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FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

Read February 12, 1904

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Immanuel Kant, to do honour to whom, and in grateful commemoration of whose services to philosophy, we have assembled on this twelfth day of February, 1904, which is the centenary of his death,—Immanuel Kant was born in the city of Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia, on April 22, 1724. His father, who was of Scottish extraction, was a leather-strap cutter, working for himself in a small way, in that city. Immanuel was one of a large family. He owed much to the careful training and religious teaching of his mother, whom, however, he lost early in life, at the age of thirteen, and to the regular domestic habits of the household. His schoolboy days were passed at the *Collegium Fridericianum* in Königsberg under the head-mastership of Franz Albert Schultz, by whom among others he may have been made familiar, later in life, with the current Leibniz-Wolf philosophy, which his own was destined to supersede; Schultz being also a Professor in the University, and a convinced expositor of that elaborate scholastic form into which Christian Wolf had thrown, or with which he had incorporated, the newest philosophical ideas of the day, those of Leibniz. At the age of sixteen and a half Kant entered as a student at the University of Königsberg, selecting Mathematics and Philosophy in the wide sense as his special departments, in which he attended the lectures of Professor J. G. Teske and enjoyed the instruction and friendship of Professor Martin Knutzen, who gave him the run of his own library, and made him acquainted with the works of the English Newton. These studies bore fruit in Kant's first publication, *Thoughts on the True Way of Estimating Living Forces* (*vis viva*), in 1747. Schultz's lectures in Theology he also attended.

On completing his student course, Kant decided for the profession of a teacher, and earned his living for nine years as a tutor in private families. His father's death in the year 1746 had left him entirely dependent on his own exertions. In 1755 he took the degree of Doctor, and qualified as a Privatdocent at the University, his

inaugural dissertation being entitled *De Igne*, which was followed soon after by his *Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidatio.* He worked steadily in this capacity for fifteen years, till the year 1770, when he was appointed to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysic, the duties of which office he continued to perform till forced to relinquish them, shortly before his death in his eightieth year, by the advancing infirmities of age.

Kant's life was thus the purely academical life of a student and teacher. It would seem that he seldom left Königsberg, and was never beyond the boundary of the province of East Prussia. Short in stature, slight in figure, and far from robust in constitution, but at the same time endued with a deep and genuine love of knowledge for its own sake, as well as with a strict sense of morality, the student's life was one for which he was eminently fitted, and fitted to adorn. A glance at the list of his works, with their dates, which is given in the collected edition of Rosenkranz and Schubert, will show the wide range of subjects in which he was at home. Physics, Astronomy, Anthropology, and Theology seem to have been his favourites. His work entitled *General Natural History of the Heavens on Newtonian Principles*, written in 1755 and dedicated to the King, Frederick the Great, which has been compared to Laplace's theory which appeared long afterwards on the same subject, was deprived of effective publication at the time by the failure of a bookseller at Leipsic Fair. (I take this fact, along with the others relating to Kant's life, from the late Professor W. Wallace's *Kant*, in Dr. W. Knight's series of Philosophical Classics, published by Messrs. Blackwood, which again is itself based upon Schubert's *Life of Kant*, contained in the collected edition above mentioned.) Kant was never satisfied till he had, as it were, worked out to the end, and obtained a full *rationale* of, any subject which offered problems or suggested questions requiring an answer, and so had arrived at the ultimate *data* involved in it, and the law of their combination. The honesty and thoroughness with which he worked at this task, whatever were the subjects in hand, are that which make his writings so extremely valuable and instructive. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri*;—so at any rate may one say who belongs in philosophy to an opposite school of thought, the school of those whose aim is to arrive at a true analysis of experience, and who may be called Experientialists, as opposed to those who proceed by speculating on its sources and its validity, and who may properly be designated *A priorists.* And if Kant himself were present with us to-day, I would appeal to him in extenuation of my temerity in undertaking this Address, and say—Suffer yourself

to be commended—*Sit fas et ab hoste laudari*—where truth is the common object, all enemies are friends.

But I have yet to mention that part of Kant's intellectual activity which is his most enduring title to renown, the Critical or Transcendental Philosophy. If Kant's activity had ceased before his bringing out the first edition of *The Kritik of the Pure Reason* in 1781, his fifty-seventh year, his influence on the thought of civilized man would have been comparatively slight, and we should not have assembled here to-day to celebrate his memory. It was because it affected the subjective aspect of experience, our knowledge or surmise of the universe, of which we find ourselves inhabitants, as distinguished from the objective aspect of that experience, the universe of persons and things as it appears to be in itself independently of experience, that Kant's new theory of the composition of experience had such far-reaching and spirit-stirring effects. It was a theory of the generating principles or factors of that experience as such. This world and the material universe of which it was a part, said Kant, we knew only by means of, or as part of, our experience; then how came about our experience itself, how was it composed, what was its value? It could not come as a direct impression or picture from the world or the material universe as they appeared to be independently of ourselves, because, as they so appeared to be, they were the *result* of our experiencing,—they might contain, or be the appearance of, some factors of that experience, but we ourselves, as we appeared to ourselves, must contain others, which did not appear, but which were no less essential.

Kant's answer to this question, the theory which he devised to answer it, speaking broadly, was this,—Our faculties, the faculties of our apperceptive Ego (which never appeared as *in itself* it was), worked in modes which supplied certain definite Forms, into which the Matter (as he called it) of Sense or Feeling was cast on coming into contact with our faculties, and in virtue of which it appeared as the ordered experience of our empirical Ego on the one hand, and of a material world and universe on the other. 'Reason,' says Kant in the Introduction to the first edition of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, 'is the faculty which supplies us with the principles of *a priori* knowledge. Hence Pure Reason is that which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely *a priori*.' Its forms, therefore, according to Kant, spring from, and connect us with, what would otherwise be wholly transcendent and unknowable; as connecting us with the transcendent they are transcendental. 'I call all knowledge *transcendental*,' he says, 'which busies itself not only with

objects but with our *a priori* conceptions of objects generally. The name for a System of such conceptions would be a Transcendental Philosophy' (Rosenkranz und Schubert's edition of *Collected Works*, in twelve volumes, 8vo, Leopold Voss, Leipzig, 1838–42, Vol. II. pp. 24 and 25). Many faculties are thus included under that of Reason (*Vernunft*) in this large sense.

Our faculty of Intuition (*Anschauung*) casts the matter of sense into its own *a priori* forms of Space and Time. Our faculty of Understanding (*Verstand*) works in forms, called by Kant Categories, which are the means of our rationally thinking, or reducing to rationality, any relation between feelings or forms, whether real or imaginary, so as to form concepts of objects. The Categories are twelve in number, three under each of the four heads of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. For applying the Categories to objects in Space and Time our faculty of Judgement (*Urtheilskraft*) works in special forms called Schemata. These are the Schema of Substance, the Schema of Cause and Causality, the Schema of Mutual or Reciprocal Action, the Schema of Possibility, the Schema of Reality (*Wirklichkeit*), and the Schema of Necessity. 'The Schemata,' says Kant, 'are therefore nothing but Time-determinations *a priori*, according to rules, and these apply, following the order of the Categories, to the Time-series, the Time-content, the Time-order, the Time-comprehension in respect of all possible objects' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Rosenkranz und Schubert's edition, Vol. II. p. 128. The passage appears also unaltered in the second edition of the *Kritik*). 'The schemata, then,' says Wallace in the work already cited, p. 173, 'are the true scientific categories. They are in Kant's words, "the true and only conditions for securing to the categories a bearing upon objects—of giving them, in short, import and meaning."'

Our Judgement-faculty, says Kant, works in two ways, analytically and synthetically; analytically it is busied only with a given object and what is already contained therein; its first principle is the Axiom of Contradiction (*Satz des Widerspruchs*), a principle which belongs to, and is applied by, ordinary formal Logic;—'What is contradictory of any given object cannot be predicated of it.' Ordinary formal Logic, however (*die allgemeine Logik*), has nothing whatever to do with explaining the possibility of Synthetic Judgements, these judgements being those in which, says Kant, 'I go out beyond a given object or concept, in order to bring something not contained therein into relation with it;—a relation, therefore, which is never one of Identity or of Contradiction, and in asserting

which the truth or error of the Judgement itself is not to be seen.' And again, 'The highest principle of all synthetic judgements is therefore this: Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.' This distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, and the essential part which synthetic judgements play in the production of experience, seems to have been considered by Kant as perhaps the most important among all the several corner-stones of his system as a whole. We must have a power of synthesising impressions; it is that power which is most essential to experience. 'The possibility of experience,' he says, 'is that which gives objective reality to all our *a priori* cognitions.' And again, 'Since therefore experience as empirical synthesis is the only mode of cognition which gives reality to all other synthesis, it follows that experience, as *a priori* cognition, has truth (agreement with the object known) only when it contains nothing more than what is necessary for the synthetic unity of experience generally.' (The four foregoing passages appear in both the first and second editions of the *Kritik*.)

It was in its finding a suitable place for, and giving a satisfactory account of, the sense of *necessity* in some parts and domains of our knowledge, as for instance in Logic and in Mathematics, that Kant saw the great and decisive advantage of his own theory over that which preceded it, so far as that was based merely on the Leibnizian principle of there being a Sufficient Reason for the real existence of things, as distinguished from their logical possibility. 'How,' he asks in his Essay on *The Progress of Metaphysic since Leibniz and Wolf*, an Essay belonging to the later years of his life, 'can a Leibnizian (who knows of no *a priori* intuition of Space) maintain the necessity of Space having three and only three dimensions, since this representation of it, as he himself maintains, is of merely empirical origin, which affords no justification for the attribution of necessity?' (Rosenkranz und Schubert, Vol. I. p. 512).

The Principles (*Grundsätze*) of the Pure Understanding are next enumerated, and brought under the four heads: (1) Axioms of Intuition, (2) Anticipations of Perception, (3) Analogies of Experience, and (4) Postulates of empirical thinking generally. In treating of these Principles, there is inserted, though only in the second and later editions, a *Refutation of Idealism* of the Berkeleyan type. And then comes the well-known chapter on the Distinction of all Objects into *Phaenomena* and *Noumena*, with an Appendix on the *Amphiboly of the Reflective Conceptions*, the amphiboly arising from our comparing conceptions together, without first ascertaining

that they belong to one and the same cognizing faculty, that is, whether they belong to Sensibility or to Understanding. There are four relations under which concepts forming part of a complex state of mind can be relevant to one another—Sameness and Difference of Kind; Accordance and Discordance; Inner and Outer; the Determinable and its Determination (Matter and Form). Ascertaining this reference constitutes a Transcendental Topic. 'We can compare concepts together logically,' says Kant, 'without troubling ourselves to inquire to what domain they belong, whether to the Understanding as *Noumena*, or to Sensibility as *Phenomena*. But when we would approach the Objects, with the purpose of applying those concepts in understanding them, then transcendental Reflection (*Überlegung*) is requisite, in the first place, to see whether the concepts to be applied belong to the Understanding or to Sensibility. Without this Reflection I make a very uncertain use of the concepts, and there arise fictitious synthetic principles, which the critical Reason cannot recognize, but which are founded solely on a transcendental amphiboly, that is, a wavering to and fro between objects of pure understanding and phenomena' (Rosenkranz und Schubert, Vol. II. p. 221. The passage appears also in the second edition). Kant maintains that Leibniz's *Intellectuelles System der Welt*, as he calls it, was largely based on this insecure foundation. Leibniz, he says, intellectualized phenomena of sense; Locke, on the other hand, sensibilized concepts of the understanding.

Kant ends this whole division of his work with an explanation of the four senses in which the word *Nothing* (*Nichts*) is used:—

Nothing.

1. Empty Concept without Object (*Ens Rationis*).
2. Missing Object of a Concept (*Nihil Privativum*).
3. Empty Intuition without Object (*Ens Imaginarium*).
4. Missing Object without Concept (*Nihil Negativum*).

Kant has now completed the first Division of his Transcendental Logic, its Analytic, and passes to the second and concluding Division, the Transcendental Dialectic, the domain or field of operation of the faculty of Pure Reason itself in its strict sense, which Kant characterizes as the seat of transcendental *Schein*, mere Appearance, or Illusion. It was his criticism, or critical examination and theory of the Pure Reason in its operations under this Division of the subject, which gained for Kant the title of *der Alles-zermalmende*, the all-shattering, Kant. The first Division of Kant's *Kritik* is thus directed against Scepticism, the second against Dogmatism. His opening sentence is—'We have above named the Dialectic generally, a Logic

of Illusion (*Schein*).' Its principles carry it, the Pure Reason, beyond the region of possible experience; they are not only *a priori* and transcendental to experience, but they hypostasise pure concepts or notions, and are, along with their objects, transcendent principles, transcendent objects. Yet this operation is unavoidable and necessarily involved in the logical function of the Pure Reason itself. What the Reason seeks in logical syllogizing is—'to find the Unconditioned which conditions any given cognition of the Understanding, and so completes it as an Unity' (Ros. u. Sch., Vol. II. p. 249).

The first Book of the Dialectic treats of the Transcendent Reason-Concepts of the Pure Reason, which Kant calls *Ideas*; the second and concluding Book treats of the transcendent and dialectical conclusions of the Pure Reason: first, its *Paralogisms* relating to the Soul; second, its *Antinomies* relating to the Cosmos; and third, its *Ideals* relating to God. 'All pure concepts whatever have to do,' says Kant, 'with the synthetic Unity of Representations (*Vorstellungen*), but concepts of the Pure Reason (transcendental Ideas) have to do with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions. Consequently all transcendental Ideas may be brought under three classes: first, the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the Thinking Subject; second, the absolute unity of the series of Conditions of Phenomena; and third, the absolute unity of the Condition of all Objects of thought generally' (Ros. u. Sch., Vol. II. p. 269).

Now, what is it which renders all this business of the Pure Reason illusory, and reduces it to a mere appearance, as we have seen that in Kant's view it is? It is the circumstance that Ideas of the Reason are formed out of pure concepts of the Understanding alone, concepts which can never be themselves given in experience, though they are that form of thought upon which all our understanding of experience is founded. They treat these pure concepts as if they were concrete experiences, consisting of sensibility or sensible imagery as well as of forms of thought. At p. 258, Vol. II, of the Ros. u. Sch. edition, he gives a *scala* of modes of representing objects, which makes this clear. 'The *genus*,' he says, 'is *Vorstellung* at large (*repraesentatio*). Under it stands *Vorstellung* with consciousness (*perceptio*). A Perception which relates solely to the Subject as a modification of its state is *Empfindung* (*sensatio*), an objective perception is cognition, *Erkenntniss* (*cognitio*). This is either Intuition or Concept, *Anschauung* or *Begriff* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former of these refers immediately to the object, and is singular (*einzeln*), the latter is mediated by a mark, something which may be common to a plurality

of things. The Concept is either an empirical or a pure concept; and the pure concept, so far as it has its origin solely in the Understanding (not in the pure Image of Sensibility), is called *Notio*. A concept formed out of Notions, which goes beyond the possibility of being experienced, is the *Idea* or *Reason-concept*. Any one who has accustomed himself to this mode of distinguishing, must find it intolerable to hear the representation of a red colour called an *Idea*. It is not even to be called a Notion, or Understanding-concept.'

Yet, notwithstanding all the foregoing destructive criticism of his own Ideas on Kant's part, the Ideas of the Pure Reason are not wholly and entirely illusory, the source of mere appearance only. True, they are not constitutive of Realities, but, since they are involved in the nature and operation of the faculty of Pure Reason itself, they are necessarily regulative of its procedure, supply the goals or ideal ends towards which the efforts of our thought should be directed, and keep us away from following arbitrary fancies. As Wallace expresses it, in the work already cited, pp. 182–3:—

'The ideas, strictly as ideal, have a legitimate and a necessary place in human thought. They express the unlimited obligation which thought feels laid upon itself to unify the details of observation; they indicate an anticipated and postulated convergence between the various lines indicated by observation, even though observation may show that the convergence will never visibly be reached; or they are standards and model types towards which experience may, and indeed must, if she is true to the cause of truth, conceive herself bound to approximate. Such is the function of ideas, as regulative; they govern and direct the action of intellect in the effort to systematize and centralize knowledge. Our thought is thus guided by its own threefold maxims of homogeneity, specification, and continuity; the first of which enjoins the unlimited reduction of special laws and forms to more general, the second demands indefinite liberty to mark out distinctions, and the third insists upon gradual and unbroken passage from species to species. Even the more concrete forms of the ideas have their use. The idea of a supreme intelligence, as regulative of the universe, serves as a clue to suggest the discovery of new relationships in the objects of nature. The idea of a soul serves to supply a principle of unity for our study of the mental phenomena; and the idea of the world serves to keep before us the way in which natural phenomena are always indicating an increasing unity and interdependence.'

Moreover, and this is an important point in estimating Kant's theory as a whole, the Ideas, being strictly ideal, and not verifiable or realizable in experience, supply us with the possibility of introducing another kind of Causality, besides the familiar one through invariable Laws of Nature, namely, a Causality through Freedom in rational beings, which, though not verifiable, is also for the same reasons not disprovable, by our actual experience.

In the remaining and much shorter Part, which completes the

whole work, the Doctrine of Method (*Methodenlehre*)—the whole of the first Part being styled Doctrine of Elements (*Elementarlehre*)—Kant seems to be making use of this Regulative Function of the Pure Reason. The whole of it is distributed under four heads:—first, its Discipline, which treats of dogma, polemics, hypotheses, and proof; second, its Canon, treating of its ultimate End or Purpose, its ideal of the *Summum Bonum*, and the relative nature and value of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief; third, its Architectonic, or the Systematic Construction combining its parts; and fourth, Its History, in which the views of some few philosophers, beginning with the Greeks, are alone touched upon, and that with extreme brevity.

The publication of the first edition of the *Kritik of the Pure Reason* in 1781 marked an important epoch in the development, not of Kant's philosophical thought only, but in that of Germany and of Europe. Its centenary was celebrated in this country by the publication of the late Professor Max Müller's English Translation of it, and in Germany by the appearance of the first volume of Dr. H. Vaihinger's careful and seemingly exhaustive Commentary, a work still in progress (W. Spemann, Stuttgart). It was a splendid and assiduous effort of thought, kept up by Kant for many years, which enabled him to carry it to completion—by no means a case of a theory rapidly worked out—to make room and account for some new insight, or some newly discovered facts. It required the devotion of a student inspired by a deep and genuine faith in the trustworthiness of rational thought, not in speculative matters only, but also in matters of practice, social and political, in morals and in religion. It is Kant as a man that we are led to venerate by a study of this, the great work of his life, which is the foundation of those later works which completed his system, the *Kritik of the Practical Reason* in 1788, and the *Kritik of the Judgement* (*Urtheilskraft*) in 1790.

Kant, we have already seen, qualified as *Privatdocent* in the University of Königsberg in the year 1755. Now it was in that very year that there appeared Sulzer's translation of Hume's *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*—so says Wallace, in the work already cited, p. 117, adding that in the very next year Kant is found recommending it to his class. It is, then, to the period beginning at that date or shortly afterwards, that we may refer that 'rousing from dogmatic slumber' which Kant in the *Prolegomena* (1783) says that he had received many years before from David Hume, and which he says 'gave a wholly different direction to my investigations in the region of Speculative Philosophy' (Ros. u. Sch.,

Vol. III. p. 9). The early part of his period of intellectual ferment thus coincided, or nearly so, with the Seven Years' War. Several works written between 1762 and 1766 seem to contain indications of the new lines of thought then opening before him. Among these may be mentioned: the *False Subtilty of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, 1762; *Attempt to introduce Negative Quantities into Philosophy*, 1763; *The only possible Ground of Strict Proof of God's Existence*, 1763; *Observed Facts relating to the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, 1764; and *Dreams of a Spirit-seer* (meaning Swedenborg) *illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysic* (meaning Leibniz), 1766. To which may be added his Dissertation *De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis*, 1770, on occasion of his being called to the Professorship of Logic and Metaphysic. After that there followed a very decided lull in his production of works for the press—a lull which it would seem was broken only once, and then only by his *Program* in preparation for his University Lectures *On the Different Races of Men*, in 1775—until with 1781 came the publication of the first edition of the *Kritik of the Pure Reason*.

But the period immediately following that publication in 1781 was one of very great activity. The greatest interest and attention had been aroused by it, and Kant himself was aware that his system was, as yet, very far from completion. The application of its results to the whole range of human action and in elucidation of natural phenomena had still to be given. To mention only the most important of the works belonging to this period—in 1783 appeared the *Prolegomena to any Metaphysic which in the future may lay claim to a Scientific Character*; in 1785, the *Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals*; in 1786 the *Metaphysical Bases of Natural Science*; in 1787 the second edition of the *Kritik of the Pure Reason*; in 1788 the Articles *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy*, and that work which perhaps of all others fixed the attention of the public, the *Kritik of the Practical Reason*; in 1790 the last of the three works which together contain Kant's whole system—the *Kritik of the Judgement-faculty* (*Urtheilskraft*), in two Parts, the first of which treats of Aesthetics and the sense of the Beautiful and the Sublime, and the second of the Teleology in Nature. But the works now mentioned are very far from representing Kant's whole output, in these years and onwards to the close of his life. For this I must again refer to the list of works given by Rosenkranz and Schubert in the eleventh volume of their collected edition.

Nor can I attempt to give even a sketch of the line of argument followed by the two great *Kritiks*—the *Kritik of the Practical Reason*

and the *Kritik of the Judgement-faculty*. I restrict myself to calling attention to what is in Kant's own estimation the central idea, the central fact, in his whole system, giving unity to all its branches, the idea and fact of *Freedom*, exhibited by him as the essential characteristic of Reason as a Reality or Rational Agency, or in other words of a Will which is Rational, giving to itself the law under which it acts—a law, therefore, which is binding *a priori* upon all rational creatures, and constitutes what Kant calls a *Categorical Imperative*, as opposed to a conditional imperative, or one binding only supposing it is desired to attain a particular End. The absolute generality or universality of this law, its being inherent in the very nature of a rational activity, is that which constitutes its moral necessity, and the Freedom of that activity belongs to its essence simply as activity or active power. This Categorical Imperative belongs, therefore, to the Form, not the Matter, of Actions, and is thus expressed by Kant, 'Fundamental Law of the Pure Practical Reason,—Act so, that the Maxim of thy Will can always at the same time be valid as the Principle of an Universal Lawgiving' (Ros. u. Sch., Vol. VIII. p. 141). The Freedom of the Will does not consist in its being free from Law, but in its *autonomy*, or acting according to a law which as an activity it prescribes to itself, or which is its form as an activity.

'The Concept of Freedom,' writes Kant in the Preface to the *Kritik of the Practical Reason*, 'so far as its reality is proved by an apodeictic law of the Practical Reason, is the key-stone to the entire structure of a system of the pure, including even the speculative reason; and all other concepts (those of God and Immortality), which as mere Ideas remain in this latter without holdfast, now cleave to this concept of Freedom, and by it and through it attain stability (*Bestand*) and objective reality; that is, their possibility is demonstrated by the fact that Freedom is actual (*wirklich*); for this Idea manifests itself by the Moral Law.' And in a note he adds, that 'Freedom is the *Ratio Essendi* of the Moral Law, while the Moral Law is the *Ratio Cognoscendi* of Freedom. For were not the Moral Law first clearly known to thought in our Reason, we should never hold ourselves warranted in making the assumption of anything like Freedom (although it contains no contradiction). But if there were no Freedom, then there would be no Moral Law at all to be found in us.'

It was this part of Kant's system, his doctrine of Freedom and the Moral Law, affecting so profoundly as it did the whole range of our ideas concerning life and practice, which gave to the whole theory

of which it was a part its spirit-stirring interest in the eyes of his own contemporaries, an interest which it retains and is likely to retain so long as the questions which it raises are still the subject of debate among philosophers, no solution of them having met with general acceptance. I feel myself, however, bound to add (seeing that I have classed myself above with opponents of the Kantian school) that for my own part my belief is, that Kant's views of Freedom, the Categorical Imperative, and the Law of Moral Right and Wrong in conduct, as distinguished from a Law determined by the pursuit of Happiness, are the expression of a true insight, and will in the end, in some form or other, be accepted as true by philosophers of all schools, that is to say, whatever may be the method they adopt of approaching the facts to be explained.

Speaking briefly, in conclusion, of the position occupied by Kant's system as a whole, I think we may say, that it replaced the Cartesian conception of an Universe consisting of two separate Realities—the *Res extensa* and the *Res cogitans* (Matter and Mind), by the conception of an Universe consisting of two inseparable aspects or modes of Reality—Things as they really were, though unrevealed and unrevealable to man, and the Revelations of those things to man, their Phenomena or *Erscheinungen* to him—man himself, like everything else, bearing both characters, and his knowledge of himself being a knowledge of himself only as an *Erscheinung*.

But it was not against Cartesianism in the shape given to it by Descartes that Kant's theory was directed; it was against the theory which Leibniz had previously deduced from it and erected in its place. Leibniz had previously constructed the Universe out of an innumerable plurality of Cartesian *res cogitantes*, which he called Monads, all differing in quality from one another, of all degrees of qualification and endowment, and all held together in a Harmony Pre-established by a Monad of Monads, whom he called God, and conceived of in the same way as he conceived of the human Soul, namely, as a self-conscious Monad holding together the plurality of lower Monads which constituted its living body or organism. Matter and Space were conceived of by Leibniz as confused perceptions or thoughts of those Monads which were souls. This theory was an Idealism in virtue of its identification of active force or power with consciousness, so reducing the Cartesian *res extensa* to a confused perception on the part of Monads or *res cogitantes*.

In this theory what Kant denied was mainly this—first, that the Monads could be known as they were *in themselves*, and secondly, that Matter was nothing but a perception on the part of the Monads.

Kant's theory was thus essentially a criticism, critical of an existing positive or dogmatic theory; it treated experience as a product of factors, which by virtue of that very way of treating them were conceived of as *in themselves* unknowable. As a speculative theory of the Universe it was, therefore, avowedly and of necessity incomplete. It introduced by its main conception an Unknowable into the Universe.

But after the communication of so powerful a stimulus to thought, by the suggestion of so novel an idea, it was not to be expected that men should rest satisfied with the avowed incompleteness of the theory, its avowed inability to know the ultimate truth of things, things as they were *in themselves*, as well as in their appearances to themselves and others. The distinction was felt to be self-challenging, self-accusing. There must be some sense discoverable, so it was felt, in which Things-in-themselves and their Phenomena were identical. Hence came into existence the various Absolutist and Idealistic systems of philosophy, which sprang successively from Kant's, those of them which obtained the most vogue being those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, Hegel's in particular seeming for a time to command universal acceptance and approval. Among these should perhaps be classed the theory of the late Professor J. F. Ferrier of St. Andrew's, founded by him on the fact, supposed to be at once unambiguous and incontestable, of self-consciousness, and expounded in his well-known and admirably written *Institutes of Metaphysic* (second edition, 1856, Blackwood and Sons).

But 'back to Kant' has now for many years been the almost universal cry in Germany. It is now felt that the absolutist and idealistic line of development of Kant's doctrines was not the true line for philosophy to take, though the readiest and most natural under the circumstances. The cry, however, if it is not to be misleading, must be understood to mean—Begin where Kant began, examine again the facts, not in order simply to adopt, but in order to verify, and in Kant's own sense *criticize*, his distinction between Things-in-themselves and Phenomena. Use that distinction solely as a lantern to the path. The avowedly Neo-criticist system founded on an union of Leibnizian and Kantian principles, by the late Charles Renouvier in France, the latest exposition of which is to be found in his last admirable work *Le Personnalisme*, published in 1903, a year before that veteran philosopher's death, would seem to be an advance in this direction.

Kant founded, it is true, in the first of his three *Kritiks*, a new science which he called Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge; but

he founded it on the hypothesis of several distinct psychological faculties, each of which faculties he left undistinguished from the formal part of the consciousness, of which it was the bearer or the agent. To draw this distinction between the agent or agency and its form, and between both and the resulting consciousness, would seem to be the next problem to be solved by philosophy, in its onward progress from the vantage-ground already gained by Kant. Consciousness stands, or seems to stand, in a twofold relation to realities which are not consciousness, first in the relation of a knowing to its objects known, secondly in the causal or really efficient relation of a producer to its product, or vice versa, or both. The nature of this second, causal, or really efficient relation, which of course includes that of the real producer or Subject, as being one at least of its terms, is what has now to be determined. And in fact we are now witnessing, and some of us assisting in the solution of this problem. Psychology is now taking, even if it has not already taken, rank as a special positive science. I need only point to the appearance, in the January of this present year, of the first number of the *British Journal of Psychology*, and the first article therein 'On the Definition of Psychology,' by one of the Editors, who is also one of our own Fellows, Professor James Ward.

If this step forward from Kant shall be securely and successfully taken, if Psychology shall become established as a positive science, based upon a definite conception of the real agent or Subject, and moving forward, like other positive sciences, by means of hypothesis, the result will be to raise what Kant called Epistemology to the rank of Philosophy in the strict sense of the term, namely, a systematized account of our whole knowledge or surmise of the nature of the Universe, of which we find ourselves inhabitants—a Rationale of the Universe so far as attainable by man. Such a Rationale, supposing it attained, or even supposing its essential foundations laid and secured by the unanimous acceptance of all philosophical schools, would be the logical *prius* of all the positive sciences, physical, biological, psychological, practical. But I need hardly say, there is at present no prospect of an agreement among philosophers upon any set of known facts, which as known facts could serve as the essential foundations of philosophy. There are many and various philosophies, but there is at present no philosophy. It is still engaged in struggling for its *status* and organization. Kant's labours show the enormous difficulties and perplexities attending the attainment of one. Is the taking of the next step forward destined to be delayed till the appearance of another Kant?