

SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF
CARL SCHURZ

IN SIX VOLUMES

SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF

CARL SCHURZ

SELECTED AND EDITED BY

FREDERIC BANCROFT

ON BEHALF OF

THE CARL SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE

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THE WRITINGS OF CARL SCHURZ

The Writings of Carl Schurz

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1874.

Thanks for your kind letter. True, my first speech¹ was a rather dry exposition of elementary truths. But we have to go through an A B C course on such matters in this Senate of ours. Morton, Ferry etc., are going to reply to me, and I am confident they are going to repeat the same absurdities to which they have been treating us for two months, and, in replying, we shall have to commence from the beginning again.

I think your idea of forming a "hard money league" is a very good one. Mr. Forbes, I believe, has already organized a committee for the dissemination of documents, and it would, perhaps, be well to aid him in that and to extend the operations of that committee. But I think a league on a large scale, a conspicuous organization, should be started at some other point than Boston. It ought not to be an Eastern movement if its influence in the West is to be unobstructed by sectional prejudice. I have already written to some gentlemen at Cincinnati about the same matter and I hope they will soon move forward. It would then be ostensibly a Western movement. . . .

¹ On Currency and National Banks, in the Senate, Feb. 27, 1874.

EULOGY ON CHARLES SUMNER¹

When the news went forth, "Charles Sumner is dead," a tremor of strange emotion was felt all over the land. It was as if a magnificent star, a star unlike all others, which the living generation had been wont to behold fixed and immovable above their heads, had all at once disappeared from the sky, and the people stared into the great void darkened by the sudden absence of the familiar light.

On the 16th of March a funeral procession passed through the streets of Boston. Uncounted thousands of men, women and children had assembled to see it pass. No uncommon pageant had attracted them; no military parade with glittering uniforms and gay banners; no pompous array of dignitaries in official robes; nothing but carriages and a hearse with a coffin, and in it the corpse of Charles Sumner. But there they stood,—a multitude immeasurable to the eye, rich and poor, white and black, old and young,—in grave and mournful silence, to bid a last sad farewell to him who was being borne to his grave. And every breeze from every point of the compass came loaded with a sigh of sorrow. Indeed, there was not a city or town in this great Republic which would not have surrounded that funeral procession with the same spectacle of a profound and universal sense of great bereavement.

Was it love; was it gratitude for the services rendered to the people; was it the baffled expectation of greater service still to come; was it admiration of his talents or his virtues that inspired so general an emotion of sorrow?

He had stood aloof from the multitude; the friendship of his heart had been given to but few; to the many he had appeared distant, self-satisfied and cold. His public

¹ Delivered before the city government and citizens of Boston in Music Hall, April 29, 1874.

life had been full of bitter conflicts. No man had aroused against himself fiercer animosities. Although warmly recognized by many, the public services of no man had been more acrimoniously questioned by opponents. No statesman's motives, qualities of heart and mind, wisdom and character, except his integrity, had been the subject of more heated controversy; and yet, when sudden death snatched him from us, friend and foe bowed their heads alike.

Every patriotic citizen felt poorer than the day before. Every true American heart trembled with the apprehension that the Republic had lost something it could ill spare.

Even from far distant lands, across the ocean, voices came, mingling their sympathetic grief with our own.

When you, Mr. Mayor, in the name of the City Government of Boston, invited me to interpret that which millions think and feel, I thanked you for the proud privilege you had conferred upon me, and the invitation appealed so irresistibly to my friendship for the man we had lost, that I could not decline it.

And yet, the thought struck me that you might have prepared a greater triumph to his memory, had you summoned, not me, his friend, but one of those who had stood against him in the struggles of his life, to bear testimony to Charles Sumner's virtues.

There are many among them to-day, to whose sense of justice you might have safely confided the office, which to me is a task of love.

Here I see his friends around me, the friends of his youth, of his manhood, of his advancing age; among them, men whose illustrious names are household words as far as the English tongue is spoken, and far beyond. I saw them standing round his open grave, when it received the flower-decked coffin, mute sadness heavily

clouding their brows. I understood their grief, for nobody could share it more than I.

In such a presence, the temptation is great to seek that consolation for our loss which bereaved friendship finds in the exaltation of its bereavement. But not to you or me belonged this man while he lived; not to you or me belongs his memory now that he is gone. His deeds, his example and his fame, he left as a legacy to the American people and to mankind; and it is my office to speak of this inheritance. I cannot speak of it without affection. I shall endeavor to do it with justice.

Among the public characters of America, Charles Sumner stands peculiar and unique. His senatorial career is a conspicuous part of our political history. But in order to appreciate the man in the career, we must look at the story of his life.

The American people take pride in saying that almost all their great historic characters were self-made men, who, without the advantages of wealth and early opportunities, won their education, raised themselves to usefulness and distinction, and achieved their greatness through a rugged hand-to-hand struggle with adverse fortune. It is indeed so. A log cabin; a ragged little boy walking barefooted to a lowly country school-house, or sometimes no school-house at all;—a lad, after a day's hard toil on the farm, or in the workshop, poring greedily, sometimes stealthily, over a volume of poetry, or history, or travels;—a forlorn-looking youth, with elbows out, applying at a lawyer's office for an opportunity to study;—then the young man a successful practitioner attracting the notice of his neighbors;—then a member of a State legislature, a Representative in Congress, a Senator, may be a Cabinet Minister, or even President. Such are the pictures presented by many a proud American biography.

And it is natural that the American people should be

proud of it, for such a biography condenses in the compass of a single life the great story of the American Nation, as from the feebleness and misery of early settlements in the bleak solitude it advanced to the subjugation of the hostile forces of nature; plunged into an arduous struggle with dangers and difficulties only known to itself, gathering strength from every conflict and experience from every trial; with undaunted pluck widening the range of its experiments and creative action, until at last it stands there as one of the greatest powers of the earth. The people are fond of seeing their image reflected in the lives of their foremost representative men.

But not such a life was that of Charles Sumner. He was descended from good old Kentish yeomanry stock, men stalwart of frame, stout of heart, who used to stand in the front of the fierce battles of Old England; and the first of the name who came to America had certainly not been exempt from the rough struggles of the early settlements. But already from the year 1723 a long line of Sumners appears on the records of Harvard College, and it is evident that the love of study had long been hereditary in the family. Charles Pinckney Sumner, the Senator's father, was a graduate of Harvard, a lawyer by profession, for fourteen years high sheriff of Suffolk county. His literary tastes and acquirements and his stately politeness are still remembered. He was altogether a man of high respectability.

He was not rich, but in good circumstances; and well able to give his children the best opportunities to study, without working for their daily bread.

Charles Sumner was born in Boston, on the 6th of January, 1811. At the age of ten he had received his rudimentary training; at fifteen, after having gone through the Boston Latin School, he entered Harvard College, and plunged at once with fervor into the classics, polite

literature and history. Graduated in 1830, he entered the Cambridge Law School. Now life began to open to him. Judge Story, his most distinguished teacher, soon recognized in him a young man of uncommon stamp; and an intimate friendship sprang up between teacher and pupil, which was severed only by death.

He began to distinguish himself, not only by the most arduous industry and application, pushing his researches far beyond the text-books,—indeed, text-books never satisfied him,—but by a striking eagerness and faculty to master the original principles of the science, and to trace them through its development.

His productive labor began, and I find it stated that already then, while he was yet a pupil, his essays, published in the *American Jurist*, were “always characterized by breadth of view and accuracy of learning, and sometimes by remarkably subtle and ingenious investigations.”

Leaving the Law School, he entered the office of a lawyer in Boston, to acquire a knowledge of practice, never much to his taste. Then he visited Washington for the first time, little dreaming what a theatre of action, struggle, triumph and suffering the National city was to become for him; for then he came only as a studious, deeply interested looker-on, who merely desired to form the acquaintance of the justices and practising lawyers at the bar of the Supreme Court. He was received with marked kindness by Chief Justice Marshall, and in later years he loved to tell his friends how he had sat at the feet of that great magistrate, and learned there what a judge should be.

Having been admitted to the bar in Worcester in 1834, when twenty-three years old, he opened an office in Boston, was soon appointed reporter of the United States Circuit Court, published three volumes containing Judge Story's decisions, known as *Sumner's Reports*, took Judge

Story's place from time to time as lecturer in the Harvard Law School; also Professor Greenleaf's, who was absent, and edited during the years 1835 and 1836 Andrew Dunlap's *Treatise on Admiralty Practice*. Beyond this, his studies, arduous, incessant and thorough, ranged far and wide.

Truly a studious and laborious young man, who took the business of life earnestly in hand, determined to know something, and to be useful to his time and country.

But what he had learned and could learn at home did not satisfy his craving. In 1837 he went to Europe, armed with a letter from Judge Story's hand to the law magnates of England, to whom his patron introduced him as "a young lawyer, giving promise of the most eminent distinction in his profession, with truly extraordinary attainments, literary and judicial, and a gentleman of the highest purity and propriety of character."

That was not a mere complimentary introduction; it was the conscientious testimony of a great judge, who well knew his responsibility, and who afterwards, when his death approached, adding to that testimony, was frequently heard to say, "I shall die content, as far as my professorship is concerned, if Charles Sumner is to succeed me."

In England, young Sumner, only feeling himself standing on the threshold of life, was received like a man of already achieved distinction. Every circle of a society ordinarily so exclusive was open to him. Often, by invitation, he sat with the judges in Westminster Hall. Renowned statesmen introduced him on the floor of the Houses of Parliament. Eagerly he followed the debates, and studied the principles and practice of parliamentary law on its maternal soil, where from the first seed corn it had grown up into a magnificent tree, in whose shadow a great people can dwell in secure enjoyment of their

rights. Scientific associations received him as a welcome guest, and the learned and great willingly opened to his winning presence their stores of knowledge and statesmanship.

In France he listened to the eminent men of the Law School in Paris, at the Sorbonne and the Collège de France, and with many of the statesmen of that country he maintained instructive intercourse. In Italy he gave himself up to the charms of art, poetry, history and classical literature. In Germany he enjoyed the conversation of Humboldt, of Ranke the historian, of Ritter the geographer and of the great jurists, Savigny, Thibaut and Mittermaier.

Two years after his return, the *London Quarterly Review* said of his visit to England: "He presents in his own person a decisive proof that an American gentleman, without official rank or wide-spread reputation, by mere dint of courtesy, candor, an entire absence of pretension, an appreciating spirit and a cultured mind, may be received on a perfect footing of equality in the best circles, social, political and intellectual."

It must have been true, for it came from a quarter not given to the habit of flattering Americans beyond their deserts. And Charles Sumner was not then the Senator of power and fame; he was only the young son of a late sheriff of Suffolk county in Massachusetts, who had neither riches nor station, but who possessed that most winning charm of youth,—purity of soul, modesty of conduct, culture of mind, an earnest thirst for knowledge, and a brow bearing the stamp of noble manhood and the promise of future achievements.

He returned to his native shores in 1840, himself like a heavily freighted ship, bearing a rich cargo of treasures collected in foreign lands.

He resumed the practice of law in Boston; but as I

find it stated, "not with remarkable success in a financial point of view." That I readily believe. The financial point of view was never to him a fruitful source of inspiration. Again he devoted himself to the more congenial task of teaching at the Cambridge Law School, and of editing an American edition of *Vesey's Reports*, in twenty volumes, with elaborate notes contributed by himself.

But now the time had come when a new field of action was to open itself to him. On the 4th of July, 1845, he delivered before the city authorities of Boston an address on "The True Grandeur of Nations." So far he had been only a student—a deep and arduous one, and a writer and a teacher, but nothing more. On that day his public career commenced. And his first public address disclosed at once the peculiar impulse and inspirations of his heart, and the tendencies of his mind. It was a plea for universal peace,—a poetic rhapsody on the wrongs and horrors of war, and the beauties of concord; not, indeed, without solid argument, but that argument clothed in all the gorgeousness of historical illustration, classic imagery and fervid effusion, rising high above the level of existing conditions, and picturing an ideal future—the universal reign of justice and charity—not far off to his own imagination, but far beyond the conceptions of living society; but to that society he addressed the urgent summons, to go forth at once in pursuit of this ideal consummation; to transform all swords into ploughshares, and all warships into peaceful merchantmen, without delay; believing that thus the Nation would rise to a greatness never known before, which it could accomplish if it only willed it.

And this speech he delivered while the citizen soldiery of Boston in festive array were standing before him, and while the very air was stirred by the premonitory mutterings of an approaching war.

The whole man revealed himself in that utterance: a soul full of the native instinct of justice; an overpowering sense of right and wrong, which made him look at the problems of human society from the lofty plane of an ideal morality, which fixed for him, high beyond the existing condition of things, the aims for which he must strive, and inspired and fired his ardent nature for the struggle. His education had singularly favored and developed that ideal tendency. It was not that of the self-made man in the common acceptation of the word. The distracting struggles for existence, the small, harassing cares of everyday life had remained foreign to him. His education was that of the favored few. He found all the avenues of knowledge wide open to him. All that his country could give, he had: the most renowned schools; the living instruction of the most elevating personal associations. It was the education of the typical young English gentleman. Like the English gentleman, also, he travelled abroad to widen his mental horizon. And again, all that foreign countries could give, he had: the instruction of great lawyers and men of science, the teachings and example of statesmen, the charming atmosphere of poetry and art which graces and elevates the soul. He had also learned to work, to work hard and with a purpose, and at thirty-four, when he first appeared conspicuously before the people, he could already point to many results of his labor.

But his principal work had been an eager accumulation of knowledge in his own mind, an accumulation most extraordinary in its scope and variety. His natural inclination to search for fundamental principles and truths had been favored by his opportunities, and all his industry in collecting knowledge became subservient to the building up of his ideals. Having not been tossed and jostled through the school of want and adversity, he lacked, what that school is best apt to develop,—keen practical,

instincts, sharpened by early struggles, and that sober appreciation of the realities and possibilities of the times which is forced upon men by a hard contact with the world. He judged life from the stillness of the student's closet and from his intercourse with the refined and elevated, and he acquired little of those experiences which might have dampened his zeal in working for his ideal aims, and staggered his faith in their realization. His mind loved to move and operate in the realm of ideas, not of things; in fact, it could scarcely have done otherwise. Thus nature and education made him an idealist—and, indeed, he stands as the most pronounced idealist among the public men of America.

He was an ardent friend of liberty, not like one of those who have themselves suffered oppression and felt the galling weight of chains; nor like those who in the common walks of life have experienced the comfort of wide elbow-room and the quickening and encouraging influence of free institutions for the practical work of society. But to him liberty was the ideal goddess clothed in sublime attributes of surpassing beauty and beneficence, giving to every human being his eternal rights, showering around her the treasures of her blessings, and lifting up the lowly to an ideal existence.

In the same ethereal light stood in his mind the Republic, his country, the law, the future organization of the great family of peoples.

That idealism was sustained and quickened, not merely by his vast learning and classical inspirations, but by that rare and exquisite purity of life, and high moral sensitiveness, which he had preserved intact and fresh through all the temptations of his youth, and which remained intact and fresh down to his last day.

Such was the man, when, in the exuberant vigor of manhood, he entered public life. Until that time he had

entertained no aspirations for a political career. When discussing with a friend of his youth—now a man of fame—what the future might have in store for them, he said: “You may be a Senator of the United States some day; but nothing would make me happier than to be President of Harvard College.”

And in later years he publicly declared: “With the ample opportunities of private life I was content. No tombstone for me could bear a fairer inscription than this: ‘Here lies one who, without the honors or emoluments of public station, did something for his fellow-men.’ ” It was the scholar who spoke, and no doubt he spoke sincerely. But he found the slavery question in his path; or, rather, the slavery question seized upon him. The advocate of universal peace, of the eternal reign of justice and charity, could not fail to see in slavery the embodiment of universal war, of man against man, of absolute injustice and oppression. Little knowing where the first word would carry him, he soon found himself in the midst of the struggle.

The idealist found a living question to deal with, which, like a flash of lightning, struck into the very depth of his soul, and set it on fire. The whole ardor of his nature broke out in the enthusiasm of the anti-slavery man. In a series of glowing addresses and letters he attacked the great wrong. He protested against the Mexican war; he assailed with powerful strokes the fugitive-slave law; he attempted to draw the Whig party into a decided anti-slavery policy; and when that failed, he broke through his party affiliations, and joined the small band of Free-Soilers. He was an abolitionist by nature, but not one of those who rejected the Constitution as a covenant with slavery. His legal mind found in the Constitution no express recognition of slavery, and he consistently construed it as a warrant of freedom. This placed him in the ranks of those who were called “political abolitionists.”

He did not think of the sacrifices which this obedience to his moral impulses might cost him. For, at that time, abolitionism was by no means a fashionable thing. An anti-slavery man was then, even in Boston, positively the horror of a large portion of polite society. To make anti-slavery speeches was looked upon, not only as an incendiary, but a vulgar occupation. And that the highly refined Sumner, who was so learned and able, who had seen the world and mixed with the highest social circles in Europe; who knew the classics by heart, and could deliver judgment on a picture or a statue like a veteran connoisseur; who was a favorite with the wealthy and powerful, and could in his aspirations for an easy and fitting position in life count upon their whole influence, if he only would not do anything foolish,—that such a man should go among the abolitionists, and not only sympathize with them, but work with them, and expose himself to the chance of being dragged through the streets by vulgar hands with a rope round his neck, like William Lloyd Garrison,—that was a thing at which the polite society of that day would revolt, and which no man could undertake without danger of being severely dropped. But that was the thing which the refined Sumner actually did, probably without giving a moment's thought to the possible consequences.

He went even so far as openly to defy that dictatorship which Daniel Webster had for so many years been exercising over the political mind of Massachusetts, and which then was about to exert its power in favor of a compromise with slavery.

But times were changing, and only six years after the delivery of his first popular address he was elected to the Senate of the United States by a combination of Democrats and Free-Soilers.

Charles Sumner entered the Senate on the 1st day of

December, 1851. He entered as the successor of Daniel Webster, who had been appointed Secretary of State. On that same 1st of December Henry Clay spoke his last word in the Senate, and then left the chamber, never to return.

A striking and most significant coincidence: Henry Clay disappeared from public life; Daniel Webster left the Senate, drawing near his end; Charles Sumner stepped upon the scene. The close of one and the setting in of another epoch in the history of the American Republic were portrayed in the exit and entry of these men.

Clay and Webster had appeared in the councils of the Nation in the early part of this century. The Republic was then still in its childhood, in almost every respect still an untested experiment, an unsolved problem. Slowly and painfully had it struggled through the first conflicts of Constitutional theories, and acquired only an uncertain degree of National consistency. There were the somewhat unruly democracies of the States, with their fresh revolutionary reminiscences, their instincts of entirely independent sovereignty, and their now and then seemingly divergent interests; and the task of binding them firmly together in the bonds of common aspirations, of National spirit and the authority of National law, had, indeed, fairly progressed, but was far from being entirely accomplished. The United States, not yet compacted by the means of rapid locomotion which to-day make every inhabitant of the land a neighbor of the National capital, were then still a straggling confederacy; and the members of that confederacy had, since the triumphant issue of the Revolution, more common memories of severe trials, sufferings, embarrassments, dangers, and anxieties together, than of cheering successes and of assured prosperity and well-being.

The great powers of the old world, fiercely contending

among themselves for the mastery, trampled, without remorse, upon the neutral rights of the young and feeble Republic. A war was impending with one of them, bringing on disastrous reverses and spreading alarm and discontent over the land. A dark cloud of financial difficulty hung over the Nation. And the danger from abroad and embarrassments at home were heightened by a restless party spirit, which former disagreements had left behind them, and which every newly-arising question seemed to embitter. The outlook was dark and uncertain. It was under such circumstances that Henry Clay first, and Daniel Webster shortly after him, stepped upon the scene, and at once took their station in the foremost rank of public men.

The problems to be solved by the statesmen of that period were of an eminently practical nature. They had to establish the position of the young Republic among the powers of the earth; to make her rights as a neutral respected; to secure the safety of her maritime interests. They had to provide for National defense. They had to set the interior household of the Republic in working order.

They had to find remedies for a burdensome public debt and a disordered currency. They had to invent and originate policies, to bring to light the resources of the land, sleeping unknown in the virgin soil; to open and make accessible to the husbandman the wild acres yet untouched; to protect the frontier settler against the inroads of the savage; to call into full activity the agricultural, commercial and industrial energies of the people; to develop and extend the prosperity of the Nation so as to make even the discontented cease to doubt that the National Union was, and should be maintained as, a blessing to all.

Thus we find the statesmanship of those times busily

occupied with practical detail of foreign policy, National defense, financial policy, tariffs, banks, organization of governmental departments, land policy, Indian policy, internal improvements, settlements of disputes and difficulties among the States, contrivances of expediency of all sorts, to put the Government firmly upon its feet, and to set and keep in orderly motion the working of the political machinery, to build up and strengthen and secure the framework in which the mighty developments of the future were to take place.

Such a task, sometimes small in its details, but difficult and grand in its comprehensiveness, required that creative, organizing, building kind of statesmanship, which to large and enlightened views of the aims and ends of political organization and of the wants of society must add a practical knowledge of details, a skilful handling of existing material, a just understanding of causes and effects, the ability to compose distracting conflicts and to bring the social forces into fruitful coöperation.

On this field of action Clay and Webster stood in the front rank of an illustrious array of contemporaries: Clay, the originator of measures and policies, with his inventive and organizing mind, not rich in profound ideas or in knowledge gathered by book study, but learning as he went; quick in the perception of existing wants and difficulties and of the means within reach to satisfy the one and overcome the other; and a born captain also, a commander of men, who appeared as if riding through the struggles of those days mounted on a splendidly caparisoned charger, sword in hand, and with helmet and waving plume, leading the front; a fiery and truly magnetic soul, overawing with his frown, enchanting with his smile, flourishing the weapon of eloquence like a wizard's wand, overwhelming opposition and kindling and fanning the flame of enthusiasm; a marshaller of parties, whose very

presence and voice like a signal blast created and wielded organization.

And by his side Daniel Webster, with that awful vastness of brain, a tremendous storehouse of thought and knowledge, which gave forth its treasures with ponderous majesty of utterance; he not an originator of measures and policies, but a mighty advocate, the greatest advocate this country ever knew,—a king in the realm of intellect, and the solemn embodiment of authority,—a huge Atlas, who carried the Constitution on his shoulders. He could have carried there the whole moral grandeur of the Nation, had he never compromised his own.

Such men filled the stage during that period of construction and conservative National organization, devoting the best efforts of their statesmanship, the statesmanship of the political mind, to the purpose of raising their country to greatness in wealth and power, of making the people proud of their common nationality and of imbedding the Union in the contentment of prosperity, in enlightened patriotism, National law and Constitutional principle.

And when they drew near their end, they could boast of many a grand achievement, not indeed exclusively their own, for other powerful minds had their share in the work. The United States stood there among the great powers of the earth, strong and respected. The Republic had no foreign foe to fear; its growth in population and wealth, in popular intelligence and progressive civilization, the wonder of the world. There was no visible limit to its development; there seemed to be no danger to its integrity.

But among the problems which the statesmen of that period had grappled with, there was one which had eluded their grasp. Many a conflict of opinion and interest they had succeeded in settling, either by positive decision, or by judicious composition. But one conflict had stubbornly

baffled the statesmanship of expedients, for it was more than a mere conflict of opinion and interest. It was a conflict grounded deep in the moral nature of men—the slavery question.

Many a time had it appeared on the surface during the period I have described, threatening to overthrow all that had been ingeniously built up, and to break asunder all that had been laboriously cemented together. In their anxiety to avert every danger threatening the Union, they attempted to repress the slavery question by compromise, and, apparently, with success, at least for a while.

But however firmly those compromises seemed to stand, there was a force of nature at work which, like a restless flood, silently but unceasingly and irresistibly washed their foundation away, until at last the towering structure toppled down.

7 | The anti-slavery movement is now one of the great chapters of our past history. The passions of the struggle having been buried in thousands of graves, and the victory of Universal Freedom standing as firm and unquestionable as the eternal hills, we may now look back upon that history with an impartial eye.? It may be hoped that even the people of the South, if they do not yet appreciate the spirit which created and guided the anti-slavery movement, will not much longer misunderstand it. Indeed, they grievously misunderstood it at the time. They looked upon it as the offspring of a wanton desire to meddle with other people's affairs, or as the product of hypocritical selfishness assuming the mask and cant of philanthropy, merely to rob the South and to enrich New England; or as an insidious contrivance of criminally reckless political ambition, striving to grasp and monopolize power at the risk of destroying a part of the country or even the whole.

It was, perhaps, not unnatural that those interested in slavery should have thought so; but from this great error arose their fatal miscalculation as to the peculiar strength of the anti-slavery cause.

No idea ever agitated the popular mind to whose origin calculating selfishness was more foreign. Even the great uprising which brought about the War of Independence was less free from selfish motives, for it sprang from resistance to a tyrannical abuse of the taxing power. Then the people rose against that oppression which touched their property; the anti-slavery movement originated in an impulse only moral.

It was the irresistible breaking out of a trouble of conscience,—a trouble of conscience which had already disturbed the men who made the American Republic. It found a voice in their anxious admonitions, their gloomy prophecies, their scrupulous care to exclude from the Constitution all forms of expression which might have appeared to sanction the idea of property in man.

It found a voice in the fierce struggles which resulted in the Missouri compromise. It was repressed for a time by material interest, by the greed of gain, when the peculiar product of slave labor became one of the principal staples of the country and a mine of wealth. But the trouble of conscience raised its voice again, shrill and defiant as when your own John Quincy Adams stood in the halls of Congress, and when devoted advocates of the rights of man began and carried on, in the face of ridicule and brutal persecution, an agitation seemingly hopeless. It cried out again and again, until at last its tones and echoes grew louder than all the noises that were to drown it.

The anti-slavery movement found arrayed against itself all the influences, all the agencies, all the arguments which ordinarily control the actions of men.

Commerce said,—Do not disturb slavery, for its products fill our ships and are one of the principal means of our exchanges. Industry said,—Do not disturb slavery, for it feeds our machinery and gives us markets. The greed of wealth said,—Do not disturb slavery, for it is an inexhaustible fountain of riches. Political ambition said,—Do not disturb slavery, for it furnishes us combinations and compromises to keep parties alive and to make power the price of shrewd management. An anxious statesmanship said,—Do not disturb slavery, for you might break to pieces the Union of these States.

There never was a more formidable combination of interests and influences than that which confronted the anti-slavery movement in its earlier stages. And what was its answer? "Whether all you say be true or false, it matters not, but slavery is wrong."

Slavery is wrong! That one word was enough. It stood there like a huge rock in the sea, shivering to spray the waves dashing upon it. Interest, greed, argument, vituperation, calumny, ridicule, persecution, patriotic appeal,—it was all in vain. Amidst all the storm and assault that one word stood there unmoved, intact and impregnable: Slavery is wrong!

Such was the vital spirit of the anti-slavery movement in its early development. Such a spirit alone could inspire that religious devotion which gave to the believer all the stubborn energy of fanaticism; it alone could kindle that deep enthusiasm which made men willing to risk and sacrifice everything for a great cause; it alone could keep alive that unconquerable faith in the certainty of ultimate success which boldly attempted to overcome seeming impossibilities.

It was indeed a great spirit, as, against difficulties which threw pusillanimity into despair, it painfully struggled into light, often baffled and as often pressing forward

with devotion always fresh; nourished by nothing but a profound sense of right; encouraged by nothing but the cheering sympathy of liberty-loving mankind the world over, and by the hope that some day the conscience of the American people would be quickened by a full understanding of the dangers which the existence of the great wrong would bring upon the Republic. No scramble for the spoils of office then, no expectation of a speedy conquest of power,—nothing but that conviction, that enthusiasm, that faith in the breasts of a small band of men, and the prospect of new uncertain struggles and trials.

At the time when Mr. Sumner entered the Senate, the hope of final victory appeared as distant as ever; but it only appeared so. The statesmen of the past period had just succeeded in building up that compromise which admitted California as a free State, and imposed upon the Republic the fugitive-slave law. That compromise, like all its predecessors, was considered and called a final settlement. The two great political parties accepted it as such. In whatever they might differ, as to this they solemnly proclaimed their agreement. Fidelity to it was looked upon as a test of true patriotism, and as a qualification necessary for the possession of political power. Opposition to it was denounced as factious, unpatriotic, revolutionary demagogism, little short of treason. An overwhelming majority of the American people acquiesced in it. Material interest looked upon it with satisfaction, as a promise of repose; timid and sanguine patriots greeted it as a new bond of union; politicians hailed it as an assurance that the fight for the public plunder might be carried on without the disturbing intrusion of a moral principle in politics. But, deep down, man's conscience like a volcanic fire was restless, ready for a new outbreak as soon as the thin crust of compromise should crack.

And just then the day was fast approaching when the moral idea, which so far had broken out only sporadically, and moved small numbers of men to open action, should receive a reinforcement strong enough to transform a forlorn hope into an army of irresistible strength. One of those eternal laws which govern the development of human affairs asserted itself,—the law that a great wrong, which has been maintained in defiance of the moral sense of mankind, must finally, by the very means and measures necessary for its sustenance, render itself so insupportable as to insure its downfall and destruction.

So it was with slavery. I candidly acquit the American slave-power of wilful and wanton aggression upon the liberties and general interests of the American people. If slavery was to be kept alive at all, its supporters could not act otherwise than they did.

Slavery could not live and thrive in an atmosphere of free inquiry and untrammelled discussion. Therefore free inquiry and discussion touching slavery had to be suppressed.

Slavery could not be secure, if slaves, escaping merely across a State line, thereby escaped the grasp of their masters. Hence an effective fugitive-slave law was imperatively demanded.

Slavery could not protect its interests in the Union unless its power balanced that of the free States in the National councils. Therefore by colonization or conquest the number of slave States had to be augmented. Hence the annexation of Texas, the Mexican War and intrigues for the acquisition of Cuba.

Slavery could not maintain the equilibrium of power, if it permitted itself to be excluded from the National territories. Hence the breaking down of the Missouri compromise and the usurpation in Kansas.

Thus slavery was pushed on and on by the inexorable

logic of its existence; the slave masters were only the slaves of the necessities of slavery and all their seeming exactions and usurpations were merely a struggle for its life.

Many of their demands had been satisfied, on the part of the North, by submission or compromise. The Northern people, although with reluctant conscience, had acquiesced in the contrivances of politicians, for the sake of peace. But when the slave-power went so far as to demand for slavery the great domain of the Nation which had been held sacred for freedom forever, then the people of the North suddenly understood that the necessities of slavery demanded what they could not yield. Then the conscience of the masses was relieved of the doubts and fears which had held it so long in check; their moral impulses were quickened by practical perceptions; the moral idea became a practical force, and the final struggle began. It was made inevitable by the necessities of slavery; it was indeed an irrepressible conflict.

These things were impending when Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, the architects of the last compromise, left the Senate. Had they, with all their far-seeing statesmanship, never understood this logic of things? When they made their compromises, did they desire only to postpone the final struggle until they should be gone, so that they might not witness the terrible concussion? Or had their great and manifold achievements with the statesmanship of organization and expediency so deluded their minds that they really hoped a compromise which only ignored, but did not settle, the great moral question, could furnish an enduring basis for future developments?

One thing they and their contemporaries had indeed accomplished: under their care the Republic had grown so great and strong, its vitality had become so tough, that it could endure the final struggle without falling to pieces under its shocks,

Whatever their errors, their delusions and, perhaps, their misgivings may have been, this they had accomplished; and then they left the last compromise tottering behind them, and turned their faces to the wall and died.

And with them stepped into the background the statesmanship of organization, expedients and compromises; and to the front came, ready for action, the moral idea which was to fight out the great conflict, and to open a new epoch of American history.

That was the historic significance of the remarkable scene which showed us Henry Clay walking out of the Senate-chamber never to return, when Charles Sumner sat down there as the successor of Daniel Webster.

No man could, in his whole being, have more strikingly portrayed that contrast. When Charles Sumner had been elected to the Senate, Theodore Parker said to him, in a letter of congratulation: "You told me once that you were in morals, not in politics. Now I hope you will show that you are still in morals, although in politics. I hope you will be the Senator with a conscience." That hope was gratified. He always remained in morals while in politics. He never was anything else but the Senator with a conscience. Charles Sumner entered the Senate not as a mere advocate, but as the very embodiment of the moral idea. From this fountain flowed his highest aspirations. There had been great anti-slavery men in the Senate before him; they were there with him, men like Seward and Chase. But they had been trained in a different school. Their minds had ranged over other political fields. They understood politics. He did not. He knew but one political object,—to combat and overthrow the great wrong of slavery; to serve the ideal of the liberty and equality of men; and to establish the universal reign of "peace, justice and charity." He brought to the Senate a studious mind, vast learning,

great legal attainments, a powerful eloquence, a strong and ardent nature; and all this he vowed to one service. With all this he was not a mere expounder of a policy; he was a worshipper, sincere and devout at the shrine of his ideal. In no public man had the moral idea of the anti-slavery movement more overruling strength. He made everything yield to it. He did not possess it; it possessed him. That was the secret of his peculiar power.

He introduced himself into the debates of the Senate, the slavery question having been silenced forever, as politicians then thought, by several speeches on other subjects,—the Reception of Kossuth, the Land Policy, Ocean Postage; but they were not remarkable, and attracted but little attention.

At last he availed himself of an appropriation bill to attack the fugitive-slave law, and at once a spirit broke forth in that first word on the great question which startled every listener.

Thus he opened the argument:

Painfully convinced of the unutterable wrong and woe of slavery,—profoundly believing that, according to the true spirit of the Constitution and the sentiments of the Fathers, it can find no place under our National Government, I could not allow this session to reach its close without making or seizing an opportunity to declare myself openly against the usurpation, injustice and cruelty of the late intolerant enactment for the recovery of fugitive slaves.

Then this significant declaration:

Whatever I am or may be, I freely offer to this cause. I have never been a politician. The slave of principles, I call no party master. By sentiment, education and conviction, a friend of Human Rights in their utmost expansion, I have ever most sincerely embraced the democratic idea—not,

indeed, as represented or professed by any party, but according to its real significance, as transfigured in the Declaration of Independence, and in the injunctions of Christianity. In this idea I see no narrow advantage merely for individuals or classes, but the sovereignty of the people, and the greatest happiness of all secured by equal laws.

A vast array of historical research and of legal argument was then called up to prove the sectionalism of slavery, the nationalism of freedom, and the unconstitutionality of the fugitive-slave act, followed by this bold declaration: "By the Supreme Law, which commands me to do no injustice, by the comprehensive Christian Law of Brotherhood, by the Constitution I have sworn to support, I am bound to disobey this law." And the speech closed with this solemn quotation: "Beware of the groans of wounded souls, since the inward sore will at length break out. Oppress not to the utmost a single heart; for a solitary sigh has power to overturn a whole world."

The amendment to the appropriation bill moved by Mr. Sumner received only four votes of fifty-one. But every hearer had been struck by the words spoken as something different from the tone of other anti-slavery speeches delivered in those halls. Southern Senators, startled at the peculiarity of the speech, called it, in reply, the most extraordinary language they had ever listened to. Mr. Chase, supporting Sumner in debate, spoke of it, "as marking a new era in American history, when the anti-slavery idea ceased to stand on the defensive and was boldly advancing to the attack."

Indeed, it had that significance. There stood up in the Senate a man who was no politician; but who, on the highest field of politics, with a concentrated intensity of feeling and purpose never before witnessed there, gave expression to a moral impulse, which, although sleeping perhaps for a time, certainly existed in the popular con-

science, and which, once become a political force, could not fail to produce a great revolution.

Charles Sumner possessed all the instincts, the courage, the firmness and the faith of the devotee of a great idea. In the Senate he was a member of a feeble minority, so feeble, indeed, as to be to the ruling power a mere subject of derision; and for the first three years of his service without organized popular support. The slaveholders had been accustomed to put the metal of their Northern opponents to a variety of tests. Many a hot anti-slavery zeal had cooled under the social blandishments with which the South knew so well how to impregnate the atmosphere of the National capital, and many a high courage had given way before the haughty assumption and fierce menace of Southern men in Congress. Mr. Sumner had to pass that ordeal. He was at first petted and flattered by Southern society, but, fond as he was of the charms of social intercourse, and accessible to demonstrative appreciation, no blandishments could touch his convictions of duty.

And when the advocates of slavery turned upon him with anger and menace, he hurled at them with prouder defiance his answer, repeating itself in endless variations: "You must yield, for you are wrong."

The slave-power had so frequently succeeded in making the North yield to its demands, even after the most formidable demonstrations of reluctance, that it had become a serious question whether there existed any such thing as Northern firmness. But it did exist, and in Charles Sumner it had developed its severest political type. The stronger the assault, the higher rose in him the power of resistance. In him lived that spirit which not only would not yield, but would turn upon the assailant. The Southern force, which believed itself irresistible, found itself striking against a body which was immovable. To think

of yielding to any demand of slavery, of making a compromise with it, in however tempting a form, was, to his nature, an absolute impossibility.

Mr. Sumner's courage was of a peculiar kind. He attacked the slave-power in the most unsparing manner, when its supporters were most violent in resenting opposition, and when that violence was always apt to proceed from words to blows. One day, while Sumner was delivering one of his severest speeches, Stephen A. Douglas, walking up and down behind the President's chair in the old Senate-chamber, and listening to him, remarked to a friend: "Do you hear that man? He may be a fool, but I tell you that man has pluck. I wonder whether he knows himself what he is doing. I am not sure whether I should have the courage to say those things to the men who are scowling around him."

Of all men in the Senate-chamber, Sumner was probably least aware that the thing he did, required pluck. He simply did what he felt it his duty to his cause to do. It was to him a matter of course. He was like a soldier who, when he has to march upon the enemy's batteries, does not say to himself, "Now I am going to perform an act of heroism," but who simply obeys an impulse of duty, and marches forward without thinking of the bullets that fly around his head. A thought of the boldness of what he has done may occur to him afterwards, when he is told of it. This was one of the striking peculiarities of Mr. Sumner's character, as all those know who knew him well.

Neither was he conscious of the stinging force of the language he frequently employed. He simply uttered what he felt to be true, in language fitting the strength of his convictions. The indignation of his moral sense at what he felt to be wrong was so deep and sincere that he thought everybody must find the extreme severity of his expressions as natural as they came to his own mind.

And he was not unfrequently surprised, greatly surprised, when others found his language offensive.

As he possessed the firmness and courage, so he possessed the faith, of the devotee. From the beginning, and through all the vicissitudes of the anti-slavery movement, his heart was profoundly assured that his generation would see slavery entirely extinguished.

While travelling in France to restore his health, after having been beaten down on the floor of the Senate, he visited Alexis de Tocqueville, the celebrated author of *Democracy in America*. Tocqueville expressed his anxiety about the issue of the anti-slavery movement, which then had suffered defeat by the election of Buchanan. "There can be no doubt about the result," said Sumner. "Slavery will soon succumb and disappear." "Disappear! in what way, and how soon?" asked Tocqueville. "In what manner I cannot say," replied Sumner. "How soon I cannot say. But it will be soon; I feel it; I know it. It cannot be otherwise." That was all the reason he gave. "Mr. Sumner is a remarkable man," said de Tocqueville afterwards to a friend of mine. "He says that slavery will soon entirely disappear in the United States. He does not know how, he does not know when, but he feels it, he is perfectly sure of it. The man speaks like a prophet." And so it was.

What appeared a perplexing puzzle to other men's minds was perfectly clear to him. His method of reasoning was simple; it was the reasoning of religious faith. Slavery is wrong—therefore it must and will perish; freedom is right—therefore it must and will prevail. And by no power of resistance, by no difficulty, by no disappointment, by no defeat, could that faith be shaken. For his cause, so great and just, he thought nothing impossible, everything certain. And he was unable to understand how others could fail to share his faith.

In one sense he was no party leader. He possessed none of the instinct or experience of the politician, nor that sagacity of mind which appreciates and measures the importance of changing circumstances, or the possibilities and opportunities of the day. He lacked, entirely, the genius of organization. He never understood, nor did he value, the art of strengthening his following by timely concession, or prudent reticence, or advantageous combination and alliance. He knew nothing of management and party maneuver. Indeed, not unfrequently he alarmed many devoted friends of his cause by bold declarations, for which, they thought, the public mind was not prepared, and by the unreserved avowal and straightforward advocacy of ultimate objects, which, they thought, might safely be left to the natural development of events. He was not seldom accused of doing things calculated to frighten the people and to disorganize the anti-slavery forces.

Such was his unequivocal declaration in his first great anti-slavery speech in the Senate, that he held himself bound by every conviction of justice, right and duty to disobey the fugitive-slave law, and his ringing answer to the question put by Senator Butler of South Carolina, whether, without the fugitive-slave law, he would, under the Constitution, consider it his duty to aid the surrender of fugitive slaves, "Is thy servant a dog, that he should do this thing?"

Such was his speech on the "Barbarism of Slavery," delivered on a bill to admit Kansas immediately under a free-State Constitution; a speech so unsparing and vehement in the denunciation of slavery in all its political, moral and social aspects, and so direct in its prediction of the complete annihilation of slavery, that it was said such a speech would scarcely aid the admission of Kansas.

Such was his unbending and open resistance to any

plan of compromise calculated to preserve slavery, when after Mr. Lincoln's election the rebellion first raised its head, and a large number of Northern people, even anti-slavery men, frightened by the threatening prospect of civil war, cast blindly about for a plan of adjustment, while really no adjustment was possible.

Such was, early in the war, and during its most doubtful hours, his declaration, laid before the Senate in a series of resolutions, that the States in rebellion had destroyed themselves as such by the very act of rebellion; that slavery, as a creation of State law, had perished with the States, and that general emancipation must immediately follow, thus putting the program of emancipation boldly in the foreground, at a time when many thought that the cry of union alone, union with or without slavery, could hold together the Union forces.

Such was his declaration, demanding negro suffrage even before the close of the war, while the public opinion at the North, whose aid the Government needed, still recoiled from such a measure.

Thus he was apt to go rough-shod over the considerations of management deemed important by his co-workers. I believe he never consulted with his friends around him, before doing those things, and when they afterwards remonstrated with him, he ingenuously asked: "Is it not right and true, what I have said? And if it is right and true, must I not say it?"

And yet, although he had no organizing mind and despised management, he was a leader. He was a leader as the embodiment of the moral idea, with all its uncompromising firmness, its unflagging faith, its daring devotion. And in this sense he could be a leader only because he was no politician. He forced others to follow, because he was himself impracticable. Simply obeying his moral impulse, he dared to say things which in the highest

legislative body of the Republic nobody else would say; and he proved that they could be said, and yet the world would move on. With his wealth of learning and his legal ability, he furnished an arsenal of arguments, convincing more timid souls that what he said could be sustained in repeating. And presently the politicians felt encouraged to follow in the direction where the idealist had driven a stake ahead. Nay, he forced them to follow, for they knew that the idealist, whom they could not venture to disown, would not fall back at their bidding. Such was his leadership in the struggle with slavery.

Nor was that leadership interrupted when on the 22d of May, 1856, Preston Brooks of South Carolina, madened by an arraignment of his State and its Senator, came upon Charles Sumner in the Senate, struck him down with heavy blows and left him on the floor bleeding and insensible. For three years Sumner's voice was not heard, but his blood marked the vantage ground from which his party could not recede; and his senatorial chair, kept empty for him by the noble people of Massachusetts, stood there in most eloquent silence, confirming, sealing, inflaming all he had said with terrible illustration, —a guide-post to the onward march of freedom.

When, in 1861, the Republican party had taken the reins of government in hand, his peculiar leadership entered upon a new field of action. No sooner was the victory of the anti-slavery cause in the election ascertained, than the Rebellion raised its head. South Carolina opened the secession movement. The portentous shadow of an approaching civil war spread over the land. A tremor fluttered through the hearts even of strong men in the North,—a vague fear such as is produced by the first rumbling of an earthquake. Could not a bloody conflict be averted? A fresh clamor for compromise arose. Even Republicans in Congress began to waver. The proposed

compromise involved new and express Constitutional recognitions of the existence and rights of slavery, and guarantees against interference with it by Constitutional amendment or National law. The pressure from the country, even from Massachusetts, in favor of the scheme, was extraordinary, but a majority of the anti-slavery men in the Senate, in their front Mr. Sumner, stood firm, feeling that a compromise, giving express Constitutional sanction and an indefinite lease of life to slavery, would be a surrender, and knowing, also, that, even by the offer of such a surrender, secession and civil war would still be insisted on by the Southern leaders. The history of those days, as we now know it, confirms the accuracy of that judgment. The war was inevitable. Thus the anti-slavery cause escaped a useless humiliation, and retained intact its moral force for future action.

But now the time had come when the anti-slavery movement, no longer a mere opposition to the demands of the slave-power, was to proceed to positive action. The war had scarcely commenced in earnest, when Mr. Sumner urged general emancipation. Only the great ideal object of the liberty of all men could give sanction to a war in the eyes of the devotee of universal peace. To the end of stamping upon the war the character of a war of emancipation all his energies were bent. His unreserved and emphatic utterances alarmed the politicians. Our armies suffered disaster upon disaster in the field. The managing mind insisted that care must be taken, by nourishing the popular enthusiasm for the integrity of the Union,—the strictly National idea alone,—to unite all the social and political elements of the North for the struggle; and that so bold a measure as immediate emancipation might reanimate old dissensions, and put hearty coöperation in jeopardy.

But Mr. Sumner's convictions could not be repressed.

In a bold decree of universal liberty he saw only a new source of inspiration and strength. Nor was his impulsive instinct unsupported by good reason. The distraction produced in the North by an emancipation measure could only be of short duration. The moral spirit was certain, ultimately, to gain the upper hand.

But in another direction a bold and unequivocal anti-slavery policy could not fail to produce most salutary effects. One of the dangers threatening us was foreign interference. No European powers gave us their expressed sympathy except Germany and Russia. The governing classes of England, with conspicuous individual exceptions, always gratefully to be remembered, were ill-disposed towards the Union cause. The permanent disruption of the Republic was loudly predicted, as if it were desired, and intervention—an intervention which could be only in favor of the South—was openly spoken of. The Emperor of the French, who availed himself of our embarrassments to execute his ambitious designs in Mexico, was animated by sentiments no less hostile. It appeared as if only a plausible opportunity had been wanting, to bring foreign intervention upon our heads. A threatening spirit, disarmed only by timely prudence, had manifested itself in the *Trent* case. It seemed doubtful whether the most skilful diplomacy, unaided by a stronger force, would be able to avert the danger.

But the greatest strength of the anti-slavery cause had always been in the conscience of mankind. There was our natural ally. The cause of slavery as such could have no open sympathy among the nations of Europe. It stood condemned by the moral sentiment of the civilized world. How could any European Government, in the face of that universal sentiment, undertake openly to interfere against a power waging war against slavery? Surely, that could not be thought of.

But had the Government of the United States distinctly professed that it was waging war against slavery, and for freedom? Had it not been officially declared that the war for the Union would not alter the condition of a single human being in America? Why then not arrest the useless effusion of blood; why not, by intervention, stop a destructive war, in which, confessedly, slavery and freedom were not at stake? Such were the arguments of our enemies in Europe; and they were not without color.

It was obvious that nothing but a measure impressing beyond dispute upon our war a decided anti-slavery character, making it in profession what it was inevitably destined to be in fact, a war of emancipation, could enlist on our side the enlightened public opinion of the old world so strongly as to restrain the hostile spirit of foreign governments. No European Government could well venture to interfere against those who had convinced the world that they were fighting to give freedom to the slaves of North America.

Thus the moral instinct did not err. The emancipation policy was not only the policy of principle, but also the policy of safety. Mr. Sumner urged it with impetuous and unflagging zeal. In the Senate he found but little encouragement. The resolutions he introduced in February, 1862, declaring State suicide as the consequence of rebellion, and the extinction of slavery in the insurrectionary States as the consequence of State suicide, were looked upon as an ill-timed and hazardous demonstration, disturbing all ideas of management.

To the President, then, he devoted his efforts. Nothing could be more interesting, nay, touching, than the peculiar relations that sprang up between Abraham Lincoln and Charles Sumner. No two men could be more alike as to their moral impulses and ultimate aims; no two men more

unlike in their methods of reasoning and their judgment of means.

Abraham Lincoln was a true child of the people. There was in his heart an inexhaustible fountain of tenderness, and from it sprang that longing to be true, just and merciful to all, which made the people love him. In the deep, large humanity of his soul had grown his moral and political principles, to which he clung with the fidelity of an honest nature, and which he defended with the strength of a vigorous mind.

But he had not grown great in any high school of statesmanship. He had, from the humblest beginnings, slowly and laboriously worked himself up, or rather he had gradually risen up without being aware of it, and suddenly he found himself in the foremost rank of the distinguished men of the land. In his youth and early manhood he had achieved no striking successes that might have imparted to him that overweening self-appreciation which so frequently leads self-made men to overestimate their faculties and to ignore the limits of their strength. He was not a learned man, but he had learned and meditated enough to feel how much there was still for him to learn. His marvelous success in his riper years left intact the inborn modesty of his nature. He was absolutely without pretension. His simplicity, which by its genuineness extorted respect and affection, was wonderfully persuasive, and sometimes deeply pathetic and strikingly brilliant.

His natural gifts were great; he possessed a clear and penetrating mind, but in forming his opinions on subjects of importance, he was so careful, conscientious and diffident, that he would always hear and probe what opponents had to say, before he became firmly satisfied of the justness of his own conclusions,—not as if he had been easily controlled and led by other men, for he had a will of his

own;—but his mental operations were slow and hesitating, and inapt to conceive quick resolutions. He lacked self-reliance. Nobody felt more than he the awful weight of his responsibilities. He was not one of those bold reformers who will defy the opposition of the world and undertake to impose their opinions and will upon a reluctant age. With careful consideration of the possibilities of the hour he advanced slowly, but when he had so advanced, he planted his foot with firmness, and no power was strong enough to force him to a backward step. And every day of great responsibility enlarged the horizon of his mind, and every day he grasped the helm of affairs with a steadier hand.

It was to such a man that Sumner, during the most doubtful days at the beginning of the war, addressed his appeals for immediate emancipation,—appeals impetuous and impatient as they could spring only from his ardent and overruling convictions.

The President at first passively resisted the vehement counsel of the Senator, but he bade the counselor welcome. It was Mr. Lincoln's constant endeavor to surround himself with the best and ablest men of the country. Not only did the first names of the Republican party appear in his Cabinet, but every able man in Congress was always invited as an adviser, whether his views agreed with those of the President or not. But Mr. Sumner he treated as a favorite counselor, almost like a Minister of State, outside of the Cabinet.

There were statesmen around the President who were also politicians, understanding the art of management. Mr. Lincoln appreciated the value of their advice as to what was prudent and practicable. But he knew also how to discriminate. In Mr. Sumner he saw a counselor who was no politician, but who stood before him as the true representative of the moral earnestness, of the great

inspirations of their common cause. From him he heard what was right and necessary and inevitable. By the former he was told what, in their opinion, could prudently and safely be done. Having heard them both, Abraham Lincoln counseled with himself, and formed his resolution. Thus Mr. Lincoln, while scarcely ever fully and speedily following Sumner's advice, never ceased to ask for it, for he knew its significance. And Sumner, while almost always dissatisfied with Lincoln's cautious hesitation, never grew weary in giving his advice, for he never distrusted Lincoln's fidelity. Always agreed as to the ultimate end, they almost always differed as to times and means; but, while differing, they firmly trusted, for they understood one another.

And thus their mutual respect grew into an affectionate friendship, which no clash of disagreeing opinions could break. Sumner loved to tell his friends, after Lincoln's death,—and I heard him relate it often, never without an expression of tenderness,—how at one time those who disliked and feared his intimacy with the President, and desired to see it disrupted, thought it was irreparably broken. It was at the close of Lincoln's first Administration, in 1865 when the President had proposed certain measures of reconstruction touching the State of Louisiana.

The end of the session of Congress was near at hand, and the success of the bill depended on a vote of the Senate before the hour of adjournment on the 4th of March. Mr. Lincoln had the measure very much at heart. But Sumner opposed it, because it did not contain sufficient guarantees for the rights of the colored people, and by a parliamentary maneuver, simply consuming time until the adjournment came, he with two or three other Senators succeeded in defeating it. Lincoln was reported to be deeply chagrined at Sumner's action, and the newspapers already announced that the breach be-

tween Lincoln and Sumner was complete, and could not be healed. But those who said so did not know the men. On the night of the 6th of March, two days after Lincoln's second inauguration, the customary inauguration ball was to take place. Sumner did not think of attending it. But towards evening he received a card from the President, which read thus: "Dear Mr. Sumner, unless you send me word to the contrary, I shall this evening call with my carriage at your house, to take you with me to the inauguration ball. Sincerely yours, ABRAHAM LINCOLN." Mr. Sumner deeply touched, at once made up his mind to go to an inauguration ball for the first time. Soon the carriage arrived, the President invited Sumner to take a seat in it with him, and Sumner found there Mrs. Lincoln and Mr. Colfax, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Arrived at the ball-room, the President asked Mr. Sumner, to offer his arm to Mrs. Lincoln; and the astonished spectators, who had been made to believe that the breach between Lincoln and Sumner was irreparable, beheld the President's wife on the arm of the Senator, and the Senator, on that occasion of state, invited to take the seat of honor by the President's side. Not a word passed between them about their disagreement.

The world became convinced that such a friendship between such men could not be broken by a mere honest difference of opinion. Abraham Lincoln, a man of sincere and profound convictions himself, esteemed and honored sincere and profound convictions in others. It was thus that Abraham Lincoln, composed his quarrels with his friends, and at his bedside, when he died, there was no mourner more deeply afflicted than Charles Sumner.

Let me return to the year 1862. Long, incessant and arduous was Sumner's labor for emancipation. At last the great Proclamation, which sealed the fate of slavery, came, and no man had done more to bring it forth than he.

Still, Charles Sumner thought his work far from accomplished. During the three years of war that followed, so full of vicissitudes, alarms and anxieties, he stood in the Senate and in the President's closet as the ever-watchful sentinel of freedom and equal rights. No occasion eluded his grasp to push on the destruction of slavery, not only by sweeping decrees, but in detail, by pursuing it, as with a probing-iron, into every nook and corner of its existence. It was his sleepless care that every blow struck at the rebellion should surely and heavily tell against slavery, and that every drop of American blood that was shed should surely be consecrated to human freedom. He could not rest until assurance was made doubly sure, and I doubt whether our legislative history shows an example of equal watchfulness, fidelity and devotion to a great object. Such was the character of Mr. Sumner's legislative activity during the war.

As the rebellion succumbed, new problems arose. To set upon their feet again States disorganized by insurrection and civil war; to remodel a society which had been lifted out of its ancient hinges by the sudden change of its system of labor; to protect the emancipated slaves against the old pretension of absolute control on the part of their former masters; to guard society against the possible transgressions of a large multitude long held in slavery and ignorance and now suddenly set free; so to lodge political power in this inflammable state of things as to prevent violent reactions and hostile collisions; to lead social forces so discordant into orderly and fruitful coöperation, and to infuse into communities, but recently rent by the most violent passions, a new spirit of loyal attachment to a common nationality,—this was certainly one of the most perplexing tasks ever imposed upon the statesmanship of any time and any country.

But to Mr. Sumner's mind the problem of reconstruc-

tion did not appear perplexing at all. Believing, as he always did, that the democratic idea, as he found it defined in the Declaration of Independence, "Human rights in their utmost expansion," contained an ultimately certain solution of all difficulties, he saw the principal aim to be reached by any reconstruction policy, in the investment of the emancipated slaves with all the rights and privileges of American citizenship. The complexity of the problem, the hazardous character of the experiment, never troubled him. And as, early in the war, he had for himself laid down the theory that, by the very act of rebellion, the insurrectionary States had destroyed themselves as such, so he argued now, with assured consistency, that those States had relapsed into a territorial condition; that the National Government had to fill the void by creations of its own, and that in doing so the establishment of universal suffrage there was an unavoidable necessity. Thus he marched forward to the realization of his ideal, on the straightest line, and with the firmness of profound conviction.

In the discussions which followed, he had the advantage of a man who knows exactly what he wants, and who is imperturbably, religiously convinced that he is right. But his Constitutional theory, as well as the measures he proposed, found little favor in Congress. The public mind struggled long against the results he had pointed out as inevitable. The whole power of President Johnson's Administration was employed to lead the development of things in another direction. But through all the vacillations of public opinion, through all the perplexities in which Congress entangled itself, the very necessity of things seemed to press toward the ends which Sumner and those who thought like him had advocated from the beginning.

At last, Mr. Sumner saw the fondest dreams of his life

soon realized. Slavery was forever blotted out in this Republic by the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution. By the fourteenth the emancipated slaves were secured in their rights of citizenship before the law, and the fifteenth guaranteed to them the right to vote.

It was, indeed, a most astonishing, a marvelous consummation. What ten years before not even the most sanguine would have ventured to anticipate, what only the profound faith of the devotee could believe possible, was done. And no man had a better right than Charles Sumner to claim for himself a preëminent share in that great consummation. He had, indeed, not been the originator of most of the practical measures of legislation by which such results were reached. He had even combated some of them as in conflict with his theories. He did not possess the peculiar ability of constructing policies in detail, of taking account of existing circumstances and advantage of opportunities. But he had resolutely marched ahead of public opinion in marking the ends to be reached. Nobody had done more to inspire and strengthen the moral spirit of the anti-slavery cause. He stood foremost among the propelling, driving forces which pushed on the great work with undaunted courage, untiring effort, irresistible energy and religious devotion. No man's singleness of purpose, fidelity and faith surpassed his, and when by future generations the names are called which are inseparably united with the deliverance of the American Republic from slavery, no name will be called before his own.

While the championship of human rights is his first title to fame, I should be unjust to his merit did I omit to mention the services he rendered on another field of action. When, in 1861, the secession of the Southern States left the anti-slavery party in the majority in the Senate of the United States, Charles Sumner was placed

as chairman at the head of the Committee on Foreign Relations. It was a high distinction, and no selection could have been more fortunate. Without belittling others, it may be said that of the many able men then and since in the Senate, Mr. Sumner was by far the fittest for that responsible position. He had ever since his college days made international law a special and favorite study, and was perfectly familiar with its principles, the history of its development and its literature. Nothing of importance had ever been published on that subject in any language that had escaped his attention. His knowledge of history was uncommonly extensive and accurate; all the leading international law cases, with their incidents in detail, their theories and settlements, he had at his fingers' ends; and to his last day he remained indefatigable in inquiry. Moreover, he had seen the world; he had studied the institutions and policies of foreign countries, on their own soil, aided by his personal intercourse with many of their leading statesmen, not a few of whom remained in friendly correspondence with him ever since their first acquaintance.

No public man had a higher appreciation of the position, dignity and interests of his own country, and no one was less liable than he to be carried away or driven to hasty and ill-considered steps by excited popular clamor. He was ever strenuous in asserting our own rights, while his sense of justice did not permit him to be regardless of the rights of other nations. His abhorrence of the barbarities of war, and his ardent love of peace, led him earnestly to seek for every international difference a peaceable solution; and where no settlement could be reached by the direct negotiations of diplomacy, the idea of arbitration was always uppermost in his mind. He desired to raise the Republic to the high office of a missionary of peace and civilization in the world. He was, therefore,

not only an uncommonly well-informed, enlightened and experienced, but also an eminently conservative, cautious and safe counselor; and the few instances in which he appeared more impulsive than prudent will, upon candid investigation, not impugn this statement. I am far from claiming for him absolute correctness of view, and infallibility of judgment in every case; but taking his whole career together, it may well be doubted whether, in the whole history of the Republic, the Senate of the United States ever possessed a chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations who united in himself, in such completeness, the qualifications necessary and desirable for the important and delicate duties of that position. This may sound like the extravagant praise of a personal friend; but it is the sober opinion of men most competent to judge, that it does not go beyond his merits.

His qualities were soon put to the test. Early in the war one of the gallant captains of our Navy arrested the British mail steamer *Trent*, running from one neutral port to another, on the high seas, and took from her by force Mason and Slidell, two emissaries of the Confederate Government, and their despatches. The people of the North loudly applauded the act. The Secretary of the Navy approved it. The House of Representatives commended it in resolutions. Even in the Senate a majority seemed inclined to stand by it. The British Government, in a threatening tone, demanded the instant restitution of the prisoners, and an apology. The people of the North responded with a shout of indignation at British insolence. The excitement seemed irrepressible. Those in quest of popularity saw a chance to win it easily by bellicose declamation.

But among those who felt the weight of responsibility more moderate counsels prevailed. The Government

wisely resolved to surrender the prisoners, and peace with Great Britain was preserved.

It was Mr. Sumner who threw himself into the breach against the violent drift of public opinion. In a speech in the Senate, no less remarkable for patriotic spirit than legal learning and ingenious and irresistible argument, he justified the surrender of the prisoners, not on the ground that during our struggle with the rebellion we were not in a condition to go to war with Great Britain, but on the higher ground that the surrender, demanded by Great Britain in violation of her own traditional pretensions as to the rights of belligerents, was in perfect accord with American precedent, and the advanced principles of our Government concerning the rights of neutrals, and that this very act, therefore, would for all time constitute an additional and most conspicuous precedent to aid in the establishment of more humane rules for the protection of the rights of neutrals and the mitigation of the injustice and barbarity attending maritime war.

The success of this argument was complete. It turned the tide of public opinion. It convinced the American people that this was not an act of pusillanimity, but of justice; not a humiliation of the Republic, but a noble vindication of her time-honored principles, and a service rendered to the cause of progress.

Other complications followed. The interference of European Powers in Mexico came. Excited demands for intervention on our part were made in the Senate, and Mr. Sumner, trusting that the victory of the Union over the rebellion would bring on the deliverance of Mexico in its train, with signal moderation and tact prevented the agitation of so dangerous a policy. It is needless to mention the many subsequent instances in which his wisdom and skill rendered the Republic similar service.

Only one of his acts provoked comment in foreign

countries calculated to impair the high esteem in which his name was universally held there. It was his speech on the *Alabama* case, preceding the rejection by the Senate of the Clarendon-Johnson treaty. He was accused of having yielded to a vulgar impulse of demagogism, in flattering and exciting, by unfair statements and extravagant demands, the grudge the American people might bear to England. No accusation could possibly be more unjust, and I know whereof I speak. Mr. Sumner loved England—had loved her as long as he lived—from a feeling of consanguinity, for the treasures of literature she had given to the world, for the services she had rendered to human freedom, for the blows she had struck at slavery, for the sturdy work she had done for the cause of progress and civilization, for the many dear friends he had among her citizens. Such was his impulse, and no man was more incapable of pandering to a vulgar prejudice.

I will not deny that as to our differences with Great Britain he was not entirely free from personal feeling. That the England he loved so well—the England of Clarkson and Wilberforce, of Cobden and Bright; the England to whom he had looked as the champion of the anti-slavery cause in the world—should make such hot haste to recognize—nay, as he termed it, to set up, on the seas, as a belligerent—that rebellion, whose avowed object it was to found an empire of slavery, and to aid that rebellion by every means short of open war against the Union,—that was a shock to his feelings which he felt like a betrayal of friendship. And yet while that feeling appeared in the warmth of his language, it did not dictate his policy. I will not discuss here the correctness of his opinions as to what he styled the precipitate and unjustifiable recognition of Southern belligerency, or his theory of consequential damages. What he desired to accomplish was, not to extort from England a large sum of

money, but to put our grievance in the strongest light; to convince England of the great wrong she had inflicted upon us, and thus to prepare a composition which, consisting more in the settlement of great principles and rules of international law to govern the future intercourse of nations, than in the payment of large damages, would remove all questions of difference, and serve to restore and confirm a friendship which ought never to have been interrupted.

When, finally, the Treaty of Washington was negotiated by the Joint High Commission, Mr. Sumner, although thinking that more might have been accomplished, did not only not oppose that treaty, but actively aided in securing for it the consent of the Senate. Nothing would have been more painful to him than a continuance of unfriendly relations with Great Britain. Had there been danger of war, no man's voice would have pleaded with more fervor to avert such a calamity. He gave ample proof that he did not desire any personal opinions to stand in the way of a settlement, and if that settlement, which he willingly supported, did not in every respect satisfy him, it was because he desired to put the future relations of the two countries upon a still safer and more enduring basis.

No statesman ever took part in the direction of our foreign affairs who so completely identified himself with the most advanced, humane and progressive principles. Ever jealous of the honor of his country, he sought to elevate that honor by a policy scrupulously just to the strong and generous to the weak. A profound lover of peace, he faithfully advocated arbitration as a substitute for war. The barbarities of war he constantly labored to mitigate. In the hottest days of our civil conflict he protested against the issue of letters of marque and reprisal; he never lost an opportunity to condemn privateer-

ing as a barbarous practice, and he even went so far as to designate the system of prize-money as inconsistent with our enlightened civilization. In some respects, his principles were in advance of our time; but surely the day will come when this Republic, marching in the front of progress, will adopt them as her own, and remember their champion with pride.

I now approach the last period of his life, which brought to him new and bitter struggles.

The work of reconstruction completed, he felt that three objects still demanded new efforts. One was, that the colored race should be protected by National legislation against degrading discrimination, in the enjoyment of facilities of education, travel and pleasure, such as stand under the control of law; and this object he embodied in his civil-rights bill, of which he was the mover and especial champion. The second was, that generous reconciliation should wipe out the lingering animosities of past conflicts and reunite in new bonds of brotherhood all those who had been divided. And the third was, that the Government should be restored to the purity and high tone of its earlier days, and that from its new birth the Republic should issue with a new lustre of moral greatness, to lead its children to a higher perfection of manhood, and to be a shining example and beacon-light to all the nations of the earth.

This accomplished, he often said to his friends he would be content to lie down and die; but death overtook him before he was thus content, and before death came he was destined to taste more of the bitterness of life.

His civil-rights bill he pressed with unflagging perseverance, against an opposition which stood upon the ground that the objects his measure contemplated, belonged, under the Constitution, to the jurisdiction of the States; that the colored people, armed with the ballot, possessed

the necessary means to provide for their own security, and that the progressive development of public sentiment would afford to them greater protection than could be given by National legislation of questionable constitutionality.

The pursuit of the other objects brought upon him experiences of a painful nature. I have to speak of his disagreement with the Administration of President Grant and with his party. Nothing could be farther from my desire than to reopen, on a solemn occasion like this, those bitter conflicts which are still so fresh in our minds, and to assail any living man in the name of the dead. Were it my purpose to attack, I should do so in my own name and choose the place where I can be answered,—not this. But I have a duty to perform; it is to set forth in the light of truth the motives of the dead before the living. I knew Charles Sumner's motives well. We stood together shoulder to shoulder in many a hard contest. We were friends, and between us passed those confidences which only intimate friendship knows. Therefore I can truly say that I knew his motives well.

The civil war had greatly changed the country, and left many problems behind it, requiring again that building, organizing, constructive kind of statesmanship which I described as presiding over the Republic in its earlier history. For a solution of many of those problems Mr. Sumner's mind was little fitted, and he naturally turned to those which appealed to his moral nature. No great civil war has ever passed over any country, especially a republic, without producing wide-spread and dangerous demoralization and corruption, not only in the Government, but among the people. In such times the sordid instincts of human nature develop themselves to unusual recklessness under the guise of patriotism. The ascendancy of no political party in a republic has ever been long

maintained without tempting many of its members to avail themselves for their selfish advantage of the opportunities of power and party protection, and without attracting a horde of camp followers, professing principle, but meaning spoil. It has always been so, and the American Republic has not escaped the experience.

Neither Mr. Sumner nor many others could in our circumstances close their eyes to this fact. He recognized the danger early, and already, in 1864, he introduced in the Senate a bill for the reform of the civil service, crude in its detail, but embodying correct principles. Thus he may be said to have been the earliest pioneer of the Civil Service Reform movement.

The evil grew under President Johnson's Administration, and ever since it has been cropping out, not only drawn to light by the efforts of the opposition, but, voluntarily and involuntarily, by members of the ruling party itself. There were in it many men who confessed to themselves the urgent necessity of meeting the growing danger.

Mr. Sumner could not be silent. He cherished in his mind a high ideal of what this Republic and its Government should be: a Government composed of the best and wisest of the land; animated by none but the highest and most patriotic aspirations; yielding to no selfish impulse; noble in its tone and character; setting its face sternly against all wrong and injustice; presenting in its whole being to the American people a shining example of purity and lofty public spirit. Mr. Sumner was proud of his country; there was no prouder American in the land. He felt in himself the whole dignity of the Republic. And when he saw anything that lowered the dignity of the Republic and the character of its Government, he felt it as he would have felt a personal offense. He criticized it, he denounced it, he remonstrated against it, for he could

not do otherwise. He did so, frequently and without hesitation and reserve, when Mr. Lincoln was President. He continued to do so ever since, the more loudly, the more difficult it was to make himself heard. It was his nature; he felt it to be his right as a citizen; he esteemed it his duty as a Senator.

That, and no other was the motive which impelled him. The rupture with the Administration was brought on by his opposition to the Santo Domingo treaty. In the reasons upon which that opposition was based, I know that personal feeling had no share. They were patriotic reasons, publicly and candidly expressed, and it seems they were appreciated by a very large portion of the American people. It has been said that he provoked the resentment of the President by first promising to support that treaty and then opposing it, thus rendering himself guilty of an act of duplicity. He has publicly denied the justice of the charge and stated the facts as they stood in his memory. I am willing to make the fullest allowance for the possibility of a misapprehension of words. But I affirm, also, that no living man who knew Mr. Sumner well will hesitate a moment to pronounce the charge of duplicity as founded on the most radical of misapprehensions. An act of duplicity on his part was simply a moral impossibility. It was absolutely foreign to his nature. Whatever may have been the defects of his character, he never knowingly deceived a human being. There was in him not the faintest shadow of dissimulation, disguise or trickery. Not one of his words ever had the purpose of a double meaning, not one of his acts a hidden aim. His likes and dislikes, his approval and disapproval, as soon as they were clear to his own consciousness, appeared before the world in the open light of noonday. His frankness was so unbounded, his candor so entire, his ingenuousness so childlike, that he lacked even the

discretion of ordinary prudence. He was almost incapable of moderating his feelings, of toning down his meaning in the expression. When he might have gained a point by indirection, he would not have done so, because he could not. He was one of those who, when they attack, attack always in front and in broad daylight. The night surprise and the flank march were absolutely foreign to his tactics, because they were incompatible with his nature. I have known many men in my life, but never one who was less capable of a perfidious act or an artful profession.

Call him a vain, an impracticable, an imperious man, if you will, but American history does not mention the name of one, of whom with greater justice it can be said that he was a true man.

The same candor and purity of motives which prompted and characterized his opposition to the Santo Domingo scheme, prompted and characterized the attacks upon the Administration which followed. The charges he made, and the arguments with which he supported them, I feel not called upon to enumerate. Whether and how far they were correct or erroneous, just or unjust, important or unimportant, the judgment of history will determine. May that judgment be just and fair to us all. But this I can affirm to-day, for I know it: Charles Sumner never made a charge which he did not himself firmly, religiously believe to be true. Neither did he condemn those he attacked for anything he did not firmly, religiously believe to be wrong. And while attacking those in power for what he considered wrong, he was always ready to support them in all he considered right. After all he has said of the President, he would to-day, if he lived, conscientiously, cordially, joyously aid in sustaining the President's recent veto on an act of financial legislation which threatened to inflict a deep injury on the character as well as the true interests of the American people.

But at the time of which I speak, all he said was so deeply grounded in his feelings and conscience, that it was for him difficult to understand how others could form different conclusions. When, shortly before the National Republican Convention of 1872, he had delivered in the Senate that fierce philippic for which he has been censured so much, he turned to me with the question, whether I did not think that the statements and arguments he had produced would certainly exercise a decisive influence on the action of that convention. I replied that I thought it would not. He was greatly astonished,—not as if he indulged in the delusion that his personal word would have such authoritative weight, but it seemed impossible to him that opinions which in him had risen to the full strength of overruling conviction, that a feeling of duty which in him had grown so solemn and irresistible as to inspire him to any risk and sacrifice, ever so painful, should fall powerless at the feet of a party which so long had followed inspirations kindred to his own. Such was the ingenuousness of his nature; such his faith in the rectitude of his own cause. The result of his effort is a matter of history. After the Philadelphia Convention, and not until then, he resolved to oppose his party, and to join a movement which was doomed to defeat. He obeyed his sense of right and duty at a terrible sacrifice.

He had been one of the great chiefs of his party, by many regarded as the greatest. He had stood in the Senate as a mighty monument of the struggles and victories of the anti-slavery cause. He had been a martyr to his earnestness. By all Republicans he had been looked up to with respect, by many with veneration. He had been the idol of the people of his State. All this was suddenly changed. Already, at the time of his opposition to the Santo Domingo scheme, he had been deprived of his place at the head of the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, which he had held so long, and with so much honor to the Republic and to himself. But few know how sharp a pang it gave to his heart, this removal, which he felt as the wanton degradation of a faithful servant who was conscious of doing only his duty.

But, when he had pronounced against the candidates of his party, worse experiences were for him in store. Journals which for years had been full of his praise now assailed him with remorseless ridicule and vituperation, questioning even his past services and calling him a traitor. Men who had been proud of his acquaintance turned away their heads when they met him in the street. Former flatterers eagerly covered his name with slander. Many of those who had been his associates in the struggle for freedom sullenly withdrew from him their friendship. Even some men of the colored race, for whose elevation he had labored with a fidelity and devotion equalled by few and surpassed by none, joined in the chorus of denunciation. Oh, how keenly he felt it! And, as if the cruel malice of ingratitude and the unsparing persecution of infuriated partisanship had not been enough, another enemy came upon him, threatening his very life. It was a new attack of that disease which, for many years, from time to time, had prostrated him with the acutest suffering, and which shortly should lay him low. It admonished him that every word he spoke might be his last. He found himself forced to leave the field of a contest in which not only his principles of right, but even his good name, earned by so many years of faithful effort, was at stake. He possessed no longer the elastic spirit of youth, and the prospect of new struggles had ceased to charm him. His hair had grown gray with years, and he had reached that age when a statesman begins to love the thought of reposing his head upon the pillow of assured public esteem. Even the sweet comfort of that sanctuary was denied him,

in which the voice of wife and child would have said: Rest here, for, whatever the world may say, we know that you are good and faithful and noble. Only the friends of his youth, who knew him best, surrounded him with never-flagging confidence and love, and those of his companions-in-arms, who knew him also, and who were true to him as they were true to their common cause. Thus he stood in the Presidential campaign of 1872.

It is at such a moment of bitter ordeal that an honest public man feels the impulse of retiring within himself; to examine with scrupulous care the quality of his own motives; anxiously to inquire whether he is really right in his opinions and objects when so many old friends say that he is wrong; and then, after such a review at the hand of conscience and duty, to form anew his conclusions without bias, and to proclaim them without fear. This he did.

He had desired, and as he wrote, "he had confidently hoped, on returning home from Washington, to meet his fellow-citizens in Faneuil Hall, that venerable forum, and to speak once more on great questions involving the welfare of the country, but recurring symptoms of a painful character warned him against such an attempt." The speech he had intended to pronounce, but could not, he left in a written form for publication, and went to Europe, seeking rest, uncertain whether he would ever return alive. In it he reiterated all the reasons which had forced him to oppose the Administration and the candidates of his party. They were unchanged. Then followed an earnest and pathetic plea for universal peace and reconciliation. He showed how necessary the revival of fraternal feeling was, not only for the prosperity and physical well-being, but for the moral elevation of the American people and for the safety and greatness of the Republic. He gave words to his profound sympathy with

the Southern States in their misfortunes. Indignantly he declared, that

second only to the wide-spread devastations of war were the robberies to which those States had been subjected, under an Administration calling itself Republican, and with local governments deriving their animating impulse from the party in power; and that the people in these communities would have been less than men, if, sinking under the intolerable burden, they did not turn for help to a new party, promising honesty and reform.

He recalled the reiterated expression he had given to his sentiments, ever since the breaking out of the war; and closed the recital with these words:

Such is the simple and harmonious record, showing how from the beginning I was devoted to peace, how constantly I longed for reconciliation; how, with every measure of equal rights, this longing found utterance; how it became an essential part of my life; how I discarded all idea of vengeance and punishment; how reconstruction was, to my mind, a transition period, and how earnestly I looked forward to the day when, after the recognition of equal rights, the Republic should again be one in reality as in name. If there are any who ever maintained a policy of hate, I never was so minded; and now in protesting against any such policy, I act only in obedience to the irresistible promptings of my soul.

And well might he speak thus. Let the people of the South hear what I say. They were wont to see in him only the implacable assailant of that peculiar institution, which was so closely interwoven with all their traditions and habits of life, that they regarded it as the very basis of their social and moral existence, as the source of their prosperity and greatness; the unsparing enemy of the rebellion, whose success was to realize the fondest dreams of their ambition; the never-resting advocate of the grant

of suffrage to the colored people, which they thought to be designed for their own degradation. Thus they had persuaded themselves that Charles Sumner was to them a relentless foe.

They did not know, as others knew, that he whom they cursed as their persecutor had a heart beating warmly and tenderly for all the human kind; that the efforts of his life were unceasingly devoted to those whom he thought most in need of aid; that in the slave he saw only the human soul, with its eternal title to the same right and dignity which he himself enjoyed; that he assailed the slavemaster only as the oppressor who denied that right; and that the former oppressor ceasing to be such, and being oppressed himself, could surely count upon the fullness of his active sympathy freely given in the spirit of equal justice; that it was the religion of his life to protect the weak and oppressed against the strong, no matter who were the weak and oppressed, no matter who were the strong. They knew not that, while fiercely combating a wrong, there was not in his heart a spark of hatred even for the wrongdoer who hated him. They knew not how well he deserved the high homage involuntarily paid to him by a cartoon during the late Presidential campaign,—a cartoon, designed to be malicious, which represented Charles Sumner strewing flowers on the grave of Preston Brooks. They foresaw not, that to welcome them back to the full brotherhood of the American people, he would expose himself to a blow, wounding him as cruelly as that which years ago levelled him to the ground in the Senate chamber. And this new blow he received for them. The people of the South ignored this long. Now that he is gone, let them never forget it.

From Europe Mr. Sumner returned late in the fall of 1872, much strengthened, but far from being well. At the opening of the session he reintroduced two measures

which, as he thought, should complete the record of his political life. One was his civil-rights bill, which had failed in the last Congress, and the other, a resolution providing that the names of the battles won over fellow-citizens in the war of the rebellion should be removed from the regimental colors of the army and from the army register. It was in substance only a repetition of a resolution which he had introduced ten years before, in 1862, during the war, when the first names of victories were put on American battle-flags. This resolution called forth a new storm against him. It was denounced as an insult to the heroic soldiers of the Union, and a degradation of their victories and well-earned laurels. It was condemned as an unpatriotic act.

Charles Sumner insult the soldiers who had spilled their blood in a war for human rights! Charles Sumner degrade victories and depreciate laurels won for the cause of universal freedom! How strange an imputation!

Let the dead man have a hearing. This was his thought: No civilized nation, from the republics of antiquity down to our days, ever thought it wise or patriotic to preserve in conspicuous and durable form the mementos of victories won over fellow-citizens in civil war. Why not? Because every citizen should feel himself with all others as the child of a common country, and not as a defeated foe. All civilized Governments of our days have instinctively followed the same dictate of wisdom and patriotism. The Irishman, when fighting for old England at Waterloo, was not to behold on the red cross floating above him the name of the Boyne. The Scotch Highlander, when standing in the trenches of Sebastopol, was not by the colors of his regiment to be reminded of Cul-loden. No French soldier at Austerlitz or Solferino had to read upon the tricolor any reminiscence of the Vendée. No Hungarian at Sadowa was taunted by any Austrian

banner with the surrender of Villagos. No German regiment, from Saxony or Hanover, charging under the iron hail of Gravelotte, was made to remember by words written on a Prussian standard that the black eagle had conquered them at Königgrätz and Langensalza. Should the son of South Carolina, when at some future day defending the Republic against some foreign foe, be reminded by an inscription on the colors floating over him, that under this flag the gun was fired that killed his father at Gettysburg? Should this great and enlightened Republic, proud of standing in the front of human progress, be less wise, less large-hearted, than the ancients were two thousand years ago, and the kingly Governments of Europe are to-day? Let the battle-flags of the brave volunteers, which they brought home from the war with the glorious record of their victories, be preserved intact as a proud ornament of our State-houses and armories. But let the colors of the army, under which the sons of all the States are to meet and mingle in common patriotism, speak of nothing but union,—not a union of conquerors and conquered, but a union which is the mother of all, equally tender to all, knowing of nothing but equality, peace and love among her children. Do you want conspicuous mementos of your victories? They are written upon the dusky brow of every freeman who was once a slave; they are written on the gate-posts of a restored Union; and the most glorious of all will be written on the faces of a contented people, reunited in common national pride.

Such were the sentiments which inspired that resolution. Such were the sentiments which called forth a storm of obloquy. Such were the sentiments for which the legislature of Massachusetts passed a solemn resolution of censure upon Charles Sumner,—Massachusetts, his own Massachusetts, whom he loved so ardently with

a filial love,—of whom he was so proud, who had honored him so much in days gone by, and whom he had so long and so faithfully labored to serve and to honor! Oh, those were evil days, that winter; days sad and dark, when he sat there in his lonesome chamber, unable to leave it, the world moving around him, and in it so much that was hostile,—and he prostrated by the tormenting disease, which had returned with fresh violence,—unable to defend himself,—and with this bitter arrow in his heart! Why was not that resolution held up to scorn and vituperation as an insult to the brave, and an unpatriotic act—why was he not attacked and condemned for it when he first offered it, ten years before, and when he was in the fullness of manhood and power? If not then, why now? Why now? I shall never forget the melancholy hours I sat with him, seeking to lift him up with cheering words, and he—his frame for hours racked with excruciating pain, and then exhausted with suffering—gloomily brooding over the thought that he might die so!

How thankful I am, how thankful every human soul in Massachusetts, how thankful every American must be, that he did not die then!—and, indeed, more than once, death seemed to be knocking at his door. How thankful that he was spared to see the day, when the people by striking developments were convinced that those who had acted as he did, had after all not been impelled by mere whims of vanity, or reckless ambition, or sinister designs, but had good and patriotic reasons for what they did;—when the heart of Massachusetts came back to him full of the old love and confidence, assuring him that he would again be her chosen son for her representative seat in the House of States,—when the lawgivers of the old Commonwealth, obeying an irresistible impulse of justice, wiped away from the records of the legislature, and from the fair name of the State, that resolution of censure which

had stung him so deeply,—and when returning vigor lifted him up, and a new sunburst of hope illumined his life! How thankful we all are that he lived that one year longer!

And yet, have you thought of it? if he had died in those dark days, when so many clouds hung over him,—would not then the much vilified man have been the same Charles Sumner, whose death but one year later afflicted millions of hearts with a pang of bereavement, whose praise is now on every lip for the purity of his life, for his fidelity to great principles, and for the loftiness of his patriotism? Was he not a year ago the same, the same in purpose, the same in principle, the same in character? What had he done then that so many who praise him to-day should have then disowned him? See what he had done. He had simply been true to his convictions of duty. He had approved and urged what he thought right, he had attacked and opposed what he thought wrong. To his convictions of duty he had sacrificed political associations most dear to him, the security of his position of which he was proud. For his convictions of duty he had stood up against those more powerful than he; he had exposed himself to reproach, obloquy and persecution. Had he not done so, he would not have been the man you praise to-day; and yet for doing so he was cried down but yesterday. He had lived up to the great word he spoke when he entered the Senate: "The slave of principle, I call no party master." That declaration was greeted with applause, and when, true to his word, he refused to call a party master, the act was covered with reproach.

The spirit impelling him to do so was the same conscience which urged him to break away from the powerful party which controlled his State in the days of Daniel Webster, and to join a feeble minority, which stood up for freedom; to throw away the favor and defy the power of the wealthy and refined, in order to plead the cause of

the downtrodden and degraded; to stand up against the slave-power in Congress with a courage never surpassed; to attack the prejudice of birth and religion, and to plead fearlessly for the rights of the foreign-born citizen at a time when the Know-nothing movement was controlling his State and might have defeated his own reelection to the Senate; to advocate emancipation when others trembled with fear; to march ahead of his followers, when they were afraid to follow; to rise up alone for what he thought right, when others would not rise with him. It was that brave spirit which does everything, defies everything, risks everything, sacrifices everything,—comfort, society, party, popular support, station of honor, prospects,—for sense of right and conviction of duty. That it is for which you honored him long, for which you reproached him yesterday, and for which you honor him again to-day, and will honor him forever.

Ah, what a lesson is this for the American people,—a lesson learned so often, and, alas! forgotten almost as often as it is learned! Is it well to discourage, to proscribe in your public men that independent spirit which will boldly assert a conscientious sense of duty, even against the behests of power or party? Is it well to teach them that they must serve the command and interest of party, even at the price of conscience, or they must be crushed under its heel, whatever their past service, whatever their ability, whatever their character may be? Is it well to make them believe that he who dares to be himself must be hunted as a political outlaw, who will find justice only when he is dead? That would have been the sad moral of his death, had Charles Sumner died a year ago.

Let the American people never forget that it has always been the independent spirit, the all-defying sense of duty, which broke the way for every great progressive move-

ment since mankind has a history; which gave the American colonies their sovereignty and made this great Republic; which defied the power of slavery, and made this a Republic of freemen; and which—who knows?—may again be needed some day to defy the power of ignorance, to arrest the inroads of corruption, or to break the subtle tyranny of organization in order to preserve this as a Republic! And therefore let no man understand me as offering what I have said about Mr. Sumner's course, during the last period of his life, as an apology for what he did. He was right before his own conscience, and needs no apology. Woe to the Republic when it looks in vain for the men who seek the truth without prejudice and speak the truth without fear, as they understand it, no matter whether the world be willing to listen or not! Alas for the generation that would put such men into their graves with the poor boon of an apology for what was in them noblest and best! Who will not agree that, had power or partisan spirit, which persecuted him because he followed higher aims than party interest, ever succeeded in subjugating and moulding him after its fashion, against his conscience, against his conviction of duty, against his sense of right, he would have sunk into his grave a miserable ruin of his great self, wrecked in his moral nature, deserving only a tear of pity? For he was great and useful only because he dared to be himself all the days of his life; and for this you have, when he died, put the laurel upon his brow!

From the coffin which hides his body, Charles Sumner now rises up before our eyes an historic character. Let us look at him once more. His life lies before us like an open book which contains no double meanings, no crooked passages, no mysteries, no concealments. It is clear as crystal.

Even his warmest friend will not see in it the model

of perfect statesmanship; not that eagle glance which, from a lofty eminence, at one sweep surveys the whole field on which by labor, thought, strife, accommodation, impulse, restraint, slow and rapid movement, the destinies of a nation are worked out,—and which, while surveying the whole, yet observes and penetrates the fitness and working of every detail of the great machinery;—not that ever calm and steady and self-controlling good sense, which judges existing things just as they are, and existing forces just as to what they can accomplish, and while instructing, conciliating, persuading and moulding those forces, and guiding them on toward an ideal end, correctly estimates comparative good and comparative evil, and impels or restrains as that estimate may command. That is the true genius of statesmanship, fitting all times, all circumstances, and all great objects to be reached by political action.

Mr. Sumner's natural abilities were not of the very first order; but they were supplemented by acquired abilities of most remarkable power. His mind was not apt to invent and create by inspiration; it produced by study and work. Neither had his mind superior constructive capacity. When he desired to originate a measure of legislation, he scarcely ever elaborated its practical detail; he usually threw his idea into the form of a resolution, or a bill giving in the main his purpose only, and then he advanced to the discussion of the principles involved. It was difficult for him to look at a question or problem from more than one point of view, and to comprehend its different bearings, its complex relations with other questions or problems; and to that one point of view he was apt to subject all other considerations. He not only thought, but he did not hesitate to say, that all construction of the Constitution must be subservient to the supreme duty of giving the amplest protection to the

natural rights of man by direct National legislation. He was not free from that dangerous tendency to forget the limits which bound the legitimate range of legislative and governmental action. On economic questions his views were enlightened and thoroughly consistent. He had studied such subjects more than is commonly supposed. It was one of his last regrets that his health did not permit him to make a speech in favor of an early resumption of specie payments. On matters of international law and foreign affairs he was the recognized authority of the Senate.

But some of his very shortcomings served to increase that peculiar power which he exerted in his time. His public life was thrown into a period of a revolutionary character, when one great end was the self-imposed subject of a universal struggle, a struggle which was not made, not manufactured by the design of men, but had grown from the natural conflict of existing things, and grew irresistibly on and on, until it enveloped all the thought of the nation; and that one great end appealing more than to the practical sense, to the moral impulses of men, making of them the fighting force. There Mr. Sumner found his place and there he grew great, for that moral impulse was stronger in him than in most of the world around him; and it was in him not a mere crude, untutored force of nature, but educated and elevated by thought and study; and it found in his brain and heart an armory of strong weapons given to but few: vast information, legal learning, industry, eloquence, undaunted courage, an independent and iron will, profound convictions, unbounded devotion and sublime faith. It found there also a keen and just instinct as to the objects which must be reached and the forces which must be set in motion and driven on to reach them. Thus keeping the end steadily, obstinately, intensely in view, he marched

ahead of his followers, never disturbed by their anxieties and fears, showing them that what was necessary was possible, and forcing them to follow him,—a great moving power, such as the struggle required.

Nor can it be said that this impatient, irrepressible propulsion was against all prudence and sound judgment, for it must not be forgotten that, when Mr. Sumner stepped into the front, the policy of compromise was exhausted; the time of composition and expedient was past. Things had gone so far, that the idea of reaching the end, which ultimately must be reached, by mutual concession and a gradual and peaceable process, was utterly hopeless. The conflicting forces could not be reconciled; the final struggle was indeed irrepressible and inevitable, and all that could then be done was to gather up all the existing forces for one supreme effort, and to take care that the final struggle should bring forth the necessary results.

Thus the instinct and the obstinate, concentrated, irresistible moving power which Mr. Sumner possessed was an essential part of the true statesmanship of the revolutionary period. Had he lived before or after this great period, in quiet, ordinary times, he would perhaps never have gone into public life, or never risen in it to conspicuous significance. But all he was by nature, by acquirement, by ability, by moral impulse, made him one of the heroes of that great struggle against slavery, and in some respects the first. And then when the victory was won, the same moral nature, the same sense of justice, the same enlightened mind, impelled him to plead the cause of peace, reconciliation and brotherhood, through equal rights and even justice, thus completing the fullness of his ideal. On the pedestal of his time he stands one of the greatest of Americans.

What a peculiar power of fascination there was in him

as a public man! It acted much through his eloquence, but not through his eloquence alone. His speech was not a graceful flow of melodious periods, now drawing on the listener with the persuasive tone of confidential conversation, then carrying him along with a more rapid rush of thought and language, and at last lifting him up with the peals of reason in passion. His arguments marched forth at once in grave and stately array; his sentences like rows of massive Doric columns, unrelieved by pleasing variety, severe and imposing. His orations, especially those pronounced in the Senate before the war, contain many passages of grandest beauty. There was nothing kindly persuasive in his utterance; his reasoning appeared in the form of consecutive assertion, not seldom strictly logical and irresistibly strong. His mighty appeals were always addressed to the noblest instincts of human nature. His speech was never enlivened by anything like wit or humor. They were foreign to his nature. He has never been guilty of a flash of irony or sarcasm. His weapon was not the foil, but the battle-axe.

He has often been accused of being uncharitable to opponents in debate, and of wounding their feelings with uncalled-for harshness of language. He was guilty of that, but no man was less conscious of the stinging force of his language than he. He was often sorry for the effect his thrusts had produced, but being always so firmly and honestly persuaded of the correctness of his own opinions, that he could scarcely ever appreciate the position of an opponent, he fell into the same fault again. Not seldom he appeared haughty in his assumptions of authority; but it was the imperiousness of profound conviction, which, while sometimes exasperating his hearers, yet scarcely ever failed to exercise over them a certain sway. His fancy was not fertile, his figures mostly labored and stiff. In his later years his vast learning

began to become an encumbering burden to his eloquence. The mass of quoted sayings and historical illustrations, not seldom accumulated beyond measure and grotesquely grouped, sometimes threatened to suffocate the original thought and to oppress the hearer. But even then his words scarcely ever failed to chain the attention of the audience, and I have more than once seen the Senate attentively listening while he read from printed slips the most elaborate disquisition, which, if attempted by any one of his colleagues, would at once have emptied the floor and galleries. But there were always moments recalling to our mind the days of his freshest vigor, when he stood in the midst of the great struggle, lifting up the youth of the country with heart-stirring appeals, and with the lion-like thunder of his voice shaking the Senate chamber.

Still there was another source from which that fascination sprang. Behind all he said and did there stood a grand manhood, which never failed to make itself felt. What a figure he was, with his tall and stalwart frame, his manly face, topped with his shaggy locks, his noble bearing, the finest type of American Senatorship, the tallest oak of the forest! And how small they appeared by his side, the common run of politicians, who spend their days with the laying of pipe, and the setting up of pins, and the pulling of wires; who barter an office to secure this vote, and procure a contract to get that; who stand always with their ears to the wind to hear how the Administration sneezes, and what their constituents whisper, in mortal trepidation lest they fail in being all things to everybody! How he towered above them, he whose aims were always the highest and noblest; whose very presence made you forget the vulgarities of political life; who dared to differ with any man ever so powerful, any multitude ever so numerous; who regarded party

as nothing but a means for great ends, and for those ends defied its power; to whom the arts of demagogism were so contemptible that he would rather have sunk into obscurity and oblivion than descend to them; to whom the dignity of his office was so sacred that he would not even ask for it for fear of darkening its lustre!

Honor to the people of Massachusetts who, for twenty-three years, kept in the Senate, and would have kept him there even longer, had he lived—a man who never, even to them, conceded a single iota of his convictions in order to remain there! And what a life was his! A life so wholly devoted to what was good and pure! There he stood in the midst of the grasping materialism of our times, around him the eager chase for the almighty dollar, no thought of opportunity ever entering the smallest corner of his mind, and disturbing his high endeavors; with a virtue which the possession of power could not even tempt, much less debauch; from whose presence the very thought of corruption instinctively shrank back; a life so spotless, an integrity so intact, a character so high, that the most daring eagerness of calumny, the most wanton audacity of insinuation, standing on tiptoe, could not touch the soles of his shoes!

They say that he indulged in overweening self-appreciation. Ay, he did have a magnificent pride, a lofty self-esteem. Why should he not? Let wretches despise themselves, for they have good reason to do so; not he. But in his self-esteem there was nothing small and mean; no man lived to whose very nature envy and petty jealousy were more foreign. Conscious of his own merit, he never depreciated the merit of others; nay, he not only recognized it, but he expressed that recognition with that cordial spontaneity which can flow only from a sincere and generous heart. His pride of self was like his pride of country. He was the proudest American; he was the

proudest New Englander; and yet he was the most cosmopolitan American I have ever seen. There was in him not the faintest shadow of that narrow prejudice which looks askance at what has grown in foreign lands. His generous heart and his enlightened mind were too generous and too enlightened not to give the fullest measure of appreciation to all that was good and worthy, from whatever quarter of the globe it came.

And now his home! There are those around me who have breathed the air of his house in Washington, that atmosphere of refinement, taste, scholarship, art, friendship and warm-hearted hospitality; who have seen those rooms covered and filled with his pictures, his engravings, his statues, his bronzes, his books and rare manuscripts—the collections of a lifetime—the image of the richness of his mind, the comfort and consolation of his solitude. They have beheld his childlike smile of satisfaction when he unlocked the most precious of his treasures and told their stories.

They remember the conversations at his hospitable board, genially inspired and directed by him, on art and books and inventions and great times and great men,—when suddenly sometimes, by accident, a new mine of curious knowledge disclosed itself in him, which his friends had never known he possessed; or when a sunburst of the affectionate gentleness of his soul warmed all hearts around him. They remember his craving for friendship, as it spoke through the far outstretched hand when you arrived, and the glad exclamation, “I am so happy you came,”—and the beseeching, almost despondent tone when you departed: “Do not leave me yet; do stay a while longer, I want so much to speak with you!”—It is all gone now. He could not stay himself, and he has left his friends behind, feeling more deeply than ever that no man could know him well but to love him.

Now we have laid him into his grave, in the motherly soil of Massachusetts, which was so dear to him. He is at rest now, the stalwart, brave old champion, whose face and bearing were so austere, and whose heart was so full of tenderness; who began his career with a pathetic plea for universal peace and charity, and whose whole life was an arduous, incessant, never-resting struggle, which left him all covered with scars. And we can do nothing for him but commemorate his lofty ideals of Liberty and Equality and Justice and Reconciliation and Purity, and the earnestness and courage and touching fidelity with which he fought for them; so genuine in his sincerity, so single-minded in his zeal, so heroic in his devotion!

Oh, that we could but for one short hour call him up from his coffin, to let him see with the same eyes which saw so much hostility, that those who stood against him in the struggles of his life are his enemies no longer! That we could show him the fruit of the conflicts and sufferings of his last three years, and that he had not struggled and suffered in vain! We would bring before him, not only those who from offended partisan zeal assailed him, and who now with sorrowful hearts praise the purity of his patriotism; but we would bring to him that man of the South, a slaveholder and a leader of secession in his time, the echo of whose words spoken in the name of the South in the halls of the National Capitol we heard but yesterday; words of respect, of gratitude, of tenderness. That man of the South should then do what he deplored not to have done while he lived,—he should lay his hand upon the shoulder of the old friend of the humankind and say to him: “Is it you whom I hated, and who, as I thought, hated me? I have learned now the greatness and magnanimity of your soul, and here I offer you my hand and heart.”

Could he but see this with those eyes, so weary of con-

tention and strife, how contentedly would he close them again, having beheld the greatness of his victories!

People of Massachusetts! he was the son of your soil, in which he now sleeps; but he is not all your own. He belongs to all of us in the North and in the South,—to the blacks he helped to make free, and to the whites he strove to make brothers again. Let, on the grave of him whom so many thought to be their enemy, and found to be their friend, the hands be clasped which so bitterly warred against each other! Let upon that grave the youth of America be taught, by the story of his life, that not only genius, power and success, but more than these, patriotic devotion and virtue, make the greatness of the citizen! If this lesson be understood and followed, more than Charles Sumner's living word could have done for the glory of America will then be done by the inspiration of his great example. And it will truly be said that, although his body lie mouldering in the earth, yet in the assured rights of all, in the brotherhood of a reunited people and in a purified Republic, he stills lives and will live forever.

TO JAMES S. ROLLINS¹

ST. LOUIS, Aug. 4, 1874.

. . . I need not tell you how highly I appreciate your friendly wishes with regard to my own fortunes. It is no affectation when I say that my own desire for a reelection is not very strong. There are many reasons of a private nature why I should not wish it, and whatever the result of the impending campaign with regard to the Senatorship may be, there will be in it no disappointment of *personal* ambition as far as I am concerned.

¹ A Mo. lawyer and politician of much ability and independence, who was long president of the board of curators of Missouri University, at Columbia. See *ante* II, 26, 27, for Schurz's references to him.

The opinions you express on the present condition of affairs in this State coincide entirely with my own. What shall I say of the attitude of the Confederates? Of course, no man of experience will look for anything like gratitude in politics. I never indulged in any delusion in that respect, even in 1870, when they grasped me by the hand and fairly smothered me with assurances of friendship and devotion. I remember many interesting scenes. Their present attitude is simply pitiable. You say that they hate me. They would, perhaps, not hate me so much, had I never shown myself their friend at my own expense. Thus the world runs.

The movement inaugurated by the farmers seems to promise well, and if the convention called on the 2d of September acts judiciously, the chances will be decidedly good. Of course I shall support the movement to the best of my ability unless the convention make a platform and nominate candidates to render such support impossible.

I was painfully surprised to be informed by Mr. Preetorius that it was suspected by some of your friends somewhere in the State that I was unfriendly to you and hostile to any political aspirations you might entertain. Mr. Emory S. Foster told him so. I hope I need not tell you that just the reverse is true, and it is a great satisfaction to me to conclude from your letter that, if ever any such rumor reached your ear, you dismissed it as unworthy of consideration. It would have been particularly gratifying to me to give testimony of my esteem for you, and I sincerely regret to learn that you have grave reasons for not desiring public position at present. Your name has frequently and very prominently been mentioned in connection with the independent convention, and it seems to me that nothing short of the reasons you state would justify the withdrawal of your name. Let us hope that those reasons will not exist much longer. . . .

THE ISSUES OF 1874, ESPECIALLY IN MISSOURI¹

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—As one of the representatives of Missouri in the Senate of the United States, I deem it my duty to submit to you a candid statement of my views on the present posture of public affairs, and in doing so I shall not confine myself to the questions at issue in our impending State election. It is well known to you that in the expression of my opinions I have not permitted myself to be controlled by the requirements of party service, but, according to my sense of duty, have treated questions of public interest upon their own merits. In the same spirit I shall speak to you to-night—in plain language, without any desire or attempt to appeal to political prejudice or passion. More than ever do I consider this the duty of a public man under the peculiar circumstances which at present surround us. You cannot look at the present condition of the public mind in this Republic, without discovering that a wide-spread and deep distrust and skepticism have taken the place of the confident assurance and sanguine expectation formerly prevailing. The grave disorders constantly occurring in many of the States; the usurpations of government accomplished or attempted here and there, reminding one of Mexican *pronunciamientos*; the insecurity of life and property, and the impotency of the law in some parts of the country; the anarchy of power and the unsettled state of Constitutional principles; the influence of reckless demagogism and ignorance in the conduct of public affairs; the discovery of corrupt practices in public office of an alarming nature and extent, and the suspicion that there are other depths of corruption yet hidden from daylight; the sinking confidence in the character of public men; the growing power of great moneyed corporations,

¹ Speech at the Temple, St. Louis, Sept. 24, 1874.

bearing hard upon the people and believed to control by corrupt means courts and legislatures; the existence and power of political rings, working for ends purely selfish by taking advantage of a blind and reckless partisan spirit; and finally, the occasional disclosure of alarming rottenness in social life; all these things—exaggerated as the darkness of the picture may be—have coöperated in overcasting the minds of many men with grave doubt and apprehension as to what is to come out of all this. I am sure your experience coincides with mine that every day you can meet, on the streets, and in counting-houses, and on farms, men—not chronic grumblers and fault-finders, nor disappointed politicians—but quiet, unostentatious and unambitious citizens, with no public aspiration but a patriotic interest in the welfare of the country, who earnestly ask and discuss the question: If this mischief be not stopped what will become of the Republic and its democratic institutions, and where are the means to stop it?

This feeling of doubt and apprehension is not the product of artificial agitation. It has been quietly growing and spreading for a long time among the most solid classes of our population, and is gradually affecting the whole tone of society. It shows itself in symptoms which cannot fail to have been noticed by every observing man. The very American eagle refuses to soar on the Fourth of July. The National birthday, barring the firecrackers of the children and the fine clothes of the militia men, has become an excessively sober and commonplace affair. The flaming Fourth of July speech, which formerly was listened to with real delight and enthusiasm, is now apt to meet rather ridicule than applause, and those who consent to serve as Fourth of July orators prefer, for their own credit, critical reviews of the situation, admonitions and warnings, to the self-glorification which formerly

was so honest, exuberant and confiding. This state of mind, however much or little justified, exists as a fact, and it will in some way exercise an influence upon our political life. In a multitude of cases it has taken a form which is greatly to be deplored; and entire loss of faith in the efficiency of democratic institutions. I heard a gentleman, not a politician, recently express himself: "Why should I not be for a third Presidential term? I am for a third, a fourth, a fifth term and as many terms as possible, for I want by some means to get rid of this democratic form of government."

Such utterances are becoming quite frequent, in the South perhaps more than in the North, but altogether too frequent in the North also. It would seem needless to say that such talk is utterly senseless, for with the social elements and political traditions of this country, any sort of monarchy or imperialism is absolutely impossible, and if any attempt in that direction were seriously contemplated by anybody, which I do not believe, it would, instead of producing stability and order, result only in confused, furious and endless civil conflicts, aggravating all the evils now complained of an hundredfold. But utterances of this kind have a demoralizing effect, for they divert the minds of men from the true problem, which is not how to get rid of democratic government, but how to restore and develop what is good in it and how to suppress or reform what is bad. Thus they cultivate that barren, inert, imbecile despondency which, seeking escape from an evil, is always apt to choose the worst—a state of mind utterly unworthy of an American. But while the present condition of things, and the feeling of anxiety and doubt springing from it, has thrown some minds into so morbid a despair, it has produced upon others, and, I am happy to say, a much larger number, a healthier effect full of encouragement and promise.

It has stirred up their sense of duty and responsibility. It has quickened their public spirit. Seldom has public opinion been more vigilant in watching the conduct of the representatives and servants of the people; seldom has it been more powerful in enforcing the condemnation of malefactors and the correction of abuses. But a few years ago, any public man, who, against the wishes and pretended interests of his party, insisted upon the investigation and exposure of malpractice, could be trampled down and ostracized as a traitor. And now, immediately after a sweeping victory, the dominant party finds itself forced by an irresistible pressure of public opinion to put its own hands to a work but recently so detested, and the scandals of the Credit Mobilier, of the Sanborn contracts, of the moiety business and of the government of the District of Columbia, were ripped open; and, in the treatment of these things, the people were still more in earnest than some of the official investigators. For many years we have not had a session of Congress that was so free from job-legislation as the last, so much so indeed that the lobbyists could not pay for their dinners, and the restaurant-keepers were disconsolate. Public opinion hung like a thunder cloud over Washington, charged with dangerous electricity, and some of those who tried to construct the famous press-gag law as a lightning rod wish to-day they had never made the attempt while the people in conventions, and still more, at elections, are sitting sternly in judgment over those of their servants who cannot present a clean bill of health.

But more than that. While but a few years ago a man who refused to obey the behests of his party was not only ostracized as a traitor, but laughed at as a fool uselessly sacrificing himself in a windmill fight, we behold to-day all over the country countless thousands asserting their

independence from party dictation, doing their own thinking for themselves, and following only their convictions of duty. And still more. While but recently very valuable classes of society kept aloof from all active participation in political movements, either from fastidiousness or modesty, or because they gave themselves wholly to private pursuits, they are now asking themselves: "Is not our apathy in great part to blame for the evils we are suffering? If we want good government, is it not time that we should take our share in the struggle to secure it?" And hence that fresh political activity, that freedom of criticism, that breaking of party lines, that movement of independence all over the field, which makes political ringmasters tremble and patriotic citizens rejoice in new hope.

I hail this effect of the doubt and anxiety which pervade the public mind as a sign of promise. It is doubt, turning into an incentive for independent thought. It is anxiety, becoming a stimulus for fresh exertion. In such a mood many errors may be committed, many mistaken notions may be entertained, many false movements may be made. But the intelligence of the American people is more than ordinarily active, the old dingdong of party cant begins to fall stale upon the ear, and the number of men who are sincerely anxious to know and to do what is right is growing every day. There are signs of the times which inspire the hope that a political revival has commenced, which, if directed with wisdom and energy, may regenerate and put upon a firmer footing than ever the free institutions of this Republic. But if it fails, then greater than ever will be the danger—not of monarchy or imperialism, but that by a sort of dry-rot our institutions may gradually lose their vitality; that our time-honored Constitutional principles may be obliterated by abuses of power establishing themselves as precedents;

that the machinery of administration may become more and more a mere instrument of ring-rule, a tool to manufacture majorities and to organize plunder; and that, in the hollow shell of republican forms, the Government will become the football of rapacious and despotic factions.

With such opportunities and such dangers before us, it is our duty to examine the problems to be solved with candor and impartiality. It will be impossible for me to discuss in the narrow compass of a single speech all questions of importance. I am obliged to confine myself to-night to those which are at this hour the most prominent, leaving others to future occasions. It is one of the great misfortunes of our situation that we can scarcely attempt to engage the attention of the people in other subjects of legislation without being disturbed again and again by what may be called the Southern problem, rekindling party spirit and distracting the popular mind. When the project of annexing Santo Domingo was before the Senate, I asked, in the course of my argument opposing it: "Have we not enough with one South as an element of disturbance? Do you want to purchase another one?" No prudent man will deny to-day that that question was very pertinent.

Last week the whole country was ablaze with excitement over the revolution in Louisiana. My opinion on the Louisiana case I expressed when it first came up in the Senate, in February of last year. That opinion was based upon a conscientious and candid study of the very elaborate report of our investigating committee. It was this: That the Kellogg government in that State had been set up by an act of gross and indefensible usurpation on the part of a United States District Judge, aided by United States troops, without the least evidence of an election by the people; that all the evidence there was of an election by the people, in the shape of returns, was

decidedly in favor of McEnery; that McEnery was *prima facie* entitled to the office of governor, subject to subsequent contest if any of the returns were fraudulent, and that the only duty of the National Government in the case then was simply to undo the usurpation effected and sustained by its own officers, to restore as much as possible the condition of things which had existed before the usurpation, and to leave the final settlement of the matter to the competent State authorities. The same views were entertained and expressed by prominent Republican Senators, especially Senator Edmunds, who is now chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. I hold to that opinion still.

But, while the act of gross usurpation was not denied, others formed different conclusions. The President had recognized the Kellogg government when it was first set up. In a subsequent message to Congress he confessed his doubts as to Kellogg's title, and asked Congress to direct him what to do, stating at the same time that, if Congress failed to act, he would continue to recognize Kellogg. Congress permitted two sessions to pass without doing anything. Thus Kellogg, in spite of the universally admitted usurpation, remained *de facto* governor of Louisiana, recognized by the National Executive; while the McEnery government maintained a show of organization, without such recognition.

The time for the election of a new legislature approached. The opponents of the Kellogg government, apprehending that no chance for a fair election would be given to them, organized; an uprising followed, and an hour's struggle drove Kellogg, with his adherents, to flight; whereupon McEnery and his associates possessed themselves of the State government.

Then Kellogg called upon the President for military aid in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. He was

the only governor of Louisiana recognized by the President, who also in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, granted that aid. The troops of the United States reinstated Kellogg, and the McEnery party, the successful revolutionists, submitted to the National authority promptly, without the least attempt at resistance. This was the end of what is called the Louisiana revolution.

But it is not the end of the disease, neither is it the final remedy. A great wrong has been committed. That wrong does not consist in the intervention of the President against those who, by force of arms, had driven Kellogg to flight; for the President acted in the exercise of his Constitutional authority. Neither can, in a republic, the right of self-help by force be admitted, for such an admission would encourage every party, every individual that has a grievance, either real or imaginary, to resort to force for redress, and a state of anarchy would ensue which no political or social organization could withstand. We have too much of that self-help already, and too little patient reliance upon the slow but orderly and peaceable ways of the law.

But the great wrong was committed before. It was when a Federal Judge, palpably overstepping the limits of his jurisdiction and perpetrating an outrage without precedent in our history, was supported by the power of the National Government in the act of virtually creating a State government which had not the least evidence of an election by the people. It was when the creature of such an unheard of usurpation was by the same National Government permitted to stand as a lawful authority, and to lord it over the people of a State. It was when, even after the President had confessed his doubt, Congress neglected to undo the usurpation and to make room for those who had *prima facie* evidence of an election by the people.

The wrong was committed even before that, and in

more States than Louisiana. It was when Federal officeholders in the South were permitted to use their authority and prestige as a power in partisan conflicts, and for the support and perpetuation of partisan State governments the most rapacious and corrupt that ever disgraced a republican country. It was when the countenance of the dominant party was not promptly withdrawn from the thieves who buried the Southern States under mountains of debt, and, filling their own pockets, robbed the people of their substance. It was when the keeping of the Southern States in the party traces was deemed more important than that they should have honest and constitutional government. That wrong is not remedied by military interference and the subjection of revolutionists.

Nor was that the only wrong committed in the South. There was another, and on the other side. It was when bands of lawless ruffians infested the Southern country, spreading terror by cruel persecution and murder. It was when helpless prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood. It was when neither officers nor volunteers could be found to arrest the perpetrators of such bloody deeds, or no juries to convict them. It was when the better classes of society contented themselves with condemnatory resolutions and pious wishes, instead of straining every nerve to bring the malefactors to justice. I know it is said that many of the bloody stories which reach us from the South are inventions or exaggerations. That may have been, and, undoubtedly, in some cases was so; but we know also that very many of them were but too true, and that they cannot be explained as a mere defense against official robbery, for the murdered victims were mostly poor negroes, while the real plunderers went free and safe. We know also that there is a ruffianly element in the South which, unless vigorously restrained

by all the power of society, will resort to bloody violence as a pastime, especially when it is permitted to believe itself engaged in partisan service, and to be safe under the protection of public opinion.

And such wrongs and evils cannot be remedied by mere complaints, however just, of oppression and usurpation.

This is the state of things we have to deal with. Is there no remedy for all this except the employment of force? There must be, if our republican institutions are to stand; and it will not be difficult to find and apply it, if the Government as well as the people will only forget their partisan interests and think of nothing but the common welfare.

Louisiana is quiet. Kellogg sits in the governor's chair—trembling, perhaps, but safe. Nobody harms him. There is no further attempt at an anarchical movement on the part of the people. Order reigns. But there is another kind of anarchy, which is just as dangerous to republican institutions and to the welfare of the Nation as the lawless self-help by force of individuals and parties. It is the anarchy of power. It is the lawlessness of authority. If you want the people to respect and obey the laws, convince them that those in power do not wilfully disregard them. If you want republican government to stand, let the government be one emanating from the people and moving strictly within constitutional forms.

When the citizens of Louisiana, after a successful revolution, promptly and unconditionally submitted to the Constitutional authority of the President, they did their duty. They demonstrated to the world that their uprising was not a revival of the rebellion of 1861, for many thousands in arms yielded instantly to a corporal's guard under the National flag. Their duty to the National authority was completely performed. They gave up to

it even their sense of right. Now it is time that the National Government should candidly consider what is its duty toward them.

The President is not expected to reverse his recognition of the Kellogg government without further action by Congress. But the election of a new legislature in Louisiana is impending, and at the request of Kellogg a force of United States soldiers is at hand, professedly to secure the enforcement of the laws in that election. That military force may be used impartially, and it may not. That will depend upon the man who controls it. It will be in a great measure under the control of United States Marshal Packard. And who is Packard? Besides being United States Marshal, he was one of the principal accomplices of Judge Durell and Kellogg in the usurpation of two years ago, and he is now the managing spirit of the State central committee of the Kellogg party.

I venture to suggest that such an accomplice in previous usurpation and present manager of a political party in a sharply contested election, such as this, is not a fit person to manage at the same time the United States troops to be used in that election. It is of the highest importance that, especially under existing circumstances, the people of Louisiana should not only have a fair election, but also that they should be made to feel that they have one. And it will be admitted that the irregular and striking combination of past performances and present functions in Mr. Packard is not calculated to inspire confidence. I am sure the whole country would applaud an order of the President relieving Mr. Packard of his official duties, and the substitution of a man of such character that everybody will believe him incapable of abusing his power for partisan ends.

This is a candid and respectful suggestion which might be enlarged upon. Indeed, if ever, now is the time to

call away not only from Louisiana, but from South Carolina and all the Southern States, or to strip of their official power, the multitude of Federal officeholders, who have looked upon themselves as mere party agents, using all their influence to sustain and strengthen the bloodsuckers desolating that country, and probably not in many cases oblivious of their own profit. And I was sincerely rejoiced when a few days ago I read in the papers that the President was seriously thinking of holding a terrible muster of Federal placemen in the South. It is a timely resolution. Never was it more necessary. Let us hope that not a single one of those who have made the Federal authority a symbol of selfish partisan power and greedy oppression may escape him, and that the beginning be made with Packard and his associates, whose partisan appeals led the President to recognize the Kellogg government two years ago, and brought him into a position in which he now could not perform the duty of enforcing the Federal authority without at the same time sustaining a flagrant wrong.

But there the duty of the National Government does not end. It will not have been fully performed as long as the usurpation set on foot by a Federal Judge and supported by the Federal power is not undone. No longer than the period of its next meeting should the Congress of the United States permit any citizen of Louisiana to believe that the highest legislative power of the Republic can so far yield to partisan spirit as to sustain a palpable, an undoubted usurpation, even after that usurpation has most ignominiously demonstrated its inability to sustain itself. That duty remains unfilled until that precedent is wiped out, which is as dangerous as that of a successful revolution would have been; the precedent of a successful *coup d'état*, creating a State government and a legislature without the evidence

of election, by the mere fiat of a Federal Judge, supported by a United States Marshal and Federal bayonets, and a band of reckless partisan adventurers. Let the highest powers in the land once more make every citizen understand and feel that, while preserving intact the lawful authority of the government, they are ready to throw aside all selfish considerations of party interest when the rights and the welfare of the people and the integrity of republican institutions are in question. Let this be done—let it be done by those who stand at the head of the dominant party, as a proof of good faith and patriotic spirit, and the lessons taught by the events in Louisiana will be of inestimable benefit to the whole American people.

On the other hand, the citizens of the South must not be permitted to forget that they, too, have a duty to perform. The people of the North sincerely desire that they should have honest and Constitutional government. Even a large majority of the Republicans in the North have long been heartily disgusted with the government of thieving adventurers which plundered the South. But when that public opinion was on the point of becoming so strong that no partisan spirit in power could have long resisted it, what happened? The bloody riot in New Orleans in 1866; the organization of the Ku-Klux all over the South; the butchery of Grant Parish, in 1873; the murders of Coushatta; the slaughter of the helpless negro prisoners in Trenton, Tennessee, not to speak of minor atrocities! What was the effect? The growing sympathy with the victims of plunder was turned into sympathy with the victims of murder.

When the Ku-Klux bill was before the Senate I opposed it, by argument and vote, on Constitutional grounds. But knowing, as I did, that the Ku-Klux bill was not only supported by partisan schemers, anxious for the preservation of party ascendancy, but also by unselfish and fair-

mind men, impelled beyond the limits of their Constitutional powers by a generous impulse, I then expressed the opinion that unless such deeds of bloody violence were suppressed by the Southern people themselves, Federal interference in any form, with all its consequences, would be demanded and sustained by an overpowering public opinion, and no Constitutional argument would be strong enough to prevent or stop it. It is to be hoped that by this time the people of the South have learned that those who disgrace them by deeds of bloody violence are their worst enemies. Let them act upon that lesson. Let them dissolve their white men's leagues; for every organization based upon a distinction of color is not only wrong in itself, but harmful to both races. Let them make the poor negro feel that he has not only a willing, but an active, protector in every good citizen. Let them understand that the most efficient method to fight the thieves who rule them is by relentlessly suppressing the murderous ruffians among themselves, who strip them of the sympathy of the country. Silent disapproval is nothing. Good intentions are nothing. Mere public resolutions are nothing. Only vigorous action will avail. Only the practical punishment of malefactors will serve. They justly demand that no thief shall find grace because he is a Republican. Let them show that no murderer will find grace with them because he is a Democrat. Let party spirit cease to be a shelter to the criminal. No white man's league will do them any good. An anti-ruffian league, of which every good citizen is an active member, is the thing the South wants.

I say this as a true friend of the Southern people, who has more than once raised his voice against the wrongs they have suffered. And I hail with gladness the spirit animating the governor of Tennessee, who does not rest until all the murderers of Trenton are in the clutches of the

law; and the charge of that Kentucky judge, who tells his grand jury that if they fail to indict, not only the man who committed a murder, but also the sheriff who wilfully neglected to arrest that murderer, he will find grand jurymen in another county who will do their duty. In that spirit, which will relentlessly pursue the lawless elements of society as the common enemy, there is salvation for the Southern people. Let that spirit prevail in the South, and no partisanship in the North will be strong enough to baffle the sympathy which their misfortunes deserve. The South will again enjoy the largest Constitutional measure of self-government, and one of the greatest of those dangers will disappear which at present threaten the most vital part of our republican institutions.

The strongest ground upon which the men, whose rapacity has been so terrible a curse to the South, have their claim on public sympathy, is that they are the protectors of the colored people. Dreadful indeed would be the fate of the negro, were the protection of thieves their only safety. When we contemplate the part the colored people have played in the recent history of the Southern States, we find them rather to be pitied than to be condemned. That they should have fallen under the control of reckless and designing men, when, ignorant as centuries of slavery had left them, they entered upon the exercise of political rights, is by no means astonishing, especially when we consider that the Southern whites, their late masters, at first maintained an attitude of hostility to their new rights, while some of those designing friends appeared in the character of Federal officeholders, a character carrying with it an authority which the colored people were wont to look upon as the very source of their liberty. Neither is it surprising that the bad example of such leaders should have had a corrupting influence upon so impressionable a class of followers.

While thus every fairminded man will judge the doings of the colored people themselves with charity, no measure of condemnation can be too severe for those who made of the ignorant and credulous multitude a tool in their schemes of rapacity. What the colored people need above all things for their own security and welfare is a good understanding with their white neighbors. Had they, when they became a power in the political field, been led by conscientious and wise men, to cast their votes for good government, and thus to promote the common interests of both races, that good understanding with their white neighbors would not long have been wanting. But what characters did assume the leadership? Men who assiduously persuaded the negroes that their only safety was in a strict organization as a race against the Southern whites, and in blind obedience to the behests of their commanders; men who used that organization only to raise themselves to power, and who used that power for the spoliation of the people; men, who, in many cases, after having filled their pockets with spoil, sneaked off to a place of safety, leaving behind the poor tools of their iniquity as victims to the exasperation of plundered and outraged communities.

Truly, there never were professions of affection and solicitude more damnably treacherous than those lavished by such men upon the negroes of the South. To place the negroes of the South in the attitude of organized partisan supporters of corruption and robbery against the whites was the blackest crime that could be committed against the colored race. And I affirm that the men who did it, the carpet-baggers and plunderers, have been and are the cruelest, the most treacherous, the most dastardly enemies the colored people ever had since their emancipation.

The mischief is done and we see its consequences. The

situation of the colored people has been seriously damaged by their false friends, and no device of legislation can furnish an adequate remedy. In this connection a word on the supplementary civil rights bill. That measure was brought forward and pressed by the dearest friend I ever had among the public men of America—a man whose memory I shall never cease to cherish and revere. This measure, however, I could not give my support. Nobody knows better than I do that it sprung from the purest motives, a rare sincerity of generous impulse and high patriotic aspirations. But it was based upon a theory of Constitutional power and upon views of policy upon which my friend and I had for years been agreed to disagree.

In a few words I will state my opinions on the bill. Those who have observed my utterances on questions of Constitutional power, such as were involved, for instance, in the Ku-Klux act, need not be told that I must consider the civil rights bill as transgressing the limits with which the Constitution hedges in the competency of the National Government, and as encroaching upon the sphere of State authority. I will not to-night tire you with a restatement of principles which I have frequently discussed.

But the civil rights bill, if made a law, would have other effects which its originator did certainly not design it to have—effects injuriously touching the interests of the colored people themselves. It has been said that the enactment of that bill would be calculated to break up the whole system of public schools in several of the Southern States. My observation and reflection convinces me that this apprehension is well grounded. And nobody would be a greater sufferer than the colored people; for nothing can be more important to them than that, issuing as they do from a state of degradation and ignorance, an efficient system of public instruction should put

them on the road of progressive improvement. Anything injuriously affecting such a system must therefore be gravely injurious to them.

Now, it is a well-known fact that in the States containing the bulk of the colored population there existed, if not a general, still a widespread and powerful prejudice against the introduction of a system of common schools, to be supported at the public expense. We know something of that even in Missouri. That prejudice, although now overborne by a superior public opinion, is far from being entirely extinct. It requires only a new and strong impetus to impart to it new strength enough seriously to disturb what has with difficulty been built up.

It is equally well known that a large majority of the white people of those States, even a large majority of those who are sincerely anxious to secure to the colored children the largest possible advantages of education in separate establishments, still are very strongly, nay, violently, opposed to any law which, like the civil rights bill, would force the admission of colored children together with white children, in the same schoolrooms. That opposition exists, and we have to deal with it as a fact. Try to enforce, under such circumstances, the system of mixed schools, and what will be the result? The old prejudice against a system of public instruction to be supported by taxation, as it still exists in the States in question, will at once find itself powerfully reinforced, and to an attack so strengthened, against a defense in the same measure weakened, it is most probable that the systems of instruction, laboriously built up, will succumb. At any rate they will be interrupted for a disastrously long period.

There is scarcely a greater misfortune conceivable that could befall those communities. But what would especially the colored people have gained? Now they

have at least their separate schools at the public expense, as a part of the general system. Destroy that system, and they will have no mixed schools, while their separate schools will perish also. Would the law, then, benefit the colored race at all? A colored man might indeed then enforce his rights to ride all over the country in a Pullman palace car, to board at a first-class hotel and to sit in the dress circle of a theater. But such things can be enjoyed under any circumstances only by the very small number of wealthier people among them. And these pleasures and conveniences of their few men of means would be purchased at a dreadful price; the interruption of the public-school system, the advantages of which they now extensively enjoy in separate establishments, would deprive the children of the poor of a thing which is as necessary to them as their daily bread. I happen to know very sensible colored men, who have the interests of their race sincerely at heart, and who, looking over the whole field, and recognizing facts as facts, are not willing to pay the price of their poor children's education for their rich men's convenience and pleasure.

At the same time I take this occasion to say that the facilities of education furnished to the colored people in separate schools are, in some parts of the country, and also in several counties of this State, far from sufficient; and I cannot impress it too strongly upon my fellow-citizens that it is not only their duty, but their interest, as it is the general interest of society, to place within the reach of the poorest and lowliest of them every possible means by which they can raise themselves to the highest attainable degree of perfection. I trust, therefore, the just claims of the colored people will not fail to meet with full satisfaction.

But in still other respects the enactment of such a law would not be beneficent to the colored man. Their

situation as freemen was surrounded with extraordinary difficulties and dangers from the beginning. They were confronted by an inveterate prejudice and by that spirit of reckless violence which is doing so much harm to the Southern people. Their false friends in the South, using them for selfish and iniquitous ends, have succeeded in increasing again the difficulties which the influence of time and habit was calculated to diminish. It would be a dangerous venture, dangerous to the colored people, if their social position were made the objective point of new strife, under circumstances so unfavorable. Now that they have the political rights of citizenship it is much wiser and safer for them to trust to the means they already possess to make themselves respected, and to leave all else to the gradual progress of public opinion, which has already outgrown many a prejudice that a few years ago still seemed invincible. As their sincere friend, I should certainly not consider it a favor to them to precipitate them headlong into numberless and endless personal conflicts, in which they inevitably would be the sufferers.

But the National Government and the dominating party can do something far better for the colored man than pass laws of doubtful Constitutionality or send troops for their protection. Let them openly and severely discountenance those corrupt partisans in the South who have misled the colored people into an organized support of robbery and misgovernment, and done all they could to make them believe that in the matured opinion of white men the science of politics consists in stealing as much of the public money as you can lay your hands on. Let them punish, at least with removal, those officeholders who have prostituted the authority of the Republic by using their official power to work into the hands of the plunderers. Let in their places be put men of wisdom, conscience and honor, who will set them an example of

high official integrity and public spirit, and disabuse them of the idea that whatever they may do as partisans of those in power, the aid of the National Government will always stand behind them.

Still more can the colored people themselves do for their own protection; and here, I think, is the way to solve the most difficult part of the problem: They cannot too soon give up the delusion that they will be safe only as long as they remain together in the same political organization. Instead of exercising over one another a system of terrorism, in order to enforce party discipline, they should encourage among themselves individual independence. Not in union is their safety, but in division. They have before them the example of another body of men, who, although from the beginning far stronger in their social position and influence, were also, under certain circumstances, threatened with an invasion of their political rights; I mean the adopted citizens. As long as they, in an almost solid body, stood together on the side of one party, the other thought of taking their rights from them; but no sooner did they break their ranks, and divide, than both sides stood up for them with equal zeal. It is a lesson easily understood. As soon as the colored citizens in the South shake off the odium which arises from their having, as a solid, organized mass, been the main support of the worst kind of partisan rule, as soon as every one of them casts his vote on this side or the other, as his opinions or inclination may dictate, each party will make their protection a special object in order to attract a majority of those votes. And I am rejoiced to learn that the number of colored citizens who emancipate themselves from the serfdom of party discipline, and who counsel with their white neighbors on their political action in order to secure good government, is growing larger from year to year. When it will have grown so large that the colored

voters become an important element, not only in one, but in both parties, under an impulse of self-interest, each party will rival in affording them the fullest measure of protection. That will do more to stop bloody excesses in the South than any military interference, and more to establish just and beneficent relations between the two races than any Congressional legislation. This view of the case may not be palatable to the managers of the party which so far has had the almost unanimous support of the colored vote. Governor Kellogg of Louisiana and Governor Moses of South Carolina, I apprehend, may not like it. They will call this the advice of a dangerous disorganizer, as I am accustomed to be called a dangerous disorganizer whenever I advocate a policy which crosses the selfish schemes of politicians. Well, the advice I give may not be good for the Kelloggs and Moseses, but I maintain that it is good for the safety and future welfare of the colored people, as well as for the cause of honest government in the South. And I declare myself in favor of honest government and of the security of every human being in the South in his life, property and rights, even if it should cost Kellogg and Moses every particle of political power they possess. And I hope the time is not far [distant] when every good citizen in the country, to whatever party he may belong, will be of the same opinion.

I am not sanguine enough to expect that, even if such a policy be followed, all elements of disorder will at once disappear from Southern society; but its most feverish distemper, at least, may thus be allayed. How much easier would it be to solve problems, now appearing so intricate if we could once deal with them on their own merits, in the light of a broad statesmanship, candid enough to face and recognize the whole truth, instead of every moment turning round to ask how this or that measure, however good in itself, may affect the chances

of the Republican or of the Democratic party! How much error would then be dispelled! How many dangers would then be averted! You, honest Republicans, who, as sincerely as I, desire the protection of the poor negro and the suppression of violence, would then readily admit a fact which is as clear as sunlight, that the government of the Republican carpet-bagger and plunderer in the South, as a protection to the negro and the Union man, has been a most glaring and disastrous failure, and that in the very nature of things it must be so. You would no longer permit yourselves to be deceived about another fact equally clear and notorious, that in those Southern States, where the carpet-baggers and plunderers have ceased to rule—such as Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee—the poor negro is far better protected and acts of violence are far less frequent than they were when that rule still existed, and than they now are in those States where that rule still exists, as in Louisiana, South Carolina, Alabama. And you would further understand that, in directly or indirectly sustaining that iniquitous rule for partisan advantage, you deprived your own party of the opportunity of carrying out beneficent and necessary reforms, and drove those States into the arms of your opponents.

On the other hand, you, honest Democrats, who have the cause of local self-government as sincerely at heart as I have, if you could but throw away the same blind partisan spirit, you would at once understand that nothing in the world can injure and imperil the cause of local self-government more than those bloody excesses and violent upheavings, apt to raise a doubt as to the fitness of the people for its exercise, and that nothing can benefit that cause more than the practical demonstration that the self-government of the people in every part of the country can, even under trying circumstances, be depended upon

to secure the amplest protection to every man's life, property and rights. I repeat, how much easier would it be to solve such problems, how much easier to avert the dangers to our republican institutions they bring with them, if but for a short period that partisan spirit could be dispelled which blinds our eyes against the truth and cripples our patriotic impulse to do what is right and just and wise.

It is, indeed, time that this should end. Let the uprising of independent thought which we now behold, at last, break through that strange and dangerous infatuation. Let the American people once more remember that it is the duty of every citizen first to be a patriot before being a partisan. Then we shall cease to stumble from blunder into blunder, and that enlightened statesmanship will not fail to appear, which by courageous action will scatter the clouds now hanging with threatening gloom over the Republic.

I ask your pardon for having dwelt so long upon this subject, but I consider it one of the most important questions of the day. I am informed that the position I have taken with regard to it has not had the approval of many of my constituents. I ask them only to believe that I have been acting upon convictions which are very sincere and very strong; so sincere and so strong indeed that I should continue to hold them did I stand with them quite alone. I have been asked by political and personal friends, for my own sake, either to abstain entirely from expressing my opinions on the financial question in this campaign, or at least to compromise a little by declaring myself, for instance, for specie payments in an indefinite future, but for some expansion at present. I cannot do that. It is

¹ About one-third of this speech was devoted to a discussion of National finances, more fully treated in other speeches published in these volumes.

against my sense of duty. Did I not consider my convictions correct I should not entertain them. Did I not deem them in accordance with the best interests of the people, I should not urge them. The fact that some of my constituents have so far not approved my opinions is all the more a reason to argue the matter with those who differ with me. No personal considerations are admissible. I know that two and two make four. No personal consideration can make me say that two and two make five, and no expediency can induce me to compromise the matter by saying that two and two make about four and a half. I am absolutely against inflation of any kind. I am in favor of the immediate adoption of a policy which will lead us by gradual but decided, direct and irrevocable steps to the resumption of specie payments. This I consider right, and for the best interests of the country. By this I shall stand as long as I stand at all.

Permit me now a few remarks on the issues of the State campaign in which we are now engaged. I am one of those who, in 1870, went out of the convention of the party in whose ranks I had served for fifteen years, for the purpose of doing an act of justice to a large number of our fellow-citizens in a manner calculated to produce the best possible effect upon the future development of the State. The motives which led me to take a step so venturesome for a public man I have never since seen any reason to be ashamed or to repent of. Many thousands of our citizens were then disfranchised in consequence of their attitude during the civil war. For five years after the close of the great conflict they had been paying taxes, and a large majority of them had been bearing all the burdens and performing all the duties of citizenship without enjoying any of its political privileges. While such exceptional restrictions were dictated by the policy of self-preservation, as war measures, at a time when the

issues and results of the conflict were still trembling in the scale, I thought their continuation an unjustifiable wrong and hardship after those issues and results were firmly secured. Moreover, those restrictive laws had put into the hands of the party to which I belonged means to perpetuate its power, which could not fail to lead, and indeed had led, to most grievous, tyrannical and demoralizing abuses. It appeared to me, as it did to thousands of Republicans, that it was time to make an end of this. I thought also that if a large number of Republicans stepped before those who had been deprived of their political rights, saying: "We, members of the dominant party, which might, by maintaining disfranchisement, perpetuate its ascendancy ever so long, actuated as we are by a sense of justice and the impulse of fraternal feeling, restore to you, freely and voluntarily, all the rights and political privileges of which you have been deprived"—such an act would go far to wipe out forever all the old passions and animosities of past conflicts, and unite the whole people of the State in the bonds of mutual confidence and good understanding. I thought also that such an act of justice, voluntarily performed at the risk of our political fortunes, would, as an example of political independence, be well calculated to disarm for the future that partisan spirit which so frequently has stood, and now stands, in the way of good government.

That was my motive and purpose. Neither can it be said that any desire or expectation of personal reward inspired that step. Had it been so, then I should have improved my advantage by joining the Democratic party, when that turned up as a majority in this State, to make good my claim on their gratitude, if there be such a thing. But I declared in 1870, and in 1872 again, that I had separated from the Republican majority with no such intention. Doubts were expressed at the time as to the

sincerity of that declaration; but I think I have proved that sincerity by maintaining ever since an attitude of absolute independence, acting on the field of National politics upon the same motives and principles which determined my course in the State of Missouri. And I am gratified to know that a large majority of those with whom I stood in 1870 have been governed by the same spirit.

It is my duty to say that the purposes for which the movement of 1870 was undertaken, have met with some disappointment. I do not lay any stress on the fact that a certain class of the same men for whose political rights and privileges we rose up in 1870, and who then pressed our hands, called us their saviors and deliverers, and extolled to the skies the virtue of our moral courage for the right and our political independence, now, when we act upon the same principles, find no insinuation too mean and no abuse too gross to vilify us before the people in press and speech. Such obloquy, although intended to hurt, does but little if any injury to those against whom it is directed; but what may we think of the gentlemanly spirit of the men who descend to it? As for myself I cannot restrain a feeling of profound pity when beholding the spectacle of such conduct, and I turn with a sense of relief to the honorable men amongst them who have remained true to the nobler instincts of human nature.

But, while attaching little consequence to these personal matters, leaving everybody to be as much of a gentleman as he pleases—the welfare of the State is entitled to more serious consideration. We have a right to ask those of the Democratic party who for some years have controlled the government of Missouri, What have you done with that power which you derived from the unselfish and generous movement of 1870? How have you cultivated that fraternal feeling between the late enemies in war, now to be friends again; that feeling which prompted the

movement of 1870, and from which you derived your profit? What has become, under your rule, of that generous non-partisan spirit which in 1870 showed itself on our side ready to renounce party ascendancy that none of you might continue to suffer under the injustice of disfranchisement? What has become of good government in Missouri under your control?

Fraternal feeling! What spirit is it that now again boisterously appeals through the organ of your leading men to ceaseless yearnings for revenge? What spirit is it that thus sedulously strives to revive the bitterest passions of the civil war to new acrimony, after so generous a gage of reconciliation and friendship had been freely given you by men who held power and might have kept it? What spirit is it that in some counties of the State uses every means of private and official annoyance to make it uncomfortable for old Union men to live there, and to deter other Union men from coming there?

Mitigation of partisan spirit! What spirit is it which loudly proclaims through the organs of the same leading men that slavish obedience is the order of the day, and that the Democratic party will "slay" every man who has moral courage enough to utter an opinion of his own at variance with the despotic behests of party rule? What spirit is it that vociferously threatens St. Louis with deadly legislation if her citizens should dare to turn out any other than a Democratic majority—the same citizens of St. Louis whose political independence you praised when, in 1870, they gave an almost unprecedented majority against disfranchisement? What spirit is it which, in the first platform the Democratic party of Missouri has made alone since 1868, commits itself to the principle of repudiation, and thus seeks to ruin the credit and to tarnish the good name of the people of Missouri?

Good government! What has become of the reputa-

tion of the State under your rule, when the newspapers of the country East and West, as well as our own, are alive with accounts of highway robbery and murder in Missouri, which the government showed itself utterly impotent to repress and punish?

And here you will pardon me for taking notice of that somewhat amusing attempt made recently by partisan papers to charge me with defaming the State, and frightening away immigration, because I had in public speech called those occurrences disgraceful to Missouri, and had demanded that the people give themselves a government which will honestly and rigorously enforce the laws. I have been accused of having called Missouri the "robber State." I have to pronounce that utterly false. What I did say is this: The good citizens of Missouri have risen up to demand "that the scandalous and alarming brigandage and ruffianism which so long a time have been permitted to disgrace the fair name of this State shall at last be rooted out by the strong hand of power honestly wielded; that the farmer shall feel safe in the solitude of his forest or prairie home, and that the traveller on every high- and by-way of the State shall be without fear of assault and robbery; that the laws be enforced rigorously and impartially, without regard to person, to local prejudice or feeling, or to political influence—enforced not only in hollow profession but in honest fact." That is what I said, and that is all; and therefore a defamer of the State! Ah, it is rather a stale trick of demagogism to accuse those who denounce existing evils, and insist upon redress, of defaming the Commonwealth—a stale trick, I say, as old as demagogism itself. Already the Greeks and Romans knew it and buried it under contemptuous ridicule. What we see now is only a feeble posthumous imitation.

Why did you not tell us in 1870 not to expose the wrongs of disfranchisement lest we defame the State and

frighten Southern immigrants from our borders? Why do you not tell those who expose corruption in the National Government to stop lest they defame the United States and frighten away European immigration? Who defamed the State when to me in my seat in the Senate more than once some of my associates came with newspapers in their hands containing lengthy accounts of the shameless brigandage here, and when I was asked the question: "Have you no laws and no government in Missouri?"

Who was defaming the State, when even European journals printed accounts of the Gad's Hill robbery as a racy anecdote, to show their readers what things can be done in this commonwealth with impunity?

And now, accuse those of wronging the community who insist that such scandals be stopped! As the irony of accident would have it, one of the Democratic papers of this city, which had called me a slanderer in one issue, published in the very next two articles, one telling the story of a murderous assault and robbery committed by a band of masked brigands upon an emigrant camp in the western part of this State, and the other giving the details of two street broils in Lexington, in which two men were mortally and one slightly wounded. And these interesting pieces of information are now making the round of the American press. This was only last week. Who defamed the State? Who frightened away immigrants? And the same Democratic paper but recently spoke with a sort of approving and encouraging tenderness of the chivalrous habit of the "ruddy young fellows" to settle their difficulties by lustily pulling out their pistols or knives, and shooting or stabbing one another dead on the public streets.

This is not a matter to be trifled with, or to be slurred over by sneering at those who demand a remedy.

The question is, Have not these murders and highway robberies happened? Not I, but every man in the land who reads newspapers will answer that they have happened—not once, but time and time again. Have the perpetrators been arrested and punished? Not I, but every man in the land who keeps the run of current news answers that the perpetrators are at large, and are turning up every moment to do the same thing without being arrested, tried and punished. Has the power of the government been rigorously exerted to arrest this disgraceful scandal? The reading public all over the country remembers that the friends of the governor excused him for not acting efficiently, on the ground that he could not obtain the necessary aid from a legislature of his own party.

Has every political party in the State pronounced itself emphatically for a relentless suppression of these outrages and a vigorous enforcement of the laws? The whole country, reading the Democratic platform of Missouri, has learned that the Democratic party in State convention forgot all about it.

Is there not, in spite of this strange case of forgetfulness, at least a unanimous sentiment among the ruling party hostile to such disorders? The country learns that a leading organ of that party finds the young men who are "handy with knife and pistol," and shoot and stab to their hearts' content, rather a nice and desirable set of fellows, and almost the whole Democratic press lustily chimes in, calling a public slanderer and unworthy of regard every man who denounces those scandals and insists upon their repression.

Who defames the State now? Who frightens away immigration? In the first place, the men who committed the murders and robberies. In the second place, those wielding power, who so long suffered these things to be

done and repeated again and again with impunity. In the third place, the so far dominant party which deemed this crying evil so trifling, and its suppression so unimportant, that when it defined its policy it forgot all about it. And in the fourth place the newspapers and the men who denounce those as enemies of the State who acknowledge the evil and demand a remedy.

It avails you little to say that murders and robberies happen in other States and countries also, and in some of them still more than here. True there are more homicides in some of the Southern States and more brigandage in Italy. But I insist that whatever may be the condition of other States and countries, here in Missouri there is altogether too much of it; that it has prevented the immigration of farmers to our prairies; that it has discouraged orderly people who like the rule of law better than knives and revolvers from settling in our country towns; that it has depreciated the value of our lands; that it has hindered the progress and prosperity of the State, and that it is a dishonor to the whole Commonwealth.

This is a hard, undeniable fact, and if the Democratic party, as an organization, have no stomach to face it and provide a remedy, it is fortunate for the State of Missouri that there are other people, and among them many thousands of Democrats, who care more for the State than for the party.

And here, fellow-citizens, I can point with satisfaction to the redeeming feature of that condition of things in Missouri, which issued from the movement of 1870. That movement could not be destined to end in a revival of those animosities of past conflicts which it was designed to change into fraternal accord; in a partisan rule more intolerant and overbearing than that which preceded it; in a government recklessly unmindful of public peace and security. It could not end there, and I am happy and

proud to say it has not ended there. In spite of the reaction of the last few years that spirit of independent thought and courageous action which broke loose from radical party control to give their rights to the disfranchised, to the people friendly conciliation and to the Commonwealth good and impartial government, that spirit has after all borne most excellent fruit; for to-day we see it rising with fresh strength in the many thousands of men who on their part have broken loose from Democratic party control to preserve those blessings which the movement of 1870 did bring forth, and to secure those which it attempted but failed to secure. I never despaired of its ultimate success. It was natural, perhaps, that after having broken an overstrained partisan rule on one side, it should at first produce too great a rebound to the other. But I always trusted that at last it would bring us to a just equilibrium. Thus the work of 1874 is to be the completion of the work of 1870. All the good which was then accomplished will remain, and the evil consequences which then ensued shall now be remedied. That is the meaning of this campaign.

And to carry this work to a successful issue, the farmer is leaving his plow and the merchant his counting-room; the old Republican and the old Democrat are laying aside their differences of opinion to join hands as good citizens in a common effort. Hundreds and thousands of men, who, for many years, had devoted themselves exclusively to their pursuits or to the quiet enjoyments of private life, are stepping forward, once more exposing themselves to the buffets of political strife to give to our State the blessings of good government. Surely, no unworthy cause could have produced so inspiring an effect. And with the utmost candor I ask every patriotic citizen of Missouri, who has the welfare of our State sincerely at heart, can he find a better way to serve that welfare than by joining in this effort?

Is it not well, is it not absolutely necessary that the attempt be emphatically rebuked, which the Democratic organization is making, and which will succeed, if their candidates are elected, to commit the people of Missouri for the principle of repudiation as it stands in the Democratic platform—a commitment which cannot fail most grievously to injure us by creating general distrust in our honesty, to drive capital away from our borders, and to blacken the character of our Commonwealth? This most important consideration alone should decide the mind of every citizen who has any conception of his true interests.

Is it not necessary that we should put the power of the Government in the hands of men who will vigorously wield that power to punish and suppress brigandage and murder with a relentless hand, men who, unmoved by local sentiment or partisan bias, will lift up the authority of the law from its disgraceful impotency, and will make the officers of the law do their whole duty without fear or favor? Men who will never permit themselves to forget, nor be surrounded with influences which will make them forget, that the protection of life and property is one of the first duties of the Government, as the Democratic organization seem to have forgotten it?

Is it not well and necessary, especially in times of business stagnation and distress like these, to lighten the burdens weighing heavily upon the people by strict economy, to turn every dollar raised by taxation or derived as interest on public moneys to the benefit of the community, instead of making public officers rich, or even enabling political favorites to fatten still more upon the substance of the people, by increasing, as has been done, their already exorbitant perquisites?

Is it not well and necessary to break the despotic partisan rule which vociferously pronounces the sentence

of political death upon every man who dares to have an independent opinion; which insolently threatens the first commercial city of the State with injurious legislation, if the people of that city, true to their honest and patriotic impulses, refuse to work into the hands of partisan rings; and which, if permitted to continue in power, bids fair to spread a network of organization over the State which will make the government, with its power and emoluments, the monopoly of a few ring-masters, and against which the people then will struggle in vain?

Is it not well and necessary that those who still speak of "ceaseless yearnings for revenge" should be emphatically informed by our votes that, in the opinion of the people of Missouri, the war is over; that the people want those who once were enemies to be friends again, that in such a spirit they mean to enforce peace, order and impartial justice, and that they look upon every one who now, by insidious appeals, attempts to revive the old passions and resentments of the civil conflict as a reckless disturber, as an enemy of society?

And here I wish to address a word directly to the late Confederates among us. There is not one of you who can say that I, or those who thought and acted as I did, have been controlled by any prejudice or motive of hostility to you. You will scarcely deny that we have shown a very different spirit, and we did it, exposing ourselves to ill-will and vituperation on the part of many of those who had been our friends, and at the risk of our political fortunes. You were reinstated in the full exercise of your political rights, not by your own exertions, for you were powerless; nor by the Democratic party, for the Democratic party alone was powerless. You were so reinstated because there were Union men, Republicans, enough in Missouri, who, with the earnest determination to be just to you, defied all the prejudices still existing and all the political inter-

ests that were against you. The spirit of justice, and nothing else, made it possible for you to acquire the influence which you now possess. This is a matter of history.

I remind you of these things not in order to establish any personal claim on your gratitude. I have had too much experience in public life to ignore what such claims are worth, and on that score I hereby absolve every one of what, in a moment of sentimental emotion, he might have thought a personal obligation. But you cannot be absolved from your obligations to the welfare of the State.

I remind you of it for your own sakes, because it ought not to be lost sight of when you form your own opinion as to the attitude you should assume.

After all this has happened; after your former antagonists have given you the most conclusive proof, not only that they desired to bury forever all the animosities of the past, but also that they wanted you to enjoy all the rights and privileges they enjoyed, and that in no conceivable sense any discrimination should be made against you—after all this, and while there is not a Union man in Missouri who, in any competition of political or business life, attempts to make your position during the war a point against you—do you think it is quite right and quite wise that so many of you should make past service in the Union or the Confederate cause an issue against or for any man in private or political life? Is it quite right and wise, for instance, that your organs should excite prejudice and inflame animosity against such a man as Major Gentry, whom every one of you knows to be a gentleman of unspotted integrity, high character, an able mind and generous instincts, on the ground that as a Union man he performed the duties of an officer in a regiment of home guards? Is it quite right and wise, since the People's party have shown their spirit by nominating two Confed-

erates among their candidates for public position, you should make an issue against others which nobody makes against you, and you should be the first to rekindle again the old spirit of resentment?

I may be told that such are not the sentiments animating a majority of the Confederates in Missouri. I hope so, and nobody will be happier than I to acknowledge the fact. But if it be so, is it quite wise to permit your organs thus to misrepresent the majority and to carry on that most mischievous sort of agitation without an emphatic rebuke?

My action with regard to your rights may entitle me at least to speak a word of candid advice without appearing impertinent. A revival of the passions of the war, instigated by Confederates for their advantage, may turn out to be a two-edged weapon. It might in the course of time array all the old Union men on one side and the Confederates on the other. Certainly the old Union men would not be the weaker party, and the spirit animating that party would be according to the provocation.

I need not say, for I have given sufficient proof of my sentiments, that I should most heartily deplore such a division of elements as a great misfortune to all classes of our people, and I earnestly entreat the late Confederates to do nothing which might lead to it. As their friend I appeal to them to frown down among themselves every demagogue who urges them on in so mischievous, so suicidal a course.

You, Confederates, wanted to be received back in the body of citizens with the full rights of citizenship. We forgot the war. We gave you a welcome with open arms, without reserve, to be citizens with us—no less, no more. With your disfranchisement removed in such a manner as it was, ceased your right to regard yourselves as a separate class. Nobody threatens your rights. You

have no separate interests to bind you together in political action. The memories you have in common you may cultivate, as we cultivate ours, but you should not make them a political element, as we do not. You have no true interests of your own which are not the interests of every other citizen. Does not every patriotic instinct tell you it is time, and indeed, it is best for you, as it is best for all of us, that at last you should sink the Confederate in the citizen; that you should not keep alive distinctions which cannot be cultivated without injury to yourselves and to the common good; that as citizens you should make the public welfare your only object in political life, and at last throw off those partisan shackles which hinder you in doing so? That is a nobler, and surely a more useful ambition, than to wrangle among yourselves as to whose war record entitles him to the best office, or to make a point against an honorable man because he was an officer in the home guards.

What is there that can prevent any sincere man among you from joining our effort to give this State good government, when your own consciences must tell you that the partisan rule against which we have risen was an injury to the best interests of the State, and certainly no honor to those who supported it? What prevents you from doing what your own best instincts must prompt you to do?

Do you want to do something that will serve your friends in the South? Let me say to you that, better than by stubbornly perpetuating the evils under which this State suffers, will you serve them by giving them an example of wise discrimination, of courageous independence and of an enlightened public spirit. Show them that in your opinion the late Confederate should not be the last but the very first to seize with zeal and earnestness every opportunity to work for the common good, resolutely turning his back upon the past and throwing aside all the

small spite and petty ambitions of partisanship. Set them this example in such a manner that your Southern brethren cannot fail to see, to admire and to imitate it, and you will have rendered them a service of inestimable and lasting value. As we offered to the Confederates our hands in the work of 1870, so we offer them our hands once more for the completion of that work. It is not disfranchisement from which they are to be delivered, but they are to deliver themselves from a sinister party servitude, which stifles their noblest ambition and impairs their usefulness as citizens. Whether this advice be taken kindly or not, whether it be followed by many or few, the time will come when even those who now reject it will recognize it as the counsel of a true friend who was just to them when they needed it, and who now only calls upon them to be just to themselves.

But we, at least, my fellow-citizens, conscious of serving a good cause, will go forward with unfaltering courage and determination. Let the little tricks and squirmings of partisan spite or speculation, filling with noise the air around you, not disturb your equanimity. They have not repressed the People's movement in its rise, they will not hamper it in its progress. Every blow of intrigue or malice that was aimed at it has brought to its ranks scores of honest men whom we welcome with pride. Let not one of you be deterred from taking his stand boldly according to his sense of duty by the little arrows of abuse which may be shot at him. I have now been well-nigh twenty years more or less active in public life, and so often have I seen the same men cover me with obloquy one day and with lavish praise the next, so often have I been killed stone-dead politically and risen up again fully alive, that I can speak from experience: He who walks his path with unswerving fidelity to his convictions of right has nothing to fear. Malice always dies of its own

poison. Every unjust aspersion upon you will raise you in the esteem of a just community, as every mean attack upon a good cause will strengthen it by the disgust it excites.

I candidly believe the independent men of Missouri are strong enough to carry to a successful end the great task which they have undertaken, the task of completing the work of 1870. They will inscribe upon the annals of this State a lesson which the politicians of this generation will remember as long as they live: That no political party, whatever its name or fame, however strong in numbers or compact in organization, can in this State abuse its power, without provoking an uprising of patriotic and independent men that will overthrow it. Such a lesson vigorously taught will be for all the future an inestimable blessing. This blessing alone is worth all the exertion to which this hour summons you. And when that victory is achieved, which can scarcely fail us, if every true man does his duty, then it may well be said again that the people of Missouri are governing themselves. We shall by the honest independence of our public spirit have set to the country an example how without partisanship the welfare of all may be served. And Missouri will stand before the world with lawlessness suppressed, and repudiation repudiated, a Commonwealth proud of its integrity, hopeful in its assured progress and strong in the courageous patriotism of its citizens.

TO SAMUEL BOWLES

OSWEGO, N. Y., Nov. 27, 1874.

Friend Bowles: Thanks for your kind letter. I regret to say that it will be impossible for me to call on you at Springfield before the meeting of Congress, although I should be no less glad than you say you would be if we

could have a good hard-pan talk. The nearest I shall get to you will be on Thursday, Dec. 3rd, when I shall lecture at Albany, arriving there at 2.20 P.M. from Batavia; and after that two more appointments on my way to Washington.

I should like to consult you on something which is occupying my mind very much. After the close of my Senatorial career I intend to devote myself wholly to literary work, and, if I am able, to do something that will last. A publisher in Philadelphia recently made a proposition to me to write a "Political History of the United States," which he wanted to have in the market in the year '76,—a sort of Centennial business. That, of course, cannot be done, but in thinking the matter over, I have become convinced that there is room for such a work, and I have pretty well made up my mind to undertake it. Can you inform me, which is the best publishing firm in Boston that can be depended upon not only to put out such a work in good shape, but also to "make it go"?

I should prefer to have a publisher in Boston, because it is quite probable that much of the work, which will require several years of steady labor, will be done in the literary atmosphere and near the great libraries of Boston, and it is a great convenience to be in close and constant communication with the publisher. In fact, my family like St. Louis so little and Boston so much—and the latter predilection I share with them—that it would not be surprising at all, if my exit from public life and my entrance upon serious literary pursuits should eventually, and perhaps very soon, result in a permanent residence under the shadow of the pine tree, since political considerations will be no longer of importance, and I think I can arrange my affairs accordingly. Of course, there is nothing certain about it, and I speak of this only in strict confidence between you and me. What do you say to that? . . .

FROM SAMUEL BOWLES

SPRINGFIELD, MASS., Dec. 3, 1874.

My dear Schurz: A political history of the United States is really greatly needed. Only a week ago we talked of it at the Bird Club dinner—the lack of such a book, the great need of one for young men. You are the best man I know of to write it. At Boston, Osgood & Co., or Lee & Shepard would perhaps be the best publishers; at New York, Appleton & Co., or, possibly, the Harpers.

I cannot bear to think of your retiring from public life. I don't believe you will. If you do, we shall be delighted to have you come to Massachusetts to live. If you were here now we could elect you Senator, just as easy!

I think it might well be a question, coming here, whether you would live in Cambridge or Concord or Boston, or whether you would n't select one of our provincial cities, like Springfield, or towns like Northampton. In the latter, you would have, in many respects, a more individual, independent position. In Boston and its vicinity, it is somehow very provincial and narrowing. All the clever fellows who settle down and around there are very apt to get into narrowing grooves. I believe it is a fact that Western Massachusetts is broader, more liberal, more individual and independent in thought, than the larger population and greater apparent activity of the eastern part of the State. However, all this is a nice question, hardly worth your bothering yourself about. Only come to us, if you can, and be assured of a most hearty welcome. . . .

MILITARY INTERFERENCE IN LOUISIANA¹

MR. PRESIDENT:—I beg the Senate to believe me when I say that I approach this subject in no partisan spirit.

¹ Speech in the U. S. Senate, Jan. 11, 1875. The Senate had just agreed to take up the following resolution which Schurz had offered a few days before: "*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire what legislation by Congress is necessary to secure to the people of the State of Louisiana their rights of self-government under the Constitution, and to report with the least possible delay by bill or otherwise."

About to retire to private station, the success of no party can benefit and the defeat of no party can injure me, except in those interests which I have in common with all American citizens, whose own and whose children's fortunes are bound up in the fortunes of the Republic. I have formed my opinions with deliberation and impartiality, and I shall endeavor to express them in the calmest and most temperate language at my command. The subject is so great that passion or prejudice should certainly have no share in our judgment.

I must confess that the news that came from Louisiana a few days ago has profoundly alarmed me. A thing has happened which never happened in this country before, and which nobody, I trust, ever thought possible.

In the debates of last week it was frequently said that no expression of opinion upon that occurrence would be quite legitimate until an official report setting forth all the details of fact should be before us. I do not quite think so. All the important circumstances of the case have come to our knowledge through a multitude of concurrent statements, among them an elaborate dispatch of General Sheridan, statements from Mr. Kellogg and Mr. Wiltz, and numerous reports in the newspapers of the country, all agreeing upon the essential points. I believe the additional details which still can be furnished will not change the aspect of the case as to its real significance. The facts as they appear are the following:

On the 4th of January the legislature of Louisiana was to assemble and organize in the statehouse of that State. It did so assemble at the time and in the place fixed by law. The statehouse was surrounded by armed forces, among them troops of the United States. The legislature assembled "without any disturbance of the public peace," in the language of General Sheridan. The clerk of the late house of representatives called it to order, he called the

roll of its members according to the list furnished by the returning board fixed by law. A legal quorum answered to their names. While the result was being announced, a motion was made by a member, Mr. Bellew, to appoint L. A. Wiltz temporary speaker. That motion was put and declared carried; not, however, by the clerk of the late house. Mr. Wiltz took possession of the chair; the oath of office was administered to him by Justice Houston, and he then administered the oath to the members returned. A motion was made to appoint a certain gentleman clerk and another sergeant-at-arms of the assembly. The motion was put and declared carried. A resolution was then offered to admit the following persons to seats in the legislature: Charles Schuyler and John Scales, of De Soto Parish; James Brice, Jr., of Bienville Parish; C. C. Dunn, of Grant Parish, and George A. Kelly, of the parish of Winn.

The status of these persons was the following: The returning board of Louisiana had declined to pass judgment upon the elections in the parishes named and expressly referred the claims of the five persons whose names I have mentioned to the legislature itself for adjudication, thus distinctly recognizing the possibility of their being legally elected members of that legislature. The question on the resolution to seat them was put and declared carried, thus admitting them to seats subject to further contest. They were sworn in.

A motion was made to proceed to the election of permanent officers. L. A. Wiltz was nominated for the speakership by the conservatives, and M. Hahn and C. W. Lowell by the Republicans. Mr. Lowell declined. The motion was declared carried. The roll was called, and 55 votes were cast for Mr. Wiltz as speaker, 2 votes for Mr. Hahn, a legal quorum voting, and 14 members, as is reported, not voting at all. Mr. Wiltz was sworn in, and the roll being

called the members were sworn in by him at the speaker's stand, among them 5 Republican members, Hahn, Baker, Drury, Murrell and Thomas, who participated in the proceedings. A permanent clerk and sergeant-at-arms were likewise declared elected upon motion. Mr. Wiltz as speaker then announced the house permanently organized and ready for business. Upon the motion of Mr. Dupre, a committee of seven on elections and returns was appointed.

In the meantime considerable disturbance and confusion had arisen in the lobby which the sergeant-at-arms seemed unable to suppress. Mr. Wiltz, the speaker, then sent for General De Trobriand, of the United States Army, who some time previous had occupied the statehouse with his soldiers, and requested him to speak to the disorderly persons in the lobby that a conflict might be prevented. The General did so, and order was restored. The house proceeded then with its business. The committee on elections and returns reported, and upon their report the following persons were seated as members and sworn in: John A. Quinn, of the parish of Avoyelles; J. J. Horan, A. D. Land and James R. Vaughan, of the parish of Caddo; J. Jeffries, R. L. Luckett and G. W. Stafford, of the parish of Rapides; and William H. Schwing, of the parish of Iberia. Then, at three o'clock in the afternoon, General De Trobriand, of the United States Army, entered the legislative hall of Louisiana in full uniform, with his sword by his side, and accompanied by two members of his staff and Mr. Vigers, clerk of the late house of representatives; and he exhibited to the gentleman presiding over the house the following documents:

STATE OF LOUISIANA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
NEW ORLEANS, Jan. 4.

GENERAL DE TROBRIAND, *Commanding*:

An illegal assembly of men having taken possession of the hall of the house of representatives, and the police not being

able to dislodge them, I respectfully request that you will immediately clear the hall and statehouse of all persons not returned as legal members of the house of representatives by the returning board of the State.

WM. P. KELLOGG,
Governor of the State of Louisiana.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
NEW ORLEANS, Jan. 4.

GENERAL DE TROBRIAND:

The clerk of the house, who has in his possession the roll issued by the secretary of state of legal members of the house of representatives, will point out to you those persons now in the hall of the house of representatives returned by the legal returning board of the State.

WM. P. KELLOGG,
Governor of the State.

When these documents were exhibited to him, the chair refused to allow Mr. Vigers to read them to the house and to call the roll of members, so that those designated in Governor Kellogg's letter might be discovered; whereupon General De Trobriand, of the United States Army, had pointed out to him by one Hugh J. Campbell and one T. C. Anderson the persons holding seats to be ejected; and those persons refusing to go out, a file of United States soldiers was brought into action, who with fixed bayonets stood in that legislative hall, seized the persons pointed out to them and against their protest ejected them by force from their seats in the legislature of that State. And who were those persons?

When the legislature convened—and, I repeat, it convened according to law, at the time and in the place fixed by law, called to order by the very officer designated by law—those persons were claimants for seats on the ground of the votes they had received; some of them presenting

claims so strong, on the ground of majorities so large, that even such a returning board as Louisiana had, did not dare to decide against them; and when they had been seated in the legislature, organized as I have described, United States soldiers with fixed bayonets decided the case against them and took them out of the legislative hall by force. When that had been done the conservative members left that hall in a body with a solemn protest. The United States soldiery kept possession of it; and then, under their protection, the Republicans organized the legislature to suit themselves.

This is what happened in the statehouse of Louisiana on the 4th day of January.

Sir, there is one thing which every free people living under a constitutional government watches with peculiar jealousy as the most essential safeguard of representative institutions. It is the absolute freedom of legislative bodies from interference on the part of executive power, especially by force. Therefore, in a truly constitutional government, may the proceedings of the legislature be good or ever so bad, is such interference, especially as concerns the admission of its own members, most emphatically condemned and most carefully guarded against, whether it proceed from a governor or from a president or from a king, under whatever circumstances, on whatever pretexts. And whenever such interference is successfully carried out, it is always, and justly, looked upon as a sure sign of the decline of free institutions.

There is another thing which especially the American people hold sacred as the life element of their republican freedom: It is the right to govern and administer their local affairs independently through the exercise of that self-government which lives and has its being in the organism of the States; and therefore we find in the Constitution of the Republic the power of the National

Government to interfere in State affairs most scrupulously limited to certain well-defined cases and the observance of certain strictly-prescribed forms; and if these limitations be arbitrarily disregarded by the National authority, and if such violation be permitted by the Congress of the United States, we shall surely have reason to say that our system of republican government is in danger.

We are by the recent events in Louisiana forced to inquire how the cause of local self-government and of legislative privilege stands in the United States to-day. Before laying their hands upon things so important, so sacred, the authorities should certainly have well assured themselves that they have the clearest, the most obvious, the most unequivocal, the most unquestionable warrant of law. Where, I ask, is that warrant? In the Constitution of the United States we find but one sentence referring to the subject. It says in the fourth section of the fourth article:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.

So far the Constitution. There are two statutes prescribing the mode in which this is to be done, one passed in 1795 and the other in 1807. The former provides that "in case of insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) to call upon the militia of other States to suppress the insurrection." The statute of 1807 authorizes the President to employ the regular Army and Navy for

the same purpose, provided, however, that he "has first observed all the prerequisites of the law."

Had in this case the circumstances so described occurred, and were "all the prerequisites of the law" observed? There had been an insurrection in Louisiana on the 14th of September, 1874, an insurrection against the State government recognized by the President of the United States. That State government had been overthrown by the insurgents. The President, having been called upon by Acting Governor Kellogg, issued his proclamation commanding the insurgents to desist. They did so desist at once, and the Kellogg government was restored without a struggle, and has not been attacked since. The insurrection, as such, was totally ended. On the 4th of January nobody pretends that there was any insurrection. The State of Louisiana was quiet. The statehouse was surrounded by the armed forces of Governor Kellogg. Those forces were not resisted; their services were not even called into requisition. There was certainly no demand upon the President for military interference by the legislature; neither was there by the Governor "in case the legislature could not be convened," for the legislature did convene without any obstruction at the time and in the place fixed by law, and was called to order by the officer designated by law. And yet, there being neither insurrection nor domestic violence, there being neither a call for military interference upon the President by the legislature nor by the governor "in case the legislature could not be convened," there being, therefore, not the faintest shadow of an observance of "all the prerequisites of the law" as defined in the statute, the troops of the United States proceeded, not against an insurrection, not against a body of men committing domestic violence, but against a legislative body sitting in the statehouse; and the soldiers of the United States

were used to execute an order from the governor determining what persons should sit in that legislature as its members and what persons should be ejected. I solemnly ask what provision is there in the Constitution, what law is there on the statute-book furnishing a warrant for such a proceeding?

It is said in extenuation of the interference of the military power of the United States in Louisiana that the persons ejected from that legislature by the Federal soldiers were not legally-elected members of that body. Suppose that had been so; but that is not the question. The question is, where is the Constitutional principle, where is the law authorizing United States soldiers, with muskets in their hands, to determine who is a legally-elected member of a State legislature and who is not?

It is said that the mode of organizing that legislature was not in accordance with the statutes of the State. Suppose that had been so; but that is not the question. The question is, where is the Constitutional or legal warrant for the bayonets of the Federal soldiery to interpret the statutes of a State as against the legislature of that State, and to decide in and for the legislature a point of parliamentary law?

It is said that the governor requested the aid of United States soldiers to purge the legislature of members he styled illegal. That may be so; but that is not the question. The question is, where is the law authorizing United States soldiers to do the bidding of a State governor who presumes to decide what members sitting in a legislature regularly convened at the time and place fixed by law are legally elected members?

It is said the trouble was threatening between contending parties in Louisiana. Suppose that had been so; but that is not the question. The question is, where is the law from which the National Government, in case of

threatening trouble in a State, derives its power to invade the legislative body of the State by armed force, and to drag out persons seated there as members, that others may take their places? Where is that law, I ask? You will search the Constitution, you will search the statutes in vain.

I cannot, therefore, escape from the deliberate conviction, a conviction conscientiously formed, that the deed done on the 4th January in the statehouse of the State of Louisiana by the military forces of the United States constitutes a gross and manifest violation of the Constitution and the laws of this Republic. We have an act before us indicating a spirit in our Government which either ignores the Constitution and the laws or so interprets them that they cease to be the safeguard of the independence of legislation and of the rights and liberties of our people. And that spirit shows itself in a shape more alarming still in the instrument the Executive has chosen to execute his behests.

Sir, no American citizen can have read without profound regret and equally profound apprehension the recent despatch of General Sheridan to the Secretary of War, in which he suggests that a numerous class of citizens should by the wholesale be outlawed as banditti by a mere proclamation of the President, to be turned over to him as a military chief, to meet at his hands swift justice by the verdict of a military commission. Nobody respects General Sheridan more than I do for the brilliancy of his deeds on the field of battle; the nation has delighted to honor his name. But the same nation would sincerely deplore to see the hero of the ride to Winchester and of the charge at the Five Forks stain that name by an attempt to ride over the laws and the Constitution of the country, and to charge upon the liberties of his fellow-citizens. The policy he has proposed is so

appalling, that every American citizen who loves his liberty stands aghast at the mere possibility of such a suggestion being addressed to the President of the United States by a high official of the Government. It is another illustration how great a man may be as a soldier, and how conspicuously unable to understand what civil law and what a constitution mean; how glorious in fighting for you, and how little fit to govern you! And yet General Sheridan is not only kept in Louisiana as the instrument of the Executive will, but after all that has happened, encouraged by the emphatic approval of the Executive branch of this Government.

I repeat, sir, all these things have alarmed me, and it seems not me alone. In all parts of the country the press is giving voice to the same feeling, and what I learn by private information convinces me that the press is by no means exaggerating the alarm of the people. On all sides you can hear the question asked, "If this can be done in Louisiana, and if such things be sustained by Congress, how long will it be before it can be done in Massachusetts and in Ohio? How long before the Constitutional rights of all the States and the self-government of all the people may be trampled under foot? How long before a general of the Army may sit in the chair you occupy, sir, to decide contested-election cases for the purpose of manufacturing a majority in the Senate? How long before a soldier may stalk into the National House of Representatives, and, pointing to the Speaker's mace, say, 'Take away that bauble'?"

Mr. President, these fears may appear wild and exaggerated, and perhaps they are; and yet these are the feelings you will hear expressed when the voice of the people penetrates to you. But I ask you, my associates in this body, in all soberness, can you tell me what will be impossible to-morrow if this was possible yesterday?

Who is there among us who but three years ago would have expected to be called upon to justify the most gross and unjustifiable usurpation of Judge Durell and the President's enforcement of it as the legitimate and lawful origin of a State government? And who of you, when permitting that to be done, would have expected to see the United States soldiery marched into the hall of a State legislature to decide its organization? Permit that to-day, and who of you can tell me what we shall be called upon, nay, what we may be forced to permit to-morrow?

You cannot but feel that we have arrived at a crisis in our affairs, and I will not conceal from you that I cannot contemplate that crisis without grave apprehension; for what has happened already makes me look forward with anxiety to what may be still in store for us. We are evidently—and I say it with calmness and deliberation—on the downward slope, and the question is, where shall we land. It is not, indeed, the success of any Napoleonic ambitions in this country that I fear, for if such ambitions existed they would still have an American and not a French people to encounter. But what I do see reason to fear if we continue on our course is this: that our time-honored Constitutional principles will be gradually obliterated by repeated abuses of power establishing themselves as precedents; that the machinery of administration may become more and more a mere instrument of “ring” rule, a tool to manufacture majorities and to organize plunder; and that finally, in the hollow shell of republican forms, this Government will become the mere foot-ball of rapacious and despotic factions. That, sir, is what I do fear.

Let us see how the drift of things has carried us on in that direction. I must confess I have long considered our policy concerning the South as one fraught with great danger, not only danger to the South but danger to the whole Republic. I have therefore opposed it step by

step and warned you of its inevitable consequences. I know full well that Southern society has been, and in a measure is, disturbed by violent tendencies and by deplorable, sometimes bloody disorders. I have never denied it, and nobody has more earnestly condemned and denounced those disorders than I. Time and again have I appealed to all patriotic men in the South to use their utmost efforts to secure peace, order and public safety among their people. Those disorders I would be the last man to palliate or excuse; but I also believe that they were in a great measure the offspring of circumstances and to be expected.

When the war closed a great revolution had suddenly transformed, among general distress and confusion, the whole organism of Southern society. Not only was that system of labor uprooted with which the Southern people had for centuries considered their whole productive wealth and prosperity identified, but by the enfranchisement of the colored people, that class of society which had just emerged from slavery, with all its ignorance, (and let me say for that ignorance they were by no means themselves responsible,) was suddenly clothed with political power, and in some States with overruling political power. That power was called into play at a time when, after the sweeping destruction and desolation of the war, the South was most in need of a wise coöperation of all its social forces to heal its wounds and to lift it up from its terrible prostration.

Surely, sir, the justice of the Constitutional amendments, designed to secure to the slave his freedom and to enable the colored people to maintain their rights through active participation in the functions of self-government, I shall be the last man to question, for I aided in passing them. Neither is that the legitimate subject of this debate. But as all these tremendous transformations came at a time

when the turbulence of armed conflicts had scarcely subsided, when ancient prejudices had not yet cooled, when the bitterness of the war was still fresh and when the hope of other solutions was still lingering among the Southern people, it was most deplorable indeed, but not at all surprising, that great disorders should have occurred. No such changes have ever been made in any free country without such disorders; and it was the business of statesmanship to deal with them. It was a great problem and perhaps the most critical in the history of this country, for it was to overcome resistance and disturbance by means sufficiently effectual without at the same time developing an arbitrary spirit of power dangerous to our free institutions.

When the Constitutional amendments fixing the results of the war and the status of the different classes of society had become assured, there were two methods presenting themselves to you to accomplish that end. One was suggested by the very nature of republican institutions. It was to trust the discovery and the development of the remedies for existing evils, as soon as the nature of circumstances would permit, to that agency upon which, after all, our republican Government must depend for its vitality, namely, the self-government of the people in the States. It was to inspire that local self-government with healthy tendencies by doing all within your power to make the Southern people, not only those who had profited by the great revolution in acquiring their freedom, but also those who had suffered from it, reasonably contented in their new situation. Such a policy required an early and complete removal of all those political disabilities which restrained a large and influential number of white people from a direct participation in the government of their local affairs, while the colored people were exercising it. That policy did, indeed, not preclude the

vigorous execution of Constitutional and just laws; and you will not understand me as thus designating all the laws that were made; but it did preclude the employment of the powers conferred by such laws for purposes of a partisan color calculated to impeach the impartiality of the National Government and thus to injure its moral authority. It did preclude, above all things, every unconstitutional stretch of interference, which by its insidious example is always calculated to encourage and excite a lawless and revolutionary spirit among all classes of society. That policy required that the National Government in all its branches should have sternly discountenanced the adventurers and bloodsuckers who preyed upon the Southern people, so as not to appear as their ally and protector. It required a conscientious employment of all those moral influences which the National Government had at its command. It was natural, in the distress and confusion which followed the war, that the Southern people, white as well as black, should have turned their eyes to the National Government for aid and guidance; and that aid and guidance might have been given, not in impeding and baffling, but in encouraging self-government to fulfil its highest aims and duties. Every Federal office in the South should have been carefully filled with the very wisest and the very best man that could be discovered for it. Nowhere in the vast boundaries of this Republic was the personal character of the Federal officer of higher importance, for being clothed by his very connection with the National Government with extraordinary moral authority, every one of them could without undue interference with local concerns, by the very power of his advice and example, make that moral influence most beneficially felt among all his surroundings.

Sir, I am not sanguine enough to believe that if such a policy had been followed local self-government would

at once have made every Southern State a perfect model of peace and order. I know it would not; but it is my solemn conviction that it would have been infinitely more productive of good, it would have been infinitely more effective in gradually developing a satisfactory state of things than all your force laws, all the efforts of Government officers to maintain their party ascendancy, all the usurpations and military interferences in the same direction. And above all things, such a policy would have left those principles intact which are the life of Constitutional government. It would have spared us such a painful spectacle as that which we are to-day beholding in Louisiana. It would have relieved the American people of the anxious inquiry you hear on all sides to-day, "What is now to become of the character of our republican Government." It was the policy naturally suggested by the teachings of our institutions; it was the true republican, American policy.

But there presented itself to you also another method of dealing with the violent and disorderly tendencies in the South. It was, whenever and wherever a disturbance occurred, to use at once brute force in sufficient strength to repress it; to employ every means to keep in every State your partisans in place, and to trample down all opposition, no matter what stretch of power it might require, no matter what Constitutional restriction of authority might have to be broken through. Such a method, if supported by a military force sufficiently strong, may also be made quite effective, for a time at least. Thus you might have brought every malefactor in the South to swift justice. Wherever three of your opponents met, you might have styled them an unlawful combination of banditti, and had the offenders promptly punished. You might have maintained in governmental power in the South whomsoever of your party you liked. You might have made every

colored man perfectly safe, not only in the exercise of his franchise but in everything else. You might have struck with terror not only the evil-doers but honest persons also, all over the land. You might have made the National Government so strong that, right or wrong, nobody could resist it.

This is also an effective method to keep peace and order, and it works admirably well as long as it lasts. It is employed with singular success in Russia, and may be in other countries. But, sir, if you by such means had secured the safety of those who were disturbed or considered in danger, would you not, after all, have asked yourselves what has in the meantime become of the liberties and rights of all of us? That method would have been effective for its purpose, but it would have been a cruel stroke of irony after all this to call this still a republic.

I do not mean to insinuate to you, Republican Senators, that you wanted to do that. I know you did not. You did not intend to employ such means, and you would have recoiled from such a result. You tried a middle course. You respected the self-government of the States in point of form; but while you and the Executive omitted to use all those moral influences which would have inspired that self-government with the healthy tendencies I spoke of, you did make laws conferring upon the National Government dangerous powers and of very doubtful Constitutionality; at least that was my conviction, and I opposed them. The effect was very deplorable in several ways. Look around you and contemplate what followed. Your partisans in the Southern States and among them the greediest and corruptest of the kind, began to look up to Congress and the National Executive as their natural allies and sworn protectors, bound to sustain them in power under whatever circumstances. Every vagabond in the South calling himself a Republican thought

himself entitled to aid from you when rushing up to Congress with an outrage story. The colored people began to think that you were bound to aid them in whatever they might do, instead of depending upon a prudent and honest use of their own political rights to establish their own position. The Federal officeholders in the South became more than ever the center of partisan intrigue and trickery. The Caseys and Packards carried off State senators in United States revenue-cutters, and held Republican conventions in United States customhouses, guarded by United States soldiers to prevent other Republican factions from interfering. Nay, more than that, the same Packard, during the last election campaign in Louisiana, being at the same time United States marshal and chairman of Kellogg's campaign committee, managed not only the political campaign but also the movements of the United States dragoons to enforce the laws and to keep his political opponents from "intimidating" his political friends. More than that, in one State after another in the South we saw enterprising politicians start rival legislatures and rival governments, much in the way of Mexican *pronunciamientos*, calculating on the aid to be obtained from the National Government; the Attorney-General of the United States called upon to make or unmake governors of States by the mere wave of his hand, and the Department of Justice almost appearing like the central bureau for the regulation of State elections. And still more than that, we saw a Federal judge in Louisiana, by a midnight order, universally recognized as a gross and most unjustifiable usurpation, virtually making a State government and legislature, and the National Executive with the Army sustaining that usurpation and Congress permitting it to be done.

And now the culminating glory to-day—I do not know whether it will be the culminating glory to-morrow:

Federal soldiers with fixed bayonets marching into the legislative hall of a State and invading the legislature assembled in the place and at the time fixed by law, dragging out of the body by force men universally recognized as claimants for membership, and having been seated; soldiers deciding contested-election cases and organizing a legislative body; the Lieutenant-General suggesting to the President to outlaw by proclamation a numerous class of people by the wholesale that he may try them by drum-head court-martial, and then the Secretary of War informing the Lieutenant-General by telegraph that "all of us," the whole Government, have full confidence in his judgment and wisdom. And after all this the whites of the South gradually driven to look upon the National Government as their implacable and unscrupulous enemy, and the people of the whole country full of alarm and anxiety about the safety of republican institutions and the rights of every man in the land.

Ah, Senators, you did not mean this, I trust; but there it is. Not a single one of these things has happened without exciting in your hearts an emotion of regret and anxiety, and the wish that nothing similar should come again; but you followed step by step, reluctantly, very reluctantly, perhaps, but you followed, and you know not where you may have to go unless now at last you make a stand. You did not mean this. You meant only to protect colored men in their rights and to this end to keep your friends in power. You did not mean to do it by the Russian method, but from small beginnings something has grown up, something that is of near kin to it. A few steps further and you may have the whole. Senators, if you do not mean to go on, then I say to you it is the highest time to turn back. It will not do to permit such things to be done as we now behold, without rebuke and resistance, for to permit them is to urge them on.

I have heard it said here that he who justifies murders in the South is the accomplice of the murderer. Be it so; but consider also that he who in a place like ours fails to stop, or even justifies a blow at the fundamental laws of the land, makes himself the accomplice of those who strike at the life of the Republic and at the liberties of the people.

Above all things, gentlemen, indulge in no delusions as to the consequences of your doings. Be bold enough to look this great question for one moment squarely in the face. If you really think that the peace and order of society in this country can no longer be maintained through the self-government of the people under the Constitution and the impartial enforcement of Constitutional laws; if you really think that this old machinery of free government can no longer be trusted with its most important functions, and that such transgressions on the part of those in power as now pass before us are right and necessary for the public welfare, then, gentlemen, admit that this Government of the people, for the people and by the people is a miscarriage. Admit that the hundredth anniversary of this Republic must be the confession of its failure, and make up your minds to change the form as well as the nature of our institutions; for to play at republic longer would then be a cruel mockery. But I entreat you, do not delude yourselves and others with the thought that by following the fatal road upon which we now are marching you can still preserve those institutions; for I tell you, and the history of struggling mankind bears me out, where the forms of constitutional government can be violated with impunity, there the spirit of constitutional government will soon be dead. Who does not know that republics will be sometimes the theater of confusion, disturbance and violent transgressions; more frequently, perhaps, than monarchies governed by strong despotic rule. The citizens of a republic have to pay some price

for the great boon of their common liberty. But do we not know, also, or have we despaired of it, that in a republic remedies for such evils can be found in entire consonance with the spirit and form of republican institutions and of constitutional government? Let nobody suspect me of favoring or excusing disorder or violent transgressions; nothing could be farther from me. But I have not despaired of the efficiency of our republican institutions. I insist that they do furnish effective remedies for existing evils.

But, sir, pusillanimous indeed and dangerous to republican institutions is that statesmanship which, to repress transgressions and secure the safety of some, can devise only such means as by violating constitutional principles will endanger the liberty of all. You say that it is one of the first duties of the Government to protect the lives, the property and the rights of the citizen, and so it is; but it is also the first duty of a constitutional government carefully to abstain from employing for that protection such means as will in the end place the lives and property and rights of the citizens at the mercy of arbitrary power. Let a policy forgetting this great obligation be adopted and followed, and free institutions will soon be on the downward road in this country, as they have been before to-day in so many others. Have we read the history of the downfall of republics in vain? It teaches us a most intelligible and a fearful lesson. It is this: usurpers or blunderers in power pretend that the safety and order of society cannot be maintained by measures within the form of constitution and law, and lawyers employ their wits to justify usurpation by quibbling on technicalities or by pleading the necessities of the case. What first appears as an isolated and comparatively harmless fact is by repetition developed into a system, and there is the end of constitutional government.

Let us not close our ears to the teachings of centuries, for if we do a repentance of centuries may be in vain.

I repeat, republican institutions and self-government have remedies to right the wrongs occurring, and if left to their legitimate action, they will prove far more efficient to that end than the arbitrary measures we are now witnessing. What is it, I ask Republican Senators, that you desire to accomplish in the South? Being honest patriots, having only the welfare of the people and not selfish partisan advantage at heart, you will desire this: that in the South peace and order should prevail and that every citizen may be protected and his life and property and rights, and that to this end a patriotic and enlightened public sentiment should develop itself strong enough to prevent or repress violence and crime through the ordinary ways of legal self-government; and if this be accomplished, no matter under what partisan auspices it be, then every good citizen, every patriot, will have reason to rejoice.

Look at the condition of the Southern States. I well remember the time, not a great many years ago, when the State of Virginia was said to be in so alarming a condition—and I remember prominent Republicans of the State hanging around this body to convince us of it—that in case the conservatives should obtain control of the State government the streets and fields of Virginia would run with blood. So it was predicted of North Carolina, and so of Georgia; and, indeed, I deny it not, there were very lamentable disorders in many of those States during the first years after the war. Now, sir, what was the remedy? You remember what policy was urged with regard to Georgia. It was to prolong the existence of Governor Bullock's legislature for two years beyond its constitutional term, to strengthen the power of that Governor Bullock, that champion plunderer of Georgia, who not long after-

ward had to run from the clutches of justice; and unless that were done it was loudly predicted upon this floor there would be a carnival of crime and a sea of blood!

Well, sir, it was not done. The people of those States gradually recovered the free exercise of their self-government, and what has been the result? Virginia is to-day as quiet and orderly a State as she ever was, I think fully as quiet and orderly as most other States, and every citizen is securely enjoying his rights. And who will deny that in North Carolina and Georgia an improvement has taken place, standing in most glaring contrast with the fearful predictions made by the advocates of Federal interference? And that most healthy improvement is sustained in those States under and by the self-government of the people thereof. This is a matter of history, unquestioned and unquestionable. And that improvement will proceed further under the same self-government of the people as society becomes more firmly settled in its new conditions and as it is by necessity led to recognize more clearly the dependence of its dearest interests on the maintenance of public order and safety. That is the natural development of things.

It will help the Senator from Indiana [Mr. MORTON] little to say that, with all this, the Republican vote has greatly fallen off in Georgia, and that this fact is conclusive proof of a general system of intimidation practiced upon the negroes there. It is scarcely worth while that I should repeat here the unquestionably truthful statement which has been made, that the falling off of the negro vote is in a great measure accounted for by the non-payment of the colored people of the school tax upon which their right to vote depended. I might add that perhaps the same causes which brought forth a considerable falling off in the Republican vote in a great many other States, such as Indiana and Massachusetts and New York, pro-

duced the same result in Georgia also, and that the same motives which produced a change in the political attitude of whites may have acted also upon the blacks. Is not this possible? Why not? But I ask you, sir, what kind of logic, what statesmanship is it we witness so frequently on this floor, which takes the statistics of population of a State in hand and then proceeds to reason thus: So many colored people, so many white, therefore so many colored votes and so many white votes; and therefore so many Republican votes and so many Democratic votes; and if an election does not show this exact proposition, it must be necessarily the result of fraud and intimidation and the National Government must interfere. When we have established the rule that election returns must be made or corrected according to the statistics of population, then we may decide elections beforehand by the United States Census and last year's *Tribune Almanac*, and save ourselves the trouble of voting.

Intimidation of voters! I doubt not, sir, there has been much of it, very much. There has been much of it by terrorism, physical and moral, much by the discharge of employés from employment for political cause, but, I apprehend, not all on one side. I shall be the last man on earth to say a word of excuse for the Southern ruffian who threatens a negro voter with violence to make him vote the conservative ticket. I know no language too severe to condemn his act. But I cannot forget, and it stands vividly in my recollection, that the only act of terrorism and intimidation I ever happened to witness with my own eyes was the cruel clubbing and stoning of a colored man in North Carolina in 1872 by men of his own race, because he had declared himself in favor of the conservatives; and if the whole story of the South were told it would be discovered that such a practice has by no means been infrequent.

But there was intimidation of another kind.

I cannot forget the spectacle of Marshal Packard, with the dragoons of the United States at the disposition of the chairman of the Kellogg campaign committee at the late election in Louisiana, riding through the State with a full assortment of warrants in his hands arresting whomsoever he listed. I cannot forget that as to the discharge of laborers from employment for political cause a most seductive and demoralizing example is set by the very highest authority in the land. While we have a law on our statute-book declaring the intimidation of voters by threatened or actual discharge from employment a punishable offense, it is the notorious practice of the Government of the United States to discharge every one of its employes who dares to vote against the Administration party; and that is done North and South, East and West, as far as the arm of that Government reaches. I have always condemned the intimidation of voters in every shape, and therefore I have been in favor of a genuine civil service reform. But while your National Government is the chief intimidator in the land, you must not be surprised if partisans on both sides profit a little from its example.

Nor do I think that the intimidation which deters a colored man from voting with the opposition against the Republican party is less detestable or less harmful to the colored men themselves than that which threatens him as a Republican. I declare I shall hail the day as a most auspicious one for the colored race in the South, when they cease to stand as a solid mass under the control and discipline of one political organization, thus being arrayed as a race against another race; when they throw off the scandalous leadership of those adventurers who, taking advantage of their ignorance, make them the tools of their rapacity, and thus throw upon them the odium for their

misdeeds; when they begin to see the identity of their own true interests with the interests of the white people among whom they have to live; when they begin to understand that they greatly injure those common interests by using the political power they possess for the elevation to office of men, black or white, whose ignorance or unscrupulousness unfits them for responsible trust; when freely, according to the best individual judgment of each man, they divide their votes between the different political parties and when thus giving to each party a chance to obtain their votes, they make it the interest and the natural policy of each party to protect their safety and respect their rights in order to win their votes. I repeat what I once said in another place: not in Union is there safety, but in division. Whenever the colored voters shall have become an important element, not only in one, but in both political parties, then both parties under an impulse of self-interest will rival in according them the fullest protection. I may speak here of my own peculiar experience, for they may learn a lesson from the history of the adopted citizens of this country. I remember the time when they stood in solid mass on the side of one party, and schemes dangerous to their rights were hatched upon the side of the other. When both parties obtained an important share of their votes, both hoping for more, both became equally their friends. This will be the development in the South, and a most fortunate one for the colored people. It has commenced in the States I have already mentioned, where self-government goes its way unimpeded, and I fervently hope the frantic partisan efforts to prevent it in others will not much longer prevail. I hope this as a sincere and devoted friend of the colored race.

But the Senator from Indiana may say that will bring about a still greater falling-off in the Republican vote. Ah, sir, it may; but do you not profess to be sincerely

solicitous for the safety and rights of the colored man? Are not some of you even willing to see the most essential principles of constitutional government invaded, to see State governments set up by judicial usurpation and State legislatures organized by Federal bayonets only that the colored man may be safe? Gentlemen, you can have that much cheaper if you let the colored man protect himself by the method I advise. The colored people will then be far safer than under a broken Constitution; the peace and order of society will be far more naturally and securely established than under the fitful interference of military force. And that can be accomplished by permitting the self-government of the people to have its course. But the Republican vote may thus fall off. That is true. The party may suffer. Indeed it may. But, Senators, I for my part, know of no party, whatever its name or fame, so sacred that its selfish advantage should be considered superior to the peace and order of society and good understanding among the people. I do not hesitate to say that I prefer the conservative government of Virginia to the Republican government of Louisiana; and, if I mistake not, an overwhelming majority of the American people are of the same opinion.

I ask you what would you have made of Georgia had you forced upon its neck, as seemed to be desired by some, the yoke of the Bullocks and the Foster Blodgetts? What would have become of Virginia and North Carolina if a Federal judge, by an act of usurpation like Durell's, had set up Republican State governments for them, and the President had enforced the usurpation with the bayonets of the Army? Where now you observe the steady growth of peace and order and a fruitful coöperation of the social elements there would be bloody conflicts of infuriated factions, a society torn to pieces by deadly feuds, a prosperity utterly prostrate. That would have been the result

but then you might have had Republican government in those States!

I ask you in all candor, Republican Senators, is that what you want? If you do, I am sure the patriotism of the American people is not with you.

O, it is indeed time we should understand that in this Republic we cannot serve the cause of law and order if we in our representative place do not respect the law and if we permit the Government to violate it without hindrance. Every lawless act of those in power, professedly intended to preserve peace and order, will most surely produce to the cause of peace and order its greatest danger. You want all the people of the South, and especially of Louisiana, to become law-abiding citizens; and yet, to make them so, the National authority has imposed upon them a government which is the offspring confessedly of gross judicial usurpation and revolutionary proceedings. How can you expect them to refrain from revolutionary acts after the Government itself has set them this revolutionary example? How can you fill them with reverence for the sanctity of the laws, if you show them that the laws have no sanctity for you?

The people of the South are not a people of murderers and banditti. Only the most morbid fanaticism of partisanship will call them so. There are, I know, bad elements among them, and you blame the better classes of society for not putting down these bad elements by their own efforts. But is not the National Government itself, by resorting to usurpation and unconstitutional proceedings, giving to those bad elements in Southern society a strength which otherwise they never would possess, enabling even the ruffian to throw himself into the attitude of a defender of Constitutional government against revolutionary usurpation?

You speak of protecting the negro. Woe to the negroes

of the South if, after their unscrupulous leaders have done so much already to identify them with organized corruption and rapacity, you now, by employing or sanctioning unconstitutional means for their protection, identify them also with the overthrow of Constitutional principles and contempt for the laws of the land! Such measures to protect them will by their very effects put them in the greatest jeopardy. Their most cruel enemies could not inflict on them an injury more cruel than this.

Let me warn you, Senators, that you stand upon dangerous ground; for if such things as have been done in Louisiana are sustained by the Republican majority in Congress, and as one evil deed always gives birth to another, if so high-handed a course be continued, you are taking upon yourselves a responsibility the extent of which it is difficult to measure. Do not treat with contempt, I beseech you, what is now going on in the public mind. I hold here in my hand an extract which I clipped from one of the Republican papers of the North, and I will read to you its language:

Unless the Republican party is content to be swept out of existence by the storm of indignant protest arising against the wrongs of Louisiana from all portions of the country, it will see that this most shameful outrage is redressed wholly and at once; for if it is right for the Federal soldiery to pack the legislature of one State in the manner the Attorney-General declares it shall be packed, or if it can be done, it is right and can be done in any other State. It is a matter that concerns Massachusetts, California and Pennsylvania equally with Louisiana; for it is an act of Federal usurpation which, if not revoked and condemned by Congress, will lead inevitably to the destruction of the whole fabric of our government.

What adds to the common indignation against the perpetrators of the wrong is the moral heroism exhibited by the disfranchised people of Louisiana, who have borne with

sublime patience and peace that which was excuse sufficient for revolution; for the doctrine is as old as wrong itself that usurpation of the people's rights makes revolution not only a privilege, but makes it a duty.

MR. SARGENT. What paper does the Senator read from?

MR. SCHURZ. The Philadelphia *Inquirer* of the 6th of this month.

MR. SARGENT. A Republican paper?

MR. SCHURZ. It is about as Republican as most Republican papers are nowadays all over the country. When such sentiments, appealing directly to the right of revolution, are expressed by loyal Republican journals in the North, they are not unlikely to be put forth in stronger language by opposition journals in the South. The growth of such feelings I cannot look upon without grave apprehension, not as to the spirit of justice and freedom which they demonstrate, but as to the dreadful consequences which they might produce if rashly acted upon. And if my voice could reach so far as to be heard by the people of Louisiana, I would say to them, "Take good care not a single moment to permit any impulse of passion to run away with your judgment. Whatever injustice you may have to suffer, let not a hand of yours be lifted, let no provocation of insolent power nor any tempting opportunity seduce you into the least demonstration of violence; for if you do, no human foresight can tell what advantage may be taken of your rashness and in what dangers and disasters it may involve, not only you, but the whole Republic. As your cause is just, trust to its justice, for surely the time cannot be far when every American who truly loves his liberty will recognize the cause of his own rights and liberties in the cause of Constitutional government in Louisiana, and that rising spirit, by a peaceful victory, will bury the usurpers under a

crushing load of universal condemnation." That I would say to them.

Indeed, Senators, that prediction cannot fail to become true. Do not indulge in vain delusions; do not lay the flattering unction to your souls that the cry of blood and murder or new budgets of atrocities in official reports, such as General Sheridan promises, will divert the public mind from the true question at issue. That cry and such reports begin to fall stale upon the ear of the people; not as if the people had become indifferent as to the wrongs perpetrated in any part of the country upon any class of citizens, but because the people have lost their former confidence in the sincerity and truthfulness of those who parade the bloody stories with the greatest ostentation. And why has that confidence declined? Because too many exaggerations have been discovered in the statements so frequently made, and because in many instances it became somewhat too glaringly apparent that the blood and murder cry was used as convenient partisan stage-thunder merely to catch votes. The people have begun shrewdly to suspect that when some men pretend they must remain in power to protect the lives of the negroes, the cry about murdered negroes must be raised simply to keep them in power.

But there is another and more important reason why this cry will be distrusted now. The people are asking themselves—and well they may—whether the very policy which is followed professedly to prevent such outrages is not in itself well calculated to serve as the cause for more. They look at Virginia, at North Carolina, at Georgia, and they find that the self-government of the people, unobstructed, is gradually but steadily advancing those States in peace, order, good feeling and prosperity. They look at Louisiana and find the self-government of the people obstructed and hear of turmoil and conflict. They do not fail to

conclude that the forcing of Bullock and Foster Blodgett upon Georgia would have reduced that State to the same unhappy condition which in Louisiana the usurpation of Kellogg had brought forth. Looking, then, at that picture and at this, they begin wisely to make up their minds to the fact that after all the Southern States can now give to themselves better government than Federal interference can impose upon them.

But, still more, the people have begun to understand, and it is indeed high time they should understand, that the means professedly used to prevent and suppress outrages are producing far worse fruit than the outrages themselves; that—and hear what I say—the lawlessness of power is becoming far more dangerous to all than the lawlessness of the mob. Therefore, I think Senators most seriously deceive themselves if they think the blood and murder cry can deceive the people about the nature of the usurpations of power we have now to deal with.

Neither do I think that you can convince an intelligent public opinion that the Kellogg party did carry the State of Louisiana by a *bona fide* vote at the last election, and that the unconstitutional employment of the Federal bayonets was merely to vindicate the true will of the people of Louisiana lawfully expressed at the polls. No intelligent man can have escaped the impression that those who executed the barefaced usurpation of 1872 would not shrink from any device, ever so foul, to preserve the fruits of that usurpation by repeating the game in 1874. It was noticed with general astonishment (and I have to refer to that case once more, for it stands out as one of the most repulsive things in the history of our politics) that a Federal officer, United States Marshal Packard, was permitted to manage the political campaign as the chairman of the Kellogg State central committee and at the same time the operations of United States soldiers in arresting his

opponents, a combination of functions so strikingly suspicious, so glaringly unfair, that when I publicly called attention to it even a large number of Republican journals protested against it as an outrage upon public decency. It has not been overlooked that when, after the insurrection of the 14th of September, arrangements were attempted in Louisiana to divest the returning board of its suspicious partisan character, the leading members of the Kellogg party most strenuously objected to the admission of an equal number of conservatives and Republicans, with one man of unimpeachable character to be chosen by them jointly to act as umpire in the return of the votes, thus insisting for themselves upon the privilege to count the votes as they might choose. It has been well observed that the returning board, having purposely preserved its partisan character when the election showed a considerable conservative majority, manipulated the returns for weeks and weeks, until, by hook or crook, that conservative majority was transformed into a Republican one. It has not escaped public attention that the Attorney-General of the United States, with ostentatious publicity, declared his purpose to stand by that returning board whatever it might do, thus encouraging it boldly to go on; and when the thing was done, declared himself for a "heroic policy" to enforce its edicts, and thereupon followed the military interference.

In view of all these things and of other information that has come within my reach, I declare it here as my solemn conviction, that the conservatives of Louisiana did fairly carry the late election by a considerable majority of votes; that they were defrauded by the returning board of the result of that election; and that the soldiers of the United States, when they invaded the legislature of Louisiana, did not vindicate but trampled under the heel of lawless force the true will of the people, lawfully expressed

at the polls. That is my honest conviction, and if common report speaks truly—and I may mention that common report without transgressing parliamentary rules—the members of the Congressional committee who were sent down to Louisiana to make investigation, as they are honorable and truthful men—a majority of them Republicans but no abject tools of party dictation—will tell Congress and the country, perhaps this very day, as the result of their conscientious investigation, that the conservatives of Louisiana did fairly carry that election; that the returning board did defraud them of its result; and that the will of the people of Louisiana lawfully expressed has been crushed out under the heel of a lawless military invasion. That, gentlemen, the country will hear, and that the American people will believe as the honest truth told by honest men.

No, Senators, do not deceive yourselves; no man will be permitted to obscure the great Constitutional question before us with flimsy side issues; for from whatever point of view you may contemplate it, every consideration of law, of moral right, of justice, of public policy, of the common welfare, puts the deed done in Louisiana only into a stronger light as a lawless transgression of arbitrary power pregnant with wrong and disaster. We must face that question, and as we are men with the responsibility of guardians of the Constitution and laws upon us, we must face it boldly. This, it seems to me, if ever, is the time when the patriot should rise above the partisan.

I have heard it whispered that some of the eminent lawyers of this body will still endeavor to find some technical plea by which to show that the intrusion of the soldier in organizing the legislative body of Louisiana was in some way justifiable under the Constitution and laws of this Republic. If it be so, then I appeal to them to consider well what they are attempting to do. Surely I

desire no injustice to be done to any man, high or low. If there be a clear justification of such an act, which I have not seen—and I solemnly declare I am not able to see one—let it be brought forward. If there be one, then I shall deplore that the Constitution and laws of this Republic are so defective in their most essential aims as to sanction an exercise of arbitrary power which in no free country on the face of the globe would be admitted a single moment. If there be such a justification, then I shall think it high time to urge such a change of the laws that they may effectually protect the independence of legislatures and the liberty of the citizen, for otherwise neither will be safe. But, sir, if there be no such justification, clear as sunlight, and palpably springing from the sacred spirit of the law interpreted in the strictest accordance with the time-honored principles of constitutional government, then, gentlemen, let us not have one artfully made by the lawyers' ingenuity of technical construction. What glory will it be to the American jurist to show the highest keenness of wit in defending such an act and in establishing it as a precedent which, through its disastrous consequences, may oblige the American people to shed as much blood and as many tears to restore their free institutions as it had cost to build them up.

I heard the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. HOWE] exclaim the other day, that he was glad not to find in the history of this country any such case as this, and he hoped to see none in the future. Truly, I felt with him; but he will see another one, and more than one, if as a lawyer he tries and succeeds in making this generation believe that this can be rightfully done under the Constitution and the laws of the Republic. Ah, gentlemen, the lawyer's technical ingenuity has not seldom done more harm to free government than even the arbitrary spirit of the soldier, for the latter would frequently have been impotent but

for the aid of the former. It may be the lawyer's ambition successfully to defend even the most obvious guilt of his client, but it is the lawyer's highest glory to stand fearlessly before the frowns of power, defending the sanctity of the law and the rights and liberties of his countrymen; and of such are the names that are handed down with imperishable honor from generation to generation. I trust, therefore, we shall have in this debate only the purest and loftiest spirit of that jurisprudence which is nursed among a people proud of their liberties.

Let us above all things be spared such miserable subterfuges as these: That because the speaker of the legislature invited an officer of the Army to persuade a disorderly crowd in the lobby to remain quiet, he had thereby given him the right or recognized his right to drag from their seats men seated as members in that legislature; or that, as the insurgents of September had not surrendered all the guns belonging to the State, the insurrection continued, and with it the right of the Federal Army to organize the legislature of Louisiana! Let not so pitiable a plea be heard when the fundamental principles of constitutional government are in jeopardy. If there be an argument in its defense, let it at least be one on a level with the dignity of the cause.

I have moved that the Judiciary Committee be instructed to report a bill to secure to the people of Louisiana their right of self-government under the Constitution. I hope that motion will prevail. I hope also it will not result in the production of a bill providing for a new election there with General Sheridan, who, with all the brilliancy of his military valor, is so conspicuously unsuited for the delicate task of a conciliatory mission, as supreme ruler of that State; with a Packard as manager at the same time of the political campaign and of the United States dragoons to arrest opponents, and with that

returning board to canvass the votes which has given already so much evidence of its unscrupulous skill. Let it not be another mockery to lead to another disgrace. I trust the Committee will discover a method to undo the usurpations that have been perpetrated, in full, and to restore their rights and powers to those whom the people of Louisiana by their votes have lawfully designated to wield them. No measure will avail, either to the cause of peace and order or to the safety of our institutions or to the character of the Government, which does not boldly vindicate the constitutional principles of the land, the privileges of legislative bodies and that self-government of the people without which our republican institutions cannot live.

I have spoken earnestly, sir, for my feelings and convictions on this great subject are strong and sincere. I cannot forget that this Republic, which it has cost so much strife and so much blood to establish and to preserve, stands in the world to prove to struggling mankind that the self-government of the people under wise laws is able to evolve all necessary remedies for existing evils without violating popular liberty or constitutional rights. I cannot forget that, if we fail in solving this vital problem, this Republic will become not a guiding star of liberty, but only another warning example. I cannot close my eyes to the fact that the generation which has grown up to political activity during and since the war, a generation constituting more than one-third of the voting body in the land, soon to constitute the whole, has but too much been accustomed to witness the bold display of arbitrary assumptions of authority, and that habits have grown up threatening to become destructive to all that the patriot holds dear. Knowing this, I have for years stood upon this floor raising my voice for the imperilled principles of constitutional government, and endeavoring to warn you and the country of the insidious advance of

irresponsible power; and with all the anxiety of an honest heart—and it may be my last opportunity upon this great forum—I cry out to you once more: Turn back, turn back in your dangerous course while it is yet time. In the name of that inheritance of peace and freedom which you desire to leave to your children, in the name of the pride with which the American lifts up his head among the nations of the world, do not trifle with the Constitution of your country, do not put in jeopardy that which is the dearest glory of the American name. Let not the representatives of the people falter and fail in the supreme hour when the liberties of the people are at stake.

TO JAMES S. ROLLINS

OBERLIN, O., April 2, 1875.

Your last very kind letter I ought to have answered long ago; but you know what the last expiring agonies of Congress are. And immediately afterwards I had to set out on a lecturing trip to fill some gaps, in other words, to avoid running into debt.

I thank you sincerely for the warm sympathy you express concerning my fortunes as a public man. It is certainly a great satisfaction to me to see so many evidences of my having won the good opinion of that class of men whose esteem one may well be proud of. As to the influences which controlled the Senatorial election in Missouri, I think those things must work themselves out. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the Democratic party begins already to feel the consequences of its narrow-minded partisan course in those States of which it had control. But would it not be a sad thing to see the Presidential campaign of next year run again in the old party-ruts and turn upon the question not which party is the

best in its policy and character, but which can make out the other the worst?

I still have some hope that something may be done to avert such a lamentable condition of affairs, and surely the memories which the centennial year calls up should inspire the American people with higher and nobler impulses of patriotism.

I shall be in St. Louis from the 16th of this month to the 21st, and then I shall go to Europe for a few months, to return to Missouri late in the fall. Will you not be in St. Louis about the time mentioned? I should be very glad indeed to see you and have a good quiet talk with you.

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TO HENRY ARMITT BROWN¹

ST. LOUIS, April 16, 1875.

I have just arrived here and found your kind letter of the 10th. I hasten to say a few words in reply. The purpose is to assemble a number of men whose standing in the country is such that their utterances will find attention and respect. It is not important that there should be a great many, but that those present should be, in the truest sense of the term, respectable and respected. The genus "politician," in the common acceptance of the term, should therefore be excluded.

I trust you will not fail to come yourself; and if you can bring half a dozen men with you, such as you would like to see your name associated with, it will fully answer the purpose. Of course, the more the better, but quality is of far greater consequence than quantity.

I have visited several States since I saw you, and my experience has been such as to raise my hope that we may

¹ A Philadelphia orator and reformer.

be able to accomplish something useful and honorable to the country if we start right.

P. S. I have in the meantime read your oration on the Congress of 1774 and can only say that I am delighted with it.

TO G. WASHINGTON WARREN

HAMBURG, GERMANY, May 20, 1875.

Your kind letter inviting me to participate in the celebration of the first centennial anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill reached me on the eve of my departure for Europe. From these distant shores I can only offer you my cordial thanks for the distinction you have conferred upon me by that invitation which, I regret to say, circumstances render me unable to follow.

The event you are going to celebrate does not, in the military annals of the world, by the side of other armed conflicts, appear remarkable either for the number of men arrayed in battle, or for the professional skill displayed. But in the history of those struggles which mark the epochs of human progress, it stands as an achievement of inspiring significance, a shining illustration of that simplicity of patriotic spirit which then was and always will be the mainspring of true greatness in a free people. We cannot too reverently commemorate that spirit as, a hundred years ago, it led the men of the American Revolution, plain and modest citizens, without the coercion of established authority, without the ambition of fame, without ostentatious proclamation, poor, feeble and at first unaided, to bid defiance to the most formidable power of their times, in their devotion to the duty of asserting their sacred rights as freemen and of securing the liberties of their children. Painfully struggling through disaster and discouragements, sorely distracted sometimes by

the meaner impulses of human selfishness, but bravely overcoming them, and, in the darkest hours of failure, disappointment and threatening ruin, lifted up by the consciousness of a just cause and illumined by the prophetic presentiment of a great destiny, that simple-minded spirit of patriotic duty gave birth to the Republic of the New World, the grandest creation of this age.

Doing honor to the memory of the Revolutionary Fathers, the American people will surely not permit the splendor of later successes to make them forget that the same dutiful spirit of patriotism which victoriously struggled through the agonies of their first contest will also in our days have to overcome the dangers brought forth by the very power and greatness of the Republic; and it will be the greatest glory of the men who founded the great Commonwealth by their dutiful heroism for the right that they still continue to aid in preserving its integrity, guiding its progress and developing its blessings by the inspiration of their example.

TO W. M. GROSVENOR

THUSIS, GRISONS, SWITZERLAND,
July 16, 1875.

It seems quite likely, from the turn things have taken, that we shall be able to do substantially in '76 what we ought to have done in '72. The fall elections will probably improve our possibilities. The main thing will be to get a machinery of action sufficiently strong and sufficiently safe. What we ought to have, in my opinion, is a meeting of notables—men whose names will be of weight with the country and who can be depended upon to agree to an independent course. Such a meeting ought to be held some time in January or February, and I have

an impression that it may possibly be in a situation to do the whole work usually done by conventions. This, however, will depend upon circumstances. At any rate, the meeting should be of the *best* sort of respectability in point of character, and not altogether composed of politicians.

To make the necessary preparations for such a meeting, so that it can be called without danger of failure at the appropriate time, should, in my opinion, be the principal object of the committee of correspondence, and I am sure, with your knowledge of men and things, you can accomplish it. I wish I could have an hour's talk with you now, but I hope I shall be back in the United States in time for a sufficient exchange of views before any open steps are taken. I have an impression that we already agree on the main points.

I think we have already talked together on the subject of candidates. Adams is not too old yet for another trial, and the more you think of it the clearer it will become to you, that of all the men who may be considered available in our sense, he is the only one who can be entirely depended upon to fill the bill in the main points: absolute independence of party dictation and entire absence of ulterior ambitions. Moreover, Adams is the name for 1876. Still, I would not talk too much about it just now. Some little injury may already have been done by indiscreet talk in the newspapers, but not enough to compromise anything.

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FROM CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

31 PEMBERTON SQUARE, BOSTON,
July 16, 1875.

Enclosed is a note from Halstead of some interest. Its views seem to me crisp and sound. Allen's election will be

our destruction; his renomination on the rag-money issue was a defiance and insult to us, and his success would render us contemptible. If we don't kill him, he will kill us.

The weapon with which to kill him is the German vote,—it is the only effective weapon at hand, and you are its holder. You must come back in time to strike in just at the close with all the freshness and prestige of your recent German reception. If you could so carry the day, our tide will set,—if not, it is a long and low ebb with us.

I hope you will consider this matter carefully. For myself, I am strongly persuaded that this year it may be well in your power to give the whole shape to next year's Presidential issue, while next year you will at most be only remotely able to influence it. I hope, therefore, you will feel disposed to sacrifice much that you may go in and smash "old Bill Allen."

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

THUSIS, GRISONS, SWITZERLAND,

July 22, 1875.

I have just received your letter of June 28th and hasten to reply. Many of the reasons you give for my immediate return to the United States, I debated with myself before my departure. It seems you and I do not quite agree on an important question of tactics. If I were on the ground to-day, I doubt very much whether I would feel inclined to go to Ohio to take an active part in the campaign in the name of "the Independents." It is true that the Democrats should not be permitted to have it all their own way. But there is no danger of that. The inflationists in the Democratic convention of Ohio have struck a terrible blow at the chances of their party. If they succeed in their State election, it will be such an encouragement to the inflation element in the Democratic party as to make that element insist upon controlling their National Convention next year, which will hopelessly

demoralize the party. If they fail in Ohio, it will be a terrible damper upon their spirits and thus have a similar effect.

On the other hand, it appears to me by no means as certain as it seems to you, that the "force-bill and outrage" Republicans will lose the control of the Republican organization. Public sentiment is indeed likely to force them to give up their Southern policy—and they, or at least most of them, will make that sacrifice, for that policy has always been to them merely a means for partisan ends—but they will still hold the leading-strings of the Republican organization. In point of sentiment we Liberals have had a majority of the rank and file of the party with us for a considerable period, but the organization was controlled by the ringmasters all the same. It is so to-day, and the abandonment of the force policy alone will not change this. I admit that the power of those ringmasters is not as absolute now as it was a short time ago, but it was only the defeat of the party at the State elections that weakened it, and it is as yet far from being wholly destroyed. And as long as that power exists, no platform or profession or promise will have much value. Although the Republicans of Ohio have made a decent platform, yet, unless I am greatly mistaken, the controlling spirits are still the old set; and how they will use their success, and what effect it will have on the Republican party—who can tell?

Under ordinary circumstances I might feel inclined to go to Ohio and help the Republicans, because the Democrats are so much worse. But at present we have to keep the more important issues of the Presidential election in view, and I think all the effect the Ohio election can produce with regard to that matter has already been produced by the action of the Democratic convention; and I think further it is our policy as Independents to let it stand there.

There are two ways in which we may expect to exercise a decisive influence upon the Presidential election of '76: either by appealing from the old parties directly to the people, or by imposing our terms as to men and policies upon one of those parties.

Whether we shall be in a situation to do the first, I am not able to predict. But I am not without hope; as you know, I attach some importance to the sentimental character of the campaign of '76, and there may be extraordinary possibilities. In this case I deem it sound policy that the Independents should not, *as such, demonstratively* attach themselves to either party in the local contests of this year.

But in the other contingency the necessary thing is that one of the parties should be profoundly sensible of needing our aid, and that this feeling should be strong enough to induce them to accept our terms, not only as to platform, but also as to candidates. To that end we must not permit the impression to grow up that we are ready to resign ourselves to a choice of evils, the bad conduct of one party being sufficient reason to us to support the other. As soon as we do that, the ringmasters will laugh at us and do what they please.

I see, therefore, no urgent reason for going into the Ohio campaign. Individually, the Independents will find their way there. But it seems to me best to keep the firm aloof until the time for serious work comes, and I do not see how I could take part in that campaign without, to some extent at least, compromising the firm in it.

So much for the question of tactics. Just now, the working of natural causes will do our business as well and probably better than we could do it by putting our hands in. These were my opinions when I left the United States, and I find nothing in the information I get from there to change them.

Why should I hurry home then? The preparatory work of organization can, I should think, just as well be done without me. All that is needed is some money to keep [W. M.] Grosvenor at work. I have written about this to Cyrus W. Field, but you ought to be able to raise some at Boston. I entirely agree with you that you, and no member of your family, should become conspicuous in this matter, exactly for the reasons you give; but will it not be possible to push forward things in your immediate reach without attracting public attention? If money enough is raised to pay Grosvenor's way this summer and next winter, we shall, I doubt not, have the necessary machinery of organization in good season. I wrote him my views *in extenso* some time ago. I *hope* means will be found to keep him at work. It is perhaps the most useful thing to be done just now.

I trust you will believe me when I say that I am not kept away from the United States by a mere desire to enjoy myself in Europe. Far from that; I cannot endure pleasure and inactivity very long, and I would rather start for home to-day than to-morrow. But I have a strong feeling that, as I should not take part in any of the local contests this fall, I had better be away so as not to be obliged to refuse aid when asked to give it. I think I am not mistaken in this. I hope to be in the United States about the middle of October and to see you soon after my arrival.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

GRINDELWALD, SWITZERLAND,
Aug. 18, 1875.

Since I wrote you last I have been in that doubtful state of mind not uncommon with those who have a high respect for the opinions of their friends even when

they disagree with them. I received your second letter enclosing one from Halstead to you; then one from Halstead to myself, one from Nordhoff, one from Field, one from Lodge, etc. Finally I concluded that, although I was by no means certain that it would not be best to let the Ohio campaign work itself out without much of an effort on our part, I ought to go and see whether my friends were not, after all, right in calling me to that field of action. I dislike to lose a chance for doing something that ought to be done. So I have resolved to return home as soon as possible. I shall leave Switzerland to-morrow although Mrs. Schurz, who was obliged to keep in bed yesterday, is scarcely able to travel. I have telegraphed for passage, and hope to be able to sail on September 8th, possibly on the 1st. In short, I shall try my best to get away as soon as possible. I may say by the way that my urgent friends in America are not at all in favor with my family here, for I have had to break up very rudely and suddenly a most pleasant circle.

Now, I do not want to have my hurried return talked about at all until I am there. If the papers should get hold of it, there would be all sorts of paragraphs about combinations, etc., which it is best to avoid,—especially as I may, in spite of all effort, be delayed, finding the steamers crowded or something like that. You know, it is not the easiest thing in the world to transport a family, so I should be glad to have the thing kept quiet.

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HONEST MONEY¹

MR. CHAIRMAN AND FELLOW-CITIZENS:—The merchants and business men of Cincinnati have greatly honored me

¹ Speech at Turner Hall, Cincinnati, Sept. 27, 1875.

by inviting me to address the people of Ohio as an advocate of honest money. For that honor I offer them my sincere thanks. In obedience to my own sense of duty I have accepted that invitation, deeply sensible of the magnitude of the question and the far-reaching importance of the declaration of sentiment which the people of Ohio will soon be called upon to make at the ballot-box.

But before proceeding to discuss the issues of this contest, I owe you a preliminary statement of a personal nature. I am told that my appearance in this campaign has been represented as part of a concerted plan to lead the independent voters of the country into the ranks of the Republican party, and to commit them to the support of its candidates in the Presidential election of 1876. That story is an idle invention. I know of no such plan. If it existed, I would not be a party to it. The independent voters have minds of their own, and I respect them too much to believe that they can be transferred to this or that side by any individual or combination of individuals. Besides, I not only do not seek to commit anybody else as to the Presidential election of 1876, but I do not mean to commit myself. I reserve to myself entire freedom of judgment on that matter, to be exercised when the exigency will arise, and I advise everybody else to do the same. My relations to the Republican party are no secret. I have deemed it my duty, as a Senator and as a citizen, to combat the errors and transgressions of the set of politicians that controlled it and to attack the abuses grown up under its rule. I was in earnest. I thought I was right when I did so, and it is no mere stubbornness of opinion when I say I think so now. Not only have I nothing to retract, but I am sure recent developments have convinced many good, conscientious Republicans, that, had our appeals been heeded in

time, that organization would have saved itself many humiliations.

It is, therefore, no sentimental partiality for the Republican party that brings me here. Whether the Republican party will put itself in a position to deserve support in the Presidential election of 1876 remains to be seen. Whether the Democrats will do so, remains to be seen also. My opinion has long been, and I have not concealed it, that the patriotic men of the Republic might do better than depend upon either. That well meaning citizens should so frequently have found themselves compelled to support one party, not because it had their approval and confidence, but because the other party appeared still worse, is not only a condition of politics unworthy of a free, intelligent and high-minded people, but one of the most prolific sources of the corruption and demoralization of our political life. In that situation we have been for years; and there is now something going on in Ohio which threatens to continue that state of things for the year 1876 only in an aggravated form.

Proclamation has been made by the Democratic leaders of Ohio that this State campaign is to be of decisive effect as to the issues of the Presidential election of 1876, and in the very front of these issues, conspicuous before all others, they have placed one which involves not only the material interests, but the character, the good name, the whole moral being of the American people. An attempt is being made to secure the endorsement by the people of the greatest State of the West, one of the greatest States in the Union, of a financial policy which, if followed by the National Government, would discredit republican institutions the world over, expose the American people to the ridicule and contempt of civilized mankind, make our political as well as business life more than ever the hot-bed of gambling and corruption and plunge the country

into all those depths of moral and material bankruptcy and ruin, which, as all history demonstrates, never, NEVER fail to follow a course so utterly demented in its wickedness.

The advocates of inflation in this State, as they themselves give us to understand, expect, if the people of Ohio by the election of the Democratic candidates declare their approbation of that financial policy, that the inflation fever will, under the stimulus of such success, sweep like wildfire over the Western and Southern States, overwhelm and subjugate the Democratic National Convention next year, dictate its policy and its candidates, and in 1876 put an inflation party into the field strong enough to defy opposition. I candidly confess I see good reason to apprehend such consequences. I do indeed not undervalue the importance of the manly, honorable and patriotic condemnation pronounced by the Democratic convention of New York upon the doctrines preached by their Democratic brethren here. It was an act deserving the grateful applause of every good citizen. But I doubt very seriously whether that act will stem the flood, if the inflationists in Ohio are successful. Pennsylvania has already followed them. It is but too probable that the sectional feeling which the inflation movement strives to excite in the West and South against the Northeast will be inflamed to more intense bitterness, and that the financial question will be used as a new agency to revive the curse of sectional warfare in our politics.

Let us indulge in no delusion. The success of the inflation party in Ohio will be the signal for a general charge along the whole line to submerge the best principles and leave helpless in the rear the best leaders of the Democratic party, and, spurred on by a reckless demagogism, to capture the national power by a tumultuous rush. This is no matter of mere local concern as some weakly pretend to believe. It is a national danger, which all

good citizens should unite to avert, and which can surely be averted only by the defeat of the inflation party here. I repeat, therefore, I have not come here to whitewash the faults of the Republican party, to apologize for its shortcomings, or to serve its ambitions. But here is an incalculable mischief, threatened by the other side, to be prevented, and I simply try to do my duty, as I understand it.

I beg leave to address my remarks directly to the Democrats of Ohio. In view of our former relations, I trust they will not for this direct appeal accuse me of any impropriety. When I, as an independent man, in the Senate and before the people, advocated a policy of conciliation and justice with regard to the South; when I attacked official corruption and transgressions of those in power; when I denounced violations of the principles of the Constitution perpetrated by Republican officers of State, you, my Democratic fellow-citizens, lavished upon me expressions of applause and confidence, for which I was duly grateful.

But Democratic inflationists seek to discredit my good faith by the accusation that I have changed sides. Let us see: In 1872 I stood before you as an advocate of the "Liberal" ticket, which had also been adopted and was supported by the Democrats. That ticket was nominated upon a platform containing, as an essential part of its political faith, the following resolutions:

The public credit must be sacredly maintained, and we denounce repudiation in every form and guise.

A speedy return to specie payment is demanded alike by the highest considerations of commercial morality and honest government.

That platform was solemnly indorsed and adopted as the political faith of the Democratic party by their Na-

tional Convention at Baltimore. Upon that platform I stood then, and upon it I faithfully stand to-day. Democrats, where are you? In making that declaration of principles, I was in earnest. If your leaders betrayed their declared faith, what right have they to accuse me of deserting my cause, when I resist its betrayal by them?

Again, they pretend that from opposition to President Grant I have turned round to speak for him and promote his reelection. Let us see. In the *verbatim* report of a speech made by Governor Allen at Mansfield I find the following language:

I have some reason to believe, and not a small reason either, that Grant, in his secret heart, wants the Democracy to carry Ohio, in order that it may be said by his partisans: Now, no other man can rescue the country but Grant; therefore, we must have Grant."

You, Democrats, will certainly not accuse your candidate for the governorship of telling a deliberate untruth. If he says he has good reason to believe that President Grant desires the Democracy to carry Ohio, then, of course, his reasons must be good. We have Governor Allen's word for it. Now I, for my part, do not wish to see President Grant's secret desires gratified on this point. I am as honestly and earnestly as ever opposed to President Grant's renomination, and, therefore, I am honestly and earnestly opposed to the furtherance of that renomination by the success of the inflation Democracy in Ohio. If there are any Grant men in this campaign, they are those who advocate Governor Allen's election, not I.

The truth is, there were a set of Republican politicians who thought they could permit themselves any iniquity if they only raised the cry of "rebel." There seem to be now a set of Democratic politicians who think they can permit themselves any iniquity if they only raise the cry

of "Grant." I opposed the former as false pretenders, and upon the same principle I oppose the latter. For it is my sincere conviction that there is just as little danger of the reelection of President Grant as there is of a new rebellion, while there is real and great danger in the tricks of wily politicians, who strive to hide their mischievous schemes behind what they believe a popular cry.

No, my Democratic fellow-citizens, I have not changed sides. I stand upon the same ground which I occupied when you cheered my utterances. I advocate the same principles and serve the same ends. To the same sentiments which then you so loudly applauded I ask you now to give a patient and candid hearing.

As Democrats, you profess to be above all in favor of two things: First, the strictest maintenance of the limitations of governmental power as an indispensable safeguard of free institutions; and second, an honest and economical conduct of our public affairs. Its fidelity to these two things is the particular boast of the Democratic party, and upon this fidelity it bases its claims on popular confidence and support. As to the necessity of these two things we fully agree. In fact it was while contending for the maintenance of the Constitutional limitations of governmental power, and for the restoration of honest and economical government, that the Independents broke with the controlling influences of the Republican party, for which you applauded us so loudly.

Now, I protest that we were in earnest and in good faith in that struggle, actuated, not by any motives of small personal spite, but by a sincere solicitude for the integrity of republican institutions and the public good. And being in earnest and in good faith, we must recognize our duty to defend that cause against whatever power, whatever party may imperil it—against Democrats no less than against Republicans.

Were you, Democrats of Ohio, in earnest and in good faith also, when you represented the strictest limitation of governmental powers and hostility to corruption and extravagance as your pet principles? Examine your present attitude. You adopted in your State convention a platform insisting upon an augmentation by the General Government of its irredeemable paper currency. And now I assert that those who advocate an inflation of our irredeemable paper currency, although calling themselves Democrats, are advocating an assumption and exercise of power by the Government far more overreaching and dangerous, and a corruption and profligacy far more demoralizing and oppressive than any we have so far experienced. If I make good that assertion, you will not be able to deny that your Ohio platform is a reckless and barefaced abandonment of the very principles the Democratic party pretends to be proudest of.

But, before proceeding to this demonstration, I must notice an evasion resorted to by some Democratic leaders, who seem to feel the soreness of that point. Here and there the pretense is put forth that the Ohio platform does not mean an inflation of our irredeemable paper currency at all, but merely an adaptation of it to the wants of trade. This argument is used to calm the apprehensions of those who recoil from naked inflation and the prospect of ruin it opens. Never was a deception more insidious.

Democrats, let us be candid as serious men, and have at least the courage of our opinions and purposes. Let us throw aside the art of the juggler when the highest interests of the people are at stake. What does the Democratic platform say? It states that the contraction of the currency wrought by the Republican party—which contraction, by the way, is only imaginary, as every well-informed man in the country knows—has brought about the present depression of business; and having made this

statement the platform proceeds to propose "to make and keep the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade."

What does this mean? If anything, it means that the volume of the currency has been reduced so much as to fall short of the wants of trade; that it must be "*made*" equal to those wants, and that can be done by issuing more of it; and that it must be "*kept*" equal to those wants, and that can be done only by issuing still more of it from time to time, as the volume put out may not have effected the purpose.

Every child in the country can understand the meaning of such language, and I wonder with what faces "honorable gentlemen" can stand up before an intelligent people feebly quibbling about a turn of phrase which has no meaning at all if it does not mean inflation. But it means not only inflation by a single act and to a fixed amount—it means inflation continuous and indefinite.

The volume of the currency is to be "*made and kept* equal to the wants of trade." Is not the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade now? It is a fact as notorious as daylight that the banks of the country, especially in the centers of trade, are full of money that lies idle for want of employment. No intelligent man questions this fact. To any candid mind this would conclusively prove, not that the volume of currency is unequal to the wants of business, but that the business of the country is unequal to the volume of the currency.

But no! say the inflationists. It does not prove that the volume of currency is equal to the wants of trade; for, although there may be a superabundance of money in the banks, there are a great many people who want money and cannot get it.

To candid common-sense, this again would prove, not that there is a lack of currency, but that there is a want

of confidence which deters those who have money from embarking in business, and from lending money to those who need it.

This want of confidence is to be overcome. How do the inflationists propose to accomplish this?

On this point we obtain some information from their chief, Governor Allen, who is by the Democratic party of Ohio charged with the great office of leading the country out of all its financial difficulties. I have studied some of the speeches of that venerable gentleman, which, I must confess, filled me with wonder and amazement. No words can do him justice but his own. In a *verbatim* report of his speech delivered some time ago at Marietta, I find the following language:

These men [meaning his opponents] go about and cry there is too much money in this country. I wish to God we could find some of it. [Laughter.] They say it is in the banks. Is it? It might just as well, for the purposes of money and currency, be in the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, for if it is not in circulation, it is no more money than so many cornstalks would be. To be money it must circulate as a medium for carrying on the exchange of the country.

This, then, is Governor Allen's doctrine. I do not wish to speak harshly of the venerable gentleman, who, no doubt, possesses many estimable qualities, and far be it from me to cast any slur upon his character as a man. But standing there as one of the great leaders whose wisdom the people are called upon to trust for the management of their most important interests, his expressed opinions challenge scrutiny. Now, I must confess, among all the glaring absurdities with which the inflation school of financiers has been flooding the land, I find none equal to this theory of Governor Allen's in brilliancy of nonsense. It deserves to be recorded and transmitted to posterity

as one of the immortal utterances of the financial statesmanship of this period.

Only think of it. Money in bank is no money at all for business purposes, because it is in bank! The great leader of the Democratic party of Ohio, which asks the people to vote for him on the very ground of his financial principles, does not know yet that in this civilized country only about seven per cent. of the business transactions are accomplished by an actual transfer and delivery of currency from hand to hand and that fully ninety-three per cent. of those transactions are effected by the transfer of bank accounts through checks, notes and bills of exchange. He does not know that ninety-three per cent. of the circulation of money in this country is effected through those very banks, which he likens to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean! He does not know yet that, in the progress of civilization, we have passed that ancient period of barbarism when a business man carried his treasury in his wallet and his counting-room in his hat!

It seems almost incredible in this nineteenth century, and yet this very absurdity is the basis of all the reasoning of the inflationists, and Governor Allen is only the blunt but the true representative of the ideas of his followers. Believing, or pretending to believe, that money in bank is lost to circulation and no longer performs the office of money, they strive either to force that money out of the banks, or to issue more which will not go into the banks. They decide at once for the latter course.

Now, suppose more of our irredeemable greenbacks be issued. No matter who gets them, the first thing the people who receive them will do is to go straightway and deposit them in banks—all except Governor Allen. "Hold on!" cries he, "that will never do! You are destroying your greenbacks for all purposes of money and currency! You are throwing them into the bottom of

the Pacific Ocean." And he sagely proceeds to stow his away in an old stocking or an earthen pot under the bed, for circulation; for, if he lends his money to anybody, or pays it out in a business transaction, the man who gets it, if it is a considerable quantity, will forthwith deposit it in a bank, and even if paid out in small sums, it will eventually get there.

Yes, this is a perverse age when people will insist upon depositing their money in banks. "Now," Governor Allen will say, "this experiment not having answered, the great mass of this new issue of greenbacks having gone into the banks, or which is the same thing, into the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, of course, we must issue more greenbacks, and more and more, until the money stays out of the banks." And, finally, Governor Allen would accomplish his purpose—that is, when the greenbacks will have become so utterly worthless that it will no longer be of any use to deposit them in banks at all. Then, I suppose, the greenbacks would, in his sense, be "better than cornstalks"; they would, at last, "serve the purposes of money and currency," and really "circulate as a medium," according to Governor Allen's enlightened financial conception.

This would, as Governor Allen gives us to understand, be "making and keeping the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade," in pursuance of the Ohio platform. I desired to prove that the Ohio platform means inflation. Will any follower of Governor Allen deny it yet?

But, O citizens of Ohio, I ask you now in all soberness, would it not be a burning shame for the people of so great a State, an intelligent, educated people, at a critical moment, when so much depends upon their decision, to designate a man, who claims their votes just because he is the exponent of such a policy, as their chosen chief, thus putting the seal of their approbation upon financial

theories so utterly absurd and childish as to become the laughing-stock of the world wherever they are mentioned! I earnestly hope the people of Ohio will think better of themselves.

Some Democratic speakers pretend that the policy of "making and keeping the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade" may, in the sense of the Ohio platform, under certain circumstances mean, instead of inflation, a reduction of the currency, namely, when it appears that the volume of currency is in excess of the wants of trade.

When will the excess be admitted if it is not admitted now, while large quantities of money lie in the banks idle for want of employment, and that paper money at a heavy discount as to gold? If now the wants of trade are considered to require still more currency, under what circumstances will they be considered to require less? It is easy to show that as you go on increasing the currency the demand will not be satisfied, but it will be still more excited.

One thing is universally admitted: If the volume of our irredeemable paper money is increased, it will further depreciate. The paper dollar, which is worth 85 cents in gold now, will be worth 80, or 70, or 60, or 50 cents, then, and what you can buy for one dollar in paper now will cost \$1.25, or \$1.30, or \$1.40, or \$1.50 then.

As the paper money depreciates and loses in purchasing power, its power of effecting exchanges will decrease in a corresponding measure. A transaction requiring the use of \$100 now will require \$125, or \$130, or \$150, then. What follows? The increased quantity of the currency bringing with it no increased power of effecting exchanges, in consequence of corresponding depreciation, you are, after the increase, just as far from satisfying the supposed wants of trade as you were before. You

try further expansion, and the result will be exactly the same. You go on trying in that way "to make the volume of currency equal to the wants of trade," and the inflation will be indefinite, until finally the currency becomes so worthless as to effect no exchanges at all, and the whole edifice tumbles down in universal repudiation, bankruptcy and ruin.

Is there any advocate of the Democratic platform who can gainsay this? If not, then let us hear no more about that platform not meaning inflation. It means inflation indefinite, unlimited, until the currency is utterly worthless.

Besides, you need only listen, not to the trimming apologizers, but to the real makers and exponents of the Democratic platform, and you hear nothing but the roar for "more money! more money!" If it did not mean inflation, it would have no value at all to them. To quibble about it is not only a useless, it is simply a ridiculous attempt at evasion. The inflationists of Ohio themselves will laugh at you, did you tell them that the platform does not mean "more money; much, very much more money!"

Now let me return to the point from which this was a digression. I affirmed that those who advocated an inflation of our irredeemable paper currency, pretending to be Democrats, are advocating an assumption and exercise of power by the Government far more overreaching and dangerous, and a corruption and profligacy far more demoralizing and oppressive than any we have yet experienced, thus betraying the very principles the Democratic party puts in the foreground in soliciting the confidence and support of the people.

First, then, as to the limitation of governmental power.

You, my Democratic friends, insist that a strict limitation of the powers of government, according to Constitutional principles, is the most essential and indispensable safeguard of popular liberty and free institutions. I con-

tend for the same doctrine. But you insist, also, that our irredeemable paper currency shall be augmented according to the supposed wants of trade. And who is to determine what the wants of trade are and to what extent the volume of currency shall be augmented? Of course, the Government. Have you considered what that means?

In specie-paying times the amount of coin circulating in a country is regulated by the circumstances of business. If there is more than finds profitable employment, it will flow out and go where it finds a better market. If there is less than the wants of trade require, it will become dear and flow in from countries where it is cheaper.

The issues of a well regulated banking system, based upon specie, will conform to the same rule. Temporary disturbances, brought on by panics or artificial operations, may arise, but on the whole the rule holds good. The Government has no arbitrary control whatever over the value of the currency. It sees to it that the coin struck in the mint be of the prescribed standard value; it punishes counterfeiting; it regulates the banking system so as to make it safe. And then it lets currency and trade in their relations take care of themselves. That is sound Democratic and also sound financial principle and practice in the true sense of the word. There the Government is reduced to its proper functions.

But how is it where an irredeemable paper money prevails? There the volume of currency is not regulated by the circumstances of trade. The paper money not having outside of the country that value which specie possesses, it does not flow out and in as the needs of business may require; the quantity the country shall have is determined by the arbitrary will of the Government.

This is a power of awful extent and significance. It is not disputed that the value, the purchasing power of an irredeemable paper currency is affected by the quantity

in circulation, and that other circumstances, such as the confidence of the people and solvency of the Government, remaining the same, an appreciable expansion of the currency will result in its depreciation, and *vice versa*. But as the currency changes in purchasing power, so the money value of all you possess, and all you have to buy or to sell, changes also; so that the power of the Government to determine the quantity of currency that shall be in circulation is virtually equivalent to the power, by its own arbitrary act, to increase or decrease the money value of all private property in the land; in other words, the private fortune of every citizen is placed at the mercy of the Government's arbitrary pleasure. You cannot venture upon any business enterprise, you cannot sell or buy a lot of merchandise on time or even for cash, you cannot make a contract involving the outlay or payment of money, but the Government will have the power to determine whether it will be to your profit or loss, and perhaps in extreme cases whether it will make you rich or bankrupt.

This, then, is the awful power of a government intrusted with the office of "making and keeping the volume of currency equal to the wants of trade." You may ask me: Cannot the Congress of the United States be depended upon to exercise such a power with wisdom and discretion? The Lord preserve us! The wisest assembly of financiers in the world would be unable to discover any other means to make and keep the volume of currency equal to the wants of trade, than by a return to a specie basis where trade and currency may adjust themselves. But Congress! Give us the most honest and intelligent Congress we can ever expect to be blessed with, and the adaptation of the volume of an irredeemable paper currency to the ever-changing wants of trade by annual legislation will be found an utter impossibility. But now imagine a Congress controlled by statesmen like Governor

Allen, who think that more and more currency must be issued until the money of the country stays out of the banks; or imagine a Congress manipulated by a ring of unscrupulous and adroit financial sharpers, and such a Congress wielding the tremendous power of changing at pleasure the current value of every dollar and every dollar's worth of property you have—does not your head swim at the prospect? And yet that is the power wielded by any government, intelligent or idiotic, honest or rascally, which is charged with the office of "making and keeping the volume of irredeemable paper money equal to the wants of trade."

You, my Democratic friends, say that it was not you who conferred such a power upon the Government by the creation of the irredeemable paper money. That is true enough. It was done under the pressure of the extreme necessities of the civil war by Republicans. But does that change the question? Previous to that civil war you would have found among the great statesmen of the Republic scarcely a single one who would have admitted the Constitutionality of an act of Congress making anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender. I know well that the Supreme Court, after the war, did consider such an act justified by the extremity of National danger. But now the National danger is over. We are at peace. The North and the South have shaken hands in renewed friendship. No foreign enemy threatens our shores. All National danger, with what justification it might afford of exceptional measures, has vanished.

And now you, Democrats of Ohio, propose to continue that awful power of the Government inseparable from an irredeemable paper money system—nay, you propose to perpetuate it,—for what purpose? Not to defend the life of the Republic against armed aggression, but to produce certain effects upon the business of the country.

You not only admit that power of the National Government to change at will all current values in the country, to dispose of the private fortune of every citizen at its arbitrary pleasure—nay, in the face of the efforts of others to strip the Government of a discretion so despotic, you insist that that power *shall* be exercised by what you euphoni-ously call “making and keeping the currency equal to the wants of trade,” by the interference of Government. And you still call yourselves Democrats, and claim the confidence of the people by your fidelity to the great principle that popular liberty and free institutions must be secured by a strict limitation of the powers of government!

When President Grant trifled with the war-making power in the San Domingo case, I with others denounced his action as a transgression of his Constitutional authority, and you applauded. When the Ku-Klux act was passed, when an act of usurpation setting up an illegal government in Louisiana was countenanced and aided by the Administration, when the Federal military invaded the legislative hall of that State, I was among those who protested against such unconstitutional assumptions of authority. Step by step we fought against what appeared as an advance of dangerous centralization. And you applauded.

But now I declare, those unconstitutional assumptions and those centralizing attempts appear as mere trifles compared with the arbitrary, despotic character of that power to kick the fortune of every citizen about as the football of its whims, which you, Democrats of Ohio, according to your platform, not only recognize as belonging to the Government, but attempt to fix upon the Government as a permanent system, by making its abolition simply impossible. Nay, you insist that such power *SHALL* be actively exercised. If that is Democracy, then, I entreat you, trifle no longer with the intelligence of the

people by pretending that a strict limitation of the powers of government as the indispensable safeguard of popular liberty and republican institutions is an article of your creed. If the great men of the past, whom you delight in calling the founders and apostles of your party, the men whose recorded opinions on this momentous question are plainly before you, if Jefferson, Jackson, Silas Wright, Benton could rise from their graves and hear the Ohio platform called a true exposition of Democratic faith, ah, how their eyes would kindle with scorn at the barefaced imposition, and how they would spurn with their heels the bastard offspring!—So much for inflation as the source of an arbitrary, despotic power, incompatible with free government. So much for the betrayal of the cardinal principle of Democracy by the Democrats who advocate it.

Now, a word about inflation as the source of corruption and profligacy. You, my Democratic friends, profess to contend for frugal, economical, honest, pure government. So do I. Is there a single candid man among you who sincerely believes that frugality, economy, honesty, purity of government can be promoted by an expansion of our irredeemable currency, or is even in any way compatible with it?

Let us look at a plain, practical side of the question. It has frequently been asked: How are you going to get your additional greenbacks afloat? The query seems to have caused some embarrassment, and the answer has usually been: Oh, we shall get it out somehow. But there is no need of indefiniteness. The matter is capable of precise statement. Obviously, there are two ways to set additional currency afloat. One is by buying up United States gold-bearing bonds in the market, or by buying gold to pay off bonds as they fall due.

But it is certain that this method will answer only in a very limited measure, for this simple reason: As you put

out new greenbacks, with the prospect of a large emission, the greenbacks will rapidly depreciate as to gold; and as the bonds are payable principal and interest in gold, they will maintain their gold value, and their price in paper money will thereby become so high that the method of putting out greenbacks by purchasing bonds will soon become very unpopular and be dropped. Or, if you mean to repudiate the bonds, of which, as I understand, there is at present no declared purpose, then, of course, you will simply repudiate them, and not buy them up at all.

But there is another way to put afloat new issues of greenbacks; it is by carrying the expenses of the Government beyond its revenues, and this, I have no doubt, will be resorted to as the favorite method. Do you know what that means? Imagine a Congress making appropriations of money for the avowed purpose of getting out, putting afloat, spending, as much money as possible, adopting systematic extravagance in expenditures as a necessary measure of financial policy to the end of "making and keeping the volume of currency equal to the wants of trade." What a day of jubilee there will be among the thieves and rascals, who think they can gain not only wealth, but respectability, by stealing as much as possible of the public money! Let it be known that ditches must be dug, that embankments must be thrown up, that mountains must be tunneled, that railroads and steamboat lines must be subsidized, for the very purpose of spending money that "the volume of the currency be made and kept equal to the wants of trade,"—what a harvest of jobs, what a crop of rings this blessed country will bear! What a glorious time for enterprising contractors, what a seductive season for Congressmen to help a friend for a little share in the profits, what a carnival of fraud, what a flying about of stray millions! For, mind

you, money will be no object; on the contrary, it *must* be spent, and the more spent the better, for the greenbacks must be got out, in obedience to the mandate, "to make and keep the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade."

No, fellow-citizens, this is no jest. This is no exaggeration. You adopt a financial policy making it the duty of the National Government to put out new issues of currency in any way that will serve the object quickest, and unlimited extravagance will be the necessary, the inevitable consequence. There never was a state ever so well administered, there never was a people ever so frugal, there never was a government ever so careful, which did not, by the emission of large quantities of irredeemable paper money, run in the vortex of profligacy and corruption. It has never been, it will never be, otherwise. It is in the very nature of things. When you manufacture this so-called money by merely printing a few words on a slip of paper, it apparently costs nothing. You are deluding yourselves with the idea that you are creating wealth, without stopping to think of the ultimate day of reckoning which demands the settlement of accounts. When you spend such money for the very purpose of getting it out, the wildest extravagance is unavoidable, and the extravagance of a government always is the very hot-bed of speculation and corruption. The rings will thrive, and the honest men will pay the cost. But not only the Government and its officers does it corrupt; still more grievously will it demoralize the people. When, by the fluctuations of so vicious a monetary system, the possessions of everybody become uncertain from day to day, every man of business will, by the very force of circumstances, be made a gambler. What is worth something to-day and may be worth nothing to-morrow is lightly made the football of chance, and when everybody,

to save himself, sees himself forced to overreach everybody else, the principles of honesty are easily forgotten. The sting of necessity stimulates unscrupulous greed, and the general example silences the voice of conscience. Honest labor appears as fruitless drudgery, and to live upon one's wits becomes the order of the day. The history of nations is full of pertinent warnings. American society can escape such a fate just as little as any other, if we flood this country with that kind of money which in its very nature carries the poison of false pretense and seduction.

My Democratic friends, we have seen in our days many startling cases of embezzlement, speculation and fraud. We have seen Credit Mobilier rings, whisky rings, mail-contract rings, Indian rings and what not. I have denounced these things no less earnestly than you. But I tell you, all these things will appear insignificant compared with the corruption and profligacy which must inevitably ensue when you put in operation a financial policy which, in order to "make and keep our irredeemable currency equal to the wants of trade," will oblige the Government to spend money in streams for the very purpose of getting it out; for then reckless extravagance with all the wastefulness and corruption inseparable from it will no longer appear as a mere incident, it will become the *systematic practice* of your Government, the very basis of your scheme of finance.

Democrats, do you ask for the confidence of the people on the ground that you are enemies of corruption and friends of economical, honest and pure government? If so, then make haste to mark with the stigma of your condemnation those of your leaders who attempt to inveigle you into the approbation of a financial policy which by the force of necessity will make the Government more corrupt and profligate than ever.

I ventured to affirm that while the Democratic party

puts forth strict limitation of the powers of government and the suppression of corruption and extravagance as its first objects, those Democrats who advocate an inflation of our currency are advocating a more despotic and dangerous exercise of governmental powers, and a more demoralizing and oppressive extravagance and corruption, than we ever experienced, thus betraying the very principles which the Democracy most loudly professes. I trust no candid man will deny that I have made good my assertion. The interested partisan may quibble, but no patriotic man will close his eyes to the truth.

What excuse, then, can be presented for such a betrayal of professed principles? What advantages can so baneful a policy offer to compensate for such curses?

The excuses put forth shine by their flimsiness. Here is a very curious one from Governor Allen himself. In one of his first speeches he said substantially this: Not the Democrats, but the Republicans, forced the greenback currency upon the people. The Republicans are responsible for it. They, therefore, ought not to vilify their own child. And since they have forced the greenbacks upon us, they must not find fault with us, if we accept the situation and give them more than they bargained for.

Ah, Governor Allen, this will hardly do, not even in a pinch. You may not be satisfied with the past financial policy of the Republican party. Neither am I. But do you not call yourself a reformer? Do you not ask the people to vote for you on the ground that you are a reformer? Is it not the office of a true reformer to remove bad things and put better things in their place? And now you come and say, that your opponents have forced upon us a bad thing, and you propose to reform by giving us more of it! You are opposed to all dangerous assumptions of power by the Government, and now you propose to reform by giving us more of that! You are opposed to

corruption and profligacy, and propose to reform by giving us more of that also! Indeed, a fine assortment of reformatory sweets in that inflation pill. No, Governor Allen, that will never do. If you propose to reform the evils you so loudly denounce by giving us more of them, you and your friends are not the sort of reformers sensible men will take to. If, indeed, that should turn out to be the real reformatory spirit of the Democracy, then prudent and patriotic men must feel in duty bound to turn round and look for salvation somewhere else. But, surely, even were I a lifelong Democrat, that kind of reformatory spirit I should, as a friend of the party as well as of my country, feel bound to aid in putting down to prevent it from doing fatal mischief to both. For this kind of reformatory spirit might at last reform Congress into an insane asylum, the public service, the machinery of the Government into the elements of a penitentiary and the party into a terror to all honest and civilized men.

But there is another excuse which at first sight appears more respectable. It is said the times are hard; business is languishing; our industries are depressed; thousands of laborers are without work; the poor are growing poorer; the country is full of distress; something must be done to afford relief. All this is true, and there are many well meaning men who, troubled by their difficulties, grope about for a remedy.

Yes, it is indeed necessary that something be done to afford relief. The question is what that something should be.

As wise men, we must first ascertain the nature of the disease before determining upon the method of cure.

The Democratic platform of Ohio affirms that the business depression was caused by the contraction of the currency wrought by the Republican party. Time and again it has been shown that this statement is false on its

very face. But the inflationists, driven by the necessity of throwing dust in the eyes of the people, exhibit such an able-bodied perseverance in misstatement that I shall once more take the trouble to give the figures from an authentic statement before me.

From that statement it appears that in 1873, when the business crash occurred, there were in the aggregate more legal-tenders and bank-notes out than ever before; including the fractional currency, there were \$9,000,000 more than in 1872, over \$29,000,000 more than in 1871, over \$52,000,000 more than in 1870, over \$58,000,000 more than in 1869, over \$56,000,000 more than in 1868, over \$46,000,000 more than in 1867; and even if we count the compound interest notes into the volume of circulating currency we find that we had in 1873, the year of the crash, a general aggregate of \$9,000,000 more than in 1872, over \$29,000,000 more than in 1871, over \$51,000,000 more than in 1870, over \$56,000,000 more than in 1869, over \$2,000,000 more than in 1868. And yet, just the years last mentioned have generally been called years of unexampled prosperity; and when during all those years the currency had reached its greatest volume, that collapse came, which the inflationists will have us believe was caused by contraction. There is the record. There was expansion, and no contraction; and if there was no contraction, then contraction cannot have caused the collapse in business. That is so simple a demonstration that I think Governor Allen should understand it. And yet I shall not be surprised to see to-morrow an inflationist come before you who, in the face of these facts and figures, will affirm that it was the contraction of the currency which did all the mischief.

What was, then, the cause of the crisis of 1873, the consequences of which are still upon us? I wonder why political economists of the inflation school will never

remember that similar disturbances occurred in the business life of other countries; but two years ago a collapse of speculation in Austria and Germany, a succession of failures in England, and similar things in almost all European countries, France being a notable exception. And it so happens that in the countries thus afflicted, especially Germany, not only no contraction of the currency had taken place, but rather an increase of its volume, partly by the influx of coin through the war indemnities, partly by an increase of bank currency; while in France business appears prosperous, although not only heavy drafts were made on the national resources for the payment of the German war indemnity, but—and I invite you to mark this—a steady contraction of the paper currency has been going on all the time for the last three years, for the purpose of returning to specie payments, which had been suspended during the German war. And when you study the condition of things preceding the collapses in European countries and in ours, you will find that agencies of a kindred nature were at work there and here; no contraction of the currency whatever, rather an expansion of it; but industrial enterprise overleaping itself; an extensive production of things for which there was no immediate demand; the sinking of capital in great undertakings which could yield no immediate return; windy schemes, stock gambling, wild speculation in all possible directions and the creation of imaginary values; wasteful extravagance in private expenditures and high living extraordinary; a morbid desire to get rich without labor; an excessive straining of the credit system—until finally the bubble burst, and people found that they were by no means as rich as they had believed themselves. So it was there, and so it was here. France, on the other hand, had gone through a disastrous and destructive war; she had to pay heavy sums of money—5,000,000,000

francs—as a war indemnity, and largely increased her debt. She was apparently prostrated. What was to be done? “Issue more paper currency to restore prosperity,” our inflationists would have said. But no; a wise financial policy determined otherwise. Not believing that the country could recuperate by deceiving itself, they issued no more irredeemable paper money. They reduced the volume of that which was in circulation, they worked sturdily and steadily toward resumption, so that a franc not only pretends to be, but *is* a franc, and he that has one knows what he has. The people set to work again in a frugal and laborious way, their industries producing things for which there was demand in the market; no capital sunk in useless enterprises; no wild speculation; no self-deception by the creation of fictitious values—and thus you find France to-day, in spite of her disasters, economically in a more satisfactory condition than the countries around her. There is a striking lesson before us. No wise man will study it without profit.

Now, it being conclusively shown that the depression of business was not brought on by a contraction of the currency, but by causes which always produce such results, the question recurs whether an inflation of the currency will furnish the relief we need. Our inflation doctors seem to me just as wise as a physician who would treat a case of overloaded stomach as a case of starvation.

Sometimes you will observe when a man is ill, and some medical tyro tries to cure in the wrong direction, that nature makes an effort to right itself. So it is also with the diseases of the body economic.

You say that, although the banks in the business centers are full of money, lying idle for want of employment, we want more currency. I tell you, business can have more currency; it can have as much as it likes without any further act of Government. According to law, every one

of you, or any association you may form, having the necessary capital, can start a bank of issue. A general license to that effect, through the free-banking act, was given by Congress last winter. We heard so much of the West and the South wanting more local circulation and starving for greater banking facilities. Now you can make yourselves comfortable. All legal impediments are removed. You can issue any amount of currency. But behold! the currency will not inflate one cent's worth. And you, worthy patriots, who clamor for more currency, do not lift a finger to create more. Why not: Here is a reason given by the Cincinnati *Enquirer*: "There is not currency enough in circulation to buy the bonds to deposit with the National Government and obtain from it National currency in exchange." This is genius. It ranks with the most brilliant financial utterances of Governor Allen himself.

But I appeal to you, business men, laborers, farmers, who honestly desire to do right, and look up to your party leaders for instruction, if you want an instance of the impudent, insulting assurance with which these men depend upon your being too ignorant and stupid to tell obvious fact from obvious falsehood, look at this: Here is the great representative organ of the inflation Democracy, the tabernacle of its brains, the feeding-pipe of its wisdom; and now, while everybody knows that millions and millions of money are lying unemployed in the business centers of the country, East and West, looking for investment sufficiently safe; while everybody knows that in every large city in the land there are dozens of capitalists with abundant means which they might devote to the creation of bank-paper issues if it were profitable; while everybody knows that there is scarcely a town of respectable size without men of means fully able to form a combination for that purpose, that organ, fighting the truth as its personal

enemy, coolly asks you to believe that there is not currency enough in the country to permit the purchase of bonds as a basis for further national-bank issues. When I read such things I do not know what to admire most: the audacity of the inventors or the pitiable weakness of the invention.

But the absurdity of that statement appears in its full glory when we look at all the circumstances of the case. Not only did the business of the country not show that it needed more, when it refused to issue more in spite of its opportunities, but it proved that it had more than it needed by surrendering a large portion of the bank currency in circulation. On the 1st of July of this year new currency had been issued to new and old banks, amounting to \$7,780,000; but, according to a letter addressed to me by the Comptroller of the Currency, \$23,579,134 of legal-tender notes have been deposited with the Treasurer for the purpose of retiring national-bank notes under the act of June 20, 1874, while under the redemption system created by the same act over \$4,000,000 of national-bank notes have been retired—by far the largest part of this reduction taking place in the West and South, which, we are told, were starving for more circulation. By the 15th of September that figure had risen to nearly twenty-nine millions. How is this? The business of the country, as they tell us, suffering most terribly for want of currency, and that same business of the country not only not accommodating itself by issuing more when it has an opportunity, but voluntarily surrendering many millions of what it has.

Let the *Enquirer* explain. Perhaps that exponent of inflation wisdom will say now that we have not currency enough, to keep us from giving up that which we have got.

But there are the facts. There is contraction; not

contraction by the Government, not contraction by the Republican party, not contraction forced upon the business of the country, but a contraction of the currency voluntarily set on foot by the business of the country when that business was at perfect liberty to choose expansion as well. To carry out the somewhat homely figure, the diseased body economic refuses to take the medicine administered by quacks; nature makes an effort to right itself; the overcharged stomach begins to give up its undigested food, and disgorges currency for which there is no legitimate employment. That state of things would seem well calculated to convince any candid man of the true state of things. But the inflation doctors, nothing daunted, still, in spite of all this, insist upon treating the case as one of starvation, and propose, if the patient refuses to take it willingly, to ram down by force still more of the indigestible stuff. They evidently belong to that class of doctors to whom the sale of the medicine is more important than the cure of the patient.

And what good do you promise us your inflation medicine will do? A patent-elixir advertisement could not be richer than the declamations of its advocates. Prosperity is to revive at once; every man, woman and child is to have plenty of money; all debts are to be paid by a sort of self-acting process; every mine, every factory, every mill in the land is to be at once in full blast, and thousands of new establishments will spring up on all sides; they will produce an infinite quantity of goods, and for all they can produce there will be a ready market; everybody will want to buy everything, and have plenty of money to do it; the laboring man will command the situation; he will have to work less and get higher wages for it than ever; and in an incredibly short time we shall all be rich; or rather, while now the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, then the rich will get poor and the poor get rich, the

"money power" will be broken, for money will be cheap money, it will be "the people's money," and the more of it the better. This sort of talk, and even wilder than this, you can hear nowadays, not only in the lunatic asylums, but on the public platforms of Ohio, put forth by men pretending to be the spokesmen and leaders of a great party, who, on the strength of these very promises, attempt to take control of the destinies not only of Ohio, but of the great American Republic.

Is it not a sad spectacle indeed to see, not only public men reckless enough thus cruelly to mock the credulity of the poor and needy, but multitudes patiently listening to such raving absurdities, instead of repelling the insult thus wantonly offered to their good sense? An irredeemable paper money, cheap money, the people's money! Inflation the relief of the poor! I entreat you, laboring men, poor men, give me your candid attention one moment. Let your minds for once cast aside prejudice and party passion, and look soberly at the facts.

Suppose we issue more currency, as the Ohio platform euphoniously calls it, "to make and keep the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade"; in other words we embark in a course of inflation. I will not argue here the Constitutional point, whether Congress has the power to increase the volume of greenbacks beyond four hundred millions, and whether the Supreme Court, as I expect it would, might declare such an act void and of no force. Suppose it can be done without any legal impediment. How will it operate? Here is a capitalist, a rich man, a merchant of abundant means, or a wealthy speculator. In the morning he takes up his paper and reads: "Congress has passed an act to issue another hundred or two hundred millions of legal-tenders, with a prospect of more." He knows, as a matter of course, that thereupon the premium on gold will rise; the purchasing power of the greenback

dollar will decrease. The next piece of news he gets in or from Wall Street is: Gold is going up and likely to rise steadily. What does he do? He begins at once to trim his sail to the wind. He seeks a way to take advantage of the fluctuations going on or still in prospect, and being a man of means, commanding hundreds of thousands or even millions, he easily finds that way. If he is a cautious man, he has, of course, lent out money or given credit only on short time, and he at once calls in the money due him with rigorous severity, to save himself from the effects of depreciation. The debtor may groan, but he will have to pay or go into bankruptcy, for the rich man saves himself before the storm, and puts his money into investments not apt to be unfavorably affected by the fluctuations of the currency. If he be a merchant, he will at once put up his prices to provide against the depreciation of the currency, and sell only at large profits and for cash, for he is not anxious to sell, and being a wealthy man, not obliged to sell, knowing as he does that his goods will rise in current money value on his hands, while his credits would depreciate. So, by taking advantage of the fluctuations going on, which, as a man of means, he is able to do, he not only saves himself but makes a handsome profit by shrewd calculation. Or, if he be a speculator, and a somewhat venturesome man, he will speculate on the rise in the price of stocks or goods, in the true gambling style, and perhaps contrive to run into large liabilities, expecting to pay them off in a money of less value than that in which he contracted them. Happily, the latter species of operators will sometimes be caught, but not unfrequently they succeed. And so on through the whole chapter. Thus the rich man, having the means to play fast and loose, standing upon that eminence in the business world where he can feel the drift of every breeze and watch the appearance of every cloud on the horizon, enjoys the

fullest opportunity and all the facilities which wealth furnishes, amidst the fluctuations of the currency and of prices, to lend out or to draw in money, to give up one investment and to make another, to buy or to sell, to speculate upon a rise or a fall—in one word, to take advantage of every chance, not only for his safety, but for his profit, as his good judgment may suggest; and in the end he will, if he was a shrewd calculator, have grown richer than ever before, by those very fluctuations. And if you had your eyes open, you could not fail to observe that the time when an irredeemable currency, with its ever fluctuating changes of values, prevailed in this country was just the time when the rich men grew rapidly richer, and enormous accumulations of wealth fell into single hands.

But now look at the other side of the picture. Here is a laboring man who works for wages. He is honestly toiling to support himself and his family, and may be has succeeded in saving a few hundred dollars, and deposited them in a savings-bank. Now Congress resolves to issue more money in abundance, and inflation commences in good earnest. The laboring man, who has listened to Governor Allen or General Cary, thinks the millennium is coming. The "people's money" will be plenty. The gold premium rises, and the prices of commodities also. The worthy laborer does not, like the rich man, read the financial articles and the market reports in the metropolitan journals, and if he did it would be of no benefit to him. The rise of the gold premium troubles his mind very little, for the "people's money" is to be cheap and plenty. But some day he goes to the store, to buy things for his household and his family. To his surprise he finds that the prices of groceries and shoes and clothing and so on, have become much higher than before. "How is this?" he asks. "Well," says the dealer, "gold has gone up, I

have to pay much more for the goods I buy of the whole-sale merchant. Therefore I am obliged to charge more."

So the worthy laborer has to pay those higher prices, for he cannot wait for a better chance, like the rich man; he *must* buy shoes and clothes, or he himself and his wife and children will have to go barefooted or naked; he must buy provisions, for his family must eat. He consoles himself with the idea that the "people's money" will make it all right. After a while he discovers that with the high prices he has to pay for all his necessities, his wages are no longer sufficient to support him and his. So he goes to his employer and says: "Everything has become very dear, and I can no longer live on the wages you give me. You must give me more." What is the answer? "Well," says the employer, "things have gone up because gold has gone up so much. Wait a little, it will come all right again. The currency will fluctuate, and, you see, in my large business I cannot change my scale of wages every time gold goes up or down." He omits, however, to add that he has been very quick in marking up the prices of all he had to sell as soon as the upward movement commenced. The laborer shakes his head, but submits for the time being, hoping for a favorable change. But things do not come all right again. Prices rise still higher, while his wages remain the same. At last he finds his situation unendurable, and, combining with his fellow-laborers, he loudly demands higher pay. The employer yields, or rather seems to yield. Gold and prices have gone up thirty or forty per cent., and he grudgingly consents to increase wages about fifteen or twenty per cent. That is all he can do, he says, for "things are so uncertain." In the meantime, more "people's money," more greenbacks, are issued, to "make and keep the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade," gold and the prices of commodities rise still higher, while wages creep slowly

after them at a respectful distance. Meantime, the lease of the dwelling of our worthy laborer has expired, and he wants to renew it. The landlord demands a much higher rent. "Higher rent!" exclaims the laborer; "am I not fleeced enough already?" "Cannot help it," says the landlord; "gold and general prices have gone up so much, and our money is worth so little, that I must have higher rent to get along myself. You must pay or move." The laborer has to submit, but resolves to emancipate himself with "the people's money" from the greedy tyranny of the bloated landlord. He has something like two or three hundred dollars of old savings, in the savings-bank, and makes up his mind to build a home for himself and his family, the simplest kind of a little wooden house of two or three rooms and a kitchen, on a cheap little lot in the outskirts. Formerly his reserve of money would have gone far toward accomplishing that end, but, upon inquiry as to the present prices of ground and building material, he finds that, since "the people's money" has been issued in abundance, his own money will not go half as far as formerly toward giving him a home. In other words, about half of the purchasing power of the real value of his savings has disappeared. But, determined to escape from the tyranny of the landlord, he resolves to try whether he cannot, in addition to his own, borrow money enough to accomplish his purpose, for, of course, "the people's money" must be easy to obtain at low interest, being "the people's money." He applies to a money-lender for a couple of hundred at low interest, on two or three years' time, to be secured by mortgage on the house and lot. "Low interest and three years' time!" exclaims the money-lender. "My dear man, you do not understand the period. Since more and more greenbacks are issued the value of the dollar decreases rapidly, and if I lend you money now on three years' time, how do I know what that

money may be worth at the end of the three years? Perhaps ten cents in gold or nothing, and you cannot pay me interest enough to cover that risk."

The worthy laborer is surprised. He thought "the people's money would be cheap money." "But," he asks, "is no money lent out at all?" "Certainly," says the money-lender; "it is lent out, if good security is offered, on call, so that I can at any moment of fluctuation dangerous to my interests put my hand upon it and take it back again." "Then," pursues the laborer, "you would be able to seize at any moment upon the security I give if I cannot pay at once when you happen to want your money back? That will never do for me." "Just so," says the money-lender; "such loans can be used only by rich men, who can make sufficient means available at any time. Of course, it's nothing for the poor." The laborer grows more and more thoughtful. "But," he asks at last, despondingly, "is there no way at all to help me and to secure you in this thing?" "Well," replies the money-lender, "there may perhaps be one way. Suppose we figure out what the amount of money you want would be in gold, and I lend it to you in gold and you secure to me by a mortgage on your property the repayment of that sum in gold at the end of three years. That would do for me, and you might have the money at reasonable interest." The laborer ponders. "But," says he, at last, "how do I know how many greenback dollars I shall have to pay for a gold dollar at the end of three years? Perhaps five or ten to one." "That's true again," says the money-lender, coolly, and there the negotiation ends. The worthy laborer begins strongly to suspect that there must be something wrong about "the people's money," which is to be so cheap for the poor man.

But there are more curious experiences in store for him. The policy of "making and keeping the volume of the

currency equal to the wants of trade" requires the issue of larger and larger quantities of "the people's money," for the wants of trade, instead of being satisfied, demand more with every new issue. The prices of the necessities of life rise higher and higher as the value of the paper money goes down and down. The speculators and gamblers of the country do a roaring business. Prosperity develops to such a point that a bushel of coal costs twenty dollars, and a jackknife its weight in greenbacks. The worthy laborer's deposit in the savings-bank, once sufficient to build a little house, will no longer buy a decent pair of boots, and as the rise of the prices of necessities always runs far ahead of the rise of his wages, he has been rather consuming what he had than laying up new savings.

Finally the inevitable crash approaches. The prudent rich man has anticipated its coming and taken his precautions. He can do so, for he had the knowledge and the means. But the poor man is the victim of his necessities. To take precautions is not possible for him. He is swept along by the tide. A feeling of distrust creeps over the business community. One day our worthy laborer goes to his place of work as usual. "I am sorry," says the employer who sniffs the breeze,— "there is an overstocked market and a downward tendency; I am obliged to take in sail. I have but little work for you at low wages, or no work at all." At last the shipwreck is complete. The rich man is in the lifeboat, the poor man in the breakers. And nothing to float him.

About that time I hope Governor Allen and General Cary will come along and repeat their speeches about "the people's money." What will then the poor laborer say in response? "Talk to me about your people's money! It is the gambler's money, the bloodsucker's money, the sharper's money, the devil's money!" And it may then perhaps be wise for Governor Allen and General Cary

and the other apostles of "the people's money" to stay away from the streets where their robbed and outraged victims congregate. I apprehend the vengeance of the poor, which Mr. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, in this campaign so loudly threatened against the advocates of resumption, might turn the other way.

Have I exaggerated? Who that has ever studied the history of countries where an irredeemable paper currency prevailed, will deny that every word I have said is borne out by the universal experience of mankind? Who will deny that, when the depreciation of such a currency drives up prices, the laboring man's wages rise last and least? Who will deny that, when the bubbles of paper speculation burst, the laboring man's earnings are cut down first and lowest? Is our country an exception to the rule? The statistics compiled by the Labor Bureau of Massachusetts, corresponding with those of the United States census, show that the cost of living had risen sixty-one per cent. between 1860 and 1870-72, while the average increase in wages was but thirty. The greater the inflation, the greater the distance between prices and wages. And who does not know, when the crisis in 1873 came, that work stopped and wages went down a good while before the cost of living did? And who had to lose the difference? The laboring man. What follows? Of all agencies which human ingenuity can invent, there is none that so insidiously robs human labor of its earnings and makes the fortunes of the poor man the football of the rich, as a currency of fluctuating value. To call it the people's money is as cruel a mockery as to call loaded dice the honest man's chance against a sharper. It is the most insidious agency to make the rich richer and the poor poorer.

We are told that an expansion of the currency and its consequent depreciation will benefit the poor, inasmuch as

it will benefit the debtor as against the creditor by enabling the former to pay off his debts in a less value than that in which they were contracted. The morality of that argument I will not discuss; I prefer to leave it to the conscience of the people. But let us look at the pretended facts upon which it is based.

Is it true, then, the poor men are the debtors of the country? To contract a debt requires credit, and credit is based upon means with which to pay. Men of very small means are seldom in debt, because they have no opportunity for being so. If we had the statistics of private indebtedness in the United States before us they would unquestionably show that more than seventy-five per cent. of it is owing by men commanding comparatively large means, and that the laborers for wages are the least indebted class of society, even in proportion to their earnings and savings, and next to them the farmers and the small business men. But the laboring people are, to a very heavy amount, among the creditors of the country. I venture to say that there is neither a manufacturer, nor a merchant, nor a professional man of means in this assembly who is not a debtor, and among his creditors are, in ninety-nine cases of a hundred, his workmen or his servants, to whom he owes wages for part of a week or a month. It has been calculated by good authority that the wages thus constantly owing for an average of half a month's service or work amount, in the whole country, to \$120,000,000. And who is it that owns the deposits in the savings-banks, amounting to about \$760,000,000? Not the rich, but the laboring people and persons of small means, who put their surplus earnings there for safe keeping. It is estimated that the same class has, in national and private banks and in trust companies, another \$200,000,000 and that nearly \$130,000,000 is owing them in other kinds of debts. There is, then,

a sum of about \$1,200,000,000 owing to the laboring people and men of small means, constituting their savings. To that amount that class are creditors. And you pretend that for their benefit you will expand the currency. Gold being at fifteen per cent. premium, those savings have a value of \$1,020,000,000 in gold. Expand the currency until the gold premium is thirty, and you have robbed those people of \$180,000,000 of their savings; expand it until the gold premium is fifty, and you have stripped them of \$420,000,000 of hard-earned money. There are the pensioners of the United States, the disabled soldiers of the war, and the widows and orphans of those who died for all of us. They receive thirty millions a year, at present representing a gold value of \$25,500,000. Expand the currency until the gold premium is thirty, and you have filched away \$4,500,000 a year from what the Republic considers a debt of honor, and robbed the wounded and the widows and orphans of so much of their sustenance. Precious friends of the people those are who, under pretense of protecting the debtor against the creditor, rob the laborers of hundreds of millions of their hard-earned savings and despoil even those who have suffered for their country.

But is not a large portion of the middle class, small business men and farmers, in debt, and would they not be relieved by an expansion and depreciation of the currency? No doubt there are many of that class burdened with liabilities, although the number of mortgaged farms is much smaller than generally supposed. I find that here in Ohio scarcely one farm out of ten has any incumbrance. But however that may be, would that expansion of the currency benefit those debtors? I say, No! for a very simple reason. No sooner will expansion become the declared policy of the Government than capitalists, money-lenders and business men having money due them will be

upon their guard. Knowing that the expansion of the currency will subject their outstandings to progressive depreciation they will at once seek to anticipate that event. They will use every means in their power to get hold of their money, or, without mercy, clutch the property that secures it, and foreclosures, executions, sheriff's sales will be the order of the day. The creditor, to save himself, will appear in his most relentless temper, and in thousands of cases the debtor, thus getting rid of his indebtedness, together with his property, in the manner most disastrous to him, will have reason to curse those who pretended to relieve him by "making and keeping the volume of the currency equal to the wants of trade."

But I am sure that it is not from that class of honest debtors that the cry for inflation comes. It is another set of men of different character. I know them, for I have seen them haunting the lobbies of Congress and the avenues of the Capital when the financial question was under discussion and I am sure you have seen them here among the most clamorous advocates of inflation. I do not point to the political demagogue alone, who seeks to make some capital for himself by joining what he believes a popular cry. But I mean the disappointed speculators, who, instead of following the path of frugal and steady industry, tried quickly to get rich on their wits, by getting up large financial operations on a small capital of their own or on borrowed money, and who finding themselves baffled by an unfavorable turn of things, and involved in heavy liabilities, now want "the people's money" to help them out of the lurch and to pay their bills. Here it is a speculation in city lots; there a paper town at a river mouth or a railroad junction; then again a large operation in coal lands, or silver mines, or fancy stock or what not. What they desire, is by a large expansion of the currency, to plunge the country once

more into the fever of wild speculation, so that they may have an opportunity to palm off their elephants upon other people, and then, when they themselves have secured their prize, let "the devil take the hindmost." And men of this class are the most vociferous apostles of "the people's money."

Suppose they succeed in their scheme; suppose by inflation, the speculating fever be revived, and they not only get rid of their liabilities, but make millions of profit on their gambling enterprises, who will lose the millions they gain? Who will pay the cost? Not the victims alone who are foolish enough to take the speculating enterprises off their hands, and then are caught by the final crash inevitably to come. Such victims would, perhaps, deserve their fate. No, the cost would be paid by the laboring men of the country, whom the depreciation of the currency would plunder of the difference between the rise of the prices of necessities and the rise of wages. The cost would be paid by the industrious and frugal, whose deposited savings would be robbed of their value; by the pensioners, the disabled soldiers, the widows and orphans of the slain, whose slender incomes would be despoiled of their power to buy bread; by every honest man in the land, who would suffer in the game of overreaching which the inflated currency would bring with it. It is the "people's money" they call it.

But I tell the speculators they will not succeed in their scheme. They are making a very serious mistake in their calculation. They believe if we now inflate the currency things will go on as swimmingly as they did when, during the war, the legal-tenders were first issued and gradually augmented. They will soon perceive a very essential difference. When the legal-tenders were first issued our people had to gain their first experiences with an irredeemable Government currency since the Revolutionary War.

The greenback appeared, not as a trick of scheming financiers, but as the creature of public necessity. The people had full confidence in the integrity and good faith of the Government as to the fulfilment of its promises. When the events of the war went disastrously against us, doubts arose as to the ability of the Government to redeem its pledges, but not as to the honesty of its intentions. Those doubts affected the value of the paper money. But when the chances of war turned in our favor and at last the arms of the Union triumphed, there was scarcely a man in the land who did not believe that what the Government had promised would, as a sacred obligation, be faithfully performed. And the same confidence which the legal-tender commanded at home was commanded by our bonds abroad.

But if you inflate the currency under present circumstances, what will be the condition of things then? The additional greenback will not appear as the creature of an imperative public necessity, to save the life of the Republic in the extremity of peril. It will appear as the product of a scheme the purposes of which are dark. The world will begin to suspect that when a government, in the face of the disastrous experiences of mankind, resorts to so extraordinary and dangerous a measure without necessity, its integrity cannot longer be depended upon. Doubts will arise, and very serious doubts, not as to the ability, but as to the honest intentions of the Government to redeem its promises. And those doubts will fall upon our business life like a deadening blight. The last remnant of confidence will be paralyzed. The world will see the specter of repudiation looming up behind so reckless a financial policy. The faith of mankind in the integrity of our Government giving way, our credit will be shaken to its very foundations, and, as you sometimes see the depositors of a bank, excited by the rumor that the cashier

is making away with the cash, instinctively unite in a feverish run upon the counter, so you must not be surprised if, in the general alarm about threatening dishonesty, you see the securities, not only of the Government, but of our private corporations also, flung by the hundreds of millions into the market, producing a crash more fearful and destructive, and a paralysis more deadly to all our economic interests than any people on earth can remember for generations past.

That, fellow-citizens, is the feast to which the advocates of inflation invite you so blandly. That is the revival of business, that is the wonderful development of prosperity which they promise you in such glowing colors. That is the drift of the policy which is to set our factories whirling, to make our farmers rich, to give our laborers abundance of work and unprecedented wages, to put bread into the mouths of the needy. Open your eyes to the truth, and you find nothing but a prospect of bankruptcy more general, and paralysis more fatal, than ever before—although it may be a small consolation to the honest men of the country to see the reckless speculators, who, at the expense of all, sought to enrich themselves, engulfed with them in the same ruin.

But I ask you, with all candor and soberness, business men, farmers, laborers, honest and patriotic citizens of all classes, is it not time to stop such wanton schemes of mischief? Can we be so blind as not to see its tendency, or, seeing it, so reckless as to run so terrible a risk? I know as well as anybody that business is depressed and that many are grievously suffering. But does not the common-sense of mankind, does not the accumulated experience of history, does not our own recollection of past events clearly point out the road of improvement and relief?

There being an abundance of money in the banks that

lies unemployed, it is evidently not more money we need. What do we need, then? Confidence, confidence which will induce timid capital to venture into enterprise. And what is the first requirement to restore confidence? It is stability, above all things the stability of current values, which renders possible business calculations of reasonable certainty. When the capitalist is assured that the dollar of to-morrow will be the same as the dollar of to-day, and that this stability of value finds full security in a rational and fixed monetary system, then, and no sooner, will he liberally trust his money to those who want actively to employ it and promise a fair return. But confidence will not grow as long as the prospect that the wild schemes of demagogues or visionaries may obtain control of our National finances hangs over the business world like a threatening storm-cloud. Confidence will not grow as long as every business man in the country looks with trepidation for the meeting of the National Congress, and does not cease to tremble until the welcome day of its adjournment, for fear lest the counsels of folly might prevail and cross even the most sensible calculation and baffle the acutest foresight. Confidence will not return until a financial policy is unalterably determined upon, which will give us, not more money, but HONEST, SAFE money. For honest, safe money is, of all foundations of sound business, the most indispensable.

Let us understand the teachings of our own history. There are many among us who remember the great crises of 1837 and 1857 in the United States. In both cases the country was flooded with an ill-secured, unsafe bank currency, and feverish speculation prevailed. Then the crash came. Speculation collapsed, the bubble of fictitious values burst, the rotten banks broke, and their currency was swept away. Business was paralyzed; the people were in distress as they are now. What remedy

was applied? The natural, the only efficient remedy, and it *applied itself*. No fresh infusion of more unsafe money; no, just the reverse. By the breaking of the rotten banks and the disappearance of their note issues the volume of the currency contracted itself violently. There was, at the end of the process, far less money in circulation than before, but that which remained was sound money. People came to their senses. Profiting by the teachings of misfortune, they began to recognize once more that not wild speculation, not the creation of imaginary values, but honest, sturdy, frugal industry is the source of real wealth and prosperity. When the first effects of the great shock were over, when the lies and deceptions in the shape of rotten bank issues and fancy values had disappeared, when the self-acting contraction of currency and credit had done its work, business enterprise began once more to feel firm ground under its feet. Business men had less of that which called itself money, but they were sure that every dollar they did have not only called itself a dollar, but was a dollar and would remain a dollar. Upon the stability of its value they could unhesitatingly base their calculations. Thus confidence gradually returned; the gaps in the volume of the currency were presently filled, not by act of Congress creating paper issues, but by gold flowing in from abroad in obedience to the laws of trade, and notes based upon gold; business enterprise revived, and soon the country was again in the course of prosperous development. To be sure, the fancy stocks and speculative values, which had perished in the crash, did not recover, but the production of real wealth was more active than before.

Look at these historic events, and then ask yourselves: What would have been the effect if Congress had tried to relieve distress and to revive business by making the notes of the broken banks a legal-tender, or by creating an irre-

deemable Government paper currency? A new element of fluctuation and uncertainty would have been thrown into the general confusion; the stock gamblers and speculators might perhaps have succeeded in loading their rotten ventures upon the shoulders of new victims; but the stagnation of legitimate business would unquestionably have continued, capital would surely not have ventured out, confidence would not have returned, the general distress would certainly have lingered on, until at last that element of unsafety and deception—an irredeemable and fluctuating currency—had been wiped out, and the business of the country had been placed again on the sound basis of the stability of current values.

Can we fail to understand that lesson? Examine the crisis which broke out two years ago, in September, 1873. That crash did not contract our currency; on the contrary, what there was remained, and shortly after the volume of greenbacks was increased twenty-five millions by successive issues from the so-called reserve. Money did not disappear, as it did in 1837 and 1857. There was more of it than before, and yet the general stagnation and suffering continue, and the future appears to us dark and gloomy, without any sign of improvement. Yes, we have more money than before; but who of you can tell me what that money will be worth twenty days after the opening of the next session of Congress? Who of you can tell me what wild antics that money may play with the fortunes of all of us, if those who clamor for inflation now should obtain control of the National Government a year hence? And now, feeling as we do with every step, instead of firm ground, a treacherous quicksand under our feet, is there still anybody who asks why confidence does not revive, why capital timidly shrinks back, why the mass of money idly accumulated in the banks does not trust itself into the hands of enterprise, why prosperity does not return,

and why the horizon is still without a visible ray of hope?

My fellow-citizens, all sane men agree that, of the great problem which oppresses us, there is but one ultimate solution. It is the return to a specie basis. Whatever other schemes may be devised, they do not even pretend to have a permanent, final settlement of the question in view. The resumption of specie payments is the only rational one, for no other system will remove current values from the reach of the arbitrary power of Government; no other can give to current values that stability without which no safe business calculations can be made; no other can restore that confidence which is the first prerequisite of a new period of prosperity. But the resumption of specie payments is also the only possible solution. It must at last come. Even the inflationists, while wildly seeking to throw difficulties in its way, still admit that finally it must come. It is as inevitable as fate. Is it not the part of prudent men, then, to move resolutely and with unflagging firmness in the direction of an end so desirable and also so inevitable?

I shall certainly not attempt to deceive you by denying that when a country is once cursed with an irredeemable paper money, the resumption of specie payments is not an easy process. Like the cutting out of a cancer, it is an unpleasant and difficult operation. But if health is to be restored, the cancer must be cut out. It is one of those evils which cannot be cured without pain and cannot be permitted to linger without peril. Delay will only prolong the suffering and increase the danger.

This is neither the time nor the place for a discussion of the different methods to bring on resumption. What we have at present to do is to stem a mischievous movement which threatens to make it impossible. But any of those methods, even the most painful, will be far less so

than a continuance of the present diseased condition of uncertainty and distrust, which wastes the working energies of the people in desolate stagnation, and, like a dry rot, eats up our prosperity. And surely, even the severest cramp to which resumption might subject the economic body will be nothing compared with the universal disaster, ruin and disgrace with which the madness of inflation would inevitably overwhelm us.

Indeed, is there any choice? We shall inevitably have a resumption of specie payment sometime; if not by a careful method, embodied in well considered legislation, then surely in another way. Then we shall drift on until our present system bears its legitimate fruit; until by a destructive convulsion our paper money is swept out of existence, and, suddenly finding ourselves without any currency, except what little specie there is left in the country, we commence business again on a very small scale. But will you not then, sitting upon the wrecks of your fortunes, wistfully look back to these days and say: "Then we should have been resolute enough to do what was necessary, and all would be better now"?

I appeal once more to the farmers, the small traders, the laboring men of the land: Will you really permit the world to think you so weak-minded as to believe that the increase of paper money would be equivalent to a Government officer going round the country with a large bag full of greenbacks to put some into the hands of every one who wants them? Or that, when you have a mortgage which troubles you, or a note to pay, or desire a loan, the Government will step in and hand you the funds? Or that the Government will, by issuing more paper money, constitute itself a sort of a rich uncle, whose business and pleasure it is to keep the pockets of the boys full of cash? Surely you are too sensible to believe in so glaring an absurdity. And yet, such are the impressions those seek to create

who, as advocates of inflation, call themselves the special champions of the laboring man and the poor.

The least reflection will certainly convince you that, whatever our financial policy may be, whether there be much or little money, he who wants to get it must earn it. The capitalist will gain it by profitable investments, the trader by buying and selling, the farmer by raising crops, the laborer by the work of his hand. Nobody will get it for nothing. But, if, under all circumstances, you must gain it by hard work, must you not see that it is manifestly for your interest to have money the value of which is certain? Must it not be clear to you that, while the capitalist may operate with money of changing value to his advantage, you with money whose purchasing power may dwindle in your hands to less and less and, maybe, finally to nothing must always be the losers in the game? Are there not many among you who remember that in the times of wild-cat banks, in working for such money, they worked not unfrequently for nothing? And does it not occur to you that if the inflation scheme prevails, the same thing may, nay, surely will, happen to you also? For do not indulge in any delusion about it, the gambling in which an irredeemable currency, a paper money of ever-changing value, is the principal element, is not a game for the laboring man, the poor man, to play. In that game only those win who deal.

An attempt is made to deceive you with a well sounding catchword. They call gold the bondholders' money, and our irredeemable paper money "the people's money." Can that be "the people's money" whose value in the people's hands is apt to vanish into nothing, and is sure to vanish into nothing if much more of it is issued? I, too, am in favor of a people's money, but it is of another kind. No, it is not right that the people should have a money of less value than the bondholder. It should be equal-

ized. But how? You cannot take from the bondholder his gold, unless you repudiate our National obligations, which, as honest and patriotic Americans, who have the honor of the country at heart, you will not do. Neither can you bring the bondholder's gold down to the level of your paper money as long as that paper money remains what it now is, or is made even worse. But what you can do is to lift your paper money up to the level of the bondholder's gold, so that you can get gold in exchange for it. That can be done only by a return to specie payments. Then it will indeed be the people's money, and the bondholders will have no better. It will be true people's money, for then your dollar will be and remain a real dollar, no longer a lying piece of paper, whose value depends upon the tricks of demagogues, and about which you have to inquire every morning what it is worth.

But I would go farther to make the people's money secure. If, after the restoration of specie payments, my opinion could be made to prevail, no bank in the United States, nor the Government itself, should be permitted to issue a note of a denomination less than five dollars. "What!" I hear the inflationists exclaim, "you would take the convenience of small notes from the people?" Yes, I would let them have something better. They should handle gold and silver. It is the small currency that most circulates among the people of small means, and it is of vital importance to them that that small currency be most secure in its value. It is a wise policy in pursuance of which the Bank of England does not issue a note under five pounds. The effect is not only that more gold and silver circulate and remain in the country, but even the great Bank of England may break, and yet every shilling in the pockets of the people is safe. That is the true "people's money," which I want the laboring men of America to have.

Does not your good sense tell you that thus your interests would be infinitely better secured, than by a currency which, by its treacherous fluctuations, makes you the helpless victim of chance?

But are you ever to have that true people's money again? Yes, if by a wise policy we resolutely work toward specie resumption. Then in a few years. But surely not for a long while, if the schemes of the inflationists prevail. In that case you will get it only when, after years of struggle and suffering, by an excessive increase of the currency—in a universal crash—the whole system will have broken down, when every paper dollar will have become worthless, when all you now possess will have been swept away, and when you are then called upon to begin again with nothing, and earn once more your first dollar. Do you like that prospect?

Indeed, while I can understand how the gambling speculator, who finds it profitable to fish in troubled waters and who makes his gains from other people's losses, should be in favor of inflation, it is utterly amazing to me how the working man, all of whose material interests are bound up in honest money, could ever be prevailed upon to listen a single moment to the treacherous doctrines that would deliver him bound hand and foot into the meshes of a system which in its very nature is robbery itself. Let me tell the laboring men that they have no more heartless enemies than those pretended friends, who, with artful catchwords playing upon their credulity, seek to make them believe that they possess the secret of alchemy with which to create wealth out of nothing, and with that nothing to make those happy who serve their purposes. If their schemes, unfortunately, should prevail, then the time will surely come for their poor victims to curse the day when they foolishly followed such treacherous counsel and curse the men who administered it.

A word, now, to those Democrats who, in their hearts, still adhere to their old, good creed, and would spurn the false doctrines of their present leaders did they not consider themselves by supposed party interest bound to submit. I do not speak to you as a partisan, for I am none. I am in earnest when I say that all I desire for this country and myself is Constitutional, honest, just and wise government, and little does it matter to me at the hands of what party the country receives it, provided it be in truth Constitutional, honest, just and wise. Neither do I conceal from you my opinion that the old parties, as now constituted, are ill-fitted to solve that problem, and that an active union of the best elements of the two would better serve the purpose. But if the two old parties are to continue to divide the field, then, for the sake of the public interest, I want each of them to be as good, and not as bad as possible; for it is certain that in the derelictions and vices of one the bad elements in the other will find a license for wrongdoing on their part, without forfeiting their chance of success. I might appeal to you as patriots to whom the best interests of the Republic should stand above all other considerations. But since you seem to believe that the interests of the Republic are to be served by your party alone, I speak to you as partisans who desire to promote the efficiency of their organization for good ends.

Have you considered what consequences the success of the inflation Democracy of Ohio will bring on? Imagine that its candidates be elected and its policy be indorsed by the people of this State; imagine the movement spreading and imposing its doctrines upon the Democratic National Convention next year. What then? All of you, hard-money Democrats, will be remorselessly sent to the rear; your influence will be utterly crushed out, for the men who will then rule your party want none of you. Why do I say this? Not to appeal to a selfish impulse,

but because it is true, and I sincerely regret it, for I deem it most desirable for the public good that each party be guided by its best men.

But more than that. Suppose the inflation Democracy, having taken possession of the national organization of your party, do succeed in their rush for the National power, and, having one of their own in the Presidential chair, and a majority in Congress, proceed to carry out their program. What then? Then unlimited inflation, and, as an inevitable consequence, universal bankruptcy and ruin more destructive than ever. And then? Remember, the attitude of your party on the slavery issue, and questions connected with the civil war, has cost you sixteen years' exile from power. Let your party become responsible now for the disasters which inflation will bring with it, and it will be looked upon as the common enemy, and any organization that in four years may rise up against it will be able to wipe it out of existence, however rotten in morals that organization may be itself. What is, then, the true dictate of your party allegiance in its nobler sense? To preserve in your party the power of doing good service by defeating those who seek to make it only an engine of mischief and of suicide. And how are you to defeat them? I remember the time when I received high compliments at your hands for having shown independent spirit enough to oppose my own party by voting against it when I considered it in the wrong. This is a great emergency, in which a signal service is to be done for the best interests of the country; and you, hard-money Democrats of Ohio, can find no better opportunity to enable me to return your compliments for the patriotic spirit of independent action.

Indeed, it is a great emergency. I solemnly appeal to every good citizen of this State to be mindful of his responsibility. Upon your action on the 12th of October

hangs a great decision. If the people of Ohio strike down the inflation movement in their midst, that will be its final overthrow. It may linger on, but the power of its onset will be broken. If Ohio fail and the advocates of barbarism and ruin rush victoriously into the field of next year's greater contest, then who knows? Future generations may have to look back upon the one hundredth anniversary of American independence—the year which, before all others, should fill the National heart with the noblest aspirations—as one of the blackest years in the history of the Republic. To meet the danger here is, therefore, the first thing needful. Upon the honest men of all parties I call to unite in a common effort. Let no one fear that the defeat of an opposition party which uses the advantages of its position to promote such nefarious schemes will be interpreted as an approval of wrongs on the other side, for, I assure you, when this great danger which threatens to engulf us all in a whirlpool of corruption, ruin and dishonor is successfully averted, you will find the men who combated the wrongs of either side as true as ever to their principles.

Citizens of Ohio, you are charged with a great office. You have to give the world the assurance that the people of the great American Republic are an honest and an enlightened people; that their integrity and intelligence may be trusted alike, and that mankind may count upon them in the forward march of civilization. I entreat you, do not fail in so glorious a duty.

FROM CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

31 PEMBERTON SQUARE,
BOSTON, Oct. 13, 1875.

I got home this morning, serene in the knowledge that "old Bill Allen's" grey and gory scalp was safely dangling

at your girdle. The world will never know it, but *I* was a leading factor in yesterday's result, for it was I who first agitated your return as the one helve which could complete the German axe necessary to the braining of that aged barbarian.

Be so good as to present my respects to Mrs. Schurz, and tell her that I am thoroughly impenitent and shall be glad to do it again.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

NEW YORK, Oct. 15, 1875.

Yes, the scalp is there. The majority is large enough, but nothing to spare.

I suppose the result will pacify Mrs. Schurz, and you may approach with fear. But as to doing it again, well, it will depend on circumstances.

Looking over the whole field, I find that the Independent voter is doing well and getting ready for the more important work of next year.

Give my best regards to all the Adamses.

FROM ALPHONSO TAFT

CINCINNATI, Oct. 16, 1875.

I cannot deny myself the pleasure of writing to you, both thanking and congratulating you for the splendid and effectual work done by you in Ohio, in the cause of a sound currency. Your speech in Cincinnati, I read, but did not hear, because I found all the approaches to Turner Hall so solidly packed, that any entrance was impossible. I hope that your assistance, so opportunely rendered, may not only save the country from further paper inflation, and hasten the return to specie payments, but may so far liberalize the Republican party that our German Liberals may feel at home in it.

FROM A. T. WICKOFF¹

COLUMBUS, O., Oct. 26, 1875.

On behalf of the Republicans of Ohio we thank you for the very valuable aid you gave the cause of honest money during the recent canvass in this State. Much of the credit for the victory gained at the late election is due to you for the very able and convincing manner in which you presented to the people the questions at issue. You deserve and have the thanks of the people of this country for your effective services in opposition to the ruinous fallacy of inflation and irredeemable paper money.

We owe you an apology for not having paid the expenses incurred by you, and earnestly request you to indicate the amount and we will remit.

TO A. T. WICKOFF

NEW YORK, Nov. 2, 1875.

Yesterday I received your letter of Oct. 26th which was sent after me to this city. I sincerely thank you for the very kind things you say of my efforts to aid the cause of honest money in the Ohio election.

As to your request that I should indicate the amount of the personal expenses incurred by me, which you express your desire to remit, permit me to say that I prefer not to make any demands or accept any such compensation. I was glad to have an opportunity to do what I did do and feel amply compensated by the result.

TO SAMUEL BOWLES

40 WEST 32ND ST., NEW YORK,
Jan. 4, 1876.

My dear Bowles: A happy New Year to you and yours! Is it not about time you should set out on your Southern

¹ Chairman State Republican committee.

tour? You will have to look up there men fit to coöperate with us. I have written letters to my friends in the West and think we shall have from that quarter what we desire. But in the South my acquaintance is limited and it will be for you to make the necessary discoveries. Here in New York we can have what we want. Strong efforts are made here for Blaine and Bristow. Our friend Phelps has again succumbed under the "personal magnetism" of the former, and Nordhoff also. It seems they have so far engaged themselves that the chances of recovery are slim. I do my very best, but with little hope. I fear we must make up our minds to get along without them. The Bristow movement is so right in principle that it deserves encouragement, and I think a large number of the men engaged in it will finally act with us, and we have this with them in common, that Bristow is our second choice anyhow, and right heartily too. I should like to see you very much to have a full exchange of opinions on the present condition of things. If you go to the South soon you might stop over here long enough for that purpose. I shall be here all of this week and until Wednesday of next, and then two or three days of every week until the time for action comes. Lodge wrote me some time ago that you wanted a demonstration in Boston for Adams now. They are afraid there that it might fail, and any such failure at the present moment would be fatal. My impression is that no such risk should be taken at present. I suggested to Lodge that it would be well to have a committee of Republicans organized there, consisting of such men as W. Gray, Allen etc., to work "inside the party" to secure a Republican delegation for Adams. Would not such a movement in the interior of the State also do good? It could be carried on openly and "demonstrate" in its way. There are undoubtedly good men enough to take part in it.

A rumor comes here from Boston, apparently from circles in which Mr. Adams moves, that he is failing in his mental faculties etc. Can this be so? I have seen him several times of late and found him uncommonly bright and mentally active, in fact, more so than I had expected, or than I had ever seen him.

TO SAMUEL BOWLES

NEW YORK, Jan. 16, 1876.

I have been corresponding with a number of my friends in the West and I find that the idea of a meeting to be called "to devise measures to prevent the campaign of the Centennial year from becoming a mere scramble of politicians for the spoils" etc. etc., is taking very well. My correspondence has been entirely confidential so far. I am confident now we can have a respectable meeting as soon as it is time to issue the invitations.

I agree with you in thinking that circumstances are growing more and more propitious. It seems almost as if Blaine had virtually killed himself as a candidate,¹ as I always thought he would. He may seemingly revive, but I am sure he will die of too much smartness at last. The effect produced by the revival of the war feeling in Congress is a very hopeful sign. It shows how strong the Centennial current is, and I begin to hope that Pennsylvania, which of all the States but recently appeared the least promising, may fall into our hands if the Centennial idea be well worked up in the progress of the independent movement. I have drawn up an address which I want to submit to you as soon as it is finished. The Republican National Committee has put off the Convention later

¹ By his passionate speech of Jan. 10, 1876, in the House, against ex-Confederates. See 3 *Reminiscences*, 365.

than I expected, but it is well. We have now plenty of time for preparatory work, and of all places in the country Cincinnati is the one where we can organize the strongest pressure.

The two parties are evidently busy using up one another in Congress. They are doing our work splendidly, and it is quite likely that in about two months they will be sufficiently disgusted, not only with one another, but each one with itself.

In the meantime I think we ought to keep Adams in the background, except in private conversation. I not only considered him the best, but in the Centennial year also by far the strongest candidate. All that should be done for him directly is to secure for him the Massachusetts delegation in the Republican National Convention. At present, I think, he had better not appear in the press at all. Blaine will, I expect, put forth a very strong effort to secure the Massachusetts delegation for himself, but that can probably be counteracted now without much difficulty.

Do you know Governor Chamberlain of South Carolina? Can you get into correspondence with him? We ought to have him with us.

. . . We, *i. e.*, you and I, ought to meet about a fortnight from to-morrow and establish thorough concert of action. I shall by that time have elaborated a complete plan of operations and ought to have your judgment upon it.

My whole house asks to be kindly remembered.

TO BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW¹

NEW YORK, Feb. 15, 1876.

General [James H.] Wilson and General Burnett are just discussing with me the propriety of your offering your resignation, and have also stated to me the reasons

¹ Secretary of the Treasury from June, 1874, to June, 1876.

which are thought to justify such a course. They give me to understand that my opinion on that matter would be of some interest to you, and presuming upon that assurance I take the liberty of giving it with entire frankness.

The American people consider you their agent and representative in the present Administration. You are expected to do their work without regard to the influences that may be arrayed against you. As long as any of that work is to be done and you are permitted to do it, I do not think that public opinion would approve of your throwing up your commission. I can readily understand that your position may be made very uncomfortable by the influences most potent with the President; but as long as you can hold the fort, which seems the only one left to the people in this Administration, I do not think you should surrender it as long as there is a shot in the magazine. And when your position has become altogether untenable, it appears to me that it would be better for the public interest, not to retire voluntarily but to force upon the Administration the responsibility of removing you and stopping your work. You may be more and more isolated in Washington, but you may be sure, also, that the people will gather round you the more strongly and earnestly, the greater the difficulties you have to face and the more resolution you show in fighting them.

Of course, I do not want to obtrude my opinion upon you, but you may look upon it as the candid advice of a sincere friend.

FROM BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,
Feb. 18, 1876.

I thank you sincerely for your kind letter of the 16th [15th] inst. Such an act of kindness just now is peculiarly gratifying. I am not able to say that your suggestions are in any respect

open to doubt, and yet the difficulties in the way of adopting and acting upon them are very great—I mean not only the personal discomfort, but also the impossibility of performing my official duties creditably or satisfactorily so long as matters remain *in statu quo*. However, I suppose it is my duty to do the best I can and act on emergencies as they arise.

It will afford me great pleasure to receive suggestions from you from time to time as they may occur to you, and I hope you will feel no hesitancy in giving them.

Please accept my thanks for the kindness already done me and believe me

Gratefully and faithfully yours.

TO B. B. CAHOON¹

NEW YORK, March 3, 1876.

I have received your kind note of February 25th and thank you most sincerely for it. Your letter to a member of the Republican committee I have also read in the papers, and I agree with every word you say concerning the condition of the Republican party in Missouri and the process it has to go through in order to save, or rather restore, its vitality. Recent developments, and especially the terrible disclosures in the Belknap case, must have made it painfully apparent to every candid man, who did not know it before, that the same reasoning would apply with equal force to the national organization of the party. We have to face the fact that the machinery of the Government is fairly honeycombed with corruption. The Republic stands before the world in an attitude of unprecedented humiliation and shame. In order to save the honor of the Nation and the confidence of the American people in their Government, no ordinary party claptrap will avail. We must elect a man to the Presi-

¹ A lawyer of distinction, living at Fredericktown, Mo.

dency who is not only known to be honest himself, but who by his character and antecedents gives the strongest guarantees that he will be strong enough to keep the Government honest. If neither of the two parties gives us such a candidate, then I hope there will be independent men enough to put up one for themselves, even if they should cast for him only a conscience vote.

Believing you my friend and trusting you as such, I speak to you without reserve. I will not conceal from you that I should be glad to coöperate with the Republican party if I can do so consistently with my notions of duty. This is my natural inclination. But I shall not do so at the risk of continuing anything like the present condition of things. If the Republicans nominate a mere partisan, then I think it would be better for the country to have that party pass for four years through the discipline of defeat. I feel naturally drawn to that party because it contains in its ranks, as I think, a vast preponderance of the intelligence and virtue of the country; but that virtue and intelligence have been of little use to the Republic since they were controlled by the worse elements of the organization. Unless their emancipation can be accomplished now, it may be accomplished by defeat.

I hope, however, such a necessity may still be averted. If I could nominate a ticket, it would be Adams and Bristow. But Bristow at the head of the ticket would completely satisfy me. He has shown that he possesses the courage necessary for a policy of reform. But I must say that of all the men who have been mentioned as the possible Republican candidates, Adams and Bristow are *the only ones* I would trust and accept. If the Republican Convention rejects these, it shows that it obeys the behest of the machine politicians to whom the most valuable qualities of a candidate are the most serious objection, and I shall, as an independent American citizen,

govern my course accordingly. I know a good many who will do likewise.

I write you this, not for publication, but confidentially, so that we may understand one another. I shall *always be sincerely glad* to hear from you. Can you send a good delegation to Cincinnati? Spare no effort.

TO SAMUEL BOWLES

NEW YORK, Mar. 7, 1876.

The Belknap case has changed the whole aspect of things. I agree with you that the Adams idea will naturally come into the foreground again. I would be well satisfied with Bristow,—as my second choice, but as such an exceedingly satisfactory one. I deem it quite possible, however, that Bristow may not turn out sufficient for the situation, especially if he sticks to the party. But I would advise you—and especially *you*—to go on talking Bristow.

I am meditating a sort of pronunciamento to come out one of these days, in which I mean to declare that I shall not support any candidate who does not come up to the Bristow standard, and that the people owe it to themselves to take the matter out of the hands of the old parties etc.

What do you think of it? Let me hear from you and send me the *Republican* sometimes.

NEW YORK, Mar. 27, 1876.

I have tried to gather myself up and do something.¹ The enclosed is a draft of an invitation to a conference

¹ Mrs. Schurz had recently died.

which has already been submitted for signature to Mr. Wm. Cullen Bryant, President Woolsey, Governor Bullock, and Governor Koerner of Illinois.¹ I desire Governor Booth's signature and should have written to him, did I know what his position on these things is. Not knowing this I would ask you, his most intimate friend, to request him in my name to sign it, if you think it ought to be done. I would then sign the paper myself and address it with those signatures to about 2[00] or 300 persons. Lodge and Brooks Adams are here, helping me—for I must confess, I am not fit for much work yet. They want to see you concerning the list of men to be invited from New England. The intention is to hold the Conference at Cincinnati on April 27th, but that point is open and I have requested the opinion of the gentlemen who are to sign the invitation.

Now, will you be kind enough to take the necessary steps to have Booth sign that paper? I thought you could prevail upon him if anybody could. Of course, the whole affair ought to be kept *strictly confidential* until the proper time comes to let it out. About that, more hereafter.

P.S. As there is no time to be lost I would ask you to get Booth's signature as speedily as possible, and let me hear whatever suggestions you may desire to make.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, Mar. 30, 1876.

My dear Senator: I certainly do not deem the words of sympathy you have so kindly sent me, intrusive. They have done my heart good, for I know they are sincere, and sincerely do I thank you for them.

¹ See Circular of Apr. 6, 1876.

May you long enjoy the inestimable blessing of an unbroken family circle. This is the best wish I have for you as a true friend.—Ever yours.

TO BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

NEW YORK, Mar. 31, 1876.

General [James H.] Wilson informed me yesterday of what you had written to him in reply to a communication from him to you. It appears that the impression he received from a conversation between him and myself and a few friends, was not altogether correct. What we, and especially I, desired to impress upon him, was that the party machine men would surely prevent the nomination of a true reformer for the Presidency, unless they were made very clearly to understand that they cannot do so with impunity. That class of politicians will control the Republican Convention, and they will do the worst they dare. All indications on the political field point that way. Nothing but the alternative of the nomination of a true reformer, or defeat, will induce them to permit the former. How that alternative can be placed before them in a way best calculated to lead to the desired result, it is as yet too early to determine. It will depend on the circumstances surrounding us when the time for action arrives.

I write these lines mainly to remove a misapprehension from your mind. You may rest assured that your name will not be trifled or made free with, and that you will in no manner be compromised or embarrassed by me and those under my influence. I think I understand and appreciate your position perfectly, and I need scarcely add that I respect your feelings with regard to it. Neither will the success of the good cause be hazarded by any

rash or ill-considered proceedings. You have not been consulted about the movements now in preparation simply because it is best—and I am sure it appears so to you as it does to me—that you should have no personal connection with anything of the kind. I had to-day a long conversation with a prominent member of the Union League of this city, Judge [James] Emott, and there is some hope that we may find a mode of coöperating with the friends of reform in that association.

There can be no harm, however, in my stating to you my own individual view of the exigencies of our present situation, and I have good reason to think that it is shared by many good citizens. While after the great domestic sorrow that has befallen me it would be more in accordance with my feelings to abstain from all participation in public affairs, yet I shall obey the call of duty. I should be happy to coöperate with my old Republican friends in the impending canvass, and ardently desire that this be made consistent with my convictions. Now, we have been so deeply disgraced in the estimation of mankind by the exposures of corruption in our public service, and the faith of many of our people in our institutions has been so dangerously shaken, that the selection of men *universally known* to be of our very best, for the highest offices of the Republic, is the most imperative duty of these times. The country cannot afford anything else. Submission to a mere choice of evils, or the election of men who would be likely to be mere tools in the hands of greedy party managers, would only deepen the disgrace of the American people; and if the political parties present to us nothing else, then I shall deem it my duty to my country to be one of those, however large or small their number, who will take an appeal from the existing organizations and put forward candidates such as ought to be presented to the people at a time like this. The main value the

Republican party has in my eyes, consists in the fact that it contains more of the intelligence and virtue of the people, than any other. But if that intelligence and virtue are subjugated and made a tool of by corrupt interests, then the good of the country will in the long run be better served, if the party is purged of its bad elements in the crucible of defeat.

TO FRANCIS A. WALKER¹

NEW YORK, April 6, 1876.

Dear Sir: The widespread corruption in our public service which has disgraced the Republic in the eyes of the world and threatens to poison the vitality of our institutions,—the uncertainty of the public mind and of party-counsels as to grave economical questions involving in a great measure the honor of the Government, the morality of our business life and the general well-being of the people,—and the danger that an inordinate party spirit may through the organized actions of a comparatively small number of men who live by politics, succeed in overriding the most patriotic impulses of the people and in monopolizing political power for selfish ends—seem to render it most desirable that no effort should be spared to secure to the popular desire for genuine reform a decisive influence in the impending National election.

Mindful of the fact that this patriotic desire is honestly struggling for effective expression inside of existing political organizations, as it is also strong outside of them, and believing that by all proper means it should be encouraged and made to prevail, the undersigned invite you to meet them and others of like purpose, who have

¹ Circular call of the Fifth Avenue Hotel conference. See letter of Apr. 15, 1876, to L. A. Sherman.

been invited in the same manner, in a free conference to consider what may be done to prevent the National Election of the Centennial year from becoming a mere choice of evils, and to secure the election of men to the highest offices of the Republic, whose character and ability will satisfy the exigencies of our present situation and protect the honor of the American name.

The conference will be held in the city of New York on the 15th of May. You are respectfully and urgently requested to be present, and to communicate your acceptance of this invitation to H. C. Lodge, Esq., 31 Beacon St., Boston.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT, New York.

THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, Connecticut.

ALEXANDER H. BULLOCK, Massachusetts.

HORACE WHITE, Illinois.

CARL SCHURZ, Missouri.

TO F. W. BIRD

NEW YORK, April 13, 1876.

I knew I had your hearty sympathy in my great sorrow, and I need not assure you that I prize it. You know very well that for a grief like this there is no real consolation. It must be lived out. The loss of the wife of one's youth is unlike any other bereavement. It is the loss of the best part of one's life. The joys of the past are darkened with mourning, and the future this side of the grave seems aimless and hollow. I shall learn to endure it, I think, and meanwhile fix my eyes upon the duties of life and try to perform them as best I can. I have commenced work again and shall gradually get hardened to it.

I thank you once more for the warm sympathy and

friendship your letter expresses. Remember me kindly to Mrs. Bird and your children and believe me
Faithfully yours.

TO L. A. SHERMAN¹

NEW YORK, April 15, 1876.

Private.

Thanks for your kind letter. Let me say that I remember you very well and am sincerely glad to hear from you. I am also happy to learn that the movement in favor of a strong reform candidate like Mr. Bristow is growing in favor with the Republicans of Michigan. Be assured that all I desire is, not to embarrass, but to strengthen it. By the time this reaches you, you will have seen in the papers the full text of an invitation to a Conference to be held in the City of New York, signed by five citizens, of whom I am one. The terms of that invitation must have convinced you that due regard is paid to the friends of genuine reform inside of the Republican party. With regard to this movement I desire to bring to your notice a few points:

1. It is not confined to the Liberals of 1872. There are a good many men of influence connected with it who so far have been counted as Republicans in good standing.

2. It is not intended to assume any attitude hostile to the Republican party, provided that party nominates men of known character and ability as thorough reformers; and it is thought that a strong but at the same time inoffensive expression of the sentiments of the independent element will very materially strengthen the friends of reform inside of the party, and make the machine

¹ Editor of *The Times*, Port Huron, Mich.

men appreciate the alternative of good nominations or defeat.

3. There is at present, as far as I can learn, no intention of making independent nominations at the meeting we contemplate. But we do desire to make our sentiments and opinions with regard to the requirements of our present situation clearly understood, so that there be no mistake about them, reserving to ourselves the right of acting according to our convictions of duty when the Cincinnati Convention shall have taken place.

To this only those Republicans will object who desire to continue the existing abuses of party government and who find us as a stumbling-block in their way. But the friends of reform in the Republican party will welcome us as their friends and natural allies, as we shall be glad to consider them; and it gives me great pleasure to say that many prominent Republicans in this region, as also in the Western States, are already taking that view of the matter. That I, personally, am not "hostile" to the Republican party when it promotes the best interests of the country, I have shown, I think, last fall in Ohio.

While I know that the reform sentiment in the Republican party is growing, I do not think, I regret to say, that it will be strong enough in the National Convention to beat the "machine-men," without outside aid. That aid we hope to furnish, and I believe, therefore, that the movement we are engaged in, is entitled to commendation and encouragement on your part.

I shall be obliged to you if you will furnish me further information concerning the state of things in your region, and hope to hear from you soon again. Of course, you will please regard this letter a private one, not to be publicly used.

TO FRANCIS A. WALKER

NEW YORK, April 17, 1876.

It is thought quite important that Mr. Robinson, the late candidate for governor in your State [Connecticut], should join our movement and be present at the conference. Mr. Frederick Billings of Vermont, whom you probably know, informs me that Judge Shipman is very warmly interested in the subject and will do all he can to secure Mr. Robinson's aid. I have no doubt that your influence will be very potent with that gentleman. I can very well understand what considerations may work upon Mr. Robinson's mind, but the situation of our public affairs is such that men who want to do service to their country can not afford to stand on ceremony.

Will it be possible to induce President Porter [of Yale] to join us openly? It would be of great value to us. Mr. [Parke] Godwin tells me that some of the most prominent clergymen of this city are ready to speak out and to take part in our conference, such as Dr. Osgood, Dr. Adams, Dr. Tyng and others. This is very important aid, and I think President Porter might add his name to such company. Would not also Dr. Bacon do the same thing?

Our call has created considerable stir among Blaine's friends here, some of whom thought that they could obtain the countenance of President Woolsey for their favorite. I am informed that they think of sending somebody to New Haven to make an effort to that end. I hope there is no danger of its success. I must confess that I look upon Blaine as one of the most dangerous enemies of genuine reform, the more dangerous as he is shrewd enough to cover his manipulations of the machine with the fairest pretenses. I would not support him under any circumstances. I suppose you might easily ascertain whether President Woolsey has any leanings

that way, and, if necessary, caution him. I am almost sure, however, that Blaine cannot be nominated, or, if he were nominated, that he would not be elected.

I have very favorable reports from the West. Public sentiment is rapidly turning in our favor. Some time ago I could not think of a single man in Indiana who might be invited; but a few days ago a prominent Republican of that State called upon me and gave me a list of outspoken reformers that astonished me.

I fear I have never thanked you for the trouble you took to obtain President Woolsey's signature. Let me do so now.

If you should desire any further information about the progress of affairs I shall be happy to give it as far as [is] in my power.

When you visit New York it will give me the greatest pleasure to see you at my house.

TO A REPUBLICAN¹

NEW YORK, April 22, 1876.

My dear Sir: Knowing you as a patriotic man and a sincere friend of reform, I am gratified, but by no means surprised, to learn that you cordially approve of the objects which the signers of the call for the conference on the 15th of May have in view. But you are in doubt as to the policy of such a movement outside of the Republican party, as I understand your letter, because the expression of any desire by the independents as to what the party should do would be apt to be taken as an attempt at dictation and provoke antagonistic feelings, and also because your party friends look with great distrust and disfavor upon anything like a third-party movement.

¹ In answer to objections to Fifth Avenue conference.

In my opinion, when a thing is right in itself, it will be very apt to turn out, in the end, as the best policy. But as you address me from the standpoint of a Republican, I will, for the sake of argument, in my answer waive higher considerations and ask you to look at this matter from a partisan point of view. I think even the most sanguine Republicans will scarcely question the following facts: The Republican party, in order to succeed in the National election, cannot afford to lose the votes of many of the Northern States. New York is so far in the hands of the Democrats; likewise Connecticut; Ohio was last fall carried by a majority of 5000 in a poll of 500,000, and that majority included the whole independent vote; Indiana is strongly inclined to be Democratic; of Illinois neither party is sure; in Wisconsin the Republicans last fall lost their whole State ticket with the exception of the governor who was elected by a very small majority, owing to his personal popularity with certain classes of Democrats in Milwaukee; California and Oregon you cannot count upon with certainty. Probably not one of these States can the Republicans expect to carry without the support of all, or at least a large majority, of those who of late years have acted independently of party control.

Now, suppose this independent element, through some organ of opinion, informs you that such support can be secured to the Republican party only by a quite satisfactory assurance of a genuine and thorough reform of the Government, in the shape of nominations of a certain character, and that, if such satisfactory assurance be given, the support and coöperation will be hearty and active; would it be quite wise or patriotic on the part of Republicans to say: "It cannot be denied that the thing they ask for is in itself most just and desirable; but their asking for it is a piece of impudence and an attempt at dictation which must be resented, and therefore it shall

not be done"? Would not that be like little children's play with the great interests of the Republic, and a folly suicidal in its consequences? You tell me there are many good men in the Republican party earnestly in favor of thorough reform, which is certainly true. You express a hope that they may be strong enough to carry the necessary reforms by efforts "inside of the Republican party," which I fervently wish may become true. But what should we think of the sincerity of that reform spirit inside of the Republican party, if it could be suddenly moved to turn against its very objects by the mere fact that other people, not inside the party, seek to accomplish the same ends, and say so? If such a thing could happen, then you will admit, it would in itself be conclusive proof that such a reform spirit is of too fickle a temper to deserve confidence, and that a party controlled by such a temper in its most important action has no claim on the support of any sincere friend of reform. And the result as to party success, under present circumstances, would be obvious.

No; I trust, if the friends of reform inside of the Republican party are strong enough in the Cincinnati Convention to control it, they will not permit themselves to be seduced by a mere childish whim to do a bad thing, simply because the independents want them to do a good one, and then lose the election. But if the reform element inside of the Republican party is not strongly enough represented in the Cincinnati Convention to control it, then it has good reason to be glad of any encouragement and aid it can get from public opinion outside. Indeed, the alliance between the sincere reform element inside and the independent element outside appears so natural and necessary that many patriotic men, hitherto strongly attached to their party, and considered as members in good standing, have expressed to me their hearty approval

of the course the callers of the conference are pursuing, and have promised their active aid and coöperation.

As to the second point of objection, I may say to you candidly that we are not at all ambitious to organize and lead a third-party movement. On the contrary, I feel authorized to say, in the name of all my friends, that we shall be heartily glad if you and others succeed in evolving from the Cincinnati Convention so good a result that we can conscientiously follow you. I fervently hope you will succeed; and, if such nominations as you tell me you desire are made, I pledge you our active efforts in their favor. For the sake of the country, I wish both parties to do the very best they can, believing with you that the Republicans have the safest shot in their locker. At the same time I do not conceal from you that, if nothing but a choice of evils should be presented to us, I should not feel bound to content myself with such a choice, and I am glad to know that a large number of men who have so far been faithful partisans are now of the same way of thinking. It is time for the moral sense of the people to revolt against that kind of degradation, to which we have too long been subjected, and I am confident, strong partisan as you may be, you too feel that there is something more precious than mere party association and fealty. In such an emergency, therefore, there will undoubtedly be an effort, outside of the old parties, for that which honest endeavor inside failed to accomplish.

I sincerely trust that such an emergency will be averted, and you and I, each in his way, should make our best possible efforts to avert it. I am sure our conference will render a most valuable service in that respect. It will furnish an opportunity to the independents and the party men to deal fairly with each other. If you and your friends, as Republicans, want the support of the independ-

ents, you ought not to be left in doubt as to the things which will secure and those which would repel that support. I notice here and there statements in the newspapers assuming that a nomination of this or that character would command the whole vote of the independent friends of reform, some of which assumptions I have good reason to think erroneous. Such mistakes ought to be avoided by a candid declaration of views and purposes, so that if the nomination you make does not receive the support you desire, you shall have no reason to say to us, "Why did you not tell us of your objections before?" It is fair we should do so in time, and the conference will furnish an excellent opportunity, especially as there will be so large a number of party men in it that a full exchange of views from different standpoints may take place. It will be neither an attempt to coerce, nor to dictate to, nor to assume any authority over the Republican or any other party. It will, as I expect, be simply the exercise of the right of American citizens openly to state their opinions on public affairs and to declare what course they may think it their duty to pursue under certain circumstances, so that their subsequent conduct may not be a surprise to anybody, every one taking part in it being bound only by the dictates of his own conscience, and not by the verdict of a majority if he does not agree with it. This can and will be done not only by no-party men, but also, with perfect consistency, by men who have not forsaken their party, but are willing to employ every legitimate means to advance a good end. And so you might join us as well as others who will be present.

I must confess I have been somewhat surprised at the ill-temper with which some Republican papers have denounced the proposed conference as a sort of gunpowder plot, gotten up for revolutionary purposes, by a set of reckless idealists, as they call us when they want to make

the moral superiority of the "practical politician" strikingly apparent. It might, perhaps, be well for them to remember that some of those "idealists" four or five years ago strongly denounced the abuses of the Government which then and since came to light, and warned the party in power of the consequences which inevitably would follow if the iniquitous agencies then at work were not sternly resisted. If the "idealists" had been listened to, McDonald would not have been permitted to organize the whisky ring in St. Louis, the Belknaps and Babcocks would not have remained great and powerful men in the Government and the Republican party would not now be obliged to struggle under that load of disgrace which to-day is its greatest element of weakness. We were then told by the "practical politicians" that if such abuses existed they would be corrected, and everything put right "inside." The "idealists" were put outside, and the "practical politicians" had their way "inside." You know the result. The "idealists" do not appear to have been quite wrong, after all. Now I find some newspapers exercising their wit at the notion that the "idealists" insist upon "a perfect angel" for the Presidency, and will not be satisfied with anything less. As the "idealists" were not quite wrong four or five years ago, so I apprehend they are not quite wrong now. They think that, in its present situation, the country needs a man for the Presidency who can be depended upon to possess the moral courage and ability required for as great an effort as human energy is capable of to crush corruption and to make this a pure government once more, whatever opposition he may have to encounter, even if it should come from his own party friends. This may be called an ideal notion, but it is also an eminently practical one; so much, indeed, that it must be carried out if the honor of the country is to be saved and repub-

lican institutions preserved. If, to use an expression employed by Governor Allen of Ohio with regard to specie payments, honest government can be laughed down as a "barren ideality," then we may tremble for the future of the Republic. It seems to me the papers referred to are not quite prudent in scoffing at the "idealists," for, unless I am greatly mistaken, "idealists" will be in great demand as soon as the Presidential campaign is opened, as they were last summer in Ohio and many times before.

As your letter embodies suggestions which have appeared in some journals not unfriendly, I deem it proper to give this reply to the *Public*. I shall also send you an invitation to our conference, and hope you will accept.

TO L. A. SHERMAN

NEW YORK, May 3, 1876.

Private.

I should have replied to your letter before this, had I not been overburdened with correspondence. I am glad to learn that the Bristow movement in Michigan is vigorously progressing, and I hope it will bring forth a strong delegation to the Cincinnati Convention. Let no effort be spared.

You ask me whether Mr. Blaine would be a desirable candidate. Let me ask you whether a man who for years has wielded great power and influence and has never used it to uncover and put down corruption, and never advanced any measure to reform the abuses of the Government, can be an acceptable candidate when it is the very first duty of the American people to reestablish the moral character of their Government, and when this must be done against the opposition which comes from the "machine"? On this question there can scarcely be two opinions among sincere and earnest friends of reform.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE¹

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—A conference of citizens assembled in New York, sincerely desiring to serve the best interests of the American people, beg leave to submit to your candid consideration the following appeal:

A National election is approaching under circumstances of peculiar significance. Never before in our history has the public mind been so profoundly agitated by an apprehension of the dangers arising from the prevalence of corrupt tendencies and practices in our political life, and never has there been greater reason for it. We will not display here in detail the distressing catalogue of the disclosures which for several years have followed one another in rapid succession, and seem to have left scarcely a single sphere of our political life untouched. The records of courts, of State legislatures and of the National Congress speak with terrible plainness, and still they are adding to the scandalous exhibition. While such a state of things would under any circumstances appear most deplorable, it is peculiarly so at the present moment. We are about to celebrate the one hundredth birthday of our National existence. We have invited the nations of the earth on this great anniversary to visit our land and to witness the evidences of our material progress, as well as the working and effects of that republican government which a century ago our Fathers founded. Thus the most inspiring memories of our past history are rising up before us in a new glow of life, forcing upon us the comparison of what this Republic once was, what it was intended to be and what it now is; and upon this we have challenged the judgment of civilized mankind conjointly with our own. There is much of which every American

¹ Adopted at the Reform conference held at Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York City, May 16, 1876, President T. D. Woolsey, presiding.

citizen has just reason to be proud; and energy and thrift, a power of thought and action, a progressive spirit, which in magnificence of result have outstripped all precedent and anticipation; a history abounding in illustrations of heroic patriotism, fortitude and wisdom; a greater freedom from foreign wars and revolutionary changes of government than most other nations can boast of; our Republic, but a century old, and just issued from the only great civil conflict we have had to deplore, so strong in resources and organization that it stands in the foremost rank of the great Powers of the earth; and yet, with all these splendid results on record, it cannot be denied that at no period during the century now behind us the American people have been less satisfied with themselves; and that the centennial anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, in so many respects to all Americans a day of sincerest pride and rejoicing, is felt to be in other respects not without self-reproach and humiliation. Of this the corruption revealed in our political life is the cause.

To the honor of the American people be it said, every patriotic citizen feels the burning shame of the spectacle presented in this centennial year; there the mementoes and monuments of the virtues of the past, and here the shocking evidence of the demoralization and corruption of the present; there the glowing eulogies pronounced on the wisdom and purity of the Fathers, and here in mocking contrast the verdict of courts and the records of legislative bodies illustrating the political morals of to-day; and this before all mankind solemnly summoned as a witness to the exhibition and a guest to the feast. Never was there cause for keener mortification, and keenly does it strike every patriotic heart. How can we avert such dangers and wipe off such shame? By proving that, although the government machinery has become corrupt, the great body of the people are sound and strong at the core and

that they are honestly determined to reform the abuses of our political life, and to overthrow at any cost the agencies of evil that stand in the way. Only such an effort, well directed and sternly persevered in until success is assured, will save the good name of the Nation, prevent the prevailing disease from becoming fatal and restore to its old strength the faith of our own people in their institutions.

At the impending National election various questions of great importance will be submitted to our judgment. The settlements of the civil war as Constitutionally fixed must be conscientiously maintained, and at the same time the Government strengthened in general confidence by the strict observance of Constitutional principles, and the old brotherhood of the people revived by a policy of mutual justice and conciliation.

Our solemn and often repeated pledge faithfully to discharge all National obligations must be fulfilled, not only by the payment of the principal and interest of our bonded debt when due, but also the removal, not later than the time provided by existing law, of the curse of our redundant irredeemable paper currency, which not only impedes the return of true prosperity but has largely contributed to the existing demoralization.

These are grave questions, and there are more we might touch, were it our purpose to lay down a complete political platform. But grave as they are, still, in our present situation, we must, as American citizens, recognize it as our pressing duty to reestablish the moral character of our Government and to elevate the tone of our political life. Honest government is the first condition of enduring National prosperity, power and freedom. Without the elementary virtues of political as well as social life decay will outstrip our progress. Our discussion and struggles about other great questions and principles will

appear like a mockery and farce if we permit our public concerns to drift into that ruinous anarchy which corruption must necessarily bring in its train, because it destroys the confidence of the people in their self-government, the greatest evil that can befall a republic. It is a simple question of life or death. A corrupt monarchy may last by the rule of force; a corrupt republic cannot endure.

It is useless to console ourselves with the idea that the corruption amongst us must be ascribed solely to the immediate effects of the civil war, and will, without an effort at reform, soon pass away. There is another cause which is not transitory, but threatens to become permanent. It is that system which has made the offices of the Government the mere spoils of party victory; the system which distributes the places of trust and responsibility as the reward of party service and the bounty of favoritism; the system which appeals to the mean impulses of selfishness and greed as a controlling motive of political action; the system which degrades the civil service to the level of a mere party agency, and, treating the officer as the hired servant of the party and taxing him for party support stimulates corruption and places it under party protection; the system which brings the organization of parties under the control of their most selfishly interested, and therefore most active element—the place-holders and the place-hunters—thus tending to organize a standing army of political mercenaries to be paid out of the treasury of the Government, who by organized action endeavor to subjugate the will of the people to their ends through the cultivation of a tyrannical party spirit.

Every student of our political history knows that since the spoils system was inaugurated, corruption has steadily grown from year to year, and so long as this system

lasts, with all its seductions and demoralizing tendencies, corruption will continue to grow in extent and power, for patriotism and true merit will more and more be crowded out of political life by unscrupulous selfishness. The war has only given a sudden stimulus to this tendency; but without the war it would have grown up and will not cease to grow as long as the hot-bed of corruption, the spoils system, lasts. The skill in corrupt practices acquired by one generation of spoilsmen will only be improved upon by the next. The result we know. We have already reaped so great a harvest of disaster and shame that, we repeat, it has now become the first duty of the American people to reestablish the moral character of the Government by a thorough reform. What can we do toward this end in the impending National election?

In this respect, fellow-citizens, we consider it our duty to speak very plainly. Never were the cause of good government and the honor of the American name more immediately dependent on the character, ability and reputation of the men to be selected for the highest offices. In view of the grave circumstances at present surrounding us, we declare the country cannot now afford to have any man elected to the Presidency whose very name is not conclusive evidence of the most uncompromising determination of the American people to make this a pure Government once more.

Our duty in this respect is plain and imperious. It suffers no trifling or equivocation. The worn-out clap-traps of fair promises in party platforms will not satisfy it; neither will mere fine professions on the part of candidates; not mere words are needed, but acts; not mere platforms, but men.

We therefore declare, and call upon all good citizens to join us, that at the coming Presidential election we shall support no candidate who in public position ever

countenanced corrupt practices or combinations, or impeded their exposure and punishment, or opposed necessary measures of reform.

We shall support no candidate who, while possessing official influence and power, has failed to use his opportunities in exposing and correcting abuses coming within the reach of his observation, but for personal reasons and party ends has permitted them to fester on; not striving to uncover and crush corruption, but for the party's sake ready to conceal it.

We shall support no candidate, however conspicuous his position or brilliant his ability, in whom the impulses of the party manager have shown themselves predominant over those of the reformer; for he will be inclined to continue that fundamental abuse, the employment of the Government service as a machinery for personal or party ends.

We shall support no candidate who, however favorably judged by his nearest friends, is not publicly known to possess those qualities of mind and character which the stern task of genuine reform requires; for the American people cannot now afford to risk the future of the Republic in experiments on merely supposed virtue or rumored ability to be trusted on the strength of private recommendations.

In one word, at present no candidate should be held entitled to the support of patriotic citizens of whom the questions may fairly be asked: "Is he really the man to carry through a thoroughgoing reform of the Government? Can he with certainty be depended upon to possess the moral courage and sturdy resolution to grapple with abuses which have acquired the strength of established custom, and to this end firmly to resist the pressure even of his party friends?" Whenever there is room for such a question, and doubt as to the answer, the candidate should be considered unfit for this emergency.

This is no time for so-called availability springing from distinction gained on fields of action foreign to the duties of government; nor for that far more dangerous sort of availability which consists in this, that the candidate be neither so bad as to repel good citizens, nor so good as to discourage the bad ones.

Passive virtue in the highest place has too often been known to permit the growth of active vice below. The man to be intrusted with the Presidency this year must have deserved not only the confidence of honest men, but also the fear and hatred of the thieves. He who manages to conciliate the thieves cannot be the candidate for honest men.

Every American citizen who has the future of the Republic and the National honor sincerely at heart should solemnly resolve that the country must have a President "whose name is already a watchword of reform; whose capacity and courage for the work are matters of record rather than of promise, who will restore the simplicity, independence and rectitude of the early Administrations, and whose life will be a guarantee of his fidelity and fitness"; a man at the mere sound of whose name even the most disheartened will take new courage, and all mankind will say: "The Americans are indeed in earnest to restore the ancient purity of their Government."

Fellow-citizens, the undersigned, in addressing you, are not animated by the ambition to form or lead a new political party. Most have long been and are warmly attached to their party associations. It would be most gratifying to us to see, by party action, candidates put forward whose character and record answer those requirements which present circumstances render imperative. We earnestly hope and trust it will be so. We shall gladly follow such a lead and make every effort in our power to render it successful. But while we are ready

to accept any and every good result of party action, we affirm that the moral reform of our public concerns is infinitely superior in importance to the interests of any political party. Glad to promote that reform through party action, we shall insist upon it at all events, should party action fail. Experience teaches us that the habitual submission of good citizens to a choice of evils presented to them by party organizations is one of the most prolific causes of corruption in our politics. The acceptance by the people of the argument that one party may be bad and still be entitled to the support of good men, because the other party is still worse, will induce each to consider how bad it may safely be. It will strengthen in each the power of the most unscrupulous element and subject the will of the people to the subtle tyranny of organization wielded by those who live by politics. To break that tyranny by a stern refusal to submit to such a choice of evils is the first beginning in the reform of our political life. Without this all other steps will prove unavailing.

We shall sincerely rejoice to see the necessity of independent action avoided. We earnestly hope that the efforts to this end being made by the friends of reform within party lines will be crowned with success, and that the just expectations of the people may not be doomed to disappointment. Indeed, we are confident if all those of our fellow-citizens who in their hearts agree with what we have said will only take the courage openly to proclaim their conviction and purposes, such a manifestation alone would produce an effect sufficient to secure nominations and an election inaugurating a better order of things.

We therefore appeal to all good citizens who find their own sentiments expressed in this address (be they inside or outside of party lines) to organize in their respective districts, and communicate with the Executive Committee

appointed at this meeting, so that efficient coöperation may become possible. Let no effort be spared in bringing the influence of a patriotic public opinion to bear upon those who in the customary way are soon to nominate the party candidates; and then, in any event, let us be ready to do what the best interests of the Republic demand.

Our generation has to open the second century of our National life, as the Fathers opened the first. Theirs was the work of independence, ours is the work of reformation. The one is as vital now as the other was then. Now, as then, every true American must have the courage to do his duty.

CARL SCHURZ, Missouri, *Chairman*.

MARTIN BRIMMER, Massachusetts.

L. F. S. FOSTER, Connecticut.

PARKE GODWIN, New York.

JOHN W. HOYT, Wisconsin.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES¹

FORT WASHINGTON, PA., June 21, 1876.

I regret now more than ever that I did not have the pleasure of becoming personally acquainted with you last fall in the Ohio campaign, but I hope you will not consider it an intrusion if I address you with that confidence and frankness with which one gentleman may speak to another. I desire to submit to you some suggestions concerning the coming contest. Here and there the opinion is expressed that your victory is already won. I am sure your own political experience does not permit you to regard as certain what is still subject to the chances of war. When examining the relative conditions of

¹ Then governor of Ohio and Republican candidate for the Presidency.

parties in the different States one by one, I cannot but conclude that the issue will be very uncertain if the Republican party depends upon its record and its own regular strength.

It will find it impossible to conduct the campaign on the old war issues. Neither does my understanding of your own opinions lead me to believe that you would have it so. There is at present far more strength, as there is more wisdom and patriotism in the advocacy of a policy of justice and conciliation, than in an attempt to rake up old animosities and in a mere repetition of old cries. The Republican party, in order to be successful, must show itself strongest on the living questions which, of necessity, will press to the foreground.

Of these the questions of finance and of administrative reform will prove the most unavoidable. With regard to the former your own publicly expressed opinions are stronger and inspire more confidence than the Republican platform. But the struggle is likely to become an arduous one. There are in our present economic condition many indications which render an extremely stringent money-market probable in September and October. Such a state of things attended with an accumulation of commercial failures will be apt, as it always is, to tell against the party in power. Still, the evil effects of that circumstance may be overcome by a vigorous fight and the development of strength in that direction in which the Republican party is at present weakest.

The question of administrative reform is the really and seriously sore point of the party. There the attacks of its opponents will be most incessant and unsparing, and, unfortunately, they may be terribly severe without being unjust. It was the corruption in the public service grown to alarming proportions after the war, and, connected with it, the reckless partisanship disregarding

Constitutional as well as moral principles, which drove the independents into opposition; and I will frankly confess to you that my own personal observations during my service in the Senate, as well as the terrible disclosures made since, from the whisky trials down to the jobbery revealed in recent investigations, have not seldom made me seriously doubt whether a thorough cleaning out of the influences now in power, by any means and at any cost, should not be considered the first thing necessary. I know that thousands of old Republicans arrived at such a conclusion.

The new Cincinnati platform promises civil service reform, but the platform of 1872 did the same, and it cannot be denied that public confidence in the mere paper promises of political parties is fatally shaken. The Republican reformers as well as the independents favored the nomination of Mr. Bristow, not on account of any personal attachment—for most of them were not at all, or like myself, but slightly acquainted with him—but because Mr. Bristow, in his official position, had vigorously used his opportunities for practical reform, thereby giving guarantees of honest government far more valuable than ever so many platforms. The platform alone will leave the party in a defensive position. It would be interpreted by the recent record of the party, and there is but too much in that record which cannot be explained away or defended by honest men. But the candidate can give life and certain meaning to it and thus revive all that ardor, part of which the defeat of Mr. Bristow threatened to transform into silent indifference. And here is the suggestion I desire to submit. In your letter of acceptance you can, if you choose, give your own construction of the platform and your own understanding of your duties if elected. You can substitute for the vague and discredited promises of a platform the frank

and vigorous pledge of a man known to be a man of honor. You can make this *your* campaign and relieve it of all vulnerable points of the party record. You can accomplish this by reiterating your own position on the financial question, and then by declaring: that the equality of rights without distinction of color according to the Constitutional amendments must be sacredly maintained by all the lawful power of the Government; but that also the Constitutional rights of local self-government must be respected; and that a policy must be followed which will lead this Nation into the second century of its existence, not as a nation divided into conquerors and conquered, but a nation of equal citizens united in common self-respect and patriotism; that dishonest practices in the administration of public affairs shall be prosecuted and punished with impartial and relentless rigor; that the offices of the Government shall cease to be the spoils of party victory; that the civil service shall be made again what the founders of the Government made it and designed it to remain, organized with sole regard to ascertained fitness and honesty, and not as a party agency or a system of rewards, favoritism and patronage; that to the accomplishment of this object you will, if elected, devote the whole energy of your Administration and by all Constitutional means endeavor to secure the permanency of the reform.

Such a declaration, put forth not as a mere customary endorsement of the platform but as an expression of your own views of public necessity, a proclamation of your own resolution and purpose in language bold and ringing, would electrify the country and call to your banner the best elements of the people from far beyond the lines of the party. It would make you stronger than the party, which seems necessary to render success sure. It would supply the manifest need of these times, and make

this one of the greatest and most salutary campaigns in our history, a campaign worthy of the centennial year. It would give back to the party under your leadership the aggressive moral force which it possessed in its best days. I may add that it would rally to your support as a strong working power a large majority of the independent element, especially also of the independent Germans, who, while having little faith in party professions, would believe in you upon your word.

I hope you will pardon the length and urgency of this letter. I feel that I have taken a great liberty by volunteering this suggestion, but I could not refrain, for the more I think of it the more I am impressed with its importance. I trust you will take it as coming from a man who speaks frankly because he means well.

You will oblige me by an acknowledgment of the receipt of this note, which will reach me here at Fort Washington, Montgomery county, Penna., until the 30th inst. On the 30th I shall take the night train on the Penna. R.R. for St. Louis.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

FORT WASHINGTON, PA., June 23, 1876.

I hope the letter I mailed to you yesterday morning has reached you. I have since received information from different quarters, especially concerning the Germans East and West, their influential men and papers and the prevailing current of sentiment among them, which impresses me more than ever with the extreme importance of a broad, bold and striking declaration in your letter of acceptance of *your own* opinions and determined purpose in favor of a straightforward strong specie-payment policy, the purification of the Government and a non-partisan civil service with tenure of office on good

behavior. Whatever the party press may say of the present state of public feeling, I know from the very best sources of information that there is among a very numerous class of citizens, naturally desiring to coöperate with the Republican party, so strong a distrust not only of the present Administration, but also of the influences which for years have controlled party politics on the Republican side, that only the strongest *personal* assurances of reform will keep them from looking for a change through a temporary success of the opposite party. There is no doubt your opponents will be shrewd enough to take advantage of this condition of things; and I believe your language in expressing your own true sentiments cannot possibly be too strong, direct and emphatic.

I pray you, do not consider me presumptuous in urging this matter so persistently upon your attention; for the public interest as well as your own appears to me so vitally concerned in it, that I should feel as if I failed in my duty did I remain silent. So I hope you will pardon me.

In pursuance of a resolution adopted by the independent conference of May last, I have called the executive committee appointed by that body to meet on the 30th inst., and your letter of acceptance will, I trust, furnish the text for an address to our constituents.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, June 27, 1876.

Confidential.

I am very glad to get your letters of the 21st and 23d. I will give your suggestions my best consideration. I do not expect to write my acceptance for ten days or two weeks. In the meantime I wish to give you with entire frankness how the matter lies in my mind *now*, hoping to hear from you again

before I write for the public. I wish to remain entirely uncommitted until the time for issuing the letter.

I now think as you do—probably precisely as you do, on the civil service reform part of our platform. I want to make that *the* issue of the canvass—to be perfectly explicit, decided and square, but *brief* in regard to it. I will therefore be glad to have your views in form, or to be referred to the document (speech or letter) which gives the best statement of the true thing.

I do not expect to say anything on the specie resumption plank. I am so pronounced and well known on that question that I feel like saying that the man who wants other interpretation of our platform than the fact of my candidacy, is pretty likely to vote against me even if he has to support Governor Allen or General Carey.

I now feel like saying something as to the South not essentially different from your suggestions, but am not decided about it. I don't like the phrase by reason of its Democratic associations, which you use—"local self-government," in *that* connection. It seems to me to smack of the bowie knife and revolver. "Local self-government" has nullified the 15th amendment in several States, and is in a fair way to nullify the 14th and 13th. But I do favor a policy based on the observance of all parts of the Constitution—the *new* as well as the old, and therefore I suppose you and I are substantially agreed on the topic.

One other suggestion let me now submit to you. I really think that a President could do more good in one term if untrammelled by the belief that he was fixing things for his election to a second term, than with the best intentions could be done in two terms with his power embarrassed by that suspicion or temptation during his first four years. Our platform says nothing on that subject. I am averse to adding topics, but could I not properly avow my own view and purpose on this head?

And now you will excuse me for writing so hurriedly and inconsiderately. I returned late last night from my home in Fremont. I am thronged with callers, and in the midst of a

shower of letters and dispatches. Whether you can support me or not you will treat this as confidential, and, I hope, let me hear from you further.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

St. Louis, Mo., July 5, 1876.

Your kind letter of June 27th has been forwarded to me. I can only thank you for the confidential frankness with which you speak to me and may assure you that this confidence is not misplaced. I am exceedingly glad to know that your views on civil service reform agree so well with those I ventured to submit, and that you desire to make that reform "*the* issue of the canvass." In compliance with the desire you expressed at our interview last Saturday, I submit the following draft of a paragraph for your letter of acceptance:

"I have long been convinced of the necessity of a thorough and permanent reform of the civil service. Dishonest officers will have to expect from me only the most rigorous execution of the law and the strictest enforcement of personal accountability. But the reform must not confine itself to mere changes of persons, it requires a change of system. The Constitutional relations of the Executive and the Legislative branches of the Government with regard to appointments to office, as correctly defined in the Republican platform, shall be inflexibly observed. The principles acted upon by the wise founders of this Government must be our rules of conduct. They did not mean the civil service to become a system of political rewards, spoils, patronage and favoritism. They regarded not party services, but ability, honesty and fidelity as the only true qualifications for appointment and promotion. They meant that the officer should be secure in his tenure as long as his per-

sonal character remained untarnished, and performance of his official duties satisfactory. They meant that the public officer should owe his whole duty to the Government and the people. They neither expected nor desired from him any partisan service. The growth of the government machinery may have rendered a judicious selection of officers all over the country by the Executive more difficult, but this difficulty is to be obviated by well regulated and fixed methods of ascertaining the fitness of candidates, and the permanency of this system may be insured by legal enactment. Upon these principles I shall, if elected, organize and conduct my Administration, and its whole energy will be devoted to the task of establishing and perpetuating this reform."

This paragraph may at first sight appear somewhat longer than you desire to have it, but the subject is of such paramount importance and it is so necessary to show a clear and complete understanding of the question and to avoid the least appearance of equivocation, that, as I think, not a single point should be sacrificed to the mere charm of brevity. Its fearless straightforwardness and completeness will undoubtedly with great effect appeal to the best impulses of the popular heart. To fight for such a program would, even in case of defeat, be glorious enough. But to succeed with it in the election, as I trust you will, and then faithfully to carry out such a reform, will place him who does it in the first rank of the best names in American history.

You ask me about the propriety of introducing the one-term principle. My impression is that it might appear well at the close of the above paragraph and with direct reference to it. It would be calculated to strengthen the earnestness of the reform pledge.

Now another matter. You say that you do not deem it necessary to refer to the currency question again.

There I venture to differ with you. The equivocal position in which the Democrats have placed themselves by demanding the repeal of the resumption clause furnishes us one of our main weapons of attack. I have already assailed that point in my paper. But neither is the Republican platform clear enough in that respect. It is indeed important that you should strengthen our position. Permit me to propose to you the following paragraph:

"On the currency question I have frequently expounded my views in public and stand by my record. I regard every law of the United States concerning the payment of any form of our public indebtedness, the legal-tenders included, as constituting a pledge and moral obligation of the Government which must in good faith be adhered to. Moreover, I am convinced that the feeling of uncertainty inseparable from the existence of an irredeemable paper currency with its incidental fluctuations of value and the restless agitation it causes is one of the great obstacles standing in the way of a revival of business confidence and the return of prosperity. That uncertainty can be put an end to only in one way: by the resumption of specie payments, restoring to the business of the country a safe basis; and the sooner this is accomplished the greater will be the benefit to all our economic interests and all classes of society."

This, I think, would place you on an unassailable ground and give us a great advantage of position, especially in the State of New York. It may appear again a little long, but I would ask you to consider that never in American history was there a letter of acceptance written of such exceeding importance, and for which the people looked with so much anxious interest.

Day after to-morrow, Friday, I shall pass through Columbus at noon and can stay until 6:30. I should be

very glad to have a conversation with you on these and some other points in your letter of acceptance before it comes out. If this be agreeable to you, may I suggest that you be kind enough to ask Captain Lee to meet me at the depot and to take me where I may see you?

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

FORT WASHINGTON, PA., July 9, 1876.

I have just got back from the West and find here your note of the 29th of June addressed to Mr. Lodge and communicated by him to me. You are perfectly right in saying that we should go one way or the other. I have in the meantime been anxiously endeavoring to ascertain how I for my part could render the best service to the cause we have at heart, and I have come to a very clear conclusion.

The result of the Cincinnati Convention appeared at first as the triumph of a respectable compromise candidate; the result of the St. Louis Convention as the triumph of a great name with the attachment of an ambiguous platform and the most objectionable man imaginable as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency. Neither side satisfactory and yet a third movement out of the question.

In order to ascertain what could be done I put myself in correspondence with Hayes, volunteering certain suggestions with regard to his letter of acceptance. I had from him a most satisfactory response. I have since met him twice and discussed all sorts of things with him. His letter of acceptance, containing his political program, will be an agreeable surprise to you, if it comes out as it was determined upon Friday evening. It is our platform in every word with the pledge of an honest man as a candidate for the Presidency attached to it. Unless I

am very much mistaken, the Cincinnati Convention has nominated our man without knowing it. He is a man of more than average ability and decidedly unspoiled as a politician. It will be our fault, I think, if we do not gain a decisive influence in his Administration. I shall support him heartily on his letter and earnestly hope you will see your way clear in the same direction. Let me confess that I never entertained as high an opinion of Mr. Tilden as a reformer as you did. He has been too much of a demagogue and is too much of a wirepuller and machine politician now to be depended upon as a man of principle.

We had a meeting of the executive committee of the conference on June 30th. It was deemed best, as the situation was then still undefined, Hayes's letter not yet being out, not to do anything with regard to the candidates. Indeed, I do not see the necessity of *united* action on the part of the independents. It may truly be said that the choice of positive evils is avoided, and a certain measure of reform is promised on either side. The question is where we can get most. Moreover, I think it would be difficult to get the conference together again. We did, however, resolve to invite all those who signed our address, about 1500, to join in the organization of a National Civil Service Reform League, for the purpose of exercising upon public opinion as well as future Administrations whatever influence may be at our command. That, I think, is a good idea and may be made useful.

I am here with my children to spend part of the summer at this quiet country place. Let me hear from you. Is it true that your father has pronounced for Tilden?

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

FORT WASHINGTON, PA., July 14, 1876.

As I expected, your letter of acceptance has had an excellent effect, and it deserves it all and more. The number of independent voters who have left the fence in consequence of it is not inconsiderable. The *Nation* also, in its cool way, has declared for you, and its influence with the thinking men of the country is very strong.

At the same time we must not underestimate the difficulties we have to contend with. You are made to bear the sins of others. You can read in Republican papers that President Grant is acting like Tilden's best friend, and indeed, if he goes on much longer "pleasing himself," nobody knows to what extent he may injure you. Still, I suppose, there is nothing to be done except to show on every possible occasion that Governor Hayes and President Grant are two very different men. I am inclined to think he would hurt you less by coming out openly against you.

But one of the worst things done yet is the election of Secretary [Zachariah] Chandler to the chairmanship of the National Committee. It is in the highest degree improper on principle that a man who wields the patronage and influence of one of the Departments of the Government, should also be the manager of a party in a campaign; and it seems utterly impossible that a member of General Grant's Administration, who is a notorious advocate of the vicious civil service system, which we want to abolish, should be the manager of a campaign in which the reform of the civil service is one of the principal issues. Several Republican papers, seeing the absolute incongruity of this arrangement, have already taken up the matter and are urging him to decline the appointment. This, I suppose, he will not heed, unless some extraordinary influences be brought to bear upon him. What those

influences should be, I confess, I do not know. I feel that it would be a delicate matter for you to interfere directly; but something should be done, or the management of the campaign will be the most glaring satire on civil service reform imaginable. In 1872 he was the chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee; at any rate, he had the "laboring oar," and he gave us then a specimen of his way to conduct a canvass. One of the first things, I presume, will be the levying of assessments on officeholders under the name of "voluntary contributions." As soon as the first symptoms of a revival of that abuse appear, I would suggest to you to protest against it in a letter to the Committee, saying that you do not want to be elected by means so repugnant to your principles, and to have your protest made public. It would not only be right in itself and place you in the right position, but it would give you ten times more votes than any amount of money raised in that way.

But far better would it be to get Chandler out of his chairmanship, if there is a way to do it; no effort should be spared in that respect.

I am hard at work preparing my first campaign speech and think it will have good effect. But it is so terribly hot that mental labor becomes almost impossible, and I do not get on as fast as I should like. Still, it will come.

TO OSWALD OTTENDORFER¹

FORT WASHINGTON, PA., July 22, 1876.²

Although I read the *Staats-Zeitung* with tolerable regularity, yet several numbers, the contents of which have

¹ Editor of the N. Y. *Staats-Zeitung*.

² This letter was written in German. The translation, taken from one of the New York newspapers, was probably made hastily and not by Mr. Schurz.

only now been communicated to me, escaped my notice during a recent journey. In them I find the accusation directed against me that I have "turned back" upon the path which I have been travelling for years; that my "present course is absolutely irreconcilable with all that I have advocated and commended until within the last few weeks"; that I am "treading under foot my own convictions," etc., etc.

Wherefore these charges? Because I prefer Mr. Hayes to the Democratic ticket. You will admit, on calm reflection, that the accusations hurled against me are very serious, and your sense of justice will not deny to me an examination of them in the same journal which made them. I request of you, therefore, the publication of this letter in the *Staats-Zeitung*, not merely by means of extracted passages, but entire.

What convictions, then, are those which you so carelessly accuse me of having "trodden under foot"? Of course you can only refer to those which touch the most important questions of our political life. Can you, yourself, really believe that I must have become false to my own convictions in regard to the financial question, because I prefer the Republican to the Democratic candidates? Let us see *who* has changed his views!

You know fully as well as I do, and have often enough admitted the fact in your paper, that, with reference to the financial question, the Republican party is assuredly not all that it should be, but that it is much "sounder" on the whole than the Democratic party. The history of the last few years, the votes in Congress, the elections in single States, the party organs, furnish indisputable evidence that a heavy majority of the "soft-money" element, and about all the lust of repudiation that exists, are to be found on the Democratic side. Now, if such a party—which still almost daily, as I write, shows it-

self through its majority in the House of Representatives hostile to hard-money—would nevertheless have us believe that the hard-money interest would be safe in its hands, it must of necessity give us, both by explanations and by acts, stronger guarantees than we should require of a party with better antecedents. In order to deserve confidence, the Democratic Convention should at least have adopted a hard-money platform, free from all stipulations and compromises, and then have nominated for the Presidency—and no less for the Vice-Presidency—candidates whose principles in regard to the hard-money question stood beyond the reach of doubt. Less than this could not have been demanded. And what has the Democratic party done in its Convention? After arraigning the Republicans for great sins of omission, chiefly to raise a dust for the concealment of its own far worse record, it proposes as the only specific measure the repeal of the resumption bill of January, 1875!

You and I have been of the same opinion, that the resumption bill of 1875 was insufficient in its details, but of value as the distinct promise of the acceptance of specie payments on the side of the Government. You and I during the session of this Congress have condemned every attempt to repeal the resumption bill as a maneuver of the inflationists. With perfect truth you have declared in the *Staats-Zeitung* that “such a repeal without at the same time accepting some practical measure for specie payments would be a moral victory of the inflationists.” You and I know that for two years past the battlecry of the inflationists has been the repeal of the resumption act, and if now the Democratic platform in acting upon the finance question presents as its only specific demand that the resumption bill shall be repealed, every honest hard-money man who seriously considers the question will ask what does this mean? The reason

can certainly not be that which the platform itself puts forth, that the promise to resume is in itself the hindrance to resumption, for among rational people it is an unheard of thing that a man was unable to pay his debt simply because he had promised to do so. No, that demand was incorporated into the platform for the simple purpose of pacifying the inflationists and binding them to the party by *concession*. This is no mere conjecture. The chairman of the Platform Committee openly declared in the Convention that this platform was a compromise, against which the hard-money party of the Eastern States had already strongly protested. And they have justly protested, because, as you yourself admit, this was a "moral victory of the inflationists." The extreme inflationists in the Convention were not satisfied with this compromise; naturally so, for a compromise never satisfies, because it only gives a part of what is desired. And what was the argument whereby the chairman of the Committee endeavored to move them to accept a compromise? That in this question the Convention could not retrograde further without ruining every chance of success for the Democratic party in the State of New York. This had its effect, and the compromise was accepted by a large majority. Thus, for the sake of victory, the inflationists refrained from further demands. But what follows a party victory? Must not every hard-money man, who is faithful to his convictions, first of all ask this question?

Still this was not the only concession which was made to the inflationists. The Convention with singular unanimity nominated Mr. Hendricks as candidate for the Vice-Presidency. Who is Mr. Hendricks? You name him in your journal "a politician without character, who has no views of his own concerning the question of finance." But you know just as well as I that he was

one of the favorite candidates of the inflationists, and that characterizes his position in regard to the question of finance. And this man is candidate for Vice-President with Mr. Tilden! It is true that men have been nominated on the same ticket heretofore who were unequal in ability and strength of character, but for the first time in the history of the country the Democratic Convention has furnished an unheard of example of placing two candidates together, who on the chief question, represented exactly opposite principles. Why was this done? To pacify the hard-money men by giving them a chance. And what chance? The chance that in case Mr. Tilden, who is no more immortal than you or I, should be overtaken by the fate of mortals, the favorite candidate of the soft-money party would possess the Executive power of the Nation. What is therefore the meaning of the compromise made with the soft-money party in the Democratic Convention? In case of a Democratic victory the soft-money Democrats would in all probability, as at present, control the majority of the party in the House of Representatives. We may accept this as very nearly certain. The hard-money Democrats would then, in accordance with the platform, help them to repeal the resumption act, as the most of them already do. An unfortunate casualty, affecting a single human life, might then deliver the Executive power into the hands of the soft-money party, and, so far as the Senate is concerned, a hard-money majority there is so precarious that a few Democratic successes in the Western States where the inflationists have the upper hand might turn that body in the same direction. What effect will such a compromise have on the inflationists in the Democratic party? Will it convert them to the hard-money side? Exactly the opposite; it will encourage them to persevere boldly in their policy, since it gives them a chance

eventually to get a part if not the whole power of the Government in their hands. I am convinced that but a little while ago you would have repelled with indignation the thought of such a game of chance with the fortunes of the country; and you have no right to be surprised if others who feel the gravity of the question do the same thing now. You cannot deny that you are running the risk of immeasurable misfortune. There is no use in lightly ignoring the possibilities of the situation, for in case of a Democratic victory, neither you nor all the hard-money men together could effect the least toward preventing such a disaster. In my opinion we have no right to stake the welfare of the country upon a card. I do not deny that the Republican platform might have been more pronounced in this respect; but since I am compelled to choose between a party which by the most enticing forms of speech and a compromise in its platform and candidates stretches out a finger with a hope of the whole hand to the paper-money party, and another which, in regard to this question, has nominated two equally reliable candidates through whom we hazard no possible disaster, and whose success makes at least probable a corresponding majority in Congress, I cannot without violating my hard-money convictions accept other than the latter. I ask you only who in this respect has trodden under foot his convictions?

So much in regard to the question of finance. As to the question of reform I most willingly acknowledge the services of Mr. Tilden in his war with the canal rings; but however important and necessary such services may be, the reform question, even when it is transferred to a greater field of action, is therewith by no means exhausted. In reality this is the least part of it. Furthermore, one thing seems to me assured in any case. However the election may result, the sweeping out of the corrupt

officials and combinations which now dishonor our public service will be sure to take place. If it is said that the election of Mr. Hayes would lead to a mere continuation of the Grant Administration, it is the chatter of party, no less absurd than if his letter of acceptance were [called] a glorification of Grantism. Mr. Grant himself has a better understanding of the matter. The news from Washington cannot have escaped you, that President Grant has found Mr. Hayes's letter of acceptance "very inappropriate," and has taken it almost as a personal affront. He will no doubt express his feelings to a further extent in the course of the campaign. It does not occur to me to elevate Mr. Hayes to a demigod because he is a candidate for the Presidency, but he is universally recognized as a man of scrupulous integrity, of a strong feeling of honor, of a quiet energy—a man who has fulfilled all public duties, which have ever devolved upon him, with success, and in every respect without reproach; a man in whom the desire to restore and preserve honor to the Government springs from the natural tendency of his nature, and not from artifice or affected feeling. It is quite as well known that in his official capacity he has repelled the bad elements of party and surrounded himself with those most deserving of respect. In the Presidency he would therein not be less successful, especially as through his decided rejection of a second term he would withdraw from the influences which would surround him all opportunity to excite in him any other emotion than that of making a single term honorable. This is no extravagant praise, but it has the advantage of being true. The realization of this feature of reform seems to me therefore as thoroughly secure through Hayes as through Tilden.

But it has always been a very important matter to me, not only that corrupt officials should be brought to

punishment, but that the most profitable source of corruption—a system of plunder—should be checked by a permanent and thorough reform of the civil service. The question, and the most important question is, How may this end be attained? Now, if I am convinced that Mr. Hayes will undertake with honest will and carry out with all energy exactly such a thorough reform of the civil service as that for which I have striven, what right have you to assert that by supporting Mr. Hayes I tread my convictions under foot? Have I reasons for these convictions? Let us see. In his letter of acceptance, which in this respect leaves far behind the Republican as well as the Democratic platform, Mr. Hayes, has presented the clearest and completest program of civil service reform with which I am acquainted. Untiring and impartial prosecutions and punishment of dishonorable officials; no more appointments by the request of Members of Congress; no removals except for deficient service; the official no longer the tool of party; honesty, capacity and fidelity the only claim to official promotion, thereby total abolition of the system of plunder; the reform secured by legislative means. Do you know a better program? Would not its realization fulfil all which I have advocated in accordance with my convictions?

But you may say Mr. Hayes is not the man to carry out such a program. Is this based upon anything more than mere conjecture? Would you not have said three weeks ago that Mr. Hayes was not the man to present such a program? It has been said that Mr. Hayes has suddenly transformed himself into a civil service reformer for the sake of effect, and in order to secure the votes of the independents. But he has expressed the same views of reform in the canal service, and even to some extent with the same words, in speeches and inaugural addresses delivered years ago. This may have escaped you, even

as it did me, but it is nevertheless true. No one, not even yourself, doubts that Mr. Hayes is a thoroughly honorable man, who honestly intends to practice what he preaches. He has shown that the substance of civil service reform is completely clear to his mind, but you deny him the courage and the energy which are necessary in order successfully to meet strong opposing influences. Moral courage in one thing implies moral courage in others. Have you considered, perhaps, how much moral courage must be inferred of a candidate for the Presidency who opposes the most powerful official influences of his party by such a program? He stands at the beginning of the campaign in which the policy of the candidate would dictate to him necessity of keeping favor with all strong influences of party, especially those already organized. Yet this candidate issues a manifesto which, in its comprehensive and sharply-defined requirements, is in itself the severest criticism of the existing misrule. Is this want of courage? This candidate says to the Members of Congress that in case of his election they must expect from him no concessions of patronage; to the officials, that no party services will be desired from them; to the politicians, that electioneering work will no longer be valid as claim to an office; to the President who has been twice chosen, and was "willing" for a third term, that whoever would undertake such reforms must deny himself the ambition of a second term. The man who in the critical period before election has sufficient courage and fidelity to his convictions to issue such a manifesto, will also have the courage after election to resist whatever hostile influences may surround him.

With these influences with which Mr. Hayes will have to battle I am well acquainted; probably few know them better. I undervalue their force by no means, but in this relation another element must be considered. In

the last few years a serious movement in favor of a thorough reform in the civil service has taken place within the Republican party; this movement has been fruitless. Why? Hardly so much because the politicians who go for spoils in Congress have not been willing to give up their patronage and the party leaders their "machine," but especially because the President, who is called upon to play the leading part in this reform, never properly knew what civil service reform meant; and since his personal friends and associates, as well as other interests, lay so much nearer to his heart, was glad to conceal himself behind the opposition in Congress in order to defeat the reform. I have always been convinced that if the President had been sincere the opposition might have been overcome, and the reform have been carried out within the entire scope of the Executive power. If he had done so much, Congress, under the pressure of a public opinion invoked by the President, would finally have accommodated itself to legislative measures in the same direction. The better wing of the party would therein have actively seconded the President, and Mr. Hayes in his struggle for the fulfilment of his program, would have found a powerful support in the same element; for this element will be particularly effective, when it finds itself naturally advocated in the first Executive officer. I have no recollection of any similar effort on the Democratic side, with the exception of a single speech of Senator Gordon on the revenue service, and a letter of Mr. Clarkson Potter, which however, contained propositions of very dubious value. What is understood as civil service reform in the Democratic camp has been shown by the Democratic majority of the present House of Representatives, which, without provoking an expression of dissatisfaction from a single one of its members, simply replaced all Republican officials without distinc-

tion by Democratic ones. You know as well as I do what scandals arose from this change. People may say that this was the usage of party. True; but such a usage of party must cease before civil service reform can begin. I am sure that I do not venture too far when I assert that you equally with myself await nothing else from a Democratic Administration than a universal expulsion of all Republican officials, good as well as bad, and the appointment of Democrats in the manner of a "new deal," according to the traditional rule of the system of spoils. You know also, just as well as I, that even now a hundred thousand Democratic patriots stand ready to hurl themselves upon the long-desired booty. It does not trouble me particularly if this or that postmaster or collector is a Democrat or a Republican, but it must be clear to every one that such a procedure only makes permanent the system of spoils, and keeps open the most prolific source of corruption.

Now, what do you look for in this particular from Mr. Tilden? Will he oppose this great and covetous assault upon the booty, which is coming not only from the North, but more especially from the South, and which will surpass everything which up to this time our history can point to in this line? Will he brave it, and at the cost of his personal popularity in his own party send back home the office-seekers that he may retain in office good men and remove only bad ones? Allow me to tell you, sir, that you do not believe this. The carrying out of such a reform, more than any other political task, requires, first of all, an unselfish and undeviating devotion to purpose, that which is called "singleness of purpose," a freedom from demagogic bias and from the grasping after popularity, a contempt for all wirepulling and political machine management. Is it your opinion that Mr. Tilden corresponds to this picture? As for

myself, it is known to you that I never, like certain other independents, placed the name of Tilden beside that of Bristow that I might recommend the candidacy of the former in case the latter should not be nominated. While I acknowledge the excellence of some of Mr. Tilden's actions, I, notwithstanding, could never, even in the most favorable moments, feel quite easy and comfortable in respect to the reform mission of a man who had grown old in the peculiar school of New York politicians, and who had developed himself into a most perfect master of the political machine before he began his reform work. And I could not refuse to listen to the opinion of other persons whose fairness I could not doubt, and who had known Mr. Tilden longer and better than I—shall I say whose opinion in the matter was of especial weight with me? It was your own. This would seem like an unbecoming allusion to private conversation if you had not yourself given up to public possession your judgment of Mr. Tilden. Whoever read your paper last winter and spring had the opportunity of seeing Mr. Tilden, when occasion offered, very forcibly unmasked as "a demagogue and a grasper after popularity," as a man unworthy of confidence, and an unsuitable candidate for the Presidency. You even found fault with that part of his annual message which had reference to the financial question, as a "suspicious step backward," adopted as a means of opening a bargain with Western inflationists in the National Convention for the advancement of private aims. You strongly suspected even the business honesty of Mr. Tilden, for you found so unsubstantial his published defense of the complaints of embezzlement of large sums in railroad bonds that you felt obliged to express your doubts about it in the *Staats-Zeitung*. To be just to you I ought to add that your opinions of Mr. Tilden spoken in private agreed perfectly

with those which you expressed in public, and both were unquestionably correct. Such was your judgment in the matter, and you will yourself find rather laughable, after all this, your complaint that "I am trampling my convictions under foot," because I prefer to Mr. Tilden as a reform candidate another man who is "not a demagogue and popularity-seeker," and whose motives and character are universally recognized as elevated high above all suspicion.

Now you will allow that, in accordance with your own openly expressed opinions, Mr. Tilden is not the man of fidelity to conviction and unselfish devotion who, as President, will surely turn aside the assault upon the spoils if any danger to the party peace or to his personal popularity is thereby incurred. Perhaps in his letter of acceptance he will make the same promises, but out of respect for your own estimate of Mr. Tilden, you must not be surprised if I place greater reliance in those of Mr. Hayes.

Just as little would Mr. Tilden be urged to a systematic reform of the civil service, through the influence of a strong element in the Democratic party, for such an element has never hitherto at least existed there. Among even the best on the Democratic side, the word "reform" has meant only the prosecution and dismissal of dishonest officeholders, and in case of a Democratic victory it will doubtless stop with the substitution of a new class of officeholders for the old class of officeholders, especially since, in that way, the claims of the victors upon the spoils can be satisfied. The retention of the spoils system, however, leaves undisturbed the most productive source of corruption. I am, therefore, quite of the same opinion as *The Nation*, a journal which has brought itself into prominence through the acutest and most unpartisan reviews of public matters. *The Nation* says:

After all which we learn of Mr. Hayes, he is a man who will hold to what he says. We do not conceal from ourselves the possibility that he may underrate the difficulties of his position. But as things stand, we must trust somebody, and we are forced to the conclusion that Mr. Hayes rather than Mr. Tilden is the man to walk in the path which to the reformers seems the right one.

That is also my conviction. I shall not, in spite of all the clamor, trample it under foot.

Some persons have found a cheap amusement in holding up before those men who took part in the May Conference in New York, and are now supporting Mr. Hayes, the address issued by the Conference, and pointing out the inconsistency of their action. Let us look at this matter more closely. The men who arranged the Conference and carried it through had for their first object a true civil service reform and a sound position on the financial question. They had all sorts of candidates in mind, but their candidates represented certain principles, and were not pressed simply on their own account. They wanted to promote the nomination of proper men in order to give their prime object the greatest possible push forward; but they had no notion of swearing unqualified fidelity to such men, whether or no their candidacy, by its attending conditions, made doubtful the attainment of the great end in view. Whoever thinks that the Conference was devoted to the service of particular persons has entirely mistaken its spirit. Had any one there asked the question: "Shall we support a candidate on a platform which, as a compromise with the inflationists, calls for the repeal of the resumption act, and requires the nomination of a Vice-President who will represent the soft-money party?" what would you have answered then? Your answer would have been a strong "Yes"; mine, and that, I believe, of the whole assembly,

would have been a distinct "No!" This case is now presented to us, and I should be trampling on my honest convictions were I now to say "Yes."

Had any one asked us the further question: "Shall a candidate be nominated who is not now numbered among the desirable ones, but who, being known as a thoroughly honorable man, takes a lofty view of his nomination and proposes to mark out for himself a program above the party platforms, which not only is satisfactory on the financial question but also seizes corruption in its very stronghold—the spoils system,—throws down the gauntlet to the political machine managers, robs the Congressman of his patronage and, by decisive measures of reform, puts an end to the prevailing abuses; and who then, unembarrassed by his following, overrides, by the force of his own will, the strongest partisan influences that can be brought to bear upon him—can we support such a candidate?" I do not believe that the Conference would have said, "No"; I doubt, indeed, whether you would have said so yourself. It is true that neither the one nor the other exigency was foreseen when the address of the Conference was drawn up; but both now present themselves, and we are compelled to choose between them. Shall we signers of the address now argue, like little children, that because the present state of things was not contemplated in the address, therefore it does not exist for us? Shall we not act the more consistent part by carrying out the spirit of the Conference, instead of shutting our eyes to the altered circumstances and following a simple name? Faithfulness to a higher duty is the true consistency which marks the man of convictions. It is better to *be* thus consistent in spirit than merely to *appear* consistent in externals.

It is true, affairs have not shaped themselves as I would have had them, and your desires are quite as poorly

gratified. Of my relations to the old parties I make no secret. I regard them exactly as I used to, and I take nothing back of what I have said as well of the one as of the other. Now, as formerly, I believe that the sweeping away of the old party management, with its organized self-seeking, and the rebuilding upon the foundation of the present order of things, would be a great blessing to our political life. My independent standpoint remains the same. Neither do I agree with you when you point out that the independent movements of the past years have been without result. Who that has studied history, even with a partial understanding, does not know that great purposes have been seldom accomplished in the way which at the outset seemed the shortest and the safest? Those who would accomplish good should not suffer themselves to be discouraged, even though their patience and endurance are sometimes by temporary failures put to a hard test. The independent movements, it is true, have not succeeded in establishing on the foundations of the old parties new and better ones, but they have not remained without influence upon the old ones. On both sides progress has been made and new opportunities have arisen, and it must be our endeavor with our best powers to hold them fast and develop them further. We must thoughtfully inquire upon which side the most can be won for our good purposes, and the least endangered and lost.

You have said of me to my credit in the *Staats-Zeitung* that I have done much to awaken the conscience of the people. That has been my intention, and that is my intention to-day. Whatever words the excitement of the moment may have put in your mouth, you cannot believe in earnest that I would lightly throw away the fruit of long years of labor and strife, and he who attributes to me motives of self-interest has but little know-

ledge of me. What I am now striving for is to guard the spirit which has been awakened from entering upon a course in which, as I believe, it is in the greatest danger of wearing itself out in a mere exchange of officeholders, and of thereby satisfying itself without winning, through thorough and systematic civil service reform, deep-reaching and permanent results.

I repeat, one branch of reform—the cleansing of the Government service from those officers who have disgraced it—seems to me in any event secured.

The question is whether or not we shall, before the general zeal for reform dies away, through an abolition of the spoils system and the permanent establishment of a sensible civil service, win the other branch of reform, which is of still greater importance for the future of our political life. After no hasty resolve, but after a calm and earnest consideration of all the circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that this end will be best attained by the election of Mr. Hayes, and in this conviction I am willing to subject myself to all suspicions and assaults. That there are in the Republican party influential persons who, in the event of Mr. Hayes's election, will strive to hinder the carrying out of his reform program, and to make use of him for other purposes, I know as well as you do. But I believe that these persons will find that they have mistaken their man. I have full confidence that the future will furnish the proof.

It is scarcely necessary for me to speak at length of other reasons which make a triumph of the Democratic party undesirable. I refer, among other things, to the strength which it would give to the ultramontane element, and to the false hopes which it would arouse in the lawless members of Southern communities, giving a fresh impulse to the commission of those excesses which make us shudder and for which the better part of our Southern people have

as great a horror as we. I have frequently expressed my opinion on this point, and according to an observation, which I first saw in the *Staats-Zeitung* not long ago, you agree with me that a liberal, just, Republican Government, in view of the moral effect of its identification with the results of the war, is, for the peace and welfare of the South, far preferable to a Democratic Government. I have therefore never intended, notwithstanding my separation from the Republican party, to unite myself to the Democratic party.

One would, it is true, have had to reckon a good deal into the bargain, if one had been obliged to regard this as a last resort in bringing to an end the all-destroying government system which we designate by the name of Grantism. This, however, as I have shown, can now be accomplished in a better way. In other respects, I believe that the peculiar elements of which the Democratic party is composed, however good some of them individually may be, are not capable of bringing about an enduring moral reform of the Government.

You have frequently, during some time past, felt it necessary to inform the readers of the *Staats-Zeitung* that I, owing to my position in this campaign, have lost the confidence of many of my friends. If that were the case, I should, as I have often done, console myself with the thought that an honest effort for the public good never loses for any length of time the confidence of patriotic citizens. While I have been pursuing the path of honest conviction, I have been obliged to accustom myself to bear to-day the blame of those who yesterday praised me, and who will acknowledge me again to-morrow. In the present case I feel myself perfectly sure of the latter.

I will hazard a prophecy as to what the future has in store for us. I should not dare to promise the people an ideal political situation if Mr. Hayes be elected; but as

regards the three points which are mentioned in this letter and which the address of the May Conference touched upon, the following appear to me as sure as anything one can ever count upon in the future: (1) The application of the whole Constitutional power of the Executive to secure a prompt resumption of specie payments, and apparently a supporting majority in Congress. (2) A weeding out of bad officers, and a consequent carrying through of his program of civil service reform on the part of the President, as far as his Constitutional powers will permit him; the employment in the public service of not one more party agent; the abolition of the spoils system; opposition to these reforms on the part of the spoils politicians in Congress; the overthrow of this opposition at the next Congressional elections. (3) An intelligent execution of the laws, joined with a just, conciliatory and honorable policy toward the people of the South.

In the event of a Democratic victory: (1) A soft-money majority in the House of Representatives; efforts on the part of the President in behalf of a resumption of specie payments, which are ruined by the majority in the House of Representatives; a continuance of our uncertain financial position for an indefinite length of time; in case of the succession of Mr. Hendricks to the Presidency, universal confusion, and a revival of the inflationists' plans. (2) The weeding out of the bad officers, but also of the good ones; a tremendous, irresistible rush of officeseekers from South and North to divide the booty; a substantial continuance of the spoils system and the civil service as party machinery and all the demoralization which would flow from that; sundry efforts in the right direction, borne down by the pressure of partisan interests from all sides. (3) The rousing of false hopes among the lawless element in the South by their party

victory, and the increase of terrible excesses and reactionary efforts, in spite of the desire of the Government and of the better part of the Southern people to suppress such disorders.

This is my view of what would result from the triumph of the one or the other party. You may hold a different view; time will tell which of us is right. May the sequel not prove injurious to the public weal.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

FORT WASHINGTON, Aug. 7. 1876.

I do not know whether you received my last letter written about twenty days ago; but I have to write again, believing that the interests of our common cause require it. I do not know your views of the present condition of the campaign, but I will give you mine. I have correspondence all over the country and know pretty well what is going on in the minds of that class of people on whose votes the result of this contest depends. In speaking to you with entire frankness I want you to understand that I do so as your sincere friend who has your success as the representative of a good cause warmly at heart, and who at the same time has in this campaign all his reputation and standing in the public opinion of this country at stake.

It is my deliberate opinion, based upon the best kind of information, that the campaign not only does not stand well, but that, if the election were to take place now, it would go heavily against us. I see it denied by the Republican papers what the Democrats claim, that a large majority of the German voters, and among them very many who always went with the Republicans, are now inclined toward Tilden. I can assure you that I know this to be so. I know also that a large number of that class

who may be called reform Republicans are to-day the same way. But for your letter of acceptance the defection would be very much larger and irremediable. But even now it is considerable enough, as I am very strongly convinced, to turn the election against us if it were to come off to-morrow.

What is the cause of this? You have probably followed the run of Democratic argument in the papers: "Governor Hayes's Administration will be but a continuation of Grant's. He owes his nomination to Conkling, Morton and Cameron, and they, of course, will remain the powerful men in the Government," etc. That is the talk repeated in endless variations, and that sort of argument is not only believed by many outside of the Democratic party, so as to turn them that way, but it keeps a great many others in serious doubt as to what they will do. Grant is doing his very worst. He is making well-meaning people so angry that they say, this concern must be cleaned out at any cost. As things now stand, I think the best thing he could do for your success would be to come out straight against you. Then there are such things as the appointment of Chandler to the chairmanship of the National Committee, the acquittal of Belknap, the attempt of the Republican members of the House Committee to white-wash Robeson etc. You are loaded down with the discredit incurred by the Administration and the old party leaders, and unless that burden be removed, so that you can rest your case upon *your own* merits, you cannot win the election. The current which is now running against you cannot otherwise be turned. It has been very painful to me to come to such a conclusion, but I have actively participated in all the Presidential campaigns since the organization of the Republican party and have learned to read the signs of the times. But for your letter of acceptance the campaign would have become a complete rout.

I do not want you to understand me as if these prospects could influence my conduct in this campaign. Not at all. I shall go to work as earnestly as if our chances were ever so good. I think also that they can be greatly improved. But it requires something which nobody can do for you; something which you can only do yourself. The artfully cultivated impression that "Governor Hayes, although an upright, able and well-meaning gentleman, has always sympathized with Grant in all his doings, and *is under such obligations* to the old party leaders that they will inevitably control his Administration," is what hurts you most.

Your letter of acceptance is sneezed at as a bundle of well-meant promises which the opposition of the old party leaders will prevent you from carrying out. This impression must be destroyed. In my opinion some opportunity should be made use of by yourself to express your sentiments in that respect,—if you do not like the form of a letter addressed to some friend, it might be in a little speech to a serenading party or something of that kind—and it can be done in language which will not offend anybody but appear as a simple sequel to your letter of acceptance.

But in some way the country should be made to understand that you do not consider yourself under obligations to anybody, either for a vote in the Convention or support in the election; that people who support you have to do so for the country's sake and not your own; that in your opinion the duties of Government stand above all personal obligations; that those who inquire about your opinions concerning public measures and current events (an allusion to Grant's recent performances) should read your letter of acceptance; that those who indulge in speculations as to what influences will be powerful in your Administration should also study that document; that

your letter of acceptance contains your program of policy, which was not only put forth in good faith but will in every point be strictly adhered to; that you were aware of difficulties to be overcome in that respect; that only such men and influences will be powerful with you in your Administration as will aid you in good faith in carrying out that plan of policy and all the reforms included in it; that you had promised this to the American people, and that nobody had ever had reason to think R. B. Hayes capable of breaking his word, etc.

Such an expression of sentiment, giving proof of your earnestness in strong and unmistakable language, would go very far to remove the apprehensions which are now working so strongly against us. And, I repeat, nobody can do that for you. If the prominent leaders of the party, Morton, Conkling, Chandler, Cameron or Blaine, did it in your name, it would be laughed at as a mockery and farce, and justly so. If I do it, as I did to some extent in my letter to Mr. Ottendorfer, which you have probably seen, the answer is, that I am being deceived or am deceiving myself and others.

Pardon me for writing thus plainly. The urgency of our necessities demands it. I have the fullest confidence in your good faith; it is therefore no distrust on my part that speaks. But I want to be able to overcome the distrust of others, and I know that I cannot do that alone and unaided to such an extent as to make it tell decisively. Something of this kind must be done to stop the demoralizing distrust which now pervades the Republican ranks, and I think it ought to be done *very soon*. We have no more time to lose.

While I am writing I receive the inclosed from Horace White and communicate it to you confidentially. Good heavens, what a campaign this is! This is the second candidate for governor we shall have to drop for corruption.

You see how necessary it is that the ground under our feet be strengthened, and I believe only you can do it yourself.

Above all things, I pray you, do not permit yourself to be deceived by the flattering reports about the condition of things which are apt to be presented to the candidates. This is the most deceptive campaign we ever had.

P. S. Some Democratic papers have ascribed your letter of acceptance, part of it at least, to me. I hope you have never thought me capable of giving rise to such a rumor. It was merely a Democratic trick.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Aug. 9, 1876.

Private.

My dear General: I am in receipt of your esteemed favor as to the prospects of the campaign and making important suggestions. I also received and replied to your former letter. Let me assure you that nothing of the sort contained in your letter will shake, or tend to shake, my faith in your hearty zeal in the cause. To be frank is the best proof of it. I do not usually give much thought to the prospects of a canvass. So far as they indicate something to be done I try to consider them. But having fired my shot, and supposing I would remain passive hereafter, I have preferred not to know much that would either depress or elate. I will, however, think seriously of your suggestions. It is to be hoped that as my past and my letters and speeches, a few of which are published in Howard's *Life*, are examined, the people will find that I am likely to be one of the last men in the world to back out of a good work, deliberately entered upon. I send you a speech by Judge Johnston, a shrewd observer. I wonder if you see what I am discovering beyond all question in Ohio. A vast majority of the "plain people" think of this as the main interest in the canvass. *A Democratic victory will bring the*

Rebellion into power. They point to a host of facts and are greatly moved by them.

But in any event we are to fight it out. If the prospect is good it will be a pleasanter task. But if it is against odds the work will be nobler.

I do not hear where you go earliest. You can do great good, I learn, in Wisconsin after you are through with New York, or rather the opening in New York.

You do not send the whole of Mr. W's letter, but from what you send it looks as if Mr. W. supposed that North Carolina had a State election this year in August. This is an error. No election there until November.

With very hearty confidence in our cause, believe me,

Sincerely,

R. B. HAYES.

P. S. Aug. 10th. The foregoing was written at my office in the midst of interruptions. I wish to add my thanks for your letter and to congratulate you on its success. It is doing good. We had the best convention, and it gave us the best ticket Cincinnati has had for years. The good elements of the party were uppermost at all points. We have a fair fighting chance to win, and this with the goodness of our cause ought to keep us in good heart.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

FORT WASHINGTON, PA., Aug. 14, 1876.

My dear Governor: I have received your kind note of the 8th [9th] inst. In it you say that you replied to my letter addressed to you some time ago, but I have received no such reply. Can it have been lost on the way to this place? It would not surprise me since the postal service here is not very regular. You remember I made some suggestion to you concerning the levying of assessments on Department clerks and other Government officers.

The matter is now being discussed in the newspapers. It appears the Senate amended a provision in a House bill touching this subject so as to make the prohibition to levy such assessments apply only to persons connected with the Government, but not to "other persons" as the House bill provided. If this amendment is agreed to, the Government clerks, etc., will receive circulars asking for campaign contributions, from party committees, which, in effect, leaves the matter just where it was before. The papers report that assessments are actually being levied now under the name of voluntary contributions. But we know from experience how voluntary they are. Not having received your letter in answer to mine I do not know what your reply may have been. But I venture to repeat my suggestion that you protest in some way against the collection of money for the canvass from Department clerks and other Government officers. A civil service reform campaign in which one of the principles we profess is, that Government officers are neither expected *nor desired* to render any partisan service—such a campaign run on money collected from Government officers, very many of whom would not pay "voluntary contributions" did they not know that there is danger in refusing, is a contradiction in itself. A protest from you, which would come as a perfectly natural thing, would be tangible proof that we mean what we say, and would have a most excellent effect. In fact it would be the honest thing to do.

I must recur also once more to the subject of my last letter. It grows every day more important that something of the kind suggested there be done. To the "plain people" who think that a Democratic victory would bring the Rebellion into power no other argument need be addressed. But there are vast numbers of Republicans or men who used to vote the Republican ticket who have lost their fear of the return of the Rebellion to power. They

want a *change* in the conduct of Government, not only a change of persons in the Presidential chair, but a radical change in the influences directing the Government. The only way to prevent that class of citizens from seeking that change outside of the Republican party is to make them quite sure that they will find it inside. At present there is a quiet migration going on from one side to the other. But I assure you I know what I am speaking of when I say that this migration is almost all going the other way. Unless that movement be arrested and, if possible, turned back, the election will be lost. I tell you here what I *know* to be true. The cry for a "change" is immensely powerful. People say, Governor Hayes is an honest man, but what good will it do to elect him, if his Administration is controlled by Morton, Conkling, Cameron, Chandler, Blaine, etc.—and off they go where they are sure of "a change." I could show you a number of letters from men of Republican sympathies, of cool judgment and more or less prominence and influence who have taken, or are inclined to take, that course. To some extent that movement is showing itself on the surface, but more of it is going on in a very quiet way unobserved by the party leaders. And, of course, the Democratic managers are using every possible means to stimulate that tendency. How easy it is for them to make an impression in that respect I know from my own convictions of the absolute necessity of a thorough reform, and of the removal of the most powerful influences at present controlling the conduct of Government. I cannot refrain therefore from urging the importance of the suggestion.

I feel that the subject I am discussing with you is a delicate one. But I can speak about it with entire frankness and candor, because I have no axe of my own to grind. If you are elected you will not find me among those who ask for or expect place or favor. I have been long

enough in public positions to become sensible of their worthlessness as an element of human happiness and especially since my recent bereavement I have absolutely no ambition in that line. Being so minded and having no friends to push forward nor enemies to punish, I feel that I can afford to speak to you about everything connected with our common cause without reserve and in perfect confidence. The only thing that I want is to promote certain objects of public importance and to that end to preserve, as a private citizen, my influence on public opinion and the esteem of those whose respect is worth something. I can do that only by telling the people what I honestly believe to be true and what I can reasonably prove to be true. What I believe as to the consequences of your election, especially with regard to the work of reform, I have stated in my letter to Mr. Ottendorfer, and I shall repeat it in every speech. It is a draft on the future, and it is in the interest of our common cause as well as your own as a candidate, that this draft be as well endorsed as possible. The strongest endorsement is your own.

I have not been well of late but am now in a condition to go into the campaign. I have given up the idea of opening in New York. It is just now a bad time for public meetings there, a large number of people being out of town and public assemblages in closed halls not being very comfortable in this warm weather. Moreover, the main speech I wish to deliver is not yet in that shape in which I want to have it. Perhaps I shall divide it into two, one on the reform question and the other on the currency. In a day or two I shall appoint a day for a meeting of the Germans in Cleveland, and then I may go for the same purpose to Chicago and Milwaukee, to return immediately to Ohio. I shall write to Mr. Wikoff about it. After Ohio I may go into Indiana. In New York, the

campaign will not become warm until after the nomination of the State tickets. More depends on the wisdom of the Republican convention in their nominations than on any speeches that can be made. As soon as I am once in the campaign I shall stay in with the exception of a few days which I shall have to devote to my children.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Aug. 25, 1876.

Private.

I hear from two friends that you feel "gloomy" as to the prospects. Your influence is large. You can influence many minds. It is too early to make figures. Let me urge you to great caution in this regard.

I have stopped all the practices you complain of within my reach. Some are denied. Some are explained. I would write more fully, but *money has corrupted one P. O. clerk*, and I do not feel safe.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

SANDUSKY, O., Aug. 27, 1876.

Next Thursday night I am going to make a speech at Cincinnati which I expect to have some influence on the tone of the campaign. I shall have it ready to print on Tuesday evening, so that it may be mailed in slips to the members of the Associated Press East and West on Wednesday. In that speech I take up the Democratic gauntlet and devote myself exclusively to the reform question. Your letter of acceptance with its reform program is, of course, the principal theme of discussion, and I should be glad to submit at least a part of the speech to you before it is printed. I do not find it possible, however, to run over to Columbus from Dayton, where I am

to speak to-morrow night, and yet be in Cincinnati in time to superintend the publication, proofreading, etc., on Tuesday. Have you, perhaps, any official or other business calling you to Cincinnati on that day? You would meet also Mr. Friedley, the chairman of the Indiana State committee, who will see me about my appointment in that State. I expect at the same time Mr. Wikoff.

I merely suggest this to you, as it might be well to have your opinion on the propriety of this and that, but, of course, I do not desire to cause you any inconvenience.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Aug. 30, 1876.

I am sorry not to be able to meet you at Cincinnati. *Can't we meet here before you return?* Your speeches do great good. We should cultivate a hopeful tone. Men in the right can afford to be cheerful even if the outlook is gloomy. Since New York we are surely bound to gain.

HAYES VERSUS TILDEN¹

Speech in Cincinnati
FELLOW-CITIZENS:—We may congratulate the American people upon the steady growth of a public sentiment which demands the correction of existing abuses and the conduct of Government upon honest principles and enlightened methods of statesmanship. That sentiment has become powerful enough to extort respect from both political parties, and on both sides have its demands become more or less the battlecries of the contest. This is in itself a hopeful sign, and if this drift of public opinion be kept alive and wisely directed as the propelling force in our

¹ Speech in Cincinnati, Aug. 31, 1876.

politics, it may accomplish a lasting reformation of our public concerns. But just such a situation, while full of promise, is also full of deception. We are naturally eager to achieve the desired result; but in that eagerness we may be in danger of sacrificing real and lasting reform to mere apparent or temporary change, leading only to a repetition of the same conflicts, but then under the disadvantage of disappointed zeal and an exhausted energy of popular movement. Under such circumstances it is therefore especially necessary that all good citizens, who have the welfare of the country sincerely at heart, should determine their political course with more than ordinary calmness and judgment and circumspection. Indeed, I do not remember a single Presidential campaign in which so many patriotic men seemed inclined to take sides only after the maturest reflection, and to despise the ordinary cant of party. To that class—in other words, to the independent voters—I shall particularly address my remarks, and I can do so with all the more propriety, as I am one of them.

In my opinion it would have been a fortunate thing for this Republic could the reformatory spirit now alive have been embodied in a new party organization strictly devoted to its purposes. Why this appeared impossible, I will not now consume your time in discussing. The fact is, we have no other choice than between the candidates of the two old parties, and that choice we are compelled to make. We find ourselves confronted with a confusion of issues, but it turns out that two problems are uppermost in the minds of most intelligent citizens: the problem of administrative reform is one, and the currency problem the other. You could not repress them if you would, and you ought not to repress them if you could. I, for one, am glad that we have at last reached the point when living questions claim and maintain their

just right to public attention. With regard to the successful solution of both those problems, it is my deliberate opinion that the true interests of the American people demand the election of Rutherford B. Hayes to the Presidency of the United States. That conclusion I have formed, after careful consideration of all the circumstances surrounding us, as an entirely independent man, who is neither governed by party discipline, nor biased by party prejudice. In giving you my reasons for it I shall address myself in the simplest possible language, not to your passions or predilections or resentments, but to your sober judgment; and if I should be fortunate enough to bring any one of a different way of thinking over to my own, it shall not be said that it was done by any artifice of oratory. This is a time for calm reasoning and very plain speech. That plain speech I shall give you, no matter whom it may please or displease.

My remarks to-night will be devoted exclusively to the subject of administrative reform. The financial question, as it appears in this canvass, I intend to discuss in another speech at an early day.

Not long ago civil service reform was treated by many as an idle fancy of theorists; to-day every sensible and patriotic man in the country will recognize it as a necessity. Extreme partisans may still attempt to belittle the evils that have befallen us and to whitewash the present condition of things. It is in vain. The people understand the truth, and it is well that they do. Only then can they act wisely. The truth is that our political machinery, irrespective of party, has grown very corrupt. Scarcely a single sphere of our political life has remained untouched by the disease. Listen to what an eminent member of the Republican party said when opening the case for the House of Representatives in the impeachment of a member of the President's Cabinet:

My own public life has been a very brief and insignificant one, extending little beyond the duration of a single term of Senatorial office, but in that brief period I have seen five Judges of a high Court of the United States driven from office by threats of impeachment for corruption or maladministration. I have heard the taunt from friendliest lips that, when the United States presented herself in the East to take part with the civilized world in generous competition in the arts of life, the only product of her institutions in which she surpassed all others beyond question was her corruption. I have seen in the State in the Union foremost in power and wealth four judges of her courts impeached for corruption, and the political administration of her chief city become a disgrace and a by-word throughout the world. I have seen the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in the House, now a distinguished member of this Court, rise in his place and demand the expulsion of four of his associates for making sale of their official privilege of selecting the youths to be educated at our great military school. When the greatest railroad of the world, binding together the continent and uniting the two great seas which wash our shores, was finished, I have seen our National triumph and exaltation turned to bitterness and shame by the unanimous reports of three Committees of Congress, two of the House and one here, that every step of that mighty enterprise had been taken in fraud. I have heard in highest places the shameless doctrine avowed by men grown old in public office, that the true way in which power should be gained in the Republic is to bribe the people with the offices created for their service, and the true end for which it should be used when gained is the promotion of selfish ambition and the gratification of personal revenge. I have heard that suspicion haunts the footsteps of the trusted companions of the President. These things have passed into history. The Hallam or the Tacitus or the Sismondi or the Macaulay who writes the annals of our time will record them with his inexorable pen.

The man who spoke thus (Mr. George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts) was not a political opponent of those

in power, not a constitutional grumbler and faultfinder, ventilating his spleen. He is a man who would have been always ready and glad to repel any unjust aspersion upon the Government of his country; but he spoke as he did speak impelled by his sense of duty to speak the truth. And he might have said much more. He might have pointed to the penitentiaries inhabited by revenue officers, who with one hand robbed the Government and with the other the business men whom they ruined by tempting their avarice, or sometimes even forcing them into fraudulent practices; have mentioned the host of defaulters and embezzlers, not only officers of the National Government, but in all possible public positions, and of both political parties, who have run away with the people's money. But why elaborate this picture? It would be difficult to tell you more than you already know, and those deceive themselves who attempt to deceive you by telling you less. It is useless and unwise to mince matters. The actual condition of things is so bad that the people have become justly alarmed, and the cry has risen that there must be a change. Yes, I want a change, you want a change, as every honest and patriotic man in the country wants it. But what every honest and patriotic man in the country ought also to insist upon and be careful to bring about, is a change that will be an improvement, a real reform, as thorough and genuine and lasting as possible. Let us see what we stand in need of.

In the first place we want to get rid of the corrupt men and the incapables who still infest the public service. Every officer who has done dishonest things must be held to a strict account. Every officer who has abused his powers or been lax in the performance of his duties, or has permitted his subordinates to be so, must be removed. Every corrupt ring must be broken up, and its members prosecuted and punished without mercy. "Let no guilty

man escape" is a good word of command, and it must be carried out. It indicates a duty so plain that only those who in high place fail to understand their responsibility will fail to appreciate and fulfil it.

This is undoubtedly a serious task, the importance of which will not be underestimated. But there is one more important still. It is that by an organization of the civil service upon honest and rational principles, not only the punishment of corrupt men be secured, but a higher moral spirit be infused into our public concerns, and thus corruption be prevented. It is a word of wisdom that an ounce of prevention is worth ten pounds of cure. There is an ever-flowing fountain of corruption in our public life, and, if we are to have a change that means lasting reform, that fountain must be stopped. We are frequently told that no Government has ever been entirely pure in all the details of administration. That is undoubtedly true. There have been some dishonest men in public employ and some dishonest practices under the best Governments, in all countries and at all times. That may be unavoidable. But where corruption develops itself during a long period of time and on an extensive scale, we may be sure that it must be the fault of the existing political system.

Let me tell you an anecdote. One day Abraham Lincoln, while overwhelmed with the cares which the rising tide of the rebellion was loading upon him, pointed out to a friend the eager throng of office-seekers and of Congressmen accompanying them in his ante-room, and spoke these words: "Do you observe this? The rebellion is hard enough to overcome, but there you see something which, in the course of time, will become a greater danger to this Republic than the rebellion itself." Abraham Lincoln was not only a good, but also a wise man, and with the instinctive anticipation of genius, he foresaw that the poison of demoralization working through a vicious civil

service system would at last bring more serious peril to the Republic than all the hostile guns then threatening the National capital. He was right. Have you ever calmly thought of it what our civil service system really is? It is one of the wonders of the world. Had it not gradually grown up among us, little by little, in the course of many years, so that we have become accustomed to the unique spectacle, we should scarcely be capable of believing in the possibility of its existence among people endowed with ordinary common-sense. I am sure, if, in the early days of this Republic, a public man had proposed to introduce it as a system, just as we now witness it, there would have been a universal cry to shut him up in a mad-house for the rest of his life.

Imagine, in this year of the great Centennial anniversary some of the wise Fathers of this Republic—Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton—rising from their graves in order to ascertain by a tour of inspection what has become of their work in these hundred years. Of course, we would have to show them our civil service—and would it not make them stare? We would have to explain to them how, nowadays, things are managed; how, on the accession of a new President, the whole machinery of our Government is taken to pieces all at once, to be rebuilt again out of green material in a hurry; how sixty or seventy or eighty thousand officers are dismissed, without the least regard to their official merits or usefulness, simply because they do not belong to the party, to make room for a “new deal”; how several hundred thousand hungry patriots make a desperate rush for public place, to get their reward for party service; how the new President and the new Cabinet Ministers, still unused to their complicated duties, and needing time and composure to study them, are fairly swept off their feet by the storm-tide of applications for office; how our Congressmen, the

National legislators, are transformed into office-peddlers, and forget everything else in their frantic run from Department to Department, to see their local supporters and tools provided with official bread and butter, thus paying off their political debts at the public expense; how hundreds and thousands of individuals, without the least possibility of sufficient inquiry into their morals or capacity, are fairly thrust into places of responsibility in a mad hurry, merely because they have "claims" on the party, or only on a Congressman, as adroit packers of caucuses or manipulators of votes; how, then, when the Administration is going at last, men of meritorious character and conduct are arbitrarily removed because they do not belong to the dominant faction of the party, or do not dance nimbly enough to the whistle of some powerful favorite; how others, notoriously unfit, or even corrupt, are protected in their places by their "friends" in power, because they are useful political tools; how thus the civil service is transformed into a vast party machinery, a standing army of political mercenaries, paid out of the Government treasury; how officers, by the insecurity of their tenure and by party taxes levied upon them, are tempted to make hay while the sun shines, in whatever way they can; how corrupt practices of the most alarming kind are not seldom anxiously covered up or "white-washed" by men appointed as the guardians of the public interest and virtue lest the exposure injure the party and disturb the efficiency of the "machine"; how thus, now and then, corruption is placed under the protection of party spirit and influence; how, finally, the civil service as a party agency is, even during the term of an Administration, continually organized and reorganized, modeled and remodeled, at the request of Congressmen or according to the changing political exigencies of the times, to control conventions, to govern State politics, to elect this man or

to defeat that man, and how in all this an honest and efficient transaction of the public business is treated as a matter of only secondary consideration, if of any consideration at all. This we would have to show the Fathers of the Republic, could they now appear among us—and what would they say? Would they not stand fairly aghast at the aspect of the monstrous abortion, and exclaim with scornful disgust: “Is it this you have made of the fair fabric of government which we formed and transmitted to your hands to be the embodiment of true liberty, wisdom, honesty and justice—is it this you have made of it”? And well might they say so, for never was there a civil service system invented so utterly absurd and barbarous in conception, so ruinous in operation and so universally demoralizing in effect.

Is there a sensible man who believes that the corrupting influence of such a system can be remedied by merely sweeping out one set of officers and putting in another set in the same way? Every honest citizen cordially applauds and honors the efforts made by brave men of either party to expose corrupt officials and to bring them to justice. But do not deceive yourselves. As long as the smell of “party spoils” is attached to public office, as long as the civil service remains a partisan agency, as long as officeholders understand that they receive their places for party services already rendered or still to be rendered, and not on account of their fitness for public trust, as long as they have reason to believe that usefulness to the party entitles them to party protection as officers of the Government, just so long will they be under the strongest temptation “to milk the cow” as long as they are in the stable, no matter what may become of the animal, and just so long you may send one set of thieves to jail and the system will inevitably raise up another.

Now, do not understand me as meaning that there are

not many honest men left in our civil service. Thank heaven, there are very many, and for having kept their integrity intact we should honor them. They deserve more than ordinary credit, for, considering how well the spoils system is calculated to deaden official conscience, the thing which should surprise us most in our civil service is not that among its officers it should have developed so many rascals, but that it should have left among them so many honest men. But, while this circumstance is ever so honorable to those concerned, we must not forget that since the day when the principle "to the victors belong the spoils" was proclaimed, the number of rascals in the service as well as the extent of their rascalities have grown constantly and in most promising progression.

There are people who console themselves with the idea that the corruption we now deplore is simply to be accounted for as one of the natural consequences of our great civil war. Undoubtedly the war, with its confusion and seductive opportunities offered to the rogues a rich field of plunder, and thus stimulated all the thieving instinct there was in the country to extraordinary enterprise. But as to the civil service, the war only gave strong impulse to the vicious tendencies existing in it. Had not the spoils system already demoralized the service, the war would have developed far less corruption.

Moreover, there was plenty of corruption before our civil conflict, and neither party was exempt from it, least of all that to which the spoils system owed its origin and development. I dislike very much to hurt the feelings of our Democratic friends, since they treat me with such distinguished consideration, but my respect for historical truth compels me to say that it was a Democratic President who, for the golden rule that ability, honesty and fidelity should be the only decisive qualifications for public employment, first substituted the whims of arbitrary

favoritism; first used the places of trust and responsibility as a means of partisan reward, and the power of removal as a weapon of punishment; first made the civil service a partisan engine, and thus left to us that terrible Pandora-box of evil from which so much demoralization, disaster and disgrace has come upon us. It was a Democratic baby, that spoils system, and it must be admitted that the Democratic party has very faithfully nursed it. It grew under that maternal care with all its peculiar virtues, until the last Democratic Administration just before the civil war became more arbitrary and despotic in the use of appointments and removals, as a means of partisan reward and punishment, and also more corrupt than any that had preceded it.

But my respect for historical truth compels me also to say, that the terrible legacy which in such a development of the spoils system the last Democratic Administration left behind it, has, under Republican rule, borne abundant fruit. I have deemed it my duty, on every proper occasion, unsparingly to denounce the abuses which have grown and spread under the last two Administrations. That duty remains the same. Of what I have said on this subject I have nothing to retract. Those abuses have injured the country in the opinion of mankind and alarmed the American people. Neither can those who were guilty of corrupt practices, or those who, in high places, permitted them to grow up, be excused as the mere victims of a vicious system. If the plea of temptation were always held valid as a justification of sin, there would soon be scarcely a temptation without a victim and such victims would have a pleasant time of it. No. I believe in personal responsibility. I have to admit that at no period in our history the conduct of some of those highest in power has exercised a more demoralizing and degrading influence upon all the spheres of public life below than it has within

the last few years. I doubt whether the arbitrary use of the power of appointment and removal as a means of favoritism and reward and punishment has ever been carried to a more alarming extent. I said so years ago, and when I repeat it to-day, I do so with the assurance that a large majority of the Republican party have in the meantime come to the conclusion that I was right. I go further in saying that the resolution in the National Republican platform expressing *indiscriminate* approval of General Grant's Administration was a weak concession to the established party usage of courtesy at the expense of truth, and misrepresentation of public sentiment, felt to be such by a large majority of those who assented to it. While General Grant's great services in the civil war will always be held in the grateful remembrance to which they are justly entitled, I can tell my Republican friends that they can scarcely afford to equivocate about such things in the pending campaign. Let them have the manhood to say what they think; let them call things by their right names, and they will not only relieve their own souls, but stand in a better attitude before this generation as well as posterity.

And yet, in spite of all the unfortunate peculiarities of General Grant's character, which fitted him so little for the complex duties and responsibilities of civil government, even under his Administration not half of the mischief would have occurred which now stands recorded had not the vicious traditions of the spoils system furnished the means and pointed out the opportunities. If, when he came into power, nothing had been known with regard to the conduct of the civil service than the principles and practice of the early Administrations, even his arbitrary impulses might have accommodated themselves to the wholesome restraints of established usage. His Administration might, indeed, not have been as pure

nor as wise as those of Washington, Adams or Jefferson, but how much misfortune would have been averted, and what crop of scandal remained unsown!

One great merit General Grant's Administration may claim. It has demonstrated the vicious tendencies of our present civil service system so strongly that even the dullest mind must perceive them. We have clearly seen how that system will endanger the integrity of good men by its temptations, and stimulate bad men only to become worse. We have been forcibly made aware of the necessity not only of a change, but of a thorough and lasting change, and that such a thorough change cannot be put off much longer without danger.

We have been in the habit of speaking with pride and exultation of the vitality and recuperative power of the American people; and justly so, for a people who can endure such a civil service system as we have had for the last forty years without utter ruin, moral and National, must, indeed, have a wonderfully tough constitution or amazing good luck. As a young people, and under extraordinarily favored circumstances, we have endured it so far. But it will scarcely do to test the robustness even of the American people too severely. The most vigorous constitutions must at last sink under constant debauch. There will be one of two things: either thorough reformation, or inevitable and perhaps rapid decay. What, then, is to be done? If it is true, and I am profoundly convinced of that truth, that under the spoils system it is simply impossible to keep up a reasonably efficient and honest civil service, and that the service will grow the more corrupt the longer the spoils system exists, then nothing can be clearer than that we must have a change which is genuine—thorough reform, including the abolition of that system. What is civil service reform? Let me tell you first what civil service reform does *not* consist in:

It does not consist in the removal of all the officers belonging to one party, and the filling of the offices with members of the other party, according to the old methods of a "clean sweep" and a "new deal." For instance, almost from time immemorial New York merchants have complained of bad practices in the customhouse of that city—a few years ago more than now. The demand for a change was always in order. To what cause were those bad practices assigned? That the customhouse is "run" as a political machine; and that a great many of the places are filled by low political hacks, who are kept there, not to secure an honest collection of duties, but to serve as party tools, and were put there for that purpose by the influence of party politicians. Now let me tell the merchants of New York that they may indeed get rid of those identical political hacks now in office by a change in party and a "new deal"; but that they will not get rid of the bad practices they complain of, if in the new deal the same customhouse offices are filled with party hacks of the Democratic persuasion to build up another political machine under the influence of "Boss" Kelly or the Hon. John Morrissey. That would be a change, but it would not be reform. It might turn out to be jumping out of the frying-pan into the fire. And this applies not only to the customhouse of New York, but to the whole civil service throughout the country.

What, then, is necessary? Let your common-sense speak. When a merchant wants a bookkeeper, he will select a man whom he has ascertained to be honest, and to understand bookkeeping; he will not take one on the ground that he can play the flute, or that he is a good hand at poker. If you want a good customhouse officer, or postmaster, or revenue collector, you must select a man of whom you have ascertained that he is honest and possesses that capacity and those business habits

which will enable him to perform the duties of custom-house officer, or postmaster, or revenue collector satisfactorily; but you must not prefer a man irrespective of his character and business qualifications, on the ground that he has "claims" for party service rendered, or as a good political wirepuller who knows how to pack primaries.

Secondly, if you want your postmaster, or custom-house officer, or revenue collector to remain honest and to do his whole duty, you must make him understand that the performance of his official duties is the only thing he is paid for; that he is the servant of the Government and the people, and not the agent of a political party; that he is required to stick to his official business, and will be liable to removal if he uses his official power or influence for partisan purposes; that as long as he performs his official duties honestly and efficiently he will stay in his place and no longer; that continued good service or extraordinary efficiency will entitle him to promotion; but that if he indulges in dishonest practices he will be severely held to account, and that no consideration of party service rendered, or to be rendered, and no party influence can save him. This is the way to *keep* men in office efficient and honest.

Now, how are you to insure the selection of fit persons for office? Let me tell you first how you will *not* insure the selection of fit men. You will not do it by turning out all, or nearly all, the officers, good as well as bad, at the incoming of a new Administration, in the way of a "new deal," rendering necessary some 60,000 or 70,000 new appointments in a hurly-burly, when the President and heads of Departments have just dropped into their places, and are still bewildered by the variety and complication of new duties suddenly overwhelming them; it is simply impossible to use the necessary care under such circumstances. You will *not* insure the selection of fit men if

the appointments are governed by the recommendation or dictation of party leaders, and particularly of Congressmen, who, in many, if not in most, cases care less for the interests of the service than for the building up of their own home influence or party machine, by which to keep themselves in place, and who, to that end, use the offices to reward their political agents and tools with pay out of the Government treasury, or to secure the services of useful political workers for the future, thus turning the offices into means of bribery. In that way you will not only fail to insure the selection of honest and efficient men for office, but you will keep in the halls of Congress itself a class of men who have neither superior character nor ability to commend them, relying only upon a shrewd management of the patronage to carry their nominations and elections. That, then, is the way how not to do it.

But you can insure the selection of fit persons for office if, in the first place, the rule is established that officers shall not be liable to removal for party reasons, but only upon grounds connected with the discharge of their official duties, as it was under the early Administrations. This will prevent the occurrence of a very large number of vacancies at the same time, and enable the Executive Department in filling those vacancies to proceed with care and deliberate circumspection. Secondly, the Executive Department, which is responsible for the administration of public business, must, in making appointments or nominations to the Senate, remain independent of the dictation of Congressmen, many if not most of whom want to use the offices for the promotion of their own political ends. Thirdly, the qualifications of candidates for office must, whenever possible, be ascertained according to well regulated public methods, either by officers of the Departments themselves, or through competent men appointed for that purpose.

The establishment of such principles and the regulation and perpetuation of the corresponding practices, wherever possible, by legal enactment, that is the civil service reform, which will not only purge the service of corrupt and incompetent officials, but which will take from it its partisan character, remove from the offices of trust and responsibility the odious attribute of spoils, stop the most prolific source of corruption and demoralization in our political system, take away from the public officer the most dangerous temptations now surrounding him and inspire him with an honorable ambition; relieve our political life of the regular army of paid party mercenaries, which threatens to subjugate all the movements of public opinion, and eliminate also that numerous class of National legislators who rely for their election and influence merely on a shrewd manipulation of the public plunder. That, then, is genuine civil service reform.

What patriotic man is there who will not recognize that the evils from which the body-politic suffers absolutely require so thorough a measure of change, and who will not eagerly embrace every opportunity to secure it? Now, let us see what prospects the two parties which ask for our votes open to us with regard to this most important subject.

The platforms, as well as the candidates of each, promise what they call "reform." I will confess at once that I have lost my faith in the professions and promises made in party platforms. They have at last become, on either side, one of the cheapest articles of manufacture in this country, and that industry continues to flourish even without a protective tariff and in spite of the general depression of business. But civil service reform is not produced in that way. If we desire to ascertain by the success of which party that reform is most likely to be promoted, we must look to the character and principles

of the candidates as well as to the component elements and general tendencies of the parties behind them. I am firmly convinced that one part of the necessary change, the driving from the public service of the corrupt officials who now pollute it, will be amply secured by the election of either of the two candidates for the Presidency. Governor Tilden has won his reputation as a reformer mainly by the prosecution of the canal ring in the State of New York. I will not follow others in questioning his motives, but readily admit that prosecution to have been an enterprise requiring considerable courage, circumspection and perseverance, for which he should have full credit. Should he be elected President, he will undoubtedly eject from their places, and, if possible, otherwise punish, all the dishonest officers now in the service; making a "clean sweep," he will eject them, together with the good ones. Nor have we any reason to expect, with regard to the cleaning process, less from Governor Hayes, should he be elected to the Presidency. It is well known that Governor Hayes was not my favorite candidate for the Presidential nomination, and I am not in the least inclined to extol him with extravagant praise. What I shall say of him will be simple justice to his character and record. You, citizens of Ohio, have had the best opportunity to form your judgment of him, from a near observation of his official and private conduct, and as far as I know, that judgment, whether expressed by friend or foe, is absolutely unanimous. Three times he has been elected Governor of your State, against the strongest candidates of the opposition. True, he has had no occasion to break up canal rings, or other extensive and powerful corrupt combinations, for the simple reason that in Ohio they did not exist. But it is universally recognized not only that Governor Hayes is a man whose personal integrity stands above the reach of suspicion, a man of a high sense of

honor, but that his administrations were singularly pure, irreproachable and efficient in every respect. If he had no existing corruption to fight, he certainly did not permit any to grow up. Nobody suspects him of being capable of tolerating a thief within the reach of his power, much less to protect one by favor or even by negligence. It is also well known that, while a party man, he always surrounded himself with the best and most high-toned elements of the organization, and kept doubtful characters at a distance. He is esteemed as a man of a very strong and high sense of duty and that quiet energy which does not rest until the whole duty is faithfully performed. The endeavor to purify the Government and to keep it pure will, therefore, with him not be a matter of artificial policy, but of instinctive desire, one of the necessities of his nature. He is honest and enforces honesty around him simply because he cannot be and do otherwise. In saying this I have only given the verdict of his opponents, and when here and there the assertion is put forth that Governor Hayes's Administration of the National Government would only be a continuance of the present way of doing things, it is one of those empty and contemptible partisan flings which prove only to what ridiculous extremities those are reduced who are bent upon inventing some charge against a man of unblemished character and a most honorable and pure record of public service.

The first cleaning-out process, then, seems well enough assured in any event. But the more important question occurs, in what manner that cleaning-out process is to be accomplished, and what is to follow. Where have we to look for that greater and lasting reform which is to insure an honest and efficient public service and a higher moral tone in our political life for the future? On this point both candidates have spoken in their letters of acceptance, and their utterances are entitled to far greater

consideration than the party platforms. Look at the letter of Governor Hayes first. It is explicit, and remarkable for the clearness and straightforwardness of its expressions. Here are his words:

More than forty years ago a system of making appointments to office grew up, based upon the maxim "to the victors belong the spoils." The old rule, the true rule, that honesty, capacity and fidelity constitute the only real qualifications for office, and that there is no other claim, gave place to the idea that party services were to be chiefly considered. All parties in practice have adopted this system. It has been essentially modified since its first introduction. It has not, however, been improved. At first the President, either directly or through the heads of Department, made all the appointments, but gradually the appointing power, in many cases, passed into the control of Members of Congress. The offices in these cases have become not merely the rewards for party services, but rewards for services to party leaders. The system destroys the independence of the separate departments of the Government. It tends directly to extravagance and official incapacity. It is a temptation to dishonesty; it hinders and impairs that careful supervision and strict accountability by which alone faithful and efficient public service can be secured; it obstructs the prompt removal and sure punishment of the unworthy; in every way it degrades the civil service and the character of the Government. It is felt, I am confident, by a large majority of the Members of Congress to be an intolerable burden and an unwarrantable hindrance to the proper discharge of their legitimate duties. It ought to be abolished. The reform should be thorough, radical and complete. We should return to the principles and practices of the founders of the Government—supplying by legislation, when needed, that which was formerly the established custom. They neither expected nor desired from the public officers any partisan service. They meant that public officers should give their whole service to the Government and to the people. They meant that the officer should be secure in his tenure as

long as his personal character remained untarnished, and the performance of his duties satisfactory. If elected, I shall conduct the administration of the Government upon these principles, and all Constitutional powers vested in the Executive will be employed to establish this reform.

Then he pledges himself to the "speedy, thorough and unsparing prosecution and punishment of all public officers who betray official trusts." And finally, "believing that the restoration of the civil service to the system established by Washington and followed by the early Presidents can be best accomplished by an Executive who is under no temptation to use the patronage of his office to promote his own reelection," he "performs what he regards as a duty in stating his inflexible purpose, if elected, not to be a candidate for election to a second term."

This is the clearest and completest program of civil service reform ever put forth by a public man in this Republic. Not a single essential point is forgotten,—and what is more, there is in it no vagueness or equivocation of statement or promise. No back door is left for escape. Each point is distinct, precise, specific and unmistakable. It covers the whole ground with well-defined propositions. If this program is carried out, the reform of the civil service will be thorough and genuine; and if the reform is permanently established, the main source of the corruption and demoralization of our political concerns, the spoils system, will be effectually stopped. It will be the organization of the service on business principles. Even the opponents of Governor Hayes will be compelled to admit this. Some of them have indeed attempted to find fault with one or the other of his propositions, but their objections are easily disposed of. A few Democratic papers argue that if officers are kept in their

places as long as their personal character remains untarnished and the performance of their duties satisfactory, the result will be "a permanent aristocracy of office-holders." Is this so? Look back into the history of the Republic and you will find that under the early Administrations down to John Quincy Adams, public officers *were* kept in place as long as their character remained untarnished and the performance of their duty satisfactory. Where was the "aristocracy of officeholders" during that period? The officers of the Government were then a set of quiet, industrious, modest and unobtrusive gentlemen who did not try to control party politics, and did not steal, but did, as a general rule, studiously endeavor, by strict attention to their official business, to win the approval of the Government which employed them, and an honorable name for themselves. But no sooner was the good old custom supplanted by the system which transformed the offices of the Government into the spoils of party warfare, and made appointments and removals depend not upon the question of integrity and competence, but upon party service and claims to party reward, than a remarkable change occurred in the character as well as the pretensions of the officeholding class. No longer did they remain the quiet, unobtrusive and dutiful public servants they had been before, but they gradually attempted to control party politics in the different States, and transformed themselves into a regularly organized force of political prætorians employed by ambitious leaders to override the public opinion of the country. If there ever was anything that might be called an officeholding aristocracy in the worst sense of the term, it did not exist under the early Administrations when good official conduct was considered a valid title to continuance in place, but it was created by the spoils system which stripped the officer of his simple character of a servant of

the Government, and made him a party agent, or in case of those of higher grade, a party satrap, obsequious to those above him and insolent to the people, over whom they thenceforth considered themselves appointed to exercise power and influence. If the civil service reform proposed by Governor Hayes reduces them to their proper level as servants of the people again, it will not be the creation, it will be the destruction of that odious sort of an officeholding aristocracy. Besides, the idea that a letter-carrier, or a customhouse officer, or a revenue agent, or a Department clerk, will become a member of an aristocracy, if left in office as long as he behaves himself well, has something so intensely ludicrous that it need scarcely be discussed. We might as well speak of an aristocracy of railroad conductors or hotel waiters.

Another very curious objection to Governor Hayes's reform plan is put forth by my esteemed friend Mr. Godwin in his recently published letter in favor of Governor Tilden, which has deservedly attracted much attention. He thinks that if officers are to be secure in their tenure as long as their character remains untarnished and the performance of their duties satisfactory, this principle will "give *all* the present incumbents an indefinite tenure, perpetuate their hold of the trusts they have so many of them abused" and be "in its practical operation an act of indemnity for all the felons and rogues who now infest and pollute the public offices." The critics of Governor Hayes's letter of acceptance seem indeed to be in terrible stress for an objection. When the principle is laid down that the tenure of an officer shall be secure as long "as his character remains untarnished and the performance of his duties satisfactory"—can that be interpreted as meaning that the tenure of an officer shall also be secure, when he has become a bad fellow, so that his character is tarnished and the performance of his duties unsatisfactory? When

Governor Hayes pledges himself to a "speedy, thorough and unsparing prosecution and punishment of all public officers who betray public trusts," does that mean that those who *have* betrayed official trusts shall go unprosecuted and unpunished? Is that an act of indemnity to all felons and rogues who now infest and pollute the public service? Oh, Mr. Godwin, lifelong friendship for Governor Tilden may carry even a man of ability and great attainments beyond the point of safety in criticizing his opponents. The most charitable explanation of Mr. Godwin's objection is, perhaps, that he never read Governor Hayes's letter of acceptance. He can now, even after his criticism, read it with profit as a study on true civil service reform. No, the plan put forth by Governor Hayes is nothing more, and nothing less, than the revival of the principle and practice which prevailed under the early Administrations, whose elevated tone and purity are still the pride of American history; the principles and practice of the men whose wisdom and virtues we have exalted in the Centennial year with glowing eulogies; the men who, could they now appear among us, would say: "If you want truly to honor our names, do it a little less by praising our virtues, and a little more by following our example."

Now, let us see what promise of civil service reform the Democratic candidate, Governor Tilden, holds out to us. In order to be perfectly fair to him I will quote the whole text of that part of his letter which refers to that subject:

The Convention justly affirms that reform is necessary in the civil service, necessary to its purification, necessary to its economy and efficiency, necessary in order that the ordinary employment of the public business may not be "a prize fought for at the ballot-box, a brief reward of party zeal, instead of posts of honor assigned for proven competency, and

held for fidelity in the public employ." The Convention wisely added that "reform is necessary even more in the higher grades of the public service. President, Vice-President, Judges, Senators, Representatives, Cabinet officers, these and all others in authority are the people's servants. Their offices are not a private perquisite; they are a public trust." Two evils infest the official service of the Federal Government: One is the prevalent and demoralizing notion that the public service exists not for the business and benefit of the whole people, but for the interest of the officeholders, who are in truth but the servants of the people. Under the influence of this pernicious error public employments have been multiplied; the numbers of those gathered into the ranks of officeholders have been steadily increased beyond any possible requirement of the public business, while inefficiency, peculation, fraud and malversation of the public funds, from the high places of power to the lowest, have overspread the whole service like a leprosy. The other evil is the organization of the official class into a body of political mercenaries, governing the caucuses and dictating the nominations of their own party, and attempting to carry the elections of the people by undue influence, and by immense corruption-funds systematically collected from the salaries or fees of officeholders. The official class in other countries, sometimes by its own weight and sometimes in alliance with the army, has been able to rule the unorganized masses even under universal suffrage. Here it has already grown into a gigantic power capable of stifling the inspirations of a sound public opinion, and of resisting an easy change of Administration, until misgovernment becomes intolerable and public spirit has been stung to the pitch of a civic revolution. The first step in reform is the elevation of the standard by which the appointing power selects agents to execute official trusts. Next in importance is a conscientious fidelity in the exercise of the authority to hold to account and displace untrustworthy or incapable subordinates. The public interest in an honest, skilful performance of official trust must not be sacrificed to the usufruct of the incumbents. After these immediate steps, which will insure the exhibition of better

examples, we may wisely go on to the abolition of unnecessary offices, and, finally, to the patient, careful organization of a better civil service system, under the tests, wherever practicable, of proved competency and fidelity.

When you have read this somewhat elaborate paragraph and pondered over it a while, you still ask yourselves: How far does he mean to go and where does he mean to stop? There is plenty of well-expressed criticism; but what is the tangible, specific thing he means to do? The difference between these utterances and those contained in Governor Hayes's letter is striking and significant. There are none of the precise, clean-cut, sharply-defined propositions put forth by Governor Hayes, indicating how the spoils system with its demoralizing influences is to be eradicated and what is to be put in its place. When we try to evolve from this mountain of words the practical things which Governor Tilden promises to do, we find that they consist simply in the appointment of new men, according to an "elevated standard," whatever that may be, and in holding officers to account for their doings, of course. When the offices are filled with new men superfluous offices are "wisely" to be cut off, and finally the "patient and careful organization of a better civil service system" is to be proceeded with "under the tests, whenever practicable, of proved competency and fidelity." It seems, then, when we boil it all down—and I think I am doing Governor Tilden's language no violence in saying so—that, first, the offices are to be filled with good Democrats in the way of a "clean sweep" and a "new deal of the spoils," and that afterwards it shall be "patiently and carefully" considered how and where "tests of proven competency and fidelity" can be established, so as to fill the offices with good men. But, first of all things, "the offices for the Democrats, the spoils for the victors."

Does any candid man pretend that it means anything else? Governor Tilden is a profuse writer, having an infinite assortment of words at his command. If he meant anything else, would he not have been able to say so in a precise form of expression? For the short allusion to subsequent systematic reform, to be "patiently and carefully" approached, is even more studiously vague and shadowy than the many paragraphs in party platforms, with the valuelessness of which we have in the course of time become so justly disgusted.

Or is there any sensible man in the land, even among Governor Tilden's independent friends, who expects anything else than simply a new distribution of the spoils? If there is, let him read the Democratic newspapers, let him look round among the leaders as well as the rank and file, and he will soon become aware of his mistake. Who does not know that the principle, "To the victors belong the spoils," was first inaugurated by the Democratic party; that the spoils system of the civil service was developed by that party in all its characteristic features; that for the last forty years it has been its traditional and constant policy and practice, and at this moment their struggle for success is in a great measure inspired by the hope of an opportunity to precipitate themselves upon the public plunder? Is Governor Tilden the man, in case of his election, to constitute himself a breakwater against the universal tendency, the unanimous, impatient will of his party? Or is there, I ask you candidly, and especially those of my independent friends who, although animated with the desire of genuine reform, are inclined to aid the Democrats, is there in the Democratic party any influential element that would urge a Democratic President to advance thorough measures of civil service reform in a non-partisan sense, or that would earnestly support him if he did? If there exists such an influential element,

where is it? Is it in the rich men's Manhattan Club, or in Tammany Hall or anti-Tammany in New York, among the "swallow-tails" or the "short-hairs"? Or is it among the old State-rights Democrats, East and West? Or among the Confederates in the South? Or among the Irish population or the Roman Catholic Democrats generally? If there is in any section of the Democratic party any desire for a genuine reform of the civil service, anything but a demand for a new deal of the spoils, show it to me. I shall certainly be the last man to deny that there are many good, honest, patriotic, well-meaning and able citizens in the Democratic organization and among its leaders. I count among them not a few valued and trusted personal friends. But where are the advocates of genuine civil service reform among them? As far as I know, we have heard only the solitary voice of Senator Gordon, who submitted in the last session of Congress a commendable proposition for the reform of the revenue service; but the commendation it received in the organs of public opinion came almost exclusively from the Republican or independent side. And now will Governor Tilden, if elected, without support in his own party, at the risk of his popularity with his own friends, brace himself up against the furious onset of hungry patriots, and say: "The interests of the service, the cause of reform, demand that the offices of the Government be no longer looked upon as the spoils of party victory; I shall, therefore, keep in office all faithful and efficient officers no matter whether they are Republicans, and turn out only the unworthy ones; go home, my Democratic friends, that I may judiciously discriminate at leisure"? Or will he tell Democratic Congressmen: "The principles on which the civil service is to be reformed demand that I should not permit any Congressional interference with the responsibilities of the appointing power; therefore

put your recommendations of your friends in your pockets and let me alone, my good fellow-Democrats"? What man in his five senses expects Governor Tilden to do this? Has he ever promised anything of the kind? Certainly he has not. Is he not too inveterate a Democrat and too closely wedded to the traditions of his party to think of it?

Well, then, what sort of reform will be brought about by a Democratic victory? I assume even that Governor Tilden and the men he may put into his Cabinet will sincerely desire to put only the best available Democrats into office, and will employ every honest effort to that end. But what will be the result? The accession of the Democrats to power will be signalized by the most furious rush for office ever witnessed in the history of this Republic. For years and years hundreds of thousands have been lying in wait, eagerly watching for the opportunity. You find them not only in the North, East and West, but still more in the South. The Southern people have many good qualities, but it is a notorious fact that among them the number of men thinking themselves peculiarly entitled to public place has always been conspicuously numerous. Now they have been on short fare for many years, and long waiting has sharpened their appetite. They will also be quick to remember that Democratic success could be brought about only by a united Southern vote, and that above all others they have claims to reward. Our brave Confederate friends have won renown by many a gallant charge during the war, but all their warlike feats will be left in the shade by the tremendous momentum of the charge they will execute upon the offices of the Government. It will be a rush of such eagerness, turbulence and confusion that men of this generation will in vain seek for a parallel. And now amidst all this, urged on by a universal cry of impatience from all sections of

the Democratic party that every radical must be driven from place at once, do you think it for a moment possible that the President and the members of the Cabinet will breast that storm and sit down with cool deliberation, to gather evidence about the character and qualifications of every applicant for the seventy or eighty thousand places to be filled, so as to keep improper men out of office? Is it not absolutely certain that the offices will be filled helter-skelter, as so often before, and that of the applicants those, as a rule, will be the most successful who are the most intrusive and persistent in elbowing their way to the front? Can it in the nature of things be otherwise? And what will become of the cause of reform?

We have had a specimen of that on a small scale when the Democratic party took possession of the House of Representatives, and had to dispose of a number of more or less desirable places. What happened? A score of applicants for every position; a "clean sweep"; a "new deal"; neither honesty, nor indispensable experience, nor usefulness, nor character was spared; the offices for the Democrats! And what Democrats! Do you remember the Fitzhughs and Hambledons and the general ridicule and indignation that followed their prompt exposure? Do you remember the hasty endeavors on the part of some new dignitaries to make out of their opportunities what could be made? Do you remember the expressions of alarm and disgust coming even from the better class of Democrats? Do you remember the haste with which some of the newly-appointed officers had to be dismissed again, that the scandal might not become too great and damaging? And such things happened when, in view of the coming Presidential election, the Democratic party was on its good behavior, and had every reason for an effort to make a favorable impression on the country. What would happen if it should succeed in grasping the

National power and then act without such restraint? What a glorious time it will be for the Fitzhughs and Hambledons when places are thrown open to them by the tens of thousands! What wonders of reform they would accomplish! True, together with the good officers now in the service, the rogues polluting it will be driven out. But may the Lord protect us against those which the general rush for the spoils will bring in.

But it is not only in obedience to the universal clamor of the party—there is still another reason why under Democratic rule the spoils system, with all its characteristic features, will be continued. That party is seriously divided in itself with regard to some of the most vital and pressing problems of the day; for instance, the financial question, especially since Governor Tilden, by the dark and equivocal utterances in his letter of acceptance, gave so much new encouragement to the soft-money wing of the party, and thus caused a fresh and vigorous effort and advance along the whole soft-money line. Why, even Tom Ewing is happy in his belligerence, and Old Bill Allen beings to smile, believing to have found in Tilden the Moses to lead them out of the wilderness.

This you observe all over the West and South. By all sorts of deceits the managers succeed in holding the party together, in spite of this division of sentiment, for the pending campaign at least, in order to render success possible. But suppose that success achieved, the war of conflicting tendencies will break out inside of the organization with new virulence. Then, the party, once in possession of the Government, will naturally strive to fortify itself in that possession so as to *remain* in power. And what means will there be to hold together the warring elements? Then oracular utterances and equivocal promises as we find in Governor Tilden's letter of acceptance, offering on paper all things to all men, will no longer

avail. Practical measures of unification, a tangible bond of cohesion, will be required. And what will, what can they be? Governor Tilden is now exhibited to us in the character of a reformer, and I have already said that I shall not deny to him in that respect what credit he deserves. But it must not be forgotten that Governor Tilden, long before he disclosed himself as a reformer, had become, in the not altogether virtuous school of Democratic New York politics, the adroitest manager, the most accomplished political machine-master of our days. He is that now, and I think I do not wrong him when I say that to this accomplishment his nomination for the Presidency is largely due. Now suppose him President, and under him the broil of conflicting factions in his own party, threatening to disrupt the organization and endangering the continued possession of power so long worked and hoped for—will not, necessarily, the arts of the manager, the party machinist, so well understood, and so long and successfully practiced, be again resorted to, in order to avert the disaster of a rupture? Let me say to you that, in my whole political experience, I have never known a man who was profoundly versed in the tricks of machine management, and had grown strong through their employment, that was willing to throw them aside when by them he could carry an important point. And what means will present itself to the man at the head of the machine in such a case? One but too well in accordance with the traditions, instincts and constant practice of the Democratic party—"the cohesive power of the public plunder." Ask yourselves whether that will not be necessarily so. Is it not inevitable that a party so torn by internal dissensions will demand that cohesive paste so as not to fall to pieces? Will not the memories of the Douglas and Buchanan feud, with its disastrous consequences, stare the managers in the face

as a warning example? Is it not certain that they will eagerly use the means already at hand? This office will be used to silence the opposition of this man, that office to purchase the support of another, and bread and butter generally to stop the clamor of factions by filling their mouths. As the war between Tammany and anti-Tammany, between Boss Kelly and John Morrissey, in New York, will be pacified by giving the adherents of one the customhouse to reform and permitting the adherents of the other to infuse virtue into the post-office or the revenue service, much to the relief and delight of the business community, will not in the same way, by a skillful distribution of the Government plunder, the soft-money and the hard-money Democrats East and West be made to understand that they belong together, and that the table will be spread for them all only as long as they live together like good boys! And the result? In spite of all the pious wishes now entertained and expressed by some Democratic leaders and some independents who follow them, "the cohesive power of public plunder" will rule the hour; the spoils system, that most dangerous fountain of demoralization and corruption, will flow more richly than ever—and then farewell, a long farewell, to the great reform that is to make and keep the public service once more honest and pure. Is that what you, my independent friends, desire and strive to accomplish? Nay, we shall be in a more deplorable condition than ever, for the spoils system naturally grows worse and worse in its effects the longer it is permitted to exist. That will be the inevitable consequence of Democratic success as I foresee it. A change, yes; but a change making the necessity of a wiser change more pressing than ever.

Let me return to the other side. No sensible man will deny that the reform which the exigencies of our condition demand can be accomplished only if the program be

carried out which we find in Governor Hayes's letter of acceptance. But is Governor Hayes the man to put through such a program? Will he possess courage and persistence enough to withstand and overcome the adverse influences in his own party which have shown themselves so powerful? This is a legitimate and important question. I shall endeavor conscientiously to answer it. That Governor Hayes has a very clear conception of what genuine civil service reform means, he has abundantly demonstrated by the specific propositions in his manifesto. Neither are these ideas new with him, or put forth merely to produce a momentary effect. You will find the same views stated, partly in the same language, in inaugural addresses and speeches delivered by him years ago, long before he was thought of as a candidate for the Presidency. They are, therefore, the offspring of deliberate and well-matured conviction. But has he the courage necessary for such a task? Courage as a candidate entitles him to the presumption that he will have courage as a President. It would seem to be the natural interest and desire of a candidate to keep at least all the organized and strong influences in his own party in the best possible humor with him, by creating the impression that he will be all things to all men, so as to insure the hearty coöperation of all. Mr. Tilden seems to understand that. Now, have you considered how much strength of conviction, how much honest courage in a candidate it requires at the opening of a canvass to go before the people with a manifesto like Governor Hayes's letter of acceptance, which, in its comprehensive and sharply defined demands for reform, contains the most unsparing criticism of abuses tainting his own party? This candidate tells Congressmen that if he is elected President they must expect no patronage from him. He tells the officers of the Government that from them no party service is desired. He tells party

workers that party service will not be regarded by him as a claim to reward; and in the face of the fact that the President of the United States now in office had himself elected twice, and would not have recoiled from a third term had it been within reach, he frankly declares his inflexible purpose not to be a candidate for reëlection, on the ground that a sincere reformer should not expose himself to the temptation of using the patronage for the promotion of his personal interests. Is not that courage,—the honest courage of true conviction? Show me in the whole history of this Republic a single candidate for the Presidency who, in the face of uncertain chances, had the courage to issue so defiant a manifesto as this? You will find none. I ask you, my independent friends, to compare the manly, straightforward, unequivocal declarations of this manifesto with that artfully constructed tangle of words, Governor Tilden's letter of acceptance. Hard money appears soft, and soft money hard, presenting a full dish of spoils for the Democrats, with a reform sauce for the independents, so that Judge Stallo is pleased. General Tom Ewing is pleased still more, and John Morrissey's manly bosom swells with pride at the profound statesmanship of his candidate. Compare the two, and then tell me on which side you find true moral courage! Let it not be said that Governor Hayes was fearless only because he did not see the bearing of his utterances. Before his letter of acceptance was published he read it to a friend, and that friend observed: "It is not unlikely, Governor, that what you say there may very much displease some very powerful men in your own party." And what was the answer? "Yes, that may be so; but this is RIGHT." And the letter came out as it was written. I think I can support a reformer who has the courage thus to feel and thus to speak.

I have gone into this campaign advocating the election

of Governor Hayes with my eyes open. I have certainly not forgotten or thought lightly of the duty I owe to the cause of reform which I have served so long; and thus, standing as I do here before you, mindful of my responsibility, I declare this to be my sincere conviction, and predict with as much assurance as things still to come can be predicted, that Governor Hayes, if elected to the Presidency, *will* employ every Constitutional power of that great office to its fullest extent to carry into practice his program of civil service reform to the very letter. He *will* organize his Administration with unswerving devotion to this great end. He *will*, whatever influences he may have to encounter, pursue with untiring watchfulness all officers of the Government who have betrayed official trust or failed to perform their duties according to the best standard of efficiency. He *will* keep faithful public servants in their offices, against all attempts to have them replaced by the political tools or the personal favorites of party leaders. He *will* tell those who claim office on the ground of mere party service that "honesty, competency and fidelity" will be regarded by him as the only decisive qualifications for public employment. He *will* tell Congressmen who attempt to dictate appointments that such interference with the appointing power is destructive of the independence of the separate departments of the Government, degrading the character of the service, and will no longer be permitted. He *will* make all Government officers understand that the civil service must cease to be a party machinery, that from them partisan service is "neither expected *nor* desired," and that they will have to confine themselves to their official duties as servants of the Government and the people. He *will* establish well regulated and public methods, in every practicable way, to ascertain the fitness of candidates for places. He *will* employ every legitimate means in his power to

induce Congress to perpetuate this reform by legislation in whatever way it may be possible and necessary.

This is what I am sincerely convinced Governor Hayes *will* do if elected to the Presidency.

I do not pretend to call Governor Hayes, as Mr. Tilden is called by some of his over-poetic friends, "the wisest man in the world." I do not put him in point of courage above all the heroes of antiquity and modern times. I do not predict that, if elected President, he will cure in three months all the ills human society is heir to, and plunge us straight into the millennium of ideal existence. But he is a man who has nobody to fear, because he has nothing to cover up. He has nobody to reward, because he did not seek the Presidency, and promised nothing. And he has no future favors to ask for, because he has no ambition to serve except to make, as President, his one Administration a blessing to the country and an honor to himself. His reform plan is the product of experience wisely turned to account, of mature reflection and of an unselfish desire to benefit the people. Behind that plan stands a clear, solid, cultivated intellect, the unostentatious but firm force of quiet, persistent energy and the inviolable pledge of a born gentleman. And I repeat, that plan, as far as the power of the Presidential office goes, he *will* carry out. I speak with confidence, for that confidence I possess. I have his word for it, you have his word for it, the whole American people have his word for it, and, as Governor Hayes is a man of honor, that word will be kept.

But you may say, "Granting all this, will he be able to carry out his good intentions, in the face of the adverse interests and influences in the Republican party which will combine to defeat the contemplated reform?" This also is a legitimate question. Let us fairly examine it.

All those who understand our Constitutional system will

admit that the President, himself and alone, can do many things toward that end by a simple exercise of the powers of his office. He can, for himself and for the heads of Departments, establish the rule that not party service, but honesty, competency and fidelity shall be regarded as the only qualifications for nomination or appointment to be considered. He can keep every officer in place who has performed his duties with integrity and efficiency. He can make the officers of the Government understand that the civil service is not to be a party agency, and that they will have to conduct themselves accordingly. He can refuse to be governed by the recommendations of Congressmen who come to him, or to the heads of Departments, to dictate appointments. He can, if need be, even without appropriations from Congress, adopt certain methods for ascertaining the fitness of candidates for office, and have them carried out through competent officers in the Departments. All this the President can do in the exercise of the Constitutional powers of his office. The only effective resistance possible, but only with regard to new appointments of a certain class, may be offered by the Senate in refusing to confirm his nominations. But whether a systematic opposition of that kind can long continue will in a great measure depend upon the spirit animating the elements composing the Administration party, as well as the drift of public opinion generally. Of that, more hereafter.

It is evident, then, that in the work of inaugurating a genuine reform of the civil service the President is the natural leader, and that much of it he can accomplish, for the time being at least, without the aid, and even against the opposition, of Congress. It may be objected that General Grant once desired to reform the civil service in this wise, but that he had to succumb to the opposition of his own party in Congress.

I answer, no; he had not to succumb. If President Grant had strongly desired to reform the civil service within the reach of his Constitutional powers, he could have done it. I go further, and say, had he insisted upon that reform, in good faith, he would have found a strong force in Congress to support him, and, if that had been insufficient, he could have appealed to the intelligent masses of the Republican party and the patriotic opinion of the country generally, and they would have sustained him. The true cause of his failure was that he never seems to have appreciated what a genuine reform of the civil service consists in; that he had other things far more warmly at heart than that reform, and that with no small degree of alacrity he availed himself of the opposition of the politicians in Congress to drop the whole scheme. That is the truth of history and I venture to say there is scarcely a well-informed man in the country who questions it.

Do not understand me, however, as underestimating the strength of the influences inside of the Republican party, which, in case of the election of Governor Hayes, will conspire and coöperate to defeat the success of genuine reform. I know them well, and indulge in no delusion with regard to them. No sooner will the new President begin his work than many of those who used the spoils, either for their own support or as a means of political management, will rally in force to hamper and cripple him. The force will be strong and very determined. The pressure brought to bear upon the President to swerve him from his purpose will be tremendous. It will be represented to him that no party can live without public plunder, and that the abolition of the spoils system will lead to the downfall of the Republic. From flattery to threats, from private appeals to open demonstrations of hostility in Congress, every means will be employed to induce him to break his word. And that opposition

will be directed by able leaders, experienced in all the resources of political warfare. No, I do not underestimate it, for I know it but too well.

And what will the new President have to oppose to such an onset? In the first place, the good faith and firm resolution of an honest purpose. To the politicians, high and low, who will come to cajole or to coerce him, he can present his letter of acceptance, and say: "This I have solemnly promised to the American people, and as a man of patriotism and honor, who is mindful of his duty to render his best service to his country, and who will not leave a disgraced name to his children, this promise I can and shall not break. It will be fulfilled to the letter." And this, fellow-citizens, is what I am convinced that Rutherford B. Hayes will do. But his own good faith will not be his only bulwark of resistance. No sooner will he have pronounced the word of honest resolution, than it will become evident that the President does not stand alone. The very conflict surrounding him will raise up for him a host of friends. The best elements, the intelligent and patriotic masses of his party, will at once be at his side. Do you doubt it? Let me address a question of some importance to you, and especially to my independent friends, and ask you to answer it candidly: When you think of a great effort like this, which runs straight against the lower instincts of the politician and appeals to the enlightened intelligence and moral sentiment of the people for aid, to which side will you look for the men of that enlightened intelligence and moral sentiment to fight for such a reform in good faith and with unselfish devotion? Let your own experience speak. You, my independent friends, most justly condemn the abuses that have crept into the Republican party, as I certainly have very frankly and unsparingly condemned them heretofore and mean to do so hereafter.

And yet, looking calmly at things as they are, you will

be obliged to admit that an overwhelming majority of the men who with head and heart would aid in the establishment of such reforms are in the Republican and not in the Democratic ranks. It was that element in the Republican party which first put forth the demand of civil service reform, and obliged even the present Administration to make an apparent attempt in that direction. It is true, that element has been overshadowed in the party by official influence and the despotic power of mercenary organization. But it is there now, as it was there in the old anti-slavery days. Will not that element at once rally with renewed strength around the President, as soon as he lifts his hand for the work of reform, to support him with its whole power? Aye, and it will be stronger than ever, not only as the advocate of a good cause before the patriotic public opinion of the country, but stronger also in working efficiency, because it will march under the open, honest and powerful leadership of the Executive head of the Republic. But still more. Not only will the President have the strong aid and support of that great element in his party, but his very effort to establish thorough reform will strip the opposing forces of their most dangerous influence.

Let the word go forth from the Executive chair that the civil service shall and will no longer be a party machine; that the officers of the Government are desired by the President to attend to their official duties only, and not to serve as party tools; that the tenure of the officer will depend upon his official conduct alone, and no longer be at the mercy of this or that Congressman or party leader; that the offices in this or that district or State will no longer be wielded by this or that party satrap, to rule local politics as with an iron rod, but that they will be given or taken away by the Government itself for the sole benefit of the public interest—let that word go forth from

the highest place, so that all the people, including the postmasters and customhouse men and revenue officers, and all who want to become such, can well understand it—and I ask you soberly to consider what the effect will be. What will become of that power of local leaders whose greatness consisted only in their possession of the Government patronage; whose influence was formidable only because at their very frown every placeman within their reach had to tremble; because their very nod could make the head of every officer not subservient to their will fly into the basket; because every applicant for place, every seeker of favor, had to inquire about their very whims with fawning anxiety? The terror of their thunderbolts will quickly pass away. Every honest public servant will remember that he has a conscience, a manhood of his own; that he is no man's man, and that his honor, as well as his prosperity, will be best promoted by being no man's man, but a faithful and efficient servant of the Government and the people. It will be like a second emancipation of the slaves. The civil service will no longer be what it now is in many places, an organization of obsequious courtiers and trembling sycophants, but of men who dare to respect themselves, and whose moral aspirations will be lifted up by that very self-respect. Every honest and efficient officer will, in his own interest, become an ardent friend of the reformed system himself. Then those party influences which oppose true reform will be stripped of their most dangerous sting. Congressmen and party leaders, no longer able to use the patronage to build up their power, will have to fall back upon their character, their principles and their ability to sustain themselves in public life, which, on the whole, will vastly improve the breed; and it will turn out, also, that political parties can live without the spoils, and be all the better for it.

That such a policy will displease many Republican politicians, I have no doubt; so much better will it please the honest Republican masses. That it will be bitterly opposed in the Congress to be elected this year is not improbable; but that will not defeat the reform. Let the first Congress under the new Administration ever so insidiously endeavor to hamper it, let it ever so stubbornly refuse all friendly legislation, yet there is not the end. I have already shown how much the President alone can accomplish by the exercise of his Constitutional powers. And if then Congress refuses to aid and perpetuate the reform by such legislative measures as may be necessary, let the President appeal to the good sense and patriotism of the people. In an election held without the civil service as a party agency, such an appeal will scarcely remain without a response.

I, therefore, declare this to be my honest conviction, not only that Governor Hayes, as a man of patriotism and integrity, will, if elected to the Presidency, be true to his word, in using all the Constitutional powers of his office to carry out to the letter the program put forth by himself, but that, powerful as the opposition he will have to encounter may be, the chances will be strongly in favor of the success and lasting establishment of the reformed system, sustained as it will be by the best elements of the Republican party and a patriotic public opinion.

Indeed, when examining the relative positions taken by the two candidates for the Presidency, and the prospects they open to us, the opponents of Governor Hayes seem to be utterly at a loss to discover a flaw in the systematic reform he proposes to establish. They find themselves forced back upon the small expedient of discrediting his intentions. "Governor Hayes," they say, "cannot be in earnest with this plan, for if he were believed to be in earnest there would be a multitude of Republican politi-

cians who would rather see their candidate defeated than such a reform succeed." There may be such Republican politicians. But Governor Hayes's own word, publicly spoken, warrants me in telling you that he is in earnest, and uncompromisingly in earnest. If there were Republicans who would try to defeat him for that reason, I am confident it would not change his position. Governor Hayes will ever be proud to have stood up for so good a cause, and would rather be defeated as its faithful champion, than succeed by betraying it. But now I ask you, my independent friends, if that cause is so good that the spoils politician would fear its success more even than the failure of his party, is not there, for you, as sincere friends of reform, every reason to desire and work for its triumph? Considering with candor every circumstance surrounding us, carefully weighing every probability and feeling the necessity of thorough and lasting reform, is it possible that you should hesitate in your choice? Can you fail to see that here is a battlefield worthy of your efforts, here the line of advance towards the objects which, as true reformers, you must hold highest? A change! is your cry. Yes, a change! is mine. But do you not, with me, insist upon a change that opens the prospect of lasting improvement? Is a change of parties all you want, whatever the consequence? If you are in earnest, you will want more; you will want a change in the very being, in the nature of parties.

That is the great thing needful. But in the success of Hayes, not that of Tilden, will you find it. Can you doubt, then, that a change to Hayes will be a greater and much more wholesome change than that to Tilden? What is a change to Tilden? A change from Republican to Democratic spoils in politics. What is a change to Hayes? A change from the spoils system to a true reform of the civil service and the overthrow of machine politics. That

is the prediction I make, and with confidence I look into the future to see it verified. Can the duty of sincere friends of reform be doubtful? I at least see mine as clearly as ever, and to the last will I perform it.

An effort is being made to convict these independents, and especially the members of the May conference in New York, who think and act as I do, of inconsistency because we support Governor Hayes, although that conference did at that time not consider him a desirable candidate. Those efforts trouble me little. I do not belong to that class of great minds who think that the cosmic order will relapse into chaos if they are damaged in their appearance of personal consistency. In my poor opinion, the most important question is, not whether I appear strictly consistent, but the question is, How are we to act in order to render the best service we can to the country? But it so happens in this case that neither myself nor that overwhelming majority of the May conference who to-day support Governor Hayes will be called inconsistent by candid men. I speak with perfect frankness to you. Things have not developed themselves as I and many others desired three months ago. We hoped for the nomination of Mr. Bristow, who stood before the country as the recognized leader of the reform movement. And I may say here, if other gentlemen, with whom in many things I agreed, proclaimed the alternative, "Bristow, or Tilden," I never agreed with them on that. Some of the reasons I have already given. I may add that Governor Tilden's untiring, extensive and complicated efforts to obtain the nomination for the Presidency were not calculated to increase my confidence in his mission as a reformer, and in the results which would develop themselves after his election. Well, our hope for the nomination of Mr. Bristow was disappointed. Why had we desired it? Not because of personal friendship for Mr. Bristow, but

because his nomination itself would have been a triumph of the reform idea, and because his public conduct guaranteed a policy in accordance with it. Of the policy represented by him a thorough reform of the civil service and a speedy return to specie payments formed the principal features. These were after all the true ends we had in view, and their realization the real object of our endeavors. And now, when a candidate stands before us whose nomination was indeed not in itself a conspicuous triumph of our ideas, but who opens to us in the most courageous and positive manner a clear prospect of the attainment of the same great ends of which Mr. Bristow had appeared as the representative,—shall we then refuse him our support? Would it be consistent to run away from the cause of true reform, merely because the name of its representative is not Bristow? Are we little children to abandon our great ends in the most serious struggles of life as soon as their accomplishment appears, although the same in essence, in a garb different from that which we had imagined?

But you say Governor Hayes was included in a class of candidates whom the conference pronounced in its address unfit for support. Aye, and what now? I have more than once addressed to the conscience of dissatisfied independents, without ever receiving an answer, this question, Had the May conference been asked, Can we support a candidate who, known as an honorable man, will show after his nomination the courage to issue a manifesto which in its demands for reform contains the sharpest criticism of existing abuses, solemnly pledges the candidate to the best reform program that can be devised and defies by its precise propositions all the vicious party influences we condemn, in every way giving the surest guarantee of good faith—if that question had been put to the conference, what member of it would have

said: "We can not support him?" Probably not one. Certainly not I. True, that case was not foreseen, but it has happened. There it is, and we have to deal with it. Shall we now again, like little children, say, because that case was not foreseen, therefore it does not concern us, although it may offer an opportunity to attain our real objects? What consistency is that?

I appeal to your consciences, my independent friends who have gone to the other side. If you should succeed, by combining with the Democrats, in defeating Governor Hayes and true reform, and after the triumph of your combination, that fountain of evil, the spoils system, continues to send forth its stream of demoralization and corruption, and a strengthened soft-money majority in the House of Representatives subjects the country to more years of harassing uncertainty and distress—what then? This is sad, indeed, you will say,—but we have been consistent! Oh, how great you will feel in your glory of consistency! But no, gentlemen, you will NOT have been consistent. As independents, you professed devotion to great objects, among which stood first true reform and a sound financial policy.

You will have abandoned those great objects when you had an opportunity effectively to serve them. True consistency it is, always to will the right, zealously to seek the right and under any name and any change of circumstances, faithfully to stand by the right. Here we have a candidate at last who openly before all the world and with defiant courage occupies the platform we have so long, and almost hopelessly, been struggling for; and now should we turn our backs upon him, should we now betray our cause when a faithful, united effort can make it triumph?

I speak with feeling, for I have been long and with earnest sincerity in this struggle. It has been said of me

that I have done something to wake up the popular conscience against the prevailing demoralization. If that be so, I am proud of it.

It was the object of my endeavors. But that duty is not all fulfilled. Now is the time to lift up our judgment to the level of the awakened conscience. Let us take care that the reformatory spirit now alive and capable of greater achievement does not run out in a mere change of parties and persons, to stand still before the citadel of the evils which have so long afflicted and degraded us. Who knows when it will rise again from the gloom of a new discouragement if now it exhausts itself in misdirected and fruitless efforts! We have, indeed, a great opportunity before us, an opportunity to shake off the disgraceful abuses which the demoralizing habits of forty years have loaded upon our political life; an opportunity to lead our Government back to the noble principles and practice of the great and wise founders of the Republic, whose virtues we are so eloquent in praising, and whose example we have been so slow to follow.

This is the year of great memories. In magnificent palaces we have laid before the world the wonders of our wealth, the fruits of our inventive genius and the astounding results of our skill and industry. And certainly we have gained the admiration of all beholders. But, great and lasting as the admiration thus gained may be, far greater still in the esteem of mankind, and far more lasting in the gratitude of our own prosperity, will be an honest and decisive blow now struck for the restoration of that virtue and purity of Government which, after all, is the only security and the highest glory of a free people. The year of the great anniversary cannot be more truly honored than by the triumph of so *noble* an effort.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Sept. 15, 1876.

Private.

I was pained to hear of your accident. I trust it will not prove a serious injury, and that you will soon be well.

Touching the assessments, I am clear it is not for me to call attention to the acts of the officials except as they are induced by the committee appointed by the National Convention. I wrote a private note to my only correspondent on the committee, and talked to Governor Noyes. I send you Governor McCormick's reply, which please return. I send also a copy of my note,¹ for *private use only* as matters now stand, and until I give consent to its publication.

Your speech on "hard times" was exceedingly happy. It is the best handling of that dangerous topic I have yet seen, by great odds. The canvass daily brings to the front, more and more, as the two leading topics, the danger of a "United South" victory, and Tilden's record as a Reformer.

You can denounce all charges of hostility to foreigners as voters and officeholders as utterly unfounded. They are the merest roorbacks. I have always voted for naturalized citizens, have often appointed them to office and shall always hold to the same opinions on that subject which I presume you do. I of course don't like Catholic interference or any sectarian interference with politics or the schools. All of this paragraph is public and *always* openly avowed by me. I was

¹ COLUMBUS, O., Sept. 8, 1876.*Private.*

My dear Sir: I send you a slip cut from an Eastern newspaper on the subject of assessments upon official salaries for political purposes. It is charged that this is done by authority of the National Committee.

My views as to what ought to be required of officeholders are set forth in my letter of acceptance and are no doubt sufficiently well known. But I think it is proper to say to the Committee that if assessments are made as charged it is a plain departure from correct principles, and ought not to be allowed. I trust the Committee will have nothing to do with it.

Sincerely,

R. B. HAYES.

Hon. R. C. McCORMICK.

not a Know-Nothing when my political associates generally ran off after that ephemeral party.

P.S. I need hardly assure you that if I ever have charge of an Administration this whole assessment business will go up, "hook, line and sinker."

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Nov. 3, 1876.

I meant to meet you at the depot yesterday, but was prevented. It is now too late to speculate on results. I shall find many things to console me if defeated. I feel more than ever satisfied with having written a square letter. Very little occurs to me that I could have changed during the canvass. The hard times with the consequent desire for change, and the opportunity which such times give for the corrupt use of money by our adversaries have greatly affected the strength of parties.

In any event I am exceedingly gratified by what you have done in the canvass, and shall always remember it with thankfulness and satisfaction.

TO T. W. FERRY¹

St. Louis, Dec. 3, 1876.

The complications in which we find ourselves involved at present are well calculated to impress two facts upon every candid mind:

1. That the result of Presidential elections may depend upon a very small number of electoral votes, these votes to come from States in a disturbed and abnormal condition; and

2. That the Constitutional method of counting the electoral vote, of deciding questions of legality connected

¹ President of the U. S. Senate.

with them and of determining the final result, has become a matter of dispute between interested parties. No doubt all patriotic citizens desire only to have the offices of President and Vice-President awarded to those who have been rightfully elected to them, no matter to what political party they may belong. As for ourselves, we have heartily and actively supported Governor Hayes for the Presidency, believing that his election would best serve the true interests of the Republic. But we deem it of far greater importance that the future President of the United States should have a clear title to his office than that he should be the man of our choice. We hope every patriotic Democrat reciprocates that sentiment. But how is that title to be established so clearly that it may stand above all doubt and cavil? We hear of charges of fraud, intimidation and terrorism with regard to the election in several States, as well as charges of sharp practice and illegal proceedings in the operation of canvassing boards, and there is reason to anticipate acrimonious party contests in the final counting of the electoral votes and the determination of the result.

The Constitution provides only that "the President of the Senate shall, in presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open the certificate and the votes shall be counted." As to the meaning of that clause there are grave conflicts of opinion. It is held by some that the President of the Senate alone is invested with the power to count the votes and declare the result, the two houses of Congress being mere witnesses to the act, without any authority to interfere. It is held by others that the two houses of Congress have power to direct the counting, and, if they see fit, to throw out the electoral votes of a State, but only by concurrent action. By others still it is asserted that an objection sustained by either of the two houses is sufficient to exclude the electoral votes of a State from

the count. We have repeatedly expressed our opinions on these points and will not now restate them. But we desire to invite attention to the important fact, that the conflict of these theories is degenerating more and more every day into a struggle of party interests, and this at a time when the election of the Chief Magistrate of the Republic may depend upon a single electoral vote, and when the two contending parties are each in control of one house of Congress.

Already do we find active and influential politicians speculating upon the manner in which the power of either house of Congress can be utilized to promote or prevent the success of this or that Presidential candidate. Elaborate schemes are published by men of standing, setting forth how a condition of things may be brought about in which the country is to have *two* Presidents contending for the possession of the Government. By reckless characters the ear of the people is familiarized with the cry of forcible resistance and civil war. The alarm of capital and the stagnation of business are growing more distressing every day. Neither is the end of this harassing uncertainty to be foreseen. The counting of the electoral vote in Congress may bring us, instead of a speedy and conclusive settlement of all difficulties, only a more exciting struggle of party interests and ambitions, and instead of an election result universally accepted as legal and just, a National Government appearing as the offspring of terrorism or of party chicanery, a Government the rightfulness of whose authority may therefore be questioned, and whose very existence may give rise to long and dangerous quarrels. Certainly no greater misfortune could befall the country.

It is evident that, in order to avoid consequences so grave, the determination of the result of this Presidential election should be confided to a tribunal whose verdict will command universal confidence, and in order to

command universal confidence in times of excited party feeling the tribunal should be as far as possible removed from party strife, party interest and party ambition. Only then will the impartiality of its judgment be generally and unreservedly believed in. Unquestionably Congress is *not* such a tribunal. There are, no doubt, men in the Senate and in the House of Representatives who in the discharge of important duties endeavor to divest their minds of all party bias. But on the whole inasmuch as the members of the National Legislature owe their places to the instrumentality of party organization, it is not unnatural that in many respects party interest and spirit should have a strong influence in shaping their opinions as well as their actions. It can scarcely be otherwise; and even supposing members to act upon motives ever so conscientious, their impartiality will not have general credit when in a matter involving party interests of such magnitude as the result of a Presidential election their judgment favors the candidate of their organization. But in a crisis like this the final verdict should not only be impartial; it should also appear so.

When looking for a tribunal fitted by its character and recognized authority to act as the great umpire of political parties in determining the result of a disputed Presidential election we find only one—it is the Supreme Court of the United States. In the debates which some time ago occurred in the Senate on a bill to regulate the counting of the electoral vote the idea was frequently put forth that, when the two houses disagreed on the reception of the electoral vote of a State or in case of the presentation of two sets of certificates from one State, on the question which of the two should be received, that question should be referred for decision to the Supreme Court or to one or more members of it. The only strong argument urged against this proposition was that the jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court is defined by the Constitution and cannot be enlarged by a mere legislative enactment. The force of that objection cannot be denied. But there is still another way open. If both political parties agree that it would serve the great interest to remove this counting of the electoral votes from the theater of party strife and to entrust that important office, with power to decide incidental questions, to the highest judicial authority in the land, there is still time to secure the adoption of a Constitutional amendment to that effect before the day fixed by law for the counting of the electoral vote arrives. There are nearly three weeks before Christmas, during which a resolution to submit such an amendment to the legislatures of the several States may be discussed and determined upon by both houses of Congress. In January most of the legislatures are in session, and those that are not may be convened for the special purpose of considering the ratification of the amendment. To accomplish this great object action must indeed be prompt, but action may be prompt if both political parties coöperate in good faith to that end. There is probably no more powerful influence to bring about such coöperation than that of the two Presidential candidates themselves. If Governor Hayes and Governor Tilden both make their respective supporters understand that such is their sincere and urgent wish for the political good, that kind of opposition at least which may spring from party spirit will quickly yield in Congress as well as in the State legislatures. Thus the most formidable and dangerous obstacle would be removed and the two parties might harmoniously unite upon a measure most important for the peace of the country and the stability of our institutions. It may be said that it would be unwise, in haste and merely for the purpose of averting a temporary danger, to engraft upon the Constitution of the Republic a permanent provision which could not again be got

rid of without great difficulty. But we are not here providing against a mere temporary danger. Unfortunately it is but too probable that from the condition of the country, as the civil war has left it, similar complications will arise in the future, not indeed at every Presidential election, but from time to time. Moreover every thinking man will admit that the makers of the Constitution, when framing that vague provision concerning the counting of the electoral votes, did certainly not foresee and contemplate the case of disputed electoral votes, and of a Presidential election depending upon disputed votes. Had they foreseen it, no doubt they would have provided for it more clearly and carefully. Even in more peaceful times when the result of a Presidential election did not turn upon a single State, the indefiniteness of the Constitutional clause caused now and then much embarrassment and perplexity. It is evidently not adequate to the more difficult circumstances at present surrounding us. A change is therefore decidedly and urgently needed, and if that change must be recognized as necessary why should it not be taken in hand at once to help us through the threatening dangers of the present crisis?

Neither can it be denied that such a change would fail of its object if it did not withdraw the counting of the electoral votes, and the determination of the result from the struggle of political parties, and that this can be accomplished only by selecting for this office a tribunal standing above all party strife. Thus the Supreme Court seems clearly pointed out by the necessities of the case. There is only one other question requiring answer: Will not the discharge of such duties draw the Supreme Court itself into the struggle of parties? We believe not. Only once every four years are the electoral votes to be counted. In most cases the result is beyond all question decided, and the figures universally recognized before the counting

begins. Doubtful cases of great importance may and probably will henceforth occur more frequently than formerly, but even then they are not likely to occur more than once or twice during the average official life of a judge of the Supreme Bench. The exercise of great power in connection with that duty will, therefore, be of rare occurrence; so rare, indeed, as not seriously to affect the character of the tribunal while the possibility of packing the Supreme Court for special occasions may be prevented by suitable provisions in the Constitutional amendment.

We commend this proposition, which is by no means new and has already been discussed in the public press, to the attention of those who may exercise an influence in favor of its accomplishment. The end we have in view appeals to the patriotic feelings of every good citizen. It is the preservation of peace and of the moral authority of our National Government. That both are in jeopardy, nobody will question. To avert this danger now and also in the future the plan here discussed appears to us a good one. But its speedy execution depends upon the prompt coöperation of the two political parties, each of which would prove by its acceptance of this proposition that it has confidence in the rightfulness of its cause or that it esteems the public welfare above all else.

CARL SCHURZ,

JOHN B. HENDERSON and others.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Dec. 6, 1876.

Private.

I have read your article on the mode you suggest for determining contested Presidential elections. Its general tone and purpose strike me favorably. What is wanted is an article which shall practically embody the views you maintain. The

suggestion is not in a condition for presentation—we can't say yea or nay to it until we see it in form for a place in the Constitution.

I am overwhelmed with calls congratulating me on the results declared in Florida and Louisiana. I have no doubt that we are justly and legally entitled to the Presidency. My conversations with Sherman, Garfield, Stoughton and others settled the question in my mind as to Louisiana.

TO HENRY CABOT LODGE

ST. LOUIS, DEC. 13, 1876.

You want to know what I think of the present condition of things? I scarcely know it myself. We are completely out of our reckoning. There is so much wrong on each side that many conscientious men hesitate to attack one for fear of playing into the hands of the other. Before the election some of our friends opposed the Republican candidates on the ground that a party must be held responsible for the misdoings of its agents and representatives, and because the campaign on the Republican side had to a great extent been taken possession of by the very men against whom a reform movement should have been directed. That was correct as far as it went; but those who acted upon that principle did not see what was going on on the Democratic side. The reason why I made as good a fight as I could for Hayes was, in the first place, that I had *very good reason* to trust the honesty of his purpose to eliminate, in case of his success, from our politics that most dangerous element of selfishness and corruption, the spoils, and that he would not fall under the control of the men who pushed themselves in the canvass,—and secondly because I had equally good reason to distrust the character and purposes of the leading men on the Democratic side

and to believe that the pretense of "reform" there was the hollownest sham in the world. Enough of their way of doing things had come to my knowledge to convince me in the strongest possible manner that this accession to power would take us from the frying pan into the fire. I never had any confidence in Tilden but now I have less than ever.

The election itself and what has followed is only a fair illustration of what preceded it. There are two things essential to the existence of republican Government: 1, that there should be a free expression of the popular will at the ballot-box, and 2, that the votes cast there should be honestly counted and carried into effect. Both those things have given way not only the latter but, I assure you, the former also. In saying this I do not repeat newspaper reports and still less do I depend upon partisan statements, but upon trustworthy information I received from disinterested and truth-loving persons. One of the evils undermining our political fabric lies, therefore, still behind the returning-boards. The fact is, the reconstruction measures have landed us in a condition of things full of new problems, the extent of which we have not been able to measure.

What is now to be done? If the determination of the Presidential question is left to a party-struggle in Congress the President of the Senate will probably assume the power of counting the votes and declare Hayes elected, while the Democrats will elect Tilden in the House of Representatives. Then worse confusion still. You will have noticed that ex-Senator Henderson and myself have petitioned Congress to pass the Constitutional amendment referring the matter to the Supreme Court. I will admit that this would be a mere expedient, justifiable for the reason that soon our Constitutional system will have to be overhauled anyhow. But if this is not adopted,

and I do not think it will be, it is of supreme importance that some method be discovered to withdraw the Presidential question from the theater of party strife in Congress and to refer it to some tribunal above partisan spirit and interest. I expect McCreary's resolution to be adopted and the joint Committee of the Senate and House for which it provides, may possibly agree upon some arbitrament which both parties will accept as binding. The Democrats will certainly have nothing to lose in doing so, and if they agree to it public opinion would scarcely leave the Republicans any choice. Mr. Lemoyne offered a resolution in the House which foreshadows something of that kind. In that way we should at least get an Administration whose existence would have a fair show of legitimacy.

What I fear most is not a civil war,—for I think neither party is prepared for that,—but a condition of things completely upsetting our political morals. The moral sense even of good honest people is apt to become confused and blunted when there is such a complication of right and wrong on each side, that the path of duty is not clear.

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TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

ST. LOUIS, Dec. 21, 1876.

I have just received your letter of the 18th. At first sight your plan, as to the general idea involved in it, strikes me favorably. But will it be possible to carry it out? I write at once without taking time for mature consideration, in order to get at the details of the scheme, and for this purpose I state the difficulties and doubts which occurred to me in reading your letter.

1. Can Congress, Constitutionally, "declare" that there "has been no election"? *Vide* 12th amendment.—

Would it not, if the understanding you propose be arrived at, be necessary that Congress consume the time between the 14th of February and the 4th of March in counting the votes *pro forma*, so as to reach the 4th of March without declaring an election?

2. Would it not require the convening of the Senate *and the House* immediately after the 4th of March, to have the committees appointed for the "surveillance" of the election in the "returning-board States"? This would render indispensable the coöperation of Grant in the execution of the plan. He might, I suppose, convene an extra session of Congress, although his term expires on the 4th of March.

3. Is it your idea that we should consult the two candidates about this matter before giving it to the public, or that, without their knowledge and consent, we should try a sort of moral coercion on them, and, through them, on the two parties in Congress?

4. Have you any reason to expect that Tilden would accept this plan? I may say here, that I do, of course, not know whether Hayes would, the proposition being entirely fresh, but it may be possible.

5. While it is true that if one party accepted and the other rejected the plan, the latter would place itself at a great disadvantage,—would it not also be true that, if both rejected it, your father and I would be in the very unpleasant position of officious, and unsuccessful intermeddlers?

6. Do you think the idea of a new election would strike the people favorably? I am very doubtful about that,—and it is a very important question.

7. Would it be wise to do anything of this kind before the joint Committee of the two houses of Congress has demonstrated its inability to devise a practicable plan?

I hope to be advised in a few days whether there is any

hope of a satisfactory arrangement at Washington. There are some men there of our way of thinking who will do the best they can—or at least try.

Now I want you to understand that I do not submit these questions in any spirit hostile to your scheme. *I shall be very glad* to be convinced of its practicability, and as you have undoubtedly thought about it a good deal, I want to have the whole of your idea as soon as possible. Why not communicate it to your father at once and have his opinion?

I shall be happy to give whatever aid I can to the execution of any Constitutional and practicable plan to remove the decision of the Presidential question from the theater of party-strife in Congress so as to secure at least a National Government whose legitimacy cannot be called in question.

TO B. B. CAHOON

St. Louis, Mo., Dec. 23, 1876.

. . . It seems to me, the most important thing to be kept in view is, that the Republic should have a Government the legitimacy of which cannot be seriously questioned. When we once have a President going into office by a method more or less revolutionary, we shall have more of that sort of thing, and worse in point of character. I think it therefore of very great consequence, that in so great a matter Constitutional forms should be guarded as scrupulously as possible.

If the counting of the votes and the determination of the results be undertaken on the 14th of February without any previous authoritative settlement of the question, What is the meaning of the provision of the Constitution as to the relative power of the President of the Senate and of the two houses of Congress? we may witness a furious and unscrupulous struggle of party interests, which may land us nobody knows where. It was mainly for this reason

that Mr. Henderson and myself favored a Constitutional amendment referring the whole matter to the Supreme Court. As you are aware, that proposition failed in the Senate; but there is still some hope that the joint Committee of the two houses, recently appointed, will agree upon some mode of submitting the question above mentioned to the members of the Supreme Court or some other impartial authority for an opinion, the two parties agreeing to accept that opinion as the law to govern their action. I should consider that the happiest possible event under existing circumstances, no matter which candidate for the Presidency may derive benefit from it. The dangers and evils of the accession of the Democratic party to power are very clear to my mind. But any action on the part of the Republicans looking like a *coup d'état*, resorted to for the purpose of retaining power, would inevitably be the destruction of the party and would thus prepare the way for Democratic ascendancy under circumstances a great deal worse. The bad precedents furnished by the former would be followed by the latter, probably with much greater recklessness—and where will be the end? Whatever influence I may possess is used, therefore, to induce Members of Congress to remove the question of power with regard to the counting of the votes from the theater of party strife and to have it conclusively decided by some tribunal standing above party interest and ambition. That is, as I firmly believe, the best that can be done under present circumstances.

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TO JACOB D. COX

Confidential.

ST. LOUIS, Dec. 28, 1876.

I was on the point of writing to you when I received your letter, and I should have addressed to you very nearly

the same questions which you want me to answer. I have been corresponding with Hayes until about three weeks ago. But his letters referred more to the changes of the situation appearing from day to day than to anything else. They indicate moreover that he believes himself fairly and rightfully elected. What influences may at present be potent with him, I do not know. I have been trying to convince him that his own interest as well as that of the country demands a settlement of the Presidential question by some other means than the mere use of party power through the President of the Senate, and I urged him to express himself publicly to that effect. He seemed to agree with me in the abstract, but there our correspondence dropped, probably because my last letter did not call for any answer. Whether he does anything to influence the counsels of the party at Washington, I do not know; but I am inclined to think he does not. I suppose the man now nearest to him is Stanley Matthews. My relations with the latter are not so intimate that I might apply to him for confidential information. Perhaps you could do so. Hayes has on several occasions spoken to me very highly of you as one of his most valued friends, and I suppose there would be no impropriety in your approaching him directly. I feel even as if you ought to do it. He is in a very perplexing and somewhat dangerous position. I mean morally dangerous, and dangerous also as to his standing as a man before the country. He ought not to be left without the advice of just such a friend as you are to him.

As to the general situation of things I conclude from your letter that we feel exactly alike. The doings of the Louisiana returning-board are, to say the least, suspicious. That a fair election in Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi etc., would have resulted in large Republican majorities, is indeed possible and even probable. But such an assump-

tion, however justifiable, is after all no solution of the question. How will Hayes and his friends and his party stand before the world if after proceedings of so questionable a character the President of the Senate, setting aside the constant usage of more than half a century, takes it upon himself alone to count the votes and to determine and declare the result of the election? What will be the upshot of such a precedent in the future history of the Republic?

You are probably aware that I, with Senator Henderson, petitioned Congress to submit the matter to the Supreme Court. I did this because it is clear to my mind that nothing can now give Hayes an impregnable and universally respected title to the Presidency but the determination of the matter by some tribunal standing outside of party interest. I am therefore writing to my friends in Congress, and especially to members of the Compromise Committee of the two houses entreating them to devise and urge some method, formal or informal, to submit at least the question of the relative power of the President of the Senate and of the two houses in counting the electoral votes either to the members of the Supreme Court or some other impartial tribunal invented for the occasion. Not only the honor and existence of the Republican party are in jeopardy now, but by some unscrupulous use of power an injury may be inflicted on our republican institutions fraught with mischief beyond all present calculation.

I think some of us, who are of the same way of thinking, ought to get together as soon as possible to consider whether we cannot ourselves, or induce Hayes to, do something to avert such a danger. Unfortunately, I cannot leave my family just now. But will you not come this way one of these days? I should be most happy to speak with you. Do come if you can. Hayes, I fear, just permits things to drift. Can you not meet him some-

where? I have letters from many of our friends, especially from New England, full of apprehension.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

St. Louis, Jan. 1, 1877.

Permit me to offer to you and your family my best wishes for the new year. Let us hope that its close may be fraught with less care and anxiety than its beginning.

There are some things which we may already congratulate ourselves upon: the law-abiding, peaceable disposition of the people; the evident fact that the very difficulties which now surround us are rapidly convincing the public mind of the absolute necessity of the total abolition of the spoils system and a thorough reform of the civil service,—and finally the prudent and patriotic attitude of the most prominent Southern leaders with regard to yourself and your intended Southern policy. These things are indeed a silver lining to a dark cloud.

I see it stated in the papers that some influential Southern men have made direct overtures to you. You have undoubtedly noticed the story told by a New York *Herald* correspondent of an attempt made by some friends of yours to organize the Southern members of the House of Representatives for independent action. Is there any truth in it?

There seems to be at last a gleam of hope that the Senate branch of the Conference Committee may come to a substantial agreement about the mode of counting the electoral vote and declaring the result. If this be accomplished, the House branch of the Committee will perhaps be obliged to accept the conclusion, and we may then arrive at a solution of our difficulties standing above all dispute. To be sure, there are still some knotty

questions to be disposed of before that point is reached, but there seems to be good reason for hope. And is not the end so desirable that every honorable effort in that direction should receive all possible encouragement?

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, OHIO, Jan. 4, 1877.

I am glad to get your New Year's greeting. It has occurred to me also that on the two leading topics of the time the present difficulties may be of great service to us. As to the South I am confident in my hope that such is the fact. I do not anticipate any help from the present House. I had heard suggestions of the sort you allude to. But I look for nothing of value growing out of Southern conservative tendencies in this Congress. Whatever the caucus decides to do will be done, and the influence referred to is too small to control the large House majority. But after this session closes, if the right result is declared, I shall confidently hope that a wise and liberal policy will enable us to divide the whites, and thus take the first step to obliterate the color line. There have been no "overtures," but an encouraging disposition is shown by letters and visitors from all parts of the South.

The *Herald* talk may have some foundation, but I am sure nothing will come of it. The present House will be ruled by Tilden's caucus. I send you a Redfield letter. The country must come to disregard the Democratic boasts. South Carolina and Florida were as strongly claimed as Louisiana.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

ST. LOUIS, Jan. 12, 1877.

When speaking in my last letter of the independent action of Southern members of the House, I did not mean to indicate that I expected anything of the kind, for I

did not. I merely desired to know whether there was anything in the story going through the papers. I am glad to learn that Southern men who have sought conversation or correspondence with you show so good a disposition.

In your reply you did not allude to what I had said about the desirability of an agreement in the Conference Committee of the two houses of Congress on a mode of counting the electoral vote. There had been a rumor in the papers that some friends of yours, assuming more or less to represent your views, had expressed a hope that no such agreement would be arrived at, but that the counting of the votes and the decision of all disputed points by the President of the Senate would be insisted upon. This matter appears to me of such importance in this crisis that I cannot refrain from expressing to you my anxiety about it, in connection with all the circumstances of the case. You will pardon me for being very frank. I do not want to force myself into your confidence or to obtrude my counsel. But at the beginning of the campaign I wrote you in one of my first letters that for whatever work I might perform in the canvass I should neither claim nor desire nor expect anything in return except the privilege of speaking to you on matters of public concern without reserve. I did so, and in some cases the advice I volunteered seemed to coincide with your views, in others it did not. In all cases it was offered in a sincere and unselfish spirit. In the same manner I address you now, believing that there are some things about which many people may hesitate to speak to a man in your position because they may not be considered pleasant. If I act otherwise I do so as a true friend.

I send you an article taken from the last number of *Harper's Weekly*, undoubtedly written by Mr. Curtis. I risk nothing in saying that it represents the sentiments

of thousands upon thousands of Republicans, not habitual malcontents, but faithful members of the party, and by no means its least estimable element. I do not accept all that Mr. Curtis says about the means the State government of Louisiana had to employ to prevent intimidation and violence; in this respect, I think, he goes too far. But what he says about the doings of the returning-board and the impression those doings have produced upon a very large number of conscientious Republicans, is undoubtedly correct. It is certainly true that there are grave doubts in the minds of that class of citizens. Those doubts were not produced by "Democratic brag and bluster," to which no sensible man would yield; but they originated in the proceedings of the Louisiana returning-board itself, and considering the well-known antecedents of that board and the suspicious circumstances surrounding its action on the present case, those doubts are not unnatural. They are expressed in private more frequently and pointedly than in public; but you may safely attribute such demonstrations as the petitions of the Philadelphia and New York merchants to Congress, asking for an agreement upon a fair mode of counting the electoral vote, to just that troubled state of mind. I know that to be so from my own personal acquaintance with a large number of Republicans.

Here and there the theory is set up that all we have to do is to convince ourselves as to the substantial right in this case and then use all means at hand to make that substantial right prevail. Just here some very grave questions present themselves. The letter of Mr. Redfield you sent me, I had already read in the Cincinnati *Commercial*. I consider Mr. Redfield to be a trustworthy correspondent who believes in what he says, and I myself believe that he is in the main correct. The probability that a fair and free election would have turned out a

considerable Republican majority in Louisiana is indeed strong. The same applies to the effect of intimidation and violence in the five parishes thrown out. I have also read General Van Alen's speech and consider him a sincere and truthful man. But all these statements, while making a very strong case, do not solve the question, why, if all these things are so certain and clear, the returning-board did not, in obedience to the law of the State, admit a Democrat as a member to witness and take part in these proceedings, but performed the decisive part of their duties as a strictly partisan body and in secrecy. Thus, by the action of the board itself, the doubt as to the merits of the case is increased in the public mind. It is useless to indulge in any delusion about this matter. I am aware that most of the party organs speak in a different tone, but as that feeling of uncertainty in most cases shrinks from public demonstration, the party press cannot in that respect be taken now as fairly representative of the constituency behind them. Under such circumstances it is more than ever necessary that the counting of the votes and the final determination of the result should be above suspicion as to fairness and impartiality. Nobody should be permitted to say that in determining the result anything extraordinary was done to take undue advantage of the position of power occupied by the party in the National Government. This is of the highest importance, for we now are going to establish a precedent fraught with good or very dangerous consequences.

It is maintained by some that the President of the Senate has, according to the Constitution, the power to count the votes, to decide doubtful cases and to declare the result, and that the two houses of Congress are only witnesses to the act, without any authority to interfere. Having studied that question, the law as well as the

precedents, I know what can be said in favor of the above proposition. It is true that it corresponds with the earliest practice. But it is also true, that no President of the Senate ever practically decided a disputed case, or claimed the power to do so, and that for more than half a century it has been the uniform usage that, whenever a case of doubt arose, the two houses of Congress took it in hand for settlement. The Wisconsin case can scarcely be quoted as a precedent to the contrary. That is the history of the country, and as the Republican party has not only never questioned that power of the two houses but practically asserted and exercised it, it has become the history of the Republican party. If now after all this, that power is claimed for and by the President of the Senate and exercised to decide all disputed questions in favor of the candidate of his party and thus to determine the result, will not such an act appear in the light of an arbitrary assumption of a doubtful power in the service of party interest? And what will be the effect?

It may be said that bad appearance is of no consequence if the act can be defended with strong argument. Indeed, I trouble myself little about mere clamor, but I do care very much not only about the merit but also about the appearance of such an act in a case like this. I will not follow Mr. Curtis in predicting the certain downfall of the party that does such things, although I think he is right. But there is a far more important consideration. What kind of a precedent would such a proceeding set to be taken advantage of by unscrupulous politicians in the future? It will not be the suspected action of a strictly partisan returning-board alone; it will not be the assumption and exercise of questionable power by the President of the Senate alone,—it will be all these things together by which a party decided a Presidential election

in its favor. Imagine such doings to stand as a precedent in our history, and then an unscrupulous set of politicians bound to maintain themselves in power, to find such a precedent, and then to improve upon it—where will be the limit of arbitrary proceedings? What will become of our Presidential elections? What an immense step will it be in the Mexicanization of the government!

It is for such reasons that I am so anxious to see the Conference Committee unite both parties upon a mode of counting the electoral vote and determining the result which will not appear in the light of a mere partisan maneuver, but be recognized as fair by all impartial men and put the legitimacy of the next Administration above reasonable question. For such reasons I think that everybody that can wield any influence should use it to that end. You can certainly not desire to be lifted into the Presidency by a proceeding of doubtful character, so doubtful, indeed, as to trouble the minds of a large number of patriotic men in your own party. An Administration whose title can be questioned by fair argument would be so completely at the mercy of the opposition and so crippled in its power for good that to carry it on would be misery to a man of fine sensibilities and a noble ambition.

It is well that you should know what is going on in the public mind outside of those circles which are apt to form themselves around a man likely to wield power. The question is asked on all sides: What can Governor Hayes do if made President in such a way? Which of the reforms he has so bravely defined and so solemnly promised, will he be able to carry out? I have received a large number of letters from all parts of the country, from men who earnestly and actively supported you and now are troubled by the same anxieties and apprehensions. As a specimen of the current thought I send you one

addressed to me by a gentleman you know as a man of honor and ability. I take the liberty of communicating it to you without the knowledge of the writer, because you ought to know what such men think and say. You will oblige me by returning it. It presents but a mild picture of the fears and gloomy anticipations at present prevailing among many of your friends.

Pardon the length and frankness of this letter. Let me assure you that it comes from a true friend who entertains for you feelings warmer even than mere esteem and is animated by the sincerest wishes for your success, prosperity and honor. I would rather speak of more agreeable things, but, as a friend, I deem it my duty to say to you what thousands of conscientious men think, although, possibly, they may shrink from making their thoughts known to you. The gravity of this crisis may justify the intrusion. Our Constitutional system has received many rude shocks of late, and, maybe, we have arrived at a turning-point now where the progress of evil may either be arrested or precipitated or at least accelerated. Any movement in the wrong direction now would open a Pandora-box of evil for the future.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Jan. 17, 1877.

Private.

I returned late last night, and find here your letter. I have no time to reply suitably this morning, but hasten to assure you that nobody is authorized to represent me on the subject of the count. I have thought it fitting that I should let that matter well alone. Of course I have opinions. But I shall abide the result. No one ought to go to war or even to law about it. I am free to say *to you* that I concur with Kent. But others abler to judge think otherwise, and I recognize their right as good Republicans so to think. Many good

Republicans think that the interests of the party will be promoted by Tilden's success. I can see many reasons for this opinion. In the absence of Congressional action the Vice-President should count and declare. I am favorably impressed with leaving it to be decided by lot. But I beg you to believe me sincere when I say that I take no part in this, and shall quietly await the event. There is a contingency which I must be prepared for. I must consider, if not write, an inaugural, and consider, if not appoint, a Cabinet. On these points I shall be glad to hear from all of my friends. I had a good talk with General Cox at Toledo, Saturday.

Write often and fully.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

ST. LOUIS, Jan. 21, 1877.

Your last letter was evidently written before the bill agreed upon in the Conference Committee had become known. For some time I had had information from Washington that an agreement was probable, and for that reason I did not write to you. That agreement changes the whole situation. Everything turns now on the fate of the bill reported by the Committee. Although there seems to be a good deal of opposition, still I think the prospects of the measure are very favorable. Of course, if the bill passes, there will be the end of the contest; this, at least, is the prevailing opinion. In the meantime it is useless to talk of anything else; nor should we. The measure is fair in its provisions as well as its intent. It is a makeshift, to be sure, but a good one. It takes the decision of the Presidential question away from the theater of party warfare and refers it to a tribunal that will not be governed by party selfishness. It promises a settlement which will, at least, be readily accepted and acquiesced in by all good citizens, and will have to be accepted by the bad ones. And the Administration

issuing from it will start with a fair chance and every possible incentive to make the dark features of its origin forgotten by vigorous endeavors in the right direction. In this respect this settlement may produce consequences extraordinarily good.

From what I have said you may conclude that I am in favor of the bill, and so I am. I mean to do all I can to secure its success, and have done some things in a quiet way already. If, contrary to general expectation, the bill should fail, it is difficult to say what then would follow. Possibly the idea of a new election would gain more strength than ever before. But until then, it is useless to consider it. Merely to mention it now would look like a disturbance of the peace.

However, the next few days will tell the story.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

ST. LOUIS, Jan. 21, 1877.

I thank you for your letter of the 17th inst. and gladly comply with the desire you express, that I should write often and fully. As to the opinion held by some Republicans "that the interests of the party will be promoted by Tilden's success," I candidly think that either party would gain immensely in strength if the other secured the triumph of its candidate by means which in the opinion of good citizens would cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the title of the next President. On the other hand, I am just as sincerely convinced that an Administration headed and conducted by you will be able to render immense service to the country—ininitely more than even Tilden could—provided your accession to power comes about in a way that places your title above reasonable dispute, and then the pledges made in your letter of acceptance are strictly adhered to and carried into effect.

As to the first proviso I must say that I have welcomed the bill reported by the Conference Committee with great satisfaction. I think there is no man in the country who should be more heartily congratulated upon the passage of that bill,—if it does pass, which I can scarcely doubt,—than yourself. My reasons are these: If the board of arbitration established by that bill decides in your favor, no man will be able to say that you were put into the Presidency by mere partisan action. The result of the great contest will not only be submitted to by the whole people, but all good citizens will unite in defending it, as brought about by the fair and impartial judgment of the highest authority in the land, against what clamor may still be raised against it by extreme partisans. The latter will then appear as the wanton disturbers of the public repose. And even if the board should decide against you, you would be saved from the mortification and disappointments which would inevitably follow such a decision in your favor brought about by a proceeding which would be looked upon, not only by the Democrats, but by a very large number of Republicans, as an unscrupulous stretch of party power for selfish party interest; and so the counting and declaring of the vote by the President of the Senate certainly would be regarded. Your name would not be associated in our history with one of the most dangerous precedents of party action.

The Conference bill may not be perfect; it may provide for a proceeding of an extra-Constitutional character, although I think its Constitutionality can be successfully defended on solid ground; but it has the great virtue of removing a question, the manner of whose decision may establish a precedent fraught with the most pernicious consequences for the future of the Republic, from the theater of apparently selfish and excited partisan strife; of insuring to the country a Government whose legitimacy

will stand above serious dispute, and of restoring confidence and repose to the popular mind. It is no wonder, that, some political circles excepted, the people should have welcomed it with such preponderance of sentiment as a measure of relief. By the agreement of the Conference Committee on that measure the situation has been entirely changed. The question is no longer whether the President of the Senate or the two houses of Congress shall determine the result, but whether this measure shall be accepted or rejected. I am convinced that the party undertaking to defeat this bill and to put in its place either the power of the President of the Senate to count and declare the vote, or the principle of the 22d rule, will sink to the bottom; and let me confess—for you want me to speak to you without reserve—I felt a pang when I saw it stated in the despatches, that telegrams coming from Ohio to Republican Congressmen advised opposition, and that Sherman, Garfield and others, generally assumed to be your particular friends and spokesmen, were going to try to defeat the bill. Whatever their views and wishes may have been before, now that a measure like this, agreed upon by the foremost men in the Senate and the House, is before Congress and the country, with that popular support which springs from a general demand for a just and impartial decision, your friends ought to understand that you cannot afford, even by implication, to appear hostile to this settlement;—just as, by the way, they ought to have understood, when at New Orleans, that as your friends it was their imperative duty to insist with all the influence at their disposal upon the appointment of a Democratic member of the returning-board, according to statute of the State, so as to take away from the proceedings of that board their exclusive and therefore so suspicious partisan character. If the Conference bill should fail by Republican

opposition, and you be then declared elected by the President of the Senate, the sentiment of the country will be so overwhelmingly against you, that, if the House sets up Tilden as a counter-President, as it then will certainly do, it will be no mere puppet show. In such a case I should consider the peace of the country more seriously in danger than before.

However, I think the measure will not fail. But it will be a matter of keen regret to me, as well as to a great many of your friends, to have an impression prevail that it succeeded against the opposition of men currently regarded as your nearest friends in Congress. Such a circumstance might even in a deplorable degree compromise the moral advantage which your success through this measure would otherwise give you to stand on. Your repugnance to any public declaration of your views and feelings on such a matter is undoubtedly well grounded and may be insuperable. But I submit to you, whether in a case like this it would not be desirable privately to advise your friends in Congress that if they deem it their duty to persist in their opposition to the Conference bill, it is also their duty not to permit the country to believe that they speak as your representatives and as such stand in the way of the settlement.

It is mainly to make this suggestion, which is prompted by the despatches from Washington and the impression they are apt to produce, that I write to-day. I shall as soon as possible comply with your invitation to your friends concerning inaugural and Cabinet matters.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

St. Louis, Jan. 25, 1877.

I have just received your letter of the 23d. You say with regard to the Conference bill: "With me the prin-

cial objection is the usurpation of the Presidential power of appointment which it involves. Congress, as my 'letter' intimates, has done this too much in the past." You know how decidedly I stand by your letter in that respect, but I do not see how this bill encroaches upon the Presidential power. It provides only for the appointment of the Commission, which, it seems to me, naturally belongs to Congress, if Congress has any power over the subject at all, while it is not pretended that the President has anything to do with the counting of the electoral vote. If this is so, then this bill would seem to involve no usurpation of the Presidential power.

If, in response to your kind invitation, I am to give you my views "fully" on your prospective inaugural, you will permit me a few preliminary remarks. Owing to the peculiarity of your situation, if you are declared elected, your inaugural will be the most important one since Lincoln's first. The Commission deciding in your favor, your title will be generally recognized and respected. Every attempt to dispute it will be frowned down by the people. But the things which preceded your accession to power—the close election, the long and doubtful contest after it, the suspicious Louisiana affair—will for a time remain in the popular mind like a lingering cloud. They will also form part of the history of the country. To clear away that cloud and completely to reconcile the judgment of history, your Administration must be, as you certainly desire it to become, not only what would ordinarily be called a creditable one, it must be a *strikingly* good one, leaving a heritage of beneficent and lasting results behind it. In what direction you mean to make it such, you have wisely outlined in your letter of acceptance. The President who carries out the pledges of that letter will have one of the most glorious names in the annals of the United States; he will be revered as the

moral regenerator of the Republic. It is the most magnificent and enviable mission I can think of, and I may say that I am heartily ambitious for you to see it gloriously fulfilled. Neither would, after all that has happened, a failure to redeem those pledges appear like an ordinary failure; it would be a dishonorable one. The greatest care must, therefore, be taken from the beginning to prevent that kind of failure which might come in spite of the rectitude of your intentions. You will to that end have excellent opportunities; and to improve them the first thing needful is a good strong start.

In this respect your inaugural will be the first act of importance. It will in a great measure determine your relations to the public opinion of the country, as well as the character of your surroundings. It would be useless to disguise the fact that at the beginning you will, in a certain sense, labor under a disadvantage. The conduct of the campaign, as well as what came after it, has left an unfavorable impression on the minds of a large element which, as I believe, you will naturally desire to have on your side, and part of which has become somewhat estranged from you. It is thought by many—not by me—that in spite of your own intentions, you have fallen under obligations which will force your Administration to a great extent into the old obnoxious ruts. You will, therefore, at first be met by a good deal of apprehension which, unless promptly removed, may have an unwholesome effect upon your personal surroundings. Certain classes of politicians will, of course, at once press eagerly around you: the party leaders, great and small, who want to take possession of your influence and make it subservient to their ends; the multitude who want offices. But the men who have only the public interest in view without asking anything for themselves are generally reticent and dislike to intrude. Some of them

may come once or twice to offer their advice, but then they will stay away unless invited and encouraged. I speak here from an experience gathered in a close personal observation of the beginning of two Administrations, the first of Mr. Lincoln, and the first of General Grant.

To attach the latter class to yourself, and by that attachment to strengthen your Administration, your inaugural can be used with great effect. You remember the excellent impression produced at the beginning of the campaign by the bold and straightforward tone of your letter of acceptance. And it is also well to remember that, when the campaign had drifted away from its original program and repelled a large number of men who at first intended to support you—and of this I could give you many striking instances!—a considerable number of Republican papers and speakers found it necessary, at the eleventh hour just before the election, to hold up once more before the people your letter of acceptance, which during the campaign they seemed to have forgotten, in order to revive the first impression. It was then too late, and the tardy attempt appeared like a stage trick. Had not the first impression held out with a great many, the election would probably have gone wrong in more than four Northern States.

I mention this to show where, in my opinion, your real strength lies, and also your hope of further success.

Your inaugural should, therefore, as I think, contain as its main part, a bold and strong statement of your political aims, embodying all you said in your letter of acceptance, expressed, perhaps, in language somewhat different, but, if possible, still more direct and specific. It is true that your letter of acceptance was distasteful to some Republican politicians, among them prominent ones, and it might now be thought good policy at first to soften things so as to avoid antagonisms, and then

gradually to exceed the promise by the performance. I believe such a policy a very dangerous one and I will give you my reasons.

If your inaugural is not at least on a level with your letter of acceptance, if it has any appearance of "backing down," the immediate consequence is likely to be that the political elements whose support and inspiration you need in order to make your Administration what you want it to be, will feel repelled and discouraged and stand aloof, while those whose impulses and desires run in the opposite direction and have already proved so disastrous to the party, will press around you with an increased eagerness and vigor of hope. On the other hand, so clear and strong a proclamation of your purposes as will convince everybody of your inflexible determination to remain true to them will at once secure you the confidence of the best part of the people and evoke so strong a support of public opinion as to render the displeasure of politicians comparatively harmless. Moreover, you will in any event have to choose between controlling the politicians and being controlled by them. The latter may be brought about, in spite of yourself, by showing any dread of their displeasure; the former by convincing them at the start that you cannot be moved from your aims. Then your battle is not only half won already at the beginning, but that part of it which might otherwise become the most dangerous, will be altogether avoided. I mean the dragging part.

The difficulty of accomplishing this is, in my opinion, not as great as it at first might appear. The most formidable influences you will have to confront are in the Senate. That Senate I know pretty well. A Senator belonging to the Administration party is naturally not inclined to oppose the President. He may try what impression he can produce by appearing for a moment to

do so, but on the whole he will keep on the right side of the Executive. A President, who has public opinion at his back, need fear no opposition in that body. I have always been convinced that had General Grant adopted a policy such as is contained in your letter of acceptance and clearly understood it and proved himself at the start firmly determined to carry it out, he would have been able to do so. He would have found friends enough of that policy in the Senate to neutralize the opposition of those hostile to it. I know that because I was there. But General Grant had no great political aims. As General Grant could have done it, so I am sure you can at once secure in the Senate sufficient support for the policy of your letter of acceptance, to make it entirely practicable, provided you do not permit its opponents for a moment to believe in the possibility of subjugating you by bluster or persistent pressure. Your influence will be all the stronger, as the Republican majority in the Senate will be so small after the 4th of March, that they cannot afford to trifle with the Executive. Thus my own experience in the Senate convinces me that by a determined vigorous start you will rather avoid long antagonisms than provoke them. Neither will you thereby injure or endanger the Republican party; on the contrary, you will lift it up and immensely strengthen it by calling once more all those moral forces into action whose coöperation made it so great in its best days.

I have dwelt upon these points so long in order to express clearly my opinion as to what the tone and spirit of the inaugural should be with a view to what is to come after it. I would now suggest the following points:

1. By way of introduction a reference to the events preceding and the circumstances attending your accession to power; the excited campaign; the closeness of the election; the doubts and the long contest following; party

passion newly inflamed and apparent danger of disturbance; the happy solution of all difficulties by the verdict of a tribunal universally recognized as fair and impartial; the triumph of law and the return of repose, confidence and good feeling—a new proof of the inherent virtue of our republican institutions. The apprehensions thus happily quieted are well calculated to remind us all of the inestimable value of peace and good understanding among the people, and that no effort should be spared to foster and maintain them. The fact that in the election the people were nearly equally divided, also reminds the successful candidate that the President of the United States must feel himself as the President of the whole people, mindful of the rights and interests of all, and not as a mere party chief. Here particular emphasis should be laid upon your desire to unite all the people in a common feeling of patriotism and national pride; to soften party passions, thus to facilitate the consideration of great questions of public interest upon their own merits, and thus to promote the common welfare by harmonious efforts.

This paragraph can, with proper elaboration, as I think, be made very effective. A phrase like the following may, in appropriate connection, be inserted in it: that you were owing to a political party your elevation to power, and are mindful of that fact; but that you will serve that party best by serving the public interest best.

Of course, the phraseology in which these ideas are to be set forth is of importance.

2. The President in assuming the duties of his office deems it proper to make to the people a frank statement of the views he entertains, the motives which animate him, and the aims he means to pursue. Here a direct reference to your letter of acceptance would be in order, designating it as a candid exposition of your principles

put before the people at the beginning of the campaign, so that they might know what kind of a man they were called upon to vote for. The pledges contained in that paper were given voluntarily and in good faith, and to redeem them in equally good faith the President considers himself bound by every consideration of public duty, of statesmanship, of patriotism and of personal honor.

The order in which the different subjects are now taken up would not seem to be of particular consequence. Perhaps you might adopt the order of arrangement appearing in your letter beginning with the economic question. A short statement of the material condition of the country would be required; the business depression, its causes and effects; the recent appearance of symptoms of improvement; not artificial schemes but well directed productive labor the healing force, together with frugal economy and good morals in public and private concerns; the necessity of returning to a normal condition in a financial point of view through the resumption of specie payments, for which the present condition of things is in an extraordinary degree favorable,—taking on the whole a hopeful view of things which, as seems to me, is entirely warranted by circumstances. Of course some strong words on the necessity of economy in public expenditures should not be wanting.

Civil service reform would come next: Reference to the abuses which have gradually grown up after the abandonment of the original system; necessity of elevating our political life to a higher moral level. Then a recapitulation of the propositions contained in your letter of acceptance, setting forth point after point as clearly and specifically as possible, in direct and positive language, so as to leave no chance for doubt or misapprehension as to the firmness of your purpose. This paragraph might close with an appeal to your party and to all good

citizens to put aside all narrow views of party interest and to coöperate with you in this great task. This passage may contain also a reference to the platforms of both parties in which the necessity of reform is strongly recognized and certain propositions urged. As both parties should be assumed to have spoken in good faith, they must be taken at their word and are in duty and honor bound to give the President their coöperation.

Next the Southern question. Here again your letter of acceptance would be the best text. Elaborating the ideas contained therein, you might allude to the inevitable confusion and perplexities which could not but follow a great civil war, and especially a sweeping revolution of the whole labor system of a country; the moral obligation of the National Government to fix the rights of the emancipated slaves and to protect them in the enjoyment of those rights; setting forth that the Southern people, as honorable men, would have done the same thing, had they been in our situation; that the abuses and misgovernment in some States, which followed the enfranchisement of the late slaves (a class of people without their fault ignorant and untutored and liable to be misled), were to a great extent not unnatural; that, notwithstanding all this, the colored people are entitled to the sympathy, not only of those who liberated them, but also of their late masters; that the outrages here and there committed upon them, and the attempts to govern them by force, must be condemned by all good citizens; that the evil of misgovernment, the existence of which you frankly and fully recognize, must be averted by the harmonious efforts of all good men; that as these evils have been aggravated by an unruly and grasping party spirit, that party spirit should be as much as possible done away with in dealing with this problem; that, while in duty bound and fully determined to protect the

rights of all by the employment of every Constitutional power at your disposal, you are sincerely anxious to use every legitimate influence of the Administration in favor of honest government in the Southern States, and thus to promote their prosperity and contentment. And as in this you will not be influenced by partisan feeling, so you call upon all good citizens in the South to cast aside the prejudice of race and party and to coöperate with you in protecting the rights and promoting the interests of all. I need not say that, in my opinion, this and the foregoing paragraph will be the most important in the inaugural as to their effect.

Then, I think, something should be said of your determination to conduct the Executive branch of the Government with the strictest regard for the spirit as well as the forms of the Constitution.

Then a few sentences referring to our foreign relations would be in order; to the international complications threatening the peace of Europe, while we maintain friendly intercourse with all the nations and powers of the world; to our wise traditional policy of non-interference and honorable neutrality; to our disposition and hope, if unhappily any question of difference should arise between the United States and any foreign Governments, to settle them in the same amicable way in which we composed our disputes with Great Britain; and your earnest desire to secure to this Republic the blessings of peace and good understanding with all peoples and powers.

Finally, you might wind up with a reference to your one-term declaration, expressing your purpose and hope to make that one term as fruitful as possible to the American people.

This I would suggest as a rough outline of the points without any one of which, as I think, your inaugural would not be complete. You have probably thought of

other things in addition to these, which have not occurred to me. If my opinions and suggestions are of any value to you, they might be made more complete and satisfactory; if you would indicate the particular points on which you desire them, I shall be gladly at your service. I intended to add something on the Cabinet question, but may do that hereafter, if agreeable to you. This letter has already grown much longer, and perhaps more tedious, than I meant it to be. It would have been shorter were it less hastily written.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Jan. 29, 1877.

I have yours of the 25th and assure you that I am very much gratified by it. After twice reading I think I can vote aye to every idea in it. Let me hastily add two or three suggestions. To bring the South to a better condition I feel like saying that the Nation will aid the people of that section, first, to the means of education, and, secondly, to internal improvements of a National character.

Again may I not properly propose an amendment to the Constitution making the Presidential term six years, and no reëlection?

Of course I see the great uncertainty about the result of the contest. But I prefer to be ready as far as may be. If my paper is not used the loss will not be great. I want also to be ready to make a Cabinet—remaining to the last free to choose as may at the time seem advisable. On the whole business I shall be glad to hear from you.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

St. Louis, Jan. 30, 1877.

I respond to your kind invitation to write about Cabinet appointments with a good deal of diffidence, for, in spite

of the best intentions, mistakes in recommending men will happen.

That you do not want in your Cabinet anybody of tarnished or reasonably suspected integrity, or tainted with demagoguery, or identified with the abuses to be corrected, by participation or apology, is a matter of course. I take it also for granted that you desire to gather around you the highest character and the best political ability available. Here permit me to venture upon a suggestion. It appears to me of first importance that you should be as well as possible assured of the *motives* animating those you select as your Secretaries. It would, perhaps, neither be possible nor advantageous to exclude all of those who have been thought of, or who have thought of themselves, as candidates for the Presidency, for this might exclude very strong and useful men. But it would be positively dangerous to have a certain class of them in the Cabinet; I mean those who are inclined to treat public questions not on their own merit and with a single eye to the public interest, but with a view to what they can make out of the power they wield for their personal ends. Such men will drift into intrigues against one another, likely to cause continual discord and uneasiness in the Cabinet, and in some respects to obstruct the best endeavors of the Executive. This appears especially important to a President who wants to effect a thorough reform of the civil service. You have put your declination of a second term wisely upon the ground that a President who means to do that should keep clear of the temptations of the patronage. Of what use would that self-abnegation of the President be if he should put the Departments, or any of them, under the control of men working for the succession and inclined to use the power of the Administration, as far as they can influence it, for their own advantage? While the head of the Govern-

ment is shunning temptation, some of the most powerful men under him would look upon temptations only as opportunities.

It is probably impossible to construct a Cabinet all the members of which perfectly agree with the President and with one another on *all* political questions. But I think I am only expressing your own conviction when I say, that as to the principal aims of your Administration the Cabinet should be substantially a unit, and consist of men who not only in a languid way acquiesce in those aims, but have them sincerely, earnestly at heart. As I said in my last letter, I am sure that you can and will succeed in carrying out your reforms and thus in doing an inestimable service to the Republic, if the work is begun and continued in the right spirit. But much of that work will have to be done in and through the Departments, and at the head of those Departments there must be men who are not only animated by vague desires in the right direction, but who have, together with prudence and discretion, the necessary pluck and steadfastness and patience to stand up to their duty under all circumstances, so that the President, who cannot always watch and direct them, may with entire confidence depend on their fidelity and efficiency. This may be said not only concerning civil service reform, but also the management of the Southern question, in which the influence to be exercised through the Departments may become of very great importance. An Administration working at cross purposes or with an uncertain and flagging spirit in its machinery, would be in danger of failure.

In suggesting the following names I have kept in mind that the Secretaries have to act in a double capacity: as practical managers of their respective Departments, and as members of the highest political council of the Government.

1. Secretary of State. You have probably thought of Mr. Evarts already. As to his capacity and acquirements nothing need be said. The present condition of Europe renders it desirable that the Secretary of State should be conversant with European affairs, and I think Mr. Evarts understands them as well as is necessary. It may be objected that he thinks of the Presidency, but, if so, I sincerely believe he does not belong to that class of aspirants who would intrigue for the promotion of personal ends, or permit their ambition to affect their sense of duty. I think him a high-minded man. I am pretty well acquainted with him, although not very intimately. But such is my impression and it is also that of several men who know him well, and whose judgment I would trust. His views and principles on all essential points would, as I think, accord with your own.

I would also mention Mr. G. W. Curtis, who is a very pure, patriotic and able man, and would, I believe, fill that place very creditably.

2. Secretary of the Treasury. My first suggestion would be Mr. Bristow, especially for the reason that the Treasury Department with its extensive machinery is one of the most, if not the most important one with regard to the reform of the service. I know Bristow to have that cause earnestly at heart and to be a sincere man. It has been said by his adversaries that he used his official power for the furtherance of his interests as a Presidential candidate. I believe that charge unjust, unless he did so by taking care of the public interest with uncommon fidelity and vigor. He is, as I think, also one of those, whom no thought of the Presidency would swerve from the path of duty, and who has the instincts and principles of a gentleman. He has made some enemies, but in a way in which every man in his position, who is faithful to his duty, will make enemies. Although he is not a trained financier,

his management of the Department has been very creditable in that respect. His appointment would be generally hailed as an earnest of the reformatory spirit of the Administration.

Governor Morgan of New York has been suggested in the press in connection with the Treasury, but being an importing merchant he is disqualified by statute. Moreover, it would perhaps be questionable policy to put the New York customhouse and the internal revenue machinery in that State under the control of *any* man deep in New York politics, be he otherwise ever so honorable. As a curious fact, which I learned in New York months ago, I would mention that it was Mr. Evarts's real ambition to be Secretary of the Treasury.

3. Secretary of the Interior. I would suggest General Cox first, if he can be spared from the House of Representatives, which, indeed, seems doubtful. Ex-Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri. He is a very able man, well versed in business, a sagacious adviser, and, I think, of correct views on public matters. Ex-Senator Pratt of Indiana, a man of high character, good ability and excellent principles. He made a very safe and efficient Commissioner of Internal Revenue. You have, perhaps, thought in this connection also of Mr. Washburne, at present United States Minister in France.

4. Attorney-General. The name first occurring to me is that of Senator Edmunds; but I candidly do not think he can be spared from the Senate, of which he is one of the most valuable members. Courtlandt Parker of New Jersey. I know him, but not intimately enough to express an opinion of my own. His reputation is that of a very able lawyer and a high-minded gentleman. My impressions with regard to him are very favorable. Chief Justice Gray of Massachusetts, a man of high standing as a lawyer and most excellent character and principles. He

would, I think, be a good selection, but I do not know, however, whether he would consent to leave the bench. Of course, Mr. Evarts would, of all these, make the greatest Attorney-General, and Mr. Henderson, already mentioned, a good one.

5. Secretary of War. Gen. Joseph Hawley of Connecticut, whom you probably know. A name that occurs to me also is that of General Harrison of Indiana; and I merely mention it as I am not sufficiently acquainted with him to express an opinion.

6. Secretary of the Navy. In connection with this office, which, I believe, is generally given to an Eastern man, I would call your attention to a gentleman whom I know as one of the best citizens in this country, Mr. Henry L. Pierce of Boston, a member of the present Congress. He is a man of sterling virtue, very good capacity, not brilliant but of excellent common-sense, and of the soundest principles. I am sure, Massachusetts and all New England would delight in having him in your Cabinet and see in his appointment another evidence of the high tone of your purposes. In a Cabinet some men are needed who will under all circumstances tell you the truth about everything, with frankness and sincerity, and I think Bristow and Pierce belong to that class probably more than most others. If you should desire to have Governor Morgan in your Cabinet, I would suggest that the Navy would probably be a suitable place. But I should consider Pierce a better appointment. He would, however, in my opinion also do for the Interior.

7. Finally—Postmaster-General. The name of Governor Jewell suggests itself as probably that of the best business manager that Department has had for a long time. He has not the training of a statesman, but, if there is political talent enough in the rest of the Cabinet, the Post-Office might perhaps be given to a business man who has made an

excellent reputation as an administrative officer, is a man of good principles and has the character of a gentleman.

I must also mention Mr. Galusha A. Grow of Pennsylvania, late Speaker of the House. He is a man of very good qualities, fine ability, considerable political and business experience and high character. Among the prominent public men of Pennsylvania he is one of the ablest and probably the most trustworthy. He would, I think, make a good Postmaster-General, as well as a good Secretary of the Interior.

I have suggested these names as they occurred to me, since you so kindly invited me to write about the matter, probably overlooking several worthy men whom you have already thought of. Now, from such a list a very strong Cabinet might be constructed, and also a fair and personally unobjectionable but indifferent one. In this respect pardon me for offering another suggestion. Your Administration will have to deal with very important and difficult problems, and, in order to carry out your purpose, it will have to surmount a great variety of obstacles and to withstand an extraordinary pressure of adverse tendencies and interests. To do that successfully it will need all the ability, character and energy—in one word, all the *positive* elements of strength that may be available; for there will be a great many things which you can neither do nor watch yourself, but which you will be obliged to trust to your Secretaries. A Cabinet of mere good intentions, but of indifferent intellectual and moral power might, and, I think, would, in the long run become a source of very great embarrassment to you, and when you once have it, it will not be the easiest thing in the world to get rid of it or to mend it. The history of the country presents many warning examples in this respect.

There has been a rumor in the papers that you would perhaps go outside of the party lines in choosing a member

of the Cabinet from the South. Looked at from certain points of view, this *might* be a good stroke of policy, if the right man can be found.

If you should desire about this or that person specific information which I can give, it will be gladly at your disposal, and I need not assure you that you can absolutely rely on my discretion, the necessity of which in such a case I appreciate fully.

TO JACOB D. COX

ST. LOUIS, Jan. 30, 1877.

Confidential.

I thank you most sincerely for your kind letter of the 24th inst. I ought to apologize for having put any question to you, an answer to which I might have thought would be embarrassing. And I may assure you, that my last letter did not have that meaning.

What you tell me of the general drift of Governor Hayes's mind, as it appears in conversation, is very satisfactory and accords with my own observations. But you say "the risk is that his selections will not be so *positive*, as we could desire." There may indeed be reason for an apprehension of that kind. Now, I have made it a rule in my correspondence with him to express my views on everything, public questions as well as individuals, with the utmost frankness and freedom, no matter whether he agrees with me or not. I told him at the beginning of the campaign that he should look upon me as one who would not claim, nor desire, nor expect anything from him except the privilege of telling him at all times without reserve what I thought about matters or men—and that I do. I have thus been trying to impress upon him the necessity, if he is declared elected and means to redeem his pledges, of making a good strong start, first by repeating in his

inaugural in the most specific and unequivocal manner all the propositions and promises of his letter of acceptance, and then by surrounding himself with the highest character and the best political ability and energy he can find, not only men of unexceptionable reputation and good intentions, but men of intelligence, will and force.

If you ask my opinion as to whether you should follow his invitation to advise him and give him information with regard to individuals, I would decidedly urge you to do so. I am sure, the advice of such men as you are, is just the thing he needs, and, I am glad to say, just the thing he desires. The more unreservedly you speak to him, the better. I am convinced that he is sincerely anxious to have your advice.

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TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

ST. LOUIS, Feb. 2, 1877.

I have received your letter of January 29th, and am sincerely glad to know that my suggestions concerning the inaugural have had your approval. Now as to the points you mention. I have thought of the same things and considered them carefully. The reasons why I did not introduce them in my suggestions are the following:

1. That the Southern people need good systems of public instruction is certainly true. One of the reasons why they do not have them, is, unfortunately, that the prevailing sentiment there is not vigorously in favor of them. There is the trouble. Their politicians may here and there talk well on the subject, but they do not feel it. If they did, they could have done much more for it. Were it possible, in some way by legislation to force them to introduce and maintain an efficient system of common

schools in their States, we should thereby benefit them much more than by any material aid we have to offer for that purpose. But I fail to see how the object can be reached either way. The matter of public instruction is subject to the control of the States, and under the Constitution as it is, the National Government cannot interfere. The only material aid we can offer them for educational purposes would be, as far as I can see, in the shape of land donations. And if we offer them something in that way—I doubt whether it could be much—the question is what they would do with it. However, I am heartily in favor of all that can be done in this respect with a reasonable prospect of good effect. It would, in my opinion, certainly be a good thing to mention in your inaugural the necessity of efficient systems of public instruction in the Southern States; to call the attention of the Southern people to it and to give them some wholesome advice. But I doubt whether it would be good policy to make promises, of which we do not know to what extent they can be performed, and how far their performance would really promote the object in view. I would hesitate to advise it.

2. As to internal improvements, it is probable—nay I consider it certain—that all sorts of schemes will be hatched in the South and urged upon Congress, some more or less useful, others gotten up merely for the purpose of having the National Government spend as much money as possible in the Southern States, and not a few with bad jobs in them. This will be a natural tendency, while the taxes and duties which flow into the National Treasury come in overwhelming proportions out of Northern pockets. Against this tendency the economy of the National finances will be continually on the defensive; and while I feel very much as you do and should be glad to see the revival of Southern prosperity promoted by all proper

and just means, we have also under existing circumstances every possible reason to take care that our public expenditures be kept within bounds. I should therefore consider it rather dangerous policy to encourage by general promises the above mentioned tendency, which will anyhow be stronger than may prove wholesome for the balance sheets of the Treasury. Besides, an internal improvement policy carried on in a broad sense, especially by giving Government aid to corporations, has always been an exceedingly dangerous thing for the morals of Congress. We have had exhibitions of that effect certainly startling enough to make us very careful. Remember the Credit-Mobilier, the Blaine letters, etc. It looks almost as if a railroad could not come within a hundred miles of a legislative body without corrupting it. It will be difficult for you, I should think, to say anything in your inaugural in the sense you indicate, that will not be liable to be construed as an endorsement of that policy, which in the past has proved so injurious to our public morals, and so dangerous to the Treasury, that the Republican party has seen itself forced to abandon it in deference to public opinion. Neither would it be well in my opinion if you *appeared* as trying to gain the favor of the Southern people by a bid of such a nature. It would seem to me best, not to mention the matter at all. It is in no way essential to your inaugural. If nothing is said about it nothing will be missed. Whatever you may say on that matter, will be apt to subject you to a kind of criticism which, as it impresses me, should be avoided especially at the beginning. Your good-will toward the Southern people can be set forth strongly in many other ways.

3. An amendment to the Constitution such as you speak of, has certainly much in its favor. The reason why I did not make a suggestion concerning it was, that after the experiences the country has gone through, that part

of the Constitution which refers to the term and the election of the President will probably be changed in several respects, and that the amendment you mention will then appear in connection with other cognate propositions. The introduction of the whole subject would, as I thought, open a field of discussion perhaps too wide for the limits to which you might desire to confine your inaugural. I, therefore, submit to your judgment whether you would not prefer, instead of singling out this one particular amendment for presentation at this time, to leave it over for your first annual message and then to set it forth in all its bearings and proper connections.

On the whole, my impression is that your inaugural will best satisfy your own taste as well as that of the public, and also best serve its object, if it is a short, terse and pointed document, setting forth in simple language your political motives and aims in a general way, and that the crowding in of too many subjects and unnecessary details would encumber and thereby rather weaken than strengthen it. If it does not go much beyond two ordinary newspaper columns, it will be read by everybody as it ought to be.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Feb. 4, 1877.

I have your note of the 1st [2d]. It impresses me very strongly. My anxiety to *do* something to promote the pacification of the South is perhaps in danger of leading me too far. I do not reflect on the use of the military power in the least. But there is to be an end of all that, except in emergencies which I do not think of as possible again. We must do all we can to promote prosperity there. Education, emigration and immigration, improvements, occur to me. But the more I think of it, the more I see in what you say. We must go cautiously—slowly.

The result of the great lawsuit will, perhaps, relieve me from all responsibility. I am, fortunately, not anxious to assume it. If it comes I want to be ready. You will see from what I write you, that "the South" is more on my mind than anything else. Perhaps, we must be content to leave that to time—taking care not to obstruct time's healing processes by injudicious meddling. I will think of it. Thanks.

FROM MURAT HALSTEAD

CINCINNATI, Feb. 16, 1877.

Confidential.

I do not know that there is any reason why when I have anything on my mind about you that I should not write it to you.

It is my impression that Hayes will rule out in his Cabinet appointments all candidates for the Presidential nomination. This of course excludes Bristow along with Morton and Blaine.

I know that Hayes feels that you should be recognized by the Administration and satisfied, and I want him to appoint you to the Cabinet. It is my guess that he will have Evarts and Sherman in the Cabinet for the State and Treasury Departments, and I want you to get the Interior, and as a matter of fact I hope to work in my way to that end with some effect.

I would like to feel that I am not crossing your wishes in this—and I do not know how to get at it except by writing to you in this way with the completest understanding that you are not under the slightest obligation to reply.

Perhaps, however, I am on the wrong track—that in all sincerity you would prefer not to go into the Cabinet, but abroad to Austria—though I think not.

At any rate I am resolved to give Hayes a push on the subject. I thought of the State Department at first—but the premiership is only nominal and the Interior would give the best field for work.

Now, I would not venture to write to you like this if I did

not feel that you know just why I do it—and that I have been thoroughly candid.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

St. Louis, Feb. 17, 1877.

I intended to reply immediately to your kind note of the 4th inst., but the illness of my mother, who lived with me and died on Tuesday last, rendered me almost unable to think of anything else. This was the third time that the hand of death knocked at my door within the last twelve months, first calling away my father, then my wife, and then my mother. These have been staggering blows from which it was not the easiest thing to rally. But however dreary and lonesome life may become, its duties remain as imperative as ever and thus they afford relief.

The feelings you express in your last letter with regard to the South I appreciate all the more as I share them fully—having long and to the best of my ability struggled against that short-sighted partisan policy which threw away the first great opportunities to put the Southern question in the course of satisfactory solution. But I think you will have a splendid chance to retrieve the mistakes made by others. What is needed above all is the establishment of good understanding, confidence and active coöperation between the intelligence and virtue represented in the Republican party at the North and the corresponding elements of Southern society. Only thus can we break the color line on the white side, secure a just respect for the rights of the negro, and measurably deliver Southern society of the control of its lawless tendencies and an unreasoning party spirit. The importance of some demonstration of the sincerity of your good-will toward all classes of the Southern people is evident, and since this

cannot, consistently with the public interest, be effected by the offer of some specific material benefit, would it not seem worthy of consideration whether the appointment to a place in your Cabinet of some man of Confederate antecedents and enjoying the confidence of that class, would not secure to your Southern policies great facilities? I see the difficulties of such a step at once, but the more I think of it, the more I am also impressed with its advantages. As a positive proof of the sincerity of the intentions you mean to express in your inaugural, it would at once give you the confidence of the best class of those people. And if the right man can be found, he would be a living link between them and your Administration. He might be able to point out to you, better probably than anybody else could, the exact things to be done in the South, and also the persons to be employed for the furtherance of your policy. To find a man of that class who has the right kind of standing in the South, who possesses the necessary capacity, and who may be depended upon as entirely faithful and sincerely devoted to the other aims you have in view, appears indeed difficult—perhaps so much so that you may not be inclined to take so unusual a stroke of policy into consideration. At any rate, I felt encouraged by the tone of your last letter to submit my general impressions about this matter to your judgment.

As I speak to you of everything that goes through my mind concerning your prospective Administration, there is another thing I must mention. Some time ago a rumor was communicated to me by a friend in Chicago, “based upon pretty good authority,” as the letter states, that, “if Governor Hayes becomes President, Don Cameron is likely to be retained in the Cabinet as Secretary of War, in deference to Pennsylvania; that Bristow is not likely to be Secretary of the Treasury, in deference to Grant; that as a compromise between Bristow and his enemies,

General Harlan of Kentucky is to be offered the Attorney-Generalship, and that Governor Morgan of New York is to have the Treasury. One of the reasons assigned for paying deference to Grant is that if he had supposed at any time before or since the election that Bristow was a possibility in the new Administration, he would have thrown the Presidency over to Tilden." This rumor came in the way of private correspondence from Cincinnati to Chicago and is troubling the minds of some warm friends of yours at both places. The first part I am not able to look upon as a serious thing since you are undoubtedly as well aware as I am that Don Cameron's only political significance consists in being the son of his father; that among the political sets in Pennsylvania the Cameron set is one of the most unsavory, and that an official recognition of it by the selection from all the old Cabinet officers of just this one to pass into the new arrangement would at once seriously discredit the character of a reform Administration.

This recalls to my mind a reminiscence of one of Mr. Lincoln's great troubles. He had been made to believe that, owing to some things that had happened in connection with his Administration, a duty of gratitude obliged him to give Cabinet appointments to Mr. Caleb Smith of Indiana and to Mr. Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania. He did so and after some very mortifying experiences he found himself obliged to get rid again of Cameron, the best way he could. He once told me himself in speaking of this and other similar things, that a President must sometimes understand the duty to appear ungrateful and the wisdom of rejecting smart combinations with uncongenial elements.

As to Mr. Bristow you will pardon me for saying another word about him which is inspired not by any personal feeling, but entirely by considerations of public interest.

It might, perhaps, at first sight appear good policy to omit from your Cabinet all those who were candidates for the nomination at Cincinnati; so as not to slight one by preferring another. Under ordinary circumstances there would be much in favor of this idea. But it so happens in this case that all the candidates, except one, are in the Senate and may reasonably be presumed to prefer their present places to any others that might be offered. Only one is in private life; and if all the others, as Senators, remain official persons in the Government, while only this one is left without official position, might it not be said that the latter received the slight?

This, however, would, as it seems to me, be either way a matter of secondary importance, not large enough to govern so weighty a business. Neither can I imagine that you would permit General Grant's personal likes or dislikes, from which the country has certainly suffered enough, to stand in the way of the public good, especially as General Grant will entirely cease to be a political entity on the 5th of March, and as his views and influence will no longer be of the least possible moment. But just now the country witnesses the very singular spectacle of a general pardon to the whisky thieves and an equally general removal from office of those who prosecuted them. Bristow and those who acted under him have literally been punished for the best service they rendered the country. I shall certainly not argue that this would entitle him to a place in your Cabinet. But he has become in a certain sense the practical exponent of a reform at present so essentially needed and his appointment would, therefore, in higher degree than that of any man mentioned in connection with the Treasury secure to your Administration that kind of popular confidence which will be most useful to you. He possesses also in a great measure the qualifications demanded by the problems before us, and

his appointment will furnish you a most faithful and serviceable instrument for the execution of your good purposes. This object is, after all, the main thing to be kept in view, and it cannot, as it seems to me, be reached by appointing one of Bristow's personal friends to some other place, for the question is not how Bristow can be personally satisfied, which is an unimportant matter compared with the other question, how the success of your Administration can be best secured and the public interest best served.

You might, indeed, attain the same end if you could put a man into the Treasury, who has the cause of honest government and reform just as sincerely and strongly at heart, who represents the same principles of official conduct, enjoys the same popular confidence and possesses the same qualifications as Bristow. Then nothing would be lost. But is it an easy thing to find an adequate substitute? I take the liberty of guessing that you do not seriously think of Governor Morgan, who, however honest and deserving, is now an old man with a remnant of vigor too small for the arduous duties of the Treasury Department, the management of which requires a high degree of working capacity. I have seen several other names mentioned in the papers as being "on the slate," and of course I do not know what your intentions may be. But with real anxiety I beg you to consider that, as your reform program is to be carried out, the most important and difficult task will fall upon the Treasury and Post-Office Departments with their immense machinery and responsibilities; that just there you will want to have men whose hearts are faithfully in that cause; who truly believe in it; upon whom you can absolutely depend that they have the necessary spirit and perseverance to effect that deliverance of the civil service from Congressional control which you so justly regard as the essential point of reform; and

that no consideration will induce them to dally with men or practices of doubtful honesty. If, on the other hand, those Departments are under the management of Secretaries who only acquiesce in the reform policy because you favor it, but, being themselves half-hearted in it, carry it on only as far as they are watched or as may be necessary to save appearances, men whose political views and habits would rather incline them to continue in the old beaten track, or who have not the necessary power of resistance against the pressure of politicians, or are naturally disposed to yield and temporize and study the art "how not to do it,"—if, in other words, the struggle for that reform is not only to be carried on by the Administration against the opposition outside, but inside of the Administration against half-heartedness or doubtful purpose—then embarrassments and failures would be likely to ensue which it is not necessary to describe. If you think it best not to appoint Bristow but can find a man of the necessary capacity answering to the first description, nothing will be lost. But the men I have seen mentioned, let me confess, answer more to the second than to the first. The Treasury Department has become particularly conspicuous in connection with the question of reform, and any appointment to that Secretaryship which appears as a "backing down" from what might be called the Bristow standard would, as I think, not only produce a bad effect upon public opinion just at the start when, after all that has happened, favor of public opinion is of particular importance to you, but may bring on further perplexities of a grave nature. I am frank to say that it appears to me difficult to find a fit substitute for Bristow to fill his place in public estimation as well as for the work to be done for the realization of your objects. I have considered it my duty as your friend to submit these views to you on a point which impresses me as one of great moment.

Do not understand me as desiring to say anything to the prejudice of General Harlan. I know him enough to like him personally and to esteem him highly. I should think he would make a creditable Secretary of War or of the Interior. You probably know better than I do whether in a professional point of view he would come up to the standard which with regard to the Attorney-Generalship should be adhered to. That place has within the last eight years suffered some degradation, and it would, as I venture to suggest, be well to fill the position of the first law officer of the Government once more with the first order of legal ability, so as to lift it up again to its true level of dignity and usefulness. His recognized standing as a jurist should give to the opinions of the Attorney-General the weight of high authority. This office may become of particular importance in your Administration, since, as I learn from good sources, Tilden has become a sort of monomaniac on the Presidency and seriously thinks of resorting to *quo warranto* proceedings after the verdict of the Electoral Commission has gone against him. Considering all this, it might appear advisable to have somebody in the Attorney-General's office coming as near as possible to Mr. Evarts in standing and ability, and perhaps Mr. Evarts himself might render there more useful and important service even than in the State Department.

The more I consider the circumstances surrounding you and the task before you, the necessity of getting at once a strong hold upon the confidence of the best elements of the people, and the adverse influences you will have to encounter, the more desirable does it seem to me that your Cabinet should contain the greatest possible amount of *positive* strength of character, reputation, ability and purpose, in the direction of those aims the attainment of which will be the real success and merit of your Adminis-

tration. The Republican party is to-day in the minority. It has lost the House of Representatives, and in two years it may not only fail to regain the House but also lose its slight majority in the Senate unless much of the ground now lost be meanwhile recovered. Your Administration, with both Houses of Congress against it, would be in a very precarious situation. The Administration party must therefore recruit its strength somewhere. In what quarter should that be? If with the "machine politicians," the loss would be far greater than the gain, just as it was before. That tendency was the cause of the decline of the Republican party. You can gain very largely in the South, but you will be strong in the South only if you are strong in the North. Strength in the North will be a condition of Southern support. But new strength here can and will most certainly be found, if you boldly appeal, by word and act, to the noblest and most patriotic aspirations of the American people; and in this respect your inaugural will be the last act of promise, the appointment of your Cabinet the first act of performance. The good effect of the former will be seriously damaged if the latter falls short of it. If both agree you will easily win back those elements which, by despair of the Republican party and hope of reform on the other side, were led over to Tilden. Indeed, you must win them back, or your Administration may be helplessly at the mercy of the opposition in both houses of Congress two years hence, which means failure. As things now stand, it is my sober conviction that nothing would be more dangerous to your success than a policy of uncertain, hesitating appearance, and that, on the other hand, the most courageous and straightforward policy of reform will be for you the safest. The Republican party in Congress will be obliged to follow you—at any rate, it will not be able to resist you; for it cannot afford to give the Democrats a chance to appear as the principal supporters of your

reform measures and appointments. Thus with all the difficulties of your position you may be congratulated on your great opportunities to make your Administration one of the most beneficent in the history of the Republic.

Probably I have done something entirely superfluous in writing you all this. At any rate, I feel that, whether you agree with me or not, I have taken a great liberty in speaking so freely. But in view of the great results that may be won or lost, I should have blamed myself for having left a duty unperformed, had I not done so, even at the risk of appearing intrusive. I am conscious of no more ardent wish than that your Administration should reflect the greatest possible honor upon yourself and do the greatest possible good to the country, and if this expression of my views seems impertinent, let me hope that the sincerity of that desire will be accepted as my excuse.

TO MURAT HALSTEAD

St. Louis, Feb. 19, 1877.

My dear Halstead: Sincere thanks for your kind letter. I shall respond to its candor and friendly spirit by giving you my true inwardness.

I have reasons to believe that Governor Hayes desires to "satisfy" me, as you say. He can do that in no better way than by carrying out faithfully and vigorously the policy indicated in his letter of acceptance. No man has staked his whole public credit more unreservedly upon the sincerity of Governor Hayes's promises than I have. If he redeems them, that will satisfy me completely.

Office for its own sake is of no value to me at all. I can afford to remain in private life, and in many respects it would be best for me. I, therefore, do not ask for anything. If Governor Hayes thinks that I can render essential service in aiding him in carrying out his pledges

and calls me into his Cabinet for that purpose, then I shall consider it my duty to accept and aid him to the best of my ability. I do not think of taking office under any other circumstances.

If my preferences were consulted as to any particular Department I should say that there are two things I have studied and know something about—international relations and finances. The State Department has another special value, as the Secretary of State is *ex-officio* more than any other Secretary the confidential Minister of the President and the representative of his policy. But that place goes very properly to Evarts, whom I have myself recommended, and I hope he will get it, unless it be thought advisable to make him Attorney-General, for which there may be strong reasons.

As to the Treasury, I have even yesterday urged Bristow in a letter to Hayes in the strongest possible manner. All the reasons given for not taking him are small compared with the great good his appointment would accomplish. It would at once give the new Administration the confidence of the country as nothing else could. Hayes is a man who listens to candid advice, and I would entreat you to use all the influence you can still to put Bristow through. It seems to me of very great importance, and the point may still be carried. But if adverse considerations should prevail then I think every possible effort should be made to have at least a man appointed to that place who believes in reform and will have courage enough to fight for it. The name you mention in your letter in connection with that Department almost frightens me. Can Governor Hayes expect that man to stand by his reform policy against the pressure of politicians? Would not the Treasury, practically the most important Department of the Government, thereby be surrendered to the old partisan influences? I fear such an appointment would

damage the new Administration very seriously in the eyes of the best part of the people, and, heaven knows, the Administration will stand greatly in need of the support of public opinion. I think it would be well for you to go to Columbus and personally urge the appointment of Bristow with all possible earnestness, or, if you find that Bristow cannot be carried, to warn Hayes against the appointment of any man who would have to change his nature in order to become a true reformer. If the Treasury be not given to Bristow, or at least to a man who enjoys and deserves the same popular confidence that Bristow has, the effect will be very bad. This is a point of such immense importance that you should not mind a trip to Columbus to carry it. I still hope for Bristow.

The Interior would not be [a] very interesting Department to me, as I have never given much attention to the Indians, patents, pensions and public lands. But it does offer some opportunities for useful work, and a seat in the Cabinet council.

On the whole, if Governor Hayes forms a good strong reform Cabinet without me, I shall be completely and sincerely satisfied. If he wants me to aid him where I can be really useful, well and good. I do not ask for anything and shall in no case be personally disappointed.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

ST. LOUIS, Feb. 20, 1877.

The enclosed letter has just been communicated to me. Its contents explain why I submit it to you. Mr. Coste, to whom the letter is addressed, is the financial manager of the Life Association here and a friend of mine. General Hood is the manager of the Louisiana Department of

that Company. He is the same General Hood who commanded a Confederate army in the last Tennessee campaign in 1864. I met him twice or three times after the war; he was a brave soldier, and is now, as I believe, a well disposed citizen. I do not think he has ever taken any active part in politics. Whether he is at all a partisan in sentiment I cannot tell. Beyond the statement contained in his letter and what we see in the newspapers I have no information about the present condition of things in Louisiana. The demand for the withdrawal of the Federal troops seems to indicate a purpose to blow the Packard government away by a popular rising, as they did with the Kellogg government in 1874. The latest Washington despatches state that General Grant does not intend to take any decisive step with regard to the two rival governments in Louisiana, but to refer the matter to Congress. It is difficult to see what Congress may be able to do within the few remaining days of this session, especially considering the present excitement of party feeling. It is very probable that General Grant means to leave that case to your Administration for settlement and meanwhile to do nothing, unless the Democrats in Louisiana precipitate a conflict before the 4th of March, which might complicate matters still more.

It occurs to me that you might, perhaps, through some confidential friend, admonish the Democratic leaders in Louisiana to keep the peace, with a view to arrange matters after your accession to power, possibly somewhat after the manner of the Wheeler compromise of 1875, although in this case not through Congressional action, as Congress will not be in session after the 4th of March, but through the moral influence of the Administration. It is very delicate business, however, especially as it may become of great importance with regard to your Southern policy. I think I see a way out, but it will be

open only when you have a good hold on the confidence of the Southern people.

TO JACOB D. COX

ST. LOUIS, Feb. 20, 1877.

Confidential.

I should have answered your last very kind letter long before this, had I not been kept at the bedside of my old mother who last week died at my house after an illness of a fortnight. The last twelve months have been full of mourning to me and mine.

I must confess that I feel somewhat alarmed by certain indications of probable Cabinet appointments. Read the enclosed slip.¹ Would not the appointment of either of the three men last mentioned be a staggering blow to the cause of reform? Would Governor Hayes, who means to adopt a liberal Southern policy, be able to gain the confidence of those Southern men who are now willing to join him, with such elements in his Cabinet? There seems to be real danger in this respect, and I wish to suggest to you that you make a direct effort, as I have done, to prevent a false start, which may at once deprive the new Administration of that popular confidence so needful to it after all that has happened. Governor Hayes certainly means well, but I fear the possibility of

¹GOSSIP AS TO THE NEW CABINET

There continues to be the usual amount of gossip over the new Cabinet. The New Yorkers all agree that Mr. Evarts will be Secretary of State, but beyond that it is evident that there is nothing that can be relied upon except it be the fact that all the Ohio Republicans announce that Bristow will not have a place. The Pacific coast influence is talking in Mr. McCormick, of Arizona, and Senator Sargent, of California. If Mr. Morrill goes out of the Treasury there is little or no doubt that Senator Sherman will be tendered the position. Senator Logan is also mentioned for the War Department.

fatal mistakes. No effort should be left untried to prevent them.

FROM MURAT HALSTEAD

CINCINNATI, Feb. 20, 1877.

Confidential.

Of course I am aware that what I write is confidential, but I wish this to be so in a special sense—that is a particularly strict sense.

You suggest that I go to Columbus to meet Hayes and talk Bristow. I saw him here and talked Schurz.

I do not think Hayes proposes to retain any official Cabinet or to appoint any Presidential candidate. That excludes Bristow. Also Morton, Conkling and Blaine! It means in my judgment Harlan of Kentucky as Attorney-General. Sherman for the Treasury regarded certain. It does not seem worth while to combat the inevitable.

I will say to you, though I had not thought of doing so, that I was very urgent with Hayes to appoint you, and ascertained that he had an opinion that there was no premiership in the Secretaryship of State, and he thought there was more room for civil service reform work in the Interior than in the War Department. I cannot go through the talk I had with Hayes. It was long and pretty thorough.¹

I am uneasy about the result, but hopeful. Now if it is Hayes, his will not be an ideal Administration.

Is there some danger that if you went into the Cabinet you would be a disturbing element? How would you get along with Sherman, if Evarts, Hawley and Harlan were in?

The Governor's remarks in reply to my urgency would be agreeable reading—but I do not feel at liberty to write them.

¹On Feb. 24th Halstead wrote: "I have also—and this is very far inside—managed to have Joe Medill's opinion of the overwhelming importance of Schurz in the Cabinet, [put] before Hayes. Medill thinks you should be Secretary of State and has said so magnificently. But Hayes has a funny idea that there is no work and no chance for reform in the Secretary of State's Department, unless the whole cussed thing is abolished."

He invited the conference with me and it was three hours long. The fact is not known among politicians at all. I have not written of it before to anybody; and I am anxious it should not get out.

By the way, that which I pressed upon Hayes in behalf of Bristow was the Davis vacancy on the Supreme Bench. One thing more I will say. I said to Hayes: "Governor, I have not concealed from you where my heart is in this matter, and now I want to say to you, it is for Schurz." And now I will not conceal from you that I have misgivings. Blessed are they who expect nothing, for they shall not be disappointed.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF OHIO.
COLUMBUS, Feb. 25, 1877.

I am just about to start for Fremont to stay over Sunday. I write hastily to return the enclosed letters and to say a few words. I do not, or have not desired to be committed on Cabinet appointments until the issue was reached. But it is perhaps proper to say that, if elected, it has for a long time been my wish to invite you to take a place in the Cabinet. I think it would be fortunate for the country, and especially so for myself, if you are one of the members of the Cabinet. I am not likely to change that opinion. The Interior Department is my preference for you. The Post-Office would come next. For State I hope to have Mr. Evarts, but have not consulted him. Mr. Sherman will probably take the Treasury. If nothing occurs to change my plans I expect to go to W[ashington] about Thursday next. All this is on the supposition that we are successful, and is to be strictly confidential.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

ST. LOUIS, Feb. 26, 1877.

Yesterday I received your kind letter of the 24th [25th] inst. I shall not try to conceal from you that the terms in which you invite me to become a member of your

Cabinet are exceedingly gratifying to my feelings. Even if the expressions of friendly sentiment in your letter were not accompanied by an offer of high official honor and of an opportunity to render some service to the country, I should most highly prize them as a mark of the confidence of a man whom I esteem so sincerely and whose personal friendship I shall ever cherish and be proud of. That confidence and friendship it will always be my endeavor to deserve, and thus to show my gratitude by something better than mere words.¹

Of the two Departments you mention, there is one, the Interior, the business of which I should, with diligent application, hope satisfactorily to master. As to the administration of the Post-Office, it requires so much of capacity for business management in detail and in great variety, and so high a degree of practical business training and habit of a peculiar kind which has so far to a great extent been foreign to my mind, that I should fear to undertake it, while I certainly recognize the very great importance of that Department with regard to the elevation of the civil service to a higher level of character and efficiency.

I intend to go to New York for a day or two and might arrange my trip so as to be on the same train with you as far as Harrisburg, when you go to Washington. In case such a meeting would please you, would you be kind enough to let me know by telegraph the time when you will leave Columbus? Your letter speaks of Thursday, but something may intervene. I shall have to start the evening before, and therefore would have to be advised early enough in order to get ready.

¹ The deep sincerity of this voluntary pledge was well demonstrated by Schurz's literary services to Hayes at all times. To almost the end of his life Schurz complied with requests for articles about Hayes, if they offered any considerable opportunity to describe Hayes's qualities.

This morning I was called upon by a Mr. Bailey from Michigan, introduced to me by Mr. Ferry, a brother of the President of the Senate. He told me of a scheme gotten up by Chandler to have Senator Christiancy appointed to the Supreme Bench in Davis's place, so as to reopen his, Chandler's, way back to the Senate. Mr. Bailey represented that such a thing would cause a great row among the Republicans in Michigan, and wanted to solicit my influence with you against it. I told him that it was too early to promise any influence for or against anything, and that I thought you would not be in a hurry to dispose of such matters, that you would undoubtedly give them all the consideration they deserved, and then decide such cases upon high principles. He desired very much to talk to you about it, and as I thought you would probably desire to know that side of the story in season, I gave him a note of introduction. I had heard of Mr. Bailey before as a good man.

Assuring you once more of my gratitude for the friendly sentiments expressed in your letter, I remain

Sincerely yours.

FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

COLUMBUS, O., Feb. 27, 1877.

I am very glad to get your note of yesterday. Your choice of Department is also my choice for you.

I should be delighted to have you go with us to W[ashington] *if we are declared elected before we start*. But I do not want my selection of Cabinet advisers known until that result is announced. I will despatch you as to train. In case of a favorable decision Wednesday, we start about noon Thursday. If no favorable decision is reached Wednesday, we do not start until in the night of Thursday. My idea is to leave undecided, or rather uncommitted, some places until I reach W.—

say War, Navy and P. M.-General. I write in the midst of interruptions—provokingly so.

TO RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

ST. LOUIS, Mar. 1, 1877.

Not hearing from you yesterday I was in doubt whether you desired to meet me on the train in going to Washington—it occurred to me that you might have good reasons for thinking it inexpedient—so I postponed my departure for New York until to-day. I expect to arrive there Saturday morning and may stay there two or three days, although my business will keep me only a few hours. But if I can be of any use to you at Washington now, or you desire for any reason that I should be there, I can without the least inconvenience go at a moment's notice. A letter or telegram would reach me at 110 West 34th Street, care of Dr. Jacobi.

Yesterday I received a letter from a prominent man who does not wish his name mentioned, in which the following passage occurs: I should like to write to Governor Hayes but do not want to appear officious. You are probably in correspondence with him, and I think you would do him a service by communicating to him what I am going to say to you now. I see from the Cincinnati *Commercial*, which probably speaks advisedly, that Governor Hayes is going to exclude from his Cabinet all candidates for the Presidency. I think this is wise. I was, as you know, a Bristow man at the Cincinnati Convention, and it would have pleased me to see Bristow restored to his place in the Treasury Department. But if Governor Hayes acts on the principle that none of the Presidential candidates shall go into his Cabinet, Bristow has to stay out with the rest. That, I think, is proper. But I understand some of the

Presidential aspirants are going to try to foist on the incoming President their next friends, their confidential agents and tools for Cabinet places, especially for the Treasury, the Post-Office, the Interior and the Navy, which have a large patronage, to run those Departments in their respective interests. In that regard Governor Hayes should be cautioned by his friends and you ought to write or talk to him about it. He might just as well appoint the Presidential candidates themselves as their wirepullers. All of which is respectfully submitted.

On the whole there appears to be some wisdom in the above. I suppose you are overrun with the most urgent recommendations, and some attempts of the kind described by my correspondent may have been made. It will probably be impossible to satisfy all the great party leaders consistently with your principles and aims. In that case would it not be the most prudent policy to give neither of them an advantage, but to fill all the places according to your own views of the public good? If the confidential friend of one is appointed, and the friend of another one is not, the latter will have a grievance. If the confidential friends of all of them are left out, each one will at least have the compensating satisfaction to know that none of the others is preferred. In that way you may come nearest pleasing them all, and strengthen your Administration for all good purposes at the same time.

From your last letter I infer that you have made no selection yet for the Post-Office. That place, on account of its large patronage and its consequent importance for an aspiring politician to have it run in his interests may be the object of a struggle around you. Would it not, in that case, be well to think once more of Governor Jewell, who was probably the best Postmaster-General the country has had for a generation, and who has already

proved his ability and desire to conduct the Department on the strictest business principles and in the interests of no person? Or, if you do not see fit to appoint him, could not a man of the same ability and principles be found?

I see by the papers that you are to take the oath of office at the White House on Sunday. Is that to preclude a public ceremony at which your inaugural is to be delivered? I hope the country will not lose the latter.

P.S. This moment I receive your letter of the 27th. I guessed right and am glad I did not start yesterday. I may hope, then, if you desire me in Washington, to have a despatch in New York.

FROM SAMUEL BOWLES

SPRINGFIELD, MASS., Mar. 6, 1877.

My dear Schurz: I am just tickled clear through that you have gone to the head at last. I was terribly afraid it would not be, and have been exhorting in public and private this last month.

The Louisiana steal is a dreadful one, but if the Republican party can follow President Jackson's example and get religion, they may yet cheat the devil!—Yours very cordially.

FROM FREDERICK BILLINGS

NEW YORK, BREVOORT HOUSE.

Mar. 7, 1877.

I can hardly believe my eyes! The reform-element square at the front and you in the Cabinet! What a Reformation! I cannot help congratulating you—and, much more, congratulating the country. Now, for a resolute Forward!—in the spirit of the inaugural—and in harmony with the Cabinet, and the better days of the Republic are close at hand.

FROM BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

LOUISVILLE, Mar. 8, 1877.

I hope I do not need to assure you that your appointment is peculiarly gratifying to me.

I beg to tender my hearty salutation to you personally, and to express the great joy I feel in common with the friends of good government and genuine reform. Your acceptance of the high public trust is an event in our political history of much more than ordinary significance.

Of course you know as well as I that the battle for reform is not to be won by manifestoes. Politicians who have long lived by the use of official patronage will not surrender it without fierce and desperate resistance. But the intelligent and patriotic people of the country are in sympathy with the President's declared purpose. There is nothing that wins the popular heart so quickly as high courage, and the fiercer the conflict the more will the people rally to the President's support. It is idle to look out for middle ground. The Administration must either conquer the machine politicians or surrender to them. Your appointment will be accepted as an earnest of the President's settled purpose to stand firmly by his promises.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

WASHINGTON, Mar. 19, 1877.

I should have answered your kind letter of the 10th long ago, had I not been overwhelmed with work; and now I can merely thank you for it.

I hope we shall be able to carry out to the fullest extent the principles of the Fifth Avenue conference. At least we shall try. I think you may depend upon the Executive branch of the Government.

Whenever you have any suggestions to make, I shall be very glad to receive them—at all times. I wish you

could come to spend a few days here. All our friends ought now to be together again.

TO W. M. GROSVENOR

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON, Mar. 29, 1877.

I am not such a dunce as to put out advertising to the lowest bidder, but I have regulated the advertising business in my Department on business principles in such a way that what cost over \$40,000 two years ago and over \$25,000 last year, will cost something less than \$3000 this year. I should think this pretty good for a beginner.

Hayes makes haste slowly but surely. You will soon wake up and see things done. Hayes is a general like old Thomas; wants to have his wagons together when he marches, but loses no battles. You need not be anxious.

Now, I do want your suggestions, and I want them sincerely, and as many of them as possible. Only you must not find fault with me if I do not answer very promptly and at length. This Interior Department is no joke.

FROM BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

LOUISVILLE, KY., April 14, 1877.

Personal.

I thank you sincerely for your kind invitation to communicate freely with you. It has not been, and is not now, my purpose to vex the ears of members of the Administration with recitals of the cruel and grievous wrongs that have been done me; keenly as they are felt by my family and myself, I do not feel at liberty to ask others to share our feelings. It is a long, long story which could not be told within reasonable limits. The substance and essence of it all is this. I committed the

political blunder of attempting to introduce and carry on reformatory measures in an Administration which was under influences altogether adverse to all reform, and for this cause incurred the displeasure of the men whose friends were touched, and the sincere hostility of the Executive head of the Nation who was made to believe by cunning and unscrupulous men that I was moved by selfish and unworthy motives. The result was that the brave and true officers who stood by me in my humble efforts at reform and honest Administration were driven from office along with me in disgrace, while every dishonest official whether convicted in public judgment or condemned to imprisonment by judicial sentence received Executive pardon and—with a solitary exception—continued to bask in the sunshine of Presidential favor. Not only this—but after I was out of office I was pursued with bitterness and mendacity, and even the money appropriated by Congress for the “detection and punishment of frauds on the Government” was used to persecute me and my friends; and officers very well know[n] to be at least in suspicious intimacy with the thieves whose crimes I had exposed were promoted to higher positions and charged with the duty of destroying my character. It seems incredible that these things should have been done, and yet I have measured my words carefully and have not stated them as strongly as I might. In looking back over the past twelve months the only thing I have to regret is that I did not yield to my own impulse to enter upon vigorous public defence of myself. I was persuaded by friends that it was better to maintain dignified silence under such attacks and let time bring my vindication. But I am now strongly of opinion that they were mistaken, and that it is better for one who is attacked on account of his public acts to make his own defence, regardless of effect on party politics. However, the opportunity to do so in my case is now in the past and it is idle to grieve over it.

What now gives me greatest concern is my desire to see justice done to the brave and true men who lost their official heads in battling for reform. I have not written to the President or any member of his Cabinet on this subject for the

reason that the men to whom I refer are well known in the Departments and to the country, and nothing that I might say could make their wrongs more manifest; and besides I prefer that each case shall be considered on its merits, if [at] all.

But I did not sit down to write you on this subject and have said much more than I intended to write any member of the Administration.

Of course I need not say to you that I have been greatly gratified by the President's inaugural address and his course on the Southern question. It was perfectly clear to me ten years ago that the unsteady and uncertain policy of the then President would lead to disastrous failure, in the business of reconstruction. A change of policy was demanded by the highest considerations of patriotism and the material interest of both sections; and I think the President has taken the only road that was open to him. We cannot afford to perpetuate the rule of any set of men—good or bad—by continued use of the bayonet. Personally I have had strong sympathy with Chamberlain whom I have regarded as able and honest, but of course it would not do to let one man, however good and true, stand in the way of sound Constitutional views, or of “permanent pacification” of the South.

It seems to me that the true question now before the President is not whether Packard or Nicholls received a majority of votes, but whether he shall continue to use the Army as a permanent factor in the Administration of the State government. My only doubt about the President's course is as to the policy of sending a commission to Louisiana, or postponing at all his manifest purpose to withdraw the troops. But I am on the outside and only judge from external appearances; there may be reasons for sending a commission to Louisiana which are not known to me. It is due to perfect candor to say that I do not feel so hopeful of success in building up the Republican party in the South as some of our friends; nevertheless I hope the President will move straight forward in the policy already indicated, first because it *is right*, and second because it will have [a] beneficial effect on the whole county [country], and

third, because it will strengthen the party [in the] North. I do not fail to perceive the disposition of certain would-be leaders in the North with a few insignificant and worthless carpet-baggers *from* the South to raise the standard of revolt; but steady and quiet courage in carrying out the Southern policy will restrain, if it does not entirely suppress, their efforts. When the thing is done there will be nothing to fight about—so long as it is open they will mistake every cautious delay for infirmity of purpose and gather some strength which otherwise they would not have. Nothing wins the approval of our people as quickly as genuine pluck in doing promptly what one believes to be right.

But I fear this first infliction may cause you to regret your invitation to me to write you freely, and now that I have written so long a letter, have half a mind to destroy it—but since it is written perhaps it is just as well to leave the work of destruction to you.

TO THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, June 16, 1877.

. . . There is no truth in the stories told about my dismissing women clerks on account of their sex. I had to dismiss some of them because there was no work for them in the line of duty in which they were employed. That could not be avoided. Efficient women clerks are as safe in this Department as elsewhere as long as there is work for them and the appropriations hold out.

FROM SAMUEL BOWLES

SPRINGFIELD, MASS., July 3, 1877.

You may like to read what I say of Father Adams's last. It looks as if there was to be a sharp cleavage. The politicians on both sides are uniting to break down Hayes. Will he

reach out for the people on both sides; will the people on both sides reach out to sustain him? That is the point.

.

I am so vexed with you, and myself too, that Cabot Lodge is n't your assistant secretary! I thought of him when you were looking for one, but thought he would n't accept, and so did n't speak of it, and now I find he would have been glad to. Nobody could have been better for you. We need to import into the Departments, just such men—fellows who have the working temperament, as he has, who have high patriotic purposes, and while independent of their salaries, will abundantly earn them. With such a man at your right hand, you would have simply doubled yourself, while you could have had the benefit of all the other kind of material in the next places below.

I hope you keep in good heart and hope. The theory of civil service reform at Washington is beautiful, but the practice is often pretty bad. But the comfort is that it seems to me you have gone so far that you cannot go back—that you must go through and find still waters beyond.

I am pretty feeble of body, this summer, but tolerably brave of soul, and am always, Heartily yours.

TO SAMUEL BOWLES

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1877.

My dear Bowles: There is your letter of June 13th still unanswered. . . .

Now, let not my failure to answer your letter at once deter you from writing to me whenever the spirit moves you. Let me have all there is in you in the way of admonition, criticism or even scolding. I have good use for it. Cordially yours.

July 5th. I have just received your last with slips. Thanks.

TO CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1877.

I regret as much as you do, that we did not meet at Boston. I should have been glad indeed to discuss with you the points mentioned in your letter more exhaustively than it can be done in the way of hurried correspondence.

On the whole, however, the question which every good citizen has to decide for himself under existing circumstances seems to me very simple. Whatever opinions you may entertain as to what ought to have been, there can be no doubt as to what *is*. The electoral question has been decided upon a plan agreed upon by both parties and in a legal way. The decision, whatever you may think of its merits, is virtually beyond the reach of review. In point of legal form the Government is as legitimate as any of its predecessors, just as the rights of an individual are when they have been affirmed by a decision of the Supreme Court. This fact is accepted by the people without distinction of party with very few exceptions.

There is, therefore, only one question remaining. If a Government of such standing undertakes to accomplish things which you recognize as good, will it be best to support and aid it in such endeavors, or to weaken it by a continued impeachment of its title? Is not the former course the best, especially when you admit that, if the measures of the Government succeed, the principal agencies of mischief will be done away with? Would it be better to confine yourself to an opposition of which evidently no good can come?—Especially when by carrying on such an opposition you aid the most dangerous elements in the body-politic? Even if you were to look at it as a mere choice of evils, can that choice be doubtful?

Indeed, we want your aid in the pursuit of our purposes, as well as the aid of all men who act on the same principles

in political life in the way of criticism, suggestion, advice and impulse—and I hope we shall have it.

TO BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, July 19, 1877.

I regret to say that in any case there will be scarcely any prospect of my accompanying the President on that trip.¹ You know what a Department is and how difficult it is to bring up arrears of work. Mine is an especially lively shop. You will remember that I have the Indians on my hands—and so I have, while I am here, to bid good-bye to many of the pleasures of this world.

Cordially yours.

TO SAMUEL BOWLES

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 30, 1877.

Thanks for your letter and clippings. Yes, the air is considerably cleared. Nobody he [here?] “scares” a bit, and what is more, nobody loses his temper.

You have done splendidly in Massachusetts. You know I have always had a weakness for that State of yours.

The animus of the *N. Y. Tribune* against me seems to puzzle a good many. What the real trouble is, I do not know. Perhaps there is some U. P. [Union Pacific] in it. If so, we shall see more of it.

I have not taken my old house, because I could not get it. Perhaps I would not if I could. But I hope to live somewhere in the neighborhood.

¹ A trip to Louisville, Ky., to open the Industrial Exposition, the subject mentioned in the omitted paragraph.

TO BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29, 1877.

I suppose you know from your own experience how a man in public position, with his hands full of work, will sometimes put off his correspondence with a friend from day to day, waiting for an hour of leisure and composure, which will never come. This is what happened to me with your last letter. The meeting of Congress intervened, and you know how the visits of Congressmen and the business they bring with them will cut up one's time. So I have to throw myself upon your indulgence as a friend hoping that you have never thought me capable of anything like wilful neglect.

Soon after I had received your letter I found an opportunity to read it to the President—and I may say that I found myself authorized to do that, not only by the terms of your letter, but also by a conversation which had taken place between the President and myself a few days before, and in which the President expressed himself to me in a manner relieving your letter *entirely* of the appearance of a declination of a thing which had not been thought of. The President, after hearing your letter, was very emphatic in his appreciation of the noble spirit which had prompted it, and it gives me all the more satisfaction to tell you this as some of our common friends seem to have fallen into the error of crediting the utterly groundless and absurd story that the President before or after his inauguration had promised General Grant, directly or indirectly, not to do anything that would look like a personal recognition of your merits. I *know* that there is absolutely nothing in it, whoever may tell the story. You remember what I told you at Louisville about the feeling prevailing in these quarters with regard to yourself. What I told you was true then and it

is true now. If any errors have been committed, I can only assure you, upon my own positive knowledge, that they were entirely unintentional. There ought to be no misunderstanding about these things between you and the Administration, and I am sure there would be none if a free and full exchange of sentiments and opinions could be had. Some of our common friends seem to misinterpret this or that step taken by the President, and those misinterpretations have undoubtedly come to you just as they have come to me.

It is certainly unnecessary to assure you of the sincerity of my friendship for you, and as your friend I would ask you, whenever anything occurs that displeases you, or anything is left undone that would please you, to give me your views without the least reserve. I shall consider it only as a return of my feelings for you.

FROM BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

LOUISVILLE, KY., Feb. 6, 1878.

I sincerely hope there is no truth whatever in the renewed story that you are going out. The country can't afford to have you retire—the cause of civil service and administrative reform can't give you up just now, and I take leave to add that for your own sake, you can't afford to quit. I want to assure you, my dear sir, that the good work you are doing and the quiet, but effective manner in which you are doing it, is now coming to be quite generally understood. I came away from Washington with very different impressions from those with which I went there, as to at least one Department, and I feel like begging your pardon for the injustice I did you in my own mind. I did feel doubtful whether the cause of reform had a single earnest and *courageous* friend in Washington. That doubt no longer exists as to your Department. On this point I am fully convinced—I wish I could feel the same way about others.

But I only sat down to urge you to "stick"—and I feel all the more free to give this advice since I well remember that I only repeat what you once said to me.

TO BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Feb. 8, 1878.

Thanks for your very kind letter. I am trying to do my duty as I understand it. No trouble about my "sticking." I shall always be happy to hear from you.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Mar. 16, 1878.

Your kind letter of February 27th has had to wait very long for an answer. But you know yourself how it is with us poor plow-horses, and I can therefore confidently throw myself upon your indulgence.

I hope you were pleased with the President's veto message. I do not think any further financial legislation will succeed during this session of Congress; at any rate, it seems almost certain that no further step in the direction of inflation and repudiation can get a two-thirds vote in both branches. There are many who voted for the silver bill and now declare emphatically that they will countenance nothing beyond it. It is very probable that an overwhelming majority of the Republicans in Congress can be rallied upon such a program, and that something like coöperation in financial matters can be established between them and the Administration. Still, the mischief done already is so great that I am by no means sanguine as to the future.

Does it not appear to you that our friend Blaine "put his foot into it"?

Let me hear from you often.

TO _____ (UNKNOWN)

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1878.

Dear Sir: I have received your letter submitting to me the following questions connected with the circular received by you from the Congressional campaign committee asking for contributions to the campaign fund; whether you are obliged to pay such contributions; whether you are permitted to do so; and whether your doing so or not doing so will affect your official standing and prospects in this Department.

1. You receive your salary as an employee of the Government for certain services rendered in your official capacity, not as a member of a political party. The salary so earned belongs to you, and, unless taxed by law, it is in no sense subject to any assessment for any object whatever. In return for it, you are expected to perform your official duties faithfully and efficiently, nothing more. In this connection I have to call your attention to the following statutory provision (19 Statute p. 169, Sec. 6):

That all executive officers as employees of the United States not appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, are prohibited from requesting, giving to or receiving from, any other officer or employee of the Government, any money or property or other thing of value for political purposes; and any such officer or employee, who shall offend against the provisions of this section, shall be at once discharged from the service of the United States; and he shall also be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars.

2. You are as free as any other citizen to spend your spare money in any legitimate way you please, and as your

political principles or your public spirit may suggest, provided you do not violate the above quoted provision of law either directly or indirectly.

3. Your contributing or not contributing as above stated will not affect in any manner whatever your official standing or prospects in this Department.

FROM JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE

JAMAICA PLAIN, MASS., July 1, 1878.

I have not seen Miss Dodge's¹ attack on me in the *Tribune*, for I thought I could do better with my time than reading the effusions of this distinguished scold. Indeed, I was rather gratified in hearing that she had attacked me, as this confirmed my hope that I was instrumental in defeating her kinsman, Mr. Blaine, as candidate for the Presidential nomination. Most persons now see that this would have been a great disgrace as well as disaster to the Republican party. I am pleased, therefore, to learn that Miss Dodge associates me with yourself and the other gentlemen against whom she bears a grudge on this account. It is unpleasant, however, to see the *Tribune* made the organ of this abuse. That paper, which in the hands of Horace Greeley, was a bugle to awaken a sleeping land, ought not to degenerate into a mop, to be used by this termagant, to twirl dirty water against those who have tried to introduce the reforms which the present time requires.

The mountain stream which ends in mud,
Must needs be melancholy—

says Lowell.

Mr. Blaine, in one respect at least, resembles Achilles. Instead of attending to the duty he was sent to perform, he sulks in his tent. I am not aware, however, that the Greek hero kept a little female dog to snarl and show her teeth when Agamemnon and Ulysses (Mr. Hayes and yourself) went by.

¹ Gail Hamilton.

FROM BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW

BREVOORT HOUSE, NEW YORK, Sept. 24, 1878.

I am glad to learn that you are going to speak at Cincinnati on the currency question, for I am sure you will neither "straddle" nor "dodge." I am entirely out of politics and propose to devote my time and energies exclusively to the practice of law; but I can never be indifferent or neutral on a matter affecting so directly the good faith of the Nation and the individual and commercial honesty of the people.

The false teachings of a large number of party leaders and the equivocal and cowardly conduct of others have borne the fruit which is now being plucked by a set of dangerous demagogues. If the paternity of legal-tender notes is an achievement to be proud of rather than a necessity to be deplored, then the present greenback movement is certainly logical so far as Republicans are concerned. The people sadly need sound teachings and courageous leadership in this matter. They have enough virtue and intelligence to follow in right directions, though perhaps not enough of either to resist mischievous teachings in which their accustomed leaders of both parties strive to outvie each other.

But I would not presume to instruct you. I only sat down to express my gratification at hearing that you are going to speak and having done so I beg to add that the continued success of your Administration of the Interior Department has given me sincere pleasure.

THE CURRENCY QUESTION¹

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—This is the second time that I have been honored by the citizens of Cincinnati with an invita-

¹ Speech at Cincinnati, O., Sept. 28, 1878. Sept. 23d, Schurz received the following telegram from Indianapolis:

"Can't you help redeem Indiana in a square fight against inflation and repudiation? Two thousand business men join in request which will be sent you. Can you come here from Cincinnati?"

"E. B. MARTINDALE,
BENJ. HARRISON,
COL. BLAIR."

tion to speak to them on the financial questions before the people. I thank you sincerely for the confidence which that invitation implies, and I respond to it with a deep sense of responsibility. The remarks I am going to make to-night will be, in a certain sense, supplementary to those I made here three years ago. I then sketched the disastrous consequences which a policy of currency inflation would bring after it to the merchant, the manufacturer, the business man generally, as well as the farmer and the laborer for wages, and especially the latter. At that time the people of Ohio, in their State election, administered a wise and noble rebuke to the inflation movement then attempted by the Democratic party of this State. It was to be hoped that this rebuke would sufficiently check that movement, to prevent its repetition. That hope has been disappointed. Indeed, both political parties in their National Conventions of 1876 pronounced in favor of an early resumption of specie payments, and thus seemed to be agreed as to the object to be attained, and the preparations for resumption have so far proceeded that it is within immediate reach. But while we are within a hair's breadth of a final settlement of the vexed question, the inflation mania has broken out afresh, and it must be admitted that many well-meaning citizens, under the pressure of temporary distress, are honestly seeking for means of relief, and are tending toward conclusions which, in the opinion of those who think as I do, are fallacious, and fraught with great danger to the National honor as well as the public welfare.

To that class of honest and well-meaning citizens I shall respectfully address myself, and in doing so I shall, instead of making an effort at high-flown oratory, speak rather in the way of a straightforward, homely, common-sense talk.

From time immemorial, and in all countries, it has been

the habit of politicians, when the people were laboring under business depression and distress, such as has been afflicting us for the last five years, to charge those managing the affairs of the Government with the responsibility for it all. And so they do now. When you ask them to particularize their charge in our case, they will tell you that the business collapse of 1873 was brought on by a contraction of the currency; that the Government withdrew from the business of the country the means with which to carry on that business, and that therefore business broke down.

This charge has been so often and so conclusively refuted, that it well nigh exhausts one's patience to refer to it again. But you have heard of men who tell the same yarn so often that they at last believe it themselves. So it may be with those who still insist that the crash of 1873 was caused by contraction. Indeed, the inflationists need that story for their theory. They cannot do without it, and therefore valiantly stick to it. What are the facts? I have the official tables before me. There was indeed a contraction of paper currency from 1865 to 1868, but the business collapse did not occur in 1868. It came five years later, and those five years between 1868 and 1873 are generally regarded as years of uncommon prosperity. Now, what happened with the currency between 1868 and 1873? In 1868 contraction was stopped. In 1869 the amount of paper currency outstanding was \$693,946,-056.61, in 1870 it was \$700,375,899.48, in 1871 it was \$717,875,751.06, in 1872 it was \$738,570,903.52, in 1873 it was \$750,062,368.94. This statement includes not only the greenbacks, the national-bank notes and the fractional currency, but also the State-bank circulation, the demand notes, the one- and two-year notes of 1863 and the compound interest notes. Thus, it appears that during several years preceding the crash of 1873 the

currency was not only not contracted, but very materially increased, so that in 1873 it amounted to over fifty-six million more than in 1869.

The fact, then, stands thus: The currency was contracted between 1865 and 1868, and several years of prosperity followed. The currency was expanded from 1869 to 1873, and the collapse of business occurred. If it were true, as the inflationists insist, that the increase or decrease of the currency were at the bottom of our prosperity and depression respectively, we would have to answer that, according to the clearly ascertained facts of history, it was contraction that caused prosperity, and expansion that caused the collapse. I might even add that between 1873 and 1874 the currency was expanded from \$750,062,-368.94 to \$781,490,916.17; that is to say, over \$31,000,000, and yet the depression was not only not relieved, but grew in distressing severity. Our inflation friends may not relish that kind of reasoning; but what have you to answer? Those who know me will bear me witness that I have never hesitated to criticise those in power for things I thought wrong; but I candidly think to charge those in power with having brought on the crisis of 1873 by a contraction of the currency would be just as reasonable as to make them responsible for the equinoctial storms, or for the depredations of the locusts in the West. If the Government is to be made responsible for everything, then I solemnly demand that the abundant crops this year be put to the credit of the Administration, and the Department of Agriculture in particular.

Let us examine the causes of the collapse of 1873, and the subsequent depression, as unprejudiced business men. We all know that at the same time when the panic occurred here in the autumn of 1873, a similar crisis broke out in Europe and swept over all Austria, the German Empire and almost the whole European continent, except France,

while a severe business depression was felt in England. Surely, although this is a great country, our Congress and Administration, and the Republican party, can not have been at the bottom of all that; and yet the effects produced by the crisis in Europe were in almost every respect the same as here. Speculations collapsed, values shrank violently, real estate went down; banks, manufacturing and trading firms failed in large numbers, extensive branches of industries stopped, laboring men were thrown out of employment or compelled to work for lower wages and grievous distress spread over all those countries as well as our own, and upon candid examination you will find that as the effects were similar in the two hemispheres so were the underlying causes.

In none of those countries was it a currency contraction that brought about the disaster, just as little as in our own. There was rather an expansion of it, especially in Germany. No, the real causes were as I have more than once had occasion to describe them: great wars resulting in an immense destruction and waste of wealth; large industries ministering to the work of destruction, instead of producing additional wealth; but after that, excessive enterprise, stimulated by apparent success; the sinking of large amounts of capital in great undertakings which could yield no immediate return, such as the building of railroads where they were not needed, far anticipating the future; the invention and introduction of new labor-saving machinery, creating new facilities of production and inciting excessive manufacturing beyond present demand; wild speculation, dealing and gambling in all sorts of imaginary values; an immense number of people frantically striving to make money quickly, by any means except solid work; an infatuated faith in the certain success of windy schemes; an unnatural straining of the credit system, by pushing speculation and enterprise far beyond

the means of those engaged in it, and finally, almost everybody believing himself richer than he was, and, therefore, spending more than he could afford; hence widespread extravagance and improvident habits. And, if we inquire what the currency had to do with it, we shall find that in this country our irredeemable paper money, by its depreciation running prices up to a fictitious point, stimulated the spirit of recklessness and gambling in almost all branches of enterprise and business, incited extravagance and thus strengthened all the bad and demoralizing influences which are usually active at such a period.

Such things are apt to go on swimmingly for some time. But illusions and lies will not last always, especially in business matters. After a while it will turn out that a million of men engaged in active warfare have consumed and destroyed wealth, but not produced any; that a railroad running from Point Nowhere to Point Nowhere can not pay dividends until it has passengers and freight to carry; that the value of real estate does not depend upon the imagination of its owner, but upon the use that can be made of it; that corner lots in paper towns, where nobody lives and nobody intends to live, will not bear heavy mortgages; that articles of industry produced beyond actual demand will become a drug in the market; that shares in joint stock companies, however skilfully ballooned by operators, will at last become worthless if the enterprise yields no profits; that men who borrow more than they can pay must at last break, and that those who spend more than they can earn will finally become paupers. This light, the light of sober truth, usually breaks all of a sudden upon the people. The illusion all at once vanishes, the bubble bursts and we are set down heavily upon the hard rock of real fact.

That thing happened to us in 1873. Then we rubbed

our eyes and wondered how it all came about. And yet it was the most natural thing in the world. People who invest in air castles have no right to expect anything else than that these investments at last vanish into the air they were made of. The best thing we can do after such a collapse is quietly to gather up our five senses and go to work like men to repair our shattered fortunes. And how can these shattered fortunes be repaired? First, by recognizing the errors of our ways and discarding all self-deceptions and delusions; by remembering that our wealth must consist in what we produce and have, and not in what we dream of; by abstaining, consequently, from all windy schemes to make ourselves rich by printing the word dollar upon a piece of paper; by acting upon the principle that the only honest way to get rid of our debts is by paying them, and that we can become prosperous only by producing things that are useful, and by spending less than we earn. These may look like very old-fashioned homespun doctrines, but whatever our modern financial jugglers may try to make you believe, these doctrines are now just as good as they were a thousand years ago, and they point the only way out of our difficulties; there is no other.

To the honor of the American people be it said, a very large majority of them have been acting upon these principles for the last five years, and they are all the better for it. It is true, a good deal of wild talk has been indulged in about all sorts of methods to manufacture money out of nothing, and to distribute it so as to keep everybody's pocket full of cash, thereby putting all at ease. But, although that wild talk has befogged some, and impeded needful legislation, yet the people, on the whole, have been steadily at work producing useful things and practicing economy; and while the results of that activity have not yet been felt in all the walks of human industry, and all

classes of society, yet I venture to say that during the last five years the American people have created more real, substantial wealth than during the five years of wild scheming, gambling and speculation which preceded the crash of 1873. I venture further to say, and I think it is felt all over the country, that business activity is slowly but surely quickening again, that the American people now stand upon the threshold of a new period of prosperity and that we shall reap an abundant harvest of it, unless we throw away our opportunities by mischievous intermeddling with the natural development of things.

That revival of business and prosperity will indeed not consist in putting upon their legs again old exploded speculations, or in restoring to their wealth again business men who broke down by venturing into operations largely beyond their means, and spreading their capital all over creation. To be sure, many of that class who are still struggling may still have to go down, and no fiat money can help them. But new men will step into their places. Such periods mean the survival of the fittest. Neither must all of the laboring men who have been thrown out of work by the crisis expect that a revival of business will in all cases give them prompt employment again in the same line of work at the same wages. Many of them will have to change their occupation, and those who use their opportunities in that respect most resolutely will be all the better for it. Reviving prosperity will consist in gradually opening a fruitful field for those branches of productive industry and corresponding trade which supply actual wants. As old stocks are exhausted they must be replaced. The pressure of the times has taught us to produce many articles, formerly bought abroad, so cheaply and in such excellent quality as to introduce them successfully and largely into foreign competition. Our abundant crops find a ready market and good prices. A multitude of

circumstances concur to give to almost every branch of business a natural and healthy encouragement; and whatever changes in the methods of production may have taken place, there is no doubt that increased and varied wants will soon render possible and profitable the employment of the same, and even a larger number of men than before. Those will reap the fruit of the revival first and most abundantly who go about their business with the most diligent industry and circumspection, striving to rise slowly and surely, and keeping their expenses prudently within their earnings. Thus we may hope, as I candidly believe, to see the American people within a comparatively short period again engaged in general and fruitful activity, and in the enjoyment of largely increased wealth; not, indeed, divided and distributed as before, but so distributed as to supersede the distress of the last five years, with a high degree of general well-being. This, I think, is within our reach, provided always, we put and keep the business of the country on a sound and safe basis, and do not spoil our chances by indulging in foolish schemes.

To furnish that sound foundation, without which business can have no healthy development and the prosperity of the people will always stand upon a volcano ready to explode at any time, three things are of the first necessity: A good National and individual credit, based upon National and individual honesty; second, a sound currency, of real and stable value; and third, a safe and reliable banking system as the depository of business funds and the machinery of business exchanges.

In discussing these subjects I shall run against some popular cries, industriously used by demagogues, and repeated by unthinking men, which are fraught with mischief and disaster, as well as disgrace. I shall speak of them without reserve, for at a moment when from a period of distress we have at last a chance to emerge upon solid

ground again, and that chance seems in danger of being thrown away by acts of dishonesty or foolishness, it is time to call things by their right names.

First, as to credit: Our National credit rests upon a faithful discharge of our National obligations, and I shall show that in a great measure the individual credit and the interest of most of us rest upon the same thing. It has become the fashion of many politicians and public agitators to cry out against the bondholders, and thus to excite a prejudice against the bond, which is an embodiment of National faith. The bondholders are represented as a set of "bloated" individuals residing down East or in foreign countries, who bought their bonds at thirty-five or forty cents on the dollar and now demand one hundred cents and high interest in gold. Thus the bondholder is pictured as a sort of criminal bloodsucker, who, with cold-blooded cruelty, fattens upon the sufferings of a downtrodden people. Now, supposing our National bonds were still in the hands of those who originally bought them, can you fail to remember that when bonds were sold for forty cents on the dollar—and the quantity so sold was not large—the life of the Nation was threatened by a monstrous rebellion; that the Republic seemed to be in the agonies of death; that it appeared uncertain whether the bond bought at forty cents on Monday would be worth ten, or one cent on Saturday; and that the purchaser of the bond risked his money for the country just as much as the soldier risked his blood? Did not the American Government ask him to take that bond at almost any price when the Republic was in extremities? And now when he has helped us by taking it and giving us his money at the risk of losing it all, are we, when everything having gone well, against the predictions and expectations of many, are we as a high-minded people to turn round upon him who aided us in the hour of supreme distress, and tell

him, "You are a bloodsucker and a scoundrel"? I have known individuals who, when you had helped them with a loan, would feel and act as if they owed you not the money but a grudge. You would despise such persons as mean and contemptible fellows. Would it be more honorable for the great American people to put themselves upon the same level by saying, "Let us hate the bondholders, for they have lent us money"?

But now suppose such a cry be taken up by the American people, and acted upon by a refusal to pay that which we owe, by direct or indirect repudiation of the whole or part of the debt contracted in the hour of need, have you considered what help we may expect in case such an hour of need and danger should come upon us again?

I must confess, even if the bondholders of to-day still were the same men who, during the civil war, bought the bonds at a low price, I should consider the outcry against them as utterly dishonorable and disgusting, as well as foolish; as a National disgrace as well as a National danger—ruinous to our good name as well as to our true interests.

But who are to-day the "bloated," holders of our National bonds? It is a notorious fact that only an infinitesimal part, if any, of our National bonds are still in the hands of the original purchasers. The original purchasers have long ago realized on them, and those who hold the bonds now have almost all bought them at high figures, and in a large majority of cases probably at their par value. And who are these holders? It is estimated that at one time about one thousand millions of our bonds were held abroad. It is stated by the Secretary of the Treasury, who has the best means of ascertaining the fact, that at present the amount of bonds held in foreign countries is less than two hundred and fifty millions, probably not over two hundred. The rest of those for-

merly held abroad have either been paid off or come over to this country, so that we find between 85 and 90 per cent. of our bonded indebtedness held by our own citizens. And is it true that these bonds are in the hands of a set of "bloated" individuals down East? Every business man knows better than that. Nearly \$150,000,000 of 4 per cent. bonds have, within two years, been sold. They are scattered all over the country, especially the West; and who owns them? Mostly small people, who consider the Government funds a better depository for their savings than the savings banks, and who thus invested in small amounts, from \$50 upward. You honest farmer or laboring man, who put your little surplus into a Government security, are you aware that you have sunk down to the level of the bloated bloodsuckers, who fatten upon the sweat of the people? But more than that. A very large quantity of 4½, 5 and 6 per cent. bonds are held by banks, by insurance companies, trust companies, savings institutions and in trust for widows and orphans. Thus they form an important part of the securities upon which these institutions are based. They are among their most reliable and most available assets. Probably most of us do not own a United States bond in the world. But every one of us who holds a policy in a life insurance company, or whose house or furniture is insured against fire, or who has a deposit in a bank or savings institution, or who has a national-bank note in his pocket is as much interested in the value of our National bonds and in a certain sense as much a bondholder as the owner of a bond himself; for if the value of the bonds is attacked and impaired the security of your investment goes, to that extent, by the board. Now, my fellow-bondholders, are you aware of the disgrace of your "bloated" criminality? Do you see now who the great, dreadful, bloodsucking bondholder is? It is the American

people. You cannot revile the bondholder without reviling the American people, and you cannot attack or impair the value of the bond without not only disgracing and ruining the good name of the credit of the country the world over, but without undermining the very foundation of the most important credit institutions in the country, in which, some way or another, the interests of all of you are involved. Do that—disturb that credit system—and you may long wait for that revival of prosperity which we so much need, and which is now within our reach; for you have taken away one of its most essential conditions.

To pay a debt is not a pleasant thing, but it is a necessary and also a profitable thing. We have shown the world that we can pay ours, and that we are willing to pay it. In 1865 the total of our interest-bearing debt was \$2,381,530,294.96. In 1878 it is \$1,794,535,650, a reduction in thirteen years of nearly \$600,000,000, or one-fourth of it. It has been said that we have paid off our debt more rapidly than was necessary and prudent. In some respects that is true. But there is no doubt that this excess of zeal in discharging our National obligations has had a powerful effect in strengthening our credit, and it is owing to the strengthening of our credit that the Government has been able to reduce our annual interest, in a far greater ratio than it reduced the debt, by funding our 6 per cent. bonds into securities bearing interest only at 5, 4½ and 4 per cent. In 1865 our annual interest charge was \$150,977,697.87. In 1878 our interest charge is \$94,554,473. Thus we have got rid of about two-fifths of the annual interest in the same period of thirteen years. In a still greater ratio the debt and interest have been reduced in proportion to the population. Thirteen years ago our debt was \$78 25-100 per capita. To-day it is \$41 57-100 per capita. Thirteen years ago the interest was \$4 29-100

per capita. It is now \$1 97-100 per capita. And if our credit remains intact the funding process will go on rapidly, and we shall soon be rid of further tens of millions of our annual burden. Disturb that credit by any act or attempt at weakening the confidence of the world at home and abroad in our ability to pay, or in our honest purposes, and the funding process will cease, and with it the beneficent results flowing from it.

Thus you see, in this as in other things, it is not only most honorable, but it pays best to be honest. The most expensive thing a nation can do is to attempt to get rid of its obligations without honestly discharging them. The next expensive thing is to quibble about them. The ruin from which it is most difficult to rise is the ruin of credit caused by repudiation. The next worst thing for a nation is to render itself suspected of a lurking desire to repudiate. And thus I do hope wherever you hear that most foolish and disgusting cry of the demagogue against the bondholder, you will, as men of honor and as men of business, meet it with all the scorn it deserves. The sense of honor of a nation is the source of its credit, and its credit is one of its best paying investments.

The second prerequisite of a revival of business and prosperity I stated to be a sound currency, a currency of real and stable value. Let me put to any thinking man in this assembly, be he farmer, or laborer, or tradesman, or merchant, or banker, or manufacturer, a plain, simple question, and ask for a candid answer. In what kind of money will you prefer to receive the wages of your labor or the profits of your business—in a kind of money whose value or purchasing power is stable and can be depended upon to remain virtually the same from day to day, and from week to week, or in a kind of money whose value and purchasing power are fluctuating and uncertain, so that you do not know what it will buy from one end of the

week or of the month to the other? Every sensible man who in the least understands his own interests will answer, instinctively: "Give us the first—the money of stable value; the money that will not cheat us, so that we may know what we have." And that instinct is natural and right. It would seem especially natural at a moment when, after a long and painful period of depression, we see at last a glimmer of daylight again, and begin to hope that with industry and prudent management we shall work ourselves up once more to a reasonable degree of comfort and prosperity.

Why will you prefer the money of stable value? We hear much talk about the necessity of confidence as one of the most necessary prerequisites of a revival of business, and justly so. Now, the most essential element of that general confidence which is so necessary is confidence in the money you handle. "When I earn ten dollars," says the workingman, "as the wages of my labor, I want to know that I can take that money to the baker, or the butcher, or the shoemaker, or the clothier, and that it will buy so much of bread, or meat, or shoes, or clothes, not only to-day, but a month hence. And when I have saved some money and put it in a savings bank to be used at some future time, I want to know that when I take it out again for use, be it a month or a year, or five years hence, it will not have materially decreased in value, but have about the same purchasing power which it now has." That is sensible. "When I have sold a lot of goods on time, one, two or three months," says the merchant, "I want to know that the money coming in after that time has not meanwhile depreciated, so as to deprive me of my profit, or even to involve me in a loss. I must have money of stable value, for it is the only kind I can base safe business calculations upon in buying and selling." Sensible again. "When I make a contract," says the builder,

"I want to be able to figure out beforehand how much money will buy the material, the lumber and the bricks and stone I shall need at a future time, and that the money I get after the performance of the contract will be worth as much as the money I contracted for." And so on through the list.

This, I say, is your natural instinct. This is what you really need and desire, all of you, except, perhaps, the gamblers who rely upon tricks that are dark to fleece their innocent neighbors. Yes, even those of you do desire this, who, although honest men, have permitted yourselves to be affected by the fiat money disease or kindred ailments. You necessarily want a money of stable value especially in difficult times like these, when careful and safe business calculations are more than ever required. If you are sincere with yourselves you will all admit that you really think so.

Now what is that money of stable value, and how can we get it? Let me put another question to you. Many of us remember the time—it was eighteen years ago, before the war—when gold and silver were current in this country, and bank notes convertible into gold and silver. The gold and silver coin of the United States was then the only legal-tender in the payment of debts. Did you then think, or can you remember anybody who then thought, that it would be best for the people of this country to do away with gold and silver and to substitute for them an irredeemable paper money, worth so much to-day and so much to-morrow? Am I right or not in saying that a man making such a proposition in times of peace would have been unanimously voted fit for a place in a lunatic asylum? The only thing you complained of, and justly so, was the existence of wildcat bank-paper under a bad banking system, because it could not be converted into gold and silver, contrary to the promise on its face. And is it

true or not that when, under the pressure of war necessities an irredeemable paper money was issued, and gold and silver done away with, all of you thought it a great danger, fraught with misfortune? Surely you cannot fail to remember this. What was it that made you all regret so much the disappearance of coin money and the substitution of an irredeemable paper currency for it? Simply the instinctive feeling that when you had a gold dollar in your pocket you knew what you had, but when you had an irredeemable paper dollar you did n't. And that apprehension has been justified by subsequent events. You may tell me that for ten years after the first heavy emissions of the paper legal-tenders in 1863 you prospered. That is true—at least it looked so. But in 1873 the fearful day arrived when the balance sheet was struck, and where were you then? All of a sudden the balloon burst, and we came to the ground so heavily that our bones are still aching. And I repeat that this collapse was not brought about by a contraction of the paper currency. I have sufficiently shown, by proving with official figures, that for the five years preceding the crash the currency had been, not contracted, but steadily expanded until in 1876 there were over fifty-six millions more of it out than in 1869.

You will remember, also, that during that whole period of so-called prosperity it was as if an evil conscience had haunted the American people on account of that very paper money; that for years following the close of the war every political convention, every meeting of merchants, every respectable board of trade or chamber of commerce declared and resolved again and again that the country must rid itself of the curse of an irredeemable and fluctuating paper currency; that every consideration of National honor, of good policy and business interest demanded a speedy return to the specie basis. As late as

1876 both the great political parties of the country affirmed most solemnly their devotion to this great object. Even most of the very men who advocated inflation as a means of temporary relief loudly protested that the restoration of specie payments was their ultimate aim. And why all this? Whence this almost universal concurrence? Simply because every candid man admitted to himself that this country would have to rest; that there could be no confidence in our economic movements; that there could be no firm and safe foundation for National prosperity until our money system should be based again upon the rock of precious metals; that our foreign commerce would not bear its full fruit until our financial system should be in harmony again with the money of the world.

That was the instinctive feeling of the American people for years after the war. Well, then, if such was the case, why were not more vigorous and consistent measures taken for the speedy resumption of specie payments, and why did the steps that were taken meet with so strong and persistent an opposition? Simply because it is one of the weaknesses of human nature, when you desire the accomplishment of a certain end, yet to recoil from the means necessary for the accomplishment of that end, if those means threaten to be painful. A person suffering from toothache may ever so much desire to be rid of the decayed grinder, yet he will shrink from the dentist's instrument with which it is to be pulled, and involuntarily exclaim, "Wait a little." And then you resort to chloroform or laughing gas to be unconscious of the pain when the operation is performed. If in 1865, after the war was closed, the Government had possessed some power of sorcery to transform overnight without pain to anybody our irredeemable paper currency into a money system based upon the precious metals, is there a single individual in the United States who would not have clapped

his hands for satisfaction and joy to be thus rid of the decayed tooth and to feel once more like a well man? But, unfortunately, there is no laughing gas for the correction of great economic evils. It is an easy thing under certain circumstances to introduce an irredeemable paper currency, but when it has long existed and produced its effects it is terribly difficult to get rid of. Its introduction will drive out the precious metals. Its expansion will diminish its purchasing power, and run up other values to a fictitious point. A return to the specie basis requires the acquisition of the precious metals necessary for redemption. It requires a reduction of the paper money within that volume which the business of the country will be able to float in the shape of specie, and paper convertible into specie. It requires retrenchment and economy in the conduct of business and all kinds of expenditures. Such operations cannot be effected without some painful sensations. They do not involve the destruction of any real value, but they do involve the destruction of fictions in business, of the delusive estimate in which men hold their possessions and prospects. It is another of the weaknesses of human nature that we dislike to be shaken up from a dream to sober reality, when that dream was pleasant. And thus when the practical preparations for resumption are to be taken in hand, people, although they may ever so much desire to be cured of the ailment, are apt suddenly to fear the remedy more than the disease, and thus, like the man with the decayed tooth, who shrinks from the dentist's instrument, will cry out, "Hold on! wait a little."

Now, what is our case? The painful consequences which were feared from the practical preparations for resumption came upon us through the crisis of 1873 in the way of a natural development without there being any preparations for resumption made. Previous to 1873 no

purchase of specie had been set on foot with a view to redemption. From 1869 to 1873 the volume of the currency was expanded from \$693,946,056.61 to \$750,062,368.98, including demand notes and compound interest rates. And yet the collapse came. From 1873 to 1874 the currency was further expanded from \$750,062,368.98 to \$781,490,916.17, and yet the depression continued, which proves most conclusively the crisis was not caused by contraction, and that it would neither be prevented nor removed by expansion. But in this way speculative business collapsed, the bubble of fictitious values burst and those values gradually adjusted themselves again to the specie basis without any interference on the part of the Government in the way of preparing for resumption. Meanwhile the banks were and remained full of money, but that money found little or no employment. It became evident, not that we had not money enough for the business of the country, but that we had not business enough for the money in the country. Then a reduction of the currency set in, also by the operation of a natural development. Congress, at the instance of the very men who insisted that the business of the country demanded more currency, gave greater facilities for the emission of national-bank notes. But instead of increasing the volume of the currency as had been predicted would be eagerly done, a considerable number of banks withdrew their notes, simply because they could find no profitable employment for them. Thus a considerable reduction of the currency was effected by natural process, and the notorious fact that in spite of that reduction all the banks remained full of money, without adequate use, was a new proof that our trouble had not been for want of nourishment, but was a clear case of indigestion.

In the meantime, business men had brought their operations within prudent limits. Retrenchment and wise

economy had become the general rule; a large amount of indebtedness was liquidated, and unsound enterprises weeded out in the business world. Thus that part of the necessary preparation for resumption which is most painful in its effects had operated itself in the way of a natural process without the intervention of the Government. As is frequently the case, when physicians are at fault, nature had made an effort to right itself. At last the Secretary of the Treasury, by virtue of the resumption act of 1875, proceeded to accomplish with comparative ease what by the opponents of resumption had been predicted to be utterly impossible. He acquired for the Treasury an amount of gold sufficient for the purpose of commencing redemption, and now, in spite of all our hesitation and stumbling, the goal is reached.

Our opponents have vociferously asserted from day to day, and proved as they thought with facts and figures, that we could not get there. But, gentlemen, we are there. The Government can resume specie payment to-day, more than three months before the time fixed by the law, and if we do not proclaim resumption to-day, it is only because the law stands in the way. The word has only to be spoken, and our paper dollar, irredeemable for fifteen years, is again virtually as good as gold. The laborer's and the pensioner's dollar is as good as the bondholder's dollar. The business of the country has again the foundation of a rational and stable value currency under its feet, and, with full confidence in the money it handles, it can now enter upon a new career of enterprise and prosperity. This we have accomplished, and, as I firmly believe, we can maintain it, provided, always, we act like a sensible people and abstain from foolish and mischievous legislation.

But now what do we behold? At the very moment when this great consummation, for which the country has been

sighing for years, appears assured, a portion of the people are growing wild with preposterous schemes and propositions to undo it all and to return to chaos again; a set of physicians, when the patient is on the point of recovery and requires only repose and quiet working of natural forces, prescribing medicine to throw him into fits once more. It is the most curious spectacle a people ever presented. It would seem only laughable did it not threaten serious consequences.

What are those schemes and propositions? Let us examine them. We find, first, the proposition to replace the money system based upon the precious metals by the so-called absolute or fiat money. During the five years of depression and distress since 1873 many people groped frantically about for means of relief, not inquiring into the true causes of their difficulty or not understanding them. They thought there must be some artificial remedy to cure it within the reach of human ingenuity. That the results of the unproductive consumption, the improvident wasting of wealth, can be cured only by the production of real wealth in a slow and steady way, did not strike them as promising in their case. They wanted some quicker and more ingenious method of getting rich again. Like the alchemists of the middle ages, they thought there must be some way to make gold out of dross. The first thing that struck them as promising was an inflation of our greenback currency. But when, from 1873 to 1874 the volume of the greenbacks was expanded from \$356,000,000 to \$382,000,000, it had not the desired effect. The increase stayed in the Eastern banks. Then an expansion of the national-bank currency was thought of, and new facilities for the emission of bank notes given. But this did not work. In spite of the new facilities the bank currency actually reduced itself. It became evident that the business of the country would not take and circulate any

more of that money, for there was no employment for it. Then some ingenious minds hit upon a bolder plan. You have probably known persons who, when they are sick, will think no medicine can help unless it be particularly strong in color and nasty in taste. They look upon everything that is natural with distrust. Thus the scheme of so-called fiat money was brought forward, and many well meaning innocent people seem to have been talked into the belief that this at last is the true thing.

What is absolute or fiat money? It is the simplest contrivance in the world. The Government takes a little piece of paper and says to it, "Be thou a dollar," and then the Government stamp is put upon the paper, and forthwith it is a dollar, or five, or ten, or a hundred dollars, as the case may be. Then all other kinds of money—gold, silver, greenbacks and national-bank notes—are withdrawn, and the fiat or absolute money put in their places. It will be the only legal-tender in payment of debts and Government dues. Now the present greenback bears this inscription: "The United States will pay the bearer one dollar"—or five or ten. Will not the fiat dollar bear a similar promise? Bless you, no. The fiat dollar will not promise anything, and just that is the beauty of it. According to the fiat money doctors, it was the weakness of the greenback, that it promised something. The fiat dollar does not promise anything, for it is in itself the performance of the promise—it is a dollar. The fiat money promises nothing beyond itself, for it does away with all other things. Gold and silver are antiquated stuff, entirely unsuitable for this progressive age and country. The fiat money once out, gold and silver will no more be thought of. We shall be entirely separate and independent from the rest of the world in all financial and commercial transactions. Our fiat money will not be exported, for it will not be taken anywhere else; and

so, like the poor, it stays all and always with us; and inasmuch as it costs almost nothing to make fiat money and we can make any quantity of it to suit ourselves, we shall get richer and richer, and there will be no end to our wealth and happiness. That is what the fiat money doctors promise us.

It will strike you that this is exceedingly simple and very fine; but you may have some misgivings, and say: "Well, this bit of paper may call itself a dollar, but it is, after all, only a bit of paper. Is there nothing of value behind it?" Whereupon the fiat money man gravely answers: "This is a great country. It has some forty or fifty thousand millions of dollars' worth of property in it. When the Government of this great country puts its stamp upon a piece of paper and thus makes it money, then that money is based upon the whole wealth of the country." That sounds magnificently, and you may think, well, if this country has forty or fifty thousand millions' worth of property, and all that property is mortgaged as security for the value of this fiat money, why should not this security be good enough for a couple of thousand millions of fiat money? Now let us see how it will work. Such promises to pay as greenbacks and national-bank notes are withdrawn to make room for fiat money. It will not be necessary to make any provision for the withdrawal of gold and silver, for the precious metals, finding no further employment, will take leave of themselves, and go abroad, where they are wanted. Now the fiat money is master of the field. It goes into circulation, and for some time it will indeed circulate, for, it being the only tool of exchange left to you, you will have to take it and use it; it will circulate just as wampum-beads and clamshells and leaden bullets circulated for awhile as currency in early colonial times. It will also maintain a certain current value, as long as its volume is kept within

the quantity that would circulate in the form of specie and paper convertible into specie. But you must consider that the fiat money plan is brought forward by earnest inflationists, whose principal object is to make money plenty by issuing enough of it to keep all the boys in cash—and why should we not? it costs nothing, and we may just as well have much as little. A thousand millions, more or less, are no object, as the Government thereby burdens itself with no promise or obligation, and finally the wealth of the country, fifty thousand millions' worth of property, stands behind it, mortgaged as security. But presently, when we have made fiat money plenty, we shall find that it depreciates, and will depreciate more and more the more we issue, just as the greenbacks did, and worse. "How can it depreciate like the greenbacks?" says the fiat money doctor, with a smile of superior wisdom. "The greenback, by the absurd promise of the Government to pay coin for it, was kept in constant comparison with coin, and therefore could depreciate as to coin. But when, by the introduction of fiat money, gold and silver are utterly banished and forgotten, and our money system has become entirely separate and independent from all other money systems of the world, how can the fiat dollar depreciate as to coin?" Let us see.

In the first place, as your fiat dollars grow more and more plenty, their purchasing power will grow less, just as the purchasing power of the clamshell currency in old colonial times grew less, the supply of them growing larger, until finally they bought nothing at all. Thus the fiat dollars will depreciate as to the articles you want to buy with them. "But what of that?" asks the fiat money doctor; "that does not mean depreciation, but it means that things grow dearer in price. When it takes two fiat dollars to buy an article which cost but one dollar before, then the Government can issue double the amount of fiat

money for the accommodation of the people, for it costs nothing, and the wealth of the country will be ample security for a couple of thousand millions more." And so it goes on and on, and in this case under the lead of the fiat money doctors, it will go on quickly until the story may be repeated of the wheelbarrowful of money carried to market and the purchase carried home in your vest pocket.

But the idea that by banishing the precious metals from our money system we can cut loose from the money system of the world, and avoid all comparison of the value of our paper money with gold, is amusingly absurd. We are a commercial nation and have large dealings with the world abroad. Our imports and exports go into the hundreds of millions. They will go into the thousands. Our exports especially are increasing beyond all anticipation. All we sell and all we buy abroad is paid and settled for on the gold basis. The prices of our principal articles of export, of our agricultural staples, are virtually determined in the foreign market. Now, while we are doing this immense business with the world abroad on the gold basis, must it not be evident to the dullest understanding that, although the last gold coin may have been banished from our domestic transactions, the value of the fiat dollar in comparison with gold will be quoted just as the greenback dollar was, and that this comparison will be a matter of daily concern and anxiety to every farmer, West and East, the price of whose products depends upon the foreign market? Thus, whatever expedient you may resort to, gold will be and remain the standard of value as to the fiat dollar. Your fiat dollar will be brought up before that tribunal to have judgment pronounced as to its worth, and the idea that by introducing here a paper-money system of your own you can withdraw from the rules that govern the commerce of the world, and change the real standard of value

in your business transactions, will appear as one of the most absurd and childish conceptions the human brain has ever been guilty of.

At last, when your fiat dollar, having been made very plenty to accommodate the people, has run down so low in its purchasing power, and cut so sorry a figure in the inevitable comparison with gold, that you begin to grow uneasy about it, you remember that it is based upon the wealth of the American people, and that some forty or fifty thousand millions' worth of property stand as mortgage security behind it. Of course, with such security, the fiat dollar ought to be worth its face in gold, and thus you may think of foreclosing that mortgage on the wealth of the country. Maybe you are a laboring man who have some money in a savings bank, which formerly was worth enough to buy a little house with, but in its fiat condition, money being plenty, appears just sufficient to pay for a jack-knife. You may go to the next best public building to see whether you can find any of the wealth of the country there, which is security for your fiat money, to lay your hands upon. I would not, however, advise you to seize upon a specific article of property as part of the wealth of the country, for you would be in danger of being arrested and put in jail for larceny. The wealth of the country, although it is security for your fiat money, cannot be handled in that way. You may think it best to present your fiat money to the Secretary of the Treasury who must be presumed to be a sound fiat man, and knows what the mortgage on the wealth of the country means. You ask him to give you good dollars for the bits of fiat paper you present, or so much of the wealth of the country as required to make that fiat paper worth something. What will be the answer? "My dear sir, you desire good dollars; these are good dollars; they are the only dollars we have. The Government has not promised you anything else.

You want a share of the wealth of this country, upon which these fiat dollars are based. Why, these fiat dollars are themselves a part of the wealth of the country. Besides, you have clothes upon your back; your wife and children have the same. If you have no house of your own, you have furniture in your rented dwelling. You have tools in your workshop. All these things are a part of the wealth of the country upon which your fiat money is based. You must levy upon what you have yourself. Of course I cannot give you what belongs to anybody else."

Now you begin to perceive that the forty or fifty thousand millions' worth of property in the country may be magnificent security to base fiat money upon, but you cannot foreclose the mortgage upon a single blade of grass. That may seem queer to you. But it is the peculiar beauty of fiat money based upon the whole wealth of the country.

There is nothing more ridiculous than to hear these fiat money doctors pretend to have made a great original discovery, and to parade it before us as the most progressive idea of the age. Why, it is a story a thousand years old. They had such money in China in the ninth century of this era. They had it in Persia toward the close of the thirteenth century. They had it in the American colonies in the seventeenth century in the shape of bead and clam-shell currency. They had it in France at the beginning of the eighteenth century, under the management of the great progressive Scotch financier, John Law. They had it in France during the great revolution in the shape of assignats. They had it in this country again during the war of independence in the shape of the Continental money; always in all essential features virtually the same: a paper money based in some indefinite way upon an indefinite something, in some cases with a promise of

redemption, in some cases without it; in some cases issued under the stress of circumstances, in some cases for financial speculation; and whenever an inflation of paper money was either a part of the scheme or forced by necessity, the final result always the same;—depreciation of the paper money, that depreciation leading to new issues, the new issues bringing forth more depreciation, and so on; everybody believing himself rich for a time, until finally the whole airy fabric broke down in general confusion, bankruptcy and ruin, when it became apparent that the grand indefinite something upon which the paper money was based, the power of the Emperor of China, or the wealth of the country, practically amounted to nothing as a mortgage security; and uniformly in the breakdown the poor people, the laboring classes suffered the greatest distress. And in every case after the great collapse, people came painfully to the old conclusion again, that, after all, the precious metals were the only safe basis of a money system; and they gathered up the few coins they could lay their hands on, and upon the ruins of their foolish hopes and windy fortunes they began a sensible business once more, in a cautious and prudent way. And now the same old scheme, exploded again and again, with a thousand years' history on its back full of ruin and disaster is dished up to us as a brand new discovery, and as the great progressive idea of the century. Why, gentlemen of the fiat money persuasion, the Chinese, a thousand years ago, were just as wise and progressive as you are now, and when they had got through with their great progressive fiat money experience they were a great deal wiser. It is a matter of wonder, as well as regret, that at this day there should be so many good people giving, even for a moment, countenance to a fallacy so hoary with age and so utterly condemned by the painful and repeated experience of mankind.

I think I may take leave of fiat money and turn to our Democratic friends who are possessed with the "Ohio idea." If I understand correctly the newest phase of the "Ohio idea," as put forth by the Democratic convention of this State and several conventions in other parts of the country, it is as follows: The resumption act is to be repealed; all reduction of the paper currency is to cease; greenbacks are to be a legal-tender for duties on imports; all restrictions on the unlimited coinage of silver are to be removed; the national-bank notes to be withdrawn and greenbacks issued in their stead; the sale of bonds for the purchase of coin for resumption purposes to be stopped; the volume of the greenback currency is to be determined by legislation or Constitutional amendment, "so as to insure the stability of their value as well as volume." I think I have stated it fairly.

That a man thoroughly wedded to the irredeemable paper mania should make such a platform his own, I can understand. But how a man, who thinks the resumption of specie payments at all desirable, can adopt it, is to me utterly incomprehensible. For any intelligent mind will see at a glance that its execution will render resumption absolutely impossible, and perpetuate the regime of an irredeemable paper currency for an indefinite period. In fact if there is any logic in this program, it means the permanent establishment of irredeemable paper money with all its disastrous influences.

First, they demand the prompt repeal of the resumption act. I remember some Democrats in the Senate who voted against the resumption act, not because they did not desire resumption, but because they did not think the act clear and effective enough. I myself criticised it on account of some of its imperfections, but voted for it because I was determined to support any step in that direction. I have ever since been glad that I did so vote,

for the resumption act, in spite of its imperfections, has proved far more effective than many supposed it would. In 1876 the Democratic National Convention demanded the repeal of the resumption act, not because the Convention was against resumption, but because, according to its declaration, it was earnestly for resumption; and because, as was pretended, the resumption act was an obstacle to resumption—a thing which I have never been able to understand. And now your Democratic convention and many others demand the repeal of the same resumption act, not because it is an obstacle to resumption, but because it has brought it on. And indeed, unless they hurry up that repeal quickly, it will appear like the repeal of last year's almanac. Now, what is the meaning of this demand for the repeal of the resumption act? Here stands the Government, and says, "For sixteen years we have promised to redeem these Treasury notes on demand, dollar for dollar—a dollar in coin for a dollar in paper. For sixteen years that promise has stood dishonored. Now I am able and ready to fulfil it. I am able and ready to make and keep the pensioner's and the laborer's dollar, the merchant's and the manufacturer's dollar, as good as the bondholder's dollar. I am able and willing to give to the business of the country the safe foundation of a sound currency, uniform and stable in value in harmony with the money of the world. All I want is to be permitted to execute the law." Whereupon you, my Democratic friends, answer: "Whether you be ever so able and ready to do all this, we say you shall not do it"; and then you proceed with a number of propositions, each and all of which are designed to take and keep from the Government its ability to perform its long dishonored promise, and to do the beneficent things it stands now ready to do. The Government says, "I have now some \$346,000,000 in greenbacks to take care of. With the coin I have, I feel

strong enough to commence and maintain the redemption of all of that quantity that are likely to be presented for redemption. There are now \$324,500,000 of national-bank notes in circulation, which are redeemable in greenbacks. This system aids me powerfully in commencing and maintaining redemption, inasmuch as it relieves me of direct responsibility for about one-half of our paper currency, while all of it will maintain the same current value. Were I directly responsible for the whole mass of paper money, \$670,000,000, my coin resources would not be sufficient to resume specie payments." Whereupon you, my Democratic friends, answer: "We demand that the national-bank currency be withdrawn and greenbacks, for which the Government is directly responsible, put in its place. This we demand, whether it renders you unable to resume specie payments or not." The Government says, further: "The resumption of specie payments renders necessary a considerable reserve of coin in the Treasury. I used to receive gold through the duties on imports which, however, was mostly needed for the payment of interest on National bonds. If specie payments are assured, that source of coin revenue may be dispensed with; but, to enable me to accumulate a reserve of coin, it was necessary that I be permitted to purchase coin with bonds, and I was permitted to do so by law. If, by the substitution of greenbacks for national-bank currency, the amount of paper money for which I am responsible be doubled, it will be all the more necessary to maintain the payment of duties in coin, and to go on with the sale of bonds for coin, if we are ever to prepare for resumption." Whereupon, you, my Democratic friends, promptly answer: "We demand that duties on imports shall be paid in greenbacks, and that the sale of bonds for the accumulation of a coin reserve shall cease."

Now, need I tell any intelligent being what the conse-

quences will be if these Democratic demands be enacted into laws? Not only to prevent the resumption of specie payments now, but to render the resumption of specie payments utterly impossible forever, at least as long as such laws exist.

It is simply doubling the amount of paper money which the Government will have to redeem and at the same time stripping the Government of every means to provide for that redemption. The source from which the Government derived its coin for the payment of interest on the public debt being stopped, the coin reserve now in the Treasury will have to be drawn upon for such interest, and that reserve will soon vanish into nothing. How the Government is then to get coin even for the payment of the interest on the public debt, our Democratic friends fail to tell us. Finding no employment as currency here, gold will promptly go abroad where it is in demand for such employment, and we shall be further away from specie payments than ever before.

I repeat, therefore: that a thoroughbred inflationist should advocate this program is intelligible; it serves his purpose. But when a man, who ever again desires to see specie payments restored in this country, adopts such a platform, what shall we think of his understanding or his conscience? The defeat of resumption will not be the only result. No sooner is such a policy inaugurated than the premium on gold will again reappear, the value of the greenback now within a hair's breadth of gold will sink and gold will again be a subject of speculation and gambling.

This is inevitable, for everything will be thrown back into fluctuation and uncertainty. The step back from specie payments will put even the good faith of the Nation in question. Confidence will be more shaken than ever. A black cloud of new doubt will hang over every business

interest; for when a policy so insane, as to run away from specie payments, can be adopted, every imaginable nonsense will thenceforth appear possible. Then good-bye reviving prosperity—we shall be at sea again, the Lord only knows how long.

It helps our Democratic friends very little to put forth the fantastic promise, "that the amount of paper issues shall be so regulated by legislation, or by organic law, as to give the people assurance of stability in the volume of the currency, as well as the consequent stability of the value." The idea to establish by Constitutional amendment, to be assented to by three-fourths of the States, that is, by twenty-eight State legislatures, how much money the country is to have—and when the amount so fixed is found too large or too small, that it should not be possible to change it until the assent of twenty-eight State legislatures shall be again obtained for the change, that idea is so childishly preposterous that we must wonder how serious men could ever have entertained it.

The other proposition that Congress, by legislation, is to be the permanent authority to regulate the volume of the currency, and consequently the value, is scarcely less astonishing, coming as it does from Democrats who pretend to be so faithful to their time-honored principles. Have you considered, my Democratic friends, what an awful power you thus propose to perpetuate in the Congress of the United States? You yourselves admit that the value of your irredeemable paper currency will depend upon its volume. Congress is to fix that volume, and by increasing or diminishing it, Congress is therefore to determine what every dollar in the land shall be worth. The value of every piece of property, of every article of merchandise, of every private fortune, of every chance the contractor has in his contract, of every dollar the laboring man has in the savings bank or the merchant on

deposit, will be at the mercy of the Congress of the United States. No man can make an investment, no merchant can sell or buy a lot of goods on time, no manufacturer can accept an order, no contractor can make a contract for a railroad or building, without Congress having it in its power to determine their profit or their loss, by regulating the volume, and consequently the value, of the currency, up or down. Can Congress, can any body of legislators, be depended upon to exercise so tremendous a power with wisdom? Why, gentlemen, no assembly of human beings, even if you get together the shrewdest financiers in the world has ever been found wise enough to determine how much money the business of a great country needs in its multifarious fluctuations. But if so awful a power should fall into the hands of such financiers as made this Ohio platform—then let us devoutly pray that the Lord preserve us.

But it is not the only question whether such a power is likely to be wisely exercised or not. The question is whether any Government should be intrusted with so tremendous, so far-reaching, so tyrannical an authority at all. Oh! my Democratic friends, who pretend to be so jealous of the power of the General Government, how are you fallen from the high estate of your ancient principles, that you should now be willing to give to that General Government the power to dispose of every citizen's private fortune. Oh! shades of Jefferson and Jackson, where are you?

I repeat, it is not only a question of Congressional wisdom. The very fact that Congress is to dispose of so tremendous an interest by mere legislative act cannot fail to have a most disquieting and enervating influence upon the business of the country. Are we not all witnesses to the fact that for years, during every session of Congress, the whole business community stood on tiptoe, with fear

and trepidation, lest some tinkering genius in Congress should get up and push through some measure interfering with all their business calculations and arrangements? Have you not all heard the heartfelt prayer of business men at the beginning of every session, that Congress might do its necessary work quickly, and then adjourn? Have you not time and again heard the general sigh of relief when Congress at last did really wind up and go home? And now imagine a Congress with a majority composed of such financial geniuses as advocate the "Ohio idea," every one of whom has his unfailing financial nostrum in his pocket, and that Congress intrusted with the power to determine the value of every man's property, and the chances for profit or loss of every man's enterprise! Will the business community ever get out of a state of feverish uncertainty and apprehension? Are fits to be the normal condition of our economic system? Are we not at last to have that repose which is so necessary for safe business calculations, for a quiet rebuilding of our fortunes and a new period of prosperity? If so, then in the name of common-sense let us get rid of a system of irredeemable paper currency, which puts into the hands of Congress the power to determine how much money we shall have and what that money is to be worth. Let us at least reduce the Government again to its proper functions, and return to that condition of things in which the currency regulates itself.

No Congress knows how much money the business of the country needs, but business itself feels and determines it with certainty. When specie payments prevail, and there is more coin in circulation than business needs, it will flow out and go where it finds more profitable employment. When there is less coin in circulation than business requires, it will become dear, and flow in from countries where it has less profitable employment. The same rule

applies to a well-regulated system of bank issues based upon specie. When the quantity of notes out is in excess of the requirements of business, they will flow back to the banks for redemption. When the quantity of bank notes is insufficient for the wants of trade, the banks will find it profitable to increase their issues, and thus the gap will be filled. Local and temporary disturbances, occasional panics or speculative periods, which under no money system can be entirely prevented, may sometimes interfere with this self-adjusting machinery, but on the whole the rule holds good. The Government has nothing to do with it but to see that the coin struck in its mints be of the prescribed standard value; it prevents and punishes counterfeiting; it regulates the banking system, so as to make it safe, and then it lets currency and trade in their relations take care of themselves, without assuming any arbitrary control over volume and value. These are the simple principles of a sound money system under which business can regain confidence in itself and prosperity will revive. That is the end which we should accomplish and which is now within our reach.

The paper-money men have contrived to befog the public mind with certain superstitious impressions to the prejudice of the cause I advocate. Let us look some of them in the face. One is a sort of dark terror with which the word contraction has been invested. It would almost seem as if contraction were some diabolical power, bringing forth all the ills human flesh is heir to. Thus, we are told that contraction, with all its concomitant evils, was one of the infernal effects of the resumption act. It is true that under the resumption act, since 1875, the currency has been contracted. But it is also true that this contraction has not had the least depressing effect upon the business of the country, and I can easily prove it. If contraction had cramped business, that is to say, if

business had wanted more currency than was out, it could easily have had it. Banking was made free by that very resumption act. Any five persons procuring the necessary capital can start a bank under the National system and issue bank notes. Had business required more currency than was out, the issuing of more bank notes would have become profitable. There is plenty of money lying idle and waiting for a chance. The chance would certainly have been taken hold of by enterprising persons had business really needed more currency. But not only has the volume of bank notes not been increased, but it has been voluntarily reduced by the banks. This is conclusive proof not only that business does not want any more currency than is out, but that it has even more than it can profitably employ. The contraction that has taken place was, therefore, not the result of a forced operation, but of a natural process.

The reduction of the volume of greenbacks has been stopped by law; but business is more sensible than Congress and rids itself of the currency it does not need, and nobody is hurt. It appears, therefore, that this terrible bugbear is entirely harmless.

Another foolish notion which has been industriously instilled into the public mind is that greenbacks are a part of the wealth of the country; that by a regulation of the volume of the greenbacks the wealth of the country is correspondingly diminished, and that a reduction of the greenback circulation must, even under the specie payment system, necessarily result in a contraction of the currency. In fact, the greenback has been made by the inflationists the subject of an idolatry which, upon close examination, appears exceedingly ludicrous. There is a sort of awful sanctity and mysterious power ascribed to it, which no other kind of money ever possessed. We hear of the bloodstained greenback, the battle-hallowed

greenback, the greenback conqueror of the rebellion, the greenback savior of the Republic, and people talk as if to withdraw a greenback from circulation after its glorious achievements would be an act of the basest National ingratitude. Well, now, assume the greenback had, in the absence of gold and silver, done good service during the war, is there anything to grow sentimental about? Did not our old muzzleloading guns do the same, while breechloaders were scarce? Did not hardtack feed our soldiers when soft bread could not be had? Did not mules have to pull our wagons when the supply of good draft horses fell short? Why do we not go in ecstasies over these things and exclaim: "Oh, bloodstained, grand old muzzleloaders that fought our battles! Oh, battle-hallowed hardtack that fed our soldiers! and thou, oh most noble mule that pulled our trains! how can you, the conquerors of the rebellion, the saviors of the Republic, ever be forgotten? How can an impious generation substitute for you something that suits better?" All this sentimentality would not prevent us from substituting breechloaders for muzzleloaders in the Army, from eating soft bread instead of hardtack and from preferring good horses to the noble mule. Is there any sound reason why we should not use something better in preference to the greenback if we can have it?

What is the bloodstained, sanctified, greenback dollar after all? It is nothing more nor less than a promise on the part of the United States to pay bearer one dollar, made a legal-tender for the purpose of currency; and I regret to say that at one time the glorious greenback was worth only thirty-eight cents on the dollar, and that since it has slowly and painfully crawled up in value, after inflicting immense loss on individuals and the country at large, until now at last it has reached par. And as to the service rendered by the greenback in the war, a retrospec-

tive view of the case inclines me strongly to the opinion that had Congress been courageous and strong enough to insist upon raising money by taxation instead of resorting to the expedient of an irredeemable paper money, which universally inflated all prices, the war would have cost us from one thousand to fifteen hundred millions less, and we would all be the better for it, had we never seen the glorious greenback. For this I have excellent authority. In a message approving an act to issue \$100,000,000 in greenbacks, January 17, 1863, that genius of common-sense, Abraham Lincoln, spoke these memorable words, foreshadowing it all: "While giving this approval, however, I think it my duty to express my sincere regret that it has been found necessary to authorize so large an additional issue of United States notes, when this circulation and that of the suspended banks together have already become so redundant as to increase prices beyond real value, thereby augmenting the cost of living to the injury of labor, and the cost of supplies to the injury of the whole country." There is, then, absolutely no reason for worshipping the greenback with that idolatrous adulation. We had better take a sober, common-sense view of it.

Now, suppose after the resumption of specie payment you present a greenback dollar to the Treasury, and you get a gold dollar for it, and the greenback is then canceled and destroyed, will the volume of currency be thereby contracted? Not at all. The greenback dollar has disappeared, but the gold dollar has gone in its place for circulation, and the volume of the currency remains just the same. Is there any horror about that? Will anybody lose anything by it? It is simply the substitution in the circulating medium of a gold dollar for a promise to pay. That is all. Now, suppose this operation be repeated many million times, and the greenbacks so redeemed by

the Treasury be not canceled and destroyed, but be paid out again and returned to circulation, according to the present law, what will happen then? Then the volume of the circulating medium will have been increased by the amount of coin issued by the process described. Now, if that increased volume of currency is just sufficient to satisfy the demands of business, and no more than sufficient, the two kinds of currency out, the metallic and the paper, will continue to circulate side by side. But if that increased volume turns out to be in excess of the real requirements of business, what will then happen? Then so much of that volume as is not wanted by business will withdraw from circulation, and it will be the metallic part, for that can be used in our foreign commerce, where our paper money cannot be used, and it will be exported. The paper money, according to the universal law, that an inferior currency always crowds out the superior one, will circulate alone. Suppose, then, it appears that the paper circulation alone is in excess of the real requirements of the business of the country, what then? Then something like the amount of that excess will go to the Treasury for redemption, and the coin paid out in that redemption being over and above the volume of the circulation required by the business of the country, will again either be hoarded or go into our foreign commerce and flow out. If, then, the greenbacks so redeemed are paid out and put in circulation again by the Government, so that the whole volume of paper money out remains in excess of the requirements of business, that process will repeat itself again and again, and thus the coin reserves of the Treasury will be gradually and surely drained, without being added to the circulation of the country.

Now, our greenback high-priests will exclaim: "Does not this show that the precious metals are a very unreliable currency?"

Not at all, gentlemen. It shows only that, in order to secure to the people the benefit of the circulation of a good value currency, it is necessary that the volume of the paper money out be not permitted to be in excess of the real requirements of the business of the country, but should be kept within those requirements. Then the precious metals will stay in active circulation and their supply will regulate itself according to the wants of trade. But you ask: "Will not that again cause a grinding and oppressive contraction?" I answer, not in the least; and why not? You all will agree that we do not want more currency than the requirements of business demand. For every greenback dollar withdrawn and held back by the Treasury a coin dollar will unfailingly appear in circulation, if that dollar is demanded for circulation by the requirements of business. It will either come out of the Treasury, and stay in circulation, or, in obedience to the same law which makes water flow down hill, it will come from some part of the world where it has less profitable employment, or its place will be supplied by bank emissions always ready to fill a gap. You see how little reason there is under the specie payment system to fear contraction as a cause of financial disturbance and depression. And it is very much to be regretted that the vague apprehensions produced by a diligent parading of that same bugbear has misled so many well-meaning men into the support of inconsistent and dangerous measures of legislation. The less the Government has to do with the volume of the paper currency, the better that volume will regulate itself, and the less shall we hear, and the less will the people be afraid of contraction as the source of all human ills.

Still another vague impression has been produced upon the popular mind, that the old silver dollar of the fathers is a sure medicine for all economic ailments, and our

Democratic friends are loudly demanding "the removal of all restrictions to the coinage of silver and the reestablishment of silver as a money metal—the same as gold, the same as it was before its demonetization." Upon this point I shall permit myself only a very few remarks. Every sensible man will be in favor of silver coin as a part of our monetary system. Silver coin is the money for the small transactions of the retail trade. It is, therefore, perfectly correct and judicious to make it a legal-tender to a limited amount. But it is not the money for the great transactions of modern commerce. It is not the metal to serve as a standard measure of value in those transactions. For this there are two good reasons: One is the weight and bulkiness of the metal in proportion to its value; and the other is the fact that in our times its value is subject to violent fluctuations. To transport a million of dollars in silver, four railroad freight-cars would be required. And the fluctuations in the value of silver have of late amounted to more than 16 per cent. in one year, about as much as the fluctuations of our irredeemable paper currency in some of its worst times. The transportation of silver money in the settlement of balances in a country like this, whose internal business transactions go into the thousands of millions, will, therefore, be immensely inconvenient and costly, and the use of silver as a standard measure of values will be like the use of a yardstick as a standard measure of length, which is two feet nine inches to-day and two feet six inches to-morrow, but has not been and is not likely to be three feet, as it ought to be, at any time. To use it as a standard of values together with gold is like the establishment of two yardsticks, one of which is longer than the other, for measuring the length of the same articles. To decree by law that the proportion of value between silver and gold shall be and remain as sixteen to one, or fifteen and a half

to one or whatever figures you may adopt, while the bullion value of silver in the commerce of the world is constantly fluctuating, would be like making a law that the water in your river shall never rise above, and never fall below a certain water mark. It is evident, therefore, that while silver coin will be largely and conveniently used in the small transactions of retail trade as a sort of token money, it will not long be able to maintain itself anywhere in the civilized world as a standard of value, and as an unlimited legal-tender in the great transactions of business. There are still some European countries in which silver money is a full legal-tender; but they have prudently limited the coinage of silver, and as was shown in the recent international conference at Paris, held at the request of our Government, they carefully abstain from entering into any international understanding concerning that subject, which would in any way bind them to the maintenance of silver as a fixed standard of value.

Congress at its last session restored the full legal-tender character of the silver dollar, and ordered the coinage of not less than two and not more than four millions of silver dollars per month. How will this work? Great predictions have been made of relief and prosperity to follow immediately upon the passage of this act, and on the other hand of evil consequences. So far no great effect either way has been visible. The mints have steadily coined their millions per month, but although the people of the United States were represented as fairly burning with love for the dollar of the fathers, nobody seems now anxious to hear its jingle in his pocket. The bullion value of the silver dollar is at present about eighty-seven cents in gold, with a downward tendency. Now, it is possible that silver dollars will be at par as long as the quantity issued remains within that volume which can be used in small retail transactions. How large that quantity is

only experience can determine. But it seems inevitable that, as soon as that quantity is exceeded by the silver dollars put into circulation, silver dollars will be quoted at a discount as to gold, or, in other words, gold will bear a premium as to silver, and we shall have the old uncertainty, and the gambling speculations of the gold-room in Wall street once more. And what will follow? As more and more silver money is put into circulation, the old universal law, that the inferior currency drives out the superior one, will operate again; gold will leave the country and silver coin will remain our only metallic currency. We shall then have reached the condition in which the Chinese have been for a considerable time. And our Democratic friends in Ohio seem [to be in] a particular hurry to reach that condition, for they loudly demand that the coinage of silver, which is now limited to \$4,000,000 per month, shall be relieved of all restrictions. But I can not permit myself to doubt that, when with the actual resumption of specie payments, a better order of things and a revival of prosperity dawns upon us, the American people will be disposed to approach this question also with a more dispassionate and clearer judgment.

The third thing which I pointed out as necessary to lay the foundation for sound business and prosperity is a well-regulated and safe banking system, as a depository of business funds and a machinery for business exchanges. How supremely important a part of our economic organism banks have become I need not explain. Every practical business man, as well as every student of the subject, knows it. The American people, even of this generation, have in this respect, gone through a lively variety of experience, from the wildcat State banks, which existed before the war, to the National banking system of to-day.

What qualities must a bank possess so that you may

call it a good one? If it be a bank of issue, its notes must be well secured and surrounded with such guarantees of convertibility that they may pass throughout the land without discount and without danger of loss to anybody. Second: Its deposits must be well secured by reserves, so as to be reasonably safe. Third: Its discount and loan business must be conducted without extortion, so as to afford reasonable accommodation to the business community. When the banks of the country possess these qualities, they are a blessing to the business community worth untold millions year after year. When the banks do not possess these qualities they are the source of infinite distrust and restlessness; for then business walks as if on a thin crust of ice, in danger of breaking through every moment. You all know this. Now compare the State-bank system as it existed before the war with our national-bank system as it exists now, and what do you find? Under the State-bank system we have had partial and general suspensions and breakdowns of banks in 1809, 1814, 1825, 1834, 1837, 1839, 1841 and 1857, resulting in aggregate losses of hundreds of millions to billholders and depositors, and the most disastrous confusion in the business of the country. Our National banking system has now been in existence about fifteen years. It has passed through a financial crisis more distressing perhaps than any that ever swept over this land; and what has been the result? Not a single holder of a national-bank note has lost a single cent, and the whole loss suffered by depositors in national banks during the whole period of their existence, including these five terrible years of collapse and distress, amounted to about \$6,000,000, a loss less than that suffered by depositors in State and savings banks this year alone. These are facts which cannot be disputed. The national banks, have, therefore, successfully stood a trial which no banking system in this

country ever stood before. And now we are told that the National banking system is unpopular, and must be abolished. I do not hesitate to say, gentlemen, it is not true that the national banks are unpopular. Whence comes the cry about their unpopularity? I will tell you. Some political agitators, to make capital for themselves and against their opponents, denounce the national banks as a monopoly oppressive to the people, and then a multitude of other politicians, as usual, bend before the breeze. That is all.

What is the test of the popularity of a bank or a banking system? It is the confidence of the business community. Apply this test. Is there an individual in this broad land who, from the foundation of the National banking system to this day, ever hesitated a single moment to take a national-bank note at its face value, no matter in what corner of the country the note was issued? You know there is not. Is it not true that business men deposit their money, as a general thing, in national banks with a greater sense of security than they ever felt with regard to any other banking system? You know that is so. It is an indisputable fact, therefore, that the National banking system enjoys the confidence of the business community in a higher degree than any other ever did. I assert then, that general confidence being that only true test, the National banking system is not only not unpopular, but it is the most popular we ever had, because it is the safest and best we ever had. And why is it the safest and best? Because under the National banking act, the details of which I have no time to go into, the notes issued by national banks are so well secured by deposits of United States bonds, that a loss on the part of a holder of a national-bank note is simply impossible; and because under the same National banking act reserves so ample are required, and a system of Government supervision is

enforced so strict and searching that the speculating away of the bank capital, or dishonest tricks in bookkeeping or in making dividends, or defrauding depositors of their funds by bank presidents and directors, is next to impossible. Hence it is that during fifteen years of their existence, including five years of a terrible crisis—and I repeat this fact, for it is important enough to bear repeating—not a cent has been lost by a single holder of a national-bank note, and the loss of depositors in national banks has been less than the loss of depositors in the State and savings-banks alone was in a single year.

And now our Democratic agitators demand that this banking system be abolished. Indeed, if we are to abolish the safest banking system we ever had at a moment when confidence, and therefore a safe banking system, is more than ever needed, the reasons must be very weighty. What are they?

First, it is said that the national banks enjoy privileges which are oppressive to the people; that for every \$100 in bonds they deposit in the Treasury they are permitted to issue \$90 in notes; that they draw interest upon the bonds, and then lend out their notes and draw interest on them also, which makes double interest; that thus they fatten and grow rich at the expense of the people, and that, therefore, it would be more economical for the people if the bank notes were withdrawn, greenbacks issued in their stead and the bonds on which the bank notes have been issued, be bought up in the market with the greenbacks so issued, so as to save the interest on the bonds. I think I state the case fairly.

From this it would appear that the banks must get immensely rich; and inasmuch as national banking is now free it is a wonder that not more of you go into so profitable a business, and a greater wonder still that about thirty millions of national-bank circulation has within a few,

years been withdrawn by the banks themselves. As people are not apt to lose a good chance to make money, there must be some trouble about those immense profits, which our Democratic friends fail to state. It is always wholesome to look at official figures. I have here a statement made by the Comptroller of the Currency before a Congressional committee in February last. It is somewhat dry reading, but we must exercise patience to get at the truth.

On February 15th the par value of the United States bonds deposited in the Treasury as security for national bank notes was \$346,243,550; gold being then at $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. premium, their currency value was \$363,372,854.

The amount of circulation issuable thereon was \$311,619,195; the gold interest on the bonds, \$17,290,071; the currency value of that interest at the time, \$18,147,279. "But," says the Comptroller, "as the banks are required to pay annually into the Treasury a tax of 1 per cent. on their circulation, or \$3,116,192, there is left \$15,031,087 in currency as the net amount of interest received by them on the bonds." "Upon receiving circulation," says the Comptroller, further, "the banks are required, by the act of June 20, 1874, to place an amount equal to 5 per cent. thereof, or \$15,580,960, with the Treasurer of the United States as a redemption fund, leaving out of the \$311,619,195 of circulation issuable upon their bonds, \$296,038,235 available for use, which amount, if loaned at 8 per cent., will produce an income of \$23,683,059, and this income added to the net interest on their bonds gives \$38,714,146 as the whole income from bonds and circulation." "But," he says further, "if the capital itself, which was necessary to purchase the bonds (\$363,372,854) were loaned out by them at 8 per cent., the annual income therefrom would be \$29,069,828, and the difference between this sum and the whole income from their bonds and circulation, which is

\$9,644,317, or 2 65-100 per cent. on the capital invested, represents the profits that the banks would receive over and above what could be obtained from the loan of the same amount of capital at the rate of interest named, provided that the whole amount of circulation received by the banks upon their bonds, less the redemption fund, could be kept loaned out by them continually throughout the year.

"In the above calculation no deduction is made for the costs of the redemption of the bank circulation, which lessens by so much the profits on circulation. Those costs were for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1877, \$357,066. Another point that should be considered in the above estimate of their circulation is that the banks held their bonds at a premium, which appeared among their assets for a large amount. It was on December 28, 1877, the date of the last report of their condition, \$8,834,639."

The Comptroller states further that if the bonds of the banks necessary to secure their circulation were converted into 4 per cent. bonds, which will as much as possible be done, their profits on circulation will be 1 91-100 per cent. on the capital employed.

Thus it appears that the national banks are by no means the gold mines they were represented to be, especially considering that of late they have not been able to keep their whole circulation loaned out the year through, and that the losses charged off by all the national banks during the year ending September 1, 1876, were \$19,719,026.42; during the following year, 1877, \$19,933,587.99, and during the six months ending March 1, 1878, no less than \$10,903,145.14, a total in two and a half years of \$50,555,759.55. Now, it will appear natural to you that the ratio of earnings of the national banks to capital and surplus for the year 1877 was only 5 62-100 per cent., and this year it will not be greater. I am sure many of your

business men of Cincinnati make a great deal more money on their capital than these bloodsucking institutions, and thus it is explained why you do not rush into national banking.

Now for the earnings of 5 62-100 per cent. on their capital and surplus which the national banks make, what do they give us? They give us the safest banking system we ever had. Suppose the profits on their circulation were 5 per cent. instead of $2\frac{1}{2}$, and their average earnings, as to capital and surplus, 12 per cent. instead of $5\frac{1}{2}$, would it not still be folly to forget that this banking system, by its safety, is worth many times the interest on their bonds every year to the business interests of the country? Can you expect to have a banking system like this without any profit at all to the men investing their money in it? You speak of saving to the people the interest on the bonds deposited by the national banks by the destruction of this system, and you call it economy; you call it economy to wipe out this safe system and substitute for it, as would inevitably be the case, the old State banks again, with their wildcat and yellow-dog currency, which robbed the people by the wholesale. You might just as well call it economy to abolish your paid fire department, and intrust your property again to the boys who run with the machine, because the paid fire department costs something. Are the business men of the country unreasoning children that they should act thus?

But you may say, why not deprive the national banks of this currency, thus saving the interest on their bonds, and then still keep them under the strict Government supervision which makes them so safe? I will tell you why not: Because the benefit arising from circulation was the principal thing which induced those corporations to come into, or organize under the National system, and to submit to the rigorous Government supervision, which is by

no means pleasant to them. Deprive them of that benefit and most, if not all, of the 2400 national banks now in existence will withdraw from the National system and become State banks again. You cannot eat your cake and keep it too. But there are still other reasons why the withdrawal of the national-bank currency and the substitution therefor of greenbacks appear to me highly detrimental to the public interest. I will not go into a discussion of the question whether new issues of greenbacks, a Government paper-money, in times of peace, would be Constitutional or not. I am strongly of the opinion that they would not be Constitutional. But, leaving that aside, even if the Constitution did not stand in the way, the following points are of decisive importance:

First. The substitution of greenbacks for national-bank notes, as I have already shown, would make the resumption of specie payments impossible, not only at present, but for an indefinite time. It would launch us out again upon the sea of irredeemable paper-money, without rudder and compass.

Second. Our national-bank currency possesses a quality very important to the business of the country, which the Government paper-currency does not possess. It is the quality of elasticity. Have you not all been demanding a currency elastic in volume? Well, the bank currency is. The Government paper is not. The volume of bank currency, under a well-regulated system, is determined by the requirements of the business of the country. When more is needed it will become profitable to issue more, and it will be issued. When less is needed, the excess flows back to the banks and withdraws. It is a self-adjusting process. The volume of Government paper-currency is fixed by law, and that law is made by politicians. Whatever the changing needs of business may be, that volume of the Government paper-currency remains

fixed, until through the slow and cumbersome machinery of legislation, the law is changed again by politicians. And of all human agencies to determine the volume of currency needed by business, business itself is the most reliable and best, and a set of politicians is the unsafest and worst. The Government is a bad banker, but if well administered it may be a good bank comptroller, as it proved in this instance. In a very important respect, then, national-bank currency, being equally safe as to the value, is vastly superior to greenbacks, and every thinking business man knows that it is so.

What other objections are there to the national banks? That, as Democrats say, the national-bank currency being based upon United States bonds, the maintenance of that circulation will tend to perpetuate the National debt. Well, the debt outstanding is about eighteen hundred millions. I would respectfully ask our Democratic friends whether they are in such a hurry to put their hands in their pockets to pay off those eighteen hundred millions this year or next? Will it not, even under favorable circumstances, take at least twenty-five or thirty years to accomplish that task? But while we have the National debt will it not be well to put it to the best use we can? When at last, after twenty-five or thirty years, we have paid it off until we come down to the last four hundred millions, will it not then be time enough to discuss whether it may be best to pay off that little amount too, or to keep it as a basis for bank circulation? Suppose we adjourn this debate until that period. Let me suggest that it is useless to borrow trouble about eggs to be laid a quarter of a century hence. Indeed, this objection shows the extreme poverty of argument to which the opponents of the national-bank question are reduced.

Their last point is that the national banks are a monopoly and the embodiment of the money-power. Now, I

am as firmly opposed to oppressive monopolies as anybody. But I am equally opposed to, and I feel a hearty contempt for, that trick of demagoguery which brings the charge of monopoly or oppressive money-power against everything against which it is thought expedient to excite the prejudices and hatred of unsophisticated people of small means. If that sort of demagoguery be extensively and effectively indulged in, we may, as a nation, have to pay dearly for it.

Can the national banks be called a monopoly? Monopolies are exclusive, and national banking is free to any person in the land who has money to invest. There is, then, a monopoly of which everybody can become a party and beneficiary. There are at present 208,000 shareholders in the national banks in the United States. More than one-half of them hold shares to the amount of \$1000 and less. They are presumably people of limited means, who have thus invested their little surplus. And any five of you, if you can raise the necessary capital, may, under the laws, organize a national bank. And this system is called a monopoly. Why, the charge is too absurd for argument. And where is the oppressive money-power in these banks? What has it been able to effect? Those banks are the most rigidly restricted, the most closely watched, the most keenly supervised and controlled institutions in the country. Has this money-power ever been strong enough in Congress to remove a single one of their restraints; to secure to them the least additional privilege or latitude of action, or to relieve them of a single one of their burdens? You all know that it has not. What a money-power is this, that can effect nothing for its own advantage!

And what are the relations of Government to those banks which our Democratic friends pretend to be so afraid of? The Government issues to the banks their

currency, and then it sees to it that every dollar of that currency be safe; that the stock be paid in, that the reserves be maintained according to law, that the books be regularly and honestly kept, and so on. In one word the Government sees to it that no tricks be played by which the billholder or the depositor might be defrauded. And, when the Government has to make a loan, the banks sometimes aid it in peddling it out. That is all, and there is your monopoly, and your grinding money-power.

And now, my fellow-citizens, I ask you in all candor and soberness, would it not be an act of wicked folly, for reasons so flimsy, without the least prospect of any real advantage, wantonly to destroy a banking system which, as every man in the country knows, is not only the best we ever had, but better than any other we are likely to have; to destroy it at a moment when with it the resumption of specie payments is easy, and without it impossible, so that it would have to be invented if it were not there; destroy it while the industrial energies of the Nation, after a long, painful period of paralysis and distress, are at last slowly and timidly venturing forth again, and when, above all things, confidence is needed to quicken the circulation of the blood in the social and economic body—and then just at such a moment to destroy the only great institution that has successfully passed the crucial test of a terrible crisis, and, therefore, justly does command universal confidence; and that institution the banking system, the most indispensable financial agency in all business transactions—aye, to start in a revival of business with the general breaking up of a good, reliable banking system; to inspire confidence with an earthquake! Why, gentlemen, the idea is so utterly childish and preposterous, that every sane man who ever thought of it must blush with shame at his own folly, when he calmly inquires into the full meaning and consequences of the proposition.

Certainly no man of common-sense need be told that under such circumstances it is the only wise policy to keep the good things we have, and to let well enough alone.

And now, my friends, I am come to a close. The American people are at present engaged in a political struggle to determine the character of the next National Legislature. The financial question has, for the time being, well-nigh swallowed up all other issues dividing parties. I sincerely regret to find the Democrats of Ohio as firmly wedded to the fallacies we combated in 1875 as they were then, and their party in other States drifting into the same dangerous current. I sincerely regret this, I say, for I am not partisan enough to rejoice at the errors of the opposition, if they threaten to become destructive to the public welfare. I desire both parties to be as good and patriotic as possible, so that the bad tendencies of one may not encourage the faults of the other, and I am glad, therefore, to see not a few Democrats manfully stand up for their old hard-money principles. May their acts be in harmony with their faith.

I do rejoice to see the Republicans of this State, and, indeed, almost all over the country, following the example you set in 1875, grow stronger in their resolution to defend the cause of honest money, true to their traditions and instincts of loyalty to the financial honor of the Republic; for they can render to the public good no better service.

The situation appears very grave. A diligent agitation seems to have propagated the paper-money mania like an epidemic. But this last blazing up may, after all, turn out to be really like the decisive paroxysm in typhoid fever, which, although apparently threatening death, is only the forerunner of convalescence. Indeed, with as intelligent and high-minded a people as the Americans, it can scarcely be otherwise. Through whatever extravagancies of imagination and reasoning they may pass,

even most of those at present earnestly opposing the re-establishment of the specie basis, they will finally land at the conclusion that, while in the economic movements of modern society paper-money is necessary, that paper-money must be convertible into the money of the world, and that its volume and value must not be the football of political agitation. The hopeful signs of returning prosperity cannot fail to weaken the inspiration which wild schemes of relief receive from long suffered distress. The laboring man, who now imagines himself engaged in a death struggle with capital as a hostile power, and is excited by extravagant theories moving entirely outside of the boundaries of existing social order, will, as the opportunity for profitable employment returns begin to feel again that society is not only not his enemy, but ready to redress his real grievances, and that in a country like ours there is the most fruitful field and ample reward for honest individual effort. Many of them begin already to perceive that the fluctuations of an irredeemable paper-money rob the laboring man first and rob him last, and that an honest dollar is his best friend. I have no doubt that when this crisis is successfully passed, the laboring man will be the first to acknowledge that those who defended honest money, even against his own errors, were the truest defenders of his interests.

But at present the duty of the hour calls upon every patriotic man for an honest effort to put an end to the senseless and destructive agitation which prevents the revival of business and the return of prosperity. There is scarcely a sane man in the country who will not admit that at some time the restoration of the specie system must come. The question is, whether it is to come now and bring with it public repose and a fruitful employment of the social forces, or whether it is to come after new and disastrous convulsions. We can never be better prepared

for it than we are to-day. Our National debt, formerly held abroad, has returned to our shores; our National credit is good beyond precedent; our products, exported in an abundance never seen before, find a profitable market; current prices are on the gold basis; our Treasury is well stocked with coin. If not now when can we ever expect to restore our money system to a solid foundation? Can any sensible man desire to see the country exposed to longer suffering from the disastrous effects of uncertainty?

There are in Europe nations groaning under the curse of irredeemable paper-money. Every one of them is painfully struggling to deliver itself of the evil. Every one of them envies us our glorious opportunities. Is it possible that we, proud of our popular intelligence, should hesitate to use them?

History shows us examples enough of peoples floundering among wild theories and schemes while under the influence of an irredeemable money they could not get rid of. But you will search the annals of the world in vain for an instance of a nation that was able and fully prepared, after long agonies, to return to a sound money system, and then wantonly run away from it. Will the American people be the first to present to the world so crazy an exhibition? It would expose us to the ridicule and contempt of mankind.

I read in the public journals of an orator speaking to citizens of Ohio, and declaring that the resumption act must be repealed before the 1st of January, and that if it is not, blood will be shed to prevent its execution. Can it be that there are men in this State ready to shed blood in order to escape the dreadful chance of exchanging their greenback for a gold dollar? If there are indeed persons who give such counsel, and victims so violently demented, the delirium must have reached a phase where it is im-

possible to draw the line between the sublime and the ridiculous. But whether there be or not, let the solemn duty of this hour unite all patriotic men in an earnest and active endeavor to prove that the American people are an honest people, scrupulously faithful to their National obligations, and a wise people, who, although not always exempt from temporary gusts of excitement and the invasion of erroneous doctrines, yet at last always follow the dictates of calm judgment and sovereign common-sense.

FROM HUGH McCULLOCH

94 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, Oct. 2, 1878.

You have my hearty thanks, and I have no doubt the hearty thanks of many thousands for your admirable and exhaustive speech at Cincinnati. It covers [the] whole ground, leaving nothing for inflationists to stand upon. It is, by far, the severest blow which has been given to the false gods which so many of our people are bowing down to. I wish all the members of the Cabinet were as sound on the financial questions as the Secretary of the Interior and as fearless as he in discussing it.

FROM HORACE WHITE

NEW YORK, Oct. 8, 1878.

I have read your Cincinnati speech, or as much of it as I could find in the newspapers, with great satisfaction. It is the first speech which attacks the citadel of the anti-specie resumption party. That citadel is the silver bill, and I tell you that I don't see how the Government is to resume on the 1st of January with that act on the statute book. It is a warning and an incentive to all holders of greenbacks to hurry up and get the gold while it lasts, because if they wait they will get only silver. . . .

TO EDWARD ATKINSON

WASHINGTON, Nov. 28, 1879.

I have received your letter of the 22nd inst. which informs me that "the Indian question has now taken root in Boston and will be followed to a conclusion if it costs a million or more," and also that "in right action my sympathy and counsel will be highly regarded." This is most welcome information, for no man can esteem more highly than I do, after my experience in the conduct of Indian affairs, the coöperation of enlightened and public-spirited citizens in the efforts of the Government to solve so difficult and troublesome a problem. It is also very important that this coöperation should proceed upon an intelligent mutual understanding so that those who have a common end in view may be kept from working at cross purposes in the choice of a line of action.

As to the ultimate end to be attained there can scarcely be any difference of opinion between us; it is the absorption of our Indian population in the great body of citizens under the laws of the land. You will also agree with me that this should be brought about in a manner least dangerous to the Indians themselves as well as to American society. Since writing your letter you have probably seen my annual report which must have convinced you that this is the objective point kept steadily in view by this Department. The report also sets forth the means by which the Government endeavors to reach that end as well as the results so far gained. The line of policy pursued, as stated in my report, is as follows:

1. To set the Indians to work as agriculturists or herders, thus to break up their habits of savage life and to make them self-supporting.

2. To educate their youth of both sexes so as to introduce to the growing generation civilized ideas, wants and aspirations.

3. To allot parcels of land to the Indians in severalty and to give them individual title to their farms in fee, inalienable for a certain period, thus to foster the pride of individual ownership of property instead of their former dependence upon the tribe with its territory held in common.

4. When settlement in severalty with individual title is accomplished, to dispose, with their consent, of those lands on their reservation which are not settled and used by them, the proceeds to form a fund for their benefit.

5. When this is accomplished, to treat the Indians like other inhabitants of the United States under the laws of the land.

Here the ultimate end is clearly pointed out as well as the process by which, in my opinion, it can be safely reached.

You say in your letter: "The present attempt to treat men as children must fail, even under your control of the Department. The natural method seems to be to establish the rights of the Indians as citizens under the 14th amendment, and then let them take their chance." I trust, if this expression seems to indicate any difference of opinion between us as to the course to be followed, that the difference exists more in words than in purpose. You will certainly agree with me that we should treat the Indians as what they really are, and take good care not to treat them as what they are not. Upon the soundness of our judgment in this respect our success will depend. I need scarcely assure you that, if, by some legal enactment or some judicial decision declaring the Indians citizens in every respect the equals of all other citizens, the Indian question could be solved, that is to say, if the Indians, such as they are at present, could be enabled "to take their chance" as citizens with other citizens in the contests and competitions of civilized life, with any fair prospect of

holding their own, nobody would more eagerly advise that course than those at present managing Indian affairs. It would be the greatest possible relief to them as well as to their successors.

I admit that the five civilized tribes in the Indian Territory, who for years have had schools, courts of justice, a form of government resembling our own, and are enjoying a certain degree of prosperity, might assume the rights and responsibilities of citizenship without serious danger to themselves, although a majority of even these Indians, as I was informed in my conferences with their leading men, still shrink from those responsibilities. I might say the same of the small number of Indians in other localities, who have gone through the intermediate stages above pointed out until they became more or less able to take care of themselves. These, however, form scarcely more than one-fifth of our whole Indian population. But if you could visit the Sioux, who have just begun the transition, the Comanches, the Kiowas, the Cheyennes, the Shoshonees, the Arrapahoes, the Utes, the Apaches, the Crows, the Assiniboines, the Gros Ventres, the Flatheads and numerous other tribes, and then put to yourself the question whether they, such as they are to-day, should be turned into the struggles of civilized life, without education, without at least some knowledge of a civilized language and of the ways of the world, without having learned how to work and how to provide for the future, without property well secured to them as individuals, simply "to take their chance," I have not the remotest doubt as to what your answer would be. You would indeed find many of them advancing with a rapidity encouraging the hope that the continuance for some time of a wise and firm guidance in the manner above indicated will enable them to take care of themselves. But you would, I am confident, agree with me in the conclusion

that to precipitate the large mass of them now into trials and responsibilities, which at best are just faintly dawning upon their minds, would be the greatest cruelty that could be inflicted upon them except, perhaps, extermination by the bullet. The result of such a measure cannot be doubtful. Having lost what pride and good qualities they possessed in their savage state, and not yet having acquired what civilization offers to fill the vacuum, they would at once become the helpless victims of the worst elements of the white population surrounding them. They would without fail in the shortest space of time be stripped of their little possessions. They would be condemned, as a race, to a life of vagabonds, paupers and beggars, of gipsies and pig stealers, and their women of something worse, a festering sore in society, carrying corruption wherever they would go, and a curse to themselves as well as to the white people among whom they would move. For we must not forget that the savage, when coming into contact with civilization unguarded and unguided, is but too apt first to acquire its vices instead of its virtues. Neither must we forget that a large portion of the white people of the West are by no means friendly to the Indians—just as the people of Massachusetts were not friendly to them in early colonial times—and that these Indians would not find them the kindest and most patient guides, if they were to take their chance among them unprepared.

This is no mere speculation. The fate of many Indians who have already been thrust among their white neighbors “to take their chance” with them without being sufficiently prepared, furnishes a warning example.

It must be evident, therefore, that the preparatory measures above pointed out—education, active work, settlement in severalty, fixed homes, property well secured to the individual—must precede their final absorption in the body of citizens, and that citizenship with its

responsibilities as well as rights must be the ultimate end and not the initial point of the solution of the problem. And it is by promoting this preparatory work, I respectfully suggest, that a movement like that inaugurated in Boston, can make itself most beneficent, and a genuine blessing to the Indian.

As to the Ponca case, which seems to have given the immediate impulse to your movement, it is scarcely necessary to repeat what I have already stated on several occasions: that this removal was effected in pursuance of a law passed before the incoming of the present Administration; that my first official report as well as that of the present Commissioner of Indian Affairs set forth the wrong done to the Poncas before that wrong was taken any notice of by the public, and that since then this Department has done all it could do under the law, by mere administrative action, to indemnify them for that wrong. I may add however that, had I then personally seen their old reservation on the Missouri, and especially their so-called houses there as I have since, I might have drawn the picture of their losses less strongly. I may assure you also that there is absolutely no wish nor interest here adverse to the welfare of the Poncas. It is, as I stated in this year's report, a matter of grave doubt, whether under present circumstances a removal back to their old reserve would not have, in a practical point of view, rather an injurious than a beneficial effect upon their future. Were you acquainted with those circumstances in detail, you would probably share that doubt.

I cannot advise you concerning the manner in which you can take their case to the Supreme Court. The question whether an appeal from the well-known decision of Judge Dundy on the application for a writ of *habeas corpus* is to be prosecuted by the Government or withdrawn, although the first steps in that direction were taken at the time, is

still under advisement. While I am at present inclined to think that the decision should be permitted to stand as it is, yet it involves considerations touching the established Indian policy of the Government so grave, that upon further examination a different conclusion may be reached. I shall advise you of this in time, if you so desire.

I will, however, not conceal from you my opinion that, while the establishment of some general principle with regard to the rights of the Indians by judicial decision may be useful in some respects, I consider practical measures for the improvement of the Indians, fitting them for the struggles of civilized life and the responsibilities of citizenship, of far greater importance. Without this, abstract rights and privileges, however logical and correct in principle, will be of no real advantage to them. In fact you will find on inquiry that but few of them would, under present circumstances, desire or take the rights of citizenship if offered to them. But as soon as the Indians become prepared for the exercise of those rights, the latter cannot and certainly will not be withheld. It appears to me, therefore, that all the energies which can be brought to bear upon the solution of the Indian problem should be concentrated upon the civilizing work as the first thing really needful. As you tell me that the citizens of Boston are willing to spend money for that cause, I may venture upon the further suggestion that at present I know of no way in which such money can be more advantageously spent than by founding and endowing an educational institute for Indian children similar to the schools at Hampton and at Carlisle of which my annual report gives a brief account. If the citizens of Boston would establish and by a board or committee manage such an institution with a farm and workshops attached to it for agricultural and mechanical instruction, this Department would see to it that any number of Indian pupils that can

be accommodated, be furnished from the various tribes. The withdrawal of Indian children of both sexes from their home influences and their education in civilized surroundings appears to me one of the most important agencies in the work of Indian civilization, for it assures the future. This Department is going to the utmost limit of its means in promoting Indian education, but the number of Indian children so educated, to return to their people as well instructed and civilized young men and women, can never be too large, and here, it seems to me, is the field on which the benevolence of public-spirited citizens can produce the greatest results for the elevation of the Indian race. I would commend this most warmly to your consideration and advocacy, and I should be most grateful to you if you could induce the citizens of Boston to take this matter in hand with their well-known spirit and energy.

I address these remarks to you with the confident hope that the movement in which you are engaged will also induce a larger number of intelligent and high-minded men and women to seek and acquire that information about Indian affairs which will enable them to form clear and reliable judgment on the various aspects of the question. Philanthropy to be effective must, above all things, stand on a sound knowledge of facts. One of the greatest disadvantages the government of Indian affairs has to contend with, is that so large a number of people undertake to pronounce judgment upon it without ever taking the trouble to inquire into its objects, the means at its disposal, its methods and the nature of its business in detail. I have known intelligent men who would hesitate to express an opinion on the merits of an improved door-knob or gas-burner without careful examination, but do not hesitate at all to dispose of the Indian question at a moment's notice without ever having investigated one single phase of it. You can also well imagine that expressions of

opinion, coming from persons ever so well-meaning, will be materially weakened in their influence upon those charged with public responsibility, when they proceed upon assumptions known to be groundless, when for instance in the discussion of the Ponca case we are told by prominent speakers in public meetings, that the Poncas are kept in the Indian Territory by the influence of the "Indian ring," while I know that this Department has no authority of law for moving them back and that I have never been approached by a human soul with regard to the matter; or that the Poncas were stripped of more than \$200,000 worth of personal property, that is to say every man, woman and child of the 700 Poncas of about \$300 each, while the ridiculous absurdity of such a statement is clear to every one knowing anything of Indians and the personal property they are apt to have; or that the Poncas were driven away from their old reservation in Dakota by the Indian ring which wanted to get possession of their lands and whose bidding was done by this Department, while I know as every well-informed person knows that the old Ponca reserve, being Indian country now as it was before, could not be and has not been taken possession of by any white person. The wrongs suffered by the Poncas are grievous enough and this Department is doing everything it can under the law to repair them, but you will readily understand that such wild statements as here mentioned are not calculated to inspire great confidence in the judgment or the regard for the truth of some of the advocates of their cause.

Such confidence ought to exist if there is to be fruitful coöperation for a common end. It needs no argument to show that the philanthropic sentiment of the citizens of Boston will accomplish more if working in good understanding with the Government than without it. I am very anxious that such good understanding and coöpera-

tion be brought about, and I am sure it can be brought about more effectually by personal conference than in any other way. I would therefore suggest to you that you make an effort to induce the citizens of Boston interested in this matter to send a committee to Washington for a frank exchange of opinions and an agreement on common purposes and corresponding action.

Such a committee might also serve another object. I conclude from your letter that there is doubt in your mind as to the fitness of the machinery of the Indian service to accomplish much good. I am aware that the talk about rascally Indian agents and the omnipotent Indian ring is still popular. I do not pretend that the Indian service, as at present organized, is all that it ought to be. But it has been and is my earnest endeavor to make and keep it as honest and efficient as any other branch of the public service, and I have reason to believe that considerable progress has been made in that direction. But in this respect I do not want to be taken on trust. Your committee, if you send one, will find everything here open to their inquiry. You are a man of affairs, experienced in such things. If you, upon examination, find our system of accountability, after the improvements we have introduced, still defective; if you discover an abuse not yet corrected, or a faithless officer undetected, or traces of an "Indian ring" not yet broken, nobody will be more grateful for the information than I. You, yourselves, may then judge whether the Indian service, as conducted at present, is a fit instrument for good purposes. I submit to you these suggestions for such use as you may see fit to make of them, hoping that they will do some good, and looking for a response with great interest.

TO E. L. GODKIN

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 7, 1879.

Your letter of November 27th has remained unanswered longer than I desired, owing to the rush of current business connected with the opening of the session of Congress.

I have gone over the points made by your correspondent as carefully as possible and find his complaints to be: (1) that pension claims are not disposed of as rapidly as they should be; (2) that many mistakes are made in the adjudication of them, and (3) that the hunting after fraudulent claims causes delay in the disposition of the just ones, while the number of claims discovered to be fraudulent is comparatively small.

The first complaint is in so far well founded, as the Pension Office with its present force is unable to keep up with the current business, especially since, after the passage of the arrears act, the number of original applications has grown to be nearly three times as large as it was before. I have satisfied myself that the present force is doing its work as rapidly as possible, and that, if it consisted entirely of experienced lawyers, which is unattainable, it could scarcely dispose of a larger number of claims. An increase of the force has therefore been asked for. As to the character of the force I have this to say: Original appointments to "clerkships" have been made, since I came into office, after competitive examination, and these examinations have, for a considerable time, been so arranged that persons conversant with the rules of evidence have a decided advantage. Moreover I have introduced the following practice: Every three months the Commissioner of Pensions presents to me the "efficiency record" of all the employés of his Office. We can ascertain with almost mathematical certainty the proportion of work done by each clerk in the Pension Office in point of quantity

as well as quality, the number of claims disposed of and the accuracy of the work, as it passes through the hands of the "reviewers." When the efficiency record is before me, those who have done the most and the best work are promoted, and those who have fallen behind are reduced. This system has proved to be a powerful stimulus, and the result is that almost every one in the Pension Office does his utmost. I do not believe there is an office in any of the Departments where there is so large a proportion of work done by the employés. With an increase of force I hope the Office will be able to grapple with the flood of work which is pouring upon it.

2. As to the mistakes made in the adjudication of pension claims I think I have better opportunities of judging than your correspondent, for the reason that rejected pension claims are carried up to the Department on appeal whenever there appears to be any chance for upsetting the decision of the Pension Office. These appealed cases are carefully examined by competent persons in the "pension division" of the "Secretary's office" and then submitted to me, and I find that the number of cases in which the decision of the pension officials has to be reversed, is very small, smaller indeed than might be expected considering the constant pressure under which the work in the Pension Office has to be done. A larger number of mistakes is probably made in allowing claims which should not be allowed, owing to the circumstance that under the present system pension claims are adjudicated on mere ex-parte testimony. But this your correspondent does not find fault with, as he thinks that it is better to give pensions to ten persons whose claims are fraudulent, than to withhold from one whose claim is just.

3. As to the hunting after fraudulent claims your correspondent is mistaken. The discoveries of fraud have

in most cases been accidental as under the present system they necessarily must be. The present system does not give the Pension Office the means to detect fraud unless it betrays itself, which it sometimes does. And for this reason the number of detections has been comparatively small, while the number of fraudulent cases is undoubtedly much larger and will no doubt increase after the passage of the arrears bill which has already proved a tremendous stimulus. The very fact that now, fourteen years after the close of the war, an average of 5760 original invalid claims and 1433 original widows' claims come in every month, while the average per month for the twelve months preceding the passage of the arrears act was only 1478 and 519, respectively, would seem to indicate that a great many persons are now trying their chance of obtaining a pension who never thought of it before and that it is high time to look for some system facilitating the detection of fraud. The Pension Office is indeed the distributor of the charities of the Government, but it is, in my opinion, an important part of its duty to see to it that the charitable fund be not robbed by persons who have no just claim upon it.

The paper of your correspondent makes upon me the impression that, in some things at least, he strives more to appear right than to be just. I do not think it quite just, for instance, that after, by implication, publicly charging the Commissioner of Pensions with something like favoritism in the payment of arrears, he should deem it sufficient to withdraw that charge in private. Neither would he, in criticising the practice of withholding record information from the claimant to test the truth of his evidence, have stated, as a great hardship, that "a man who has nearly completed his case and then lost the number of it, should be unable to obtain that number from the Office,"—had he taken the trouble to inform

himself instead of crediting unfounded complaint; for the number of a claim is never withheld from the claimant but always furnished him by the Office on demand; neither is the claimant called upon to *prove* by parole the facts which are of record in his case, unless he be informed that the record itself is unsatisfactory and he must support it by parole evidence.

However, it is not necessary to go into further detail. Your correspondent seems to have an idea of the duties of the Pension Office somewhat different from that entertained by officers who feel themselves responsible for the protection of the public interest. We cannot act upon the principle that in the distribution of public charity it is of no consequence whether the Government be defrauded or not. If we admitted such a principle, the Pension Office would soon be a mass of corruption, especially at a time when such legislation as the arrears act stimulates the greed of every unscrupulous person that has ever served in the Army.

I am very far from justifying the language used by Mr. Bentley in his letter to you, although I understand the feelings of a public officer who does his best to perform his duty and then finds himself assailed from a quarter from which he had expected support.

It is of course useless to pursue this matter further before the public. I can only assure you that here every possible effort is made to perform the duties imposed upon the Department satisfactorily and to render the service as efficient as may be to that end. I wish you could look into this matter personally, but I know how impossible that is.

TO GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 29, 1879.

I intended to answer your last note some time ago but the current business of the Department would not let me do so.

It seems to me that it is time for the opponents of General Grant's nomination to act. The "boom business" has been so much overdone that the public mind is open for a reaction. I have watched the matter with great attention and firmly believe now in the possibility of preventing the mischief. All that is necessary now is that those who are earnestly opposed to the third term should openly say so. You strike the nail on the head in saying that the real danger consists in "the habituation of the popular mind to personal government." But I think you are not right in your apprehension that the people have no clear appreciation of that danger. It is just this appreciation, together with their remembrance of the corruptions and abuses of the Grant regime, that makes the Germans so unanimous in their opposition to the third term. I see this cropping out everywhere. Without the German Republican vote several of the Northwestern States, such as Wisconsin, Illinois and Ohio, cannot be carried. This is gradually becoming well understood among politicians. Now let it be known that the Independent Republican element in New York is of the same mind,—let this become known through a strong and unmistakable demonstration, and the back of the Grant movement will be broken.

Why not proceed in *Harper's Weekly*? And if you do not think it practicable to speak out bluntly there editorially—I mean as to the support of Grant in case of his nomination—would not *Harper's Weekly* publish communications stating the whole argument?

I repeat, it seems to be time now to go forward. A few weeks hence the practical preparations for the elections of delegates to the National Convention will commence, and now we can inaugurate a healthy movement not only to prevent Grant's nomination but that of any candidate whose record is not clean. Determined action now will be apt to save us a great deal of trouble. What has been said and done so far may remain without effect unless followed up with more decided demonstrations. Is the organization of the "scratchers" in any manner active? They should not hesitate now to step forward and make known their minds.

I write to you with entire frankness, knowing that you fully appreciate the greatness of the issue. I hope you will communicate with me, of course, in entire confidence. I find that we are stronger in numbers as well as influence than we thought some time ago. We can afford to "stand up and be counted."

TO HENRY CABOT LODGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Jan. 3, 1880.

I am afraid I cannot "postpone to a certain day." The fact is the article I intended to write was to be about the Grant business and calculated to produce an effect upon the movements preparatory to the Republican National Convention. In order to do that, it would have to appear now, or at least within two or three weeks. Even if I could find time, this or next month, to write it, which is quite impossible, it would not come out in time to do any good. But I have scarcely ever been more absorbed by current business than I am now, so that I can scarcely think of anything else.

Now, as to the Grant business, one thing seems to me

necessary to kill it with unfailing certainty: it is that those who do not mean to support him under any circumstances—and there are legions of them—should make it known, boldly and loudly, before the election of delegates to the National Convention takes place. Much is done in that direction already, but more should be done. Cannot you and your friends set the “Young Republicans” of Massachusetts going? Now is the time for them to do something decisive. It does not look at present as if the South would nominate Grant. If the opposition, which really exists, shows itself in season and with sufficient strength and determination, his name will never appear in the convention. I agree with you perfectly in what you say with regard to Sherman.

TO MRS. HELEN JACKSON¹

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Jan. 17, 1880.²

I should certainly have answered your letter of the 9th instant more promptly had I not been somewhat overburdened with official business during the past week. I hope you will kindly pardon the involuntary delay.

As I understand the matter, money is being collected for the purpose of engaging counsel to appear for the Poncas in the courts of the United States, partly to represent them in the case of an appeal from Judge Dundy's *habeas corpus* decision, and partly to procure a decision for the recovery of their old reservation on the Missouri river. I believe that the collection of money for these purposes is useless. An appeal from Judge Dundy's *habeas corpus* decision can proceed only from the Govern-

¹ “H. H.”

² This and the other letters are printed in the appendix to Mrs. Jackson's *Century of Dishonor*.

ment, not from the Poncas, for the simple reason that the decision was in favor of the latter. An appeal was, indeed, entered by the United States district-attorney at Omaha immediately after the decision had been announced. Some time ago his brief was submitted to me. On examining it, I concluded at once to advise the Attorney-General of my opinion that it should be dropped, as I could not approve the principles upon which the argument was based. The Attorney-General consented to instruct the district-attorney accordingly, and thus Judge Dundy's decision stands without further question on the part of the Government. Had an appeal been prosecuted, and had Judge Dundy's decision been sustained by the court above, the general principles involved in it would simply have been affirmed without any other practical effect than that already obtained. This matter is therefore ended.

As to the right of the Poncas to their old reservation on the Missouri, the Supreme Court has repeatedly decided that an Indian tribe cannot sue the United States or a State in the Federal Courts. The decisions are clear and uniform on this point. Among lawyers with whom I discussed this matter I have not found a single one who entertained a different view; but I did find among them serious doubts as to whether a decision, even if the Poncas could bring suits, would be in their favor, considering the facts in the case. But, inasmuch as such a suit cannot be brought at all, this is not the question. It is evidently idle to collect money and to fee attorneys for the purpose of doing a thing which cannot be done. Had the disinterested friends of the Indians who are engaged in this work first consulted lawyers on the question of possibility, they would no doubt have come to the same conclusion.

The study I have given to the Indian question in its various aspects, past and present, has produced in my mind the firm conviction that the only certain way to

secure the Indians in their possessions and to prevent them from becoming forever a race of homeless paupers and vagabonds, is to transform their tribal title into individual title, inalienable for a certain period; in other words, to settle them in severalty and give them by patent an individual fee-simple in their lands. Then they will hold their lands by the same title by which white men hold theirs, and they will, as a matter of course, have the same standing in the courts, and the same legal protection of their property. As long as they hold large tracts in the shape of reservations, only small parts of which they can make useful to themselves and to others, the whole being held by the tribe in common, their tenure will always be insecure. It will grow more and more so as our population increases, and the quantity of available land diminishes. We may call this an ugly and deplorable fact, but it is a fact for all that. Long experience shows that the protests of good people in the name of justice and humanity have availed but very little against this tendency, and it is useless to disguise and unwise to overlook it, if we mean to do a real service to the Indians.

For this reason I attach much more importance to the passage of legislation providing for the settlement of the Indians in severalty and giving them individual title in fee-simple, the residue of their lands not occupied by them to be disposed of for their benefit, than to all the efforts, however well intended, to procure judicial decisions which, as I have shown, cannot be had. I am glad to say that the conversations I have had with Senators and Representatives in Congress on the policy of settling the Indians in severalty have greatly encouraged my hope of the success of the "severalty bill" during the present session.

I need not repeat here what I said in a letter to Mr. Edward Atkinson, which you may possibly have seen

some time ago in the Boston papers, about the necessity of educating Indian children. You undoubtedly understand that as well as I do, and I hope you will concur in my recommendation that the money collected for taking the Ponca case into the courts, which is impossible of accomplishment, and as much more as can be added, be devoted to the support and enlargement of our Indian schools, such as those at Hampton and Carlisle. Thus a movement which undoubtedly has the hearty sympathy of many good men and women, but which at present seems in danger of being wasted on the unattainable, may be directed into a practical channel, and confer a real and lasting benefit on the Indian race.

FROM MRS. HELEN JACKSON

NEW YORK, Jan. 22, 1880.

Your letter of the 17th instant is at hand. If I understand this letter correctly, the position which you take is as follows: That there is in your opinion, and in the opinion of the lawyers whom you have consulted on the subject, no way of bringing before the courts the suits for the prosecution of which money has been and is being contributed by the friends of the Poncas; that the reason you do not approve of this movement is that "it is evidently idle to collect money and to fee attorneys for the purpose of doing a thing which cannot be done." This is the sole reason which I understand you to give for discountenancing the collection of money for these suits. Am I correct in this? And are we to infer that it is on this ground and no other that you oppose the collection of money for this purpose? Are we to understand that you would be in favor of the Poncas recovering their lands by process of law, provided it were practicable?

You say, also, that you hope I will "concur" in your "recommendation that the money collected for taking the Ponca

case into the courts shall be devoted to the support and enlargement of our Indian schools." May I ask how it would be, in your opinion, possible to take money given by thousands of people for one specific purpose and use it for another different purpose? You say, "Had the friends of the Indians who are engaged in this work first consulted lawyers on the question of possibility, they would, no doubt, have come to the same conclusion." Had the friends of the Indians engaged in this work, and initiated this movement without having consulted lawyers, it would have been indeed foolish. But this was not the case. Lawyers of skill and standing were found ready to undertake the case; and the matter stands therefore to-day precisely as it stood when I wrote to you on the 17th instant. All the money which is thought to be needed for carrying the Ponca case before the courts can be raised in twenty-four hours in Boston, if you can say that you approve of the suits being brought. If your only objection to the movement is the one objection which you have stated, namely, that it would be futile, can you not say that, if lawyers of standing are ready to undertake the case, you would be glad to see the attempt made in the courts, and the question settled? If it is, as you think, a futile effort, it will be shown to be so. If it is, as the friends and lawyers of the Poncas think, a practicable thing, a great wrong will be righted.

You say that "to settle them (the Indians) in severalty, and give them by patent an individual fee-simple in their lands," will enable them to "hold their lands by the same title by which white men hold theirs," and that "then they will, as a matter of course, have the same standing in the courts and the same legal protection of their property." May I ask you if any bill has been brought before Congress which is so worded as to secure these ends? My only apology for troubling you again is my deep interest in the Indians, and in the Ponca case especially.

TO MISS EMMA ALLISON

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24, 1880.

Private.

I have received your kind letter of the 12th inst. and beg leave to express to you my sincere thanks for the encouraging sentiments it conveys to me.

Yesterday I had my last interview with Chief Winnemucca and the delegation accompanying him. It gave me the most heartfelt pleasure to comply with all their requests, and they appeared to be completely satisfied. I hope they will now become permanently settled, and if Congress gives me the legislation I have asked for, I expect to be able to make those of them that will occupy land in severalty, proprietors of farm lots in fee simple before I go out of office. I shall do all I can to make such arrangements on the Malheur reservation as will answer that object. They appear to be well meaning people and I shall befriend them as much as I can. I am very glad I have had them here, and they expressed their thankfulness in a very touching manner.

For whatever information you may be kindly disposed to give me concerning the condition and wants of the Indians on the Pacific Coast I shall be much obliged to you.

TO MRS. HELEN JACKSON

WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 26, 1880.

In reply to your letter of the 22d instant, I beg leave to say that if an Indian tribe could maintain an action in the courts of the United States to assert its rights, I should object to it just as little as I would object to the exercise of the same privilege on the part of white men. What I do object to is the collection of money from philanthropic

and public-spirited persons, ostensibly for the benefit of the Indians, but in fact for the benefit of attorneys and others who are to be paid for again testing a question which has been tested more than once, and has been decided by the Supreme Court so clearly and comprehensively that further testing seems utterly futile. You say that there are lawyers of skill and standing ready to undertake the case. Of course there are such. You can find lawyers of skill and standing to undertake for a good fee any case, however hopeless: that is their business. But I am by no means of your opinion that, whether it be futile or not, the experiment should be tried once more, and for this purpose the collection of money should be further encouraged. It cannot be said in this case that if the attempt will not help it will not hurt. There seems to be now a genuine and active interest in the Indian question springing up. Many sincere friends of the Indians are willing to spend time and money for the promotion of their welfare. Such a movement can do great good if wisely guided in the direction of attainable objects; but if it be so conducted that it can result only in putting money into the pockets of private individuals, without any benefit to the Indians, the collapse will be as hurtful as it seems to be inevitable. It will not only be apt to end a movement which, if well directed, might have become very useful, but it will also deter the sincere friends of the Indians who contributed their means in the hope of accomplishing something from further efforts of that kind, so that we may find it very difficult, for a long time at least, to engage this active sympathy again. Confidence once abused does not revive very quickly. This is my view of the case. You ask me "how it would be possible to take money given by thousands of people for one specific purpose, and use it for another and different purpose," meaning the support of Indian schools. It

would, in my opinion, be far better to lay the matter in its true aspect frankly before the contributors, and to ask them for their consent to the change of purpose, than to throw away the money for a purpose which cannot be accomplished.

In reply to your inquiry whether any bill has been brought before Congress providing for the settlement of the Indians in severalty, and for conferring upon the individual title in fee-simple to the lands allotted to them, I am glad to say that several bills of this kind have been introduced in both the Senate and the House, and are now before the respective Committees on Indian Affairs for consideration. If such a bill passes, of which there is great hope, the Indian, having a fee title by patent to the piece of land which he individually, not as a member of a tribe, holds as his own, will stand in the eye of the law just like any other owner of property in his individual right, and, as a matter of course, will have the same standing in court. This will do more in securing the Indian in the practical enjoyment of his property than anything else I can think of, and it has long been my endeavor to bring about just this result. I trust we shall obtain the desired legislation during the present session of Congress.

TO E. DUNBAR LOCKWOOD

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, April 1, 1880.

I notice in the [Philadelphia] *Telegraph* of March 30th an article about the Ute matter if possible still more outrageous than the first. It says that my "avowed object" in making the bargain with the Utes "was to get from them twelve millions of acres of land for the land speculators and miners of Colorado," and that I gave them for that less than forty thousand acres, located

nobody knows where. It says further that this agreement was obtained from the Utes while they "were held as prisoners and not allowed to consult any one but himself while in Washington."

This constitutes the charge, and is a misrepresentation of facts from beginning to end. For months before the agreement was made the Ute chiefs here were at perfect liberty to consult any one they pleased, and they were called upon by a great many persons and had conversations about their affairs with Congressmen and Senators and others; in short, with all whom they desired to see.

Secondly, the fact is that ever since the attack upon Thornburgh and the Meeker massacre, I have single-handed and alone been standing between the Utes and destruction, for which I have been ridiculed and reviled beyond measure. If I had removed my hand from them a day a war would have been inaugurated and we should have seen the last of this tribe. I can say without any exaggeration that I alone saved them, and that in point of fact they can be saved in the future only by removing that source of irritation that exists between them and the white population that is now in very large numbers crowding around them.

Now, as to the agreement itself, it is untrue that for twelve millions of acres they get only forty thousand acres as the *Telegraph* says. I send you herewith a copy of the bill containing the agreement, which was drafted by my direction and from which you will see that in the aggregate they will have between seven and eight hundred thousand acres; and not only that, but they will be settled at the expense of the Government, receiving everything needful to them, and will have an annuity of fifty thousand dollars, representing a capital of a million and a quarter in addition to their former annuities.

What the *Telegraph* says about their remaining insecure

in the possessions which they are to have is equally untrue, for you will see that they will hold their lands in fee simple and receive from the United States individually a United States patent just like any white man. You will further see that their land is to be inalienable for twenty-five years and exempt from taxation and execution; and further that the courts are to be open to them, as they are open to any white citizen. The provision concerning their admission to citizenship, which I had put in the bill, was stricken out by the Senate Committee; but we are going to have a general bill making provision in that respect.

Thus you will see that the strictures of the *Telegraph* are utterly unjust and have not the least foundation in fact.

The *Telegraph* further says that I have been hotly contesting the admission of the Indians to the protection of the courts, and that I have been throwing every obstacle in the way of the friends of the Indians, who wished the decision of Judge Dundy confirmed by the Supreme Court. This is equally untrue, for I recognized the decision of Judge Dundy myself as good and did not contest it at all. So it stands in full force unquestioned by this Department.

In the second place, I did not contest the right of the Indian to go into court, but simply showed that as the law now stands an Indian tribe has no standing in court according to the decision of the Supreme Court. This is a matter of fact which nobody questions. But what I did do is to have introduced in Congress more than one legislative provision for the opening of the courts to the Indians just as they are opened to the whites.

Thus you will see that the article of the *Telegraph* is based on untruth from beginning to end, and that what has been done for the Utes is not only saving them from utter destruction but giving them ample provision and protection as far as the law can give it for the future.

I have no doubt that Mr. Warburton, whom I believe to be a just man, will not hesitate to retract the untruthful and injurious statements which the *Telegraph* has put forth.

TO HENRY CABOT LODGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, May 23, 1880.

Grant's nomination appears now more probable than it did some time ago, but by no means certain. He has not a majority of the votes, but his managers will resort to every possible means to obtain control of the Convention. The temporary organization will be of the utmost importance, and the first, perhaps the decisive fight, will be right there. It can be kept out of the hands of the Grant managers only by the organized coöperation of all the elements of opposition. This is vital. Let not the Massachusetts delegates put any obstacle in the way of such coöperation on account of their fear of Blaine. If that coöperation fails, the Grant managers will have their own way, and everybody can now see what the consequences will be. I am as firmly convinced as ever that Grant's defeat will leave the nomination of Blaine impossible. There seems to me no reason, therefore, why the Edmunds, Sherman and Blaine delegates should not coöperate on all preliminary questions, such as temporary and permanent chairman of the Convention, the unit rule etc., etc. It would be fatal not to do so. The field must necessarily unite against Grant on these things, and when Grant is out of the way its different elements may fight each other; in the meantime each delegation holding fast to its candidate. The Sherman men, as far as I know them, will not go over to Blaine. The chances are one hundred to one that Blaine cannot be nominated. Let me impress upon you the absolute necessity of harmonious coöpera-

tion of all the opposition elements on all questions except the nomination itself. What kind of an enemy you have to deal with has become apparent by the proceedings of the Illinois convention. Please let me hear from you.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, June 15, 1880.

The papers bring the news of the death of your father. It is needless to use many words to assure you of my heartfelt sympathy in your bereavement, which I am sure you will bear as a man of your stamp must. But I wanted to let you know that I have thought of you on this mournful occasion as a sincere and warm friend.

TO HENRY CABOT LODGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, June 22, 1880.

Thanks for your kind letter of the 20th. Garfield was here a few days ago and I had a full talk with him. There will be a complete refutation of the charges by one of his friends very soon. I am inclined to think that it will be addressed to the *Nation*. At any rate, it will come. I have known Garfield very well for many years, and I have full confidence in his integrity. He is, in my opinion, incapable of a dishonest act, although a shrewd lobby agent may have succeeded in placing him in an equivocal position. I think the country will soon be fully satisfied of the uprightness of his character.

Your work at Chicago was admirably done. There is only one thing I might find fault with: When Conkling offered the resolution binding all the delegates to support

the nominee, whoever that nominee might be, he ought to have been put down at once and with the greatest emphasis. I am sure it might have been done by a single speech.

But the work of the machine, so ingeniously contrived, was undone in the neatest and most businesslike manner. On the whole, the results of the Convention are a great blessing to the country. They will have a restraining effect upon the bad elements in both parties. There is much that we may congratulate ourselves upon.

Now—will you be nominated for Congress? I hope so.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

WILMINGTON, DEL., June 28, 1880.

My dear Schurz: Thank you kindly for your note of sympathy and friendship. My father passed from life as peacefully and painlessly as ever is man's lot. Ever since I saw the signs of his mental decay I have looked upon his death as a welcome release, but there is a pang in the long parting that nature inflicts, and I feel it sensibly.

From some cause, the note you wrote on the 15th has just reached me. I must go down to Washington in a week to gather up some matters I abandoned in haste to go to my father's bedside, and then I hope to take your hand. Ever sincerely yours.

END OF VOLUME III

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