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THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE PACIFIC WAR

UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
NAVAL ANALYSIS DIVISION

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A GUIDE TO
THE REPORTS OF THE
UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC
BOMBING SURVEY

Edited by Gordon Daniels



United States Marines Land on Iwo Jima

THE CAMPAIGNS

of the

PACIFIC WAR

United States

Strategic Bombing Survey

(PACIFIC)

NAVAL ANALYSIS DIVISION

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Foreword

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a Directive from the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of military strategy, for planning the future development of the United States armed forces, and for determining future economic policies with respect to the national defense. A summary report and some 200 supporting reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany have been published.

On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the effects of all types of air attack in the war against Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the Survey during its Japanese phase were:

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.

Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice Chairmen.

Walter Wilds, Secretary.

Harry L. Bowman,

J. K. Galbraith,

Rensis Likert,

Frank A. McNamee,

Fred Searls, Jr.

Monroe Spaght,

Dr. Louis R. Thompson,

Theodore P. Wright, Directors.

The Survey's complement provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The military segment of the organization was drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, transport and information. The Survey operated from headquarters established in Tokyo early in September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution engagement by engagement and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war-production plant by plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's overall strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among the civilian population, the effectiveness of the Japanese civilian defense organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of the study.

The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many documents which have not only been useful to the Survey, but will also furnish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements are being made to turn over the Survey's files to a permanent Government agency where they will be available for further examination and distribution.

Acknowledgment

The studies of Campaigns of the Pacific War, presented in this volume, are an outgrowth of the investigations conducted in Japan in late 1945 by the members of the Naval Analysis Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. This Division, composed of officers whose combined experiences covered all major operations of the Pacific War, was constituted to assist the Survey when its directive for investigation of the war against Japan was broadened to include not merely the restricted subject of strategic bombing but the entire United States air effort.

The original purpose of the Campaign Studies was to provide supporting material for *The Over-All Report*, which has been presented to the Chairman of the Survey, and in which the conclusions of the Naval Analysis Division are embodied. However, since much of the material assembled here has not previously been available, it was felt that these studies, with the two companion volumes of interrogations, merited a wider circulation both within the services and among civilian students of military affairs. In line with this larger purpose, track charts, tabulations of various data, and translations of important documents have been compiled by the members of the Division and are appended to the narratives of the various campaigns.

It should be pointed out that in no sense are these Studies to be considered definitive. The work of the Naval Analysis Division was conducted under pressure of time, and was further complicated by the early detachment of several of its members to other duties. It is however felt that the Studies provide a useful summary picture of the Naval War against Japan and present, in convenient form, material essential to further study of the conflict.

To facilitate the investigations conducted in Japan, the war was arbitrarily divided into campaigns and these apportioned among the members of the Naval Analysis Division. This division of responsibility, which applies both to the interrogations and to the Campaign Studies was as follows:

Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstie, U. S. N.: Central Pacific Campaign, March–September 1944, including the Occupation of the Marianas.

Capt. T. J. Hedding, U. S. N.: Japanese Naval Planning, Iwo Jima Campaign, Okinawa Campaign, Final Naval Operations.

Capt. Steadman Teller, U. S. N.: Central Pacific Operations, June 1943–February 1944, including the Gilbert-Marshall Islands Campaign, Campaign to Destroy Japanese Shipping.

Capt. J. S. Russell, U. S. N.: Aleutians Campaign.

Capt. Courtney Shands, U. S. N.: Coral Sea, Midway, Solomons Campaign.

Comdr. T. H. Moorer, U. S. N.: Pearl Harbor, The Japanese Invasions, New Guinea Campaign.

Lt. Comdr. J. A. Field, Jr., U. S. N. R.: Western Carolines Operation, the Philippines Campaign.

No attempt was made to impose a rigid outline for the treatment of the various campaigns, due to their varying nature and duration. Such uniformity as the studies possess is the result of the editorial efforts of Capt. F. M. Trapnell, U. S. N., Captain Russell, and Lieutenant Commander Field.

For the arduous work of supervising the assembly, technical preparation, and printing of the publications of the Naval Analysis Division, Lieut. (jg) H. C. Smither (SC) U. S. N. R., was chiefly responsible.

R. A. OFSTIE,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Senior Naval Member,
U. S. S. B. S.

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I

Japanese Naval Planning

Foreword

This chapter outlines the Japanese Naval Planning for the Pacific War. The material was originally prepared by the Historical Research Department of the Japanese Naval Ministry, under the direction of Captain T. Ohmae, I. J. N., and consisted of answers to specific questions prepared by the Naval Analysis Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Further interrogations of Captain Ohmae and other Japanese naval officers were conducted in an effort to clarify specific points, and information so obtained has been incorporated in the text.

The Naval Planning Organization

In describing the Japanese war planning organization, the peculiar nature of the Japanese Government must be kept continually in mind. In time of war the Japanese nation, militarily, economically, and politically was completely dominated by the military, the military being itself divided into two independent factions, the Army and the Navy. Although the idea that the Emperor was the supreme head and embodiment of the state was accepted by all, the precise extent of his authority and influence on national policy remained somewhat obscure. All actions, however, were taken in his name, and an Imperial Rescript, such as was issued on 14 August 1945, to terminate the war, had complete authority over the nation. Such being the case, it is important to note that the right of "access to the throne" was enjoyed only by the titular heads of the military services, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and the War and Navy Ministers, and that the war powers of both Army and Navy were not subject to control by any other governmental body.

The Government (Cabinet) was dominated by the military in the persons of the War and Navy Ministers, both invariably from the active lists of the Army and Navy. Cabinets fell and were formed at the whim of the military; the resignation of either minister terminated a cabinet and failure of either branch of the services to nominate a minister prevented the formation of a new one.

An equally important point to be borne in mind is that the two factions of the all-powerful military, the Army and the Navy, exercised their authority only through mutual agreements. Unless an agreement was reached between these two factions, nothing could be accomplished.

The Imperial Headquarters, which was created only in time of war for the purpose of assuming supreme military command, was formed in November 1937. Its nucleus was the two general staffs, and it was headed by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy. As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the Emperor was the titular head of this body, though the practical extent of his authority is not clear. What was discussed and agreed upon within this Headquarters was known only to the members. This headquarters was primarily concerned with operational plans, though being the supreme military command body it had great influence on national war policies. Within this headquarters the Chief of the Army General Staff determined all matters concerning Army operations, and similarly the Chief of the Naval General Staff determined all matters concerning naval operations. Should there develop a difference of opinion between the two Chiefs, and should agreement not be reached, stalemate and inaction resulted.

The Government (Cabinet) was composed of the Prime Minister, the War and Navy Ministers, the Foreign Minister and various other ministers. This body was primarily concerned with the economic and political administration of the nation and with the provision of the material and man power for the conduct of the war.

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The Supreme War Council was the chief advisory body in formulation of war policies and was composed of members of the Board of Field Marshals and Admirals, the War and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy, and other high officers (including former War and Navy Ministers) appointed by the Emperor. The Imperial Headquarters however had more of a voice in formulating national policies than this unwieldy council. As a result of reverses, the Supreme War Council was superseded in August 1944 by the Supreme Council for the Direction of War. Although the Supreme War Council continued to exist, it retained little power. This Supreme Council for the Direction of War was established primarily to facilitate formulation of fundamental policies for the conduct of the war, and to obtain a national unity in the prosecution of the war. It was not concerned with operational plans, and acted chiefly as a liaison organization between the Imperial Headquarters and the Cabinet. It was composed of six voting regular members: the Prime Minister, the War and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and the Foreign Minister. In addition, the regular members could bring any other minister to a meeting although these latter had no vote. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff also attended but did not vote. On occasion, and by Imperial Order, the President of the Privy Council would attend. When matters of special importance were to be discussed, the Emperor was requested to attend the meetings. There were also occasions when informal meetings were called by the Emperor; this occurred twice in June 1945 when attempts were being made to terminate the war.

During the later stages of the war liaison conferences were held every Tuesday and Friday at the Imperial Palace, but were not attended by the Emperor. Conferces were the Chiefs of Staff, their Deputies, the Chiefs of the 1st Sections (Plans), the Chiefs of the Operations Sections, and other senior officers of the Army and Navy General Staffs. Towards the end of the tenure of office of the Koiso cabinet, these conferences were attended by the Prime Minister and the War and Navy Ministers. At these conferences operational plans of the Army and Navy, and joint operations were discussed. However no decisions were made.

Within the Naval General Staff, naval planning was accomplished in the First Section of the First Department, which section was concerned with operational planning. Logistic Planning was done in the Second Department, Naval Intelligence was provided by the Third Department, Communication Planning was done in the Fourth Department, and Radio Intelligence was provided by a special section. Naval operational plans originated either in the First Department of the Naval General Staff or in the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet. After discussion by the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, the final plans were drawn up. As previously mentioned, these operational plans were discussed at the liaison conferences between the Army and Navy. Important plans were discussed at the Imperial General Headquarters and the agreement of the Army General Staff was obtained before the plan was submitted to the Chief of the Naval General Staff for final approval. When joint operations were agreed upon, identical orders were issued by each General Staff. If the plan involved participation of the Government in providing necessary material and personnel, steps were taken to obtain the Navy Minister's agreement.

If the contemplated operations were of great importance, the directives were issued in the following manner: For those operations which extended beyond the authority delegated by Imperial Directive to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the plan was submitted through the Imperial Headquarters to the Emperor for approval, after which it was issued as an order of the Naval Staff, Imperial Headquarters. Directives for plans of lesser importance which did not exceed that authority were issued in the name of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, but by direction of the Naval Staff, Imperial Headquarters.

The Basic Plan for the Greater East Asia War

The Basic Plan as formulated by the Japanese and placed into effect in December 1941, consisted of the following three phases;

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

I. The seizure of the Southern Areas which are rich in resources; the attack on the United States Fleet in Hawaii, and the seizure of strategic areas and positions for the establishment of a perimeter for the defense of the Southern Resources Area and the Japanese Mainland. The area to be seized was that within the line which joins the Kuriles, Marshalls (including Wake), Bismarcks, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya and Burma.

II. Consolidation and strengthening of the defensive perimeter.

III. The interception and destruction of any attacking strength which might threaten the defensive perimeter or the vital areas within the perimeter. Concurrently with intercept operations the activation of plans to destroy the United States will to fight.

By the successful accomplishment of the three phases of this plan the Japanese hoped to attain the goal of this war, making Japan self-sufficient.

Upon the successful completion of the first phase, and influenced by the unexpected ease with which their initial operations were carried out, the activation of the second phase was delayed and plans were formulated for further expansion.

These expansion plans were for the purpose of extending Japanese control of the Pacific and provided for the following:

(1) The capture of Port Moresby in order to strengthen the defenses of New Guinea and the Bismarcks.

(2) The capture of Midway in order to strengthen the defenses of the Central Pacific and to force a decisive engagement with the United States Fleet.

(3) The invasion of the Western Aleutians in order to reinforce the defenses of the Northern Area.

(4) The seizure of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa in order to cut lines of communication between the United States and Australia. This latter step was contingent on the successful completion of the others and was scheduled to be activated subsequent to the capture of Midway.

Upon completion of these expansion operations, the consolidation of position was to be completed as follows:

(1) The Northern Area, June 1942.

(2) The Solomons and Eastern New Guinea Area, November 1942.

(3) The Southern Areas, January 1943.

(4) General consolidation of all occupied areas, March 1943.

Supporting Plans

In support of the basic plan, plans were formulated for the conduct of the following operations:

(1) *Raids on advanced Allied bases.*—These operations were for the purpose of preventing the strengthening of Allied positions as operational bases.

(a) Air raid on Port Darwin. This was carried out on 19 February 1942.

(b) Air raid on Ceylon. Raids by carrier forces were carried out on 5 and 13 April 1942.

(c) Air raids on Hawaii. These were to be conducted by seaplanes refueling from submarines at French Frigate Shoals and if possible by land based planes operating from Midway subsequent to its capture.

(d) Raids on Diego Suarez and Sidney by midget submarines. These were carried out on 31 May 1942.

Every effort was to be made and every opportunity seized to reduce Allied air and surface strength by raiding tactics.

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(2) *Operations Against Allied Lines of Communication.*—The Japanese expected to accomplish much through the use of German submarine blockade tactics, and plans were made to employ such tactics in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Carrier and land based aircraft were to be employed when ever possible against lines of communication. They also planned to operate auxiliary cruisers in the Southern Pacific and East Indian Oceans at the outbreak of the war.

(3) *Operations for the Protection of Japanese Lines of Communication.*—Until about the end of 1942 shipping losses were comparatively light and no comprehensive plans for the protection of shipping were in effect. With the sudden rise in shipping losses the following countermeasures were taken to protect their lines of communications;

- (a) Convoy operations were organized and a system of shipping control established.
- (b) Surface escort units were organized and additional escort vessels provided.
- (c) Antisubmarine patrols were activated and search and reconnaissance operations increased.

A refuge policy for shipping was established.

- (d) Small type vessels were employed for transportation in advanced areas.
- (e) Development of improved antisubmarine weapons and the training of personnel in antisubmarine warfare were undertaken.

(4) *Air Defense Operations in the Home Islands.*—Although this was an Army responsibility, the Japanese Navy acted in an assisting capacity. Air defense plans provided for the following:

- (a) Employment of concentration in the use of intercept fighters.
- (b) Installation of antiaircraft batteries in the vicinity of metropolitan and industrial areas.
- (c) Installation of radar at strategic points.
- (d) Stationing of patrol vessels to the east and south of the Home Islands.
- (e) Improvement of fighter performance; research toward development of improved types.
- (f) Measures for the dispersal and removal to underground installations of industrial activities, and the evacuation of industrial areas.
- (g) Strengthening of air defense organizations.

Japanese Comments on the Basic Plan

In commenting on the Basic Plan and upon the implementation of this plan the Japanese made the following comments and expressions of opinions. Several of the senior Naval officers interrogated stated that even the original perimeter was perhaps too extended to be maintained with the military potential available. They further felt that they failed properly to estimate their military and economic requirements for the war, and that they had particularly underestimated the economic potential of the United States and the United States will to fight.

The unexpected success of the operations in the first phase, and the ease with which these operations were carried out, caused the Japanese to underestimate the existing United States strength and to embark on a further expansion. This policy of further expansion was hotly debated; however the faction in favor of pushing the initial advantages won out. The air raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942 had some influence on this decision in that it tended to confirm the need for additional bases to the east. As they stated, the reserve strength which should have been used in consolidating the positions seized in the initial phase was dissipated in the unsuccessful attempts at further expansion. In view of the limitations of Japanese military strength, shipping, and the national economy, this attempt to expand an already too big strategic sphere brought about unsolvable problems. At the time when the defenses of those areas which had to be held at any cost were left wanting, operations for the capture of Port Moresby, Midway, and the Aleutians were undertaken, thereby further dissipating the nation's strength. Thus it was conceded that the expansion program which was intended to strengthen the Japanese defense position actually weakened it. All the

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Japanese interrogated on this subject considered that this expansion was a fundamental error in the conduct of the war.

The losses sustained in these unsuccessful attempts at expansion beyond the original outlined perimeter proved to be the greatest handicap in carrying out subsequent naval operations. It was stated that the loss of a major portion of their carriers in these operations was a serious blow to their naval air strength and, after still further air losses during the Solomons Campaign, the Japanese Naval Air Force never fully recovered.

When the Japanese were forced to return to their original plan of consolidation, it was with greatly reduced strength. Although priority was given to the construction of carriers and the strengthening of their air forces, they stated that they were unable to match the speed of the United States counteroffensives, and that they were continually behind schedule in the building up of defenses and the training of their air forces.

Comments on Supporting Plans, Their Concept and Execution

Japanese opinions regarding the concept and execution of supporting plans, obtained in interrogations are summarized below.

(1) *Raids on advanced Allied bases*—As could be expected from their military ideology of the offense, the Japanese considered that operations of this nature would be of great value and gave them high priority. In the early stages of the war, these raids were quite successful, particularly those carried out by carrier forces.

After the Battle of Midway, in which the Japanese carrier forces sustained such heavy losses, most of the strength which they could muster had to be used in the attempts to counter United States offensive operations. Thus after the early raids, Japanese carrier forces were unable to continue these operations against Allied bases. With their carrier forces reduced to relative impotence, the Japanese attempted with small success to conduct raids using land-based air forces. United States opposition increased at every point while the training and quality of Japanese air forces declined steadily. Toward the end of the war, the chief Japanese hope seemed to lie in raids against United States advanced bases by special attack (Kamikaze) forces. Such raids on anchorages were carried out by submarine-borne "human torpedoes" in early 1945, and by a special attack force of airplanes on Ulithi in March 1945. Again they were not considered highly successful, although abortive attempts were made to repeat the latter.

The Japanese in analyzing these raiding tactics, felt that they started too late to originate and to prepare and train for that type of operation—the use of suicide tactics of all types. They continue to feel that, had adequate advance preparations been made and the inherent spirit of the special suicide attack been fully utilized, these tactics perhaps would have reversed the tide of battle.

(2) *Operations against Allied lines of sea communications*.—Although some results were obtained from the outbreak of the war until about the time of the Guadalcanal battles, submarines, which would have been the greatest threat to our sea communications, were largely employed in the defense of vital areas, in supply operations to bypassed bases, and in tactical support of fleet operations. Hence only a small force of submarines was employed against Allied shipping, and due to the effectiveness of the United States antisubmarine measures these operations were confined to such areas as the Indian Ocean.

As regards surface raiders, very little preparation and training was carried out before the war and the results obtained by these forces were very slight.

(3) *Operations for the protection of Japanese lines of communications*.—The Japanese were quite frank in condemning their failure to protect their lines of communications. They felt that as a whole their military ideology placed too much emphasis on offensive operations, leaving much to be desired

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in the study and planning for such purely defensive operations as protection of surface shipping. Moreover since shipping losses were comparatively light during the first year of the war, no consideration was given to developing and improving tactics for this type of operation. Therefore, by the time that losses took an alarming aspect, the Japanese were behind in the development of countermeasures and continued to fall farther behind as the attacks against shipping were accelerated. In retrospect they felt that, since the basic objective of the war was to obtain for Japan the resources in the southern areas, maintenance of the security of the sea lanes between these resources and the industrial homeland should have been considered an integral part of the basic war plan. Japan's inability to maintain the security of these sea lanes had a vital effect on her ability to sustain her war industries.

(4) *Air defense operations in the Home Islands.*—By the time air attacks began against the home islands, the Japanese fighter defense was inadequate to meet these attacks. As a result of losses sustained in prior operations and the continuing attrition, the defense was inadequate in both numbers and performance. Although attempts to obtain improved types were made, the planes did not materialize.

As a result of heavy losses suffered in combat prior to the threat of major air attacks on her homeland, a large part of her effective fighter strength had been destroyed. Lack of aviation gasoline and the need for conserving their remaining strength for the defense against invasion, resulted in orders to disperse or conserve the remaining fighter strength.

The dispersal and moving underground of essential industries, as well as the evacuation of the metropolitan areas, were not effected until it was too late.

Operational Plans Formulated Throughout the War

After the failures at Port Moresby and Midway in May and June 1942 the Japanese attempted to consolidate the occupied areas in accordance with the original basic plan. Defenses in general were to be strengthened in the Western Aleutians, Ogasawara, Wake, Marshalls, Gilberts, Bismarcks, New Guinea, and the entire southern occupied area. The areas to be held at all costs were the Southern Resources Area, and the area to the westward of a line joining the Kuriles, Marianas, and Carolines. In March 1943, in view of the unfavorable outlook in the Solomons and Eastern New Guinea, these areas were removed from the vital area and only delaying operations were to be undertaken there.

Operational plans for defending the vital areas and the defensive perimeter were prepared. The objective of these plans was to defend these areas, to destroy United States forces which attempted to attack the defense perimeter, to cut United States lines of communication, and to establish a strategically strong position. In support of these plans every effort was to be made to build up naval air forces, both carrier and land-based.

In order to achieve this purpose, the following operational tasks were to be performed:

- (a) Establishment of a strategically strong position based on air power.
- (b) Destruction of the United States Fleet based in advanced positions or after enticing it into action under conditions favorable to the Japanese; invasion or destruction of positions which were strategically important, thus forcing abandonment of any offensive operations before they could be activated.
- (c) Swift consolidation of secured areas, so that any attempt to counterattack could be repulsed through close cooperation between air and sea power.
- (d) Increase in commerce raiding operations so as to prevent reinforcement in men and supplies.
- (e) Increase in protection of the Japanese lines of communication.

In accordance with the foregoing, and in cooperation with the Army, a speedy strengthening of defenses was attempted. However the carrying out of this task was beyond Japanese capabilities.

The "Z" Operation Plan (formulated about May 1943)

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The operational policy of this plan was:

(a) To establish a front line of defense along the line joining the Aleutians, Wake, Marshalls, Gilberts, Nauru, Ocean, and the Bismarcks, and to strengthen the principal positions along this defense line, with local commanders responsible for countermeasures against any attacks against this line. The Combined Fleet was to stand by in the vicinity of Truk.

(b) In the event of attack, to draw the attacking force toward the principal positions and to destroy it by the joint action of land-based air and mobile attack tactics of the carrier striking force.

(c) To conduct raids against United States carriers in order to reduce their power.

The tasks to be performed were as follows:

(a) Maintenance of a strict watch on the main strength of the United States Fleet by submarine reconnaissance.

(b) Search and reconnaissance by land-based aircraft.

(c) Reduction of enemy strength by destructive raiding of advanced enemy bases.

(d) Upon receipt of reports of contact with enemy forces, the Mobile Fleet was to sortie without delay and, operating in close cooperation with land-based air and submarine forces, destroy first the enemy carriers and, second, the transports.

(e) Garrison forces at the point of enemy attack were to endeavor to destroy the enemy at the shore line. If, however, the enemy succeeded in forcing a landing, local forces were to counterattack persistently in an effort to delay the enemy as long as possible and to prevent the establishment of bases.

The disposition of forces prescribed by this plan was:

(a) Naval Surface Forces

(1) In the Truk–Marshalls–Gilberts area: local naval forces of the 4th Fleet consisting of Cruiser Division 14 and several destroyers.

(2) In the Bismarck–Solomons area: local naval forces of the 8th Fleet consisting of Destroyer Squadron 3.

(3) At Truk: main strength of the Combined Fleet consisting of Battleship Division 1; Cruiser Divisions 4, 5, 7, and 8; Carrier Division 3 (Air Flotillas 1 and 2); Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 4; and Submarine Squadrons 1 and 3.

(b) Naval Air Forces

(1) In the Marshalls area: Air Flotilla 22.

(2) In the Truk–Bismarcks–Solomons area: 11th Air Fleet consisting of Air Flotillas 25 and 26, plus two Air Groups.

As a result of the Munda and Kolombangara landings and the landings at Lae and Salamaua, it became apparent that Rabaul could no longer be considered an effective position. Therefore, at the end of September 1943, the defense line was withdrawn and the vital area was reduced to that within the line Kuriles–Marianas–Carolines, and the Sumatra–Java–Timor line. Efforts were then concentrated on the strengthening of these areas and on sending reinforcements. But due to the lack of shipping the desired results were not achieved.

The United States occupation of the Gilberts and Marshalls was resisted with only inadequate land-based air and local garrisons. As these areas had been removed from the vital area in September 1943, the Combined Fleet was not committed. A further reason for not committing the fleet was that, as a result of the heavy losses sustained by the carrier air groups at Midway and in the Solomons, the carrier divisions were not ready for operations. The "Z" plan, in modified form, remained in effect until May 1944, when it was cancelled and superseded by the "A" plans.

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The "Y" Operations Plan (formulated about May 1943)

The operational policy and tasks for this plan were similar to those for the contemporary "Z" Plan, except for the area of operations. The front line of defense prescribed in this plan was that joining the Andamans, Nicobar, Sumatra, Java, and Timor. In case this defense line alone was threatened, the main strength of the Combined Fleet was to be moved to the Philippines or to Singapore. In case this defense line was threatened and the "Z" Plan also activated, then only a portion of the carrier force was to be utilized, together with local forces available.

The disposition of forces prescribed by this plan was:

(a) Naval Surface Forces—There were available only minor units in small numbers as local naval forces in this area. These were attached to the Southwest Area Fleet at Singapore, and to the 2d, 3d, and 4th Southern Expeditionary Fleets at Surabaya, Manila, and Amboina respectively.

(b) Naval Air Forces—The main strength of Air Flotilla 23 was in the Celebes area; the remainder was in Manila and Northern Sumatra. After September 1943, the 13th Air Fleet (Air Flotillas 23 and 28) was similarly deployed.

The "A" Operations Plan (formulated May 1944)

At the end of February 1944, the Gilberts and Marshalls had been occupied and Truk and the Bismarcks neutralized and bypassed. The outer defense was then further withdrawn to the Marianas, Palau, and the Sumatra–Java–Timor–Western New Guinea line. The "A" plan was drawn up for a decisive action in defense of this line. Forces necessary for this operation were expected to be ready the latter part of May 1944.

The objective of this plan was to concentrate all available forces for a decisive action against United States attacking forces.

The tasks to be performed were as follows:

(a) Consolidation of decisive battle forces was to be expedited. The enemy fleet's main force was to be contacted and destroyed sometime subsequent to the latter part of May, in the general area between the Central Pacific and the Philippines, or in the area south of the Timor–Java–Sumatra line. Unless otherwise directed, participation in any decisive action prior to the time when the forces could be thoroughly organized was to be avoided. Insofar as possible, the seas close to the bases where the Mobile Fleet was based were to be selected as the scene for the decisive battle.

(b) In the event that the enemy's attack materialized prior to the time of completion of the organization of the Mobile Fleet, decisive action employing naval surface forces was to be avoided and land-based air and local defense forces would be employed in intercepting and destroying the attacking force. In this eventuality every effort was to be made to avoid excessive losses of shore-based air, except where such losses would have a favorable effect on the ensuing decisive action.

(c) At the opportune moment when preparations for the decisive action had been completed, the entire force was to be thrown against the enemy's main strength in an effort to contact and destroy it.

(d) In preparation for the decisive action, priority was to be given to preparations for air operations by construction of air bases and by stock piling of fuel and ammunition. The Army and Navy were to cooperate in these preparations, and share all air bases jointly.

The disposition of forces prescribed by this plan was:

(a) Naval Surface Forces: The forces of the First Mobile Fleet, consisting of Battleship Divisions 1 and 3, Carrier Divisions 1, 2, and 3, Cruiser Divisions 4, 5, and 7, and Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 10, were to stand by in the Central and Southern Philippines.

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(b) Naval Air Forces: The First Air Fleet, consisting of Air Flotillas 61 and 62, was to be deployed in the Central Pacific (Marianas–Western Carolines), Philippines, and the area north of Australia.

The preparations for the decisive action under this plan were never completed as planned and the training of the air force, particularly the carrier air groups, was behind schedule. The Japanese considered that the carrier air groups would be ready in August. In view of the United States carrier strike on Palau in the latter part of March 1944, and the occupation of Hollandia in April, the Japanese estimated that the next attack would be against Palau, which also was a scene of action favorable to their plan.

However when United States forces appeared off Saipan in June and initiated their assault the "A" plan was activated even though complete preparations had not been realized. In the ensuing battle of the Philippine Sea, the major portion of their carriers and practically all of the carrier air groups were lost. In addition the shore-based First Air Fleet suffered severe losses. These losses to the Japanese Naval Air Force vitally affected all subsequent operations, and the prospect of success in future operations at sea became very dim.

The "Sho" Operations Plan (formulated in July 1944)

After the fall of the Marianas, and as a result of the heavy losses sustained in that campaign, the Japanese considered that any attempt to recapture these islands was out of the question. The United States had obtained control of the Central Pacific areas. This again forced the Japanese to further withdraw their defense line to one running from the Home Islands through the Nansei Shoto, Formosa, Philippines, and Timor–Java–Sumatra. The "Sho" plan was drawn up for a decisive action in defense of this line, with the probability that it would take place in the vicinity of the Home Islands, Nansei Shoto, Formosa or Philippines. The Nanpo Shoto was also considered as a possible scene of action. The next attack was expected some time after August 1944.

The operational policy of this plan was:

(a) By means of an all-out coordinated effort of land, sea, and air forces, to fight a decisive action in defense of the Home Islands, Nansei Shoto, Formosa, and Philippine areas. Only under favorable conditions would a decisive action be fought in defense of the Nanpo Shoto.

In accordance with the estimate of the probable areas of action, and in order to facilitate preparations and to establish command relationships the following four plans were drawn up:

Sho Number 1—Philippine Area.

Sho Number 2—Formosa–Nansei Shoto–Southern Kyushu Areas.

Sho Number 3—Kyushu–Shikoku–Honshu Areas.

Sho Number 4—Hokkaido Area.

As the Sho Number 1 and Number 2 were considered most likely to be activated, priority was given to strengthening the defenses in these areas. After a brisk discussion between the Army and Navy, it was agreed that an all-out land defense would be made only if the action were to occur in the Northern Philippines. If the action were to occur in the central or southern part, only air and surface forces would seek decisive action.

The tasks to be performed were:

(a) Destruction of enemy forces at the point of attack, by air, sea, and land forces concentrating on carriers and transports. The primary target for the Naval air forces was to be the United States Carrier Task Force; for Army air forces, the convoys.

(b) Disposition of air strength in depth, and conservation of this strength until just before the attempt to land.

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(c) All-out air attacks and surface torpedo attacks when the enemy fleet and convoys approached sufficiently close to the objective.

(d) Maintenance of a counter landing force in readiness; a counter landing if a favorable opportunity occurs.

The initial disposition of forces prescribed by this plan:

(a) Naval Surface Forces

(1) Inland Sea area: The 3d Fleet, consisting of Carrier Divisions 1, 3, and 4, and Destroyer Squadrons 10 and 11; the 6th Fleet consisting of Submarine Squadrons 7, 8, and 11, plus Battleship Division 2 of the 2d Fleet.

(2) Ominato area: The 5th Fleet consisting of Cruiser Division 21 and Destroyer Squadron 1.

(3) Philippines area: Southwest Area Fleet consisting of Cruiser Division 16 plus some destroyers.

(4) Singapore area: The 2d Fleet consisting of Battleship Divisions 1 and 3, Cruiser Divisions 4, 5, and 7, and Destroyer Squadron 2, plus one half of Destroyer Squadron 10.

(b) Army and Navy Air Forces

(1) Northeast and Home Islands areas: Army, the 1st, 10th, 11th, and 12th Air Divisions plus Training Command Aircraft; Navy, the 3d and 12th Air Fleets plus Air Groups of the 3d Fleet.

(2) Nansei Shoto-Formosa areas: The Army 8th Air Division and the Navy 2d Air Fleet (this air fleet was later sent to the Philippines).

(3) Philippines-Area north of Australia: The Army 4th Air Army and the Navy 1st Air Fleet.

When Palau and Morotai were attacked in September, the Japanese estimated that the next move would be against the Philippines so no changes were made in the "Sho" plan. When in October the attacks did occur on the Central Philippines, the "Sho" plan was activated and, in accordance therewith, the Fleet was committed and reinforcements were dispatched to Leyte.

The Battle for Leyte Gulf was a complete defeat for the Japanese Fleet. In it the major portion of the remaining Japanese naval surface strength was destroyed. In addition the Army and Navy air forces in the Philippines suffered severe losses. This campaign also saw the initiation of special attack (Kamikaze) tactics.

The "Ten" Operation Plan (formulated in early March, 1945)

With the occupation of the Central Philippines and the establishment of United States air bases in this area, the final severance of lines of communication between Japan and her vital resources was accomplished. The Japanese estimated that United States strategic plans were aimed at positions surrounding the East China Sea, with the most probable objective being in the Nansei Shoto. With operations continuing throughout the Philippines, the Japanese did not expect that Formosa would be attacked. The "Ten" plan was formulated for the final defense of an inner line established through the Home Islands, the Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the South coast of China. With the Japanese fleet almost completely destroyed and the air force reduced to the employment of suicide tactics, a "decisive action" was no longer possible and only a "last ditch" defense was contemplated.

The operational policy for this plan was:

(a) To hold out in the Nansei Shoto, Formosa and Shanghai areas.

(b) In the event that a hopeless situation arose, to make the enemy losses as heavy as possible and to delay the development of air bases to the utmost.

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(c) During this period further preparations were to be made for the final defense of the Home Islands.

In order to facilitate defense preparations in the probable objective areas, and to establish command relationships, the following four plans were drawn up:

Ten Number 1—Nansei Shoto—Formosa area.

Ten Number 2—Formosa.

Ten Number 3—Formosa—East and South coasts of China.

Ten Number 4—Hainan and areas to the westward.

The tasks to be performed were:

(a) To combine and concentrate the major portion of Army and Navy air strength, and to deploy these forces in the Kyushu—Nansei Shoto area.

(b) To use the major portion of this combined air strength in special attack (Kamikaze) tactics.

(c) To meet the attacking forces with the entire strength of the aerial special attack force with the object of destroying it. The Naval air force was to consider the destruction of enemy carriers as the primary objective.

(d) When favorable opportunities arose, the use of surface forces was to be considered.

(e) No preparations were to be made for the training of surface counter landing forces.

The disposition of forces prescribed by this plan was:

(a) Naval Surface Forces: Only remnants of the Combined Fleet remained in the Inland Sea consisting of Battleship Divisions 1 and 3, Carrier Divisions 1 and 4, three destroyer squadrons, about 30 submarines, and a few cruisers. Most units were under repair. No trained air groups were available for carriers.

(b) Air Forces:

(1) Home Islands area (including Nansei Shoto): Army, 6th Air Army; Navy 3d, 5th and 10th Air Fleets.

(2) Formosa: Army, 8th Air Division; Navy, 1st Air Fleet.

(3) Southwest Area: Army, 3d Air Army; Navy, 13th Air Fleet.

(4) China: 5th Air Army.

In accordance with plans Iwo Jima was defended only by limited operations of naval land-based air forces. However the United States amphibious assault on Okinawa was opposed by large-scale suicide attacks and a desperate suicide sortie by the battleship *Yamato* with an escort of light vessels. Heavy losses were suffered by the remnants of the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces.

The "Ketsu" Operation Plan (formulated at the end of March, 1945)

With the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the last line of defense was broken; the air and sea blockade of the Home Islands was complete. The next projected advance of the United States forces was obviously the invasion of the Home Islands with Southern Kyushu and the Kanto area the most probable objectives. The "Ketsu" plan was drawn up for the final defense of the Empire.

The operational policy for this plan was:

(a) To use the concentrated strength of all forces in an effort to smash the advancing United States forces. Strong, quick, and decisive operations were to be carried out to the bitter end.

(b) To make every effort to strengthen the defenses of the vital areas.

The tasks to be performed were:

(a) Strengthening of vital invasion points, and important straits and bay entrances. Steps were taken to guarantee security of surface communications.

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(b) Mobilization and concentration of all mobile forces, particularly air and suicide attack strength, in order that enemy forces could be successfully counterattacked while enroute to invasion points.

(c) To conduct all types of suicide attacks against enemy convoys, both at sea and when close to land.

(d) In anticipation of large-scale air raids, to take every possible measure to preserve and increase combat strength. Strong measures were to be taken to make appropriate disposition of military supplies and to expedite dispersal and evacuation of establishments.

(e) Every means was to be employed to give full play to the united combat strength of the Army and Navy air arms. The Army and Navy air forces were to make joint use of bases, and maintenance and logistic supplies were to be interchanged.

(f) Prior to activation of these plans, anti-air and anti-submarine operations were to be accelerated.

(g) Raids with the object of neutralizing enemy air bases in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa were to be carried out.

The disposition of forces was:

(a) Naval Surface Forces: All remaining naval surface forces were scattered among bases in home waters, the major portion being at Kure. Except for personnel of AA guns, most of the personnel had been assigned to various types of suicide operations.

(b) Air Forces: All the remaining air strength of the Army and Navy, including training planes, was assigned for an all-out air defense against invasion. The greater proportion of these planes were suicide planes. The Army Air Force, consisting of the 1st, 5th and 6th Air Armies, had approximately 3,200 planes of all types. The Navy Air Fleets with various Air Flotillas, could muster approximately 5,200 planes of all types. These planes were disposed throughout all the Home Islands and in Korea and China.

Preparations for these operations were considerably disorganized by increasingly heavy United States raids by land-based and carrier-based planes. Attacks preliminary to the invasion were being systematically conducted against all of the Home Islands by Allied carrier forces. These attacks included shore bombardment by heavy ships and shipping sweeps of coastal waters by light surface forces.

The Imperial Rescript of 14 August 1945 terminated hostilities, and on 2 September 1945 the surrender terms were executed.

II

*The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor,
Planning and Execution*

Foreword

The Japanese attack on the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 has been the subject of so much writing and debate that general familiarity with the important events surrounding that fateful episode is assumed. Consequently no attempt is made herein to present the entire story or to analyze the political and military effects which the attack had on the subsequent course of the war. This is rather a presentation of material not hitherto available, dealing specifically with the operational aspects of the planning and execution of the attack.

The information contained in this narrative was supplied from memory by the Japanese officers listed below and, although considered accurate in general, may be subject to minor corrections in detail after examination of translated documents.

Admiral Nagano, Osami,
Chief of the Naval General Staff.
Rear Admiral Mito, Hishashi,
Chief of Staff, Sixth Fleet (Submarines).
Captain Tomioka, Sadatoshi,
Chief Operations Section, Naval General Staff.
Commander Miyo, Tatsukichi,
Member Operations Section, Naval General Staff.
Captain Kuroshima, Kameto,
Captain Watanabe, Yasuji,
Members Staff Combined Fleet.
Captain Fuchida, Mitsuo,
Leader of First Attack on Pearl Harbor.

Introduction

The purposes of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor were:

To render impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and to insure freedom of action in the South Seas Operation, (including invasion of the Philippine Islands), and to facilitate the defense of the mandated islands. The attack was conceived and proposed by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, CinC of the Japanese Combined Fleet. In January 1941, Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi, Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Fleet was ordered to make a preliminary study of the operation, and in the first part of September 1941 members of the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff and selected members of the Staffs of the Combined Fleet and the First Air Fleet commenced work on the details of the actual plan.

Organization of the Task Force

In order to avoid detection it was necessary to keep the force as small as possible and at the same time to provide the most powerful air attack force available. This was effected by reinforcing the air groups

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of Carrier Division 1 (*Akagi, Kaga*) and Carrier Division 2 (*Soryu, Hiryu*) with the highly trained pilots of Carrier Division 4 (*Ryujo, Ryubo*). In addition the recently organized Carrier Division 5 (*Zuikaku, Shokaku*), was similarly reinforced with such highly trained flight personnel as were available and special training was scheduled to bring this division to the peak of efficiency. The surface force was composed of vessels selected for long cruising range, and the commanding officers of all units were the best available. For the complete organization see Appendix 1.

Selection of Track

Three courses were considered for the Pearl Harbor Task Force:

- (1) The northern course which was actually used. (Appendix 2.)
- (2) A central course which headed east, then following along the Hawaiian Archipelago, and,
- (3) A southern route passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south.

The principal disadvantage of the northern route was the possibility of adverse weather which would further complicate the difficult problem of refueling at sea. However this was outweighed by the fact that the northern route involved little chance of meeting commercial vessels and offered the best hope of avoiding detection by United States Navy land-based search planes, thus greatly increasing the chances for surprise. The central and southern routes offered advantages and disadvantages generally the opposite of the northern route; although the calmer sea would facilitate refueling, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes passed near Wake, Midway, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands. The element of surprise and the ability to refuel at sea were the most important factors and if either failed, the operation would have been impossible. Since it was considered that the refueling problem could be overcome by training, the northern route was selected. In order to prevent discovery enroute, it was planned to:

- (1) Pass between Midway and the Aleutian Islands outside the range of patrol planes.
- (2) Use screening destroyers ahead of the compact main body, and in the event any vessels were encountered, divert the main body to avoid detection.
- (3) Use three submarines to patrol ahead and give warning.
- (4) Maintain complete radio silence.

Selection of Date and Time of Attack

In view of the phase of the moon, 10 December would have been most suitable from a tactical standpoint since the darkness would facilitate surprise. However, because of the general international situation and the possible advantages to be derived from a Sunday attack, the Imperial Headquarters, in cooperation with the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, designated 8 December (east longitude date) as "X"-day. In order to provide maximum daylight for the operation the take-off time was set as near dawn as possible and the attack time was set at 0330 Japanese time (0800 Hawaiian time). Sunrise was 0230 Japanese time (0700 Hawaiian time).

The Attack Plans

Since the primary objective of the attack was to put the United States Pacific Fleet temporarily out of action, the main force of the attack was to be directed at battleships and carriers. It was decided that torpedo attack was the most effective method of putting these major warships out of commission for a considerable length of time. Hence the following two difficulties had to be considered:

- (1) Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow.
- (2) Pearl Harbor in all probability would be equipped with torpedo nets.

To overcome the first difficulty it was planned to attach special stabilizers to the torpedoes and to launch them from an extremely low altitude, thus preventing them from diving. In regard to the second

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difficulty, since torpedo nets would prevent a successful attack with torpedoes, provision was also made for horizontal and dive-bombing attack. In addition it was planned to use fighter aircraft to destroy American aircraft in order to prevent a counterattack on the main Japanese attack units or an attack by American bombers against the task force itself. At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking units were to maintain a single formation and patrol over Oahu, attacking American fighters as they got into the air. If no American aircraft took off, the fighters were to split up and attack grounded aircraft.

On 3 November, Admiral Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, in cooperation with Admiral Yamamoto, definitely decided to attack Pearl Harbor if diplomatic negotiations with the United States failed. On 1 December 1941, Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the general plan as outlined above. By this time the following individuals were cognizant of the complete plan:

- Chief of the Naval General Staff;
- Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff;
- Chief of the Operations Section, Naval General Staff;
- Members of the Operations Section, Naval General Staff;
- The Commanders in Chief, the Chiefs of Staff and selected Staff;
- Members of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and First Air Fleet Headquarters.

The Emperor knew of the plan to attack the main strength of the United States Pacific Fleet with a carrier task force after the last ultimatum to the United States Government had been delivered.

No persons not connected with the Navy were familiar with the plan.

Preparations for the Operation

In August 1941 intensive training of the designated air groups was commenced. Emphasis was placed on shallow water torpedo drops, on horizontal and dive bombing, and on strafing tactics. Surface vessels conducted many refueling exercises and by the end of November the Task Force was considered to be satisfactorily trained.

Orders Placing Plan Into Effect

In the period from early November 1941 to 2 December 1941 the Chief of the Naval General Staff issued a series of general orders regarding the Pearl Harbor attack to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet who in turn issued more specific orders to the Pearl Harbor Attack Force (First Air Fleet). (See Appendix 14).

Movement of Pearl Harbor Task Force

In accordance with instructions from CinC Combined Fleet, the Task Force sortied from Hitokappu Bay at 0600, 26 November and proceeded along the track shown in Appendix 2. On 2 December instructions were received to the effect that negotiations had failed and that 8 December was designated as "X"-day. The refueling was successfully completed on 3 December without mishap. (In the event of failure of the fueling operation it had been planned to continue without the destroyers.) After refueling, the Task Force proceeded along the track without incident. No shipping was encountered and the force successfully escaped detection. During the approach, the following instructions were in effect:

(1) If discovered prior to "X"-minus-2-day, the Task Force was to return to Japan without executing the attack.

(2) If discovered prior to "X"-minus-1-day, the decision as to what action to take was the responsibility of the Task Force Commander.

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(3) If discovered on "X"-minus-1-day or the morning of "X"-day the Task Force was to continue with the attack.

(4) If at any time during the approach to Pearl Harbor the negotiations with the United States had been successful the attack would have been cancelled.

(5) If, at any time during the approach to Pearl Harbor the American Fleet attempted to intercept the Japanese Task Force, the Japanese planned to counterattack. If the American Fleet advanced into Japanese home waters in pursuit of the Task Force it was planned to commit the Main Body of the Japanese Fleet as a support force.

(6) If, after arriving in Hawaiian waters, it was found that the American Fleet was at sea and not in Pearl Harbor, the Japanese planned to scout a 300-mile radius around Oahu and attack if contact was made; otherwise they were to withdraw.

During the approach the main force in the Inland Sea and land-based air units in the Kyushu area carried on deceptive communications designed to indicate that the Task Force was still in Japanese waters. The Task Force arrived at the launching point 200 miles north of Oahu at 0730, 7 December (Hawaiian time).

The Attack

The air attack was executed by two waves of aircraft composed of 3 groups each. The organization, plane assignment, armament and targets assigned are shown in Appendix 3. In addition there was a combat air patrol as shown in Appendix 4 and also reconnaissance flights by ship-based seaplanes as listed below:

<i>Type Aircraft</i>	<i>Number of Aircraft</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Mission</i>
Type Zero recco seaplane	2	<i>Tone</i> (1) <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina anchorage just before attack.
Type 95 recco seaplane	4	<i>Hiei</i> (1) <i>Kirishima</i> (1) <i>Tone</i> (1) <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Patrol waters around Oahu during attack.

The organization of the attack units was based on the following considerations (See Appendix 3).
First Attack.

I. Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes)

Target: Battleships

Considerations:

(a) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.

(b) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate. However, it was estimated, considering the degree of training of the bombing units, that four out of five salvos could be placed on stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of type 97 bombers.

(c) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, it was desired to use as many torpedoes as possible. However both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:

1. If torpedo nets were laid, the torpedo attacks would be unsuccessful.

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2. Launching torpedoes in shallow water such as that at Pearl Harbor required a special technique.

3. Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

II. Torpedo Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes)

Target: Battleships and Aircraft Carriers

Considerations:

(a) Short range torpedo runs are very accurate. Therefore the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo drops were selected in order to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions mentioned would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the planes concentrated on the battleships).

III. Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers)

Target: Air Bases

No. 15 Attack Unit (27 A/C): Hangars and grounded airplanes at Ford Island.

No. 16 Attack Unit (27 A/C): Hangars and grounded airplanes at Wheeler Field.

Considerations:

(a) Since the primary objective of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to put the United States Pacific Fleet temporarily out of action, the primary targets were battleships and carriers. However fighter plane bases were to be attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against the horizontal bombing and torpedo units.

(b) It was known that Wheeler Field was a United States Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the United States Pacific Fleet were usually kept at Ford Island.

IV. Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters)

Targets: Airborne planes, grounded planes.

No. 2 Fighter Striking Unit—Ford Island and Hickam.

No. 4 Fighter Striking Unit—Wheeler and Ewa.

No. 6 Fighter Striking Unit—Kaneohe.

Considerations:

(a) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over Oahu, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

(b) If no fighter opposition was met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on Oahu, thereby preventing a counterattack against the Task Force.

Second Attack.

I. Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes)

Target: Air Bases

No. 6 Attack Unit: Hangars and grounded aircraft at Hickam.

No. 5 Attack Unit: Hangars and grounded aircraft at Kaneohe, Ford Island and Ewa.

Considerations:

(a) By putting the American airplanes on Oahu temporarily out of action, counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.

II. Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers)

Target: Aircraft Carriers and Cruisers.

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Considerations:

(a) Although the 250-kg. bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleships, it was estimated that they would be effective against United States cruisers and carriers.

(b) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the Hawaiian Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

III. Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters)

Target: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

No. 2 Fighter Striking Unit—Ford Island and Hickam.

No. 4 Fighter Striking Unit—Wheeler and Kancohe.

Considerations:

(a) By destroying enemy aircraft counterattacks against air units and the surface forces would be prevented.

Execution of Attack

The aircraft in the first attack unit took off at 0600 (Hawaiian Time) from a position 200 miles north of Oahu. The second attack unit took off one hour and fifteen minutes later. The tracks of the attacking aircraft after they sighted Oahu are shown in Appendix 5. The approach was made at an altitude of 3,000 meters above a dense cloud layer which was hanging at about 2,000 meters. The first group arrived over Oahu at about 0740, were ordered to attack at 0750 and attacked as follows:

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Time</i>
Dive Bombing Unit	Wheeler Field	0755
Torpedo Attack Unit	Battleships	0757
Fighter Striking Unit	Grounded Aircraft	0800
Horizontal Bombing Unit	Battleships	0805

The Second Attack Unit sighted Oahu at 0840, was ordered to attack at 0855 and commenced the attack about 0900. Complete details are not available since the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki was killed in action January 1945. Both attack units attacked for 30 to 60 minutes and then rendezvoused with their respective fighter units at a point bearing 340° distance 20 miles from Kaena Point and proceeded directly back to the carriers. Because of the length of the flight, it was impossible to withdraw on deceptive courses.

Losses.

For the entire operation the Japanese action losses were as follows:

Aircraft—First Attack Unit

Fighter planes.....	3
Dive Bombers.....	1
Torpedo Bombers.....	5
Total.....	9
 Second Attack Unit	
Fighter Planes.....	6
Dive Bombers.....	14
Total.....	20
Grand Total.....	29

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Submarines	
Fleet Type Submarine	1
Midget Type Submarine	5
	—
Total	6

The estimated damage to the American Forces was as follows:

<i>Naval Vessels</i>		
<i>Sunk</i>	<i>Heavily Damaged</i>	<i>Lightly Damaged</i>
4 battleships	4 battleships	1 battleship
1 cruiser		
2 tankers		

<i>Aircraft</i>	
Shot down	10
Destroyed on ground	250

(Undetermined number destroyed in hangars)

The above estimate was made after a study of pilot reports and photographs taken by attacking aircraft. No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the damage immediately after the attack but one element of fighter aircraft was ordered to fly as low as possible and observe results after the attack was completed.

Japanese Submarines.

About 10 to 12 "I" type submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Fleet participated in the Pearl Harbor attack. These submarines departed Yokosuka Naval Base on 11 November and proceeded toward Pearl Harbor by different routes. The *I-19*, *I-21* and *I-23* proceeded ahead of the Task Force to act as lookouts. The remaining submarines, which included the *I-69*, *I-74* and *I-75* rendezvoused at Kwajalein and then proceeded to Hawaii. Five of the latter group carried midget submarines (two-man crew) on the deck aft of the conning tower. The submarines were given the following orders:

- (1) Establish lookout stations in Hawaiian waters not later than the evening of 6 December (Hawaiian time). Launch midget submarines when on station.
- (2) Scout and reconnoitre Hawaiian area prior to the attack. Midget submarines will enter Pearl Harbor and attack the American Fleet after the air attack.
- (3) Attack before initiation of the Task Force strike is strictly forbidden.

The use of the midget submarine was an experiment but it was thought that they would be of some assistance to the Task Force and also possibly make effective torpedo attacks themselves. One midget submarine reported the results of the Air Attack as observed on the night of 7 December and at 0041 hours 8 December another message was received from a midget submarine claiming damage to one or more large war vessels inside Pearl Harbor. This attack was partially verified by a large submarine patrolling outside the harbor which witnessed a great explosion at 2101, 7 December. However, since none of the five midget submarines was recovered, their exact story was never known.

One of the "I" class submarines was lost; the time and place of sinking was unknown to the Japanese. In addition one submarine was detected and depth charged near the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Although it ran afoul of the submarine net, it extricated itself and returned to its base in a damaged condition. The remaining submarines operated in the vicinity of Hawaii until early January, and then proceeded to the West Coast of the United States.

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General Information

1. The attacks on Pearl Harbor were not continued or followed up by surface craft bombardment because the sole objective of the attack was to destroy the capital ship strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in order to delay any United States advance across the Pacific. Hence, since this objective was achieved by air attack, no further attack was considered necessary. Also, since the whereabouts of the American carriers was unknown and the chances of locating them by air search were small, it was considered that a quick withdrawal would be most advantageous. Consideration was also given to the probability of a counterattack by the estimated 50 or more large land-based planes that remained in Hawaii after the attack.

2. No landing operation was planned because insufficient time was available to make all preparations during the month of November and also it was recognized that the problems of ship speed and logistics would have made it impossible to execute the initial attack without detection during the approach.

3. During the Pearl Harbor Operation the following units were diverted to secondary targets:

(a) The Midway Neutralization Unit (*Akebono, Ushio*) left Tokyo Bay about 1 December, arriving at Midway during the night of 7 December, bombarded the air base and returned to the western part of the Inland Sea.

(b) It had been planned to conduct an air attack on Midway while returning to Japan but the operation was cancelled because of weather. On 16 December however, while proceeding to Japan from Pearl Harbor, two aircraft carriers (*Soryu* and *Hiryu*), two cruisers (*Tone, Chikuma*), and two destroyers (*Tanikaze, Urakaze*) were diverted to Wake Island to assist the invasion on 23 December.

4. During the planning and execution of the Pearl Harbor attack the following sources of intelligence were utilized:

(a) Interrogation of crews of merchant ships which called at Hawaii in mid-November.


(b) Submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding outbreak of the war.

(c) Commercial radio broadcasts from Hawaii.

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

UNIT	COMMAND	STRENGTH	MISSION	
TASK FORCE	AIR ATTACK FORCE	SIX AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AKAGI KAGA HIRYU SORYU	AIR ATTACK	
	SCREENING UNIT	ONE LIGHT CRUISER ABUKUMA NINE DESTROYERS URAKAZE KASUMI ISOKAZE ARARE TANIKAZE KAGERO HAMAKAZE SHIRANUHI AKIGUMO	SCREEN COVER	
	SUPPORT FORCE	COM BAT DIV 3 REAR ADM MIKAWA, GUNICHI	SCREEN SUPPORT	
	PATROL UNIT	COM SUB DIV 2 CAPT. IMAIZUMI, KIJIRO	PATROL SHIP LANES	
	MIDWAY NEUTRALIZATION UNIT	COM DES DIV 7 CAPT KONISHI, KANAME	ATTACK AIR BASE ON MIDWAY	
	1 SUPPLY UNIT	CAPTAIN OF KYOKUTO MARU KYOKUTO () MARU () (SPECIAL)	FIVE TANKERS KENYO () MARU KYOKUTO MARU KOKUYO () MARU SHINKOKU () MARU AKEBONO MARU	SUPPLY
	2 SUPPLY UNIT	DUTY SHIP) CAPTAIN OF TOHO () MARU	THREE TANKERS TOHO MARU TOEI () MARU NIPPON MARU	

NOTE: THESE ANSWERS ARE BASED ON RECOLLECTIONS AND INQUIRIES OF CONDR FUCHIDA, MITSUO, COMMANDER OF THE AKAGI AIR UNIT



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AIRCRAFT ATTACK ORGANIZATION


UNIT	COMMANDER	TYPE OF AIRPLANE	NUMBER OF AIRPLANES	TYPE OF ATTACK	ARMAMENT EACH AIRPLANE	TARGET
FIRST ATTACK UNIT	COMOR FUCHIDA LT. COMDR. HASHIGUCHI LT. ABE LT. COMDR. KUSUMI	15	15 15 10 10	HORIZONTAL BOMBING ATTACK	ONE 800-KG ARMOR PIERCING BOMB	BATTLESHIPS
		10				
		10				
		10				
	COMDR. MURATA LT. KITAJIMA LT. NAGAI LT. MATSUMURA	12	12 12 8 8	TORPEDO ATTACK	ONE 800-KG AERIAL TORPEDO	BATTLESHIPS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
		8				
		8				
		8				
	COMDR. CHIDA LT. SAKAMOTO LT. COMDR. ITAYA LT. SHIGA LT. SUGANAMI LT. OKAJIMA LT. KANEKO LT. SATO	27	27 27 9 9 9 6 6 6	DIVE BOMBING ATTACK	250-KG LAND BOMB	AIR BASES FORD ISLAND WHEELER
		54				
		360				
		9				
		9				
	COMDR. SHIMAZAKI LT. ICHIHARA LT. COMDR. EGUSA LT. KOBAYASHI LT. CHIHAYA LT. MAKINO	27	27 27 18 18 18 27	HORIZONTAL BOMBING ATTACK	ONE 250-KG LAND BOMB, SIX 60-KG ORDINARY BOMBS	AIR BASES HICKHAM KANEHOE FORD ISLAND EWA
		54				
		18				
18						
18						
COMDR. SHIMAZAKI LT. SHINDO LT. NIKAI DŌ LT. IIDA LT. NŌNO	9	9 9 36 9	AIR CONTROL AND STRAFING ATTACK	TWO 20-MM MGS TWO 7.7-MM MGS	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CRUISERS	
	36					
	9					
	9					
SECOND ATTACK UNIT	COMDR. SHIMAZAKI LT. SHINDO	9	9 9 36 9	AIR CONTROL AND STRAFING ATTACK	TWO 20-MM MGS TWO 7.7-MM MGS	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CRUISERS
		9				
		36				
		9				
	COMDR. SHIMAZAKI LT. SHINDO	9	9 9 36 9	AIR CONTROL AND STRAFING ATTACK	TWO 20-MM MGS TWO 7.7-MM MGS	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CRUISERS
		9				
		36				
		9				
	COMDR. SHIMAZAKI LT. SHINDO	9	9 9 36 9	AIR CONTROL AND STRAFING ATTACK	TWO 20-MM MGS TWO 7.7-MM MGS	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CRUISERS
		9				
		36				
		9				

COMBAT AIR PATROL

PATROLS	TYPE OF AIRPLANE	NUMBER OF AIRPLANES	SHIP ON WHICH BASED	TYPE OF PATROL
PATROL 1.	TYPE ZERO	18	AKAGI - 9 KAGA - 9	DIRECT AIR ESCORT
PATROL 2	CARRIER	18	SORYU - 9 HIRYU - 9	AIRPLANES READY ON FLIGHT DECK
PATROL 3	FIGHTER	18	ZUIKAKU - 9 SHOKAKU-9	AIRPLANES READY ON HANGER DECK (FUELED AND ARMED)
<p>1. DIRECT AIR ESCORT WAS CARRIED OUT FROM AN HOUR BEFORE SUNRISE UNTIL 45 MINUTES AFTER SUNSET.</p> <p>2. THE PATROLS ALTERNATED EVERY TWO HOURS.</p>				

NOTES

AIRCRAFT APPROACH TO OAHU



1. SECOND ATTACK UNIT
2. ORDERED TO DEPLOY AT 0850 HOURS
3. DIVE BOMBING UNIT
4. ATTACK RUN ORDERED AT 0855 HOURS
5. HORIZONTAL BOMBING UNIT
6. KANEOHE
7. HICKHAM
8. FORD ISLAND
9. FIRST ATTACK UNIT

10. ORDERED TO DEPLOY AT 0740 HOURS
 11. ATTACK RUN ORDERED AT 0750 HOURS
 12. DIVE BOMBING UNIT
 13. WHEELER
 14. TORPEDO BOMBING UNIT
 15. HORIZONTAL BOMBING UNIT
 16. EW A
 17. No19
- THE FIGHTER STRIKING UNITS IN EACH ATTACK OPERATED AT WILL AFTER DEPLOYING.

(TIMES ARE IN HAWAIIAN TIME)

III

*The Japanese Invasion of the Philippines,
the Dutch East Indies, and
Southeast Asia*

Introduction

For several months prior to the outbreak of hostilities on 7 December 1941 the relations between the United States and Japan had been severely strained and a further deterioration was indicated at any moment. The economic sanctions which the Allies had applied against Japan, with her resultant inability to replenish oil supplies made her condition critical. That Japan planned an attempt to make herself self-sufficient by annexing certain of the rich Southern Areas was indicated by such known activities as extensive overseas expeditionary training; the presence of 100,000 troops in Formosa and Hainan; an agreement with the Vichy government whereby 40,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Indo-China and Japan was permitted to occupy strategic air and naval bases there, including Camranh Bay; reinforcement of the Mandated Islands with submarines, aircraft, and land defenses; improvement of airfields and bases on Formosa, the Paracels, Spratly, Saipan, and the Mandates; and storage of oil reserves at such strategic points as Itu Abo, Lord North, and Tobi Islands.

Because of the relatively small forces available to the Allies in the Far East their strategy in the event of war had necessarily to be defensive, pending receipt of reinforcements, and all plans were based on the probable Japanese courses of action.

Conferences between United States, British, and Dutch staff officers resulted in the solving of some operational difficulties, but no firm agreement was reached as to a Supreme Commander or as to air and surface command during joint operations. The basic war plans provided for deployment of the United States Asiatic Fleet to the south where it was to join with the British and Dutch, while the Australian and New Zealand Navies concentrated in their home waters. In the planned deployment of forces, particularly of air forces, there was a general tendency to underestimate the Japanese strength and to discount the possibility of the simultaneous attack over a large area which actually occurred.

At the beginning of the war the primary objectives of the Japanese were to make Japan self-sufficient by occupation of the rich area to the south, and to establish and hold a defense line surrounding the occupied area and the Japanese Mainland. This program, while simple in outline, was highly complex in execution. Designed to seize the initiative, the initial phase involved a surprise blow by the bulk of the Japanese carrier forces to destroy or paralyze the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters and to sever communications with the United States Asiatic Fleet, and simultaneous invasions of the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Southeast Asia.

Japanese Plans

In order to carry out such invasions, the Japanese Army and Navy jointly devised the operation plans in minute detail. Each operation was carefully coordinated with, and dependent upon the success of the other. By use of surprise attacks, spearheaded by air power, the Japanese expected to complete the invasions in a very short time and thus free all forces for defense against counterattacks or for offensive action in

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other theaters. The following translation of the Japanese War Plans sets forth the general instructions relative to the commencement of hostilities:

"The day of opening of operations will be designated X-day and will be determined by Imperial Command.

On X-day initiate a surprise air attack on the Philippines, assault and land on Malaya using air attack as the situation demands. If weather is bad postpone the Philippine landings but execute the Malaya landings so far as possible. After the Malaya landings and air attacks and after the Pearl Harbor strike is completed, activate attacks on Hongkong. If there is a serious attack on Japanese forces prior to X-day, open operations upon receipt of Imperial Command to do so."

In order to insure surprise and reduce the time enroute during which the invasion forces would be subject to attack, such nearby rendezvous points as Indo-China, the Pescadores Islands, Formosa, Okinawa and Palau were selected as standby areas pending commencement of hostilities. (Appendixes 10 and 11).

The first objective in the attacks on the Philippines was the destruction of the United States Far East Air Force. To provide bases from which the short-ranged Japanese Army aircraft could operate, the initial invasion of Luzon was aimed at Aparri and Batan Island. Four days following the outbreak of hostilities an invasion of Davao and Legaspi was scheduled to be staged from Palau, and ten days later (X+14) landings in Lamon Bay and Lingayen Gulf were scheduled. During the consolidation of the Philippines it was planned to launch successive invasions of Menado, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Banjarmasin, Kendari, Makassar, Ambon, Timor and Bali. Simultaneously with the occupation of the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand were to be invaded and Miri and Kuching in British Borneo, valuable because of oil, were also to be occupied.

After capture of Malaya, including Singapore, and the occupation of the Philippines, Borneo, Celebes and Sumatra it was planned to combine all forces and launch an invasion against Java, the heart of the Dutch Empire. By this time it was expected that the Carrier Striking Force would have completed operations in the Pearl Harbor, Wake and Rabaul areas and it was planned also to employ its overwhelming power to insure quick and complete victory.

Upon completion of these plans the Japanese Army and Navy launched intensive training programs designed to fit each unit for the specific mission assigned therein.

Commencement of Hostilities

War was not long in coming. On 5 November 1941 the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was warned by despatch from Imperial Headquarters that war was feared to be unavoidable, and directed to complete all preparations by the first part of December. On 21 November all forces were ordered to proceed to designated rendezvous points, and on 1 December all forces were notified that the decision to enter into a state of war had been made. On 2 December the date to commence hostilities was designated as 8 December. The complete despatches are set forth in Appendix 14.

Because of a heavy fog which grounded Japanese planes in Formosa on the morning of 8 December, it appeared that the key operation of the Philippine campaign, the destruction of American air power in the Philippines, would fail and furthermore that, warned by the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States heavy bombers would initiate an attack on the invasion forces massed in Formosa and then withdraw and disperse. Radio intelligence available to the Japanese on the morning of 8 December indicated that such an attack was planned and all air raid precautions, including protection against gas, were put into effect at Formosan bases. However the attack did not develop and at 1015 of the same morning the 21st and 23d Air Flotillas (Navy) were able to launch all available aircraft for the planned attack on United States air bases in Luzon. Since the attack was not initiated until shortly after noon the Japanese were greatly surprised to find the United States heavy bombers as well as most of the fighters still on the ground.

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Well briefed, as a result of excellent intelligence obtained by photographic reconnaissance prior to the war, the highly trained Japanese pilots delivered an effective 90-minute assault on aircraft and facilities in the Manila Area. By the close of 8 December half of the heavy bomber force and one third of the fighter strength of the United States Far East Air Force had been destroyed, and of the remaining 17 B-17's, 15 P-35's and 50 P-40's many were heavily damaged. By 10 December all remaining United States Army heavy bombers had been withdrawn to the south. The United States Navy search planes followed on 14 December after also losing half of their strength. The few remaining fighter aircraft were used primarily for aerial reconnaissance leaving the Japanese in complete control of the air over the Philippines. Thus the initial phase of the Japanese offensive was a success and their amphibious forces were free to advance virtually unopposed in the air.

Occupation of the Philippines

Following the Luzon air attack, Aparri, Vigan, and the Lingayen Area were quickly occupied by the forces of the Third Fleet from Formosa while the Southern Philippine Support Force, operating from Palau with carrier-based air support, occupied Legaspi, Lamon Bay, Davao and Jolo. As the advance into the Philippines progressed, the 5th Air Army moved from Formosa into Luzon where it supported ground operations. The 21st and 23d Air Flotillas (Navy) moved to Davao, Palau and Jolo to cooperate with the 3d Fleet as it moved southward. By the end of December 1941 all large-scale amphibious operations in the Philippines were completed, and the Third Fleet, after refueling at Formosa, proceeded to the Davao-Palau Area where forces were assembled for the move on Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, Ambon and Timor. The 5th Air Army was later moved from Luzon to China and all subsequent Japanese Air operations in the Netherlands East Indies theater were conducted by Navy carrier and land-based aircraft.

Malaya Operations

Simultaneously with the Philippine Operations the Japanese successfully advanced into British Borneo and Malaya. Preceded by intensive air attacks by Army and Navy aircraft based in Indo-China and supported by an overwhelming naval force, the landings proceeded on schedule. The highlight of the air action occurred on 10 December when the 22d Air Flotilla, acting upon information furnished by submarines, sank H. M. S. *Prince of Wales* and H. M. S. *Repulse* with the loss of only four planes. This action not only removed the only threat to the Malaya invasion forces but also had a tremendous morale effect on all forces involved. Following closely after the air success of Pearl Harbor this action again demonstrated the skill of the Japanese pilots and further emphasized the importance of air power as a weapon in naval warfare.

The Organization of the Allied Command

The outbreak of hostilities on 8 December found the majority of the ships of the United States Asiatic Fleet disposed to the south in accordance with previous plans. The submarines and patrol aircraft with their tenders were dispersed through the Philippines. However the immediate destruction of the United States Army's air strength which gave the Japanese complete control of the air made the Philippines untenable even for the submarines. On 14 December what remained of Patrol Wing 10 was ordered south and on 31 December the last of the United States submarines departed from Manila leaving only a few gunboats and motor torpedo boats to continue the struggle along with the ground forces on Bataan and Corregidor.

The southward withdrawal of the United States Asiatic Fleet necessitated a complete reorganization of base and communication facilities. Operational headquarters were reestablished in Surabaya in order to be as near as possible to the scene of operations.

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Meanwhile the situation in Malaya grew progressively worse and the British Far Eastern Command was forced to leave Singapore for Colombo. In order to coordinate the various American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces operating against the Japanese, the Allies, on 2 January, announced the establishment of a unified command (short title—Abdacom) with General Sir Archibald P. Wavell as Supreme Commander. Faced by a rapidly advancing enemy and hindered by almost unsurmountable language difficulties and differences in national attitudes, the command was never more than a paper organization and actually never functioned as a unified command. In fact each nation retained control of its own forces and employed them in its own interests. The British were primarily concerned with conveying troops for the defense of Malaya, and the Dutch also used cruisers and destroyers for conveying merchant ships. This practice prevented full use of the combat ships for strikes against Japanese amphibious forces which advanced through the Celebes rapidly and at small cost.

The Japanese Occupy Celebes and Borneo

In order to execute a simultaneous move through the Molucca Sea and the Macassar Straits, the ships and aircraft assigned to the Japanese Third Fleet were organized as the Netherlands East Indies Force and divided into an Eastern and Western Invasion Force, supported by the 21st and 23d Air Flotillas respectively. The tactics employed by the Japanese were ideal for the conditions encountered. In rapid succession they build up the strength and provided air facilities at one base, overcame weak air opposition at the next point of attack and then, using amphibious forces strongly supported by cruisers and destroyers, easily landed and immediately commenced preparations for the next advance.

Employing paratroops known as the Special Naval Landing Force the Japanese commenced the Celebes operations by assaulting Menado on 11 January and on the same day they also occupied Tarakan on the east coast of Borneo. Balikpapan, Kendari, Macassar, Ambon, Koepang, and Bali were taken in that order, and by the end of February all forces were concentrated for the final push into Java. The movement of Japanese amphibious forces is shown in Appendix 10.

As in the Philippines, Japanese air power was again decisive here. Not only did it make Darwin and Surabaya untenable, but it continually menaced Allied surface forces. In addition the Japanese superiority in the air gave them excellent intelligence of Allied movements and at the same time hindered Allied search operations, largely conducted by the PBY's of Patrol Wing 10.

The opposition to Japanese air power was negligible. With most of its air power destroyed in the Philippines, surviving elements of the United States Army Far East Air Force, operating from makeshift bases in the Dutch Islands, was never able to launch heavy bomber strikes of more than eight to ten planes against the Japanese invasion force. In addition the combined fighter strength of the United States, Britain, Netherlands Indies and Australia was dispersed over such a wide area that it was unable to protect bases and ships or engage actively in offensive operations. The mobile Japanese air forces, manned by experienced pilots and equipped with modern well designed planes, were superior in numbers and performance to any opposition they encountered.

Allied Counteroffensive Efforts

As the eastern prong of the Japanese southern offensive moved through the Celebes, the inadequate and rapidly dwindling air, sea, and submarine forces of the Allies attacked at every opportunity but in no case were they successful in inflicting heavy losses or even in delaying the Japanese operations. The major United States offensive effort occurred off Balikpapan on the night of 23–24 January when a division of four United States destroyers succeeded in sinking four large transports participating in the invasion of Balikpapan. In an effort to repeat the Balikpapan success a larger United States and Dutch striking force, composed of four cruisers and two destroyer divisions was organized and ordered again to attack the

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Balikpapan transports at night. However on 3 February they were sighted by land-based planes operating from Kendari and a heavy attack by all available aircraft of the 21st and 23d Air Flotillas resulted the next day. The *Marblehead* was permanently disabled, the *Houston* suffered major damage, and the Dutch cruiser *De Ruyter* was temporarily damaged making it necessary to cancel the operation.

The Java Campaign

By 15 February the Japanese were closing in on Java from both the east and west sides with overwhelming strength. In the east the Japanese controlled all of the Celebes from their strong air base at Kendari, Ambon had been captured, and bombing attack on Koepang and Bali indicated that these points were scheduled for occupation in the near future.

The invasion of Bali actually occurred on 18 February when the Japanese landed on the southeast coast and seized the airfield thus exposing the sea area south of Java to air attack. The Allied reaction was immediate but ineffective. On the night of 19–20 February a combined striking force composed of three cruisers and six destroyers attacked a Japanese force of six destroyers and several transports. In a series of short engagements with torpedoes and shellfire, one Allied destroyer was sunk and two cruisers and one destroyer were damaged. The smaller Japanese force lost no ships although one destroyer was moderately damaged and one was so heavily damaged that it had to be towed to Macassar. This marked the first occasion during the campaign in which a Japanese combat ship was damaged to such an extent that it was unable to proceed under its own power. After the engagement the Allied force retired to Surabaya and the Japanese completed the occupation of Bali without major resistance.

On 19 February the Japanese Carrier Striking Force, operating from Staring Bay in Celebes and employing aircraft from four carriers, launched a heavy air attack against shipping and shore facilities at Darwin, Australia. Encountering practically no opposition this strike succeeded in destroying virtually every ship in Darwin in addition to inflicting such severe damage to the airfield and shore installations that immediate evacuation of the town was ordered. The few remaining land-based Australian and American fighters were destroyed, and the reconnaissance seaplanes with their tender were forced to withdraw to the south. On 20 February the Japanese Navy, employing paratroops for the second time, occupied the airfield at Koepang on Timor. Not only did Koepang provide a base from which strikes could be launched against Australia but its occupation also placed the Japanese squarely across the fighter ferry route from Australia to Java.

In the west the danger to Java was equally grave. On 14 February the Japanese Army initiated a surprise paratroop attack on Palembang in southeast Sumatra. Following the initial attack by paratroopers, amphibious forces were landed in large numbers and the fate of Sumatra, which produced half of the oil of the Indies, was sealed. On 15 February, Singapore, the British bastion of defense in the Far East, surrendered unconditionally.

The virtual exhaustion of Allied fighter strength under constant attacks by Japanese aircraft and the Japanese advance to the eastern and western approaches to the Java Sea convinced General Wavell that further defense of Java was useless. Consequently the unified command was dissolved on 25 February, and the Dutch assumed control of the defense of Java. American, British, and Australian Naval forces remained to fight as long as resistance served a useful purpose.

As it was evident that the defense of Java could not be attempted without fighter plane reinforcements, an effort was made to bring in assembled fighters via ship from Australia. After considerable delay due to indecisions incident to the change in high command, the *Langley* was ordered to sail for Tjilatjap with a cargo of P-40 fighters. During this delay the Japanese had established routine air patrols in the sea area south of Java and the *Langley* was promptly located and sunk by land-based aircraft from Kendari.

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Battle of the Java Sea

By the end of February the Japanese were prepared for the final two pronged pincer movement against Java. Bali was reinforced and at the same time a large convoy moved down from Jolo to the area west of Makassar where it was joined and supported by the forces of the Third Fleet previously engaged in the Celebes operations. Simultaneously a second convoy, supported by the cruisers and destroyers assigned to the Malay Force, approached Banten Bay near the west tip of Java.

To oppose this final thrust by the Japanese there remained a striking force of 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 10 destroyers belonging to four different nations and manned by personnel exhausted by constant activity. Never had this force operated as a tactical unit and there was no common set of signals or communication plan. Under such conditions, the Allied striking force supported by only a token air force was doomed to defeat. In the battle of the Java Sea, 27-28 February the Japanese, while losing no ships, sank two Allied cruisers and three destroyers and ended all threat to their invasion convoys by splitting the remaining Allied force. The latter ships had no alternative but to attempt escape from the Java Sea through the Japanese controlled exits. In this endeavor the three remaining Allied cruisers as well as four destroyers were lost. The escape of the remnants of the Allied Navy from Java waters on 1 March 1942 marked the end of organized resistance to the Japanese occupation of the Southern Resources Area.

Employment of Japanese Carriers and Battleships

An important feature of the Philippines and Indies-Malaya Campaign was the Japanese employment of battleships, cruisers and large carriers as support forces. Although these ships did not take part in the amphibious operations and indeed participated in only minor surface action, they were always lying off ready to render assistance if necessary. The movements of the Main Body of the Second Fleet together with that of the Carrier Striking Force are shown in Appendix 11. That these ships could participate in such widespread operations perfectly coordinated with the activities of the invasion forces is only another indication of the careful planning and preparation made by the Japanese prior to the war. At the commencement of hostilities, the Main Body of the Second Fleet, which contained the only two battleships during the Southern Operations, moved south towards Singapore to intercept the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* should the 22d Air Flotilla fail in its attack. From Camranh Bay it moved from operation to operation: after supporting the Lingayen invasion, it proceeded to Palau where it rendezvoused with the Pearl Harbor Striking Force and moved south to the Kendari Area to support the Netherlands East Indies Campaign. Except for the carrier attacks on Ambon on 23 January and on Darwin 19 February this powerful force of four battleships, six large aircraft carriers and several cruisers and destroyers took part in no further action until it arrived in the Indian Ocean on 25 February 1942. Here it operated in support of the Java and Christmas Island invasions and intercepted Allied ships attempting to escape from the Java Sea. Upon completion of the Java operations the force returned to Staring Bay, Celebes, where it refueled and reorganized for the strikes on Colombo and Trincomalee carried out on 5 and 9 April. These strikes were successful and on 18 April 1942, the day of the B-25 raid on Tokyo, the Striking Force arrived back in home waters. Thus, between 7 December 1941 and 9 April 1942, the Japanese Carrier Striking Force operated across 120° of longitude from Hawaii to Ceylon and conducted strikes against ships and shore installations at Pearl Harbor, Rabaul, Ambon, Darwin, Tjilatjap, Colombo, and Trincomalee. Allied losses to Japanese carrier air attack included five battleships, one aircraft tender, one cruiser and seven destroyers sunk or very heavily damaged; three battleships, three cruisers and one destroyer damaged; and thousands of tons of auxiliaries and merchant ships sunk. In addition hundreds of Allied aircraft as well as docks, hangars and base facilities were destroyed. Despite the scope of the operations not one ship of the Japanese Carrier Striking Force was sunk or damaged by Allied action. Indeed the force was seldom sighted and never effectively attacked.

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Conclusion

The campaign once again demonstrated the military advantage of the initiative and mobility. Utilizing surprise attacks made according to a well conceived plan the Japanese succeeded in bringing superior forces to bear on every objective. By contrast, the Allies were forced to withdraw from one base to another and to reorganize and reestablish communication after every move. This, coupled with the initial lack of coordination between the Allies, prevented a firm and unified stand at any time. The Japanese demonstrated to the world the mobility, range, and striking power of the carrier striking force, and in so doing set the pattern for the Pacific war. But, as in other phases of military operations, the overwhelming initial successes of the Japanese offense blinded them to the necessity of solving the defensive problem of a carrier force faced with serious opposition. The United States solved this problem by improvements in design which reduced the vulnerability of carriers and by the development of radar and specialized tactics which permitted fuller realization of the potentialities of carriers throughout the subsequent course of the war.

The effective employment by the Japanese of amphibious forces and the coordination of air and surface elements including submarines was also indicative of that which was to follow and served notice to the world that in Japan the Allies had a progressive as well as an aggressive foe, well equipped and trained to exploit her initial advantage in military strength.

The Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Dutch Indies and British Malaya, rich in oil and other essential materials was completed in an incredibly short time. Never before in military history was so much gained in exchange for so little. With the exception of three destroyers, sunk by Allied submarines, not one Japanese major combat vessel was lost and very few were damaged. Air, ground, and shipping losses were equally insignificant, while the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Australia lost the majority of the sea, land and air forces engaged. April 1942 found the Japanese with their Empire greatly enlarged, their fleet completely intact and the morale of both the military and home fronts sky-high as a result of continuous victory.

But the Japanese could not stand prosperity. Impressed by the apparent weakness of the United States and its Allies and with an inflated estimate of her own offensive power, Japan planned to employ her new found strength for expansion to the eastward. It was this expansion which spread the Japanese force too thin and introduced problems unsolvable with Japan's limited economic and military strength.

Commencing with the Battle of the Coral Sea, a consequence of the first phase of this plan of expansion, Japan suffered a series of irreplaceable losses; she had committed herself to a course of action which served only to hasten her total destruction.

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Captain Watanabe	Nav No. 13
Captain Fujita	Nav No. 14, 81
Captain Takahashi	Nav No. 15
Captain Ishihara	Nav No. 17
Captain Ihara	Nav No. 68
Rear Admiral Shoji	Nav No. 101
Captain Sonekawa	Nav No. 77
Commander Shibata	Nav No. 88
Commander Nomura	Nav No. 116

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Allied Naval Forces

United States Asiatic Fleet

Cruisers (2)

Destroyers (13)

Destroyer Squadron 29.....	<i>Paul Jones (FF)</i>
Destroyer Division 57.....	<i>Whipple, Alden, Edwards, Edsall</i>
Destroyer Division 58.....	<i>Stewart, Parrott, Bulmer, Barker</i>
Destroyer Division 50.....	<i>Peary, Pope, Ford, Pillsbury</i>

Submarines (29)

Submarine Division 29.....	<i>Salmon, Skipjack, Saury, Seal, Sargo, Spearfish</i>
Submarine Division 22.....	<i>Snapper, Sturgeon, Sailfish, Stingray, Sculpin, Swordfish</i>
Submarine Division 201.....	<i>S-36, S-37, S-38, S-39, S-40, S-41</i>
Submarine Division 202.....	<i>Seadragon, Scaraven, Scalion, Scawolf</i>
Submarine Division 203.....	<i>Perch, Shark, Pickerel, Tarpon, Porpoise, Permit, Pike</i>

Seaplane Tenders (4)..... *Langley, Childs, Preston, Heron*

NOTE—6 Motor torpedo boats, plus tenders and other auxiliary craft were also available.

British Naval Forces

Battleships (1).....	<i>Prince of Wales</i>
Battle Cruisers (1).....	<i>Repulse</i>
Heavy Cruiser (1).....	<i>Exeter</i>
Light Cruisers (2).....	<i>Dragon, Danae</i>
Destroyers (5).....	<i>Tencos, Scout, Jupiter, Elcetra, Encounter</i>

Australian Forces

Light Cruisers (2)..... *Perth, Hobart*

Dutch Forces

Cruisers (3).....	<i>De Ruyter, Java, Tromp</i>
Destroyers (6).....	<i>Piet Hein, Van Ghent, Evertsen, Kortenaer, Witte de Wit, Banckert</i>
Submarines (18).....	

NOTE—Only those ships which actively opposed the Japanese advance are listed.

Appendix 6

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Allied Air Forces

United States Far East Air Force

1 Heavy Bombardment Group	35 B-17's
1 Pursuit Group	90 Operational P-40's
1 Philippine Pursuit Squadron	12 P-26's
1 Observation Squadron	21 Miscellaneous aircraft

NOTE—An additional 150 aircraft were on hand but they were not operational due to lack of equipment and spares awaiting shipment from the United States.

Patrol Wing Ten (Navy)	
Patrol Squadron 101	15 planes
Patrol Squadron 102	15 planes
Patrol Squadron 22	12 planes

NOTE—VP22 did not report until January 1942.

Netherlands East Indies

Two hundred aircraft of all types (largely of American manufacture including Brewster and Curtiss fighters, Martin Bombers and Consolidated Patrol planes).

The majority of the bombers were based in Sumatra and engaged in the defense of Malaya.

British Air Forces in Malaya

The British had a total of 332 aircraft in Malaya divided as follows:

Bombers	82
Fighters	204
Torpedo Bombers	39
Patrol Planes	7
	<hr/>
	332

Australian Air Forces

The Australian Air Force was composed of about 165 operational planes, the majority of which were Brewster fighters, Lockheed Hudson Bombers and Consolidated Flying Boats.

Appendix 6

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Japanese Naval Forces

Southern Force

(Second Fleet)

Main Body:

Battleship Division 3 (1st section) (2 BB)	Kongo, Haruna.
Cruiser Division 4 (4 CA)	Atago (FF), Takao, Maya, Chokai.
Destroyer Division 3 (4 DD)	

Philippine Force

Northern Force:

Cruiser Division 16 (1 CA, 2 CL)	Asbigara (F), Kuma, Nagara.
Destroyer Squadron 5 (1 CL, 12 DD)	Natori, DesDivs 5 and 22.
Seaplane Carrier Division 11 (1 CVS, 2 AK)	Mizubo, Kamikawi Maru and Sanyo Maru.
Base Forces 1 and 2	Transports and auxiliaries (Subchasers, mincraft, gunboats, cable layers and survey ships).
Mine Division 17 (2 DM)	Itsukushima, Yacyama

Southern Force:

Cruiser Division 5 (3 CA)	Haguro, Myoko, Nachi
Carrier Division 4 (2 CVL)	Ryujo, Shobo
Destroyer Squadron 2 (1 CL, 12 DD)	Jintsu, DesDivs 8, 15, 16, 18
Destroyer Division 4 (1 CL, 12 DD)	Naka, DesDivs 2, 4, 9, 24
Seaplane Carrier Division 11 (1 CVS)	Cbitose

Malaya Force

Cruiser Division 7 (4 CA)	Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano
Destroyer Squadron 3 (1 CL, 12 DD)	Sendai, DesDivs 11, 12, 19, 20
Base Force 9 and 11	Transports and auxiliaries (Subchasers, mincraft, gunboats, cable layers and survey ships).
Submarine Squadron 4 (1 CL), 2 Submarines: <i>Kimu</i> (F)	SubDivs 18, 19, 21.
Submarine Squadron 5 (1 CL), 2 Submarines: <i>Yura</i> (F)	SubDivs 29, 30
Submarine Squadron 6 (1 CL), 2 Submarines: <i>Chogei</i> (F)	SubDivs 9, 13

Carrier Striking Force

(First Air Fleet)

Carrier Division 1 (2 CV)	Akagi (FF), Kaga.
Carrier Division 2 (2 CV)	Soryu, Hiryu.
Carrier Division 5 (2 CV)	Shokaku, Zuikaku.
Battleship Division 3 (2 BB) (1st Section)	Ihiei, Kirishima
Cruiser Division 8 (2 CA)	Tone, Chikuma
Destroyer Squadron 1 (1 CL, 9 DD)	Abukuma, DesDivs 7, 17, 27.

Appendix 7

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Land-Based Air Force

(Eleventh Air Fleet)

21st Air Flotilla (180 planes)	Formosa.
22d Air Flotilla (117 planes)	Saigon Area.
23d Air Flotilla (180 planes)	Formosa.

NOTE—(1) After completion of the Lingayen Invasion Destroyer Squadron 5 was detached from the Philippine Force and ordered to report to the Malaya Force for escort duty.

(2) After the Philippine Operations the Philippine Force was redesignated as the East Indies Force which in turn was joined by the Malaya Force for the final thrust at Java.

Japanese Army Air Forces

Philippines (Fifth Air Army)	144 planes—fighters, bombers, reconnaissance planes.
Malaya–Burma Operations (Third Air Army)	447 planes—fighters, bombers, reconnaissance planes.

NOTE—Upon completion of the Philippine Operations the Fifth Air Army was ordered to the Malaya Theater.

Japanese Army Forces

Philippines	16th Division, 48th Division, 2 Tank Regiments, 44 Antiaircraft guns, 6 Artillery Battalions.
14th Army	
Burma and Thailand	33d Division, 55th Division.
15th Army	
Dutch East Indies	2d Division, 38th Division, 48th Division, 56th Mixed Infantry Group.
16th Army	
South Seas Detachment	3 Tank Regiments, 83 Antiaircraft Guns, 5 Artillery Battalions.
Malaya	5th Division, 18th Division, 4 Tank Regiments, 11 Artillery Battalions, 60 Antiaircraft guns.
25th Army	
23d Army	21st Division, 21st Base Force, 21st Air Base Unit, 48 Antiaircraft guns.

Appendix 7

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

United States Losses

<i>Name of Ship</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Agent</i>
Cruiser (1):			
<i>Houston</i>	Off Java	1 Mar. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
Destroyers (5):			
<i>Edsall</i>	South of Java	1 Mar. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
<i>Peary</i>	Port Darwin, Australia	19 Feb. 1942	Carrier aircraft.
<i>Pillsbury</i>	Bali Strait	1 Mar. 1942	Destroyers.
<i>Pope</i>	Java Sea	1 Mar. 1942	Carrier aircraft and destroyers.
<i>Stewart</i>	Surabaya, Java	2 Mar. 1942	Land-based aircraft
Seaplane Tender (1):			
<i>Langley</i>	South of Java	27 Feb. 1942	Land-based aircraft.
Tanker (1):			
<i>Pecos</i>	South of Java	27 Feb. 1942	Carrier aircraft.
Submarines (4):			
<i>Perch</i>	Java Sea	Feb. 1942
<i>S-36</i>	Makassar Straits	20 Jan. 1942
<i>Sealion</i>	Cavite, P. I.	10 Dec. 1941
<i>Shark</i> (SS 174)	Molucca Sea	Feb. 1942
Minesweepers (4):			
<i>Bittern</i>	Cavite, P. I.	10 Dec. 1941
<i>Finch</i>	Corregidor, P. I.	10 Apr. 1942
<i>Quail</i>	Corregidor, P. I.	5 May 1942
<i>Tanager</i>	Corregidor, P. I.	4 May 1942
Gunboats (3):			
<i>Asheville</i>	South of Java	3 Mar. 1942
<i>Oabu</i>	Corregidor, P. I.	4 May 1942
<i>Wake</i>	Shanghai, China	8 Dec. 1941

British Losses

<i>Name of Ship</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Agent</i>
Battleship (1):			
<i>Prince of Wales</i>	Off Malaya	10 Dec. 1941	Aircraft.
Battle Cruiser (1):			
<i>Repulse</i>	Off Malaya	10 Dec. 1941	Aircraft.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Cruiser (1):

<i>Exeter</i>	Java Sea	1 Mar. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
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Destroyers (3):

<i>Electra</i>	Java Sea	27 Feb. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
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<i>Encounter</i>	Java Sea	1 Mar. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
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<i>Jupiter</i>	Java Sea	27 Feb. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
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Australian Losses

<i>Name of Ship</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Agent</i>
Cruiser (1):			
<i>Perth</i>	Java Sea	1 Mar. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.

Dutch Losses

<i>Name of Ship</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Agent</i>
Cruisers (2):			
<i>De Ruyter</i>	Java Sea	28 Feb. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
<i>Java</i>	Java Sea	28 Feb. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
Destroyers (6):			
<i>Evertsen</i>	Java Sea	1 Mar. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
<i>Kortenaer</i>	Java Sea	27 Feb. 1942	Cruisers and destroyers.
<i>Piet Hein</i>	Bandoeng Strait	19 Feb. 1942	Destroyers.
<i>Van Ghent</i>	Banka Island	13 Feb. 1942	Ran aground.
<i>Witte de With</i>	Surabaya	28 Feb. 1942	Aircraft.
<i>Banckert</i>	Surabaya	28 Feb. 1942	Scuttled after damage by bombing.

Appendix 8

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Japanese Losses

War Ships Sunk and Damaged During Japanese Invasion of Philippines and Dutch East Indies

Sunk

Destroyers	Location	Date	Agent
<i>Sbinonome</i>	Off Miri	18 Dec. 1941	Moored mine.
<i>Sagiri</i>	Off Kuching	24 Dec. 1941	Submarine attack.
<i>Natsushio</i>	Off Macassar	9 Feb. 1942	Submarine attack.


Damaged

Cruisers			
<i>Myoko</i>	Davao	4 Jan. 1942	Air attack. (Damaged, returned to Sasebo).
<i>Naka</i>	Vigan	10 Dec. 1941	Air attack. (Light damage from strafing).
<i>Kinu</i>	Off Java	1 Mar. 1942	Air attack. (Slight damage, near miss).
<i>Kuma</i>	South of Cebu	9 Apr. 1942	PT boats. (One torpedo struck bow but did not explode).
Minelayers			
<i>Yaeyama</i>	Subic Bay	1 Feb. 1942	Shell hit (dud).
Seaplane Tenders			
<i>Chitose</i>	Borneo Straits South of Celebes	12 Feb. 1942	Air attack. (Damage unknown).
Destroyers			
<i>Oshio</i>	Lombok Strait	20 Feb. 1942	Night battle. (Damaged. Towed to Macassar).
<i>Suzukaze</i>	Off Kendari	4 Feb. 1942	Sub attack. (No. 1 and 2 crew compt flooded).
<i>Asagumo</i>	North Surabaya	27 Feb. 1942	Cruisers. (Light damage steering by hand).
<i>Asagumo</i>	Banten Bay	1 Mar. 1942	Cruisers. (No. 1 boiler room and engine room flooded).
<i>Shirayuki</i>	Banten Bay	1 Mar. 1942	Shore gunfire. (15 cm hit bridge).
<i>Shikiname</i>	Banten Bay	1 Mar. 1942	Shore gunfire. (Port side damaged).


Japanese Merchant Ship Losses

Month	Number of ships	Total tonnage
December 1941	8	47,740
January 1942	14	62,440
February 1942	7	31,426
March 1942	15	77,816

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR



THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR



THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Central Agreement Between Japanese Navy and Army Established in November 1941 (Translation)

I. Objectives.

The reduction of the primary foundations of American, British, and Dutch power in Eastern Asia; the occupation of the Southern Areas.

Scope of Occupation.

The Philippines, Guam, Hongkong, British Malaya, Burma, the Bismarcks, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Timor.

II. Operational Plan.

A. To seize the initiative with a sudden attack on the Philippines and Malaya, while opening operations at the same time elsewhere; and to complete the operations within a short period.

Opening of operations: A sudden assault and landing by the Malaya Advance Force (Senken Heidan) preceded by an air strike. Also an initial air strike on Philippines.

Utilization of the results obtained in the air. Occupation of Malaya and the Philippines by the major portion of the Occupation Forces (Koryaku Heidan).

B. During the opening period of operations: The occupation of strategic areas in Guam, Hongkong, and British Borneo, and the stabilization of Thailand and Indo-China.

C. During the above operation the occupation of strategic areas in the Bismarcks, Dutch Borneo, and Celebes, as well as in South Sumatra, depending on the progress of the Malaya Operation; and preparations for the Java Operation.

D. During or after the above the occupation of strategic areas in the Moluccas and Timor.

E. After neutralization from the air the invasion of Java, and after the occupation of Singapore the occupation of North Sumatra.

F. If the disposition of the Combined Fleet is shifted to interception because of the movements of the main United States forces, or if war with Russia begins, the Philippines and Malaya Operations will proceed without interruption.

G. In amphibious operations, anticipate making landings before enemy opposition.

H. If the British invade South Thailand before us, while we are preparing for operation:

Elements will immediately invade Thailand by land and sea, and will secure Bangkok and an air base to the South. After the Advance Force (Senken Heidan) has departed its rendezvous the procedure will be according to schedule. Before departure aerial operations will be accelerated while the landing of the Main Force will be delayed, and then the landing in force will be made. (Elements of Navy FB (TN: large air unit) will be diverted from the Philippines Area).

I. If the British or Americans attack us while we prepare for operations:

Local forces will intercept them, an air offensive against the pertinent armies will be opened, and otherwise the predetermined plans will be followed.

III. The opening of operations.

X-day, the day of the opening of operations, will be determined by Imperial Command.

On X-day we assault and land on Malaya (with an initial air attack depending on the situation) and initiate air attacks on the Philippines. If the weather is bad the Philippines Advance Unit (Senkentai)

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

landings will be postponed, but the Malaya assault and landings will be attempted insofar as is possible.

After the Malaya landings and air attacks and after the first strike against the United States has been completed, the attacks on Hongkong and Guam will be activated.

If there is a serious attack by the enemy to seize the initiative before X-day:

- (1) We will open our operations after having received an Imperial Command to do so.
- (2) We will await such a command until it has been dispatched.

IV. Outline of Operations.

A. Philippine Operations.

1. Army and Navy Air Forces will launch the initial air attack from Taiwan and Palau. Naval Forces will maintain Batan Island as an emergency landing field for the attackers.

2. Various Advance Units.

(X-1) depart rendezvous point; land at Aparri, Vigan, Laoag, Legaspi, and Davao and then occupy Jolo as rapidly as possible. Naval Forces will garrison.

3. Until about (X+14).

Main force of 14th Army to Lingayen; an element to land on Ramon; occupation of Manila. Cover by force from Third Fleet.

4. After the main Army forces have been landed: One brigade will mop up Luzon; 48th Division will secure Manila.

B. Malaya Operations.

25th Army, 3d Air Army, and Expeditionary Fleet will be nucleus force.

Plan A.

Advance Force will assault and land at Ban Don, Nakon, Singora, Patani, and Kota Bharu and will maintain bases.

Army-Navy Air Forces will launch the initial air attack from South French Indo-China against enemy air power, ships, and small craft.

Plan B. (If there is difficulty in assaulting and landing.)

The landing of the Advance Force will be an attempt at raids and landings in small numbers. (Launched from the West coast of French Indo-China). The main force of the Advance Force will begin to land after (X+1).

The adoption of Plan B will be determined by Imperial Headquarters before the departure of the Advance Force from its rendezvous point.

2. After this landing of the Advance Force, it will proceed to land as quickly as conditions permit on Kota Bharu. (Depending on circumstance, the landing may be effected with a small number of troops at the same time as the main force of the Advance Force).

3. Upon the return of an element of the 14th Army's escort shipping, the main force of the 25th Army will land at Singapore from South Thailand and then, if the opportunity presents itself, will endeavor to debark one group (Heidan) on the East coast of South Malaya.

C. British Borneo Operations.

First, a sudden attack will be launched on Miri by an element directly attached to the Southern Army and then Kuching will be occupied; bases will be maintained; Navy Air Force will support the operation.

Appendix 12

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

D. Hongkong Operations.

One Group of 23d Army, and 2d China Fleet as nuclear force.

Annihilate local enemy shipping, assault enemy positions on the Kowloon Peninsula, occupy Hongkong. After completion of the occupation, the group above will be assembled as the group to occupy the Netherlands East Indies.

E. The Guam and Bismarck Operations nuclear force of South Seas Detachment and 4th Fleet will seize Guam; land combat unit to relieve as garrison. To occupy Rabaul; land combat unit to relieve as garrison.

F. Netherlands East Indies Operations.

To occupy Batavia, Bandoeng, Surabaya:

Main force of 16th Army in vicinity of Batavia; one group diverted to vicinity of Surabaya.

Element of 16th Army to Tarakan, Balikpapan, Bandjoermasin, Ambon, Koepang. (Navy to relieve Tarakan and Ambon as garrison.)

Navy to Manado, Makassar.

Element of 16th Army to strategic areas of Bangka Island, and Palembang.

Elements of 25th Army to land on Madang from West Coast of Malaya, and occupy Achie and then Sabang.

G. Thailand and Burma Operations.

Element of 15th Army (main strength assigned from 25th Army) to South French Indo-China, South Thailand, Victoria Point.

The main force of the 15th Army to the vicinity of Bangkok, one group by land route from French Indo-China, one group from North China about (X+40). Depending on the arrival of the main force of the 15th Army, an element of the 25th Army will advance to the main force's area.

An element of the 15th Army to occupy Moulmein Base.

V. Command.

Army-Navy cooperation.

In local land operations there will be a consolidated command, depending on circumstances.

VI. Transport convoy.

A. Rendezvous points.

1. Force to occupy Guam: Ogasawara.

2. Force to occupy Philippines:

Advance Unit: North Luzon Area
Pescadores or Takao
Davao
Legaspi Area
Palau

Main Force: Lingayen Area
Pescadores
Ramon Bay Area
Nansei Shoto

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

3. Force to occupy British Malaya:
Advance Force: Hainan Island
 South French Indo-China
Main Force: Taiwan, Canton
 Hainan, South French Indo-China
4. Force to occupy British Borneo:
 Camranh Bay
5. Forces to occupy Netherlands East Indies,
Borneo and Molucca Area: Palau
Sumatra Area: Hongkong
East Java: Luzon, Jolo
West Java: Hainan, Formosa

VII. Operations date and zone time to be employed. The date of the operation opening will be calculated from the Imperial Command. Central Standard (Tokyo) time will be used.

VIII. Joint Command Set-up Established.

Southern Army-Combined Fleet, 2d Fleet
Southern Army-Expeditionary Fleet
14th and 16th Armies-3d Fleet
15th and 25th Armies-Expeditionary Fleet
3d and 5th F. B.-11th Air Fleet
3d F. B.-Expeditionary Fleet and 22d Air Flotilla
South Seas Detachment-4th Fleet
China Expeditionary Army-China Seas Fleet
23d Army-2d China Fleet

IX. Operation Designations.

Southern Operations in General.....	"A" Operation
Philippines Operations.....	"M" Operation
Malaya Operations.....	"G" Operation
Nei Operations.....	"H" Operation
Guam Operations.....	"G" Operation
British Borneo Operations.....	"B" Operation
Hongkong Operations.....	"C" Operation
Bismarck Operations.....	"R" Operation

Appendix 12

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Imperial Navy's Course of Action in Operations Against United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands Formulated in November, 1941 (Translation)

I. Outline of Operations.

Continue control over China Coast and Yangtze River.
Quickly destroy enemy fleet and air power in East Asia.
Occupy and hold strategic points in Southern Area.
Destroy enemy fleet in Hawaii.
Consolidate strength to hold out for a long time.
Destroy enemy will to fight.

II. Combined Fleet Course of Action.

(a) General Operations

1. With the forces in Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Expeditionary Fleet and Eleventh Air Fleet as a nucleus destroy enemy fleet in the Philippines, British Malaya and Netherland Indies.

Early stages of operations.

First occupy British Borneo and then as quickly as possible occupy Dutch Borneo, Celebes and Southern Sumatra. The above to be followed by occupation of Molucca Islands and Timor.

Establish air bases in all of the above named places. Utilize the air bases for subjugation of Java and then occupy Java. After capture of Singapore, occupy northern Sumatra and then at an opportune time commence operations in Burma. Cut supply routes to China.

2. Forces of the Fourth Fleet.

Defend the South Seas Islands, patrol, maintain surface communications, capture Wake. At opportune time attack and destroy enemy advanced bases in South Pacific Area. In cooperation with Army capture Guam and then Bismarck Area.

3. Forces of the Fifth Fleet.

Patrol the area east of the home islands. Make preparations against surprise attacks by enemy. Make reconnaissance of Aleutians and defend Ogasawara. Maintain surface communications. Be on guard against Russia.

4. Forces of the Sixth Fleet. (Submarines)

Make reconnaissance of American fleet in Hawaii and West Coast areas and by surprise attacks on shipping destroy lines of communications.

5. Forces of First Air Fleet. (Carriers)

Attack enemy fleet in Hawaii and reduce its strength. Thereafter support 4th Fleet operations and assist in capture of Southern Areas.

6. Main body of Combined Fleet.

Support operations in general. Operate as suitable.

7. Part of Combined Fleet.

Destroy enemy lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

(b) Second Phase of Operations.

1. Forces of Sixth Fleet. (Submarines)

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Make reconnaissance and surprise attacks on main forces of enemy fleet. Destroy enemy surface communications in cooperation with a part of Combined Fleet. At opportune time make surprise attacks on enemy advanced bases.

2. Forces of First and Eleventh Air Fleets.

(Carriers and land-based bombers)

Search for and attack enemy forces. Destroy enemy advanced bases.

3. Forces of Third Fleet, Expeditionary Fleet and other forces as necessary.

Defend occupied points in Southern Area. Operate patrols, maintain surface communications, search for and destroy enemy shipping in Southern Area, attack and destroy enemy advanced bases on our perimeter.

4. Forces of Fourth Fleet.

Defend and patrol points in South Sea Islands and Bismarcks. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy shipping. Make surprise attacks and destroy enemy bases on our perimeter.

5. Forces of Fifth Fleet.

Defend Ogasawara and patrol area to north of those islands and east of home islands. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy fleet should it appear in the area. Attack and destroy enemy bases in the Aleutians.

6. Part of Combined Fleet.

Destroy enemy surface communications in Pacific and Indian Oceans.

7. Main Body of Combined Fleet.

Support all operations. Operate as required.

8. In case of attack by strong American Force.

Maintain contact with part of Sixth Fleet. Reduce enemy strength by air and submarine attacks. At suitable opportunity assemble major portion of Combined Fleet and destroy enemy.

9. In case of attack by strong British Force.

By movement of Third Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Expeditionary Fleet, air force, and submarine squadrons maintain contact with enemy force and destroy it by concerted attack. The main body of Combined Fleet, depending upon condition and location of American Fleet, will also be used in destruction of British Fleet.

10. The important points to be defended among the points which were occupied were as follows: (Asterisk indicates advanced bases).

Manila*, Hongkong, Davao, Singapore*, Batavia, Surabaya*, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Mendao, Makassar, Ambon, Penang, Rabaul.

III. China Area Fleet Operations.

Continue operations against China. Cooperate with the Army in destruction of United States and British forces in China. Second China Fleet cooperate with Army in capture of Hongkong and destruction of enemy forces there. Maintain surface communications along China coast. Prevent enemy from using China coast. Cooperate with Combined Fleet and Army in operations. (Escort of surface transport and defense of assembly points).

IV. Operations of Naval District and Auxiliary Naval Station Forces.

Defend assigned areas. Maintain surface communications in assigned areas. Cooperate with Combined Fleet and China Area Fleet in operations affecting assigned areas.

Appendix 13

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Japanese Naval Despatches Ordering Commencement of Hostilities

5 November 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC Combined Fleet

1. In view of the fact that it is feared war has become unavoidable with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, and for the self preservation and future existence of the Empire, the various preparations for war operations will be completed by the first part of December.
2. The CinC of the Combined Fleet will effect the required preparations for war operations.
3. Execution of details will be as directed by Chief of the Naval General Staff.

5 November 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC China Area Fleet

1. In view of the fact that it is feared war has become unavoidable with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, and for the self preservation and future existence of the Empire, the various preparations for war operations will be completed by the first part of December.
2. The CinC Combined Fleet will effect the required preparations for war operations in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Order, No. 1.
3. The CinC of the China Area Fleet will continue operations against China and at the same time effect required preparations for war operations.
4. Execution of details will be directed by Chief of the Naval General Staff.

7 November 1941.

From: The Chief of the Naval General Staff
To: CinC Combined Fleet

1. CinC Combined Fleet, as a measure of self defense, is authorized to carry out operations against Portugese Timor in cooperation with Commander, Southern Army.
2. Execution of details will be as directed by Chief of Naval General Staff.

7 November 1941.

From: CinC Combined Fleet
To: First Air Fleet

The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for refueling.

NOTE: (Upon arrival at Hitokappu Bay all ships with a limited cruising range were deck loaded with drums of fuel oil and oil was stowed in all available spaces inside the ships.)

21 November 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC Combined Fleet

1. CinC Combined Fleet will order forces necessary for war operations to proceed to suitable standby areas.
2. During the period CinC Combined Fleet is preparing for war operations should any challenge be received from United States, British or Dutch forces he is authorized to utilize any strength he may deem necessary for self defense.
3. Execution of details will be as directed by Chief of Naval General Staff.

Appendix 14

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

21 November 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval G

To: CinC China Area Fleet

1. During the period CinC China Area Fleet is preparing for war operations should any challenge be received from United States, British or Dutch forces he is authorized to utilize any strength he may deem necessary for self defense.

2. Execution of details will be as directed by Chief of the Naval General Staff.

25 November 1941.

From: CinC Combined Fleet

To: First Air Fleet

(Pearl Harbor Attack Force)

The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for the dawn of X-day (exact date to be given by later order).

Upon completion of the air raid, the task force, keeping close coordination and guarding against the enemy's counterattack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan.

Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble.

25 November 1941.

From: CinC Combined Fleet

To: First Air Fleet

(Pearl Harbor Attack Force)

The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26th November and advance to 42° N. 170° E. on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete refueling.

1 December 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff

To: CinC Combined Fleet

CinC China Area Fleet

1. It has been decided to enter into a state of war between the Imperial Government on one side and the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands on the other during the first part of December.

2. The CinC Combined Fleet will destroy the enemy forces and air strength in the eastern seas at the same time will meet any attack by the enemy fleet and destroy it.

3. The CinC Combined Fleet will, in cooperation with the Commander of the Southern Army, speedily capture and hold important American and British Bases in Eastern Asia and then Dutch bases. Important strategic points will then be occupied and held.

4. CinC Combined Fleet will in case of necessity cooperate with the operations of China Area Fleet.

5. The time for activating the movements of forces in accordance with preceding articles will be given in a later order.

6. Execution of details will be as directed by Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Appendix 14

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

1 December 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC Combined Fleet

Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire, and the Netherlands. Time to start action will be announced later. The CinC Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war direct an attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian area and reduce it to impotency using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

NOTE: (The above despatch was issued by Admiral Nagano under authority delegated by Imperial Order. The commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December).

2 December 1941

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC Combined Fleet

1. CinC Combined Fleet will activate the force under his command in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Order No. 9 on and after 8 December.

2. Operations against the Netherlands will be initiated when opportunity offers after operations against the United States and Great Britain have started.

3. Executing of details will be directed by Chief of the Naval General Staff.

2 December 1941

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC Combined Fleet

The hostile action against the United States of America, the British Empire, and the Netherlands shall be commenced on 8 December. Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

2 December 1941

From: CinC Combined Fleet
To: Pearl Harbor Task Force (First Air Fleet)

Execute attack X 8 December designated as "X" day.

NOTE—(1) The decision to commence hostilities was made by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

(2) On 2 December Imperial General Headquarters issued the order establishing 8 December 1941 as the date on which hostile action was to begin.

Appendix 14

IV

The Battle of the Coral Sea

Plans

Following immediately on the initial success of their original plan of expansion into the Southern Resources Area, the Japanese embarked on a series of further advances the purpose of which was to establish a defensible outer perimeter.

The first of these expeditions planned was the capture of Port Moresby, in southeastern New Guinea, which was to form a southern outpost of the Japanese defensive system. Seizure of this location would deny to the Allies a potential base within air range of Rabaul, and would establish the Japanese in a position dominating the Northern Australia and New Guinea areas. On 30 April 1942 an occupation force with strong combatant escort departed Truk and sailed southward. Occupying Tulagi on 3 May, this force then proceeded through the Solomon Sea toward Port Moresby.

To counter this anticipated move, a United States task force built around the carriers *Lexington* and *Yorktown* entered the Coral Sea to meet the advancing Japanese, and "to destroy enemy ships, shipping, and aircraft at favorable opportunities in order to assist in checking the advances by the enemy in the New Guinea-Solomon area."

The United States Attack on Tulagi

On 4 May, immediately on receipt of intelligence of the Japanese occupation of Tulagi, *Yorktown* launched a strike group against the small occupation force in Tulagi harbor. Results were disappointing due to lack of important targets: the destroyer *Kikuzuki* and several small landing craft were sunk, the destroyer *Yuzuki* and the mine layer *Okinoshima* damaged, and a number of aircraft operating from the seaplane carrier *Kiyokawa Maru* were shot down. The damaged minelayer was subsequently sunk by a United States submarine.

The Coral Sea Battle

Throughout the 4th and 5th long-range land-based search planes unsuccessfully searched for the Japanese occupation force which was then effecting a final rendezvous in the Shortland Islands prior to the final advance on Port Moresby. On the 6th it was at last located and unsuccessfully bombed by three B-17's while on a course which indicated that it would pass through Jomard Passage, Louisiade Islands, on the next day.

While United States aircraft were searching for the Moresby invasion fleet, long-range Japanese land and sea planes based at Rabaul and in the Shortland Islands searched unsuccessfully for the United States task force, the main portion of which was operating to the southeast of the Louisiade Islands while a small supporting cruiser group proceeded independently to an area south of New Guinea in the hope of intercepting the Japanese transports.

At about 0845 on the morning of 7 May United States carrier search planes located a portion of the Japanese transport force including the aircraft carrier *Shoho* near Misma Island. This group was immediately attacked by aircraft from both *Yorktown* and *Lexington*. Dive bomb and torpedo hits sank the *Shobo* within 15 minutes of the first hit. At the same time as the attack on *Shobo*, a striking group from the Japanese carriers which were operating in support to the eastward and were as yet unlocated by the United

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

States forces, located and sank the United States destroyer *Sims* and critically damaged the fleet oiler *Ncosbo*.

Throughout the remainder of the 7th land-based aircraft both United States and Japanese searched for but failed definitely to locate the opposing carrier task forces. Early the next morning, however, the two forces located each other and simultaneously launched aircraft to attack. In the resulting exchange of blows the Japanese carrier *Shokaku* received severe damage as a result of six hits by dive bombers, while the United States suffered damage to both *Yorktown* and *Lexington*, and the latter, with uncontrollable gasoline fires and delayed fuel tank explosions had to be abandoned and sunk by United States destroyers.

At the same time that the carrier duel was being fought, a force of 12 torpedo planes with fighter escort from the 25th Air Flotilla at Rabaul attacked the detached United States cruiser force. Despite lack of air cover the cruisers beat off the attack without damage to themselves, shooting down ten of the twelve attacking torpedo planes.

Consequences of the Engagement

As a result of the loss of the *Shobo*, damage to the *Shokaku*, and heavy loss of pilots and aircraft from both their land-based and their carrier air groups, the Japanese support force was greatly reduced. For this reason the invasion force retired and the date of projected occupation was postponed to July. In June however, the disastrous losses in carrier strength suffered by the Japanese at Midway forced final abandonment of the plan to invade Port Moresby by sea. With the turning back of the Port Moresby occupation force at the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese southward expansion by sea was stopped and a base saved to the Allies which was destined to be the principal stepping stone in the Allied advance through New Guinea.

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- | | <i>Nav. No.</i> | <i>U. S. S. B. S. No.</i> |
|---|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, IJN.....
(Philippine Sea) | 3 | 32 |
| Commander Sekino | 16 | 75 |
| (Solomons and Santa Cruz) | | |
| Captain Yamaoka..... | 10 | 53 |
| (Coral Sea) | | |
| Rear Admiral Komura | 106 | 464 |
| (<i>Chikuma</i> and <i>Tone</i>) | | |

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Forces Involved

UNITED STATES

Minneapolis (CA)

Rear Admiral F. J. Fletcher

New Orleans (CA)

Astoria

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith

Chester

Portland

Yorktown

Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch

Lexington

Phelps

Capt. A. R. Early

Dewey

Farragut

Aylwin

Monaghan

Morris

Capt. G. C. Hoover

Anderson

Hammann

Russell

Support Group

Australia (CA)

Rear Admiral J. G. Grace RN

Chicago

Hobart

Perkins

Walke

JAPANESE

Kashima (OCL)

Vice Admiral Inoue (At Rabaul)

CarDiv 5

Rear Admiral Hara

Zuikaku (CV)

Sbokaku

CruDiv 5

Vice Admiral Takagi

Myoko (CA)

Haguro

Asbigara

DesDiv 27 (4 DD)

DesDiv 8 (2 DD)

Tokiwa (CM)

Kiyokawa Maru

Tobo Maru (AO)

Occupation Force

CruDiv 6 *Aoba* (CA) (F)

Kinugasa

Kako

Furutaka

CruDiv 18 *Tenryu* (F) (CL)

Tatsuta

Sobo (CVL)

1 DD

DesRon 6 *Yubari*

6 DD

Kanikawa Maru (XAV)

Tsugaru (CM)

5 AP's

SubRon 8 6 SS

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Detailed Losses

Ships

UNITED STATES

Sunk

Lexington (CV)

Necosbo (AO)

Sims (DD)

Damaged

Yorktown (CV)

JAPANESE

Sunk

Shobo (CVL)

Kikusuki (ODD)

Landing Barges (4)

Damaged

Shokaku (CV)

Okinoshima (OCL)

Yuzuki (ODD) Captain and
others killed by strafing.

Aircraft

66

80


Personnel


543

900 (about)

Appendix 16

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR





- BOMBS (13)
- ◐ TORPEDOS(7)
- ☪ A/C
- ☪ SHOT DOWN (4)

TORPEDO & BOMB HITS MADE ON SHOHO (CV) BY AIRCRAFT CARRIER TASK FORCE, CORAL SEA 7 MAY 1942. DRAWING TAKEN FROM TRANSLATED JAPANESE NAVAL DOCUMENTS.

V

The Battle of Midway

Japanese Plans

The first phase of the Pacific War, following the neutralization of the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor, consisted of the swift expansion of the Japanese Empire into the South Pacific and Southeastern Asia and the establishment of a defensive perimeter of island positions to the southeast and to the south. This phase terminated in the seizure of the Dutch East Indies and the acquisition therewith of the resources considered necessary by Japan to sustain her power and position in the Western Pacific.

Immediately after the seizure of the key objectives, the second phase commenced, in which Japan planned to seize additional outposts to guard the newly gained Empire against attack, to consolidate positions and to cut enemy supply lines. This phase included a plan to occupy Midway and the Aleutians in order to establish an outer defense line to the east and northeast of Japan. Occupation of these points was to be followed by establishment of air coverage from these bases to a radius of 1,300 miles, a radius which included the Hawaiian Islands.

The Japanese, aware of the fact that all available United States carrier strength had been present in the distant Coral Sea only three weeks before, designated 6 June 1942 as the date of occupation of Midway Island, and made the following estimate of the United States situation:

“Relying on the line determined by our initial operational advance as his first line of defense, the enemy is growing desperate to check his decline as his outer shell crumbles under our successive blows, and as India, Australia and Hawaii become directly threatened. By strengthening and giving an active role to both his aircraft in the Australian theatre and his submarines, roaming under the seas which we command, he conducts guerilla operations against us. With a striking force he reconnoitered the South and Southwest Pacific Ocean Area. Comparatively speaking, he is displaying remarkably vigorous activity. His morale was not at once shaken by his crushing defeat in the Coral Sea on 7–8 May 1942; and the last 10 days of May saw the sudden return of lively activity throughout enemy areas after our fleet sortie from Hashira Jima; he is paying singular attention to the Australian Area; the time is ripe to strike at Midway and the Aleutians.”

United States Defensive Efforts

United States forces to counter such an attack were relatively weak, but the Japanese intentions were suspected by the United States Command. Naval losses sustained at Pearl Harbor and in the Battle of the Coral Sea had not been replaced. In view of this deficiency it was decided not to commit the United States surface vessels, but instead to reduce the strength of the Japanese Fleet through attrition, prior to its arrival at the objective, by means of long-range air attack from the three carriers then steaming at top speed from the Coral Sea toward Midway. In addition, the local defenses of Midway were strengthened, a submarine cordon was established, and Marine aircraft squadrons and long-range Army and Navy search planes were concentrated at Midway.

As the Japanese Fleet advanced behind a submarine scouting line with island-based air coverage to the southward and westward, the United States Task Force took up a position to the northeast of Midway.

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

The Battle

On 1 and 2 June Midway based aircraft conducted negative searches to a distance of 800 miles to the north and west. However at 0904 3 June (plus 12 time) a patrol seaplane made the initial contact with the Occupation Force about 500 miles to the southwest of Midway. A B-17 striking group immediately took off to attack the transports but scored no hits. Shortly after midnight the same night one flying boat damaged a transport with a torpedo hit while another strafed the decks of the transport columns.

At 0545 the next morning (4 June) a flying boat reported an enemy air group heading for Midway from the northwest and shortly thereafter sighted the carriers of the enemy striking force.

All planes at Midway were immediately launched. The torpedo planes and B-26's, sent against the enemy carriers, made a heroic but unsuccessful torpedo attack while the Marine fighters, outnumbered four to one, made attempts to turn back the enemy air groups. The Japanese attack severely damaged Island installations including the aviation fuel system, and subsequent fueling operations had to be carried out by hand, thus severely handicapping air operations.

About 0830, against extremely heavy fighter opposition, shore-based Marine dive bombers conducted a bombing attack on the battleships and carriers of the Japanese striking force. Against this same overwhelming opposition an unsuccessful torpedo attack was carried out by the *Hornet* torpedo squadron. At about 1020 the *Enterprise* and *Yorktown* dive-bomber squadrons, protected by their own fighters, carried out a successful dive-bombing attack making three hits on *Soryu* which was rearming all planes preparatory to attacking the United States carriers in lieu of Midway, two hits on *Akagi*, and four on *Kaga*. When attacked, *Akagi* had 40 planes on board and *Kaga* 30; the latter sank later that afternoon as a result of fire and a delayed fuel tank explosion and at the same time the damaged *Soryu* was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine *Nautilus*.

In the meantime a second aircraft striking group was launched by the enemy including all aircraft from the as yet undamaged *Hiryu*. This group attacked the United States Task Force, scoring three bomb hits on *Yorktown* which put her flight deck out of action, and forced her withdrawal from the battle. Three days later while retiring to the eastward, *Yorktown* and the destroyer *Hammann* were sunk by torpedoes from the Japanese submarine *I-168*.

During the afternoon of the 4th, aircraft from *Hornet* and *Enterprise* located *Hiryu*, the remaining carrier of the striking force which had attempted to escape to the north, and attacked scoring six bomb hits. Damage incurred in this battle by both *Akagi* and *Hiryu* was so great that these two vessels became unnavigable and were scuttled by their crews about 0500 on the morning of the 5th.

The Japanese Retirement

As a result of the loss of all four aircraft carriers of the striking force, which deprived the invasion fleet of air support, and of a serious collision between the heavy cruisers, *Mogami* and *Mikuma* during the night of the 4th, Admiral Yamamoto ordered abandonment of the operation and retirement of all ships.

On the 5th adverse weather conditions prevented United States carrier groups from locating the retreating forces to the north and west of Midway, although a Marine dive bombing group from Midway located the crippled *Mogami* to the southwest and inflicted additional minor damage to this vessel and *Mikuma* (CA).

No further contacts were made until the next day when dive-bombers from both *Hornet* and *Enterprise* attacked and sank *Mikuma* and seriously damaged *Mogami* and the destroyer *Arashio*.

During this battle, carrier-based dive-bombers made 191 sorties obtaining 32 hits, 15 of which were the principal factors in the destruction of the First Air Fleet carrier force while the remainder sank the *Mikuma* and damaged the *Mogami* and *Arashio*. Although the B-17's of the Seventh Air Force based at

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Midway made 62 sorties for horizontal bombing attacks, testimony of Japanese survivors indicates that no hits were scored by this means. The difficulties which attend high altitude bombing of ships were well illustrated when, on the afternoon of the 6th, a flight of B-17's reported sinking a "cruiser" by an attack delivered from over 10,000 feet; in fact, the "cruiser" was a United States submarine which hastily submerged when the first bombs fell off her bow. In contrast to the more experienced carrier dive-bomber pilots the hastily assembled Marine dive-bombers made 50 bombing sorties but attained very few hits. However the manner in which the Marine attack occupied the fighter defense of the Japanese carriers on the 4th greatly contributed to the hits of the carrier bombers which came in shortly thereafter. Unfortunately both the Army and Navy torpedo attacks against the enemy were made in vain. Approaching without fighter protection, the torpedo groups were attacked and cut to pieces principally by the defending Japanese fighters before they were able to press home their attack.

Consequences of the Battle

As a result of this battle, the Japanese expansion to the east was stopped and Midway Island was saved as an important American outpost. To the Japanese this battle was disastrous. The loss of 4 of their finest aircraft carriers, together with 250 aircraft and some 100 of their first-line pilots deprived them of the powerful striking force with which they had achieved their conquests and with which they had planned to cut down United States efforts to counterattack. Battleships and seaplane tenders were withdrawn from the fleet for hasty conversion into carriers but all efforts to regain what had been lost were insufficient, and from this date the balance of power in the Pacific shifted steadily to the United States side. In view of the strategic situation at the time and the condition of United States defenses, the carrier action at Midway was perhaps the decisive battle of the war.


Bibliography

1. Detailed report of Striking Force, and First Air Fleet on Midway operations, 27 May to 9 June 1942. WDC No. 161519.
2. ONI Combat Narrative "The Battle of Midway."
3. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Interrogations:

	<i>Nav No.</i>	<i>U. S. S. B. S. No.</i>
Battle of Midway.....	1	6
Battle of Midway.....	2	11
Battle of Midway.....	4	23
Battle of Midway and Supplement.....	13	65
Aleutian Campaign.....	20	97
Battle of Midway.....	33	138
Battle of Midway.....	39	165
Japanese Naval Planning.....	43	192
Battle of Midway.....	46	195
Transports at Midway.....	60	252
Battle of Midway.....	66	295
Battle of Midway.....	83	407
Battle of Midway.....	106	464
Japanese Submarine Operations.....	108	466

I. J. N. Liaison Committee answer to Naval Analysis Division memorandum No. 14 dated 19 October 1945.


THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR



B-17 ATTACK ON MIDWAY TRANSPORTS. — 1700/3 JUNE.

PB-Y TORPEDO ATTACK ON MIDWAY TRANSPORTS.—0100/4 JUNE

The Campaigns of the Pacific War




TRACK of JAPANESE SUBMARINES
BATTLE of MIDWAY 3-7 JUNE, 1942

BATTLE OF MIDWAY

4-6 JUNE 1942

(SUBMITTED BY IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE OF TOKYO, JAPAN)




ACTION CHART OF THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY.

JUNE 5

TIME ZONE (-9)

EXTRACT FROM TRANSLATED REPORT OF ACTION
FIRST AIR FLEET STRIKING FORCE



THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Summary of Attacks Upon First Air Fleet, Striking Force, Battle of Midway

(Translation of Japanese document WDC No. 161519)

Local time (+12)	Tokyo time (-9)	Japanese report of number of attacking aircraft	Japanese report of target	Japanese report of bombs or torpedoes dropped	Japanese report of hits	Remarks (correct data when known)
4 June	5 June					
0707	0407	9 B-26's	<i>Hiryu</i>	9 T	0	4 B-26's actually attacked.
0710	0410	4 torpedo bombers	<i>Akagi</i>	3 T	0	6 VT in attack
0711	0411	4 medium bombers	<i>Hiryu</i>	4 T	0	Army-Navy.
0712	0412	9 VT	<i>Hiryu</i>	9 T	0	Midway Torpedo
0715	0415	1 VT	<i>Akagi</i>	1 T	0	Group.
0756	0456	9 medium bombers	<i>Hiryu</i>	9 B	0	
0808	0508	4 VF				
		4 VB	<i>Hiryu</i>	4 B	0	
0812	0512	6 VB	<i>Hiryu</i>	1 B	0	Midway.
0829	0529	4 medium bombers	<i>Haruna</i>	5 B	0	U. S. M. C.
0830	0530	3 VB	<i>Kaga</i>	3 B	0	
0835	0535	3 B-17's	<i>Soryu</i>	11 B	0	16 B-17's.
1020	0713	16 VTB	<i>Hiryu</i>	16 T	0	
	0725	12 VB	<i>Soryu</i>	—	3	Sank 1610/5 (-9).
	0726	3 VB	<i>Akagi</i>	3 B	2	Scuttled 0200/6 (-9).
	0730	9 VB	<i>Kaga</i>	9 B	4	Sank 1625/5 (-9) explosion of fuel tank.
	0730	5 VTB	<i>Hiryu</i>	5 T	0	

Appendix 23

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR




1703	1403	13 VB.....	<i>Hiryu</i>	13 B	4
1703	1403	13 VB.....	<i>Hiryu</i>	13 B	4	Scuttled 0210/6(—9)
	1408	2 VB.....	<i>Haruna</i>	2 B	0
	1420	3 VB.....	<i>Tone</i>	3 B	0
	1428	34 VB.....	<i>Tone</i>	34 B	0
	1432	9 VB.....	<i>Chikuma</i>	5 B	0
	1445	1 medium bomber.....	<i>Chikuma</i>	6 B	0
1810	1510	3 medium bombers.....	<i>Chikuma</i>	4 B	0	2 B-17's.
1826	1526	2 medium bombers.....	<i>Haruna</i>	3 B	0	6 B-17's.
	6 June					
	1336	4 VB.....	<i>Tanikaze</i>	5 B	0
	1507	26 VB.....	<i>Tanikaze</i>	—	0	<i>Hornet</i> and
	1545	6 VB.....	<i>Tanikaze</i>	4 B	0	<i>Enterprise</i> .

Appendix 23

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

HIRYU (CV)


5 June 1942 (-9)

Time	0407	0411	0412	0456	0508	0512	0713
Type	B-26	Med. Bombers	Torp. Bombers	Med. Bombers	Fighters Dive Bombers	Dive Bombers	Torp. Bombers
No. of A/C	9	4	9	9	4 each	6	16
Bombs dropped	9	4	9	9	4 bombs strafing	1	16 Torp.
No. of hits	none	none	none	none	none	none	none
Chart of Hits	---	---	---				Runs: 5 off stbd; 1 off port; 2 off fan-tail; 1 off stbd; 1 off bow.
Time Sunk' or Scuttled	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Location	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Remarks	1 med. bomber shot down	---	---	---	3 dive bombers shot down	3 dive bombers shot down	1 torp bomber, 2 dive bombers shot down

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

HIRYU (cont.)

5 June 1942 (-9)

Time		0730	1403
Enemy A/C	Type	Torp. Bombers	Dive Bombers
	No. of A/C	5	13
Bombs dropped		5 torps.	13
No. of hits		none	4
Chart of Hits		Runs: 3 off bow; 2 off fantail.	
Time sunk or Scuttled		----	Scuttled 6 June 1942, 0210
Location		----	31° 27.5'N, 179° 23.5'E
Remarks		2 torp. bombers shot down	2 dive bombers shot down

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

AKAGI (CV)



5 June 1942 (-9)

Time		0410	0415	0726
E n e m y A/C	Type	Torpedo Bomber	Torpedo Bomber	Dive Bomber
	No. of A/C	4	1	3
	Bombs dropped	3	1	3
No. of hits		-----	-----	2
Chart of Hits				<p>1 run-in on starboard; 2 run-in on port; 1 on port side made suicide dive</p> <p>1 run-in aft on port side and one drop at about 500m</p> <p>First bomb struck about 10m off portside of bridge Second bomb struck on edge of central elevator. (fatal hit) Third bomb struck on after edge, port side of flight deck.</p>
Time Sunk or Scuttled		-----	-----	Scuttled 6 June 1942, 0200
Location		-----	-----	30° 30' N, 178° 40' W
Remarks		3 bombers shot down, 2 by our guns	-----	-----

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

KAGA (CV)



5 June 1942 (-9)

Time		0530	0730
E n e m y A/C	Type	Dive Bombers	Dive Bombers
	No. of A/C	3	9
	Bombs dropped	3	9
No. of hits		none	4
Chart of Hits			 <p>Sank with great explosion from the fuel storage (on bomb storage) hold.</p>
Time Sunk or Scuttled		-----	Sank 5 June 1942, 1625
Location		-----	30°20.3'N, 179°17.2'W
Remarks		-----	9 Dive Bombers shot down

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

SORYU (CV)




5 June 1942 (-9)

Time		0535	0630	0725
E n e m y A/C	Type	B-17	Torpedo Bomber	Dive Bomber
	No. of A/C	3	17	12
	Bombs dropped	about 11	4 torps	----
No. of hits		none	none	3
 <p>Chart of Hits</p>		<p>2 very near misses: 1 forward and 1 off std.</p>		
Time sunk or scuttled		----	----	Sank 5 June 1942 1610
Location		----	----	30°42.5'N, 178°37.5'W
Remarks		----	10 torpedo bombers shot down (in cooperation with fighter cover	1 dive bomber shot down

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

HARUNA (BB)




5 June 1942 (-9)

Time		0529	1408	1526
E n e m y A/C	Type	Torpedo Bomber	Dive Bomber	Medium Bomber
	No. of A/C	4	2	2
	Bombs dropped	5 Strafed	2	3
No. of hits		-----	Very near misses	none
Chart of hits		 <p>2 very near misses; 3 near misses (TN:SIC)</p>		
Time sunk or Scuttled		-----	-----	-----
Location		-----	-----	-----
Remarks		-----	-----	-----

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

CHIKUMA (CA)




5 June 1942 (-9)

Time		1432	1445	1510
E n e m y A/C	Type	Dive Bombers	Medium Bombers	Medium Bombers
	No. of A/C	9	1	3
	Bombs dropped	5	6	4
No. of hits		none	none	none
Chart of hits				
Time Sunk or Scuttled		-----	-----	-----
Location		-----	-----	-----
Remarks		-----	-----	-----

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

TONE (CA)




5 June 1942 (-9)

Time		1420	1428	(TN: Illegible)
E n e m y A/C	Type	Dive Bombers	Dive Bombers	Medium Bombers
	No. of A/C	3	34	3
	Bombs dropped	3	34	3
No. of hits		none	none	none
Chart of hits				
Time sunk or Scuttled		-----	-----	-----
Location		-----	-----	-----
Remarks		-----	-----	-----

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

TANIKAZE (DD)

6 June 1942 (-9)

Time		1336	1507	1545
E n e m y A/C	Type	Dive Bomber	Dive Bomber	Dive Bomber
	No. of A/C	4	26	6
	Bombs dropped	5	----	4
No. of hits		none	very near misses	all wild
Chart of hits				 2 enemy A/C dive into sea
Time Sunk or Scuttled		----	----	----
Location		----	----	----
Remarks		----	1 Dive bomber shot down	3 dive bombers shot down

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Forces Involved

UNITED STATES

Enterprise (CV) (F)

Rear Admiral R. A. Spruance

Hornet (CV)

Pensacola (CA) (F)

Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid

Northampton (CA)

Vincennes (CA)

Minneapolis (CA)

New Orleans (CA)

Atlanta (CL)

Phelps (DD) (F)

Capt. A. R. Early

Balch (DD)

Benham (DD)

Worden (DD)

Aylwin (DD)

Monaghan (DD)

Ellet (DD)

Maury (DD)

Conyngham (DD)

Yorktown (CV) (F)

Rear Admiral F. J. Fletcher

Astoria (CA) (F)

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith

Portland (CA)

Hammann (DD) (F)

Comdr. A. E. True

Morris (DD)

Russell (DD)

Anderson (DD)

Hughes (DD)

Submarine Force

Rear Admiral R. H. English

JAPANESE (*Main Body*)

BatDiv 1:

Yamato (BB) (F)

Admiral I. Yamamoto

Mutsu

Nagato

BatDiv 2:

Ise (BB) (F)

Hyuga

Fuso

Yamasbiri

CruDiv 9:

Kitagami (F)

Oi

DesRon 3:

Sendai (CL) (F)

12 destroyers

CarDiv :

Zuibo (CVL)

No. 1 Supply Group

Naruto

Toci Maru

1 destroyer

No. 2 Supply Group

Sacramento Maru

Tora Maru

Striking Force

CarDiv 1:

Akagi (CV) (F)

Admiral C. Nagumo

Kaga (CV)

CarDiv 2:

Hiryu (CV)

Soryu (CV)

BatDiv 3:

Haruna (BB)

Kirishima (BB)

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<p><i>Cachalot</i></p> <p><i>Cuttlefish</i></p> <p><i>Dolphin</i></p> <p><i>Drum</i></p> <p><i>Finback</i></p> <p><i>Flying Fish</i></p> <p><i>Gato</i></p> <p><i>Grayling</i></p> <p><i>Greenling</i></p> <p><i>Grenadier</i></p> <p><i>Grouper</i></p> <p><i>Grouler</i></p> <p><i>Gudgeon</i></p> <p><i>Narwhal</i></p> <p><i>Nautilus</i></p> <p><i>Pike</i></p> <p><i>Plunger</i></p> <p><i>Pollack</i></p> <p><i>Pompano</i></p> <p><i>Porpoise</i></p> <p><i>Tambor</i></p> <p><i>Tarpon</i></p> <p><i>Trigger</i></p> <p><i>Trout</i></p> <p><i>Tuna</i></p> <p><i>Midway Aircraft</i></p> <p>Marine Air Group 22</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">VMF-221 28 VF</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">VMSB-240 34 VB</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">VT-8 6 TBF</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">VPB</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">14 PBV-5</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">16 PBV-5A</p>	<p>CruDiv 8:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Tone</i> (CA)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Chikuma</i> (CA)</p> <p>DesRon 10:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Nagara</i> (CL)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">16 destroyers</p> <p>No. 1 Supply Group</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Kyokoto Maru</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Sbinkoku Maru</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Tobo Maru</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Nippon Maru</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Koyuyo Maru</i></p> <p>No. 2 Supply Group</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Naichiro Maru</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Kyoci Maru</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Hoko Maru</i></p> <p><i>Occupation Force</i></p> <p>CruDiv 4:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Atago</i> (CA (F))</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Chokai</i> (CA)</p> <p>BatDiv 3:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Kongo</i> (BB)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Hiei</i> (BB)</p> <p>DesRon 4:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Naka</i> (CV)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">16 destroyers</p> <p>CruDiv 7:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Kumano</i> (CA (F))</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Suzuya</i> (CA)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Mikuma</i> (CA)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Mogami</i> (CA)</p> <p>DesRon 2:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Jintsu</i> (CL)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">12 destroyers</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">1 mine sweeper</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">1 subchaser</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">16 transports</p>
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Seventh Air Force

4 B-26

17 B-17

1500 Marines

(Sand Island)

1000 Army

(Eastern Island)

Engineers,

1 battalion

Survey,

1 battalion

50 Marines

(Kure Island)

MTB Squadron One

CarDiv 11:

Cbitose (CVS)

Tokisba

Kamikawa-Maru

1 destroyer

24th Air Flotilla (Search
from Marshall Islands)

26th Air Flotilla (Search
from Marcus Island)

Appendix 24

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Detailed Losses

Sunk

UNITED STATES
Yorktown (CV)
Hammann (DD)
Aircraft 150
Personnel 307

JAPANESE
Akagi (CV)
Kaga (CV)
Hiryu (CV)
Soryu (CV)
Mikuma (CA)
Aircraft 253
Personnel 3500

Damaged

Mogami (CA) (Major)
Arashio (DD) (Major)
Tanikaze (DD) (Minor)
Akebono Maru (Major)

Appendix 25

VI

The Aleutian Campaign

Preliminary Events and Planning

Success at Pearl Harbor was beyond Japanese expectation. The United States Pacific Fleet was immobilized by a sudden stroke of Japanese naval air power and a comparatively easy and rapid expansion to the south took place. Japanese planners realized that inevitably the war must turn to the defensive. When this occurred a strong outer perimeter of air bases from which to conduct air reconnaissance and attack, backed by a powerful fleet operating on interior lines with its own concentrated carrier-borne air power, would make the war so expensive for America that she would tire of it. Then a peace could be secured which would gain for Japan the needed resources in lands to the south, the control of China, and a strong and dominating position in East Asia.

The first United States air attack against the home islands of Japan occurred on 18 April 1942, when the planes of the Doolittle Raid took off from a carrier 600 miles east of Honshu. This token attack directed Japanese attention to the east and northeast. It added point to the argument of those Japanese planners who advocated taking advantage of the favorable situation created by the success of current operations to extend the defensive perimeter of the Empire. In 1942 the American territory nearest to the Japanese homeland was that in the Aleutian Islands. Japan's perimeter originally conceived to pass through the Kuriles, Wake, Marshalls, Bismarck Archipelago, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya and Burma was intended to be moved outward to include the Western Aleutians, Midway, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia and Port Moresby.

The plan for the Midway and Aleutian Campaign was prepared on a staff level below that of the Imperial Headquarters. It was presented in completed form to that headquarters, to the Naval General Staff, and to the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet. The Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, approved the plan and was anxious to carry it out. The Chief of the Naval General Staff initially opposed the plan, but gave way to the enthusiasm of the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, and ultimately approved it. The agreement of the Army was then secured in Imperial Headquarters and the plan became a scheduled operation.

The Aleutian and the Midway operations were intimately related. The main strength of the Japanese Fleet was to be employed in the seizure of Midway and would offer battle to the United States Pacific Fleet under one of three tactical plans, the choice of which would depend upon developments. In the north a small, but relatively powerful part of the Japanese Fleet, the Second Mobile Force, composed of two aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers, and three destroyers, would strike Dutch Harbor a paralyzing blow, while, at the other end of the Aleutian chain, the islands of Adak, Kiska, and Attu would be seized by other forces regularly attached to the Japanese Fifth Fleet.

The mission of the Fifth Fleet up to this time had been twofold: (1) "The defense and patrol of assigned area;" and (2) "Anti-Soviet security." The "assigned area" embraced the eastern seaboard of Japan including Marcus Island, Ogasawara Islands, Hokkaido, and the Kurile Islands. That "anti-Soviet security" was regarded seriously was evidenced by the fact that float planes of the *Kimikawa Maru* made an extensive photo reconnaissance of Kamchatka in January 1942. On 11 May (east longitude date) from a position 150 miles south of Kiska, the *Kimikawa Maru* supported by the light cruiser *Kiso* used her float planes to make

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a photo reconnaissance of Adak and Kiska. This was quite successful in the case of Adak, but thwarted by weather in the case of Kiska.

Apparently the Japanese overrated, rather than underrated the severity of weather in the Aleutians. It is believed that this is attributable to their experience in the Kuriles, the proximity of which to the Asiatic mainland gives them a far greater range of temperature and more severe winter weather than that experienced in the Aleutians. However, the Japanese fishing boats for a long time had been sterilizing areas of Bristol Bay of fish by their thorough methods, and these with the seal and sea-otter activities in the southern Bering Sea must have amassed for Japan very considerable meteorological and geographic information.

At any rate, the Aleutian Campaign was first planned as a reconnaissance in force. Adak was to be occupied, any United States military installations there destroyed, its harbors mined, and then the occupying force withdrawn to land on Attu. The job ashore on these two islands was to be done by the Army. Kiska was to be occupied by a naval landing force. Kiska and Attu were to be held until fall and then the occupying forces withdrawn before the onset of severe winter weather. Meanwhile the Japanese expected confirmation of their belief that these northern islands, so like their Kuriles, were unfit as bases for sustained air operations. An advantage to be derived from the seizure of islands in the Western Aleutians was that of a base for flying boats which could cover the northern half of the 1,400 miles between Adak and Midway. The barrier air patrol thus established would prevent a surprise penetration of the United States Pacific Fleet beyond the contemplated Japanese base at Midway towards the Empire. Incidentally, further carrier raids of the Doolittle variety would be made much more difficult.

The first blow in the Aleutians, the Japanese carrier attack against Dutch Harbor, was timed to be 1 day earlier than the carrier attack against Midway, thus to confuse the enemy and throw off his timing.

The Japanese Occupation

The Second Mobile Force, the principal elements of which were the two carriers *Ryujo* and *Junyo*, launched their attack against Dutch Harbor on schedule on 3 June (west longitude date). It was not considered a success by them, however, since about two-thirds of the planes turned back due to weather. Only 6 fighters and 13 carrier attack planes, all from *Ryujo*, reached the target. The force retired, refueled destroyers, and attempted to carry out the plan for the second day which called for a reconnaissance and air attack on Atka and Adak. While visibility had been the principal difficulty the first day, they found that wind and sea conditions as well as visibility were a bar to flight operations the second day. They therefore steamed towards Dutch Harbor and as wind and sea improved they launched two weather scouts. Late in the afternoon they launched against Dutch Harbor a single attack of about 32 planes flown by pilots selected for their experience. This flight reached the target and did considerable damage. The surface units of the Second Mobile Force were scouted throughout most of the second day by PBV's, and alarming attacks by B-17's and B-26's developed which, handicapped by unfavorable weather, did them no damage. Returning from the attack, the *Junyo* planes chose a rendezvous point off Umnak Island which turned out to be almost directly over a United States airfield of the existence of which the Japanese had hitherto obtained no intelligence. They here lost four planes to defending United States Fighters. The Second Mobile Force retired to cruise in a support area about 400 miles south of Kiska. It had no further contacts with United States forces. A planned interception of United States air raids against Kiska was cancelled due to weather, but two carrier scout planes reached and reconnoitered the Komandorski Islands on 13 June (east longitude date).

On the day of the second attack on Dutch Harbor, which was the day of the main engagement at Midway, two occupation forces moved up to positions from which to run in to their objectives. The first of these forces was the so-called Adak-Attu Occupation Force, and the second, the Kiska Occupation Force.

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As a result of the Japanese defeat at Midway the occupation of the Western Aleutians was cancelled by the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet. However, within about an hour, this order was countermanded and these two forces were ordered to proceed with their operations. Shortly thereafter a message was received indicating a further change in plan. The Adak occupation was cancelled and the Adak-Attu Occupation Force was directed to seize only Attu. The Kiska Occupation Force landed a battalion of naval landing force at Reynard Cove on Kiska at 1500, 6 June (150th meridian west longitude, zone plus 10, time and date). The Adak-Attu Occupation Force landed a battalion of Army troops on Attu at about 0300, 7 June (zone plus 10 time and date).

The reasoning of the Japanese Fleet commanders which occasioned the rapid cancellation, reinstatement and ultimate modification of the plan for the occupation of the Western Aleutians, is not clear. Some credence may be given to one account which states that the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, decided against the Aleutian occupation immediately upon learning of the destruction of the major carrier force at Midway, but thereafter gave way to the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Hosogaya, and ordered the occupation of just the two westernmost islands, dropping from the plan Adak which is only 300 miles west of Dutch Harbor, but retaining Kiska which is 600 miles west. Certainly there would be a great temptation to save something from the debacle at Midway, and the story in the Japanese newspapers that some American territory had been occupied would detract from any leak of the sad information on the loss of carriers in the larger battle.

It is quite evident that the Japanese High Command was concerned over the possible intervention of the United States Pacific Fleet in this token occupation of American soil, for the carrier *Zuibo* was detached from the defeated Midway force and sent up to reinforce the Second Mobile Force as the latter stood by at a discreet distance in support of Kiska. When this force returned for a rapid replenishment at Ominato during the period 22-29 June, it sortied reinforced by a fourth carrier, the *Zuikaku*, and remained in a support position until 6 July. By this time the Japanese were apparently convinced that the Americans would not accept a carrier duel in the bad visibility of summer in the Aleutians, or that the aircraft carriers of the Pacific Fleet were deploying elsewhere.

Due both to the vagaries of weather and the extreme demand for search from the Dutch Harbor area, United States air reconnaissance did not discover that an occupation of Kiska and Attu was taking place until 4 days after it had begun. The PBY's led off in the bombing of Kiska, followed by B-17's and the longer range B-24's as soon as these could be concentrated at the strip on Umnak Island. Initially this strip could be used only as a staging point, but it was expanded as rapidly as possible to the proportions of an air base. Ironically, no suitable airfield site could be found on Unalaska Island, which has two harbors but impossible terrain for an airfield. As a result the good terrain on Umnak was utilized and was served by lightering material to an indifferent beach on that island.

The initial Japanese landings on Attu and Kiska were made with combat and labor troops totalling about 1,200 men at each location. At the end of June the Kiska garrison was doubled. Antiaircraft and communication personnel were added as well as submarine base personnel and six midget submarines. About 6 September 1942 the Army troops on Attu were all moved to Kiska leaving Attu unoccupied, except for a small naval communication unit, until 30 October 1942 when the so-called Second Attu Invasion Force of Japanese Army troops was landed. Little by little the garrisons on these two islands were built up, although with extreme difficulty as the United States air and sea blockade tightened, until on Attu at the time of the United States assault, May 1943, there were 2,500 troops and on the same date at Kiska about 5,400.

Japanese air activities from their acquired bases in the Western Aleutians were beset with difficulties from the start. Fog and the swell in Kiska harbor were found to be great operational hazards. Additionally the lightly armed and unarmored float planes were no match for United States bombers and fighters. A unit

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of six Kawanishi Type 97 flying boats moved in on 8 June, but the surviving planes, only half the original number, were flown out on 15 August, when it was decided that long-range aerial reconnaissance was impractical because of enemy attacks, sea and weather at the base. Float planes continued to be brought in, however. The seaplane carriers soon found the harbor of Kiska untenable due to United States bombing, and, after being attacked even at outlying anchorages, thereafter limited their activities to flying off planes to land at Kiska or Attu from distances off shore, or to quick dashes into port with a hasty unloading in darkness or bad weather.

Expulsion of the Japanese

Having successfully seized bases in the Western Aleutians, the Japanese decided during the fall of 1942 to hold and reinforce their Aleutian outposts rather than to withdraw from that area as was originally planned. A Japanese Imperial Headquarters directive of 1 November 1942 implemented that decision with orders for the moving up of troops, the construction of defense works, and the building of airfields on Kiska and an island of the Semichi group adjacent to Attu. The then firm intention of the Japanese to hold the northern anchor of their defensive perimeter in the Aleutians was evident from the fact that the date of February 1943 was set for the completion of the tasks contained in the directive.

That the Japanese had come to the Aleutians to stay was also evident from United States reconnaissance. As United States strength was gradually built up the action against the Japanese grew from operations of attrition principally by air and submarine, but with a surface ship bombardment of Kiska on 7 August 1942 thrown in, to an advance down the Aleutian chain to secure bases closer to the Japanese. The island of Adak was occupied on 30 August 1942 and an airfield was in operation there by 13 September 1942; the island of Amchitka was occupied on 12 January 1943 and fighters operated from there on 17 February. With this extension of bases to the westward and the control of the air thus assured, United States naval surface forces augmented the blockade in early February 1943. On 19 February the United States heavy cruiser *Indianapolis* and two destroyers intercepted and sank the 3,100 ton *Akagane Maru*, enroute to Attu loaded with a platoon of troops, stores and materials for an airstrip.

With the sinking of the *Akagane Maru* the Japanese began a series of operations in which the entire strength of the Fifth Fleet, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and six destroyers, was used to escort supply ships to Attu. The first convoy run was successfully completed when the ships discharged in Holtz Bay on 10 March (east longitude date). The second convoy run was intercepted off the Komandorski Islands 27 March 1943 (east longitude date) by a much weaker United States force of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and four destroyers. In the ensuing battle, although the United States heavy cruiser and one destroyer were heavily damaged, a successful delaying action was fought and the Japanese force finally withdrew because of radio intelligence of impending air attack. While supply ships had been precariously running the air blockade into Kiska and Attu under cover of weather and darkness, the Komandorski action ended all surface ship supply to these bases.

The successful American assault and occupation of Attu against the fanatical resistance of the Japanese Army garrison took place during the period of 12–28 May 1943. During the progress of this action ashore the Japanese made three unsuccessful air raids, and attempted but gave up an evacuation, first by destroyer, then by submarine. Japanese air sorties against the United States amphibious forces at Attu were made on 14, 23 and 24 May (east longitude dates). The first two sorties were made by 19, the last by 17 twin-engined naval land-based attack planes from Paramushiro. The first sortie did not reach the target due to weather; the second dropped torpedoes but made no hits; and the last was intercepted by P-38's and driven off.

The United States amphibious assault on Attu caused a very considerable reaction in the Japanese Fleet. A concentration of major units began in Tokyo Bay about mid-May in preparation for a sortie against the United States forces at Attu. Before the Fleet sailed, however, Colonel Yamazaki in command of the Attu

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garrison announced, on 28 May, that he would make his final charge. With Attu in United States hands, and the relatively heavy concentration of United States air strength in the Aleutians, Japanese fleet operations in the north were cancelled as being of no promise.

The situation confronting the Japanese was an unhappy one. Kiska, the strong point at the north end of the Japanese perimeter, was bypassed and could no longer be supplied. Moreover, the assault and occupation of Attu might presage a further amphibious advance from the north towards Japan, and the defenses of the Kuriles were weak. The Japanese therefore decided to withdraw the Kiska garrison and absorb it in the defenses of the Kuriles. The defense of the Kuriles was to be greatly augmented.

An Imperial Headquarters directive of 21 May 1943 read, in part: "The Kiska Garrison Force will evacuate in successive stages, chiefly by submarine, as expeditiously as possible. Also, with due regard for fog conditions, and after ascertaining the enemy situation, transports and destroyers are to be used in conjunction with this movement if circumstances are favorable. Defenses of the Kuriles, Hokkaido and Karafuto are to be strengthened expeditiously. Garrison units for the Northern and Central Kuriles, now standing by in Hokkaido, as well as Hokkaido garrison units, will be moved up and deployed in the Northern and Central Kuriles. Furthermore, particular attention will be given to the strengthening of anti-aircraft and coastal batteries in the Northern Kuriles. Army and Navy air forces will be deployed immediately in the island chain to act as the backbone of defense. All air and shipping base installations will be put in order and strengthened immediately." The Army air strength to be deployed was "the major part of the First Air Division," and the Navy, "the major part of the Twelfth Air Fleet," 88 and 146 airplanes, respectively.

After a costly attempt to evacuate the Kiska garrison by submarine, in which 3 of the large undersea craft were sunk, it was decided to employ light cruisers and destroyers, utilizing the thick fog of the summer as cover to prevent the detection and destruction of the evacuating force. Accordingly light units of the Japanese Fifth Fleet sortied from Paramushiro on 7 July 1943 and stood by about 400 miles southwest of Kiska awaiting favorable weather until they were forced by lack of fuel to return to Paramushiro, where they arrived on 18 July. Sortieing again on 22 July, a successful dash was made into Kiska Harbor on 29 July (east longitude date) by two light cruisers and 10 destroyers. After a brief visual landfall at the southwest end of Kiska Island at 1105 (Tokyo time) this force circumnavigated the north end of the island at high speed in thick fog. Hugging the shoreline, the navigation was by soundings, radio bearings, and indifferent radar information. The force anchored at 1350, embarked approximately 5,100 troops, got underway at 1435 and, dividing into two groups, departed by approximately the same route they had followed coming in. Outbound, the light cruiser *Abukuma*, leading one of the groups, sighted a submarine off the northwest coast of Kiska. This was the only contact with United States forces made by any of the Japanese ships.

The day on which the Japanese evacuated the Kiska garrison, a strong United States task group was absent from its patrol southwest of Kiska Island engaged in fueling. A close in patrol by submarine was in effect. A single destroyer patrol on a radius of 40 miles from the island had been removed on 24 July, east longitude date, and was not again activated until 30 July. Air searches were in effect, but were hampered by fog. Ashore the Japanese preparations for evacuation were interpreted as a redeployment for defense. United States air and surface ship bombardments were continued after the Japanese evacuation. On 16 August (east longitude date) an assault landing was made on Kiska by elements of United States and Canadian troops, the total number of which comprised 34,000 men. The Japanese had escaped from Kiska.

Pressure on the Kuriles

With Kiska occupied by the United States, the war in the north settled down to one of attrition by submarine against the Japanese, minor air raids, air reconnaissance, and minor surface ship raids against shipping and Japanese bases in the Kuriles.

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On 5 August 1943 the Japanese Northeast Area Fleet was organized, comprised of the Fifth Fleet and Twelfth Air Fleet. The Commander in Chief, Northeast Area Fleet was charged with the defense of the Kuriles Area and given tactical command of local base forces. An Imperial Headquarters Directive of 30 September 1943 stated, "The object of Northeast Area Operations is to smash the oncoming enemy and to defend the Kuriles, Hokkaido, and other integral parts of the Empire. Simultaneously, and insofar as possible, enemy strength in the Aleutians is to be whittled down." Despite the last statement Japan was on the defensive in the Kuriles, and desperately concerned over an amphibious advance from that direction against the Empire. In November 1943 an estimated 262 airplanes were in Hokkaido and the Kuriles, in about equal numbers for the Army and Navy. Air activity was confined to defensive fighter patrols and anti-submarine patrols except for a few Attu reconnaissance missions. Also one attack mission against Attu was conducted on 10 October 1943 by naval twin-engined land-based attack planes. Air strength in the Hokkaido-Kuriles Area in the summer of 1944 was approximately 500 planes. By the spring of 1945 practically all air strength had been withdrawn from the Kuriles except for about 18 Army fighter planes on Paramushiro and 12 Navy dive-bombers divided between Shimushu and Etorofu.

An index to the importance which Japan attached to the defense of the Kuriles is indicated in the number of Army troops deployed there. From 14,200 men in late 1943 the garrisons were increased to a total of 41,000 men in mid 1944 and decreased to 27,000 men in 1945. These men were Japan's answer to the threat of United States invasion from the North via the Aleutians. The men were not in action, except in defense against harassing air raids, or against sporadic shore bombardment by light United States naval forces. However, they were required to maintain their defensive positions and hence were unavailable for combat assignment elsewhere. Moreover, their supply and movement afforded excellent shipping targets for aggressive United States submarines. This resulted in a heavy loss of ships to Japan as well as a loss at sea of about 10 percent of the total personnel deployed to the islands.

Comments and Conclusion

The Aleutian campaign in its two phases, consisting first of the Japanese expansion into and expulsion from the Western Aleutians, and second of the operations of holding and attrition against the forces in the Kuriles, was in true perspective a minor part in the war against Japan. However, it had results, both tangible and intangible, which deserve to be recorded.

Foremost among the tangible results was the direct loss to Japan of ships, aircraft, personnel, equipment and materials. This loss was relatively small, but not insignificant to a nation which had to fight an economical war. Japan salvaged nothing from what she put ashore in Attu and Kiska except approximately 5,100 men less their equipment from the latter island. In Western Aleutian operations she lost three destroyers sunk and four heavily damaged, five submarines sunk, and nine cargo transport ships sunk. Of these, air attack accounted for one destroyer sunk, two severely damaged, two submarines sunk, and seven cargo transport ships sunk. Nothing has been found to date upon which an accurate report of Japanese air losses can be based. Estimates shown in appended exhibits indicate 7 planes lost in the carrier raid on Dutch Harbor, 60 from those water-based at Kiska and Attu during the Japanese period of occupancy, and an undetermined number in the Kuriles. Equally vague was the information on personnel killed. Of particular interest in this study were those killed in air raids on Kiska. From interrogations this is estimated to be between 5 and 7 percent of the garrison over the period of occupation of 1 year and 2 months, a disappointing total in view of the United States attempt to bomb the Japanese out. Another but less evident tangible result was the absorption in the northern theater of operations of parts of the military strengths of the opposing powers, commitment of forces to this theater which prevented their use elsewhere. Covered by a short initial effort involving a part of the Japanese fleet, represented by the employment of two aircraft carriers in early June, four by the end of that month, and terminating with the withdrawal of fleet support

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on 7 July 1942, the Japanese put ashore garrisons on Kiska and Attu. The maximum combined strength of these garrisons at any time was about 8,500 men, yet the United States gathered together a landing force of 34,500 men by July 1943 in order to expel the Japanese from their holdings. Such is the disproportion of forces required to wrest the initiative from a small but aggressive nation which has made quick early gains against a powerful but unprepared opponent. When Japan fell back upon the Kuriles this disparity of forces was no longer in her favor. She then had to deploy a far greater fraction of her total men under arms against the threat of invasion from the north than did the United States to hold a reestablished frontier and to conduct sufficient operations to ensure the semblance of threat. Compounding the ill effect upon Japan, the highly trained United States amphibious troops, experienced and hardened in the Aleutians, were employed in the Central Pacific to speed the advance toward the heart of the Empire over an alternate route the choice of which lay with the side having the initiative. The air situation was analogous.

The intangible results of the Aleutian Campaign may be said to have been its effect upon national morale and the lessons afforded to the military. The shortest distance between the United States and Japan is through the Aleutian Islands. The great circle route from Seattle to Tokyo is 1,200 miles shorter than that from San Francisco through Honolulu to Tokyo. The seizure of American territory in Attu and Kiska was given great emphasis in the Japanese press. It colored Japanese propaganda where it was flaunted as an example of the prowess of Japanese arms and of the uselessness of attempting to interfere with Japan's assumption of her sphere of influence in Asia. In the American press the attack against Dutch Harbor was compared to that against Pearl Harbor and an immediate and complete public release of damage was demanded. Japanese expansion into the Aleutians gave rise to popular clamor in the United States for their expulsion at all cost. American rejoicing over the victory at Midway was tempered by dark foreboding over the possibility of an invasion of Alaska. It may be said, however, that in overall effect on the course of the Pacific War Japanese initial successes in the Aleutians served only to heighten the resolve of the American people and to further mislead public opinion and generate false confidence within Japan.

To be mentioned among the intangible results of the Aleutian Campaign was its effect upon the probable participation of Russia in the Pacific War. Russia was an ally of the United States in Europe and a potential ally in the Pacific. The probability of Russia's commencing hostilities against Japan depended in some degree upon the possibility of assistance reaching her by seaborne transport. An air route via Nome was in operation and over it was ferried a large number of lend-lease aircraft. The water route passed through the Aleutians and the Kuriles. In order to facilitate a future entry of Russia into the war against Japan it was necessary to secure this water route, which was done to the extent of expelling the Japanese from the Aleutians and weakening and containing their forces in the Kuriles.

The military lessons of the Aleutian campaign were of considerable moment. The paucity of United States naval forces in June 1942 caused orders to be given to the task force commander to operate cautiously under the concept of calculated risk; he was not to hazard his surface fleet unless assured of a disproportionately large return in damage to the enemy. These were difficult orders indeed. He elected to deploy the major portion of his destroyers to hiding places in the fjords of islands around Dutch Harbor so that they might execute a night torpedo attack if the opportunity offered. The principal naval surface ship strength was held in waters south of Kodiak, almost certainly out of reach of the Japanese but equally beyond range of any promising quarry. The defense of the Aleutians and Alaska was entrusted to air for which there was the Eleventh Army Air Force of 6 heavy bombers, 20 medium bombers, and 32 fighters, and a Navy patrol wing of 20 amphibious flying boats. At the time of the Dutch Harbor raid the Japanese Second Mobile Force was found and attacked, but no damage done to any surface ships. When the occupation of Kiska was discovered, orders were given to bomb the Japanese out. The impracticability of this effort was evident from the course of subsequent events. With thrice the original air strength and two air bases as close as 60 and 200 miles respectively from Kiska, air effort alone did not suffice to drive the Japanese from their

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honeycomb defense. Although blockaded by air and sea, the Japanese held their much bombed island outpost, Kiska, until it was outflanked by the amphibious assault and capture of Attu.

Early experience in the Aleutian campaign also developed clearly the disadvantages of the northern short route to Japan. The prevalence of fog in the summer and great storms in the winter was known, but the effect on air operations was not fully appreciated. Significant was the ratio of total theater loss to combat loss in aircraft of the Eleventh Air Force. This ratio was 6.5 to 1, as against 3 to 1 for an average of all Pacific theaters. Reflected in it were unusual hazards due to weather,—visibility at base, icing, storm damage, poor maintenance, condition of the runways,—and the hazard of operating from a sparse number of airfields strung along a single line of islands which paralleled the direction of the target. Significant also was the number of days upon which successful bombing missions could be flown: for a period of 19 days, 11–30 June 1942, during the early attempt to bomb the Japanese out of Kiska, only six successful heavy bombing missions were completed. Likewise in the critical period of the Attu occupation, weather permitted air bombardment and support on only 9 out of 20 days.

Much was learned in the art of building airfields. In an atmosphere of secrecy and urgency two airfields were built in the vicinity of Dutch Harbor in late winter of 1941–42 and spring of 1942. Completed in 4 months' time by Army engineers these fields were used to great advantage when the Japanese attacked. However, in the move to Adak a field was made on this barren island in only 15 days. In the dead of winter on the island of Amchitka, a fighter strip was in operation a little over a month after the initial landing. Certainly the Aleutians ranked high as a school for the rapid building of air fields.

With prevailing bad visibility the Aleutians early became an experimental and proving ground for airborne search radar. The British ASV equipment, hastily manufactured in the United States, was installed in the search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four beginning in March 1942. By the date of the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor all the flying boats of that wing were equipped with it. Assisted by this device, search planes were able to locate the Japanese Second Mobile Force, and, in at least one instance, to avoid contact with the Japanese fighter patrols. It enabled the weakly armed boats to conduct aerial search in darkness and poor visibility, conditions favorable to their defense. Also, in an area so poorly equipped with radio aids, the importance of radar in providing navigational fixes and in permitting instrument letdowns cannot be overemphasized. Without radar the effectiveness of air search would have been reduced to practically nothing. Without it the Japanese gave up as ineffective their flying boat searches from Kiska. Later in the campaign, radar was made to serve yet another purpose when Ventura search land planes led blind bombing attacks over Kiska.

Unique in the naval history of the Pacific war, the Aleutian campaign provided at the Komandorski battle the only conventional daylight gun duel between opposing surface forces in which air attack was not made. The Japanese had airborne at the scene of the battle one ship-based reconnaissance plane; the United States none. Yet with victory almost in their hands and a United States heavy cruiser seriously damaged and at one time stopped dead in the water, the Japanese broke off the action for an important, if not governing, reason: fear of imminent air attack. Failure to conduct an air attack is a dark chapter in the United States air effort. The bombers, both heavy and medium, were delayed several hours because they found it necessary to change their bomb load from one of demolition against Kiska to one appropriate for employment against warships. When they arrived at the scene of battle, the Japanese surface fleet had withdrawn and was beyond range.

Despite the fact that the area is one of the most unsuitable in the world for air operations due to weather and terrain, aircraft played a dominant role in the North Pacific as they did in all theaters of the war against Japan. The opening blow of the campaign was struck against Dutch Harbor by carrier aircraft of the Japanese Fleet. The first counterblow against the occupation of Kiska was struck by United States flying boats and bombers. The first amphibious moves to the westward were for the purpose of securing

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airfields so that added pressure from the air might be applied against Japanese holdings. In later stages of the war aircraft maintained a steady though relatively small effort against the Kuriles in order to maintain, in conjunction with submarine patrols and surface ship sweeps, the attrition of shipping and the threat to Japan from the north.


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
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Summary of Air Effort

Japanese Attack on Dutch Harbor, 3 and 4 June 1942

	Japanese		United States	
	Available	Lost	Available	Lost
Fighters	20	1	32	2
Light bombers.....	36	5 ¹
Medium Bombers.....	20	1
Heavy bombers.....	6	1
Flying boats.....	20	4
Float planes.....	6	1
Total.....	62	7	78	8

¹(4VB, 1VT)

Results at Dutch Harbor:

Casualties 43 killed, 50 wounded.

Destroyed..... 4 oil tanks and 20,000 barrels of fuel oil, 2 barracks, 4 huts, one 20 mm. gun and emplacement, one Navy flying boat (PBX-5A) destroyed on the ground.

Damaged..... 1 barracks ship (S. S. *Northwestern*), 1 warehouse, 1 hangar.

No damage to ships of the Japanese Second Mobile Force.

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Summary of Air Effort

Against Kiska and Attu 10 June 1942-15 August 1943

	Japanese		United States			Total
	Available	Lost	Available 4-21-43	Combat and Antiaircraft	Opera- tional	
Fighters	128	18	108	126
Light bombers	0	2	2
Medium bombers	30	7	18	25
Heavy bombers	24	10	22	32
Patrol planes (land and sea)	6	54	5	34	39
Float planes	54	?	1	?	1
Total .	?	60	236	41	184	225

Japanese estimate of personnel killed:

Air	About 150 Navy.
Sea	About 1,000 Navy.
Land.....	About 200 Navy, about 250 Army, plus 2,351 Army in the United States occupation of Attu.

Japanese ships sunk:

By air	One destroyer— <i>Oboro</i> . One submarine— <i>Ro-65</i> . Seven cargo and transport ships— <i>Nissan Maru</i> , 6,537 tons, <i>Nojima Maru</i> , 7,189 tons, <i>Bornco Maru</i> , 3,110 tons, <i>Montreal Maru</i> , 6,577 tons, <i>Kotobira Maru</i> , 6,101 tons.
Otherwise	Two destroyers— <i>Arare</i> , <i>Nenobi</i> , both by submarines. Four submarines— <i>Ro-61</i> (air assist), <i>I-9</i> , <i>I-31</i> , <i>I-7</i> , all by surface ship. Two cargo and transport ships— <i>Kano Maru</i> , 8,572 tons, by submarine; <i>Akagane Maru</i> , 3,121 tons, by cruiser and destroyer gunfire.

Japanese Navy ships heavily damaged:

By air	Two destroyers— <i>Hibiki</i> , <i>Hatsubaru</i> .
Otherwise	Two destroyers— <i>Kasumi</i> , <i>Shiranubi</i> , both by submarine torpedo.

Additionally various Japanese small craft varying in size from net tenders and patrol craft down to landing boats were lost. United States submarine sinkings away from the vicinity of the Aleutians are not included.

Appendix 29

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Summary of Air Effort

For the War in the North Pacific 7 December 1941 - 15 August 1945

Eleventh Army Air Force:

Aircraft attack missions flown	7,318
Tons of bombs dropped	4,331
Aircraft lost in air combat	39
Total aircraft lost due to enemy action	63
Total aircraft lost in the theater	409
Japanese aircraft claimed destroyed, air and ground	113

Navy Fleet Air Wing Four (Land and Water Based):

Aircraft attack missions flown	704
Tons of bombs dropped	295
Aircraft lost in air combat.....	16
Total aircraft lost due to enemy action	35
Total aircraft lost in the theater.....	(?)
Japanese aircraft claimed destroyed, air and ground.....	5

NOTE—Aircraft search missions flown, the primary employment for Fleet Air Wing Four, are not summarized.

Navy Carrier Aircraft (U. S. S. Nassau at Attu, May 1943):

Aircraft attack missions flown	86
Tons of bombs dropped	4
Aircraft lost in air combat	0
Total aircraft lost	7
Japanese aircraft claimed destroyed, air and ground	0

NOTE—*Nassau* was engaged in providing fighter cover for amphibious and support force, and close support of ground troops in the Attu operation, May 1943. Weather and terrain made flying exceedingly hazardous.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Chronological Summary of Japanese Warships Sunk or Heavily Damaged in the North Pacific

7 December 1941 - 15 August 1945

(All dates are east longitude dates)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>Results and Remarks</i>
6-12-42	<i>Hibiki</i>	Destroyer	Heavily damaged by near bomb misses off bow by PBY. Steaming possible at reduced speed. Accompanied by destroyer <i>Akatsuki</i> arrived Ominato about 26 June 1942.
7-5-42	<i>Nenobi</i>	Destroyer	Sunk by submarine torpedo. Attacked off Agattu Island by U. S. S. <i>Triton</i> , struck from abaft starboard beam by one torpedo, capsized in 2 minutes, sank in 5. Survivors, 20-30; about 200 lost. Survivors picked up by <i>Inazuma</i> .
7-5-42	<i>Arare</i>	Destroyer	Sunk by submarine torpedo. Attacked just outside Kiska Harbor by U. S. S. <i>Growler</i> . Hit by one torpedo, broke up and sank. This destroyer together with <i>Kasumi</i> and <i>Shiranubi</i> , after escorting <i>Argentina Maru</i> and <i>Chiyoda</i> into Kiska Harbor with reinforcements for Navy garrison, stood out but because of fog anchored off Salmon Lagoon where they were attacked by the <i>Growler</i> .
7-5-42	<i>Kasumi</i>	Destroyer	Heavily damaged by submarine torpedo. Attacked as above, bow was broken and hung down at about 30° angle. Bow was later cut off and ship was towed to Maizuru arriving about 1 August 1942.
7-5-42	<i>Shiranubi</i>	Destroyer	Heavily damaged by submarine torpedo. Attacked as above. Missed by first torpedo, hit by second. Hull broken just abaft forward stack. Patched and braced and towed back to Maizuru arriving about 1 August 1942.
9-1-42	<i>Ro-61</i>	Submarine	Sunk by destroyer depth charges and gunfire. <i>Ro-61</i> torpedoed U. S. S. <i>Casco</i> in Nazan Bay, Atka Island, 31 August 1942 (ELD), ran aground trying to go north around Atka. Sighted, bombed and strafed as it surfaced by PBY (Lt. S. E. Coleman, VP-42), bombed by second PBY (Lt. C. H. Amme, VP-43). Damaged, it was depth charged and forced to surface by U. S. S. <i>Rcid</i> , sunk by gunfire. Five of crew survived and were made prisoners of war.

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Date	Name	Class	Results and Remarks
9-28-42	<i>Ro-65</i>	Submarine	<i>Sunk</i> in Kiska Harbor. <i>Bombed</i> by B-24, Japanese claimed lost by accident. (Mishandling after bomb damage?)
10-17-42	<i>Oboro</i>	Destroyer	<i>Sunk</i> off North Kiska Island by <i>bombs</i> from 6 B-26's. Sank at 1235 (—9), 17 survivors. One B-26 (2d Lt. J. Pebworth, 11th A. A. F.) was shot down in this attack. <i>Oboro</i> was carrying supplies to Kiska.
10-17-42	<i>Hatsubaru</i>	Destroyer	<i>Heavily damaged</i> by <i>bombs</i> from B-26's in same attack which sank <i>Oboro</i> . <i>Hatsubaru</i> was escorting <i>Oboro</i> . <i>Hatsubaru</i> received one direct hit which destroyed rudder, but proceeded under own power to Kakumabetsu, 4 men killed, 14 injured.
6-11-43	<i>I-9</i>	Submarine	<i>Sunk</i> 40 miles northeast of Shemya Island by <i>ramming</i> by U. S. S. <i>PC-487</i> .
6-14-43	<i>I-31</i> (<i>I-24</i>)	Submarine	<i>Sunk</i> off Sirius Point, Kiska Island by <i>depth charges</i> from U. S. S. <i>Frazier</i> . War Diary of Japanese 1st Destroyer Squadron refers to this loss as being the <i>I-24</i> .
6-23-43	<i>I-7</i>	Submarine	<i>Beached and sunk</i> in vicinity of Twin Rocks, Kiska Island, as result of gunfire from U. S. S. <i>Monaghan</i> . Conning tower of this submarine was holed as it stood in to Gertrude Cove. It went in, unloaded, and was again attacked as it stood out. Damaged, it was beached east of Gertrude Cove. About 40 survivors reached shore.
4-27-44	<i>I-180</i>	Submarine	<i>Sunk</i> in 55° 10' N. 155° 40' W. off <i>Kodiak</i> by <i>depth charges</i> of U. S. S. <i>Gilmore</i> . This sinking was not precisely confirmed by available Japanese sources, but is believed correct.
5-31-44	<i>Isbigaki</i>	Gunboat	<i>Sunk</i> in 48° 28' N. 151° 30' E. by <i>Submarine torpedo</i> .
3-16-44	<i>Shirakumo</i>	Destroyer	<i>Sunk</i> in 42° 18' N. 145° 11' E. off Erimo Cape, Hokkaido by <i>submarine torpedo</i> .
7-7-44	<i>Hachijo</i>	Escort	<i>Heavily damaged</i> in Kataoka Wan by <i>air attack</i> . Serious damage to hull, auxiliary engine room flooded.
6-22-45	<i>Kasado</i>	Gunboat	<i>Heavily damaged</i> near Otaru, West Hokkaido by <i>submarine torpedo</i> . Bow was broken off, temporary repairs completed 26 July 1945.

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*Chronological Summary of United States Ships Sunk or Heavily
Damaged in the North Pacific*

(All dates are west longitude dates)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>Results and Remarks</i>
6-4-42	<i>Northwestern</i>	Barracks ship	Damaged by fire after direct hit by bomb in Japanese carrier aircraft attack on Dutch Harbor.
6-19-42	<i>S-27</i>	Submarine	Grounded on Amchitka Island. Destroyed on 10 July, to avoid falling into Japanese hands.
7-14-42	<i>Arcata</i>	Army transport	Sunk by Japanese submarine gunfire. 53° 41' N. 157° 45' W.
7-30-42(?)	<i>Grunnion</i>	Submarine	Missing, presumed sunk by destroyer depth charge.
8-30-42	<i>Casco</i>	Small seaplane tender.	Torpedoed by Japanese submarine <i>Ro-61</i> , one engine room destroyed, beached, subsequently floated, repaired and returned to service, 5 killed.
12-27-42	<i>Wasmuth</i>	Destroyer mine sweeper.	Sunk by accident — own depth charge — off Scotch Cap, Unimak Is. None killed.
1-12-43	<i>Worden</i>	Destroyer	Grounded and sank at entrance to Constantine Harbor, Amchitka.
1-13-43	<i>Arthur Middleton</i>	Transport	Grounded by storm, Constantine Harbor, Amchitka Is. Refloated 1-31-43.
3-26-43	<i>Salt Lake City</i>	Heavy cruiser	Damaged by cruiser gunfire in Komandorski action. Some flooding, list, and impairment of speed.
3-26-43	<i>Bailey</i>	Destroyer	Heavily damaged by cruiser gunfire in Komandorski action. One engine room flooded, various holes in hull and machinery derangements.
5-12-43	<i>Perida</i>	Transport	Holed by pinnacle rocks, beached in Massacre Bay; forward holds flooded. Later refloated.
7-20-43	<i>Dellwood</i>	Army cable layer.	Foundered off Massacre Bay, Attu, after striking pinnacle rock near Alexai Point. No personnel lost.
8-18-43	<i>Abner Read</i>	Destroyer	Heavily damaged probably by a mine during Kiska landings. Stern blown off, but towed to base. One dead, 70 missing, 34 injured.

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Translation of Japanese Report of Activities and Losses in the Kuriles

*Translation of Reply to U. S. S. B. S. Nav Memo 26 as Submitted by Japanese Navy
General Headquarters Tokyo, 22 November 1945*

Dates and Times of Japanese Aleutian Air Sorties Originating in the Kuriles

Date	Time	Number and Type of Planes	Mission	Sortie Area
9 June 1942	Not indicated	2 flying boats	Cooperate in Aleutians Strategy	Advanced to Kiska.
14 May 1943	0800	19 land-based attack planes	Attack (impossible to complete due to bad weather)	Attu Island.
23 May 1943	0555	19 land-based attack planes	Attack	Attu Island.
24 May 1943	0645	17 land-based attack planes	Attack	Attu Island.
25 Aug. 1943	Not indicated	? land-based attack planes	Reconnaissance	Western Aleutians.
2 Sept. 1943	Not indicated	? land-based attack planes	Reconnaissance	Western Aleutians.
29 Sept. 1943	Not indicated	? land-based attack planes	Reconnaissance	Attu Island
14 Oct. 1943	1500	8 land-based attack planes	Attack	Attu Island

*Damage to Installations, Shipping and Aircraft in the Kuriles
Resulting from American Air Raids*

Date	Time	Place of damage	No. and type of attacking planes	Damage	Notes
12 Aug. 1943	A. M.	Paramushiro	3 B-24's	3 airfield barracks knocked down; 33 men killed.	
3 Sept. 1943	0915	Paramushiro	12 B-25's	Slight damage to the <i>Teisbo Shima Maru</i> (2,742 tons) as well as one 4,000-ton vessel.	
21 Jan. 1944	0240	Shimushu, Paramushiro.	Several flying boats.	Slight damage.	
14 Mar. 1944	2125	Shimushu, Paramushiro.	10 twin engine planes.	1 intercepting night fighter missing.	
30 May 1944	0935	At sea, East of the Kuriles.	Flying boat	<i>Shinyo Maru</i> (patrol ship) sunk.	

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Date	Time	Place of damage	No. and type of attacking planes	Damage
				Notes
30 May 1944	P. M.	At sea, East of the Kuriles.	Flying boat	No. 3 <i>Showa Maru</i> (patrol ship) sunk.
31 May 1944	At sea, East of the Kuriles.	Flying boat	Enemy planes repeatedly attacked Naval vessels, sinking three and severely damaging three others.
24 June 1944	2215	Northern Kuriles	Not known	2 land attack planes destroyed by fire, 1 moderately damaged. Some fuel lost by fire.
19 Aug. 1944	1120	Shimushu	2 B-24's	No. 4 picket boat div. received bomb hits.
20 Aug. 1944	1130	Northern Kuriles	Several flying boats.	2 intercepting type Zero fighters missing.
27 Aug. 1944	0924	Shimushu	Not Known	1 fishing boat sunk.
5 Sept. 1944	0600	Shimushu	2 B-24's	2 buildings on shore damaged.
11 Jan. 1945	1051	Paramushiro	3 B-24's	Aircraft installations received bomb hits.
12 Jan. 1945	0945 1005	Paramushiro	5 B-25's 4 B-24's	2 buildings on shore destroyed.
25 Jan. 1945	0920	Paramushiro	4 flying boats 4 B-25's	13 machine gun batteries damaged.
5 June 1945	1200	Shimushu	2 B-24's	1 ammunition warehouse destroyed.
8 June 1945	1200	Shimushu	3 B-24's	1 unescorted vessel sunk, 2 slightly damaged 12 men killed.
18 June 1945	1230	Northern Kuriles	2-3 B-24's	Motor-powered sailboats strafed, 1 destroyed by fire, 1 unable to navigate.
24 June 1945	1425	Matsuwa	2 B-24's	1 land attack plane slightly damaged, 2 Army fighters heavily damaged, 4 moderately damaged, 3 slightly damaged.
11 July 1945	0500	Paramushiro	6 B-24's	2 buildings destroyed.

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Damage to Installations, Shipping and Aircraft in the Kuriles Resulting from Attacks by American Vessels

Date	Time	Place of damage	Damage
24 July 1942	1415	Etorofu Island	4 small vessels sunk by submarines the <i>Hiaki Maru</i> (342 tons), the <i>Kojima Maru</i> (134 tons), the <i>83 Shinsei Maru</i> (63 tons), and one other.
11 June 1943	1446	Paramushiro Island	<i>Kotake Maru</i> (5,228 tons) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
28 Feb. 1944	1540	Paramushiro Island	<i>Kaiko Maru</i> (3,548 tons) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
2 Mar. 1944	2315	West of Uruppu Island.	<i>Akasbizan Maru</i> (4,541 tons) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
3 May 1944	Not Known	West of Uruppu Island.	<i>Fushimi Maru</i> (4,935 tons) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
31 May 1944	1130	70 miles West of Matsuwa Island.	<i>Isbigaki</i> (PG) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
31 May 1944	1205	West of Matsuwa Island.	<i>Madorasu Maru</i> (3,802 tons) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
1 June 1944	0746	Matsuwa Island	<i>Iwaki Maru</i> (3,124 tons) and <i>Hifuri Maru</i> (4,366 tons) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
13 June 1944	2135	150 miles West of Paramushiro.	<i>Takashima Maru</i> (5,633 tons) moderately damaged by submarine torpedo attack.
14 June 1944	0000	Matsuwa Island	Bombardment, lasting one hour, 2-4 CA's and 8 DD's which approached through fog. Slight damage.
9 July 1944	1000	North of Shimushu	<i>Taipei Maru</i> (6,284 tons) sunk by submarine torpedo attack.
22 Nov. 1944	1742 1754		Bombardment by 6 light support craft, damage not clear, but slight.
12 June 1945	1815 1945	Northern Kuriles	Bombardment directed against Matsuwa Island at 1815 hours and against Paramushiro Island at 1945 hours. One small craft destroyed by fire off Paramushiro at 1917 hours, but full details not known.
26 June 1945	Not Known	Onnekotan Offing	Attack, lasting 1½ hours, by 3 surface craft and 1 submarine (surfaced) against the surface craft attached to the 8th Kuriles Defense Unit. The <i>Kusunoki Maru</i> and the Subchasers Nos. 73 and 206 sunk.
22 July 1945	1945 2005	Paramushiro Island	Bombardment by 7 surface craft, slight damage.

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Damage Due to Operational Hazards

Date	Time	Place of damage	Damage
16 July 1942	0440	Onnekotan Straits	<i>Sbumagawa Maru</i> ran aground, slight damage.
17 July 1942	Not Clear	Onnekotan Straits	Due to the difficulty of assisting the <i>Sbumagawa Maru</i> , the <i>Ishigaki</i> , which went in to take her off, was driven aground by heavy waves, suffering light water damage.

Appendix 33

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Organization of Japanese Forces for the Occupation of the Western Aleutians 1 June 1942

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet—Admiral Yamamoto

Northern Force, Commander in Chief Fifth Fleet, (Vice Admiral Hosogaya, Moshiro; Chief of Staff, Capt. Nakazawa, Tasuku):

Nachi, *Flagship*, (Capt. Kiyota, Takahiko): 1 heavy cruiser.

2d Section, Destroyer Division 21: 2 destroyers.

Second Mobile Force, Commander Carrier Division 4 (Rear Admiral Kakuda, Kakuji):

Carrier Division 4:

Ryujo, *Flagship*, (Capt. Kato, Tadao).

Junyo, (Capt. Ishii, Geito): 2 aircraft carriers.

Second Section, Cruiser Division 4:

Takao, *Maya*: 2 heavy cruisers.

Destroyer Division 7:

Ushio, *Oboro*, *Akebono*: 3 destroyers.

Oiler, *Taiyo Maru* (later the *Tobo Maru*): 1 oiler.

Adak-Attu Occupation Force, Commander 1st Destroyer Squadron (Rear Admiral Omori, Sentaro; Chief of Staff Comdr. Arichika, Rokuji):

1st Destroyer Squadron, less 3 divisions:

Abukuma, *flagship*: 1 light cruiser.

Destroyer Division 21:

Wakaba, *Hatsushimo*, *Nenobi*, *Hatsubaru*: 4 destroyers.

Kinugasa Maru with Army North Seas detachment embarked (301st Independent Infantry Battalion, Maj. Hozumi, Masatoshi, approximately 1,200 men): 1 transport.

Magane Maru: 1 mine layer.

Kiska Occupation Force, Commanding Officer of Kiso (Capt. Ohno, Takeji):

21st Cruiser Division:

Kiso, *Tama*: 2 light cruisers.

22d Cruiser Division (less two auxiliary cruisers):

Asaka Maru: 1 converted light cruiser.

Destroyers:

3 from 27th Division, 2 from 6th Division: 5 destroyers.

Hakusan Maru, with No. 3 Maizuru Special Naval Landing Force embarked (about 550 men, Lt. Comdr. Mukai, Nifumi, Landing Force Commander): 1 transport.

Kumagawa Maru, with about 700 labor troops embarked: 1 transport.

Kaiho Maru, *Shunkotsu Maru*, *Hakubo Maru*: 3 gunboats.

Subchaser Division 13: 7 or 8 subchasers.

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Submarine Force, Commander 1st Submarine Squadron.

1st Submarine Squadron: *I-9* flagship.

Submarine Division 4: *I-25*, *I-26*; Submarine Division 2: *I-15*, *I-17*, *I-19*: 5 submarines.

Seaplane Force:

Kimikawa Maru and attached float planes: 1 seaplane carrier; 14 float planes; 1 destroyer.

Escort: *Sbiokaze*.

Base Air Force, Commanding Officer of Flying Boat Unit (Capt. Ito, Sukemitsu):

Detachment of Toko Naval Air Group: 6 flying boats.

Kamitsu Maru, No. 2 *Hino Maru*, No. 2 *Hisbi Maru*, No. 5 *Seiju Maru*: 4 cargo ships:

Attached Forces:

Awata Maru: Converted cruiser.

Fujisan Maru: Oiler.

Teiyo Maru: Oiler.

Nissan Maru (oil, gasoline, coal): Collier-oiler.

Akasbisan Maru (miscellaneous auxiliary stores and munitions): Cargo ship.

No. 2 *Toko Maru* (stores ship): Cargo ship.

Muroto: Cargo ship.

Added subsequently, during June 1942:

To 2d Mobile Force:

Zuikaku (20 June): 2 aircraft carriers.

Zuibo (9 June).

Destroyer Division 4 (9 June): 4 destroyers.

To *Submarine Force* (9 June):

2d Submarine Squadron:

Submarine Division 7: *I-1*, *I-2*, *I-3*: 3 submarines.

Submarine Division 8: *I-4*, *I-5*, *I-6*: 3 submarines.

To *Seaplane Force* (9 June):

Kamikawa Maru and attached float planes: 1 seaplane carrier; 14 float planes.

Escort: *Hokaze*: 1 destroyer.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Organization of United States Forces in the North Pacific

1 June 1942

North Pacific Force, Commander Task Force Eight, (Rear Admiral Theobald).

Nashville, heavy cruiser, flagship.

Air Search Group, Commander Patrol Wing Four, (Capt. Gehres):

20 amphibian flying boats, 4 heavy bombers, 3 small seaplane tenders.

Surface Search Group, Commander Alaskan Sector, (Capt. Parker):

One gunboat, 1 mine sweeper, 5 Coast Guard cutters, 14 small patrol vessels.

Air Striking Group, Commanding General 11th A. A. F. (Brig. Gen. Butler):

Three Army fighter squadrons, 1 Army heavy bomber squadron, 1 Army medium bomber squadron,
1 Army composite group, 1 Navy fighter squadron, 1 Canadian fighter squadron, 1 Canadian
reconnaissance squadron.

Destroyer Striking Group (Comdr. Craig):

7 destroyers.

Submarine Group, (Comdr. Lake):

6 submarines.

Main Body, (Rear Admiral Theobald):

2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 4 destroyers.

Tanker Group, (Comdr. Maples):

2 Oilers.

Appendix 35

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Organization of Forces at the Battle of the Komandorski Islands

United States:

Task Group Commander (Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris):

Richmond, flagship, (Capt. Waldschmidt): One light cruiser.

Salt Lake City, (Capt. B. J. Rodgers): One heavy cruiser.

Destroyers, Commander Destroyer Squadron 14, (Capt. R. S. Riggs): *Bailey*, *Cogblan*, *Dale*, *Monaghan*, four destroyers.

Japan:

Main Body, Commander Fifth Fleet (Vice Admiral Hosogaya, Moshiro):

Nachi, flagship.

Maya: Two heavy cruisers.

Tama: One light cruiser.

21st Destroyer Division: *Wakaba*, *Hatsushimo*, two destroyers.

Escort Force, Commander 1st Destroyer Squadron, (Rear Admiral Mori, Tomachi):

Abukuma, flagship: One light cruiser.

6th Destroyer Division: *Ikazuchi*, *Inazuma*, two destroyers.

"D" Convoy

Asaka Maru: One auxiliary cruiser.

Sakito Maru: One transport.

2d Escort Force, *Usugumo*: One destroyer.

Sanko Maru, convoyed vessel: One cargo ship.

NOTE—"D" Convoy retired as the battle opened, 2d Escort Force and convoyed ship had not joined.

For a detailed Japanese account of the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, see U. S. S. B. S. Interrogation No. 438 (Nav-93), Tokyo, 24 November 1945, and for a detailed United States account, see "Combat Narratives, The Aleutians Campaign." Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Organization of Forces at the Battle of Attu

United States:

North Pacific Force, (Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid):

Shore Based Air Group, C. G. 11th A. A. F., (Maj. Gen. W. O. Butler):

Air Striking Unit (Maj. Gen. Butler):

Bombardment Aircraft: 24 heavy, 30 medium.

Fighter Aircraft: 128 fighters.

Air Search Unit (Captain L. E. Gehres): 24 patrol land planes; 30 patrol amphibians; 5 sea-plane tenders, small.

Alaskan Sector Escort and Supply Group (Rear Admiral J. W. Reeves): 24 assorted small ships, additional small craft.

Motor Torpedo Boat Group (Lt. Comdr. Denny): 11 motor torpedo boats.

Submarine Group (Comdr. Gray): Two divisions, plus two submarines.

Southern Covering Group (Rear Admiral McMorris): Four light cruisers, 5 destroyers.

Northern Covering Group (Rear Admiral Giffen): Three heavy cruisers, 4 destroyers.

Attu Reinforcement Group (Capt. C. L. Hutton): 32d Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, embarked in 4 transports, 3 cargo ships.

Tanker and Service Group: 6 oilers, 2 repair ships.

Shemya Occupation Force (Brig. Gen. Copeland):

4th Infantry Regiment, 18th Engineer Regiment, transported in 5 transports, 1 cargo ship.

Assault Force, (Rear Admiral F. W. Rockwell):

Support Group (Rear Admiral Kingman): 3 battleships, 1 escort aircraft carrier, 6 destroyers, 2 destroyer mine sweepers.

Mine Sweeper Group (Lt. Comdr. Freutsch): 4 destroyer mine sweepers.

Landing Force (Maj. Gen. Brown, later Maj. Gen. E. Landrum):

17th Infantry Regiment, reinforced; one battalion.

32d Infantry Regiment, reinforced; 78th Coast Artillery AA Regiment, less one battalion; one battalion of 50th Engineer Regiment.

Japanese:

Commander Northern Force, Commander in Chief 5th Fleet (Vice Admiral Kawase, Shiro):

Attu Garrison (Col. Yamazaki):

North Chishima Coast Defense Infantry (Lt. Col. Yonekawa); 303d Independent Infantry Battalion (Maj. Watanabe); Antiaircraft, shipping engineers, headquarters units, etc.

Naval Communication Unit (senior communication officer present—Comdr. Emoto), aviation personnel, etc.

Total personnel about 2,500.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Fifth Fleet (Vice Admiral Kawase):

Maya (flagship), *Haguro*, *Myoko*, (both temporarily assigned), *Nachi*, *Abukuma*, *Tama*, two converted light cruisers;

1st Destroyer Squadron (Rear Admiral Mori);

Kiso, flagship;

Attached destroyers;

Various auxiliaries and patrol craft.

Twelfth Air Fleet (Vice Admiral Totsuka):

24th Air Flotilla (Rear Admiral Yamada) (452d Air Group in Kiska, remainder in Kuriles and Japan);

27th Air Flotilla (under direct command of Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, administratively under 12th Air Fleet).

NOTE—Major units of the Combined Fleet assembled in Tokyo Bay preparatory to an attack on United States Forces at Attu, however, the Attu garrison fell before Fleet operations were initiated. Included in units which left Truk for this concentration were the Japanese battleships *Musashi*, *Kongo* and *Haruna*, and the heavy cruisers *Tone* and *Cbikuma*. Present in the Tokyo area were the carriers *Shokaku* and *Unyo*; the battleship *Yamashiro*; the heavy cruisers *Mogami*, *Suzuya* and *Kumano*; the light cruisers *Oyodo* and *Agano*.

Appendix 37

VII

The Solomons Campaign

Introduction

Japan embarked upon her career of conquest with the intent of making herself economically self-sufficient. With the rapid expansion into the East Indies, carried out against weak and disorganized opposition by the outnumbered Allies, half of her plan was realized; an area rich in the necessary vital resources had been seized, all that remained was to defend and exploit it.

To protect both this newly conquered area and the Japanese homeland, a defensive perimeter was established running from the Kuriles in the north through the Malay Archipelago and westward to Burma. In the southeast this defensive line was drawn through the Solomons with Rabaul on New Britain serving as nerve center and citadel.

In early 1942, United States carrier raids on Japanese positions in the Marshalls and the carrier-mounted B-25 raid on the homeland impressed the Japanese with the desirability of further advancing the outer defenses of their newly captured empire. In the south the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia, Port Moresby, and Guadalcanal were selected as the key objectives. These sites dominated the vital United States—Australia—New Zealand line of communications, and their possession would contribute importantly to the defense of the Empire.

In order to check this expansion and to contain the Japanese within the already occupied area, limited countering moves were undertaken by the United States. During this phase the capture of Port Moresby by sea was prevented by an American carrier force which intercepted and turned back the Japanese invasion fleet in the Battle of the Coral Sea. The intended further expansion to the eastward was stopped shortly thereafter at the Battle of Midway and such losses in aircraft carriers inflicted on the Japanese that the advances into New Caledonia and the Fijis, which were also dependent on success in New Guinea and the Solomons, had to be abandoned. Within the Solomon Islands chain however the Japanese continued to advance with the purpose of establishing a number of strong defensive outposts for Rabaul.

Initial United States Landings

In early summer of 1942 the Japanese commenced a consolidation of positions on the eastern coast of New Guinea and on the island of Guadalcanal in the southern Solomons. Harbor and airfield construction was begun, and aviation and ground troop garrisons installed. To prevent the Japanese from gaining too strong a hold in the latter area, the United States undertook an amphibious operation in which it was planned "to occupy and defend Tulagi and adjacent positions (Guadalcanal and Florida Islands) and the Santa Cruz Islands (Ndeni) in order to deny these areas to the enemy and to provide United States bases in preparation for further offensive action." This operation was carried out by forces of the South Pacific area, with support from Southwest Pacific forces in the form of operations aimed at interdiction of Japanese naval air and submarine activity in the Eastern New Guinea—Bismarck Area.

On 7 August 1942 the United States counteroffensive in the Pacific was begun with the landing of the reinforced First Marine Division in the Tulagi—Guadalcanal area of the Solomon Islands. Three task forces participated in this operation, the transport and landing force with its escorting cruisers and destroyers, a carrier force giving air support at the scene of the landings, and a force of flying boats and shore-based aircraft which provided long range search and bombing. The initial landings were successfully carried out,

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and on Guadalcanal a partially completed airstrip was captured, the possession of which was destined to be the object of extremely bitter fighting on land, on sea, and in the air.

Battle of Savo Island

The United States landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal immediately provoked the Japanese into energetic countermeasures designed to dislodge the Marines from their precarious foothold. During the first and second days after the landings, this reaction was limited to air raids which attempted to disrupt the disembarkation of troops and supplies, but a greater effort was at hand; on 8 August a Japanese cruiser force was dispatched from Kavieng and Rabaul with orders to "attack and destroy enemy transports in the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area."

Five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer under the command of Rear Admiral Mikawa rendezvoused between Cape St. George and Green Island, passed north of Bougainville, through Bougainville Strait and down "the Slot" toward the transport area off Guadalcanal.

At about 1130 (zone minus 11 time) while still north of Kieta and some 300 miles from Guadalcanal, this force was sighted by an Allied search plane which maintained contact for about an hour. As a deceptive measure, Admiral Mikawa reversed course and stood back towards Rabaul, returning to his original course only when the plane had departed. Although reports of this contact were immediately sent out by the search plane, confusion occurred in the relaying of the message, and the information did not reach all ships and commands concerned with resulting lack of alertness.

As just such a raid as this had been anticipated, the covering force of five United States and two Australian cruisers with their accompanying destroyers was divided into a northern and a southern screening force and stationed across Indispensable Strait, to the north and the south of Savo Island. During the action which followed, however, only one of the Australian cruisers was present as the officer in tactical command had retired in the other to the transport area in order to attend a conference called by the Task Force Commander.

About 2 hours prior to their arrival off Savo Island, the Japanese cruisers catapulted four scouting planes to reconnoiter Guadalcanal and to illuminate the transport area by dropping flares. Additional information concerning the location of the United States transports was also transmitted to the raiding force by Japanese observers on Guadalcanal who were able to observe the area by the light from a burning United States transport damaged by bombing during the afternoon.

At about 0130, while steaming in column formation with the heavy cruiser *Chokai* in the lead, the Japanese sighted the southern United States radar picket destroyer close aboard to starboard moving slowly south. The Japanese force was immediately slowed to 12 knots to reduce the visibility of the ships' wakes, and all guns were trained on the destroyer. As the United States ship made no move either to give battle or to escape, doubt arose in the minds of the staff on the Japanese flagship as to whether they might not have been seen and reported but not engaged in order to be lured into an ambush. Nevertheless they held their fire and after safely passing astern of the United States destroyer increased speed to 26 knots and rounded the southern coast of Savo Island.

A few minutes later the southern group of Allied cruisers was sighted off Kokumbona and within 2 minutes of the sighting all Japanese ships had fired torpedoes; by this attack both heavy cruisers of this group, *Chicago* and *Canberra*, were damaged, the latter so severely that she had to be sunk the next morning. Immediately following this attack, the Japanese turned left towards the northern group which had been the subject of continuous reports by *Chokai's* observation plane. During this turn the Japanese column became separated into two groups, *Chokai* and Cruiser Division Six heading for a position to the east of the northern United States group, while Cruiser Division Eighteen and the single destroyer passed to the westward.

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

As the Japanese approached the northern group, they momentarily employed their searchlights to illuminate their targets and then opened fire at point blank range. Surprise was again achieved, and the United States ships replied at first only with their anti-aircraft batteries and with machine guns. Subsequently a few main battery salvos were fired, one of which struck *Chokai* just abaft the navigating bridge, damaging the searchlights and the operations room, destroying all charts, and killing about 30 men. So overwhelming was the Japanese fire, however, that the heavy cruisers *Quincy* and *Vincennes* sank within an hour, and the *Astoria* the next morning.

Following this eminently successful action, the Japanese ships turned northwest around Savo Island. Due to the loss of all charts on the flagship, the delay in reassembling their broken formation, and the fear of being caught at daylight within range of dive-bombers from the United States carriers, of whose presence to the southward they had knowledge through radio intelligence, the Japanese retired without returning to attack the now unprotected transports. Their only loss of the operation occurred as Cruiser Division Six was entering harbor at Rabaul the next morning, when the heavy cruiser *Kako* was sunk by a United States submarine.

In this disastrous battle the Allies lost four heavy cruisers as a result of fatigue, lack of proper precautions, and confusion. Coming as it did at the very start of the Allied counteroffensive, this loss dealt a heavy blow to the then limited Allied naval strength in the Pacific, and its consequences were only gradually overcome.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Savo Island, 8 August 1942

Forces Involved

Allied:

Southern Group:

Australia (CA)¹ Admiral Crutchley, R. N.

Chicago, (CA) Capt. H. O. Bode, U. S. N.

Canberra (CA).

Bagley (DD).

Patterson (DD).

Northern Group:

Vincennes (CA) Capt. F. L. Riefhohl,

U. S. N.

Astoria (CA).

Quincy (CA)

Helm (DD).

Wilson (DD).

Radar Patrol:

North: *Ralph Talbot* (DD).

South: *Blue* (DD).

Japanese:

Cruiser Division Six:

Chokai (CA) (F) Admiral Mikawa, I. J. N.

Aoba (CA).

Furutaka (CA).

Kinugasa (CA).

Kako (CA).

Cruiser Division Eighteen:

Tenryu (CL).

Tatsuta (CL).

One destroyer.

¹Absent from battle area during action.

Losses

Allied:

Quincy (CA).

Vincennes (CA).

Canberra (CA).

Astoria (CA) (damaged and subsequently sunk).

Japanese:

None.


Damaged

Chicago (CA) (Major).

Ralph Talbot (DD).

Chokai (CA) (Minor—No. 1 Turret damaged out of action. Operation room destroyed.)

Aoba (CA) (No 1 and No. 2 twin mount torpedo tubes hit and set afire.)



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Battle of the Eastern Solomons

Following the Battle of Savo Island 8–9 August 1942, the Japanese landed minor garrison reinforcements on Guadalcanal without opposition. Their offensive efforts, however, were primarily devoted to air raids and ship bombardments while sizeable reinforcements were gathered at Rabaul and in the Shortland Islands in preparation for a major assault to dislodge the tenacious marines from Henderson Field.

On 19 August a convoy consisting of 4 transports, escorted by 4 destroyers under the command of Admiral Tanaka, departed Rabaul to arrive at Guadalcanal on the 24th with 700 army personnel of the Ikki Detachment and 800 marines of the Yokosuka Fifth Special Landing Force. About 100 miles to the eastward of this group, 2 screening units were operating; 1 included the carriers *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku* while the other included the light carrier *Ryujo*. In the general vicinity of the transport force the seaplane carrier *Chitose* operated her ship-based seaplanes. This entire force proceeded towards Guadalcanal under cover of the shore-based reconnaissance aircraft of the 25th Air Flotilla which, operating from Rabaul, searched as far as 164° east longitude.

In order to prevent this landing, two United States task forces, one centering on *Saratoga* and the other on *Enterprise*, were operating about 100 miles southeast of the Solomons. At about 1040, 23 August initial contact with the enemy transport force was made by long-range reconnaissance plane. The two carriers immediately attempted to close the range and *Enterprise* launched an eight-plane search to a distance of 180 miles covering sectors between 345° to 045° true bearing. Although the Japanese invasion force was still beyond this scouting radius three screening submarines were attacked with inconclusive results. At 1510 *Saratoga* launched an attack group composed of 31 dive bombers armed with 1,000-pound bombs and 6 torpedo-carrying planes. Due to a breakdown in communications causing a delay in the receipt of a message indicating a change of course of the enemy, this striking group failed to make contact and was forced to land at Guadalcanal, where it remained overnight, returning to *Saratoga* the next morning. Similarly, an afternoon Marine attack group from Guadalcanal and another *Enterprise* search group again failed to locate the enemy, although again a submarine was attacked.

At dawn on the 24th, 20 dive bombers took off from *Enterprise* to search over a distance of 200 miles between true bearings of 290° and 070°, and again the only contact was with a single submarine. In the meantime another patrol plane had sighted the *Ryujo* group at 0935 in latitude 04° 40' south longitude 161° 15' east, or 281 miles bearing 343° from the United States carriers. At 1028 and again at 1249 the *Chitose* reported being tracked by a United States flying boat which was driven away by three fighters although it escaped being shot down. At 1210, in order to determine whether other carriers were in the vicinity of this contact, *Enterprise* was ordered to conduct an additional search while *Saratoga* prepared her group for a strike. At 1440 *Enterprise* search planes located *Ryujo* distant 198 miles bearing 317° from the United States carriers and at 1500 *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku* were located and unsuccessfully attacked by 2 *Enterprise* search planes 198 miles from their parent carrier on a bearing 347°. At 1510 a small supporting cruiser unit was located about 225 miles away on a bearing of 347°. Communication difficulties caused by the limitation of plane equipment which provided only one radio frequency for both fighter direction and scouting plane messages resulted in delay in receipt of these contact reports. At 1435 the *Saratoga* air group was launched to attack the *Ryujo* at its estimated position, and at 1620 this attack was delivered. Although only 4 bomb hits and one torpedo hit plus several near misses were claimed by the attacking air group, the Japanese reported that the *Ryujo* received 10 bomb hits from the dive-bombers, burned fiercely, and sank. Not a single United States plane or crew member was lost.

Shortly after the carrier attack upon the *Ryujo*, two flights consisting of three and four B-17's respectively of the 11th Bombardment Group operating from Espiritu Santo took off to engage the enemy.

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The three-plane flight claimed four hits at about 1705 on a carrier reported to be dead in the water (*Ryujo* at this time was burning and sinking) while the four-plane flight claimed two an hour later on another carrier estimated to be to the eastward of the first. Photographs at the time did not substantiate these claims, nor did the Japanese report such hits.

Immediately following these attacks the seaplane carrier *Cbitose* reported that two carrier-type dive-bombers attacked her at 1815 damaging the topside equipment, rupturing the port fuel oil tanks and flooding the engine room to such an extent that a 7° list was incurred. Soon thereafter, fire broke out in the crew's quarters and among the planes, several of which were jettisoned, and *Cbitose* retired to Rabaul.

Simultaneously with the first attack upon *Ryujo*, Japanese planes from *Sbokaku* and *Zuikaku* attacked the *Enterprise* which was launching a second wave against *Ryujo*. The Japanese air group was first detected upon the radar screen at a distance of 88 miles from *Enterprise* and was constantly tracked for a period of 22 minutes prior to the attack. However, poor radio discipline of the United States fighter pilots and the lack of an alternate communication channel prevented effective fighter direction. Several of the Japanese bombers penetrated the screen and at 1709 scored three hits on *Enterprise* plus several damaging near misses. Excellent damage control saved *Enterprise*, and retirement from the battle area was made at 24 knots. During the concluding phases of this attack, *Enterprise* and *North Carolina* were bombed by eight horizontal bombers which "approached unobserved at 15,000 feet"; the salvoes missed *North Carolina* by about 2,000 yards. This ended the action of the 24th, except for a bombardment of Guadalcanal about midnight by the destroyers *Isokaze*, *Kawakaze*, and *Kagero* from the Eighth Fleet, which were later attacked but not damaged by Marine dive-bombers from Guadalcanal.

Expecting the action to be resumed the next morning the carrier *Wasp*, returning from Noumea, was joined by *North Carolina* and proceeded to a point southeast of Guadalcanal to reinforce the *Saratoga* force. However, no further carrier action occurred.

Despite the withdrawal of the supporting force during the night, the enemy transport units continued towards Guadalcanal. At dawn a group of 12 Marine dive-bombers departed Henderson Field in search of the enemy reinforcement force, locating it at 0935. In the subsequent attack the light cruiser *Jintsu* sustained a bomb hit between No. 1 and No. 2 turrets which flooded the forward magazines and caused such extensive damage that Admiral Tanaka transferred his flag to the destroyer *Kagero* and ordered *Jintsu*, escorted by the destroyer *Suzukaze*, to Truk for repair. At the same time the 9,300-ton transport *Kinryu Maru* was bombed and set on fire. About 1015, while standing by this gutted and abandoned transport, the old destroyer *Mitsuki* sustained three hits from a flight of eight B-17's of the 11th Bombardment Group operating out of Espiritu Santo. At 1140 this destroyer sank, leaving only the destroyer *Yayoi* and Patrol Boats Nos. 1 and 2 to rescue the survivors of both ships. At 1200, the attempt to land troops was cancelled by order of the Commander Outer South Seas Force, and all ships retired to the Shortland Islands.

Except for contacts with scattered Japanese units during their retirement this was the last action of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the results of which prompted the commander of the Japanese Second Destroyer Squadron to write "Gradual reinforcement of landing forces by small units, subjects all of the troops involved to the danger of being destroyed piecemeal. Every effort must be made to use large units all at once". This recommended procedure was soon followed in the subsequent Battle of Santa Cruz.

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Battle of Eastern Solomons, 25 August 1942

Forces Involved

Allied:

Saratoga (CV) (F)
Rear Admiral Fletcher, U. S. N.
Minneapolis (CA) (F)
Rear Admiral Wright, U. S. N.
New Orleans (CA)
DesRon One:
Belts (DD) (F)
Capt. Brewer, U. S. N.
Farragut (DD).
Worden (DD).
MacDonough (DD).
Dale (DD).
Enterprise (CV) (F)
Rear Admiral Kinkaid.
North Carolina (BB).
Portland (CA) (F)
Rear Admiral Tisdale.
Atlanta (CL).
DesRon Six:
Balch (DD) (F) Capt. Sauer.
Maury (DD).
Benham (DD).
DesDiv 22:
Grayson (DD) (F) Comdr. Holcomb.
Monssen (DD).

Japanese:

Main Body: Third Fleet:
Shokaku (CV)
Zuikaku (CV).
6 Battleships.
Advance Force: Battleship Div 11:
Hiei (BB).
Kirishima (BB).
Cruiser Division 7:
Suzuya (CA).
Kumano (CA).
Chikuma (CA).
Destroyer Squadron 10:
Nagara (CL) (F).
12 Destroyers.
Detached Force:
Ryujo (CVL).
Cruiser Division 8:
Tone (CA) (F).
2 Destroyers.
Occupation Force:
Jintsu (CL) (F).
Suzukaze (DD).
Umikaze (DD).
2 Destroyers.
4 Transports.
Ikki Detachment:
(700 Army).
Yokosuka 5th Special Landing Force:
(800 Marines).
Bombardment Force DesDiv 30:
Less: *Uzuki* and *Mochizuki*.
Isokaze (DD).
Kawakaze (DD).
Kagero (DD).

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Detailed Losses

Sunk


<i>Allied:</i>	<i>Japanese:</i>
20 aircraft.	<i>Ryujo</i> (CV) (By dive-bombers).
	<i>Mutsuki</i> (ODD) (By B-17's).
	<i>Kinryu Maru</i> (XCL) (By dive-bombers).
	90 aircraft.

Damaged

<i>Enterprise</i> (CV) (3 bomb hits— dive-bombers).	<i>Cbitose</i> (CVS) (2 hits dive-bombers).
	<i>Jintsu</i> (CL) (1 hit dive-bomber).

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR



THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Cape Esperance, 11 October 1942

Following the battle of the Eastern Solomons, the Japanese continuously reinforced their Guadalcanal garrison with personnel from the Ikki and Kawaguchi units by means of destroyer transports. At times as many as 900 troops were landed in a single night at Cape Esperance on the northwest tip of Guadalcanal by these ships which normally departed from the Shortland area and steamed southeast toward Guadalcanal, transiting the inside passage between New Georgia, Choiseul and Santa Isabel Islands so as to reach the landing area at night. Landings of this nature were generally accompanied by bombardment of the airfield by additional ships covering the landing or by the destroyer transports after debarkation was completed.

In order to stop this constant stream of reinforcements a small United States cruiser task force sortied from Espiritu Santo on 7 October to take up station in the vicinity of Russell Island. This force was directed to "search for and destroy enemy ships and landing craft".

On 10 October two planes from each cruiser of the force conducted a negative search of the area used by the Japanese landing reinforcement, and proceeded to Tulagi with instructions to rejoin their parent vessels at 1600 the next day. At about 1345, 11 October United States patrol planes reported a Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers about 210 miles to the northwest enroute to Guadalcanal. The presence of this force was again confirmed at 1810 when the ships were sighted 110 miles from Guadalcanal.

The United States cruiser task force immediately proceeded towards Cape Esperance in order to be in position to intercept the Japanese about midnight. While en route, the planes which had been based at Tulagi returned to the cruisers, but due to the imminence of battle they were not taken aboard. Instead they and one additional plane from each ship were dispatched to Tulagi in order to clear the cruiser decks of aircraft in preparation for a night action.

At 2200 the remaining cruiser planes were catapulted to search for the Japanese force. The *Salt Lake City* plane crashed on catapulting and burned; thinking that the bright light from the flares in this plane was a signal from the beachhead, the approaching Japanese answered with their searchlights. Shortly after 2300 and again at 2330 the *San Francisco* search plane reported one transport and two destroyers off the north beach of Guadalcanal. However, these ships were neglected in the search for the more important Japanese cruiser and destroyer force; at 0230 they were seen retiring to the northwest unharmed.

At about 2232, as the United States ships approached the passage between Savo Island and Guadalcanal, radars on both *Boise* and *Helena* picked up a formation of five ships, at a range of 18,000 yards to the northwest. This report was transmitted to the task force by voice radio but the United States commander was unable to visualize the situation since the flagship was not equipped with the most recent radar. At that time, he was concerned lest the ships reported as the enemy force be his own five destroyers out of position following a recent course change. Shortly thereafter, an exchange of messages indicated that these destroyers were overtaking the cruisers on the latter's right flank. This placed the destroyers in the line of fire between the opposing cruiser forces.

At 2346 the *Helena* opened fire, followed by the *Salt Lake City*, *Boise* and *Farenholt*. The Japanese force was completely surprised. The heavy cruiser *Aoba* and the destroyer *Fubuki* received hits immediately and executed a turn to the right, followed by the heavy cruiser *Furutaka*, while the heavy cruiser *Kinugasa* swung left as she began firing at the United States cruisers. This maneuver removed *Kinugasa* from the general bearing of fire and permitted her to act almost unmolested.

Aoba, which was leading the enemy column was struck by the opening United States salvoes which killed a large number of personnel on the bridge including Admiral Goto, the officer in tactical command. *Fubuki* was sunk before completing her turn. *Furutaka*, subjected to the concentrated fire of all United

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States ships as they "capped the T", sustained such severe damage that she sank soon after reversing course. *Aoba* and *Kinugasa* fled to the northwest while the destroyer *Murakumo* started to retire, then returned to the battle area and rescued a number of survivors. This delay was fatal, since both *Murakumo* and the destroyer *Natsugumo* which joined her were sunk the next morning by dive-bombers and fighters from Guadalcanal.

During the battle the United States destroyer *Duncan*, which had closed to attack with torpedoes, was caught in a position between the two forces and fired on by both, receiving such damage that she sank the next day. *Boise* and *Fareholt* received major damage while the *Salt Lake City* sustained minor damage. After turning back the Japanese force, the United States ships retired to Espiritu Santo.

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Battle of Cape Esperance, 12 October 1942

Forces Involved

Allied:

San Francisco (CA) (F)
Rear Admiral N. Scott, U. S. N.
Salt Lake City (CA).
Boise (CL).
Helena (CL).
Farenholt (DD).
Buchanan (DD).
Laffey (DD).
Duncan (DD).
McCalla (DD).

Japanese:

Aoba (CA) Rear Admiral Goto.
Furutaka (CA).
Kinugasa (CA).
Furutaka (CA).
Murakumo (DD).

Detailed Losses

Sunk

Duncan (DD).

Furutaka (CA).
Fubuki (DD).


Damaged

Boise (Major).
Salt Lake City (Minor).
Farenholt (Major).

Aoba (CA) (Major).
Kinugasa (CA) (Minor).

Appendix 42

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Battle of Santa Cruz, 25-26 October 1942

Between August and the first part of October all attempts made by the Japanese to regain Guadalcanal had ended in failure. This was in part due to their lack of landing craft which forced them to send reinforcements to the battle area in small units where they were destroyed piecemeal. After 2 months of occupation the American defenses were being so rapidly developed that the Japanese decided that a major assault was necessary. They planned first to gain control of the airfield; then, while basing planes there, to mop up the remaining American units at will.

In preparation for this large-scale attack, efforts were made to sever the United States lines of communication to Guadalcanal, and Submarine Force "A", composed of the six submarines *I-4*, *I-5*, *I-7*, *I-8*, *I-22* and *I-176*, was deployed in the Indispensable Straits. On 31 August while patrolling in a position northwest of Espiritu Santo, the *I-26* damaged the *Saratoga* with a torpedo hit. On 6 September the *I-11* unsuccessfully attacked *Hornet* in the same area. In the same vicinity on 15 September, *Wasp* was sunk by the *I-19*, and *North Carolina* and *O'Brien* were damaged. In order more fully to exploit this lucrative area, Submarine Force "B" composed of *I-9*, *I-15*, *I-21*, *I-24*, *I-174*, and *I-175* was additionally assigned. On 20 October, while just east of San Cristobal, the heavy cruiser *Chester* was damaged by the *I-176*. On the 14th and again on the 23d the *I-7* shelled Espiritu Santo in nuisance raids. Following the battle on the 26th both "A" and "B" Forces were ordered to proceed to an area north of the Santa Cruz Islands to intercept the United States task force and destroy damaged ships. However, the Japanese submarine effort, though of limited success, did not interrupt the flow of supplies and personnel so necessary for maintaining the United States possession of Guadalcanal, and on 15 October, 4,000 troops of the American Division landed there. Constant Japanese air raids on Henderson Field by planes based at Rabaul and staged through intermediate fields harassed construction personnel in their efforts to improve the vital airfield and other installations on the island. Enemy destroyers landed approximately 900 troops per night until the Japanese strength on Guadalcanal reached a peak of some 26,000 Army troops and 3,000 special naval attack troops. At the same time, additional Japanese troops and supplies were being concentrated in the Rabaul-Shortland area, and long-range reconnaissance was conducted by seaplanes based on the *Kiyokawa Maru* in the Shortland area.

By 11 October, the heaviest Japanese naval force assembled since the Battle of Midway sortied from Truk to provide the necessary sea and air strength for the general attack. On the 13th the battleships *Haruna* and *Kongo* bombarded Henderson Field for a period of 1 hour and 20 minutes; of the United States planes at the field only one escaped undamaged. In an attempt to maintain this neutralization, additional bombardments were conducted by Japanese cruisers and destroyers during the next few days. Although all available planes were flown in from Espiritu Santo, so effective were the Japanese bombardments and air raids that on 26 October only 23 fighters, 16 dive-bombers and one torpedo plane were available for the defense of Guadalcanal, and the operation of even this handful was limited by a critical shortage of fuel. For over a week, while the tempo of Japanese attacks was increasing, the only fuel available for the defending fighters was flown in by Marine C-47's assisted by available planes from the Army Air Force 13th Troop Carrier Squadron. Although constantly harassed in the air by fighters, and on the ground by enemy mortar fire, each plane was able to fly in enough fuel to maintain 12 fighters in the air for 1 hour. The importance of this unusual mission can be measured by the fact that on the 24th, 24 Grumman fighters were able to shoot down 20 Zeros and 1 bomber in 1 short flight.

During the period of preparation for a general assault, the Japanese estimated that 6 days would be required properly to distribute their forces following the landing of the final contingent of special troops. This landing occurred on 15 October 1942 and Y-day was initially set as the 21st. However, during this

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period probing attacks into the American lines along the Matanikau River were repeatedly beaten back, delaying Y-day until the 23d. On the 22d the light carrier *Hiyo* developed engine trouble, the flag of Carrier Division Two was shifted to the *Junyo*, and *Hiyo* returned to Truk. Early that day, 4 heavy land attacks against the Fifth Marines were repulsed with the loss of over 2,000 Japanese troops and 12 tanks. Again Y-day was postponed until the 24th. After another series of failures to break the lines it was postponed until the 25th, at which time Vice Admiral Nagumo, in command of the Japanese naval forces, sent a dispatch to the Island Commander calling his attention to the fact that the supporting fleet would be forced to retire due to lack of fuel if the attack was not carried out immediately.

Following receipt of this message another and equally disastrous effort was made to break the American lines. This assault on Lunga Ridge against the weary Marines who had been subjected to incessant attack by land, sea, and air, carried the Japanese to the southern edge of Henderson Field, where they were driven back by a desperate counterattack. However this measure of success prompted the Army commander to send a dispatch to the anxious naval force that the field had been captured at 2300. According to plan, 14 fighters and a few bombers from the carriers were sent to the field at dawn the next morning where they circled awaiting a signal to land. This erroneous message was not corrected until 0700 at which time it was too late; eight United States fighters were extricated from the mud, took off, and shot down all of the Japanese planes.

During the afternoon planes from Guadalcanal attacked a small Japanese transport force of cruisers and destroyers, inflicting sufficient damage on the destroyer *Akikaze* to flood one boiler room and render one engine room inoperative. This force had landed supplies and personnel and was assisting the land action with gun fire. Later during the afternoon this unit reported that they had been again attacked, this time by six B-17's, but that no damage was sustained.

To oppose the Japanese movement at sea, two United States task forces formed around *Enterprise* and *Hornet* had been directed to skirt the northern shores of Santa Cruz Islands, move southwestward to a point east of San Cristobal Island and there await a chance to intercept any enemy approach to Guadalcanal. These forces, as well as the convoys proceeding to Guadalcanal were under constant surveillance between 13 and 26 October by Japanese submarines and by aircraft from the 25th Air Flotilla operating from Rabaul and the Shortland Islands.

At dawn on 25 October *Enterprise* launched a search to the northwest but no enemy forces were located. Shortly thereafter, a shore-based patrol plane picked up the advance elements of the enemy force operating under protection of a weather front and at 1250 they were fixed in latitude 08° 51' S. longitude 164° 30' E., about 360 miles from the United States task force which they were closing on a southeasterly course. At 1430 *Enterprise* launched a search group followed by a small striking group but the enemy was not found, despite the fact that the search was extended to such a distance that six planes were lost in water landings due to lack of fuel. Five other planes had been damaged earlier in the day, seriously reducing the aircraft available for combat.

During the night of 25-26 October, incomplete contact reports received by the United States commander indicated that the enemy was divided into two or more units. At dawn of the 26th *Enterprise* launched 16 planes to search to the northwest to a distance of 200 miles. Shortly afterwards, information was received that a patrol plane had made contact with the *Zuibo* approximately 2 hours before. However, no attack group was launched until the information was amplified by the carrier scouts. During this search, contact was made at 0717 26 October with the Japanese Battleship Striking Force and at 0750 with the carriers *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku* of the Carrier Striking Force. Two search planes completing a leg in the adjacent northern sector hastened to attack the carriers which had just been reported but instead located and attacked the light carrier *Zuibo* at 0840 making two bomb hits which caused fires and such extensive damage to the flight deck as to render it inoperative.

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At 0830, following these contact reports, *Hornet* launched an attack group composed of 15 dive-bombers, 6 torpedo planes and 8 fighters, followed at 0900 by an *Enterprise* wave of 3 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes and 8 fighters. At 0915 the second *Hornet* wave of 25 planes was launched. As these groups proceeded to the target independently, the flights extended over a distance of several miles, resulting in a weak defense against enemy fighter attacks. While en route to the target the Japanese air striking groups were passed and were reported as being on their way to attack the United States carrier forces.

About 1040 the first *Hornet* wave fought their way through the Japanese fighter defense and arrived over Carrier Division 1, and at once attacked the flagship *Sbokaku*, scoring four 1,000-pound bomb hits on the port side and two near the after elevator. Immediately thereafter, the *Enterprise* group, depleted by enemy fighter action, unsuccessfully attacked the battleship *Kongo* with both torpedoes and bombs. The second *Hornet* wave failed to find the enemy carrier groups but succeeded in locating and attacking the heavy cruiser *Chikuma* which was separated from the main body of the Battleship Striking Group. In this attack two hits were made, one of which damaged the bridge while the other bomb pierced the hull and exploded in the engineering spaces, killing the crew and reducing the speed of the ship; additionally two near misses on the starboard side inflicted severe casualties, and caused underwater damage to the hull. *Chikuma* was later subjected to glide and horizontal bombing attacks but no additional damage was inflicted.

At the same time that *Sbokaku* was being attacked, aircraft from that vessel and from *Zuikaku* carried out an attack on the *Hornet* obtaining hits with four bombs and two torpedoes; in addition to these hits, *Hornet* was also crashed by two Japanese planes, one of which was piloted by the Dive Bombing Squadron Commander. Throughout the day sporadic attacks by aircraft of Carrier Division 1 operating from the undamaged *Zuikaku* continued against the *Hornet*; these scored one bomb and one torpedo hit and at about 1650 *Hornet* received a final bomb from a high-level horizontal bomber. Between 1220 and 1245 an attack by *Junyo* planes obtained two bomb hits on *Enterprise* and one each on the battleship *South Dakota* and the light cruiser *San Juan*, while a Japanese plane crashed the destroyer *Smith* starting heavy fires. In addition to the damage which the United States ships received from the air, the destroyer *Porter* was sunk by torpedoes from the submarine *I-21* while rescuing pilots who had landed in the water. At 1840 *Hornet* was abandoned and sunk by United States destroyers, while the United States task forces retired to Espiritu Santo. Following this action the Japanese striking force turned southeast to close the damaged United States forces. Although they sighted the burning *Hornet* and the United States destroyers firing into her, no contact was made with the main United States force and the destroyers retired before the Japanese could close. At about midnight the Japanese turned and withdrew to the north.

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Battle of Santa Cruz, 25-26 October 1942

Forces Involved

Allied:

Task Force:

Enterprise (CV)
Rear Admiral Kinkaid.
South Dakota (BB).
Portland (CA).
San Juan (CLAA).
Porter (DD).
Maban (DD).

Shaw (DD).
Cushing (DD).
Preston (DD).
Smith (DD).
Maury (DD).
Conyngham (DD).

Task Force:

Hornet (CV)
Rear Admiral Murray.
Northampton (CA)
Rear Admiral Good.
Pensacola (CA).
San Diego (CLAA).
Juncaw (CLAA).

Morris (DD).
Anderson (DD).
Hughes (DD).
Austin (DD).
Russell (DD).
Barton (DD).

Japanese:

Advance Force:

CruDiv 4:
Atago (CA) Vice Admiral Nagumo.
Takao (CA).
Maya (CA).
CruDiv 5: *Myoko* (CA) Flagship.
CarDiv 2: *Junyo* (CV).
DesRon 2:
Isuzu (CL).
2 destroyers.
DesDiv 24: 4 destroyers.
BatDiv 3:
Kongo (BB) Vice Admiral Kurita.
Haruna (BB).
DesDiv 15: 3 destroyers.
DesDiv 2: 4 destroyers.

Carrier Striking Force:

CarDiv 1:
Shokaku (CV) Vice Admiral Kondo.
Zuikaku (CV).
Zuibo (CVL).
Kumano (CA).
DesDiv 4: 2 destroyers.
DesDiv 16: 4 destroyers.
DesDiv 61: *Terutsuki* (DD).

Battleship Striking Force:

BatDiv 11: *Hiei* Rear Admiral Abe:
Kirishima.
CruDiv 8:
Tone (F).
Chikuma.
CruDiv 7: *Suzuya* (F).
DesRon 10: *Nagara* (F).
DesDiv 10: 3 destroyers.
DesDiv 17: 4 destroyers.

Supply Group: Oilers:

4 transports (oil tankers).
1 destroyer.
3 transports (cargo) cargo vessels.

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Detailed Losses

Sunk


<i>Hornet</i> (CV) (Aircraft).	No ships.
<i>Porter</i> (DD) (Submarine).	
20 planes (shot down).	100 planes.
54 planes (operationally).	
74 total (lost).	

Damaged

<i>Enterprise</i> (2 bomb hits, several damaging near misses).	<i>Shokaku</i> (flight deck damaged, maximum speed 21 knots).
<i>South Dakota</i> (1 bomb hit No. 1 turret. Some damage to guns of No. 2 turret.)	<i>Zuibo</i> (flight deck damaged).
<i>San Juan</i> (one bomb hit).	<i>Chikuma</i> (3 bomb hits on main battery control post and torpedo tubes abaft bridge. Heavy damage forward. Port engine out of commission).
<i>Smith</i> (Japanese plane hit No. 1 gun mount).	<i>Terutsuki</i> (DD) (medium damage).
	<i>Akikaze</i> (DD) (1 bomb rendered starboard engine inoperative and flooded No. 1 boiler room).

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Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942

The difficulty experienced by the destroyer transports used to reinforce the Japanese on Guadalcanal, in loading and unloading tanks and heavy artillery precluded the delivery of such weapons via the "Tokyo Express". This deficiency greatly contributed to the failure of the Japanese to overcome the stubborn American resistance during the latter part of October 1942. To rectify this situation, a convoy of 12 heavy transports was assembled in the Buin-Faisi area during the first part of November, and loaded with approximately 10,000 replacement troops of the Hiroshima Division, 3,500 special naval attack troops, heavy field artillery, and other supplies. At the same time major surface units rendezvoused at Rabaul and Truk preparatory to supporting the vital landing. Due to the damage inflicted upon the aircraft carriers and the heavy loss of planes and pilots in the battle of Santa Cruz 3 weeks before, no fleet air support was available and the Japanese were forced to rely upon the protection of a limited number of shore-based fighters operating over an increasing distance as the convoy approached its destination.

Initial operations on 11 and 12 November consisted of heavy raids by bombing and torpedo planes on United States transports which were unloading supplies off Lunga Point. Although practically all attacking aircraft were shot down by defending fighters and ships guns, they succeeded in inflicting damage upon three transports, the cruiser *San Francisco*, and the destroyer *Buchanan* before being driven off. Nevertheless 90 percent of the United States personnel had been disembarked together with a large portion of supplies before the operations were finally interrupted by the approach of the Japanese heavy bombardment group.

Early in the morning of the 12th search aircraft located Japanese forces approaching Guadalcanal from the north. One group consisted of the battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima* in column, screened by a light cruiser and 15 destroyers; the second more distant group consisted of the slower transports. Although greatly inferior in gun power, the defending United States cruisers departed Lunga Channel late in the day and proceeded towards Savo Island in an attempt to turn back the Japanese and to prevent them from effecting the landing and bombardment. At 0124 of the 13th the first radar contact was made at 27,000 yards by the cruiser *Helena* which immediately transmitted the information to the flagship; as the United States officer in tactical command was again embarked in the *San Francisco*, with inadequate search radar, he was faced with the same difficulty in assessing the situation as had been the case in the Battle of Cape Esperance a month before. Soon thereafter other ships equipped with the latest radar installations began to broadcast enemy contacts. Before the tactical situation was clear to the United States commander his leading destroyers were within torpedo range, and the flagship within 2,000-3,000 yards of the enemy vessels. While maneuvering to fire torpedoes and to avoid collisions, the United States force became scattered and disorganized; with each ship operating independently, the problem of identification became critical, and United States ships occasionally fired into each other.

At 0148 the Japanese illuminated the defending cruisers and fired torpedoes. Fortunately the Japanese ships were supplied with only bombardment ammunition, but their torpedoes inflicted fatal damage upon several United States destroyers and cruisers. In the ensuing melee the battleship *Hiei* was selected as the principal target, received 85 hits and fell out of control, while the destroyers *Akatsuki* and *Yudachi* were sunk. Left behind after the other ships had retired, *Hiei* was repeatedly bombed and torpedoed the next day by planes from Guadalcanal and was finally scuttled and sunk by her own crew. United States ship losses were large in this furious 34-minute night cruiser action, but the landing of supplies and bombardment of the airfield was frustrated.

Following this battle the Japanese transport force and the remaining bombardment vessels retired during the 13th. During this retirement small destroyer formations were located and attacked by long-range search planes with but limited success and on the evening of the 13th a fast cruiser force led by the *Chokai*

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

approached Guadalcanal. So seriously had the defending United States cruiser force been damaged that it retired towards Espiritu Santo, leaving the defense of the Guadalcanal area to the motor torpedo boats based at Tulagi. At about 0220 on the 14th, the Japanese cruisers commenced bombarding Henderson Field. These ships were subjected to three attacks by the motor torpedo boats and finally retired at 0340 to the south of New Georgia Island. At daylight *Enterprise* which had been rapidly approaching from the south, launched a search which located the enemy cruisers. About 0800, a Marine air group from Henderson Field made a dive-bombing and torpedo attack followed immediately by the *Enterprise* scouting planes and air striking group. These attacks caused sinking of the heavy cruiser *Kinugasa* and serious damage to the heavy cruiser *Chokai*, the light cruiser *Isuzu*, and the destroyer *Michishio*. Following its attack the *Enterprise* air group proceeded to Guadalcanal to operate from there in further action against the oncoming transports.

At 0830 on the 14th search planes from Southwest Pacific forces located the enemy transport force which had been standing by north of New Georgia and reported that it was again headed for Guadalcanal. Shortly thereafter, two *Enterprise* planes on search mission attacked and damaged two of these ships. To permit *Enterprise* to retire beyond the range of enemy aircraft during this critical period, her striking group had landed at Guadalcanal but lack of personnel and adequate servicing equipment limited the number of air attacks which could be launched against the enemy transports from that base. In most instances it was necessary to roll bombs across the muddy field to the waiting planes, then lift and load them by hand. About 1300 a group of about 40 Marine aircraft, followed at 1500 by the *Enterprise* air group, attacked the approaching transports inflicting severe damage; 8 were either sunk or gutted by fire and rendered unnavigable, while the remaining 4, after being seriously damaged, were beached near Tassafaronga where unloading operations were attempted despite attacks by planes from Guadalcanal and B-17's from Espiritu Santo.

In support of the transport landing the remaining elements of the Japanese heavy bombardment group, which had been turned back in the cruiser action of the 13th, again approached Guadalcanal. In the meantime the battleships *Washington* and *South Dakota* had been detached from the *Enterprise* task force and had arrived in the vicinity of Guadalcanal to intercept this group and such cargo ships and transports as had survived the day's air attacks.

At midnight *Washington* made radar contact with the Japanese force to the northwest. At 0016, 15 November she opened fire at 18,500 yards and immediately thereafter, *South Dakota* and destroyers took up the action. Opening fire in their turn, the Japanese concentrated on the United States destroyers until about 0100 when the destroyer *Ayanami* illuminated *South Dakota* which was immediately taken under fire by the battleship *Kirishima*; as *Washington* was not under fire by the Japanese she was left free to engage *Kirishima*. About nine 16-inch and forty 5-inch hits were made on *Kirishima* resulting in such damage that she became unnavigable, and as attempts to steer by the use of the engines failed, the captain ordered the ship scuttled. The destroyer *Ayanami*, while using her searchlights to illuminate *South Dakota*, was sunk by that ship.

Although the United States destroyer losses to heavily charged warheads of enemy torpedoes were again greater than similar losses of the Japanese, this determined attack upon Guadalcanal was turned back and the Japanese abandoned all efforts to recapture that strategic island.

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Battle of Guadalcanal

Cruiser Night Action, 13 November 1942

Forces Involved

Allied:

San Francisco (CA)
Rear Admiral D. J. Callaghan, U. S. N.
Portland (CA).
Helena (CL).
Juncaw (CLAA).
Atlanta (CLAA).
Aaron Ward (DD).
Barton (DD).
Monssen (DD).
Fletcher (DD).
Cushing (DD).
Laffey (DD).
Sterrett (DD).
O'Bannon (DD).

Japanese:

BatDiv 11: *Hiei* (BB) (FF) Vice Admiral Abe:
Kirishima (BB).
DesRon 10: *Nagara* (CL) (F).
DesDiv 16: *Amatsukaze*, *Tokitsukaze*,
Hatsukaze.
DesDiv 61: *Terutsuki*.
DesDiv 6: *Akatsuki*, *Inazuma*, *Ikazuchi*.
DesRon 4: *Asagumo* (F).
DesDiv 2: *Murasame*, *Samidare*, *Yudachi*,
Harusame.
DesDiv 27: *Sbigure*, *Sbiratsuya*, *Yugure*.

Detailed Losses

Sunk

<i>Atlanta</i> (CLAA).	<i>Hiei</i> (BB).
<i>Juncaw</i> (CLAA).	<i>Akatsuki</i> (DD).
<i>Helena</i> (CL) (torpedoed and sunk during retirement).	<i>Yudachi</i> (DD).
<i>Barton</i> (DD).	
<i>Cushing</i> (DD).	
<i>Laffey</i> (DD).	
<i>Monssen</i> (DD).	

Damaged

<i>Portland</i> (CA).	<i>Ikazuchi</i> (DD). (No. 1 and No. 2 guns damaged).
<i>San Francisco</i> (CA).	<i>Murasame</i> (DD) (No. 1 boiler room damaged).
<i>Aaron Ward</i> (DD).	<i>Amatsukaze</i> (DD) (Minor).
<i>O'Bannon</i> (DD).	<i>Hatsukaze</i> (DD).
<i>Sterrett</i> (DD).	

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14 November 1942

Allied:

Enterprise (CV) (FF) Rear Admiral Kinkaid.
Northampton (CA).
Pensacola (CA).
San Diego (CL).
DesRon 2:
 Clark (DD).
 Anderson (DD).
 Hughes (DD).
DesDiv 4:
 Morris (DD).
 Mustin (DD).
 Russell (DD).

Aircraft from Henderson Field, Guadalcanal.

Japanese:

Bombardment Unit:

Kinugasa (CA).
Isuzu (CL).
CruDiv 7: *Suzuya* (CA).
Cru Div 4: *Maya* (CA).
CruDiv 18: *Tenryu* (CV).
DesDiv 10:
 Maragumo (DD).
 Yugumo (DD).
 Kazagumo (DD).
DesDiv 8: *Michishio*.

Transport Unit:

DesRon 2: *Hayashio* (F) Rear Admiral R. Tanaka.
DesDiv 15: *Oyashio* (F), *Kuroshio*, *Kagero*.
DesDiv 24: *Umikaze* (F), *Kawakaze*,
 Suzukaze, *Yukikaze*.
DesDiv 31: *Takanami* (F), *Makinami*,
 Naganami.
DesDiv 30: *Mochizuki*, *Amagiri*.

Transport Unit:

Arizona Maru, *Brisbane Maru*, *Kumagawa Maru*, *Kinugawa Maru*, *Sado Maru*, *Kirokawa Maru*, *Nagara Maru*, *Yamaura Maru*, *Nako Maru*, *Yamatsuki Maru*, *Canberra Maru*.

Detailed Losses

Sunk

None.

Kinugasa (CA).
Arizona Maru, *Kumagawa Maru*, *Sado Maru*,
Canberra Maru, *Nagara Maru*, *Brisbane Maru*.

Damaged

None.

Kinugawa Maru, *Hirokawa Maru*, *Yamaura Maru*,
Yamatsuki Maru, (all beached). *Maya* (CA),
Isuzu (CL), *Yukikaze* (DD), *Chokai* (CA),
Michishio (DD).

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Guadalcanal

Night Battleship Action, 15 November 1942

Forces Involved

Allied:

Washington (BB) (FF)
Rear Admiral W. A. Lee.
South Dakota (BB).
Walke (DD).
Benbam (DD).
Gwinn (DD).
Preston (DD).

Japanese:

CruDiv 4:
Atago (CA) Vice Admiral N. Kondo.
Takao (CA).
BatDiv 11: *Kirishima* (BB).
DesRon 10: *Nagara* (CL).
DesDiv 61: *Terutsuki* (DD).
DesDiv 11:
Shirayuki (DD).
Hatsuzuki (DD).
DesRon 4: *Asagumo* (DD).
DesDiv 2: *Samidare* (DD).
DesDiv 6: *Ikazuchi* (DD).
DesRon 3: *Sendai* (CL).
DesDiv 19:
Uranami (DD).
Shikinami (DD).
Ayanami (DD).

Detailed Losses

Sunk

Benbam (DD).
Preston (DD).
Walke (DD).


Kirishima (BB).
Ayanami (DD).

Damaged

South Dakota (BB).
Gwinn (DD).

None.

Appendix 46




BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL 12-13 NOV. 1942


PLAN OF BOMBARDMENT OF AIRFIELD, GUADALCANAL,
NIGHT OF 12 NOVEMBER, 1942. BOMBARDMENT GROUP
ARRIVED SAVO ISLAND 0000 BUT DELAYED 40 MINU-
TES DUE TO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER REPORT FROM
OBSERVATION POST ON GUADALCANAL.
ROUNDS: 438. ILLUMINATION: 2 RECCO SEAPLANES.
RANGE: 18-23 KM.


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
THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR



THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR










BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL

13 NOV. 1942



THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR






BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL

14-15 NOV. 1942

TIME ZONE MINUS 11



THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Tassafaronga, 30 November 1942

Following the battle of Guadalcanal 12–15 November all plans to recapture that island were abandoned by the Japanese and all their efforts were directed instead toward making its final capture by the Americans as expensive as possible. For a period of approximately 3 weeks, only air raids and the appearance of minor naval vessels broke the lull for United States forces. However towards the end of November Japanese shipping in the Shortland area increased as supplies were loaded upon fast transports, and it became apparent that a Japanese move in force to supply their hard pressed island garrison was imminent.

In order to deny the Japanese the much needed food, ammunition and technical personnel, a United States task force of five cruisers and four destroyers was formed on 27 November to intercept the rejuvenated "Tokyo Express" before it could effect a landing. At about 2300 on 29 November this task force got underway from Espiritu Santo to intercept the Japanese landing which was expected to take place at Tassafaronga.

During the night of 29 November, Japanese Destroyer Squadron Two consisting of eight destroyers under the command of Admiral R. Tanaka departed Buin, passed east through Bougainville Strait past Roncodor Reef, then south to Ramos Island, then west and south around Savo Island to Tassafaronga. As darkness fell the United States task force, approaching from the south, passed through Lunga Channel and, after being joined by two more destroyers entered Indispensable Strait. During the approach no information was available to the United States task force commander concerning the location or composition of the Japanese force other than the fact that air reconnaissance on the 29th and 30th indicated that vessels had left Buin during the night on a southeasterly course.

In order to gain information of the enemy during the approach, as well as to provide flare illumination during the battle, cruiser planes were flown to Tulagi during the afternoon of the 30th with instructions to commence search operations at 2200. Unfortunately, weather conditions delayed these operations. Shortly after 2300 *Minneapolis* established radar contact with the enemy force. At 2316 *Fletcher* launched torpedoes at a range of 7,000 yards, while at the same moment the Japanese formation slowed from 15 to 12 knots as they approached the shore line between Cape Esperance and Tassafaronga. Just as the Japanese destroyer *Naganami* sighted two torpedoes crossing her bow, the United States cruisers opened fire; the Japanese had no previous knowledge of their presence.

In order to guard against divulging the number and position of the destroyer force, Admiral Tanaka had ordered that gunfire be withheld until absolutely necessary for defense. Only the destroyer *Takanami*, serving as a picket ship on the port beam of *Naganami*, and hence closest to the United States cruisers, disobeyed these instructions and returned the fire, with the consequence that she was soon sunk by the overwhelming volume of fire from the United States task force.

As soon as the cruisers were sighted, all three Japanese destroyer divisions fired torpedoes, executed a simultaneous turn to the left, and retired at 24 knots without using their guns. This maneuver, which had been practiced at night for a period of a year and a half, resulted in sinking the *Northampton* and inflicting major damage upon the *New Orleans*, *Minneapolis* and *Pensacola* with the loss of only *Takanami*. The attempt at reinforcement of the Japanese ground troops with vital supplies was frustrated.

In discussing the operations of his well trained unit after overcoming the surprise attack of the superior United States forces, the Japanese commander was prompted to write:

"The enemy had discovered our plans and movements, had put planes in the air beforehand for purposes of illumination, had got into formation for an artillery engagement, and cleverly gained the advantage of prior neutralization fire. But his fire was inaccurate, shells improperly set for deflection were especially numerous, and it is conjectured that either his marksmanship is not remarkable or else the illumination from his star shells was not sufficiently effective."

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Forces Involved

Allied:

Minneapolis (CA) Rear Admiral C. H. Wright.
New Orleans (CA).
Pensacola (CA).
Honolulu (CL) Rear Admiral M. S. Tisdale.
Northampton (CA).
Fletcher (DD).
Drayton (DD).
Maury (DD).
Perkins (DD).
Lamson (DD).
Lardner (DD).

Japanese:

DesDiv 30:
Naganami (DD) (FF) Admiral Tanaka.
Makanami (DD).
Takanami (DD).
DesDiv 15:
Oyashio (DD).
Kurashio (DD).
Kagero (DD).
DesDiv 24:
Kawakaze (DD).
Suzukaze (DD).

Detailed Losses

Sunk


Northampton (CA).

Takanami (DD).

Damaged

Minneapolis (CA) (Major)
New Orleans (CA) (Major).
Pensacola (CA) (Major).

Naganami (DD) (Minor).



THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Occupation of New Georgia

Following the November surface engagements, the Japanese devoted their efforts to air attacks on Henderson Field and to providing fighter cover for destroyers operating in "The Slot", engaged in evacuation of about 12,700 troops from Cape Esperance. Constant air attack by United States fighters and dive bombers between 18 November and 8 February 1943 succeeded in destroying approximately 600 enemy aircraft and seriously damaging 21 destroyer-transport during these operations. In addition the destroyer *Terutsuki* was sunk by PT boats and the destroyer *Makigumo* went down in Doma Cove, a victim of the first offensive mine field laid by United States surface craft in the Pacific. On 8 February, United States troops completed a sweep of Guadalcanal which effectively ended all organized Japanese resistance. The loss of Guadalcanal was unexpectedly announced by the Japanese Imperial Headquarters the next day.

Although the Japanese had been eliminated from Guadalcanal, they continued consolidation of airfields and bases in the islands to the northwest. In January, Japanese Army Air Force units arrived in Rabaul to compensate for the heavy losses which the Naval Air Force had incurred in the operations against Henderson Field. In February, Japanese carrier air groups from the Third Fleet were also based at Rabaul to offset the continuing losses inflicted by the growing American strength, and by the middle of this month the Japanese had a greater concentration of force in the Buin-Shortland area than ever before. During the same period airfield construction on New Georgia and Kolombangara was progressing rapidly. In order to neutralize this program, as well as to divert attention from other United States operations, ship bombardments of the installations at Munda on New Georgia and Vila-Stanmore on Kolombangara were begun in January. These bombardments were regularly conducted without incident until 6 March when a light United States task force surprised and sank the Japanese destroyers *Minegumo* and *Murasame* in a night action off Vila. So quickly did this action occur that the Japanese destroyers had time to fire only a few rounds before being overwhelmed by cruiser fire; of the entire crews of the 2 destroyers only 49 men survived to swim ashore.

In the continuing efforts to dislodge the Japanese from their air bases, bombing raids and additional bombardments were carried out. However results from both bombing and shell fire were disappointing, and in May it became apparent that although the daily attrition of the Japanese Air Force was heavy, it could not be knocked out until its air bases were neutralized. Preliminary operations to cut Japanese lines of communication were carried out during the first week of May when a mine field was laid near the coast of Kolombangara. So successful was this operation that the destroyers *Kagero* and *Kuroshio* were sunk a few days later, while the destroyer *Oyashio* was sunk by dive bombers in adjacent waters during rescue operations.

On 21 March the first continued land, sea, and air effort undertaken by United States forces in the Solomons since the capture of Guadalcanal began with the landing at Segi Point, New Georgia. Supporting operations designed to deny the Japanese the Kula Gulf route for supply of garrisons at Vila and Munda led to two night surface actions in July. On the 6th the destroyers *Nagatsuki* and *Niizuki* were sunk but at the cost to the United States of the light cruiser *Helena* and the destroyer *Strong*. On the 12th, the light cruiser *Jintsu* was sunk in a night action of which the Japanese wrote that she "had achieved a heroic end, with the Admiral, his staff, the commanding officer and all but a very few witnesses heroically killed". In this latter action the light cruiser *Honolulu* and the destroyer *Guinn* were sunk and the light cruiser *St. Louis* damaged. As a result of these somewhat expensive actions, the short route became increasingly dangerous to the Japanese who were reduced to the expedient of sending ships and barges around Vella Lavella to the west of Kolombangara. The landing of United States troops at Segi Point was soon followed by others which culminated in the final fall of Munda on 5 August 1943.

During this 6-week campaign, the air operations of the combined United States Army, Navy and Marine aviation units reached a greater intensity than in any previous period during the Solomons campaign. Fighter planes provided continuous patrols over convoys and beach heads while close air support to the advancing ground forces was constantly provided by dive-bombers. Long-range bombing planes supported

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

the operations with neutralizing raids on Rabaul airfields and enemy shipping, while reconnaissance flights were conducted to guard against enemy surface attacks on United States convoys. So severe were the losses inflicted on the Japanese Army aviation units that in August, having received no replacements, they finally withdrew.

Battle of Vella Gulf

The first phase of the northward march through the Solomons ended with the capture of the airfield at Munda. The possession of this airfield by United States forces greatly minimized the usefulness of the Japanese field at Vila across Kula Gulf. However the Japanese continued to reinforce the garrison at that field by sending in troops and supplies from Buin by way of Vella Gulf, and in order to counter these operations, destroyers and torpedo boats frequently swept the area in search of Japanese ships and landing barges. About midnight on 6 August, 6 United States destroyers encountered a Japanese force of 4 destroyers transporting 950 Army troops and 55 tons of supplies to the garrison at Vila. In the subsequent action the destroyers *Hagikaze*, *Arashi*, and *Kawakaze* were surprised and sunk by torpedoes from the United States destroyers while *Shigure*, although damaged, managed to escape to the north. As a result of this action the Japanese, realizing the difficulty of maintaining their supply lines to Kolombangara Island, elected to evacuate their garrison from Vila-Stanmore rather than attempt to hold it as a threat to further United States advance.

Battle of Vella Lavella

Just after midnight of 17 August, while sweeping the area north of Vella Lavella Island, a group of four United States destroyers encountered a similar Japanese force escorting landing barges some of which were loaded with personnel destined for Horaniu while others were empty and involved in the evacuation of Vila. Flares were dropped by Japanese planes over the United States force and the Japanese destroyers opened fire ineffectively at maximum range while interposing themselves between the United States force and the landing barges which promptly separated in an attempt to escape. About 0100, action was again joined at which time the destroyer *Sazanami* turned towards the United States ships and delivered a torpedo attack which succeeded in turning them away although no hits were made. While further contact was not established, 5 Japanese landing craft were sunk, the destroyer *Isokaze* was damaged, and the evacuation prevented although 370 men were successfully put ashore at Horaniu during the early morning of 18 August. Minor contacts with Japanese barges and aircraft continued during the next 2 weeks until 25 August when the last enemy stronghold at Bairoko Harbor fell to Allied troops. On 3 September the successful amphibious occupation of Vella Lavella by-passed and neutralized the Japanese garrison of approximately 10,000 men on Kolombangara.

Shortly after Munda was occupied, aircraft operations were begun from that base in support of amphibious landings in the New Georgia Group as well as in neutralization strikes against Vila. As soon as the United States field on Barakama was completed, additional sorties were directed against landing barges, supply dumps and airfields on Bougainville to render the bases at Kahili and Ballale untenable to Japanese aircraft; the resultant attention to small landing craft was primarily responsible for the effectiveness of the blockade maintained against the by-passed islands which finally forced the fall of Kolombangara and smaller bases. In opposing these operations the Japanese suffered the loss of approximately 700 planes and crews between June and October 1943. This heavy attrition in daylight operations forced them to limit their effort to night bombing and torpedo attacks which were carried out with indifferent success.

On 6-7 October, during the final stages of evacuation of Kolombangara, another night destroyer action was fought northwest of Vella Lavella. In this battle the Japanese lost the destroyer *Yugumo*; the United States destroyer *Chevalier* was sunk and *Selfridge* was damaged through torpedo action, while *O'Bannon* was damaged as a result of collision. On 9 October, the Allied forces completed their advance and the New Georgia campaign came to a successful end.

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Night Action Vila Stanmore, 5-6 March 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

Montpelier (CL) (F)
Rear Admiral A. S. Merrill.
Cleveland (CL).
Denver (CL).
Conway (DD).
Waller (DD).
Cony (DD).

Japanese:

Murasame (DD).
Minegumo (DD).

Detailed Losses


Sunk

None.

Murasame (DD) (gun fire).
Minegumo (DD) (gun fire).

Appendix 50

TRACK CHART
VILA STANMORE
6 MARCH 1943



THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

*Compositions of Task Forces, New Georgia Campaign, Solomon Islands, Vella Gulf,
6-7 August 1943*

Forces Involved

Allied:

DesDiv 12:

Dunlap (DD) (F) Comdr. Moosbrugger.

Craven (DD).

Maury (DD).

DesDiv 15:

Lang (DD) (F).

Strett (DD).

Stack (DD).

Japanese:

DesDiv 4:

Hagikaze (DD) (F) Capt. K. Suguara.

Arashi (DD).

DesDiv 27:

Kawakaze (DD).

Sbigure (DD).

Detailed Losses

Sunk

None.

Hagikaze (DD) torpedoed.

Arashi (DD) torpedoed.

Kawakaze (DD) torpedoed.

Damaged


None.

Sbigure (DD) gun fire.

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THE BATTLE OF VELLA GULF

NIGHT ACTION 6-7 AUG. 1943



THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Vella Lavella, 17-18 August 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

Nicholas (DD) (F)
Capt. T. J. Ryan, U. S. N.
O'Bannon (DD).
Taylor (DD).
Chevalier (DD).

Japanese:

DesRon 3: *Sazanami* (DD) (F)
Rear Admiral M. Ijuin, I. J. N.
DesDiv 17:
Hamakaze (DD).
Isokaze (DD).
DesDiv 27: *Shigure* (DD).
17 landing barges.
2 auxiliary subchasers.
4 shipboard landing craft.
3 armed Daitsu boats.

Detailed Losses

Sunk

None.

2 auxiliary subchasers.
2 shipboard landing craft.
1 armed boat.

Damaged

None.

Isokaze (DD) (Minor).

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Vella Lavella, 6-7 October 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

Selfridge (DD) (FF)

Capt. F. R. Walker, U. S. N.

Chevalier (DD).

O'Bannon (DD).

Ralph Tallot (DD).

Lavallette (DD).

Japanese:

DesRon 3: *Akagumo* (DD) (F)

Rear Admiral M. Ijūin, I. J. N.

DesDiv 17: *Isokaze*.

DesDiv 10:

Makigumo (DD).

Kazegumo (DD).

Yugumo (DD).

DesDiv 27:

Sbigure (DD).

Samidare (DD).

Fumitsuki (DD).

Matsukaze (DD).

Yunagi (DD).

Auxiliary subchasers and small boats from 1st
Base Force.

Detailed Losses

Sunk

Chevalier (DD) (Torpedo).

Yugumo (DD).

Damaged

O'Bannon (DD) (Collision).

Selfridge (DD) (Torpedo).

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THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Bougainville Campaign

While the New Georgia campaign was drawing to a successful end, plans were being laid by the United States to seize a beachhead on Bougainville Island to provide additional fighter and bomber strips for the campaign to neutralize the great base at Rabaul. This base served as the hub for the Japanese southern defense system, and the center of Japanese communication with the many thousands of troops in southern Bougainville, Choiseul and the Shortland Island area.

Initial softening-up operations were begun in early October with combined air raids and shore bombardments directed at the airfields and ground defense installations on Bougainville, Buka and Ballale Islands, as well as at the Bonis airstrip on Buka Island. As the month progressed, the air attacks by the Navy and Marine and Army shore-based planes operating under Commander Aircraft Northern Solomons were intensified until by 1 November raids of approximately 100 planes were being carried out 4 times a day; this effort totaled 3,259 sorties during October with the loss of only 26 planes. Although the ground installations were considered the primary targets during this period, the Japanese lost approximately 290 aircraft in combat with the result that in October Japanese aircraft sorties were less than half those of September. At the same time that these operations were causing such heavy attrition to the Japanese air force, long-range aircraft from the Southwest Pacific Command were carrying out supporting raids against positions at Rabaul and on New Britain.

On 27 October a diversionary landing on Treasury Island was successfully completed, and was followed by a landing on Choiseul. On 31 October and 1 November prior to landing on Bougainville, bombardments were conducted at Buna closely followed by air strikes from a United States carrier task force. Aircraft from this force were able to deny the enemy the use of that field during the first two critical days of the Bougainville landing, and while a few Japanese planes from Rabaul succeeded in attacking the ships off the beachhead, progress of the operation was not affected.

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Buka-Bonin Air Strikes, 1-2 November 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

Saratoga (CV) (FF)

Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman, Air Group 12

Princeton (CVL) Air Group 23.

San Diego (CLAA).

San Juan (CLAA).

Lardner (DD) (F).

Farenholt (DD).

Woodworth (DD).

Buchanan (DD).

Lansdowne (DD) (F).

Grayson (DD).

Sterett (DD) (F).

Stack (DD).

Wilson (DD).

Edwards (DD).

Japanese:

Shore-based air, and field defenses.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay

While the transports were being unloaded off Cape Torokina, a small United States cruiser task force stood by to the northwest to intercept and destroy any surface craft which might oppose the landing operations. During the early morning of 1 November, long-range reconnaissance aircraft reported a cruiser force standing down towards Cape Torokina from Rabaul, and a flow of information was maintained throughout the approach of the Japanese. Five destroyers, transporting 250 Army personnel destined for a counterlanding near Mutupina Point, accompanied the Japanese cruiser group until it was sighted by Allied aircraft during the morning. At this time the transports were ordered to return to Rabaul while the remainder of the ships continued in the hope of attacking the United States landing force about 2100. During the approach, the light cruiser *Sendai* was unsuccessfully attacked by reconnaissance aircraft, while at about 0130 November 1, a search plane successfully bombed the heavy cruiser *Haguro* inflicting sufficient damage to limit her speed to 26 knots.

At about 0230 radar contact with the enemy force was made by the United States cruisers, and the accompanying destroyers were ordered to attack with torpedoes. In the ensuing battle *Sendai* was sunk, and the destroyers *Samidare* and *Sbiratsuyu* retired from the battle after colliding while trying to avoid the torpedoes and gun fire of the United States force. During maneuvers to avoid the fire of the American cruisers, the heavy cruiser *Myoko*, flagship of the Japanese force, also collided with the destroyer *Hatsukaze* so slowing the latter that she became easy prey and was sunk by United States gun fire. About the same time *Haguro* received six 6-inch shell hits, four of which failed to explode. Throughout this battle Admiral Omori, the Japanese commander, had difficulty in locating his enemy although star shells and aircraft flares were repeatedly employed. Despite the fact that the night was dark and the sky overcast, the United States cruisers employed smoke for concealment, and thus hampered Japanese efforts at illumination. On the United States side the destroyer *Foote* was hit by a torpedo and the *Spence* and the light cruiser *Denver* received minor damage from shell fire. In view of the poor illumination, unknown composition of the United States force, damage to his ships from collision, and the fear of being within range of the United States dive bombers at daylight, Admiral Omori broke off the action and retired to Rabaul where he was immediately relieved of command for failure to destroy the invading transport force.

By nightfall on 2 November, the desired beachhead had been firmly established, and all immediate objectives secured. Construction of air strips and an advance naval base was immediately begun. With the establishment of this base offensive operations could be conducted beyond New Britain, Rabaul and New Ireland, a junction between South and Southwest Pacific forces was effected, and heavy concentrations of enemy troops were by-passed.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, 1-2 November 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

Montpelier (CL)
Rear Admiral A. S. Merrill, U. S. N.
Cleveland (CL).
Columbia (CL).
Denver (CL).
Charles Ausburne (DD).
Dyson (DD).
Claxton (DD).
Spence (DD).
Thatcher (DD).
Converse (DD).
Foote (DD).
Stanly (DD).

Japanese:

CruDiv 5:
Myoko (CA) (FF).
Haguro (CA)
Rear Admiral S. Omori, I. J. N.
CruDiv 10: *Agano* (CA).
DesRon 3: *Sendai* (CL).
Hatsukaze (DD).
Wakasuki (DD).
Naganami (DD).
Sbigure (DD).
Shiratsuyu (DD).
Samidare (DD).

Detailed Losses

Sunk

None.


Sendai (CL) (gun and torpedo).
Hatsukaze (DD) (collision and gun fire).

Damaged

Denver (CL) (gun fire).
Spence (DD) (gun fire).
Foote (DD) (torpedo).

Shiratsuyu (DD) (collision).
Haguro (CA) (bomb and gun fire).
Myoko (CA) (one shell hit and collision damage).

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THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Air Strikes on Rabaul

Immediately following the neutralization of the Buka airfields during the initial landings at Empress Augusta Bay the United States carrier force was ordered north to deliver an all-out attack upon the Japanese shipping reported concentrated at Rabaul. Approach to the target was made under cover of a weather front, and approximately 100 planes from the *Saratoga* and *Princeton* delivered the attack while shore-based Navy fighters from advanced bases in New Georgia flew fighter cover over the carriers. The latter planes were serviced on the carriers as necessary and sent back to their bases upon the return of the ships' own air groups.

This carrier strike of 5 November was directed primarily against a group of heavy cruisers which had just arrived from Truk and was presumably preparing for an attack on Allied shipping off the Bougainville beachhead. In this attack five enemy heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and two destroyers were damaged forcing abandonment of the plan. The damage to some was so serious that they were returned to Japan for repairs, and their services were thus lost to the Japanese Fleet for 5 months.

Six days later two United States carrier forces again raided Rabaul, followed the same day by a strike of some 40 B-24's from Solomon bases.

Although the destroyer *Suzunami* was sunk, and several ships damaged by the carrier planes, adverse weather conditions over the target area limited the damage which could be inflicted. During the retirement, about 120 enemy aircraft attacked the United States carriers but were beaten off after suffering heavy losses. Once again Navy planes based ashore at Segi Point provided fighter defense for the carriers while the latter's entire aircraft complements were sent against Rabaul.

Following the night surface engagement off Empress Augusta Bay and the carrier raids upon enemy surface forces in the vicinity of Rabaul, the Japanese effort to resist the American advance was confined to air raids against supply shipping during the first 3 weeks of November. Rapid replacement of aircraft permitted the Japanese to make 896 sorties during November, the greater portion of which were by fighters in defense of Rabaul. However several raids against United States shipping off Cape Torokina resulted in the loss of one high speed transport and damage to several other United States vessels. By the end of November, a total of 4,481 sorties by United States aircraft from the South Pacific command with the loss of only 69 planes had reduced the Japanese air garrison to impotence and forced them to resort to sporadic night raids of limited effectiveness.

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Rabaul Carrier Strike, 5 November 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

Saratoga (CV) (FF)
Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman.
Princeton (CVL).
San Diego (CLAA).
San Juan (CLAA).
Buchanan (DD).
Edwards (DD).
Farenholt (DD).
Grayson (DD).
Lansdowne (DD).
Lardner (DD).
Sterett (DD).
Stack (DD).
Wilson (DD).
Woodworth (DD).

Japanese:

Ships in harbor anchorages.

Detailed Losses

Sunk

None.

None.

Damaged

Maya (CA) bomb; fires; repairs completed 9 April 1944.
Atago (CA) bombs; fires; repairs completed 22 December 1943.
Mogami (CA) bombs; fires; repairs completed 18 February 1944.
Agano (CL) bomb; guns disabled.
Takao (CA) bombed.
Noshibi (CL) torpedo; hull damage.
Fujinami (DD) torpedo (dud); hull damage.
Wakatsuki (DD) bombs; numerous holes in hull at waterline; flooding.

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Rabaul Carrier Strike, 11 November 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

Essex (CV) (F)
Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery
Bunker Hill
Independence
Screen Vessels
Saratoga (CV) (F)
Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman.
Princeton (CVL).
San Diego (CLAA).
San Juan (CLAA).
Buchanan (DD).
Farenholt (DD).
Grayson (DD).
Lardner (DD).
Lansdowne (DD).
Woodworth (DD).

Japanese:

Ships at anchor and standing out of harbor.

Detailed Losses

Sunk

None.

Suzunami (DD) sunk near entrance to Rabaul Harbor.

Damaged

Agano (CA) major damage aft from torpedo. Towed to Truk.

Yubari (CL) minor damage due to strafing attack.

Urakaze (DD) minor damage due to strafing attack.

Naganami (DD) major damage aft from torpedo. Towed into Rabaul.

Umikaze (DD) flooding of compartments due to strafing attack.

Appendix 60

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Cape St. George

The final surface action in the Bougainville campaign occurred during the night of 24–25 November when a United States destroyer force surprised five Japanese destroyers in St. Georges Channel. This force, which was evacuating 700 troops from Buka to Rabaul, was attacked; 3 of the Japanese destroyers were sunk and 1 damaged without injury to United States ships.

In the final phases of the interdiction of Rabaul three carrier strikes were made against Kavieng, on 25 December and on 1–4 January. The objectives were to reduce Japanese shipping and to neutralize the local airfields in support of Marine landings at Cape Gloucester. Although no major targets were found the strikes succeeded in damaging the light cruiser *Noshiro* and two destroyers in addition to a number of aircraft and ground installations.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Battle of Cape St. George, 25 November 1943

Forces Involved

Allied:

DesDiv 45:

Charles F. Ausburne (DD).

Claxton (DD).

Dyson (DD).

DesDiv 46:

Converse (DD).

Spence (DD).

Japanese:

DesDiv 31:

Onami (DD), Capt. K. Kagawa.

Makanimi (DD).

DesDiv 11:

Amagiri (DD).

Yugiri (DD).

DesDiv 30: *Mizuki* (DD).

Detailed Losses

Sunk

None.

Onami (DD).

Makinami (DD).

Yugiri (DD).

Damaged

None.

Mizuki (DD) 1 hit (dud) gun fire.

Battle of Cape St. George

Carrier Raids on Kavieng, 25 December 1943 and 1 - 4 January 1944

Forces Involved

Task Force 37.2:

Bunker Hill (CV) (F)

Rear Admiral F. C. Sherman.

Monterey (CVL).

Bradford (DD).

Brown (DD).

Bell (DD).

Charrette (DD).

Connor (DD).

Cowell (DD).

Appendix 61

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Conclusion

Except for mopping up operations, the Solomons campaign came to an end with the landings upon New Britain. With these landings the advance from the southeast through the Solomon Islands merged with the advance from the southwest through New Guinea. Along the line of advance all Japanese strongholds had either been captured or neutralized. In the Solomons operations Japan had lost a total of 50 combat vessels as well as having a large number of ships damaged and rendered inoperative for periods of several months. In the air she had incurred a loss of 2,935 aircraft and the lack of rescue facilities caused an equal loss in combat crews. The latter losses were keenly felt for, due to the lack of fuel and training facilities and the pressure of the United States advance, it was never possible to replace these highly trained first line aircrews. The losses suffered in the Solomons weakened all subsequent Japanese defensive efforts and reduced Japanese naval air strength to a point from which it was never able to recover.


Bibliography



1. ONI Combat Narrative No. 11, "The Battle of Savo Island."
2. ONI Combat Narrative, "The Battle of the Eastern Solomons."
3. ONI Combat Narrative No. IV, "The Battle of Cape Esperance."
4. ONI Combat Narrative, "Battle of Santa Cruz."
5. ONI Combat Narrative, "Battle of Guadalcanal."
6. ONI Combat Narrative No. VII, "Battle of Tassafaronga, 30 November 1942."
7. ONI Combat Narrative No. XI, "Bombardments of Munda and Villa-Stanmore."
8. ONI Combat Narrative No. XII, "The Bougainville Landings and the Battle of Augusta Bay."
9. Navy Department Communiques 1-300, December 1941 to March 1943.
10. "Operations in Pacific Ocean Area", Nav 43 dated 28 February 1944.
11. Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area report of "Operations in Pacific Ocean Area", November 1943 dated 28 February 1944.
12. Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area report of "Operations in Pacific Ocean Area", December 1943, January 1944.
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	Nav. No.	U. S. S. B. S. No.
Rear Admiral Matsuyama (Battle of Savo Island)	61	255
Capt. Kato (Midway-Savo Island).....	83	407
Capt. Yamamoto and Ohmae (Solomons Campaign).....	109	467
Comdr. Sukino (Solomons and Santa Cruz).....	8	46
Capt. Watanabe, Y. (Battle of Midway)	13	65
Comdr. Okumiya (Solomons-Santa Cruz)	16	75
Capt. Toyama (Midway Transports).....	60	252
Comdr. Shibata and Capt. Inoue (Midway)	66	295
Capt. Miyazaki (Air Operations Solomons and New Guinea)	97	466
Rear Admiral Komura (<i>Chikuma</i> and <i>Tone</i>)	106	464
Lt. Comdr. Tokuno (Savo Island—surface)	33	138
Capt. Ohmae (Defense Plans—Marshalls and Gilberts)	38	160
Lt. Comdr. Unoki (Munda).....	46	195
Vice Admiral S. Omori, I. J. N. (Solomons)	78	389
Capt. Ohmae (Overall Planning)	43	192

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15. Japanese Government reply to Nav Memo No. 11 "List of Sunk and Damaged Naval Vessels."
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 - WDC No. 160268 War Diary of Sixth Fleet, 1942.
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THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Japanese Naval Losses in the Solomons, 4 May 1942 - 17 February 1944

Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
4 May 1942	<i>Okinoshima</i> (CM)	Tulagi	Air attack—attacked by carrier-based planes. No hindrance to operational movements. Some personal casualties.
Do	<i>Yuzuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—engaged carrier-based planes. No damage to hinder operational movements. Some personal casualties. Captain killed.
5 May 1942	<i>Kikuzuki</i> (DD)	do	Damaged in air attack. Ran aground—sunk by carrier-based planes.
8 May 1942	<i>Shobo</i> (CVL)	Coral Sea	Air-attacked—dive-bombing (single-engine bomber) and torpedo attack. Sunk.
Do	<i>Shokaku</i> (CV)	do	Air attack—3 bomb hits, 8 near misses. Completed repairs at Kure Navy Yard on 19 July 1942.
12 May 1942	<i>Okinoshima</i> (CM)	Off Cape St. George	Submarine—sunk.
22 July 1942	<i>Mizuki</i> (DD)	Buna	Air attack—attacked by total of about 100 fighters and bombers. Some bomb damage.
26 July 1942	<i>Asanagi</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—scraped reef while evading, putting slight bend in starboard main shaft.
8 Aug. 1942	<i>Aoba</i> (CA)	Near Tulagi	Night battle—hit on No. 2 torpedo mount. Caused fire. Torpedo mounts No. 1 and No. 2 disabled.
Do	<i>Chokai</i> (CA)	Battle Savo Island	Night engagement—No. 1 turret inoperational. Operations room demolished.
9 Aug. 1942	<i>Kako</i> (CA)	Kavieng	Submarine—sunk.
19 Aug. 1942	<i>Akikaze</i> (DD)	Guadalcanal	Received a direct bomb hit on the after end of No. 3 turret.
Do	<i>Hagikaze</i> (DD)	Near Solomons	Air attack—damaged aft. Repairs completed 15 March 1943.
22 Aug. 1942	<i>Kawakaze</i> (DD)	Solomons	At 0550 (—9) was strafed by enemy planes at a point 100 miles northwest of Tulagi.
24 Aug. 1942	<i>Chitose</i> (CVS)	Battle of Eastern Solomons	Air attack dive-bombers—proceeded to Truk.
Do	<i>Ryūjo</i> (CVL)	do	Air attack—dive-bombing (single-engine bomber) and torpedo attack. Sunk.
25 Aug. 1942	<i>Mutsuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—attacked by 3 B-17's. Hit in after engine room. Sunk.

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
25 Aug. 1942	<i>Jintsu</i> (CL)	do	Air attack—1 bomb hit forward. No. 1 and No. 2 guns and adjacent hull damaged. Proceeded to Truk. Magazines flooded.
28 Aug. 1942	<i>Asagiri</i> (DD)	Solomons	Air attack—bombed by 10 dive-bombers. Only able to make 6 knots. Sunk.
Do	<i>Shirakumo</i> (DD)	do	Was rendered incapable of navigation following dive-bombing attack—towed.
Do	<i>Yugiri</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—dive-bombed by 10 planes. Considerable damage to upper deck, etc. Repairs completed at Kure 15 Jan. 1943.
1 Sept. 1942	<i>Akitsuibima</i> (CVS)	Buka	Air attack—some damage from near-misses, but no hindrance to operational movements.
14 Sept. 1942	<i>Myoko</i> (CA)	Solomons	Air attack—attacked by 10 B-17's. Damage very slight.
25 Sept. 1942	<i>Yura</i> (CA)	Shortland	Air attack—attacked by 2 B-17's. One bomb-hit on No. 7 turret.
2 Oct. 1942	<i>Tenryu</i> (CL)	Rabaul	Air attack—one bomb-hit and one near-miss. Repaired locally by repair-ship. One torpedo hit aft. Sunk.
5 Oct. 1942	<i>Minegumo</i> (DD)	Between Shortland and Guadalcanal	Air attack—near-misses. Major damage to bow on both sides. Flooded throughout below upper-deck line. Best speed 14 knots.
Do	<i>Murasame</i> (DD)	En route from Shortland to Guadalcanal	Air attack—3 near-misses. Many holes on port side forward. Best speed 21 knots.
11 Oct. 1942	<i>Hatsuyuki</i> (DD)	Near Savo Island	Night engagement—minor damage.
Do	<i>Natsugumo</i> (DD)	do	Dive-bombing attack—sunk.
12 Oct. 1942	<i>Fubuki</i> (DD)	Battle Cape Esperance	Night cruiser action—sunk.
Do	<i>Murakumo</i> (DD)	Near Savo Island	Dive-bombing attack—sunk.
Do	<i>Aoba</i> (CA)	Battle Cape Esperance	Night battle—hit on director. Fire and flooding caused.
Do	<i>Furutaka</i> (CA)	do	Night engagement—sunk.
14 Oct. 1942	<i>Samidare</i> (DD)	Solomons	Air attack—minor damage.
19 Oct. 1942	<i>Ayanami</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—minor damage.
24 Oct. 1942	<i>Akikaze</i> (DD)	Battle of Santa Cruz	Air attack—flooding in boiler room and able to proceed only on engines of one side. Able to make 21 knots.
25 Oct. 1942	<i>Yura</i> (CL)	East of Indispensable Strait	Air attack—sunk.

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
26 Oct. 1942	<i>Chikuma</i> (CA)	Battle of Santa Cruz	Air attack—engaged 30 bombers and 9 fighters. Five bomb-hits on main fire control station aft of bridge and torpedo tubes. Forward port engine disabled.
Do	<i>Akizuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—No. 1 boiler-room and starboard engines disabled.
Do	<i>Shokaku</i> (CV)	do	Air attack—dive-bombers—flight deck inoperational. Maximum speed 21 knots.
Do	<i>Zuibo</i> (CVL)	do	Air attack—dive-bombers—flight deck inoperational.
27 Oct. 1942	<i>Teruzuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—attacked by large-type planes. Minor damage.
5 Nov. 1942	<i>Amagiri</i> (DD)	Rabaul	Air attack—hull dented below water line by torpedo-hit (dud).
7 Nov. 1942	<i>Nagatsuki</i> (DD)	Solomons	At 1530 "A" Reinforcement Unit was attacked by more than 20 enemy small and medium planes. Major damage.
Do	<i>Takanami</i> (DD)	do	Do
8 Nov. 1942	<i>Mochizuki</i> (DD)	Tassafaronga	At 2030, she received 1 direct torpedo hit from a PT boat. Was not seriously damaged.
13 Nov. 1942	<i>Akatsuki</i> (DD)	Battle of Guadalcanal	Night engagement—sunk.
Do	<i>Yudachi</i> (DD)	do	Night engagement—unable to navigate. Sunk.
Do	<i>Hiei</i> (BB)	do	Night engagement, and air attack—sunk by dive-bombing and torpedo attack.
Do	<i>Ikazuchi</i> (DD)	do	Night engagement—hits on No. 1 and No. 2 guns and amidships.
Do	<i>Murasame</i> (DD)	do	Night engagement—hit in No. 1 boiler-room. Best speed, 21 knots.
Do	<i>Amatsukaze</i> (DD)	do	Night action—minor damage.
Do	<i>Hatsukaze</i> (DD)	do	Night battle—damaged.
Do	<i>Yukikaze</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—near-miss. Turbine foundation destroyed.
Do	<i>Mitsubishi</i> (DD)	Shortland	Air attack—engaged one B-17. Fire and engine room flooded. Disabled but no danger of sinking.
14 Nov. 1942	<i>Isuzu</i> (CA)	Battle of Guadalcanal	Air attack—two near-misses. Severe flooding in No. 3 boiler-room. Best possible speed, 15 knots.

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
Do.....	<i>Chokai</i> (CA)	do.....	Air attack—bow flooding from near-miss, but no obstacle to operational movements.
Do.....	<i>Kinugasa</i> (CA)	do.....	Air attack—sunk.
Do.....	<i>Maya</i> (CA)	do.....	Air attack—near-hits on port side, amidships, starting fires which were put out. Maximum speed, 30 knots.
15 Nov. 1942.....	<i>Ayanami</i> (DD)	do.....	Night engagement—sunk.
Do.....	<i>Kirishima</i> (BB)	do.....	Do.....
18 Nov. 1942.....	<i>Umikaze</i> (DD)	Buna.....	Air attack—fire amidships and in No. 3 boiler-room.
24 Nov. 1942.....	<i>Hayashio</i> (DD)	Solomons.....	At 1925 was dive-bombed and sunk at 2305.
29 Nov. 1942.....	<i>Makigumo</i> (DD)	East of Buna.....	Air attack—near miss. No. 2 fireroom on fire, but fire extinguished before serious damage.
Do.....	<i>Shiratsuyu</i> (DD)	do.....	Air attack—one bomb hit forward. Flooding. Best speed, 21 knots.
30 Nov. 1942.....	<i>Takanami</i> (DD)	Battle of Tassafaronga.....	Night engagement—sunk.
Do.....	<i>Naganami</i> (DD)	do.....	Surface engagement—minor damage from large-caliber shell fragments.
1 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Isonami</i> (DD)	Buna.....	Air attack—near-miss. No. 2 boiler-room flooded. Forward tank No. 3 rendered useless.
3 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Makinami</i> (DD)	Guadalcanal.....	Was slightly damaged by dive-bomber.
7 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Arashi</i> (DD)	Shortland.....	Was slightly damaged.
Do.....	<i>Nowaki</i> (DD)	Solomons.....	Air attack dive-bombers—near-miss. Large hole in starboard side. Forward engine-room and No. 2 fireroom flooded. Disabled.
Do.....	<i>Oyashio</i> (DD)	Shortland.....	Had 2 killed and 8 wounded by gunfire.
8 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Isonami</i> (DD)	East of Buna.....	Air attack—near-miss. Minor damage.
12 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Teruzuki</i> (DD)	Guadalcanal.....	Torpedo boat—two torpedo hits. Sunk.
16 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Kagero</i> (DD)	Shortland.....	The hull was slightly damaged by dive-bombers.
18 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Tenryu</i> (CL)	Solomons.....	Submarine—sunk.
25 Dec. 1942.....	<i>Mizuki</i> (DD)	do.....	Collision—No. 2 and No. 3 boiler-rooms flooded. Proceeding on 1 set of engines. Best speed, 6 knots.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
Do	<i>Uzuki</i> (DD)	do	Collided with the <i>Nankai Maru</i> , was seriously damaged, and rendered un navigable.
26 Dec. 1942	<i>Ariake</i> (DD)	do	At 0801, 3 B-24's attacked. 28 men were killed and 40 wounded by near-miss. Ship afire. Best speed, 16 knots.
Do	<i>Tachikaze</i> (DD)	Rabaul	Air attack—one bomb hit on port bow. Major damage. Additional near-misses.
1 Jan. 1943	<i>Suzukaze</i> (DD)	Solomons	Air attack—near-miss. No. 2 crew compartment holed on port side. Best speed, 12 knots.
2 Jan. 1943	<i>Suzukaze</i> (DD)	do	Near-miss of a bomb in an attack by about 20 bombers and fighters at 1605 (—9) on 2 Jan. southeast of Rendova Island.
10 Jan. 1943	<i>Hatsukaze</i> (DD)	do	Was hit by a torpedo just under the ward-room on the port side and was seriously damaged.
Do	<i>Natsushio</i> (DD)	Guadalcanal	Torpedo boat—one torpedo hit. Holes in both sides. Speed, 18 knots.
14 Jan. 1943	<i>Noshiro</i> (DD)	Kavieng	Received 1 direct hit and 5 near-misses.
Do	<i>Oyodo</i> (DD)	do	Near miss. Sustained light damage.
Do	<i>Yamagumo</i> (DD)	do	Sustained 155 holes from near-misses and strafing. An oil tank flooded.
15 Jan. 1943	<i>Arashi</i> (DD)	Northeast of New Georgia	Air attack—attacked by 9 dive-bombers. Near-miss damaged rudder.
Do	<i>Urakaze</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—fighter—small holes in hull from strafing.
19 Jan. 1943	<i>Akizuki</i> (DD)	Solomons	Submarine—one torpedo hit. Moderate damage. Able to proceed at 20 knots
23 Jan. 1943	<i>Hakaze</i> (DD)	Kavieng	Submarine—sunk.
1 Feb. 1943	<i>Makigumo</i> (DD)	Doma Cove, Guadalcanal	Mine—sunk.
Do	<i>Makinami</i> (DD)	East of New Georgia	Air attack—attacked by 30 bombers. No 3 crew compartment, No. 1 and No. 2 boiler rooms completely flooded. Unable to make headway.
4 Feb. 1943	<i>Kawakaze</i> (DD)	East of Kolombangara	Air attack—engaged 10 small-type planes. Flooding and minor damage. No hindrance to operational movements.
Do	<i>Kuroshio</i> (DD)	Guadalcanal	Slightly damaged by near-misses in dive-bombing attack but continued in the operation.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
Do	<i>Maikaze</i> (DD)	South of Shortland	Air attack—near-misses. Attacked several times by dive-bombers. Flooded and disabled.
Do	<i>Sbiranubi</i> (DD)	East of Kolombangara	Air attack, dive-bombers—engaged 10 small planes. No. 3 turret caught fire but no effect on cruising ability.
7 Feb. 1943	<i>Isokaze</i> (DD)	West of Guadalcanal	Air attack, dive-bombers—engaged 30 small planes. Received 2 hits. No damage to engines.
Do	<i>Hamakaze</i> (DD)	Southeast of Gizo	Dive-bombing—engaged 30 planes. No. 1 turret hit by bomb.
18 Feb. 1943	<i>Sata</i> (AO)	Solomons	Was hit by a torpedo and became un navigable.
3 Mar. 1943	<i>Arashio</i> (DD)	Bismarck Sea near Rabaul	Skip-bombing (B-25's)—sunk.
Do	<i>Asabio</i> (DD)	do	Do
Do	<i>Shirayuki</i> (DD)	do	Do
Do	<i>Tokitsukaze</i> (DD)	do	Do
6 Mar. 1943	<i>Minogumo</i> (DD)	Kolombangara	Surface engagement—engaged more than 3 cruisers, starting large fires. Sunk.
Do	<i>Murasame</i> (DD)	do	Surface engagement—flooding and afire from engagement with over 3 cruisers. Sunk.
1 April 1943	<i>Samidare</i> (DD)	Off Shortland	Air attack—near-miss. Rivets loosened.
2 April 1943	<i>Aoba</i> (CA)	Kavieng	Air attack—caused fire in after part of ship but no danger of sinking.
Do	<i>Fumitsuki</i> (DD)	West of Kavieng	Air attack—near-miss. Flooding in boiler-room. Could navigate under own power.
8 May 1943	<i>Oyashio</i> (DD)	Kolombangara	Dive-bombers—sunk while rescuing personnel from <i>Kagero</i> and <i>Kuroshio</i> .
Do	<i>Kagero</i> (DD)	do	Mine and air attack—after touching 3 mines was attacked by 50 dive-bombers. Flooding increased and ship sank.
Do	<i>Kuroshio</i> (DD)	do	Mine—touched 3 mines. Large fires started. Sunk.
5 July 1943	<i>Tanikaze</i> (DD)	Kula Gulf	Night battle—engaged cruisers and destroyers. Unable to use generators.
Do	<i>Yubari</i> (CL)	Off Buin	Mine—flooded in 1 section. Could navigate under own power.
6 July 1943	<i>Hagikaze</i> (DD)	Southeast end of Kolombangara	Air attack after running aground—sunk.
5 July 1943	<i>Mochizuki</i> (DD)	Kolombangara	Night engagement—No. 1 gun and No. 1 multiple torpedo tubes damaged.

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Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
Do.	<i>Satsuki</i> (DD)	do	Night engagement—slight damage to upper deck amidships and damage to armament.
Do.	<i>Suzukaze</i> (DD)	Kula Gulf	Night engagement—engaged cruisers and destroyers. No. 1 turret jammed. Searchlights smashed.
6 July 1943	<i>Nagatsuki</i> (DD)	Southeast end of Kolombangara	Air attack after running aground—sunk.
Do	<i>Niizuki</i> (DD)	Kula Gulf	Surface engagement—sunk.
12 July 1943	<i>Jintsu</i> (CL)	Near New Georgia	Night engagement—sunk.
15 July 1943	<i>Nagara</i> (CL)	Kavieng	Mine—exploded under stern. Slight damage to bottom.
17 July 1943	<i>Hatsuyuki</i> (DD)	Shortland	Air attack—sunk.
Do	<i>Minazuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—many near-misses. No hindrance to operational movements.
Do	<i>Satsuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—major damage to machine guns and searchlights. Slight hull damage. Best speed 20 knots.
Do	<i>Yunagi</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—near-miss. Considerable damage to hull and armament. No hindrance to navigation under ordinary conditions.
20 July 1943	<i>Kumano</i> (CA)	North of Kolombangara	Air attack—major damage from torpedo hit in starboard side, aft. Repairs completed at Kure 31 Oct. 1943.
Do	<i>Yugure</i> (DD)	North of Kula Gulf	Air attack—hull broke up. Sank off Kolombangara.
Do	<i>Kiyonami</i> (DD)	Choiseul Island	Dive-bomber attack—sunk.
22 July 1943	<i>Nissbin</i> (CVS)	East of Buin (Bougainville Island)	Air attack, dive-bombers—sunk.
28 July 1943	<i>Mikatsuki</i> (DD)	Cape Gloucester	Aground and sunk by aircraft (30 B-25's).
Do	<i>Ariake</i> (DD)	Northeast of Cape Gloucester	Air attack after running aground—sunk (30 B-25's).
3 Aug. 1943	<i>Akikaze</i> (DD)	South of Rabaul	Air attack—major damage in vicinity of bridge.
6 Aug. 1943	<i>Arashi</i> (DD)	Kolombangara	Sunk by night surface action.
Do	<i>Hagikaze</i> (DD)	do	Do
Do	<i>Kawakaze</i> (DD)	do	Do
17 Aug. 1943	<i>Isokaze</i> (DD)	Vella Gulf	Night battle—engaged 4 cruisers and 2 destroyers. Slight damage.
26 Aug. 1943	<i>Hamakaze</i> (DD)	North of Buka	Air attack—near misses caused some flooding. Slight damage to bridge.

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Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
2 Oct. 1943	<i>Minazuki</i> (DD)	Kolombangara	Surface engagement—engaged 3 cruisers and 3 destroyers. Hits above waterline on starboard side.
6 Oct. 1943	<i>Kazakya</i> (AO)	Solomons	Torpedoed and sunk.
Do	<i>Yugumo</i> (DD)	North of Vella Lavella	Gunfire—sunk.
12 Oct. 1943	<i>Minazuki</i> (DD)	Rabaul	Air attack—near-miss. Revolving mechanism of No. 1 and No. 2 guns disabled.
Do	<i>Mochizuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—near-miss. Minor hull damage, No. 2 gun disabled.
16 Oct. 1943	SCS No. 31 (1007T)	do	Air attack—sunk.
21 Oct. 1943	<i>Kiso</i> (CL)	Northeast of St. George Cape	Air attack—one hit by 80-Kg. bomb causing moderate damage to hull. Repairs completed Maizuru 2 March 1944.
24 Oct. 1943	<i>Mochizuki</i> (DD)	Northwest of Rabaul	Air attack—sunk.
1 Nov. 1943	<i>Haguro</i> (CA)	Cape Torokina	One bomb hit amidships—damaged bridge and side plating. Slowed speed to 26 knots.
Do	<i>Myoko</i> (CA)	Rabaul	Air attack—near-misses, little damage.
Do	<i>Shiratsuyu</i> (DD)	Empress Augusta Bay	Collision—collided with <i>Samidare</i> following damage to rudder by shell hit. Slight damage to hull.
Do	<i>Samidare</i> (DD)	do	Collision—collided with <i>Shiratsuyu</i> . Bow stove in. Repairs completed at Yokosuka 15 March 1944.
2 Nov. 1943	<i>Haguro</i> (CA)	do	Night engagement—hull and armament damaged by shellfire.
Do	<i>Hatsukaze</i> (DD)	do	Night battle—disappeared after collision with <i>Myoko</i> .
Do	<i>Myoko</i> (CA)	West of Bougainville	Collision—during a night action collided with <i>Hatsukaze</i> . Slight damage to hull.
Do	<i>Sendai</i> (CL)	Battle of Empress Augusta Bay	Night engagement—sunk after reporting inability to navigate.
Do	<i>Fumizuki</i> (DD)	Solomons	Fuel oil tank riddled by machine gun fire from fighters at 1040 (—9), 6 killed, 4 injured.
Do	<i>Shiratsuyu</i> (DD)	do	1040 (—9) attack by dive-bombers main battery director damaged, 4 killed, 2 injured.
3 Nov. 1943	<i>Naka</i> (CL)	Between Truk and Rabaul	Air attack—bridge strafed by machine gun fire.

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Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
4 Nov. 1943	<i>Isokaze</i> (DD)	Kavieng	Mine—port side aft, touched mine. Maximum speed, 16 knots.
5 Nov. 1943	<i>Maya</i> (CA)	Rabaul	Air attack—bomb hits. Fire in port engine room. Repairs completed at Yokosuka 9 April 1944, including bulge and other refitting.
Do	<i>Atago</i> (CA)	do	Air attack—damage to hull by 2 near-misses by 150 Kg. bombs. Repairs completed at Yokosuka 22 Dec. 1943.
Do	<i>Mogami</i> (CA)	do	Air attack—one bomb hit in hull amidships. Fires. Repairs completed at Kure 18 Feb. 1944.
Do	<i>Agano</i> (CL)	do	Air attack—one AA gun disabled.
Do	<i>Takao</i> (CA)	do	Air attack—one bomb hit.
Do	<i>Noshiro</i> (CL)	do	Air attack—hull damaged 0715 (—9).
Do	<i>Fujinami</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—torpedo hit (dud). Minor damage. 1 killed, 9 injured.
6 Nov. 1943	<i>Wakatsuki</i> (DD)	do	Air attack—holed many times below waterline. Minor damage.
Do	<i>PC No. 11</i> (270T)	do	Air attack—sunk.
10 Nov. 1943	<i>PC-</i> (200T)	do	Do
11 Nov. 1943	<i>Yubari</i> (CL)	Outside Rabaul Harbor	Air attack—machine gun strafing. Small holes in after bridge, etc.
Do	<i>Urakaze</i> (DD)	Off Rabaul	Air attack—strafed by machine guns. Slight damage.
Do	<i>Umikaze</i> (DD)	New Britain Area	Air attack—strafing. Minor flooding.
Do	<i>Naganami</i> (DD)	Outside Rabaul Harbor	Air attack by carrier torpedo planes. Aft section damaged. Towed into port by the <i>Makanami</i> .
Do	<i>Agano</i> (CA)	do	Air attack by carrier torpedo planes—one torpedo hit. Aft section sheared off. Towed to Truk by <i>Noshiro</i> (CL).
Do	<i>Suzunami</i> (DD)	Rabaul	Air attack, dive-bombers—while mounting torpedoes. Explosions split hull. Sunk near entrance to Rabaul Harbor.
13 Nov. 1943	<i>Yubari</i> (DD)	Inside Rabaul Harbor	Air attack—near-miss. Small holes forward.
24 Nov. 1943	do	South of New Britain	Air attack, dive-bombers—near-miss. Some damage to hull and armament.
25 Nov. 1943	<i>Mizuki</i> (DD)	Battle of Cape St. George	Surface engagement—shelled by destroyer. Hit by 1 dud.

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Date	Ship	Place	Remarks
Do	<i>Yugiri</i> (DD)	do	Surface night engagement—sunk.
Do	<i>Makinami</i> (DD)	do	Do
Do	<i>Onami</i> (DD)	do	Night engagement—sunk.
1 Dec. 1943	<i>Wakatsuki</i> (DD)	Solomons	Air attack—near-miss. Some damage to armament.
7 Dec. 1943	<i>Akikaze</i> (DD)	Near Kavieng	Collision—collided with <i>Amagiri</i> . Starboard side damaged. Repairs completed at Truk 20 May 1944.
Do	<i>Amagiri</i> (DD)	do	Collision—collided with <i>Akikaze</i> . Minor damage near bow.
21 Dec. 1943	<i>Akikaze</i> (DD)	Between Rabaul and Truk	Air attack—near-miss. Rivets sheared, causing flooding.
1 Jan. 1944	<i>Noshiro</i> (CL)	Kavieng	Air attack, dive-bombers—hull damage from bomb hit (dud), near-misses, and machine gun strafing.
4 Jan. 1944	<i>Fumitsuki</i> (DD)	do	CV air attack, 50 planes—flooding after torpedo and bomb attack.
Do	<i>Satsuki</i> (DD)	Kavieng (Steffen Strait)	Carrier air attack by 50 planes. Outer plates twisted. Propeller shaft bent. Maximum speed, 24 knots.
14 Jan. 1944	<i>Matsukaze</i> (DD)	Rabaul	Air attack—small holes in hull.
17 Jan. 1944	<i>Harusame</i> (DD)	Solomons	Was slightly damaged.

Appendix 64

VIII

The New Guinea Campaign

Introduction

Concurrently with the occupation of the Philippines and Indonesia the Japanese advanced into the large island-studded area north of Australia. Within 3 weeks after the fall of Manila in January 1942, the first landings at Rabaul (New Britain) and Kavieng (New Ireland) took place. From Rabaul, which became the center of strength in the Southwest Pacific Area, the Japanese staged a two-pronged drive designed to establish a line of defensive positions through this area and to isolate Australia from the United States. Their forces moved southeastward through the Solomons and westward into New Guinea, the last important island barrier between northern Australia and her advancing enemy.

The land mass of New Guinea, covered with impenetrable jungle backed by high mountains, includes an area of more than 300,000 square miles and extends in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction for 1,500 miles from Cape Sansapor to Milne Bay. Because of the difficult terrain and heavy jungle, land routes of communication at the beginning of the war were almost nonexistent and were never developed to the point where they were of military importance. Consequently the movements of both sides were confined to amphibious jumps along the coast line, and air power and air transport were especially important in this theater.

During the first week of March 1942 the Japanese made their initial landings in New Guinea at Lae and Salamaua on the west shore of the Huon Gulf and commenced construction of air facilities in preparation for further advances. During this operation they were attacked by United States carrier planes which succeeded in damaging one light cruiser, one mine layer and one destroyer, and in sinking three 7,000-ton merchant ships. In the first week of May 1942 a Japanese invasion force, rounding the eastern tip of New Guinea and bound for Port Moresby, was checked by United States naval forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea. This was the first setback sustained by the Japanese in their southward advance, and the Allied success prepared the way for the offensive operations which moved westward, step by step, along the New Guinea coast until finally Sansapor was secured on 30 July 1944.

In contrast to the Allied organization which provided separate commands for the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific, the Japanese command, the Southeast Area Fleet and the Eighth Area Army, established at Rabaul, was charged with the direction of all operations in the Southeast Area. Since it involved a direct threat to Rabaul and Truk, the Solomons Campaign as fought was considered more important by the Japanese than the New Guinea Campaign, and consequently the majority of Japanese naval air and surface strength in the Rabaul Area was directed towards the Solomons. Indeed it was not until October 1943 that the Japanese Ninth Fleet was activated in New Guinea with headquarters at Wewak, and even then it was not an operational fleet but served only as an administrative command designed to maintain closer liaison with the Japanese Army. With the exception of the Coral Sea Battle there were no major naval engagements in the New Guinea Campaign. By the time the Allies gathered sufficient strength to commence the drive to the Admiralties and Hollandia, the Japanese Navy based at Rabaul and Truk had been so reduced by constant losses in the Solomons and by carrier strikes in the Central Pacific that it did not move to oppose the amphibious forces of the United States Seventh Fleet.

Beginning of the Allied Offensive

After checking the Japanese offensive at the Battle of the Coral Sea the United States and her Allies commenced gathering forces for a counteroffensive. The tasks outlined by the United States Joint Chiefs

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of Staffs involved the seizure and occupation of three general objectives, namely: (1) the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi and adjacent positions; (2) the remainder of the Solomon Islands and the Northeast Coast of New Guinea including Lae and Salamaua; and (3) Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Guinea–New Britain–New Ireland Area. The latter two operations were further divided into five phases: (a) the capture of the airfield at Gasmata and of Lae and Salamaua, (b) the occupation of Cape Gloucester and Madang, (c) the capture of Lorengau, (d) the capture of Kavieng, and (e) the capture of Rabaul. The speed with which the tasks could be performed as well as the timing of the separate operations was governed by the availability of shipping and the speed of development of bases and airfields necessary to insure air superiority.

On 21 and 22 July 1942 the Japanese landed at Buna-Gona and Sanananda on the northeast coast of New Guinea, and in August they began to push southward across the Papuan Peninsula in a renewed drive on Port Moresby, which had been saved from invasion in May. This renewed Japanese offensive in New Guinea, together with the fact that the Guadalcanal-Tulagi operation was prolonged over a period of months, delayed the Allied drive to Lae and Salamaua until September 1943. To support the overland drive on Port Moresby the Japanese, during the last week of August 1942, landed troops at Milne Bay. Here, after suffering heavy casualties at the hands of the Australian troops the Japanese, for the first time during the war, were forced to evacuate. By the autumn of 1942 the Australian forces had gathered sufficient strength to shift from defensive tactics to counterattacks against the Japanese entrenched in the Papuan Peninsula.

While the Japanese concentrated a major portion of their available naval, air, and land strength on the battle of Guadalcanal, the Allies executed an envelopment which brought the Buna Campaign to a successful conclusion. The Allies were now in a position to commence preparations for offensive action against Lae and Salamaua.

Japanese Attempts to Reinforce Lae and Salamaua

The defeat of the Japanese in the Papuan campaign impressed them with the existing threat to the Lae–Salamaua control of the Dampier Strait. In an effort to provide reinforcements they successfully sailed a high speed convoy to Lae in January 1943 and landed supplies and troops with light losses. Encouraged by this success they repeated the attempt in March but were intercepted in the Bismarck Sea and turned back by land-based planes operating from New Guinea.

Shipping Strike in the Bismarck Sea, 1-4 March 1943

On the afternoon of 1 March 1943 a large enemy convoy was sighted by B-24's north of Cape Gloucester bound for Lae in an effort to reinforce Japanese troops in the Lae-Salamaua area. The convoy consisted of eight destroyers (*Shikiname*, *Ukikaze*, *Asakumo*, *Uranami*, *Arashio*, *Asashio*, *Sbirayuki*, *Tokitsukaze*), a special service vessel (*Nojima*) and eight transports (*Shinar Maru* 3,800 tons; *Teiyo Maru* 6,870 tons; *Oigawa Maru* 6,500 tons; *Kyokusei Maru* 5,500 tons; *Taipei Maru* 3,750 tons; *Aiyo Maru* 2,746 tons; *Kenbu Maru* 700 tons, and *Kokoku Maru* 543 tons). On board the convoy was a force of about 5,000 ground troops assigned to the 51st Japanese Division. In addition the *Kenbu Maru* was loaded with aircraft, fuel, and spare parts, sorely needed in the New Guinea area.

When first sighted a heavy frontal weather condition provided the convoy with a certain amount of protection. However, beginning at dawn on 2 March, United States Army and Australian aircraft made repeated attacks on the convoy with good results, despite the defensive efforts of Japanese air cover from Rabaul. The weather again interfered and no effective attacks were delivered during the afternoon.

During the night of 2–3 March the convoy was tracked by Navy seaplanes which dropped bombs intermittently without results. At dawn fresh attacks were made on the Japanese ships which were then

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approximately 60 miles east of Salamaua. Favored by good weather the Allied fighters and bombers shuttled continuously from New Guinea bases to Huon Gulf and succeeded in sinking many ships.

During the night PT boats attacked a damaged cargo vessel which was lying dead in the water and sent it to the bottom. The following day, 4 March, the Allied Air Force brought the engagement to a close by sinking the only destroyer remaining in the area.

According to the Japanese a total of thirteen vessels were sunk. Only 4 destroyers (*Sbikiname*, *Ukikaze*, *Asakumo* and *Uranami*) managed to reach a friendly port. The loss of personnel also was high, totaling about 2,900 men, despite the fact that 2,734 survivors were rescued by destroyers and submarines.

This shipping strike demonstrated to the Japanese that they could not run cargo ships or fast destroyer transports to any front on the north coast of New Guinea east of Wewak. Thenceforth, in order to reinforce their positions in northeastern New Guinea, they were compelled to rely upon barges, small craft and submarines.

Strategic Situation — Spring 1943

Following the conclusion of the Papuan campaign Allied forces moved steadily along the coast of New Guinea. By April 1943 they had pushed 75 miles northwest of Buna. Meanwhile the enemy was reinforcing his land and air strength along a strong defensive line extending from Rabaul to Hollandia. Throughout 1942 Rabaul had been the headquarters for joint Army-Navy air operations directed against Allied positions in the Solomons and New Guinea. However during the spring of 1943 the Japanese Fourth Air Army, consisting of the Sixth and Seventh Air Divisions, was established at Wewak, which thereafter became steadily more important as an air and shipping center for operations in the New Guinea area. From that time on the New Guinea operations were primarily the responsibility of the Japanese Army while the Navy devoted its entire effort toward the Allied drive in the Solomons.

Allied plans in the Southwest Pacific called for the establishment of a series of air and naval bases along the north coast of New Guinea in order to facilitate the northward advance. The success of air supply at Buna, as well as the heavy though sporadic air strikes of the Japanese, again emphasized the absolute necessity for control of the air. The Japanese were of the same mind for during the first 6 months of 1943 they took no offensive ground action but instead concentrated all efforts on strengthening defensive installations, constructing airfields and launching air strikes at Allied front-line positions.

Japanese Air Activity March-June 1943

In a determined effort to establish air superiority in the New Guinea area the Japanese during the last weeks in March 1943 unleashed at widely separated points a series of heavy air strikes. This effort was not maintained although it flared up once more in the middle of May and again in June. By this time it had become evident that the extensive commitments which the Japanese had assumed in the early months of the war were imposing limits upon their ability to maintain continuous pressure simultaneously in both the Solomons and New Guinea theaters. By April 1943 the Allies had attained numerical as well as qualitative superiority over the Japanese Air Force and the ratio steadily increased until the end of the war. Thus, with control of the air assured, the Allies were ready in June 1943 to begin the first of a long series of amphibious operations.

The Allied Landings on Woodlark - Kiriwina Islands and Nassau Bay, 30 June 1943

As the initial phase of the general offensive movement the Allies planned to make simultaneous landings on Woodlark Island, and Kiriwina Bay, and Nassau Bay on the New Guinea mainland, on the morning of 30 June 1943. In its final form the plan called for the Sixth Army to be transported by the Amphibious

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Force, Seventh Fleet. Air cover was to be supplied by Fifth Air Force fighters based on Goodenough Island, previously occupied for that specific purpose, and Dobadura. The 5th Air Force was assigned the additional missions of antisubmarine escort and defensive reconnaissance. After staging at Townsville and Milne Bay, the three forces proceeded to their destinations where the troops were landed on schedule without opposition. The unloading was carried out as planned except for delays resulting from heavy seas, improper organization of troops and crews, and lack of experience. As a result of these difficulties the amphibious force learned valuable lessons which later enabled them to launch a series of operations which averaged about 35 days between landings for a period of 18 months.

The Lae Operation

Plans for the Lae Operation were formulated in July 1943. The plans involved a landing 15 miles east of Lae on the Huon Peninsula from which drives in two directions, one toward Lae and one toward Finschhafen, were to be initiated. Meanwhile Nadzab, an unused field 15 miles west of Lae, was to be seized by joint use of paratroop and airborne units. Troops in the vicinity of Salamaua were to complete the destruction of Japanese forces in that area. In addition to transporting the troops to landing points, the Seventh Fleet was assigned to tasks of blockade designed to deny the Japanese seaborne reinforcements, and of antisubmarine patrol. The Allied Air Force was to support the operation by (1) intensive aerial bombardment prior to and during the amphibious movement, (2) antisubmarine escort, (3) air blockade of the Lae-Salamaua area, and (4) close support of ground troops.

Fall 1943

Throughout July and August 1943 there was hard fighting in the New Guinea theater, particularly around Salamaua. The Fifth Air Force made repeated air attacks upon enemy positions around Lae and Salamaua and in addition cooperated with the PT boats and United States Navy Patrol Planes in an air anti-barge offensive which destroyed or seriously damaged several hundred Japanese barges in a period of 10 days. Denied the use of regular shipping and unable to construct a road along the north coast of New Guinea, the Japanese were forced to use barges or sea trucks to transport troops as well as supplies. The loss of this equipment seriously interfered with the enemy ability to oppose the Lae landings.

By the end of August 1943 pressure against the Japanese was mounting throughout the Pacific theater. During July and August the Allies occupied New Georgia and also made landings in Vella LaVella thus by-passing Kolombangara. Hard pressed for shipping and having expended a fatal number of ships and aircraft in the unsuccessful attempt to defend the Solomons, the Japanese were in no position to jeopardize their overall defensive position by reacting in strength to the invasion of the Huon Peninsula.

The Allies therefore decided to carry out the invasion after a succession of preliminary air strikes designed to neutralize forward enemy air bases in the operating area.

Preliminary Air Strikes, 17 August-1 September 1943

On 17 August a sustained air offensive against Wewak was begun by the Fifth Air Force. Within 5 days the Japanese Air Force was effectively neutralized. About 250 aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air and the Japanese were compelled to withdraw their air support all the way back to Hollandia. This concentrated offensive was followed up by further attacks.

By the time of the landings the only real air threat remaining was the forces of the Eleventh Air Fleet in Rabaul, which, hard pressed by United States forces in the Solomons, could provide little assistance.

Landing Operations, 4 September 1943

Staging from Milne Bay and Buna the amphibious forces proceeded up the coast without contacting the enemy. The Japanese apparently anticipated a landing at Salamaua and disposed their troops accordingly;

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consequently the Allied landings on the Huon Peninsula were totally unopposed during the initial stage. During the continuing landing operations enemy troops were pinned down by heavy bombing attacks by B-24's.

Shortly after the first landings the Japanese commenced light but continuous air attacks against landing craft and beaches. Several landing craft and auxiliaries were damaged and some personnel casualties occurred but operations continued on schedule.

On 5 September, Nadzab, which commanded the chief escape route of the Japanese, was captured by airborne troops and by 6 September the field at Nadzab was operational. Meanwhile, Allied troops closed in on Lae and by 7 September were within 6 miles of the Lae airfield. On 16 September the troops entered Lae which had been previously pulverized by heavy air attacks on pillboxes, trench defenses, and gun positions. The surviving Japanese offered only slight resistance before they fled north.

With the capture of Lae the last serious threat to southeastern New Guinea was removed. The Allies were now assured virtual control of Huon Gulf with all its strategic advantages, and Vitiaz Strait was now open for the use of Allied patrol boats, operating against enemy barge traffic between New Guinea and New Britain. The occupation of Lae did not, however, bring Rabaul within closer range of Allied land-based planes.

Finschhafen Operation — 22 September 1943

Following the capture of Lae, plans were formulated for an amphibious operation north of Finschhafen. The purpose of the Finschhafen operation was to make possible the development of that area as a concentration and staging point for further operations and as an advance base for aircraft and light surface ships.

In support of the operation the Fifth Air Force was assigned the routine tasks of (1) preliminary aerial bombardment, (2) air support of convoys, and (3) aerial blockade of the Finschhafen Area. Photographic reconnaissance of Wewak, Alexishafen, and Hollandia indicated that the Japanese, as in the Lae operation, would be unable to offer serious aerial resistance. Strong surface opposition was not expected.

Staging from Buna and Lae the amphibious forces proceeded to the landing area without opposition. However, as the landing craft approached the beach they were attacked by several waves of Japanese bombers but suffered no damage. After some confusion caused by lack of information as to the character of the beach, the troops landed in the face of moderate opposition. Again the Japanese launched continuous but ineffective air attacks against Allied supply routes. After hard ground fighting the Japanese, on 22 October, were driven from Finschhafen and henceforth no longer threatened the Cape Cretin Area.

The capture of both Lae and Finschhafen within a month's time clinched the Allied air and surface control of Huon Gulf. During the next few months the Finschhafen area was developed into a great supply base capable of being used as a staging area for further amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea. Both the Hollandia and Aitape operations were staged from Finschhafen and, after the original landings in New Britain and the Admiralties, Finschhafen handled most of the supplies which were fed into those points. With the capture of Finschhafen the first phase of the New Guinea campaign was ended. The succeeding efforts of the Allies were devoted to the neutralization of Rabaul in order to insure the success of the projected Admiralty and Hollandia operations.

The Advance Into New Britain and the Admiralty Islands

The Landing on Arawe — 15 December 1943

The purpose of the Arawe landing was to isolate the Japanese in western New Britain from supplies and reinforcements furnished from Rabaul and at the same time to insure the protection of Vitiaz and Dampier Straits which were to be used during the planned occupations of Cape Gloucester and the Admiralty Islands.

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A force of 4,750 troops was assembled to oppose the estimated 500 troops on Arawe. The invasion convoy proceeded from Goodenough Island to Arawe and after an uneventful approach commenced landing troops as scheduled.

Due to lack of fire support and the fact that the Japanese were apparently forewarned, one assault wave was repulsed after suffering 50 percent casualties. Much confusion existed because of faulty communications with the landing boats. Other landings, however, were successful and positions were quickly consolidated.

The air support consisted of heavy bomber attacks, antisubmarine sweeps by seaplanes, close support by 6 B-25's and high cover by 8 P-38's. Although there was no surface opposition, 33 Japanese Navy planes from Rabaul managed to slip by the fighter cover and attack the invasion craft. One United States coastal transport was sunk and other vessels were damaged. This attack did not, however, prevent the landings and Arawe was secured as planned.

The Landing on Cape Gloucester — 26 December 1943

It was considered necessary to capture and develop the Cape Gloucester Area, including airfields, in order to facilitate the isolation of Rabaul and other projected operations in the Bismarck Archipelago.

In another routine operation, 2,400 United States Army troops, plus the First Marine Division and Air Force Engineers, departed Cape Gudest on Christmas Day and after an uneventful approach commenced landings on beaches well prepared by air and naval bombardments. The estimated 7,500 Japanese furnished negligible resistance to the landings and the beachheads were quickly consolidated.

Prior to the landings the Fifth Air Force heavily attacked the surrounding enemy air bases at Rabaul, Gasmata, Hoskins, Wewak, and Madang. In addition 400 tons of bombs dropped on the beaches at Cape Gloucester caused partial withdrawal of the enemy forces.

There was no enemy naval reaction to this operation and the air reaction was very late. Expecting a reinforcement of Arawe instead of an assault on Cape Gloucester, the enemy attacked Arawe first. However, at 1430, 20 medium bombers covered by 50 or 60 fighters attacked the invasion forces at Cape Gloucester. Ten planes succeeded in penetrating the Fifth Air Force fighter cover, and sank one destroyer and damaged 3 destroyers and 3 landing ships, tank. At dusk 18 planes again attacked the landing ships, tank, convoy but all were destroyed before inflicting any damage. After this flurry of activity Japanese sorties rapidly decreased and 3 days after the landings they ceased altogether.

The significant points concerning the Cape Gloucester landing were the comparative ease with which surprise was achieved as well as the sluggish manner in which the Japanese reacted both in the air and on the ground.

Landings in Admiralty Islands

In keeping with the assigned mission of extending Allied control westward, the landings on Los Negros Island were planned as a reconnaissance in force of Momote air strip, with the intent that the landing force would remain on in occupation in case the area was found to be only lightly held. If opposition was heavy it was planned to withdraw. Photo reconnaissance showed no signs of enemy activity but scouts put ashore by seaplane 2 days before the landing reported 4,000 to 5,000 Japanese in the vicinity of the air strip. Acting on this information the volume of fire support was increased but no other change was made in the plans. The force staged from Gudest Point on the New Guinea coast and arrived at the objective on time and unopposed. Despite a certain amount of light weapon cross-fire and fire from heavier shore batteries the assault waves reached the beach and within 1½ hours the Momote air strip was secured. Naval gun fire was the critical factor in the success of the landings since weather delayed the air support, scheduled

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to be provided by B-24's and B-25's. Shortly after the landings were begun rain set in and the resulting reduced visibility was an important factor in protecting the landing boats.

Since the Japanese Naval Air Forces at Rabaul had been withdrawn to Truk on 19 February to replace losses inflicted by United States carrier strikes on 17 February, and since the Fifth Air Force had neutralized Japanese bases in New Guinea there was no air opposition to the landings. Lacking air support the Japanese did not risk surface action.

Ground fighting continued throughout March. Nine days after the landings cargo ships commenced unloading at Seadler Harbor and on 15 March new landings were made on Manus Island resulting in the capture of the Lorengau air strip. By 11 March the Momote air strip became operational for heavy bombers, and by 29 March all major resistance in the Islands was overcome.

The Allied occupation of the Admiralty Islands provided complete control of the Bismarck Sea and the approaches to Rabaul, Kavieng, and the northeast coast of New Guinea. It also brought the entire Caroline Chain and western New Guinea within range of heavy bombers and search planes.

The Landings in the Hollandia Area, 22 April 1944

The object of the Hollandia landings, which were the largest operations yet undertaken by Southwest Pacific Forces, was to seize and occupy Tanahmerah Bay, Humboldt Bay and the Aitape Area and there to establish major air facilities, an intermediate supply base and minor Naval facilities for the purpose of supporting further operations to the westward.

Strategic Situation

This jump of 400 miles along the New Guinea coast was made feasible by the fact that the isolation of Rabaul had reached its final stages, and that the Japanese Fleet had been forced back to the southern regions. The South Pacific Forces had occupied Green Island, north of Buka, and Emirau Island north of Kavieng. This, with the seizure of the Admiralty Islands and the United States Marine advance along the west coast of New Britain, had made Rabaul a position of no strategic importance. That it was so considered by the Japanese was indicated by allowing the withdrawal of all aircraft to Truk and the abandonment of all efforts to furnish air replacements.

On the New Guinea coast the Japanese had been cleared from the Huon Peninsula. However, a force estimated to be about 16,000 remained in Madang, isolated from support by sea, and with all airfields destroyed by constant attack by the Fifth Air Force. The next garrison, 100 miles to the west at Hansa Bay in the Wewak area, had also received constant pounding resulting in virtual neutralization of the Japanese Air Force as well as of 35,000 ground troops.

West of Wewak a string of Japanese airfields and garrisons stretched along the north coast of New Guinea with centers and estimated strength as follows: Aitape, 2,000; Wakde, 3,000; Hollandia, 9,000 to 12,000; Vogelkop Peninsula, 15,000 scattered over several airfields.

Allied Air Preparation

For 6 weeks prior to the landings the Fifth Air Force continually pounded the Japanese air bases from Wewak to Wakde. Heavy strikes in early March against Madang and Hansa forced the Japanese to withdraw what remained of their forces to the Wewak and Hollandia Areas. Between 11 and 27 March heavy strikes were made on the 4 airfields at Wewak and the effort was then shifted further west to Hollandia. The overall result was the virtual destruction of the Japanese Sixth Air Division with the attendant removal of any danger of effective interference with the Hollandia operations.

Long-range operations against Manokwari and Jap airdromes west of Hollandia served to hinder the Japanese in their effort to bring in reinforcements from the Philippines.

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The Approach and Attack

As a deceptive measure the invasion forces of over 200 ships and about 80,000 men departed from eastern New Guinea and followed a circuitous route toward the Admiralties, thence westward and finally southward to the objective.

On 22 April, landings were effected as planned and came as a complete surprise to the Japanese. Preceded by intense carrier and land-based air bombardment and naval gun fire which eliminated all opposition, landings were effected with no casualties. Both Aitape airfields were captured the first day and fighters commenced operations on 24 April. Hollandia airfield was captured on 26 April and one strip was ready by 30 April.

In this operation the Seventh Fleet was augmented by the Fast Carrier Task Force of the Pacific Fleet which afforded protection against any show of force by the Japanese Fleet and also made available powerful preliminary air bombardment as well as close air support. The presence of the Fast Carrier Task Force increased the total strength of the Allied Air Forces engaged by 800 planes.

The Hollandia operations marked the first time during the long series of amphibious operations conducted by Southwest Pacific Forces in which carrier-based aircraft were used as close air support. Although provision was made for additional land-based cover from the Admiralties, Finschhafen and Gusap, only one squadron succeeded in arriving over Hollandia due to unfavorable weather. The ready availability of carrier air support demonstrated to the amphibious commanders the superiority of this type of support over that based some distance from the scene of action and resulted in its use in succeeding important operations.

The successful conclusion of the Hollandia operation resulted in the acquisition of an important base as well as the isolation by land, sea, and air of approximately 50,000 Japanese troops in the jungles to the eastward.

The Toem-Wakde Landings (17-18 May 1944)

The object of the Wakde landing was to seize and occupy by overwater movement the Wakde Area and establish air and limited naval facilities.

The invasion force staged from Humboldt Bay on 15 May and proceeded to the initial landing area on the mainland at Arara undetected and unopposed. Without employing preliminary air or surface bombardment unopposed landings were made as scheduled. The following day shore to shore movements were made to Wakde which was secured in 2 days after some opposition. The Allied casualties numbered 100.

Here again there was no enemy naval or air opposition which was surprising in view of the heavy reinforcements of the 23d Air Flotilla at Sorong.

The Landing at Biak (27 May)

After the capture of Hollandia it was found that the Allied heavy bombers could not operate from Hollandia because of the limited size of the airfields. Furthermore aerial reconnaissance failed to reveal sites suitable for heavy bomber strips to the westward, short of Biak.

Without strips in the forward areas the heavy bombers were forced to continue operations from 440 miles to the east of Hollandia. This situation made the capture of Biak an operation of such strategic urgency that it was hurriedly executed without adequate planning or preparation.

Nevertheless the invasion force of 12,000 troops sortieing from Humboldt Bay was successful in achieving tactical surprise despite limited air activity by the Japanese. Against very light opposition troops were landed with practically no casualties.

Fifth Air Force medium bombers and attack planes furnished close support while B-24's bombarded the area. As in the Hollandia and Admiralty operations the air support schedule was interfered with by

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bad weather. A front between Biak and Hollandia delayed the arrival of fighter cover until 1110; just 10 minutes too late to intercept the only 3 enemy aircraft which appeared over the landing area during the day. Within 10 days the first air strip was secured and Allied troops were successfully advancing across the Island.

The Japanese Attempt to Provide Reinforcement "Kon" Plan

Compared to the other numerous invasions conducted by Southwest Pacific Forces the Biak operation is unique since it created the first and only positive Japanese naval reaction to the advance along the New Guinea Coast. Realizing that the Allied capture and development of Biak would introduce a direct air threat to Halmahera and the Philippines, the Staff of the Combined Fleet devised and on 29 May placed into effect the "Kon" plan. This operation, based on previous experience in the Solomons, had as its main objective the continuous transportation of reinforcements to Biak by combat ships. The secondary objective was the Naval bombardment of Allied land positions when the situation permitted.

The first actual attempt to proceed to Biak was made by six destroyers, three of which carried troops, departing from Sorong at midnight 7-8 June. Despite air cover provided by the 23d Air Flotilla, the Japanese destroyers were attacked by bombers of the Fifth Air Force. Although one destroyer was sunk and others damaged the force proceeded to Biak as planned, arriving about 2230 the night of 8 June. Just as the troops were about to be disembarked, however, the Japanese force was set upon by a group of Allied cruisers and destroyers and driven westward. A voluminous exchange of fire resulted in no important damage to either side. The Japanese escaped to the westward and disembarked the troops at Sorong, the original point of departure.

To insure success, the Japanese planned to execute the next reinforcement attempt by employing a force of two 18-inch gun super-battleships, four heavy cruisers and eight destroyers, which were ordered to rendezvous south of Halmahera Islands, embark troops and proceed to Biak. The power of this force far exceeded that available to the Allies and had it been brought to bear would have seriously threatened the Allied position.

However, this operation never materialized. The impending Allied assault on Saipan was discovered and on 11 June the Japanese cancelled the "Kon" plan and executed the "A" plan in defense of the Marianas. Consequently all Japanese Naval air and surface forces were ordered north and the defense of New Guinea including Biak was left to the hard pressed garrisons. All enemy ground resistance on Biak ceased on 2 July.

The Noemfoor Landing, 2 July 1944

To obtain the air installations previously used by the Japanese, Southwest Pacific Forces on 2 July made an unopposed landing on Noemfoor, southwest of Biak. Softened by air and surface bombardment the small Japanese garrison offered only light resistance which was easily overcome within 4 days. By 25 July the two fields on Noemfoor were in operation.

The Sansapor Landings, 30 July 1944

The object of the Sansapor landings was to extend the Allied lines 200 miles to the westward, thus completing the neutralization of the Japanese in New Guinea, and at the same time obtain air bases within range of Halmahera, Molucca Passage, Banda Sea and Makassar Strait.

The invasion force of 20,000 troops departed Maffin Bay at 2300 on 27 July and arrived at the destination unopposed and undetected. Landings were made at Cape Damari and on the offshore islands of Amsterdam and Middleburg on 30 July, and at Cape Sansapor on 31 July. The Japanese offered no opposition

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to the amphibious operation which ended the 1,500-mile trek by the Allies along the north coast of New Guinea.

The Morotai Landings, 15 September 1944

The amphibious landing on Morotai Island in the Moluccas was the final westward thrust of the Southwest Pacific Forces prior to the move into the Philippines.

This operation, coincident with the assault by Central Pacific Forces on Peleliu, marked the convergence of Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific Forces. Development of air facilities on Morotai enabled long-range planes to reach into the Philippines, Celebes and Netherlands East Indies, and thus render support to the operations which followed.

Very heavy air assaults were made against Japanese airfields in the Halmaheras, Celebes and Ceram areas before the landings. These strikes were indirectly supported by the attacks of the Fast Carrier Task Forces of the Central Pacific against Philippine objectives in support of the landings at Palau, and directly on the day of landing by one fast carrier task group sent down for this purpose.

The invasion force mounting 16,842 troops proceeded to the objective without opposition. Supported by a surface force of two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and ten destroyers and a carrier force of six escort carriers and eight destroyer escorts, the troops found little opposition. The prospective airfield was quickly taken and construction of the air strip began on D-day.

There was no surface opposition by the Japanese and air opposition was extremely light. Although 45,000 troops had been put ashore by 1 October ground opposition was so light that the total Allied casualties amounted to only 9 killed, 33 wounded, and 2 missing.

The Allied Invasion of Borneo, May - July 1945

Although not actually a part of the New Guinea campaign the invasion of Borneo is described herewith since it was a continuation of the innumerable amphibious operations conducted by the Southwest Pacific Forces in the drive westward. The invasion conducted by Australian ground troops was designed to seize the rich Borneo oil fields as well as to establish air and naval logistic facilities for future operations.

On 1 May, the first Borneo operation was directed against the Island of Tarakan, approximately 185 miles southwest of Tawi Tawi. This was followed in turn by a landing at Brunei Bay on 10 June and an invasion of Balikpapan on 1 July. All three operations followed the familiar pattern of neutralization of airfields, air and ship bombardment, and finally assault by amphibious forces. With the exception of difficulties experienced in preinvasion mine sweeping, plus a spasmodic reaction from Japanese shore batteries, the opposition was negligible and casualties were very light. No naval and only very light air activity was encountered.

The almost complete absence of Japanese opposition to the Borneo invasion is easily explained. After the United States landings and advance into the Philippines the Japanese made the decision to withdraw all military forces from the Borneo, Celebes and Java areas to Sumatra and Malaya and leave only such Army forces as were deemed necessary to police fleet anchorages and important oil centers. Despite the shortage of transports two divisions of troops were actually removed from the Borneo-Celebes area prior to the Allied invasion. Also, by March 1945 all large Japanese naval units had left the Singapore area for home waters and the few remaining naval units were ordered to report to the Commander of the Southern Army at Singapore for operational control. Consequently, prior to the Allied invasion of Borneo the Japanese Navy had completely withdrawn from the area and henceforth the Japanese plan was one of evacuation rather than reinforcement and defense.

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The Japanese Air Forces in New Guinea

The burden of the Japanese effort in New Guinea was carried first by the Navy, then by the Army, and finally again by the Navy. The following description of the organization of each force is submitted in order to clarify the part played by these forces as the strategic situation changed.

The Japanese Land-Based Naval Air Force in New Guinea

With the exception of the Coral Sea action and the United States carrier strikes on Hollandia all aircraft, both Allied and Japanese, operating in the New Guinea area, were land-based. The first Japanese naval air operations were those conducted by the Eleventh Air Fleet at Rabaul, and the second, those operations in Western New Guinea conducted first by the 13th Air Fleet with headquarters at Surabaya and later by the First Air Fleet with headquarters at Palau. The operations were not coordinated and took place in different areas at different times.

Operations from Rabaul

When the Japanese established headquarters at Rabaul and commenced operations to the south in early 1942 they moved the Eleventh Air Fleet from Formosa and assigned it to the Southeast Area Fleet. The Eleventh Air Fleet was equipped with fighters, medium bombers and large seaplanes. Patrols were immediately initiated from Rabaul as far south as Horn Island and along the New Guinea coast to Madang. After the Japanese occupation of Salamaua and Lae in March 1942, and Buna later in July, they constructed airfields for use in the Solomons operations as well as for staging attacks against Port Moresby.

Prior to 7 August 1942 the major Japanese air effort from Rabaul was directed towards New Guinea. However, the invasion of Guadalcanal by United States Marines presented a more direct threat to Rabaul and the Japanese henceforth conducted the majority of missions in the Solomon area. After the initial losses in the Battle of Guadalcanal the effective Japanese air strength was gradually built up by drawing reinforcements from the Marshalls, Truk, Marianas and Celebes areas. This served greatly to weaken these areas and resulted in the expenditure of a large part of the Japanese Naval Air Force.

As the Solomons campaign increased in fury the New Guinea air activities were of necessity confined to search missions sprinkled with a few night attacks against Allied ships and installations at Milne Bay, Buna and Port Moresby. However Japanese air activity flared up in May 1943 when large groups of fighters and bombers were launched against Buna. In July 1943, the Japanese Army Air Force assumed responsibility for the New Guinea area. But by the time the Allies commenced the move on Lae and Salamaua in September 1943 the United States Fifth Air Force had either destroyed or driven back the Japanese Army Air Forces in the Wewak area. Consequently only the 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul, although hard pressed in the Solomons, could strike at the Allied invasion forces. Employing 58 fighters and 18 medium bombers the Japanese delivered a sustained but ineffective attack against Allied amphibious units. Additional strikes were scheduled but they were seldom executed due to the heavy requirements in the Buin (Solomons) operation. At the end of November 1943, when the issue in the Solomons had been decided, the Japanese planned to devote a large part of their effort to the Finschhafen area, but by that time the 11th Air Fleet had been rendered impotent by continuous attacks by United States Army and Navy planes.

The last Japanese air activity in the Eastern New Guinea area occurred during Allied landing on Arawe, New Britain on 15 December 1943. Continuous but ineffective day and night attacks were delivered until January after which infrequent night attacks only were launched.

No reinforcements were received in Rabaul after December 1943. Therefore there was a rapid decline in the Japanese Naval Air Forces towards the end of 1943. After the United States carrier attacks on Truk on 17-18 February 1944 the 120 remaining serviceable aircraft at Rabaul were ordered to Truk as replacements. By 20 February only 10 planes remained at Rabaul and the 11th Air Fleet as a fighting unit ceased to exist. The effective strength of the Japanese Naval Air Force in Rabaul is shown by Appendix 67.

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Air Operations in Western New Guinea

The initial air operations in the Western New Guinea area were conducted by the Navy's 23d Air Flotilla under operational control of the 13th Air Fleet at Surabaya. With headquarters at Kendari, a base in the Celebes captured and developed during the Dutch East Indies campaign, the 23d Air Flotilla was assigned the following missions in the area southwest of New Guinea: (1) maintenance of air bases, (2) protection of the Celebes area against air attack, (3) convoy escort, (4) search of the sea area between New Guinea, Australia and Timor, and (5) monthly bombing attacks against Darwin, Australia, and Merauke, New Guinea. Additional airfields were established at Koepang, Ambon, Kai, Balikpapan, Makassar, Sorong, Nabrie, Soemba and Babo.

No serious losses were incurred while carrying out the assigned missions. However during 1943 the experienced air crews and their planes were gradually transferred to Rabaul to participate in the Solomons and Eastern New Guinea operations and as a result, by the winter of 1943-44, the 23d Air Flotilla had reached a very low state of efficiency.

After the United States capture of the Admiralties the headquarters of the 23d Air Flotilla was moved to Davao as the Japanese marshalled their forces against an anticipated attack on Palau. In addition the 23d Air Flotilla based aircraft at Wakde, Biak and Sorong and for the first time during the war assumed the responsibility of patrols along the north coast of Western New Guinea as far east as the Admiralty Islands. On 13 April 1944 the 23d Air Flotilla headquarters were moved from Davao to Sorong, since by that time the Japanese had accumulated sufficient information to indicate that there was no immediate threat to Mindanao and Palau, as previously thought, but that Allied Forces were massing in Eastern New Guinea preparatory to a possible invasion of Hollandia. An invasion of Hollandia also indicated the Allied intention to continue up the New Guinea coast to the Philippines. To combat such a move the 23d Air Flotilla was reinforced with units from Malaya, Japan and Truk. By the middle of May the aircraft available numbered 180 and operational control of the 23d Air Flotilla was transferred from the 13th Air Fleet to the First Air Fleet which in turn was directly responsible to the CinC Combined Fleet. At the same time 70 Japanese Army planes were ordered to Sorong from Manila and placed under operational control of the Navy. The mission of the combined force of Army and Navy planes was to search for and attack Allied invasion forces and to conduct night harassing attacks against Allied bases. To meet a major attack provisions were made to render assistance to the New Guinea Forces by drawing from the forces at Palau and Davao.

The 23d Air Flotilla operated against Allied invasion forces at Biak during May and June. However, after learning of the large Allied force advancing toward Saipan, the Japanese High Command on 11 June 1944 executed the "A" plan which had been devised for the defense of Palau or the Marianas. As provided in this plan all naval aircraft in New Guinea were immediately ordered to Palau and no further defense of New Guinea by naval aircraft was attempted. The 23d Air Flotilla headquarters withdrew to Ambon and subsequently functioned only as a field maintenance unit.

The Japanese Army Air Force in New Guinea

The Japanese Army Air Force was not established in New Guinea until July 1943. Prior to that time the Fourth Air Army had been based at Ambon with advance forces at Rabaul which provided air cover for New Guinea convoys and in some cases cooperated with the 11th Air Fleet in operations in the Solomons. During the first 6 months of 1943 the strength of the Fourth Air Army was rapidly increased and plans were made to move into New Guinea as soon as suitable bases were provided. The Fourth Air Army was composed of the Sixth and Seventh Air Divisions. The Sixth Air Division was assigned 324 planes while the Seventh Division was assigned 156 planes for use in the New Guinea area and 84 planes in the Ambon area. Between 1 August 1943 and 20 September the Fourth Air Army moved to New Guinea from Rabaul and Ambon and established headquarters at Wewak. From this time until the loss of Hollandia in April of

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1944 the Fourth Air Army was responsible for the New Guinea area east of longitude 140° E. Operations were conducted from fields at Wewak, Dagua, But, Aitape, Tami, Hollandia, Nubia and Manus. Advanced staging fields were located at Madang, Alexishafen, Lae, Salamaua, Finschhafen and Saidor.

Immediately after the Fourth Air Army became operational at Wewak, it was attacked by the United States Fifth Air Force in preparation for the invasion of Lae and Salamaua. Very effective attacks were delivered on Wewak and But on 17-18 August and continued throughout September. As a result the Japanese Army Air Force was neutralized and unable to interfere as the Allies pushed up the coast. By November 1943 the Naval Air Forces in the Celebes area were weakened considerably from constantly furnishing replacements to Rabaul and it was therefore necessary to withdraw the Seventh Air Division from New Guinea and employ it in the Celebes area. During the winter of 1943-44 sustained attacks by the Fifth Air Force against the Sixth Air Division caused such high losses that on 25 March 1944 the Fourth Air Army was forced to withdraw from Wewak and establish headquarters at Hollandia.

Less than 1 month later (15 April 1944) the invasion of Hollandia appeared imminent and the Fourth Air Army headquarters was removed from the command of the Eighth Area Army at Rabaul, evacuated entirely from Hollandia, and established at Menado (Celebes) under the control of the Second Area Army. In the Hollandia operations the Sixth Air Division was completely destroyed and subsequently deactivated.

Having lost all effective air strength in New Guinea, and faced with the additional threat to the Philippines created by the United States invasion of the Marianas, the Japanese Army Air Force was never again a menace to Allied movements in New Guinea. Flying from fields in Biak, Noemfoor, Sorong, Samate and Lollabata, the few remaining planes of the Seventh Air Division continued to nibble at the Allied bases employing small attacks of only a harassing nature.

Considering the number of aircraft expended by the Japanese Army in the New Guinea campaign the results were far from profitable.

Delivery of aircraft to the combat zone never took place as planned. Due to faulty factory inspection, inexperience of pilots, and the poor condition of landing fields, ferry losses amounted to 30 percent and many of the aircraft that were delivered to the forward area were in an unflyable condition. After being assigned to an operating unit the aircraft were subject to all varieties of maintenance difficulties. Because of the interdiction of shipping by United States submarines and aircraft, spare parts and heavy maintenance equipment for aircraft and fields were never delivered. Not only did this reduce the plane availability but it also seriously interfered with the construction and maintenance of fields and dispersal areas. Furthermore the main repair base for Army aircraft in New Guinea was on Halmahera, 1,000 miles from Wewak. This base never functioned adequately and to make engine changes planes actually had to be sent to Manila, 1,500 miles away. As a result few engine changes were made and repairs in the field were limited to those of the simplest type.

The Japanese were unable to withdraw their planes before a threatened attack because of the low availability and were unable properly to disperse their planes because of the restricted clearings in the New Guinea jungle.

Disease also took its toll of Japanese pilots and this, combined with high combat and operational losses, resulted in an attrition of such high proportions that it could not be overcome by the limited resources of Japan. The effective strength of the Japanese Army Air Force in the New Guinea area is shown in Appendix 66.

Conclusion

The completion of the New Guinea campaign marked the successful execution of the primary mission of the Southwest Pacific Forces, which was to extend control to the westward and establish bases from which the Allies could launch attacks against, first the Philippines, then Formosa, and finally the Japanese

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mainland. The entire campaign was based upon the progressive forward movement of air forces to provide fighter cover and bomber support for surface elements and upon the isolation of each separate position prior to the final assault. The progress of the Allied drive is shown by Appendix 65.

The campaign was slow in getting underway. When the Japanese strength was at its peak the Allied Forces were limited by the higher priority of the European theater. However, in 1943 sufficient air, naval and ground forces were finally assembled to commence the offensive which quickly moved as far as the Huon Gulf. That this initial Allied success made the Japanese realize that they had underestimated Allied strength, and that further defeats were impending, is reflected in the tenor of the following directive issued by Imperial Headquarters on 30 September 1943, "Make every effort to hold the important southeastern area extending eastward from the eastern part of New Guinea to the Solomon Islands by repulsing all enemy attacks in the area. "To accomplish this purpose: (a) Consider Rabaul as the center and make every effort for a protracted defense of important positions in the Bismarck Archipelago and Bougainville Areas. (b) Endeavor to hold out in the northern New Guinea Area by reinforcing important positions in this area. (c) Endeavor to destroy the attacking enemy before landings are made by using air and surface forces. (d) In case the enemy succeeds in landing operations endeavor to destroy him before he consolidates his position thereby disrupting his plan for counterattack. (e) Endeavor to concentrate military supplies for high speed transport to the above mentioned important positions, particularly to those in New Guinea."

But to "endeavor" was not enough. Beginning in the early part of 1944 the Allies possessed an ever increasing numerical superiority in all types of weapons. At the same time the continual attrition suffered during 1942 and 1943 had completely unbalanced the Japanese war machine in the New Guinea theater. The ground force was relatively unaffected but immobile due to the shipping shortage. The naval force was formidable but had suffered heavy losses in the Solomons and was withdrawn to the west. The air force was all but destroyed by Allied air strikes and thus unable to give support to ground troops or to render protection to the long lines of communication. Finally the air and submarine attacks throughout the Pacific had reduced the merchant shipping to such an extent that submarines, wooden vessels, barges and small craft provided the major source of supply. Further to complicate their problem in New Guinea the Japanese were confronted with the additional danger of the powerful Allied drive through the Central Pacific which became the major threat to their security.

From such a divided and unbalanced force the opposition was negligible. While the Allied air sorties were numbered in thousands those of the Japanese were numbered in tens, and while the Allies roamed the sea areas off the coast of New Guinea with large forces of carriers, cruisers, destroyers and merchant ships the Japanese had none.

In the New Guinea campaign the primary difficulties of the Allies would seem to have been in the logistic rather than in the military field.

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
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
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7. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Interrogations:

	Nav No.	U. S. S. B. S. No.
Capt. Komota, I. J. N. (Solomons and New Guinea)	71	360
Capt. Sonokawa, I. J. N. (22d Air Flotilla)	77	387
Comdr. Doi, I. J. N. (Mining Rabaul)	92	435
Col. Kaneko, I. J. A. (4th Air Army)	94	440
Capt. Ohmae, I. J. N. (9th Fleet Operations)	95	441
Capt. Miyazaki, I. J. N. (Air Operations—Solomons and New Guinea)	97	446
Capt. Shimanouchi (Kon Plan)	104	462
Lt. Col. Sugita (Rabaul Operations)	113	484
Lt. Col. Tanaka (Rabaul Operations)	113	484
Comdr. Nomura (Land-Based Air—Celebes and Rabaul)	116	601

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IX

*Central Pacific Operations From 1 June 1943 to 1 March 1944,
Including the Gilbert-Marshall Islands Campaign*

Introduction

The summer of 1943 marked the end of the period in which the United States had been strategically if not tactically on the defensive in the Pacific war. The United States position in the Aleutians was secure, vital supply lines to the South and Southwest Pacific were protected by an adequate system of air and naval bases, and in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea Japanese forces were being slowly forced back in campaigns which cost them heavily in naval and air strength. Japan had lost important advanced bases and had suffered steady attrition of her naval and air forces which prevented her from building up offensive power for further assault. United States forces on the other hand were rapidly increasing to the point which would permit a major offensive. However the Allies lacked advanced positions from which Japan's essential supply lines could be attacked or the homeland threatened. At this stage of the Pacific War, while neither opponent possessed important geographical advantages for attack, the advantage in men and materials was shifting definitely to the United States, and United States initiative shaped the remainder of the war.

United States and Japanese Plans

United States plans for Central Pacific Operations called for capture of a succession of Japanese positions from which attacks could be launched against Japanese strong points such as Truk and the Marianas and also against essential lines of communication. The several directives issued for these operations defined the purposes as to gain control of the Gilbert Islands and the Marshall Islands, to secure a base area for attack on the Carolines, to improve the security of lines of communications, and to support other operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans by extending the pressure on the Japanese.

The Japanese anticipated an eventual attack on the Gilbert-Marshalls Area and in May 1943, to defend this outer line, had prepared the "Z" plan for employing the Fleet, based at Truk, to assist land-based aircraft and garrison troops in the islands.

During the following summer the Japanese position in the Solomons deteriorated to such an extent that the "Z" plan was modified by eliminating the Bismarcks and Gilbert-Marshalls from the vital areas which would be defended by the Fleet. However, garrisons in the Gilbert-Marshalls were to be reinforced and supplemental plans were made to shift land-based aircraft from adjacent areas to meet an attack as it developed. It was also necessary for Japan to consider the possibility of accelerated Allied attacks in the Solomons or New Guinea Areas where Japanese forces were losing ground slowly. The United States not only held the initiative but the choice of several objectives widely separated in a theater whose geography allowed full employment of superior naval and air power.

Preliminary Operations

The first preparatory operation for capture of the Gilbert Islands was the unopposed occupation of islands in the Ellice group in August 1943 and the reoccupation of Baker Island in September. Construction of airfields commenced immediately and by October aircraft of both the United States Army and Navy, operating from these fields, were harassing Japanese forces on Nauru and the Gilbert Islands and were

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obtaining valuable photographic intelligence of the latter group. Carrier Task Force raids on Tarawa and Makin during September and on Wake in October reduced the force of Japanese air attacks on United States positions in the Ellice Islands and destroyed a substantial portion of Japanese reconnaissance aircraft strength in the area. During September 1943, United States ground and naval forces were assembled in the New Hebrides and the Hawaiian Islands where training for amphibious operations was begun in October. By the end of that month United States forces for invasion of the Gilberts were almost completely trained and ready to move.

The Solomons and New Guinea campaigns had increased in tempo during this period of preparation forcing the Japanese to divert more aircraft, personnel and light naval ships to meet the Allied thrusts toward Rabaul, the enemy's key base in the Southwest Pacific. The successful United States landing on Bougainville Island 1 November 1943, convinced the Japanese High Command that the threat in this sector was greater than that of attack in the Central Pacific. A number of the naval vessels which had been held at Truk in conformity with the general plan for defense of the Pacific perimeter were sent via Rabaul to assist in checking the United States advance toward Rabaul. This force of cruisers and destroyers was attacked by carrier aircraft within a few hours of its arrival at Rabaul and retired immediately to Truk leaving one cruiser and one destroyer seriously damaged. Upon arrival at Truk, four cruisers which had been damaged to a lesser extent were sent to Japan for repairs. The Japanese thus lost, at least temporarily, a substantial portion of their cruiser strength in the Pacific.

Occupation of the Gilberts

Initial landings on Tarawa and Makin Islands of the Gilbert group were scheduled for 20 November 1943. All United States Forces engaged in these operations were enroute to their objectives by 12 November and on 13 November aircraft based on the Ellice and Baker Islands commenced heavy day and night attacks on the Gilberts. Japanese reaction to the approach and subsequent operations of the attack groups and carrier task forces was limited to air and submarine action. Neither interfered seriously with the landings. Japanese air reinforcements which were flown in from Rabaul and the Empire were not sufficient to maintain aircraft strength in the Marshalls in the face of frequent strikes by United States carrier aircraft and heavy losses suffered by the Japanese in futile attacks on United States surface forces. A small Japanese naval force sortied from Truk on 24 November and remained in the Western Marshalls until 4 December but made no move to interfere with the operations in progress. A few troops were hurriedly despatched from Truk to reinforce certain island garrisons of the Marshalls group.

Despite the failure of the Japanese to reinforce the Gilberts as planned the garrison troops of Tarawa and Makin put up a bitter defense. At Tarawa preliminary bombardment by surface vessels and strikes by carrier aircraft were effective in destroying above-ground installations on the island. However, the time interval between the lifting of the final bombardment and the arrival of the first assault wave was too great. This was caused by unexpected current, slowness of the assault boats, and difficulty with depth of water at the outer reef. The lack of covering fire at the critical time of landing resulted in heavy losses during the first phase of assault. United States Marines sustained 20 percent casualties among the 15,000 combat troops employed during the assault and the ensuing 2½ days of hand-to-hand fighting required to eliminate the garrison force. Only 146 prisoners were taken of an estimated 4,800 Japanese garrison and labor troops.

Makin Island, attacked at the same time, was garrisoned by a Japanese force estimated to be 600-800 men. The 27th United States Army Division landed 6,500 troops during the assault and met determined resistance until the evening of the second day when the island was brought under complete control. United States casualties numbered 186. 104 prisoners were taken, principally Korean laborers. Apamama Island, which was undefended except by a small group of lookouts, was captured by a United States force of 78 men landed from a submarine on the night of 20 November.

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Occupation of the Gilbert Islands was supported by approximately 900 carrier-based aircraft which flew 2,278 action sorties in a wide variety of missions, the more important of which were neutralization of enemy air bases, direct support of the landing and subsequent ground operations, interception of enemy air raids and diversionary raids such as the strike on Nauru Island which preceded the landings. These aggressive air operations supplemented by the activities of Army and Navy land-based air from southern bases neutralized Japanese air power in the Gilberts-Marshalls area. The only serious damage from air attack suffered by United States Forces was a torpedo hit on the light carrier *Independence* which necessitated her withdrawal for repairs. The only serious naval loss was the sinking of the escort carrier *Liscome Bay* by Japanese submarine torpedo.

Build Up And Subsequent Planning

United States garrison forces which relieved the assault troops on Tarawa, Makin and Apamama commenced immediate development of these islands for further operations against the Marshalls. By the end of December four airfields were operational, three of which were suitable for heavy bombers. Pressure was maintained on the Japanese bases in the Marshalls, Wake, Nauru and Kusaie by air raids from the steadily increasing force of land-based aircraft and by carrier air strikes on the most important of these bases. The inadequate Japanese land-based air forces in the Marshalls, although reinforced by more than 100 percent, were unable to prevent United States development of strong bases only 300 miles distant, and by December had lost a complete air flotilla, approximately 100 planes, in the attempt.

Planning and assembly of forces for invasion of the Marshalls commenced during consolidation of the Gilberts. The Marshall Islands offered at least two alternative objectives, either of which might be chosen in accordance with the directive to seize one advance fleet anchorage and two supporting positions. The Japanese realized that, having determined not to commit their fleet in defense of these islands, they must anticipate the point of United States attack and reinforce it before the attack was launched. One Japanese staff officer when recounting the discussions among members of the Combined Fleet Staff stated: "There was divided opinion as to whether you would land at Jaluit or Mille. Some thought you would land at Wotje but few thought you would go right to the heart of the Marshalls and take Kwajalein." Mille, Wotje and Maloelap garrisons were reinforced. United States Pacific Fleet planners decided to employ superiority in mobile and air forces to strike boldly at the heart of the new area which was to be brought under control.

Occupation of the Marshalls

Forces for invasion of the Marshalls were assembled on the Pacific Coast and in the Hawaiian Islands with a few elements being brought from the Ellice and Samoan Areas. The Fourth Marine Division was lifted from the West Coast between 6 and 13 January and passed through staging points in the Hawaiian Islands. The Seventh Infantry Division, United States Army, mounted in Hawaii. All attack forces left those islands about 22 January in order to arrive at their objectives in early morning of 31 January. Three initial objectives were to be attacked simultaneously: Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur Islands in Kwajalein Atoll and Majuro Atoll roughly 270 miles to the southeast. Three attack groups composed of 217 ships carrying 63,735 troops were assigned to these objectives. A neutralization group of 7 cruisers and destroyers was employed to bombard Japan's most threatening bases at Wotje and Taroa.

Four fast carrier task groups of Task Force 58, which included 12 carriers, commenced supporting air operations on D-minus-2-day, 29 January 1944. These groups could bring 700 aircraft to bear against the estimated 130 Japanese aircraft distributed among bases in the Marshalls. Simultaneous attacks by this force on fields at Roi, Kwajalein, Wotje and Taroa were so successful in achieving surprise and destroying their targets that by evening on 29 January there was not an operational Japanese aircraft east of Eniwetok.

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The Japanese air and submarine efforts to oppose the invasion were negligible, and enemy plans for garrison reinforcement and strengthening of fixed defenses could not be accomplished quickly enough to meet invasion at all points. Simultaneous heavily supported landings well inside the reinforced perimeter islands overwhelmed the defenses within a few days. Roi-Namur Islands were completely in United States hands by noon of D-plus-2-day and 2 days later on 4 February the occupation of Kwajalein Island was completed. Majuro Atoll, the third primary objective was occupied without opposition, the small group of Japanese defenders having abandoned the atoll prior to the United States landing.

The Gilbert and Marshall Islands, extending through an area one thousand miles long and including at least seven Japanese strong points, had been brought under United States control. Continuous operation of United States carrier task forces in the area, unchecked by Japanese land-based aircraft, forced the Japanese Fleet to abandon Truk as a major base. Between 3 and 10 February 1944 all units of that fleet except a few cruisers and destroyers of the Area Defense Forces withdrew to Palau and the Empire leaving United States forces in the Central Pacific unopposed except by garrison troops and a decimated Japanese air force.

Seizure of Eniwetok

It had been planned to seize and develop the strategically located atoll of Eniwetok on 10 May to provide the United States Fleet with an anchorage which would complete the neutralization of Truk and from which large-scale operations against the Marianas could be initiated. The outstanding success of the Marshalls operation and the fact that reserve troops assigned thereto were not needed, allowed rapid preparation for the next offensive. These factors, together with the flexibility of United States planning and fleet organization, permitted the Eniwetok assault to be scheduled for 17 February, 3 months prior to the date originally planned.

An assault force and the necessary supporting forces for the now familiar pattern of amphibious attack were rapidly organized at Kwajalein and sortied for Eniwetok on 15 February 1944. To insure freedom from interference by Japanese air strength at Truk a carrier air strike on that stronghold was planned to coincide with the operations against Eniwetok. The success of this supporting strike is attested by the total absence of any enemy air attacks on our forces operating against Eniwetok.

The amphibious operations against the three most important islands of the atoll, Engebi, Eniwetok and Parry, proceeded smoothly as they were attacked in that order by the experienced air, ship, and assault troop team. Engebi was captured on 18 February after one day of preliminary bombardment from ships and by guns landed on small islands nearby. The capture of Eniwetok and Parry Islands required 5 days, 19 to 23 February. The other less important islands of the atoll were captured during these seven days of operations against the three principal islands. United States fighters were operated from the field at Engebi by 27 February. The total Japanese force present in Eniwetok Atoll was 3,400 men. In its capture United States forces suffered 716 casualties.

Part of the success of this operation can be attributed to the rapidity with which advantage was taken of previous successes at Kwajalein and Majuro. There were many evidences that hasty preparations were in progress for greatly increasing the strength of the defenses at Eniwetok. Many guns ready for emplacement and materials for fortification and beach defenses were found at each objective.

Carrier Task Force Raids

During the operations against Eniwetok, United States carrier task groups struck Truk on 16 and 17 February, Jaluit on the 20th, and the Marianas on the 22d. At Truk the sustained two-day attack by carrier aircraft destroyed 26 merchant vessels, 6 combatant ships, and 270 aircraft, damaged 6 more naval vessels, and inflicted severe damage on fuel and provision storage. It had been planned to strike Ponape and Jaluit next but in view of the success of the Truk operation a carrier strike on the Marianas was substituted for the one against Ponape.

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The carrier task force which attacked the Marianas on 22 February struck this center of the new Japanese defense line in the Pacific at the very time the enemy was making strenuous efforts to reinforce it. Although detected by reconnaissance aircraft 420 miles east of Saipan, the task force fought its way through a night-long series of attacks by land-based aircraft without significant damage and commenced launching the first of a day's strikes next morning. One hundred twenty aircraft, the entire strength of that portion of the Japanese First Air Fleet in the Marianas, were destroyed. The destruction of the advanced echelon of the First Air Fleet was a severe blow to the air organization upon which Japan was depending heavily for the defense of the Marianas and Western Carolines. It was the first of several strikes by carrier task forces which were to prevent the First Air Fleet from ever reaching its full strength and fighting efficiency.

Conclusion

Preparation and execution of the Gilbert-Marshalls Campaign covered the period between August 1943 and March 1944. In that time the United States air-amphibious team, spearheaded by carrier task forces shattered the Japanese defensive perimeter and brought under United States control an area of 800,000 square miles including numerous islands which provided several large fleet anchorages and many airfields. United States carrier task forces and land-based aircraft had destroyed or rendered impotent all Japanese air power east of the Marianas. The threat of attack by carrier task forces had forced the Japanese Fleet to the extreme western Pacific Ocean. This campaign eliminated Truk and the eastern Caroline Islands as an effective part of the Japanese Pacific defense system. The rapid establishment of advanced operating bases for the United States Fleet made possible the repeated carrier air strikes upon the Carolines and provided the support vital to the Southwest Pacific Forces in New Guinea. It was an essential preliminary to the occupation of the Marianas soon to follow.

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	Nav No.	U. S. S. B. S. No.
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Comdr. Matsuura (Gilbert-Marshalls Shore-Based Air).....	30	123
Comdr. Nakajima (Gilbert-Marshalls).....	34	139
Capt. Ohmae (Defense Plans, Gilberts and Marshalls).....	38	160
Capt. Ohmae (Overall Planning).....	43	192
Capt. Shiki (Movements of Japanese 2d Fleet in Central Pacific) ...	82	396
Admiral Nabeshima (4th Fleet Operations).....	96	445
Comdr. Fujimuri (Submarine Operations).....	108	466

2. Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy replies to U. S. S. B. S. Questionnaires Nav-0, 12 October 1945, Nav-2, 18 October 1945 and Nav-9, 31 October 1945.

3. Imperial Headquarters directives.

4. War Diary of 22d and 24th Air Flotillas.

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Strength of Opposing Ground Forces, Casualties and Japanese Garrison Strength in the Central Pacific Gilbert Islands

Location	United States		Japan		
	Assault Troops	Casualties	Garrison Troops	Killed	Prisoners
Tarawa	¹ 15,545	¹ 3,024	² 4,800	4,654	¹ 146
Makin	¹ 6,507	¹ 186	² 800	696	¹ 104
Apamama	¹ 78	¹ 5	¹ 20	¹ 20	0
Total	22,130	3,215	5,620	5,370	250

Strength of the most important Japanese garrisons in the Central Pacific, 15 January 1944

Location	Garrison Troops	Location	Garrison Troops
Eniwetok Atoll	² 1,000	Nauru Island	² 6,000
Jaluit Atoll	² 3,500	Ponape Island	² 5,000
Kwajalein Atoll	² 8,000	Truk Atoll	² 20,000
Maloelap Atoll	² 3,300	Wake Island	² 6,700
Kusae Island	² 4,000	Wotje Atoll	² 3,500
Mille Atoll	² 5,500	Unknown	² 6,000
		Total	72,500

¹CINCPAC monthly reports to COMINCH "Operations in Pacific Ocean Areas."

²MIS, War Department

³Action Reports, United States Pacific Fleet.

Marshall Islands

Location	United States		Japan		
	Assault Troops	Casualties	Garrison Troops	Killed	Prisoners
KWAJALEIN ATOLL					
Roi Island			² 3,000		
Kwajalein Island			² 3,000		
Other Islands			² 2,000		
Totals for Kwajalein Atoll	¹ 42,546	¹ 1,516	² 8,000	7,710	¹ 290
ENIWETOK ATOLL					
Engebi Island		¹ 251	¹ 1,200		¹ 16
Eniwetok Island		¹ 131	¹ 900		¹ 25
Parry Island		¹ 334	¹ 1,300		¹ 25
Totals for Eniwetok Atoll	¹ 7,997	716	¹ 3,400	3,334	¹ 66
Grand Totals	50,543	2,232	11,400	11,044	356
MARSHALLS CAMPAIGN					

¹CINCPAC monthly reports to COMINCH "Operations in Pacific Ocean Areas."

²MIS, War Department

³Action Reports, United States Pacific Fleet.

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Extracts from official reports of the Imperial Japanese Government concerning the Gilbert-Marshalls Campaign

The material contained herein was extracted from the following Japanese reports of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy:

(a) Reply to U. S. S. B. S. questionnaire NAV-2, 18 October 1945.

(b) Reply to U. S. S. B. S. questionnaire NAV-9, 31 October 1945.

In some instances the original replies were corrected by the Japanese Government as additional information became available. Questions and answers are indicated by Q. and A.

Q. Make chart or table showing the command organization of Japanese forces, (Army, Navy and Air forces) in Central Pacific, (east of longitude 150° E.) as of 1 November 1943.

(a) Include names of senior commanders and their chiefs of staff.

(b) Show relationship of command between the services (Army, Navy, Air Forces).

A. Organization chart of Japanese Naval Forces in the Central Pacific, east of longitude 150° E., as of 1 November 1943.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, Truk

1st Bat Div Commandant	2d Fleet Commander in Chief	3d Fleet Commander in Chief
	4th Squadron Commandant	3d Squadron Commandant
	5th Squadron Commandant	7th Squadron Commandant
	2d Destroyer Squadron Commandant	10th Squadron Commandant
	4th Fleet Commander in Chief, Truk ²	
14th Squadron Commandant, Truk ² Nagara, Naka ¹ , Isuzu ³ ,	4th Minor Base Force Commandant, Truk ¹	
22d Air Squadron Commandant, Ruotto ¹	41st Naval Guards, Truk ¹	
22d Air Squadron	42d Naval Guards, Ponape ¹	
3d Minor Base Force Commandant, Tarawa ¹	6th Base Force Commandant, Kwajalein ¹	
67th Naval Guards, Nauru ¹	61st Naval Guards, Jaluit ¹	
	62d Naval Guards, Jaluit ¹	
	63d Naval Guards, Wotje ¹	
	64th Naval Guards, Moloelap ¹	
	65th Naval Guards, Wake ¹	
	66th Naval Guards, Mille ¹	
	6th Fleet Commander in Chief, Truk ²	
	SubRon 1	

¹ Indicates permanent location.

² Indicates the location 1 November 1943.

³ Indicates a warship.

(a) Roster of each commandant, chief of staff, and senior staff officer:

	Commandant	Chief of Staff	Senior Staff Officer
4th Fleet.....	Vice Admiral Kobayashi, Hitoshi	Rear Admiral Nabeshima, Shunsaku	Capt. Inouye, Kenichi
14th Squadron.....	Rear Admiral Ito, Kenzo	Commander Fupita, Isamu	Commander Hori, Yoshifusa after 4th Nov.
3d Minor Base Force.....	Rear Admiral Shibazaki, Keiji	Commander Esaka, Wataru	
4th Minor Base Force.....	Rear Admiral Wakabayashi, Seisaku	Commander Hori, Yoshifusa	Commander Higuchi, Nobuo after 4 Nov.
6th Base Force.....	Rear Admiral Akiyama, Monzo	Capt. Hayashi, Koichi	Date unknown. Capt. Hirata, Taro.
22d Air Squadron	Rear Admiral Kira, Shunichi	Commander Matsuura, Goro	

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(b) Relationship of Command between Land, Sea and Air Forces:

The Naval Commandant (Commander in Chief, 4th Fleet) was responsible for integration of command.

The senior commandants exercised the authority of integrating command in their respective islands. However, as far as air operations were concerned, the air forces took direct orders from Combined 22d Air Squadron; while only in case of co-operating with defensive operations on land, were they subjected to integration of command by the Senior Commandant present on the spot.

Q. Give the Order of Battle as of 1 November 1943 for Japanese forces in Central Pacific as follows:

(a) Troops in each island garrison of Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama.

(b) Disposition of aircraft east of longitude 150° E.

(c) Disposition of naval vessels east of longitude 150° E.

A. Order of Battle as of 1 November 1943:

(a) Garrison strength of respective islands:

Makin, about 300;
Tarawa, about 2,000;
Apamama, about 20 (only lookouts).

(b) Disposition of aircraft, east of longitude 150° E.:

Headquarters:

(Ruotto)

		25 (Ruotto).
755th Flying Corps	"Chuko"	9 (Maloelap).
		6 (Nauru).
252d Flying Corps	Fighter	21 (Taroa).
		9 (Kwajalein).
552d Flying Corps	"Suisei"	18 (Mille).
801st Flying Corps	"Daitei"	8 (Jaluit).
6th Base Force: 952d Flying Corps	Patrol seaplane	3 (Makin).
4th Base Force: 902d Flying Corps	Patrol seaplane	9 (Kwajalein).
(Minor)		9 (Truk).
		3 (Saipan).

Total 120

NOTE:—" " indicates the type of aircraft in Japanese name.

(c) Disposition of naval vessels, east of longitude 150° E.:

Truk:

(Headquarters of Combined Fleet):

1st Bat Div

Yamato, Musashi

(Headquarters of 2d Fleet):

4th Squadron

Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai.

5th Squadron

Miyoko, Haguro.

2d Destroyer Division

Noshiro, unknown number of destroyers.

(Headquarters of 3d Fleet):

3d Squadron

Kongo, Haruna.

7th Squadron

Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma.

10th destroyer Squadron,
a part

Yakagi, unknown number of destroyers.

(Headquarters of 4th Fleet):

14th Squadron

Naka, Isuzu, Nagara.

Some other vessels attached to 4th Fleet.

(Headquarters 6th Fleet):

SubRon 1

18 submarines, approximately.

Several subchasers attached to 4th Base Force.

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Marshall Islands:

I Mine sweeping Corps, 2 subchaser Corps of 6th Base Force.

- Q. Copies or gist of principal operation orders, plans, or directives for defense of Gilbert and Marshall Islands. What were the instructions in effect on 1 November which guided the senior navy, army, and air commanders in their operations in the Central Pacific, (east of longitude 150° E.)?
- A. Gist of Operation Plans for Defense of Gilberts and Marshalls effective on 1 November.
- (a) To detect the foe movement at an early stage by utilizing the lookout organization.
 - (b) By suitable reconnaissance air patrol, to detect the approaching movement of the foe.
 - (c) Should an approaching foe be detected, to destroy the foe on the sea, by repeated counterattacks of all aircraft on the spot.
 - (d) Should foe commence landing, to use every possible means to destroy him at the beach; and preparing for such a situation to complete fortification as soon as possible. (It was almost hopeless to build permanent fortifications because of difficulties in transporting the necessary materials).
 - (e) When the enemy attacked the Gilberts, our operational plans, which had been drawn up in complete form on about 8 September, were as follows:
 1. Large submarines in the Rabaul area (and, if possible, small submarines) were to move up and operate in the vicinity of the Gilberts.
 2. 2d Fleet was to advance to sea area from west to north of Nauru and decoy the enemy fleet. Then, after 36 land-based attack planes from Rabaul had carried out attacks on the enemy, it (2d Fleet) was to move up to Mille area and continue operations.
 3. If necessary, a destroyer squadron was to come up from the Rabaul area and participate in the operations.
 4. Planes of 3d Fleet were undergoing training, but even those elements of a low degree of training were to join in these operations depending on the time of the enemy's attack.
 - (f) In spite of the above plans, when the United States forces attacked the Gilberts the 2d Fleet had already suffered great damage at Rabaul on 5 November. Further, due to the increased tempo of operations in the Solomons, the land-based attack plane units and the destroyer squadron which were to have been diverted from that area could not be employed in accordance with plans. There was nothing else to do but get along with the strength then in the Gilberts and Marshalls. Successive reinforcements of air strength from other areas were either not on time or were insufficient in number and we never got back on our feet.

Q. What were total aircraft losses in Gilbert-Marshall Islands between 1 November - 31 December 1943? Give approximate proportions of combat and noncombat losses?

A. Total aircraft losses in the Gilbert-Marshall Islands area between 1 November and 31 December:

There are estimated to be about 80 planes, broken down as follows:

"Chuko".....	About 50 planes.
Fighters	About 15 planes.
Flying boats	About 5 planes.
Patrol seaplanes	About 5 planes.
"Suisci".....	About 5 planes.

TOTAL	80
-------------	----

Q. What aircraft reinforcements were sent into Gilbert-Marshall Islands area between 1 November and 31 December 1943?

A. Aircraft reinforced to the Gilbert-Marshall Islands area between 1 November and 31 December are as follows:

24 November:	21 land-based attack planes.
25 November:	3 land-based attack planes.
26 November:	12 land-based attack planes.
28 November:	4 land-based attack planes (moved up to H.Q. AirFlot 24).
2 December:	46 (approx.) land-based attack planes.
	12 "Tenzans."
	37 fighters.

Total	135
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Q. What changes in disposition of naval vessels in the Central Pacific area east of longitude 150° E. were made and when during period 1 November and 31 December?

A. Changes of disposition of naval vessels in Central Pacific area of longitude 150° E., and the date of the changes:

- (a) A surface force, formed around the 2d Fleet for participation in operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Areas, departed Truk on 3 November arriving Rabaul 5 November. On that date, however, it underwent an air attack by a United States carrier task force and sustained serious damage. It departed Rabaul the same day, returning to Truk. Subsequently a considerable number of ships required repairs. From that time on, surface strength at Truk was seriously weakened.
- (b) There was a plan in existence to reinforce the garrison strength of Makin by transporting about 1,500 Army troops to that island. The troops were loaded on 4th Fleet's *Nagara*, *Isuzu*, and 2 destroyers, which departed Truk about 19 November. Due, however, to the commencement of strikes on the Gilberts by United States carrier task forces, the troops were eventually diverted to reinforcement of the Marshalls although the possibility of making counterlandings on Makin had once been under consideration. The ships arrived at Mille about the 22d or 23d, and landed the troops there.
- (c) On about 24 November, 2d Fleet (participating elements unknown) sortied from Truk and proceeded to Kwajalein, subsequently moving to Ruotto, where items of cargo were landed. They then sailed on the night of 3 December and returned to Truk.
- (d) No sortie of fleet in strength was made in connection with United States raids on the Gilberts.

Answers to U. S. S. B. S. questionnaire NAV-9 dated 15 October 1945.

Q. Give the disposition of air strength in the area to the east of longitude 150° E. on 25 January 1944.

A. Marshalls Area:

	HDQ Air Flot 24	
	Air Group 752	12 land-based attack.
Ruotto	Air Group 753	3 land-based attack.
	Air Group 281	20 fighters.
	Air Group 252	50 fighters.
Taroa	Air Group 752	9 land-based attack.
	Air Group 531	9 Tenzans
Wotje	Comdr. of Air Group 801	No planes.
Kwajalein	Air Group 952	10 float reconnaissance.
	Air Group 753	9 land-based attack.
Eniwetok	Air Group 752	6 land-based attack.
	Air Group 204	About 50 fighters.
Truk	Air Group 902	About 10 float reconnaissance.
	Air Group 755	About 8 land-based attack.
Marianas:		
	Air Group 201	About 30 fighters.
	Air Group 802	About 5 flying boats.
Saipan	Air Group 902	About 4 float reconnaissance.
	HDQ. of 4th Fleet and of Air Flot 26.	
	HDQ. of Air Flot 22.	
Tinian	Air Group 755	18 land-based attack.

Q. List naval vessels in waters to the east of longitude 150° E. on 25 January 1944.

A. Truk:

Bat Div 1 *Musashi*

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2d Fleet:

- CruDiv 4 *Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai*
- CruDiv 5 *Myoko, Haguro*
- DesRon 2 *Noshiro*, several destroyers.

3d Fleet:

- BatDiv 3 *Kongo, Haruna*
- CruDiv 7 *Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma*
- CarDiv 2 *Junyo, Hayataka, Hiyo, Ryubo*
- 10th Div *Yabagi*, several destroyers.

4th Fleet:

- 14th Div. *Naka, Isuzu, Nagara*
- Several ships and boats attached to 4th Fleet.
- Several subchasers attached to 4th Minor Base Force.

6th Fleet:

- Katori*, SubRon 1 and SubRon 8

Marshall Islands:

- 1 mine sweep unit and 2 subchaser units attached to 6th Base Force.

NOTE—Of the above listed ships, a considerable number should have been in home waters undergoing repairs.

Q. Give gist of principal operation orders, plans or directives for defense of the Marshall Islands.

- A. (1) Make every effort to prevent enemy invasions and occupations, at least to the extent of inflicting the maximum damage on him.
- (2) Dispose air strength in depth and concentrate air attack strength at rear bases. By doing this it will obviate being surprised even though information gained from patrols is scanty. Plan to use bases at Eniwetok and Wake as much as possible.
- (3) Plan to use surface craft at Truk in urgent transportation operations and do not expend them in decisive naval actions.

Q. What aircraft losses were sustained in the Inner South Seas Area east of longitude 150° E. between 1 January and 1 March 1944?

- A. (1) January, about 100 planes.
- (2) February, about 430 planes.
- (3) About 340 planes were damaged at Truk on 16-17 February.


Q. What aircraft reinforcements were sent to the Inner South Seas Area between 1 January and 1 March 1944?

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| A. 1st Air Fleet, | about 600 planes. |
| 25th Air Flotilla, | about 160 planes. |
| 26th Air Flotilla, | about 150 planes. |
| Air Group 551, | about 24 "Tenzan" planes. |
| Air Group 851, | about 6 flying boats. |
| Total about 940 planes. | |

Q. What losses or severe damage to naval and merchant vessels occurred in the Inner South Seas Area between 1 January and 1 March 1944?

A. (a) Naval Vessels:

- 13 Jan.: Wotje:
- Patrol vessel Sunk by B-25 strafing attack.
- 17 Feb.: Truk:
- Naka* (CL 17) Sunk during carrier air strike.
 - Katori* (CL(T) 1)
 - Oikaze* (DD-2)
 - Tachikaze* (DD-11)
 - Fumitsuki* (DD-30)
 - Maikaze* (DD-103)



9-15 November 1943
 ATAGO, MOGAMI, TAKAO and
 TONE sailed for JAPAN for
 repairs.

3 February 1944
 YAMATO (BB11)
 NAGATO (BB9)
 and remaining units
 of Japanese 2nd
 Fleet sailed for
 PALAU

10 February 1944
 MUSASHI (BB12-Flagship of
 Combined Fleet), 1 CL and
 2 or 3 DDs sailed for JAPAN

10 FEB 44
 9-15 NOV
 24 NOV
 7 DEC (MIDNIGHT)
 19 NOV
 28 NOV APPROX
 19 NOV
 7 NOV
 3 NOV

Approximate track of Japanese
 Naval units (probably CHOKAI,
 SUZUYA, CHIKUMA, and 6 to 8
 destroyers). 24 Nov to 7 Dec 1943.

CHOKAI and 2 DDs turn back to
 escort damaged tanker to TRUK.

Units of Japanese 2nd and 3rd Fleets
 Sailed from TRUK for RABAUL 3 November 1943

4th Crudiv	7th Crudiv	8th Crudiv
ATAGO(CA9)(FF)	KUMANO(CA16)(F)	CHIKUMA(CA18)
CHOKAI(CA11)	MOGAMI(CA13)	TONE(CA17)
KAYA(CA12)	SUZUYA(CA15)	
TAKAO(CA10)		

2nd Deadiv	10th Deadiv
NOGHIRO(CL23) or JINTSU(CL16)	AGANO(CL21)(F)
4 to 6 DDs	4 to 6 DDs

Units of Japanese 2nd and 3rd Fleets ar-
 rived RABAUL early morning of 5 November and
 shortly afterward were damaged in U.S. Carrier
 aircraft attack. The following units sailed
 for TRUK after sunset the same day: ATAGO,
 CHIKUMA, KUMANO, MOGAMI, SUZUYA, TONE and 5 or
 6 DDs.
 Arrived TRUK 7 November 1943

SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENTS OF MAJOR JAPANESE NAVAL UNITS
 IN CENTRAL PACIFIC BETWEEN 1 NOV 1943 AND 10 FEB 1944

TRACKS SHOWN ARE APPROXIMATE ALL DATES EAST LONGITUDE.

- ① — 2° & 3° FLEET UNITS BETWEEN TRUK AND RABAUL 3-7 NOVEMBER 1943
 - ② — 2° & 3° FLEET UNITS BETWEEN TRUK, KWAJALEIN, ENIWETOK, 24 NOV-7 DEC. 1943
 - ③ — ISUZU (CL-12)
 - ④ — NAGARA (CL-9)
 - ⑤ — NAKA (CL-17)
- MOVEMENTS OF 4TH FLEET CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS ON MISSIONS OF REINFORCING ISLAND
 GARRISONS 18 NOV - 15 DEC 1943.
- DATES SHOWN FOR MOVEMENTS OF THESE VESSELS MAY BE
 IN ERROR BY ONE DAY IN A FEW CASES.

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Shigure (DD-60)	Severely damaged—carrier air strike.
Harusame (DD-70)
Akikaze (DD-7)
Nowake (DD-100)
Akashi (AR-2)
Hakachi (Target Ship)

(b) Merchant Vessels:

11 Jan., Kwajalein:	
Ikuta M.	Sunk by 10 B-24s, low level attack.
13 Jan., Wotje:	
Transport	Severely damaged by B-25's strafing.
17 Feb., Truk:	
26 MVs	Following "Maru's" sunk during carrier air attack: <i>Iloki, Aikoku, Shojin, Reiyō, Heian, Riyo, Seiko, Hoyo, Seicho, Hokuyo, Tei-kichi, Soko, Nagano, Amagisan, Tatsubama, Fujisan, Zuikai, Rio De Janeiro, Dai San Tonan, Yamashimo</i> and <i>Akagi</i> , plus 5 other unidentified ships.

Q. What changes in plans were made as result of carrier task force strike on Truk, 16-17 February?

A. Truk became unsuitable as a fleet anchorage. Because of this and also because of heavy losses to supply ships, the Combined Fleet decided to fall back. Since it had lost much of its mobility, it became exceedingly difficult to make use of the fleet in an aggressive manner during the defensive operations of the Marianas.

Q. Give the disposition of Japanese air strength in the Marianas on 20 February 1944.

- A. Saipan: 30 type 0 ship-based fighters; 10 Suisais.
 Tinian: 40 Type 1 land-based attack planes; 10 Gekkos.
 Guam: 5 Type 0 land-based transports.

Q. What were the losses of Japanese aircraft during the carrier task force strike on the Marianas, 22 February 1944?

- A. (1) From United States carrier based air attacks 40
 (2) From aerial engagements 20
 (3) Destroyed on the ground 30
 (4) From other causes (Chiefly from faulty landings and take-offs at night) 5

Q. What damages to land installations and personnel casualties resulted from this carrier aircraft strike?

- A. (1) Majority of hangars and part of the living quarters were destroyed by fire.
 (2) Personnel casualties numbered about 300 (of which about 250 were airplane crews).

Q. What was the effect of this attack on operations in defense of the Marshalls and the Inner South Seas Area.

A. As a result of the strikes on Truk by the United States task force, it was decided that the 1st Air Fleet, which at the time was undergoing training in the homeland, be put in the Marianas. The advance echelon had arrived in the Marianas on 20 February, just in time to have its protruding nose flattened. This became the weak point in the disposition of the 1st Air Fleet and before its strength could be brought up to a point where some confidence could be placed in it, the various units in the Inner South Seas Area were subjected to separate attacks.

Q. What changes were made in plans of operations orders for defense of Inner South Seas Area between 1 January and 1 March?

- A. (1) After about 10 February the standby area for the main strength of the Combined Fleet was changed to Palau Area.
 (2) After about 21 February all the air strength in Rabaul Area was transferred to Truk to assist in defense of that area.
 (3) Gist of orders to the various commanders on 1 March 1944:
 (a) With the forces available defend the Marshalls and Truk to the death.
 (b) Endeavor to destroy the enemy forces by using air forces of the remaining bases at Truk, Wake, Nauru, and Marshalls.
 (c) Regard Truk as the outpost of the Marianas and Palau and always keep a strong aircraft patrol force there so as to be able to reconnoiter the enemy.

X

*The Central Pacific Campaign, 1 March to 1 September,
Including the Occupation of the Marianas*

Strategic Situation at Beginning of Campaign

In February 1944 the occupation of Kwajalein, Majuro and Eniwetok in the Central Marshalls, and the Carrier Task Force strikes on Truk Atoll and on the Marianas profoundly changed the strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean Area. Thus a new casting up of the strategic accounts of both the United States and Japan as of early March is essential to intelligent analysis of succeeding events.

The occupation of the Central Marshalls, the first major break in the Japanese defensive perimeter (and at its center), established American forces 2,200 miles west of Hawaii in bases well suited to our further plans. In these islands protected anchorages for the entire Fleet, and for the assembly of large amphibious forces, were obtained, together with sufficient land area for air strips suited to all types of aircraft. This in turn permitted long-range search and photo reconnaissance of areas of interest in the next forward movement, air attack on fruitful enemy objectives within range, and continued interdiction and blockade of strong but newly by-passed positions still held by the enemy in this area. Finally capture of the Marshalls projected the supporting bases for the United States submarines 1,300 miles closer to the trade routes of Japan than the prior forward base at Midway.

* The strike on Truk, coupled with the Marshalls invasion, had effects far beyond the sinking of some 200,000 tons of naval and merchant shipping and the great destruction of aircraft there accomplished. Both as a base for the Fleet and for advanced base supply Truk was now useless. Thus Rabaul was cut off from all outside help and the whole position in the South and Southwest Pacific was weakened accordingly. In addition, due to the greater importance of Truk, the last of the air defense of Rabaul was withdrawn to the Central Pacific to meet the new threat there, and Japanese air opposition in the Rabaul-Solomons area became a thing of the past.

The carrier strike on the Marianas, following immediately that on Truk, was conceived purely as an operation to hurt the Japanese as much as possible, and a continuance of pressure which would keep them off balance in their dispositions and planning. Strategically, however, it had the effect of displaying the capabilities of the Fast Carrier Task Force in long-range operations and emphasizing to the enemy that the inner defense line itself was now seriously threatened.

The Japanese, for their part, were now faced with the fact of American occupation of key points in the center of their defensive perimeter and knew they did not have the forces necessary to change that unfavorable situation. The position in the South had likewise deteriorated, as already noted, with Rabaul, the key defensive point there, having totally lost its effectiveness, and American strength being pushed further and further west along the New Guinea coast. It was apparent to them that a complete revamping of basic strategy was immediately called for.

The United States position was firm indeed in early March 1944. The initiative had been won, adequate forces were in sight, and it was possible to plan in orderly fashion for future operations. Japan, on the other hand, was faced with the most urgent need of devising means to counter the unpredictable but obviously intended blows at her inner perimeter, with forces so limited that opposition with the slightest chance of a favorable outcome could only be offered under ideal conditions.

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Purpose and Intent (Governing Directives)

Thus the stage was set for the next major move in the Central Pacific, by which American Forces proposed to establish themselves firmly in the Southern Marianas on the inner perimeter of Japan's defense. In this second of two giant strides across the Pacific a position would be gained to serve as a base for operations which would break Japan's capacity to wage effective warfare. Prior to the landings there would be a period of preparation, of "softening up", closely tied in with corresponding plans for employment of our forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. The intent was to keep him constantly off balance, to prevent his getting set for any spot or time, and during this period so to reduce his strength in planes and ships and other war essentials that the final strike would have every advantage. Being on the offensive, with freedom of movement over a vast theater, the United States plans could be extremely flexible, to take quick advantage of any indicated weakness.

Early Japanese Plans and Dispositions

When the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet directed the evacuation of Truk as the fleet base on 10 February 1944, to avoid expected American attack there, Admiral Koga himself with his staff proceeded to Tokyo for conference with Imperial Headquarters to discuss new plans and dispositions which the situation now demanded. Consequent to these meetings it was decided to base the First Mobile Fleet in the Singapore Area or in home waters for continued training, but the Commander in Chief in his Flagship (*Musashi*) would be located at Palau to await developments.

Shortly after arriving in Palau in early March, Admiral Koga issued his operation Order No. 73 (the "Z" Operation), a translation of which appears in Appendix 71. This order recognized the defensive position and the major importance of the Central Pacific Front but did little more than establish very broad operational policies to counter possible attacks by fleet or invasion forces on the inner defense line. Imperial Headquarters Directive No. 358 issued on 22 March (the "To" Operation, also appearing in Appendix 71) made specific provision for the employment of shore-based naval air in the home islands "to intercept and annihilate any enemy fleet which approaches for an attack in the waters close to our homeland." The training of carriers and their new air groups, and the replacement and building up of shore-based air strength, had not yet developed to the point where concrete and detailed plans could be prepared for major commitment of Japanese naval forces against possible United States offensive action in the Marianas and Western Carolines.

In March 1944 the organization of the Third Fleet (the aircraft carrier force) was revised, thereafter comprising Carrier Divisions One, Two and Three, with three carriers in each Division. CarDivOne was undergoing training and upkeep in the Singapore Area and remained there until moved up to Tawi Tawi on 15 May. Carrier Divisions Two and Three, similarly engaged in the Western Inland Sea, joined the Fleet at Tawi Tawi on 16 May. The Third Fleet thereafter was maintained in a training and stand-by status in this area until 13 June, when sortie was made to participate in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

The Air Group assigned to CarDivOne had been sent from Truk to Rabaul in early November 1943 to augment the defense against United States landings at Bougainville. There it had been almost completely wiped out in attacks on our shipping and in efforts to repel the United States carrier strikes of 5 and 11 November against Rabaul. Reformed in Japan in January 1944 the group was sent to Singapore the following month to continue training in company with the parent carriers. CarDivTwo air units had suffered similar heavy losses at Rabaul when sent there in January 1944 in a last attempt to maintain control of the air. These units were reformed in Japan about 1 March. The Air Group of CarDivThree was newly formed about 1 February 1944.

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United States Operations — The Preparatory Phase

The period March to June 1944 was pointed towards the Marianas operation scheduled for the latter month, but pressure against the enemy continued to be exerted by all available forces as preparations for the further advance were being made. In the Marshalls, aside from consolidation and development of newly captured bases, there proceeded a methodical occupation of the smaller islands while insuring the complete isolation of the by-passed atolls of Wotje, Maloelap, Mille and Jaluit. By late March the United States had captured some 90 percent of enemy possessions in the Marshalls and completely dominated the 330,000 square miles of sea and air in their environs. Long-range shore-based air engaged in constantly expanding operations to the west against enemy installations and shipping, and in photo reconnaissance of future objectives. Finally the Fast Carrier Task Forces projected their operations as far distant as Palau in the Western Carolines and Hollandia in New Guinea. These operations were all closely coordinated with the programs of the South and Southwest Pacific Theatres and frequently were in mutual support of one another.

Shore Based Air

The westward movement of air bases in the Central Pacific together with the northwest movement of South Pacific and Southwest Pacific forces permitted increasing correlation of attack effort by aircraft under these separate commands, with particular reference to Truk and the Western Carolines.

The first attacks by land-based planes on Truk began in March, both from Central Pacific and South Pacific bases, and were accomplished in major part by Army B-24's. These strikes were normally made at night to avoid fighter interception, and were designed primarily to destroy aircraft and aircraft installations on the ground. Further to the west Woleai, Yap, and Palau received increasing attention from Southwest Pacific heavy bombers in the effort to destroy aircraft and reduce the usefulness of these bases for staging enemy air forward. Particularly heavy concentrations were put on these principal areas immediately prior to and during the operations of the Fast Carriers in advanced positions.

Aerial mining to interdict shipping was a further employment of long-range planes in the Central Pacific. During April the principal entrances to Truk lagoon were mined by naval planes from Eniwetok, as was Woleai by planes from an Australian squadron. This mining activity, together with that completed at Palau late in March by carrier planes, was intended primarily to neutralize enemy surface movements during the Hollandia operation in New Guinea.

The detailed planning for the operations against the Mariana Islands required extensive photographic reconnaissance of the objective area. The extreme ranges involved dictated the use of heavy bombers for these missions. The usual practice was to employ Naval or Marine photographic Liberators with a close defensive escort of Army B-24's. One such mission from Guadalcanal was staged through Eniwetok, and after photographing Guam returned to home base via the Admiralties. In making this flight, airfields under the control of South Pacific, Central Pacific, and Southwest Pacific forces were used.

The essential employment of heavy bombers for the purposes noted above, together with their use for the large-scale long-range search operations continuously in process, required that other types be devoted to the attack and constant interdiction of the by-passed Marshalls and other enemy bases at more moderate distances. A standard pattern of almost daily strikes was evolved, using Army medium bombers and Navy "Venturas," and Navy and Marine fighter-bombers and dive-bombers. Neutralization of runways, and destruction of gun emplacements, trucks and a variety of small boats were the objectives. A saturation strike by all available aircraft was made on Jaluit on 13-14 May, when 240 tons of bombs were dropped by 52 B-24's, 43 B-25's, 95 F4U's, 64 SBD's, and 26 F6F's. A similar raid was made on Wotje on 21 May, when 230 tons were dropped.

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Carrier Attack on Western Carolines, 30 March-1 April

After abandonment of Truk as a major fleet base it was noted that a substantial number of important units of the Japanese Fleet were thereafter using Palau. South Pacific Forces seized Emirau Island late in March, while the Southwest Pacific Forces were occupying portions of the Admiralty Islands. Operations against the Hollandia Area in Northern New Guinea were scheduled to occur in April. In view of this situation enemy forces at Palau presented a definite threat to our current and planned operations. It became apparent also that if that base could be rendered useless to the enemy for a minimum of one month, it would materially aid the projected Hollandia assault.

The attack on Palau, therefore, was designed primarily to destroy enemy naval ships and air forces there and, by mining the entrance channels, further to immobilize forces using or attempting to use that base. Attacks on Yap, Ulithi and Woleai, were incidental to the main strike on Palau.

The attack force (Task Force 58) was built around 11 fast carriers, operating in three groups with the customary supporting vessels. As previously mentioned this effort was supplemented by strikes on enemy bases and long-range searches by aircraft from both the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas. Submarines were included for special attacks on shipping and for observation and lifeguard duties.

At dawn on 30 March the fighter sweep which initiated the attack succeeded in virtually eliminating all planes airborne at Palau, and strafing of fields did the same on the ground. Enemy aerial opposition did not end after the first day's fighter sweep, however, since a large number of reinforcing planes were flown in during the night of 30 March. The result was that the dawn sweep of 31 March again met heavy opposition, and this group of enemy planes had also to be destroyed.

Throughout both days, after control of the air was obtained, the primary target was shipping. Confirmed sinkings included 2 old destroyers and four escort vessels, and 20 naval auxiliary and merchant vessels grossing 104,000 tons; of the latter, 6 were tankers totalling 47,000 tons. Unfortunately complete surprise had not been achieved, and early air search sightings of the approaching Task Force had resulted in the escape from port of 4 naval vessels and 15 to 20 merchantmen.

The mining operations carried out at Palau constituted the largest tactical use of mines ever made by United States forces, and the first in history from carriers. Being a daylight mission the mine-laying torpedo planes were escorted by fighters which strafed antiaircraft positions and drove back into the harbor ships which were attempting to escape. The closure of desired channels was effectively accomplished.

On 31 March a single Task Group attacked Yap, Ulithi, and Ngulu, and on 1 April the entire Task Force struck Woleai. Damage was largely confined to shore installations, with some small craft sunk in the harbors.

Approximately 150 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air or on the ground against United States combat losses of 25 planes. The vessels of the Task Force suffered no damage, being effectively defended against air attack by fighters and antiaircraft, although a number of small-scale raids were attempted.

Death of Admiral Koga, CinC Combined Fleet

It has already been stated that Admiral Koga set up his headquarters at Palau in early March, while the bulk of his fleet was based in home waters or in the Singapore Area. Admiral Koga announced his decision to hold the Marianas-Palau line until death, feeling that once this inner defense line was broken there could be no further hope for Japan. To that end he chose two bases from which to direct operations: if the attack were in the north he would command from Saipan, and if in the south he would base at Davao.

From early search plane reports on 29 March it was estimated that the American Task Force might attack Palau, but from information at hand the Japanese could not judge whether this would be simply in the nature of a raid or the beginning of a massive-scale advance toward what they called the last line of

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defense. On the afternoon of the 30th, however, reports were received that a large transport force was proceeding westward from the Admiralty Islands, and that a part of the Task Force which attacked Palau had moved on to the westward. From a new estimate of the situation, based on these reports, it was decided that the American Task Force might undertake a landing in Western New Guinea.

Admiral Koga adopted the following measures to meet these new developments: first, most of the fighter planes in the Marianas were moved to Palau; second, the planes of Admiral Ozawa's carrier force at Singapore were ordered to proceed to Davao since these planes, although not sufficiently trained for effective use in fleet operations, could be used from land bases; and third, Admiral Koga himself planned to proceed to Davao to command from a central position in the southern area.

Pursuant to the last decision, on the evening of 31 March two four-engined flying boats took off from Palau, carrying the bulk of the staff, to proceed to Davao. One plane, encountering a severe low pressure area between Palau and Mindanao, circled the storm to the north and eventually crashed in an attempted night landing near Cebu. The chief of staff survived this crash. The second plane, with the commander in chief embarked, was not heard from again after entering the bad weather zone.

Fifth Fleet Support of the Hollandia Operation, 21-24 April 1944

In order to complete the reconquest of New Guinea, forces under General MacArthur were ordered to seize the coastal area in the vicinity of Aitape and Hollandia, and thus by-pass and neutralize the enemy's holdings in the Hansa Bay and Wewak Areas. For this major effort, pushing far to the northwest, Fifth Fleet units cooperated with the Seventh Fleet to provide naval and air support. Simultaneous landings at the two objectives were scheduled for 22 April.

Task Force 58, assigned to this support task, had the primary mission of destroying or containing any enemy naval force attempting to interfere with the landings, and secondarily to neutralize enemy airfields and furnish requested air support.

Beginning at dawn of 21 April the carriers launched strikes against the fields in the Hollandia region as well as against the minor airdromes at Wakde and Sawar, about 100 miles west. They supported landings and troop movements ashore, in addition to keeping enemy airfields neutralized. The preparatory work of the Fifth Air Force was so complete however, and the strength of enemy forces and installations so slight, that little support was called for from Task Force 58. The actual landings met almost no opposition, and by noon of 22 April the beachheads were secure.

During the entire operation 13 enemy planes were shot down near the Task Force and about 20 at or near the target but damage to grounded planes was difficult to assess because of prior heavy destruction. Numerous small craft were sunk or damaged, and ground installations, fuel and ammunition dumps, and stores were destroyed. Task Force 58 lost 10 planes in combat.

Second Carrier Air Attack on Truk, 29-30 April 1944

After completing its support of the Hollandia landings, orders were issued to Task Force 58 for a two day air strike against Truk, commencing 29 April. The primary objective was to inflict the maximum possible damage to shore installations. The plan provided for a daily initial fighter sweep by approximately 84 planes followed by the usual staggered launchings of subsequent bombing attacks.

There was considerable airborne opposition to the first fighter sweep, made possible by advance warning by the Truk radar. Squally weather conditions and heavy cloud cover impeded the air action somewhat, but by mid-morning virtually all airborne enemy had been eliminated. An early torpedo air attack in small numbers launched by the enemy against our forces was broken up without damage.

In excess of 2,200 sorties were flown against land installations after air control had been achieved. Hangars, ammunition dumps, oil in storage, and a large number of miscellaneous structures were destroyed.

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Valuable shipping targets were few and were a secondary consideration, but several small vessels and barges were destroyed or damaged.

The Commander in Chief of the 22d Air Flotilla at Truk, when interviewed after the war, reported that he lost 59 planes in aerial combat during this strike and that 34 planes were destroyed on the ground of the total of 104 aircraft available to him at the time of this operation. Casualties on the ground for the Navy alone were the highest for any attack in the war, with 170 killed and 300 wounded.

The United States carrier force lost 27 planes in action, in large part victims of antiaircraft while attacking at low altitudes. The operations to rescue downed aviation personnel met with signal success. Of 46 pilots and aircrewmembers making water landings, 28 were rescued. The cooperation of carrier aircraft and seaplanes contributed to the outstanding rescue of 22 downed personnel by the submarine *Tang* alone.

Carrier Air Attack on Marcus and Wake Islands, 19-23 May 1944

This was a relatively small operation with only one Task Group, containing three carriers, participating. The purpose was to reduce the effectiveness of Marcus and Wake by destruction of aircraft, installations, and surface craft at or in the vicinity of the two objectives. A secondary purpose was training, particularly for new air groups on the carriers.

The opening strike on Marcus on 19 May was made by night fighters, followed throughout the day and on into 20 May by composite attacks. One "Betty", the only enemy aircraft seen, was shot down. Two small boats were sunk, and a moderate amount of damage was done to buildings and miscellaneous targets. The comparatively meager results were due to several factors, including lack of targets, bad weather, intense antiaircraft fire, and the comparative inexperience of the air groups participating.

Although United States combat losses were only four aircraft, 22 percent of all aircraft over the target were hit by antiaircraft fire.

While Marcus was under attack by the main body of the Task Group, a surface unit with one light carrier made a sweep approximately 370 miles to the north. All air searches were negative except for a single sampan which was destroyed.

Operations against Wake, on 23 May, followed about the same pattern as those against Marcus. A series of composite carrier strikes were launched, with a fair number of surface installations being destroyed or damaged, and a lugger and three barges sunk. Our combat loss was limited to one plane.

It is of interest that the Japanese executed the "TO" Operation, previously mentioned, when the United States force attacked Marcus and issued a cancellation after the Wake attack when it became apparent that there was no further threat to the homeland.

The Invasion of the Marianas (Operation "Forager") United States Directives, Situation and Strength

The Operation Plan for the occupation of the Southern Marianas was issued by the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas in late April 1944. The important immediate objective, of course, was the gaining of forward bases which would serve both for continuing operations against the enemy's sea communications and for direct long-range air attacks on the homeland of Japan. There naturally followed the security of our own lines of communication through the Central Pacific, and the opportunity for increased offensive action looking to the isolation and neutralization of the Japanese held Carolines to the south.

The Commander Central Pacific Task Forces (Commander Fifth Fleet) issued the detailed directive for these operations. His combatant naval strength was concentrated in the Fast Carrier Task Forces, and to them was assigned the primary task of preventing interference with the occupation by Japanese surface

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and air forces. Spearheading the advance they were initially to destroy enemy aircraft and air facilities in the Marianas and the Bonins, to destroy enemy defenses at Saipan, Tinian and Guam by air attack and bombardment, and finally to furnish air support as required by the Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.

The Commander Forward Area, Central Pacific, was directed to maintain the neutralization of Wake and the by-passed atolls of the Marshall Islands by land-based air strikes and, in coordination with South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Forces, deny to the enemy the use of his air bases at Truk.

D-day, the day of the landing on Saipan, was established as 15 June 1944. W-day, the landing on Guam, was tentatively set as 18 June.

The strategic situation in the Central Pacific immediately prior to the westward movement on the Marianas left little of concern to the American forces. By-passed atolls still occupied by the Japanese were effectively blockaded and offered small threat to our lines of communication. Growing shore-based air forces gave reasonable assurance against serious surprise air attacks staged through these areas, and assistance in interdiction from South and Southwest Pacific air commands was becoming increasingly effective as their operations moved west and north. Bases were being rapidly developed to provide facilities for the supply and rehabilitation of fleet units, and the assembly and onward routing of new forces and supporting echelons.

In the Southwest Pacific amphibious landings had been made on Biak Island on 27 May, and the campaign for the control of this island was continuing. Positions in the rear, along the northern coast of New Guinea, were consolidated, and preparations made for further advances to the westward. The Biak campaign was fortunate in its timing in that it was considered by the Japanese to be the major area of current United States interest, with prospective important operations intended, and hence served to attract some enemy forces, both surface and air, which might otherwise have been employed against us in the Marianas, as well as to delay their reaction to the Central Pacific move.

In the North Pacific the increasing scale of American operations from the Aleutians, which included both ship and air bombardment of the Kuriles and continuing photo reconnaissance of these regions, had been of such concern to the enemy as to cause him to strengthen his air defenses there at the cost of an already weak reserve.

The organization of United States forces assigned to operation "Forager" is given in Appendix 74.

Japanese Directives; Situation and Strength

Admiral Toyoda became Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet on 3 May 1944, taking the place of Admiral Koga who had been killed while fleeing the March carrier attack on Palau. No new important policy directive had been issued to the Combined Fleet in the interim. On 3 May, concurrent with his assumption of command, Admiral Toyoda received Imperial Headquarters Directive No. 373 which was to be the guiding instrument during the forthcoming Marianas operations. The substance of this plan, designated the "A" operations, was that the fleet and shore-based air forces should be prepared for decisive action by the end of May and that they should only be committed under conditions and in an area favorable to exerting maximum strength. On the same date Admiral Toyoda issued his Operation Order No. 76, giving detailed instructions. Translations of both these papers are given in Appendix 72.

Strategically the Japanese position was not good. Threatened on a long front which extended from Western New Guinea, through the southern Philippines, Palau, and to the Marianas, their strength at individual points was totally incapable of seriously opposing the overwhelming forces which the Americans could bring to bear at the place of their own choosing. Japanese lines of communication with their forward areas were highly insecure under the continuing attacks of submarines and air forces, and their land-based air strength was suffering due to attacks of land-based and carrier aircraft. As the Japanese Fleet, however, had not been actively engaged since the preceding fall, several months had been available for attempted

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rebuilding of its carrier air forces. Japan's only hope therefore lay in employing the mobility of the Fleet together with shore-based aviation in a concentrated and coordinated attack on approaching United States forces. This is precisely what was intended in the "A" plan.

The critical situation which was facing Japan was fully appreciated by Admiral Toyoda. In a message to Commanding Officers on the occasion of becoming Commander in Chief, quoted in full in Appendix 73, the admiral stated: "The war is drawing close to the lines vital to our national defense. The issue of our national existence is unprecedentedly serious; an unprecedented opportunity exists for deciding who shall be victorious and who defeated."

Appendixes 76 and 77 give the tables of organization and strength for the Japanese ground and air forces as of 1 June 1944 in the areas of interest.

Strategic Importance of the Marianas

Being directly across our path north to the Japanese Empire and west to the Philippines, Formosa and the coast of China, the strategic importance of the Marianas was obvious. They formed a natural barrier of islands whose location permitted the Japanese to stage land-based aircraft from the Empire and the Philippines to any island in the Western Pacific. It was therefore possible for the enemy to concentrate an offensive or defensive air force on selected islands in the chain and to provide shore-based air cover and support for a surface fleet operating within air combat range.

Conversely the loss of these islands would mean a major break in the inner ring of defense, with advantages to the invading forces as set forth in the purposes of the American Forces.

The Capture of Saipan, 15 June-9 July

Rehearsals of the prospective landing operations were conducted by the elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force in the Hawaiian and Solomons areas during the latter half of May. None of the carrier air groups scheduled for the operation could participate in the rehearsals, due to active war employment. It was therefore arranged for Commander Support Aircraft to brief all scheduled units at the forward bases.

Task Force 58, spearheading the offensive, departed from Majuro on 6 June. The plan provided for initiating the attack with fighter sweeps of the principal enemy strongholds at dawn of 12 June, D—3-day. Fortuitous conditions, however, permitted a long-range sweep of Guam, Rota, Tinian and Saipan the preceding afternoon. The change thus possible was put in effect because of the increased opportunity for surprise, the large estimated strength of enemy aircraft in the Marianas, and the desirability of altering the pattern of initial dawn attacks used in previous carrier attacks on shore air objectives.

A fighter sweep of 225 planes was launched from a position about 200 miles from Guam and 225 miles from Saipan and Tinian. There was no indication that the Task Force was detected prior to the approach of these planes to the objective. The results reported by the Commander Task Force 58 were a total of 147 planes put out of operation: 110 destroyed (81 airborne, 29 on the ground), 13 probables, 24 damaged. This represented roughly one-third of the estimated total Japanese air strength in the Marianas. Against this the United States carriers suffered the loss of 11 fighters, the pilots of five of which were subsequently rescued.

The effectiveness of the initial fighter sweep may be judged by the fact that even though considerable airborne opposition met the early fighter sweep on D—3-day, the Task Force was not seriously bothered even by snoopers on the night of June 11—12. The major object of the sweep was attained; control of the air had been effected.

Pre-Invasion Strikes

During daylight hours of 12—14 June all targets were kept under maximum air attack, with the objectives of destroying aircraft, rendering airfields temporarily unusable, destroying coastal defense and

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AA positions, and burning the cane fields which overlooked the prospective troop landing areas on Saipan. Normally these were scheduled, or "canned" strikes, with modifications as necessary to take especially attractive targets. Included in the latter was a convoy of the main bulk of shipping trying to escape from Saipan, some 21 ships altogether, which was caught about 220 miles to the northwest and effectively disposed of: confirmed sinkings of the larger merchantmen totalling eight vessels for about 26,000 tons, plus 1 torpedo boat (*Otori*) and 3 submarine chasers of the escort. A smaller group of 7 vessels was heavily struck 350 miles southwest of Guam.

Enemy air opposition continued, particularly from fields on Guam and Rota, but on such a small scale as to be of very limited effectiveness. With these favorable conditions, and in accordance with plans, two of the Fast Carrier Task Groups were sent north on the night of 13 June to strike the enemy air at Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. The seven carriers of these groups carried out attacks on 15 and 16 June, meeting sizeable airborne resistance of about 30 to 40 fighters at Iwo Jima and discovering over 100 planes parked on the fields. The majority of these planes were destroyed, installations were thoroughly worked over and the area was left in poor condition to stage planes into the Marianas. Eleven carrier aircraft were lost in these operations.

The Landing

Air support for the initial assault on Saipan on 15 June was furnished by the two Task Groups remaining on the scene together with two escort carrier divisions specifically assigned to support missions. With H-hour established at 0840, a heavy pre-H-hour strike was made along the beaches by about 160 carrier planes. This was followed by an H-hour strafing attack by 72 planes just preceding the beaching of the leading wave of landing craft. Between 0840 and 0910 approximately 8,000 troops, with nearly 150 LVT (A)'s operating as light tanks in support, were landed on the shores of Saipan. Aircraft and ships continued in direct support throughout the day, and by 1800 nearly 20,000 men had been put ashore.

With the exception of the time absent from station consequent to the Battle of the Philippine Sea, described hereafter, the Fast Carriers remained in support until the end of the Saipan campaign. Their missions included augmenting the direct support of ground forces furnished by the escort carriers (and later by shore-based air) interdiction of enemy airfields in the area, "softening up" of positions on Guam and Tinian in preparation for planned landings, and night interception of Japanese planes being ferried into the available operating fields, principally on Guam. Additional strikes mentioned later were also put on Iwo Jima 24 June and on 3-4 July to reduce the continuing air threat from the north.

Facilities for operating planes from Saipan developed rapidly as our troops gained control of the southern part of the island. A small strip directly on the beach, at Charan-Kanoa, was made usable for the small artillery observation planes on 20 June. Aslito airfield, captured on 18 June, began receiving Army P-47 fighters on 22 June at which time they assumed responsibility for combat air patrol. These planes were delivered to the area aboard escort carriers, and were catapulted when the field was ready to receive them. In all, 74 P-47's left the carriers and landed on Saipan between 22 and 24 June. Long searches to the westward for enemy surface forces were necessary, and five PBM patrol planes arrived for this purpose on 17 June, operating thereafter from buoys well off shore; this force was later expanded to five squadrons based on six tenders.

From the landing on 15 June until 7 July, enemy aircraft carried out a series of raids on United States ships in the vicinity of Saipan and on the forces ashore, probably originating initially at Guam, Rota, or Tinian and later from the Carolines. None of the raids was of serious proportions, and they were more of a nuisance than a real threat. The number of planes involved totalled perhaps 150 in all raids, and attacks were generally made at dusk or early evening. In addition, one Task Group was subjected to a fairly determined attack by eight to ten torpedo planes in the early evening of 15 June. Seven of the attackers were shot down

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by antiaircraft, and late combat patrol and night fighters accounted for a further eight planes of the Japanese fighter cover.

Battle of the Philippine Sea, 19-20 June 1944 *Movements of the Japanese Fleet*

In their "A" plan, previously referred to, the Japanese had anticipated the obvious American offensive which had now come to pass; but they had slightly misjudged the location of the thrust. "Wishful thinking", as one naval officer described it on interrogation, had estimated that the next major blow would be at Palau or further south, areas best suited to coordinated defense measures by both shore-based air and the Fleet. Thus when an air reconnaissance of Majuro Atoll on 9 June discovered the absence of the United States Task Force, with its implication of early attack, no immediate counteraction was put in motion. The current operations around Biak, initiated when Southwest Pacific forces landed there in late May, were continued with a portion of the Fleet strength while the major strength remained in a stand-by status at Tawi Tawi. When the fighter sweep from Task Force 58 struck the Marianas on 11 June, the Japanese Fleet Headquarters adjudged this to be a diversionary operation in the Biak campaign.

The Japanese Main Body sortied from Tawi Tawi at 0900 on 13 June for Guimaras Strait in the Central Philippines, in accordance with prior plans based on improved conditions for the training of carrier air groups in this region. Concurrently reports were received of the continuing attacks in the Marianas and the great strength of American forces deployed there, indicating that landings were in early prospect. Accordingly the Fleet was alerted for the "A" operation on the evening of the 13th, and with the report of transports approaching Saipan early on the 15th, the "A" plan was fully activated. On this latter date also, the "TO" Operation (employment of aircraft in home islands) was again executed.

The track charts of the Japanese forces, their composition, and their official action reports covering the ensuing battle actions, are found in Appendixes 78 to 84.

Task Force 58

On 14 June, a United States submarine reported that large Japanese forces, present 2 days earlier, had sortied from Tawi Tawi. Subsequent submarine reports indicated a course toward the Central Philippines, and Commander Fifth Fleet accordingly took steps to prepare for major action. Carrier Task Groups operating against the Bonins were recalled, and a rendezvous of all four Groups of the Task Force was arranged for about noon on the 18th in a position west of the Marianas suitable for covering the expeditionary forces. Appendix 83 shows the subsequent moves of Task Force 58 in relation to those of the enemy force. Lanes of approach were guarded by the adjustment of submarine patrols, the extension of SoWesPac long-range searches from the Admiralties, and the establishment of a tender-based patrol plane squadron on Saipan.

On the 15th United States submarines reported the passage through San Bernardino Strait of large enemy forces whose subsequent course indicated definite commitment to action. With later sightings showing the progress of Japanese vessels it was hoped that contact and an initial attack might be carried out on the 18th, but an afternoon search to a distance of 500 miles from Saipan was negative. Similarly a night radar search by patrol planes, to a distance of 600 miles from base at Saipan, was unproductive. Indications were, however, that by making a high speed run to the west during the night, it probably would be practical for Task Force 58 to initiate dawn attacks on the 19th. This proposal was ruled out by reason of the primary requirement of protecting the forces at Saipan, forcing a position close enough to this objective to prevent an "end run" by the Japanese Fleet which might strike and retire with disastrous consequences to us. Thus the stage was set for the initiation of action by the Japanese dependent on their direction and speed of approach into the battle area.

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Attack on Task Force 58 — 19 June 1944

The first day of heavy action broke with ceiling and visibility unlimited, wind east 14 knots, cloud cover of about 3/10 in the vicinity of the Task Force. Sunrise was at 0542. At 0720 carrier planes on combat air patrol over Guam reported many planes taking off from the airfields, and reinforcements were immediately sent in. At 0800 a large group of aircraft was detected approaching Guam, and additional fighters were vectored out to intercept this raid. By 0930 approximately 35 enemy planes had been destroyed over Guam, but United States fighters reported planes still taking off in waves and many more on the ground.

At 0950 aircraft were detected all around the horizon, and shortly thereafter a large group developed 130 miles to the westward. This was the beginning of the carrier plane attack, and a general alarm was sounded to the Task Force at 1004. Fighters over Guam were recalled, additional fighters were launched from the carriers, all bombers and torpedo planes on deck were sent to a rendezvous to the eastward, decks were cleared to facilitate the arriving, servicing and launching of fighter planes on a rotating schedule, and preparations were made for a prolonged battle.

The attack developed into the most powerful yet made by the Japanese against United States surface forces and involved an unprecedented number of planes. These strikes were, however, poorly coordinated, and while raids of varying intensity came in all day only four reached major proportions. Interceptions were normally made at distances of 50 to 60 miles from the carrier groups, and United States fighters arrived at the interception point with an altitude advantage. The incoming raids were thoroughly broken up, resulting in almost complete destruction of the attacking groups. Only small units were able to break through the protective force and most of these were destroyed by ships' gunfire.

Approximately 40 enemy planes penetrated the fighter defense in these raids. One scored a direct hit on the *South Dakota* with a 250-kg. bomb, one crashed the side of the *Indiana*, and near misses were made on a heavy cruiser and several carriers, doing slight damage and causing small personnel casualties.

The last action of the day occurred at 1823 with the interception of a large group of planes enroute to Guam. Fighters followed the enemy in, shooting down many in the act of landing or in the landing circle.

The battle ended in a decisive victory for Task Force 58. Approximately 366 airborne planes had been destroyed in the air by its fighters, 17 more destroyed on the ground, and 19 were accounted for by ships' antiaircraft. In addition, although not known at the time, two of the Japanese aircraft carriers had been sunk as a result of submarine action. Against this stood United States combat losses of 26 planes, with 24 pilots and air crewmen, and the superficial damage to ships previously noted.

The task now was to intercept the Japanese surface forces. Carrier air searches had been conducted on the usual schedule during the day, but negative results indicated that the enemy was maintaining his distance. Accordingly at about 1900, when all planes had been recovered, the Task Force headed westward at 23 knots toward the estimated Japanese position. One Task Group, low on fuel, was left behind to take care of enemy aircraft attempting to use fields on Guam and Rota.

Attack on the Japanese Fleet, 20 June 1944

During the night 19-20 June radar searches by patrol planes from Saipan had given negative results. A morning search launched at 0525 from the Task Force had no better success on surface forces, but contact with enemy shipborne seaplanes indicated that surface targets were in flight range. At noon the Task Force had reached a position some 315 miles west of Guam. Shortly thereafter a small fighter attack group was sent out in the best estimated direction, followed at 1330 by the regular sector search. The first of these returned without contact, but at about 1515 the Task Force was alerted when garbled and indistinct reports began coming in from units of the formal search. Subsequent verifications indicated that

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the enemy was in two or three groups, at a distance of roughly 250 miles, and orders were issued to prepare to launch a strike of full strength.

At 1630 a "deck load" strike of 216 planes was launched and preparations started for the second deck load. Shortly after the first strike was launched, however, a correction was received on the nearest enemy position indicating it to be about 60 miles beyond the original report, and the second strike was therefore ordered held until morning.

Aircraft of the striking group arrived over the targets at intervals from 1820 to 1845. They were met by a heavy barrage of anti-aircraft and by interception by small groups of fighters totalling perhaps 35 planes. Each air group attacked individually in a coordinated dive bombing and torpedo attack, with carriers as primary targets, while fighters engaged the enemy interceptors.

The Japanese Fleet was under continuous attack from 1820 to 1900, and by sunset (1919) most of our planes had left the area. Damage to the enemy as reported in his action report, Appendix 79, was as follows:

Sunk—*Hiyo* (XCV), *Genyo Maru* (AO), *Sciyo Maru* (AO).

Damaged—*Zuikaku* (CV), *Junyo* (XCV), *Ryubo* (CVL), *Chiyoda* (CVL), *Haruna* (BB), *Maya* (CA), *Hayasui* (AO).

In addition the attacking planes estimated that 22 Japanese fighters were shot down.

Consequent to the long night flight back to the Task Force, together with an acute fuel shortage, there was some confusion among the returning groups. Aside from the difficulty of distinguishing the various carriers, there were a number of deck crashes which delayed landing operations and numerous planes were forced to make water landings due to fuel exhaustion. Altogether this part of the operation was slow and costly. Of the 216 planes that had taken off on the afternoon strike, only 116 were landed safely. Twenty of these lost were shot down in combat or unaccounted for; the remaining 80 were lost in water landings because of fuel shortage, or in deck crashes. Flight personnel killed or missing totalled 38.

Pursuit of the Enemy Fleet

With the completion of recovery operations the Task Force resumed course westward with limited prospect of overhauling the main body but with the possibility of locating some damaged ships. During the night 20–21 June PBM patrol planes from Saipan made contact, but a scheduled night search and attack from the carriers was cancelled due to the extreme range.

At about dawn on 21 June deck load strikes were launched with enemy cripples designated as primary targets, but this had negative results. Equally unfruitful was a final afternoon search to the west. In the early evening, therefore, the retirement of Task Force 58 towards Saipan was directed.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea did not result in the hoped-for destruction of the Japanese surface fleet, but the loss of three aircraft carriers and two of their critically short fleet tankers, together with severe damage to a number of vessels, left it in poor condition for early effective action. The important result, however, lay in the almost complete decimation of the trained air groups of the three carrier divisions engaged. Japanese carrier aviation was substantially finished as a naval force in the war.

Covering Operations, 22 June–9 July

With the withdrawal of the Japanese Fleet from the Marianas the threat to our forces there was sharply reduced, and it became possible to return parts of the Fast Carrier Task Force to the Marshalls for replenishment. The arrival of Army P-47's at Saipan, together with the escort carriers in support there, made few strikes necessary at Saipan by fast carrier planes. The bulk of the effort of Task Groups remaining on station was therefore expended on Guam and Rota, to prevent use of these fields by planes flown in

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from the Carolines, while Task Groups leaving or returning to stations took care of Iwo Jima, to interrupt the staging of aircraft from the Empire to the Marianas.

It will be recalled that a heavy attack by carrier aircraft had been made on Iwo on 15-16 June, destroying virtually all enemy planes located there and severely damaging the air installations. During the subsequent week, however, the enemy had flown in many aircraft from the Empire, constituting a threat to the Marianas Operations and presenting a worthwhile target for attack. Accordingly, early on 24 June, a long-range fighter sweep was launched on Iwo from one Task Group. This flight was intercepted by fighters, however, and in the ensuing engagement the majority of the enemy were destroyed. There followed a series of enemy attacks on our carriers, with the same result, largely due to our combat air patrol. In addition, planes which appeared to be headed for the Marianas were intercepted late in the afternoon. From Japanese sources it is reported that approximately 114 of their planes were destroyed during the day. United States losses were only 9 fighters.

Again on 3 July attacks were initiated on the Bonin and Volcano Islands, this time by two Task Groups. A long-range sweep on that afternoon by 63 fighters caught the Japanese by surprise at Iwo, resulting in heavy losses to them in planes both airborne and on the ground. The following day a full flight schedule by one Task Group was carried out against Iwo Jima, Haha Jima and shipping, and during the afternoon Iwo Jima was taken under heavy bombardment by cruisers and destroyers of the force. Concurrently the carriers of a second Task Group conducted an attack on Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, in which a sizeable tonnage of enemy shipping was bagged, with damage to targets on shore. While these strikes against the Volcano and Bonin Islands were successful, they were not without considerable cost, United States losses being 22 aircraft on combat missions.

The Occupation of Guam and Tinian

The landing on Guam was initially scheduled for 18 June, 3 days after Saipan was invaded, and that on Tinian was tentatively set about 2 weeks later. Due to the strong resistance encountered by our troops on Saipan, which necessitated the use of the entire floating reserve for this attack, these subsequent assaults were considerably delayed. The attempted interference by the Japanese Fleet had been a further influence to postponement.

The Fast Carrier Task Forces continued in support of the Marianas operations after Saipan had been made secure, but the necessity of direct support of ground force operations by the fast carriers decreased as the campaign progressed, due to the gradual building up of shore-based air forces and the cumulative effects of the long softening-up attacks on all shore objectives prior to the landings. Accordingly, except for participation when all-out effort was required, the fast carriers were principally employed in the interdiction of threatening enemy bases within the area and in operations outside the immediate theater in preparation for future moves.

Assault and Capture of Guam, 21 July-10 August

The long delay in this operation made possible a period of carefully planned and controlled gunfire, of coordinated air strikes and surface bombardments, and of thorough aerial reconnaissance. This increased the effectiveness of the air strikes and, as the tempo of air activity rose, practically all Japanese artillery was destroyed and low-level dive-bombing and strafing attacks were carried out with negligible ground opposition.

The operations at Guam on 21 July took place almost exactly as planned. H-hour was 0830, when the first waves landed on the beaches. This had been preceded by 2 hours of heavy gun bombardment, by rocket salvos from LCI (G)'s immediately ahead of the assault waves, and by intense close support naval gunfire beginning a few minutes before the landing.

The entire Fast Carrier Task Force, together with assigned escort carriers, provided direct air support

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for the landing as well as intensive preparatory air strikes during the preceding days. At Guam, carrier aircraft delivered heavier and more concentrated air support than ever before. Prior to H-hour on 21 July the landing and flanking beaches were hit simultaneously by 312 planes and by naval gunfire. Immediately prior to and after the landing an additional 92 aircraft, mostly fighters, strafed and bombed the beaches and adjacent areas. Thereafter regular support missions averaging 35 planes reported every hour to Commander Support Aircraft for target assignment; repeated air strikes were also made on assigned areas away from the landing beaches further to immobilize the defenders. Of a total of about 56,000 troops employed in the assault, 19,000 were Army and 37,000 were Marines. The operation went forward rapidly, and such enemy fire as gradually developed did not greatly hinder the landing of troops and supplies.

The ground operations on Guam were divided into three stages. The first stage accomplished the domination of the area in the vicinity of Apra Harbor and terminated with the capture of Orote Peninsula on 29 July. This placed the control of Apra Harbor in United States hands and was the critical period of the assault operation. In the second stage the troops pushed across Guam to the eastern coast and then northward to the extreme tip of the island, which was secured on 10 August when organized enemy resistance ceased. Stage three, involving the elimination of remaining pockets of Japanese resistance, was a long and difficult task, due to the tenacity and stubbornness of the defenders and to the exceedingly rough terrain. The figures on Japanese casualties illustrate this stage: on 10 August the total of enemy dead counted was just under 11,000; a month later, on 9 September, 15,600 of the enemy had been killed on Guam. As of 10 August, the American ground forces had lost a total of about 1,400 men killed or missing in action.

After 21 July three of the Fast Carrier Task Groups withdrew from the area, and the volume of air support at Guam immediately dropped off. Support of both the Guam and Tinian assaults was continued by the one remaining Fast Carrier Task Group assisted by Combat Escort Carriers. The airfield on Orote Peninsula was made serviceable on 3 August. On the following day garrison aircraft of a Marine Air Group together with men and equipment, were landed from an escort carrier. By 7 August this group had relieved ship-based aircraft of all routine combat air patrols.

Assault and Capture of Tinian 24 July-1 August

Most of the features of the assault on Tinian followed the general pattern of previous amphibious operations. The principal differences were the long period available during which preliminary aerial, artillery, and naval bombardment could be carried out, and the proximity of the objective to the newly won base at Saipan, from which it was separated only by a channel less than 3 miles in width. This latter factor made it possible for the operation to be principally a shore to shore movement.

The assault troops began landing at 0740 on 24 July following the now well defined sequence of preparatory actions. Of particular interest, however, was the unusually heavy concentration of explosives in the beach area, immediately preceding the landing, made possible by employing Army artillery emplaced on the south coast of Saipan. These batteries comprised ninety-six 105-mm. howitzers, twenty-six 155-mm. howitzers, and twenty-four 155-mm. guns.

Air support in the landing area was of the usual effective pattern supplemented by a heavy strike on Tinian Town, the only important community, by a force from the one Fast Carrier Task Group still in the area. Besides the Fast Carriers, Air Support was furnished by five combat escort carriers and the garrison aircraft shore-based on Saipan. Repeated support missions were flown throughout the day, with assignment of objectives by the Commander Support Aircraft. Particular attention was given to road and railroad junctions in an attempt to prevent the movement of enemy troops during the night. It is noteworthy that during the entire operation no large concentrations of Japanese troops were seen from the air.

The assault was made by the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, while the 27th Army Infantry Division was alerted in reserve on Saipan. The strength of assaulting troops was approximately 35,000 men. By night-

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fall of the first day a secure beachhead had been won at a cost of very few casualties. Two of the fire support vessels, however, suffered comparatively heavy losses when taken under fire by an undiscovered and well camouflaged battery of 6" guns located in caves at the base of a cliff.

Expansion of the beachhead and progress down the island was rapid in the ensuing days. On the third day the important airfield in the northern area was overrun and by evening of the following day had been reconditioned and was operational for United States planes. The Japanese made their last stand in the cliffs and high ground in the extreme southeastern portion of the island. The conquest of this position, however, took only a short time, and 9 days after the landing, on 1 August, the island was declared secure.

Casualties to the assault troops during the Tinian operation totalled slightly over 300 killed and missing in action through 1 August. Of the Japanese dead, some 5,500 were reported buried.

Continuing and Concurrent Operations Carrier Attack on Western Carolines, 25-28 July

With preliminary plans for attack on Yap, Palau, and Ulithi under consideration, it became essential to obtain thorough photographic coverage of these islands. This requirement, combined with the desirability of preventing attacks on United States forces engaged in the Marianas operation by destruction of aircraft and shipping at Yap and Palau, led to a carrier attack on these islands. It was with this end in view that three of the four Fast Carrier Task Groups had been released from support operations after the initial landing on Guam on 21 July.

One Task Group confined its operations during this period to the islands of Yap, Ulithi, Fais, Ngulu, and Sorol. Heavy strikes were combined with photographic missions against these targets. There was no airborne opposition but as a result of these attacks a few planes were destroyed on the ground, various small vessels were damaged, and ground installations were destroyed or damaged. Photographic coverage was completely successful.

The other two Fast Carrier Task Groups initiated their attack on Palau with a fighter sweep against enemy aircraft. Only light air opposition was met, all of the six airborne enemy planes sighted being destroyed. However, as a result of this and other attacks which followed, a fair number of aircraft were destroyed on the ground or water. Shipping targets were cleverly camouflaged and difficult to locate, and only modest success was attained. A fighter search patrol located an operating destroyer and this vessel, the *Samidare*, was blown up and sunk by strafing attack.

Photographic missions and attacks on ground targets on Palau were met with antiaircraft fire of considerable intensity, causing the combat loss of eight of our aircraft. Photo coverage of good quality was obtained.

Carrier Attack on Iwo Jima and Bonin Islands, 4-5 August

Two groups of the Fast Carrier Task Force were directed to the Iwo Jima, Haha Jima, Chichi Jima area to destroy enemy aircraft, shipping and installations. Enemy fighter opposition was negligible and the major effort was directed against shipping.

Assisted by a submarine contact report, carrier planes located a sizable convoy in the vicinity of Chichi Jima on 4 August. After major destruction by bomb and torpedo attack during daylight remnants of the convoy were hunted down at night and sunk by surface vessels of the attack force. Confirmed sinkings include one destroyer (*Matsu*), five merchantmen totalling about 23,000 tons, and four small transports; in addition numerous smaller craft, escorts and other types, were sunk or damaged.

During daylight of 5 August, while air attack against shore objectives was continued, the supporting United States cruisers and destroyers conducted a sustained bombardment at Chichi Jima against small craft in the harbor, shore batteries, and installations.

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Shore-Based Air — Marianas

Work on fields and facilities for the operation of planes from the newly acquired bases in the Marianas went forward rapidly. By the end of July the 6,000-foot Isely Field runway on Saipan was practically complete and operationally capable of handling 150 aircraft; a new fighter strip was completed, and progress was good on the first of the tremendous runways necessary to accommodate the B-29's.

The first strike on Iwo Jima by land-based planes was made on 14 July by two PB4Y (Liberator) aircraft of a naval patrol-bombing squadron. This was followed by other strikes on the Bonins and on Truk in July, and in August a sizable number of sorties were made on these distant targets by B-24's and PB4Y's of the Army and Navy. Most of the shore-based missions during July and August however were in direct support of the now concluding occupation operations, and in interdiction of the Lesser Marianas.

Marshall Islands Bases

During the occupation of the Marianas, United States aircraft, principally Marine fighters and dive-bombers, continued the bombing of Mille, Wotje, Maloelap, and Jaluit. The dug-in enemy continued to resist in spite of 13,400 attacks, in which 7,200 tons of bombs had been dropped on these islands from January through July. In the case of Truk, the neutralization of this base was continued by Army heavy bombers from Eniwetok.

Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok atolls served for the staging of practically all logistic support for the Marianas Operation. The scale of this effort is suggested in the case of Eniwetok, the most important from the standpoint of shipping, which handled approximately 1,700 arrivals and departures during the month of August, and which on 1 day had a total of 414 ships present in the lagoon.

Southwest Pacific

Forces under the CinC, Southwest Pacific Area continued the consolidation of positions taken during previous months. The Japanese gave vigorous opposition on Biak, where a beachhead was established in late May, and it was not until 28 June that organized resistance collapsed. Units of the Seventh Fleet furnished logistic and fire support of the troops ashore and prevented the enemy from landing reinforcements. A possible threat from strong Japanese surface forces, present in the southern regions, was removed with the opening of the assault on the Marianas which drew these forces northward to the defense of this vital area.

The small island of Noemfoor, to the west of Biak, was occupied on 2 July, and the Cape Sansapor area on the northwest tip of New Guinea on 30-31 July. These operations completed the by-passing of New Guinea, eliminating all Japanese aerial opposition and all except minor shipping. The air forces could now seriously undertake neutralization of the Halmahera Area in preparation for the Morotai Operation in September.

Southwest Pacific heavy bombers, generally operating from the Admiralties, gave continued support to the Central Pacific operations by strikes on Japanese bases in the Carolines.

Comments and Conclusion

As later events were to prove, the occupation of the Marianas fully attained the objectives set out in the original directives. Concurrent with the completion of this campaign preparations were being made to continue the Central Pacific offensive, directed next towards the Western Carolines. The Japanese, for their part, were now faced with a vastly changed strategic situation with American forces strongly emplaced on their inner defense line in a position which gravely threatened their ability to continue hostilities. Their appreciation of the crises facing them is expressed in "General Policy for Urgent Operations", issued on 21 July 1944, governing employment of the Combined Fleet, the content of which appears in a later

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chapter (the "SHO" Operations). At about the same time the Imperial Headquarters issued a directive (the "SETSU-GO" Operations) for the defense of the China Sea Coast.

Almost unanimously, informed Japanese considered Saipan as the decisive battle of the war and its loss as ending all hope for a Japanese victory. Announcing the fall of Saipan to the nation, General Tojo, the one man most responsible for his country's entry into war, said: "Japan has come to face an unprecedentedly great national crisis." On 18 July, the Tojo cabinet, which had guided the destinies of Japan since pre-Pearl Harbor days, was forced from office to be succeeded by a government charged with giving "fundamental reconsideration" to the problem of continuing the war.

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Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 73

8 March 1944.
KOGA, Mineichi,
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet.

Flagship *Musashi*, Palau.

Combined Fleet Order:

1. During the present period the Combined Fleet will carry out its main operations on the PACIFIC Front. In the event that an enemy fleet or invasion force attacks in this area, the fleet and the Army forces will concentrate all available strength to crush the enemy. Every effort will be made to hold necessary strong points.

2. These operations will be called Z Operations. The *Outline for Z Operations* is established in the Separate Volume.

Outline for Z Operations

1. Operation Policy:

A. To destroy the power of the enemy, reconnaissance and raids will be carried out at opportune moments.

B. Necessary interception dispositions will be completed immediately, utilizing all available forces, if an enemy fleet or invasion force attacks.

C. The attacking enemy force will be discovered at an early stage by means of airplanes, submarines, picket boats, etc. Its nature will be determined and it will be tracked.

D. The main operations will be directed at the CENTRAL PACIFIC Front. The Area stretching from the KURILE Islands and the waters east of HONSHU through the NANPO SHOTO, the MARIANAS and the CAROLINES to NEW GUINEA in the west will be considered the interception zone, and the enemy fleets will be intercepted and attacked here. Enemy carriers will be put out of action first by a concentration of our air power. After air superiority has been achieved the attack will be directed against convoys. In some situations, the convoys will be attacked and destroyed first. Surface forces, in concert with these air attacks, will raid enemy convoys or enemy fleets in important areas.

E. Every effort will be made to destroy the major element of the enemy landing forces at sea. Those which remain will be annihilated just before they land or at the beach. Thus, important areas will be held. Escort or supporting forces will also be destroyed.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive No. 358

Dated: 22 March 1944.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA, Shigetaro.

To: YOKOSUKA Naval District Commandant TOYODA.

CinC Combined Fleet KOGA.

KURE Naval District Commandant NOMURA.

SASEBO Naval District Commandant KOMATSU.

Northeast Area Fleet Commander TOTSUKA.

I. Details regarding the TO operation and the organization of the forces engaged in this operation are indicated herewith.

Appendix 71

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- (1) The officer in tactical command will be the Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.
- (2) Forces:
 - (a) The bulk of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group with the exception of SENTAI B(OTSU).
 - (b) The Naval Air Forces attached to the Combined Fleet in the HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU areas with the exception of SENTAI B(OTSU) which uses RAIDEN (JACK) and with the exception of forces which operate from tenders and ships fitted to carry aircraft.
 - (c) Forces under special orders.
- (3) The operational objective is to intercept and annihilate any enemy fleet which approaches for an attack in the waters close to our homeland.
- (4) Operational tactical command.

When Imperial Headquarters issues the order to execute the TO Operation, the Commander, YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group, will take charge of the forces indicated under paragraph (2) above and will come under the tactical command of CinC Combined Fleet.

The Commander, YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group, is hereby authorized to issue beforehand (to forces designated to be organized into the TO Operation) necessary instructions on action to be taken after the execution of the TO Operation has begun.
- (5) The Commandants of the various Naval Districts will cooperate in the movement and concentration of forces engaged in the TO Operation and will provide for their supplies, equipment, quarters and rations.

II. With the execution of the TO Operation, Air Flot B which uses Raiden (Jack) and is attached to the Combined Fleet in the HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU Areas, will, unless special orders are issued, report to and come under the operational tactical command of the Commandant of the nearest Naval District. In the event that Air Flot B cooperates in AA defense with plane units (HIKOKITAI) of the forces engaged in the TO Operation, command of these operations will be assumed by the Commandant of the Naval District in which they may be.

III. When air forces attached to the Combined Fleet are to be assigned in HONSHU, SHIKOKU, or KYUSHU for training and readiness or the like, their disposition and degree of training and readiness, etcetera, will be reported beforehand to the Commander, YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

IV. Cancel Imperial Headquarters Directive No. 292.

(Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Secret Dispatch No. 221701)

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive No. 383

Dated: 20 May 1944.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA, Shigetaro.

To: YOKOSUKA Naval District Commandant YOSHIDA.

CinC Combined Fleet TOYODA.

KURE Naval District Commandant NOMURA.

SASEBO Naval District Commandant KOMATSU.

Northeast Area Fleet Commander TOTSUKA.

Execute the TO Operation.

Preparations for action by the various units of Air Flot 61 and by the 301st Naval Air Group will be carried out according to schedule.

(Imperial Headquarters Navy General Staff Section Secret Dispatch 201035)

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THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive No. 386

Dated: 24 May 1944.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA, Shigetaro.
To: YOKOSUKA Naval District Commandant YOSHIDA.
CinC Combined Fleet TOYODA.
KURE Naval District Commandant NOMURA.
SASEBO Naval District Commandant KOMATSU.
Northeast Area Fleet Commander TOTSUKA.

Cancel the organization of TO Operation forces based on Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive No. 383.

(Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Secret Dispatch No. 241800)

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive No. 397

Dated: 15 June 1944.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA, Shigetaro.
To: YOKOSUKA Naval District Commandant YOSHIDA.
CinC Combined Fleet TOYODA.
KURE Naval District Commandant NOMURA.
SASEBO Naval District Commandant KOMATSU.
Northeast Area Fleet Commander TOTSUKA.
2d Air Fleet Commander FUKODOME.

Execute the TO Operation. However, preparations for action by the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group, the 27th Air Flot, and the 301st Naval Air Group will be carried out according to schedule, and the 2d Air Fleet, excluding headquarters, will be incorporated into the operational organization.

(Imperial Headquarters Navy General Staff Section Secret Dispatch 201035)

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive No. 404

Dated: 28 June 1944.
From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA, Shigetaro.
To: YOKOSUKA Naval District Commandant YOSHIDA.
CinC Combined Fleet TOYODA.
KURE Naval District Commandant NOMURA.
SASEBO Naval District Commandant KOMATSU.
Northeast Area Fleet Commander TOTSUKA.
2d Air Fleet Commander FUKODOME.

Cancel the organization of TO Operation forces based on Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive No. 397.

(Imperial Headquarters Navy General Staff Section Secret Dispatch 281741)

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Imperial Headquarters Directive 417

7 July 1944.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA.
To: YOSHIDA, Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval District.
TOYODA, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.
NOMURA, Commandant KURE Naval District.
KOMATSU, Commandant SASEBO Naval District.
TOTSUKA, Commander in Chief Northeast Area Fleet.
FUKODOME, Commander in Chief 2d Air Fleet.

Organization of TO-GO Operations Force as given in Imperial Headquarters Directive 409 is hereby dissolved.

Imperial Headquarters Directive 424

13 July 1944.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA.
To: YOSHIDA, Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval District.
TOYODA, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.
NOMURA, Commandant KURE Naval District.
KOMATSU, Commandant SASEBO Naval District.
TOTSUKA, Commander in Chief Northeast Area Fleet.
FUKODOME, Commander in Chief 2d Air Fleet.
KIRA, Commander in Chief 3d Air Fleet.

Imperial Headquarters Directive 358 is hereby cancelled. Hereafter, matters pertaining to "TO-GO" Operations will be handled by Combined Fleet.

(Imperial Headquarters Secret Dispatch No. 131926)

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Imperial Headquarters Directive 373

3 May 1944.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA.

To: CinC Combined Fleet TOYODA.

CinC Combined Fleet will, in addition to acting in accordance with Imperial HQ Directive No. 209 "Operations Policy to be Followed by Combined Fleet", also operate in accordance with appended supplement "Urgent Operational Policy to be Followed by Combined Fleet."

Supplement "Urgent Operational Policy to be Followed by Combined Fleet"

Firstly:

To concentrate majority of our forces for decisive battle, place them on the main front of the enemy's attack and to thwart the enemy's plans by smashing his fleet with one blow. To accomplish this end,

(1) Lose no time in getting our decisive battle strength into trim, and lay plans to apprehend and destroy the main strength of the enemy fleet on the seas from the Central Pacific Area to the Philippines and North of Australia Area, beginning about the latter part of May.

(2) Prior to accomplishing full preparedness of the above mentioned decisive battle strength, the policy will be, except for special circumstances, to avoid decisive action.

Secondly:

Outline for operations in the sea area for decisive action will conform to the following:

(1) Upon completion of preparations of First Mobile Fleet and First Air Fleet in the latter part of May. First Mobile Fleet will be ordered to stand by in the Central Southern Philippines; First Air Fleet will be deployed in the Central Pacific, Philippines and North Australia Area where it will hold itself in readiness for decisive action. Special attention will be focussed on suitable employment of both fleets in seizing the right moment to throw full strength into the destruction of the enemy's main force.

(2) Insofar as possible, the sea area for decisive action will be chosen close to the point where our mobile fleet is standing by.

Thirdly:

In the event that the enemy attacks before our decisive battle strength is in a state of readiness, operations will be conducted as follows:

(1) With the exception of holding specially designated points, and unless conditions are particularly favorable for our side, decisive action on the part of the surface forces will be avoided. The main policy will be to divert and crush the enemy, using base air force strength and local defense forces. The specially designated points mentioned above will be listed separately.

(2) In employing base air strength in the case of such an eventuality, due consideration is to be given to the everchanging war situation. Unless conditions are such that the action will be especially advantageous in the light of plans for the coming decisive battle, particular effort will be made to avoid excessive expenditures of strength which might work to the disadvantage of the impending decisive surface action.

Fourthly:

Operations in other areas during the period of decisive battle will conform to the following:

(1) Army and Navy will observe the closest cooperation in, for the most part, employing forces already present to intercept the attacking enemy. Insofar as possible, established policy will be observed in holding designated sectors of vital importance.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

(2) Effort will be made to execute tactics of surprise attack with the object of destroying the enemy's will to advance.

Fifthly:

Special attention will be given to the following points in preparing for decisive action.

(1) Navy and Army will act as one in making operational preparations. Their general deadline will be within the last 10 days of May, toward which they will expedite operational preparations from the Central Pacific extending to the Philippines and North of Australia Areas, including Western Carolines, Central Southern Philippines, Halmahera and Western New Guinea. Simultaneously, they will strengthen defenses of these important sectors, and take immediate action to establish a strategic situation in the sea area for decisive action which will be advantageous to our side.

(2) Priority will be given to preparations for air operations. Every effort will be spent toward construction of bases, strengthening of defenses, and accumulating requisite stores of fuel, and ammunition.

Sixthly:

Operations conforming to this operational policy will be known as "A" Operations.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 76

Flagship OYODO in Tokyo Bay.

3 May 44.

TOYODA, Soemu
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Order:

1. The Combined Fleet will direct its main operations in the area extending south of the CENTRAL PACIFIC to the north coast of NEW GUINEA. It will concentrate decisive strength in this area and will cooperate with friendly forces. It will destroy the enemy offensive strength, in particular the enemy task force, and thus frustrate the enemy plan of resistance.

2. This operation will be called A* Operation. The *Outline for A* Operation* is established in Separate Volumes 1-3.

3. Each force commander, while carrying out the present operation, will employ the necessary force in accordance with the *Outline for A* Operation*.

Appended Order:

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Orders 73, 55 and 56 and Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order 46 are hereby rescinded.

1. Operation Policy:

A. Decisive forces will be deployed quickly in the area of main operations.

B. Advance key points will be utilized to the full in order to gain intelligence of the enemy situation.

C. Stress will be laid on raiding attacks, by which a great diminution of enemy strength is anticipated.

D. The greater part of the Base Air Force and the full strength of the Task Force will be concentrated in the battle area. The enemy will be lured into this area and a decisive battle with full strength will be opened at a favorable opportunity. The enemy task force will be attacked and destroyed for the most part in a day assault.

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E. The decisive battle areas have been roughly prearranged as follows:

Battle area 1.—PALAU Area.

Battle area 2.—Western CAROLINES Area.

F. Until the enemy is lured into the battle area all efforts will be directed to gaining intelligence of the enemy situation. Intermittent attacks with small forces will not be made.

G. When the enemy plans an invasion of important points in the Western CAROLINES Area, a decisive battle will be waged in compliance with D above. After the enemy aircraft carriers have been destroyed by a concentration of forces, the main attack will be directed against transport convoys.

H. When the enemy maneuvers in the MARIANAS Area or in both the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES Area simultaneously, that portion of the enemy force in the MARIANAS Area will be attacked by base air forces in that area. The strongest force that can be concentrated in the Western CAROLINES Area will be directed against the enemy task force. The decisive battle will be waged in compliance with D above.

I. As soon as the enemy is damaged, he will be pursued. The strongest air force that can be used will be immediately deployed at land bases and ceaseless air attacks will be waged day and night. Surface forces will cooperate with the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI). Complete success is anticipated. Coincident with the continuing destruction of the remnants of the enemy fleet, enemy supply routes will be severed and advance air bases attacked.

J. Submarines of the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will be used principally in raiding attacks, scouting and pursuit.

2. *Raiding operations:*

A. Raiding operations will be carried out by the greater part of the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI).

B. Raiding operations will be carried out against the enemy task force anchored at important points captured by the enemy in the MARSHALLS.

C. The time for raiding operations will be T-day. T-day will be decided by the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) Commander.

D. When the command "Start A* Operation" is given (before raiding operations are carried out), important areas will be reconnoitered by an element of the air force and Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI).

E. This operation will be called the TATSUMAKI (*1) Operation. The outline of the operation is set forth in Separate Volume 2.

3. *Plan for luring enemy fleet to battle area:*

A. Base Air Force:

Forces will be concentrated secretly and quickly in the Western CAROLINES, Southern PHILIPPINES, HARU (*2) and KAME (*3) Areas. In this way the enemy will be led to underestimate our strength in these areas.

B. Task Force:

(1) By special order an element will proceed to ULITHI or PALAU and wait, thus drawing on the enemy. The subsequent activities of this force will be specially ordered.

(2) The main strength of the Task Force will plan to leave the Southern PHILIPPINES in such a manner that it will not be detected prematurely. It will then proceed immediately to the area east of the

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

PHILIPPINES without leaving a trace. The enemy will thus proceed to attack our forces on the basis of a mistaken estimate of our strength. In preparing for this operation of the Task Force, some supply ships will be sent ahead previously and made to wait.

4. Outline of battle:

A. Base Air Force:

(1) If the enemy fleet is discovered south of TRUK, the Base Air Force will maintain contact day and night from various bases in the Western CAROLINES and will gain detailed intelligence of enemy movements, strength and condition. For this purpose, the greater part of the reconnaissance force of the CAROLINE and MARSHALL Islands Areas, utilizing the bases at WOLEAI, YAP and PALAU, will follow the westerly advance of the enemy fleet. The seaplane reconnaissance unit will secretly use various islands. Both units will change courses and maintain intermittent contact. At the same time the attack force will change direction secretly, concentrate quickly and perfect dispositions.

(2) After the enemy fleet has been maneuvered into the desired position, both land and carrier-based air forces and night attacks by small and medium-type airplanes. Afterwards day and night attacks by large-type airplanes will alternate with the attacks by the other airplanes. The attacks will continue day and night. The attack will be concentrated against one group of aircraft carriers and each attacking SHUDAN will select one or two carriers as its target. These will be crippled or destroyed at one blow.

(3) Each air base in areas subject to enemy air attacks will concentrate all airplanes 30 minutes before sunrise on days on which raids are expected and will complete arrangements for taking off. The attacking enemy airplanes will be destroyed by our interception forces and the security of the base maintained. Our attack force will wait at a suitable assembly point and begin the attack at daybreak after having received the report of the reconnaissance force that the enemy fleet has been contacted.

(4) When the enemy fleet withdraws, reconnaissance and interception forces will coordinate their strength and will pursue the enemy at once. While the greater part of the force moves east from the CAROLINES, the remaining enemy forces will be destroyed. An element of the air force will concentrate in the KAME Sector and exploit our success by attacking enemy air bases and supply lines. The greater part of the pursuit force, when the situation warrants, will proceed by special orders to RABAUL. Separate orders will be issued concerning operations subsequent to the advance.

B. Task Force:

(1) Standard positions of deployment for main body of the Task Force (CarDiv One) at the beginning of the attack are set forth in the Separate Chart. However, the Task Force Commander may alter these when necessary. Reports will then be sent beforehand to all departments concerned.

(2) When the aircraft carriers proceed beyond the island chain or when they are in danger of becoming intermingled with the enemy, their movements will be transmitted to friendly forces (especially the Base Air Force).

(3) Stress will be laid on day air attacks with large forces operating beyond the range of enemy carrier-based airplanes.

(4) When shifting to the pursuit, aircraft carriers will avoid going far beyond the island chain. HIKOKITAI will be deployed at land bases by special orders or as ordered by the commanding officer. They will receive orders from the Base Air Force Commander.

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C. Cooperation between the Base Air Force and the Task Force:

(1) When the enemy task force is discovered proceeding toward the battle area, the full strength of Base Air Force reconnaissance units will be used to maintain continuous contact. At the same time, other areas will be scouted and the complete enemy situation ascertained.

(2) Objectives of attack usually will be specially ordered. When necessary, however, an enemy task force group concentrated in the east will be the objective of attack of the Base Air Forces and an enemy task force group concentrated in the west will be the objective of attack of the Task Force. The Base Air Force and the Task Force will notify each other so as to avoid over-concentration.

5. Pursuit:

A. By the orders of the Base Air Force Commander, all available airplanes (including carrier HIKOKITAI) will be assigned the objectives listed below. Continuous day and night attacks will be kept up irrespective of the type of airplane used. Complete success is anticipated.

Objective 1—Annihilation of enemy remnants.

Objective 2—Cutting of enemy supply routes.

Objective 3—Attacking enemy forward bases.

B. Surface vessels will seek to destroy crippled enemy ships in the battle area and the escort fleet in the vicinity and to attack enemy transport convoys.

C. An element of the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will seek out the enemy task force, cut its escape route and destroy the remnants.

B. Outline for Deployment of Base Air Force

Anticipated strength during last 10 days of May (1944)

Marianas Area

<p>Iwo Jima:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">6 Attack 6</p> <p>Saipan:</p> <table style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; border-collapse: collapse; margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">6 Reconnaissance seaplanes</td> <td rowspan="4" style="font-size: 3em; padding: 0 5px;">}</td> <td rowspan="4" style="padding: 0 5px;">100</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">6 Flying boats</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">64 VF</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">24 Bombers</td> </tr> </table>	6 Reconnaissance seaplanes	}	100	6 Flying boats	64 VF	24 Bombers	<p>Tinian:</p> <table style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; border-collapse: collapse; margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">12 Attack</td> <td rowspan="4" style="font-size: 3em; padding: 0 5px;">}</td> <td rowspan="4" style="padding: 0 5px;">192</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">12 Attack (night)</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">6 Reconnaissance</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">108 VF</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">6 VF (night)</td> <td rowspan="2" style="font-size: 3em; padding: 0 5px;">}</td> <td rowspan="2" style="padding: 0 5px;">170</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">48 Bombers</td> </tr> </table> <p>Guam:</p> <table style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; border-collapse: collapse; margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">62 Light bombers</td> <td rowspan="3" style="font-size: 3em; padding: 0 5px;">}</td> <td rowspan="3" style="padding: 0 5px;">170</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">96 VF</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">12 Attack (night)</td> </tr> </table> <p>Rota:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">16 Attack 16</p>	12 Attack	}	192	12 Attack (night)	6 Reconnaissance	108 VF	6 VF (night)	}	170	48 Bombers	62 Light bombers	}	170	96 VF	12 Attack (night)
6 Reconnaissance seaplanes	}			100																		
6 Flying boats																						
64 VF																						
24 Bombers																						
12 Attack	}	192																				
12 Attack (night)																						
6 Reconnaissance																						
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6 VF (night)	}	170																				
48 Bombers																						
62 Light bombers	}	170																				
96 VF																						
12 Attack (night)																						
	484																					

Western Carolines Area

<p>Peleliu:</p> <table style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; border-collapse: collapse; margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">32 VF</td> <td rowspan="5" style="font-size: 3em; padding: 0 5px;">}</td> <td rowspan="5" style="padding: 0 5px;">60</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">6 VF (night)</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">6 Attack</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">6 Reconnaissance</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 5px;">10 Reconnaissance (army)</td> </tr> </table>	32 VF	}	60	6 VF (night)	6 Attack	6 Reconnaissance	10 Reconnaissance (army)	<p>Yap:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">54 VF 54</p> <p style="text-align: right; border-top: 1px solid black;">114</p>
32 VF	}			60				
6 VF (night)								
6 Attack								
6 Reconnaissance								
10 Reconnaissance (army)								

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Eastern Carolines

Woleai: 24 VF..... 6 VF (night) 6 Attack.....	}	}	36	Kaede Jima: 64 VF.....	}	}	64
				Take Jima: 24 VF..... 6 VF (night).....			30
Haru Jima: 12 Attack 6 Reconnaissance				}	}	18	
				148			

Southern Philippine Area

Davao: 108 VF..... 8 VF (night)	}	}	116	Lasang: 16 Bombers.....	}	}	16
							132

Haru and Kame Areas

Sorong: 36 VF..... 30 Fighters (Army) 6 Attack..... 6 Reconnaissance..... 10 Reconnaissance (Army).....	}	}	88	Wasile: 24 Attack (night).....	}	}	24
							112

Total combat..... 990

In addition an Air Transport Force, basing from Honshu, through Marianas to Davao, totaling about 71 planes.

C. Outline for Operations

1. The outline for operations of each force with regard to the situation prior to the decisive battle is as follows:

When Battle Dispositions are ready, and at the command "Start A-GO Operation":

<i>Force</i>	<i>Action</i>
Interception (YOGEKI) zone forces in the Marianas, Eastern and Western Carolines and Western New Guinea Areas.	Strict patrol at various bases and vital sea sectors. If necessary, picket boat disposition will be strengthened.

5 Base Air Force

1. Important enemy positions will be reconnoitered from advance bases and the whereabouts and movements of the enemy task force determined. Points to be reconnoitered are as follows:
 Vicinity of Tulagi, Admiralty Islands, Majuro, Kwajalein and Eniwetok.
2. Patrols will be strengthened. Outline of patrol procedure is set forth in Separate Volume 3.

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- | | |
|--|---|
| Task Force | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Will complete preparation to move out so as to be able to make a sortie within 6 hours and will then wait.2. On special orders one element of the force (normally CruDiv 5, FUSO, two destroyers) will proceed to the Ulithi or Palau Areas and wait. |
| Advanced Expeditionary Force
(SENKEN BUTAI) | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Important enemy positions will be reconnoitered.2. Surprise operations will be conducted.3. An element of the force will be sent to the area south of the Carolines with the principal duty of gaining intelligence of the enemy situation. |

When indications point to an Enemy Sortie, and at the command "Prepare for A-GO Operation Battle":

- | <i>Force</i> | <i>Action</i> |
|--|---|
| Interception (YOGEKI) zone forces in the Marianas, Eastern and Western Carolines and Western New Guinea Areas. | Various forces will take up requisit dispositions and complete preparations for attack. |
| 5 Base Air Force | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Patrols will be especially strengthened.2. Contact will be maintained once the enemy has been discovered. The complete enemy situation in other areas also will be accurately determined. Every effort will be made to detect enemy plans speedily.3. As the enemy proceeds westward to the point of battle, reconnaissance and attack forces will concentrate at bases in the vicinity of the point of battle and will complete dispositions. |
| Task Force | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Will immediately make a sortie and proceed to the area east of the Philippines and wait.2. In accordance with the enemy situation, will maneuver so that it can shift to the attack the following morning.3. Every effort will be made to conceal plans. |
| Advanced Expeditionary Force
(SENKEN BUTAI). | Same as above, except that one of the elements of the force will be detached at once to the area south of the Carolines. |

NOTES

1. When "Prepare for A* Operation Battle" is ordered prior to the command "Start A* Operation", both commands will be acted on simultaneously.
2. Separate orders will be given for the start of the decisive battle.

Imperial Headquarters Directive 426

18 July 1944.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA.
Based on Imperial Headquarters Orders Nos. 2 and 9.

To: TOYODA, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.
KONDO, Commander in Chief China Area Fleet.

1. Commander in Chief China Area Fleet will carry out operations versus important sectors along the

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CHEKIANG-KWANGTUNG¹ coast in accordance with the appended agreement by Central Authorities.

2. Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will assist in the above-mentioned operations in conformity with the appended agreement by Central Authorities.

(Imperial Headquarters Secret Dispatch No. 181242)

1 TN: North and South China Sea Coast.

Appendix to Imperial Headquarters Directive 426

Agreement by Army and Navy Central Authorities in Regard to CHEKIANG-KWANGTUNG Operations

18 July 1944.

Navy Section, Imperial Headquarters.

Army Section, Imperial Headquarters.

To insure secrecy of plans, CHEKIANG-KWANGTUNG Operations will be known as "SETSU-GO Operations".

Agreement by Army and Navy Central Authorities in Regard to CHEKIANG-KWANGTUNG Operations

1. Object of operations:

To maintain control over key sectors of the CHEKIANG-KWANGTUNG coast, and to thwart enemy plans to land United States forces in this area. Simultaneously, preserve safety of transport lanes along the coast and maintain relay bases for ships and boats in this area.

2. Time of operations:

To be put into effect as soon as possible. Scheduled for first part of August.

3. Points to be consolidated:

Coastal key sectors in vicinity of CHEKIANG and FUKIEN. Add reinforcing elements to AMOY vicinity.

4. Line of command:

Command to be exercised jointly by Supreme Commander China Expeditionary Army and Commander in Chief China Area Fleet.

Commanding General, Army of TAIWAN, will assist in carrying out supply of China Expeditionary Army.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will assist Commander in Chief China Area Fleet, in particular employing part of strength under tactical command of Commander in Chief 2d Air Fleet to provide transport screen and support ground actions.

Land operations will devolve upon Commanding General 13th Army, with assistance from elements of the 5th Air Army.

Naval operations will be directed by Commander in Chief China Area Fleet.

5. Strength to be employed in operations:

Army:

CHEKIANG Area: Nuclear strength 4 infantry battalions.

FUKIEN Area: Nuclear strength 4 infantry battalions.

AMOY: Nuclear strength 1 infantry battalion.

Navy:

Part of China Area Fleet.

6. Defense of sectors to be held:

Responsibility for defense of newly consolidated sectors will be determined by joint decision of Supreme Commander, China Expeditionary Army and Commander in Chief China Area Fleet.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Dispatch 041213

4 May 44.

TOYODA, Soemu
*Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet.*

Message to Commanding Officers on the Occasion of My Assuming Command:

By Imperial command I have been appointed Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet. The OYODO will be my flagship. Our Combined Fleet in several engagements has crushed the main enemy forces with lightning speed. In the two and one-half years since, together with our armies, we occupied the areas essential to GREATER EAST ASIA, officers and men of the fleet have voluntarily sacrificed their lives and inflicted great damage on the enemy. The fate of the enemy was nearly sealed, but in the midst of this period the enemy recovered his fighting strength and, taking advantage of our supply difficulties, moved over to a full-scale counterattack.

The war is drawing close to the lines vital to our national defense. The issue of our national existence is unprecedentedly serious, an unprecedented opportunity exists for deciding who shall be victorious and who defeated. This autumn we will make this great task our responsibility.

By giving all possible thought to basic plans, by utilizing opportunities for advance or retreat and by placing faith in the great fighting ability of our officers and men, we will carry out the decisive operations which mean certain enemy defeat.

Orders and instructions will be issued separately regarding operation policy and measures for carrying it out. We must achieve our objectives by crushing with one stroke the nucleus of the great enemy concentration of forces, thereby reversing the war situation, and, together with our armies, shifting directly to the offensive. Officers and men of the decisive battle force must trust in God, train thoroughly in the art of warfare and in one battle determine the fate of the Empire.

Officers and men guarding important areas will exert themselves to the utmost, using all possible ingenuity to complete bases immediately. They will endure hardships, strengthen unity and devote every effort to building an iron wall of defense for the homeland.

Officers and men of forces guarding islands in the MARSHALLS and important points in the Southwest Area must defend the main bases and fight back. They will wage decisive battles and will execute raids and pursuit attacks. Every effort will be made to create strong points for pursuit attacks. Thus our entire forces, united in our noble cause, fighting to the death, will destroy the enemy who enjoys the luxury of material resources.

Realizing the gravity of responsibility for the fate of our Empire, with its history of more than 2,600 years, full of reverence for the glory of the Imperial Throne and trusting in the help of God, I will endeavor to comply with the Emperor's wishes.

The desire of officers and men of the entire fleet must be to respond wholeheartedly to this great honor and duty.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

United States Forces Involved

1. Joint Expeditionary Force: Vice Admiral Turner.

Expeditionary Troops: Lt. Gen. Smith, U. S. M. C.

Northern Troops and Landing Force (Saipan): Lt. Gen. Smith, U. S. M. C.

Assault Troops: V Amphibious Corps:

Corp Troops;

2d and 4th Marine Division;

27th Army Infantry Division (Reserve);

77th Army Infantry Division (Alerted—Hawaii).

Southern Troops and Landing Force (Guam): Maj. Gen. Geiger, U. S. M. C.

Assault Troops: III Amphibious Corps:

Corp Troops;

3d Marine Division;

1st Marine Provisional Brigade.

Northern Attack Force: Vice Admiral Turner.

Southern Attack Force: Rear Admiral Conolly.

Carriers, Escort (CVE)	14	Net Vessels (AN, AKN)	5
Battleships, old (OBB).....	7	Minelayers and sweeps	
Cruisers, heavy (CA).....	7	(DMS, AM, YMS).....	44
Cruisers, light (CL).....	5	Landing Ship, tank (LST)	87
Destroyers (DD).....	94	Landing Craft, tank (LCT).....	65
Destroyer Escorts (DE)	28	Landing Craft, infantry (LCI)	25
Command Ship (AGC)	2	Landing Ship, dock (LSD).....	8
Transports (AP, APA, APD,		Seaplane Tender, DD type (AVD).....	2
APH, APc, XAP)	77	Misc. (PC, PCS, SC, ARB,	
Cargo (AK, AKA, XAK)	34	ARS, AT, ARL)	47
		Total Ships	551

2. Fast Carrier Task Forces: Vice Admiral Mitscher.

Normally organized as four Carrier Groups, but with provision for immediate organization of a fifth Task Group of battleships and cruisers if surface gun action became imminent. The Fast Carrier Task Forces comprised:

Carriers, Essex class (CV)	7	Cruisers, light (CL)	6
Carriers, light (CVL)	8	Cruisers, antiaircraft (CLAA)	4
Battleships, fast (BB)	7	Destroyers (DD)	58
Cruisers, heavy (CA)	3	Total	93

3. Forward Area Central Pacific	Rear Admiral Hoover.
Shore-based Air Force, Forward Area	Maj. Gen. Hale, U. S. A. A. F.
Air Defense Command, Marianas	Col. McKittrick, U. S. M. C.
Bomber Command	Brig. Gen. Landon, U. S. A. A. F.
Search, Reconnaissance and Photographic Command	Capt. Taff, U. S. N.
Dive Bomber and Fighter Command	Brig. Gen. Cushman, U. S. M. C.
Transport Air Group	Lt. Col. McQuade, U. S. M. C.

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Total shore-based air forces assigned were:

	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Marines</i>
Fighters (VF)	75	36	172
Fighters, night (VF-N)	8	36
Bombers, heavy (VBH)	96	36
Bombers, medium (VBM)	64	48
Bombers, dive (VSB)	72
Torpedo (VT)	36
Patrol, heavy (VPH)	12
Patrol, medium (VPM)	60
Photographic (VD)	13	6
Observation (VSO)	48
Transport (VR)	13	12	36
	269	258	352
Total shore-based aircraft			879

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

4th Fleet: Truk
 CinC: Vice Admiral Hara
 Cof-S: Rear Admiral Kobayashi

4th Base Force: (Truk)
 Comdr: Rear Admiral Kobayashi

5th Base Force: (Saipan)
 Comdr: Rear Admiral Tsujimura

30th Base Force: (Palau)
 Comdr: Rear Admiral Ito

Chichijima Area SP Base Force:
 (Chichijima)
 Comdr: Rear Admiral Mori
 Truk Sector Army Group.

31st Army: Saipan
 Mariana Sector Army Group.
 Ogasawara Sector Army Group.
 Palau Sector Army Group.

Air Flot 61: Pelieliu
 Comdr: Rear Admiral Ueno

Air Flot 22: Truk, Harushima
 Comdr: Rear Admiral Sumikawa

Central Pacific Fleet: Saipan
 CinC: Vice Admiral Nagumo
 Cof-S: Rear Admiral Yano

Combined Fleet: Inland Sea
 CinC: Admiral Toyoda
 Cof-S: Rear Admiral Kusaka

1st Air Fleet: Tinian
 CinC: Vice Admiral Kakuda
 Cof-S: Capt. Miwa

Chain of Command, Japanese Forces in Marianas - Carolines, 1 June 1944

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Order of Battle, Defense Forces in Ogasawara—Marianas—Carolines, 1 June

(1) Ogasawara Islands:

Chichijima Chichijima Area Special Base Force	
Hahajima	Ogasawara Army Group.
Iwo Jima Iwo Jima Guard Unit

(2) Mariana Islands:

Saipan 5th Base Force Hdq.	
Pagan	29th Div. (Army).
Tinian Guard Division 56	43d Div. (Army).
Rota Guard Division 54
Guam	

(3) Caroline Islands:

	4th Base Force Hdq. 52d Division (Army).
Truk Guard Division 41 51st Independent Mixed Brigade).
Enderby	South Seas 7th Detachment (3 Divisions).
Ponape Guard Division 42 (52d Independent Mixed Brigade).
Mortlock	South Seas 4th Detachment (3 Divisions).
Mereyon Guard Division 44 South Seas 5th Detachment (2 Divisions).
Palau 30th Base Force Hdq. 35th Division (Army).
Yap Guard Division 46 50th Independent Mixed Brigade.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

1 June 1944

Assigned Strength

Base Air Forces, Marianas and Carolines

(No Army Air in Central Pacific)

Air Group No. 121	10 Tenian No. 1
Comdr: Comdr. Iwao	Suisai (reconnaissance)
Air Group No. 261	10 Peleliu
Comdr: Comdr. Ueda	Type Zero Fighters
Air Group No. 263	80 Saipan No. 1
Comdr: Comdr. Tamai	Type Zero Fighters
Air Group No. 265	80 Guam No. 1
Comdr: Comdr. Urata	40 Yap
Air Group No. 321	40 Peleliu
Comdr: Comdr. Kubo	15 Guam No. 1
Air Group No. 343	15 Tenian No. 1
Comdr: Comdr. Takenaka	Gekko N; VF
Ueno	Shiden VF
Air Flotilla No. 61	40 (Tateyama)
Comdr: Rear Admiral	
Senior Staff Officer:	
Comdr: Ito	Ginga VB
Peleliu	80 Guam No. 2
	40 Tenian No. 2
	40 Yap
	Suisai VB-CV
	40 Tenian No. 1
	Type No. 1 Land Attack
	40 Peleliu
	Type Zero Land Transport
	20 Tenian No. 1
1st	
Air	
Fleet	
CinC: Vice Admiral	
Kakuda	
CofS: Capt. Wada	
Tenian No. 1	
Air Group No. 151	20 Harushima No. 1
Comdr: Comdr. Nakamura	Suisai (reconnaissance)
Air Group No. 202	40 Harushima No. 1
Comdr: Comdr. Netaba	Type Zero Fighters
Air Group No. 251	40 Meroyon
Comdr: Comdr. Shibata	Gekko
Air Group No. 253	20 Takeshima
Comdr: Comdr. Okawara	Type Zero Fighters
Air Group No. 301	80 Takeshima
Comdr: Comdr. Yagi	Type Zero Fighters
Air Group No. 503	Raiden VF
Comdr: Comdr. Masuda	40 (Yokosuka)
Air Group No. 551	Suisai
Comdr: Comdr. Takahashi	40 Kaedeshima
Air Group No. 755	Tenzan CV VBT
Comdr: Comdr. Kusumoto	40 Harushima No. 2
	40 Harushima No. 1
	40 Guam No. 1
	(Part of Meroyon)
Air Group No. 201	80 Davao No. 1
Comdr: Comdr. Nakano	Type Zero Fighters
Air Group No. 501	Suisai
Comdr: Comdr. Sakata	Type Zero Fighters (bombers)
Air Group No. 751	40 Lasang
Comdr: Comdr. Ohtani	Type No. 1 Land Attack
Air Group No. 153	40 Davao No. 2
Comdr: Comdr. Inoguchi	Type Zero Fighters
Air Group No. 732	40 Sorong
Comdr: Comdr. Miyo	Suisai (reconnaissance)
Air Group No. 753	20
Comdr: Comdr. Umedami	Type No. 1 Land Attack
	40 Wasile (Halmalera)
	40 Menado
Air Flotilla No. 26	
Comdr: Rear Admiral	
Arima	
Davao No. 1	
Air Flotilla No. 23	
Comdr: Rear Admiral	
Ito	
Sorong	

(For additional reference)

Air Flotilla No. 22
Comdr: Rear Admiral
Sumikawa
No. 1 Harushima

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Battle of the Philippine Sea, 19 - 20 June 1944

Task Organization—First Mobile Fleet

Commander Task Force	Vice Admiral Ozawa (<i>Taibo</i>)
A. Carrier Force	Vice Admiral Ozawa (<i>Taibo</i>)
CarDiv 1 ("A" Force).....	Vice Admiral Ozawa (<i>Taibo</i>)
<i>Taibo</i> ¹ .	
<i>Sbokaku</i> ¹ .	
<i>Zuikaku</i> ³ .	
CarDiv 2 ("B" Force).....	Rear Admiral Joojima (<i>Junyo</i>)
<i>Junyo</i> ³ .	
<i>Hiyo</i> ² .	
<i>Ryubo</i> ³ .	
10th DesRon.....	Yahagi plus 15 DD
B. Main Body ("C" Force).....	Vice Admiral Kurita (<i>Atago</i>)
BatDiv 1.....	Vice Admiral Ugaki (<i>Yamato</i>)
<i>Musubi</i> .	
<i>Yamato</i> .	
<i>Nagato</i> .	
BatDiv 3.....	Vice Admiral Suzuki (<i>Haruna</i>)
<i>Haruna</i> ³ .	
<i>Kongo</i> .	
CruDiv 4.....	Vice Admiral Kurita (<i>Atago</i>)
<i>Takao</i> .	
<i>Atago</i> .	
<i>Maya</i> ³ .	
<i>Chokai</i> .	
CruDiv 5.....	Rear Admiral Hashimoto (<i>Myoko</i>)
<i>Myoko</i> .	
<i>Haguro</i> .	
CruDiv 7.....	Rear Admiral Shiraishi (<i>Kumano</i>)
<i>Tone</i> .	
<i>Cbikuma</i> .	
<i>Kumano</i> .	
<i>Suzuya</i> .	
<i>Mogami</i> .	
CarDiv 3.....	Rear Admiral Obayashi (<i>Cbitose</i>)
<i>Zuibo</i> .	
<i>Cbitose</i> .	
<i>Cbiyoda</i> ³ .	
DesRon 2.....	Noshiro plus 10 DD.

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

First Replenishment Force

Oilers (AO):	Escorts (DD):
<i>Hayasui</i> ¹ .	<i>Yunagi</i> .
<i>Nichiei Maru</i> .	<i>Tsuga</i> .
<i>Kokuyo Maru</i> .	<i>Hibiki</i> .
<i>Seiyoo Maru</i> ² .	<i>Hatsushimo</i> .

Second Replenishment Force

<i>Genyo Maru</i> ² .	<i>Yukikaze</i> .
<i>Azusa Maru</i> .	<i>Uzuki</i> .

¹ Sunk by SS, 19 June.

² Sunk by A/C, 20 June.

³ Damaged by A/C, 20 June.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Military Top Secret
(GUNKI)

WDC 161517
Group 11
Item 11--0

First Mobile Fleet Classified No. 1048 (5 September 1944) *Detailed Battle Report of AGO Operations*

Battles in Seas West of SAIPAN from 13 June to 22 June 1944. Issued by 1st Mobile Fleet Headquarters

III. Development:

A. Conduct of Operations by Task Force Commanding Officer.

1. According to AGO operational plan of the Combined Fleet, the task force assembled at TAWI-TAWI in southern PHILIPPINES on 16 May.
2. 1st Supply Force sent to DAVAO.
3. Part of 3d Supply Force sent to PALAU.

20 May—Order for opening of AGO Operations.

27 May—In the west, offensive-defensive battle begun at BIAK in NEW GUINEA Area.

29 May—5th CruDiv, the FUSO (BB), the 27th DesDiv and the 10th DesDiv ordered to join KON Operations.

8 June—KON Operations suspended.

(a) 2d Supply Force sent east of the PHILIPPINES on the 3d, but in view of the subsequent situation, they were ordered to GUIMARAS to stand by.

(b) Routine reconnaissance.

(c) Enemy plans unknown to us but our movement of task force to TAWITAWI discovered by them.

(d) Enemy submarine pack met at end of May in seas south of the PHILIPPINES. Between the 6th and the 9th, 4 destroyers were damaged by enemy subs in spite of our antisubmarine operations by ships and planes.

(e) Due to lack of sufficient destroyers for a decisive action, changed anchorage in temporary recognition of need to bow before enemy submarine dispositions.

(f) Decided to move anchorage to GUIMARAS on 13th.

(g) On 10th KON Operations resumed. The 1st BatDiv (less the NAGATO), the 5th CruDiv, the 2d Destroyer Squadron (less a part) and a part of the 10th DesDiv from the task force ordered to take part in the battle.

(b) Greater part of enemy task force discovered in MAJURO area on 6 June. Not there on 8 June. Attack expected, therefore.

(i) 11 and 12 June. Enemy attacked in MARIANAS relying on their mobile force made up of aircraft carriers and converted carriers.

13 June—Enemy attacked SAIPAN on the 11th and 12th. Our task force left TAWITAWI for GUIMARAS on the 13th as planned. Suppose enemy landing on SAIPAN because they opened fire on coastal fortifications and started mine sweeping.

(a) At 1732 hours KON Operations temporarily suspended and 1st BatDiv, (less Nagato), 5th CruDiv, 2d Destroyer Squadron, *Nosbiro* (CL), *Shimakaze* (DD) and *Okinami* (DD), 10th DesDiv and 4th DesDiv, *Yamagumo* (DD) and *Nowaki* (DD) ordered to return to original group.

(b) In accord with the aims of the Combined Fleet and of the Task Force in the AGO Operations, close cooperation between the base, sea and air forces and the advanced forces, and damage by

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day to groups of regular enemy aircraft carriers by sea and air battle was expected, and it was decided to open the sea and air battle on the 19th.

In view of the delay in the advance of the Hachiman group, however, the date of the engagement was planned in accordance with this.

14 June—At GUIMARAS for supplies.

15 June—About 30 enemy transports appeared in seas west of SAIPAN and began landing. At 1400 hours a part of the enemy task force attacked IWO JIMA and then CHICHI JIMA and continued maneuvers in the area. 1717: Order for execution of AGO Operations. 1800: The task force (less those groups which had just returned from KON Operations, named above) left GUIMARAS. 2038: Know that an enemy sub discovered and reported the activities of our task force. Suspect the enemy will attack with a great force of carriers.

16 June—Continuous air attacks on IWO JIMA. The 1st Supply Force and the group returned from KON Operations (names above) joined us. Began refueling at sea. Enemy continued to advance westward. Also constant warning of maneuvers from the north.

18 June—Clear weather. Began search for enemy—1 enemy scout plane sighted 400 miles ahead.

(a) Our search planes sighted 3 groups of enemy aircraft carriers between 1425 and 1540:

Grid Position:

UI2CHI—1st group—2 regular carriers, 10–15 destroyers.

URA4E—2d group—2 seemingly regular carriers, 10 others.

URA1A—3d group—2 seemingly carriers, 10 others.

Course, west; about 380 miles from main force.

(b) Discovered 1 large carrier, 2 converted carriers, 1 battleship and 5 destroyers at grid position 3I.

(c) Discovered 1 large carrier, 4 battleships at grid position NA SO 4 TE; then 10 other ships at grid position 7I on a westward course. Then 4 more large carriers were reported.

(d) Discovered large enemy force with battleships at grid position RE I 3 TSU.

(e) Discovered group of 3 regular carriers and 5 battleships at grid position KO KI 3 U.

(f) Also a group of 10 more vessels at grid position 15 RI.

(g) Distance from enemy: Vanguard, about 300 miles; main body, about 380 miles.

19 June—After the discovery at 7 I, the carrier force temporarily turned aside so as to maintain, on the whole, a distance of 400 miles from the enemy, and after despatch of attack forces, changed course to 120°.

Execution of attacks were as follows:

0945 At grid position 7I by 1st Attack Force of 3d Carrier Division.

1045 At grid position 7I by 1st Attack Force of 1st Carrier Division. (This group incurred some damage from enemy vanguard on the way. Some may have attacked grid position 3RI.)

The 1st Attack Force of the 2d Carrier Division conducted a search over a fairly broad area at grid position 3 RI, as did the 2d Attack Force of the 1st Carrier Division, and the 2d Attack Force of the 2d Carrier Division at grid position 15 RI, but did not discover the enemy, so all gave up the attack. The 1st Attack Force of the 2d Carrier Division and the 2d Attack Force of the 1st Carrier Division returned to their ships; the 2d Attack Force of the 2d Carrier Division turned to Guam.

The 2d Attack Force of the 2d Carrier Division (about 50 planes) engaged a large group of enemy fighters in the skies over Guam Airfield No. 1 and incurred considerable damage. Those arriving at Guam

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Airfield No. 2 were 1 carrier fighter plane, 7 type 99 carrier bombers, and 1 Judy bomber, and it had become impossible to use almost all the planes.

Decision taken to detach planes from 2d Attack Force of 3d Carrier Division and for the other units to take them in.

Before the sinking of the *Taibo* (CV), it had been possible to transfer the greater part of 2d Attack Force to the *Zuikaku* (CV).

Explosion and sinking of the *Taibo*: The *Taibo* was attacked with torpedoes by an enemy submarine (one torpedo hit) at 0810 on the 19th (position: 12° 24' N., 137° 20' E.) immediately after completing despatch of the 1st Attack Force. At 1432, a great explosion occurred suddenly, and she sank at 1628. (Position: 12° 05' N., 138° 12' E.).

Sinking of the *Shokaku* (CV): On the same day, the *Shokaku* was attacked with torpedoes by an enemy submarine at 1120 (4 torpedoes hit). Caught fire and sank at 1401. (Position: 12° 00' N., 137° 46' E.).

Sea-air battle was at height at 1432 when *Taibo* exploded; transfer was effected to the *Haguro* (CA), and at 1200 on the following day the *Zuikaku* was adopted as flagship.

As the signalling efficiency of the *Haguro* was inadequate after the transfer, the state of the battle was temporarily obscure; were unable to attack grid position 15 RI; number of remaining planes on our side about 100 (carrier planes taken aboard: 44 fighter, 17 fighter-bombers, 11 bombers, and 30 attack planes; total 102 planes). Accordingly, saw need to withdraw quickly to westward to conduct reorganization, and review strength of forces from standpoint of supply; order given to this effect, and to reopen engagement on the 22d.

20 June—Task Force sailed northwest to take on supplies but found from an enemy radio message intercepted by *Atago* (CA) that enemy flying boats were following them. Retreated hurriedly without supplies.

After reports showing enemy knowledge of our complete dispositions, ordered 1st and 2d Supply Forces to retreat hurriedly westward (about 1520 hours).

At 1615 a search plane discovered an enemy force containing 2 aircraft carriers and 2 battleships. (Position: 14° 20' N., 138° 30' E.).

At 1700 attempted torpedo attack with diversion attack forces by night, but could not come to grips with enemy, and as a result of enemy air attack incurred by our task force and supply forces from about 1530 hours, the greater part of our carrier air forces were lost, and air support became impossible; so at about 2100 the diversion attack force was given the following order: "If no prospect of night battle, withdraw speedily to northwest."

From 1730 on the 20th, for about an hour, the 1st Carrier Division, the 2d Carrier Division, diversion attack forces, and supply forces incurred enemy air attack.

(1) Total of attacking planes, about 130 to 150 planes:

1st Carrier Division, about 50 planes.

2d Carrier Division, about 40 planes.

Diversion attack force, about 20 planes.

Supply force, about 35 planes.

(2) Shot Down.

By air combat: More than 40 planes.

(But this does not include those planes which did not return.)

By antiaircraft fire: About 70 planes.

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(3) Damage: See special paragraph.

1707: *Mogami* transferred to vanguard.

1720: Despatch of torpedo attack plane force (3 planes of tracking force, 7 planes of torpedo bomber unit).

1945: Task Force ordered to withdraw from battle in this area at the commanding officer's discretion depending on the state of the battle.

2015: The 1st and 2d Supply groups were ordered to turn toward Nakagusuku Wan after withdrawing hastily to the west.

21 June—3d Carrier Division, despatched at 0500, ordered to conduct search for whereabouts of ships within 350 miles radius from 90° to 180°.

1030: The *Asagumo* (DD) proceeded slowly to Nakagusuku Wan at 16 knots, on account of fuel trouble.

1545: All units of the main force ordered to enter Nakagusuku Wan, diversion attack forces to return to south-central part of Philippines and stand by, and the *Fuso* (BB) and 1st and 2d supply forces to join diversion attack forces.

22 June—Diversion Attack Force and main force arrived at Nakagusuku Wan.

2303: Task Force (less *Fuso* and *Natori* (CL)) ordered to turn and proceed to western Naikai.

23 June—Supply forces ordered to western Naikai.

24 June—Task Force arrived in western Naikai.

(T.N.: SUMMARY NOTE: The inadequacy in training, particularly of air force training, had no small influence on the war in the air. More detailed summaries of reconnaissance and air attacks (15–22 June) and air battles (17–22 June) are also given in this section.)

I. Damage inflicted and losses:

A. Damage Inflicted.

1. 1st Attack Force (estimated as shown below but difficult to determine for sure).

Observations were made as follows:

(a) The 3d Carrier Division definitely scored hits on a large aircraft carrier and on a large cruiser. (*Zuikaku* signal No. 191718).

(b) The 1st Carrier Division saw black smoke belching forth continuously from 4 aircraft carriers, after an attack. (3d Carrier Division signal No. 1925).

(c) Conditions directly before attack by 1st Carrier Division (at 1040); It was seen that one battleship continuously emitted white smoke and that an aircraft carrier was on fire.

(a) It was, therefore, estimated that 1 carrier and 1 battleship or cruiser set on fire for certain in attack by 3d Carrier Division.

(b) In an attack by the 1st Carrier Division, fires were started on 4 aircraft carriers, or 3 (excluding possibility of duplication if one of them was the one set on fire by the attack by 3d Carrier Division).

In all, it is certain that 4 or 5 aircraft carriers and 1 battleship or large cruiser were sunk or damaged, and it is not possible to assert that others did not blow up and sink.

The number of planes shot down is estimated at a total of 160:

(a) The number of planes which failed to return on the 19th was large, and although the certain gains are not clear, looking at it from the point of view of the reports of fighter pilots picked up (14 planes shot down by 9) and considering the number of planes engaged, more than 50 planes were shot down.

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(b) More than 40 planes by the air battles of the 20th and about 70 by antiaircraft fire. An analysis of the damage inflicted by air groups follows:

(a) Bombing and torpedoing:

Objective of bombing and torpedoing Aircraft carrier group at 7 I.

Battle Unit.....	1st CarDiv.	3d CarDiv.
Number of Attacks	1	1.
Number of planes used:		
Jill.....	27	8.
Judy.....	53	0.
Carrier-fighters	48	14.
Fighter-bombers	0	42.
Results		

- (1) 4 Aircraft carriers set on fire.
- (2) More than 18 planes shot down (of these 6 uncertain).
- (1) 1 large aircraft carrier and 1 battleship set on fire.
- (2) More than 6 planes shot down (of these 1 uncertain).

(b) Dogfights.

(1) Aerial battle on 19 June:

Group in action	Types of planes on our side	Types and number of enemy planes encountered	Number shot down		
			Certain	Uncertain	Total
1st. CarDiv.:					
1st Attack Force	Fighters	Fighters; number unknown	12	6	18
2d CarDiv.:					
1st Attack Force	Fighters	Fighters; about 40	2	0	2
1st Attack Force	Fighter-bombers		2	0	2
3d. CarDiv.:					
1st Attack Force	Fighters	Fighters; about 30	5	1	6
2d. CarDiv.:					
2d Attack Force	Fighters	F4F, F6F; more than 30	4	2	6
Total			25	9	34

(2) Aerial battle on 20 June:

Group in action	Types of planes on our side	Types and number of enemy planes encountered	Number shot down		
			Certain	Uncertain	Total
1st CarDiv.	Fighters.....	F6F, SB2C, TBF's; about 50	15	4	19
2d CarDiv.....	Fighters	As above; about 40	7	4	11
	Fighter-bombers		3	2	5
3d CarDiv.....	Fighter-bombers	Bombers; about 20	2	0	2
Total.....			27	10	37

B. Losses:

1. Damage to ships in the battle of 20 June:

(a) *Zuikaku* (CV): Received 1 direct hit by bomb aft of the bridge and 6 near misses. Fighting and navigational capabilities not impaired.

(b) *Hiyo* (XCV): Ship suffered combined bombing and torpedo attack; one torpedo hit, making steerage impossible. While drifting about, ship again incurred torpedo attack by enemy submarine. One torpedo hit, large conflagration broke out within the ship, and she finally sank at 1932 hours.

(c) *Junyo* (XCV): Received two direct hits near the smokestack and six near misses. Departure and arrival of planes became difficult. Navigational powers not impaired.

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(d) *Ryubo* (CVL): Slight damage incurred by near misses, but fighting and navigational powers not impaired.

(e) *Chiyoda* (CVL): One direct hit in aft section of flight deck, slight damage, but fighting and navigational powers not impaired.

(f) *Haruna* (BB): One direct hit on deck aft, and near misses. Necessary to flood magazine, and to dock; but immediate fighting and navigational powers not impaired.

(g) *Maya* (CA): Fires, owing to near miss on port tube; necessary to dock, but immediate fighting and navigational powers not impaired.

(b) *Genyo Maru*: From three near misses the engines were badly damaged and were flooded; it became impossible to proceed. Ship abandoned. (Disposed of by gunfire from the *Usuki* (DD)).

(i) *Seiyo Maru*: Bomb damage started large conflagration. Ship abandoned. (Disposed of by a torpedo attack from the *Yukikaze* (DD)).

(j) *Hayasui* (AO): One direct hit and two near misses. Slight damage. However, fighting and navigational powers not impaired.

2. Analysis of aircraft losses as follows:

(a) 1st Carrier Division:

Classification	Type of plane	Lost (on fire or sunk)	Failed to return	Lost by forced landing (hit by shell)	Dead	Missing	Wounded
Those of 1st. attack force lost in battle with planes defending skies directly over enemy.	Jill		23			61	
	Judy	1	41		2	82	
Those lost by defensive fire of enemy task force.	Zero		32			32	
Those lost in diversion attack engagement with enemy planes.	Zero		8	5		8	

Classification	Type of plane	Lost (on fire or sunk)	Failed to return	Lost by forced landing (hit by shell)	Dead	Missing	Wounded
Sunk with <i>Taibo</i> ...	Jill		(3)				
	Judy		(4)				
	99—Bomber		(1)				
	Zero—Fighter		(5)				

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Classification	Type of plane	Lost (on fire or sunk)	Failed to return	Lost by forced landing (hit by shell)	Dead	Missing	Wounded
Sunk with <i>Shokaku</i>	Jill	(2)					
	Judy	(5)					
	99—Bomber	(2)					
2d Attack Force	Jill		1			3	
	Fighter-bombers		8			8	
3d Attack Force	Jill	(2)	1	4	6	3	
Mistakes in maneuver on return to ship.	Jill	(1)					1
	Zero	(1)					
	99—Bomber	(1)					
	Judy	(1)				1	
Enemy reconnaissance planes.	Jill	(2)	2			6	
	Judy	(6)	1			12	
Grand total		(29)	122	12	8	215	1

(b) 2d Carrier Division.

Classification	Type of plane	Lost (on fire or sunk)	Failed to return	Lost by forced landing (hit by shell)	Dead	Missing	Wounded
1st Attack Force	Fighters		1			1	
	Fighter-bomber units	1	4		1	4	
	Jill		1			3	
2d Attack Force	Fighters		15			15	
	99—carrier bombers	2	7	(11)	8	14	5
	Judy		5			10	1
	Jill			2		6	
Lost in battle with plane defending skies directly over enemy, and on anti-submarine patrol.	Fighters		5	(1)		5	
	Fighter-bomber units	1	7	(1)	1	7	
	Jill	1		(2)	3		
Additional	Fighters		1			1	
Overall total		6	47	(15)	14	65	6

THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

(c) 3d Carrier Division.

Classification	Type of plane	Lost (on fire or sunk)	Failed to return	Lost by forced landing (hit by shell)	Dead	Missing	Wounded
Those lost by air battle alone.....	Fighters ..	7			7		
Those lost in air battle or by anti-aircraft fire of enemy mobile fleet.....	Jill	3			9		
	Fighters.....	8			8		
	Fighter-bombers.....	32		(1)	32		
	97—Carrier-attack plane..	9			27		
Additional	Jill.....	1			3		
	Fighters.....	3			3		
	Fighter-bombers.....	1			1		
	97—Carrier-attack planes	1			3		
Total		65		(1)	93		

Reference Operational Chart translated and accompanying.

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THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

From the Files of the Navy Board of Merit

601st Air Group Classified No. 5—5.

601st Air Group Battle Report No. 1. Classified MILITARY TOP SECRET.

From 13 June to 24 June 1944

AGO Operation

601st Naval Air Group

Development:

19 June—Direct hit of 250 kilogram bomb on enemy carrier. Conflagration was seen. Other enemy losses unknown. Twelve of our carrier fighters were definitely lost, six probably lost.

20 June—The 1st Shotai while on patrol at an altitude of 4,000 m. sighted below them at 1830 enemy carrier bombers at 3,500 to 4,000 meters and then Grumman fighters above them at 4,500 to 5,000 meters. The 1st Shotai attack them. No. 4 plane of the 1st Shotai attacked 3 SBD sections and at 1930 made a forced landing on the water. The 2d Shotai saw the on-coming Grumman fighters and attacked. Then the planes separated and attacked the SBD's below.

The attacking force consisted of 9 carrier fighters, 5 carrier bombers, 1 reconnaissance plane, and probably 3 carrier fighters and 1 reconnaissance plane.

Losses (Japanese): Five forced landings on water; one plane failed to return.

Battle results and losses:

1. Battle Results:

a. Bombing:

Classification	Bombing target	Attack target			No. of planes used			Battle results
	Place or name of ship	Day	Night	Total	Day	Night	Total	
	7-I task force	1	1	Judy	Judy	Good.
	15-RI task force	1	1	Fighter-bombers 10	Fighter-bombers	10	None.

b. Torpedo Attack:

Classification	Target torpedo	Attack target			Number of planes used			Battle results
	Place or name of ship	Day	Night	Total	Day	Night	Total	
	7-I; task force	1	1	Tenzan "Jill"	Unknown.
	15-RI; task force	1	1	Tenzan "Jill"	3	3	None.
	EE-1; task force	1	1	Tenzan "Jill"	7	7	None.

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c. Air Attack:

Kinds of friendly planes	Kind and number of hostile enemy planes	Number of planes in attack unit		Total
		Lost	Probably lost	
Direct escort fighters for primary attack.....	Fighters; about 30	12	6	18
Interceptor-fighters ZERO—type 52.....	Fighters; about 20	9	3	12
Interceptor-fighters ZERO—type 52.....	Bombers; about 20	5	0	5
Interceptor-fighters ZERO—type 52	Torpedo-bombers; about 6	1	1	2

2. Losses (Japanese):

Classification	Kind of plane	Failed to return	Lost (burned)	Persons dead	Missing	Wounded
By attack units and escort fighters over enemy territory.	TENZAN "Jill"	23			61	
	SUISEI "Judy"	41	1	2		1
By defensive fire of enemy task force.	ZERO	32				
	ZERO	5	15			
By interceptor-fighters in enemy attack.	TENZAN "Jill"		3			
	SUISEI "Judy"		4			
Losses sustained because of torpedo attack on TAIHO.	Type-99		1			
	ZERO		5			
By torpedo attack on SHOKAKU.	TENZAN "Jill"		2			
	SUISEI "Judy"		5			
Damage from attack ..	Type-99		2			
	ZERO					
2d Attack Force	TENZAN "Jill"	1				
	Fighter-bombers	8				
3d Attack Force	TENZAN "Jill"	3	24			
	TENZAN "Jill"		1	2	1	1
By bad landings on ship	ZERO		1	1	Severe damage	Slight damage
	Type-99		1	Burned	1	
On scouting	TENZAN "Jill"	2	12			
	SUISEI "Judy"	4	1			

¹ Emergency landings—sank.

² Emergency landings—damaged and sank.

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WDC 161642
Group 17
Item 17 A

652d Air Group Classified No. 8—5
652d Air Group Battle Report No. 1

Classified MILITARY SECRET. From 18—21 June 1944.

(Attack on enemy task force)

Plan:

1. To destroy the enemy task force in the Marianas and wipe out the landing force.

Summary of Progress:

19 June—Bombed Guam. Combat with 30 Grumman fighters.

Battle Results and Losses:

a. Bombing attack:

CHUTAI SUISEI "Judy"	Bombing target	Time	Bombing altitude	Results
Unit	Carriers	1545	600—6000	Unknown.

b. Torpedo attack:

Torpedo attack target	Day	Night	Total	TENZAN "Jill"			Results
				Day	Night	Total	
Carriers	1	0	1	2	0	2	Unknown.
Total	1	0	1	2	0	2	

c. Strafing on land:—None.

d. Air attack:

Type of planes (friendly)	Kind and number of enemy planes met in combat	Number of planes shot down			Total	Notes
		Certain	Probable	Total		
Fighters	Fighters; about 50	7	4	11	Based on planes not returned.	
	Bombers; about 34	0	2	2		
Fighter-bombers	Fighters; about 15	3	1	4		
	Bombers; about 11	2	1	3	Not included.	
Total	About 110	12	8	20		

e. Losses (Japanese):

Classification	Type of plane	Lost	Failed to return	Damaged	Dead	Persons		Notes
						Missing	Wounded	
18 June: air escort	ZERO—Type 52							
19 June: air escort	ZERO—Type 52							
19 June: 1st Attack Force	ZERO—Type 52	1			1			Escort force.
	ZERO—Type 21		5			5		Fighter-bomber force.
	TENZAN "Jill"		1			3		
19 June: 2d Attack Force	ZERO—Type 52		15			15		
	Carrier-bomber							
	Type 99	2	7	11	8	14	5	
	SUISEI "Judy"		5			10	1	
	TENZAN "Jill"		2			6		
20 June: escort withdrawn	ZERO—Type 52		5	2		5		Fighter force.
	ZERO—Type 21		1	7	1	1	7	Fighter-bomber force.
Escort anti-submarine	TENZAN "Jill"	1		2	3			
Other	ZERO—Type 52	1			1			
Total		6	47	16	14	65	6	

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Combat Report of 653d Naval Air Group from 13 to 22 June 1944

I. Plans (TN: Omitted).

II. Progress of Operations (TN: Summarized. Parts omitted).

At advance anchorage at TawiTawi when AGO Operations began at 0000 on 20 May. Alerted for AGO Operations at 1727 on 13 June. Left Guimaras Strait between 0700 and 0840 on 15 June.

19 June—At 0420 13 Type 97 carrier attack planes (Kate) took off to search for the enemy ($13^{\circ} 15' N. 138^{\circ} 5' E.$). Eight of these failed to return. At 0700 two Kates took off from *Cbitose* (CVL). At 0940 they made contact with the enemy, sighting seven columns of black smoke from enemy carriers before being driven off by two Grumman fighters. At 0725 the first special attack unit (Tokubetsu Kogeki Tai) took off (43 carrier bombers, 7 carrier attack planes, 14 carrier fighter). (Position $13^{\circ} 40' N. 137^{\circ} 40' E.$). Of these, 31 bombers, 2 Tenzan (Jill) attack planes and 8 fighters failed to return.

While we were advancing in the following formation:

CHIYODA

ZUIHO

CHITOSE

with plane cover at 6,000 meters, at 0935 we were attacked by a group of Grumman fighters from an altitude of 8,000 meters, but our fighters were quickly put aloft and counterattacked. Planes 50 and 27 of the 333d Air Group heavily damaged an enemy carrier and set it afire. Four enemy planes were shot down (of which one was a probable). At 1340 one Jill (Tenzan) and one Kate (Type 97 carrier attack) took off from *Cbitose*. The lead plane sighted an enemy submarine and attacked it.

20 June—At 1654 made dispositions in anticipation of enemy attack. Radar contact with enemy planes at 230° relative bearing at 1703. At 1725 24 enemy planes approached bearing 158° at a height of 3,000 meters, dividing into 4 groups. At 1732 about 50 enemy planes assumed attack positions and began bombing *Chiyoda*. The first bomb hit the sea on the starboard side. Although the ship was rocked by the near misses, there was no damage; but flying bomb fragments were scattered (TN: three words illegible). The enemy planes returned to the attack with increasing fury, dropping some tens of bombs on both sides in near misses and scoring two hits on the after part of the flight deck (TN: one line illegible). Two carrier bombers were burned, one Tenzan (Jill) carrier attack plane and one Zero 52 carrier fighter were slightly damaged. 20 men were killed and 30 wounded. Our planes shot down 6 enemy planes (four were probables) and our antiaircraft fire brought down two. At 1746 the enemy withdrew. Seven planes pursuing the enemy did not return.

21 June—Our planes failed to sight the enemy.

22 June—Anchored in NAKAGUSUKU WAN (Okinawa).

III. Message File (TN: Not translated).

IV. Damage and losses (summarized):

A. Bombing:

1. Although planes 52 and 53 of the 333d Air Group made suicide dives upon one battleship, the results are unknown.

2. One carrier badly damaged and probably set afire, but this is not certain.

3. Plane 50 of the 333d Air Group scored a hit on a carrier and success is certain.

4. A plane of the 1st DAITAI dived on a transport. Results unknown.

B. Aerial combat:

1. On the 19th, five F6F's shot down (one probable).

2. On the 20th, two TBF's shot down.

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C. Our losses in aerial combat:

1. On the 18th:

- One plane failed to return.
- One plane's tail damaged in landing.
- One plane fell into the sea when its engine failed during take-off.

2. On the 19th:

- 50 planes failed to return.
- 6 planes damaged by 1 to 25 hits.
- 3 planes fell into sea when landing.
- 1 plane damaged in the hangar.

3. On the 20th.

- 7 planes failed to return.
- 1 plane fell into the sea when landing.
- 1 plane collided with the hydraulic arresting gear cable in landing and was destroyed.
- 1 plane, owing to engine difficulty, cut the arresting gear cable in landing, crashed into the battle bridge and was destroyed.

4. On the 21st.

- 1 plane failed to return.
- 1 plane in landing had its hook damaged. It crashed into an arresting cable and was badly damaged.

D. Summary of our strength:

	13	14	15	16	17	June 18	19	20	21	22	23
Zero fighters Model 21	46	46	46	46	46	45	10	4	4	4	4
Zero fighters Model 52	17	17	17	17	17	17	8	5	5	5	5
TENZAN (Jill) Model 12	9	9	9	9	9	9	7	6	5	5	5
Type 97 carrier attack (Kate) Model 12	18	18	18	18	18	17	8	8	7	7	7
Total	90	90	90	90	90	88	33	23	21	21	21

WDC No. 161635

252d Naval Air Group, Classified No. 13-5.

Military Secret (GUNGOKUHI).

War Diary of the 252d Naval Air Group from 1 to 30 June 1944 (302d Fighter HIKOTAI)

Excluding TAROA and MALOELAP Detachments

I. Progress of operations:

The main unit was at MISAWA Base. The TATEYAMA Detachment was at TATEYAMA Base from 16 June onward. The IWO JIMA Detachment was at IWO JIMA from 18 June onward.

1 June to 16 June—Numerous flights between MISAWA and TATEYAMA.

16 June to 30 June—At TATEYAMA.

18 June 30 June—IWO JIMA Detachment (23 operational planes).

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24 June—Attack by United States task force. 19 American planes destroyed by anti-aircraft fire and pursuit planes. 3 identified as F4F type. (6 are probables). 12 of our planes failed to return; one pilot returned alive.

25 June—We were reinforced by 16 ZERO's from TATEYAMA. 23 operational planes on hand.

30 June—Reinforced again. 33 operational planes.

WDC No. 161635

252d Naval Air Group, Classified No. 13-7.

Military Secret (GUNGOKUHI).

War Diary for the 252d Naval Air Group from 1 to 31 July 1944

I. Progress of operations:

(a) Main unit located at SUNOSAKI Air Base. 11 officers and 295 men moved to TATEYAMA from MISAWA. TAROA and MALOELAP Detachment reports not included.

(b) On IWO JIMA:

3 July—We were attacked by more than 40 Grumman fighters. We destroyed 7 of these over our base, all being confirmed. Ten of our Zero's failed to return. 19 operational planes remaining.

4 July—17 of our Zero's took off to meet an enemy attack, shooting down 5 enemy planes, and one unconfirmed. A Zero attacked a surfaced submarine but results were not clear. All our Zero's were rendered unflyable, 4 being lost in combat, the rest damaged by bombardment from a surface task force and by air bombing. 14 planes under repair.

5 July—All personnel engaged in repairing landing strips.

6 July—One flyable plane. Two officers, 14 men flown to TATEYAMA for purpose of ferrying back Zero fighters.

14 July—We shot down two enemy PB2Y's.

6-31 July—Antisubmarine action. No losses.

22d Air Attack Force Classified No. 1-10

MILITARY SECRET (GUNGOKUHI)

War Diary of 22d Air Attack Force (KUSHU BUTAI) from 1 to 30 June 1944

I. Situation (TN: Excerpts):

Since last month the enemy had been engaged continuously in operations for the occupation of BIAK Island. Our reconnaissance revealed the presence of a strong enemy task force at anchor in MAJURO Harbor and its departure about 6 June, from which it was concluded that a new operation might be expected. While we were on the alert, the enemy struck the MARIANAS on the 11th from an unexpected quarter, and on the 15th began landing on SAIPAN Island. Our forces on the 15th instituted the AGO Operations for the enemy's annihilation, but since by the 19th there was no hope of success, our striking force withdrew from the field of battle. In the meanwhile the SAIPAN defense force was battling bravely against a strong enemy but nevertheless under the ceaseless attacks of the foe was pressed gradually back to the north.

II. Progress of operations:

On 15 June 11 TENZAN (JILL) planes of the 551st Naval Air Group attacked the enemy convoy

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and task force, sinking four transports and one heavy cruiser. A torpedo hit was scored on a battleship with unknown results.

On 16 June one land attack plane from the 755th Naval Air Group and four Jills (TENZAN) from the 551st Group attacked the enemy fleet, sinking one cruiser, scoring a torpedo hit on another, and probably torpedoing a third.

On 17 June five Jills of the 551st Naval Air Group attacked the enemy transport convoy. They set one light cruiser afire and it listed heavily and is considered to have sunk. One destroyer was set afire and probably sank. One tanker was blown up and sunk.

Because of our having launched an all-out attack in the AGO Operations, early on the morning of the 19th 13 Zero fighters, 2 night fighters and 2 carrier attack planes (all that could fly in the Second Air Attack Force) moved forward from TRUK to GUAM in support of the fighter units there and shot down three or more planes (confirmed).

On the 23d one Jill of the 551st Naval Air Group attacked an enemy convoy west of SAIPAN and sank one large transport.

Attacks on SAIPAN No. 1 airfield and on the enemy supply dumps on SAIPAN were made with considerable success by 2 land attack planes on the 23d, 2 carrier attack planes of the 551st Air Group and 3 land attack planes of the 755th Air Group on the 26th, 3 land attack planes of the 755th Air Group on the 27th, one land attack plane of the 755th and four Jills (TENZAN) of the 551st on the 28th, and one land attack plane of the 755th on the 29th. (Note—From 11 to 14 June the 755th Air Group was at GUAM and was incorporated in the 4th Air Attack Force (KUSHU BUTAI). During this period land attack planes of the 755th blew up and sank one enemy heavy cruiser in a night torpedo attack).

On the 21st half the strength of the Third Air Attack Force (land attack planes) and half the strength of the Eighth Air Attack Force (carrier attack planes) came under this command. On the 27th and 30th one land attack plane each day from the 732d Air Group and on the 26th three carrier attack planes from the 705th Air Group were under this command. In combat with the enemy on the TRUK front they achieved the following combined results: 16 B-24's shot down and about 40 damaged.

Our total losses during June were as follows: Crews lost or failed to return: 151st Air Group, one JUDY (SUISEI) crew; 755th Air Group, 12 land attack crews; 253d Air Group, 15 persons; 251st Air Group, 3 persons (night fighters); 551st Air Group, 16 land attack crews.

SHOKAKU Classified No. 35-7.

MILITARY TOP SECRET (GUNKI)

20 June 1944.

Combat Report of SHOKAKU (except part of the plane units)

AGO Operations from 15 to 20 June 1944

I. Situation:

The enemy had advanced to the west side of NEW GUINEA Island in ever-increasing attacks upon us. His fleet was massed in the SOLOMON and MARSHALL Islands with the intention of piercing our inner South Seas line of defense at a single stroke.

In the early part of May he leaped to BIAK and after pressing us west, from 11 June onward quickly began operations for the control of our MARIANAS, using the principal strength of his task forces.

Our striking force was at GUIMARAS anchorage. On 13 June at 0930 we left TAWITAWI. On the 14th at 1627 the order came from the Combined Fleet for the AGO decisive operation. At 1630 on the

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same day we anchored temporarily for supplying and fueling, completing preparations for the decisive battle.

II. Our Plan (TN: Not translated):

(TN: The remainder of the report as listed in the table of contents, including progress of operations and results, is missing.)

CHITOSE Classified No. 20-6.

25 June 1944.

Combat Report No. 1 of *CHITOSE* (CVL) AGO Operations from 15 to 22 June 1944

I. Plan:

A. To throw our entire strength in support of the base forces in order to annihilate the enemy striking force and disrupt their plans for a counterattack.

1. On 20 May the Striking Force was at anchor in the PHILIPPINES completing preparations for the all-out attack. The Diversion Force in response to orders was to sortie to the PALAU area and engage the enemy while the Striking Force sought to execute the plans by advancing east of the PHILIPPINES in support of the Diversion Force. The base air force and the Advance Force were to appear in full view of the enemy in order to lead him, and the base air force would then turn to the execution of its duties in an all-out attack and damage the enemy. At the time the striking force made contact with the enemy a strict watch was to be kept against the enemy tactic of a flanking movement. The base air forces scouting was not airtight, and until it should become clear as to whether the enemy's carrier force on this side was light, a part of the attack plane strength (for instance, the 2d Air Flot) was to be stationed.

The pursuing forces would dispel all dangers. They would repeatedly attack the withdrawing enemy and destroy him. If convenient in the surface action the operation would be executed in this way, or, depending on circumstances, the plane units would be deployed to land bases or undertake to reinforce the efforts of the surface combat force.

V. Results:

A. Bombing (including strafing):

1. Enemy task force attacked twice at grid point NA SO 4 TE by 19 carrier attack planes, 4 carrier fighters, 2 Type 97 carrier attack planes, and 2 Jills (TENZAN). Four carriers set afire and five planes shot down (one unconfirmed).

2. One intruding enemy carrier was attacked but as it was near sunset the attack was broken off. Two planes shot down.

3. One submarine was attacked. Results unknown.

B. Aerial combat:

1. Two Grumman's shot down.

C. Our losses:

1. Twenty one planes of all types lost, 29 crew members killed and 2 missing.

CHIYODA Classified No. 16-9.

MILITARY TOP SECRET (GUNKI)

22 June 1944.

Combat Report No. 1 of *CHIYODA* (CVL), AGO Operations from 15 to 22 June 1944

A. On 20 June at 1730 an enemy formation of 20 planes was sighted at 5,000 meters bearing 130°.

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These split up into groups and began dive bombing attacks. There were many near misses on both sides of the ship and at 1738 one bomb hit the flight deck aft and started a medium-sized blaze. Torpedo planes were sighted on both sides of the bow. These attacked. Next two dive bombers scored near misses on the starboard quarter.

At 1746 the enemy were driven off and we ceased firing. We shot down 7 planes and the remainder fled. The fire on the flight deck aft was extinguished.

B. *Other losses:*

On 18 June, one special attack plane fell into the water while being taken aboard. On the 19th one Type 97 carrier attack plane made a crash landing and one failed to return, and one fighter made a crash landing.

WDC 161517
Group 11
Item No. 11-0

MILITARY TOP SECRET (GUNKI)

5th SENTAI Classified No. 5-9.

War Diary of 5th SENTAI, 1-30 June 1944. Issued by the 5th SENTAI Headquarters
AGO Operations

I. *Situation of Enemy and Our Own Forces:*

A. The enemy on BIAK Island has strong positions and is gradually pushing our forces. The KON forces intended to send reinforcements but were unable to.

B. On the 11th an enemy task force made up of the greater part of their surface military strength attacked the MARIANAS; also fierce air raids were carried out. On the 15th they started landing on SAIPAN.

C. On the 13th AGO Operations opened. Our striking force left GUIMARAS to attack. On the 19th in the early morning we caught the enemy task force west of the MARIANAS and attacked fiercely. Although we bombed and sank 5 aircraft carriers, we were not able to gain a decisive victory. Since there was slight damage to our own carriers and our air power, too, we temporarily suspended pursuit.

II. *Conduct of Operations:*

A. Were transferred to KON forces at end of last month and waiting on alert at DAVAO. On the 2d, headed for BIAK with the Guard Force (CruDiv 5, DesDiv 27) and the Indirect Escort Unit (*FUSO* and DesDiv 10) of the KON Force. We had left DAVAO to attack, but since KON Operations were suspended on the 3d, on the 5th we returned to DAVAO and waited on the alert. In the meantime, on the 4th we shot down one of three enemy B-24's attacking at dawn and drove off the others.

B. On the 7th, 5th CruDiv and DesDiv 10 again joined the KON Force and left DAVAO the same day. On the 9th reached BACHAN (TN: Phonetic) Anchorage and joined with the Transportation Unit (16th CruDiv, *URANAMI* and *SHIKINAMI*) and waited on the alert. On the night of the 7th when we left DAVAO, the *KAZAGUMO* was attacked and sunk by a torpedo attack from an enemy submarine. On the 10th, BatDiv 1 (less the *NAGATO*) DesRon 2 (*NOSHIRO*, *SHIMAKAZE*, *OKINAMI*) joined the KON Force.

C. On the 13th the BatDiv 1, DesRon 2 and CruDiv 5, which were being used in AGO Operations were ordered to return to their original group, so the same day they left SAMUBAKI (TN: Phonetic)

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Anchorage under command of BatDiv 1 Headquarters. On the 19th attacked an enemy task force in waters west of the MARIANAS but were unable to annihilate it.

On the 20th 30 enemy carrier-based planes attacked the main force. We drove them off with anti-aircraft operations and completely protected the carriers. This unit shot down 10 planes. The task force arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA on the 24th after a short stay in the western part of the Inland Sea. Two planes were lost (whereabout unknown) on the 18th while searching for the enemy.

D. On the 26th to KURE for rush preparations for battle. Left on 29th. To SINGAPORE via MANILA and GUIMARAS. Doing operational transportation.

WDC 161517
Group 11
Item No. 11-0

MILITARY TOP SECRET (GUNKI).

DesRon 10 Classified No. 12-6.

War Diary of Destroyer Squadron 10, 1-30 June 1944

Most of this group was at TAWITAWI at the beginning of the month—some on KON Operations, convoying, etc. Left TAWITAWI on 13th for GUIMARAS; left GUIMARAS on 15th for AGO Operations.

Mostly in main unit and vanguard of the Task Force and some convoy for supply force. Headed for seas east of the PHILIPPINES for a decisive battle with the enemy task force and invasion units conducting the invasion of the MARIANAS.

18th—Discovered first enemy carrier-based planes, and then, task force. Engaged on 19th—considerable success. On 20th attacked by planes from enemy task force. Shot down a considerable number. This unit shot down 15 planes. No loss. In the two battles part of our carriers were sunk by enemy planes and submarines, so most of this unit did rescue work and carried out antisubmarine operations.

22d—Arrived at NAKAGUSUKU WAN.

23d—A part was sent to GUIMARAS. The remainder went to western part of the Inland Sea, arriving on the 24th and later going to KURE and to YOKOSUKA.

Summary:

MICHISHIO shot down six carrier bombers (2 of which are uncertain) on 19th and 20th.

KAZAGUMO was sunk by a torpedo while attacking a surfaced enemy submarine sighted bearing 240°, distant 20 miles from ST. AUGUSTINE Cape at 0320 on 8 June.

ISOKAZE, at TAWITAWI. On 9th enemy sub reported seen outside the bay. Carried out antisubmarine operations together with the *TANIKAZE*, the *SHIMAKAZE* and *HAYASHIMO*. The *TANIKAZE* was sunk (bearing 229°, distant 9 miles from BONGAO Island) by a torpedo. On 19th did rescue work when the *TAIHO* was hit by a torpedo.

URAKAZE—On 19th and 20th, rescue work when *SHOKAKU* hit by torpedo from enemy submarine. Also, shot down three enemy carrier planes. More rescue work when the *HIYO* was sunk. On the 20th the *SEIYO MARU* was badly damaged by an enemy carrier-bomber. The *YUKIKAZE* torpedoed it as it had to be abandoned.

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HATSUZUKI—Shot down two enemy planes on the 19th and 20th. Rescue work when *TAIHO* was sunk.

WAKATSUKI—On 6th were convoying the *KOSEN MARU* together with the *MINAZUKI* (DD). No sooner had we left port at TAWITAWI for BALIKPAPAN than the *MINAZUKI* was sunk by a torpedo from an enemy submarine. Incurred another submarine torpedo attack while doing rescue work, but no damage. Arrived at BALIKPAPAN on the 8th. Left BALIKPAPAN on the 9th as a convoy escort. On our own for awhile, but rejoined main force on the 17th. Shot down two enemy carrier-bombers and damaged two on the 19th and 20th. Rescue work for *TAIHO* when it was sunk.

SHIMOTSUKI—On 19th shot down two enemy carrier-bombers. No damage.

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TOP SECRET

Impressions and Battle Lessons (Air) in the "A" Operations

(NOTE—Due to lack of reference material there may be errors, but this paper is being distributed for whatever value it may have. Any person having any suggestions kindly note them on the margins and return by 15 December 1944.)

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Part I

In accordance with orders commencing the "A" Operations, the Task Force was standing by at TawiTawi since 20 May. During this time, because of enemy submarine activities and lack of training fields, the ability of the air personnel constantly declined. Therefore it became necessary to speedily move to Guimaras or Manila. As a result on the 13 June we moved to Guimaras.

BatDiv 1, CruDiv 5, DesDiv 4, Asagumo, Okinami and Shimakaza were incorporated into the "KON" Operation Force and concentrated at Batjan anchorage on the 12th; Task Group 2 standing by at Guimaras and Task Group 1 plus the *Fuso* standing by at Davao.

During the morning of 11 June we received reports of the enemy Task Force attack on Saipan. The Fleet Headquarters estimated that this was a diversionary operation of the Biak Operation but on the following day, the 12th, learning that the enemy was in great force, that it had 12 to 15 aircraft carriers as its nucleus, it was thought possible that this was a forerunner of an invasion operation. Having previously estimated that the advance to Guimaras was advantageous from the standpoint of air preparation, the entire force proceeded to Guimaras anchorage from TawiTawi as scheduled at 0900 on the 13th. Receiving reports on the 13th that the enemy had commenced shelling and sweeping operations in Saipan the belief that landings would take place there gained credence. The Replenishment Force was put on 30 minutes stand-by and the fuel on *Fuso* was transferred to 1st Replenishment Force.

At 1400 on 14th arrived Guimaras, and was speedily refueled from the *Azusa Maru* and *Genyo Maru*.

At 1727 on 13th "Prepare for A-GO Decisive Operation" was ordered. The Task Force decided to destroy in daytime the enemy regular carrier groups in accordance with Combined Fleet Operation Plans and in cooperation with friendly air forces and Advanced Expeditionary Force. This was to be followed up with an all-out attack aimed at the annihilation of the enemy. The daytime air attack was scheduled for the 19th.

At 1700 on 15 June replenishment operations were completed. During the same morning about 30 enemy transports appeared in the seas to the west of Saipan. At 0717 the same day the "A" Decisive Opera-

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tions were ordered activated. At 0800 the Task Force departed from Guimaras and passed through San Bernardino Straits at 1730 same day heading for the seas to west of Marianas. Having determined the general compositions and dispositions of the enemy Task Force and moreover having received reports of enemy air raids in the Iwo area, it was estimated that there were no enemy carrier groups to the west of the Island chain. Therefore the reconnaissances to the eastward were abandoned and searches were carried out for the enemy Task Force which was estimated to be to the west of Palau by radio intelligence. However the enemy was not found. At 1530 rendezvoused with 1st Task Group and the returning force of the "KON" Operation Force. All cruisers and lesser ships commenced refueling at sea. At 1530 the 17th refueling completed and started for Point "C" as ordered in (First Military Sector Order?). At 0500 on 18th commenced air reconnaissance in accordance with method two of Third Battle Method of daytime air operations. (Forward first step has point of origin $13^{\circ} 50' N$, $134^{\circ} 20' E$, from 12° to 115° distance 425 miles.) Fleet proceeding on course 60° speed 20. During these searches scattered enemy patrol planes were seen at a point about 400 miles ahead of the Fleet. At 1100 second phase searches (Origin $14^{\circ} 40' N$, $135^{\circ} 40' E$, from 340° to 100°) were started.

Between 1425 and 1540 three enemy carrier groups were sighted bearing 255° distance 235 miles from Saipan (two regular CV's, two of which appeared to be regular CV's, and two of which appeared to be CV's). All were on westerly courses, distance about 380 miles from this unit.

CarDiv 3 planned to proceed to Guam after carrying out attacks at dusk. Special Attack Units took off but due to being released from attack stand-by orders of the Task Force this attack was called off.

On the afternoon of the 18th it was estimated that the enemy was to the east (as noted before) and to the north (from erroneous reports of sighting enemy ship-based planes). It was decided therefore for the Task Force to first destroy the enemy placed at bearing 220° , distance 350 miles from Iwo on the 19th, and after that to proceed against the enemy which was to the west of Saipan. Shortly after this order was issued, however, it was learned that the presence of the enemy to the north was based on an erroneous report. It was therefore decided to destroy the enemy regular carrier group which had advanced to west of the Island chain launching the attack from a position about 300 miles away from it and about 580 miles from the Island chain. At 2000 the advanced guard was separated and air combat disposition assumed. Vertical depth disposition was assumed on 19 June (distance between Advanced Units and Main Units about 100 miles; CarDiv 2 about 15 kilometers north of CarDiv 1). In this formation the air operations were commenced; course of advance 50° , line of bearing of enemy was 50° .

At 0330 19th first phase forward search took off (16 float reconnaissance planes of 2d Fleet). At 0415 second phase search took off (13 ship-based attack planes of CarDiv 3 and 1 float reconnaissance of *Chikuma*). Third phase at same time (11 *Suisei* of CarDiv 1 and 2 float reconnaissance planes from *Mogami*).

At 0630 sighted four enemy CV's and four BB's and others bearing 264° distance 160 miles from Saipan (7I) on westerly courses. At 0845 sighted three enemy regular CV's, five BB's and others at a point about 70 miles SW. of Guam (15RI). At 0900 sighted one large CV, two special type CV's, one BB and five DD's at point about 50 miles north of (7I). At that time the distance guard was about 300 miles and to the main body about 380 miles.

At 0730 first phase Attack Unit of CarDiv 3 (18 VF, 46 VF-VB, and 9 VT) took off. At 0800 first phase Attack Unit of CarDiv 1 (48 VF, 54 VB and 27 VT) took off.

The "A" force, in order to keep about 400 miles from the enemy, reversed its course but after the attack units had taken off they went on course 120° .

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At 0900, on contact at (3 RI), first phase attack unit of CarDiv 2 (26 VF-VB, 16 VF, 7 VT) which had taken off at 0830, was notified of the change in the target and directed to it.

At 1000 a contact plane was sent off to (15RI) and second (first ?) phase attacks of CarDiv 1 and CarDiv 2 were ordered in that direction.

At 0945 the first phase attack units of CarDiv 3 were subjected to severe enemy fighter fire at a point about 20 miles short of their target. Although heavy damages were sustained a portion was able to penetrate and to attack (7I). A hit each was scored on an enemy CV and a large cruiser, causing fire to break out on the CV.

At 1045 first phase attack units of CarDiv 1 carried out an attack on (7I). Black smoke from four CV's was definitely witnessed. After receiving orders to change targets the first phase attack unit of CarDiv 2 headed for (3RI) but were unable to sight the enemy. Instead they headed for (7I) but were intercepted by about 40 Grumman F6F's and were unable to reach the target. The second phase attack units of CarDiv 1 (11 VF-VB plus unknown VF and VT) and CarDiv 2 (26 VF, 36 VB, and 2 VT) took off at about 1300. They headed for (15RI) but on arrival at the estimated target position no enemy could be sighted, and although searches were carried out over a fairly large area most of the airplane units were unable to establish any contact. At 1340 however a part of CarDiv 2's attack unit (six Suisais and two VF's) sighted the enemy in two groups (1st group consisting of 3 CV's and 20 other vessels, 2d group of 3 CV's and a dozen other vessels). They tried to break through at 1345 but met stiff Grumman VF opposition. Casualties were heavy and results not clear.

Most of the airplane units headed for Guam, but upon arrival over their destination they were intercepted by about 30 enemy Grumman VF's. They landed on No. 1 and No. 2 fields on Guam while still being engaged by the enemy. Although a repetition of the first phase attack of CarDiv 1 and a dusk torpedo attack by CarDiv 3 had been planned, damages suffered by the *Taiho* and the delay in landing on CV's made it impossible to carry this plan through. Had the first phase attack brought favorable results the Mobile Fleet had planned to approach the Island chain early on the 20th and resume their activity; at the same time have the Diversionary Attack Force proceed and destroy the enemy at one blow. If, however, results were not up to expectations the Fleet had planned to temporarily retire to the west, be refueled and resume the attack. At 0810, however, the *Taiho* received a torpedo hit from an enemy submarine and at 1432 suddenly exploded. At 1828 she sank. At 1120 the *Shokaku* was subjected to enemy submarine torpedo attacks (four hits) causing fire to break out and to sink at 1401. The Flag of the Mobile Fleet was shifted to the *Haguro* via the *Wakatsuki* at 1606, and at 1202 on the 20th the Flag was shifted to the *Zuikaku*.

Upon transferring to the *Haguro* it was deemed that the results obtained by the first day's attack was insufficient particularly in that the attack against the (15RI) enemy could not be carried out and in view of the fact that our remaining air strength numbered only about 100 planes it was deemed best that the airplane units which had been sent to shore bases be recalled to the CV's and to retire to the west to refuel and reorganize. Orders were issued to plan to resume decisive battle on the 22d. Under orders of the Commander Diversionary Attack Force, searches were carried out on the 20th to the east of the refueling point and at 0700 rendezvous was made with the 1st and 2d Replenishment Force and refueling commenced.

At 1100 the Commander Diversionary Attack Force, believing that there was a good likelihood of attacks by enemy CV force, ordered two phase-reconnaissance to the rear. At 1124 the search plane reported seeing an enemy force composed of two CV's, two BB's, one cruiser, and several DD's at a point bearing 20° (later corrected to 5°) distance 500 miles from Peleliu (this was about 200 miles to the east of the advanced guard). The Headquarters of the Mobile Fleet estimated that this was a friendly force.

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At 1610 at a point about 200 miles east of the Flagship of the Mobile Force what appeared to be a group of enemy carrier planes was sighted. At 1615 the enemy Task Force (having as its nucleus two CV's and two BB's) was sighted at 14° 20' N. 138° 30' E. Refueling operations therefore were abandoned and a speedy retreat made towards the northwest. Since at the time of sighting the enemy was on a westerly course it was decided to carry out a dusk attack. At the same time three contact planes and seven VT planes were sent off, and ordering No. 4 Battle Formation a night battle employing the Diversionary Attack Force was decided upon.

For about a half hour from 1730 the Mobile Force was subjected to attacks by large formations of enemy planes (about 150 planes). Although we shot down about 100 enemy planes (40 by aircraft and 60 by gunfire) we also suffered considerable damage. The *Hiyo* was hit by one bomb and one torpedo, and while drifting received an enemy submarine attack and sank at 1932. *Junyo* received two direct hits making landings and take-offs impossible. The *Zuikaku*, *Ryubo*, *Chiyoda*, *Haruna*, and *Maya* all suffered minor damages while the *Gcnjo Maru* and the *Sciyo Maru* were sunk or abandoned.

It became evident that the torpedo units could not contact the enemy and moreover since over half of our remaining air strength had been lost the plans for night battle were abandoned and the entire force retreated to the northwest.

After that large type enemy planes contacted us so there was a possibility that we would be attacked by the enemy on the 21st. Judging however from intercepted enemy messages and from search reports it became apparent that the enemy also had suffered considerable air losses and was giving up the combat zone.

At 1300 on the 22d the Mobile Force dropped anchor in Nakagusku Bay, terminating the operations.

Part II

At the outset of this operation all personnel burned with desire to destroy the enemy and place the Imperial Country on safe ground. Moreover on June 15th these units were given an Imperial Rescript which increased their desire to destroy the powerful enemy. However they were not able to attain the objective of destroying the enemy and hence have been put to the present distressed condition. It is a matter of deep regret. Now we must examine the cause of this distressed condition and make it a lesson for the future operations. Now let us review the failure of the present operation and express our opinion about the failure:

1. The main principle of any military operation should be based on attacking the enemy first. However military operations should not be based on dogmatic and hopeful judgment. Unless we retain a flexible mind we cannot grasp the opportunity to win the battle. This is especially so in the interception type of operation.

(a) It was planned by the authorities that in the "A" Operation against the Marianas and eastern Carolines and Harojima Island sections we would chiefly use shore-based aviation. In the operation against the Palau section we would chiefly employ carrier Task Forces. We took this decision on the assumption that the enemy's main attacking front would be in the west Carolines. Although it cannot be said that the "A" Operations should have been activated on the 12th when a large enemy force appeared in the Mariana area, it should have been activated at the latest by the 13th when the enemy commenced shelling and sweeping operations.

The 2-day period referred to above had a great effect on operations. During that period was the dividing point of whether or not the enemy could be successfully attacked while he was busily engaged in attacks on himself by our remaining friendly shore-based air strength. There is a feeling that we were a little slow in commencing operations. Without saying that anyone in particular is at fault, reconnaissance and intelligence were to blame for faulty estimates.

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In the basic structure of the operation it was imperative that very close cooperation exist between the Task Force and the shore-based air strength. However, from the characteristics of the bases in that area, it was evident that we could not put up a favorable air combat strength. In consideration of the fact that some of the air bases became impotent we feel that the operations should have been directed to areas in which shore-based air could be used to a maximum (such as Iwo) and with such cooperation to participate in decisive battle.

(b) It reads in chapter 49 in the Combat Sutra that "Tactics is like sandals. Those who are strong should wear them. A cripple should not dare wear them." The plan in operation No. A is minutely worked out and the strategy of the operational unit has also been checked in great detail. But the training for combat duty in each detachment is not complete. Therefore, it looks, as said in the Combat Sutra, as if well-made sandals were allowed to be worn by a cripple.

Although we could not control the fortune of the battle, we should like to say that the combat strength of each air force was not yet sufficient due to too much hurry in which the air fleet was gathered. After the air force had been organized, the 1st flying squadron went into action after 6 month's training, the 2d flying squadron after 2 month's training, and the 3d flying squadron after 3 month's training. As will be mentioned below, the degree of the training was not sufficient to meet the demand of an actual battle. Referring to the 2d flying squadron, the personnel and armaments were delayed in being put to good order. The training could be started only in the first week of April, and in the first week of May when the men went into action, they could barely man monoplanes as far as their training was concerned, and their maneuver was extremely poor. For one example, the reconnaissance squadron was properly machine-checked only just before starting, and none of the pilots had more than 100 nautical miles of flying experience. As to the communications, they had not a single practice of transmission and reception at Tenzan, and the radars were totally unusable. Referring to the 1st flying squadron, they had had a fairly large number of training days after the formation, but due to a fast advance to the South Pacific and the younger ages of available crew, damages to the motors and machines occurred repeatedly so that proper maintenance of the planes was delayed. And the degree of their training was not much different from that of the 2d flying squadron crew. The 3d flying squadron did not differ from the other two. Moreover, after the squadrons were concentrated at Tawitawi, they loafed there for one month, decreasing the efficiency of their training. Looking from the result of the operation, the first attacking unit of the 1st and 3d flying squadrons and a part of the second attacking unit of the 2d flying squadron reached their objective on June 19, but about half of the attackers failed to reach their objective at all with all their efforts. What was the cause of this failure must be carefully studied, but there is no ground for doubt that one cause was insufficiency in training and practical flying experience.

Furthermore, although the contact planes maintained contact with the objective 15RI on the 19th and the enemy flying squadron in the night of the 20th, they contacted imperfectly with our attacking unit, making our force lose a good opportunity for attacking. This was again due to insufficiency of training. The attack on an enemy carrier 350 nautical miles off shore is not an easy task even for trained pilots. What could be expected to accomplish then to plan to attack an enemy carrier 380 nautical miles off shore with the planes so unprepared as the above, and furthermore, with the order changed after taking off? It is essential for a commander to grasp constantly the actual conditions of his troops, use them to suit their fighting strength the best, and endeavor to increase the combat strength, overcoming all the obstacles.

(c) This operation was to take advantage of the entrapped concentration of the enemy fleet on the fringe of the Marianas, attack the main body with a small force, and smash the plan of the enemy advance. Therefore, it resembles very closely the battle of Okehazama in which Oda Nobunaga led personally his body-

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guards to the headquarters of the enemy general Imagawa Yoshimoto and smashed the enemy force so completely that he could build a foundation to reduce all the warring lords to his vassals. The main cause of Nobubaga's victory was his maneuver that diverted the enemy force to the Zensho Temple with an unidentified detachment and with a lightning speed caught Yoshimoto unprepared at his headquarters. The success of our operation depended on one factor, that is, a surprise attack. For further emphasis on this point, since a carrier has its intrinsic weakness against enemy attacks, our operational success was to be decided in a fraction of a second in which to gain an initial advantage and surprise the enemy. In other words, the first attack should have been made as destructive as possible. For this reason a strict secrecy of the plan was absolutely essential. However, from the result of this operation we found something which should not have been. The following items are listed to learn lessons from the past mistakes and guard against repeating them in the future.

(1) Unsuitability of the Advance Base:

TawiTawi is not only within the sphere of enemy reconnaissance but lacks air defense and an airfield for training. It is close to a focal point of the sea lanes leading to the New Guinea and Borneo areas, and ships at anchor within the port can be seen from a long distance on the high seas. The exit channel is restricted by the peculiar terrain, and it is extremely difficult to keep the time of attacking secret. There are some advantages for servicing, but the disadvantages above mentioned makes this port extremely unsuitable for an advance base of a fleet whose operational plan must be kept absolutely secret, because we must admit that our fleet concentration here for the South Philippine expedition was prematurely exposed to the enemy and thus caused to invite the concentration of enemy submarines. Under the circumstances then prevailing the Gulf of San Miguel would have been a better selection. And when our fleet concentration was suspected to be known to the enemy, the base should have been changed before the enemy submarines could concentrate.

(2) In the early evening and later on June 16 our ships used incautiously flashlight signals in servicing in high seas within the distance of such signals being detected by enemy submarines, as if the ships were at anchor at their base in peace time. Moreover, on the 18th a radar signal was kept flashing for a long time in search of one unaccounted plane which flew off for action. Such an abuse out of sufficient consideration of the necessity of keeping the plan absolutely secret must be admitted as an important cause for the failure of this crucial battle of Okehazama in the great war of East Asia. This was so different from all the security measures taken to keep secrecy of the plan at the time of the Hawaiian raid in the beginning of the war, resulting in such an adverse effect. Today when secrecy can be kept with ever increasing difficulty, precaution is more and more in order.

(3) On the 18th the combat planes of the 3d flying squadron met with enemy planes six times. One failed to return (fairly certain that it was shot down). On the 19th, as a result of six aerial battles with the enemy, seven of our planes failed to return. Six of them were shot down. It was strongly suspected that our attack on the 18th and the communications between our ships gave a warning to the enemy, made him divine our plan, and prepare for the battles accordingly. On the 18th the 3d flying squadron was determined to attack the enemy as soon as sighted and prepared to return to the carrier, if it was not later than 1400, and to land on Guam, if it was after 1500. But by an order from the operational unit the attack was cancelled. Although the outcome of the attack could not be predicted, a surprise was planned before sunset. If it had been carried out, it could certainly have been a surprise attack, as compared with the attack carried out next morning.

Under these conditions it would be better to be prepared for an attack immediately after discovery of the enemy. And in case there is a risk of our operation being already known to the enemy on the day of the attack, it is admittedly necessary to launch a night flanking movement on a large scale in order to administer

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the first blow on the enemy. If the 3d flying squadron under the circumstance had reported its plan of attack to the flag commander of the fleet, there would not have been any blunder. And in receiving the order of cancelling, if it had any confidence in itself at all, it should have proposed its opinion.

(d) This operation was planned with a close cooperation with the base air force as the basic necessity, but the air force at the 5th base was in the midst of moving its troops for the operation in the Biak area. And the Yawata detachment was delayed in advancing because of inclement weather. Thus adverse conditions piled up on land with the result that not enough troops were distributed in the Mariana area, and even the enemy disposition within 200 nautical miles of Saipan and Guam could not be learned clearly. Therefore, the operational unit had to depend upon its own scouting report. This was the most important cause for the miscarriage of this operation. Considering the importance of the security of Biak together with the disposition of troops at that time, it is not proper to judge generally the merit of the action or find an excuse for it.

In this crisis of battles, on which the fate of Japan depends, the Army Air Corps comprising one arm of the Army did not participate in this operation in the least. And the Navy Air Corps was so scattered in the Co-Prosperity Area of Great East Asia that there was presumably "no place left undefended, and no place defended sufficiently." It is admitted that this is a problem requiring deep deliberation. Today with the Philippine battles already started, it would be inviting repetition of the same mistakes again, if we are satisfied with patching up our blunders now for the time being by the inertia of old traditions. It is urgently hoped that a direct, radical policy will be formulated.

(e) The enemy attempted a thorough-going interception of our attacking planes by using accurate radio instruments and by disposing a powerful fighter plane formation about 100 nautical miles in advance of the carriers. Therefore, the special task planes of the 3d flying squadron suffered fairly heavy damages before the attack with the result that only 14 to 15 out of 42 planes actually participated in the attack. The first attacking planes of the 2d flying squadron failed completely in joining in the attack. Against the above enemy tactics we should have emphasized an early or night attack as a matter of course, but on account of insufficient training of our pilots and lack of radar equipment, we were compelled to resort to a day assault. This was another cause for the failure to gain victory.

We should re-examine the loading standard of our carriers and strengthen the air controlling unit to support the fighting unit. The improvement of training of the whole air corps personnel is highly desired, but the conditions of the war front will not permit now the practice of this program. Then we should install radars on our ships as rapidly as possible. If this can be done, we should form a night attacking unit with highly trained personnel, which will attack the enemy, taking advantage of every instance of favorable weather, and put the enemy into confusion. The rest of the units will then be able to surprise the enemy while in confusion. This is one tactic that we should study further.

(f) Secrecy of the plan of the operation of our unit must be emphasized as mentioned above. In case our plan becomes known to the enemy, and moreover, the enemy has left its carriers around, it is essential to cut off the retreat of enemy planes to the carriers by using every trick of tactics and then attack the carriers anew. In the battle on the 19th the group command ordered the operational unit to retreat to northwest away from the enemy, be serviced on the 21st and launch the second attack on the 22d. But the operational fleet unit sailed that night in the general direction of north at 18 knots per hour and was serviced on the 20th in the neighborhood of the enemy, and attacked by the enemy pursuit planes. Consequently, it was compelled to abandon the objective of the operation.

(g) It is admitted that the antisubmarine defence (especially during a battle) should be re-examined. Since a battle of a fleet is now mainly carried out by the aerial battle by its planes, the fleet is frequently staying

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in the same combat area to launch or receive the planes. Therefore, the antisubmarine defense must be carried out more strictly than ever before. In spite of this situation the fleet observes practically no other precaution than posting lookouts for submarines in a circular fleet formation, and cruises unconcerned at a high speed with the blind trust that the submarine danger is not much to worry about. This is indeed a serious misconception which makes us really worried.

In the operation No. A three of our carriers were sunk by enemy submarines all at once. It was indeed regrettable that this could not be avoided. At least each fleet should post a small carrier against enemy submarines around the formation, and tighten its antisubmarine defense measures, and during a battle the guard ships should advance ahead of the carriers at will and fire guns for warning for enemy submarines. These measures should be adopted at once, but a most urgent problem for antisubmarine defence is development of efficient antisubmarine weapons.

During the operation No. A, enemy submarines were sighted, yet our submarines engaged in the battle very little, out of proportion to damages done to them. This was admittedly due to lack of improvement in the radio instruments of submarine detection at the base, while the enemy submarines were equipped with improved radars. Furthermore, in order to avoid confusion among our submarines, their field of operation was restricted to the water east of the line joining the archipelago. This was very regrettable. It would admittedly have been better, if the submarines had not been subjected to restriction to the operational field and ordered about where to go according to the development of the battle.

II. Grouping, encirclement, and a straight-line thrust formation to be used as battle tactics in the operational unit, and their relative merits have been exhaustibly treated already in "Use of the Operational Unit" published in a series of aviation reference library. In the Operation No. A the operational unit used a straight-line thrust formation in order to damage or sink the enemy carriers with the special task unit of the 3d flying squadron and complete the victory with the rest of the units. This was excused by the unbalanced disposition of troops at that time. But the air corps experienced difficulty of maintaining the relative positions of the carriers due to the departure and return of the planes from them. Not only that, the advance squadrons tended to stall in the same position with the conscious intention to come under the support of the main body as soon as possible. As a result, unconsciously the flying units began to congregate in the same area to the great confusion of all. The straight-line thrust formation ended up in a group formation with all its attending disadvantages only appearing in the situation. In the straight-line thrust disposition by which to absorb the frontal attack of the enemy and to save the main body until the last in order to finish up the enemy, there is something risky in the control of the fighting units.

The encirclement avoids the above disadvantages. In this a part may be discovered by the enemy, yet the other units may often succeed in a surprise attack. In this formation each unit devotes itself to the success of its surprise attack without depending upon the maneuver of some other units. Therefore, the effect of the whole fleet will be doubled.

When the enemy was discovered (by a false report) in the north and east on the 18th, our unit went after one enemy formation with the risk of being flanked by the other enemy formation. When we recollect this situation, the advantage of the encirclement tactics needs not be elaborated long. However, in order to be able to adjust to the changes in the battle front, or to avoid falling into the enemy's hands by repeating the same tactics all the time and thus making the enemy wise about our way, it will be necessary to devise another method.

The straight-line thrust formation is a tactic to be used as a means of expediency when the enemy is expected to be encountered all of a sudden without warning, and has much to be improved as a standard tactics. Accordingly, in the formation of an operational unit (air fighting force) the present system of un-

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balanced disposition should not be continued. It should be formed so that it will be adaptable to the encirclement tactics with a balance of fighting power maintained among the units.

III. *The Value of the Fighting Unit*—The bombers of the fighting plane type hereafter designated as the special task unit of the 3d flying squadron were used. The result showed that due to the damages inflicted by enemy interception, 14 to 15 out of 42 planes only could participate in the attack, but after the attack, they returned relatively easy due to the simple instruction of the operation. It should be noted that the Zero bombers (especially when flying low) can hardly escape the enemy's clutches by themselves, once caught by the enemy radar, and as long as they do not abandon their assignment, they can no longer act as bombers and will be useless for raiding purposes, and furthermore, even when they drop bombs, they will have to start from a low altitude with the expectant disadvantages in an aerial battle with the enemy. In consideration for the need of increasing our fighting power in the future, it will pay our effort to give thought to the replacement of personnel for this type of bombers.

Section II.—*Duty in the Front.*

1. In case an aerial battle is expected, it is admitted that a circular formation with a carrier at the center is the best. In the aerial battle to be described below the effectiveness of the circular formation was firmly demonstrated. This was particularly true when there was a strong antiaircraft battery. But even in a fairly strong circular formation antiaircraft firing has not yet reached the stage of complete blockage of enemy plane attacks. Therefore, with the present radio equipment, it was seriously felt that a circular formation should be made with one carrier at the center so that the giant carrier could be moved out of the sphere of battle at will, if necessary. The senior commander should be on board the carrier at the center. If not, in taking in the returning planes, the operation of the circular formation should be delegated to the commander of the flag carrier.

2. The squadron assigned to pick up forced-landing planes should not limit itself to have one carrier around, if that can be arranged, in the area where there is danger of enemy submarine attacks. And at the time of forced landing it should maneuver at right angles or diagonally, while on the alert with detecting instruments and scouting boats.

It will usually take a long time to take in forced landed planes and thus give a chance of concentrating for enemy submarines. Therefore, a prolonged straight line course should be avoided. Instead, the course should be zig-zagged at right angles from time to time. Besides, scouting boats should be increased and assigned the duty of advancing ahead of the carrier and sweep the water. At such a time scouting boats surrounding the carrier should fire occasionally as a warning for enemy submarines and allow them no chance to attack.

3. Orders of attacks and other important items were frequently delayed in transmission, and in extreme cases such orders never reached the advance posts. In the operation of a large detachment installation of a communication system should be of a primary concern.

4. In the reports from scouting planes which were stationed at a base which is to function as the most important coordination center of communications, the position, course; and armament of sighted enemy planes were not clear in more than 50 percent of the cases. This is admitted to be of grave concern. In such a case, the base from which the most successful scouting planes flew out and which gathered the most accurate information should correct or revise the reports and rebroadcast them.

III. The System of Organization.

In the division of the air duty and its assignment it was observed that the personnel of a carrier went frequently into combat duty before fully understanding the function of the carrier. This resulted naturally in deterioration in the spirit of emergency adaptation, which hithertofore has been observed. From the stand-

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point of improving the defense a part of the ground crew of the flying unit (a squad leader of the ground crew and part of the squad members who are expected to study and be trained in the defense maneuver in the normal time as an assigned duty of the flying unit) should be enrolled in the permanent personnel of the carrier.

IV. *Camouflage of the Carrier*—In this operation three carriers were torpedoed and sunk with a serious loss of the supply source of gasoline. It is admittedly essential to establish a radical measure to strengthen the defense and minimize such damages.

The Case of the Shokaku (carrier)—1. In this battle the fuel consumption of the 1st attacking unit (18 fighter planes, 18 bombers, 9 chasers, and 9 scouting planes) was about 130,000 liters. Therefore, if four attacks are to be made, 600,000 liters will suffice. One cause of suffering an explosion on the ship in this battle seemed to have been leakage of gasoline from a damaged tank. It is necessary to consider a preventive measure to safeguard fuel tanks. One suggestion will be a need of cutting off the fuel load to one half. Any space obtained in reconditioning should be directed to safeguarding fuel tanks.

2. The position of gasoline tanks should be located farther away from the hangar.


3. The gasoline tanks should be more strongly safeguarded and be so constructed that a slight damage will not cause leakage.

4. The part adjacent to the gasoline tanks should be partitioned to small units. Each of such units should be equipped with a powerful ventilator. And it is also necessary to have proper equipment with which the hangar can be ventilated rapidly.


5. It is essential to install an outlet and its accessory with which gasoline can be drained rapidly when in need. This concerns with the fate of the carrier. This important item should be considered soon and acted upon.

Appendix 81


DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FLEET
AFTERNOON OF 20 JUNE, 1944




DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FLEET
MORNING OF 19 JUNE, 1944



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XI

The Western Carolines Operation

Introduction

Ever since United States seizure of the initiative in the Pacific, Allied forces had been separated, advancing by two separate routes. One of these campaigns, that in the South and Southwest Pacific, with its supply lines through the New Hebrides and Australia, had moved steadily westward and northward; the other, conducted by Central Pacific forces with its supply route through the Hawaiian Islands, had moved westward through the Gilberts and Marshalls to the Marianas.

Thus, in the summer of 1944, although Japanese bases in the Central and Western Carolines were under repeated air attack from three sides, and were greatly reduced in effectiveness, they still presented a long salient between the two arms of the United States advance. Occupation of Palau, Yap, and Ulithi was planned to cut off this salient, to provide the major fleet anchorage necessary to future operations which the Marianas did not offer, and to link Central Pacific forces with those of the Southwest Pacific which would advance simultaneously to Morotai, 480 miles southwest of Palau.

For these operations, the objective of United States Pacific Ocean Areas forces was "to gain and maintain control of the eastern approaches to the Philippines-Formosa-China Coast Area." This task, broader in scope than mere occupation of certain islands, involved the destruction of Japanese air and sea forces which could prevent United States control of these eastern approaches. Accordingly, in the assignment of tasks to sub-commanders, it was specified that all forces should "maintain and extend unremitting military pressure against Japan. Apply maximum attrition to enemy air, ground, and naval forces by all possible means in all areas." Appreciation of the scope of this larger purpose is basic to an understanding of the campaign.

The operations against the Western Carolines covered the three months from July through September 1944. Every major command in the Pacific Area was involved and operations extended over the entire Central and Western Pacific. Nearly 800 vessels, 1,600 aircraft, and an estimated 250,000 personnel, exclusive of garrison forces, participated, of whom 202,000 were Navy, 19,600 were Army, and 28,400 were Marines.

The Japanese were estimated to have strong garrison forces on two of the three objectives, with some 38,000 in the Palau group, and 10,000 on Yap, although Ulithi was thought to be very lightly if at all defended. Their naval and air strength, however, was a different matter. Previous attacks by carrier and land-based air had reduced the aircraft in the Western Carolines to a few scout and fighter planes, and while substantial air forces were thought to be present in the Philippines, the range was such as to make all but a limited number of twin engined bombers ineffective. Submarine attacks were expected, but due to the damage inflicted on the Japanese Navy at the battle of the Philippine Sea in June, it was not anticipated that any enemy striking force would venture beyond cover of land-based air to contest our landings. As this estimate of Japanese intentions was in fact proven correct, the critical factors in this amphibious operation were those of distance, weather, and beaches, the problems of landing, reinforcing, and supplying the assault forces. Our covering forces, freed from the necessity of defending the beachhead, were at liberty to carry out the larger task of attacking enemy forces along the Philippine-Formosa line.

Prior to the scheduled landing on 15 September, considerable advance effort had been made toward the neutralization of the Palau Islands. As far back as March, the fast carriers had carried out a 2-day raid on this group destroying aircraft and shipping, and mining the anchorage to such good effect that it was never again fully reopened. Beginning in June, raids by four-motored bombers from the Southwest Pacific had

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been made with increasing frequency, and in the last week of August and first week of September B-24's in nine major strikes dropped over 600 tons. A second 2-day carrier strike was made in mid-July, inflicting heavy damage and securing photographic coverage of important installations.

Covering Operations

Bonin Raid—31 August—2 September:

The far-flung covering operations for the Western Carolines operation began on 31 August when one fast carrier group hit the Bonin and Volcano Islands, following up with further air strikes and cruiser and destroyer bombardment on 1 and 2 September; some 54 Japanese aircraft were destroyed, 8 small ships and a number of barges sunk, and ground installations damaged.

Mindanao Raid—7—10 September:

Following on this northern strike, a heavy 6-day series of attacks by three carrier groups was planned on Mindanao, at the southern end of the Japanese line, to neutralize important airfields, destroy aircraft, ships, and installations, and to obtain photographic coverage for future operations. It was anticipated that this island, with a land mass about equal to the British Isles, would be defended by some 200 planes operating from 9 major bases and a number of subsidiary strips, and that the western and southern coasts would offer profitable shipping targets. As it turned out, however, although a large amount of shipping was eliminated both by air and by surface attack, the Japanese showed surprising weakness in the air, only 58 planes being destroyed of which most were burned on the ground. The anticipated threat to the Palau and Morotai landings being thus disposed of, the planned attacks were cut short on 10 September and the carriers moved north to fuel and prepare for attacks on the Central Philippines.

First, Visayas Raid—12—13 September:

Two days of strikes on the Visayas proved much more profitable. Although attacks on the United States force were sporadic and ineffective, considerable opposition was experienced over the Japanese fields, and the final score showed over 300 Japanese planes destroyed, some 13 large merchant ships, 20 smaller ones, and 35 sampans or barges sunk. On conclusion of the Visayas strikes, one carrier group went south to support the landings on Morotai, and one east to Palau, while the third replenished preparatory to the attacks on Luzon.

Intelligence gained during these strikes on the Southern and Central Philippines confirmed previous information as to the weakness of Japanese garrisons in the Leyte area. This knowledge, combined with the successful elimination of air opposition, led to the decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to omit planned invasions of Talaud and Mindanao and to strike next directly at the Visayas. The invasion of Yap was cancelled, and the troops which were already embarked for this assault made available to augment Southwest Pacific forces.

Luzon and Second Visayas Raids—21—24 September:

The first carrier air attack of the war on Luzon, 21 and 22 September, was an aggressive move which met with signal success. Although not contemplated in original operation plans, the favorable results of the Mindanao and Visayas strikes led to the decision to attack in conformity with the instructions to "maintain and extend unremitting military pressure" against Japanese forces. One of the most important targets outside the Empire, with its docks, installations, shipping, and major complex of airfields, Luzon was estimated to be defended by over 500 aircraft. Furthermore it was used as a major training base for Japanese pilots, and it was felt that disruption of activities at Luzon airfields would intensify one of the major problems confronting the Japanese, the shortage of trained aviators.

In 2 days of attacks on Luzon on 21 and 22 September, the carrier air groups destroyed such Japanese aircraft as rose to fight and a larger number on the ground, for a total of over 300, and sank a sizeable amount of shipping including 3 destroyers, 3 tankers, and 20 freighters, with major damage to more. The

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second day of strikes was curtailed by bad weather, and after fueling the carrier groups proceeded southward for a second attack on the Visayas. These islands were again worked over on 24 September with little opposition, and a 350-mile strike was flown to Coron Bay in the Calamian Group where shipping fleeing from Luzon had taken refuge; this attack sank 31,000 tons including two large tankers. Total damage inflicted on the Japanese in the fast carrier strikes between 31 August and 24 September amounted to 1,000 aircraft destroyed and over 150 ships sunk, exclusive of barges and sampans. United States carrier plane losses, both at Palau and in the covering operations, totalled 114.

Palau Landings and Occupation of Ulithi

The landings on Peleliu in the Palau group took place as scheduled on 15 September, and although the Japanese garrison offered the bitterest resistance until its final extermination in late November, the issue was never in doubt. At Angaur, Army troops landed on 17 September and the island was secured on the 22d. Air opposition to the invasion of the Palau group consisted of nightly attacks by a lone float plane over the period 18 to 26 September, none of which did any damage. Naval opposition was limited to three submarines which the Japanese sent into the area; no damage was done by these units although they reported sizeable mythical successes to Tokyo, and two of the three did not return.

Direct air support for the attacking troops was furnished by a group of escort carriers, augmented at first by one and, during the period of the landings, by two fast carrier groups. After seizure of the airfield on Peleliu, Marine aircraft gradually took over this responsibility. Base development on both Peleliu and Angaur was commenced at once; direct support missions were flown from the captured strip on the 24th, and the new heavy bomber runway was operational by 16 October.

The original plans for the Western Carolines operation had contemplated occupation of both Yap and Ulithi starting about 5 October. As indicated above, the success of the carrier strikes on the Philippines led to the decision to abandon the attack on Yap and divert the troops scheduled for that operation to the planned invasion of Leyte. Ulithi was occupied on 23 September without opposition, providing the Fleet with an advanced anchorage for forthcoming operations. The move of base facilities forward from Eniwetok was at once begun.

Conclusion

The end of the Western Caroline operation found the United States in a favorable position for the conduct of future operations at an accelerated pace. The Japanese garrisons in the Carolines were surrounded, an air base linking the Central and Southwest Pacific lines of advance had been secured together with the advanced fleet anchorage essential to the coming assault on the Philippines and the move north to Japan. Considerable damage had been inflicted on the enemy by the fast carrier force at low cost and, as a result of these strikes, the significant decision to invade the Central Philippines had been made.

Busy refurbishing their damaged fleet, seeking to husband their strength for the coming decisive action, the Japanese had left Palau without sea or air support. But, although they could avoid battle, they could not prevent the continued deterioration of their position. While they planned for a fleet engagement under cover of shore-based air, the Philippine air garrison suffered staggering losses. While they struggled to bolster their line of defense, their capabilities were weakened by great losses in shipping. At the end of September it was obvious that the crisis was at hand and that decision could no longer be delayed.

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2. Monthly Report of Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, August and September 1944—CinC United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

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3. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Interrogations of:

	<i>Nav No.</i>	<i>U. S. S. B. S. No.</i>
Capt. K. Tamura, I. J. N. (Allied Offensive Mining Campaign)	5	34
Capt. M. Fuchida, I. J. N. (Pearl Harbor, Philippine Sea, Leyte Gulf)	39	113
Col. M. Matsumae, I. J. A. (Japanese Army Air Force in the Philippine Campaign)		249
Vice Admiral S. Miwa, I. J. N. (Japanese Submarine Warfare)	72	366
Vice Admiral S. Fukodome, I. J. N. (The Naval War in the Pacific)	115	503

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United States Forces


Western Pacific Task Forces	Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr.
Joint Expeditionary Force	Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson.
Western Expeditionary Force	Rear Admiral G. H. Fort.
Peleliu Attack Group	Rear Admiral G. H. Fort.
First Marine Division Reinforced (28,400 men) ..	Maj. Gen. W. M. Rupertus, U. S. M. C.
Angaur Attack Group	Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy.
81st Infantry Division less 323d Infantry (19,600 men) ...	Maj. Gen. P. J. Mueller, U. S. A.
Mine Sweeping Group	Comdr. W. R. Loud.
6 high speed mine sweepers,	
2 high speed mine layers,	
6 large mine sweepers,	
9 motor mine sweepers.	
Fire Support Group	Rear Admiral J. B. Oldendorf.
5 old battleships,	
4 heavy cruisers,	
4 light cruisers,	
14 destroyers.	
Escort Carrier Group	Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstie.
12 escort carriers,	
13 destroyers.	
Covering Forces	Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr.
Fast Carrier Force	Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher.
8 carriers,	
8 light carriers,	
7 battleships,	
4 heavy cruisers,	
7 light cruisers,	
3 antiaircraft cruisers,	
60 destroyers.	
Antisubmarine Group	Capt. T. V. Saunders.
1 escort carrier,	
4 destroyer-escorts.	
Replenishment Group	Capt. J. T. Acuff.
7 escort carriers,	
24 fleet oilers,	
7 destroyers,	
15 destroyer-escorts.	

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Japanese Garrison Strength and Disposition

Peleliu-Ngesebus	10,500
Angaur	1,500
Babelthuap and other	26,000
Total	38,000
Army combatant troops	19,000
Navy combatant troops	5,000
Construction personnel	14,000
Total	38,000

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XII

The Philippine Campaign

Introduction

The steady advance of United States Forces across the Pacific had brought Japan, by early fall of 1944, to a position of grave peril. Kept continually off balance by the timing and sequence of United States blows, dangerously weakened by attrition in important categories of weapons, the Japanese had been unable to back up their defensive perimeter with the planned fleet action and had been steadily forced back without being able to offer more than local resistance. Already the shipping losses inflicted by United States submarines and latterly by the carrier and shore-based air strikes were afflicting their economy and their military machine with a creeping paralysis as the ties binding their homeland with the vital Southern Resources Area became steadily more tenuous. The loss of the Marianas had been recognized by those in responsible position as a mortal blow, and any further advance to the westward would clearly end all hope for success or even prolonged resistance. Despite the continuous attacks of United States submarines and air attacks, including aerial mining by China-based Army aircraft, a trickle of commerce still flowed behind the Philippine-Formosa-Ryukyu Island screen, but this would last only as long as the screen remained unpierced. The war had reached the point where a further defeat meant to the Japanese Empire no longer incidental losses but loss of life itself.

Japanese Situation and Plans

The fleet available to the enemy in his desperate and crucial strait while still strong was unbalanced. An extreme shortage of escort vessels greatly handicapped the operations of his shrunken merchant marine. His great strength in heavy surface forces, unexploited since Guadalcanal, was offset and reduced in value by his weakness in destroyers and especially in aircraft carriers and carrier pilots. Furthermore, the training of these pilots and the operations of the fleet as a whole were increasingly restricted by lack of fuel. A consequence of these shortages was the enforced division of the Japanese Fleet—its inability to base where desired, the carriers held in the Empire while awaiting new pilots and replacement aircraft, the heavy ships forced to base at Lingga where fuel was available. Thus neither the preferred base, the Inland Sea, nor the possible base, the southern area, could support the united fleet. Reunion of the two parts was hoped for and every effort was made, but so difficult was the pilot problem that a rendezvous at Lingga was not anticipated before the middle of November. In the meantime a number of tankers were transferred from Army and civilian control to the Navy, and by bending every effort it was possible to accumulate enough fuel in the Empire to permit the carrier force to make one final sortie east of the Philippines.

The pilot weakness which thus immobilized the carrier fleet at this critical time also affected though to a lesser degree the Army and Navy land-based air forces. The inadequate training program, further restricted as it was by shortage of fuel, forced upon the Japanese a continuing choice between quantity and quality, a dilemma repeatedly resolved by American pressure in favor of the former alternative. Only in administrative matters was improvement possible: in consequence of the approaching crisis the summer of 1944 saw for the first time Army air units subordinated to Naval command in the Hainan-Formosa area and in Hokkaido with resultant better integration of operations.

In late summer the Japanese Navy was able to dispose against the United States advance some 200 land-based planes in the Philippines, another 500 in Formosa, the Nansei Shoto, and western Japan, and about 200 in the Tokyo area. The Army for its part had 250 in the Philippines and could draw for reserves on

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units in the south, in China, and in the Empire. The destruction inflicted on the Philippine air garrison by the carrier strikes of September clearly showed the Japanese the magnitude of the problem. So vital were reinforcements considered that a late September convoy from Japan carrying aircraft personnel and material to Manila was escorted by battleships; so great was their respect for United States carrier attacks that the convoy never entered Philippine waters, transshipping its cargo at Brunei Bay, 700 miles from destination. The problem was fully appreciated by the Japanese command, but although the Asiatic mainland, the southern regions, and the Empire were milked to reinforce their island chain, the results were uniformly too little and too late.

The Japanese Army, still strong in numbers, still undefeated in mass, faced again the dilemma of an Army in an island war, an Army lacking secure support by sea and air. Unable to be strong everywhere, how should they decide where to be strong? To defend the island chain reinforcements were brought from Manchuria; to defend the Philippines, Yamashita was recalled from semiexile; but numbers and skill without support could not warrant optimism. The Japanese in New Guinea could testify on this question.

The Japanese intent was simple: It was to hold the line right where it was by throwing all the Navy and as much Army and air strength as could be made available into a finish fight, a fight to repel United States forces wherever they might appear. It was a forlorn hope for even if it succeeded there was no plan for a second try, and while planes and troops might possibly be replaced, the fleet could not. "Since without the participation of our Combined Fleet," said Admiral Toyoda, "there was no possibility of the land-based forces in the Philippines having any chance against your forces at all, it was decided to send the whole fleet, taking the gamble. If things went well we might obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the worst should happen, there was a chance that we would lose the entire fleet; but I felt that that chance had to be taken . . . Should we lose in the Philippines operations, even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the loss of the Philippines."

In preparation for our moves, the Japanese, after the loss of the Marianas, developed the Sho plans, a series of alternatives with which to counter any American thrust against their protecting island chain. Of these plans, Sho No. 1 provided for the defense of the Philippines, Sho No. 2 for the Formosa-Nansei Shoto-Southern Kyushu area, Sho No. 3 for Kyushu-Shikoku-Honshu and Sho No. 4 for Hokkaido.

In all cases the general strategy was similar. While it was hoped to complete the training of carrier pilots and to reunite the carriers with the surface strength at Lingga before the United States struck, little faith was placed in this possibility. The weakness of the carrier force led therefore to a plan based on exploitation of the main gunnery strength of the fleet and of the land-based air forces. The battleships and cruisers of the Second Diversion Attack Force would approach from their southern base, fight their way to the beaches and destroy the invasion shipping. From the Inland Sea a decoy force, tentatively composed of the Second Diversion Attack Force and Carrier Division 4, would attempt to lure the United States carrier task force away from the scene of action. Shore-based air forces were to inflict maximum damage on raiding United States carrier forces whenever and wherever possible, but once invasion came they were to conserve their strength until D-day, the day of landings, when all assault shipping would be invitingly concentrated off the beaches and when attacks on the United States carriers would assist their advancing fleet. The whole plan revolved about the strong surface gunnery force and was designed to get it in to where it could do the greatest damage. Little thought was given to getting it out. The war had reached a point where the Japanese fleet, hopelessly outnumbered and, as imminent events would prove, even more hopelessly outclassed, could not risk the fleet action it had previously desired but was forced to expend itself in suicidal attack upon the United States transports.

As it was considered most probable that Sho No. 1, the defense of the Philippines, would be the operation actually called for, the Japanese Army concentrated its efforts on reinforcing that archipelago. Insecure at

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sea and in the air, they met the problem of how to be strong everywhere at once by the best possible compromise, strongly manning Luzon, and preparing a mobile counterlanding force to delay or if possible throw back our troops after we had committed ourselves to a specific objective. For this purpose, reminiscent of Guadalcanal, all available transports were transferred to local control and, as things turned out, were expended in the reinforcement of Leyte, according to plan. One thing the Japanese had learned—that in island warfare if the sea at your back and the skies overhead are not secure, the initial enemy landing is the crucial one.

United States Situation and Plans

In contrast to the Japanese, the United States, holding the initiative, was faced not with the necessity of being able to fight anywhere but with the choice of where to fight. Was it desirable to cut the Japanese Empire at its central point in the Philippines, or to cut it farther north, north and west of the Marianas, and concurrently advance on the homeland? The two lines of separate advance by Central and by Southwest Pacific forces had joined in September at Palau and Halmahera in the eastern approaches to the Philippines. The momentum of the advance, the logic of available forces, and the military necessity of controlling the Philippines dictated the decision.

Again in contrast to the Japanese was the United States military situation. While it is axiomatic that no commander ever has available the forces he desires, and while the extravagant fleet described in Japanese estimates of the situation had little basis in fact, there was enough, properly used, to do the job. September had answered the then critical question of carrier air versus a large and well dispersed shore-based force (though its striking power was by now seriously weakened): the mobility of the carrier task force permitting concentration of force had enabled the United States to outnumber the enemy at its chosen time and place as well as to outfight him anywhere. Air supremacy, the first and principal question, was assured.

The critical problem facing the United States was, as it had always been, the logistic one, the supply of great forces 6,000 miles from the source. Some idea of the immense amounts of necessary material may be gathered from an example: in the month of October alone the fleet received 4½ million barrels of fuel oil, oil which came largely from the Caribbean but some of which was brought all the way from the Persian Gulf. This supply problem was further complicated in this instance by the 1,000-mile October advance of base facilities from Eniwetok to Ulithi with its stretching effect on the pipeline, and by the sudden and unexpected advance in the date of the invasion.

As a consequence of the September operations, particularly the successful carrier strikes on the Philippines, and of information on the weakness of Japanese forces there, it was decided to omit planned operations against Talaud and Mindanao and to strike directly at the Visayas. In mid-September, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CinC Southwest Pacific Area to seize and develop bases and install forces in the Central Philippines, and directed CinC Pacific Ocean Areas to augment the forces of the Southwest Pacific and to furnish necessary fleet support. Pursuant to this directive the following Central Pacific forces were transferred to operational control of CinC Southwest Pacific:

- (a) The XXIV Corps totalling some 50,250 men.
- (b) Garrison forces totalling some 20,000 men.
- (c) The 77th Division, as area reserve.
- (d) Four transport groups with associated escorts and landing, control, and mine craft.
- (e) A fire support group of six old battleships, three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and escorts.
- (f) A support group of 18 escort carriers with their screens.
- (g) Miscellaneous service units.

Other Central Pacific forces, notably the submarines and the Fast Carrier Task Force, retained under Central Pacific command, were assigned to cover and support the invasion of the Leyte-Samar area. Thus in effect this great operation was initiated by Southwest Pacific forces using Central Pacific methods, methods made necessary by the fact that the beaches were 500 miles from the nearest United States airfields.

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Yet in one sense the aims of the two United States forces in this campaign were somewhat different. For General MacArthur's forces reoccupation of the Philippines marked the completion of the Southwest Pacific theatre's immediately assigned mission, the successful return which would also bisect the Japanese Empire. Forces in that theatre would then be available for whatever the situation might later demand. For the Central Pacific forces involved the Philippines were just a step on another road which was to lead to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Consequently the tasks assigned the fast carriers looked further ahead—they were to gain air supremacy over the Philippines and protect the landings and in addition, as at Palau, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan, to apply maximum attrition by all possible means in all areas; finally, should opportunity for destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet offer, such destruction would become their primary task.

Preliminary Raids

The Philippines campaign opened with resumption of the highly successful carrier strikes of September, this time farther north. On 10 October Task Force 38 struck Okinawa and the enemy alerted his forces for Sho No. 2, and shortly thereafter also for Sho No. 1. On the next day the carriers struck Luzon, and then from 12–16 October the greatest battle of the war to date between ship and shore-based air was fought as the carriers sent repeated heavy strikes against Formosa. In this battle the Japanese sent over 600 aircraft against the United States Fleet as it stood and fought, but succeeded in seriously damaging only two cruisers; against this the Japanese losses in the air and on the ground amounted to some 650 planes. United States losses, both combat and operational, totalled 76 planes. These disproportionate losses are indicative of the decline in Japanese air capabilities after three years of war. Additional damage was inflicted on Formosan installations by carrier plane attacks on shops, hangars and factories, and by China-based B-29's which struck Takao depots in support of the fleet.

This succession of devastating strikes commencing 10 October provoked the most violent Japanese air reaction thus far experienced. In no previous operation had reinforcements been rushed to a threatened area on such a lavish scale; the efforts made here to strengthen their garrisons and to crush the United States Fleet indicated the Japanese intention of expending their maximum available air strength to repel any intrusion into their inner zone. Although the damage inflicted on the United States force was small, early exaggerated claims by Japanese pilots led to the decision of the high command to order out the Second Diversion Attack Force in pursuit of American cripples and, even more important, to commit the almost-trained air groups of Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 in the hope of striking a crushing blow. Over half of these aircraft were in fact moved to Formosa. The consequences of this further weakening of the Japanese carrier striking force were not long to be awaited.

The importance of Japan's losses in land-based planes to our carrier forces in September and early October is difficult to overestimate, and their cumulative impact on enemy air striking power was decisive. Far smaller losses broke the Luftwaffe in the decisive battle of the war: then the greatest single day's loss was only 178 planes, and German losses over the two months of the Battle of Britain roughly equalled those suffered by the Japanese in October 1944 alone. In retrospect the responsible Japanese commanders with one voice blamed the loss of the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the consequent loss of the Philippines on their weakness in land-based air, which was initiated by the United States carrier strikes. October saw the end of the Japanese air forces in the conventional sense; what had once been a formidable weapon was transformed perforce into a sacrificial army of guided missiles.

Battle For Leyte Gulf

At 0800 on 17 October an advance party of Rangers began landing on the islets in the mouth of Leyte Gulf to secure the entry, and nine minutes later the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet

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alerted his forces for Sho No. 1, the defense of the Philippines. The First Diversion Attack Force, comprising the main battleship and cruiser strength of the Japanese Navy was ordered to advance from the Singapore Area to Brunei Bay in northwest Borneo, and the submarine force was ordered to the Leyte area. On the 18th, with certainty made doubly sure both by report of gathering United States forces in the Gulf and by interception of voice radio messages concerning our point of landing, Sho No. 1 was fully activated. The Second Diversion Attack Force, which had retired to Amami-O-Shima after its abortive sortie during the Formosa Battle, was ordered south to the Pescadores. Now the consequences of the Formosa battle came to the fore: With the crisis at hand, with the readiness date of the carrier forces indefinitely postponed, and with the Second Diversion Attack Force absent from home waters, the weakened carriers for lack of better employment were incorporated into the decoy force. Thus on the 20th, as United States forces went ashore on Leyte against light opposition, Japan's remaining carrier air strength, the so-called "Main Body" of the Japanese Fleet—four carriers with partial air groups, two battleship-carrier hermaphrodites without planes, three light cruisers and ten destroyers—left the Inland Sea and headed south on its final mission of lure and sacrifice. It had been hoped to execute the attack on the 22d but logistic problems, the provision of fuel for the Second Diversion Attack Force and the loading of aircraft on the carriers of the Main Body, forced a series of delays; on the 21st however CinC Combined Fleet designated the 25th as X-day. By this time all forces involved in this desperate enterprise were underway, and from the far corners of the shrinking Empire, the whole combatant strength of the Japanese Navy converged on Leyte Gulf. On this same day the commanding general of the Japanese Army Air garrison in the Philippines requested an impossible immediate reinforcement of 800 planes.

The First Diversion Attack Force from the south reached Brunei on the 20th, fueled, split into two parts, and departed on the 22d. The main strength headed northeast along the western coast of Palawan before turning eastward through Central Philippine waters to San Bernardino Strait, while a smaller group of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers sailed eastward through the Sulu Sea to force the southern entrance of Leyte Gulf. The Second Diversion Attack Force, leaving the Pescadores on the 21st, came southward past western Luzon, and after replenishing in the Calamian Islands, came south again to follow and support this southern force. The Main Body, which had sortied from Bungo Passage on the afternoon of the 20th, sailed south until evening of the 22d when it turned southwest, shaping a course for Luzon. From the Formosa area all available submarines were ordered south to concentrate off the eastern approaches to the Philippines, and also from Formosa the Navy's Second Air Fleet, now at an operational strength of some 450 aircraft, was ordered on the 23d to Luzon. Within the narrow waters of the Philippines, motor vessels, sailing craft, and naval transports scurried to Leyte from Mindanao, from Cebu, and from Panay with reinforcements for the Japanese garrison. United States forces, for their part, were continuing the normal routine of an amphibious operation, the troops advancing ashore under cover of naval bombardment and air support, beachhead forces laboring to unload vast stores and ponderous tackle, aircraft from the fast carriers striking deep into the Visayas and north to Luzon to beat down the enemy's air strength, and the escort carrier squadrons supporting the ground forces and duelling for air supremacy over the Gulf.

First reports of the approaching Japanese fleets came from United States submarine sightings off Borneo, Palawan, and Manila, and first blood was drawn when the submarines sank two heavy cruisers of the First Diversion Attack Force and damaged another on the morning of the 23d. On the 24th, following receipt of these reports, the three groups of fast carriers which were operating on a broad front north and east of Samar sent strong searches west and southwest to maximum range. These search groups sighted the powerful Center Force south of Mindoro, and sighted and attacked the southern group off Negros, inflicting slight damage on a battleship and destroyer. Due to the great disparity in reported strength of these forces, the three carrier groups were concentrated off San Bernardino Strait from which location they struck repeatedly at the Center Force, the smaller Southern Group being left to the battleships inside the Gulf. In these strikes the giant

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battleship *Musashi* was sunk, one heavy cruiser crippled, minor damage inflicted on other battleships, and the Japanese forced temporarily to reverse course to the westward.

As these Japanese forces threaded their way eastward through the Philippines, their reinforced Base Air Force, attempting to aid their advance, attacked with over 200 planes, concentrating on the northernmost United States carrier group, which was also subjected to a strike of some 70 aircraft from the yet undetected Main Body now some 100 miles east of Luzon. The preponderance of carrier types in these attacks, together with the direction from which some of them approached and the absence of any reports of carriers with the already sighted enemy forces, led to a search being made to north and east which, late in the afternoon, sighted and reported the Japanese Main Body.

As the impotence of this new force, left as it was with less than thirty planes aboard, could not be known, and as it appeared that the Japanese Center Force had been seriously damaged, the fast carriers with their attendant battleships were withdrawn from San Bernardino Strait and ran north through the night in order to destroy this threat of air attack at dawn. In the Gulf, the support group of old battleships and cruisers moved to the southern entrance and awaited the arrival of the enemy battleships. On shore, MacArthur's troops pulled in their lines, consolidated their positions, and awaited the outcome of this battle in which they were the pawns. Turning again to the eastward, the enemy Center Force at midnight passed unmolested through San Bernardino Strait into the Philippine Sea and turned south toward Leyte Gulf. The lure had worked.

In the early hours of the morning, the Japanese Southern Force steamed into Surigao Straits and was destroyed: of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers, only the cruiser and one destroyer escaped from the Strait and the cruiser, crippled, was sunk by carrier air the next morning. The Second Diversion Attack Force, following in support a half hour later, suffered a light cruiser crippled by torpedo boats, delivered an abortive attack in which the flagship was damaged by collision, and retired without having engaged. At dawn far to the north our carrier task force fell upon the Japanese Main Body and, sinking all four carriers, wrote an end to the Japanese carrier air force.

Continuing toward Leyte, the Japanese Center Force, for which so much had been sacrificed, encountered off Samar a group of six escort carriers with three destroyers and four destroyer-escorts, engaged in support of troops. Here in unequal combat, in exchange for sinking one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer-escort, the Japanese lost three heavy cruisers to aircraft from these and other escort carriers, another crippled by destroyer torpedo, and suffered priceless damage in confusion and delay.

Weakened by his losses, lacking air support, utterly without intelligence of events beyond his field of vision, the Japanese commander could only lash out blindly in whatever direction seemed to promise the best hope of inflicting damage on United States forces. Realizing that his approach had long been known to his enemies, he feared that his chief objective, the soft invasion shipping, had escaped from Leyte Gulf; scattered interception of United States voice radio messages led him to believe that Leyte airfields were operational and were readying strikes against him, and that the United States Seventh Fleet was concentrating for the attack; the destruction of the Southern Force in Surigao Strait and the delays he himself had suffered had ended all hope of profiting from the planned coordination of his forces. Fearing a trap, preferring to accept air attack in the open sea rather than in the narrow confines of Leyte Gulf, and feeling that a United States force falsely reported off northern Samar offered the most profitable target, he turned his ships about and ran northward. In the afternoon, having failed to discover this new enemy and faced with a critical fuel situation in his destroyers, he retired. The naval threat to the United States landing was over.

Throughout the 25th and 26th United States Army and carrier aircraft struck at the retreating enemy with good results: Army planes sank the crippled light cruiser from the Second Diversion Attack Force, and carrier planes sank the other southern cripple, a light cruiser and a destroyer in the Center Force, and a cruiser, a destroyer, and two transports which had been reinforcing the Japanese garrison on Leyte. By

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nightfall of the 26th Japanese combatant ship losses totalled one large and three light carriers, three battleships, six heavy and four light cruisers, nine destroyers and a submarine, and their Navy, as a navy, had ceased to exist.

Not only did these losses write an end to the career of the Japanese Fleet as a fighting unit, but they produced a confusion and disorganization which made the surviving enemy units easy and frequent prey to United States carrier aircraft strikes and to United States submarines. Of the destroyers which took part in and survived the great battle, 10 were immediately committed to the reinforcement of Leyte, of which 4 were sunk by a carrier strike on 11 November, and 3 to another only 2 days later. This latter strike also caught two heavy cruisers, crippled survivors of the battle, and sank them in Manila Bay. By the end of the campaign, additional piecemeal losses had cost the Japanese 1 battleship, 2 large aircraft carriers and 1 escort carrier, 4 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 10 submarines. Thus the number of combatant vessels lost by the Japanese in the defense of the Philippines totalled 68; these ships, less 4 submarines whose cause of loss is not known, were sunk as follows: by carrier aircraft 31 with 4 assists, by surface vessels 14 with 4 assists, by submarines 13 with 1 assist, and by shore-based aircraft one with 1 assist.

The role played by the Japanese Air Force in the Battle for Leyte Gulf deserves some comment as indicative of the state to which this once effective arm had fallen due to cumulative losses, insufficient training, and blockade. As a consequence of their repeatedly demonstrated ineffectiveness against our superiority in planes, pilots, and techniques of fighter direction, and of their heavy losses to the overwhelming carrier strikes on the Philippine-Formosa-Nansei Shoto chain, the bizarre Kamikaze tactic, which had been under consideration since the June Battle of the Philippine Sea, became standard procedure. Forced to it by loss of pilots and by inferior training, and inspired by the suicidal venture of their fleet and by the crash, reputedly into a carrier but actually into the water by Admiral Arima on the 15th, the first organized suicide attack was made during the Battle off Samar. With this attack, the Japanese may be said to have abandoned the air war; from this time on they made little attempt at reviving their air force. Macabre, effective, supremely practical under the circumstances, supported and stimulated by a powerful propaganda campaign, the special attack became virtually the sole method used in opposing the United States striking and amphibious forces, and these ships the sole objectives.

Leyte and Ormoc

Battle damage and aircraft losses incurred in the Battle off Samar had forced one of the three United States escort carrier groups to retire, and a second group was badly hurt by suicide attacks. This reduction in air strength at the objective area made it necessary to call in the fast carriers and urgently desirable that shore-based fighters be established as rapidly as possible. For the remainder of the month the fast carriers flew fighter sweeps over the Visayas and Luzon, and on the 27th, with only one airfield in operation, the Far Eastern Air Forces assumed responsibility for air defense and support of troops in the Leyte-Samar area. At the same time CinC Southwest Pacific directed that no aircraft of either the Third or Seventh Fleets should attack land targets without specific permission. On the 29th the remaining escort carriers were withdrawn to replenish.

Air defense at Leyte was weak, however, due to slow development of airfields and to radar difficulties in the hilly terrain, and for a considerable time United States supporting units in the Gulf were left exposed to increasing threat of suicide attack. It was decided as best strategy that the fast carriers retire to prepare for a planned mid-November strike on Japan, and on the 29th the escort carriers were withdrawn to rearm and replenish. The Japanese, for their part, were making the most strenuous efforts at building up their Philippine air strength, and on 1 November sent down a strong suicide attack which sank one destroyer and damaged three others in Leyte Gulf. As the air situation thus seemed to be deteriorating rather than improving, CinC Southwest Pacific requested further assistance from Third Fleet forces.

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The planned attack on the Empire was therefore abandoned and throughout November the fast carriers struck at Japanese aircraft and shipping in the central Philippines and in Luzon.

The idea of a mobile counterlanding force to reinforce the invaded area, had been an integral part of the Japanese Sho plan. This part of the operation had been begun contemporaneously with the sortie of their fleets, and on 26 October in the closing stages of the battle, United States carrier aircraft caught a cruiser, a destroyer, and three naval transports which had just unloaded at Ormoc and sank all but one transport. The reinforcement operation, known as the Ta operation, was continued in determined fashion and, profiting by the local weakness of United States land-based air, substantial reinforcements were landed in nine echelons between 23 October and 11 December. Although the greater part of the embarked troops were landed, to a total of some 30,000 continual harassment of these convoys by Army and Marine garrison aircraft in increasing strength plus occasional carrier strikes prevented the unloading of any considerable amount of material and inflicted serious shipping losses. In exchange for these 30,000 troops and something over 10,000 tons of material landed, the Japanese lost 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 1 mine sweeper, 5 patrol craft, 5 naval transports, and 5 cargo ships. Of these, Army and Marine shore-based aircraft destroyed 11 cargo ships and 4 patrol craft, naval surface forces sank 2 destroyers and 2 patrol craft, shore batteries sank 1 transport, and carrier aircraft destroyed the remaining 15 ships.

Throughout November the fast carriers struck at Luzon cutting at the increasing flow of Japanese aircraft reinforcements coming down from Formosa and at shipping, destroying over 700 aircraft and 134,000 tons of ships. In increasing strength the Army and Marines air-based on Leyte ranged over the airfields of the Visayas and Mindanao. Pressing their remaining aircraft carriers into service as transports, and sending a steady stream of replacements south by the Nansei Shoto-Formosa chain, the Japanese with greatest effort managed to match these losses and even to increase their air strength over the month of November, but it was a losing battle. By the end of the month, responsible Japanese commanders in the Philippines had conceded the loss of the air and were requesting impossible quotas of aircraft reinforcements from the homeland. On Leyte the Japanese continued their stubborn resistance aided by heavy rainfall which hindered the progress of United States mechanized equipment, even briefly attempting the offensive with abortive paratroop raids on United States airfields on 26 November and 6 December.

On 7 December, however, Seventh Fleet forces covered by Leyte-based Fifth Air Force planes executed a flanking landing on the west coast of Leyte despite determined and effective attacks by suicide aircraft. This landing operation, staged through the Camotes Sea, was in significant contrast to the Japanese inability to reinforce their Leyte troops; command of the inner air and waters of the Visayas, while still contested, was shifting to the United States side; American forces ashore numbered over 240,000 and the end of the Leyte Campaign was only a matter of time.

Mindoro

By early December, United States shore-based air held a precarious control of the Central Philippines. To advance this cover, in anticipation of our projected landing in Lingayen Gulf, it was planned to seize the lightly held island of Mindoro and develop airfields in the neighborhood of San Jose. As the operating limitations of land-based air from Leyte fields would probably preclude effective support by land-based air, it was decided to send the Seventh Fleet escort carriers into Sulu Sea to support the landings while the fast carriers blanketed the Luzon fields from the east. Although the Japanese had early radio intelligence of the approach of the attack force, and sighted its movement into Visayan waters on the 13th, they anticipated the landing not at Mindoro but on Palawan, fearing the threat of shore-based air to their China Sea lifeline more than a further advance in the Philippines. On this reasoning, the Japanese attacked on the 13th with upwards of 150 planes, and ordered out from Indo-China ports the remnants of their Second Diversion Attack Force. Suicide attacks on this day seriously damaged a cruiser and a destroyer, but the effectiveness

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of the fast carrier patrols over Luzon and the escort carrier defense of the objective area, limited enemy successes during the critical landing phase to the sinking of two LST's in exchange for the expenditure of some 100 suicide aircraft. The Second Diversion Attack Force retired without approaching the area, presumably due to United States carrier and battleship strength in the Sulu Sea. No opposition was encountered ashore, and, with a perimeter established, construction of airfields was at once begun.

Ten days later occurred the last Japanese naval interference with United States operations when two cruisers and six destroyers of the Second Diversion Attack Force, emboldened by the withdrawal of the United States heavy units, made a high speed run in from the westward and conducted a brief night bombardment of the beachhead.

Sighted in their approach late in the afternoon, the Japanese force was attacked by planes of the newly installed Mindoro air garrison which sank one destroyer and damaged other ships at a cost of 21 aircraft. Completing its bombardment at midnight, the Second Diversion Attack Force retired westward at high speed, never to reappear.

Lingayen Gulf

The war's final operation of consequence in the Southwest Pacific was the invasion of Lingayen Gulf. Originally scheduled for 20 December, this operation was postponed until 9 January consequent to the delays in the establishment of shore-based air strength in Leyte and Mindoro. The object of this operation was the prompt seizure of the Central Luzon plain and the Manila area, the destruction of the principal defense forces, and the denial to the enemy of the northern entrance to the South China Sea. The general plan was similar to those of the Leyte and Mindoro operations: the reinforced Seventh Fleet was to transport, protect and land the attack forces by a route passing through the inland waters of the Philippines and west of Luzon; air support was to be provided in the objective area by the escort carriers while the Army Air Forces neutralized Japanese air to the southward and the fast carriers struck at Formosa, the Ryukyus, and Luzon prior to the landings, and afterwards operated in strategic support.

On 20 December all organized resistance on Leyte ceased. During the preceding 3 weeks Army bombers had struck at Legaspi in strength and Army planes in small numbers had ranged over all of Luzon. On 22 December the heavy bombers began a series of strikes on the great complex of airfields in the Manila-Clark area forcing the disorganized Japanese to still further dispersion of their few remaining aircraft. Early violent fighter reaction to these strikes soon ceased, the remaining operational Japanese aircraft being either so widely dispersed as to be unavailable on short notice, or else being held in reserve for suicide attacks against the most dangerous enemy, the expected approaching fleet. Further evidence of this reluctance of the Japanese air forces to engage any but this most profitable objective may be seen in the large score of locomotives, trucks, and such miscellaneous items destroyed by the Army Air Force for want of better targets.

On 3 January as the mine sweeping, bombardment, and escort carrier groups began their northward advance through the Sulu Sea, the fast carriers commenced two days of strikes against Formosa and the Ryukyus in which, despite comparative lack of opposition in the air and extensive Japanese efforts at dispersal and camouflage, over 100 aircraft were destroyed, the majority on the ground. Designed to prevent reinforcement of Japanese air strength in Luzon, a reinforcement which in fact was probably no longer intended, this effort reduced the Formosa-based air strength available for attacks on United States forces in Lingayen Gulf. On the 4th, however, the hoarded remnants of the Philippine air garrison began suicide attacks on the advancing ships, sinking one escort carrier. On the 5th these attacks increased in intensity, causing extensive damage to another escort carrier, two cruisers, and a destroyer. As it became apparent that the land-based air forces could not keep all Luzon fields neutralized, and as the escort carriers were fully occupied at the objective area, CinC Southwest Pacific requested that the fast carriers strike south of

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their originally designated area so as to cover the Clark Field complex. This was done, and on 6-7 January repeated strikes destroyed over 100 enemy planes. This blow, combined with the continuing land-based sweeps and the efforts of escort carrier planes reduced the estimated enemy sorties from some 130 aircraft on the 6th to less than half that number on the 7th and to purely token efforts thereafter.

The best efforts of these three forces, however, were unable to eliminate at once every flyable Japanese plane, and since every such plane, less a handful reserved for the evacuation of staff officers, was by now designated for a suicide mission, United States attack forces were exposed to serious danger. Although orders had been issued by the Japanese to concentrate their special attacks on the transports, these orders were not well followed out, and the combatant ships in Lingayen Gulf, their radars hindered by surrounding land, received the heaviest damage. On 6 January, 16 ships were hit, 10 of them suffering serious damage, and the situation appeared so serious that the fast carriers, which had planned to attack Formosa on the 7th, were retained to continue striking Luzon. Suiciders continued to appear in two's and three's for a week or more, but the battle in the Gulf, weird as it was and impressive as a testimony to the effectiveness of this form of attack, marked the end of the Japanese air forces in the Philippines. On 8 January the Naval Air Commander left for Singapore and his staff for Formosa, while the Commanding General of the 4th Air Army retired without his army to the hills of Luzon.

Painful and extensive as was the damage suffered by the fleet during the mass suicide attacks of early January, it is incidental to any judgment regarding the employment of United States air power in this operation, a judgment which is properly based on the course of the invasion itself. The submarine blockade, four months of carrier strikes overwhelming the Japanese air garrisons and destroying their merchant shipping, the destruction of their fleet in the great battle of October, and the attrition of their surviving air, of their transport, and other installations by the Army Air Force, made possible the invasion of Luzon under militarily ideal circumstances. Unopposed on the beaches, our troops went ashore to fight a campaign at their leisure against an enemy disorganized and demoralized, badly equipped and badly supplied, isolated beyond hope of remedy; a campaign in which every aircraft in the sky was friendly.

And yet these very factors which made the campaign so attractive made it in a sense anticlimatic. The true military harvest from this operation was not the reconquest of Luzon, it was the control of the South China Sea and the opportunity to commence the direct assault on Japan. This first harvest was reaped between 10 and 19 January when the fast carrier force, accompanied by a group of fast oilers, ran the Straits between Luzon and Formosa and swept as far south as Camranh Bay and as far west as Hongkong, sinking 47 ships including seven large tankers for a total of 150,000 tons. Japan had indeed lost her empire.

On 17 January, with the completion of the Lingayen airstrip, the Army Air Forces took over responsibility for the support of the Luzon Operations and the escort carriers retired. Returning from the China coast strikes, the fast carriers struck twice at Formosa on 15-16 and on 21 January with only slight opposition. Subsequent to this latter date, operations moved northward in preparation for the Iwo Jima and Okinawa invasions.

Conclusion

In June the loss of the Marianas had struck terror into the hearts of responsible Japanese authorities and had convinced many that the war was lost. By January 1945 Japan was in fact a defeated nation. The Philippines had been lost, true, but much more important was what had been lost with them. The Southern Resources Area, the prize for which the war had been fought, was gone and American fleets sailed with impunity to the shores of eastern Asia. All hope of future resistance had depended upon oil and now the tankers were sunk and the oil cut off. The surface fleet was gone, and so were 7,000 aircraft, expended in four months defense of the last supply line. Suicide attack, bleeding tactics, were now the last best hope of this shrunken empire and even these economical methods of defense suffered from the blockade: pilot training

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was cut again to a bare 100 hours and in the Inland Sea the surviving ships of the Imperial Navy could barely muster enough oil for a last planned one-way trip.

At home the bad news began to be known and mutterings of negotiated conditional peace arose even in the armed forces. Japan was defeated: it remained only necessary to persuade her of the fact.

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Imperial Headquarters Directive 431, 21 July 1944, General Policy for Urgent Operations

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Shimada.

To: Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, Toyoda.

1. The general policy for urgent operations to be followed by Combined Fleet has been established as outlined in supplement.
2. Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will act in accordance with the above mentioned operational policy and execute forthcoming operations.

Supplement to Directive No. 431

General policy for urgent operations to be followed by Combined Fleet.

First—Operational policy:

1. Make utmost effort to maintain and make advantageous use of the strategic status quo; plan to smash the enemy's strength; take the initiative in creating favorable tactical opportunities, or seize the opportunity as it presents itself to crush the enemy fleet and attacking forces.
2. Cooperate in close conjunction with the Army, maintain the security of sectors vital to national defense and prepare for future eventualities.
3. Cooperate closely with related forces to maintain security of surface routes between Japan and vital Southern sources of materials.

Second:

1. Various types of operations:

(a) Operations by base air forces:

Main base air force strength to be stationed in the homeland (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu), Nansai Shoto, Taiwan, and Philippines, and part strength in Kuriles, vital Southern sectors and Central Pacific, with the object of attacking and destroying the enemy fleet and advancing forces.

(b) Mobile forces and majority of other surface forces will station their operational strength in the Southwestern Area and, in accordance with orders, will be moved up to the Philippines or temporarily to Nansai Shoto. A part is to be stationed in the homeland area and will engage in mobile tactics as expedient, plus coordinating actions with base air forces to crush the enemy fleet and advancing forces.

(c) Submarine force operations:

To carry out interception tactics in force or surprise attacks as the opportunity presents itself.

A part will be assigned for reconnaissance of the enemy situation, to cut off the enemy's supply lines in the rear, and to transport supplies to our forward bases.

(d) Surprise attack operations:

(1) Attention will be given to surprise attack operations, particularly against the enemy fleet at its advance bases.

(2) Effort will be made to put various types of surprise attacks into execution, employing submarines, airplanes and other types of surprise attack weapons.

(3) Emphasis is to be placed on concentrating and stationing local surprise-attack elements so as to smash the enemy fleet or advancing forces while they are on the high seas.

(e) Protection of surface lanes of communication and antisubmarine warfare:

Important strategic points are to be protected and maintained in order to preserve safety of surface communication between Japan and Southern resources. Simultaneously, forces concerned are to maintain close cooperation in nullifying attacks by enemy task forces, air-raids from enemy bases, and activities of enemy submarines.

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2. Operations in various areas:

(a) Homeland (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu) Nansei Shoto, Taiwan and Philippines area.

(Applicable to Ogasawara sector):

To cooperate with Army and related forces, giving priority to strengthening defenses and taking all measures to expedite establishment of conditions to cope with decisive battle. In event of enemy attack, summon all strength which can be concentrated, and hold vital sectors, in general intercepting and destroying the enemy within the operational sphere of planes of our base air force.

(b) Northeast area:

To cooperate with the Army in strengthening combat preparations. As a general rule annihilate the enemy by means of Northeast Area forces locally available, thus holding vital points. To accomplish this:

(1) Assume "vertical-depth" disposition and carry out strong and decisive tactics. At the same time be prepared to cope with aggressive landing tactics on the part of the enemy.

(2) If feasible, carry out a thorough progress of surprise attacks on enemy advance bases in an attempt to break his will to advance.

(c) Central Pacific area:

(1) Make practical use of air-bases as expedient for surprise attacks, render the enemy's bases useless and crush the enemy's fighting strength.

(2) Keep up an offensive against the enemy in the Marianas, using for the most part planes from Ogasawara and Palau areas. Also, should the enemy attack, he is, as a general rule, to be smashed and his advance halted by means of Central Pacific Area forces locally available.

(d) Southeastern Area:

(1) Maintain closest cooperation with the Army and give utmost attention to defense. Make certain airfields available for the most advantageous use, and insure the security of vital sectors.

(e) Southwestern Area:

(1) Maintain security of resources areas and hold vital sectors necessary to their defense. Place emphasis on protection for fleet anchorages. Cooperate closely with the Army to build up personnel and material fighting strength locally, and maintain a self-sufficient status.

(2) In case the enemy attacks, concentrate all possible local strength with the object of crushing the enemy and holding vital sectors.

(3) Assign some submarines or, if the circumstances require, surface vessels to operate along the Indian Ocean coast and west coast of Australia with the objects of obtaining intelligence on the enemy and cutting off his lines of supply.

(4) Give assistance to German submarines in their antishipping campaign in the Indian Ocean.

Appendix 87

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Excerpts from Imperial Headquarters Directive 435, 26 July 1944,

Designation of Urgent Operations as "Sho" Operations

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, Shimada.

To: Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, Toyoda.

1. Decisive action in the Homeland (interpreted as Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and, dependent on circumstances, Ogasawara sector) Nansei Shoto, Taiwan and Philippines area as based on supplement to Imperial Headquarters Directive 431 titled "General Policy or Urgent Operations to be followed by Combined Fleet" is hereafter to be known as "Sho" Operations."

<i>Subdivisions:</i>	<i>Anticipated area</i>
Sho No. 1	Philippines.
Sho No. 2	South Kyushu, Nansei Shoto and Taiwan.
Sho No. 3	Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and possibly Ogasawara.
Sho No. 4	Hokkaido.

Areas for execution of Sho Operations will be designated by Imperial Headquarters.

Appendix 88

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Excerpts From Battle Summary of First Diversion Attack Force in Operation "Sho"

Disposition of Our Forces Prior to Activation of Operation

(1) *Shore-Based Air Forces*—Having previously seen through the enemy's plans of aggression we had been rushing our defense dispositions. When on 9 October enemy task force moves against the Ryukyus and Formosa became exceedingly likely, we assumed strict alerts against them. Operations "Sho-1" and "Sho-2" were activated for shore-based air forces on the 12th to counter the air attacks carried out by enemy task forces from the 10th. Our air forces carried out continuous attacks against the enemy until about the 17th during which time a dozen or more enemy carriers and many other of his ships were sunk or damaged. While gradually concentrating our air strength southward, the attacks against the task force were continued.

(2) *Surface Forces*—While the air forces carried out continuous attacks against the enemy task force, the surface forces were coordinating their actions in the following manner.

(a) Prior to issuance of operation "Sho-1" Alert.

First Diversion Attack Force concentrated at Lingga standing preparatory to activation of operation.

Second Diversion Attack Force sortied from Bungo Channel at 0700, 15 October and proceeded southward.

(b) At time of issuance of Alert for operation "Sho-1" (0809, 17 October).

First Diversion Attack Force had completed all preparations and was standing by to sortie.

Second Diversion Attack Force anchored at Amami Oshima and was scheduled to sortie from there on 18th after refueling.

(c) At time of activation of operation "Sho-1" (1730, 18 October).

First Diversion Attack Force was enroute to Brunei where it was scheduled to arrive at 1000, 20 October.

Second Diversion Attack Force had sortied from Amami Oshima and was enroute southward scheduled to arrive Bako on 20 October, and to sortie on 21st after refueling.

Main Body of Mobile Force was scheduled to sortie from Bungo Channel on 20 October and proceed southward.

(3) *Advance Expeditionary Force*—The submarines of this force were making preparations at Western Island Sea subsequent to the 14th and were scheduled to sortie from Bungo Channel subsequent to the evening of 19 October.

Plans—Plans for the "Sho" operations were outlined in Combined Fleet OpOrd No. 85, 1st Diversion Attack Force's OpOrds 1, 2, 3, and 4.

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Organization of First Diversionary Attack Force (1-YB)

Force	Commander	Composition	Duties
1st Group (1st Night Combat Unit).	CinC 2d Fleet	CruDiv 4 BatDiv 1 CruDiv 5 (less <i>Mogami</i>). DesRon 2 (less <i>Sbigure</i> , <i>Kiyoshimo</i>).	1. Destruction of enemy surface forces. 2. Destruction of enemy con- voys and landing forces.
2d Group (2d Night Combat Unit).	Comdr. BatDiv 3	BatDiv 3 CruDiv 7 10th Division (less DesDivs 61, 41, 4, plus <i>Nowake</i>). <i>Kiyoshimo</i>	Same as above.
3d Group (3d Night Combat Unit).	Comdr. BatDiv 2	BatDiv 2 <i>Mogami</i> DesDiv 4 (less <i>Nowake</i>) <i>Sbigure</i>	1. Destruction of enemy con- voys and landing forces. 2. Diverting enemy surface forces.
1st Supply Force.	Comdr. 11th Maritime Transportation Unit.	<i>Yubo Maru</i> <i>Hakko Maru</i> <i>Mimurosan Maru</i> <i>Itsukushima Maru</i> <i>Banci Maru</i> <i>Nipho Maru</i> <i>Chiburi</i> <i>Yurishima</i> Coast Defense Ship No. 19 Coast Defense Ship No. 27 (Mine Sweep No. 34)	Supplying (Location: Singapore- Brunei).
2d Supply Force.	Senior Commander	<i>Nichici Maru</i> <i>Ryori Maru</i> <i>Kurabashi</i> Coast Defense Ship No. 32	Supplying (Location: <i>Nichiki Maru</i> , Sama-Urucan. <i>Ryoei Maru</i> , Singapore-Bako.

Plan of Operation—The main strength of 1-YB would sortie from Brunei 0800, 22 October and pass through San Bernardino Straits at sundown on 24th. It would then engage the enemy in night action in waters to the east of Samar and after destroying same break into the Tacloban area at dawn on 25th. Enemy convoys would here be destroyed and his plans to land upset.

The 3d Group would coordinate its action with those of the main strength. It would sortie from Brunei at CinC's order and break through to Tacloban on the 25th via Surigao Straits.

Developments—16 October: Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 350 (SMS 161405), "1-YB will make immediate preparations to sortie."

Situation about the time this DesOpOrd was received:

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1. Prior to receiving messages:

The enemy task force appeared in the Ryukyu and waters to the east of Formosa on 10 October and carried out air raids against those areas. To counter this, the Shore-Based Air Force's phase of the operations "Sho-1" and "Sho-2" were activated. It became apparent that the enemy would attempt landings in the Philippines and for this reason training program for 1-YB which was in the Lingga area was abandoned as of 15 October. Entire attention was transferred to preparing for its sortie.

2. Subsequent to receiving order:

(a) 1-YB continued with its preparations.

(b) *Aoba* and *Nosbiro* cancelled their scheduled repairs in dry docks in Singapore area.

(c) Work of installation of radars on aircrafts of 1-YB at Singapore was called off.

(d) A portion of the tankers (*Yubo Maru* convoy) escorted by DesDiv 4 (*Michishio*, *Nowake*) were ordered to precede 1-YB to Brunei.

(e) DesDiv 2, which had temporarily been placed under the tactical command of CinC Southwest Area Fleet, was ordered to proceed to Brunei and stand-by.

17 October:

0855 In its DesOpOrd No. 351 (SMS 170835) Combined Fleet issues "alert" for operation "Sho-1".

1000 In its DesOpOrd No. 353 (SMS 170928) Combined Fleet orders 1-YB to proceed to Brunei as soon as possible.

18 October:

0100 1-YB leaves Lingga for Brunei.

1635 CruDiv 16 deleted from 1-YB and assigned to 2-YB in accordance with Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 359 (SMS 181101). At the same time 2-YB (CruDiv 21, CruDiv 16, DesRon 1) deleted from Mobile Force and assigned to Southwest Area Force. The 2-YB is then ordered to Manila as soon as possible after refueling at Takao.

1808 Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 360 (SMS 181732): "Activate Operation 'Sho-1'."

20 October:

1200 1-YB arrives at Brunei.

21 October:

1533 Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 363 (SMS 200813):

"1. The enemy, while employing a part of his strength in the Indian Ocean area to divert us, in directing his main force to carry out landings in the Central Philippines.

"2. It is the intention of the Combined Fleet to direct all of its power, cooperating with the Army, against the advancing enemy to destroy him.

"3. 1-YB will break through to the Tacloban area at dawn on the 25th (X-day) and after first destroying the enemy's surface forces, will cut down his landing forces.

"4. Coordinating its actions with those of 1-YB, the Mobile Force will maneuver in the seas to the east of Luzon for the purpose of luring the enemy to the north. At the same time utilize any opportunity to attack and destroy him.

"5. CinC Southwest Area Fleet will command all of the Naval air forces concentrated in the Philippine area, and in coordination with 1-YB's break-through, will carry out destructive attacks against the enemy's carrier and landing forces. At the same time, in cooperation with the Army, counterattacks will be carried out against the enemy's land forces.

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"6. The main strength of the 6th Base Air Force will be deployed so as to make possible the carrying out of an all-out attack against the task force on the 24th (Y-day). For this purpose, it will be placed under the tactical command of CinC Southwest Area Fleet.

"7. Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarine Force) will continue to act in accordance with previous orders.

"8. All other operation 'Sho' forces will continue with their present assignments unless subsequently specifically ordered otherwise."

21 October:

1200 CinC Combined Fleet sets 25th as X-day and 24th as Y-day.

1925 In accordance with Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 367, 1-YB is placed under direct command of CinC Combined Fleet.

2053 SMS 212053 from CinC 2d Fleet:

"1. Main Force of 1-YB (CruDiv 4, CruDiv 5, CruDiv 7, BatDiv 1, BatDiv 3, DesRon 2, 10th Division), to sortie from Brunei at 0800, 22d. Speed of advance, 16 knots; north Palawan course; south of Mindoro on 24th and thereafter, speed 20 to 24 knots. Arrive east entrance to San Bernardino at sundown of same day and at 0400, X-day, arrive vicinity of Suluan Island, from whence break through to anchorage.

"2. 3d Group (BatDiv 2, *Mogami*, and 4 destroyers) will depart Brunei during afternoon of 22d. It will arrive east entrance to Surigao Straits in the Mindanao Sea at about sundown on X-day-minus-one after crossing the Sulu Sea. In coordination with Main Force of 1-YB, will break through to anchorage at dawn on X-day."

22 October:

Main Force of 1-YB departs Brunei at 0805 and 3d Group at 1500.

Selection of Route From Brunei to San Bernardino

Roughly speaking there are three routes: via the east side of Palawan; via the west side of Palawan; and via Dangerous Grounds to Mindoro Straits. Of these, the route via the west side of Palawan was selected in spite of the fact that submarine hazards were the greatest on this route, because supply ships could not adequately be deployed on either of the other routes due to delays in deploying them; lack of spare time if the CinC Combined Fleet's general plans were to be adhered to; and because this route made possible the best defenses against enemy large type planes.

Advance Patrols and Antisub Direct Escort

With the transferring of Type 0 float reconnaissance planes of 1-YB to San Jose base, advance patrols and antisub direct escorts were carried out by land-based attack planes of Air Group 901.

Between 1431 and 1735 *Noshiro*, *Takao*, and *Atago* each reported sighting submarines but all turned out to be false alarms. During this time, the *Yamato* and *Musashi* each reported sighting mines.

At 1700 CinC 1-YB orders air reconnaissance for the following day.

23 October:

0530 Speed 18 knots on zig-zag course. (During night; speed 16 knots, straight course).

0634 *Atago* hit with torpedoes (4).

0634 *Takao* receives torpedo hits (2) and becomes inoperational.

0653 *Atago* sinks in position 9° 28' W. 117° 17' E.

0656 *Maya* receives torpedo hits (4).

0700 *Maya* sinks.

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Disposition of CruDiv 4 (less Chokai) after encounter with enemy subs

1. Estimating that the *Atago* could not be saved, crew was transferred to the *Kishinami* and at the same time, flagship of BatDiv 1 was ordered to assume radio guardship duties for the fleet. *Kishinami* and *Akishimo* were ordered to rescue survivors of the *Atago* while the *Shimakaze* was ordered to pick up the survivors of the *Maya*. *Naganami* and *Akishimo* were ordered to screen the *Takao*.

2. Since the 3 ships of CruDiv 4 had lost their fighting power, a decision was made to transfer the fleet flag to flagship of BatDiv 1, *Yamato*. The *Chokai* was then placed under the command of Commander CruDiv 5. Every effort was made to complete the transferring of the flag from *Kishinami* to the *Yamato* as expeditiously as possible, but judging from the damage inflicted on CruDiv 4, it was estimated that there were many submarines in the waters in the vicinity which would hamper making the move. At 0915, therefore, Commander of BatDiv 1 was ordered to assume command temporarily. At 1623, the command was returned to me (Kurita) when transfer to the *Yamato* was completed, after which it was decided that the fleet would advance as originally scheduled, maintaining a strict alert for enemy subs and aircraft.

3. Since the *Takao* had become inoperational, two destroyers from the fleet were assigned to her. At the same time the Southwest Area Fleet was asked to arrange for further protection for her and to take her in tow to Brunei, if necessary by way of Urugan where temporary repairs could be made.

23 October:

0739 CinC (on board *Kishinami*) assigns *Chokai* to CruDiv 5.

0830 CinC (on board *Kishinami*) to flag BatDiv 1 (*Yamato*) "Plan to transfer fleet flag to *Yamato*. Commander BatDiv 1 will assume command of fleet until CinC comes aboard."

1026 From Commander BatDiv 1 to CinC Combined Fleet, Mobile Fleet, and Southwest Area Fleet and Chief of Naval General Staff:

"1. At 0634 (daybreak), *Atago* and *Maya* were sunk and *Takao* rendered inoperational by actions of 3 enemy submarines. (Two destroyers have been assigned to *Takao*).

"2. CinC is at present on board the *Kishinami* and plans to board the *Yamato* at about 1300.

"3. I am temporarily assuming command of 1-YB. Operations are being continued as scheduled."

1630 Flag of 1-YB hoisted on *Yamato* and 1-YB is being commanded from her.

2034 Text of Combined Fleet SMS 231710: From Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet estimate of situation as of 231200:

1. Estimate of enemy plans: It is very probable that the enemy is aware of the fact that we have concentrated our forces. He will probably act in the following manner:
 - (1) Concentrate submarines in great strength in the San Bernardino and Surigao Straits Area.
 - (2) Plan attacks on our surface forces, using large type planes and task forces, after tomorrow morning.
 - (3) Plan decisive action by concentrating his surface strength in the area east of San Bernardino Strait and Tacloban where he has his transport group. He should be able to dispose himself in this manner by afternoon of 24th.
2. Our plans.
 - (1) Carry through our original plans.
 - (2) In affecting the operations, the following points are specially emphasized:
 - (a) Make up for our inferior surface strength by making every effort to direct the enemy to the north towards the Main Body of the Mobile Force.

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- (b) Maintain an even stricter alert against submarines and aircraft. Utilize every possible trick to keep enemy submarines under control, particularly while breaking through the narrow straits.
- (c) Destroy enemy task force carriers with our shore-based planes, while his carrier-based planes are engaging our surface forces.

24 October:

0810 Enemy carrier-based planes establish contact.

Engagements of First Day (Air Actions)

A total of 350 sorties in 6 waves of carrier-based planes were made between 0830 and 1730. They were torpedo planes and bombers (none of which had fighter escorts). *Myoko* had to drop out of formation due to a torpedo hit (flag of CruDiv 5 was transferred to the *Haguro*) and was forced to retire from the scene unescorted. *Musashi* sank from numerous torpedo and bomb hits at 1935. *Yamato*, *Nagato*, and *Kiyoshimo* suffered considerable damages from bomb hits and the *Yabagi* from near misses.

1055 1-YB reports being engaged by 30 carrier-based planes which were beaten off.

1135 1-YB spot report. *Myoko* receives one torpedo hit. Can make only 15 knots. She is ordered to retire alone to Brunei.

Movements of 3d Group:

1151 BatDiv 2 reports being contacted by enemy planes but suffers only minor damages. (Two *Fusc* airplanes were lost by fire.)

1220 1-YB spot report No. 2 announces that *Musashi* also hit by one torpedo.

1225 1-YB reports being attacked by second wave of planes, consisting of about 30 carrier-based aircraft.

1250 1-YB action spot report No. 3. *Musashi* receives 3 (making a total of 4) torpedo hits and many near misses. Maximum speed 22 knots.

1315 1-YB SMS 2+1315 to Main Body, Mobile Force, and Southwest Area Fleet; Info, Combined Fleet, 1st Air Fleet, and 2d Air Fleet: "We are being subjected to repeated enemy carrier-based air attacks. Advise immediately of contacts and attacks made by you on the enemy."

1342 1-YB action spot report No. 4. "3d wave consisting of about 80 carrier-based planes attacked us."

1400 General situation in Leyte Gulf as reported by *Mogami's* plane at 0650: In position bearing 180° distance 15 miles from Dulag: 4 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers.

In position bearing 90° distance 7 miles from same: 80 transports.

In position on northeast of Panaon Island: four destroyers, and a dozen small boats to northwest of same.

In position about 40 miles southeast of Dulag: 12 destroyers and 12 carriers.

1452 1-YB action spot report No. 5. *Musashi* receives one (totaling 5) torpedo hit; *Yamato* receives one bomb hit; *Musashi's* operational capacity has been impaired. *Kiyoshimo* is guarding her and she will proceed to Bako via Coron, if necessary, under own power.

1510 1-YB action spot report No. 6. 4th wave, consisting of 25 planes attacked. *Yamato* received bomb-hit forward.

1530 1-YB action spot report No. 7. Being engaged by 5th wave consisting of over 100 planes.

1602 1-YB action spot report No. 8. During the attack of the 5th wave, additional damage has apparently been inflicted on the *Musashi*. Details are as yet undetermined. *Nagato's* maximum

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speed, after being bombed, is 21 knots. *Yamato* has received further bomb hits but her fighting power is unimpaired.

1719 Supplement to action spot report No. 8. *Kiyoshimo* bombed; maximum speed 20 knots. *Yabagi* suffers from near misses; maximum speed 22 knots.

Commander of 1-YB's estimate of the situation as of 241600. 1-YB SMS 241600

"Originally, the main strength of 1-YB had intended to force its way through San Bernardino Straits about one hour after sundown, coordinating its moves with air action. However the enemy made more than 250 sorties against 1-YB between 0830 and 1530, the number of their planes involved and their fierceness mounting with every wave. Our air forces, on the other hand, were not able to obtain even expected results, causing our losses to mount steadily. Under these circumstances it was deemed that were we to force our way through, we would merely make of ourselves, meat for the enemy, with very little chance of success to us. It was therefore concluded that the best course open to us was to temporarily retire beyond the range of enemy planes and reform our plans. At 1600 we were in the Sibuyan Sea (13° 00' N. 122° 40' E.) on course 290°, speed 18 knots."

Summing up the situation, whereas the enemy air attacks became more intensified with each wave, our air forces failed to obtain satisfactory results against the enemy task forces located in the Lamon and Legaspi areas. Moreover, apparently the main body of our Mobile Force was not succeeding in diverting or attacking the enemy. Our various forces were not successfully coordinating their actions and because of this, 1-YB placed in a position of fighting the entire battle alone, was being whittled down with nothing to show for its sacrifices.

If 1-YB were to continue eastward in the face of these circumstances, it seemed very likely that it would be subjected to terrific pounding from enemy aircraft in the narrows to the east of Sibuyan Sea. In view of this danger, the wider and more maneuverable central Sibuyan Sea was selected to carry out our antiair engagements. This was the situation which prompted the CinC of 1-YB to submit his opinions in 1-YB's SMS 241600.

However, upon receipt of CinC Combined Fleet's admonition—"With confidence in heavenly guidance, the entire force will attack!"—the following schedule was drawn up: Pass through San Bernardino Straits at 250100; proceed southward down the east coast of Samar and break into Leyte Gulf at about 251100.

1815 Combined Fleet SMS 241813: "Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 372. With confidence in heavenly guidance, the entire force will attack!"

1939 1-YB SMS 241939 to Comdr. Detached Reconnaissance Unit, 1-YB: "1-YB is advancing. Report enemy situation in areas to east of Legaspi, east of Samar and Leyte, immediately."

Movements of the 3d Group:

2020 BatDiv 2 SMS 242013: "We plan to break through to Dulag at 250400."

2145 1-YB SMS 242145: "Main Force 1-YB (4 battleships, 6 cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 11 destroyers) plans to pass through San Bernardino Straits at 250100; proceed southward down the east coast of Samar and arrive position Yaruse 32 at about 260600 and in Leyte Gulf at about 1100, same day.

"3d Group will break into Leyte Gulf as scheduled and then join forces with the Main Force in the vicinity of 10 miles to the northeast of Suluan at 250900."

2213 1-YB SMS 242213: "We were subjected to repeated enemy carrier-based plane attacks all day long on 24th resulting in considerable damage to us. Powerful enemy task forces to the east and to the north of Legaspi are exceedingly active.

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"Main Force 1-YB, chancing annihilation, is determined to break through to Tacloban anchorage to destroy the enemy.

"The air force is ordered to carry out a full strength attack against task forces.

"It is strongly desired that the whole force throw its entire power into the fray so as to attain its aims."

Movements of 2-YB:

2255 5th Fleet SMS 242245: "2-YB will pass through south entrance to Surigao Straits at 0300. Plan to break through with speed of 26 knots."

25 October

0150 5th Fleet SMS 250101: "2-YB two cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers expect to break through from south entrance to Surigao Straits at 250300. Plan to make a clockwise sweep of Leyte Gulf after passing the Dulag area, and head for the south entrance to Surigao Straits (0900) destroying the enemy wherever he may be found. At 0900 2-YB will have enough fuel left to last for 2 days and nights at a speed of 18 knots."

Existing situation until commencement of surface engagement on 25th

The First Diversion Attack Force succeeded in passing through San Bernardino Straits at 250035 and immediately assumed night search disposition to guard against being surprised by the enemy. Determined to carry out its break through into Leyte Gulf at about 1100 after rendezvousing with the 3d Section at 0900 at a point 10 miles east of Suluan light, it proceeded southward hugging the east coast of Samar.

In the meantime, since the 24th, attempts were made to search out and contact the enemy with the entire float reconnaissance plane strength of 1-YB which had been deployed over bases in the Philippines. These searches were directed to the surfaces in the vicinity of Leyte Gulf, east of Legaspi, and to the northeast of Samar. Unfortunately, however, communication could not be maintained efficiently (due to changing the flagship, radio interferences and poor shore-based communication facilities) and the desired intelligence could not be obtained at the time desired.

Subsequent to the afternoon of the 24th, we received no intelligence of value from the shore-based air forces.

There were scattered squalls this night and visibility was approximately 15 kilometers.

In position bearing 358° distance 80 miles from Suluan light at 0600 on 25th. Anticipating enemy air attacks, the force was in the process of assuming anti-air disposition when suddenly, at 0644.5 (sunrise was 0627) while in position bearing 357° distance 60 miles from Suluan light, seven masts were sighted bearing 125° distance 37 kilometers from the *Yamato*. At 0645 two Grumman attack planes were sighted in the same direction. It was subsequently definitely established that the masts belonged to ships of a gigantic enemy task force including six or seven carriers accompanied by many cruisers and destroyers. Some of the carrier-based planes were in the air.

Estimate of the situation and own plans at time of sighting enemy task force on the 25th

1. The enemy was encountered at a time when neither he nor we expected it.
2. Employing every trick known to him, the enemy would try to put distance between himself and us (if possible maneuver himself to the windward of us) so that he could carry out a one-sided air action against us.

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3. So that we could take advantage of this heaven-sent opportunity, we should take after the enemy in present formation and at top speed. We planned to first cripple the carriers' ability to have planes take off and land on them and then to mow down the entire task force.

The Engagement

The entire First Diversion Attack Force was put on an instantaneous standby and deployed in a 110° direction. The gap between the enemy and us was closed as rapidly as possible. The *Yamato* opened fire with enemy carriers as her target at 0658. Anticipating the enemy's attempt to get to the windward of us, we maneuvered to the northeast of it, pressing on it all the while. Immediately prior to our commencement of shelling, the enemy suddenly turned sharply to port and subsequently made the maximum use of local squalls and smoke screens put up by his destroyers to hide in. The enemy attacked us continuously with his torpedo and bomber planes, while having his surface units retire to the southeast.

During this time, we were able to estimate that the enemy was in considerable confusion from the fact that he immediately asked for reinforcements and by ordering the planes which were based on his carriers to proceed to Tacloban.

All our units, overcoming the desperate defenses put up by the enemy's aircraft and screening vessels, pressed on magnificently. In the spirit of "a sighted enemy is the equivalent of a dead enemy" these units inflicted considerable damage on him.

Our battleship force, intent on closing in on the enemy carried out gun battles with the forward batteries only. Its main purpose was to cut off the enemy carriers' escape. Interference from the enemy, however, prevented it from advancing freely, and one by one allowed the enemy to make good his escape with the exception of two or three carriers and some cruisers and destroyers which were forced to abandon their position.

For these reasons we were unable to get an overall picture of the enemy. Two observation planes from the *Yamato* likewise were unable to scout the enemy due to enemy fighter action.

As stated before, our battleship force was unable to establish visual contact with the enemy except those units of his which were forced to drop out of his formation. However, since the direction in which the enemy retired was fairly clear and in view of the fragmentary intelligence obtained from our advance units, the entire force was ordered to take after the enemy at 0800.

Development, thereafter, were not too much to our liking, however. The enemy's air action against us became fiercer as time went on causing considerable damage to us.

Since the operation's main aim was the breaking through to Leyte Gulf, fuel conservation had to be considered. At 0911, all the ships were ordered to close in and the Main Body proceeded on a course of 0°, speed 20 knots. At 0948, the *Yamato* sighted another carrier force at about the maximum visible distance to the east. The *Haruna*, which was closest to this enemy was ordered to the attack, but she was unable to get into firing range. Moreover, the enemy managed to get to the windward and put up a smoke screen, so the chase was abandoned.

Damaged ships were ordered to proceed northward to San Bernardino Straits independently, while the remaining units closed in and assumed combat disposition 30 and proceeded on course 0°, speed 22 knots.

At 1148, an enemy battleship (estimated to be of the *Pennsylvania* class) and four probable destroyers were sighted while in position bearing 0° distance 47 miles from Suluan light, bearing 173° distance 38 kilometers from the *Yamato*. This force was pursued but by 1200 it escaped beyond visual range and the chase was abandoned.

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25 October:

- 0653 1-YB reports sighting enemy masts.
- 0700 1-YB announces it's opening fire on three enemy carriers.
- 0702 1-YB reports that it is engaging enemy task force, and orders 3d section to join it.
- 0725 1-YB announces sinking one enemy cruiser.
- 0730 1-YB states that the enemy is a task force consisting of six carriers (three of which are regular carriers) which is trying to get away in a smoke screen.
- 0736 1-YB claims the sinking of one carrier.
- 0845 CinC 1-YB advises 1-YB's shore-based air forces that he is engaging the enemy and orders that aircraft be sent out to reconnoiter this enemy as well as to scout the enemy in Leyte Gulf.
- 0907 *Chikuma* reports to *Yamato* that she received a torpedo hit making her unnavigable.
- 0911 CinC 1-YB orders all ships in force to close in.
- 0918 From *Chokai* to *Yamato*: Bomb-hit on forward aircraft. Trying to repair same.
- 0920 From *Chikuma* to *Yamato*: One propeller; speed 18 knots; unable to steer.
- 0945 CruDiv 7 SMS 250830; Have transferred flag to *Suzuya* (flagship changed as result of damages to *Kumano*).
- 1000 First Diversionary Attack Force SMS 251000 1-YB action spot report No. 1 (25 October): known results obtained to present: Definitely sunk: two aircraft carriers (of which one is regular large type carrier) two heavy cruisers and some destroyers. Definitely hit: One or two carriers. Enemy carrier-based planes continue to attack us. The remaining enemy (including six or seven carriers) is making use of squalls and smoke screens to make good its retirement to the southeast. Friendly units heavily damaged: *Chokai*, *Chikuma*, *Kumano*. Others being checked. We are at present proceeding northward.
- 1018 1-YB SMS 251018: Damaged ships are ordered to hug the coast and head for San Bernardino Straits.
- 1030 *Kumano* SMS 250945: Heading for San Bernardino Straits. Actual speed, 15 knots.
- 1030 From flag 10th Division to *Yamato*: 1. Results obtained by us: one carrier of the *Enterprise* class sunk and one seriously damaged (its sinking is almost certain); three destroyers. 2. Damages sustained: *Yabagi* hit, but battle cruising not hindered.
- 1100 1-YB SMS 251100: Correct 1-YB's action spot report No. 1 as follows: three or four carriers, including one of the *Enterprise* class, have been sunk.

Estimate of the situation and plans as of 1230, 25 October

Until about 1200, we were determined to carry out the plan to penetrate into Leyte Gulf in spite of repeated enemy air attacks. However, according to an enemy dispatch, the enemy 7th Fleet was ordered to concentrate in position about 300(?) miles southeast of Leyte. The enemy was also concentrating its carrier-based air strength at Tacloban and together with its surface task force, was disposing itself to counter the penetration into Leyte which it anticipated. Its preparations to intercept our force apparently was complete whereas we could not even determine the actual situation in Leyte Gulf. Moreover, in view of what happened to the 3d Section and to the 2d Diversionary Attack Force, it seemed not unlikely that we would fall into an enemy trap, were we to persist in our attempt at penetration. The wiser course was deemed to be to cross the enemy's anticipation by striking at his task force which had been reported in position bearing 5° distance 113 miles from Suluan light at 0945. We believed that turn about, proceed northward in search of this element would prove to be to our advantage in subsequent operations.

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Having so determined the situation, we turned northward.

- 1115 1-YB SMS 251030: Enemy carrier-based planes, including those from damaged carriers, are using Tacloban base. (Voice communication intercept).
- 1120 Owada Comm. Unit SMS 250924: Being attacked by an enemy force consisting of four battleships, eight cruisers, and other units. Vice Admiral Lee? will proceed to and from? Leyte area. Request that high speed carriers go to the attack immediately 0727.
- 1120 1-YB SMS 251120: Our position Ya Hi Ma 37; Course, southwest. Proceeding to Leyte anchorage. Enemy task force is in position 30 miles to northeast and another large force 60 miles to southeast.
- 1144 Takao Comm. Unit SMS 250940: Enemy plain text message (broadcast at 250905 from the Admiralties): Our force is being attacked by a force composed of four battleships, eight cruisers, and others. Proceed to Leyte at top speed.
From: Commander New Guinea Operations Force.
To: First Task Fleet.
- 1150 From CinC 1-YB to CinC's 1st Air Fleet and Southwest Area Fleet. Attack the enemy task force reported at 0945 in position, Ya Ki I Ka.
- 1206 1-YB requests info as to targets of aircraft and results obtained.
- 1230 Admiral Kinkaid cancels present orders and orders addressee to proceed to point 300 (?) miles southeast of Leyte Gulf in a plain text message intercepted by Owada Comm. Unit.
- 1236 1-YB SMS 251236: First Diversion Attack Force abandoning plan to break through to Leyte Gulf. Turning about and will proceed northward along the East Coast of Samar in search of an enemy task force. After decisively engaging same, plan to go through San Bernardino Strait.

On this day, between the hours of about 0700 to 1630, the enemy carried out bombing and torpedo attacks by aircraft in 11 waves numbering a total of 450 sorties. Considerable damage was sustained from them by the *Kumano*, *Suzuya*, *Chikuma*, *Chokai* and *Hayashimo*.

In view of the circumstances, the damaged ships were ordered to proceed under their own power wherever possible. Those that could not were disposed of and the crews transferred to screening vessels and sent to Coron.

In other words, the *Kumano* and *Hayashimo* proceeded independently; the *Suzuya's* crew was transferred to the *Okinami* and the *Chokai's* crew to the *Fujinami*. All proceeded towards San Bernardino Straits, selecting a route hugging the coast of Samar in doing so.

The *Nowake* was sent to the aid of *Chikuma* and has not been heard from since.

- 1320 In an action spot report, 1-YB reports being attacked by about 150 planes in three waves from 0700.
- 1325 In an action spot report 1-YB reports being attacked by 72 enemy bombers and torpedo planes and later by 19 bombers but only slight damage sustained.
- 1710 The Southwest Area Force reports that with the exception of one regular carrier being damaged by a Kamikaze Special Attack Unit, results obtained are undetermined.
- 1732 In an action spot report, 1-YB reports being attacked by about 60 carrier-based bombers and of sustaining some damage from them. Also states that two friendly bombers subject it to attacks by error.
- 1917 In its SMS 251917, 1-YB orders all damaged units to make every possible effort to proceed alone but where this is impossible, to dispose of it and transfer the crew to its screening vessel and proceed to Coron.

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Movements on the 25th of the 3d Section [BatDiv 2, (Yamashiro, Fuso), Mogami, DesDiv 41 (Michishio, Asagumo, Yamagumo), Shigure]

Under command of Commander BatDiv 2, the 3d Section was scheduled to break through to Dulag at 250400, ahead of the 2d Diversion Attack Force. At 250130 it passed through Surigao Straits and broke through to Leyte Gulf. At 0330, it was engaged by enemy destroyers and torpedo boats, resulting in some damage to us.

Although developments in subsequent engagements are not definitely known, judging from action spot reports from the Commander of the 2d Diversion Attack Force and reports from the skipper of the destroyer *Shigure*, it seems likely that all ships, with the exception of the *Shigure*, went down while breaking through to Leyte Gulf. They were apparently engaged by powerful enemy surface units in their break-through operation, and were overpowered even though they kept fighting to the bitter end.

The *Shigure*, though she suffered considerable damage, was ordered to proceed to Coron since her ability to cruise under combat conditions was unhindered.

25 October:

- 0220 BatDiv 2 SMS 250100. Passed southern entrance of Surigao Straits at 0130 and broke through to Leyte Gulf. Unable to determine enemy disposition outside of sighting some torpedo boats. There are squalls but the weather in general is gradually improving.
- 0335 BatDiv 2 reports sighting what appears to be three enemy ships.
- 0418 2-YB reports arriving on battlegrounds.
- 0532 Message from 2-YB announces complete destruction of BatDiv 2 and that the *Mogami* is seriously damaged and burning.
- 1425 BatDiv 2 SMS 250330: Enemy destroyers and torpedo boats disposed on both sides of north entrance to Surigao Straits. 2 of our destroyers have received torpedo hits and are out of control; the *Yamashiro* received one torpedo hit but her battle cruising is unhampered.
- 1535 In her SMS 251018, the *Shigure* reports that the 3d Section passed the southern entrance to Surigao Straits at 0130. At 0355, it encountered powerful enemy surface units (estimated to include four battleships, five cruisers, and five destroyers). Friendly units engaged those hostile units to the last; but all of them with the exception of us (*Shigure*) went down (not certain of one destroyer of DesDiv 4). The enemy cleverly utilized islands to hide behind and made extreme use of his electronic devices, making it exceedingly difficult for the *Shigure* to determine the enemy disposition. Since the *Shigure* was all alone, she decided to retire to the South and to consider subsequent plans. While retiring, the steering gear broke down and she had to resort to manual steering. Though emergency repairs were made, she could not be handled easily, so she decided to head for Coron.
- 1925 Combined Fleet SMS 251647. Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 374: 1. If there is an opportunity to do so, the First Diversion Attack Force will contact and destroy what is left of the enemy tonight. The other forces will coordinate their action with the above. 2. If there is no chance of engaging the enemy in a night engagement tonight, the Main Body of the Mobile Force and First Diversion Attack Force will proceed to their refueling points as ordered by their respective commanders.

The First Diversion Attack Force proceeded northward with the object of contacting and destroying the enemy task force located to the north. By 1730, it had reached a position to the northeast of Samar but it was unable to contact it. The enemy, however, carried out almost continuous air attacks against us and apparently slipped down southward to the east of the force.

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Friendly shore-based air forces were directed to attack the enemy task force in the vicinity of the First Diversion Attack Force, but they were unable to even establish contact with it, let alone attack it.

In view of the enemy situation and because of fuel considerations, the search for the enemy was abandoned. Maintaining strict alert against enemy submarines, the Force headed for San Bernardino Straits at 26 knots. It passed through the Straits at 2130.

In view of the manner in which the enemy carried out air attacks on the 24th and 25th, and because the enemy would undoubtedly seek revenge for the one sided naval engagement of the 25th, it was estimated that the enemy would attempt to attack with carrier-based planes as well as large type planes on the 26th. Attacks, therefore, by our shore-based air force on the enemy task force and on his Tacloban air base were recommended.

2130 1-YB SMS 252130: In view of the one sidedness of the decisive action carried out today, the 25th, there is much likelihood of the enemy's attempting to carry out revenge attacks against us with the entire strength of the remainder of his task force. It is probable that such contact would be made in an area in the vicinity to the east or north of Legaspi on the 26th. We are of the opinion that the situation may offer an excellent opportunity for the shore-based air force units to strike the first blow against the enemy and gain control of the air.

Air Action on 26 October

True to expectation the enemy established contact with carrier-based planes at 0730 and struck at 0830. His force was composed of several dozens of carrier-based bombers and torpedo planes. By this attack, the *Noshiro* became unnavigable. The first wave of attacks was followed up with another of several dozen carrier-based aircraft and about 30 B-24's. *Noshiro* finally sank, principally by enemy carrier-based plane action (total number of planes attacking her: about 170).

For over an hour thereafter, the enemy was in contact with us. We maneuvered to evade him and in doing so abandoned our original plan to proceed to Coron. Instead we advanced to a position to north of Palawan.

27 October

Five destroyers (*Hamanami*, *Kishinami*, *Akishimo*, *Shimakaze*, *Urakaze*) were sent to Coron to refuel while two others (*Isokaze*, *Yukikaze*) were refueled from the *Nagato* and *Haruna* at Dangerous Ground. These all arrived Brunei on 282130.

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Excerpts From First Mobile Fleet—Report of Sho Operations Air Strength of CarDiv 3 at Time of Sortie (for Sho operation)

Type 0 ship-based fighters	52
Type 0 ship-based fighters (bomb equipped)	28
Tenzan—Jill—VT	25
Suisei—Judy—VB	7
Type 97 ship-based attack planes—Kate—VT	4
<hr style="width: 10%; margin-left: auto;"/>	
Total	116
Oyodo float reconnaissance	2

According to Combined Fleet SMS 191220, 2-YB would under certain circumstances, be returned to the Mobile Force. I (commander of KdMB) therefore issued following order in event that 2-YB is placed under my command.

“Mobile Force DesOpOrd No. 62 (SMS 200021).

“The Mobile Force will operate in the manner described in Mobile Force’s procedure in ‘Operation Sho’ after 2-YB returns to my command with the following changes and exceptions:

“2-YB will advance to east of Luzon channel, and, acting in coordination with KdMB, will divert the enemy task force northward to assure the success of 1-YB’s break-through operation. At the same time it will mop up on whatever enemy is remaining.

“(1) Plan of action of KdMB will be as outlined in SMS 190831. Will advance to northeast of Philippine Islands on X-day-minus-2 to X-day-minus-1 and commence attack. (1-YB’s break-through will be on X-day).

“(2) 2-YB will proceed to eastward of Luzon Channel on X-day-minus-2 and lure the enemy (putting dummy messages on the air) to such a position as to assure successful air action from the KdMB which will be coming down from the north. Subsequently, it will maneuver in such a manner as to form an advance guard for the KdMB.

“(3) If the opportunity arises, the KdMB and 2-YB will combine in an all-out attack against the split enemy.

“(4) If circumstances favor it, 2-YB will proceed to waters immediately east of Luzon and carry out mobile operations.

“(5) CarDiv 4, DesDiv 61 and DesDiv 41 will be assigned to 2-YB at an appropriate time to carry out decisive action against enemy surface forces.”

General circumstances at time of preparing for sortie

The enemy task forces had been making appearances in the Ryukyu-Formosa area since 10 October which called for the activation, on 12 October, of the shore-based air force’s Sho-1 and Sho-2 Operations. For this purpose, the entire air strength of CarDiv 3 and CarDiv 4 had been placed under the tactical command of 6th Base Air Force’s Commander, under whose orders it was being moved up. 2-YB (CruDiv 21, DesRon 1), in coordination with results obtained by the shore-based air forces on the 13th, was ordered out on the 14th to mop up on the enemy.

For these reasons, the actual make-up of KdMB differed considerably from that described in the outline for Sho operations as described originally by Combined Fleet. When, therefore, the enemy landing forces started to operate in Suluan Island area on the 17th, the senior staff officer was sent to Kure to confer with officers of the Combined Fleet. This resulted in the assigning of what remained of the airplane units of Air

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Groups 653 and 634 (these had been in the process of moving up) and planes of Air Group 601 that were capable of being carrier-based. The carriers of CarDiv 3 were brought to Oita air base and, in spite of bad weather conditions, the transferring of aircraft to carriers was completed during the morning of the 20th.

The supply force—*Jinci Maru*, *Takane Maru*, and the *Akikaze* and four coast defense ships—were delayed so a staff officer of DesRon 11 was ordered to take charge of it and to sortie for Amami Oshima during the 23d.

Developments which led to selecting date and time of departure

Combined Fleet Headquarters had at first settled on the 22d for X-day with expectations of having 1-YB break-through to a point close to the enemy's beachheads in Leyte-Samar area on that day. For this, it desired KdMB to sortie on 19th. But 1-YB advised that it could not make it before the 25th, possibly the 24th, and after considering refueling, that it would be impossible before the 25th.

KdMB also advised that it could not possibly get underway before the afternoon of the 20th, due to plane loading operations, etc. Though 1-YB and Combined Fleet were as yet undecided as to whether X-day would be the 24th or 25th, KdMB decided to sortie at 1700 on the 20th and carry out its first air offensive against the enemy on X-day-minus-1 or X-day-minus-2 depending on X-day. KdMB decided on this day because it wanted to contact the enemy which was reportedly proceeding southward from a point east of the Philippines as soon as possible, and decided on 1700 because of the hazards which accompany passing through Bungo Channel at night.

Items pertaining to selection of route

All units concerned were notified by us that we would proceed on course 1 as described in the original operations order. However, just as we were sortieing from Bungo Channel on evening of the 20th, we were contacted by an enemy sub. We evaded this to the east and upon learning subsequently, that enemy subs were converging on our originally planned route No. 1, we continued on route No. 2.

Disposition of friendly forces

(1) 2-YB arrives Bako 200800; completes refueling 210800. In accordance with Combined Fleet SMS 181101, 2-YB assigned to Southwest Area Force.

(2) 1-YB to proceed on to Brunei and then through San Bernardino Straits: 3d Group (BatDiv 2, *Mogami*, 4 destroyers) scheduled to pass through Surigao Straits and break through on 25th.

(3) Shore-based air forces have all preparations about completed. 6th Base Air Force unofficially scheduled to carry out all-out attacks from X-day-minus-2.

Developments after Sortie

201700 KdMB departs Okishima in Bungo Channel.

201745 Saeki Air Group plane sights enemy sub bearing 170° distance 15 kilometers from *Zuikaku*.

201845 Contacted by enemy sub's radar. Evaded him by proceeding eastward until 2100. Thereafter proceeding on course No. 2.

210700 First search flights carried out by KdMB.

212300 KdMB's Supply Force to advance to Amami Oshima as follows: *Takane Maru* during the 23d; *Jinci Maru* during 25th.

220850 *Hiyuga* intercepts what appears to be enemy task force's voice transmission.

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Estimate and disposition of situation at—

220900 If the task force located by communication intelligence of the *Hyuga* and Base Force 31 was to proceed northward, KdMB would be within its attacking range during the morning.

In view of this fact, it was decided that the refueling of KdMB would be carried out as scheduled during the afternoon while carrying out air and radar searches and with the entire attacking force on a No. 2 stand-by. Planes based on the *Oyodo* to carry out antisub searches.

Estimates and decisions based thereon from time supply operations were completed until 240600

1. Estimates:

(a) The enemy knows general position of 1-YB and undoubtedly will go all out to prevent 1-YB from reaching objective. He must be disposed in such a manner as to best intercept 1-YB.

(b) There were several enemy task forces to the east of Luzon since the 19th, but there seemed to be a general tendency for these to move southward.

(c) Even in the event that the enemy task forces move southward to the east of San Bernardino Straits, it is essential that KdMB be so disposed as to carry out its initial air attack against the enemy during the 24th and to lure him up northward.

2. Decisions:

(a) Lure the enemy northeastward by putting messages on the air. Proceed on a southwesterly course.

(b) Maneuver so as to be in position 20° N. 127° E. at 240600.

(c) Maintain strict air alert after the 23d.

Estimates and decisions as of evening of 23d

1. Estimate:

The enemy knows the general disposition of our forces:

(a) Our 1-YB and 2-YB would undoubtedly be subjected to air attacks from task forces and shore-based air forces. The enemy will concentrate his surface forces to the east of San Bernardino Straits and in the Tacloban Area and seek decisive action with us at the time our break-through operation is attempted.

(b) Enemy submarines will be stationed near the straits and in other strategic points to carry out attacks against our Diversion Attack Forces and Mobile Force.

(c) At 222000, KdMB put a fairly long message on the air and subsequently made several contacts with enemy submarines.

2. Decisions:

(a) KdMB to arrive in position 19N, 126-40E at 240600 and thereafter proceed on course 225°.

(b) Send off search planes at 0545 and if the enemy is sighted, initial air attack would be carried out.

Every effort would be made to have these planes return to their ships and prepare for subsequent intercept operations.

(c) If the enemy is not sighted on the initial search, a second search would be effected at about 1300. Attacks would be carried out if the enemy is sighted and if dusk is at hand, all planes would be ordered to shore bases.

(d) KdMB would proceed on a straight 220° course, and upon contacting the enemy, would maneuver in such a manner as to lure him northward.

(e) In the event that the air attacks fail to lure the enemy northward, the advance guard may be

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sent ahead and engage in mobile action. This operation will not be put into effect, however, unless activated by the headquarters of Combined Fleet.

(f) Because of fuel consideration, a part of the force will have to return to the Formosa area after carrying out the air attacks on 24th.

(g) In the event that we fail to draw the enemy northward, and if the task force proceeds southward to interfere with the break-through operations of 1-YB and 2-YB, KdMB will proceed to vicinity of Samar by morning of 25th. Air action will be carried out against the enemy task force there and the planes will proceed to shore bases. In this eventuality, ships having short cruising ranges will be sent back to Takao and Bako while CarDiv 3, CarDiv 4, DesDiv 41, DesDiv 61, *Oyodo* and *Tama* carry out the operation.

Developments on 24th

- 240820 Planes of 6th Base Air Force report sighting enemy bearing 60° , distance 90 from Manila.
- 240910 Plane of Air Group 901 reports sighting enemy force including 4 carriers and about 10 other ships proceeding eastward.
- 241115 One of our search planes reports sighting enemy proceeding northward in position bearing 120° distance 180 miles from the Mobile Force. Can't tell whether any carriers are in it. Visibility 20. Fierce squalls to east and south of it.

Estimates and decisions

1. Carry out an all out air attack against force sighted by our search plane.
 2. Figuring that there would be much likelihood of poor weather in vicinity of target, our planes were instructed to proceed to Nichols Field or other shore bases if landing on carriers was too hazardous. Carriers would subsequently pick these planes up at some point to the east of northern Luzon.
 3. Surface units would proceed westward as soon as planes took off and after taking on the planes again, would act in a manner appropriate to the existing situation.
- 241145 Attack unit takes off. 40 fighters, 28 bombers, 2 reconnaissance, and 6 torpedo planes. Position of enemy task force: bearing about 210° distance 150 to 160 miles.

Estimates and decisions

1. 1-YB had been under air attack since 0730 from enemy task forces located to east of Luzon. Considerable damage was being inflicted on it until 1800.
2. The enemy easily guessed 1-YB's objective and was prepared to prevent its attaining it at any cost. The enemy would undoubtedly proceed southward with the intention of carrying out decisive action tomorrow.
3. We received no reports from the airplane units of CarDiv 3. Contact with our search planes was also lost.
4. It was apparent that KdMB was not succeeding in its mission of drawing out the enemy. Some drastic action had to be taken, giving no consideration to the cost to KdMB, to draw the enemy northward. The one remaining plan was to have the advance guard (CarDiv 4, DesDiv 61, DesDiv 41) advance against the enemy, and in coordination with our air action, effectively divert the enemy and mop up on what was left of him after our air action.

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Decision

"KdMB SigDesOpOrd No. 2 (SMS 241439)

1. Assume No. 2 tactical Disposition.
2. Advance guard (CarDiv 4 (*Ise, Hyuga*)), DesDiv 61 (less *Suzutsuki*), DesDiv 41 (*Shimotsuki*) will proceed southward. Contact, at the opportune moment, the remaining enemy and destroy him.
3. Two reconnaissance planes will establish and maintain contact with the enemy from about 1500 to sundown.
4. The main body will proceed westward until about 1600. After taking on our aircraft, it will proceed southeastward and will continue the battle on the following morning.

NOTE—The principle objective of the Advance Guard is to divert the enemy. If, therefore, there seems to be little or no chances for a night engagement, it will expeditiously rejoin the main body.

241635 One enemy plane sighted. He reports our position, drops radar window, and upon receipt of acknowledgment from enemy, departs. We fired on him and sent two fighters up to intercept him, but he escapes.

241910 Receive dispatch from CinC Combined Fleet telling one and all to have confidence in Divine Guidance and attack.

Estimates and decisions

Decide to act in accordance with CinC Combined Fleet's orders.

Advanced on course 140°. Will have entire remaining air strength take off from 0600 and make every effort to divert the enemy from 1-YB.

242000 1-YB announces that it is retiring beyond range of enemy air attacks.

242010 *Estimates and decisions:*

In spite of the CinC's order to attack, CinC 2d Fleet saw fit to turn about and retire to a considerable distance, according to advice received from him. Under such circumstances, there was great possibility of KdMB standing alone against the entire enemy strength. The entire KdMB, therefore was ordered to turn about and retire northward.

242110 Combined Fleet SMS 241959: In receipt of 1-YB SMS 241600 (outlining reasons for retiring westward). Advance, in accordance with Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 372.

Estimates and decisions

Judging from this day's developments, it was obvious that the enemy was completely aware of 1-YB's objective and was unstinting in his efforts to keep 1-YB from attaining it. In view of the threat that 1-YB posed to him, it seemed almost certain that the enemy would continue his vicious attacks on the morrow. In accordance, therefore, with KdMB OpOrd No. 1, and even though it meant the complete destruction of the KdMB, the following order was issued:

1. The main body will be in (grid) position HEN HO 33, course 140°, speed 16 knots at 250600. The Advance Guard and the *Sugi* will join the main Body.

2. *Kiri* will proceed alone to Amami Oshima and after refuelling join the main body as soon as possible.

250000 Attacks against the enemy were carried out and since only three of our planes returned to carriers results obtained could not be determined. Other planes landed on shore bases. Planes on hand: 19 type 0 fighters of which 14 can be used only for covering operations, 5 fighter-bombers, 4 Tenzans and 1 Suisei.

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- 250713 *Zuikaku* contacted by enemy.
- 250817 About 80 enemy planes detected.
- 250830 80 enemy carrier-based planes attack. *Zuikaku* receives one torpedo hit, and forces it to be steered manually. *Zuibo* receives bomb hit. *Cbitose* listing. Other ships capable of making 20 knots. While engaging in evasion maneuvers, lost sight of the 6th Group. Damage to it unknown.
- 250857 *Akitsuki* sinks.
- 250937 *Cbitose* sinks. *Sbimotsuki* to its rescue. *Cbiyoda* drops out of line. *Isuzu*, *Maki* assigned to aid it. *Tama*'s maximum speed is 13 knots as result of torpedo hit. Ordered to Okinawa alone.
- 251000 2d Wave, 30 planes attack.
- 251100 *Zuikaku*'s communication system breaks down. Flag hoisted on *Oyodo*. From comm. intell. there is possibility that an enemy task force is in a position bearing southwest of Ogasawara. 6th Group ordered to retire on course 330°.
- 251200 About 100 enemy planes attacked between 0830 and 1000. *Akitsuki* sunk, *Cbitose* and *Tama* forced to abandon their position in formation. *Zuikaku* unable to communicate. Other ships able to make 18 knots.
- 251414 *Zuikaku* sinks.
- 251527 *Zuibo* sinks. *Hatsutsuki*, *Wakatsuki*, *Kuwa* assigned to their rescue.

Situation at time of attack of third wave

1. Enemy situation:

Judging from the number of enemy planes and direction from whence they came, we had apparently succeeded in diverting two groups of task forces. The distance between them and us was about 150 to 200 miles which was being gradually shortened.

2. Considerations which influenced the decision of whether to continue with our diverting operation or to counterattack with our considerably damaged force:

(a) No aircraft available for our use. Reconnaissance strength, attacking strength: nil.

(b) Enemy position unknown.

3. Decide to draw the enemy further north.

- 251915 DesDiv 61 (*Hatsutsuki*) and *Isuzu*, which had been assigned to rescue work of *Zuikaku* and *Cbiyoda*, advise that they were engaging enemy surface units at 1905 and 1910. *Oyodo*, *Hyuga*, *Ise* and *Sbimotsuki* proceed to their aid. Course 185°, speed 16 knots. Asked *Hatsutsuki* for position but received no reply. Searched until 2330 but made no contact with friend or foe.
- 252400 *Wakatsuki* joined up en route and its report was as follows: *Hatsutsuki*, *Wakatsuki* and *Kuwa* engaged in rescue work of *Zuikaku* and *Zuibo* when, at 1900 they were engaged by about 10 enemy surface ships (2 large cruisers, 2 apparent battleships and about 1 DesRon). These attacked from the east. *Wakatsuki* and *Kuwa* made a quick retreat, *Hatsutsuki* laid down a smoke screen, and what happened subsequently is unknown.
- 261500 KdMB action summary (SMS 261602): At 251700 another 80 enemy planes attacked but these were repulsed. The 6th group joined the main body and while proceeding northward, we were contacted by another enemy formation but by 2000 we had evaded it.

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At about 1930, on receipt of advice from DesDiv 61 (*Hatsutsuki*) and the *Isuzu* that after picking up survivors from our carriers, they were engaged by enemy surface units, the *Oyodo*, *Hyuga*, *Ise*, *Shimotsuki* and *Wakatsuki* turned about in search of the enemy. The search was continued till about midnight but no trace of the enemy could be found.

Turning about again, the remaining units of KdMB proceeded northward.

Since the 20th, this force had done everything in its power to prevent the enemy from going southward so as to enable the Diversion Attack Force to gain their objectives and our only regret is that a considerable price in ships was exacted of us.

The *Sugi* and *Kiri* separated from the main body during the night of the 24th to rescue survivors. They failed to receive the word that KdMB had changed its course and though they tried to rendezvous they failed to do so. Because of dwindling fuel, they went on to Takao where they arrived at 260930 and arrived Kure, via Oshima, on 30th.

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Comparative Forces—Leyte Operations
Comparative naval forces as of 23 October

	United States	Japan
Carriers	6	1
Light carriers	6	3
Escort carriers	18	0
Battleships	12	7
Battleship-carrier conversions	0	2
Heavy cruisers	7	13
Light cruisers	13	6
Destroyers	93	33
Destroyer escorts	11	0

Comparative air strength as of 23 October

United States (approximately)	1280	carrier-based aircraft.
Japan (approximately)	600	shore-based aircraft.
	116	carrier-based aircraft.
	<hr/>	
	716	total Japanese

Battle For Leyte Gulf—Naval Forces Engaged
Battle of Surigao Strait

Task Groups 77.2 and 77.3:

Rear Admiral J. B. Oldendorf,
6 old battleships,
4 heavy cruisers,
4 light cruisers,
26 destroyers.

"C" Force:

Vice Admiral S. Nishimura,
2 battleships,
1 heavy cruiser,
4 destroyers.

Second Diversion Attack Force:

Vice Admiral K. Shima,
2 heavy cruisers,
1 light cruiser,
4 destroyers.

Battle off Samar

Task Group 77.4:

Rear Admiral T. L. Sprague,
16 escort carriers,
9 destroyers,
11 destroyer escorts.

First Diversion Attack Force:

Vice Admiral T. Kurita:
4 battleships,
6 heavy cruisers,
2 light cruisers,
11 destroyers.

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Battle off Cape Engano

Task Force 38:

Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher.

5 carriers.

5 light carriers.

6 battleships.

2 heavy cruisers.

7 light cruisers.

44 destroyers.

Main Body Mobile Force:

Vice Admiral J. Ozawa.

1 carrier.

3 light carriers.

2 battleship-carriers.

3 light cruisers.

8 destroyers.

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Philippine Campaign—Combatant Ship Losses

Japanese

	Large carriers	3
	Light carriers	3
	Escort carrier	1
	Battleships	4
<i>By types:</i>	Cruisers	14
	Destroyers	32
	Submarines	11
	Total	68

By agent of destruction (submarines omitted, half credit assigned for assists):

	Carrier air	Surface units	Sub- marines	Army air	Total
Leyte battle.....	13 3/2	7 3/2	2 1/2	1/2	26
Subsequent campaign.....	18	2	10	1	31
Total.....	31 3/2	9 3/2	12 1/2	1 1/2	57

United States

	Light carrier	1
	Escort carriers	3
	Destroyers	6
	Destroyer escorts	3
	High-speed transport	1
	Submarines	7
<i>By types:</i>	Total	21

By agent of destruction (submarines omitted):


	Kamikaze	Surface	Submarine	Air	Total
Leyte battle	1	4	0	1	6
Subsequent campaign	5	0	3	0	8
Total	6	4	3	1	14


Aircraft losses October - January inclusive

Japanese (estimated).....	17,000
United States carrier aircraft	736
United States Army aircraft (F. E. A. F.).....	231
United States total	967


¹Including 722 Kamikaze.

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XIII

The Iwo Jima Campaign

With the successful landing in Luzon by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area in January, United States control of the Philippine Archipelago was assured and final severance of the Japanese line of communications to the Southern Resources Area was imminent. As a result of serious losses incurred in the Philippine and previous campaigns, together with a breakdown in the pilot replacement program and a critical shortage of fuel, the Japanese Air Forces were no longer capable of effective action when employed in the conventional manner. In desperation they had initiated the "special attack" or "Kamikaze" tactics. United States forces on the other hand were stronger than ever—stronger in numbers, better trained, and moving forward with an overwhelming offensive power. United States domination of the Pacific Ocean Area was complete and the time was at hand to strike in earnest toward the heart of the Japanese Empire.

The Japanese correctly estimated the intention of the United States to attack and seize Iwo Jima under cover of carrier air raids on the Home Islands. In view of the continuing operations in the Philippines it was not considered probable that landing operations in Formosa or the Nansei Shoto would be carried out.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, to occupy one or more positions in the Nanpo Shoto with a target date of 19 February 1945, and one or more positions in the Nansei Shoto with a target date of 1 April 1945. The purpose of these occupations was to acquire additional airfield sites in order to increase the weight of our shore-based air attacks against the Home Islands, to complete the air-sea blockade of Japan, to facilitate preparations for an invasion of the Home Islands, and to maintain unremitting military pressure against Japan.

Accordingly, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, selected Iwo Jima as the most satisfactory objective in the Nanpo Shoto. This island had three airfields, two operational and one under construction, within escort fighter range of most of the important bombing targets on Honshu, and would provide emergency landing facilities for B-29 operations from the Marianas. The capture and occupation of Iwo Jima had to be effected expeditiously in order to release shipping and naval forces for the impending Nansei Shoto operations.

Japanese operational plans did not provide for any large-scale operations in the defense of Iwo Jima; the Nanpo Shoto was not considered a vital area in the concept of the "Ten" Operation Plan then in effect. Only local forces were to be employed in the defense of Iwo Jima, together with limited operations of special attack airplanes and piloted torpedoes (Kaitens). Consequently, the Japanese reaction to the invasion of Iwo Jima was quite limited.

Preliminary bombing of both Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima was conducted by shore-based aircraft from the Marianas. Covering operations for the invasion were begun by the Fast Carrier Force when, on 16-17 February, the first carrier raids on the Japanese Home Islands were made. On these two days and again on the 25th, carrier-based air strikes were made in the Tokyo area. These strikes were notable for the lack of air opposition encountered and for bad weather in the operating areas. Also during these raids a limited number of sorties were directed against strategic targets such as aircraft engine and airplane factories in the Tokyo area.

Preceded by the usual shore bombardment and carrier air strikes the initial Iwo Jima landings were made on the 19th of February, beginning what developed into the most vicious and hard-fought land campaign in the Pacific. The natural terrain features of Iwo Jima together with a very elaborate and complete underground defense system made this island most difficult to occupy. In spite of intense naval gunfire and

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air bombardment, the Japanese had to be dug out by ground troops and killed individually. Against such prepared positions direct air support had but limited effectiveness. Ground casualties were high. On 16 March 1945, organized resistance ended.

In support of this operation, from the 12th of February until the end of March, neutralization of Chichi Jima in the Bonins was maintained by B-24's based in the Marianas and by strikes from the escort and fast carrier groups.

Upon completion of the operation, the airfields were rapidly developed. These three airfields were used primarily by fighters escorting the B-29 attacks against Central Honshu. On 8 March P-51's of the garrison air force commenced operations. Iwo Jima also became a base for reconnaissance and shipping strikes by naval shore-based patrol planes. In United States hands this island became a northern outpost for the protection of vital installations in the Marianas. Before the close of the war some 2,400 B-29's made emergency landings at Iwo Jima, a substantial number of which might otherwise have been lost.

The cost of the Iwo Jima Campaign to the United States was approximately 21,000 casualties (killed, wounded and missing), 1 escort carrier and one LCI(G) sunk, major damage to 30 ships, and 168 aircraft lost.

As a result of the Iwo Jima Campaign airfield sites had been acquired about 600 miles closer to the Japanese Home Islands which, together with the increased strength of the Strategic Air Forces in the Marianas, permitted heavier air attacks on the Home Islands. Severe losses had been inflicted on the Japanese Air Force in the Home Islands by the initial carrier raids which together with Iwo-based fighter sweeps would thereafter be continued on a much wider scale.

Control of the Pacific areas had been extended still further toward the inner defenses of Japan. United States forces were enroute for the assault on Okinawa, the final bastion of the Japanese inner defenses. Within the Home Islands the Japanese were assembling the remnants of their air and naval forces for a major attempt to defend the Nansei Shoto, the expected objective of the next United States attack. At the same time frantic preparations were being made for the final defense against the invasion of the Home Islands. Behind the scenes political maneuverings were being carried out to end the war, though as yet such efforts could not be made openly.

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Forces Involved

United States Forces:

United States Pacific Fleet.....	Admiral C. W. Nimitz, U. S. N.
Central Pacific Task Forces (5th Fleet).....	Admiral R. A. Spruance, U. S. N.
Joint Expeditionary Force.....	Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. N.
Expeditionary Troops.....	Lt. Gen. H. M. Smith, U. S. M. C., 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions.
Amphibious Support Force.....	Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, U. S. N.
Attack Force.....	Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, U. S. N.
Gunfire and Covering Force.....	Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers, U. S. N.
Fast Carrier Force.....	Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher, U. S. N.
Submarine Force.....	Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., U. S. N.
Strategic Air Forces, POA.....	Lt. Gen. M. F. Harmon, U. S. A. A. F.
Forward Area Forces.....	Vice Admiral J. H. Hoover, U. S. N.

The Joint Expeditionary Force consisted of 495 ships, with 352 supporting aircraft.

The Gunfire and Covering Force consisted of 7 old battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, and 15 destroyers.

The Support Carrier Group contained 11 escort carriers.

The Expeditionary Troops consisted of 111,308 troops, of this number 75,144 were assault troops and 36,164 garrison troops.

The Fast Carrier Force consisted of 118 ships: 17 aircraft carriers, 8 battleships, 1 large cruiser, 3 heavy cruisers, 12 light cruisers, and 77 destroyers. Embarked aircraft totalled 1,170.

Japanese forces:

Combined Fleet.....	Admiral Toyoda, I. J. N.
First Diversionary Attack Force (2d Fleet).....	Vice Admiral Ito, I. J. N.
6th Fleet (submarines).....	Vice Admiral Miwa, I. J. N.
3d Air Fleet.....	Vice Admiral Teraoka, I. J. N.

Nanpo Islands Air Group:

The First Diversion Attack Force, consisting of units of the 2d Fleet, comprised 3 battleships, 2 battleship carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 25 destroyers. In addition to units of the 2d Fleet, there were two aircraft carriers, two small aircraft carriers, and one escort carrier in the 3d Fleet, however, these carriers were not operational as no air groups were available.

The 6th Fleet had approximately 15 operational submarines.

The 3d Air Fleet contained approximately 400 operational aircraft.

The Nanpo Islands Air Group consisted of six fighters and four bombers at Iwo Jima, and three seaplanes used for escort duty at Chichi Jima.

No Japanese surface forces were committed to this operation. A small number of submarines, including midgets, did participate. The exact number is not known.

Of the 3d Air Fleet only approximately 40 planes (24 suicide) participated in the defense of Iwo Jima.

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Detailed Losses

United States Losses (from United States sources)

SHIPS

<i>Agent</i>	<i>Sunk</i>	<i>Damaged</i>
Suicide planes	1	3
Bombs	0	1
Shore batteries	1	15
Operational	0	11
Totals	2	30

Aircraft:

Personnel (does not include naval losses):

To enemy antiaircraft	77	Killed	4,590
To enemy aircraft	40	Missing	301
Operational	51	Wounded	15,954
Total	168	Total	20,845

Japanese Losses

Ships:

Sunk:

2 submarines.
4 lookout ships.

Damaged:

5 lookout ships.

Aircraft (period 1 February—1 March 1945)

<i>Service</i>	<i>Combat</i>	<i>Operational</i>	<i>Total</i>
Army.....	150	150	300
Navy.....	¹ 187	245	432
Totals.....	¹ 337	395	732

¹24 suicide.

Personnel:

Dead:

Counted and buried.....	13,234
Estimated sealed in caves or buried by enemy.....	8,070
Total.....	21,304
Prisoners of War.....	212

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XIV

The Okinawa Campaign

The Okinawa Campaign began immediately after the completion of the occupation of Iwo Jima. The forces of the Southwest Pacific Area were continuing operations throughout the Philippine Archipelago, and land-based air, operating from bases in the Central Philippines, had completed the isolation of the Japanese Southern Resources Area from the Home Islands. Only remnants of the Japanese Fleet remained and these were at bases within the Home Islands. The Japanese Air Forces had been reduced to the point where they were no longer effective in conventional employment, but with their adoption of special attack, or Kamikaze tactics, they remained a definite threat to United States surface and amphibious operations. From bases in the Marianas, the weight of strategic bombing was beginning to be felt on Empire targets. The Strategic Air Force had just initiated the destructive fire raids against the major Japanese cities. Although militarily defeated, Japan seemed determined to continue the struggle until destruction. The United States forces, together with the British Pacific Fleet, had complete control of the Western Pacific, and were prepared to bring overwhelming force to bear at the place and time determined by United States plans. The Japanese estimated that these plans were aimed at positions surrounding the East China Sea, most probably in the Nansei Shoto.

In accordance with a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to secure a position in the Nansei Shoto as a base for further operations against the Home Islands, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area directed that Central Pacific Forces occupy Okinawa. This island offered numerous airfield sites, excellent anchorages and locations for naval facilities, and a sufficient land area for the staging of assault troops for subsequent operations. From these bases the attack on the coastal waters of Japan and on the Home Islands could be greatly intensified.

The assault and occupation of Okinawa was the largest amphibious operation of the Pacific War. The Joint Expeditionary Force which attacked Okinawa consisted of 1,213 ships, 564 carrier-based support aircraft and 451,866 ground troops, including both Army and Marine divisions. In addition this force was directly supported and covered by the Fast Carrier Force (82 ships, 919 aircraft) and the British Carrier Force (22 ships, 244 aircraft). Operations of the 21st Bomber Command of the United States Army Strategic Air Force and of the Far Eastern Air Force supported the invasion.

The capture of Okinawa was the most difficult operation undertaken in the Pacific by United States forces. The scene was relatively close to the Home Islands, where the remaining strength of the Japanese naval and air forces was concentrated, forming a very serious threat to the operation. Intelligence information indicated that Okinawa would be defended by approximately 80,000 troops, established in well prepared defensive positions, particularly in the southern part of the island. A large native population would add to the difficulty of the operation.

The Japanese, realizing the serious implications of the loss of Okinawa, were determined to make an all-out effort to hold this island. Their plans for its defense provided for the employment of the major portion of their remaining air strength in suicide attacks on the assault forces, attacks by naval surface forces, and a characteristically determined defense by their garrison forces. In the event that a hopeless situation arose, the Japanese directed in their plans that enemy losses would be made as heavy as possible and that the development of air bases would be delayed to the utmost. In order to increase the effectiveness of the air forces, both the Army and Navy air forces assigned to the defense of Okinawa, were placed under a single command, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

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Preassault operations were initiated against aircraft and aircraft installations by the United States Fast Carrier Force in attacks on Kyushu, Shikoku and Western Honshu on 18-19 March. The operations of this force were then directed against Okinawa on 23 March in preparation for the assault. Thereafter for 2½ months the fast carriers operated continuously in the Okinawa area providing direct air support and cover for the United States amphibious forces. This was the longest sustained operation of the Carrier Force of the entire war.

Preliminary to the assault on Okinawa, the islands in Kerama Retto, 15 miles to the westward, were seized on 26 March in order to provide a base for logistic support, a protected anchorage, and a seaplane base for the operation of search and antisubmarine patrol planes. Preliminary to the main landings extensive mine sweeping, surface bombardment, beach reconnaissance, and underwater demolition were carried out.

At 0830, 1 April 1945 the amphibious assault on Okinawa began. Landings were made over the western beaches against unexpectedly light opposition, and by noon the two airfields at Yontan and Kadena had been captured. As operations ashore progressed, Japanese resistance increased. On 9 April heavily defended positions to the south were encountered and a long drawn out battle began.

The expected air reaction was slow to materialize and for the first few days was relatively light. However starting on 6 April, the Japanese Air Forces struck with a fury never before encountered. The scale of effort in suicide attacks was the most outstanding and spectacular aspect of the Okinawa operation. During the period from 6 April to 22 June, ten major organized Kamikaze attacks were carried out. The relatively short distance from Japanese air bases in Kyushu and Formosa permitted employment by the enemy of planes of all types and pilots of every degree of proficiency. During this operation there were 896 air raids in the objective area. A total of approximately 4,000 Japanese planes were destroyed in combat, of which 1,900 were suicide planes. The violence of this attack is further revealed by the damage inflicted on United States forces; of 28 ships sunk by air attack, 26 were by Kamikaze planes; of 225 damaged by air attack, 164 were by this means. Practically all of these attacks were directed against ships.

The expected Japanese surface ship reaction developed on 6-7 April. At 1520, 6 April, a force consisting of the battleship *Yamato*, the light cruiser *Yabagi* and eight destroyers sortied from Tokuyama, in the Inland Sea, with the object of attacking United States surface forces off Okinawa at daylight on the morning of 8 April. This force, the 1st Diversion Attack Force, was located while proceeding south through the Bungo channel during the evening of 6 April by United States submarines. It was contacted again at 0822 7 April by an air search group from the Fast Carrier Force. Commencing at about 1240 a series of coordinated attacks by carrier fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo planes was made against this force. At 1423 the *Yamato* capsized and blew up as a result of five bomb and ten torpedo hits. Of the original force, one battleship, one light cruiser and four destroyers were sunk. The remaining destroyers suffered varying degrees of damage and retired to Sasebo.

Heavy air attacks on the amphibious and covering forces continued during April and May, after which they declined rapidly. During this period valuable support was rendered by the 21st Bomber Command and the Far East Air Forces in attacks on airfields in Kyushu and Formosa. During April approximately 40 percent of the effective sorties of the 21st Bomber Command were directed against airfields in Kyushu. On 7 April, the first of the land-based aircraft attached to the Tactical Air Force landed on Okinawa airfields. This force, consisting primarily of Marine and Army Fighters ultimately relieved the carriers of responsibility for the air defense of the objective area and direct air support of the ground troops. Units of Fleet Air Wing One, consisting of both patrol seaplanes and land planes, operated from Kerama Retto and from Yontan airfield on Okinawa, conducting search and antisubmarine operations, and antishipping strikes in the East China Sea and Korea areas.

A British carrier force supported the operation by sending air strikes against the Japanese air bases in Sakishima Gunto and Formosa which were a constant threat from the southwest. This force operated from

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26 March to 20 April and again from 3 May to 25 May, and although relatively small, it provided valuable and necessary service.

Ashore the operations proceeded slowly. By 20 April all organized Japanese resistance in the northern two-thirds of the island had ceased. On 19 April the United States ground forces launched a large-scale offensive in the south, but slow progress was made against stubborn resistance. Japanese defense positions were well planned; the rugged terrain with many natural caves and elaborate underground installations presented difficult obstacles to overcome. Direct air support was provided by the Fast and Escort Carriers and by the Tactical Air Force. Fire support was provided throughout the land campaign by naval surface forces. With the breaking of the key defense line which was centered around the Shuri stronghold, opposition rapidly declined. On 21 June all organized resistance on Okinawa ceased.

The price paid for Okinawa was not cheap. Ashore United States losses were 7,213 killed and missing, and 31,081 wounded. Afloat the cost was also high, 4,907 killed and missing, and 4,824 wounded. The losses in ships during this campaign were 36 sunk, 368 damaged, the greater part as a result of air action. United States air losses were 763 airplanes for the period from 1 April to 1 July.

The cost to the Japanese was even more; approximately 131,000 were killed and 7,400 prisoners were taken; 16 ships were sunk and 4 damaged; and more than 7,800 airplanes were lost. But more important still was the loss of 640 square miles of territory, with numerous airfield sites and fleet anchorages within 350 miles of the southern home island, Kyushu. To prepare this island as a base for further operations, the United States undertook a tremendous development program involving extension and construction of air, ground and naval facilities, which would have played a major part in the final destruction and invasion of Japan.

Action Details of Campaign

Action with the 1st Diversion Attack Force, the "Yamato Force", on 6-7 April 1945. All time zone minus 9.

In accordance with the "Ten" operation plan for the defense of the Nansei Shoto, which directed that surface forces were to take favorable opportunities to penetrate into Okinawa anchorages and carry out suicide attacks on United States surface forces, Despatch Order No. 607 was issued by CinC Combined Fleet and was received at 1500, 5 April 1945 by Vice Admiral Ito, I. J. N., Commander First Diversion Attack Force aboard his flagship *Yamato*.

This operation was designated the "Ten-Ichi" operation and the order directed the First Diversion Attack Force to sortie from the Inland Sea on 6 April 1945 and to carry out a surface attack on United States forces at Okinawa. The attack was scheduled for dawn on 8 April.

This force was composed of units of the Second Fleet and consisted of:

Battleship *Yamato* (flagship).

Light cruiser *Yabagi* (DesRon F).

Destroyer Division 41: *Fuyutsuki*, *Suzutsuki*.

Destroyer Division 17: *Isokaze*, *Hamakaze*, *Yukikaze*.

Destroyer Division 21: *Asashimo*, *Hatsushimo*, *Kasumi*.

Admiral Toyoda, CinC Combined Fleet during this campaign, stated after the war that at the time the force was organized it was very difficult to obtain even the 2,500 tons of fuel oil necessary for this operation. Thus again the effect of the shortage of fuel oil on Japanese naval operations is apparent.

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Additional units of the 2d Fleet were in operating condition, but lack of fuel prevented their participation. Admiral Toyoda further stated that in arriving at the decision to commit this small force to such an operation it was questioned whether there was even a 50-50 chance of success. However it was felt that although there was not a 50-50 chance, nothing would be gained by having these units remain idle in home waters, and that such a mission was in keeping with the traditions of the Japanese Navy.

At 1520, 6 April 1945, this force departed from Tokuyama, and proceeded south through the Bungo Channel east of Kyushu. That evening at 1700 it was sighted by the submarines *Threadfin* and *Hackleback* of Task Force 17. It was at first decided to permit the force to proceed southward before attacking it. However, when later information indicated that the Japanese force might not be proceeding towards Okinawa, the Fast Carrier Force was directed to launch search and attack groups. At 0822, 7 April, a carrier search unit made contact. A tracking and covering force of 16 fighters was launched at 0915. At 1000, strikes from two task groups were launched. At 1030 patrol seaplanes of the Kerama Retto Search and Reconnaissance Group made contact and subsequently trailed the remnants of the Japanese force until 0430 the following morning. At 1045 a strike from a third task group was launched.

At 1210, *Asashimo*, which had fallen behind due to engine trouble, reported being under air attack; the last report from this ship was heard at 1221. At 1240 the attacks on the *Yamato* force by the first two Task Groups began. As a result of these attacks, the *Yamato* received two bomb hits and one torpedo hit, the *Yabagi* was hit at 1246 and stopped, and the *Hamakaze* sank at 1248. Other destroyers received varying degrees of damage. At 1333 the third task group began attacking. As a result of the attacks of this group the *Yamato* received three additional bomb hits and nine additional torpedo hits, capsized, blew up and sank at 1423. It is interesting to note that all bomb hits and nine of the 10 torpedo hits were on the port side. *Yabagi* was again hit by bombs and torpedoes and sank at 1405. *Kasumi* sank at 1657. At 2240 after transferring personnel *Isokaze* was scuttled. Of the original force *Yamato*, *Yabagi*, *Hamakaze*, *Isokaze*, *Asashimo*, and *Kasumi* were sunk. *Suzutsuki* was heavily damaged, but was able to retire to Sasebo with *Fuyutsuki*, *Yukikaze* and *Hatsushimo*. *Hatsushimo* was later sunk on 30 July by a mine at Maizuru Naval Base. The Japanese had provided air cover from Kyushu up to 1000, but it consisted of only three to five fighters and was not in evidence at the time of the attack.

A total of 386 aircraft participated in these attacks. United States plane losses were 4 dive-bombers, 3 torpedo-bombers, and 3 fighters, all to antiaircraft; personnel losses were 8 pilots and 8 air crewmen.

Kikusui operations

The Philippine Campaign saw the initiation of the Special Attack (Kamikaze) tactics by the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces. These suicide attacks on United States naval surface forces however, were sporadic and unorganized. Again during the Iwo Jima campaign suicide tactics were used, though on a very minor scale. These attacks in the two campaigns were highly effective in inflicting damage on United States surface forces, and the Japanese were convinced that only by the use of Kamikaze tactics could they hope to halt the United States amphibious advances. Since the employment of this type of tactics was the most effective yet tried, it became the principal weapon of the Japanese air forces.

In the defense of the Nansai Shoto a definite organization was set up for the employment of suicide units, and both Army and Navy air forces assigned to the defense of this area were placed under a single tactical command, the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Toyoda. These two air forces, the 6th Air Army and the 5th Air Fleet, operated from bases in Kyushu.

Ten major attacks by suicide units of both air forces were carried out during the period from 6 April to 22 June. These organized attacks were given the name of "Kikusui" operations. These operations were as follows:

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Number	Date (1945)	Navy planes	Army planes	Total
1	6-7 April	230	125	355
2	12-13 April	125	60	185
3	15-16 April	120	45	165
4	27-28 April	65	50	115
5	3-4 May	75	50	125
6	10-11 May	70	80	150
7	24-25 May	65	100	165
8	27-28 May	60	50	110
9	3-7 June	20	30	50
10	21-22 June	30	15	45
Total		860	605	1,465

In addition to these "Kikusui" attacks, sporadic small-scale suicide attacks were carried out during this period by 140 Navy and 45 Army planes. From Formosa 250 suicide attacks were conducted, 50 by Navy planes and 200 by Army planes. The total suicide sorties against United States surface forces during the Okinawa campaign was 1,900, by Navy planes 1,050 and by Army planes 850.

In addition to these suicide sorties, orthodox torpedo and dive bombing attacks were carried out; the total number of sorties is, however, not known except for Navy aircraft with a reported 3,700 sorties.

Of interest is the effectiveness of these suicide attacks, considering the number of ships sunk and damaged and the number of suicide sorties carried out. During the period of the Kikusui operations, 26 ships were sunk and 164 damaged by suicide planes as reported by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

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Forces Involved

United States Forces:

United States Pacific Fleet	Admiral C. W. Nimitz, U. S. N.
Central Pacific Task Forces (5th Fleet)	Admiral R. A. Spruance, U. S. N.
Joint Expeditionary Force	Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. N.
Expeditionary Troops (10th Army)	Lt. Gen. S. B. Buckner, Jr., U. S. A.
III Amphibious Corps, 1st and 6th Marine Divisions	Maj. Gen. R. S. Geiger, U. S. M. C.
XXIV Army Corps, 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions	Maj. Gen. J. R. Hodge, U. S. A.
Floating Reserve:	
2d Marine Division	
27th and 77th Infantry Divisions	
Northern and Southern Attack Force	Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr., U. S. N.
Amphibious Support Force	Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, U. S. N.
Gunfire and Covering Force	Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo, U. S. N.
Fast Carrier Force.....	Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher, U. S. N.
British Carrier Force	Vice Admiral H. B. Rawlings, R. N.
Submarine Force.....	Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., U. S. N.
Strategic Air Forces, POA	Maj. Gen. W. H. Hale, U. S. A. A. F.
Forward Area Force.....	Vice Admiral J. H. Hoover, U. S. N.

The Joint Expeditionary Force consisted of 1,213 ships, with 564 support carrier aircraft. The Gunfire and Covering Force consisted of 10 old battleships, 9 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers and 23 destroyers.

The Support Carrier Group contained 14 carrier escorts.

The Expeditionary Troops employed totalled 451,866.

The Fast Carrier Force consisted of 86 ships: 15 carriers and light carriers, 8 battleships, 2 large cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 11 light cruisers, and 48 destroyers. Embarked aircraft totalled 919.

The British Carrier Force consisted of 22 ships: 4 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 light cruisers, and 12 destroyers. Embarked aircraft totalled 244.

Japanese Forces:

Combined Fleet.....	Admiral Toyoda, I. J. N.
1st Diversion Attack Force (2d Fleet)	Vice Admiral Ito, I. J. N.
1st Air Fleet (Formosa).....	Vice Admiral Onishi, I. J. N.
3d Air Fleet (Tokyo Area).....	Vice Admiral Teroka, I. J. N.
5th Air Fleet (Kyushu).....	Vice Admiral Ugaki, I. J. N.
10th Air Fleet (No. Honshu)	Vice Admiral Maeda, I. J. N.
3d Fleet (carriers).....	Vice Admiral Ozawa, I. J. N.
6th Fleet (submarines).....	Vice Admiral Miwa, I. J. N.

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The 2d Fleet consisted of 3 battleships, 2 battleship-carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 25 destroyers. Of these units only one battleship, one light cruiser and eight destroyers participated in the defense of Okinawa as the 1st Diversion Attack Force.

The 3d Fleet consisting of two carriers, two light carriers and one carrier escort, was inoperational due to lack of air groups.

The 6th Fleet had approximately 15 operational submarines.

The 1st Air Fleet had approximately 150 planes, the 3d Air Fleet 300, the 5th Air Fleet 250 and the 10th Air Fleet, the Training Command, about 900. Upon initiation of air attacks on United States forces at Okinawa, the 5th Air Fleet became the operating air fleet, and the other air fleets transferred planes and pilots to this command as needed. All air fleets had either reorganized or were in the process of reorganization and training for suicide attack operations.

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Detailed Losses United States losses (from United States sources)

SHIPS

Agent	Sunk	Damaged
Suicide planes	26	164
Miscellaneous air attacks	2	61
Shore batteries	1	8
Suicide boats	1	7
Mines	4	1
Antiaircraft fire (friendly)		10
Operational	2	78
Storms		39
Totals	36	368

AIRCRAFT

	Lost to—		Operational	Total
	Enemy AA	Enemy A/C		
Carriers (United States)	304	59	202	565
Carriers (British)	¹ 26		72	98
Marine	28	13	23	64
Navy VP	9	2	2	13
20th AF (Kyushu)	¹ 17		6	23
Totals	¹ 458		305	763

¹ Combat.

PERSONNEL

	Killed	Missing	Wounded	Total
Navy	4,907	1	4,824	9,731
Marines	2,744	90	13,523	16,357
Army	4,288	91	17,558	21,937
Total	11,939	181	35,905	48,025

¹ Included in "killed."

Japanese losses

SHIPS

Sunk:

- 1 BB.
- 1 CL.
- 4 DD.
- 3 DE.
- 1 AP.
- 6 SS.

Damaged:

- 4 DD.

AIRCRAFT (1 April–1 July 1945)


	Combat	Operational	Total
Army	¹ 1,780 (850)	805	2,585
Navy	² 2,375 (1,050)	1,850	4,225
Total	³ 4,155 (1,900)	2,655	6,810
Army reported destroyed on ground			1,020
Total			7,830

¹ Figures in parentheses indicate "suicide."


Personnel:

Counted dead	107,539
Estimated dead	23,764
Total	131,303
Prisoners of War	7,401

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Yamato's Battle Chronology

April 6-7, 1945

5 April:

1500 Received Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 607.

6 April:

1520 1st Diversion Attack Force (*Yamato, Yabagi*), DesDiv 41 (*Fuyutsuki, Suzutsuki*), DesDiv 17 (*Isokaze, Hamakaze, Yukikaze*), DesDiv 21 (*Asashimo, Hatsushimo, Kasumi*) sorties from off Tokuyama.

1710 Float reconnaissance plane of Saeki Air Group detects what seems to be an enemy submarine.

2000 Negotiate Bungo Channel. Change to course 140° at point bearing 140° distance 2.5 miles from southern tip of Fukushima. Assume No. 1 alert cruising disposition. Speed 22 knots, pursuing simultaneous zigzag maneuver, "i" time interval method.

No. 1 Alert Cruising Disposition

()

()

Isokaze

()

Asashimo

()

Kasumi

()

Yabagi

()

Hatsushimo

()

() 1.5 km.

()

Yamato Flag

()

()

Hamakaze

()

Yukikaze

30°

()

Fuyutsuki

()

Suzutsuki

Time interval in "i" maneuvers in 5 minutes.

7 April:

0300 Negotiated Osumi Channel, assuming No. 1 alert cruising disposition. Course, 220° ; speed 22 knots; simultaneous zigzag maneuver, "i" time interval method.

0345 Changed course to 280° at point bearing 193° distance 8 miles from Sata Misaki.

0600 Assume No. 3 Alert Cruising Disposition.

No. 3 Alert Cruising Disposition

0°

Yabagi

(DesRon Flag)

320°

Asashimo

280°

Kasumi

240°

Hatsushimo

200°

Suzutsuki

40°

Isokaze

80°

Hamakaze

120°

Yukikaze

Fuyutsuki

160°

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- 0840 Note 5 enemy carrier based planes at point bearing 150° distance 40 kilometers.
- 1014 Note that 2 enemy flying boats have contacted the 1st Diversion Attack Force at point bearing 230° distance 45 kilometers.
- 1016 Simultaneous turn to right to 180°.
- 1017 Commence firing main and auxiliary batteries at flying boats noted above.
- 1018 Cease firing. Lose above planes in clouds.
- 1020 Simultaneous turn to 230°.
- 1045 Simultaneous turn to 160°. Speed 20 knots.
- 1057 Simultaneous turn to 210°.
- 1110 Sight contacting plane bearing 180° distance 5 kilometers. Make simultaneous turn to 240°. Speed 24 knots.
- 1119 Turn to 270°.
- 1125 Turn to 240°.
- 1129 Turn to 205° and head for scheduled course.
- 1133 Speed 22 knots.
- 1135 Sight 7 enemy carrier-based planes bearing 270° distance 40 kilometers.
- 1141 Simultaneous turn to 180°.
- 1145 Resume zigzagging.
- 1222 Note the Oshima Transportation Unit bearing 250° distance 45 kilometers.
- 1232 Note 150 enemy carrier-based planes bearing 130° distance 50 kilometers.
- 1234 Speed 24 knots. Cease zigzagging. Commence firing at the aircraft noted above.
- 1237 Independent evasive maneuvers to port. Course, 100°.
- 1240 All units pursue 100° course. Several SB2C's commence diving bearing 90°.
- 1240 One shot down.
- 1241 Evasive maneuvers independently at maximum battle speed. Two medium sized bombs hit near aft mast. Aft fire control room, No. 2 auxiliary gun, No. 13 radar damaged.
- 1243 5 torpedo planes head for ship from point bearing 70° to port, distance 7,000 meters. Undertake to evade independently.
- 1243 3 torpedo tracks noted at point bearing 90° to port, distance 1,000 meters.
- 1245 One torpedo hit in port-forward.
- 1257 Several SB2C's go into dive from starboard-stern. One shot down.
- 1300 Set course on 180°.
- 1302 New target of 50 planes sighted bearing 200° distance 30 kilometers.
- 1322 Simultaneous turn to starboard to 210°.
- 1327 Speed 22 knots.
- 1333 20 torpedo planes head for ship from point bearing 60° to port distance 4,000 meters.
- 1334 Note 6 torpedo tracks bearing 50° to port distance 2,000 meters.
- 1337 3 torpedo hits port amidship. Auxiliary steering gear is damaged.
- 1340 Simultaneous turn to starboard to 230°.
- 1341 Note 4 torpedo tracks bearing 60° distance 7,000 meters.
- 1342 Attempt independent evasive maneuvers. 1 torpedo plane shot down 500 meters from bow.
- 1344 2 torpedo hits port amidship.
- 1345 Fix auxiliary steering gear at center position and change course to 205°. Several SB2C's dive on ship from bow. Attempt evasion. 2 SB2C's shot down.
- 1400 Several SB2C's dive on ship from starboard-bow.

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- 1402 3 medium type bomb hits port amidship.
- 1405 Note 1 torpedo track bearing 60° to starboard distance 800 meters.
- 1407 1 torpedo hit on starboard amidship.
- 1410 Note 4 torpedo tracks bearing 60° to port, distance 1,000 meters.
- 1412 2 torpedo hits on portside, amidship and aft. Set course on 0°. Actual speed 12 knots. Listing to port 6°.
- 1415 Note 1 torpedo track bearing 90° to port distance 1,000 meters.
- 1417 1 torpedo hit on portside amidship. Angle of list increasing rapidly.
- 1420 Listing to port 20°.
- 1423 Induced explosion blows up forward and aft turrets resulting in ship's sinking.

Results obtained:

Shot down	5 planes	Damaged	20 planes
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Damages suffered:

Sunk (killed in action, including Captain)	2,498
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Action Report of 2d Destroyer Squadron *The Ten Ichi operation battle report (7 April 1945)*

The general plan of the operation was for the Special Attack Force to leave Bungo Straits at sundown on the 6th, pass through Osumi Straits in the early morning of the 7th, to approach Okinawa from a northwesterly direction in the East China Sea, the attack to take place at dawn on the 8th. Land-based aircraft would attack any enemy task force sighted en route.

Progress of the operation (principal combat only) is as follows:

6 April:

- 1520 Special Attack Force consisting of the Battleship *Yamato*, light cruiser *Yabagi*, and destroyers *Fuyutsuki*, *Suzutsuki*, *Hamakaze*, *Isokaze*, *Yukakaze*, *Asashimo*, *Kasumi*, *Hatsushimo* and sub patrol destroyers *Hanatsuki*, *Kaya*, and *Maki* left Tokuyama Anchorage.
- 1620 Sub patrol (*Hanatsuki*, *Kaya*, and *Maki*) returned.
- 1645 1 B-29 sighted.

7 April:

- 0600 Passed through Osumi Straits. 1 plane dispatched from *Yamato* for antisub protection.
- 0657 *Asashimo* falling behind due to engine trouble.
- 0815 *Yabagi* dispatched 1st plane.
- 0830 Report of enemy carrier-based planes on way to attack.
- 0840 *Yamato* sighted 7 F6F's. Planes circled force once and left without attacking.
- 1016 *Yamato* fired at tracking planes, but planes were out of range.
- 1114 8 F6F's tracking the force while flying in the clouds. *Yamato* and *Yabagi* fired at them.
- 1140 Situation: Air attack expected but because of the cloudy weather and the state of the enemy the number of planes is not expected to be large.
- 1152 8 F4U's and 10 F6F's above but not attacking.
- 1210 *Asashimo* attacked by enemy plane(s).
- 1221 *Asashimo* reported seeing 30 planes. (Last report had from *Asashimo*).
- 1228 *Yamato* sighted large type planes.
- 1229 20 carrier-based planes sighted.
- 1232 Total of 150 SB2C's, F6F's, F4U's, TBM's appeared. *Yamato* opened antiaircraft fire.
- 1241- About 200 carrier-based planes directed attack mainly on *Yamato* and *Yabagi* using bombs
- 1300 and torpedoes (1st wave).
- 1245 *Hamakaze* hit by bomb. Navigation impossible. 1 plane shot down.
- 1246 *Yabagi* hit by bomb and torpedo. Navigation impossible.
- 1247 *Hamakaze* hit by a torpedo. Burning.
- 1248 *Hamakaze*'s hull broken in two—sunk. (30° 47' N. 128° 8' E.).
- 1248 *Fuyutsuki* hit by 2 rocket bombs (duds). *Yamato* hit by 3 torpedoes and 2 bombs.
- 1305 1 torpedo passed through the bottom of the *Fuyutsuki*.
- 1308 *Suzutsuki* hit by bomb forward—fire.
- 1325 2 direct bomb hits on *Kasumi* and because of a near hit navigation impossible. *Yamato* hit by a bomb.
- 1337 *Yamato* listing badly to port.
- 1342 About 150 enemy carrier-based planes approaching to attack. (2d wave).
- 1345 About 50 planes attacking *Yabagi*. *Fuyutsuki* assuming duty to pick up survivors of sunken ships. By 1350 the *Yabagi* had been hit by 2 torpedoes and was unable to navigate. The *Yamato*

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hit by bombs and torpedoes. All ships other than the destroyers *Fuyutsuki* and *Yukakaze* sunk or badly damaged.

- 1356 *Isokaze* taking in water because of a near hit aft. Speed cut down.
- 1405 *Yabagi* sunk (12 direct bomb hits and 7 torpedo hits).
- 1417 *Yamato* sunk. CinC 2d Fleet Cominch killed.
- 1430 *Suzutsuki* burning.
- 1440 Enemy planes left after strafing survivors of *Yabagi* and *Hamakaze*.
- 1450 *Hatsusbimo* and *Yukikaze* started to pick up survivors.
- 1505 2 PBM's searching for and picking up fallen enemy flying personnel.
- 1524 *Fuyutsuki* firing at PBM.
- 1657 *Kasumi* sunk.
- 1902 All survivors picked up.
- 2240 *Isokaze* scuttled after personnel were transferred. (30° 46' N. 128° 92' E.).
- 2250 *Hatsusbimo* and *Yukikaze* left for Sasebo.

8 April:

- 0845 *Fuyutsuki* arrived at Sasebo.
 - 1000 *Hatsusbimo* and *Yukikaze* arrived at Sasebo.
 - 1430 *Suzutsuki* arrived at Sasebo. Entered No. 7 drydock.
- Battle results: At least 19 planes were shot down.

Losses: *Yamato*, *Yabagi*, *Isokaze*, *Kasumi*, and *Hamakaze* sunk. *Asashimo* separated from the rest in the morning due to engine trouble. At 1240 it reported combat with enemy planes. It was probably sunk since there was no more contact with it. The *Suzutsuki* was very badly damaged but managed to return to Sasebo under its own power.

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XV

Final Naval Operations

The period 1 July to 15 August 1945 witnessed the final actions of the war, although the Japanese surrender did not take place until 2 September 1945 aboard the U. S. S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. Naval operations were limited to attacks on the home islands of Japan by fast carrier forces and continuing operations of land-based aircraft from the Marianas and Okinawa. A British Carrier Force joined the United States Fast Carrier Force in these operations.

Operations of the fast carrier forces were for the purpose of maintaining military pressure on Japan during the period of preparation for the invasion of southern Kyushu which was scheduled for November 1945. Lack of aerial opposition by the Japanese was notable during this period. In preparation for the final defense against the expected invasion, the Japanese adopted a policy of extreme conservation. Aircraft were elaborately dispersed and camouflaged making it exceedingly difficult to locate and destroy them on the ground. In conformity with this policy even normal search operations were cancelled by the Japanese with the result that Allied forces almost invariably achieved tactical surprise. In conjunction with air attacks by the fast carrier forces, battleships and heavy cruisers carried out surface bombardment of industrial targets on the eastern coast of Japan and light vessels conducted antishipping sweeps of coastal waters. Such operations as these indicated the completeness of the blockade of Japan, and of United States control of the Pacific Ocean areas. During this period United States submarines first penetrated the Japan Sea and attacked the last remaining lines of seaborne transport between the home islands and the mainland.

The fast carrier forces made the following strikes:

10 July	Tokyo.
14-15 July.....	Hokkaido—Northern Honshu.
18 July.....	Tokyo.
24-25 July.....	Inland Sea—Kure.
28 July.....	Kure.
30 July.....	Tokyo—Nagoya.
9-10 August	Hokkaido—Northern Honshu.
13 August.....	Tokyo.
15 August	Tokyo.

These strikes effected extensive damage to aircraft and airfield installations, to the remaining units of the Japanese Fleet, and to merchant shipping—particularly the Aomori-Hakodate ferry system. Of particular interest was the strike on the Hokkaido-Northern Honshu area on 9-10 August, which wiped out a force of aircraft being assembled by the Japanese for suicide attacks on the B-29 bases in the Marianas. These attacks were to consist of large-scale landings by airborne suicide troops in an operation similar to that conducted with some success at Yontan airfield on Okinawa on 24 May 1945.

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During this period the following surface bombardments of coastal targets were carried out by units of the fast carrier forces:

14 July.....	Kamaishi (North Honshu).
15 July.....	Muroran (Hokkaido).
17-18 July (night)	Hitachi (East Honshu).
22-23 July (night).....	Omura (South Honshu).
24-25 July (night)	Shiono Misaki (South Honshu).
29-30 July (night).....	Hamamatsu (South Honshu).
30-31 July (night)	Shimizu (South Honshu).
9 August.....	Kamaishi (North Honshu).

In addition to damage inflicted on industrial plants and urban areas, these bombardments had a definite effect on the Japanese morale. The fact that United States surface forces could conduct shore bombardments of the sacred soil of Japan brought home to the Japanese the realization that perhaps the war was not going smoothly.

Augmenting the damage caused to Japanese shipping by carrier aircraft attacks, shore-based planes from the Marianas and Okinawa, including Navy patrol planes, conducted extensive antishipping missions in Japanese home waters. Antishipping sweeps by light surface forces found few targets in the coastal waters of Japan or in the East China Sea.

On 10 August the first definite news of the Japanese surrender offer was received by United States forces and on 15 August hostilities ceased.

Damage to Major Japanese Ships in Kure Area

The report which follows furnishes a brief description of the bomb damage inflicted on 12 Japanese naval vessels in the Kure anchorage during the period from 19 March to 28 July 1945. The battleships *Ise*, *Hyuga*, and *Haruna*; the carriers *Amagi*, *Katsuragi* and *Ryubo*, and the cruisers *Tone*, *Aoba*, *Oyodo*, *Iwate*, *Izumo*, and *Settsu* are included in that order. This report contains a diagrammatic sketch of each ship which indicates the location of most hits and the extent of damage, and includes information as to the number of hits, type of aircraft attacking, time of grounding or capsizing and other such details.

The information presented herewith was obtained from the Japanese Naval Headquarters at Kure, from interrogation of officers who were actually aboard during the attacks, and by a visual inspection of the ships. The sketches of the ships, Appendix 106, were furnished by Captain Matsumoto, a naval constructor, who in most cases boarded the ships immediately after the attacks. The ships were attacked heavily by United States Navy carrier aircraft on 19 March and 24 and 28 July. United States high altitude horizontal bombers attacked during the same period. Since several ships were resting on the bottom on approximately an even keel they appeared undamaged from the air and consequently were heavily attacked although already completely flooded and permanently out of commission.

Many types of bombs, fuses and rockets were employed. Although the majority of the bombs were of the 500- or 1,000-pound general purpose type, 100-, 260-, and 2,000-pound bombs were used to a limited extent. Of special interest is the fact that several ships, particularly cruisers, were fatally damaged below the water line by near-misses while in many cases direct topside hits caused very little effective damage.

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This report contains the best information available at this time and is considered generally accurate. However, since all records were allegedly destroyed and the information regarding attacks was supplied from memory, corrections in small details are expected. It was impossible to assess underwater damage accurately without employing divers or without docking facilities.

Appendix 107 presents one bow and one beam photograph of each ship while Appendix 108 shows the present location of the ships as they lie disabled in Kure harbor.

I. Report of bomb damage to *Ise* (BB-XCV):

1. Summary of hits:

	19 March	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits.....	1	5	14	20.
Near Misses	Many	Many	Many	Many.

2. Present condition:

a. Due to severe damage to the hull caused by numerous hits and near misses the ship has filled with water and settled to the bottom. It is now listing 15° to starboard.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 19 March:

(1) *Ise* was attacked by about 10 or more Grumman carrier-based aircraft. Two thirds of the bombs were near misses. One bomb struck the aircraft elevator and damaged it severely. None of the attacking aircraft were shot down.

b. Attack 24 July:

(1) *Ise* was attacked by 30 carrier-based aircraft at 0615. She received many near misses and four direct hits located as follows:

- (a) Roof of No. 3 turret.
- (b) Main deck, starboard bow.
- (c) Flight deck, starboard bow.
- (d) Officers' head amidships (dud).

(2) At about 1200, 30 carrier-based aircraft attacked again and scored a direct hit on the bridge which killed the commanding officer as well as all personnel in the immediate vicinity. In addition considerable overall damage was caused by shrapnel from three very near misses. Personnel casualties during the day amounted to about 50 killed and 100 wounded.

c. Attack 28 July:

(1) A great number of carrier-based aircraft attacked ships in the Kure area during the day. At 0615 three aircraft attacked *Ise* and 0900 she was again attacked by about 60 planes which scored 6 hits and 9 very near misses. Another attack followed at 1000 and *Ise* received eight hits and many near misses. At 1400, 18 B-24's released a salvo of bombs aimed at *Ise* but inflicted no damage.

5. General information:

a. After the attack on 24 July the ship settled by the bow and took considerable water. All topside weight was removed and 3 days continuous pumping operations restored the ship to an even keel after which plans were made to tow the ship to the drydock. However, the attack on 28 July caused the ship again to settle to the bottom and although salvage operations were continued until 1800 they were unsuccessful. The ship was judged a complete loss and consequently abandoned.

b. A serious fire below decks in the vicinity of No. 1 turret caused considerable damage.

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c. *Ise* finally settled to the bottom with a 20° list to starboard such that the main deck is awash at high tide.

d. Direct hits on numbers 1 and 3 turret roofs failed to penetrate the 6-inch armor.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Lieutenant Goto, I. J. N., turret officer of No. 2 turret; Lieutenant (jg) Nogai, I. J. N., antiaircraft control officer.

II. Report of bomb damage to *Hyuga* (BB-XCV):

1. *Summary of hits:*

	19 March	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits.....	1	10	Unknown	11.
Near misses.....	Many	Many	Unknown	Many.

2. *Present condition:*

a. Due to severe damage caused by numerous hits and near misses the ship has filled with water and settled to the bottom.

3. *Extent of salvage:*

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. *Details of attacks:*

a. Attack 19 March 1945:

(1) *Hyuga* was attacked by many carrier planes which scored many near misses as well as one direct hit on the port side.

b. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) Hundreds of carrier planes raided Kure between the hours of 0915 and 1630. Fifty to 60 planes (mostly TBF's) attacked *Hyuga* with about 200 bombs. Ten direct hits as well as 20 to 30 near misses were scored. The ship began to take water immediately and grounded shortly after the attack.

c. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) *Hyuga* received many hits and near misses but she was already fatally damaged. On 1 August 1945 she was completely abandoned.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Lieutenant H. Masaharu, I. J. N.

III. Report of bomb damage to *Haruna* (BB):

1. *Summary of hits:*

	19 March	22 June	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits.....	1	1	1	Many	Many.
Near misses.....	1	0	1	Many	Many.

2. *Present condition:*

a. Due to severe damage caused by numerous hits and near misses the ship has filled with water and settled to the bottom.

3. *Extent of salvage:*

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. *Details of attacks:*

a. Attack 19 March 1945:

(1) *Haruna* was attacked by 15 carrier planes. She received one hit on the starboard side aft of the bridge which caused only light damage.

b. Attack 22 June 1945:

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(1) *Haruna* was attacked by eight large horizontal bombers (B-24's). Received one hit on port side aft which caused light damage.

c. Attack 24 July:

(1) *Haruna* was attacked by more than 10 carrier planes (Grumman). She received one hit on port side aft which caused light damage.

d. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) *Haruna* was attacked continuously from 0800 to 1700 by carrier planes (Grumman). B-24's also attacked at 1300 but scored no hits. *Haruna* received many hits and near misses and was abandoned by the crew immediately thereafter.

5. *General remarks:*

a. The attacks on 28 July were concentrated on *Haruna*. She received many hits and near misses which destroyed her buoyancy in the unarmored sections. As the quantity of water being shipped increased water also entered through the bomb holes on the upper deck causing the ship to settle quickly.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Captain Yoshimura, I. J. N., Commanding Officer.

IV. Report of bomb damage to *Amagi* (CV):

1. *Summary of hits:*

	19 March	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits.....	1	3	1	5.
Near misses.....	Unknown	Several	Many	Many.

2. *Present condition:*

a. Due to severe damage to the hull caused by numerous near misses the ship filled with water and almost capsized to port before settling to the bottom.

3. *Extent of salvage:*

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. *Details of attacks:*

a. Attack 19 March 1945:

(1) *Amagi* was attacked by many carrier-based planes. One bomb-hit on an antiaircraft gun starboard side abeam No. 3 elevator caused minor damage to the gun and to the elevator.

b. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) *Amagi* was attacked at 0930 by 30 carrier-based planes and again at 1530 by 20 planes of the same type. The following damage was received:

(a) One rocket hit on flight deck alongside island.

(b) One bomb hit amidships between No. 2 and No. 3 elevator caused heavy damage to the flight and hangar decks and also caused the after port side engine room to flood.

(c) A very near miss on the port side abreast No. 2 elevator nicked an antiaircraft gun and caused serious underwater damage by flooding number 3, 4, 5, and 6 boiler rooms.

(d) A near miss on the starboard side forward of the bridge caused flooding of forward bomb stowage.

c. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) *Amagi* was attacked by about 30 carrier planes at 0930, by 11 B-24's at 1200 and by 30 carrier planes again at 1530. She received one hit amidships port side from carrier planes and many near misses by carrier planes and B-24's. Since she was already heavily flooded as a result of the attack on 24 July

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the additional leakage caused by the near misses was sufficient to cause her to list gradually to port. At 1000 29 July she listed 70° and now lies on her side.

5. *General remarks:*

a. *Amagi* was built at Nagasaki and moved to Kure for fitting out. She was never operated because of (1) shortage of escort vessels, (2) shortage of fuel, and (3) shortage of aircraft.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Japanese Naval Headquarters, Kure.
V. Report of bomb damage to *Katsuragi* (CV):

1. *Summary of hits:*

	19 March	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits.....	1	1	2	4
Near misses.....	0	0	1	1

2. *Present condition:*

a. The damage from hits was not fatal. The ship suffered very little underwater damage and consequently is still seaworthy although unfit for flight operations due to damage to flight and hangar decks.

3. *Extent of salvage:*

a. All military equipment has been removed and the ship is being fitted out for repatriation duty. The estimated capacity is 5,000.

4. *Details of attacks:*

a. Attack 19 March 1945:

(1) An estimated 300 carrier aircraft raided Kure. Ten planes attacked *Katsuragi* which received only one hit on the starboard side forward. The bomb was a 500-pound GP bomb which skipped into the side and blew a hole 5 feet in diameter in the side plating and upper hangar deck. The flight deck and upper hangar deck were damaged by shrapnel. Temporary repairs have been completed. One man was killed and three were wounded. There was no damage by near misses.

b. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) About 200 carrier aircraft raided Kure. Ten to 12 planes attacked *Katsuragi* which received only 1 hit on anti-aircraft gun port side amidships. The bomb was 500-pound GP bomb and inflicted only superficial damage although the entire gun crew of 13 was killed and 5 additional personnel were wounded. The ship was also hit by 50-cal. machine gun bullets which caused no damage.

c. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) Hundreds of CV aircraft raided Kure. A total of 10 to 12 aircraft attacked *Katsuragi* which received 2 hits amidships by 1,000-pound bombs. The bombs penetrated the flight deck just aft of No. 2 elevator and exploded in the upper hangar deck. A strip of flight deck 10 meters in width was blown to starboard falling across the stacks which were also damaged. The upper hangar deck was bulged outward in every direction and much of the flight deck and all elevators are bent out of line. Total casualties were 13 dead and 12 wounded.

5. *General remarks:*

a. Ship was well camouflaged and consequently *Amagi* and other ships in immediate vicinity received a majority of attacks.

b. There were no fires at any time.

c. No rockets were fired at the *Katsuragi*.

d. There was no listing and no underwater damage.

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e. *Katsuragi* shot down one plane on 28 July which had just attacked *Amagi*.

f. Prior to the attack of 19 March the ship had fired only two antiaircraft practices.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Captain Miyazaki, I. J. N., Commanding Officer; Ensign Hoashi, M., I. J. N., Antiaircraft Battery Officer.

VI. Report of bomb damage to *Ryubo* (CV):

1. Summary of hits:

	19 March	Total
Hits	5	5
Near misses	0	0

2. Present condition:

a. Although the ship is afloat and on an even keel considerable repair work will be required before she is fit for sea because of the extensive damage to the flight and hangar decks.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All military equipment has been removed and the ship is being fitted out for repatriation duty.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 19 March 1945:

(1) *Ryubo* was attacked while under way by many carrier planes and received the following hits:

(*a*) One bomb hit at frame 167 of upper hangar deck which made a hole 10 meters in diameter in the flight deck and another hole 5 meters wide plus a crack 12 meters long in the side plating of the hangar in the vicinity of the warrant officers cabins.

(*b*) One bomb amidships at frame 172 made a hole and broke the upper deck line.

(*c*) One bomb near frame 202, port side, middle deck, made a large crack in the outer skin and caused the ship to take considerable water which required 15 days to pump out. The force of the explosion blew No. 3 elevator completely out of the elevator well.

(*d*) One solid head rocket hit in the vicinity of frame 125 on starboard side of the upper hangar. It broke the plates of this deck and a bulkhead in the neighborhood of the entrance to No. 1 boiler room making five holes (70 cm. in diameter).

(*e*) One solid head rocket hit near frame 105 on the starboard side of the middle deck and made six holes 50 cm. in diameter in the plates.

5. General remarks:

a. On 24 March, 5 days after the attack, *Ryubo* entered Kure Navy Yard for temporary repairs which required one week. Machinery was repaired but no effort was made to repair the flight and hangar decks. On 1 April she was moved to present mooring and heavily camouflaged. Because of weather there was no enemy reconnaissance during the time required to complete the camouflage and consequently the ship was apparently not discovered and attacked on 24 and 28 July. In order not to reveal her position the anti-aircraft guns were not fired during the above attack.

b. In addition to the two rocket hits mentioned above seven additional rocket hits were received on 19 March. They did not explode and did no damage.

c. There were 20 killed and 30 wounded on 19 March. A captured American pilot stated that all bombs dropped on *Ryubo* weighed 500 pounds.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Captain Hojima, I. J. N., Commanding Officer.

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VII. Report of bomb damage to *Tone* (CA):

1. Summary of hits:

	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits	4	2	6
Near misses	7	7	14

2. Present condition:

a. Due to severe damage to the hull caused by numerous hits and near misses the ship has filled with water and grounded.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible and above the surface of the water have been removed and the remainder of the ship has been abandoned.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) Kure harbor was under attack from 0615 to 1700. About 100 carrier planes (Grumman) attacked *Tone* scoring 4 direct hits and 7 near misses. As a result of extensive damage, the ship lost buoyancy and was towed to shallow water and beached to prevent sinking.

b. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) A great number of carrier-based planes and B-24's attacked *Tone*. The B-24's missed the objective but the carrier planes scored two direct hits and many near misses. The accumulated damage was fatal and personnel and equipment were removed from the ship on 28 July. The ship was totally abandoned on 4 August 1945.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Lieutenant Yoshio, M., I. J. N.

VIII. Report of bomb damage to *Aoba* (CA):

1. Summary of hits:

	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits	1	8	9.
Near misses	1	Many	Many.

2. Present condition:

a. Due to severe damage to the hull caused by numerous hits and near misses the ship has filled with water and settled to the bottom. The after section of the hull is completely broken off.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible and above the surface have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) *Aoba* was attacked continuously from 0615 to 1600 by carrier-based planes. About 30 Grumman attacked during the day and obtained 1 direct hit on the bow and a very near miss on the port side aft of No. 2 stack. The near miss caused the following damage:

(*a*) Complete flooding of all engine rooms and of numbers 4, 5, 6 and 7 boiler rooms. The ship lost buoyancy and settled to the bottom at 1000.

b. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) *Aoba* was attacked by about 10 Grumman aircraft in the morning and again later in the afternoon. She received four direct hits and was set afire. At 1600 B-24's attacked and obtained four or more hits on the stern causing it to break off. The ship was abandoned because of the accumulated damage.

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NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Captain Murayama, I. J. N., Commanding Officer.

IX. Report of bomb damage to *Oyodo* (CL):

1. Summary of hits:

	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits	4	4	8.
Near misses	4	Many	Many.

2. Present condition:

a. Due to severe damage to the hull caused by numerous hits and near misses the ship has filled with water, capsized to starboard and settled to the bottom.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All weapons and equipment above the surface which were easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) *Oyodo* was under attack from 0615 to 1700 by about 50 carrier-based planes (SB2C's and F6F's). Four direct hits and many near misses caused the ship to list slightly to starboard. The ship was also damaged by strafing.

b. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) *Oyodo* was under attack from 0700 to 1600 by about 40 carrier-based planes (SB2C's and F6F's). She received four direct hits and many near misses. At 1000 she listed heavily to starboard as a result of hits near the bridge which caused extensive flooding. At 1200 she capsized to starboard and now lies on the bottom in shallow water. All personnel abandoned ship the afternoon of 28 July.

5. General remarks:

a. The *Oyodo* was the flagship of the CinC of the Combined Fleet.

b. She was never attacked by horizontal bombers.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Lieutenant Ayuba, I. J. N.

X. Report of bomb damage to *Iwate* (OCL):

1. Summary of hits:

	19 March	24 July	Total
Hits	None	None	None.
Near misses	3	5	8.

2. Present condition:

a. Due to the age and condition of the ship the plates were easily split by near misses and the ship quickly flooded and settled to the bottom.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 19 March 1945:

(1) On morning of 19 March, *Iwate* was enroute Kure to Bungo Nado to conduct gunnery practice. Many carrier planes passed overhead. Eight Grumman planes attacked the *Iwate* which received three near

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misses but suffered no damage. The strafing wounded 12 and killed one and caused slight damage to the superstructure.

b. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) On 24 July four carrier aircraft attacked the ship. No direct hits were received but three bombs fell about 20 to 30 meters from the starboard side amidships and exploded very deep. There was no geyser of water but a tremendous shock wave similar to that of a depth charge. An examination below decks revealed a hole 1 meter in width below the water line. This was about 1000 and it was thought that the ship could be saved. However, a few minutes later the ship went down by the bow, then settled by the stern. Twenty-four hours later the ship capsized.

5. General remarks:

- a.* *Iwate* was a very old ship used primarily for training and operations in home waters.
- b.* There was no fire and no topside damage.
- c.* The aircraft dived from port quarter to starboard bow and all bombs overshot.
- d.* The angle of glide of the aircraft was 60°.
- e.* There were none killed; three were wounded in hold.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Lieutenant Commander Nishikawa, Gunnery Officer.

XI. Report of bomb damage to *Izumo* (OCL):

1. Summary of hits:

	19 March	28 July	Total
Hits.....			
Near misses.....		3	3

2. Present condition:

a. Due to severe damage caused by 3 near misses the ship filled with water, capsized, and settled to the bottom.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All weapons and equipment which were above the surface and easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 19 March 1945:

(1) While the *Izumo* was at Etajima many carrier planes raided Kure. Two planes bombed and strafed the ship inflicting no damage. The ship moved to Imishima for drydocking and returned to the present anchorage in Kure at the end of April.

b. Attack 24 July 1945:

(1) There was no direct attack on *Izumo* which was heavily camouflaged; all aircraft concentrated on *Haruna*.

c. Attack 28 July 1945:

(1) Many aircraft raided Kure. Twenty Grumman planes attacked *Izumo* from direction of mountains and scored three near misses but no direct hits. All near misses over shot. All three near misses caused underwater damage and the ship took considerable water. Number 1 hold filled and ship gradually listed 15° to port and then capsized suddenly 1 hour after the attack.

5. General remarks:

- a.* There was no fire at any time.
- b.* Two men were killed and three wounded by the attack.

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c. Two American planes crashed on the beach.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Lieutenant Commander Okinoka, I. J. N., Gunnery Officer.

XII. Report of bomb damage to *Settsu* (OCL):

1. Summary of hits:

	24 July	28 July	Total
Hits	3	3
Near misses	Many	3	3+

2. Present condition:

a. Due to the age and condition of the ship minor bomb damage caused her considerable flooding and she settled to the bottom.

3. Extent of salvage:

a. All weapons and equipment which were easily accessible have been removed and the ship has been abandoned.

4. Details of attacks:

a. Attack 24 July:

(1) At 1500 *Settsu* was attacked by about 30 Grumman planes and received 3 direct hits and many near misses on starboard side. The near misses caused plates to split and the ship gradually flooded. On 26 July she grounded on even keel.

b. Attack 28 July:

(1) Ship completely grounded and consequently was attacked by only three planes which scored two near misses but no hits. On 29 July the ship was entirely abandoned.

NOTE—Details concerning the above attacks were furnished by: Lieutenant Shimakawa, I. J. N.

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Forces Involved

United States Forces:

United States Pacific Fleet	Admiral C. W. Nimitz, N. S. N.
Third Fleet	Admiral W. F. Halsey, U. S. N.
Fast Carrier Force	Vice Admiral J. S. McCain, U. S. N.
British Carrier Force	Vice Admiral H. B. Rawlings, R. N.
Fleet Air Wing One	Rear Admiral J. D. Price, U. S. N.
Forward Area Force	Vice Admiral J. H. Hoover, U. S. N.
Fleet Air Wing Eighteen	Rear Admiral M. R. Greer, U. S. N.

The Fast Carrier Force consisted of 94 ships: 14 aircraft carriers and small aircraft carriers, 8 battleships, 15 heavy reuisers and light cruisers, and 57 destroyers. Embarked aircraft totalled 1,022.

The British Carrier Force consisted of 28 ships: 4 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 6 light cruisers, and 17 destroyers. Embarked aircraft totalled 244.

Fleet Air Wing One maintained an average strength of 165 patrol planes, 77 of which were patrol land planes and 88 patrol seaplanes.

Fleet Air Wing Eighteen maintained an average strength of 205 patrol planes, 142 of which were patrol land planes and 63 patrol seaplanes.

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Detailed Losses

United States naval losses (from United States sources)

Ships: One destroyer damaged by suicide plane.

Aircraft

	To enemy anti-aircraft	To enemy aircraft	Operational	Total
United States carriers	184	11	71	266
British carriers	43		29	72
Navy patrol planes	18	2	4	24
Totals	258		104	362

Japanese losses (Japanese sources)

Ships:

Sunk:

Damaged:


Aircraft carrier	1	Aircraft carrier	1
Battleship	1	Small aircraft carrier	1
Battleship carriers	2	Aircraft carrier escort	1
Heavy cruisers	2	Battleship	1
Light cruisers	1	Destroyers	4
Old light cruisers	3	Mine layer	1
Escort destroyers	9	Escort destroyers	10
Railroad ferries	¹ 10	Railroad ferries	2
Totals	29	Totals	21


¹ 2 beached.

Aircraft (period 1 July-15 August 1945)


	Destroyed in air and on ground	Lost operationally	Total
Army	485	255	740
Navy	901	1,725	2,606
Totals	1,386	1,980	3,346


Appendix 105








- NOTES
- (1) THIS DIAGRAM SHOWS EFFECTS OF BOMBINGS ON 19 MARCH AND 24 JULY.
 - (2) FATALLY HIT ON 24 JULY AND WENT TO BOTTOM.
 - (3) DAMAGES SUFFERED BY BOMBINGS ON 28 JULY ESTIMATED VERY HEAVY BUT SHIP ALREADY ON BOTTOM. HITS NOT SHOWN.
 - (4) COMPLETELY ABANDONED 1 AUGUST 1945.













NOTES

- (1) ALL HITS ON 24 & 28 JULY WERE SCORED BY SHIP BASED PLANES. THE SHIP WAS STILL AFLOAT AFTER THE ATTACK ON 24 JULY SO WAS TOWED TO SHALLOWS AND HER BOW BEACHED.
- (2) EXACT HITS ARE UNDETERMINED ON 28 JULY, BUT AS A RESULT OF ATTACKS, THE SHIP WAS BADLY FLOODED AND THE SHIP JUDGED TO BE BEYOND HELP. IT IS REPORTED THAT FORMATIONS OF B-24S ALSO ATTACKED ON THIS DAY, BUT THEY DID NOT SCORE A SINGLE HIT.




NOTES

- (1) DIAGRAM SHOWS DAMAGES SUFFERED DURING ATTACKS OF 24 & 28 JULY
- (2) NEAR MISS ON PORTSIDE ON 24 JULY CAUSED SERIOUS FLOODING IN ENGINE ROOMS SHIP GROUNDED AT 0800
- (3) MANY BOMB HITS ON STERN OF SHIP ON 28 JULY CAUSED HEAVY FLOODING, STERN BROKE AND WENT TO BOTTOM
- (4) DAMAGE SUSTAINED ON 28 JULY MADE IT NECESSARY TO ABANDON SHIP.




- NOTES:
- (1) DIAGRAM INDICATES DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY BOMBING ON 24 JULY & 28 JULY.
 - (2) DAMAGES SUSTAINED DURING ATTACK ON 24 JULY RESULTED IN SLIGHT STARBOARD LIST.
 - (3) BOMBING ATTACK ON 28 JULY RESULTED IN HER BEING CAPSIZED AT 1200.
 - (4) ALL ATTACKS BY CARRIER PLANES.



IWATE


NOTES:

- (1) BOMBINGS ON 24 JULY CAUSED SHIP TO FLOOD AND GO TO BOTTOM.
- (2) NO HITS
- (3) BECAUSE OF ITS OLD AGE, SHIP GRADUALLY BECAME FLOODED FROM DAMAGES TO OUTER PLATES FROM NEAR MISSES UNTILL SHE FINALLY LOST ALL BUOYANCY.
- (4) THE BOMBINGS OF 24 JULY WERE FATAL TO HER.



IZUMO

NOTE:
(1) THIS SHOWS HOW THE IZUMO CAPSIZED AS RESULT OF BOMBING ON 28 JULY.
(2) THREE NEAR MISSES. NO DIRECT HITS.
(3) SHIP GRADUALLY LISTED 15° TO PORT AND THEN CAPSIZED ONE HOUR AFTER ATTACK.



NOTES:
 (1) DIAGRAM SHOWS DAMAGES RESULTING FROM BOMBING ON 24 JULY
 (2) ON 24 JULY THREE DIRECT HITS CAUSED NO SERIOUS DAMAGE BUT NEAR BOMB MISSES ON STARBOARD CAUSED OUTER PLATES TO SPLIT PERMITTING HER TO FLOOD, BECAUSE OF HER AGE FLOODED AREA GRADUALLY INCREASED UNTIL ENTIRE SHIP BECAME COMPLETELY FLOODED ON 26 JULY.
 (3) ON 28 JULY SHIP ATTACKED BY ONLY 3 PLANES. NO HITS.
 (4) COMPLETELY ABANDONED BY 29 JULY.



Photo 1
Bow View of *Ise* (BB-XCV)



Photo 2
Beam View of *Ise* (BB-XCV)

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Photo 3
Bow View of *Hyuga* (BB-XCV)



Photo 4
Beam View of *Hyuga* (BB-XCV)



Photo 5
Bow View of *Haruna* (BB)



Photo 6
Beam View of *Haruna* (BB)

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Photo 7
Stern View of forward starboard and flight deck of *Amagi* (CV)



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Photo 8
Quarter View of hull and superstructure of *Amagi* (CV)



Photo 9
Beam View of *Katsuragi* (CV)



Photo 10
Flight Deck View of *Katsuragi* (CV)

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Photo 11
Beam View of *Ryūbo* (CV)



Photo 12
Bow View of *Ryūbo* (CV)




Photo 13
Bow View of *Tone* (CA)



Photo 14
Beam View of *Tone* (CA)



Photo 15
Beam View of *Aoba* (CA)



Photo 16
Deck View of *Aoba* (CA)



Photo 17
Stern View of *Oyodo* (CL)



Photo 18
Hull View of *Oyodo* (CL)

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Photo 19
Bow View of *Iwate* (OCL)



Photo 20
Beam View of *Iwate* (OCL)




Photo 21
Hull View of *Izumo* (OCL)



Photo 22
Deck View of *Izumo* (OCL)




Photo 23
Port Quarter View of Superstructure of *Settsu* (CL)



Photo 24
Appendix 107 Port Quarter View of Superstructure of *Settsu* (CL)

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XVI

The Campaign to Destroy Japanese Shipping

By nature of her geography Japan has been a maritime nation since earliest times. Emergence from self imposed isolation in 1870 and determination to modernize led the Japanese to increase the size of the merchant marine for communication with all countries of the world. Rapid industrial development in the first quarter of the twentieth century stimulated interest in foreign trade and emphasized Japan's position as an important maritime nation. Like England, Japan became increasingly dependent upon shipping to provide essential raw materials and to support a modern economy which was built upon developing foreign markets. Although not as dependent upon outside food supplies as her Occidental counterpart, Japan relied upon shipping for raw materials and to sustain her growth as an industrial nation. Petroleum, so essential to modern industry, was obtainable only from overseas. Even coal required water transportation from the continent and from northern mines to the factories in the south of Honshu.

At the outbreak of World War II Japan possessed about 6,200,000 gross tons of shipping which was sufficient to her subsistence and immediate military needs. Although Japanese officials declared that there was never enough shipping, it is impracticable to determine how much more would have been required to exploit the suddenly acquired resources in the south. It is evident however that a nation at war can maintain or increase her merchant fleet only by building or otherwise acquiring ships faster than they are destroyed. At the outbreak of hostilities Japan did not take energetic steps to increase her shipbuilding program nor to insure protection of the shipping she already possessed. The modest scale of her shipbuilding effort, only 260,000 tons for the year 1942, may have been imposed by more important considerations. However, Japan's failure in 1942 to initiate a program of escort vessel construction and to organize convoy protection along efficient lines can only be explained by a lack of foresight or great overconfidence. The Japanese Navy, though profiting by following British example in many ways, did not profit by the bitter British experience with German submarine warfare in World War I. There was no single command or office of the Japanese Navy primarily responsible for shipping protection at the outbreak of war. There was no program for construction of Japanese escort vessels and only two were built prior to April 1943.

In December 1941 the Japanese Navy had assigned to duties of protecting shipping 12 destroyers, 100 torpedo boats, subchasers and other small craft, and 210 converted merchant vessels. Four air groups and one auxiliary aircraft carrier were also available for these duties. These units were distributed among the Naval Guard districts, Base Forces and units of the China Fleet as shown in Organization Chart Number 1 of Appendix 112. There was no central authority to specify escort procedures, determine routes, or shift forces promptly to meet new threats to shipping. Each command, including the area fleet commands, was responsible for protecting shipping within its area. The above listed units were distributed among these commands but obviously were not employed exclusively in protection of shipping.

There was no escort organization and the procedure for coordinating the work of adjacent commands or the various commands along an extended shipping route was loose and inefficient. Three departments of the government each controlled movements of a proportion of shipping. The Shipping Control Association (Senpaku Uneikai) controlled such shipping as had not been requisitioned by the Army or Navy. The Army, through its shipping headquarters at Ujina and five sub headquarters outside the Empire, controlled those ships assigned to its jurisdiction. The Navy, through the central office of Naval Transportation, headquarters of fleets, Naval Stations and sub offices in occupied territories controlled some requisitioned civilian shipping and all naval cargo and transports vessels except those units directly under fleet control. Coordination of control existed only at the top through conference of the interested government depart-

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ments regarding the general distribution of shipping. Arrangements for shipping protection between outlying ports were not uniform and exchange of information regarding sailings and departures and enemy submarine sightings was not always complete.

The initial Japanese drive to the south and through the Central Pacific swept all Allied naval and air forces out of those areas except for a few submarines. The Japanese shipping which followed this advance enjoyed comparative immunity from attack during the first 6 months of the war. The few United States submarines operating in the South China Sea, Philippines and N. E. I. were employed principally in opposing the Japanese advance. The few Allied aircraft of the type suitable for long-range attacks on shipping were engaged in scouting or attacks on combatant ships. The Japanese High Command felt that their essential lines of communication were secure. They built no escort ships and planned construction of only four for the fiscal year ending March 1943.

Within 6 hours following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the United States Chief of Naval Operations issued orders which initiated air and submarine warfare against Japanese shipping. At that time United States submarines in the Southwest Pacific numbered 29 and in the Central Pacific 22. The former group was already deployed to resist Japan's southward advance and the majority of Central Pacific submarines moved immediately to the focal points of enemy shipping lanes off Yokohama, Nagasaki and Shimonoseki, in the Bungo and Kii channels, and in Tsushima Straits. Tasks assigned to the Submarine Force Pacific were to establish the maximum number of patrols off the Japanese homeland, emphasizing the above listed stations, and to inflict the maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping. The number of United States submarines rose slowly during 1942 and at the end of that year there were about 35 on patrol in the Pacific. Sinkings by submarine increased steadily and totaled over 670,000 tons on 1 January 1943. By that time, air attacks had accounted for about 255,000 tons, almost equally divided between Army and Navy aircraft.

The persistent attacks of Allied aircraft on Japanese attempts to reinforce Guadalcanal by sea gradually forced the employment of light naval ships for the Tokyo Express. This also became true in the New Guinea campaign after United States and Allied bombers, attacking a 16-ship convoy in the Bismarck Sea in March 1943, sank all 8 merchant ships for a total of 30,000 tons and 4 of 8 escorting destroyers. Thereafter fewer Japanese merchant ships were brought within range of United States land-based aircraft, but the Japanese Navy was required to assume an escort burden which ultimately resulted in serious reduction of destroyer strength. The United States Army Fourteenth Air Force increased the scale of attack against Japanese river traffic on the Yangtze, seriously reducing shipments from this area which supplied a major portion of Japan's iron ore. This air force also harassed Japanese shipping along the China Coasts from the Gulf of Tonkin to Shanghai.

During 1943 the Solomons and New Guinea campaigns accelerated in tempo, requiring the Japanese to increase their supply effort to those areas as well as to commit larger military forces. United States submarines took their toll along the shipping routes from the Empire to the southeast and United States aircraft made the last few hundred miles of these routes increasingly dangerous for enemy shipping. When the Japanese commenced moving supplies near their front line destination only at night Allied aircraft countered with the Navy "Black Cats" and Army low altitude bombers which were also equipped with radar for night attacks on shipping. In November of 1943 when shipping losses had reached a total of about 2,500,000 tons, the Japanese undertook a tardy reorganization and strengthening of their escort forces. The Combined Escort Fleet, with headquarters in Tokyo, was established 15 November 1943 and organizational changes were made as shown in chart number 2 of Appendix 112.

The reorganization of Japan's escort forces and increased construction of escort vessels which had commenced a few months earlier were ineffectual in halting the downward trend of available Japanese merchant tonnage. Japan's merchant fleet had already been reduced to 80 percent of its original size in spite of a greatly increased shipbuilding program and several factors beyond her control were steadily

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working to reduce it further. Lack of ship repair facilities outside the Empire was always serious and the lack of such facilities in main Pacific bases such as Truk and Rabaul was especially costly. Ships damaged in these areas often were unable to move out of the danger zone and frequently were lost in subsequent attacks. The lack of oil storage capacity sufficient to sustain fleet operations from these bases required Japanese tankers to remain in locations subject to air attack. United States submarines were increasing in number and remaining longer in the operating areas as their bases were advanced. United States carriers were increasing in number and soon would be reaching a figure which permitted frequent employment of carrier task forces on antishipping strikes. New developments and production of American radar and sonar equipment were widening the gap between the effectiveness of Japanese defense and the power of the United States offense. Japan had fallen behind in ability to protect her shipping and her position was rapidly becoming worse.

The carrier task force raid on Truk, February 16-17, 1944, was the first of a series of heavy blows at Japanese shipping. More than 186,000 tons including 52,000 tons of tankers were sunk in the 2-day attack by dive-bombers and torpedo planes. This tanker loss, added to 48,000 tons sunk by submarines in the same month, seriously reduced the Japanese Navy's supply of oil and soon affected the fleet's mobility.

Less spectacular but maintaining daily pressure against single enemy ships and the smaller interisland craft were the Allied long-range search aircraft, both land and sea planes. United States Navy patrol planes and Army B-24's armed with bombs daily covered a good portion of the Pacific by searching sectors extending 600 to 800 miles from their bases. As United States forces advanced along the northern New Guinea coast, Navy tender-based seaplanes operated from advanced locations against enemy shipping. As landing fields for heavy bombers were completed, the tenders and their planes moved forward to new hunting grounds. "Black Cats" often operated at night in areas where a seaplane had little chance of survival during daylight. Army and Navy land-based aircraft conducted armed search for shipping throughout the Borneo, Celebes, and South Philippines area. Allied land-based and seaplane reconnaissance aircraft maintained the blockade of bypassed islands, including Truk, Rabaul and Ponape. The tonnage of ships sunk to their credit is not as impressive as that for other forces but their daily sorties kept the stopper in the bottle forcing the Japanese to use submarines for supply which might otherwise have been used to destroy Allied shipping.

In February 1944 the Japanese gave up reinforcement of Rabaul and withdrew their air groups. Truk was neutralized as a fleet base by the threat of carrier raids. Reinforcement by surface ships to such of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands as were still in Japanese hands had also been effectively stopped by aircraft. The last attempt to supply Biak by surface ships occurred in the middle of June 1944 when a surface group was severely damaged by B-25's. All supply to New Guinea ended in July of that year.

Carrier strikes preliminary or incident to United States invasion of the Marianas and Palau Islands sank practically all Japanese shipping in these areas. Carrier aircraft attacking Palau on 30 March 1944 sank 95,000 tons, 47,000 of which was tanker tonnage. Three days preceding the United States landing on Saipan carrier aircraft sank 10 of 12 small freighters and 1 escort vessel in the convoy fleeing from the vicinity.

The Japanese had lost over 5,000,000 tons of shipping by August 1944, but more significant was the fact that the 3,250,000 tons remaining was insufficient for minimum requirements even for their greatly reduced empire. The United States Foreign Economic Administration estimated that in 1944 Japan's minimum shipping requirements would average 4,470,000 tons. The Japanese merchant fleet had been destroyed faster than the empire which it served.

In a desperate attempt to conserve precious shipping still remaining the Japanese reorganized their escort forces in August 1944. The principal changes of this second reorganization were placing the Combined Escort Forces under the Combined Fleet, creation of eight tactical commands designated as the First to Eighth Escort Convoys, and elimination of the Second Surface Escort Unit, the entire staff of which had

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been lost in the United States invasion of Saipan. Although eight Escort Convoys were provided for, the lack of suitable officers and ships prevented immediate organization of more than four. A fifth eventually was added. The number of escort vessels had increased about 20 percent since the first reorganization in November 1943 and the reduction in total length of convoy routes to be covered brought the Escort Force closer to adequacy than ever before. The Japanese Fleet, being inactive a large proportion of the time, often could spare light vessels to bolster the escort strength of important convoys. This was facilitated by the overall command of Escort Forces being exercised by the Combined Fleet. However, the new command arrangement had its disadvantages for the Escort Force. Heretofore vessels or aircraft of this force could not be diverted to missions in support of fleet operations or in defense of Japanese held territory but this was now changed. During the carrier task force raids on Formosa in October 1944 radar-equipped aircraft and crews of the Escort Force Air Groups specially trained for antisubmarine warfare were employed in night attacks on the United States Fleet, and most of these aircraft and crews were lost. This was a serious blow which greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Japanese air groups employed in escort.

Reorganization and strengthening of Japanese forces for protecting shipping did not prevent its continued destruction at a high rate. United States bases in the Marianas now permitted submarines to increase their total time on patrol along Japan's convoy routes in the China Sea. Carrier task forces could replenish of suitable officers and ships prevented immediate organization of more than four. A fifth eventually was at Ulithi or Guam when necessary and reach the launching point for aircraft strikes on the Philippines or the Ryukus in two days' steaming. The replenishment of carrier groups at sea, moreover, had reached such a high degree of development that these forces could maintain attacks every few days against Japan's communication lines when profitable to do so. Land-based aircraft from bases at Biak and Morotai could reach shipping in the Southern Philippines, the Celebes and Eastern Borneo.

In September 1944, after carrier aircraft had beaten down Japanese air in the Philippines by repeated strikes, attention was turned to Japanese shipping. Successive carrier raids on Manila in September left that harbor strewn with hulks of Japanese merchant and combatant ships. A subsequent carrier raid on Coron Bay sank more ships which had taken refuge there. Heretofore the safest shipping route between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan had been via Borneo, and the western shores of the Philippines, Formosa and the Ryukyus. Good harbors, a chain of airfields for escort aircraft and proximity to Japanese strong points made this route ideal. After September 1944 convoys were forced to take the longer, less satisfactory route along the Indo-China and South China coasts, crossing the East China Sea north of the most dangerous area for air attacks.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese to reinforce Leyte gave United States air forces another opportunity to smash enemy shipping. Twelve merchant ships and 15 naval vessels carrying troops and supplies or performing escort duties were sunk by United States aircraft in or near Ormoc Bay. Of these, Army aircraft sank 8 and carrier and Marine aircraft sank 19. United States carrier task forces entered the South China Sea in early January 1945 to cover Allied landings at Lingayen Gulf and to attack Japanese shipping wherever it could be found. In a rapid succession of air strikes extending from Saigon to Hongkong these forces destroyed more than 260,000 tons of Japanese shipping including 68,000 tons of tankers.

Seaplane tenders with their patrol squadrons moved into the Philippines with United States invasion forces at Leyte, Mindoro and Lingayen. The daily pattern of protective reconnaissance, and searches for Japanese shipping by Allied aircraft and "Black Cat" operations, soon covered most of the South China Sea. By February 1945 United States aircraft from Philippine bases extended their daily operations to the area along the Asiatic coast covered by the Fourteenth United States Army Air Force operating from China, thus bringing under constant air attack Japan's remaining shipping route to the Southern Resources Area. Mining of the approaches to Shanghai by this Air Force in early 1945 further reduced Japanese communication with Central China. The mining of Palembang, Saigon, Singapore and Shanghai by B-29's also added to Japan's shipping difficulties.

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United States forces in the Philippines completed the isolation of Japan from southern resources and by March 1945 Japanese shipping through the South China Sea had ceased. United States Navy patrol aircraft based at Iwo Jima, Army and Navy aircraft operating from Okinawa and the Fourteenth Air Force reaching from China bases, brought under attack by May of 1945 Japan's last shipping routes to the Asiatic mainland. B-29's began a systematic campaign of mining Japanese ports and coastal waters which in the last four months of the war sank or disabled almost 650,000 tons of shipping. United States submarines in June commenced operating in the Japan Sea. Shrinking stock piles of essential raw materials had already markedly reduced Japanese war production. The critical shortage of bunker oil and aviation gasoline limited the operations of what remained of the Japanese Navy and Air Forces and forced resort to such drastic measures as the employment of capital ships to carry petroleum products to the homeland. The supply of coal, the only fuel available in quantity within the homeland, was drastically reduced by a carrier aircraft attack on the Hokkaido ferry system which destroyed or put out of commission all railroad car ferries employed to bring coal from that northern island to the industries of Honshu.

Before hostilities ceased on 15 August, the 1,500,000 tons of Japanese merchant shipping remaining was practically useless because of complete Allied control of shipping routes and the closing of the most important Japanese harbors by mines. With stock piles exhausted, a shattered fleet lacking fuel, and air forces limited by lack of gasoline to a final suicide effort, Japan had lost the power to wage war. The strategic campaign against the Japanese merchant marine pursued relentlessly for 3½ years by United States submarines and by carrier and land-based aircraft had steadily weakened Japan's industrial and fighting strength and greatly hastened her final collapse.

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2. Reports of the Joint Army Navy Committee on assessment of loss or damage inflicted on enemy naval and merchant vessels.
3. Federal Economic Administration, Special Areas Branch, Far East Enemy Division report on Japanese War Economy 1943-44, dated November 1944.
4. U. S. S. B. S. Island Study of Truk, Rabaul, Wake and the Marshall Islands.
5. Records of Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
6. Aircraft Action Reports, United States Navy.
7. CINCPAC monthly reports to Cominch "Operations in Pacific Ocean Areas." August 1942 to August 1945.

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
1. Statistics submitted by Japanese Navy and Transportation Departments to Advanced Echelon, United States Far Eastern Air Forces, and reproduced in FEAF Intelligence Memorandum No. 27 dated 4 October 1945.
2. U. S. S. B. S. (G-2 section) memorandum dated 5 November 1945 containing a statement of "The Principal Problems and the obstacles which confronted Japanese shipping during War Time" prepared by the Chief of Planning Department, Japanese Ministry of Transportation.
3. I. J. N. Liaison Committee Reply to Naval Analysis Division Memorandum No. 0, of October 1945 and 24, of November 1945.

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4. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Interrogations:

	<i>Nav No.</i>	<i>U. S. S. B. S. No.</i>
Capt. OI, Atsuki (shipping and shipping escort)	11	61
Lt. Comdr. Yatsui (Leyte, Hongkong, Matsuyama)	37	159
Capt. Ohmae (overall planning)	43	192
Lt. Comdr. Yasumoto (escort and protection of shipping)	45	194
Admiral Horiuchi (escort and protection of transports)	47	199
Comdr. Okamoto (antisubmarine devices)	48	200
Comdr. Chinaya (Ambon)	49	201
Lt. Comdr. Kuwabara (Camranh Bay)	53	225
Lt. (jg) Okuno, Y. (antisubmarine)	56	228
Rear Admiral Matsuyama (escort and defense of shipping)	57	229
Comdr. Terai, Yoshimori (Saigon strike)	89	427
Comdr. Yatsuka and Comdr. Sogawa (convoy organization)	102	460
Comdr. Shibata (sub attacks on convoys)	107	465
Capt. Abe (escort shipping)	110	468
Lt. Comdr. Mizutani (escort shipping)	111	469

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


DESTRUCTION OF JAPANESE MERCHANTSHIP TONNAGE
MONTHLY COMPARISON OF SINKINGS BY THE THREE
PRINCIPAL AGENTS


STEEL SHIPS OF 1000 GROSS TONS & OVER INCLUDING TANKERS.
FROM THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

CARRIER RAIDS ON

PHILIPPINES



THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR



THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Reply of the Imperial Japanese Government to United States Strategic Bombing Survey Questionnaire Nav. No. 24 dated 8 November 1945 including Chart 1, 2, 3

Q. Submit an organization chart showing Japanese naval forces engaged in escort and protection of shipping on the following dates. Show relationship for purposes of escort between the Japanese Naval General Staff, various escort groups, forces or fleets, naval stations and fleets and minor naval stations. Include a table listing vessels available to each of the principal commands on those dates.

- (a) At beginning of war.
- (b) After organization of the Combined Escort Fleet, November 1943.
- (c) After August 1944 or when the most significant reorganization occurred about this time.

A. 1 (a) At the opening of hostilities 8 December 1941 (chart No. 1):

(1) Commander in Chief of all Fleets, Naval Districts, and Guard Districts have full responsibility for escort and antisubmarine operations within their respective areas of responsibility.

(2) At this time forces whose principal duty was escort had not yet been organized.

(b) After the organization of Surface Escort General Headquarters 15 November 1943 (chart No. 2):

(1) The Commander in Chief of Surface Escort was under the direct control of the Emperor, and in addition to commanding directly attached forces, he was delegated the command of all Commanders of Naval Districts and Guard Districts with respect to escort, antisubmarine operations, and emergency rescue of shipping.

(2) The relationship between the Commander in Chief of Surface Escort and the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was one of cooperation.

(3) Senior officers from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and from the Commander in Chief of the China Area Fleet were attached to the Commander in Chief of Surface Escort.

(4) During this period antisubmarine vessels which were designed for that purpose were continually increasing in number and converted vessels were being detached from the organization of escort forces.

(c) As of 21 August 1944 (chart No. 3):

(1) The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet on 9 August was empowered to command the forces of Surface Escort General Headquarters and of Naval Districts and Guard Districts concerned with respect to the following matters, and on 21 August was empowered to command the China Area Fleet with respect to the same matters:

(a) Matters especially necessary in preparing for and carrying out the "SHO" Operation.

(b) Matters concerning the protection of surface traffic and the carrying out of antisubmarine operations where overall control was especially necessary.

(2) Senior officers from the Commander in Chief of Surface Escort and the Commander in Chief of the China Area Fleet were attached to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Q. Give the program for building Japanese escort vessels during the war including:

(a) Table showing types and numbers of escorts planned for appropriate periods and the types and numbers placed in service during the same periods.

(b) Changes in the program and reasons therefor.

A. 2 Plans during the war for construction of escort vessels and changes therein.

(See next page)

THE CAMPAIGNS of the PACIFIC WAR

Period	Construction plans	Number commissioned	Reasons for changes
From April 1941 to March 1942	0	0	1. Difficulty of procurement of materials, fittings, etc.
From April 1942 to March 1943	A 4 C 0 D 0	A 2 C 0 D 0	2. Lack of technical skill in construction of war vessels (it was impossible to avoid allotting the construction of escorts to shipyards with little experience in building naval vessels.)
Total	4	2	
From April 1943 to March 1944	A 17 C 10 D 17	A 17 C 6 D 12	3. General lowering of efficiency caused by use of conscript laborers.
Total	44	35	
From April 1944 to March 1945	A 44 C 68 D 78	A 27 C 39 D 46	4. Competition with the construction of other types of naval and merchant vessels, and with repair of damaged vessels.
Total	190	112	
From April 1945 to August 1945	A 7 C 9 D 9	A 5 C 8 D 5	5. After 1944, interference by bombing. 6. An accumulation of other trivial causes behind the scenes.
Total	25	18	


THE CAMPAIGNS of *the* PACIFIC WAR

Summary of data on the different types of vessels

Type	Standard displacement <i>Tons</i>	Planned speed <i>Knots</i>	Number and type of engines	Armament	Number of depth charges carried
A <i>Sbimusbu</i> class	860	19.7	12	3 single mount 12-cm. guns; 15 25-mm. machine guns.	120
A <i>Mikura</i> class	940	19.5	12	1 multiple mount 12-cm. dual purpose gun; 1 single mount 12-cm. dual purpose gun; 15 25-mm. machine guns.	120
C Odd-numbered	745	16.5	12	2 single mount 12-cm. dual pur- pose guns; 15 25-mm. machine guns.	120
D Even-numbered	740	17.5	12 ¹	2 single mount 12-cm. dual pur- pose guns; 15 25-mm. machine guns.	120

¹Diesel. ²Turbine.

CHART NO 1



NOTES


1. Destroyers and airplanes attached to forces other than those listed above carried out anti-submarine escort and patrol duties when it was necessary in attack operations.
2. ———— Chain of command.
- - - - - Advisory relationship.

(TN: In these charts, "net-tender" (HOKAKUMU TEI) means net-tender for indicator nets. Net-tenders for anti-submarine nets are called "anti-submarine net-tenders".)

JAPANESE
ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL FORCES ENGAGED IN
ESCORT AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

EFFECTIVE 8 DEC 1941

CHART NO 2




NOTES

1. Destroyers and airplanes attached to other forces than those listed above cooperated in escort and anti-submarine patrols in addition to their regular duties.
2. Furthermore it sometimes happened that small vessels which had been requisitioned or borrowed by various forces were armed and used in anti-submarine patrols.
3.
 - Chain of command.
 - Chain of delegated command.
 - Advisory relationship.

JAPANESE
 ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL FORCES ENGAGED IN
 ESCORT AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

EFFECTIVE 15 NOV. 1943

JAPANESE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL FORCES ENGAGED IN ESCORT AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING EFFECTIVE 21 AUGUST 1944



NOTES

1. Destroyers and airplanes attached to other forces than those shown in the chart cooperated in escort and anti-submarine patrols in addition to their regular duties.
2. Furthermore it sometimes happened that small vessels which had been requisitioned or borrowed by various forces were armed and used in anti-submarine patrols.
3. ——— Chain of command.
 - - - - - Chain of delegated command.
 - - - - - advisory relationship.

THE PACIFIC THEATER

AIRLINE-GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES

DISTANCE EQUIVALENTS

Nautical Miles	Statute Miles	Statute Miles	Nautical Miles
1	= 1,1515	1	= 0.86839
2	= 2.3031	2	= 1.7368
3	= 3.4547	3	= 2.6052
4	= 4.6062	4	= 3.4736
5	= 5.7578	5	= 4.3420
6	= 6.9093	6	= 5.2104
7	= 8.0609	7	= 6.0787
8	= 9.2124	8	= 6.9471
9	= 10.3640	9	= 7.8155

