeated on the battlefield by an army that had been in existence only six years, and was commanded by youthful lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, the prestige that the war had brought to Bulgaria and the praise which the Bulgarians had earned by the progress they were making in every direction as a self-governing people—all this tended to rouse jealous animosity toward Bulgaria among the Serbians. While outwardly maintaining normal relations with Bulgaria, Serbia inwardly cherished a determination to thwart every Bulgarian attempt at the unification of the Bulgarian nation in the Balkan Peninsula and the creation of a united Bulgarian state. On her part Bulgaria tried to disregard the past and to live on friendly terms with Serbia. During the arbitrary rule of the late Serbian King Milan, when life in Serbia was quite insecure for those who opposed his policy, Serbian political refugees, of whom Mr. Pashitch, later Prime Minister of Serbia, was one, found refuge in Bulgaria. When in 1905 Austria

declared a customs war upon Serbia and closed her frontiers against the importation of Serbian swine and cattle, Bulgaria offered to Serbia a customs union and treaty, which accorded reduced rates on the Bulgarian railways for the exportation of Serbian goods by way of Varna and Salonica. Serbia declined to ratify the treaty, but the offer undoubtedly helped the Serbian government indirectly to make a more advantageous arrangement with Austria than she would have otherwise made.

A Bulgarian writer who stood in close touch with political circles in Bulgaria wrote in 1910: "We have tried more than once to be of service to the Serbians in their economic struggle with Austria, and we know positively how amicably inclined our government has been towards Serbia and with what readiness it has always come to the assistance of the Serbian government, whenever its help has been asked." Compare with this statement that of Prof. Tsvitch of Belgrade University, who in his pamphlet, "The Annexation of Bosnia and the Serbian Question," of 1909, censures Europe for having allowed the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria and for thus making Bulgaria bigger and stronger than Serbia. He also deprecates the declaration of Bulgaria as an independent kingdom, because thereby "the equilibrium in the Balkan Peninsula has been destroyed" (!).

"It is a mistake," says he "to allow the existence in the Balkan Peninsula of a state twice as big as its neighbor. There will be no peace, unless the territorial equilibrium between these states is strictly observed." These sentiments are unfortunately not peculiar to this writer. They are those of all Serbians, and confirm our statement that the feelings of the Serbian people towards the Bulgarians have been those of jealous animosity.

### III

#### Serbian and Bulgarian Claims to Macedonia

The author of the article on Macedonia in the Encyclopædia Britannica (11th edition) thus defines the region comprised under that name: *Macedonia*, the name generally given to that portion of European Turkey which is bounded on the north by the Karadagh Mountain range and the frontier of Bulgaria, on the east by the river Mesta, on the south by the Aegean Sea and the frontier of Greece, and on the west by an ill-defined line coinciding with the mountain chains of Shar (ancient Scardus), Grammus and Pindus."

This delimitation of Macedonia is, generally speaking, in accordance with the boundaries assigned to it by the best and most reliable travelers and geographers. Speaking more specifically, we may say that the natural geographic, historic and ethnographic boundary between Macedonia, Albania and "Old Serbia" are the Shar and Karadagh Mountains, the river Black Drin, and the southwestern part of the Lake of Ochrida. The river Bistritsa (ancient Haliakmon) separates Macedonia from Thessaly, while the river Mesta separates it from Thrace. The administrative division, under the Turkish rule, into the *vilayets* of Salonica, Monastir and Uskub or Kossovo, did not coincide with the geographic boundaries. The administrative partition was based upon political considerations. The aim was to give the preponderance to the Mohammedan population in each *vilayet* or to mingle peoples of various nationalities so that no one of them should form a compact whole in any *vilayet*. If these nationalities happened to be hostile to each other, so much the better for the interests of the Turkish authorities.

In this way, for example, the *vilayet* of Salonica was made up of parts of Macedonia proper and of parts that properly belong to Thessaly. The same is true of the *vilayet* of Monastir and Uskub, which comprises parts of Albania and "Old Serbia," north of the Shar Mountain.

The Serbian contention that the districts of Uskub or Skopia and of Tetovo or Kalkandelen belong not to Macedonia, but to "Old Serbia," is refuted by all travelers in Macedonia and by all geographers. The Byzantine administration as well as the Turkish geog-

raphers and administration counted these districts as part of Macedonia. Moreover, the name of "Old Serbia" does not connote either a historical or a geographical region. It is a recent creation of Serbian chauvinists for the purpose of political propaganda, and was unknown even to Serbian geographers before the middle of the last century; and even then the designation was applied only to the country north of the Shar Mountain. In 1871 a certain Miloevitch, a Serbian ultra-patriot, in his "Journeys in Old and True Serbia," extended the name "Old Serbia" to Macedonia and to more than half of the Balkan Peninsula.

We may dismiss as beyond the scope of practical politics the Serbian claim to Macedonia, based upon the historical fact that in the reign of the Serbian King Stefan Dushan (1331-1355) Macedonia was wrested by conquest from the Byzantine Empire, and Skopia was the royal residence. If one were to settle present questions on the basis of what took place five hundred or a thousand years ago, then the Bulgarians have a right to claim not only Macedonia, which for more than 130 years was in their possession, but also present Serbia, including Belgrade and the territory beyond the River Save, where Bulgarian political rule in the ninth and tenth centuries extended.

Assuming to consider the Macedonian question from the standpoint of actualities, the Serbians found their claim that the Slav population of Macedonia is Serbian and not Bulgarian upon the following arguments, if quibbles can be dignified by that name:

1. The name *Bulgarians*, by which the Macedonian Slavs call themselves, is not an ethnic denomination and does not mean that they are Bulgarians by nationality. It comes from the word *Vulgaris* and means a *boor* or *peasant*.

2. The Serbians, being a nation of warlike and rebellious nature, and the Turks on that account disliking the name *Serbian*, the Macedonian Slavs, though Serbians by nationality, have from fear of the Turks called themselves Bulgarians, because the latter designation bore the suggestion of humble, submissive subjects.

This juggling of sophistry implies that the Slavs of Macedonia have called and do call themselves, and have been called by others, *Bulgarians* and not Serbians. We have already pointed out that the name *Bulgarian* has absolutely no connection whatever either in meaning or by derivation, with the River Volga or with the Latin words *vulgus* and *vulgaris*. That the name *Bulgarian* by which the



Slav population of Macedonia has always been known is an ethnic and not a spurious name is proven by the testimony of all travelers who have visited the country, as well as by that of history. When in the second half of the tenth century the eastern portion of the Bulgarian Kingdom was brought under subjection by Byzantium, the western portion, having its seat in Macedonia under Tsar Samuel, resisted Byzantine attacks for more than forty years, until finally, in 1018, it was subdued by Emperor Basil II. Prof. Iretchek, the best living authority on the history of the Balkan Peninsula and its peoples, in his "*History of Serbia*" (German edition, 1911, p. 204) says: "These antagonists of Basil II are always designated in Greek, Arab and Armenian sources, as well as in Diocleas (a Croatian chronicler) as Bulgarians." In this western Bulgarian kingdom an archbishopric was established in the town of Ochrida with jurisdiction over the dioceses in Macedonia, which existed until 1767 under the name of "Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ochrida." It is so styled even in charters granted to it by the Emperor Basil II in the eleventh century. By the subjugation of the western Bulgarian kingdom this emperor gained also the surname of *Bulgarokthon* (slayer of the Bulgarians), by which Byzantine historians speak of him. The official titles by which the Greek archbishops in Macedonia were designated up to within the second half of the last century, and which titles conform to usage dating far back in history, likewise prove that Macedonia was considered a Bulgarian country. According to the "Collection of Divine and Sacred Canons," published by Ralli and Potli in Athens, 1885, the title of the archbishop of Strumnitza was this: "Right Honorable Archbishop of Strumnitza and Tiberiopolis and Exarch of Bulgarian Macedonia." The archbishop of Castoria was styled "Right Honorable Archbishop of Castoria and Exarch of all Old Bulgaria." This is confirmed by F. C. H. L. Pouqueville, a French traveler in Macedonia, who relates in his "*Voyage dans la Grèce*," Paris, 1820, Vol. II, p. 355, that he was told by the metropolitan of Castoria that his archepiscopal throne ceased, since 1768, to be subordinated to the autonomous archbishop of Ochrida, and that in consequence thereof the title of "Exarch of Bulgaria" was conferred upon him.

Major W. M. Leake in his "Travels in Northern Greece," London, 1835, Vol. I, p. 341, tells us that the Greek bishop of Korytsa or Kortcha, told him that his diocese was a part of Old Bulgaria. The Russian philologist, Prof. Grigorovitch, who traveled in Mace-

donia in 1844, and knew personally the then Greek archbishop of Bitolya or Monastir, says that his title was "Archbishop of Pelagonia and Exarch of all Upper Macedonia," but that formerly he had been styled "Exarch of All Upper Bulgaria." Michael Constantinovitch, a Serbian by birth and a janissary by profession, who in the second half of the fifteenth century took part in several expeditions with the Turks, in his memoirs writes of Macedonia as a "Bulgarian country." The same is true of various Byzantine historians, such as George Acropolita, Anna Comnena, George Cedrynus and others, who speak of Macedonia as a Bulgarian country and of its inhabitants as Bulgarians.

The writings of various modern travelers, who have visited Macedonia, offer undeniable evidence of the nationality of the Macedonian Slavs. Their testimony is the more valuable because they saw the country and reported what they had seen long before there was any Serbo-Bulgarian or Greco-Bulgarian dispute about Macedonia; hence, there is no reason to suspect them of any preconceived notions or partiality.

F. C. H. L. Pouqueville, former ~~French~~ consul general of France at Janina, whose *phil-hellenic* sympathies were strong, and who in the early part of the last century traveled through Greece, Thessaly, Epirus, Albania and Macedonia, for the purpose of studying the geography, antiquities and ethnography of these countries, has left us in his "*Voyage dans la Grèce*" (Paris, 1820, 5 Vols.) a most valuable description of the topography, geography and ethnography of these countries. He entered Macedonia from the south, coming from Thessaly over the Pindus Mountains, and his first stop was at the village of Piacos or Doupiari, not far from the lake of Castoria.

"Thus far," he says, "I had traveled as if in a known country, since I could talk to the people, and have intercourse with them, but here the scene changed. I was entering the country of the Bulgarians, and I was obliged to have recourse to some Slavic words, which I had learned during my stay in Ragusa, in order to make myself understood in speaking to the people." In all his description of Macedonia he nowhere mentions Serbians, but speaks of Bulgarians and of the difficulty he found in conversing with them in Greek or with the small vocabulary of Serbian or Croat words he had picked up in Ragusa. He mentions towns and villages he visited, gives the numbers of houses in them and of their families or inhabitants, and explicitly calls the population Bulgarians. He says

that the district of Serbia (Selfidjeh in Turkish) is the natural boundary between Macedonia and Thessaly and not the river Bistritsa, as the ancients had supposed, and that in the east the river (Black) Drin forms the line of demarcation between the language of the Bulgarians and that of the Albanians.

Ami Boué, a well-known French geologist, visited European Turkey at four different times in 1836, 1837, 1838, 1839, and in 1840 published his work, "*La Turquie d'Europe*," which gives a most complete ethnography of Turkey. In Vol. II, p. 6, he says: "The Serbians comprise the inhabitants of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and a part of those of the *pashaliks* (districts) of Prishtina, Ipek and Prisen." Speaking of the Bulgarians (*ibid*, p. 5), he says: "The Bulgarians occupy Bulgaria, Lower Moesia and the greater part of Upper Moesia, while they form the principal nucleus of the population of Macedonia, excepting the southwesternmost part from Castoria and on the Yenije-Karasoo (Bistritsa). The mountains between the basins of Florina and Castoria, between Kailari and Shatista, between Ostrovo and Verria and between Voden and Niausta, limit the territory where nothing but Bulgarian is spoken from that on the south, where Greek is the language of the peasant. In his "*Recueil d'Itinéraires dans la Turquie d'Europe*," 1854, Ami Boué affirms the predominance of the Bulgarian element in the various towns and districts which he visited, such as Skopia, Prilep, Tetovo, Monastir, etc. North of the Shar Mountains he mentions no Bulgarians, but speaks only of Serbians.

Cyprien Robert, professor of Slavic literature in Collège de France in Paris, who also traveled in European Turkey, in his "*Les Slaves de Turquie*," (Paris, 1844), says of the Bulgarians: "Their race far exceeds the official limits of Bulgaria, to which geographers persist in assigning for boundaries Thrace, Macedonia and Albania, three provinces which now abound with Bulgarians. In Macedonia they form the bulk of the population."

G. Lejean, a French engineer who traveled in the Balkan Peninsula in 1857-8, in his "*Ethnographie de la Turquie d'Europe*," published in 1861, accompanied by an ethnological map which has been accepted as generally correct, says: "In Macedonia the Bulgarians have occupied almost the entire territory, and have gradually pushed the Greeks towards the sea, where they have maintained themselves in a narrow and marshy strip between Platomona and Kolakia." Lejean divides the Serbians into "Serbians proper in the Principality,

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Bosnians in Bosnia and Turkish Croatia, ~~R~~slavians around Novipazar, Herzegovinians and Montenegrins," but excludes them entirely from Macedonia.

M. A. Ubcini in his "*Lettres sur la Turquie*" (Paris, 1854, Vol. III, p. 174) says: "Among the peoples of Slavic race who are immediate subjects of the Porte, the Bulgarians hold the first rank. Cut in two parts by the Balkans, they reach to the Black Sea and the Thracian [Aegean] Sea at Bourgas and Salonica, extend to the west as far as Albania and Serbia, and skirt the Danube on the north from Feti-Islam [Ada Kaleh] as far as Silistra." He limits the Serbians, who are direct subjects of the Sultan, to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the districts of Prizren, Prishtina and Novipazar, i. e., to the territory north of the Shar Mountains.

Commandant Léon Lamouche, a French military officer, who for several years was Chief of the Staff of the Inspector General of Police in Macedonia, and who therefore had good opportunities to familiarize himself with the country and its population, in his book, "*La Péninsule Balkanique*" (Paris, 1899, p. 2), writes: "Up to 1878, we may say, no one who had studied the subject had any doubt of the Bulgarian character of the Macedonians. Travelers of various origins, French, German, Austrian, English, such as Lejean, Hahn, Ami Boué, Kanitz, the Bohemian historian Iretchek, etc., are in accord on this point. The Macedonians themselves, a long time since, have been conscious of their community of race with the inhabitants of Bulgaria. At the time of the religious strife between Greeks and Bulgarians, the inhabitants of Uskup, Prilep, Monastir, were most ardent in defending the Bulgarian interests. The Bulgarian nationality of Macedonia was then considered a matter of public notoriety. In the project for the reorganization of European Turkey, elaborated in 1876 by the Conference of the Ambassadors at Constantinople, Macedonia was joined to a *vilayet* having its principal seat at Sofia. By the treaty of San Stefano it was included almost in its entirety within the boundaries of the Principality of Bulgaria, of the Great Bulgaria, which was divided later into three parts by the Congress of Berlin. . . . Even the Turkish authorities acknowledge that the majority of the inhabitants of the *vilayets* of Salonica and Monastir and of the *sandjak* (district) of Uskup are Bulgarians. I have made inquiries on this subject of the officials of many towns in Macedonia and their answers have been identical."

Lamouche estimates the Bulgarian population of Macedonia at

a little over 1,000,000, which together with the Bulgarians in the Adrianople *vilayet* would make a total of 1,500,000. The Serbian claims to Macedonia he rightly attributes to the desire of Serbia to have an outlet on the Aegean Sea, which he considers reasonable; "but," he adds, "this does not prevent any impartial observer from recognizing the Slavs of Macedonia as "Bulgarians and not Serbians."

René Pinon, a well-known Frenchman who has devoted much study to the Balkan question, in his "*L'Europe et l'Empire Ottoman*" (Paris, 1909) after adducing the various arguments by which Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks support their claims to Macedonia, and referring to Lamouche's book, says: "We would be inclined to attach more importance to the opinion of European officers, Frenchmen in particular, who have been all over their districts and have interrogated the villagers in the absence of Turkish policemen or officials, or to the opinion of a Lazarist Friar, like M. Cazot, whose functions as President of the Bulgarian Catholic Seminary in Salonica have called him to traverse alone a large number of villages in the Salonica region. Almost all these witnesses agree in regarding the Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarians. After all, it is certainly true that, up to 1878, and especially at the Congress of Berlin, the Christians of Macedonia were generally regarded as Bulgarians. They called and still call themselves *Bulgarians*."

The Englishman, Major William M. Leake, who in his works made valuable contributions to the knowledge of the geography, topography and ethnography of Greece and the adjacent countries, in his "*Researches in Greece*" (London, 1814, p. 237) says, in speaking of the Albanians and their language: "Many Slavonian words then found their way into the Albanian language, and have been increased in number by the intercourse between Albania and the extensive regions of Servia and Bulgaria, which surround it on the north and the east, and throughout which the Bulgarian dialect of Slavonic is spoken." In his "*Travels in Northern Greece*" (London, 1835, 4 vols.), Leake in mentioning (Vol. I, p. 341) his conversation with the Greek bishop of Korytza or Kortcha, who told him that his diocese was a part of Old Bulgaria, and in proof thereof adduced some Bulgarian names of villages, etc., adds: "A stronger proof is the use of the Bulgarian language, which is still spoken in some of the villages of this district." In speaking of the village of Khaivat in the district of Salonica, Leake writes (Vol. II, p. 234): "It is in-

habited by Bulgarian Christians, a people which occupies, with the exception of two or three large Greek villages, all the great maritime plain of *Lower Macedonia*." On p. 272 (*ibid.*) he tells us that in the diocese of Voden are comprised of about 100 villages of Bulgarian Christians, who in general are ignorant of the Greek language. *Leake nowhere in his description of Macedonia mentions any Serbians.*

Edmund Spencer, who is pro-Serbian in his feelings and thinks that the Serbians are a coming nation in the Balkan Peninsula, in his "*Travels in European Turkey in 1850*" (London, 1851, p. 402), writes: "Throughout the whole of that vast district, extending from the frontier of Serbia, the Danube and the Black Sea to Salonica on the Aegean Sea, and through Thrace to the Gulf of Saros, the Bulgarian language is spoken, and that people constitutes the dominant race, comprising altogether a population, according to the statements of well-informed natives and resident Franks [Europeans], of about four millions and a half." In the vicinity of Serres, "a large district of Macedonia," he says that the Bulgarians are the dominant race. He speaks of no Serbians in Macedonia.

Rev. Henry F. Tozer made a journey in European Turkey in 1861, visiting Thessaly and Macedonia. In his "*Researches in the Highlands of Turkey*" (London, 1869, 2 Vols.), he nowhere mentions Serbians in Macedonia, although he speaks frequently of the various nationalities he met with there, and gives an account of their history, customs, beliefs, etc. Chapters VII, VIII and IX, of Vol. I are devoted to Macedonia and to his journey from Salonica via Voden, Monastir, Ochrida, etc., to Albania. In describing his visit to Ostrovo, in the district of Voden, he says (p. 163): "The subject population in the country districts of all this part of Turkey is composed of Bulgarian Christians." On p. 176 we read: "The Bulgarians, who form the largest element in the Christian population from Salonica to the confines of Albania, are a very interesting people, and are highly spoken of for industry and honesty. They are the most numerous of all the nationalities inhabiting European Turkey, and are estimated at between five and six millions." On p. 186, in speaking of the Christians in Ochrida, he says: "The Christians are Bulgarians, and these, too, cease with the mountains which bound the lake on the west. The lake, which was the Lacus Lychnitis of classical times, may be said to form the division between Western Macedonia and Central Albania. In a geographical point of view,

indeed, the Scardus [Shar Mountains] might more accurately be regarded as the boundary, but the Slavonic population in this part overruns its natural limit."

In Struga, a town on the Lake of Ochrida, Tozer visited a Bulgarian school of 200 children, and was told "that other schools like this have lately sprung up among the Bulgarians of these parts (we saw one ourselves adjoining the metropolitan church at Ochrida)." In his journey from Prisen to Uskup or Skopia, he came down the Shar Mountains to the valley of Tetovo or Kalkandelen, and says (p. 353): "The scattered villages which appeared here and there are inhabited by Albanians, and so in part is the plain below; there, however, they are mixed with Bulgarians, and beyond that no regular Albanian population is found, but only a few scattered villages. Thus in this more northerly district also, as we have already seen in the neighborhood of Ochrida, the Scardus is, roughly speaking, the line of demarcation between the two races, though there the Bulgarians extend over it for a little distance to the west, as here the Albanians to the east." In Chapter XVII, where he describes "the Vardar Valley," he likewise speaks of Bulgarians.

Miss G. Muir Mackenzie and Miss A. P. Irby, two English ladies, traveled in 1863 in Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Montenegro, and in 1867 published their most interesting book, "*Travels in the Provinces of Turkey-in-Europe.*" In what high estimation this work was held is shown by a preface contributed to the second revised edition of 1877 by the late William E. Gladstone, in which he says: "I do not mean to disparage the labors and services of others when I say that, in my opinion, no diplomatist, no consul, no traveler, among our countrymen, has made such a valuable contribution to our means of knowledge in this important matter, as was made by Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby, when they published, in 1867, their travels in some of the Slavonian Provinces of European Turkey."

Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby tell us that "Bulgaria" they understand to be "not that insignificant portion of the same termed 'the Turkish province of Bulgaria,' but the whole tract of country inhabited by Bulgarians." They recognize three sections of Bulgaria as it is divided by the Balkan and the Rhodope Mountains, namely, northern Bulgaria, between the Balkan Mountains and the Danube, Central Bulgaria, between the Balkan and the Rhodope Mountains, and Southern Bulgaria, between the Rhodopes and the

frontiers of ancient Greece; in other words, Macedonia. They consider Salonica to be geographically Bulgarian, and they include in Macedonia the town of Istip or Shtip "and other towns lying on the more northerly route between Salonica and Skopia." Voden, Monastir, Ochrida, Prilep, Veless and other towns with their districts, that they visited are explicitly reckoned as Bulgarian. Neither in the text of the book, nor in the map which accompanies it, are any Serbians mentioned in Macedonia. As the two ladies were pretty well acquainted with the Serbian language and the Serbians, this omission is significant. But still more significant is the fact that in 1868 a Serbian translation of the work, made by Ch. Mijatovitch, a Serbian *savant* and ex-minister of Serbia in London, was published at Belgrade at the expense of Prince Michael of Serbia. In his preface to this translation Mijatovitch praises Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby as distinguished explorers of the Bulgarian and Serbian countries, and expresses no dissatisfaction with or protest against their classification of the population from Salonica to Ochrida, Skopia and Nish as Bulgarian, and the designation of one province of Macedonia as "Southern Bulgaria." The map attached to this Serbian translation was slightly corrected by the Bohemian Zach, a colonel in the Serbian army, who marked the Dibra District as Serbian, while the map of the original marks it as Albanian.

Mrs. Elodie Lawton Mijatovitch, wife of Mr. Mijatovitch, in her "*History of Modern Serbia*" (London, 1872, p. 168-9) in speaking of the revolt which broke out in 1842 against Turkish oppression in the Province of Nish, says explicitly that it was a rebellion of Bulgarians and Bulgarian peasants. On p. 260-1 she writes: "Between Serbia and Montenegro lie Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these two provinces expect their liberation from Mussulman rule to be accomplished by the Serbian and Montenegrine princes. A treaty existed between Prince Michael of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, by which the latter prince acknowledged the former to be the chief leader of the 'Serbian movement' and bound himself to execute any plan he (Prince Michael) might form for the delivery of Bosnia and Herzegovina." She never once mentions Macedonia as entering into this "Serbian movement," or "Serbian idea"; that is, the preparation of the Serbian nation under Turkish rule for the day of liberation."

Mr. (now Sir) Arthur J. Evans, who by his frequent travels



and researches in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Albania and Macedonia is entitled to speak with authority on the subject, recognizes no Serbians in "Macedonia proper, that is, in the country to the south of the Shar Mountains," but speaks of them as inhabiting "the lands on the other side of the Shar Mountains, that is, in the region called Old Serbia, which lies between Macedonia proper and the boundaries of Bosnia."

In speaking of Greco-Bulgarian relations later on we shall have occasion to cite the testimony of other English writers who ignore any Serbian pretensions in Macedonia and do not speak of Serbians being part of its population. But as a recent English view on the subject we will quote the following statement from "The Annual Register, 1915" (Longmans, Green & Co., London, p. 252): "It may be of interest to record here, in connection with the acrimonious Serbo-Bulgarian dispute about Macedonia (one of the worst questions of the Alsace-Lorraine type) that the problems of nationality in that region were dealt with at the meeting of the British Association for the advancement of Science, in September. No more impartial tribunal for deciding such a question can be imagined, and the erudite speakers gave their verdict in favor of Bulgaria. One authority, Sir Arthur Evans, said that the Macedonian population was 'homogeneously Bulgar,' except along the coast; and Professor Elliot-Smith, the great anthropologist, whilst not going quite so far as Sir A. Evans, also said that Bulgaria had a much better claim than Serbia to the disputed territory."

We reserve for quotation elsewhere the testimony of the American missionaries, who in their reports from 1874 to 1914 as they appear in "The Missionary Herald," make no mention of any Serbians in Macedonia, although they speak of Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs and Turks. As the American missionaries are not men with any political bias or working for any political propaganda, their testimony is of great value, for they are not passing travelers, but permanent residents in the country, whose language they are acquainted with, and with whose people both in towns and in villages they are in constant contact. It is worthy of notice that in 1880 the A. B. C. F. M. announced that as by the Berlin Treaty Bulgaria was divided into three parts—Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia—for the future instead of European Turkey Mission, the board would employ the term "Mission to the Bulgarians." Up to 1891 missionary work in Macedonia was carried on entirely

in the Bulgarian language, and only in 1892 was new work started in Albania.

Not very many Russians or other Slavs have traveled through Macedonia, but those who have done so are decidedly of the opinion that the population is Bulgarian. Victor Grigorovitch, professor of Slavic philology in the University of Kazan (Russia), made in 1844 a journey in Macedonia for the purpose of studying the language and ethnography of its population. In his "*Sketch of a Journey Through European Turkey*," 1848, he says: "The villages between Salonica and Yenidje Vardar are principally inhabited by Bulgarians. The villages in the region of Yenidje-Vardar, Voden, Florina, Monastir, as well as those between Monastir and Ochrida, are inhabited exclusively by Bulgarians, mixed here and there with Koutzo-Vlakhs and Turks."

The Russian historian Hilferding, author of a History of the Serbians and Bulgarians, who was Russian Consul in Bosnia for more than a year, in 1857 visited "Old Serbia," i. e., the region north of the Shar Mountains, and a part of Northern Macedonia. Referring to the town of Prizren in "Old Serbia," he writes: "It still lies in Serbian territory, but on its very edge is the foot of the huge mountain which arrests the movement of the Serbian element towards the south and serves as a boundary between the Serbian and the Bulgarian races. The latter has gone over this mountain to the southeast and has populated Macedonia and the eastern part of Albania."

V. Makushev, another Russian historian, who had made personal researches in some of the south Slavic countries inhabited by Serbians, in his "*Slavs Beyond the Danube and on the Adriatic*," 1867, gives the area occupied by the Bulgarians corresponding to that given by Lejean. Of the Serbian race he says: "The limits of the Serbian race, which inhabits in a compact mass Serbia, Bosnia, Turkish Croatia, Herzegovina and Montenegro, extend on the south to the river Boyana in Albania, whence they traverse the valley of the Zeta to Gussinyeh, Djakova and Prizren, where the line that separates the Serbians from the Bulgarians begins."

Professor E. Golubinsky of the Moscow University in his standard work, "*A Short Sketch of the History of the Orthodox Bulgarian, Serbian and Rumanian Churches*" (1871), enumerates the various dioceses under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, "which by their population either

wholly or partly are Bulgarian." The following dioceses in Macedonia he regards as "wholly Bulgarian": Melnik, Strumnitsa, Doiran, Voden, Moglen, Monastir, Prespa, Ochrida, Veless and Skopia. He admits the existence of no Serbians in any of the "partially Bulgarian" dioceses in Macedonia, but says that Vlaxhs or Greeks are mixed with the Bulgarians in these districts.

Professors Pypin and Spassovitch of the St. Petersburg University in their "*History of the Slavic Literatures*" (1879) assign to the Serbians the following territory: the principalities of Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Turkish Croatia, Dalmatia, part of Istria, Slavonia, the Military Frontier, Syrmia, Batchka, Banat and into Hungary." They also recognize Serbians in "Old Serbia," mixed with Albanians. The Bulgarian race they place within "the large region from the river Timok, on the Serbian frontier, and the mouths of the Danube on the one hand, to Salonica and the boundaries of Albania on the other—i.e., ancient Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia."

Professor T. D. Florinsky of Kiev University, a distinguished Slavic philologist and historian, in his work, "*The Slavic Race, Statistico-Ethnographical Survey of Contemporary Slavdom*" (1907), writing of the Bulgarians, says: "The Bulgarians inhabit chiefly the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula, namely, the old countries of Moesia [Bulgaria], Thrace and Macedonia. . . . In these regions is concentrated the principal compact mass of the Bulgarian nation. Here is the true old-time Bulgarian territory." Then he draws the boundaries of this Bulgarian territory, including almost the whole of Macedonia. Professor Florinsky is inclined to regard as Serbian the districts of Skopia, Kratovo and Tetovo, where the language of the people, he thinks, exhibits "peculiarities of the Serbian language with the retention of some characteristic Bulgarian features." But even this concession to the Serbian claims in Macedonia he makes on linguistic grounds only, with the proviso: "until the ethnographical relations in Macedonia have been investigated by a special commission of competent learned men."

Professor L. Niederle of Prague University, in his "*Survey of Contemporary Slavdom*," published as Part II of the "Encyclopædia of Slavic Philology," edited by the Imperial Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg (1909) under the editorship of Prof. V. Jagitch, the best living Slavic philologist, places the nucleus of the Serbian nation in the Balkan Peninsula in the independent

Serbian kingdom, the larger part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the independent principalities of Montenegro, the northern portions of the Turkish *vilayets* of Scutari and Skopia, and finally in Syrmia and southern Hungary (Batchka and Banat). In delimiting the territory inhabited by Bulgarians, Prof. Niederle draws its geographical boundaries, which are too detailed for reproduction. Suffice it to say that in Macedonia he recognizes only in Skopia, Tetovo and Kumanovo a mixed Bulgaro-Serbian population, while all the rest he considers as essentially Bulgarian.

P. J. Schaffarik, the famous Bohemian and Slavic historian, whose "*Slavic Antiquities*" are to this day the standard work on the ancient history of the Slavs, speaks of the Slavs in Macedonia as Bulgarians. In his "*Slavonic Ethnography*," published in 1842, and the ethnological map which accompanies it, he considers the population of Macedonia as Bulgarian.

Prof. K. Iretchek, the Bohemian historian already mentioned, in his "*History of the Bulgarians*," 1878, says: "The Bulgarians inhabit the ancient countries of Moesia [Bulgaria], Thrace and Macedonia," and then proceeds to give in detail the boundaries, which stretch from the Danube on the north along the river Timok, past Vrania, along the Shar mountains, down through Castoria, Salonica, Serres, the southern slope of the Rhodope mountains and reach the Black Sea at Little Samokov.

But the most convincing evidence against the Serbian pretensions in Macedonia is to be found in what Serbians themselves have thought or written about the country before chauvinistic ideas had taken hold of Serbian writers. We have already quoted the correspondence between the Bulgarians in Bucharest and the Serbian government concerning a Serbo-Bulgarian political union in 1867. We shall now proceed to adduce other Serbian testimony which proves that the Serbian propaganda is of recent origin and artificial in its nature.

Vuk S. Karadjitch is highly honored among the Serbians as the founder of the modern Serbian literature in the popular language, the author of the modern Serbian orthography, the collector of the best Serbian popular ballads, and as a man thoroughly familiar with the Serbian language in its various dialects. By his extensive travels in Serbia, Syrmia, Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Montenegro and other regions where the Serbian language is spoken, he gained a wide knowledge of its dialects. In 1814 he published his "*Gram-*

*mar of the Serbian Language as Spoken by the Common People,*" the first work of its kind in Serbian. In 1824 a German translation of it was published entitled "Wuk Stephanowitsch's Small Serbian Grammar," made by the well-known German philologist, Jacob Grimm, who was personally acquainted with Karadjitch and from whom he derived a great deal of his knowledge about the Serbians.

In his introduction to the translation Grimm designates the river Kulpa, the town of Cattaro and the river Timok as the lines which divide the Serbian language respectively from the Slovene, the Albanian and the Bulgarian. "Its range," he says, "extends over the following regions: Southeast Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Bosnia with Herzegovina and Montenegro and Serbia proper." No mention of Macedonia is made. But when he speaks of the Bulgarian language he says that it is spoken "in Bulgaria and in Macedonia." Quoting Karadjitch's division of the Serbian language into dialects, Grimm says that Karadjitch recognizes three dialects: Herzegovinian, Ressavian and Syrmian, and in the enumeration of the regions where these dialects are spoken, Macedonia does not appear. A still stronger confirmation of the fact that Karadjitch did not consider the Macedonian dialect as Serbian is given by his publication in 1822 of 27 Macedonian ballads, written down by himself, and on the basis of which he presented the characteristics of the *Bulgarian* language and formulated his views on a reformed Bulgarian orthography.

Stephan Verkovitch, a Serbian by birth, spent more than nine years living and traveling in Macedonia collecting popular ballads from various places and carrying on antiquarian research. In 1860 he published at the expense of the Serbian Literary Society, Belgrade, a volume of 335 songs under the title "*Popular Songs of the Macedonian Bulgarians.*" The book was printed in the state printing office at Belgrade, and is dedicated to Princess Julia, wife of the then reigning Prince Michael of Serbia. His introduction, written in Serbian, is so interesting for the light it throws upon the nationality and language of the population in southeastern Macedonia, where his researches were chiefly carried on, that we will quote parts of it. After stating that this region, comprising the district of Salonica, Serres and Drama, is erroneously believed to be peopled by Greeks or Vlachs, he says: "As I have, however, for more than nine years lived and traveled in these regions, I have had a good opportunity of becoming well acquainted with them and their

inhabitants, and being sure that it would be especially pleasing to my Slav readers to know somewhat more circumstantially and intimately about these distant brethren of theirs and about the regions they inhabit, will state the boundaries of this part of Macedonia in which these Bulgarian Slavs are settled." His lengthy description of the boundaries may be summed up as follows: To the north of Salonica "the Bulgarians extend over Kukush, Doiran, and Petrich up to Melnik; from the latter town over Demir-Hissar, Serres and Drama they reach the river Mesta, which separates Thrace from Macedonia." To the west of Salonica he places the river Bistritsa as the natural boundary between Macedonia and Thessaly, "or, in other words, between the Slavic and Greek world, and up to this river in the villages the Bulgarian Slavs have the preponderance everywhere."

In this region so defined by him, Verkovitch places four different nationalities: Bulgarian, Macedo-Wallachian or Tsintsar, Greek and Turkish, "but of all these the Bulgarians are numerically the most important, and after them come the Tsintsars. "That the Slav population is the most important may be inferred from the fact that almost every Tsinstar, besides his mother-tongue, speaks also Bulgarian; on the contrary, it is rare to find a Bulgarian who speaks Tsintsar." In regard to his calling the ballads Bulgarian, he says: "I have called these ballads Bulgarian and not Slavic, because to-day if you should ask any Macedonian Slav, 'What are you?' he would at once reply, 'I am a Bulgarian,' and their language they call Bulgarian." Verkovitch nowhere in his introduction speaks or even mentions any Serbians in Macedonia, and this omission occurs in a book issued at the expense of a Serbian Literary Society, printed at Belgrade, in the State printing office, dedicated to the wife of the then reigning prince of Serbia, and published by a Serbian in A. D. 1860, when there was no Serbo-Bulgarian dispute about Macedonia, and fully ten or twelve years before the existence of any Bulgarian Exarchate!

The two Brothers Miladinov, natives of Struga, a small town in the district of Ochrida, published in 1861 more than 650 popular ballads under the title: "*Bulgarian Popular Songs*." The book was published at Zagreb or Agram, capital of Croatia, and is dedicated to the late Bishop Strossmayer, the famous benefactor and patron of Croatian literature, who defrayed the expenses of the publication. The songs were collected from various parts of Macedonia,

namely, Kukush, Strumnitsa, Voden, Castoria, Veless, Dibra, Prilep, Ochrida, Struga and Monastir. Considering that the Croats and the Serbians are kith and kin by race and language, is it not strange that in a Croat city, at the expense of a Croat Bishop, songs from Macedonia should be published as Bulgarian without protest against such a flagrant violation of the rights of the Serbians in Macedonia?

A Bulgarian monk, named Neophyt, printed, in 1835, "in Kra-gujevats, at the Princely Serbian Printing-Press," a small Bulgarian geography, the full title of which ran thus: "A short political geography for the instruction of the Bulgarian youth, printed with the approbation and at the expense of His Serenity, the Prince of Serbia, Milosh Theodorovitch Obrenovitch, as a gift to the student youth of Bulgaria, and with the blessing of the most Reverend Metropolitan of Serbia, Peter."

In this geography, so highly patronized by the two highest Serbian dignitaries, secular and clerical, Macedonia is described as a province "inhabited by Greeks, Bulgarians, Kutso-Vlachs, some Mohammedans and Jews," and then the author goes on to enumerate several towns in Macedonia which he calls "Bulgarian." No Serbians in Macedonia are mentioned, and this in a geography printed at the expense of a Serbian Prince and accompanied with the blessing of a Serbian Archbishop!

Dimitri Stephanovitch, a Serbian, and a warm advocate of a Pan-Slavic Federation, in his French pamphlet, "*Slavs and Greeks in Turkey*" (Paris, 1861), demands as the portion due to Serbia in this Federation, only Bosnia and Novipazar. Vladimir Iovanovitch, also a Serbian, in his book, "*The Serbians and the Mission of Serbia in Eastern Europe*," thus defines "Old Serbia": "It is the Serbians of Herzegovina, Bosnia and Metokhia, called Old Serbia." The Serbian author who concealed his name under the initials, "C. C.," in his pamphlet, "*The Eastern Question and Serbia*" (Belgrade, 1870), writes: "It is a mistake to believe that in Thrace, Rumelia and Macedonia there are any Greeks. The latter form the majority only in the towns along the coast of the Aegean Sea; but the rural population is *purely Bulgarian*." Vesselinovitch, a Serbian writer, in his pamphlet, "*The Serbians in Macedonia*," does not deny that as early as the tenth century "the Slavs of Macedonia called themselves by the political name of *Bulgarians*, and that their country has borne the name of *Bulgarian territory*."

Aside from the above quoted evidence, there are three official documents of primary importance that affirm most emphatically the nationality of the Macedonian Slavs and classify Macedonia as Bulgarian.

In order to put an end to the Church strife between the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarians, who demanded a separate church administration, the Turkish government, in 1870, issued a charter establishing such an organization under the name of "Exarchate." This charter was principally based upon a project previously presented by the Greek Patriarch for the solution of the question. In this project the Patriarch was willing to assent to the constitution of a Bulgarian Exarchate, provided its jurisdiction was limited to the dioceses or districts comprised in Bulgaria proper, the territory between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains. The Bulgarians refused to accept the project and demanded that the dioceses in Thrace and Macedonia should also be included. To reconcile the two sides, the Turkish government in the tenth article of the charter enumerated the seventeen dioceses of which the Exarchate was to be formed, sixteen of which (including Nish and Pirot) were in Bulgaria proper, and only one diocese, that of Veless, was in Macedonia. But fully aware that these seventeen dioceses did not include all the territory inhabited by Bulgarians, the Turkish government added the following clause to the above article:

"If all or at least two-thirds of the inhabitants of the Orthodox rite of places other than those enumerated and named above wish to submit themselves to the Bulgarian Exarchate in their spiritual affairs, and if this is proven and established, they will be authorized to do so; but this cannot be done except on the demand and by the consent of the whole or at least two-thirds of the inhabitants."

The Greek Patriarchate refused to recognize this charter solely because of this clause, for in every other of its provisions, the charter is based upon the previous patriarchal project, and makes the Exarchate in every respect subordinate to the Greek Patriarchate. Although the charter included in the Exarchate the dioceses of Nish, Pirot and Veless, which the Serbians pretend are by nationality Serbian; although Bulgarian bishops on the strength of the Imperial charter were in the course of time sent to seven dioceses in Macedonia, no Serbian protest was ever raised in defence of any Serbian rights in Macedonia. If Macedonia were a Serbian country, why was no protest made?



2

In December, 1876, after the massacres of Bulgarians in the spring of that year, a European Conference, composed of the Ambassadors to Turkey and of special delegates of the Great Powers, met at Constantinople to elaborate an autonomous administration for Bulgaria. One of the prominent members of this conference was the late Marquis of Salisbury, then Secretary for India, and later Prime Minister of Great Britain. The territory and the people that this Conference recognized as Bulgaria and as Bulgarians is best shown by the project it presented for autonomy, in the elaboration of which the late Eugene Schuyler, U. S. Consul-General in Constantinople, had no small share. The first article of the project reads thus:

“Of the territories below designated, and conformably to the map hereto attached, two *vilayets* (provinces) will be formed, which shall be administered in the manner specified below:

“The Eastern *vilayet*, which will have its chief seat at Tirnovo, will be composed of the districts of Rustchuk, Tirnovo, Tultcha, Varna, Slivno, Philippopolis (excepting Sultan-Yeri and Akhiritchelebi), and the counties of Kirk-Kilisseh, Mustapha Pasha and Kizil-Agatch.

“The Western *vilayet*, the chief seat of which will be Sofia, will be composed of the districts of Sofia, Vidin, Nish, Uskub, Bitolya (excepting two counties on the south), a part of the district of Serres (three counties on the north), and the counties of Strumnitsa, Tikvesh, Veless and Castoria.”

In the minutes of the deliberations and discussions of the Conference a great deal is said about guaranteeing the rights of the Greek and Turkish minorities in these two *vilayets*, but not a word is said by any one about any Serbians in Macedonia. No one of the delegates in the Conference ever questioned the essentially Bulgarian character of the two *vilayets*. Greek and Turkish protests, mostly made by order of the Turkish authorities, were presented to the Conference against its project as favoring the Bulgarians and contesting the Bulgarian character of the enumerated districts. Not one protest or declaration ever came from any Serbians complaining of the violation of Serbian rights.

On January 31, 1878, at the end of the Russo-Turkish war, “bases of peace with Russia” were signed at Adrianople by Russian and Turkish plenipotentiaries. The first article of the agreement was as follows:

“Bulgaria within the limits determined by the majority of the

Bulgarian population and which, in no case, will be less than those indicated by the Conference of Constantinople, will be erected into an autonomous principality, tributary, with a national Christian government and a native militia."

Article 6 of the Treaty of San Stefano, which brought the Russo-Turkish war to a definite close, designates in detail the boundaries of the newly-created Bulgarian Principality, which included nearly the whole of Macedonia and of Thrace almost up to Adrianople. The Greeks especially raised an outcry against this article; the Serbians were significantly dumb.

Some of the European Powers, chiefly England, took exception to this treaty, fearing that a "great" Bulgaria would prove a cat's paw of Russia. A European Congress was convened in June, 1878, in Berlin, and the Treaty of San Stefano was revised. By the treaty of Berlin, which replaced that of San Stefano, Bulgaria was arbitrarily divided into three parts: 1, the Principality of Bulgaria, between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains; 2, the autonomous Province of Eastern Rumelia, south of the Balkans; 3, Macedonia, for which a reformed administration was to be provided. The districts of Nish, Pirot and Vrania, which the Sultan's charter of the Exarchate, the Conference of Constantinople and the Treaty of San Stefano had recognized as Bulgarian, were arbitrarily annexed to Serbia, while more than half of Dobrudja was likewise arbitrarily detached from Bulgaria and given to Rumania to compensate her for the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia. No questions were asked of the population of these territories as to the changes made; they were treated as chattels fit for barter.

In the most interesting work by the late William T. Stead, "*The M. P. for Russia*" (London, 1909), we find what competent people thought and said about the work of the Berlin Congress. Mr. Gladstone and other prominent Liberals in England strongly disapproved of it. Madame Novikov, a prominent Russian lady, who on account of her connections with official circles in Russia and her influence in England, was called "The M. P. for Russia," in a letter to Mr. Stead, in 1878, writes: "I cannot understand how it is that Englishmen—even liberal Englishmen—should so strangely ignore the fact that Eastern Rumelia, so far from being coextensive with Southern Bulgaria, does not include one-half of the Bulgarian lands south of the Balkan." The late Prince Gortchakov, Chancellor of the Russian Empire, in a conversation with Madame Novikov, told

her: "Surely you know that I was strongly opposed to the partition of Bulgaria; but to start a new war on their behalf was more than I dared to do."

The late Ivan Aksakov, the influential President of the Slavic Association, and a prominent public man in Russia, in a public speech in Moscow soon after the Berlin Treaty was signed, made the following statement: "Never did any war cause such sacrifices, prompted by sublime charity, as this which had been undertaken for the sole purpose of delivering all the Bulgarians from the Turkish yoke. By the Treaty of San Stefano the whole of Bulgaria was freed. But now it would appear, with the sanction of the self-same generous liberator of Bulgaria, Bulgaria is torn asunder alive, and the best, the richest portion of her territory finds itself anew under the Turkish yoke."

The late General Ignatiev, for many years Russian Ambassador to Turkey, and author of the San Stefano Treaty, who was thoroughly acquainted with the Balkan Peninsula, in speaking with Mr. Stead in the spring of 1888, said: "The Bulgaria of San Stefano is only the Bulgaria of the Constantinople Conference with rectifications necessitated by closer knowledge of the ethnographical and geographical details. In the treaty of San Stefano I proposed to construct a Bulgaria that would be homogeneous as regards nationality and religion."

The late Prince Bismarck, in his famous speech of February 19, 1878, in the Reichstag, made this statement: "The ethnographical situation of Bulgaria, as I know it from authentic sources and as it is evident from the best map we know of, that of Kiepert, is the following: the limits of the nationality come down on the west almost without any admixture to beyond Salonica, and stretch on the east with a little admixture of Turkish elements to the Black Sea."

It is hardly necessary to waste time in replying to the Serbian assertion that the Macedonians, though Serbians by nationality, call themselves Bulgarians for fear of the Turks, who dislike the Serbians on account of their warlike and rebellious qualities. The assertion is historically untrue. Before the Serbian rebellion of 1804, the Serbians were so abject in their submission to the Turks that a traveler of the sixteenth century describes the people as "poor captives, none of whom dared to lift up his head." It is strangely significant that the Greeks make use of the same argument, *mutatis*

*mutandis*, to prove that the Macedonians are Greeks. If it were true that the Macedonian Serbians concealed their nationality under the name of Bulgarians, why is it that the Serbians in Bosnia and in the Province of Novipazar north of the Shar Mountains never adopted the same subterfuge, but have persisted in calling themselves Serbians?

We have said enough, we think, to show incontrovertibly that the Macedonian Slavs by nationality are and always have been Bulgarians; that this name by which they have called themselves and have been called by their neighbors—Turks, Albanians, Greeks, Vlachs, and even Serbians—as well as by foreign and Slavic travelers, historians, philologists, ethnographers and statesmen, is an ethnic name and not a nickname or a subterfuge. To the twaddle of the Serbians we have opposed the authority of distinguished men who have written and spoken without partiality or prejudice, and who enjoy a world-wide reputation. It was reserved, forsooth, for a few Serbian professors of a third-rate Belgrade university, whose reputation does not extend beyond its precincts, or the outskirts of the city, to discover that all these men, from Pouqueville down to Bismarck, were mistaken or deluded in believing that the Macedonians are Bulgarians, and to pronounce all the ethnographic maps and statistics of trustworthy travelers and cartographers like Misses Mackenzie and Irby, Lejean, Boué, Shaffarik, Kiepert, Réclus and others, erroneous and unreliable. For these Serbian professors the greatest authority on the Macedonian question is a certain Serbian Goptchevitch, whose work on "Macedonia and Old Serbia" has been condemned by all prominent Slavists as biased, untruthful and untrustworthy, and to which the only criticism vouchsafed by the great Slavist Jagitch was: "What a pity for the fine paper and the good print—the two sterling qualities of the work."

We refrain from entering into any discussion about the language of the Macedonian Bulgarians, for it can be of no profit or interest to people who are ignorant of both Serbian and Bulgarian. We could easily show that this language is a Bulgarian and not a Serbian dialect. It has been recognized as such by all Slavic philologists. Dr. V. Oblak testifies that "beginning with Grigorovitch down to Kalina [a Polish philologist] and Lavroy [a Russian philologist] the Macedonian dialects on the whole—even to isolated exceptions—are reckoned as belonging to the Bulgarian

language-stock, and by our knowledge of them to-day there is hardly a single serious great scholar who would dispute this connection." American missionaries carried on their work in Macedonia entirely in Bulgarian prior to the occupation of the country by the Serbians in 1914, when, as Mr. W. P. Clarke writes, the authorities forbade preaching in Bulgarian (*Missionary Herald*, 1915, p. 519). Only Bulgarian Scriptures and tracts were circulated in Macedonia, as is shown by the following letter written by an American missionary who spent many years at Monastir and Salonica, which he left nineteen and fifteen years ago, respectively: "Previous to 1897, as I remember, there were almost no sales of Serbian Scriptures. Whatever was sold was sold in the vicinity of Uskub, where there were refugees from Old Serbia or travelers. My colporteur never took more than one or two Serb Testaments and that as 'samples,' on his tour. North of the Shar Mountains the language is Serbian, and there the greater part of sales of Serbian Scriptures were made. While I was in Macedonia I met quite a number, here and there, who had been to seek employment in Serbia, who could speak Serbian learned there. I do not remember one who spoke Serbian as his home language. My experience is that with the exception of a small minority in the border towns from Tetovo (Kalkandelen) and Skopia to Komanovo there are none in Macedonia who speak Serbian as their mother tongue."

Prof. L. Niederle, a well-known Bohemian ethnographer and historian, gives the following conclusions as those of an objective investigator:

1. The Slavs in Macedonia and Old Serbia represent a people whose national sentiment up to this time is not fully and in equal measure developed, in comparison with the two Slavic neighbors, that is, Serbia and Bulgaria.

2. There is no doubt that the larger part of these Slavs feel and declare themselves to be Bulgarians; moreover, this is an old, historical denomination, that has not resulted only from the Bulgarian church propaganda of the last decades. The name "Serbian," although these territories in some past time were attached to the Serbian state, has not taken root.

3. From the philological point of view the language of the Macedonian Slavs, although it represents particularly a group of local dialects, is, in its chief features, nearer to the Bulgarian than

to the Serbian language. In consequence of this, he counts the Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarians, and recognizes that only in "Old Serbia" are a considerable number of families found that regard themselves as Serbians.

To this dispassionate declaration of the learned professor we may add that some years ago the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences proposed to the various Slavic academies to send to Macedonia a commission of competent Slavists to investigate the language of the people. The Serbian Academy of Sciences protested against the proposition and rejected it.

## IV

### The National Consciousness of the Macedonian Bulgarians.

Another basis which Serbian chauvinists adopt in their claim to Macedonia is that its Slav population possesses "no national consciousness, no sentiment, either Serbian or Bulgarian"; that "they are predisposed to appropriate without opposition the one or the other of these sentiments, and thus become Bulgarians or Serbians." Dr. Milovanovitch in his pamphlet "*Serbs and Bulgarians*," writes: "After a Bulgarian rule of 135 years the Macedonians felt themselves to be Bulgarians; but the later Serbian rule over them almost eradicated this feeling. At the time of King Dushan the Macedonian population as far as the seacoast was called Serbian. Under the Turkish yoke this Serbian sentiment vanished and the population relapsed in its primitive condition," i. e., they became again Bulgarians. He carefully avoids giving any explanation of this strange national metamorphosis. Like every other Serbian assertion, this statement is based on words only; no proofs are adduced in its support, for there are none. It is historically untrue that the population of Macedonia was ever called Serbian. King Dushan ruled only twenty-four years (1331-1355), and during his reign the Serbian state attained its greatest territorial expansion in the Balkan Peninsula. He conquered from Byzantium the whole of Macedonia, minus Salonica, as far as the River Mesta, the boundary between Macedonia and Thrace. Dushan's kingdom did not include either Thrace or Bulgaria proper. In official documents he was styled "King of Serbians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians." On what ground did he include "Bulgarians" in his title, if it were not that he ruled over Macedonia, for outside of Macedonia he possessed no other Bulgarian territory? The allegation that the Macedonians were called "Serbians" under Dushan is disproved by Dushan himself.

The first sign that the Bulgarian nation gave of national life and consciousness was about the second half of last century. Up to that time the Bulgarians, besides being subject in secular matters to the Turks, were in church matters under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch and his bishops. The name Bulgarian was ignored

even in the official language of the Turkish government, and the Bulgarians were classed as "*Roum Millet*" (Greek nation). In the churches and schools the Bulgarian language was proscribed and replaced by Greek. It was in 1835 that the first Bulgarian school was started. This movement toward national self-assertion and the vindication of national rights gained its greatest momentum when in 1858-9 the Bulgarians made a formal demand upon the Greek Patriarchate to have bishops of their own nationality, and to be recognized as a national unit. The movement rapidly spread to Macedonia. Petitions to the Turkish Government and the Greek Patriarchate poured in from all over Macedonia, making common issue with their Bulgarian brethren in their demands. Some of the principal Macedonian dioceses even sent delegates to Constantinople to press their cause, in conjunction with delegates from Bulgaria and Thrace. Obedience to the Greek bishops and the payment of the customary "bishop's dues" to them as their spiritual rulers were refused by the people, in spite of the pressure brought to bear upon them by the civil authorities. In some places, such as Doiran and Kukush, the people in their desperate efforts to get rid of the Greek ecclesiastical rule and safeguard their national interests, united with the Roman Catholic Church and recognized the Pope as their spiritual head. When in 1870 the Sultan's charter instituting the Bulgarian Exarchate was promulgated, *Te Deums* and joyous celebrations were held all over Macedonia. Formal declarations of secession from the Greek Patriarchate and petitions for incorporation with the Exarchate were presented to the Turkish government by the Macedonian dioceses.

In the autumn of 1878, when it became known that the Berlin Congress had divided Bulgaria into three parts, risings in the valleys of the Struma and the Vardar took place as a protest against separating Macedonia from Bulgaria. It was necessary to send a European International Commission to induce the revolted districts to lay down their arms under the assurance that the reforms provided in the Berlin Treaty for Macedonia would be carried out.

After the constitution of the Bulgarian Principality in 1878, Bulgaria became the place of refuge for all Macedonian Bulgarians, who found life in their country unbearable under Turkish rule. In 1902 in Sofia alone there were about 18,000 such refugees, while the whole number in Bulgaria now must be over 150,000. In the army and in the government service, in the schools and in vari-



ous other occupations, as lawyers, merchants, physicians, etc., there are thousands of them employed. During the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, 15,000 Macedonians fought as volunteers in the ranks of the Bulgarian army, first against the Turks and then against the Greeks and Serbians. To Bulgaria the Macedonians have turned as to their mother country, where they were sure of receiving a brotherly welcome. No Macedonians have ever served in the army or the government of Serbia; none have ever been employed in her schools as teachers. Serbia to them has always been a foreign country.

In their schools and educational life also the Macedonian Bulgarians have given abundant proof of their national consciousness. Of all the Bulgarians those in Macedonia were the most heavily oppressed by the attempts of the Greek bishops to denationalize and hellenize them. If any Bulgarian dared to talk of Bulgarian nationality or Bulgarian schools, he was denounced to the Turkish authorities as a seditious man, a rebel against the Government, and was liable to imprisonment or exile. Not a few of these victims of the Greek bishops met an untimely death in prison or exile. Yet the spirit of the people was not broken, and by dint of perseverance and determination they carried on the fight for national self-assertion. As early as 1839 a Bulgarian school was opened at Veless, and eleven years later a school for girls was started. In 1857 at Kukush Bulgarian was introduced into the school along with Greek, and three years later a girls' school was started. In 1870 there were in the diocese of Kukush thirty-seven schools in all, in thirteen of which the language of instruction was Greek, in six mixed, i. e., Greek and Bulgarian, and in the eighteen Bulgarian. In 1848 a Bulgarian school was started in Skopia; a little later in Shtip, Prilep, Ochrida and other towns. Some of the schools were personally visited and are mentioned by Misses Mackenzie and Irby, Tozer and other travelers in Macedonia. Prof. Grigorovitch in 1844 enumerates nine schools in Macedonia where the instruction was conducted in Bulgarian. By 1860 in almost all the towns and larger villages in Macedonia there were Bulgarian schools.

Among those who initiated the Bulgarian movement for national self assertion and paved the way for it there were several who were natives of Macedonia. The monk Paissi, who in 1762 wrote the first history of the Bulgarian nation—a work breathing the most ardent patriotic zeal, and which gave the first impetus to the Bulgarian national awakening—was from Macedonia. The first

Bulgarian teacher, the monk Neophyt, who is rightly considered the patriarch of Bulgarian teachers, was a Macedonian. The man who established the first Bulgarian printing-press at Salonica, in 1839, was a Macedonian, and the author of one of the first Bulgarian books ever printed [in 1816 in Buda-Pest] was again a Macedonian.

These facts and others which we might easily cite demonstrate in a most convincing manner the national feelings and consciousness of the Macedonian Bulgarians. They also disprove the false assertion of both Serbians and Greeks that it was due to the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate and its propaganda that the Macedonian population was converted to Bulgarianism. The following short sketch of the Exarchate and its work in Macedonia will make the matter clearer.

The Bulgarian Exarchate, as we have already said, was instituted in 1870; but it was not really constituted till 1872, when the first Bulgarian Exarch was chosen. The first Bulgarian bishop in Macedonia was sent the following year to the diocese of Veless. In 1874 a census was taken in the dioceses of Ochrida and Skopia, and as the population proved to be more than two-thirds Bulgarian, two Bulgarian bishops were sent to these dioceses. Three years later (1877) the Russo-Turkish war broke out as a result of the massacre of Bulgarians in the previous year, and for the avowed object of freeing Bulgaria from Turkish rule. The three Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia were removed from their dioceses by the Turkish authorities. When the war ended, in 1878, and the Berlin Treaty erected Northern Bulgaria into a Principality and Southern Bulgaria into an autonomous province, the Turkish Government felt bitterly inimical to everything Bulgarian. The Exarch, who resided in Constantinople, was practically ignored by the Sultan and his government, and a deaf ear was turned to all his demands for the reinstatement of the three bishops in Macedonia or the appointment of new ones. The union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria in 1885 increased the resentment of the Turkish Government against the Bulgarians. This resentment grew stronger and more pronounced as public meetings were repeatedly held all over Bulgaria demanding the application in Macedonia of the reforms promised by the Berlin Congress. Delegates also were sent to the Powers signatory to the Berlin Treaty, to lay before them the grievous condition of the people in Macedonia. It was only in 1890 that the Turkish Government consented to the return of the bishop of Skopia and

Ochrida to their dioceses. Three years later two more bishops were allowed to go to Veless and Nevrokop; but the Turkish authorities in Macedonia were so ill-disposed towards the bishops and so obstructive to the opening of Bulgarian schools and churches, that the Exarch in a memorial presented to the Sultan in 1893 vigorously protested against their conduct. He demanded that the tenth article of the Charter of the Exarchate be carried out, that censuses be taken in the other Macedonian dioceses without further delay and that no impediments be put to the establishment of Bulgarian schools and churches, but that they should enjoy the same privileges that were granted to those that were under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Greek Patriarch. As a consequence of this step of the Exarch, which was backed up by the government and people of the Bulgarian Principality and by some of the European Powers, three more bishops were sent in 1895 to the dioceses of Monastir, Dibra and Strumnitsa, respectively. These seven bishops were all that the Exarchate was able to send to Macedonia up to the year 1912, when the Balkan war broke out. From the sketch we have given it becomes apparent that no Bulgarian bishops were able to remain in Macedonia permanently. For twelve years (1878-1890) Macedonia was practically without any Bulgarian bishops, and its Bulgarian population was left to the tender mercies of the Greek bishops and the Serbian propaganda. The Turkish authorities coöperated openly with them in repressing the national spirit of the people, in forcing the people to declare allegiance to the Greek Patriarch, in closing Bulgarian schools and churches, etc. These repressive measures did not cease even after 1895, when the bishops were in their dioceses. All kinds of obstacles were raised against them in the performance of their ecclesiastical duties. They were not allowed to undertake any tours of inspection among their flock, while the Greek bishops were free to do so; their protests and representations to the government against the open favoritism shown to the Greek and Serbian propaganda were unheeded.

The severities of the Turkish Government against the Bulgarians in Macedonia reached such a pitch that the Exarch found himself obliged, in 1904, to present a memorial to the Ambassadors of the European Powers at Constantinople and another to the Grand Vizier exposing the state of things in Macedonia. In the memorial addressed to the Ambassadors he says: "The measures taken, at the demand of the Greek Patriarch, against the Bulgarians who

have rejected and do reject his jurisdiction, are of extreme harshness. The petitions by which the Bulgarians demand the right to recognize their own ecclesiastical authorities, are either returned to them or destroyed; the Bulgarian churches are closed and their doors sealed; the priests are driven away under guard and forbidden to officiate in the Slavic language; the Bulgarians are told in the plainest manner that they will not be allowed to worship and to instruct themselves in their own language, and they are formally asked to enter the fold of the Patriarchate. . . . It is not by disregarding law and justice, nor by violating liberty of conscience that the pacification of the country will be attained. Respect for law and conscience alone can insure tranquility. Instead of taking sides for this or that church, let true impartiality be shown to each of them; let all the people have the right to remain attached to their respective institutions. There will be then no more misunderstandings, no more quarrels among the Orthodox Christians who, by themselves, will reach a peaceful solution of the difficult ethnical and ecclesiastical question, that is, to know to what nationality and to what church they belong. The Patriarch, who proclaims loudly the unalterable affection which all the Orthodox Christians cherish for his throne, will be the gainer thereby."

From the strongly worded memorial presented to the Grand Vizier we cite the following:

"In several memorials, especially in that dated June 12, 1904, we have brought to your notice the revolting acts of violence to which the Bulgarian population has been subjected by the Patriarchate, with the coöperation of the local authorities. With designation of dates and of places, and with documents in hand, we have denounced to you bishops and Greek consular officials who, going from village to village, have threatened the Bulgarian population with the use of force in order to make it submit to the Patriarchate. On the other hand, the Bulgarian bishops are expressly forbidden to make pastoral rounds in the villages of the Exarchate or to send priests and teachers to these Bulgarian villages. We have proved to you that it is with the aid of armed force that the Bulgarian Exarchist villages are forced to declare themselves patriarchists, and the petitions of the Bulgarian population demanding their separation from the Patriarchate have been destroyed by order of Hilmi Pasha [Inspector General in Macedonia].

"All these acts of violence have been committed not secretly or

upon some isolated persons, but upon villages, upon whole districts, upon the whole population and in broad daylight, with the connivance of the authorities. If the villages complain to the governor, he tells them that every village which declines to accept Greek priests and teachers, but obstinately persists in making use of the Bulgarian language in the churches and schools, will see both of them closed. Sometimes it is the police that take it upon themselves to bring some prominent men of a village to the Greek bishop, who at first lectures them, then, if they refuse to speak, abuses them. In some villages, the authorities, accomplices with the Patriarchate, forbid the Bulgarian teachers to enter the schools. Some governors, by official orders, impose Greek teachers upon the Bulgarian villages. Others simply send back to the villages the list of the teachers with their diplomas, saying that the superior authorities cannot permit the opening of a new school, or that they do not authorize this person or that person to teach, and not infrequently that they do not authorize any one to teach in the existing schools."

Such were the conditions under which the Exarchate, its clergy and teachers had to work in Macedonia. Both the Greek bishops and the government authorities were actively hostile to it, and no pains were spared by either side to paralyze its activities.

Is it not absurd, then, to affirm that it was the Exarchate's propaganda that created a Bulgarian nationality in Macedonia by converting, through its priests and teachers, Serbians or Greeks into Bulgarians?

## V

### The Serbian Propaganda in Macedonia: Its Causes and Aims

Writing in 1898 the late Dr. Milovanovitch says: "The Serbians did not begin to think about Macedonia until 1885; but as late as 1889 the Serbian action was conducted without any plan, without any understanding and without any result. Only for the past nine years has the Serbian campaign in Macedonia been organized to counteract the plans of the Exarchate and defend the Serbian nationality there."

This statement proves that the Serbian campaign in Macedonia is of recent origin, that before 1885 the Serbians did not pay any attention to Macedonia, although the Bulgarian Exarchate had already been in existence for fifteen years. Dr. Milovanovitch fixes upon 1889 as the date of the organization of the Serbian propaganda in Macedonia, because it was from that year that the Serbian government took it in hand and began to subsidize it. The Serbian company had its base of operation not in Macedonia, but in Belgrade, whence it was organized, directed and financed.

The failure of Serbia's attempt in 1885 to prevent the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria or to seize Bulgarian territory as a compensation, made the position of the late King Milan, the originator of the Serbo-Bulgarian war, very precarious. Milan was already unpopular with a large part of the intelligent class of Serbians. The fatal issue of a war made his unpopularity still greater, and he feared an outbreak of discontent. To avert this misfortune, Milan found it necessary to divert public attention in Serbia from home affairs, and he hit upon a Serbian propaganda in Macedonia as the best plan. He could not agitate the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because three years earlier he had signed an agreement with Austria conceding to her the absolute possession of the two provinces.

The initiation of this Serbian propaganda in Macedonia was welcomed by the Turkish government, which had been incensed against the Bulgarians by the proclamation of the Union and by the persistent efforts of the government and people of Bulgaria before the European Powers to obtain the execution of the twenty-third

article of the Berlin Treaty, which granted autonomy to Macedonia. The Turkish statesmen knew perfectly well that there were no Serbians in Macedonia, and that a Serbian propaganda there would be fruitless and could be of no menace to Turkish interests; but it would be a wedge driven between Bulgaria and Serbia and would tend to weaken or paralyze Bulgarian influence in Macedonia and the demands of the Bulgarians for autonomy. The more pretenders to Macedonia there were, the easier it would be for Turkey to play the game of *divide et impera*.

With this end in view the Turkish government readily accepted in 1890 the appointment of Serbian consuls in Skopia, Monastir and Salonica, although Serbia's commercial and industrial interests in these three provinces were nil. That the installment of these consuls had political agitation for its object is evident from the fact that Turkey, while permitting their establishment in Macedonia, would not allow any Serbian consul in "Old Serbia," that is, north of the Shar Mountains, where there is a Serbian population. The Serbian propaganda was the chief business of these consuls in Macedonia and they assumed its direction.

But Serbia was aware that, in order to carry on a propaganda in Macedonia, it was necessary to gain the favor of another power besides that of the Sultan. This power was the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, without whose aid the propaganda could not hope for success. By the privileges the Patriarch enjoys he exercises absolute control over the churches and schools of the populations that recognize his jurisdiction. No permission for the erection of a church is granted except at the demand of the Patriarch, and he has the right to establish schools wherever and whenever he pleases. In order that a church should be erected in a place it was provided that there must be a recognized religious community or congregation. By a later law enacted by the Turkish government, no new school could be opened in a quarter of a town where there were not at least thirty houses or families that wanted it. Nowhere in Macedonia were there enough Serbians to constitute a religious community, or enough families in a town or village to justify the opening of Serbian schools. It was necessary to create such communities artificially, and this could be done only through the Greek Patriarchate. Here and there in Macedonia there were still Bulgarian communities that had not been allowed by the government to join the Exarchate, and which were under the jurisdiction of the

Greek bishops. These Bulgarian so-called Patriarchists could be made centers upon which "Serbian" communities could be grafted and a Serbian nationality created, for which churches and schools were to be established. The Greek Patriarchate would lose nothing by the arrangement, because its chief concern was to keep these communities under its spiritual authority and, by declaring them Serbian, to prevent their entering under the jurisdiction of the Exarchate's charter.

This winning over of the Greek Patriarch to the Serbian cause in Macedonia was consummated in 1896, during a visit of the late King Alexander of Serbia to Constantinople. How it was done is best told in the words of the late V. Georgievitch, the then Serbian Minister to Turkey and a year later Prime Minister of Serbia. In a report addressed to the King, as recorded in his book, "The End of a Dynasty," he says:

"As to the Patriarchate, we must simply win it . . . by the Russian method. If the considerable influence that England formerly enjoyed in Turkey has passed wholly over to Russia, it is solely because the latter without sparing its resources has gained by this tried means the dignitaries of the Sultan's court, the prominent persons in the army and in the ministries, and especially the ulemas [high religious dignitaries]. In our struggle against the Bulgarians we should make use of the same methods."

By an alliance, then, with the Greek Patriarchate and by bribery, the Serbians tried to create in Macedonia a Serbian nationality and Serbian interests. With the help of corruption funds they succeeded in opening in 1892 the first Serbian school in Skopia and in having a Serbian ecclesiastic appointed in 1899 as bishop of the Skopia diocese. Against this appointment even the Patriarchist party in Skopia protested and refused to accept him as their spiritual head. A census was ordered by the government in order to ascertain how many of the inhabitants wanted the Serbian bishop. Only twenty-eight families appeared on his side, and yet in spite of this, bribery prevailed, and the Serbian was appointed. In the schools which the Serbian propaganda succeeded in opening by *the approved method*, pupils were received free of charge, being supplied with clothing, shoes and even pocket money, while not unfrequently their parents, being of the poorer class, were also paid for sending their children to these schools.

All the teachers in the schools were Serbian emissaries sent by



the Serbian government from Belgrade, and their object was to work among the people for the Serbian cause. In the market-places, coffee-houses and villages these Serbian emissaries went about distributing pamphlets and leaflets extolling the grandeur, nobility and might of the Serbian nation by distorting both ancient and modern history. In Skopia four hotels of doubtful character, run by Serbian men and women, with drinking saloons and *cafés-chantants* attached, were opened. In 1896 some Bulgarian teachers were denounced to the Turkish authorities as revolutionists, and at their trial Serbian agitators, with one of the Serbian teachers at their head, appeared as the chief witnesses. In short, no means were considered too base to be employed in fighting the Bulgarian element in Macedonia and furthering the aims of the propaganda.

And yet, with all the help that Serbia received from the Turkish authorities, the Greek Patriarchate and corruption funds, what were the results attained? If we can credit statistics published ten years ago, and which have not been refuted, the total number of so-called Serbians in Macedonia amounted to 52,672, with 13 high and 122 primary schools with 3,612 pupils, as against 897,160 "Exarchist" Bulgarians, with 71 high and 788 primary schools with 45,033 pupils.

That the Serbians have no ground to stand upon in Macedonia is recognized even by the Greek, Dr. Cleanthes Nicolaïdes, who in his German work, "Macedonien," urges both Serbians and Vlaxhs to work together with the Greek Patriarchate against the Bulgarians. He thinks that instead of opening Serbian high schools in Salonica and Monastir, it would be ~~have been~~ better, in unison with the Patriarch, to open primary schools, for "*it is meaningless,*" says he, "*to found a few high schools in the principal towns, while any support in the broader masses of the population is still wanting.*"

The chief object of the Serbian propaganda in Macedonia has been dictated not by the existence of any Serbians there, but by the desire of Serbia to get to the Aegean Sea. Barred by Austria from the Adriatic Sea and unable by any scheme or any corruption or any Patriarch to secure an outlet upon it, the Serbians turned their longing eyes upon the Aegean Sea and upon Macedonia, where the help of both civil and patriarchal authorities could be easily attained with the aid of money. But to lay claims to an exit on the Aegean Sea through Macedonia, it was necessary first to create

the semblance of a right to the country. Hence the Serbian pretensions to Macedonia.

The Serbians themselves realize that their claims are baseless, for every Serbian who has written on the subject of Macedonia, after most extravagant and fantastic arguments that all Macedonia is and has always been Serbian, that the Macedonians are genuine Serbians and Bulgarians only in disguise, etc., winds up his quibbles with a pathetic appeal to the brotherly love which should subsist between Bulgarians and Serbians, and asks for a division of Macedonia. To divide Macedonia and get a large share of it is the ultimate motive which has prompted Serbia to enter into alliance with any one, Greek, Turk or Patriarch, who could help her attain that object. The chauvinism displayed in this kind of Serbian literature is appalling, and the violence done to history and facts of common knowledge is simply amazing. We have already given samples of the arguments by which the Serbian would-be *savants* support their claims. We could multiply them by numerous other quotations which disclose their psychology. According to writers like Prof. Andonovitch and others, not only Macedonia, but half of Bulgaria is Serbian; the Slavs who peopled the Balkan Peninsula in the VIIth century as far as Greece were Serbians; the modern Greeks are not pure Hellenes, but descendants of these "Slavo-Serbians"; Emperor Justinian was a Serbian; Salonica has 70,000 Serbian inhabitants and no Jews; the Bulgarians of today are Tartars, therefore the Macedonian Slavs cannot be Bulgarians, but must be Serbians; all travelers and writers who have written about Macedonia as being Bulgarian were ignoramuses; that there is not a single truthful testimony according to which the Macedonian Slavs have called themselves Bulgarians or have spoken the Bulgarian language; that the intelligent class of Bulgarians are without faith or dignity, veritable parasites, who for money abjure their religion and become Catholics or Protestants, and as an example he points to the "Anglo-American" Robert College in Constantinople, which has turned out "more than 1,000 Bulgarian graduates, most of whom have come out of this college as Protestants," etc.

How can one argue with a man whose moral sense is so perverted as to pen unabashed such a tissue of falsehoods? One can only pity the Belgrade University for having such a professor to educate and instruct its students. *Ab uno disce omnes.*

## VI

### Greco-Bulgarian Relations

No Greek, not even Venizelos, can speak of the Bulgarians without abusing them. "Treacherous Bulgars," "the traditional foe," "the hereditary enemy," "barbarians," are some of the choice epithets that they heap upon the Bulgarians. People read these abuses and repeat them, without attempting to understand why the Greeks cherish such hatred for the Bulgarians, or in what the latter's iniquity consists. As no Greek has so far, to our knowledge, given an explanation of the enigma, it behooves us to do so.

It is true that Bulgarian history from the second half of the VIIth century to the end of the XIVth, when Bulgaria lost her political independence to the Turks, is mostly taken up with wars between the Bulgarians and Byzantium, often attended on both sides with an exhibition of ruthlessness peculiar to those times. We leave to the reader to decide who was the greater barbarian: the Bulgarian King, who in the IXth century had the head of a Greek Emperor, slain in battle, cut off and the skull encased in silver used as a drinking bowl at his banquets, or the Greek Emperor Basil II, who in the XIth century ordered the eyes of 15,000 Bulgarian war prisoners to be gouged out, leaving to every hundred men one man with one eye to lead them back to their King. For this cruelty the Byzantine historians honored the Emperor with the title of "Bulgarokhton" (slayer of the Bulgarians), with which modern Greeks also have adorned their present ruler for the cheap glory he gained in the Balkan wars, and the ravages and cruelties his army perpetrated upon the Bulgarians by his orders (see "Report of The International Commission to Inquire Into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars," published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 95-108; also Will S. Monroe's "Bulgaria and Her People," Chapter XXVII).

One would have supposed that the conquest of Bulgaria by the Turks and the fall of the Byzantine Empire, which made both Greeks and Bulgarians subjects of the Turkish Sultan, would have done away with their mutual disagreements and hatreds, and their common misery under Turkish rule would have created a bond of

sympathy between them. This perhaps might have happened, had not Greek ambition and intolerance stood in the way. With the loss of her political independence Bulgaria lost also her ecclesiastical organization as a self-governed religious community, and was subjected by the Sultan to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. All Bulgarian dioceses in Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia were placed under the spiritual jurisdiction of Greek bishops. The Greek language replaced the Bulgarian both in the churches and the schools, and even the name Bulgarian ran the risk of being relegated to oblivion. All Orthodox Christians, no matter of what nationality, were classed as Greeks even by the Turkish authorities, simply because their spiritual head was the Greek Patriarch. We do not propose to go into any exposition of this rule and the character of the persons who exercised it. There is abundant literature on the subject by various writers, some of them Greeks, which lays bare the corruption, venality and simony of the Greek hierarchy, so much so that the name *Fanariot*, by which this hierarchy was known, came to imply baseness, duplicity, hypocrisy, extortion, etc.

After the Crimean war in 1856 the Sultan published an Imperial Decree guaranteeing to his Christian subjects equal rights with the Mohammedans, and proclaiming liberty of conscience for all. This decree created a great sensation among the Christian subjects of Turkey, for it granted to the Christian nationalities in the Empire privileges which were to secure them against the oppression or domination of one nationality over another. Two years after the issuance of the decree, a mixed council of clericals and laymen was called by the Greek Patriarchate to deliberate upon the question of fixing regular salaries for the clergy instead of the tolls and indefinite dues levied on the Christians, by which the Church had derived its revenues—a practice full of abuses and which the Imperial Decree specifically condemned. In this council, consisting of about forty members, there were only four Bulgarians and one Serbian from Bosnia, representing a population of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  or 7 millions in the Bulgarian and Serbian dioceses, all the rest being Greeks and representing a Greek population of not more than  $3\frac{1}{2}$  or 4 millions. A petition from the Bulgarian and Bosnian delegates was presented to the Council demanding the regular and fixed salaries should be appointed for the Patriarch, the bishops and the lower clergy; that to the Bulgarian and Bosnian dioceses bishops should be appointed of the respective nationalities, or such as knew the

language of the people and could conduct church services and preach in that language; that the dioceses should have the right to recommend those whom they wished consecrated as bishops, and that the Greek language should not be imposed upon the people in their churches and schools. All these demands were scornfully rejected by the Council on the ground that they were incompatible with the tenets of the Church, which recognizes no racial distinctions!

The defiant attitude of the Greek Patriarchate, instead of ~~supporting~~ <sup>suppressing</sup> the national movement among the Bulgarians, made them insist still more firmly upon their demands, and finally, after waiting two years for the Patriarch to do justice to their demands, they formally declared in 1860 that they ceased to acknowledge him as their spiritual head. Petitions and protests addressed to the Turkish government and the Patriarch made this renunciation of allegiance to the Greek hierarchy publicly known. The government was asked to do justice to the Bulgarians by recognizing them as a national unit, distinct from the Greeks, and by restoring to them the former ecclesiastical privileges of having their own separate church organization or administration of which former Sultans had deprived them at the instigation of the Greek Patriarchate.

Thus arose the "Greco-Bulgarian Church Question," which was settled ten years later by the issuance of a Sultan's decree instituting a Bulgarian church organization under the name of "Exarchate." In this struggle, which was momentous for the national self-assertion of the Bulgarians, the whole Bulgarian nation, in Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia, took part. The Sultan's decree, as we have already observed, was practically based upon a former project elaborated and presented by the Greek Patriarch in 1869 for the solution of the question. The tenth article of the decree places under its provisions all those dioceses that the Patriarch's project granted to the Exarchate and which included the territory between the Danube and the Black Sea, i. e., what was usually denominated on the maps as Bulgaria proper. It was provided in addition, however, that after an enumeration in those dioceses not specified as entering into the jurisdiction of the Exarchate, wherever the whole or at least two-thirds of the population should prove to be Bulgarian and should express a wish to be under the authority of the Exarch, they should be allowed to do so. In all other respects the Bulgarian Exarch was made subordinate to the Greek Patriarch, whom he was to recognize and honor as his superior. The Greek Patriarchate,

however, refused to accept the Sultan's decree, and the reason of the refusal was the "two-thirds" clause of the tenth article. The Patriarchate claimed that there were no Bulgarians in Macedonia and Thrace, but that the population was Greek, although the people of Ochrida, Prilep, Veless, Kukush, Skopia, etc., had years before 1870 formally declared by petitions to the Turkish government and Patriarchate their solidarity with the demands and aspirations of the other Bulgarian dioceses, and had ceased to obey their Greek bishops.

The only way to settle the advanced claims by Greeks and Bulgarians to these dioceses was the taking of a census of the population so that the people might be enabled to show their preference. But this project did not suit the Patriarchate, for it knew that the results would not be favorable to its pretensions. Unable to annul the Sultan's decree, which the Bulgarians gladly accepted, or to prevent the taking of a census in Thrace and Macedonia, the Patriarchate had recourse to a subterfuge. In 1872 the Patriarch convened a Church Council, composed exclusively of Greek clerics, which proclaimed the Bulgarian Exarch, his bishops and clergy, as well as all those who should recognize their jurisdiction, schismatics. This was done, as stated in the resolution passed, on the ground that the Bulgarians wished to introduce racial distinctions in the Eastern Orthodox Church, as if God Almighty, Jesus Christ and his holy apostles had ordained that Greeks only could be consecrated patriarchs and bishops to lord it over other nations.

The Russian, Serbian and Rumanian churches in their responses to the Patriarch's communication of what the Council had done, not only disapproved the decision, but plainly hinted that they considered it unjustifiable. The Serbian Metropolitan, for example, found the Bulgarian demands just, and suggested that similar rights and privileges should be granted to the Serbian dioceses that were still under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarchate.

The object of the schism was evident. It was intended to frighten the Bulgarians in general, and those in Macedonia and Thrace in particular, who were devoted to their religion, from joining the Exarchate as an institution that had seceded from the Eastern Orthodox Church and had become heterodox. The plan was, however, defeated by the stern resolution of all the Bulgarians to hold on to their national church, which, they knew, had not deviated one jot or tittle from the dogmas and doctrines of the

Eastern Church, but, on the contrary, had demanded what was fully consistent with the teachings of the apostles, the decisions of the Church Councils and the spirit of Christianity. This national determination was made most manifest in Macedonia, where the people, in the census-taking, boldly and overwhelmingly by majorities declared their wish to join the Exarchate. Seven dioceses in Macedonia were added to those constituting the Exarchate, and if the Turkish government, for political reasons of its own and under outside pressure, had not temporized and procrastinated with the faithful and loyal execution of the Exarchate's charter, the whole of Macedonia and of Thrace would long ago have been attached to the Bulgarian national church.

The national movement of the Bulgarians for self-assertion proved a death-blow to the aspirations of Hellenism in the Balkan Peninsula. Especially since the creation of the Kingdom of Greece in 1829 these aspirations had begun to grow, and found a ready and willing tool in the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople and his bishops. A so-called *Megali Edeea* (Great Idea) had obsessed the Greeks, who dreamed of resuscitating the Byzantine Empire, with the King of Greece enthroned in Constantinople and Greek hegemony assured in the Peninsula. That this wild dream is still cherished by the Greeks is best illustrated by the title of Constantine XII, which they have bestowed upon their present ruler, as the presumed successor of the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI, although he is the first Greek King to bear this name.

The Hellenization of the various Christian nationalities of the Balkan Peninsula over which the Greek Patriarch held supreme spiritual sway was the necessary preparation for the realization of the Great Idea. It was hoped to supplement thereby the numerical inferiority of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire who, according to Lamouche and others, could not be estimated at more than two or three millions both in Europe and Asia Minor.

To what flight of imagination about their numerical status in the Turkish Empire the Greeks had risen before the appearance of the Greco-Bulgarian Church Question is seen in the statement published in 1853 in the Greek newspaper *Helios* (Sun), which enumerated 10,000,000 Greeks and about 4,000,000 "Hellenized Bulgarians," and predicted after 30 years there would be 30,000,000 "pure Greeks." The article bears the significant caption: "The Seen and the Unseen Hellas," meaning evidently by the latter term

the Greece which was to be evolved by the process of Hellenization. The prophecy has not been realized, and the Bulgarian national movement has been the principal cause. It not only put a stop to the process of Hellenization among the Bulgarians, but also stirred up the national consciousness of the other Christian nationalities which were under the rule of the Patriarch, especially the Wallachians and Albanians. The first national school among the former was opened in 1862 in the town of Vlakho-Klissura. The Greek Patriarch tried to close the school and drive away the teachers, but failed owing to the determined opposition of the people. That the situation was getting serious and menacing for Greek aspirations with the accession to this national movement of the Macedonian Wallachians, whom the Greeks had always considered a docile and easy prey to Hellenization, was fully realized by the government at Athens. In a circular addressed in 1863 to various learned men and professors of Greece, the Minister of Public Instruction urged the organization of a committee at his ministry, which should elaborate a plan for the maintenance and spread of the Greek language wherever Greeks and other Christians lived and where there was a distinct movement against it.

In the Greek Parliament a deputy sounded this cry of distress when he said: "What has been taking place for some time in Thrace and Macedonia, endangers the future of the fatherland and places an insurmountable barrier to the progress and grandeur of enlightening Hellenism. Some races, altogether unworthy to be named, which a little while ago counted it an honor to be associated with Hellenism, are becoming now blind and senseless tools of two anti-Hellenic propagandas, and are doing all they can to efface every trace of its existence. The Greek language has been rejected and has been replaced by a barbarian tongue. Two hours, gentlemen, outside of Salonica (*Voices: 'In Salonica itself, in Salonica itself'*), and in Constantinople itself, the Greek Church, Greek language and Greek nationality have become objects of derision and contempt."

The status of Hellenism and Hellenistic propaganda in Thrace and Macedonia has become worse, as we shall see, since the day when these lamentations were uttered. The Bulgarians have established their national existence on a firm basis, impervious to any Hellenizing influences. The national movement of the Macedonian Wallachians, whom a Greek geographer about seventy years ago



declared to be "Greeks speaking usually Wallachian," has gained in strength and extent, and even the Orthodox Christian Albanians have begun to clamor for the recognition of their language and nationality. All this revulsion of feeling towards Hellenism and opposition to its encroachments among people whom the Greeks had considered as already gained to the cause of the Great Idea, was the outcome of the national awakening of the Bulgarians, who were the first to raise the cry for national rights, liberty of conscience, and freedom of worship and instruction in the vernacular.

A nation of "thick-heads, numb-skulls, barbarians, boors," as the Greeks were pleased to call them, dared to brave the power and authority of the Greek hierarchy and to shatter Hellenic political designs. With Bulgaria as a political power in the Balkan Peninsula, Hellenic dreams and aspirations for predominance are seen to be still more unrealizable. Is it strange, then, that Venizelos and his compatriots do not love but vituperate the Bulgarians.

## VII

### Greek Claims to Macedonia

The claims of the Greeks to Macedonia are on a par with those of the Serbians, if not even less tenable. They date back to Alexander the Great and Greek culture and civilization, whatever those terms may mean, that are said to have obtained in Macedonia before the birth of Christ. No account is taken of Roman conquests or Slavic settlements after Christ, and of the transformations that have taken place since then. Emile de Laveley, the well-known Belgian writer, in his French work, "The Balkan Peninsula," 1888, cites the two arguments advanced by the Greeks in support of their claims to Macedonia. The first is based on their "ethnocratic pre-eminence," namely, the pretension that the Greeks are of a nobler race; hence, the Bulgarians ought to be subject to them. The second argument is stated in the words of a Greek Minister in London as follows: "When a country has formerly belonged to the Hellenes, it is not enough that it is occupied today by Bulgarians that it should be adjudged to them. The right of the Greeks is imprescriptible." The learned Belgian professor dismisses both these arguments with the words: "It is difficult to discuss such theories; it is painful to have to point them out," and adds that on such theories one would have to restore the Netherlands to Spain or Austria, America to England or Spain, and rearrange the map not only of Europe, but of the whole world.

Another Greek argument is that the Bulgarians inhabiting Macedonia are not actual Bulgarians, but "Bulgarophone Greeks," that is, Greeks whose vernacular—*mirabile dictu*—is Bulgarian! How this linguistic miracle came to pass was thus learnedly expounded to H. N. Brailsford ("*Macedonia*," p. 200) by a Greek bishop: "Originally the population of Macedonia was Hellenic; but it won so many victories over the Slavs, and took so many prisoners of war, that linguistic difficulties arose. The Slavs being then, as now, notoriously stupid, would not learn Greek, so the Greeks were forced to learn Slav in order to have a means of giving orders to their servants." The good bishop does not say

when all these things happened, nor need we inquire about it. We give the argument for what it is worth.

A third argument in favor of the Greek claims to Macedonia is to be found in the German work, "*Macedonien*," by the Greek, Dr. Cleanthes Nicolaïdes. He says that owing to the Greek war for independence the name "Greek" had become hateful to the Turkish government as that of a rebel and an enemy of Turkey. On the other hand the Bulgarians were considered loyal and submissive subjects. So the Greeks in many towns in order to conceal their nationality preferred to use the Bulgarian language. The author does not tell us why the Greeks in Constantinople, on the islands of Crete, Khios, Mytelene, etc., in Smyrna and the Aegean sea-coast and the Patriarchate itself did not adopt the same subterfuge, but persisted in calling themselves Greek. Moreover, we have seen that the Serbians base their claims to Macedonia on exactly the same argument, except that, according to their story, this national transfiguration was undergone by Serbians and not Greeks.

Leaving the Greeks and the Serbians to reconcile their logic in the matter, we shall proceed to state some facts and adduce evidence which will throw light on the subject.

All writers and travelers who have written on the Balkan Peninsula agree in placing a Greek population on the sea-coast and the southernmost parts of Macedonia. We have seen that Ami Boué places "the mountains between the basins of Florina and Kastoria, between Kailari and Shatista, between Ostrovo and Verria and between Voden and Niausta" as the limit of "the territory where nothing but Bulgarian is spoken, from that on the south, where Greek is the language of the peasant." Lejean and Cyprien Robert are of the same opinion. The Chalcidic peninsula especially they regard as containing a compact Greek population. This is confirmed by Major Leake, who in his "*Travels in Northern Greece*" (Vol. II, p. 270) says that the Greeks are now chiefly confined to that peninsula, "and there the name of places are of Greek form and derivation." Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby regard Salonica, which "is geographically Bulgarian," as "a point on the ethnographical boundary which, in this part of Turkey in Europe, divides the Slavonic population from the Greek." The line of division, according to them, coincides with the old Roman *Via Egnatia* between Salonica and the lake of Ochrida. "The other boundary cities are Monastir, Voden and Yenidjé, in all of which

dwelt few or no Greeks." In the latter town, as well as in the country around, the only Greeks were the bishops and the schoolmaster in the town. "The principal men speak Greek, for commercial purposes, but none of the women know it." In Monastir, its environs and all the country around," the Greeks, who people neither town nor country, contrive to have their interests and language represented by the wealthy and crafty Tsintsars" or Walachians. Half-way between Monastir and Prilep, after crossing the Tcherná (Black) River, "at every step on the other side the Greco-Tsintsar element becomes weaker, and the Bulgarians have got more and more the upper hand, both in church and school."

In Prilep they visited three schools, "one for the Tsintsar merchants, who elect to have their children learn Greek, the other two for the Bulgarians, who bring together 400 scholars." In Veless, "a thoroughly Bulgarian town," they found a Tsintsar school with thirty to forty pupils, and two Bulgarian schools with 500 pupils between them. Bulgarians who had traffic with the South knew Greek, like the host in whose house they lodged, "but his wife and family did not know a word." At Skopia they found no Greek or Tsintsar school, but they saw three "Slavonic schools."

Rev. F. H. Tozer says that "Greek communities are comparatively rare northward of Mount Olympus and its parallel, and unmixed Slavonic blood is uncommon south of that line." He thinks it was a mistake that, in forming the kingdom of Greece, Thessaly and all the part of Albania within the same latitude were not included within its boundaries, "since by that means nearly all the Greeks and Hellenized Albanians would have been excluded from the dominions of the Sultan." In referring to a Greek pamphlet published in 1861 by the Secretary of the Constantinopolitan Synod, he says: "The writer urges that the Bulgarians form but a small part of the population of Western Macedonia; he says that many of the people are only Greeks who speak Bulgarian; and even goes so far as to assert that the physical appearance and customs of the Bulgarians in these parts show them to be originally Greek, and not Bulgarian—all of which statements can be contradicted by one who has traveled in the country."

Mr. (now Sir) Valentine Chirol, a distinguished English journalist and former political editor of the London *Times*, in his book, "Twixt Greek and Turk" (London, 1881), in which he describes his tour in Macedonia, considers Kosana (Kozhani) as the

last purely Vlakho-Greek town in Macedonia. Northwards, he asserts, the Wallachs are only found interspersed with the Albanians, Turks and Bulgarians, and generally in a minority. In Monastir he found, at the time he wrote, Bulgarians who were under the jurisdiction of the Exarchate; those "who share in the patriotic aspirations of the above," but "who have not thrown off their allegiance to the Greek Patriarchate," and Bulgarians who have been Hellenized and speak Greek in preference to their own tongue and whose "number is small and daily diminishing."

"Then," says he, "there are the Greeks, who are, it is true, Greek only in name; for with the exception of the archbishop and the Hellenic Consul, there is scarcely a family in Monastir that can lay claim to pure Greek blood. They are Wallachs; and among them, again, there is a large and growing section which still speaks its own tongue in preference to Greek, and has distinct national aspirations outside of Hellenism." Chirol divides the population of the town of Monastir into three equal sections: Turks, Hellenized Bulgarians and Wallachs, and Bulgarians, and then adds: "But take the whole *vilayet* of Monastir, or go further and take the whole province of Macedonia—namely, the four *sandjaks* of Monastir, Salonica, Drama and Serres—and the proportion obtained is very different. After leaving Kosana we lost sight completely of the Greco-Wallach element, all the villages along our road being either Turkish or Bulgarian; and the farther north or east one goes from here, the stronger the Bulgarian element becomes. To the west the confines of Macedonia are close at hand, and yet even in the mountains which, bounding it in that direction, are the bulwarks of Albania, Bulgarians are to be met with in large numbers as far as the Lake of Ochrida."

Léon Lamouche, the French officer of whom we have already spoken, says that in Macedonia the Greeks are found "on the sea-coast and in all the southern region bordering upon the Greek Kingdom."

H. N. Brailsford ("Macedonia") informs us that the Wallachs, although they affect to be Greeks, speak Wallachian at home and are a nationality apart. "They are not a very numerous stock, though without their aid the Greeks would cut a poor figure among the statistics of the Macedonian races. The so-called Greeks of Monastir are Vlakhs to a man."

About thirty years ago Mr. (now Sir) Arthur Evans published

a long article on "Macedonia." From a French translation of it we render the following extracts: "It is time for the Greeks to look unpleasant facts in the face. In all Macedonia in its length and breadth, the Bulgarian element widely predominates. Only in some of the towns in the extreme southern districts it is true that one meets here and there the Greek element, but even here, it is neutralized and in point of numbers entirely smothered by the Bulgarian population in the village districts. Salonica, the only truly large city in the province, is chiefly inhabited neither by Greeks nor by Bulgarians, but by Spanish Jews and Mohammedans, and therefore can not be claimed by either side. Even in Monastir the town population is predominantly Bulgarian, and the Bulgarian language is the language of the market. Prilep, Skopia, Shtip, Kratovo, Palanka, Strumnitsa, Melnik and other towns in the interior are purely Bulgarian. I do not make the assertion from hearsay, but from personal acquaintance with the country, when I say that it is possible for a traveler to journey through the whole of Macedonia, from the Pindus Mountains to the frontiers of Bulgaria without meeting a single Greek." The testimony of Mr. Evans gains additional force from the fact that he is well acquainted with the Greek and Serbian languages and was in a position to judge of the nationality of the people. He nowhere mentions having found any Serbians in Macedonia.

The late Sir George Campbell, M. P. for Kircaldy, in his book, "*A Very Recent View of Turkey*," published in 1878, writes: "So much of the present Eastern Question depends on a due appreciation of the geographical area of the Bulgarian country, that it should be rightly understood how much they occupy the whole center, and it may be said, body of European Turkey. . . . On the south of the Balkans, almost as far as Salonica, the Bulgarian race prevails. There is a small but very clear German ethnological map by Kiepert, lately published, which gives the races very well as far as they can be roughly delineated on a small scale. I am bound to say that all my inquiries and personal observations, so far as they enable me to test Kiepert's map, go to confirm its general correctness. From collating consular and other reports, and other inquiries, I had made out the Bulgarian area to be much as Kiepert puts it before I had seen his maps, and in the parts of the country which I visited, my inquiries led to the same result. . . . Kiepert gives the Greeks the country up to and including Adrianople that seems

about as much as they can fairly claim. From the Darrube then to near Adrianople and Salonica, and from the Black Sea (less a small Greek fringe) to the Albanian Hills, is the Bulgarian country, except so far as Turkish settlements are interspersed in greater or less degree." Sir George speaks of no Serbians in Macedonia.

The American missionaries, who by long residence, frequent travels in the country and daily contact with the people are competent judges, tell the same story. Writing as early as 1874 that Monastir had been selected for a new station in Macedonia, Mr. Clarke says: "Of the Christians, about 2,000 are known as Bulgarians, the rest being called Greeks, though, as a matter of fact, there are scarcely any real Greeks in the city. This place is the centre of a considerable population of decided and earnest Bulgarians, but a larger part of the Christian population are Hellenized Bulgarians of pure origin. These latter, like the Bulgarians in and about Philippopolis during the past few years, are increasingly proclaiming their true nationality, and glorying in it."

Mr. Jenney, after living eight years in Macedonia, writes in 1882: "Not one in twenty of the Christian population of Macedonia is a Greek, or uses the Greek language. The large majority are Bulgarians. Next in numbers come the Wallachians and Albanians, and last of all the Greeks. Some of the Wallachians use the Greek. Few of the women can more than pass the compliments of the day in that language. These are all counted as Greeks by the Greek party. Two-thirds of the so-called Greek party would leave the Greek church and join the Bulgarian if they dared to. The declared aim of this Greek party is, by fair means or foul, to require the Greek language to be used in all the churches and schools, so as to make a stronger claim before the Powers that Macedonia should be ceded to Greece. This nine-tenths of the population do not desire. It is understood in many places that if one expresses a strong desire for Bulgarian schools, he will be accused of being an insurrectionist, and sent, if possible, into exile. The poor victim thus falsely charged must either leave, or pay a large bribe for his release, often amounting to \$500 or \$1,000. To escape this tyranny of the Greek bishops many in several of the cities and villages near Salonica have joined the Catholic party, so as to secure the aid of the Austrian and French consuls."

In 1889 Mr. Bond of Monastir reports a conversation he had with the Greek bishops of Strumitsa: "I besought him," he writes,

"to train his priests to preach salvation to the people in their own Bulgarian tongue, which alone they can understand. There are not ten Greek families in all the Strumitsa region, and yet the Greek language is forced upon the schools and churches."

In 1892 Mr. Baird, long a resident in the country, writes: "Greek-speaking villages are not found in northern or in central Macedonia."

In 1895 Dr. House, also a long resident missionary, reports that the villages to the north and west of Salonica are Bulgarian.

In 1907 Mr. Haskell, on a visit to Xanthi or Sketcha, writes that no Bulgarian school or church is tolerated in the town, although "there are doubtless over one hundred (possibly over two hundred) Bulgarian families in the place, but they have no rights which a Greek is bound to respect."

In 1880 Mr. Baird writes from Monastir that there is no bookstore in all Macedonia where one can buy ordinary Bulgarian school-books, or even almanacs, because "Bulgarians are afraid to keep Bulgarian books for sale." Even his colporteur was arrested for selling Bulgarian books.

Some of these reports of the missionaries plainly show under what disadvantages the Bulgarians in Macedonia were laboring many years after the Constitution of the Exarchate, and how baseless is the assertion that the Exarchate could under such circumstances carry on any action or propaganda for the Bulgarianization of Macedonia.

The pretensions of the Greeks that Thrace and Macedonia are inhabited by Greeks were shown to be groundless by what happened about forty years ago. In April, 1876, an attempt at an insurrection against Turkish rule took place in Southern Bulgaria, or Thrace, in the district of Philippopolis. The insurrection proved a failure, but in putting it down the Turkish troops and irregulars committed frightful massacres. Two official commissions, one British and the other American, were sent to investigate and report upon the massacres. The American Commission, in which the late Eugene Schuyler, United States Consul-General to Turkey, and J. MacGahan, of Columbus, Ohio, a newspaper correspondent, took part, by its report of the horrors committed, roused public opinion in Europe and especially England in favor of the Bulgarians. This report helped indirectly the political liberation of Bulgaria, and the names of the two noble Americans are to this day cherished in Bulgaria as those of national benefactors.



In the reports of the two Commissioners, as well as in the European and Greek press, the insurrectionists, the massacred people, the scores of men who were hanged by the Turkish Government, and the hundreds of others who were imprisoned in the Turkish dungeons, were invariably spoken of as Bulgarians. No protest on the part of the Greeks was ever raised against their being called so. On the contrary, the Greek press found particular pleasure in keeping prominently before the public the Bulgarian nationality of the revolutionists, hoping thereby to curry favor with the Turks, by representing the Bulgarians as disloyal and hostile to the government.

In December, 1876, a European Conference met at Constantinople to elaborate a plan for the better administration of Bulgaria, including Thrace and Macedonia. The Conference, as we have already mentioned, proposed the creation of two *vilayets* or provinces with an autonomous administration from which all inhabitants, without distinction of race, language or religion, were to benefit. No sooner had this decision of the Conference become known than the Greeks raised the alarm, and two Greeks appeared in Constantinople as delegates with a protest from "the inhabitants of Philippopolis," without any signatures, protesting against the granting of autonomy to the country south of the Balkans. The Greek Patriarchate also protested against the extension of the limits of Bulgaria to Thrace and Macedonia, and the granting of autonomy as "contrary to justice and scientific truth, a violation of the geographical limits consecrated from time immemorial by history and every ethnographical theory." On December 29, 1876, as the English Blue Book shows, the Greek *Chargé d'Affaires* in London declared to Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary, that the Greek nation would consider an extension of autonomy to the south of the Balkans as a severe blow to the interests of the Greek race. He also added that the Greeks "would, as a body, feel better disposed towards the continuance of Turkish rule than to any preponderance or domination of the Slav races."

Here, then, we have a strange phenomenon. When an insurrection breaks out in Thrace, the insurgents, the thousands of people killed, massacred, hanged and imprisoned, are declared even by the Greeks to be Bulgarians; but as soon as self-government is offered to the sorely tried province, lo and behold, it appears that its in-

habitants are not Bulgarians, but Greeks, who reject the offer! Every sane and thinking man would naturally ask: If Thrace was really Greek, why should the Greeks object to autonomy or fear any preponderance or domination of the Slavs, that is, the Bulgarians? Is it reasonable to believe that the Greeks are so enamored of Turkish rule as to prefer it to self-government?

The reason of this fear of the Greeks and the utter falsity of their claims and protests was soon made manifest. The Berlin Treaty of 1878 created out of the larger part of Thrace an autonomous province, called *Eastern Rumelia*, eliminating thus the name of Southern Bulgaria, evidently out of consideration for Greek susceptibilities. The first Governor-General of the province, though a Bulgarian on his father's side, was Greek on his mother's side, and a Greek by education, habits of thought, family connections and language.

What more could the Greeks have desired for their prospects? And yet, in spite of all this, from the very beginning of the working of the autonomous administration in the province, Eastern Rumelia proved to be so overwhelmingly Bulgarian, as it had always been, that the Greeks could elect only two out of the fifty-seven deputies in the Provincial Assembly. In 1885 Eastern Rumelia proclaimed its union with Bulgaria, and no Greek voice was raised against it.

The same is true of Macedonia. By spurious statistics that vary with their authors, and by ethnographical maps that have been differently colored every time they have appeared, the Greeks have tried to throw dust into the eyes of the world as to the position of their national element in Macedonia. To what ridiculous results they have arrived is very well shown by Valentine Chirol in his "Twixt Greek and Turk." He says that the Greek bishop of Monastir confessed to him in 1881 that in the whole district of Prilep there were only six villages and in the town eighty Wallach houses that acknowledged his spiritual jurisdiction. At the time of the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, in the elaborate returns which the Greek Syllagos or Association of Constantinople, presented to Sir Henry Layard, the British Ambassador to Turkey, the Greek population of the district of Prilep was set down at 40,000 souls, either resident in the town or scattered over ninety Greek and forty-seven mixed villages. In the short space of three years these 40,000 Greeks had dwindled down to eighty *Wallach* families in the town

and *six* villages, most probably also Wallach, in the district! What became of the rest? Why, they vanished into thin air, for they had never existed, except in the imagination of the Syllogos and in its fictitious statistics.

As an example of the reliability of Greek statistics on Macedonia we give the following data. A certain Greek professor, Sarpoulos of Athens, sets down the Greeks in Macedonia at 500,000, the Slavs at 120,000, Turks at 100,000, and Jews at 40,000, whereas, everybody knows that in the town of Salonica alone there are from sixty to seventy thousand Jews. Some notables of Salonica in a memoir to the Greek Patriarch and the Turkish government, in 1878 put the number of the Greeks in Macedonia at 800,000, while the Greek Syllogos of Constantinople in the same year puts the Greeks at 438,000, but raises their number to 705,000 by counting as Greeks 70,000 "Greco-Vlaks," and 197,000 "Bulgarophones." The Greek Minister in Paris in 1904 stated that in Macedonia in 1877 there were 256 Greek schools with 10,968 pupils. The Greek Syllogos for the same year lays claim to 638 schools with 32,885 pupils, while Mr. Chassiotis, a Greek author, in his book on "Public Instruction Among the Greeks," states that in 1878 the number of Greek schools in Macedonia was 421 with 20,682 pupils.

Which of these three Greek school statistics is correct? The puzzle is hard to solve; but the discrepancy between them is so great that one is led to doubt the veracity of any of them. Emile de Lavaley, from whom we have quoted the above Greek statistics about the population of Macedonia, says: "According to the most serious statistics favorable to the Greeks, the latter form only one-tenth of the population."

The numerical inferiority of the Greeks in Macedonia in comparison with the Bulgarians and the other Christian nationalities there has led Greek politicians to resort to a subterfuge in representing the people as "Exarchists" and "Patriarchists," the former recognizing the Bulgarian Exarch and the latter the Greek Patriarch as their spiritual head. All "Patriarchists" they reckon as Greeks, and all who are "Exarchists" are classed as Bulgarians.

This division is ethnographically wrong and misleading. An "Exarchist" is really a Bulgarian, for no Greek would own allegiance to the Bulgarian Exarch, whom the Greek Patriarch has pronounced a schismatic; hence, there are no Greeks who are "Exarchists." A "Patriarchist" is not necessarily or really a Greek, for all the Vlaks,

and Orthodox Albanians who are under the Patriarch's jurisdiction, as well as several Bulgarian communities, which, not having been allowed by the Turkish government to join the Exarchate, are kept under the same jurisdiction, pass by the name of "Patriarchists." All "Patriarchists," therefore, are not Greeks, either by nationality or language, and ought not to be classed as such. The Greek statistics, as Valentine Chirol and others have rightly observed, take the religious denomination as their basis, which is as accurate for determining the nationality of a man as it would be to class all Catholic Bulgarians as Italians or French, or all Protestant Bulgarians as Englishmen or Americans. The Bulgarian and other statistics, which reckon the Bulgarian population of Macedonia at about one and one-quarter millions, are based upon nationality and the language habitually spoken, and "these," Chirol says, "are the least deceptive."

The intolerance of the Greeks towards the other nationalities in the Balkan Peninsula, that seek to assert themselves as distinct national units, proceeds from the same cause. The Greeks had hoped to swell their numbers by Hellenizing foreign elements and under the guise of religious identity passing them as genuine Greeks. Any movement against this process of Hellenization is hateful to a Greek, and no means are spared in checking it.

Mr. Brailsford ("Macedonia," pp. 215-16) tells us that Greek bands of brigands murdered the Albanian priest of the village of Negovan, because he had translated the Greek liturgy into Albanian, and a fair number of Vlakh priests and teachers were likewise executed, because they attempted to say mass or teach the children in Rumanian.

The reports of the American missionaries, engaged in evangelistic work among the Albanians, testify to the "unscrupulous opposition" offered to the work. In 1890 Mr. Kyrias, an Albanian preacher and teacher in Kortcha, writes that the Greeks were opposed to any preaching or teaching in Albanian, simply because they considered the work most dangerous to Hellenism.

In 1898 Mr. Baird reports: "The Greek church fiercely opposes all schools, books, newspapers and preaching in Albanian, even when conducted by Orthodox Greek Christians."

In the *Missionary Herald* of 1913 (p. 102) we read: "In a discussion with an American keenly interested in the moral and intellectual uplift of Albanians, a certain Greek commander recently made the expressive remark: 'You are not friends to Greece. You

and your American work will not be needed now, for you are a propaganda for autonomy and the Albanian language.'”

What is true of the treatment of the Albanians by the Greeks is equally true of their treatment of the Vlaks. Hellenism is intolerant of all who desire to live a national life of their own.

Contrast with this spirit of national bigotry and tyranny the following words of Mr. Thomson, a missionary of long residence in Bulgaria: “Our freedom to work is astonishing, when we think what it might have been had Bulgaria been like Greece, Rumania, Serbia, Austria or Russia.” Contrast with it the letter written in 1914 by the Minister of National Education in Bulgaria to the Principal of the American Board of Missions School for Girls at Samokov, in which he expresses the gratitude of the nation and the government for “the education and the moral and spiritual training of the youth,” effected by the American schools in Bulgaria; the recognition that the Bulgarian Government has granted to these schools on a par with the national schools, or the letter that the same minister addressed to Mrs. Haskell in 1914, expressing “deep and heartfelt sorrow” at the death of her husband, “who fifty years ago, with unexampled self-sacrifice, came to Bulgaria, then enveloped in darkness, with the high and noble mission to bring to her light and love,”—and you will be able to judge between the “barbarity” of the Bulgarian and the civilizing culture of the Greek.

## VIII

### Rumano-Bulgarian Relations

When Bulgaria was still a Turkish province, Rumania was an autonomous principality, enjoying the privileges of practically self-government. The relations between Rumanians and Bulgarians were very friendly, and Rumania was the place of refuge for thousands of Bulgarians, who either for political reasons or out of a desire to lead a life of freedom, betook themselves there. As in Rumania there were already thousands of Bulgarians, who by former emigrations had settled in many towns and villages in Rumania and in Bessarabia, then forming part of Rumania, these Bulgarian refugees felt as if they were not altogether in a strange land. The Rumanian Government and people treated them kindly and hospitably, and a great many prominent Bulgarian commercial houses were established in the principal towns. In Bucharest itself in the sixties of the last century a Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee was formed, having for its object the liberation of Bulgaria from Turkish rule. This idea was freely propagated in the Committee's press, by its secret emissaries in Bulgaria, and even bands of insurgents that in 1867 and later crossed the Danube into Bulgaria, hoping to raise a general insurrection, were organized and fitted out on Rumanian soil. The Rumanian Government winked at all these proceedings and naturally gained the sympathy of the Bulgarian people.

This sympathy was so great that when in 1878 Bulgaria was called upon to choose her first ruler, voices were not wanting to urge the election of Prince Charles of Rumania as such, and bring about a personal union between the two countries. The plan did not succeed, as the Russian Tsar, Alexander II, had another candidate in view for the newly-created Principality of Bulgaria, which Russian blood and treasure had emancipated.

The relations between free Bulgaria and Rumania continued to be very good, however, and when in 1886 Bulgaria, owing to the abdication of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, was in quest of a new ruler, the project of electing King Charles of Rumania was again seriously revived; but as the relations between the Russian Tsar Alexander III and the Regency in Bulgaria were strained, and the

Tsar would not recognize anybody who might be chosen without his previous consent, King Charles declined the proposal.

There was no reason why the relations between Rumania and Bulgaria should not have continued always friendly. Although there were probably as many as 150,000 Bulgarians inhabiting Rumania and Bessarabia, it had never entered the head of any Bulgarian, either before or after the constitution of the Bulgarian Principality, to lay claims on any part of Rumania. The large river Danube formed a natural and well-defined boundary between the two countries, which could give rise to no frontier disputes. But the Berlin Treaty upset what nature had ordained, and by allotting to Rumania a large part of Dobrudja sowed the seeds of future discord between the two countries. This act of diplomatic short-sightedness was done in order to compensate Rumania for the loss of Bessarabia, which she was made to retrocede to Russia. Rumania protested in vain against the exchange; the people of Dobrudja, where there were hardly any Rumanians, and who were mostly Bulgarians and Turks, were not consulted about it. How badly the new Rumanian-Bulgarian boundary in the Dobrudja was drawn is shown by the fact that one of the principal forts of Silistra, which commands the town, was left in the hands of the Rumanians, while the town itself was turned over to the Bulgarians. Many of the people of Silistra had their fields and vineyards on Rumanian territory.

Having been allowed to extend its possessions on the right bank of the Danube over territory which neither by nationality, language nor historic rights belonged to her, Rumania naturally thought that she might, under the pretext of a better rectification of frontiers or eventual territorial compensation, aspire to more territory from Bulgaria. Her object has been to extend her dominion so as to include the towns of Varna, the principal Bulgarian seaport on the Black Sea; Shumen and Rustchuk, forming thus with Silistra a quadrilateral of strongly fortified places. But as, according to the French proverb, "appetite comes in eating," Rumanian greed for territory was not satisfied with this, but reached out for other Bulgarian territory as far as Tirnovo and along the Danube as far north as the town of Vidin, especially as in the latter district there is a Rumanian population of 38,500, which might serve as a plausible excuse for Rumanian pretensions.

The Rumanian press and some Rumanian writers have made no attempt to dissemble this plan of theirs, and it would have been

very easy for Rumanian politicians, at the opportune moment, to grossly exaggerate the actual number of Rumanians inhabiting Bulgaria, to claim them as rightfully belonging to Rumania.

J. D. Bourchier, who has been for more than twenty-five years the special correspondent of the London *Times* in the Balkan Peninsula, and is well-versed in the political conditions of Rumania and the Balkan States, in his work, "*The Balkan States*," 1905, wrote: "Rumania will claim compensation in case any population which she claims to be Rumanian is adjudged to some other power." In the Balkan Peninsula there was no place where Rumanians existed, except those who inhabited Bulgaria, about 123,000 inhabiting Serbia, and those in Macedonia, Thessaly and Epirus, whose number is estimated by Prof. G. Weigand\* to be about 160,000, and about half of whom he assigns to Macedonia. This Rumanian or Vlach population in Macedonia nowhere forms a majority or a compact mass, but is scattered over various districts interspersed among villages of other nationalities, so that it has no importance as a social-political factor in the country. In church matters the Vlachs are under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch and a large part of them pride themselves on being Greeks, although their home language is Vlach or Rumanian.

It was not possible for Rumania to raise a Rumanian question in Bulgaria or Serbia, for she would have exposed herself to the raising of the question of the Bulgarians in Rumania. Moreover, the Rumanians in Bulgaria and Serbia, who had settled there for good almost eighty years earlier, were treated on a footing of equality with the native population and therefore had no reason to complain.

But in Macedonia it was different. There the Vlachs were in a country the future of which was uncertain, and their national existence was precarious, owing to the successful attempts at Hellenization that the Greek clergy had made and was making among them. Eighty thousand Vlachs in the midst of a population of two and one-quarter millions could not count much in any future redistribution of territory in the Balkan Peninsula, nor could they justify Rumania in claiming any part of Macedonia as hers by right of nationality. The numerical insignificance of the Vlach population, the

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\* Dr. Weigand, professor of Roumanian language and literature in the University of Leipzig, has compiled his statistics by personally visiting almost all the villages and towns in Macedonia inhabited by Vlachs, during his two journeys undertaken for the study of their language, customs, manners and mode of life.



absence of any district which could be called purely or really Vlach, the geographical position of Macedonia and Rumania, precluded the advance of any such claim.

But if Rumania could not substantiate her claims to Macedonian territory, she could make use of the Macedonian Vlaks as barter for territory nearer home. She was aware of the fact that, owing to the Christian population of Macedonia being overwhelmingly Bulgarian, Bulgaria was the most serious claimant to Macedonia. If in case of a rearrangement of the map of the Balkan Peninsula, Macedonia should go to Bulgaria, Rumania could then come forward with a demand, based upon the trite pretext of "the balance of power," for compensation with Bulgarian territory.

With this purpose in view a Rumanian propaganda, supported and directed from Bucharest, was started among the Vlaks in Macedonia with the ostensible object of safeguarding them against Hellenization and preserving their nationality. It was ostensibly a "cultural" propaganda, carried on by the establishment of Rumanian schools and churches, subsidized by the Rumanian Government, to replace the Greek schools and churches which were in existence among the Macedonian Vlaks. At first no great importance was attached by the Greeks and their Patriarchate to this movement. The process of Hellenization that had gone on for years among the Vlaks had stifled any national consciousness among them, and although the people still clung to their language, they had no literature, no priesthood and no teachers of their own. Those of them who had an education, and their number was relatively small, had received it in the Greek schools at home or in Greece, and were ardent admirers of Greek history, language, literature and culture. As a rule, they became firm champions of Hellenism, and considered it an ignominy to be counted as Vlaks. The similarity of religion and church rites, the docility and submissiveness of the Vlach population to the Greek bishops, priests and teachers, facilitated the work of Hellenization.

Eventually the Patriarch and his clergy tried to prevent the spread of the Rumanian propaganda, obstructing the opening of Vlach schools. The question assumed a more threatening aspect when in 1892 six Vlach delegates from Monastir presented to the Sultan a petition bearing 5,000 signatures asking for the appointment of a Vlach Archbishop to reside in the town of Monastir. The

Greek Patriarch was naturally opposed to the proposition, and the Turkish Government pigeonholed the petition.

But in 1905 a Sultan's decree was issued granting to the Vlaks, "in order to safeguard their national interests," the permission "to use their own language in their schools, to perform their religious services in their own churches, with their own priests and in their own language." They were also granted the privilege of choosing their own village mayors and of taking part in the elections of the members of the provincial administrative councils.

The concession of these privileges to the Vlaks was tantamount to their being officially recognized as a separate national unit, which carried with it their right to be registered in the official rolls as Vlaks, and not as Greeks, as the custom heretofore had been. But the decree expressly stated that the Vlaks were to remain under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Patriarch.

This decree infuriated the Greeks. Armed bands, chiefly organized on Greek territory, and sent over into Macedonia, began to terrorize the Vlach population and prevent it from joining the Rumanian propaganda. The Greek Patriarch forbade the consecration of priests of Vlach origin, threatened with excommunication those of them who should dare to use the Rumanian language in the church services or sympathize with the aims of the propaganda. An attempt to have the Vlaks join the Bulgarian Exarchate and have their priests ordained by the Bulgarian bishops failed, because the Exarch refused to interfere in the Vlakho-Greek strife and become a tool of the propaganda.

The persecution of the Vlaks by the armed Greek bands and the Greek Patriarch produced a strain in the relations between Rumania and Greece, and on September 12, 1905, four months after the promulgation of the Sultan's decree in regard to the Vlaks, Greco-Rumanian diplomatic relations were broken off.

On the resumption of these relations in 1911 the Rumanian Government again took up negotiations with the Greek Patriarchate, hoping to induce it to sanction the privileges granted to the Macedonian Vlaks by the Sultan, and the establishment of a Vlach church organization with its own spiritual chief. The answer of the Patriarch was a categorical *non possumus*, on the ground that these things were asked for by an insignificant minority, while the majority of the Vlaks did not desire to separate themselves from the Greek church.

In its demand for a separate Vlach church organization, Rumania was really not sincere, for it did not suit the political plans for the furtherance of which she intended to use the Macedonian Vlachs. If the Greek Patriarch were to grant such an organization, he *ipso facto* would destroy the ground on which he had based his opposition to the establishment of a Bulgarian church organization, namely, that the church did not recognize racial distinctions. A Vlach church organization would have worked in favor of the Bulgarian cause in Macedonia, for the Patriarch could not have refused to a million of Bulgarians what he granted to 80,000 Vlachs.

But a church separation was not in accordance either with the Greek or the Rumanian aims. As early as 1905 the Rumanian Government had declared its opinion, as the Rumanian official *Green Book* of that year testifies, that "it would not be in the interest of the Sublime Porte or in that of Rumania's problems to push affairs too far, and make the Vlach religious community the outcome of a religious schism." In the next place, the smallness of the Vlach population, which nowhere formed a compact or predominating mass, made it incapable of becoming a national or political factor in Macedonia. The Vlachs could count for something only in union with the Greeks. As to their being annexed to Rumania, it was out of the question, because Bulgaria stood geographically between Rumania and Macedonia. Hence a division of tendencies arose between the Vlachs who wished to remain united with the Greek Patriarch, and those who were in favor of a separatistic national movement.

Both these factions found fault with Rumania, which preached to them loyalty to the Turkish Government. The Bulgarian movement for an autonomous Macedonia found no more favor with Rumanian politicians than it did with those of Greece and Serbia. The Vlachs, however, thought differently. During the insurrection in Macedonia in 1903 many Vlachs joined the ranks of the Bulgarian insurgents and fought bravely both against the Turkish troops and against the Greek bands which coöperated with the latter.

This displeased the Rumanian politicians, who were not slow in condemning the common action of the Vlachs with the Bulgarians. *Romanul de la Pind*, the organ of the nationalist Vlachs, in opposition to this condemnation declared that the Vlachs, in view of the reluctance of the Rumanian Government to demand the separation of the Vlach church from the Patriarchate, "find it necessary to unite their destiny with that of the Bulgarian nation, which seems to them less

dangerous for their national existence and whose enemies (the Greeks) are also their own enemies." And again: "If we do not wish to exist as a separate nation in Macedonia, nothing remains for us to do but to follow the advice of the Rumanian Government; if, on the other hand, we wish to exist as a separate nation, we ought to get rid of these counsels—to follow the impulses of our hearts and act as the needs of our people dictate."

Rumanian statesmen, such as Bratiano, Lahovary, Sturdza, Take Ionescu and others, were not wanting in protestations that Rumania "had no plans of any conquests in Macedonia, as this province is too far away from Rumania," or of "annexing it or creating it in a Rumanian state." All they wanted was "to help the cultural development of a population with which we are bound by origin and common sentiments," and thus preserve its nationality and language.

While such were the outward professions of the Rumanian statesmen, Bratiano, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1902, in a circular addressed to the Rumanian diplomatic representatives abroad, wrote: "The affairs of Macedonia have constantly occupied our attention, because they interest us: (1) on account of a numerous (*Sic!*) population in Turkey of Rumanian origin, and (2) on account of the *political equilibrium in the Balkan Peninsula.*"

The Rumanian periodical, *La Renaissance Latine*, in its issue of July, 1904, gave more precision to Bratiano's idea by declaring that "the Rumanian Government is striving less at the creation of a colony of Aromani, than at securing a pledge, which it could cede to Bulgaria in return for extensive concessions, as, for example, *the rectification of the Dobrudja frontiers.*"

Writing not long ago before the first Balkan war, Prof. Barbu-lescu of the University of Yassy, untrammelled by political considerations or diplomatic circumlocution, was more outspoken when he wrote: "The role and activities of the Aromani in Macedonia ought to consist not only in purely cultural action, but also in political action, parallel with it, for in that province we have to do with the Bulgarians, who are aiming at the eventual annexation of our Dobrudja, and, therefore, wish to violate our territorial integrity. . . . The Rumanians, therefore, ought to pursue in Macedonia a cultural as well as a political aim: to prevent the Bulgarians from gaining possession of Macedonia. In order to retain Dobrudja we ought to pursue in Macedonia such a policy as would, as far as possible, unite us more closely with Serbia, the Greek Patriarchate

and the Greeks, and thus enable us to paralyze the Bulgarian aspirations to territorial expansion in Macedonia.”

These quotations, and many others which might be adduced, from the utterances of prominent Rumanians show the ulterior object of the Rumanian propaganda in Macedonia and confirm the statement of the correspondent of the London *Times* that the Vlaks of Macedonia were to be used as barter for compensation. The confession of Prof. Barbulescu that Rumania can work against the Bulgarians in Macedonia only in conjunction with Serbia, the Greek Patriarchate and the Greeks, proves that the “numerous” Vlach population in Turkey, of which Bratiano speaks in his circular, is powerless to act by itself. It is characteristic of the pretensions of the Rumanians, Serbians and Greeks in Macedonia that while claiming that they have large populations there and that the Bulgarians form an insignificant minority, none of them feel strong enough to cope with the latter separately, but all clamor for joint action. Bulgaria is the only country that has refused to barter away its rights to enter into bargaining or combinations with one nationality against another. Strong in the righteousness of the Bulgarian cause, both the Government and the Exarchate have declined to entertain propositions for political blackmail or unjust acquisition.

The charge that Bulgaria aims at an eventual annexation of Rumanian Dobrudja and desires to destroy Rumania's territorial integrity, is gratuitous and baseless. We have already spoken of the way Rumania obtained possession of Dobrudja in 1878. Rumanian rule there has been attended with harshness and deliberate oppression of the Bulgarian population. The Bulgarian schools were closed, the Bulgarian language was proscribed, Bulgarian clubs or reading rooms were forbidden, and church services were allowed only in Rumanian. These proceedings of the Rumanian Government were certainly provocative, but Bulgaria kept aloof from any political agitation or propaganda in Dobrudja. It even went beyond that: it allowed the opening of a Rumanian school in the very capital of Bulgaria for a population (in 1905) of only 230 Rumanians, most of them unmarried! That Bulgarians may have cherished sentimentally the desire to see Dobrudja eventually restored to Bulgaria, to which it belongs both by right of nationality and by geography, is very probable; but it can hardly be called an attempt at the destruction of Rumania's territorial integrity.

If Rumania is justified in entertaining a longing desire for the

annexation of Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia, on the ground of historical and national rights, why should it be wrong for Bulgaria to entertain a similar desire in regard to Dobrudja? Geographically and historically that province was a part of Bulgaria up to 1878, when it was arbitrarily detached from it and annexed to Rumania. The latter country has no more right to Dobrudja than Bulgaria has to Transylvania. Rumanian territorial integrity begins on the left bank of the Danube. Her natural expansion lies in another direction, not across the Danube. By her geographical position, Rumania is not a Balkan State and does not belong to the Balkan Peninsula. On the right bank of the Danube she is an intruder, with potentialities for future mischief-making, and a standing menace to the security of Bulgaria and the peace of the Balkan Peninsula.

## IX

### The Balkan League and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913

The formation of the Balkan League and the joint coöperation of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria in a war against Turkey for the freeing of their respective co-nationalists, from Turkish rule was almost a miracle. The current opinion in Europe had been that with the apparently irreconcilable divergences of opinion among these states about the settlement of the Balkan Question, and the mutual hatreds among their peoples, no political combination for common action was possible. But the unexpected happened. How this was brought about and the struggle with Turkey crowned with success is so well told in the "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Balkan Wars," published in 1914 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that those who wish to get into touch with the events preceding the war and with its subsequent phases may with profit consult that Report. In fact, no one who wishes to understand the Balkan situation or to talk intelligently about it can afford to ignore its contents. Additional and valuable information can be gained also by the perusal of "The Balkan League" (published by John Murray, London, 1915), the author of which, I. E. Gueshoff, was Prime Minister of Bulgaria from March, 1911, to May 30, 1913, exactly four weeks before the second Balkan War began. Mr. Gueshoff's book is interesting both for the light it throws on the formation of the Balkan League and its vicissitudes during the First Balkan War, and for the diplomatic documents it contains, which supplement the contents of the Report of the Carnegie Commission.

It is a mistake to attribute to the initiative of Venizelos the formation of the Balkan League. It is true that on October 16, 1911, the Greek Minister at Sofia informed the Bulgarian Government that, if it could assure Greece of Bulgaria's willingness to intervene in the event of a Turkish aggression upon Greece, he was authorized by his Government to declare that Greece in her turn would fight should Bulgaria be attacked by Turkey. The proposal was accepted, but no treaty or project of a treaty was drawn. On April 27, 1912, Greece presented a draft for a defensive alliance with Bulgaria, but as nothing was said in the project about the autonomy

of Macedonia and Thrace, Bulgaria refused to entertain this project, and submitted to Greece the following formula:

"Greece undertakes not to offer any opposition to an eventual demand by Bulgaria of administrative autonomy for Macedonia and the vilayet of Adrianople, guaranteeing equal rights to the nationalities there."

This formula, with some slight modifications in the wording, was finally adopted by Greece, and a Greco-Bulgarian defensive alliance was signed on May 29, 1912, at Sofia. This was followed by the signature, on October 5, 1912, of a Military Convention between Greece and Bulgaria, but no agreement with respect to the future frontiers in Macedonia of the two countries was concluded.

On March 13, 1912, that is, two months and a half before the signing of the defensive alliance between Greece and Bulgaria, a treaty of friendship and alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria was signed. This treaty, due to the initiative of Bulgaria, was the real foundation of the Balkan League. Article 2 of a Secret Annex to this treaty states that, "Serbia recognizes the right of Bulgaria to the territory east of the Rhodope Mountains and the River Struma; while Bulgaria recognizes a similar right of Serbia to the territory north and west of Shar Mountain." As to the territory lying between the Shar Mountain and the Rhodope Mountains, the Aegean Sea and the Lake of Ochrida, a detailed delimitation line was fixed, *beyond which Serbia undertook to ask for nothing*. This delimitation line left to Bulgaria the larger part of Macedonia, reserving the districts of Skopia, Kumanovo, Tetovo, and Dibra, for the arbitration of the Russian Emperor. This was done in order to satisfy the pretensions of Serbia to these districts, and at the same time to appease public opinion in Bulgaria, which has always considered the above districts as being part of Macedonia and by right of nationality belonging to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian Government in making this concession to Serbia by leaving these districts to be arbitrated upon and adjudged by the Russian Emperor, wished to guard itself against the imputation of sacrificing Bulgaria's interests to those of Serbia, with the latent hope perhaps that the arbitrator might still adjudge to Bulgaria the "disputed zone" in whole or in part. The article is most explicit on this point, for it reads thus: "Bulgaria undertakes to accept this line, if His Majesty, the Russian Emperor, who will be requested to act as supreme arbitrator, pronounces in its favor. It is understood



that the two parties bind themselves to accept as a definite frontier the line between the indicated frontiers which His Majesty, the Russian Emperor, will esteem to correspond best to the rights and the interests of the two parties."

Subject to arbitration, then, was not the whole treaty or the delimitation line "beyond which Serbia undertakes to ask for nothing," but the line "between the indicated frontiers" and the Shar Mountain, which comprised the disputed or contested region.

On September 30, 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, ordered a mobilization of their forces as a reply to a similar measure on the part of Turkey, and on October 18, 1912, the Allies formally declared war against Turkey. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Bulgarian Government, as Gueshoff tells us, came into the possession of a copy of a circular letter, No. 5669, by Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, dated September 28, 1912, i. e., two days before Bulgaria mobilized, and addressed to Serbia's diplomatic representatives abroad. In this letter, discussing the proposal made on August 14, 1912, by Count Berchtoldt, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to assist Turkey in extending "decentralization" to the Christian nationalities, Pashitch instructed the Serbian diplomats and consuls to support the cause of reforms in Old Serbia and to demand the following frontiers for that province:

"The geographical frontier of this territory must start from Poteritsa, on the Turko-Bulgarian boundary, and turn to the south in the direction of the watershed of Vardar, thence continuing towards Babuna, in such a way as to include within the scope of Old Serbia the towns of Prilep, Kitchevo and Ochrida, together with their surroundings."

By the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of March 13, 1912, Prilep and Ochrida had been adjudged to Bulgaria, and here was Pashitch, six months after the signing of that treaty, in a secret dispatch, behind the back of the Bulgarian Government, and in violation of the treaty, claiming them as Serbian!

The Bulgarian Government strongly protested against this exhibition of bad faith on the part of Serbia, but as the war had already begun, there was nothing else to do but to go on with it. While the Bulgarian troops were fighting in Thrace against the Turks, the Serbian and Greek troops were occupying Macedonia, driving the Turkish forces before them.

After having established themselves in Macedonia the Serbians

in November, 1912, occupied the seaport of Durazzo, on the Adriatic. In view of the opposition of Austria to this occupation, Serbia had finally to abandon her pretensions to an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. Mr. Gueshoff quotes a telegram of November 9, 1912, from Sazonoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Bulgarian Government, in which he said that the Bulgarians, "who had stood at the head of the Balkan Alliance, must explain to the Serbians that necessity obliges them not to seek any territorial acquisitions on the Adriatic coast. The Triple Alliance had definitely decided the question, and after our great gains we must not start a fresh war for a harbor. Obstnacy on the part of Serbia might give rise to very serious complications."

The Serbo-Bulgarian treaty makes no mention whatever of securing a seaport for Serbia on the Adriatic, or of extending Serbian territorial possessions over Albania. What it provides for is, that in case Austria should declare war on Serbia, Bulgaria would send to Serbia an army of at least 200,000 men, to act offensively or defensively against Austria. Serbia did not inform Bulgaria when it advanced towards the Adriatic or when it definitely renounced its claim to an Adriatic seaport, and yet the Serbians afterwards complained that the Bulgarians did not support them in securing a footing on the Adriatic Coast.

"The truth is," says Gueshoff, "that when we conveyed to them the urgent counsels of Russia, we invariably declared that we should do everything humanly possible to perform our duty under the treaty of alliance."

Had Serbia maintained her occupation of Durazzo and been attacked by Austria, Bulgaria would have been obliged to give her the promised help. In case Bulgaria had refused to stand by her engagement, Serbia's complaint would have been justified. If Serbia withdrew from the Adriatic, she did it either because she did not wish to pick a quarrel with Austria or because she saw that even Russia did not approve her action and refused to uphold her in it.

But what is significant in this question of a Serbian outlet on the Adriatic and discloses the nefarious designs of the Serbian Government in regard to its treaty with Bulgaria, is the fact that before Serbia had renounced the Adriatic port, in the early part of December, 1912, the Serbian Minister at Paris told the Russian Ambassador "that in the event of non-compliance with the Serbian

demand for sovereign ownership of an Adriatic port, Serbia would be forced to look for compensation beyond the frontiers fixed by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." These words plainly show that Serbia was already planning to violate her territorial understanding with Bulgaria, and that the latter was to be asked to compensate her for a loss which she suffered through no fault or action of Bulgaria.

The subject of the delimitation of frontiers, already settled by the treaty, was raised by Serbia while the war against the Turks was still going on and its final issue was uncertain. Sazonoff, in apprising the Russian Minister of Belgrade of the above conversation between the Russian Ambassador and the Serbian Minister at Paris, says: "A violation of the territorial understanding between the two countries, which has been attained at the cost of so much labor, can find in us neither sympathy nor support."

On January 23, 1913, Pashitch, the Prime Minister of Serbia, for the first time spoke to the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade about a rectification of the frontier fixed by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, and at the very beginning of March the Serbian Minister at Sofia handed to the Bulgarian Government a note, officially asking for compensations not mentioned in the treaty. The Bulgarian Government naturally refused to entertain this proposal, which was contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty and was not justified by anything that had happened. To have accepted the Serbian demands would have meant to submit to revision the entire treaty, for which there was no reasonable excuse.

Such was the opinion of Sazonoff, who in a telegram of March 10, 1913, to the Russian Minister at Belgrade, says: "We cannot help regretting that, without waiting for the conclusion of peace, the Serbian Government should raise a question with which we can have no sympathy, because it is in contradiction to the obligations assumed by the Serbian Government." As the conference which had sat in London from December 16, 1912, to January 27, 1913, failed to bring about peace between the Balkan Allies and Turkey, owing to the refusal of the latter to accept the proposed terms, hostilities against Turkey were resumed, and were carried on principally by Bulgaria in Thrace.

Neither Serbia nor Greece took part in them, except that two Serbian divisions coöperated with the Bulgarians in the siege of Adrianople.

All this time Serbia was maturing her plans to break her treaty

with Bulgaria and plotting with Greece against Bulgaria. On March 8, 1913, the Rumanian Minister at Belgrade informed his government that he had "learned from several sources that Serbia is negotiating with the Greeks for the purpose of concluding a defensive alliance against Bulgaria. Both the Serbian Government and the Greek Minister here are impenetrable. The latter spends several hours daily at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." A little later the same Minister wrote: "All those with whom I have spoken tell me that, from the general to the last soldier, the Serbians under arms refuse to abandon Monastir and the other towns claimed by the Bulgarians in virtue of the treaty of alliance, and would rather be killed by Savoff than give up what they have conquered."

In Russia, too, they were aware of these Serbian machinations and designs, for on April 17, 1913, Sazonoff telegraphed to the Russian Minister at Belgrade as follows: "The Bulgarian Minister, acting on instructions from the Sofia Cabinet, has called our attention to the dangerous under-currents which threaten the existence of the Balkan Alliance. For instance, not long ago the Serbian Finance Minister asked for supplementary military credits for a period from the conclusion of peace until the final repartition of the conquered territories among the allies. The Serbian and Greek armies are being reinforced against the Bulgarian troops. Besides, it appears that special negotiations have been opened between Serbia and Greece, and it is seriously rumored that an alliance between those two countries has been concluded."

On April 26, 1913, the Bulgarian Prime Minister in a long dispatch to the Bulgarian Minister at Petrograd instructed him to assure Sazonoff that Bulgaria had no intention of breaking the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty or of engaging in any fratricidal war. He pointed out that it was Serbia that had raised the question of a revision of the treaty, and was seeking alliances against Bulgaria and that both Serbia and Greece were massing troops on the Bulgarian frontiers.

"If Mr. Sazonoff," the dispatch said, "should ask for further proof that we are not responsible for the present acute tension, but are, on the contrary, sincerely desirous of a peaceful settlement of the dispute, we are in a position to furnish it to him. For this purpose, and in order to seek an issue out of the present difficulty, I authorize you to propose to him that, in conformity with Article 4 of the Secret Annex, Russia should settle our dispute with Serbia. The Serbian case will be found stated in the above-mentioned letter

of Mr. Pashitch. We entirely reject the Serbian thesis, and as Mr. Pashitch wishes to meet me and discuss it, all interviews are useless, because the Ministerial Council in no wise can continue further discussion on this basis. We insist upon the carrying out of the treaty. . . . There being an open dispute between us and Serbia, and this dispute falling within the scope of the said Article 4, we most urgently request that the Russian Government undertake its settlement and invite the two sides to state their respective cases in order to enlighten the arbitrator. Let me add that when Mr. Spalaikovitch handed me the letter of Mr. Pashitch, he himself admitted, in reply to my declaration that we could not consent to a revision of the treaty, that there was no other way of settling the matter except by recourse to the stipulated arbitration."

On the strength of this declaration on the part of the Bulgarian Government Sazonoff wired on April 30, 1913, to the Russian Ministers in Belgrade and Sofia to remind the respective governments to which they were accredited that "every dispute concerning the interpretation or the application of the treaty and the military convention must be submitted to the arbitration of Russia, as soon as either side declares that it is impossible to reach an agreement by direct negotiations." Sazonoff left it to the two allied governments to inform Russia "in due time that all disagreements will be settled in the way indicated by the treaty and not by armed force."

On May 2, 1913, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria informed the Russian Minister at Sofia, who had communicated to him the contents of Sazonoff's telegram, that Bulgaria was in sympathy with Sazonoff's proposal "that all disputes between Bulgaria and Serbia be settled in the way indicated by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty."

On May 4, the Russian Minister at Belgrade telegraphed that Pashitch said that Serbia did not intend to disrupt her alliance with Bulgaria, but "that in view of what has happened the treaty of alliance must undergo an amicable revision," that "he still hopes that the two countries will arrive at a friendly understanding." In case this should prove impossible the Serbian Government announced it would always be ready to submit its claims to the arbitration of the Russian Government. Four days later the same Minister sent another dispatch to Sazonoff in which he reiterated the willingness of Pashitch "to conform to the advice of Russia in the matter of the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute; but," he added, "in order to make clear the character of the dispute which has arisen; to give a moral satisfaction to the Serbian army; to calm the political excitement

in the country; to preserve ties with Greece, which has identical interests with Serbia, and in that way to facilitate the task of the arbitrator—Mr. Pashitch considers it absolutely necessary that there should be a preliminary friendly exchange of views between the allied Premiers.”

In reading the telegrams of Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, it should be borne in mind that he was an avowed Bulgarophile and Serbophile, and that his influence over the Serbian Cabinet was paramount. The answer of Pashitch in the above telegram is evidently evasive and was given in order to protract the discussion and gain time. That it was so considered in Petrograd is apparent from the following telegram from Sazonoff to the Russian Ministers in Belgrade and Athens, dated May 27, 1913: “It looks as if the Serbian and Greek Governments are playing a dilatory and dangerous game, professing to us their peaceful intentions but at the same time avoiding clear and definite replies to our proposals and getting ready for a common war against Bulgaria.”

On June 18, 1913, Sazonoff again telegraphed to the Russian Minister at Belgrade: “Please use your influence to obtain a reply from Mr. Pashitch about his consent to arbitration as soon as possible. All further resistance or delay may have the most disastrous consequences.” The following day he again telegraphed: “Information received from various sources confirms the growing agitation in the Bulgarian Army for immediate war or demobilization. If Serbia does not accept the arbitration of Russia *without reservation, as Bulgaria has done*, the Bulgarian Government refuses to wait any longer, and the proposed meeting of the Premiers will not take place. An unconditional acceptance by Serbia of Russian arbitration can in no way be regarded as a concession to Bulgaria.”

To these urgent appeals from Sazonoff the Russian Minister at Belgrade replied on June 21, 1913, by the following characteristic telegram: “I have received your telegrams of June 18 and 19. Following your instructions, I am using all my efforts to persuade the Serbian Government to accept our arbitration without reservations, but for the time being am meeting with general difficulties. The general impression here is that we want to force Serbia to accept all the demands of Bulgaria, and against this impression I am struggling with all my energy. Nevertheless, I have not lost hope of a satisfactory settlement.”

Hartwig’s “efforts” at persuasion, whatever they may have been, did not materialize, for we find Sazonoff telegraphing to the Russian

Minister at Sofia on June 25, four days before the outbreak of the second Balkan war: "We blame Serbia also for not having given us a definite answer whether she will submit to the arbitration of the Imperial Government."

The dilatory tactics of the Serbian Government are explained by the fact that it really had no desire to submit its dispute with Bulgaria to arbitration; on the contrary, it was all the time working to consolidate its alliance with Greece against Bulgaria and if possible to align Rumania and Turkey with herself, for an eventual attack upon Bulgaria. The King of Greece, according to the testimony of Majoresco, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of an audience given to the Rumanian Minister at Athens towards the end of March, had spoken to him of an alliance between Greece and Rumania against Bulgaria. On April 19, 1913, the Serbian Minister at Bucharest formally proposed to Rumania a similar alliance, and a month later the Greek Minister at Bucharest made a like proposal, adding that Turkey also might participate in such an alliance. Serbian and Greek delegates had been sent to Constantinople in May to try and induce the Turkish Government to join the alliance. In the beginning of May a conference was called in London to conclude peace between Turkey and the Balkan Allies. The terms of the treaty had been drafted by Sir Edward Grey. On May 2, 1913, this draft was communicated to the Balkan delegates and ten days later the Bulgarian delegate announced his readiness to sign the treaty. But the Serbian and Greek delegates demurred and tried to retard the conclusion of peace. More than that, they visited the Turkish Ambassador in London and asked him to wire to Constantinople urging that instructions be sent to the Turkish delegate to delay the signature of the treaty, promising Turkey as compensation a Thracian frontier to the west of Adrianople when the war between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece should break out. The Ambassador refused, but Sir Edward Grey, who had been made aware of the fact, peremptorily ordered the delegates either to sign the treaty or leave London, and it was signed on May 30, 1913.

And all this time Serbia was professing, according to Hartwig's dispatches to Sazonoff, that she "harbors no aggressive intentions against Bulgaria," "values as before a sincere friendship with her," and did not intend to destroy her alliance with Bulgaria!

If further proof of Serbian perfidy were wanted, it is to be found in the sham resignation of Pashitch on June 22, when he had pretended the day before to accept Russian arbitration. We

give the circumstances as stated in an official dispatch sent out at the time by the Belgrade Press Bureau. The Serbian Cabinet had been convoked to give its sanction to the acceptance of arbitration. Pashitch was in favor of it, because otherwise a war with Bulgaria would become inevitable. But several ministers opposed it because "the acceptance of the Russian demand would be tantamount to the abandonment of the Serbian point of view." General Bojanovitch, the Minister of War, "laid stress upon the temper in the ranks of the army, which in no circumstance will abandon the territory conquered at the price of its blood." As two or three other ministers sided with the General, Pashitch tendered the resignation of the Cabinet.

Both Greece and Serbia were aware of "the growing agitation in the Bulgarian army in favor of immediate war or demobilization," to which Sazonoff had referred in his dispatch of June 19, quoted above. They also knew that public opinion in Bulgaria was greatly excited by the tergiversations of the Serbian and Greek Governments in the negotiations for arbitration. When on June 1, 1913, the Bulgarian Prime Minister proposed to Pashitch to have the treaty with its Secret Annex and the military conventions made public in order to enlighten public opinion in both countries, Pashitch refused. The reason for his refusal was evident. He wished to exploit the ignorance of public opinion in Serbia by representing the Bulgarian demands as exorbitant or unjust. Had he made public the obligations contracted by Serbia towards Bulgaria he would have let it be seen that Serbia had no real standing ground in her pretensions to a revision of the treaty. He was also afraid that the Military League in Serbia, which was all-powerful, would be up in arms against the government for having made the concessions to Bulgaria contained in the treaty.

In the night of June 29, 1913, an attack was made by the Bulgarian troops without a formal declaration of war on the Greek and Serbian lines. It has been proved beyond any doubt that the order for this attack was given by General Savoff, without the knowledge of the Bulgarian Ministry. On the following day, as soon as the ministry was informed of what had happened, orders were given to stop military operations and the Russian Minister at Sofia was requested to telegraph to Petrograd and urge the intervention of Russia with Greece and Serbia to prevent hostilities. The Minister's telegram ran as follows: "According to news received today a serious conflict has occurred between the Bulgarian troops and the Serbian and Greek troops. In view of his immediate de-



parture for Petrograd, Mr. Daneff [the Bulgarian Prime Minister] begs you to take steps at Belgrade and Athens to prevent further fighting."

Sazonoff at once telegraphed this request to Belgrade and Athens and sent a reassuring telegram to Sofia. The Serbian Government replied with a flat refusal, as is seen from Hartwig's dispatch of July 1, in which he says that "no peaceable measures would have any effect on the Government, because of the general excitement, which has become extreme." A printed war proclamation, bearing the same date and issued before Hartwig's dispatch could have reached Petrograd, was published in Belgrade, declaring war on Bulgaria. The reasons given in the proclamation, signed by the Serbian King, for the declaration of war were that the Bulgarians would not allow the Serbians to take the Macedonian districts they had conquered from the Turks, and would not let Serbia be joined with the sea.

Both statements are false, for Bulgaria claimed no districts except those that Serbia had recognized in the treaty as by right belonging to her, neither did Bulgaria oppose Serbia's desire to have an outlet on the sea. Even by the terms of the Bucharest Treaty of August 10, 1913, which gave to Serbia the Macedonian districts she unjustly coveted, Serbia did not gain direct and immediate access to the sea. She had to obtain it by a separate agreement with Greece through Greek territory at Salonica. What reason is there to suppose that Bulgaria would have been less ready than Greece to grant a similar privilege to Serbia, if Serbia had carried out loyally and faithfully her treaty obligations?

It is worthy of note that the Serbian declaration of war made no mention whatever of the Bulgarian attack of June 29, which, according to Hartwig, had produced such excitement in Belgrade. One would have naturally expected the Serbian Government to make the most of this attack, unprovoked by the Serbians, and give it prominence as a justification for declaring war. Again, the date, "July 1," and the words "given at Belgrade," in the proclamation are not in print, but are inserted in handwriting, and the date on which it was communicated to the Serbian commander at Orakh, at least *four* days' journey from Belgrade, again bears the date of July 1, the day of its alleged issue at Belgrade!

All this proves that Serbia had been preparing all along for a war with Bulgaria, and that even the proclamation of it was ready before the Bulgarian attack of June 29. Her negotiations for arbitration and a peaceful solution of the dispute were a mere sham,

designed to gain time and exhaust the patience of Bulgaria. In the meantime Serbia had strongly fortified strategical points in Macedonia and had massed her troops along the Bulgarian frontier.

We have previously pointed out that there was no treaty between Greece and Bulgaria fixing a delimitation of frontiers or a repartition of territory. Availing himself of this uncertainty the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, probably with the knowledge of Serbia, one week after the war with Turkey had begun, proposed to the Bulgarian Government a scheme for the repartition of the conquered territories by which Greece reserved to itself a population of 2,000,000, magnanimously leaving to Bulgaria territories inhabited by only 1,300,000! In view of the fact that the Greek forces which took part in the war were only one-third of the Bulgarian and that Bulgaria's losses were seven times those of the Greeks, the claims of Greece were certainly grossly exaggerated and inadmissible. While in London as a delegate to the Conference of December, 1912, Venizelos had proposed orally to the Bulgarian delegate a new project for fixing the boundaries. On February 6, 1913, he passed through Sofia on his way to Athens, and Gueshoff, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, asked him to submit in writing what he had proposed orally in London. Venizelos promised to do so on his return to Athens, but he delayed fulfilling his promise, and when at last his proposal came it was found to be totally different from the one he had made in London. Proposals on the part of Bulgaria to send a special delegate to settle the question of frontiers, the fixing of the positions of the Bulgarian and Greek armies and the question of demobilization were likewise evaded by the Greek Government. Plotting already with Serbia the discomfiture of Bulgaria, procrastination was the policy of Venizelos as well as of Pashitch.

Besides Serbia and Greece there was a third pretender, Rumania, who claimed compensations at the expense of Bulgaria. In the summer of 1912, almost four months before the outbreak of the first Balkan war, Bulgaria had proposed to come to an understanding with Rumania in view of an eventual Turkish catastrophe. Rumania declined the offer, "with the vague assurance that, if matters reached a climax, Bulgaria and Rumania would easily come to an agreement." Rumania thus declined to join the Balkan League and help in the emancipation of her co-nationalists in Macedonia, whose number Rumanian statistics put somewhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000, and for whose welfare the Rumanian Government pretended to be so much concerned. On November 3, 1912, soon after the war against Turkey had begun, Rumania semi-officially

asked Bulgaria for a cession of territory in Dobrudja from Silistra and Tutrakan down to Baltchik on the Black Sea. Bulgaria refused to entertain the proposition, for the simple reason that this part of northern Bulgaria is the most fertile and most advanced in agriculture, that the population of about 300,000 is mostly Bulgarian and Turkish, with only about 4,500 Rumanians in the Tutrakan and Silistra districts, and that Rumania had no justification in claiming such a territorial compensation. Even the Rumanians who lived in this region were perfectly satisfied with Bulgarian rule; had it been otherwise, they would have emigrated long ago to Rumania, which is in plain sight on the other side of the Danube. But they did not do so, for in Bulgaria they were free citizens with their own land and stock, while in Rumania they would have been simple serfs, as almost all the peasants of Rumania are.

On January 8, 1913, Rumania threatened Bulgaria with mobilization and invasion, but Russian interference prevented her from carrying out her threat. Three weeks later a protocol was signed in London between the Bulgarian delegate and Take Ionescu, the Rumanian Minister of the Interior, embodying the concession which Bulgaria was willing to make to Rumania. These concessions were the following: (1) Bulgaria will grant school and church autonomy to the Vlaks in the future Bulgarian possessions in Macedonia, and will permit the establishment of an episcopate for these Vlaks and the subvention of their churches and schools by the Rumanian Government; (2) Bulgaria will raze to the ground the fortifications around Silistra and recognize the right of Rumania to fortify the southern frontier of Rumanian Dobrudja and thus get the desired absolute security; (3) Bulgaria consents to the rectification of the Rumanian-Bulgarian boundary so as to give Rumania better facility for the improvement of the harbor of Mankalia on the Black Sea, and for its greater security."

The Rumanian Government refused to ratify this protocol, and finally the matter was referred to the mediation of the Great Powers. On May 9, 1913, the ambassadors' conference in Petrograd drew up a protocol by which Bulgaria agreed to cede the town of Silistra to Rumania. A mixed Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was sent to fix the limits of the ceded territory, but a divergence of opinion arose between the delegates as to the manner of delimitation and the matter was left in abeyance. In the meantime the second Balkan war broke out.

That this failure of the cession of Silistra was not unwelcome to Rumania is evidenced by the fact that she joined in the

war almost immediately. The Rumanian Government has cleverly represented its entrance into the war against Bulgaria as an act of pacification of the Balkans. It was, on the contrary, a dastardly act more becoming that of a robber than of a pacifier. The London "Punch" characterized this act truly when, in a cartoon showing a Bulgarian and a Serbian struggling together it represented Rumania with a revolver in hand standing between the two and rifling the pockets of the Bulgarian. That Rumania, instead of working for the pacification of the Balkans, was anxious for complications so that the Balkan League might be broken up and she might fish in troubled waters, is shown by the following fact: In a "Report to H. M. the Rumanian King by the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs," dated April 19, 1913, the Minister informed the King that on that day he had received a proposal from the Serbian Minister for an alliance against Bulgaria, to which proposal he had given an evasive reply. He expressed confidence that Greece also would soon make a similar proposal, but that to her also an evasive answer should be returned. Then he added: "There is always danger that before matters come to a head between the allies and Bulgaria and war breaks out, all negotiations for an alliance with us might only serve to render the Bulgarians more conciliatory towards the claims of Greeks and Serbians and help to consolidate their alliance to the detriment of Rumania. We cannot intervene except when war breaks out between Greeks, Serbians and Bulgarians. At that moment our hands must be free so that we shall be able to impose peace."

What better proof does one need of the role played by the would-be pacifier of the Balkan Peninsula?

In order to make clearer the dispute raised by Serbia in violation of her treaty obligations, which was the real cause of the second Balkan war and the breaking up of the Balkan League, it is well to give the complaints of the Serbians with their refutations by the Bulgarians, as set forth in a memorandum prepared by the Bulgarian Government for submission to the Russian Emperor as the arbitrator.

1. The Serbians maintain that the events which led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire were not fully foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, and that this fact gave them the right to call for an entire revision of the treaty. Considering that the treaty clearly and definitely states what territory is to belong to Serbia, what to Bulgaria and what is to be submitted to the arbitration of Russia, the contracting parties had

in view the possibility of what actually occurred—the dismemberment of all Turkey in Europe.

2. The Serbians claim a revision of the treaty because, after its conclusion, Greece and Montenegro took part in the war against Turkey. This fact cannot modify the relations established by the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria. The entrance of Greece into the war was of especial assistance to Serbia in her campaign against the Turks in Macedonia.

3. The Serbian claim that they mobilized more troops than were called for by the treaty gives them no right to demand the revision of the treaty. By the terms of the military convention between the two states, Bulgaria was required to have an army of not less than 200,000, and Serbia not less than 150,000. Bulgaria mobilized 620,000 men all told, of whom 480,000 were effectives, while Serbia mobilized, according to General Savoff, only 201,115 men. The losses of Bulgaria in the war were 93,000 (killed, dead of disease, and wounded), while the Serbian total does not exceed 25,000 casualties.

4. Serbians try to justify their demand for the revision of the treaty by the allegation that, contrary to the text of the treaty, Bulgaria sent less than 100,000 men to the Macedonian theater of war, while the Serbians helped the Bulgarians with two divisions in the siege of Adrianople. The stipulation in the military convention that Bulgaria should send 100,000 men to the Vardar theater of war was only conditional, "if no other special arrangement be made." By a supplementary agreement, concluded on the basis of the Military Convention, Bulgaria was required to send one division to the Vardar theater of war. This she did by sending 32,000 men who took part in the battle of Kumanovo and assisted the Serbians in defeating the Turks. The Serbians had the same number of troops at Adrianople, and they had come to replace the Bulgarian troops which had been sent to Tchataldja to fight the Turks. This was done in accordance with the agreement which provides for the transference, according to circumstances, of the necessary troops from the Macedonian to the Thracian theater of war, and *vice versa*.

5. The Serbian assertion that Serbia deserved compensation because the Bulgarians took Adrianople is not valid, because, according to the treaty, Serbia conceded to Bulgaria all the territory east of the Rhodope Mountains, which certainly includes Adrianople.

6. In regard to Serbia being deprived of a seaport on the Adriatic Sea, the treaty mentions no such seaport. What it does state

is, that should Austria declare war on Serbia, or march any troops into the Sandjak of Novipazar, Bulgaria will come to the assistance of Serbia with at least 200,000 men. The Serbians abandoned the port they had occupied of their own will, without even informing Bulgaria. If Serbia, on account of Austria's opposition, was forced to abandon the Adriatic seacoast, so was Bulgaria forced, on account of Russian opposition, to abandon her conquests on the Sea of Marmora, including the seaports of Gallipoli, Rodosto and Silivria. Bulgaria had also to cede to Rumania territory of her own. Although Serbia lost her Adriatic seaport, she had received a guarantee by the decision of the Great Powers of a free railway to one of the Adriatic ports, and besides, by the annexation of the Province of Novipazar, Serbia would be able to use the Montenegrin ports on the Adriatic.

It has been said that the Balkan war, which began as a war of liberation, degenerated into a war of conquest. The foregoing exposition of the circumstances attending the beginning and the continuation of the struggle will show upon whom falls the blame for the change. Bulgaria went into the war with the avowed purpose of liberating from Turkish rule the Bulgarians in Macedonia, whose cause she had always had at heart. It was this motive that prompted her to conclude a treaty of alliance with Serbia, whereby she hoped to secure the liberation of Macedonia, as well as of Old Serbia, north of the Shar Mountains, the Serbian right and claim to which she fully recognized. Although the Bulgarians had the right to insist on their claims to the province of Skopia, which had always been recognized as Bulgarian, they agreed, in order to spare Serbian susceptibilities and pave the way for a mutual understanding, to allow that part of Macedonian territory to be considered as doubtful or contested and to leave it to Russian arbitration to decide to whom it should belong. That concession on the part of Bulgaria seems to have been satisfactory to Serbia, for otherwise she would not have signed the treaty. But the Serbian Government on the very eve of the Balkan war, as is proved by the secret circular of Pashitch, which we have quoted, was bent on playing false to its engagements with Bulgaria. The conduct of the Serbian army and authorities towards the people of Macedonia, as soon as the Serbian troops had occupied the country, also proves that they regarded the war as one of conquest, not of liberation. The report of the Carnegie Commission supplies abundant evidence of this (pp. 49-57, and Chapter IV). Schools and churches were closed, priests and teachers were arrested, maltreated, or driven out of the country,

and men who had fought for the liberty of Macedonia "were arrested and punished like mere vagabonds and brigands." Merchants were forbidden to have any intercourse with Bulgaria, and Bulgarian books and newspapers were confiscated and proscribed. The Bulgarian bishops of Veles and Dibra were expelled from their dioceses, while the bishop's vicar at Uskub "was first driven out of his house, taken by force, shut up in a room and belabored by four soldiers until he lost consciousness." People who called themselves Bulgarians exposed themselves to the risk of being beaten and even killed. Gendarmes and various other Serbian agents went about the villages forcing the people, under threats of punishment, to sign prepared addresses and declarations renouncing their Bulgarian nationality and declaring that they and their fathers had been and were "pure Serbians."

The Greeks did not lag behind the Serbians in these oppressive measures, which show that both Serbians and Greeks came as conquerors and enslavers of the people and not as their liberators. It was a systematic attempt at the denationalization of the people under a regime of terror and tyranny, which began with the entry of the Greek and Serbian armies into Macedonia (November, 1912), and continued to the beginning of the second Balkan war (June, 1913). Who were, then, responsible for the conversion of the Balkan war of liberation into a war of conquest? Was not Bulgaria justified in looking upon allies guilty of such proceedings towards her brethren in Macedonia as perfidious enemies?

Another illustration of the regime which the Serbians established in Macedonia after the Bucharest treaty is found in the decree of "public security," issued on October 4, 1913, by the Serbian King, for the administration of the province. It was the establishment of a military dictatorship, pure and simple, which called forth cries of horror even in the foreign press. This Draconian edict is published in full on pp. 160-162 of the report of the Carnegie Commission; but as a sample of its ordinances we shall cite a few of its articles:

Article 2. "Any attempt at rebellion against the public powers is punishable by five years' penal servitude. The decision of the police authorities, published in the respective communes, is sufficient proof of the commission of crime. If the rebel refuses to give himself up as prisoner within ten days from such publication, he may be put to death by any public or military officer."

Article 3. "Any person accused of rebellion in terms of the

police decision, and who commits any crime, shall be punished with death."

Article 4. "Where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels do not return to their homes within ten days from the police notice, the authorities have the right of deporting their families whithersoever they may find convenient. Likewise, the inhabitants of the houses in which armed persons or criminals in general are found concealed, shall be deported."

Article 16. "Any one who knows a malefactor and does not denounce him to the authorities shall be punished by five years' penal servitude."

Article 18 provides that any act of aggression and any resistance by *word* or force offered to a public officer is to be punished "by ten years' penal servitude, or at least six months' imprisonment, however insignificant be the magnitude of the crime."

Article 20 provides twenty years' penal servitude for those who recruit bands against the State or for resistance to the public authorities, while by article 21 accomplices of rebels or of bands shall be punished by death or by at least ten years' penal servitude.

Article 26 empowers the Prefects or Governors to enact such police measures as they deem best and fix the penalties for their contravention.

In commenting upon these harsh and oppressive regulations for the administration of Macedonia, the Carnegie Commission says: "As a matter of fact, if one did not know what Macedonia is, one might guess it from the publication of these ordinances."

If the population of Macedonia is truly Serbian, as Serbians claim, what need was there of such Draconic laws, and why should it have been deprived of the rights of citizenship which the Serbian Constitution confers upon all Serbians? These tyrannical ordinances show plainly that Serbia ruled in Macedonia against the will of the people, as a conqueror and intruder, and that the only way it could maintain its rule was by terror and violence. The object of these ordinances was to crush the national spirit of the people and cow them into forcible submission to a rule which they detested.

The Greeks applied equally harsh and oppressive measures to that part of Macedonia which the treaty of Bucharest allotted to Greece as its share of the plunder. Even some of the Greek papers, which dared to be outspoken, condemned these measures. Arrests, beatings, tortures, banishments, closing of schools and churches, burning of Bulgarian books and holy images bearing Bulgarian inscriptions,—in a word, every sort of persecution to force the people



to renounce their nationality and language has been freely used.

Those who are acquainted with the conduct of both Serbians and Greeks in Macedonia before the Balkan war will not wonder at these proceedings. Neither Serbia nor Greece has ever wanted to see a good government, as prescribed by the Berlin Treaty, established in Macedonia. The sufferings of the people have never evoked any sympathy or commiseration at Athens or Belgrade. These sufferings have found an echo only in Bulgaria and among its people. Two years after the Berlin Treaty was signed, an appeal bearing the signatures of 102 representatives of Bulgarian communities was addressed to the European Ambassadors in Constantinople. In it the petitioners, exposing the hardships and sufferings of Macedonia, begged the Powers to hasten the execution of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty and introduce the promised reforms. Such appeals were from time to time repeated, public meetings held, and delegations sent to the various Powers to plead the cause of Macedonia, invariably from Bulgaria. No appeal was ever issued, no public meeting ever held, no delegation ever sent by either Serbia or Greece in favor of Macedonian autonomy. And yet the reforms demanded by the Bulgarians were for the good of all the nationalities in Macedonia without distinction of race, religion or language!

When all these peaceful means to secure the execution of what the European Powers had solemnly promised failed, recourse was had to risings in Macedonia in order to force the Powers to act. In all these risings only Bulgarians from Bulgaria and Macedonia took part. Playing upon the ignorance and credulity of the outside world, Greeks and Serbians have represented, under the name of *Comitadjis*, these champions of Macedonian liberty as brigands and cut-throats. It is a base calumny that should not be allowed to pass unchallenged, for it is an insult to the memory of men who freely died for a righteous cause. A *Comitadji* or committee-man is the Turkish name for a revolutionary and means simply a man who is affiliated with a revolutionary committee and who fights for the cause which that committee represents. Although it is true that among the *Comitadjis* there were some who might be classed as "black sheep," the large majority of them were serious-minded men, whose chief object was to free Macedonia from Turkish rule. Teachers and professors abandoned their class-rooms, students of colleges forsook their desks and books, army officers and government officials threw up their careers, and tradesmen left their counters to join the ranks of the insurgents. If men like these who sacrificed

their lives for freedom are to be counted as brigands and cut-throats, then there is in history no blow that has been struck for liberty against tyranny that ought not to be called a crime, or men who, from George Washington down, have fought in the cause of liberty, should not be branded as criminals fit for the gallows.

In 1903, when the most serious insurrectionary movement in Macedonia took place, the Serbians and especially the Greeks organized bands to fight, not with the Bulgarian insurgents for the freedom and autonomy of Macedonia, but against them in conjunction with the Turkish troops. These bands were recruited in Greece, especially in the island of Crete and in Thessaly, and sent over to Macedonia to help the Turks in putting down the insurrection. They were real mercenaries and even local Turks were hired to cooperate with them.

Deputations of Greek officers actually visited the Turkish Minister at Athens and offered him their swords to fight the Bulgarians in Macedonia. The Greek bishop of Castoria sent his bravoes to guide the Turkish troops to massacre the Bulgarian villages. There is a photograph in existence showing the bishop, surrounded by Turkish officers, in the act of blessing the Turkish cannon that were to batter Bulgarian villages to dust. Bulgarian refugees captured in Thessaly were handed over to the Turkish police to be tortured in Turkish dungeons. The Greek Patriarch issued an encyclical ordering the bishops and priests to denounce the insurgents and their sympathizers to the Turkish officials.

The Greek Committee or the "Macedonian Syllagos" of Athens issued a circular ordering the faithful to burn, shoot, assassinate and purify the soil of Macedonia from all that is Exarchist, and thus prove to the world that Macedonia is "purely Greek."

In view of these facts one can easily determine who were acting as brigands and cut-throats; those who were fighting for the liberty of Macedonia or those who were helping the Turks to keep it under subjection.

The American missionary, Rev. Dr. W. P. Clarke, who knew Macedonia both under Turkish and Serbian rule, writing from Monastir on the last day of 1914, after one and a half year's experience of Serbian administration, says: "People long for the past—and yet that was bad enough. There is great suffering, some of it due to the war, but much entirely unnecessary. The condition in the villages is worse than even here in Monastir. As I have written before, my prayer is for 'peace and freedom.' May God have mercy on poor Macedonia!"

## X

### Russo-Bulgarian Relations.

Bulgaria owes to Russia her political emancipation from Turkish rule. But even before that came the feelings of the Bulgarians towards Russia were those of affection, gratitude and deep-seated sympathy. The people of Bulgaria looked upon Russia as their defender and benefactor. All the church books, ecclesiastical robes for the clergy and sacred utensils were as a rule supplied gratis from Russia. Hundreds of young Bulgarians received their education free of charge in Russian colleges and universities, and on their return home acted as teachers, journalists, physicians, etc. Russian literature, both before and after the political emancipation, was assiduously studied and cultivated in Bulgaria, and numerous are the translations made of its productions. Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol and many other Russian writers are household names among educated Bulgarians. This intellectual and literary connection between Russia and Bulgaria was still more strengthened by the liberation of Bulgaria in 1878. The Russian language was introduced into the curriculum of the Bulgarian schools as a special subject, and in the higher classes of the colleges, Russian textbooks for the students and Russian helps for the teachers were in common use. One can safely say that in no Slavic country outside of Russia were the sympathies for Russia, her language and literature so strong as in Bulgaria. There is hardly a town in Bulgaria where one does not meet with Bulgarians who are conversant with the Russian language. Streets, public parks, monuments and institutions are found almost everywhere bearing the names of prominent military or civil Russians. In Sofia, in front of the National Assembly building, stands a magnificent bronze equestrian statue of the late Alexander II, who both for Russians and Bulgarians is deservedly the Tsar-Liberator. Nearby rises the sumptuous pile of the finest Cathedral in the whole Balkan Peninsula reared by public subscription to commemorate his memory. In Pleven, so renowned by the famous siege, all the places connected with the glorious military feats of the Russian army have been piously preserved and kept up, and are known by the name of "The Holy

Places," where people go as on a pilgrimage to revere the memory of those who died for the liberty of Bulgaria.

So long as Tsar Alexander II lived the relations between Russia and Bulgaria ran smooth and friendly. Prince Alexander Battenberg was a great favorite with the Tsar and had been elected as the first ruler of Bulgaria on the Tsar's recommendation. A noble-minded and great-hearted man, Alexander II had at heart the welfare of Bulgaria, which his magnanimity had called into being as a free, self-governing country. His death in 1881 was, therefore, a great loss to Bulgaria, and was destined to exert a baneful influence upon Russo-Bulgarian relations. His son and successor, Alexander III, a man of strong will, opinionated and autocratic in character, is said to have had a personal dislike for the Prince of Bulgaria. There was also a party or clique in Russia which looked unfavorably upon a prince, German-Polish and not Russian by birth, ruling over Bulgaria. The political inexperience of the Prince, the party dissensions and bickerings of the political leaders in Bulgaria and the annoying interference of Russian officials in the internal affairs of the country tended to produce misunderstandings and friction between the two countries.

The acute stage of this undesirable tension in Russo-Bulgarian relations was reached in 1885, when Southern Bulgaria, or Eastern Rumelia, proclaimed its union with the Principality. The Russian Emperor took umbrage at this proclamation, because it was issued without his consent, although it only re-established what the San Stefano treaty between Russia and Turkey had sanctioned seven years earlier. In a fit of ill humor, the Emperor ordered all the Russian officers who were serving in the Bulgarian army, to leave Bulgaria, although he must have known that Turkey or Serbia or both together might attack Bulgaria. The measure produced an extremely painful impression among the Bulgarian people, who interpreted the Emperor's action as an abandonment of Bulgaria to her enemies.

But the Serbo-Bulgarian war was successfully fought by the Bulgarian troops, and the union was consummated, thanks also to the diplomatic support of England and the other European Powers. Russia, however, lost a good deal of the sympathies of the Bulgarians and the influence which she had through her officers in the Bulgarian army was gone forever. The animosity against Prince Alexander of Battenberg grew more pronounced as his popularity

among the people and the army were augmented by the favorable issue of the Serbian campaign.

In 1886 a number of Bulgarian officers, evidently suborned, at the head of a regiment and the military cadets at Sofia, kidnapped the Prince at night and took him off to the Russian town of Reni on the Danube. When the news of this treacherous act spread through Bulgaria, a cry of indignation was raised by the whole army and people, a provisional government was organized, the perpetrators of the outrage were arrested and strenuous efforts were made to bring back the deposed Prince. He returned to Sofia amidst the enthusiastic acclamations of the people, but the determined opposition of the Russian Emperor to his stay in Bulgaria induced him, for the good of the country, as he declared, to abdicate and leave the country, after having appointed a Regency of three men to govern it. For almost a year the princely throne of Bulgaria remained vacant. Internal troubles, fomented from outside, threatened the safety of the country and hung like an incubus upon the people. Russia refused to recognize the Regency, insisted on having a Russian commissioner to govern the country during the interregnum, sent emissaries to stir up trouble and sedition in the army and among the people, and would accept no prince who was not her nominee.

In spite of all the pressure brought to bear upon them, the Regency stood firm in defense of the rights of the country to manage its own internal affairs, rejected all proposals that would infringe upon those rights and maintained the principle of "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians." In their desire to placate the Russian Emperor, they proposed to have Prince Waldemar of Denmark, brother of the Russian Empress, elected Prince of Bulgaria; but the offer was declined by the Prince. Finally, in 1887, the present ruler of Bulgaria was elected to the vacant throne and thus an end was put to the dangerous political uncertainty that had existed for nearly a year. The European Powers in their desire not to displease the Russian Emperor delayed recognizing the new Prince of Bulgaria till after Russia had recognized him. This recognition was given in 1896 by Nicholas II on condition that Prince Boris, the Bulgarian heir to the throne, should be rebaptized in the Eastern Orthodox Church.

The relations between Russia and Bulgaria would have continued to be friendly and normal were it not for the policy which

the Russian government adopted in regard to the Macedonian question. It has been related already that in 1889 Serbia began an active propaganda in Macedonia in support of its claims that Macedonia is Serbian. Whether by order of their government or on their own initiative, the Russian Consuls in Macedonia made no secret of their support of the Serbian claims. Attempts were also made by the Russian government to have the seat of the Bulgarian Exarchate removed from Constantinople to Sofia, which would have meant the abandonment of Macedonia to the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch and the Serbian propaganda, for the Turkish government would have never consented to the Exarch exercising any jurisdiction in Macedonia from Sofia.

The Russian support of Serbia's intrusion in Macedonia grew more open in 1903, when the present King of Serbia came to the throne and Serbia adopted a policy more favorable to Russia than to Austria. In that year, with the help of Russian diplomacy, Serbia succeeded in gaining the sanction of the Greek Patriarch for the appointment of a Serbian as bishop of Skopia and later on of another Serbian as bishop of Dibra, although in neither of these places were there any Serbian communities to justify these appointments.

The effect of these Russian proceedings upon public opinion in Bulgaria was disastrous to Russian influence and prestige. The Bulgarians saw that Russia was repudiating her own treaty of San Stefano, by which she had sought to create a united Bulgaria, and was now backing Serbia in opposition to Bulgaria. Still Bulgarian sympathies for Russia did not entirely disappear, for it was still hoped that Russia in time would see the falseness of the position she had taken.

Two of the political parties in Bulgaria, the Nationalists and the Progressists, were strong in their attachment to Russia, and the democratic party also showed similar leanings. The proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria in 1908 was made while the Democratic party was in power, and although it took place almost simultaneously with the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, it had no political connection with it. It was a measure dictated by the best interests of Bulgaria. To sever all vassal or tributary relations with Turkey was to avoid serious complications, which were sure to arise in regard to various questions: as for example, the Union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria, which

Turkey had never formally recognized; the stationing of Turkish garrisons in the Balkans, as prescribed by the Berlin Treaty; the payment of tribute, the regulation of the mosque and pious foundations properties, etc. In proclaiming its independence of Turkish suzerainty, Bulgaria did nothing more than Serbia and Rumania had done a few years before.

The conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912 was done under the aegis and with the knowledge of Russia, as is evident from the fact that the Russian Emperor was to be the arbitrator in the dispute over the "Contested Zone." The treaty was the work of a Nationalist or Russophile Cabinet of Bulgaria. That Russia desired and worked for the maintenance of the treaty against the Serbian violation of it may well be believed, for the preservation of a Balkan League was for the benefit of Russian policy and to the detriment of that of Austria. The disruption of the League might have been prevented had Russia exerted stronger diplomatic pressure at Belgrade. It was a misfortune that she was represented in Serbia at the time by a man whose sympathies were decidedly pro-Serbian and anti-Bulgarian, and who evidently was working for the violation of the treaty. From the documents which we have already cited it is apparent that Bulgaria was not the cat's-paw of Austria in the course she took against Serbia, but acted in the firm belief that the conduct of Serbia left her no alternative but to fight for the assertion of the rights conferred upon her by the treaty.

The military party in Serbia, with the Crown Prince at its head, the public press and all the leading politicians were firm against the yielding of any Macedonian territory to Bulgaria. Even if the arbitrator had pronounced in favor of the Bulgarian claims, which were based upon the explicit stipulations of the treaty, the Serbian army would have refused to evacuate Macedonia. No secret was made of this; Serbian military men openly declared it. General Bojanovitch, the Serbian Minister of War, in declaring that the Serbian army would in no circumstance abandon the territory it had conquered at the price of its blood, added significantly that he declined all responsibility for the consequences which might result from the disregard of this temper of the army. These were ominous words, coming as they did from one who had had no part in the assassination of King Alexander and his wife a few years before, the memory of which events served as a deterrent to opposition to the Military League.

The intervention of Rumania in the Balkan war was due, according to Russian testimony, to Russian instigation, in order to save Serbia and humiliate Bulgaria. What the consequences of this intervention would be must have been well known to Russia, namely, that Macedonia would go to the Greeks and Serbians, and an area of about 3,000 square miles of Bulgarian territory with a population of about 300,000, freed thirty-five years before by Russian blood and treasure from the Turkish rule, would be handed over to the tender mercies of the Rumanians. And yet in 1902 Russia had concluded a military convention with Bulgaria by the terms of which she had undertaken to defend with all her forces the integrity and inviolability of the Bulgarian territory!

As if all the humiliation that had been inflicted upon Bulgaria were not enough, and while the country was still smarting from the wounds of mortification, the Russian Emperor in May, 1914, paid an official visit to the Rumanian King at Constanza. Toasts and speeches were exchanged, the Emperor lauding the King as the pacifier of the Balkans and accepting the honorary colonelcy of the Rumanian regiment that was the first to invade Bulgaria the year before. What the effect of these Russo-Rumanian amenities upon the Bulgarian people was may be easily imagined. They certainly did not tend to rehabilitate Russian good will in the eyes of the people, or to dissipate the prevalent opinion that Russia had abandoned her *protégé* in the Balkan Peninsula. Even the staunchest Russophiles in Bulgaria were shaken in their confidence in Russian diplomacy, and the Constanza meeting added the finishing touch to the estrangement between the two countries.

If the siding of Bulgaria in the present war against Russia is denounced by Bulgaria's enemies as base ingratitude, it is well to remember that Bulgaria is not wholly to be blamed for it. The medal has its reverse side.



## XI

### In Conclusion

In the foregoing pages we have tried to give a short but faithful sketch of the Balkan situation and of the causes which have contributed to it. In the various documents which we have cited our aim has been to quote competent and impartial witnesses, unbiased by national or party prejudices. To the inane and sophisticated reasonings of Serbians and Greeks about Macedonia and its population, we have opposed the authoritative opinions of learned men, foreign travelers, prominent statesmen and official documents bearing the sanction of international acts.

The testimony of all these is overwhelmingly in favor of the Bulgarian contention that the Macedonian Slav population is Bulgarian in feeling, consciousness and national aspirations and desires. The Greek and Serbian claims are artificial, resting upon no solid basis except that of forcible propaganda, originated and directed from outside. We have shown that it was not the Bulgarian Exarchate that created Bulgarian nationality in Macedonia, for that nationality existed there long before the institution of the Exarchate, but that it was the Bulgarian nationality that caused the establishment of the Exarchate. The relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria have always been those of two cognate and kindred peoples, animated by the same national motives and impulses. The oppressive rule imposed by both Serbia and Greece upon Macedonia, whereby they have sought to terrorize the people and crush their national spirit, is a convincing proof that the rulers were aliens in an alien country. They obtained possession of the country by treachery and the violation of solemn engagements, and they founded their rule upon force and not upon the consent of the people.

Macedonia's cries of distress were bound to find an echo in Bulgaria, and Bulgaria would have proved false to all her traditions and to her legitimate national obligations had she turned a deaf ear to those cries. Only those who are utterly ignorant of public sentiment in Bulgaria and of the close ties that have ever existed between Bulgaria and Macedonia could suppose that the Bulgarian nation would swallow tamely the insult and humiliation inflicted upon it

by the Bucharest treaty. Bulgaria entered the European war, not for the conquest of foreign territory or the imposition of its rule upon unwilling people, but for the vindication of its rights and the liberation of its kin from an oppression that was worse than that of the Turks.

The claims of Italy to the Trentino, of France to Alsace-Lorraine, of Rumania to Transylvania, and of Serbia to Bosnia are not a whit more valid than the claims of Bulgaria to Macedonia. They are based upon the principle of nationality, the desires of the people, and their right to determine under what government they choose to live.

While the Entente Allies unceasingly proclaim that they are fighting for the liberty of small nations and the upholding of right and justice, in Macedonia they are fighting for the subjugation of a people to the rule of Serbia, which was established and maintained by brute force and oppressive laws. If France claims the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine because forty-five years ago they were annexed to Germany against the will of their inhabitants, why should Bulgaria be denied her claim in Macedonia, which is and has been much more Bulgarian than Alsace-Lorraine ever has been French?

It has been said that Bulgaria in joining the Central Powers against Russia has proved a traitor to the Slavic cause.

But what is the Slavic cause? If by the Slavic cause is meant attachment to Russia and the satisfaction of the just claims of every Slavic nation to what by right belongs to it, no Slavic people has been more loyal to such a cause than the Bulgarians. Up to 1903 Serbia had been false to that cause. Its policy was avowedly anti-Russian, and its aim was and has been, not the safeguarding of what were its proper and legitimate interests, but the intrusion upon and the violation of the rights of its Slavic neighbor—Bulgaria.

Russia's treatment of the Poles, her surrender of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria, were certainly not in accordance with the advancement of the Slavic cause. That Austria should rejoice at the opening of a breach between Bulgaria and Serbia in Macedonia one can easily understand; but that Russia should try to widen the breach by going contrary to its San Stefano treaty and encouraging Serbian pretensions, which only a few years before she had effectively rejected, is incomprehensible on the basis of any consideration for the Slavic cause.

Was it for the good of the Slavic cause that a large part of

Macedonia, inhabited by Bulgarians, was handed over to the Greeks, to be oppressed and denationalized by them?

Was it in consonance with the Slavic cause that Serbia entered into an iniquitous league with Greece for the spoliation of Macedonia, to the sentiments and desires of whose population she was utterly indifferent, provided she secured for herself a large portion of the booty?

Was it for the advancement of the Slavic cause that the grandson of the Tsar-Liberator permitted, nay, instigated, the occupation by Rumania of the most fertile and prosperous part of North Bulgaria, emancipated in 1878 by his grandfather at the cost of Russian blood and treasure?

Was the Serbian regime in Macedonia, with its Draconian laws and relentless persecution of everything Bulgarian, a part of the Slavic cause?

If these are the essential and distinguishing characteristics of the Slavic cause as understood at Petrograd and Belgrade, then Bulgaria cannot be blamed if she refuses to subscribe to them.

A prominent Serbian has been credited with the following remark:

“Bulgaria stabbed us in the back. We did not suppose Bulgaria, whose people are our own kinsmen, would treacherously turn against us.”

It does not behove a Serbian to talk of Serbo-Bulgarian kinship or of treacherous conduct after all that has happened, for facts within the memory of living men, and which we have exposed in our sketch of Serbo-Bulgarian relations, speak louder than words. According to the “Annual Register” (published by Longmans, Green & Co., of London), in which a historical survey of events is given for the year 1915, Bulgaria in May, 1915, submitted to the British government its demands and conditions for joining the Entente Allies. They were the following: (1) Restitution by Serbia of both the contested and uncontested portions of Macedonia; (2) cession of Kavalla, Drama and Serres; (3) restoration by Rumania of New Dobrudja; with the exception of Silistra; (4) restoration of the Enos-Midia frontier according to the London Treaty of May 30, 1913.

On August 16, 1915, the Serbian Parliament held a secret session to consider the Allies' proposal that Serbia cede to Bulgaria “that

part of Macedonia which she had admitted to be Bulgarian, according to the principle of nationality, before the second Balkan war." But "the Serbian military party, led by the Crown Prince, had obstructed a settlement too long, and in September the storm began to gather. A serious hitch thus arose, and the obduracy of Serbia ultimately proved fatal to success."

To this English statement of what actually occurred during the negotiations of the Allies with Bulgaria and Serbia, before Bulgaria's entrance into the war, we may add that of Professor Paul Milyukov, the well-known leader of the Constitutional Democratic party in Russia. In a speech before the Russian Duma about a year ago, Professor Milyukov took Russian diplomacy severely to task for having brought about the second Balkan war and the destruction of the Balkan League by countenancing Serbia's pretensions "contrary to the stipulations of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, concluded under the ægis of Russia."

Then he continued: "Having found no support in Russia, the Bulgarians, as we all know, suffered a great disaster. Russia allowed Rumania to go as far as the Bulgarian capital, which lived through a moment of deadly fear when the enemy's aeroplanes hovered over it, and it seemed as if the fate of Bulgaria was sealed. Bulgaria could not forget this, and could not help passing into the Austrian channel. It was evident from that moment that if we wished to turn Bulgaria again into our channel we could do it only in one way—namely, by removing the consequences of the treaty of Bucharest and by restoring to Bulgaria what had been unjustly taken away from her. It was also evident that if we did not do this, Bulgaria would be free to choose her own way of realizing her national aspirations, and would go, not with us, but with our adversaries."

In regard to Serbia's conduct during the Entente Allies' negotiations with Bulgaria, Milyukov's declaration entirely agrees with the English statement quoted above.

"The obstinacy of Serbia," said he, "was likewise due to our insufficient insistence. During a whole year the plan of an Austro-German invasion of Serbia and the possibility of her disastrous defeat were well known. During all this time it was no secret that Bulgaria was getting ready to occupy, in such a contingency, Macedonia. Serbia showed herself yielding only when danger imminently hung over her; but no sooner had the danger temporarily passed away than she at once withdrew her concessions."

These declarations refute the assertion that Bulgaria stabbed Serbia in the back as wholly gratuitous and baseless. She acted in all her transactions openly and above board with Serbia and the Allies, and her future conduct was plainly imposed upon her statesmen by the obstinacy and obduracy of Serbia. More than a month before Bulgaria joined the Central Powers her Prime Minister frankly stated to an American correspondent what her demands were, and declared that at the opportune moment she would not fail to secure them. Serbia certainly had plenty of warning as to what she might expect, and the Serbian statesmen must have been very simple-minded indeed if they thought that Bulgaria would allow them to enjoy peacefully what they had wrested from her by trickery and perfidy.

That Serbia, on the other hand, was playing a treacherous game in her negotiations with Bulgaria and the Allies is proven by the following extract from a letter, written by "a prominent Serbian" (supposed to be the Serbian minister at Athens), and published in the Greek Paper, *Patris*, of November 7, 1915, three weeks after Bulgaria declared war against Serbia:

"Fifteen days before the Bulgarians attacked the Serbians, we had concentrated on our frontier 120,000 men against 30,000 Bulgarians. Under the circumstances, if we had attacked first we would have been in Sofia in ten days, and would have forestalled thereby the Bulgarian invasion."

On the authority, then, of this "prominent Serbian," while Serbia was professing to negotiate through the Allies an understanding with Bulgaria, she had already massed a strong force on the frontiers of Bulgaria ready to stab her in the back. Where does the treachery lie?

In his address before the League to Enforce Peace on May 27, 1916, President Wilson said:

"We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . . Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations."

In his peace message to the Senate on January 22, 1917, he


again declared that "no peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."


These noble sentiments and memorable words of the President, unbiassed by prejudice and unblinded by party spirit, must find an echo in the heart and mind of every one who deplors the present sad plight of Europe, chiefly due to the disregard of these principles in the conduct of its political life.

In no European country have President Wilson's opinions met with a warmer and heartier reception than in Bulgaria. Although the youngest State in the Balkan Peninsula, Bulgaria has been the foremost in recognizing and establishing the rights of liberty and equality for all its citizens. In its struggle for a national church organization, the Bulgarian people fought for the principle of nationality, for the right of peoples to independence, for liberty of conscience and worship, and for "government by the consent of the governed."

In the treatment of foreign elements in Bulgaria the Bulgarian Constitution guarantees equal rights to all, and of all the Balkan States Bulgaria is the only one where all nationalities enjoy not only the privilege of freedom of conscience and worship, but also of free national development.


Measures of forcible denationalization, of crushing the national vitality or spirit of a people are unknown as well as repugnant to the popular sentiment and character. Having themselves suffered for centuries the oppression of alien masters, they have come to realize and appreciate the boon of liberty and national self-preservation for others as well as for themselves. They have no lust for conquest or the acquisition of other people's property, no desire to dominate other peoples. What they demand and are fighting for is that their national rights shall be respected and their national unification permanently established.













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