


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CAN CHINA SAVE HERSELF?

A SERIES OF PAPERS
ON
CHINESE AFFAIRS

BY
GILBERT REID, D.D.



UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

REPRINTED FROM
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SHANGHAI.
1915.

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CAN CHINA SAVE HERSELF?

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE REFORM MOVEMENT.

FOR twenty years and more I have directed my chief study and attention to the cause of reform in China, that thereby the nation's independence and sovereign entity might be preserved, and dangers without and commotions within be alike averted. That I might be free to devote myself to such a work, usually regarded as unsuited to a Missionary Society, I withdrew from the Missionary Society under whose control and for whose interests I had worked for a previous ten years, and followed an independent course culminating in a non-missionary organization known as the International Institute of China. Part of these efforts has been put forth in Peking, part in Shanghai, and part in the provincial centres.

The beginning of these reform efforts was when China was still at war with Japan in 1894-5. It was the menace to China, beyond all previous experience, that first convinced China of her real weakness, and this consciousness of weakness brought about the first national spirit of reform which China had been all too late in fostering. This spirit of reform has had many setbacks; reformers, old and young, Chinese and foreign, have had many disappointments; but the number of reformers is greater today than twenty years ago, and the spirit of reform is more wide-spread than at any time in the past. This is an encouragement which all would do well to bear in mind.

Of many of these reform movements, of the discouragements which have occurred, of the dangers and obstacles which have stood in the way in the past and still stand in the way today, I am somewhat familiar; and the views which I now venture to express are the outcome of experience, and whilst in some respects they may be considered hard and critical, I assure my Chinese friends that my feelings are those of sympathetic interest in China's ultimate triumph in the contest with evil forces which are at work within and without. In all probability the ones to find fault with

my reflexions—if there be any—will be more from amongst foreigners than from the Chinese.

When the war was still on between these two countries of the East, towards the end of 1894, I had the honour of meeting an aged and high official in the Peking Government, who impressed me as much with his patriotism as with his modesty and courtliness of manner. He had been tutor to the previous Emperor Tung-chih, and was at the time President of one of the Boards, and Minister of the Grand Council, the Inner Council, and the Board of Foreign Affairs. That he might be near to the palace, he occupied three rooms behind a small tea-house. When I called on him, he insisted on putting on his official robes, that he might shew full propriety to the stranger from abroad. During the conversation I handed him a little Memorandum outlining some points which I thought necessary for China at the time. There was nothing remarkable about the suggestions, but being the only ones which any foreigner had presented him, he took them as a token of friendship. He arose from his seat, and in the custom of the olden days he bowed low three times, thanking me for my interest in his country. Resuming his seat, he said something like this:

“I am now an old man and have seen the foreign Powers encroach upon us more and more. My country has grown weaker and weaker. I have but little hope that anything can be done, but we must at once begin reform, for in no other way can we save ourselves.”

Here was a man who remembered the war of 1842, and was in Peking during the war of 1858 to 1860. He knew of the Tai-ping Rebellion but he had seen the Government victorious and peace restored. What he feared most was the ever-increasing encroachment from foreign Powers and wars with one nation after another. Free from foreign relations, China could go on in contentment and security for thousands of years. What made him lose heart, and what makes the Chinese lose heart, today, is the unending series of foreign complications, which give the Government but little chance to put its house in order and carry out, untrammelled, her own schemes of national reform.

Before the treaty of peace was signed and ratified by China and Japan, a number of young men in the capital, belonging to the *literati* and hence reckoned as followers of the old learning, felt deeply the defeat of China at the hands of Japan, and after a series of consultations they were induced to form a Reform Club, the first of the kind in China. The mere fact that Chinese banded themselves together in a *hui* or Society was in itself an innovation and a reform. The reform movement was espoused by some of the older and higher officials in the Empire.

This reform movement lasted for a little over three years, and though the changes were taking place at a too accelerated speed, the outlook for the cause of progress was full of promise.

The *coup d'état* of 1898 by the Empress Dowager reversed the wheels of progress, and the reactionary movement, also characterized, most strangely, by a spirit of patriotism, rounded itself out in the fanaticism of the Boxer movement, which reached its head in the siege of the Legations and the massacre of missionaries and Chinese converts of 1900. This brought severe punishment in the form of indemnity on the Chinese nation, a burden more obstructive to progress than even the reactionary spirit which had gained the mastery.

If the first reform movement, based on learning and imbued by patriotism, had remained unchecked, there is good reason for believing that the cataclysm of 1900 would never have occurred, and a free course for ever-advancing development would have lain open for Government and people. China's subsequent troubles and new dangers may, therefore, be traced to the suicidal action of the then existing Government, of the Government in power.

The second reform movement, less rapid than the first, began in about 1903, under the initiative of the then two strong Viceroy, Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai. The Government in power, centred in the Empress Dowager, previously reactionary, became suddenly progressive. The reform was directed to the establishment of constitutional Government. Particular reforms, once advocated by the young Emperor, were now espoused by the Empress Dowager.

The third reform movement was associated with a subversion of the second effort at reform. This was the Revolution, which sprang into life in the autumn of 1911. The revolutionary spirit was a new spirit of patriotism, never experienced before, but being a revolution of bloodshed and assassination, it endangered the country by upsetting the existing Government with its progressive reforms throughout the whole land. The bitter and the sweet flowed together, and whenever this is done, the sweet is made bitter, but never the bitter made sweet.

The last four years have shewn the gradual development of this third reform movement, which has had more to do with forms of government than with moral reformation. Difficulties of many new kinds have appeared to hamper the current of national progress. Just when the Government was beginning to be stable and secure, and various internal reforms were being undertaken, a severe blow was struck at the very heart of the Republic by the inroads of foreign wars on to Chinese soil, accompanied by the offensive demands of the Japanese Government under the pressure of force and the threats of war.

Thus for twenty years the reform spirit, the spirit of progress and patriotism, has been struggling into being, as of a woman in travail. Few nations in their good endeavours have been beset with so many difficulties as has China. What beset Japan, when she undertook reforms, is as nothing in comparison with the ob-

struction to Chinese advancement and to their national well-being.

In a preliminary way we may point out two essentials for the salvation of the nation: one, to face the facts as they are and have been, and not hide one's head as does the ostrich in the coming storm; and the other, to keep up hope, so long as the life of the nation is not yet wholly extinct.

Other suggestions will be given in subsequent discussions.



II.

WHERE CAN HELP COME FROM ?

THERE are two sayings worth remembering. One is from David's Psalms: "Some trust in horses and some in chariots, but we will trust in the Lord our God." Another saying, almost a maxim, is: "Heaven helps those who help themselves."

The first truth, then, which needs to be impressed on the Chinese mind, as it ponders the way to save the nation, is that help from foreigners and foreign Governments is of little avail. This most unpalatable fact has received verification in the events of the last few months, since war intruded itself on the Chinese nation.

Each of the reform movements during the last twenty years has been characterized by a greater willingness to learn from other peoples, and a greater desire to extend friendship, in the larger outlook of international relationship. Under the leadership of President Yuan Shih-k'ai, an earnest attempt has been made to secure real solidity as well as cordiality, in the political and commercial relations of China with treaty-making Powers. In harmony with his past experience as viceroy a large number of foreign advisors have been employed in the Government, as well as many Chinese who have taken special courses of study in foreign lands or who shewed exceptional ability and trust-worthiness in the old régime.

Until most of the Great Powers entered on war, whose shadow rested ominously over China as over the nations at war, the outlook for China was increasingly hopeful. Peace and good order were being re-established, and friendship and confidence between the Chinese and all other peoples had never been more sound and stable.

The war spirit, as projected into the life of China, *volens volens*, proved a touch-stone of the kind of interest which foreign nations have in China. In these times of severe testing, China has had her eyes opened as to the amount of help she may expect from others. The question has turned from the way to make China prosperous to the way to save China from destruction. This change of *venue* indicates the weaker position in which China is placed today, as the result of outside intrusion, from what she was, say, in the month of July a year ago.

It is plain to even superficial observers that if the war had been kept away from Chinese territory, China would have found free scope for development and would have maintained cordial sentiments to all. So far as China's best interests were concerned, she was obligated to keep aloof from the mutual antagonisms of the European warring nations, and to treat all nations with equal fairness and friendship. The faithful maintenance of all rights granted to foreigners, whether German or British, Russian or Japanese, was the true policy for China to pursue, and this was what China endeavoured to do, in the face of many counter forces.

From the time that Japan refused to accede to the request of China that she remain neutral, down through all the months of military aggression and subsequent diplomatic dictation, it has become more and more apparent that in spite of the friendship of individual Japanese, the policy of the Japanese Government has been detrimental to China and could by no possible argument be viewed as a help. It is wisdom on the part of China to allow these occurrences to sink deep into the memory, even if it be profitless to continue to recount them.

The Chinese, in the rapid growth of these unfriendly occurrences, have hoped, much like a drowning man clutching at a straw, that the United States would come to the rescue. The facts are that whilst the U. S. Government and the best of the people of the U. S. have wished well for China, they have had no intention to do more than support China through the ordinary diplomatic channels. In a crisis such as China has had to face, substantial aid from the United States could hardly be expected by the Chinese people or Government.

The feeling has largely prevailed that as Great Britain and Japan were Allies, there was a big possibility that the British Government would exercise a restraining influence on Japan, not in the task of crushing Germany, but wherever the independent action of China and the policy of "equal opportunity to all nations," as guaranteed by the Alliance, were in danger of being fettered, if not totally destroyed. A prominent Chinese expressed the common hope of his countrymen, when he said to me some months ago, "Whether we are helped or not depends on England."

The other countries have not been specially considered, when outside help was deemed desirable. The result of the protracted negotiations has not only been humiliating, but tinged with a feeling of disappointment as to the value of outside help. The Chinese try to put a good face on in their misfortunes, but they feel deeply the unpleasant experience.

There is in all this the danger that a reaction will set in and that all foreign help at any time may be construed as valueless. It should, therefore, not be forgotten that both Americans and Britons exerted themselves, specially through the publicity of the press, to awaken the conscience of their Government and of

public opinion to the actual facts, or in other words to the wrongs perpetrated on China by Japan. It is to the credit, also, of the British representative in Peking that he has desired China's welfare and has shewn himself a worthy accredited agent of his Government at Peking—perplexed, but not once devoid of dignified self-control.

Be it remembered, too, that this war of hate between one nation and another—a hate in which China has no part—is not to last for ever. The relations of these nations to China or to their own interests in China, will not be the same in the balmy days of peace as they are under the abnormal conditions of today. Whilst China has learned a valuable lesson, not to trust too much to the friendship of foreign Governments, and of certain ones in particular, she should not sink too deeply into "the slough of Despond."

After all, individual friendship is worth cultivating by the Chinese and ought to be gladly recognized. Even the political advisor to President Yuan Shih-k'ai from Japan, Dr. Ariga, though hampered by the task of serving two masters, has, if reports be correct, sincerely sought to uphold the President in plans of civil and political transformation. As for the British, there have been not a few who have dared to face misunderstanding and petty censure, in the defence of China's rights, as based on treaty, agreement, law, reason and nature.

Granting the disappointment that intelligent Chinese feel at the moment concerning outside help, there are two principles which they do well to apprehend. These are contained in the sentence which we quoted at the beginning: "Heaven helps those who help themselves."

Have the Chinese—and this is really the crucial question—the ability to hold on? They are patient and resigned; in fact they are too easily resigned to their fate. Moreover, they dislike to acknowledge that they have been beaten in battle or in the council-chamber. Better to save their face and hide the disgrace, than to see the facts, accept the knife, feel the pain, and have the will not to die. In all the reform movements of the past as well as in many industrial, educational and political undertakings, the Chinese are full of enthusiasm at the beginning, but failure has come through the disposition to get tired. If Scotch grit could be inoculated into Chinese character, it would be to their good.

Is it then possible for the Chinese to change their nature and persevere to the end. The Chinese are proficient in the grace of yielding, in never giving an offence, in being courteous; are they willing to accept a counter-irritant in the form of a little stubbornness, and in wearisome, plodding, toil? Are they in fact ready to undergo the exertion of saving themselves, or do they insist in going to heaven "on flowery beds of ease?" If officials, merchants, students, peasants and the modern women, once face the fact that if China is to be saved, they must do it themselves,

then the case is at once full of hope. "Where there's a will, there's a way," is another good motto worth remembering. Or take the saying handed down from a Han Emperor: "With determination, the thing is done;" this is equally good for the Republic as for days of the Han two thousand years ago.

The other truth equally important is that Heaven will help, if China will only help herself. This truth is imbedded in the teaching of China's own sages, as assured by the promises of Christian revelation. Heaven has His own ways to save, and the only prerequisite is that the individual or the nation be disposed to do his part in the effort of salvation, and to trust in Heaven for consummation.

With the history of Poland and Finland before our eyes, it may seem as if Heaven were slumbering or sleeping, but the story of the Dutch Republic, of the Swiss Republic, in fact of all the Republics on the American continent, freed from foreign thraldom, is a story to cheer the Chinese Republic, as it determines to preserve its own, and so revise her methods, her temperament, and her ambitions, that by righteous and laudable endeavour she may command the blessing of God and the respect of the world.

Let the Chinese do their part, and they need have no fear of Heaven, though they may, now and then, mistrust those who are their rivals. As the good Book says, "Work out your own salvation in fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of His own good pleasure."



III.

MUST CHINA BECOME MILITARY?

SEEING that China has been convinced by late events that national salvation must come more from herself than by the help of foreign nations, a goodly number of the more advanced of the Chinese people have become convinced that salvation must come from increased military strength; in a word, that China must adopt militarism as has Japan, as have the warring nations of Europe, Great Britain as much as Germany, and Russia and France as much as Austria-Hungary, and as a strong party in the United States is doing. The arguments for China's change of racial and national policy are undoubtedly strong, but I will not repeat them as I wish to argue the other side. I believe that one result of this present awful war will be a growing sentiment in favour of methods of peace, reason, justice, confidence, co-operation, negotiation, arbitration and a world-wide Judicial Court. The present craze for fighting is a species of madness. Even combatants who are traders and not gunners have caught the contagion. When the war is over, the decision must be either continued brute force or a higher civilization with more recognition of religious ideas. If Europe, the United States and Japan decide for the former, then I suppose China must fall into line; but I have a faint hope of the growth of the human race, of progress, and that God still reigns.

Though China may not expect much help from rival outsiders, she may expect help from Heaven, *i.e.*, as I have said before, if she helps herself. Heaven's blessing will hardly rest on brute rather than on spiritual force.

As to China in particular, I regard this ambition for a great army and navy as useless, as senseless, as suicidal.

It is no doubt true that if China had been strong in a military way, as she is in other ways, the demands of Japan would have met different treatment; probably there would have been a great war in Asia as well as in Europe. It is fortunate, then, that China was weak in this particular.

The question now is as to the future. Shall China prepare for war, or, in a truer sense, prepare for self-defence?

The thought that lies back in the mind is that defence is needed against Japan and further Japanese dictation, so that China should prepare to get back from Japan what that country has just lately extorted contrary to right and reason.

This means an army as numerous, as well-trained, and as martial in spirit as the army of Japan. How much money will be taken from better pursuits to support such an army? How many years will be required for such training, and will Japan allow China to fix the term of years?

Even if China could have on the roll 2,000,000 men to Japan's 500,000, this fact in these days of modern warfare gives no encouragement to China in regard to power of resistance or power of conquest. China, to be a match for Japan, must be her equal in arms and ammunition. This means more arsenals, better-worked arsenals, and it also means that matters of arms and ammunition be kept secret from foreign Powers. We can, therefore, understand why one of the demands made by Japan aimed at placing arms, ammunition and arsenals under Japanese direction. China in attempting to strengthen herself in this direction has a gigantic task and will need an enormous sum of money. She need not expect that what she does will be unknown to Japan.

When China has become strong to the danger-point, and has a valuable supply of guns, and new and costly arsenals in working order, Japan will then find no difficulty in finding a *casus belli*, and in gaining possession of China's military equipment. China by military preparations is only preparing a gift to be presented to Japan.

The uselessness of a strong navy is still more apparent. When Japan waged war on China in 1894, the Chinese had a stronger fleet than the Japanese, but to-day the naval power of Japan ranks with those of the great European Powers and of the U. S. For China to attempt an equally strong navy would be more difficult than to have a strong army. It is even more apparent that such a navy would ultimately be a gift to Japan.

It is too late for China to attempt to compete with Japan in either army or navy. Japan is unhampered except in a financial way, but China is hampered in every way. She is deprived of coast defences, and her great ports suited as fortresses are in the possession of others or have become neutralized. In the north this is especially marked, Dalny, Port Arthur, Taku, Weihaiwei and Tsingtao are all excluded as places of defence to China. Without the power to defend herself by means of fortresses, of what use would a strong army or navy be to her against a nation like Japan? The maritime provinces and those along the Yangtze are within Japan's reach. She will not be checked by any attempt on the part of China to become a strong military Power. To make the attempt would only be a waste of energy, time and money. In all probability Japan alone would be benefited.

I acknowledge that these views are not acceptable to quite a number of Chinese officials and those foreign merchants who deal in arms, ammunition and battle-ships. Every country finds it

difficult to avoid speculation in the purchase or sale of arms and ships, and China has not yet reached that point of purity in politics, where such lines of business would prove no temptation. I recall how, many years ago, before I had collected a single dollar for the International Institute, the offer was made to me that I act as agent for one of the largest ship-building companies in England. Beside a tempting salary, a still more tempting commission was promised, and I saw how by one deal in a battle-ship or two or three deals in cruisers and gun-boats the whole Institute could be erected without asking for any contribution. Furthermore, there was the inducement of good connexions with an Englishman high in the British Government. If such a line of business was tempting to me, I need not be surprised if it is tempting still to others.

Whilst I thus advocate that China fight shy of the militarist epidemic, I do not advocate that under existing circumstances she should have no navy, still less no army. One extreme does not necessitate another extreme. China, utterly defenceless, and relying only on moral principles and moral platitudes, would prove a temptation to ambitious outsiders, which even law and treaties could never hold in check. Whilst we may be unwilling to attack pirates, we should guard our own house. Even countries in Europe, whose neutrality is guaranteed, do not discard military defence or refuse to confer with strong Powers about the possibility of war. By having something of an army, China would not be so humiliated as she certainly would be if not a cash were spent for military purposes. It must not be forgotten that most people, in East and West, gauge national strength by the ability to fight. For China to attempt to lead the world in paths of peace is not only premature, but would be looked upon with something of contempt.

When the great war has ended, other nations besides Japan will give attention to China. If China is a totally weak military nation, she will be the prey of others, even when they are preying on each other. If she is fairly strong to be at least self-respecting, she will be able to lead in her own affairs and decide whether to join with Japan against the West, forgetting the insulting character of Japan's late misdeeds, or join with the West against Japan, forgetting the habit of these nations to demand reward and concessions for services rendered, or, better than all, to do the just thing by all, never forgetting that Heaven blesses the righteous doer, whether a nation or an individual.



IV.

CAN CHINA JOIN THE LEAGUE OF PEACE?

IN our first discussion we reviewed hopefully the reform spirit of China as seen in three reform movements of the last twenty years. In our second discussion we pointed out most regretfully the failure of foreign nations to help China as they ought to have done, but uttered a warning against the extreme position that help when proffered should be rejected. In our third discussion we expressed the opinion that China should not become military, but warned against the extreme position of having no kind of navy or army. In a word, we have advised the good quality, traditional to China, of moderation.

In confirmation of such moderation—the Doctrine of the Mean—we have the following words by Ex-President Taft which close an article by him in “The Saturday Evening Post” of Philadelphia:

“It is not necessary for us to become a military Power and to develop militarism in our people—indeed, it is impossible for us to do so; but we may, by only moderate provision for our defence, give weight to our voice in a real and effective peace-promoting League.”

As Ex-President Taft recommends a stronger navy for the United States and only a moderate-sized army, so we would recommend for China a stronger army but a navy no larger than the one at present. We urge China to flee from militarism even as the United States, under equally serious jeopardy, are similarly advised by one of the most level-headed and experienced of American statesmen. We also beg to point out to the solicitous and patriotic minds of China the kind of help and defence in which the United States are now urged on all sides to take a lead, namely, a League of Peace. This is rightly termed by Ex-President Taft “a real and effective peace-promoting League.”

In the same article the same distinguished writer shews his moderation in support of a stronger navy by giving equal support to this League of Peace. He says:

“I am in favour of a League of Peace, by which the leading countries of the world shall agree not to enter into any war except after they have submitted the justiciable issues fairly and fully to an Arbitral Court, or the non-justiciable issues to a Commission of Conciliation.”

In an address by Ex-President Taft delivered in Cleveland at a Congress called to advance this sensible proposition, he used these words :

“To constitute an effective League of Peace we do not need all the nations. Such an agreement between eight or nine of the Great Powers of Europe, Asia, and America would furnish a useful restraint upon possible war. The successful establishment of a Peace League amongst the Great Powers would draw into it very quickly the less powerful nations.

In a speech made by another, Japan was mentioned as one of those “Great Powers,” whose espousal was deemed desirable. As nations are dubbed “Great,” when they are strong in the military spirit, Japan must in good reason be included. If she will join in all sincerity such a League, the peace of the Far East, to say nothing of the Pacific, and the rest of the world, will be assured, so far as it is determined by the action of Japan.

Whilst in all these suggestions concerning the “Great Powers” China is never mentioned, due to the fact that China’s traditional policy has always been one of conciliation and mediation, she has a good chance of admission to such a League, as she can at least claim that she is one of “the less powerful nations,” *i.e.* less powerful in the ways and spirit of war.

China only needs to keep her eye on this one suggestion for permanent peace, and not take too much to heart the recognized distinction between “Great Powers” and “less powerful nations.” If Japan, proud of her military status, enters the League, and China, humiliated by her military weakness, is admitted to the League, the relations between the two countries may be satisfactorily adjusted without the necessity of going to war.

What more is meant in this new form of proposed prevention of war that has not already existed? It is more than the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is summoned from time to time to meet at The Hague. Arbitration is more or less a compromise, and therefore is never a complete medium for establishing either justice or peace.

What is proposed as the fulfilment of past efforts for guarding the rights of all nations and warding off war is : first, a real international Arbitral Court, the Supreme Court of the World; and, secondly, a Commission of Conciliation to consider all disputes between nations which are non-justiciable by the Arbitral Court.

With these three Courts of Arbitration, of Justice and of Conciliation, full provision is made for settling to the best advantage all questions of dispute between one nation and another.

By a League of Peace the members bind themselves not only to submit to these three kinds of Court, but agree that if any one member of the League refuses to submit to them and proceeds to war, all the remaining members of the League will unite to defend by force the member attacked.

In our opinion it would be far better for China to join in with these methods, elaborated by the highest wisdom and by much experience, for the universal security of the permanent laws of Heaven, than to aspire to the destructive processes of a militarism whose havoc and frightfulness are becoming more awful from year to year.

In joining with this League of Peace, China would still need a moderate army and navy for performing her part in the great combination of an international police, but she would not need so great an army or navy as to be able to resist by herself any one or more of possible enemies.

In the past China has not made full use of these international agencies in warding off outside aggressions or in securing for herself a recognition of her rights. In the last humiliating negotiations with Japan—forced on China under threat of war—the peace secured was of the peace-at-any-price kind, and not based on strict justice. Compulsion knocked Justice on the head. China realized that she ought not to yield; she also realized that she was too weak to defend her rights or to resist the aggressor; so she yielded for the sake of peace. Even without this complete measure of a "peace-promoting League," the Chinese Government had the possibility, however slight an one, of calling into action The Hague Court of Arbitration, or at least of retarding the aggression by expressing a readiness to abide by the decision of an impartial commission. In all likelihood a Commission of Conciliation would have resulted much like this now proposed as part of the League of Peace.

As to the future, there is in my humble judgement no hesitation in recommending that China turn her talents, not to militarism, but to this and all similar proposals for defending one's land and people without recourse to war.

China should not again let slip these proffers from the intelligence and conscience of other nations for universal security and peace. Let her give a deaf ear to the advisor whose genius goes no further than to rattle the sword and shout defiance at all foes. Our good neighbour, Dr. Timothy Richard, interested in China as in the general cause of peace, has long favoured some scheme like this which is now being broached amongst neutral nations. Others for many years have written and pondered on some such idea of world-wide confederation. China in seconding the movement will place herself in respectable company.

In previous articles we have more than once counselled China to form no Alliances and to make no secret Agreements with any Power, however friendly or approachable. We do not recommend an Alliance with Japan, though many reasons may be advanced in its favour, and not a few Japanese and Chinese are working to this end. Neither do we recommend an Alliance with the United States, with Great Britain, with Germany, with Russia or any other of the Great Powers. In any Alliance the nation allied with

will certainly expect, if not demand, exceptional privileges and various concessions. We have no hesitation in recommending joint participation in a general League of Peace as here outlined. This League seeks for general peace and justice, not for the spoliation of any one country or the aggrandizement of others. China through this League would be in Alliance with Heaven, with Heaven's laws, and with other nations in equality of friendliness.

Some twenty-five men of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, headed by the Hon. Joseph H. Choate, former Ambassador to the Court of St. James, have lately issued an admirable letter, briefly worded, in support of a speedy peace amongst the warring nations of the world. We close our discussion with one quotation, which we commend to the Chinese and all their foreign friends:—

“Whilst we must not be over-confident of our individual qualifications to point out the detailed methods through which the result may be accomplished, we may still advocate measures which seem practicable and appropriate to the purpose.

“We can see that definite rules of national conduct should be agreed upon; that a court of competent jurisdiction should be established to judge of national conformity to those rules; and that new sanctions should be provided to compel respect for the judgements rendered.

“Above all, the motive and spirit of the new institutions should be, clearly and fully, not the promotion of ambition or the extension of power, but the safeguarding of human rights and the perfection of individual liberty.”



CAN CHINA RID HERSELF OF CORRUPTION ?

FOR the great and enormous task of working out salvation for China—of preserving intact all territory which is rightfully her own—we have stated facts which should inspire her with hope though avoiding the danger of extravagant credulity and empty imaginings. This moderation of hopefuliness results on the one hand through failure by foreign Powers to help China in resisting the aggressiveness of Japan, and on the other by the possibilities contained in a League of Peace, in which both Japan and China would take part along with the Powers of Europe and America. All reflexions of this character point more to help from without than to help from within. They are still far from the chief thing which should concern China, and that is *her own duty in working out her own salvation*. The main question is none other than the one with which we began these discussions, "Can China save Herself?"

The most indispensable act of self-preservation, of national salvation, is, in our opinion, a *moral* one. This was our opinion when the first official attempt at reform was made in 1895, and that opinion, through the experiences of twenty years, has been solidified into a conviction. I regret to say that this opinion or conviction has been held by too few of the Chinese in positions of greatest influence. Of the three periods of reform, outlined in our first article, the first was most characterized by this idea of moral reformation; and, strange as it may seem to foreign investigators, the ones most keen on the moral reformation of the Government were those classed as conservative and anti-foreign, rather than those who favoured progress and cultivated friendliness with foreigners. Those who espoused Western ideas were often the most corrupt, while those who held to the old ways and cared nothing for railways and mines, foreign schools and a foreign-trained army, often lived simply, and were respected for their honesty and unselfishness.

In those days nearly all the documents or pamphlets discussing reform directed their chief attention to exterior matters, to forms of administration, and to the means for material prosperity. Through previous study, and through my acquaintance with several officials of the conscientious type, the first important pamphlet

which I prepared on "The Cure of China's Sickness," laid chief stress on the disease within and the remedy within, and secondarily considered questions of an exterior and superficial character. I analysed minutely all the forms of corruption in the official life of China, much as if I had the right through being a Chinese Censor.

Amid all the changes which have since taken place, there has been no real improvement of this moral kind, in uprooting governmental mal-administration or personal trickery and speculation. The Revolution was not so much against the idea of absolutism as against the rule of the Manchus, men of the same race; still less was there a moral uprising of the people to bring into being a class of officials, who should be honest, straight-forward and clean-handed, self-denying and public-spirited, painstaking, frugal and simple. China's prosperity and permanence would be assured, if only corruption, in the Government and among the people, could be removed. We say, the people, for the habit of "squeeze" is a custom of the whole country, from the gate-keeper and house-cook clear up to the Emperor's palace or the President's Office.

One of the strongest criticisms of this root-trouble of China's many troubles lately appeared in an editorial of "The Shanghai Times," entitled "Eradicating Corruption." We make the following quotations:

"Since Yuan Shih-k'ai was chosen by the people to fill the highest office in the country, he has done his best to put an end to corruption. His task has been a heavy one, and despite the rigorous punishment he has meted out to wrongdoers, corruption is still rampant. Recent events have proved it. Measures of greater severity will have to be taken to stamp out the evil, especially amongst Government officials, and further, the whole condition of the country will have to undergo a complete change.

"Squeeze or corruption is part and parcel of their being; it is essential to their lives; it is as necessary almost as the food they eat. In the higher places in the country it is euphemistically known as commission on the one hand, and in the lower it is known as squeeze.

"Commission, cumsha, squeeze, under whatever name it be known, is an incubus on the development of the country; it prevents trade from righting itself; it is as bad a tax upon industry as the likin, and the prosperity of the country is greatly impaired merely because the Chinese desire to follow out the 'Chinese' or 'olo custom,' and obtain something for nothing.

"To deal with squeeze means to grapple with the whole social structure of the Chinese nation. It means nothing less than a big revolution, of which the Chinese are at present incapable. They cannot rid themselves of an hereditary custom by the mere asking."

These are the views of a foreigner, but the Chinese, who will consult their own consciences, must acknowledge the correctness

of these strictures. In a late Memorial handed to the President of this Republic by the newly-formed Department of Censors, there are contained strictures which are even more severe. We quote:

“In China there are nominally 600,000 soldiers at present which cost the country \$150,000,000 which is just about one-third of the total income of the country. Yet with such tremendous expenditure it is bitterly regretted that not a battle dared be fought in times of emergency. In Japan the soldiers on active service are only about 500,000 which require an annual expenditure of a little more than \$80,000,000.

“Upon comparing those figures we can only conclude that the number of troops in China do not really exist, and we therefore strongly recommend that this point be investigated with a view to cutting down the expenditure.

“In Peking the expenditures of the Ministers for Communications and the Interior are the worst of all while other Ministers are all acting extravagantly without regard to the interests of the country. Such extravagances are found all the way up to the President’s own office and right down to all other official departments where there are numberless officials who simply draw salaries without doing any work.

“When we collect we collect every cent, and when we spend we spend as though it was clay and sand. We therefore recommend that strict orders should be issued to remedy this evil at once, and that all duplicate positions, unimportant posts, useless officials, etc. should be absolutely abolished. The President himself should carry this out in the capital for the example of others. By doing this, important reforms can be taken up, otherwise what is the use of talking about poverty while we are spending so extravagantly.”

The far-seeing, out-spoken statesman of Japan, Count Okuma, while mistaken and unfriendly in his attitude towards China in so far as the twenty-one demands were concerned, has always been sincerely interested in China’s welfare and has more than once referred to China’s corruption as the greatest drawback to prosperity and national strength. In an article lately published he used the following language:

“China is known as a country with a history of three thousand years of civilization. In the civilization which was developed during that time, there have been many noteworthy things. But corruptions of many years’ standing crept in, which is a serious affair for China. If China should awaken from her slumber, cut out old evils, and try to harmonize her original civilization with that of Europe and America, reforming and developing the country of her own accord, it will be a matter for congratulation not only for the cause of the peace of the Orient, but also for the peace of the world. I am afraid that such time will not come at once, although I hope that it will come as soon as possible.

“When China meets foreign enemies and is attacked by them, she awakens partly and for a time appears to enter into a new life. But as soon as the temporary trouble passes away she returns to her former condition, and all efforts made so far have resulted in no improvement and no advancement. So I am sorry that China is too conservative and cares very little to remove her traditional evil habits; nay, that she has no intention of reforming herself.

“In China there have been 22 or 23 great revolutions and innumerable smaller revolutions in the past. Was there any change in thought and characteristics made each time after these revolutions took place? No, there was no trace of a change having been made. China’s revolutions only change the dynasties, but no new addition was made to the Chinese civilization.”

The remark made here concerning China’s inability to keep awake, till reforms are carried to completion, is one true to the facts, and is again and again acknowledged as the sad truth by thoughtful Chinese, but, alas, this particular need is almost as incurable as the various forms of cancer. It is well, however, that Count Okuma’s remark, for once spoken in clear-cut language, should sink deep into the hearts of all Chinese, who talk so much of national salvation and the escape from destruction.

Count Okuma also gave utterance to another important thought. He said:

“Japan’s fundamental policy toward China is to save China from her sickly conditions and to help to promote the peaceful development of that country.”

A year ago I would have advised China to accept salvation through the proffered medical skill of Japan, applied in such a kindly spirit; but after the experiences of the year I now urge China to fight shy of such a physician, and at once to apply herself to her own cure. After the naval scandals and parliamentary bribery and the sharp business practices of Japan, she may well be met by the rebuttal: “Physician, heal thyself.”

Is it not, moreover, just possible that rather too much has been made of China’s official corruption and the impeccable incorruptibility of all other Governments? The only danger of glossing over the corruption which has existed for centuries in China is that the guilty ones will be soothed into that very slumber that Count Okuma justly stigmatizes as a menace. The only way to avoid a wrong impression is to say that all these remarks of ours concerning China’s corruption—all these criticisms of the Chinese Government—are meant for the sole consideration of the Chinese, especially those occupying lucrative positions.

What, after all, is China’s corruption which makes it so dangerous, so malignant, and also so elusive?

A diagnosis of the disease is not so very hard, if the feelings of the patient are not to be considered. Every surgeon appears hardhearted, though he hides within him a kind heart. Having kept

my eyes open for many years in my frequent contact with Chinese officials of the old and the new *régime*, I am not hesitant in saying just where the knife should be applied. A plaster is of no use; the knife must have a sharp edge and cut deep, "*maskee*" the cries of the patient.

The most apparent symptom of a chronic trouble is what is commonly called squeeze. This exists in Western lands and in Japan, but there it is called commission. It more often appears in the under-strappers. Even an honest official like the late Chang Chih-tung was powerless in keeping all the officials in his service from all kinds of peculation. He remained poor, but the officials under him got rich. The old Tsung-li Yamen had not a few high-minded Ministers, but they failed to keep the chief steward from amassing a fortune. The squeeze in the Palace was carried on by the eunuchs, who had the faculty of diminishing the gifts or bribes intended for the Empress Dowager. I have even heard that when the present quarters of the Vice-President were arranged for his arrival from Wuchang, the cost seemed to him too high, and when it was referred to the President, it seemed best to let the matter slide. Every house-keeper in China knows how useless it is to force the cook to bring in a correct bill. If an English or German house-lady finds it impossible to reform one Chinese of this humble class, who oftentimes is recommended as a Church-member, how can we blame a high official or the President of the Republic, who has hundreds under his appointment and direction? Squeeze is certainly here, but even if it be incurable, remedies can be applied for prolonging life. Perhaps at an early date a cure for that which is now incurable will be discovered by some man of genius, more likely a Chinese than an European or American or even a Japanese.

Quite similar to squeeze, which is in China more a genus than a species, there comes in the bane of peculation. This is not so much a commission on contract work as the misappropriation of public funds. In the worst cases it is embezzlement. In former days there was no crime, because nearly every *yamen* had a fund for general or incidental expenses. Now, under the system of auditing, it requires more ingenuity to pay one's own bills out of the public treasury. In the old days, wealth was more quickly acquired by having charge of the army, for it was generally known that according to recognized custom the actual number of troops was lower than the published list, and the pay was also, by mutual consent, considerably lower. Under new regulations even a Chiang-chün is in need of circumspection and discretion.

A third form of corruption is the giving and accepting of gifts, in a word, bribery. In every country it is hard to refuse a gift from an interested friend; how much more amongst a polite people like the Chinese? Birthdays and wedding-days and, in China, funerals, would lose their charm, if there were no gifts. These festive occasions, and even times of mourning, are more delicately

developed in China than in the West. Since the Republic, it has been more difficult to devise a way for getting an official post through the medium of a well-chosen gift. One is more apt to cut his own throat in devising a scheme. In high places bribery is on the wane.

Another form of corruption, more glaring today than in the distant past, is extravagance. Chinese salaries long ago were ridiculously small, and the few made themselves rich by all kinds of devices, taken for granted or mysteriously secret. When, in the second period of reform, new ideas were adopted from the West more than from Japan, salaries were raised all around, and at the same time some of the old lucrative measures remained in force. When I was in Peking in 1909, after several years of absence, I was asked frequently, "What do you think of our progress?" After acknowledging various signs of progress, I would be asked more questions, as if surmising the thought of my heart, until under pressure I would confess to some impression like this: "You have progressed, but it is all on the surface. There is new apparel, but underneath a putrifying sore. Everything now is for good appearances. The officials, high and low, are skilled in spending money."

This extravagance, more noticeable in the second reform period than in the first, has maintained its own during the third period, amid all the fluctuations of parties and party-leaders. Salaries are like those in America, whilst they should be more like those in Japan. Even clerks in Peking ride around in style, as if they were Ministers of State. As something of a contrast to this craze, when I was in Peking in 1909 I purposely went in a Chinese cart to call on the officials; and last year in a jinricksha, even when having audience with the President.

Extravagance is one of the worst features of modern corruption; it has come in with modern ideas and the returned student. At the same time the old forms of corruption cling to the ship of State like so many barnacles.

Yes, most important of all, for bringing in the day of salvation, is for China to cure herself of her corruption. Will all classes join in making the effort?



VI.

CAN CHINA MAKE USE OF WHAT JAPAN HAS CONCEDED ?

WE have, during the negotiations forced on China by the Japanese Government, pointed out in many discussions the serious character of these negotiations—Japan to demand and China to acquiesce—and the great injury which China would receive therefrom. However, even when the battle goes against one, it is wise to neglect no chance, however small. So in those negotiations if there is even one gleam of light, the Chinese Government should take heart and press on in its work of salvation. Count Okuma and Baron Kato have to their countrymen made it clear that Japan has secured all that she insisted upon, but to those abroad, whose suspicions have been stirred, assurances have been given that Japan in the future, as in the past, is always ready to be considerate and obliging, and that harm to China or any one else was far from Japan's intention. Dr. Ariga, on relinquishing his post as political advisor to the Chinese Government, has made the statement that he counselled moderation on both sides that war might be averted. That Japan in the final form of Treaties and Notes has shewn her ability to yield on some points of the original demands is taken as a gracious act on Japan's part, deserving high encomium. "The Outlook" of New York, which has been Japan's good friend to the disparagement of China, has stated the case thus:

"Some of the demands of Japan have seemed to 'The Outlook' from the beginning to be reasonable. Some of the reported demands in the earlier version seem to us to be unreasonable and open to condemnation. As a result of further conference between China and Japan the unreasonable demands have been expunged from the treaty by Japan and the present form of the agreement is now satisfactory to both Governments, so that all danger of war has happily been averted."

As all "unreasonable demands have been expunged" through the generosity of Japan, though personally we fail to see where the expunging comes in, it ought to be easy for the unprejudiced mind to indicate clearly the various aspects of this feat of good-nature. To our prejudiced mind this task is too hard. We are, however, able to shew where Japan has ostensibly conceded some-

thing in a a minor way; and these little things we take as so many gleams of light, which shine forth from a kindly neighbour amid the blackness of much high-handedness.

In the new Treaty between China and Japan concerning the province of Shantung (a Treaty which should never have been made till the war in Europe had ended) the first Article states that China agrees to whatever Japan and Germany may agree concerning German "rights, interests and concessions" in Shantung. This of course fails to reveal any consideration for China on Japan's part, but none the less there is a feeble struggling of the light to pierce through the clouds. How so? It is just possible that Germany, if she holds her own in the great struggle against untold odds, will refuse to give up her rights, or interests or concessions, which China by law has given to her and not to another, and, for China's sake in preserving the *status quo ante bellum*, will proceed to resist the terms of Japan. It is also possible that under the same circumstances Japan will be ready to make an alliance with Germany in preference to the one with England. This has already been advocated in the Japanese press. We draw attention to these possibilities, well aware that China herself can do nothing, except to maintain cordial relations with Germany as with Japan, to the end that the gain of these two military Powers may be attained without too great a loss to China.

In the second Article of the Treaty, it is agreed that China may herself build the railway between Chefoo and Weihsien, though a loan, if needed, must come from Japan and no other country, should Germany in turn consent to abandon this particular privilege. All this was very thoughtful on Japan's part, seeing that China is the country where the railway is to be built. This is more than a glimmering light; it is something of a flash light. The thing for China to do, then, is to bestir herself and proceed to raise the capital from her own people to build this railway. In doing so, she needs to remember that confidence is inspired only by strict honesty. Judging from past experiences of Chinese building railways, west from Canton, south from Foochow, between Shanghai and Hangchow and thence to Ningpo, and conspicuously in the province of Szechwan, there is no encouragement that they will be able to build this railway from Chefoo to Weihsien. This is the view that the majority of foreigners will take concerning China's powers of development. Let there, then, be more than newspaper articles and public meetings; let there be actual purchasers of railway shares and a determination to complete the task in thorough honest methods. We are glad to note that the Chinese in eastern Shantung are taking this matter into serious consideration. The thing to stir the heart of the nation is the shame of leaving to Japan that which China is unable to do. This railway question is a touchstone for the two nations.

China also agrees to open more places in Shantung to foreign

trade and residence. It is for her to make her own selection as to which places are most suitable, and it will then be her part to define the limits for the foreign settlements and the regulation for their management. It would be well if the Chinese merchants, and merchants from other countries than Japan, could be induced to reside and trade within the area of these new settlements. It is also important that regulations be drawn for excluding those undesirable classes, which disgrace Peking in certain streets, the Japanese concession of Tientsin, certain parts of the International Settlement of Shanghai, and which threaten to turn Tsingtao from a model port into a "sink of iniquity." That the disadvantages of additional trade-centres for all nations may be less than the advantages, China must take the lead and not follow on the beck of Japan. Even if American, British or German merchants fight shy of these smaller places of trade, there will still be competition between the Chinese and Japanese, and if the Chinese are in real earnest and evince their usual business capacity, they will be the ones to build up great honges whilst the Japanese will open small shops or peddle their wares on the streets or in the markets. These towns of foreign trade will be the touchstone of Japanese and Chinese business capacity.

In the first of the Notes the declaration is made by the Chinese Government that "within the province of Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext." This declaration meets with Japan's approval and was in fact made at Japan's instigation. Its hopeful aspect is that Japan professes to support China in putting a stop to the territorial aggressions of foreign Powers. Japan in so doing binds herself by what she would bind others. Could Japan see her way to hand back Tsingtao to Chinese jurisdiction rather than turn it into a Japanese Concession and an International Concession under foreign jurisdiction; and could she persuade her Ally, Great Britain, to hand back to China the island and territory of Weihaiwei, this would establish to China the peaceful possession of the *whole* of the Province of Shantung. Japan, in an equally magnanimous spirit, might then delight to withdraw from Port Arthur, Dalny and all Liaotung. It is well for China to cherish this spurt of good feeling, and put to the test this official Declaration. If this Declaration of China, originally a demand of Japan, is as innocent as some are pleased to believe, the outlook for China is full of encouragement and all fear of Japan will soon cease to be.

In the Treaty concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, China is cheered by the assurance of Japan that "when, in future, the judicial system in said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts." In other treaties made by China with Japan, as with Great Britain and the

United States, the same possibility is held up for China's stimulus. This new Treaty specifies Manchuria and Mongolia where Japanese are expected to predominate. It would be well for China to make a beginning of full sovereign jurisdiction in the whole of China—the removal of extra-territoriality—by so reforming the judicial system as to be first tried in Manchuria and Mongolia in relation to Japanese criminals. After being tested there, it could gradually be extended south and west throughout the whole of China.

In the fourth series of Notes, bearing on Manchuria and Mongolia, China agrees that in case she is unable to provide the funds for new railways in these regions, she will first approach Japanese capitalists. The way is thus open, not for the nationals of other countries to build railways in this part of China (*i.e.*, no equality of opportunity), but for either Chinese or Japanese. As in Shantung, so in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, China has the chance to build her own railways. Has she the power to do so? Will she shew to the world that she has no intention to hand over to Japan the complete control of this valuable and extensive part of her territory? To seize her opportunities, she needs to be up and doing, or more demands will soon be made.

Again, "If foreign advisors or instructors in political, financial, military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." The more pleasing side of this arrangement is that the Chinese Government can make use of her own capable young men, rather than to keep them waiting for employment in Peking or Shanghai. The selection should be carefully made, or the advice and instruction will be of but little service.

Concerning the Hanyehping Company the Chinese Government will place no obstacle in the way of the Chinese Company and Japanese capitalists agreeing together on some plan of co-operation. The hope contained in this Official Note is that the shareholders and directors of this Company will prefer *not* to co-operate with Japanese capitalists. The business of this Company is too important to allow any transfer, in whole or in part, to the wealthy potentates of other countries. It consists of the Hanyang Iron Foundry, of the Tayeh iron mines, and of the Pingsiang coal mines. The total value has been estimated by a foreign expert as 40,000,000 taels. The three concerns were amalgamated by Sheng Shuan-huai, who secured them at most favourable terms. The authorized capital is 20,000,000, taels, of which 13,000,000 have been paid up.

Japanese interest in these works began in 1902, when the first contract was signed for the purchase of iron ore. In 1904 Japan made a loan of three million yen, and afterwards other loans of different amounts were made until the total amount was nine million yen. For several years Sheng Shuan-huai has favoured joint enterprise with the Japanese, and when he came

into power in the latter portion of the Manchu rule, he won over to his side the Minister of Finance, Duke Tsai Tse, Prince Ching, and other high officials. On the outbreak of the Revolution, he fled to Japan, where he was well cared for. Early last year it was announced that this Company had arranged for a loan of fifteen million dollars with Japanese financiers. The willingness of the Japanese Government to leave the matter of co-operation to the Company itself, and the desire to keep the Chinese Government from any kind of restraint, came naturally from the experiences of past years. From a patriotic point of view the Chinese might be expected to arouse all their latent and potential energies for rescuing this valuable business from the hands of the Japanese, by redeeming past loans and declining co-operation.

Why such a business should have been a financial failure, and what has become of all the capital invested and the money borrowed, demands minute and accurate investigation, or the confidence of the public will never be raised to the point of advancing the necessary capital. Sun Pao-chi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, is now in Shanghai to take over his duties as President of the Company. The economic and commercial salvation of China, and even her political salvation, will be gauged very much in the mind of many on-lookers by the action of the Chinese in reference to this Hanyehping Company. Reform here will inspire hope of reform in the whole government.

The opportunities for complete freedom of action in self-development, as a result of the protracted negotiations with Japan, are not all that China or her friends may wish, but proper use of every opportunity, however small, will pave the way for larger opportunities and the exercise of fuller national powers. It is our hope that the newly-awakened desire for salvation will stir every soul to perform the duty that lies next to hand. In due time there will come larger opportunities and with them heavier responsibilities.



VII.

SHOULD CHINA REFORM HER SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT?

IN all the attempts of China to work out her own salvation and so to establish the foundation of law and order that overthrow or collapse may alike be averted, she must never lose sight of her main internal trouble, namely, corruption. Her measure of internal peace depends on the degree to which corruption is reduced.

In withstanding outside perils, China must not lose sight of the fact that it is Japan, who, in these days of world-wide calamity, has been the aggressor and wrought the mischief. China's measure of external security depends on the degree to which this menace is reduced.

China should never have her eyes so diverted to other necessities and considerations as to lose sight of the particular trouble both within and without. Japan's profuse professions of eternal friendship and even of regrets for the high-handedness of the Japanese Government should not be taken as sustaining nourishment, till she of her own accord offers to terminate the treaties that China under duress was forced to sign. Already it is noticeable that Chinese as well as foreigners have closed their eyes to the facts, now that China has signed an agreement and reached a settlement, for the sake of peace. With equal importance the punishment of one or more officials for their corrupt practices should not mislead the President or any one else into thinking that the Government of this vast country has at last become pure. The danger-signal with both the blue and red lights needs to flash forth amid the darkness of the way.

If it so be that the men in charge of the danger-signals are ever awake, we can safely advance to other and minor questions bearing on "forms and fancies."

To describe the form of government for any people as insignificant will be judged by many as a great error; it is insignificant only when brought into comparison with other matters such as the two we have just mentioned. One has said: "Monarchy, aristocracy or democracy are all good, if well administered." Another has said, equally truly, "All government must be imperfect, because men are imperfect. Every system has its shortcomings and inconveniences."

Even within the limited period of the last decade China has presented quite a variety of forms of government. Before the Boxer year, under the reign of the Empress Dowager, the form of government might well be called an absolute monarchy, an autocracy, though the previous history of the Manchu House had been more that of limited rather than unlimited rule. After the Boxer year, on the return of the Court to Peking, there was a definite policy of a constitutional monarchy, through the intelligent processes of gradual development. The Government thus in a short period underwent many changes in its structure and methods of administration. When the strong-minded Empress Dowager and the high-minded Emperor passed off the scene, the day of autocracy had ceased for ever. The Government, whilst monarchical in name, was pushing ahead with due modération towards the example of democratic monarchy exemplified in the British Empire, and for the time was an oligarchy or intellectual aristocracy. Towards the end of 1911, the Government formally renounced all the elements of absolutism and was transformed into a rule first by parliament and then by Prime Minister.

From this time on the rush of events has in a perfectly natural way produced changes in the Government almost kaleidoscopic. China for a while was a nation of two Governments, the one called a republic, in Nanking, and the other still a limited monarchy, in Peking. Next the nation, in form, if not in heart, became united. The policy announced to the world was that of a Republic. The Provisional Constitution was republican, not monarchical; and the Government as such was recognized in due course by the rulers of other nations. Henceforth the form of Government, republican in name, continued to undergo, through the necessities of experimenting, considerable variety, until most had lost all interest in forms and constitutions, and desired a Government that could bring peace and order.

This desire of the people of the land has been fully met by the strong, centralizing force of the President, Yuan Shih-k'ai. For the time being, all the forms of a republic have disappeared; and whilst the term Emperor is discarded for that of President or Chief Executive, the Government for a year and more has been more absolute and the rule more autocratic than during most of the period of the Tsing Monarchy. The Government, from the time of the Punitive Expedition, has been really that of a dictatorship; and the reason put forward for this has been, "The people are not yet suited to a republican government."

With the opening of the war in Europe and the beginning of troubles with Japan the patriotic sentiment of the country has kept back all rebellion and has placed full confidence and also full power in the one strong man, called the President, who has bravely, unflinchingly, and with rare patience and self-control, directed the policy of the nation. The present form of government, what-

ever its name, its characteristics, or its constitution, has commanded respect, because, as cited above, it has been "well administered." A Government that could rule is what the people have wanted, and that is what they now have.

This recital shews the multitudinous character of forms of government. It also shews, as already maintained, that forms are minor matters, in comparison with other matters. The main thing is to have a Government that can function, a Government that is honest, and a Government that can deal firmly and intelligently with other sovereign nations.

The history of France, since the great Revolution of a hundred years ago and more, has illustrated this same tendency to change, united with the other tendency to develop, and has furnished all kinds of Constitutions, all suitable for being studied by the Chinese, but no one being suitable for complete imitation. President Lowell of Harvard University, in his book on "Governments and Parties in Continental Europe," refers to the period following the monarchy of Napoleon III., when the present Republic of France was born, in the following language:

"Previous constitutions in France have been long documents and have contained elaborate bills of rights The present constitution is very different, and barely provides for the organization of the powers of the State. The earlier constitutions in France were attempts to frame an ideal system, but the present one resulted from an immediate need of providing a regular government of some sort that could rule the country for the time, and was drawn up by men who had no belief in its inherent perfection."

Referring to the National Assembly which decided on the form of government, President Lowell continues: "The monarchists formed a majority of the Assembly. At one moment it seemed not impossible that the Count de Chambord might become king. A monarchy was out of the question, and so this assembly of monarchists at last set to work to organize a republic; or rather a sufficient number of monarchists, feeling that a republic was, for the time at least, inevitable, joined with the minority to establish a government on the only basis possible. But although the republican form was adopted, the institutions that were set up departed essentially from the ideas the French had been accustomed to associate with that term."

That China has a government that can maintain order over a wide stretch of territory and amongst a populous and independent people, in the face of plots, intrigue and disturbing aggressions, brings great credit to itself and particularly to him who is the Head of the nation. A new committee has been selected to draw up still another constitution. The work should be carried on in a calm spirit, academic enough to pursue without any passion the investigation of all types of Constitution, and practical enough to know which one is best suited to China today, and remain suit-

able for years to come, when the present strong leader of the nation has passed off the scene of action.

While these experts are coolly at work (*i. e.*, after the heat of summer), there are two demands resting on two classes of the people; the one, the demand for greater efficiency and honesty on the part of all the officials, and the other, that of submission to authority on the part of those who are governed. In a pure Government, affording no excuse for any more rebellions, the Committee on Constitutions can take its time to draw up a new Constitution, perfect in principle and phraseology, looking at the ideal but ever mindful of that which is practical. The task for all is that of national reform and personal reformation. Whatever the Constitution to be now evolved, and however eccentric some of the ideas to be advanced, it is no use for our Chinese friends, old conservative, or returned student, to get ruffled, lose heart or whisper conspriacy.

Personally I would be willing to live under any form of government, if the governing authorities be just and honest, and if "life, liberty and happiness" be measureably secured. Some years ago I prepared in Chinese a book on "Western Constitutions as Adapted to China," taking up the four types as found in Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States, and shewing wherein, in my humble judgement, they were suited to China at that time. These types remain the same, and possibly Japan presents another type, but the suitability of one or all of these Constitutions to the new conditions in China demands careful discrimination. In the main China can learn much from others, but the essence of her Constitution is within her own past rather than in the experiences of others. President Wilson in his book on "The State," has concisely expressed the principle: "One rule there is which may not be departed from under any circumstances, and that is the rule of historical continuity. In politics nothing radically novel may be safely attempted. No result or value can ever be reached in politics except through slow and gradual development, careful adaptation and nice modification of growth. Nothing may be done by leaps."



VIII.

WHAT PRINCIPLES MUST CHINA HOLD TO?

IN our previous discussion we closed with the remark that China in the making of a Constitution should maintain connexion with her own past rather than adopt theories from the experiences of other countries. We make this the basis of our present discussion. This view was put forth by Professor F. J. Goodnow, advisor to the Chinese Government, over a year ago. He said: "They must remember that any Constitution which is to be expected to be successful, must be in harmony with the conditions of the country and must, on that account, be in the nature of an evolution out of the history and traditions of the people."

One other thought needs to be borne in mind by Constitution-makers, and that is, whatever the form of government finally adopted for the use of the nation, it should suit general conditions rather than be moulded by one man, however strong and capable, in adaptation to his personal convenience. China needs a Constitution suitable not so much to the present Chief Executive Officer, Yuan Shih-k'ai, as to the country under any leadership. The Government of Mexico suited President Diaz during a long administration of autocratic authority, and brought prosperity to the nation, but the time came when that Government, which suited President Diaz, ended in turmoil and anarchy to the nation.

The autocratic and centralized Government, which has evolved itself for the last two years, whilst accepted by the people as adapted to the peculiar conditions which have existed, must not be regarded as final and perfect, but only as a temporary necessity. The Constitution now to be made—the fruition of all past Constitutions—must as far as possible adhere to fundamental principles of sound politics, rather than to the distinctive traits and tastes of one individual, however efficient and high-minded his administration.

History of many peoples has proved that the more civilized a people, the less suitable or acceptable is a government of absolutism. Anything like dictatorship is tolerable only in times of war or in special internal or external peril. If China desires to be reckoned amongst the civilized nations of the world, she must adopt a Constitution which will discard all autocratic features and place responsibility on more than one. People always delight to see a strong man, a leader among men, but they will resent all power

in the hands of one. In saying this we should also add that there have been in history illustrations of the absolutism not only of one man, but of a Parliament, not only in a monarchy, but in republics.

No constitution for many a century, if ever, has been drawn up with the distinct object of safeguarding an autocratic government. The political principles of Chinese history are as clear on this point as is the Constitution of the United States. In practice, too, every dynasty which has conformed to these traditional principles has flourished, and when it has cast aside these principles it has wrought for itself, not for the country, destruction. Of all the countries of Europe, Russia has stood for autocracies, but for a long time the autocracy has not been one of the Tsar but of the bureaucrats. In theory the Constitution of Japan has provided more for the autocratic idea than has the Constitution of any of the strong Powers.

It was only natural that when the Constitution-makers of the Tsing dynasty set to work, especially those in the Manchu clave, they should seek to introduce this feature of the Japanese Constitution, thinking that the Manchu House would have more power, if the Constitution so stated it. There need be no surprise, if there be those who, seeking to curry favour with the President today, should also try to find a precedent for one-man rule or a strong executive in the Constitution of another Oriental people, prosperous and energetic, the people of Japan.

It is something of a fallacy that absolutism is characteristic of Oriental peoples. So far as China is concerned the traditional spirit of the Chinese is no more in favour of autocratic methods than were the people of the thirteen American Colonies when they, through the War of Independence, determined on a government of their own. In any case, whatever may be said of the past, or of past teachings, the trend of the civilized world is against autocracy. It is well for China to fall in with this trend, as well as to adhere to her own traditions. Mencius thus spoke of the days that had gone before: "The able and virtuous monarchs of antiquity loved virtue and forgot power."

On the reverse side of the principle just stated is the other principle or fact that all peoples are more and more adopting democratic ideas. It is felt that when the present war is over, the day of mighty emperors will be over and democracy will come to its own. There are those who fancy that kings and emperors will cease to be. This, however, is a minor matter. Great Britain, all through the present Hanoverian (or Teuton) House, has been more democratic in civil affairs than most of the republics of Central and South America. What needs to be borne in mind is that a republic or a limited monarchy may be alike commended, so long as provision is made for greater protection to the rights of the people and for greater exercise of popular self-government.

As the adoption into the body politic of democratic ideas has been a matter of growth through many centuries, and must be ex-

pected to grow still more, so the degree of democratic control must expand with the growth of the people's education. All that a constitution can do is to leave the door open for such expansion of democratic government. The franchise at the outset may be very limited, simply because the people are only partially qualified. With advance in education there comes increase in the powers and franchise of the people. A constitution in these days must be based on the rights of the people, must purpose the people's welfare, and must give scope for participation of the people, directly or indirectly, in the duties of government. The American Declaration of Independence declared that the basal principles of Civil Society are "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." In the phrase "inalienable rights" we have an advance on the conception of past thinkers, namely, that beyond the rule of the people, behind all laws, governments and constitutions, are certain "inalienable rights," which must not be destroyed or overlooked. A constitution is good just in so far as it protects and preserves these "inalienable rights."

After a hundred years and more these principles may well enter into the Constitution of China. China can hold to them, not because the American conception of government is thus stated, but rather because the whole traditional thought of China has been, the people first, the ruler second.

Democratic ideas commanded a hearing in China before the present governments of the world had their being. They carried greater weight among the thinkers of China than among the distinguished ones of ancient Greece and Rome. The people in fact had more rights in China under a monarchy than in the so-called republics of the Greeks and Romans. Mencius was the Rousseau, the Tom Paine, the John Stuart Mill of China. His teaching, tersely expressed, was simply this: "The people are the most important element; the spirits of the land and grain are next, the sovereign is the lightest." In principle the Emperor and every district Magistrate are regarded as father and mother of the people; this is "government *for* the people." What remains is provision in the written constitution for "government *by* the people."

Here, then, comes in the necessary corollary of democratic government, that of representative government. This was not so apparent in ancient China, with its different kingdoms, but in the China of to-day, with the largest population of any country in the world, it becomes a necessity. As the Hon. Elihu Root has said, "Popular will cannot execute itself directly except through a mob." Without the selection of a few to represent the many, China is in danger of two extremes, alike great evils, either

autocracy—all power grasped by one man—or mob-rule, where every man demands his 'say.' In a large and populous country strict democracy, where every man exercises authority, is an impossibility; to try for it means anarchy, and anarchy, by a law of nature, suddenly reverts to absolutism, to military dictatorship. The only safe government in such a country as China is representative government.

A constitution needs to make careful provision for the way the people, with universal or limited suffrage, shall exercise their civil rights in electing their representatives, and further provision for the kind of men the people are allowed to elect. Further provision is needed for the kind of business these elected representatives are to perform. Not all official business needs to be conducted on the representative basis. A check on radical movements of the people's representatives is in every country found necessary. As a rule this check is found in the selective principle, that is, a certain number selected by the rulers or under certain provisions of the constitution. How far the officers of a country are to be elected by the people, and how far selected through other channels is largely a matter of national tastes. Where the dividing-line is to take place is unimportant; what is important, and, important for China in making her final constitution, is that the door be left open for representative government. Bluntschli, the Heidelberg publicist, has well written: "Representative government and self-government are the great work of the English and American peoples. The English have produced representative monarchy with parliamentary legislation and parliamentary government. The Americans have produced the representative republic. We Europeans upon the Continent recognize in our turn that in representative government alone lies the hoped-for union between civil order and popular liberty."

With representative government there naturally goes the other idea of some form of parliamentary government. This means in a large country like China, and as already provided in the Constitution of the Tsing Government, a national assembly, provincial assemblies, and local municipal councils. It is true that China's past affords no reason for such bodies of men, but this much may be learned from the constitutions of other countries. No nation in the world, with any pretext to the spirit of progress or to public well-being, but has espoused this idea. A limited power to parliament as in Russia, or Persia, or India, or Mexico, is a sign of backwardness. Such is not the ideal for any nation to work towards. We may rest assured that the Duma of Russia after the present great war will not be the same as it has been heretofore. China cannot hold a place among the great Powers, if she discards the parliamentary idea. The new Constitution must give Parliament a place and give it powers. Nothing less can be satisfying to the people.

One other important principle is worthy of mention, and that is the powers of government must be divided, so that one part can be a check on the others. In this way, autocracy becomes impossible. In a large country like China, Constitutional provision must be made, first of all, for division of power between the Central Government and the local and provincial authorities. The more local any business is, the more should it be left to the people. To centralize all authority in the national capital is almost as bad as to seek to do it in one man. The centralization of the past two years has been a necessity, but the necessity must not become permanent. The past history of China testifies to the desirability of leaving much of the power to the people locally and to the different provinces or separate kingdoms. In the United States, where we can have under the Constitution a strong Chief Executive, all the taxes outside of customs dues and internal revenue, and now the income tax, are set apart for municipal or state purposes; they do not go to meet the expense of the National Government.

Something new for China, and not a traditional proposition, is the distribution of power between three departments, executive, legislative and judicial. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States is as great a man, and as highly esteemed, as the Chief Executive. When we consider that, say, half of the powers rests with the States and half with the National Government, and that in the latter the Executive is one of three, we come to see that only one-sixth of the power rests with the President of the United States. There is no possibility for him to become a Caesar or an autocrat.

The Hon. Elihu Root says: "Unlimited official power concentrated in one person is despotism; and it is only by carefully observed and jealously maintained limitations upon the power of every public officer that the working of free institutions can be continued."

Such a division of power between executive, legislative and judicial officers may be an innovation, but having proved its worth in other countries, I do not hesitate to recommend that in China's new Constitution some form of the principle be adopted and utilized.

These are a few great political principles. Being principles and not rules, they allow great freedom of action and scope for modification and adoption. The more China's Constitution deals with principles and leaves minutiae to future development, the better assured is its preservation. What the Constitution-makers of China most clearly need to follow are principles. And here we close the discussion with some excellent thoughts on the United States Constitution from the Hon. David Jayne Hill, some time ago U. S. Ambassador to Germany:

"We have as a people placed more emphasis upon principles than upon personalities. We believe that ours is a Government of

law ; and not of men. In the days of the American Revolution men did not believe in independence because they believed in Washington, but they believed in Washington because he was struggling for independence ; nor in the days of our Civil War did they believe in the Union because they believed in Lincoln, but they believed in Lincoln because he was trying to save the Union. There is something in American character that places more confidence in settled principles than in the trumpet call of theorists, partisans and partitioners of patronage."

May the Chinese character revert to its old type, love of principle, and so, as they strive to do in America, overcome the perils of patronage, which is here called corruption and "squeeze." Thus can China save herself.



IX.

WHAT WORKS MUST CHINA PERFORM ?

IN previous discussions we have already pointed out enough reforms to keep China busy for many a year. We have, however, dealt largely with principles, and emphasized the idea with which we began, namely, that China's salvation depends more on herself and on Heaven than on help from foreign Powers. In fact foreign Powers, taken together or taken singly, have often proved more of a menace than a blessing. The most that can be expected in the way of altruism is from foreign individuals rather than from foreign governments. If any foreign government can be induced to help China it is rather due to national self-interest than to altruistic motives, or possibly it is due to the high altruistic sentiments of some one individual who happens to be in office, and has ventured to carry his religion into politics.

It is very well, and very easy, to talk of principles, as in our last discussion. It is about as easy as for the Chinese to draw up regulations. The harder task, and the really serious problem, is to carry out some of these principles, and get to doing something. Even principles introduced into a Constitution are no guarantee of a nation's salvation. The Constitution is a palladium of liberty. What is still needed is that all the people and all the officials begin to do something with a practical bearing on the public weal.

Do the Chinese possess the quality of being "up and doing?" Will they undertake some one thing and see it through?

In 1895 I presented to the Military Council of the Empire a Memorial on ways to develop Manchuria. This was before Russia had begun to press in, and the proposals were meant to forestall any aggression. Prince Kung, Weng Tung-ho, Jung Luh and the rest of them, complimented me highly on my ideas and my "good heart," and—nothing was done.

The same year I had about a dozen conferences with Li Hung-chang about an University for Peking. This was a pet scheme of his. I helped him to draw up a plan. Shortly he said to me, "No use, nothing can be done; my colleagues don't want an University,"

Those were the bad days of the Manchus, who are guilty of every failing that the Chinese have. Now we have a Republic, such as it is. Progress is in the air. Educated men, who have

seen the world, are to the front. We are living in better times. Something at last is going to be done.

Having eaten much bitter from the open hand of the Japanese, China has been stirred as never before. A national spirit "moves upon the waters," and yet the old question arises, "Will the Chinese carry through that which they have begun?" Various movements have been set a-going; new Societies have been started; will they go on to the end?

In a previous discussion we pointed out different opportunities open to China by the new treaty enjoined by Japan. Within the narrow scope of this remarkable treaty there is much for China at once to do. The principal thing is the reform and restitution to Chinese possession of the industrial Works of the Hanyehping Company. Will this be done?

Lest it be thought that we only talk of principles and think in a general, indefinite way, we will close these discussions of China's salvation by specifying a few practical enterprises for the Government and the people to undertake. There is nothing new in what we say; we merely give an enumeration, so that any Chinese who is at leisure may feel the call to do something.

I. China needs in Peking a first-class, well-equipped, high-grade University, superior to the High School standard and better than any University started by missionaries. Then will Li Hungchang's dream come to realization. Some University in Shanghai, in Tientsin, in Hongkong, or in Hankow should not take the place of a real University at the national capital, controlled by the Faculty and the President rather than by the students.

II. China needs a national system of education, supported not from the national revenue, but from local and provincial resources. The system needs to be national, directed from the Ministry of Education, but the management and support of each school should be local. Universal education, if aimed at, should be of an elementary kind, like the "three R's" in the West. Hence stress should be laid equally on an University and on Primary Schools. Taxes for public schools should go to them and for no other purpose. Universal education must be simple; the special and the expert is for the few. So a national system of education is better when it is simple than when it is elaborate.

III. China needs improvement in her agriculture. This does not mean that the Chinese have not been good farmers or good gardeners in the past; it only means that they have something to learn from the West, especially from the science of farming. Thus the farmers of the State of New York have at last acknowledged that they can learn from the graduates of the Agricultural Department of Cornell University. It will not be long before this new Department in Nanking University, a union of three Missions, will be gladly utilized by the provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei.

IV. Afforestation is another practical work needing to be taken in hand. It is nearly thirty years since Dr. Joseph Edkins wrote a series of articles on this subject in the first Chinese daily of Tientsin. The reform has been urged on Chinese officials again and again, but neglect of a plain duty has been the rule rather than the exception. The Germans at Tsingtao and along the line of the Shantung Railway have set a good example, and have always been ready to encourage the planting of trees in other parts of China. Professor Bailie of Nanking University is carrying on the same needy work in connexion with his agricultural department. It ought to be possible to get every Governor to see that all the officials under them, in conjunction with the gentry, shall undertake in a simple way the planting and preserving of trees. An editorial in "The National Review" for 24th July gave a clear statement of what can be done in all parts of China.

V. Here comes in another important reform, that of Conservancy. A National Bureau for this purpose has already been established, with Mr. Chang Ch'ien as the enthusiastic director. The American Red Cross Society dispatched engineers to study the problems in the region of the Hwai river, and it was expected that Americans were to raise the money to undertake model Conservancy Works. Americans are the only ones with abundance of means—all the more abundant through sales in time of war—and their good fortune should lead them to carry on this Red Cross proposal. Should American philanthropists lose their ardour, it is left to the Chinese to do one more part of her self-salvation. The task for the whole of China is gigantic, but a start should be made.

VI. Another practical reform is currency reform. We are not ourselves particular whether gold or silver or copper is made the standard, so long as some standard is agreed upon. In our opinion gold should be the standard, seeing that this is the standard throughout the world. This does not exclude the wider use and circulation of silver and copper and paper, but gold is the standard and the ratio of exchange is definite. A definite plan of currency reform was agreed upon by Dr. Ch'en Chin-t'ao and foreign experts, before the Manchu dynasty came to its untimely end. Under the republic the Ministry of Finance has invited currency Advisors, and for a while there was a special bureau under Liang Ch'i-chi'ao; but the reform has gone no further than the academic stage. It needs to be put into practice.

VII. Mines should be opened and railways built on the co-operative basis, with Chinese and foreign capital, but no more concessions should be given outright to foreigners, at least until the law is established that two foreign nations at war with each other cannot in consequence take possession of each other's property, rights or concessions within the domains of Chinese territory. The way should be open for foreign capital and proportionate control, but not for absolute foreign control. If foreign

capitalists do not care to co-operate, they had better be left out. If the Chinese, on the other hand, continue to hamper and frustrate all foreign help, they, too, should be left alone. Co-operation means co-operation, nothing more, nothing less.

VIII. China should go on with her salt reforms. A first-class English advisor, with experience, is at the head. His advice should be trusted and followed. A system as efficient as the Maritime Customs will soon be developed, bringing revenue to the Government and forming a model for other departments.

IX. In our humble opinion, likin should be abolished, whether foreign Powers agree or not to increase tariff. Internal trade should be free from all impediments. Free trade, whatever we say of it in an international sense, is an absolute necessity in a national sense, within the bounds of one's own country.

X. A national banking system needs to be established so that the Chinese in one part of the country can trade with those in another through a common medium of exchange. The bank of China or the Bank of Communications should have branches in every city of China, so that the same notes can be accepted everywhere throughout the country. If a cheque from a bank in New York City may be cashed at the Hongkong Bank in Shanghai, a cheque of the Bank of China in Chungking should pass with the same bank in Shanghai.

These are enough practical points to show that scope is given for a large variety of talent in China.

It is to be hoped that Japan and England, France and Russia, Germany and the United States, Spain and Portugal, and all the rest, will have mercy on China by giving her a chance to set her house in order. Should the exhilarating experiences of the past year after all prove a sedative, and in the course of the next ten years no reform be undertaken, or rather carried out, we will then yield to the superior argument of our friends the Japanese, and welcome their paternal sway in China as it has been so gleefully welcomed in Chosen.



X.

SHOULD CHINA REVERT TO A MONARCHY?

IN our discussions of the ways for China to save herself, it was our intention to close with a reference to the good works which China should undertake. There has, however, arisen a rather lively dispute as to the comparative advantages of a monarchy or a republic for China. The question is a serious one, needing calm discussion and comprehensive investigation. It is because the question, and still more the manner of the discussion and the nature of the decision, bear closely on China's preservation or destruction, that we include the topic in this series of articles. What we are bearing in our own minds and what we would wish all Chinese to put to the front in all their thoughts, is that nothing should be done or said, planned or decided, that would in the slightest degree imperil China. The war in Europe is not over; embarrassing relations with Japan have not ceased; unexpected complications from many directions are almost a certainty; it behoves the Chinese authorities to walk warily, lest through a dispute as to forms of government, the country be placed at the mercy of unfriendly observers. The very excellent editorial in the "The National Review," for the 21st July, takes note of this, along with other sensible ideas, when it says: "To turn back now would be to precipitate chaos again, a state of things which China cannot afford."

There are certain principles which should lie at the basis of all considerations of this serious question.

1. First, all sides of the question should be considered. There should be no one-sided view, and it should not be thought that any side has all the truth. A calm student of political science will probably conclude that the excellences of a monarchical or republican government, when placed side by side, differ in degree very little from each other. This fact of itself should prevent undue heat in mutual recrimination. The more the study is made thorough and all-around, and the more it leaves out personal considerations and seeks the public well-being, the more of benefit and the least of harm, will be the result. China is not the first country which has faced this question, and a number, from ancient Greece and Rome down to England, France, the Netherlands, Brazil, and Mexico, have made several experiments.

If there is any criticism to be passed, it is that an all-around consideration of the question has been taken up by a self-constituted Society, the Devising Peace Society. Even if the question is passed on to the new Constitutional Committee, this Committee, consisting of only ten persons, is not sufficiently representative of the people of the country. When the Revolution demanded the abdication of the Manchu Throne, the Princes and Ministers made a fair proposition, which unfortunately was never followed, that the question of a monarchy or a republic be decided by a representative Assembly from all the provinces and all the races of China. Up to the present, the question has not been openly, fairly and calmly considered by any real representative body of the Chinese. Intimidation has more than once throttled discussion. Those intimidated have henceforth talked only in whispers. The formation of this Society and the Memorandum of Prof. Goodnow have been the first in an official way to present the monarchical side of the question. For four years Chinese who have thought in a way different from the articulate majority have deemed self-preservation the first law of nature, and have remained silent. A year and a half ago I ventured to take two sides of six discussions of constitutional questions, one bearing on the restoration or not of the Manchu House, under certain important limitations, and this all-round view of the question was severely criticized in certain quarters in Shanghai, while commendations came from other places in China. The discussion, having been choked off before, has now attained to articulation in the official life of Peking.

2. In the second place, free discussion is essential to progress and particularly to the right decision of this question of government. If freedom finds its development in the discussion of such a question, there is hope of freedom in other matters. Ever since the Revolution, the custom has been for any party in power to take for itself all the liberty possible and put a check on the other side. During the attack from Japan all parties felt pretty free to express their opinion on Japan's actions. They should be equally free to express an opinion, strong and yet fair, open and yet considerate, on this question of monarchy or republic. It may be that those most loud in demanding that other people's views be forbidden and the people punished will be, not the conservatives of China, but those who have preached "liberty, equality and fraternity." It is well, then, to be reminded that lovers of liberty will best attain the ends of liberty by allowing freedom of expression on this important question.

While in one respect it is true "that it is both too late and too early to discuss this issue," it is also true that discussion is not too late, seeing that up to the present no discussion has taken place. Every one has been forced to sing one tune. To try to sing another tune has proved, of course, discordant. Now is the time to allow different parts of the same tune—the nation's salvation

—to be sung by different groups, each singer safe in his life and all moved by a common purpose.

3. Taking for granted that at last there is to be free discussion, and an all-around view of the question, then a change from republic back to monarchy should be made only if, as Professor Goodnow has said, no such opposition "either on the part of the people or of foreign Powers" arises "as will lead to the recurrence of disorders which the present republican government has successfully put down."

It is here that the discussion of the topic appears of doubtful value. Revolutionists opposed to President Yuan Shih-k'ai may be tempted to stir up disturbances, which Japan will find to her advantage to utilize. It would seem, however, that if the present Government has been strong enough during the last year to maintain peace and order in the face of being humiliated at the hands of Japan, there should be no difficulty in achieving the same result while discussion is taking place.

We learned from the Revolution that opposition to the then Government was not supported by the mass of the people. In these days, when the excitement and terror have died down, it is a question whether the people the country over—the back-bone of the body politic—will actually oppose reversion to monarchy and prefer a republic or *vice versa*.

It will not be long till the President has felt the pulse and announced his mind as that of China's great leader.

4. We have more than once recommended that China's form of government should be in harmony with her own traditions and the spirit of the nation, rather than moulded on the model of any foreign country, the United States or Japan, France or Mexico. This is the teaching concerning the State as given by President Wilson and by Professor Goodnow, China's learned advisor.

On this general proposition it has long been my humble opinion that some form of monarchical government fits in better with the inherited ideas and customs of the mass of Chinese, to say nothing of Manchus and Mongols, than does a republic with a President.

This general concurrence of view and even of wish, receives its modification when a particular person is spoken of as future Emperor, whether the young boy-Emperor Hsuan T'ung, the President Yuan Shih-k'ai, the Duke of Confucius, or some long sought-for descendant of the Mings.

5. The law of continuity also prevails among peaceful peoples. If this law is to have any weight in China, it would mean that if a monarchy is to be again adopted, then the Revolution and the Republic are only a break in the natural flow of national events and orderly government, and the House of Tsing would be allowed to continue rather than the attempt be made to start a new dynasty with, say, Yuan Shih-k'ai as first Emperor. To go on with the

government much as it was at the beginning of 1912 would seem the natural process, if a monarchy is to be again tried.

It is quite apparent that many of the supporters of a monarchy for China have Yuan Shih-k'ai in mind as Emperor. So far as continuity is concerned, the natural working out of the republic, giving it a full chance of being tried and tested is a better proposition than to begin a new Imperial House.

In this respect, the discussion of a monarchy or republic is "too early." The Republic, as men dreamed of and longed for, has not been properly tried. If the Republic, on this theory, proves itself not workable by the time Yuan Shih-k'ai ceases to be President, then it will be soon enough to talk of reverting to a monarchy. Moreover the boy-Emperor will then have grown or, in case of death, his successor selected, and his fitness or otherwise have been recognized.

Thus it was that the Commonwealth in England was changed back to the Royal House of Stuart.

In one way the law of continuity can be recognized and Yuan Shih-k'ai be made first Emperor of a new dynasty, and that is when the Revolution is made to be a natural evolution of the corrupt Manchu rule, and the Republic a natural evolution from the Revolution, and the present autocracy a natural evolution from the Republic, and a monarchy a natural evolution from autocracy. It was in this way that Napoleon I. became first Emperor of France, and by the same natural process his great Imperialism ended in downfall, with reversal to the former House of Bourbon.

6. In a previous discussion we pointed out that autocratic rule by one man is never arranged for in a written constitution. Autocracy should never be more than temporary amongst a civilized people. It is well to speak clearly on all these matters, and to do so of China would require us to acknowledge that since Parliament was dissolved, there has not been a real Republic but an autocracy, which under the circumstances has worked well for the peace of the country. The question, therefore, is whether China in escaping from autocracy shall revert to a monarchy or advance to a republic.

There seems to be in the minds of some the thought that a monarchy finds better scope for autocratic powers than a republic, and the plan to make Yuan Shih-k'ai Emperor is that according to law he may be more autocratic.

Herein are two or three misconceptions. If autocracy is all that is wanted, no change is necessary; the existing Government under the name of republic is autocratic, as was that of Cromwell in the English Commonwealth.

It would be a calamity to China to plan permanently an autocratic Republic or an absolute unlimited monarchy. The only kind of monarchy not to be dreaded is a limited, constitutional monarchy, such as that of the Tsings had become. Such a mon-

archy is not far different from a republic, and the selection of one or the other is then a mere matter of taste and fitness.

In a limited monarchy anything like great or autocratic power, does not rest with the Emperor but with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet or with Parliament. Hence if a place of the highest power is to be provided for Yuan Shih-k'ai, he should not be made Emperor but Prime Minister again under the boy-Emperor. Autocracy in a responsible Prime Minister is the only safe kind of autocracy, for it is never permanent.

A constitution which provided for an autocratic President would be something of an anomaly. The genius of the Chinese can be better directed.

7. As already indicated, and as pointed out in a previous discussion, the form of government, whether limited monarchy or a real republic, does not much matter; what matters is an honest, clean government. China can change from monarchy to republic and back again to a monarchy any number of times, but if the officials are avaricious and peculators, bribe-takers and bribe-givers, without public spirit and without conscience, doom awaits the nation. A pure government is the first thing.

8. Even in a limited monarchy there is scope for expansion in democratic ideas, just as much as in a republic. This we have discussed before. What, then, the Constitution must be sure to provide is that the people more and more take part in the government. On this point Dr. Goodnow speaks with no uncertain sound at the close of his Memorandum: "If China is to take her proper place among nations, greater patriotism must be developed among the people and the government must increase in strength in order to resist foreign aggression. Her people will never develop the necessary patriotism unless they are given greater participation in the government than they have had in the past."

Whether monarchy or republic, as we argued in a previous article, there must be provision for growth in democratic ideas, for representation by the best men, for representative or legislative bodies, and for distribution of the powers of government.

In the summer of last year I was in Peking and talked with upwards of a hundred officials and many others on various public questions. Some had read my discussions on constitutional government. I found a variety of opinion. In some cases I only conjectured what was in the mind. A few plainly desired to see the House of Tsing carried on in the name of the boy-Emperor. Of these some wanted Yuan Shih-k'ai as Prime Minister, much as he seemed to be at the time from the Manchu point of view. A goodly number thought the Manchus and all the Chinese associated with them were out, and good riddance, and if any man was to be Emperor, he must be Yuan Shih-k'ai. Many worshipped Yuan Shih-k'ai, and did not care what he was called. They followed a man, not a principle. Others, though not as many as in Shang-


hai, plainly wanted a republic. Most of these wanted Yuan Shih-k'ai as President, and here and there was one opposed to him and in favour of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. They naturally disapproved of the abolition of a national Parliament, and thought the Constitution, not a man, should rule.

Probably the same diversity of opinion still prevails, though as a result of the contest with Japan the opinion has grown in favour of Yuan Shih-k'ai, willing to recommend the form of government which they suppose he wants.

What is needed is that the government take shape according to devotion to principles rather than to any man.







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