


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SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF
CARL SCHURZ

IN SIX VOLUMES

SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF

CARL SCHURZ

SELECTED AND EDITED BY

FREDERIC BANCROFT

ON BEHALF OF
THE CARL SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE

VOLUME IV.

JULY 20, 1880—SEPTEMBER 15, 1888

UNIV OF
CALIFORNIA

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

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SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE

TO VIVID
REMEMBRANCE

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THE WRITINGS OF CARL SCHURZ

The Writings of Carl Schurz

TO JAMES A. GARFIELD¹

INDIANAPOLIS, July 20, 1880.

My dear Garfield: Those are not the least sincere and faithful among your friends who tell you the truth even when it is not pleasant. I consider it a duty to say to you that your letter of acceptance has been a great disappointment to very many good men who hailed your nomination with joy and hope. Especially the vagueness of your language on the financial question, and still more the positive abandonment of ground taken, and to a great extent maintained, by the present Administration with regard to the civil service, have greatly discouraged many who expected to support you with enthusiasm and would have done so with effect. I enclose a letter from Horace White which is only one of a large number I have received and which indicate that the same feelings are alive with a much more numerous class of voters than that which he represents. You will find a tone of regret running through many Republican newspapers that do not always give an indiscriminate approval to whatever the party and its candidates may do or say. I do not even mean here the *Nation* and kindred periodicals. I know how I feel about it myself and how much stronger that feeling would be, did I not know you personally.

¹ Republican candidate for President.

If your letter was intended to serve your chances in the election, the calculation was, I think, at fault. The voters who are going to decide this election by throwing their weight on one side or the other, are likely to be influenced by one of two currents of sentiment: one is that since the Republican party has been in power for twenty years, the time has come for a change, and this current has great strength; the other is that the administration of public affairs during the last four years having been on the whole satisfactory, it is most prudent to let well enough alone. This current may become stronger provided the next Republican Administration bids fair to be at least as good as the present. As the one or the other of these currents of feeling grows during the campaign, so the election will go. Discussion of all other topics will have little effect upon the result.

Your letter of acceptance has had the effect of strengthening the current first mentioned and to weaken the second. It is universally interpreted as opening a prospect of the reestablishment of the party machine in the civil service, and of a return to the old system of Congressional patronage; in one word, as a reactionary movement in the direction of the worst of old abuses. It is useless to speak after this of regulating the civil service on sound principles by Congressional action, for everybody knows as well as you or I do that as long as Congressmen do not find their patronage cut off by the Executive, it will be idle to expect any Congressional legislation curtailing their enjoyment of it. And I know from four years of executive experience, that honest government is impossible with the civil service as a party machine, and the public offices used as patronage and perquisite. The intelligent public knows it just as well. But the public does not know as well as I, that if elected, your whole moral and intellectual nature will recoil from a relapse into the old abuses. The public

judge you from your utterances. You may fear defeat from two causes: the disaffection of the regular party machinists, or the disaffection of the intelligibly independent and the conservative elements which stand between the two parties but are necessary to the victory of either. If you should suffer defeat in consequence of strong declarations for sound principles which might attract the latter but disaffect the former, it would be a defeat with honor. If you should suffer defeat by surrendering sound principles and which might propitiate the former but drive away the latter, it would be a defeat with disgrace tainting your whole future career.

Where is the greater danger? The regular machine elements do not like you because they know that at heart you do not belong to them, whatever you may say. If they support you it is because they cannot do otherwise; they care for party success and are nothing without their party. If they did wish your defeat, any concessions of principle you may make to them will simply deprive you as a man of their respect without winning their support. I think they will support you because they cannot do otherwise without destroying themselves. If Conkling himself sulks, his following will go on without him and he will lose it.

The independent and conservative elements care little for mere party. If they support you, it is only because they see reason to hope for good government at your hands. They would have supported Hayes heartily and vigorously, and expected to favor you in the same measure as you would give assurance of improving upon what he had begun. In the same measure as they see reason to fear a reaction, they will drop off, thinking that it might be just as well to try a change of party. It may be said that they are not very numerous. But they are certainly numerous enough to hold the balance of power in the

contested States necessary for Republican success. Without them you can scarcely hope to win.

Besides, you want not only to be elected, but, if elected, to do good service to the country and credit to yourself by your Administration. I think I am not entirely ignorant of politics. Let me make a prediction. No skill in nice balancing will save you from the necessity of choosing between two roads, one running in the reactionary tendencies and machine politics, and the other in the direction of intelligent, progressive and reformatory politics. Following the latter, you will be supported by the best intelligence and moral sense not only of the party but of the country and be their leader. Following the former, you will have the political machinists around you and will be their slave. Just in the same measure as President Hayes maintained in practice the principles with which he started out, he won the applause of the country and made his party strong. His failures, which have brought the censure of the respectable opinion of the country upon him, all were in the direction indicated in your letter of acceptance as the course you mean to follow. I must confess that I regretted to find in your first utterance as a candidate an implied disapproval of the principles of your predecessor, the good record of whose Administration is at the present moment the best capital of the party whose candidate you are. I should not wonder if President Hayes had felt that himself.

I write you this for the reason that I think it necessary you should understand every phase of the campaign, and to point out some dangers which might be rendered still more serious by further steps in the same direction. I am going to speak here to-night and you will find my speech in the papers. I had originally sketched out a different and higher kind of argument, when your letter appeared and forced me to adopt the low key you observe

in its tone. You will discern at once that it is intended to stop all hasty demonstrations of discontent in independent quarters. I have written to my correspondents to the same [end], and with what effect, I do not know yet.

I communicate to you Horace White's letter, of course only in strict confidence. Please return it to me after having read it. I am on my way to the Pacific coast, and letters will find me from Aug. 28th to Sept. 1st in San Francisco, and until Sept. 5th at Sacramento City, Cal.

HAYES IN REVIEW AND GARFIELD IN PROSPECT¹

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—In response to the invitation with which a large number of citizens of Indianapolis have honored me, I shall speak to you only on a few of the questions which will be discussed in the present contest; on those, I mean, which come directly home to you. I shall address myself to the conservative business men of the country, whose interest in politics is only that of the public good.

I shall appeal not to your passions, but to your reason, and, without any resort to the artifices of oratory, give you a plain practical talk. The language of party warfare is apt to fly to violent exaggerations for the purpose of producing strong impressions; the language of reason and common-sense will abstain from them. Let me say at the outset, therefore, that I do not agree with those who speak of the present moment as the greatest crisis in the history of American affairs. The questions we have to dispose of are not those of immediate life or death; but the bearing they have upon the future welfare of the nation, and upon those interests which most nearly affect us, is important enough to make us consider well what we

¹Speech at Indianapolis, Ind., July 20, 1880.

are doing, to call for our best judgment and a strenuous effort to put that judgment into execution.

In the first place, let us make it clear to our own minds what we want. The answer is, in a general term, that we want a good government; that if we have it we must endeavor to keep it, and that if we have it not we must endeavor to get it. What is good government? We may answer again in general terms, that it is a government which well understands the public business, and, understanding it, transacts it within the limits of its constitutional power, intelligently, honestly and justly. The second question we have to answer to ourselves is, how far the government we have comes up to these requisites, how far the principles upon which it acts, the methods it employs, the aims it pursues and the degree of efficiency it develops, answer the public need, and how far in this respect we ought to preserve what we have or look for other things we have not.

As a member of the present Administration now on the point of yielding its power into the hands of a new set of public servants, I may be permitted to appeal to the candid judgment of the American people as to the manner in which the public business has been conducted during these last years. While it might be natural that, bearing a part of the responsibility myself, I should be inclined to take a favorable view of its performances, still I feel that my ways of thinking are independent enough not to betray me into mere partisan eulogy, and that we may confidently rely upon the judgment frequently expressed, not only by our friends, but also by very many candid men among our opponents. As a matter of course I do not expect Democratic politicians and orators to give us that fairness of judgment in the heat of an election contest which they could not deny us during the repose of a previous period, and which they will not deny us when this contest is over;

for it is a common experience that partisan spirit will, under the excitement of the campaign, call a man a villain to-day whose worth was recognized yesterday, and whose merit will again be admitted to-morrow. I think I am not exaggerating when I say that the fair-minded men of this country will admit, and do admit in their hearts to-day, that on the whole the public business has been conducted by this Administration, as far as it was in its control, honestly, intelligently and successfully. I should be the last man to claim perfection for it, for as one of those who had an opportunity to watch affairs in detail, I am well aware of errors committed and of failures suffered in this and that respect. No administration of government ever has been or ever will be free from them; and with respect to them I claim no larger measure of charity than would be claimed by any member of a government acting upon correct motives of duty, and willing to have the acts and the general success of the Administration impartially judged as a whole. It has maintained the public faith and raised the credit of the United States to a point never reached before. It has with consistent energy followed a policy relieving the country of the evils of an irrational and dangerous money system, and greatly promoted the prosperity of the people by the restoration of specie payments. It has funded enormous masses of the National indebtedness at a lower interest, and thus saved many millions a year to the taxpayer. It has faithfully executed the laws with a conscientious observance of sound Constitutional principles. By its fidelity to these Constitutional principles it has removed many obstacles which stood in the way of a friendly understanding between the different sections of the country and different classes of people. It has, under trying circumstances, when the public peace was disturbed by riot and violence on the part of a numerous class of citizens,

greatly aided the restoration of order and security by a calm and moderate employment of the limited power at its command, without in any case resorting to a doubtful stretch of authority. It has reformed many abuses in the public service, infused a higher sense of duty into its different branches, raised its moral tone, increased its efficiency, punished dishonesty and kept the service unsullied by the scandals arising from lax notions of official integrity. In saying this I am not unmindful of the fact that the reform of the public service has not overcome, in so high a degree as was intended and as was desirable, the obstacles opposing it in the shape of inveterate political habit and antagonistic interest; that therefore the highest standard has not been reached; that some mistakes have been made in the selection of persons for public position—points of which I shall say more in the course of these remarks; but it is certainly true that the service is now showing a greater degree of efficiency, a higher moral spirit and a stronger sense of duty than has prevailed perhaps at any time since the period when the administrative machinery was demoralized by the introduction of the spoils system. It has in many of its branches introduced rules and methods which have borne excellent fruit, and are capable of the most beneficent development if further carried on by coming administrations in sympathy with them.

I think I can say without exaggeration that these achievements will stand unquestioned in history by all fair-minded men. Withal the country is on the whole in good condition. The people are prosperous again; business is reviving; our industries are active; labor finds ready and remunerative employment; the Government enjoys the confidence of the business community in a rare degree, as our financial management has won the confidence of the whole world. Everybody sees reason to look

hopefully into the future, provided the conduct of our public affairs remains as good as it has been.

Now the time for a change in the *personnel* of the Administration has arrived, and if the present conduct of affairs is on the whole good, patriotic and sensible citizens will see to it that the change now to come be such as to give the greatest possible guarantee for the preservation of all that is good, and, wherever possible, for an improvement on it. They certainly will endeavor to prevent such a change as would threaten a serious deterioration. We should, therefore, favor that candidate for the Presidency who in this respect can be best depended upon.

We have to deal with two parties and their candidates. The Republican party, with James A. Garfield at its head, and the Democratic party, with General Hancock. I do not deem it necessary to discuss the possibility of the victory of the Greenback party and their nominees, for the simple reason that their chances of success are not perceptible to the ordinary eye, and that their organization may be looked upon as a mere tender to the Democracy.

Now I desire you to put before your minds with impartial candor the question, whether the Democratic candidate and the party behind him can be best depended upon to preserve that which is good in the present condition of things, and develop it in the direction of improvement? I wish to state the question mildly, for I am not partisan enough—indeed my orthodoxy in that respect has now and then been questioned—to deal in wholesale and indiscriminate denunciation of our opponents. I do not mean to incite your prejudices and inflame your passions, but to discuss facts and to draw from them legitimate conclusions. I do not want the party to which I belong to depend for success upon the failings of its opponents, and I am, therefore, not inclined to exaggerate the latter.

While adhering to one party I desire the other to be as good as possible, so as to compel my own to do its best. In this respect, therefore, I sincerely declare that I wish well to the Democratic party. I once participated in an attempt, which attempt miscarried, to move it up to the progressive requirements of the times. The contending political parties in a republic should be such in point of mental and moral constitution and capability that the government may be intrusted to either without serious apprehension for the safety of the public interest. I hope it will be so some day, and I wish it were so now. Let us see whether it is so now.

To speak in all candor, it appears to me that the Democratic party labors under historic as well as constitutional difficulties. Since the downfall and disappearance of the slave-power as a compact political interest, from which the Democratic party, more than twenty years ago, derived its morals, its logic, its political skill and statesmanship, that party has been floundering about, out of logical connection with the questions of the day; never knowing the time of day; always looking for something to turn up, and when something did turn up, spoiling it; lamely lagging in the rear of the events and requirements of the day; always behind; denouncing as impossible things that were already accomplished facts; with a strange incapacity to understand the present and to measure the future, making itself the recipient and rallying point for all dangerous and obstructive tendencies and elements, and thus committing blunder after blunder, which at the moment of their birth it uniformly gloried in as great strokes of policy, from the secession movement in 1861 down to the nomination of General Hancock in 1880.

There are many good and clear-headed men in the Democratic party, men whom I personally esteem and whose friendship I value, who deplore this condition of things

as much as I do, but are unable to control the obstreperous elements and tendencies of the organization, and to fit it for the tasks and responsibilities of government.

It is not my habit to rake up the embers of past discords and to substitute for the living questions of the present issues which lie behind us; but if we want to ascertain the prevailing tendencies and the present capability for good government of the Democratic party in accordance with the spirit and requirements of the present day, it is not unfair to review some striking experiences as illustrations.

Looking back to the year 1864, the fourth year of the civil war, when the Southern Confederacy was near the total exhaustion of its resources, we find the Democratic party in National Convention solemnly declaring that the war was a failure and must be abandoned. A few months afterwards the triumph of our arms was decided, the Confederacy collapsed, the restoration of our Union was assured and the Democracy was forced to acknowledge that the war had been a success. The Democracy had proclaimed its despair of the Republic just at the time when the triumph of the Republic was ripe. It became evident to every one that, had the Democratic policy been then adopted, the war would have indeed become a failure and the Union have gone to wreck and ruin.

When slavery breathed its last and its abolition had become an evident logical necessity, requiring nothing more than the form of law, the Democratic party declared that the abolition of slavery would be the ruin of the country and must by all means be averted. Who is there to deny now that the abolition of slavery was an absolute necessity, and has turned out a blessing? The Democrats are compelled to admit it themselves.

When as measures of settlement the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were passed, the Democratic party declared them void and entitled to no respect,

and almost immediately afterward found itself compelled to admit that for the peace of the country and as a basis for future development these Constitutional amendments had to be maintained.

Coming down to more recent history, when the Republicans in Congress had passed the resumption act in 1875, and the fruit of the restoration of specie payments was almost ripe to be plucked, the Democratic party in its National Convention of 1876 thought it a smart thing to declare that the very act passed for bringing specie payments was an impediment in its way and must be repealed. And who is there to deny now that had the act been repealed under the pressure of all the inflation elements in the country, the confusion of our financial policy necessarily ensuing would have prolonged the evils of an irredeemable paper currency under which we were then suffering? I need not accumulate further examples to show how incapable the Democratic party proved itself to understand and appreciate not only the immediate requirements of the times but facts that had been virtually accomplished, and how its greatest efforts were directed to the end of obstructing things that had become inevitable, and which it afterwards found itself compelled to admit as good.

And now in this year of 1880, when the war issues are fairly behind us; when by its conciliatory spirit and its strict observance of Constitutional principles the Government has removed all the elements of discord between the two sections which it was in its own power to remove; when, aided by a wise and successful financial policy, general prosperity is again blessing the land, and when the people look above all things for enlightened practical statesmanship that well understands the questions it has to deal with to foster and develop that prosperity; now the Democratic party knows nothing better to do than to set aside all its statesmen of known and settled opinions,

political experience and training, and to nominate for the Presidency a major-general of the regular army, a professional soldier, who has never been anything else but that, and who from the very nature and necessities of his profession has always stood aloof from the management of political questions.

I shall certainly not attempt to depreciate the character of General Hancock and the great services which he has rendered to the country. He is a gentleman of irreproachable private character, which I shall be sorry to see any effort made to discredit. As a soldier he has shown signal bravery and skill in the handling of troops under difficult circumstances, and his name is identified with some of the most splendid achievements of the war. For all this every good citizen will honor him. But the question is not whether we shall honor a deserving general.

The question is whether that deserving general would be the kind of a President the country needs, a President who can be depended upon successfully to solve the problems of statesmanship which are now before us; to preserve the good things already done and to improve upon them. To lead battalions of brave men against a fortified position, or to win a campaign by a dashing manœuvre, is one thing; to regulate the finances of the country in such a way that the blessings of a sound currency may be permanently secured to us; to develop our commercial opportunities; to organize the civil service in such a manner that it may conduct the public business upon sound business principles, is another; and in the latter case the brave spirit and ability which storms hostile batteries and lays low invading hosts does not appear in the first line of importance. When such difficult civic duties are to be performed we shall, as reasonable men, inquire whether the brilliant captain, who appears so glorious at the head of his columns, is also familiar with the complex interests which in official

station he would have to serve; whether his knowledge, training, experience and mental habits fit him clearly to distinguish on the political field good from evil, not only in the abstract, but in the confusing multiplicity and variety of forms in which things appear in reality; whether he will be sufficiently equipped to penetrate, restrain and baffle the wiles of political intrigue and the conflicts of faction among the friends, which always surround the chief magistrate of a great commonwealth; whether he will show himself fitted to move on that field of civil action and duty, where forces are handled and directed not by a mere rule of command and obedience, but by finding the just measure of firmness and moderation in the pursuit of great objects and in the resistance to evil influences. I cannot impress it too strongly on your minds that there can be no greater difference than that between the handling of troops in a campaign and the handling of the political forces of a great people and the handling of the political affairs of a great government.

Moreover it must not be forgotten that this Government is no longer the simple machinery it was in the early days of the Republic. The bucolic age of America is over. The interests the Government has to deal with are no longer those of a small number of agricultural communities, with here and there a commercial town. They are the interests of nearly fifty millions of people spread over an immense surface, with occupations, pursuits and industries of endless variety and great magnitude; large cities with elements of population scarcely known here in the early days, and all these producing aspirations and interests so pushing, powerful and complicated in their nature, and so constantly appealing to the Government rightfully or wrongfully, that the requirements of statesmanship demanded in this age are far different from those which sufficed a century ago.

It is believed by many that it is an easy task to perform the duties of the President of the United States—that the only thing he has to do is to form a program of policy which he desires to carry out, and to call good and experienced men into his Cabinet to attend to the detail of the business, without meddling himself with its intricate complications. The experience I have gathered from personal observation, not only as a member of the legislative body but also of the Cabinet, has convinced me that this is a great mistake.

If all the President had to do were to select seven men who agree with him as to the principal objects to be accomplished, and then consult and agree with them about the means to be used, undisturbed by the pressure of outside forces, it would, indeed, be a comparatively easy and a comfortable thing. But the fact is that the President of the United States, by the very nature of his position, is obliged to spend far more time in listening to the advice and the wishes and the urgency of men outside of his Cabinet, than to his consultations with Cabinet ministers themselves. The opposition he may encounter from the opposing party in Congress and in the press is, in most cases, the least of the difficulties he has to contend with. The greatest puzzles that are apt to perplex and sometimes to overwhelm his mind come from his own party, who have a claim upon his attention and insist to have that claim respected. Not only upon the great measures of his Administration, but upon every detail, the advice of the members of his party, especially those in Congress, is urged upon him with all imaginable sorts of argument and from all imaginable sorts of motive. There is scarcely an appointment he has to make, there is certainly not a reform he wants to execute, that he will not have to carry through a siege and storm of opposing wishes and interests. Every object he pursues will run counter to the wishes

not only of his opponents, but of some of his friends; every reform, the execution of which may appear to him desirable, will tread upon the toes of somebody whose interests lie in the abuse to be reformed, or who has a friend to protect who is connected with it; and all these pleas, representations, remonstrances, urgencies and pressures go to the President, not through the members of his Cabinet, but behind their backs; and it is a matter of long and varied experience that unless the President himself has a sufficient knowledge of affairs, a clear eye to see through arguments and motives, and that temper and skill which are necessary to resist without offending, and to conciliate without giving up his objects, he will inevitably be run over and lamentably fail. No man who has not witnessed it has an adequate conception of the furious pressure the President is subjected to, especially during the first period of his administration; and that first period is apt to determine the character of the whole. No Cabinet minister can carry out a reform in the branch of the public service over which he presides unless he has the President at his back, for if the President yields to remonstrances and urgencies brought to bear upon him against such a reform, the Cabinet minister will find himself baffled at every step.

I speak from experience when I say that most of the good things that have been done under this Administration, whatever merit the respective Cabinet ministers may deserve for them, are no less due to the clear-headed and faithful support, frequently called the "amiable obstinacy," with which President Hayes stood behind them by warding off the opposition. It is for such reasons of inestimable benefit to an administration that the President himself should have had the experience of active work in legislative bodies, and especially in the Congress of the United States. It will require in a President a high degree

of that intuitive genius with which but very few men in a century are endowed to make his administration successful without that experience.

Now put, for the sake of argument, in that most trying position, General Hancock or any man trained exclusively in the walks of army life, of which he is so conspicuous an ornament—I mean a man not endowed with that intuitive genius which I have spoken of, and which even his most ardent friends, as I understand, do not claim for General Hancock. What has there been in the school of his past life to fit him for it? As a boy he was accepted by the Government as a cadet at West Point, and that was his college and university. I have high respect for that military school. Every branch of military science is taught there, I have no doubt, with knowledge, skill and success. The principles of military honor and the great law of command and obedience are inculcated as the guiding stars of the future life of the student. The affairs of ordinary human existence outside of the military profession, and the problems it has to deal with, are necessarily treated as matters of only secondary moment. Our military school at West Point has given us many glorious soldiers who have adorned the history of the country; but it has never been pretended that it was meant to be, or was, a school of statesmanship. That school absolved, the young man entered into the regular army service. Of all classes of our society it may be said that our regular army is the most exclusive, the most widely separated from the ordinary business life of the people in point of sympathy, duty and habit. If we have an apart class among us, a class whose contact with the cares and endeavors and business and objects of the life of the masses is only occasional and unsympathetic; a class that in its ideas and aims is separated from the multitude, it is the officers of the regular army. This is not meant to dis-

credit in any sense the character of our service or of the officers in it; it is the almost unavoidable peculiarity of their training and situation, for which they are in no way responsible. Their duties may be arduous; but, except in places of highest command in active warfare, they are extremely simple, specific and narrow; and it is a common experience that the mental horizon of men is apt to become limited by the sphere of their duties. I have heard it said a hundred times by men who had spent the best part of their lives in the regular army, and then were thrown upon their own resources to make a living in ordinary pursuits, that their army life had unfitted them for the every-day tasks of society. They found themselves, in a multitude of cases, utterly bewildered by the competition they had to run with those who had been trained in civil pursuits. How is it possible to assume that men who have spent the best part of their lives, who have grown old in that exclusive atmosphere, should show particular fitness for the most complex and confusing of all duties, the highest civil office in the land?

It may be said, therefore, without exaggeration, that in a hundred cases to one, by taking an old regular army officer, who has never been anything else, and putting him into the highest and most difficult political position, you may spoil an excellent general in making a poor President.

There he is, with an honest intention to do right and to serve his country. Problems of financial policy suddenly rise up before him—questions of revenue, of commercial policy, not in the way of general maxims and vague principles, but in the mysterious shape of practical problems to be applied to a given state of circumstances; questions of party politics, where the interests of the public and of the party are curiously mixed together in bewildering confusion. The man at the head of affairs

means to do right; let us assume his Cabinet officers mean the same. But now a host of Senators, Representatives, prominent political leaders from all parts of the country swarm in upon him. Having never had any practical contact with the workings of financial or commercial systems, having stood aloof from the intricacies of political management, the man at the head of the Government is the objective point of all their efforts. There are a hundred politicians of name and importance, real or pretended, who lay claim to his attention, and having heard them all—as he has to hear them—and finding that their views and objects run counter to one another, he suddenly discovers himself in an unexpected state of uncertainty as to what is right and what is not, what will serve the interest of the country and what will benefit or injure the interests of his party. He has to meet a multitude of arguments put at him by a multitude of men from a hundred different motives, all seeming to him important, because all are to him new; not a few among the most prominent of those who urge their opinions most strongly upon his mind, trained and skilled by long practical schooling in all the arts of covering up the weak points of their cases and concealing their motives by specious arguments, and of making private interests appear those of the public. They have all contributed to his election and success; they are all entitled to his regard; he has heard of them all as prominent men entitled to respect; he has considered them all as men entitled to credit; and now he discovers that their opinions clash and that their aims are different and contradictory. Scores of them beseeching him with their urgency to make him believe that the Cabinet minister he trusts, by the things he attempts to carry out is injuring the party upon whose permanence the life, or at least the welfare, of the Republic depends. He has yet to learn that the Senator in

his State or the Congressman in his district has interests of his own, peculiar to himself; that those interests are sometimes not exactly those of the country or even of the party at large; that the man who is recommended to him for high official position, as a model citizen of the Republic, has attained that position, in the opinion of his backer, less by services rendered to the commonwealth than by services rendered to a person; that the same man will be represented to him by others, not as the model citizen, but as a villain who cannot be trusted a moment. He will be told that those who judge of political objects and the means by which to attain them from a higher standpoint than mere personal or partisan interest, are amiable theorists, who are well enough in their way, but are useless in the practical conduct of politics; that the practical politician, who cares less for public questions but is skilled in the management of men, is after all the man who can alone be counted upon to preserve the power of his party, and thereby the salvation of the Republic. And when he has gone through this for weeks and months, and his head begins to swim in the confusing contests of interests and ambitions entirely new to him, and he feels himself in many things he has done or left undone under a pressure giving him no rest of mind, a helpless tool of foreign wills instead of being the director of things, he will then conclude that the repulse of the fiercest onset at the battle of Gettysburg and the taking of the angle of intrenchments in the Wilderness, glorious feats of arms, were after all very simple things compared with this. And as he goes on and gradually the light of experience dawns upon him, and he discovers glimmers of truth and finds himself unable to correct mistakes irretrievably made, and to redress injuries irremediably inflicted, and to recover failures which have then become part of the history of the country, he finally will see reason to wish that his

friends had permitted him to enjoy his military renown in peace instead of casting over it a cloud of civil failure.

The picture I have drawn is one which every man of experience in political affairs will recognize as applicable to every novice in politics placed in the Presidential chair, even under ordinary and favorable circumstances. But what is likely to happen to such a man elevated to the Presidency with such a motley host upon his back as the Democratic party is to-day?

That party as now constituted is indeed a wonderful mixture of elements. I shall certainly not question the convictions and the motives of the enlightened and patriotic men that are in it who mean to do the best they can for the country with the means they have; but it is not unjust to them to say that many of them are undoubtedly not without their misgivings as to the latter, and are held where they are by the strength of life-long associations, by the traditions of circles and constituencies within which they move and from which they have derived their position and power; and also by the opinions grown from long struggles against what they considered and what in some cases may have been abuses on the other side; men of good intentions, laboring under the disadvantage of seeing their aspirations and endeavors hemmed in and baffled by followers and by circumstances which they cannot control. There is the Southern element of which I shall certainly not be inclined to deny that a marked improvement has taken place in the temper and aspirations of many of its leading men, who have cast the old ambitions of the war period behind them and are now with a patriotic spirit endeavoring to serve the country, and to whom therefore our esteem is due. It is also true that they begin to be supported by a class of orderly and well-meaning citizens; but it is no less true that they find themselves hampered and clogged by noisy factions in

their constituencies, who, whether they are a majority or not, endeavor, and I regret to say in many instances successfully, to impress their temper upon the character of Southern politics; still smarting under the defeats of the war and the losses which those defeats had brought upon them; some of them with a sullen feeling that those defeats were an insult as well as a wrong to them, for which, in some way, they must have satisfaction; with a vague desire to retrieve of the old condition of things something they do not know exactly what; and withal insisting that something is due to them as Southern men in politics, as well as in society, and in their worldly fortunes as compared with the rest of mankind; rather reckless of the rights of others; with financial ideas destitute of a due regard for the good faith of the country, inclined to fly to any money system which they vaguely think can be manipulated so as to make them rich again by legerdemain; deeming it due to them that large appropriations should be made for their particular benefit, for all imaginable purposes, good, bad and indifferent, merely to pour money into that section of the country; with scarcely any traditions in government, except such as existed in their States before the war, and the reactionary desires and attempts of the party immediately after it; with appetites sharpened by long exclusion from power and the sweets of office, and greedy to make the most of that if they can obtain it.

There is the Northern Democracy, also with men of statesman-like instincts in it and excellent intentions, but behind them a large number of restless and ambitious politicians who, for twenty years, have been boxing the compass to find some principle or some policy, to avail themselves of some passion, or some prejudice by which they might win an election and regain the possession of power. Such an element, however, will be found, more

or less, represented in all parties. But the Democracy has had the misfortune of exercising a remarkable power of attraction for the adventurous, and even the dangerous, elements of our population; and its attempts to regain power by all sorts of devices, and the advocacy of all sorts of principles and policies has gathered under its banner so many divergent tendencies and incongruous elements, held together by the only desire to regain the spoils of government, that when the party comes into power nobody can tell which element will be uppermost in strength and determine the current of its policy.

Thus we find there the hardest of hard-money men hand in hand with the wildest of inflationists, the freest of free-traders and the stiffest of protectionists; we find them in their platforms declaring for the restoration of specie payments to satisfy one part and the repeal of the resumption law in the same sentence to satisfy the other part of the organization. We find men who would scorn the idea of faithlessness to our national obligations in the closest alliance and coöperation with those who repudiated their debts in their own States, and who would not hesitate a moment to repudiate the debts of the Republic. We find men sincerely desirous of cultivating among the Southern people the heartiest sentiments of loyalty to the Republic and respect for the rights of all, irrespective of color, and by their side men who still think that their own rights are worth nothing unless they are permitted to oppress the rights of others. And it must not be forgotten that upon these different elements the official declarations of platforms have not the least effect. While the party in its national conventions declares for specie payments, that does not hinder a moment Democratic Congressmen from opposing resumption in Congress, or the Democrats of Ohio from nominating their inflation leader, General Ewing, or the Democrats in Indiana from

nominating the fiat-money man, Landers, for the governorship of those States; nor does it prevent the Democrats in many of the Western and Southern States from pursuing their greenback agitation as lustily as before.

While they declare for an observance of our national obligations, that does not hinder the Democrats in many of the Southern States from going on in their work of local repudiation, and declaring that local repudiation is so good a thing that it ought to be made general. But all these factions, these incongruous elements, are held together by one great impulse—that is, the appetite for public plunder, which the exclusion from power for twenty years has stimulated to a degree of keenness scarcely ever seen before. Now consider that, if General Hancock ever can be elected, it must be by a very hearty coöperation of all these elements—the Greenback-Democrats in Ohio, Maine and Indiana and the West and South, with the hard-money men in New York, New Jersey and other States; the protectionists in one quarter and the free-traders in another; the war-Democrats in the North and the reactionary elements elsewhere; and to all these elements together, General Hancock, if successful at all, will owe his success; and all those elements, if the successful party is to be maintained in its strength and continued in power, must be satisfied in order to hold them together.

That will be the situation and such the problem which the soldier, to whom political science and management so far have been a sealed book, will have to solve. What will he do to satisfy the hard-money men without driving the Greenbackers away? What will he do to keep the Greenbackers in the party without betraying the principles of the hard-money men? How will he satisfy the Southern element, that claims to have been robbed by an anti-slavery war, and is entitled to restitution in some shape, and at the same time keep the management of the govern-

ment within the bounds of economy and propitiate the Northern taxpayer? How will he content the Southern men in the distribution of offices, who will claim that they have furnished the majority of votes and are therefore entitled to the lion's share? And how will he keep the Northern Democracy in good spirits and in working order by a distribution of the patronage which will appease the hunger of twenty years? These are some of the problems which the unsophisticated soldier-President, whose whole sphere of mental activity has so far been confined to the handling of troops on the field of battle, and to the narrow horizon of duty which army life in times of peace comprises, will have to solve. And these problems he will have to solve not in the quiet of the closet, surrounded by a few able counsellors in peaceful consultation, but quickly, under the bewildering pressure of not a hundred but thousands of eager politicians, who fill the ear with a babel of sound and with a pandemonium of conflicting ambitions. This is a task that would tax a man of phenomenal genius to the utmost of his capacity; but what will become of one who is unaided even by the least experience of political life, and has nothing but his inner consciousness to measure the value of the arguments and pretenses which are dinned into his ears and the character of the interests that besiege him with their urgency for immediate action?

Let us see now what, in view of all this, we have a right to expect from a Democratic victory. Is it the maintenance of our public faith? While there are prominent opponents of repudiation in the Democratic party, it is a notorious fact that all the elements hostile to the Constitutional discharge of our National obligations have also gathered under the same banner. Nearly all, if not all, the States that have repudiated or speak of repudiating their own debts are Democratic States, with heavy Democratic majorities, furnishing Democratic electoral votes

and Congressmen. Who will tell me that it is certain they will be more conscientious with regard to the national debt than they showed themselves with regard to their own? Have we a right to expect a sound financial policy? While there are many good, sound-money men in the Democratic party, it is equally well known that the Democratic party has irresistibly attracted to its fold a very large majority of the Greenbackers, inflationists and fiat-money men. It has, indeed, in its national platforms of late declared for sound money; but in 1876, while it pronounced for resumption it demanded at the same time the repeal of the resumption law. I ask, what would have become of resumption had the resumption law been repealed? But while thus speaking of sound money in their national platforms, is it not equally true in a large number of the States the most prominent inflationists are put forward for the highest honors followed by the masses of their party? So General Ewing, in Ohio, so General Butler, in Massachusetts, so Mr. Landers, in Indiana; while in Maine, Democrats and Greenbackers fuse in cordial embrace, and while in many of the Western and most of the Southern States the Democrats almost *en masse* represent unsound financial ideas. Is it not true, that to the very last, resumption was opposed in Congress by Democratic Congressmen? Why, when General Hancock was nominated, the attraction for the Greenbackers seemed to be so strong that the venerable Peter Cooper and General Sam. Carey, of Ohio, were among the first to pay to him their devotion and wish him success.

Now, can anybody foretell what will happen in these respects in case of a Democratic victory? In fact, we do not know whether the advocates of the public faith or the repudiationists, whether the hard-money men or the inflationists, are the strongest element in the Democratic

party throughout the country, and which of those elements will control its policy. I appeal to you, business men, am I going too far in saying that all this is dark, and that in voting the Democratic ticket you will take a gambling chance, and that chance being rather against you? Are you prepared, taxpayers of the country, to take that gambling chance under such circumstances?

But one thing is certain, that the Democratic party, in its fashion, will reform the civil service. That it will certainly do; it will do it according to an old Democratic principle, "to the victors belong the spoils." That principle is of Democratic origin, and the Democratic party has adhered to it with a fidelity worthy of the best cause. Other parties were infected by it, but the Democratic party may claim the glory of its paternity and of its most unswerving advocacy. It may abandon any other principle, but not that. If there ever was a Democrat, either at the head of the organization or in the ranks, who has proved recreant to that great doctrine, and made proclamation of his opposition to it, I do not know his name. It is so closely interwoven with the traditions of that party that I doubt very much whether it could be abandoned without destroying the party's existence. That great word, "the cohesive power of public plunder," had its first and most pointed application to the Democracy. And, indeed, when we look at its heterogeneous elements to-day, it is not easy to imagine any other cohesive power which could hold them together. If General Hancock, or any other leader, should signify his intention to abandon it, every Democrat in the land would receive the news with an ironical smile, and simply say that that leader knew a trick or two. If such an intention were declared, and the declaration believed, it is not unlikely that their hosts would disband at once. When the Democracy, therefore, speaks of a reform of the civil service, the meaning of

that term, in the light of history and of the tendencies at present prevailing, can be nothing else than that the reform shall consist in putting out all the Republicans and putting all Democrats in their places. What a reform that would be! How the North and South would shake hands over the bloody chasm filled with such good things! What a host of men would be marching upon the capital from all quarters of the compass, each one feeling that he is born to serve the public, and that the Government cannot get on without him! It is said that at the present moment, when the Democracy feels sanguine of success, as it always does, the most popular work of literature with Democrats, even with those who never read a book before, is the "Blue Book," being the register of offices under the Government, with salaries attached, each active Democrat selecting his, and many the same.

Now let us see what that sort of Democratic reform in the civil service really means and what its effect would be. Look at the present condition of the service. I have already admitted that the reform of it has not gone so far as was intended and was desirable, but I may say also that more has been accomplished than is generally known and believed. I repeat, it is an almost universally acknowledged fact that at present the public business is, on the whole, well and honestly conducted in the Government offices. The revenues are collected with remarkable fidelity, and never in the history of the country has the loss in their collection been as small as now. In some of its branches it has almost entirely disappeared. The postal service is acknowledged to be more than ever ably, honestly and efficiently done. Even in those branches of the public service which more than others have almost from the beginning of the Government borne the reputation of being inefficient and corrupt, such as the land and especially the Indian service, cases of peculation and

roguery have become comparatively rare, and the general inefficiency of officers is very much improved; and I speak of this with assurance, for the reason that I am conversant with the details. How has this been brought about?

In the first place, officers of all grades were made to understand that dishonesty of whatever kind or degree would under no circumstances be tolerated. Officers guilty of corrupt practices, whenever their guilt was shown with sufficient clearness, have been exposed and ejected from their places without hesitation. Every man in the service understanding this, it may be said that if persons with thieving propensities were left or put in place, they did in most cases not dare to steal. Secondly, the number of removals made by this Administration has been comparatively small. Not only clerks in the Departments, but officers, appointed for a term of years, were generally left in their places as long as they showed the necessary degree of ability and efficiency in the discharge of their duties. In this way the service retained a very valuable stock of official experience which could not but tell in its general efficiency, while at the same time public servants were imbued with a feeling that the best way to secure themselves in place was to perform their duties according to the best standard. Thirdly, in appointing new men care was taken to select such as would presumably be capable to perform the tasks assigned to them. In some Departments, and in a number of the larger government institutions in the country, systems of examinations were introduced, which deterred at once the entirely incapable from urging themselves or being urged for official position, while they furnished also a good measure of the capacity of the applicants. This system of examination may not in all cases furnish an absolutely reliable test, but it has proved to be an infinitely better test than mere recommendation from political favor. It has not

been extended as far as it should be, but a good beginning has been made, capable of large extension and development. Fourthly, the practice of making promotions from lower to higher places for good official services rendered, not only in the Departments, but also in some branches of the service outside of them, has been carried out to a much greater extent than is generally known; thus furnishing another stimulus to the zeal of the public servants. I repeat that mistakes in appointments have undoubtedly occurred, some of a more or less conspicuous kind, and that the principles of a thorough reform have not been as universally applied as they should have been. Great cries have been raised about instances in which those principles appear to have been disregarded; but under the old regular spoils system such instances were the rule, compliance with which would not have been criticized at all; and the very cries that are now raised with regard to them in our case prove that at present they are the exception. The very kind of criticism applied to the Administration shows that things have grown better. In spite of the imperfections of the methods followed, the result has been that the public business is recognized to be conducted now in a more business-like manner than before, and that the efficiency of the service has been lifted up to a much higher standard.

Now substitute for this the Democratic reform, making a clean sweep according to the old spoils system, and what will you have? Hundreds of thousands of politicians, great and small, but all hungry, rushing for seventy or eighty thousand places, backed and pressed by every Democratic Congressman and every Democratic committee in the land. This impetuous rush must be satisfied as rapidly as possible, for they want to make the best of their time, and in this case, as well as others, time is money. It is useless to disguise it; the masses of office-

seekers, starved for twenty years, will not be turned back as long as there is a mouthful on the table. Seventy or eighty thousand officers selected at random from that multitude of ravenous applicants will be put into places held now mostly by men of tried capacity and experience. They must be taken at random, for it is impossible to fill so large a number of places, in so short a time as the furious demand will permit, in any other way. Need I tell any sensible man what the effect upon the conduct of the public business will be? It will be the disorganization of the whole administrative machinery of the Government at one fell blow; it will be the sudden substitution of raw hands for skilled and tried public servants; the substitution of the eager desire to make out of public affairs as much as can be made in the shortest possible time, for official training, experience and sense of responsibility. It will be a removal for some time at least of those carefully devised guards which are now placed over the public money and its use; it will in one word be the sudden distribution of so many thousand places of trust, responsibility and power, now well filled, in the true sense of the word as spoils among the hosts of the victorious party.

It is useless to say that the Democratic party contains a sufficient number of men of ability and integrity to fill all those places. No doubt it does. But it is absolutely impossible for those who have the appointing power, even if they were ever so well disposed, to make careful selections for so many thousand places in a short time, especially considering the fact that usually the least worthy aspirants are among the most clamorous and the most skillful in securing the strongest political indorsements. Need I tell the taxpayers what such an experiment will cost? Suppose, after a success of the Democratic party in a Presidential election, all the offices, high and low, in

all the banks and savings institutions of the country, were to be filled suddenly with Democratic politicians upon the recommendation of Democratic Congressmen and campaign committees, what would the stockholders and the depositors think of the safety of their money? And yet the interests involved in the banks are certainly by no means greater than the interests involved in the conduct of the great Government of the United States. I do not think this is putting the case too strongly, and I invite the business men of the country and the taxpayers generally to consider it well before they cast their votes.

I am willing to assume that in all these respects General Hancock entertains the best possible intentions, and even that he may form for himself a plan of action intended to obviate these difficulties and disasters. He may possibly tell you so, and mean what he says. Yet is it not obvious that, having no experience whatever in political life, he will be completely at the mercy of wind and waves, and that there will be a power of wind in the Democratic victors clamoring for the spoils strong enough to upset the ingenuity of the firmest and most skilled politician in his party? No, let nobody indulge in any delusion about it; a Democratic victory means that the victors will take the spoils at once; and this means the complete destruction for a time of the whole administrative machinery of the Government, with all its checks and guards, and the people will have to foot the bills for the carnival. This will be a reform of the civil service to make the ears of the taxpayers tingle.

No prudent citizen can fail to be repelled by such prospects unless equally great or greater dangers threaten from the other side. Let us look at that other side now. I am certainly not one of those who would assert that the Republican party has been without fault. I have been one of its most unsparing critics, and have been unsparingly

criticized myself by thoroughgoing partisans in return. I shall always claim for myself freedom of opinion and speech in that respect. The Republican party has undoubtedly made a great many mistakes. I will not go back to the period of reconstruction and an absolved Southern policy, because that lies far behind us, and is not an issue in this campaign. Its Constitutional results have become settlements, accepted by both sides—in profession at least, and the policy of force after the admission of the late rebel States has under this Administration yielded to a scrupulous rule of Constitutional principles. Neither would I deny that, with regard to the question of the public debt at one time and to the currency question for a more extended period, there was in the Republican party an antagonism of opinions, a contest of conflicting ends. We have had Republican advocates of the payment of the public debt in greenbacks; we have had Republican inflationists, and the discussions inside of the Republican party were for some time heated and bitter. Thus for a season the party seemed to stumble along with an uncertain gait, but it has always had an unerring instinct which in the end made it turn right side up; and then it kept right side up. When in 1869 the Republican majority in Congress declared for the payment of the public debt, principal and interest, in coin, there was the end once and forever of the repudiation movement, open and disguised, in the Republican party. When in 1875 the Republican majority in Congress passed the resumption act, there was the end, once and forever, of the unredeemable paper-money business in the Republican party. Those who remained repudiationists or fiat-money men did not remain Republicans, at least not leaders of the party. They tried their luck for some time inside of it; then they left it, and became independent Greenbackers, and finally most of

them landed in the Democratic party, as the Democratic Greenbackers, who for a time became independents, mostly went back there. General Weaver and his followers are still in the intermediate state, but will no doubt finally materialize as sound Democrats.

But while the Democratic party has been attracting such elements, the Republican party has been either converting them to sound principles or ejecting them until they almost wholly disappeared among its component parts. Thus it has become emphatically the protector of the national faith and the party of sound money. I have no doubt that the disagreements still existing upon financial subjects of minor importance in the Republican party will be solved in the same way after mature discussion. This tendency in the Republican party has been owing to some very characteristic causes. It has not only a predominance of good sense and a thoughtful desire to be right and an endeavor to do that which was best for the general interests of the people, but it was also the traditional feeling grown out of the loyal attitude of the Republican party during the civil war in support of the Union and the preservation of the Republic—the feeling of solemn duty that all the obligations contracted for so sacred a purpose must be and remain sacred and inviolable. Therefore, it was that the idea of repudiation never could obtain a permanent foothold among Republicans, whatever the vacillations of individual minds during a limited period may have been. And the abhorrence of repudiation in our discussions of the financial problem inspired the most powerful arguments that brought the Republican masses to a sound appreciation of the money question.

In this way the Republican party, steadily progressing in an enlightened perception of the principles of sound finance, has become *the* reliable sound-money party of the

country, to which, as parties now are, the solution of new financial problems can alone be safely trusted. And how magnificently do the effects of the results already achieved appear in the revival of our business prosperity!

It may be said that our financial policy has not wholly originated that prosperity. True, but it has most powerfully aided it by giving us that confidence which is impossible without stable money values and a sound currency system. And what prudent man would now risk these great results by turning over our financial policy to the hands of a party which, as I have shown, is the refuge of all destructive elements threatening new uncertainty and confusion?

Indeed, not only in the traditions and good sense of the Republican party do you find the best security there is at present for the sanctity of our national faith as well as a successful management of the financial policy; you find equal security in the known opinions and principles of its candidate, James A. Garfield. His convictions on these subjects have not found their first and best proclamation in the platform of his party or in his letter of acceptance. His record of nearly twenty years of Congressional service is not a blank on the great questions of the times, like that of his opponent. There is not a phase of the question of our national obligations; there is not a point of financial policy, from the first day that the subject was considered in Congress since he became a member of that body to the present hour, that he has not discussed with an ability and strength, a lucidity of argument, amplitude of knowledge and firmness of conviction, placing him in the first rank of the defenders of sound principles.

If you want to study the reasons why the public faith should be inviolably maintained, why an irredeemable paper currency is, and always has been, a curse to all the

economic interests of this and all other countries, why confidence can be restored and maintained, why business can obtain a healthy development, why foreign commerce can be most profitably conducted only with a money system of stable and intrinsic value, you will find in the speeches of James A. Garfield upon this subject the most instructive and convincing information. You will find there opinions not suddenly made up to order to suit an opportunity and the necessities of a candidate in an election, but the convictions of a lifetime, carefully matured by conscientious research and large inquiry, and maintained with powerful reason, before they had become generally popular. You find there a teacher, statesman and a leader in a great movement, with principles so firmly grounded in his mind, as well as his conscience, that he would uphold them even were they not supported by a powerful party at his back. There is double assurance, therefore, in the traditions and acts of the party and in the character of the leader at its head.

As to the civil service, I have stated to you what in my opinion its condition is to-day, and that opinion accords, I think, with that of every fair-minded observer. As to what it will become in case of a Republican victory, I shall not predict the millennium, neither from the knowledge I have of the obstacles in the way of a permanent reform on sound principles, nor from the party platform, nor from the last utterance of the candidate. One thing, however, may be taken for certain: the administrative machinery of the government will not be suddenly taken to pieces and disorganized, to be recomposed of raw material. In so far as it has shown itself honest and efficient, it will be preserved in its integrity and efficiency, and upon the good foundation laid there is reason for assurance that it will be developed to greater perfection. The business interests of the country, the taxpayers

generally, whose first desire it must be to see the public business of the Government administered in an honest and intelligent way, will, therefore, have no reason to fear sudden and fitful revulsions in the organization of the administrative machinery, as the distribution of the spoils among the victors after Democratic success would inevitably be. This is the least advantage we may expect with certainty; but that advantage is so great that no man of sense will fail to appreciate it. Of the greater, more thoroughgoing and permanent reforms which I have long considered not only necessary but also practicable, and which have been attempted and in part carried out, it may be said that so far their advocates have made themselves heard only on the Republican side, and that at present there appears to be no other organization of power in which they can be worked for with any hope of success. That this work will not be given up, is certain, while, on the Democratic side, we have no reason to look for anything else than a complete relapse into those barbarous methods which in former times have proved so demoralizing as well as expensive.

And now I appeal to the conservative citizens of the Republic, to you who desire the public faith sacredly maintained, where will you go? Can you, in view of present circumstances, conscientiously go to the Democratic party? You will indeed find there not a few men who think as you do; but with them, you will find closely allied in party interest all those elements to whom our national obligations are the football of momentary advantage. You will find on that side every State that has repudiated or speaks of repudiating its public debt; you will find there all those who decried the public creditor as the public enemy, and whom no loyal tradition and impulse attaches to the national honor. You will find there a party, inside of which the public faith has still to

fight a battle with its enemies, without any certainty of its issue. Is that your place? Or will you go to the Republican side, where the loyal maintenance of our public faith has become a fundamental principle, universally adhered to with unswerving fidelity, in spite of the gusts of adverse public sentiment in former days? And you who desire to preserve the fruits of the success gained in the abolition of the curse of an irredeemable paper money and the reëstablishment of specie payments, where will you go? Will you go to the Democratic party, where again you will find some who think as you do, and yet with them as a powerful and perhaps the most numerous component part of the organization, wielding commanding influence in a great many of the States subject to its control, the great mass of the inflationists and fiat-money men who were gathered under the Democratic banner by a seemingly irresistible power of attraction, and furnished many of the acknowledged leaders of that organization, and who even now, when the prosperity of the country has been so magnificently aided by a sound financial policy, would be ready to subvert it all and throw the country back into the wild confusion of the fiat-money madness? Will you, business men, farmers, manufacturers, merchants of the country, find the safety of your interests there? Will you help a party to power, inside of which, between its component elements, the battle of a sound-money system and an irredeemable paper currency is still pending, and will you trust the earnings of the poor as well as the fortunes of the wealthy to the uncertainties of its issue? Or will you go to the Republican side, where great victories for the cause of good money have been achieved; where sound sense and patriotism have won every fight so far decided, and where we may with certainty look for the same sound sense and patriotism to solve the problems not yet disposed of?

And you who desire the administrative business of the Government performed in a business-like way by honest and capable public servants, where will you go? Will you go to the Democratic party, which has no other reform idea than an eager desire to take the whole administrative machinery of the Government suddenly to pieces, and to fill it as rapidly as possible with politicians demanding offices as spoils? Or will you go to the Republican side, where you have the assurance of a civil service which, in spite of shortcomings and mistakes, has already on the whole proved itself capable to transact your business honestly and efficiently, and where you find all those elements that are faithfully and energetically working for a more thorough and permanent reform?

I might go on with the catalogue to show you where the path of safety lies; but it is enough. Your own State of Indiana furnishes you at this moment a most instructive illustration. Look at the contending forces here. On the one hand, a man put forward by the Democrats as their candidate for the governorship, one of the leaders of the wildest inflation movement, one of the most vociferous advocates of the repeal of the resumption act, the successful execution of which has conferred upon the American people such inestimable blessings.

Where would our prosperity be had he and his followers prevailed? And now you find him the representative man of the Democratic party, still advocating his wild doctrines, and hoping for their triumph, which would be the ruin of your prosperity. You are certainly mindful of the fact that the wise and patriotic men among you, and I am glad to say that they were a majority of your voters, made an effort to do away with the scandals of fraudulent voting, arising from the absence of a good registration law and the seductive opportunities furnished by your October elections. You know how a majority

of your citizens with the applause of all fair-minded men in the country, voted and carried that reform at an election held for the ratification of your constitutional amendments; you know how by Democratic judges that decision of the majority was set aside upon reasons which made the whole legal profession stare the country over. Is that the party which, as citizens of Indiana, mindful of the welfare and the good name of this State, you will support?

Now look to the other side. Your Republican candidate for the governorship, one of your purest, best informed and most useful and patriotic men who on every question of public interest stands on the side of the honor of the country and the welfare of its citizens; whom even the voice of slander cannot reach, and to whose hands his very opponents would without hesitation commit their interests. That is the illustration Indiana gives of the character of our national contest.

What is there then on the Democratic side which could seduce you from the path of safety? Is it the nomination for the Presidency of a soldier who during the war did brave deeds and deserved well of the country? Is it a sense of gratitude for those brave deeds that should make you elevate the soldier to the place in which a statesman is wanted? Gratitude to those who on the field of battle bared their breasts to the enemies of the country is a sentiment of which I shall not slightly speak; it is a noble sentiment; but is the Presidency of the United States a mere bauble that should be given as a reward for things done on a field of action wholly different?

Is the Presidency like a presentation sword, or a gift horse, or a donation of money, or a country house, given to a victorious soldier to please him? If so, then simple justice would compel us to look for the most meritorious of our soldiers and reward them in the order of their merit; and, brave and skillful as General Hancock has been,

there are others who have claims of a still higher order. Then, General Grant having already been President, we should reward General Sherman and Lieutenant-General Sheridan first before we come to the major-general nominated by the Democratic party. Certainly let us be grateful; but let us not degrade the highest and most responsible trust of the Republic to the level of a mere gift of gratitude. Let military heroes be lifted up to the highest rank in the service which belongs to the soldier. Let them be rewarded with the esteem of their countrymen; and, if need be, let wealth and luxury be showered upon them to brighten that life which they were ready to sacrifice for their country.

But let it never be forgotten that the Presidency is a trust that is due to no man; that nobody has ever earned it as a thing belonging to him, and that it should not be bestowed but for services to be rendered in the way of patriotic and enlightened statesmanship.

But, above all things, the Presidency should never be pointed out as the attainable goal of ambition to the professional soldier. I certainly do not mean to depreciate the high character of the regular army. But I cannot refrain from saying that in a republic like ours great care should be taken not to demoralize it by instilling political ambition into the minds of its officers. The army is there to obey the orders of the civil power under the law as it stands, without looking to the right or to the left. And it will be an evil day for this Republic when we inspire the generals of our Army with the ambition to secure the highest power by paving their way to it with political pronunciamientos. I will not impute to General Hancock any such design. He may have meant ever so well when he issued General Order No. 40, which is now held up by a political party as his principal title to the Presidency. But you once establish such a precedent, and who knows

how long it will be before you hear of other general orders issued for purposes somewhat similar to those for which they are now issued in Mexico? I am for the subordination of the military to the civil power. And therefore I am for making Congressman Garfield President, and for letting General Hancock remain what he is, a general, always ready to draw the soldier's sword at the lawful command of the civil power.

What have we, on the other hand, in the Republican candidate: his youth was that of a poor boy. He lived by his daily labor. He rose up from that estate gradually by his own effort, taking with him the experience of poverty and hard work and a living sympathy with the poor and hard-working man. He cultivated his mind by diligent study and he stored it with useful knowledge. From a learner he became a teacher. When the Republic called her sons to her defence he joined the army and achieved distinction in active service as one of the brave on the battlefield. He was called into the great council of the Nation, and has sat there for nearly twenty years. No great question was discussed without his contributing the store of his knowledge to the fund of information necessary for wise decision. His speeches have ranked not only among the most eloquent, but among the most instructive and useful. Scarcely a single great measure of legislation was passed during that long period without the imprint of his mind. No man in Congress has devoted more thorough inquiry to a larger number of important subjects and formed upon them opinions more matured and valuable. He was not as great a soldier as his competitor for the Presidency, but he has made himself, and is universally recognized as, what a President ought to be, a statesman. He understands all phases of life, from the lowest to the highest, for he has lived through them. He understands the great problems of politics, for he has

studied them and actively participated in their discussion and solution. Few men in this country would enter the Presidential office with its great duties and responsibilities better or even as well equipped with knowledge and experience. He need only be true to his record in order to become a wise, safe and successful President. If the people elect him it will be only because his services rendered in the past are just of that nature which will give assurance of his ability to render greater service in the future. The country wants a statesman of ability, knowledge, experience and principle at the head of affairs. His conduct as a legislator gives ample guarantee of great promise in all these things.

In a few months you will have to make your choice. I know that when a party has been so long in power as the Republican party, many citizens may be moved by a desire for a change. In not a few cases it may be a desire for the sake of a change. While the impulse is natural, it should not be followed without calm discrimination. Prudent men will never fail to consider whether the only change possible bids fair to be a change for the better. It is true that parties are apt to degenerate by the long possession of power. The Republican party cannot expect to escape the common lot of humanity; but no candid observer will deny that within a late period the Republican party has shown signs rather of improvement than deterioration; and that it possesses the best share of the intelligence, virtue and patriotism of the country. In matters of most essential moment to the public welfare it can be safely better counted upon for efficient and faithful service, while its opponent opens only a prospect of uncertainty and confusion.

The Democracy may in the course of time gain the confidence of the people; but that should be only when the repudiationists and the advocates of unsound money

have ceased to be in its ranks so powerful and influential an element as seriously to threaten the great economic interests of the country; when by energetic and successful action in protecting the rights of the voter whether white or black, whether Republican or Democratic in all parts of the country, and by the suppression of fraud at the ballot-box through a healthy and irresistible power of public opinion within itself, it will have won the right to appear in its platforms as the protector of the freedom and purity of elections, and when it will find it no longer necessary to discard the ablest of its statesmen and to put a general of the Army, who has never been anything but a soldier, in nomination for the Presidency, to make for itself a certificate of loyalty to the settlements of the great conflict of the past.

And for all these reasons, in my opinion, the interests of the Republic demand the election of James A. Garfield to the Presidency of the United States.

FROM JAMES A. GARFIELD

MENTOR, O., July 22, 1880.

My dear Schurz: Yours of the 20th inst. from Indianapolis came duly to hand—and was read with interest. I thank you for your frank and faithful criticism; and with equal frankness let me say that I do not think my letter of acceptance is a surrender of any essential point gained by the present Administration. On the subject of finance, I did not dream that any one could doubt my attitude, for on every phase of the subject I have stood on the skirmish line against all forms of soft money and bastard silver fallacy. The only fear my friends have had was that I should be too radical. So good and sound a man as Senator Hoar wrote me urging that I avoid suggestions which would create apprehensions of violent change. The key to sound money is, I think, contained in my phrase,

"to maintain the equality of all our dollars." Can any sound-money man suggest a more radical creed? Remember I was not writing an inaugural message, nor an exhaustive essay on finance; but a brief campaign summary of Republican doctrine.

On the subject of civil service, there is more room for difference of judgment, because there are real differences of opinion among Republicans. I think I may say, without immodesty, that no member of Congress has said or done more in behalf of real reform in that service than I have. But I have been saying, for several years past, that the pressure of public opinion should be brought to bear upon Congress, rather than upon the President, to make any reform in that direction effective. If the President will sketch the outline of a bill fixing a tenure of office for all minor offices, and prescribing the grounds on which removals are to be made, and in a message urge its passage, he will concentrate the weight of public opinion upon Congress, and some action will at last be compelled. So long as he makes the fight with Congress a concrete one, involving the personality of each appointee, Congress, or rather the Senate will beat him half the time or more. If he makes it a fight of general principles with no personality involved in the contest, he can win. In short, in my letter of acceptance, I have sought to shift the battleground from the person of the appointee to the principles on which the office shall be held. Of course, I may be in error; but I think I am right. If any one thinks I have surrendered to Congressional dictation, other than by legislation, such a one will find himself greatly mistaken if the trial comes. I shall be sorry if the President is grieved at the clause of my letter to which you refer. But I have never doubted that one portion of his order no. 1 was a mistake, and was an invasion of the proper rights of those who hold Federal offices to take part in the nomination of candidates to office. In a district like mine where nomination is equivalent to election, the right to participate in the proceedings of a caucus is more important than the right to vote. The popular understanding of the order has made the holding of a local Federal office a badge of political disability. This should not be. If the order had been

confined to the great centers, like New York, where office-holders from all quarters were concentrated, and were used to control local caucuses in which they had had no right to participate, it would have met general approval. It was that phase of the case I sought to touch in my letter. I thought my position was not only right in itself, but would remove the only real objection to the order, and at the same time advance the cause of civil service reform.

Here, as on the financial questions, I have not attempted to go into details; but have left myself free to propose such a plan as will embody the necessary elements of a permanent and effective reform. I recognize the strength which the Administration has given to the party by its singularly fine record. They have had my cordial support—in the midst of some contradiction—and I have no purpose to let the party down from the high standard of recent work. I do not think Horace White is justified in treating my letter as a surrender to the machine. He ought to remember that all the pressure and pride of my public life are behind me to project into future action what I have so long advocated; and that I have distinctly referred to my public record for my opinions. If you will read an article which I wrote for the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1877, you will see how fully I discuss the subject of civil service. Some of these gentlemen treat my letter as though I had never spoken before. You can do much to prevent their taking this view of it, and, as you know me better than they, I shall hope for your assistance.

I have read your Indianapolis speech with great satisfaction. You do it great wrong when you speak of it as a poor one. It has the clear and incisive spirit which characterizes all your utterances, and its repetition at the leading centers of political life will do great good. I have made no terms of concession with the New York wing; but have trusted to time and the pressure of the campaign. My freedom is in no way crippled, beyond the committals fairly made in the letter of acceptance; and I do not think that is inconsistent with my past record. Certainly I did not intend it should be. I return White's letter, as you request. I hope you will write me *freely* and

often—and, especially, let me know what the outlook is on the Pacific coast.

TO JAMES A. GARFIELD

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22, 1880.

My dear Garfield: Yesterday I received your telegram asking me to go to Cleveland to speak. I shall certainly do so with pleasure and to-day telegraphed to Mr. Chas. O. Evarts, the secretary of the Campaign Committee, to that effect.

Now a word on the campaign as it has developed itself during the last two months. Since my return from the West I have received some strong impressions in that respect from numerous letters and conversations. They were most pointedly summed up in a few words spoken by a New York business man whom I met here yesterday. He is a man of standing and influence in his circle, has always voted the Republican ticket when voting at all and may be taken as a fair representative of a large class. "At first," he said, "it looked as if the election of General Garfield would give us another sober, quiet, clean, business-like Administration, uncontrolled by extreme partisan influences, like the present Administration. But for several weeks the old talk and cries of sectional warfare and bloody shirt, etc., have been uppermost again, as is said, with the full approval of Mr. Garfield. Now if that, as well as the old patronage business, is to be the spirit and character of Mr. Garfield's Administration, there are a great many of us who think we might as well try a change, for four years of sectional quarrel may and probably will have a disturbing effect upon the business affairs of the country, and unsettle everything." I find similar apprehensions expressed in many letters I receive, particularly also from Germans. Of course it is unjust to

hold you responsible for everything that is said on the stump. But somehow or other the impression seems to have got around that the tone of the campaign was determined upon at your conference in New York as the result of an agreement or capitulation concluded between yourself and the elements represented there. I am free to say that I always considered your trip to New York a mistake, for it was certain that under existing circumstances you could not make it without giving color to rumors of concession, surrender, promises etc., impairing the strength of your legislative record. And I may add, that if, as the newspapers state, you go to the meeting at Warren, the result will be just as injurious with a large class of voters, besides exposing you to the chance of listening to expressions of condescension like those at the Academy of Music in New York, very little short of contempt and insult. I enclose a couple of editorials from the *Evening Post* and the N. Y. *Herald* which it is worth your while to read. They may be somewhat overdrawn in their coloring, but they do give expression to a current of thought running through the heads of a large number of people whose votes we need. That the effect of that sort of a campaign is virtually as stated by these papers is abundantly proven by the Maine election. There we had the "sectional" music by the whole orchestra and in endless variations. I will not say that it *caused* the Republican defeat, but it proved entirely ineffectual in preventing it, while a quiet, conservative, persuasive tone of discussion, in the line of your anti-sectional and reform utterances in Congress, might have won converts and so prevented the disaster.

These things are not pleasant to contemplate, but as your friend I consider it my duty to point out to you dangers you have to confront, and which you ought to see and appreciate in time. I should like to have a talk with

you, but that is probably not an easy thing to arrange, and, perhaps for some reasons not even desirable. But I want you to know that upon all these things you can depend upon me to tell you exactly what I think.

By the way, when I was in Indiana, the Committee showed a great desire to have me speak at some places before the October election. I have not heard from them since my return. I might visit two or three important places in Indiana in connection with my appointment at Cleveland. Webb Hayes writes me that they want a speech from me very much at Fremont. I thought, as you are probably better informed about the necessities of the campaign in that region, you might indicate to the respective committees what to do. I ought to be back here by the 6th or 7th of October on account of public business.

FROM JAMES A. GARFIELD

MENTOR, Oct. 15, 1880.

My dear Schurz: At last we have got down to the bottom of our news-bag—on the election of last Tuesday, and find the extent of the victory. It is clear to me that the chief force which produced the result was the fear of patriotic business men that they could not safely entrust the country and its great material interests in the hands of a party so full of dangerous and reactionary tendencies as the present Democracy.

The drift of the debate during the last three weeks has been very markedly in the business direction. Our friends in Cleveland were deeply impressed by your speech as were also the people of Toledo. Your work was felt and appreciated everywhere. I hope you will be able to strike some more blows, at the nerve centers, between now and November. I hear that there is some antagonism between the German Republican leaders in New York City, which it is thought you might do

much to allay. Of this you know better than I. I shall be glad to know how the field looks to you now. With thanks for your very effective work, and with kind regards.

TO JAMES A. GARFIELD

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Nov. 3, 1880.

My dear Garfield: I congratulate you and the country most sincerely on your success. *Quod felix faustumque sit.* Your real troubles will now begin. But, as I have frequently taken occasion to say during the campaign, President James A. Garfield will have only to act according to the teachings of Member of Congress Garfield to give this country one of the most wholesome Administrations it ever had. Accept my cordial wishes.

TO JOHN D. LONG¹

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 9, 1880.

I have read a full report of the speeches delivered on the resolutions passed at a meeting over which you presided, held in Boston, on the 3d of December, for the purpose of expressing sympathy with the Poncas.

That meeting was held in the interest of justice. It demanded justice for that Indian tribe. But it seems that not one of the speakers remembered that measure of justice which is due to the officers of the Government whose names were connected with that deplorable affair. Permit me to demand justice for them also. To this end it is necessary to pass once more in rapid review the salient points of the case. The old Ponca reserve in southeastern Dakota, a tract of 96,000 acres, was confirmed to that tribe by various treaties. In 1868 a treaty

¹ Governor of Mass. An open letter on the removal of the Poncas.

was concluded with the Sioux by which a reservation was granted to them, including the tract which formerly had by treaty been confirmed to the Poncas. The Sioux treaty of 1868 was ratified in the usual way and became the law of the land. The Poncas, however, continued to occupy the ceded tract. They and the Sioux had been hereditary enemies, and the former had suffered much from the hostile incursions of the latter. After the Ponca reserve had been granted to the Sioux these incursions became more frequent and harassing, so much so that the Poncas found themselves forced to think of removal to some safe location. Several times they expressed a wish to be taken to the Omaha reservation where they might live in security. But, although they had initiated an agreement with the Omahas to that effect, the arrangement was for some reason not accomplished. In 1874 and 1875 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommended the removal of the Poncas to the Omaha reserve and their permanent location thereon. These recommendations, however, were not acted upon by Congress. On the 23d of September, 1875, a petition was signed by the chiefs and headmen of the Poncas requesting that they be allowed to remove to the Indian Territory and to send a delegation there to select a new home. This petition was forwarded to the Indian Office. It was subsequently asserted, by members of the Ponca tribe, that when signing the petition they had not understood it to contain a request to be removed to the Indian Territory; but they had in their minds a removal to the Omaha reservation and the sending of some of their chiefs and headmen to the Indian Territory to see whether they could find a suitable location there. However that may be, they expressed the desire to remove from their lands in Dakota.

Thereupon the Indian Appropriation Act of August 15, 1876, appropriated "twenty-five thousand dollars

for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with the consent of said band." The Act of March 3, 1877, appropriated fifteen thousand dollars "in addition to that heretofore appropriated for the removal and permanent location of the Poncas in the Indian Territory." At the same time Congress, by Act of March 3, 1877, provided for the removal of the Sioux to the Missouri river. As the Ponca reserve had, by the treaty of 1868, been formally ceded to the Sioux, the execution of the provision of law with regard to the Sioux, without the execution of the provision of law with regard to the Poncas, would have brought the old enemies together upon the same ground, and would have threatened serious consequences to the Poncas as the weaker party. It is true that in 1875 a kind of treaty of peace had been made between the Poncas and one band of the Sioux which it is said had been observed by that band; but subsequently some of the Poncas had been killed by Sioux belonging to another band. These circumstances, it appears, induced the Indian Office to send an inspector, Mr. Kemble, to the Ponca reserve early in January, 1877, for the purpose of obtaining their consent to the proposed removal. They at first disclaimed any desire to remove, but finally agreed to send a delegation to the Indian Territory for the purpose of selecting a suitable location for their tribe, and that then their chiefs be permitted to visit Washington to negotiate for the surrender of their lands in Dakota. They were told by Inspector Kemble that the expense of sending a party to the Indian Territory and a delegation to Washington could not be incurred until they had consented to relinquish their Dakota lands. Inspector Kemble reported to the Indian Office that he had obtained that consent at a council held with the Poncas on the 27th of January, 1877, and that such consent was given with the under-

standing that the final details of the transaction should be completed at Washington after the selection of lands in the Indian Territory had been made. He forwarded, also, the minutes of that council, from which it appeared that the consent he claimed to have been given consisted in speeches made by the chiefs, but not in a formal relinquishment on paper with their signatures. However, Inspector Kemble reported it as a conclusive consent. A delegation of Ponca chiefs went with him to the Indian Territory where they had hoped to find a home among the Osages, whom they believed to be similar to them in language and habits. But when the delegation arrived at the Osage agency the head chiefs as well as the agent were absent; the Ponca delegates were inhospitably received and poorly provided for, and the weather being inclement, were detained in uncomfortable quarters for several days. Most of the delegates became disheartened at the outset and refused to consider other desirable locations which were shown them, and on reaching Arkansas City eight of them left in the night without the knowledge of the inspector, and started on foot for the Ponca agency, which they reached, after a tedious and difficult journey, in forty days. The other two, with the inspector, their agent and the Rev. S. D. Hinman, continued their inspection and pronounced in favor of the northeast quarter of the Quapaw reserve as a location for their tribe.

Thus the removal was initiated, and the preliminary measures carried out, before the present Administration came into power. Reports made to the Indian Office were to the effect that on their return to their people the Ponca chiefs found the tribe divided in sentiment, the opposition to removal being constantly strengthened by the influence of outside parties; that the jealousies and animosities which had always prevailed among the different bands of the tribe were so intensified by those differences of opinion

with regard to the removal, that violence was threatened to any one who should attempt to leave the reservation; that to protect the removal-party from the intimidating tactics of their opponents forty-five soldiers were sent from Fort Randall. But the influence adverse to the removal so far prevailed that only 175 members of the tribe crossed the Niobrara on the 17th of April, on their way to the Indian Territory. After the departure of this party the remaining five hundred and fifty Poncas, notwithstanding strong opposition, were prevailed upon by the inspector to go, and four companies of cavalry were sent for to attend the removal; but before the arrival of the troops, all the Poncas, as was reported to the Indian Office by their agent, had decided to go peaceably, and the soldiers were recalled while on their march to the agency. On the 16th of May, 1877, all the Poncas were on their way. Contrary to the express wish of the agent, but in accordance with previous orders, which the commanding officer thought he could not disobey, the twenty-five soldiers who had remained at the agency, after the departure of the first party, accompanied the second as far as Columbus, Nebraska. The journey was continued under great difficulties and hardships, occasioned by unprecedented storms and floods. On their arrival in the Indian Territory a majority of the Poncas were dissatisfied with the location chosen for them by their two chiefs who had remained with Inspector Kemble. That dissatisfaction deterred the Indian Office from making provision for their permanent settlement there. The Ponca chiefs asked to be permitted to visit Washington, and in the fall of 1877 they arrived in this city.

From this recital of facts, taken from the official records in this Department, it appears that all the legislation which brought about the removal of the Poncas, and the initiatory steps taken to this end, occurred before the

present Administration came into power; that the Indian Office had first recommended their removal to the Omaha reservation, upon which no action was taken, while Congress did provide for their removal to the Indian Territory. The removal itself, in pursuance of the law quoted, was effected a very short time after I took charge of my present position, when, I will frankly admit, I was still compelled to give my whole attention to the formidable task of acquainting myself with the vast and complicated machinery of the Interior Department. If at some future day you, Governor, should be made Secretary of the Interior, you will find what that means; and although you may accomplish it in a shorter time than I did, yet you will have to pass through some strange experiences during the first six months. During that period I had to confess myself as little conversant with Indian affairs as many of those seem to be who are now writing and speaking upon that subject. Under such circumstances I had to leave the practical management of the several bureaus, as to the business left over from the former Administration, for a short time, without much interference on my part, to the bureau chiefs whom I had found in office. I believed them, and justly so, to possess what I had not the advantage of, experience in the current business. On the Ponca affair I thought it best to accept the laws recently passed as the expressed will of Congress and to take the judgment of the then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hon. J. Q. Smith, which I have no doubt was conscientiously formed, as he was a man of just and benevolent impulses. His opinions, as I subsequently found, were largely based upon the reports made to the Office by Inspector Kemble. As to the measures taken by Mr. Kemble to obtain what he represented as the consent of the Poncas to the relinquishment of their lands and their removal to the Indian Territory, it

may be said that he followed a course which unfortunately had been frequently taken before him on many occasions. Having been a man of military training, he may have been rather inclined to summary methods; moreover it is probable that as the Ponca reserve had been ceded to the Sioux by the treaty of 1868, and as Congress had provided also that the Sioux should be removed to the Missouri river, and the Sioux were the same year to occupy that part of the country, the removal of the Poncas may have appeared to Mr. Kemble a necessity, in order to prevent a collision between them and the Sioux which would have been highly detrimental to both. Besides he stood not alone. In this opinion that the removal of the Poncas was necessary, he had the concurrence of Bishop Hare of the Episcopal Church, as expressed in dispatches to the Indian Office. Had I then understood this matter and Indian affairs generally as well as I do now, I should have overcome the natural hesitancy of a man new in office to take personal responsibilities.

The details of the case did not come clearly to my knowledge until the Ponca chiefs arrived in Washington and told their story. I concluded that they had suffered great hardship in losing the reservation originally conferred upon them by treaty, after a so-called consent which appeared not to have been a free expression of their will. They had also endured many disasters on their way to the Indian Territory, and after their arrival there were greatly afflicted by disease and lost a large number of their people by death. Then the question of redress presented itself. They requested permission to return to Dakota. This request was denied, not without very careful consideration. The Sioux had in the meantime been removed to the Missouri river and occupied that part of their reservation which included the Ponca lands. To return the Poncas to those lands under such circum-

stances seemed a dangerous experiment, not only on their account but, also, because the temper of the Sioux at that period appeared still very critical, and it was believed that the slightest irritation might lead to another outbreak of that tribe, the most powerful of all the Indian nations. Indeed, military officers predicted that another and a larger Sioux war was threatening and that any untoward occurrence might bring it about.

In the consultations had upon that subject the late Mr. William Welsh, of Philadelphia, one of the sincerest, warmest and also most experienced friends the Indians ever had, took an active part; and with his concurrence the conclusion was arrived at that under these difficult circumstances the return of the Poncas to Dakota would be too dangerous a venture, and that it would be best to propose to them a selection of lands in the Indian Territory, which they might choose themselves. This they consented to do. Had we then proposed to Congress the return of the Poncas and obtained authority and money for that purpose, and a new Indian war had ensued, which was not only possible, but, from the information we received from that quarter, appeared probable, the folly of such a step would have been more seriously and more generally condemned than all the wrongs done to the Poncas are now.

The Poncas did select a new location in the Indian Territory, at the Salt Fork of the Arkansas river, and in July, 1878, they went to it. It is the tract of land they now occupy. That land is among the very best in the Indian Territory, with respect to agricultural and pastoral pursuits; and since then they have been provided with houses and schools, cattle, farming implements, horses etc. While they suffered severely from disease on the Quapaw reservation, and lost many of their people by death, their health has constantly improved, and

according to the latest reports received, the births among them have exceeded the number of deaths during last year.

In the meantime the state of things in the Sioux country has been greatly changed for the better by careful management. The 13,000 Sioux who shortly after the removal of the Poncas from Dakota had occupied the country on and near their old reserve, selected new locations for themselves farther west of the Missouri river. They are in good condition now, but I am not by any means certain whether the reappearance of the Poncas in their vicinity might not induce some reckless young men among them to resume their old quarrels, which were amusement to them, but a very serious thing to the Poncas. But another difficulty arose of a grave nature: the invasion of the Indian Territory by white intruders striving to obtain possession of certain lands in the Indian Territory held for Indian settlement in that region, of which the present Ponca reservation forms a part. With regard to this difficulty I expressed, in my last report, the opinion that the success of this invasion, introducing into the heart of the Indian Territory a reckless, lawless, grasping element of adventurers, sure to grow and spread rapidly after once having gained a foothold, would bring upon the Indian population of that Territory in its present condition the most serious dangers. The lands coveted by the invaders are held against the intrusion on the ground that they are reserved for Indian settlement. It is important, therefore, that the Indian settlements actually on such lands should remain there at least while the Indian Territory is in danger. To take away the existing Indian settlements from those lands under such circumstances would very much weaken the position of the Government in defending them, and encourage the invasion. The lands occupied by the Poncas belong to that region. If

the Poncas were now taken from those lands and returned to Dakota, this very fact would undoubtedly make other northern Indians, who have been taken to the Indian Territory, restless to follow their example, such as the northern Cheyennes, the Nez Percés and possibly even the Pawnees. Unscrupulous white men, agents of the invaders, would be quickly on hand to foment this tendency. An evacuation by the Indians, and possibly an extensive one, of the very region which is held by the Government against the intruders on the very ground that it is reserved for Indian settlement, would be the consequence, and that just at the moment when the Government has the struggle for the integrity of the Indian Territory on its hands, and it requires the greatest watchfulness and energy to defeat the invasion. At this moment, while I am writing this letter, intelligence arrives that a new attempt is made by bands of intruders to gain possession of those lands. The unscrupulous leaders of that lawless movement, although repeatedly baffled, appear determined not to give up. Any measure looking to an evacuation by the Indians would, therefore, now be especially unsafe. An attempt to right the wrongs of the Poncas in that way now, might involve consequences disastrous to an Indian population a hundred times as numerous as they are. Those who look only at the wrongs of the Poncas may not appreciate this consideration. But it is the duty of Government officers responsible for the management of Indian affairs at large to foresee such consequences, and to guard against the danger of choosing that method of undoing a wrong to some, which will be apt to bring greater disaster upon a hundred times larger number.

Does it not appear, in view of this complication of difficulties, that the Poncas, after the great fundamental mistake of ceding their lands to the Sioux in 1868, were

more the victims of unfortunate circumstances than of evil designs on the part of anybody connected with the Interior Department? And if your meeting was called in the interest of justice, would it not have been just to the officers of the Government connected with this affair to take these circumstances into account?

But more remains to be said. It was reported in several speeches in your meeting that *now at last* that great wrong to the Poncas has been "unearthed." I beg your pardon, it is *by no means now* that it has been unearthed. It was fully disclosed and published three years ago. And who did it? Not you, Governor, nor Mr. Tibbles, nor Senator Dawes, nor Mayor Prince. But I did it myself. In my annual report of 1877, my first report after the removal of and after my meeting with the Poncas in Washington, three years ago, I made the following statement:

Congress at its last session made provision for the removal of the Poncas from their former reservation on the Missouri river to the Indian Territory, resolved upon for the reason that it seemed desirable to get them out of the way of the much more numerous and powerful Sioux, with whom their relations were unfriendly. That removal was accordingly commenced in the early summer. The opposition it met with among the Poncas themselves and the hardships encountered on the march are set forth at length in the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The Poncas, about 700 in number, were taken to the Quapaw reservation, in the northeastern corner of the Indian Territory, with a view to permanent settlement. But the reluctance with which they had left their old homes, the strange aspect of a new country, an unusually large number of cases of disease and death among them and the fact that they were greatly annoyed by white adventurers hovering around the reservation, who stole many of their cattle and ponies, and smuggled whisky into their encampments, engendered among them a spirit of discontent which threatened

to become unmanageable. They urgently asked for permission to send a delegation of chiefs to Washington to bring their complaints in person before the President, and it was reported by their agent that unless this request be granted there was great danger that they would run away to their old reserve on the Missouri river. To avoid such trouble, the permission asked for was given, and the delegation arrived here on November 7th. They expressed the desire to be taken back to their old reservation on the Missouri, a request which could not be acceded to. But permission was granted them to select for themselves, among the lands at the disposal of the Government in the Indian Territory, a tract at least equal in size to their old reservation, and they also received the assurance that they would be fully compensated in kind for the log-houses, furniture and agricultural implements, which, in obedience to the behests of the Government, they had left behind on the Missouri.

The case of the Poncas seems entitled to especial consideration at the hands of Congress. They have always been friendly to the whites. It is said, and as far as I have been able to learn, truthfully, that no Ponca ever killed a white man. The orders of the Government always met with obedient compliance at their hands. Their removal from their old homes on the Missouri river was to them a great hardship. They had been born and raised there. They had houses there in which they lived according to their ideas of comfort. Many of them had engaged in agriculture, and possessed cattle and agricultural implements. They were very reluctant to leave all this, but when Congress had resolved upon their removal they finally overcame that reluctance and obeyed. Considering their constant good conduct, their obedient spirit and the sacrifices they have made, they are certainly entitled to more than ordinary care at the hands of the Government, and I urgently recommend that liberal provision be made to aid them in their new settlement.

In the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the same year you will find that statement amplified

with much information in detail. In the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, presented by me in 1878, the following passage occurs:

It should be remembered that their old reservation in Dakota was confirmed to the Poncas by solemn treaty and at the time of making the treaty they received promises of certain annuities in consideration of the cession to the United States of a large tract of land. That treaty, which is still in force, also recognized certain depredation claims which are still unadjusted. By a blunder in making the Sioux treaty of 1868, the 96,000 acres belonging to the Poncas were ceded to the Sioux. The negotiators had no right whatever to make the cession, and the bad feeling between the Sioux and the Poncas, which had existed for a long time, compelled the removal of the latter to the Indian Territory.

In this removal, I am sorry to be compelled to say, the Poncas were wronged, and restitution should be made as far as it is in the power of the Government to do so. For the violation of their treaty no adequate return has yet been made. They gave up lands, houses and agricultural implements. The houses and implements will be returned them; their lands should be immediately paid for, and the title to their present location should be made secure. But the removal inflicted a far greater injury upon the Poncas for which no reparation can be made, the loss by death of many of their number, caused by change of climate.

Nothing having been done in the previous session of Congress, my report notwithstanding, a bill was drafted in this Department and submitted to Congress during the session of 1878-'9. In that bill provision was made for an appropriation of \$140,000, to indemnify the Poncas for the lands and other property given up by them, and to acquire title for them to their new reservation.

In my annual report of 1879 the same subject was again

referred to in the following language: "That the Poncas were grievously wronged by their removal from their location on the Missouri river to the Indian Territory, their old reservation having, by a mistake in making the Sioux treaty, been transferred to the Sioux, has been at length and repeatedly set forth in my reports as well as those of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. All that could be subsequently done by this Department, *in the absence of new legislation*, to repair that wrong and to indemnify them for their losses, has been done with more than ordinary solicitude."

At the same time I presented the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of that year which, as a reminder, contained the text of the bill submitted by the Department to Congress at the previous session and adds: "By the provisions of the above bill it will be seen that everything has been done for the Poncas, *so far as this Department can act*. Their lands were ceded to the Sioux by act of Congress, and proper reparation can only be made by the same authority."

You will admit that the language employed in those reports with regard to the wrong done to the Poncas could not have been stronger; there was nothing concealed or glossed over. Three years ago, therefore, the matter was fully "unearthed" and reparation demanded, and it was done by this Department. But Congress took no notice of it. If the reparation to the Poncas proposed in the bill submitted to Congress was not satisfactory, then there was a full opportunity for Congress to amend that bill and to act upon its own judgment. If the Poncas had any real friends in Congress, those friends had, ever since 1877, sufficient knowledge furnished them by me upon which to speak and to act. But session after session passed; this Department again and again called attention to the matter and Congress said nothing, and did nothing

except to appropriate money for the support of the Poncas.

Had Congress directed this Department to do this or that, there would have been no hesitation in executing the law. But now I read in your speech that all that was required to right the wrongs of the Poncas was "a heart and a stroke of the pen" on the part of the principal officer of the Government managing Indian affairs. Three years ago, by my declarations in the annual report, I showed that I had a heart for the Poncas long before the speakers at your meeting. But when you said that it required merely a stroke of the pen on my part to return the Poncas to Dakota, you had certainly forgotten that the powers of the Executive branch of the Government are limited; that such a removal and the resettlement of the Poncas in Dakota would have required much more money than their support where they were; and that this Department had no authority of law to spend a dollar of money that was not appropriated. You go even so far as to say that this Department had no legal authority to keep them in the Indian Territory, and to spend any money for them there; you forget that this Department reported the matter to Congress in 1877, without any concealment as to the wrong done, and that Congress by law made appropriations for the support of the Poncas in the Indian Territory year after year with that full knowledge. It is said that had I recommended to Congress an appropriation for their return to Dakota, it would have been granted. But an appropriation was recommended by this Department for the purpose of indemnifying them in another way, and Congress, with a full knowledge of the facts spread by me before them, might have amended that bill, had it been so minded; yet the matter received no notice at all.

The reasons why I recommended that the Poncas be

indemnified upon the lands they then occupied, and why I thought it wise that it should at least be tried whether they could not be made comfortable and contented there, are stated above.

It was hoped that when they were settled upon their new reserve in the Indian Territory they would go vigorously to work to improve their condition, and that such work, with the prospect of increasing prosperity and well-being, would render them gradually satisfied. Their lands are the best in the Indian Territory; the climate is as good as in southern Kansas, which is now becoming densely peopled; their sanitary condition was greatly changed for the better. The inspiration of successful work might have made them hopeful and healthy. This would in all probability have been the case had the restlessness of their minds, which at first was natural enough, not been constantly excited by reports coming to them from the outside that their stay on the lands they occupied would only be temporary; that they would certainly be returned to Dakota, and that, therefore, any effort to improve their condition on their present location would be thrown away. That such influences were assiduously brought to bear upon them there is no doubt. The evidence is abundant, and the result has been by no means beneficial to them, although not a few of them have actually gone to work.

In my annual report I mentioned a petition which was recently received from the Poncas, and which seems to indicate that they themselves begin to appreciate their real interests. It is in the following words:

We, the undersigned chiefs and head men of the Ponca tribe of Indians, realize the importance of settling all our business with the Government. Our young men are unsettled and hard to control, while they think we have a right to our land in

Dakota, and our tribe will not be finally settled until we have a title to our present reservation, and we have relinquished all right to our Dakota land. And we earnestly request that the chiefs of the Ponca tribe of Indians be permitted to visit Washington the coming winter for the purpose of signing away our right to all land in Dakota, and to obtain a title to our present reservation, and we also wish to settle our Sioux troubles at the same time.

We make the above request, as we desire to have the young men of our tribe become settled, and commence to work on their respective claims. We also desire to make this visit in order to convince the Government that it is our intention of remaining where we are, and requesting the aid of the Government in obtaining teams, wagons, harness, tools &c., with which to work our land.

Signed:

WHITE EAGLE,	BLACK CROW,
FRANK LA FLESCHÉ,	BIG SOLDIER,
CHILD CHIEF,	THE CHIEF,
STANDING BUFFALO,	LITTLE PICKER,
RUSH-IN-THE-BOTTLE,	BIG BULL,
SHORT-MAN,	RED LOAF,
FOUR BEARS,	YELLOW BIRD,
WHITE BUFFALO BULL,	WHITE FEATHER,
BUFFALO RIB,	PETER PRIMEAUX,
BIG GOOSE,	WALKING SKY.

We the undersigned certify, on honor, that we were present and witnessed the signing of the above by each of the individuals named, and that the above was written at the solicitation of the Ponca chiefs.

JOSEPH ESAW, *Interpreter.*
A. R. SATTERTHWAITE.

PONCA AGENCY, INDIAN TER.,
October 25, 1880.

I notice in your speech a remark that this petition has been obtained "by fraud or false promises or some cajol-

ery." I can only assure you that there is no information in this Department to that effect, and I suppose you have none. I may assure you, further, that the petition has not been instigated by anybody here. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that it was the outgrowth of a very natural sentiment growing up among those people. When the chiefs, White Eagle and Standing Buffalo, were here last winter to testify before the Senate Committee, it appears that great care was taken to prevent White Eagle from coming to see me, and he did not come; but Standing Buffalo solicited an interview with me, and remembering the absurd rumor spread on the occasion of the visit of the Ute chiefs here, that they were held under duress and were not permitted to speak in the presence of anybody but a Government official, I assembled several gentlemen in my office while my conversation with Standing Buffalo was held. Standing Buffalo spoke to me as follows: "I would rather do what you want me to do because I know you have always treated me well. If I controlled matters myself I would not go away; I would stay where we are. I am the old chief, and if I go back there I want to see how many people will stay even if White Eagle goes. I have a farm-house with pine lumber, and I have got lands; I don't think it very good for white men to try to get the Poncas back to their old reservation."

When asked what the condition of the health of his people was, he answered: "When any people, even the white man, go to a new country, when they first go there they do not get along, some die; but they get used to the country. When first we got there, all sick; now we are getting better; some people have had consumption before they went down to the Indian Territory; a good many died on account of the change."

When asked whether they had been receiving letters from Omaha or other places, asking them not to do any

work because they would be taken away from there, he answered: "Yes, we get letters all the time; I do not know whether the letters come from Omaha; they also told me the Ponca going to get his land back; that is the reason the Ponca didn't want to work. I think that letters came from here; somebody put them, Bright Eyes put them, and in that way the letters came around to the Ponca Agency."

I have also received a letter, signed by Standing Buffalo, dated on May 3, 1880, in which the following passage occurs:

As I told you when I was in Washington last winter, I would rather stay here than anywhere else. My people have quieted down, but somebody has told them that when Congress adjourns they will be told whether they can go back to their old reservation or not. I do not do as I want to at all times, but I do as you advise me to do; but one-half of the tribe would remain here with me if I advise it, should the others leave. I can prove by any one that the half-breeds are the worst about trying to get back to Dakota; some white men have been fooling with us for nearly two years, and preventing us from doing anything. It is not our fault that the Poncas are unsettled. Stop these white people from interfering with us and our people will quiet down and go to work. When I was in Washington I thought that but few of the Poncas would be willing to stay, and I asked for only ten wagons; I would now like to have twenty wagons for my people.

The talk Standing Buffalo held with me is so much in accord with the letter I received that I am compelled to conclude the latter expresses his real sentiments; and if so, then the petition appears to be the result of a change of feeling, which from Standing Buffalo's immediate followers has spread over the whole tribe; this, certainly, can have been the case. It seems to me therefore that to

call it the result of fraud or other illegitimate practices, is at least a hasty conclusion not warranted by other evidence. Moreover, if the petition does not express the real sentiments of the Poncas, and has been extorted from them by illegitimate means, the men so extorting it have made a great mistake in advising that they be permitted to go to Washington where they would be at perfect liberty to express their true sentiments not only before me but before others. I would certainly not restrain them. But if that petition does express their real sentiments and they are willing to stay where they are, and to improve their condition, and to accept indemnity for the lands they lost in Dakota, would not that be, in view of all the difficulties surrounding the case, a satisfactory solution of the problem? If the point of right and principle in question be fully and clearly established by act of Congress; if the ceding away of the Ponca lands to the Sioux be thus fully recognized as a wrong; if ample indemnity be paid for it, and if the Poncas then are content to stay where they are, thus avoiding a new removal, the breaking up of their present houses and farms and mills and educational facilities, and the transfer to Dakota, where all these things would have to be begun again from the beginning, avoiding also a possibly unpleasant contact with the Sioux, and a partial evacuation of the Indian Territory, which appears especially dangerous under present circumstances—would that not be satisfactory to you? Would you in that case wish they had not come to such a conclusion? And, indeed, considering that the quality of the land on which they now are is much better than that of their land in Dakota, and the circumstance that after much suffering they appear at last to have now become acclimated like other settlers in that region, does it not seem that in time they may become prosperous and contented? Would you regret this? It was said that the

advocates of fiat money deplored the reviving prosperity of the country because it destroyed their arguments. Can it be that any sincere friend of the Indians would regret the success of a solution apt to avoid serious risks and difficulties because it stopped their agitation? I should be sorry to think so.

I say to you frankly that I desire this solution. I know very well that no reparation can be perfectly complete, for the loss they have suffered by death, which I deplore as much as you do, cannot be repaired by this settlement, nor can it be by their return to Dakota. But we have to take care of the living, and this can be done by the solution here set forth, which appears to me the best for the Poncas as well as the safest with regard to the maintenance of peace and the protection of the rights and interests of tribes in the Indian Territory much more numerous than they. Nor would such a solution leave out of view the principles contended for. It is in the nature of compensation for property taken by the Government in the way of expropriation for public use, or by an error like the Sioux treaty of 1868, where restitution in kind would endanger the rights of other innocent parties. I will say further that conscientiously believing this to be the best solution, I shall express that opinion to the Ponca chiefs and encourage its acceptance, not by way of command, but by way of argument. I shall consider it my duty to do so, and I shall be glad if the Poncas accept it. It is quite possible, if new emissaries are sent among them again for the purpose of dissuading them from any consent to this proposition or of inducing them to run away in a disorderly manner from the lands they now occupy, that the Poncas may be prevailed upon to reject the reparation thus offered to them, notwithstanding the petition they have sent to me. But I trust that you and all the sincere friends of the Indians engaged in this movement will

discountenance such mischievous practices; and that if this solution appears acceptable to the Poncas no influence be employed to prevent it. On the contrary, I should think that every true friend of the Indians would aid in its accomplishment.

Permit me now a few words about the resolutions passed at your meeting. The first of them denounces the wrong done to the Poncas and demands reparation. The second is in two parts: first, "that it is unbecoming in a free Government to allow its agents to slander, prosecute and imprison those whose only offense lies in befriending the victims of that Government's oppression." This undoubtedly refers to the arrest of Mr. Tibbles last summer, on the Ponca reservation, by the Indian agent there. The report made to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by Agent Whiting, upon this occurrence, was as follows:

I have to state that on the 28th ultimo, as I was on my way to Arkansas City, I was informed that Mr. Tibbles had started that morning on horse-back for Ponca agency, and in connection with an accomplice, who was to remain in the State of Kansas he intended to coax the Poncas to run off, a few families at a time, and meet at a point a few miles from Nez Percé reservation, where he (Tibbles) would have supplies furnished to feed them, until quite a number were collected, when he would take them all back to Dakota. The Indians informed me that Mr. Tibbles told them to collect all the property they could and meet him at the above-named point; that he promised them wagons, harness, farming implements, horses, cattle etc., and that they would receive rations until they could raise a crop. Mr. Tibbles told them to run off in the night and to tell no one where they were going. The evening Mr. Tibbles was arrested four families had made arrangements to run off and join him at the appointed place.

On the 29th ultimo I returned to the agency and found Mr. Tibbles under arrest, but being very pleasantly entertained at

the house of Mr. Frisbie, agency carpenter, where he had taken his supper.

Mr. Tibbles was arrested on the evening of the 29th ultimo, while trying to make his way across Nez Percé reservation to a cattle camp, where he was making his headquarters, by a Nez Percé policeman, and taken to Oakland agency, where he was recognized, and was informed that he must consider himself a prisoner until word could be sent to Ponca agency. Mr. Tibbles was escorted to Ponca agency by agency employes where he arrived about dark and was given his supper. Upon my arrival I took Mr. Tibbles to my house and gave him a room for the night, stationing a white employé in the hall, to see that he made no effort to escape. In the morning Mr. Tibbles was given his breakfast, after which he was told to mount the pony he brought to the agency, and in company with the chief of police and four Indian policemen he was escorted to the State line and warned of the consequences should he return.

Mr. Tibbles was treated kindly and respectfully while under arrest, there was no violence attempted or threatened, and he was assured that no harm should befall him. He was entertained the same as any other person visiting the agency, except a watch was kept over him to prevent his escaping.

I am aware that Mr. Tibbles says he went there to have a legal consultation with the Indians, and that his life was in imminent danger. He frequently speaks of such perils. He seems to like the robes of martyrdom. From what I know of the two men I see very good reason to take the word of Agent Whiting in preference to that of Mr. Tibbles. Upon this point I expect you to agree with me some day. As to the things done by Mr. Tibbles on the Ponca reservation, according to the report of Agent Whiting, I desire to call your attention to the following sections of the Revised Statutes:

SEC. 2111. Every person who sends any talk, speech, message or letter to any Indian nation, tribe, chief or indi-

vidual, with an intent to produce a contravention or infraction of any treaty or law of the United States, or to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the United States, is liable to a penalty of two thousand dollars.

SEC. 2112. Every person who carries or delivers any talk, message, speech or letter intended to produce a contravention or infraction of any treaty or law of the United States, or to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the United States, knowing the contents thereof, to or from any Indian nation, tribe, chief or individual, from or to any person or persons whatever, residing within the United States, or from or to any subject, citizen or agent of any foreign power or state, is liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars.

SEC. 2113. Every person who carries on a correspondence, by letter or otherwise, with any foreign nation or power, with an intent to induce such foreign nation or power to excite any Indian nation, tribe, chief or individual, to war against the United States, or to the violation of any existing treaty; or who alienates, or attempts to alienate, the confidence of any Indian or Indians from the Government of the United States, is liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars.

SEC. 2147. The Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and the Indian agents and sub-agents, shall have authority to remove from the Indian country all persons found therein contrary to law; and the President is authorized to direct the military force to be employed in such removal.

SEC. 2148. If any person who has been removed from the Indian country shall thereafter at any time return, or be found within the Indian country, he shall be liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars.

SEC. 2149. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs is authorized and required, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to remove from any tribal reservation any person being therein without authority of law, or whose presence within the limits of the reservation may, in the judgment of the Commissioner, be detrimental to the peace and welfare of the Indians; and may employ for the purpose such force as may be necessary to enable the agent to effect the removal of such person.

When a man enters an Indian reservation and mischievously tries by false promises which he cannot perform, as in this case, or in any other way, to induce the Indians to run away, breaking up their settlements, an Indian agent will consider it his duty to enforce the above provisions of law.

The second part of the resolution is as follows: "That it shows consciousness of wrong and fear of justice when the highest officials belie their principles by denying a hearing in our own courts to those who claim the protection of the laws." I suppose this refers to the circumstance that on some occasion I stated that, according to the opinion of lawyers I had consulted, an Indian tribe cannot sue the United States in the Federal courts, as decided by the Supreme Court in the case of the Cherokee Nation *vs.* the State of Georgia, which decision was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. If there was any denial of justice in this then it was Chief Justice Marshall who did it, unless the lawyers misunderstand him; but certainly not I, for I declared at the same time that "if an Indian tribe could maintain an action in the courts of the United States to assert its right I should object to it just as little as I would object to the exercise of the same privilege on the part of white men." It may be that the censure expressed in that resolution refers to the circumstance that when the brief of the United States District Attorney in Nebraska for an appeal from Judge Dundy's *habeas corpus* decision was submitted to me, I could not approve the principles upon which the argument of that brief was based and advised the Attorney-General that, as far as I, as Secretary of the Interior, was concerned, there was no desire that an appeal should be taken, but rather that Judge Dundy's decision should stand without question on the part of the Government. Moreover, I have repeatedly recommended the passage of a statute by

Congress extending the jurisdiction of the courts over Indian reservations, and that the Indians have the protection of the laws like white men.

Under such circumstances I think you will admit yourself that the language of the resolution was highly intemperate and unjustifiable, to say the least of it.

The third resolution calls upon the President for a prompt use of his large powers to rectify the injuries done. This seems to leave out of view that the President has to execute the laws passed by Congress as they are and cannot order the use of any money without an appropriation. And as in this case there is neither legal authority nor appropriation he can do nothing without the further action of Congress.

To sum up the case, on two things you and I are agreed. First, a great wrong has been done to the Poncas. I denounced that wrong years before you did. Second, reparation is due them. This Department asked for reparation long before you did. The only question of difference between us is what that reparation shall be. You look at it from the standpoint of one who has the Poncas alone in view. I look at it as one who has the responsibility for the management of the affairs of all the Indian tribes, of whom the Poncas form but a small part. You demand a reparation which with that responsibility upon me, I consider attended with serious risks and difficulties. I demand a reparation which, in point of principle, is just as good, but which at the same time is to avoid all those risks and difficulties.

In differing from you I am actuated by no pride of opinion. I have shown more than once, when I became aware of having made a mistake, that I did not hesitate to acknowledge and correct it. Such an acknowledgment would be particularly easy in this instance, as I was the first to denounce the wrong that was done; and when now

my opinion as to what reparation should be made does not agree with that of others, they have no reason to attribute it to mere stubbornness, and certainly not to a want of heart for the suffering Indians. In what I say to you I express my honest conviction under a keen sense of the responsibility I have to bear. It may be called an error of judgment, perhaps, which I think it is not, but nobody has a right to call it anything else. The thought of gross injustice to the Indians is as revolting to me as it is to you, and probably much more so, for my impressions are not owing to a sudden excitement produced by a single case. I have seen large numbers of Indians here in Washington, where they came to express their complaints and their wishes. I have gone to visit them on their reservations and in the wilderness in order to study their needs, and there I have learned to appreciate their good traits, as well as their faults and their helplessness; and I am not ashamed to say that I have conceived for them the hearty sympathy of a personal friend. But that very friendship does not permit me to overlook the dangers and the interests of the many when a wrong done to a few is to be righted, and can be substantially righted without putting the rights of others in peril. When a man in my position has patiently, earnestly and laboriously studied the Indian problem, when day after day he has watched over the rights and interests of those helpless people as much as any one in his position before, spared no effort to better their condition and accomplished some things at least that promise to endure, he may consider himself entitled to something better than scurrilous abuse or injurious insinuations from decent men.

I deeply regret that an agitation like this appears to have brought about antagonism between those who ought to work harmoniously together for a common end. I do not desire to boast of anything. But when an effort is

made to produce the impression as if this Department had during four years devoted itself principally to the business of oppressing the Poncas, I may be pardoned for mentioning some other ends it has endeavored to serve. If those who participate in this agitation will take the trouble to raise their eyes for a moment from that one case which alone they see in the whole Indian question, they would perceive that under this Administration many things have been done which deserve their hearty sympathy and coöperation; they would observe constant efforts to secure by statute to the Indians the equal protection of the laws and an impregnable title to their lands and homes; they would notice practical measures, not merely to declare the Indian "a person" in theory, but to *make* him a person capable of taking care of himself, and of exercising and maintaining his rights; they would see the establishment of educational institutions which, although new, have already produced most promising results; they would see thousands of Indians but a short time ago vagrant and idle, now earning wages running into hundreds of thousands of dollars as freighters; they would see the organization of an Indian police which has not only been most efficacious in the maintenance of law and order, but also in producing a moral discipline, formerly unknown to them; they would see multitudes of Indians but a few years since on the warpath, now building houses and cultivating their farms in their simple way, and raising cattle and asking Congress for the white man's title to their lands; they would notice the conspicuous absence of those scandals in the Indian service which at another period called forth so much complaint; they would see a general treatment of the Indians humane and progressive; they would see the introduction of principles in our Indian policy which at a future day promise to work the solution of that difficult problem. I do not pretend that this is

complete or perfect, but it is something; and every true friend of a just and sound Indian policy will rather endeavor to promote its development by sympathetic co-operation than discredit and hamper it by unreasoning criticism and random attacks.

Certainly I do not deprecate criticism. When it is just, it is useful and welcome; when it is unjust, it may injure the cause it is meant to serve. Needless disagreements, preventing the coöperation for a good end of those who ought to work together, I should especially deplore in a community whose enlightened public spirit and active philanthropy have served so many noble causes and whose good opinion I therefore particularly value.

TO JAMES A. GARFIELD

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2, 1881.

Dear General: You invited me to write you my views on the situation, and I will do so without reserve.

You labor under certain disadvantages as compared with the present Administration, which you should not lose sight of. We came in under a cloud: a disputed Presidential title, hard times, the Republican party in discredit and discord. The Administration goes out with the record of purity and generally successful management; the times are prosperous, the party strengthened morally and numerically. Your Administration will come in under a full blaze of sunshine: good times, a hopeful feeling throughout the country, the character of the party restored and its prospects brightened. We started on a bad state of things; every improvement went to our credit. You start on a good state of things; every failure to keep things in the present good condition, every untoward accident, will go to your discredit. Your task is the more difficult one and will require the more careful handling.

We had much to gain, you have much to lose. That is what I mean in saying that you labor under a certain disadvantage.

Upon the success of your Administration will depend the future of the Republican party as well as your own. The two are in a certain sense identical. If you succeed, you should be and will be renominated. If you fail, the Republican party will succumb to the opposition in 1884. Any lowering of the present standard will be looked upon as a failure.

Your success in the best sense of the word will depend upon your management of the public business, not upon the management of party politics, or, at least, upon the latter only in a very small degree. It is now generally recognized that the Republican party in the last campaign was greatly strengthened by the character and success of the present Administration. Indeed, without these things victory would have been impossible. The success of the present Administration was owing exclusively to the conduct of the public business, for political management there was none. If wise political management can go hand in hand with a good conduct of the public business so much the better. But the latter should never be subordinated to the former. The idea that the former can make up for failures in the latter, will prove a disastrous delusion.

You want, therefore, in the first place, a good business Cabinet upon whose intelligence, integrity and energy you can depend. It is desirable that the party be kept harmonious if that is possible, and that to this end the different elements composing the Republican party be properly respected. But it is of infinitely greater importance that every member of your Cabinet give you, by his character and ability, the greatest possible assurance that in his hands the public interests committed to his

care be perfectly safe. You will get along much better without harmony in the party than without a perfectly honest and intelligent management of the public affairs. When the former can be obtained only at the expense of the latter, it should be sacrificed without hesitation. It is a great mistake that an Administration cannot sustain itself and succeed in the best sense of the term without an harmonious party at its back. Our experience is that the friendship of certain elements in the party purchased at the price which it would have cost, would have been far more dangerous to our general success than their hostility proved to be. You will undoubtedly go through the same experience, and it will not injure you, if you realize and appreciate it early enough. An Administration faithfully serving the public interest will always be much stronger than any faction in the party, however strong and demonstrative, even if it appear like a majority of it.

Permit me to repeat some of the remarks I made in our conversation here. You should be perfectly sure not only of the ability and general character but also of the political motives of every one of your Cabinet Ministers.

Your Cabinet should be *your* Constitutional council, not an assemblage of agents of party leaders.

No member of your Cabinet should have reason to think that he owed his position to any other influence than your own free choice.

Especially at the head of the Treasury, the Interior, the Post-Office and the Department of Justice you should have men whom you can count upon to [serve] the public interest and [be] loyal to yourself under all circumstances, without being watched. They should also have the necessary moral courage to say No on all proper occasions whatever pressure be brought upon them. They must be able to say No for you, and even to oppose your own good-nature

when necessity requires it. These are the Departments which manage the public service in all the branches that involve the moral and political character and the efficiency of the Administration at home. An unreliable man at the head of any one of them can do much mischief without your becoming aware of it in time to prevent the consequences.

As to the Treasury, I fear you have lost your best opportunity. It has always been my opinion that Mr. Sherman ought to remain at the head of it, and that it will be almost impossible to find a man that can fill his place. The advantage of the confidence which his retention would have secured to your Administration, and of the ability he would have brought to the discharge of his duties would have far outweighed all the disadvantages possibly growing from the displeasure of some political leaders, which his presence in the Cabinet might have called forth. Of course, I do not know whether his retention is still among the possibilities, but if it is, I would in your place not hesitate a moment between him and some second-rate man who would probably shine only by the contrast.

For the Postmaster-Generalship, which requires only an inferior kind of talent, a man of thoroughly sound character and business ability will be sufficient, but you should be able to depend upon him as a personal friend.

I have heard Wayne McVeagh mentioned in connection with the Department of Justice. In fact, you mentioned him yourself in your conversation here. I think he would be a good selection in every essential respect. He would also be a most excellent feature of your Cabinet in a social respect.

The Interior Department is the most dangerous branch of the public service. It is more exposed to corrupt influences and more subject to untoward accidents than

any other. To keep it in good repute and to manage its business successfully requires on the part of its head a thorough knowledge of its machinery, untiring work and sleepless vigilance. I shall never forget the trials I had to go through during the first period of my Administration, and the mistakes that were made before I had things well in hand. It is a constant fight with the sharks that surround the Indian bureau, the General Land Office, the Pension Office and the Patent Office, and a ceaseless struggle with perplexing questions and situations, especially in the Indian service. Unless the head of the Interior Department well understands and performs his full duty, your Administration will be in constant danger of disgrace. Of all men that I know there is not one as well fitted for that place as General Walker, the present head of the Census Office. He has been Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and understands that business thoroughly. You cannot find a man better equipped for it. He possesses large acquirements, great working capacity and extensive knowledge of general affairs, great energy and firmness, and at the same time an excellent temper. His character is of the highest. If he were placed at the head of the Interior Department, I should consider you out of danger at the most delicate point. I have heard it said that he does not represent any political force. If he did not, in the party sense, I should scarcely consider it an objection; for a successful conduct in that branch of the business would soon be felt in itself as a political force.

But he would represent in your Cabinet the liberal Republican element in its best features, and his appointment would, I have no doubt, be hailed by a very large number of Republicans, and just those whose approval a man like you would most keenly appreciate, as a thing of good omen. I earnestly commend this to your attention.

The estimation in which your Administration will be

held, will depend in a great measure upon the character of your Cabinet, and that character will be determined not only by the presence of some elements in it, but also by the conspicuous absence of others. I trust it is scarcely necessary to speak to you of such characters as Chaffee, Dorsey, Filley, Hitchcock etc. Any one of them connected in any way with your Administration would sink it at once in public esteem.

I understand that efforts are being made to press upon you Mr. Bowman of Kentucky, as a Southern man. He has been for some time in the employment of this Department as a Commissioner, and my experience leads me to the conclusion that he would by no means be a proper man to take into your official family. Also Mr. Routt of Colorado has been spoken of. He does not possess the necessary ability and I know that the support given him is only ostensible. Some of those who bring his name before you will privately tell you so, as they have told me.

But I do not know whether you desire to have my judgment of persons. If you do, command me, and I shall speak to you with entire frankness. On the whole, whatever you may think at present of the necessity of satisfying everybody and of avoiding unpleasant complications, I have no doubt before you are far advanced in your Administration, you will become convinced that the best policy is to make up your mind clearly as to what you want to accomplish for the public good, and then to select the best men you can find for that purpose and to go straight ahead without fear or favor. "A pound of pluck is worth a ton of luck." It is pluck in the pursuit of good ends the people admire and they will stand by.

I have to apologize for the length of this letter, and perhaps also for the positiveness of its tone. But I have written you with entire frankness as one who means to be a true friend to you. I see the difficulties and dangers

surrounding you and feel anxious about them. When I shall have returned to journalistic work to exercise an influence [on] public opinion, nothing will delight me more than to be able to carry on the business of criticism in the way of support and approval of your endeavors and achievements.

TO JAMES A. GARFIELD

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16, 1881.

Permit me now a few remarks of a general character in addition to my last letter. I hear that you are troubled by the "geographical question" in connection with the formation of your Cabinet. While it may seem desirable that the members of the Cabinet should be fairly distributed in the geographical sense, this consideration appears, before the formation of the Cabinet, of far greater importance than it will after the *fait accompli*. When the Cabinet is announced there always is a little grumble from this or that section or State, but it will soon die out. The only thing of real importance is that every member of the Cabinet be fit for his place, no matter from what part of the country he may come. If you succeed in making a Cabinet the individual fitness of whose members is conceded, the geographical grumble will amount to nothing and never give you any trouble. But if you sacrifice fitness to the geographical consideration and a member of your Cabinet turns out a failure, the people will scarcely accept the excuse that you selected a man of questionable fitness, or rejected a better man, merely for the purpose of gratifying a particular section of the

¹ About Schurz's wish to appoint a Commissioner of Indian Affairs of such qualities that he would be retained by Garfield's Administration. See letter of Jan. 28, 1881.

country. The judgment of public opinion will be that the public interest should have been considered as first in importance.

If, for instance, you should be inclined to consider the appointment of General Walker as Secretary of the Interior on account of his eminent fitness and as the most available representative of the "independent" element of the Republican party, the objection that he hails from New England would, as I think, be generally deemed of small consequence. It would be forgotten in a fortnight; and you would have the benefit of his ability, experience and political connections thenceforward unquestioned.

Moreover, recent events make it more important than ever that you should have a good man belonging to the independent wing of the Republican party in your official family. It cannot have escaped you that if one-half of the "Republican scratcher's" vote in New York had gone to the Democrats, the election would have been lost. To be sure, the same may be said of "stalwart" elements. But there is this distinction to be made: while these stalwarts have no place of abode except in the party and the offices are to them a matter of great consideration, the class of the independents I speak of deem it of far greater importance that the Government be well conducted than what set of men conducts it, and are therefore not unwilling straightforwardly to oppose the party when they think it wrong. Besides, no man with open eyes will fail to observe that the general tendency is decidedly in the direction of independent politics, and that the independent element is therefore likely to grow steadily in strength. The feeling in favor of "a change," after the Republican party had been in power for twenty years, was very strong, and it would have been almost irresistibly so, had the Administration during the last four years been more open to attack. That feeling in favor of "a change" will be

still stronger when the Republican party has been twenty-four years in power, and it may become overwhelming if the conduct of the Government during the next four years presents vulnerable points or the Republican party renders itself in any way obnoxious to independent opinion. The Republican party will more than ever need the support of the independent element in order to maintain itself in power four years hence, and it can keep that support only by deserving it. That support will certainly be forfeited by any connivance with present and any relapse into old abuses.

One of the greatest dangers to the ascendancy of the Republican party consists in the evils of boss-rule. Look at New York to-day. Whatever some editors may say, there is no doubt that Mr. Platt's nomination for the Senate was dictated by Mr. Conkling, and if there were an election in that State to-morrow it is more than probable that an overwhelming majority of the independent vote would go against the Republicans. At least I am so advised by persons who may be presumed to be well informed. In Pennsylvania there is an actual revolt. In regard to this matter your Administration will find itself in the same situation in which the present has been during the last four years. It will have to attract and keep attached to the party the elements which local politics are calculated to repel. It will have to do this by conducting the affairs of the Government in an irreproachable and generally acceptable manner, and also by keeping itself in living contact with the independent element. You will find it necessary to have somebody in your Cabinet who in this respect can do what I did during these four years: maintain active correspondence with those elements, explain to them things liable to be misunderstood, communicate their views and wishes to the head of the Government and so on. He should be a man

understanding the independent element and enjoying their confidence. Walker possesses these important qualifications. He is a man of tact, also, as well as of sound principle. His administration of the Department would, I have no doubt, raise him in the general opinion of the country and be of great benefit to you. Compared with such considerations the geographical question would seem to amount to very little.

Let me call your attention to another point. The civil service reform movement started in the Democratic party is meant to be, and is, a serious thing. Pendleton believes in it and will honestly push it. Others will aid him from political motives. Some people laughed at it at first, but it will not be a thing to be laughed at as it goes on. It is probable that the men having the matter in hand will produce a sensible plan. They will have the sympathy and support of a constantly growing number of Republicans. The Republican party cannot afford to let this movement pass to the credit of the Democrats. If the Republicans in Congress are wise they will take it out of the hands of their opponents and carry it on themselves. If they do not do so in Congress, the Administration will have to do it alone, and to this end you will want at least one man in your official family who believes in it and understands it. Any return to old vicious methods will turn out to be fraught with very grave consequences as to the strength of the party.

I find an opinion expressed in some papers that the machine-victory in the Senatorial election in New York will be apt to secure to Conkling the control of the patronage in that State. It should have just the contrary effect. The control of the offices would strengthen Conkling in the management of the party organization, but it would inevitably drive away from the party a number of voters more than large enough to bring on its defeat as soon as

the Democracy is reunited. Only your Administration can save New York and States similarly situated, by being and offering that which boss-rule is not. I trust you do not think of putting at the head of the Treasury a Wall street banker. It would be fatal. If you deem it necessary to give a place in your Cabinet to the Conkling-Grant wing of the party, no fairminded man in the country will find fault with you for selecting the person and the place yourself. If Conkling then quarrels with you, he will soon discover that he cannot afford to quarrel with two Republican Administrations in succession. It will be likely to prove a fatal blow to his influence even among the followers who so far have stood by him. You are entirely master of the situation. Only let your Administration be clean in character and able in its management of the public business, and the rest will in a great measure take care of itself. There are certain antagonisms which, I think, you cannot avoid. You will easily pass through them if the cleanness of your Administration in point of character and its ability secures the confidence of the country. Failure in that respect will be the only really dangerous thing.

P. S. The enclosed may amuse you as a specimen of the tricks of a shrewd wirepuller who wants to appear as a great man and to become your Postmaster-General.

TO JAMES A. GARFIELD

Jan. 28, 1881.

Dear General: Your letter of the 20th inst. seems to indicate that you do not desire to give your assent in any manner that might be considered binding, to the appointment of Inspector Pollock as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the understanding that he should remain in place under your Administration. In suggesting his

appointment I did, of course, not mean anything but that after the 4th of March he should have a full and fair chance to prove his efficiency. I recommended him knowing him, from my own official experience, to be in every essential respect well fitted for the place. I do not think that the appointment of Senator Bruce would be a fortunate one. The Commissionship of Indian Affairs requires a man of thorough business training and habits, indefatigable industry, quick judgment and great power of resistance. I fully recognize Senator Bruce's excellent qualities, but they are not such as would fit him for the perplexing and arduous duties of that office. He appears to be rather of an indolent disposition, and I am inclined to think he would soon feel very uncomfortable in the Indian Office, which is one of the most difficult and trying positions under the Government. However, if you desire to leave matters *in statu quo* until the 4th of March and then make new arrangements, I will drop it here, only repeating that you will need in the Interior Department and the Indian Office men of capacity, working energy, experience and great firmness of character, to guard your Administration against damaging accidents.

You ask me whether I do not think that Wayne McVeagh would be a proper man to form the connecting link between your Administration and the independent element. I esteem Wayne McVeagh very highly, and my relations with him are those of warm personal friendship. I should be very happy to see him in your Cabinet, and I sincerely hope he will be there. His general correspondence with the independent Republicans, however, would not be as intimate and confidential as it would be between them and General Walker.

But permit me to suggest that it would probably be an exceedingly good thing for your Administration to have both McVeagh and Walker in it. I cannot impress upon

you too strongly the necessity of having in the Interior Department a man who can be depended upon to put that most vulnerable and dangerous point of the Administration in a condition of safety. With regard to this point, if I had the responsibility of constructing a Cabinet, the geographical would not have a feather's weight with me. Let me repeat that the geographical consideration appears of great importance only before the formation of the Cabinet, and perhaps one day after it, and is then never heard of again. General Grant had in his Cabinet at one time five men from the States east of the Alleghany mountains, a fact which was scarcely remembered at that time, and the only censure passed upon the Cabinet was that the men composing it were in some instances not the right kind of persons. Believe me, if your Secretary of the Interior is good, nobody will ask where he comes from a week after his appointment. If he turns out badly, it will not be taken as an excuse that he was selected for geographical reasons. I speak of this with so much warmth and urgency because I know the Interior Department and all the difficulties and dangers connected with it; because I have the policies successfully inaugurated in several of its branches very much at heart and would greatly deplore to see them spoiled, and because I am convinced, from personal observation and experience, that Walker is far better equipped for its business than any man so far mentioned in connection with it, in fact far better than any man I know.

As the Cabinet is the subject of frequent discussions here, I have now and then mentioned Walker's name, and in every instance the unanimous judgment was that his appointment would be almost too good a thing to hope for. I can only add that such an appointment would be hailed by every well-wisher of the Republic in general and your Administration in particular with the greatest satisfaction,

while the appointment of any man of indifferent or doubtful qualifications to so enormously difficult and responsible a position would be likely to become the cause of great regret to you.

Pardon this reiteration. My own interest in the matter is only that of an ordinary American citizen. Yours is that of the responsible head of the Government.

TO HENRY L. DAWES¹

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, Feb. 7, 1881.

I have read your speech recently delivered in the Senate on the killing of the Ponca chief, Big Snake, in which you made certain reflections on the conduct of the Interior Department calling for my attention.

A Cabinet officer has no voice on the floor of the Senate. He cannot personally defend himself there against any attack, however unjust. He cannot correct misstatements of facts, however reckless. And even when Senators undertake his defense, as was generously done in this instance, they can scarcely ever be as conversant with all the circumstances of the case as the attacked Cabinet minister is himself. I shall certainly not object to the freest use of the privileges of a Senator, which I well understand; but no fairminded man will, on the other hand, find fault with me if I employ those means of public defense which every citizen has at his disposal. The nature of your attack relieves me of those considerations of official restraint which otherwise would control my language.

I have been exposed to so much misrepresentation and

¹ An open letter in reply to a speech made by Mr. Dawes in the U. S. Senate on the case of Big Snake.

obloquy in connection with the Ponca business that I think it time to call things by their right names. I want fair play, nothing else.

The facts upon which you make your speech are, in a few words, as follows:

The agent of the Ponca Indians in October, 1879, officially informed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that a Ponca Indian, Big Snake, was threatening his life and stirring up disturbance among the Indians. He requested that this Indian be arrested and confined at Fort Reno, and that a sufficient force of soldiers be sent to the Ponca agency to effect the arrest. This request was sent by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs through the Interior Department, with its approval, to the Secretary of War. The soldiers appeared at the Ponca agency and the officer commanding them was informed by the agent that Big Snake was expected at the agency at a certain time on that day to receive some money due him, and he thought it would be better for the officer to make the arrest on that occasion. The Indian came and the officer informed him that he was there for the purpose of arresting him. The Indian, a powerful man, resisted; a scuffle ensued, and in that scuffle one of the soldiers, without orders, shot him.

Whether the agent was justified in fearing danger to his life from the Indian, I will not discuss. There is no doubt that he thought so. It is probable that he had reason to think so. When I visited the Ponca agency late in September, 1879, I was informed by several persons of the troublesome conduct of Big Snake. The agent wrote the Indian Office on that subject not long after the massacre of Meeker and his employés had taken place on the Ute reservation, and there was more excitement among the Indians, and more apprehension among agency people than usual. His representations could not be disre-

garded by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Department.

The request by the agent to have the Indian arrested and confined "for the rest of his natural life" was at once rejected and altered by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to an arrest until further disposition. So it went to the War Department.

From this plain statement of facts, and all the evidence in the case, which also shows that the agent who was present called out to the soldiers not to shoot, it appears clearly that this deplorable catastrophe was only the result of a sudden impulse of a soldier, a bad impulse certainly, and that no one else but he himself could be held responsible for the murderous deed. This will be the conclusion of every fairminded man, as it was the conclusion arrived at by Senator Kirkwood, who is conversant with all the circumstances of the case, being the chairman of the committee appointed to investigate it, and who expressed that opinion clearly and unmistakably on the floor of the Senate.

Now, what have you made of this story? Delivering a eulogy upon the murdered Indian, you describe him as one of two brothers who had long and firmly resisted the tyranny of the Government; one of the brothers "the Government is at this moment engaged in the laudable attempt to starve into submission since it has not as yet been convenient to otherwise dispose of him," which I suppose is intended to mean that the Government has as yet not found it convenient to procure his assassination; while the other, Big Snake, has "fallen in the conflict." "With the latter," you say, "the work was quicker and more effective." As you describe the attempt to arrest Big Snake, "the struggle continued with doubtful odds, until a soldier, from a position prearranged for the purpose, put an end to it by a ball which pierced the brain of the victim."

No man can read your speech, which, as I am informed by the best possible authority, was not the product of momentary excitement, but a coolly and carefully prepared and elaborated effort, printed and sent several days before its delivery to the newspapers of your State, without receiving the impression that you mean to hold this Department of the Government responsible for the murder, not as a mere accidental consequence of a hand-to-hand struggle incident to an attempted arrest, but as a concerted and prearranged act, designed to rid the Department of a troublesome opponent of its policy. You go even so far as to add: "Indeed, the whole thing has been so in accordance with the ordinary mode of transacting Indian affairs, or the life of an Indian is counted of so little consequence, that when inquired about concerning it by the Senate of the United States, the Interior Department forgot for nearly a year to answer the inquiry at all, and did not think it worth while to express an opinion upon its character."

If this means anything pertinent to this case it can only be that the ordinary method of transacting Indian affairs in this Department is to murder men unless they fall in with its official policy, and that by it the life of an Indian is considered a matter of small moment.

I must confess that when reading this atrocious statement I could not repress a feeling of indignation; but upon mature reflection it became clear to me that the outrage of so revolting an insinuation had passed the line which separates the sublime from the ridiculous. Senator Kirkwood characterized it by the following quiet remark, on the floor of the Senate:

Now, whether the Senator desired to be understood as wishing to convey the impression that this had been a prearranged plan beforehand to kill the man, that this soldier

had been stationed there for the purpose and that the struggle was a pretense to give him the opportunity of doing it, I do not know. If that was the intention of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Dawes) I can say that he was mistaken; he was mistaken in the facts, and that he has allowed his feelings in this matter to becloud his judgment.

Senator Kirkwood, being conversant with all the circumstances of the occurrence, no doubt stated them correctly. If he erred in anything it was, perhaps, that he thought your judgment might have been clouded by your feelings.

I should not forget to mention that when Senator Logan, himself a warm advocate of the red man's rights and interests, indignant at the insinuations thrown out by you, proclaimed his opinion that the officer now at the head of the Interior Department had conducted the affairs intrusted to his charge wisely and justly, and should not be assailed in such a manner, you had the good grace to say: "Neither here nor elsewhere has a single word ever fallen from my lips in disparagement of the general policy of the Indian department or its head toward the Indians. On frequent occasions here and before the public at home I have taken occasion to commend it, with the exception of this particular transaction with regard to the Poncas."

With this admission, then, it would seem that the chief of the Interior Department is, in your opinion, on the whole a good public officer who only occasionally, when he takes it into his head to oppress an Indian tribe, will plot or connive at the assassination of men who stand in his way.

You find yourself compelled to say at last: "No one has charged, I have not charged the head of this Department with the commission of these wrongs." This is characteristic. No, you did not mention me directly, holding

me personally responsible, but with skilful use of language you insinuated the meaning without undertaking to use the straightforward expression, and I fear many will think that the latter would have been more manly than the former. But if there could be any doubt as to the real meaning you desired to convey, that doubt is solved by a remark in which you rise to the true level of your greatness. It deserves to be recorded.

You said: "It has been a relief to me, however, in examining our treatment of these weak and defenseless people to find that these methods are not American in their origin, but bear too striking a resemblance to the modes of an imperial government carried on by espionage and arbitrary power. They are methods which I believe to be unique and which I trust will not be naturalized."

You have succeeded in making yourself understood. From the Pequot war to our days there never was an Indian unjustly killed in this country until a German-born American citizen became Secretary of the Interior. All has been peace, love and fraternity. The red man has for three centuries reposed securely upon the gentle bosom of his white brother, and no man to make him afraid, until this dangerous foreigner in an evil hour for the Republic was clothed with authority to disturb that harmonious accord and to disgrace the American name with espionage in Indian camps, and the blood of slaughtered victims; and all this he did in an effort to naturalize on American soil the dark and cruel methods of imperial governments, of which this foreigner notoriously is, and has always been, a faithful and ardent worshipper and champion. And, "it is a relief" to your patriotic soul that there is hope this wicked naturalization scheme will never succeed. It is pleasant to reflect that there is one man at least among us who even under such threatening circumstances will not despair of the Republic.

Next to plotting against the life of an Indian, you accuse me of not furnishing the correspondence upon the case of Big Snake asked for by the Senate, within ten months of the call. You say that "the Interior Department forgot for nearly a year to answer the inquiry." I informed you officially on the 5th of January of this year that when the resolution of the Senate on the 12th of March, 1880, was delivered at this Department, it was forthwith referred to the Indian Office, with special directions for report; that by some accident the report did not take its regular way through the Interior Department to the Senate; that it is probable the late chief clerk of the Indian Office, Mr. Brooks, took it before your committee for the investigation of the Ponca case, rather in order to expedite than to delay it. This official statement, showing that the inquiry was not forgotten for ten months, should have been considered sufficient among gentlemen.

The circumstance of such an accidental delay would be treated as a very insignificant affair by any statesman of average size. After having received from a Cabinet Minister an explanation such as I gave, he would decently accept that explanation without further comment. But with this official statement before you, you repeated time and again in the course of your remarks, "that the Interior Department forgot for nearly ten months to answer the inquiry at all"; that I "had even forgotten that the inquiry had been made," etc.

Since with characteristic zeal you thus insist upon magnifying so small an affair into importance, you will not object if I inquire into the candor and ingenuousness of your reasoning. I affirm that the inquiry was not forgotten, not only not for ten months, but not for a day. The question arises: Did you not know that it was not forgotten? The record of the session of the Senate Committee inquiring into the Ponca case, of which you are a

member, held on March 20, 1880, shows that Mr. Brooks, the chief clerk of the Indian Office, was before you for examination. You asked him: "Were you requested to furnish the Committee with copies of any papers that might be in the Indian Office bearing upon the killing of Big Snake?" He answered, "I was, and I have them here." You asked him further: "Do they contain anything additional to what has already been testified to before the Committee?" The answer was: "Really my time has been so fully occupied that I have not had time to examine them, and cannot say whether they contain anything additional or not."

From this it appears that Mr. Brooks had before the Committee copies of the papers existing in the Indian Office bearing upon that case, and that you were aware of it ten months ago. But to obtain the greatest possible certainty as to the delivery of the papers I asked Mr. Brooks, (who is at present in Florida, no longer in the public service,) by telegraph, for his recollections of this matter, and received the following reply:

FERNANDINA, FLA., Feb. 5, 1881.

HON. CARL SCHURZ,

Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C.:

At Mr. Dawes's request made full copies of Big Snake papers and tendered them to him at meeting of Committee. He suggested that there might be others and asked me to hold them prepared until search was made. Found nothing, and at subsequent date, at conclusion of meeting of Committee, gave him all the papers in the case, together with some data concerning Cheyennes. I and he know it.

E. J. BROOKS.

The record of the investigating Committee and the dispatch of Mr. Brooks support one another so strongly as to remove all reasonable doubt.

And now, it being clear that the papers were delivered into your hands ten months ago, you undertake to charge the Interior Department with having for ten months forgotten to answer the inquiry and you iterate and reiterate that charge. The question is no longer whether the Interior Department forgot to furnish those papers, but what you did with them after they had been furnished! I will charitably suppose that your memory is not long enough for the business you are engaged in; for without such an explanation it would appear that you show a dangerous readiness to overcome ordinary scruples in an eager desire to make small points.

But you venture a step farther the effect of which you have probably not calculated beforehand. You say in the debate following your prepared speech:

I have complained of them [these wrongs] to him [the head of the Interior Department] and before the public, and entreated him to take hold of this thing himself and leave upon the records of the country not only that he had no part or lot in this great crime, but that he disapproved of it. This very action of the Senate itself—this resolution that he forgot to answer for ten months—I implored, myself, the Indian Bureau to so answer that it would leave upon the records of the country the disapproval of it—that disapproval which they were free enough to give me in private.

Here I find myself and the Indian Office accused of having resisted your personal entreaties and implorations.

Do you undertake to say to me, Senator Dawes, that you, personally, have ever complained of these wrongs to me and “entreated me to take hold of this work myself”? Do you mean it to be understood that you implored, yourself, the Indian Bureau or any officer thereof “so to answer that it would leave upon the records of the country the disapproval of it, which they were free enough to give you

in private"? I have made inquiry of this subject and I have been informed that there is no man in the Interior Department to-day who can remember you ever to have spoken to him upon this matter except in questions asked in the proceedings of the Committee of investigation. And as to myself—and I wish you to understand me clearly—whatever speeches you may have made elsewhere, you never approached me, personally, upon this subject either by way of entreaty or otherwise.

You know, and the country knows, that I was the first man, in 1877, frankly and without disguise, to lay the hardships suffered by the Poncas before Congress and the public. You know that in 1878 I submitted to Congress and the public the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, repeating the story of their wrongs. You know that in 1879 again I recurred to it in strong language in my official report, and that a bill for indemnifying the Poncas was submitted to Congress, during the preceding session. During all these years you sat in the Senate of the United States, and not a word from you was heard in response to the entreaties, not which you made to me, but which I officially made to you as a member of the highest legislative body of the Republic.

The recommendations I made to remedy the wrong done, and which now are asked for by the Poncas in the Indian Territory themselves, might not then have met your approval; but they should at least have attracted your attention and reminded you of your power as a legislator, as well as your duty, to change them so as, in your opinion, to meet the requirements of right and justice. Not a word was heard from you. I may in charity go so far as to say that these reports and recommendations may have escaped your notice as they escaped the notice of many others who did not take special interest in the subject, and that only when your constituents in Massachusetts began

to hold meetings upon this matter you thought it worth your while to take an interest in the grievances of the Poncas which ever since have so violently agitated you. But might it not be supposed that a man so profoundly in earnest as you are, would at least then have spared no trouble and lost no opportunity to make his views heard by those immediately in charge of this business? You know that the Interior Department was open to you and you did not fail to avail yourself of your opportunities. Indeed you were seen in the Interior Department during the time that this agitation was going on and while you were taking in it an active and conspicuous part. It is also remembered, not only by myself, but by others in this Department, if you made any entreaties at all, what the subject of those entreaties was. While you desire the country in general, and I suppose your constituents in particular, to understand that your heart was overflowing with philanthropic emotions concerning the downtrodden Indian, and that the wrongs of the Poncas uncontrollably disturbed your night's sleep, the subject of all your entreaties in the Interior Department is recorded in a dozen or two of applications for office urged by you and filed with your name during that period of your new-born anguish about the red man.

I do not mean to blame you here for soliciting places and favors in this Department or elsewhere; but when you have come for that only, then you must not tell me and the public that you came with implorations for the poor Poncas and that I coldly received your appeals.

Permit me now to say that your exposition of the murder of Big Snake and the connection of the Interior Department with it, as made in your prepared speech; your burst of eloquence on the naturalization of the methods of imperial government; your reiterated charge that I for ten months forgot to answer an inquiry con-

cerning it; your proclamation of the zeal with which you in vain intreated me and others to rectify the wrong, are fair specimens of the spirit with which this agitation has been carried on for many months, not only by you but by others.

I know that many honest and sincere philanthropic men and women have taken a warm interest in the fate of that poor tribe, and have endeavored to do the best they knew to procure the redress of the hardships it had suffered, and for this I sincerely honor them. But it is also true, and a very large portion of the American people, witnessing this agitation, are now becoming aware of it, that agitators of a different class have endeavored to turn the movement for the benefit of Indians into one for the blackening of the character of one they choose to represent as a tyrannical oppressor. A new illustration has been furnished of the fact that it is difficult to exaggerate the malignant unscrupulousness of the speculator in philanthropy hunting for a sensation. And once more has it become apparent how easily it happens that honest people, following such lead with the dangerous assurance of half knowledge, permit themselves to be made tools for the pursuit of questionable ends. While, ever since my accession to office, I may say without a boast, I was honestly endeavoring to do the best I could for the Indian race, I have been held up for many months as a heartless tyrant, oppressing hundreds of suffering men, women and children.

What I permitted myself to say was strictly in self-defense. But the fact that I first called attention to their grievances was discarded without notice. The reason I gave for not recommending the return of the Poncas to their old homes in the winter of 1877, when, from their own statements, I had first learned to appreciate the true nature of the case, consisted in the danger of thereby provoking another Sioux war, and possibly with it the

destruction of the Ponca tribe and the devastation of a large expanse of country. That opinion was shared by some of the wisest philanthropists of the country as well as men long experienced in Indian affairs. It was thrown aside as unworthy of attention. My anxiety that the removal of the Ponca settlement in the Indian Territory in the face of the invasion of that Territory by lawless intruders might, by inviting and facilitating the invasion, bring on a great danger for the peace and welfare of many peaceable tribes there, was treated as a ridiculous whim. The public were told again and again that the land occupied by the Poncas in the Indian Territory was a malarious swamp upon which the Indians were rapidly perishing by disease; that they had already lost from one-fourth to one-half of their number; that they could not and would not gain a living there by agriculture and other labor; that the whole tribe would be in their graves before becoming acclimated or in any manner contented with their situation; that the Poncas had been for four years shut out from all correspondence with the outside world, while they are known to be constantly visiting the nearest town in Kansas with their wagons, freighting and trading; that the agent controlled them with his "white police," while the police force consisted exclusively of Ponca Indians, no white man among them. Whenever I hinted that I saw reason to think otherwise, such utterances were treated as unscrupulous falsehoods coming from a heartless oppressor.

At last, in October, 1880, the Poncas in the Indian Territory, by a letter addressed to the Indian Office, signified their desire to remain in the Indian Territory and to relinquish all their right to their old Dakota lands. That letter, having been published, was treated by men high in station as the product of fraud, cajolery or other iniquitous contrivances.

In December last the Ponca chiefs came here. They repeated the expression of the desire of their people to remain where they were located, in unequivocal and earnest language. Then it was said that their friends, who wanted to ascertain their true sentiments, were arbitrarily denied access to them, and that when in council the Ponca chiefs manifested their adherence to the desire expressed in their letter, they were doing so quailing under the "hard look" of an Indian agent and the overawing presence of the Interior Department.

At last a commission named by the President, one-half of its members designated by the Ponca relief committee of Boston, went to the Indian Territory and saw the Poncas in their new homes. The Indians assembled in council. All white men except the commissioners were rigidly excluded from the meeting. The hard-looking eye of the agent was absent. The overawing influence of the Interior Department was far away and carefully shut out. The commission had even called to their aid a missionary known to the Poncas as an old friend, and as a strenuous opponent of their removal from their lands in Dakota. Nothing was left undone that the sharpest critic of the Interior Department and the most watchful friends of the Poncas could desire. They were plied with questions addressing themselves to every impulse of dissatisfaction and greed, questions which might be looked upon as direct appeals to induce them to express a desire to return to Dakota. After the first day of the council the Indians were told to take another day and then to answer again. And what was the result? There had been more misapprehension of the facts assiduously fostered, more downright falsehood persistently reiterated with regard to this case than upon any similar subject that I can remember. The truth at last appeared coming from the lips of the Indians themselves.

Was the expression of their desire to remain in the Indian Territory genuine, or the result of fraud? Was their land a malarious swamp in which they must all perish? Did they think the land was worse or better than their land in Dakota? Were they well cared for in the way of houses? Had they been bribed by promises or were they induced by pecuniary considerations to resolve to stay in the Indian Territory? Had the chiefs spoken for themselves alone, or had they represented their people? This the Indians themselves have answered. These are the salient features of the testimony reported by the Commissioners:

FIRST COUNCIL

The agreement signed in Washington was read:

General Crook.—Now if this expresses the wishes of all who are here, they are to say so, and if not, they are to say not.

Answer for all.—We all hear and understand it. (The chiefs and all others of the Poncas at this point consulted.)

General Crook.—Those who agree to it are to hold up their hands—men, women and children.

(A general showing of hands.)

General Crook.—If there are any who don't agree to it, let them hold up their hands.

(No reply.)

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Mr. Allen.—Ask him if he thinks this land is better than his old land.

White Eagle.—I think this land is a better land; that it is improving. Whatever we plant will come up.

Mr. Allen.—If the Great Father wanted to send you back there and give you all you had before, would you want to go or stay?

White Eagle.—If the Great Father should make that for me, I should think he 'd have me wandering around; and for

that reason, I should be unwilling to go and should want to remain here.

Mr. Allen.—If the Great Father should give him a strong paper for the land, would he be willing to go back there and remain permanently?

White Eagle.—I would remain here. The matter is finished and so I'll sit here.

Mr. Allen.—Ask him if the houses they have here are as good as those they had in the old home.

White Eagle.—We think that these houses here are a little good. Those houses up there were bad—they had dirt roofs. These are better than the others.

Mr. Allen.—Do they raise as large crops as they did up there?

White Eagle.—In that land there were insects that destroyed the crops; in this land there are no insects (grasshoppers).

General Miles.—I want to ask a few questions here. I want to inquire what is the condition of the tribe at present as regards health.

White Eagle.—Counting this winter makes the third season we have not been sick.

General Miles.—Has there been much sickness in the tribe since they came to this territory?

White Eagle.—For two seasons there was sickness.

General Miles.—Do they find this country as healthy as that they left up there? Have they during the past three years been as healthy as they were during the three before they came down?

White Eagle.—From the time the sickness stopped I have been walking here and find it very good. I put this country before the other—find it healthier.

General Miles.—Ask them if there is any sickness now?

White Eagle.—No, sir, I think not.

SECOND COUNCIL

General Miles.—He stated yesterday that the last three seasons his people were healthy. I want to know whether he

is aware whether last year was an unusually dry season or an ordinary season?

White Eagle.—When we came to this country we were sick because we were not accustomed to the warm weather, but now we are used to it and are better and think we will like it.

General Miles.—I understood them to say that no threats had been made to induce them to change their minds. Now I want to know what effect the promises and assurances made to him and his people have had upon his people in bringing about this change of mind.

White Eagle.—We were dwelling in this land and doing nothing and were foolish as it were; so we assembled together and sent a letter to the Great Father, asking him to send for us. We did this of our own accord; nobody caused it.

General Miles (upon suggestion of Mr. Stickney).—Don't they remember that the Secretary told them when this affair came before him he would recommend it to the favorable action of Congress, but he himself had nothing to do with making the appropriations?

Answer from all.—We so understood it.

General Miles.—In case Congress fails to appropriate \$90,000 but allows them to remain here without the \$90,000, what effect will that have upon the tribe?

Standing Buffalo.—Even if they did not wish to give us that money, we should wish to remain here and work for ourselves.

Mr. Stickney.—Does he speak for all?

Answer from all.—We speak with one heart.

General Miles.—If no money is appropriated, but the privilege granted of remaining here or going back to their old homes, how many would remain here and how many go back to Dakota, supposing it to be optional with them and they to be perfectly free to do as they pleased?

Standing Buffalo.—We think that if we went back to Niobrara we would receive no tools and no rations, and so we would prefer to remain here.

General Miles.—But supposing they received the same treatment in every way, houses, tools, rations, everything at

Niobrara as here, what then would they do? I want to get at the bottom of their hearts in this thing.

Standing Buffalo.—Even if the Great Father should give us all those things up there, we would fear wandering around and would prefer to stay here.

General Miles.—Ask White Eagle.

White Eagle.—I think the same.

General Miles.—Ask him if he is sure that all his people think the same about this as he does.

White Eagle.—Even if the Great Father is willing it is a very abominable thing for us to be going about doing nothing, and so we want to stay here.

General Miles.—Is he sure that all his camp think the same way?

Mr. Stickney.—Does he know anybody of a different opinion?

White Eagle.—All are of one opinion.

General Miles.—If there is any man in this room who would go back to Dakota if assured the Great Father would grant the same privileges as now given here and they should not be disturbed, let him speak out; if he would want to spend the remainder of his days there with a firm title to his land and the conditions the same.

Peter Primaud (Chief of Police).—If the Great Father was to say to me "Go! you can go back to that place"—even if he was to give me \$20,000, I would not go.

Standing Yellow.—What these chiefs say, they say for us and we agree to.

Bear's Ear.—We young men sent the chiefs to Washington and they have come back with good news. I have put a big stone down here and will sit upon it. I prefer to stay here.

General Miles.—In case the Great Father shall decide to give those up there a paper as strong as this restoring their land to them and shall decide to send the \$90,000 to those up there, I want to know how many of these here would wish to go back there or whether they would wish to remain here without the \$90,000.

Standing Buffalo.—Even if he did n't give us the money, we

would all be willing to stay here; but why should he not give us the money?

Big Bull.—I give my assent to all the chiefs have said at this meeting. I want to stay here and have a farm of 160 acres for myself. We all have heard what the chiefs said very plainly, and agree to it all.

That the Poncas once desired to return to Dakota nobody disputes. But what is their condition, what are their wishes now?

Nothing can be clearer that not only does it not need any money to induce them to stay in the Indian Territory, but that no money could induce them now to go away; that the tribe did not declare their willingness to stay because the chiefs had "touched the pen" binding themselves to do so; but that the chiefs had touched the pen because the tribe was determined to stay.

I had confidently expected and predicted that the Poncas, after the first experiences of a new settlement, would become aware of its advantages and then remain comfortable, contented and prosperous. Who will deny now that my expectations and predictions have been fully justified by the result?

When the commission had made their report it appeared that these important facts were clouded in language so obscure as to be scarcely discernible.

I asked the chairman of the Senate Committee investigating the Ponca case to have the commissioners called before them in order to resolve that obscurity into clearness. The chairman asked me in writing to be present. The meeting of the Committee was public—Mr. Tibbles, Bright Eyes, several ladies with them and several journalists being in attendance. Two members of the President's commission were there as witnesses to be examined. I asked for permission to put questions to them and that

permission was granted. Having read the testimony accompanying the report of the commissioners I knew what had happened, but the commissioners knew it also. The questions I addressed to them clearly revealed the fact that the Poncas in the Indian Territory were found by the commission unanimous and enthusiastic in their desire to stay; that they resisted every temptation of money held out to them to move; that they found their lands fertile, their health good and their general condition comfortable, with the hope of greater prosperity than they had had in their old homes. The clear ascertainment of these facts was the result of the examination before the investigating Committee. That result was published in the papers, and I here affirm emphatically the truthfulness of the report. And then, Senator Dawes, in a card skillfully worded to break the force of that publication, you appeared before the public stating that "the character as well as the significance" of the examination had been misrepresented. You know, as well as I do, that the report as published by the Associated Press was truthful in all that it stated, more than fair to you and one of the witnesses, and that no essential feature was left out, except, perhaps, some questions and answers the publication of which would have revealed only the distress of one of the witnesses examined, and the efforts of one of the examiners to come to his relief. That was the character of the report. And what was its significance? Its significance is plainly stated in the President's message in the following words:

The commission in its conclusions omit to state the important fact as to the present condition of the Poncas in the Indian Territory, but the evidence they have reported shows clearly and conclusively that the Poncas now residing in that Territory, 521 in number, are satisfied with their new homes;

that they are healthy, comfortable and contented, and that they are freely and firmly decided to adhere to the choice announced in the letter of October 25, 1880, and the declaration of December 17, 1880, to remain in the Indian Territory and not to return to Dakota Territory.

That was the President's conclusion, and it was the significance of the examination before your Committee as published in the press report you impugned. You know, sir, that this is true. The truth may have been disagreeable to you, but nevertheless it is the truth, and your card in the newspapers, calculated to discredit a truthful report, is only a worthy companion of your speech on the Big Snake case.

I fear, Senator Dawes, you have somewhat overreached yourself. There are voices making themselves heard among your constituents which show that fair play has its friends among them as well as elsewhere. It may be interesting to you to hear the remarks of the *Boston Journal*, a strong Republican party paper, and certainly not unfriendly to you. It said on the 2d of February:

Some time, when the heat of personal pique and prejudice has had a chance to subside, we should like to have these Ponca advocates tell us under what Secretary of the Interior the Indians as a whole have been more kindly and humanely treated than under Mr. Schurz; under whose administration they have made more rapid progress in civilization; and who has been more strenuous and earnest than Mr. Schurz in promoting the education of the Indians, their material prosperity and their advance toward the rights and responsibilities of citizenship than he. If there is any merit in discovering this Ponca question, it belongs to Mr. Schurz; for he had drawn the attention of Congress to the wrong done the Poncas before Mr. Tibbles and the Ponca Committee had ever shed tears together. The Ponca Committee want to have lands

assigned to the Poncas in severalty; Mr. Schurz wants this done, not for the Poncas only, but for all the tribes. If the philanthropic people who are so much concerned about the Poncas were ever to see the Indian bureau managed in accordance with what is succinctly described as "the western idea," it would dawn upon their minds that they had not acted with the highest wisdom in assailing with extreme vituperation an administration of Indian affairs which has been, on the whole, the cleanest, the most just and the most humane we have had.

The Boston *Herald* and other journals speak in the same vein.

While receiving with due diffidence these compliments, which I have at least endeavored to deserve, I do expect that the sincere philanthropists engaged in this movement will in course of time justify the prediction.

Indeed, in the midst of this storm of vituperation which has been conjured up against me, sober and candid minds may stop once more to inquire what has caused this virulent warfare, and what is to be the end of it. A blunder was made in an Indian treaty years ago. A wrong was committed against the Poncas. That wrong was generally acknowledged, first by me. A remedy was to be found. Charged with the responsibility of the conduct of all Indian affairs, and having in view the whole field, I proposed a remedy. Persons without that knowledge and responsibility proposed another. The remedy I proposed was to do substantial justice and at the same time avoid other and greater difficulties concerning the peace, safety and interest of other numerous tribes of Indians.

The remedy, demanded elsewhere, left out of view these considerations and demanded abstract justice without regard to the safety and interests of others. "Let justice be done though the heavens fall" is a good cry for

the agitator, and scarcely ever fails to draw a round of applause. To do, whenever possible, justice in such a manner that the heavens do not fall, is the office of government, for the falling of the heavens is apt to injure innocent parties. And now when I have been vilified without measure for months as the cruel oppressor of the Poncas, it turns out that these Indians confess themselves comfortable and contented; that they want to stay where they are and cannot be bought to leave; that their prospects of well-being are brighter than ever before; and that if Congress wants to be just to the Poncas in the Indian Territory according to their own clearly expressed wishes, it will have to adopt substantially the identical recommendations submitted by this Department two years ago. This is the solution I foresaw, and the dangers and difficulties I wanted to avoid have been avoided.

Permit me now to make an appeal for the Poncas to you, Senator. Let these Indians at last have rest. Give them the indemnity they justly ask for and which I asked for them years ago. Let them quietly go about their farms and improve their homes and send their children to school, undisturbed by further agitation. That is the best service you can render them. They would probably be in a better condition already had that agitation never reached them.

These are some of the things I should have said had I been on the floor of the Senate to answer your speech. I might say more now, and it will give me pleasure to do so, if you desire to continue the conversation. This correspondence may possibly seem to you somewhat extraordinary; but it cannot reasonably surprise you to find that, as there must be some limit to the silence as well as the patience of a Cabinet Minister, an attack like yours is apt to encounter a defense like mine.

FROM JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE

JAMAICA PLAIN, MASS., Feb. 17, 1881.

As a citizen of Massachusetts, and an old friend, I desire to congratulate you on your able and satisfactory defense against the charges made against you, in regard to the Indians—charges which to me never had any sense or reason. I have watched the whole course of the argument, and believe you to have been the best friend the Indians have had. It is not necessary for you to be told this—but it is gratifying to me to say it.

With much respect, yours.

FROM EDWARD EGGLESTON

22 WASHINGTON SQUARE,
NEW YORK, Feb. 22, 1881.

I presume on our acquaintance, perhaps long since forgotten by you, to tell you how much I admire the administration of your Department, especially your wise and statesmanlike management of Indian affairs. My long residence on the frontier enables me to judge of the extreme difficulty which attends every attempt to deal with the relations of savage tribes to civilized life. I am sure that in the history of the contact of the white with the red race, no such large-minded wisdom has been shown as we have seen during your term of office. The impulse of the philanthropists is good but it is only in America that men presume to discuss a question of practical statesmanship without making any serious effort to understand it.

If I were a journalist, as formerly, I would gladly say these things publicly, but I can only give myself the pleasure of saying them to you—and I fear you will not greatly care to hear them.

TO JAMES A. GARFIELD

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22, 1881.

Dear General: The enclosed¹ I found in the *New York Times*, and considering the strong party character of that paper, I thought it might be worth your while to read it and to observe the drift of thought in it. It is unquestionably right, and any political action based upon the theory that the world is divided between two or three political leaders and will be satisfied if they are harmonized, will certainly lead to great disappointments. How much trouble you would save yourself by just picking out the fittest man for each place and then going ahead to make a good business Administration, thus winning the approval and support of public opinion in spite of grumblers.

Pardon the intrusion. I do want to see you succeed.

FROM EX-PRESIDENT HAYES

FREMONT, O., March 10, 1881.

My dear General: A thousand thanks for your gratifying letter. We are, and we shall be I hope always, more than political friends—personal friends. Your interests, your career, your family will be in my thoughts and heart. Let it be so and let us enjoy it.

The two happiest people in the country are here in "Spiegel Grove," where we hope to see you and yours often. Love to the young folks.—Ever,

R. B. HAYES.

FREMONT, O., June 1, 1881.

Is it true you are editing the *Evening Post*?² I must see what you write. If true, Mrs. Hayes will not forgive me if

¹ Clipping entitled: "A Hint to Business Men."

² Schurz was editor-in-chief of the *New York Evening Post*, 1881-83.

she loses anything you write. Please tell your business manager to put my name on his list for the tri-weekly, or semi-weekly, or whatever edition will contain your editorials, and send me the bill.

We are busy and happy—time passes swiftly and agreeably—getting ready to live in our country home.

All sorts of non-paying public trusts of local significance, merely, are piling up on my hands. I look out of the loopholes, and see what I do see! and am content.

PRESENT ASPECTS OF THE INDIAN PROBLEM^{*}

That the history of our Indian relations presents, in great part, a record of broken treaties, of unjust wars and of cruel spoliation, is a fact too well known to require proof or to suffer denial. But it is only just to the Government of the United States to say that its treaties with Indian tribes were, as a rule, made in good faith, and that most of our Indian wars were brought on by circumstances for which the Government itself could not fairly be held responsible. Of the treaties, those were the most important by which the Government guaranteed to Indian tribes certain tracts of land as reservations to be held and occupied by them forever under the protection of the United States, in the place of other lands ceded by the Indians. There is no reason to doubt that in most, if not all, of such cases, those who conducted Indian affairs on the part of the Government, not anticipating the rapid advance of settlement, sincerely believed in the possibility of maintaining those reservations intact for the Indians, and that, in this respect, while their intentions were honest, their foresight was at fault. There are men still living who spent their younger days near the borders of "Indian country" in Ohio and Indiana, and it is a well-

^{*} *North American Review*, July, 1881.

known fact that, when the Indian Territory was established west of the Mississippi, it was generally thought that the settlements of white men would never crowd into that region, at least not for many generations. Thus were such reservations guaranteed by the Government with the honest belief that the Indians would be secure in their possession, which, as subsequent events proved, was a gross error of judgment.

It is also a fact that most of the Indian wars grew, not from any desire of the Government to disturb the Indians in the territorial possessions guaranteed to them, but from the restless and unscrupulous greed of frontiersmen who pushed their settlements and ventures into the Indian country, provoked conflicts with the Indians and then called for the protection of the Government against the resisting and retaliating Indians, thus involving it in the hostilities which they themselves had begun. It is true that in some instances Indian wars were precipitated by acts of rashness and violence on the part of military men without orders from the Government, while the popular impression that Indian outbreaks were generally caused by the villainy of Government agents, who defrauded and starved the Indians, is substantially unfounded. Such frauds and robberies have no doubt been frequently committed. It has also happened that Indian tribes were exposed to great suffering and actual starvation in consequence of the neglect of Congress to provide the funds necessary to fulfil treaty stipulations. But things of this kind resulted but seldom in actual hostilities. To such wrongs the Indians usually submitted with a more enduring patience than they receive credit for, although in some instances, it must be admitted, outrages were committed by Indians without provocation, which resulted in trouble on a large scale.

In mentioning these facts, it is not my purpose to hold

the Government entirely guiltless of the wrongs inflicted upon the Indians. It has, undoubtedly, sometimes lacked in vigor when Indian tribes needed protection. It has, in many cases, yielded too readily to the pressure of those who wanted to possess themselves of Indian lands. Still less would I justify some high-handed proceedings on the part of the Government in moving peaceable Indian tribes from place to place without their consent, trying to rectify old blunders by new acts of injustice. But I desire to point out that by far the larger part of our Indian troubles have sprung from the greedy encroachments of white men upon Indian lands, and that, hostilities being brought about in this manner, in which the Indians uniformly succumbed, old treaties and arrangements were overthrown to be supplanted by new ones of a similar character which eventually led to the same results. In the light of events, the policy of assigning to the Indian tribes large tracts of land as permanent reservations, within the limits of which they might continue to roam at pleasure, with the expectation that they would never be disturbed thereon, appears as a grand mistake, a natural, perhaps even an unavoidable mistake in times gone by, but a mistake for all that, for that policy failed to take into account the inevitable pressure of rapidly and irresistibly advancing settlement and enterprise. While duly admitting and confessing the injustice done, we must understand the real nature of the difficulty if we mean to solve it.

No intelligent man will to-day for a moment entertain the belief that there is still a nook or corner of this country that has the least agricultural or mineral value in it, beyond the reach of progressive civilization. Districts which seemed to be remote wildernesses but a few years ago have been or are now being penetrated by railroads: Montana, Washington Territory, Idaho and New Mexico

are now more easily accessible than Ohio and Indiana were at the beginning of this century, and the same process which resulted in crowding the Indians out of these States has begun and is rapidly going on in those Territories. The settler and miner are beginning, or at least threatening, to invade every Indian reservation that offers any attraction, and it is a well-known fact that the frontiersman almost always looks upon Indian lands as the most valuable in the neighborhood, simply because the Indian occupies them and the white man is excluded from them. From the articles in the newspapers of those remote Territories, it would sometimes appear as if, in the midst of millions of untouched acres, the white people were deprived of the necessary elbow-room as long as there is an Indian in the country. At any rate, the settlers and miners want to seize upon the most valuable tracts first, and they are always inclined to look for them among the lands of the Indians. The fact that wild Indians—and here it is proper to say that when in this discussion Indians are spoken of as “wild,” and their habits of life as “savage,” these terms are not used in their extreme sense, but as simply meaning “uncivilized,” there being of course among them, in that respect, a difference of degrees—hold immense tracts of country which, possessed by them, are of no advantage to anybody, while, as is said, thousands upon thousands of white people stand ready to cultivate them and to make them contribute to the national wealth, is always apt to make an impression upon minds not accustomed to nice discrimination. It is needless to say that the rights of the Indians are a matter of very small consideration in the eyes of those who covet their possessions. The average frontiersman looks upon the Indian simply as a nuisance that is in his way. There are certainly men among them of humane principles, but also many whom it would be difficult to

convince that it is a crime to kill an Indian, or that to rob an Indian of his lands is not a meritorious act. This pressure grows in volume and intensity as the population increases, until finally, in some way or another one Indian reservation after another falls into the hands of white settlers. Formerly, when this was accomplished, the Indians so dispossessed were removed to other vacant places farther westward. Now this expedient is no longer open. The western country is rapidly filling up. A steady stream of immigration is following the railroad lines and then spreading to the right and left. The vacant places still existing are either worthless or will soon be exposed to the same invasion. The plains are being occupied by cattle-raisers, the fertile valleys and bottom-lands by agriculturists, the mountains by miners. What is to become of the Indians?

In trying to solve this question, we have to keep in view the facts here recited. However we may deplore the injustice which these facts have brought, and are still bringing, upon the red men, yet with these facts we have to deal. They are undeniable. Sound statesmanship cannot disregard them. It is true that the Indian reservations now existing cover a great many millions of acres, containing very valuable tracts of agricultural, grazing and mineral land; that the area now cultivated, or that can possibly be cultivated by the Indians, is comparatively very small; that by far the larger portion is lying waste. Is it not, in view of the history of more than two centuries, useless to speculate in our minds how these many millions of acres can be preserved in their present state for the Indians to roam upon?—how the greedy push of settlement and enterprise might be permanently checked for the protection of the red man's present possessions, as hunting-grounds upon which, moreover, there is now but very little left to hunt? We are sometimes told that ours is

a powerful government, which might accomplish such things if it would only put forth its whole strength. Is this so? The Government is, indeed, strong in some respects, but weak in others. It may be truthfully said that the Government has never been intent upon robbing the Indians. It has frequently tried, in good faith, to protect them against encroachment, and almost as frequently it has failed. It has simply yielded to the pressure exercised upon it by the people who were in immediate contact with the Indians. Those in authority were, in most cases, drawn or driven into an active participation in conflicts not of their own making. When a collision between Indians and whites had once occurred, no matter who was responsible for it, and when bloody deeds had been committed and an outcry about Indian atrocities had been made, our military forces were always found on the side of the white people and against the savage, no matter whether those who gave the orders knew that the savages were originally the victims and not the assailants. Imagine, now, the Government were to proclaim that, from the many millions of acres at present covered by Indian reservations, white men should forever be excluded, and that the National power should be exerted to that end, what would be the consequence? For some time the Government might succeed in enforcing such a resolution. How long, would depend upon the rapidity with which the western country is occupied by settlers. As the settlements crowd upon the reservations, the population thickens, and the demand for larger fields of agricultural and mining enterprise becomes more pressing, the Government may still remain true to its purpose. But will those who are hungry for the Indian lands sit still? It will be easy for the rough and reckless frontiersmen to pick quarrels with the Indians. The speculators, who have their eyes upon every opportunity for gain, will urge

them on. The watchfulness of the Government will, in the long run, be unavailing to prevent collisions. The Indians will retaliate. Settlers' cabins will be burned and blood will flow. The conflict once brought on, the white man and the red man will stand against one another, and, in spite of all its good intentions and its sense of justice, the forces of the Government will find themselves engaged on the side of the white man. The Indians will be hunted down at whatever cost. It will simply be a repetition of the old story, and that old story will be eventually repeated whenever there is a large and valuable Indian reservation surrounded by white settlements. Unjust, disgraceful, as this may be, it is not only probable, but almost inevitable. The extension of our railroad system will only accelerate the catastrophe.

We are frequently told that the management of Indian affairs in Canada has been more successful than ours in avoiding such conflicts. This appears to be true. But, while giving credit to the Canadian authorities for the superiority of their management in some respects, we must not forget that they are working under conditions far less difficult. The number of their Indians is much less, and their unoccupied territory much larger. They have still what may be called an Indian frontier—the white men on one side of the line and the Indians on the other, with vast hunting-grounds visited only by the trapper and fur-trader. Their agricultural settlements advance with far less rapidity than ours. There is far less opportunity for encroachment. When in the British possessions agricultural and mining enterprise spreads with the same energy and eagerness as in the United States, when railroads penetrate their Indian country, when all that is valuable in it becomes thus accessible and tempting to the greed of white men, when game becomes scarce and ceases to furnish sufficient sustenance

to the Indians, the Canadian authorities in their management of Indian affairs will find themselves confronted with the same difficulties.

What does, under such circumstances, wise and humane statesmanship demand? Not that we should close our eyes to existing facts; but that, keeping those facts clearly in view, we should discover among the possibilities that which is most just and best for the Indians. I am profoundly convinced that a stubborn maintenance of the system of large Indian reservations must eventually result in the destruction of the red men, however faithfully the Government may endeavor to protect their rights. It is only a question of time. My reasons for this belief I have given above. What we can and should do is, in general terms, to fit the Indians, as much as possible, for the habits and occupations of civilized life, by work and education; to individualize them in the possession and appreciation of property, by allotting to them lands in severalty, giving them a fee-simple title individually to the parcels of land they cultivate, inalienable for a certain period, and to obtain their consent to a disposition of that part of their lands which they cannot use, for a fair compensation, in such a manner that they no longer stand in the way of the development of the country as an obstacle, but form part of it and are benefited by it.

The circumstances surrounding them place before the Indians this stern alternative: extermination or civilization. The thought of exterminating a race, once the only occupant of the soil upon which so many millions of our own people have grown prosperous and happy, must be revolting to every American who is not devoid of all sentiments of justice and humanity. To civilize them, which was once only a benevolent fancy, has now become an absolute necessity, if we mean to save them.

Can Indians be civilized? This question is answered

in the negative only by those who do not want to civilize them. My experience in the management of Indian affairs, which enabled me to witness the progress made even among the wildest tribes, confirms me in the belief that it is not only possible but easy to introduce civilized habits and occupations among Indians, if only the proper means are employed. We are frequently told that Indians will not work. True, it is difficult to make them work as long as they can live upon hunting. But they will work when their living depends upon it, or when sufficient inducements are offered to them. Of this there is an abundance of proof. To be sure, as to Indian civilization, we must not expect too rapid progress or the attainment of too lofty a standard. We can certainly not transform them at once into great statesmen, or philosophers, or manufacturers, or merchants; but we can make them small farmers and herders. Some of them show even remarkable aptitude for mercantile pursuits on a small scale. I see no reason why the degree of civilization attained by the Indians in the States of New York, Indiana, Michigan and some tribes in the Indian Territory, should not be attained in the course of time by all. I have no doubt that they can be sufficiently civilized to support themselves, to maintain relations of good neighborhood with the people surrounding them, and altogether to cease being a disturbing element in society. The accomplishment of this end, however, will require much considerate care and wise guidance. That care and guidance is necessarily the task of the Government which, as to the Indians at least, must exercise paternal functions until they are sufficiently advanced to take care of themselves.

In this respect, some sincere philanthropists seem inclined to run into a serious error in insisting that first of all things it is necessary to give to the Indian the rights

and privileges of American citizenship, to treat him in all respects as a citizen, and to relieve him of all restraints to which other Americans citizens are not subject. I do not intend to go here into a disquisition on the legal status of the Indian, on which elaborate treatises have been written, and learned judicial decisions rendered, without raising it above dispute. The end to be reached is unquestionably the gradual absorption of the Indians in the great body of American citizenship. When that is accomplished, then, and only then, the legal status of the Indian will be clearly and finally fixed. But we should not indulge in the delusion that the problem can be solved by merely conferring upon them rights they do not yet appreciate, and duties they do not yet understand. Those who advocate this seem to think that the Indians are yearning for American citizenship, eager to take it if we will only give it to them. No mistake could be greater. An overwhelming majority of the Indians look at present upon American citizenship as a dangerous gift, and but few of the more civilized are willing to accept it when it is attainable. And those who are uncivilized would certainly not know what to do with it if they had it. The mere theoretical endowment of savages with rights which are beyond their understanding and appreciation will, therefore, help them little. They should certainly have that standing in the courts which is necessary for their protection. But full citizenship must be regarded as the terminal, not as the initial, point of their development. The first necessity, therefore, is not at once to give it to them, but to fit them for it. And to this end, nothing is more indispensable than the protecting and guiding care of the Government during the dangerous period of transition from savage to civilized life. When the wild Indian first turns his face from his old habits toward "the ways of the white man," his self-reliance is severely shaken. The

picturesque and proud hunter and warrior of the plain or the forest gradually ceases to exist. In his new occupations, with his new aims and objects, he feels himself like a child in need of leading-strings. Not clearly knowing where he is to go, he may be led in the right direction, and he may also be led astray. He is apt to accept the vices as well as the virtues and accomplishments of civilization, and the former, perhaps, more readily than the latter. He is as accessible to bad as to good advice or example, and the class of people usually living in the immediate vicinity of Indian camps and reservations is frequently not such as to exercise upon him an elevating influence. He is in danger of becoming a drunkard before he has learned to restrain his appetites, and of being tricked out of his property before he is able to appreciate its value. He is overcome by a feeling of helplessness, and he naturally looks to the "Great Father" to take him by the hand and guide him on. That guiding hand must necessarily be one of authority and power to command confidence and respect. It can be only that of the Government, which the Indian is accustomed to regard as a sort of omnipotence on earth. Everything depends upon the wisdom and justice of that guidance.

To fit the Indians for their ultimate absorption in the great body of American citizenship, three things are suggested by common-sense as well as philanthropy.

1. That they be taught to work by making work profitable and attractive to them.

2. That they be educated, especially the youth of both sexes.

3. That they be individualized in the possession of property by settlement in severalty with a fee-simple title, after which the lands they do not use may be disposed of for general settlement and enterprise without danger and with profit to the Indians.

This may seem a large program, strangely in contrast with the old wild life of the Indians, but they are now more disposed than ever before to accept it. Even those of them who have so far been in a great measure living upon the chase, are becoming aware that the game is fast disappearing, and will no longer be sufficient to furnish them a sustenance. In a few years the buffalo will be exterminated, and smaller game is gradually growing scarce except in the more inaccessible mountain regions. The necessity of procuring food in some other way is thus before their eyes. The requests of Indians addressed to the Government for instruction in agriculture, for agricultural implements and for stock cattle are in consequence now more frequent and pressing than ever before. A more general desire for the education of their children springs from the same source, and many express a wish for the allotment of farm tracts among them, with "the white man's paper," meaning a good, strong title like that held by white men. This progressive movement is, of course, different in degree with different tribes, but it is going on more or less everywhere. The failure of Sitting Bull's attempt to maintain himself and a large number of followers on our northern frontier in the old, wild ways of Indian life will undoubtedly strengthen the tendency among the wild Indians of the Northwest to recognize the situation and to act accordingly. The general state of feeling among the red men is therefore now exceedingly favorable to the civilizing process.

Much has already been done in the direction above indicated. The area of land cultivated by Indians is steadily extended, and the quantity and value of their crops show a hopeful increase from year to year. Many Indians are already showing commendable pride in the product of their labor. Much more, however, might be done by the Government to facilitate and encourage

this progress, by making larger appropriations for the appointment of men competent to instruct the Indians in agricultural work, and for furnishing them with farming implements. Unfortunately, members of Congress are frequently more intent upon making a good record in cutting down expenses in the wrong place, than upon providing the necessary money for objects the accomplishment of which would finally result in real and great economy. It may be remarked, by the way, that the promotion of agricultural work among the Indians is frequently discouraged by well-meaning men who reason upon the theory that in the transition from savage to civilized life, the pastoral state comes before the agricultural, and that the Indians, therefore, must be made herders before they can be made farmers. This theory is supported by historical precedents. It is true that the transition from the savage state to the pastoral is less violent than that from the savage state directly to the agricultural, but this does not prove that the latter is impossible. Moreover, the former requires certain favorable conditions, one of which is not only the possession of large tracts of grazing land but also of large numbers of cattle; and another is, that the transition, which would necessarily require a considerable time, be not interfered with by extraneous circumstances. There are only a few isolated instances of Indian tribes having devoted themselves successfully to the raising of herds and flocks, such as the Navajoes, who have hundreds of thousands of sheep, and manufacture excellent blankets by hand. Some thrifty Indians on the Pacific coast have raised small herds of cattle, and something more has been done by the so-called civilized tribes in the Indian Territory. The rest of the Indians have only raised ponies. To make all our wild Indians herders, would require the maintenance of the system of large reservations which, as I have shown, will

be a precarious thing under the pressure of advancing settlement and enterprise. It would further require the distribution among them of large numbers of stock animals. Such distributions have been gradually increased, but even among the tribes best provided for, only to the extent of giving to each family one or two cows, and I see no prospect, with the resources likely to be at the disposal of the Indian service, of carrying this practice much further than to make it more general among all the tribes. But the possession of a cow or two will not make a man a herder. And even if the number were increased, and the cattle belonging to the members of a tribe were herded together for the purpose of regular cattle-raising, that pursuit would require the constant labor of only a small number of individuals, while, under existing circumstances, it is most desirable, if not absolutely necessary, that all of them, or at least as many as possible, be actively and profitably employed, so as to accelerate the civilizing process. To this end it seems indispensable that agricultural work be their principal occupation. But we need not be troubled by any misgivings on this head. The reports of early explorers show that most of our Indian tribes, without having passed through the pastoral state, did cultivate the soil in a rough way and on a small scale when first seen by white men, and that subsequently they continued that pursuit to a greater or less extent, even while they were driven from place to place. The promotion of agricultural work among them will therefore only be a revival and development of an old practice. The progress they now make shows how naturally they take to it. And if the Government, as it should, continues to furnish them with domestic animals, cattle-raising in a small way may become, not their principal business, but a proper and valuable addition to their agricultural work. I have no doubt, however, that young Indians may be profitably

employed by the cattle-raisers of the West, as mounted herdsmen or "cow-boys." If paid reasonable wages, they would probably be found very faithful and efficient in that capacity.

Other useful occupations for which the Indians show great aptitude have been introduced with promising success. They are now doing a very large part of the freighting of government goods, such as their own supplies and annuities. "Indian freighting," on a large scale, was introduced only a few years ago, at almost all the agencies, especially on this side of the Rocky Mountains, which are not immediately accessible by railroad or river. The Indians use their own ponies as draught animals, while the Government furnishes the wagons and harness. The Indians have, by this industry, already earned large sums of money, and proved the most honest and efficient freighters the Government ever had. There is no reason why, in the course of time, they should not be largely engaged by the Government, as well as private parties, in the transportation of other than Indian goods.

That Indians can be successfully employed at various kinds of mechanical work, has already been sufficiently tested. A respectable number of their young men serve as apprentices in the saddler, blacksmith, shoemaker, tinsmith and carpenter shops at the agencies in the West, as well as at the Indian schools, and their proficiency is much commended. The school at Carlisle has been able to furnish considerable quantities of tin-ware, harness and shoes, all made by Indian labor, and, in some of the saw-mills and grist-mills on the reservations, Indians are employed as machinists with perfect safety. Many Indians who, but a few years ago, did nothing but hunt and fight, are now engaged in building houses for their families, and, with some instruction and aid on the part of the Government, they are doing reasonably well. Here

and there an Indian is found who shows striking ability as a trader. All these things are capable of large and rapid development, if pushed forward and guided with wisdom and energy. All that is said here refers to the so-called wild tribes, such as the Sioux, the Shoshones, Poncas, Cheyennes, Arrapahoes, Pawnees etc. The significant point is that, recognizing the change in their situation, Indian men now almost generally accept work as a necessity, while formerly all the drudgery was done by their women. The civilized tribes in the Indian Territory and elsewhere have already proved their capacity for advancement in a greater measure.

One of the most important agencies in the civilizing process is, of course, education in schools. The first step was the establishment on the reservations of day-schools for Indian children. The efforts made by the Government in that direction may not always have been efficiently conducted; but it is also certain that, in the nature of things, the result of that system could not be satisfactory. With the exception of a few hours spent in school, the children remained exposed to the influence of their more or less savage home surroundings, and the indulgence of their parents greatly interfered with the regularity of their attendance and with the necessary discipline. Boarding-schools at the agencies were then tried, as far as the appropriations made by Congress would permit, adding to the usual elementary education some practical instruction in housework and domestic industries. The results thus obtained were perceptibly better, but even the best boarding-schools located on Indian reservations, in contact with no phase of human life except that of the Indian camp or village, still remain without those conditions of which the work of civilizing the growing Indian generation stands most in need.

The Indian, in order to be civilized, must not only

learn how to read and write but how to live. On most of the Indian reservations he lives only among his own kind, excepting the teachers and the few white agency people. He may feel the necessity of changing his mode of life ever so strongly; he may hear of civilization ever so much; but as long as he has not with his own eyes seen civilization at work, it will remain to him only a vague, shadowy idea—a new-fangled, outlandish contrivance, the objects of which cannot be clearly appreciated by him in detail. He hears that he must accept “the white man’s way,” and, in an indistinct manner, he is impressed with the necessity of doing so. But what is the white man’s way? What ends does it serve? What means does it employ? What is necessary to attain it? The teaching in a school on an Indian reservation, in the midst of Indian barbarism, answers these questions only from hearsay. The impressions it thus produces, whether in all things right or in some things wrong, will, in any event, be insufficient to give the mind of the Indian a clear conception of what “the white man’s way” really is. The school on the reservation undoubtedly does some good, but it does not enough. If the Indian is to become civilized, the most efficient method will be to permit him to see and watch civilization at work in its own atmosphere. In order to learn to live like the white man, he should see and observe how the white man lives in his own surroundings, what he is doing, and what he is doing it for. He should have an opportunity to observe, not by an occasional bewildering glimpse, like the Indians who now and then come to Washington to see the “Great Father,” but observe with the eye of an interested party, while being taught to do likewise.

Such considerations led the Government, under the last Administration, largely to increase the number of Indian pupils at the Normal School at Hampton, Va.,

and to establish an institution for the education of Indian children at Carlisle, in Pennsylvania, where the young Indians would no longer be under the influence of the Indian camp or village, but in immediate contact with the towns, farms and factories of civilized people, living and working in the atmosphere of civilization. In these institutions, the Indian children, among whom a large number of tribes are represented, receive the ordinary English education, while there are various shops and a farm for the instruction of the boys, and the girls are kept busy in the kitchen, dining-room, sewing-room and with other domestic work. In the summer, as many as possible of the boys are placed in the care of intelligent and philanthropic farmers and their families, mostly in Pennsylvania and New England, where they find instructive employment in the field and barnyard. The pupils are, under proper regulations, permitted to see as much as possible of the country and its inhabitants in the vicinity of the schools.

The results gained at these institutions are very striking. The native squalor of the Indian boys and girls rapidly gives way to neat appearance. A new intelligence, lighting up their faces, transforms their expression. Many of them show an astonishing eagerness to learn, quickness of perception, pride of accomplishment and love for their teachers. Visiting the Carlisle school, I saw Indian boys, from ten to fifteen years old, who had arrived only five months before without the least knowledge of the English language, writing down long columns of figures at my dictation and adding them up without the least mistake in calculation. Almost all submit cheerfully to the discipline imposed upon them. The boys show remarkable proficiency in mechanical and agricultural occupations, and the girls in all kinds of housework. They soon begin to take a lively and intelli-

gent interest in the things they see around them. Most of this success is undoubtedly due to the intelligence, skill and energy of the principals of those schools, General Armstrong and Captain Pratt, who in an eminent degree unite enthusiasm with practical ability. But it is evident that the efforts of the most devoted teachers would be of little avail, did not the pupils possess a corresponding capacity of receiving instruction. A third school of this kind was more recently established on the same plan at Forest Grove, in Oregon, for the education of children of the Indian tribes on the Pacific coast.

When the Indian pupils have received a sufficient course of schooling, they are sent back to their tribes, to make themselves practically useful there, and to serve, in their turn, as teachers and examples. We hear sometimes the opinion expressed that the young Indians so educated, when returned to their tribes, will, under the influence of their surroundings, speedily relapse into their old wild habits, and that thus the results of their training will, after all, be lost. Undoubtedly there was good reason for such apprehensions at the time when the Indians had no other conception of their future than an indefinite continuance of their old life as hunters and warriors, when civilized pursuits were not in demand among them, and all influences were adverse to every effort in that direction. Then, an educated Indian necessarily found himself isolated among his people, and his accomplishments were looked upon not only as useless, but as ridiculous. Under such circumstances, of course, he would be apt to relapse. But circumstances have changed since. It is generally known among the Indians that hunting will soon be at an end; that the old mode of life has become untenable and productive work necessary. Now, knowledge and skill are in immediate demand among them. As long as they are expected to live all their lives in tents of buffalo-

skin, or of canvas furnished by the Government, the skill of the carpenter appeared to them useless. But now that they build houses for themselves and stables for their animals, the carpenter supplies an actual want. As long as they had no use for wagons, the wagon-maker was superfluous among them. As long as they raised only a little squaw-corn, and to that end found it sufficient to scratch the soil with their rude hoes, no mending of plows was called for. But since they have engaged more largely in agriculture, and are earning much money by freighting, the man who can repair plows and wagons and harness has become in their eyes a distinguished being. As long as they expected to live forever separated from the whites, the knowledge of the white man's language, and of reading and writing, was regarded as an unprofitable, and sometimes even a suspicious acquirement. But since the whites are crowding on all sides round their reservations, and the Indians cannot much longer avoid contact with them, and want to become like them, the knowledge of the white man's language and of the "speaking paper" appears in an entirely new light. Even most of the old-fogy chiefs, who have clung most tenaciously to their traditional customs, very earnestly desire their children to receive that education for which they feel themselves too old. In one word, knowledge and skill are now in practical requisition among them, and the man who possesses these accomplishments is no longer ridiculed, but looked up to and envied. The young Indian, returning from school, will, under such circumstances, not be isolated in his tribe; for he will be surrounded by some who, having received the same education, are like him, and by a larger number who desire to be like him. It is, therefore, no longer to be apprehended that he will relapse into savage life. He will be a natural helper, teacher and example to his people.

Especial attention is given in the Indian schools to the education of Indian girls, and at Hampton a new building is being erected for that purpose. This is of peculiar importance. The Indian woman has, so far, been only a beast of burden. The girl, when arrived at maturity, was disposed of like an article of trade. The Indian wife was treated by her husband alternately with animal fondness, and with the cruel brutality of the slave-driver. Nothing will be more apt to raise the Indians in the scale of civilization than to stimulate their attachment to permanent homes, and it is woman that must make the atmosphere and form the attraction of the home. She must be recognized, with affection and respect, as the center of domestic life. If we want the Indians to respect their women, we must lift up the Indian women to respect themselves. This is the purpose and work of education. If we educate the girls of to-day, we educate the mothers of to-morrow, and in educating those mothers we prepare the ground for the education of generations to come. Every effort made in that direction is, therefore, entitled to especial sympathy and encouragement.

It is true that the number of Indian children educated at Hampton, Carlisle and Forest Grove is comparatively small, at present between four and five hundred. And it may be said that it will always remain small in proportion to the whole number of Indian children of school age. But, I have no doubt, even this comparatively small number, when returning to their tribes, will exercise a very perceptible influence in opening new views of life, in encouraging the desire for improvement and in facilitating the work of the schools at the agencies. This influence will naturally be strengthened in the same measure as the number of well-educated Indians grows larger. And I see no reason why the Government should not establish many more schools like those at Hampton and Carlisle.

It is only a question of money. We are told that it costs little less than a million of dollars to kill an Indian in war. It costs about one hundred and fifty dollars a year to educate one at Hampton or Carlisle. If the education of Indian children saves the country only one small Indian war in the future, it will save money enough to sustain ten schools like Carlisle, with three hundred pupils each, for ten years. To make a liberal appropriation for such a purpose would, therefore, not only be a philanthropic act, but also the truest and wisest economy.

As the third thing necessary for the absorption of the Indians in the great body of American citizenship, I mentioned their individualization in the possession of property by their settlement in severalty upon small farm tracts with a fee-simple title. When the Indians are so settled, and have become individual property-owners, holding their farms by the same title under the law by which white men hold theirs, they will feel more readily inclined to part with such of their lands as they cannot themselves cultivate, and from which they can derive profit only if they sell them, either in lots or in bulk, for a fair equivalent in money or in annuities. This done, the Indians will occupy no more ground than so many white people; the large reservations will gradually be opened to general settlement and enterprise, and the Indians, with their possessions, will cease to stand in the way of the "development of the country." The difficulty which has provoked so many encroachments and conflicts will then no longer exist. When the Indians are individual owners of real property, and as individuals enjoy the protection of the laws, their tribal cohesion will necessarily relax, and gradually disappear. They will have advanced an immense step in the direction of the "white man's way."

Is this plan practicable? In this respect we are not entirely without experience. Allotments of farm tracts

to Indians and their settlement in severalty have already been attempted under special laws or treaties with a few tribes; in some instances, with success; in others, the Indians, when they had acquired individual title to their land, and before they had learned to appreciate its value, were induced to dispose of it, or were tricked out of it by unscrupulous white men, who took advantage of their ignorance. They were thus impoverished again, and some of them fell back upon the Government for support. This should be guarded against, as much as it can be, by a legal provision making the title to their farm tracts inalienable for a certain period, say twenty-five years, during which the Indians will have sufficient opportunity to acquire more provident habits, to become somewhat acquainted with the ways of the world and to learn to take care of themselves. In some cases where the allotment of lands in severalty and the granting of patents conveying a fee-simple title to Indians was provided for in Indian treaties, the Interior Department under the last Administration saw fit to put off the full execution of this provision for the reason that the law did not permit the insertion in the patent of the inalienability clause, that without such a clause the Indians would be exposed to the kind of spoliation above mentioned, and that it was hoped Congress would speedily supply that deficiency by the passage of the general "Severalty bill," then under discussion. Indeed, without such a clause in the land-patents, it cannot be denied that the conveyance of individual fee-simple title to Indians would be a hazardous experiment, except in the case of those most advanced in civilization.

The question whether and how far the Indians generally are prepared for so great a change in their habits as their settlement in severalty involves, is certainly a very important one. Among those belonging to the five so-called

civilized nations in the Indian Territory, opinions on this point are divided. When I visited their Agricultural Fair at Muscogee, two years ago, I found that of the representative men meeting there a minority were in favor of, but a strong majority opposed to, the division of their lands in severalty. This opposition springs in great part from the timid apprehension of the Indians that the division of their lands would, in the course of time, bring upon them the competition of white men, in which they distrust their ability to hold their own; and this feeling is worked upon by the ambitious politicians among them, who aspire to the high offices in their tribes, and who know that the settlement in severalty will be apt eventually to break up the tribal organization and to deprive the politicians of their importance. The friends of the severalty policy, on the other hand, I found to be mostly bright, active and energetic men, some of them full-blood Indians, who trust their own ability to sustain themselves, and are clear-headed enough to foresee what the ultimate fate of the Indian race must be. Among the "wild" tribes now beginning to adopt "the white man's way," the idea of settlement in severalty appears more popular in proportion. Appeals to the Government from Indians of that class for the allotment of farm tracts to heads of families and for "the white man's paper," have been very frequent of late, and in many instances very urgent. It is not to be assumed, however, that most of those who make such demands have more than a vague conception of what they are asking for, and that all the consequences of their settlement in severalty are entirely clear to their minds. In treating with uncivilized Indians we must never forget that their thoughts move within the narrow compass of their traditional notions, and that their understanding of any relations of life beyond that limited horizon are mere abstractions to them, and must neces-

sarily be very imperfect. I have become acquainted with several chiefs of so-called "wild" tribes, who had won a reputation as men of ability, such as Spotted Tail, Red Cloud, Chief Joseph and others, and while I found them to possess considerable shrewdness in the management of their own affairs according to their Indian notions, their grasp of things outside of that circle was extremely uncertain. I may except only Ouray, the late chief of the Ute nation, a man of a comprehensive mind, of large views, appreciating with great clearness not only the present situation of his race, but also its future destiny and the measures necessary to save the Indians from destruction and to assimilate them with the white people with whom they have to live. We must not expect them, therefore, to evolve out of their own consciousness what is best for their salvation. We must in a great measure do the necessary thinking for them, and then in the most humane way possible induce them to accept our conclusions. This is in most cases much more easily accomplished than might generally be supposed; for, especially in the transition from savage to civilized life, the Indian looks up with natural respect to the superior wisdom of the "Great Father," and, notwithstanding the distrust engendered by frequent deceptions in his intercourse with white men, it is not difficult to win his confidence if he is only approached with frankness and evidence of good-will. As to the severalty policy, those of the Indians who have become convinced of the necessity of adopting the "white man's way" are easily made to comprehend the advantage of each man's having his own piece of land, and a good title to it. The ulterior consequences, as the gradual dissolution of the tribal relations, the disposition to be made of the unused lands for a fair compensation and the opening of the large reservations,—these things will become intelligible and naturally acceptable to them as they go on. More op-

position to the severalty policy may be apprehended from the "civilized tribes" in the Indian Territory, for the reasons above stated, than from those just emerging from a savage condition. But, I have no doubt, that also will yield in the course of time, as the peculiarities of their situation become clearer to their minds. It is only to be hoped that the change of sentiment may come soon, before the pressure of advancing enterprise has forced a conflict, and while the necessary transformation can be effected in peace and good order.

It must be kept in mind that the settlement of the Indians in severalty is one of those things for which the Indians and the Government are not always permitted to choose their own time. The necessity of immediate action may now and then present itself suddenly. Take the case of the Utes. Living in a country where game was still comparatively abundant down to a recent time, they were less inclined than other "wild" tribes to recognize the necessity of a change in their mode of life. But the pressure of mining enterprise in the direction of the Ute reservation was great. The impatience of the people of Colorado at the occupation by Indians of the western part of the State gave reason for the apprehension of irritations and collisions, and this state of things was aggravated by the occurrence of some disturbances at the agency. Under these circumstances, the Interior Department thought it advisable, in the autumn of 1879, to dispatch a suitable man as special agent to the Ute country, with instructions to allay the troubles existing at the agency, and to inquire whether steps could be taken to effect the settlement of the Utes in severalty, with any chance of success. While this measure was in preparation, the whole aspect of affairs suddenly changed. Fights and massacres occurred on the Ute reservation, which are still fresh in our memory. The people of Colorado

were in a blaze of excitement. The cry, "The Utes must go!" rang all over the State. We were on the brink of an Indian war at the beginning of winter. That war threatened to involve the whole Ute nation, and to cost us many lives and millions of money. It would finally have resulted in the destruction of the Ute tribe, or at least a large portion of it,—of the innocent with the guilty, at a great sacrifice, on our part, of blood and treasure. It was evident, to every one capable of judging the emergency, that such a calamity could be averted only by changing the situation of the Indians. Negotiations were opened, and the Utes agreed to be settled in severalty upon the lands designated for that purpose, and to cede to the United States the whole of their reservation, except some small tracts of agricultural and grazing lands, in consideration of certain ample equivalents in various forms. Nobody will pretend that the Utes were fully prepared for such a change in their condition. Their chief, Ouray, was probably the only man among them who had a clear conception of the whole extent of that change. But nothing short of it would have saved the Ute tribe from destruction, and averted a most bloody and expensive conflict. In fact, even after that measure of composition, it required the most watchful management to prevent complications and collisions, and that watchful management will have to be continued for some time, for the danger is by no means over.

I cite this as an example to show how, in the conduct of Indian affairs, the necessity of doing certain things without sufficient preparation is sometimes precipitated upon the Government. Similar complications may arise at any time where the pressure of advancing enterprise upon Indian reservations is very great, and sustained by a numerous and rapidly increasing population, but especially where valuable mineral deposits have been discovered

or their discovery is in prospect. There is nothing more dangerous to an Indian reservation than a rich mine. But the repeated invasions of the Indian Territory, as well as many other similar occurrences, have shown clearly enough that the attraction of good agricultural lands is apt to have the same effect, especially when great railroad enterprises are pushing in the same direction. It required, on the part of the Government, the greatest vigilance and energy to frustrate the attempted invasions of the Indian Territory, year after year. But as the endeavors of the Government have not always in similar cases had the same success in the past, they may not always be equally successful in the future, and there is now scarcely a single Indian reservation in the country that will not soon be exposed to the same chances. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to the Indians, as well as to the country generally, that a policy be adopted which will secure to them and their descendants the safe possession of such tracts of land as they can cultivate, and a fair compensation for the rest; and that such a policy be proceeded with before the protection of their present large possessions by the Government becomes too precarious—that is to say, before conflicts are precipitated upon them which the Government is not always able to prevent, and by which they may be in danger of losing their lands, their compensation and even their lives, at the same time. It would undoubtedly be better if they could be carefully prepared for such a change of condition, so that they might clearly appreciate all its requirements and the consequences which are to follow. But those intrusted with the management of Indian affairs must not forget that, with regard to some Indian tribes and reservations at least, the matter is pressing; that the Government cannot control circumstances but is rather apt to be controlled by them, and that it must not only devise the

necessary preparations for the change in the condition of the Indians with forecast and wisdom, but must push them with the greatest possible expedition and energy if untoward accidents are to be avoided.

It is, therefore, very much to be regretted that the bill authorizing and enabling the Interior Department to settle the Indians in severalty wherever practicable, to give them patents, conveying a fee-simple title to their allotments, inalienable for a certain period, and to dispose of the reservation lands not so allotted with the consent of the Indians and for their benefit, so that they may be opened for general settlement and enterprise, did not become a law at the last session of Congress, or, rather, that such a law was not enacted years ago. The debate in the Senate on the severalty bill, last winter, turned on the imperfections of its details. No doubt, such imperfections existed. It would, indeed, be very difficult, if not impossible, to draw up a bill of this kind so perfect in all its details that further experience gathered from its practical application might not suggest some desirable amendment. But the essential thing is that opportunity be given to the branch of the Government managing Indian affairs to gather such further experience from the actual experiment, and that opportunity will be given only by the enactment of a law containing the principal features of the plan, and allowing the Executive sufficient latitude in applying it, according to circumstances, wherever the Indians may be prepared for it, or wherever, even without such preparation, the exigencies of the case may demand prompt action. The Executive will then be able understandingly to recommend amendments in the details of the law, as practical experience may point out their necessity. Certainly, not another session of Congress should be permitted to pass without comprehensive legislation on this important subject.

I am aware that I have not discussed here all points of importance connected with the Indian problem, such, for instance, as the necessity of extending the jurisdiction of the courts over Indian reservations, bringing the red men under the protection as well as the restraints of the law; and the question how the service should be organized to secure to the Indians intelligent, honest and humane management, etc. It has been my purpose merely to set forth those important points which, in the practical management of Indian affairs, should be steadily kept in view. I will recapitulate them:

1 The greatest danger hanging over the Indian race arises from the fact that, with their large and valuable territorial possessions which are lying waste, they stand in the way of what is commonly called "the development of the country."

2 A rational Indian policy will make it its principal object to avert that danger from the red men, by doing what will be most beneficial to them, as well as to the whole people: namely, by harmonizing the habits, occupations and interests of the Indians with that "development of the country."

3 To accomplish this object, it is of pressing necessity to set the Indians to work, to educate their youth of both sexes, to make them small proprietors of land, with the right of individual ownership under the protection of the law, and to induce them to make that part of their lands which they do not need for cultivation, profitable to themselves in the only possible way, by selling it at a just rate of compensation, thus opening it to general settlement and enterprise.

The policy here outlined is apt to be looked upon with disfavor by two classes of people: on the one hand, those who think that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian," and who denounce every recognition of the Indian's rights and every desire to promote his advancement in

civilization as sickly sentimentality; and, on the other hand, that class of philanthropists who, in their treatment of the Indian question, pay no regard to surrounding circumstances and suspect every policy contemplating a reduction of the Indian reservations of being a scheme of spoliation and robbery, gotten up by speculators and "land-grabbers." With the first class it seems useless to reason. As to the second, they do not themselves believe, if they are sensible, that twenty-five years hence millions of acres of valuable land will, in any part of the country, still be kept apart as Indian hunting-grounds. The question is, whether the Indians are to be exposed to the danger of hostile collisions, and of being robbed of their lands in consequence, or whether they are to be induced by proper and fair means to sell that which, as long as they keep it, is of no advantage to anybody, but which, as soon as they part with it for a just compensation, will be a great advantage to themselves and their white neighbors alike. No true friend of the Indian will hesitate to choose the latter line of policy as one in entire accord with substantial justice, humanity, the civilization and welfare of the red men and the general interests of the country.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

WILMINGTON, DEL., July 7, 1881.

Personal.

My dear Schurz: I am glad to get the *Post* and trace your hand daily in its columns. In the number I received yesterday was an echo to some thoughts of my own in relation to the late "impressive utterances" (as the *Herald* styled them) of ex-Senator Conkling on the great and paramount duty of "holding up the hands" of Vice-President Arthur in the hour of his possible call to the Presidential office, and giving among other reasons the fact that in the absence of any President *pro tem.* of the Senate and Speaker of the House, his single

life would stand between the country and the confusion likely to arise for want of a *locum tenens* of the Presidency. And the New York *Sun* regrets the "accident" of the Senate's failing to elect a President *pro tem.* before adjourning in May last.

In the light of history this is rather *too cheeky*; for the Senate did not "omit," but Mr. Arthur did designedly *prevent*, an election and in the face of frequent intimations did decline to vacate the chair in order to allow a President *pro tem.* to be chosen. When the subject was broached to him, he asked "*who*" would probably be chosen (the Democrats by the retirement of Conkling and Platt having a majority), and was told Mr. Bayard would certainly be. Mr. Conkling took occasion to put the same question and received the same reply.

Mr. Gorham, in their Washington organ, the *Republic* suggested that if Mr. Harris, of Tennessee, would be chosen, the opportunity for *that* would be allowed, but the Democratic majority did not propose to have their action dictated by the anti-Administration cabal. Mr. Harris of Tennessee had placated offended deity by pairing *against* Judge Robertson's nomination and was in sympathetic relations with Robertson's opponents.

The facts, of the notification to Arthur that the Democrats were ready to go into an election of President *pro tem.* and his reply, were conveyed to me by sundry Senators who informed me also that I would be chosen if Mr. Arthur would allow an election, but this opportunity he deliberately refused to allow. And it won't do now for him and his "Boss" to equivocate in the face of an indignant public in relation to their own unworthy dealings with an important public fact.

May Heaven avert the contingency of Arthur's promotion.

FROM ALONZO BELL¹

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5, 1881.

Personal.

I was greatly rejoiced on my return from a sea-trip to find that the Ponca war was at last ended, that Bright Eyes had

¹ Assistant Secretary of the Interior under Secretaries Schurz and Kirkwood.

capitulated to Tibbles, and that Tibbles had surrendered to Bright Eyes. I very much fear, however, that this last act of the pale-face is in the line of other wrongs perpetrated upon this most unfortunate band of Indians, and that the confiding Indian maiden will some day feel that the fate of Big Snake was preferable to the unhappy one which she has chosen.

Will Dawes hold the Department responsible for this? Will Governor Long add it to his long list of indictments? Let us hope that both may take a rose-colored view of the union between the dusky daughter of the forest and the gay professional philanthropist who buried all the wrongs of her race in a greater one upon herself. I fear poor Bright Eyes has made a mistake, but I am willing to forgive her if the act has effectually disposed of Tibbles. Even so great a sacrifice may be rare economy if it gives the Nation a rest from the vexatious borings of the Tibbles school of philanthropy.

I should like much to see you and talk over affairs connected with public interests. Our Indian policy is substantially yours. In fact, I see no desire anywhere to depart from the wise plans laid down by you. Mr. Kirkwood shows an earnest desire to do the best possible in all branches of the service. If his Administration is as successful as yours both the country and himself will have reason to be well satisfied. With grateful remembrance of your leadership, I remain,

As ever truly,

A. BELL.

TO GEORGE M. LOCKWOOD¹

The Evening Post,
NEW YORK, Oct. 27, 1881.

Private.

This morning I received an anonymous letter referring to the resolution to investigate the contingent fund expenditures in the different Departments passed by the Senate yesterday, and saying that now at last my "rascalities" in handling the contingent fund would "come

¹ Chief Clerk, Interior Department.

to light." I have so far been resting in the happy consciousness not only of not having taken any advantage of the contingent fund, but of never having charged to it or drawn from it any of the expenses incurred by me personally in the discharge of official business, to the reimbursement of which I would be entitled. Can you think of anything that I may not remember or that may never have come to my knowledge, in connection with the contingent or any other fund, that might bear any evil construction or be capable of misrepresentation or distortion in that way? Having been quite punctilious in these things, I can not remember anything of the kind. Do you? If so let me know.

Are you not coming to New York to vote? If so, do not fail to call on me, as you always should when you visit New York. I am at my desk usually from 9 A.M. until 4.30 P.M., and I live at 45 East 68th Street.

I suppose the anonymous letter I mentioned was from some embittered politician who wanted to annoy me. I get such things quite frequently.

FROM THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON

25 BUCKINGHAM ST.,
CAMBRIDGE, Nov. 26, 1881.

Personal.

I wish to write to you frankly about something and know you will answer in the same way.

The Massachusetts Woman Suffrage Association are to make a special move this winter to obtain municipal suffrage for women in this State and they are to hold an important meeting in Tremont Temple, Jan. 10th or 11th. Now the Blackwells are firm in the conviction that when the Kansas campaign on the subject took place in 1867 you expressed yourself to them as favorable to woman suffrage and willing to speak in favor of it. This is new to me but I agree with

them that if you are favorable, your influence would be very important to us. Can you not speak at that meeting or at some time during Jan. 10th or 11th? Of course we would pay your usual lecture fee which is understood to be \$100. It would gratify me greatly if you would come.

P. S. Governor Long's message will distinctly favor municipal suffrage for women, I am told.

TO THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON

NEW YORK, Nov. 28, 1881.

Your kind note of the 26th inst. has just reached me. Frankly, I have never taken any part in the Woman Suffrage movement. It is a mistake that I was intending to go to Kansas when the subject was under discussion there, and I could not possibly be in Boston on the 10th or 11th of January.

Will you not visit New York some time this winter? If so, I hope you will let me know of it. I should be very happy to see you here.

TO GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

The Evening Post,
NEW YORK, Jan. 16, 1882.

A resolution has been introduced in the Senate and passed, calling upon the Interior Department for copies of a ruling made by me as Secretary of the Interior in 1879 with respect to the Northern Pacific railroad land grant, and of other papers connected with the case. I suppose these papers will go to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate for examination as to whether the ruling was in accordance with law. Some newspapers have availed themselves of the introduction of that resolution to charge me with performing that official act under the influence

of improper motives. While the Senate may not feel inclined to take cognizance of mere irresponsible newspaper talk, yet it seems to me that when either by any act of the Senate or in the debates of that body injurious reflections are cast upon the official conduct and character of one who has been six years a Senator and four years a member of the Cabinet, he may be considered entitled to a full and fair inquiry into all the facts in question. Whether the resolution introduced by Senator Teller was intended to convey any such reflection, I do not know. But it has been so interpreted and I am advised that several Members of Congress so understand it.

Under these circumstances I would ask you to move in the Senate that either the Judiciary Committee, or one especially appointed for the purpose, be instructed to investigate thoroughly and publicly my official action in the case referred to. The facts are easily obtainable, and the investigation I desire is that those who attack my conduct be given the best possible opportunity to make good their charges and insinuations, and that the truth may have a chance to become known by the voice of unassailable authority.¹

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19, 1882.²

You may be sure that I will aid in procuring any investigation you may deem necessary to prevent injustice to you personally and officially. I comprehend your impatience and disgust at the indications of underhanded imputation upon your official action and career.

I will let Edmunds know of my disposition, and I hope he will feel as I do. . . .

¹ See letter of March 15, 1883, to Geo. W. Julian.

² In answer to a letter similar to the one of Jan. 16, 1882, to Senator Edmunds.

TO GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

NEW YORK, Jan. 24, 1882.

I have to thank you for your kind letter informing me that the papers connected with my ruling in respect to the Northern Pacific railroad grant have been referred to the Judiciary Committee. I fear I did not make myself sufficiently clear when asking you to move an investigation of my official conduct in that case. Not only is the ruling itself attacked as incorrect, but I find myself charged in some public papers—and these charges seem to have been called forth by a resolution introduced in the Senate—with having by an arbitrary stretch of authority as Secretary of the Interior “restored” to the Northern Pacific railroad a forfeited land grant, and with having done this to benefit a personal friend, Mr. Henry Villard, who is alleged to have been then as now the principal party interested in that road. These charges do not only appear in certain newspapers, but they are, as I am advised, circulated and countenanced by some Members of Congress.

Inasmuch as they touch the integrity of a great Executive department in an important official act, they may be considered entitled to attention, not as a mere matter of personal concern, but as a matter of public interest. The people ought to know whether their affairs have been honestly administered or not. It is, therefore, of importance that it be generally known, not only whether the ruling made in the case referred to, is correct, in point of law, but whether the allegations made concerning the circumstances under which it was made, have any foundation.

It can very easily be shown that the case, before being decided, was most carefully and conscientiously considered on its merits; that, as a legal question, it was submitted to

the Attorney-General; that the Attorney-General heard elaborate argument upon it; that the decision as it stands was drawn up according to his instructions; that in all parallel cases he declared it to be not only within the power but the duty of the Executive under such circumstances to recognize land grants as still legally existing and to act accordingly; that Mr. Henry Villard had neither at the time when the ruling was made nor for nearly two years afterwards any interest in the Northern Pacific Company; that he was, on the contrary, interested in a rival enterprise, and that there was absolutely no connection between him and the ruling in question and no communication, direct or indirect, about it between him and me.

It is not only of interest to me but also to the public that the truth should be brought out in some way sufficiently authoritative to stand above cavil. If to that end it is best that the Committee, to which the matter has been referred, be authorized to send for persons and papers, to swear witnesses and thus to ascertain the facts by way of a formal and public investigation, I should be glad to have that done. If the object can be accomplished in some less expensive and circumstantial way, I should be satisfied. I appeal to you as to a friend of truth and justice, for your judgment as to what should be done, and your aid in doing it.

FROM GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

U. S. SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, Jan. 27, 1882.

I have yours of the 24th with accompanying enclosures. I do not think it at all probable without some more specific statement than appears in newspapers, if you—a newspaper man—will pardon my saying so, that the Senate would order

or admit any investigation of the kind you name. You of course have it entirely in your power to answer public complaints by a statement of the facts and a reference to the sources of information, and you have a right by a memorial addressed to Congress to implore an inquiry, if you think the matter of sufficient consequence to do so. On such a memorial doubtless the Senate or House would direct an investigation. But if you or any other prominent man commence the practice of appealing to Congress for investigations every time you are assailed in the newspapers, you will have a pretty busy life; and to appeal once and not afterward in some similar case raises an implication that you cannot bear an investigation in the second. On the whole I should advise you to fight it out as far as you like in the public prints until something more definite should be stated against you in one house or the other of Congress. I was sorry not to be able to see Mr. White at the time he called, and he could not wait until I should be at leisure.

TO JOSEPH MEDILL

NEW YORK, Sept. 21, 1882.

To-day I received the Chicago *Tribune* of the 19th containing a long interview, in which Mr. Blaine responds to some remarks about him as a civil service reformer which appeared some time ago in the *Evening Post*, with a column or two of personal abuse directed against me. The abuse being of the old Gail Hamiltonian pattern, and somewhat stale, calls for no reply. Neither am I in the least disposed to enter into a dispute with Mr. Blaine as to whether he or I was more faithful to the principles of civil service reform while in office. In fact, I should not take notice of the matter at all but for a rather amusing circumstance, more amusing even than such a dispute would be.

Mr. Blaine is known to be of a very dramatic disposition,

and it is his characteristic method, whenever he feels himself attacked, to defend himself by an assault upon the accuser, and thus to entertain and divert the public by the spectacle of a lively fight between individuals. So in this instance. Mr. Blaine was sure that the article in the *Evening Post* which reflected upon him was from the pen of Mr. Schurz, who is, as Mr. Blaine sweepingly remarks, of all men, "studiously and gratuitously offensive in all he says." Mr. Blaine identified the hand of his antagonist beyond doubt, and then he sallied forth in his characteristic style. Now, I cannot resist the temptation to spoil the dramatic combination by saying that Mr. Blaine has directed his tirade to an entirely wrong address. When the *Evening Post* discussed Mr. Blaine as a civil service reformer I was quietly enjoying my summer vacation—more than 200 miles from New York, equally ignorant of Mr. Blaine's new pretensions as a civil service reformer and of what the *Evening Post* was going to say about him. If, therefore, he wants to remain true to his method of meeting a charge by reviling the accuser, he will in this case have to abuse somebody else.

I do not, however, say this for the purpose of suggesting that he ought not to abuse me. I have to admit that he has sufficient reason for it. Although I am not the author of the *Evening Post* article in question, and might have preferred to treat Mr. Blaine's new reform attitude good-naturedly as the rich joke which he himself undoubtedly feels it to be, and, although I am anxious to see full justice done to him in the *Evening Post* according to the facts, yet there is another disturbing difference between us beyond the civil service question. To make a clean breast of it, it consists in my entertaining, as Mr. Blaine knows, quite seriously the opinion that the author of the Mulligan letters will, in spite of "booms" and "plumes"

and reform professions, never get votes enough to be elected President of the United States. And, as I not only entertain this opinion, but have sometimes expressed it, Mr. Blaine cannot be expected altogether to restrain his feelings.

TO JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

The Evening Post, 210 BROADWAY,
NEW YORK, Jan. 9, 1883.

I am at work at the Clay biography, that is to say, I have for a considerable time been engaged in studying the material, of which, however, there is still a larger quantity before me which I have not been able to touch. There has been less intelligent and valuable work done on Clay's life than on that of any other prominent American statesman, so that his biographer, at least a biographer as he ought to be, has to do it all himself. I have become greatly interested in the subject, but I am entirely unable to name a definite time for the completion of the work. The fact is that my regular duties will not permit me to spend more than two or three evenings, or rather parts of two or three evenings a week on it, and you will readily understand that under such circumstances no rapid progress is possible. It has occurred to me that I could furnish the biography of Gallatin in a much shorter time than that of Clay, for the reason that the subject is more familiar to me and the material is much more "ready to hand." I wonder whether an exchange of subjects could be made with the gentleman who has undertaken Gallatin? What do you think?

I am sorry I cannot give you a more definite promise than that I shall do the best I can. Be assured, it is not my fault. I am simply the victim of circumstances which have condemned me to work as a journalist.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SAVANNAH NEWS

January 30, 1883.

On the 16th of this month you did me the honor of addressing to me personally an editorial article in your journal on the subject of homicide in the Southern States. You do not deny, as I understand you, that the discussion of the subject in the *Evening Post* and the *Nation* may have been prompted by motives friendly to the Southern people. You can scarcely think otherwise when you remember—as certainly many Southern men remember—that I was one of the first among Republicans in Missouri that championed, at the expense of their party standing, the reënfrenchisement of those disfranchised on account of their participation in the rebellion; one of the first among Republicans in the Senate who advocated a general amnesty, who never ceased to denounce the abuses of the so-called carpet-bag governments and who zealously opposed every policy or measure calculated to withhold from the Southern people their rights and privileges as citizens. And what I did in the Senate those who are associated with me in the *Evening Post* did with equal zeal in the press. We therefore may say that we befriended the Southern people when they most needed friends, and that the same spirit animates us now and gives us a right to speak. Neither can you, as an intelligent and well-informed man, give your countenance to the silly insinuations which you mention in your article, that this discussion has on our part been conducted with a desire to divert immigration from the South and to direct it to some other part of the country. For you must be well aware that for many years before the beginning of this discussion the South has attracted but very few immigrants, and that there are at present no signs of migration turning that way. What you have not can not be taken

from you, and if there is anybody who does not desire you to have it, he will naturally find it the best policy to leave things just as they are. But what we wish is not to leave things just as they are.

I am somewhat surprised at your suggestion that the *Evening Post* would show more friendship for the South if, instead of drawing your attention to certain disturbing influences by way of criticism, it spoke of the "great resources" of the South, of its "wonderful recuperation from the waste of war," etc. That is what the *Evening Post* has lost no proper occasion for doing. No man can more sincerely rejoice at the return of prosperity to the South than I do, and it is for that very reason that I deplore the circumstances which prevent your recovery and progress from being more rapid and general. Heartily wishing that you should have that immigration of men and means, which for the development of your resources is so eminently desirable, we ask for the privilege—and it may be claimed as a privilege of friendship—to inquire into the reasons why those advantages are turned away in so great a measure from your fertile soil and your great opportunities. It is not for our benefit, but for yours, that this inquiry is made, for its results may be much more valuable to the Southern people than to anybody else. I know that friendly services of this character are not always graciously received, but this consideration should not deter those who mean well and whose duty it is to discuss matters of public interest.

No observing and candid man will deny that one of the reasons why immigration shuns the South, in spite of its genial climate, its fertile acres and its variety of tempting advantages, consists in a social distemper, which finds its expression in the frequency of certain kinds of homicide. I say "certain kinds of homicide," for I do not deny that there are classes of crime which occur more frequently in

other parts of the country. You point to the cities of New York and Chicago as examples of the insecurity of human life at the North. I admit at once that robbery, and murder for the sake of robbery, are more rare in the South than among the crowded populations of our great centers, and that in this respect a man's life may be safer almost anywhere in Georgia than on certain streets of New York or Chicago after dark. The same may be said comparatively of all great capitals in the world. But the homicides in the South which attract so much attention and produce so baneful an effect are not murders perpetrated by professional thieves who kill men to rifle their wallets; they are homicides occurring among persons whom, in a multitude of cases, your own journals are in the habit of designating as gentlemen, as citizens of respected standing, of good families, belonging to the better classes of society. And these homicides are the result of commonplace troubles, disagreements about business matters, importunities of creditors, social disputes, family feuds, quarrels about a dog or a horse, accidental insults, heated words at a ball or a card table or a church meeting.

The question may be asked whether homicides of that kind are more infamous in character than murders committed for the purpose of robbery, and I answer at once that they are not. But when I am further asked why such homicides should do more harm to your community in the estimation of the world than murders for the purpose of robbery do to ours, the answer is that here the murderer is, as a general thing, condemned by public opinion and hunted down as an infamous criminal and hung, if caught, while the kind of manslaying in the South I speak of is, as a general thing, greatly "deplored," but at the same time very frequently excused, and almost universally protected against due punishment by morbid public sentiment. In the one case, the law-abiding citizen finds public

opinion, which condemns manslaying as an infamous crime, as well as the organs of the law, which punish it as such, strongly on his side, while in the other case he finds himself confronted by certain traditional notions of society which are apt to protect the willful manslayer against social infamy as well as against the punishment provided by the law. And such traditional notions, and the practices which grow up under them, create a social atmosphere which most people, when they deliberate upon the choice of a new home or field of enterprise, prefer to avoid.

It has been suggested that this view of the case is practically controverted by the thousands of people of means who go into the mining regions of the far West to invest their capital there, although the homicidal use of the revolver and bowie knife is comparatively as frequent there as in the South, if not more so. But this fact does not impugn my argument in the least, for this simple reason: The law-abiding citizen who goes to the far West knows to an absolute certainty that the ruffianly state of society there is a thing of only a short duration; that, as immigration pours in it will very soon establish those habits of social order which its good elements bring with them, and that in introducing those habits there will only be a few lawless ruffians to put down, but no settled adverse public opinion or morbid social notions of any strength to overcome. This is a universal experience with which the law-abiding citizen going there is well acquainted, and, therefore, he is not deterred from going. But as to going to the South, he fears that he would find those social notions which furnish excuse and exemption from punishment to the manslayer as the principal obstacle to that good order which he considers essential to his well-being. This is the difference, and it is just this difference which, in its practical effects, tells so seriously against the South.

Now, as to the facts concerning homicides in the

Southern States, you say in the editorial article addressed to me: "We confess that the practice complained of, while it is not so prevalent as the editor would make it appear, is none the less to be deplored, and, we are convinced, is rapidly going into desuetude." I emphatically disclaim all desire to make that "practice" appear more prevalent than it really is. What the *Evening Post* has been doing for two or three months, is not to invent any cases, nor to exaggerate them, but simply to discuss them as they were reported by Southern newspapers.

Their number, I regret to say, was quite large, too large indeed, to be accepted as representing the decline of the practice. And it was the Southern press that classified them, and drew attention to them by elaborate descriptions. In a multitude of instances we were told the deed was done by a man "greatly respected by his neighbors," of a "well-known family," or "a citizen of prominence," or "a member of good society," and that the occurrence was "generally deplored," or that it had "cast gloom over the community"; and, in not a few cases, that "further difficulties were apprehended." But we did not once hear that the perpetrator was tried, found guilty and hung, or even that it was generally hoped he would be. Thus it was the Southern press which made these homicides conspicuous and gave them their peculiar significance. What we did was simply to point out to the Southern people that, for the sake of their good name as well as prosperity, such outrageous practices should not only be deplored, but stopped. And as you yourself "confess that the practice is to be deplored," I may fairly assume that you earnestly desire to see it stopped. We are thus engaged in a common cause, and you will, therefore, surely take it in good part if I venture to make some suggestions concerning the means to be used to that end.

It is necessary to set those forces in motion which are

apt to exercise healthy influence upon public opinion. There are several prominent journals in the South which substantially agree with us. And judging from the letters received in this office from persons of high character and respected standing in the South, there are many men in that part of the country who are deeply grieved at the practices we lament, and whose voices would certainly be listened to if speaking out openly, boldly and in concert. If in every Southern State such men were prevailed upon to come forward and form associations under the name of law and order societies, or any similar title, for the distinct object of suppressing this evil, they would, supported by the most respectable part of the press, soon be able to produce a powerful impression upon public sentiment, and to organize a strong, perhaps an irresistible influence. This is the plan I commend to your serious consideration.

They would have to direct their efforts mainly to three objective points: First—To eradicate, especially from the minds of young men, the antiquated and foolish notions that it is decent and gentlemanly and chivalrous to resort to violence upon every possible provocation. Second—To discourage the carrying of concealed weapons and to see that the laws prohibiting it be enforced. Third—To use their whole influence to the end that homicide be punished according to law without fear or favor. Let me say a few words on these points in their order.

There is much extravagant talk in the South about a "higher type of manhood" which "quickly resents an injury," and about a "chivalrous" or "cavalierly" spirit which is always ready to appeal to the sword or to the pistol to redress one's own or other people's grievances. This sort of talk is very apt to seduce the imaginations, especially of young persons, who are easily made to believe that they will show themselves as "perfect gentlemen," or become superior beings, or win a sort of patent of nobility,

if on the slightest occasion they are prepared to feel insulted, and then to put a bullet or a charge of buckshot into somebody else's body. Such young people should be taught well, by precept and example, to appreciate the difference between a gentleman and a ruffian. They will then perceive that, in point of fact, a ruffian is easily and frequently "insulted" by a ruffian, but a true gentleman is very rarely insulted by another true gentleman. When one of these rare cases happens there are almost always methods of composition short of violence, and honorable to both parties. When a gentleman is insulted by a ruffian he will only lower his own dignity by adopting the ruffian's method of settling a quarrel. When ruffians insult one another they should not be permitted by any decent person to believe that respectable society will regard them as gentlemen if they fight each other with revolvers or shot-guns, and thus settle their quarrel in a ruffianly way.

No community, and no member of it, should be permitted to forget that it is the great office of the law to redress wrongs and to protect the individual against assaults upon his rights, his honor, his property and his life. Your trouble is in a great measure that there are so many persons among you who think they can not, or they ought not, to intrust to the law and its organs affairs in which they have any personal feeling and interest, and that "taking the law in one's own hand" is regarded with too encouraging a leniency by public sentiment. It is the characteristic mark of civilized society that the individual looks to the law for his protection and the enforcement of his rights, while the habitual resort to violence by self-help is the equally characteristic mark of the barbarous state.

Constant self-help by force and violence in resenting insults or in enforcing claims of right may have been considered "chivalry" some centuries ago. But that kind of chivalry has been outgrown by a higher civilization.

Those who try to put a pleasing face upon the homicidal practice by speaking of it as owing to high spirits of the "descendants of the cavaliers" in the South, seem to forget that an overwhelming majority of the descendants of that race of cavaliers live not here, but in England; and that, it may be supposed, the best of the cavalierly spirit has descended upon those of the native soil, together with their names, their escutcheons and their family traditions—at least as much as upon the side lines in the Southern States. But the descendants of the cavaliers in England have become civilized in the same way as other people of this century. They have undoubtedly retained a good deal of pride of ancestry, and in most cases a lively sense of honor. But while they have their disputes and quarrels like the rest of us, we do not hear of any shooting and stabbing among them. In fact, if any member of their order should try to demonstrate his cavalierly spirit and his quickness to resent an insult by whipping out a revolver on every occasion, or by going after an enemy with a shotgun, they would look upon him as an unmitigated ruffian, entirely unworthy of their society, and they would have him tried and hung if he actually killed anybody. In this civilized century that man is regarded as the finest cavalier who most conscientiously reveres the sanctity of the law, shows the most just and generous spirit in the treatment of his fellow-men, maintains his dignity by abstaining not only from all mean but also from all brutal things and cultivates the highest graces of civilized life. If the high-spirited young men of the South desire to take rank among the modern descendants of the cavaliers, and to become themselves true cavaliers of the nineteenth century, they will quickly drop—together with their antiquated notions of chivalry—their revolvers and their shotguns as protectors of their honor and as their badges of nobility.

But even if they would model their conduct rather after the knights of five hundred years ago, it should not be forgotten that some of the cases on record would at no period of history have been thought to have any kind of chivalry in them. For instance, when a man, who wants to avenge a real or imaginary insult, deems the whole code of honor satisfied if he simply notifies his enemy that he will shoot him at sight, and then kills him with a shotgun from an upper-story window; or when a debtor puts a bullet into the heart of a creditor who insults him by dunning at an inopportune time.

Intelligent, generous and ambitious as the people of the South are, I should think it could not be difficult by a proper presentation of the case, coming from the most respected class among them, to awaken them to a keen appreciation of the mischief springing from such antiquated and discreditable notions of chivalry and honor.

The practice of carrying concealed weapons appears very much in the same light. That revolvers are habitually carried by a very large portion of the male population of the South is an admitted fact. Now, I ask you, in all soberness, what condition of society would you call it, in which a gentleman thinks it necessary, whenever leaving his house, to put a revolver in his pocket in anticipation of some "difficulty" with some other gentleman, which may induce or oblige him to kill the latter? This view of the matter may at first sight seem exaggerated. But is it so in fact? Ask yourself, for what purpose are deadly weapons so generally carried in the South? Not for protection against wild beasts or against highway robbers. You insist yourself that as to robbers the roads in Georgia are safer than some of the streets of New York or Chicago, and I do not deny it. And yet no gentleman here thinks it necessary to have a pistol on his body when he goes to his business place or to his club or to a ball. The few

individuals who do so will scarcely be considered gentlemen any longer when the fact of their constantly carrying arms becomes known. Why, then, is it done by so many persons belonging to the best society in the South? Is it not really done in constant expectation of some insult, or some dispute, or some collision—in one word, some “difficulty” which may oblige or induce the carrier of the pistol to make use of it by killing somebody? Is not the mere statement of the case sufficient to show that this widespread habit is in itself a severe reflection upon the social condition in which it prevails? Is it not true that the men going constantly armed in anticipation of a quarrel thus carry a temptation to resort to violence with them, and that thus their pistols become the cause of their “difficulties”? Are not there a great many men in the South to-day who would never have got into bloody and disgraceful troubles had they not habitually carried revolvers ready to their hands, and who now devoutly wish they had never done so? Would not Southern society be in a position much more unassailable before the world, and much more satisfactory to itself, if such a habit had never prevailed?

Laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons can not become efficient unless they are supported by a strong public opinion and by social custom. As soon as decent people, in sufficient force and concert, speak out on the subject and make their influence felt, so that a man habitually carrying arms must feel himself in danger of being frowned upon by polite society as “not a gentleman,” or rather as a ruffian, those who have any social aspirations will soon abandon the dangerous habit, and the decisive step in the way of that reform will be accomplished; for, public opinion settled, the unruly can then be coerced by the enforcement of the law.

And it will then no longer be difficult to secure the third

point I mentioned, the punishment of the manslayer according to law. When willful homicide, unless justified by the clear necessity of self-defense or mitigated by the extremest circumstances of mental distress, is regarded and treated by society as the infamous crime it is, which must exclude the perpetrator from all civilized and self-respecting companionship, it will find juries to convict and judges to sentence the guilty and governors to withhold their pardon. There will then be no element ever so rough that it might not be brought under the control of legal authority.

You and all those in the South who "confess to deplore" the homicidal practice, and who in their hearts must necessarily desire to stop it, should therefore feel called upon promptly to take this matter in hand with that courage which, conscious of serving a good cause, is not to be daunted by the fear of temporary unpopularity. If the law and order societies I have suggested are formed all over the South, and if they pursue their end with pluck and energy, they can scarcely fail of success; and their success will confer a blessing upon the South, of which they will have reason to be prouder than of any warlike exploits and for which their children will never cease to be grateful.

Do not reject this advice as coming from one who does not live among you. The Southern people have more and warmer friends here than they are apt to recognize—friends who are heartily glad of every sign of advancement and prosperity in the Southern States, who esteem and admire the many good and noble qualities of the Southern people, and whose cordial wishes accompany every effort you make in the way of social and material progress. And we feel it to be a pity that these efforts should be hampered by deplorable traditions of the past, and that those noble qualities should be dimmed by a blemish which you yourselves need only see as others see it, in

order to wipe it out. I assure you, we have undertaken this discussion, not from any desire to exhibit that blemish to the world, for the Southern press has done that, nor from any meddlesome spirit of fault-finding, but to stir up the sensitiveness of the Southern people to the keenest possible perception of an evil existing among them and of the necessity of correcting it by their own endeavor. And I may assure you also that nothing will give us more genuine and heartfelt pleasure than to record and bring to public notice and commendation any movement in the right way.

In your editorial article you seem to intimate that in this part of the country, too, there are evils enough to which we might devote our reformatory zeal. This is true, and we faithfully strive to subject those home distempers to proper diagnosis and treatment as occasion offers. If you find that we have overlooked any, I shall gratefully accept the benefit of your criticism and advice as a welcome reciprocation.

Since you have addressed yourself in your journal personally to me, I trust you will not deny me the favor of giving this letter a place in your columns so that it may meet the eye of the same circle of readers.

TO GEORGE W. JULIAN

NEW YORK, March 15, 1883.

Sir: In your contribution to the March number of the *North American Review* you seek to show that the Interior Department has constantly been under the influence of the railway corporations. The statements upon which you rely to substantiate that charge, with regard to my administration of that Department, I pronounce essentially

false, and I shall now briefly review those among them which can pretend to any importance.

On page 244 you say:

Another advantage gained by the railroads had its origin in an opinion given by Attorney-General Black in 1857, when the railroad companies were anxious to obtain certified lists of their lands before they had been earned. Mr. Black held that these lists were simply in the nature of information from the records of the Department, and that he could see no objection to issuing them to any person who desired to make a proper use of them, just as any other information would be furnished from the records; and that they could have no influence on the title to the lands. Under this opinion the Department issued the certified lists as requested; but in May, 1880, the Secretary of the Interior decided that when any of his predecessors have certified lands under railroad grants, their acts are final and conclusive, and binding upon him as their successor. He further held that a complete legal title was conveyed by such certified lists, and that the latter were in all respects equivalent to patents.

This can have but one meaning, and it has been so understood by all the newspapers which have commented upon it—that certified lists of lands, issued without the lands having been earned by the railroad companies, merely in the nature of information, without any intention of conveying title thereby, were decided by me, as Secretary of the Interior, to have conveyed to the railroad companies complete legal title to the lands so listed.

You cannot but know that this is false. The only decision I can find to which your statement can possibly refer is the one in the case of *Charles Brown vs. the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad*, rendered by me May 4, 1880. The merits of the case had already been passed upon by my predecessor, Secretary Zachariah

Chandler, on August 31, 1876. They had also been covered by a decision of the United States Circuit Court for the eighth circuit, Judge Dillon presiding, as follows:

"The title to the tract of land in controversy in this suit was, by the Act of 1856, vested in the State of Iowa. The tract in question was within the terms of the Act of 1856, and when it was selected and the selection approved and certified by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the title became perfect in the State. - Every act had then been performed necessary to make the title of the State complete." (Duray *vs.* Hallenbeck.)

The Act of 1856 was an act granting land to the State of Iowa to aid in the construction of the Missouri and Mississippi Railroad (now the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company). As you know, land grants for the benefit of railroads were at that time made to the States wherein the roads were to be built, the lands to be transferred by the States to the companies. In the original granting act here referred to, as well as the act amendatory thereof, it was expressly and specifically provided that complete legal title should be conveyed to the State and the company by certified lists, and in no other way. Moreover, the conveyance of title by certification was provided for by a general statute enacted in 1854, being now Section 2449 of the Revised Statutes. It is as follows:

Where lands have been or may hereafter be granted by any law of Congress to any one of the several States or Territories, and where such law does not convey the fee simple title of the lands, or require patents to be issued therefor, the lists of such lands which have been or may hereafter be certified by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under the seal of his office, either as originals or copies of the originals or records, shall be regarded as conveying the fee simple of all the lands embraced in such lists,

or that are of the character contemplated by such act of Congress and intend to be granted thereby; but where lands embraced in such lists are not of the character embraced in such acts of Congress and are not intended to be granted thereby, the lists, so far as these lands are concerned, shall be perfectly null and void, and no right, title, claim or interest shall be conveyed thereby.

This statute would have covered the case completely, and made it my clear duty to recognize the certified lists as conveying title, even had the granting act not specifically provided for this and no other mode of conveyance.

And out of this state of facts you constructed the slanderous story that I had made a law of my own, for the benefit of railroad corporations, by which unearned lands could be surreptitiously put into their possession. As to the conveyance of unearned lands in that way, a little honest inquiry would have acquainted you with the fact that when, during my administration, a case in which unearned lands had by mistake been put upon such a list came to my notice, the list was at once cancelled, and the clerk responsible for the mistake promptly punished.

A word about my ruling, that when any of my predecessors had certified lands under railroad grants, their acts were final and conclusive, and binding upon me as their successor. This, too, you treat as an unscrupulous contrivance of mine. You are a lawyer, practising before the Departments. Are you so ignorant as not to know that while principles of administration and rules of practice and the like may be changed, the adjudications in any specific case by any one Secretary have always been held to be final and conclusive and binding upon his successors, unless new and essential facts be adduced which were not before the Secretary making the decision, or a new state of the law? Have you not ordinary sense

enough to see that this must be so, for if it were not, everybody who had a decision rendered against him would have his case reopened at the incoming of a new Administration and that the whole time of the Departments would be absorbed by rehearing and deciding the same cases over and over? If you have never heard of this, you may learn what everybody else knows by reading the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *United States vs. Bank of Metropolis*, 15 Peters, and the opinions of Attorney-Generals, vol. 2, pp. 9 and 464; vol. 4, p. 341; vol. 5, pp. 29 and 123; vol. 9, pp. 101, 301 and 387; vol. 12, p. 358; vol. 13, pp. 33, 226 and 456. But you can scarcely plead ignorance of this, for all these authorities are quoted in that very decision of mine, the decision of May 4, 1880, to which your statement above quoted refers.

This would seem sufficient to show what you are capable of in the way of reckless falsification, and I might dismiss this branch of the subject were there not a few more flowers too fragrant to be left unnoticed.

On page 246 of your article you say:

But they [the railroad corporations] were still exposed to possible danger under the adjudications referred to, and naturally felt the need of some further security. This they found in an opinion of Attorney-General Devens, dated June 5, 1880, and asked for by Secretary Schurz, as "an authoritative expression of his views." Although the distinguished Secretary is not a lawyer, he is uncommonly skilled in the use of English words, and perfectly familiar with their import, and it seems a little remarkable, therefore, that he should have found it necessary to ask for this legal advice, in view of the clear and unmistakable language of three decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the very question now submitted, with others, for interpretation. But this opinion of the Attorney-General is still more remarkable than

the request of the Secretary, and cannot fail to surprise every member of the legal profession who may chance to read it.

It is a part, and a most important part, of the duties of the Attorney-General, the highest law officer of the Government, to give legal advice to the heads of the Executive Departments, who are not presumed to be lawyers, and sometimes are not. It is, therefore, not only natural, but it may be looked upon as a matter of duty, that the heads of the Departments should ask for such advice when they have to decide disputed points of law. That the point on which I asked advice was a disputed one among lawyers appears from the simple fact that you hold one opinion upon it and Attorney-General Devens another. There is one reason imaginable, and only one, why under such circumstances the head of a Department, "not a lawyer," might hesitate to ask the Attorney-General for advice. It is, that he might consider the Attorney-General incompetent as a jurist, or corrupt as an officer. How was this in Attorney-General Devens's case? He is highly respected by the profession as a lawyer. I have long known him, and the country knows him, as the very soul of honor. The State of Massachusetts is evidently of the same opinion. He was a judge there before being called to the Attorney-General's duties, and no sooner had he left the Cabinet, than he was placed as a justice on the supreme bench of that Commonwealth. There he is now. Can you tell any reason why this man as Attorney-General should not be trusted for his legal advice on a disputed question of law by a Secretary "not a lawyer"? Do you know anything about Judge Devens calculated to make it appear "a little remarkable" that he should be so trusted? For when you say that the request of the Secretary of the Interior for legal advice was "a little remarkable," and

the advice given by the Attorney-General "still more remarkable," you evidently mean to insinuate that the Secretary of the Interior, and still more the Attorney-General, were under "railway influence." If you know anything to substantiate this insinuation you should not withhold it, for, while I am only a journalist, the late Attorney-General, Mr. Devens, is on the supreme bench of Massachusetts, and the people of that State are on public grounds obviously entitled to the benefits of your knowledge.

The subject of my request for advice and of the Attorney-General's opinion was the question whether land-grant railroads were entitled to indemnity only for lands sold, reserved or disposed of by the United States, within the granted limits, between the passage of the granting act and the definite location of the line, or also for lands sold, etc., within the granted limits before the passage of the granting act. The latter view, more favorable to the railroad companies, had always been held and acted upon by the Department when I came into office. In 1875 Justice Davis, in the case of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company *vs.* the United States, delivered an opinion favorable to the former rule. There were also other conflicting decisions. Now, you present the matter in your article as if I had resorted to every device to uphold the rule more favorable to the companies against the opinion expressed by Justice Davis.

This, you cannot but know, is false again. What are the facts? Having laid down for the action of the Department the principle that it should give to the corporations nothing which it was not under a strict construction of the law absolutely bound to give, I accepted the opinion of Justice Davis as the principle to govern my decisions in such cases, and subsequently, in 1879, embodied that principle in a paragraph put by my order in the instruc-

tions issued by the General Land Office to the local land officers. It was as follows: "In the adjustment of grants for railroads the principle has, until recently, prevailed that indemnity was allowed for all lands sold, reserved or disposed of within the granted limits, whether such sale, reservation or disposal occurred before or after the granting act; and the certifications and patents have been executed in conformity thereto. In accordance with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company *vs.* the United States, it is held by the Department that indemnity can only be allowed for lands sold, reserved or disposed of in the granted limits by the General Government after the granting act and prior to the time when the railroad right attached, unless the grant be one of quantity specifically set forth in the act." And to this I caused to be added a rule which arrested ever so much loose practice advantageous to the corporations, and which is still in force, to this effect: "In the adjustment of all grants it consequently becomes necessary to know for what lands lost *in place* the indemnity selections are made, and with the view to that end you will require the companies to designate the specific tracts for which the lands selected are claimed." If you do not appreciate the bearing of this instruction, I am sure the land-grant railroads do.

It is clear, therefore, that far from trying to prevent the introduction of the principle set forth in Justice Davis's decision as the rule of Departmental action, I introduced it myself, and my rulings were made in accordance with it until the last months of my administration, when, in consequence of the protests of parties interested, and the arguments urged by respectable attorneys, the question was submitted to the Attorney-General, and I was overruled by him. Neither was his opinion only a suggestion that in view of conflicting decisions of the courts "it would

seem that the safe course for the Department would be to return to its original construction"; but after quoting the conflicting opinions of judges, the Attorney-General says, in the most positive language: "In direct answer to your second inquiry, I am therefore of opinion that the road is entitled to indemnity, provided the lands can be found within the proper limits, for the lands which it may have lost by reason of the fact that lands within the granted limits were sold or preëmpted *previously or subsequently* to the date of the grant." And then the opinion concludes in these words: "In view of the interest manifested in the question by you, and on account of their relation to other railroads than the one immediately concerned, I have felt it my duty fully to hear arguments of all other parties who have deemed that rights might be affected by any opinion which should be given in the present case."

Do you find it still a little remarkable that I should have asked for a legal opinion in this matter, or that, when it had been given with such positiveness and so unusually solemn an assurance of careful consideration, I should have deemed it my duty to follow it? If you do, you will have to find it "still more remarkable" that, subsequently, Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court, in the case of *Barney vs. Winona, and St. Peter Railroad Company vs. McCrarys* (Report 421), decided, United States District Judge Nelson concurring, as follows:

I am of opinion that, by the true construction of the act of Congress of March 3, 1857, granting lands to the territory of Minnesota, the indemnity clause was intended to include alternate sections within the prescribed limit which had been sold by the United States or lost by preëmption *prior to the date of the grant, as well as such as might be sold between that time and the location of the road*. And without further comment on the cases of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Gal-

veston Railroad Company *vs.* the United States, and the Burlington and Missouri Railroad Company *vs.* the United States, *I do not believe the Court in those cases intended to establish a different doctrine.*

This is as direct and strong an endorsement of Attorney-General Devens's opinion as can possibly be imagined. Justice Miller, who is certainly a member in good standing of the legal profession, if he "chanced to read" that opinion, evidently was not "surprised" at it but simply agreed with it; and so he tells me that I was mistaken as to the import of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston decision in giving the instructions above quoted, and that the Attorney-General was right in overruling them, and that you are very wide of the mark in anticipating a unanimous verdict of the legal profession against the latter.

And this case, in which the Interior Department had to yield to legal authority, which it did very reluctantly, is the identical case which you in your article call a "shameful prostitution of the Land department."

However, even this flight of fanciful eloquence does not fill the measure of your ambition. You go on to say (page 248):

But the most remarkable fact remains to be stated. The Land department having procured the opinion of the Attorney-General justifying this wholesale plunder of the public domain is still not satisfied. The opinion, it should be remembered, follows the decision of the Supreme Court as to the specific case of reserved lands. It admits that for them no indemnity can be allowed. But the Department disregards this opinion in the interest of the railroads when it becomes an obstacle to their purposes. I understand that the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé road has been allowed an illegal excess of indemnity for lands reserved at the date of its grant, amounting to about 800,000 acres, according to the principle

affirmed in the case of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad against the United States. Of the excess more than 400,000 acres have been awarded contrary to the opinion of the Attorney-General and since it was given.

This is, indeed, "the most remarkable fact," to be stated; for he who inquires at the Interior Department will learn that, while Attorney-General Devens's opinion was given in 1880, and granted lands were patented the same year, the last approval of indemnity land to the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad was made on April 13, 1875, two years before he became Attorney-General, and I, Secretary of the Interior. There is evidently a limit to the "shameful prostitution of the Land department," but there seems to be none to the cool, unblushing and elaborate audacity of your misrepresentations.

I should stop here were not this letter intended for the public as well as for yourself. To the public a word should be said about your general allegation that the Interior Department almost invariably decided in favor of the railroad companies and against the settlers. When you wrote this you had before your eyes the testimony of the chief of the railroad division of the General Land Office given before a Senate committee. In reply to a question concerning the general drift of decisions, he said:

I find on examination that during the year ended December 31, 1881, there was final action pursuant to office and Department decisions in about 824 cases between settlers and companies, in about 635 of which cases the land in controversy was finally awarded to the settlers, and their filings or entries allowed or permitted to stand awaiting completion, or approved for patenting; and in about 189 cases the land was awarded to the companies, and the filings or entries of the settlers cancelled. In addition, some 227 applications to file or enter land within the limits of grants and reserved therefor were finally rejected.

Part of the year referred to was within the term of my administration, and all, or almost all, of the decisions made were under the rules and principles sustained or established during that period. I have no doubt that the record of the other years of my administrative term will, on examination, turn out to be about the same.

One point more remains to be touched. If you had intended to be in the least degree truthful and fair in the presentation of the spirit governing my administration of the Interior Department, you would, together with the acts which you thought to be in favor of the railroads, have mentioned at least some of my decisions and rulings adverse to them. It would not have been necessary to go into elaborate detail; but from the many rulings, instructions and decisions you would have felt in honor bound to point out at least one which was of peculiar interest and attracted much attention. It was my decision of July 23, 1878, in the case of Nelson Dudymott on his appeal from a decision of the General Land Office. I ruled that when the act making a grant of land to a railroad company provided that all the lands so granted "which shall not be sold or disposed of by said company within three years after the entire road shall have been completed, shall be subject to settlement and preëmption like other lands, at a price not exceeding \$1.25 per acre to be paid to the company." This provision meant that all lands not actually sold by the company three years after the completion of the road should be thrown open to settlement under the preëmption law; and I forthwith directed the Commissioners of the General Land Office to instruct the local land officers accordingly. This was done. The decision covered six of the land-grant roads completed more than three years—the Union Pacific, the Kansas Pacific, the Denver Pacific, the Sioux City and Pacific, the Central Pacific and the Western Pacific.

It turned over to the settlers under the preëmption law, at the "Government price," a great many more millions of acres than were ever covered by any decision or ruling concerning indemnity. For this act you had no memory. In the result of it you are personally concerned. The railroad corporations rushed at me with urgent applications for a reconsideration of the decision and a suspension of the instructions. I refused to suspend the instructions; and in a review of the decision on September 3, 1878, I reaffirmed it. The corporations then went before the courts, and the Supreme Court finally decided that, under the loose wording of the granting acts, the covering of the granted lands with a mortgage, which the companies had done as soon as they availed themselves of the granting act, was a "disposition" of them within the meaning of the law. Thus my decision was overruled, and I may say this was the keenest disappointment I suffered while I was at the head of the Interior Department.

Who was responsible for that loose wording of the law which brought forth this decision of the Supreme Court, and deprived the settlers of their preëmption right to untold millions of acres? When these granting acts were passed you were a member of the National House of Representatives, and also a member of the Committee on Public Lands. The larger part of the time you were chairman of that committee. You posed as the champion of the homestead law and as the protector of the settlers' rights and interests. They were given into your official care. If there was a man in Congress who should have considered it his solemn and especial duty to see to it that in all these granting measures the settlers' rights and interests be jealously guarded, and that no loose and equivocal language creep in that might be interpreted to their injury, you were that man; and yet you sat there and

voted for all these acts, whenever you voted at all, without a single word of remonstrance or even of inquiry. Indeed, almost all the other practices which you now complain of as abuses existed when you were the chairman of the committee whose principal duty it was to investigate them and to provide a remedy. You failed to do so.

And now you do not blush to pursue, with wanton and malignant falsehoods men whose office it became at a later time—an office sometimes performed with great regret—to execute the laws which, in great part at least, through your neglect of duty, have become what they are.

FROM EX-PRESIDENT HAYES

SPIEGEL GROVE, March 20, 1883.

Your reply to Julian is capital. I read it to Mrs. Hayes. You know there is a warlike side to her sympathetic nature. She was delighted with it. Brother Julian is a censorious old dog—sour and malignant. He was once too near to success ever to forgive those who passed him in the race. Your famous speeches in the anti-slavery conflict were no doubt a great offense to him, but when you added to that triumph a signal example of efficiency in the Executive Department with which he was most familiar, you were guilty of a personal affront which stirred his bile beyond control. You are square with him now. He will not forgive you. You will hear from him again.¹ Thanks for your attention to the von Holst matter.

FROM THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON

CAMBRIDGE, April 5, 1883.

A Washington correspondent of the New York *Tribune* writing of the condition of the Departments says of the Women

¹On May 6, 1883, Hayes wrote: "I knew Julian would come back at you. He is fond of controversy."

there employed, "ill-health and physical weakness cause a high average of absences among them, which interfere with the regular work." I should be very glad, if you are willing to give it, of a brief answer, from recollection, to these two questions:

1. Is there a higher average of absence among the women so employed?

2. Is not any loss through physical weakness, as compared with men clerks, balanced by gain in the steadier habits of women in other ways? I had supposed so.

I only ask for a very brief answer and should like to use it publicly.

The inference drawn by the *Tribune* writer (April 1, 1883) is that the proportion of women "will have to be diminished." (I think the writer is a male clerk.)

TO THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON

The Evening Post, 210 BROADWAY,
NEW YORK, April 6, 1883.

According to my experience the correspondent of the *Tribune* is substantially right. I have no statistics at my disposal at present, but have frequently had occasion to observe the fact in question.

Neither can I say that "the loss through physical weakness as compared with male clerks is balanced by gain in the steadier habits of female clerks in other ways." It is, I think, the experience of the Departments that the average is on the whole more favorable on the side of the male clerks. Many female clerks, perhaps a large majority of them, do excellent work. But there are some, not quite inconsiderable in number, who are irregular, pretentious, wayward and impatient of discipline, and they run down the general average.

TO B. B. CAHOON

NEW YORK, April 11, 1883.

Let me thank you for your kind letter of March 26th. I should have answered it much more promptly had I not been somewhat overcrowded with work. So you think Mr. Julian was completely answered? I have been attacked and vilified a good deal. But nobody ever did it so clumsily as Mr. Julian. He deserved what he got. But I have had one great satisfaction on this occasion. I spent a few days at Washington and went over my decisions and records with some of my old officers in the Interior Department to see whether there were any vulnerable points in my administration. We did this as impartially as we could, and I am happy to say, while mistakes had been made in small things as will always be the case, we did not find anything of importance that would not stand the most searching investigation and criticism. And that, I think, is the judgment of my successors. It is the kind of record I want to leave to my children.

What you say about the two old parties and about the tariff is perfectly true. But it is in my opinion by no means certain that the tariff question will be much of an issue in the next Presidential campaign. It would be if the Democrats had courage enough to tackle it at the next session of Congress. But whether they will have that courage is very doubtful. I shall not be surprised if one of the free-trade Democrats should bring in a bill with a great flourish of trumpets to have it quietly smothered by his party friends. Such things have been seen before, and the Democratic party may be foolish enough to try it again. It is easy to see that if they let the next session pass without doing anything, their position on that question will be very weak and unmeaning.

On the whole, however, I think we are gaining as to the general character of our political life. The reform movement has won some important positions and the ear of the people. There will be a rearrangement of parties, probably, in a very few years. But it is difficult to say upon what dividing question it will take place. Meanwhile, we must watch and do the best we can.

TO GEORGE W. JULIAN

NEW YORK, May 9, 1883.

Sir: The public letter you recently addressed to me is in point of argument so wild and absurd that it appears more like a joke than a serious thing. It seems you desire it to be treated as the latter. A rapid analysis will expose its folly.

You accuse me of having devised some devilish machinery for conveying to railroad companies lands which do not belong to them. To this end you attack a decision of mine in the case of *Brown vs. the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company*. In that decision I recognized that company as entitled to certain lands, showing that the title of the company through the State had already been affirmed by the United States Circuit Court for the eighth circuit thus: "The tract in question was within the terms of the act of 1856, and when it was selected and the selection certified by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the title became perfect in the State. Every act had then been performed to make the title of the State complete." (*Duray vs. Hallenbeck*.) I showed further that the matter had also been passed upon by my predecessor, Mr. Chandler, in the same sense, in the case of *Bell vs. the Chicago, Rock Island and*

Pacific Railroad Company, in which decision he said with regard to the certification of the lands:

The line of the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad Company (of which the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company is the successor) was definitely located prior to March 3, 1857, and upon the application of an agent of the State of Iowa, appointed by the governor of said State, the lands in question were on December 27, 1857, duly certified to the State for the benefit of said company. If there had been any irregularities in the selection and certification of these lands to the State and the granting of them by the State to the company, these were waived and all prior acts treated as valid.

In my decision I thereupon disclaimed jurisdiction over the lands, for the following reasons: "1. These lands were certified to the State by my predecessors, and their acts are final and conclusive and binding upon me as their successor. (*United States vs. Bank of the Metropolis*, 15 Peters; two Attorney-Generals' opinions, p. 9, *id.* 464, etc.) 2. The certification of these lands invested the State with a complete legal title to the same (*Duray vs. Hallenbeck*), which was in all respects equivalent to patents."

This is the devilish contrivance of mine to give to a railroad what did not belong to it. In my first letter I showed that the conveyance of lands by certified list is provided for by general statute, as it is also specially provided for by many of the granting acts. In an act amendatory of the granting act here in question it is spoken of as a matter of course.

What, then, is the trouble here? You say that in this case the certification was all wrong and worth nothing. Why? Because—I quote your own language—"the grant is *in præsenti*, and the title passed to all the lands in it by

the grant itself." Was not the road entitled to the lands in question? You affirm yourself that it was. You say expressly: "There is thus no controversy whatever about your action in recognizing as valid the certified lists referred to." And "the certified lists referred to" were the only ones contemplated in my decision. The only trouble, in your own words, is "that the Act of 1856 does convey the fee simple title of the lands in dispute, and, therefore, that the lists which pretend to convey them are perfectly null and void." And yet, "there is no controversy whatever about my action in recognizing as valid the certified lists referred to." Your logic is too deep for this world. In the same breath you affirm that by my decision no land was given to the railroad to which it was not entitled, that I had concocted a devilish scheme to give to the road what did not belong to it by recognizing the lists certified to by my predecessors and that I did right "in recognizing as valid the certified lists referred to." A man grown so blind in his fury as to box his own ears is always a ludicrous spectacle.

I might leave this matter here on your own showing, but will add for your information that certified lists have their use even when a land grant is made *in presenti*. The grant usually refers to so and so many sections of land on each side of the road. The certified lists specify the sections and identify them by numbers according to the survey, and thus they become evidence of title attaching to specific tracts. It is in this sense that the Act of 1854 providing for conveyance of title by certified list applies to grants *in presenti* like the one in question. The issue of specified lists is therefore not only a general practice, but a necessity where patents are not specially provided for or where the tracts granted are not specifically identified in the granting act. This disposes of one-half of your letter.

Your next charge is equally portentous. It is that I committed the crime of asking the Attorney-General for legal advice in a case on which the Attorney-General's opinion did not agree with your own. This accusation is sufficiently preposterous in itself but the circumstances of the case serve to show its venom. In 1875 Justice Davis, of the Supreme Court, delivered in the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad case, an opinion which could be interpreted as restricting in a certain way the right of land-grant railroads to indemnity lands. My predecessor, Mr. Chandler, did not so construe it, but maintained the old regulations more favorable to the railroads. So I found them when I came into office in 1877. Being determined to concede to the corporation nothing but what, under a strict construction of the law, they were entitled to, I adopted the interpretation of Judge Davis's decision most unfavorable to the railroads, and changed the regulations governing the action of the Land Office, accordingly. After these new regulations had been in operation a considerable time, questions arose before the Department as to their correctness in point of law. As is customary and proper, and as every conscientious executive officer will do, I submitted the matter to the Attorney-General for legal advice. After hearing full argument the Attorney-General ruled in the clearest and most emphatic terms, that my interpretation of the Davis decision was wrong, and that, as to the point at issue, I had to return to the rule laid down and observed by my predecessors. This I did, not hastily and joyfully, as you falsely assert, but reluctantly; for the Attorney-General's opinion was given on June 5, 1880, and I changed the instructions to the Land Office accordingly on October 16, 1880, more than four months afterward. And this you call criminal eagerness on my part to serve the railroads.

Every sane man, looking at these undeniable facts, will naturally conclude that had I wanted to favor the corporations, I should simply have permitted the rules governing the Land Office to stand as they had always stood, and as my predecessor, Mr. Chandler, had maintained them for nearly two years after the decision in the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston case. This is clear. If there is any fault to be found with me at all, it might be, not that I favored the corporations, but that, instead of changing my ruling unfavorable to their interests promptly after the authoritative opinion of the Attorney-General, I did it reluctantly and hesitatingly, waiting more than four months. After all this, to accuse me of undue eagerness to serve the railroads is madness or malice. Take your choice.

The same applies to what you say of a subsequent decision of Justice Miller, in which that eminent Judge clearly and emphatically indorses the opinion of Attorney-General Devens. You argue that Justice Miller, if he did not agree with the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston decision, should have entered a dissenting opinion when the decision was rendered. But Justice Miller did not say at all that he disagreed with it. What he did say was that, in his opinion, the Court did not in that decision "intend to establish a different doctrine" from that which had prevailed before; in other words, he decided that your interpretation of that and other similar decisions was wrong, and that the construction put upon them by Attorney-General Devens was right. What sane man will call that inconsistency?

Your third point against me was that the Interior Department under my administration "disregarded even this opinion of the Attorney-General in the interests of the railroads when it became an obstacle to their purposes," by awarding four hundred thousand acres of *indemnity*

lands to the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad, "contrary to the opinion of the Attorney-General and since it was given." I thereupon showed that "while Attorney-General Devens's opinion was given in 1880, and granted lands were patented the same year, the last approval of indemnity lands (the only kind of lands referred to in the opinion) to the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad was made on April 13, 1875, two years before he became Attorney-General and I, Secretary of the Interior." You had to admit that your charge was false. The difference between awarding, contrary to the opinion of the Attorney-General, indemnity lands not granted, on the one hand, and the patenting of granted lands on the other, is simply the difference between allowing the road what was not due to it, in the one case, and allowing it what was due to it in the other. The former I did not; the latter I did. And if it should be found, as you say it may, that during some period in the past the road had received lands in excess, then the Land Office, in the adjustment of the grant, will take the proper steps to rectify the mistake, a thing which was done during my administration, repeatedly, in similar cases. But your charge that I favored the railroad to the prejudice of the United States is just as false and absurd in its second form as it was in the first.

But more. Your general allegation that the Interior Department almost invariably decided in favor of the railroads and against the settlers, I confuted by quoting the sworn testimony of the chief of the railroad division of the General Land Office, that in one year, when the rulings and principles established and sustained during my administration were in force, of the office and Department decisions in 824 cases, in 635 the land in controversy was finally awarded to the settlers, and in 189 to the railroads. What now? The only escape you find is in saying that

your general allegation "related to the general administration of the Land department during a long series of years." And you significantly add: "If you made any such decisions (adverse to the railroads) I had nothing to do with them; my task was to show that for nearly a third of a century the Land department to a very great extent has been the servant of the railways and not the people." This is a highly characteristic admission. It was, then, not your "task" to speak the truth, but to make a case by suppressing the truth. When a decision was made in favor of a railroad, no matter whether it was ever so just, you adduce it as proof that the railroads controlled the Land department. When three times as many decisions were made in favor of the settlers against the railroads you had "nothing to do with them." This kind of suppression of the truth is a simple falsification of facts. Your self-imposed "task" was, therefore, that of a falsifier, convicted as such by your own statement.

The same recklessness appears in your assertion that five or six of the Department decisions under my administration have been overruled by my successors. I have inquired into that matter, and am informed by very competent authority that this is true only of one, the decision in the Gates case. This would demonstrate the rather remarkable fact that, although I have been out of office for two years, but one of the hundreds of decisions made during the four years of my administration has by my successor been set aside. I might almost thank you for the opportunity you give me of showing an infallibility on my part and that of my legal advisers which I should have hesitated to claim. The same might be said if there were six such cases instead of one.

But, to tell the exact truth, I have been overruled in two other instances: once when I had issued instructions to the General Land Office restricting the claims of the railroads

to indemnity lands, the same instructions spoken of above; and then when I decided that the unsold lands of six land-grant railroads should be thrown open to settlement at the Government price. In the first case I was overruled by the Attorney-General, whose opinion was subsequently indorsed by Justice Miller's decision, and in the second case I was overruled by the Supreme Court. In both cases I had set aside the policy sustained by my predecessors, and in both cases superior authority ruled that I had gone beyond the intent of the law, not in favor of, but against the interests of the railroads. When, in my first letter to you, I mentioned that second decision of mine which threw open to the settler many millions of acres—indeed, so vast a quantity of land that all the land involved in the indemnity controversies about which you throw up so much dust appears as a miserable pittance in comparison to it—your genius rose to its most brilliant effort to make out that even in this case I was governed by railroad influence. You called my whole proceeding “clap-trap,” and then arraigned me as a traitor to the interests of the American people—for what? For submitting to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which affirmed that the lands in question, although unsold, were “disposed of” by mortgages, and could therefore not be thrown open to settlement as I had directed, thus setting aside my ruling point-blank, in the clearest language, without the remotest possibility of a question as to its meaning. Your accusation in this case is so unique that it can not be explained by any ordinary mental process. One might be inclined to feel your pulse, were there not another explanation. But there is.

I showed in my first letter that in this case the railroads concerned were saved by the loose wording of the granting acts, and that these acts were framed and passed when you were a member of the House of Representatives and a

leading man in the Committee on Public Lands, for the larger part of the time even its chairman. It was your special duty to watch this kind of legislation with untiring vigilance to protect the interests of the settlers. I showed that you voted for all these large land grants, whenever you voted at all, without a word of remonstrance, and that, while almost all the other practices you now complain of as abuses existed or grew up during that period, you never exerted your influence to check or remedy them. The loose language of the acts upon which the decision of the Supreme Court above referred to was based, elicited not a whisper from the leader of the Committee on Public Lands, the spokesman of the settler. If you could not prevent their adoption, you could at least protest against their objectionable or ambiguous clauses. But your voice was silent, and you simply voted "aye." Your record in the Congressional *Globe* convicts you.

It is a fact known to every well-informed man that the mischievous results of the land-grant system have sprung from the reckless provisions of the granting acts, and not from the faithlessness of those who had to administer the laws as they stood. As one of the makers of those laws, and especially as the one man whose special business it was to watch and scrutinize them in behalf of the settlers, you can not escape your responsibility. The public records prove your failure in that duty. There is not a man in the land from whom false accusations against an executive officer would come with a worse grace than from you.

But that was not your only failure. Worse remains behind. At the close of your letter you address me in the following tremendous language: "It seems utterly incredible that you presided over the great home Department of the Government for four years; and the fact that the country has survived your administration is a fresh

illustration of the power of republican institutions to withstand the most deadly assaults." A dreadful state of things indeed! There was a Secretary of the Interior so unscrupulous as to recognize as valid certified lists about which "there is no controversy"; a Secretary who did not blush to ask the Attorney-General for legal advice and to follow it; who dared to permit granted lands to be patented, and who, after having tried to wrest many millions of acres from the railroad corporations, had the audacity to bow to an overruling decision of the Supreme Court. That our republican institutions should have endured such a strain is indeed almost incredible. But the danger of the situation was vastly aggravated by the singular circumstance that the whole American people witnessed these open and notorious proceedings without alarm. Only one man saw through it all, and you were that man. What did you do? When all these terrible things were going on, did we hear the blast of your bugle-horn summoning all friends of the imperiled Republic to the rescue? No. Where were you, then, at that awful crisis?

Alas, you were otherwise engaged. You were then going round among the railroad kings offering them your talents for a consideration. And only when the railroad kings failed to purchase your services, you became conscious of your own exceeding virtue and the total depravity of everybody else.

This revelation, however, is not surprising. You had already unmasked yourself before. Had you been sincere you would have been content to speak the truth. Instead of reviling with ridiculous charges a man who in official station had proved more dutiful than you, you would have fairly recognized my earnest endeavor to reduce the allowances of the corporations to the narrowest limit under the law. But it seems to be the uncontrollable

propensity of hypocrites to overdo what they attempt. Even before the evidence was all in you convicted yourself by the virulent extravagance of your pretended zeal.

Here I take leave of you. As you now stand before the public I shall pass over without notice what you may still be moved to say.

FROM JOHN A. LOGAN

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28, 1884.

Confidential.

My dear Sir: Is there any good reason why my old friend, the Hon. Carl Schurz, should not be a friend just now, and help

Yours truly,
JOHN A. LOGAN.

Hon. C. SCHURZ,
NEW YORK.

This is the only letter I have written to any one, save in reply to those written me.

TO JOHN A. LOGAN

NEW YORK, Feb. 29, 1884.

My dear General: Your kind note reached me last night. Were I not personally friendly to you, I should answer in ambiguous phrase signifying nothing. But as a friend I speak to you with that frankness which is authorized by the confidence you show me in your letter.

I think you are doing yourself harm by permitting your name to go before the Chicago Convention. No man is benefited by failure in such an enterprise, and it is my candid opinion that you are bound to fail. New York will be the pivotal State in the coming election and I do not

believe you can carry it because on two points your record is against you. There is probably no State in which the civil service reform sentiment is stronger on account of the wide-spread dissatisfaction here with machine politics, and unfortunately you are counted rather among the friends of the old system. And, secondly, this being the financial center of the country, people here are very sensitive with regard to our financial policy. This sensitiveness is likely to be greater now than it has been since the restoration of specie payments, for the reason that very dangerous consequences are apprehended from the accumulation and the continued coinage of silver dollars. In this respect your record on the specie payment question would be fatal to you in this part of the country.

Moreover, it seems to me impossible that you should get the nomination, for another reason. To judge from what I see and hear, and from the expressions of sentiment which float through the press, there is in the Republican ranks an almost unanimous voice in favor of nominating Lincoln for the Vice-Presidency. This, of course, will preclude your nomination.

I know, my dear General, that, as you are now situated, many who want to appear as your friends will not tell you the truth, and that you will be tempted not to regard the telling of the truth, if it is unwelcome, as a sign of friendly feeling. I sincerely wish all bitterness of experience may be spared you in finding out which kind of friendship is the best. I should not have said to you what I have, did I not candidly and firmly believe that these things are true, and that it is the duty of an old friend to be perfectly frank, for the man who dissuades you from exposing yourself to a certain and grievous disappointment does you a real service.

TO W. G. SHERMAN

45 EAST 68TH ST., NEW YORK,
March 1, 1884.

Let me say in reply to your letter of February 25th, that you entirely misconstrue what I said at Brooklyn¹ if you set me down as an "apologist of violent methods" such as are used here and there in the South. On the contrary, I abhor them as I abhor every crime, and as much as you abhor them. But the question how that condition of things can be changed for the better, is not one of mere sentiment. And when you say that this matter must be put forward by the Republican party as a political issue on the ground that things have not improved in the South since the war,—that on the contrary, they have grown worse,—you expose yourself, as I pointed out at Brooklyn, to the fatal reply that, as the Republican party has accomplished no improvement during the nineteen years it has been in power since the close of the war, it is useless to ask again for the same thing that has proved itself so ineffective, and that it is time to try some other kind of remedy. It is evident that upon such an issue the Republican party can not rely for success.

My opinion is that a very considerable improvement has taken place in the South at large since 1865 (although in some localities the state of things is still very bad), and that, while the Government should exert the power the Constitution gives it for the protection of citizens in the exercise of their rights, a complete remedy, if there is one, will be found only in the economic regeneration of the South and in the division of the colored vote as well as the white between different political parties.²

¹ At a banquet, Feb. 22d, where independent Republicans gave notice that they would oppose any candidate with an objectionable record. See Schurz to Storey, Nov. 1, 1891.

² This letter was sent to the St. Louis address given on the letter to

TO GUSTAV SCHWAB

45 EAST 68TH ST., NEW YORK,
March 21, 1884.¹

My dear Mr. Schwab: I saw the *Tribune* only late this afternoon, and found in it a statement that some of my friends were engaged in raising a fund of \$100,000 to be presented to me. Upon further inquiry I learned that you are the treasurer of a committee organized for that purpose, and that a very considerable part of the sum named is already available. Let me confess to you that this matter is very embarrassing to me, not as though I were in doubt as to the general line of conduct to follow, but because I should be exceedingly sorry, in obeying my impulse, to do anything that might in the least be liable to be interpreted as a want of appreciation on my part of the generous motives of my friends who prepared this valuable surprise for me. Let me assure you that I esteem it a great honor to have such friends, and that I am proud of being thought by them deserving of such rewards. Nobody can appreciate this more than I do. At the same time I feel as if, while I am able to work, I could not accept such sums of money without giving a proper equivalent for them. This may be a mere matter

which it was an answer. A few days later it was returned with the following note from General Sherman:

"912 GARRISON AVE., ST. LOUIS, March 5, 1884.

"Dear General: The similarity of names resulted in the carrier delivering this letter. I don't know such a person as W. G. S——, and as his name is not in the directory, I think it best to send back the letter, with the opinion that if such a person exists he is hardly worth your time or notice.

"W. T. SHERMAN."

¹ The original was in German. Probably the translation that was soon printed in the New York newspapers, to explain the status to the contributors, was made by Mr. Schurz.

of feeling, but as such it is of great importance to the person concerned. To this feeling I should have given decided expression had I been consulted when this enterprise was begun. I consider it, therefore, proper, before any formal presentation is made to me, to ask, through you, my friends to forgive me if, with the highest possible appreciation of their generous sentiments, I feel obliged to decline in advance this valuable sign of their friendship and esteem, so that no further steps be taken; and I wish to say further that I shall be indebted to you, dear Mr. Schwab, if you will kindly return to the respective contributors the various sums paid into this fund. I am, cordially and gratefully, your friend,

C. SCHURZ.

TO SIMON WOLF

NEW YORK, March 22, 1884.

I have received your letter by which your committee invite me to attend a meeting of citizens of Washington on the 24th inst.; or, if this be incompatible with my engagements, to state in writing such views as may occur to me with regard to the platform communicated to me together with the invitation.

Not being able to be present at the meeting, I wish to say here that most of the general propositions set forth in the platform appear to me to be self-evident; and as to their recognition, every candid observer will testify that public sentiment has made great progress in our day, although that progress may have been interrupted now and then by temporary agitation. A great many of us remember the time when "Sunday laws abridging religious liberty" did not only prevent the working classes from enjoying the public libraries, museums etc., but where, in a great many places, they absolutely interrupted

the ordinary modes of communication, such as railroads and street cars, not to speak of other restrictions of a similar character. When we compare in this respect the opinions generally existing thirty years ago with those existing now, we cannot fail to observe that there has been a very marked change. Recently we witnessed in this city some evidences of that change in the opening on Sunday of an art exhibition, and the holding of Sunday concerts for working people. This was accomplished virtually without any struggle, and the result has gone far to disarm adverse impressions and even to win the approval of formerly opposing elements. It appears to me certain that the advance of enlightened liberality in these things will inevitably become more general and cannot permanently be turned backward; and it is worthy of note that this advance has so far effected itself without very strong organized efforts to force it. I have no doubt it will be so in the future. The progress of that liberality will be all the more rapid, the more clearly it appears that its results are really redounding to the mental and moral elevation, and to the happiness of the people.

As to prohibition, it is, aside from the question of principle, a matter of experience that wherever it has, on a large scale, been tried, it has failed; that is to say, instead of accomplishing its professed object, namely, to improve popular morals by rooting out the vice of intemperance, it has simply served to impair the respect for law generally, and to produce in that way demoralizing effects. That intemperance is indeed a great evil no candid man can fail to acknowledge; but that evil cannot be exterminated by measures prohibiting indulgences in themselves not vicious, thus encroaching upon the domains of personal rights.

It can be, and it has clearly in a great measure been, reached effectively by the moral agencies at the disposal

of society. This, of course, is not meant to exclude just and proper license regulations.

As to the necessity of protecting the public school system against sectarian control and of distributing the burdens of taxation "equally," the general principles will be readily subscribed to by a very large majority of the American people, although the second postulate, equal taxation, will be subject to very different interpretations when such things as tariff duties are discussed.

FROM P. B. PLUMB

SENATE CHAMBER, WASHINGTON, May 6, 1884.

Four years ago you named to me five persons either of whom you said could be elected if nominated by the Republicans. Three of them were Windom, Harrison, Sherman—the others I do not recall.

As I am a delegate to Chicago and consequently burdened with the responsibility of a choice, I am desirous of such exchange of opinion as will enable me to see clearly. Kansas is for Blaine very strongly—but willing to accept any one else whose election would be more certain. We want success.

Naturally we think of New York, and wish to be sure of carrying it. It is essential to Republican success—and there is the usual contrariety of opinion as to who is strongest for that purpose. Can you enlighten me?

While I do not go to the extent you do in some directions, I am in accord with your general ideas of fitness, and desire to aid in making a nomination which you and those like you can cordially support.

TO P. B. PLUMB

Private.

110 WEST 34TH ST., N. Y., May 12, 1884.

Your letter of the 6th inst. did not reach me until the 9th. I should have answered it at once had I not preferred to wait for some information from the interior of

the State which I expected, and which I have in the meantime received.

New York must be considered a doubtful State. If the Democrats nominate a decent man, it will require not only a better candidate but also a united and strong effort on the part of the Republicans to carry it. There is an uncommonly large and influential independent element here whose interest is mainly centered on the administrative reform question. This element is apt to develop a strong campaigning force when its interest is well enlisted; it has in this respect on several occasions shown remarkable efficiency. It will, I think, rally to the support of any Republican candidate of unblemished character who may be counted upon to conduct the National Administration in accord with the reform idea. Of those who have of late been most prominently mentioned as possible Republican nominees, Edmunds would probably be the strongest here; but Gresham, Hawley, Lincoln and several others would, I have no doubt, run well.

The two candidates most spoken of, Blaine and Arthur, would here be the least acceptable. I know a great many people in this State as well as outside of it, and I speak advisedly when I express the opinion that Blaine cannot possibly carry New York. In some papers I see it stated that he would have the support of the Independents as much as anybody. Such opinions are simply absurd. He has, indeed, a good many enthusiastic friends who make much noise but are not nearly strong enough to give him the State; on the other hand, he will not only not have the united support of the Independents, but a very large portion of them will, in unison with a considerable number of hitherto faithful Republicans, actively oppose him. I see good reasons for apprehending that Blaine's nomination would be followed instantly by a break. I am advised by men who know the State thoroughly that in every one

of the 12,000 school districts there are some Republicans who quietly but firmly declare their determination under no circumstances to vote for Blaine. That their number is very large in this immediate vicinity I know from personal observation. This feeling in New York would scarcely remain without influence in Connecticut and New Jersey. I have reports from Massachusetts that Blaine would find it a desperate job to carry that State. It looks very much as if Blaine's nomination would mean disintegration and disaster from the very beginning.

Arthur stands much better. His Administration has in many respects given satisfaction; especially among the business men of this city he has many friends. But he has been so much mixed up with faction fights in New York politics and identified with a class of politicians who have made themselves so odious with a majority of the party, that he would lose a great many votes. The party support would, especially in the country districts, be languid, and the Independents would mostly treat the matter with indifference. This, of course, is not the way to carry New York under present circumstances. Moreover, there is serious doubt as to whether he could carry Ohio—this on account of the old Garfield feelings.

I write you this as the candid opinion of one who wants to see the Republican party succeed and hopes to be able to contribute his own efforts to that end, but who believes also that in order to succeed, it must deserve and invite success by a good and wise nomination.

FROM P. B. PLUMB

SENATE CHAMBER, WASHINGTON, May 25, 1884.

Private.

I duly received yours of 12th. I agree with you about New York being doubtful—but if we can nominate a candidate

who can carry Indiana, California, Nevada etc., we can get along without it. While I do not believe in precisely the kind of administrative reform you do, still I have no doubt that *any* Republican who may be elected will carry out the existing law, in obedience to his oath and to public sentiment. If Blaine is objectionable why would not Mr. Tilden, for instance, be equally objectionable? And to this complexion it will come at last according to present indications. I concur with you to the extent of saying that it is not wise to nominate either Blaine or Arthur—and yet I regard Blaine's nomination as very likely to happen. Who is to make headway against him? The only really strong man is Mr. Sherman (John), who is not yet really in the canvass. How would he do? The General is talked of—objections being that his wife's religion would offend many Presbyterians and Methodists. Gresham is a good man, but little known. Hawley is better, but from the East and from a small State. I confess the more I think of it the more the muddle grows. David Davis would be my solution, but he can't be nominated.

TO P. B. PLUMB

110 W. 34TH STR., NEW YORK, May 27, 1884.

Your note of the 25th has reached me. In my opinion any calculation according to which the Republican party can get along without New York in the Presidential election is very faulty, for the same causes which make certain candidates unavailable in this State will act with similar force in others. Moreover, the business troubles will have a decided influence upon the canvass. Do you think that after the developments that have taken place here, any Republican candidate whose record and character are not entirely above question will have any chance of success? It matters little who may be the nominee on the other side. You know very well that there are

thousands upon thousands of voters in the Republican ranks, upon whom party allegiance sits very lightly at present and whose criticism is always first directed against their own party. It is needless to discuss whether this should or should not be so, for it is a fact, and as a fact it must be taken into account. I look upon the coming election as very much in doubt generally, and as well-nigh hopeless with any candidate who is in any way objectionable.

I expect to be in Chicago during the Convention and hope to have the pleasure of meeting you there.

TO G. W. M. PITTMAN

NEW YORK, June 15, 1884.

Your kind letter of the 11th has reached me. I regret most sincerely that we do not agree as to supporting Mr. Blaine for the Presidency. Let me assure you it was by no means with a light heart that I declared myself against him. But I could not conscientiously do otherwise. The Republican party has been called the party of moral ideas. It once deserved that name. It has been regarded the world over as the guardian of our National honor and good-faith. We have now a question of political ethics to deal with in which the character of the Republican party is directly involved. There has been a good deal of demoralization and rottenness since the war, public and private, in politics and business. Of late, the crop of shame and disgrace has been rather abundant. And now the Republican party, the party of moral ideas, the standard-bearer of National honor, is the first one to declare worthy of the highest honors of the Republic a man who by his public record, by his own published correspondence, stands convicted of trading upon his high official position and

power for his own pecuniary advantage. It says to the youth of the country that such things may be done with public approval, and that men who do it may become Presidents of the United States if they are only "smart" enough to strike a popular fancy.

The Republican party that does this plants a seed which, if permitted to take root, will surely bear a terrible crop of demoralization and corruption. It is not the Republican party I have been serving. The best service which, as I think, can now be rendered to it and to the country, is to prevent that dreadful aberration from bringing forth its fatal fruit by making it manifest that a man with such a record may be nominated but cannot be elected. This is what, in my judgment, and I am glad to say in the judgment of many thousands of Republicans, the honor of the country and the safety of republican institutions demand, and if I, as a citizen, have any duty to perform, I conceive it to be in this direction.

There is, therefore, no prospect that we shall meet on the Blaine side. May I not hope that we may meet on the Anti-Blaine side before the end of the campaign?

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

110 W. 34TH ST., June 28, 1884.

We are together against Blaine and for honest government. I should be glad to see you in the Presidential chair on the 4th of March, 1885. If my vote could put you there, I should not hesitate a moment. If you are nominated, I shall work for your election to the best of my ability. I feel, therefore, that I can speak to you as a friend.

I have no right to meddle with the business of the Democratic party, but I know you will not consider it an in-

trusion if I give you my view of the situation. The revolt in the Republican party is at this moment very strong. But it would be a mistake to consider Blaine a weak candidate. He is weak in his own party, but he will have the support of the Irish dynamite faction, and the speculators and rascals will flock to him without distinction of previous condition. He will have a large campaign fund at his disposal. The Democratic candidate in order to beat him will, therefore, *need* the support of the Independent Republican vote to make up for desertions and to furnish the necessary majority. The Independent Republicans will undoubtedly cast a more than sufficient number of votes, if the character of the Democratic candidate be such as to overcome this disinclination to "vote for a Democrat." That disinclination still exists with many. If the Independent Republicans feel themselves compelled to nominate a "conscience ticket," and thereby to declare their distrust of the Democratic nominees, the whole movement will be so seriously crippled as to leave the result doubtful. Only in case they vote directly for the Democratic candidates, their votes thus counting double as against Blaine, will the result be certain.

There are only two possible Democratic candidates for whom that vote can be counted upon—you and Cleveland. The nomination of either of you would make success reasonably sure. Cleveland's enemies say that he cannot carry New York on account of the hostility of Tammany. This is nonsense. What Tammany's proclaimed hostility and friendship respectively effect has been seen in the cases of Tilden and of Hancock. The hostility of Tammany would very largely increase the Independent vote for Cleveland. I am sure he would carry the State by an immense majority. Your enemies say that you cannot be elected on account of your Dover speech. This is nonsense also. The Independent Republicans who have

revolted against Blaine understand that speech and do not care anything about it. What begins to tell more against you is the apparent friendship of Tammany. It would not be a good thing for you to appear as the club with which Tammany Hall killed Cleveland because he was too much of a reformer. At any rate, the nomination of either of you would reasonably insure success. The nomination of any other man would be apt seriously to discourage and weaken that Independent element whose vote is necessary to defeat Blaine.

I am sure it is as clear to you as it is to me, what a terrible calamity for the country Blaine's election would be. It is equally clear that if the Democratic party, under circumstances so unusually favorable, fails again, it will be eternally damned for incorrigible stupidity as well as want of patriotism. The coming election is therefore for it a matter of life or death.

As between you and Cleveland the "question of merit" is easily decided. Of course, your long and great career gives you the strongest title to the first place. If there is any other question it is that of availability. In that respect the difference between you would probably be slight, but between either of you and any other possible candidate it would be very great.

Naturally, you desire to be nominated, and you have my hearty wishes. But if it should turn out that you cannot be nominated, I take it for granted that you would desire the nomination of the man who, next to you, can command the support necessary to success; and that man is Cleveland. I take it that Cleveland wants to be nominated, but that in case that is impossible, he would desire the nomination of the other strongest man, and that would be you. These would be the natural sentiments of two patriotic men. Would it not be equally natural there should be an understanding between the

friends of these two patriotic men in the Convention, to the effect, that, as soon as it becomes reasonably clear that the one cannot be nominated, his forces go over to the other to secure his nomination, so that in any event the success of the common cause be safe? The expressed wish of the candidates would no doubt go very far to bring about such an understanding. It would probably be decisive.

I hope you will not charge me with unwarrantable meddlesomeness for making a suggestion like this. My excuse must be my profound anxiety that this Republic be spared the terrible disgrace of Blaine's election and the dangers of a Blaine Administration. There seems to be cause for serious alarm in the confusion of counsel of which the newspapers inform me.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 29, 1884.

I have just received your frank and friendly letter of yesterday and in the same spirit [I] respond to it.

I have often wondered how I became a candidate for Presidential nomination, for independent of other reasons I was not only not seeking it but often seeking other things inconsistent with it, such as following and declaring my real convictions on measures and policies contrary to the will or whim of my party.

However, so it is, and there are new contingencies out of which my nomination is possible if, indeed, it is not probable. That thoughtful and patriotic men should recoil from a Blaine-Logan Administration is natural enough, and that *you* should do so, I fully expected.

I am sure you know that I hold and shall treat all personal questions and ambitions as quite secondary to the chief object—a nomination by the Democratic Convention which shall justify the combination of all the opposing forces to Blaineism.

I do not believe you suspect me of any disposition to weaken the tendencies and forces which may lead to Governor Cleveland's nomination at Chicago. I am too grave about it to be effusive, but a fortnight ago when Dorsheimer, who has been and is on very friendly terms with me, told me of his desire to go to Saratoga and urge Cleveland's nomination, I lent him both hands and the fullest assurance of my content and best wishes for his success. It was then assumed by us both that Cleveland would have an absolute majority of the State delegation and under the unit rule would be presented as the choice of the combined Democrats of the Empire State. But now that plan appears to have been thwarted or weakened. The decided preference manifested for Cleveland by the Republican opposition to Blaine and Logan caused an effort to give him an appearance of a solid support in New York, which has resulted in embarrassment to Cleveland's especial supporters in his own party in New York.

Telegrams from New York insisting that the South and West should go solidly for him *because* New York was solid for him, and then, *e converso*—that New York should go for him *because* the *other* States were so, have undoubtedly created confusion in men's minds and given rise to doubts whether he has that strength at home which would enable him to carry New York.

I am annoyed by anything that tends to jeopard the great object I have in view, the defeat of the Republican party under Blaine's leadership. Do not suppose for a moment that I have lowered my ideals of duty or lost my sense of responsibility to our country or abated that pride and self-respect that restrain me from being an applicant for public favor.

In the New York papers and in many [other] sources [I] see accounts of Governor Cleveland's strength and then again the most decided expressions of opposition to him. We who live outside of New York cannot possibly comprehend the force and direction of the currents and countercurrents in the rather turbid pool of its politics, and I confess the study is not attractive to me.

I have wholly abstained from any participation or association with any of the local politicians, and among the few New Yorkers who are personally desirous of my political advancement and are my friends, Cleveland finds favor and no opposition. The banded "unions" which have been so fostered into political action of late, and the issues they seek to create between capital and labor, are dangerous to the welfare of all classes. I fully agree with you that at such a time Blaine is not a weak candidate before the masses of the people, and certain elements heretofore acting commonly with the Democratic party will be very apt to transfer their votes to a leader so likely to produce public confusion, which is the harvest-time of public plunderers.

My dear General, I am not [to] be a candidate by my own presentation, but should other causes make me one I shall be glad and grateful for your counsel and aid. The work ahead of us to regenerate and reform measures and methods of government, to raise its *tone and level* of administration will demand our best energies and *united* effort. I write offhand, but I hope transparently and satisfactorily and will be glad if you will write me again. Your words will always have the regard and respect which I [you] know I bear to you.

TO J. W. HOAG

NEW YORK, June 29, 1884.

Dear Sir: Your kind letter of the 25th inst. has reached me. We have not circulated any "documents" yet, giving elaborate reasons for our opposition to Blaine, but only a short protest for signature, which has already received a large number of names, all of Republicans who refuse to vote for the candidates nominated at Chicago. I enclose the heading of it, and I shall be glad to have your signature too, which I hope you will give upon a candid consideration of the case.

As you say you *know* that I was right in 1872, you will

permit me to tell you why I believe I am right now.¹ The greatest danger threatening our republican institutions is that deterioration of public morals which, although leaving their form for the time being intact, corrupt their substance. That demoralization will spread the more rapidly and thus become the more pernicious, the more it is tolerated by public opinion. This general proposition you will certainly not deny. But it is useless to accept it in theory if it is disregarded in practice.

The Republican Convention has nominated for the Presidency a man who, by his own published correspondence, stands convicted of having traded upon his high official position and power for his own pecuniary advantage. Of this the notorious "Mulligan letters" leave no doubt. By nominating such a man the Republican party, which once could justly call itself "the party of moral ideas," says to this and coming generations, that in its opinion such practices may not only be carried on with impunity, but that men who indulge in them may still be glorified with the highest honors and trusts of the Republic—may become Presidents of the United States. Have you considered what that means? It means the planting of a seed which, if permitted to grow, will bear a crop of demoralization and corruption hitherto scarcely dreamt of. It means the poisoning of the ambition of our American youth. It means the eventual destruction of republican government by rot and disgrace.

There is but one remedy. It may be demonstrated decisively and conclusively, that when a political party, whatever its name or past career, is reckless enough to nominate such a man, the American people may be

¹ Mr. Hoag's letter contained this sentence: "I followed your lead in 1872 and *knew* you were right. I think you are wrong now, but would be glad to see some of the reasons you give for taking the position you do."

counted upon to have moral spirit enough to defeat him. This is the only remedy that will be effective. I therefore consider the defeat of Mr. Blaine a moral necessity, and I deem it my sacred duty as a citizen of this Republic, who has its honor and its future at heart, to help [in] defeating him to the best of my ability. If, as you say, I was right in 1872, I feel profoundly that I am ten times more right now.

May I hope that you will sign your name to the enclosed protest?

FROM JOHN B. HENDERSON

St. Louis, Mo., July 1, 1884.

My dear General: I intended to call on you personally in New York, but I had only a few hours there, and those hours were occupied in my private business.

In Augusta, I saw Mr. Blaine and had a conversation with him in which he expressed regret—much regret—that you were indisposed to support him. Indeed your rumored opposition gives him more concern than that of any and all others.

It is now quite certain that not Governor Cleveland but that old political trickster, Tilden, will be nominated at Chicago. I know you cannot support him; and in case of his nomination I hope to see you and all our German friends arrayed against his methods and in condemnation of his political courses.

You know I am no stickler for regular nominations. I have not said and shall not say one word against that independence in politics that condemns bad conduct or bad methods in political action; but I do believe that if Blaine be elected, he will give us a good Administration. He can afford to rise above the shackles of party and he *will* do it. If he has been a Prince Hal in days gone by, when responsibility comes, he will be a Henry V. The Falstaffs that have followed him rather than thrift might come from fawning, will not be recog-

nized in shaping his policies nor be suffered to bring odium upon his Administration.

I expect to be in New York before the 25th inst., and I hope that you may be able to suspend all further movements on the political chessboard, till I can see you. To-morrow I will write frankly to Blaine, on several matters, and among them his feelings toward you, and also the methods of administration to be adhered to, should he be elected, and when I see you, I hope to be able to satisfy you in reference to his policy. I am so confident myself, that I am anxious to have my personal friends feel as I do.

Please write me, and, if possible, say you will take no further action till I see you.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

110 W. 34TH ST., July 2, 1884.

Many thanks for your kind letter of June 29th. I must confess that I am seriously alarmed at the prospective issue of your Convention. There is good reason for believing that Butler and John Kelly are working together, not only for the defeat of Cleveland but for the overthrow of every other candidate giving promise of good government. Kelly gave out some time ago that you were his favorite. I hope you never believed it. If you do, the bitterest disappointment is in store for you. I predict that the Butler-Kelly combination will only use your name to head off Cleveland and then drop you too as one of those "of whom it is very doubtful whether they can be elected." I read already of rumors about speeches having been discovered, made by you at the beginning of the war in the Delaware legislature, which are said to be "worse than the Dover speech," the new discoveries to be used against you in the Convention. If the Convention has not courage enough not only to emancipate itself

from the dictation and intrigues of Butler and Kelly, but to *defy them*, it will be in very great danger of doing not only a weak, but a disastrous thing.

I notice that Tammany has now put forward the "workingmen" to mask its own operations against Cleveland. The whole demonstration signifies only that a few corrupt politicians want to have their own way. The Independent vote will carry the State for Cleveland triumphantly, as it will for you. Of this I am honestly convinced, and I may say I am not ill advised as to the condition of things here.

There is no safety but in a friendly understanding and coöperation between your friends and Cleveland's. They have the same general objects in view and ought to act together, instead of being distracted by divided counsel, thus leaving the field to the intrigues of the common enemy. Two or three ballots, I should think, would determine clearly enough whether you or Cleveland can be nominated, and then there should be a concentration. Ought not this [to] be promptly arranged?

I repeat, if the Democrats fritter away their chances *this* time, when everything conspires to present them the finest opportunities, there will be no resurrection for them. While the final destruction of a party by its own imbecility might well be endured, it is dreadful to think of the almost irreparable detriment the Republic would meanwhile receive through Blaine's election.

TO JOHN B. HENDERSON

NEW YORK, July 5, 1884.

Yesterday I received your kind letter of the 1st inst. I shall, of course, always be glad to meet you as a friend and to talk with you about whatever it may be, includ-

ing the present campaign. You will, therefore, be very welcome when you come here. But in justice to you as well as to myself, I cannot have you under the impression as if there were any prospect of a change of attitude on my part with regard to Mr. Blaine's candidacy. Let me assure you, it is not a pleasant thing to me to embark in a movement of opposition to my party. I know too well what that implies, and I should not do it without necessity.

I cannot look upon Mr. Blaine as a mere jolly Prince Hal who has lived through his years of indiscretion and of whom the Presidency will certainly make a new man. Neither do I think that, even if something like such a change were possible, it would much lessen the evil effect which the mere fact of his election would inevitably produce.

A campaign like this is extremely distasteful to me. Some things yet unpublished have come to my knowledge which strongly confirm my opinion of Mr. Blaine. But the public record to which, in discussing his career and qualifications, I am disposed to confine myself, is bad enough—quite sufficiently so to determine my position.

I wish the whole thing were over and you and I could stand in the same line again.

TO HENRY CABOT LODGE

NEW YORK, July 12, 1884.

My dear Mr. Lodge: I have long resisted my impulse to write to you, but I can resist no longer, although what I am going to say may look like an intrusion. My excuse must be that you are one of the young men for whom I have a very warm feeling.

I learned some time ago that you had declared for Blaine, and now I find in the papers an announcement of a ratification meeting at which you are expected to speak. I

have no doubt you think, or at least you have persuaded yourself to think, that you are doing that which is best not only for yourself but for the country. Pardon me for entreating you to reëxamine carefully the reasons which have brought you to that conclusion, before you irretrievably commit yourself. You can scarcely fail to find that the question you have to deal with in determining your position is not a mere secondary point of policy upon which one might disagree with his party while at the same time voting the party ticket. It is this time one of those moral questions which touch the most vital spot in the working of our institutions. The election of Mr. Blaine to the Presidency will be a virtual indorsement of corrupt practices by the American people. It will establish a precedent teaching the growing generation and those coming after it, that a man may freely use his official power for private gain and still be considered by the American people worthy of the highest honors of the Republic. The crop of demoralization which will spring from such a seed, is incalculable. It may poison the whole future of the Republic.

To contribute to such a result or merely to the possibility of it is a thing which a man of your way of thinking can hardly feel easy about. I cannot think that you do and that you ever will. And such, I am sure, is the belief of those of your friends for whose confidence and esteem you have hitherto cared most. If you really do not feel quite certain that you are right you should consider the risk you are running,—a risk which you have perhaps not quite measured.

You will find all at once your position essentially changed. Those who have been your friends, the circle to which you naturally belong, will perhaps not loudly censure you. But you will soon begin to feel that your relations are no longer what they used to be. You will

presently miss that open confidence to which you had been accustomed. This will be the case especially if under these circumstances you accept a regular nomination for Congress. I beg of you to think this all out for yourself. You are a young man. You have the great advantage of affluent circumstances. You have the promise of an honorable and useful career before you. That promise will certainly not be damaged if you follow a noble impulse at the risk of temporarily compromising your party standing and of obscuring the prospect of immediate preferment. A young public man rather strengthens himself in the esteem of those whose esteem is most valuable, even when they do not wholly agree with him, by an act of obedience to his best impulses, which at the same time is manifestly an act of unselfishness. A standing thus achieved is the moral basis of a career such as you would choose for yourself and as your most desirable friends will be proud to aid you in accomplishing.

But that promise may be fatally damaged in another way. The course you are in danger of following, as it takes you out of the fellowship of those with whom so far you have been bound together in sympathy and confidence, will unite you more and more in fellowship with the opposite element, the ordinary party politicians. The more you try to satisfy them, the less will you satisfy yourself. The result will be a disappointment all the more bitter as you then will see reason to reproach yourself for not having done the right thing, which was also the natural thing, at the decisive moment.

Believe an old and experienced friend, my dear Mr. Lodge, who tells you that you cannot afford to take the regular Republican nomination for Congress this autumn. You cannot afford to do it as a matter of ordinary prudence, were you ever so firmly convinced of being right with regard to the Presidential ticket. A young man may

commit an impulsive indiscretion with impunity. But if he brings upon himself the suspicion, however unjust it may be, of stifling on an important occasion his best impulses for the purpose of getting quickly into place, the taint will stick to him as long as the companions of his young days live. He may never get rid of it. To avert it is worth a sacrifice.

I know I have sometimes spoken to you approvingly of your efforts to identify yourself with the "regular organization" and thus to make your way up. I should not object to unimportant concessions of points of policy to that end. But there is a moral limit to those concessions, and in this case I am strongly convinced that this limit is reached.

Will you pardon my frankness in saying all this to you? I should not have ventured to do it, in fact I should not have taken the trouble of doing it, were not my feelings for you warm and sincere. This being so, I should have reproached myself with an unperformed duty had I not made this attempt to warn you of what I conceive to be a great danger to your future career. It is certainly not too late to turn back. If you do it, do it promptly, straightforwardly and boldly.

I do not want to think of our speaking on different sides when I go to Massachusetts in this campaign.

Believe me, sincerely your friend,

C. SCHURZ.

FROM HENRY CABOT LODGE

EAST POINT, NAHANT, July 14, 1884.

Dear Mr. Schurz: I received your kind letter this evening. It touched and gratified me very deeply as a mark of interest which you would not have shown unless you had felt a most sincere friendship for me. I am very much indebted to you for

it and I appreciate it very highly. It is too late for me to alter my course even if I wished to. By the time you receive this I shall have spoken at the meeting to be held to-morrow evening. I did not conclude on this course without a great deal of very painful reflection. I regard my action as the only honorable one to take. If I had announced to the Massachusetts Convention that if Mr. Blaine were nominated I should bolt him they never would have sent me to Chicago. I took the position with my eyes open. The understanding was clear and binding even if tacit. I made up my mind that if Blaine were nominated I should have to abide by the result and not bolt. Mr. Curtis on the floor of the Convention declared that we, the Edmunds men, came there in good faith. I assented to that statement and to it I can give but one interpretation. Again no protest was made on the floor of the Convention and the nomination was made unanimous without objection. Under these circumstances for me to bolt or do anything like it especially as I went to Chicago as the head of the Republican organization in this State, seems to me simply dishonorable. I may be wrong but I am firmly convinced on this point. I shall speak at the meeting to-morrow, announce my formal adhesion to the ticket and make a short party speech. Next week I shall resign the chairmanship of the committee. I am not likely to please anybody in this business. The Blaine Republicans will think me lukewarm and are as likely as not to defeat my nomination for Congress. If that nomination comes to me (and I shall not lift a finger to get it), as I feel now I shall accept it. I do not look on that matter as you do. I should announce my own principles and run on my own feet. I should be entirely free and my own master. Colonel Lyman ran on the Butler ticket, was elected by Butler votes and by a combination with the Butler party. Every Independent in the State applauded the result. Why should it be so suddenly wicked in me to run on the Blaine ticket after freely declaring my own independent views? If every man who votes the Republican ticket is to be branded, the Independent movement will die of narrowness and prejudice.

Moreover, I have fought the Democracy in this State during the past year and I have a very bad opinion of it. Despite the nomination of Blaine I firmly believe that to the masses of the Republican party we must look for progress and reform in public affairs.

Besides considering this subject deeply myself I have consulted some men in whom I have confidence and they advise me to adopt my present course. This is the advice of John and Charles Adams and of Roosevelt. Roosevelt not only advises it but means to return and vote for Blaine himself and has offered to speak in my district. I speak of running for Congress only as it looks to me now. Matters may of course change. One thing in your letter and only one surprised and pained me. That was your intimation that my friends would leave me and my position be affected. If social ostracism is to be attempted in this business, I confess a feeling of revolt would master me completely. My people have lived here for generations. I have been born and brought up here. I never have done a mean, dishonorable or cowardly thing in my life, so far as I know. I have never injured a man or wronged a woman. If I am to be banned because I vote according to what I believe conscientiously to be the dictates of honor, then have the old anti-slavery days indeed come again and I will fight against such treatment with all my strength. But I have no fear of this. Except for a few extremists and a few envious men, the community which has known me all my days will do me justice in the end. Moreover, in my district here there are scores of men who have stood by me and followed me and worked for me and they beg me now to stand by them. There is an obligation here which I cannot overlook although it would not be of itself decisive, perhaps.

I am fully aware that I shall at this time be accused of the worst motives but I must make the best of it. If I cannot answer and remove it by my life and acts then I am much mistaken. On mere grounds of expediency it seems to me that no party was ever founded on opposition to a single man or ever will be. Whatever the result of the election the parties will remain. By staying in the party I can be of some use. By

going out I destroy all the influence and power for good I may possess. I have written you at great length, my dear Mr. Schurz, and with entire frankness and of course in the most absolute confidence. I wished *you* to know just why I act as I do. I want you to realize that however mistaken I may be I act from a sense of duty and from a conviction that I have a debt of honor which I must pay no matter how disagreeable and distasteful it is. Believe me that I am sincerely grateful for your letter and your kind interest. I shall never forget either and am, most truly yours,

H. C. LODGE.

TO HENRY CABOT LODGE

NEW YORK, July 16, 1884.

I received your kind letter of the 14th this morning, and am sincerely glad you have accepted what I said to you, in the right spirit. Of course I regret that it has had no effect, especially as the reasons you give for the course you have chosen do not seem to me conclusive. Our duty to the country, which we discharge at the ballot-box, is in all respects paramount to any duty we may owe to the party. In my opinion there is nothing that could overrate the former.

I can understand that you do not like the Democratic party. But it seems to me that the effect upon our political morals certain to be produced by the election of a man with a notoriously corrupt record, to the Presidency of the United States, will be infinitely more detrimental to the public welfare than anything a Democratic Administration might bring with it. The latter would in the worst case be temporary, the former lasting. In this respect my convictions are so strong that I should have worked and voted against Blaine under any circumstances, asking only that the opposing candidate be an honest man.

However, you have made your choice, and further

argument is superfluous. I only want to assure you that nothing in my letter was in the least degree intended to hint at "social ostracism." What I referred to was *political* fellowship and coöperation.

Believe me, sincerely yours.

FROM HENRY WARD BEECHER

BROOKLYN, N. Y., July 29, 1884.

I have received such statements respecting Cleveland from several eminent clergymen of Buffalo, that I am paralyzed. Pray, put off your speech, of which Metcalf tells me, until we are *sure* of our ground. It would be very disastrous to you, and to the cause, if AFTER your speech (which will of course be very able) it should come out, as Rev. Dr. Ball of Buffalo assures me, that Cleveland's debaucheries "continue to this hour."

I am informed by Rev. Dr. Mitchell, formerly of Brooklyn (now of 1st Presbyterian Church, Buffalo—the most influential Church there) that the whole body of ministers in B. are of one mind, and counseled the publication in the *Telegraph* newspaper.

The Independents, of all men, being the advocates of moral reformation in politics cannot uphold a grossly dissipated man—and they ought not to wait to be *driven* from their position, but retreat in good order, before being charged, from an untenable ground. It may be possible to compel C. to *refuse* the nomination. Bayard, Thurman, Carlisle,—any clean man will be better than a spavined man for a race. Cleveland, if debauched, and held to by the Independents, will elect Blaine, by such a majority as will tread the Independent movement hopelessly under foot.

TO HENRY WARD BEECHER

NEW YORK, July 30, 1884.

Since I wrote you yesterday I have once more gone over the whole ground, reëxamining carefully the stories told

by the Buffalo *Telegraph* as well as the statements Mr. Richmond made to me; and the more I study the case, the more do I become convinced that Governor Cleveland is a much calumniated man. The stories as told bear all the signs of artful inventions either by a political trickster or by a journalistic sensation monger who persuaded himself that the fourteen-year-old offense, which forms the substratum of them, would deter Governor Cleveland and his friends from ever attempting to challenge the fabric of falsehood built upon it. I think you will find it so upon further investigation. Meanwhile it looks to me as if the Buffalo ministers were permitting themselves to be used for ends which they would not approve, and in a manner which they would ultimately be sorry for. I have written Mr. Richmond to acquaint them with the facts so that they may know the whole truth. But as Mr. Richmond has probably stopped at Albany on his way to Buffalo, my letter may not reach him for a day or two.

As to my meeting and speech, I have concluded to let the preparations go on. The affair is to come off on Tuesday of next week and has already been advertised. Before that day I shall have further advices from Buffalo. If they show that my view of the case is wrong, it will be time enough to draw back. But I do not think it would be justifiable to order off a meeting already advertised and to create confusion and doubt by such a demonstration of distrust, as things now stand. I suppose you would not advise the rejection of Cleveland, that is, virtually, the giving up of the campaign as to practical results, if nothing could be charged against Cleveland except what is admitted—this having been followed by an eminently useful life. At least Mr. Metcalf told me that you had said you would not.

I assure you, I do not take this matter lightly and

should be glad to have your view of the case as it presents [itself] to you on fuller information.¹

WHY JAMES G. BLAINE SHOULD NOT BE PRESIDENT²

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—In obedience to the invitation with which I have been honored, I stand here in behalf of Republicans opposing the Presidential candidates of the Republican party. You may well believe me when I say that it is no pleasure to me to enter upon a campaign like this. But a candid statement of our reasons for the step we have taken is due to those whose companionship in the pending contest we have left. It is, therefore, to Republicans that I address myself. I shall, of course, not waste any words upon politicians who follow the name of the party, right or wrong; but to the men of reason and conscience will I appeal, who loved their party for the good ends it was serving, and who were faithful to it in the same measure as it was faithful to the honor and the true interests of the Republic. Let them hear me, and then decide whether the same fidelity will not irresistibly lead them where we stand now.

At the threshold I have to meet a misapprehension of our motives. It has been said, and, I suppose, believed by some, that we were dissatisfied with the Republican party because its present candidates were protectionists. This is easily answered. Is Senator Edmunds, of Vermont, a free-trader? On the contrary, he is well known to be as strong a protectionist as any member of the Senate. And who among the candidates before the Republican National Convention was the favorite of the same "Independent Republicans" now opposing the

¹ In a short time Beecher came to agree with Schurz and likewise made campaign speeches in behalf of Cleveland.

² Speech at Brooklyn, Aug. 5, 1884.

Republican nominations? The same Senator Edmunds. Why was he their favorite? Because he was thoroughly trusted as an honest man, who could be depended upon to be faithful to those moral principles and political methods the observance of which would make and keep the Government honest. There was the decisive point. We should have supported other Republican candidates even of less prominence and of less ability than Mr. Edmunds possesses, no matter whether they were as strong protectionists as he, provided they satisfied that one fundamental requirement of unimpeachable, positive and active integrity. This is a fact universally known which no candid man will question. What, then, has the tariff question to do with the motives of our opposition? Nothing at all. And if any of those to whom these presents may come still assert that the tariff is the moving cause of our action, they convict themselves of being afraid of the real reasons which govern us, and of seeking artfully to deceive the people about them. So far, it may have been a mistake; now it will be a lie.

Undoubtedly the tariff is an interesting and important subject; so is the currency; so is the bank question; so is the Mormon question; so are many others. At other times they might absorb our attention. But this time the Republican National Convention has, with brutal directness, so that we must face it whether we will or not, forced upon the country another issue, which is infinitely more important, because it touches the vitality of our institutions. It is the question of honesty in government. I say the Republican Convention has forced it upon the country, not by platform declarations, but by nominating for the Presidency a man with a blemished public record. Understand me fully. The question is not merely whether Mr. Blaine, if elected notwithstanding his past career, would or would not give the country a compara-

tively honest Administration. The question is much larger than that. (It is whether the public record of the Republican candidate is not such as to make his election by the American people equivalent to a declaration on their part that honesty will no longer be one of the requirements of the Government of the Republic. It is whether such a declaration will not have the inevitable effect of sinking the Government for generations to come, perhaps forever, into a depth of demoralization and corruption such as we have never dreamed of before. If this is really the issue of the pending campaign, then you will admit it to be the most momentous that has been upon us since the civil war; nay, as momentous as any involved in the civil war itself.

Above all, let us be sure of the facts. Are the public character and record of the Republican candidate really such that his election would produce results of greater consequence to the future of the Republic than the decision one way or the other of any political question now pending? Some of Mr. Blaine's friends assert that he is a much abused and calumniated man; that certain charges have been trumped up against him and exploded; that unscrupulous enemies are persecuting him with accusations of a vague and indefinite nature, using against him the insidious weapons of hint, insinuation and innuendo. If this be so, it is wrong. Mr. Blaine has a clear right to demand the facts. The citizens who are asked to vote against him on the ground of his character and record have a right to demand the facts. And if indeed others have been vague in their statements on a subject so important to the people at this time, nobody shall have any reason to complain of a want of straightforwardness on my part. Nothing could be more distasteful to me than to discuss the personal conduct of a public man. But it has been forced upon us as a public duty, which, however

disagreeable, must be performed. I shall certainly not abuse Mr. Blaine. I shall not even make a charge against him which he has not made against himself. You shall have his own words, taken from the official record of Congress, by which to judge him. I shall leave aside all other accusations brought by others, however well authenticated or plausible, and confine myself to one representative and simple case. It is a somewhat tedious story.

In May and June, 1876, an investigation was made by a committee of the National House of Representatives into the affairs of certain land-grant railroads. This investigation brought out certain letters which Mr. Blaine, while Speaker of the House of Representatives, had written to Mr. W. Fisher, of Boston, a gentleman connected in a business way with one of those roads. The first one of the letters I want to mention reads thus:

AUGUSTA, June 29, 1869.

My dear Mr. Fisher: I thank you for the article from Mr. Lewis. It is good in itself and will do good. He writes like a man of large intelligence and comprehension. Your offer to admit me to a participation in the new railroad enterprise is in every respect as generous as I could expect or desire. I thank you very sincerely for it, and in this connection I wish to make a suggestion of a somewhat selfish character. It is this: You spoke of Mr. Caldwell's offer to dispose of a share of his interest to me. If he really desires to do so I wish he would make the proposition definite, so that I could know just what to depend on. Perhaps if he waits to the full development of the enterprise he may grow reluctant to part with the share, and I do not by this mean any distrust of him. I do not feel that I shall prove a dead-head in the enterprise if I once embark in it. I see various channels in which I know I can be useful.

Very hastily and sincerely your friend,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. FISHER, India Street, Boston.

This is what *Puck* calls the "letter of acceptance."

The second, dated three days later, reads as follows:

AUGUSTA, ME., July 2, 1869.

My dear Mr. Fisher: You ask me if I am satisfied with the offer you made me of a share in your new railroad enterprise? Of course, I am more than satisfied with the terms of the offer; I think it a most liberal proposition. If I hesitate at all it is from considerations in no way connected with the character of the offer. Your liberal mode of dealing with me in all our business transactions of the past eight years has not passed without my full appreciation. What I wrote you on the 29th was intended to bring Caldwell to a definite proposition. That was all. I go to Boston by the same train that carries this letter, and will call at your office to-morrow at 12 M. If you don't happen to be in, no matter; don't put yourself to any trouble about it.

Yours,

J. G. B.

MR. FISHER, JR.

Here let us pause a moment. Who were Mr. Fisher and Mr. Caldwell? Business men occasionally engaged in railroad affairs, in this case interested in the building of the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad in Arkansas, and in the financial operations connected therewith. It should be remembered that this Little Rock Railroad had received from the National Government a valuable grant of land, and that its interests could occasionally be promoted or injured, as the case might be, by the legislative action of Congress.

And who was Mr. Blaine? He was at the time Speaker of the National House of Representatives. And what is the Speaker of the House of Representatives? He is, without question, by far the most powerful man in the Government, next to the President of the United States. He appoints the committees of the House, in which all legislation is prepared—aye, in which, it might almost be said, the principal business of the House is done. He

can, if he pleases, compose those committees in a way favorable or unfavorable to certain lines of policy, or measures, or interests. He can make the Committee on Banking and Currency a protector or an enemy to the national banks. He can give the Committee on Pacific Railroads or on Public Lands a bias friendly or hostile to the land-grant roads. And so on. He can reward and exalt, or punish and humiliate members whom he likes or dislikes, or whom he wants to strengthen or to weaken, by giving them desirable or undesirable places on the committees. Moreover, he presides over the deliberations and administers the rules of the House. It is in a great measure in his power to recognize or not to recognize members who want to "catch his eye" in order to speak or make motions. He decides points of order—to be sure, subject to appeal—but his bare decision goes, of course, for much. And during those days of hurry and confusion which sometimes occur, especially towards the close of the session, a great many things may be put through the House by his rapid action, of which only he and those especially interested and watchful keep the run. In short, it is currently said that a bill to which the Speaker is seriously opposed has but a slim chance, and that a measure he desires to pass will frequently find unexpected and powerful help.

Such is the power of the Speaker, almost too vast and arbitrary in a government like ours, especially as to the composition of the committees. But all the more important is it to the country that this vast power, so dangerous if abused, should be wielded with the utmost scrupulousness and the highest sense of official honor; and all the more important to the Speaker himself that his disinterestedness, his impartiality—in one word, his official honor—should stand clean and clear not only above reproach, but above the reach of suspicion.

Well, Mr. Blaine had for eight years been in various business transactions with Mr. Fisher, in which he says Mr. Fisher treated him very handsomely. Now, he was thankful to Mr. Fisher for his "generous" offer to admit him (the Speaker) "to a participation in the new railroad enterprise"—that railroad being a land-grant road. The "terms" offered by Mr. Fisher, whatever they may have been, pleased Speaker Blaine greatly. But he wanted more. He wished very much that Mr. Caldwell, the business friend of Mr. Fisher, should "dispose of a share of his interest" to him (the Speaker), and that without much delay. And he desired Mr. Caldwell as well as Mr. Fisher to understand that he (Speaker Blaine) *would not prove a deadhead in the enterprise if he once embarked in it*, and that he *saw various channels in which he knew he could make himself useful*.

But Mr. Caldwell seems to have been a little hard of hearing in this respect. He may have thought that Mr. Blaine was neither a practical railroad man to help in building a road, nor as useful a financier as a practical banker or Wall Street man would have been in raising funds. He seems to have feared that Mr. Blaine might turn out a deadhead in the enterprise after all, and that his "usefulness in various channels" would not amount to much. And so for three months Mr. Blaine waited in vain for that "definite proposition" from Mr. Caldwell which he had so urgently asked for.

Mr. Blaine then evidently grew impatient at Mr. Caldwell's obtuseness, and wrote two more letters calculated to quicken his intelligence. The first was as follows:

AUGUSTA, ME., Oct. 4, 1869.

Personal.

My dear Sir: I spoke to you a short time ago about a point of interest to your railroad company that occurred at the last session of Congress.

It was on the last night of the session, when the bill renewing the land grant to the State of Arkansas for the Little Rock road was reached, and Julian, of Indiana, chairman of the Public Lands Committee, and, by right, entitled to the floor, attempted to put on the bill, as an amendment, the Fremont-El Paso scheme—a scheme probably well known to Mr. Caldwell. The House was thin, and the lobby in the Fremont interest had the thing all set up, and Julian's amendment was likely to prevail if brought to a vote. Roots and other members from Arkansas, who were doing their best for their own bill (to which there seemed to be no objection), were in despair, for it was well known that the Senate was hostile to the Fremont scheme, and if the Arkansas bill had gone back to the Senate with Julian's amendment, the whole thing would have gone on the table and slept the sleep of death.

In this dilemma Roots came to me to know what on earth he could do under the rules, for he said it was vital to his constituents that the bill should pass. I told him that Julian's amendment was entirely out of order, because not germane; but he had not sufficient confidence in his knowledge of the rules to make the point, but he said General Logan was opposed to the Fremont scheme, and would probably make the point. I sent my page to General Logan with the suggestion, and he at once made the point. I could not do otherwise than sustain it, and so the bill was freed from the mischievous amendment moved by Julian, and at once passed without objection.

At that time I had never seen Mr. Caldwell, but you can tell him that, without knowing it, I did him a great favor. Sincerely yours,

J. G. BLAINE.

W. FISHER, Jr., Esq., No. 24 India street, Boston.

On the same day he wrote a second letter to Mr. Fisher which reads thus:

AUGUSTA, Oct. 4, 1869.

My dear Mr. Fisher: Find inclosed contracts of parties named in my letter of yesterday. The remaining contracts

will be completed as rapidly as possible, as circumstances will permit.

I inclose you part of the *Congressional Globe* of April 9, containing the point to which I referred at some length in my previous letter of to-day. You will find it of interest to read it over and see what a narrow escape your bill made on that last night of the session. Of course it was my plain duty to make the ruling when the point was once raised. If the Arkansas men had not, however, happened to come to me when at their wits' end and in despair, the bill would undoubtedly have been lost, or at least postponed for a year. I thought the point would interest both you and Caldwell, though occurring before either of you engaged in the enterprise.

I beg you to understand that I thoroughly appreciate the courtesy with which you have treated me in this railroad matter, but your conduct toward me in business matters has always been marked by unbounded liberality in past years, and, of course, I have naturally come to expect the same of you now. You urge me to make as much as I fairly can out of the arrangement into which we have entered. It is natural that I should do my utmost to this end. I am bothered by only one thing, and that is the indefinite arrangement with Mr. Caldwell. I am anxious to acquire the interest he has promised me, but I do not get a definite understanding with him as I have with you. I shall be in Boston in a few days, and shall then have an opportunity to talk matters over fully with you. I am disposed to think that whatever I do with Mr. Caldwell must really be done through you. Kind regards to Mrs. Fisher. Sincerely,

J. G. BLAINE.

W. FISHER, Jr.

Now, Mr. Caldwell may have been very slow of apprehension. But these two letters (for they were evidently addressed to him through Mr. Fisher) were certainly clear enough to remind him that Mr. Blaine was something more than a mere railroad man or Wall Street financier; that, in fact, he was Speaker of the House of

Representatives. They told him very pointedly that Mr. Blaine, as Speaker, had done him a great favor—although he had done it “without knowing it,” and in a correct way—but a favor which was of great value to the company. And it was certainly not the fault of Mr. Blaine’s letters if Mr. Caldwell did not understand that a Speaker of the House, who could do such favors “without knowing it,” might do equal and still greater favors while knowing it; and that, therefore, Mr. Blaine, as Speaker, had more various channels in which to make himself useful, and to prove a live-head in this land-grant railroad enterprise, than a mere railroad builder or a mere Wall Street financier. And writing two letters on the same subject on one day, Mr. Blaine showed himself dreadfully in earnest in pounding clear notions of the Speaker’s opportunities for usefulness into Mr. Caldwell’s head, in order to induce that gentleman to give at last to Speaker Blaine that interest in the railroad enterprise which the Speaker insisted upon having.

Mr. Blaine’s friends dislike greatly to be brought face to face with these letters. They cannot deny their genuineness and they cannot explain them away. Some of them content themselves with the general remark that after all they were such as the Speaker of the House would have no reason to be ashamed of. And then they at once change the subject and speak of the tariff. The fact is that Mr. Blaine did see reason for being extremely anxious that they should not become known. He certainly did not consider them innocent. But they did become known in a very peculiar way. Mr. James Mulligan, who had been the bookkeeper of Mr. Fisher, having been summoned to testify before the investigating committee, brought those letters among others with him to Washington. This he did with Mr. Fisher’s consent. As soon as Mr. Blaine heard of the letters he called upon

Mr. Mulligan, and the meeting was a very curious one. Mr. Mulligan, the next day, described it to the committee under oath. He swore that Mr. Blaine had come to him and implored him most piteously to give him those letters—there were fifteen of them in all; that Mr. Blaine almost went on his knees, saying that if the committee should get hold of these papers it would ruin him and sink him forever; that Mr. Blaine had talked even of suicide and made an appeal in behalf of his wife and his six children, and that then he opened to him (Mulligan) the prospect of a consulship abroad; that Mr. Blaine, finally, wanted at least to be permitted to look at the letters, which Mulligan did permit him to do on condition that he would return them; that Mr. Blaine did return them, and then wanted to look at them again, and then refused to give them back, and against Mr. Mulligan's protest kept them in his possession.

The next day Mr. Blaine testified that what Mr. Mulligan had said about his (Mr. Blaine's) being on his knees and talking of ruin and suicide was "mere fancy." As to the consulship, he admitted he had alluded to something like that in a jocular way. He disclaimed meaning to say that Mr. Mulligan falsified; "not at all." Mr. Mulligan might have put a wrong construction on what he said. But as to the letters, Mr. Blaine admitted that he took them from Mulligan and kept them against Mr. Mulligan's remonstrance. Mr. Blaine insisted that the letters, being his "private correspondence," were his property, in whatever way obtained, and he also refused to give them up to the committee.

This is the story as it appears in the sworn testimony; it shows conclusively that, whatever his friends may now say, Mr. Blaine himself did not consider those letters at all harmless. You will readily admit, it is a sorry and humiliating thing to see Mr. Blaine, the late Speaker of

the National House of Representatives, involved in a pointed issue of veracity on sworn testimony between him and Mr. Mulligan—Mr. Blaine's own friend, Mr. Fisher, testifying that he had known Mulligan intimately for many years, and that his character was the best, as good as, or perhaps better than, that of any other man he ever knew; and another one of Mr. Blaine's friends, Mr. Alkins, swearing that he had never heard anything against Mr. Mulligan's reputation, and that he had never doubted anything Mr. Mulligan said—all of which you can read at length in Miscellaneous Document No. 176 of the House of Representatives, Forty-fourth Congress, First Session. A sorry story, I repeat; but the sorriest thing of all was that Mr. Blaine fatally discredited himself by daring and obvious misstatements of his own about other points connected with this affair, of which I shall speak later. At any rate, it is not denied by anybody that Mr. Blaine got possession of those letters and kept them without authority, in violation of his promise to return them, and that he made a desperate struggle to conceal them. This, I should think, is sufficient to show that Mr. Blaine himself in conscience felt these letters to be extremely grave things to him, and the smiles of his friends are rather ghastly when they now try to make light of them.

How, then, did the letters come out? Mulligan's testimony, being telegraphed all over the country, created a tremendous sensation. There was a universal outcry. It became clear to Mr. Blaine that the further concealment of these letters was impossible. It was sure death. There was still a desperate chance in apparent audacity. The highly exciting scene is still remembered as he himself read them to the House of Representatives. But he who coolly reads the printed proceedings of that day will find some very curious and characteristic things. Mr.

Blaine did not permit the letters which he read to pass into the hands of the officers of the House so that their contents might have been verified. He promptly put them into his own pocket again and carried them away. And, secondly, in reading them to the House he dexterously mixed letters of different periods and about different subjects together, so that no listener could on the spot make head or tail to them.

Thus Mr. Blaine could prevent the House from verifying the letters and from at once understanding their full import. But he could not prevent the letters as actually read from being subsequently arranged according to dates and subjects and compared with the testimony. Then their connection became clear, and with it their meaning. What is that meaning? What does it signify when a Speaker of the House of Representatives writes to a business man that he (the Speaker) wants a profitable interest in an enterprise the value of which has been, and may again be, affected by acts of the same legislative body over which that Speaker presides, and in which he exercises great power; when that Speaker says he *feels that he shall not prove a deadhead in the enterprise if he once embarks in it*, and that he *sees various channels in which he knows he can be useful*, and when finally, the desired profitable interest not being forthcoming, he points to an exercise of his power as Speaker by which, even "without knowing it," he did a great favor to the party from whom he asks that profitable interest, thus pointing directly at the field upon which he can make himself most useful? What does this mean? On its very face it means one of the highest and most powerful officers in the Government marketing his official power for private gain. It means *official power offering itself for prostitution to make money*.

I say this is its meaning on the very face of it. Still,

let us carefully examine whether that face may not possibly deceive us. For explanation we naturally turn to Mr. Blaine himself, and to his nearest friends. What have they brought forth? Let us see.

First, Mr. Blaine, in a solemn statement in the House of Representatives, said that the "company derived its life, franchise and value wholly from the State," and that "the Little Rock road derived all that it had from the State of Arkansas and not from Congress." The obvious object of this statement was to convey the impression that the House, over which Mr. Blaine presided as Speaker, had no power over that land-grant road or its interests and value, and that, therefore, his owning or his asking for an interest in that enterprise, while he was Speaker, was an absolutely harmless thing. I regret to say that this explanation, coming from Mr. Blaine, was almost as bad as the original offense, for in making it he deliberately said what he knew to be not true. And this I affirm, not upon the authority of one of Mr. Blaine's enemies and detractors, but upon the authority of Mr. Blaine himself. Remember Mr. Blaine's letter of October 4, 1869, to Mr. Fisher. "It was on the last night of the session," he wrote, "when the bill renewing the land grant to the State of Arkansas *for the Little Rock road* was reached." This was the bill which he informs Mr. Fisher and Mr. Caldwell would have failed to pass but for his (Speaker Blaine's) opportune intervention. And Speaker Blaine wants it understood that by intervening he did Mr. Caldwell "a great favor." Who was Mr. Caldwell? Was he the State of Arkansas? No; he was the builder of the Little Rock road. And it was he, the Little Rock man, and not the State of Arkansas, to whom Mr. Blaine claims to have done this favor. Mr. Blaine knew, as every well-informed man knows, that land grants for railroads, with some exceptions, were nominally

made to States, but really with a specific road in view, and that all legislation concerning those land-grant roads made to States for railroad purposes always directly affected the interests of the roads concerned. That he knew this is clear from the language in his own letters. It is therefore, I repeat, not one of Mr. Blaine's enemies, but Mr. Blaine himself, who has proved out of his own mouth that when he made this explanation in the House of Representatives he knew it to be untrue.

The second point alleged by Mr. Blaine in his own defense is that he did not get any favor from those railroad men that was not open to anybody else; that is to say, properly speaking, no real favor at all. He declared solemnly before the House of Representatives that he bought his Little Rock bonds and stocks "at precisely the same rates as others paid," or, in the language of Mr. Blaine's warmest friend and spokesman, "as they were sold on the Boston market to all applicants." Here again Mr. Blaine has to face his own tell-tale letters. What did that gush of gratitude mean when he wrote to Mr. Fisher: "Your offer to admit me to a participation in the new railroad enterprise is in every respect as generous as I could expect or desire"; "of course I am more than satisfied with the terms of the offer; I think it a most liberal proposition"? Did it mean: "Oh, Mr. Fisher, how generous you are in letting me have some bonds and stocks 'at precisely the same rates as others pay'; it is such a liberal proposition"? What did it mean when he wrote further: "You spoke of Mr. Caldwell's offer to dispose of a share of his interest to me; I wish he would make the proposition definite, so that I could know just what to depend on"? And again: "I am bothered by only one thing, and that is definite and expressed arrangements with Mr. Caldwell. I am anxious to acquire the interest he has promised me." Did this mean that Mr.

Caldwell's interest, of which the Speaker of the House was so anxious to acquire a part, consisted only of the privilege of buying Little Rock securities at "precisely the same rates which others paid"? Did it mean that Mr. Caldwell should graciously concede to him some right which "all applicants in the Boston market" possessed? What an audacious farce such an assertion would be! If there is anything evident from Mr. Blaine's own letters it is that the Speaker of the House wanted to be—and, according to his gush of gratitude to Mr. Fisher, was—if not the favored *one* in that railroad enterprise, then one of the favored few, on the "bottom floor," in the "inside ring," who skim the cream before the public get at the milkpan. And when in the investigation he hinted at his being situated in the enterprise no better than the public generally, he was confronted by Mr. Mulligan with a memorandum book in Mr. Blaine's own handwriting, showing that Mr. Blaine had received as a gratuity or commission about \$130,000 in bonds and \$15,150 in money. Thereupon there was dead silence on the part of Mr. Blaine. He had nothing more to say than that he did not want his private affairs inquired into. It is painfully evident that here again Mr. Blaine stands convicted, not by his enemies and defamers, but by his own pen, of having made solemn explanations of his conduct before the House of Representatives which were obviously untrue.

These are the things referred to when I said that Mr. Blaine, in the issue of veracity between him and Mr. Mulligan concerning that famous interview, had put himself at a decided disadvantage by untruthful statements about other parts of this business.

The third point urged in extenuation is that there was no subsequent legislation concerning that railroad, except, as Mr. Blaine said, an act "merely to rectify a previous

mistake in legislation." But, whether to correct a mistake or not, it was a very important act. It was to repeal a proviso that the granted lands "should be sold to actual settlers only, in quantities not greater than one quarter of a section to each purchaser, at a price not exceeding \$2.50 per acre." The repeal of that proviso was certainly calculated to enhance the value of the land grant very materially, and also that of the land-grant bonds, of which Mr. Blaine had become a holder. Many members of the House voted against the repeal, but it was carried.

The fourth point urged in favor of Mr. Blaine is that after all he did not make any money by the operation. It appears that the Little Rock enterprise proved somewhat wild-cattish; that Speaker Blaine had disposed of a number of bonds among his neighbors and friends at high rates; that some of these, when the enterprise failed, grew ugly; that he found it best to take back the securities and refund the money; and so he claims that on the whole he lost instead of gaining. If this is so, it shows that this was not one of the operations through which Mr. Blaine made his fortune. But would his failure to make the money he desired and expected to make change the character of the transaction? You might as well say: This man is a truthful man. To be sure he lied, but nobody would believe him. Or, this man is an honest man; to be sure, he tried to pass counterfeit money, but nobody would take it. Would the conduct of the Speaker of the House on account of this failure be official power *not* offering itself for prostitution? No, it would only be official power offering itself for prostitution without, in this instance, realizing its price.

Is there, then, nothing in the official record to put those fatal letters in a better light? Search and sift that record as carefully as you may, and you will search and sift it in vain. You will find other curious things. You

will find this Speaker of the House "controlling" a large interest in another land-grant road liable to be affected by Congressional legislation, the Northern Pacific—"a splendid thing," which he himself "can't touch," but which he can offer to his friend Fisher, cautioning that friend to be careful to keep the Speaker's name quiet. You find a large and mysterious sum of money passing through his hands, which he "had not in his possession forty-eight hours," but paid over to parties whom he tried to protect from loss—a mysterious sum of money much inquired about, of which Mr. Blaine proved himself anxious to show where it had not come from, but avoided showing where it had come from. We find him mediating as a friend between different interests and organizations connected with railroads, and we begin to ask ourselves with wonder whether there was a pie in which the Speaker of the House did not have his finger.

We find something more. We find Mr. Blaine again and again protesting against any line of inquiry which might "expose his private business." What? Here was the late Speaker of the House of Representatives, the second officer in the Government, whose official integrity was questioned, before an investigating committee of the same House over which he had presided; and he did not cry out: "Here are my books, here my bank accounts, here my letters, here my keys, here my friends, here my enemies—take them all! Search, sift, question, leave no stone unturned, no dark corner unexplored; hold up every circumstance in the least suspicious to the sunlight. I have been Speaker of the House of Representatives. When my official integrity is seriously questioned I must stand before the people, not only as one who cannot be legally proved guilty, but as one whom suspicion must not touch!" No, he did not say anything of the kind. He did not remember Alexander Hamilton's

example. What example was that? When some mysterious circumstance had become known which threw a shadow of suspicion upon his official integrity, what did Hamilton do? Crouch behind the limitations of legal evidence? Protest against exposing his private affairs? Not he. With a courage that must have wrung his own proud heart and pierced with agony that of his wife, he tore the veil from the mystery with his own hand, and, at the expense of confessing himself guilty of a transgression of a widely different and peculiarly "private" kind, he proved the stainlessness of his official character. Rather would he have those of his failings exposed which men are most anxious to conceal, rather the happiness of his home endangered, rather his reputation as a husband and a father questioned than leave the faintest shadow of suspicion upon his official honor. But what find we here? An official honor of a different kind. We find Mr. Blaine protesting again and again: "I do not think that my private business ought to be exposed." "I do not want all my private matters gone into that way." What private matters? The pecuniary relations between the Speaker of the House of Representatives and operators in land-grant railroads. Fiercely he struggled to keep the Mulligan letters concealed. On what ground? Because, as he said, they were his "private correspondence," which, he pretended, nobody had any right to see. And what did we see, when at last that was found out which Mr. Blaine called his "private" correspondence? And what would we see if that were exposed which Mr. Blaine called his "private" business? Again, it is not one of his enemies and detractors that asks this question. It is Mr. Blaine's own language before the investigating committee that forces it upon us.

Analyze this case to classify it. Here we find not a mere solitary slip of the conscience, not a mere occasional

yielding to the seduction of opportunity to eke out a scanty existence. Here we find the Speaker of the House of Representatives in a businesslike way participating, and urgently asking for a greater share, in a large enterprise, the pecuniary success of which is in a great measure dependent on the action of the same House over which he presides, and in which he wields great power—for the *purpose of getting rich*. We find him pointing out the exercise of his official power as a channel in which he already has made himself useful, and, consequently, can make himself more useful, in order to obtain more of a valuable interest in such an enterprise, thus literally trading on his official trust and opportunities. To cover up these things we find him resorting to all sorts of barefaced untruths, deceptions and concealments on the most solemn occasions. The concealments resorted to and the side perspectives opened by the official investigation strongly suggest the inference that the case disclosed is only one of several. We find that he did get rich while in office, without any other regular business. His most devoted friend, by implication, admits his fortune to be nearly half a million, while the estimates of others go far beyond that. But the lowest estimate, about half a million, is wealth to all of our countrymen, except a few. This is the character of the case.

And this is the man we are asked to elect President of the United States and to crown with the highest honors of the Republic. In the face of these facts? Perhaps you still doubt them, and I suggest to you another test. Tell one of Mr. Blaine's spokesmen what I have said and ask him whether it is not true. The answer I predict will be, that the objectors to Mr. Blaine are all free traders; that I, in particular, am a very objectionable person, who has done all sorts of wicked things and should not be believed. I advise you, then, to reply

that you readily concede all my wickedness, but that I am not a candidate for the Presidency asking to be voted for, while Mr. Blaine is, and that therefore you would like to hear about Mr. Blaine. The answer is likely to be that I am a much worse man than you ever thought I was; that the tariff is in danger; that unless the Republican party triumph the Democrats will come in, and that therefore Mr. Blaine must be elected. When you hear this answer you will then be sure enough of your facts. But will you still think of making him President?

I know there are among those intending to do this thing still many estimable citizens. I entreat them soberly to consider what it is they mean to do. I grant a man may speculate in railroad securities, if he does it honestly, without forfeiting his good character. He may also dispose of Little Rock bonds and other securities among his neighbors and friends, and thereby earn a commission. A good many men make it a business to do such things, and it is a legitimate business, as things go. But when a Speaker of the House of Representatives has taken favors of a pecuniary value from railroad operators, whose interests are liable to be affected by Congressional legislation; and when that Speaker of the House, asking for more favors, has urged that request on the ground that he will not be a deadhead in the enterprise, and that he knows he can make himself useful in various channels; and when he has thereupon directly pointed out his official power as a channel of usefulness; and when, attempting to explain his doings, he has on solemn occasions unblushingly said things glaringly untrue; and when in an investigation into his official integrity he has, instead of voluntarily, freely and widely opening all the avenues of knowledge to prove his official purity, constantly and anxiously protested against any inquiry into his private business—when a Speaker of the House

of Representatives has done this, and then the American people, in full view of these facts, deliberately elect that man their President—I ask you soberly and candidly, and I hope you will ponder it well, do you not think that the American people in doing so will put a disgrace upon themselves and upon the Republic? And more. We may be ever so lenient as to the private morals of public men. We may overlook ever so readily delinquencies in private conduct. But when a public man has conspicuously betrayed and prostituted high official trust for pecuniary gain, and is then elevated by the people, knowing this, to higher official trust and honor, do you not think that such a precedent and example will have a fearfully demoralizing and corrupting effect upon the public mind and come home to us in incalculable dishonor and disaster? If you have not thought of this, is it not time you should?

Look around you. Ours is certainly a magnificent country. It is inhabited by a powerful and energetic people, living under free institutions devised with uncommon wisdom. We have accomplished much. Wars and rebellions, small and great, we have successfully gone through. In spite of all sorts of errors and blunders we may have committed we have achieved wonderful successes. We have grown rich and great and civilized, and we find ourselves surrounded with all the elements of further and still greater success and progress. A grand prospect, apparently without bounds. And yet there is something which disquiets us. It is the germ of a moral disease which threatens the vitality of this great Commonwealth. You observe with alarm the morbid eagerness spreading among our young people to get rich without productive work; how this eagerness becomes more and more unscrupulous in the means it employs; how defalcations and embezzlements in places of public

as well as private trust increase in number and magnitude, in ebbs and tides, to be sure, but the advancing tides growing all the time more formidable; how men of high position among their fellow-citizens, standing at the head of great financial institutions, now and then despoil those who trusted their money to them by acts little short of downright robbery. You watch the great corporations which the industrial developments of our times have brought forth; how powerful they are; how the financial management of them by hook or crook accumulates enormous fortunes in single hands; how this accumulated wealth sometimes grows more greedy and unscrupulous the more it increases; how it seeks to control for its purposes governments and legislatures and courts and the feeders and organs of public opinion, and how in some cases it has succeeded. With growing apprehension you see the Senate of the United States gradually invaded by millionaires whose whole distinction is wealth and whose world of action is making money. And an instinctive fear creeps over you that, unless this dangerous tendency be checked, or at least kept within bounds, not only our social life will be disastrously demoralized, but that our political contests will become mere wrangles between different bands of public robbers, legislation only a matter of purchase and sale and the whole government a festering mass of corruption; and that thus this great Republic will rapidly go the way of many predecessors—grow, flourish, become corrupt, rot and perish.

Examine your own inmost thoughts and you will have to admit that just there you see our danger. It is an instinctive apprehension, but the instinct is correct. You may, indeed, say that we are after all still far from the ultimate catastrophe. You may also say that we can never expect to have a state of moral perfection in politics. That is true. There will probably always be

some attempt at corrupt practices, more or less, as there will always be some highway robbery. But the extent of those corrupt practices, the more or less, and, therefore, the damage and danger arising from them, will depend upon the popular maintenance of that moral standard according to which corruption is branded as a dishonorable thing, condemned as a crime and treated as such. As long as it is branded and condemned you can fight and repress it with effect. But I ask you in all candor and entreat you to consider it well: what will the effect be if corruption not only ceases to be branded with dishonor, but if men tainted with it are held up, not merely by some individuals, but by the people, as men to be admired and honored, as models for the emulation of the ambitious? There will, I admit, always be some highway robbery. But there will not be very much as long as highway robbers are treated as criminals and sent to prison. But what would become of society if highway robbers were honored as model citizens and made presidents of trust companies?

And this, just this, fatal leap the American people are asked to take in this Presidential election. Consider it well. It is success that attracts the eager eye of the young. Public honors mean the popular approval of public conduct, and the public conduct of him who receives them is set up by the people as a model for the ambitious to follow. The more powerful that model, the higher the pedestal on which it stands. The Presidency of the United States is the highest. What will the model teach in this case, and what kind of ambition will it excite? How will it work to teach our young by this example of popular approval that in order to win the highest honors of the Republic it is no longer necessary to be officially honest? What will the effect be upon our aspiring politicians if they are told by the American

people that as men in high place they may prostitute their official power for private gain, and then lie about it, and then baffle investigation by refusing to have their "private business" inquired into, and then be exposed by their own showing, and have all this known by the American people, and still be elected Presidents of the United States? Where will our public morals be if the American people by this election proclaim that in their opinion these practices are "all right," and that the man who has conspicuously indulged in them is just the man to be distinguished and exalted as the great representative American with a big A?

If you want to know what the result of Mr. Blaine's election would be, stop and observe what the result of his mere nomination already has been. What do you see? Men high in standing, who but yesterday were shocked at such things as Mr. Blaine has done, who thought that the people would and ought to brand them with their emphatic disapproval, now meekly apologizing for the same things and dismissing them as little eccentricities of genius. Nay, some of them grow fairly facetious at the "Pharisees," or "saints," or "dudes," or "gentle hermits" who denounce corruption to-day as they themselves denounced it yesterday. Indeed, "Pharisees" and "saints." What, then, are the strange and extravagant things which these Pharisees and saints demand, and which after Mr. Blaine's nomination have suddenly become so ridiculous? Do they ask that a candidate for the Presidency should be the ideal man and the embodiment of all the human virtues? That he should part his hair in the middle and wear lavender gloves? No, not that. But these strange creatures, these "Pharisees" and "dudes," insist that a man to be elected President of the United States should be a man of integrity; that he should have a just sense of official

honor; that he should not be one with a record of prostituted official power, such as the Mulligan letters and the investigation show, upon his back. That is all. Why, how ridiculous this is, to be sure! Have you ever heard anything so outlandish?

Well, fellow-citizens, when you see grave men, men of public standing, suddenly disposed to laugh at other men who to-day refuse to honor bad practices which yesterday they all in common condemned, it is not altogether amusing. It is a rather serious symptom of the moral effect Mr. Blaine's mere nomination has already produced. But it is only one of many. The Republican party once proudly and justly called itself the party of moral ideas. Where are those moral ideas now? What is the answer of the thorough-paced partisan when you remind him of "the party of moral ideas" of the past, and point at the record of his candidate? "Hang moral ideas, we are for the party!" And he will tell you further that, whatever may become of your moral ideas, you are in honor bound to be for the party too. The Republican party was a party of freemen and volunteers. From the Whigs and from the Democrats they came, proud of having cut their party ties, and they gathered around the anti-slavery banner, for this they thought the cause of right. And now the spokesmen of the same party tell you that he who opposes the candidates of his party because he conscientiously believes it wrong to support them commits a dishonorable act.

As a member of a party I do not cease to be a citizen. Under all circumstances the duties which I owe as a citizen to my country are superior to the duties which I can possibly owe to any party. When I go as a delegate to a party convention, I consult with others as to what may be best for party action. When as a voter I go to the polls, I consult my own conscience about what is best

for the country's welfare. And if I conscientiously find that what the party demands is not for the good of the country, then it is not only my right but my duty as a citizen to vote against it. Who will gainsay this? But now we are told not only that a delegate to a convention has no right to oppose his party's nominees, but that an ordinary member of the party is by his honor forbidden to do so. A new code of political honor is invented which forbids us to be honest. There was an outcry once in this country against the English principle: "Once a subject, always a subject." It seems the Blaine party wants to improve upon this by the proclamation: "Once a party member, always a party slave." And what is worse, we see men who know that all we say is true, and who but yesterday said it themselves, stifle their consciences and wear the badge of that slavery.

But that is not all the mere nomination of Mr. Blaine has already accomplished. As it is tainting the present so it is defiling the past. How often have you had to read and to hear these days that, as Mr. Blaine is pursued with charges and abuse, so were Washington and Lincoln pursued, and that between these three there is really little difference. What a comparison! It is true Washington was called by his enemies a monarchist and Lincoln a baboon. But we cannot learn that either of them found it necessary to defend himself against the imputation. If the friends of Mr. Blaine want to establish a real parallel between him and them they should carefully examine Washington's and Lincoln's private correspondence. Among Washington's letters they would have to find one somewhat like this:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY.

To W. FISHER, Esq., *Army Contractor*:

My dear Mr. Fisher: Your offer to admit me to a participation in your beef contract is very generous. Accept

my thanks. But I want more. You spoke of your friend Caldwell, who has the flour contract, as willing to dispose of a share of his interest to me. I wish he would make the proposition definite. Tell him that I feel I shall not prove a deadhead in the enterprise. I see various channels in which I know I can be useful.

Sincerely your friend,

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

P. S.—In looking over my order books, I find that when Mr. Caldwell delivered the last lot of flour there was some irregularity, which induced the Commissary of the Army to refuse acceptance. I promptly cut the red tape by ordering the Commissary to accept the delivery at once, so that I saved Mr. Caldwell much trouble in getting the flour passed and in obtaining his money. Thus, without knowing him, I did him a favor which must have been worth much to him. Let him hurry up his proposition to me.

G. W.

Or in Mr. Lincoln's private correspondence they might look for a letter somewhat like this:

EXECUTIVE MANSION.

My dear Mr. Fisher: Your agent, Mr. Blaine, a very smart young man apparently, who got your Spencer rifle accepted by the Ordnance Department, brought me your very generous offer for a share in the contract, for which accept my thanks. I learn, also, of your friend Mr. Caldwell's disposition to let me have a share of his interest in the manufacture of belts and cartridge boxes. Let him make me a definite proposition as quickly as possible. I tell you I am not going to be a deadhead in that enterprise. I feel it. There are lots of channels in which I can make myself useful. By the way, you can tell Mr. Caldwell that I did him a great favor some time ago without knowing him. A large lot of belts and cartridge boxes were detained here because the ordnance officers wanted more time to inspect them. But the troops needed them, and I ordered them to be hurried to

the front, and Caldwell got his money. You see? I want him to send me a definite proposition at once.

Yours truly,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Well, if such letters could be found among Washington's and Lincoln's private correspondence, and if it could be further discovered that Washington and Lincoln had publicly declared that the interest they had in those contracts was only such as any other citizen might have purchased on the Boston market, and that they could not have exercised any power with regard to those contracts, because in the one case it was the business of the Commissary and in the other of the Ordnance Department, and if Washington and Lincoln had taken those letters from Mr. Fisher's bookkeeper without authority and kept them notwithstanding a promise to return them, and if Washington and Lincoln before a committee of Congress investigating these things had time and again protested against inquiry into their private business, and if Washington and Lincoln had accumulated large fortunes while in office—then, I admit, the parallel would be justified, and Washington and Lincoln, too, might be enrolled in the order of Americans with a big A.

But as history knows them it would have been a delight to see Washington's boot kick the man suggesting such propositions out of his tent, and to hear Lincoln crying out at the insulting tempter, "Do you take me for a knave?" and whirling him down the stairs of the White House.

You see what Mr. Blaine's nomination has already done for us. Not only has it taken the moral backbone out of many living men who were aggressively honest before, but it has led even to the desecration of the graves of the dead. Washington and Lincoln had to be paraded

as tattooed men to make the American people forget the dark spots on the Republican candidate. Our great historic names, whose significance should ever be the inspiration of American youth, had to be dragged down into the dust to meet his. We have had to witness one of those infamous attempts at profanation which even the most passionate zeal of partisanship cannot excuse.

But if the mere nomination of Mr. Blaine has accomplished this, what would be the effects of his election to the Presidency? Imagine that event to have taken place. Imagine then one of the older men among us with the old-fashioned notions of better times to meet a company of young, able, active and aspiring politicians, and to discourse to them about their duties as public men. He would, of course, mention foremost among those duties unselfish devotion to the public interest, scrupulous honesty and the maintenance of the highest standard of official honor. You must not be surprised if an answer like this comes back: "Old friend, you are behind the times. That was good talk years ago, but only Pharisees and dudes speak so now, and they, you should know, are very ridiculous persons. As for us, we are going into politics to make money. We see various channels of usefulness there, and we are not going to be deadheads in anything that offers itself." "But," you object, "the people will never tolerate such a thing." What will the answer be? "You are behind the times again, old friend. Years ago the people might not have tolerated it, but now they do. They rather like it. Do you know the story of James G. Blaine? His case was clear enough. Everybody knew that he had been 'on the make' when he was Speaker of the House. There were the Mulligan letters and the testimony, and the fact that he had made a large fortune without any business. There could be no doubt about it. And what

happened? The Republican party nominated him for the Presidency. And Mr. Evarts made a long speech for him, with several jokes in it. And those who protested against it were laughed at as dudes and Pharisees. And he was elected President, and called the great representative American. You see the American people like this sort of thing. This is the way to wealth and to public honor at the same time, as in James G. Blaine's case. That is what we want too. It is the road to the Presidency. And some of us may get there in the same way. Let us be 'on the make,' then." What would you answer? Would not, in case of Mr. Blaine's election, all this be true, every word of it?

But more would be true; and here I ask for the attention of business men. Do you think that the contagion of that example would remain confined to the political field? Do you think that the sanction and encouragement, aye, the glorification which being "on the make" would receive by the popular vote for Mr. Blaine, would not be noticed by your cashiers and your bookkeepers and your salesmen and your clerks? Will not many of them ask themselves why they should be more conscientious in the discharge of their business duties and the use of their business opportunities than the man whom the American people honored with the Presidency was in the use of his opportunities as Speaker of the House of Representatives? Have you not had enough of that sort of thing? Do you want to give it an additional stimulus by letting every one in the country who handles other people's money or goods know that the American people regard being "on the make" by hook or crook rather as an elegant accomplishment which will not stand in the way of the highest honors?

Now, what does all this signify? It is what will follow if in electing a man with a notorious and conspicuous

record such as Mr. Blaine's to the Presidency of the United States, the American people take the fatal step of declaring the corrupt abuse of public power, the prostitution of official trust for private gain, will no longer be branded with dishonor, but will henceforth not even stand in the way of a man's promotion to the highest office of the Republic.

There is corruption enough now. But when the American people shall have proclaimed that they care nothing for a proper sense of honor in their public men and the public service, then a crop of corruption and demoralization will ripen such as we have never dreamed of. You complain now that the money kings and the great corporations have too much power in our public concerns. But when the American people by a solemn popular election shall have taught our politicians, young and old, that they can make themselves rich by the prostitution of official trust without fear of disgrace, that they may have pelf and public honor at the same time, there will be no limit to the corrupting power of wealth, and your dreaded money kings and corporations will do in open daylight what they now attempt in the dark. Corruption will irresistibly "broaden down from precedent to precedent." Its flood may overwhelm all that we hold dear and are proud of to-day.

Citizens of the United States, I warn you solemnly not to take this fatal leap. The honor of the American people, the vitality of our institutions, the whole future of the Republic are involved in the issue. Do you want to protect that honor, to save those institutions from deadly rot, and the future of the Republic from incalculable disaster and disgrace? There is but one thing to do. If a political party, however great and glorious, has been so forgetful of its dignity and its duty as to nominate a candidate for the Presidency conspicuously bearing the

fatal taint, then the American people must show that they have moral sense enough to reject him, and to reject him overwhelmingly. That is the way of salvation. There is no other.

It is vain for Mr. Blaine's friends to cry out that, however grave his offenses may have been, the people have already again and again condoned them. If it were so, it would be the highest time to reconsider before pronouncing the final verdict. But I deny it. It is not so. True, the legislature of Maine elected him a Senator, and the Republican National Convention nominated him as their candidate after his offenses had become known. So much the worse for the Maine legislature and for the Republican Convention. But they have only proved that *some* people have forgiven and forgotten his delinquencies. The question is, How many? *The American people* will pronounce their opinion on those offenses in November for the first time, and I trust it will be shown by an overwhelming majority that the American people have never forgotten them, and never will make the man guilty of them President of the United States.

In view of all this, of the glaring unfitness of the nomination, and of the fearful demoralization and disgrace the election of such a candidate by the American people would inflict upon this Republic, I do not hesitate to declare as my honest conviction that the consequences of Mr. Blaine's election, immediate and remote, would be far worse, infinitely more dangerous to our future as a Nation, than anything a Democratic Administration could under present circumstances bring with it. I mean exactly what I say. Take all the things which the most fanatical Republicans predict and the most nervous of them fear as to the possible results of Democratic success—a precipitate disturbance of our tariff policy, renewed troubles in the South, a clean sweep and a new

deal in all the Federal offices—consequences which I by no means admit as probable with such a President as the Democrats have nominated, at the head of affairs—but admit for argument's sake that all these things would follow; yet all the evils thus predicted—business confusion and financial loss, violence in the South and another carnival of spoils in the Federal offices—would only be of a temporary nature. The energy of our business community and the resources of the country would quickly help us over our financial embarrassments, and bad laws can be changed by amendment and repeal. New disorder in the South and a spoils carnival would quickly provoke an overwhelming reaction, and the guilty party would soon lose power again. All these apprehended results of a Democratic victory, if they really did occur, would, therefore, be only temporary. Subsequent action would obliterate them to the last trace. They would be like flesh wounds, painful enough at the time, but capable of easy and permanent healing. But you let the American people declare that in the bestowal of their highest trusts and distinctions they care nothing for official honor; that gross and systematic prostitution of official power for private gain, even in the most important positions in the Government, is not regarded by the people as an offense disqualifying a public man for the most exalted honor in the land, the Presidency of the United States—let the American people declare that, and you have injected into our system the virus of a disease which is not of a mere passing nature, which will not be easily and permanently cured by a mere reaction, but which will fester on and on, attacking the very fountain of our vitality. This is not a mere flesh wound—this is poisoning of the blood.

Therefore I repeat that nothing a Democratic success can bring with it will be as bad in its nature and as dangerous in its consequences to the future of the Republic as

the mere fact of Mr. Blaine's election. And I am ready further to declare that, for this reason, while I had my preferences among the Democratic candidates, I should have been willing, as against Mr. Blaine, to support any of them, provided he be an honest man with a perfectly untarnished record of official integrity. And here I may say, by the way, that some of Mr. Blaine's friends pretend that the nomination of Mr. Hendricks for the Vice-Presidency, together with Governor Cleveland in the first place, must be a great embarrassment to men of my way of thinking, and that we are unwilling to face it. They are mistaken. I am willing to face it. There are things in Mr. Hendricks's record, in the way of opinion and endeavor, which, I say it frankly, I was opposed to at the time and which I would oppose now were they to be repeated. But there is one thing which is not to be found in Mr. Hendricks's record, and that is the least flavor of corruption or of the prostitution of official power for private gain. Here is what the *New York Tribune* said of him some years ago: "An honest jurist, an able and incorruptible statesman and a wise politician, his views on public questions are entitled to great weight. His record as Senator, Representative, Commissioner and State legislator is pure and untarnished." And this happens to be now the main question. I therefore do not hesitate to say that were Mr. Hendricks not the candidate for the Vice-Presidency merely, but the Presidency itself, I should, in spite of our disagreements on subjects of policy, accept his election as a welcome escape from the blood poisoning with which Mr. Blaine's election would inevitably curse the American Republic.

Nobody can deny that I have treated Mr. Blaine fairly and with moderation. I have not depended upon statements made by his enemies or detractors. I have not even quoted the fiery denunciations poured upon him,

not many years ago, by some of his recently magnetized friends. I have discussed only one phase of his career, and only one salient point in that phase. I have not taken up his foreign policy in order to inquire whether it is true that he recklessly jeopardized the peace of the country, and that the most important international questions, as soon as he touched them, began to revolve around a claim and seemed to turn into a job. I have not touched his plan of distributing the surplus revenue, which, of course, involves the preservation of the surplus as the fountain of a multitude of jobs. I have not touched his original and curious conception that the people of Virginia should not repudiate their debt, but neither should they pay it, for the United States should pay it for them, and so on. All these things, interesting and instructive specimens of statesmanship, I have left aside. I have, as I said, discussed only one salient point in one phase of his career, and in doing so I have called to the stand as principal witness Mr. Blaine himself. By his own words, written and spoken—words authentic beyond cavil, words imprinted on the official records of the Government—Mr. Blaine has convinced me, and, I trust, has convinced you, that his defeat as a candidate for the Presidency is at this time the supreme duty of American citizenship. To vindicate the honor of the American name it should be done by a phenomenal majority, so that the world may know how strongly the American heart beats for righteousness and honest government. And to repair the honor of the Republican party it should be done by Republican votes. Yes, to repair the honor of the Republican party it should be done by Republican votes, to make it known that, while a strange debauchment of conscience permitted such a nomination to be made, the true Republican heart revolted at it, to undo by its own act the disgraceful mischief.

But here the partisan cry rises up that this would involve party defeat. Republicans, do you not see that the best Republican principles have already been defeated by that Republican nomination? Do you not see that those principles, which were the great soul of the Republican party, command you to maintain good government at any cost, be it even the timely sacrifice of party ascendancy? I am speaking to Republicans, and, I trust, to patriotic men and to men of sense. Many of you, perhaps, recoil from the thought of having the Government, by the defeat of the Republican party, pass into the hands of the Democrats. There was a time when such a transfer of power appeared to involve great danger. That was the time of the civil war, of supreme National peril. That time lies twenty years behind us. The Union is no longer in jeopardy. The existence of the Government as such is safe. We are in profound peace. I have shown you that, aside from the question of honesty in government, there is none the decision of which one way or the other would result in more than temporary inconvenience. This is an auspicious time for looking calmly at the nature of our Government and its requirements. Every thinking man will admit these propositions: republican government, as it has shaped itself, is government through political parties. This certainly does, in the nature of things, not mean that one party should remain in possession of the Government all the time. Such a state of things would inevitably in the long run bring forth very corrupt and very tyrannical government, because it would be irresponsible. What a long uninterrupted period of party ascendancy may accomplish we have already learned by painful experience. I go further, and affirm: The very notion that there is only one political party capable of carrying on the Government, or that there is only one party that can be trusted with it,

will in the long run become seriously dangerous to free institutions. A republic in which this assumption is practically maintained will be a republic only in name. The absurdity of the assumption is self-evident. The American people are almost equally divided in politics. In 1880 the Republican vote was 4,450,921; the Democratic vote, 4,447,888—about one-half of the people on one side and one-half on the other. If it were true that the existence of the Republic depended upon the ability of one-half of the people to keep the Government permanently in their own hands, and out of the hands of the other half, the Republic might as well wind up at once and have a receiver appointed. It is absurd. There must be, therefore, in the very nature of republican government, occasionally a change from one party to another.

Now, the Republican party has been in power for twenty-four successive years—nearly a quarter of a century. Candidly, my Republican friends, you cannot think that the Republican party should or can always remain in power. Does it not occur to you, when looking at the present condition of things, that it would have been much better for the Republican party had it already gone through the discipline of some interruption? At any rate, every sensible man knows that with the certainty of fate it will have to go out of power *sometime*. No sane being will deny this. Well, then, I beg you soberly to consider whether, all things taken into account, the present time is not as propitious a one as you can ever expect to find.

Look at the circumstances surrounding us. I repeat, we are in profound peace. Nobody will pretend that, as far as political parties are concerned, the existence of the country depends on the ascendancy of either of them. I have already shown you what dangerous consequences

the election of the Republican candidate would draw after it. I will, indeed, not say that Mr. Blaine is the most objectionable candidate the Republican party will ever nominate; for if you elect him, heaven only knows what that precedent may bring forth next. There may be at least a chance for geniuses of the school of Dorsey or Brady, or similar statesmen of magnetic faculties. But the very fact that the election of the present Republican nominee would pave the way for such a class of successors is in itself a strong reason why he should not be elected. This is bad enough; it would be folly to wait for worse and to invite it.

On the other hand, the Democratic party has never presented a candidate whom any friend of good government, Democrat or Republican, could see step into the Presidential chair with a greater feeling of security than Grover Cleveland. This time, therefore, is uncommonly propitious for a change of power, on account of the safety with which it can be effected. And here I may remark, by the way, that the scandalous stories recently circulated about Mr. Cleveland's private character have, to my knowledge, been inquired into by several parties separately—by men of high standing in Buffalo, by a clerical gentleman of the editorial staff of the *Independent* and by others—and that the reports of all of them, as they have come to me, based upon a conscientious study of the facts of the case, agree in pronouncing those stories monstrous calumnies on the man, which will recoil upon the inventors. The public will undoubtedly hear more from the investigators through the press. With this conviction I stand here speaking of Governor Cleveland. I beg Republicans to remember that when Mr. Cleveland was elected governor of New York two years ago, it was through Republican support that he received his enormous majority. And I am sure every Republican in New

York whose object was not mere party advantage, but an honest, able and fearless administration of public affairs for the public good, has ever since congratulated himself upon the support he gave that Democratic candidate. To be sure, while receiving the hearty approbation and applause of the friends of good government, Governor Cleveland also made enemies: the bitterest among them were the greedy politicians for whom he was not a good enough partisan because he was so good a governor; and he was so good a governor just because he was not a good enough partisan for them.

Mr. Blaine's advocates loudly complain that Governor Cleveland is not a statesman. It must be admitted that he is not a statesman in the Blaine sense. If he were, it would be dangerous to vote for him. He has evidently not the genius to be all things to everybody. He is not magnetic enough to draw every rascal to his support. He will probably be cold enough to freeze every job out of the White House. He is not brilliant enough to cover the whole world with flighty schemes. But, unless I am much mistaken, he possesses very much of that kind of statesmanship which is now especially required and for which Mr. Blaine has conspicuously disqualified himself. And that is the statesmanship of honest and efficient administration. What is the kind of business which under present circumstances the Executive branch of the National Government has to attend to? It is in the main administrative business. It is to see to it that the laws be faithfully and efficiently executed, and, to that end, to introduce and maintain honest and efficient methods for the execution of the laws, and to enforce the necessary responsibility. This is administration, and this is under present circumstances the principal business of the Executive. No flighty genius, therefore, is required to *make* business for the Government; but what we want

is solid ability and courageous integrity to see to it that the business which is found there be well done.

Of this kind of statesmanship Mr. Cleveland, as all who have impartially observed his career will admit, possesses in a high degree the instinct, and now also the experience. When he entered upon his duties as mayor of Buffalo, a few years ago, he said: "It seems to me that a successful and faithful administration of the government of a city may be accomplished by constantly bearing in mind that we are the trustees and agents of our fellow-citizens, holding their funds in sacred trust to be expended for their benefit; that we should at all times be prepared to render an honest account to them touching the manner of its expenditure; and that the affairs of the city should be conducted as far as possible upon the same principles as a good business man manages his private concerns." You may say that this is neither very brilliant nor quite original. But it contains after all the fundamental principles of honest and efficient administration, applicable not only to a city, but to a State and to the Nation. And when a public man coming into power speaks such words, and fully understands what they mean, and has the ability and courage to give them full effect, he possesses a statesmanship for executive office infinitely more valuable to the country than Mr. Blaine's statesmanlike skill and experience in making himself "useful in various channels," and being a deadhead in none.

And that Mr. Cleveland did understand the meaning of what he said and was determined to carry it out, he showed sometimes in a way which astonished the natives. Here is an instance: When the city council of Buffalo, composed of Democrats and Republicans, had passed a resolution approving an extravagant contract for street-cleaning, his veto message contained the following language: "This is a time for plain speech. I withhold my

assent from the same [the resolution] because I regard it as the culmination of a most barefaced, impudent and shameless scheme to betray the interests of the people and to worse than squander the public money. I will not be misunderstood in this matter. There are those whose votes were given for this resolution whom I can not and will not suspect of a willful neglect of the interests they are sworn to protect; but it has been fully demonstrated that there are influences, both in and about your honorable body, which it behooves every honest man to watch and avoid with the greatest care." This meant as plainly as parliamentary language could express it: "Gentlemen, there are some scoundrels among you. I know it. And I want you to know that I know it, and that I watch you, and that your schemes will not succeed as long as I am here." I like that kind of statesmanship. The taxpayers of Buffalo liked it. The people of the State soon showed that they liked it. And I think the people of the United States would like it too, the knaves always excepted.

Mr. Cleveland had never been a professed civil service reformer. But he soon showed that he understood and adopted the vital principles of civil service reform by instinct. He said in his letter of acceptance when nominated for the governorship: "Subordinates in public place should be selected and retained for their efficiency, and not because they may be used to accomplish partisan ends. The people have a right to demand here, as in cases of private employment, that their money be paid to those who will render the best service in return, and that the appointment to and tenure of such places should depend upon ability and merit." This is the whole in a nutshell. And he not only understood it and said it, but he acted accordingly when in power, for he favored and signed and faithfully helped to execute the civil

service act for the State of New York which embodies just these principles, although he knew that it cut off the loaves and fishes of public spoil in a great measure from his own party. But more. He said in the same letter of acceptance: "The expenditure of money to influence the action of the people at the polls or to secure legislation is calculated to excite the gravest concern. It is useless and foolish to shut our eyes to the fact that this evil exists among us, and the party which leads in an honest effort to return to better and purer methods will receive the confidence of our citizens and secure their support." Having said this, he favored and signed a prohibition of political assessments in the civil service of New York, although he knew that this measure would most severely curtail the electioneering funds of his own party.

As a member of the Civil Service Reform Association, I may say that when we prepared and urged a legislative reform measure we never inquired whether Governor Cleveland, although a Democrat, would sign it, because we knew he would if it was a good one. When the citizens of New York City sought to correct the crying abuses of their municipal government, they, too, always counted with the same confidence upon the governor, no matter whether the Democratic or the Republican party might be hurt by a measure of true reform, and that confidence was always justified. And, by the way, it is rather a shabby piece of business that some of the gentlemen who leaned upon the governor as one of their principal pillars of strength, and were then full of praise of him for his courageous resistance to party pressure, should throw paltry quibbles at him since he has become a candidate for the Presidency. Had he not been nominated it would have been said that the unbending courage for the right with which he resisted pressure coming from his own party was the very thing that defeated him. It

was, indeed, the thing which made his enemies hate him so bitterly. But take his whole record. When he ceased to be mayor of Buffalo a Republican paper said: "Yesterday Buffalo lost the best mayor she ever had." When he ceases to be governor, to become President of the United States, these very gentlemen will say: "New York never had a more efficient governor than this."

In justice we are bound to say that here is a man whose ideas of honest, intelligent and efficient administration are remarkably clear and correct; who has not only promised but performed; whose performance, in fact, went ahead of the manifesto; who has proved himself to possess in an eminent degree the principal requisites of executive efficiency, which are incorruptible integrity, a clear head, a well-informed mind, a devotion to duty shrinking from no labor, a cool judgment, a high sense of official honor, a keen instinct of justice and that rare courage which, whenever the public good requires it, firmly resists not only the opposition of a hostile party but, which is more difficult, the entreaty of party friends. You fear that another party coming into power will, in its eagerness to get possession of the offices, turn out the good men together with the bad, and you ask whether there is a man who as President would be strong enough to withstand the pressure of his partisans. I admit you cannot find many strong enough to do this, but I do not think I risk anything in saying that Mr. Cleveland is one of the few. I should not be surprised if he were the strongest of them all. As to the higher spheres of statesmanship, it may be remembered that in every position of power assigned to him he has shown an ability to perform its duties beyond the expectations of his friends. And when he now says, as he did a week ago in accepting the nomination, that he considers himself pledged to give to the people "the utmost benefits of a pure and honest ad-

ministration of national affairs," we may recall the fact that so far not one of his pledges has remained unfulfilled. Indeed, a man with just such a public record and just such qualities might be seen in the Presidential chair without alarm, whatever party name he may bear; for he need only follow his own example in order to adopt from any party what is good, and to reject, even coming from his own party, what is bad. He would be especially what the hour demands: The representative of courageous conscience in the administration of public affairs.

You will admit, therefore, my Republican friends, that if a change of party in power must come sometime, the present time is an exceedingly propitious one, considering the safety with which the inevitable transition can now be effected. You can scarcely hope to find a man more peculiarly adapted to the occasion.

But, let me repeat, even if it were not so, even if greater risks were to be taken and real perils to be feared, the duty of the hour would always remain the same. It is to defeat a candidate whose election to the Presidency would be a proclamation to all the world that a high sense of official honor is no longer required in the Government of the United States, and that the American people consider a man who has offered for prostitution his official power to make money as still worthy of the highest honors of the Republic, to be held up as a model for emulation to this and coming generations.

Republicans, I yield to none of you in pride of the spirit and the great achievements of the Republican party in the past. There are undoubtedly men before me who took an active part in the great Republican campaign of 1860. I know you will feel your pulse beat quicker when you remember the joyous glow with which the enthusiastic consciousness of a noble cause filled our hearts; with what eagerness we went into the conflict, having nothing to

apologize for and nothing to conceal; with what affection and confidence we commended to the suffrages of the people our standard bearer, honest Abraham Lincoln. Remember how, under Republican guidance, the American Union was washed clean of the stain of slavery, and the great rebellion was vanquished, and Abraham Lincoln was borne once more on our shield, with the same faith and the same affectionate confidence, for the trials of power had given to his honesty still more radiant luster.

And now, after twenty-four years of uninterrupted ascendancy, what has the party come to? Look at it, the party of moral ideas, presenting as its great leader and representative a man whose unclean record it cannot deny and dare not face. Listen to its spokesmen, how they dodge and squirm around that record as something too hot to touch—unfortunate attorneys, wretchedly troubled by the feeling that, if they respect themselves, they must take care not to become identified with the public morals of their client. Watch them, how they use the tariff question as a great fig leaf which they stretch and spread to make it cover and hide the crookedness of their standard bearer! What a burning shame and disgrace is this! Pride of party indeed! Those who are truly proud of the good the party has done will be too proud to consent to its degrading perversion into an instrument of evil. If the great party which abolished slavery and saved the Republic is to serve as an instrument to poison the life of the same Republic by crowning corruption with its highest honors, then the truly proud Republicans will wash their hands of it.

As they understood the great problem of the anti-slavery period, so they understand the great problem of to-day. The contest in which we are engaged is not a mere crusade against one man. It is not a mere race between two. It is one of the great struggles for the

vitality of this Nation, the second one in our days. In 1860, when the slave-power had stretched out its hand to secure its ascendancy in this Union forever, we fought to reestablish the fundamental condition of human society, which is freedom. And now, when the corrupt tendencies stimulated by the civil war and the commotions following it culminate in reaching for the prestige of National approval, we fight to reestablish the fundamental condition of good government, which is honesty. The cause of to-day is no less great and vital than was the cause of twenty-five years ago, and those who were proudest to stand up for freedom then will be proud to stand up for honest government now.

This is not the cause of a mere party. It is greater than any party. It is in the broadest sense the cause of the people, the cause of all classes and honorable occupations, alike. It speaks the language of interest and says to our merchants and business men: You know that the successful working of commerce and trade hangs upon trust between man and man. You need credit as a nation as you need confidence between individuals. If you discover that a managing man in your business is in secret concert with any of your customers, and uses the opportunities of his position for his own personal profit, you confide in him no longer, but you discharge him. If you learn that the cashier of your bank so uses the opportunities of his place, you distrust the institution and withdraw your deposits. What will you think of yourselves, what will the world think of your business judgment and your sense of honesty, if in something far greater than your shop or your bank, if in the Government of your country you promote the man who has done this, to the highest place of honor and trust? You complain that the credit of our great enterprises has most injuriously suffered at home and abroad by the unscrupulous tricks

of the inside rings in corporate management. How will it be if you give the solemn sanction of your votes to something akin to the same practice in the Government of the Republic?

This is the cause of labor and says to the workingmen: What you need above all things is a government of just laws and of honest men to execute the laws. You need men who have the conscience and courage to say "No" to you when the law forbids that which you may ask for; for such men will have the conscience and courage to say "No" to those more powerful than you when they ask for what is unjust and injurious to you. Beware of the demagogue who the more he flatters you with promises to-day, the more he will be likely to betray you to-morrow. Beware of the political jobber, for in the very nature of things he is always the monopolist's own pet and bed-fellow. How can you, laboring men, so betray your own interests as to support a candidate whose election will mean that in the opinion of the American people jobbery in the Government is a legitimate occupation, not to be punished, but to be honored?

This is the cause of patriotism and national pride, and it says to every citizen of the Republic: Do you want the world abroad to respect the American name? Then show them first that the American people respect themselves. The American people will show how they respect themselves by the choice they make for their highest honors. Ask yourselves, Americans, how this Republic will stand in the esteem of mankind, and how its influence will be upheld by the confidence of nations if the American people by a solemn vote proclaim to the world that official honor is to them a thing of indifference, and that they select their President from among those who have traded on high official trust to make money.

And in the face of all this still the cry of "Party!"

Woe to the republic whose citizens think of party and nothing but party, when the honor of their country and the vitality of their Government are at stake! But, happily, what an impotent cry it is in these days! Look around you and see what is going on. The time of a new migration of political forces seems to have come. The elements are restlessly moving, in all directions breaking through the barriers of old organizations. Here they march and there, some with uncertain purpose, crossing one another's paths and sometimes even their own. No doubt, one of the candidates of the two great parties will be President. But neither of the two parties, when it issues from the struggle, will be what it was before. This is the disorder which evolves new energies, for good or for evil. Such are periods of promise, but also of danger. What will come we cannot foresee. But in the confusion that surrounds us it is the part of patriotic men to stand together with clear heads and one firm purpose. Their duty is plain. It is to see to it that, whatever the future may build up, its foundations at least be kept sound; that the honor of the American people be preserved intact, and that all political parties, new or old, become forever impressed with the utter hopelessness of any attempt to win success without respecting that vital condition of our greatness and glory, which is honest government.

TO HENRY C. BOWEN

110 W. 34TH ST., NEW YORK, Aug. 6, 1884.

Last Monday I was in the office of the *Independent* at the instance of your son who desired me to look at an article written by Dr. Ward upon the Cleveland scandal. I did so and found that the article was based upon information which entirely coincided with that which I had received from Buffalo myself. The conclusions to which

Dr. Ward had come seemed to me also entirely justified, and I was rejoiced to see reason to hope that the *Independent* would give its powerful aid in guiding the conscience of the country by positive advice through the acknowledged difficulties of the present situation. I need not say that I was greatly disappointed in not finding the article in the number of the *Independent* which appeared to-day, and considering the large number of people who are looking to the *Independent* for counsel, and some of whom had already been led by me to expect positive advice now, I cannot help thinking that its non-appearance is a public misfortune so great that I cannot refrain from writing you about it.

The cause we are engaged in is the cause of honesty in politics. The election of a man like Mr. Blaine would be such an encouragement to the base and rapacious impulses apt to govern the conduct of politicians, it would so demoralize the public mind and open the floodgates of corruption so wide, that it is no exaggeration to say the success of our free institutions is at stake. I carried out that idea, which unquestionably is the true issue of this campaign, in a speech which I delivered last night at Brooklyn. I may say that I am convinced all the great vital questions of the anti-slavery struggle are in this, and while in the anti-slavery struggle we could wait, a defeat in this present contest would be a decisive one and produce consequences which cannot be obliterated.

I think I am not wrong in believing that the present silence of the *Independent* is owing to the scandals recently told about Mr. Cleveland by some newspapers. I understand also that the investigation carried on by Dr. Twining comes to the same conclusion at which other investigators of the same case have arrived, and that the only thing of importance it leaves standing in the case is the charge of bastardy. I would certainly not ask and expect you to

make light of this charge. But what alarms me and what would greatly distress other friends of good government is the apprehension, that your laudable desire to vindicate and promote virtue in all private relations might be allowed to stand in the way of your making your great influence felt in behalf of the great cause of *public* virtue in the present pressing emergency. You will certainly not fail to see that if this cause does not receive the full support of those devoted to it now, the consequences will be so disastrous to the whole American people that no good man in a position of influence will like to share the responsibility for having checked the movement for honest government now going on, on such grounds.

TO ALBERT H. WALKER

NEW YORK, Aug. 7, 1884.

I have received your kind letter of yesterday and beg leave to say in reply that I shall read with sincere interest your defense of Mr. Blaine when you make it, and you will do me a favor by sending me a copy of it so that it may under no circumstances escape my attention. And you may count upon it that, if you convince me of error either in my premises or my conclusions, I shall candidly say so. But, as I have given much thought to this matter and spared no trouble to get at the truth, and as I know I have made my inquiries and drawn my conclusions in a conscientious spirit, I cannot refrain from saying that, so far, I firmly believe I am right.

FROM GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS

ASHFIELD, MASS., Aug. 15, 1884.

I thank you for the copy of your speech. Nothing could be better in matter and manner, in tone and structure. It

is a model of the best political oratory and a masterly presentation of the case. There will be nothing so good said upon either side during the campaign.

I see that Blaine has begun a suit for libel, and I am very glad, for if a story so universally told and believed be untrue, the untruth ought to be known. The suit is a very important event in the canvass—for if the story should be substantiated Blaine is ruined—and if disproved, the reaction will cover the public offenses. Cleveland will be seriously hurt by his scandal?

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TO PAUL BECHTNER

INDIAN HARBOR HOTEL,
GREENWICH, CONN., Aug. 20, 1884.

Your letter of the 16th inst., presenting to me in the name of the "signers" an open reply to my Brooklyn speech, has been forwarded to me here. I am certainly far from underestimating the merit of that "reply" as a literary effort; but you must pardon me for saying that, with the best possible intention, I cannot find anything in it that in the remotest sense could stand as an answer to, or a refutation of, the arguments submitted by me to my hearers at Brooklyn. On the contrary, it seems to me to betray a dangerous want of apprehension as to the facts in the case, as well as the importance of them with regard to the public welfare. However, I shall not enlarge upon this subject in this letter which is to be a mere acknowledgment of yours, for it has long been my intention to visit Milwaukee during this campaign, and I shall avail myself of that opportunity to make a few remarks on your "open reply" in public speech. I shall urgently invite the signers of the document addressed to me, to give me the honor of their personal presence on that occasion.

TO GEORGE F. HOAR

NEW YORK, Aug. 22, 1884.

Senator: In the newspapers I find a letter addressed by you to a friend, the principal object of which seems to be to discredit some of the statements made by me in a speech recently delivered at Brooklyn. You will pardon me for pointing out to you some serious mistakes into which your zeal for your friend Mr. Blaine seems to have betrayed you. Among them the following are the most important:

1. On June 29, 1869, Mr. Blaine, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, wrote to Mr. W. Fisher, Jr., thanking him for having admitted him (Speaker Blaine) to a participation in "the new railroad enterprise," the Little Rock road, and expressing a strong desire to have Mr. Caldwell also "dispose of a share of his interest" to him (Speaker Blaine), adding that he felt he would "not prove a deadhead in the enterprise," and "saw various channels in which he knew he could make himself useful." Mr. Caldwell hesitated to comply with Speaker Blaine's wish. Thereupon, Mr. Blaine, three months afterward, on October 4th, wrote Mr. Fisher two letters, in which he related quite circumstantially how he (Speaker Blaine) had, without knowing it, and in a correct way, done the Little Rock road and Mr. Caldwell a great favor by an exercise of his power as Speaker. At the same time he reiterated his "anxious" request for the share of Mr. Caldwell's interest in the enterprise spoken of three months before, suggesting to Mr. Fisher to tell Mr. Caldwell about the "favor."

The question is what Speaker Blaine meant when he said that he would not be a deadhead in the enterprise, and that he saw various channels in which he knew he could make himself useful; and also what the object was of the letters of October 4th. You say Speaker Blaine

meant simply that he was acquainted with many capitalists, and had peculiar facilities for placing bonds. Does it not occur to you that, if Mr. Blaine had meant this, it would have been the most natural thing for him to say so? *But he did not say so. He did say something else.* I expressed the opinion that Speaker Blaine meant to point to the exercise of his official power as the channel of his usefulness. I think this, for the simple reason that this was *the thing, and the only thing, he did point at* in two letters written on one day, requesting that Mr. Caldwell be told of it, and at the same time repeating his urgent demand for a share in Mr. Caldwell's interest. On which side do we find the evidence, the only evidence there is—on yours or on mine?

2. You say this was, after all, a very innocent matter, for "it is one of the most gratifying things in life to a man charged with legislative duties to encounter a person to whom he has fairly rendered a service," and to mention it to him, and that it is the "acme of uncharitableness" to see anything wrong in it. Very well. Let me adopt one of your illustrations. You meet an old soldier and say: "My old friend, I have worked to get you your pension, and did get it for you. It has given me great pleasure." This is virtuous and pleasant. But how would it be if you said: "My old friend, I got your pension for you, and now I want twenty per cent. of it"? When the Speaker says to a railroad man: "I rendered you and your road in a perfectly proper way a great favor, and I am glad I did it," that is one thing. But when the Speaker says to a railroad man: "I did you such and such a service by the exercise of my power, *and now I want you to give me a valuable interest in your enterprise*; I know I am not going to be a deadhead in it, and I see various channels in which I can be useful"—is not that quite another thing? But that is just what Mr. Blaine did.

3. You say it is not true that when Mr. Blaine read the Mulligan letters in the House the order in which he read them tended to create the least difficulty in understanding them. What is the fact? He read those of October 4th first, and then one of July 2d, and then the one of June 29th, which contained the "deadhead" and the "channels of usefulness," thus just reversing the order of time and connection. Did he put the cart before the horse to make the thing intelligible?

4. You say that the charge of falsehood as to Mr. Blaine's solemn declaration before the House that the Little Rock road derived all its value from the State of Arkansas, and not from Congress, is unfounded. What are the facts? That Mr. Blaine made that statement with reference, to use his own words, "to the question of propriety involved in a Member of Congress holding an investment of this kind," you cannot deny. The object of the statement confessedly was to convey the impression that the House, over which Speaker Blaine presided, had no power over that land-grant road or its interests and values, and that his owning or his asking for an interest in it while he was Speaker was a proper and harmless thing. Now, Mr. Blaine knew perfectly well that the original grants were made nominally to States, but really for specific lines. So in this case. The original Act of February, 1853, granted land to Arkansas and Mississippi "to aid in the construction of a railroad from a point upon the Mississippi river opposite the mouth of the Ohio river, via Little Rock, to the Texas boundary, near Fulton, in Arkansas, with branches to Fort Smith and the Mississippi river." Mr. Blaine knew further that the very bill referred to in his two letters of October 4th, by promoting the passage of which he had done Mr. Caldwell "a great favor," was "an act to extend the time *for the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railway Company* to complete

the first section of twenty miles of said road," thus keeping the land grant *for the benefit of that road alive by Congressional action* beyond the time originally conditioned. He knew further that in addition to this, Congress had in 1872 passed an act relieving the Little Rock road of certain restrictions concerning the sale of granted lands which had been imposed in 1869. And now I ask you, Senator, whether in the face of all these acts of *Congressional* legislation, Mr. Blaine's solemn statement before the House of Representatives, by which he tried to whitewash himself—that "the company derived its life franchise *and value* wholly from the State," and that "the Little Rock road derived *all that it had* from the State of Arkansas, *and not from Congress*," and that the company was "*amenable and answerable to the State and not in any sense to Congress*," was anything else than a deliberate, unblushing untruth, known by him to be such?

You also deny that when Mr. Blaine, on the same solemn occasion, declared he had never received any Fort Smith bonds, "except at precisely the same rate that others paid," he said what was not true. Again, what are the facts? Mr. Blaine's words before the House of Representatives were these:

In common with hundreds of other people in New England and other parts of the country, *I bought some of these bonds*—not a very large amount—paying for them *at precisely the same rates that others paid*. I never heard, and do not believe, *that the Little Rock Company ever parted with a bond to any person except at the regular price fixed for their sale*. Instead of receiving bonds of the Little Rock and Fort Smith road as a gratuity, *I never had one except at the regular market price*.

When Mr. Blaine said this to the House of Representatives on April 24, 1876, before the Mulligan papers

became public, he knew, but the public did then not know, that he had received large quantities of bonds upon the following contract:

Boston, Sept. 5, 1869.

Whereas, I have this day entered into agreements with A. & P. Coburn, and sundry other parties resident in Maine, to deliver to them certain specified amounts of the common stock, preferred stock and first-mortgage bonds of the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad Company, upon said parties paying to me the aggregate sum of \$130,000, which several agreements are witnessed by J. G. Blaine, and delivered to said parties by said Blaine:

Now, this agreement witnesses, that upon the due fulfilment of the several contracts referred to, by the payment of the \$130,000, and for other valuable considerations, the receipt of which is acknowledged, I hereby agree to deliver to J. G. Blaine or order, as the same come into my hands as assignee of the contract for building the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad the following securities, namely: Of the land bonds, 7 per cents., \$130,000; of the first-mortgage bonds, gold, 6's, \$32,500. And these \$130,000 of land bonds and \$32,500 of first-mortgage bonds thus agreed to be delivered to said Blaine are over and above the securities agreed to be delivered by Warren Fisher, Jr., assignee, to the parties making the contracts, which parties with the several amounts to be paid by each and the securities to be received by each, are named in a memorandum on the next page of this sheet.

And it is further agreed that, in the event of any one of said parties failing to pay the amount stipulated, then the amount of securities to be delivered to said Blaine under this agreement shall be reduced in the same proportion that the deficit of payment bears to the aggregate amount agreed to be paid.

WARREN FISHER, Jr., Assignee.

That this contract was carried out appears from a memorandum in Mr. Blaine's own handwriting produced

by Mr. Mulligan before the Investigating Committee in Mr. Blaine's presence without a word of objection from him as to its correctness. And in the face of this contract, and of the fact that large quantities of Little Rock bonds went to Mr. Blaine, according to the memorandum, without any payment on his part, as a gratuity or commission for Little Rock securities passing to A. & P. Coburn and other parties from Mr. Fisher, Mr. Blaine had the hardihood to say that the "Little Rock Company never parted with a bond to any one except at the regular price fixed for their sale," and that he himself "never had one except at the regular market price." In both these cases Mr. Blaine evidently said what was not true; he knew it to be untrue when he said it, and he said it with the obvious intent to deceive the House of Representatives and the "44,000,000 of his countrymen" whom Mr. Blaine "took into his confidence." How do you call this? I know how you would have called it before Mr. Blaine's nomination, but that nomination seems to have had a strangely confusing effect upon party men's notions as to public morals. To call it "brilliant audacity in the handling of truth," may suit the vocabulary of the modern era better.

5. You say that I lay too much stress upon Mr. Blaine's energetic protest against "the prying into his private affairs"; that I forget the circumstances; that Mr. Blaine was then a candidate for the Presidency; that the inquiry was instituted by his Democratic opponents, etc. Do you mean to suggest that a public man in high station, whose official integrity is seriously questioned, should accept and facilitate investigation only by his party friends? You will certainly not deny that Mr. Blaine had strong friends upon that committee. But a public man of a high sense of honor, rather than submit to continued suspicion, will invite investigation by his opponents, not try to

baffle it. Feeling himself innocent, he will throw wide open the doors of knowledge, the wider the better. He will not fear the appearance of suspicious circumstances, for he will be ready and eager to explain them. He will not increase and justify suspicion by concealment. Only the guilty will rest under suspicion, because he fears exposure and conviction. The character of the things Mr. Blaine succeeded in covering up we are left to infer from the character of those which came out against his remonstrance. You think George Washington would have raved with anger if his "private correspondence" had been inquired into by a committee of Tories? Neither you nor I know how that would have been. But of one thing I am very sure—in Washington's "private correspondence" nothing would have been found in the remotest degree resembling the Mulligan letters.

6. You say that Mr. Blaine's offenses have not been "condoned," but that he has been "triumphantly acquitted"; that this has been done by the governor and the legislature of Maine sending him to the Senate, by his appointment to the Cabinet and by his nomination for the Presidency. Let us see. Did these events in the least change the facts in Mr. Blaine's record? Can it be said after these events that Mr. Blaine did not write the Mulligan letters, that he did not make the false statements before the House, that he did not protest and struggle against inquiry into what he called his "private business"? Of course not. Did they change in any sense the character of those facts? Certainly not. What, then, did they effect? They showed only that some people, when they bestowed public honors upon Mr. Blaine, either did not know these facts or chose to overlook them for party reasons, or regarded them as compatible with the standard according to which, in their opinion, public honors should be bestowed. But does this relieve other

people of their duty as citizens to form a conscientious judgment upon these same things, and to vote accordingly? I wonder whether you would apply your triumphant-acquittal rule with equal readiness to other cases. I am informed that your opinion of General Butler has long been quite unfavorable. General Butler was elected to the governorship of Massachusetts two years ago. He has been nominated for the Presidency by Greenbackers and Anti-monopolists. Did that change in any way the facts constituting his record? Did it change your opinion of those facts? Were that election and these nominations, in your opinion, a "triumphant acquittal"? The mere statement of the proposition is sufficient to show the absurdity of it.

As to Mr. Blaine's case, the generality of American citizens are now for the first time called upon to declare whether his public record is regarded by them as compatible with the standard according to which the American people are willing to bestow the highest honor and trust in this Republic. If the American people declare that it is, then our public men, great and small, will have learned that they may work in their "various channels of usefulness" to make themselves rich, with the same spirit of enterprise and the same brilliant audacity in the handling of facts which they will have been taught to admire in the model set up for them without fear of endangering their preferment in the highest places. What the consequent effects of this upon the future of the Republic are likely to be, I have endeavored to set forth in my Brooklyn speech. Of the effect which Mr. Blaine's mere nomination has already produced, your way of defending him furnishes, I regret to say, an instructive example.

7. You are greatly mistaken when you "take it for granted that what Mr. Schurz has not said in this speech

against the personal honesty of Mr. Blaine is not worth saying." There are many more facts in Mr. Blaine's record which just begin to form the subject of popular discussion, and which may in a most urgent manner call for your attention before the end of this campaign. I confined myself carefully to a few representative points which rested upon Mr. Blaine's own letters, speeches and oral testimony alone. Neither can I accept the compliment that my Brooklyn speech is an unusual exhibition of "clear and skillful statement." Whatever strength that speech possesses consists simply in the circumstance that it is the sober truth, plainly spoken. And just there is your trouble.

TO ALBERT H. WALKER

NEW YORK, Sept. 2, 1884.

Private.

I can say only a few words in reply to your kind letter, as I am very much occupied, being on the point of leaving for a long Western trip.

1. The letters of June 29th and October 4th do actually belong together. They treat of the same subject. The letters of October 4th are only the upshot of Mr. Blaine's impatience at Caldwell's long hesitancy. He wanted to stir him up by putting before him a strong inducement for joining interests with him. This seems to me perfectly clear. No other explanation has, as far as I have heard, the least ground to stand upon.

2. As to Mr. Blaine's statements to the House, he wanted to make the House and the country believe that his having an interest in the Little Rock road was not improper, because the interests of the road did not in any way depend upon Congressional action, and, secondly, that he had not been in any sense favored by the Little

Rock people in obtaining the bonds. Even if it could be made out that these statements were *technically* correct, they would still remain actually false. A man under such circumstances has no right to shield himself by mere technicalities. But his statements were technically as false as they were actually. The subsequent miscarriage of the speculation did not in the least degree change its character. His arrangement with Fisher was intended to be an extremely advantageous one to him. He actually did get the bonds without paying for them.

3. As to Mr. Blaine's conduct before the Investigating Committee, his protests against any inquiry into his "private business," being the business transactions of the Speaker of the House with land-grant railroads—etc., etc., that is largely a question as to what standard we apply to such things. In my opinion no man of a high sense of official honor will for a moment think of conducting himself as Mr. Blaine did.

Pardon these hasty, offhand remarks.

TO R. R. BOWKER

DAYTON, O., Sept. 21, 1884.

Your letter of the 16th reached me yesterday. I had one from Mr. [George Fred.] Williams of Boston at the same time. I wrote him that as to "making a new speech" for circulation as a campaign document, I am saying new things all the time but, as I am travelling 100 to 150 miles a day and am constantly surrounded by crowds of people, I have not time to sit down and write out a new argument. You must go on disseminating my Brooklyn speech, which after all contains the whole case. You may supplement it with my answer to Hoar, the new Mulligan letters and such other things as you can pick up.

You intimated that something more was to come out about Blaine. How is that?

I am having arrangements made for meetings in Ohio from October 6th to 10th inclusive. On the 11th I shall then speak once more at Chicago, and on the 13th I can be at Buffalo, speaking at a number of places along the New York Central road, to be at New York again on Sunday, October 19th. These meetings might now be arranged for. Other meetings in New York and those in Connecticut and New Jersey can be fixed upon afterwards. It will be time when I am in New York, from September 28th to October 4th.

But am I to remain the only Independent speaker in the field? Is there no one to take a part of the burden? We have plenty of able men in Boston and New York. They are needed here, for the State of Ohio is in doubt, and the October election may decide the whole campaign. Is nobody available? I must say that I begin to feel a little lonesome in this struggle. Where is Curtis? And where are the able speakers from Massachusetts? They ought all to be here, now or as soon as possible, before the October election. I cannot do it all alone.

P. S. There is a great demand for the German edition of my Brooklyn speech in this State. Send as many as you can raise.

TO JAMES BRYCE

NEW YORK, NOV. 9, 1884.

As to the double-chamber system in our Constitutions, Federal and State, it may be said not to be a subject of discussion at all in this country. It is generally looked upon as a natural—I might say as a matter of course—part of our political arrangements, so much so, indeed, that a proposition to abolish it, even when coming from a respectable quarter, would scarcely find any serious

consideration. On the whole I think the popular judgment is right in this respect. The double-chamber system, as we have it in our State legislatures, was designed principally to prevent hasty and ill-considered legislation; and this it has done and is doing—of course not always, but in a sufficient measure to keep itself in favor with the people. Now and then a senate is criticized as assuming airs or as grasping for power, and that sort of thing—sometimes, as in the case of the Senate of the United States, not unjustly; but these things have never gone so far as to make the system, as such, in any degree obnoxious or unpopular, or to affect the general appreciation of its usefulness. It may also be said that the upper houses, in Congress as well as in State legislatures, are usually composed of a class of men somewhat superior to those in the lower houses. The general average is usually higher. Moreover, as you are aware, the people of the United States have long been accustomed to look to the Senate at Washington for thorough debates on the public questions most interesting to them, and during the larger part of our history the American people have regarded the Senate as an institution they had reason to be proud of. Originally, when the Constitution of the United States was formed, the institution of the Senate very naturally suggested itself as the representation of the States; but I have no doubt, even if the historic conception of the sovereignty or the rights of the several States were ever so much weakened, the practical value of the Senate as the upper house of the National Legislature would remain very much the same in popular estimation. And that practical value is the only point considered here, as our upper houses do not represent privileged classes or separate interests, but are justly looked upon without any jealousy or apprehension as mere parts, but useful parts, of the legislative machinery. The opinions here

expressed are not only my own, but, I am confident, those of the American people generally.

TO GROVER CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, NOV. 15, 1884.

My dear Sir: I put off my congratulations until all uncertainty was over, but I need scarcely assure you that they are none the less sincere and cordial. I congratulate you not only on your personal success, but on the great opportunities before you to render the country services of inestimable value. You will have it largely in your power to relieve the people of the morbid apprehensions that the passage of the Government from one party to another involves all the perilous chances of a great revolution. You can lift party politics up to a higher plane by striking the decisive blow at the spoils system. You can extend and perpetuate the reform of the civil service. You can thus bring about a state of things in which public questions can once more be discussed on their own merits. By all this you can inspire the American people with greater confidence in their institutions and in their future than they have felt for a long time. And it cannot but be flattering to you to know that there are a great many people who believe not only that you can, but that you will do these things.

In order to accomplish them you will no doubt have to go through very hard struggles with that element whose first impulse after a victory is to reach for the spoils. I know how hard such a struggle is, for I have witnessed some of it myself. The onset on you will probably be fiercer than any we have seen in our generation. The character, and consequently the fate, of your Administration is not unlikely to be determined at the start, within

the first three months, perhaps in the first thirty days after your inauguration. The crucial test will not be the tariff question; for that, I am confident, will settle itself more easily than many people now suppose. But, it is the civil service question which will present itself for decision at once, and unless decided rightly, will continue to harass you without ceasing. If you decide it rightly and firmly stick to the decision, it will stay decided, and your Administration will mark one of the most important turning-points in our political development,—so important indeed, and so salutary in its significance that to stand in history identified with it might satisfy the ambition of any man. A failure would of course be all the more deplorable as opportunities so great occur but rarely.

Will you pardon me for speaking thus freely in a letter of congratulation? Having the fullest confidence in your high purposes I thought you would not take it amiss. You can easily understand that I should feel a very deep interest in your success, and I need scarcely say that I most heartily wish your Administration may become the greatest possible honor to yourself and the greatest possible blessing to our country. If I can serve you in any way as a private citizen I shall be glad to do so. From this time on you will be approached by few men who can candidly say that they do not want from you something or other for themselves or their friends. As one of these few I might sometimes find occasion to speak to you perhaps more frankly than others differently interested, and to venture now and then upon a suggestion or the communication of some piece of experience not likely to come from those usually pressing around men in power. I would do this, of course, only if agreeable to you and without any inclination to intrude. And I wish to assure you also that whatever may come from me in this way may be

received under all circumstances without the least sense of obligation on your part.

Again offering to you my cordial good wishes, I remain
Very truly yours.

Governor GROVER CLEVELAND.

TO GEORGE FRED. WILLIAMS

110 W. 34TH ST., NEW YORK, NOV. 16, 1884.

Well, we may say that we have fought a good fight and done the country some service which we have reason to be proud of. The Cleveland majority in this State has at last been confirmed by the official canvass in the counties, and this morning even the *Tribune* gave up its crazy pranks and confessed its defeat. To-day I thought it time at last to mail my congratulations to Cleveland, the last shadow of danger of a setback having vanished. Now we shall have to hold up his arms in well-doing to the best of our ability. We must not permit him to see and hear nothing but the talk of the officeseekers and their friends who from this time on will constantly press around and upon him.

There is one thing I would strongly recommend to you and our friends in Massachusetts generally. Try to get hold of Patrick Collins and other Democratic Congressmen from your State, to indoctrinate them as much as possible with sound civil service reform principles, and to make them understand that any failure in this respect would quickly bring about a reaction and sweep them out of power again. They should be made to see that of all things this is the one that cannot be trifled with.—Cordially your friend.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

WILMINGTON, DEL., Nov. 17, 1884.

My dear Schurz: The canvass just ended has been so critical, and the part you have borne in it so honorable and important that I want to say so to you with a great deal of emphasis. Ever since I came to know you in the Senate my respect for your character and admiration for your abilities have grown apace. There has been a great deal to wound you in the malign assaults of those who cannot appreciate the true intent of your action; and, naturally, bitter resentment from those whose selfish and dangerous plans you have so boldly exposed and overthrown, so that a tribute of appreciative and grateful acknowledgment from a man who ardently loves this country and aspires to serve it worthily may not unpleasantly be mingled in your cup.

In his own measure and mode each of us has helped to guard the republican institutions from peril and degradation, and I trust your hands may be strengthened by official power to make the victory you have so powerfully assisted, fruitful of good results.

I know but little personally of the President-elect. Heaven grant that he may comprehend and fulfil the needs of the hour.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, Nov. 21, 1884.

I thank you most sincerely for your cordial letter of the 17th. I need not tell you how I value your good opinion. The approval and esteem of good, patriotic men is after all, next to the accomplishment of good ends, the best reward offered by public life. The attacks you mention which I had to endure in the late campaign were indeed cruel enough. Of course, I have seen a good deal of that sort of thing before; but it was a novel experience to be vilified most meanly and maliciously by a paper which

pretended to be on the side of the same candidate whose election I advocated. Well, when we go forth to fight for a good cause, we must also be willing to suffer for it. Words like yours, my dear friend, are well calculated to make me forget it all.

We have all done our duty in this important contest, and now let us hope that our success will be a blessing to the country. Personally, I know no more of the President-elect than you do; but I believe that he is a thoroughly honorable and patriotic man, and also a man of courage. It is generally assumed that he will call you to the head of the Cabinet, and as it would be *the* natural thing to do, I expect he will. A conversation I had with him across a dinner table, a little more than a fortnight before the election, was calculated to strengthen that belief. I hope, when the summons comes to you, you will not hesitate to accept at once. I say this, knowing that it will be a sacrifice, for it would no doubt be much pleasanter to you to stay in the Senate. But you are a necessity to the coming Administration as a member of it. Mr. Cleveland will go into power, undoubtedly with the best intentions, but without any experience of National politics and without much knowledge of persons, and I hope he will consult you early. The character of the Cabinet will be of greater importance than it has been at any time during the past twenty years, and the President should have at his disposal for selection for it the best material there is in the successful party; and he should have the advice of the very best of it at the first moment he begins to move. The only influence I shall be able to exercise will be that of an independent volunteer.

I wrote a letter to Mr. Cleveland a few days ago, congratulating him upon his success, telling him what I hoped his Administration would be, and adding that if I could serve him as a private citizen, I should be glad to do

so, especially by venturing an occasional word of suggestion, if acceptable to him, a privilege which I should value. I may, therefore, possibly have some further correspondence with him, and if so I shall always say to him frankly what I think as to what would best serve the public interest.

TO GEORGE FRED. WILLIAMS

110 W. 34TH ST., NEW YORK, NOV. 23, 1884.

Your kind letter of the 19th is in my hands. I must say that I do not attach [as] much importance to the projected letter to Governor Cleveland as those do who first moved it, nor as those who oppose it. I do not see how it can do any harm, nor do I think it will do much good, except in one respect. It says that those who *ask* for office as a reward for services rendered during the campaign thereby cease to represent the original principles and aims of the Independent movement. This I think is a proper declaration, and also a useful *advertisement*. I regret to say there are some Independents who, on the strength of the support they have given Mr. Cleveland during the campaign, are fishing for places. I know it, for some of them have written to me asking me for recommendations. This is a very bad thing which should be discountenanced, and I think a public declaration like the one in the projected address would be calculated to stop it. I do not think anything else would have the same effect.

This, you will observe, refers only to the *asking* for office as a reward for services rendered, leaving open all the other points you refer to, for consideration when occasion happens. It is rather unfortunate that the matter of the address has got into the papers prematurely. I hope, however, it will be finally disposed of in a manner satisfactory to all our friends.

Do you not think Blaine has dug his grave deep by his serenade speech? There are, I understand, a good many Republicans here who voted for him and are now heartily glad he is defeated.—Cordially yours.

TO GEORGE FRED. WILLIAMS

NEW YORK, Nov. 26, 1884.

Your letter of the 24th did not alarm me at all. I read it with great interest and thank you for it. Your first argument, that the address "reflects upon our constituency," and that if there is any reason for apprehension as to some of our people, Mr. Cleveland should be cautioned privately, certainly deserves consideration—although I am not quite as sure as you seem to be, that the public would take it as a reflection. It is a very unfortunate circumstance that by the indiscretion of somebody in Wisconsin the thing got into the papers, and that, if there is any mischief, that mischief is already done. I did not know that Bowker was going to Boston and have not seen him since his return. No meeting of the Committee has been called since he got back, as far as I know.

The second branch of your argument referring to the question whether office should be accepted if Cleveland offers it, you seem to have pointed at me personally. I will give you my opinion quite frankly. You are aware that almost the whole Independent press is opposed to acceptance. You have probably seen the articles in the *Evening Post*, *Nation* and in the *Boston Herald*. I admit that the arguments produced there are not all correct and on the whole not conclusive. There is undoubtedly great force in what you say. It would perhaps be well to have the matter openly and thoroughly discussed. If Mr. Cleveland should tell the Independents that he needed one

of them in his Cabinet to carry out his reform policy, and that he could not well get along without such help, it is questionable whether the Independents would have a right to say that it would be improper for any one of their number to respond to the summons. However, I do not think this is likely to be the case. But, as you have applied the argument to me personally, I am bound to add, that such a summons should not come to me. The reason is a very simple one. My circumstances do not permit me to go into official life again. However willing to do the work and to take the responsibility, I could not bear the expense incidental to official dignity. Public life has kept me poor, I am growing old and I have to think of my family. And as we are conversing here in friendly confidence, I may point out to you a lesson to be found in this circumstance. You are young, public spirited, ardent and full of talent. Do not go into public life in a manner seriously interfering with your private pursuits until you are, in the matter of fortune, measurably independent—of course, great emergencies always excepted. I have made that mistake and have to suffer from the consequences.

But my inability to accept office does not touch the general question which may present itself to somebody else to be decided upon its general merits. Of course, I cannot enter into the public discussion of it, because my name has already been drawn into the controversy in the papers—altogether too much.

If there should be any misunderstanding here as to what you have said about our National Committee, I shall take very great pleasure in rectifying it as soon as the first opportunity presents itself. And finally I want to assure you that I am always sincerely glad to hear from you, and that your letters will never be too long nor too many.—Your friend.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

110 W. 34TH ST., NEW YORK, DEC. 2, 1884.

I am very much disquieted by a rumor which has found its way to me. It is that you did not consider yourself rich enough to bear the expenses of the office of Secretary of State and would therefore hesitate to accept the offer which, I am sure, will come, if it has not come already. I fervently hope this is not so—that is to say, I hope you are rich enough, or, if you unfortunately are not, this deplorable circumstance will not stand in the way of your entering the Cabinet. In such a case, why should you not be Secretary of the Treasury? The Treasury is really the most influential office in the Government, while the position is far less expensive; and I know of no man in America available for that position, who at the head of that Department would so universally and unconditionally command the confidence of the country, and especially of the legitimate business interests, as you would. In that position *you* would just as much be the leading man in the Cabinet as in the Secretaryship of State. And possibly you might do still more good there.

At any rate, I trust there is nothing to make you hesitate in accepting Mr. Cleveland's invitation to become a member of his Administration. You are absolutely needed there, and I have the best reason for saying that you will be the first man to be called upon as the new President's confidential adviser in getting up his official family, and that he will rely more on you than on anybody else. I need not tell you how profoundly anxious I am that our victory should bear the best possible fruit for the country, and that, to this end, the Administration should get started right. In fact, the first start may be decisive of its character and ultimate success.

When will you be in New York again? I should be glad to talk with you about a great many things.

FROM GROVER CLEVELAND

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
ALBANY, Dec. 6, 1884.

My dear Sir: I received a most gratifying letter from you some time ago. Ever since its receipt I have had an idea, held in a sort of indefinite thoughtless way, that we should meet, and that then I might acknowledge all your consideration and kindness to me.

But you have suggested, I am informed, difficulties in the way of your coming to me which I fully appreciate; and those not less insurmountable seem to prevent my coming to you.

You may be sure that I should be most glad to hear your views at length, in this time of anxiety. I wish I might ask you to write to me as to one whose desire is to merit the good opinion of the men who have trusted him, but one who knows little of what awaits him in his new sphere of duty.

Yours sincerely,
GROVER CLEVELAND.

Hon. CARL SCHURZ.

TO GROVER CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Dec. 10, 1884.

My dear Sir: I gladly respond to your very kind invitation to express to you my views "at length," and I do so not without a strong feeling of responsibility. The anxiety of which you speak, I fully understand and share. Permit me first a few remarks on the general aspect of the situation.

I said in my letter of November 15th that in my opinion the character and fate of your Administration would be determined by its treatment of the civil service question. In repeating this I do not underestimate the importance of other subjects of public interest with which you will come into contact. But they are mostly subject to

legislative action while the practical treatment of the civil service question is the business of the Executive and is, aside from the ordinary routine, likely to be its principal business during the first eight or nine months of the new Administration. The passage of the Government from one party to another is the decisive crisis of administrative reform. If it weathers that crisis successfully, it will live. If the American people have now a change of party in power in which the public interest is the only ruling motive and consideration, an example is set which will have almost the force of law to govern similar events in the future. The man who carries this through will be one of the greatest benefactors of the American people, and you have the opportunity of being that man.

In serving this great end you will at the same time do the best service to your party. There is a new confused migration of political forces going on. They are footloose and restless. Their party allegiance restrains them very little. Both parties, the Republican as well as the Democratic, have come out of the last campaign in a shape very different from that in which we knew them before. The Democratic party won under the banner of reform, aided by the most determined reform-elements coming from the Republican side. If the Democratic party, when in power, should drop that standard for the purpose of winning back the forces that strayed from it in the late contest, it would not fully succeed in accomplishing that purpose, while losing all its moral strength and also the support of the auxiliary forces which made its victory possible. The party now come to power must be a reform-party in order to live, for it is certain that the opposition, as long as out of power, will be the most watchful and vociferous advocate of reform ever seen. The Democrats are not a majority party now. But they can become a majority party if their policy satisfies those

Independents and discontented Republicans who have been for some time longing for a new reform-party, that a new party is not needed. In other words, the Democratic party will have to be, in that sense, the new party itself. Then it will be the party of the future and as such in a situation to render very valuable service to the country.

Your own position is essentially the same. Your strength with the people consists in your character and reputation as a reformer, that is to say as a man whose honest purpose it is to put the administrative part of the Government upon a sound business basis. This is what the best part of the people expect you will do. If you succeed in this, your Administration will be voted a general success, although there may be mishaps in other directions. If you fail in this, your Administration will be judged generally a failure. In this one respect you will be closely watched by millions of eyes, and criticism will be sharp, for your past career and your professions of high principle have led the people to expect so much in this direction that every mistake of importance will be liable to be construed as a falling away from your original purpose.

This is one of the disadvantages of having started with a superior reputation. Whenever Arthur did a creditable thing, people would say: "He is after all a better man than we thought he was." If you should do things not up to the mark, people will be apt to say: "He is after all not as good as we thought he would turn out to be." And this is part of the material out of which public opinion is made. And public opinion is an important factor, especially when an Administration has to do things for the accomplishment of which it needs the support of public sentiment against a portion of its own party. That you will have a struggle with the spoils hunters in the Democratic party you are

no doubt prepared for; and it will be not only with the spoils hunters themselves but with a good many otherwise well-meaning people who think that reform is an excellent thing in theory but should not be carried too much into practice. Your purpose, as I understand it, is, in the first place, faithfully to execute the civil service law in letter and spirit, and secondly, as to the offices not under the civil service law, to make no removals except for "cause," that cause including cases of the abuse of official position for partisan purposes, and to be governed in your appointments by the interests of the service. This being in its nature executive business, you will have to bear the sole responsibility for it. The opposition to this policy on the part of officeseekers and dealers in patronage, especially Members of Congress, will therefore turn against you, and it can be disarmed only by a decided attitude on the part of the Administration, supported by public opinion, as it will be, if consistent.

If the character of this struggle depended upon your own fidelity and courage alone, I should feel no anxiety at all. But it does not. Neither does it depend upon the mere laying down by the President of certain principles of action. It depends upon the fidelity and energy with which those principles are carried out by the heads of the several Departments. I know from personal experience how the mill works, and that experience has convinced me that no President, however firm and courageous he may be, can succeed in the fight for systematic administrative reform, if he has to carry on the fight against his own Cabinet. More than that: he cannot succeed unless the Cabinet, at least the heads of the principal Departments, are substantially of the same mind with him and support him in good faith and with constant energy.

The problem, I repeat, cannot be disposed of by the mere proclamation of a certain policy. It presents itself

in the shape of a multitude of individual cases, but few of which the President will be able to examine himself. A very large number of them, especially in the Post-Office Department, do not come before him at all. In most of the cases which do come before him, he will have to trust the heads of the respective Departments for the information on which he is to act, for the reasons why this man should be removed and the other man should be appointed, while he himself has to bear the responsibility. Now, my experience is that the great danger of a reform Administration consists in the inclination of those engaged in it to admit exceptions to their rules. As soon as this is done every case will be represented as an exceptional one upon all sorts of plausible pretexts; that by this removal or that appointment the party will be greatly strengthened in this or that locality, or the favor of this or that powerful interest can be propitiated, etc., etc. As these exceptions accumulate, the character and credit of the Administration go down and down until finally there is little left but the original good intentions.

In one word, if you want to have a reform Administration, you must have, at least at the head of the three great "patronage" Departments, the Treasury, the Post-Office and the Interior, men who understand reform as you do, who believe in it as you do, who are willing to fight for it as you are and who will not be swerved from their purpose by any political seduction, even if they should be prospective candidates for the Presidency—the severest trial to which the political virtue of a public man can be exposed. At least they should not be much below this standard; for if your Department-Chiefs look upon your reform policy as a mere amiable hobby to be humored for a while, and if they say to the politicians wanting patronage: "We should be glad to accommodate you, but you know the President has some singular notions in his head,

and you must be patient"—your reform policy is doomed. You must be able absolutely to depend upon them as to their governing motives as well as their ability practically to deal with such things, and this requirement is most imperative just at the start, for then the pressure and the struggle will be severest and the character of your Administration will then virtually be determined.

On this point I cannot express myself too strongly, for I know from experience what I am speaking of. Neither will this matter admit of much experimenting. If you make any serious mistake in your first choice for the Cabinet, the consequences will make themselves felt immediately, for the call for decisive action is upon you at the very beginning. And, moreover, you will not find it as easy as might be imagined to get rid of a man who is once in your Cabinet.

There is another general point of view which I would commend to your consideration. It can hardly be expected that the starting of a new Administration should pass off entirely without accidental blunders. They will not hurt you much if you have the confidence of the country to such an extent that an occasional mistake will be ascribed to accident rather than to questionable motives. It must not be forgotten that you are a comparatively new man on the National field, not yet as well known and as confidentially trusted elsewhere as you are in this State. In this respect the impression produced by the general character of your Cabinet will be of great importance to you. It may win and strengthen confidence, or it may start suspicion and distrust. Your party, too, makes a sort of first appearance in the National Executive. Much depends upon the manner of that appearance. Your Cabinet will be its first introduction. Under such circumstances, it seems to me, you should have in that Cabinet only men well known to the American people,

men of generally recognized standing and esteemed character. There should be none among them about whom any intelligent citizen would have occasion to ask: "Who is this man? Why was he selected for so important a place?" For, when such questions can be asked, others are certain to follow, such as these: "What are the influences that may have induced the President to select just him? Who are his friends, or what are the interests behind this man that were so potent with the President?" and so on. This would not be well; under existing circumstances it might be positively harmful, for such impressions sometimes go deep and last long, and they might endanger that confidence which you will need and which upon your own merits you would be certain to win.

Another consideration which is looked upon as important in the formation of a Cabinet is that of locality. Of course, no one section of the country ought to be designedly favored, but geographical reasons should after all not stand too much in the way of more important ones. The principal thing is the quality of the men. Of the four members of Washington's Cabinet two were from Virginia. In Jefferson's Cabinet there were for several months three men from Massachusetts, two of whom he kept. Grant's Cabinet had two men from Massachusetts at the same time, and, if I remember rightly, five of the seven members from States east of the Alleghany mountains. There is always some geographical grumble which, however, lasts only a day or two, while, if there is a well-founded grumble about the character or ability of a Cabinet Minister appointed perhaps just to satisfy geographical considerations, it lasts as long as he is in office. There seem to be certain superstitious notions, that the Secretary of the Navy should be from the seaboard, the Secretary of the Treasury from New York, the Secretary of the Interior from the West, etc., but such notions have

really nothing in sound reason to support them and are usually urged only to bolster up certain candidates for the respective places. The only really important thing is to get the right men.

On the whole, if I were in your place, I would not be in a hurry. If by the middle of February you have finally made up your mind as to who shall be in your Cabinet, you will have done much better than a good many of your predecessors, some of whom had to make up their Cabinets in part after their inauguration. You certainly want time to inform yourself and to look at the problem from various points of view. I see from the papers that you have consulted Mr. Bayard, as Mr. Stetson told me you would, and I am glad of it, for it would be difficult to find anywhere a better man to consult.

I hope you have not misunderstood what I said to Mr. Stetson about the impracticability of my responding to your wish that I should visit you at Albany. I assure you it was not in any sense a question of pride with me, but merely one of expediency. I have no doubt you, as well as myself, would prefer to avoid the various interpretations which inevitably would follow such a visit. But I scarcely need tell you that I shall always be most sincerely glad to serve you with such suggestion or information as may come from me, and I highly appreciate that confidence on your part which calls them forth. There are matters of detail which it might perhaps be more convenient to talk than to write about, and I need not add that if an interview can be arranged in a manner not liable to the objections mentioned, I shall embrace the opportunity with very great pleasure.

This letter has grown much longer than I intended; but you are partly at fault yourself, having called for an expression of my views "at length."—Very sincerely yours.

TO GROVER CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Jan. 3, 1885.

Colonel Burt, who called on me this morning, said that when he was at Albany a few days ago, you asked him whether he knew how I liked your civil service letter. I thought you would not be seriously in doubt as to my opinion of that excellent document. Its merit has been practically tested by the impression it produced. Your friends are fully satisfied, especially as they remember that in your public career performance has not only not fallen short of promise but rather gone beyond it. And your opponents find themselves obliged to recognize the letter as a good thing and have nothing to say except that you do not mean it or that the spoils-seekers will be too strong for you. Of course there are grumblers among those who want patronage to distribute or who want office for themselves. After your inauguration their number will be much larger than it now manifests itself, and they will give you and the heads of Departments a great deal of trouble. But that cannot be helped.

It has been noticed among civil service reformers that your letter does not cover the question whether men in office, who have been conspicuously efficient in the discharge of their duties and not liable to objection of any kind, should not be reappointed upon the expiration of their terms of office, irrespective of party affiliation. But while I suppose you would seriously consider the propriety of such reappointments when the time for action comes, you have, in my opinion, wisely abstained from discussing that question now. I think you said just enough on this subject for the present, and you said it in the right way too—simply announcing your determination to do certain things instead of theorizing about them. You may indeed be congratulated upon the success of your

first post-election utterance. It is in itself an event of great importance.

But in spite of the favorable impression produced by it on the Independents and those Republicans who, although they did not vote for you, more or less sympathized with us, there is still a drift of feeling prevalent among a great many of them, which manifests itself in such things as the following paragraph taken from the Boston *Advertiser*, a paper which advocated your election quite heartily [quotation omitted].

I have found similar things in other papers. This indicates a lingering of the old distrust of all Democrats, and a latent inclination to return to old political associations—watching you, as you fight your battle, not without some sympathy and hope, but after all from the standpoint of a doubting and critical “opposition.” There would be sound reason for this if there were any great divergence between you and them as to the objects to be accomplished, or if you were certain to be overborne by the adverse influences in your party. But considering that your political purposes and those of the Independents and liberal Republicans are in the main the same, as I think they are, and that you have the support or acquiescence of a strong enough portion of the Democratic party to make success appear at least possible, and that, moreover, in a certain sense you will have to make the party of the future, this attitude of critical opposition or expectancy is simply calculated to prevent or at least delay the reorganization of political forces and the concentration of energies for harmonious effort which must take place to render that success certain. These are the arguments I have been using with my friends as far as I could reach them, to make them understand that in the difficult struggles you will have to go through for the accomplishment of our common object, we should not stand by and wait to see

how you will come out, but help you in every possible way to come out right, by active and constant support and coöperation, and to this end, instead of speaking of critical opposition, identify ourselves with you as much as may be necessary.

This view of the situation is gradually gaining ground, but it is still far from being as generally accepted as it should be. You can undoubtedly do more than anybody else to draw the whole, or at least a large majority of this important element, from its expectant and doubting position to rally it around your Administration and thus to promote that active union of the best intelligence of the South and of the North which the public interest demands. You can do this, it seems to me, not only by forming a Cabinet that will inspire confidence, but by telling the country in your inaugural address specifically what you mean when speaking of Democratic principles and a Democratic policy as applied to present circumstances. This, I believe, can be done in such a way as to explode a good many of the specters which have been frightening people so long, and to make those who substantially agree with you concerning the public objects to be accomplished, feel that the further maintenance of an attitude of doubtful expectancy or critical opposition would on their part be positively wrong as well as absurd.

If agreeable to you, I should be glad to submit to your judgment my thoughts on this matter in greater detail. I regret in this respect that, when you will visit this city, as the newspapers say, in two or three weeks, I shall be absent, to be gone from the 13th or 14th inst. until the 1st of March. Personal conversation on these things would probably be more useful. But I apprehend, as you are to leave Albany for Buffalo in a very few days, you will in the meantime be too much occupied with the winding up of your official business, to have leisure for

anything else. In that case nothing but correspondence by letter will remain for an exchange of views, and I shall then, if you desire it, write again when you will be relieved of your governor's business and more at ease.

Wishing you a happy New Year, I am sincerely yours.

TO JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

110 W. 34TH ST., Jan. 7, 1885.

I have received your kind note of yesterday—in fact, I have been expecting some admonition of this kind for some time. My engagements have indeed very seriously interrupted my work, and I shall labor under the same difficulty for several weeks longer, at least until about the middle of March. I have written several chapters in the rough, but there is so much more to be done that I have no hope of completing the book¹ this spring. Of course, I look upon it, not as a hasty job, but as a very serious task, and if I furnish you anything at all I want it to be the best I can do. All I can say now is that, as I have advanced in the work, my interest in it has very much increased; that I want to complete it, and that I mean to give my whole time to it as soon as the exigencies of my situation permit. I can only add that I should have finished it long ago, had I not been diverted from it by more pressing duties, and that I hope soon to be able to take it in hand again.

TO GEORGE W. FOLSOM²

110 W. 34TH ST., Jan. 10, 1885.

Last night I received your kind letter of yesterday with a check for \$600 to refund my travelling expenses during

¹ *Henry Clay* in the American Statesmen series, of which Mr. Morse was the editor.

² Treasurer of the Independent Republican organization.

the campaign. I did not keep any detailed account of my actual outlays on my campaign trips, as it was my expectation to bear those expenses myself. Least of all did I expect that the Committee would have any surplus funds after the election. But since that is the case I do not see why I should not permit at least a part of an outlay of money to be refunded, which was really larger than I could well afford.

The sum you send me, however, exceeds those outlays considerably. According to my general expense account during those two months I spent on my campaign journeys about \$450. My trips were generally rather long but in those instances I had tickets from one place to another presented to me. Now I want to have the satisfaction of having made a little cash contribution to the campaign in addition to my work. I therefore return the \$600 check, and if you will send me one of \$300 in its place, that will about cover what I paid out in excess of what might be considered my cash quota of the campaign expenses.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN¹

Of all the great historic men of America Benjamin Franklin was doubtless the greatest specific American. Washington has been said to have much of the English gentleman; Jefferson of the French philosopher—but Franklin in all his ways of thinking and doing was the genuine characteristic product of the new world. He was the universal Yankee in ideal development; the very apostle of restless, inquiring, independent, courageous, prolific, versatile and genial common-sense; the self-made man in the greatest proportions—self-made in

¹ A lecture written in 1884 and delivered in Charleston, S. C., Jan. 21, 1885, and in other cities, North and South.

business, in morals, religion, science and statesmanship. His has been one of the useful lives in history in two respects: he not only did many things that were highly beneficial to his generation, but no human being, high or low, learned or ignorant, old or young, rich or poor, can study that life without drawing some valuable lesson from it, not only general, but specific. Few men, if any, have ever more effectually taught by precept and example the true science of life; that is, the science of virtue, of usefulness and of enjoyment. And among the great men of history there is scarcely one who, of the successes he achieved, owed more to himself and less to the favor of circumstances.

He was born in Boston in 1706. His father was a soap boiler and tallow chandler, respectable, but rich only in the number of his children, of whom there were seventeen. Little Ben got very scanty schooling, was apprenticed to his brother as a printer, sold ballads on the streets composed by himself, wrote newspaper essays anonymously, quarreled with his brother and ran off to Philadelphia to seek his fortune when seventeen years old. At an early age he had become a voracious reader, one of those knights of the nocturnal tallow dip who surreptitiously wrest knowledge from poverty and hard work, to astonish the world in later life. He made his entry into Philadelphia, a shabby-looking lad with two large rolls of bread under his arm, and munching a third,—the young girl who was destined to become his wife standing in a doorway and smiling at the doleful apparition. He soon found employment as a journeyman printer.

He was an uncommonly bright young man, but not at all a perfect one. On the contrary, there was a decided streak of badness in him. And here is one of the most striking peculiarities of his career: a struggle of a strong intellect with strong passions and faults, the intellect

winning the battle by systematic effort. At first his principles, or what he called so, hung rather loosely about him. As a boy he had adopted vegetarianism, sincerely believing in it. He got rid of it in this way: a few months after his arrival in Philadelphia he had occasion to go to Boston for the purpose of seeing his father. On his way back the sloop on which he travelled was becalmed off Block Island and the seamen caught some cod. Young Franklin had formerly been very fond of fried fish; and when the cod came hot out of the frying pan "I balanced some time between principle and inclination," he frankly says in his autobiography, "till I recollected that, when the fish were opened, I saw smaller fish taken out of their stomachs; then I thought: 'If you eat one another, I do not see why I may not eat you.' So I dined upon cod very heartily, and continued to eat with other people, returning only now and then occasionally to a vegetable diet." "So convenient it is," he adds, "to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."

This was quite witty. But it is upon reasoning of just this kind that smart men yield to temptations which smell well enough to excite an appetite, and then, thus getting rid of their principles, gradually become *bad* men. Young Franklin was upon a slippery path. A friend of his brother's at Newport entrusted him with a sum of money to be collected from a debtor at Philadelphia, and to be transmitted on demand. Franklin collected the money and used a large part of it for himself and his friends, thus virtually embezzling it—a thing which subsequently caused him much trouble. But still worse: Governor Keith of Pennsylvania induced Franklin to undertake a voyage to London, to purchase an outfit for a new printing-office. Before leaving Philadelphia, Franklin exchanged promises of marriage with Miss

Read, the young lady who had watched him eating his rolls on his first arrival. At London, where he remained about eighteen months, young Franklin got into all sorts of intrigues with low women, at one time even trying to seduce the mistress of a friend. To Miss Read he wrote only once, to tell her that it would be a long time before he would get back—which was meant and understood to be a breach of the engagement.

On the other hand, he worked industriously, saved some money, read many books, made some valuable acquaintances, wrote some ingenious things and then returned to Philadelphia with a merchant who befriended him. On the voyage he pondered very seriously over the disreputable things he had done. His failings alarmed him, and he looked round for a staff on which to lean. First he became suspicious of his religious views. He had abandoned revealed religion when he was a mere boy. While in London he had written a pamphlet entitled a "Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain," a very ingenious production, designed to prove that if God is the Maker of the Universe and is all-good and all-wise, whatsoever he does must be good and wise; and if he is all-powerful, there can be nothing existing or acting against or without his consent; that, therefore, all that human creatures do, must be done according to the will of the all-powerful God, and must be good and wise; that, therefore, no freedom of will nor distinction between good and evil—indeed, no evil can exist, and that all creatures must be equally esteemed by the Creator. This acute piece of logic now appeared unsatisfactory to him,—not as if he had detected any flaw in the reasoning, but because he began to suspect, while his doctrine might be correct, it did not work well morally, and was, therefore, as he said, "*not very useful.*"

It struck him that, not a *certain specific* religion, but

a religion of some sort was necessary to mankind, and that the important part of the office of that religion was not to make men *believe* certain things, but to make men do certain things. He *wanted* a religion; and as he had given up *the* Revelation and could not bring himself back to it, he—if I may use that expression—proceeded to reveal a religion of his own to himself. He put down a creed and a liturgy in writing for his own use. His creed consisted in a profession of belief in the existence of one Supreme and most perfect Being, author and father of the gods themselves. These gods he conceived to be intermediate between the Supreme Being and man, each of them controlling a solar system. And to this ruler of *our* solar system, our particular God, he addressed his worship. His scheme of worship or liturgy consisted mainly of an “adoration,” praising God as the Creator, the all-wise and all-good,—and then a “petition” resembling the litanies of the Episcopalian prayer book, praying God to aid him in being good and in doing good to others. All this he wrote down in a neat little prayer book for his own use, which is said to be still in existence.

This creed, except the fantastic conception of the intermediate gods, he adhered to substantially through life. As an old man he wrote in his autobiography:

I had been religiously educated as a Presbyterian; and though some of the dogmas of that persuasion appeared to me unintelligible, others doubtful, I never was without some religious principles. I never doubted, for instance, the existence of a Deity; that He made the world and governed it by His Providence; that the most acceptable service of God was the doing good to man; that our souls are immortal, and that all crime will be punished and virtue rewarded, either here or hereafter. These I esteemed the essentials of every religion; and to be found in all the religions we had in this country. I respected them all, though with different degrees

of respect, as I found them more or less mixed with other articles which, without any tendency to inspire, promote or confirm morality, served principally to divide us and make us unfriendly to one another. This respect to all, with an opinion that the worst had some good effects, induced me to avoid all discourse that might tend to lessen the good opinion another might have of his own religion.

This liturgy he seems to have practiced for twenty years, while at the same time he held a pew in the Presbyterian church. The pretension of one church to be exclusively right and others wrong, he used to liken to "man traveling in foggy weather; those at some distance before him were wrapped up in the fog, as well as those behind him, and also the people in the fields on each side; but near him all appears clear, though in truth he is as much in the fog as any of them."

This was his self-made religion, which satisfied him so much that he ceased disquieting himself with doubts and metaphysical speculations. Meanwhile at the age of twenty-two he had established a printing-office and worked industriously. But his self-made religion did not at once have the moral effect he desired it to produce. His intercourse with low women continued, and about a year after he had written his creed and liturgy an illegitimate son was born to him. As he became settled in business, he looked round for a wife—this, too, in a somewhat businesslike way. He became engaged to a Miss Godfrey, but the matter fell through because the girl could not bring any money with her. He looked further round, but to no purpose. Finally he returned to his first attachment, Deborah Read, the young woman who had watched him munching his roll, with whom at a later period he had exchanged promises, and whom he had then abandoned. Franklin met her again, the old

affection revived, and he married her, thus making good, as far as possible, the wrong he had done her. He tells the whole story in his autobiography in a candid, matter-of-fact way, without the least affectation of romance, or even sentiment. But on the whole it must be admitted that, while the final marriage was creditable enough, his conduct at this period of life does not appear like that of a high-minded man. It was painfully apparent what tendencies in his nature he had to overcome in order to rise to a high level.

But he was equal to the task. When he had become a married man he conceived, as he tells us, "the bold and arduous project of arriving at moral perfection." He "wished to live without committing any fault at any time." He undertook to supplement his self-made religion by a self-made scheme of moral improvement, and a quaint, thoroughly Franklinian scheme it was. He tried to practice self-discipline and to cultivate virtue by means of bookkeeping. This is the way he did it. He wrote the names of the virtues he resolved to practice, in a little book, allotting one page to each. They were thirteen: Temperance, Silence, Order, Resolution, Frugality, Industry, Sincerity, Justice, Moderation, Cleanliness, Tranquillity, Chastity and Humility. Each page he divided into little squares, and each day he marked there every offense committed against any of the virtues. At first the result discouraged him somewhat, for he did not find himself quite as good as he expected. Then it struck him that he might make better progress if he paid special attention to one virtue at a time, so as to acquire the habit of it, letting the others meanwhile take their chance. This system of methodical watchfulness by bookkeeping he carried on for a long period, and repeated it from time to time throughout his long life with remarkable success. He tells us himself that he saw his faults

constantly diminish, and when a very old man he wrote: "It may be well my posterity should be informed that to this little artifice, with the blessing of God, their ancestor owed much of the constant felicity of his life, down to his 79th year."

Thus the great Franklin, as history knows him, began to take shape. He prospered in his business of course, working early and late, setting type and printing; making lampblack and ink; dealing in rags and soap and live-geese-feathers, and when he had bought a new supply of paper carting it home himself on a wheelbarrow. He got the bulk of the jobs, and soon he had a newspaper going, the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, which he presently made the best and most successful in the colonies. Having disciplined himself, he now began to educate the people.

It may be doubted whether any publication in this country ever made so large an impression upon the public mind as Franklin's famous almanac, the *Poor Richard*. It was a comic almanac, full of fun, not always quite decent; but it achieved its phenomenal success and celebrity by those quaint bits of proverbial philosophy which were inserted in the little spaces between the remarkable days in the calendar. Almost all of them became household words at once, and many have remained so ever since. Here are some of our old acquaintances: "Early to bed, and early to rise, makes a man healthy and wealthy and wise." "He that has a trade, has an estate." "There are no gains without pains." "He that by the plow would thrive, himself must either hold or drive." "Little strokes fell great oaks." "He that goes a-borrowing, goes a-sorrowing." "Vessels large may venture more, but little boats should keep near shore." "Three removes are as bad as a fire." "What maintains one vice would bring up two children." "Forewarned, forearmed." "Fish and visitors smell in three days."

"It is hard for an empty bag to stand upright." "Let thy maid-servant be faithful, strong and homely." "Necessity never made a good bargain." "Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other." "Keep your eyes wide open before marriage; half shut afterwards."—And so on.

Many of these sentiments, of course, were not entirely new with Poor Richard. "Not a tenth part of the wisdom," says Franklin himself, "was my own, but rather the gleanings that I had made of the sense of all ages and nations." But what was his own was the selection and the quaint, pregnant form which gave that wisdom currency. Of many sayings now in everybody's mouth it is scarcely remembered that Franklin was their author, such as "Time is money," "Knowledge is power," and that well-known definition: "Orthodoxy is my doxy, and heterodoxy is your doxy," of which John Adams said that it was the brightest epigram he had ever heard.

It has frequently been said of most of Poor Richard's proverbial philosophy that it does not address itself to the highest instincts and aspirations of human nature. This is true. The same may be said of the Franklinian maxim "Honesty is the best policy." It implies that honesty is only *one* of *several different policies*, but that of these it is the safest and the best. This maxim does indeed not rise to the loftier plane of the sentiment that right is right, and must be maintained as right, no matter whether it appear as the best policy or not. But Franklin recognized the fact that while this sentiment is professed by *many*, it is the controlling motive only with *few*. And he easily concluded that, while right, indeed, should be maintained for its *own* sake, it would help the cause of right and honesty *amazingly*, with the common run of mankind, if honesty were at the same time recognized as the best policy and the safest investment. In fact, he

had in this respect gone through some instructive experiences with himself. Possessing a full share of the evil passions and dangerous frailties of human nature, he had found himself obliged to call upon *his understanding* to quicken and support his *moral sense*. His *moral* nature was originally not at all of the ideal stamp. His was essentially an *intellectual* morality. He had to try hard to become a *good* man by becoming a *prudent* and a *wise* man; he had to *reason* himself *up* to the highest standard of moral sense, and the measure of success he achieved in this, is largely the measure of his greatness. Many men have to reason themselves up to a high morality—only they do not succeed. Moreover, he had to appeal to a population still in a raw social state, poor, and in their struggles with the necessities of the day naturally disposed to understand the coarse voice of interest more easily than the whispers of the finer feelings. Poor Richard's homely lessons of thrift and general worldly wisdom, in showing them the way of *prosperity* through honesty and justice, pushed them forward at the same time in the way of moral elevation. The American people were after all much the better for Poor Richard's teachings.

The success of *Poor Richard* was prodigious. It gained a yearly circulation of 10,000 copies. It was translated into French, Spanish and modern Greek, and thus gave Franklin his first celebrity in Europe. Meantime he had also begun to make Philadelphia a literary and philosophical center. Philadelphia was then a town of from 9000 to 10,000 inhabitants, a stretched-out and shady place, every house having its garden and every family its cow. Pretty much everybody had enough to live on, but few people more than enough. Life was slow and dull; tolerant as to religion; few books to read except religious works; no mental activity except about trade

and theology. And of this Franklin made an intellectual and literary center—a strange undertaking. The way in which he did it was thoroughly characteristic.

While he was still a young journeyman printer he founded a club for debate and mutual improvement, called the Junto. Did he have any doctors and professors to draw upon? No, he got together such bright young men as he could find. There were among them four printers, one surveyor, one shoemaker, one carpenter, one engrosser of deeds, one self-taught mathematician, one merchant's clerk and one young gentleman of some fortune with literary tastes. A majority of them being mechanics, the club was dubbed the "Leathern Apron Club." Any person to be admitted had to declare that he loved mankind in general and truth for truth's sake. At each weekly meeting each member had first to answer a number of questions: What remarkable thing he had read or heard of; what had been the reason of the success or failure of any one within his knowledge; what effects of vice or virtue he had observed; what defect in the laws of the colony had come to his notice; whether he thought of anything in which the Junto might be serviceable to mankind or to the country, or to any one of its members; whether any deserving stranger had arrived in town, and how he could be obliged and encouraged,—and so on. Then discussion followed. Thus the "Leathern Aprons" were stimulated to observe and to think, and to formulate and express their thoughts. Then the young men began, under Franklin's leadership, to investigate and discuss all sorts of philosophical, religious and political questions, somewhat crudely perhaps at first, but earnestly, ingeniously and perseveringly, and always with an eye to public or private usefulness. Neither were their debates idle talk. They boldly undertook to reform things in their town and the colony. Some subject of public complaint

was mentioned in the Junto, an essay was read about it and a discussion followed; the essay, amended after debate, was printed in Franklin's *Gazette*; the impulse for a public movement was given and in many cases the improvement carried out. Thus Franklin's leathern-apron philosophers became practical reformers and public benefactors in more than one way. They wanted to enlarge their reading, and that was the origin of the great Philadelphia Library. They wanted to systematize inquiry, and out of it grew the American Philosophical Society. The Junto lasted nearly forty years. That same "Leathern Apron Club" became the best school of philosophy, morals and politics then existing in the colonies. It organized that intelligence, inquiry and public spirit which are the making of new countries. Of course, most of its thinking was done by the young man who had at one time threatened to become a pretty bad boy himself. And he did most of the studying too, for at the age of twenty-seven he began learning French, Italian, Spanish and Latin, and he practiced music on the harp, the guitar, the violin, the violoncello and later on a glass-harmonica invented by himself.

At the same time he kept himself virtuous with the aid of bookkeeping, reformed the night watch, organized the first volunteer fire-company in the city (the second in the colonies), wrote pamphlets about finance and currency, about the defense of the colonies against the French, organized a volunteer militia, built a battery and got cannon for it, started street cleaning, introduced the broom corn, the yellow willow for basket-making and the use of plaster of Paris to improve meadows, caused a ship to be sent to the Polar seas for the discovery of the Northwest passage, invented the famous open fireplace called the Franklin stove—a good many things for a young man—and then he made ready to become one of the

first scientific men of the age. This happened in this wise.

Here was a man absolutely without any scientific education. Scientific methods and apparatus were unknown to him. But what he did have was a pair of open and remarkably active eyes, a restlessly inquiring mind and an exquisite faculty of putting two and two together. In one word, he was a keen observer and a keen reasoner at the same time. He became a great light of science by simply applying his penetrating common-sense to the things he saw. One of his first achievements was his famous theory about the movement of storms. The way he made his discovery was thoroughly characteristic. One evening, in 1743, Franklin wanted to observe an eclipse of the moon which was to occur at nine o'clock. Before that hour a violent northeast storm arose, and the eclipse could not be seen. Some time afterward he read in a Boston paper that the storm had begun there only an hour after the eclipse was over. Now, Boston is situated northeast of Philadelphia. And here was a storm blowing from the northeast, coming therefore *from* Boston, and arriving in Philadelphia a good deal earlier than it had occurred at the place it apparently started from. "There must be a mistake somewhere," most people would have said, and dismissed the matter. "Very curious," said Franklin, "let us look into it." He wrote to Boston and heard that the facts were actually so. He inquired further and found that it was usually so with these northeast storms. Now he looked round for analogies, and then settled upon the following explanation:

Suppose a great tract of country, land and sea, to wit, Florida and the Bay of Mexico, to have clear weather for several days, and to be heated by the sun, and its air thereby exceedingly rarefied. Suppose the country Northeastward, as

Pennsylvania, New England, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, to be at the same time covered with clouds, and its air chilled and condensed. The rarefied air, being lighter, must rise, and the denser air next to it will press into its place. That will be followed by the next denser air, that by the next, and so on. So the water in a long sluice or mill race, being stopped by a gate, is at rest like the air in a calm; but as soon as you open the gate at one end to let it out, the water which is next to the gate begins first to move, that which is next to it follows, and so, though the water proceeds forward to the gate, the motion which began there, runs backward, if one may so speak, to the upper end of the race, where the water is last in motion.

That was all. How simple it was!

In a similar way he started valuable theories about the noxious character of the air exhaled from the lungs, and he may be said to have originated the science of ventilation. The manner in which he tested the effect of heat upon different colors was remarkably characteristic of his simple common-sense way of scientific experiment. He describes it himself, thus:

I took a number of little square pieces of broadcloth from a tailor's pattern card, of various colors. There were black, deep blue, lighter blue, green, purple, red, yellow, white and other colors or shades of colors. I laid them all out upon the snow in a bright sunshiny morning. In a few hours the black, being warmed most by the sun, was sunk so low as to be below the stroke of the sun's rays; the dark blue almost as low, the lighter blue not quite so much as the dark, the other colors less as they were lighter; and the white remained on the surface of the snow, not having entered it at all. (What signifies philosophy that does not apply to home use!) May we not learn from hence, that black clothes are not so fit to wear in a hot, sunny climate as white ones?

The thing was indeed so simple that it appears astonishing, not how anybody should have thought of it, but how anybody could have failed to think of it.

In exactly the same way Franklin achieved his greatest success, which at one bound placed him in the front rank of the scientific men of his century. On a visit to Boston he witnessed some experiments in electricity made by Dr. Spence, a scientific lecturer from England. They excited his curiosity. The recent invention of the Leyden jar had much advanced the knowledge of the subject and made it a matter of fashionable interest and entertainment. But to Franklin it was entirely new. On his return to Philadelphia he received an electrical tube with directions for using it. This was in 1746. Franklin repeated the experiments he had seen at Boston, became fascinated with the study, interested some friends in it, and then went on making experiments of his own, which nobody had ever witnessed before.

Soon he outstripped all the scientific lights of his time by the brilliancy of his achievements on a field on which the best minds of the period were competing. His was the theory of plus and minus, or positive and negative electricity; and then it struck him that lightning and electricity must be essentially the same thing. The way in which he formed his conclusion was exceedingly simple again. He observed that the electrical fluid strikingly agreed with lightning in several essential particulars. This he knew from seeing and experimenting. From this he concluded that they were *probably* the same thing. "But," said he, "the electric fluid is attracted by points. We do not know whether this property is in lightning. But since they agree in all the particulars wherein we can already compare them, is it not likely they agree likewise in this? Let the experiment be made." And he made it, again in a very simple way. He caught the lightning in a snare as it were, and then interrogated it.

Everybody has heard the story of the kite, and seen the picture. He stretched a large silk handkerchief on two

sticks fastened together crosswise and put a sharpened iron wire on the top of the perpendicular stick. To this kite he tied a long hempen string, and to the lower end of this a silken cord, and where the two joined he fastened an iron key. On a summer afternoon when a thundercloud was coming on, he went out with his son to fly the kite. As the thundercloud passed over it, the fibers of the hempen string rose and bristled up, and the iron key gave forth electric sparks. The lightning was caught and answered the question addressed to it. The simple-experiment conclusively proved that Franklin's reasoning was correct, that electricity and lightning were the same thing, and that lightning could be caught and conducted by the piece of metal with a sharp point.

At the same time great news came from Europe. His letters about his theories and experiments had attracted wide attention in England and on the Continent. His suggestions concerning the identity of electricity and lightning and the conducting of the latter by iron rods had been practically tested in France with complete success, at the same time that Franklin caught the lightning with his kite. Then honors began to shower upon the modest Philadelphia printer. The Royal Society unanimously elected him one of its members. Yale and Harvard gave him the honorary degree of master of arts. His doctor's title he received not many years afterwards in England. He suddenly found himself one of the most famous men of his time in the world of science.

At the same time he had put himself on the high road of becoming one of the first statesmen of his country. He began humbly. His rule was never to seek a public office and never to decline one. In 1736, at the age of thirty, he was chosen clerk of the general assembly, which he remained, by reëlection, for several years. In 1737 he was made postmaster of Philadelphia; a few years

later a member of the assembly, also an alderman and a justice of the peace. And then he was appointed Postmaster-General of the colonies. He quickened the snail pace of the mails, straightened the bridle paths, shortened the time it took a letter to go from Philadelphia to Boston and vice versa from three weeks to one week and a half, and made the postal service yield an annual revenue. He served as a peace commissioner in making Indian treaties. *And then he invented the American Union.* The war between France and England had begun, the most memorable and dramatic incidents of which were Braddock's defeat and the capture of Quebec. Delegates of the colonies north of the Potomac met at Albany to consider what should be done for defense. Franklin's common-sense spoke: Let the colonies unite and they will be strong. He laid before the convention a plan for a union foreshadowing in its principal features the Constitution of the United States adopted thirty-five years later,—in fact substantially the same plan adopted by the British Government one hundred years later as the sum of wisdom in the organization of the Dominion of Canada. It was, however, rejected at the time, but the idea of union remained alive. Indeed, it had been suggested before Franklin, by William Penn in 1697, and by Coxe in 1722—but only theoretically. Franklin applied it first to a given state of things as a remedy for pressing evils. And when his plan was rejected and another substituted by the British Government which involved the taxing of the colonies by act of Parliament, it was Franklin who, with prophetic utterance, pronounced that axiom: "No taxation without representation," which repelled the stamp act, and which became the first watchword of American patriotism in its struggle for final independence. There was the American statesman of common-sense, fully developed.

Franklin aided the Government zealously in the French war. He slyly extorted appropriations for military purposes from the Quakers in the Pennsylvania assembly. He helped General Braddock to get wagons from the Pennsylvania farmers upon Poor Richard's bond. After Braddock's defeat he himself took the field against hostile Indians and came near being made a general with an independent command.

But his destiny sent him to other fields of usefulness. The Pennsylvanians were constantly wrangling with their proprietaries, William Penn's sons. One of these was a miser, the other a spendthrift; both were blockheads and both bent upon squeezing as much money out of the colony as possible. To represent the interests of the colony near the home government Franklin was sent to England as the agent of Pennsylvania. Thus began his illustrious diplomatic career.

He was then fifty-one years old. Look at his past life. He had been a journeyman printer, a merchant's clerk, a boss printer, a journalist and an almanac maker, a fireman, the inventor of a stove, clerk of the general assembly, member of the same, alderman, justice of the peace, postmaster, militia colonel in active service, Postmaster-General, member and trustee of various boards and institutions, experimenter and discoverer in electricity, and inventor of the lightning-rod. He had achieved a great name in the world of science; he had in the meantime by industry and prudent management accumulated an independent fortune. Now he was a diplomat. A truly American career, and such it remained to the end.

Franklin had no training as a diplomat, just as he had no training as a man of science; but, as he had the scientific instinct, so he had the diplomatic instinct to perfection. True diplomacy is not, as some have said, the art of lying. It is the art of making truth pleasant; of combin-

ing interests; of yielding a little to accomplish much; of knowing how to persuade, how to push and how to wait. All these things Franklin instinctively knew how to do, and he even perfected himself in the diplomatic art of dining. He rather liked it, too. He loved, as he said, "good company, a chat, a laugh, a glass and even a song as well as ever," and at the same time he relished more than ever "the grave observations and wise sentences of old men's conversation." His great diplomatic achievement during the first five-year period of his service consisted in making a compromise on a disputed question in which the colony had all the advantages and the proprietaries an empty nothing.

He had also his ups and downs. In 1762 he returned to Philadelphia, desiring to give himself entirely to scientific pursuits. An Indian broil made him the staunch friend and defender of the poor savage, and a new quarrel with the proprietaries sent him back to England. Now his diplomatic business grew more serious. The stamp act was passed. At the request of the government the colonial agents, although protesting against the measure, had given the names of men fitted to be stamp-tax collectors. When the news reached America, a storm broke loose. Philadelphia, like other cities, was in a blaze of excitement. Franklin's enemies spread the story that he had not only approved of the stamp act but tried at once to get under it a fat office for a friend. Popular feeling against him ran so high that his house was said to be in danger of being mobbed. Franklin, when he heard of this, bore it calmly. The true Franklin was soon to appear again.

The business world in England grew alarmed at the outburst in America and began to clamor for the repeal of the stamp act. Parliament instituted an inquiry. At the bar of the House of Commons English business

men spoke for their pockets; Franklin was summoned to speak for America. This was one of the greatest moments in Franklin's life. He set forth the condition of things in America with such clearness, defended the rights of his countrymen with such force and declared their determination to resist arbitrary taxation with such courage that his hearers were equally astonished at the range of his knowledge and at the defiant firmness of his attitude. If the calm philosopher was so fierce, what could be expected of the sturdy and excitable rustics he represented? The impression he produced was profound. When reports of this scene became known in America, Franklin was again the hero of the day. His very enemies confessed themselves proud of their representative. The stamp act was repealed. America was once more in a blaze of excitement, this time joyous. And at every one of the numberless carousals that followed, Franklin's health was drunk as that of the great champion and benefactor of the American people.

But once more he had to pass through one of those strange contrasts of contumely and honor so characteristic of public life. George III. stubbornly insisted on having his own way. New methods of taxing the colonies were devised. New excitement in America. Resolutions were adopted all over the colonies to buy no more English goods. Now the English shopkeeper grew ugly too. Irritation followed irritation. Franklin strove in vain to enlighten and propitiate public opinion by clever newspaper publications. The adverse current was irresistible. The Ministerial party began to look on him as the chief promoter of American resistance. Soon they found an opportunity to humiliate him. In December, 1772, some letters fell into his hands written by Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts to persons of influence in England suggesting measures of force against the dis-

affected in the colony. These letters Franklin sent to the Massachusetts committee of correspondence to warn the patriots of the treachery of the colonial officers. They created a profound excitement. The assembly petitioned the King for the removal of the Governor. Then Franklin's enemies in England thought their time had come. Franklin was summoned to appear before the Privy Council where the petition was to be considered. He was summoned only to be publicly outraged. Wedderburn, the King's solicitor, appeared as Governor Hutchinson's counsel, and in an elaborate speech he poured a torrent of abuse upon Franklin's head, denouncing him as a thief who had stolen Governor Hutchinson's letters, and as the most mischievous enemy of the country. Franklin stood under the pelting storm with unmoved face, in silent and defenseless dignity. The next day he found himself dismissed from the office of Postmaster-General of the colonies.

Another picture. Lord Chatham, who had consulted Franklin as to the policy by which America might be pacified, took him upon the floor of the House of Lords to listen to a debate on Lord Chatham's plan of pacification. Lord Sandwich, opposing it, referred to Franklin as "one of the bitterest and most mischievous enemies the country had ever known." Whereupon Lord Chatham, with all the magnificence of his utterance, declared that

if he were the first Minister of this country and had the care of settling this momentous business, he should not be ashamed of publicly calling to his assistance a person so perfectly acquainted with the whole of American affairs as the gentleman so injuriously reflected on; one, he was pleased to say, whom all Europe held in high estimation for his knowledge and wisdom and ranked with our Boyles and Newtons; who was an honor, not to the English nation only, but to human nature.

When Franklin heard this, his countenance was as placid and unmoved as it had been under the hailstorm of Wedderburn's vituperation.

In March, 1775, Franklin left England for America to confer with the Continental Congress. During his ten years' sojourn in England, he had by no means been entirely absorbed by *public* affairs. The versatility of this model Yankee had been as wonderful as ever. While zealously advocating the cause of the colonies he had at the same time thought and written on such things as the introduction of silk culture in America; he had worked to promote Captain Cook's philanthropic expedition to the Pacific islands; he had drawn up a plan for a new system of spelling; made valuable studies and experiments in ventilation; inquired largely and ingeniously into the cause of colds; discussed in his letters such things as the average fall of rain; chimneys; fireproof stairs; metallic roofs; the Northwest passage; spots on the sun; the glass-harmonica; improved carriage wheels; glass blowing; the torpedo; the Aurora Borealis; inflammatory gases; Prince Rupert's drops; the effects of vegetation on air and water; smoke-consuming stoves; the effect of oil on the sea in storms; the relative force required to pull boats over shallow and over deep water; pointed or blunt lightning-rods; and points of political economy discussed with Adam Smith. If anything had escaped his observation, it must have been far out of his way.

When he arrived at Philadelphia, he found his country in open revolt against Great Britain. His keen eye had, much earlier than others, foreseen that a separation of the colonies from the mother country was likely to come. Still he had worked to avert it, faithfully, though without much hope. When it came it was to him neither unexpected nor unwelcome. Now the struggle had begun. The Continental Congress governed the United Colonies.

The battle of Lexington had been fought, and the peaceable Philosophical Society was eagerly studying methods of making saltpeter. Franklin found himself greeted as a revolutionary leader, and he had slept only one night on dry land when the general assembly of Pennsylvania appointed him a member of the Continental Congress. The old philosopher—for he was then sixty-nine—was kept prodigiously busy. He had to plan a new postal system and was made Postmaster-General, at a salary of \$1000 a year. He was put at the head of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, and made a member of several of the busiest committees. While doing all these things in Congress, he was put at the head of the committee of safety of Pennsylvania, which had to make the militia ready for war and fortify the river—a committee which met at six o'clock every morning. But more. He was hurried off to General Washington's headquarters to devise a system of army organization—and, a little too late, to Canada to attach the Canadians to the American cause. A busy time for the old philosopher, then seventy. And then, scarcely returned, he was made a member of the Committee to draft the Declaration of Independence—he the only member from Pennsylvania who was stoutly for independence the year before. The Declaration of Independence being adopted and signed, he made his famous historic joke. "We must be unanimous," said John Hancock, "there must be no pulling different ways; we must all hang together." "Yes," said Franklin dryly, "we must, indeed, all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately."

And then he took an important part in framing the plan of confederation, insisting, against the judgment of his associates, that it would not do to give the small States the same power in Congress as the large and populous ones, and that, if they had an equal vote without

bearing equal burdens, a confederation upon such iniquitous principles would never last long. Indeed, it did not last long. Ten years later every sensible man knew that the old philosopher was right, and the Constitution of the United States did justice to his foresight.

In the same debate he threw a flashing ray of intelligence upon the future with regard to slavery. A Southern man spoke of slaves and sheep as equally liable to taxation. "Slaves," said Franklin, "rather weaken than strengthen the state. There is some difference between slaves and sheep; sheep will never make any insurrection."

But as if all this had not been occupation enough, he was in addition made president of the convention called for giving Pennsylvania a new constitution; and finally, after having served on a committee of Congress in a last attempt at negotiation with the British Admiral Howe, he was sent once more abroad to invoke aid for the struggling young Republic. This was his famous embassy to France. He arrived at Paris in December, 1776. France was then surreptitiously aiding the American cause. The Government did it to weaken and humiliate England. French society favored it from an impulse of sentiment. Society was then in that strange intellectual and moral ferment which foreshadowed the great revolution. The ostentatious and exhausting despotism of Louis XIV., the scandals of the Regency and the putrid corruption of Louis XV.'s reign had left behind them among all classes of men a vague presentiment that some great change was coming. All the traditional beliefs and ideas of the past had been shaken. Montesquieu in his *Persian Letters* had riddled all social, political and clerical institutions with caustic criticism, and preached in his *Spirit of the Laws* the gospel of constitutional government. The Encyclopedists under the lead of Diderot and d'Alembert had exhausted the armory of

wit and science to destroy the power of traditional authority. Voltaire had pelted all religious fanaticism and political tyranny with the tremendous hailstorm of his sarcasm. Rousseau's dreamy philosophy had moved the sentimental with the beauties of his restored state of nature, and inflamed the imagination of the young with the picture of an ideal republic. Everybody had become a philosopher, and every philosopher thought it his office to deny *some* of the things which formerly had been taken for granted, and to smile at some of the beliefs he himself had formerly respected. Society was fairly ringing with ironical laughter at itself. Witty negation was the most spicy amusement of members of the Church, and the salons of the highest aristocracy resounded with discussions of philosophical republicanism. Society danced upon a volcano, knowing the crust to be thin, and eagerly knocking holes into it. The very persons who constituted the traditional order of things played gayly with the fire that was to consume them.

To this society the American Revolution, a people far away in the Western wilds fighting for their liberty, appeared like a theatrical performance illustrating their own vague dreams. They became enthusiastic over the piece, were eager to applaud the heroes of the drama and willing to pay for the spectacle—aye, some, moved by genuine feeling, to take part in the performance as actors themselves.

But things went badly at the beginning on the American theater of war, and the interest in France began to flag. The French Government was not unselfish. While it desired to cripple and humiliate England, it had taken care not to compromise itself so far as to be obliged to see the revolted colonies through at any cost. It still might without disgracing or endangering itself have abandoned them, if they showed no self-sustaining power. And, no

doubt, the mishaps at the beginning of the war had produced a discouraging impression. Society, too, began to be a little sobered in its sympathies by the monotonous reports of defeat. The republican spectacle did not come up to its expectations. Then Franklin arrived in Paris. Here was a new sensation. He was the revelation of America to Europe. And more. He was the picturesque embodiment of the philosophical republicanism dreamed of in French society. He was the familiar character of Poor Richard, "Bon homme Richard," alive. He was the renowned sage who had tamed the lightning of heaven. He was the courageous patriot who had pleaded the cause of his country at the bar of the British Parliament, defied the power of the court and made the Declaration of Independence—for, indeed, in their opinion, he had done it all alone. His very appearance seemed to tell the whole story. No artistic imagination could have shaped a finer embodiment of that which everybody wished the representative new-world republican to be. He was then seventy years old, the very picture of robust old age; his face benignant, shrewd, self-possessed, placid and serene; his bearing one of natural ease and dignity. He did not, as some traditions have it, affect a rustic appearance. The woolen stockings, the heavy shoes tied with leather strings and the broad-brimmed hat are a myth. His attire was simple and modest, but gentlemanly according to the taste of the time. On public occasions or in society he appeared in black velvet, white stockings and silver-buckled shoes. But he threw aside the fashionable wig, wearing only his natural hair, thin on the top of the head, but falling in ample gray locks upon his shoulders. His conversation was quiet, straightforward and instructive; full of wise sayings, quaintly original, witty and good-natured, always within the rules of good taste, showing that he knew the ways of the world.

Such was Benjamin Franklin, printer, of Philadelphia, when he appeared in France as a representative of the young American Republic. To say that he was received with respect and affection, would be saying nothing. He was idolized, adored.

Men imagined [says Lacretelle] they saw in Franklin a sage of antiquity, come back to give austere lessons and generous examples to the moderns. They personified in him the Republic of which he was the representative and the legislator. They regarded his virtues as those of his countrymen, and even judged of their physiognomy by the imposing and severe traits of his own. Happy was he who could gain admittance to see him in the house he occupied.

He was the lion of the street no less than of the salon. A correspondent of an American paper wrote:

When Dr. Franklin appears abroad, it is more like a public than a private gentleman, and the curiosity of the people is so great, that he may be said to be followed by a genteel mob. A friend of mine paid something for a place at a two-pair-of-stairs window to see him pass in his coach, but the crowd was so great that he could but barely say he saw him.

Innumerable pictures and prints, busts, medals and medallions of him were made, some so small as to be set in the lids of snuffboxes, or to be worn in rings. Courtier and shopkeeper, duchess and chambermaid, talked of Franklin with equal interest and reverence as the friend of humankind who looked as if he had come to restore the golden age.

A wonderful popularity was his—but more wonderful still, he maintained it the nine long years he was in France. And, indeed, the young American Republic needed such a spokesman. He appeared at a critical time and his mere

appearance revived the flagging interest and waning confidence. What Franklin represented must not only be necessarily good, but also it could not be doomed to failure. What he predicted could not but come true. At the gloomiest moments his face remained serene. When he was told that Lord Howe had taken Philadelphia, he jocosely replied: "No, Philadelphia has taken Lord Howe." When the Revolutionary cause seemed to be breathing its last, he caused the new American State constitutions to be translated into French, which were to the political philosophers of French society a new and inspiring revelation of their own theories. He lost no opportunity to represent the cause of America as the cause of progressive mankind; and having French mankind devotedly on his side, he got over all the miseries of the begging diplomat, and obtained from the French Government all America wanted.

After Burgoyne's surrender the French Government dropped its disguise. It formally recognized the independence of the Colonies and made treaties of alliance and of commerce with the United States. The American commissioners were, as the envoys of a friendly Power, solemnly received by Louis XVI. on the 20th of March, 1778. In preparing for the great occasion Franklin thought for the first and last time of accommodating his appearance to the court ceremonial of a European monarchy. There was an unbending rule that no man should appear before the King of France except with a wig on his head and a light court sword at his side. As the great hour approached, Franklin ordered a wig. When the *peruquier* brought it and tried it on Franklin's head, it would not fit. "It is too small," said Franklin. "No, monsieur," answered the wigmaker, "your head is too big." Franklin then resolved to do the unheard-of thing: to stand before the Majesty of France in his own hair and

also without a sword. The chamberlain stood aghast, but all France applauded, and Europe echoed. Thus the first recognized envoy of the American Republic appeared in the diplomacy of the world in the simple garb of an American gentleman.

Soon afterward there was another presentation, of less practical significance, but no less picturesque. Voltaire, eighty-four years old, visited Paris once more, to receive the last homage of his country and age, and then to die. The American envoys waited upon him. Voltaire, feeble and emaciated, raised himself from his couch and spoke to them in English. "I beg your pardon," he said to a French lady present, "I have for a moment yielded to the vanity of showing that I can speak in the language of a Franklin." A short time afterward they met again at a session of the Academy of Sciences in the presence of a large concourse of scientific and literary men. The vast audience called upon them to rise and would not be satisfied until they had embraced and kissed. The cry went forth: "How charming to see Solon and Sophocles embrace!" A thoroughly French comparison.

Franklin and Voltaire had indeed something in common, and yet we can scarcely imagine two human beings in their mental and moral natures more different. Both enemies of superstition, bigotry and despotism; both champions of enlightenment and progress. But Voltaire the outgrowth of those fanaticisms and tyrannies, those systems of oppression, mental, moral and physical, which had enthralled Europe for centuries; he the soul of an avenger, filled with the spirit of destruction; pouncing upon wrongs and abuses, upon traditions and authorities, to slay them with his fierce wit and to hold up their mangled remains to universal hatred, contempt and ridicule; the intellectual precursor of the great revolution, that terrible upheaving which buried the past in blood and

ruins and evolved a new social order from the agonies of universal overthrow. And there stood, in his embrace, Franklin, the calm, serene, benignant apostle of common-sense—the child of a society in itself unembarrassed and unhampered by the oppressions and tyrannies of the past; a society of equals all engaged in productive work to better their fortunes; no traditional social structure in their way to be destroyed; their welfare dependent only upon a wise development of existing conditions; he himself the philosopher of utility; his mind constantly at work to make the life of his fellow-beings more comfortable and happy, in small things as well as great; *his* ideal of revolution and liberty not “that the last King should be strangled with the guts of the last priest,” but that his people should not be taxed without their own consent; that they should shake off the yoke of a distant power seeking so to tax them, and then be free quietly to regulate their own affairs,—his whole being toleration, benevolence and light.

It is certain that Voltaire never could have been Voltaire had he grown up in America; and it is equally certain that Franklin, while he highly respected Voltaire as a “Literary Patriarch” and all that, had no conception at all of the revolutionary significance of Voltaire’s work. It is remarkable that in Franklin’s large correspondence not a single utterance is to be found indicating that he saw in the French people and in the movement of ideas any symptoms of an approaching political and social earthquake. It was not Solon and Sophocles that embraced, but the genius of American self-government and the genius of the French revolution, utterly incapable of understanding and appreciating one another.

The phenomenal popularity of the philosopher was, of course, a great aid to the diplomat. But Franklin possessed in the highest degree that invaluable diplomatic

quality which is called tact. He has been charged with obsequiousness to the French Government. Those who make that charge leave out of sight the difficulties of his position. He had much to ask for and little to offer. He begged gracefully, accepted with dignity and showed his gratitude without stint, knowing that he would soon have to beg for more. He has been accused of being toward the last a little too easy and even indolent. In one respect this is true. He did not keep order in his accounts and correspondence. But in other respects he was wiser than those diplomats who always want to be doing something. He understood to perfection the great art of doing what was necessary and *not trying too much*, and of doing what he had to do in the most agreeable form. Thus he effected what he was sent for: to get from France all the aid that was needed for the accomplishment of American independence. In 1781, feeling the burden of his years,—he was then seventy-five,—he offered his resignation to Congress; but instead of accepting it, Congress added to his embassy the additional office of a member of the commission to conclude peace with England. He was associated with Jay and John Adams, whose services cannot be estimated too highly. In making the treaty of peace he vainly strove to realize one of his favorite ideas. He had long advocated the doctrine that free ships should make free goods, that is, that an enemy's goods carried in neutral ships should be exempt from seizure. He went even farther than that. "I wish," he wrote to Robert Morris, "the powers would ordain that unarmed trading ships, as well as fishermen and farmers, should be respected as working for the common benefit of mankind, and never be interrupted in their operations even by national enemies; but let those only fight with one another whose trade it is and who are armed and paid for the purpose." Privateering he condemned as little

better than robbing or piracy. But these ideas were far ahead of the time then; they are somewhat ahead of the time now; but we are evidently moving in their direction. In another hundred years mankind may not stand advanced fully to the point where Benjamin Franklin stood a hundred years ago. Indeed, he had the satisfaction of embodying some of his humane principles in his last diplomatic achievement, a treaty with Prussia, which Washington praised as "marking a new era in negotiation."

At last, in July, 1785, Franklin, seventy-nine years old, was relieved of his duties and returned home. Thomas Jefferson had been appointed in his place.

There appeared to me [Jefferson wrote at a later day] more respect and veneration attached to the character of Dr. Franklin in France, than to that of any other person in the same country, foreign or native. The succession to Dr. Franklin at the court of France was an excellent school of humility. On being presented to any one as the Minister of America, the commonplace question used in such cases was: "C'est vous, Monsieur, qui remplace le docteur Franklin?" (Is it you, sir, who replace Dr. Franklin?) I generally answered: "Nobody can replace him, sir; I am only his successor."

Such a popularity undoubtedly had not been without its martyrdom; but on the whole he had enjoyed it, and these nine years in France had, perhaps, until then been the happiest of his life.

Now the old philosopher returned home, loaded with years and with honors. During the seven weeks of a not very comfortable sea voyage he still wrote three of his most useful essays, one on navigation, another on the cause and cure of smoky chimneys and another on smoke-

consuming stoves. The passion of usefulness ruled him to the last.

He hoped to have rest for the remaining days of his life in his quiet home at Philadelphia among his books and friends. But he had scarcely arrived when he was made a member of the supreme executive council, and then president (or governor) of the State of Pennsylvania, an office he held for three consecutive years, elected unanimously each time except the first, when one vote was cast against him. But in the meantime he was also a member of the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United States. The principles he professed and acted upon there were of the democratic kind. He did not believe in a strong and splendid government. He was opposed to every restriction of the suffrage. He would not consent to anything that would "depress the virtue and public spirit of our common people." He was opposed to the requirement of a fourteen-years residence before admitting foreigners to citizenship. He would not consent to the absolute veto power of the President. He did favor the power of Congress to impeach public officers, the President included. When the Convention found itself in an apparently hopeless tangle about the equal representation of the States, large and small, in Congress, and seemed on the point of breaking up, Franklin first proposed that every day's session should be opened with prayer, which, however, was not accepted, as one member said, because the convention had no money to pay the clergyman. And finally, Franklin, as a member of a special committee, to which that question was referred, suggested, as a compromise, the simple solution that every State should have an equal representation in the Senate, while in the lower house the people should be represented according to numbers, and that house should have the power to originate the revenue bills.

Unquestionably, this arrangement has proved the conservative balance-wheel of our Constitutional system for nearly a century.

It was one of Franklin's favorite hobbies that the high officers of the Government should serve without salaries. But this was a point he could not carry. His efforts only proved that even the strongest common-sense is sometimes not without its crotchets. In the compromise of the Constitution concerning slavery he acquiesced, but before he closed his eyes forever his venerable name and benignant countenance appeared foremost among the champions of the anti-slavery cause. The first memorial against slavery presented to the Congress of the United States at its first session was signed by Benjamin Franklin as President of the Abolition Society. It was an eloquent document.

From a persuasion [it says] that equal liberty was originally the portion and is still the birthright of all men, your memorialists conceive themselves bound to use all justifiable endeavors to loosen the bonds of slavery, and promote a general enjoyment of the blessings of freedom. Under these impressions, we earnestly entreat your serious attention to the subject of slavery; that you will be pleased to countenance the restoration to liberty of these unhappy men who alone, in this land of freedom, are degraded into perpetual bondage, and that you will step to the very verge of the power vested in you for discouraging every species of traffic in the persons of our fellow-men.

A long debate arose in the House as to whether the petition should be referred to a committee for consideration. By a large majority it was so referred in spite of the heated opposition led by Mr. Jackson of Georgia, who was the first to formulate the pro-slavery argument which at a later day became the staple of the discussion on that

side of the question. In this cause Franklin's genius flashed out once more in all its originality. Twenty-four days before his death, at the age of eighty-four, he wrote for the newspapers a humorous piece describing a debate in the Divan of Algiers on the petition of a religious sect to deliver the Christian slaves, putting all the arguments of a champion of American slavery in the mouth of an advocate of the Algerian pirates who argued in favor of keeping the Christian dogs in bondage. Here was once more, as fresh as in his youthful days, the old quaintness of conceit, the old delicate irony, the old kindly wit and humor, illustrating the old strength of argument in a cause sacred to his heart, a cause fit to inspire the last effort of a great man. He died on the 17th of April, 1790.

His last years since his return from France were less active than had been his wont. He began to feel that the responsibility for what then happened belonged to a generation younger than his. While he freely contributed his wisdom to the movements of opinion then going on, he felt also that he was somewhat entitled to rest and might take his ease without any sense of neglected duty. He expressed this in his own quaint manner when in a letter he described his home life with his daughter and grandchildren, saying:

Cards we sometimes play here, in long winter evenings; but it is as they play at chess, not for money, but for honor, or the pleasure of beating one another. I have, indeed, now and then a little compunction in reflecting that I spend time so idly; but another reflection comes to relieve me, whispering: "You know that the soul is immortal; why then should you be such a niggard of a little time, when you have all eternity before you?" So, being easily convinced, and, like other reasonable creatures, satisfied with a small reason when it is in favor of doing what I have a mind to, I shuffle the cards again, and begin another game.

And well might he, without much compunction of conscience, think of ease in his high old age, for few men ever lived who made throughout their lives a more arduous and valuable use of their time. I know of no man in history whose mind was more incessantly active and more inexhaustibly fertile—not in abstract ideas and creations of fancy—for his imagination was not remarkable—but in observing things and phenomena and men and affairs and in drawing rapid conclusions from what he observed, and in making those conclusions practically useful. His was a wonderfully *originating* mind, not dependent upon suggestions or impulse from others, but seemingly always knowing what to do and doing it or seeing it done. And almost all he thought or said or did was calculated to do somebody some good.

I began by saying that no human being can study Benjamin Franklin's life without drawing some valuable lesson from it. There is a characteristic reason for this. With all his greatness—we may look upon him as one of the greatest men that ever lived—yet we find him so essentially, sympathetically, lovably human, that every human being feels near to him. There is in his greatness nothing that repels, or even in the least discourages approach.

He was full of human passion and frailty, like many other people. He overcame them, not by working himself up to lofty ethical abstractions, above the reach of the common run of men, but by common-sense reflections, which the most ordinary minds can understand and which even natures of a coarse moral fiber can follow; and by exertions of will, which everybody should be capable of. He set out, not as a self-conscious, wonderful genius to do *great* things, but as a clear, observing and active mind to do *useful* things; and doing many useful things in a manner intelligible to all, he became great.

The manner in which he conveyed his wisdom to the ordinary mind also brought him near to common human nature and ingratiated him with it. He not only knew what human ignorance and weakness were; he not only never looked haughtily and superciliously down on them; but he respected them and addressed them with sympathy. His scientific writings were wonders of clearness and simplicity. There was in them nothing of that affectation of scientific mysteriousness indulged in by many who try to appear profound by being unintelligible. He made philosophy and science the plain, sensible, familiar friend and fire-side companion of everybody's life. The initiated reader of his scientific writings is constantly astonished and delighted to find how simple it all is. He never thought of oppressing any one with demonstrations of mental superiority. On the contrary, it was his constant endeavor so to infuse his thoughts into his hearers, as to make them feel that those thoughts were really their own.

This was with him not only a matter of instinct but a well cultivated habit.

I made it a rule [he says in his autobiography] to forbear all direct contradiction to the sentiments of others and all positive assertion of my own. I even forbid myself the use of every word or expression that imported a fixed opinion, such as *certainly*, *undoubtedly*, etc., and I adopted instead of them *I conceive*, *I apprehend* or *I imagine* a thing to be so and so. When another asserted anything that I thought an error, I denied myself the pleasure of contradicting him abruptly; and in answering I began by observing that in certain circumstances his opinion might be right, but in the present case there appeared to be some difference, etc. The modest way in which I proposed my opinions procured them a readier reception and less contradiction. To this habit (after my character for integrity) I think it principally owing that I had early so much weight with my fellow-citizens when

I proposed new institutions or alterations in the old, and so much influence in public councils—for I was but a sad speaker. Never eloquent, subject to much hesitation in my choice of words, hardly correct in language, and yet I generally carried my points.

It was the wonderful persuasiveness of the superior mind which sympathetically identified itself with the inferior understanding.

As a politician, a popular leader, a statesman, too, he exercised his consummate faculty of identifying himself in intellect and standpoint with those upon and through whom he had to work. He never quarreled about trifles. He avoided quarreling even about important things. He never hated anybody except George III.

He was a successful man in his private affairs (and showed by his example how one who began wretchedly poor may accumulate enough to sustain a great and conspicuous position in life), not by streaks of good luck or any uncommon business enterprise or effort, but by observing certain very ordinary rules of thrift, industry and prudence, intelligible to all and, it might be said, within the opportunities of almost all. It has been said by some that his wisdom had been, after all, nothing but the picayunish wisdom of the narrow-minded penny saver and somewhat out of date now. Those who say so forget that Franklin also taught how a fortune penuriously won may be generously risked or spent for great ends; for the same Franklin unhesitatingly put his whole fortune in jeopardy to help General Braddock in his expedition; what to him was an enormous sum, he lent to the Continental Congress, when the chances of the American Revolution looked extremely uncertain. He offered to make himself liable for the tea thrown into Boston harbor, if thereby a just policy toward America could be

secured; thus repeatedly placing his hard-earned fortune at the service of his country.

He became a singularly happy man, so happy indeed that he could say near the close of his life,—if he could live it over again with some few changes he would like it,—not by the mere favor of fortune, nor by a lofty philosophy lifting him above the reach of disappointment and sorrow, but by controlling those evil passions he had in common with most others; by turning his faculties to the best account for himself and his fellow-men; by never losing sight of his wise maxim that “human felicity is produced not so much by great pieces of good fortune that seldom happen, as by little advantages that occur every day”; and by simply enjoying the pleasant things of this world, *freely* and *heartily*, as other good people enjoyed them, getting the fullest possible measure of them he could.

He was a virtuous man, earnestly, methodically so; but his was not that straitlaced and forbidding kind of virtue which looks with a stern and sour eye upon human weakness and at every worldly enjoyment and pleasure. His was a thoroughly human, sympathetic, merry, lovable virtue—a virtue that nobody would be afraid of and that everybody would not only understand and esteem but enjoy.

In one word, the manner in which he became good, useful, great and happy is so much within the reach of common intelligence as well as common opportunities that, studying it, scarcely any human being can fail to see in it a great many suggestions which pointedly apply to his own actual condition, and to feel the impulse of trying something like this too, although perhaps in a much smaller sphere and with much more modest mental resources. And the mere attempt, if made with some degree of earnestness, will be almost sure to produce some good.

It was at the time thought to be the highest praise that could be conferred upon a man when Turgot, in his celebrated epigram, said of Franklin: "Eripuit cœlo fulmen, sceptrumque tyrannis" ("He snatched the lightning from the heavens, and the scepter from the hand of the tyrants"). In one respect this poetic compliment, however great, was not large enough. For it might well be added that Franklin also stripped science of its mystery and virtue of its terrors.

He was the greatest of Americans; one of the great men in history, and, with all his greatness, a most genuine man of the people.

FROM HORACE WHITE

NEW YORK, Jan. 24, 1885.

Confidential.

My dear Schurz: My interview with Governor Cleveland has left this impression on my mind; that his present inclination is to appoint Bayard, Secretary of State, Whitney, Secretary of Treasury, Garland, Attorney-General and J. Q. Adams,¹ Postmaster-General or something else. He asked my opinion of Trumbull without being led up to it by me in any way. So I infer that he had had Trumbull in his mind for some time. I did lead up to Adams, and he said that he had mentioned Adams to some of his friends without, however, intending that any inference should be drawn from it. Then he added that the name of Adams would go a great way in any Cabinet and that since J. Q. had been a consistent Democrat from the war period down, no objection could be raised against him on that score. He holds the same opinion of Judge Abbott that you do and expressed it in almost the same words.

I used every argument that could be thought of against the appointment of Whitney—in a temperate way of course. I need not recapitulate them to you. He met them all with counter-arguments, or rather he stated whatever was to be

¹ Eldest son of Chas. Francis Adams, Sr.

stated on the other side. He may have done this for the purpose of drawing me out and seeing *how much* I was opposed to Whitney. I have considerable hope that when he comes out of his comparative seclusion at Albany and meets real public opinion, the present inclination of his mind—if I am right in my interpretation of it—may be overborne.

His objections to Bayard as Secretary of the Treasury are based upon Bayard's political affiliations in New York. His (Bayard's) intimate associates, he says, are men who believe in patronage as a means of political advancement and are as case-hardened in this respect as Tom Platt, Geo. Bliss or Barney Biglin. Bayard himself, he concedes, is above all such base and paltry considerations, but he thinks that these men would, nevertheless, have their way with him.

This is a matter which, of course, cannot be communicated to Bayard himself. He is so high-mettled that he would sheer the track at once and refuse to come within gunshot of the Cabinet in any capacity, and I think we must try to land him there even if the Treasury is bestowed elsewhere. I know that Governor Cleveland wants him for Secretary of State, and considering the present state of complication and bedevilment in that quarter, it is worth an effort to get him there if the other plan fails.

The first thing to be done is to keep Whitney out. Judge Schoonmaker proposes Daniel Manning as a counter-nomination: Manning is a banker, a man of good repute, much better known to the country than Whitney, and a man of experience. I should say that he would be one of the few men left from whom the choice could be made, if Bayard is not taken. D. Willis James is another. Hewitt would be an excellent choice if his health were sufficient. But Manning gave me to understand that he favored the appointment of Whitney. Godkin had a talk with Stetson yesterday. Stetson stated with great positiveness that Whitney was not a candidate for the place, that he distrusted his own ability to fill it and that if his (Whitney's) opinion were asked as to the fitness of the appointment of himself, or anybody so little known to the country as himself, he would say no. This is another

puzzle! Most people would say that if this is his frame of mind he can solve all difficulties and save the party from a great risk by taking himself out of the way. Governor Cleveland told me that he had not made a pledge to any human being for a place in the Cabinet, or any other place, and that he should not do so until he had consulted certain party leaders, among whom he mentioned Carlisle and Lamar. He inquired particularly how long you would be away and said that he would have been extremely glad to see you at Albany but could not blame you for not coming. I think that a letter from you guided by the information which you now have would be very useful. Of course it must not be known how you have derived the information, although I do not consider that I am violating any confidence in telling you things which he would have told you if you had accepted his invitation to call upon him at Albany.

Regarding the reappointment of Postmaster Pearson [of New York]—the thing is quite feasible provided the Independents will signify in writing their desire for it. Curtis objects to this, because it looks like a division of spoils—so much for so much. That is, he objects to the “signing of paper.” He thinks that the appointment ought to be done “out of hand,” as altogether the fittest thing to be done, etc. Of course if that were practicable it would be the best thing. But Governor Cleveland said that it might embarrass him in other cases to reappoint Mr. Pearson on his own motion. A multitude of other Republican postmasters would claim the same consideration and it would be extremely difficult to deal with them. Reasons as plenty as blackberries might exist for their non-retention but it would be hard to make the public understand them, etc.

I enclose you Curtis’s letter so that you may be fully possessed of his views. My own opinion is that we cannot under the circumstances refuse to “make it easy” for Governor Cleveland to do what we desire in the premises although it may be well to have the paper signed by Ottendorfer, Hewitt and some other leading Democrats. Mr. Ottendorfer told me that he would cordially coöperate if Democratic coöperation

were desirable. I should qualify all this by saying that Governor Cleveland did not promise to reappoint Mr. Pearson, but indicated that his personal inclination lay that way.

Governor Cleveland is strongly opposed to the silver coinage, and from some remarks which he made I infer that he has no liking for the pending treaties.

The impression I got of Governor Cleveland is that he is an honest, true-hearted, single-minded man, who has mastered the civil service question and is inflexible in his intention to carry out that reform in the spirit of his recent letter, but that as to the great mass of National questions, which will come up for daily treatment, his information is extremely defective and that he is liable to make many and even serious mistakes unless his daily advisers and associates are men of experience, training and proved political ability.

P.S. Please write me what you think of Curtis's objections.

TO SILAS W. BURT

NEW YORK, Feb. 16, 1885.

In reply to your question as to how the appointment of Mr. Daniel Manning as Secretary of the Treasury would strike me, I have to say that while I think the appointment could be defended I do not think that it would be considered, either in the Democratic party or out of it, as "putting the best foot foremost." What Governor Cleveland wants is not a Cabinet that can be defended but one that commends itself affirmatively and strongly to intelligent public opinion. The opinion that is formed of the Administration during the first sixty days will be the governing opinion of the succeeding three years and ten months.

My opinion of Mr. Manning, derived from a single interview with him, is altogether favorable, and this opinion has been confirmed by all that I have learned from others; but he is not one of the three or four foremost

men in the Democratic party. The Treasury Department should be given to one of these foremost men. So also should the State and Interior. The party is not yet out of the woods. It is not in a position to take risks. Its majorities in the pivotal States are narrow and uncertain. It is under the necessity of doing its very best and of seeming to do so.

The three men of widest and solidest reputation in the Democratic party who may be considered available for Cabinet places are Thurman, Bayard and McDonald. These are the men who have come to the front by ten years' competitive examination and this is proved by the fact that they stood next to Mr. Cleveland at the Chicago Convention.

In my judgment a Democratic Cabinet, in this time of trial, should contain all of these men. A Cabinet which did not contain any one of them would not look much like a Democratic Administration. Unless some of the "old hard heads"—the men of experience, and of reputation gained in the combats of the forum and in the competition of statecraft—are found in the Administration there will be no certainty about anything. Intentions may be ever so good, yet the public will never be reasonably sure of what will be done in any given emergency. Mr. Manning has had little more experience with National legislation and administration than Governor Cleveland himself. His reputation is that of a politician rather than of a statesman—a politician of the better class, indeed, but still coming short of what ought to be expected in an office which will be in some sense the keynote of the Administration. The Departments of State and Treasury should be filled by men of whom it will be generally said by intelligent and observing persons in all parts of the country, "We know where to find them; their characters are established, their mettle has been proved, their

intelligence and capacity have been tested." This is rather more than can be said of Mr. Manning. I have made some inquiries down-town concerning him and I have met almost everywhere the response: "We know nothing of Mr. Manning except as a shrewd politician." Mr. Hewitt, Mr. McDonald and Mr. Bayard are known for the possession of statesmanlike qualities and of well defined ideas of financial principles. If Mr. Bayard should for any reason not have the State Department I think Mr. Thurman would be the next best man.

The factions in Ohio and Indiana need not deter Governor Cleveland from going into those States for Cabinet officers if he really desires to do so.

One glimpse of the shillelah in his hands will soothe all the factions to silence. Thurman bestrides the factions in his State like a colossus. Both intellectually and morally he overshadows all his compeers in Ohio. McDonald holds a corresponding position in Indiana and is well entitled to it.

If it be said that both these men and Mr. Bayard are Presidential candidates, the answer is that if Mr. Cleveland's Administration proves a success he will himself be the chief beneficiary and will certainly be reëlected. If it is not a success no Democrat will be elected in 1888. Those things should be left to settle themselves. To take a man into the Cabinet or to leave him out because he may or may not have aspirations for the Presidency would be taking a lower and narrower view of the situation than I think Governor Cleveland capable of. It will be safe for him to assume that every Congressman and every governor of a State and nearly all members of the State legislatures have aspirations of this sort and that it will be quite impossible for him to get a Cabinet which will be free from them. The ambition is laudable and I would not give much for a Cabinet destitute of it.

As I have already said, I think Mr. Manning's appointment as Secretary of the Treasury could be defended but it would require a good deal of explanation.

I do not understand what is meant by the phrases "an old men's Cabinet" and "a young men's Cabinet." What is wanted is public confidence. If this is gained, the years of the [members of the] Cabinet will make no difference.

TO GROVER CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Feb. 24, 1885.

The more I think of it the more does it seem to me that your inaugural is a matter of uncommon importance—that it should rise as far as possible above the perfunctory commonplace of such occasions and speak with the voice of leadership to the political forces behind you, to give them impulse and direction. My impression now is even stronger than it was at the time I wrote the notice I left with you, that the principal questions before the country should be mentioned in your first official utterance, succinctly but at the same time with a certain statesmanlike comprehensiveness. The moment of your accession to power is an epoch in the history of this Republic, and much depends upon the first effect produced by it upon the public mind. All of which is respectfully submitted.

I have been thinking over the names you mentioned to me yesterday in connection with the Cabinet, and it has occurred to me that while the three Southern men among them are all United States Senators of renown and experience, the Northern men named are all new men, nationally speaking, that is, men without experience and established standing in National affairs. This circumstance may, perhaps, not be looked upon as one of vital

consequence but it might be worth considering in making your final arrangements.

TO L. Q. C. LAMAR¹

NEW YORK, Mar. 2, 1885.

Horace White and George Jones of the *Times* informed me that President Cleveland had offered a place in the Cabinet to Mr. Whitney, and that it had been accepted. White telegraphed a remonstrance to Albany to be presented to Mr. Cleveland and he also wrote to Bayard, making me promise that I would write to you. I do so, somewhat reluctantly, because I detest complaining. But it seems necessary in this instance.

We Independents have taken upon us a certain responsibility with regard to the coming Administration. We have promised our followers an era of reform and high-minded government.

Mr. Manning's selection for the Treasury Department is to us a terrible load to carry. He has no standing in National affairs. He has, justly or unjustly, the reputation of a machine politician, whose elevation to the most powerful place in the Cabinet is widely regarded, among our own people, as a reward for political services rendered and as an encouragement for further political services to be rendered. This imputation may be all unjust, but it will be, indeed it is now, pretty generally accepted. This is a fact which no amount of explanatory talk can change; and this fact will deprive the Administration of a very large part of its moral credit and the popular confidence. The appointment of Mr. Whitney added will deprive it of most of the rest. I am not personally acquainted with that gentleman, having seen him only

¹ Prospective Secretary of the Interior.

once. He may be an honest and a clever man, but he has still less of national standing than Mr. Manning. The only reputation he has, is that he is Senator Payne's son-in-law, the brother-in-law of the Standard Oil Company, worth several millions, and that he last fall contributed \$25,000 to Mr. Cleveland's campaign fund. These are his only distinctions. Aside from these he is only known as a politician on a small scale.

These two gentlemen appear in Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet as the men he brought with him; as his confidential friends and advisers, and as the leading spirits of the "reform Administration." Not only the opposition will represent it so, but so it will seem to a large majority of the people who elected Mr. Cleveland.

They will ask: What merit is there in Mr. Whitney that would entitle him to be a member of the Government? What motive can have prompted his appointment? Is it to pay for his campaign contribution? Is the Standard Oil Company behind him? Is it not known to the President, that one of the most scandalous and alarming signs of the times consists in the invasion of the Senate by millionaires who have no distinction but their money? Is it the business of a "reform Administration" to invite the millionaire who has no other distinction than his money, also into the Cabinet? These questions will be asked. What answer can we give to the patriotic men who followed our lead? Shall we speak of the President's good intentions? Facts are stronger arguments than the intentions observed by them. There can be no doubt about it, if these things are done, the moral credit of the Administration, with our people at least, will be gone. It will require years to recover it, if it can ever be recovered. An Administration with such leading spirits will not be trusted. And thus the great opportunity for the "coöperation of the best elements," which we have

long been wishing and working for, is recklessly thrown away. You can imagine how I feel when I think of this after the struggles I have gone through.

When I saw Mr. Cleveland I gave the best interpretation to what passed between us. What has since happened makes that interview appear in a different light. When speaking of Mr. Manning I said that it was a mistake to take into a Cabinet a personal friend for the purpose of having a confidential man there; that thus jealousy and ill-feeling were created; that he would soon find all high-minded men in his Cabinet deserving of equal confidence, and that no arrangement should be made indicating that such was not his expectation. He disclaimed this with regard to Mr. Manning. But not a word was said by him of his intention of appointing Mr. Whitney. Had that name been mentioned I should have told him frankly all the objections that I have written you of, and I should have added that, such selections left the regard due to the men of national standing in the Cabinet somewhat out of view, that, had there been such a combination of confidential home-politicians, such a germ of clique-business and intrigue in the Hayes Cabinet when I was invited into it I should have considered it due to my self-respect to decline the invitation. Indeed, you will vainly look for just such a couple of appointments from the President's own State in the history of Cabinets.

I have reason to believe that the selection of Mr. Whitney was contemplated, if not resolved upon, by Mr. Cleveland when I saw him, and that he withheld the information from me because he did not want to discuss it. But Mr. Whitney's selection had been warmly protested against by Independents when his name was mentioned before, and Mr. Cleveland was well aware how distasteful that selection would be to them. Immediately after the election expressions of Democratic gratitude to the

Independents were loud and gushing. We declined all reward. We wanted only a Government we could confide in. But now I may say that, as to the arrangement of the Administration, everything we especially recommended in that respect was refused, and everything we especially objected to, was done. And surely those recommendations as well as objections were in the highest degree unselfish, modest and reasonable.

If the Cabinet is formed as intended, a majority of the rank and file of the Independents, disappointed and distrustful, will, I apprehend, quietly find their way back to their old associations. Those of the leaders who are, as journalists, obliged to speak, will also be obliged to criticise severely, if they want to keep the confidence of their readers. I, for my part, unwilling to denounce and unable to defend, shall lapse into silence, consider myself discredited with my constituency, dismissed from the political field and relegated to private pursuits. Is it not a singular fate? My coöperation with Democrats for good ends leaves me strange experiences. When I had to bolt from my party in Missouri for the purpose of restoring the ballot to the disfranchised "rebel sympathizers," I was first praised by them to the skies, and then they used those very ballots to drive me out of the Senate and to put one of their own men in my seat. And now when I have exposed myself to the bitterest hatred and vindictiveness of the party from which I received all my public honors, for the purpose of inaugurating an era of reform and high-minded politics, I find myself, by the very first act of those so put into power, discredited, if not made ridiculous, in the eyes of those who followed my lead, and virtually driven from the field of political activity and influence.

Do not misunderstand me. This is no case of personal grievance. I have none. I want nothing. The Administration could offer me nothing that would have the least

value to me. But I do not want to see the great aims long and faithfully fought for, recklessly compromised. I do not want to see this great chance for a fruitful working together of the best political elements thrown away to gratify a few politicians. Do not deceive yourself. Your Administration can do little without the confidence of public opinion. It would have that confidence in the highest degree with a Cabinet of statesmen, and will lose it with such confidential advisers surrounding the President.

You may ask why I did not address this letter to Mr. Cleveland. Because not speaking to me about Mr. Whitney's appointment indicated that he did not want me to speak to him about it. I still take him to be an honest and well-meaning man; but I fear he is already under dangerous influences. I write to you because I think you and Bayard may still do much to save the coming Administration from moral discredit and yourselves from constant embarrassment and mortification in it. You might very properly do this: Ask Mr. Cleveland pointedly whether the Cabinet so constituted has the confidence of the Independents, and whether it will not be well that relations of frank confidence with the Independents be maintained. If he says that this Cabinet has the confidence of the Independents you may safely answer that he is grossly deceived. If a letter is mentioned written by Mr. George Jones of the *Times* complimentary to Mr. Whitney, you will find that this letter was obtained under circumstances which Mr. Jones would probably like to have inquired into. At any rate, it would not be out of the way to insist that the feelings of the Independents concerning this Cabinet be first directly and authentically ascertained.

This letter is for you only—of course, I suppose, you may feel it necessary to discuss what I say with Bayard.

But I pour myself out to you in the confidence of friendship. Your opportunities and responsibilities are great. See to it that you do not start in an unseaworthy bottom.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, March 21, 1885.

My dear Mr. President: Pardon me for asking the favor of a moment's attention. When I had the honor of an interview with you at Albany, I received, from what you said to me, the impression that you were strongly inclined to reappoint Mr. Pearson.¹ The question you asked me whether it was proper and customary to renominate such an officer before the expiration of his term, suggested the inference that the reappointment of Mr. Pearson would be one of your first official acts. What I heard from your more confidential friends strengthened that impression and inference as to your intentions. Reports received from Washington, and still more the circumstance that Mr. Pearson's term has been permitted to expire without his reappointment, have created an apprehension that the matter is in doubt.

My name does not appear upon a single petition or recommendation for any appointment in your gift. I believe most, if not all, of the Independents who took an active part in the late campaign have followed the same line of conduct. If I, in accord with them, now say a word to you in behalf of the reappointment of Postmaster Pearson, it is not on account of any personal interest in him—for he is a stranger to me—but because his case is a representative, not an individual, one. We speak not for a person but for a public cause.

As you have permitted me to believe, it is your opinion

¹ The postmaster of N. Y. City.

no less than mine that to keep in place, or to reappoint, without regard to party affiliation, officers who have been conspicuously efficient in the discharge of their duties, who have maintained a good general character and who have not meddled with party politics beyond the ordinary exercise of a citizen's right, is a good rule, in fact a rule demanded by the public interest. That the enforcement of such a rule will greatly add to the character and efficiency of the service is self-evident, for it will teach all public officers that the best possible performance of their official duties without partisan service will give them an excellent claim to be retained in place even if there be a change of party in power,—and that no other claim can be depended on. It is equally clear that without the establishment of such a rule the public service will never become a non-partisan service, but will always have a strong tendency to degenerate into a party machine, periodical “new ideals” being the regular order. If upon the expiration of the term of every Republican officeholder you put a Democrat in his place, the whole service, outside of the comparatively small number of subordinate places covered by the civil service law and a few other exceptions, will, at the end of your Presidential term, be essentially, and purposely, a Democratic service; and if then the Republicans win, they will only have to follow your example to make it an essentially Republican service again, and so on and on. But if you establish and follow the rule above indicated, reappointing a Republican here and there on account of proved fitness, you will have made a precedent which no succeeding Administration can afford to disregard, and thus you will have conferred a great and lasting benefit upon the Republic.

The reappointment of Mr. Pearson is in this respect regarded as a test of your policy, and it is only in this sense that I address you in its behalf. I need scarcely

add that the failure of your Administration to adopt this rule and to illustrate it by keeping Mr. Pearson in place would disappoint the hopes of those of your supporters who have the success of your endeavors to reform abuses and to purify the political atmosphere most earnestly at heart. They cordially appreciate the noble resistance you have offered to the pressure of the spoils politicians, and they would be much pained at seeing that record blurred, and the cause they have in common with you compromised, by an act calculated to render uncertain, or at least more difficult, your complete success. It is generally believed, although you never made a pledge to that effect, that you went to Washington with the intention of reappointing Mr. Pearson. It was generally expected, by friend and foe, that this intention would be carried out. If now, in spite of your own inclination to do a thing so good in itself and so beneficial in its consequences, and in spite of an overwhelming sentiment in its favor among the business community here, regardless of party, and among the friends of reform throughout the country, considerations of a partisan character should after all outweigh all this, and thus maintain their ascendancy, keeping the field open for a future revival of spoils politics, the disappointment would indeed be great.

But it would be a disappointment not only to many of your friends,—the result would disappoint you too. It would greatly encourage, but by no means satisfy, the office-hunters and patronage-dealers. By encouraging them it would bring them down upon you with new expectations and more exacting demands. With these demands you would not be able to comply without giving up your whole reform policy. And by refusing them you exasperate the spoilsmen in the Democratic party just as much as by appointing hundreds of Pearsons. Nothing will satisfy them but a complete surrender. Half a

reform will make those people just as much your enemies as a whole reform, but it will not make you half as strong with the most patriotic and enlightened class of citizens. The approval of public opinion is always the principal strength of any reform Administration, and it will in a great measure depend upon the completeness of the reform policy. This has been the experience of all Administrations which made attempts in that direction. But owing to your splendid record and the fact that your performances have always gone beyond your formal promises, public expectation is now higher than it has ever been before.

The importance of the subject and my deep interest in it will, I hope, serve as an excuse for the earnestness of my language.

FROM PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 23, 1885.

My dear Sir: Your letter of [day before] yesterday is received.

Mr. Pearson's term expired, I believe, less than twenty-four hours ago.

I have had many things to consider and act upon, of the first importance and which admitted of no delay.

I hope you fully appreciate that the subject broached in your letter gives rise to many anxious reflections.

There are official documents and papers on file in the Post-Office Department, which relate to the subject, and which having been presented to me have perplexed and troubled me.

May I say that I want to do just the right thing, and at the same time gratify a host of kind friends and good men of whom you are an honored representative?

I take up my burden every morning and carry it as well as I can till night, and frequently up-hill.

Your letter has produced a profound impression upon me as indicating the wishes of a friend and ally who has a right to insist upon the recognition you ask.

And yet I know you would think but little of me, if convinced that I would do a wrong thing, simply because you, in ignorance of the facts involved, asked it.

I hope I shall be led in the right path.

Yours very sincerely,

GROVER CLEVELAND.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, March 26, 1885.

I have just received your kind note of the 23d inst. and hasten to remove a wrong impression which my letter seems to have produced. It is that it "indicated the wishes of a friend and ally who had a right to insist upon the recognition he asks." Nothing could be farther from my mind than to insist upon a "recognition." The practice of recognizing persons by the use of official trust for political or personal services rendered, is on the contrary one of the practices I have frequently denounced as dangerous. What I want to see recognized is not a person but the public interest. But above all, I trust there is nothing in my letter in the remotest degree open to the construction that I could possibly want you to do a wrong thing simply because I asked it. I should be sorry if such a thought has crossed your mind. I argued in favor of Mr. Pearson's reappointment only upon public grounds, believing him to be a true exponent of those principles upon which the public service should be conducted, and that by his reappointment the public interest would be greatly benefited. If there are facts in your possession showing that Mr. Pearson is not the kind of man we took him to be, or that by his reappointment the public interest will not be served, I should be the last

man on earth to desire that reappointment. I should openly applaud his rejection.

But in that event, permit me to suggest, the Administration would owe it to itself as well as to the public, to let it be understood what the real reasons for Mr. Pearson's rejection were. This is no ordinary case. It has been widely and with unusual interest discussed in the press as well as in private. The friends of civil service reform have earnestly advocated this reappointment because it would greatly advance the cause they have at heart. The spoils politicians in the Democratic party oppose it because they do not want that reform. Your enemies in the Democratic party and the more unscrupulous Blaine men wish it should not be done because they do not want you to have the credit of it and do want to spite the Independents. Among the best class of citizens it has been generally expected as the proper thing. If it is not done, the naked fact of Mr. Pearson's rejection would be understood by the public as a victory of the partisan spirit which opposes your principles over the public spirit which upholds them.

This would be deplorable. Nothing but public knowledge of the facts in Mr. Pearson's career which rendered his rejection necessary will remove that impression. We here have been led to believe that the charges made against Mr. Pearson under the last Administration were a mere flimsy contrivance on the part of a Republican faction to get rid of a good public servant because they could not use him—just the reason why a true reform Administration would insist upon keeping him. That contrivance did not seem to Mr. Arthur sufficient to serve even as a decent excuse for Mr. Pearson's removal. The matter would have to appear, of course, in an aspect far more grave to cause his rejection now. The worst thing for the character of the Administration would be the use of insufficient charges against Mr. Pearson as a mere pretext; the next

worst thing, his rejection for partisan reasons frankly avowed; the best thing, his reappointment if his record is found good, or, if not, a frank avowal of the reasons which compelled his rejection. Those reasons being sufficient, they will be most promptly and heartily approved by those who most earnestly advocated Mr. Pearson's reappointment.

I need scarcely add that this would not in any sense invalidate the arguments I had the honor to submit to you for keeping in place some unobjectionable Republican officers so that the way for the establishment of a non-partisan service be opened.

Pardon me for a general remark upon the relations, as I conceive them, between the Independents and your Administration. That remark is called forth by what you say of "insisting upon a recognition." The support we gave you in the campaign was a free offering. The suggestions we occasionally venture upon now are a free offering again—the latter, of course, to be presented only as long as welcome. We supported you because we thought so to serve the public good. We try to advise you to the same end. I will not deny that there is now one feeling of a somewhat selfish character in all this, but only one. It is that we want to get as the product of our work as much public good as possible. We wish that at the close of your Administration we may stand fully justified before ourselves and before the country, and speak with pride of the results of what we have done. We wish also that by your success our influence upon public opinion for the public good may be strengthened—as it would certainly be very much weakened by your failure. This is all the recognition we want. And in this sense let me say again, that your success will be all the more certain and complete, the more consistent, far-seeing and thorough your Administration is in its reform policy.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, March 31, 1885.

Permit me to congratulate you and the country upon the fact that the result of your inquiry into Mr. Pearson's case enabled you to carry out your original intention of reappointing him. The inauguration of the policy of which this reappointment is so conspicuous an illustration is certain to be of immense benefit to the Republic. The friends of reform all over the country are, of course, very much rejoiced, and if there is some dissatisfaction among certain classes of Democrats, there are many others, and, I am sure, a much larger number, who heartily applaud the patriotic and courageous step you have taken.

The contrast between the reappointment of Mr. Pearson and the appointment of Mr. Higgins in the Treasury Department, as to their reception by public opinion, cannot fail to strike you as very significant. The former has exalted your name, greatly strengthened your Administration in the confidence of the people and pointed out to your party the path of honor, usefulness and strength. The latter has called forth indignant protests from most respectable quarters, served to create distrust in those who made the selection, embittered the faction fights in the party, been defended only by way of awkward apology and will be a constant source of trouble and mortification while it is permitted to stand, which I pray may not be long.

So you will always find it in similar cases. I fervently hope that your career as President will be full of such experiences as the first, and that it may be altogether spared a repetition of the second. A steadfast adherence to the policy exemplified by Mr. Pearson's reappointment will not fail to ensure this happy result.

THE NEW SOUTH

Introduction

Twice during the last twenty years I had occasion to travel extensively over the Southern States, and to become acquainted with their condition. In 1865, a few months after the close of the civil war, I visited all of them, except Texas and Florida, and last winter all of them, except Mississippi. Each time I came into contact with a great many persons of all shades of social position and of political opinion. I improved my opportunities of inquiry and observation to the best of my ability. My object was, not to verify the correctness of preconceived notions, but to gain, by impartial investigation, a true view of things. Of the view thus obtained these pages are to give a brief and plain account.

C. S.

NEW YORK, April, 1885.

In 1865, immediately after the close of the civil war, Southern society presented the spectacle of what might be called a state of dissolution. The Southern armies had just been disbanded, and the soldiers, after four years of fierce fighting, had returned home to shift for themselves. The Southern country was utterly exhausted by the war. Even where there had been no actual devastation, the product of labor had, ever since the spring of 1861, been mostly devoted to the support of armies in the field—that is, economically speaking, wasted. The money in the hands of the people had become entirely valueless. Thus the people were fearfully impoverished. The slaves, who had constituted almost the whole agricultural working force of the South, had been set free all at once. The first and very natural impulse of a large number of them was to test their freedom by quitting

work and wandering away from the plantations. The country roads swarmed with them, and with a vague anticipation of a great jubilee they congregated in the towns. Thus the South was not only in distress and want, but the complete breaking up of the old labor-system and the difficulty of getting to work on a new basis made the prospect of recovery extremely dark. The negroes behaved on the whole very good-naturedly. There were few, if any, criminal excesses on their part, except pig and chicken stealing. But the negro did not yet know what to do with his freedom, and the whites had not yet learned how to treat the negroes as freemen. The former masters were easily infuriated at the new airs of their former slaves, and resorted to all sorts of means to make them work. A great many acts of violence were committed by whites on blacks. But for the interposition of the National power much more blood would have flown, and the South might have become the theater of protracted and disastrous convulsions. The Freedmen's Bureau, an institution which subsequently became discredited by abuses creeping into it, did at the beginning most valuable service in evolving some order from the prevailing chaos, and in preventing more serious catastrophes. The passions of the war were still burning fiercely, and the restored Union, which manifested itself to the defeated Southerners only in the shape of victorious "Yankee soldiers" and liberated negro slaves, was at that time still heartily detested.

The contrast between the condition of things existing then and that existing now, cannot well be appreciated without a review of the developments which have brought it forth. No greater misfortune could, in my opinion, have happened to the South at that time than the death of Mr. Lincoln. He was the only man who, taking the perplexing problem of reconstruction into his hand, would

have stood between the North and the South, looked up to with equal confidence by both. His moderation and charity would not have aroused suspicion at the North, nor would his tenacity of purpose with regard to emancipation and the rights of the negro have appeared vindictive to the South. He could have prevented the passions of the war from disturbing the work of peace. While thus President Lincoln would have been the best man for the business of reconstruction, President Johnson was, perhaps, the worst imaginable. During and immediately after the war his uppermost thought was that treason must be made odious by punishing the traitors. But a few months after his accession to the Presidency he insisted with equal vehemence that the government of the late insurgent States, then in a state of dangerous confusion, must be virtually turned over to the same class of men whom but recently he had denounced as traitors fit to be hanged. His ill-balanced mind was incapable of seeing that what might be wisdom some time afterwards, was folly then. The passionate temper with which he plunged into a bitter quarrel with Congress and the Republican party about these questions produced two most unfortunate effects. The minds of Southern men were turned away from the only thing that could put them on the road of peace, order and new prosperity, namely, a prompt and sincere accommodation of their thoughts and endeavors to the new order of things. They were made to delude themselves instead with the false hope of reversing in some way the emancipation of the slaves, at least partially, by legislative contrivances—their false hopes begetting false efforts in many directions, and these efforts leading to bitter, futile and wasteful struggles, which the poor South might and should have been spared. And secondly, Mr. Johnson's proceedings made the Northern people seriously afraid of a disloyal

pro-slavery reaction in the South. He irritated the majority in Congress by defiant demonstrations, and thus he caused the most intricate problem of the time to become the subject of a passionate party broil, which seemed to render men heedless as to the consequences of their doings. The Republican majority in Congress, thinking itself betrayed by the President, went faster and farther in their measures to protect the rights of the freedmen, and to procure loyal majorities in the Southern States, than they might have thought necessary to do had they not distrusted the Executive. And, on the other hand, Mr. Johnson, by intemperate utterances, stirred up opposition in the South to the measures enacted by Congress. Negro suffrage was introduced, instantaneous and general, thus thrusting a mass of ignorance as an active element into the body politic, while at the same time a large number of those who had taken a more or less prominent part in the rebellion, constituting the bulk of the property and intelligence of the South, were disfranchised and debarred from active participation in public affairs.

I do not say this to criticise the reconstruction measures in general. I have always believed that they were adopted from good motives and for good purposes; that in the light of history some of them appear ill-judged, but that reconstruction was one of those tangled problems in solving which any policy that may be adopted will in some way bring forth unsatisfactory consequences, and in some respects look like a mistake. Here were a number of insurgent communities just reconquered by force of arms; in them four millions of negroes liberated from slavery by the Government against the will of their former masters; that former master class exasperated by defeat and material distress, and face to face with the former slaves; these elements, with a fierce and apparently irreconcilable antagonism between them, to be brought

into peaceful and mutually beneficial relations under a new order of things, so that the weaker might be permanently safe in the presence of the stronger. That was the perplexing task to be accomplished. Was it to be done by the constant interposition of a superior power? That would have been putting off indefinitely the restoration of local self-government in the Southern States. Was it to be done by at once restoring the States to their functions, leaving all the political power in them exclusively in the hands of the whites? That would have been surrendering the late slaves, emancipated by the act of the National Government, helpless to the mercy of their former masters, whose natural desire at the time was to reduce them to slavery again. Was it to be done by arming the late slaves with political rights so as to give them the means of self-protection, and by curtailing at the same time the political rights of the late master-class, so as to weaken their means of aggression? That would expose those States to all the evils of a rule of ignorance. Thus neither of these systems, nor any mixing of them, could in all respects have worked satisfactorily as to immediate consequences. But here I have to do only with actual results.

The great mass of negro voters fell promptly into the hands of more or less selfish and unscrupulous leaders, and the scandals of the so-called carpet-bag governments followed. The Southern whites might, perhaps, have exercised a stronger influence for good upon the negroes had they at once frankly and cordially accepted the new order of things. But the old passions and prejudices did not yield so quickly, and, moreover, I repeat, President Johnson's ill-advised doings had inspired them with delusive hopes of some sort of reaction. It would be wrong to class all who during that period—from the close of the war until 1877—acted as Republican leaders in the South

among the demagogues and scoundrels. There were very honorable and patriotic men among them. But, on the whole, the corruption and public robbery going on under those governments can hardly be exaggerated. A mimicry of legislation, carried on by negroes, in part moderately educated, in part mere plantation hands, and led in many cases by adventurers bent upon filling their pockets quickly—that was for years what they had of government in several Southern States.

This, of course, could not last long. A change was sure to come. Unfortunately, the carpet-bag governments were, in a measure, sustained by party spirit in Congress, while, on the other hand, the reaction against them in the South took a lawless character. The Ku-Klux organization was first started for the suppression of disorder, and then became itself an element of lawlessness. Efforts were made to overcome the negro majorities by terrorism. Negroes who were politically active, suffered cruel maltreatment. A good many murders occurred. No doubt, of the "Southern outrage" stories, some were manufactured for political effect in the North, but others were unquestionably founded on truth. When the National Government ceased to uphold the carpet-bag governments by force of arms, the "Southern outrages" of the bloody kind gradually ceased. But the efforts to keep the negroes from exercising political control continued, although by different means. Force was supplanted by ruse. In some places negro majorities were overcome by tissue ballots. In others, registration was made difficult. In others, the voting places were so arranged as to put the negroes at a disadvantage. In others, where many offices were voted for at the same time, it was provided by law that there should be a separate ballot-box for each office, and that ballots put by voters into the wrong boxes should not be counted, the

effect of which was that persons unable to read, and thus to identify the boxes, would be apt to lose their votes—an arrangement working somewhat like a disqualification of illiterates. In still other places efforts were made to influence the negro vote as it is influenced here and there in the North. Thus, while at the beginning of the reconstruction period the negroes were enfranchised and a large number of whites disfranchised by law, which brought forth Republican majorities and the carpet-bag governments, subsequently the negro vote was in a large measure neutralized, first by force and then by trickery, thus, by means wrong in themselves and eventually demoralizing in effect, making Democratic majorities to put an end to the carpet-bag governments, prevent the return of negro domination and secure honesty in the administration of public affairs.

There has been, concerning these facts, much crimination and recrimination between the North and the South, partly just and partly unjust. "By your reconstruction acts," said the South, "you subjected us to the rule of ignorant and brutal negroes led by rapacious adventurers, who mercilessly plundered us at the time when the South, exhausted and impoverished, was most in need of intelligent and honest government." "We could not help that," answered the North, "for we were in justice bound not to leave the emancipated negro helpless at the mercy of his former master; we had to arm him with rights, and if you had been in our places, you, as an honorable people, would have been bound to do, and would have done, the same thing." "You have terrorized voters," said the North, "and controlled the ballot-box by force and fraud, and thus got political power which did not belong to you." "We could not help that," answered the South, "for the government of combined ignorance and rapacious rascality stripped us naked, and

threatened us with complete ruin. No people could have endured this. We had to get rid of negro domination at any cost, and if you had been in our places you would have done the same thing."

While this discussion was going on, a non-political but most powerful influence asserted itself. The Southern people got to work again. Immediately after the war the average Southerner was laboring under the impression that the emancipation of the slaves had brought the whole economic machinery of the South to a complete standstill, and that, unless some system of compulsory labor were restored, there was nothing but starvation and ruin in the future. Encouraged by President Johnson's erratic manifestations, he made all sorts of reactionary attempts, but failed. He had, after all, to try what could be done under the new order of things, and he did try. Gradually he discovered that the negro as a free man would work better than had been anticipated. He discovered also that white men could, and under the pressure of circumstances would, do many kinds of work to which formerly they had not taken kindly and readily. As work proved productive, hope revived, and with hope, energy and enterprise. The Southern man became aware that his salvation did not depend upon a reversal of the new order of things, but upon a wise development of it. He found that this new order of things was opening new opportunities and calling into action new energies. So his thoughts were more and more withdrawn from the past, with its struggles and divisions and resentments, and turned upon the present and future with their common interests, hopes and aspirations. While the professional politicians of the two sections were still storming at one another, the farmers, and the merchants, and the manufacturers, and the professional men, had found something else to occupy their minds. Many of

them came into contact with Northern people and met there with a much friendlier feeling than they had anticipated. It dawned upon them that this was, after all, a good country to live in, and a good government to live under, and a good people to live with. And it is this sentiment, grown up slowly but with steadily increasing strength and spreading among all classes of society, even those whose feelings against the Union were bitterest during and immediately after the war, that has made the New South as we see it to-day.

It is not my purpose here to show in detail the economic growth of the South since the war. The Northern visitor will still be struck with the enormous difference between the South and the North in the matter of wealth. Traveling from State to State and attentively looking at country and town and people, he will be apt to ask two questions. One is: How could Southern men, considering the sparseness of their population and their comparative poverty, be so foolhardy as to urge the South into that war with the rich and populous North? And the other is: How was it possible for the Southern people, considering the enormous disparity of means and resources, to maintain that war for four long years?

But, although still poor, the South is decidedly richer than it was before the war, while, of course, its wealth is differently distributed. New industries have sprung up and old ones are better developed. The mineral resources are gradually drawn to light. In the iron regions of Alabama new towns are growing up, the appearance of which reminds one of Pennsylvania. Cotton mills are multiplying. Manufacturing establishments of various kinds are rising in many places. While the sugar interest in Louisiana has much declined, other branches of agriculture, such as tobacco in North Carolina, have taken a new start. The cotton crop is constantly growing

larger. The question of decisive import is no longer only how the negroes will work, for the white people themselves are working much better than before. The number of young men in the villages and small towns standing idle around the grocery corners is steadily decreasing. Among young people the tendency to devote themselves earnestly to useful and laborious occupations is becoming much more general. The poor whites of both sexes are in many places found to make industrious and faithful operatives in manufacturing establishments.

About the working habits of the colored people different judgments are heard. One planter and one manufacturer will praise them while another complains. After much investigation and inquiry, I have formed the conclusion that the employers who treat the negroes most intelligently and fairly are usually satisfied with their work, while the employers who complain most are usually those who are most complained of. The question of negro labor seems to be largely a question of management. There may be exceptions to this rule, but not enough to invalidate it. The number of colored men who have acquired property is not very large yet, but it is growing. I have seen negro settlements of a decidedly thrifty and prosperous appearance. A few colored men have become comparatively wealthy and live in some style. It is generally said of them that they are "improvident." This is doubtless true of a large majority of them; but they are only somewhat more improvident than their former masters who used to live on next year's crop. It is a question of degrees between them. Since their emancipation they have shown much zeal for the education of their young people. Here and there this zeal is said to have cooled a little, but, as far as I have observed, it has not cooled much. Their educational facilities are still scanty in the agricultural districts,

where school is kept only three months in the year. A large portion of the colored country population is therefore still lamentably ignorant.

The most unsatisfactory feature of their condition as a class is a disinclination to work, shown by many of their young people who have grown up since the abolition of slavery. There is said to be a notion spreading among them that it is the aim and end of education to enable people to get on without work. This tendency is exciting a prejudice against the education of negroes not only among certain classes of whites, but also with some of the more thrifty among the negroes themselves. I heard of a prosperous negro farmer in Alabama owning a well-stocked farm of 500 acres, worked by him with his children, who refuses to send his boys to school because learning would spoil them for farm work, and who permitted only one of his girls to learn reading and writing, so that she might be able to keep his accounts. Here is a field for missionary work, which those whose public spirit is devoted to the elevation of the colored race should keep well in view. The relation of grammar to industry must be made tangible to the young mind, as it is at the Hampton Institute and several others. The addition of industrial teaching to the common school is in this respect of especial importance. Among those who have been slaves there are a great many skillful mechanics—blacksmiths, carpenters, harness-makers, shoemakers, etc. Their sons, raised in freedom, seem to be less inclined to devote themselves to these laborious trades; and yet the negro, with his mechanical aptitudes, might, properly trained and guided, furnish the South all the handicraftsmen necessary for ordinary work. As it is, the negroes constitute, and will for a long period to come continue to constitute, the bulk of the agricultural laboring force in the principal cotton States, and every

sensible Southern man recognizes them as a most valuable and, in fact, indispensable element in developing the resources and promoting the prosperity of the South. They are there to stay, and must be made the best of by just and wise treatment.

The visitor will be struck with the generally hopeful and cheery tone prevailing in Southern society. Their recovery from the disasters of the war has been more rapid than at first they expected. They are proud, and justly proud, of what they have accomplished in that direction. They are glad to have strangers observe it. Having done so much, they feel that they can do more. While business is in many respects depressed in the South, less complaint of this is heard than at the North. The general spirit prevailing in the South now is very like that characteristic of the new West: a high appreciation of the resources and advantages of the country; great expectations of future developments; a lively desire to excite interest in those things, and to attract Northern capital, enterprise and immigration; a strong consciousness and appreciation of the importance to them of their being a part of a great, strong, prosperous and united country.

The political effect of the steady growth of such feelings has been a very natural one. It is the complete disappearance of all "disloyal" aspirations. However strong their desire to destroy the Union may have been twenty years ago, I am confident, scarcely a corporal's guard of men could be found in the South to-day who would accept the disruption of the Union if it were presented to them. Those were right who predicted in the early part of the war that the abolition of slavery would not only break the backbone of the rebellion, but also remove the cause of disloyalty from the South. This it has completely accomplished. In fact, never in

the history of this Republic has there been a time when there was no disunion feeling at all in this country, until now. Ever since the revolutionary period until within a few years there have always been some people who, for some reason or another, desired the dissolution of the Union, or who thought it possible, or who speculated upon its effects. Now, for the first time, there is nowhere such a wish, or such a thought, or such a speculation. By everybody the "Union now and forever" is taken for granted. The South is thoroughly cured of the mischievous dream of secession, not only by the bloody failure of its attempt, but by the constantly growing conviction that success would have been a terrible misfortune to themselves. Many a Southern man who had been active in the rebellion, said to me in conversation about the war: "It is dreadful to think what would have become of us if we had won." They would fight now as gallantly to stay in the Union as twenty-two or three years ago they fought to get out of it. There is no doubt, should any danger threaten the Union again, the Southern people would be among its most zealous defenders.

There has been a suspicion raised at the North that this loyal garb is put on by Southern men merely for the purpose of concealing secret disloyal designs. This is absurd. Before the war they plotted and conspired, it is true. But they did not keep their purposes secret. On the contrary, they paraded them on every possible occasion. They were outspoken enough, and it was not their fault if they were not believed. Whatever may be said of our Southern people, they have never been deep dissemblers. When they say they are for the Union, they are just as honest as they were when they pronounced themselves against it.

As to the abolition of slavery, the change of sentiment

is no less decided. However desperately they may have fought against emancipation, but few men can now be found in the South who would restore slavery if they could. It is said that there are some, but I have not been able to find one. The expression: "The war and the abolition of slavery have been the making of the South," is heard on all sides. It is generally felt that new social forces, new energies, have been called into activity, which the old state of things would have kept in a torpid condition. There is, therefore, no danger of another pro-slavery movement. The relations between the colored laborer and the white employer are bound to develop themselves upon a *bona-fide* free-labor basis. Of the social and political relations between the two races, something more will be said below.

The distrust among Northern people as to the revival of loyal sentiments in the South, while in some cases honestly entertained, has in others been cultivated for political purposes. The question is asked: "Why, if they are loyal, do they select as their representatives men who were prominent in the rebellion? What about their reverence for Jefferson Davis?" and so on. Every candid inquirer will find to these questions a simple answer: In the "Confederate States," a few districts excepted, nearly all white male adults entered the military service. They were all "rebel soldiers." When after the war the Southern people had to choose public officers from among themselves, they were in many places literally confined to a choice between rebel soldiers and negroes. In other places they were not so confined. But they followed the natural impulse of preferring as their agents and representatives men who really represented them, who had been with them "in the same boat" in fair weather and in foul. This companionship in good and ill fortune has in all ages and in all countries been a strong

bond to bind men together. One rebel soldier could hardly be expected to say that another rebel soldier was unworthy of public trust because of his service in the rebel army, for he would thus have disqualified himself. Nor was there necessarily any disloyalty in this—not even a remnant of it; for a rebel soldier who after the war had “accepted the situation” in perfectly good faith and sincerely resolved to accommodate himself to the new order of things, might naturally prefer as his representative another rebel soldier who had “accepted the situation” with equal sincerity, for the representation would then be more honest and, probably, more efficient.

A peculiarly terrific figure in partisan harangue is the “Rebel Brigadier.” From the descriptions made of him the “Rebel Brigadier” might be supposed to be an incurably black-hearted traitor, still carrying the rebel flag under his coat to bring it out at an opportune moment, still secretly drilling his old hosts on dark nights, and getting himself elected to Congress for the purpose of crippling the Government by artfully contrived schemes to accomplish the destruction of the Union as soon as his party is well settled in power. Now, what kind of man is the “Rebel Brigadier” in reality? He belonged in the South, originally, to the same class to which the Union brigadiers belonged in the North. After the close of the war he found himself as poor as the rest of his people. At first he moped and growled a little, and then went to work to make a living—as a farmer, or a lawyer, or a railroad employee, or an insurance man, or a book agent. Being a man of intelligence, he was among the first to open his eyes to the fact that the war had been—perhaps a very foolish venture for the South, because it was undertaken against overwhelming odds—and certainly a very disastrous one, because it left nothing but wreck and ruin behind it; one of those

enterprises which a man of sense may delude himself into once, but never again. He is now very busy repairing his fortunes in the civil walks of life, and the better he succeeds, the more conservative he grows, for the more clearly he perceives that his own fortunes are closely linked to the general prosperity of the country, and that everything hurtful to the country hurts him. He is in many instances drawn into public life by the choice of his neighbors. His views on questions of public policy may frequently be mistaken—they probably are. He may also be always ready to jump up in defense of his record and the record and character of his associates in the war. He shows pride of his and their gallantry in the field, as every soldier will do, and he is unwilling to have it said that his motives were infamous—a thing which but few men, and those not the best, are willing to hear or admit. But having learned at his own cost what civil war is, he would be among the last to think of rebellion again. He has that military honor in him which respects the terms of a capitulation; and if he has any ambition to show his prowess once more, it will be for the restored Union and not against it.

But what does the affection for Jefferson Davis mean which is occasionally displayed? The candid inquirer will find that those demonstrations of affection have a sentimental, not a practical significance. Southern men do not attempt to shift the responsibility for the rebellion. They discriminate little among themselves as to the proportion of guilt, and in treating Jefferson Davis and other leaders with respect after their downfall, they think they are in a certain sense acting in self-defense. I have heard the most thoroughly “reconstructed” Southerners say that, if after the close of the war they had made haste to tear one another to pieces and to cover their leaders with disgrace, they would not feel themselves entitled to

the respect of Northern gentlemen. To illustrate the compatibility of such sentiments with thorough loyalty to the Union I may quote a conversation I had with a young Southerner who had grown up since the war, graduated at Harvard and become in all respects a thoroughly national man without the least tinge of sectional feeling or prejudice.

The Southern people [said he] really trouble themselves little about Jefferson Davis. They have no confidence in his judgment, and would not think of following him again as a leader. But they do not like to hear it said that the leader they once followed was an infamous rascal. The Northern people ask too much of us when they insist that we should brand all such men with infamy. Look at my case. My father was a Confederate general. I was a baby when the war broke out, and have studied the matter since. I think the secession movement was the craziest thing ever attempted, and its success would have been one of the most horrible misfortunes in the history of the world. Now, my father talked, and agitated, and fought on that side. He is as guilty as any of them. And yet I know him to be a very kind, honorable and good man in every respect, the best man I ever saw. Would you ask me to call my father a black-hearted traitor? I cannot do it. He is a good and honest man, and is my father.

I repeat, the young man who said this is one of the most enthusiastic Americans that ever cheered for the Stars and Stripes, a man who would willingly let his State go to the bottom to serve the Union.

As to Jefferson Davis, the question of practical importance is whether he would find any followers if attempting to lead another movement against the National authority. He would not only not find any number worth speaking of, but such an attempt would destroy the last remnant of his prestige in the South at once. If he were suspected

of having any ambitious designs involving the political action of the Southern people, he would instantly reveal himself as what he really is: a powerless old man who, having once led the Southern people into disaster and ruin, is now treated with the respect usually thought due to eminent misfortune, because it is believed by all that he will never try to do so again. The sentimental demonstrations in his favor, while they do sometimes touch a sore point at the North, are, therefore, beyond that, really of no practical consequence whatever.

More pertinent is the question why the Southern whites, with the revival of loyal sentiment, did not in large numbers join the Republican party, but remained in mass on the Democratic side. Men of standing and influence in the South would, in my opinion, indeed have rendered a valuable service to their people had they put themselves into friendlier communication with the dominant party immediately after the war, thus to gain more of the confidence of the freedmen who naturally looked to the Republican party for guidance. Many difficulties might thus have been avoided. But, unfortunately, it was just then that President Johnson's indiscreet conduct turned their thoughts in a different direction. And, moreover, the character and conduct of many of the Republicans in places of power in the South at that period did not invite such a movement. Some of the latter preferred to organize the negroes as a political force under their own absolute leadership. And thus the Republican party, in some of the Southern States at least, became that organization of ignorance led by rapacity, by which the Southern whites felt themselves virtually forced, in spite of the divergencies of political opinion among them, to rally under the Democratic banner. The bond which held them together was the common fear of negro domination. This fear

exercised an influence more or less strong as the danger of negro predominance was locally more or less threatening. But for this one element of political cohesion, that which is called "the Solid South" would ere this have dropped to pieces. And as that element of cohesion loses its strength, the South will, no doubt, gradually cease to be "solid."

Of this the premonitory symptoms are already apparent. The common interest, as Southern men conceive it, of preventing negro domination in their own borders, is essentially of a defensive character. But the Southern States have no longer any common object to carry aggressively against the interests of the rest of the country, as they had, for instance, when they were fighting for the expansion of slavery. There is, therefore, no longer any distinctive "Southern policy" in the old sense. The economic interests of the South and of the North are becoming more and more alike. There is no longer any essential difference between them as between two countries whose material development requires, respectively, different means and policies. Economic questions are no longer discussed between the sections, but within them. As to the tariff, for instance, it looks as if the protection sentiment were gaining ground in the South as it is losing ground in the North. Although the "cause of silver" is strong in the South, yet nobody will pretend that there is unanimity about it or that it is felt to be a peculiarly Southern interest. About these things, as well as the matter of internal revenue, the subject of banking, civil service reform, temperance legislation etc., there is enough difference of opinion among Southern men who now call themselves Democrats, to produce serious effects as soon as the apprehension of common danger disappears.

The "time-honored principles" of the Democratic

party, as far as they refer to theories of government, have become somewhat obscure as to their identity in the Southern mind, and are correspondingly weakened as to their influence in Southern politics. Many of the older men there, indeed, still delight in an argument about a point of "strict construction," and in quoting Jefferson's first inaugural. But to the common run of mankind in the South the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798 have ceased to be known by name, and even a good many of the older men, when it comes to a practical application of their political principles, are not at all disinclined to admit considerable latitude in the exercise of the National power, if it promises them any local advantage. Indeed, it might even be said that many Southern men in these days seem inclined to favor—perhaps not in theory but certainly in practice—rather too loose than too strict a construction of the Constitutional functions of the General Government.

Moreover, there is a generation of young men growing up in the South who, when the present and prospective condition of the South is discussed at the North, are in most cases left altogether out of view. And yet, in point of fact, in a very few years an absolute majority of the voters of the South will consist of men who never saw a Confederate flag, who never in their lives saw a negro that was not a freeman, and who know of slavery only as a thing of mere historic interest, which in its day did a great deal of mischief to the country, and upon which the enlightened opinion of mankind has recorded its judgment. Whatever foolish attempts may have been made by some persons in the South immediately after the war to educate their posterity in hatred of the North and of the Union, these young men draw their ideas and aspirations entirely from the new order of things. The political battlecries of old times are to them

almost meaningless vociferation; their minds are absorbed by present cares and interests of far greater importance to them. A good many of them are ambitious to accomplish something in the world, to make their abilities tell, and to that end to infuse some new life into the old Southern communities. They grow impatient at the slow pace of the old-time "war horses," and of the solemn dignitaries who still cling to traditional notions and ways; they speak with remarkable irreverence of the antiquated pretensions of the old "chivalry," and have as little sympathy with the narrow views of the farmer politician who would rather see a good system of public instruction go to the bottom than make a decent appropriation of money for the support of it. A good many young men answering this description are beginning to show an active interest in public affairs; not a few have already become members of Southern legislatures, and they will, of course, in rapidly increasing numbers push to the front, and at no distant day occupy the places of controlling influence. Their feelings are throughout strongly national, and in several places I found among them evidences of a very intelligent and stirring public spirit. They have so far "gone with the party," but there is much independent thinking among them, which, no doubt, in the course of time will determine their political action. Some exceptions may be found, but not many.

In this respect the change taking place in the political attitude of the colored people can scarcely fail to produce far-reaching effects. The two races in the South have been kept in relations of mutual fear by the apprehension on one side that negro domination meant ruin to the people, and that the continued ascendancy of the Republican party threatened a return of negro domination, and, on the other side, that a victory of the Democratic party in a National election would mean the

restoration of slavery. The latter belief had been industriously kept alive by Republican politicians and colored preachers, and was much more generally entertained among the negroes than might be thought possible. In fact, as soon as the result of the late Presidential election became known in the South, very many of the former slaves went to their former masters to offer themselves anew for service.

Of this fear the colored people are now thoroughly cured. They looked upon the Republican party as the natural protector of their freedom, and upon that protection as necessary to them. They have now discovered that this necessity no longer exists, and that, as to their freedom, they need not be afraid of the Democrats. This experience has set a good many of them to thinking about some other things, especially about their social status, and the means by which to improve it.

There are two different standards by which to judge the treatment the negro receives in the South: one is a comparison with the treatment white people mete out to one another, and the other is a comparison with the treatment the negro receives at the North. Applying the first standard, we find the difference undoubtedly very great in all those relations of life which are not effectively regulated by law. But comparing, in this respect, the South with the North, the difference will be found small, and it is accounted for in a great measure by the obvious difference in the mental and moral condition of the colored people, and their significance in the social body at the North and the South respectively. The Northern negroes have, with few exceptions, been freemen all their lives, and their parents before them; most of them are tolerably well educated, and they form only a small percentage of the population, so small, indeed, that as a constituent element of society they are scarcely

of any consequence. While there are in Southern towns not a few negroes comparing very favorably with those we see in the North, a large part of the colored population of the South consists of plantation hands, a class of persons entirely unknown in the Northern country. Emancipation found many of them only a few removes from absolute barbarism, and no educational efforts could have lifted them very high above that state in one generation. The colored population, with such elements in it, forms in some of the Southern States a majority, in others a strong minority of the people, heavily preponderating in certain geographical districts. The negro in the South is, therefore, a very different being from the negro in the North in point of quality and of quantity, and of his practical relations to the interests of society. As to the spirit in which the negro is treated the two sections correspondingly differ somewhat, but not very much. As a matter of fact, there is among the white people of the North as well as of the South a wide-spread feeling that the two races do not belong together. In neither of the two sections do they, therefore, mingle socially upon an equal footing. But as to those public accommodations and conveniences, the equal enjoyment of which is usually put under the head of "civil rights," a difference in the treatment colored people receive is perceptible between the North and the South; it is, however, mainly one of degrees, and not very great. Neither is the treatment of negroes the same in all the Southern States. I have travelled with negroes—I mean colored persons travelling independently, not as servants accompanying their employers—in first-class railway cars as well as street cars, not only in the North, but also in the South—in some Southern States at least. In Georgia the railroad companies have to provide for the colored people separate cars, of the same quality, however, as furnished

to white people paying the same fare, while in Tennessee, as I am informed, colored passengers are invariably turned into the smoking-cars. I found at several railroad stations in the South separate waiting-rooms for colored people, a discrimination which is not made at the North. I have never met any colored people as guests in the dining-rooms of first-class hotels, either at the South or at the North. I have seen colored people sitting in the same rows with whites at lectures, in at least one or two instances in the South, and several times in the North. In the South the two races do not attend the same churches and schools, and this, as I have been assured by colored and white people alike, in accordance, not only with the wishes of the whites, but also with the preference of the colored people themselves, who in many places have shown a desire even to have their white teachers supplanted by persons of color. In the North, whites and negroes have sat together in schools and churches, and here and there do so now; but, if I am rightly informed, in most places where the number of colored people is considerable, they have separated. This separation is, of course, more voluntary in the North than in the South, but it is generally favored by colored preachers and teachers for business reasons. We hear, from time to time, of in-offensive colored people being brutally ejected from public places and means of conveyance, and such stories come unquestionably oftener from the South than from the North. The spirit which prompts such brutalities is, of course, the same everywhere. It is more frequently met with in the South, partly because the contact between the two races is more frequent, and partly because there is still a larger class of whites in the South who feel so little confident, and therefore so restless, concerning their superiority over the negro, that they avail themselves of every chance to make sure of it by some outward

demonstration. And the frontier tone still prevailing in the sparsely-settled districts of the South is apt to make such demonstrations peculiarly rude. There is but little, if any, difference between the North and the South as to the sentiment prevailing about such things in what may properly be called the best society, for a gentleman of genuine self-respect will never fear any danger for his dignity in meeting with people of ever so lowly a station, or in respecting their rights.

It has frequently been asserted, and probably not without reason, that on the whole the colored race meets with more cordial kindness among the white people of the South than among those of the North. The difference may be defined thus: In the South more kindness, in the North more justice. Kindness is warm, but arbitrary; justice is cold, but impartial. I am, however, inclined to think that, but for the low moral and intellectual condition of the plantation negroes, and the dread inspired by their number, and the race-antagonisms on the political field, the general relations between the colored people and the whites would indeed be more satisfactory, more agreeable, in the South than in the North, and I believe that as the negroes become better educated, and as the change in their political attitude takes place to which I shall refer below, their "civil rights" will, even without further legal machinery, find fully as much protection in the South as in the North, and perhaps more.

The election of a Democratic President has been to the negro a great blessing, for it has delivered him from two dangerous delusions: one, that the success of the Democratic party in a National election would make him a slave again, and the other, that by acting together as a race the negroes could wield in politics a controlling influence with much profit to themselves. They know now that their freedom is assured whatever party wins, and

that it is not necessary for them to herd together in a political party of their own for self-defense. They know also that they can never hope again to become the ruling power in politics as they felt themselves to be for a time under the leadership of Republican adventurers, and that, therefore, negro politics in the old way will never pay them again. This will help them to understand that they will best serve their race by identifying themselves closely with the general interest.

The state of mind produced among the negroes by this revelation can scarcely be better expressed than in the language of an address delivered by an intelligent colored politician, a United States mail agent, before a colored debating club in a Southern city during my visit there. Of this address I was fortunate enough to secure the manuscript. The title was "The Effect of the Incoming Administration upon the Negro Race." After setting forth that the election of a Democratic President did not, as had been apprehended, threaten the freedom of the negro, it proceeded:

Man cannot live upon bread alone, nor can a race achieve civil and political success by politics alone. Education, wealth and morality must keep pace with political progress in order for that progress to be of a lasting and permanent character. Having given nearly twenty years to vain endeavors to secure full and complete civil and political rights under Republican rule, and having failed, Democratic restoration destroys all hope of securing them with the ballot; therefore, the negro will eliminate himself from the body-politic. His ambitions and aspirations will naturally turn to the obtaining of money, property, education and the improvement of his morals. And when he shall have spent as much time and consideration upon these subjects as he has upon politics, his condition will be advanced a hundred per cent. The bugbear "negro domination" being removed

by national Democratic success, will bring about a better local feeling between the two races, and also be the means of producing division in the ranks of the party that is now held together by fear and race prejudices. That Democratic success will benefit rather than injure the negro race is fast making itself manifest to every thoughtful reader of the signs of the times. Too much politics and not enough of the other substantialities of life has done the race more harm than Democratic opposition.

This, no doubt, expresses the general sentiments of educated colored people in the South. It means the end of race politics. But it does not mean the end of negro voting. About this, too, the orator here quoted had something to say:

Hereafter the negro, in casting his vote, will be governed by his immediate interest. If A, a Democrat, runs for office against B, a Republican, he will not vote for B, simply because he is a Republican, nor for A, simply because he is a Democrat; but he will vote for the one who will do that which will be to his interest. No one can call this ingratitude on his part, for he has more than paid the debt of gratitude he owed the Republican party for his freedom.

Indeed, the phrase that the debt of gratitude to the Republican party was more than paid, I heard from so many colored men in nearly the same language, that it seemed almost as if the word had been passed around among them. This simply signifies a strong tendency among the negroes of the South to go over to the Democrats, and to put themselves in accord with "their white neighbors and friends." Many of them openly avow this intention.

The consequences will inevitably be what they always are under such circumstances. In most of the Southern States the Democratic party will be substantially without

opposition. The common dread of negro domination, which held it together in spite of internal differences of opinion on other points, will have vanished. These differences will make themselves felt more strongly and widely. Independent movements will multiply. Most of these will probably at first not turn on National politics, but on home questions. Instead of driving the negro away from the ballot-box, each Democratic faction will try to strengthen itself by getting as much as possible of the colored vote. The negro will thus be virtually dragged to the polls again by Democratic hands. Instances of this on a small scale, in local contests, have already been witnessed. When different candidates or factions of the Democratic party, or two different parties, outbid one another for the colored vote, the negro's rights will, of course, find the most efficient protection in that very competition for their political favor, and the effect will also be gradually to soften the harshness of civil discrimination in the way above indicated. Thus the original object for which negro suffrage was instituted, the protection of the freedman's rights, will, indeed, have been accomplished by it. Of course, as soon as the colored vote breaks up, it will cease to be a political force on the side of the Republican party. Republican politicians complain already that the introduction of negro suffrage has served only to give the Southern States a larger proportion of votes in Congress and in the Electoral College than they otherwise would have had, and that this increase tells almost wholly in favor of the Democrats. It has, indeed, had that effect with regard to the relative strength of parties; but there is nothing surprising in this. When the matter of negro suffrage was under discussion there were far-seeing men enough who predicted that, as is usually the case with a population at the same time ignorant and poor and dependent, the vote of the negro

would, for a long period to come, really not be his own; that it would virtually be cast by the political leader, probably a demagogue, or by the employer. This prediction, in the very face of which negro suffrage was introduced, stands justified. The demagogue cast the bulk of the colored vote as long as the negro was in dread as to his freedom. That apprehension being dispelled, the employer, or rather the employer class, will control the bulk of it now—until the negro shall have become sufficiently educated and independent to think and act for himself. This may be considered a grievance by the Republican politician. But the Republican of conscience and principle will not forget that just in this way negro suffrage has accomplished the paramount object for which the true Republican desired its introduction, namely, the protection of the freedman's rights, and that it was probably the only way in which that end could be reached.

But as the old antagonisms cease and the negro vote is bid for by different interests among the employers, it will be apt to become a regular article of trade, and an element of gross corruption in Southern politics. In casting about for remedies to be applied, Southern men will do well to consider that, consistently with the new order of things, this evil can be mitigated only by bringing the colored people under the best possible educational influences, and by encouraging among them the acquisition of property, and thereby the creation of a conservative interest calculated to bring the responsibility of voters home to them.

The accession of a large body of colored voters will, of course, make the Democratic party in the South much stronger than before. But it is probable that, in the absence of the cohesive power of common fears and of a distinctively Southern policy, the divisions on local ques-

tions which have already taken place will facilitate the formation of new groupings on questions of a National character, and that the South, at a day not very distant, will cease to figure as a "solid" quantity in our National elections.

But whether this takes place in four, or in eight, or in twelve years, no unprejudiced observer will fail to recognize the fact that the Rebellion is really over, and that those who still speak of the white people of the South as "unregenerated rebels, as disloyal and as bitter as ever," betray either lamentable ignorance or something much worse.

I think it safe to affirm that to-day, twenty years after the close of the war, the Southern people are as loyal to the Union as the people of any part of the country, that they fully understand and profoundly feel the value of their being part of it, and that a disunion movement would find no more adherents in South Carolina than in Massachusetts. I think it also safe to say that, whatever atrocities may have happened during that terrible period of sudden transition from one social order to another, the relations between the white and black races are now in progress of peaceful and friendly adjustment, and that the disappearance of race antagonism on the political field will do more for the safety of the negro's rights and the improvement of his position in human society than could be done by any intervention of mere power.

If there are any dangerous political tendencies perceptible among the Southern people, they are not such as are frequently used as bugbears to frighten the loyal sentiment of the North, but rather lie in the opposite direction. There is no longer any danger of a stubborn adherence to State-rights doctrines of an anti-national character. The danger is rather in an inclination to look too much to the National Government for benefits to be

conferred upon the people of the Southern States—an inclination cropping out in a variety of ways of far greater practical significance than mere discussions on theories of government. Neither is there any danger that in consequence of the Democratic victory in the National election the negro will be deprived of his right to vote; the danger is rather that, as the Democrats divide among themselves, the negro will be drawn to the polls and made to vote more than he otherwise would, by demoralizing inducements.

It is also to be apprehended that large numbers of people in the South, under the influence of their struggle with poverty or with chronic embarrassments, will long be subject to those delusions on economic questions which are at the bottom of the fiat-money idea and the silver movement, and that, as they see a prospect for an industrial development in the South, extreme protection theories may grow strong there by the time the North is through with them. But these things are not peculiar to the South. There is nothing of a "peculiar institution," of a "Southern policy" in them. A "friend of silver" in Texas cannot possibly be hotter than a "friend of silver" in Colorado. The fiat-money man in Mississippi borrows his arguments from the fiat-money man in Ohio; and the free-trader in South Carolina or the protectionist in northern Alabama is substantially of the same mind with the free-trader in Minnesota or the protectionist in Pennsylvania. There is no longer any division of political aims and motives marked by Mason and Dixon's line. The errors which the Southern people are liable to commit with regard to all these things may be grievous enough, but they will not be peculiarly Southern errors; and in the eyes of sensible men they will not furnish even a plausible pretext for keeping alive sectional suspicions and animosities.

The election of a Democratic President, whatever else may be hoped or apprehended from it, has certainly had two immediate results of great importance. It has convinced every candid man in the country that the Southern people were not, as had been apprehended by some, waiting for the advent of the Democratic party to power to put forth disloyal sentiments and schemes, but that the victory of the party supported by them was rather esteemed by them as an opportunity for a demonstration of national feeling; and, secondly, it has proven to the country in general, and in particular to the negroes, that the freedom and rights of the late slave do not depend upon the predominance of any political party, but are safe under one as well as under the other.

These points being settled, the public mind may henceforth rest in the assurance that the period of the rebellion is indeed a thing of the past; that the existence of the Government and the legitimate results of the war are no longer in jeopardy, whatever political party may carry the elections, and that the American people can, without fear of any darkly lurking danger, give themselves to the discussion of questions of political ethics, or of administration, or of political economy, treating them upon their own proper merits. This consummation may be unwelcome to that class of politicians whose main stock in trade has long consisted in unwholesome sectional distrusts and animosities carefully nursed, and who, therefore, make it a business to blow up any savage freak of a Southern ruffian into a crime of the Southern people, or the harmless lunacy of any Southern "crank" into a serious danger to the Union. But to the patriotic American the welfare of the Republic is after all dearer than the political capital of any party. The more enthusiastic he was as a Union man, the more sincerely happy he will be to see the Union fully restored, and

held together, not by force of arms, but by a common national pride and common interests and hopes and aspirations. The more earnest he was as an enemy of slavery, the more he will rejoice to find the rights of the freedman secured by his friendly relations with his white neighbors. Instead of eagerly seizing upon every chance for sowing suspicion and bitterness between the North and the South, he will hail with gladness all evidences of returned fraternal feeling, and he will not be ashamed to own that even those who during the war stood against him as enemies, had, as fellow-citizens, his sympathy in the calamities they had brought upon themselves, and that his heartiest wishes are with them for the success of every honorable effort to repair their fortunes and to resume their places in the citizenship of this Republic.

TO JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

110 WEST 34TH ST.,
NEW YORK, April 30, 1885.

Your letter dated on the 22d inst. reached me only this afternoon. Can there be a mistake in the date?

I hear the growl of the impatient editor, and I appreciate his feelings, too. The present situation of the matter is this: I am pretty well advanced in the biography and hard at work on it. Most of the material I have in hand. Barring accident, I hope to get the book [*Henry Clay*] done by October—that is to say, I deem it probable that I shall. I might rush it through, but that, I am sure, you do not want me to do. All I can say is that I shall do my utmost to finish it by that time. The book would have been finished long ago had I not been interrupted by calls upon my time of various kinds, which I could not possibly disregard. Even now I am working under some strain,

but I do hope to accomplish it. To that end I am keeping clear of all engagements which are not forced upon me by actual necessity. I may add that I like the work.

This is a careful statement of the case, and now I refer the matter to your own judgment.

The information you say you will give me as to "the amount of probable compensation" will be welcome.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, June 25, 1885.

I trust it is not too late to congratulate you on the selections you have made for the marshalships in Chicago and Cincinnati, the appointment of Mr. Stallo, and the removal of Meade. All these things have made an excellent impression and greatly strengthened public confidence in your purposes and firmness.

I learn through this morning's papers that efforts are making to induce you to appoint some representative of one of the Democratic factions here collector of customs. Pardon me for saying that I should consider anything of the kind a great mistake and a misfortune. The New York customhouse is the most prominent place in the home service. It has a sort of National character. It is the place where the practical reform of the civil service is most conspicuously on trial. The selection you make for the collectorship will therefore be looked upon as a test of the general tendency of your Administration in that respect. The character of the appointment should, therefore, in my humble opinion, be such as to convince every one at first sight, that the customhouse is not to be in any sense a machine in politics. It is quite evident that the selection of any one "representing" any of the factions would produce just the contrary effect.

I have had some anxious letters again from Boston about the collectorship there. May I speak once more of the disheartening shock the independent element received by the appointment of Mr. Pillsbury and of the importance of putting a *thorough reformer* into the other influential place so that the impression made by the former may not remain the prevailing one?

At our interview here something was said about a little speech I had made at a dinner in Boston in the midst of the excitement caused by the Pillsbury appointment, and that I should send it to you. I do so now, although it is old, because, as I am assured through a great many letters from different parts of the country, it faithfully expresses the independent sentiment.

As it may interest you to hear something of the current of opinion concerning your Administration, I may say that among those with whom I come into contact the feeling is generally one of satisfaction, confidence and hope. People say that on the whole things go well, and that although mistakes were made, you may be depended upon to correct them. You are constantly gaining friends. It is true, there is more trust in you than in the party.

Of course, we should not forget, that the great danger, politically, of an Administration like yours is to sit down between two chairs. Three policies are before you. One is to return altogether to the old practices of the spoils system. This would indeed rally a considerable portion of your party firmly around you, but it would after all finally result in fatal defeat and dishonor. I should not speak of this as a "possibility" at all. The second is to strike out boldly and consistently in the line of reform, aiming straight at a non-partisan service. A portion of the party, not however a large one, might revolt, but you would find a powerful public sentiment on your side with recruits far more than enough to fill the gap. You will

then have a party, to be sure, with new elements but also with new vitality in it. The third is to go forward in the line of reform far enough to disgust some of the old party—for almost any degree of systematic reform will do that—but not far enough to inspire the reform elements outside of the party with that enthusiasm which will induce them to step under your banner in mass and as an organized force. Thus the gap would be made and not filled. This is what we might call sitting down between two chairs. The second policy appears, therefore, not only the best one for the country, but the only safe one for you and your party.

You will have noticed that the Republican platform in Ohio makes two issues, one the “bloody shirt,” and the other civil service reform. The first is more or less burnt powder; but the importance of the second will depend on two things: what the Democratic State conventions will say, and what you do. The Republican platforms will all fairly ring with the reform cry. There is danger that the Democratic conventions will be far less outspoken in that respect. If so, everything will depend on you, not merely as regards this year’s campaigns, but the success of your Administration and the vitality and fate of your party generally.

If, under these circumstances, you would permit me to make a suggestion, it would be 1, to extend, as soon as possible, the civil service rules beyond the scope in which you found them, even if it be only a little; 2, to leave in office or reappoint some conspicuously efficient Republican officeholders; and 3, to correct, as soon as it can conveniently be done, some of the mistakes made, for instance, in the internal revenue collectorships in New England.

Pardon me for adding that the sweeping changes in the internal revenue collectorships have always struck

me as questionable proceedings. Those places were not put under the four-years-term rule for the very purpose of withdrawing them from periodical change. Should this very circumstance make arbitrary removals more justifiable than they would be in the case of a fixed term? Of course, I say nothing against removals for good cause. But can the mere fact that such officers were appointed for indefinite terms, be taken to furnish in itself sufficient cause for removal? In this case the repeal of the four-years-term law, for which the Civil Service Reform Association have petitioned, would make official tenure only less secure.

Excuse the length of this letter, remembering that I mean well. Again I thank you for the good things you have done and congratulate you on the golden opinions you have won.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, June 28, 1885.

I am obliged to encroach upon your time again. The writer of the enclosed letters, Mr. Wm. Means, was mayor of Cincinnati a few years ago, a Democratic "Reform Mayor," and is, I believe, a gentleman of good standing in that community. I made his acquaintance last year when I was speaking in Ohio and went through the singular experience of finding myself vilified more atrociously than I had ever been vilified before, at the rate of about three columns a day, by the paper pretending to be in that State the principal organ of the party whose Presidential candidate I was working for. This circumstance led Mr. Means to speak to me; and thus to introduce himself at that time.

I said to him in reply to his first letter that I was not in the habit of writing to you about individual candidates

for office, but that, if he desired it, I would communicate his letter to you, and that I was sure you would be glad to get in such cases the best information that could be had. He authorized me to send you his letter, and I now do so. Of the persons mentioned by him I know nothing.

Let me mention also, by the way, that I have a letter from a friend in Cleveland who informs me that the newly appointed collector of internal revenue there, John Farley, loudly proclaims that civil service reform is nonsense, and that he is going to remove all the employees connected with his office, some of whom have been very efficient, and one of the best of whom was on your side in the last election. I mention this for what it may be worth for the purpose of suggesting that it might be well to caution the new appointees in this respect. Some of them may be apt to do considerable mischief and to create much ill feeling and prejudice against the Administration by such proceedings.

I cannot tell you how glad of every occasion I am to congratulate you on a success, and how loath to find fault. But my devotion to our common cause, as well as my personal feeling for you, makes it a duty to say something to you about your customhouse appointments. The appointment of Burt is the ideal one, provided there is sufficient reason for the removal of Graham. If there is not, the Senate will be likely to reject Burt. But as to Mr. Hedden,¹ I fear you will have made a grave mistake. Whatever recommendations may have been procured from business men, it is universally believed that Mr. Hedden would never have been thought of as a candidate, had not Mr. Hubert O. Thompson "invented" him. Nobody would assume that Mr. Thompson put him forward for the purpose of reforming the public service. There is a feeling in the community that the Administra-

¹ See letter of Sept. 17, 1885.

tion might stand in a better light, in some respects at least, had it appointed Mr. Thompson himself instead of putting him in power under a very thin disguise. This is what I have heard said a dozen times by very respectable men. I enclose an article from yesterday's *Times*. It is substantially what I have no doubt a large majority of our people think, although they may express themselves more mildly as the *Evening Post* does. You will also notice the Mephistophelian grin of the *Sun*. As to my own feelings I must confess this appointment revives my first misgivings that New York politics may become the rock upon which your Administration will wreck itself; that right there will always be the source of advice dangerous to your good name and to success in the accomplishment of your best purposes; that this appointment was obtained from you to put the customhouse under the control of a political machine; that it will be so used *without your knowing it*, and that you will become aware of the true state of things when it is too late to prevent the mischief. Pardon my frankness. I feel very anxious about this thing.

TO LUCIUS B. SWIFT

110 W. 34TH ST.,
NEW YORK, Aug. 25, 1885.

I have attentively read the papers which you have sent to me from time to time. As you know, I earnestly sympathize with you as to the main question. But it seems to me that the criticism passed by the [Indianapolis] *Evening News* upon the Eastern Mugwumps, as represented by the New York *Times*, is too severe. We have gone through all sorts of experiences here. There have been many things done by the Administration [which] at

first sight [were] extremely displeasing, but many of them after a while put in such a shape as to mark, after all, a movement in the right direction. Thus we have become accustomed not to see in every occasional lapse a complete abandonment of the whole civil service reform policy. I myself look at the failure at Indianapolis, deplorable as it is, in the same light. It indicates that there is still a great deal to be struggled for, but it does not indicate that our struggles so far have been in vain, or that our struggles in [the] future will be hopeless. On the contrary you will find that, whatever disappointments we may have suffered, the disappointments on the other side are infinitely more severe. I do not think the *News* is just when it says the Eastern Mugwumps have virtually become Democratic partisans and sycophants of the Administration under any circumstances. I know that it is not so.

I think, if you have further charges against Jones, they ought to be communicated to the President—of course in such a way as to avoid all appearance of persecution. I have no doubt he means to do right, even if he is sometimes ill advised.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Sept. 17, 1885.

The enclosed letter I received from ex-President Hayes with the request, if I had a friend in the Administration, to communicate it to him. I beg leave to submit it to you.

I also take the liberty of bringing to your notice some articles of the *Evening Post* on the Bacon case. I am with deepest regret obliged to say that they fairly express the feeling which at this moment prevails among our common friends here. I wrote to you at the time of Mr. Hedden's and Mr. Beattie's appointment [respectively as collector and as surveyor of the port of New York], that while they,

or rather their backers, were in control of the customhouse, all sorts of things in violation of your principles and pledges would be done, or attempted to be done there, without your knowledge. It seems I was not far out of the way. Similar mistakes made here and there have not yet called forth open demonstrations of feeling like those of the *Evening Post*; however, the respect which is entertained for your character and the confidence in the rectitude of your intentions have inspired hope and restrained criticism. But it becomes clearer every day that no reform Administration can succeed, and the best intentions on the part of the President will not prevent failure and disgrace, if those exercising power under him do not honestly sympathize with him in his principles and aims. The open opposition of your policy among the members of the party is not half as dangerous to your success and not one-thousandth part as dangerous to your honor as the bad faith or indifference of men entrusted with the execution of your views and the redemption of your promises.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Sept. 23, 1885.

Permit me to offer you my personal thanks for the steps you have taken in the Bacon-Sterling¹ affair. You have given new courage to the friends of good government. I hope the investigation you have ordered will go to the bottom of the matter and, as a result, it will become clear that there is no impunity for any officer of the Government, high or low, who trifles with the character of the Administration.

¹ Sterling, who had recently been appointed weigher in the New York customhouse, in place of Captain Bacon, had been suspended, and Collector Hedden had been ordered to report on the facts.

The anti-reform movement in the Democratic party seems to be gathering considerable momentum, and it looks as if the meeting of Congress would bring a tremendous pressure upon you with threats of active opposition. My experience in public life leads me to believe that there is one way, and only one, to break the force of this movement at the start and thus to ensure its defeat; and that is, not to make any compromise with it, but to meet it at once with calm, and if necessary, defiant determination. As soon as these gentlemen hear from you that whatever they may say or do, they cannot move you an inch, and that you are at any moment ready to appeal to the country against them, so that all may know whether the American people will stand by a President who is honestly resolved to redeem his promises—most of them will come to the conclusion that you are stronger than they are, that yours is the winning cause and that the best they can do for themselves is to follow you. And if they do not, you will have the people on your side.

Let me repeat once more: Your greatest danger is in having men in places of power under you who do not sympathize with you in your endeavors.

TO ALFRED T. WHITE

NEW YORK, Oct. 12, 1885.

I have read the resolutions of the Brooklyn Independent Republican Committee with great pleasure, and from the expression of my views on the present situation, for which you ask me, you will see that we are in substantial accord.

The coming election presents itself in two aspects. In the first place, it is an election of State officers. We have therefore to select among the candidates those whose character, whose past career and whose known opinions

furnish the best evidence of their fitness for the positions they are to occupy if elected. We have to choose between Mr. Davenport and Mr. Hill for the governorship. Both have been in conspicuous positions which tested their qualities. Mr. Davenport has proved himself a man of ability and high character, thoroughly devoted to his public duties, and in sincere sympathy with those reform movements which aim at the improvement of the public service and the elevation of our whole political life. Mr. Hill has on many occasions proved that he looks upon official power as a means of party service and of personal advancement, regardless of the public interest, and that he is in thorough accord with that class of politicians who do all in their power to obstruct and defeat a healthy reformation of our public concerns, and thus to keep alive those demoralizing practices which for so long a period have degraded our political life and endangered the public welfare. They are both partisans, but Mr. Davenport represents the best tendencies, not only in his own, but in both political parties, and Mr. Hill the worst.

These are well-known facts, which might be regarded as sufficient to induce us as citizens of New York, whose duty it is to look to the good of the State, to prefer Mr. Davenport to Mr. Hill. The candidates for the other State offices should be treated, respectively, according to the same principle.

In the second place, we have to consider how the result of our State election may affect the general interests of the country. We have a President who is honestly and earnestly endeavoring to carry out certain reforms of the highest importance. In this endeavor he is embarrassed and obstructed by a very active element in his own party, which insists upon the distribution of the public offices as spoils, upon the organization of the public service as a party machine and upon breaking down whatever stands

in the way in the shape of laws or regulations or adopted methods and practices. Of this element Mr. Hill is a recognized representative. Now, it is clear that, if Mr. Hill, as a representative anti-reform man, is this year defeated in this important State of New York, in which last year another Democratic candidate was victorious as a representative reformer, the anti-reform element which seeks to baffle the President's efforts will thereby be materially weakened, and the cause of reform will gain new strength. Mr. Hill ought, therefore, to be defeated.

But we are told that President Cleveland himself is going to vote for the Democratic candidates, Mr. Hill included. This does not change the nature of the case in the least. That he is in a very difficult situation we all know. It is his privilege to regulate his relations with his party in his own way, and it is our business as friends of reform to do our duty to our cause in our way.

It is a gratifying and a significant fact that the Independents in this State, who last year cut loose from their party connections to support Mr. Cleveland for the Presidency, this year, without any previous consultation, simply obeying a common impulse, recognize their duty upon the same principles to support Mr. Davenport for the governorship. But in order to secure to their endeavors, which, it is hoped, will be as successful this year as last, their full effect upon the political situation, it is important that the Independents should not permit their conduct to be misinterpreted.

There has already been much foolish talk in the newspapers about what they call our "change of sides," our "returning to the fold" and so on. It should be generally understood that there is on our part no change at all, that we are acting upon exactly the same principles this year as last; that upon these principles we should support Mr. Davenport if he were a Democrat and oppose Mr. Hill

if he were a Republican; that there is no "returning to the fold" this year, as there was no going into a fold last year, and that we shall be found ready, in the future as in the present and the past, to support the Davenports as against the Hills under whatever party names they may appear.

It should further be understood that while the Independents will support Mr. Davenport for the governorship, they protest most emphatically against the unjust attacks made upon President Cleveland in the Republican platform, as well as against those declarations which are designed to make party capital by a revival of sectional prejudice and ill-feeling between the North and the South. That President Cleveland has made mistakes no candid man will deny; but, on the other hand, no candid man can deny that he has rendered the cause of reform very great service. The professions of Republican politicians in favor of civil service reform would deserve and receive much more confidence if, while censuring real mistakes or violations of correct principle, they proved themselves at the same time willing to encourage with just recognition all the good that is done and all the honest efforts that are made in the right direction, no matter under what party auspices. And as to the Southern question, everybody knows that there has been of late years an immense change for the better in the South; that the disunion feeling of old times has entirely yielded to a new National spirit; that the condition of the colored people as to their prosperity and the protection of their rights, as well as the relations between the two races, is now much more satisfactory than it ever has been; that meetings of colored men in the South themselves protest against the demagogic clamor in the North about their wrongs; that the existence of the evils denounced by Republican politicians would only prove the failure of the Republican party during its long possession of power to remedy them,

and that if restored to power it would let things go just as they are going. Their denunciatory talk about the South is, therefore, more than idle—it is as an incentive to sectional animosities for the benefit of a party, vicious and unpatriotic clap-trap. And the Independents do not desire their support of Mr. Davenport to be construed as approving anything of the sort.

In defining the position of the Independents as every one of them would define it, I do not mean to say that they renounce forever all more permanent party attachments. On the contrary, they look forward to the time when such attachments may be again advisable. But at present we are passing through a period of transition. There are no clearly defined differences of principle or policy between the two great parties. Their platforms, except in their mutual denunciations, read remarkably alike. The question between them which most concerns the public interest is mainly that of good administration. The issue between them in this respect is not made up by their platform declarations, but practically, by their nominations of candidates. These nominations have been on either side sometimes good and sometimes bad, which indicates that they are not made according to a fixed standard. As long as this condition of things prevails we shall render the best service to the public interest by supporting in each case the best men representing the best methods, regardless of party. The more a party identifies itself with the reforms aimed at, the steadier the Independents will be in the support of its candidates. A party, old or new, making itself in its organization, as well as its professed principles, a trustworthy champion of these reforms, would count them among its most faithful members. And when at last these reforms shall have become so firmly rooted in the laws of the Republic and the practices of our political life that they cease to be an issue in our elections, differences

of opinion on other subjects will form the dividing line and the Independents no doubt will attach themselves to this or that party according to the opinions they hold on the questions then most important. Much will be done, I apprehend, toward bringing on so auspicious a condition of things by practically demonstrating to the satisfaction of both political parties that on either side the Davenports can and the Hills can not be elected to high office.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Jan. 16, 1886.

The relations between the Administration and the Senate concerning the matter of suspensions from office are attracting general attention. A few days ago I was asked by a newspaper man for a statement of my views on that subject, but I prefer, if you will permit me, first to say to you what I should have said to him. It is as follows:

The law as it now stands does not oblige the President to communicate to the Senate his reasons for the removals or suspensions he has made. He may therefore decline to give such reasons. But, while the law does not command, it does not prohibit. The President is at liberty to give his reasons if he chooses. Should he, under existing circumstances, avail himself of that permission?

Your letter of December 25, 1884, addressed to Mr. Curtis, was generally understood as a distinct pledge that under your Administration no good officer, who had not made himself an offensive partisan, would be removed before the expiration of his term. It would have been an insult to you had your pledge at that time not been taken as seriously meant. It would be disrespectful to you to treat it now as a trifling matter. I, therefore, do not at

all agree with those who say that, when you remove one man and appoint another, the only important thing is the quality of the man appointed, and not the reasons for the removal. On the contrary, it seems to me that the public pledge of the President makes his reasons for making removals a matter of first importance. If our public life is to be saved from its demoralization it is essential that the promises of political parties and of public men should again count for something. It is of the highest consequence to the American people that the public pledge of a President should be regarded as a moral obligation of the very first order, which nobody would dare to make light of. It is impossible to overestimate the value of a conspicuous example of the strictest fidelity in this respect.

Your reasons for making removals are, therefore, of the greatest public interest, for upon their character depends the answer to the question whether the pledge has been kept or not.

What, then, should be done when those reasons are inquired into by persons entitled to respect? All should be done that can be done to sustain the belief of the people in the good faith of the President. How does the case stand at present? Those reasons are questioned by Senators who, whatever their motives may be, are entitled to consideration as members of the highest legislative body. But—as the truth should be told—the questioning is not confined to the Senate. It is very generally believed among the people that removals have been made in violation of the President's pledge. Whether this popular belief be well founded or not, it certainly exists. It is also very widely believed that President Cleveland has honestly meant to keep his pledge but that he has been misled by men upon the good faith and discernment of whose advice he depended in making removals and appointments, the responsibility for all of this falling upon him.

Under such circumstances a mere refusal to communicate, or to permit the heads of Departments to communicate to the Senate the information that may be asked for, would, however some newspapers might applaud such a step, be regarded by candid and soberly thinking men as an evasion. It would be thought that if the President's pledge had been well kept, the Administration would find very little difficulty in announcing that fact. It would be useless to speak of the law not providing for such communications, or of encroachments by the Senate upon the rights of the Executive, when every well informed man knows that the President might make such communication to the Senate as a voluntary act of courtesy, expressly reserving all the legal rights of the Executive. It would be equally useless to say that the information had been asked for by Senators from factious motives and for hostile purposes, when everybody knows that nothing would more utterly confound the factionists than a clear showing of strict fidelity to the President's pledge. A flat refusal, or a mere general answer that the removals had been made for the good of the service, would therefore be quite generally taken as equivalent to a confession that the President's pledge had not been kept. If in examining the cases in the light in which they are now coming to your attention, you find that in point of fact your pledge has been violated, no evasion, no shifting of the issue, will avail to conceal that fact. It would only aggravate the difficulty. It seems to me, therefore, that those who advise such a course, fail to keep the honor of the President and the moral effect of the whole proceeding sufficiently in view.

If the Administration should not be able to make a clear showing, the frankest and most courageous course would, as usual, still be the safest refuge. The President, while letting the world know what had happened and how

it happened, would be able to retrieve his moral standing before the people by doing all in his power to redress the wrongs which the violation of his pledge had brought with it. Those wrongs are of a very grave character. Evidently, whenever the rule has been proclaimed that no officer shall be removed except for cause, a removal will mean much more than it otherwise would. It will reflect seriously upon the character or business ability of the person removed. Any officer, therefore, removed without good cause, has been most unjustly injured in his character and reputation, and thus grossly wronged. It will scarcely do to say that under present circumstances removals are not so interpreted; for that would be equivalent to saying that President Cleveland's pledge not to remove any officer except for cause, including offensive partisanship, was a sham and entitled to no more credit than the shallow pretenses of any ordinary politician. Now, if the President in some cases, in which he had convinced himself that, in violation of his pledge, gross wrong had been done, would use his power to redress that wrong by reappointing the person wronged, his moral prestige would be retrieved and the dignity of a Presidential pledge saved, in spite of all that had happened.

But another wrong done to the President himself calls for equal attention. No man can do anything more injurious to the President, nay, more insulting to him, than to induce him either by false information or misleading advice to dishonor an important public promise given to the people, and thus to make him responsible for a thing which he would never have thought of doing of his own motion. The President, I think, would do justice to himself and to his high trust, only by holding to the severest account any officer under him guilty of such scandalous disloyalty. And now the reasons for removals

being asked for, there is an excellent opportunity for ascertaining who among the officers of the Government has so betrayed him.

These may look like heroic remedies, but if it is true that a public pledge of the President has been violated, and a pledge, too, that had been believed in more than any other similar one for many years, then no remedy can be too heroic to avert the demoralization which such an event, unredressed, would inevitably bring in its train. A case in which with the public good, also a question of honor is involved, would seem to make heroic remedies appear the most natural ones.

I think I fully appreciate the difficulties of your position. In one of my first letters to you I endeavored to point out that the greatest danger to a reform Administration consisted not in general attacks upon its system, but in insinuating requests from apparently friendly quarters for this and that little concession, and in the disposition of the Administration to yield one little thing after another, until it finally woke up to the fact that it had yielded its whole character, and further, that however firm might be your own resolution to carry out your promises and purposes, your honor and good faith would be in a great measure at the mercy of those wielding authority under you, and that disappointment and failure were almost certain unless your subordinates were in hearty accord with your principles and objects or kept in the strictest discipline. I venture to say that if the Administration is now embarrassed, it is from these causes, and then none but heroic remedies will avail. The consequences of a lack of that accord or discipline are illustrated by the following letter in which an internal revenue collector in Virginia makes wanton and insolent sport of the President's reform policy, plainly defying his displeasure:

U. S. INTERNAL REVENUE DEPUTY COLLECTOR'S OFFICE,
RICHMOND, Sept. 5, 1885.

H. S. NICHOLS,
NORFOLK, VA.

Dear Sir: It affords me pleasure to say that your duties as stamp collector at Norfolk for the period from 15th of June to 31st August, 1885, were entirely satisfactory. Your removal from office was not from any delinquency of duty or inefficiency but entirely upon the principle that "to the victor belong the spoils"—you being an appointee of the Mahone Republican party. I wish you health and prosperity in the future, which I think you deserve.

Very truly yours,
A. L. ELLETT, *Collector*.

That collector's name is now before the Senate. If the Administration chose to put up with so defiant a demonstration of offensive partisanship and of contempt for its reform principles, I should, were I a member of the Senate, certainly vote for his rejection, from respect for the President.

I have of late had occasion carefully to study the debates in Congress on the power of appointment and removal, from the first Congress to the present time, and I have come to the conclusion that a law making it the duty of the Executive to communicate the reasons for removals made to the Senate and to put them on record accessible to the public would not only be Constitutional, but a very great help to a reform Administration. What a blessing it would have been to you and to your Cabinet officers had you and they, whenever a removal was urged by politicians, been able to say that no removal could be made except for reasons publicly to be avowed and answered for upon the responsibility of the Executive! It is indeed said that sometimes removals have to be made, the reasons for which cannot be disclosed. I answer that

in my four years' experience at the head of one of the most difficult Departments, I have never known such a case. I then believed, as I do now, that such a law, or in the absence of it, such an established practice, would prevent a vast deal of trouble and mischief and that its benefits would far outweigh any inconvenience.

Pardon the length and straightforwardness of this letter. I feel very strongly on the subject of it. Standing by you with full confidence in the integrity and earnestness of your purpose and with warm personal attachment, I could not well be silent at a crisis the result of which may seriously affect your success and even more.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

175 WEST 58TH ST.
NEW YORK, Feb. 1, 1886.

I felt as if I could scarcely trust my eyes when I saw in this morning's newspapers the announcement that Mrs. Bayard too¹ had been snatched from your side. I too know what it is to be bereft of the companion of one's life, but not many men have had to bear so sudden an accumulation of grief as that which now has fallen upon you. It is unnecessary to say that you have more than ever the heartfelt sympathy of those who know and love you as I do; even the indifferent multitude are touched in their hearts at beholding such bereavements. I trust your strength will not fail you in bearing it all. I was glad for your sake when I heard the rumor denied that you intended to give up your official position² for the purpose of seeking recreation in foreign travel. There is nothing more invigorating to the soul of a man in such

¹ Mr. Schurz had recently sent condolence on account of the death of one of Mr. Bayard's daughters. ² Secretaryship of State.

sorrow than devotion to great duties and the arduous pursuit of high aims.

With affectionate sympathy, I am,
Ever your friend.

TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

Feb. 5, 1886.

At the risk of appearing importunate, I address you again. I have been very much affected by what our friend Colonel Burt told me of your feeling that, after your resistance to the demands of your own party friends, you were now suspected of deceiving the people, and that too, by men upon whose support you should have been able to count. Colonel Burt seemed to think that my letter had strengthened that impression in your mind. Believe me when I say that, if I entertained such a suspicion in the faintest degree, I should certainly not have written to you at all. It is just because I have the strongest confidence in your sincerity and highly appreciate the noble stand you have taken with regard to your own party, as well as the difficulties and struggles you have had to go through, that I should grieve to see you drift into a false position which [is] likely to deprive you of the credit you deserve, and the country of many of the fruits of your endeavors.

According to Colonel Burt you had also received from my letter the impression as if I thought you had pledged yourself to communicate to the Senate the reasons for removals. I certainly did not intend to convey any such meaning. What I did mean was that your letter to Mr. Curtis was understood to contain a distinct pledge not to make any removals for mere partisan reasons; that when the performance of that pledge was questioned by persons entitled to consideration, you could not afford to use your

Constitutional privilege as a cover for refusal of all information on the subject; that the pledge of the President made the reasons for removals a matter of high public importance; that, to rescue our political life from its demoralization, it was necessary that the pledges of parties and of public men should again count for something, and that, therefore, whatever disposition was made of this matter, it should be such as to sustain the confidence of the people in the good faith of the President.

Consider the aspect of the case. The Republican Senators are not going to let the matter rest. Some of them are in possession of cases of removal which have an ugly partisan look. You refuse all information about them. They contrive some way of investigating them, and they certainly have the power and are very likely to do that. Some of the cases in question are brought out before the public on mere partisan grounds in direct violation of your pledge. Suppose this contingency. In what light will it leave you? As a President who had made a public pledge; who, when questioned about its fulfilment, sheltered himself behind his Constitutional privilege to avoid giving any information; who thus did all, as far as his power went, to conceal the truth, but who could after all not prevent the truth from coming out in spite of him. In that case the charge would be, not only that your pledge had been violated, but that you had done all in your power to conceal and suppress the evidence. Have you considered that contingency?

Whatever the Constitutional privileges of the Executive may be, I know that I express your own feeling when I say that President Cleveland cannot afford to have any concealments of that kind. "Tell the truth" was the word that helped him and his friends over the most dangerous crisis in his campaign, and "Tell the truth" is the solution of the present complication.

Things having gone so far, you may think that you cannot make any communication of the kind to the Senate, not even as an act of courtesy and with an explicit reservation of the rights of the Executive. You may also think that the heroic remedies I proposed in my last letter were too heroic—although I fear you will, before you leave the Presidential chair, wish you had adopted them.

But is not there a middle course still open to you? If you will not now open yourself to the Senate, can you not take the people into your confidence? Can you not make a declaration in some shape, which may go before the public in an authoritative form, stating that you did make such and such a pledge; that—assuming it to be the case—in the confusion of the beginning of the Administration some removals have been made, much against your intention, which were not in accord with that pledge; that you refused laying your reasons for removals before the Senate because of Constitutional considerations; but that you do not mean to conceal anything, and are resolved to deal frankly with the people? And then, can you not, in addition, issue an Executive order, that henceforth in every case of removal the reasons therefor shall be put upon public record?

By such a voluntary declaration you will not only do what is in best accord with your character, but also avoid that greatest of your present dangers that things incompatible with your pledge be proven after an apparent attempt on your part to conceal the evidence, for you will then have forestalled whatever may come out. And, secondly, by the Executive order you will give an additional proof of your good faith, relieve yourself and your Secretaries of much importunity and introduce a very important and wholesome reform. Possibly your Cabinet ministers may at first not favor this. But I know from my experience that it is entirely practicable, and, more-

over, this is a case for him to decide whose moral standing with the people is most important and most at stake.

I am so firmly convinced of the wholesomeness of the practice of regularly recording the reasons for removals, that at the last meeting of the Civil Service Association here, I introduced a resolution recommending its introduction either by law or Executive regulation, and it is probable that something to that effect will be adopted at the meeting of the executive committee of the National Civil Service Reform League which will meet on February 16th, the same body to which you addressed your letter containing the pledge concerning removals. Would it not be a happy circumstance if before that time an Executive order like the one here suggested were already issued, so that we might pass a resolution of congratulation instead of one recommending such a step to be taken?

Pardon me for cautioning you against a class of persons whom I know from my own experience,—persons trying to ingratiate themselves with men in power by telling them that those who find fault are a set of mere malevolents and that everything is “all right” with the people. In this respect the atmosphere of Washington is peculiarly deceitful. It is not “all right with the people” in the present instance. There is much criticism of the removals outside of the circle of hostile partisan Senators. I regret to say that I have in my possession a considerable number of letters from Maryland, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin and even from New England, letters from men who supported you, and many of whom write to me because they followed my leadership in 1884, that, judging from the removals and appointments they witness in their vicinity, it is “after all pretty much the old thing over again.” This, of course, is extremely unjust, for they overlook the great good that you have really accomplished. But it is a kind of injustice to which all those

who are trying to work out difficult reforms are frequently exposed, for even well meaning people are apt to be more mindful of bad things near them than of good things farther away. To this is also owing the danger of reform Administrations to sit down between two chairs, going far enough to exasperate the opponents of reform and not far enough to satisfy the bulk of its friends. That such a feeling of dissatisfaction as above described exists among our friends, is much to be deplored. And I have found that letters and newspaper articles are not sufficient to allay it. The answer that we Eastern Independents seem determined "to see no evil in anything the Administration may do," and that this is unfortunate, comes back with increasing frequency, and it has a significant meaning.

Believe me, nothing is more distasteful to me than the duty of saying unpleasant things, and I perform it at a present sacrifice of feeling, in the hope of having all the more pleasant things to say hereafter, and publicly.

TO GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

NEW YORK, Feb. 27, 1886.

Accept my thanks for the copy of your report which you had the kindness to send me. I suppose the resolutions recently passed by the National Civil Service Reform League have been forwarded to you. The first three of them recommending publicity in all things connected with appointments and removals seem to me entitled to especial consideration. In my whole legislative and executive experience I have never known a case of removal in which it would not have been perfectly feasible and proper to put the reasons for such removal (provided they were proper ones) upon record, nor a nomination

which might not have been discussed and voted upon in open, just as well as in secret session of the Senate. And what I know of the public service convinces me very strongly that the treatment of all recommendations and other papers concerning appointments or removals as public documents, part of the public records, would be a great reform in itself.

I am also convinced that the moral authority of the Senate with regard to the appointment and removal question is very seriously impaired by the secrecy of its proceedings and that the influence for good of the best elements in it would be greatly strengthened by opening its doors. Would not the present occasion be a most proper and auspicious one for so important a step in the right direction?

TO GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

NEW YORK, March 12, 1886.

Am I presuming too much upon your kindness if I ask you to send me also Mr. Wilson's speech?

I am one of those who follow this debate with great interest and in a spirit of entire impartiality. I want simply the truth to prevail, justice to be done and the cause of good government to be advanced. Now I must confess I was shocked when I read in the papers this morning that the Senate, after listening to an arraignment of the President for unjust suspensions, went into secret session and confirmed, at the solicitation of a leading Republican Senator, R. S. Dement of Illinois, who had been nominated in the place of a suspended officer, and that officer a man who during the war for the Union had conducted himself so gallantly that he was promoted to a major-generalship for skill and bravery in the field. This case, if any, seemed to be fit to be made a test case. But

when this is thrown aside and eliminated from all further inquiry, merely because, as is reported, a Republican Senator feels himself under some personal obligation to the person nominated, and that person supposed to be a very unfit one for the place, then the whole warfare of the Republicans in the Senate is in great danger of falling into contempt for apparent want of sincerity.

It seems to me there is but one way to make that which is now going on in the Senate, serve the cause of good government instead of leading to a restoration of the spoils system pure and simple,—and that is to make the executive sessions of the Senate, as far as appointments of office are concerned, public. There is no doubt, the Senate has lost grievously in public estimation—and I say that with great sorrow, for I deeply appreciate its importance in our political system. It will continue to lose as long as it authorizes the suspicion that it covers office jobbery by the secrecy of its proceedings. Is not this the proper time to relieve it of this odium? And are not you the man to take the lead in effecting so wholesome a reform?

P. S. March 19th. I see a curious report from Washington in the *Times* this morning. It is that the Finance Committee of the Senate has asked the Secretary of the Treasury whether there are any specific charges against suspended officers, and that in cases in which they are told by the Secretary that there are no charges affecting the moral or official character of the suspended officer, they will proceed with the consideration of the nominations made. Does this mean that in cases where the public interest was confessedly well served, or where there was at least no charge that it was badly served, suspensions are to be treated as justifiable, while in cases where there are charges affecting the moral or official character of the

suspended officers, the propriety of the suspension is to be questioned? It strikes me that, if the cause of justice and of good government is to be subserved, the rule ought to be the reverse. Where there are no charges, the question comes in rightly: Why, then, was this man suspended? And if offensive partisanship is alleged,—a reason for removal which seems to me perfectly legitimate provided the rule be impartially applied,—the question would be: Was he really an offensive partisan according to the definition adopted? (All this the Senate can ascertain to the satisfaction of the public if it proceeds publicly.)

If the rule adopted by the Finance Committee is as the *Times* reports it, it will give color to the allegation that the Republicans of the Senate only want the President to admit that he has made partisan removals, and this merely to justify the Republicans in declaring the spoils system to be after all the orthodox creed of both parties. It is the legitimate business of the opposition to show, if it can, that those in power have not been true to their pledges. But if that opposition wants to win the public confidence and to benefit the public interest, it must, in doing so, set up a higher standard for itself.

FROM GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, March 17, 1886.

Yours of the 12th inst. was duly received. I have been so busy the last few days that I could not reply at once. As you understand, I am not at liberty in honor and duty to explain any discussions, or cliques, or difficulties among Senators when the doors are closed. Of course, if any such thing as you imagine took place, it was in violation of what both parties profess as their grateful duty toward ex-soldiers.

I note what you say about secret sessions, but I think the

error into which you and the public press fall is in not distinguishing between official papers and documents regarding home administration, which I agree ought almost always to be fully open to public inspection and discussions, etc., in considering a subject. It could hardly be considered for the public interest that the Cabinet meetings, for instance, should be open to the public, particularly in respect of suspensions of public officers and selections for appointments, although in the case of suspensions, the reasons for privacy would be much less strong. The natural kindness of heart that most people possess leads one to dislike to express unfavorable opinions about the fitness or capacity of particular gentlemen for particular offices, or to state publicly that they stand low in the estimate of the community where they reside.

TO GEORGE FRED. WILLIAMS

NEW YORK, March 18, 1886.

My dear Mr. Williams: Your kind letter of the 13th is in my hands. Let me thank you for the full report of the Reform Club speeches which you had the goodness to send me. You want my opinion about them?

I think it is well to give the President a full measure of praise for the good he has done, and as much encouragement as possible to do more. At the same time I do not think it is fair to him to permit him to believe that in the opinion of the Independents nothing but good has been done, and that they are in a state of unmixed delight. Neither do I consider it just, or wise, to condemn every severe criticism of the Administration, even if it be partisan in its character, as an unprincipled proceeding and an unmitigated outrage. I have always thought it wrong and mischievous to give the President to understand, that nobody cared about the removals he made if only the appointments were good, or that a dozen very good appointments would offset a dozen or a score of very bad

ones. It appears to me that the question whether the President has kept his pledge not to make any partisan removals, is of far greater importance than the question whether the Senate is right in asking for papers concerning suspensions. And if we answer the latter in the negative, that is not answering the former in the affirmative. If the debates now going on in the Senate serve to direct the President's attention to that pledge and make him sensible of the necessity of holding all the members of his Administration to it, it will be of very great benefit to the cause of reform.

There is one thing the Independents cannot afford to do; they cannot afford to appear as blind partisans of anybody or anything. If they want to preserve their healthy influence upon public opinion, they must take care not to disturb the popular belief that they are at all times ready to tell the truth, whether it be agreeable to themselves or not. Before expressing their unconditional approval of any given state of things, they must consider whether they want the people to believe that this state of things is the realization of the object of their endeavors. If the question were to-day put to them: Is that which the Administration is doing—is that the reform you have been preaching and fighting for?—what would they say? They would not say "Yes." Then they must not permit the people to believe that they are completely satisfied. In other words, they should be as straightforward and outspoken in their criticism as in their praise. It would have served the President better if they had at all times spoken about his failings as frankly as about his virtues.

From this you may conclude that the speeches at the Reform Club dinner, although I agree with most of what was said, appeared to me a little too one-sided. You did perfectly right in speaking bluntly about the office-monogery of the Democratic committees in Massachusetts,

and I was delighted to read what you said. I hope you will not stop there but pursue the matter at Washington. I do not so completely sympathize with you in what you said about Edmunds. I think he went in 1884 about as far as a man generally so much attached to party, and holding high office under the auspices of his party, can be expected to go. I admit that he did not go far enough to suit me, but his conduct stood at any rate in very favorable contrast to that of other Senators who were, before the nomination, no less convinced than he, of Blaine's dishonesty. Edmunds has some very good points and valuable elements of usefulness in him. I suppose I am more lenient in my judgment in such cases than you are, because I am older and have often been judged harshly myself.

The Senate have fearfully injured their case by the confirmation of the nomination of Dement in the place of General Salomon. I see they are now trying to reconsider that step, but they cannot entirely undo the moral effect produced by it. What a blessing a good, strong, searching but high-toned opposition would be to Cleveland's Administration and to the cause of good government!

This letter is for you, of course. When will you be here again? I hope anon.

TO GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

NEW YORK, March 18, 1886.

Many thanks for your letter received to-day as well as for the documents you have had the goodness to send me. If I am not taxing you too much I should be obliged to you for copies of all speeches delivered upon your resolutions. I take very great interest in the matter.

I have not forgotten the difference between papers

bearing upon the conduct of public affairs and discussions in considering nominations. But I do not think the discussions in the Senate upon nominations can well be put upon the same level with discussions in the Cabinet. The relations between the President and the members of his Cabinet are necessarily of a far more confidential nature than the relations between the Executive and the Senate.

As to the "kindness of heart" which would lead one to "dislike to express unfavorable opinions about the fitness or capacity of particular gentlemen for particular offices," I judge from my own experience in the Senate, and I would appeal to yours. I cannot remember a word I ever said in executive session about any nomination that I would not be perfectly willing to utter in public. And I have no doubt it is so with you. But even if there should be some inconvenience of that kind, how great is the mischief that would be prevented! Would such a thing as the confirmation of Dement have happened, had the proceedings been public? You know as well as I that even much worse things have been done at one time or another which would never have been done but for the secrecy enveloping them. And as to suspensions, would not the discussion in public nominations made to fill the places of suspended officers, which would involve the justice of the suspensions, be far more effective in preventing unjust ones, or in exposing them when made, than what is now going on? And the Senate would not need the papers now withheld, for it would always be able to investigate the conduct of the public business with regard to any particular office, and it could easily get all the evidence required to determine its own and the public judgments.

In addition, let me repeat, for it cannot be repeated too often, the Senate has been for some time, and is now, suffering terribly in public estimation in consequence of its secret proceedings on nominations. And this, it

seems to me, is a consideration of an importance infinitely greater than any inconvenience that might arise from publicity.

FROM GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, March 23, 1886.

I have yours of the 18th. I am so much pressed for time that I cannot go into a discussion of the distinctions that I think exist in respect of the subjects you mention. The real truth is, as I believe upon a wide variety of evidence, that the President did not find himself able to hold up to his professions when he has been set upon by the whole body of Democratic Senators and Members of Congress and the rest of the Democratic party in the country—nine-tenths of whom believe, as you doubtless know, that offices are the stakes for which political parties play and are the spoils of victory. The official letter of the Postmaster-General inviting accusations and complaints as necessary, and stating that they would be sufficient and stating that he had consulted the President, would seem to show this conclusively to any mind that was not determined to be blind.

TO GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

NEW YORK, March 25, 1886.

I do not wish to take your time with a lengthy correspondence but beg leave to make one observation in reply to your letter just received, without expecting any answer.

If the President, yielding to party pressure, has broken his pledges,—a matter about which a great many people, of whom I am one, desire to be clearly advised,—the Senate has it in its power to prove that fact without the “papers” asked for. The Senate can refer case after case for

thorough inquiry to the respective committees; these can, by way of ordinary investigation, call upon Department and bureau officers and others for information, about the conduct of the public business at the time when the suspended officer was in place, and then ascertain whether there was cause for the suspension. In a similar way it can be ascertained whether the suspended officer was an "offensive partisan." For instance the case of General Salomon, in whose place Dement was appointed, might have been properly so treated. If such inquiries were conducted *openly, aboveboard*, in broad daylight, they would determine the public judgment. But such an effect cannot be produced by the Senate receiving and examining papers in secret conclave, and then pronouncing verdicts after secret discussion of the reasons. I regret to say—but it is a solemn truth—the secret proceedings of the Senate in regard to such things have no longer the confidence of the people. And it would be useless to disguise the fact, that the Republican majority of the Senate has gained nothing by the debate now going on. On the contrary it is bound to lose as long as it sticks to its secret proceedings, with such things as the confirmation of Dement, of Rasin and other similar cases breaking that darkness with occasional streaks of light. It looks as if the rule of secrecy were bound to yield before long, and the party defending it will be at a great disadvantage in public opinion.

FROM GEORGE F. EDMUNDS

SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, March 26, 1886.

I have yours of the 25th. The trouble would be, in the way you propose, precisely the one that now exists, with the further complication that, in sending for persons and papers by a

committee, the dignity of the Senate would require, if papers were refused, that the refusing official should be punished for contempt, and this proceeding, applied to all the instances, would be somewhat cumbrous. The Departments do not intend that the public or the Senate shall know the contents of even the confessedly official papers in the files regarding the administration [official conduct] of the people to be removed, because, in the great mass of cases, it would doubtless appear that their official behavior had been perfect and therefore their proposed removal must be purely political.—In haste, yours truly.

TO WAYNE McVEAGH

NEW YORK, March 30, 1886.

I regret to say I cannot be with your Civil Service Association on the 8th of April on account of an engagement I have on that day, which cannot be set aside.

It would be easy enough to "skin" some of the President's accusers on that occasion; but I am afraid it would not be so easy to prove that they are altogether wrong. Did any one of the President's defenders in the Senate maintain that the President had really kept his word, that is, had abstained from making any removal except for cause including "offensive partisanship"? Is it not, on the contrary, generally believed to-day that in not a few instances that pledge had been violated? And can you think of a greater service the President could have rendered to the American people as a reformer, than by proving that there are public men who keep their pledges strictly and without fear of consequences?

Now, do not understand me as undervaluing the good things that Cleveland has done. But I confess to you that the so-called pluck with which he repelled the demand of the Senate for information concerning the reasons for the suspensions made, does not strike me as that sort of

moral courage which the reform of the public service stands in need of. A frank statement of the case, expressly reserving, if you please, the Constitutional rights of the Executive, would have served the cause of reform better, and would have done him infinitely more honor. I see reasons for fearing that this "reform Administration" will end like its predecessors: sit down between two chairs—do just enough to disgust the enemies of reform, and not enough to satisfy its friends.

You see, I am not in a jubilant state of mind with regard to this subject, and would rather not make a public speech on it just now. The only kind of power we Independents have springs from the popular belief that we speak the truth without fear or favor. As soon as we forfeit that confidence by undue partiality, we are gone. I could not speak without saying what I think, and at the same time I should not like to touch that sore point hastily. Do you not think I am right? This of course is confidential, but you might, in confidence, tell Messrs. Parish and Wood why I do not send them a long letter in response to the invitation.

TO W. H. CLARKE

April 30, 1886.

I have received your note of yesterday¹ and beg leave to say in reply that the occurrence to which you refer did not take place in my presence but was related to me by Charles Sumner. That the words quoted expressed Mr.

¹NEW YORK, April 29, 1886.

Dear Sir: Did Mr. Lincoln use the following words in your presence: "Behold this spectacle! We have conquered the rebellion, but here is a greater danger to the country than was the rebellion"? He referred to officeseekers. What other, if any, prominent man was present?

Yours respectfully,

W. H. CLARKE.

Lincoln's real sentiments, I know from my own experience. I met Mr. Lincoln on board a steamer near City Point, in the early spring of 1865, shortly before the capture of Richmond. He told me then that he had left Washington, partly because he wanted to be near the theater of the important operations then going on, and partly because he wanted to run away from the officeseekers, and he added: "I am afraid that thing is going to ruin republican government," and much more to the same effect. The expression in quotation marks I remember particularly.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, May 6, 1886.

The enclosed correspondence, as I am informed, is going the round of the newspapers. I am also told that it is not altogether wrong in the description of impressions prevailing in Administration circles. As my name is conspicuously mentioned as one of those who are "more disposed to blame than to commend" the President, it is perhaps proper that I should say a word about it. I should write to the President directly had not my last letters to him remained without the courtesy of an acknowledgment. But presuming upon your friendship I would ask you to mention occasionally to the President, that, while I, of course, reserve to myself the right of freely expressing my opinions, I have made it a rule not to say anything about him to others, that I have not said about him to himself, and that in the letters I have addressed to him are criticisms far more pointed than any I have expressed to anybody else. And as to the disposition rather to censure than to commend, I may add that if anybody has borne the brunt of the battle for Mr. Cleveland when he was a candidate, I have. If anybody

has had to suffer for it, I have. How could I possibly be inclined to depreciate rather than commend the fruit of a victory so dearly bought? If there is a man in this country who praises every good thing done by this Administration with real gladness and who feels every one of its failures as painfully as if it were his own, I am that man. And I can assure you, the Independents generally are of the same way of thinking.

Now, as to my real opinion of the state and tendency of things, I see good reasons to fear that the President will finally sit down between two chairs, having done enough in the way of reform to exasperate the spoils politicians, but not enough to satisfy the reform sentiment and to make converts. There are two ways out of this dilemma. One is to throw all reformatory purposes overboard and to unite the party by satisfying the spoils politicians. This, however, will mean dishonor and certain defeat. The other is to follow a bold reform policy which will appeal to the best instincts of the people. This means a leadership which, the more determined and uncompromising it is, the more it will command popular respect and, probably, party following. Partisans are apt to submit to a leader who has the advantage of power and position, and whom they know they cannot subjugate. In any event such a policy will revive public confidence and win recruits of the best kind, and thus a good chance of victory.

The Democratic party is not as strong to-day as it was a year ago. The unfortunate practice of making removals upon the ground of secret ex-parte charges has much weakened it. The helplessness of the majority in the House presenting the spectacle of a party without a policy has weakened it still more. And I am afraid the Jefferson Davis business in the South, although some of the large Republican papers take a sensible view of it, has furnished to the demagogues just the political capital they wanted

for the rural districts. If a new Presidential election were to take place next fall, Blaine would inevitably be the Republican candidate. I should, for my part, of course, march to the breach again, but with a presentiment of certain defeat.

President Cleveland can save the situation, and, as things now stand, nobody else can. But he can do it only if, as the honest and sincere man he is, he drops the policy of gaining small points by management of the patronage, and acts with the firmest determination upon his best impulses. This would have been easier and more effective a year ago than now; it will be easier and more effective now than a year hence, for then it may be altogether too late. In my view, the boldest policy in situations of this kind is the safest; it is, in fact, the only safe one. Every uncertain step brings forth new difficulties. Every concession to an evil tendency creates a clamor for more.

This is my diagnosis of the case. It is not prompted by a hot and impatient temper. For that I am too old. It is a conclusion drawn calmly and impartially from the observations and experiences of a long public life.

Believe me when I say that I watch this Administration with an intense and altogether friendly anxiety. I know of few things that would be more disastrous to the country and more painful to my feelings than its failure.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1886.

Since I received your letter of the 6th inst., I have not seen the President, but I believe I know enough of him and his sentiments to give no force or weight to the tenor of complaint by him of the attitude of the Independents toward his Administration, which the newspaper cutting you sent me

contains. The truth is that the public press serves just now as the mouthpiece of discontent in all its forms—from the growl of the disappointed officeseeker to the venomous assault of the defeated jobber. If the public interests are to be advanced, the petty rivulets of individual profits must be closed up, and the latter process is painful, the former duty generally thankless.

If I may speak of that portion of public affairs which pass under my own hand and eye, I could give you a score of private interests which have been interfered with by my presence in the State Department, the vexation of each of which would account for all the published expressions of desire to have some other person in my place.

If I wanted to describe the position and objects of the President, I should say that he cares less to please *anybody* than to render true and permanent public service. I believe it pains him when those who supported him in the canvass from independent and personally disinterested motives express a want of faith in his steadfastness in that line of administration which he promised he would follow. Standing where he does, viewing the field of battle in every direction, he comprehends practical difficulties and deficiencies of means to overcome them, that others cannot see or comprehend. In the first place the imperfect nature of party success in 1884, which transferred the Executive control to a Democratic President but left the Senate in the hands of a well-drilled Republican majority, which in turn was compelled to conciliate a faction especially profligate and opposed to all reform in the "Re-adjusting" element of Mahone and Riddleberger.

Of the House of Representatives I can only say that it consisted of "solid" delegations from the Southern States, whose only bond of political unity was safety from negro and carpet-bag domination, and a party name. As to all questions of administration—fiscal policies and foreign policies—*quot homines tot sententiæ*.

To put an end to jobbery in its many phases was a logical duty, and as you know it consists more in negation than in affirmation. I really believe *all* men who really love honesty

per se and hate its opposite, must feel wholly satisfied with the President's course so far as measures and administrative methods are concerned.

The reform of the civil service was the more difficult because it had to be commenced so abruptly, and in such sharp contrast with the system it was intended to replace. Therefore it could not arise *per saltum* at a point of complete accomplishment, but of its substantial progress there can be no reasonable denial. When I look over this Department and see one single removal (for inebriety) and the place filled by a learned international jurist (Dr. Wharton)—and the entire clerical force left to enjoy conscientious self-respect in the performance of duty—I feel that the highest demands of civil service have been fully met.

Since Mr. Cleveland's inauguration no such obstruction to civil service reform—no such contempt for every honest effort in its behalf—no such withholding of aid has been exhibited as the Republican majority of the United States Senate has furnished. Surrounded thus by disappointed partisans of his own party and without even a single just critic, much less an assistant, in the Congressional ranks of his opponents, I can see the difficulty of the President's course, but I believe it will be this—to obliterate lines of geographical and sectional prejudices and animosities, to dispel all apprehension of oppression or injustice by the African race, to cause honesty and efficiency to be the prevailing elements in filling offices, to prevent public power from perversion to the ends of private profit, and at the close of his term to secure an opportunity for the people of the United States to pass judgment at the polls without official interference or corruption or intimidation and freely to select his successor.

I must believe that you are satisfied that such has been and will be the course of the President and his Administration, and that when you contrast it with what would have been in case of Blaine's election, you must not only feel satisfied with the important influence you exerted in the canvass of 1884, but glad and grateful that the opportunity to render so great and patriotic service was vouchsafed to you.

My dear Schurz, the struggle between the elements that save and those that destroy society will never cease, and no man with your heart or brain can ever look coolly on and witness the conflict without anxiety. I not only do not wonder at, but I expect from you, criticisms that betray your vexation with every indication of weakness or unwisdom in a party administration or management, to whom so much of importance has been entrusted. Only this—do not hold the President responsible for a condition of things he did not create, and with which he is honestly endeavoring to do the best he can, and that, too, without abandoning certain canons of political and personal integrity, which we agree are essentials. There are elements of passion and mercenary interest striving to mould party organizations to their own purposes, and dexterous politicians are seeking to place themselves in line and receive the propulsive power. They are——

May 17th. Here I was stopped in my letter, which I would destroy if I felt any confidence that I would get time to write another.

I feel quite sure that the movement which so awakened public conscience in 1884, and which had no advocate more potential than yourself, has not ceased—that it is still aroused [and] will, I trust, save the country from the fate which threatened it at the hands of mercenary organizations.

It is very difficult to get time for personal correspondence, but I am always glad to hear from you whether you shall praise or blame the work in which I am associated.

Suppose you come here and take a closer look at it! I will be most glad to give you a room in my house; although grief has clouded it of late, still I wish you would come.

This is a fearfully rambling answer, but it has been made amid many interruptions.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, May 20, 1886.

Let me thank you for your kind letter, and also for your invitation to come to Washington and look more closely

at what is going on. I should have done so ere this but for two reasons: one that I apprehend, if I were seen much with the President and members of the Cabinet the cry would be raised again by jealous partisans about the Mugwumps exerting an influence, etc., which might be disagreeable to all of you; and the other, that I do not know whether such opinions and suggestions as I have to offer will be at all welcome or acceptable to the President, since the occasional expression of them by letter has of late remained not only without response but without notice. It was principally for this reason that I asked you to mention to him what I had written to you, or to show him my letter. I think it is desirable that about the relations between him and the Independents there should be no misapprehension. While I should regret and wish to prevent any misconstruction on his part of our attitude, I should be equally sorry to draw any mistaken conclusions from his.

Having been in Executive office myself I understand perfectly what work you have to do and what difficulties to overcome in order to make a good Administration. I know also that fighting the thieves is one of the important tasks—a very meritorious and in a certain sense an ungrateful one, because it makes bitter enemies while the best things you do will sometimes never become known and never be put to your credit. On the other hand every lapse in this respect, however slight, is counted against you and made prominent. For instance, the injury done to the Administration by the Pan-Electric business is great, while its faithful struggle against jobbery remains, in great part at least, unknown to the multitude. In this way great injustice is done,—but it is always so and nobody can count upon being made an exception to the rule. I think I understand perfectly how it happened that the opportune moment for relieving the Administration of this

blemish was suffered to slip away; yet, without being in the least disposed to blame anybody, I regret it all the same on account of its moral effect.

But the Administration of President Cleveland will be judged according to the outcome of its reform policy. That is the criterion he set up for himself, and it is not likely to be superseded by any other issue. If the Administration succeeds in that, it will be voted a success; if it fails in that, a failure. And no plea as to the difficulties it had to contend with will materially affect the verdict of history, for the overcoming of those difficulties is just the problem to be solved. Nobody appreciates more highly than I do the honest and courageous efforts made. It would be a pity if they failed. But what troubles me is that the President seems to think he has to stoop down for the purpose of lifting up his party to his level. I have seen that sort of thing before. The danger is that he who thus stoops down may not be able to get quite straight up again himself.

I think it probable that President Cleveland considers me an extremist on this question. Now, you have known me six years in the Senate and four years in Executive office. Have I ever appeared to you like an impracticable visionary? Have you not rather found me on the whole to be a man of temperate judgment and conservative instincts? But I cannot disregard facts. I know from early observation that the "active politicians" of both parties, as a class, are deadly hostile to civil service reform. I know that nobody can remain true to that cause who makes his action dependent upon the consent of the "active politicians." That reform can be carried out only if they are made to understand that it will be done whether they like it or not, and that the people will be appealed to over their heads. Every concession encourages them and increases their power of resistance. The

Executive is the great reliance of reform. The Executive must not count upon and wait for aid from the Legislative. The civil service law was passed when the politicians of both parties in Congress were frightened by the growing power of independent movements. Now they try to undo it again. You have noticed the proviso attached by the Committee of the House to the civil service appropriation, the effect of which would be wholly to destroy the competitive system. Here the responsibility of the Executive begins again, for the Executive can, I think, prevent that proviso from passing or from taking its intended effect. Let me tell you what I would do if I had the power. I would ascertain whether the Commissioner of Pensions, whose patronage is greatly enlarged by that proviso, had been instrumental in procuring its adoption by the Committee. If found guilty of such interference, I would instantly dismiss him. But in any event I would inform him that, in case the proviso passed, he would have to make room for a man who could be counted upon to make no recommendations for appointment except after competitive examination—for competitive examinations may be held in the Department without being ordered by law, as I had them during the four years I was Secretary of the Interior.

But there I would not stop. I would in some way make it known to the politicians in Congress as well as to the officeholders concerned, that, in case of the passage of the proviso, I would have no man at the head of a Department or of any one of the great offices subject to civil service law, who could not be depended upon, from honest sympathy with the principles and ends of that law and of civil service reform generally, to select and appoint only the highest rated and best men without regard to party from the eligible lists submitted to them, however great a choice those eligible lists might offer.

As soon as the Executive has made it known that such is his irrevocable and unbending resolution, the politicians in Congress will see that all their tricks may disgrace and weaken their party, but will do them no good in any way, and even your pension-commissioners, and customs collectors and postmasters, trembling in their boots, will urge their friends in Congress to let the law alone. Now you may call this a heroic remedy; but I tell you when a reform is supported only by a strong and growing sentiment among the people but antagonized by the active politicians of the party organizations, it cannot be carried through without heroic treatment, and any one who shrinks from strong measures will be likely to fail. I repeat, I have seen this thing before.

President Cleveland is now in the same position in which President Grant was when Congress refused the appropriation for the Civil Service Commission. Grant yielded, and the public judgment was that his reform professions were not sincere enough to stand the test of opposition. Of course we look to President Cleveland for much better things. Would you not think it worth while to mention to him the plan I suggest?

But pardon this long letter. I have taxed your time much more than I intended. Let me add only that I am certainly grateful for the many good things which have been effected by this Administration; that I am very far from being sorry for what I did in 1884, and that I shall be every moment ready to do it again—which, by the way, is not at all unlikely to be called for—only I wish then the good cause to be as strong as those in power can make it.

TO WILLIAM POTTS¹

NEW YORK, June 11, 1886.

I am glad to learn that you will go to Washington so soon. As you know so well what our cause needs, I have but little to suggest. When you see the President it will be important, it seems to me, to make him well understand, that even if we could honestly overlook the mistakes made by the Administration, the just demand of our constituency that we should tell the truth, would not permit us to do so. We must tell the truth if we want to hold our forces together and preserve our influence on public opinion.

Secondly, the President ought to be assured that the inquiry resolved upon by the [Civil Service Reform] League is a movement entirely friendly to him. While it is not to whitewash anything, it is to set things in the right light, which no doubt will be favorable to him personally. At the same time, if the inquiry discovers things which he does not know, they will be laid before him before the report to the League is made, thus giving him an opportunity to right wrongs which may have escaped his attention.

I should not wonder if the President had the impression that I entertained very extreme views with regard to this business, and desired the adoption of extreme measures. The fact is that I deem it of the highest importance—and it is my principal anxiety—that the popular belief in the President's good faith be sustained, and therefore I think his pledges with regard to the removals, etc., should be carried out to the letter; these [pledges] should be conspicuous in case of any violation of them, and those exercising authority under the President should be held to respect them with the utmost strictness.

¹ Secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League.

It is not only the President's honor I have at heart, but the establishment of the fact that a public man's word *can* be kept and ought to count for something—a matter of the highest consequence to the reform cause. Furthermore, my experience convinces me that the President will not gain anything by making concessions. He will not conciliate the spoilsmen unless he gives them all, and he will lose in the opinion of the country in the same measure as he *tries* to conciliate the spoilsmen. Every such attempt will only create new demands and new embarrassments. He will find that the politicians most pampered with patronage are his most insidious opponents.

As to the methods followed by the Administration in making appointments and removals, it might be well to get the President's own views.

On the whole he ought to feel that, in us, he has [to] do with men who are willing to fight for him again—which they probably will have to do—and want to be enabled to do so with effect.

TO SILAS W. BURT¹

NEW YORK, June 21, 1886.

I am glad to learn that you are going to Washington to see the President. You may have occasion to invite his attention to a very significant fact. President Cleveland has grown remarkably in popularity within a few weeks past. And what has been the cause of it? Nothing else than that his reform policy was attacked in Congress by members of his own party, and that he was presented to the country by the very men who assailed his course, as a President faithful to his pledges even against the opposition of his own party friends.

¹ Colonel Burt was then Naval Officer of the port of New York and a close friend of President Cleveland. He was one of the most successful of the leaders and practical workers in civil service reform.

As you will remember, in judging of the situation it has always been my central idea that the President could render no greater service to the country, to his party and to himself than by being strictly, conspicuously, even punctiliously, faithful to his word in spirit and letter. It will be the greatest service to the country, because nothing is more necessary for the elevation of our political morals and the promotion of reform than to eradicate the abominable popular notion that there is nothing like good faith or a sense of honorable obligation in politics, and that the pledges of a public man are made only for temporary effect. That notion he can eradicate by proving that a public pledge can be sacred to a man in high position above any other consideration and that it can be practically kept.

He will thus render the greatest service to his own party, because the popular approval, which his honest firmness cannot fail to command, will force his party up to a more elevated sense of duty and thus infuse into it new vitality.

And it will be the greatest service to himself, because it will secure to him a most enviable place in American history as a benefactor of his people not to speak of his impregnable and commanding position as the necessary man of his time.

The effect produced in the public mind by the attacks in Congress upon his reform policy shows clearly, I think, that I have not been mistaken as to the source of President Cleveland's strength.

It is for this reason that I have always been so anxious for a strict observance of his pledges, and that I have so earnestly deplored every real or apparent departure from them—such cases for instance as that of General Salomon and those brought out in the Senate debate. It is for this reason also that I advised a different course when the Senate

asked for the reasons for the suspensions made, and when the President, as I thought, had such a splendid opportunity to confirm the popular belief in his good faith by taking the people into his confidence. It is for this reason, too, that I am so anxious he should make a warning example of some one of his subordinates who in all sorts of ways try to circumvent the law, and thus trifle with the President's honor. If such an example were conspicuously made, it would prevent ever so much mischief, save the President a world of trouble and raise him higher than ever before in public estimation.

In this respect the participation of officeholders in party conventions to which the enclosed article of the *Evening Post* refers, deserves especial attention. The President has now an opportunity to nip that abuse in the bud by disciplining some of the offenders. If he does not, the evil will inevitably grow until it becomes unmanageable, and we shall have the scandals of an officeholders' party machine and of postmasters' conventions again.

The President will inevitably discover, if he has not already done so, that the Congressmen who have been most pampered with patronage, remain the most persistent and insidious enemies of the reform policy; and that the districts in which the most appointments are made in accordance with the recommendations of such Congressmen will be the first to build up the old-fashioned officeholders' party machine again.

It is quite evident that the President's fidelity to his pledges will be the principal point of attack on the part of the opposition. The movement in the Senate last winter and the resolutions of inquiry concerning the classified service recently introduced by Mr. Ingalls leave no doubt of this. That is the point, therefore, where the President should be strongest. He should be so unassailable that all fair-minded men even in the opposition must

feel impelled to admit the fact. Of course, charges will always be made by unscrupulous politicians; but they will be harmless unless founded on truth. If, however, there should be many and important charges founded on truth, they might produce a reaction in public sentiment, all the greater as they would create the impression that the Administration was not what it pretended to be—a matter on which the American mind is very sensitive.

But the President can avoid all this by simply following the true impulses of his nature and by discarding the counsels of small political cunning. Thus he will win and maintain a grand and unconquerable position.

TO L. Q. C. LAMAR¹

NEW YORK, Sept. 28, 1886.

Your kind letter of the 24th reached me yesterday. I thank you very much for having made General Kryzanowski's case "special." His physicians apprehend that he will not survive the coming winter.

When I congratulated you upon the restoration of Duddenhausen to his place, as an act of justice, I believed that his official conduct had been entirely blameless. I understood it to be so at the time of his suspension. Had I had any reason to think otherwise, I should never have said a word about his case. And I wish to assure you now that if any wrong is discovered with regard to him, I shall be glad to hear that he is treated according to his deserts, and call that an act of justice too.

Let me add that with regard to these things I have much more the character of the Administration at heart than the personal interests of the individuals concerned. It simply so happened that the Duddenhausen and Salomon

¹ Secretary of the Interior.

cases¹ came to my special notice. I have nothing to ask for but to be enabled to say that the President's pledges have been kept. I trouble myself little about the rest. There is probably no unofficial person more interrogated and appealed to about the doings of the Administration than I am. Moreover, as a member of a special committee of the Civil Service Reform League I shall soon have to help in making a report on the progress of the reform, the course of the Administration as to the matter of removals and appointments included. We can report only the truth, and nobody can be more anxious than I am that the truth should show the Administration in every respect faithful to the President's word.

I think it would have been well, had the Administration at the start adopted a rule to put the reasons for every suspension or removal on record. Many suspensions would then not have been urged by the politicians; many, if urged, would have been refused for a very obvious and exceedingly strong reason; and the Administration would in many cases have escaped the suspicion of having made removals on mere political grounds, or of having made the removals first and hunted up reasons for them afterwards. But for the adoption of such a rule it is not too late. It will always be a salutary measure in itself.

The Administration has done many good things and these good things are evidently the source of its moral strength. It ought not to suffer a weak spot to exist in its armor.

This morning I made the acquaintance of the new collector of customs here. I do not think the President could have made a better appointment. What we are now looking for is to see him turn out some of the office-holders who, in defiance of his circular, have appeared as

¹ Removals from office.

managers in party caucuses and conventions. An example is very much needed.¹

TO L. Q. C. LAMAR

175 WEST 58TH ST.,
NEW YORK, Oct. 9, 1886.

I thank you very much for your letter of the second. I fully agree with you in all you say of the President. I believe firmly in the sincerity of his professions and his integrity of purpose. I am sure that he wishes to redeem his pledges with the utmost strictness. I agree with you also that the lapses which have occurred were owing mainly to two things: the unscrupulous partisanship or incapacity of subordinates, and to the bad advice given by Members of Congress. But it should not be forgotten that whatever weight be attached to this circumstance, it does not ultimately relieve the President of his responsibility. As to the officers under him, he has the power to fill their places with men who, as to the conduct of the public service, are of the same way of thinking with him, or, if he cannot find a sufficient number of individuals so qualified, to keep those he has well disciplined by practically convincing them that they hold office only on condition of a strict observance of reform principles. And as to the bad advice given by Congressmen, the President is under no obligation whatever to follow it, and he has already had ample opportunity for learning that as to

¹ Lamar's long answer of Oct. 2, 1886, is printed in Mayes's *L. Q. C. Lamar*, 488-89. It began as follows:

"My dear Mr. Schurz: I have received your letter and it has been both gratifying and interesting to me. I needed no assurance that you would not desire the retention in office of any unworthy man. I have absolute confidence in your disinterestedness, and know no act in your life that would give me the least misgiving on that subject."

appointments and removals the recommendations of Congressmen are throughout the least trustworthy. His responsibility is, therefore, after all undivided, and it is not unnatural that ultimately, notwithstanding the integrity of his intentions, he should be blamed for all the things originally owing to the bad faith of subordinates or the bad advice of Congressmen. The public judgment, and to a great extent the practical good done by the Administration, will at last depend upon the energy with which subordinates have been kept under discipline and the interference of Congressmen with Executive duties has been resisted.

As an illustration I send you by this mail a pamphlet I received from Indianapolis a few days ago. It contains a report from Lucius B. Swift to the Civil Service Reform Association of Indiana. I know Mr. Swift well. He was in 1884 the head and front of the Independent movement which did so much to give Indiana to Cleveland. He wants no office. He is not a disappointed politician. He is not a notoriety hunter. You meet in him simply an unselfish and perfectly sincere man, very much in earnest.

You will admit, when you have read his report, that the picture he draws is a very sad one, and I must say that what I know of Mr. Swift's character and conscientiousness induces me to believe in its substantial correctness. It will, I have no doubt, be generally accepted as true.

Now, that in consequence of the bad faith or incapacity of subordinates, or of bad advice given by Congressmen, such a state of things should have grown up, may be explained in perfect consistency with the President's sincere intentions. But that consistency would become questionable if such a state of things were permitted to continue so after having once been revealed. And it is difficult to see how the trouble in Indiana can be remedied

without a resort to pretty heroic measures. They will be unavoidable sometime, and they will have to be the more heroic, the longer they are delayed.

As I told you, I belong to a committee appointed by the National Civil Service Reform League to make a report upon the general condition of things. We have a local report from Maryland before us which is no more favorable than that from Indiana, and also one on the Indian service by Mr. Welsh. If I remember rightly, you said to me that some of the civil service reformers at Baltimore who had criticized the Maryland appointments were themselves prejudiced and perhaps not entirely unselfish partisans. I am not sufficiently acquainted with all of them; but several of them, and those the most pronounced, I know well, and I firmly believe them to be entirely disinterested and earnest friends of good government. And because I know them as such, I regret more keenly than I can express to see growing up among them suspicions as to the President's motives—suspicions of the groundlessness of which I am convinced, but have not been able to persuade them in consequence of what they have observed in their own State.

I have suggested to my colleagues on the National League committee that before making a general report, some of them should go to Washington and have a talk with the President and some Department chiefs about the facts before us. We may have discovered some things which are new to the authorities at Washington, and they may present views calculated to put things into a new light. What do you think of this plan?

One suggestion permit me to submit to you now. You have trouble about the removal and appointment of clerks at Indian agencies. The best thing to be done, in my opinion, would be to make clerks of the same grade of pay in the Indian Office at Washington and at the Indian

agencies interchangeable. This would bring the agency clerks under the civil service law, and in the course of time, when a number of clerks have been inter-exchanged, give the agencies the benefit of approved business methods and the Indian Office the benefit of the experience gathered by clerks at the agencies. To effect this, legislation would be necessary; but a recommendation in your report followed up with some further pressure would be likely to bring it, and produce at once a very good effect by opening a new prospect of reform.

While I am writing I receive a letter from St. Louis informing me that the new collector of customs there, Mr. Lancaster, is doing the same things which are disgracing the Indianapolis post-office, especially worrying resignations out of good clerks whom he can find no reason for removing. There is much sensitiveness in Missouri about the efforts made to replace the few Union soldiers still in the Federal service there, with Confederates. There are, as I am informed, two left in the marine office of the customhouse, who are to be got rid of now. One of them, Captain Schuster, through a friend, asks me whether I think him justified in declining to resign if requested to do so without any reason. My answer will be in the affirmative. I am not acquainted at present with any of the ruling spirits in the Treasury, or I should directly bring the matter to their attention. Will you, perhaps, be kind enough to mention the subject to them as soon as possible? They may possibly prevent a scandal there. How magnificently did the President correct the mistake made by the appointment of Hedden! That is the kind of medicine needed.

Now, my dear Mr. Lamar, you know where I live and where, whenever you visit this neighborhood, you will always be heartily welcome. Let me hope to see you soon again.

TO L. Q. C. LAMAR

NEW YORK, Oct. 14, 1886.

Permit me to add a postscript to my last communication. I have just received a letter from St. Louis informing me that Mr. Lancaster, the collector of customs, was asked whether there was anything in Captain Schuster's official conduct that made his resignation or removal desirable, and that Mr. Lancaster answered: "Nothing of the kind. I was pleased with him and have nothing to say against him. But political pressure forces me to discharge him at once if he refuses to hand in his resignation." This information comes from a trustworthy man. There is, as you see, a case very similar to that of the Indianapolis post-office preparing itself at St. Louis.

I think all the heads of such offices in the country ought to be directed by Executive order, whenever they recommend or before they make a removal, to report to the respective Department at Washington reasons for it, and be held strictly responsible for the correctness of their statements. The collector of customs here, Mr. Magone, has adopted that rule, as I understand, without being ordered to do so.

TO WINSLOW WARREN

NEW YORK, Oct. 16, 1886.

There is one feature of your State campaign which, perhaps, has not received all the attention it demands, and it is just that feature which makes your election one of general interest. One of the most significant figures in the public life of our day is the millionaire in politics. His appearance is by no means of evil under all circumstances. When men of wealth devote their leisure and opportunities to the study of public questions, endeavor to qualify

themselves for the discharge of public trust and then seek official position for the purpose of employing their abilities for the public benefit, they may render very great service and become a blessing to the community. The country has reason to congratulate itself upon the fact that so many young men of means and leisure have of late shown a disposition to give their abilities and time to public matters in the right spirit.

But we find in politics millionaires of another class who are a curse. I mean the rich men who without marked qualifications for important position, and without having earned promotion by useful and distinguished public service, seek high office merely on the strength of their money, either to use its power for their own advantage, or to add the conspicuous honors of high political station to their wealth. The very appearance on the field of politics of millionaires whose money is their only, or at least their principal, title to consideration is an element of corruption, for it means that in some way somebody or something is to be bought. It means the employment of the millionaire's money to procure his election to the place he covets, either through the direct bribery of individuals, or through the bribery of a political organization with campaign funds. It cannot mean anything else. In either form it is corruption; in the latter form corruption especially insidious and demoralizing because it is usually called by a different name.

The consequences of the invasion of public life by millionaires of this class are already disclosing themselves. One seat after another in the Senate of the United States is falling into their hands. In some cases the purchase is a matter of notoriety. I know of no recent occurrence more alarming than the refusal of the Senate to investigate the charges of corruption made by respectable parties with regard to the election of a millionaire Senator from

Ohio. I have read the charges as well as the evidence upon which they are based; also the arguments made in the Senate against investigating them; and I do not hesitate to say that if charges of corruption in Senatorial elections based upon evidence creating so strong a presumption are thrown aside by the Senate as not entitled to an investigation, upon reasoning so flimsy, there will be, as far as the action of the Senate itself is concerned, nothing to prevent every seat in that body from being acquired by some millionaire for himself or his attorney, in the way of downright purchase very thinly disguised. I candidly ask you, can you imagine anything more calculated to undermine the moral standing and authority not only of the Senate, but of the whole Government, aye, the stability of our institutions generally, than the refusal of the highest legislative body in the Republic to investigate strongly supported charges concerning the purchase of seats in it by rich men?

The nomination of men whose only, or whose principal, strength consists in the money they have, to State governorships, which this year, beginning with Maine, has become strikingly frequent, is of the same character. It means corruption in some way. To express it in the mildest language, it means that not uncommon ability, not superior qualifications, not distinguished service on the part of the candidate, but the possession of large funds by him is in some way depended upon as the decisive influence to determine the action of the party and of the voting body. This, too, looks to purchase in some form. Among the millionaires wishing to be governors your Republican candidate, Mr. Ames, is probably the most conspicuous. However estimable a gentleman he may be in his way, his qualifications for the high station he covets are known to be such that the proposition to make him governor of Massachusetts would have been received with

derision, were he not a millionaire. His case is therefore in point.

It is high time, as [it] seems to me, that the American people, and especially those who have the peace and good order of society at heart, should give some attention to this matter. We are living in times in which the arraignment of the rich and the poor against one another is especially mischievous. It ought by all means to be avoided; it ought certainly not to be provoked. There is much alarm at the appearance of anarchism, of revolutionary theories and of all sorts of tendencies subversive of social order. What do you think will be the effect, if you give the poor to understand that the highest political powers, the power to make laws and the power to execute them, are virtually for sale, and that the highest offices are to be no longer for the able and trustworthy and meritorious who deserve them, but for the rich who can pay for them?

Massachusetts has had the reputation of maintaining a rather high standard of ability and character as to her principal public dignitaries. There have been lapses in her record, no doubt, but she has never, so far, succumbed to the prestige and the demoralizing influence of the money bag. It would be a pity, and, under existing circumstances, a disaster peculiarly deplorable, if she should do so now. Our Independent friends may be congratulated upon the unanimity and promptness with which they rallied to prevent such a misfortune. The straightforward and vigorous utterances of Mr. Andrew, the candidate they support, upon the subject of the use of money in elections, are especially gratifying. His success would not only do honor to Massachusetts, but, as an emphatic rebuke to the pretensions of millionairessdom in politics, produce a very wholesome effect upon political life throughout the country at a time when such an effect is much needed.

TO ABRAM S. HEWITT¹

175 W. 58TH ST., Oct. 26, 1886.

You are aware, I presume, that I am to speak at a meeting of Germans next Friday evening in behalf of your candidacy. A good many of my acquaintances are hesitating as to whether to vote for you or for Mr. Roosevelt. As you no doubt know, the argument used against you with considerable effect is that, although the nomination was thrust upon you, yet, in order to obtain the energetic support of Tammany Hall and of the County Democracy, you have been obliged to give pledges to their leaders, or at least to come with them to some sort of an understanding as to appointments to office.

Whenever this objection to you was advanced in my presence, I answered what I believe to be true: that Mr. Hewitt has no understanding, either expressed or implied, with Tammany Hall, or the County Democracy, or any other political organization or set of politicians, as to appointments to office to be made, or patronage to be distributed, in the event of his being elected mayor; that, on the contrary, he will make his appointments and conduct his administration and carry on the work of reform in the affairs of the city with a sole view to the promotion of the public good, and not in any partisan or factional interest.

This I have constantly expressed as my honest *belief*; but the correctness of that belief having been challenged, I should be glad to be able to say that I *know* it from the best authority. And as I regard you as the best authority I address myself to you personally with the request that you tell me whether my belief is correct.

It is not my purpose to elicit from you, in reply to this, a letter for publication. I only wish to be enabled to

¹ Then Democratic candidate for mayor of New York City.

speak with a positiveness calculated to produce a greater effect than a mere expression of confidence would have.

FROM ABRAM S. HEWITT

NEW YORK, Oct. 27, 1886.

I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 26th inst. In reply I can only repeat . . . that I was nominated for mayor without my knowledge, that I was not asked to give any pledge of any kind whatever, by Tammany Hall, or the County Democracy, or by anybody else, and that I have made no other pledge and shall make no other as to the administration of the office, except that I will discharge its duties to the best of my ability, without fear or favor and in the interests of the whole people and not for the benefit of any political party. I do not know how I can make this declaration any stronger, but I would do so if I could. While you only ask a reply for your own personal use, you are at liberty to read or publish the [this] letter in any way you see fit. . . .

TO JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

NEW YORK, Nov. 19, 1886.

I am glad to know that you approve of the closing chapter [of *Henry Clay*] as it stands. I am especially anxious that there should be no mistakes as to facts and dates in the book. I have, indeed, been careful to verify everything—at least I think I have. But I may have, here and there, depended too much upon my memory, and thus some little errors may have slipped in. I should be especially obliged to you for advising me if, in reading the proof, anything of a doubtful nature should occur to you.

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TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Dec. 15, 1886.

My dear Mr. President: There are some things which should be said to you now, and as I have been asked to do it, I crave your indulgence for a few minutes.

It is your endeavor, I apprehend, to serve the cause of reform consistently with what you conceive to be the interest of your party. Under such circumstances a correct view of the relation between that cause and party interest is of high importance. In this respect it should be observed that the political situation has of late undergone a significant change. It may be doubted whether the National Labor party now organizing will live long. But it seems very probable that it will appear with some strength in the election of 1888. Had a Labor candidate in 1884 received in the whole State as many votes as Henry George received last month in this city, you would have lost New York by at least 20,000. It is by no means unlikely that two years hence a Labor candidate will receive at least something like the George vote, in the State. Much less would suffice to defeat the Democrats on the basis of the figures of 1884, considering that, according to trustworthy estimates, fully three-fourths of the Labor vote is drawn from the Democratic ranks. In New Jersey and Connecticut the proportion would probably be about the same.

The Democrats will, therefore, be doomed to defeat, unless votes enough to cover the deficiency be won over from the Republicans.

The Democratic party has, indeed, gained one important point. The superstition that a Democratic President will absolutely ruin the country, is effectually dispelled; that is to say, when a Democratic nomination especially commends itself to favor, or a Republican nomination

repels public confidence, the old vague fear will no longer stand in the way of Democratic success.

But aside from that, the Democratic party, as a party, has not grown in the popular confidence since 1884. It has rather lost ground. It has, as represented in Congress, shown a singular incapacity in dealing with public problems, and the demonstrative efforts of its politicians to defeat a consistent reform policy have offered a somewhat repulsive spectacle generally. It might make some local gains by a statesmanlike treatment of the tariff question; but there is scarcely any hope of that, especially with its diminished majority in the next Congress. The Democratic party, as such, will therefore not be able to draw the necessary number of votes from the Republicans.

It has only one chance of salvation, and that is by renominating you. I do not know, and do not inquire, whether you desire to be nominated or not. I only mean to say that, whatever your personal wishes may be, a failure to renominate you would be understood as a distinct rebuke by your party of the attempted reform policy with which your name is identified, and that then any Republican candidate will easily defeat his Democratic competitor.

But your renomination will save the Democratic party only if your name remains strong enough to draw a large number of Republican votes—not only the old Independent force, but much more; and you will be renominated only if the Democratic politicians know that you can draw them and that nobody else can. You were nominated in 1884 not on account of the strength you had within your party, but on account of that strength which you were believed to possess outside of it. A renomination in 1888 will come to you only if, for the same reason, you are looked upon as a necessity—for you have already displeased the spoils politicians in your party, so much so

that even a complete surrender to them would hardly make them trust and love you. The less outside strength you command, the less will you appear necessary to your party, and the less will be the probability of your renomination. The Democratic politicians who sneer most at the Mugwumps will be the first to throw you overboard as soon as they see that the Mugwumps are no longer in force on your side.

It is scarcely necessary to say that your strength outside of your party depends entirely upon the confidence inspired by the course of your Administration. In this respect it has become a duty of friendship to speak without reserve. Until recently a general trust in the sincerity of your professions sought for what appeared to be your mistakes and inconsistencies the most favorable explanations. The worst things laid to your charge were construed as mere errors of judgment, and perhaps occasionally a certain stubbornness of temper in sticking to an error once committed. But the fact should not be concealed from you, that this confiding belief has been seriously shaken by your action in the Benton-Stone case.¹ This was not a mere mistake as to the character or qualification of a person, or an error owing to misinformation. This was a retreat from a position of principle—a “back-down” apparently for partisan reasons or under partisan dictation. The letters with which that retreat was sought to be covered made the matter appear only worse, and the subsequent revelation of the fact that the Democrat Benton had really attacked your Administration while the Republican Stone had cautiously abstained from doing so, has poured over all professions of principle and

¹ Benton was a Democratic and Stone a Republican U. S. district attorney who had respectively made campaign speeches. Both were dismissed for offensive partisanship, but Benton was reinstated. See 43 N. Y. *Nation*, 430, 450.

impartiality in the proceeding a flood of ridicule, which is even more hurtful than serious criticism.

The evil consequences of that act go far beyond the abandonment of that one position. It was like a flash of lightning showing many other things in a new aspect. It gave a new and a strange significance to the fact that the "offensive partisan" and "pernicious activity" business, however originally intended, had, in point of practical application, served only to cloak the removal of Republican officeholders, while Democratic officeholders were permitted to do partisan work very much as they pleased. It brought to mind the other fact, that while in Republican States many good things were done, in States which had Democratic Senators or other strong and exacting Democratic leaders, the spoils system flourished again as of old. It severely staggered the old belief that where no explanation was given of a questionable act, a creditable explanation must at least be possible. In one word, this one step has greatly diminished the number of those who were always confident that whatever you did, if not always well done, was at least always well meant.

There is a condition of public confidence under which all a man does is construed favorably, and there is another under which all is construed unfavorably. You have had all the advantages of the first. If I am not mistaken, you are now standing on the dividing line between the two. If you should drift into the second, other weak points of your Administration, which so far have plagued you comparatively little, would then rise to uncomfortable importance, in a manner sometimes quite unjust to you. Such is the Pan-Electric affair, and the retention of the Attorney-General [Garland] in the Cabinet, the generous motives for which I perfectly appreciate.¹ Such is the

¹ Attorney-General Garland held stock in the Pan-Electric Co., which owned a patent of which the Bell telephone was alleged to be an infringe-

neglect of business in the Navy Department, which has for a long time been the current talk of the service and cannot fail finally to break out in the newspapers, aside from the ostentatious—to use a mild term—display of wealth by the Secretary [Wm. C. Whitney], especially unfortunate at a time when more than ever the highest official circles should set an example in preserving the old republican simplicity of social life in Washington against the invasion of vulgar millionairedom; and especially offensive and imprudent while the contrasts between the extremes of wealth and poverty are more than ever the subject of public attention. Such is the speech of the Postmaster-General as reported, approving the partisan cry that the decapitating process does not go fast enough, together with the fact that the number of unfortunate changes in country post-offices, which to the rural mind represent the character of the Administration, has been particularly great. Such are many things which have so far been excused when they could not be explained or justified, and which injured you comparatively little while the presumption was in your favor; but which will be calculated to harm you seriously as soon as the presumption becomes doubtful or turns against you.

As the case stands to-day I should say that, if the election were to take place to-morrow, and if you were the candidate on one and Blaine on the other side, you would receive the whole Independent vote, and perhaps ment. If this claim were sustained, the value of the Pan-Electric stock would be very great. Mr. Garland permitted the Solicitor-General to institute proceedings impugning the validity of the Bell patent. The Republicans charged Mr. Garland with an attempt to enrich himself by using the resources of his Department for personal ends; though the decision of the case rested, of course, with the Court and not with Mr. Garland or his Solicitor-General. A Congressional committee afterwards exonerated these gentlemen.—Peck, *Twenty Years of the Republic*, p. 55, n. See also E. Benj. Andrews, 2 *Hist. of the Last Quarter-Century*, 108, 109.

some Republican votes which were cast for Blaine in 1884; whether enough of the latter to cover the deficiency caused by the Labor movement, is questionable. But if the Republicans nominated, instead of Blaine, some fair man, you would have only a part of the Independent vote—consisting of the most decided anti-tariff men. In the first case, Blaine being now the weakest man the Republicans have, your success would perhaps be barely possible; in the latter case, your defeat might be looked upon as certain, and I venture to say that while Blaine's nomination would seem inevitable, if the Convention were held to-morrow, the number of Republicans who are afraid of it is constantly growing and not at all unlikely to control the Convention in 1888.

It being clear that you can save your party only by enabling it to draw a large number of votes from its opponents; and that this can be done only by a strong reform policy commanding general confidence, it seems no exaggeration to say that your action in the Benton-Stone case is the worst blow the Democratic party has received since 1884. It has been received with jubilant shouts by your worst enemies, such as the *Sun*, who wish not only to defeat but to disgrace you. It has encouraged the spoilsmen in your party as they have scarcely ever been encouraged before, for it has made them confident that they can subdue the strongest President if they only try hard enough. And surely they will try more than they ever did. Neither will they be deterred by what you say about reform, in your message. On the contrary, they find there another encouragement. They find the advanced positions tacitly abandoned, and the cause of administrative reform driven back into the last line of defense within the narrow entrenchment of the civil service law,—and even that entrenchment in spots by no means impregnable. They see no longer an advancing,

but a retreating cause; and let us not forget that while a strong, aggressive movement commands esteem and acquiescence, a halting, retreating one invites contempt and attack.

The spoilsmen see more. They understand perfectly who those are whom you dismiss as "impracticable friends" and men of "misguided zeal." They remember well that this is the same taunt those men had to hear from the Republican side, when they threw their political fortunes to the winds, repudiated Blaine, turned their backs upon their party and supported you who promised to be the champion of their common principles. And the spoilsmen eagerly believe that the spirit which inspires that taunt now, cannot be very different from that which inspired it on the other side two years ago. In this new departure they will see a fresh incitement to redouble their energies. Is there any hope that the power of resistance will grow in proportion to the increased vigor of the assault?

Nothing can be more certain than this. You cannot sacrifice the reform cause to your party without at the same time sacrificing your party to the worst element in it. This surely you do not mean to do. But I warned you more than once that your principal danger was to sit down between two chairs. I am afraid you are virtually there now. Only a heroic policy can extricate you from that situation. But it must be adopted soon, for it grows more difficult every day; the time is not far off when even the most heroic policy may no longer suffice to save your party, although it may be all the more necessary to save your honor.

Do not believe that I fail to appreciate the many good things you have done. Nobody values them more highly. Nobody rejoiced more than I at the enthusiastic reception you had at Cambridge a few weeks ago, and nobody can

be more grieved than I, to think that it would hardly be so enthusiastic now, and that there your popularity culminated to descend thenceforth. Neither should you believe that anything I have said was caused by irritation at the expressions contained in your message. In my long public life I have met with so many similar things that they have ceased to vex and even to surprise me. I will admit, however, that I am sorry for the younger Independents who followed your standard, and to whom this experience is new. At any rate, permit me to remind you that no great reform ever succeeded without a high degree of impracticability among its champions; that, not to any political cunning, to your own impracticability you owe all the prestige and power you have; and that you need all of it now more than ever to save your cause, your party and your own standing in the confidence of the people.

It is due to you, as well as to myself, to say that the sentiments here expressed are by no means my own alone. I have had earnest consultations with friends well known to you, both Democrats and Independents, who all believe that you have reached a very critical point in your career, some of them going in their apprehensions even much farther than I do, and requested me to write to you. To do so, I considered a duty, but I assure you it was not a welcome task.¹

Sincerely yours.

FROM CHARLES R. CODMAN

57 MARLBORO' ST.,
BOSTON, Jan. 31, 1887.

I arrived here on Saturday having pushed through from Washington. I had but one interview with the President which lasted two hours and which he showed no impatience to bring

¹ See the letter of Feb. 3, 1887, to Col. Codman.

to an end. I laid before him my statement which was substantially to this effect: "Dissatisfaction exists among our friends who feel that at the rate at which removals are being made there will scarcely be any Republican left in office at the expiration of Mr. Cleveland's term, and we shall have a condition of things no better than under previous Administrations. The 'clean sweep' would be complete though it would be gradually accomplished." I also said that there was much criticism of the Maryland and Indiana appointments and, generally, I said explicitly what I told you I should say. The President heard me with the greatest patience and attention, and when I had done he said in substance that our friends ought to be quite sure that they understand exactly what his pledges were, and that to his knowledge he had violated none. All that he had said in his letter to Curtis (and it was more than he need to have said) was that officials, not in the classified service, who were competent, and not offensive partisans,—might expect to retain their places and would not be turned out to reward party workers. "He had never *said* that they might expect reappointment at the end of their terms of office. He claimed that all the removals that had been made were, so far as he had been able to control them, for what were believed to be good reasons. Not that mistakes had not been made, not that instances could not be found where good officials had been removed and bad ones put in their places, not that some of his own appointees had not disregarded the principles upon which he himself acted."—All this was said in answer to the suggestion of unfaithfulness to his pledges. He said, besides, that he had already been considering whether a farther step in advance could not soon be taken. He stated that the pressure upon him to make removals merely to give places to Democrats was at an end. So much at least had been gained. Whether it were best to make an announcement, that—now that the offices were reasonably fairly divided between the parties—appointments in the Post-Office Department, at least, should be made wholly from considerations of fitness without regard to politics, was something he was considering.

To my suggestion that at least some conspicuous reappointments might be made of Republican postmasters he seemed to incline favorably, and when I said that these appointments might be made to advantage outside of Massachusetts, he replied "that that too should be considered." We then had a general conversation in which among other things the President said that he had often refused to make appointments that Senator Gorman desired, telling him plainly that it could not be done. He claimed that the collector and district attorney at Baltimore were good appointments and that Rasin the Naval Officer (whatever his antecedents) did his work well. Of Indiana he spoke as if he were disgusted and discouraged at the behavior of his party friends in that State. He recognized Mr. Swift's honesty of intention and said nothing disparaging about him. And then he said, when we got onto the inter-state commerce bill and other matters, "I can't grasp this *whole* thing," meaning the whole range of Presidential responsibility—as I understood him. I have given you the points of the conversation as I recall them. Of course I have omitted many things, such as some local matters in Massachusetts. The President mentioned your letters and said that they sometimes irritated him, though he acknowledged your entire disinterestedness. The impression made upon me was that he thought you did not allow for the difficulties of his position in the immense variety of questions and subjects to which he is obliged to give attention.

Let me sum up my general impression:—If I saw the President oftener I should have an opportunity to judge better; and, even as far as it goes, I may be quite wrong in my observation. With my present light, it appears to me that the President inclines too much to look at the details of his functions and imagines that by working these out correctly he will be best able to achieve results. It is in a certain sense with him, "Take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves." He has not the scientific way of going to work, of laying down his propositions and then carrying them out in a general way. He wants to make a good appointment in every case and thinks less perhaps of the prin-

ciples upon which all appointments should be made. I say that he thinks *less* of these; I am far from saying that he does not regard them at all. He has certainly an idea of educating the leaders of his party and he believes that encouraging progress has been made in this direction.

I am of opinion that President Cleveland has shown much courage in his power of resistance, and rather less in his power of advance, but my conclusion is, that in spite of appearances and inconsistencies, he is a man of a good and honest purpose. I think he ought to be supported cordially, that we should not irritate or discourage him, but that nevertheless we should kindly and clearly point out what we think should be done.

As I was about to leave him he said, "And now what are you going to say to your friends?" I replied, as well as I can recall it: "I am going to tell them that you say that you never promised to reappoint capable Republicans when their terms expired, that you claim that progress has been made, that you expect to make still more and that you are considering what the next step shall be." To this he made no objection.

And then I said to him, almost the last thing, "I don't want you to think hardly of Carl Schurz, who is really your friend." "Yes," said he with perfect good nature, "but where am I to find three or four hours to answer his letter?"

Our whole intercourse in this interview was frank and cordial. The President talked a good deal. I don't think his tone was despondent, although some of the things I have described him as saying may seem to indicate it. I can only say that I left him, as I always do, with an increased regard for him. He has his limitations, of course, like the rest of us. He certainly has not been trained to be and perhaps (though I am not so sure of that) cannot be a logical and constructive statesman, but he is a faithful public servant, honest and manly and simple and brave, and growing every day in experience and in comprehension of the situation. I am for sustaining him, and in the interests of good government I would not be too rigid with him.

The American people, too, have their limitations and peculiarities, one of which is that they do a great many things

without any particular system. It is the French rather than the Anglo-Saxons that want mathematically perfect constitutions and who are disappointed when they don't work to perfection.

But our people like a *man*, and when they get a notion that a President means to do right *on the whole*, notwithstanding many errors and shortcomings, and that in so doing he disturbs the "little games" of the machine-men, even if some very good people find fault with him and do so justly, the average people are apt to do what I must think is demonstrably unreasonable, but which is yet profoundly characteristic of our people, and that is to stand by him, right or wrong.

I hope, therefore, that our report will deal very gently with Mr. Cleveland, even more so than does the original draft, and I intend to look at it again with the view of suggesting modifications in the direction I suggest.

TO CHARLES R. CODMAN

NEW YORK, Feb. 3, 1887.

I thank you for your letter of January 31st as well as the postscript received yesterday. On the whole I must confess that your account of your interview with the President makes upon me a melancholy impression. His mind seems to be controlled by irritation at his critics rather than by an intelligent endeavor to disarm their criticism. That irritation threatens to become somewhat morbid. Last night I saw a letter he had addressed a day or two ago to one of his friends here, in which he expressed the opinion that the Independents were working for the same object as the extreme spoilsmen, such as Dana and others, to ruin him.

The explanations he gave you do not explain anything. It certainly does not justify his submission to Gorman's influence when he says that he might have done worse

and submitted still more. It does not explain his unjustified removals and bad appointments when he says that he never pledged himself to reappoint Republicans—which pledge I think nobody ever accused him of making.

When he says that his pledge with regard to removals has been kept, he stands probably alone in saying so. I shall certainly give him credit for believing himself what he says; but in that case he indulges in a delusion decidedly dangerous not only to his success but to his good name. Moreover, he seems to overlook that it is of vastly more importance, practically, what others think of his fidelity to his pledges, than what he thinks of it himself.

His belief that Benton did not make the speeches imputed to him, shows only how easily he permits himself to be deceived by politicians who tell him what he likes to believe.

All this gives me little hope as to the forward steps he is "considering." A Democratic friend of mine is going to Washington to-day to urge an extension of the civil service rules. I pray he may succeed, in the first place for the sake of reform itself, and then because *something* is absolutely needed to make the weak position into which the President has put himself, less conspicuous.

As to my personal relations with the President, I undertook the ungrateful rôle of the friend who utters disagreeable truths, because I thought nobody else would do so while it was most necessary. It was an act of self-sacrifice. If for this he "thinks hardly" of me, I am sorry, but not on my own account. I shall always be ready to explain how what I said was meant, but not to apologize for it. When Mr. Cleveland complains of my letters to others instead of answering them, he does not act wisely. If he has done things bad in appearance,

and a friend calls his attention to that fact, and he neglects giving explanations to put them in a better light, he must not blame that friend for thinking that those things are as bad as they appear. Lincoln knew better how to treat such differences of opinion between himself and his friends. What shall I say of Mr. Cleveland's plea that he could not "find three or four hours to answer my letters"? Might I not say that he could possibly find those three or four hours where I found three or four months to advocate his election? Seriously speaking, I have been in official position and overburdened with work myself, but I always could find time to answer letters which I really wished to answer.

I assure you, I do not mean to urge a question of courtesy. I simply regret that the President does not do the right things to hold those together who ought to coöperate for common objects. I regret this, because I sincerely wish him well.

Now, as to our report, I think all we have to do is to speak the truth—first because it is the truth, and then because as soon as we Independents do anything to shake the popular belief that we have the courage and can be depended upon to speak the truth under all circumstances, all our moral spirit, all our influence upon public opinion, all our power for good, will be gone. Of course, I do not wish to hurt the President unnecessarily and would therefore speak the truth unfavorable to him as mildly as possible, but it must be the truth.

What you say of the American people doing things without system, while French doctrinaires will insist upon perfection or nothing, is no doubt true. But I do not think those who insist that a President's pledges and orders must mean something, should therefore be classed with the French doctrinaires.

It is evidently desirable that we should have a confer-

ence before the report is made, and I hope we may have it soon.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1887.

My dear General: How are you getting on? I hope this bright Easter sun is cheering you, and healing your wound.¹

Mr. Straus has just gone to Turkey, and it pleased me to know he had you among his friends. He impressed me very favorably and I believe he will do good service at Constantinople. I hope next year a more respectable pay will be attached to the place.

By this mail I send you an advance copy of the correspondence of this Department for 1886, and will ask you to read under the head of Brazil an extraordinary case in which your friend Blaine sought to induce closer commercial relations with Brazil by demanding more than three times the amount of the Alabama award for one of Mr. Elkins's clients!

My dear Schurz, if you never performed any other service for our countrymen than the part you played in preventing Blaine from becoming Chief Magistrate, you deserve a statue.

Get well rapidly and believe me, sincerely yours.

P. S. I send you a very sensible paper on a "burning question."

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

175 W. 58TH ST., NEW YORK.

April 28, 1887.

Let me thank you for your very kind letter of the 12th [11th] inst. It has given me a great deal of pleasure. Answering your inquiry concerning my condition I am glad to say that I got out of bed week before last, that I am walking on crutches, as yet very cautiously, that I

¹ Mr. Schurz had recently slipped and fallen on the pavement, fracturing a hip-bone.

am gaining a little every day and that my physicians promise a complete cure. It will, however, be a good while yet before I shall be able to walk with any freedom. But my general health is unimpaired and I am in good spirits.

The Brazilian correspondence, which you were good enough to send me, I have read with much interest. Yes, Blaine appears there, in all his beautiful suggestiveness. Those who contributed to his defeat may indeed rest in the consciousness of having done their country a good turn. I do not know whether, as you say, I deserve a statue for my part in that business; but if I have never anything else for it than the insidious persecution which has since followed me from that quarter and the abuse I have received from both sides, I shall be satisfied with my lot, especially since it looks as if he were disposed of forever as a Presidential candidate, and then also as a power in politics. Of course, he will fight to the last, and I do not look upon his discomfiture as certain. But it grows more probable every day. If it is accomplished, we shall not see another notoriously corrupt man nominated for the Presidency in our day. It will clear the political atmosphere wonderfully, and I shall, after having taken an active part in eight Presidential campaigns, claim my discharge, to devote my leisure to my favorite literary work.

The paper about the land and labor party which you sent me is full of good sense. I think the labor organizations as they now are, at least the Knights of Labor, will break down before long, to rise up in a better form. But it is very probable that there will be a labor candidate for the Presidency in 1888, and that he will draw the principal part of his strength from the Democratic ranks, at least in the critical States, New York, Connecticut and New Jersey. No coquetting with "Labor" as Gov-

ernor Hill does it, will prevent that; it will rather tend to discredit those resorting to it with the conservative element. The Democrats will, therefore, in order to fill the gap caused by the labor defection, have to draw upon the sincere friends of reform among the Republicans and the Independents. And that can be done only by a strong reform policy.

I think you did a good thing in appointing Straus. He is an excellent man and will, I trust, do good service. You will have noticed that the appointment was received with uniform favor by the press. Last Sunday I had a call from John Sherman and his brother the General. Do you think John is making much headway as an aspirant to the nomination?

Do you ever visit New York, and when you do, will you ever be able to find half an hour to cheer this sufferer with your kind countenance? You will probably find me at home for a good while yet.

FROM EX-PRESIDENT HAYES

SPIEGEL GROVE, July 2, 1887.

My dear General: This hot morning I give a few minutes to the duty and pleasure of telling you how much I am delighted with your *Henry Clay*. Wm. Henry Smith had written me that it was the best of the series and very excellent. Critical notices all point the same way. I knew you were not likely to be unjust. But owing to your aversion to Hero Worship I feared you would not see as others do the wonderful combination of attractive qualities possessed by Clay. He was by nature sound and an adherent of the best. This with his prodigious magnetism, grace and eloquence made him a unique character. You have satisfied the demand of his admirers, and still kept faith with historical accuracy and justice. It is well done, exceedingly.

Now a word more personal, almost impertinent. You

write so easily and rapidly, it will not interfere with your necessary work. *Do write a full autobiography.* You need not publish. Leave that to the young folks. How great the curiosity to know your method of mastering our language. How much instruction you could give. Then you are an enigma in a certain sense. Explain yourself. You can write the most readable sketch of the sort to be found in our language.

Sincerely,

R. B. HAYES.

FROM EX-PRESIDENT HAYES

FREMONT, O., July 9, 1887.

My dear General: I am specially rejoiced that you have begun the autobiography. Anything you write is quite sure to be of interest and value. But this sketch—don't make it too short—will be, I am sure, of the greatest interest.

You ask for the exact point of the mystery in your own case as many think of it. To me there is no mystery—nothing requiring explanation. But you know the strength of the tie which binds the average Englishman, Scotchman, Irishman or American to his party. To break it is almost a crime. Now you were a Republican prior to 1872. Then you left the Republican party and joined the Democrats. In 1876 you left the Democrats and joined again the Republicans. You remained with the R's through 1880, and in 1884 left them and went again to the Democrats. I am stating this not as I see it, but as the average party man sees it, and speaks of it. Two views are taken of this. The less intelligent conclude that your changes are due to selfish and unworthy motives. To them there is no mystery in your conduct. You are no "enigma" to them. They see clearly why your political conduct is what it is. I have often denied to such the correctness of their accusations against you. But the other and better informed class are confident that in what you have done you are perfectly sincere and honest. But "How strange it is," they say. They can't understand it. It is a mystery. You are an "enigma." With such, the common explanation

is, "Well he is a German"—or "He is a Free Trader." "He is a good man—an honest man—a man of extraordinary talents, but not a practical man in his political conduct." Does this make clear to you what I meant?

With all friendship and good wishes,

Sincerely,

R. B. HAYES.

FROM MOSES COIT TYLER

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,

ITHACA, Aug. 30, 1887.

I read your two volumes on *Henry Clay* just as soon as they appeared, and have been intending ever since to tell you of my gratitude for the instruction and delight which they gave me. It happened at the time that I was confined to my room by a savage attack of rheumatism; and it is literally true that while reading the book I was able to forget the pains which my enemy was inflicting upon me.

I congratulate you sincerely and heartily on the happiness of finishing so great and noble a piece of work. I don't know a more wholesome book on American political history. I see in it not only the result of great and patient research applied for that immediate purpose, but the fruits of a lifetime of study, thought and practical experience in the affairs of state. Your book will for many a year instruct the student of our history and be an inspiration and a pure and elevating monitor to multitudes of young men. I should like to express, also, my sense of satisfaction in the delicacy, power and charm of its literary style.

I have long thought that if an opportunity should occur, I should be glad to say a word to you respecting your career in American politics. I first heard of you distinctly in 1860—when I was but recently from college. I have observed closely your sayings and doings since then. I have myself been entirely free in my political relations, long voting with the Republican party from my convictions as an anti-slavery man. I find, on looking back over the whole period, that in

every vicissitude and combination of political parties, I have invariably been in agreement with you. This of course is of little account to you; but to me it gives an interest and a confidence in your political character and judgment, which I can now feel for no other American statesman living.

I really fear that this may seem a little too blunt and crude in its expression. I write in some haste, but very sincerely. What you say of Gallatin's place in American political history will yet be applied to one whom I have often compared to Gallatin.

TO MELVILLE E. STONE¹

NEW YORK, Oct. 3, 1887.

Last night I received from you a telegraphic message requesting me to give you by wire my opinion of President Cleveland's Administration, to be published on Tuesday. I did not comply with your wish, not as if I were disinclined to oblige you, but because I consider it a matter of doubtful propriety to confront the President, at the moment of his arrival as the guest of the citizens of Chicago, in a Chicago newspaper with the criticism pronounced by all sorts of men upon his public conduct. If that criticism is favorable, it will be apt to appear as a mere compliment for the occasion. If it is unfavorable, it ought not to be thrust at the President where he appears merely as a guest. This being my opinion, you will pardon me for not having responded to your telegraphic request.

TO MAYOR HEWITT

Nov. 5, 1887.

Permit me to introduce myself to you as one of a large number of citizens who, without regard to your party

¹ Editor of the *Chicago Daily News*.

affiliations, supported you when you were a candidate for the mayor's office. At the instance of some of them for whom I then spoke, I address you now.

In saying this I do not lay claim to extraordinary consideration. I mention it only in order to remind you of the fact that the ground upon which the independent citizens supported you was well understood. We believed that as mayor of this great city you would infuse an element of superior intelligence and honor into the conduct of our municipal affairs, and, by the force of your example as well as by the legitimate use of your influence, endeavor to emancipate them from the rule of that narrow-minded, selfish and not infrequently corrupt partisanship from which the community has in the past suffered so much injury and disgrace. You cannot fail to remember how you encouraged that belief.

No just man will deny that many of your acts have deserved and obtained the applause of your fellow-citizens. So much the more is it to be deplored that now you have taken a step which, in its evil effects, threatens to outweigh all the good you have done or may do during the rest of your official term; and here I express not only my own, but the opinions, as far as I know, of all those who supported you without being moved by partisan motives.

The contest for the district attorneyship has at this time assumed unusual importance—not on account of personal or party considerations, but because it involves great public interests. The corruption so long prevailing in our municipal affairs has seriously injured the welfare as well as the good name of this community. A vigorous prosecution of the thieves and betrayers of public trusts, of bribe-givers and bribe-takers, was felt to be the first step necessary if the public interest was to be protected and the disgrace wiped out. When at last that vigorous

prosecution took place it was hailed by all good citizens as the breaking of a better day. Everybody knew that it was owing mainly to Mr. Martine, who controlled the operations of the district attorney's office, and to Mr. Nicoll, who worked up and conducted the trial of the boodle cases. This was so generally understood that when Mr. Martine desired a place on the bench, as was proper enough, Mr. Nicoll was almost universally looked upon as his natural successor. There was a general feeling that he had managed the prosecution not only with skill and untiring energy, but also with that firmness against adverse pressure, that fearlessness of the power of those he had to bring to justice and of their friends, which are especially indispensable under such circumstances. And since the district attorney's office appeared as the soul of the prosecutions, as the principal protector of the public interest and honor, Mr. Nicoll, who had done so well in the past, was regarded as especially trustworthy for the future, in fact, as the special representative of the vigor of the law.

That ordinary political hucksters who derive their sustenance from selfish combinations should have opposed him was not surprising. But nobody reckoned you among that class. You are a man of recognized ability and high social standing. You have the prestige of a distinguished public career, and, as the head of this great municipality, of important official position. Many a time you have given the people to understand that you regarded public office as a public trust. When you oppose what is generally looked upon as demanded by the public voice as well as the public interest, it must be expected that you have weighty reasons for it—reasons corresponding with your character and station.

You have given us those reasons in a letter addressed to the Harlem Democratic club, and pardon me for saying

that to many of your friends they have been a painful surprise.

You say that originally you had been willing to do all you "could in a proper way to secure Mr. Nicoll's nomination"—thus admitting the propriety of it. Why, then, did you not do it? Because, some time in September last, Mr. Nicoll had told you that "he preferred to resume his private practice of the law." My dear Mr. Hewitt, you and I are no novices in public life. When you tell me that such a casual remark about preferring private station must be taken as a conclusive reason against bringing that man forward for office, if he is otherwise fit and desirable, you will certainly not expect me to receive that statement without a smile. Have we not both heard it said many a time that not the man should seek the office, but the office the man? Do we not both remember many instances when public men were urged and finally prevailed upon to take office, much against their original desire? A prominent case of that kind is fresh in my memory; it is that of the Hon. Abram S. Hewitt, when, after repeated declarations that he did not desire that office, he permitted himself to be nominated for the mayoralty. But you give up your argument in your own letter; for you say that Mr. Fellows wished to retire to his private practice just as much as Mr. Nicoll, but that "he was solicited to accept a nomination, which he neither expected nor desired." So it appears that the wish to retire to private practice was conclusive against Mr. Nicoll, but not against Mr. Fellows, and that, in spite of such wish, the nomination could be urged upon Mr. Fellows, but not upon Mr. Nicoll. You must, therefore, pardon sensible men if they do not take your argument as serious.

But you give another reason. "In this condition of affairs," you say, "the nomination of Mr. Nicoll was

demanding by certain newspapers which are either not the organs of the Democratic party or are distinctly opposed to its principles." Well, what of it? Do you mean to say that the advocacy of Mr. Nicoll by newspapers not the organs of the Democratic party would make him less efficient in the prosecution of evil-doers, a less valuable district attorney to the city of New York? I remember when Abram S. Hewitt was a candidate for mayor, newspapers "not the organs of the Democratic party" advocated his election. Did he repel them? Did he think it for himself a disqualification for the office?

Indeed, you say that one of the newspapers spoke in a dictatorial tone. What of that? Would that have diminished Mr. Nicoll's qualifications for the place? Would it have lessened the importance of the prosecutions by a man of his proven trustworthiness? Let me ask you, instead of indulging in feverish imaginings about "newspaper bosses" and "brooding Buddhas," to look the facts calmly in the face. It was not one newspaper that at first expressed the demand for Mr. Nicoll's nomination. It was almost the whole press of this city; it was the *Herald*, the *Sun*, the *World*, the *Times*, the *Tribune*, the *Staats-Zeitung*, the *Evening Post*, the *Commercial Advertiser*, the *Mail and Express*, *Harper's Weekly*, the *Independent* and others. And why did these newspapers, in almost unbroken chorus, agree in that demand? Not because they wanted to start a popular current, but because they moved in it. They did not create public sentiment, but they simply obeyed it. They only gave voice and expression to a demand which embodied the best impulses of our people and did honor to the community—the demand for justice and good government. Will you make us believe that, as "self-respecting men," you and your friends among the leaders of the Democratic party could not have yielded to that de-

mand because among the newspapers expressing it there was one you did not like? Let us see where that kind of "self-respect" has carried you.

I know that we cannot expect our candidates for office to be perfect angels. I am not in favor of criticizing the private conduct of candidates for office, unless it is absolutely necessary. But it becomes absolutely necessary when that private conduct reveals faults of character which would render the candidate unfit for the office to which he aspires. Mr. Fellows is an eloquent man, and, I suppose, a pleasant companion. He may possess other estimable qualities; he may be good yet for many things in this world. But recent revelations have served to illustrate some of his weaknesses, which, in fact, have long been known, and which make him especially unfit for the duties of a public prosecutor. He stands self-confessed as having, after losing a considerable sum of money which he did not possess, in gambling, paid his gambling debt with a note, the payment of which he sought to avoid by pleading in court the law against gambling. He stands self-confessed as having solicited a pecuniary favor from William M. Tweed, the champion public robber and corruptionist of this land—and that immediately after he (Fellows) had left the employment of the prosecuting attorney of this county, and after Tweed's unexampled misdeeds had become clearly known to him.

In private life you would, as a "self-respecting" man, probably leave any one guilty of these things to the society of his boon companions, to the mercy of his creditors and, perhaps, to the attention of the police. As a "self-respecting" business man, who wishes to preserve the good repute of his firm, you would hardly make him your partner or manager, or recommend him to your neighbors for confidential employment. Can you, then, as a "self-

respecting" public man, advise your fellow-citizens to intrust him with almost uncontrollable power over those interests which, at this moment, are to them the dearest—even the good name of the community? As a "self-respecting" mayor of New York, can you ask the people of the city to put the indictment of gamblers at the discretion of a gambler evading the payment of his debts, and the prosecution of bribe-givers and bribe-takers at the mercy of a man who did not blush, when just rising from the study of Tweed's crimes, to beg a pecuniary favor from him who in our history stands as the very embodiment of corruption? Would you thus intrust the honor of the community to one who has confessedly shown that his character lacks the first elements of the sense of honor required in the office of public prosecutor?

Since your "self-respect" would not let you recognize the moral sense of the community which favored Mr. Nicoll, I invite you to contemplate calmly the "self-respect" which you enjoy as the eulogist of the "simple Christian life" and the high character of Mr. Fellows.

And now, do you really think, as your letter seems to intimate, that unless the people elect to the district attorney's office a man who has been capable of trying to escape from his gambling debts under the cover of the very law against gambling, and of begging pecuniary accommodations from the most notorious public thief in the land, your party will be defeated in the Presidential election next year, and that, as you say, "this State will open the Treasury to jobbers and to schemes foreign to the purposes of our Government and to the best interests of our people"? Do not deceive yourself. If the Democratic party has been hurt by anything connected with this struggle about the district attorneyship, it is by the perverseness of some of its leaders, who rejected

the man who most clearly represents at this juncture the cause of justice and good government, and by the nomination of a man whose success would make every rascal in the land rejoice. It is by the blind infatuation which has led these leaders to drag even the National Administration with them into the mire of a bad cause.

What malignant enemy of President Cleveland was it that induced Mr. Cooper to extort from him that most unfortunate letter intermeddling in New York City politics on the side of the typical "dead beat" as a candidate for an office which is the guardian of the public honor? If the President had had a true friend in your councils, that friend would have strained every nerve to confirm his disinclination to descend from the high dignity of his office; that friend would not have failed to remind him of 1882, when the meddling of the National Administration with New York State politics resulted in the most sweeping opposition victory on record; that friend would have struggled to the bitter end against the publication of the President's letter after the new revelations concerning Mr. Fellows's career, in ignorance of which, I have no doubt, that letter was written, and after learning which I trust he would wish it never had been written.

I shall say nothing in extenuation of the fact that the President permitted himself to be so misused. But certain it is that the bitterest enemies of the President and of the Democratic party could not have dealt them a more vicious blow. For more than thirty years I have been an attentive observer of political events, and never, never have I witnessed more wanton recklessness on the part of party leaders, sacrificing the interests and good name of a great municipality, the character of a National Administration, as well as the interests of their party and cause, to their blundering folly or their small selfishness.

No, sir; the injury you and your friends have done to

your party and your cause by the nomination of such a man as Mr. Fellows would not be repaired, but it would be aggravated, by his election. "He serves his party best who serves his country best," and surely the rank and file of your party can, under existing circumstances, do no better service to themselves and to their cause than by showing that, whatever the vagaries of some of their leaders, the masses at least are sound at heart and worthy of confidence.

To the last minute I shall not cease to hope that your true self-respect will reassert itself and draw you away from that side on which, as you well know, you can find to-day every thief, every corruptionist, every law-breaker in New York, including those who have run to Canada—for there is not one of them who does not pray for the election of Mr. Fellows; not one who does not stand in deadly fear of Mr. Nicoll.

But if we cannot be spared the incredible spectacle of the mayor of New York asking the people on the score of "self-respect" to put in the place of public prosecutor a person whose self-confessed and absolute moral unfitness would be an encouragement to the very class to be prosecuted, then, I trust, the citizens of New York will prove self-respecting enough to take care of their own honor by giving an overwhelming majority to a man whose character has stood the test of severest trial, who has made himself a terror to evil-doers, whose election will show that our people really demand honest government, and whom they can exhibit as their choice without shame.

FROM GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS

STATEN ISLAND, NOV. 7, 1887.

My dear Schurz: You never did anything more timely, more conclusive or more patriotic than the letter to Hewitt. It is a great public service.—Always yours.

TO OSCAR S. STRAUS¹

NEW YORK, Feb. 7, 1888.

Your very kind letter of November 15th has had to wait very long for a reply. I shall attempt no apology for you know what New York life is. I am sometimes quite out of patience with it and seriously think of transferring my household to some place in the country.

All I hear from you and about you is so good that as your friend I could hardly wish it better. I have no doubt you will come out of your official trials with honor and bring many pleasant memories home with you. I am not surprised to learn that you do not find much time for literary work. The performance of your official duties, strictly speaking, would probably leave you leisure enough. But it is the nothings of life, that part of social intercourse that does not do anybody any good, to which we have to bring the greatest sacrifices in the way of scattering and frittering away our working power.

Of myself I can only say that I am well and pretty firmly on my feet. I expect to sail for Europe in April, but it is not probable that I shall extend my travels as far as the dominions of the Sultan. When I shall have to return here, I do not know yet; perhaps about midsummer, perhaps later. I have begun another historical work, beginning where the *Life of Henry Clay* ends, in 1852. I intend first to write the history of the political struggles which immediately preceded the civil war; the period from 1852 to 1861, in one or two volumes. And if then I still have work enough in me, I mean to undertake a history of the civil work [war] itself—a political, not a military history. But I must confess that the task rises up before me in such awful proportions as

¹ Then U. S. Minister to Turkey.

to make me doubtful whether I have strength enough to carry it out.

Let me give you in a few words my view of the political situation.

Cleveland's message on the tariff has stirred the country profoundly. It has made him some new friends, but it has frightened others away. On the whole I think it has strengthened him. The question is whether the Democratic party will stand up to its support. If it does and renominates him upon a strong revenue-reform platform, and then makes a vigorous, determined fight, it will, in my opinion, make great gains, especially in the Northwest, as well as in New England, and carry the country.

But will the party stand up? That is not yet certain. There is a faction darkly working against Cleveland under the leadership of Governor Hill, who does not seem to have given up his own Presidential aspirations, of Randall and of Gorman. Their object, if they cannot compass Hill's or Randall's nomination, is at least to prevent Cleveland from getting a two-thirds vote in the Convention. On the other hand the feeling for Cleveland is strong, and the intrigues of his opponents in the party will in all probability be doomed to failure.

It is not so improbable—although I hope it will not be so—that the Democratic party, lacking in courage as well as in intelligence, will compromise on the tariff and, as it has been in the habit of doing, try to persuade people that it is not as dangerous an enemy of the high tariff as the Republicans make it out to be. That would make an apologizing and, therefore, a weak campaign.

On the Republican side Blaine is decidedly in the lead. In my opinion there is but one thing that can prevent his nomination. The protectionists are very much frightened. Their fright may possibly drive them to the conclusion

that they cannot afford to handicap their imperiled interests with a Presidential candidate of bad repute. In that case Blaine may be thrown overboard; in any other case his nomination appears to me certain.

There are four possibilities:

1. Cleveland and Blaine are nominated, and the Democrats adopt a platform in full accord with Cleveland's message. This would, in my opinion, make Cleveland's success sure and fruitful.

2. Cleveland and Blaine are nominated, and the Democrats yield on the tariff issue. This would make a more or less personal campaign with the advantage still decidedly on Cleveland's side.

3. Cleveland and some Republican other than Blaine are nominated, and the Democrats stand by Cleveland's message. I should then still call Cleveland's chances good.

4. Cleveland and some Republican other than Blaine are the candidates, and the Democrats yield on the tariff issue. I should then think the result very doubtful.

A fifth possibility—Cleveland's defeat in the National Convention—I do not contemplate. If such a thing could happen, it would create an entirely new situation, probably fatal to the Democrats.

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TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, March 7, 1888.

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You would like to go with me to Europe? And how glad I should be if you did! The only charm of high office consists in the opportunities it furnishes for doing some service, but its honors are not an equivalent for

its burdens. I for my part thoroughly appreciate the privileges of private station, and have learned to look at public life and its struggles in a contemplative and judicial mood. I do not know whether I could feel the *gaudium certaminis* as I did in times gone by—although, when I read of a speech like that delivered in the Senate by Ingalls a few days ago, I do wish I were on the floor of the Senate once more, if only for twenty-four hours.

The copy of the fisheries treaty which you speak of as having been mailed to me, has not yet arrived. But I have read the treaty in the newspapers. However an unscrupulous party spirit may cry it down, I have no doubt the good sense of the American people will do you justice. They will understand that the settlement of international differences is brought about by mutual accommodation, and that a treaty can be dictated only after a successful war, or by a strong Power to one much weaker, with a threat of war. The “small politician” does, indeed, abound in these days. But he will not be able to control public opinion with regard to international topics.

You are very kind in offering me the hospitality of your house during my prospective Washington visit and I appreciate it highly. But I know better than to quarter myself upon a Cabinet Minister, especially a Secretary of State, who is overburdened with social duties. Moreover I have already promised Henry Adams to be his guest. But I shall report myself to you as soon as I get there and spend as much time with you as you can afford to lose—at least I shall want to do so.

The death of the Kaiser, which is reported this afternoon, may be followed by curious complications. He was a great restraining power in Europe. Your Ministers at Berlin, Petersburg and Vienna will have to keep their eyes and ears open.

EMPEROR WILLIAM I¹

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:—Summoned by the German societies of New York I stand here to give expression to the feelings which have been aroused in us by the death of the first Emperor of the reborn German nation. Not for a promulgation of political creeds are we met. Here I see before me native Americans to whom the German Empire is a foreign land. Even the honored chief of our National Government, members of his council, the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, the governor of our State, the mayor of our city, and more, the father of American history, as well as other lights of science, are, if not in person, at least with their expressed sympathies, here present. And as to us German-born: I see here the strict republican, and by his side the man who in his native land was an equally strict monarchist. I see here survivors of those who, after the year 1848, after unsuccessful struggles for honest convictions, sought the shores of the New World as refugees, hardly believing then a day could come when, without breaking faith with themselves—for a self-respecting man does not hesitate to be truthful and just—they would unite with the younger generation in the funeral cortège of one of the princes who had sent them into exile. Before you stands one of them, who lost many friends under the iron hand of the Prince now mourned, and who himself escaped from that iron hand with difficulty and peril.

But whatever may be our origin and our antecedents, here we are assembled as citizens of the great American Republic, to which belongs our faithful devotion. We remember well the old and wise rule of this Republic

¹ A eulogy delivered in German at the memorial service in New York City, March 21, 1888. The translation published in the *New York Times*, March 22, 1888, has been revised by the Misses Schurz.

never to meddle with the affairs of the Old World, even though as American citizens we are permitted to take a warm interest in the destinies of the peoples from whom we sprang or to whom we are bound in sympathy. This mourning service, thousands of miles from the country which has been ruled by the scepter of the departed Emperor, has therefore nothing of the perfunctory tribute of allegiance which the subject is wont to pay to his sovereign. Neither do we speak the language in which that allegiance traditionally expresses itself. The universal and free expression of opinion here indicates how genuine is the feeling expressed in Germany; and our simpler words carried across the sea are evidence of the mourning that is there expressed in more formal speech. A common sorrow makes the whole world kin.

This is, indeed, a rare manifestation. How many kings have died in this century whose death did not elicit more sympathy in America than any ordinary event of general interest! Why, then, this general emotion after Kaiser Wilhelm's death? Why these flags at half-mast, these eloquent eulogies, this universal impulse to lay a wreath upon the dead Kaiser's grave? He was certainly no republican. Forty years ago he helped to suppress with relentless power the revolutionary insurrections the spirit of which found almost undivided approval in America. His severe assertions of princely authority by divine right, his principles as to the share of the will of the people in the government, his preference given to the military element in the organism of State were more than foreign to American ideas. The development of constitutional forms in Germany under his dominion appeared to American ways of thinking little in harmony with the spirit of this century and the civilization of the German people. Not a few of his measures of government suffered the severest criticism from Americans. These

things would have sufficed in determining the judgment passed upon any other prince. But with all this Kaiser Wilhelm was by far the most popular monarch among Americans whom this century has seen, aye, even more, a truly popular man.

We all know the reason. Under his auspices was satisfied that profound yearning which the German had carried in his heart through so many years of misfortune and humiliation, the yearning to be once more a united and great people. Thus he was at the same time a King and a popular leader. In indelible characters his name is written upon the monument which in the history of the world marks the rebirth of a great nation. Like a heroic poem appeared this tremendous event which our times witnessed with amazement and upon which posterity will look back with wonder. And this heroic poem tells of the warrior King, as he, the snow of old age upon his head, surrounded by his paladins, in the midst of his armed people led his armies into the field and piled victory upon victory; how he then came home adorned with the imperial dignity as the emblem of the finally united and now powerful and glorious nation, and how he, centuries hence, will live in the history and legends of the German people, like Frederick Barbarossa, a figure standing in dim, mythical splendor.

This was Kaiser Wilhelm who, when the one great deed had illumined all his past, entered into the heart of the Germans, as a national hero, crowned with victory, whom this heart with German fidelity and gratitude held and cherished as an honored national patriarch, whose joys and sorrows, hopes and cares, the people felt as their own; whose wishes were seldom crossed without regret; before whose window day after day the multitudes assembled to catch one more look of his countenance, and to cheer his old eyes with signs of attachment; whose

venerable image even during his life, similar to the old legend, exercised its charm far beyond the German boundaries until, at last, the heavy burden of years brought him to the grave. And when at that grave it is said that no future Emperor will bear the crown of the Empire as his equal it is true in a sense of profound significance.

This does, indeed, not mean that no successor may equal or even surpass him in mental power, for his gifts were not those of genius; but he did possess the gift invaluable in a ruler—a gift of mind and of character at the same time—to perceive with a clear eye the genius, the wisdom and the energy of others, to accommodate himself with modesty to the superiority of others, and to open to them the sphere of action and of glory, aye, without jealousy to see the merit of others under his orders placed, in the opinion of the world, above his own. In September, 1870, after the battle of Sedan, he offered in the circle of his faithful ones, but heard by the whole civilized world, this toast: "We must to-day drink the health of my brave army. You, Minister of War von Roon, have sharpened the sword; you, General von Moltke, have wielded it, and you, Count Bismarck, have lifted Prussia to the present altitude of its power through the conduct of its policy." Well, and if Roon, Moltke and Bismarck had done all this, for which King William expressed to them his gratitude, before all the world, what then remained for King William himself? The merit of having brought to light and of having given free scope to the statesmanlike genius of Bismarck, the organizing genius of Roon and the military genius of Moltke; the merit of that sound sense which, sacrificing pride and prejudice, puts those more capable into action and encourages them to the highest exertion of their power; the merit of that unselfishness which is so often lacking in

the powerful, which permitted him to say after an achieved success to Bismarck, Roon and Moltke: "This is your work." This made him neither a great statesman nor a great general, but it made him a successful ruler and a capable head of a government doing great deeds. However, this quality of mind and character has by no means been without example in the house of Hohenzollern, and not on this account can it be said that Kaiser Wilhelm will not have his equal on the imperial throne of Germany.

He stands alone and his position will always be unique as the link which binds together the old time and the new. His childhood saw the deepest humiliation of the fatherland. With his mother, the noble Louise, Prussia's Regina Dolorosa, he was compelled to fly from the capital conquered by Napoleon. The French Empire, which had crushed Prussia and subjugated Germany, was to him not a mere foreign state, but the product of revolutionary ideas. He, like all those around him, saw the salvation of his country only in a strong military power ever ready to oppose hostile armies, and in an unlimited royal power with which to suppress revolutionary ideas. These were the traditions of his house, these were the prevailing views of his time, the only ones with which he came in touch. Under their exclusive influence he grew up. Thus his principles and conceptions of duty formed themselves, and to those principles and conceptions of duty he has held fast all the days of his life. Like the other Princes of his house, he, as a boy, became a soldier, but more of a soldier than the others. His soldier-like zeal for service and the article of creed that the King according to his will must care for the welfare of the people, and that every subject owes obedience to the King, filled his whole horizon. As a youth he saw how the promises of representative institutions, which had been given in the year 1813 in the days of the popular insurrection

against the Napoleonic despotism, remained unfulfilled because they would have been dangerous—dangerous to public order, which to him meant the same thing as the unlimited power of the King. As a man he found himself face to face with the revolutionary movements of the years 1848 and 1849, to which again the French Revolution had given the immediate impulse. The soldier, the first subject of the King, as he called himself, knew of no other duty than to strike down insurrections with armed force. Thus he went into the field and with severity he did his work.

At last the day came when he himself mounted the throne and with his own hand put upon his head the crown “given him by God.” That was to him no mere traditional form of speech—it was in him a deep-rooted religious conviction. The years of revolutionary movement had indeed resulted in a constitution, but the most essential part of all constitutions was to the King the least possible limitation of his power. It was his honest, aye, his pious faith, that God had made him King and ordained him to govern his people according to the best of his knowledge and conscience and that it was the duty of the representatives of the people simply to help him in doing so; that he would violate his own sacred duty if he permitted any essential part of the kingly power bestowed on him by God to escape him, and that those who would undertake to curtail the power of the monarch would be culpable of a revolt against God’s commandment. His army was to him the sword of the Lord, the shield of the order of the universe, and of all human obligations he perhaps knew of none more sacred than the oath of fidelity sworn to the colors. The servant of the state was according to his mind not irresponsible, but politically responsible only to the monarch. Irresponsible he did not feel even himself, but responsible only to God and his own

conscience. This was his constitutionalism—a constitutionalism certainly little in harmony with the constitutional ideas of other countries, but by no means sprung from the lust of power of a despotic nature.

Indeed no greater contrast can be imagined than that between Kaiser Wilhelm and the typical despot who, despising and oppressing the people, squanders the marrow of the land in lazy, luxurious extravagance. His life was one of such frugal simplicity that the millionaires of this country would do well to follow his example. As a boy he had made a vow at the time of his confirmation in church in which the following sentences are found: "I will never forget that the Prince is also a man and that he also is subject to the universal laws. I will cultivate a sincere, cordial benevolence to all men, even the lowliest, for they are my brothers. I esteem it much higher to be loved than to be feared, or merely to have a princely authority." This was not a mere youthful idealism, evaporating quickly. He had a warm heart for the people, and this it was that brought him so near to the people's heart. Many of the plans of legislation to better the condition of the laboring man probably sprang from this source. He had a profound feeling for the sufferings of the poor. Deputations telling him of want and misery often drew tears from his eyes. The proud Hohenzoller, the unbending soldier, the severe champion of kingly power, the unforgiving suppressor of insurrections, the fame-crowned warrior King felt a real yearning to be personally popular. This was not a mere princely whim nor was it cold calculation. It was a trait of his heart. It was natural to him to give pleasure even to strangers whom he met, by a friendly greeting; he loved to show himself, to satisfy the wish of the multitudes who daily assembled before his window, but also to rejoice at the signs of attachment which he received. If this multitude

had disappeared, as a symptom of indifference or antipathy, it would have been a blow to his heart.

No prince could have taken the duties of governing more seriously than the Kaiser himself. No blacksmith at his anvil, no peasant on his acres, no merchant in his counting-room could have devoted himself to his business more conscientiously, more indefatigably, more industriously than Kaiser Wilhelm worked in his government business. To concern himself with everything, great and small, to look into everything, to manage everything, or at least to help in conducting, was to him a stern command of duty, and he who looks for an illustration of that which is called in the Prussian idiom "service" will find it in Kaiser Wilhelm's daily life. Into his last clear moments, even into the feverish dreams of the hours of his death, the thought of his official duties pursued him, and with the voice of a dying man he gave to his successor his counsels on the great interests of his country. "I have no more time to be tired," he said when he felt the last hour coming. But in his whole life he had given himself little time to be tired.

Not only the welfare of his own people, but also the peace of Europe he bore upon his shoulders. No opinion could be more mistaken than that, after the achievement of German unity, the Kaiser and his mighty Chancellor had wished for further conquests or new feats of arms. The Germans are a military but not a war-loving people. The German army is the whole people in arms, and such an army is not led into the field with a light mind. The Danish, the Austrian and the French wars were preparatory to the foundation of German national unity, and thus was this great problem of the time solved. The united Germany is the guardian of the peace of Europe. Without exaggeration it may be said that it has prevented more wars than it has carried on. How great in that

respect was the merit of the Chancellor the world knows, but it knows also how the old Kaiser himself, with restless care and zeal and in personal meetings and conversation, made his friendly relations with other monarchs of Europe tell for the peace of the Continent. And it is certain that the restraining words of the friendly and powerful old man not seldom fell heavily in the scale.

Thus he has in internal and foreign policies endeavored to perform, with personal care and zealous activity, that kingly duty which, together with the kingly power, he felt imposed upon him by God. This conception of monarchical power and duty was his political religion, to which he held fast with the strong pious faith of his nature and which he professed always with full sincerity. To those principles he stood with open visor, and the glory of this great national policy of his government and the hearty attachment of the people to the old father on the imperial throne helped him mightily to maintain them. It is therefore less astonishing that under his reign the development of constitutional methods did not make more progress, than that it has progressed so far. He stepped from the old time into the new, representing the spirit of the old time in its most successful, most venerable, most winning form.

The patriarch is departed, and with him the prestige of the patriarchal régime. There can be no second patriarch like him. When after that wonderful career from misfortune and humiliation to highest power, magnificent fame and almost unexampled popularity the old Kaiser at last closed his eyes forever, there appeared a spectacle such as the world had not seen in centuries. Not only the funeral pomp was extraordinary; not only did all the powers of Europe gather around his bier, even France, once so grievously struck by his hand, bringing a wreath to adorn it; but more than this: all

civilized peoples on earth, as if surprised by an event expected for years, turned their eyes to the German capital with cordial sympathy, but also with almost anxious expectation, and everywhere the question was asked, "What now?" Almost universal was the thought: "What is here being consigned to the grave is more than a great historic personality, it is the strongest pillar of a historic idea of government." So the whole world attended this funeral cortège with the feeling of awe by which man is touched in the face of a stupendous event.

An unusually universal and heartfelt sympathy turns to the old Kaiser's successor. The name "Our Fritz," which Kaiser William first pronounced and which the German people adopted with enthusiasm, has resounded through the world as the name of a popular favorite; and in him who bore it, people saw a Prince who was closer to the ways of thinking and feeling of the citizen than princes ordinarily are. With profound feeling has all civilized mankind lamented his terrible suffering and with their whole hearts wished him recovery and a long life. With the same feeling it watches his effort, in the uncertain days through which he struggles with his disease, to impress the stamp of his own mind upon the great inheritance Kaiser William leaves him.

Great, indeed, is this inheritance. Few as great have been left by princes to posterity. May a benign fate protect it. He who attentively contemplates the life of states and nations during long periods learns to be careful not to pass too dogmatic a judgment upon the past and not to conceive plans and expectations too sanguine for the future. He knows that new creations in order to stand firm must be built upon that which is vital, strong and durable in the past. He knows that historical developments do not, without danger of relapse,

move forward by great leaps; but he knows also that they do not stand still.

In obedience to the law to which all earthly things are subject, the inheritance left by Kaiser William will have further to develop itself in order to be in accord with the character and the needs of the time. Nobody will dare to say that he looks clearly into the future. But one thing appears certain, the new German Empire, which honors Emperor William as its father and its first head, will stand all the firmer the more it can say of itself that it has created what is the true aim and end of all government—a people united, strong and happy in liberty, peace and progress.

TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, March 29, 1888.

I begin to fear now that I shall not find time to go to Washington before my departure for Europe. The request I intended to make orally, comes therefore to you in writing. Considering myself completely retired from active public life, I am going to undertake a literary work of some magnitude. I purpose to write a political history of the civil war—beginning with the election of Pierce in 1852; and as our international relations played a very important part in the history of that period, I wish, if such a thing is possible, to get access to the state archives of several foreign Governments, especially those of England, France, Spain, Belgium and Holland. Now I would ask you whether you would consider it consistent with your official responsibilities to give me letters to the United States Ministers in those countries, requesting them to aid me to that end with their influence as much as their relations with the Governments to which they are accredited will conveniently permit? I do not know

whether such a thing can be done, but I thought I might at least try. If you think it cannot be done, do not hesitate to tell me so. I know your friendship too well to doubt your willingness to serve me, under any circumstances. I need not add that, in case it can be done, I shall use the privilege accorded to me with the utmost discretion. It is my ambition to make that historical work worthy of its subject, and thus to render a little service to the American people.

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TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, April 3, 1888.

Accept my heartfelt thanks for that gorgeous passport and the very kind letters of recommendation. I have no doubt they will help me greatly if anything can be done at all.¹

I thank you also for the kind things you say of my little speech on the dead Kaiser. It has not been printed in pamphlet form, and I must confess, I do not know why it should be, as it is a mere ephemeral. There was a good deal of curiosity here as to what I, an old "forty-eighter," would have to say about an Emperor, and about the very man, too, who in South Germany commanded the Prussian troops against us, and who was at that period the best hated of all the German princes. The curious people found to their surprise how easy it is to overcome such an apparent embarrassment of situation, by simply telling the truth.

If I can do anything for you in Europe, please let me know. . . . I do not expect to be back before the latter part of September,—unless the Republicans nominate

¹About getting access to foreign archives.

Blaine again. His election would be so burning a disgrace, so unmitigated a calamity to this Republic, that to help in averting it I should hurry to the front once more.

TO COUNT DÖNHOF¹

HEIMFELDER HOLZ, near HARBURG,
May 18, 1888.

Will you permit me, dear Count, to consider you as my confidential friend in the great world of Berlin and to encroach upon your time for a moment? Last week I found a notice in a Hamburg paper which referred to a report published in Frankfort about some remarks said to have been made by Prince Bismarck to "two prominent men from abroad." This notice speaks also of a denial published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. The reporter of the New York *Herald*, who called upon me here a few days later, told me that he had heard from the banker Bleichröder that I had been indicated as one of these "prominent men" and also that the words attributed to the Prince had been made use of for purposes of speculation on the bourse. Hereupon I tried to procure the originals of the Frankfort paper and of the answer in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. I have received these articles, and at the same time an explanation purporting to come from me, which appeared in the Frankfort *Europäische Correspondenz*.

All these things were entirely new to me. I have not yet the faintest conception what may be the source of these Frankfort publications. In America, where, by the way, the journalistic spirit of invention is scarcely more developed than here, I have learned to treat similar things with indifference. I would do the same now, if this case were not a rather serious matter for me. The

¹ Translated by Miss Schurz.

article of the *Norddeutsche Allegemeine Zeitung*, which is generally supposed to be inspired by the Chancellor, and the wording of which I now see for the first time, gives rise to the supposition that the "unnamed men in the background" may be equally responsible with the reporter for the report circulated about the remarks of the Prince. As it seems that I am regarded as one of these "men in the background," you may well imagine how painfully this affair affects me. As it happens, you yourself have accidentally been a witness of the circumspection with which I have treated the newspaper correspondents with whom I came in contact, and you know how anxious I have been not to commit any indiscretion. If I should have reason to believe that the friendliness with which I was honored by these eminent persons might now be regretted by them as misplaced cordiality and might, in a more or less direct way, be publicly so considered—this would of course be in the highest degree painful to me.

May I ask you, who move familiarly in the social as well as the political circles of the Prince, to tell me how, in your opinion, the matter has been there regarded and what view I am to take of it? If I am imposing too much upon your friendly sentiments, have the goodness to tell me so frankly. But you will understand how much I desire this explanation.

The reporter has played me another trick. A newspaper notice is circulating now that I have personally requested the Crown Prince to intervene in the Techow affair.¹ Of course there is not a word of truth in it. May I ask you, by the way, if anything new has come to your notice about this case? Mr. Rottenburg was so kind as to let me hope that I should be informed if anything could be done. But I have not yet heard anything.

¹ Techow was an old '48er who had applied for amnesty so that he might return to Germany, but the application was refused.

TO L. S. METCALF

HANS FORSTECK, KIEL, GERMANY,
Aug. 13, 1888.

I have received your cable message and answer it by letter, as I cannot put all I wish to say into a telegraphic despatch.

The friendly contact I have had with Prince Bismarck and other German statesmen, while on the one hand giving me much information about German affairs, has on the other hand greatly embarrassed me in writing out my experiences and views for publication. They have spoken to me with such frankness and confidence that I feel myself under great restraint. No sooner had my interviews with Prince Bismarck got into the papers than I was flooded with requests to write about them. One newspaper offered me as much as five hundred dollars for one single column; another one hundred dollars each for a series of letters on German affairs which I might make as long or as short as I pleased. And so on. Whatever of temptation there might have been in such offers, I resisted for the very reason above suggested. When the requests were repeated with increased urgency, I replied to one and all that I would certainly not write anything about German affairs until after my return to the United States, if at all. And I have not written a line for publication, accordingly.

When I shall be in New York again I cannot yet tell. For the last six weeks my eldest son has been in a private hospital here suffering from a dangerous illness. . . .

FROM THADDEUS C. POUND¹

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1888.

Dear Sir: May I not, with propriety, address you concerning the political situation in your adopted country? We

¹ Formerly lieutenant-governor of Wisconsin, and Republican Representative in Congress.

occupied common ground in 1884, both disagreeing with the action of our party's National Convention, and both conspicuously, and I believe potentially, opposing the election of Mr. Blaine for substantially the same reasons. The result of that contest is now an open book, the preface of which promised better than the later pages disclose. So long as the hero was a freeman, he satisfied the independent citizen, but when taken captive by partisan masters and personal ambition for a second term, he suddenly dropped to the low level of the Democratic party and its most offensive partisan methods.

The Republican party, with which I have never broken allegiance, has just held its Convention, and nominated fit and worthy candidates for President and Vice-President. The issues, or the distinctive issue presented for the campaign is sharply defined. I am squarely for Harrison and Morton, and believe you capable of no different attitude. No man can do more to promote the success of the Republican ticket than you. I want to see you in the saddle, and bid you hasten to recross the ocean and take the field. The battle is to be one of reason and not of noise and bluster. I feel sure of the reinstatement of the Republican party to executive control on a higher plane of political and public morals than that towards which it was drifting in 1884. May I promise your speedy return and earnest coöperation?

TO THADDEUS C. POUND

FORSTECK, KIEL, Sept. 15, 1888.

Your letter from Washington asking me to "recross the ocean and take the field" for Mr. Harrison reached me some time ago. Being detained here longer than I anticipated by circumstances with which our Presidential election has nothing to do, I can only communicate to you in writing the views which would govern my course in the pending campaign could I return home in season. I do so after having calmly considered the subject far away from the excitements of the struggle.

In condemning the concessions to the spoils element in the Democratic party made by President Cleveland in violation of his own original program, I go as far as his severest critic among the friends of reform. With my experience of public life, I cannot join in any of the excuses or palliations which have been offered for them. I do not think, for instance, that, had he unflinchingly done those things which he had given the country reason to expect of him, he would have been a "President without a party." The American people love that manly courage which, in keeping good faith and in righting wrongs, does not shrink from defying great odds. The spectacle of a President telling his party friends that neither flattery nor threats could tempt him to abandon a single iota of his word, either in letter or spirit, would have stirred the noblest impulses of the American heart. His very enemies would have been compelled to do homage to the intrepidity of his rectitude. The party organization, seeing that it could not command him, would have been obliged to follow his leadership, for it could not have sacrificed such a President without ruining itself. He might indeed have lost the support of some of its worst elements, but he would have gained on the other side the full confidence and aid of a much larger number of patriotic men who stood ready, without regard to political antecedents, to rally around a thoroughgoing reformer. His party would then have been morally as well as numerically stronger than it is to-day. This, I think, would have been the result; but even if such expectations had not been entirely fulfilled, certain it is that by the example of such conduct President Cleveland would have rendered a far greater service to the cause of healthy politics and good government in America than by anything else he has done or could have done.

In view of the departures from the standards set up by

himself, the extent and significance of which have, perhaps, not fully come to President Cleveland's own consciousness, I can well understand the feelings and reasoning of those of our independent friends who, after having supported Mr. Cleveland in 1884, now, on account of his failings as a civil service reformer, oppose his reelection. I am very far from questioning the sincerity of their motives when they argue that such shortcomings should not be permitted to pass with impunity. But I differ from them in answering the important question, whether, if they succeeded in punishing Mr. Cleveland, they would not at the same time punish the country still more.

The main consideration is, after all, how the public interest in the largest sense can be best served. Concerning administrative reform, we have seen enough of political life to know that, as to their devotion to the spoils system, there is no difference between the working politicians in the Republican and those in the Democratic party. Both will occasionally yield to a demand for reform from fear, or to make political capital, or shout for it when in opposition; but both hate it at heart and will exert their whole influence against it whenever they feel at liberty to do so. There are exceptions, but not many, on either side. It is true, a larger number of friends of reform have been associated with the Republicans than with the Democrats. But nobody will pretend that they control the nominations or the actual policy of the party. It was, no doubt, owing to the pressure of Democratic partisans that President Cleveland practically gave up a very important portion of his reform program. So it had, no doubt, been owing to the pressure of Republican partisans that President Grant in his time threw overboard the whole system, examination, rules and all. And it is certain that the efforts President Cleveland really did make in the way of reform found no counte-

nance among Republican politicians. It is equally certain that a Republican victory now would be followed by a "clean sweep," with all that the term implies, involving not only all Democratic officeholders, good and bad, outside of the classified service, but the Republicans left in office by President Cleveland, too, as Republicans who consented to remain in place under a Democratic Administration are especially hateful to Republican politicians.

Is it reasonable to expect that Mr. Harrison, if elected, would oppose such a "clean sweep" with greater courage and firmness than was shown by Mr. Cleveland? Mr. Harrison is, in point of personal character, no doubt vastly preferable to Mr. Blaine. But neither his professions nor his antecedents stamp him as a man who would resist the demands of the influential politicians of his party. He would on the contrary, to the extent of his power, meet them, as he asked his demands to be met under a previous Republican Administration. The cause of civil service reform would, therefore, have to hope rather less from Mr. Harrison than from Mr. Cleveland.

But, if I rightly understand the attitude of the Republican party, it is really Mr. Blaine, not Mr. Harrison, whom we are invited to put into power. Mr. Blaine is vociferously proclaimed, not only as the "greatest statesman," as the "real leader of the Republican party," but also as the "Premier," the "head of the Republican Administration" that is to be. That Mr. Harrison's Administration shall be under Mr. Blaine's control seems to be taken for granted, without any conspicuous dissent. Mr. Harrison is so pointedly consigned to the rôle of second man that his position as a candidate appears grotesque in the extreme. It is an entirely new thing in our Constitutional history that one person is to be elected President of the United States for the very purpose

of permitting the Presidential power to be wielded by another.

Such an innovation would appear in the highest degree objectionable, even if a better man than Mr. Blaine were to be the beneficiary. But as it is Mr. Blaine himself, I am reminded of what you say to me in your letter: "We occupied common ground in 1884, both conspicuously, and, I believe, potentially, opposing the election of Mr. Blaine, for substantially the same reasons." Those reasons I then elaborately explained to the public, and they need not be recapitulated. They were sincerely believed in and are as valid now as they were then. What has happened since is certainly not calculated to weaken them. Those who acted with us in 1884 upon sincere motives can hardly deem it safe or creditable to the American people now to invest with the power of "head of the Administration" the same man whom they repudiated four years ago, and whom this year the prudent men of his party would have feared to nominate under his own name. I do not know whether it would not, in some respects, be safer on the whole to make him President in name as well as in fact, than to put him in control of a President's power without a President's responsibility. We have had a feeble indication of the consequences of such a state of things during the few months of General Garfield's Presidency, which ended with his tragic death. The American people, I should think, have had enough of that. But if the Republican party wishes to bring on the full development and fruition of that sort of government, my vote shall certainly not contribute to such a result.

Neither am I frightened by the Republican campaign cry that if Mr. Cleveland be reelected, the industries of the country will surely be ruined and general distress follow. Let me recall to you some historical facts. As

you are well aware, it was not the tariff question which drove the Independents from the Republican party in 1884. But then the tariff policy of the party was professedly not what it is now. For many years it was freely admitted by the Republicans that the tariff, originally intended to meet the financial needs of the war period, and adapted to a very different internal-revenue system, was full of unjust and offensive features, and that it must be revised and reduced in its rates. One Republican platform after another, one Republican President after another, one Republican Secretary of the Treasury after another, joined in this admission. There is scarcely a Republican leader of note who did not advocate revision and reduction at some time and in some way. A tariff commission appointed under the very last Republican Administration and containing the most pronounced Republican protectionists strongly recommended an average reduction of tariff rates of 20 to 25 per cent., as demanded by the public interest. This was the teaching we heard in the Republican school. But now, when the Democrats attempt to do in a very moderate way what the Republicans had for years been promising to do, we are told that, unless this attempt be stopped, the country will go to ruin. The very men who constantly declaim about the "magnificent past" of the Republican party, give us to understand that if the policy of tariff reduction advocated during that "magnificent past" by Republican platforms and statesmen had been carried out, distress and misery would have been the lot of the American people.

It is a singular spectacle. For years we have been told that, indeed, high protective duties were necessary while our manufacturing industries were in the feeble infant state, but that the protective duties would be less needed as the manufacturing industries grew older and stronger. Yet the more those industries cease to be

infants, the older and stronger they grow, the more strenuously the Republican party insists that the high duties must be maintained or even raised. And finally it informs us in this year's platform that "rather than surrender *any part* of the protective system," it will wipe out the taxes on tobacco and whisky—taxes of the most rational character, for they are in the truest sense voluntarily paid on things that are not necessities of life, and one of which, the whisky tax, Thomas Jefferson, notwithstanding his hostility to excises, recognized as a tax of sanitary value in a moral as well as physical respect. Would not, but a few years ago, a proposition completely to abolish the whisky tax have encountered the almost unanimous opposition of the Republican party?

But more. It was the custom of the Republican party to pledge itself in its platforms that the Government should be administered with strict economy. The platform of this year omits this pledge, and recommends the liberal spending of the public money for a variety of subjects. What this means is easily understood. There is a large surplus in the Treasury. That surplus is constantly increased by a revenue far exceeding the current needs of the Government. Such a surplus, constantly growing, is by every sensible man recognized as a public danger. It not only withdraws from business channels the money required for active circulation, but its very existence always breeds jobbery and corruption. Everybody knows that. How get rid of it? Common-sense would say that if our taxes yield too much revenue, let us promptly reduce our taxes, first those which are most irrational and burdensome to the people. But the Republican party tells us—rather than reduce the tariff, rather than surrender any part of the protective system, let ever so much more revenue than we need be raised, and let us spend the money liberally in whatever way we can. In

fact, we begin to hear the idea of an economical administration of the Government rather jeeringly spoken of as a picayunish, narrow-minded policy. No true friend of the country can witness such a tendency without serious concern. A democratic government which constantly raises a much larger revenue than it needs for an economical administration, and then embarks in lavish expenditures for the sake of spending the surplus—that government is in a very bad way. Such a practice, some time continued, will produce a carnival of rascality in our public affairs compared with which the Tweed régime in New York will appear like white innocence and virtue. Such a practice, raised to the dignity of a system, would be the moral ruin of the Republic.

When I thus see the Republican party sacrifice the professions and pledges of its better days—sacrifice the often repeated promise to reduce the tariff—sacrifice the whisky tax which but yesterday the Republican party would have almost unanimously scorned to abolish—sacrifice the idea of an economical administration of government so essential to the morals of a democratic republic—when I see it ready to sacrifice everything “rather than surrender *any part* of the protective system,” I am forced to the conclusion that the Republican party has fallen completely under the control of selfish, grasping interests, in which the spirit of monopoly is running mad.

The very arguments currently used in aid of that policy are calculated to make one distrustful of the cause they are to support. How in the world can anybody have the face to say that the Mills bill would destroy the protective system and thereby the industries of the country—the Mills bill, which proposes tariff reductions much smaller than those proposed time and again by Republicans high in authority, in fact averaging considerably less than those recommended by the Republican and protectionist

Tariff Commission! The Mills bill, which, if enacted into a law, would still leave behind it one of the highest protective tariffs the world has ever seen—aye, a higher tariff than was designed under the stress of our civil war!

Equally astonishing is the argument that, if the danger is not in the Mills bill itself, it is in the spirit animating it, in the principles embodied in President Cleveland's tariff message. What are those principles? That "the necessities of life used and consumed by all the people, the duty on which adds to the cost of living in every home, should be greatly cheapened"; and that "the duties on raw material used in manufactures" should be "radically reduced" or abolished. Against the second part of this proposition the Republican party makes its open war. According to them, the free importation of raw material is to destroy the protective system and with it our industries. No more self-evidently fallacious assertion has ever been advanced. It will make Henry Clay, the greatest champion of the protective policy this country has ever had, turn in his grave; for it was he who said: "There are four modes by which the industry of the country can be protected, and one of them is the admission, free of duty, of every article which aids the operations of the manufacturers." Nothing could be plainer. The recognition of this truth is as old as common-sense. It has not been confined to "free-trade theorists," but been wisely embodied in many protective tariffs. That our tariff has not recognized it is one of its peculiarly irrational features, for it is in a great measure owing to the artificial enhancement of the price of the raw material that the products of American manufactures have not been more successful in competing with those of other nations in the markets of the world.

It is one of the curiosities of this campaign, that, as I notice in the papers, some Republican protectionists

speaking and writing as if the successful competition of American manufactures in the foreign market were neither attainable nor even very desirable to be striven for. As to its being attainable, we know that we already sell abroad manufactured articles in the production of which the ingenuity and superior efficiency of American workmanship overbalances the disadvantages under which American industry labors on account of the higher cost of what Henry Clay calls "the articles which aid the operations of the manufacturers." It is self-evident that, the more these disadvantages be removed, the more will the superior ingenuity and productiveness of American labor get a fair field, the greater will be the variety and quantity of American manufactures sold in the foreign market and the more promising will be the development of our industries. There are many foreign manufacturers who appreciate this keenly. While theoretical economists abroad, of course, applaud every movement in the economic policy of the United States which they consider as emanating from sound principles, I know, from personal observation, that European manufacturers who understand their business look forward with grave apprehension to the time when American industry will be relieved of the clogs which now hamper it and enter the markets of the world to compete with them. They know well that the competition of American ingenuity and energy, untrammelled by artificial shackles, will be to them of all competitions the most formidable. They are right; for competition in the foreign market, the rubbing against the world on every field, will tend to stimulate and develop to the highest potency the peculiar strength of American industry, which consists in its inventive genius, productive energy and skill of hand. The more advantageously these great qualities come into play, the more successful will American industry be. Necessity is the mother of in-

vention, competition the stimulus of energy. Both invention and energy will gradually relax under a system which, while promising artificial protection on the one hand, creates artificial obstacles on the other. Let those obstacles be removed, let American inventive genius and productive energy enter the struggle with the outside world on fair terms—in the first place with raw material as free to us as it is to others—and you will open a most fruitful field of activity to the strongest forces of the national character.

That our manufacturing industries should be enabled to enter the foreign market is especially important to our laboring men. The mechanical appliances now existing in the United States are in some branches of industry already sufficient to produce in seven or eight months as much as the home market will consume in twelve. Periodical stagnations in those branches must be the result. As the laboring man well knows, it is of the highest consequence to him, not only to be well paid while employed, but to be constantly employed. He will also without difficulty understand that the more limited the market is, the more easily will it be glutted, and the more subject will industry be to periodical stagnation; and that, on the other hand, the wider the market is for the products of labor, the more constant will be its employment.

Nothing could be more amusingly audacious than the efforts made by Republicans to persuade the American workingman that his wages depend absolutely on the maintenance of our tariff, and that American labor will be repressed to the level of "the pauper labor of Europe" if we "surrender any part of our protective system." Republican speeches and papers fairly teem with comparisons of wages in the United States and wages in England, to show the effect of the protective tariff in one country and of free trade in the other. I shall not here inquire

into the correctness of those comparisons; but, assuming them to be correct, what do they prove? That it is the tariff which makes wages higher in America, and the absence of a tariff which makes them lower in England? As everybody knows, wages range higher in free-trade England than in protectionist Germany. Now, if it is true that wages depend upon the tariff, then free trade must have caused higher wages in England, and wages in Germany must have been depressed by protection. Or, if we assume that wages range higher in England than in Germany, somehow, in spite of English free trade, may it not be said with equal justice that wages range higher in America than in England, somehow, in spite of American protection?

The discussion has its humors. In an article on "Wages and the Tariff," published by one of the foremost champions of the present protective system (New York *Tribune*, August 14th), the following statements occur: "The competition of foreign labor is felt in many branches of manufacture in England. They are not protected against the competition of inferior classes of foreign labor who earn less and live in greater wretchedness than themselves." But where are those "inferior classes of foreign labor who earn less and live in greater wretchedness" to be found? In such countries as Germany, France and Belgium, countries which have protective tariffs. Thus, while we are told that in high-tariff America workingmen must be protected against the pauper labor of free-trade England, we are also told that the workingmen of free-trade England must be protected against the pauper labor of the high-tariff countries on the European continent.

If it is true that wages in one country which has a protective tariff are higher than wages in another country which has free trade, and also that wages are higher in the country which has free trade than in several other

countries which have protective tariffs, it cannot possibly be true that the relative rates of wages are determined by the existence or non-existence of a protective tariff system. The Republican argument that, if the tariff be disturbed, the wages of American workingmen must fall in consequence, is thus clearly set at naught by notorious facts.

I shall not theorize upon the wages question, but simply mention the further facts, that such a measure as the removal of duties from raw materials has never resulted in a reduction of wages; that wages in the United States considerably rose during the low-tariff period from 1846 to 1861; that wages have also risen since that time, but most in the unprotected industries, and that wages in England have risen since the beginning of the free-trade period between twenty and one hundred and fifty per cent. Tariff protection is therefore not at all a condition *sine qua non* of a rise in wages. Moreover, every candid and reflecting observer understands that in the United States the rate of wages is largely affected by the abundance of fertile, cheap and easily accessible lands and an almost infinite variety of natural resources offering labor, ample opportunity and reward; that American industrial labor is distinguished by a superior inventive genius, skill and productive energy which make it intrinsically more valuable than foreign labor; that, in other words, the American workingman earns more than the workingman of the old world, because he generally produces more; and that the American rate of wages will not only be maintained, but will have the best chance of being increased, if American industry be given a larger field of operation by relieving it of those impediments which in a great measure exclude it from the markets of the world.

It is avowedly the Republican plan of campaign to frighten the public mind with a picture of a destructive collapse of our manufacturing industries and of the

national prosperity in case the policy advocated by President Cleveland in his tariff message be approved by the people. That this collapse should be brought on by giving our industries what a prudent protective system would always have given them—free raw material—is so absurd in itself that I greatly doubt whether those who make the prediction themselves believe in it. Such a breakdown might follow a sudden and sweeping abolition of all our tariff duties, which I am sure nobody contemplates. I do think, however, that if there is any danger of it, it will be, not in consequence of the Democratic, but of the Republican policy.

Nothing is more apt to produce sudden and strong revulsions in public opinion than a defiantly selfish attitude on the part of a privileged and powerful interest in the community. That "the manufacturers of the United States are most directly benefited by our tariff laws," that they are "getting practically the sole benefit, or at least the most directly important benefits" of them and that in consequence they "make large fortunes every year when times are prosperous," profits indeed in some cases exceeding all bounds, is an admission which in unguarded moments will escape Republican leaders. Witness the famous "Fat Circular" of the President of the Republican League. When now those protected interests proclaim through the mouth of the Republican party that they are ready to sacrifice almost anything, and to do almost anything, "rather than surrender any portion of the protective system," the proclamation has a peculiarly irritating sound. There is something of the insolent recklessness in it which, in the career of grasping power, usually precedes the day of judgment. It reminds one somewhat of Tweed's famous reply to his accusers: "What are you going to do about it?" If this defiant spirit should be encouraged by a Republican victory in this Presidential

election, it will be likely to go so far in its exactions as to provoke a violent rebound, and there is great danger that then the whole protective system, every tariff duty that favors any particular interest, will, without any regard to immediate consequences, be swept away at one stroke.

I cannot express myself too strongly on this point. The question is not whether tariff reform will or will not come. It is sure to come, either now or in the near future. The question really is, whether it shall come in the temperate and prudent shape proposed in Mr. Cleveland's message, tending to strengthen rather than to endanger the manufacturing industries, or in the shape of an angry reaction a little later, threatening such loss and confusion as is incident to sudden, violent and sweeping changes of system.

The danger that, if moderate tariff reform be rejected now, such an angry reaction will follow, is greatly increased by the appearance in the business world of the "Trusts." I notice that the Republicans greatly exert themselves to create the impression that the organization of Trusts has nothing to do with the protective tariff. But an intelligent people will not fail to see that the two contrivances are designed to serve the same object: to enhance the price of goods by cutting off competition. The protective tariff does this by Government interference—by the imposition of a tax upon the imported foreign article. The Trust does it by controlling the production of certain articles and the consequent fixing of the price through a coalition of the producers. It is said that Trusts have been formed to control the production and sale of things on which there is no tariff duty at all. This is true in some instances. But in a large majority of cases the Trusts cover branches of industry which are at the same time "protected" by the tariff. In fact, the protective Tariff and the Trust are children of the same parentage; the Trust is the younger brother of the Tariff.

When complaint was made that the protective tariff, by cutting off foreign competition, obliged people to pay higher prices for the things they had to buy, the protectionists used to reply that this might be true, but only at the beginning; that under the fostering care of the protective system, a multitude of manufacturing establishments would spring up at home; that they would compete among themselves; that this home competition would soon bring down prices in the home market as much as foreign competition would have done, or even more; and that thus the people would have the benefit of a great development of home industries and, at the same time, of low prices in consequence of home competition. This had a fair and consoling sound. But when home competition begins to tell, the Trust steps in, and lets us know that industries which are protected against foreign competition by the tariff will keep up prices and maintain or raise their profits by combination among the producers, and thus protect themselves against home competition too. Thus the people are deprived of the benefit of one as well as the other, and the Trust appears as the protective idea pushed to its logical extreme.

Efforts are being made to reach the Trusts by legal prohibitions and penalties. They may ultimately succeed, but experience teaches that such attempts do not usually succeed at the beginning. We know how difficult it is to frame laws on such subjects which cannot more or less easily be evaded. The open and secret friends of the Trusts will, if they cannot prevent legislation, exert all their ingenuity to smuggle clauses into it which will prevent it from becoming effective. It will probably require much experimenting to provide laws which completely answer the purpose. In the meantime, the people will continue to suffer extortion and tyranny from the very culprits. Much more expedient will it be, while the

efforts at effective law-making go on, to say to the manufacturers combined in Trusts: "As you will not let the people have the benefit of home competition, you shall not have the benefit of protection from foreign competition. The tariff duties on your articles shall therefore be promptly done away with. You shall not eat the cake and have it too." This policy will be unquestionably just and at the same time effective in going straight to the mark.

To be sure, the attempt may be made to defeat this relief too, by forming combinations controlling the production and sale of the articles concerned all over the globe, as has been done in the case of copper. But it is evident that such world-wide coalitions are extremely difficult to organize. They are possible only when the number of producers is comparatively small, and then only when production for the market requires a very large capital at the start. But even then they are apt to be broken into somewhere on the face of the earth by somebody who is strong enough, and finds it to his interest to do so. At any rate, the prompt admission of foreign competition, where home competition is artificially cut off, is a remedy surer of immediate effect than any other within sight. As shown by the example of the Standard Oil Trust, it may not prevent combinations for the control of production, but it will in almost every case prevent extortion by the artificial raising of prices if the articles concerned are at all produced abroad.

The protected interests which, as to their standing in public opinion, have so long relied upon the charm of captivating cries, should not be blind to the fact that the springing up of Trusts has put upon the tariff question a new face. The Trust is extortion undisguised. It bluntly bids the people "Stand and deliver." The efforts to obscure the relationship between Trust and protective

tariff will not succeed long, if they succeed at all. No free and spirited people will long endure such combinations when their nature has once been understood. It is therefore no mere fancy when I speak of an angry reaction not unlikely to come, causing sudden and sweeping changes without regard to immediate consequences, unless a policy of just and rational reform, such as proposed in President Cleveland's tariff message, be adopted in time. That angry reaction will be all the more probable if it should appear that the legislation against the Trusts, which is now being devised, will not remedy the evil as thoroughly or as promptly as the public interest demands.

All parties interested would, therefore, do well very calmly to consider whether the choice they have now to make, instead of being between tariff reform and no tariff reform, is not really between a moderate and easy change, beneficial to the industrial interests of the country, to be adopted now, and a sudden, violent and sweeping revulsion, doing rough justice in obedience to an exasperated popular feeling, unmindful of existing interests, to come in the near future. I am in favor of prudent and temperate reform, and wish to avoid the danger of abrupt, sweeping and possibly destructive changes. I am, therefore, in favor of the tariff policy proposed by Mr. Cleveland, and against that of the Republican party. And, in my humble opinion, the manufacturers as well as the laboring men will best serve their own interests if they act upon the same view of the subject.

Having said this, I am willing to repeat that, as I and probably most Independents think, President Cleveland would, by setting the example of strictest fidelity to all his reform pledges expressed and fairly implied, have rendered the Republic a greater service than he has done by any of his official acts. But that is no reason why we should overlook or underestimate the merit of the other things he

actually has done. During his Presidency the country has been relieved of an impression sedulously fostered by party spirit, and until within three years sincerely entertained by many good citizens, that one-half of the people were disloyal and dangerous to the Union, and that the Republic would go to destruction if the Government passed from the hands of one party to those of another. This is a gain to the morals of our political life which cannot be too highly appreciated. Moreover, President Cleveland has given the country an administration of public affairs which, notwithstanding its shortcomings, has, in many important respects, by its ability, its fidelity to the public interest and its wholesome conservative spirit, deservedly and in a high degree won the approval and confidence of the people. And, finally, he has by his tariff message identified himself and his candidacy with an economic policy which bids fair to correct existing evils, to obviate destructive disturbances, to enlarge the remunerative activity of industrial labor and to secure a steady development of the general prosperity.

The situation may in some things be unsatisfactory to many of us, as I frankly admit it to be. But we are not excused from doing our duty as citizens and voters, if we cannot have the ideal party or the ideal candidate. We have conscientiously to make our choice among the possibilities presented to us, and thus to serve the interests of the Republic as best we may. Upon due consideration of these possibilities, and exercising in this as in other cases my best judgment as an independent citizen, I find that I cannot support Mr. Harrison, as you wish me to do; but I shall deem it my duty to vote for Mr. Cleveland if circumstances permit me to reach home in time for the election.

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