



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


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# THE CAUSES OF WAR

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INCLUDING AN OUTLINE AND  
STUDY OF THE WORLD WAR AND  
OFFICIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

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BY

ROBERT EARL SWINDLER

*Author of "Methods and Suggestive Outlines in History,"  
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Arcata, California*



BOSTON  
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TO THE  
CLASS OF 1907  
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RICHARD G. BADGER

Made in the United States of America


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The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A.



TO  
LIEUTENANT ORAN L. RABER  
MY ONE-TIME CLASSMATE IN COLLEGE  
AND EVER A SYMPATHETIC  
FRIEND

417312



## PREFACE

**WE** believe we are justified in starting out in this volume upon the fundamental and scientific basis that, if we are to cure a malady, we must understand its cause,—we must properly diagnose the case; that in order to find a remedy for war and build securely on the foundation for a lasting peace, we must understand the underlying causes of conflict. Accordingly, the first part of this work is the outgrowth of the author's interest in, and study of, the causes of war,—with particular reference to the wars of the past half-century. This study naturally and fittingly led to a more intensive study of the European background of the World War, its remote and fundamental as well as its immediate causes.

There was also recognized the need, well nigh universal up to the very present, of a brief suggestive course in book form, for the study of the Great War,—its background, progress and issues, and the peace outlook, which would be suitable for the busy student and the busy citizen, who are simply bewildered in the great mass of unorganized material that confronts them,—and that this should be adapted to the schoolroom as well as the home. Hence the second and third parts of this work.

For the most part, in following out the two-fold plan just mentioned, the author presented his material in his original articles for the schools and the public, year by year and month by month, as the Great War progressed. Necessarily therefore, the chronology and subject-matter as continued in the present treatise are largely as they were written then. This accounts for present-tense verbs and descriptions occurring in a number of places where, if writ-

ten from the present field of view, they would occur in the past tense, etc. But these matters do not materially alter the nature or the accuracy of the book. On the contrary, they show points of view and problems of the recent past that it is well to keep in mind, in our attempt to understand and interpret the present world status, and to follow the tremendous work before the peace conference, in the adjustment of the pending momentous and multitudinous issues of reconstruction.

As mentioned a number of times in the body of this work, the treatment of our subject herein presented is not intended to be exhaustive. Already too much of such material is presented to the ordinary reader. There is a very great amount of information, covering all phases of this war: its causes, the peace movements and propaganda during the war; diplomatic relations of the various governments; international movements of various sorts and international law, with its violations; official "books" of the warring and other nations; the tools, implements, inventions, provisions, regulations, etc., of war; the issues of the war; forms, theories, ideals and practices of the different governments and peoples involved in the war; finances and financial problems; possibilities in peace terms and arrangements, including the much discussed League of Nations and the Bolshevik movement and danger,—and so on. But in all this there is for the general reader *absolutely no systematic organization or uniformity of plan for study or teaching*. The author's plan, therefore, is to present as adequately as may be, in a very brief treatment like this, the essential points, so that they may be better grasped and understood by the average reader, and to suggest a wider reading and study for those who may have a little more time.

R. EARL SWINDLER.


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# CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I INTRODUCTION—OUR SCHOOLS AND A NEW PATRIOTISM . . . . .	11
II GENERAL STATEMENT . . . . .	17
III CLASSIFICATION AND COMMENT . . . . .	23
IV FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES . . . . .	31
V PRETEXTS AND EXCUSES FOR WAR—SOME ILLUSIONS . . . . .	40
VI THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN EUROPE . . . . .	51
VII CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR . . . . .	58
VIII CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS (1911-1913) . . . . .	74
IX CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904) . . . . .	81
X CAUSES OF THE BRITISH-BOER WAR . . . . .	91
XI CAUSES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898) . . . . .	105
XII CAUSES OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1870) . . . . .	115
XIII THE UNITED STATES . . . . .	121
XIV GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGY . . . . .	123
XV OUTLINE OF THE WAR AND ARMISTICE TERMS . . . . .	135
XVI OFFICIAL PEACE DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATIONS . . . . .	160
XVII PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (continued) . . . . .	168
XVIII OFFICIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (concluded) . . . . .	176
XIX THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS . . . . .	186
XX THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS . . . . .	202

## APPENDIX

I PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS AT PARIS . . . . .	215
II PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS AT BOSTON . . . . .	223
III PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS AT NEW YORK . . . . .	233
IV FINAL DRAFT OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT . . . . .	245
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	263
INDEX . . . . .	265



## THE CAUSES OF WAR





# THE CAUSES OF WAR

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION—OUR SCHOOLS AND A NEW PATRIOTISM <sup>1</sup>

**Y**OU will recall readily the famous poster for the Second Liberty Loan, with the picture of the statue in New York harbor, of "Liberty Enlightening the World." The lady artist who designed this poster received a splendid prize from the United States Government, and she deserved it, for that poster went a long way in raising nearly \$5,000,000,000, to help make the world "safe for democracy." The appeal that "Liberty must enlighten the world" had its effect. *But let me tell you, recent convulsions, as in Russia, are teaching us that not only must liberty enlighten the world, but intelligence must enlighten liberty, in order to save the world. Our schools must save the democracy for which we fight. Our students, by making the most of their education and their American ideals, are to help gain and preserve the blessings of liberty to mankind.*

Many of the nations which, up to the present, have been taking leading places in the affairs and problems of the world, can do so no more. The war is sapping their manhood and retarding their institutions that train for greatest worth and usefulness to their fellowmen. Other nations, in their new-found freedom, know not how to use it, because of past oppressions and inexperience in self-government. Never did the world need leaders as it does today; never did it so need men of vision and of high ideals, men of incorruptible

<sup>1</sup>Written February, 1918.

moral fiber and integrity, men of sacrifice and of unfaltering determination in the arduous paths of service. The youth of America should be made to realize that here at once is their rich heritage and their unexampled opportunity. Not with one speck of pride or of *superiority* should they look upon this situation, but as a *privilege to serve* unequaled in the history of man. Out of this vision and this great opportunity is to come a new patriotism that has no bounds less than the planet itself.

We must become more familiar with our country's most cherished ideals. We must see to it that our youth are intelligently imbued with those ideals. Only by so doing are we to vitalize our teaching and our training for citizenship in our schools. *The principles of democracy are at stake in the world today*; and if the major portion of the student's education in these trying times is not the gaining and putting into practice of these principles of *patriotism* and SERVICE, his education, costly as it is, is a failure. To the extent that his science, his art and his philosophy of history and of life fail to serve these ideals, just to that extent our educational system is serving the same base end as has Germany's in the past generation. Many of our students and teachers do not need this warning; yet there are many others that do, for to be asleep to the real needs and vital test of democracy in this time, is to be playing with our destiny as a free people. The supreme test of mankind today is a test of *ideals*, of moral and spiritual principles and standards of conduct; and everything material on earth must serve one or the other of these two opposing ideals. The one we hope America will be as ready to stand for as her patriots have always professed for her; the other we know autocratic powers have always stood for, and have made the lovers of freedom pay the price in suffering and blood. The clearer these principles are held before the younger generation, the safer are American democracy and world liberty to be.

The provincialism in many circles, and the still prevalent ignorance of the present world conflict afford most convincing evidence of the universal need of enlightenment. And we know whence that training, to be effective, must come—it must come through the *education of the youth of our land*. We should never forget that it was from the enlightened walls of *schools* throughout the nations that liberty was born—both religious and political freedom—and this fact answers the question why the schools of the nations have furnished the first martyrs in every great struggle for liberty.

It is truthfully said, that in a democracy, where the people themselves rule, they should always know, before they embark on any great project, *why* they are going into it. Yet, even today, after the United States has witnessed this titanic world struggle for four and one-half years, not one boy in one hundred can give the essential causes of the war. This is not the student's fault, but the fault of aimless and indefinite teaching and training, for which we are all to blame—even the government of the United States (for it simply reflected the general disinterestedness of the masses of the people) which should have kept us better informed of the facts, from the beginning of the war.

What are these American ideals, for which we now stand and stake our all? What is this liberty and democracy of which we rather flippantly speak in this generation, the selfish side of which we have appropriated so well, but which, nevertheless, is the message of our great republic to the world? The answer has come over and over again in the lives of our great American patriots, in their fervent speeches and their earnest devotion and invaluable service to their country. Their conduct is our creed, and we should therefore study their lives with a new purpose. The answer must likewise come in the present crisis. The war has brought out what sacrifice there is in the great heart of France. It has enabled England to find her *soul*, and with

it a truly new England is born. Likewise must Columbia find her *heart* and her *soul* if she would realize her high mission in the world. As never before our citizens must be filled with the conviction that America's lesson is an *abiding faith in humanity, and in the growing principles, the institutions and the final triumph of democracy among men*; that here we worship *principles*, not *personages*, but have the highest regard and greatest reverence for our statesmen who have so nobly embodied those principles—a Washington and a Lincoln, not "*sacred majesties*" to be bowed down unto, but *citizens* enshrined in the hearts of their countrymen because of the service they have rendered free government in the hours of its utmost need. Let our boys and girls feel a new thrill of pride in our magnificent Stars and Stripes, because in them they see a new meaning, whether floating in home breezes o'er the peaceful institutions of a free-born people, on the great marts of trade, or on the blood-stained and treacherous field of battle, unfolding to the oppressed peoples of the earth the foundation tenets of American freedom, and giving to all the assurance that true *representative democracy, by the grace of God, shall no longer be an experiment, but a triumphant realization*, destined to preserve to the nations government by the initiative and consent of the governed. ✓

How much in this day do we really appreciate the country in which we live? How much thought do we give to the blessings she affords us? Does it often come to our minds, that for every pleasure that is ours today, some one in the past has dared to sacrifice comfort and life to give us that pleasure? For centuries our forefathers have been fighting the battles of liberty and pouring out their life-blood that we might be secure in that liberty. They did it, as one has said, that these priceless heritages "might not perish in the graves of the fathers."

How much we owe our ancestors for all that, and how much we are in debt to our country! God pity the boy or

girl who, when knowing this, would give nothing in return. It is no idle dream that Uncle Sam is urging us to do our part. Would we curse the generations yet to come by failing to uphold liberty in this crisis? The words of Patrick Henry are still as applicable as they are eloquent, "Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?" From all over the world comes the statement that never did America fight in a juster cause than she has just been fighting. And that cause she must still uphold. In failing to do our part now, we should be recreant Americans. Rather let us pause in our mad rush for the perishing things of life, to appreciate the compliment the world is today paying to American citizenship.

But our schools must hasten to give to this citizenship a vision which comprehends not only its own state and nation, but is world-wide. Indeed, Columbia's highest resolve must be to be true to the principles that gave her birth, and gave to the world the inspiration of liberty. For it is her privilege, in this "age of ages telling" to move under the impelling conviction that *this world cannot remain permanently half free and half enslaved by privileged autocracy*; and that the God of human destiny has decreed that it shall become *free*—that the faith in which American citizenship was born and has been nurtured, the faith in which other peoples have come to believe, and which is now the only hope of the race, shall be *realized in fact*—and that "government of the people, by the people, for the people," *cannot* "perish from the earth."

Citizens of America: it is your duty to know the justice of your country's cause. And, you who have not gone to war, it is your privilege and opportunity to serve your country in the highest sense. All this and more, you have the opportunity to stand for those principles that have made America what she is, and so honored throughout the world. Yours is the leadership in these great movements whose watchword is *service* and whose task is to keep our people

at home and at the front true American patriots and citizens, through all the grime and mud and fire and terror of war, and until they all come home.

Only when she realizes that it was in a righteous cause, can a mother be comforted for the loss of her son in France. Only when a father sees that the liberty he holds so dear was at stake, and might have been lost for generations to come, if the enemy had won, can he be reconciled to have sacrificed his valiant son on the altar of war. It is because of these things that the writer, though late as it now is to learn, is attempting to give you the causes of this mighty conflict.

## CHAPTER II

### GENERAL STATEMENT

**W**ITHIN the last generation there has been a world-wide uneasiness and expectancy that has never been equalled in the past. The decade before the present war witnessed the greatest unrest the world had ever known. Statesmen and seers everywhere felt that something was going to happen, but no one knew just what. Now we have learned what was imminent. The recent revolution in Russia and the entrance of United States into this war will prove to be the greatest events of the World War period. It is but the continuation of the fight of the peoples of the earth for their liberties from oppression. It is another powerful link in the mighty chain of which the English revolutions of 1642 and 1688, the American Revolution and the French Revolution were the first links. And men will see, as never before, that the French Revolution of 1789, with the single exception of the present conflict, is the greatest, most tremendous event of modern times.

If there is one thing above all else that the study of history teaches, it is that there is a unity or continuity, in human events and purposes and that man's true progress is through evolution. In this truth is found the explanation of the fundamental causes of war. The revolutions referred to above are a few of the many examples of this fact. It is equally true that revolutions of the people never go backward, ultimately; every one spells progress in the end. We should therefore in view of this fact, keep our faith in democratic Russia, for like France she will recover from her period of anarchy and severe trial—her deception and

spoilation by German perfidy—and will come out all right in the end, although it may be generations before she is fully recovered. The very means of oppression, such as absolute monarchies, the “armed peace,” under which the nations have groaned, ambition of rulers and of governments, and often war itself—are but the means by which the people may rise. At a terrible cost, it is true; yet, progress is always costly, and in its truest sense the survival of the fittest holds even unto the last.

Whether recognizing this evolutionary principle or not, we know that there has been for years, and still is, among the most intelligent and best classes everywhere, a great cry and longing for world peace—not simply a cessation of military warfare, but an era of peace for weary mankind. This, however, is not to be confused with the present socialistic and pacifist movement, which is wholly abortive, and would be in the interest of the autocratic central powers, and not in the interest of democracy. Yet, despite all we have heard and been taught in recent years concerning peace and the end of warfare, we are learning, what the American people have been slow to learn hitherto, that there are times in the history of nations when, in order to enjoy peace, they must be prepared for war. It would be suicide for any great nation at the present time to act otherwise. One people, in its philanthropic enthusiasm, cannot bring peace to the world, much less any little group of peace advocates. Nor can it guarantee its own peace—it cannot adopt a policy of peace, and say it will have it, whether others will or no. We see this in our own experience now. Indeed, the realization of this fact is one of the reasons why the President and Congress plunged this peace-loving country and non-aggressive American people into the mighty world conflict that rages today. France has been confronted with such a situation in the past, and other examples are not wanting. It amounts to this—as, I have believed for years—that, instead of diminishing the chances of war, the anti-



preparedness peace tendency may augment these chances, may invite conquest, or as in the case of the United States, because of the aggressions of others, may help to drag an unwilling people into war. There are several nations fighting today that not only did not want war, but did not expect it, and those least prepared have suffered most. War was thrust upon them; there was really no choice. The nations of the world are so close together and so interdependent in our day that one cannot have peace when others are determined upon oppressive war. The allied nations were unwillingly dragged into war, let me repeat, but thanks to the people's instinct for human liberty, they are in the war heart and soul now, and are in it to crush the inhuman and merciless beast of autocratic and bigoted oppression! Pity it is that many of us have not seen until now that autocracy has always been the arch-enemy of freedom and human rights, and never could be trusted. Its whole foundation, as history shows, has been laid in hypocritical presumption and class privilege and selfishness, playing upon the innocence and ignorance of its unfortunate and incapable victims.

The trouble with the peace advocates before the war (and all honor to them—God forbid that the teachers of the young should be aught else) it seems to me, has largely been this: they have observed particularly the effects of war, but have done little along the practical line of studying its causes and proposing effective remedies. Not until the present gigantic conflict has there been anything like concerted and serious action on the prevention of war; and still less is the understanding of its causes. Many people, indeed, declare useless any study of the causes of war. With this view, the writer cannot at all agree; it is but blind fatalis̄m, dangerous and utterly helpless in the face of the world situation and of most wars. How are we to apply the remedy—How are we to have peace—if we do not understand the cause? As in the study of medicine and disease,

so in this field, the search for causes is no less indispensable than the search for remedies; and certainly, the scientific method of treatment requires that we find the causes before we apply the remedy. The failure to do this, I maintain, is just the reason why so much that has been said and attempted in the past has been fruitless and disappointing. Men have not made a careful and systematic search into the causes of war. It is remarkable how little space is given to the causes of war in our histories. Generally speaking, they have been examined most superficially—have been strangely neglected. With one breath history instructors are teaching that causes and results are more important than wars themselves, and in the next breath they are hurrying their classes on from the causes to the wars and their results. Better not know the names of battles and leaders than not understand, in some degree at least, why the armies are fighting.

Those who oppose an intensive study of the causes of war, because they think it would increase the warlike spirit from the mere thinking upon the subject, have, it seems to me, a most peculiar and illogical method of reasoning. It is the people's not knowing the causes of wars that has often enabled their rulers to plunge them into conflicts and keep them there. This is true to some extent in the present war, as most of us know, particularly with the central powers. The search for the truth is dangerous only to its enemies. An acquaintance with the causes of war, even modern conflicts in civilized countries, can but lead the people to hate it more! When they see all the greed, the haughtiness, the selfishness, the blasphemous presumption of "divine right" monarchs and privileged classes, and sometimes the ignorance, misunderstandings and honest differences of peoples, that are back of war, they will certainly be greater lovers of peace, and more intelligent workers for it.

Moreover, it must be understood that there can be no real progress toward the peace we covet if we deny that

there is such a thing as a righteous war. The liberty of American democracy rests on that foundation stone. God has so willed it, and we cannot change it, although we believe it is God's will that some day wars shall cease from the earth. War has often rendered a great service in the past, and even today it must be seen that in the struggle for political and economic independence, as well as that for physical existence and comfort, the necessities and ambitions of the strong will be satisfied at the cost of the weak. We say this should not be. Christianity and our finer instincts are trying to lead us away from it. Nevertheless, it is the physical law of nature, has all our past history as a race back of it, and is the "survival of the fittest," one of the greatest of all biological laws; and, as Emerson says, the student of history may become more reconciled to this "copious bloodshed of ages past"—bloodshed often, too, in the name of the Prince of Peace—when he reflects that it is a temporary and preparatory state—age-long though it be—and has actively forwarded the culture of man. Nor is this any argument in favor of war as such, today; it is only a recognition of the service of war in the past. It is folly, it is a manifestation of ignorance of the history of mankind's development, to try to get away from or ignore the benefit of wars in the past. They are the price man has paid for his civilization, whether they be against kings on their "divine right" thrones, autocratic governments, religious bigotry and intolerance, or what not. Civilization has been destroyed by these conflicts, it is true, and is being destroyed; yet, more still of civilization has been preserved and gained, else we could not have democracy and enlightenment today; for man's normal condition throughout the ages, almost up to the present, has been a state of warfare and strife. Through the countless ages of the past these wars have raged. From it all there has come an evolution into the present state; and our faith can but repeat, "as was said three thousand years ago, so still

it must be said, the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." In spite of the fact that wars have taken the physically best in all ages, they have sifted humanity, both physically and intellectually, and have found the best for its leaders. War has brought different races and nations of the earth together—at first to blows; but from blows to truce, to trade, to inter-marriage, and finally to peace.

Considerations of this kind help to bring us to a true view of the nature and function of war. We became conscious of the fact that it is mingled with everything, that it is the subject of the greater part of historical treatment, if we take the human race as a whole; that it has, until very recent times, been the chief occupation or employment of the most conspicuous men of the world's long history; and that, in one form or another, it is the law of nature. With this view, we may study the causes of war intelligently, without prejudice, and be better able in consequence to utilize the knowledge thus gained in applying it to the remedies for war and the "fight for peace." So, the relationship of the causes to the ends of war must never be lost sight of. Also, on the severity of wars, on the degree of their necessity, on the extent to which they go in violating the laws of civilized warfare and outraging the sense of humanity, will depend the opportunity of modifying their character and the probability of an evolution into a world peace. "Civilized" warfare, as practiced by Germany in the present conflict, has become so horrible as to generate one of the most powerful reactionary influences against it. On the other hand, the measure in which wars are inevitable, or have been (and this can be found only by a close study of their causes) will furnish the character and limits of remedial measures.

## CHAPTER III

### CLASSIFICATION AND COMMENT

**I**T is manifestly true that in the present day there are only two classes of wars that are justifiable, namely, those for defense or self preservation, and those for liberty or freedom from oppression. Yet, the attempt to classify the causes of war, past and present, is difficult, and results are more or less inaccurate and uncertain. For convenience, however, and for the sake of discussion, they may be grouped as follows:

1. Dynastic affairs. (Have ceased to be fundamental causes.)

2. Religion. (No longer exists as a leading cause.)

3. Love of a people for war. (Becoming rarer.)

4. Colonial expansion. (Recent, but has lost its attraction, except perhaps for Germany.)

5. Racial predominance—tendency to domination by one race in a composite nation, as in Austria-Hungary. (Still a cause for strife.)

6. National or race hatred. (Still strong, as in Germany vs. France and vice versa—inherited from the past, with distrust and misunderstanding.)

7. Growth of nationality—to secure national unity. (Chief cause of most wars in latter part of nineteenth century, and some today.)

8. "Balance of Power," in Europe. (Still a contributing cause.)

9. Imperfection of government—weakness, anarchy, as in Mexico and a few small states in Europe today. (Still a cause and excuse.)

10. Territorial adjustment—tendency to secure natural boundaries.

11. Trade rivalry and commercial motives. (Many of England's petty wars in the past century, also other European countries.)

12. Conquest—ambition of leaders. (Napoleon Bonaparte best modern example.)

13. Great navies and standing armies of Europe—the “armed peace.”

14. Suppression of democratic and revolutionary movements of the people, by autocratic governments. (Ever a leading cause, but especially 1820-50.)

15. Desire for political freedom and democracy, national, world-wide, against autocratic governments. (Most recent, and greatest now.)

16. To uphold the principles of international law. (More or less connected with several above.)

We can get some idea of the multiplicity and complexity of the causes of the present war when we note that nearly all of the foregoing causes—all except possibly three—contributed to the conflict. It might be well also to state in passing that this all foreshadows greater problems of readjustment when the fighting ceases and even more complex than the problems of the war, the peace negotiations taking perhaps a longer period than the war itself, for the whole world will be vitally interested and must take part.

One reads in a good many historic works and treatises on peace that wars usually have very trifling causes. This has sometimes been true; and some people think by this means alone to discredit war. Others, on the contrary, are partisans of great causes, and they likewise are sometimes right. Both these tendencies, however, lead to erroneous conclusions, for neither represents the facts of history. So many times the writer has heard men say that the present world war is without cause; from the pulpit, from the lecture platform, from the press—from all ranks of life comes this

statement; also, that it is useless, and serving no purpose. If so then the United States has erred and most grievously sinned in going into it. But let us remember that things do not happen in this world without cause, be that cause good or bad. The laws of nature and of God—which are one and the same—teach us that just as sure as there are events, these events have causes and results. Then, just as sure as there are wars, these wars have causes and results. Here again we get back to the fundamental proposition that to understand wars we must become familiar with their causes. The American people would do well today to read less about the details of what is happening, and the continual conjecturing that gets nowhere (leave that to the experts and those whose duty it is to give their attention to it) and devote more time to a study into why the great world tragedy has come. We could then be more useful and ready to do our part when peace finally comes. We are in the war, and are called upon for untold sacrifices. We should know why these things are necessary and what really is at stake. It is no credit to the American people that when this mighty conflict began in 1914, they stood aghast, and in their ignorance of world problems and conditions said: “What are they fighting for over there, anyway?” “I don’t believe they themselves know;” “It is only a family quarrel between King George and the Kaiser,” etc. We have been too self-contained and selfish, and have not realized how much their problems are ours, how the whole world is one brotherhood, and how close and interdependent all peoples are. At last we are being brought to realize that we must be citizens of the world, not alone of our state or nation, and that as citizens of the world we have obligations no less binding upon us than are those of our country. It is idle to talk of a world peace without an intelligent world understanding. And once again, this goes to show how poor students of history we have been. It is not exaggerating to say that a few farseeing statesmen were

trembling at the prospect of this war, and were trying to tell us the signs of the times, that in 1898, when the Spanish-American war broke out, in 1908-10, when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina without their consent; in 1912-13, the period of the Balkan wars—we persistently refused to listen, because indeed, we thought we were still living in an age of isolation, and had no concern in the problems of the old world. We have continued to refuse to listen until it has all come home to us, with an outlook that is by no means a reassuring one. We should be given a few facts to disabuse our minds.

For instance, it is not right for teachers and text-books to build up prejudice against England, even though it be done through ignorance, by representing her as the England of George III, when she was an aristocracy, instead of the Britain of today, which in all but name is as much of a democracy as our own. We should know that England alone prevented Germany from going to war with us in 1898. The children should know that England's fleet has a number of times kept us out of war. Moreover, it is not right to teach our youth that our own Revolutionary war was the only nor the first nor the greatest revolution of a people against their oppressors. Justice to the troubled history of France demands that we be brought to see that it was France that saved what democracy there is in Europe, though she may have taken courage from our example a few years before, that it was France who, single-handed, for years fought for liberty against the combined autocratic thrones of Europe (England at that time being one of them), and that a chastened France at last survived even the heartless Napoleon, who would have ruined her, because, recognizing his first service, she was too faithful to him. The youth should likewise know that the Kaiser and the autocratic government of Germany (the same kind of government that England had a hundred years ago) have had designs on the United States—her Monroe Doctrine, her



democracy, her influence in the direction of liberty for a full generation. We should not be deceived about the character of the Kaiser and his government. He was too autocratic even for a Bismarck to support. Single-handed he has directed the policy of the Empire. His ministers have always been only his servants. As the historian West says, "He believes thoroughly in the 'divine right' theory, and he has repeatedly stated it in as striking a form as ever did James I of England or Louis XIV of France, two or three centuries ago." Whether he believes in that theory personally or not, he has certainly tried to get his people to accept it, and has acted upon it. Read this statement of his to the city of Munich: "The will of the king is the supreme law." And again, to a body of teachers upon the proper teaching of history: "You must teach that the French Revolution is an unmitigated crime against God and Man!" Addressing a body of military recruits in 1891 he said: "You are now my soldiers. You have given yourselves to me, body and soul. There is but one enemy for you and that is my enemy. In these times of socialistic intrigue, it may happen that I shall call upon you to fire upon your brothers and fathers \* \* \* in such a case you are to obey me without a murmur!" In 1897 he referred to himself as the "Viceroy of God." His relatives and friends have preached the same gospel everywhere they have gone, and especially in the Oriental countries and Turkey—they knew they did not dare to do so openly in America; but they did just as bad a thing—they deceived us as to the purpose of their visits here. A nominal friendly visit was nothing less than the perfecting of a knowledge of our military conditions and resources and of the German spy system in America. And this august mission was headed by no less distinguished a personage than the brother of the Kaiser himself! They have relied on that impression of the American people as proof that we would not go to war with Germany. The German government and Kaiser have little understood the true spirit

of American democracy! Why should we not fight with all our might the power that would wipe democracy from the face of the earth? We have seen the fruits of liberty and democracy so bountiful all about us in the world that we have not understood nor appreciated this mighty counter-current that still survives out of a medieval age. It is high time that our eyes were opened, and that we see the greatest of all causes, for which we are fighting.

We need also to distinguish carefully between real causes and pretended ones. The little things which are spoken of as causes, and are generally given by the parties engaging as causes, are usually but pretexts, or mere occasions, and not efficient causes. A king may lead a country into war on a slight pretext, as in Austria in 1914; but the ideas and principles that are back of such acts—the type of government that they stand for—are the causes, and are not trifling. They represent a system, whose earmarks are oppression, whose gospel is greed. The fundamental cause for Austria's plunging the nations of Europe into this war were her designs upon the Balkan states and her fear lest Russia might gain or control them, and with them Constantinople. And Russia, with her Czar, was equally culpable, except that the Balkan states had a racial sympathy with Russia that they did not have with Austria. But now, thank God, the Russia of the Czar is no more. And America's greatest obligation, next to saving her own liberties, is to help that struggling New Russia.

Often a long standing and vital cause of conflict is hidden behind such pretexts, or excuses, and is revealed only by the results of the war. This is one of the curses of autocratic governments and of ambitious, powerful monarchs. This leads us to say that while a war cannot be without causes, the cause may be unjust, or even useless, though the war itself cannot be, to the side that is wronged. If both sides have real grievances, as is often the case, the reason for each going to war must be understood, else we are partisans of the one and unfair to the other. On this

point, here in America, many a student and teacher, both North and South has misunderstood and misrepresented the Civil War and its causes, in the United States. We have therefore been unable to reconcile the causes with the results of the war. There are usually at least as many causes of war as there are parties engaged in it. Ruin and sorrow for a lost cause was the price that the South had to pay for not understanding why the North and those devoted to the national cause should fight for the Union and liberty, for the negro. The "crime of reconstruction" is the reproach that the South can lay at the feet of the North with a radical Congress, for not understanding why the South fought and sacrificed and suffered so long, having been taught by masters of thought to distrust a strong central government, as did their forefathers the government of King George. This is one of the many instances that go to show that peoples' ignorance of each other and their misunderstandings are one of the most potent causes of trouble.

Now, let us return to a brief discussion of a few of the causes grouped above. Wars of *religion* have ceased to exist; but religious prejudice has been taken into account in recruiting for the present war in those countries where "holy war" has been declared, as in Russia and Turkey, with slight traces of religious appeal elsewhere. *Dynastic affairs* in themselves can no longer cause war. Men's intelligence in times of peace has triumphed over *their love for war*. Hence but for the others we could dispense with the first three causes entirely. Yet, it is not out of place to discuss the love of people for war in the past. It helps us to understand what the war passion and loyalty let loose on the battlefield means today.

Man has inherited the fighting instinct from his remote ancestors, who lived in a state of nature, with the lower animals. In that environment war is the effect of a need—the need to exist, to survive. It is the instinct to live, which is the greatest of all instincts. The farther we go back in the history of man and the nearer we find him to nature, and

the more he is under the control of his animal nature—why, the more we find that war with him has been the effect of a human need, and its end the satisfaction of that need.

There are hundreds of cases on record of wars of conquest due to the migrations of peoples who had outgrown their native valleys, plains or desert pastures. The pinch of hunger and famine drove them on, and the more satisfied and peaceful peoples whom they invaded became their victims and slaves, or were pushed on, to struggle for existence, or fight for it elsewhere. Again, it is nature's law of the survival of the fittest. We recognize this principle in all animal life in nature. The big fish devours the smaller one; the forest giant makes the smaller beast its prey, as it does the still smaller; the eagle's mighty strength was developed in order that he might prey upon more helpless creatures. The same law rules the plant kingdom. The large sturdy plant crowds out and kills its weaker, more delicate competitor. The more warlike plant, as the thistle and the thorn, "chokes out" the tenderer stem. So, savage man took his lessons from nature and from necessity, since he had no religion of the higher life and of unselfishness to guide him, except as his imagination slowly and feebly led him to "the gods" as arbiters of human destiny and judges of his deeds. It is only the religion of one God, a God of mercy as well as of judgment upon mankind, that can save the race from its animal instincts and from war. And were it not for that in man that is *spiritual*, and above nature, the principle that "might makes right" would still hold undisputed sway. The warlike instinct is therefore inherent in human nature, and man has to conquer it with his *reason*, else he is no better essentially than the brute. The war spirit we have inherited from generations for countless ages past, and it is only the long process of man's evolution into a higher state that can save that civilization for which we fight. Not until the spirit of Jesus of Nazareth has met its response in the spirit of man and has supplanted the beast in *nations*, will warfare cease.

## CHAPTER IV

### FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES

**B**ECAUSE of their close relationship, we may treat *commercial causes* and those of *colonial expansion* together. There are those who hold to the materialistic conception of history, and claim that at bottom the real causes of war are economic in nature—that they even go back to a basic wrong in society—namely, the production and distribution of wealth in the capitalistic form. This is so far from the truth of the history of wars, however, that it may be dismissed as altogether too narrow a view. Yet, the economic factor, and greed for gain, cannot be ignored. To a certain extent in the recent past, society has had an economic basis in much the same way that in medieval times and in the ancient world men sought through war to secure mines and treasures, as for example, the ancient Romans and Carthaginians, as well as other peoples. It is true that military politics, built upon an economic basis, still dominates to a large extent in some countries. Some of the latest and best examples are Germany, Austria and Russia. This evil, however, has been no less true of international relations. The opium war between China and England was inspired by the very basest cupidity on England's part, and remains one of the black pages on English history. In fact, colonial wars have sought primarily and generally the employment and security of capital, the monopoly of commerce, or the exclusive use of the shortest and most lucrative trade routes. It is an earnest of better things, however, that now most of the greatest world powers are seriously considering the neutralization of the strategic commercial

points, such as Constantinople, Gibraltar, the Suez and Panama canals, etc. That these places be dismantled and internationalized is one of the strong demands that will be brought upon the parliament of the world at the conclusion of this war. This all is a gigantic task, however, and may not be accompanied in the near future.

There has also been a certain degree of necessity in these economic wars, especially on the part of some peoples. Repeatedly have nations felt it necessary, because of the overweening ambitions of others, to engage in war, under pain of being reduced to an inferior position among the states of the world. Besides Belgium in this war, Denmark, China, some of the Barbary States, and the South African republics may be cited as examples in recent times. Under pretext of defending its flag, its citizens or its interests, a European nation has taken advantage of the occasion to establish itself and extend its power and control gradually. It was indeed a surprise to the world that the United States did not do this thing in the case of Cuba in 1898, and again, in Mexico more recently. The general result, however, has been to supplant a backward and most unprogressive civilization with a progressive, more enlightened, sanitary and democratic one; and this result is at least gratifying. It is remarkable, for instance, that the Boers of South Africa have so loyally and with so very little friction supported England in this war, against their kindred, the Germans. The explanation lies in the fact that Great Britain has given them self-government, with more efficient administration, has taught them democracy, and they are far more prosperous than they were under the old regime. This is not to argue, however, that the end justifies the means. We may add in passing also, that we have been guilty of the same conduct toward the American Indians that the European nations have been toward the untutored and backward peoples of the Old World.

With regard to our fifth cause, *racial domination in a*

*composite union*, we may say that it is one of the greatest crimes of which governments and rulers have been guilty in the past. In most instances it is one of the basest forms of slavery, and has scarcely any justification whatever. There can never be world peace so long as an alien race or nationality, with different ideas, ideals and political instincts and institutions, lords it over a subject people, simply because chance and might, or physical force, have triumphed over justice and humanity. The world can never breathe freely until the Polish people get their freedom and independence, as do the various peoples of Austria-Hungary—and are free to gravitate to those states or confederations to which they by race and right belong. Turkey must leave Europe, where she never has had a right to be. Turkey is not a nation in the true sense, anyway, and never has been. She has no right to exist, for she has ever existed unnaturally, by criminal subjection of peoples who otherwise would long have been free, and arbiters of their own destinies. If there ever was a chimerical state it has been the Ottoman Empire. Its whole history has been one of cruelty, rapine and murder.

Our sixth cause, *national or race hatred* may also be disposed of rather briefly. To the desire for revenge has been attributed by many, and perhaps justly, the greater part of wars. The German kaiser was right in part at least, when he said that this present conflict has its basis in the Europe of the past centuries. Nations, no more than individuals can violate the laws of justice and right without at later times having to pay most dearly for these violations. Like individuals, “the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children to the third and fourth generation,” and on, and on, until the wrongs inflicted are fully atoned for. It is hard to forgive and forget great crimes. Nor is there so much virtue in forgetting as we are sometimes wont to believe. It is Christian and wise to forgive, but it is not always wise to forget. Particularly is this true in interna-

tional affairs. To forget the past is to fail to understand the present and to read the future. In the study of the history of mankind, this distinction needs to be made clear and appreciated. We can safely forget only when to forget is to further the cause of liberty, as in the case of our past relations with England, and the troubles of our own civil conflict. We can forget in the case of England because we know that the England of a powerful aristocracy and "divine right" monarchs is no more. For the same reason we should have known and remembered the principles and conduct of the present kaiser and government of Germany. It is a sad fact that in the past the nation that has not been able to return evil for evil has been doomed to disappear from among the independent nations of the world. Let us hope that such a thing in the future cannot be. It is a terrible test of our faith, in the midst of the present whirlpool of horror; but when faith is lost, all is lost. In ancient times, among the uncivilized peoples, even by scriptural injunction, it was "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"; but when the world is "made safe for democracy" the principles of Christ can reign in the nations as well as in the hearts of men. Poor Belgium, poor Belgium! What a comment on our Christian civilization! The time must come when the innocent cannot be made to suffer for the sins of the plunderers of justice and virtue, for the crimes of the privileged parasites of the human kingdom.

In considering our seventh cause, i. e., the *growth of nationality*, we note that the present German empire was built upon a series of wars none of which was really justifiable, and Germany today is paying the price of her past perfidy—that of the founders of her empire. The union of Germany would indeed have been delayed to a later generation, but who dare say she would not have been better for the delay? It would have been a Germany of democracy, no matter how long delayed, if it had been allowed the natural course of development. In taking Schleswig-Holstein Bis-



marck was thinking of German imperial interests, not of the true interests of those provinces, much less of the interests of Denmark whom he robbed of them. Shortly after, he showed his perfidy by driving Austria out of Germany and German affairs, in the "Six Weeks War," just after he had persuaded her to help him conquer Denmark and take from her the two provinces, with the tacit understanding that the booty was to be divided between the two victors, Austria to have her full share. It is likewise well known that Bismarck was courting war with Louis Napoleon of France, in 1870, and that his mutilization of the telegram of the king of Prussia to France was the occasion of France declaring war. In other words, he tricked Napoleon and the government of France into declaring the war which he (Bismarck) desired. Nor did the "Iron Chancellor" conceal to his people the fact that he proposed to create a German empire on the principle of "blood and iron." That was his gospel for Germany. We know how dangerous to the peace and safety of the world it is for the government or people of a great country to revert to the war instinct, to become militaristic, in the sense that Germany has been since the time of Frederick the Great. The war spirit is the most violent of emotions, and in its desperation is much akin to insanity! On the pretext of nationality there have always been certain nations that have had a predilection for the life of war—different peoples (led by their rulers) at different times. At one time it was Rome; at another, Spain; at another time France, under Louis XIV; at another, Italy. For more than fifty years it has been Germany, led by Prussian autocracy. How well, how thoroughly, how efficiently have the German people obeyed that gospel! Even their most wonderful arts of peace have been made to contribute to that end, instead of to the far nobler, disinterested end of charity for the whole world. "Gott straffe England" is the gospel of hate, not of patriotism—of hate in its most malignant form, and obedience to that

gospel is the explanation of the many outrageous acts of barbarism—the atrocities of Germans—of which we hear so much, and with which we are so familiar, today. But “Gott straffe England” was only the beginning. “Gott straffe democracy” is the true purpose and watchword today; and that means the United States of America, first and foremost of all, for America is first and foremost in democracy.

The other great struggle for nationalism in the past century, namely, the unification of Italy, which is still going on, we need comment upon but very briefly. While it has not been unmixed with injustice on Italy’s part, no such crimes can be laid at the feet of Victor Emmanuel, Cavour and Garibaldi as at the feet of the leaders for an imperial Germany. On the other hand the history of Austria, the arch-enemy of Italian freedom in the past century, is even worse than that of Germany. And now, that the whole world is reaping the fruits of these past wrongs, it must be a liberty washed in blood that is to rise upon the ruins of the past. One of the fondest hopes of the best servants of the world at present is, that this great catastrophe may be bringing near the end of the era of selfishness and of might.

In considering the “*balance of power*” as a cause of war, we find that it has contributed to wars in Europe for centuries past; that it has its weight in the present war, and is dangerous for the future until, or unless the results of the present conflict and coming peace give guarantees that will obliterate the natural distrust of states and peoples for each other, together with the disturbance of peace and prosperity throughout the world.

Our ninth cause, *imperfection of government* is so evident that it may be passed over with but a word of comment. It is in general only small and weak nations, or those in a more or less violent state of transformation of government, that are prey to the exploitation of war. Portugal and perhaps Spain have happily recovered from that state within the past and present generations, but there is no

immediate hope for Mexico, nor for the new Russian states. The present allied intervention will bring its political results only after years. The military object, of course, may be gained soon and Russia saved from Germany, but, after that, it will take her generations to find herself.

The *desire to secure natural boundaries*, always strong, but more so if those boundaries have once been held, is one of the great causes for several countries engaging in war, even in the present war—as in the case of Italy, Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia and to some extent others. Not that this was the only cause with any of them; but it was a great, if not controlling, motive. After France was plunged into the strife, of course she desired Alsace-Lorraine, as a better natural barrier against Germany, together with other reasons which are well known, chief among them being the race hatred, national feeling, and the keenest desire for revenge upon Germany for taking those provinces in 1871. Many unnatural boundaries must be wiped out at the conclusion of this world conflict, and a new map of the Eastern world made in the adjustment.

Wars arising from trade rivalry in their essentials have already been discussed above, and may be passed over here.

*Wars of conquest* and of the *ambition of leaders* next claim our attention. Facts already considered make it appear that the nations in the past have lived chiefly on the principle that might makes right. The study of wars of conquest makes this conviction all the stronger. By this we are able to see how far as nations, up to the present war at least, we have been from the principle of peace and honor that we have been accustomed so much to talk about. With this realization many illusions, and many theories and fond hopes vanish. We are just beginning to take the world as it is—to understand it and frame our future plans upon that basis. It is a striking thing to note that, until recent times the right of conquest was never brought in question. That it has been condemned in modern times, however, is

proof of the value of our civilization. In these dark hours of trial we should keep this fact in mind; it carries a message of hope for mankind. Until recently, the act of conquering was appreciated as one of the very highest of human activities, and the greatest warriors were the greatest statesmen. The literature, particularly the poetry, of the middle ages, was replete with the exploits of the military heroes. Force was desired by the state, with very few exceptions among the ancient and medieval peoples, above everything else. Let us be thankful we have gotten beyond that stage, and that the disturbers of the world's peace, notwithstanding their frantic efforts to justify their actions and to shift responsibility, nevertheless stand condemned before the judgment bar of humanity! The ambition of a leader singly, can never again bring on a great war, nor has one ruler alone been able to, for a hundred years past.

*Great navies and standing armies* are contributing causes only when other causes are back of them. Yet, we must see, as a result of this war, that great standing armies are abolished forever. This is imperatively necessary, not only to guarantee peace, but to enable the nations to pay off their tremendous war debts. At the rate that the armies and navies were building in Europe previous to this war, the whole continent would have been bankrupt in another generation, even without war. How necessary it is then, that those expensive and crushing burdens upon the peoples be done away with, or lowered to the very minimum—to the extent that their expense shall be small, as compared with the arts of peace!

The fourteenth cause listed above, namely, the *suppression of democratic and revolutionary movements of the peoples*, which has been a leading cause in the past, and has proven the perfidy of princes, is bound to decrease and vanish, as the cause of democracy grows and finally triumphs throughout the world. The long and patient struggle of the people is at last to be rewarded. It has taken thousands of years

to develop democracy on earth, but now she is coming to her own, and the days of kingly power and oppression are numbered. To appreciate this fact, and to remember the principle for which we struggle—to keep our patience in this generation, it is necessary that we see events in terms of centuries, and great movements in terms of the great ages and stages of evolution of man's civilization, in eras as God counts them, in their true perspective and as they are.

*The desire for political freedom and democracy* on the part of the people, is of course the other side of the struggle represented by the cause given immediately above, and cannot be considered wholly apart from it. Suffice it to say here that this struggle has been going on in modern times from the outbreak of the English revolution of 1642 to the present time, is now at its greatest height, and will continue for ages to come, though unaccompanied in its last stages, we fondly hope, by the maelstrom of war.

The last cause—to *uphold the principles of international law* and justice and the solemn obligations and treaties of nations—is, with the last above named, the greatest contribution of the United States of America to the world.

## CHAPTER V

### PRETEXTS AND EXCUSES FOR WAR—SOME ILLUSIONS

**N***NATIONAL* honor is sometimes made a pretext for war; it is also sometimes a real cause. The civilized world has never expected a nation to suffer the outrages of a foreign State,—especially if they occur repeatedly. The United States has only followed a long-standing precedent in this respect. The American government and people showed a forbearance that was remarkable before entering the war against Germany. Critics of our government's course would do well to remember this fact. Several other nations would have refused to suffer what they have suffered, and would have gone to war, if they had been strong enough. The fate of Belgium, Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania has *terrorized* them into maintaining a technical peace. Nothing is more precious to a State than the respect for her personality, her honor, her sense of fair play. It is with nations as with individuals in this particular. If the United States, after her stand for the right of neutrals and for humanity, had done less than follow up her professions by war, she would have been considered the world over as vacillating and cowardly, as materialistic and selfish, and would have *hindered* rather than encouraged the cause of democracy throughout the world; the revolution in Russia would not have had her powerful aid, and democracy would be staggering o'er the whole earth. Belgium accepted Germany's challenge, rather than slavishly submit, because of the God-given right of all honorable people to govern themselves and maintain their national integrity and honor. Like all free peoples, she would rather die than submit to the

vassalage of the inhuman strutting "lord of destiny"—she would preserve her honor before the world, though she might lose her existence, as the penalty. For this, Belgium has an immortal name in history, as has many an individual martyr, for like conduct.

Despite the above, and numerous other instances, however, national honor has often been a mere pretext of ambitious States and covetous princes and worldlings, for waging war against a weaker people.

During long centuries, up to the present, Europe has been rending herself, each group trying to make itself greater through the dependency of its neighbors,—all this under the pretext of succession to power, political equilibrium, and sometimes, "balance of power." This has kept alive among the nations the Machiavelian principle that might makes right. But, we must remember that of the many wars thus waged, the *alleged* causes were only *pretexts*, the real causes being deeper and more selfish. This point cannot be too strongly emphasized. Text books often lead us astray here, giving these excuses as the causes, rather than the motives back of them. On such pretexts Rome and Carthage contended for no less stakes than the "dominion and exploitation of the Mediterranean world." Later, Genoa and Venice, of the Italian city States, likewise fought for *predominance in commerce and navigation*; then Spain and Portugal, for their colonial empires; then England, Holland and France, following the countries of the Iberian Peninsula. The real motive, however, was chiefly commercial, as the nature of these contests testifies.

This was all done under the old-time conviction that, in order to have prosperity, a nation must gain a *monopoly* on trade and treasure, a monopoly of exchange and exploitation. Consequently, this era was followed up and completed by the conquests and wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It had its revival, again, in the wars of colonial expansion in the past century. If a State could not secure

a monopoly, it felt that it must at least "turn the balance of commercial power" in its favor. Even modern and present day warfare is somewhat of a commercial enterprise in this sense. This is an astounding fact, once we come to reflect upon it. The nations still are jealous rivals; they desire to monopolize certain trade zones, and they still do business with each other on the old suspicious *competitive* basis—an economical theory of capitalism that for *internal* industry in the various countries was exploded long ago. For instance: the railroads of this country went through (1), the stage of *competition* of small roads, with much duplication, extra cost, and poor service. They soon learned they were violating an economic principle—that this did not pay. So, (2), the next step was *consolidation*, wherein a few large corporations came to own and control all the former small roads, leaving the business in the form of a few great *systems*. Next (3), came the period of *cooperation*, when *pooling* began. The rates and traffic in general were so manipulated for the benefit of the railroads as a result, that the States and the national government were constrained to take up the problem of the regulation of the railroads. But the point is, the railroads doing business with one another, or former rivals, came to the principle of cooperation as the best and most satisfactory and feasible plan. This record can be duplicated, for many other industries.

Today, as the war problem has developed, the efficiency of cooperation is manifest in every industry, and in all the industries of our whole national life, as they aid one another, for a common end. The world war has made cooperation and efficiency the two greatest words of the business world. The cooperation of the allies is bringing victory to them, while without it they were floundering in defeat. On no important undertaking along any line whatsoever, do they launch forth without the cooperation of all. International commerce should long ago have been put upon this same basis,—should have been operated on the friendly and



cooperative plan, instead of the suspicious and restrictive competition that still prevails. The old competitive theory, with first the "navigation laws" (as those of Spain, England, France and Holland), now, the *protective tariff* restrictions—ignores the truth that the well-being of one State is not incompatible with that of its neighbors, but almost always, the opposite. It has an interest in their prosperity, and their well-being contributes to its own. As we all know the "navigation laws" helped to cause many wars between nations or peoples. The protective tariff, that companion instrument of the privileged classes, has likewise caused much trouble, especially *internal*, for all the great nations. Thus we see, it is *privilege, selfishness* and *greed* that are at the bottom and back of the usual pretended causes of war.

Accordingly all European States have actually been established and consolidated by force. If one condemns this selfish conquest (as the world is condemning it today) it can no longer be a question of restoring that which was unjustly gained, of a revision and general transfer of titles. This would result in a complete overthrow of the political chart, and would return without profit to the parceling out of nations and to the disorder and anarchy of the middle ages. The present condition (previous to 1914) in the main has been confirmed by a long possession, and has been consolidated by general consent of the powers of the world. As all nations, somewhere along their course, have proceeded in much the same manner, no one can criticise and condemn another unsparingly without reflecting discredit upon itself. This truth by no means argues, however, that there should be no territorial readjustments to right wrongs of the past, as a result of this present war. It is to help us to see, on the other hand, that many pretended arguments for freedom of peoples and restoration of former conditions, that are advanced by Germany, her allies and sympathizers, are besides the point, and not at all parallel cases to those conditions of subject and unfortunate peoples whom she and

the other autocratic governments (including Russia in the past) have criminally oppressed, rather than enlightened politically and otherwise. For instance, the England of 1917 is not responsible for a former England's crimes against Ireland. Since 1911 England has offered her "home rule," but civil differences and strife in *Ireland* would not have it so. It is all an *Irish* question now, not an English question, and the factions in Ireland are wholly responsible for its fall. England would gladly be rid of the thing altogether. It is what it has always largely been,—a *religious* question, a strife between Catholics and Protestants, of the Protestant Ulster counties and the greater Ireland, which is overwhelmingly Catholic. That is not the only difficulty at present, but it is by far the most important one. Ireland certainly ought to accept Home Rule, as England now offers it, rather than hold out for independence, as the radicals and lawless element are doing. Ireland alone is too weak to protect herself. She has not the wealth nor power to maintain an army and a navy, to guard an independent status, and without these she would be a prey to any power that might seek to enthrall her. The Germans are beside the mark when they demand that England give up Ireland, India, South Africa and Egypt,—all of which are as democratically and self-governed as their people will accept—before they demand that Germany restore Belgium, Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, and the recently ravished Balkan States and Russia—all of which were exploited, and still are, solely for the Teutonic race's benefit, not their own. Those nations and parts of nations, however, that are *oppressed* by foreign rulers and governments, such as Poland, Bohemia, Hungary (largely), the various Balkan peoples within the Dual Monarchy and the Italians in the Trentino and Triest regions—which once were free peoples, or joined to their own nationalities, must be restored, to work out the destiny of their own nationalities under *democratic* forms of government, if Europe is to have peace in the future.

Of the weaker and less distinct types, such as Finland and several of the African and other colonial possessions, perhaps autonomy, or a gradual growth in self-government is best. The conditions seem to warrant this solution, even in the case of the Philippine islanders. To give them their independence in the very near future, with their ignorance of, and inexperience in self-government, is mere folly, and would leave them the prey of the ambitious despoiler. It would be more charitable, if not more honorable, to sell them outright, to the highest bidder, than thus to cast them adrift.

Again, the difference we would point out is this; when subject peoples are in the hands of liberal democratic governments they are relatively safe; but wherever they are under autocratic rulers, they are continually in danger. History has abundantly proved the maxim, "Put not your trust in kings."

We have already noted that, under pretense of defending its flag, its interest or its citizens, many a nation has taken advantage of the occasion to establish itself and extend its power gradually, over less able or less fortunate countries. These things have been so carried out at times that it has been impossible to chastise the aggressor, or prevent them. But happily, that age is passing. The latest example of the above cause, previous to the present war, was Italy, in her war with Turkey for North African possessions, just before the outbreak of the first Balkan war, a few years ago. Yet, there are those who justify this type of war on the ground that it is necessary, as in the case of Hindus, Africans, etc., to make them *subjects first*, in order to *transform them* for the better *afterwards*. But at best, this is a very doubtful position to take, and is a mere *excuse* for war. The question is, does the end justify the means?

For wars they have waged in the past on pretext chiefly, and not for sufficient cause, *all* the great nations of Europe are paying dearly today. England, for example, is suffering and paying the penalty in this war for troubles she engen-

dered and wars she helped to promote in her own selfish interests as late as the nineteenth century. The toll of 100,000 brave men in the Dardanelles campaign was (in large part at least) the price she paid for upholding Turkey, "the Sick Man of Europe," a couple of generations ago. For less than fifty years ago England was still in much the same position that Germany was in 1914, with motives very similar (under Disraeli) both with regard to her international policies and her allies. But England's *democracy*, the voice of her *people*, has saved her in the present generation from the condemnation that the world heaps upon Germany. Likewise, Germany can be saved from this condemnation in the future only, when democracy there, as in England, comes to her rescue. Moreover, one of the certain results of this war for Germany, whether it come soon, before the present war is over, or after years of internal struggle, will be the triumph of democracy over the Kaiser, the haughty Crown Prince and the autocratic princes and governments of the several States of the Empire. We should not be surprised also, to see Austria-Hungary dismembered, its various peoples reverting to the nationalities to which they belong. The Czech movement in Bohemia shows the drift of affairs in that polyglot empire.

This spirit of democracy,—of individual and social justice—is responsible for the cooperation among the liberal governments that is to win the fight of the people of the earth for freedom. As we said in our introductory article of the present series, this is the culmination of the Political Revolution, and is the greatest and most glorious development of the modern age. The reactionary powers of Europe have far underrated this great movement, and hence have miscalculated its strength and effect, all through the past decade and the present war. Similarly, many of us have little realized the magnitude and meaning of this great liberal wave in the present generation. On this fact Mr. John B. Winslow, chief justice of the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin, has the following to say,—“The future historian will find many things of surpassing interest when he comes to review the opening decades of the twentieth century, but he will find nothing more interesting or significant than the great wave of *democracy* which is now sweeping over the earth. . . . This remarkable world movement must be apparent to the most superficial present day observer of the signs of the times. Let any such observer take the world’s map and put his finger where he will, he will find some phase of it. In Great Britain it takes the form of nullifying the powers of the House of Lords and curbing the privileges of birth; in France and Germany it appears in the garb of socialism; in China a republic supplants the rule of the Manchu dynasty, and in other countries it appears in various movements, all directed with greater or less wisdom to the wiping out of one form or another of privilege. . . . In our own country the democratic drift is, perhaps, more marked than anywhere else. . . . Unless every sign fails, we shall have democracies . . . before many years such as the world has never seen on any scale before; at least, we shall experiment with them.” Greater weight attaches to this statement of Judge Winslow from the fact that it was made before democracy over the world made itself so potently felt in the present conflict.

We can better understand the illusions of the German people and their ignorance of the true science of government (an ignorance or incapacity which many of their own statesmen have avowed) when we note the character of their leaders, no matter how great statesmen they may have been. The people of the whole empire practically have been nurtured politically on illusions, false principles and pretexts, not on principles of justice in State and world affairs. Frederick the Great furnishes a case in point. In his memoirs he makes this statement: “My troops being always ready to act, my treasury well filled, the vivacity of my character, *my ambition, the desire to have myself spoken of,*—were the

reasons that I went to war with Marie Therese,"—i. e., when he took the Austrian province of Silesia away from her by force and involved all Europe in war. Many German militarists, both in the army and the navy, several great German authors of political science texts, as well as responsible heads of the great commercial concerns,—have persistently held forth this same soulless principle to the German nation. These things are perhaps too well known to need specific instances given here. It is true that other European governments acted upon quite similar theories a century ago; but that the German Kaiser and government still cling to it,—is their peculiar crime in our day. Napoleon Bonaparte, after his campaign of 1812, made this remark concerning his own aggressiveness: "Alexander (of Russia) and myself were like two cocks, ready to go into battle without knowing why"—a statement which was false as to Napoleon's designs—but which nevertheless acknowledges that neither sovereign had just cause for precipitating that terrible year of conflict. *Ambition*, wholly selfish, was the real cause, of course. Napoleon's desire was that all kings might assist at his final imperial coronation. He took the world-conqueror, Alexander the Great, as his model. And today, the German Crown Prince, it seems, is not so far removed from the same folly as we were content to believe a couple of years ago. That the ambition of monarchs and leaders no longer plays the part in war that it once did, however, is a distinct step in the progress of the people's rule.

As a final word let me repeat: the important differences between fundamental causes of war, and the immediate causes and pretexts cannot be too strongly emphasized. The writer doubts if the present generation will bring elimination of the fundamental causes. A great deal, on the other hand, may be done to eradicate the immediate causes and pretexts. Secretary Bryan did a noble thing along this line, in securing the twenty-odd arbitration treaties between the United States and other countries, to prevent wars until at least a

year's consideration is made. Another instance a few years ago was the agreement between Argentine and Chili that they would not go to war for *five years* over boundary disputes that were about to lead to a clash of arms. They kept their agreement. Eradication of the *vital causes*, however, we may well question coming, except by the long, gradual, but sure process of political evolution. Stricter regulations may be made and enforced through international law and agreement, backed by the "League to Enforce Peace." But, like the "Balance of Power," to which it is similar, this cannot be permanent, in itself—it can serve only for a time. Yet, it is true that the coming peace is fraught with great possibilities in this direction, while revulsion at the present horrors leads many to "faintly trust the larger hope" of permanent peace hereafter. Do not such persons forget, however, that the whole process of civilization has been a development through continuous conflict toward comparative peace? This condition has been brought about by a slow process of education of the minds and *conscience of men*; and this we must realize in its final consummation before there can be lasting peace for mankind. That the present tragedy of nations may lend impetus to and hasten the day of peace is the reasonable hope of most men, though many doubt its realization in the near future.

The Europe of 1920 will little resemble that of 1914, just as the Europe of 1914, little resembled that of a century earlier. Greece was the first in the nineteenth century to recover her national life; and now she is recovering it anew. Belgium was separated in 1830 from her unnatural incorporation with Holland; now, she must be resurrected to a newer, greater life, and guaranteed a free existence and development. Hungary received a constitution of her own, in the dual monarchy in 1848, if she did not gain the independence the patriot Kossuth dreamed for her; she must now be given an even freer hand, if not complete independence. Bohemia at that time struggled for self government; she

must be given complete "home rule," if not more this time. The Bohemians have already raised their voice in a menacing way toward German Austria. Poland more than once rose in revolt against those who destroyed her independence. As President Wilson so timely pointed out in his war message, last year, the Poles must once more breathe as an independent people. The great crime of partitioning in the eighteenth century must be atoned for, and the penalty paid and loss sustained, by her despoilers. The peoples of the world,—with friendly help and oversight in some instances of course,—must be left to work out their destinies and "the world must be made safe for democracy." The influence of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs must be made as harmless as that of the Hanoverians in England today, or like them, must turn their influence into the current of democracy.

War, we have said, assumes the survival of the fittest, the most apt, the best. But, the best for what? The fittest for what? That is the capital question now. It is not easy for one people to modify the wish, the interests, and still less the national characteristics of another. The failure at many efforts at it has helped to bring on this colossal war. Once it could be done by war and the conqueror after the war; but in so far as this transformation is possible today, it is not by war and force that it is to be accomplished. Free intercourse between nations, social and commercial, is perhaps the most powerful pacifying influence. When nations and races come to mingle with each other more vitally, like individuals they will come to understand and appreciate one another better, and will at last learn to heed that most costly and precious lesson, that *peace*, and not *war*, is to be the true and only rational basis of civilized human society.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

**T**O a considerable extent the conditions that brought about the great European conflict in 1914, of the present century, can be traced to the work of the Congress of Vienna, at the end of the Napoleonic era, a century before. The present decade, consequently, has often been compared and contrasted with the Napoleonic period, a little over a century ago. And in no other respect, perhaps, has the contrast been so sharply drawn as in the difference of motive that actuated Prince Metternich and his autocratic congress of princes and their minions, on the one hand, and the motives which have been the impelling force in the liberal nations in the World War of 1914-1918, on the other; and the contrast continues in the spirit and work of the peace conference at Versailles.

Since the above is true, in our brief review of the immediate background of the great World War we cannot stop short of the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) and its immediate outgrowth, the Holy Alliance, a hundred years ago. There were two cardinal principles of this notorious Vienna congress that were responsible in so large a degree for the terrible woes of the present time, namely (1), the bargaining about of territories and nationalities as if they were "mere chattels and pawns in a game," and (2), the restoration of oppressive and autocratic kings upon their thrones, against the flame of democracy enkindled by the French Revolution, and the repression of all democratic aspiration of the *people* of the nations. One needs but to examine the history of the first half of the nineteenth century and recall

the origin of our Monroe Doctrine to satisfy himself as to this fact.

Despite the strength of the peoples' revolutions of 1830 and 1848, which came so near overthrowing once for all this medieval tyranny, enough of it remained on the continent of Europe to make possible the next great step in violation of the rights of man,—the crime of Bismarck and the Prussian war-lords in their wars for the union of the German peoples in a great empire. This story is too well known to warrant its repetition here. But what was the consequence of this type of unification? That is what is all-pertinent to our subject in hand. It was simply this: Bismarck's imperialistic and "blood and iron" policy soon arrayed a group of nations in bitter, distrustful and hostile feeling against himself, his sovereign and the new German Empire. To meet this menace to his dream of a "Deutschland über Alles" the greater part of the remaining years of his life were spent. The astute Imperial Chancellor sought constantly an alliance to meet this growing hostility with another threat, or application, of "blood and iron." He would sow discord (*divide et impera*),—as has frequently been practiced by Germany since,—and bring in jealous rivalry, if possible, his threatening opponents, while he would seek an alliance with one or more of them. And this alliance would safeguard the interests of Germany in the future. Thus arose the *Triple Alliance*, Bismarck's famous "Dreibund" of Germany, Austria and Italy, in 1881. Italy, contrary to her natural interests and past experience, was induced to join in this "unholy" alliance with the Teutonic powers because of France's aggressive movements at this time in Algeria, northern Africa,—which territory was coveted by Italy and was adjacent to Tunis, which had already been appropriated by France and which in turn adjoined Tripoli which the Italians in 1911 fought with Turkey for. The Italian people, however, soon became aware that their age-long enemies, Austria and Germany,

were more of a menace to them than was France. Hence, at an early date Italy showed that she could not be depended upon in an offensive war as a partner of the Teutonic countries,—as many German writers pointed out years before the fateful outbreak of war in 1914.

And now, to go back for another thread of our narrative. After the humiliation of France in 1871 Bismarck had hoped that his neighbor to the west had been so completely crushed that she could never again be a real obstacle to the ambitions of Germany. He was therefore astonished, and not a little alarmed, to witness the rapid recovery of France from her losses in this war. By 1875 he was planning another war with France,—one of the “*sperlos versenkt*” kind. But he had already sown the dragon’s teeth. Great Britain and Russia both called a halt upon him. He was constrained to forego this war; but he must make up for this failure in some way. Then followed his constant effort until he secured the Triple Alliance referred to above.

But before the “*Dreibund*” was accomplished the war-cloud had lowered over the Balkans, and in this both Germany and Austria were deeply interested. The Balkan provinces (as we bring out in Chapter VII of this work), stung to madness by the “*Bulgarian Massacres*” and other atrocities, led by Bulgaria, were planning a revolution and war to drive the abominable Turk out of Europe. And they looked to Russia for aid. The Czar was more than willing, since he had his heart set on Constantinople and the Mediterranean trade. Upon the pretext of interfering in behalf of persecuted Christians he joined the Balkans, marched upon the Turk, and soon won a complete victory over the Sultan. In this Russo-Turkish war of 1878 the Ottoman rule in Europe would have ended, but for the jealous intervention of the other great powers of Europe, led by Austria and Great Britain. This time they feared that Russia, rather than Germany (and Germany was with them, strongly seconding Austria) would break the “*balance of*

power" and threaten their expansion, if not their empires. Then, upon the close of this war, which only partly emancipated the Balkans from the Turk, came the famous Congress of Berlin. Bismarck was playing a grand rôle in securing this congress for Berlin, and he was the dominating figure in it. But the real significance of this Treaty of Berlin for our purposes is, that Russia considered Germany as one of the chief nations that had robbed her of her conquests of the war, and hence Russia was later willing to listen to the overtures of Germany's most watchful adversary, France.

After the movements described in the preceding paragraphs had culminated for Bismarck and Germany in the Triple Alliance of 1881, France was the first to sense the larger meaning of it all, and sought an alliance to counteract the "Dreibund." This led to the *Dual Alliance* between France and Russia; for Russia, as we have just seen, had had a forecast of Bismarckian diplomacy in the Congress of Berlin, and next to France, was most endangered by the new militant Germany.

Great Britain so far, had kept aloof from both alliances. Relying upon her great fleet and upon her isolation by water from the Continent, she, like the United States for a century, felt for a time that she could steer an independent course. Both nations have since been disillusioned. (This, by the way, is a strong argument in favor of some sort of a league of nations, to take the place for a time at least, if not to develop finally into a permanent one,—of the "Balance of Power," which will never remain "balanced"). It was the immense increase of standing armies on the Continent, as against Britain's "contemptible little army" of volunteers, and the German feverish rush to build a great navy, that opened the eyes of Englishmen and, coupled with the reapproachment efforts of King Edward VII, led Great Britain about 1905 into the "friendly understanding—*Entente Cordiale*—with France, and then with Russia. This

Triple Entente amounted to a three-fold alliance against the Triple Alliance of the Teutonic powers and Italy, with the distinct advantage that England was able secretly to cultivate a friendly feeling with Italy, for reasons that we have already stated.

It is significant that this Triple Entente was consummated in spite of the Fashoda incident of 1898, which had threatened war between England and France, and in spite of some conflicting interests of these two nations in the Near East. Moreover, this Entente was maintained throughout the next decade (1905-1915) despite the difficulties that Great Britain and Russia encountered over "spheres of influence" in Persia and boundaries in the Himalayas. These facts serve to show that Great Britain, France and Russia all distrusted the bold and unscrupulous policy of Germany, and would compromise their own differences in order to have each other's aid against this common danger, whenever the test should come. This explains the continuance of the Triple Entente to the very hour of war in 1914.

Meanwhile Germany and Austria-Hungary were showing unmistakable signs of a determination to control all central Europe and also the Gateways to the East, by their Mittel-Europa-Berlin to Bagdad railway scheme, and Austria's aggressiveness in the Balkans. Let us not forget that Austria had been instrumental in robbing Russia of the Balkan victories, 1878, and now (1908), while Russia as a result of the Russo-Japanese war and internal conflict was powerless to aid her Balkan kindred, annexed the Serbian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This she did without any nations' consent except her own (and encouragement of her ally Germany), and contrary to the wishes of her own inhabitants.

The German Emperor had urged Austria to proceed with this seizure of the two Balkan provinces, promising her that with his "shining sword" he would stand by her side. Thus had Austria, at the risk of a great war in Europe, changed

by main force the status of a couple of Balkan provinces that had been assigned to her for protection at the Congress of Berlin, from a weak protectorate for administrative purposes, into a part and parcel of her empire. This is one of the five instances in which Germany and Austria in the decade 1905-1915, by their "brazen aggressions" threatened the peace of Europe and the world. These five instances the author has referred to in another chapter. But a little explanation is in place here. The first instance was when the Kaiser, after announcing that no changes of territory must be made anywhere in the world without his consent, in the first Moroccan crisis in 1905, after France, backed by Great Britain and Spain had informed the sultan of that country that he must submit to order and decency,—made a personal visit to this sultan and informed him that he did not have to do anything of the kind. Although the Kaiser was finally obliged to retreat from this position through the international finding of the Algeiras conference, the French minister Delcassé, to assuage the wrath of Germany and the Kaiser's wounded pride, was forced to resign, to keep the peace. The second instance was the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908, just mentioned above. The third crisis was precipitated by the Kaiser sending his warship the *Panther* to the Moroccan port of Agidir, on the occasion of violent disorder breaking out there and France's sending troops, upon the advice of Spain and with the backing of England to restore order in that country. France was now upheld by the powerful assurance of Great Britain and Russia, which had recovered considerably from the results of the Russo-Japanese war. Yet, France yielded sufficiently to grant the Kaiser considerable territory on the Congo, as a counterpoise for what she was getting in Morocco, and thus again she helped to avoid a war with Germany. It was with very ill grace, however, that Germany acceded to peace at all on this occasion. Her great army expansion was not yet completed, else she would not

have, as our German authorities tell us. This occurred in 1910-1911. The fourth came in connection with the Balkan wars, 1911-13, when the German and Austro-Hungarian governments backed the Turks (German officers had been drilling Turkish troops since 1888, and in 1896 Wilhelm II had visited Turkey, sealed a strong bond of friendship with the Turkish government, and joined with the Turks as a promoter of their "holy religion," and trade with Germany) and were upon the point of going to war with the Balkan states. Great Britain more than any other European nation sought to prevent this threatened general European war, and should be given credit for the same. Had the Entente been as aggressive as Germany and Austria, no doubt the World War would have broken out two or three years sooner. The fifth and last instance was the German Imperial Government's deliberately launching the greatest tragedy of history, in 1914. Since the precipitation of this fatal crisis is quite extensively treated in other portions of this book a further exposition of it here is unnecessary.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For a further treatment of the above five crises the reader is referred to the International Year Book, 1914 to 1918 numbers.

## CHAPTER VII

### CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR

THE writer has been encouraged by friends to make a separate statement of the causes of the present World War, before concluding the series of articles on the *Causes of War*. Such a statement is all the more pertinent at this time, since teachers and students, as well as the public generally, are more vitally interested in the conflict so recently raging than in any former war,—as is natural they should be; moreover, a good deal of the opposition in this country to the war has been due to ignorance of its causes,—of why America is in it,—and of the issues at stake. Still another reason for the following treatise is, that nowhere have we found anything that approaches a complete and accurate statement of the vital causes as they have affected all the powers engaged,—either collectively or individually. And finally now that the war is over, if we are to be of service to the bringing of a just peace that we have been in waging a just war, we must understand the causes in order to help intelligently in applying the remedy for war.

Two distinctions made in a former chapter I wish to repeat at the outset,—namely, (1) that *remote and fundamental* causes must be carefully distinguished from *immediate causes and from pretexts*; and (2) that there are different causes for different nations, or groups of nations, and usually as many causes at least as there are peoples engaged in conflict. In this connection it is well to repeat that it is difficult to classify the causes fully and accurately, to do which requires great pains, as well as familiarity with every important detail of the life, government and ambitions



of each State. The treatment which follows, however, the author feels, is essentially just and reasonably accurate.

We need spend but little time with the mere *pretexts* for this war, such as the Austrian forty-eight-hour ultimatum to Serbia for the assassination of the Austrian archduke and wife,—the twenty-four-hour demands and the ultimatums of Germany to France and England, together with her demand that Russia *immediately* demobilize her vast army;—or Germany's excuse in the case of her invasion of Belgium, that England or France, or *both*, would have invaded that country, and thus broken their solemn treaties, as Germany did, if the Germans had not gone first. Most of the above excuses were *premeditated lies*, as the facts have since shown, and *all* were mystified, presumptuous, and wholly selfish pretexts for war. It is worse than stupidity for a person to believe that England or France would have invaded Belgium,—no matter what irresponsible individuals may have said or imagined,—in order to break through into Germany, *when England had only 50,000 troops ready in those first days, as against the vast army of a million superbly equipped men which Germany had ready for instant action on the Belgian frontier*, to say nothing of Belgium's army of defense, also, in face of the fact that it took England *two* years to raise an army large enough to have the *slightest hope of striking through Belgium, against Germany*, had the British even desired it. It is equal folly to claim that France would have invaded Belgium, since she had practically all her army concentrated on the Alsace-Lorraine border, at the other extremity of the country, a fact which proves that even after the German ultimatum (which amounted to a declaration of war)—France did not expect such dishonorable conduct by Germany; and without the aid of England's little army, she would not have been able to save her own capital, Paris, in the battle of the Marne, in her extremity, throwing in, as she did, tens of thousands of young men, *unarmed*, to face certain death, in order to

with thinking like this, will be in for a second

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fill up the lines and check the onrush of the Germans. These are the facts of history. The German government's persistent *falsifying* to the German people and to the world constitutes another of the long list of its atrocities and barbarous crimes, that are prolonging the suffering and horrors of war, even now.

We shall now proceed to the consideration of the *vital* causes of the conflict. We shall take (1) those of the *Entente allies* and (2) those of the *Central Powers*. This general and natural separation of the causes into two groups is necessary because, as stated above, there are different causes for different countries, and as many causes (or more), as there are nations engaged in combat. Let us take the individual States of the allies first.

#### *England's Causes for Going to War*

(1) *Protection* of her colonial possessions and maintenance of her supremacy on the sea and in commerce.

(2) *Democratic* principles vs. autocracy, and opposition to the *militarism* of the German imperial government.

(3) *Germany's* invasion of Belgium and England's treaty obligation in guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. (The same solemn treaty that Germany violated.)

(4) *Maintenance* of the "balance of power" in Europe, threatened by the rapid development and the ambitions of Germany.

#### *France*

(1) *Maintenance* of treaty obligations and their protection (Russia and England in particular).

(2) *Fear of Pan-German* dominance and conquests in Europe, with their dangers to France.

(3) *Revenge*, for Germany's taking Alsace and Lorraine in 1871, with race-hatred engendered by that act.

(4) *Democracy* (France a republic) vs. military autocracy.

(5) *Distrust* (as in England) of the colonial policy and ambitions of Germany.

(6) German invasion compelled France to fight, in self-defense.

### *Russia*

(1) Desire for control in Balkans and possession of Constantinople, with access to the Mediterranean, as against Austria-Hungary's ambitions in the same region (involving conquest).

(2) Racial sympathy with Serbia and other Slavic States.

(3) Distrust and hatred of Germany (by the Russian people especially).

(4) Democracy vs. power of kings (recent factor).

### *Italy*

(1) Hatred of Austria, an enemy of Italian freedom and unity.

(2) Spirit of nationality—completion of unification of Italy, by securing Italian provinces still held by Austria.

(3) Fear of the growing power and ambition of Germany, i. e., Italy wished to maintain the "Balance of Power" in Europe, which Germany was about to overthrow.

(4) Desire for more Italian influence and commercial advantages in the Balkans.

### *The Balkan States—Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, Greece*

(1) Desire to work out their own destinies (spirit of nationality) and be free from Turkish and Austro-Hungarian menaces—a sequel to the Balkan wars of 1912-13.

(2) Securing of natural and national boundaries (race cohesion) as fruits of their conquests of 1911-13, which Austria deprived them of in the moment of victory.

(3) Growth of spirit of democracy (resulting in recent action of Greece).

*Japan*

(1) Fear of commercial power of Germany in the far East and in the Pacific.

(2) Spirit of expansion and nationality.

(3) Economic needs arising from great population with little room to expand.

(4) The Japanese "Monroe Doctrine"—similar to position of U. S. with respect to Latin America.

*Small States of Europe, Asia and America, such as Portugal, Cuba, Siam, and semi-belligerent attitude of several other countries in Eastern and Western Worlds*

(1) Democracy vs. Autocracy.

(2) Violation of international law and rights of neutrality by Germany and other Central powers.

(3) Treaty obligations with larger nations, with protection they afford (as in Cuba with United States, Portugal with England, etc.).

(4) Sufferings and hardships caused by the German submarine blockade and destruction of neutral commerce (so strong as to warrant separation from the four causes above—in fact, the leading cause for war with several of the small States referred to).

*Belgium*

(1) *Invasion by Germany*, which carries with it:

(a) Fight for national honor and for existence—purely a case of self-defense.

(b) Maintenance of her solemn treaty obligations with England and France (the same obligation that Germany had with these same countries and Belgium, and which Germany so contemptuously broke, as "mere scraps of paper").

## THE CENTRAL POWERS

### *Austria-Hungary*

(1) Desire for *control of the Balkans* (conquest) with Constantinople, and predominating influence in the near East, particularly the Mediterranean countries and commerce.

(2) Growth of *nationality* among the Slavic and other peoples of the Austrian Empire, with its consequent peril to the oppressive, autocratic government of the Dual Monarchy—(well may she fear it!)

(3) Growth of *democracy* among the several peoples of the Empire (the companion to *national feeling* and desire for independence).

(4) Pan-Germanism—philosophy of imperialism.

### *Germany*

(1) Militarism,—the doctrine of “blood and iron.”

(2) Jealousy of England’s commercial power and determination to wrest from her the supremacy on the sea, and in colonial commerce.

(3) Pan-Germanism—imperialism, the dream of a Teutonic “Mittel-Europa,” with German domination on the continent of Europe. (Berlin to Bagdad Railroad and country.)

(4) Autocracy’s struggle with the growing spirit of democracy throughout the world—the curse of “divine right” kings.

(5) Domineering German diplomacy (one of the greatest *immediate* causes).

### *Turkey*

(1) Hope of regaining lost provinces in Europe.

(2) Revenge upon the Balkan States for their conquests of Turkish territory in the Balkan wars, 1912-13.

(3) German influence and propaganda.

*Bulgaria*

(1) Revenge upon the other Balkan States for depriving her of much of her conquests in the First Balkan war, 1912.

(2) Hope of regaining her conquests of 1912.

(3) German influences and sympathies, particularly of the ruling house in Bulgaria.

*U. S. REASONS FOR GOING TO WAR WITH  
GERMANY*

(1) To uphold the principles of international law, the sacred obligations of treaties, and the rights of neutrals, and of small States.

(2) The moral ground of humanity, in the scale against barbarism.

(3) To uphold her own honor and respect among the powers of the earth, and to prove the sincerity of her professed principles.

(4) To cast in her powerful resources with the liberal governments of the world with the cause of democracy vs. autocracy,—to help make the world “safe for democracy.”

*Explanation of Causes*

And now, to discuss the above causes briefly. We shall follow the order given in our outline, and take England, of the allies first.

(1) *Protection of colonial possessions and maintenance of supremacy on the sea and in commerce.* It has been claimed by Germany that she has as good right to a colonial empire and supremacy on the sea as England has, which would be true if she gave her colonies the same freedom and self-government that England does hers. But just the opposite is the case, as Germany's colonies in Africa have shown. True enough it is that Great Britain got many of her colo-

nial possessions and much of her consequent commercial power unjustly and by methods of oppression and force. But this nearly all happened before England became the democracy she is today; and she has done as much as any nation on earth could do in recent years to right those wrongs of "kings and aristocracies"—in fact so much that her colonies are allowed more freedom than those of any other country (as England has always done on colonial liberties among the powers of Europe); while on the other hand, Germany's government and exploitation of her colonies has been so oppressive generally speaking, and so feudalistic, that the colonists *hate* her, and welcomed the chance of war to remedy their condition. Again, Great Britain's fleet and commerce threaten the world in no such manner as Germany's do, but have repeatedly been a protection to other countries from diabolical intrigues and aggressions by the German government and its agents. It was Germany above all others that worked and plotted to throw China into anarchy and disruption, at the same time extorting concessions from that helpless government that were most humiliating and embarrassing to the Chinese, as though China were vassal to the Kaiser,—all through a process that exhibited a deliberate policy of atrocity that rivaled in every respect the more recent ravages of Belgium. The Kaiser set these crimes afoot with the injunction to his agents that they should make the power of Germany *felt* in China, that the Chinese should be *impressed* by it. It is the German government that has upheld and been chiefly responsible for the continuation of the horrible, ghastly murders, starvation and practical annihilation of the Armenian Christians in Turkey. By his mere word the Kaiser could easily have put an end to this butchery, any time in these recent years; but instead, a few months ago, after one of the greatest massacres of wholly innocent people was perpetrated, the Kaiser sent the congratulation to the Sultan, "God bless you for your noble victory," etc., etc.

(2) *Democracy versus autocracy.* We have already called attention to the fact that Great Britain as a whole is a democracy practically as much as our own. In fact it is more so, in several particulars (though not in others), especially, since 1900. On the other hand, we need only to read any historical account of the form and workings of the Prussian and German imperial governments to realize that they were practically absolute monarchies,—each in its sphere, and the Kaiser being at the head of both—veiling to the people their feudalistic character (a scheme of Bismarck's, but followed more extensively since) only by *paternalistic reforms*.

(3) *Germany's invasion of Belgium*, besides breaking faith with England, presented a direct menace to that country, from across the Channel, greater than any danger that has confronted her since the period of the early career of Napoleon Bonaparte, before the battle of Trafalgar, more than a century ago. Autocracy so near a growing democracy was not to be tolerated.

(4) As to *maintenance of the "balance of power"* in Europe, we may say that the development of Germany in the present generation,—agriculturally, commercially, scientifically, financially and otherwise industrially—has been *phenomenal*, and has astonished the world! Add to this fact that her *militarism and Machiavellianism in politics have kept pace with all this growth*, and you have the "*Teutonic menace*" to Europe and to the world.

*Next France*, with her causes. France, of course, was more directly menaced than England. Although France had compulsory and universal military service she was more democratic and therefore less prepared for immediate action than was Germany, and was a year—a fateful year—behind Germany in her military program. A democracy cannot mould a people into a perfect military machine so quickly as an *absolute power above them can drive them into it*. Yet, France saw that once more she must fight for *liberty*,



*fraternity* and *equality* against the foe that would crush these foundation principles of democracy. This consideration for France explains both (1) her course for *maintenance of treaty obligations* with her allies and, (2), her *fear of Pan-Germanism* as causes of war for her. Her democracy and existence were both at stake.

(3) *Revenge for the exaction of Alsace-Lorraine* from her by Prussia in 1871 was, naturally, a strong incentive for war on France's part. She has since that fatal year been the leading power in Europe to warn the world against the ambitions of Germany and the Hohenzollerns, and to counsel preparedness for the "inevitable day."

*Third, Russia.* Russia's desire for control of the Balkans and possession of Constantinople, with access to the Mediterranean sea was due chiefly to two causes, namely, (1) Growth of a national consciousness and pride among the most intelligent and influential elements in the State, and (2) the ambition of the Russian monarchs and privileged nobility to *expand* (east, south and southwest—and at an early time, west also, and north) to ice-free and unhampered ports on the seas. Constantinople as the capital of a new and greater Russia had been the dreams of her czars since the time of Peter the Great. In this, of course, the Russia of the Czar was equally guilty with Germany and Austria in stirring up strife and precipitating the greatest of all conflicts. Russia's aggressions in Manchuria, contrary to her solemn pledges to Japan, with Port Arthur as the terminus of her great Trans-Siberian railroad and coveted port on the Pacific, it is well known, was the chief cause of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05.

Russia's other causes are so similar to those of other countries of the allies that they may be passed over here.

*Fourth, Italy.* Of all the allies so far considered—and perhaps of *all* of them, without exception—Italy has been most guilty. She is less democratic than the others—(except Russia at first), though far more so than either Ger-

many or Austria-Hungary—and has allowed her strong spirit of *nationality* and *Italian* unity to lead her into two wars of conquest within a decade, i. e., her war with Turkey in 1911, and the present war. Yet, Italy at heart is democratic, her local government being patterned after that of France and her causes for war are most natural ones and emanate from the people themselves.

*Fifth, the Balkan States.* These have been sufficiently commented on in a former article, and need not be separately treated here. The above outline of their causes will suffice.

*Sixth, Japan.* Japan's motives are also sufficiently clearly given in the above outline of her causes, as are also those in the *seventh* (g), and *eighth* (h) groups of the outline, and to save space we omit further consideration of them at this point.

The above discussion of the allies' causes with the rather full outline of the causes for the Central Powers will perhaps give the situation as affecting the European nations in themselves as complete consideration as is needed. It remains for us to go somewhat more into detail concerning our own country's causes for entering the conflict, and finally, to make a brief summary of causes *in general*, so as to fix the great weight of responsibility for the world tragedy where it rightfully belongs.

Keeping in mind our classification of America's motives in this war, as a concise working basis, we could do no better in elaboration and in exposition of our case against Germany, than to consider thoughtfully the following paragraphs from President Wilson's noted Flag Day Speech of last year.

"It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters

of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf . . . their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance,—and some of those agents were men connected with the official embassy of the German government itself here in our own capital. They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her,—and that by *direct suggestion from the foreign office in Berlin*. . . . They repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had we withheld our hand.

“But this is only part of the story. . . . The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never regarded nations as peoples, men, women and children of like blood and frame as themselves. . . . They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller States in particular, and the people who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their purpose has long been avowed. . . . The rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the

writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmolested, filling the thrones of the Balkan States with German princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies . . . developing plans of sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The demands made by Austria upon Servia were a mere single step in a plan that compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad. They hoped that their demands might not arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the final issue of arms.

“Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia. . . . The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! . . . The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force.

“And they have actually carried the greater part of that plan into execution! . . . The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a single power. . . . The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving Germany, certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships lying in the harbor of Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin. From Hamburg to the Persian gulf, the net is spread.

“Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set and sprung? . . . It wishes to close its bargain before it is too late. . . .

“If they fail, their people will cast them aside; a government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time

except Germany. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain armed; as they will remain, and must be ready for the next step of aggression. . . .

“Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the intrigue for peace? . . . Their present particular aim is to deceive all those who throughout the world stand for the rights of peoples and the self-government of nations; for they see what immense strength the forces of justice and liberalism are gathering out of this war. They are employing liberals in their enterprise. They are using men, in Germany and without, as their spokesmen for their own destruction,—socialists, the leaders of laborers, the thinkers they have hitherto sought to silence. . . .

“The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted in this country than in Russia and in every country in Europe to which the agents and dupes of the imperial German government each gets access. . . . They proclaim the liberal purposes of their masters; declare this a foreign war which can touch America with no danger to either her lands or her institutions; set England at the center of the stake and talk of her ambition to assert economic dominion throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation in the politics of the nations; and seek to undermine the government with false professions of loyalty to its principles. . . .

“The great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a great *people's war*, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included; and with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies . . . and help set the world free, or else stand aside and let it be dominated as long ago, by . . . a power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in

the face of which political freedom must wither and perish.

"For us there is but one choice, we have made it. . . . We are ready to plead at the bar of history." . . .

### Summary and Conclusion

A brief survey of the causes catalogued and discussed in the foregoing articles with the study of the subject they imply, shows the following clear divisions and contrasts:

(1) All the Allied powers and those fighting with them have *democracy*, with its attendant liberties as one of their leading causes; while *none* of the "Central Powers" were democracies, but were fighting for the principles of despotism. This is so universally true that the World War has become, above all else combined, a *struggle of democracy with despotic power*, and those two causes are truly in the balance. This fact alone brands Germany—her kaiser and imperial government, who have been the soul and masters of the Central States—as the chief culprits in this war and the arch-enemies of mankind.

(2) The Central Powers, led by Germany, have been in the present generation (since 1905) the only exponents and defenders of the principle that "might makes right," and have since that time been in the grip of the "war-lords" Bernhardt, Treitschke, "Herr" Ballin, and such like, with the whole leadership of the German army and navy to preach that doctrine, a doctrine so welcome and sweet to the palate of the kaiser and imperial government of Germany. Here I cannot refrain from quoting a few characteristic statements of Bernhardt: "War is the father of all things; . . . a moral obligation, an indispensable factor in civilization . . . Germany is the fittest to survive. . . . The Germans have proved themselves . . . one may say, *the* civilized nation. . . . Absolutely the most important task of a modern State consists in making its armed force as powerful as possible."

(3) In the decade between 1905 and 1915 *five* times Eu-

rope was brought to the verge of a general war—*every time* by the brazen aggressions of the German and Austro-Hungarian governments. *Four* times one or all of the allied States and the small nations they were protecting *yielded*, to save Europe from the devastation of war; but in 1914 they *did not yield*—THEY COULD NOT YIELD and remain free and honorable, treaty-abiding nations.

(4) Finally, with respect to the United States' particular case and cause, we wish it to be borne in mind that, although for two years England violated international law and our right to be neutral through her seizing, holding as contraband and disposing of our cargoes, as well as rifling our mail,—yet she appropriated only *property*, and did not destroy even that; while on the other hand Germany by her submarine warfare *utterly destroyed* (and Germany set her submarine blockade in action first) not only our ships and cargoes, but also *human lives*, the lives of our citizens (who had a perfect right to be on the high seas—never before in the history of civilization were people absolutely denied the use of the open sea)—then boasted of her achievement and celebrated these murders with holidays and rejoicing! Is not the case sufficiently plain? The Judge of all has told us that "Life is more than meat, and the body more than raiment."

We have omitted treatment of some of the lesser and immediate causes of this war, as well as several of the pretexts and excuses, but we feel they are not important enough to demand further space and consideration in this work.

In our next month's article we shall begin an outline and suggestions by which the war may be studied in our schools,—after which the questions of *peace* will be taken up and studied carefully.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS (1911-1913)

**T**HE Turko-Italian war of 1911, in which the Italians so readily overcame the Turks, opened the eyes of the Balkan nations, and convinced them that the time was opportune for a concerted movement to drive the "unspeakable Turk" out of Europe, and especially, out of Balkan affairs. Turkey had proven herself much weaker than was generally anticipated, and her once tributary states in Europe were now confident of victory and the fruits of victory, in the rounding out of their own nationalities and patriotic aspirations. Thus did the Italians' victory over the Turks in 1911 lead directly and immediately to the greater victory of the little Balkan states the next year. They knew that their triumph would eliminate the rule of the Ottoman entirely from Europe, if only the great European powers would leave them alone. As the great powers had a number of times intervened in their struggles with Turkey previously, however, they knew that possibility of intervention still existed. But their chance to win was such that they would run the risk anyway, in the hope that the justice of their cause would stay the meddling hand. And so war came.

As indicated above, the First Balkan war came as a result of the universal conviction of the Balkan states that the time had come to throw off the last remnants of Turkish tyranny, and drive the monster out of Europe. Their strong national feeling and ambition to rule over all the people of their own blood fed the flame.

The Second Balkan war was a fight over the division of the spoils of victory, of which Bulgaria had hardly received



her just share. This was unfortunate, but it was natural, as the victors had come to no previous conclusion as to their respective claims in the region conquered. This trouble was aggravated by Austria-Hungary's intervention at the close of the First war, backed by the "shining sword" of the German Kaiser.

Before the Balkan wars of 1911-13 historians were accustomed to include in the Balkan states Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, Bulgaria, and sometimes Greece. After the First Balkan war a separate state, Albania, was set up, due to the jealous intervention of Austria. That made six. And since Greece received part of the region fought for and has also played an important rôle in the Balkans in the great World War, it is right that she be included in the Balkan group, as she is, geographically, in the peninsula. Accordingly, the writer, whenever referring to the Balkan states as a whole will include Greece.

The Balkan question has been for three quarters of a century, and still is, a most complicated and intricate one. As already observed in an earlier chapter of this work, the wars of the nineteenth century, and particularly of the latter part of the century, have been mostly wars of nationality. It was to be expected, therefore, that this spirit would manifest itself strongly in the Balkans and prove a strong moral force toward victory. Nevertheless, all the world was surprised, and little less than astonished at the swift and terrible defeats that these little states inflicted upon the country that but a short time before had held them under its despotic sway of crime and massacre.

The story of the unification of Italy and Germany we need not recount here, although they had their remote and indirect bearings on the recent Balkan troubles,—especially, since they paved the way for the ambitions of Italy along the Adriatic, and the mutual jealousies and intrigues of the Teutonic and Russian governments in the Near East. And the Crimean war (1853-56) needs little more than passing

mention. This war meant for Turkey (a), the abolition of Russia's protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and of the Czar's claim to special right of intervention in behalf of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, (b) closing of the Straits to the warships of all nations, and (c), the formal admission of Turkey into the family of European powers. It marked also a distinct step on the part of several of the small Balkan principalities toward freedom from Turkish rule, the setting up of independent governments, or their protection, control, or annexation by European powers. The chief significance of this all is that these small states and principalities have ever since remained a continual menace to the "balance of power" and peace of Europe. So they will continue to be if an effective League of Nations is not formed as an immediate outcome of the World war.

Bulgaria was the last of the original Balkan states to obtain independence of Turkey. The Bulgarian Exarchate was established as a separate religious community March 10, 1870. This struggle resulted in a movement toward nationality. Bulgarian insurrections against Turkey broke out in 1875-6, and these led in turn to the Russo-Turkish war and the virtual loss of Bulgaria to Turkey, in 1878. Since that time the Bulgarians have looked to Russia repeatedly for aid, and have considered her their best friend and protector, until the period immediately before the Balkan wars, when their German rulers began to veer them toward the Central powers. Bulgaria's defeat in the Second Balkan war, 1913, at the hands of the other Balkan states sealed her alliance with the Teutonic powers and Turkey; and that explains her line-up in the World War. She had gained her final independence from Turkey in 1908.

By the Congress of Berlin, concluded in July 1878, at the close of the Russo-Turkish war alluded to above, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia and Montenegro were severed from direct rule by the Sultan. Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania achieved their complete independence

at this time, while Bulgaria was a Turkish protectorate in name at least, until 1908, as stated above.

From the remote past the different peoples of the Balkan peninsula have inherited racial animosities and political troubles and confusion. The Bulgarians resented the "tyranny" of the Greeks in ecclesiastical and educational matters. The Albanians have always been wild and ungovernable and unable to assimilate the benefits of ordered government and society. The Roumanians prided themselves in their Roman stock and traditions and held apart from the other peoples of the peninsula. As is stated in the Rand-McNally Atlas (p.42):

For 1000 years the Balkan Peninsula has suffered from political confusion due in part to its geographical position, which made it the meeting-ground of conflicting races and religions. In ancient times it was occupied by various branches of the Arian stock, the Thracians in the northeast, the Illyrians in the northwest, and the Greeks in the south, whose commingling gave rise to the mixed Macedonian type inhabiting the northern central part of the peninsula. Under Roman, and especially under Byzantine rule, it attained its highest development, Constantinople becoming the chief center of the world's civilization and commerce. In the seventh century, A.D., the Servians and Bulgarians, of Slavonic stock, pressed southward into the peninsula, driving the Greeks before them to the south, the Illyrians (ancestors of the present Albanians) to the southwest, and the Romans back toward the northwest. The introduction of Christianity in the ninth century marked the transition from barbarism to civilization. For a time the Bulgarians were masters of the peninsula, but in the fourteenth century the Servians established a short-lived supremacy which by the defeat of their army in 1389, followed by the fall of Constantinople in 1453 gave way before the irresistible advance of the Turk. Four centuries of retrogression ensued, during which the peninsula, with the exception of Dalmatia in the northwest, which continued under Venetian and later passed under Austrian rule, was abandoned to almost hopeless barbarity. It was not until the nineteenth century that the almost smothered germs of national vitality were quickened again under Russian influence, and that the Balkan peoples were aroused to struggle for freedom from the yoke of the "unspeakable" Turk.

Coming back to recent years, we find that Bulgaria's desire to annex neighboring parts of European Turkey inhabited by Slav, especially Macedonia, was widely cherished, and more or less tension existed with Serbia, Greece and Austria even before the first Balkan war. It was also realized

that strategically Roumania's position was one of commanding importance. This can easily be seen by a glance at the map, which will show the peculiar shape and frontiers of Roumania. She has stood in the pathway of both Teuton and Russian advance toward the regions beyond the Black Sea, and, second only to Serbia, in these same powers' path to the eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor and the Orient. Thus, the security of Roumania, like the other small states of this region, depended upon a delicate tension of international relations that has justly been called the "powder-box" of Europe. And even now, let me repeat, only a strong League of Nations can guarantee peace in this troublesome region in the future.

As Bulgaria was the *last* of the Balkan states (save only Albania) to gain her complete independence of Turkey, so Serbia was the *first* (save only Greece). But that did not make hers a stable government. She virtually gained her independence in 1829, immediately after Greece became free from Turkey. And complete independence was given her by the treaty of Berlin, 1878. Her progress, considering her opportunity has been disappointing,—the most so of all the Balkan states; and this has made her all the more a prey to Austrian and German intrigues. The new Jugo-Slav state, however, with a greater Serbia as the nucleus, gives promise of better things for the future.

It was a general conviction of the students of the Balkan affairs just previous to the World War that, in case of a breakout of war in this region, the Central Powers and Russia would each attempt to seize as big a slice of the Balkan regions as possible; the Russians would make for Constantinople, the Austrians for Serbia, Macedonia and the Saloniki coast; the English would make for the Dardanelles, to protect their Eastern possessions; the French for Rhodes, parts of Asia Minor and Syria, and the Italians for Albania and the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic. They were not very far wrong when the World War came. Said M. Berard:

“The outcome cannot be anything but a general European war of the most terrible kind.” (See Victor Berard, “The Balkan Question,” Villari volume, with Introduction by James Bryce.)

Italy’s interest and part in the Balkan question in this period was summed up by an Italian as follows:—“Italy has every interest in preventing the influence of Austria and Russia in Macedonia from extending and being gradually converted into a more or less effective dominion.”—(By an Italian deputy.) This feeling and interest explains the tenacity with which the Italian delegates to the peace conference cling to their shadowy claim to Albania and the southern Adriatic coast.

While studying the Balkan situation just previous to the First Balkan war in 1911 the author of the present volume made this statement: “The idea prevails in Europe that the time has come for the solution of this most perplexing problem. England seems most anxious that this be speedily accomplished. According to Mr. Bryce there are two solutions. One is the absorbing of the existing nationalities into the great dominions and great nations which border upon Turkey. The other is the growth of these nationalities, or some of them, into nations and states. The latter, I think is the more satisfactory solution, and will prove the more likely, providing the great powers do not unjustly intervene. Mr. Bryce concludes his chapter (‘Introduction to the Eastern Question’) with these words: ‘He who, looking above and beyond the dust of current politics, will try to fix his eyes, as Mr. Gladstone did, upon the heights of a more distant landscape, will find reason to think that the development of these nationalities has in it more promise for the future than the extension of the sway of one or two huge military empires, and will believe that to encourage and help them to grow into nations is an aim to which such great and enlightened peoples as those of England, France and Italy may fitly direct their efforts.’” This is ample evidence to the

writer's mind, of Great Britain's more liberal policy in international politics in recent years, under the wise tutelage and leadership of such men as Gladstone and Lord Bryce. And as a sequel to this statement that I made eight years ago, let me say that the present Jugo-Slav movement has been made acceptable to the Allied nations through such earlier championship as that mentioned in the above quotation. It is not a new movement, born of the War, but is now, because of the World War, realizable beyond the fondest hopes of its early champions.

We have omitted at this point of our study of the causes of war in recent years, any separate treatment of the causes of the Turko-Italian war of 1911, because we gave rather a detailed statement of the underlying cause and the meaning of this war in our chapter in which we treated *wars of nationality* of which this one between Italy and Turkey is (on Italy's part) the most prominent one of the twentieth century, previous to the World War. We may add in passing, however, that there was a good deal of *sentiment*, the vision and memory of the glories of ancient Rome and her sway over the land of the Carthaginians,—in the zeal with which the Italians fought the Turks and their subjects in northern Africa. Then too, this war meant one of the final steps in the unification of Italy, as the Italians conceived a united Italy to be,—the same thing that led them to enter the World War against Austria, for the provinces of the Trentino and Trieste.

## CHAPTER IX

### CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904)

**T**HE cause of the war for Japan was mostly economic rather than political.<sup>1</sup> It goes back to the enormous increase in Japan's population, the growth of her industries and commerce, and on the other hand to the inadequateness of her agriculture to supply a living for her growing population or to produce sufficient raw material for her manufactures. For these very reasons, Japan has felt that she could not allow any other nation to secure a controlling influence in any part of the Chinese Empire, much less in Korea.<sup>2</sup>

With Russia, the cause was primarily political rather than economic. It was therefore less vital than that of Japan. Economically, Russia had no such reason for bringing on such a conflict as had Japan. She is able to take care of herself for a long time to come, in that respect.

Russia's great political aim, as Professor Hershey states, was to gain access to the sea in four directions, viz.: Black Sea and Mediterranean, Baltic Sea, Persian Gulf, Pacific Ocean.<sup>3</sup> This has been her vision and ambition ever since the time of Peter the Great. She is still actively striving for all but the northern one of these. (And in passing it may be observed that this desire to secure such outlets helps to explain, to a considerable degree, many of the nineteenth century wars in these regions and is no small contributory cause to those conflicts.)

<sup>1</sup> Hershey, "Int. Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War," p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> "The Japanese people have grown to such numbers that they need an outlet beyond the sea and cannot resign into strong hands their nearest field for colonization and expansion"; Lawrence, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Hershey, p. 3.

Expansion in the direction of the Pacific has seemed to Russia to involve the least resistance as well as being of immense importance to her in Oriental politics and commercial influence.

Her great efforts of recent years have been directed toward securing an ice-free port on the Pacific. This was directly her reason for the occupation of Korea.

While the relations of Russia with the Far East go back to the conquest of Siberia and even farther, we are particularly concerned here only with her advances in the latter part of the 19th century.<sup>4</sup>

In 1867 Russia got a strong hold on the island of Saghalien. She exercised joint sovereignty with Japan over the island. In 1875 she found means to oust Japan and appropriated the whole island to herself. This is an excellent example of Russian unscrupulousness that was bound, sooner or later, to be met by the desperate revenge of the Japanese. Such action of Russia only helped on the Europeanizing of Japan to meet her hated rival in the Far East.

The events which finally brought Russia and Japan into collision, arose from Russia's construction of the Trans-

<sup>4</sup>The history of Russian politics in Manchuria may be divided into four periods:

- (1) From the beginning (three centuries back) to the "Cassini Convention," 1896, which conceded to her first privileges in the North of this province,—principally the right to build the Trans-Siberian Railway across the Chinese territory to Vladivostock.
- (2) From 1896 to the Boxer Uprising, 1900. During this period Russia obtained the cession on lease of Port Arthur and the right to prolong the Railroad to this port by a branch which traverses all Manchuria.
- (3) From 1900 to the agreement for the evacuation of Manchuria, 1902. Boxer uprising gave Russia the pretext and occasion to conquer Manchuria and establish herself there firmly.
- (4) From 1902 to the outbreak of War (Feb., 1904). Convention signed with China for evacuation of Manchuria—followed by period of negotiations—in which Japan distinguishes herself by her opposition to Russia and brings on the War.—According to M. Rey, on Causes of Russo-Japanese War in *Revue General de Droit International Public*, V, XII, 215-ff.



Siberian Railway to the Pacific, with the end in view (her long cherished hope) of securing an ice-free port on the Pacific.

Railroads in the Far East have been the forerunners and occasions of war. Russia was trying to grasp a port that was not hers. She under-estimated the fatal consequences of such an action.

If Russia had confined her aggressive movements to Manchuria alone, the present history of the Far East would doubtless have been far different. But, to secure her ends, she made similar encroachments in Korea, particularly in interfering in this peninsula after the China-Japanese War.<sup>5</sup>

Korea had been tributary to both China and Japan for centuries. She claimed independence at various times. In 1875, the Koreans fired upon a Japanese man-of-war and in redress were forced to open trade with Japan and receive a Japanese minister at the Korean Court.

China unwillingly gave up her suzerainty over Korea, 1875-85. She now agreed with Japan that if events should necessitate Chinese or Japanese troops in Korea and either sent troops, the other should be notified. In 1894 on the abduction and assassination of a Korean rebel, Chinese and Japanese troops *were* sent. Reforms in the Korean government were now urged by Japan.<sup>6</sup> China refused to consent to these reforms. Japan gave her ultimatum, following up with the capture of the Korean capital and king.<sup>7</sup> Both empires then prepared for war and in July, 1894, the con-

<sup>5</sup> See Hershey, "Int. Law & Dip. of Rus.-Jap. War, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> In 1868 Japan, making up from feudalism to the modern type of government determined to reassert her former claims upon Korea. The Koreans insolently refused this vassalage. Japan recognized Korea's independence in 1876 but new ports were opened to Japanese trade in 1880.

<sup>7</sup> It was Korea's opposition to the "open door" policy which led to the intervention of Japan and China and the stationing of Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea. Another insurrection in Korea in 1894, brought Chinese and Japanese troops face to face again and was followed by the Chino-Jap. War in 1895.

flict began.<sup>8</sup> Peace was made in March, 1895. China ceded Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa to Japan.

The terms of peace of the Chino-Japanese War having given Japan the Liaotung Peninsula with an important ice-free port, the outcome of the war afforded Russia an opportunity to administer a severe blow to Japan and ingratiate herself with China. This was accomplished by Russia leading in a Russo-French-German "recommendation"<sup>9</sup> to Japan not to take possession of the Liaotung Peninsula. Backed by France and Germany, she intervened with a threat, saying that Japan's possession of the peninsula would be a "perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East."<sup>10</sup> Japan, under this pressure, gave up the peninsula to China. She relinquished all her claim November 8, 1895, for a consideration of 30,000,000 taels. This was one of the causes of the Russo-Japanese War—It was another wound to Japanese pride that was to be avenged later at the expense of Russia. It simply hastened the struggle, however, for war, sooner or later, was inevitable.

<sup>8</sup> As Hazen gives it, "The immediate cause was the relations of the two powers to Korea."

<sup>9</sup> The Recommendation is as follows: "The imperial Russian Government having examined the terms of peace demanded by Japan of China, consider the contemplated possession of the Liaotung peninsula by Japan will not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but will also render the independence of Korea illusory, and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East. Accordingly, the Imperial Government, in a spirit of cordial friendship for Japan, hereby counsel the Government of the Emperor of Japan to renounce the definitive possession of the Liaotung peninsula. Lawrence, p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> "The insincerity of the powers in talking about the integrity of China and the peace of the East was not long in manifesting itself. The intervening powers immediately set about reaping their reward. Russia secured the right to run the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian railroad across Manchuria, a province of China, to Vladivostock, and to construct a branch line south from Harbin into the Liaotung peninsula, with a terminus at Taliénwan. At the end of a certain time, and under certain conditions this railroad was to pass into the possession of China, but meanwhile Russia was given the right to send her own soldiers into Manchuria to guard it. This was the beginning of Russian control of Manchuria. She poured tens of thousands of troops into that Chinese province and gradually acted as if it were Russian. She also acquired extensive mineral and timber rights in the province. Hazen, "Europe Since 1815," p. 697.

The establishment of the Russo-Chinese bank was another event which offended Japan. The treaty of 1896 between China and Russia opened up all the harbors of China to Russia.

In January, 1898, she got control of the Liaotung Peninsula for twenty-five years through pressure and a threat of war on England if England refused it. In the words of Mr. Rose, "Port Arthur was to become the Gibraltar of the Far East."<sup>11</sup> What did this mean?<sup>12</sup> It meant that the Czar of Russia had compelled China to cede to his already enormous empire the very peninsula whose acquisition by "little Japan," had been pronounced by the European powers to be an unwarrantable disturbance of the balance of power in the East. No greater insult could have been given the Japanese government and people.<sup>13</sup> There is no questioning the fact that mis-government in Korea was a real menace to the peace of the East. By the natural course of events it would offer a ready prey to Russia whenever she should choose to lay hands on it.

For a long time in Japan there had been a strong war party in favor of overrunning Korea and repeatedly with difficulty it was kept down.

The Queen of Korea, in 1895, believed that the welfare of her country depended on continued association with China and the preservation of Chinese standards of civilization.

The Japanese became complicated in her murder, October, 1895. The king took refuge in Russian legation at Seol

<sup>11</sup> Rose, II, p. 317.

<sup>12</sup> "That Russia did not look upon her possession as merely a short lease, but as a permanent one, was unmistakably shown by her conduct. She constructed a railroad south from Harbin, connecting with the Trans-Siberian. She threw thousands of troops into Manchuria; she set about immensely strengthening Port Arthur as a fortress, and a considerable fleet was stationed there. To the Japanese all this seemed to prove that she supposed ultimately to annex the immense province of Manchuria, and later probably Korea, which would give her a large number of ice-free harbors and place her in a dominant position on the Pacific, menacing, the Japanese felt, the very existence of Japan."—Rose.

<sup>13</sup> Rose, II, p. 317.

and Japan had a terrible indemnity to pay, for the Russo-Japanese war had this murder as a remote cause. Russian influence had taken the place of the Japanese and all that Japan had done in the past was undone. Korea was rapidly becoming a Russian possession when the Russo-Japanese war broke out and Japan thus recovered her control over Korea.<sup>14</sup>

Japan now realized, if never before, the ultimate object of Russia and that war was the only recourse left to the island nation, if she was to be an important factor in Oriental affairs.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> In 1898 an agreement was signed by Russia and Japan which put Japan on an equal footing with Russia and Korea. But rivalry between the two nations, Russia and Japan, continued and Russia undoubtedly was the aggressor. Russia pressed continually for further leases in the country. This was a source of great anxiety to Japan. Russian soldiers were actually occupying the country, not simply protecting Russian interests. "The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interests of Japan. If Russia was established on the flank of Korea it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire. Korea is an important outpost of Japan's line of defense, and Japan considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety." Hershey, pp. 52-3, quoting from correspondence between Japan and Russia, translated by Asakawa, p. 29.

<sup>15</sup> As Lawrence remarks, "It is a matter of life and death for Japan to keep Korea out of the hands of any strong and aggressive state. F. J. Lawrence, "War and Neutrality in the Far East," p. 1.

Russia was disposed to maintain that the question of negotiation between her and China concerning Manchuria and Korea were not of a nature to be submitted to other nations. In fairness to her it must be conceded that there was some ground for Russian position and attitude in the Far East, and for her delay in withdrawing her troops from Manchuria. This, however, does not excuse her for repeated breaches of trust with China and the other powers concerned. The Russian position is perhaps nowhere better stated than by Count Lansdorff (on 27th of January, 1902), Sec. Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 929. He says: "The imperial government of Russia has no intention of dealing a blow to the principle of the 'open door' as she understands it, and Russia has not the least intention, at this moment to modify her political stand on this point. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain concessions in China, the agreement of a private character relative to those concessions would not be different from those concluded at other times by many other foreign corporations. But, would it not be truly strange if the *Door* which is *opened* to certain nations were closed to Russia, whose

Articles were now prepared by the Japanese Government as the basis of understanding. The essential features were:

1. A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, and to maintain the "open door" in these countries, and 2, a reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and of Russia's special interests in Manchuria.

Russia's reply after eight weeks was substantially as follows:

1. The mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interest in Korea.

3. Recognition of the right of Japan to send troops to Korea.

4. Mutual engagement to consider that part of the ter-

frontiers join those of Manchuria, when she has been forced by recent events to send her troops into this province to reestablish order in the evident and common interest of all nations? It is true that Russia has conquered Manchuria, but she maintains her firm determination to restore it to China and to recall her troops as soon as the necessary measures are taken to avoid an outbreak of trouble in the neighboring territories. It is impossible to deny that an independent state has the right to accord to others such concessions, and I have some reason to believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not exceed—those which have been so often formulated by other foreign Societies. I judge that, in these circumstances, it would not be easy for the imperial government to refuse to Russian societies—that which is given by other governments to Societies and syndicates of their own nationality."—M. Rey, in *Causes of Russo-Japanese War in Revue General De Droit International Public*, XII, 267.

"Russia was not disposed to abandon Manchuria and it was manifest that she was seeking only pretexts for putting off the date of evacuation."—Rey, p. 276.

La Russe h'a pas le droit d'abandonner ses interests en Manchourie et ne peut sortir de la voie qu'elle s'est trac'ee. Elle ne pourra retirer ses troupes de Manchourie que lorsqu elle sera convaincue qu'il n'existe plus de danger pour ses possessions et commencera le peuplement de la zone de son cheinen de fer quand elle le jugera a propos.—Rey, p. 276, French translation of one of the many official Russian statements on this affair.

ritory of Korea lying to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.

5. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interests.

In the meantime, Russia's aggression, both in Manchuria and Korea, was increasing daily.

The Boxer uprising in China in 1900 "added fresh causes of quarrel to those already in existence." The Chinese authorities in Manchuria attacked the "foreign" Russian officials and settlers there. In a very short time the whole province was in Russian military occupation.

"It will thus be seen that in these counter-proposals Russia not only reduced Japan's demands regarding Korea, but imposed new conditions upon Japan in that country. But—most significant of all—she quietly ignored the most important part of Article I of the Japanese proposals, viz., that part which stipulated for a mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire and to maintain the 'open door' in China and Korea,"<sup>16</sup> . . . "if not indeed to preserve her status as an independent state for the future.

"It became to her as clear as daylight that the new position she had acquired in the Orient by her victory over China could be maintained and even her independence must be guarded only by an armament powerful enough to give her a voice among the first powers of the world."<sup>17</sup>

Russia's methods were practically without scruple. Neither the Russian Court nor the officials and army in Manchuria and Korea could be relied on for the fulfillment of their promises to China, Japan, Korea or any of the European nations. She withdrew her troops from the southwest of Mukden province by October 8, 1902. On the date set for

<sup>16</sup> Hershey, *International Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War*, p. 56.

<sup>17</sup> *Idem*, p. 9. Quoted from Asakana's "The Russo-Jap. Conflict," pp. 79-80.

her withdrawal from the remainder of the province, however, April 8, 1903, she was still in full occupancy and it was evident that not even a nominal withdrawal was intended."<sup>18</sup>

Russia's persistent failure in the face of repeated promises to withdraw her troops from China after the Boxer uprising led directly, we may say, to the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.<sup>19</sup>

"The inspiring force which moved some 40,000 men gladly to lay down their lives on the hills around Port Arthur was the feeling that they were helping to hurl back in the face of Russia, the gauntlet which she had there so insolently flung down as to an inferior race."<sup>20</sup>

Russia's demands of China in 1903, among other things, included the closing of Manchuria against the economic enterprises of all foreigners except Russians and the opening of no new treaty-ports without Russia's consent.<sup>21</sup>

The final year of negotiation (1904) had come. After three successive overtures of the Japanese government to Russia, the views of the two governments were apparently as irreconcilable as ever. Japan made still a fourth attempt to obtain a favorable reply from Russia, and its provisions were as follows:

1. Suppression of the clause (in Article 5) requiring Japan not to use any part of Korea for strategical purposes.

2. Suppression of the whole Article (6) concerning the establishment of a neutral zone.

3. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest, provided that Russia will engage (a) to respect the territorial integrity of China and Manchuria, (b) to recognize the treaty rights, including those of the settlement of Japan and other Powers

<sup>18</sup> Hershey, *Int. Law & Dip. of Russo-Jap. War*, pp. 33-4.

<sup>19</sup> See Rose, pp. 318-19.

<sup>20</sup> Rose, p. 319.

<sup>21</sup> *Idem*, p. 35.

in Manchuria, (c) to recognize Korea and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest.

4. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria, and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests.

The Russian reply to this last proposal of Japan was not returned until Feb. 7, 1904, the day after diplomatic relations between the two countries had ceased. Thus we see that Russia's persistent delay in withdrawing her troops from Chinese territory in the year after the Boxer uprising led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war.

Japan "had expended much blood and treasure in order to secure a predominating interest in the Korean peninsula. . . . The rapid growth of Russian power in the Pacific coasts, the enforced cession of Saghalien in 1875, and of the Liaotung Peninsula with the hard-won Port Arthur 20 years later, had aroused profound distrust of Russian policies in the minds of Japanese statesmen."<sup>22</sup>

Without attempting to give all the factors that bore upon the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan, we may reduce the fundamental causes of the war to two, viz.: (1) Russia's determination to secure if possible, an ice-free port on the Pacific, with Russian control of Manchuria and Korea—mainly a political interest; (2) Japan's equal determination that this should not be accomplished—mainly an economic interest and question of ultimate self-preservation.

<sup>22</sup> C. M. Hist., XII, p. 577.



## CHAPTER X

### CAUSES OF THE BRITISH-BOER WAR

THE American press and people in general have been inclined to lay the blame of this war almost entirely on the British.<sup>1</sup> They have done this more or less blindly,

<sup>1</sup>British occupation of South Africa began in 1806, when Cape Town was surrendered to the English. In the London Convention of 1814, the Dutch surrendered to the English Crown their claims to Cape Colony and some other adjacent territory, for a consideration of £6,000,000 sterling. British immigration to South Africa began about the year 1819. In 1825 an Executive Council was appointed to assist the Governor of the colony. In 1828 the Hottentots received equal rights in the law (courts) with the Europeans. In the years 1833-5 the abolition of slavery was accomplished. This was accompanied by disturbances that assumed serious proportions. Discontent with the British rule had not been wholly lacking before; as a result of the liberties given them in 1828, the Hottentots had broken loose from several restraints imposed upon them formerly, by the English administration; there had been considerable friction before the Dutch were ready to surrender Cape Colony, in 1814; but these were as nothing compared with the storm that arose in 1834. "The great wrong which stirred the Dutch to the depths was the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 1834." Green: "Causes of South African War," p. 5. And Doyle, who has written perhaps the best account of the causes and events leading up to the final war, says: "The emancipation of slaves in 1834 fanned the smouldering discontents into a flame." Doyle: "The War in South Africa," p. 5.

There were two reasons for this outburst, (1) A very inadequate sum was appropriated for the slave-owners in return for the loss of their slaves. (2) The money was paid over in London, and because of this fact, the colonists received but little of it. This worked a real hardship to the Boer farmers. It meant beggary to a number of them. The war of 1834-5, waged by the British against the Kaffirs, was very unjust to the latter, and they were almost immediately restored to their former homes. Many of the Boer farmers now determined to leave the colony, and migrate farther inland, away from the domination of the British. The first *trek* was in 1836. The long journey, with its perils and hardships, broke up all local self-government and the science of cooking, etc., and put these Boers back into their medieval ancestral type of government and individual liberty. This backward step in civilization is no small factor in explaining the failure of the British to conciliate the Boers, and the gradual growth of a hostile spirit that was to culminate in war of the two races.

In 1848 Sir Harry Smith was sent out as Governor of the Colony. He

through prejudice, or without a sufficient knowledge of the facts. There are not lacking, however, in this country as well as in England, eminent authorities who justify for the most part, if not altogether, England's action and policy in South Africa. Indeed, opinion seems to be pretty evenly divided, among those who are in a position to judge wisely and impartially. Green, in his "Causes of the War in South Africa," is decidedly favorable to Great Britain. He contends and rightly, that the rule of Great Britain was a distinct advance and uplift for the Boers as well as the natives; that the Boer and not the English administration was the oppressor of the natives, and that it was liberty only for himself that the Boer sought; Doyle,<sup>2</sup> who can hardly be denied the merit of making a studied attempt to be fair and unprejudiced in his account, feels that it is his duty as well as his right, to defend his country against much of the abuse that has been heaped upon it, and to vindicate for the most part, her policy. Among other things he says: "That to no one of the British states has she ever had a more

declared the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers British Territory. This led to war. England was victorious, but had to give up the Orange River Sovereignty, because the Home government did not sufficiently support the Governor. Sir Geo. Grey was the next governor, 1854-9. His was a wise rule. The franchise was made liberal and representative government was established. Meanwhile, the Boer government in the Transvaal had become very chaotic. Finances were in a deplorable condition. The people were oppressively taxed. However, in 1857 the Transvaal Republic was launched. This was followed by civil war, which dragged on for some time. In 1871 the discovery of diamonds and the foundation of Kimberly opened a new era for this troublesome and disputed territory. The year 1872 marks the beginning of responsible government in the original Cape Colony of South Africa. Cecil Rhodes came over in 1871.

Diamond region (around Kimberly) was claimed by (1) Orange Free State; (2) Transvaal Republic; (3) an individual, named Waterboer. Waterboer placed himself under the British government, which presently erected the country into a crown colony (in 1871). Later investigations found that Waterboer had never enjoyed any right to the territory. The British government, claiming that a strong power was necessary to preserve the peace and govern the people offered the Free State £90,000 sterling for its claim to the colony. This was accepted, and the controversy was closed, although a sense of injustice continued to rankle in the breasts of many of its citizens. Bryce, pp. 148-49.

<sup>2</sup>Doyle, A. C.: "The War in South Africa."

incontestible right," than to this, both by the right of conquest and the right of purchase; that England had the same kind of a problem the United States would have had if the Dutch of Pennsylvania had moved West and set up a different form of government from that of the United States, and United States had come in contact with this foreign government in her westward expansion. Mr. James Bryce, whose opinion always carries weight and merits the greatest consideration, while admitting on the one hand evils of the English rule, her many mistakes and blunders, on the other hand in the general policy and administration of the English rule, justifies his government. He states that the Boers had gone backward in civilization; were separated for two centuries from European culture and political systems; that they would not work the gold when they found it, had an aversion for commerce, industrial pursuits, and finance, and absolute incapacity for such pursuits; that into this condition it was that there came the swarm of gold-seekers after 1884. Sanderson, another English author, while excusing his country still less than Bryce, still cannot lay the blame of the war upon his government, although he does hold Cecil Rhodes somewhat responsible.

On the other hand, there are both moderate and violent partisans of the Boers' cause and actions. Of the former class the French author Despagnet is a good example. He dismisses from the very first any of the alleged grievances of the British as real causes of the war. On what he considers as the fundamental cause, he comments as follows:

"It is in the general schemes of English politics for several years that we are to seek the true motives of the war and this war itself is only one manifestation, the most grave it is true, of the end pursued by Great Britain since she has become dominated by aspirations of quasi-universal supremacy disguised under the name of imperialism." This very expression is used by another Frenchman (Peyronnard) in his "*Des Causes de la Guerre*, quoted fr. R. G. C. I,

VII, p. 85. It is his opinion that the war was not only not justified by any of the alleged grievances, but not even explained by them. Continuing, he says: "Is it, then, a war of races:—that of the Anglo-Saxon against the Dutch in South Africa?" "No!" answers Mr. Westlake: "It is a war for an ideal." That ideal is the English policy of liberal government, of equality of rights to all as against the Boer régime of domination and privilege.<sup>3</sup> (The author [Despagnet] gives it as his view that it can hardly be believed that England would go into such a war merely for an *ideal*.)

Another claim of some English authors is—according to Despagnet—that, Great Britain, having once acquired authority in certain regions, finds herself obligated to defend the interests which she has developed there, and it is natural and just that the neighboring districts become tributary to her, because they will grow normally or naturally into the sphere of her influence.

The real policy he insists is found in the triumph of the imperialistic idea in England and the principal cause of the war is the pressure of financiers and speculators engaged in the gold mines. He holds D'Israeli chiefly responsible for the imperialism-political evolution as he designates it, of England, that brought on her conquests in South Africa.

The German press and people, as we would naturally expect, were rather violently opposed to Great Britain in this war. The extreme sentiment is voiced by the historian, Theodore Mosen, in giving what he considers as the feeling in Germany toward England, and particularly on the British-Boer War. Among other things he says:

"The radical defects of the English system, the trampling on nations subjugated and despised, and the prevalence of money interests . . . has become too evident. . . . As far as I know, every German is at heart with the Boers, and that not because their cousinship is a little closer than the

<sup>3</sup> See Westlake, *The Transvaal War*, pp. 1 to 5.

English, but partly because the hate against your countrymen has reached fearful . . . dimensions; partly because this war is not only a calamity . . . but an infamy." What a joke this statement is, considering Germany's treatment of *her* colonies!

In our study of the motives and immediate and remote causes of this war, we find that there is quite a complexity of interests and provocations, some quite vague and flimsy and others more clearly manifest and certain.

It is Mr. Doyle's opinion that it was a dangerous venture for Great Britain to change the habits of this most conservative Teutonic stock of people. If she had not tried this, conciliation might have succeeded (beginning with 1814.) He holds England responsible for the war in the following respects:

1. Severe and injudicious punishment of Dutch farmers. Dutch could not forget it.

2. Emancipation of slaves, 1834, "fanned the smoldering discontents into a flame."

3. The Boers moved into Natal to get away from the British, but when they got there, they found that the English had preceded them in occupation—by sea. An unwelcome information indeed. (In leaving Natal, the Boers left what they had fought the fierce Zulus to gain and could not leave it but with a sense of deep injury to themselves.)

4. Delay in promised reforms after the annexation (in 1877) and an unsuitable governor,<sup>4</sup>—Sir Owen Lanyon.

Montague White, former Consul General of South African Republic in London, classifies the causes of the English-Boer War substantially as follows:

1. Discontented and irreconcilable element in Johannesburg—one of the most important factors.

2. Conservative Dutch farmers intensified in their re-

<sup>4</sup>On the conduct of the Boers as a republic, he says: "Can it be wondered at, that South Africa has been in a ferment ever since, and that the British Africander has yearned with an intensity of feeling unknown in England for the hour of revenge?"

sistance by 65 years of bitter experience with Great Britain.

3. Sudden inrush of a mining, commercial and speculative community.

4. Clumsy diplomacy.

5. Greed for gold-capitalism.

6. Lust for empire (yellow press of London its mouth-piece).

7. Thirst of revenge—remembering defeats and outrages upon Englishmen.—*N. A. Rev.* 170: 225-ff.

Captain Mahan, U. S. N. (*N. A. Rev.* 170, pp. 313-4), in discussing the causes of the English-Boer War, holds England responsible in two respects, viz.:

1. Her insistence that a large alien population in the Transvaal be relieved from grievous political and social wrongs.

2. England's claim of the right of suzerainty in this matter.

Causes of the war in South Africa are classified by Mr. Green as follows:

British rulers in various ways annoyed the old inhabitants, as for example—

1. The injudicious introducing of English language prematurely into the courts and public offices before the people were able to understand it.

2. Their early military rule was sometimes arbitrary.

3. Missionaries were a constant source of trouble to the Boers because they taught the natives the equality of all men before the law, and since they were the only friends the poor blacks had, they made it a point of conscience to report to London every act of injustice which came to their knowledge.

4. The great wrong which stirred the Dutch to the depths was the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 1834—

a. Insufficient compensation for them.

b. Paid over in London so that colonists received

but little of it and this meant beggary to many of the colonists.

The Boers held that emancipation was the crowning wrong, that slavery was sanctioned by the Old Testament and that people might as well take away their oxen as their slaves. This emancipation and squandering of the slaveholders money in London led to the "Great Trek" in 1836.

5. Lack of tact of Great Britain in annexing Transvaal republics in 1877. Great Britain was too hasty in her action.

6. Finally the indiscretion of Britain with regard to Transvaal independence. Krugar had been in England and had heard Gladstone condemn the high-handed annexation of the Transvaal. When Gladstone came into power, however, he allowed the annexation to remain as an accomplished act. The Boers were bitterly disappointed in his action and an insurrection followed, in which the Boers won many noted victories.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand we have the Boer injustices. . . .

7. Their denial of fundamental and necessary rights and privileges to outlanders such as water-supply, sewerage, street lights, pavements and proper police; independent courts of justice; rights to plead in English; English schools, etc. These Outlanders, already a majority ruled by a tyrannical and ignorant minority of Boers, thus led to the formation of the Transvaal National Union, the object of which was to agitate reform in 1892.

8. The Jameson raid in 1895 was a capital blunder. This

<sup>5</sup>Internal independence was restored to the people of the Transvaal in 1881 and reaffirmed in 1884. The British in South Africa were indignant at this action which they called surrender to the Boers. They urged complete conquest and control to all South Africa by England. This the mother country had scruples against doing, and seemed in the ever-increasing probability of a European war, to be unwilling to do. The Boers saw nothing in this action but cowardice and from this time on they treated the British government as infamous, planned to be wholly independent of them and to drive them and their language out of all South Africa.

gave Kruger the pretext to say that the Union and even the British Cabinet sought to gain its end by *force* and not by reason. It alienated the sympathies of all Dutch descent throughout South Africa.

9. Green is very emphatic in stating that this was a war of race opposition and the clash of the two civilizations. He says, "It was as if two centuries had run against each other." The African Dutchman lived a different life from the Europeans—and as a consequence there was no fusion in the Transvaal.

Professor Naville of Geneva considers the corrupting effect of a flood of wealth that came without labor to be the chief cause of the war. It was, at least, the final cause, though not the greatest. If the cause just mentioned might have been eliminated, there would not have been the two bitter contending forces to fly at each other. There might have been a blending of German and English, as there was in New York.

### *The Causes of the Final Quarrel*

After the discovery of gold in abundance in 1886, there was "not a wrong which had driven the Boer from Cape Colony which he did not now practice upon the Uitlanders. The Pretoria government, for example, became a most corrupt oligarchy.

The wrongs of the Uitlanders he sums up as follows:

1. Heavily taxed, they provided seven-eighths of the revenue of the country.

2. Despite this prosperity they had brought, they were deprived of the right to vote and could by no means influence the disposal of the great sums which they were providing.

3. Had no voice in choice or payment of officials. Men of the worst private character might be placed with complete authority over valuable interests.



4. Had no control over education—though paid the taxes.

5. No power of municipal government—very unsanitary and corrupt cities.

6. Despotic government in the matter of the press and the right of public meetings.

7. Disability from service upon a jury.

8. Continual harassing of the mining interests by vexatious legislation.

(a) Dynamite monopoly.

(b) Liquor laws—Kaffirs habitually drunk.

(c) Incompetence and extortions of State-owned railroads.

(d) Surrounding Johannesburg with tolls from which the towns had no profits, etc.<sup>6</sup>

Distinct from all the former definite wrongs, it was a constant irritation to freeborn and progressive men, accustomed to liberal institutions that they should be despotically ruled by corrupt, narrow-minded bigots and buffoons, as eighty per cent of their rulers were.

In defense of the Boers it may be said that if they had allowed the Uitlanders privileges and citizenship they would soon have usurped the government and they themselves would again have been obliged to leave their homes or become mere dependents.

The argument of the Boers would be more valid if they had received no benefit from the incomers. The foreigners' thrift made the Boers, themselves, rich. "Had President Kruger given the franchise generously to the Uitlander, his pyramid would have been firm upon its base and not balanced upon its apex."

It was a settled animosity of Kruger and the leading Boers against the Uitlanders and the British in general that pre-

<sup>6</sup>The salary list had become twenty-four times what it was when Uitlanders arrived, and five times the total revenue then in 1899.

vented any compromise or understanding with them. No little part of this was due moreover to sheer ignorance on the part of the Boers.

Everyone must admit that Cecil Rhodes, in his zeal for the growth of the British power in South Africa, was somewhat unscrupulous in the use of means to gain that power. "He would rather carry a strong position by storm than trust to the slower and safer methods of investing and starving out the foe."<sup>7</sup> He was responsible for the Jameson Raid, in 1895, which is the blackest spot on English rule in South Africa, and did more than anything else to turn all the Dutch descent against the British and determine to drive them out of Africa. While no doubt Jameson went in (at that moment) without his authority, Jameson's work was a part of Rhodes' larger plan.

Dr. Jameson took matters into his own hands, it is true. This action, however, only revealed Rhodes' deeper scheme of taking away the independence of the Transvaal Republic. This incident "stopped all prospects of voluntary reform in Transvaal, led Orange Free State into active sympathy with her and plunged all South Africa into a turmoil of race hostility which culminated finally in the British-Boer War.

The grievances of the Uitlanders became heavier than ever after the Jameson raid.

A petition to the Queen of England, signed by 21,000 Uitlanders, was now gotten up. The petition was answered and the war and final crisis came. This petition reads as follows:

"The condition of your Majesty's subjects in this State has indeed become well-nigh intolerable.

"The acknowledged and admitted grievances of which your Majesty's subjects complained prior to 1895, not only are not redressed, but exists today in an aggravated form. They are still deprived of all political rights, they are denied any voice in the government of the country, they are taxed far

<sup>7</sup> Sanderson, p. 284.

above the requirements of the country, the revenue of which is misapplied and devoted to objects which keep alive a continuous and well-founded feeling of irritation, without in any way advancing the general interest of the State. Mal-administration and speculation of public moneys go hand-in-hand, without any vigorous measures being adopted to put a stop to the scandal. The education of Uitlander children is made subject to impossible conditions. The police afford no adequate protection to the lives and property of the inhabitants of Johannesburg; they are rather a source of danger to the peace and safety of the Uitlander population.

“A further grievance has become prominent since the beginning of the year. The power vested in the Government by means of the Public Meetings Act has been a menace to Your Majesty’s subjects since the enactment of the Act in 1894. This power has now been applied in order to deliver a blow that strikes at the inherent and inalienable birth-right of every British subject in, namely, his right to petition his Sovereign. Straining to the utmost the language and intention of the law, the Government has arrested two British subjects who assisted in presenting a petition to Your Majesty on behalf of four thousand fellow-subjects. Not content with this, the Government, when Your Majesty’s loyal subjects again attempted to lay their grievances before Your Majesty, permitted their meeting to be broken up, and the objects of it to be defeated, by a body of Boers, organized by Government officials and acting under the protection of the police. By reason, therefore, of the direct as well as the indirect act of the Government, Your Majesty’s loyal subjects have been prevented from publicly ventilating their grievances, and from laying them before Your Majesty.

“Wherefore Your Majesty’s humble petitioners humbly beseech Your Most Gracious Majesty to extend Your Majesty’s protection to Your Majesty’s loyal subjects, resident in this State, and to cause an inquiry to be made into

grievances and complaints enumerated and set forth in this humble petition and to direct Your Majesty's representative in South Africa to take measures which will insure the speedy reform of the abuses complained of, and to obtain substantial guarantees from the Government of this State for the recognition of their rights as British subjects." <sup>8</sup>

With regard to the government of South Africa by the British, it is a fair statement of the situation to say that while a few of the governors were arbitrary and narrow and bigoted, most of them were not. The local administration on the whole was quite efficient. In 1877, the South African Republic was annexed to the British Crown by Sir Theophilus Shepstone. The majority of the Boers were against this, but seeing its advantages, would have become reconciled, had not the English government followed it up, as Mr. Bryce says, with three "capital blunders": (1) Failure to grant the local autonomy Shepstone had promised. (The Volksraad was never convoked, the constitution was never promulgated.) (2) The selection of a successor to Shepstone,—a military officer who was personally very unpopular, would not "mix" with the Boers, and was wholly incapable of dealing with the delicate political work at hand. (3) Removal of the two native dangers the Boers had feared: (a) Extinguishing of the Zulu Kingdom; (b) Reduction of Sikuhum's strongholds and establishment of peace in the *northeast*.

<sup>8</sup>All over South Africa was heard the one cry of oppression by the Boer government, and that those who would be free must themselves strike the first blow. That war was at hand, that arms were stored away for that purpose and the visitor invited to see them was a matter of common knowledge. The Marquis of Loure in an article in the *North American Review*, March, 1900, rather sides with the British. While admitting that the thirst for gold will lead any people to extremes, he says that the Boers had an ancient and narrow form of government with a hateful intolerance of all free institutions of the Anglo-Saxon type. The conflict is only the inevitable one between progress and stagnation. He says, "We who are sowers of freedom have a right to reap the harvest and we prefer to have the envy and malice rather than the contempt of those who have not plowed the straight furrows we have made." P. 311.

“Against the wish of every wise Boer, against the wish of every loyal colonist, in spite of addresses, in spite even of deputies sent to London, the English government insisted wantonly and wilfully in 1852-4 on founding two independent Boer States to mar the unity of one African dominion and built up with deliberate carefulness all the pain, anxiety and danger that we have to face today; such was the beginning of our trouble in South Africa.”<sup>9</sup>

This is only one example of the numerous administrative blunders that the English government made in South Africa, Mr. Curt (quoted above) further remarks: “Democratic in principle the Boer republics are, in fact, limited oligarchies”—and says that today (1900) it is “the clash between that most modern of all communities, a gold-field population and the most antique and intolerant government in the world.”

Now, after considering these different views and opinions, some of them, indeed, all but absurd, what conclusion are we to come to! It is evident, to begin with, that we cannot accept without modification the statements of either the English on the one hand, or of the Germans on the other. The Germans and French charge the whole trouble to English imperialism and greed for gold. The British insist that they had to protect the rights of their subjects in South Africa, and that the discovery of gold, and the consequent inrush of immigrants, an event which could not be foretold, was responsible for the war. Now, laying aside all the little events, pretexts, and grievances, and admitting that the Boer control in South Africa in the period 1877-1900 was mediæval, tyrannical, and wholly uncalled for and unjust, the real causes of the war, it seems to us, may be summed up as follows:

(1) Colonial expansion policy of Great Britain. (And she has more of an excuse for this policy than any other nation except possibly Japan, because it has been, and its maintenance is, vital to her existence as a great world power.)

<sup>9</sup> Henry Curt, in *North American Review*, 170, p. 205.

(2) The incompatibility of the English liberal political system with the oligarchical government and rude, unprogressive social life and customs of the Boers. (This seems to me the great fundamental cause of the whole struggle. But for this, a great South African nationality might have developed, blending together all the discordant elements, without war, and without the race antagonism that prevailed.)

(3) The discovery of *gold*, and the consequent exploitation of the mines by English capitalists and financiers. This, however, was more the nature of a mere event, than an underlying cause.

## CHAPTER XI

### CAUSES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

**T**HE causes of the Spanish-American War, like those of all other wars between different races or systems of government, can be understood and explained only by a study of the diplomatic relations of the two countries along with their political and economic (especially commercial) systems, as well as the essential inherent characteristics and peculiarities of each people.

Admiral Chadwick, in his excellent volume, "Relations of United States and Spain-Diplomacy," characterizes these relations as "the story of more than a hundred years of what has been really a racial strife." He says, "The chief cause was in the absolute racial unlikeness itself, and this racial temperament still has an influence over the relations of men—more potent—than any other force in humanity."<sup>1</sup> The war was but a final episode in a century of diplomatic ill feeling.<sup>2</sup> There was a great difference in the civilizations and the political traditions of the two countries; but, "it was more than antiquity, more than an old civilization, which produced the differences which made it impossible for the North-American Anglo-Saxon to live near his Spanish neighbors without friction."<sup>3</sup>

The author's hypothesis that this hundred years of diplomatic struggle between the United States and Spain "was really a racial strife" is not altogether correct. It does not explain all. It is unquestionably true that lack of mutual sympathy and understanding contributed in "no slight de-

<sup>1</sup> Introduction, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Introduction, p. 3.

gree" to the outcome, but economic considerations are also very important (e. g., the struggle over the right to navigate the Mississippi River and the "greed of American and Spanish protectionists" which was at one time at the bottom of the Cuban revolt) in 1895.

Professor Hershey, in his review of Mr. Chadwick's book, observes that it is justly pointed out (in Mr. Chadwick's volume) . . . that at the time this message (McKinley's final war message to Congress) was sent in, Spain had practically yielded to all the American demands which were officially presented to her. She had revoked the order of reconcentration, and had, at the eleventh hour, granted the required armistice to the Cuban insurgents. In short, President McKinley surrendered to the war advocates at the very moment he had won an apparent victory for peace. McKinley's weakness was not in his failure to yield to those demanding peace, but in not insisting on "the absolute independence of Cuba as the sine qua non of peace."<sup>4</sup> Mr. Chadwick deals with the causes of the war, as we would expect, from the standpoint of diplomatic relations. But the reviewer observes that "diplomatic relations do not tell the whole story of the causes of any war."<sup>5</sup> He indicates that a study must also be made of the "economic, social and general political relations between the two peoples or races."<sup>5</sup>

The reviewer agrees with Chadwick that it was a good and wise thing "to cut this Gordian knot" with the sword; and adds—"what misery and bloodshed might have been avoided if it had been cut by General Grant in 1873, or, perhaps better still, by Sec. Webster in 1850."

Why did not Cuba gain her liberty from Spain in 1825, along with the continental Latin-American states? The answer is, the United States prevented her. That the United States interfered in the Latin-American attempt to help Cuba to independence in 1825 and prevented that action, is

<sup>4</sup> Hershey in *N. A. Review*, 16; pp. 148-50.

<sup>5</sup> Hershey in *Review of Chadwick's Book*.



explained by the fact that there was in this country the fear that the freedom of slaves in Cuba, following her independence from Spain, would set the South on fire;—which, indeed it would have done. To quote Berrien, of Georgia, in a debate in Congress at this time: “When we look to the situation of those islands, to the commanding position they occupy with reference to the commerce of the West Indies, we cannot be indifferent to a change in their condition. But when we reflect that they are in juxtaposition to a portion of the Union where slavery exists—that the principle of universal emancipation must march in the van of the invading force, and that all the horrors of a servile war will too surely follow in its train—these merely commercial considerations sink into insignificance. . . . We cannot allow their (European) principle of universal emancipation to be called into activity in a situation where its contagion from our neighborhood would be dangerous to our quiet and safety.”<sup>6</sup> And Chadwick sums up the situation in these words: “American slavery was thus the bulwark of what remained of Spanish dominion in the Americas.”<sup>7</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge goes so far as to say that “the War of 1898 was the price the United States paid for having kept Cuba in bondage at the dictates of our own slave power.”<sup>8</sup>

Far be it from us to underestimate the high and noble purposes of the people of this country, and their sympathy for the suffering Cubans; yet, it is not altogether without justice that Europeans look upon this war as one of aggression on the part of the United States, with the ultimate end in view of annexing Cuba, or at least, of so controlling her government and destiny as to best secure the interests of the United States. We are not prepared to say nor do we believe, that the action of our government and people was due mainly to a motive of self-interest. But let us re-

<sup>6</sup> See Benton, *Abridgement of Debates*, VIII, 421 & ff.

<sup>7</sup> Chadwick, p. —.

<sup>8</sup> Lodge, “War with Spain,” p. 6.

count a bit of American history, with the opinions of some noted Americans on this subject, and let them speak for themselves. J. Q. Adams, than whose opinions on such subjects no American's are more important, once said: "There are laws of political as well as physical gravitation and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cart her off from its bosom." The *View of Jefferson* in his time is very interesting: "Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states . . . yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, but by war, . . . I have no hesitation in abandoning my first wish to *future chances*."<sup>9</sup>

Buchanan, Secretary of State, made this statement in 1848: "If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce. . . . Human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial consequences which would result to every portion of the Union."<sup>10</sup> This was in the administration of Polk. "Successive later administrations pushed the project of purchase to the very eve of the Civil War." Buchanan was the chief advocate.<sup>11</sup> In 1875 (President Grant) the situation was similar to that of 1898. Had Grant yielded to Congress, there would have been war<sup>12</sup> (due largely to Spanish outrages such as Virginius affair). And in 1876: "The President . . . desires . . . to express the desire of the United States to maintain a firm, solid and enduring peace with Spain and to remove

<sup>9</sup> Jefferson's writings, X, 315.

<sup>10</sup> See Chadwick, p. 221.

<sup>11</sup> Chadwick, p. 233.

<sup>12</sup> See Chadwick, p. 80.

every disturbing question . . . desires to disabuse the mind of the Government and people of Spain of the existence of any desire on the part of the government of the United States for the acquisition of Cuba.”<sup>13</sup>

Several wrote that the United States “have constantly indulged in the belief that they might hope some day to acquire those Islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by just and lawful means, with the consent of their sovereign.” Thus we see that the annexation of Cuba to the United States has been looked upon as an ultimate probability by most prominent American statesmen; but they have been content to wait for its realization. Jefferson believed Cuba would finally “give herself to us.” Popular disapproval of the “Ostend Manifesto,” however, proved that Cuba was not to be taken by force of arms with the will and consent of the American people as a whole.<sup>14</sup>

The incapable administration of the government by the Spanish officials in Cuba was the cause of most of the friction between the United States and Spain with regard to Cuba. If Spain had granted Cuba a liberal government, all the moral support that the Cubans got from the United States would have been much more difficult, if not impossible to secure. The Spanish government, at home, however, came at least to see the futility of the officials’ arbitrary means of punishment. But the officials in Cuba could never be brought to that realization. “It was their tenacious holding to this view of sudden and severe vengeance<sup>15</sup> which . . . more than all else—the effects of reconcentration excepted, finally brought on war in 1898.”<sup>16</sup> The Spanish govern-

<sup>13</sup> See Chadwick, p. 389.

<sup>14</sup> The United States government, in the course of the 19th century, repeatedly made it understood that this nation *would* intervene to prevent Spain transferring Cuba to any other European power. See Moors Digest of Int. Law, VI, p. 450. Also p. 464, on the American opinion on annexation of Cuba to U. S. and p. 83, Vol. VI, on unselfish motives of U. S.

<sup>15</sup> An immediate cause.

<sup>16</sup> Chadwick, p. 473.

ment could not control these officials. Conditions were in quite as deplorable a state at home as in Cuba. In the incompetence of Spain to deal with revolted Cuba and her own officials there undoubtedly was one of the causes of the war. The distracted and anarchical condition of Spain for sixty years made efficient government in Cuba impossible. The United States had been on the point of intervention in 1875, as we have seen. The Spanish character, however, had much to do with this. It is characteristic of the Spaniard to proceed to immediate and summary punishment without a resort to trial or jury.<sup>17</sup>

We all know the story of the blowing up of the *Maine*. It cannot be denied that this incident was one of the immediate causes of the war, and that the American people were inflamed against Spain as never before. But it cannot justly be claimed that the Spanish government was responsible for or connived at, this deed of horror. It is more likely that it was the work of irresponsible Spanish individuals incited perhaps, by Spanish officials in Cuba.<sup>18</sup> The Spanish government expressed deep sympathy for this disaster, as also did the Spanish navy department. We have no valid reason to question the sincerity of this action.

There was unquestionably an uncontrollable desire for war in the United States. (But it was Congress which really forced the country into war.)<sup>19</sup> The Spanish government

<sup>17</sup> Admiral Chadwick takes the position that the suffering in Cuba (1896-8) was due as much to the insurgents themselves as to the Spaniards. He says that especially was unemployment due to the Cubans themselves; that the great error of the Spanish government in connection with the reconcentration was its "disregarding precautions which should have been taken to feed the people thus herded together," that it was this that caused the rapid growth in the United States of a hostile feeling to Spain. That, "there is no denying the force of the Spanish argument" (charging responsibility for the suffering mainly to the insurgents) —and adds, "nor could mere injury to commerce be made a just ground for intervention." Dr. Hershey, in his review of this book, takes exception to this statement, and says that there is no question but that the Spanish were far more to blame for these sufferings than were the insurgent forces of the island.

<sup>18</sup> See Benton, *Int. Law & Diplomacy. Spanish-American War*, p. 76, and Chadwick's "Diplomacy" on this.

<sup>19</sup> Benton, pp. 92-3 for the stated causes for going to war.

was slowly but surely receding from her hostile position and war would have been averted but for the *Maine* disaster and the publication of the letter of the Spanish minister.

Woodford, the United States minister in Spain, was confident that we could have peace if the United States would wait a little, that all her and Cuba's demands would be granted. Every reason leads to the belief that all just claims could have been readily adjusted . . . yet "this (blowing up of the *Maine*) was without doubt the very event which was regarded by the masses of the Americans as justifying a resort to war out of pure revenge."<sup>20</sup>

The United States' grounds for intervention were:

1. In the cause of humanity.
2. For the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in Cuba.
3. In defense of commercial and financial interests involved.
4. For self-preservation.
5. For the *Maine* disaster.

The movement of the American squadron gave the Spanish government much concern. "The display and concentration of naval forces near Havana in the waters of the Peninsula (Spain) and the persistency with which the *Maine* and the *Montgomery* remained in the Greater Antilles are causing increasing anxiety and might, through some mischance, bring about a conflict," are the words of Senor Gullon of the Spanish government, to Senor Duprey de Leme, Spanish Minister to the United States. (Feb. 8, 1898).<sup>21</sup>

The more distant and remote causes are summed up by Lebrand as follows:<sup>22</sup>

1. Cuban's desire for freedom, autonomy, like the other Latin-American countries.
2. The desire of the United States to own or control Cuba—a natural desire.

<sup>20</sup> Benton, p. 106.

<sup>21</sup> See Chadwick, p. 538.

<sup>22</sup> Le Brand's "Spanish-American War and the Law of Nations," p. 19.

3. The nature of the Spanish government of Cuba and the Cuban insurrections.

4. Geographical situation of Cuba, including her command of the Carribean and Gulf Sea-coasts.

Spanish statesmen felt that Spain could not renounce Cuba—Cuba and the Philippines, the last of her great colonial empire (in the Occident and in the Orient). Without these they felt that Spain could not long exist—they said as much.<sup>23</sup>

Mr. Lodge notes the following causes:—

1. Sympathy for the oppressed and suffering Cubans.
2. American resentment against dominion of Europe in the New World.

3. Case of the *Virginius* (1873). An American vessel captured in high seas, taken to a Cuban port and about fifty of her crew shot. The United States accepted money and war was avoided, but the question of moral insult was unsettled.

Captain Mahan asserts that “the avowed purpose and cause” of the United States’ action was not primarily for “redress of grievances (such as blowing up of *Maine* and executions of American citizens) against Spain, but to enforce the departure of the latter from Cuba. But, we may well ask, what motives led us to wish to drive Spain from the Western world? Was not the United States, after all, looking largely to her own ultimate interests? Did we not need the control, if not the actual possession, of Cuba in order to make complete the chain of United States predominance (in commanding the key to the Carribean Sea and Gulf region) in the New World?”

Mr. Lodge’s opinion coincides almost exactly with Captain Mahan’s, on the purpose of the war. He says that what the United States desired above everything else—her purpose in going to war, was to drive Spain out of Cuba, and Congress was very careful to frame its resolution so as to make that point explicit.

<sup>23</sup> See Le Brand, p. 19.

Summing up, then, we may say that the causes of the Spanish-American war in 1898 were:

1. Remote and fundamental.

2. Immediate (which approached from some points of view but not in all respects, mere pretexts).

(a) The remote and one of the two fundamental or underlying causes was unquestionably the incompatibility of the Spanish and American race temperaments, and political institutions and ideals. It was impossible that the two ever should become blended or reconciled. Other considerations and events, such as the United States intervention in Cuba, with the slave problem of that time, the grievances the United States had against Spain on account of the outrages on Americans by the Spanish officials in Cuba, particularly the *Virginius* affair, were only occasions for bringing to the front this incompatibility of the two races, or were of the nature of mere pretexts for hostility. All these differences and difficulties could ultimately have been settled by peaceful means, and would have been, had the United States been dealing with another such nation as England or Germany.

(b) The economic situation in Cuba undoubtedly contributed its share in causing this war; but important as it was, it was by no means the fundamental cause. It cannot be separated from the other causes.

(c) The incompetence and inability of the home government in Spain made possible the abuses of her officials in Cuba, and these two things together were important factors in the United States' intervention. This cause is more or less blended, however, with the first, or fundamental cause above mentioned.

(d) The sympathy of the American people for the suffering Cubans—the cause of humanity. This was indeed an important cause—it swept away the whole American people in a great flood of enthusiasm for the war, and was indeed, a fundamental as well as an immediate cause of the war.

(e) The attitude of the McKinley administration (not at first as Secretary Alger observes, but after the pulse of the

nation had been felt, and the war fever detected) with its almost utter disregard of genuine diplomacy.

(f) The blowing up of the *Maine*, after all has been said, can be taken as little more than an *occasion* or mere pretext.

(g) The long desire of at least a portion of the American people to see Cuba become a part of the United States no doubt added no inconsiderable momentum to the rising tide of war spirit in the United States. Nor can we say that the United States was greatly to blame for this. It was (1) a natural self-interest; (2) it was seen that Cuba would be better off under our flag.

(h) In connection with the necessary interests of the United States in Cuba as Lebrand observes, there is, of course, the geographical cause. Cuba is "only a few hours sail from the United States, but several days from Spain; it is to the interest of the United States to possess or at least control an island which is so prominent at the entrance to the enclosed waters of the Gulf." This interest was sooner or later bound to clash with that of Spain.



## CHAPTER XII

### CAUSES OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1870)

**S**HELDON AMOS (in his book on Remedies for War) sums up the causes of the Franco-Prussian War as follows:

1. Growth of Prussia and Germany with Bismark's determination to secure a United Germany.
2. Alleged intervention of France in nominating Hohenzollern as successor to the Spanish crown.
3. Political schemes of the Emperor Napoleon III.
4. Antipathy existing between French and German people.
5. Territorial acquisition on both sides.
6. Enormously developed military institutions.
7. Alleged ill-treatment of the French Ambassador of Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

Among these, however, he recognizes only three important causes: "In some cases, as in the Franco-German War of 1870, it is difficult even for contemporaries to decide to which of the three causes—that is, (1) natural efforts after increased liberty and security proportioned to the growth and the consolidation of the internal resources of one of the Belligerent States, or resistance, by anticipation, to future aggressions or direct ambition and political acquisitiveness—the war is to be attributed."<sup>2</sup>

Writers differ materially in giving the causes and ex-

<sup>1</sup>This certainly is as complete a list of causes for this war as could be found by anyone, no matter how much study he should put on an investigation of the causes; but it is true and sound despite its complexity.

<sup>2</sup>Amos, pp. 70-71.

planations of this war. Saliers, a French author, claims that France had been "caught in 1870 in the dream of universal peace," and that that explains her being wholly unprepared for the war with Germany.<sup>3</sup> The English historian, Rose, on the other hand, says that French feeling against Prussia had been growing for years before 1870, and that France's counting on Austria as an ally against Prussia (in revenge for the events of 1866) explains, in part at least, the Franco-Prussian War.<sup>4</sup> Signobos avers that for such "unforeseen" facts (as war of 1870) no general cause can be discerned in the intellectual, economic, or political condition of the continent of Europe."<sup>5</sup> Another historian gives these causes:

1. Bismark's policy of a United Germany—made this war necessary—naturally raised the apprehensions of Napoleon III, and caused the French to prepare for and expect war.

2. Question of succession to the throne of Spain stirred France into a ferment rapidly as news could fly. A Hohenzollern (Leopold von Hohenzollern) had been elected, and had given his consent. France could not possibly allow the government of Spain to fall into the hands of Prussia, which her acceptance of this election would mean.<sup>6</sup>

We will here give the causes the historian, Rose, assigns for this war:

1. France counting on Austria as an ally against Prussia.

2. Bismark realized that it would take war to solve the problems of reunion, which was impossible in time of peace.

3. The question of the Spanish succession now furnished this *casus belli*.

Mr. Rose here gives Gramont's (the French Minister) statement in the Chamber of Deputies, which is as follows: "We do not think that respect for the rights of a neighbor-

<sup>3</sup> Saliers, pp. V and VI in Preface, "La Guerre."

<sup>4</sup> See Rose, I, Chap. I.

<sup>5</sup> Signobos, p. 847.

<sup>6</sup> C. M. H., XI.

ing people (Spain) obliges us to allow an alien Power (Prussia) by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles V to succeed in upsetting to our disadvantage the present equilibrium of forces in Europe, and imperil the interests and honor of France. We have the firm hope that eventually it will not be realized. To hinder it, we count both on the wisdom of the German people and on the friendship of the Spanish people. If that should not be so, strong in your support and in that of the nation, we shall know how to fulfill our duty without hesitation and without weakness.”<sup>7</sup>

The statements of various prominent men on this war are significant and throw light on the different views:

“The war of 1870 was the personal work of Bismark, prepared by Napoleon III’s personal policy.”<sup>8</sup>

“The responsibility rests for the most part on one man—Bismarck himself. The nation was not back of such aggressiveness, though, when once committed to war, it could be depended on to carry it through.<sup>9</sup> At least, he caused these wars (1866-71) to occur *when* they did.”<sup>10</sup>

“The occasion was the purchase of the Belgian railroads by the French Eastern Company in February, 1869. The Belgian government forbade the sale. The French government attributed this check to Bismark.”<sup>11</sup>

The proposition made to the Reichstag, Feb. 24, 1870, to admit the Grand Duchy of Baden into the northern Confederation, renewed the agitation against Prussian and German unity.

“The story of the Franco-German dispute is one of national jealousy, carefully fanned for four years by newspaper editors and popular speakers until a spark sufficient to set Western Europe ablaze. This was true alike on the part of Germany and France.”<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Rose, “The Devel. of the European Nations, 1870-1900,” p. 46.

<sup>8</sup> Signobos, “Political History of Europe Since 1814,” p. 847.

<sup>9</sup> C. M. Hist., XI, p. 432.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 434.

<sup>11</sup> Signobos, p. 806.

<sup>12</sup> Rose, I, 56.

The immediate cause, however, all must agree, was due to Prince Bismarck. The French Minister Daree, who favored peace, was replaced early in 1870 by Gramont, an enemy of Prussia. Napoleon's plan for the invasion of Southern Germany which had been discussed with Archduke of Austria, fell through and peace seemed assured, when Bismarck's publishing of the telegram from King William set everything on fire and caused France to declare war on Prussia.

A note had been addressed from Paris to the Prussian government saying that the coming of Hohenzollern to Spain was regarded by France as a provocation and menace from Prussia and that France could not "suffer the empire of Charles V to be restored."<sup>13</sup> The French minister at Berlin was ordered to press for an immediate renunciation of Prince Leopold's claims. He was informed that the matter was one for Prince Leopold and the Spanish people, but that the King would communicate with Leopold's father on the subject. An explicit order from King William to Prince Leopold was demanded by France; in the meantime, it was announced from Madrid that Leopold had withdrawn his candidature. The matter seemed again settled, but this did not satisfy Napoleon. He demanded that Prussia promise to guarantee that no such attempt in favor of a Hohenzollern should ever again be made. King William absolutely refused to so bind himself. The French ambassador was finally informed that he could not be received by the King.

The telegram published by Bismarck, shortened by him for the purpose, conveying the impression that King William had treated the French ambassador with disrespect, aroused all France. This led immediately to the French declaration of war against Prussia. The telegram cut down was as follows:

"After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary

<sup>13</sup> See Signobos, p. 807-11.

Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to the Imperial Government of France by the Royal Government of Spain, the French ambassador at Ems further demanded of his Majesty the King that he would authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King bound himself for all future time never again to give his consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French ambassador again, and sent to tell him through the aide-de-camp on duty that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador."

The French people could see in this action of Bismarck nothing but the basest insult, notwithstanding that historians who have carefully examined the dispatch and compared it with the original telegram of King William of Prussia have claimed that it was not at all such—that the abbreviated form had not the incendiary language in it that the original had.<sup>14</sup> A perusal of the two shows that there is some basis for this claim.<sup>15</sup> There is no question, however, that Bismarck wanted war, and that the French government were almost as eager. Both the German and French people,

<sup>14</sup> See Rose, p. 49-50.

<sup>15</sup> The original telegram is as follows: "His Majesty writes to me: 'Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from me, finally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this kind *a tout jamais*."

"Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself he could see clearly that my Government once more had no hand in the matter.' His Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince. His Majesty, having told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has decided, with reference to the above demand, upon the representation of Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but only to let him be informed through an aide-de-camp: 'That his Majesty had now received from the Prince confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say to the ambassador.' His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency whether Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should not be at once communicated both to our ambassadors and to the press."

on the other hand, shuddered to think of the horrors of such a war between the two great powers.

Prussia's monster crime, however, was not the war,—it was the stealing of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE UNITED STATES

#### *Fundamental and Immediate Causes of Our Conflict with Germany*

**I**N our series "The Causes of War," we have dealt with man's motives for war in the past; the European background of the great conflict just closed; the causes of this war for each of the individual nations involved;—in the meantime showing the nature of recent German diplomacy; the autocratic government and military caste that were responsible, in the Kaiser's dominions, for the universal devastation and bloodshed; and finally, in a general way, with America's reasons for entering the cause of the free nations in the supreme struggle of democracy and right against autocracy and might. Now, in our series of articles on the "*Outline and Study of the World War*," we shall state our own cause more specifically, and follow up with the study of the military and other events of the war, the preliminary peace problems of the peace conference—all with the view to making this material most available and suitable to the needs of our readers, as they deal with the war and current history.

It is to be hoped that the lively interest in the reading and study of current history which has been stimulated by the war will continue in these equally critical and unsettled times of world reaction and reconstruction, and that the great services of the leading weekly and monthly magazines and periodicals will not be forgotten.

Following is an outline on the United States and her causes

and interests in the world war. This outline has been used throughout the schools of Fort Smith as a basis for the study of this war, as our government urges upon our schools today, —and is recommended by teachers and school officials in a good many systems. Practically all references are available in any community.

#### WAR STUDY OUTLINE FOR SCHOOLS

### *I. Why We Were At War With Germany*

#### A. Fundamental Causes.

1. Democracy versus autocratic power. (This world cannot remain permanently half free and half enslaved by autocratic power.)
2. The moral ground of humanity versus the principle that "might makes right" with Germany's consequent cruelties and barbarous warfare.
3. U. S. championship of international law, the sacred obligations of treaties, the rights of neutrals, and of small states.
4. U. S. has also gone to war to uphold her own honor and respect among the powers of the earth, and to prove the sincerity of her professed principles.

#### B. Immediate Causes.

1. Germany's domineering diplomacy and attitude toward our Monroe Doctrine.
  - a. Admiral Diederich and Admiral Dewey in Manila harbor in 1898. (See *World's Work*, June, 1916.)
  - b. The Samoan incident. (See *World's Work*, June, 1916.)
  - c. The Kaiser, Roosevelt, and Venezuela, 1902.
  - d. Utterances of the Crown Prince and others with regard to U. S. and Monroe Doctrine. (See "Out of Their Own Mouths.")



- e. German spy system in America. (Pres. Wilson's Speeches.)
- f. Germany's aggressions in South America and Mexico.
- g. Von Zimmerman's proposal to Mexico and Japan for partitioning U. S. among them.
2. German submarine blockade.
  - a. Interference with legitimate American commerce.
  - b. Destruction of American lives and property.
  - c. Shameless violation of our rights as neutrals, (rights she had solemnly promised to respect, but whose violation she now celebrated publicly in numerous places).
  - d. Great loss of food needed for suffering peoples.
3. Atrocities in Belgium, Poland, Northern France, Serbia, Roumania—showing Germany's deliberate policy toward her helpless, innocent victims.
4. Similar effect on American opinion was caused by the Zeppelin raids on the unprotected and innocent in London and other English towns.
5. Nefarious plotting of German agents in the U. S. with working men, banks, anarchists, bombs, traitors, pan-Germans, etc. (Hundreds of cases unearthed by U. S. secret service, showing millions of dollars spent in this country by Germany to foment strife and influence our neutrality while Germany was still professing friendship and peaceful relations with the U. S.)

## *II. Danger of Failure to This Country*

1. Germany threatened to make us pay for all the cost of the war to her. (A staggering indemnity, just as she had already collected from every country she had conquered.)

2. The Kaiser, Crown Prince and Princes of Germany have scoffed at the idea of democracy (have boasted of the submarine as the "argument of kings" against democracy).
3. The Kaiser claims to be king by divine right, and to be God's agent on earth. (Read from his addresses to soldiers, history teachers,—in Munich, etc., etc., 1891, 1897, 1900, 1909, 1914, 1916, 1917. See *Teacher's Journal*, June, 1917, *World's Work*, June, 1917. *Review of Reviews'* December, 1917. "Out of Their Own Mouths," etc.)
4. The German police system was more severe than ever were the quartering of the British soldiers of King George on the American colonies. (We did not stand it then, we must not run the risk of it now.) See *West's Modern World*.
5. Germany curbed freedom of speech and of the press, and suppressed the individual, and made him just a link in the machinery of the government, which was controlled by a privileged autocratic class above him. In Prussia, men voted according to wealth, not universal suffrage. In one district in Berlin three men paid one-third of the taxes, had one-third the vote of all the district of the city.
6. If we had lost this war, we should have lost the guarantee of everything that Washington and his compatriots fought for, and "government of the people, by the people, for the people," would have perished "from the earth," for generations to come, if not for centuries.

### III. *The Duty of Every American to Support the War*

1. It is our duty to know, first of all, the justice of our country's cause.
2. We should have the courage *to hold up that cause* wherever it is assailed for—

3. Sedition and treason are continually being sown throughout our land, and must be met and put down.—This is still true.
4. To be worthy of the country that has given us the blessing of liberty, we must support with a will all the movements among the people to aid in this work, such as—
  - a. The War Y. M. C. A. work.
  - b. The Red Cross Work.
  - c. The food production conservation campaigns.
  - d. The Liberty Loans.
  - e. Every other war agency with which we come in contact.

An equal duty now devolves upon us to support with all our power the principles for a just and lasting peace, that our peace delegates are striving for at Versailles.

#### *IV. Some Reliable References On the War and Its Issues*

##### *A. Magazines and Periodicals.*

- a. *World's Work*, June, 1917. "Germany's Long Road to Democracy."
- b. *World's Work*, June, 1916. "The Mailed Fist in American History."
- c. *Review of Reviews*, December, 1918. Editorials.
- d. *Everybody's* (continuing throughout 1918). Brand Whitlock's Story of Belgium.
- e. *World's Work* (continuing throughout 1918). Mr. Rathom's exposals of the working of the German spy system in U. S. French Strothier on same.
- f. *Independent*, October 20, 1918. "Peace with Victory." Ex-President Taft.
- g. *History Teachers' Magazine*, January, 1918. Critical outline, notes and references on the causes, issues and events of the Great War, by Professor Harding, of Indiana University.

## B. Books.

- a. "Evidence in the Case," J. W. Beck, Assistant Attorney General, U. S.
- b. "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story," in book form.
- c. "Out of Their Own Mouths." From German sources.
- d. "The German Terror in France."
- e. "My Four Years in Germany," Ambassador Gerard.
- f. "With the Turks in Palestine," Alexander Aaronsohn.
- g. "England and Germany," by Cramb, written before the war.
- h. "Germany and the Next War"—Bernhardi.

## C. Library Pamphlets and Booklets.

- a. "Plain Words From America," Prof. Johnson, of Columbia University.
- b. Speeches of General Smuts, formerly Boer General against England.
- c. "Why the War Must Go On."
- d. "List of Neutral Ships Sunk by Germans."
- e. "Deportation of Belgian Women."
- f. "The New German Empire."
- g. "The Red, White and Blue Book," U. S. Official Documents.
- h. The U. S. Official Bulletin.
- i. "Sixteen Causes of War," Prof. A. C. McLaughlin, University of Chicago.
- j. "The Great War."
- k. "Democracy Today," Lake Classic Series, Scott Foresman Co.
- l. "Ireland and Poland."
- m. "When the Prussians Came to Poland," by an American woman who lived at the time of the German invasion. (Good sized volume.)

- n. "Their Crimes."
- o. "Microbe-Cultures in Bukharest."
- p. "Why Italy is with the Allies."
- q. "Character of the British Empire."
- r. French, English, Russian and Italian "Official Books."
- s. "The Union of Two Great Peoples," W. H. Page, U. S. Minister to England.

The above references are not meant to be complete, nor the only reliable ones, but they form a working basis for the proper study of the war, and for that reason were selected. The military events will be outlined and commented on later.

## CHAPTER XIV

### GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGY

**T**HE foregoing outline is not exhaustive,—it is not intended to give all the good material that may be found and read with profit; but it is intended as a brief guide and course for the ordinary student and the busy teacher who may not have time for a more extensive study. For the person who wishes to supplement this reading by a further study, there is an excellent collection of noteworthy and authentic volumes to be found in the average public library, or the library of any first rate college or university. For a list of these books see Prof. Harding's outline and bibliography in the January (1918) number of the *History Teachers' Magazine*,—the article that we have referred to once or twice previously. This article is also one of the "War Information Series," published by the Committee on Public Information.

Let us now take up the Imperial German government's policy and plan of conquest in the beginning of the war, as shown by our previous study of the causes of the war. The first acts of the Imperial German government, in conjunction with the prearranged plan of her military general staff, were in accord in every particular with her policy as instigator of the war. (Here again I would refer the readers to Mr. Beck's excellent volume, "The Evidence in the Case.") A new verification of this fact is found in the recent publication of the German Prince Lichnowsky's arraignment of the German government in the years immediately preceding the war, and particularly, the Kaiser's responsibility for the catastrophe. (Prince Lichnowsky's complete diary may be found

in "Current History" magazine, published by the New York Times; also in U. S. "War Information Series" is similar positive proof. See "Conquest and Kultur," January, 1918, pp. 133-35.<sup>1</sup>

Apparently the German government's original plan was to localize the war, if possible, between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, if by threats it could prevent Russia—before Russia's great army expansion was completed—from coming to the aid of her Serbian fellow-Slavs. Greater importance attaches to this demonstration of militant Pan-Germanism at this particular time, from the fact that Russia was still staggering from the effects of the Russo-Japanese War and the seething revolution in her empire. If not successful in localizing the conflict, then the Kaiser and his lords would proceed to bring on a general European conflict,—which they knew was most likely in any event—for every one knew that a general conflagration would then be inevitable. Really, however, the Kaiser and his government desired a war with Russia, and that speedily, in order that they might forever crush the eastern empire's military strength and threat to German expansion. Thus would the Teuton war lords realize their dream of near-Eastern supremacy. So, in spite of the Czar's earnest and sincere attempt to avoid war, and his unbroken pledge not to be the aggressor, Germany forced war upon Russia. And if Russia, then France would be involved, as a matter of course, because of her treaty obligations. The military plan was to crush France in the very first weeks of the war, then turn upon Russia and prostrate her before her great, unwieldy army and empire could be harnessed for effective combat. In order to be doubly sure of speedy success in the west, the Kaiser would take France by surprise by striking through Belgium—this to be a wholly unexpected movement, because of the French, German and

<sup>1</sup>Reference to the Prince's revelations is also found in April 4, 1918, number of the Nation. All who have not should read this amazing revelation from a German source.

English solemn agreement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. And that France *was* wholly surprised is shown by the fact that her army was concentrating on the Alsace-Lorraine front, where alone a German attack might be anticipated. Then, with their initial success, perhaps the Germans could frighten off unready England for a while, and dictate the terms of a victorious Teuton peace before Great Britain should be ready to fight. England's honorable entry into the war, however, was a disappointment to Germany, and her "contemptible little army," like Belgium's resistance to tyranny, helped in the delay to German arms that made the first battle of the Marne a defensive victory, and a victory for democratic civilization. Despite German protests of surprise, however, even the British nation's entry into the conflict was not altogether unexpected, for the Kaiser's plans had deep roots, and had provided for England's entry—so confidently in fact, and in so many ways,—that William II with his military lords had counted, in that event, upon crushing his traditional enemy of the seas, and becoming master of Europe *just that much sooner*. To assure ourselves of this let us recall the constant German toasts to the "inevitable day"—the day when the German navy should dominate the seven seas, instead of the Union Jack. Although this general plan was kept from the German people it was universally known and its execution awaited by the army and navy officials.

These new enemies might prolong the war for six months or even a year, to be sure, but what of that? So much sooner would "Kultur," by force of arms, be realized as the guiding force of mankind. Welcome, even, if the net of war should be spread beyond the seas, as well as involving other European nations. The German army was invincible and the German people disciplined, ready and unconquerable, in the eyes of the military masters. Let us not forget the Teuton slogan: "In Paris within three weeks, in London within three months, and in New York within three years!" There



are varying versions of the dates set by the military authorities of the Kaiser for the above victories, but these statements come too directly, and from too many sources for it to be doubted that such expressions were common among the officers of the German army and navy and high, responsible government officials. This plan, with the policy and doctrine it involved, therefore, comprehended even the United States of America, should we champion international law against the lawless submarine, or dare uphold the rights of humanity, of small states or even uphold our own honor or dignity as a nation. German victory was a necessity, and "necessity knows no law!" Or, again, as one official put it, "The German people are right because they number 87,000,000 souls!" Yet William II of Germany thought he understood President Wilson and the peace-loving American people well enough to be safe in acting on the presumption that we would never be counted among his active enemies in war. Our entry into the struggle was his greatest surprise and disappointment. Uncle Sam did not give him his chance to demonstrate that (in his own words) "I will stand no nonsense from Uncle Sam after this war," or that, with a stronger fleet he "would take Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck," as he once told a member of the American embassy in Berlin.

One other major part of the Teuton plan must not be overlooked, and that is, the "Hun policy of frightfulness." That this policy was a part of the German military doctrine *even before the war* has been abundantly proven. With a constantly increasing ferocity it had been developing since before 1900. The first exhibition to the world on a large scale was in the Boxer uprising incident (1900), wherein the Kaiser charged his troops to make the German name feared and the German sword felt, as was that of Atilla and the Huns 1,500 years ago. The following statement from that speech might well have made the whole world shudder with apprehension: "Quarter will not be given, no prisoners will be taken. Use your weapons in such a way that for a thousand years no

Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance! Be as terrible as the Huns!"—William II, to the German Chinese expeditionary force, July 27, 1900.

The Kaiser and the German people instead of resenting this characterization "Hun" by the allied world, should accept and *love* it, for their "beloved majesty" himself invented the phrase and applied it literally to his own troops; and we may be sure, it *will last* with them *a thousand years*, as the Kaiser predicted!

With the ordinary "Hun" practice of frightfulness the reader is too familiar to warrant us in an exposition of them here. I will merely mention them in passing.

### 1. *Submarines.*

- (a) Firing upon helpless survivors in the water.
- (b) Sinking neutral merchant and passenger ships, with their crews, without warning.
- (c) Shelling undefended town (larger ships also did so).
- (d) Sinking hospital and Red Cross ships, with wounded, etc.

### 2. *Airships and Airplanes.*

- (a) Bombing undefended towns and cities, and murdering non-combatants—innocent women, old men and children.
- (b) Bombing Red Cross hospitals, Y. M. C. A. huts, etc., back of the lines—contrary to all former practices in war.

### 3. *Artillery.*

- (a) Utter destruction of churches, cathedrals and other buildings of non-military character exempt by the usages of war from mutilation and destruction. These contain many of the most priceless treasures of civilization.
- (b) The long-range guns firing on Paris—of no military advantage to Germany, but the

frightfulest suffering, grief and apprehension on civilians in their defenseless condition. (75 deaths at Easter worship, etc.)

#### 4. *Infantry.*

- (a) Treachery in the ordinary practices of warfare.
- (b) Driving women and children in front of them in advance upon enemy, so that enemy must fire upon its own people, if it would check German onrushes.
- (c) Wearing Red Cross insignia, to obtain advantage of unsuspecting foe—concealing machine guns, etc., on army stretchers.

#### 5. *Army in Retreat.*

- (a) Utter destruction of everything—desolation, and poisoning wells, etc.

All the above, however, are small and *merciful* in comparison with the Hun policy of *starvation*. Few American citizens realize to what extent, and with appalling results, this terrible weapon has been wielded by the German military command in the occupied region of the countries overrun by the Teuton armies. I shall not attempt to describe this monster crime upon humanity, but merely mention the facts that, (1) in the past four years Germany has starved to death, in conjunction with her allies, more enemies than they all have killed in war; (2) the greater percentage of these victims are women and children, the hope of the future generation; (3) after thus bringing these peoples face to face with starvation, she has used this extremity as an excuse before the world for *deporting* the ablebodied, men and women, into Germany, there to be forced to work in support of the Hun armies against their own people; (4) The German officers and troops deliberately took the food *out of the mouths* of these starving people, and used it to their own hearts' content; (5) it was *hunger, starvation*, that forced Roumania

to make peace with the Central Powers; (6) most of the factories of the occupied districts were stripped of their machinery, *in order to force starvation and non-resistance upon the industrial classes*, the best citizens; (7) this all has virtually *crushed* most of the small nations of Europe; (8) this devitalization is bound to affect the off-spring of the survivors for generations to come; and (9) there are 30,000,000 of these innocent victims of Teuton greed and lust for power, —think of it, 30,000,000! This is the greatest suffering the world has ever known, and may justly be considered the “darkest page in human history . . . wrought deliberately by a single nation to further its own ends!”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>For a more detailed statement of this “food war” of “Kultur” against humanity, see the article “Forerunners of Famine,” by Frederick C. Walcott, of the United States Food Administration, in the April (1918) number of the National Geographic Magazine.

## CHAPTER XV

### OUTLINE OF THE WAR AND ARMISTICE TERMS

#### **O**UTLINE of the World War 1914-1918

##### I. The Year 1914 in the War.

- A. Declarations of war and beginnings of hostilities.
1. After assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Austrian throne (June 28, 1914), and Austrian ultimatum to Serbia (July 28), Austria declares war on Serbia (July 28).
  2. Germany, in support of Austria, declares war on Russia (Aug. 1).
  3. Germany begins war on France (Aug. 3).
  4. Germany invades Belgium (Aug. 4).
  5. Following German violation of Belgian territory, Great Britain declares war on Germany (Aug. 4).
  6. Montenegro joins Serbia against Austria-Hungary (Aug. 8).
  7. Japan declares war on Germany (Aug. 23).
  8. Turkey declares war on Russia (Oct. 30).
  9. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey (Nov. 5).
- B. Military events.
1. In the Balkans.
    - (a) Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia—successfully resisted by Serbians (Aug.-Dec., 1914).
  2. In the West.
    - (a) Invasion of Belgium, Luxemburg and Lorraine by Germany (mentioned above), with Paris as the immediate objective (Aug. 3-Sept. 5).

- (b) First Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6-10), saves Paris, Joffre and Foch gaining a defensive victory, and hurling the right wing of the German army back from the Marne to the Aisne (with aid of Gen. French's English army).
  - (c) Entrenchments, followed by first battle of the Aisne (Sept. 15-28), and the first battle of Ypres, for the Channel ports (Oct.-Nov.).
3. In the East.
- (a) Russian invasion of Austrian Galicia (successful) and German East Prussia (the latter shattered by Hindenburg's victory at Tannenberg, Aug. 25-31).
  - (b) German-Austrian invasion of Russian Poland.
  - (c) Turkish expeditions against Russians in Black Sea regions and against Great Britain in Egypt (Nov.-Dec.), the latter a complete failure.
4. In the Orient.
- (a) Japanese siege and capture of Tsing-Tau (Sept. 1-Nov. 6). German isles in Pacific taken by Japanese and British fleets.
5. In Africa.
- (a) Togoland and Kamerun occupied by English and French troops (fall and early winter of 1914).
  - (b) German Southwest Africa invaded, and German East Africa attacked, by British and other colonial troops.
- C. Naval engagements.
1. German Cruisers seek safety in Dardanelles (*Goeben* and *Breslau*). Turks forced to buy them—Germany leads Turkey into war.
  2. Battle of Heligoland (really a British victory).
  3. Battle off Chile, S. A.—Admiral von Spee (Ger.) sinks Admiral Craddock's (Eng.) little fleet (Nov. 1).

4. Battle off Falkland Islands—Admiral Sturdee (Eng.) sinks Von Spee's fleet (Dec. 8).<sup>1</sup>

## II. *The Year 1915 in the War.*

### A. Declarations of War.

1. Italy breaking away from triple alliance with Austria and Germany, declares war on Austria (May 23).
2. Bulgaria (entering on Germany's side) declares war on Serbia (Oct. 14).
3. England declares war on Bulgaria (Oct. 14), as result of Bulgaria's move against Serbia.
4. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria (Oct. 19).

### B. Military campaigns.

#### 1. In West.

- (a) Allied offensive in France (Jan.-April) deadlock, unbroken by battles of Neuve Chapelle, Champagne, the Labyrinth, and Lens, in Artois.
- (b) German offensive—second battle of Ypres:—in the Argonne—(May-July)—deadlock unbroken.

#### 2. In the East.

- (a) Austro-German invasion of Poland checked before Warsaw by Russians (Feb.).
- (b) After reaching Carpathians Russians expelled from Galicia by Von Mackensen; Germans having come to the aid of worsted Austrians (May-June).
- (c) Von Hindenburg's drive through Poland and northern Russia, to swamps before Riga—Russian ammunition and other supplies give out (Aug.-Sept.).

#### 3. In the Balkans.

- (a) Austro-Bulgarian invasion of Serbia—Serbia crushed, overrun, and occupied (Oct.-Nov.).

<sup>1</sup>Long before this time German commerce had been driven from the ocean.

- (b) Allies fail at Gallipoli, and establish base at Saloniki, in Greece (Feb.-Dec.).
- 4. In Asia.
  - (a) Turks invade Persia—opposed by Russians—German plan of “Mittel Europa,” Berlin to Bagdad control clearly revealed.
  - (b) British expedition in Mesopotamia frustrates the realization of this plan.
- 5. In Africa.
  - (a) All Germany’s colonies in Africa taken by Allies, except part of German East Africa.
  - (b) Egypt and Suez canal safe from capture by Turks or Germans.
- C. Naval Engagements.
  - 1. Dogger Bank (Jan. 24), German squadron badly crippled, in attempt to surprise British fleet.
  - 2. British and French naval attack on Dardanelles (Mar. 18-May 27), in conjunction with Allied army, fails. This failure was a surprise to the Germans and Turks as well as to the Allies, and Ambassador Morgenthau tells us, could have succeeded, if the Allies had only known the condition of defense at this early stage. Later, when their armies tried so hard, it was impregnable, due to guns, fortifications and other supplies that had come from Germany.
  - 3. Small Russian victories on Baltic and Black seas.
  - 4. Internment (in neutral ports) or destruction of German commerce destroyers. (The Emden and other commerce destroyers had wrought great havoc with neutral and Allied shipping.)
  - 5. German submarine sinkings become a menace to Allies.

### *III. The Year 1916 in the War.*

#### A. Declarations of War.

- 1. Germany declares war on Portugal (Mar. 9).



2. Austria declares war on Portugal (Mar. 15).
3. Italy declares war on Germany (Aug. 27).
4. Roumania declares war on Austria-Hungary (Aug. 27)—thus coming in finally with the Allies.
5. Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, declare war on Roumania (Aug.-Sept.).

**B. Military Operations.**

1. In the Balkans.

- (a) Montenegro and northern Albania overrun by Bulgarian and Austrian armies (Jan.-Feb.).
- (b) Allied army at Saloniki, Greece, takes offensive and captures Monastir, in Southern Serbia, from Bulgarians (Nov.)—checked from further advance by subsequent downfall of Roumania and Russia. (Italian, French, Serbian, Albanian, English all in this army.)
- (c) Roumania (after espousing cause of Allies) rashly attempts to overrun Transylvania-Austrian territory claimed by Roumania—is invaded and crushed by the combined drives of Von Mackensen and Von Falkenhayn (Aug.-Dec.). Her complete prostration, however, would not have occurred but for the treacherous betrayal by the Russian pro-German war minister Sturmer. This, indeed, was the major cause of Roumania's downfall.

2. In the East.

- (a) Russian (Grand Duke Nicholas) attack upon Turks in Armenia, and capture of Erzerum, Trebizond and Erzingan (Jan.-July).
- (b) Second Russian invasion of Galicia (June 4-Aug. 15)—after capture of 350,000 Teutons Russians are halted before Halicz, having exhausted their ammunition and other supplies.

3. On Italian front.

- (a) Austrian invasion of Italy (May-June)—Aus-

trian territory in Trentino recovered, and 230 sq. mi. of Italian territory captured, but Austrians fail to gain Venetian plain.

- (b) Italian counter-offensive (June-Aug.)—regains most of territory just captured by Teutons and reaches Gorizia, only a few miles from Trieste; but is definitely checked on Carso plateau.

#### 4. In Asia.

- (a) After an expedition undertaken without sufficient support, Gen. Townshend's (Br.) army surrenders to Turks at Kut-el-Amara, although it had advanced to within 18 miles of Bagdad (April 28).
- (b) Three separate Russian expeditions against Bagdad routed by Turks (Jan.-May, July and Aug.).

#### 5. In the West.

- (a) First battle of Verdun (Feb.-July)—German Crown Prince sacrifices 500,000 men, but fails to take Verdun. "*Ills ne passerent pas!*"
- (b) Anglo-French offensive on the Somme (July-Nov.). Only slight gains of territory by Allies.
- (c) French counter-offensive at Verdun (Oct.-Dec.). Recapture in a few days, territory that the Crown Prince had fought desperately for months to obtain.

#### 6. In Africa.

- (a) All but a small mountainous part of German East Africa, the last German colony in Africa, overrun by British and Belgian colonial troops.

### C. Naval Operations.

1. Battle of Jutland (May 31)—German attempt at surprise of British fleet fails, but both sides lose sev-

eral vessels. Germany more cautious with her fleet after this.

2. German submarines and commerce raiders inflict great damage on British, French and neutral shipping, and involve Germany in trouble with U. S. Germany promises (with some reservations) not to sink American ships without warning (a hollow promise, as afterward shown).

#### *IV. The Year 1917 in the War.*

##### A. Entry of United States into the war (April 6, 1917).

1. Causes (see Chapters VII and XIII).

2. Vast Preparations by United States.

- (a) Army and navy programs.

- (b) Selective draft (June 5).

- (c) Airplane program.

- (d) Merchant shipping program.

3. Financing the War.

- (a) Liberty loans—Loans to the Allies.

- (b) Taxes.

- (c) War Savings Stamp campaigns, prepared for the year 1918.

4. President Wilson's leadership and War messages.

5. The President's fight for unrestricted powers of administration.

6. Effect on Allies of United States' entry into the War.

7. Fighting German propaganda and spies in United States.

##### B. Other declarations of war.

1. United States declares war on Austria-Hungary (Dec. 7).

2. Cuba declares war on Germany (April 7).

3. Panama virtually enters war against Germany (April 7).

4. Brazil declares war on Germany (Oct. 26).

5. China declares war on Germany and Austria (Aug. 14).

6. Greece, after deposition of King Constantine, declares war on Germany and Bulgaria (July 2).

7. The following nations, in addition to all the Allied and associated states, either broke off diplomatic relationship with Germany or declared war on her: Argentina (Pres. of Argentina refused to sign the break voted by the national legislature), Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador.

### C. Military Operations.

#### 1. In the West.

(a) Second battle of the Somme. (British advance to within range of Bapaume (Jan.-March), followed by German withdrawal to "Hindenburg line," from Somme to Rheims, the French joining with British in driving the Germans back to this line. Teutons had thus abandoned one-fourth of the territory they had held in France).<sup>2</sup>

(b) Battle of Arras (April-June) British threaten the coal city of Lens, but fail to capture it. Only a few sq. mi. of territory won.

(c) Battle of the Aisne—French offensive—Soissons to Rheims (April-Nov.)—drives the Germans back beyond *Chemin-de-Dames*, with about 35,000 prisoners.

Most wanton destruction marked the path of the Germans in retreat. Much as had been heard before, and witnesses, in Belgium and France, of the German atrocities, this fiendish desolation was a shock to the civilized world.

(d) Messines ridge, blown up and occupied by British, in Belgium, near Ypres (June).

<sup>2</sup> This reversal taught the Allies the absolute necessity of *unity of command* and unity of counsel among the Allies, and led directly to the Inter-Allied Council at Paris and to the appointment of Gen. Foch as Generalissimo of all the Allied armies on the West and Italian fronts.

- (e) German attack on Ypres (July)—captured only about 1,200 prisoners.
- (f) Battle of Flanders—around Ypres—(July-Dec.). English and French take all the high ground beyond Ypres.
- (g) French second counter-thrust at Verdun (Aug.-Sept.)—gains back remainder of territory German Crown Prince had taken at such cost the year before.
- (h) Battle of Cambrai (Nov.-Dec.).
  - (1) General Byng (Br.), without artillery preparation, advances on 35 miles front, capturing many villages, and advancing from 10 to 20 miles.
  - (2) German similar counter-stroke gains back half the territory Gen. Byng had just captured.
- (i) *American expeditionary force*, under Gen. Pershing—
  - (1) First United States troops land June 26-27.
  - (2) First American troops in action, October.
  - (3) No heavy fighting in 1917 on American sectors.

## 2. In the East.

- (a) Russian winter offensive—checked by Germans (Jan.).
- (b) Russian summer offensive—under Kerensky and the new Russian republic. Captures Halicz and threatens Lemberg, when part of Russian forces mutiny, and break the power of the Russian drive. Followed by Russian demobilization and rule of the Bolsheviki.

## 3. In Italy.

- (a) Italian campaign (July-Oct.). Progressing successfully, if slowly, when abruptly stopped by—

- (b) Austro-German counter campaign (Oct.-Dec.). By tactics similar to those used against Serbia and Roumania, with the additional vicious campaign of "propaganda" which disconcerted one of the Italian armies, the Teutons were able to drive the Italians back to the Piave river and take nearly 300,000 prisoners. But with speedy help from the British and French, with Gen. Foch in command, Italy was saved from threatened disaster.

#### 4. In Asia.

- (a) British Mesopotamian campaign (Feb.-Oct.). British recapture Kutel-Amera (Feb.) and capture Bagdad (March).
- (b) Russian aid to British in this sector stopped by Russian revolution.
- (c) Hejaz revolts, and declares independence of Turkey.
- (d) General Allenby (Br.) captures Jerusalem (Dec. 10).

#### 5. In the Balkans.

- (a) Complete collapse of Roumania (Jan.-Feb.), due to betrayal of Roumanians by Russia's Pro-German war minister Sturmer.
- (b) Saloniki armies of Allies powerless because of Russian revolution in hands of Bolsheviki; but an army of 300,000 Greeks being trained to aid Allies in 1918.

#### 6. In Africa.

- (a) German East Africa, last German colony completely overrun by Allies.

#### 7. Naval Operations.

- (a) Battles in Gulf of Riga—inconclusive.
- (b) Submarines—German renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare (Feb. 1) brings United States into the War, while it threatens in the

spring and early summer months to starve England and France into surrender.

V. *The Year 1918 in the War.*

A. Military operations.

1. In the East.

- (a) While Brest-Litovsk peace treaty is being made by Germany and the Bolsheviki, German invasion of Russia in violation of the treaty continues. (Jan.-March.)
- (b) Finland, after declaring independence of Russia, fights Bolsheviki "Reds," to gain it. Later Fins helped by German troops.
- (c) At least *five* civil wars going on in Russia: Fins vs. Bolsheviki; Ukraine vs. Bolsheviki; Bolsheviki and nobility of Esthonia; Cossacks and Bolsheviki on the Don; Bolsheviki and Tartar on the Volga. (Feb.-March.)

2. On Italian front.

- (a) Italians hold against repeated assaults of Austro-Germans (Jan.-Feb.), on Piave. Aid is given Italians by British and French, and finally, by American troops.

3. On Western front.

- (a) Great German offensive (made possible by surrender of Russia and release of half a million German troops from the Eastern front) begins against British in the West. (March 21.) In 10 days Germans advance on an average of 15 miles and reach a point within 12 miles of Amiens—Battle front from Arras to La Fere. In last days of battle French come to aid of British. Germans had advanced to within 60 miles of Paris, and captured about 1,000 sq. mi. of territory. Disaster to British *fifth* army.

German long range gun bombards Paris (March 23, for week).

- (b) Second phase of German drive.
    - (1) Battle of Amiens. With reënforcements of men and guns Germans renew drive upon Amiens. Allies drenched with poison gas from new, more deadly German shell. *Americans* (probably 100,000)—*participate in this fight*, and save Amiens (April 30).
  - (c) Third phase of German offensive.
    - (1) Battle line shifts further north, and Germans advance and occupy Armentieres in Belgium and Messines ridge, near Ypres. (Broke Portugese line here.) Mt. Kemmel falls to Germans.
  - (d) Fourth phase (on the Aisne), (May 27-June 1).
    - (1) Germans cross Aisne, May 27.
    - (2) Germans cross Vesle, May 28.
    - (3) Germans reach Soissons, May 29.
    - (4) Germans reach the Marne, May 30.
    - (5) *Americans halt Germans at Marne* (June 1)—Cross Marne and bring back German prisoners (June 19).
  - (e) Fifth phase—(between Montdidier and Noyon (June 9).
    - (1) Germans achieve only slight gains on 60 mile front.
  - (f) Final German drive (Soissons to Rheims, July 15-18).
    - (1) Germans definitely halted within three days.
4. *Great Allied counter-offensive* (started by Americans July 15). Americans captured Château-Thierry and drove Germans back across Marne.



- (a) Americans strike apex of German Rheims-Soissons pocket.
- (b) French and Americans drive in sides of German pocket (July 18 through month of August), until the whole salient is obliterated. Fought Germans back continuously for seven weeks.
- (c) French, British and Americans launch terrific offenses in quick succession, all the way from Rheims to the North Sea (Aug.-Sept. 10). A few of the details of their speedy successes are:
  - (1) Australians occupy Perronne (Sept. 1).
  - (2) British and French advance on 90 mile front, from Cambrai to Soissons, capturing Ham, Guiscard, Chauny, as some of leading objectives.<sup>3</sup>
  - (3) The first all-American army under exclusive American command in a dashing, brilliantly executed offensive completely wipes out the *St. Mihiel salient* (which the Germans had held for four years) in *twenty-seven hours* (Sept. 12-13).
- (d) British and French drive forward on both sides of St. Quentin and capture 10,000 prisoners Sept. 18.—French take St. Quentin Oct. 1.
- (e) American army assigned the difficult *Argonne region* begins (Sept. 26) the great final battle of the Argonne forest and country—advance continually until the very last hour of the war, on Nov. 11.
- (f) Similar Allied and American successes are

<sup>3</sup> Allied armies capture 112,000 Germans in July and August. For complete account of the American participation in the war, July 15 to Nov. 11, see General Pershing's report to the Secretary of War in *Jan., 1919*, number of Review of Reviews.

achieved all way north to region of the Belgian coast. (Oct.)

(Here things were happening so rapidly over the various fields of conflict and in so many different departments of activity that we leave the Western front for a short time, to chronicle some of the major events in these other fields.)

5. On the Eastern Front.

- (a) Germans advance toward Petrograd (Feb.).
- (b) Turks take Trebizond (Feb. 25).
- (c) Germans complete their conquest in Finland (May 3).

6. In the Balkans,—Greeks attack Turks in Macedonia, (May 30); 1,700 prisoners.

7. On Italian front,—Italians begin beating back Austro-Germans beyond Piave (Jan.), soon followed by Austrian offensive 1,000,000 strong which crossed the Piave, but is soon driven back (June-July).

8. In Asia.

- (a) British take Jerico (Feb. 22), Damascus, and destroy Turk army (Sept.-Oct.).
- (b) Japanese, British and American (marines) troops land at Vladivostok (April 5-7), to oppose Germans and Bolsheviki.
- (c) British, in 700 mile march from Bagdad take Baku (oil fields.)

B. Naval Operations.

- (a) British bombard and sink *Goeben* and *Breslau* in Dardanelles (Jan. 20).
- (b) British attack Zeebrugge and Ostend sub-bases (April 23), effectively dam up one and all but destroy the other.

C. In northern Europe (Russia), Allied and American troops land at Archangel, against Germans and Bolsheviki.

D. In the Orient—American troops from Philippines land

at Vladivostok (Aug. 15), to coöperate with Japanese and other Allies.

E. Serbian (reorganized army) drive in Balkans defeats Bulgars and advances 60-70 miles—other Allies cooperate, and straighten line (Sept.-Oct.).

WAR AND PEACE

I. (1918) Concluded. (We shall go back to the first week in October, so as to connect up the last allied movements in the field better than we were able to the last month, before hostilities ceased.)

A. *The Crushing allied Drive* (Oct.-Nov. 11).

1. Germans evacuate Lens (coal center in France) (Oct. 3).
  3. Austrian naval base at Durazzo destroyed by Italian, British and American ships (Oct. 3).
2. French fleet take Bierut, Syria (Oct. 7).
3. Cambrai falls (Oct. 7) to British.
4. Americans clear Argonne forest of enemy (Oct. 11).  
Serbs occupy Nish same day.
5. French take Laon and La Fère (Oct. 12).
6. Belgians take Roulers (Oct. 13).
7. Italians enter Durazzo, Albania (Oct. 14).
8. Germans evacuating Brussels (Oct. 15); Bohemia in hands of revolutionists.
9. Americans take Grand Pré. British enter Lille (last important stronghold of Germans in northern French except Valenciennes) (Oct. 16).
10. Ostend, Zeebrugge and Thiult (sub-bases of Germans) occupied by Allies (Oct. 17).
11. German army driven to border of Holland,—15,000 Germans cut off are interned in Holland (Oct. 21).
12. British take Valenciennes (Oct. 22).
13. Italian drive on Piave started—one of the greatest offensives of the war. Continues for only *ten days*, when 500,000 Austrians are taken prisoners and

250,000 horses and \$1,000,000,000 fall into hands of Italians. Italians had only one regiment of Americans and five divisions of British and French, to help them; so the Italians must be given the credit for the biggest single military victory of the war. Half the Austrian forces of 1,000,000 men, were captured. This overwhelming disaster explains Austria-Hungary's immediate suit for an armistice and speedy surrender (Nov. 4).

14. British take Aleppo (in Turkey) and U. S. first army completes capture of 20,000 Germans (Oct. 26).
  15. British take Kerkuk (155 miles northwest of Bagdad) (Oct. 27).
  16. Turks evacuate Baku (Oct. 29).
  17. French and Serbian cavalry reach Belgrade, thus freeing Serbia of Teutons (Nov. 1).
  18. Revolt of German sailors and soldiers at Kiel (Nov. 6) presages revolution in Germany.
  19. *U. S. troops take Sedan* (Nov. 7),—where the Prussian army took prisoner the Emperor Napoleon III, with 200,000 troops, in 1870, and sealed their triumph of that year over France.
  20. Belgians reach Ghent; British, Mons; French reach Belgium (Nov. 11.)<sup>4</sup>
- B. We shall now take up the armistice terms as imposed upon the chief Central Powers, Austro-Hungary and Germany, with a brief prelude of the political events that followed in rapid succession in the Central Powers during October and the first days of November.

1. (a) *Czar Ferdinand* of Bulgaria abdicates (Oct. 4), after Bulgaria's collapse in Macedonia. His son Boris takes throne.

<sup>4</sup>The allied advances continued everywhere along the Western front, with increasing speed, until the hour of 11:00 a. m., November 11, when the German military command had agreed to accept the Allied terms for an armistice as finally directed by the authority of Marshal Foch. Practically all of France and western Belgium was cleared before hostilities ceased.

- (b) Bulgaria in revolution—King Boris quits (Nov. 2).
- (c) Turkish (War) cabinet resigns (Oct. 8).
- (d) Emperor Charles attempts reforms in Austria-Hungary, to save his empire (Oct. 18), but is too late. (Collapse of Austria-Hungary comes as result of Italian successes in last week of October.) Abdicates Nov. 11.
- (e) Von Hertling, last war chancellor of Germany, falls from Power (Oct. 3), and is replaced by Prince Maximilian, a man of peace (Oct. 4).
- (f) Kaiser consents to electoral reform (Sept. 30), but too late.
- (g) During October German states carry out sweeping reforms, weakening Kaiser's war powers, granting suffrage reform, etc., *but all too late.*

- 2.
- (a) New German Chancellor (Maximilian of Baden) asks for armistice and peace negotiations (Oct. 4).
  - (b) President Wilson replies to German note of Oct. 4, on Oct. 7, refusing peace by negotiation.
  - (c) Karl Liebknecht (anti-war Socialist), pardoned by Kaiser (Oct. 9).
  - (d) Wilson calls for independence of Czechs and Jugo-Slavs from Austria-Hungary, as reply to Austria's plea for peace (Oct. 19).
  - (e) German note accepts Wilson's terms of peace (Oct. 21).
  - (f) Wilson refers German note of Oct. 21 to Allies (Oct. 28).
  - (g) Turkey signs armistice (Oct. 31); Allied fleet sails for Constantinople.
  - (h) Armistice with Austria-Hungary signed (Nov. 3).
  - (i) Kaiser refuses to abdicate (Nov. 8), but is

shown he must, and renounces Imperial and Prussian crowns (Nov. 9).

- (j) Germany (under Socialist ministry) accepts Allied terms of armistice, and hostilities cease (Nov. 11). By this date all four of the Central Powers had surrendered to Allies, on Allied terms.

#### ARMISTICE TERMS

### II. *Armistice Terms.*

1. *Bulgaria.* Surrenders to Allies on Sept. 30.
  - (a) Bulgarian army to demobilize immediately.
  - (b) Arms, ammunition and supplies to be turned over to Allies.
  - (c) All Greek and Serbian territory to be evacuated by Bulgarian troops.
  - (d) All means of transportation, including the Danube, be opened to Allies for operations against Austria and Germany. (By this action Turkey was completely cut off from her two remaining allies, Austria and Germany, and with continued defeats, was soon upon her knees begging for peace.)
2. *Turkey* surrenders to Allies (Nov. 1). Terms similar to those imposed on Bulgaria.
3. *Austria-Hungary* surrenders to Allies (Nov. 4).<sup>5</sup>
  - (a) Demobilize her armies and call home all Austria's troops helping Germany.
  - (b) Withdraw all Austrian forces from invaded territories, leaving all war supplies, and even coal, to be disposed of by Allies.

<sup>5</sup> Because of their importance, and the relation they are certain to bear to the final peace terms we give the conditions that were imposed upon Austria-Hungary and upon Germany more in detail.

- (c) Virtually one-half Austrian artillery and equipment on Austrian soil to be surrendered.
- (d) All Germans in Austria to leave within fifteen days or be interned. (Bulgaria had acted similarly with Germans and Austrians at earlier date.)
- (e) Allied and U. S. forces to take possession of all military points which they considered needful.
- (f) Allies to have use of Austrian railroads to operate against Germany.
- (g) Austria surrendered all German submarines in Austrian waters, together with fifteen best Austrian submarines, three Austrian battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, and other naval vessels to be selected by the Allies.
- (h) All war vessels not surrendered to Allies to be concentrated and disarmed under Allied direction.
- (i) Austria-Hungary returns all Allied prisoners of war, but Allies *not* to return Austrian prisoners.
- (j) Austria must not destroy property in her retreat.
- (k) Allied war and merchant vessels to have free navigation of all Austrian waters, including Danube (Allies to take possession of Danube fortresses, to guarantee its free navigation), for use against Germany.
- (l) Allied blockade of Austria and her allies subject to will of Allies.
- (m) All aircraft of Austria and her allies

left in Austria to be put out of commission, and kept by Allies until after war ends with Germany.

- (n) All Austrian naval bases to be occupied by Allies, and all naval supplies or craft of Allies held by Austria to be surrendered.
- (o) Austria-Hungary to keep no army except as a police force to maintain order.
- (p) Italian claims (that which Italy went to war to gain) provinces held by Austria-Hungary before the war to be returned to Italy. *Here the exact boundary was laid out, with great precision, evidently, to mark out the boundary settlement in the final peace terms.*
- (q) Local government (civil) to be reinstated in Austrian countries, but under Allied oversight and control.<sup>6</sup>

4. *Germany's Terms of Armistice.* (Surrendered to Allies, November 11.)

I. *Military clauses on Western Front.*

1. Immediate evacuation by Germany of invaded countries—Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg—to be completed within fifteen days from signature of armistice. German troops not out by that time become prisoners of war. Allies to occupy territory as Germans retreat.
2. Repatriation, to be completed within fourteen days, of all inhabitants of above

\*The seventeen armistice points given above show how complete was the surrender of the Austro-Hungarian government. These armistice terms, which are not yet a peace, are more complete and humiliating than the "unconditional surrender" of any previous sovereign nation in modern times.



- mentioned countries, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted.
3. Surrender of 5,000 guns; 30,000 machine guns; 3,000 minen-werfers; 2,000 aeroplanes.
  4. Evacuation by German armies of all territory on left bank of Rhine—these countries to be administered by local authorities under Allied and U. S. control, or armies of occupation. A neutral zone east of Rhine to an average of about 35 kilometers, from borders of Holland all the way to Switzerland, to be reserved, as safeguard, until peace. Germans have 19 days from Nov. 11, to evacuate Rhine territory.
  5. Civilians in above territory to be left undisturbed, with no damage to property or persons. Military establishments of all kinds to be turned over to Allies intact. Stores of food, etc., to be left for civilians.
  6. Five thousand locomotives, 50,000 wagons, 10,000 motor lorries to be delivered to Allies, together with all railways of Alsace-Lorraine. All barges taken from Allies to be restored to them.
  7. Allied and U. S. armies to have right of requisition in all occupied territory. Upkeep of troops of occupation in Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) charged to Germany.
  8. German command must reveal all mines, fuses, etc., and assist in finding and destroying them; also all poisoned wells, etc.

9. Immediate return of all allied and U. S. prisoners of war without reciprocity on Allies' part.
10. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory to be cared for by Germans, who will be given medical material required for same.

## II. *Eastern German Front.*

1. Immediate evacuation by all German troops and German agents, *of any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Roumania or Turkey*, and withdrawal within borders of Germany.
2. German troops to cease all requisitions and seizures for German use, from said territories.
3. Abandonment of treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest and supplementary treaties.
4. Allies to have free access to territories evacuated by Germans on eastern front, in order to convey supplies of food, etc., to population, or for any other purpose.

## III. *Unconditional Capitulation in East Africa within one month.*

## IV. *General Clauses.*

1. Repatriation of all allied and U. S. citizens whatsoever, not included in clause 9 above.
2. Reparation for all damages done. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit of the National Bank of Belgium, restitution of Russian and Roumanian gold taken by Germany, same to be held in trust by Allies until final peace.

## V. *Naval Conditions.*

1. Notification to neutrals by Germany that

- freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to naval and mercantile marines of allied powers.
2. All naval and marine prisoners of war of Allied and associated powers to be returned, without reciprocity.
  3. Surrender to Allies and U. S. of 160 submarines. All other submarines to be paid off, disarmed and placed under supervision of U. S. and Allies.
  4. The following surface vessels to be surrendered: six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers, fifty destroyers of most modern type. All other surface warships to be concentrated in German naval bases designated by Allies, and placed under supervision of Allies and U. S. All vessels of auxiliary fleet to be disarmed.
  5. All mines and obstructions laid by Germans *outside* German territorial waters (this means the German war zone) to be swept away by help of Germans.
  6. Freedom of access to Baltic sea to be given to naval and merchantile marine of Allies and U. S., with their right to occupy German fortifications to guarantee same, and right to sweep all German territorial waters, with German aid.
  7. Allied blockade of Germany to continue and all German ships at sea liable to capture.
  8. All naval aircraft to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases specified by Allies and U. S.
  9. In evacuating Belgian coast and ports Germany shall abandon all merchant ships,

- tugs, lighters, cranes and harbor materials, and inland navigation materials, stores and supplies of all kinds.
10. All Black Sea ports to be evacuated by Germany, all Russian war vessels seized by Germany to be handed over to Allies and U. S.
  11. All Allied merchant vessels to be restored. No destruction of ships or materials before evacuation, surrender or restoration.
  12. German notification to world (especially Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland) that all restrictions on trading with Allies and associated countries, are removed.
  13. No transfer of German shipping to any neutral after signature to armistice.
- VI. Duration of armistice, 30 days, with option to extend.
- VII. Limit for German reply to armistice terms—72 hours.<sup>7</sup>

The above, therefore, were the conditions that Germany accepted to gain an armistice,—a mere cessation of hostilities—not peace.

A brief perusal of the above, and a comparison of the armistice terms imposed upon the Central Powers individually will reveal the fact that those Germany was obliged to meet were the most drastic of all, as indeed they should be. Moreover, they were the most specific and humiliating in all history; and came only *four months* after the Kaiser boasted last July of German victory and the “shining German sword,” as he was sacrificing 500,000 more of his sub-

<sup>7</sup> Slight changes were made in several of these armistice conditions before they were finally signed by the official German delegates, but were of a technical and very minor character, and did not at all alter the nature or severity of their application.

jects in a struggle that every people but his own by that time realized was a hopeless one for him and all he stood for. Thus ends the "divine right" rule of the Hohenzollerns, and the "divinity that doth hedge about a king."

The peace problem is quite a different issue. We shall take it up in our next chapter, and continue, as the peace conference sits. Yet, there are several clauses in the armistice terms that are meant to be permanent, such for example, as the giving up of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, the boundary marked out between Italy and the former States of the Austrian empire, the renunciation of Constantinople by Turkey, reparation for damages done, abandonment of all German official propaganda in Russia and the Brest-Litovsk treaty, etc. The exactness of the armistice terms and the permanent character of several of them, as well as the promptness with which they were submitted to the German commissioners after their application for them on November 7, shows that the men who framed them and the responsible statesmen back of them, had been shaping them for some time before hostilities ceased. Their effect therefore was instant.

## CHAPTER XVI

### OFFICIAL PEACE DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

WHILE we are awaiting the final consummation of the armistice conditions and the preliminaries of peace, we may well give our attention at this time to the study of the movements for peace up to the present. Accordingly, we shall take up these developments, as shown by the statements of war aims of the belligerents by the official representatives of those belligerents, or from semi-official sources. This will also include peace proposals from neutrals, as well as the principles of peace and peace terms, set forth from time to time by the United States and the allied nations, and by the Central Powers.

Aside from the above movements there have been various efforts at peace, it is true, such as the peace propaganda by the Socialists, certain German-Americans, the Pan-German peace campaign, the "peace at any price" clique, etc.; but these latter have all been so ill-advised, so absurd, or so un-American and abortive, that we need not consider them in this connection. Moreover, the crises in which they figured *have all passed*, and we may let that phase of the subject rest in oblivion. There is one outgrowth of these factors that will not rest, however, but has constantly become more menacing,—and that is, the Bolshevik movement in Europe and the principles of the I. W. W. in America. This condition among a considerable portion of the earth's people today is nothing less than a mental state and the philosophy of *anarchy*, and as such it must be met and put down. This state of *anarchy* is the other extreme from autocracy, and because it is actually being accomplished in governmental affairs in

Russia and threatening the other nations, must be met, if necessary, by force, and speedily suppressed. We shall have more to say of this lawless element later, but at present, let us return to our subject in hand.

We are all rejoicing beyond our fondest hopes, at the happy termination of the war, the armistice conditions, and the political revolution in Germany since November 11, as it is natural and right we should be. But a word of warning is still in place, and indeed necessary, from the very fact that the war was over before many of us had fully grasped what it meant. There are still so many of us who have not realized the true nature of this war, and the significance of the issues involved, and the character of the government and political ideals of our chief adversary, that there is still danger of this country settling back into pre-war conditions and habits of thinking, and yielding up important international prestige and guarantees that alone can safeguard the principles of democracy in the future. The war for democracy as intelligent Americans understand it, is not yet won, despite the defeat of the military masters of Germany. No greater mistake could be made than to think so. The real fight that affords the opportunity for the *demonstration* of democracy to the world, has just begun.

We can, we must, make our final peace only with the legally and justly constituted representatives of the German people, not with any temporary revolutionary faction. We must know that these representatives have the unquestioned right and the unquestioned power to speak for the German nation as a whole, whatever that may prove to be. And the only way to be sure of that, is to act for final peace when, and not until when, the German people, in a legal and democratic manner, have elected and established a democratic government with duly chosen delegates to speak for them in the peace conference of the nations. This demand is not vengeance on a defeated foe, it is simply justice and common sense. Germany has done much since the close of hostilities to further

the settlement of peace, but what she does with herself in the next few months will determine very largely the period and nature of peace deliberations at Versailles.

It shall be our plan in this article to discuss the peace advances and proposals in connection with our own government's part in them, and with President Wilson's speeches and diplomatic notes as a basis; for in studying his communications directly or indirectly, with the various belligerents, and their answers, and vice versa, we are taking note of all the important official action in the direction of peace on either side of the conflict.

The President's first public utterance on the subject of peace after this war, is found in his address "America First," delivered before the Daughters of American Revolution, at Washington, D. C., October 11, 1915, and is as follows: "Peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted principles of international law, only upon those things which remind nations of their duties to each other and deeper than that, of their duties to mankind and to humanity." This was said a year and a half before the United States entered the war. Thus early did the president speak out for a peace that would guarantee justice and the principles of humanity. From the first he was far more certain and consistent in his conception of the part America should take in the peace problems than he was as to the stand we were to take in the war; and that but proves that he was more a man of peace than he was of war,—as the average American was,—until the very last minute of neutrality.

His first approach to a detailed statement of peace terms is found in his address before the United States Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), on "A World League for Peace," still two months and a half before our entry into the war. After stating that "in every discussion of the peace that must end this war it must be taken for granted that a world league to enforce peace shall be formed, making impossible such a



world catastrophe again," he continues. "It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise (peace) . . . . To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their policy and the approved practices of their government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might . . . show mankind the way to liberty . . . to add their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world.

"The treaties and agreements which bring it (the war) to an end must embody terms which will create a peace . . . . that will *win the approval of mankind*, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged.

"If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be a peace made secure by the *organized major force of mankind*.

"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that *Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed*, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from one sovereignty to another as if they were property.

". . . There should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland. . . .

"So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling toward a full development of its resources and powers should be assured a *direct outlet to the great highways of the sea*. . . . No nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

"And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, equality and coöperation.

". . . And the question of limiting naval armaments

. . . opens up the question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation. . . . There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armies are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained."

By an analysis of the above statements we find that President Wilson before the United States entered the war declared indispensable the following conditions of peace:

1. A peace must be built up on the principles of international law and of humanity.
2. There must be a World League to enforce peace.
3. The United States must play a part in this peace.
4. The peace must not be in the interest of any particular nation or group of nations, but must win the approval of mankind.
5. This peace must be built upon the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed—a democratic peace.
6. Poland must be reunited and given independence.
7. There must be freedom of the seas for all nations.
8. There must be a limitation of military and naval preparations and "all programs of military preparation."

Let us keep these points in mind, and see, as we proceed, how President Wilson has explained, enlarged upon and supplemented them, since January, 1917. We should also note whether he has remained consistent in all essentials with his first utterances on this subject.

On the occasion of his first war message to Congress (April 2, 1917), the President made it clear that he still had the same ideas as to our part in and demands concerning the terms of peace and agreements of the nations in their league to enforce peace after the war. These are his words: "My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the

last two months (February and March, 1917), and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same thing in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22nd of January, last."

He throws further light upon his idea of the League to Enforce Peace, however, by this further statement: "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants."

Thus he adds one more condition to the eight listed above, namely:

9. It must be a league of *democratic* nations.

This of course implies that if the Central Powers are to join this league they must be genuinely transformed into democratic nations and governments.

In his Flag Day address (June 14, 1917), the President makes this statement concerning the nature and purpose of the war and the peace that is to follow: "The great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a *People's War*, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world . . . the German people included." This is abundant proof that if the President abides by his former conviction we shall never make a final peace with Germany until we are certain it is a democratic Germany with which we deal. And that, let me repeat, and no less the American people must demand, if this war is not to be in vain.

We shall next give our attention to President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peace proposals (Aug. 27, 1917). The Pope's proposals as the President summarizes, are substantially as follows:

1. That the nations "return to the *status quo ante bellum*" —(political condition before the war).

2. That there be a "general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration."

3. That by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established.

4. That the territorial claims of France and Italy, problems of the Balkan States, restitution of Poland, etc., "be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible," after the war.

The President then proceeds with convincing force to point out that:

(1) It is manifest that no part of this (Pope's) program can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the *status quo ante* furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it;

(2) The *status quo ante* is NOT a basis upon which a firm and just peace can be established, for:

(a) The object of this war is to deliver the free people of the world from the condition it was put in by the *status quo ante* of Germany before the war. The scathing indictment of Germany follows: "a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible Government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, . . . delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood, not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands . . . the enemy of four-fifths of the world."

(b) To deal with such a power according to the Pope's plan would "involve a recuperation of its (the German government and military system) strength and a renewal of its policy," and compel a *permanent hostile combination of nations against it*.

These were plain, blunt words, but they were as true and convincing as they were plain, and they have helped much to revivify the Allies and to defeat Germany, and make the victorious peace of freedom's cause triumphant.

In this speech there is just one more condition of peace that President Wilson contends for,—and it is the *tenth* one we have, before the great official peace communications and notes came to the United States from the Central Powers after the United States entered the war. It is this:

10. There should be no exclusive economic leagues against, or in favor of, any nation or group of nations after the war. There must be *equal economic opportunity* for all nations.

Next, we shall take up the “peace drives” of 1917, by the Central Powers, the Bolsheviki, and certain elements in some of the Allied countries.

## CHAPTER XVII

### PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (*Continued*)

**T**HE German ambassador informed me that a conference had been held in Berlin in the early part of July, (1914), at which the date of the war was fixed. This conference was presided over by the Kaiser; the Baron Wangenheim was present to report on conditions in Turkey. Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there, and so was Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz. With them were the leaders of German finance, the directors of the railroads, and the captains of industry. . . . Each was asked if he were ready for the war. All replied in the affirmative, except the financiers, who insisted that they must have two weeks in which to sell foreign securities and arrange their loans. (Two weeks more would make it the last of July, as actually happened.)

"The Italian Ambassador at Constantinople announced that Baron Wangenheim said the same thing to him, Italy, at that time being a member of the Triple Alliance. . . . All the details of the meeting were still (Aug. 26, 1914) fresh in Baron Wangenheim's mind."—Henry Morgenthau, former American Ambassador to Turkey, in the *New York World*, Oct. 14, 1917.

The above quotation from an official source is worth reading again and again, and fixing definitely in mind. Once more let me repeat, most assuredly we cannot admit Germany into the League of Nations until she has a genuine constitutional government and has repudiated everything that her former imperial and militaristic government has stood for—until she *repents in sackcloth and ashes* for the colossal weight of crime that she has heaped upon suffering humanity,

under the leadership of her war lords and lords of trade and industry, who, as above shown in 1914, are still the real masters of Germany.

There is as much reason to study the causes and nature of the war now as there has been at any time during its progress, for the simple reason, as we pointed out once before, *that we must know the cause of a disease in order to apply the remedy.* And now, as the Supreme Council of the Nations is preparing the remedy, it is incumbent upon them and upon the peoples to whom they are responsible and whom they represent, to have the causes clearly and constantly in mind, if broken humanity is to be healed of its wounds in the future. At one and the same time we are face to face with the world's greatest opportunity and its greatest danger. That is why today witnesses the world's greatest crisis, and a great forward or great backward step is inevitable. Because of these facts the writer is adding a number of additional war study pamphlets to the list given a few months ago. Some have been referred to before, others have not, but none as definitely as they are now.

Published by the Committee on Public Information:

### I. *War Information Series*

No. 21 "America's War Aims and Peace Program."—Carl L. Becker, Cornell University.<sup>1</sup>

No. 14. "The War for Peace."—Arthur D. Call, Secretary American Peace Society.

No. 13. "German Militarism and Allied Ideals."—Stuart P. Sherman, University of Illinois.

No. 13. "The War Message and Facts Behind It."—Annotated text of President Wilson's War Message, April 2, 1917.

No. 14. "Why America Fights Germany."—John S. P. Tatlock, Stanford University.

<sup>1</sup> All quotations in this article without names of authors mentioned are taken from "America's War Aims and Peace Program."

No. 2. "The Nation in Arms,"—Secretaries Lane and Baker.

No. 16. "Study of the Great War."—Topical Outline, Samuel B. Harding, Indiana University.

## II. *The "Red, White and Blue" Series*

January, 1918. "Conquest and Kulture."—Notestein and Stoll.

March, 1918. "German Treatment of Conquered Territory."

January, 1918. "German War Practices."

March, 1918. "War, Labor and Peace,"—President Wilson.

September, 1917. "The President's Flag Day Address."

—, 1917. "The Battle Line of Democracy."—Prose and Poetry of the World War.

—, 1918. "War Cyclopaedia."—Reference Hand-book on the War.

### *Germany's First Peace Proposal*

At the close of our last chapter we were dealing with the Pope's peace message of the summer of 1917 and President Wilson's answer, rejecting the papal terms. The reader will recall that we proposed a consideration of the peace moves of the Central Powers next, and United States official negotiations with them.

"The first official proposal for peace came from Germany, at the close of the year 1916, at a time when, in Germany's eyes, victory for her army was already at hand. In the west the Allies had no more than held the German line; while in the east the Central Powers had gained the aid of Turkey and Bulgaria, had overrun Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and had inflicted serious reverses upon the British in Mesopotamia. . . . During the first two years then closing, the fortunes of war were decidedly with Germany and her allies.



Under these circumstances the German government offered to discuss peace, confident that if the Allies accepted the offer she could get what she wished; while if they refused it, it could be made to appear that they were responsible for prolonging the conflict." This was the offer contained in the German note of Dec. 12, 1916, and forwarded to the belligerents through the neutral powers. The substance of Germany's proposals at this time was as follows:

(1) Though ready to continue the war (forced upon them), yet "prompted by the desire to avoid further bloodshed and make an end to the atrocities of war," all the Central Powers "propose to enter forthwith into peace negotiations."

(2) These propositions "have for their object a guarantee of the existence, honor and freedom of the development" of the Central Powers and are "appropriate terms for the establishment of a lasting peace."

(3) Germany is carrying on a war of defense against her enemies, which aim at her destruction.

It was not an offer of terms, but an offer to stop the war if the Allies would agree to Germany's terms, whatever they might be. For the Allies to have accepted this proposal and a peace conference at that time would have been nothing less than an unconditional surrender to Germany.

### *Reply of the Entente Governments*

The French denounced the proposal as a trap, and Lloyd George, speaking for Great Britain, stated that it would be nothing less than "putting our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of the Germans." Quoting Lincoln's words, he further stated, "We accepted the war for an object, a worthy object. The war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time." In his speech Lloyd George also spoke of "complete restitution, full reparation and effective guarantees," and

that the Allies "refuse to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere."

The Allied answer amounted to this:

- (1) "Reparation for violated rights and liberties."
- (2) "Recognition of the rights of nationality."
- (3) "Free existence of small states."

In this it will be seen that Great Britain and France were championing the rights of nationality and of small states as early as 1916 in the war, as *sine qua non* of peace.

It was about this time (December 18, 1916, to be exact) that President Wilson addressed his first feeler and peace note to the belligerent powers. The main features of this communication are:

- (1) Each side professes to be fighting defensive war.
- (2) Each side professes to be the champion of small nations, and—
- (3) Each side professes to be "ready to consider the formation of a League of Nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world;" and therefore,
- (4) "The objects for which both sides are fighting; stated in general terms, *seem* to be the same"; therefore,
- (5) Each side might state in definite terms what would satisfy them and their people, or in other words, what they are fighting for.
- (6) The President is justified in making this request because the United States is "as vitally interested as the Governments now at war," in the "measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world."

So, we see, in his first general communication to the warring countries President Wilson declared that the United States must have a part in the settlement of world peace. This, we must remember was four months before our entry into the war. But the emphasis the President put upon the part United States must play in the determination of peace was lost sight of in the *violent criticism that was voiced in Great Britain and France, as well as in some portions of our own country, from the fact that he did not distinguish in*

*this note between the different aims and states of the Allied and Central Powers in the war.* And many still believe that in stating that in general terms the objects of both sides *seem to be the same*, President Wilson was justly offending the Allied powers and stretching the attitude of neutrality to wholly unjustifiable bounds. However that be, this note of inquiry elicited answers from the Allies that were *far more definite terms than had ever been stated before.*

The Central Powers in their united reply merely stated that they were "ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace." This was conclusive proof that the Central Powers did not desire the world *and much less their own people to know for what aims of conquest and domination their autocratic governments were sacrificing them by the millions.* Such always is the secret diplomacy of irresponsible kings and greedy, unscrupulous militarists.

The Entente (Allied) Powers, as President Wilson pointed out, "have replied much more definitely, and have stated, in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement." To quote further from this address to the Senate (January 22, 1917), "We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must hereafter hold the world at peace." And as the President here stated, he had brought the peace settlement just that much nearer, by revealing to the world the essential democracy of the Allies' cause as against the sinister, secret, Machiavellianism of the Central Powers. And just to that extent, also, he was preparing the United States for the day soon to come, when she must vindicate her right to be called a democracy by throwing in her powerful aid with the other liberal governments of the world to save to the world the cardinal American principle of "government by the consent of the governed."

This speech of President Wilson (Jan. 22, 1917), as well

as his reply to the Pope (Aug., 1917), was treated in last month's article, and therefore will not be further analyzed here.

"The general effect of these events was to bring into clearer light the fundamental issues of the war," especially, after the Russian revolution which overthrew the Czar (March, 1917), and the entry of the United States into the war (April 6, 1917). Sixteen more states now declared war on Germany or severed diplomatic relations with her. This all brought on an internal crisis in Germany, with the upshot that the Reichstag on July 11 refused to vote war credits for the time being, and repudiated the annexationist scheme of the war party (which was in power). Bethmann-Hollweg resigned the imperial chancellorship, and the Reichstag resolutions were published to the world. They are worth noting in this connection:

- (1) Germany fights in self-defence, to preserve her territories.
- (2) The Reichstag is for peace and "lasting reconciliation among the nations."
- (3) It is against "forced acquisitions of territory, and political, economies and financial violations."
- (4) It rejects all plans for an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war.
- (5) The freedom of the seas must be assured.
- (6) The Reichstag will work for international arbitration —"jurisdictional organizations."

From the above points it is easily seen that the Reichstag was moving for peace; it was answering to the world what the Kaiser and his government and army disdained to answer. It was the voice of the German people that the Reichstag had heard,—their reaction to the democratic peace terms that President Wilson and the peoples and governments of the Allies had forced upon their attention. But what did the voice of the German people or the resolutions

of the Reichstag amount to, at that stage of the war? Kaiser Wilhelm with his war lords rode rough-shod and defiantly over the German people and their representatives, brandished again his "shining sword," and with God's help, promised a German junker's peace. And the people and the Reichstag were not again heard from until the last days of the war. The "shining sword" had so dazzled them that they were again ready to follow their "God's anointed"; and the collapse of Russia confirmed their belief in victory.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### OFFICIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (*Concluded*)

I N our last chapter we gave some space to a consideration of the German-Bolshevik peace developments and their effects on peace negotiations throughout the world. A further examination of this conspiracy is necessary to a proper conception of its nature and results, especially, upon Russia and upon German honor before the world.

#### *Brest-Litovsk Conference and Peace Treaty*

Winning support, as it did, among Socialists and certain labor and pacifist elements everywhere, this abortive peace offensive of the Bolsheviks and Germans constituted for months a distinct danger and threat to the Allies and the cause of democracy. Tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the Allied governments to "negotiate peace" with their enemies. But the defiant refusal of the heads of the Allied and American governments to surrender the principles for which they fought soon brought all effective opposition to an end, as their peoples became aware of the nature of these German-Anarchist schemes.

The exact nature of the Russian surrender to the German government is revealed in the following statement in the introduction to "War Information Series" No. 20, (Oct., 1918): "The documents show that the Bolshevik revolution was arranged for by the German Great General Staff and financed by the German Imperial Bank and other German financial institutions.

"They show that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a be-

trayal of the Russian people by the German agents, Lenine and Trotsky; that a German-picked commander was chosen to 'defend' Petrograd against the Germans; that German officers have been secretly received by the Bolshevik government as military advisers, as spies upon the embassies of Russia's allies, as officers in the Russian army and directors of the Bolshevik military, foreign and domestic policy. They show, in short, that the present Bolshevik government is not a Russian government at all, but a German government acting solely in the interests of Germany and betraying the Russian people, as it betrays Russia's natural allies, for the benefit of the Imperial German government alone."

Not only did the Allied countries and United States suspect all this treachery and later find it out for a fact, but there were even Germans who admitted it. "A German politician, writing in the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung of Aug. 27, 1918, stated: '*We have brought about treaties of peace at Brest and Bucharest (with Roumania) which correspond to our interest, but not to our principles as we presented them in the peace offer.*'"—War Information Series 21, p. 26.

### *The Final Developments Before the Armistice*

On July 4, 1918, President Wilson reiterated his statement that there could be no peace while the Imperial German Government, which was responsible for the war, remained in power. And he laid down the "ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

(1) "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to a virtual impotence.

(2) "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of politi-

cal relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

(3) "The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and respect for the common law of civilized society that governs the individual citizens of all modern states in their dealings with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

(4) "The establishment of a League of Nations that will check every invasion of right—affording a tribunal—to which all must submit, and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned, shall be sanctioned."

In his New York address of Sept. 27 (1918), the President once more declared that he could not make peace with the governments of the Central Empires on any sort of bargain or compromise whatsoever, since we cannot accept their word for anything. In this address he speaks more definitely and in detail on the matter of a League of Nations. Without reserve he declares that the League must be formed—not before nor after the peace is made, but in the peace council itself; also, that the League is the "most essential part of the peace settlement itself." And, as we all know, he won his point in the Peace Council at Versailles by having the constitution of the League drawn up as the very first permanent work of the Conference. Whether the necessary two-thirds majority of the United States Senate ratifies this constitution or not, the evidence throughout the world at present is, that the peoples of the nations are looking



forward with confidence that the League of Nations will be established as a remedy for war in the future.

The President throws still further light upon his conception of the League of Nations by the following "particulars" which he states in this same (Sept. 27) speech:

(1) "The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites. . . ."

(2) "No separate or special interest of any single nation or group of nations" can be made if such "is not consistent with the common interest of all."

(3) "There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations."

(4) ". . . No special, selfish, economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of boycott or exclusion *except* as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control."

(5) "All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known to the rest of the world."

As has been pointed out by several students of President Wilson's speeches, his program for the peace of the world is found in his *fourteen points* of January 8, 1918, his *four points* of July 4, and his *five points* of September 27, 1918, (just noted above). These three pronouncements, taken together, are known as his *twenty-three peace points*.

### *Analysis of President Wilson's Program*

We shall now make a brief analysis of the above twenty-three points, as enunciated by President Wilson. Some he has repeated, expounded, or enlarged upon a number of

times. Others he has modified somewhat, due to fundamental political changes in the governments or political conditions in the Central Powers; but, in their spirit and in their essentials these points remain the same. We may state their essence as follows:

1. A peace must be built up on the principles of international law and of humanity.
2. There must be a World League to enforce peace.
3. The peace must not be in the interest of any particular nation or group of nations, but must be in the common interest of all, large and small states alike.
4. This peace must win the approval of the *people* of the nations—of the major force of mankind.
5. It must be built upon the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed—a democratic peace.
6. There must be freedom of the seas for all nations, great and small.
7. There must be a limitation of military and naval armaments, “of all kinds of military preparation.”
8. There must be a reunited and independent Poland—along the line of nationality.
9. Alsace-Lorraine must be returned to France. (His statements amount to this.)
10. Italy must receive Italian provinces of the Trentino and Trieste (Italia Irredenta), in so far as these regions are unquestionably Italian.
11. All German occupation and political domination in any part of former Russia must cease (i. e. as Russia was in 1914).
12. There should be no exclusive economic leagues in favor of, or against, any nation or group of nations, after the war.
13. There must be absolutely no secret treaties, covenants

or international agreements between any nations or group of nations, but all treaties, etc., must be published to all the world.

14. Open minded and impartial adjustment of all colonial claims must be secured, with the interests of the peoples concerned uppermost in mind. (This developed into a *mandatory* for the German colonies, and perhaps others, in the League of Nations.)
15. Restoration of Belgium, with full sovereignty, and reparation, by Germany.
16. Peoples of Austria-Hungary must be given autonomy—self-government. (This was changed later to complete independence for Czecho-Slavs and Jugo-Slavs, after President Wilson recognized their independence; and he made the acceptance of this change a condition of acceptance of an armistice with Austria-Hungary.)
17. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro must be left to determine their own future, and Serbia must be accorded “free and secure access” to the Adriatic. All the Balkan states’ differences must be settled along “historically established lines of allegiance and nationality.”
18. Turkish portions of the Ottoman empire should be left for the Turks, unmolested; but in parts where non-Turkish populations predominate such peoples should be given complete self-government within their provinces.
19. Specifically, there must be no bargaining of nations at the peace table,—one nation granting another some such advantage in order to secure a corresponding advantage for itself, etc., but each part of final settlement based on the “*essential justice of that particular case.*”
20. That all well-defined national aspirations be accorded the utmost satisfaction possible *without adding new*

*elements of discord*, as well as (in 19 above) "absolutely no handing about or division of peoples as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game" (such as in division of Poland in eighteenth century).

21. The relationship of *nations* with one another to be governed by exactly the same code of morals and principles of conduct as that which obtains between *individuals* in all modern civilized society. (Just the opposite to Gen. Von Bernhardt's German doctrine in his "Germany and the Next War.")

A consideration of the above twenty-one more or less separate propositions will show that President Wilson has set forth (notwithstanding the many criticisms of their "indefiniteness," valid criticisms to a degree) the most complete, definite and comprehensive peace program that has come from any source, despite the fact that the details in many respects are lacking. Moreover, since all the Central Powers accepted President Wilson's peace program as a basis for an armistice and peace negotiations, it was certainly imperative that the author of this program, above all others, be present at the Congress of Versailles, to interpret his own propositions. Such a consideration should silence once for all the opposition to and criticism of, his leaving the United States in the interest of humanity and peace—for his own country and the world alike. Opposition to some of his *principles* is valid, and the inalienable right of his fellow-citizens; but opposition to the part he is playing in the peace negotiations is a totally different thing, and is inexcusable, from every point of view. It is right, and it is to be hoped that such action may react disastrously upon these critics.

There are three of the above propositions, however, that the writer would call the reader's attention to, in particular. One is the demand for "absolute freedom of the seas." No

one knows just what that means, and there are conflicting opinions as to what it might mean in the League of Nations. An able statement of the difficulties involved in this point—as well as others—is given by Joseph H. Odell, in Nov. 6, 1918, issue of the Outlook. (“The President’s Fourteen Points.”)

The second point is the President’s plan for the disposal of Turkey. In an early chapter of the series on the *Causes of War* the writer made this statement (in 1917): “Turkey must leave Europe, where she has never had a right to be. Turkey is not a nation in the true sense, anyway, and never has been. She has always existed unnaturally, by a criminal subjection of peoples who otherwise would long since have been free, and arbiters of their own destinies. If there ever was a chimerical state, it has been the Ottoman Empire. Her whole history has been one of cruelty, rapine and murder.” All evidence and disclosures of her action during the war, which have recently been thoroughly exposed, serve only to justify this demand and make it doubly insistent. The writer would refer the reader especially to Ambassador Morgenthau’s story, just published in book form—the part dealing with Armenia, Syrian and Greek massacres and cruelties, as well as the nature of the Turkish Government.

The third point is concerning the “breaking down of economic barriers.” What shall this “breaking down of all economic barriers” between nations include? Does it involve the doing away with all protective tariff between nations? If so what about war materials? The present League of Nations Constitution urges government ownership or control of all war materials or their production. Certainly, unless the League of Nations becomes a permanent preventive of war, the United States cannot be dependent upon any foreign power for war materials and manufactures. It must protect these industries sufficiently to build them up to a safe war basis, in readiness for any time of danger. Tremendous difficulty will also be experienced in bringing

all the protective tariff nations to the point of giving up this commercial privilege in favor of their own industries. This point presents a veritable Chinese puzzle; and it may prove to be a puzzle that is unsolvable. Yet, something along this line should by all means be done, to prevent the benefits of a great portion of the world's commerce going to certain great commercial nations and privileged classes in those nations, to the detriment of all others—small, non-commercial nations in particular. Part of the difficulty may be overcome by a free commercial rivalry among the nations; but great international "trusts" and monopolies must also be regulated. Something toward a solution might be obtained by government ownership of those industries that might need protection. Certainly this last is one possible solution, since government ownership is one of the biggest industrial issues the world over, to-day.

The above situation, while presenting difficulties for the League of Nations, on the other hand is only one of the *many* instances that demand this effective League as the only alternative to a virtual race-suicide through war in the future. It is scarcely worth while discussing an international court of arbitration if there is to be no League of Nations behind it. The present League may not be permanent, may not include all the world—and may not be satisfactory in a number of respects—so much can scarcely be expected from it—but *it must lead finally to a permanent league of the nations of the earth*. No other outcome is thinkable. This final League may not be realized in our day, but our day must make it possible and start it on its way. This is the supreme duty and privilege of the present generation. I shall have more to say of this League in a later chapter.

There is one feature of the final negotiations between the German Government and President Wilson, leading directly to the Armistice and German surrender of Nov. 11 that is very significant—in the light of political development in Germany since. And that is, that President Wilson by his

unshakable demand that *the German people must speak for peace rather than the Imperial German Government alone*, whose word he could never take for sincerity—that the President himself in this demand in Germany's *hour of disaster, drove the Kaiser from his throne*, and the German princes from theirs. In other words, it was President Wilson, together with the overwhelming victories of Allied arms in the last days of the war, *and not the German people as a democracy*, that drove the Hohenzollerns from power. And for that very reason *the German nation cannot yet be accepted as a true democracy*. Nations do not change their fundamental ways of thinking so soon, and never primarily by force. Germany has a splendid chance to develop a great democracy; but let us not be too hasty in receiving her with open arms, as a regenerated criminal.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

**A**FTER so much has been written and said on the subject of the "League of Nations," and especially, as it is being so widely discussed pro and con, at present, the writer would hardly feel justified in adding a chapter on this question to the present treatise on the War, were it not for two phases of the momentous peace problem which have not been so widely discussed, and which have been more or less neglected or ignored. These two phases are: (1) the German attitude and point of view on the matter of a League of Nations or International Arbitration, and (2) the progress of this League idea among the Allied Powers in the years just preceding the War.

And now, to take up the German attitude first. Few persons, among those who have not given the matter close study, realize how thoroughly the great German teachers and writers, political and military, dominated the thought and molded the convictions of the German nation. True, we have been told in our War Information campaign, that the German people had no will of their own, followed blindly their leaders, because they had been taught and felt that they *had* to follow them, etc. But, not until we begin to investigate this phenomenon for ourselves do we realize how the leaders, as those mentioned above, furnished the very moral, political and military *gospel* for the nation—and that not alone because they molded the thought of the people, *but because they worked and thought along with the nation*, and in some instances took counsel of the people and their temper. That there was a very strong undercurrent of the *common people*



against all this new militant doctrine, is true; but such an undercurrent did not and could not mold the character of the German nation.

Because of the almost unlimited influence of these literary and political "lights," therefore, we shall examine briefly their teachings and attitude toward peace and a "society of nations" as the best means of answering our first question above. Note these quotations:

"They (Governments) usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote their own political aims. *This was the position of affairs at the Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the United States of America*, who in recent times have earnestly tried to conclude treaties for the establishment of arbitration."—(von Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War.")

"Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts of President Taft a great step forward in the path to perpetual peace." (*Idem.* p. 17.)

"This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage. . . . It has always been the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages that have played with the dream of perpetual peace."—(H. von Treitschke, greatest German historian.)

Frederick the Great, who is very much quoted in recent years in Germany and considered as the greatest of the German rulers, and is idolized as no other among his people, once said: "In matters of state, when a man stops to consider he is a Christian, he is lost."

"War is a biological necessity of the first order."—(Von Bernhardi.)

"So long as there are men who have human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests come into being, and occasions for making war arise."—(Bernhardi.)

"The extra-social and super-social structure which guides

the eternal development of societies, nations and races, is war.”—(Claus Wagner.)

“War is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in nature.”—(A. W. Von Schlegel.)

“Between states the only check upon injustice is *force*, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own part and promote its own ends and ideals. *No power exists which can judge between states and make its judgment prevail.*”—(Bernhardi.)

“Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say, *by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.*—(Ibid.)

“Might is at once the supreme right, and *the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war.* War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things.”—(Ibid. p. 23.)

“The knowledge therefore, that war depends on biological laws leads to the conclusion *that every attempt to exclude it from international relations must be demonstrably untenable.*”—(Ibid, p. 24.)

“To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual leads to error, since in a human race conceived as a whole, *struggle*, the most essential vital principle, would be ruled out. *Any action in favor of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and Nationality is impossible.* Such conceptions belong to the wide domain of Utopias.”—(From Schleiermacher, quoted by Bernhardi.)

“Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social petrefaction and stagnation.”—(Kuno Fischer.)

“War is elevating, because the individual disappears before the great conception of the State. . . . *What a perversion of morality to wish to abolish heroism among men!*”—(Treitsche. Trietsche is referred to by scores of German writers and speakers as their great historian-philosopher.)

“States which from various considerations are always active in this direction (peace) are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States of America in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal peace *in order to be able to devote their undisputed attention to money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred million dollars which they spend on their navy; they thus incur a great danger, the loss of all chance of contest with opponents of their own strength. . . . If they advance farther on this road, they will one day pay dearly for such a policy.*”—(Bernhardi.)

“This law (the law of Christian love) can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. . . . Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature cannot be political.”—(*Ibid.*)

“Proposals are made from time to time—to settle the disputes which arise between the various countries by Arbitration Courts, and to render war impossible. *The politician who—honestly believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted. . . .* Where does the power reside which insures the execution of this judgment when pronounced?”—(Bernhardi.)

“In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908 that the High Court of International Justice established by the Second Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this idea. A general arbitration treaty between two countries affords no guarantee of permanent peace. . . . *If these relations change . . . then every arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke.*”—(Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, in a speech to the Reichstag, March 30, 1911.)

“*The efforts directed toward the abolition of war must not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must*

*be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race.*"—(Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," p. 34.)

"By Courts of Arbitration . . . the weak nation has the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the natural law of development, *which can lead only to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally.*"—(*Ibid.*)

"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political world when national character and military tradition act and react upon each," says Bernhardi. "These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war, and he is incontestably right"—(*Ibid.*)

"*God will always see to it that wars recur as a drastic remedy for the human race,*" says Treitschke; and like him, Bernhardi declares, "*Our people must learn to see that the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy.*"

"The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately planned wars," says Bernhardi; and with regard to Frederick the Great the same author, agreeing with Treitschke, declares that "None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the aggressor."

"The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has always led to happy results. . . . The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results."—(Bernhardi, p. 43.)

"*The end-all and be-all of a State is power,—and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle with politics.*"—(Treitschke.)

Kaiser Wilhelm II repeatedly remarked that his army and navy, and not parliamentary bodies and negotiations with other countries, were his main reliance and the hope of Germany; and when he made the historic statement that "Ger-

many's future lies upon the water," he was counting the years until the "inevitable day" that was the toast of many a German drink in high naval, military, and governmental circles. What faith could such characters have in a true "freedom of the seas"?

*"The State is itself the highest conception in the wider community of man . . . for there is nothing higher than it in the world's history. . . . The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrifice the hopes of the future to the present need of peace."*—(Bernhardi, referring especially to the German reverses in the Moroccan crisis, 1909-1911.)

"While on the one side she (United States) insists on the Monroe Doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own arms toward Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her fleets. . . . The United States' aim at the economic, and where possible, the political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy in the Pacific. Their interests, both political and economic, notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, *clash emphatically with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this. . . .* Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the State. . . . No one stands above the State; it is sovereign. . . . *In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States.*"—(Bernhardi.) (How, then, can it enter into a League of Nations, to enforce peace or justice?)

In hinting at the turn of affairs of "the next war," General Bernhardi made the following comment on Germany's justification should she break her treaty and violate Belgian neutrality: "This argument (in favor of breaking the neutrality treaty) is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany (notice he puts Germany first) against France and England, the two

last mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium" (a thing which they *did not do*, but which Germany did do, in violation of her pledged word).—(Bernhardi.) It is highly significant that this suggestion was published to the German nation *three years* before the deed actually happened in August, 1914. It is easy from this evidence of purpose to trace whence originated that German fiction that England and France both had attacked, or would immediately, attack Germany through Belgium, on the 1st of August, 1914. (The German versions of the story varied from day to day, you will recall.) We have always heard that an evil-minded person thinks evil of others.

And again, "That England would pay much attention to the neutrality of weaker nations when such a stake (a general naval and continental war was at issue is hardly credible."—(Bernhardi, *Ibid*, p. 158.)

"It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for defense."—(*Ibid*, p. 228.)

"We must also devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavor to make them more effective in attack."—(*Ibid*, p. 234.)

"We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization than the Great Asiatic power (Japan). We, like the Japanese, can fulfil it only by the sword."—(*Ibid*.)

"In one way or another we must square our account with France, if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. . . . This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the *matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path!*"—(Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," p. 106.) Pray, reader, does this not explain the terrible German terror in France during the War?—in Belgium, and in all sections that might be of any strength against Germany should they not "be so completely crushed"?

The above quotations are but a fraction of the declarations among leading Germans that serve to show their attitude toward a League to Enforce Peace, and toward international conciliation by means of Arbitration Courts. The temper of the whole German policy, up to the very hour of their final defeat last November, is strongly opposed to a League of Nations, whose fundamental purpose is to establish lasting peace for mankind. They,—and the leaders of the German Government at the time of the armistice are the same as its leaders today,—gave sanction to the League of Nations idea in President Wilson's *fourteen points* only because of military and political necessity. The German people I dare say had hardly entertained the idea of a League to enforce peace until it was forced upon them in the last days of the war. Just another incident to illustrate the spirit that was abroad among the people in Germany in the years before and leading up to the War, which unmistakably shows the effect of such teaching as we have noted above. The writer has an intimate friend, an English professor of music. His family had friends in Germany, whom they were visiting a few years ago, i. e., German friends. Although on very intimate and friendly terms, the matron of the German household remarked to the English Professor's sister-in-law one day in casual conversation: "Germany and England are going to have a war one of these days, because we *hate* your people, and England had better look out!"

The preceding examples are given simply because they readily come to mind, and because Gen. Von Berhardi's book is on my desk at the present moment. Among other high German authorities who have given like utterances are the ex-Crown Prince of Germany, Maximilian Harden, the famous Tannenburg, Admiral Kirchhoff, Werner Sombat, Ernest Jackh, Ernest Hasse, Gen. von Schellendorf, Frederick Lange, A. Sprenger, Paul Rohrbach, Rudolph Theuden, and a great number of the now notorious group of German professors. The book, "Out of Their Own Mouths," also contains a number of quotations from Germans that have

a bearing on this subject. Now, what shall we say of all this? Can the authors of such statements be at heart in accord with the principles of the League to Enforce Peace? And there is no evidence as yet that any fundamentally different voice than theirs is the voice of Germany today. We are therefore forced to conclude that Germany has been, and to all intents and purposes still is, the arch-enemy to the peace movement, as well as foremost in her war-mindedness and militarism. Else why does she not confess her wrongs? Why does she not repudiate her methods? Why does she not cast aside her war-lords? Why does she not *voluntarily* return many of the precious relics of Europe's best civilization that her Vandal hands seized upon? Why does she not fall on her knees and in contrition beg forgiveness for the crimes of Rheims, Louvain, Dinant,—of her Zeppelins, her submarines, her "super-gun," her murderous raids over the unprotected English and French towns, her deportations of workmen and women into slavery, her deliberate and systematic starvation of peoples in portions of her occupied districts?—and a hundred other questions we might ask.

Now, let us give our attention briefly to the second phase listed in the opening of this chapter—the attitude of the Allied countries on the same subject. We shall begin with Great Britain, because there, next to our own country, we find the leadership in the peace movement. Not least significant among the German remarks above are the specific references to the efforts of the United States and Great Britain toward international peace and arbitration in the last two decades before the War. These references help to bring into relief, as I have just stated, the fact that despite the British-Boer war of 1899-1901 and the still more recent Persian incident with Russia, Great Britain, both as a government and as a people, has been, among the nations of the earth, the greatest, most hopeful and sincere champion of universal peace, *save only the United States of America*. The utterances of such statesmen as Gladstone and James



Bryce, and the readiness of her foreign ministers to enter into arbitration treaties for the settlement of international difficulties, and even the limitation of armaments, as well as the remarkable backing by the English people of the League of Nations at the present hour,—attest to this fact. Also, history,—Gen. Bernhardt's statements to the contrary notwithstanding,—will be glad to acknowledge that Foreign Minister Gray, with the aid of other British statesmen, fought for peace and not for war; that months before the war, if not years before, he publicly championed the idea of a League of Nations; that he held out against hope, for peace, in the days just before the outbreak of hostilities, up to the very last moment, indeed,—and had the ear of every great Government of Europe (even that of the German Ambassador to England) save only the war-bent, blood-thirsty German Imperial Government. Even after the Great War had been raging for more than a year, Mr. Gray remarked what a pity it was that the League, which was so near to realization, could not have been made a fact before the catastrophe came.

Of what virtue is it that Kaiser Wilhelm II, as Mr. Arthur Bullard tries to make the deduction, was not converted to the War Party's plan until after the Moroccan crisis in 1911? It was with him merely a matter of expediency and not of principle, that he opposed war before that time. It was simply that the Kaiser felt the time had not yet come. So many times in his speeches in the two decades between 1888 and 1909 did he refer to this subject, that there can be no doubt of his constant anticipation of this war and the glorious part he, as the emulator of Frederick the Great, was to play in it.

France also was listening attentively to the idea of the League, though naturally more distrustful than England, on account of the direct German menace. Still, she was hopeful that war would not come, even though she felt that she must increase her period of military service in 1913 from two

to three years, because of the alarming military program and unmistakable threat of Germany.

The United States of America can well be proud of the fact that she has led in all this movement for Arbitration as a check upon war (though not at all proud of what many of her pacifists, before and during the war, have done; and it is but natural, therefore, that she should occupy the leading position in the present supreme fight,—for fight it is,—for peace. Whether the constitution of the League as now drawn up is accepted in its entirety or not, those American statesmen and would-be statesmen,—whether from conviction or for political reasons—*who oppose the principle of the League of Nations to Enforce Peace*, not only are committing an illogical act in the light of America's position so far, but will also find themselves running counter to the great statesmanship of the world by their wilfulness (as did the "wilful twelve" in the beginning of the war) and at the same time *lowering the confidence of the great common peoples of the world in the unselfish charity and utter sincerity of the people of the United States of America*. A great spectacle indeed, will it present to the world, should the United States, the chief champion of the League, and without whom it could never have been formed, cast off her own product, and with it the present hope of the world for the solution of its greatest problem!

It boots but little that men may argue that this League cannot abolish war. Most thinking men perhaps do not claim so much for it in the immediate future. *But it can prevent another world struggle such as the one we have just passed through, or put it off until the coming governments of the people make war a thing of the past*. Nor is there any more strength to the argument that the League constitution would conflict fundamentally with the Constitution of the United States. Personally, I do not believe the February draft does, or that another one adopted by the Peace Conference would. But if it did, by implication, on some one

or more minor points (in a major sense it cannot, as now drawn up, or possible to be drawn up, or passed upon by the democracies of the nations) there are *two* sufficient reasons, to the writer's mind, why we need not be alarmed over the prospect, namely: (1), Enough democratic nations with constitutions or fundamental laws similar to ours will be members of the League, having the same problem to face, that *amendments to remedy such defects will be forthcoming*, and (2), No great constitution was ever entered into without compromise and sacrifice of some degree or sort, real or imaginary, by all parties to the compact. Trusting to its future (and often a very few years of experience sufficed) and in its fundamental justices, each party has looked forward to the future to remedy the defects and guarantee that party's liberties or rights. We should apply the lesson of our own early national history in this respect. The Constitution of the United States did not prevent trouble, it is true; it did not even prevent a civil conflict; but it *did* survive all conflict, and has made a great civil war again impossible. Likewise will the constitution of the League of Nations have to be tested; but its fundamental democracy and justice will prove its salvation. Likewise also, its democratic principles will save its various members from *participation in a foreign conflict unless they see, as in the case of the war just closed, that it is a life and death struggle between right and wrong,—in which case any people would be proud to fight.*

How very true was this in the case of our own Constitution of 1787, the greatest written governmental document on the face of the earth. So will time and the spirit of fairness and justice to all remedy by amendment all really objectionable features of the constitution of the League of Nations. Certainly today the world as a whole is more democratically minded than were the people of the United States in 1787; and if the *people* could be trusted then, with the United States' Constitution in their hands, verily the *peoples of the world*, who have just concluded a mighty war to prove that

there is no master above them, can be depended upon to successfully administer the international relationship of the nations in the future. If not, then as well admit that democracy throughout the earth is doomed, and Lincoln's idea but a dream.

It is not in fine legal and constitutional distinctions that mankind's security in the future is to rest, but in the goodwill and fairmindedness of its peoples, one toward another. Let us see to it that no vain quibblings and obstructions of words is put in their way. It is not so much the letter as the *spirit* of the law, as expressed in the League of Nations that is to guarantee peace in the future. Away with that type of politician and statesman who still thinks the world is so small and isolated that he need not look beyond the boundaries of his own country, and has no vital concern outside of it! Such persons helped to make this war possible. Henceforth America's final safety is the safety of the world, and vice versa.

In 1911 (repeated in an early chapter of this book) the writer made this statement: "One nation, in its philanthropic enthusiasm, cannot bring peace to the world; it cannot adopt a policy of peace and say it will have it, whether others will or no." We all realize this now, though so many of us doubted it at that time that we were unprepared for war when it came. Now, if *one* nation cannot adopt such a policy, then there is only one way under heaven that peace can come, and that is by its *joint adoption* by the governments representing the overwhelming majority of mankind. What other than this is the League of Nations? The former isolation and peace is forever impossible; the latter, then, must come, else Bernhardt is right; might is right in the political and moral world, as well as in the realm of nature, and the War-god rules forever and aye.

Summing up then, we may say that the governments of the Allied nations, and their peoples, led by the United States and Great Britain, through their program of Arbitration

treaties and good-will were rapidly preparing the way for an initial hopeful experiment of a League of Nations or "Federation of the World," when the Machiavellian Teutonic governments launched the world suddenly upon the greatest of all wars. This was because these selfsame Teutonic governments were rapidly drifting in the opposite direction to the Allied or democratic countries, and more and more were considering war as their birthright and the manna of their future existence.

What, therefore, is our conclusion? Does our championship of the League of Nations contradict our earlier stand to the effect that a League of Nations could not be the final remedy for war? If the reader will examine carefully the author's whole treatment in this work he will find that nowhere have we objected to a League of Nations, or hinted that we would not support it; we have only doubted its ability to "abolish war in the near future." We have said that such a league, if formed at the time we were writing, "could last only for a time," and we believe that probably is still true, even though two momentous years have passed since the above statement was made. Does our (and by "our" I mean a considerable number of men everywhere) recent claim that "it is only the spirit of Christ" in the "hearts and consciences of men" that can "save us from our animal instincts and from war," and that peace for weary mankind cannot come until the "beast in nations" is conquered, and until governments must abide by the same principles of conduct and honor as obtain between individuals,—does this all conflict with our present stand on the League of Nations? I think not. Certainly, the spirit of Christ has advanced far into the council chambers of the great nations of the world within the past two years; certainly the "beast in nations" is not the ruling power today, the "beasts" being for the most part removed,—interned in neutral countries, or in ignominious hiding (except the Bolsheviki, another type of beast, that is even worse); certainly the world on the eve of

the adoption of the League is much nearer to the "same principles of conduct and honor as obtain between individuals"—since this code forms one of the articles of the League constitution. In looking upon the whole matter of war and peace in the historical, biological, or *evolutionary* light, such as we have consistently followed in this work, we have come to an intelligent and intelligible interpretation of the present world status. We have been obliged at times to recognize accelerating and reactionary currents, as we pointed out in the beginning. The terrible, the astounding, the wonderful and glorious events of the years 1914-1919 have lent an unforeseen and tremendous impetus to the onward sweep of democracy and to the idea of a world society as a remedy for war. We have stated more than once in our earlier treatment of the War and its issues, that "the coming Peace Conference" possesses momentous and almost unlimited possibilities along this line; but no one could foresee what magnitude these possibilities should actually assume at the end of hostilities, and what gigantic political changes were immediately in store for the world. (We could, we did, prophesy some of them.) The World War has simply hastened for generations the slow transformation which we were justified in feeling was coming surely, if slowly, in the evolution of the race.

Moreover, there were those among us who felt already, before the fateful year of 1914, that we had come to the parting of the way, and the old order no longer sufficed. On this point the author made the following statement (found in an earlier chapter of this book): "War, we have said, assumes the survival of the fittest, the best. But, the best for what? The fittest for what? That is the capital question now. It is not easy for one people to modify the wish, the interests and, still less, the national characteristics of another. The failure of many efforts as it has helped to bring on this colossal war. (Here I was thinking especially of Germany's attempts to Germanize Alsace-Lorraine and

Poland, Russia's similar attempts at times, and Austria-Hungary's race problems in her polyglot Empire.) Once it could be done by war, and the conqueror after the war; but *in so far as this transformation is possible today, it is not by war and force that it is to be accomplished.* Free intercourse between nations (another principle of the League of Nations), social and commercial, is perhaps the most powerful pacifying influence. When nations come to mingle with each other more vitally, like individuals they will come to understand and appreciate one another better, and will at last learn to heed that most costly and precious lesson, that *peace*, and not *war* is to be the true and only rational basis of civilized human society." (Chapter 5.)

## CHAPTER XX

### THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

As read by President Wilson before the Peace Conference at Paris, France, February 14, 1919.

#### PREAMBLE

*I*N order to promote international coöperation and to secure international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to this covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Nations:

#### ARTICLE I

The action of the high contracting parties under the terms of this covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of a meeting of a body of delegates representing the high contracting parties, of meetings at more frequent intervals of an executive council and of a permanent international secretariat to be established at the seat of the league.

#### ARTICLE II

Meetings of the body of delegates shall be held at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require for



the purpose of dealing with matters within the sphere of action of the league. Meetings of the body of delegates shall be held at the seat of the league or at such other places as may be found convenient, and shall consist of representatives of the high contracting parties. Each of the high contracting parties shall have one vote, but may have not more than three representatives.

### ARTICLE III

The executive council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, together with representatives of four other States, members of the league. The selection of these four States shall be made by the body of delegates on such principles and in such manner as they think fit. Pending the appointment of these representatives of other States representatives of (blank left for names) shall be members of the executive council.

Meetings of the council shall be held from time to time as occasion may be required and at least once a year, at whatever place may be decided on, or, failing any such decision, at the seat of the league, and any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world may be dealt with at such meetings.

Invitations shall be sent to any Power to attend a meeting of the council at which such matters directly affecting its interests are to be discussed, and no decision taken at any meeting will be binding on such Powers unless so invited.

### ARTICLE IV

All matters of procedure at meetings of the body of delegates or the executive council, including the appointment of committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the body of delegates or the executive council,

and may be decided by a majority of the States represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the body of delegates and of the executive council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

#### ARTICLE V

The permanent secretariat of the league shall be established at ———, which shall constitute the seat of the league. The secretariat shall comprise such secretaries and staff as may be required, under the general direction and control of a secretary-general of the league, who shall be chosen by the executive council; the secretariat shall be appointed by the secretary-general subject to confirmation by the executive council.

The secretary-general shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the body of delegates or of the executive council.

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the States members of the league in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the international bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

#### ARTICLE VI

Representatives of the high contracting parties and officials of the league when engaged in the business of the league shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, and the buildings occupied by the league or its officials or by representatives attending its meetings shall enjoy the benefits of extraterritoriality.

#### ARTICLE VII

Admission to the league of States not signatories to the covenant and not named in the protocol hereto as States to be invited to adhere to the covenant requires the assent of

not less than two-thirds of the States represented in the body of delegates, and shall be limited to fully self-governing countries, including dominions and colonies.

No state shall be admitted to the league unless it is able to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and unless it shall conform to such principles as may be prescribed by the league in regard to its naval and military forces and armaments.

#### ARTICLE VIII

The high contracting parties recognize the principle that the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations, having special regard to the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, and the executive council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction.

The executive council shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several governments what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the program of disarmament, and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the executive council.

The high contracting parties agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct the executive council to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those countries which are not able to manufacture for themselves the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The high contracting parties undertake in no way to conceal from each other the conditions of such of their industries as are capable of being adapted to warlike purposes or the scale of their armaments, and agree that there shall be

full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programs.

#### ARTICLE IX

A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the league on the execution of the provisions of Article VIII, and on military and naval questions generally.

#### ARTICLE X

The high contracting parties shall undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the executive council shall advise upon the means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled.

#### ARTICLE XI

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the high contracting parties or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the league and the high contracting parties reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each of the high contracting parties to draw the attention of the body of delegates or of the executive council to any circumstance affecting international intercourse which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

#### ARTICLE XII

The high contracting parties agree that should disputes arise between them which cannot be adjusted by the ordinary

processes of diplomacy they will in no case resort to war without previously submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or to inquiry by the executive council and until three months after the award by the arbitrators, or a recommendation by the executive council, and that they will not even then resort to war as against a member of the league which complies with the award of the arbitrators or the recommendation of the executive council.

In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the recommendation of the executive council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

#### ARTICLE XIII

The high contracting parties agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy they will submit the whole matter to arbitration. For this purpose the Court of Arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties or stipulated in any convention existing between them. The high contracting parties agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered. In the event of any failure to carry out the award the executive council shall propose what steps can best be taken to give effect thereto.

#### ARTICLE XIV

The executive council shall formulate plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice and this court shall, when established, be competent to hear and determine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable for submission to it for arbitration under the foregoing article.

## ARTICLE XV /

If there should arise between States' members of the league, any dispute likely to lead to rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the high contracting parties agree that they will refer the matter to the executive council; either party to the dispute may give notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties agree to communicate to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the executive council may forthwith direct the publication thereof. Where the efforts of the council lead to the settlement of the dispute a statement shall be published indicating the nature of the dispute and that of settlement, together with such explanations as may be appropriate.

If the dispute has not been settled a report by the council shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts and explanations the recommendations which the council thinks just and proper for the settlement of the dispute. If the report is unanimously agreed to by the members of the council other than the parties to the dispute the high contracting parties agree that they will not go to war with any party which complies with the recommendations and that, if any party shall refuse so to comply, the council shall propose measures necessary to give effect to the recommendations.

If no such unanimous report can be made it shall be the duty of the majority and the privilege of the minority to issue statements indicating what they believe to be the facts and containing the reasons which they consider to be just and proper.

The executive council may in any case under this article

refer the dispute to the body of delegates. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request must be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. In a case referred to the body of delegates all the provisions of this article and of Article XII, relating to the action and powers of the executive council shall apply to the action and powers of the body of delegates.

#### ARTICLE XVI

Should any of the high contracting parties break or disregard its covenants under Article XII, it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other members of the league, which hereby undertakes immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of the covenant breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant breaking State, and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the league or not.

It shall be the duty of the executive council in such case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league.

The high contracting parties agree further that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which may be taken under this article in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant breaking State, and that they will afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the high contracting parties who are coöperating to protect the covenants of the league.

## ARTICLE XVII

In the event of disputes between one State member of the league and another State which is not a member of the league, or between States not members of the league, the high contracting parties agree that the State or States not members of the league shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute upon such conditions as the executive council may deem just, and upon acceptance of any such invitation the above provisions shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the league.

Upon such invitation being given the executive council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

In the event of a Power so invited refusing to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of the league which in the case of a State member of the league would constitute a breach of Article XII, the provisions of Article XVI, shall be applicable as against the state taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purpose of such dispute the executive council may take such action and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

## ARTICLE XVIII

The high contracting parties agree that the league shall be intrusted with general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest.



ARTICLE XIX

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world there should be applied the principle that the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the league.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the league.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached the stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory Power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory Power.

Other peoples, especially those of central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and

the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the league.

There are territories such as southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific isles which, owing to the sparseness of their populations or their small size or their remoteness from the centers of civilization or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory State, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate the mandatory State shall render to the league an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory State shall, if not previously agreed upon by the high contracting parties in each case, be explicitly defined by the executive council in a special act or charter.

The high contracting parties further agree to establish at the seat of the league a mandatory commission to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatory powers, and to assist the league in insuring the observance of the terms of all mandates.

#### ARTICLE XX

The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and human conditions of labor for men, women and children both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend,

and to that end agree to establish as part of the organization of the league a permanent bureau of labor.

ARTICLE XXI

The high contracting parties agree that provision shall be made through the instrumentality of the league to secure and maintain freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all States members of the league, having in mind, among other things, special arrangements with regard to the necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918.

ARTICLE XXII

The high contracting parties agree to place under the control of the league all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. Furthermore they agree that all such international bureaus to be constituted in future shall be placed under control of the league.

ARTICLE XXIII

The high contracting parties agree that every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any State, member of the league, shall be forthwith registered with the secretary-general and as soon as possible published by him, and that no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE XXIV

It shall be the right of the body of delegates from time to time to advise the reconsideration by States, members of the league, of treaties which have become inapplicable,

and of international conditions, of which the continuance may endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE XXV

The high contracting parties severally agree that the present covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly engage that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to the league shall, before becoming a party to this covenant, have undertaken any obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE XXVI

Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified by the States whose representatives compose the executive council and by three-fourths of the States whose representatives compose the body of delegates.

## APPENDIX I

### PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS AT PARIS

On February 14, 1919, Before the Peace Conference, at the Reading of the Constitution of the League of Nations

**M**R. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor, and assume it a very great privilege, of reporting in the name of the commission constituted by this conference on the formulation of a plan for the League of Nations. I am happy to say that it is a unanimous report, a unanimous report from the representatives of fourteen nations—the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and Serbia.

“I think it will be serviceable and interesting if I, with your permission, read the document, as the only report we have to make.”

After having read the entire document, President Wilson continued as follows:

“It gives me pleasure to add to this formal reading of the result of our labors that the character of the discussion which occurred at the sittings of the commission was not only of the most constructive but of the most encouraging sort. It was obvious throughout our discussions that, although there were subjects upon which there were individual differences of judgment with regard to the method by which our objects should be obtained, there was practically at no point any serious differences of opinion or motive as to the objects which we were seeking.

“Indeed, while these debates were not made the opportunity for the expression of enthusiasm and sentiment, I

think the other members of the commission will agree with me that there was an undertone of high respect and of enthusiasm for the thing we were trying to do, which was heartening throughout every meeting, because we felt that in a way this conference did intrust unto us the expression of one of its highest and most important purposes, to see to it that the concord of the world in the future with regard to the objects of justice should not be subject to doubt or uncertainty, that the co-operation of the great body of nations should be assured in the maintenance of peace upon terms of honor and of international obligations.

“The compulsion of that task was constantly upon us, and at no point was there shown the slightest desire to do anything but suggest the best means to accomplish that great object. There is very great significance, therefore, in the fact that the result was reached unanimously.

“Fourteen nations were represented, among them all of those powers which for convenience we have called the great powers, and among the rest a representation of the greatest variety of circumstances and interests. So that I think we are justified in saying that the significance of the result, therefore, has the deepest of all meanings, the union of wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot be resisted, and which, I dare say, no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist.

“Now as to the character of the document. While it has consumed some time to read this document, I think you will see at once that it is very simple, and in nothing so simple as in the structure which it suggests for a League of Nations—a body of delegates, an Executive Council, and a permanent secretariat.

“When it came to the question of determining the character of the representation in the body of delegates, we were all aware of a feeling which is current throughout the world. Inasmuch as I am stating it in the presence of the official representatives of the various Governments here present, in-

cluding myself, I may say that there is a universal feeling that the world cannot rest satisfied with merely official guidance. There has reached us through many channels the feeling that if the deliberating body of the League of Nations was merely to be a body of officials representing the various Governments, the peoples of the world would not be sure that some of the mistakes which preoccupied officials had admittedly made might not be repeated.

“It was impossible to conceive a method or an assembly so large and various as to be really representative of the great body of the peoples of the world, because as I roughly reckon it, we represent, as we sit around this table, more than twelve hundred million people. You cannot have a representative assembly of twelve hundred million people, but if you leave it to each Government to have, if it pleases, one or two or three representatives, though only with a single vote, it may vary its representation from time to time, not only, but it may [originate] the choice of its several representatives. [Wireless here unintelligible.]

“Therefore, we thought that this was a proper and a very prudent concession to the practically universal opinion of plain men everywhere that they wanted the door left open to a variety of representation, instead of being confined to a single official body with which they could or might not find themselves in sympathy.

“And you will notice that this body has unlimited rights of discussion—I mean of discussion of anything that falls within the field of international relations—and that it is especially agreed that war or international misunderstandings, or anything that may lead to friction or trouble, is everybody’s business, because it may affect the peace of the world.

“And in order to safeguard the popular power so far as we could of this representative body, it is provided, you will notice, that when a subject is submitted, it is not to arbitration, but to discussion by the Executive Council. It can,

upon the initiative of either of the parties to the dispute, be drawn out of the Executive Council into the larger forum of the general body of delegates, because through this instrument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and this is the moral force of the public opinion of the world—the pleasing and clarifying and compelling influences of publicity, so that intrigues can no longer have their coverts, so that designs that are sinister can at any time be drawn into the open, so that those things that are destroyed by the light may be promptly destroyed by the overwhelming light of the universal expression of the condemnation of the world.

“Armed force is in the background in this program, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war.

“The simplicity of the document seems to me to be one of its chief virtues, because, speaking for myself, I was unable to see the variety of circumstances with which this League would have to deal. I was unable, therefore, to plan all the machinery that might be necessary to meet the differing and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say of this document that it is not a straitjacket, but a vehicle of life.

“A living thing is born, and we must see to it what clothes we put on it. It is not a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in which power may be varied at the discretion of those who exercise it and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we were called upon to make definite. It is a definite guarantee of peace. It is a definite guarantee by word against aggression. It is a definite guarantee against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin.



“Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared, and its powers are unmistakable. It is not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be used for co-operation in any international matter. That is the significance of the provision introduced concerning labor. There are many ameliorations of labor conditions which can be effected by conference and discussion. I anticipate that there will be a very great usefulness in the Bureau of Labor which it is contemplated shall be set up by the League. Men and women and children who work have been in the background through long ages, and sometimes seemed to be forgotten, while Governments have had their watchful and suspicious eyes upon the manœuvres of one another, while the thought of statesmen has been about structural action and the larger transactions of commerce and finance.

“Now, if I may believe the picture which I see, there comes into the foreground the great body of the laboring people of the world, the men and women and children upon whom the great burden of sustaining the world must from day to day fall, whether we wish it to do so or not, people who go to bed tired and wake up without the stimulation of lively hope. These people will be drawn into the field of international consultation and help, and will be among the wards of the combined Governments of the world. There is, I take leave to say, a very great step in advance in the mere conception of that.

“Then, as you will notice, there is an imperative article concerning the publicity of all international agreements. Henceforth no member of the League can claim any agreement valid which it has not registered with the Secretary-General, in whose office, of course, it will be subject to the examination of anybody representing a member of the League. And the duty is laid upon the Secretary-General to publish every document of that sort at the earliest possible time.

“I suppose most persons who have not been conversant with the business of foreign affairs do not realize how many hundreds of these agreements are made in a single year, and how difficult it might be to publish the more unimportant of them immediately, how uninteresting it would be to most of the world to publish them immediately, but even they must be published just as soon as it is possible for the Secretary-General to publish them.

“Then there is a feature about this covenant which, to my mind, is one of the greatest and most satisfactory advances that has been made. We are done with annexations of helpless peoples, meant in some instances by some powers to be used merely for exploitation. We recognize in the most solemn manner that the helpless and undeveloped peoples of the world, being in that condition, put an obligation upon us to look after their interests primarily before we use them for our interests, and that in all cases of this sort hereafter it shall be the duty of the League to see that the nations who are assigned as the tutors and advisers and directors of these peoples shall look to their interests and their development before they look to the interests and desires of the mandatory nation itself.

“There has been no greater advance than this, gentlemen. If you look back upon the history of the world you will see how helpless peoples have too often been a prey to powers that had no conscience in the matter. It has been one of the many distressing revelations of recent years that the great power which has just been, happily, defeated, put intolerable burdens and injustices upon the helpless people of some of the colonies which it annexed to itself, that its interest was rather their extermination than their development, that the desire was to possess their land for European purposes and not to enjoy their confidence in order that mankind might be lifted in these places to the next higher level.

“Now, the world, expressing its conscience in law, says

there is an end of that, that our consciences shall be settled to this thing. States will be picked out which have already shown that they can exercise a conscience in this matter, and under their tutelage the helpless peoples of the world will come into a new light and into a new hope.

“So I think I can say of this document that it is at one and the same time a practical document and a human document. There is a pulse of sympathy in it. There is a compulsion of conscience throughout it. It is practical, and yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate. And I want to say that so far as my observation instructs me, this is in one sense a belated document. I believe that the conscience of the world has long been prepared to express itself in some such way. We are not just now discovering our sympathy for these people and our interest in them. We are simply expressing it, for it has long been felt, and in the administration of the affairs of more than one of the great States represented here—so far as I know, all of the great States that are represented here—that humane impulse has already expressed itself in their dealings with their colonies, whose peoples were yet at a low stage of civilization.

“We have had many instances of colonies lifted into the sphere of complete self-government. This is not the discovery of a principle. It is the universal application of a principle. It is the agreement of the great nations which have tried to live by these standards in their separate administrations to unite in seeing that their common force and their common thought and intelligence are lent to this great and humane enterprise. I think it is an occasion, therefore, for the most profound satisfaction that this humane decision should have been reached in a matter for which the world has long been waiting and until a very recent period thought that it was still too early to hope.

“Many terrible things have come out of this war, gentlemen, but some very beautiful things have come out of it. Wrong has been defeated, but the rest of the world has been

more conscious than it ever was before of the majority of right. People that were suspicious of one another can now live as friends and comrades in a single family, and desire to do so. The miasma of distrust, of intrigue, is cleared away. Men are looking eye to eye and saying, 'We are brothers and have a common purpose. We did not realize it before, but now we do realize it, and this is our covenant of friendship.'"

## APPENDIX II

### PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS AT BOSTON

On February 24, 1919, on the Subject of the Constitution of the League of Nations

**G**OVERNOR COOLIDGE, *Mr. Mayor, Fellow Citizens:*  
I wonder if you are half as glad to see me as I am to see you. It warms my heart to see a great body of my fellow citizens again, because in some respect during the recent months I have been very lonely indeed without your comradeship and counsel, and I tried at every step of the work which fell to me to recall what I was sure would be your counsel with regard to the great matters which were under consideration.

I do not want you to think that I have not been appreciative of the extraordinarily generous reception which was given to me on the other side. In saying that it makes me very happy to get home again I do not mean to say that I was not very deeply touched by the cries that came from the great crowds on the other side. But I want to say to you in all honesty that I felt them to be a call of greeting to you rather than to me.

I did not feel that the greeting was personal. I had in my heart the overcrowning pride of being your representative and of receiving the plaudits of men everywhere who felt that your hearts beat with theirs in the cause of liberty. There was no mistaking the tone in the voices of those great crowds. It was not a tone of mere greeting; it was not a tone of mere generous welcome; it was the calling of comrade to comrade, the cries that come from men who say, "We have waited for this day when the friends of liberty should come across the sea and shake hands with us, to see

that a new world was constructed upon a new basis and foundation of justice and right.”

I can't tell you the inspiration that came from the sentiments that came out of those simple voices of the crowd, and the proudest thing I have to report to you is that this great country of ours is trusted throughout the world.

I have not come to report the proceedings or the results of the proceedings of the Peace Conference; that would be premature. I can say that I have received very happy impressions from this conference; the impression that while there are many differences of judgment, while there are some divergencies of object, there is nevertheless a common spirit and a common realization of the necessity of setting up new standards of right in the world.

Because the men who are in conference in Paris realize as keenly as any American can realize that they are not the masters of their people; that they are the servants of their people and that the spirit of their people has awakened to a new purpose and a new conception of their power to realize that purpose, and that no man dare go home from that conference and report anything less noble than was expected of it.

The conference seems to you to go slowly; from day to day in Paris it seems to go slowly; but I wonder if you realize the complexity of the task which it has undertaken. It seems as if the settlements of this war affect, and affect directly, every great, and I sometimes think every small, nation in the world, and no one decision can prudently be made which is not properly linked in with the great series of other decisions which must accompany it, and it must be reckoned in with the final result if the real quality and character of that result is to be properly judged.

What we are doing is to hear the whole case; hear it from the mouths of the men most interested; hear it from those who are officially commissioned to state it; hear the rival claims; hear the claims that affect new nationalities, that

affect new areas of the world, that affect new commercial and economic connections that have been established by the great world war through which we have gone. And I have been struck by the moderateness of those who have represented national claims.

I can testify that I have nowhere seen the gleam of passion. I have seen earnestness, I have seen tears come to the eyes of men who plead for downtrodden people whom they were privileged to speak for; but they were not the tears of anguish, they were the tears of ardent hope.

And I don't see how any man can fail to have been subdued by these pleas, subdued to this feeling, that he was not there to assert an individual judgment of his own but to try to assist the case of humanity.

And in the midst of it all every interest seeks out first of all, when it reaches Paris, the representatives of the United States. Why? Because, and I think I am stating the most wonderful fact in history—because there is no nation in Europe that suspects the motives of the United States.

Was there ever so wonderful a thing seen before? Was there ever so moving a thing? Was there ever any fact that so bound the nation that had won that esteem forever to deserve it?

I would not have you understand that the great men who represent the other nations there in conference are disesteemed by those who know them. Quite the contrary. But you understand that the nations of Europe have again and again clashed with one another in competitive interest. It is impossible for men to forget those sharp issues that were drawn between them in times past.

It is impossible for men to believe that all ambitions have all of a sudden been foregone. They remember territory that was coveted; they remember rights that it was attempted to extort; they remember political ambitions which it was attempted to realize, and, while they believe that men have come into a different temper they cannot forget these things,

and so they do not resort to one another for a dispassionate view of the matters in controversy. They resort to that nation which has won the enviable distinction of being regarded as the friend of mankind.

Whenever it is desired to send a small force of soldiers to occupy a piece of territory where it is thought nobody else will be welcome they ask for American soldiers, and where other soldiers would be looked upon with suspicion and perhaps met with resistance the American soldier is welcomed with acclaim.

I have had so many grounds for pride on the other side of the water that I am very thankful that they are not grounds for personal pride, but for national pride. If they were grounds for personal pride I'd be the most stuck up man in the world, and it has been an infinite pleasure to me to see those gallant soldiers of ours, of whom the Constitution of the United States made me the proud commander.

You may be proud of the Twenty-sixth Division, but I commanded the Twenty-sixth Division, and see what they did under my direction, and everybody praises the American soldier with the feeling that in praising him he is subtracting from the credit of no one else.

I have been searching for the fundamental fact that converted Europe to believe in us. Before this war Europe did not believe in us as she does now. She did not believe in us throughout the first three years of the war. She seems really to have believed that we were holding off because we thought we could make more by staying out than by going in. And all of a sudden, in a short eighteen months, the whole verdict is reversed.

There can be but one explanation for it. They saw what we did—that without making a single claim we put all our men and all our means at the disposal of those who were fighting for their homes, in the first instance, but for a cause, the cause of human rights and justice, and that we went in not to support their national claims but to support the great cause which they held in common.



And when they saw that America not only held ideals but acted ideals they were converted to America and became firm partisans of those ideals.

I met a group of scholars when I was in Paris—some gentlemen from one of the Greek universities who had come to see me, and in whose presence, or rather in the presence of whose traditions of learning, I felt very young indeed. I told them that I had one of the delightful revenges that sometimes come to a man. All my life I had heard men speak with a sort of condescension of ideals and of idealists, and particularly those separated, enclloistered persons whom they choose to term academic, who were in the habit of uttering ideals in the free atmosphere when they clash with nobody in particular.

And I said I have had this sweet revenge. Speaking with perfect frankness in the name of the people of the United States I have uttered as the objects of this great war ideals, and nothing but ideals, and the war has been won by that inspiration. Men were fighting with tense muscle and lowered head until they came to realize those things, feeling they were fighting for their lives and their country, and when these accents of what it was all about reached them from America they lifted their heads, they raised their eyes to heaven, when they saw men in khaki coming across the sea in the spirit of crusaders, and they found that these were strange men, reckless of danger not only, but reckless because they seemed to see something that made that danger worth while.

Men have testified to me in Europe that our men were possessed by something that they could only call a religious fervor. They were not like any of the other soldiers. They had a vision, they had a dream, and they were fighting in the dream, and fighting in the dream they turned the whole tide of battle and it never came back.

One of our American humorists, meeting the criticism that American soldiers were not trained long enough, said: "It takes only half as long to train an American soldier as any

other, because you only have to train him one way and he did only go one way, and he never came back until he could do it when he pleased."

And now do you realize that this confidence we have established throughout the world imposes a burden upon us—if you choose to call it a burden. It is one of those burdens which any nation ought to be proud to carry. Any man who resists the present tides that run in the world will find himself thrown upon a shore so high and barren that it will seem as if he had been separated from his human kind forever.

The Europe that I left the other day was full of something that it had never felt fill its heart so full before. It was full of hope. The Europe of the second year of the war, the Europe of the third year of the war was sinking to a sort of stubborn desperation. They did not see any great thing to be achieved even when the war should be won. They hoped there would be some salvage; they hoped that they could clear their territories of invading armies; they hoped they could set up their homes and start their industries afresh, but they thought it would simply be the resumption of the old life that Europe had led—led in fear, led in anxiety, led in constant suspicious watchfulness. They never dreamed that it would be a Europe of settled peace and of justified hope.

And now these ideals have wrought this new magic, that all the peoples of Europe are buoyed up and confident in the spirit of hope, because they believe that we are at the eve of a new age in the world when nations will understand one another, when nations will support one another in every just cause, when nations will unite every moral and every political strength to see that the right shall prevail.

If America were at this juncture to fail the world, what would come of it? I do not mean any disrespect to any other great people when I say that America is the hope of the world; and if she does not justify that hope the results

are unthinkable. Men will be thrown back upon the bitterness of disappointment not only but the bitterness of despair.

All nations will be set up as hostile camps again; the men at the peace conference will go home with their heads upon their breasts, knowing that they have failed—for they were bidden not to come home from there until they did something more than sign a treaty of peace.

Suppose we sign the treaty of peace and that it is the most satisfactory treaty of peace that the confusing elements of the modern world will afford and go home and think about our labors, we will know that we have left written upon the historic table at Versailles, upon which Vergennes and Benjamin Franklin wrote their names, nothing but a modern scrap of paper; no nations united to defend it, no great forces combined to make it good, no assurance given to the downtrodden and fearful people of the world that they shall be safe. Any man who thinks that America will take part in giving the world any such rebuff and disappointment as that does not know America.

I invite him to test the sentiments of the nation. We set this up to make men free and we did not confine our conception and purpose to America, and now we will make men free. If we did not do that the fame of America would be gone and all her powers would be dissipated. She then would have to keep her power for those narrow, selfish, provincial purposes which seem so dear to some minds that have no sweep beyond the nearest horizon.

I should welcome no sweeter challenge than that. I have fighting blood in me, and it is sometimes a delight to let it have scope, but if it is a challenge on this occasion it will be an indulgence. Think of the picture, think of the utter blackness that would fall on the world. America has failed! America made a little essay at generosity and then withdrew. America said: "We are your friends," but it was only for today, not for tomorrow. America said: "Here is our

power to vindicate right," and then the next day said: "Let right take care of itself and we will take care of ourselves." America said: "We set up a fight to lead men along the paths of liberty, but we have lowered it; it is intended only to light our own path." We set up a great ideal of liberty and then we said: "Liberty is a thing that you must win for yourself. Do not call upon us," and think of the world that we would leave. Do you realize how many new nations are going to be set up in the presence of old and powerful nations in Europe and left there, if left by us, without a disinterested friend?

Do you believe in the Polish cause, as I do? Are you going to set up Poland, immature, inexperienced, as yet unorganized, and leave her with a circle of armies around her? Do you believe in the aspiration of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs as I do? Do you know how many Powers would be quick to pounce upon them if there were not the guarantees of the world behind their liberty?

Have you thought of the sufferings of Armenia? You poured out your money to help succor the Armenians after they suffered; now set your strength so that they shall never suffer again.

The arrangements of the present peace cannot stand a generation unless they are guaranteed by the united forces of the civilized world. And if we do not guarantee them cannot you not see the picture? Your hearts have instructed you where the burden of this war fell. It did not fall upon the national treasuries, it did not fall upon the instruments of administration, it did not fall upon the resources of the nation. It fell upon the victims' homes everywhere, where women were toiling in hope that their men would come back.

When I think of the homes upon which dull despair would settle were this great hope disappointed, I should wish for my part never to have had America play any part whatever in this attempt to emancipate the world. But I talk as if there were any question. I have no more doubt of the ver-

dict of America in this matter than I have doubt of the blood that is in me.

And so, my fellow citizens, I have come back to report progress, and I do not believe that the progress is going to stop short of the goal. The nations of the world have set their heads now to do a great thing, and they are not going to slacken their purpose. And when I speak of the nations of the world I do not speak of the governments of the world. I speak of the peoples who constitute the nations of the world. They are in the saddle, and they are going to see to it that if their present governments do not do their will some other governments shall, and the secret is out and the present governments know it.

There is a great deal of harmony to be got out of common knowledge. There is a great deal of sympathy to be got of living in the same atmosphere and except for the differences of languages, which puzzled my American ear very sadly, I could have believed I was at home in France or in Italy or in England when I was on the streets, when I was in the presence of the crowds, when I was in great halls where men were gathered together irrespective of class.

I did not feel quite as much at home there as I do here, but I felt that now, at any rate, after this storm of war had cleared the air, men were seeing eye to eye everywhere and that these were the kind of folks who would understand what the kind of folks at home would understand and that they were thinking the same things.

I feel about you as I am reminded of a story of that excellent witness and good artist, Oliver Herford, who one day, sitting at luncheon at his club was slapped vigorously on the back by a man whom he did not know very well. He said: "Oliver, old boy, how are you?" He looked at him rather coldly. He said, "I don't know your name, I don't know your face, but your manners are very familiar." And I must say that your manners are very familiar, and let me add, very delightful.

It is a great comfort for one thing to realize that you all understand the language I am speaking. A friend of mine said that to talk through an interpreter was like witnessing the compound fracture of an idea. But the beauty of it is that, whatever the impediments of the channel of communication the idea is the same, that it gets registered, and it gets registered in responsive hearts and receptive purposes.

I have come back for a strenuous attempt to transact business for a little while in America but I have really come back to say to you, in all soberness and honesty, that I have been trying my best to speak your thoughts.

When I sample myself I think I find that I am a typical American, and if I sample deep enough and get down to what is probably the true stuff of a man, then I have hope that it is part of the stuff that is like the other fellow's at home.

And, therefore, probing deep in my heart and trying to see the things that are right without regard to the things that may be debated as expedient, I feel that I am interpreting the purpose and the thought of America; and in loving America I find I have joined the great majority of my fellowmen throughout the world.

## APPENDIX III

### PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS AT NEW YORK

On March 4, 1919, in Further Explanation of the League of Nations

*MY Fellow Citizens:* I accept the intimation of the air just played; I will not come back "till it's over, over there." And yet I pray God, in the interests of peace and of the world, that that may be soon.

The first thing that I am going to tell the people on the other side of the water is that an overwhelming majority of the American people is in favor of the League of Nations. I know that that is true; I have had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings true in every case. I account myself fortunate to speak here under the unusual circumstances of this evening. I am happy to associate myself with Mr. Taft in this great cause. He has displayed an elevation of view and a devotion to public duty which is beyond praise.

And I am the more happy because this means that this is not a party issue. No party has the right to appropriate this issue, and no party will in the long run dare oppose it.

We have listened to so clear and admirable an exposition of many of the main features of the proposed covenant of the League of Nations that it is perhaps not necessary for me to discuss in any particular way the contents of the document. I will seek rather to give you its setting. I do not know when I have been more impressed than by the conferences of the commission set up by the Conference of Peace to draw up a covenant for the League of Nations. The representatives of fourteen nations sat around that board—not young men, not men inexperienced in the affairs of their own

countries, not men inexperienced in the politics of the world; and the inspiring influence of every meeting was the concurrence of purpose on the part of all those men to come to an agreement and an effective working agreement with regard to this League of the civilized world.

There was a conviction in the whole impulse; there was conviction of more than one sort; there was the conviction that this thing ought to be done, and there was also the conviction that not a man there would venture to go home and say that he had not tried to do it.

Mr. Taft has set the picture for you of what a failure of this great purpose would mean. We have been hearing for all these weary months that this agony of war has lasted of the sinister purpose of the Central Empires, and we have made maps of the course that they meant their conquests to take. Where did the lines of that map lie, of that central line that we used to call from Bremen to Bagdad? They lay through these very regions to which Mr. Taft has called your attention, but they lay then through a united empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose integrity Germany was bound to respect, as her ally lay in the path of that line of conquest; the Turkish Empire, whose interests she professed to make her own, lay in the direct path that she intended to tread. And now what has happened? The Austro-Hungarian Empire has gone to pieces and the Turkish Empire has disappeared, and the nations that effected that great result—for it was a result of liberation—are now responsible as the trustees of the assets of those great nations. You not only would have weak nations lying in this path, but you would have nations in which that old poisonous seed of intrigue could be planted with the certainty that the crop would be abundant; and one of the things that the League of Nations is intended to watch is the course of intrigue. Intrigue cannot stand publicity, and if the League of Nations were nothing but a great debating society it will kill intrigue.



It is one of the agreements of this covenant that it is the friendly right of every nation a member of the League to call attention to anything that it thinks will disturb the peace of the world, no matter where that thing is occurring. There is no subject that may touch the peace of the world which is exempt from inquiry and discussion, and I think everybody here present will agree with me that Germany would never have gone to war if she had permitted the world to discuss the aggression upon Serbia for a single week. The British Foreign Office suggested, it pleaded, that there might be a day or two delay so that the representatives of the nations of Europe could get together and discuss the possibilities of a settlement. Germany did not dare permit a day's discussion. You know what happened. So soon as the world realized that an outlaw was at large, the nations began one by one to draw together against her. We know for a certainty that if Germany had thought for a moment that Great Britain would go in with France and with Russia she never would have undertaken the enterprise, and the League of Nations is meant as a notice to all outlaw nations that not only Great Britain, but the United States and the rest of the world will go in to stop enterprises of that sort. And so the League of Nations is nothing more nor less than the covenant that the world will always maintain the standards which it has now vindicated by some of the most precious blood ever spilled.

The liberated peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and of the Turkish Empire call out to us for this thing. It has not arisen in the council of statesmen. Europe is a bit sick at heart at this very moment, because it sees that statesmen have had no vision, and that the only vision has been the vision of the people. Those who suffer see. Those against whom wrong is wrought know how desirable is the right and the righteous. The nations that have long been under the heel of the Austrian, that have long cowered before the German, that have long suffered the indescribable agonies

of being governed by the Turk, have called out to the world, generation after generation, for justice, for liberation, for succor; and no Cabinet in the world has heard them. Private organizations, pitying hearts, philanthropic men and women have poured out their treasure in order to relieve these sufferings; but no nation has said to the nations responsible, "You must stop; this thing is intolerable, and we will not permit it." And the vision has been with the people. My friends, I wish you would reflect upon this proposition; the vision as to what is necessary for great reforms has seldom come from the top in the nations of the world. It has come from the need and the aspiration and the self-assertion of great bodies of men who meant to be free. And I can explain some of the criticisms which have been leveled against this great enterprise only by the supposition that the men who utter the criticisms have never felt the great pulse of the heart of the world.

And I am amazed—not alarmed, but amazed—that there should be in some quarters such a comprehensive ignorance of the state of the world. These gentlemen do not know what the mind of men is just now. Everybody else does. I do not know where they have been closeted, I do not know by what influence they have been blinded; but I do know that they have been separated from the general currents of the thought of mankind.

And I want to utter this solemn warning, not in the way of a threat; the forces of the world do not threaten, they operate. The great tides of the world do not give notice that they are going to rise and run; they rise in their majesty and overwhelming might, and those who stand in the way are overwhelmed. Now the heart of the world is awake, and the heart of the world must be satisfied. Do not let yourselves suppose for a moment that the uneasiness in the populations of Europe is due entirely to economic causes or economic motives; something very much deeper underlies it all than that. They see that their Governments have never

been able to defend them against intrigue or aggression, and that there is no force of foresight or of prudence in any modern Cabinet to stop war. And therefore they say, "There must be some fundamental cause for this," and the fundamental cause they are beginning to perceive to be that nations have stood singly or in little jealous groups against each other, fostering prejudice, increasing the danger of war rather than concerting measures to prevent it; and that if there is right in the world, if there is justice in the world, there is no reason why nations should be divided in the support of justice.

They are therefore saying if you really believe that there is a right, if you really believe that wars ought to be stopped, stop thinking about the rival interests of nations, and think about men and women and children throughout the world. Nations are not made to afford distinction to their rulers by way of success in the manœuvres of politics; nations are meant, if they are meant for anything, to make the men and women and children in them secure and happy and prosperous, and no nation has the right to set up its special interests against the interests and benefits of mankind, least of all this great nation which we love. It was set up for the benefit of mankind; it was set up to illustrate the highest ideals and to achieve the highest aspirations of men who wanted to be free; and the world—the world of today—believes that and counts on us, and would be thrown back into the blackness of despair if we deserted it.

I have tried once and again, my fellow citizens, to say to little circles of friends or to larger bodies what seems to be the real hope of the peoples of Europe, and I tell you frankly I have not been able to do so because when the thought tries to crowd itself into speech the profound emotion of the thing is too much; speech will not carry. I have felt the tragedy of the hope of those suffering peoples.

It is tragedy because it is a hope which cannot be realized in its perfection, and yet I have felt besides its tragedy, its

compulsion—its compulsion upon every living man to exercise every influence that he has to the utmost to see that as little as possible of that hope is disappointed, because if men cannot now, after this agony of bloody sweat, come to their self-possession and see how to regulate the affairs of the world, we will sink back into a period of struggle in which there will be no hope, and, therefore, no mercy. There can be no mercy where there is no hope, for why should you spare another if you yourself expect to perish? Why should you be pitiful if you can get no pity? Why should you be just if, upon every hand, you are put upon?

There is another thing which I think the critics of this covenant have not observed. They not only have not observed the temper of the world, but they have not even observed the temper of those splendid boys in khaki that they sent across the seas. I have had the proud consciousness of the reflected glory of those boys, because the Constitution made me their Commander-in-Chief, and they have taught me some lessons. When we went into the war, we went into it on the basis of declarations which it was my privilege to utter, because I believed them to be an interpretation of the purpose and thought of the people of the United States. And those boys went over there with the feeling that they were sacredly bound to the realization of those ideals; that they were not only going over there to beat Germany; they were not going over there merely with resentment in their hearts against a particular outlaw nation; but that they were crossing those three thousand miles of sea in order to show to Europe that the United States, when it became necessary, would go anywhere where the rights of mankind were threatened. They would not sit still in the trenches. They would not be restrained by the prudence of experienced continental commanders. They thought they had come over there to do a particular thing, and they were going to do it and do it at once. And just as soon as that rush of spirit as well as rush of body came in contact with the lines of the

enemy, they began to break, and they continued to break until the end. They continued to break, my fellow citizens, not merely because of the physical force of those lusty youngsters, but because of the irresistible spiritual force of the armies of the United States. It was that they felt. It was that that awed them. It was that that made them feel, if these youngsters ever got a foothold, they could never be dislodged, and that therefore every foot of ground that they won was permanently won for the liberty of mankind.

And do you suppose that having felt that crusading spirit of these youngsters, who went over there not to glorify America but to serve their fellow men, I am going to permit myself for one moment to slacken in my effort to be worthy of them and of their cause? What I said at the opening I said with a deeper meaning than perhaps you have caught; I do mean not to come back until it's over over there, and it must not be over until the nations of the world are assured of the permanency of peace.

Gentlemen on this side of the water would be very much profited by getting into communication with some gentlemen on the other side of the water. We sometimes think, my fellow citizens, that the experienced statesmen of the European nations are an unusually hard-headed set of men, by which we generally mean, although we do not admit it, that they are a bit cynical, that they say "This is a very practical world," by which you always mean that it is not an ideal world; that they do not believe that things can be settled upon an ideal basis. Well, I never came into intimate contact with them before, but if they used to be that way, they are not that way now. They have been subdued, if that was once their temper, by the awful significance of recent events and the awful importance of what is to ensue; and there is not one of them with whom I have come in contact who does not feel that he cannot in conscience return to his people from Paris unless he has done his utmost to do something more than attach his name to a treaty of peace. Every

man in that Conference knows that the treaty of peace in itself will be inoperative, as Mr. Taft has said, without this constant support and energy of a great organization such as is supplied by the League of Nations.

And men who when I first went over there were skeptical of the possibility of forming a League of Nations admitted that if we could but form it it would be an invaluable instrumentality through which to secure the operation of the various parts of the treaty; and when that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure. The structure of peace will not be vital without the League of Nations, and no man is going to bring back a cadaver with him.

I must say that I have been puzzled by some of the criticisms—not by the criticisms themselves; I can understand them perfectly, even when there was no foundation for them; but by the fact of the criticism. I cannot imagine how these gentlemen can live and not live in the atmosphere of the world. I cannot imagine how they can live and not be in contact with the events of their times, and I particularly cannot imagine how they can be Americans and set up a doctrine of careful selfishness, thought out to the last detail. I have heard no counsel of generosity in their criticism. I have heard no constructive suggestion. I have heard nothing except, “Will it not be dangerous to us to help the world?” It would be fatal to us not to help it.

From being what I will venture to call the most famous and the most powerful nation in the world we would of a sudden have become the most contemptible. So, I did not need to be told, as I have been told, that the people of the United States would support this covenant. I am an American and I knew they would. What a sweet revenge it is upon the world. They laughed at us once, they thought we did not mean our professions of principle. They thought so

until April of 1917. It was hardly credible to them that we would do more than send a few men over and go through the forms of helping, and when they saw multitudes hastening across the sea, and saw what those multitudes were eager to do when they got to the other side, they stood at amaze and said: "The thing is real, this nation is the friend of mankind as it said it was." The enthusiasm, the hope, the trust, the confidence in the future bred by that change of view are indescribable. Take an individual American and you may often find him selfish, and confined to his special interests; but take the American in the mass and he is willing to die for an idea. The sweet revenge, therefore, is this, that we believed in righteousness, and now we are ready to make the supreme sacrifice for it, the supreme sacrifice of throwing in our fortunes with the fortunes of men everywhere. Mr. Taft was speaking of Washington's utterance about entangling alliances, and if he will permit me to say so, he put the exactly right interpretation upon what Washington said, the interpretation that is inevitable if you read what he said, as most of these gentlemen do not. And the thing that he longed for was just what we are now about to supply; an arrangement which will disentangle all the alliances in the world.

Nothing entangles, nothing enmeshes a man except a selfish combination with somebody else. Nothing entangles a nation, hampers it, binds it, except to enter into a combination with some other nation against the other nations of the world. And this great disentanglement of all alliances is now to be accomplished by this covenant, because one of the covenants is that no nation shall enter into any relationship with another nation inconsistent with the covenants of the League of Nations. Nations promise not to have alliances. Nations promise not to make combinations against each other. Nations agree that there shall be but one combination, and that is the combination of all against the wrongdoer.

And so I am going back to my task on the other side with renewed vigor. I had not forgotten what the spirit of the American people is, but I have been immensely refreshed by coming in contact with it again. I did not know how good home felt until I got here.

The only place a man can feel at home is where nothing has to be explained to him. Nothing has to be explained to me in America, least of all the sentiment of the American people. I mean about great fundamental things like this. There are many differences of judgment as to policy—and perfectly legitimate—sometimes profound differences of judgment; but those are not differences of sentiment, those are not differences of purpose, those are not differences of ideals. And the advantage of not having to have anything explained to you is that you recognize a wrong explanation when you hear it.

In a certain rather abandoned part of the frontier at one time it was said they found a man who told the truth; he was not found telling it, but he could tell it when he heard it. And I think I am in that situation with regard to some of the criticisms I have heard. They do not make any impression on me, because I know there is no medium that will transmit them, that the sentiment of the country is proof against such narrowness and such selfishness as that. I commend these gentlemen to communion with their fellow citizens.

What are we to say, then, as to the future? I think, my fellow citizens, that we can look forward to it with great confidence. I have heard cheering news since I came to this side of the water about the progress that is being made in Paris toward the discussion and clarification of a great many difficult matters and I believe that settlements will begin to be made rather rapidly from this time on at those conferences. But what I believe, what I know as well as believe, is this: That the men engaged in those conferences are gathering heart as they go, not losing it; that they are finding community of purpose and community of ideal to an extent that perhaps they did not expect; and that amidst all the



inter-play of influence—because it is infinitely complicated—amidst all the inter-play of influence, there is a forward movement which is running toward the right. Men have at last perceived that the only permanent thing in the world is the right, and that a wrong settlement is bound to be a temporary settlement—bound to be a temporary settlement for the very best reason of all, that it ought to be a temporary settlement, and the spirits of men will rebel against it, and the spirits of men are now in the saddle.

When I was in Italy a little limping group of wounded Italian soldiers sought an interview with me. I could not conjecture what it was they were going to say to me, and with the greatest simplicity, with a touching simplicity, they presented me with a petition in favor of the League of Nations. Their wounded limbs, their impaired vitality were the only argument they brought with them. It was a simple request that I lend all the influence that I might happen to have to relieve future generations of the sacrifices that they had been obliged to make. That appeal has remained in my mind as I have ridden along the streets in European capitals and heard cries of the crowd, cries for the League of Nations, from lips of people who, I venture to say, had no particular notion of how it was to be done, who were not ready to propose a plan for a League of Nations, but whose hearts said that something by way of a combination of all men everywhere must come out of this. As we drove along country roads weak old women would come out and hold flowers up to us. Why should they hold flowers up to strangers from across the Atlantic? Only because they believed that we were the messengers of friendship and of hope, and these flowers were their humble offerings of gratitude that friends from so great a distance should have brought them so great a hope.

It is inconceivable that we should disappoint them, and we shall not. The day will come when men in America will look back with swelling hearts and rising pride that they should have been privileged to make the sacrifice which it was neces-

sary to make in order to combine their might and their moral power with the cause of justice for men of every kind everywhere.

God give us the strength and vision to do it wisely! God give us the privilege of knowing that we did it without counting the cost and because we were true Americans, lovers of liberty and of the right!

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS

REVISED DRAFT—ADOPTED AT PARIS, APRIL 28, 1919

**I**N order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understanding of international law as to actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the high contracting parties agree to this covenant of the League of Nations.

*(In the original preamble the last sentence read: "Adopt this constitution," instead of "Agree to this covenant.")*

### *Article One*

The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this covenant, and also such of those other states named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to this covenant. Such accessions shall be affected by a declaration deposited with the secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other members of the league.

Any fully self-governing state, dominion or colony not named in the annex may become a member of the league if its admission is agreed by two-thirds of the assembly, provided it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and shall accept

such regulations as may be prescribed by the league in regard to its military and navel forces and armaments.

Any member of the league may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the league, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

*(This article is new, embodying with alterations and additions the old article seven. It provides more specifically the method of admitting new members and adds the entirely new paragraph providing for withdrawal from the league. No mention of withdrawal was made in the original document.)*

#### Article Two

The action of the league under this covenant shall be effective through the instrumentality of an assembly and of a council, with permanent secretariat.

*(Originally this was a part of Article One. It gives the name "assembly" to the gathering of representatives of the members of the league, formerly referred to merely as "the body of delegates.")*

#### Article Three

The assembly shall consist of representatives of the members of the league.

The assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require, at the seat of the league, or at such other places as may be decided upon.

The assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world.

At meetings of the assembly, each member of the league shall have one vote, and may have not more than three representatives.

*(This embodies parts of the original articles one, two and*

*three with only minor changes. It refers to "members of the league," where the term "high contracting parties" originally was used, and this change is followed throughout the revised draft.)*

#### *Article Four*

The council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy and of Japan, together with representatives of four other members of the league. These four members of the league shall be selected by the assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the representatives of the four members of the league first selected by the assembly, representatives of (blank) shall be members of the council.

With the approval of the majority of the assembly the council may name additional members of the league, whose representatives shall always be members of the council; the council with like approval may increase the number of members of the league, to be selected by the assembly for representation on the council.

The council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the league, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world.

Any member of the league not represented on the council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the league.

At meetings of the council each member of the league represented on the council shall have one vote, and may not have more than one representative.

*(This embodies that part of the original article three*

*designating the original members of the council. The paragraph providing for increase in the membership of the council is new.)*

#### *Article Five*

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this covenant, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or the council shall require the agreement of all the members of the league represented at the meeting.

All matters of procedure of meetings of the assembly or of the council, the appointment of committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the assembly or by the council, and may be decided by a majority of the members of the league represented at the meeting.

The first meetings of the assembly and the first meeting of the council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

*(The first paragraph requiring unanimous agreement in both assembly and council except where otherwise provided is new. The other two paragraphs originally were included in article four.)*

#### *Article Six*

The permanent secretariat shall be established at the seat of the league. The secretariat shall comprise a secretariat-general and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

The first secretary-general shall be the person named in the annex; thereafter the secretary-general shall be appointed by the council with the approval of the majority of the assembly.

The secretaries and the staff of the secretariat shall be appointed by the secretary-general with the approval of the council.

The secretary-general shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the assembly and of the council.

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the

members of the league in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

*(This replaces the original article five. In the original the appointment of the first secretary-general was left to the council, and approval of the majority of the assembly was not required for subsequent appointments.)*

### Article Seven

The seat of the league is established at Geneva.

The council may at any time decide that the seat of the league shall be established elsewhere.

All positions under, or in connection with the league, including the secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

Representatives of the members of the league and officials of the league when engaged on the business of the league shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the league or its officials, or by representatives attending its meetings, shall be inviolable.

*(Embodying parts of the old articles five and six, this article names Geneva instead of leaving the seat of the league to be chosen later and adds the provision for changing the seat in the future. The paragraph opening positions to women equally with men is new.)*

### Article Eight

The members of the league recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for

such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several governments, limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the council.

The members of the league agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those members of the league which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The members of the league undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

*(This covers the ground of the original article eight, but is rewritten to make it clearer that armament reduction plans must be adopted by the nations affected before they become effective.)*

#### *Article Nine*

A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the council on the execution of the provisions of article 1 and 8 and on military and naval questions generally.

*(Unchanged except for the insertion of the words "Article One.")*

#### *Article Ten*

The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the council shall ad-



wise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

*(Virtually unchanged.)*

#### *Article Eleven*

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern of the whole league, and the league shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the secretary-general shall, on the request of any member of the league, forthwith summon a meeting of the council.

It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each member of the league to bring to the attention of the assembly, or of the council, any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb either the peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

*(In the original it was provided that the "high contracting parties reserve the right to take any action," etc., where the revised draft reads, "the league shall take any action," etc.)*

#### *Article Twelve*

The members of the league agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the council.

In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

*(Virtually unchanged, except that some provisions of the original are eliminated for inclusion in other articles.)*

*Article Thirteen*

The members of the league agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration. For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

The members of the league agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a member of the league which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

*(Only minor changes in language.)*

*Article Fourteen*

The council shall formulate and submit to the members of the league for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice. The court shall be competent to hear and determine disputes of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the council or by the assembly.

*(Unchanged except for the addition of the last sentence.)*

*Article Fifteen*

If there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the secretary-general, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the secretary-general, as promptly as possible, statements of their cases, all the relevant facts and papers; the council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

The council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of any dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute, terms of settlement thereof as the council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the council, either unanimously or by a majority vote, shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

Any member of the league represented on the council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

If the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league reserve to themselves the right to take

such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

The council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the council.

In any case referred to the assembly all the provisions of this article and of article twelve relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

*(The paragraph specifically excluding matters of "domestic jurisdiction" from action by the council is new. In the last sentence the words "if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council," etc., have been added.)*

### Article Sixteen

Should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles Twelve, Thirteen or Fifteen, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance

of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the prevention of all financial intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking member of the league and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the league or not.

It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military or naval forces the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armaments of forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league.

The members of the league agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the league which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the league.

Any member of the league which has violated any covenant of the league may be declared to be no longer a member of the league by a vote of the council, concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the league represented thereon.

*(Unchanged except for the addition of the last sentence.)*

### *Article Seventeen*

In the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member of the league, or between states not members of the league, the state or states not members of the league shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purpose of such dispute, upon such conditions as the council may deem just.

If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of articles twelve to sixteen, inclusive, shall be applied, with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the council.

Upon such invitations being given the council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute, and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purpose of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the league, the provisions of article sixteen shall be applicable as against the state taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purpose of such dispute, the council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

*(Virtually unchanged.)*

#### *Article Eighteen*

Every convention or international engagement entered into henceforward by any member of the league shall be forthwith registered with the secretariat and shall, as soon as possible, be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

*(Same as original article twenty-three.)*

#### *Article Nineteen*

The assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the league of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

*(Virtually the same as original article twenty-four.)*

*Article Twenty*

The members of the league severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements, inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case members of the league shall, before becoming a member of the league, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

*(Virtually the same as original article twenty-five.)*

*Article Twenty-one*

Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international agreements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

*(Entirely new.)*

*Article Twenty-two*

To those colonies and territories, which, as a consequence of the late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples from a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

The best method of giving practicable effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples be entrusted to ad-

vanced nations, who, by reasons of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the league.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic condition and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training, of the nations for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the league.

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size or their remoteness from the centers of civilization or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory and other circumstances can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. In every case of mandate, the manda-



tory shall render to the council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the league, be explicitly defined in each case by the council.

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to advise the council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

*(This is the original article 19, virtually, except for the insertion of the words "and who are willing to accept" in describing nations to be given mandatories.)*

### *Article Twenty-three*

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing, or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the league (a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations; (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; (c) will entrust the league with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; (d) will entrust the league with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest; (e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the league. In this connection the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-

1918 shall be in mind; (f) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

*(This replaces the original article twenty and embodies parts of the original articles eighteen and twenty-one. It eliminates a specific provision formerly made for a bureau of labor and adds the clauses (b) and (c).)*

#### Article Twenty-four

There shall be placed under the direction of the league all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the league.

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions, but which are not placed under the control of international bureaus or commissions, the secretariat of the league shall, subject to the consent of the council, and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

The council may include as part of the expenses of the secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the league.

*(Same as article twenty-two in the original, with the matter after the first two sentences added.)*

#### Article Twenty-five

The members of the league agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

*(Entirely new.)*

*Article Twenty-six*

Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the league, whose representatives compose the council and by a majority of the members of the league whose representatives compose the assembly.

No such an amendment shall bind any member of the league which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the league.

*(Same as the original, except that a majority of the league instead of three-fourths is required for ratification of amendments with the last sentence added.)*

*Annex to Covenant*

*One*—Original members of the League of Nations.

Signatories of the treaty of peace:


United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, China, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serbie, Siam, and Uruguay.

States invited to accede to the covenant:

Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela.

*Two*—First secretary general of the League of Nations (blank).

*(The annex was not published with the original draft of the covenant.)*



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## INDEX

- Aaronsohn*, "With the Turks in Palestine," 126
- Agidir*, incident, 56
- Algeciras*, conference, 56
- Alsace-Lorraine*, recovery of, a motive of France, 37; Germany's selfish motive concerning, 44; a cause for war on part of the French, 60, 67; Prussia's monster crime in 1871, 120; French army concentrated, not expecting German advance through Belgium, 130; armistice terms, 154-5; Pope's proposal concerning (p. 4), 166; President Wilson's statement concerning, 180 (point 6)
- Allenby*, General, captures Jerusalem, 144
- Allepo*, capture of, 150
- Argonne*, battle of, Americans in, 147, 149
- Armistice*, terms for Germany, 154-8; for Austria-Hungary, 152-4; for Bulgaria, 152; Turkey, 152
- Assassination*, of Franz-Ferdinand, 135
- Austria-Hungary*, fundamental cause for war, 28; arch-enemy of Italian freedom and unity, 36; revolution of her peoples certain, 33; "Dreibund," 1881, 52; intervention in Russo-Turkish war, 1878, 53; imperial designs, 55, 56, 57; causes for war in 1914, 63, 70; aggressions since 1900, 75, 78, 79; terms of armistice (see Armistice above)
- Bagdad*, railway, 63, 70; city captured by Turks, 140; recaptured by British, 144
- Baker*, Secretary, "The Nation in Arms," 170
- Baku*, evacuated by Turks, 150
- Balkan States*, causes for war, 1914-16, 61; troubled past, 76-8
- Balkan Wars*, 1912-13, causes of, 73
- Bank*, German Imperial, finances Bolsheviki, 176
- Bapaume*, in Second battle of the Somme, 142
- Belgium*, causes of war, 1914, 62; invasion by Germany planned, 59, 192; armistice terms, 154; Brand Whitlock's "Story of," 125
- Belgrade* (Serbia), captured by Austro-Bulgarian armies, 137
- Berard*, Victor, prophecy of War, 79
- Bernhardi*, General, principles, 72, 187-92; quotations from, 187-92
- Bethmann-Hollweg*, von, speech in Reichstag, 189; resignation, 174
- Bismarck*, policies, 34-35; at Congress of Berlin, 52-53-54
- Bolsheviki*, rise of, 143; effect on Russian army, 143, 145; and on Russia, 145, 176-7; danger of, 159
- Boris*, of Bulgaria, succeeds to throne, 150; abdicates, 151
- Boxer*, uprising, 131-2
- Brest-Litovsk*, treaty, nature of, 176-7; German violation of, 145
- Breslau*, German warship, enters Dardanelles, 136; sunk by British, 148
- Bryan*, W. J., treaties, 48
- Bryce*, James, on the Balkan question, 79, 80
- Bosnia-Herzegovina*, annexation, 26, 55-6
- Bulgaria*, and Turkey, 76, and other Balkans, 53, 76-8; causes of war, 64; Armistice terms, 152


- Byng*, General, advance, 143; reverses, 143
- Cambrai*, falls to British, 149
- Carthage*, commercial struggle, 31, 41
- Chadwick*, Admiral, on Spanish-American War, 105-6
- Chateau-Thierry*, American advance, 146
- China*, declares war, 141
- Commercial* causes of war, 24, 30, 31
- Congress*, of Berlin, 54, 76
- Conquest*, wars of, 37-8
- Constitution* of League of Nations, 202-14; of United States, 197
- Crown Prince*, German, 46, 48
- Cuba*, why not independent in 1825? 106-7; American interests in, 107-8, 112, 114
- Czar* of Russia, not the aggressor in 1914, 129; guilt of his government, 67; overthrow, 174
- Dardanelles*, neutralization of, 31-2; British and French at, 46, 138
- Denmark*, war with Prussia and Austria, 35
- Doyle*, A. C., on British-Boer war, 92, 95
- Economic* wars, 31-2
- Ecquador*, 142
- England*, Causes of war in 1914, 60; causes of war with Boers, S. Africa, 103-4; Opium War with China, 31; England and Ireland, 44; colonial expansion, 32, *nv*, 46; Great Britain and the Triple Alliance, 53-4-5-6; Nature of British government, 26, 32, 34, 44, 46, 47, 60, 64-5; Great Britain and the "League of Nations," 194-5
- European War*, 1914, causes of, 58-64; background of, 51-7
- Falkenhayn*, Gen. von, in Roumerdinand, 139
- Ferdinand*, of Bulgaria, resigns, 150
- Finland*, reference to, 45; and Bolsheviks, 145; German conquest of, 148
- Foch*, General, in battle of Marne, 136, allied commander-in-chief, 142; in Italy, 144
- Formosa*, ceded to Japan, 84
- France*, confronted with danger of war, 18, 26, 35, 37, 53, 56, 60, 66, 116-18; causes of war, 1914, 60; causes of Franco-Prussian war, 115; military program, 59, 66; treaty relation, 54-5, 59, 60; German invasion, 61, 135; General Bernhardt's statement concerning, 192
- Franz-Ferdinand*, Archduke, assassination, 59, 135
- Frederick the Great*, his principles and wars, 47, 187; Bernhardt, a German authority on these wars, 190
- Gerard*, Ambassador, book on Germany, 126
- Germany*, causes of war, 1914, 63; ultimatums, 39, 59; invasion of Belgium, 34, 39, 59, 62, 66, 135, 154, 191-2; atrocities and policy of frightfulness, 22, 34, 63 (militarism) 52-3, 60, 62, 64, 65, 69, 131-4, 170; starvation in conquered territory, 132-4
- German* ideals and political practices, 17-18, 27, 31, 34-6, 44, 46, 53, 55, 59, 63, 65, 66, 69-72, 131-2; treaty obligations broken, 58, 60, 62, 66, 145-177; ("necessity knows no law") 131, 191-2; Propaganda in United States, 27, 69-71, 123, 125; progress in industries, 66; in militarism, 27, 35, 66, 131, 186-7, 187-93
- Goeben*, enters Dardanelles, 136; sunk by British, 148
- Great Britain* (see England)
- Greece*, causes of war, 1914, 61; declaration of war, 142; struggles for liberty and union of her peoples, 49, 77
- Guatemala*, war on Germany, 142
- Heligoland*, Battle of, 136
- Hershey*, A. S., on Spanish-Ameri-




- can War, 106; on Russo-Japanese War, 81-83, 88
- Hindenburg*, Gen. von, stops Russian advance, 136; drive in Poland, 137
- "*Hindenburg Line*," 142
- Hindus*, 45
- Holy Alliance*, 51
- Hoover*, Herbert, and U. S. food administration (testify to starvation by Germans) 133-4
- Hungary*, revolution of 1848, 49; freedom, 49
- Huns*, reason for name, 131-2
- India*, 44
- Italy*, war with Turkey, 68, 73, 80; causes of war, 1914, 61; Italian unity and nationality, 35, 37, 45, 52, 67-8; Declares war on Austria, 137; on Germany, 139; interest in Adriatic and Balkans, 61, 79; Great victory in close of war, 149-50
- Jameson Raid*, 97, 100
- Japan*, causes of Russo-Japanese war, 81, 90; causes of war, 1914, 62; war with China, 83, 84; in Korea, 82-4-7, 88-9-90; in Manchuria, 83, 86, 87-89, 90; German proposals to, 69, 123
- Jerusalem*, captured by British, 144
- Jutland*, battle of, 140
- Kaiser*, the German, claims to divine right, 27, 124; speeches and character of rule, 27, 48, 56-7, 59, 60, 63, 65, 131; threats to peace of Europe, 55-7, 128-30; visits to Turkey, and responsibility for Turkish massacres, 57, 65; abdication, 152
- Karl*, Emperor, leaves Austria, 151
- Kemmel*, Mt., captured by Germans, 146
- Korea* (see Japan)
- Kossuth*, 49
- Kruger*, Paul, in S. Africa, 99-100
- League of Nations*, a discussion, 186-201; German attitude, 187-93
- League of Nations* ("to enforce peace") 49, 76, 162, 164-5, 178, 180, 184
- League Covenant*, text of February draft, 202-214; final draft, 244-261
- Lens*, coal city, siege by British, 137, 142; evacuated, 149
- Liberia*, declares war on Germany, 174
- Lille*, evacuated by Germans, 149
- Lloyd-George*, answer to German peace proposal, 171
- Lodge*, Henry Cabot, on Spanish-American war, 107, 112
- Mackensen*, Gen. von, expels Russians, 136; in Roumania, 139
- Mahan*, Capt., on Spanish-American war, 112
- Marne*, first battle of, 59, 130, 136; second battle of, 146-9
- Messines Ridge*, 142, 146
- Mexico*, German intrigues in, 69, 123
- Mihiel*, St., battle of, 147
- Monastir*, taken by Allies, 139
- Monroe Doctrine*, 26, 52, 122; Gen. Bernhardt on, 191
- Morganthau*, Henry, Ambassador's "story," 126, 183
- Nationality*, growth of, as cause for war, 23, 34-6, 61-3, 67-8
- Navigation Laws*, 43
- Neuwe Chapelle*, battle, 137
- Nicaragua*, declares war, 142
- Noyon*, battle line, 146
- Ostend*, Sub-base, British attack on, 148
- Panama*, canal and neutralization, 32; war on Germany, 141
- Paris*, German Super-gun fires on, 132, 146
- Peronne*, capture of, 147
- Poland*, partitions, 50, 182; must be restored 50, 164, 180; "When the Prussians Came to Poland," 126; German government in, 44, 123 ("Ireland and Poland"), 126; efforts to Germanize, 200
- Portugal*, revolution in, 36; ally of England, 62; in Belgium, 146

- Prussia*, and Bismarck, 35; Triple Alliance, 52; War with France, 115-20; militarism, 35, 163 (war lords), 193
- Quotations*, from Pres. Wilson's Flag Day Address, 68-72; from Jan. 22, 1917 speech, 162-4; Reply to Pope, 166; "Four points" from July 4, 1918 speech, 177-178; "five points" from Sept. 27, 1918 speech, 179; from German leaders on war, and arbitration, 187-92
- Red Cross*, hospitals fired upon by Germans, 132
- Religion*, wars of, 23, 29
- Rheims*, shelling by Germans, 132 (cathedral); German attack in Rheims salient, 146; French and Americans wipe out salient, 147
- Roulers*, recaptured by Belgians, 149
- Roumania*, historical sketch, 76-8; declares war on, 139; Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria declare war on, 139; overrun by armies of Central Powers, 139
- Russia*, member of Triple Entente, 54-5; Crimean War, 75-6; war with Turkey, 1878, 76; and Congress of Berlin, 53, 76-7, and Constantinople, 28, 61, 67; access denied to Mediterranean, 76; causes of war in 1914, 61; causes of Russo-Japanese war, 81, 90; revolution, and overthrow of Czar, 11, 17, 28, 174, 143
- Russo-Japanese War*, causes of (see *Russia* above)
- Selective Service Draft*, in U. S., 141
- Serbia*, causes of war, 1914, 61; historical sketch, 75, 77-8; Austria declares war upon, 135; resists Austrians, 135; crushed by Austro-Bulgarian invasion, 137; nucleus of new Jugo-Slav state, 78
- Spain*, negotiations with U. S. over Cuba, 106; revolution in, 110-36; Moroccan crisis, 56; war with U. S., 1898 (causes), 113-14
- Spanish-American War*, causes of, 113-14; Chadwick on, 105-6; Lodge on, 107, 112; Capt. Mahan on, 112
- Tannenburg*, battle of, 136; junker, 193
- Tariff*, protective, 43, 183-4
- Turkey*, character of government, 33, 183; war with Italy, 80; First Balkan war, 74; Crimean War, 76; with Russia, 1878, 76; causes of war, 1914, 63; in thrall of Germany, 65, 70; declares war on Russia, 135; Great Britain and France declare war on, 135; declares war on Roumania, 139; armistice terms, 152; fortifications at Dardanelles, 138
- United States*, interest in Cuba, 107-9, 114; causes of war, 1914, 64, 68-72, 122-3; part in League of Nations, 196-8; importance of entry into World War, 17; German hatred toward, 36; greatest contribution to the world, 39; military program in 1917, 141
- Uruguay*, 142
- Valenciennes*, capture of, 149
- Venezuela*, Roosevelt and the Kaiser, 122
- Verdun*, first battle of, 140; French counter-stroke at, 140; second counter-thrust by French, 143
- Versailles*, congress of, 51; Pres. Wilson at, 182
- Vienna*, Congress of, 51; responsibility for this war, 51
- War*, an instinct, 29-30; classification of causes, 23-4; fundamental causes, 31-9; pretexts and excuses, 28, 35, 40, 41, 43-4, 45; Austrian and German pretexts, 59-60; nature and function of, 22; causes of World War, 58-64; outline for study of, in U. S. A., 135-59; immediate causes for U. S., and fundamental (outline), 121-27, First year of, 135

- Second year of, 137  
Third year of, 138  
Fourth year of, 141  
Fifth year of, 145  
Last events, 149  
Balkan Wars, causes of, 73-ff  
British-Boer War, causes of, 91-ff  
Franco-Prussian War, causes of, 115-ff  
Russo-Japanese War, causes of, 81-ff  
Spanish-American War, causes of, 105-ff
- No longer same necessity for war, 50, 199-201; war and the League of Nations, 49, 76, 196-201; war the political gospel of the German government, 187-92
- Y. M. C. A.*, duty to support, 125; treatment by Germans, 132
- Zimmermann*, German foreign minister, notes to Mexico and Japan, 69, 123





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