i:^ ^ o^ 2^ ^^^ s:^. "^2-
OF TUF. AT
PRINCETON, N. J.
x>o::v_'VTzo:v ois-
■ SAMUEL AGNE\V,
OF PHILADELPHIA, PA.
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Case, Shelf, Jiook,
Divisior Section s
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T H E
Certainty and Necefity
O F
Religion in General :
Or, the Firft
Grounds and Principles o F
umane ^Vitv
EftabliflVd ;
[a Right Sermons Preach'd ac S. Mar- lins in the Fields at the Lecture foi tiic Year 1(^9", founded by tht Honourable ^hcrt Boyle^ Efquire.
Hy ^ trar7cis CLifhell, D. D. Canon ot ChrtpXhurch^ and Preacher to the Honourable Society o^i Lincolns-lnn.
Tf.>e' StcO'/id Edi:iij;i ( orn-iled Tvith fome JJdhh'vs.
L 0 N D O jY^
I'rintcd by T. W. for Tho. Bemtt^ at the Half- Mooa in St. Paul\ Charch-Yard, i ycj .
/
TO THE
Moft Reverend Father inGodTlmmts Lord Archbiiliup of Canterbury.
Sir Henry JJljurJl^ Baronet 5 SiYjohn^)theram, Serjeant atLaw3 JoJ?n Fyelyn Senior. Efquire,
Trufl-ees bv the Appointment of the Hono- rable/<() li £ R 7^ BOTLE, Efquirc
Mojl Reverend and Honoured^
HAving, by Your Appointment, prcachM the follov/ini^ Sermons, and publifli'd them, by your Command; I humbly defire, this Dedication of them to You may be accepted as fome Ac- knowledgment for tliat great Trufb you have been pleafed to' honour me with.
I have notliing to fay for the Perfor- mance, but that I have endeavoured, all I could to proportion my Care to the Subjecl, and DefignofthcLeclurc; and, where the Management is faulty, I have A 2 reafon
The Epiftle Dedicatory,
reaibn to hope that the Evidence of the Truths, I defend, will bear me out.
I have taken the Liberty to Print my Sermons all together, inacontinu'd Dif- courfe, that the Strength of the Proofs there given may appear more plainly from th.eir Connexion.
If it fliall pleafe God to render what I have done, in any degree, or meafure, ferviceable towards the raifmg, or pro- moting a Senfe of Religion among us, I fiiall extreamly rejoyce at my Succefs; and, I am fure, I fhall have my Satisfa- 0:ion encreafed by Your Approbation of my Endeavours, and by your farther Protection and Defence of the fame Caufe, in which I am now particularly eng'iged, and which ought to be the general Concern of Mankind.
lam,
Mofl Reverend and Honoured,
Tour mqfi faithful and obedient Servant^
Franck GaJlrelL
T H E
PREFACE.
i\ every Age of the World^ of which ive have Any Account left us^ the Wicked^ ncfs of M-tnkind has much the large ft /hare tn their Htjlory : and. if we inttrely credited the Complaints of the fever d Ht' jlortans^ who acquaint tu with what paffed m their days, we fhould be difpofed to con- clude^ that thofe particular ttmcs^ of which they write f were certainly much wor/e, than any that went before^ and^ confequently that Vice^having been always grow ing^and gat her - i/igStrength^ as the JVorld advanced in years ^ the Prefent Generation of Men mufi far ex- ceed all their Predecejforsin Wtckednefs. But, tho* I have a very ill Opinion of the Age we now live m, I cannot look upon this Reflex- ion as jufl, and well-grounded.
The true Occafion both of the Obfervation^ and the Complaints grounded upon ity I take to be, that variety of Wickednefs, whereby the fever al Ages^ and Countries of the World have been difiinguiflfdfrom one another. For there have been as many different Metheds^ A J and
ii The Preface.
and, Fajhiom of finning^ among Men^ asForfns of Goziernment \ and as many Changes and Revolutions in Vice^ as in Empire, Some Feriods of Time have been remarkable for open Cruelty^ Rapine^ and QppreJJton ; fome for Treachery^ and private Revenge^ and all thefecret ways of DeJtruBion ; others for Luxury^ and Riot, and all manner rf extra- vagani Lufi, and Debauchery ; At fome Sea- fins Profanfs, and a publtck contempt of Re- ligion have prcvaiPd; at other tiw.es Indif- ference^ and an utter Neglect of all that^s good andfacred ; fo?netimes Hypccrify^and an open pretence to Piety and Virtue have been generality ufedfor a Cover to a clofe andfccret practice of all fort of Vice ; a-nd Jometimes Men have had the Impudence to defend the worfi Actions, by endeavouring to make them appear conftflent with Religion.
Thefe, and manyfuch Differences as thefe are ohfervable in the Htfiory of former times ; hut the peculiar, dijiinguijhing Cha- racter of This Age, is a publick Denial of Religion, and all the Obligations of it, with an. Endeavour, to difprove the Evidences brought for it, and to offer a more rational Scheme of Libertzn/fm. ^Tis true indeed, this ought to be the Plea of all rvicked Men who are refolved to continue in their Vices
and
The Preface. iii
and^ upon that account^ it may be jufily wonder'^ d at^ that the number of Atheijisy and profej} Libertines has not been much greater injormer Ages^ than in this^ in which we pretend to jujter yiews , and Jironger Proofs of Religion than were heretofore known : But ^tisplam^ there never were more than there are now^ to whom thofe Characters do truly belong , what ever jbfter Names they are pleaftd to diflingutflj themfelves by ; and this 1 apprehend to be the reafonoftt. The Scriptures of the new Tejlament^ which are ^ generally^ tn this part of the World, believed to contain the Revelations of God^ are fo plain and particular^ fif^^ and ex- prefsy m the Account they give of the Duties required of Men ^ and of the future Rewards and PunijbmeiUs annexed to the obfervance or breach of them 'j and the World is fo in- light ned now by the great Improvements of Kjiowledge which have been lately made^ f- fpecially by a critical and exact Search into the Defign, and Meaning of the Sacred Wri- tings^ that "^tis tmpojjible for Men of Senfe to reconcile a Profligate Life with thofe Ide- as of God and Religion which they meet with m the Scriptures ; and therefore they find themfelves obliged^ in defence of their Vices ^ ('which they cannot perfvade themfelves to part A 4 with^)
IV The Pretace.
wtth^^ to deny^ not only KcveUtion^ hut all wanner of Religion loo ; (ince^ if there he Any Religion at all, they are forced iO ac- knowledge that rve have the fairefiy and mofl rational Draught of it frefented us in the Writings of the New Tejlament,
This Method of reafonin^ is, noiv^ found to have a Jlronger Influence in quieting the Confcience, and making an til Manfatisfied rvith hitnfelf than any Plea formerly u fed', hecaufe it has a greater fhew of Fairnefs and Sincerity in it : "^tis fo very reafonahle, and honour ahle a thing for a Man to act up to his 'Principles, that wicked Men are eafily difpo- fed to eniertam agood Opinion of the Princi- ples of Irreligion, hecaufe the confrant Agree- uhlenefs of theirPracttce to them makes their Character confiftent, and all of a piece, and gi''^ e them a great Advantage hot h in point of 'Judgment, and Honour, over thoje, who toretend to other Principles, and yet acljufl /ts they do.
But, whatever Preference may he due to fhefe Men upon a companfon of them with tricked Profejfors of Religion J and whate- ver Eafe, and Sat is faction K may afford them, in a continued Courfe of Vice, that sheir 'Judgment and Practice agree together ; Jihmkit may he made very evident, tha(
ihey
The Preface. v
they hive only (ou?id out a rew Artifice to de- ceivethtr/jffh'es ; and r oat all their Reafcnings an KOt only vain a//d froundhjs^ but direlilf oppoftteto the clear e/l Conceptions of Truth^ and Happine/Sy whicij Mankind is capable of.
This is the plain Drfign of the follorving Dtfcourfe ; and^ to render it more effectual for the checkings andputting fame flop to: he reigi'ing Corruption ojthi< Jge^l have focon~ tnvcd it^ as to make it hear with enual Force agatn^ all the Principles nhich can he made ufe of^ tojupport Irrtligton.
I know very well^ that the Folly and Vk- reafonahlemjs of downright Atheifni are fo ma,*itell^ and the pernicious Confeqnences of no Retioion-nt-all^ fo vifih/e in thenfelves^ an.i h.ive^ hefidcs^ been fo j^tflly and largely expojcd alrcaJy^ in many late Difcourfes, that no body will dare to own the Title or Character of an Atheiii, whatever his private Semi- ments may he ; afjd therefore^ 1 have enden- vourcd togive fuch a Proof of Religton^ ai will overthrow all the loofe Principles and Ob- jecfions now commonly made ufe of to eva- cuate the practical Force and Power of it : all which may properly be ranked under the Style of Irreligion, if they will not be allowed to comeundtr that c?/ AthcifiT) ; which ^ as far as we are cjncerri'd to know or do any thing
irk
vi The Preface.
it$ the World^ I take to be much the fame thing '^ as v.' ill more fullj he made out in the Dijcourfe it felf,
'The Beliig of a God u not , indeed^ openly and dincHy queJlio?^'d^ becmfe the The- ory of the 'VfJiverfe camjot he jo eafdy^ and sonvemently explained , without fome fuch Not ten y to which the Nunie of God may be gtusn\ hm^ if what fame Philofophcrsvotich'^ ffitocaiiby the Naj9Je of God be not An in- telligent Iking, or be not the Govemour of the World, or do's not particularly con- cern himfelf with the Adions of Men ; V^ £^ one to m^ whether there be £ny fuc-j Being as God or no : all Hjfothejes concerning the Ori^in^ Duration^ and frefent ftate of the Vi'^orld are then altke^ that is^ they are all e- qualiy ft to entertain our Im agin. it ion s^ and to hel^ us to be infenfible of the Tedioufnefs of livitjg : ivhich^ if the notions of God^ here^ AftiY laid dewn are not true^ is all the Bufnefs we have to do here,
Birtjiill it vpillbe urged^ that, aUomng that Notion of God which 1 have given ^ there are fea\ if any who can properly be f^/Zf ^ Atheifts, bccaufe the generality at leall^ of thofewho are com?nonly thought to dejerve this Name do proftfs to beluve a God. of all thofe Attributes I have ajcnbed to htm^ And to acknorv ledge
that
The Preface. vii
that Men are under jome Obligations of Reli- gion; but^ if we examine all thiir Vri/iciples together , and conf/der the necejfary Confe- qur'fices of thern^ we f\ jail find that they are dtjlin^yuijlfd from Athcifts, by Title and Vrofjjion only^ and riot by any real Difference in their Faith: For the Religion of thcfe Men is nothing clfe^ but a few hone f Princi- ples relating to Jf^ficc^ Friendlhip, and So' ciety^ which are whelly owin^ to their Com" plexion, or Education, and net to their Be- lief of a God ; and the praBical Influence e- 've?i of Thefe coynmonly reaches no farther^ than that particular Set of Mrn^ tn v.}i}ofe Company or hittreds they are mofi ingagedy and is intirely bour> ' d and regulatea by their prefent Eafe , Advantage , or Reputation, and not by any Future Profpecis in another Life ; and thofe of them who feem to admit a. fllture State , when they come to explain, themfelvesy make it fuch a one as Men need have very little regard for in This.
Thefe are all the Principles which the ge^ neraltty of thoje who have lately infulted the Chrijhan Faith do really believe, and aci upon ; thus i4: the fum both of their Faith ^ a,nd Praciice^ however they are pleafed to magnify the Excellence and Perfection of natural Religion , and whatever regard
they
viii The Preface.
they pretend to have for the clear Md, eajie farts of the Chiiftian Revelation.
By Religion, therefore^ I would here be under flood to mean that ivhole Scheme of Hu- mane Duties^ ivefnd delivered in the Wri- tings of the New Tefiament^ as recom?nen- ded and inforced hy ftich a Future State as is there defcnhed ; which may properly he calPd , with refpe^ to the Author of it^ Chriftian Morality. "^Tis tn this Senfe and Extent of the Word that I have endeavou- red to efiablijb the Certainty and Necefli- ty of Religion \ and "^tis pUin^ that the Argument Sy made ufe of for this purpofe^ wiUft no other Scheme hut this^ there being no other Draughty or Model of Life to be conceivedj that would he capable of produ- cing fuch a noble Scene of Happinefs^ as I have fhewn, would be the certain effect oj an univerfal Practice of the Chrifitan Mo- rality.
I have not defended to a particular Defence of fever d Duties^ commonly infijled upon as Principles of n at ur al Religion^ the Reafona-^ blenefs^ and natural Obligtition of which is quefiioned byfome who are willing to lye under 45 few Refiraints as they can ; this^ ^ fy-i ^^ not done^ both becaufe tt was neceffary to give <t general Idea of Religion frjl^ and a parti-'
cular
The Preface. ix
ctiUr ExaminAtion of the fever d Parts of ity ivas too long a Task to come withtn that com^afs of Writing which I tvas confined to ; And becauje I am fully fatisfed^ that it is a, jhorter and better way of reafoning to prove the Truth of the Chriftian Revelation, which being throughly proved^ it ivill follow y that we are to fubmit entirely to the Autho- rity ofit^ and to regulate all our falfe andim- perfect Views of Religion by that mojl per feci Plan which God him felf has given of it in the Scriptures,
^Tisfor the fame Reafon that I have made no particular inquiries into the Condition, ^W Duration (?/o^r Future State, and the Nature ofthofe Rewards and Punifhments which we are to expect hereafter^ nor have offered at any explication of the fever d Diffi- culties which occur in the Doctrine of Divine Providence ; becaufe a full and Satisfactory Account of thefe things can be had no other way than from Revelation ; and in general^ "'tis a fujficient Anfwer to /ill the Objections which may he ra fed from hence^ that t\\Q\'Q is a God ; that there are Marks and Tokens of Wifdom , in the whole Oeconomy, and Courfe of the World ; that Man is made and defigned for Religion, here, \vhile he lives , and for a future State, after Death. //'
X The Preface.
If any of thefe Principles hold^ they all hold ; and no particular Difficulties which do not evidently overthrow the whole Scheme^ can have any force at all. If there be no future State^ there^s no Religion ; // there be no fuch thing as Religion^ there is no fuch thing as Wifdom^ or Deftgn in the Frame and Con- Jiitution of Man ; and if the Jppearances of Wifdom here have no Reality under them^ we jh all have more reafon to dijhufl all the Signs anc\ Tokens ofit^ which any other Parts of Nature can afford ^, and confcquentlj, we can have no proof of fuch a wife and intelligent Being as God. In this Proce/s of Reafoning, we argue upon a full and com^rehenfive I^now- ledge of I he Principles we argue from ^ Lecaufe^ if there be no future Life after this^ we know the utmoft that can he known of the State and Condition of Man : But the fee?/nng Inequa-^ lities of Providence^ in the Condu^i of the Univerfe^ can be no Argument againjl any of the Principles before advanced ; hcc.tufe, while we k^^zve certain Tokens of Wifdom re- maining^ no doubtful Jppearances of the con- trary will be fufjicient to overthrov th€77i ; and all thofe mu'l needs bijj^ rJjcre we c.innot carry our Obfer: at ions to the fart h( ft end of things^ in all the different Points of dijLmce from us ; which is theprefent Cafe.
For
The Preface. xi
For except we were able to take a full and. '?xaII View of the whole Vniverje^ ami all the Relations which the fever al parts of it hear to one another^ "'tis irnpojfihle for us to know^ that fuch or fuch athirig was ill contrived in it\ If we are not fare that there is no fuch thing as a future State^ we cannot condenai the pre font Courfe of Humane Ajjairs as une- qual , or fortuitous ; and mdefs we were throughly acquainted with all the Circumjlan- ces of our Condition in another IVorld^ the jufl Proportion of future Rewards and Pu- nijhf'/jents to the Aclions cf this Life^ and the exact Manner and Methods of God'^s deal- ing with us hereafter^ we can never make it appear from Reafon^ that the Scripture-Ac- count of God's future Appoint fnents for U6 is contrary to the Rules offuflice or Wifdom^ and confequently that our Expectation of a. future State is vain^ fince the moft prohalle Reprefentation we can have of it^ which is that we find in the New-Tejtajnem , is til- grounded.
If therefore^ the General Proof of Reli- gion hereafter nivenfla^sd good^ no p^trti* culat Dijjiculties either in the real Rhccno:ne- na of Nature^ or in the arbitrary Schemes and Hjpothifes of Men ought to hive any weight with us* The next and the only t Li^g
whtcj
xii The Preface.
which remains to he done by us^ is^ that tve fhould fearch md ex Amine into the Scriptures^ and bemg convinced of their Trnth^ {hould fmcerdy endeavour to jorm both our Opinions and Practice upon that moft ptrfect Model of Religion which is there laid down.
!By the fame Author,
TH E Certainty of the Chriftian Revelation, and the NecefTity of behevingit, EftabUfhed j in oppofition to all the Cavils and Infinuations of fuch as pretend to allow Natural Religion, and rejetl: the Gofpel.
Some Confiderations concerning the Trinity, and the ways of managing that Controverfie , The Second Edition, to- gether v-itha Defence of them againil the Objedions of the Dean of St. Fratls,
THE
Certainty and NeceJJfty
O F
RELIGION
In General, isc.
HEB. xi, 6.
He that cojucth to God muft bcliCVe that he w, and that he is a ^warder of them that ddt^ently Jcek^ htm.
F.Hglon has been fo long in Pof-
fellion, fo powerful hath been
its Intiuence, and fo univerfal
its Autho. ity, fo nearly is Man-.
adconcern'din all it promifes, orthreat-
.s, and liich mighty Confcquences attend
'B tjie
2 . The Certainty and Neceffity
the Truth, or Falfhoodof its Pretenfions, that I have often wonder'd, how the Men of thefe latter days, who are at fuch a di- ftance from the firft Rife of things, durft difpute a Title fo well owned and atteft- ed ; the Denial of which is fo dangerous, and which, if it had at firft been falfe, they have no pofTible means left of difpro- t^ing : whereas, on the contrary, the Evi- dences of its Truth are ft ill in being, ftill frefh, and in all their ftrength of Convi- clion : as I hope in fome meafure to make good in the following Difcourfe.
I am very fenfible that I engage in a Subject, which feveral great and learned Men have already, and fome of them very lately, treated of, with the wifeft Refle- £lions, and jufteft Pvcafoning imaginable. But, befides that Truth it felf is fruitful, and a Subject of this nature is hardly ever to be exhaufted ; the fame Objecl may ad- mit of different Views ; there may be new, and more fuitable ways of offering the fame things to the Underftanding ; or old Arguments maybe ftrengthen'd and fenc'd in from the Ob'ieftions which have been formerly raisM againft them, by fome ad- ditional Supports : or, fliould there be no- thing of all this in what I have to fav, vet
of ^lu^ton hi Gaieral. ^
1 think I am juftitvablc in repeating the fame things once more, to the Sliamc and Confufion of thole, who have hitherto been unable to anfwer them , and yet continue in their Sins and Unbelief.
But fince it is not fo much Their Convi- d:ion, (wjiicli nothing, I fear, but unpro- mis'd, irrefiftible Grace can effect) as the fecuringand confirming Others in the Truth that I chiefly aim at ; fmce the en- creafmg and propagating a true Senfe of Religion among Vien, is my principal De- fign, and not a learned Triumph over an Adverlary, I have ordered my Method accordingly, and confequently have made Choice of fuch a one as in the general Ma- nagement of it is different, tho', in feve- ral of its parts, it will be found to fall in with that of others.
The Cert ami j and NccvJJity of Reliyiori^ is, what I undertake to prove, and there- fore I fliall confider Religion in the full Latitude and Extent of the Notion, as it takes in all thofe Obligations which refult from the Nature of Man^ the Bei/jg and ylttrthntcs of God, and the ReUtton in which the one ftands to the other. In tiie profecuting of which Subie6l , I ihall B 2 cliieflv
/\, Tl?e Certainty and NeceJJity
chiefly make Choice of fuch Arguments, as, being taken from what we know, of our felves, and of fuch Objects without us, as we are beft accjuainted with, are moft eafily perceiv^ed by us, and entertain'd with the leaft Pvcfiftance or Sufpicion.
All nice and philofophical Reafonings I fhall forbear, as much as I can ; but, where the Nature of the Subject, or the particu- lar Prejudices of the Perfons to be fatisfied require a more fpeculative and metaphys- eal Account of things, I fliall chufe out iiich Arguments of this kind, as the Un- derftanding may with the leaft difficulty comprehend, and fhall but lightly men- tion fuch, which, tho' convincing to fome,' who are already well ufed to Speculation, may chance to be fufpected, by others, of too much Finenefs, and fo will probably, tho' very unjuftly, create in them a Dif- guft to all the reft. And I fliall all along take a due care to diftinguiOi between fuch Notions and Opinions as are abfolute- Iv necelTary to the Beh^g of Religwa^ and thofe others, which, tho' oftentim.es ufed in the Defence of it, and earneftly con- tended for, are of that nature, that Reli- gion would no waysfuffer, if they fliould prove to be falfe*
* Now,
of ^li^ion in Generd. 5
Now, in order to purfuc my intended Method, with tlie more Clearncfs, I think my fcif obHged in this pkicc togive an ac- count of wdiat I mean by Religion ; a right Notion of which being firft laid down, it will afterwards be eafier to judge, whetlier there be any fuch thing ; and if there be, whether it be reafonable and neceflary, that Mankind fliould be influ- enced by it.
By ReUgion then, in general, I mean all that IVorjhip^ Service^ or Obedience^ which we, who call our felves Men^ ought to pay to Gd?^ ; or whatever we are, in any refpe6l, obliged to upon the Profpect of his Favour, or under the Penalty of his Difpleafure, in this or ^future State,
From whence 'tis plain, that, in order to make it appear, that there is fuch a thing as Religion, we muft prove that there is a God^ or fome fuperior Being, who can, and does c^^^t' M.t?2 to live af- ter fuch a particular manner ; and that M.t;^ is capable of, and a6lually under fuch an Obligation ; the Performance, or Neg- lecl of which, will be attended with very different Confequences, and thofe, fuiH- cient to determine him to act one ^ray, r?tlicr than another.
B 3 D?
6 The Certainty and TSlecelJiiy
But if a Man were defirous of convin- cing fuch Perfons as denied all this, where fliould he firft fet out in his Proof? What Order fliould he give his Thoughts ? Whence muft he take his Rife to prove original Founda don-Truths ? What Evi- dence will be powerful enough to prevail upon thofe, who love a l.ye, and hate to be reform'd ; How are they to be attempt- ed who are ftrongly fortified with their Prejudices, and have liardly left a Man, who would attack them, any Ground to ftand upon ? Such an unreafonable Defi- ance of the common Senfe of Mankind, is juftly thought by the Wifeft Men, to deferve Punifhment, rather than Confata- tion. However, fmce thofe, who are yet innocent, or indifferent, may be corrup- ted ; and thofe who are juft entring upon the ways of Irreligion may be farther ad- vr.nc'd and confirm'd in them by more fet- tled Atheifis^ the fame Care is to be taken for the Security of the former, as fhould be applied to the Convi6lion of the latter, were they judged capable of being con- vinc'd ; and therefore, the Method to be ufed upon this Occafion muft be fuch, as will moft furely deftroy the Pretences of jitheijm^ as well as give the eafieft Ac- county
of^li^ion In General, y
count, and moft undeniable Proof ofT^f- ligion\ that fo the Arguments, made ufe of by the Pcrverters of Mankind, may lofe all their Power and Force upon others, by lofing the Advantage of coming unan- fwer'd.
In order, therefore, to fatisfy thofe who have not quite renounc'd their Reafon of the Truth of Religion, according as I have before defcribed and ftated it • and of the Falfliood of thofe Grounds upon which it is oppofed, I fhall proceed, in tliis man- ner.
F/>/, I fhall give fome Account of the Nitttire of Man, the Nature of God., and that ReUtion which there is between them ; fo far as is necelTary to eftablidi the Notioiu>f Religion,
Secondly, I fhall prove that there is a, God, or a Being of fuch a Nature as is be- fore fuppofcd.
Thirdly, From the Knowledge which,
under the former Heads, ic will appear,
that we have, or are capable of having,
concerning the Jhmmne and Divine Na^
B 4 tures,
8 Tlje Certainty and Neceffity
tures, I ihall deduce a pofitive and direct Proof of Religion,
Fourthly^ I fhall farther evince the Truth of Religion^ from a Comparifon of it with Irreligion^ and the necelTary Con- fequences arifing from thence.
Fifthly^ I fhall confider the Grounds and Pretences of Ir religion ; what can be offered in Defence of it, and what are the ufual Pleas for it •, and from thence fhew the Abfardityand Folly of their Conduct who have no better Reafons for what they Beheve, and Do, than thofe, which they allege, upon Examination, will be found to be.
Sixthly^ I fliall make fome Enquiries into the Caufes of Athetfm and Irrehgion^ or the Reafons which induce Men to take up fuch Opinions. '
Andfliali conclude with a fhort Expli- cation of the different Notions oi Atheifm ^nd Deifm.
L Ftrf^
of ^Itgion ill Gaieral. p
I. ¥trfi then, I am to give fome Account of the Nature of Man, the Nature of God, and the Relation which is between them, fo far as is necefTary to eftabhfli the NotioQ of Religion.
The Knowledge of Rf//^/^;/, as of all other Things whatfoever, muft begin from "the Confideration of our Selves. Now our Exifience being granted , the fame Confcioufnefs which fatisfies us of this, if we carefully attend to what pafTes within us, will farther inform us, that we are ca- pable of T/'Z/^/.v/^g, Perceiving, d.nd /(^noiv- tng ; which Capacity is ufually ftiled Vn- derjlanding : And that we have likewile a Power of A5ling, or not Acting ; that is, we can entertain a r/^c?//g///, ordifmifs iti caufe a Motion, or hinder it, when we have fo determin'*d with our felves, and that barely by determining fo to do ; which general Power, as it relates, botli to thinking and moving, is called the Will.
'Tis plain alfo from the fame Experi- ence, that we are capable of Fleafure and Pain : by which I mean all manner of ^- greeable 2.nd difagrteable Sentiments what- ever, whether caufed by our felves, or occafioned by anv thing without us.
And
I o The Certainty and Neceffity
And upon farther refledion we may find, that Pleafure and Paw, of fbme fort or other, are the firft, and only Springs of AHiofi, which fet all our Powers on work, and give Rife to all our Determinations ; (The obtaining the one, and avoiding the other, being the • continual imployment of the Soul.)
But the particular Reafon., Motive^ or End of any Aftion being always fome- tliingfuture^ and the Views and Profpefts we a£l upon being commonly remote, we are farther convinced, that we may, and often do aft foolifhly, and to our own Prejudice, either by ieffening or difconti- nuing our prefent Satisfaftion, or by bringing more Pain and Trouble upon our felves, than what we already feel ; and that the only caufe of this, is, the diffe- rent reprefentation of things /«/^«r^, fi-om what they are perceiv'd to be when fre- fent^ both in themfelves and in their Con- iequences. From whence we infer, that there is no other way of remedying this Evil, and preventing our being accelTory to oiu' own Mifery, but by reftifying out: Notions of fuch things, as, being future, do not, by immediate Imprellions, afTure us, that they really are, what to us they appear to be. Nov/
of ^ligion in General, 1 1
Now as to the K.nowledge we are capa- ble of in this kind, we are to coriider, what every Man may be fenfible of that will refleft , t'iz. That there are fomc things, which appear with fuch a Light and Clearncfs toourunderftandings, that we cannot poffibly deny our AfTent to them : That in many Cafes, there is not Evidence enough to command our Aflfent, but fo much only, as inclines us to give it one way, rather than another; and this in different degrees. That fome- times we are held in fufpence, by e- qual motives of Credibility, fo that we find it difficult to determine our felves either way: And that many things there are, whereof we have no manner of No- tions at all, and fo can determine nothing concerning them.
And here 'tis farther to be obferved, that what is in its own Nature certain, may appear doubtful to us at one time, and probable at another; and what we AiTent to as probable now, may after- wards command our AiTent as certain : And that in fuch matters, where we can- not certainly determine what is True or Falfe, we may oftentimes be fure, that
we
1 2 Tl?e Certainty and Neceffity
we know as much as can be known of thenij by the Strength of our prefent Facuhies.
But, befides thefe general differences in the ' appearance of things to us, with reipeO: to Truth or Fdjhood^ as Qertcim^ Frohahle^ Doubt ful^ o\' Exceeding our pre- fent reach ; We are moreover to take no- tice of another difference in the appear- ance of things to us, with refpe^l to Aciion^'2i.\\A the confequences of it, Happi- nefs or Mifery, For, it often lb happens, that, where the Truth o^^ thing feems doubtful to us, it plainly appears to be fafer, and more to our Prefent Advantage, or affords a better profpe8: of Future Happincfs, to A61 one way, than another. And abundance of Inftances there are, in which,, we find our felves under a mcelfity di Aciing oneway, or other, where nei- ther fide appears certainly true^ and there the confiderations of ^Mety and Danger muft determine us.
But after all, when we know as much as v^'e can, we find that we are not £- i^u:itl^ dffpofed to clofe with whatevei" is otFered to our (yjotce ; bur that fometimes we are under a nece/Jity of prefer r/ng one tiling, dndrejeciing'dnothQT -^ And, when itij^in our Poorer to deterrnirje our {elv^es^
either
of ^hgion in General. i 5
either way, we cannot always <^(? what \vc IV illy either for want oi^ K.'^owl^^gf^ and .Strength to elfecl what wc defu'c, or be- caufe we are Forced and Overruled, by fome Extrtnftck Violence^ to Acl contrary to what we would, and could have done, ifwe had not been under that Force.
This is all the Account of Humane Na- ture, wliich I thought neceffarytomy pre- icnt Defign of cftabli filing the Truth of Religion : And I perfwade my felf, I liavc faid nothing upon this Subjecl, which any Man, who fairly confults himfelf, can pofTibly call in queftion.
All Qucllions concerning the Origine^ and Sub fiance of the Sout^ its Vnion with the Body^ and fe par ate Extjlence^ I have purpofely waved ; as things which do, in a great meafure, ly out of the Reach of na- tural Reafon^ and, confequently, admit of no certain Proof from the:^^ e \ arc, as com- monly handled, involved in great Ambi- guity of Terms, and, which way foever explain'd, I think, as for as I have hitherto fecn, make no manner of change, either as to the Truth ^ or Nature of Religion.
Whether the Soul be tnfufed^ or deriz'cd^ material^ or immaterial'^ whether it de- pends upon the Body^ in all its A6lions, or
fome-
1 4 TJ^e Certainty a)id TSkceJJity
Ibmetimes a^s ofitfelf\ is dtffolved with it, or exifts after it ; if, what I have faid before concerning our own Experience, be true, it will be found, that Religion has a very good bottom to ftand upon, whichfoever of thefe Opinions be admitted. But, if the Soul came from without the Body^ is of a different Nature from it, can A^i in- dependently of it^ and Exift after its Dif- Iblution, as is extreamly frohable from Reafon^ and very certain from Revelation • then here are fo many additional Argu- ments, for the Truth of what may be mf- ficiently prov'd , without 'em , from plainer and more undeniable Principles ; as I fhall endeavour to make good in the following Difcourfe.
The next Thing I am to do, is to con- fider the Nature ofGod^ or, what that No- tion, or Idea is, to which I affix that Name: which in fhort is this ; An Eternal Being, of all pojjtble Perfe^ions in himfelf, and from whom every thing elfe deriv'd its Being, and whatever belongs to it.
But, to give a more particular Account of my Thoughts in this Matter : I conceive God to be One unchangeable Being ; of an intelligent Nature ; who always nectffarily
Ex'
of Religion in General. \ j
£jc//?f^ofhimrelf; whoKnows every tiling that can be known •, and oin Do every thing that is pofTible to be done ; who does every thing that he Wills, and nothing but what he Wills himfelf ; who enjoys an un- alterable State of the greatefl: Happinels that can be enjoy'd ; who never Wills, or Does any thing inconfiftent with thisStatc- who makes fjtmfe/f the ultimate end or all he does ; and next, to that, the Good^ or Havptnefs of ?i\\fuch Beings^ as are ca- pable of it ; which, together with all other Beings, and every thing that belongs to them, had their Original from him, and depend upon liim for their Continuance • and, lallly, who brings about \\'hatevcr he Wills, orDcfigns by the fittefl: and mod proper Means.
Tliis feems to me to be the eafiefl: No- tion of God that we are capable of concei- ving: and, if it canbeproved, that there really is fuch a Being as is here defcrib'd, I think 'tis all that's necefliiry upon this Subjed, with refped to what I have un- dertaken.
For, whether we reprefent God to our Thoughts as 2Lpire andfimple acf^ ^.Jhiritu- iil6ubfia/7ce^ Qvfubtle Matter \ ^is ihcw/jo/e niAfs^ or Suhfiame of the World^ taken all
to-
1 6 The Certainty and TSleceJJlty
together, or as the Soul and aciive Prin^ ciple of it ; as confirPd to the Heavens^ or dtjfufed through the whole extent of Being ; ^s.thQ Maker and Creator of all things, or as the Principle and Fountain from whence they flowed ; or whether we confider him under any other Idea that our Rea- fon, or Imagination can frame ; if we allow all the Charafters of a Deity before mentioned, 'tis the fame thing, as to Re- ligion, which foever of thefe Opinions we embrace; as will hereafter appear. But, if any of them are urged to over- throw that Notion of a Deity which I have given ; the Proof of fuch a Being, to which that Notion belongs, will be a full and fuflicient Anfwer to them.
Now, as to the Relation which is be- tween God anrl Man, we thus conceive ; That-God is our Creator, and Parent, the Author of our Being and Nature, and of all the Powers and Capacities belonging to it ; and that we are his Creatures^, thojjfue of his Power, and the Workman/hip of his Hands ; that God is our ProteBor, Gover- j7our, and Mafter, and that we are his De- pendents,Subje^^ts, 2.ndSerz>ants ; that God is our Benefa^or and the Author of all our
Happi-
oj l^ligioii in General. \y
Hcippincfs, and wc obliged and indebted o him for whatever we enjoy. All which Relations do necelHirily refult from the Natures of the Beings related ; as will plainly appear, upon a juft Comparifon of them together •, and will be farther ma- ni felled, when we enter upon the particu- lar Proofs of Rchgion.
Sup[X)rmg therefore that I have given a true Account of the Nature of]\Un^ (whicli being taken from Experience, can admit of no other Proof, nor of any greater Cer- tainty : ) the^'SnTy thing remaining to bo done, before I come to the main Argu- ment I proposM, is, to prove,
II. That ihtre is a, God^ or a Being of fuch a Nature as I have endeavourM to rcprefent; whicli is the fecond Thing I undertook.
In difcourfing on which Subje^t^ that t mayexprefs my Thoughts with the more Clearnefs, give every Argument its due weight, and everywhere ^proportion my Building to my Foundation ; I iliall conii- der the Being of God under the differenr Degrees of Poffible^ Probahls, andOr/4///* <^ Firfl,
1 8 Tlye Certainty and Keceffity
Firft then, As to th^Poffthility offuch a Being ; I cannot imagine any Man of fuch an irregular Make of Underftand- ing, as to apprehend that Defcription I have given of a Deity to be ahfurd^ and chimerical^ or to have any Inconftjlency^ or Contradiciion in it. I am fure I have faid nothin,^ but wJiat I very well conceive mv ^t\^\ and what I think, isaseafily con- ceivable by any Body elfe ; and I have u- fed the plaineR: and mofl: intelligible Ex- prefHons, I could, upon this Occafion.
But fluther to aflift the Weaknefs of cur Underftandings, in framing a more diflinft Conception cf God, we will confi- der thefeveral Idea's, of which this com- plex Notion is made, and fee whether they will not fuit very well together.
Now, 'tis plain to any Man who refleds upon the Ideas which are lodged in his Mind, that he has a Notion of T/W and of the feveral Periods of it, which he can place at what t'iftance hepleafesto mea- fure the DLratioFi of any thing by them^ but never, at liich a diftanc e, by all the Addition liis Imagination is capable of, but that he can ftill fuppofe fome Being to exift, both before^ and after • and the Be- ing
of ^li^ion in GencraL i p
ing, before and after which he cannot conceive any Time, or other Being, he calls Eternal.
In like manner, when we confider the Variety of Beings in the World, we are not able to imagine, or fuppole fuch a number of any ofthem, as that there can- not ftili be a greater : and this poffible Va- riety of Things, never to be exhaufted, is ftiled Infinite, And if we can conceive fuch "^n Infinity o^ Things foffihle^ we can conceive alfo a Power proportionable which can produce whatever we fuppofe pofTible to be produced, and a Kjioivledge anfwerable to it, wliich takes in whate- ver can be known ; and ^/^^^ is, whatever can he.
Thus it is that we conceive an eternal^ intelligent Being, of I'jfinite Kjiotv ledge and Power.
And this \Ve do very cafily, witliout fuch Intenfnefs of Thought, and nicety of ALjhncfion^ as may be imagined necel- laryon this Occafion : for v/e find Infinity almofl: in every Thing ; All our Studies, and Enquiries, lead us to this Notion.
As for mftance : When we coniider the Dimenfions o^ Matter^ we lelTen,and mag- nify them, till we are loll: either way: C 2 ^).\^
2 0 T7;e Certainty and Necefjity
and ftill we find our felves as far from any Bounds as when we firft fet out up- on the Search.
In Uke manner, when we turn our thoughts to obferve the Various ktnds of Natural Bodies in the World, the far- ther we advance our Inquiries, tlie more ftill do the Species or Sorts Multiply upon us ; and the pofTible variety of more does proportionably increafe, till, confounded with the growing profpeft, we are con- tent to admire, what, invain, we tried to Reach.
'Tis the fame thing if we contraft our View, and keep within the compafs of o/^e Kjnd or Dtutfwn of Bodies only as Vlants^ Minerals^ and the like, the more differences we perceive in them, the more we comprehend pofiible, every new Mode^ Quality^ OY Relation^ that we take notice of affording an inconceiveable variety of Combinations with thofe ob- fcrved before.
'Tis thus, alfo, in the intelleciual Na- ture. The different Degrees of Kjiowledge^ Porver^ and Happinefs^ which we are con- fcious of, do fufficiently affure us, that we are capable of greater, and greater ftill; and, whatever Notion we can
frames
of ^ligion ui General, 21
trame of our own State, with refpccl to any of thefcQiialiHcations ; from the ut- moft top of what we are arrived to, we can look faither Itill, and conceive }ii2;her Advancements of each kind pofTible, cither in our felves, or in other Men, or at leall in other Beings of larger Capaci- ties; and this, in a continual Rife, with- out any thing to terminate our View.
From whence we are farther enabled to conceive, that God is in(nittely happy ^ as well as infinitely h^nowino and Powerful ; that is, that he enioys all the Happinefs which can pofTibly be enjoyed by any Ca- pacity of being.
Having got thus far into the Notion of a Deitj^ I think, we may with lefs Diffi- culty conceive, that fucti a Being as this (.lid necejfanly exifl ofhimfelf\ that is, that an eternal Being had nothing ^e/(?r6' it, to be the Cd:(fe or yluthor of its Exiflence ; And farther, that he is unchangeable^ or always the fame ; that is, that an eternal Be- ing always is ; and a Being oi" infinite Kjiow- l^^ge^ Power ^ and Happinefs^ is always a- like^ K^nowing^ Powerful^ and Happy,
The actual Produchon of all things^
which arc not God, hy him^ and their De-
pendance 'upon him for their CQUtinuancc,
C I and
2 2 Tl^e Certainty and TSLeceffity
and all other Circumftances of their being, are not Things hard to be conceived by thofe who acknowledge that he can do all things pofTible ; and he who knows every thing, tliat can be known, may as eafily be fuppofed to efFe£l whatever he defigns, by the fittefl: and moft proper means ; and that is, to be infinitely Wife.
And what Other i^f^y^;^, ov Motive can we Imagine that an intelligent Being, of infinite Happinels, flioiild aB upon, but his own free Pleajure ? and who can hin- der the Almighty from doing what he will ; But that the Hai^pinefs of all fuch Beings, as are capable of it, fo far as it is confiftent with the Wifdom of God to grant them the Enjoyment, fliould be very a- greeable to his Good Will and Pleafure, we are not, I believe, difpofed to doubt.
And this compleats the Account of the NAttrre of God which I gave before in fliort,and liave now examined over again, more particularly.
From all which, I think, it may fafely be concluded, that the Ide^^ we have form'd of a God^ is no Chimera^ or extra- vagant rvork of the Imagination^ but a very fojjible confiflent Notion ; and that thofe,
who
of %itgion in General. i ^
who aiTlnTithat there islbmcfuch Btinp^^ to which this Ida belongs, cannot be cen- fu red for vain incoherent Thinkers, who have put things togetlicr without any Ground, or Warrant from Reafon.
How far the bare Conception of fuch an Ide^^ as that, which we liave framed of God, or the meer Poffibilityoi (\xch.2i Be- ing, does, without the Affiilance of other Principles, prove the Reality of his Ex- ijlcf/ce, I fhall not here examine. The Arguments drawn from hence, tho' in themfelves, perhaps certain^ to feveral Perfons coHvi/icnjf^ and not to be Mfp.^o- •ved by any, do not fit every Undcrftand- ing ; nor have that regular unit ''r.-a F^ce of Truth, which takes at firft fight, is well as pleafes after firther Examination : on- ly thus much I fhall alledge, in their De- fence, that the grcai:e{V, and commoneil: Objection, made againft this kind of Proof, is very ill grounded.
It is not true indeed that whatever is poffible, or whatever we have any Idea of, for that Reafon .zf///.f^V is; and therefore 'tis urged, that the ^c?//^/ Eje//?^';^^^ of a God docs by no means follow from the Poljibihty or Conception of fuch a Being: But then it is anfwered that the Conclu- C 4 fion
14- The Certainty and 'Keccffity
fionmay and does hold in this Cafe, and in no other whatfoever. Becaufe Con- cepion Aippoies Fcjlbiltty^ and Poffibtltty a CorrefpO'^'Avif Power \ and a Poiver of E:>cijhir^y when applied to fuch a Being as God, muft neceilariiy infer JB-ual Ex- ijlence ; but the unufual Nicenefs of fuch a Proof as this being likely to raife fome Prejudice againft it, I fhall wave the Pro- lecution of it ; and, to cut off all Colour of Advantage from fuch as are difpofed to cavil, I fhall content my felf at prefent with having fliewn that 'tis i^fr^poffible and conceiveable^ that there may beTnGod ; and pafs on to the next Enquiry I am to make, whether it be not very probab/e that there ii one.
4- comj^on Argument for the Being of a God, (and 'tis never the worfe for being common) is the generd Concurrence and Agreemcrit ofMankind'm the Acknowledg- ment of this great Truth. We will con- fider the Argument it felf, in its full Strength, and then fee, what fairly follows from it.
The Sum ofwhatrnxsy be faid upon die firil, is this : That all Accounts and Rela- tions ohhii trefint- State ofthe Workl, and
of ^Itgion In GnicraL 15
all the Hiftories o^'pafi Ages which are now extant do agree in alTiiring us, that, fmce the firft Memory of Things was preferv- ed, till now, there was no periodot Time, nor any Nation under the Sun, in which the Being of a God was not acknowledg'd and believed by a 'vaji Generality of all who were then and /^//erc living.
And farther, that not onh' the gi*eateft part o^ Mankind^ taken in grcfs, and the grcateft part of every Nation^ confidered asadiilincl Society of Men, were of this Belief, but the greateft pi;v of every Se^ or Divtfion^ as they ftand diftinguifli'd by their different Opinions in other things ; their different Capacities ; Inter efts ; i'^^ajs^ and Manners ofThinkin({ ; as, the Learned and /(^^or^^//^ ; thofe who had exrjnined the Point, and confider'd the Reafons for and againft it, and thofe who had it only propofed to them, without any proof either way, but wliat was imrnediately offerM from the nature of the thing ; the Mahometan^ and Idolater^ who add abfurd things to tlie Nature of God, as w^ell as the Jew^ and Chnftian^ who think more confilf ently of him ; thofe who hold the fVorld to be Eternal^ or made by Chance^ a* well as thofe who look upon it as the
Eftecl
l6 The Certainty and TSleceJJhy
Effect of Wifdom ; thofe who explain the
Works of Nature by Mechmicd Powers^
and thofe who in their Account of the Sy-
ftem of things make ufe of Intelligences^
2iT\A Ahfir acted Notions : not only the i^f-
Ugious and Superflitious^ and fuch as ex-
peO; that any good or ill Confequences
Ihould attend their Belief of a God, but
thofe, whofe other Opinions declare that
they have nothing at all, or very httle, to
hope or fear from a God, as the Epicurean^
tlie Sadducee^ the Hobbift^ and the Deiji :
and laftly, all {oiXso^rvtckedMenj who are
uneafie under the Thoughts of a God,
and endeavour to jTiake them off.
Thofe few who in different Ages of the World, have oppofed the common Belief^ have had no Folic wers ; and feveral of them, at the Se?f-^»as of greateft Seriouf- nefs and Recolledion, liave renounc'd the Opinions which they maintain'd at loofer hours : fo univerJ^Hy has the Opinion of a God obtained amonc; Men 1
From whence I think thus much at leaf]: may be fairly inferr'd, That fuch a Per- fwafion, as this, is VQvy frttable to the Vnderfimding^ and agrees very well with all the Principles of our K^norvledge : and, therefore, tho' it could not be certatnly
proved
of ^ligwn in Gcuenil. 2 7
proved to fcHow from tho{c evidef^t Per- cepttons that we have oK other Truths ; ycL, h-.^ing rcadilv entertained by our Reafon, without any OppoHtion from them, it muft, upon this Account Oiily, be extreamiy probaLle^ and worthy of belief.
For fuppofe it to be an Error ; what can we aflign tor the Cau/e of fuch an umverjal Error ?
'Tis pofTiblc indeed, that the Generality of JSUnkrad may be deceived, in a Judgment founded upon the Reports of »S>;2/^, or Ima~ gindtton ; they may beheve that the Sun is very near oftheHune bulk in which it ap- pears to the Eye, when 'tis many times bigger than the Earth ; or that it moves, when it ftands (Hll ; or, if they do not be- heve Wrong, in either of thefe JPoints, there may be fomething elfeoffuch a Nature fuppofed, in which all Mankind m.ay be miftaken ; as moft of tiie Learned think that the rell: of the World are, in both thefe Judgments. But the Notion of a, God, is Matter of pure Thought, and Reafon, in the Conception of which Senfe, and ImAgtncLtion have no fhare : and therefore, it can never owe its Original to them.
There
iS The Certainty and ISlecefflty
There is nothing in the Idea of God, as I have endeavoured to defcribe it, v/hich falls under the cognizance of our Se?ifeSj nor is any Man confcious to himfelf, that he has perceived God at any time this way. For v/hich reafon, xh^fenfible re- prefentations that are made of the Detty may occafion a great variety of Errors concerning him ; but it cannot be inferred from hence, that thofe Notions and Opi- nions of a God, which are purely intelk- Bual^ and in which all Men agree, pro- ceed from the fame Fountain as thefe ad- ditional Errors do, in which they differ very 'much, and confequently that thofe may be, in their own nature, as falfe as thefe, tho' they are not yet difcovered to be fo. This I fay, will by no means fol- low, becaufe the difference of the repre- fentation, in this latter cafe, proves an incapacity in the Faculty^ to perceive the objecls about which it is employed ; whereas in the other fuppofition, where all Men conftantly think alike, concerning Objefts not perceivable by Se-rife^ 'tis a certain fign that their Ideas are fuitahU And proportionate to the Faculty which per- ceives them ; and therefore, 'tis very pro- bable alfo, that they are truly forted, and put together, 'Where-
of^ligion in GeneraL 29
Wliere-ever there is '3igemrdjgreeme?it in the Perception^ there is certainly an V- mformity in the Affetimnce ; whicli is as necelTary to make an univerfd Error^ as an umverfd Truth ; and, therefore, fup- pofinganMcnmiftaken, about the Bulk^ OY Motion o'ithi^ Sun, it neceffarily follows from hence , that, whatever appears to the Serije^ in this Cafe, appears the fame to all Men : But then we need not have made any Judgment at all concerning ihcCc Jp^ peara/iceSy oftered to our Se^/e ; becaufe fcvcral Rcquifites to a jufl Ser/fation are wanting , without which , we know, that we are incapable of judging with Al- furance ; and tho' we aredeceivM for the prcfent, by judging too haftily ; our Opi- nions concerning thefe things may be af- terwards altered, and correfted by Rea- jon ; which, being a Faculty fuperior to Senfe^ may preferve us from the lUufions of it.
But when all Men agree in Matters of pure Refiec^ionAnd Reajon^ we have all the Ailnrance wh.ich we can have, that they are in the right, Becaufe, in this Cafe, we are certain, not only that the J/'/>f4r- a//ce Ls uniform^ but that the Faculty is employed about its proper Object And
if.
^o The Certainty and TSleceJJlty
if, the Underftanding fhould be deceived in fuch things as fall within its own imme- diate cognizance -, there is no higher FncuL ty to coiTe8: the Miftake : How, then, can we imagine the Minds of Men to be fo difpofed as to be under a Neceffity of he- ing deceived ? which they muft be, if a conflant nniverfd AffenrAnce of Truth fhould be only the Veil of Faljhood,
But here, perhaps, it may be faid, that where the Evidence is not fo ftrong as to conm^and our Affent ^ Error may carry the Face of Tr/ah^ tho' we have not yet been able to difcover the Cheat ; and therefore, 'tis our own Fault if we are; deceived in fhts inftance, as well as in thofe of Serfe, fince we are not under a heceffhy of giving our Judgments accord- to the Appearance. To wliich I anfwer, that, allowing a We Poffihilityo^ Erring^ in the prefent Cafe, all that I defign'd to prove from this Argument o^ General Con- /e;?/^ holds good ftill; which is, that, be- caufe all People have agreed to acknow- ledge a God, 'tis therefore very probable that there is one, and very^ agreeable to the Reafon of Mankind to believe there is : fo that, altho' a Man is not from hence/////v convinc'*d of the Certainty of it, he cannot
help
of Religion in General 3 i
help believing that it is a very reafonable O- pinion, and that thtrc's verj/grrat iikelu /^f^^^of its being built upon /'^re Founda- ttons^ tlio' lie has not yet fearch'd fo far as to difcover them. For he cannot give an Account, how all Men fhould come to be miftaken in a mruter of this Nature-^ and, if they were, how they could ever be undeceived ; which may be done, in all the Inftances of ^enfe^ or Imagination^ in which any Error can be judg'd fof- fible.
All that can be farther fuppofed to countenance a Sufpicion, is, that, pofli- bl}', there was a time when Men believed ot'herrvife ; but, fome People having ftart- ed fuch an Opinion, and drefi: it up very plaufibly, it took mightily in the World, and fo was handed down from one, to a- nother, and, in fucceeding Generations, fpread and prevaiPd, 'till it became um- verpil. But there is no manner of ground for fuch a Suppo futon,
I. Becaufe, let us look as far back as we can, there are no M/irks or Footjleps to be found of the Rtfe and Onginal of this Opinion, no gradual Propagation of it dif- coverablc, it being, in every Age^ that we hav^e any account of, as umvirfally belie- ved, as it is nvn\ 2. Be-
^ 2 The Certainty and TsleceJJity
2. Becaufe no fardllel Inflame can be afligned, which might give any colour for a fufpicion in this ; no Perfwafion of the hke nature, having ever been detected to be an Error ^ after fo long, and fo wide an Eftablifliment.
I do not know of any Opinion whatfo- ever which ciciudly obtained fo umverjd a Belief 'ds that of a God, and afterwards was proved to be falfe ; and 'tis very dif- ficult to imagine how fuch a thing fhould cciiie to pais : However, I can conceive and allow it to be polhble, that a mifta- ken matter of Fa^l^ or a con]eciural Hyfo- thesis of fomething belonging to natural Kjiowled(je^ may, atfomediftanceoftime from its firft appearance in the World, be pretty generally beheved as certain ; and aftCi "wards by a Difcovery o? frejh Ctr- cumfiance. la the one, or making ne^v Ob~ fervations about the other ^ a great part of Mankind may come to be of another Opi- nion, of the Truth of which they may be much furer : but an Error in matters of this nature cannot prove the Poffibility of a Mijtake in the Cafe in quiflion, Becaufe the notion of a God refults from common Refle- xion and Reafoning, and does not depend upon any, fuch Particular Circumftances of
Time^
df ^ligion in General, > ^
Time or Fl^tce^ or any other External hell^s^ and tnlhuments of Kjiojv/edge^ by wliich the Learned have fometimes made new dilcoverics in the Cafes before mentioned.
All the Objervaiions of Senfe^ upon which the Beliefof aGod is founded, lie open to every ALtri^ and are the fame now that they ever were ; and the Inferences drawn from them arc "very eajie^ and with- in the reach of common Capactucs. If fomc h.ave refined upon them, and carried their Rcafonings much farther than o- thers, it has been only to fatisfie the un- warrantable Scruples^ and Sufpicions of a few Pretenders to Lejtrntng^ who make ufe of that little Knowledge which they have, to argue, themfelvcs out o^ all. But the Generality of Mankind^ both Learned^ and Ignorant, have {o firmly believed, a God upon the fir ft plain obvio.'is grounds of Af- fent,as not to require^ orfband in need of farther Satisfaction ; and, therefore, their J'aith cannot be owing to the plaufible Co- lours, ov jpdcious Keafoning^, of any//y? Inventors o^faljd Notions and Opinions.
But, after all, allowing the Suppofitioii to be true, (which I think impoflible ) that there was a time, in M'hich God was
D ;?<»
54 77;f? Certainty and Neceffity
no jvhere acknovi^ledged in the World ; whoever invef/tedtliQ Notion^ whatever were the occafions of its beiftg firfi: Started or the Arguments^ upon which it was jirfl beheved, the Propagation of it after- rvardsy and the Conflancy and Vniverfality of the Belief ever fwce^ muft have Sprung from the Agree ablenefs of fuch an Opinion to the common Reafon of Mankind^ and to all their other Knowledge, and from the Strength and Sufficiency of thofe Reafons^ upon which it \^norv^ and has been^ long received. For all ^^ fir ft Arguments and Grounds of believing it, if they were any other than what we Jiave now, and which have been tlie fame in all Ages, whereof any Knowledge is left us, have been all loir, and, confequently, their Influence hath been fpent,long ago: neither, in any of the ancient Diilourlesj)'^/^ extant^ concern- ing the Being of a Gody is there any Ap- peal made to Authority ^ or Antiquity ; as if Men were obliged to believe this Truth, bec'aufe it was foantient, or becaufefuch, and fuch eminent Ferfons had firfl: recom- mended, or enjoyned the Belief of it : But all the Arguments made ufe of are wholly built upon the Nature and Neceffity of ths things which are always the fame ;
and
of ^li^ion in General, 3 5
and therefore have the fame plain Rea- JToiii for the Being of a God, always hat! the fame Influence, and they will upon Examination, be found to have no Art or Sophillry in them, and every body that pleafesmay examine them.
Nothing then remains, but to enquire into the Force, and Validity of thofe Rea- fons, upon which our Belnf of a God is originally founded.
I fuppofc it now but a probable Perfira- fto?2^ arifing from that Readincfs and Af- furancc of AlTent, with which we em- braced this Truth, and yielded to the firjl obvious Proofs of it, upon a bare Pro- pofal of them to the Underftanding ) in which Perfwafion we are very mucli con- firm'd by knowing, that all Mankind have conllantly agreed with us in it ; being fully fatisfied from hence, that no Peculiar Temper of Mind^ or Scheme of Thoughts^ no private Intereft^ or national Byajs^ has difpofed us to make this judgment, but fomcthing corn?no?t to the ivholc humane Nature,
Upoa thefe grounds have the Geyierality
of the World always believed in God ; and
tho', to a nice Examiner of things they
D 2 ma^'
J 6 Tl?e Certainty and TSleceJfUy
may not appear Strong enough to Create certain irreftjlible Conviction^ yet are they fufficient to juftify 2ifull and entire Ajfent^ and to warrant our ^c?/;^^ according to it. For to fufpe6l a thing to be falfe, and to a^ as if it were fo, upon a bare imaginable Foffibility that it may be fo ; or rather, becaufe we have not received the highefi degree of Proof which the thing is, in its own Nature, capable of, when, at the fame time, w^e have no manner of Rea- {qw to diftruft that evidence we have ; can be i\Qii\\tv rational^ prudent^ novfafe.
However, fmce there are Perfons, whofe Aciions^ and (at leafb, fret ended) Opinions come up vo ^his Character^ we will confi- der the common Proofs of a Deity more clofely and throughly^ and fee if, what up- on the iirft View appears fo probable^ and makes f^ftrong an Impreflion upon the Mind, may not, upon farther Examina- tion, iirike us with fuch Certainty and Power of Conviction as we cannot refifl:, without queftioning all our other Know- ledge, and difclaiming all manner of Di- ftinciioii between Truth and Falfhood : which is,
The
of ^hgion in General, 57
The Third Confidcratlon I propofcd in treating of this Argument : Whether it be, not only2.pofJible^ or probable Opinion that there may be a God ; but a certain and infallible Truth that there is one.
All the common natural Arguments and Reafons; upon which the general Belief of a God is founded, are taken from thex^///- hle frame of things^ called the Worlds and from thofe {Q\cx2i\ parts of it,which fall un- der every man's Notice and Obfervation ; upon a flight Survey of which, any man who is in the Icafl: capable of Refle8:ion, where ever his Thoughts light, will /'er- t^/i/f or imagine that he perceives, plain Marks, andTokens o'tPower^ and ]Vifdom^ much of the fame kind, tho' in proportion far greater than ever he has obferv'd in any of the moft wonderful Effects of /^aw^//^ Skilly and Stre}7gth'^ the immediate Re- fult of which, I believe, would be this Conclufion, That certainly there is /^wp Beings exceedingly more powerful^ and knowing than Man^ who w^as the Author^ a,nd Contriver of this fl:upendous Fabrick.
And, if Admiration^ and Curiofitj^ in-
yirchim to farther Enquiries, (as'tisdif-
D I ' ficult
j 8 Tl^e Certainty and Ncaf/ity '
ficult to fuppofe they fhould not,) the Compafsy and Extent of the whole Work, the Variety of Obje£ls in it, the Ccnfi.ixcy^ and Vmformity of fome Appearances, and the regular Changes^ and Revolutions of others; the Connexion^ and Dependance of the feveral parts ; the Vnion^ and Con- federacy of multitudes, of different kinds, towards fome common Production ; and the 'various^ particular^ Ends and Vfes of things, all ajfiflant to one another, and Juhfervtent to fome opener al Defign ; all tbefe, I fay, well confiderM, and weigh'd together, would ftrengthen, and confirm his former Judgments, and farther dif- pofe him to conclude, That the Author of all thefe Inftances of Power is able to do whatever elfe can be conceived /'^y^^/f, nothing elfe conceivable feeming more difficult to this Inquirer than vv^hat he fees already done ; That a Being of fo much Knowledge, as his Works declare him to be,fo vaftly exceeding.^V/'s, is able to do Things, which are far above Man'^s, Reach, and Comprehenfion to conceive at all ; And that he who has fo wifely Or- dcr'd and difpofed every thing he has made to the mofl: proper Ends, has there- fore excrcifed jiis Power^ fo far, and no
farthei\,
of^ligion in General. 59
fiirthcr, becaufe It was moft agreeable to his Wifdom fo to do.
There Is nothing, I think, in all this, but what is eafie, and natural, and what may very well be imagined to be found out, without the help of much Learning, or an extraordinary Talent of Reflexion ; and yet, this is what has conftantly, in all Ages, fatisfied both the Learned, and the Thoughtful^ and ftood the Teft of T/wf, s.nd Sophiflry^ and Malice,
But fuppofe,y^wf extravagant Thinkers^ entirely under the Government of their ^enfes and Lu(ls, (hould diftruft all their reafonings of this kind, and, becaufe they were not bye, when the World was made, and do not fee tiic Hand which fupports the Frame, and moves all the feveral Wheels of it, fhould therefore doubt of the Being of a God, notwith- ftanding t\\Q.Teflimony of Nature ; is there no certain Proof to be given, that we arc not miftaken who believe a God upon thefe Grounds? Several have already ffiewn that there is, and this is what I fhall at prefent endeavour to make good, in the clcarefl: and mod: unexceptionable manner that I can.
D 4 No\^
^o Tl?e Certainty and KcceJJity
Now, Certainty or Evidence (which 1 fhall all along take in the fame Senfe) is fuck a frm well-grounded Jffent^ to the Truth of what we perceive, as excludes, not only all manner of doubt, but all con- ceivable poffihi lay oj a Mijlake : And thus, I fuppofe, and take it for granted, that we are certain of all our own Perceptions and Senjations, whatever we feel or ai'e confcicus to our felves of; and that we are fully, and undecivably allured of a great many of our 'Judgments, founded upon the juft, and well-regulated Reports of our external Senfes^ to the fame degree as we are of the Agreement and Difagree- ment o{ 2inY pure intellectual Ideas.
Except this be allowed, we have no JPrinciples to reafon from, nor indeed any I^norHedge at all, not fo much as Scepti- ctfm ; but univerfal Darknefs and Confu- fion cover humane Nature : But he who grants thus mucli, and is true to his own lieafon^ mull acknowledge that /"Atr^ is a God ; as will appear from the following Coniiderations.
Being then, as I fuppofe, by an infalli- ble Conjctoufnefs, fatisfied of our own Ope- rations^ and Extjhnce, and, by various, Inzfreljions^ made upon certain Organs of '' ■ ' ' the
of ^U^ion in General, 4 1
the Body, fully convinced of the reality of things without us ; upon fartlicr Ohferva- tion and Reafomng wc come to thcfe cer- tain Conclufions :
That there are a great many Changes in the World; That a great m^Luy new Appea- rances prefcnt themfelvcs to us, which, before, were no where to be found ; and that others go off, and difappear, the rife and original o: which we never knew ; That, under all thefe Changes,2.nd Varieties of Appearance, there is fome- thing, confiantly the fame, which we call Matter, or folid extended Suhjlance ; That the different Appearances in Matter, which our Senfes inform us of, proceed imme- diately from the Differences of Bulk, Number, Figure, Motion, or Reft ; That we are confcious of feveral things in our felres, which we perceive to be different irom all thefe ; Tliat we were not always thus confcious, but that there was a time, when this Confcioufnefs began, and when all that we percerje in our felves as di- ftinci from Matter, (which we call Mind or Spirit,) v/2isRr(]: joined d.nd united to a certain portion of Matter, called humane Bddy ; That , when this humane Body changes its Appearance , and fuch a partis
cular
42 T7;^ Certainty and Nccepty
cuh-vVnion of the parts of it is dtffolved^ then that Confcioufnefs^ and all thofe in^ ternal Operatiom^ which are now the Ob- je8: of it, ceafe to be joined with that Matter which they were juft before united to.
Being well affured of the Truth of all thefe Conclufions^ we are immediately led to thefe following Enquiries. ' From whence arife all thefe things? How came there to be fach a thing as Mat^ ter ? When and by what means , did It begin to exift f What is the Caufe of all thofe {wccf^i^QChanges in it? And why does it exilt after fo many dtffere-nt man- ners'^ Whence are we our felves ? What was it that gav: us fuch confctous Beings ; Hq)v are they united to our Bodies ? what limits the Cc fitinuance, and afterwards diffolves the Bond of this wonderful V- nion ?
Now, in purfuit of thefe Enquiries, we find it utterly inconceivable^ and />/- foffihle that any thing fliould make it felf-^ that a Beings which once did not exift, fhould begin to be, of it felf\ without the A0iftaace oH fame other Being which <^xifl:ed hefcre it : From whence we are
irre^
of (^cli^ion in General /j. ^
irrefipbly conviiic'd that fomcthing miift be eternal \ fuice otherwifc , nothing could ever have been : for, if any Time can be fuppofed, in which Toothing did exift, nothing would ever have exifted unlefs tljAt^ wliich once was 7iot^ could raife it Jclf into Being ; but this is im- foj/tble^ and 'tis certain that fomething now really />, therefore fomething muft be e- ternal.
And, as, from hence 'tis evident that fomcthing muft he eternal^ fo, 'tis plain from tht/e ver/il Changes which wc obferve in the World, from the SuccefTion o^new confctous Beings^ and from the different Difpofitions of Matter^ that Every thing IS not eternal ; now, if fomething be eter- nal, and a great many things are not eter- nal, then it plainly follows, that every thing which is not eternal^ was derived from that which is ; ( /. e. ) originally re- ceived its Beings and whatever belongs to it, from fome eternal Author or Cauje : becaufe, if it had not, we muft fuppofe, either that fomething made it jelf\ which before is fhewed to be impoffthle-^ or,that one temporary Being produced an other^ which it could not do, but by the Force and Efficacy o'ijuch Powers, which, together
witii
44 ^*^^ Certainty and Nchffity
with its Exijlcnce^ it received from fome other temporary Being, and fo on, till we come to fome eternal Fountain o^ all Power, and Being,
The only Queftion then is, What is e- ternal ? for upon this depends the Refo- lution of all our other Doubts and Enqui- ries : and for our better and m-ore certain Satisfaction in this point, I fliall,
Firft, Confider all the Claims and Pre- tensions that are made to tliis glorious Pre- rogative oi eternal Exiftence :
Afterwards, I fliall examine what thofe Attributes are which muft necejfarily be- long to an eternal Being :
And then fhew that that Being to which thefe Attributes agree, is what v/e call Gody and that there is no other Being which /^, or can he veiled with the like Characlers.
I. Firft then. As to the Claims dind Pretenfions to eternal Exiftence : thele, I think, are all the Suppojlttons that can be made.
Eeitherthat Matter alone is eternal.
Or that Mind alone is eternal.
Or that Mind and Matter are both eter- nal. But
of^h^ion hi General. 45
But Matter may be confidcred under tliree different States.
For either we imagine it as having con- tinued from all Eternity in one entire folid M.ifsy without any Dijtinciion^ or Motion of its parts.
Or we confider it as loo[e^ and dnjtded into innumerable little Particles^ all in conftant Agitation or Motion. Out of which quiet Majs, or Moving Atoms^ the prejent frame of things was, in time, ftruckout, T^vAfornPd.
Or eife we muft fuppofe that it has eter- nally exilied under tliat for?nj which we now call the World^ which, mth^ princi- pal parts of its Struciure^ was always the fame, with a confiant Succeffion of feveral of the chief Species^ or forts of things in it.
There is nothing elfe imaginable^ but an eternal iSttccejfion of nerv Worlds^ and r.e^v Species of Beings in them ; which is an Opinion too extravagantly abfurdto be owned by any body : Bccaufc, who ever affirms tliis, muft be obliged to grant, either that every new World makes itfelf^ (wh'ch IS a contradi6lion already explo dedj or that what he (alls 7i€w lVorld\ are
only
46 7l^c Certainty and NeceJ/Jty
only fo many ^eiv Forms, all owing their produ^lion to fome common pimt^le^ which is Eternally the fame ; and fo tlie notion falls in with fome of the other be- fore mentioned.
2. But, which of thefe Hypothefes has Truth and Certainty of its fide, is the next thing to be enquired into ; and the beft way to determine it will be by confider- ing the neceffary Attributes, and Chara6:ers ofan eternal Being .
It has been proved already, from the frefent State of things, that all Beings, which exift in Time, muft be made by fomething which was eternal, becaufe vit was impoffible that they fhould have exited any other way : The fame will now appear a priori from the Nature of an eternal Being, the infeparable CharaB- ers of which are, neceffary Exifience, and all pqffible Ferfeciion ; both which are in- cluded in the A^c)?/^;? ofan eternal Being, and do evidently infer each other ; For an eternal Being muft exift necejfanly, and have all pofjible VerfeUion ; and whatever exifls necejifarily muft alfo have all poffible Ferfeclton ; as whatever has all poffible Ferfe^ion rnuft extfi neceffarily.
An
of Religion in General. 47
An eternal Being mnft exifi Kecejfariiy bccaiife it exifts ofitfelf\ for it ahv/iysrvas what it //, it aln-nys had the fame Nature wliich it has, and therefore tlierc dwAjs was the fume Reafo^, that is to lay, the fawe necelJity for its cxifting. This is too evident to need a farther Proof.
The otlier neceffary Charafter of an eternal Being is, that it has nllpofjible Per- fc[iiofi \ that is, that there is nothing con- cervable^ or in the Nature oi^thmgs poffii?le whieh added to it would give it any Jd- uantagey or, in any hw^c^ render it mar? perfeii than it is.
This is plain fi'om the very Notion of Foffihtlity which implies is a Power fome- where correfpondent to the utmoft Ex- tent^2.ndCap.uny o^thingspo/fible •, (6 that to fay a thing is pofJibU, is to fay that there is fome Power capable oi produci/i& or having it ; and, therefore, if you fup- pofe an eternd necejfary Being to wan/- anv Perfection, what is imagln'd to be w.tnti//a to it muft be, for that very realbn, iw- poffible ; for, it cannot be conceived to want what it is in its own Power to have, and it can receive nothing which it has not from my other Being ; becaufe no other Being oi'f^reater Power is conceiz-ab/e, not a
Umpo^
48 The Certainty and Neccffity
temporary Beings becaufe the Extftence and Terfeciion of all temporary Beings are de- rived from that which iseterndy not an eternal neceffary Being, becaufe this which is fuppofed imperfeci^ is us much an eternal neceffary Being as the other^ and therefore muft have all the fame PerfeBions, For why fhould the Perfedions of the one be limited and thofe of the other not ? And whence fhould this Impotence proceed in one eternal neceffary Being which was not in another, when neither of them has any other Principle of its Exifience and Ptrfecfion but its felf ? There can be no difference afligned or imagined be- tween one eternal necejfary Beings and another ; and therefore wherever thele attributes are found they muft be ac- companied with all pffihleferfe^ion.
5. Now i^ fome thing certainly hceter- naly and necejjary Exifience^ and allpojjible Ferfe6lwn^ be the ejfential Characters of an eternal Beings (as has been proved,) then this eternal Bemg muft be what we call God -J the CharaBers z.nd. Attributes o{ an eternal Being belonging to Him^ and to no other^ as will eafily appear, by applying them fir ft to that notion which we have
framed
of ^ligioii in Gcncvdl. ^c^
Framed of God and afterward'* to tlic fcvcral Hypothiffs before mentioned.
That knowledge Paver, and P/f.if//re^ are Perfections, cannot by us Men be doubted of, who can frame no Notions o'i any other, and who meafurc the /;6?(?^- ^^efs and perfection of every thing cije by its Almijtry and Subftrviency to tljefe, fo ^ti to conclude that, were there no ik'ings wiiich in joyed tijefe PerfeBtons, there would be no diflerence between a regutar Wortd, and a Chaos ; or between Mul- tiplicity, and Variety of iieing, and eter- nal unfjcr fat Nothing.
Thefe, therefore, muft be t\\{iPri?icip.il Characters of an eternal Being ; and lu^ Kjw)v ledge. Power 3.nd Happinejs, mullbj copnn/enjurate to his Exi/tence, that is, e- tcrnal ;^£'C(?//'^r)/(^ialifications,boi.iKled on- ly by /j/^-y^/t-//; and, whatever elfe is ynade by this eternal Being, as 'tis proved that e-
ofe Beings w hicii a re capi being no other end, upon which Jiich a Be- ing, as we here fuppofe, cdn ac7 ; and all iiis iVorks mull cany the Marks of their Afithor upon them, that is,- be fuch a> arc lit for a Being of thofe glorious ^a- V. UficatioK^
^o Tl^c Certainty- and Kcccjfity
lifcAtions to make , and defign for fudj Ends.
Thus rnay the whole Idea of God, as it is before defoibed, be eaGly made out, by fofitive direci confec^uence, from the Prwct- pies juft now laid down, and prov'd ; as plainly appears from the nature, and extent of the Frtnciples themfelves, and from //'(^ Inftances which I have given, in the chief, and moil: dijlinguijhing, moft contefied CharaO:ers of the Deity.
But I am fenfiblc that this way of pro- ving a God, tho'in it felf the truefl:, and moil: direct, is not like to meet withy^ general ?in Acceptance, or convince Men fo effectually, as a lefs degree of Evidence m another kind', becaufe, the Demonfira* tion confifting of many parts , and the. Ideas upon which it is founded hzm^^pire- ly intellectud, and not admitting of any ^ fenfihle Reprefentation, there are but few who are capable of fo much Steadmefs, and Attention of Mind, as is required to perceive the whole for a of the Proof.
But dien 'tis certain, that tho[e, who de- ny a God, muft not own themfelves to be of the number of thofe, who are incapa- M?of ccmp'.chcnding fuch an Argument as this,, becaufe they will, from hence, be
proved
of ^Itgion in CeneraL 5 i
proved to a6l very unrcafonably, in de- nying^ what, by their own ConfclTion, they do not underfiand^ and confcqucntly are not //> j^id^^es of; which is as iiblurd^, as to deny a Provofuion in M^ttbem.tticks^ without being aoleto imderftand the De- monllrdtum given of it : and, here, it will be allowed by all, that the Demonfiratio/i is never the lefs true and concluding^ be- caufe there are but few, who have made {q great a progrcfs in this Science, and are fo well vcrsW in. t h is fori of re ^fon/ng J as to perceive the Vdidity of it.
And therefore, it cannot be altogether improper to offer, what may becalPd a inetaphyfcal nhjlrncfed proof o^ 1 Deny ^ for \.\\Q Satisfaction o{{ud\ as by fteady Re flexion, and a juft: Ufe of their Reafon, will eafdy underftand it; and, for the Shame and Confufion of thofe, who re- nouncing common Opinions and Jrgu^ mcntSj upon no Grounds, pretend to ne^r Difcoz'eries, in Matters which they do not iif/dcrfiand^ and confcqucntly cannot dif prove,
Hov/ever, I have been as fhort as I pof-
fible could be, upon the pofitive part of
the Argument, and as pljiin as the Sub-
jedl would give me leave to be, liaving
£ 2 made
5 5 Tl^c iertixinty and Ncceffhy
made ufe of the commo^iefi^ eajkjl Terms, which the Language would furnifli. me with, upon fuch Matters as I have had oc- cafion to fpeak of: fo that, all the Diffi- cuhy lean imagine in the Apprehenfion of what I have fa id, mufb arife from the r/auireo^ the Idea's^ and from th.Q connex- ion^ and I'AYiety of Confeo^uences^ which are not eafjy to be comprehended in one t'iejv , efpecially without any Affilliance from Scnje, But this could not be a- voided.
Havint^ therefore, as clearly and intelli- gibly as I could, in ^Lpofith-e direct man- ner, proved, that //;fr^^^//?Go^, byfiiew- ing. That there certainly is fom.e eternal Being ; that all the Characters and Attn- hates of an eternal Being do agree 2.sm\ be- long to that Idea we have conceived of God ; and therefore that that eternal Beings which certainly u^ is as certainly what we call God: Having, I fay pofitively^ and directly proved this, I proceed to make good the fame Truth neg^atively^ or by way ofCjyijecj^itence-^ which, taking this for pro- ved That there is fame eternal Bei/ig^ I do, by fiiewing, that the Characlcrs and Attri- hutes of an eternal Being can agree to no-
thinz
of ^Itgion In Gcncrd, 5 5
ihiug elfe but what we call Go i, therefore tliev muft agree to God^ th.erefore that ftcrnd Herng^ which certainlv is, muft as certainly be God,
111 the Profecution of which Argument, tho' I make iife of the i^rh:ct^)U-i infilled upon ill the tormer, and the' the Conclu- ions from them, not being direB^ have not, m their own n.xturt^ the fi^.-n^ der^ree of li-vi- dence as pojiti-vc direct Dedaiiion^ have, yet I quefHon not but <" fhi'il be befter, and more <i;enerally underllood, and fhall more f.itisraclorily prove what ihave un- dertaken, to a great many Peribns, thii way, than the other.
For, befides that the, fa/fhood of all wrong //y/'6?^/;fy^/is,generally,much eafier demon- jlrated^ and perceived^ than the certainty of the true one, T fhall have frequent rccomih to fen fih/e in/htnces^ w^hich, rend- ring the things prefent to our Minds, feem Clearer, to moll People, than /'//re intel- lectual Ideas ^t\id' owv reafon allures us tliat they are not.- And therefore, that I may not be wanting to niy Snhjecl., and my Defign in treating of it, I think my felf obliged to accommodate my felf, to all irnderjlandings^ and to all manner of^ Preju- dices,
E : Tt
^4 *^^'^ Certainty and Necefjity
It has been proved already, from the prefent Extjhnce of things, that ibmething muft be eternal', we have rcckon'd up the feverai Pretenfions that can be made to Eternal Exigence ; and have confider'd the Characfers and Attributes of an eter-. nal Being
Now, if that which is eternal be not God^ and the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being do not belong to him^ then fomething elfe mufi: be eternal, and fome other of the fore-mention'd Suppo- fitions muft be true ; but, upon Exami- nation, I beUeve, it will be found, that none of thofe Siippofitions, which exclude the being of a God, can be true ; and, therefore, what I have proved concern- ing God muft ftand Good,
This it is my prefent Bufinefs to fliew : and, moreover, I iliail endeavour to make it appear, that, as Gc).^/ is certainly eternal^ and nothing elfe can be eternal, exclf/fve of him^ fo likewife he is the on- ly eternal Beings and whatever ipi anv of tiie other Hypothefes' ts conceived to Se e- tcrnal, if it really be fo, mufl:, in fome man- nerj entirely belong to him,
Firfr
of ^I'lgion in General. 5 5
Firft then, Let us frame to our felves a ]<[otion o't Matter nlor^e^ with its Parts 'dll umted, and .r/ re/l : and when we liave done fo, we fliall eafily judge, how im- poffible it is to conceive , tliat matter fhould have fo exifted, neceffanlj of ttfelf^ from all Etermty^ and that, tn time, the World, and all things in it, in the man- ner we now behold them, fhould \\ivq pro- ceeded from or have been frodnced by it.
For, without running overall the Cha- ra6lers of an eternal Being, the abfurdity o^this Stippofition will fufficiently appear, by what we flainly perceive, and know, and what conllantly, and trrefifltblj offers itfelfto oury^"/?/^^, ^iwd. under Jhndings, in tiie prefent frame of things.
Solidity, Extent ion, Figure, Motion, Per- ception, AndJVill, are the c/z/^fof allour Ideas, and what we are the befl: acquaint- ed with; and, fo£ir as we perceive them diflincf from one another. Separately exift- ing, or necejfarilj connected, our Reafo- ///;7g5 about them arc they//r<?/?of any we have; fo that, iiwc ^vc??/ijial:en'mthefe, I cannot fee how we have, or are capable ot having, any /knowledge ^td\\.
E 4 ^&^^'
5^ J he Certainty and 2\cceJJity
Solidiij^ Exterifwn^ and Figure^ I do not only perceive to be confiantly united.^ but /?ccejfar/ly^ and i^?-Jet?arahly toco-cxift together in the fame Suh]eci^ which I call Matter or Body -^ fo that we cannot conceive any fort of Body, or Portion of Matter^ without thefe tliree Quahties be- longing to it ; but it dees not follow, that, where-cver thef three QLialities co-exift together, there is either Motio'n, Percepti- on, or Will, there being no neccjfary Con- nexion betvvxen ciny oithife latter ideas and the other before mentioned ; as is plain, not only from the Natures of the Ideas themfelves, but from then' ffarate £.x- ijlence aclually perceived by us.
How then does Matter, which we now^ fuppofe to exi ft without any A/(?/^/^;2, Per- ^ception, ■ovWill, come to have ilf(5/^/(?;2 ad- ded to it?
AH the Motion that Vv'e perceive in B^- dies without us is made by SHccejfi;e ImpuL- fes from one Body to another, where tviry /^///tJ/iJof Matter ov%xs Its Motion \.o fome other ';\hu'i^ this cannot help us to con- ceive liow Motion: flYould begin whtro, e- very thing is at reft .- the only Idea that sve receive fro rii Body, with reibefi; to Mo~ iyon^ is that of a Capacity of being monjed ■■ • when
of ^It^ion m OcneraL 57
when it is at rcil, and not of a tforver of /riovingit'. felf : this we have rion; vvhat palTes iVtihn/ us^ wlicn, without any ex- ternd Impuljl upon us, by a bare Thought^ or Det er mi /iaiio// 0^ ouv felves, we betln a Motion in our onu Bodies^ anc^ by that means, commnntcate it to other Bodies ^ which were before at reft ; wX-iich power of heginuiN'i Motion is included in what we call Will: but Muter Being fup- pofcd to exift without Perception and Will^ and confequently without this power of hcginning Motion in its Jtlf-^ and there being nothing eljt to ccmirnnnicate Motion to it; it necelTarily follows from hence, that it muft et email) continu. in the fame ftate o'i'union^ I/.dijlinciion^ and Rejh
Tliere needs no more for the over- throwing this Hjpothtfs^ no ftrefs being ever laid upon it.
In the next place then, if we imagine nil the parts of this Material World ^ioofe from one another, and all in motion ; it will be quite as irrational to think, that fo it mult have been eternally and necefjari- /)', till, dtfome certain time, the featured Atoms mtt trgether^ Or were dijpojed after
fuch
5 "8 The Certainty and TSleceJJhy
fuch a manner, as produced thtfrefint Structure^ and Conjlitution of things.
Many are the Abfurdities and Inconfi- jhnctes with which this Opinion is char- geable; but I Oiall^at prcfent, inftancebut in two.
The firft is, the Hippofing an eternal motion o^ different Particles o'i Matter ^ he- fore the Produliion of the World ; which implies an infinite fucceffion of EffeclSyWith- out ^/fy C^///^ to produce them : For, Mo- tion^ being fomething difimci from Mat- ter , does not necefjanly e:s.ifi^ becaufe Matter exifts, for then, it would always exift, in every Particle of Matter) which we fee it does not; nor does it cydftofit/elf^ independently of Matter^ becaufe it cannot exift without It ; and 'tis plain that Mat- ter could not produce it in its icWfrom all Eternity, becaufe it cannot produce it at all: and therefore there can be no fuch thing as eternal Motion^ oxfucceffion of Motion^ m different parts of Matter; becaufe, every Motion is a meer Effect and Paffion^ and there is no aciive power any where aflignable, or conceivable, whicfi could produce^ ox caufe fuch an Effect : fo that to fuppofe an eternal Motion with- out an eternal Power of moving, is one very
great
of ^ligion in Gencrcd. 5 p
great Abfurdity, which thole are guilty of who let up the Hypothcfis o^^ Atoms.
The other is, the alcribing (nchmw Ef- fects to Matter af^d Motion together, in the production of the World, as, for a n-hole Eternity before^ never proceeded from them, and could not poffibly, at anytime^ ho, produced by them. For, Matter and Motion not implying Perception and IVill^ (feveral Bodies in motion being now actu- ally perceived to exift without them, and the whole Syjlern of moving Atoms bein^ in tlie prefent Hypothelis, fuppofed fo to ty^i{\, before the Beginni»^ of the World^ we fliall never be able, from hence, to ac- count for the Exiilence of Beings endued with Perception and IVi!!^ which are Qiia- lifications, in their own Natures^ utterly dtjlinci from thofe of Extention^ Figure and Motion^ and have no conceivable re- lation to them.
That thefe three latter may be, where the former are not, is plain : How then do thnfe other come to be added to them ? If Matter at reji^ whatever degree of Ex- tent lon^ or kind of Figure, it is imagin'd to have, can never make us conceive any poJfibiUty of Motion in it, without the lielp oi fomethrng elje befidcs Extent ton
an^
6 o Tl?e Certainty and 'Kecefjtty
and Fi^^ure to produce it (as is provM be- fore ;) fo neither can Mutter and Motion to- gether, whatever variety of Bulk^ Tex' iure^ or Velociiy we reprefent to our felves, give us any Idea of 'Perception and Wili^ or of a Pomr of -prohcing them : But, Mat- ter in motion mud eternal^ move on, or refi and move by turns if you pleafe, without advancing to any ^^erv Ferfections. For whether the parts of which it confifts, be gr offer or finer ; be of this or that Figure ; or move quicker or flower ; which wav fo- ever we confider matter^ 'tis, in all Forms, equally incapable of Thinkings Willing^ or Moving it fclf. Nor is tliere the leaft ground to expe8: any Powers of this kind from FUme or Air^ rather than from Stone or CUy -, or to fuppoie that the glorious Bo- dy of the Sun has any nearer refemblance to what we afcribe to God, than the con- temptible flock of a Tree hath.
But this Subject has been fo learnedly, ?Aid fully handled already by others, that T fhall not enlarge any farther upon it, nor expofe this ridiculousScheme of things, by fhewing all the peculiar Jnconfiflencies which attend it ; but fhall proceed to ex- amine the other Hypothecs concerning the
Beiffg
of ^Ugion 1)1 General. 6 i
Being of the Worlds which is thought, by fome, to be more defcnfible.
In the third place then it is fuppofed, that the World has eternal!) extfled, under the/iwe Form wherein we now behold it, as to the prtncipd psrts of its Structure, with a confiant Succtjjion of feveral of the chief Specks or forts of things in it.
But this (3puiion of the Eternity of the World has been the moft exploded of any, tho' moft of the Favourers of it have, at the lame time, alfcrted the eternal Exifl- ence of a God too. And the Reafon of this is, becaufe the greateft part of the r/wjl ancient Philofophtrs and learned Men thought that they perceived fuch vifible Marks and Tokens of the Newnefs of the Worlds in the Kife^ Propagation^ and In- crcafe Q^ Societies and Governments^ Langua- ges and Laivs^ Jrts and Sciences;a.nd theXV^- dition concerning thcOriginal ^ndBeginning of Things was, in their time^ Co frefi, and ib generally received in all Countries, that few of them were able to reconcile all this with the eternal exiilence o^ the World : And thi^ Tradition having all along contin- ued^ and the Truth oiihoje ancient Ohfer- vations having been more and more coa-
firm'd
6 1 Tloe Certainty and "KcceJJtty
firni'd by many new Invent torn of things ftnce^ fome of which were of {uohgeneral xy^,that 'tis impoflible to imagine, either that they fhould not have been invented heforey if the World had been of ^ very long continuance^ or iliould have been loft again after they were once invented, the Jame Objeciions have conftantly lain againft the Eternity of the World : and thefe have been ftrengthen'd by feveral other Arguments^ drawn from the many Abfurdities, and Inconfifiencies^ which feem to be implied in the Notion q{ eternal Succeffion,
All which, and whatever elfe can be faid againft the Eternity oftheWorld^ when aiferted together tvith the eternal Exijlence of a Gody do more ftrohgly conclude a- gainft this Suppofition, when the Being of a God is not taken into it, under which refpeft I now conlider it ; and thus eon- fider'd, it is moreover, befides what has been already alledg'd, attended with the fame Difficulties, and Chargeable with the ilime OhjeSiionSy^s thtformerHypothefis was.
For, fuppofmg the main hulk 2ind frame of the World to have been eternally the fame : Matter and Motion were no more capable of eternally producing^ fuch a Succeffion of various Objecls, as we now perceive in
the
of Religion m General , 6 :^
the World, than they were of producing them, and the World together, in time ; and yet, if we fuppofcan eternal Succefjion of new Obiecls without a God^ they muffc all be produced by the Power of Matter and Motion: For, every particular nexf Ohjecl^ being produced /«^/wf, muilowe itsBeingtothat which was eternal-^nnd no- thing, in t his Suppofition, being f/^r;z^/ but Matter and Motion^ every new Generation of Beings muft have x.\\q.\v Original from thvfi\ the precedent Generation having no othci- Powers nor Differences than thc///^- ceeding^ but what arife from the various Difpoji'.ion o^ Matter and Motion.
'Ihisis plain, in relation to all fuch Be- ings- as want the Faculties of Perception and ]Vill\ and, upon Fxamination, the Cafe will be found to be the fame, with refpecl to fuch as are endued with f/i'?/? Qualtficattons : For, cvea/-/;f/^ahb, in the prefent Hypothciis, muil be allowed to derive their whole Being from Matwr and Motion ; becaufe they are temporary Beings which began to be, and there is nothing elft eternal but Matter and Motion.^ and confequently there isnootherO/y/fafTio-- nablc for their Frodt^chc??.
Which
64 The Certainty and TSleceJJity
Which need not be proved to thofe, who hold the Eternity of the World, with- out a God; becaule, there are none, I be- lieve, of this Opinion, but fuch as do af- cribe the Orfgi?/iU o'i Percptiofj 2Lnd Will no Matity andMo:io:o^ ^Hedging that xhtfor* mer are only different Modifications of the Utter: in which they act very confiftent- ly with them felves, in making an abfurd Scheme all of a piece , not blending Truth with Falfjjood^ but taking in/?// the Ahfurdittes^ which do any way depend up- on one another, and belong to the main building.
However, that I may leave no room for Exception from any fide, I think my felf obliged to fliew,that,. i^ Percept ion ^nd Will are not the IJjut ^nd Effects oi Mat- ter and Motion^ as I have already fhewn that they are not, the Exiflence o^ifitelU- (fent Bei?igs^ without a Ged^ is inconceivable^ and impojfible ; becaufe no other Caufe of their Produftion can be aiTigned.
For, fuppofe it fliould be enquired,how fuch a particular Man came to exift^ how he came to begin to be a confciou^ Being ; he did notput himfelftc^QtheVy in fuch a man- ner as we now perceive him to exift, he did not give himfelf thofe Capacities^ and
Power<
of (^cli^ion in GcncrJ. 6j
Powers wliicli he is co?ifcious of, togctlier with Iiis CovfcioNfrefs of them; this is a flat Contradiciiony ?.nd granted to l)e fo on all hands.
Whence then did he derive this mighty Difference of Beings which we perceive ili Iiim, by which he is din;inf?;uini'd from all other things that fall under our Cogni- zance ? Not from fame intelligent Betng^ of in finitely j^re^trrr V er feci ions ^h\xt of the like /•/W with thofe he perceives in himfelf; nor from any mech:imcal Powers o'i Mitter^ and Motion : both thefe Caufes are fet a- fidc, in the prefent Enquiry.
Nothing then remains, but that the Man, who now exijls^ 7\.i\(\ fometiir.e a^o be- gan to he^ mull: have receiv^edhis Exillence^ and all thofe Qunlificntions which difirin- guifli him from iMattcr, (vom fo)?:e other Mm of the like nature with himfeli^ who exifted before him ; who iikcwife received his Being from fome other Man, &c. Bat this is .thfurd^ and irrational ; not only, up- on tiie account of the infimte Subordina^ lion ofCtv/^j, -dnd EjfccJs^ which follows from thi^ Suppofition, and which is by every bD:ly reiect::d as a OiDcking repug- nant Notion : but, becaufelt is hereby af- fjrm'd, tliiu one Being may, folcty^ by its
66 7h Certainty and Neceffity
orv» power ^produce amther Being of the/^^/f Nature and FerfeSiions with its felf; which I take to be the next Impojjibility to that of a Bemg^s making itfelf.
For Bodj^ and MW, are the only kinds, of being, that we know any thing ofj and, by all that we can learn of Body ^ ov Matter^ we conceive it utterly impoflible that any fort of body flionld produce the leafi new T article of Matter : nay, 'tis generally af- firmed by theLearned, that one Body never imparts any Motion to another without lofing itfelfwhat the ^'/^/'^r receives: This is certain, that J in all the material ProdruJi- ons obfervable by us, there is only a new dijpofition of the parts of Matter^ and not any new Being made ; neither is this new Difpofition received entirely from fome other Beingy of the fame kind,or texture with itfelf, but fl'om nuterial Particles and Motions^ conveyed from feveral dijlant parts of Nature.
Thus, v/e fee, that it is not one Seed, or cne Tree^ that immediately begets another :. but tlieSf/n, and the Rain^ and the Earth., and other Bodies^ contribute their fhare tovvards raifingthe Seed into a Tree: which produces new Seed, that muft un- dergo the like Clianges, and borrow from
the
of ^Uf^ion in General. 67
the fame Caufcs, before it can attain to the form of another Tree.
And 'tis farther remarkable that none of thofc different difpofuions of Matter ^\v\\\Q.h we find in the World, can be conceived to be the producl o^ Matter and Motion done^ without the AfTiftance and Regulation of lb me oti)cr Beir^^ o{ higher Perfect torn y as lias been fhcwn before.
How then is it po{ribIe,that6;2u'A//W,or conjcwus Beings fhould produce another en- tire dif{inlty\\\\<\y or Being, of equal per- fections with it felf, without loling an}^ thing from it felf, or borrowing any Affift- ance from any other kind of Being cxift- ing in tlie World ? and, wliat is as ftrange, do all this, without being as confciom of fhis it's chief PerfeBion^ as it is of all it? other ?
This^ I fay, cannot polTibly be ) and, therefore, If the World be eternal^ without aGody all the continuAl Changes ^ 7{v\{\neiv ProducHons^ which have ever been m it, muft be afcribcd to Matter and Motion', only, Matter and Motion not being able to produce fuch Ejjlcis ; from hence X conclude, that the Eicrnity of the IVorl^^ confidercd as it now is, without the et?y- ^// E -'^t/i'-nfe of .\ God^ is imvoffii^ls,
T 2 * And
68 T7;e Certainty and Neceffity
And thus I have confiderM all the leve- ral Hyfothefes^ which pretend to give any account of the prefent Conftitution of things, called, the World^ exclufively to the Bein^ of a God. And, from what has been offered upon thefe Heads, it fuffici- ently appears, that 7iothing elfe^ which is fuppofed to be eterml, befides God^ hath thteffentiai properties 0^ an €ter?tal Bei?igj Viz, necejfary exiftence^ and all foffihle Per- fectton ; or can be the cnufe of all thofc Te?npo)r/iry Beings ^ which iiave been pro- duced in time.
For, whatfoever is faid to be eternal^ which is not God^ is, at the fame time, faid to want thofe Pcrfeclions, which we af- cribe to God, and which are certainly the chief, if not the only ones, imaginable by us. And, as 'tis manifeft that, where thele are wanting, there cannot be aH po/Jible perfeUton ; fo, 'tis abfurd to fuppofe,
that, what isdeftituteof/C^/^"'^^^?^) ^nd Will^ fhould nccejfanl) Caufe, and be the Author of all Temporary Productions^ ra- ther than fuch a Being, as is indued with thefe Chara£lers, in the higheft and moft perfect Degree.
'Tis very plain, then, from hence, that there is fuch an eternd Being, as we call
God^
of ^li^ion in Genevitl, 69
God; becaufe /wthing eije cwn he Eternal cxcliijive of hi/tt : all the fiippofitions of tliis nature, being proved to be falle, and abfurd.
The next thing, to be inquired into, is ; Whether God be the only eternd Beings or Whetlier any thing elfe, that has been for- merly l'upnored,can hQ.\\kQ.\\'\({^Eternal to- >' ether rvtth hnn.
But, before I enter upon the Conli- derationof thofe feveral Hypo thejes, which do, all, tho'ina different manner, elta- blilh ^weternal Co-exijlence oi Matter and Mind ; I think it necelTary to premife fomething concerning the Nature^ and Difiinchon of thefe two kinds of Beings, as far as wc are capable of perceiving themi that, fo, I may cut otf a great many Dtfputes^ and MtjLtkes, occafion'd by the Confufton of our Ideas upon this Sub)e£l, and, what I have to fay afterwards, may be better underftood.
I do not perceive any fuch Connexion be- tween the Ideas of Verception^ and Will, and tliofc of Extent ion, higure, and Mo- tion, that, where-ever the former arc, there mud: the Utter be alfo ; nor, do I fee any Reaibn, wiiy Verceptiony and li'/ll,'dvc V ^ nor
70 The Certainty and Neccgity
not as eafily believed to cxifl: feparately from EiKtenfto??^ Figure^ and Motion ; as Kxte}7^ton^ Figure^ and Motion are, to exift feparately from Perception ; and Wt!l only, becaufe ^/;f/^ are dUudly perceiv'd fo to exift, and we have not, x^t^h^tn actually io^ifcious of fuch a feparate Exiftence of the other. But this does not hinder but thztV erceptton^ and VVtll^mayfo exijij and have a Subject ^ or Sub [lance of their own, difiirict from that which llipports thefe Qualities of Exter2jioK^ Figure^ and Motion, Jf Thinhng^ and Willing were common to ^^'f ?7 JBi'i;?^ that we knew, we could no more frame an Idea oFzpure material Suhfiance^ exifting without thefe Qualiji'' cations^ than we can, now,ofa/??/r^ thtnk^ tng Subfiance^ exifting without thofe Qua- lities ^ which we attribute to Body : but 'tis certain, from an actual Separation of thefe dijjerent Ideas^ perceivable in dijfe- re?it Stibjecfs^ tlrdt/ome of them may exift without the other ^ tho', without this kclual Separation^ we could not have been fo certain of it ; and, therefore, tho' the other have never yet hten perceived to ^^- tfi fparately from thefe^ it dees not fol- low from thence, that they cannot fo exift : but, confideriiig the vaft diftance that ■ . there
of ^ligion in General. 7 i
rliere is between the Natures of the fevc- ral Ideaf, without any curtceivable Rtfem- bLuice^ or RtLttion to one another, 'tis •very prob^bte^ tliat tlicydo Arifeivom dif- ferent Principles ^ and are founded in dtf~ ^'•'rent Sub'^ecls.
However, Iiaving no farther Certain- ty of it from ncLturd Reafonj (and I piu- pofely wave all other Proof at prefent,) let us fuppofe, that Perception and iVi/l^ Extenfion, Figure, and Motion, have all the f^me common Subject to fupport them, are radically, and ultnnately founded in the fdme Subjidnce^ and ilTue from tlic f/ime Principle., of which Subjecty Suljiance, or Principle , we know nothing more, than that it is fomet hi ng, which fifiains thefe different (Minlities, or whatever elfe we call tliem, which could not exiji of themfelves, without tt .- Suppofmg, I fay, all this, 'tis ridiculoufly, any, with- out any colour of Reafon, inferred from hence, that, therefore, P^rt^/'/^/o^/ and Will are only different Modifications^ or Dif- po fit ions of Extent ion. Figure, and Mo- tion ; or do, in fome manner, or other, wholly refnlt from them : For, why may not diftinct Qualities co-exi[t together in the fame Subjecf, without being derived F 4 one
7 1 TI^c Certainty and Nece/Jity
one from Another '< or, why fhould Ver^ ception^ and Wiil^ be Modificatso/is of jEoc- tenfio)'?. Figure^ and Motion^ any more than Extenfiori^ figure^ and Motion are different Modes o^ Perception^ and J^^f^/Z/f I cannot fee, what groundThey can have to beheve otherwife, who affirm, what we call the Mind or Soul of Man, to be no- thing elfe but Matter^ under a pecuhar Dijpofitioii of tt'^s Parts,
But, that Thinkm^^y and WilU}7gy upon a Suppofition, that they actually exift tn matter^ and cannot exift vnthout it, are not, therefore, Modifications^ or Effects of the <3//?er Qualities of Matter^ which are in it, antecedently to the Addition of thefe^ may be farther illullrated by this In fiance.
Motion is fomething added to the origi- nd, and effential Qualities of Matter ; owes it's Capacity ofexifltng^ to it,and can- not exiil, without it : and yet 'tis plain, that Motion is no Modification^ or effcft of Soliditjj Extenfion, or I'lgure; which arc every thing, that we conceive in Matter, before Motion is added to it; but is fome- thing, in its own nature difincf from a/l . the/e, and not refulting from any con- cdvable Difference of them : So that k
does
of ^li^ion in General. y 5
does not follow that, becaufc Matter is fo/iii, or extended^ or of fiich a figure, thcicforc it mill]: be /;; motion.
And if this be true of Motto-/?, it mud be much more true o^Thinking^ and Will- tng. For that Idea we have oi Motion does involve Matter in it ; we had never known, what Motion was, had we not perceived fometliingthat was w^jt'^-^ ; and we cannot perceive a thing, as moved^ witluDut perceiving it, as extended too ; and Exter/Jio/; nccefTarily implies the o- thcr effential Properties of Matter : but I can form a Notion oi' thought and H^;/I^ and be confcious of fomctliing, which thinks, and ivills^ without having any Ideas, at the fame time, o\^ Solidttj^ Ex- tenfior/^ Figure^ or Motion ; and, there- fore, \^ Motion may be joyned to the o- ther Qiialities of Matter^ \v\x.\\o\\\. refuit- tng from them, tho' in the Idea, we have of it, it cannot be conceived, without them;'tis nir{ch more prohakie^thatThot/g^ht^ and I'ViII , may co-exifi with Motion^ and all the rellof the tnaterid Qualities^ without being the ejfelis., or produ^ of them, when they carry no Marks of fuch an Original upon them, and, in their Conception, have no appearance of any
74 ^^^ Certainty and NeceJJhy
ReUtton to them. And, if it does not follow, that, hQC-mk Matter is of fuch a nature^ and fo moii^e^^ therefore it moves ; much lefs can It be inferrM, that, becaufe Matter is fo and fo difpofed^ and moved^ therefore it thinks^ and Wills.
This being premifed, it plainly appears from hence, that 'tis ^nucl) more probable in Reafof^^ that God fhould be the o»ly Eternal Beings than that Matter^ any way ccnfidered, fhould be co-eternal with him ; For, the Not ion o^ God is full and com- pleat ^ without any Qonfiderationo^ Mat- ter ; and the Addition of the Idea of Mat^ ter to it, does not add any thing to the Per- fection of the Divine Being,
The Forver of producing Matter^ and Mo~ . tion^ and of forming an infinite variety of Beings out of them, is indeed ?iPerfeBion^ very worthy of God^ and what we juftly attribute to him : but the actual Exi pence of any of thefe Beings does no way heigh- ten the Idea we have of him; whom we conceive to be (U perfect in himfelf^ before their Exiflence^ as after it.
The actual Communication of ibme of his Perfections to a particular rank of his Creatures^ and his giving them the V/e
and
of ^ligion tn General. 7 5
! ncl Enjoymem of his other Works^ do railc new Idea of liiiii in them^ which they
dl by the name o\^ Goodrjefs ; but this they look upon only as a njoluntary opening and difclofing tlie Glory of his orighid Nature, dnd not a ^eceffarj/ addtt tonal Ad- vincement of it.
It is, therefore, mofi: Agreeable to our Rsa- foii^ and to all the Notions we have of the Divine nature^ that God Ihould have exited alone^ from all Eternity ; aixl, in ti'/ne^ Iiave produced the World and all things in it.
But, if any Man had rather believe, that Matter at rejl^ or Matter and Mo- tion^ or the prefent Frame of the (Vorld^ with the feveral kinds of beings in it, were co-etcrnal with God^ he mult, at the lame time, hold, that, whatever was co- eternal with God did either fubfifl: eter- nally of Its felf nijHnflly from, and inde- pendently of him ;
Or, is really a necejfary part of the Di- vine nature^ and lieips to make up the Idea, of God ;
Or, did eternally proceed from him, be- caufehe jiad, iternally^ an effUhial will to produce it.
But,
J 6 The Certainty atid Nece£ky
But, the firft of thefeSuppofitions can- not be true : for neither Matter alone, nor Matter and Motion, nor the prefent Com- , fihution of things can be eternal, indepen- dently of God •, becaufe, (as has been fully proved already,) none of them could have ' e.xijh'd eternmy, rvithout a God.
And, therefore, whatever is fuppofed to be eternal^ which does not entcA' into the Ide.i, we have given of God, mu(t be taken into it; as necejfarily I'elongtnc to the Divt'ne Nature ; or muft l")e look'd upon, as tliQ free eternal effect of his eternal \VilL
Thus fome have affirm'd, that the World, and every thing that we fee, or know, is God:
Others, that all xbm2^s flowed from God: . by which Exprellion, if they mean necef- fary Ema'natwn, .they mult be all referred to his Be:ng, ^nd Effence-j if froduciiony to his Will.
So that, however we exprefe our felves J upon thefe Matters, every f/;//?^ that we f can imagine, or frame any Notion of, muft he cither God, or, Ibme way, pro- ceed from him, be alcribed to his Nature,^ or reckoned among his Works,
The Inference from all which is this;
Thar 'tis mofl ratt-jn^t to think, that no
■ ■• more
fjf ^cU'^iou in GoicrAl. yy
more belongs to tiie Ickd of God, than what \vc have before attributed to him; and that he did, tn tnnc^ of his own freq will, produce evcrj thinly not contained in that Idea, even origuid Mtittr and Motion^ as well as the frame and. Structure of the IVorldy and the Farietj o^pariuttlar Bet/igs in it.
But, if any Man afTcrtsthe Eter/jity o[ a^jy of thcje^ together witli God^ in the full extent of that Idea which we have given of him^whetlicr his Opinion hctruej or falj'cy it can make rw change in our Thoughts, witli icgard to Keltgicn -. Be- caufe, the Idta. of God, being fo far the fame here as we have cftablifht it, the fame Cor/fequemes will every where flow from it; and the AiTcrtorsof any fuch Opinion will bear the fame Relattcn to God^ and be under the fame Obligations^ with us , who differ from them, in fomc other things^ relating to God ; which, however lield, have no other Jnfiuence upon us, tliaa as we are obliged not to Entertain ^.tiy fa/fe iXctlons o^ God, nv//- i^g^jy when we may have better Infor- mation : or, where we cannot, yet fomc Opinions may appear ?norc juitable to our Reafony and, more for the Honour of God
than
78 'J7;e Certainty and NeceJJity
than others ;which I take to be the prefent Cafe,and,thereforeyfhall wave any further Enquiry into thefe Matters, as having no proipe6l of a Poffibility of knowing any thing more about them.
Thus have I, with as much Brevity and Difpatch as the Subject would allow, exa- mined all the Accounts, which are, or can be given, of the prefect Exiftence of things; and, from particular Obferva- tions upon each of them, (not all that might be made, but fuch as I judg'd fufficientfor mypurpofe) have (I think) made it very evident, that there mufi he d God^ or Being of fuch a nature as I be- fore delcribed, who was the true and on^ 7y Caufiy or Author of every thing we fee, or know, or has ever been, befide him \ and, that, without the Suppofition of fuch a Being , the World could not fojjlhlj have ever exified^ as, we fee, it does.
I fhallnow add (omc general Reflections ^ to ftrengthen the Doctrine here maintain ed, concerning the Origiiul of the JVorld^ and fo conclude the Proof of a God.
That the World is, what we now per- ceive it to be, muft be afcribed either
to
of Rdigton in General. 79
to Chance y' Neccffity ^ or iVifJom : but Charjce^ is ?iothirig'^Necef!!ty.^\y\l\\ou\i a God, timntclligiblr^ and, therefore, IVifaom^ or what is meant by it, God, who is a wife Beings mxde tlie World^ and all things in it, in that form., and manner, which we now behold, and admire.
To Hiy, that the World was mtide hy chance^ is, to fay, that it was made, \vl' know not bom^ or without any Caufe ; and is, in truth, to ufe Words, which have no deter- mined Meaning.
7 here is no Man, who has made any Enquiries into the Nature of Things, but knows, that nothing, which before rvtu not, can ever be, without owing its Ori- ginal to fome real pofitive Beings of antece- dent Exifience, h2 adequate, 2nd infufficient Caufes are indeed often afligncd for the Productio?io'i t\\m2^s\ bccaufe, being ;z£j:f to, and immediately preceding, the Efjecls^ they are, /<9/^//, taken notice of, without any regard had to their being Subordinate to, or Directed by other Caufes; and, oftentimes alfo, fomething is thought to be the Kcxt, and immediate Caufeot' a thing, which hath no influence at all upon it : but, in both thefe Cafes, 'tis fome real
EJfi.
io The Certainty and Meceffity
Efficiency, obfcrved by us, that gives rife to thefe Judgments; which arc fo far true, as they fuppofc the Effect to proceed from fome real Caufe , tho' there may be a Miftake in attributing it to a wrof2g one^ or to one that had only a ^are in produ- cing it ; and, therefore , there mufl: be fomething ycaI aflignM , which was as much , and as properly , the immediate Caufe of the meeting of the Farts of Mat- ter, in order to make a World, as the parts of Matter, /o met, were the C^^y/^ of the ProduBion of the IVorld, which can be nothing elfe, but fuch and fuch par- tictiUr Dnerminations of Fi^^urej and Mo- tioNy in the feveral parts of Matter : but thefe mufl:, either have been eternal, or have fprang from certain eternal fixt Rules, refulting from the Natures o^ Mat- ter, and Motion •, or have been impreffed by a divine Po vjr : in all which Cafes there can be nothing cifud^ but every thing mufl: have been neceffary, or providential.
For, fuppofing the whole Syflem 6[ Matter fo2indfo figrtred, and moved ; we cannot confider it as indiffirent to feveral Effecls, but neceffaril) determined to fome, which muft inevitably follow upon fuch a fnp- pofed Difpofuio:^ , unlefs fomething ex-
trinfudl
o/ ^'h^ion in GeneraL 8 i
trip7jicai to Matter fliould refirairt^ ok changi the origtnul Determination : and if any thing, extrinfic.il to Matter, or, heftdes iMatter and Motion, be allowed, it muft be God. But if there be nothing elfe ex- illing befldes Matter and Motion^ then are all the Effe6ls refuking from them nccejfary^ becaufe, whatever Difpofuion^ or Mo: ion of Matter we fuppofe, and when^ foever^ in the whole extent* of Eternity, we fuppofe it, every followmg t/Z^t'/W/^ have been what it z>, and there could have been no otlier produced in the room of it.
The Reafon^ wliy certain . Portions of
Matter, /(? and yc» figured and movedy do
jiot a/ivajs neceffarily produce the fame Ef-
fe^^isy is, becaufe, iliQir particular Determr^
/nations are reftrained, or over-ruled by
the necejf.iry hnpuljcs of other extrifificd
Matter ; or by the greater Power of the
DivmeWili: and, this being unperceiv\l
by us, we look upon feveral of thefe/^^ir-
ticular Etfecls as ca\ualy which can, only.
and, that very improperly too, with re-
fptct to our Comprehenfiofiy hz ftiled fb;
whereas in reality , with refpeB to the
univerfal Nature^ and £/y7f/>//i;_; of things,
G thev
8 2 77;6' Certainty and Kcceffity
they mufl: be either mceffary^ or volutin tary.
But, if we confider the whole Frame and Colleftion of things together^ we cannot form any Idea of Chayice^ cither in the World as it r/orv is^ or in tts original for- mation ; unlefs we will be fo ridiculous as to fay, that every thing which is^ is cafual-^ that every thing which has been from all Eternity happen'd by chance ; and that it was hy chance that Matter and Motion WQVQ, eternal^ or that any thing extjled at all ; Chance having the fame Title to all the fe Effects as to any one of them.
I need not confider the other Occafion we take of forming this Notion o^^ Chance^ from the Indifference that we perceive oftentimes in our felves with regard to feveral contrary Actions, which makes our doing one thing rather than another, when the Mind feems alike difpofed to both, to belook'd upon as a cafual Rejult^ rather than 2i Proper Effect, This may be accounted for otherwife, by the Prepon- derancy of fome motive^ determining us to a8: this way rather than another ; and the feeming IndJjference m.ay be fhewed to have fprung from our ig-norance of the whole Nature, and all tlie Confequences
of
of ^Itgion in GeneraL 8 5
of the thing in queftion, and the feveral Reafons and ways of acling ; but there is no occafion for fuch a Proof, becaufe, thofe who fa}' that the World was made hy chance^ cannot be fuppofcd to life the Word in thii Senfe^ forafmiich ns they do not acknowledge, that God^ or any in- telligent Being was concerned in tlie Pro- duction o'( it : and if they did, yet would they not entertain fucli low and abfurd Notions of him, as to think, that fome Chance-Thought ov ABtono^ hts produced it.
'Tis plain then, that Chance^ is nothing elfe but an mfignificant IVord^ and an tg- nor.-tnt Pretence^ which, Jias no Senfe^ or /^r.7/?w, under it, and therefore, can give us no manner of light in our Enquiries in- to the Nature^ and Original of things.
Neither will Neceffity^ which is the next thing to be confider'd, give us much bet- ter Satisfaftion : For, if we examine this Notion well, 'twill evidently appear, that there can be no Necefjity for the prefent Ex I /hn c e oi the World, in the manner we behold.
For, nothing can be f lid to be ahjolnte-
h r/eceffary^ but what 'tis altogether /w-
G ? fojjihlc
^4 Tl-^' Certainty and 'Kcafjlty
■poffible fliould be otherwife ; but impoJJIhle it is not that the World iliould never have exifted^ or that it fliould be deftrojed now it does exift ; Becaufe it is not im- pofTible but there may be a Being , of much greater Perfection and Power than the World, which could have /^/Wr^^ the World from exifirng^ or can now dejlroy it.
But, if any Man Tnall fay that he can- not conceive luch a Being, as could hinder }A3.ttei' from ex /Jl;.ng J or dejlroy it now it does exiflr, becaufe, he cannot conceive a Power, of making Comethin'S out of no- thing , or, of reducing j07nething^ to no- things the lad of which is here luppofed, and the firfl: muft be allowed , if the World does not exift neceflarily, but was made: If any Man, I fay, fliould objed this, I anfwer that it feems to me con- cetvabte enough from the Idea I have of God^ that, what is here afcribed to him, may fall within the compafsof his Fou'cv^ which, reaching to ^//things /'r?;^/^/^, that is, to all things which do not imply a Contradttiton^ may extend to the Acts o^ Creation and Annihilation ; which, tho' tfie manner of tlie Performance be incow-
pcht?/f,blty
of- ^iigioji tn General. 8 5
fYeheafible^ cannot be proved to carry any Coritradicfioii in them.
However, if there be thofe who pre- tend that they cannot co??/prelje/?d the Pofjibiltty of thefe A6lions, yet, this is very coHceivAble by any Man, that there niaybe/(3Wf Beings offo mncJi Perfection and Poiver, tliat, tho' he could not Ijuj- der Matter from exijting^ or reduce it to nothing now it does exill ; yet he might have hinder'^d it from being put into any Motion, Form, or Order, and miglit liavc continued it in that State, or can reduce it now to a confujed^ unmoving Chaos , or Jcatter it mio innumerable incoherent Par- ticles. Tliere is no manner of Difficulty for a Man to frame a Notion of thefe thing'j, Wiio has feen frequent Inftances of the jame hind of Power, in a lejfer de- gree^ exercifcd by Men. And this is fuf- fi-cient to overthrow the Necejfitj of the prcf'ent Fr.^me dnd Con/litution of things, which was the thins; deficra'd.
If, therefore, the World, and all things in it, in the Condition we now behold them, do not lubnll by a nece/fity of Being, nov Sivczlic refult of Chance, it unavoida- bly follows, that thevarethe F.f^ecl, and G'j Pro-
^6 Tloe Certainty and Kecefjity
Frodu5i of JVifdom, the Workmiinjbtp^ and Contrivance of a rvife Jgent.
This is certainly the moft rational Hy- pothefisthatcanbedevifed, or maintain- ed; for we, who efpoufe this opinion, liave clear and dtflmcl Ideas of that Power ^ and Wifdom^ by which wx explain tlie Ori- ginal of Things ; but thofe who afcribe the Exijlence, and Stvuciure of the World to any thing elfe, have no Ideas of what they afcribe them to. No Man has any Notion of Chance^ or Neceffity, except he annexes the Idea o'i Power to them ; and he can have no Idea o'i Power without Jy.now- hdge^ all Power proceeding originally from Mind^ which, by ConJcioufne[sy we are Senfibleof; and we can frame no Notion of any other Seat ox Spring of Power but this, and, therefore, wemakefome Mind or intelligent Being the Author of every thing, as being the only conceivable Foun- tain of all Power.
Our Notions of Wijdom^ Contrivance^ and Defign^ are as clear as that of Power ^ and known the fame way : And if Wifdom be ever plainly difcoverable in its Works and Effects^ it is fo in the Frame and Con- fiitution of the World^ and the feveral parts of k. If we have any reafon to
con«
of ^'Ir^^ion in GoievAl. 87
vLoncliidc that Towpis and Cnies were l^in/i , ■ iiid I\jngdo7KS^ and Common-wexlths were modelH\ by the Thought and Contrivance oUntelli^ent lietngs, we have much more Caiife to beheve that tlie Vmverfe was made, f\tjhwn'*d, and difpofid ^ by the Cotinfel and iVifdom, of Ibmc more per- tea and capacious ^V/;?^ ; the Marks and Prints of H'^z/^f^w beinp; /'/•'«z>i'^^, and wor^^ legible in the f V.twf and Difiofaion of the IVorld^ than in any of the moft admired Works of Alan.
And, therefore, if wc allow our felves to have anv Ideas of Power, and }(j2oir- ledge, we mudconfefs, x.\v\tPorver\sinfe- p.tr.ible from J\^./W)vledge ; and, that there is no Potver, but there is fome IQnowledge commenjhrate to it, it beinc^ utterly incon ceivable that any thins^ fhould he, or be m.tde, and there fhould be no Being that knows how it came to be, or in wliat man- ner it was produced.
And this, I think is, of it felf, a fure Ground of Belief; that there is (i God^ who was the Author of the World, and every thing in it, without carrying the Proof any higher ; but , for the fake of thofe who will not be (Iitisfiefl with thio, I have given d. farther Demonilration of the G 4 Be-
8 8 Tl)e Certainty and Neceffity
Being of God, not with any Hopes of convincing theni, but to make it impofTi- ble for them to urge any thing to the con- trary.
Thus have I finifhed the Proof of a God, and (as I perfuade my felf) made it I'erj evident^ that there really ?////<:// a Beings and that, what we call God, is a Being oiftich a nature as I before defcribed ; who is vefted with all thoje Characters^ and Properties^ which I there attributed to him.
Which Confiderations, together with thofe plain and eafy Reflexions before fuggefted upon our felves, and our orvri Nature , if carefully attended to , will cer^ainly convince us of the Reality of all thofe Relations^ which I have fuppofed between Qod and Man • and furnifli us with manv direct^ and undeniable Argu^ rnents of the Truth^ and Neajfity of Re- hgion : which is the third Thing I pro- pofed, and the principal part of tlie De- fign which I am purfuing in this Dif- courfc.
Ill, From
of fj^eli^ioji 1)1 Gmeritl. 85^
TIT. From the Knowledge which I have fliewn that we have, or are capa- ble of having, concerning the Humane^ and Divine N.ttures^ I fliall deduce a po- fitrue and direfi Yvoof oiReiigio/i.
Religion^ in fhort, is, w^hatever we arc obliged to by God. In order, therefore to prove that there is fuchathing as Religi- on, it muil: be fliewn, that iUz;? is capable of being obliged to att as he is direAed ; that God has a Power of obliging him to do what he commands; and that Man is aclual.'y under fuch an Obligation, or that God does aclually will and require fome- thingofhim.
Now 'tis plain to any Man who con- fults himfelf, that he hath, in feveral cafes, a Po'.ver of determining himfelf to ^icl^ or nottoaci\ and a Power oj actings or not •iciing^ according to ///^// Determination^ that he is influenced to ^cl^ feveral ways, by different Motives^ and Profpetls ; that he oftentimes futfers himfelf to be in- fluenced by certain Confiderattons^ which lie c:ight not to have a£led by, as he plainly perceives by condemning himfelf afterwards for what he has done ; and that he often neglecis^ or rcfufes to obey
luch
po The Certainty and Neceffity
luch Motives and Incitements to A8:ion, which he himfelf Judges that he o^ight to have followed , by Approving of them both before, and after fuch Neglecl or Refulal. From whence it evidently fol- lows, that a Man may be obliged to aft one particular way rather than any other ; becaufe, there may be fuch Reafons and Motives propofed to him for his acting fuch a jvay^ as, upon a jull: Ballance of them, with all the feveral Inducements, which can be offered for his acting any other way, he muft acknowledge, o^/ght to determine him ; fo that, fhould he adl this ivay^ he muft necejfartly approve htm- felf^ and, fhould he act any other way, he muft neceffarily condemn himfelf.
That Being, which hath a Power of of- fering fuch Reafons and Motives as thefe to any Man, may properly be faid to have a Forver of obliging him to a6l as he fhall direft.
And that God hath this Power, is very manifeft, if we confider, what it is that influences and determines us to afl ; which being nothing elfe but fome kind of Pam^ or Pleafure ^ in prefent^ or in profpecl, God, who can do all things poflible, and, confequently, who can put us into, and
con-
of ^ligion in General. p i
continue us, to all Eternity, in a ft-ate of Pairi or Pleafurc^ the greatcft of cither kind which our Natures are capable of, can, by annexing thefe to different ways of acling, offer llich Motives to us, as, we fhall be forced to acknowledge, ought to deterynine us to do what he com- mands ; and therefore, God ccin^ if lie pleafeth, oZ-Z/^c us to obey him.
The only Qiieltion then is, Whether we are .xttu.illy under fuch Obligation? whether God hath given us any Laws, or Rules to walk by, and annexed /vf/^ diffci'ent Co/jfeque/ices to our Aclions, ac- cording as we obey or difobey him as, make it abfolutcly ?jecejfary to our Hap. pi^cfsy to conform to his Will ?
But, before I enter upon the Refolu- tion of thib Qiicliion, I think itrequifite to give a fiillei' Account o^\:hc A. tt/zre^ and Ground of what we call Obligation^ or Duty^ and to be more particular in ex- plaining the Power and Right of obliging.
Now 'tis plain, from what has been already faid. That an Obligation^ with refpecl: to Man^ is nothing elfe but fuch a Real on , or Motive , as, when duly offered to him, necejfari/y determines him
to
p 1 ^ 77;^ Certainty and Neccfflty
to ^^■'^/^ one way of a£ling before another; and this Reafon^ or Motive^ can be no- thing elfe but a greater degree either of Happmefs to be obtained, or Mifery to be avoided by ailing thus, than (all things confidered) can be obtained, or avoided by acting a;>-^ other way. Such a Reafon, or Motive as this, does, in the :i!tri6lefl: and moft proper Sence of the Word, oblige us to 3.8: according to it; that is, we find our felves under a mcef- fity of Submitting to it, or we are for- ced to acknowledge that we ought fo to do, and while theTe thoughts are prefent to our Minds, we cannot polTibly aft o- therwife.
There is no other Notion ox Ground o^ Obligation imaginable : or if anv other be pretended, it will upon Examination, be found to be ultimately refolvable into this.
'Tis true indeed, we feldom go fo far in our inquiries into thefe Matters, as to Trace the feveral Reafons of our a£ling up to their Origm&l fprtng\ but are con- tent to refolve what we do into the next and immediate motives wliich determined us, and which, we took, upon publick Credit, to be Juji and Sufficient grounds
for
of ^li^wn in General. 9 ^
for us to a£l upon, without ever Exa- mining, our felvcs, trom whence their force is derived.
Thus for example ; when we are asked w^hy we did fuch, or fuch a thing ; we think It a full anfwer to fay ; that we were obliged in gratitude to do it ; or that the Laws ot our Country in joined it; or that we did it in obedience to a Parent^ or a Goi'ernour^ or the hke ; but if it fhould be further demanded of us, what obligation Gratitude lays upon us; what regard is due to the Laws of our Country •, why Parents and Governours are to be obeyed ; we fliould be apt to look upon fuch Qucftions as thefe as Cap- tious and Impertinent, and not deferving a ferious return ; becaufe we take all thefe Notions of Humane Duty to be fo well fettled, and agreed upon, that there can be no room lor a Difputc about them. But fhould w^e urge the Command of God for what we did, we fhould be aifo- niflied to hear it asked , w^hat ground there was for obeying God.
And yet, fo it is, that, tho' the Rea- fons here given for our CondutEl have, (when truly alledged) that direci and im- wt'^/A/f appearance of Certainty, in them-
felves.
p4 TJ^^ Ccrtn'mty and "KcccJJity
felves, that there is no need of a farther Proof of them, to any Man who judges foberly and fah-ly ; yet there are thofe to be found, to wliom they do not appear fo ftrong and conclufive, as to command then' Submiffion to them. Thefe are thev who endeavour all they can, to re- move the ancient Landmarks and Bounds of Duty ^ and to take away all Difi motions of Good, and Evil ; who ftrike at the Foundations of Virtue and Religion^ and queftion the very Being as well as Au- thority of God : and, to Satiffie the un- reafonable fcruples. of thefe Men, 'tis ne- ceiTary to fliew that the Principles before mentioned, together with many others of the fame kind, are all founded upon fuch a Bottom as muft be fufficient to fupport them, the Enemies of Religion themfelves being Judges.
The fhortefl: therefore, and fureft way of convincing the moft perverfe difputers of this World, that they are obliged to perform all the particular Duties of Hu- mane life required of them, is, to prove to them ; that there is a God who hath annexed exceeding Happinefs to the Pra- Bife^ and extream Mifery to the Neglecl: of thofe things. For here they mutl ftop,
and
of Rtin^ion hi General, 9 5
nnd they can have no further Queftions to ask; it being utterly impolfible for them to doubt whether they fliould chufc to be Hdppy rather than Mtferahle ; and perfectly abfurd to inquire why they Ihould feek their own Happincfs.
This is then, in reality, the Tr/^^ and itltimnte Grourid of Humane OhLiga.tton^ tho' 'tisfeldom that we have anyocca- fion to fearch fo deep for a Proof of thx common Rules ^nA Principles of Mordity^ and it would be an unneceflary undertak- ing now, if we had not to do w^ithfuch Perfons as obftinately ftand out againft all the ufualMethods of Reafoning.
The Nature and Ground of obliga- tion in General being thus fixed; what is meant by the Right and what by the Power of obliging^ in what refpect they are the lame, or, at leaft, only diftindl Conceptions of the fame thing, and in what rcfpe8:s they are different, will plainly appear, if weconfider thefeveral Inflances to which thefe Notions are ap plied.
All the Beings capable o? obliging^ or being obliged^ are thofe that we call in- telligent Beu>gs ) which, as far as our Knowledge in thefe Matters reaches arc only Gody Angels^ and Me>?. Whe-
^6 The Certiiuiiy and tKcceffity
Whether there are any J;/^f/i-, ov mid- dle Natures between God and Men^ and how they are determined to afl: them- felves, or what influence they have upon other Beings, natural Reajbn does not fer^^/^/jy inform us : but, in general^ with refpe^: to ^//the intelligent Beings^ which we can frame any Notions of, it may be affirmed, that no one has either a Right or Power of obin'tng another to a£l accord- ing to his dire8:ions, any farther than he hatha Power of contributing to the Happy- nefs^ or Mifery of that Being,' which he undertakes to Govern.
Thus are we led to conclude by all that we know concerning God, and our- felves ;
For firft, as to God : I am not able to comprehend, how he can lay Men un- der an Obligation of Living according to the Laws and Commandments he gives them , any other way than by making them knowy that he hath it in his Power to render them happy, or miferable^ accord- ing as they obe^^ or difobey him ; and that he n'//Z certainly Reward or Punifh them according to their Behaviour toward him.
'Tis not his great and fupereminent
Powir
of ^Ugion 111 General', 97
Poivtr in creating Men and giving thcni Bti»^j \y\ndusyjd!ely in its felj-\ the ground and foundation of his Title to their Obe- dience : This, if he had not alfo given them a cap.u/ij of being happy could never become a Rcafon or Motive of a£ling to them, and, confequently, no Obligation could be founded upon it : For, were they made and ordained io be miferxble\ and were they furc that their nnfery was to have no End, and would admit of no /r- batement or increap, by what means could the Author of their Being oblige them to a6l one way rather than another, when he could not offer aily thing to tlicm which would have any weiglit in deter- mining them fo to a6l ? What, in this Cafe, could induce them to obey God, ra- ther than to difobcy him, when 'tis cer- tain that, which way foever they a6lcd, they were not capable, either of the plea- fure of approving, or the pain of Con- demning what they did, all manner of pleafure, and all AcLclfion of Mifcrv, be- ing, in the State of Mankind now fuppo- {cdy utterly impoflible. They migiit m- deed, by dn over-ru/i/ig Poiver, b^ forced to do what was commanded them : but tliis is not a rational Obligation^ whicli i^ H ackno^v*
9 8 Tl?e drtainfy and Necefflty
acknowledged, and fobmitted to, as/^/- table and agree.ible to Reafon^ and per- formed with the full Concurrence of the Will of thofe who obey it.
In vain, then, and very falfly, do foms nice abilradcd Thinkers magnify the Excellence and Perfection o^ pure Beings or Exifience^ even when joined with the kig!'e(t degree of Mijcry : a Moment's Ex- perience woukl foon convince them, tJiat. to hey was no otherwife the Perfeclion of a rAtiond Being than as it included a Cd- j>acity ofbemg tjappji : but if, after fuch Ex- perience, they fliould iiill think it better to i>e niifernbley th.an not to he at all ; the S:i-^ tisfdctton of knowing tliemfelves to he^ muif out balance tl;e other M:fery which they felt j and coniequently, God's Right of obliging them would then hz founded m his Power of making them lefs, or more miferah/e, by continuing, or taking away, that Satisfa£lion , which they enjoyed : which coniirms the Truth of what I alfert.
This will farthv^r appear, if, in the next place, \vc confidQi' th.2t Righty mid Pom r if obliging, which Tlif.'^ have, or pretend to haV'C over one another- for whatever
kind
of ^li'^ion 1)1 Genera!. 99
ki/td or extent it be of, it is ^]]fou?7ded ///, and commeniuYAte to^ their fo^ver of contri- hutmg to the H^^fimfs^ or Mtjcry oF one another.
Many times indeed it fo liappens, that fome Men demand to be obeyed by o- thers,and lequiid them to Hve according to th:;ir();d'ji-sand Directions, when, at the fame time, they neither have, nor ever will have , any Power to Reward tlie obedience, or to Punifh the diibbedience, ofthofe upon whom they lay their com- mands ; fo, as to make it more for the interert: of fueh Perfons to obey than to difobey them. Upon which account, it is thought that, in many Cafes, there maybe a Right of .obliging^ where there is no Power to oblige: but without any Ground.
For, if there be a G(?^, who will judge the Aftions of Men, and will give to every one accordi/20 to bis work ; and it the Perfons , requiring Obedience frOm o- thers, arecommiffion'd bv ^^i^^^ to require it; then have they a Power :is well as a Right of obliging i\\c{\\ to it : bccaufe there arc fucli Rewards and Pumjhmer.is^ an- nexed bv G^d to the obedience, or dif- '^V'dience of thofe who arc under anv
loo ll?e Certainty and Kece/Jity
Authority derived from htm^ as are fuffi- cient to determine them to do what their refpe8:ive Governours or Majlers require of them : and, confequently, whoever are appointed by God to bear Rule over us, have a certain Power of contributing to our Haf^intfs^ or Mijery^ tho' it fliould fo happen that they cannot be the immedi- ate caufes of either themfeiijes.
But, if there be no God, tlien are there no Perfons Comm/J/ion^d or Authorifed by him to command others \ but whoever take upon them to give Laws to their Brethren ufurp upon the common Li- berty, and Equahty of Mankind ; and liave, in this Cafe, no morea/^^g/^/^than a Power of obliging thofe, whofe Intereft it is not to obey tJiem \ as will more fiillv appear hereafter , under another Head.
Other Inftances there are among Men, where the Power of obliging is, or may be exercifed, without the Right ; and that is, when fome Men, by the Advantage ot" a Superiour 6a.'/// and Strength^ do^- without any Authority from God^ command Obe- dience from others, upon the profpe^l of great Rewards, and Punifliments, in fuch thin<^s, where the Perfons fo commanded',
ar0
of ^li^ion in Generd.
\o\
are left at Liberty by God to a£l either way, as fliall fccm to tlicm bed, or moll for their Advantau;c /// this Life : In which cafe, tfiofe that prercribefuch par- ticular Acbions toothers, have a Power of obliging them to obey, becaufe they have a Power of determining them to nciy by the Confideratioii of greater Hapj/inefs to be obtained, by their doing as they are diret^ted , than could be hoped for , if they followed their own advice: but thofe who pretend to fiich an Authority have no Ria^ot to life that Power, they have, becaufe they are the?nfeives under greater Obligations^ with refpecl to Gody not to employ it^ than thofe y upon whom it is exercifed, are, with refpeci to them^ to obey it : but if there be no God^ then is tlieir Powi^r their Right,
Fromall which it follows, that, where- ever there is a Right of obliging^ there is likewife a Power of obliging ; and, where there is an ahfolute uncontroulable Power of obliging, there is, for that very Rea- fon, a Right alfo, but, where there is only a jubordtnate dependent Power of o- bliging , it may be exercifed without R^-^htj that is, contrary to fome Obligati- H j ons^
102 7h Certatnty and Nccejfity
ons^ which the Perfpns, who cxercife if, owe to a Suferiour Power.
But here, by a Right ofobltging^l would be underftcod to mean, a Liberty of offer- ingfuch Motives And Confideratior/s to ra-- t'tond Beings^ as, ivb^n duly apf lied, will necelTarily determine theni to act accordtno- ^y, with the full Cvnfent , and Appro- bation of their Mind ; And not ^> title to order and difvoje of them, and their Acii- ons, by an irrefiftible Force, accordnjg to the free and unlimited Pleafure of that ■Being, to whomfuch a Title is fuppofed to belong,
Hovv^ far it is confiflent with the Na- ture of God to order and difpofe of his Creatures thus, is no part of the prefent Enquiry ; but that he hath fuch a Right and Poiver of obliging, as I have explained, is fufficiently proved from the neceflary ■Attributes of God, before fpetiiied ; • and from the A^ature and Ground of all Obli- gation, of which I hA've here given a par- ficular account.
: Whether Cod hath a Right and Title to our Obedience upon any other Foun- dation but that of his Power to make us happy ; whether it be poffible for Man to a 3: voluntarily upon anv other Reafonor
Motive
of ^'ligion in General, i o j
Motive but that of hii own Hdppinefs ; and, whether H^xpptfiefs be the tiltmmte End of all ouv Jcf ions, and the r//t /mate Ground 0^ ■A\\OhIi(r^ation^ or only ii/uhor- dtnxte, but nccelfarj and infcpardble Con- fideration in everv thing wedo, if, what I have already faid upon thcfc Matters, does not fatisfy, iHiall no farther difputer. becaufc lam very well afTui'ed, that, what- ever other Grounds or Motives for our O- bcdience toGod may be imagined by fome, who pretend to act upon more ;^.9^/^ and difmtereffed Principles than that of their own Happinefs • 'tis impoHlble to perfuadc a Man, who does not yet believe any Re- ligion at all, to become religious, except it can be plainlv, or probably, at leal]-, Jiiade out to him, that he fliall better his Condition by it. This I am fure is the only Argument w^hich can prevail upon an Unbeliever to e^nbracc Religion ; and whoever fah'ly confultshimfelf, will £i\\dj that he neither dots^ nor can zdi upon any other ground.
It mull be confelTed, indeed, that, we often acl without knowing, or confider- ing what the Confequences of our acting will be; and we arc fo made and difpo- fed by nature that we readily acknow- H 4 ledge
104 7h Certainty and TSleceJJity
ledge our {tlves obliged to fubmit to the Will ai.cl CoiT.mands of God, nithcut any exfrefs Co/^(ideyaiton of future Happinefs^ to be obtained by our Obedience : but, on the other fide, it muft be owned too, that, if it could be evidently prov'd to us, that Mifery would be the certain Con^ fequence of thofe Actions, which, upon the firll: View, we thought our felves obliged to, we fliould then be forced to ac- knowledge, that we were miftaken in our firfc Judgments, and that it would be more reafonable for us to a8: any 0- ther way^ which, upon new and better " Proof, we were allured, would be more for cur HAppt}7efs.
Tihefe Things being premifed, I return to the min Qaeftion, "Whether we are actually under ui-iy Obligations to God^ or, (which is th.e fame thing, m other terms,) "Whether there be any Juch thino as Religi- on ? And, in this manner, I fhall prove that there is.
,Firft, I fliall fhew, that there \sfuch a pariicular vjay of actings iueh ^ courfe of ^^Aciions^ or Scheme and Model of livings which whoever duly and fairly reflects up» j ''' • on, '1
n
of ^ligion in General, i o y
on, w'lWhc forced to ack/iorriedge, that, if lie did //z^e after That manner, he fhoiild approve himfilf for fo doing;, and if he It- I'cd otherivife^ he fliould co»de?> n himjelf for it; and that he who finds himfelf ne- ceiTarily dctermin'd to approve fuch a par- ticular way of living, and to condemn the contra rv , wufl Acknowledge that he ought or is ohliged to aft accordingly. From whence I fliall draw this Inference, that, all things confidered, it miift be more for his Hiippinefs to a£l thus than otherwife, becauie, if it were not, he would not be under a neceffity of Judging as he does. And therefore, he r^ rrtdy and really obli- ged to aci as he judges he ought to act.
Secondly, I fhall prove, that God^ who was the Author of our Being, gate U6 fuch a Nature^ by which v/e are neceflarily de- termined to judge after fuJi a manner, for this very ?.nd^ that we fliould excr- cifeand employ all tiie F;rf////;>j and Vow- ers^ he has furniflied us with, fuitably hereunto : From whence I infer , that, what our Reajon tel: > us ought to be dom^ that we are commandtdby God to do ; and therefore, what God has made to appear reajonable or unreafonable^ and what he has difpofed us to approve or condemn, will
ac-
J q6 The Certainty m^l Ncceffity
accordingly conduce to our Happimfs or Mtferjy and upon that account are we ob- liged to do the one, and avoid the other. And that God purpofely created us after fuch a manner, with a Delign to oblige us to fuch and fuch Performances, I fliall farther endeavour to fliew, not only from the general Confideration of the Make and Nature of Man^ but from many other To^ kens and Indications of fuch an End, or Defign, plainly vifible in the World,
Thirdly, I fhall pofitively and directly prove from the Nature of Religion it felf that a Regular Practice of all thofe Duties or Obligations^ of which it confifts, would certainly conduce to the greatefl Happi. nefs^ that Man is capable of, confidered only in his prefent Condition^ as included within the Bounds of /^/^ Life.
Fourthly, I fhall fhew, that the DefeB rffuch a Practice^ and the Confluences of that defed, do neceffarily lead us to the Acknowledgment of fuch a future State^ as is fufficient to determine us to prefer one particular way of a6ling before ano- ther, xv^onfuch Reafons and Motives^ that !S, fuch Degrees of H.tppinefs and Mffery^
than
of Religion in Gcnewxl. i 07
than which we arc Curcgreanr^ ^nd more poiverful, cannot bcoftered to us.
From all which Confidcrations , the Certainty and Nectjjity o^ Religion will be- plainly and t\illy evinced.
I . Firll then, I am to fhew, that there is one f Articular ivaji of alltng^which we are neccfjarily determined to prefer to an)/ other ; ib that, upon a clear and impartial View of pure natural Reafon only, we cannot but thus acknowledge, that' what we prefer that we o^ght^ or are obliged to do , and whatever is contrary to it that we ought , or are obltgea , not to do ; and conicqucntly , that we are really obliged to act according to fuch Judg- ments, becaufe it muft, in the ilTue, be mc^ for our Happmefs fo to a6l.
That there are fome Natural Notions of Good and E'vily Right and Wrongs or fome fuch certain DijtinBious^ resulting from the Natures^ and Re I a: ions o^t\\mgSy as cannot be altered, or deltroyed by any arbitrary Agreement or Inftitution what- foever ; and that thele Notions are per- ceivable, by the bare uje of our Reafon
the
I o 8 T^^c Certainty and Tslece(pty
the r^.me way that any other part of our Knowledge is, has been conftantly own- ed by the^re^^^/ and)r//^//^r/^of Man- kind, however they may have difFer'd in affigning, which they were^ and what rvt"t :he true Grounds and Foundations of them.
Now, to put thefe Matters beyond all reafonable doubt, and to cut o!f all occa- fion of Conteft concerning them, I only defire this may be granted me^ That there are fome things fo clearly^ d.nd fully pro- pofed to the ?4ind, that a Man cannot deny^ or with-hold hiS A-jent to them ; and that, wherever this happens, there is the greatefi Certainty we are capable of: For then it mull: be granted alfo, that we may be as certain , that fuch or fuch Things ought ^ or ou^ht not to he done^ as that fuch or fuch Thmgs are^^ or are not after fuch a manner.
For Example ; I may be as fully fatif- fied, that I ougi^)t to deiire, and endea- vour after my own Happinefs, and that I ought not to take away the Kappinefs of another Man, when I know I /hall not add to my own by it, as I can be of the Truth of thefe Propofitions ; that c-- I'cry thing which mo'ues is \ that the jame
thing
of ^f^iiij^ion in Ocntral. \ 09
f^/>g cannot poflibly exifi, and not exifty At the fame time ; that is, in both thefe Inftances, the things alTented to, have an equal Snitablentjs or ylgreeablenejs to to our Reafon^ and the hke Force or Vto- lence would be offered to our Under- ilandings by a Denial of either: Which is the only Ground^ and Standard oi Certain- ty aflignable by us.
Several other mord Profojittons might be brought, which carry fo clear and tlill a Conviction 2i\on^ with them, as is not to be over-ruled by any after Confiderations: But the com7non Rides and Maxims of MorMiijy which are look'd upon as Laws of Nature, are not fo generd as thofe be- fore inllanced in, nor have, in all re- fpects, the fime degree of Certainty be- longing to them ; but what they are, how they are known, and how far they par- take of Certainty and Evidence^ I Ihall now give a fhort Account, and from thence fliall prove, that we are necejjsrily determined to ajfent to, and approve theje aljoy and to coridttnn^ and diny the con- trary of them ; and , confequentl)', that we have all the Reafon in the World to believe, that it will conduce more to our
Hap-
1 1 o The Certainty and Islcceljity
Happinefs, to a6l up to thefe Principles^ than to live in oppofition to them.
ThQ highefi and moft general mOYdX Du- ties commonly inftanced in, are fuch as thefe ; That God is to be worfhtp^ed ; that Varents are to be obeyed ; and that all other natural and civil Relations areproporttona-^ bly to be refpecled ; that vre ought to abjlain from all forts of Intemperance and Excefs^ and to provide all thtngj necejfary for the continuance of our Life • that we fbould not do any other Man an Injury ; but jhould contribute all rve can to the Happmejs of Mankind^ and ?nore particularly^ to the Welfare and Support of that Society we belong to.
Now thefe, and fuch like Propofitions as thefe, are known^ or found out^ by the Vfe2.nd Employment of our natural FactiU ties^ in the fame way that all other Truths are ; that is, Men are taught the Ideai which thefe Terms belong to,or^t?^ them by their onm Obfervation^ and then, by comparing them together, they immedi- ly acknowledge fuch or fuch a Relation between them, without being influenced by any other Motive fo to judge but what refults from the Things t he h^f elves.
The
of ^li^ion in General. i i i
The Relations indeed oiynornl Ideas^ as well as the Ideas themfelves^ arc, moft of them, /^.tr;7,Mrom others firft, before we are capable of hnding them out our felvcs; but this is no more an Argument, that our Alfent to fuch kind of Propofitions is only the EjfeH of Education/, and, confe- qucntly, a weer Prejudice^ and no right Judgment ; than it would be an Argu- ment, to prove, that all the Mithewau- cd Isjiowltdoe which a Man hath, is no- thing clfe but a Set offdfe Notions^ thru/1 upon his Underftanding by Educdtiu/i^ be- caufc lie liappen'd to be tiiught tfie iirft Grounds and Elements of this Science, while he was young, before he was capa- ble of finding them our by his own Ob- fervation : for, when we aftenvards come to review the ?rwral IQwwlcdge we goi,. whilft we were Children ; let us be ne- ver fo jealous over our felves, and let us take all the Care we can to deliver our felves from the Prejudices of Education^ we fliall ftiU adhere to, and be farther latis- fied of, moft of thofe Truths wliich we were then taught ; as is fufliciently pro- ved by the Experience of feveral, who being Religiouily Educated, have endea- ^ oured nfter wards todivcft their Minds
of
t 1 1 The Certainty and TSLeceffity
of all thofe found Principles they had been taught, and yet have found the truth too hard ibrthem. The Certainty and Impar- tiality of whofe Judgment , has been llrengthen'd by the pint Atfent of feveral of a contrary Education ; who being loofeiy, or Ignorantly bred, have, upon fober and mature Reflection, acknow- ledged tlie Power of Religion.
And, for a farther Illuftration of this Point, fhoLild we kippofea Y^vion entirely ignorant of all fuch Matters, but capable of ynderftanding them, when propofed, and fhould one of thefe moral Rules or Maxims be barely explained to him, with- out any Reafons offered to wove or incline his AfTent either way ; 'tis very difficult to imagine, how he could judge otherwiie than «'f do.
As for Example : Suppofe fuch a Per- fon were juftly informed concerning his own Nature^ and the Nature of God^ and what was meant by iVorfJjip^ and by all the Notions contrary to it ; and he were ask'd, which he fliould rather do, perform fuch Acts as would exprefs this vVorfhip, or neglect^ (^ight^ and omit them, or elfe ridicule^difhonoury 2ii\d bla/ph erne th.d.t Be- ing which we call God: or fjppofe, he
were"
of ^'U^ion VI General. \ i j
were told, what a Parent was , and that fuch a. Perfon was his Parent^ and that he himfelf was fenfible of a great many KindnefTes wliioh he had received from him ; and it were propofed to him, after a due ExpHcation o^" What was me?nt by thefe things, euher to warder him, or to defend him f'-oni fome imminent Dan- ger without anv hazard to himfeiP, or to Jtand jHll and Jo neither ; who is there that can doubt whether , in thefe CafeSy fairly propofed and ftated, fuch an unprejudiced Perfon as this would not chufe to rvorjhip his God, and defend his Parent f
We have therefore fufficient Reafon to conclude that moral Truths concerning humane Actions are knowable the fame way that all other Truths are, which terminate in Speculation only ; and that Men know more^ or feiver of them, according to the different C.:rj^tc/ry, and Application ofthofe, who are employed, in thefe Enquiries.
And, as to the Certainty and Evidence of fuch Truths as thefe ; 'tis, as in all o- ther kmd of Knowledge, greater, or lefs^ according as the Propofuions confidered are nearer to, o^ farther from tlie firfi ge- ^*ral Axioms^ ox Rules of MoraUti, from 1 ^ whence
I 14 Tl^e Certainty and Necefjky
whence all the reft are deduced ; fuch a? are thofe before mention'd, of feekingo/ifr
owp'/ HappmeJ'Sy unii not taking away another MarPs^ when we cannot add any thing to our own by it ; and fuch as immediately follow from hence, as^ that we ought to ■prefer a greater Goo^^ cr Fleafure^ to a lejs ; a lejjer E'vily or Pain^ to a greater ; and the like : The E'uidence of which is as- great, asthatofanyM^^^'t/^/yy/^^/, orA/^- r/^f/z/.i^'^/V^/ Axioms whatever.
But the other mord Duties which I had- occafion to inftance in, concerning the Worjbip of God^ Obedience to Parents^ &c. \v\\iQ[\d.rcleJs general^ have not tho, fame degree of Evidence ; becaufe the Certainty- and Necejjity of the Connexion of thofe Act- ions with our own Happimfs^ ( which is the original Foundation of all Action and Duty,) isnot fo clearly difcoverable^ that we immediately perceive it ; but the £- 'vidence of thofe common Principles and Rules of Morality which I have mention- ed before, is fo great, that^- when they are fairly offered to the Underftanding, with-^ out any C^nft deration of our ownHappineJs being conGcrn'd in them ; (if this may be fuppofed; as, in feveral Inftances, no doubt, it mayj) we never refujeour Af-
fenp
of ^ligion in General. \ \ 5
/(?«/• to them : and, if lb, there can be no reafon alTiguM, why we lliould jndge wrong, when there is nothing fuppofed to determine the Mind either way, but the Nature of the Ideas themfelves which we judge of; and, when cili Men^ in the fame Circumfl-ances,^:^^^/?^^/// judge aHke.
But, the truth of all thefe moral Prin- ciples depending intirely upon the relati- on which they bear to our Happinefs, we arc farther to examine, what ground there is to believe, that afting up to thefe Prin- ciples is the lurell: way to make our felves Happy.
Now the Reafon wc have to conclude that there is a Connexion between fuch moral Aci'wns and our Happincjs ; and that the Performance of thofe Actions^ which, without ^.nyvifihle relation to our Happinefs, we approve, will be attended with /nore Pleafure, or lejs Pain than fuch Omifjions^ or ABions^ which, without any profpeci of Mifery, we condemn ; the reafon, I fay, we have, thus to conclude, is this: we lind oar fcKxs under an ahfo- lute necefflty of defirmg, and en'deavourtng after our own Happinefs, and every thing which wc know tends to it ; and o'i jiyifjgy and Avoiding, whatever mt apprehend I 2 mav
1 1 6 n^e Certainty and Neceffity
may ^(^Jfe/^, or take it awaj^ or put us into a contYAYj State of Mtfory : we find alfo, that Pleafure^ and Paik-^ Ha^pinefs^ and Mtfery^ are the only Principles^ and Mo- tives of Aoiion ; and the obtaining the one, and avoiding the other, the only Ends of all Endeavour and Purfuit : and therefore, we cannot conceive it poflQble, that Beings fo made, oi fnch a Nature and C on ft 1 1 ut ion as this, fiiould be alfo contrived after fuch a manner as to be necejfarily determined to approve thofe An- ions, and to h^dae themfelves obhs^ed to do them, wliich would tend to their Mi- fery^ and to condemn thofe Omiffions^ and Performances, and j^idge that they ought not to be guilty of them, which would procure their Happinefs.
Except then it can be proved from Rea- fon^ or it be fome other way difcoverable, that aBing according to thefe moral Ruleii will certainly be attended with more Mifery^ or lefs Happmcfi^ than a fling a^ gam ft them ; the prefent Approbation of our Judgment is a fufficient Argument, that the Ohfervance of them will conduce Tnore to our Happinefs^ than tlie NegUcl^ or Violation of them : and if it be impofli- ble to prove the contrary, as I think it
is.
of ^ligion in General. i 1 7
is, and as it will plainly appear to be here* after, when I come to confidei* ^futur^ State^ then are we -/leceffarily deter muPd to m^kc fuch j!/d<^Me;^/tsconccvn\nfi, our Afti- oiis, as I have mentioned ; and, if we are ncceflarily^ determin'd to judge thus, we have they'^w^, or very near the fame Rex- fon to conclude, that the Obfer'vation of fuel) moYAl Rules , or Juch x particular ivay of AcHrig as our Reafo^ approves will contribute ///^r^ to our flappimfs than that which it condemns-^ and, confequently, that we arc obliged fo to a8: ; as we have to coi.clude, that what we are neceffarily determined to give, or refule our Affent to , fliould be true^ or f:'Jfe , accord- ingly.
For the original Frame and Conflitutio?} of the Mi?id^ being the only St^a-adard of Haputnefs as well as Truth ^ and the Mind being as capable of Happmefsy as Truth ; (nay, iftlicfc can befeparated, and there be any Treccdcnce of one to tl..c other, be- ing made fir ft and principally for Happi. nej's) there is as tnuch ground to fuppofe, that iMen are not deceived when thev are neccjfarily determined to fttdge^ that fuch a tiling ought ^ or ought not to be done, as when tliey are determined to judge, tliat I I fuch
1 1 8 Tl:c Certainty and Necejfity
fuch a thing ^^ or is not : jind, if fo, then, confequer-tly, fuch a thing as they have thus neceffarily judgM, ought, or ought rot to be done, will as certainly tend to their hUppmfs ^ or Mtfery^ ac- cordingly , if they a^ agreeably to the feveral Judgments they have made ; for, otherwife, they would have been de- ceived in fo judpj^g : and , when the Mind is no other way concernM in any thing elfe than as it has 2i relation to its felf^ and lias nothing to do to know any further, whyfhould not it judge as truly and certainly of the Statahlenefs ^ and Unfuitaklenejs , of other things , to its felf\ as it does of their Jgncment^ and "Difagreement^ among one another f
Since therefore theCcgeneral Frinciples^ or Rules of humane -aUion^ which are com- monly Icokt upon as the firif foundations of all Morality or Duty^ are found fo very agreeable to our pureft and moft impar- tial Reafon, that, upon a bare propofal of them, without any /^r^^/^'/^^/^ relation to our Hapfmefs^ they command, our Jjfent^ and Approbation^ and we cannot but ac- knowledge , that, what we approve that \ve ought to do. and what we condemn that rve o^ight not to do^ it may, I think,
' ' be
of ^lio^ion in General, i 1 9
be very fairly infcrr'd from hence, that it would conduce more to our Happtnefs to a£l accordi?ig to them, than to acl 0- therivije-j and, confequently, that we arc really , and cffeBuall) obliged , in the full extent and force of the Word , to a flricl: and careful Obfervation of thefe Meafures, in the whole Courfe of our Lives.
From all which it plainly appears, that the Certai'/zty of thefe moral Axwms or Pro- pofttions, which I have placed in thtfecond rank, falls 'very little fhort of the Evi- dence of thofe firjl irrcfijlible \jtfdgmentSy or rather l-fnprejjions concerning our own Huppimfs , mentioned before : for thefe latter are known immediately by their own light, as the former are; and, if it does not prefently appear to us, with the fame clearnefs, that fuch Aftions as are agreeable to thefe moral Rules, have a neceflfary Connexion with our Happinefs • yet, that there is fuch a Connexion be- tween them, is, in t!ie htghefi degree that can be pr.uable. And this is the leafl-, that can be inferred, from what has been alledged, upon this Head ; and I am very cautious of laying more ftrefs upon any I 4 Ar^
t 20 Tl:>e Certainty and Neceffity
Argument than it will unqueftionably bear.
2. The next Step I am to make in the Twof of ReligioKy is, to fhew, that, what our Reajon approves , or condemns , and tells us that we ought, or ought not to do^ that we are commanded to do^ or not id do^ by God himielf, who gave as ftich a Nature^ by which we are ;^^ •' ^jjartly de- termined to judge, and to be dpihd, after fuch a certain manner -^ for this Und, and with this Def^gn that we fliould a^i ac- cording! j ; of which Ettd^ and DeCign he has given us feveral Tokens, and indica- tions : which is a farther Confirmation, that it is more for our Happ/nefs, to ohjtrve thefe Meafures of acting, than not ; and confequently, that we ire chliged hy Cod to obferve them.
That we received our Betngs, together with all the P ''n^'^^^■, Capacities, and what- ever elfe belongs to them, from God, is very evident ircm tlie Account before given of the Divine Nature ; aad there- fore, when we are necefjanly determined to judge, or to he affecied^ after fuch a riianner, that 'tis plainly out of cuqPower " ' " to
of ^li^ion in Geneyal. 1 1 1
tD judji,e, or to be affedled otherwife, we mull conclude, thnt fuch ?. Vetermi- nation is four. dec' in our very Frame and Make J and, coivlquently, is the i1 V/C- of God, who, being dn i^^i'/Iigefit and tp//^ Being, n?i.ll be (iippoied to order every thing he makes to Ibme End : and, there being no End \\ hlch he can be fuppofed to Cizfc^n any thing for, but that which it is capable of, and whicli it is peculiarly fitted to attain; what Reafon can be given, why we fhouldbc capab/e o^ Juch Actions^ 2Liid peculiarly dijpofcd to them, by a necejfary Approbation oi them, if it were not defgned by God that we fhould a5l ac- cordingly ?
And, farther, Since, by our very A^j- ture and Confiitutio/i^ we find our felves irrefijlihly deterr^tKea to feek, and endea- vour after Happix.efs, and to avoid Mi- fery ; we have all lIu reafon in the World to conclude, that Happtnefs is the ultimate End of our Being, and all our Actions : and, therefore, God, who made us after this mnnner, having alfo made it necef- fary for us t': .ipprovc fuch Aftions, and to judge them fit to be done ; and to con- demn others as not fit to be done ; we • annot conceive itpoljible^ that he fliould
f?}aki
I 2 1 The Certainty and NeceJ/ity
r,:ake it necejfary for us to aim at Happinefs^ in all that we do, and yet at the fame time, fhould make it ^eceffary for us to approve fuch A'^ions, and toji^dge ourfe/ves obliged to do them, as would no tend to our Hap- pnefs : for this is to deftgn^ and determine us to a certain End^ and, at the fame time, to make it neceffa/y for us to approve iuch means as are contrary to it , and to con- uemn fuch as would leai us thither ; which is a perfect Contradidion to all the no^ tions we have of a wife Being, and cannot be fappofed of God,
As therefore we have reafon to be throughly fatisfied , that , what we ne- ceffarily judge ought ^ or ought not to he \done ^ muf^ be in reality what we have iudg'd it t^ ^ " becaufe it is impoffible to conceive, that we (liould h^ fo diJ}ofed^ with relation to our own Happinefs^ as to be under a neoefftty of being m'jliken^ in the clearejl and moft vr^mediate Perceptions^ which Vv'^e are capable of, concerning it; fo, likewife, when we confider our felves, as made and cortrwed by God^ we are farther , and more direftly convinced of the truth of all thofe things which we find our felvcs necpJarily determined to affent tor^ becaufe we are fully affured from the
of Religion in General, i 2 j
Nature of God. that we canriot be deceived by him, and, confcquently, that we are not mijlaktn in any of thofe Judgments which we are nectjfan/j determined to make, when it is God that determines us.
But, if any Sufpicion of a Miftake could be entertained , there feems to be lefs ground for it in thofe Judgments, wherein our Happinejs istmmediate/y concern'd,than in the Judgments we make upon things which have no relation to us : for 'tis more reafonable to think, that Gc><:/ fliould make us after fuch a manner, as to leave us under a neceffity of Judging ivrong^ -in Matters, where the Conftquences would be the fame to us, wliether we judged right^ or not ; than to imagine, that he fhould purpofe/y determine us to judge wrong, where Hafpinefs^ and Mtjery^ de- pend upon our Judgment.
Thus it appears, x\nt God d^x^ defign to oblige us to fuch a particular way of act- ing, or living, fiom the general Conjidera^ tton of the Nature of Man ; wliereby he is ^ecejfarily determined to approve fome Ani- ons, and to condemn others, and to judge thusothimfelf, t\\2Lthz ought to do what he fo approves, and that he ought not to do what he lb condemns : and, therefore, we are
obliged
1 2 6 The Certainty and 'KeceJJity
in our Favour, and not to our Difad- Vantage.
Now 'tis plain, that, in both thefe Ca- fes, our Adions are not the Effects of pure Reafo?ij tho% upon Examination, they are found to be exaftly agreeable to it : for, befides that, we do not, immediate- ly perceive a necefTary connexion bet ween fuch Adions and our own Happinefs; nor upon the ftri£left Obfervation of what pafTes within us, are fenfible, of thofe Steps, and Degrees, which we are con- fcious of, in all manner of reajoning : be- fides all this, I fay, if we afted by rea- fon only^ what need would there be of thofe prevtoui Sentiments^ we feel ; when we might perform all xh^outwaraAciions that were proper, upon a bare rational Profpecf of the Advantages, which we were likely to gain by them : but , if we look into our felves , we fhall be convinced , that we cannot help having thofe Sentiments which we feel upon fuch Occafions ; that we do not reafon our felves into them ; and, if, by the Un- happinefs of our Temper, or any other way, we fhould want thefe Sentiments of Gratitude, Reverence , or the like, we fhould find fome difficulty in reafo-
ning-
of ^Itgion in GeneraL i 27
ning our felves into the ftme outward
Behaviour^ as vv^ould Iiavc followed, if
we had been Jo ajjecied \ and, tho' we
were never fo well convinced, that our
Happiriefs was really concern'd in fuch a
Behaviour, all our A6lions would come
JloweVy be performed with nt^tc Conjlramt^
and lefs Lonformity to one another, than
if they had proceeded h'om a lively nsi^
turd Serije ^ till Hxhit^ had enabled us
to a6l with greater Eafe and Difpatch.
And thus we lliould find our felves ori- ginally m.ide and difpofed^ with rcfpcO; to all t\\Q,gef2eral Duties oi Morality^ and Re^ Itgion^ if we entred upon a particular Ex- amination of our whole Frame and Con- ftitution : from whence we may con- clude, that thefe natural and original In- cltnatwnsy and Propenjions to fbme Ani- ons, and Rejhaints jrom^ and Auerjions to others^ which wi:, feel in our felves, without being confcious of 2iny previous Deliberation concerning the Reafonable- fiefs ^ or Vnreafonabientjs of what v/edo; or, which, alter Judgments of this Na- ture made, we look upon, as certain Motions of the Soul, carrying us on to ad according to fuch Judgments, witli more Lajcj ^ackntjsy and ^application of
Mind,,
iiS The Certainty and Necefflty
Mindy than we fhould have done, upon the hare Co/njich^.-a of ouf Reafon^ with- out them : All thefe Dif^r-fittonsy I fay, and SeattmeMs of the Soul, being given us by God , and ^'.-'/^^V^j us^ conformahlj to the Di£lates of ear ReAJon^ in dif- charging what we call the Duties of Re- ligion; we have fufficisnt Caufe from hence to conclude, that God did defign us for the Prutice of fucn Duties ^ and confequently , that an obedient Comi^li^ ance with this Defign will contribute more to our Happfnefs^ than our Difohe- dience can ; which is 2. farther Proof, that rve are aHually under Obligations to God^ or that there really is fush a thing ds Re^ lizior?,
o
Which Obligations^ together with God^s Right of oblfgi;7/r^ we are conftantly put in mind of by the Oeconomy and Confiitu- tion of Humane Society^ and the feveral Relations arifing from thence.
The different kina^ o^ Government ^ and SubjeBion^ to be found among Men, are the chiefejl Marks and Characters , by which they are difting4.ufli'd from one another in Society ; thefe take up a large fhare in theix Thoughts and Dif-
courfesji
of^'Ii^ion in General, 129
courfcs, and a great part of their Ani- ons are influenc'd and determined by the Xotions and Opinions they have of them: I rom whence wc arc led to acknowledge, that we are under hightr Ohligxtions of Obedience to God than we can be to any I'um.Xfie Governour whatfoevcr : for, w hether we confider our felves as 6Vr- r.ints^ Children^ ov Suhjech', or any Other way inferinur to others ; whatever Rea- I'ons are alledged for our Duty and Obedi- ence to AhfierSy Parents^ or Princes^ or for their Right of commanding us^ will conclude more firongly upon us , w^lien we confider our felves ivtth Relation to God.
All tlic Re.tfons which arc given for our Obedience to Men, and for their right of obliging us, are Power ^ Goodnefs^ and Property. When a Perfon has a Power of contributing to my Htppinejs^ or Mifery^ and I do, Ibme way or other, belong to him, lb as to he calFd his^ I look upon my {<A^ ^soblig^ed to obey him, or to att according to his Will; and if, be/ides his having tliis Power and Property^ I confider him ^.s more inclinable to dome good, than hurt, I conceive my felf un- K der
1 30 T7;e Certainty and Kecejfity
der higher Ohligatiojis of Obedience to him.
But now God hath dl thefe Titles to our Obedience in the highefi degree pjjibLe ; for, by giving us our intire Being, and cvxry thing that belongs to our Nature, ^tis plain, that he hath, not only, a greater Vower of contributing to our Happi- nefs^ or Mijery than any Man can have, but alfo, a greater Property in us, by this Jcl' of Creation^ or Production^ than can accrue to any Man by Conquejl, Purchafe^ Covenant^ Generation^ or any other way whereby Men come to have a Property in one another. And that he has more Goodnefs towards us, or is more inclina- ble to contribute to our Hnppimjs than Mifery ^ is manifeft from the Benefits^ wliicli we have already received from him.
Tlic inference I draw from hence is, that, as our Reafon^ and "Judgment^ which tell us, what ought, or ought not to be done ; and as our natural Inclina- tions^ and Jz'erjions, which difpofe, and excite us to a£l agreeably to our Reafon were given us by God, with a defign of engaging us to acl accordingly ', fo, moreover, were we put into fuch a State
and
of ^lti(wn in General, i J i
arid Condition^ with regard to one ano- ther, that the nccclTaiy Relations re- fulting from Society might put us in mind of our relation to God , and of the proper pccuUar Anions confequent upon it ; fo that, by a confiant traditional Education/ in the exercife of thcfe Duties of Subjedion, of different forts, to one another^ we fliould be led to the Ac- knowledgement of our Obligations to a Superior Beings more eafily, than if every Man liad been left to himfelf, to find them out, by the ufc of hii own Faculties only^ without thefe particular Occasions of fetting his Reafon and Inclinations 0!i work.
All which Confiderations concerning the State of humane Nature ^ and Society^ are at leati very probable Arguments^ that we are actually obliged by God to fuch a particular way of living as we call Religion: and confequcntly , we have Reafon to conclude, tint a careful fra- (hie of Religion (all things confidered,) \vill contribute more to our Happinefs^ than a iXeglecf or Tranjgre/fion of it ; be- caufe the fame God, who defigns us for Happimfsy defigns us alfo for the Practice of the D:it.'tfs of Religion^ tho' we do K ?. not
1 3 2 T}?e Certainly and Neceffhy
not yet perceive an immediate Connexion between Religion^ and Hdppinefs ; which is the next thing to be proved.
^. In the third place then I (hall give fome pofuive and direct Proof from the Ndture of Religion it felf^ that a reguUr Practice of all thofe Duties or Obligations of which it confifls would certainly con- duce to the greateft Happinefs that Man is capable of, confidered only in his pre- fe-nt Coridittony as included within the Bounds o'i this Life.
'Tis plainly perceived upon a fiiort tran- fient View and Comparifon of the Hu- mane and Divine Natures that Man was ?nade and dejigned by God for Happinefs ; and by the trrefifitble De fires of Happinefs^ and Aver pons to Mijery^ that wx Expe- rience in our felves, as alio by our conjlant unalterable Endeavours to attain the one and avoid the other, we are more nearly and neceiTarily convinced, that the Enjoy- ment of the pureft moft unallayed Happi- nefs that we are capable of, muft be the iiltifnate End of our Beino and all our jU
clions.
Since therefore God hath made us capa- ble
of ^ligion in General, 1 5 5
hie of Happ: fiefs, and defigned us for it^ and we jind our felves necejfanly determi~ nedto aim at tliis End ; fince the only way of attaining this End, is by our Actions^ and we are afTured by Experience that all our Aclions do not lead to it, but that Mifery as well as HAppinefs may be the Effect and Confcque/ice of our Aflions, it follows from hence, that there muft be one parttctiLir n\ty of achfig , which , if' fteadily purfued, will certainly procure \\s greater Hnppinefs than we can pofTibly attain b}' any other.
And farther , if we are defigned for Happinefs^ and this Happinefs be attaina- ble only by one particular way of ailing, 'tis certain that the fame God who de- figned us for fuch an End muft defign alfo that we fhould ufe fuch means as would condu8: us thither.
In Conformity to which Dcfigns wc cannot but believe that , as he hath given us a certain Kjiow I edge of and ne- ctfjfary Determinations toward our End^ hc muft have given us ^Kofuffictent Tokens and hidicatwns of the Means that lead to it ; and, upon Examination we are iatisfied that he has done fo ; by framing K I our
134 T^-^ CeKta'mty and Keceffity
our Mtfids after fuch a manner that we are necefl'arily determined tc approve fome Aftionsand to condemn others, and to judge our felves obliged to do what we appiove, and to avoid what we con- demn; by gi'v'tng us fuch natural Prcpen- fions and Averfwns agreeable to the Judg- ments of our Reafon, as by a fudden and unperceivable Influence difpofe us to, and aflift us in the Performance of the fame A6lions which Reafon prefcribes ; and by putting us into fuch a fate or condi- tion of Life with refpeO: to one another^ wherein the different kinds of Govern- ment and Subjection, and the Notions and A6lions refulting from thence un- avo'dably lead us to the Acknowledg- ment of God\ Superiority, Power, and Right of obliging, and of the NecelTity of our Obedience to him, in all the fe- veral Inftances of Duty, in which we conceive our felves bound to any govern- ing Relation among Men, but in a much higher and more exalted manner, as becomes the might\^ Inequality be*- tween God and Man,
From M'hence we are fartlier hd ta conclude tliat a!i other Duties and Obli- gations^ which we apprehend our felves
un-
of ^Ugjoii in General. i j 5
iiidcr, with refpe^l to oar felves^ or 0- :hi'rs, arc tlic Effc£l of our Obligation
o Cody tlic Supreme Governour of the ll'or/d^ whofe Poiveraml Right arc over '•I things^ original^ and independent ; from u'hom all other Powers and Rights are
i^nvt'd-^ and on whom tlicy ^^/^-W; the Scnfc of which Obligation renders all our A6lions that are ducly influenced by it Religious^ tho' God be not the imme- di.ite O^jt'cV of them.
And thcfc arc fufficient Marks and E- videnccs to affurc us that God does re- quire us to acl fuch a particular way, and confequently that wc arc n^iudly obliged to frame our Lives according to thofe Rules and Meafures which come under the Name of Rdtgion , unlcfs it can be ilicwn, from more certain Difcoveries of the Nature of Man^ and the Defign of God , that , notwithftanding all thcfe fair Appearances, Religion is not the ^Vay to Happinefs. But, as 'tis manifcft li'om what wc have already obfcrved of the A' at lire of God, and our own Fra/?:d and ConiHtution, that no higher AlTti • ranees can be given us of the Trutii oi uny thing tliiui what we have had in this K 4 matter
i -^ 6 Tloe Certainty and NeceJ/Ity
mattpr\, from a Concurrence of our Rea^ fon^ ?7£LturAl Inclifiitttons , and externd Condition , and that we cannot be de- ceived in afTenting to fuch TelHmony ; fo, upon farther Experiences, andObfer- vations, taken from our felves, and the State of Mankind, with relation to Re- ligion, we fhall find that Religion is, in its own Nature^ fo fitted and friited to the Nature of Man^ and fo proportion'' d to the original Difpofitions^ and Dejires of the Souly as by a proper Tendency and Efficacy to promote his hlappmefs.
This appears firfl: by what we feel in pur felves. "What jufl: and impartial Reafcn approves v/e find a Pleafure in approving; Inclination fuperadded to Judgment heightens the pleafing Senti- ment ; citing what Nature inclines to and Rctfon warrants , is accompanied with a new and higher Satisfaction, all which Fieafurcs we repeat and enjoy over again by Rejiexion. And, if any P^^^^^ or Vneaftnefs either mixes with the Plca- fjrc , or attends it , that does not arife from t\icfa??ie T bought s or Actions that this docs, but from fome contrary Application c}f M^>^d^ c-ithcr in our felves, or others.
of 'T^cho^ion in GaicraL i 5 7
\ liich obllruQs, and oppofcs us in the ; acticc of Rclis^ion , or from feme o- tlier extrt?/jic.il Caufe wliich has no De- pendancc upon, or Connexion with Re- hgion ; fo that the due Perfoyninme of any Rchgious Aftion is never proper/ji tlic Caufe of any Patn or Trouble to him that performs it , however in fome In- ftanccs it may feem to be the Occafiou of it.
But, in order to be farther fatisfied of the natural Connexion between Religion' and Happinefs^ and that we may more dearly perceive that the latter is the true and genuine EFi'eft of the former, we fhould take off our Tlioughts from the prefent State of Mankind^ and reprefent to our felves another Generation of Men, Jiving together in a conjiant rfguUr Ob- fervance of all the Duties and Ohligattons of Rehgion : for there we fliould behold fuch a glorious Scene of Happinefs rifing before us, that, confidering the neceffary Circumfances of our mortal Condition^ we could not pofllbly imagine, or form an Idea of any thing m thui Life be- yond it.
This would be a State of umverfal Peace, Safety , Tta^iquillity^ and Love^
Vviiere
1 3 8 77;e Certainty and TSLcccffity
where there would be no Injuries nor Fears ^ no En'vy nor Difirufi ; where e- very Man would find all the Pleafures of Friend fhip in the Company of every Man , and feel his own agreeable Thoughts towards others redoubled, by knowing that others had all the fame Sentiments for him : all the rmturd Af- f elites and Defires of the Soul would he fit is fie d^ without a painful Eagernefs in the Purfiiit, or Satiety in the Enjoyment ^ and there would be no irregular imagi- nary Defires to create the Uneafinefs of Difafpomtment : then every Man would be plea fed with all that he dtd, and have his Satisfaftion heightned by a full and en- ' tire AfTurance that his Aftions were ajf-. proved by the Worlds and accept. ihle to God.
Was true Religion lb unii/erfal/y^nnd ejc- acllj pradlifed among Men, they would engage the Power and Wtfdorn of the fti- ^reme Governour in their Favour^ by the Honour^ Refpecl, and Obedience which they paid him ; they would be furc of all tlie Benefits and Advantages of hu- Tn&ne Strength and Skill ^ by a mutual Performance of all t]\Q Duties of Society : und by an equal rcgi\Iar Conduct;;, ^wd.
Man-
of Religion in General. 1 5 9
Management of their own particular Ca- pacities and Powers , they w^oiild pre- ferve themfeives in the fittefl: and moll proper Condition of cn'oying thofc a- greeable Satisfaclions, which God had put within their Reach, and would prolong the Enjoyment of them, by extending their Lives to the utmoft Term , to which by any Endeavours of their own, they could poflibly carry tliem.
Whoever takes a full and difl:in8: View 0^ Religion^ in all its P^^i^r and £jf/^«/^, muft acknowledge that thefe are the ^r//e and nece(j/iry Efjetis of it, where its Influ- ence is freely difper^fed, without Check or Oppofition from contrary Caules. And what greater Hiippt'/iefs than this can we conceive our felves capable of without a longer Date of //refect Ltfe, or ^profpecl of a/iother ? or, at leaft, what greater is attainable by any other ^t7/o;?j befides thojeof Religion?
But this, I confefs, is all but an inuigi- iiAry Scene^ a bare Idea or Pattern drawn by the Mind , which never was , and perhaps never will be exemplified /;2///t' redity of things : and therefore it does cot necclTarily follow from hence that, ivhenj^thc GenemUty of Men 3.ci contrary
10
1 40 TJye Certainty and Neccfftty
to Religion, as now they do, thofe few who are mixt with them, and Hve ex- A[ily Accordi/Jg to the Rules and Precepts of it^ iliall enjoy more Happinefs than any of the reft , much lefs fuch whofe Pra8:ice is tnconfiant and defective^ which is certainly the Cafe of the heft and moft careful Obfervers of thofe meafures of ading which Religion pre- fcribes.
However, thus much, I think, may juftly be inferred, That Religion is, inits own Nature J froducitve o^ HapptnefsyRnd of nothing elfe, and confequently was de- figrPd and ord.ttn'*d bj^ God for the obtain- ing thisEffeclo
From whence I conclude, that if Man was made for Happinefs^ and was directed and difpofed to feck it by the means of Re- ligion^ and if thefe means are found to be in their o)vn Nature fuffictent , but are fome way or other, witiiout the Fault of the Perfon who ufes them, render'^d tnef- fechial for the prefent ; from hence, I fay, we may certainly conclude that God^ who in his great WKdom has order'd all thefe things, did not order th.em in vain, but has fo contrived them that, Jome timt or other y the End to which they all point
fh?.U
of ^'li^ion in General. 1 4 1
jiicill be obtained ; and therefore, if a ftd and exact Obfervance of all the Du- ties of Religion be not attended with a fuitabic Happincfs m thU Life , 'tis a Itrong Proof that there will be a//z///re State^ in which there will be Rewards anfwerable to the higheft Performances and Expectations.
Wc have Reafon alfo, from the Good- nefs and Wifd.om of God, to hope, that the (incere Endeavours of thole , whofe Courfe is fometimcs interrupted with voluntary Traufgrclfions of the Rules prcfcribed them, will notwithftanding, by fome Favour or Grace, procure them a State of Happt/iefs. But this we may be fure of, that God will put a mighty Di/Iinclion between fuch d.s do but Jome- r/^//f.c deviate from thofe religious mea/ures which he hath propofed to them, and fncJi as conjlantly a6l by dtfjerent Prtn- ciples.
4. The Proof of this Conclufion is the fourth thing I have undertaken, in order to tlie Rllablifliment of the Truth and Necefjitj of Religion^ under which head I am to ihew, that the Defect of a ge- neral and regular Pra^icc of Rehgion,
and
1 4© Tlx' Certainty and ^Kcccfflty
to Religio^y as now they do, tho/e few who are mixt with them, and Hve ex~ aBIj accordti'ig to the Rules and Precepts of it^ fhall enjoy more Happinefs than any of the reft , much lefs fuch whofe Pra£lice is inconftant and defe6iive^ which is certainly the Cafe of the beft and moft careful Obfervers of thofe meafures of ading which Rehgion pre- fcribes.
However, thus much, I think, may juftly be inferrM, That Religion is, in its own Nature ypyoduciive o^Happnefs^and of nothing elfe, and confequently was de^ fign''d and ordmi*d i?j God for the obtain- ing thisEffeclo
From whence I conclude, that if Man was made for Happinefs ^ and was directed and difpofed to feck it by the ?neans of Re- ligion^ and if thefe means are found to be in thetr oivn Nature fujficient ^ but are fome way or other, without the Fault of the Perfon who ufes them, render'' d inef- fecfual for theprefent ; trom hence, I fay, we may certainly conclude that God^ who in his great WHHom has order'd all thefe things, did not order th.em in vain, but has fo co^^t rived them that, Jome ttmt or other ^ the End to which they all point
fii?.'-
of^'li^ion in General. 141
fliall he oOtAined ; and therefore, if a full and exacl Obfcr Vance of all the Du- ties of ReUgion be not attended with a fuitablc Happinefs /« t^Jts Life ^ 'tis a fttong Proof that there will be a /«/ //re StAte^ in which there will be Rewards anfwerable to the higheft Performances 1 nd Expeftations.
We have Reafon alfo, from thcGc?^^- nefs and Wifdom of God, to hope, that the (incere Endeavours of thofe , whofe Courfe is fometimcs interrupted with voluntary TranfgrelTions of the Rules prefcribed them, will notwithftanding, by fome Favour or Grace^ procure them a State of Happt/iefs. But this we may be fure of, that God will put a mighty Viilnniiori between fuch diSdo but fome- r/^/>!f.f deviate froni thofe religious meafures which he hath propofed to them, and fuch as conjhntly a£l by dijjerent Prirj- ciplti.
4. The Proof of this Conclufion is the fourth thing I have undertaken, in order to tiie RrtabliOiment of the Truth and Necefliti of Religion^ under which head I am to fhew, that the Defeci of a ge- ncYAl and rtguUr Practice of Religion,
and
i 4 2 The Certainty and NeceJJny
unci the Confequences of this Defeclj ^o necefTarily^ lead us to the Acknowledg- ment of fuch a future State, as is fuffici- ent to determine us to prefer one parti- cular way of Life before another, upon fuch Reafons and Motives, that is, fuch degrees of Ha^pinejs and Mifery , than which we are fure greater , and more powerful cannot be offered to us.
*Tis very plain, that Religion is not umverfally pra6lifed in the World, nor do the generality of any Nation or Society of Men make their Duty to God the go- verning Principle of their Anions. 'Tis manifelt likewife, that thofe few who are fenfible of their Obligations^ and do endea- vour to difcharge them, do in many In- ftances neglect them, or aB contrary to them : upon which Accounts it happens, that as there is more Mifery in the World than our mortal Condition, would otherwile fubjetl us to, fo it oftentimes falls to the religious Man^s Lot to have the greateflfuare of it.
Nor is all the Troiible and Uneafincfs hefuffers the Effecl: of ^'/V/t?»j Habits and lmp-cffio?is mixing with, and obftrucling the Performance of his Duty, or carrying
him
of ^Ugion in GeneraL 1 4 j
him to contrary AQ:ions, Ttlio very much he owing to this Caufe; but a great many Affli^lions and Calamities are brought upon him by the MaUce and Hatred of wicked Men, purely for his being religious \ fo that, did he prfecHy and compleatly fulfil all his Duty to God, there is Reafon to believe, that his Mifery would be pro- port ionably eiicre^fed,
Vxoxvi whence it plainly follows, that God hath provided fome other fiat e of Hap. pnefs for fuch as live exactly according to his Purpofe and Intention here ; which will be lb full and fufficient a Recom- pence for all the Mifery they have indu- !x:dinthis Life, as to juftify tlieir Obedi- ence to God, notwithdanding their pre- fent Sufferings upon tluit account.
For, if God de{igrPd Man for Happi- nejs^ (as 'tis certain he did,) 2.n^ appointed Religion to be the ?neans of obtaining it< (as manifeftly appears from his annexing Pleafure to the purelt and moli unmixE praclice of Piety and Virtue^ as well as from fcveral other Indications,) 'tis im- poffible to fuppofe that, after a due and proper \}k ot the means, God fliould iliffer Iiis Ends to be dtftated^ by the den- Ted^ dcptn(ic>tt Power ^ and Qomrirayice of
other
1 44 The Certainty and Kecefjity
other BeingSy and fliould prder things {o^ that thofe who were mojl diligent and ex- act in obferving the trueft meafurcs of a£l- ing, fliould , for that uery reafon^ meet with the Uajl Succefs,
Should we therefore fiippofe d.fewPer- fons perfectly religious^ afflicted and tor- mented by wicked Men, barely upon that account , fas there can be no other , if they are what we fuppofe them to be ; j we miift then conclude, thatGod has migh- ty Blejfings in Jlore for them, in compari- fon of which their prefent Sufferings are as
nothing.
From hence alio we may nifer, that thofe whofe (incere Refolutions and Endea- njours are not attended with exact and u- mverfal Performance, and yet, who are rendred 7nore rmferahle by the Actions of wicked Men than tliey other wife would have been, for the fake of thofe degrees of Religion they have attained to ; 'tis rea- fonable, I fay, to conclude that thofe will, fotne time or other, receive more Happmefs, Oi' lefs Mifery t\\ia others, proportionably to the difference of their Ohedience, and Ajfljction now : For , according as they have purfued the Means, fo will their Attainments of the Rnd be • or, if no Re- ward
of (Religion in General. i ^ ^
ward be due but to ^ifull.Difchnyge of all Ohltg.ittons , it cannot be imagined that thofe who have Pertbrm'd fome part of what tliey were obliged to, and endea- V'oured at (jenerd Obedience^ fliould be puniflied as highly as thofe who have beea guilty of a greater^ or of a total Neglect , VioUtion or Contempt of their Duty.
However therefore it be as to the man- ner of it, 'tis very agreeable to the IVifdom and Dejigns of God, according to all the Indications of them which he hath afford-, ed Mankind, to make the Condition of tIiofe,who ad by t\\Q,Prtnciples of Religion^ preferable, to that of others who acl by contrary Meafures, whicli it would not ail ways be, were there no other Sra^e of Life after this is ended.
From all whicli it plainly follcxc^ hat- there mull: be a Future State, in whic * Mdii \Vill be diliinguiflfd from one anothv.r_, by di^crent degrees of H.tppinefs and Al/fery^ ciccording to rhe different regard they had to Religion in this Ltfei
The Certainty of which State we arc
^irther convinced of by the general// '^/;/j-,_,
A tifertes , and bnperfecfions of our pre-
t fent
1 46 'Ilje Certainty and ISleceJJItj
ient Nature; which proceed from fome Principle, or Difpofition within us, c6n- trary to that of Religion : which Prin- ciple, or Difpofition is the Reafon of that umuerfd Wickednefs which reigns in the . World,
Did Mankind enjoy all the Happinefs tliey were otherwife capable of in this mortal Condition^ yet, fo long as they found in themfelvesC apactties^ and De fires ^ of greater^ unknown, degrees of Pkafure, which from the prefent Frame and Con- ilitution of things they had no Hope, or Profpeft of injoying, and felt an 1)-neafi- nefs at the Thoughts of p. n ting with thofe Enjoyments, of which they were j/cffe/s^dj by the unalterable Decree of Death ^ which they knew themfelves fub- ject to ; were thev I fay in fuch a Condi- tion, they would have great Reafon from hence to conclude, that God did defign them for fome other ?r/ord perfecJ State^ where all their Cap/tc/tus would be filled, all then Dejires fatisfied, and ^0 kind of Pain or Vneafnefs would check or allay the Fullnefs of their joy: not that they themfelves would have any jufl caufe to Complain, as if God had not dealt kindly by them, in granting them lefj'er degtets
of
of ^I'lghn ill General. 14/
■ if Happinefs than what thcyArere caps- i'Uof\ but becaufe, in fuch a cafe as is fuppofed, ihcii Capacities and Defires would be given them i^ I'Ain ; which does not feem confiftent with the JVifdom of God. And, moreover^ the V?ieafiriefs of Definr?g what was i?npoffible ^ and the 'i^untul Fears and Apprehensions o'i what was certain^ which they would then ex- perience, would appear i/iconfifioit with God's Dcjl^n of m.iL'i//^ Man for Happi?;efs ; and therctorc it would be more agreeable to all the Notions we have of God, and to all the Obfcrvations we have made upon his other Works, to fuppofc that, had this Life been the utmoll: Extent of Mans Being and Happinefs^ God would not have given hirri a fenfe, or profpccl of any other : upon fuch a Suppofition as this, 'tis highly rational to think, that con- flant even Co'/itentwent would have bound- ed all his Thoughts, that his Soul would always have remained at xh^ftme equal Poize , and tliat he wouM have lived^ without deliring more than\\'\\dX he aclu- ally enjoyed^ and have died^ without any previous Fedrs of hfing what he had in prefent^
J> 2 And
1 4^ Tl^c Certainty and Kcccffity
And, if there be good ground tobe.^ lieve, that there would be a Sta/e offu- ture hU^pnefs^ tho' Men er/jojed all that they were capable of here , according to t]ie prefent Circumftances of their Na- ture and Condition ; both becaufe their prefent Happinefs was not compleat, by reafon of fome Pain and Uneafinefs mixt with it, and becaufe their Capacities and Dcfires exceeded all their aftual En- ioyments; how much more reafonable is it to make the fame Conclufion now^ when we, every way, f^Hfo far jhort e-z-e/i of that Happimfs^ which the condi- tion of this Life might allow us? as will plainly appear, if we compare the pre- fent ^Jtate of the World , with that Draught and Reprefentation, which we liave before given of Humane Life, un^ cicr a regular Praftice of the Duties of •Relif^ion.
We are, now, not only confcious, in gef- neral, of Capacities greater of Happinefs tlian what we enjoy ; but there are feveral kinds , and degrees of it, within our •Knowledge, and feemingly within our /^each and Power, which, with alJ the Endeavours we can ufe, we are not able to obtain ; and tlie more Wants we are
fcnfi-
I
of ^ligion hi Geney-iil, 1 49
icnfiblc of, and the better and more par- Licularly wc know wliat they arc, the llrongcr arc our Delircs to have them fup- plied, and the greater is our Uncafmcfs un- der Defeats and Difappointments, which, Experience alfures us, arc very frequent. Then the Satisfaclions which wc do meet with , are commonly very fhort , and •mixed with Pain, and we have a greac many other things to iear, bciidcs Death, But the Troubles and CaLmnties oi'Hu- 7nxne Life are too well known to need be- ing infifcd upon, and too large a fubic6l to be particularly treated of in this place. 'Tis fufficient to my purpofe to remark in general, wdiat I think may very fafely be affirmed , that , if what falls to every Man's fliare was, fairly computed , the Mifery of the great eft part of Mankind would out-v/eigh their Happinefs.
If, therefore, Man was dejigri^d by God for Happinefs^ and is fo framed tl/at he cannot enjoy compleatHappinefs m thid Ufe^ without a mixture of Uneafmefs, and yet has Capacities^ and Defires of greater tlian he can conceive belonging to his Nature, in the necelliiry Circumftances of it here ; and farther, ii Mankind be now involv'd ill fuch a State or Condition of Life, in L ^ whi<h
|)0 T}?e Certainty and TSlaeJftty
which they all achially enjoy much lefs hliffinefs than they find themfelves by Nature capable of here^ and the greateji ■pdYt of them have a Urger Jhare of the Troubles^ than the Jdvmtages of Life ; ixom hence I think it rnay be truly and certainly inferrM, that there will be a~ nother State of fure ccmflext Happinefs^ anfwerable, at leaft , to the higheil: No- tions and Conceptions which wc are able to frame of it.
But fuice, as has before been prov'd, God harh not abjolutely and unconditional- ly determined all Men to be happy, but harh made Haffinefs and Mffery^to de- pend upon our Actions^ and conlequent- ly hath annexed Happinefs to a particu- lar way of acl'ing, we bave all the Rea,- ion in the Y/orld to believe, that the Happnejs of another State will be the I'Cirdon ot" thcfe , and thofe only , who li^e according to the Rules of Religion here : and this, I believe, no body who (y^ns2L]utnre State^ is difpofed to doubt of; and therefore I fliall fpend no time in in unneceifary Frcof of it.
And, tho' tiiere are none to be found XK'ho. cxacily difcharge all the'Obligations id Eeligioii, yet 'tis more agreeable to .1^^.' - ■ ' ' our
of ^ligjon in GoieraL \ 5 i
our rcafbn to conclude that thofe who fincerely endeavour to do it, fliall, by the efpecial Grue and lavour of God^ m fome fuch way or manner as to his Wifdom fhall fcem fit, be rendred t^i/?^- hle of future Htpptnefs^ than to believe, that ali Men fliall be miferxhU^ and none of them obtain Happinefs, contrary to all the Marks and Indications we have of the Defign of God m makiiig Man.
Suppofing therefore what I think has hecn fufficicntly proved under this Head, that there will be a. future Si ate, in which all Men will be f^^p/^y or mrferxble^ ac- cording as they have befiaved themfelves here, with regard to what we call Re- ligion.- this, I lay, being allowed, itma- nifeltly follows from hence, that it is more for our H^tpprrtefs to act up to the Rules and Directions of Religion, than to purfuc any other Meafurcs, whatever we may happen to futfer in this Life for fo doing; becaufe the Happinefs of a future State will fo far outweigh all die fufferings of this, that, when we come to cnioy it, we fiiall be forced to ac- knowledge , that the end and reward of our Labours was \(^vy well worth all the Troubles, and Difficulties we L 4 found
1 J X 7h Certatnty ami NeceJJky
Wnd ^.n the way to it , and it it be ab^ fo-uttly^ with regard to the whole extent '^rid dtiratton of eur Being ^ more for our Happinefs to live Religioufly than ©therwife, then are we in the higheft and ftrideft fenfe obliged to hve fo, which was the thing I undertook to prove.
Nay further , if, befides the natural Tleafure which refults from Religious ABs^ while we are praOiifrng them here, God has given us a certain Proffeci^ and well grounded Hope of a State ^ of greater Blifs hereafter , I dare venture to affert that, generally fpeaking , Religion will prove the fureft way to happnefs^ e- ven in this Life ; fo that, tWj Jomettmes^ the Sufferings of fome particular IvUn^ upon that account, may exceed all the noble Satisfactions which Rehgion can afford them here, yet, all things being confi- der'd, and the different Methods of ail- ing weigh'd together, with all the probct- ble Confcquences, which , according to the common courfc of things, m^v at- tend them, there will be fiifficicnt rea- fon for a wife Man to prefer the pra- ctice of Religious Duties to the ways of Jrreiigion', upon thefcore of the prefenf 'Happt^'/efs which he is likely to cnjpy biV ••■:] that
of ^Itjrion in General!, I 5 j
L!icLt means, reckoning in the Hopes and l^rofvect only^ and not the Vofftffioyi of a- f.nther State: as will more plainly ap- pear under the next General Head of Difcourfc :
Which is a Proof of Religion, from a Comparifon of it with Irreligton^ and the neceflary Confequences arifing from fhencc.
IV. I have before ^)MQ.n 2.^0 fit iv e di* reci proof of Religion, drawn from the natures and relxttons of the 'Beings con cerned in it, I fliall now endeavour to confirm the Truth of what I have ad- vanced, by fliewing, what Ahjurd anvi Vnreajonake things would follow from a dental of Religion^ and how PerntcU Otis and Dejhtutive to Mankind, the eftabliOiment of a contrary Belief and Pradliice would be.
In the management of which Subje£l, I fhall firfl: confider the fezrra/ Steps and pegreis of Irrel/gton ; and then fhew fiow
far
I 5"4 7l}e Cenatnty and TSlcceJJlty
fer they all led to the fame Ends, and what are the peculiar Confequences of each.
Ir religion^ fb far as it confiftsin Ofini' <on or Beliefs is of three Sorts: for ei- ther Men deny the hehjg of a God, and confequently, all Rehgioiis Duty falls of eoiirle, when this Foundation of it is taken away; or they acknowledge a God, but deny that Ala^ is a?2j^ waysObligsct by him to a6i lb as we pretend that he ought to a£l ; or elfe they own that they are m feveral Inftances obliged to Worfbip God, and to hve according to thofe Rules and Principles of Aftion, which we have before mentioned, but they do not believe that there is any futurs State sff Rervards and Pumffmnnis after this life.
Now thefe are very different NotianSj. confidered barely in themfelves, as mat> ters of SpecuUtiorfi only ; but^ if we ex- amine the i^ntcfical Effecfs and Canfequen^ c^i-of them, we f^iali find that they all aim at the fa.me thing ^ which is, thQ ejlablifliing a ^^;?t'r^/7i^cTri' ofLiwy^g as i-very Man fteafes^ upon Piincipk^ con- trary to thofe of Religion.
This is plain of the two £rft Opinions,
v/hicii
of Religion in GcncrnL \ 5 5
W'hich take away all manner of Religious obligation^ and, upon flri6l examination, will be found to be True of the laft; which fo far Loofins and Weakens the Influence of Religion^ that it will not be able to bear up againft the force of con- trary Motives to A£lion.
But let us confider thefe Notions a- part, and then we fhall the better per- ceive what the ^/^t-f^, znA immediate Con- fequences of each Opinion are, and how far they /^///^ with one another,
Firfl: then, we will fuppofc that there is no GoH ; and Confcquently no Religion : this being fuppofed , what are we to think ot our Selves r What kind of Be- ings are we ? How came we firft to ex^ tfiy and what are we to do while we continue to be ?
ThaL we are^ and that we feel our felies foand fo jlffecledhis impofliblc to doubt : And the fame way, that we arc a (Tured of our own Being, or of any Jimple perception whatfoever, we are likewifeaf- {\\x&c.oit\\Q, Jgretment 2Lnd Connexion of fome things, and the dtfagreement and tn- con[ijtcncyQ'[ot\\QXS\ viz,, by fuch an tmme- Uet^t confcioufnefsy as we can neither refifl
nor
I 5 6 The Certainty ami Kecejfity
nor diftruft : but if thefe things, whidi we necejfarily perceive, as together, or afunder, and which we cannot poflibly perceive otherwife, fhould not be Joined or Separated accordingly, m the Nature a/zd Reality of things, but only in our Mind, then do we know nothing certain beyond J/^pearances,2.nd the Affeci ions of our own Minds, and yet are invincibly Difpofed to believe what may be Falfe^ with Ho ftrong an affent, tliat 'tis extreamly dif- ficult to entertain the leaft Sufpition of a bare poffibility of its Faifhood ; as any Man may experience in himfelf, if he will but try to Doubt of what we call a felf-evident Propofition\ which is the reafon that there are fo few who pretend to be thorough Scepticks, if there ever were really any fuch, as, I dare confi- dently affirm there never were» But, if it were polTible for us to prevail with our felves to doubt of the Being of a God, after a ilill and imoartial Confi- deration of the Proof beK)re given of this Trutli, I do not fee where our Doubts, could ftop , or what could determine our Affent to any thing el(e: Reafn, Truth, and Evidence would then be bare aninformmg Sou-nds^ ; our whole Lite
of ^dij^ion in General. 157
would be nothing but Sufpcncc and A- mazcmcnt ; Darkncfs and Ignorance would cover our Underftandings, and continual Uneafincfs would arife from d reftlefs SucccfTion of vain, undetermin'd Thoughts.
If therefore there l^e no God, notwith- (landing that there is the fame appearance of Evidence for his Being, as there is for the truth of any thing elfe ; fas thole who have fully examined the Proofs of it, mull allow j then have we the fame Rca- fon to quclfion all our other Kjioivledq, The Confequcncc of which would be, that we fliould then feel in our felves a continual defuc of Knowing, and a con- ftant agitation of Thoughts in the fearch or puriiiit of Knowledge joyn'd with a continual diftrufl: of all appearances of Truth, without any manner of Relt or Acquicfcence, which would be fuch an 'uncafie State as no Man, I believe, could bear ; and, fuch as no Man was ever yet fenfible of
But this perhaps is too much to fup pofe, it being very eafie to imagine, that there may be Men wIid deny the heing of God, ^[id all ?n.in/icr of Religion, without fufpeQing any of their o.'her /yno^v/edg^
and
1 5 8 The Certainty and NeceJ/Jty
and who I in all other matters , Argue from the fame Principles, and Aft by the fame Rules as the reft of Mankind do. 'Tis very poflible, that Perfons who never gave themfelves the trouble of being ac~ quainted with Mathematkks, may think an the Demonftrations, which are there pretended to, falfe , and the whole Sci- ence a Cheat, without calling in qucftion any other parts of Knowledge which they have happened to be converfant in: and it is much more conceivable, that fuch as ne- ver duly and fairly confidered the Argu- ments for die being of God and Religio^^ fhould deny both, without diftrufting their Faculties upon other Occafions; which is certainly the cafe of all that pre- tend to fuch a denial.
Now in applying my felf to thefe Men, I do not think it fufficient to alledg, that the Proof I have given of thefe great Truths, is directly and immediately drawn* from fuch Principles as they own , and make ufe of in other matters, though this may certainly be affirmed ; to alledg this is not fufficient, becaufe they may have that eafie Anfwer ready which all People give who are fond of their Opini- ons, and unwilling upon enquiry to find
them
o/ ^lij^ion in General \ jp
them falfc : thus, I fay, they would be apt to anfwer ; That Arguments drawn out to any length are very Uncertain; that there may be a Miftake in Ibmc part of the Deduftion ; that confequences^ at a great diftance from their firft Pn/jcipUs^ may not have all the Force and Strength of tliofe Principles convey'd to them; and that therefore, though the whole Contexture of the Proof feems fpecious, they have no reafon to change fuch O- pinions as they are fully perfv/aded of, for others which they certainly per- ceive to be Falfe , though they are fei out fo plaufibly, that it is not eafie to tell where the Falfhood of tl]em lies.
Since theretbre the Perfonswho detiy the Being of God and Religion^ are not well acquainted with what they deny ; have very imperfect Notions of thefe things, and do not trouble themfelve«i to look into them, or to confider the Proofs that are brought for them; but yet are fuppofcd to underftand their own Principles , which they profefs to be well perfwaded of, and to adl: by -, it cannot but be very proper todifcourfe with them upon this Subiecl, and, fup- pofing their Principles true, to conlider
them
l6o The Certainty and TSleccJJhy
them in their fiill Extent, and to exa-^ mine into the genuine confcqiiences of them : and, if when I have given a true Idea and Re^refemation of Irreltgton^ they will own it ftill, I defire no bet- ter WitnefTes to confirm the Truth of \^hat I have urg'd in the Defence of Religion,
Suppofing then that there is no God, nor Religion , and that we muft judge^ and a6l^ as our Reafon prefcribes we fhould in fuch a Cafe ; thefe two things do ne- cejfarily and immediately follow :
1. That all Men are equal^ and that there is no fuch thing as Superiority^ Right, OT Authority o^ Siny kind.
2. That every Man is to acl^ as he him- J'elf fliall judge moil: convenient for his
own particular Happmefs.
I. That all Men are eq^ual'is very plain, if we confider the Original Capacities^ and Powers of Humane Nature, without any external Advantages of B/r///, Educa- tion , and Society : nor do thefe Diffe- rences , if there be no God, caufe any fuch \lnequality between particular Men, as to make one Man fubject to another,
of^Ugion in Gencrdl. \6\
cr to lay any Obli^dtion upon the one to a6l according to the Will ot'thc other.
There needs no further Proof of this but to confider , That no Man , whatever his Circumllances in tlie World are, can liave fuch a certain titicontroUhle Power over any of his Brethren, as to make it neceffnrj for another Man to obey him in what he commands. For, whatever a Man promifes or threatens, be it never fo great in either kind, may, by fome fudden unforefeen Accident, be hindred from taking effed, even in the moment of Kxccution ; befides, whatever is pro- mi fed or threatned , being ceitainly of no longer continuance than Life, be it never (o great in it felf, it may not, oftentimes, countervail fome other Mo- tive wliicii the Fcrfon thus accofted is g-ovxrn'd by. There may be fome par- ticular luiioyment that he is polTefs'd of, which his imagination has fo heightn- cd , or which Habit has made fo ne- celfary to him, that nothing pleafant or grievous in Lite can be ot weipjit e- nougli to determine him to a contrary Choice.
Thus have we fcen Men of nj Rel'gion \{ facri-
1 6 1 Tl?e Certainty and iKeccjjity
Sacrifice all that they Iiad, and bear all that could be inflifted upon them, rather than they would renounce their .Ambition ov Renje^ige^ or do any thing that they thought would {lain the gior^j^ which their former A6lions had procured them.
From whence it follows, That, ex- ccft there he a God^ no Man can have a tr//e Right of obliging another; • die Right of obliging being founded in (uch a Foner of contributing to the Happnefs or Mifery of others as their Reafon mull: necejjarily fubinit to ; which no Man can hav^e, without being fupported by Divine Authority.
It may indeed fo happen, fometimes, bv ti)e favour of particular Circumllan- C€s, that a Ferfon may propofe to me to ■act alter fuch a manner, upon Juch pro- L-dbie Motives and ReafonSy as may con- vince me, that 'tis more for ^ny Happi- mfs to act thus than othenvife-^ but this is not fuinicient to give any particular Man, or rank of Mien, a Right to my Obedience ; becaufe I can never be jure of iheu" Pojver of enforcing thefe Ado- fives : and therefore, tho' I do find the \Vovld at prefent fo conftituted , that Men of fuch a Char^cfcr^ or Relation^
jiave
of %Aigion in General. i 6 j
have more probable Opportunities of con- tributing to my Happwejs or Mifery than others, I am not to look upon them as having any Kij^ht or Authority over me ; but fuch whofe Wills and Counfels I fol- low oftncr than thofe of other Men, be- caufe I judge it more for my hiterefi fo to do : but when I judge it more for my par- ticular Interelt to follow my own^ or my other Marl's Advice, then am I as much obliged to aft accordingly ; and in fuch a cafe, I have as true a Right of my orvn^ or the Perfon whofe Advice I take has as much Right and Authority over me, as my Father^ Majler, or Pri/ice.
All which Titles^ and Re/atiop!., and whatever elfe are ufed to imply ■ jov-:rn~ ment and ^ubjnlion^ if there be m God^ are falfe trnpofing Names; and, if any Advantage has been taken in our Infancy to convey any Notions of Authority^ Duty^ or Obligation by them, we are to fliake off all thefe Prejudices, as well as tho/e concerning God and Religioj/, which, (as we are now to believe} have been made ufe of, only for ihc better enforcing ^hefe upon us.
We mud: difcard like wife thofe other /ife Notions of /< (if/-'/, d.nd Property -^ bv M 2 the
1 64 TI'C Ceytainty and Nccejf/ity
"the means of which, fome Men challenge to themfelves larger Shares and Portions of the necefTary Supports and Advanta- ges of Life, than are allowed to the reft of Mankind, for which there is no man- ner of Ground //? reajb?? : For, all Men being 6'^/Ai/, they have all an equal Rtght and Title to every Thing which they are capable of enjoying, or poiTeiling ; nor can any Priority of PojfelJion^ any Pains of 'labour of Acquifttton , any Promtfe^ Contract^ or Agreement whatfoever be fuf- ficient to give a Man, a Plight ^ ov Property m any thing, to theExclufion of any other Man ; which will appear very plainly if we confider,
2. The fecond Confequence arifing from the Suppofition of no God nor Reli- gion, which is this ; That e'very particu- lar Man is to a£l as he hnnjelf fliall judge moft convenient for his onn Perfonal Inte- reji or Happinefs,
There is no other Principle^ Reafon, or Motive of A6\ion im-aginablc in fuch a cafe. And, if all-Men do, and mujl acf according to this ?;-/>/!://?/<', they mull: al- fo, if tliev will be confiftent with them- felves, j^^dgc, that there is no fuch thing ^ • as-
I
of ^ligm in GoicraL i 65
^is Authority^ or Duty^ i^^^^^^-, or Frofertyy orany tiling die commonly thought to be the Ca,ufes o/'thcm, to be implied ?/?tIicm, or to reft/U from them ; that k, Thac there can be /20 Action of their otvTf, or <?- ther MenSy or af^y other Circumfiame or ReLition whatfocver, wiiich can be anv bar or hindrance to any Man's Endea- vours of bettering his Condition, or ad- vancing his Happinefs, wheTi^ and in Tr/ziT/- mxfincr faci'sr he fliall think fit.
Now, that this is the /9ece(farjy and on- ly Frimi^le, which fuch Perfons as den}' tlic Being of G&dand Religion can be in- fluenc'd bv in their AQions, is very plain, if we coniider thefe two thii^gs, wiiicb, as has before been fnewn, Reajcm and Ex perience affure usof :
Firfl^ That we are naturally^ and necef- f^rtly determined to feek, and endeavour after our own Happinels, whether there be a God or no^ or v/hatever otlicr No- tions we Iiave of things; which is too '[ain to need any Proof.
Secondly^ That, if there he rro God^ no Man hatli it in his Ponder to contribute fo iar to die Happiiicfs or xMifery of another, tiiat it muft needs be unavoidably better rbr that other to do what he prc- " M 3 fcrjbcs
1 66 Tl?e Certainty and Ncceffity
fcribes, than to r,8: contrary to his di- rection, and thrit the Perfon thus pre- fcrtbed to cannot poffibly help judging fo.
And, if no Man hath fuch a Power, there ai c no ether higher Betrigs that we know of; noneatleaft, if there be no God, to be imagined, who h.2iVQ^ greater Power over us than one Man hath over another.
From whence it follows. That every M^v?., being necejfanly determined to aS: for his own Happinefs, and no Man ha- ving Fower enough to make the Obedi- dience of others to him necejfary to their Happinefs , no Man is to aH according to the Will of another^ any further than he himjelf judges tliat he fhall be the happier {ov fo doing.
And if, moreover, we confider how fmali the Differences of Foiver are among Men , what reciprocal Advantages they have over one another, how changtahie all thefe diftinguilliing Circumflances are, and what different Notions and<S>^/- ttments Men have of the Happinefs of this Lfe: If, I fay , we carefully con- fider anci weigh all this, we fliairbe ifill more iluisfied, that there can be nofoch thing as Authority^ ov Subjection^ Cb/iga-
:^ ' r!0P7^
of ^ligion hi General, i 67
tion^ Right ^ or Property ; and fliall better perceive tlie whole Force and Influence of the foremeiitioned Principle of AQion.
Suppohng then that, Societies being c- (lablifli'd as we now find tfiem, due Care were taken to perfwadc Mankind, that there was no fuch thing as God or Religiofi; fo that every Man, having thronghly worn off thofi Notions , was prepared to do ^vhatever he judged mod conducing to his own Happinefs : upon this Suppofition , it muft needs follow, that a great many JVTen \v^')uld find themfelves very uneafie, in the want of fcveral things, which they fiw others polTefs'd of, and in the performance of feveral Anions, by the command of o- thers, who were free from that Trouble themfelves ; and what could retrain fuch Men from feizing upon whattlicy want ed , and freeing tliemfelves from what was troublefome to tliem, but the con fidcration of worfting their Condition by I fiuitlefs Tryal? But this 'Thought ( OLikl not hold them long , becaufc fo many would find themfelves in thefe Circumftances, that they would ibon be fcnfible of their Strength , • and , being enraged at the Unrcafonablcncfs ofthofe M 4 few.
1 6 8 TIpc Certainty and Neccjjity
few, whom they faw diiHngiiiflied from them by fuch over-propoi tioned Advan^ tages of Life, they would join together in a Defign of bringing things to a greater Equality: And thofe who hau tafted the extraordinary pleafiires of Go- vernment and Excefs, whofe Imaginati- ons had been entertained with the Pride and Elegance of Living , would endea- vour to fupport the Difference of their Condition^ and be- , reftlefs under the Lofs of it , and would employ all their Art and Strength •to- recover their Ground , and trampk upon the reft of Mankind.
This would be th? Effea of a full Efta- hlijhment of 7rrf//g/cJ';^*in*thet.\Vorld, if we confider the pre/hit, State^nd Conjlitu- tion of dl hmmhe [oocieties ; there being no Nation or Society of Men, in which the far greatefi Part of the People are not forced to ufe Abundance of Pains^ and to undergo 2. great many Troubles^ and Difficulties^ in fupplying their own IVants, and in mini firing to tht^ Eafe and Pleafure &f others. .. , •
But, let. us fuppofe Men united toge- ther upon what Terms or Conditions we pleafc , however things arc divided a-" i • ■ ' ' nioiig
m
of d^ligiqn in General, i 6^
mong them, if everj Man be convinc'd that there is no God, nor Keligwyi^ the Confusion and Mifery of all will be the certain Confequence of fuch a Behcf. For every Man being to purfue his own Happinefs^ and there being as many fe- I'eral Notions of Happincls as there are different Pafjions and Inclinations in the Soul of Man, all which require different Methods of Purfuit^ 'tis impofTible but Men mull clafli and interfere one with another, and every one's Happinefs be built upon , or promoted by the Mi- fcry of others ; which muft end in the worft State of War imaginable. When Luft , Ambition , or Revenge is the ruling PafTion in a Man's Mind, what fliould hinder him from making the Mi* fery, or Dcftruclion of a Nation the w^ay to his Satisfaction , if he can do it fe- curely, or judges nothing more terribJe than the Uneafinefs of his prefent Con- dition? And the fame may be faid oif any thing elfe^ that a Man places liis chief Jiappincls in , whatever w^as the Caufe of fuch a Choice.
All that can be alleged to avoid thefe dreadful Confeqiiences^ which feem to be the certain imm^diata Efcch of Jtheifn/^
■ hy
I/O The Certainty and NeceJJity
is, tliat the Advantages of Society and X/- nion are fo very great, and every Man is lo fenfible tliat his own particular Happi- nefs is included in that of the Publick, that, by vertue of this very Principle, Men will readily agree to obferve all fucli things as tend to the common Prefervation^ and Welfare of Society,
To which I anfwer, That this indeed, to Perfons who have felt or confider'd the Inconveniencies and Calamities of a State of Divifion, is a fufficient Motive, to enter into^ or continue in Society, upon fuch Terms as do then feem to conduce to their particular Happinefs ; but if, after- rvards^ it fliall appear to any of them, that the breaking of any of thefe Terms and Conditions will contribute more to their Happinefs than the keeping them, they are as much obliged to ad contrary to their former Promtfe^ Contracf^ or Agree- ment, as they were at frfi to make it.
And, if we rightly confider things, we fhall find. That the Generality of eve- r]i Society are Men of too narrow and confin'd Underftandings, to perceive all the ill Confequcnces which the^r particu- lar Aciions^ may bring upon Society^ and, if they have fome confafed Notions of
them,
of Religion in General. 1 7 i
tncm, yet the Mifcliiefs do not appear to I'lcm Co near as to fall in their Dajs^ and uwolve them^ and they have no concern bc\'ord tbe/r o-ivn Lives.
Belldcs, the ^^reatelt part both of thofe who are, and thofe who are not, capable of fuch Judgments and Reflexions as thefe, arc too ilrongly afle£led with the Senfe of I prefent Good or Plenfnre to forego the tm- I mediate Gratificatio/is of their Defires, up- on a fair?t Profpeci of uncertain Mi [chiefs that may attend them ; and which, if they do happen at all, do not {q^.tcv greater or TKore difficult to be horn, than their prc- fent Self-denial.
lie therefore who is a thorough j4theifi^ and will purfue his Principles as far as thev will carrv him, muft look upon all the Notions of Government, ^^^^^^y and Property^ of what kind foever they be, with all the pretended Grounds and roun- dattons of them, and the feveral Relations fuppofed to refult from them, either as fatj'e Pretences, devifed by fome cunning Men, by the means of which they would lay certain reftraints upon others, that fo they might enjoy their onn Liberty to more advantage; or as ufelefs infignifcant In- vent tons
1 7 2 The Certainty and Nccefflty
'ventions , wliich make no manner of Change in the Condu6l oF Life, but leave every Man to acl the fame way, as he would do, if there were no fuch Notions or Expreflions ever Iieard of :
He muft look upon himfelf as the Su- freme "^n^ge of his own Happinefs^ and the Chief Goi'ernour and Director of his own Actions : and being fully aifured that eve- ry Man elfe is fo too, he is not to expecl that any other AUn will contribute to his Ha^pinefs, any further than as he thinks he ferves his own Interefi by it ; nor can he conceive a Defign of contributing to the Happinefs of another Man^ but upon thQ fame Con fider at ions: And, being well convinc'd of thefe things, and refolvM to aft accordingly, he muft examine where- in his chief Happmefs confifts, and how he may beft attain it ; upon which En- quiry he will find. That he muft place his Happinefs in the Enjoyment of the ^r eat efiF leaf lire which he is capable of,and which has the leaf Allay ^ or. mixture of Pain with It. Now, in pui'fuing what he thinks the greateft Pleafure, and avoiding what he judges will be any ways Painful to him , He muft perform^ or amit^ any Afiton whatfoever, tlic Perfarmance, or
Omit"
of ^itgion in GcncrnL .175
■Omiffioii of which, hc^r/dges conducive to 'ffofe Ends which he has propofed to him* (c\^\ and fo he knows miift every other JSLi/i^ who 'lets upon tlie J'nme Principles that he docs, be his Notions of Happinefs or Mifcry never To different from his: upon which account he cannot but ac- knowledge , that nil Actions arc altke^ and of the fame Nature^ and that there is ho ground for any diftinftion of them in- to lii-ivful and iinlxwful^ yijt and tinjull^ vertuoHs and vittous ; becaufe there is no Kjnd, or Sort of Action imaginable, but may contribute indifferently, either to the H^ppinefs^ or Mifery, of fome Man : and coniequently, he mult alio grant, that there can be no certain Rules ^ orPrinciples of Actings no particular Set of Actions^ or Scheme of Life^ wliich will certainty pro- cure, any Man that follows it, more Happt- nefs^ than he could obtain by any other weans ; but the fa?/^e Man mufv be obliged oftentimes to aft contraryWaySy and to pur- fue the fame End by the mojt oppofite Me^ thods imaginable ; and, if he be utterly difappointed of his Hopes, by the interfe- ring Purluits of others, he mull change his chief Pleafure , and chufe a new Objeft of his Happinefs, lead he fliould undergo
a izreat
174 "^^^^ Certainty and ISiecefflty
a great deal of Mifery for obftinately fticking to his tormer Choice :
And further, the Perfon, whofe Cha- ra8:er we are drawing, if he will be true to his own Principles , Oiould not be deter'd from the Pi'ofecution of his Ends, by any Concern for the Happnefs of others^ or Senfe of their Mifery^ or by any regard to their "Judgment and Opinion concern- ing his Aclions, and the Meafures he takes :
He is never to prefer the public!: Good of a C/'O', Nation^ or Empirey to his own private SatisfaBion^ tho' it were to laft but for a moment , if he cannot be fo happy without it. Generofity^ Friendfiip^ •.indGr^aitudey muft give place, when they do not ferve to promote his Attainment of what appears more agreeable to him than the doing fuch things as go under thofe Names ; all Sentiments of Tender- nefsy Pity, and Companion are to be laid afide, when the Sufferings and Mifer^es of others can procure him what he efleems a greater Happinefs than the Eafe of complying with thofe foohfli Difpofitions of his Nature or Temper, which, toge rbsr with all other Inclinations that he
finds
of ^ligion in GcneraL 1 7 5
finds ill himfclf, his Reafon tells liim are to be direfted toward liis chief Happinefs ; whicli coiiilfts in the Gt\tttjication of the jlrongelt and ?fwjl i,'igorous Pa/Jion of the Soul, whichfoever it is that happens to be the uppcrmoll in hisConftitution :
He is to look upon all the Notions of Praife ^ Horiotir^ and Rcput/itior/^2.s meer empty Names ^ when afcribed to a Man on account of any thing but Cunnnig and Art in the ?nanagi?!g and ndvar/cing his own Ifjterejl^ and bringing about all his Defigns of this nature, by the furelt and moft effectual Means lie can ; and therefore nothing whicli ferves for the promoting this end is to be accounted bafe ov dijhorwnr/ihle-^ but, if the World will, contrary to Reafon^ and ihcir own Princi- ples^ agree to call fonie things fo, and reputation be necefjary to him in the Profecution of his chief Pleafure^ or the imaginary Vneajhiefs ot Dijgrace fpoils his Enjoyment of it, he muft comply with the e/Uh/ilb^d Error, while it pre- vails, but lb I'ar only as itjUnds inhu jvay to Happinefsy or helps to promote it :
And laftjy. The Per/on thus confirm'^d tn Ir religion^ being fenfible that his Life is the ut?ncjt Compap and Extent of his
Happi'
i y 6 The Ceitainty and Kecefflty
I{appi/7efsy all his Cares and Endeavours^ all his Concerns and Deftgns are to be confined within the fame Bounds ; he is to have no regard to Memory or Pofien- ty, lie is not to be concerrPd if the whole Race of Mankind Hiould end with him^ nor to abate any thing Q^his frefent Sa- tisfaction^ to procure the greatefl: Ad- Vantages imaginable to fucceeding Ge- nerations,
This is a fhort Draught and Reprefen- tation of the Faithy and Practice^ of one who, upon a full perfuajion of Mind, de- nies the Being of a God.
'Tis true indeed, there are very few, if any, fuch thorough Athetjls in the World ^ as come up to this whole Chara6:er. The Generality of thofe who are ftiled fo, arc either fuch as never thought any thing of the matter, or elfe h2.VQ fome fmall Re- mains of Religion about them , which ^ their Reafon, and Education will not give them leave wholly to caft off: But, if the Ignorance of the one, and Prejudices of the other were removed ; ( as if A- theifm fliould fpread, and come into a general Reputation, they foon would be,> fhen (hould we perceive that the difmal
Effed':
of ^ligion hi General, \yy
Effccls and Coiifequcnces of thefe Prin- ciples were far greater and moredrcad- ful than we can now imagine or de- fcribe. For there's a great deal of Dif- ference between an ignorant^ ox half per -^ funded Atheift^ and one that is pof.ttvely and fully fo, upon 'Judgment and Re^ flexion. Should a Nation of People be duly taught and inftrudled in the Do-^ cirines of Irreligion^ they would be much more ailonifliingly wicked than thofe who had neuer heard of God ^ or who retai-fi'd fome loofe imp erf e^ Notions of him.
Ahd if God fliould fuffer this to be the Refult of the bold Talk and Argu- ing of the prcfnt Atheifts of this Nation ; they would then repent that they did not keep their opinions to themfehes^ and make their Advantage of other Peoples Credulity : For, if a/l the People, or any confider able Number of them wQi't of their perfwafion , they would foon overturn Goz'ernrm-nt, and bring all things to an Equality^ and then tarewelall the Plea- fures , Enjoyments, and Canvcniencies of Living , when ez^ery Alan mufl labour '^nd toy I to maintain his oivn Life, and
i/S Tlye Certainty and TSlecelJity
at the fame time be in continud J: ear of having it taken away by others,
WJiat I have fiid of Atheifm^ is, with very Uttle Difference, appHcable to all manner of Detfm^ which is fuch an ac- knowledgment of a God^ as includes little or no Religion in it. For, if the Detfi be of the Eincure<xn !Seciy and makes God an un-concern*d Spectator oj Humcin Act ton s^ he muft, as to what concerns his own Condu6l, ]udge and cici altoge- ther t\\^fcime way that the Atheift does : For, if God require nothing of him , if he be not f leafed or offended wtth any thing lie does , nor hath annexed any Rewards or Punijhments to this or that fort of Life, then has he ///// Liberty to chufe for himfelf, and to profecute his own Happincfs in what way or manner he fhall think fit ; which is exaft ly the Cafe of the Atheif,
It is the fame thing, in effe£l:, with tliofe who make God a necejjary Canfe^ and Men necejjary Agents : For , accor- ding to this Opinion, ^// A6lions are *e///.'t', as being equaky necejfary, and every Man muft be guided by his own Determinati- ons \ and then there can be ;j<3 general
RuLs
o/^'li^^ion ui General. 179
{tiles or Principles for Men to a6t by;
'lerc can be no fuch thing as Obligation:, I {toward or Ptr,jijhment : nor will any of ihofe Notions or Di(linciions^ which are taken away by Athetfmy ha ve any place or foundation under this Hjpoihcfis.
As to the Perfuafion of thofe who be- lieve a Gody acknowledge fome fort of Proz'tde/jce, and grant that fome regard is due to the fouereign Author and Go- fer nour of the World , but deny a fu- ture State : There fecms indeed to be a confiderable Difference between this and the 01 her extravagant Suppofitions ; and fo indeed there is, as to the Credit htlity of the Opinion , but the Influence it has tdpon Practice is very near the fame ; cfpecially with refpe6l to thofe of thefe latter days^ to whom the Cer- tainty of a future State hath been more fully difcovcred. For, if we confider the prcfent Pofure and Conflituttun of Human J fairs , and we believe that things have always gone on in the fame Courfe from the beginning, without |any fenfwlc extraordinary Inter pofition of Pro- vidence , as they who deny all Revela- tion muO: believe ; if, I lay, we are of Li' N 2 this
1 8o T7;e Certainty and Ncceffity
this Opinion , and obferve how things are managed in the World ; how Wick- edmfs oftentimes thrifts and flourijhes^ and that not only for a fenfon ^ but fb as to ilrengthen and fix it felf upon as lading l^oundations as our Happinefs ftandsupon; and how, on the contrary, the CaLmnties and Sujjerings of the Righteous are often commenfurate to their Lives, and a great many of them are meerly owing to their being Righte- ous ; what Force or Power can fome flight Sentiments of Religion have upon us, when the frefent Happinefs of thio Life m.ay be promoted by aQing contrary to it, and we have nothing to lofe or fear after Derah^
I fliall not examine liow far we are pblig'd to a6l in fuch a cafe, upon the ac- count of the certain irreftjlible Poiver of God, which he may exert, if he will, tho' it fliould be granted that he has not hi- therto done it, or upon the account of the Benefits we may have received from him ; but we fhall find this true in fact, that thofe who are firmly ferfraded that God will exert his Power no other wife than he hath done alrea^ly^ vrill not, by thofe Pumfmnents which they fee light
Pro-
of ^'ligioJi ill GcHC)\iL I 8 I
Promircuony, upon nil forts of Men ^ at different Ttmes, and in d/ffere/fi- Circum- fiances^ be dctcr'd from pro fee if: in a, tliC Dcfigns which tliey have framed for the Attaintment, or EftabUfliment of their onm Hdlfpinefs^ by Any means which they fliall think hkely to fuccecd.
Thus have I endeavour'd to give a true account, and Reprefentathn of all kind of Irreltf^ion^ and to flicw the ne- cejfary Effects of it, with refpedl to the Happinejs of Mankind,
And now, upon a fair and iufl: compa- rifon of Religion and Irreligton together, according to the different Notions^ and Confequences of them , Religion mud needs appear, not only more agreeable to the Reafon and true Interefl of Men tn ge- neral^ more juitable and proportionate to the Capacities and Exigencies of Human Nature ; but more conducive to tlie Hap- pinefs of particular Men^ in the prefent Conjlitution and State of humartSociettes in the World ; fo that, upon a due Ba- lance of all the ufual Accidents of Life, 'tis njery probable t\\2i\, a Religjous Man Hiould cx\)oymore Happinefs \v\\i\c he lives here^ than a Perfon of another Character: as ^ ^ N 5 might
1 8 1 71)6 Certainty and Necefllty
might be fully and particularly made out if there was occafion ; but this requi- ring a fet Difcourfe, and not falling di- reftly within my prefent Defign, I think it fufFicient to mention fome few general Confiderations only, which fhew the Advantages which a Religious Mm has above another that acls by contrary Prin- ciples. Such as are thefe following :
He who a6ls upon a true thorough Senfe of Religion, hath, with refpe8; to all the external Enjoy/ijents of the "World, more contracled Defires and fewer Wants than another; and, confequently, his Happi- nefs does more feldom interfere with any other Man's, and he is lefs obnox- ious to the Aflaults of En;uj, Ambition or Covetoujnefs, than the Wicked, in their Profperity are.
He is not eager in the piirfuit of the f?ecejfary Si/pports^ and lejfer Conveniencies of Life, and he takes care to avoid all mianner of Injuyj and Offence of others ; and therefore he m.uft be freer from the Efled's of Anger , Malice, and Revenge^ than fuch as advance their own Eaie or Fortune byj difquieting and robbing others:
He
of ^li^ion ifi Geneyal. i 8 5
He profeiTcs to contribute all that lie c.\\\ to the liappff/cfso'i other Me?/, with- out dcric,ning any Worldly Advantage to himfclt" by It, up^n which account a great many will find it their Interefl: to defend and fecure him, and will perform levcral Offices of Kmdneft to him, in or- der to engage his future Endeavours for tliem when there fhall be occafion; H'liereas, he that is known to a£l for limfelfonly, will be trufted and affifted "0 further tlian liis own prefent Interefi: IS perceived unavoidably to concur with another Man's:
And laflly , the Happinefs which a Religious Man propofes to himfelf in a- not her Life isfuch, as, he is firmly per- fuaded, exceeds all Experience^ Imagina- tion^ or fojfihility of Comprehension \ and confequently, the Hopes of obtaining it, being ftrong and vigorous in proportion to his Belief, mud afford him greater Pleafure here than the Hopes of any other Enjounent of this Life could ; and a well grounded Hope of the greateft and hap- pielf Condition which a Man can frame to himfelf here, which is gradually in- crcafing, by a fuccefsful Advance of the beii laid Defigns lor the Attaintment of N 4 it-
184 Tl?e Certainty and Necedity
It; is, I believe, comparM with any /icfual E'/ijoymem whatfoever, the high eft pitch of Fleafure that we can be fenfible of, with- out the Frofpect of a future State, which mufl: fo far exceed this, as the objed of a Rehgious Hope is greater^znd more durable in the PojfeJJion^ than any other, and as the prefent AiTurance of in joying it is lefs liable toL'i fappointment 2ind. Defeat ; which it certainly is in many refpe£ls, there being no external Accidents^ or Humane Endea- I'ours \vhich can deprive us of it.
This being the State and Condition of a Religious Alan J he mull: be generally inuch happier than the Wicked^ in Truth and Reality , tho' perhaps not in their 'judgment of him ; as enjoying more Eafe and Satisfaclion in himfelj\ by a conftant unalterable Succefs in the purfuit of his main End \ as being Ujs exfofed to the Injuries of others^ by reafon of his aflifi:- ing fome, and his taking due Care not to intrench upon the Happinefs of any ; and as being better able to bear thofe real Calamities and Mi fries which may hap- pen to him, by a certain, comfortable expedation offach Hafppinejs as will in- 'fnitely outweigh all that he can fufter within the Compafs of this Life.
>
(?/ ^U^ion in General, \ 8 5
This I think abundantly fufficient for the proof and Eftablifhment of Religion : but , for a further confirmation of it, and that I may leave no room for the Enemies of God, and j\Ltnktnd to £^Iory in their Strength, as if they had as much to fay for their Opinions, if they might bf heard , as we have faid for ours ;
V. I fhall, in the next place, confider the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion ; wh-dXcan ^^ urged in defence ot it, and what are the uj'ual Pleas for it ; and fliall from thence fhew the ylhj'urdity , and Folly of their condu6l, who have no bet- ter Reafons for what they believe, and do than thofe which they allege, upon exa- mination, will be found to be.
IntheProfecutionof which Sub jed, I fliall obfervethefe Steps or Meafures :
1. I fliall enquire how far /;t67/^/o^z is capable of beitJg proved, what Kjnd or Degree of proof it admits of.
2. I fliall confider the common Ways and Mithoiis of defending it.
3- I
lZ6 Toe Certainty and TSLeceJjlty
^. Ifhallanfwer fome of the prt/.'cipal Ohjeclioiis made ufe of againft Reli- gion.
4. I fhall make fome general Reflexions upon the dtfjerent Grour.-is , and Foundations , wh^ch Religion and Irreligion ftand upon, and the diffc-. rent Condii^ of thofe who ad under the Influence of the one and tlie other^
I. Ftrft then, I am to enquire how far
Irreligion IS capable of Proof ; that is, how far a Man is aUe to prove that there is na God, no Obligation of aEitng juch a way^ if there be, ox no future State of Happt- siefs, or Mifery.
Were a Mandifpofed to beheve all, or any of this, or had he a mind to convince others, of the Truth of any of thefe Pro- pofitions, what way or Method could he take to fatisfie either his own , or their Underftanding ? 'Tis plain, that none of the things enquired into, are Objeds of Senfe, or Internal Confctoufnefs ; we can- not fee with our Eyes, nor feel with any mtimate'Perception, that there is no God^ no Religion, or Future State ; and there- fore, no nevo Experiments, or Obfervations
of
of Religion hi Gemrd. \ 87
^\^ this nature, nor any old Tefiimomes^ ov Jathorities , grounded upon fuclu
ive any place upon this Subjecft, any iirther than they turnifh Matter fori^cft- '/iing and Rejkxion\ from whence we mull: immediately derive all the Know- ledge that we can have of any of the ?ro- pofitions in queftion ; all which being ne- gative^ there's no other way of proving the Truth of them, but by fhewing, ei- ther their Repugnancy^ or tlieir Dtfagreea- blenefs to Our Reafon^ and to thofe other Principles of our Kjmvledge , which we cannot poffibly doubt of ; the firft way we denwnjtrate them to be certain^ the latter we make them appQ^iV probable.
As to Demonjlration ; there's ao Avay of denwnfirattng a thing not to be^ ^ut ;hy proving, that 'tis impolTible, and ^ fiom- tradicHon to be ; and who will und^rti^ie to convince tlie World, that it is i^npoffi^ ble there fliould be a God r or fuppoljnc tlierc be, that Religion^ and a hutur'e State , are downright Contradictions^ What is there in any of thefe Notions that Ihocks our Reajon^ and rellrains our Affe'rt f What other more certain Know- ledge have we, with which our Belief of thcfc things is inconfiilent } There was
never
1 88 The Certainty ami Ncaffity
never any Proof of this kind offered, or pretende J to yet ; the Vanity of all fuch Attempts being eafily difcoverabie, upon the fir A Tryal of our Underftandings that way.
All that remains then to be done, is, to produce fuch Reafons and Arguments for the Doctrines of Irreltgton^ and to fhew fuch Marks and Chara8:ers of Truth upon them, as fhall render them fuitMe and agreeable to our Minds ; fo that, upon a fair Propofal, we fhall be eafily inclined to embrace^ and ajfent to them, tho' the Evidence be not fo ftrong, as irrefifiibly to determine us.
This we call arguing from Probability ; which is nothing elfe, but an Appeal to the common Keafon of Mankind ; fo that what the generality of Wife Men^ in alt Ages, have, upon due examination, af- fented to, as mofi agreeable to right Rea- fon^ that opinion is mofi probable ; and, in matters of pure Rejiefhon , deduced from the firfi Principles of Knowledge, which are common to all Men alike, who have the fame ufe of their Faculties, this muft: be acknowledged to be a very good Ruh^ and Meafure of Probability : But Athetfm and Jr religion will never ftand
this
of ^cU^ion in General. 189
this teft ; the wife, and learned part of the World having condanr'y rejecled, and condemned them.
But, fuppofing tlic Dilquii>ion were to begin /ww , and Men were to chufe their Opinions again ; how would a Perfon go about to prove , that 'tis pwre agreeable to Renjoriy and the Na- ture of Things^ that there fliould be no God, no Religion, nor future State, than that there fiiould be any of thefe Things ?
All the Arguments that can be made ufe of upon this occafion, muft be drawn, either. from our own Exiflence, and Co?i- jlitution, or from the Exifience, Frame, and Difpofuion of the World , and all things )vtthout us. We are certain, that we are, and we know not our Original^ or by what Faiver we came at firll to be : We perceive a great many things without usy the beginning of which we know not, nor can we tell by what means they came to exift : Is it therefore moll likely, and probable, that there Oiould be no fuch Be- ing^ as that which we fuppofe to be the Caufe of all thefe things, than that there really is fome fuch }'erfecl Being ^ as we f]ave before defcribcd, who was the Ju-
thor
t po The Certainty and TSleceJJlty
thor of all thefe EfFefts which we per- ceive ? Can we , from the Oeconomy of the (Vorldy and the iJourfe of Nature^ in- fer, that there is no governing and dire^- ing 'Power in the Univerfe} Can we, from the Fra-me and Dtfpofition of our own Mends, prove, that we are under no Law or Obligation ofaQing? or that Religion is defiructive of our Happinefs? Can we, from the Circumjlances of our Nature , or the Conjiituiton of things without us, make it reafonable to think that we fhall not live again, be confcious of all our former Actions, and be happy or mijerahle according to the different KJnds of them ? However true thefe things may, or are fuppofed to be tnthem- felves, they will by no means /<?//£? »v from the forementioned Principles ; and there can be;;^ other but thefe imagined antece- dent to them: For if God, Religion, and a TutureState, are all po/fible, (as they muft needs be acknowledg'd to be,) the real Extjlenoe of any thing elfe will never fur- nifh any Argument for their Non-exifience.
2. In vain then do we expect any di- rt ^i Proof of Ir religion. In t he next place
< there-
of ^ligion in General. i p l
therefore I fliall confider the uf»al Ways ind Methods of defending it ; which are vlicfeFour.
Rtdicnling Religion.
Requiring a more certain MathemA-.
//c/t/ proof of it. Endeavouring to fhew the PoJJiblity
of things fubfilling ivithout tt. And railing fome looje Objections againll it, which chiefly aim at the prefent Profejjion and Pra^iiceoVit'in the World.
I. As to the F/>y/of thefc ways; 'tig certain that the G^'/^tr^/z/j of thole who advance, or profefs any of the foremen- tioned Opinions, contain'd under the No- tion of Irreligion^ are fuch as barely derry the contrary Truths, without giving any Reafon for their Disbelief: they fpeak a bold thing againft God^iwd Religion^ and fo fall to then* Sins, without ever examin- ing the Truth of what they fay ; a light Word or Phrxfe applied waferwus Thu^g^ an odd Simile or Lumpanjhn^ a ridiculous Turn or Allufwn is all they pretend to. Now, there's notlnng fo well eftablifht, orconfirm'd, but may he ridtcuPd^ tho* it cannot be confided : ajid the greater
and
1 p 2 The Certainty and NeceJ/ity
^nd more fublime the Subject is, the fit- ter it is for Burlefque ; the Boldnefs of the Raillery heightens the Wit of it. But I need not fpend time to prove, that a 'Jejl- is no Argument : Befides, I fliall have occafion to confider the Perfons of this Chara<?ter in another place, and fo fhall pafs on.
2. To the Seco}id Way made ufe of by the Patrons of Irreltgion to juftifie their I^ifideiity; and that is, by alleging, that the Doctrines of Religion, and the Proofs given of it, have not that Degree of Cer- tainty which they ought to have, in or- der to their Convi8:i6n. Why, fay they, are not fuch important Points as' thofe, in which the Happinefs o^ Mankind is fo far concern'd, made as plain and evident to our Underifandings as any Pro^ofition in Mathe7naticks f prove them to us in tlitfame manner and we will beUeve them. The Infujficiency^ and Abfurditj of which Plea,will manifeftly appear from thefe fol- lowing Confiderations.
For, firft of all, 'tis very abfurd for Perfons to call for 7nore and greater Proof of the Truth of a thing before they have confuted any one of tholb x4.rguments
that
of ^li^ion tn GoicraL i^r
that are already advanced ; and there Fore the Proof that has been given of Rchgion, whatever it he, is fuificient, till it be overthrown by contrary Alle-
gations.
. In the next place, 'tis ridiculous to ask for o^her Kjnci of Proof tiian the Nature of theThi/ig in que ft ion will bear ; it be- ing the fame as to defire, that the Nature of things riiould be chang'd : and there- fore to call for Mathemnticd Demonllra- :/(7/2 in Points of Religion^ is as much as 10 lay, let Keltgion be turn'd into Mathe- 7nxticks , and we will believe it ; the Meaningof which is only this, that fuch Men as thele like Mathematicks better than they do Religion -. For indeed the Perfons who call for this kind of Proof in Religion^ will allow of no fuch thing as Demorifirntion any where but in Numbers and Figures ; whereas we have as dear Ideas of ma?jy other things, and do as evi- dently perceive the Agreement^ or Difa- orecment ot them , and make as certain Deductions from them : particularly, in the prcfent Subjecl we are upon, we have as clear and diftincb Notions of K^/20,vicdge ^ IV til y Rorver^ Duration^ and all thofc other Original Ideas, from whence
O we
1 94 ^^ Certainty and Neccf/ity
we took our firft Rife in the Proof of jR^- ligion^ as we have of Number and Yigure ; we are alfo as certain of the Truth of thofe Proportions, that Nothing cun make It felfy that Something m^uft be eternal^ that Motion mujl begin from Will, and fe- veral other, from whence all our Argu- ments for Religion are deduced, as wc are of fuch Mathematical Axioms asthefe, that the Whole is bigger than any oj its Parts^ that when equal Nmnbers are added to equaly the rvhole is equal^ and the like ; and the Deduction of other Propofitions from thofe former is, in all the interme- diate links of Connexion , as evidently perceived there as here ^ and the main Conclfifions are as certain as any Mathema- tical Concliifwn^ at t\\\^ Jhne Dtftance from the firji Principles of that kind of Know- ledge, can be.
In the Proof of a God this is very plain ; and if the Obligations of Religion^ and a future State, will not be allowed to have thcfime degree of E'vidence, as the being of God hath, yet they have all the Cer- tainty "* lis conceivable they fljould have, by way of Dedu8:ion from any Ideas which our Minds are furnifht with; fo that fuppofing rhemtiue, they cannot be pro- ved
of ^Ir^ion in General. ipj
ved any otherwife, than they are from bars unnjfifled Renfori ; and therefore, 'tis very iinjuft to require a further Dcmonjlration of them , when the rational Grounds which they {land upon, cannot be over- thrown by contrary Proofs, I do not mention the additional Advantage of /^c- uelation^ becaufc that belongs to another place.
But, befides all this, where we arc under a necejjity of judging one way, (^as we are in all iuch matters where it con- cerns our Happinefs to att^ or not to aB^ 'tis contrary to Reafon not to be deter- mined by that degree of E'Lidence^ what- ever it be , which appears on one Jide^ when we have nothing on the other fide to ballance it ; and therefore it mull be very foolifli and abfurd to take the Party of Irreiigion^ for no other reafon but this^ that the Proofs of Religion have not all that Strength and Evidence of Conviction
iiicli fonie other Truths feern to have. And yet this is the only Defence that fome Pec^le make for then* Impiety and 'Vnbclicj.
^. But others there are vv^ho pretend
to build their Jrreligjon upon pojitive Prin-
O 2 ciples :
1^6 The Certainty and TSleceJfity
ciples ; and for that end have made neiv Schemes or Hypothefes^ wherein they en- deavour to explain the original Difpofiti-- on, and Condu^ of things without a God ; but all that they prove, is, that they who only defiled the common Do£lrines con- cerning God , Providence, Sec, without advancing any other in their ftead were the wifer Men ; For all thefe new Noti- ons of theirs, either fignifie nothing at all, or they mean the fame thing as we do by a God, or elfe they are altogether irrational and contradictory.
What are Fate, Neceffitj, Chance^ and univerfd Soul, but meer Covers for Igno- rance, of the fame kind as occult Caufes ? the true Refult of all which Principles is a neiv fort of Creation ; where all things are made by nothing, or nothing is fet up as the ejjicient Caufe of all things.
But if thofe who ufe any of thefe Names mean, by the Maker or Cauf of all tilings,^ a Being dflincl from the things made • J'uch a Being cannot be^onceived without dl thofe glorious Attributes which make up our Idea of God, For, if we will allow the original Author of the World the highefl Perfeclions imaginable hy us^ as his Work certainly required i if
tlie
of ^ligion in GencraL \ p/
the firft great Caufe of all things had the nobtefl Qudities nv can conctive^ as the Etfefts produced by it fufficiently declare; we muff grant this Author^ or C^iufe to be an intelligent Bcwg, endued witli Kj20]v- ledge and / Vtll : For 'tis irnpoffihle for Man to frame a Notion o^ any Powers^ Facul- tieSy or J^^alnieSj greater or nobler than thefe y and 'tis eafier to believe, thatfomc Mano^ more refined. Inlellecitials made the World, than that any other Caufe^ which wanted thefe PerfeBtons^ could be the Au- thor of it.
I fiiall not here enter into a more par- ticular Diiquifition of any Scheme, or //;- pothefis , which excludes the Being of a God ; having confider'd them all before, in the former part of this Difcourfe, and fliew'd them to be , in thofe Points, where they mean any thing dtftnci from the common Notions which we have un- dertook to defend, very ahfurd and mcon- fiftent.
And indeed, the Faljfjoodand Abfurdity of all thefe Sche?nes and Hjpothefes^ which pretend to give an account of the Frame and State of things rvtthout a God, or in- dependently of him, are fo manifeft and notorious, that 1 am fully pcrfuaded a O 3 Man
i 9 8 The Certainty and Neceffity
Man may be able to prove them fo, a- gainft a great difproportion of Parts and Learning ; but this is not my bufmefs at prefent, nor is there any occafion for fuch an Undertaking now.
For ,. fliould we allow the Jtheijlh Scheme of things to be poffihle^ and con ft- flent^ (^which is the moft that is pretend- ed,) yet we are affured, by the commoyi Redfon of Mankind, that the Philofophy of a God is mofi vAtiond^ without the Help of RevelAtion^ and uninjerj'd Tradi- tton which confirm the Truth of it : and therefore the Pcfptbtltty of another Hy- pothefis cannot juftify the Defenders of it, unlefs they can alfo make it appear to be more reafonablej and more fit to he be- lieved^ than that which obtains \ but the Athe'tfi will never be able to give an ea,fer.^ ]ufier^ and more pit is factory account of dl the VhoenomenA in the Vmverfe^ than he can who owns a God^ if he fhould offer at fiich a thing, which is more than any one has ventured at yet.
^ And the fame mav be applied to others who acknowledge a God^ and pretend to |hew that' there is no fuch thing as Religi- (^^ and a Future States For they cannot fav. t}iat Ged^ who made the fVorld. and *^!^-' ^ •• all
of ^[{'^lon in GaicraL 199
all tilings in it, is not able to over fee and govern the Works oF liis Hands ; that He, who ^jtre Man his i^f///!;', and all his Fa- culties ^nddapacities^ ca-M/rwt require him to /ff? lifter fuch a manner ivhile he lives ^ or cannot renew him again after Death^ and cofitinue his Life to him, in fuch a State as he fleafes to make agreeable^ or di fd.gr ee able to him, and as long as he plea- fes : This is to bring Weaknefs out of Strength, to fet Bounds to God within the acknowledgM Sphere of his Power, and to fav he cannot do things which are Itfs than thofe which he can do, and has done.
Nor can they prove, that 'tis more ^- greeable to the Nature of God, and to all thofe Notions we have concerning Him^ and ourfelves, that he (bordd not exercife liis Power after this manner than that he (bould. The utmoft they pretend to prove, is, that 'tis />«y/'7^/£' God may not do all this that we conceive of him : as will plainly appear, if we confider the chief Arguments made ule of upon this oc- cafion ; which arc taken from the fup- polcd Mxteriality^ and Mortality of the S')uL
O 4 Here
20O Tl?e Certainty itmi TSleceffity
Here lies the Principal Strength of Ir-^ religion ; thefe are the fundmiental Prin- ciples , which the whole Fabrick ftands upon; and great Endeavours have been ufed to confirm the Truth of them. Now, 'tis plain to any Man, who duly confiders thefe Notions , without that Confufion and Ambiguity of Terms, which they are commonly delivered in, that 'tis tm- fojjihle to prove, that the Soul is not fome- thing perfecHy diftinB from Matter^ and Motion^ and all the Mod/fcanons of them, and that it cannot fubfi(t^ and act after the Dtjfolution of the Body ; nor are there any Arguments to be produced, which prove , that 'tis mere probable , that the Sojtl fhould be fomething material^ and be dtffolved with the Body^ than that it fhould be a difiinB Principle and furvive it. All that can be urged in behalf of the former Opinions, is, that we cannot^ from the .Knowledge v/e have of the Qua- lities and Operations which ^v/e attribute to each, certainly demcnflratej that what we term Soul and Body^ are t^vo dijhn'ci Subllanccs) tho', at the fame time, ir muft be confefs'd, that Men have been, generdlly , more difpofed to believe.//^ ^^^ than the contrary Opinion j and 'tis r^-'
of (/^/(.^/ou tti Oeneyal. i o i
demon/lrable that the Soul is not zny Mode^ Compofitiori , or Refult of the Qualities^ M'hich we afciibc to Body, as it is that *ny Idea we have in our Minds is not ayiy other.
Allowing then that it is poffible ^ that whatever we afcribc to Body and Soul fe- farately, may be united in one common Sub^ jecJ; and that this common Subject, doth, by Death, lofe thofe Capacities, and Poiv- ersy which we attribute to the Soul^ m the fame manner as it is divefted of Moti- on ; fuppofmg, I fay, this, whicii is the moft that can be fuppofed ; from hence indeed it follows, that it is pojjible, that the fame common Subjeci: may never fub- fift in the fame manner it did before, as we grant 'tis poflible, that what is now at reft, may never be in motion again : But then it is as poffible alfo that it ?nay : God may, if he pleafes, put us together again after death, in fuch a manner, that we fhall feel our felves to be tlic fame that we were before we died, and fhall be confcious of all our former Life ; and that he ivt/l do fo we have a great deal of leafon to think, tho' we had not any af furance of it from Rcze/ation, as has be- fore been proved, And therefore the Ar- gument?
2 02 The Certainty and Kcceffity
guments which are brought for the Ma~ teridity^ and Mortality of the Soul^ let them have all the Weight and Certainty, which they are imagined to have by thole who urge them, are wholly trifling and infignificant, with refpe8: "to what they are brought to prove ; For no new Difco- series are hereby made of the Will and Defign of God ; and , confequently , the Proof that has now been given of Reli- gion^ and a Future State, will have the fame Force and Evidence ftill, tho' the Soul fhould be granted to be Material, and Mortal : And we fhould ftill have the fame Reafon to believe, that God does require us to act after fuch a manner, and that he rvill reward, or fumjh us, in ano- ther Life, according as we behave our felves in this ; becaufe the Arguments here made ufe of in the Proof of this Point, are not taken from the Immaterial^ and Immortal Nature of our Souls, but from what we certainly, by infallible Confciouf- nefs, know of our felves, and from what, by evident Demonfiration we collecl con- -cerning the Nature of God, which every Man who owns fuch a Being muft afcribe to him..
Thus
of Religion in Gaicral. 20^
Thus have I examined the Prcteaces of thofe Adverfarics of Religion , who take upon them to eftablifli /?ew Pnj^crp/es and Hyfjothefcs^ to explain the State and Condritution of things by ; and have flicwn, that the utmoil: they aim at, is, to make it fecm pofjihle^ that thojk JppeA- ranees in the World, from whence' w« mfer the Betng of a God, Reli^ioni^ aTid a Future State, may be othcrwije acc^oimt- ed for ; and that they do not fo much <is endeavour, either to defiroy our Scheme; or, upon a jufl: comparifon in all Points, to fhew, that theirs is a more rational Sy- ftem, than ours.
But mod of the Profeflfors and Favour- ers of Irreltgion, with whom we are now , in thefe latterTimes, concerned, arc fuch as never trouble themfelves with Schemes and Hjpothefes ; They come by their O- pinions much eafier, a-nd maintain them with lefs expence of Argument. Some /oofe Objectton againft etny Notion, or Do^ ctrtne which goes under the name of Kf- ItgWfi, or whatever has atjy Relation to it is enough for their turn ; They never examine what is the juft Inference that may be drawn from what they Obje^l, or >vhat Anfwcr may be given to it, but
im-
2 04 "The Certainty and Nece/Jky
immediately condemn all Religion fortht &ke of fbme little remote Confequence^ which their Imagination repielents to them as inconfillent with it.
^. Some of the principal of which Ob- jedionsl fhall anfwer very briefly^ and expofe the Abfurdity of them j which is the Bufinefs I propofed to my felf under the Third of thofe Heads, into which I divided my Diicourfe, concerning the Grounds^ and Pretences of Irreltgt--
T^h.Q chief ^r\d mojl common Objeftions
againii Religion are thefe : Myfieries^ Imonfifiencies^ and Abfurdi-
ties in Scripture ; Extravagant Notions , and pernicious
Doctrines^ maintain'd under the
Name of Religion ; Variety of Opinions^ and Cenfures of
one another, among thofe who pro-
fefs to own the fame common Prin-
ciples of Faith , and argue from
them;
m
of Religion in General, 205
Fooltjh , and ridiculous Arguments^ brought by fome in the Defence of true Opinions ;
The Scandalous Lives of great Pre- tenders to Piety and Vertue, and of fuch as are pecuHarly defignM to promote the Pradlice of them among others ;
Religion the Effect of Fear^ and Educa- tion ;
Religion a meer politick Contrivance,
As to the firft of thefe Obje6lions ; I fhall confidcr it no farther than as it is made ufe of, to weaken the Credibility of all Religt-'n', and 'tis fuificient to ex- pofethe Weiknefs of it, to fhew the Ar- gument barely with its Confequences^ which is this ; Such a Paffage m Scripture I cannot under jhnd^ or reconcile to ano- ther, or fuch a Story, or Account of Mat- ter of Fa6l, does not agree with my Know- ledge of things of the like Nature, there- fore this Pafjage^ or Account isfalfe, there- fore the Book in which it was found is f^lfe, therefore nil the fever al Books m the wJoole Bible, which were writ by fever al Men, in fever d Rlnces of the World, and at feveral Times, during the fpacc of a-
boui
io6 The Certainty and TSiecelJity
bout two thoufand Years, are all falfe ; therefore there is no God, or no Obligation of obeying him if there be, or no iuture State.
Moft of the particular Cavils again ft Scripture, have been fully anfwered by thofe who have purpofely undertook the Defence of Revelation : but it is fuffici- ent at prefent to fay, that nothing of this kind proves any thing againft the Truth of Scripture in general, much lefs againft the frji Fundamental Principles of Reli- gion, which I have endeavoured to efta- bhlh.
The next thing ob)e8:ed againft the Truth of Religion, is; that there are Se- vcvRlabfurdznd pernicious Doctrines pro- pofed to the World, under the Name of Religion , and warmly contended for, by thofe who believe , and maintairi them.
Some Men place all their Religion m Shew and Pageantry, their Worfhip is all Theatrical, and a great deal of their Faith and Difcipline, extravagant and Romantick ; therefore all Religion is Priefl -craft , and all Scripture Legend^ faith the Jtheift ; but Socrates and Plato
^vould
of ^ligion in GoieraL 207
would not have argued thus ; thofe wifer Heathens, tho' they laught at the Gods, and Devoito'fio'i the People of t/jtir Times ^ ciid not therefore turn Atbeifts^ but em- ployed the Strength of their Reafon in icarching out higher Notions of God^ and in framing to themfelves a more rtitiond Religion.
litgotry and Super [lition have oftentimes produced as dreadful and pernicious Con- iequcnces to a Country or Nation, as the wild Liberties and Extravagancies of A- theifm could do : but what's that to Re- ligion^ which luffers equally both ways, and is no more the Cmfe or Occafwn of the onc^ than the other ? Cruelty and Re 'venge, and all Actions tending to the mifi chief o\' Dejl ruction of Mankind, are aji contrary to the Nature of Religion whe n exercifed by a fuperfi^tious Zjalot ^ a.s when praftifed by an Atheifi ; tho' the former covers them with tlie name of Re- ligion, and the latter does not : and there- fore true Religion is very unjulliy and unreafonably condcmn'd upon this ac- count.
Another foolifli Objection is taken from, that variety of Opinions which is found a-
mong
20 8 The Certainty and TSleceJJity
ftiong the Profeffors of Religion , and thtir peremptorj Cenjures of one another, for holding falfe and abfurd Do6lrines.
What a ftrange DifAgreement is there among Men in Pomts of Religion } Say thofe that have none at all. Some believe one thing , and fome another ; fome ex- pound Scripture in this Senfe, and fome in that ; Creed is fet up againfl Creed^ and Jltar againft Jltar ; what one Man thinks his Duty, another apprehends Dam- nation from. Suppofing then we have our Opinions to chufe, what is to be done in fuch a Cafe ? fhall we take the Jlrongefi Side, what the mofi, or what, we think the wifcft believe ? or fhall we examine the Reafons of all Sides impartially, with- i)ut Prejudice, and let our Judgments be determined by the great eft Appearance of Evidence ? No, we will do none of ail this ; but, without examining their feve- ral Pleas, we will take up Opinions quite Aifferenti\om all of them : and becaufe one Man denies one thing, and another ano- ther, that we may be fure to be free from thofe Errors which they condemn one another for, we will t^eny what no Bo dj elf e dots, what ail the different Par- ties fubfenbe to, and agree in. Thefe
are
of^'li^iofi in General, 209
are the Refolutions of the Irreligious ; and what a ftrange Contradi£lion is this, to make V/^ny of Coujhn^ the Character of Truth, and yet to allow no Opinions to be tiiie, but thofe that have the /eafi pre- tence to it ?
Neither is it more juft and reafonable, to condemn all Religion upon the account of the weak Defence, and Patronage of fome of its Frofejfors, What if the Athe- ifts fhould be able to defeat fome trifling Argument of ignorant iv ell-meaning Hone- ft) , or fii^erjtitious Zjal ? to triumph prefently, and cry out that Ignorance, or Phrenjj was the Mother of all Devotion^ would be as foolifh a Boaft, as for a Ge- neral to defpife the Weaknefs and Cowar- dice o( his Enemy, becaufe he had plun- dered two or three fmall open Villages, when all the G reat Towns, and the chiet Strength of the Kingdom had been unaf- faulted, or attempted in vain.
The fcandalous P radices of Men of great Pretences to Piety, and fuch as, by their peculiar manner of Life, are look'd upon to be wholly in the Inter efls of Riligtcn, is another very unwarrantable Occaflon of
P fome
210
77;e Certainty and Kccefjity
fome Mens disbelieving every thing that goes under that Name ; who infer from hence, that fuch Perfons as thefe do not beheve ReUgion them/elves^ and confe- quently there's no more Reafon to think that others do, tho' they difguife their Notions better, in order to ferve their prefent Interefl: ; efpecially if they be Men of fuch Senfe as is fufficient to put them above the fufpicion of vulgar Cre- dulity. But this Argument is frlfe, and unconcluding in aH its Parts,
For, Firit of all , it does not follow, That fuch Men as thefe believe nothing them/elves of what they profefs ; the truer Inference is. That corrupt Nature^ vicious Habits^ and a loofe Education are often- times too hard for Conference and Reafon, it being very plain that the fame thing happens in feveral other Cafes. For there's f^o Man whatfoever, be his Prin- ciples never fo loofe and wide, and his Reafon never fo much deprav'd, but fliall many times do what he himfelf fhall con- demn himfelf for doing, and which con- tradicls the Principles which he refolv'd to ftand by : and therefore , for a Man to infer [romfofne grofs Sins of a Pretender to Religion y that he does not believe any
thing
of ^•li^ion in General. 2 i i
thing ofwhat he profcircs, is as abfurd as to prove, tliat an ^thc:Jl docs certainly believe a God, wliatevei" he fays to the contrary, becaufe he often frears b) hitn^ and invokes him in his Curfes,
Befides, fuppofe this true o^ fome Men who pretend to a great Senfe of Rehgion themielves, or undertake to promote it in others, that they do -not believe any thing of it ; as there are fometimes Pre- fumptions ftrong enough to induce us to judge fo; what reafon have we from hence to conclude, th^t othersy of a more unfufpeded Conduft, are all of the fame mind, if we could but fee to the Bottom of them ? or, what if there be a great many f'^lfe Frete/iders to Religion ? how is t\\\s ^w Argu?nent againft thelV///^// of it ? we have no reafon indeed to believe it upon their Word ; nor does tlieir con- tradicting what they fiy by their PraQice giv^e us any more reafon to disbelieve it. Nor, a fame of thofe, whole peculiar Em- ploywent it is, and whofe prefent biterefi it ferns to be, to propagate and advance the Belief of Reltgiou in the WoJd, fhould be fuppofed to believe nothing of it themjtlvesy would it follow from hence, that their Unbelief was occafion'd by • P 2 know
2 I 2 The Certainty and TieceJJJty
knowing more of it's falfhood than ,o- thers, and by being better acquainted with the whole My fiery and (lontnuance : this is evidently proved to be falfe by the Experience of thofe, who have thought more, and enquired further concerning thefe things than the reft of the World have done •, for the more they have confi- der'^d the fundamental Dodrines of Re- ligion, and the more jtifi and exdi they have been in tracing, and examining all their Reafonings about them, tho, firo^ger have they been confirm'd in the Belief of them. But if there rf^/Zy ^r^ any fuch Men, as, for argument's fake, we have now fe^ppofed , they were certainly Jl- theifis before they put on the Garb of Re- ligion: and what fliould hinder an A- theifi from taking up this Difguife, and preparing himfelf for it by a clofe Difli- mulation, who thinks all Means lawful for the promoting his prefent Intereft in this World ; and 'tis not every Atheift's good fortune to be better provided for in another Condition of Life , than he might probably be hy acting a Religious Part.
But.
of ^ligion in General. 1 1 j
But, if the Generality of dll forts of Men mult be allow'd really to believe the Rei/giou they prof tfsy this, fliys the i;-??^?- Itever^ is the Kcafon of it ; A llrange prevalence of Fear^ and ftrong Imprefli- ons of Education have captivated their Underftandings, and difpofed them all to the fame way of Reafoning. Upon this account it is that there have been fo few true Philofophers, who were able to think rightlv, and ludgc clearly of things; But now and then fome bold Genius has ventured to fhake off his Chains , and alTert the Liberty and Prerogati-vc of /;«- ?nan Nature ; and as one Alexander^ or C^efar^ fo one Epicurus^ or Lucretius is enough for an Age : fuch Spirits are not of the connnon Alike^ and appear in the World but feldom, and are therefore to be admired. To whicli it may be fufficir cnt to anfwer, that I have already prov- ed Religion to be the ntcejjary Ijjue and Froduci of Reafon^ and of the jirfi un- queftionable Principles of all our J\ji07v- ledge ; and therefore, )vhatever elfe is af- iigned as a Caufe of it muft bcfalfe.
But I have thefe further Confiderati-
ons to add, viz. tliat the Effeds of Fear
r 5 and
2 1 4 Tl^e Certainty and NcceJ/Jty
and Education never are fo uniform, lading and univerfal as the Belief of Re- ligion is obferved to be, efpecially when they operate contrary to the Truth and Reafofi of tilings, as they arefuppofed to do in this cafe ; That Men are as much, and as often, difpofed to der/y, as to he- licve what they/I'^r, when the Grounds and Reafons for (ear are the fame, and are more inchn'd to the former, when the t1:ings feared are reprefented at a greac Diftance; That fenfud Appetites , Habits of iridul^ing them, frefent Enpy- ments, or near ProffeBsof Pleafiire, and Ctifioms of living contrary to the Rules of Religion, have a much ftronger and m^ore powerful Influence upon the Judgments of Men, than fuch ImprefTions of Eear, or Edtuation which contradiQ all thefe; efpecially if Reafon be o{ the jame fide with tliem, as the Patrons of Irreligion muft fay; And therefore, neither iear^ nor Education, nor both together, can be the true Cauje of fuch 2igenerd heltef. of Religion as is profefs'd in the World ; nor any thing elie but the Reafon and Evidence of tht things believed.
The kil: Objedion I fhall mention,
which
of ^ligion in General, 1 1 j
which the Atheifl thinks tlic mofl: fotmi- dablc of all, and a pciTe£l Diftovcry of the whole My ftery, is, That Rei/gw/^i is a Politick Contrti'Ance,
Now, tliat which gives occafion for fuch a Sufpicion, is, That all the eminent Pohticians, in their wife Precepts of Ad- \'ice, have thought it neceflary for every Prince to encourage and promote Religion m liis Country, and to have a Shew of 't himfelf, whatever his inward Senti- ments were. But /A^- is fo far from be- mg any Plea for Atheifm, that 'tis a very flrong Argument for the Truth^ Reafo}7a' blentj's , and A'eceffity of Religion : For that is certainly highly rational, which is moil fuitable and agreeable to the publick Reafon of Mankind^ confidered to- gether in Soctetj ; without which there would be little Ufeof K^-.tyc^/^atall. And, if Men are bornfonable Creatures, if they naturally defire 'jociety, and Society can- not poffibly fubfifl: without Religion, as the Objedi^lion it felf fuppofes, then is Religion as agreeable to the Nature of Man, and as necejfary to his Happinefs as Conz'erfition, and living together. And were it not for other Mens having Religt- V ± on.
2 1 6 Tloe Certainty and Nece/JIty
on^ the Athetfl would find it very uncom- fortable living in the World.
Thefe are the chief Fleas , Defences^ a.nd Oijecfio/is commonly urg'd and mfi- fted upon, by the Enemies of Religion, And, if there be any other, which have not been here particularly confidered, they admit of the fame Anfwers as are gi- ven to thofe which are here mentioned, or they may be as eafily accounted for out of the Proofs before laid down, con- cerning the Truth and Certainty o^ Religi- on ; and therefore, without fpending more time in making little Cavils , and ground- lefs Sufficions^ look confiderable by a for- mal Examination and Anfwer of them, I fhall pafs to the
4. Next thing I propofed to do, in or- der to fliew the Abfurdity and ¥olly both of the Principles and Praclice of thofe, who reject the great , and important Truths of Riliown ; and that is to make ibme general Repawns upon the different Grounds and Foundations^ which Religi- on and Jrreligion ftand upon, and the dif- ferent Conduct of thofe, who act under the Influence of| the one and the Jother.
Now.
of (J^eli^ion in Gencrah 1 1 7
Now, upon a drift and impartial Re- view of what has been offered in this Caiifc, wc fliall find, that all the fevcral Fropofitions, contained under the Notioa of Rfligio?i^ have been proved to be /r«e, and agreeable to our Reafon^ by a dire^ Dedtdhon from the frfi Principles of our K^nowledge ; which Deduction, in moft of the Parts of it, has all the Certainty that any confequential Truths can have, and where there is not ahfolute Certainty^ there is as much Evidence as the Nature of the things proved is capable of, in the prefentCondition andCircumffanccs of our Being, and fuch as the Mind fully affents to, without being able to entertain the leafl: Sufpicion of a Miftake, 'tho it can- not prove there is not a bare PofTibility of Error.
It will likewife appear tliat Religion is in all the particular Branches and Duties of it, admirably pted for the promotincr the H-ipl'inefs of Mankind tn general^ COn- iidering their prefent State and Condition in the World .- And further, it will be found to be very probable at leaft, if not evident, that the grcateft degree of Hap- pinefs, \\\\\d\Q\Qxy panic uUr Man is ca-
pabl<?
2 1 8 The Certainty and iSleccJJity
pable of, will be the Confequence of his regular Difcharge of all the Obligations of Rehgion, and that fro^ortionMy to a Man's Behaviour^ in this refpecl^ while he lives, flnall his Reward be in another State-, but in every proportion greater than can be conceived, or imagined by us now.
And as the Truth of thefe Matters will appear to be made out from the Rea~ fon and Nature of things ; fo will it be further manifefl:, that the general Opinion of the World has always gone the fame wav : and , if Te(itmony , or Authority could be of anv ufe here, that the beft, and the greateft is on this Side.
Befides, we fliall not only be fatisficd of thefe things by a pofmve direct Proof-, but we fhall fee the contrary Hypothtfes proved abfurd and mipoffible ; or, where any thing foffihle is advanced , we fhall perceive it to be lefs prohcihle in // fef\ and the Confequence^; drawn from it , to be falfe and ridiculou:>.
We fhall likewife be convinc'd, that Libertinifm, and IrreLgion, do evidently and dire&ly tend to the Mtfery of Man- kind in general^ with refpeft to the ^tate they are now in^ and that every Man who
acts
of Religion hi General, i \ 9
at^ls by thefe Principles, will very proba- bly , if not certainly , be inconceivably mifcrable in n?wthtr State of Life, in pro- portion to his Neglect^ or VioUtion of the Duties prefcribed by Religion.
On the contrary, we fhall find, That the Docirims of Irreligion have none of thofe Grounds of Credibility^ nor are^ or can be defended by any of thofe Ways^ or Methods, by which Religion is efta- blifhM ;
That they confift wholly in the Denial and Contradiction of other Propofitions, and therefore do not admit of any pofi- tiz'e direflYvoo] but m Lift be proved by a Confutation of the Aflertions deni- cd;
That the Jjfertions denied by the Irre-- ligious , cannot be Oiewed to be f^lfiy either from their Repugnancy , or their DiJ agree ablenefs to our Reafon^ and the antecedent Principles of our Knowledge ; or from their Inconfiftence with our Happi^ 7ief ; or from the common Suffrage^ and Teflitnony 0'' Mankind-^
And that the negative Principles of Ir- religion^ and the practical Confequences of them cannot, upon ^ ju ft Comparifon, be proved to be more fu it able to our Reafon,
or
2 2 o Tf:>e Certainty and ISlecelJity
or Happinefs^ than the contrary DoBrines are.
We fhall likewife, upon a flight Re- view of the common Arguments^ and 'PUas that are brought for Irreligion^ be eafily fatisfied , that notliing of all this is fo much as pretended to ; but that the ftrongeft EflPort of human Invention that way, reaches no further than an Ofer at explaining the Original^ Order ^ Courfe^ and Event of things, either without a God^ or independently of him^ or with Exclusion to thofe particular Confequences refpeft- ing Men, which go under the Name of Duty and Sm^ Reward and Pumjhment ; and that the moil: which any Endeavours of this kind can amount to, is, to fhew, that 'tis pojjihle things may be^ after that particular manner in which they are ex- plained to be.
Thefe are the different Grounds^ and Proofs o^ Religion 2ind Irr el igion : And if we carefully compare them together, it will eafily appear, that they do not only differ as /^i'^^rt', or lefs rational \ but that all the Reafon lies on the fide of Religion ; the Conception^ or Proof of a bare Poffibi- l}ty of the World's fubfifting without any fuch thing , being no manner of Argu- ment
of ^cli'rioji in Goiernl. 1 1 \
ment that there is none. And therefore It mud be very abfurd to deny all the Principles of Religion , and every thing that is offered in defence of them, upon thi6 account only.
But allowing that there may be a great deal more than this faid for hreligion^ lb as to render it fomething probable to be be- lieved ; yet if the pojiti've direci Proofs for Religion ftand good, without confide- ring thofe which pretend to fliew the Jb- furditj , and Impoffibility of a contrary Scheme^ the former cannot ftand upon fo fure and frm a bottom as the Latter^ nor be advanced XOifo high a degree of Credibi- lity \ and therefore it muft be very unrea- fonable to give our aiTent on that fide, where there is the leafl Appearance of Pro- bability,
Nay further, fliould we fuppofe the Proof on both fides to be equal^ yet fuch different Conftquences do attend the Belief of the one and the other^ that 'tis the Ex- tremity of Madnefs and Folly, to prefer the Party of Irreligion : Wiiich, befides the prefeiJt Pains ^ Troubles^ and Dij advan- tages it is laid to bring upon the Perfons who make this Choice, and the Mifchiefs and Inco?iveniencigs which Mankind will
cer-
2 2 2 The Certainty and TSLecefJity
certainly fuflPer from one another upon this account ; befides all this, I fay, it is threatned with eternal^ imxprejjible Mife- ry to come after this Life, And this is a Confequence fo concerning and dreadlxil, that it muft be a 'vaft Preponderancy of Proof thsit can juftifie our running the ha- zard of it ; which I am fure, is more than any Man that makes the venture, can pretend to.
I do not here argue, that a Man ought to prefer Religion before Irreltgion meerly becaufe 'tis f^fer fo to do ; becaufe, by the Confp.jfioii of nil Parties, a Man fhall not faffer any thing in another ftate by fuch a Choice, whereas he that chufes /r- religion has only his own Optmon for his fecurity, and is threatned by the Perfons of a contrary Perfuafion with eternal Mi- fery after Death : I do not think this alone^ a fufficient reafon to determine a Man's Choice to one fide, againft all other Ar- guments to the contrary ; for then a Man might be threatned out of any thing : but, if the Evil threatned be very conftderabley and 'tis full as probable , that it fhould happen, as it is that it fhould not, which is the Cafe now fuppofed, he a£l:s very rationally and wifely, who chuies rather
tQ
of ^ligion in General. 22 j
to undergo fome Icjfer Inco)7ventencies at prcjern^ than to put himielf i/i danger of greater. Now, that the Mtfery annex'd to Irreligio» is very confiderable^ cannot be denied , it being reprefented as much greater than can be imagined or conceived by us : and t!iat this ^hjlry jhould be the Portion of all thofe who believe and act by fuch Principles, is as likely, as it is that it fliould not be fo, whatever Hypothecs be allowed.
For if the World were made by chance, notwithllanding all the Characters oflVif- dom we behold in it, why may it not as well happen, that there fliould be a »/- tare State^ and that thofe whom we call Irreligious fliould be mtjcrable in it, and the Religious Happy ? It looks indeed like Wtfdorn^ and fo does the Regularity of the World^ and a great many conjtant Dif- crtmtnaiions made there. Why fhould the Wind blow down the roLten Fruit, and leave the jnuna ? Why fhould the Plague fweep :x\vd.y fomey and \Q2iWQ others in the fame City or Houfer but (\t may be anfwered) there are natural Reafons and y.aufts for thefe things : And fo there may be for the other, for ought we know; the i^^icked may be peculiarly citjpojed to
be
2 24 -^^-^^ Certsimty and TSlecejJlty
be miferable ; the fame Temper and Con^ fiitution of Bo^ or Soul^ whicli inclined them to be wicked^ may render them mi- ferable alfo when they live again ^ and there is as much Chance for their living Again , as their was for there frjt Be- mg.
But if all things exift by Neceffity^ then a Future State may be neceffary too, and the Wicked may be necejfarily miferahle in it, for any thing there is in this Hypothefis to the contrary »
Where e^ery thing is fuppofed cafual^ ox every thing neceffary^ 'tis impolTible to give any reafon^ wJhy any thing that may be conceived to h^^ jhould^ ov jhould not exifi', or JJjould, or jhould not be, after fuch^ or fuch a manner ; and therefore all things of this nature muft be equally pro- bable ; becaufe nothmg can be alleged to determine the Mind one way, rather than another.
But, if there be a God^ and the World^ and all things that are^ have been^ or are to be^ arp acknowledged to be the Effects Q^his W^tll, there are no Reafons to per- fuade us, that 'tis ?7wre probable that God rvill not punijh the Wicked in another State
than
of ^li^ion in General. ii<^
thcin that he ivill ; at leaft they have not yet been produced.
From whence it follows, That, it be- ing equally probable in every Hyfothefis^ that tlie Irreligious will be extrcamlj jniferabley tliey have by their own Confejfiou^ and Ac- count of things^ no more reafon to chufe that fide they are of, than the other ; and therefore, in this Cafe, a Man muft not acl- at all^ or, if he does, the general 0- pinionof or/'^rj concerning the fafefi fide^ iliould dired him which way he is to
aa.
But moreover, it is not only as proba- ble, that the Irreligious iliould be mifera- ble in a Future flate, as not, allowing any of their orvn Hypothefes to be true ; but^ by their own way of Proofs it appears, tliat our Hypothefis is as likely to be true, as any other advanced by them^ nothing further than a PcJJihiUty of theirs being aimM at.
And not only {o \ but rve do alfo pretend, by jnany direci andpofitive yirgu- ments, to evince tl>e Certainty odours ; and atthcnmie timetofhew all theirs to be jtbfurd and i^npof/iLIi.
Wlierefore, if, upon an ejual Probabi-
//*^ we ought to take ih^ fajefl mcafure^^
Q. much
2 2 6 Jl?e Certainty and Necefftty
much more are we obliged fo to do, when Redfon and Happi/iefs are both of the fame
Side. '
Nay farther, He who chufes that Fatth and PracHce^ againft which Eternal Mife- ry in another State is denounced, ought to have, not only more Grounds of Prohabtii- ty, but Certaifvty and Evidence of Convi- ction o'[ his fide ; he fliould ho, fully fatis- lied, from certxin direct Principles^ that his own Opinions are right ^ or that the contrary are ah fur d and irrational : becaufe the Confequences are of that vaf irnpor- tance , that tlie prefent Inconveniencies whicli we are li<ke to fuftain, by ading a contrary ivay^ can bear 'no proportion to the hazard or likelihood of Mifery that attends our acting this way.
Thus do we of the Proteflant Faith^ defend our felves againft the Papfh, when tliey peremptorily condemn us to e- 'verlafing Mifcry , for being of contrary Opinions to theirs^ without meeting with the fime Returns from us, and then urge us to take t he /^/f////^^': Thus, I lay, do we anfwer ; did we beheve their Opinions or Cenfures tohc probable^ tho' 'twas pofji- bU^ and to us perhaps feem'd as probable^ cyvmorefo^ that they might ho falfe, we ^ would.
of T{clr^ion in General. 227
would thcfi allow fomc Weight in tlie Ar- gument : But we do not rjow go over to them upon the account oi\Safefj, becaufc we not only thi/zL- our O^imois certain^ 7\wA their s tmfojfihle^ abfiird^ OV /rrationa/^ and are fully perfuaded that we Invcpro- "^ed them lb ; but, fuppoling our felves to err in all the Points in controverfie be- tween us, we think it derf^onJhabU fi'oni common Principles^ own'd on both fidcs^ that none of tliefe Errors if they fliouid be fuch, which, upon due care taken to inform our felves better, are believed by us r.s Truths^ can expofe us to the ha^zard of D.i?nnAtion^ if in all things clfe we live tip to the Principles of our Religion. And if t lie Jthcifi can make the fame De- fence lor himfelf ; if the Dochmes cf Re/i- yjon^ and the fuPpofed Confequences cf Ir re- ligion feem ^s abjurd and conirarj to ail the principles of hi'! K^ponled^^e ^ Owned by him, as the Popijh Tenets do to a nrott- fiiint ; or as ridiculous and unrrayrantable ■^^ the yifons , Rtfi'eries , O'C Predictions of every little EnthufJ.iJl , or Fortune: teller^ to a Man oi calm^ fid.%te Senf ; and if he be able to make this good in the u- Ju.tl JVAjf and ?nethods of Re-ifontn^, tlien ' mav he defpilc our 'Unedtmngs , and Q, - lau^h
2 2 8 Tl?c Certainty and KcceJJhy
laugh at th.Q Mifery of d FuPure Stale fc curely.
But for Men to deny all tliefe impor- tant Truths , without offering at any Proof of their Falfliood ; to fay thev are doubtful and uncertain Points, and yet to a6l with the fame AlTurance and Se curity , as if they were certainly falfe ; to refute their Aflent to them for want of greater and more evident Proof, without confuting the Arguments already advan- ced, or producing ftronger on the contra- ry lide ; to laugh at the Terrors- of the Lord, without proving them firrt to be vain or refilfible ; to contradict the gene- j-al Beliefof the World, without making any new Difcoveries, or Obfervations ; to lay alide a whole Scheme and Syllcm of things, which has been proved and ciiabliflied in all the principal Brandies and Connexions of it, bccaufe they are not able to comprehend, or account for Ibme httle remote Conf^quence; and- to venture eternal Mifery upon a feeming PolTibihty of an Efcape, which very few perceive or allow : Thefe are all egregi- ous Inllanccs of tlie ahjurd Faith ^ and ■.foolijh Conducl o'iih^z Enemies of Religion ] and confequcntly gpod Proofs ot the
Judg-
of ^ligion VI GenerJ. 229
Judgmentand Wifdoin of thole, who be- lieve and acl upon co^Jtrarj Groufids and Me,ifures.
There's another thing alfo wliich the Atheiji commonly difcovers his Folly in, and tliat is the piblijhing and jir op Abating liis Opinions : For, 'tis more the Jtheifi\ Interel]-, that othtr People Hiould have Re/igfo»y than it is any Religious Man\. For, ^Jis whole Hafpinefs being in this Life^ the more other People are rclirain'd, and tlie better they are periliaded, that he acts by the Hune Rules which they do, the lar- ger will his Liberty and Advamnges be, and the lefs he will fufter from their De- figns and Purfuits ; whereas the Religi- ens jSU'fPs Reverfw?i is not endangered, but confirm'd by what he lofes, or luticx'ii here.
Other Proofs likewife, of tlie V^re^tfo- ii.xblenefs , and Abfurdity of Irreligio)?^ might be brought from the hico/i(ijhnci both of the Kt///; and FruHce of tljofe who arc profefs'd Favourers of it : fuch as tlieir Credulity and Readinefs of Bgiief in common indifferent Matters, and tla.nr embracing abfurd Opinions, wliich are exploded by all the World befides, when :at the fame time they are diilruftful of Q J every
230 Tl^^ Certainty and l\.cceffity
every tiling upon the Subjeft of Religion ; their believing Matters which concern their prefent Happinefs v.pon weaker Grounds; their expofing thcmfelves to greater Troubles and Inconveniencies, and running greater Hazards upon a faint Profpeft of future Happinefs in this Life ; and fometimes, on the contrary, fearing and avoiding things upon a lefsAppea^ ranee or Likelyhood of Danger, than what Religion affords; and laftly, their aQ:irig contrary to their own Principles^ and denying themfelves what they efteem fubifantial Pleafure and Satisfaction, out of a regard to imaginary Notions, wdiich hive no Foundation but in the Opinion of Men. But , thefe being Matters of common Obfervation, and too long to be fully infiifed upon here, I fliall think it fufficient to have hinted at thpm, aiid fo pafs on to the,
VT. Sixth and lafl general Branch of my Difcourfe propofcd in the beginning of it, and tliat is, To give forne Account of the Caujes of Jtleijm and Jrrciigicn^ or the Reajop^s which induce Men to take lip fuch Opinions*
There
of^li^ion in General, 1 5 1
There is nothing which People are bet- ter TatisHed of, than oftlie Power and In- fluence of Prejudices^ and fdfe Motives of "Judo^ino ; cverv body being apt to rc- folvc tile Caufc of another Man's dilTei-ing in Opinion from him, into fome particu- lar Ihnfs upon his Undcrftanding. But this we do commonlv, without exami- ning whether tlie Pcrfon who differs from us, has not better Reafons for his DifTent, than we have for our Pcrfuafion; wlie- thcr the Opinion lie is of be not, in the Reahty of tilings, true, tho* he believes uponfalfe Grounds; or whether we our felves are not difpofed to iadg as wx do, upon fome of the like Motives that we fuppofe him to have followed. By which means we are often, not only guilty of the fame Partiality which we ciiarge upon others, but are cither confirm'd in our Errors, or elfe prevented from making juft linquiries into the Truth of things ^ fo that, if we are in the right, it is by chance, and more than we are able to prove to our felves, or others.
Upon which account, I think it a very prepollerous and deceitful Method ot proving a thing falfe, toafTign (omt^ecu-
Q^ 4 llAf
2 5 - T7;c Certainty and Neceffity
har Prejudices and wrong Motives of judg- ing^ which may foffibly induce Men to be of fuch an Opinion, the' the Truth iliould be of the other fide, and which have often had the Hke Influence upon Men's Ui> derftandings in other Matters ; and from thence immediately, without any further Proof, to infer, that fuch and fuch Per- fons have no other Reafons for the BeHef of the point in queftion but thefe, and confequently, that they are in the wrong : this, I fay, is not a fair way of arguing. But, after plain and manifefi Proofs of the ^Truth of an Opinion, according to the ftanding Rules and Principles of Rea- foning^ it is not only proper to enquire hovv^ any Men came to be of a contrary Per- fuafion, but the Strangenefs and fceming TJnaccountablenefs of the thing make it expected^ and in fome refpe^l necejfary ; in order to a fuller Satisfaclion of thofe, who, notwithflanding all the apperr.uue of Evidence to thenfelves^ mav be apt to have fuch favourable Notions of Man- kind, as to imagine, that Perfons, who have the fame Faculties, and all other Advantages oi Knowledge that they have, v/eiald not deny whiit appears \o plain to
their
of (J^elig'ton in GcncyaL 25^
them , except tlicy had /'owe rational Grounds for their Denial.
Having therefore, as I perfuade my felf, f^f^y-, ^nd evidently proved thcTruth of Religion ; I think, I may now be al- lowed to fay ; That Atheifm and Jrrel/gi^ on mull be the EfftB of lPrc]udice and Prepolfeffion only, if any fuch Caufe of it be arfignable.
And if we fearch the Heart of Man, and look into the hidden Myftericsof Ini- quity lodg'd there ; if weconfidcr what falfe and corrupt Renfomngs^ and what other Arts and Methods of Deceit are u- fed by Men to delude themfclves , we fliall foon difcover the fecrct Spring and Origin.ilof all Atheifm and "Unbelief,
Now, the Caifes from whence it pro- ceeds are plainly thefe two ; The Fear of an Jfter-reckoning for a ivicked Life, and The Inanity of appearing^ either greater or ivifcr than other Alen. The firfl of which is the principal and niofl powerful Caufe, and is only allifted, and ftrengthcncd af- terwards, by the AccciTion of the latter. And what other account can be ajffigned ? Or what other Reafon can be given of the Rife oi Irreli^ioia and ^Ay^»v;r Opini- ons. Jt
2 34 T^^^'^ Certainty and MeceJJity
It cannot be the Force and Evidence of Truth which produces Atheifm^ as is mani- feft, not only from the foregoing Proofs of Religion^ but from the Confejjion and Conduct of the Atheills themfelves. It is not becaufe the Notions of God^ Immor- tdity^ and a. future State fliock the Un- derftanding , and contradiQ: the plain Principles of Reafon , that they deny thefe Foundations of all Religion, Were the Being of a God confider'd only as an Hypothefts , to folve the Difficulties of Nature by , without thofe troublefome Confequences of Duty^ Sin and Punijh- ment^ the Atheiji would not fcruple this Philofophy ; and Lucretius himfelf would eafily grant the Soul to be immortal^ to be feparated from the Body and reunited a- gain, would you allow him but this Con- clufion, that neither feparate^ nor reuni- ted^ it hath any Serfe or Remembrance of what was done before the Separation. God fhould alfo enjoy the Fulnefs of Perfection^ he fhould be clothed with all the magnify cent Attributes that Man could conceive, fo his whole Employment was the Com- frehenfion of htmfelj^ and the Contempla- tion of ht^ own Glory ^ and he was not
un-
of Religion in General. 235
unncccfTarily troubled to take account ol ■vir Aclions. This is the dreadful Appre- henfion which perverts Mens Reafons, and makes them deny what they Tear, when they are refolved to run the hazard of it.
The quieting and laying thefe fears^ Lucretius confelfes is the rvhole Defig/; ot his PJiilofophy. Which is a farther Con- firmation of what I have undertaken to maintain ; as will appear from thefe fol- lowing Remarks.
For firft this Fhilofopher obferves, and feems to wonder at it, that the Fears of Death were 'very gc nerd ^ and made frotig Imprejjioris upon the Minds of Men.
2. He affirms that thefe Fears were oc- cafioned by an Apprehenfwn of fame other State after this Life.
^. He takes notice only of thofe whom we ftile H^/VZy^, that were afraid, oi-^ fu- ture ftate ; they were the chief Ob]e61:s of his Pity and CompafTion, who, be- i. 3. V. 1025, CJ-.. ^^^^^ the Fear of Scourges, Racks J and Pri/ons in this IVorldy were tortured with the Dread of ^cw , and more terrible Puntjhments , in fome other ; and all his Arguments ferve only for the Confolation and Encourage- ment
■f 1
-^6 Jhe Certainty and ticcejjlty
ment of fuch unhappy Wretches, whoi through Fe^r of future Fains ^ either de- nied themfelves {omtfrefent Gratifcattofiy or were uneafie under the Guilt of ^aji ABtons 'j none but the Wtcked and Impt-
Lib. 5. ver. ,222. ^f ^ ^aiig Concerned in all the rahulom, and Poetick Stories o^ fut tire Torments^ which he de- rides.
From all which it is very plain, that a Kefolution to enjoy the Pleafures of Sin^ and to live in them without Check or D/- jiurbmcey is the reafon why Men deny, and feek for Arguments to overthrow, thofe Opinions, which would otherwife be embraced as moll rational ; as is manifeft from Lucretiue'^ own Obferva- tions.
For the univerfd AffrehenCion of fbme- thing '-i/i^^r this Life^ which he plainly in- tirnates, is no flight Argument of the Truth of another State : as, I am fure^ the dijlingui^lbtng Fears of the IVicked^ are a very flrong Proof of the effenttd Dif- ference of Good and Evil, and the Duenefs of Reward and Pumjhment accordingly. For, otherwife, v/liy fhould the Wicked condemn themfelves for what they do ? or, S\v;;^0^\m.di future St xte^ whyfhould they
expeft
of^d'ijyion in Gcncrdl. 257
cxpecl to bi punijlyd in it f Why fliould they not ratlicr conceive God to be of t\\t\x Side? Why ihould they not give him contrary Attributes, and make him punijb the Righteous and reward the Wicked ? Or, if tliat be too harfli a Notion of the Dcity^ why do they not change the Na- tures of Good and Evil^ and call Evil good^ and Good evil } The Confcquence is ftill the {lime. If it be Wifdom to Hve as they do, if they Jive mojl up to their A\t<ure^ and r^ojl agree ahlj to their Reafon^ what have they to fear ? if this be their Cafe tliey may be fure, that Almighty ll'lfdom and Perfection will approve^ and be pleas'd ivith their Actions. But if thelc Opinions offer too great a Violence to their Reafon to be embraced by tliem, it is plain that they muH: acknowledge, not only that there is a Dijfere/ice in . /c//- o?is^ but that theirs are evil ; not onlv that foMe Aciiofis defervc Reward^ and forrie Pu»ijh?^ient , but that the iatta- is due to theirs^ or clfe what realbn is there for Fears ? Or why do not all Me?t fear a future State alike, the Righteous as well as the Wicked r Now , when Men are refolv'd to commit what they know to be /// nnd puntjhaiU'y there is no Refuge
Iclt
238 The Certainty and TSlo<:eJJity
left but to contrive fome means of ImpunU ty^ fome way of efcaping the Sentence threatned ; and this they promife them- felves by denying either the Judge^ or the FUce of Fumjhment, And this is the true Caufe and Spring o^ Athetfm, For no Man ever deny'd a God who thought his Way and Courfe of Life acceptable to fuch a Being ; no Man ever queftioned a future State who could poflibly perfuade him- felf, that, if there was one, Happtnefs would be his Portion in it.
As then it is not a Zjal for Truth which makes Men Jthetjls, fo neither is it 2igenerof^ Undertaking to free the World from the Bondage of Religion, For tliey mufi: needs be convinc'd that it would be very much for the Advantage o^ Manki-nd jn general ^ if all Men lived up to the flrici Rules of Religion, What noble I- deas doth fuch a Speculation as this af- ford us ? and how difmal would the Prof- pe8: be, if Atheifm fhould fpread as faft as Chrijtiamty did in the frjt Ages of the Gofpel ? But not 10 purfue this Thought any farther, what Bondage or Slavery is there in Religion ? and how is our Liber," ty abridged by the I. an) of God ? Thofe who bear the l^oke think it eafie and plea-
jfant.
of ^li^ion in General. 210
.int, and, withowtix future Rcw/ird^ pre- ferable \.o Athcifm^ as much as a 7//// and e.tfie Goz'cryjment is to be preferred to A- narchy and living Wild. Why then fhould they who never felt the Burthen complain of the Weight of it ? but there are fome Pleafurcs and Enjoyments which Cuilom hath made them fond of, and rendred difficult to be left off, and thefe they are refolved to en)oy ilill .• but they cannot doit fully and to the height, without fome Check and Regret till they have got rid of tliofe hears of a future Puyiijbme?it w^hich their own Qonj'ciences^ and the general Faith of the World threa- ten them with : in order therefore to this Knd, Q^Qxy little Ohjecltun or SuJj>icion is improved into an Argument againil Reli- gion-^ and that, by the advantage of Jirong Wtjbes^ and :i gradual Decay of con- trary ImpnJjionSj is heightncd into Demon- (tration ; till, what, at firlf, their Luih fuggclled to them, with a ferhavs there maybe no fuch thing as God^ QY a future State, is, at laR, ripen'd into a lold De- ntal.
And , when ihzy have once got this Mallery over themielvcs, then do they ik free, anddefpiletherell of tiie World
in
240 The Certainty and TSleceJJity
in Fetters, and laugh at what others a- dore. Then do Novelty and Boldmjs pafs for Truth ^ and the Pleafure of Be/kv^ zm is made the Ground of Faith, For how exquifite and trantporting is the Plea- fure of a new Notion or Invention ? and how are Men's Wits fet upon the flretch to find out frefli Opinions, and to drefs up old ones in a different manner, only to gettheCharafter of fuch as thtnk out of the road ? Men fliall hve like Beafis in the State of Nature^ and devour one ano- ther, couch in their Dens at Nighty and in the Morning feck their Prey : Beafis^ on the contrary, fliall be fo rational as to e- reft Common- wealths , and Govern- ments, if fuch Notions as thefe will fervc to eliablifli th& Reputation of their Au- thors.
Bcfides , the expofwg and ridiculing common Opinions^ eipecially the defpiling what is very much refpei^'ted and admi- red, carries a peculiar Satisfaction in it ; there being nothing which recommends any Notion or Reflexion, any ftroak of Wit or Reafon fo much as the Boldnefs of it. From hence it comes to pafs, that Treafon , and Biafphemy are entertained with a greater Gull than Private Calumny,
ane"
of l^ligwn in General. 241
and Detr.uHon-j and the fame ExprcfTion is counted wittier when it llrikes at God^ or the /C^/v'^, than when it is levelPd a- gainft a Herd of common Mnrtab, For, to ridicule the grcateft Actions that have been done in the World, to laugh at the nobleft and moft celebrated Schemes of Knowledge that have ever been laid to- gether, is thought to argue a Spirit capa- ble of greater Performances. And to defpife and contemn what the reft of Mankind ftand in aw of, feemsto fliew fuch a Superiority ofSenfs^ o\' Courage ^ as eafily tempts Men to aflecl this Chara- cter, without confidcring whether they are able to fupport it.
Thus areMenconfirmM and eftablifh- cd in Athcifm^ by the f^Anity of appearing 'neater or wiicr than others^ and of being thought Mailers qS jirier and tnore extra- ordinary Talents either of H Vr, or Reflexi- on ; as is plain alfo from another Inftance, in which Men Ihew themfelves to be ve- ry much influenced by thefe Motives in matters of Religion ; and that, is , a groiindlefs unreafonable D/j'fidencc and 'Jea/oujie of being put or impofed upon : calling every thing Tnck or Impofhire ^vhich thev donot underftand, or wliich
n aav
242 TJ?e Ceytainfji and Keccffity
any Body elfe gets an Advantage by. For, by this means, they imagine, that they eftablifh to themfelves a Reputation of great Sagaatj and Reach ^ and o^ feeing far into matters ; whereas , in reahty, this overmuch Cunning of theirs , only betrays the Weaknefs of their Judgments;^ and lliews them to be of the fame fizeof Underftanding with thofe fooHfli Pohti- cians, who find athoufand Myfteries in State- Affairs, more than the Managers themfelves ever knew of, and who think every the moft natural, and undefigning Action of a Prince , to be the effea, of fomc fecret Counfcl , and Contri- vance.
Now, that thefe before-mentioned are the true and proper Caufes of Atheifm : and that the Belief and Patronage of the Docirines of Jrreligion isfolely the Refult ol Prejudice^ and not deliberate Reafon^ will further appear from the following Reflexions.
I. Thofe who go under the Name of Atheijts or Dei (is, whether real, preten- ded, or repu/edy are generally Perfons of no great Reach, or Capacitj, Menofftrong
Lufls*
oj ^ligion in General. 24 j
Lufts, and irregular Imaginations, witli- out a due Ballall of Realbn ; impatient of Thinking and Attentiou, and confc- quently, unable to examine any Variety oF Pretences, or to diftinguifli betwixt Colour and Argument. Thofe of them who are furnifli'd with a better ilock of n.tturd Se'fife than the red, have it whol- ly u /I improved and unculthjcited', or, if they have made any Advances in Know- ledge by Study, or Induftry, they have either %^r//? Ute^ and fo have fallen into the middle of Learning , without the Affiftance of the firft grounds and Rudi- ments of it, applying themfelves to fuch Books they ht upon, or which happened to be recommended to them , without due Choice and Dire£lion ; or elfe they have been cliiefly converfant in fuch Stn- dits as have by no means qunhficd them to be Judges out of thetr onm lV,v/.
For a Man may be very well vcrs'd in Htfioryy Anticjuities^ or Experimental ]yfioiv ledge \ he may be a great Mafter of Language and Criticijm, and a nice Dif cerner of the true Aleanmg^ or Reading^ of an ancient Author : he may have a jull Rclifh for Wit^ and tlegance of ExpreJ/ion^ \n(\ have Skill enough to difcover the R 2 Beauties
244 '^^■^ Certainty and Neceffity
Beauties and Faults o{ tliQ mo ft celebrated Models of Writing , and yet , after all, in matters of general and abfiracled Rea- foning^ not be able to underlland a ^laiii^ eafte Confequence. For, 'tis not difficult to obferve how ridiculoufly oftentimes, Men of known Abilities in fome of thefe, or the like refpecls, argue and infer in o- ther Matters ; and how incapable they are of making, or perceiving a juft Dedu- ction , in points of ;?^c)r^/, or f/^'// Know- ledge, and ilich in which the Conduct of Life^ and ihe H^ippinefs of Mankind is im« mediately concerned: whereas, on the contrary, thofe who are acquainted with the. general Rules, and JL^iri of Reafoning^ and the different kinds and manners of Froof^ are capable of making true Judg- ments and Inferences in any Subjecl, which they have been ever fo little con- verfant in, upon a bare explication of the 'ferms^ and a jujl Relation of the fafls belonging to the Matter to be judg'd of. Now , this is is a piece of Kj^oivledge^ which, I may venture to fay, the Fa^jou- rers of Ir religion have been always the greateft Strangers to •, and the lefs any of them have been acquainted with this kind "^f Learning, the lefs they have employed
and
of ^li^'ion in General, 245
and exercifcd their rational Faculties, and the lefs common natural Senfe they have been born witli , the Itrongcr, more contident, and more unfcrupulous Atlicifts have they been.
2. Secondly, as we are ratisfie<:l, from the Characfer, and Capacities of the A- theijls^ tliat they are wholly determined to their Opinions bv Prejudices and falfe unequal Motives of ^judging ; fo are we further confirmed in this Perfuafion by the Manner and Procefs of their Faith. For they commonly helieve fr/l^ before they enter upon any Examination ^ or Proof of their Principles. Wiiatever they underftand of the matter, all the Argu- ments and Objcclions they are furnifliM with are found out afterwards, not to fa- tisfie and convince themfelves , but to make a fhcw of Defence againfl the Charge of others ; they take up their Opinions hailily and on a fuddain ; they do not proceed by Degrees, by cautious and wary Steps, weighing and ballancing the Arguments on both (ide/, fomctimes inclining to the one, and fomctimes to the other, calling in the Advice and Rea- fcn of other Men to their AfTillance, R ^ and
2^6 Tl?e Certainty and TSlece^
and all along ihewing a Concern and Fe-ir of being miftaken, fuitable to the importance of the thing to be judged of
Thus indeed do Men commonly be- have themfelves in a Change from o^e Sea of Religion to another^ if they fin- cerely aim at Truth, and are not govern- by any other undue Motive. But who ever heard of a Man who took this Me- thod of turning Atheifi ? Which of them all can fay he confider'd, and compared the Proofs of both Opinions before he left the one , and took up the other ? When was any body called in to plead in the behalf of Religion^ before it was caft off, and to fettle the firft Miftrufts and Waverings of an Athetjltcd Confcir ence ? Afterwards perhaps , upon fome Checks and Relu61:ance of his Mind, an Atheifi may have had fome faint Defigns of examining into the Truth of Matters, and may have difcours'd with others a- bout it ; but then a long Cuftom of think- ing and talking one way, r.nd the trou- blefomeConfsqucnces attending ii Change of Faith, may have iaciifpofed him to ei> certain or reliili the Argviments for Reii- ^jo'/f -J not to mention any thing of a judt-
ciaI
of ^It^wn in General. 247
^lal Bttndnefs inflicled upon Iilm from God^ for his long and iinrcafonablc Op- pofition to the Truth, But, if an Atheifi will examine fairlv into the firfl Rife and Origtnxl o\^ his V^tth^ he will find that it was cither a haftj Effort^ occafioned by ht^'h Bloody and a ntts'^d ImiXgt nation ; or fomc bold Strain of Wtt^ which ftruck him at a time when he was rightly difpo- fed to be pleafcd with it. And, if we fhoiild examine into thefc things more particularly, I believe, it would appear, that nil trreligiotis Opinions arc frjl taken up tn Company ; and that no Man re- ceives the firfl Impreffions o^ Athetfrn, a- lone , from his own cdm and fedite Re- flexions.
And thus, as Irreligion fprings from Prejudice^ fo is it nourijhed and fed the Ume way^ viz. byaconftant Application to fuch Books and Company, as i7,ivc it any countenance or colour of Defence ; with an induftrious avoiding and ridicu- ling the contrary ; picking out fuch things as minifter mod occaiion for Raillery ; and magnifying evcrv bold thing which is faid by any Man, without any regard to his other Opinions, or the Confcquen- ces even of that which is liked ; 'tis no R 4 mar-
248 77?^ Certainty and yicceljity
matter whether it really proves any thins; againft Religion or no, fo it be thought, by the ProfeJJors of Religion , to bear hard, either upon the funddmentd Vrin- ciples, or Any remote Docfriyies which are owned by them.
From whence it comes to pafs, that the ^refent Athetfm is a fromifctious MtfcelUny of all the bold Notions that have ever been vented by thofe who are ftiled Free-think- ers • where, whatever feems to be level- led againft any Point of Religion is em- braced as the moft fenfible and rational account that can be given of the thing ; but thofe Parts of Religion which are e- ftablifhed by the fame Authors , are flighted and paft over as weakly done ; whereas I will be bound to prove, that there is never an Article^ or Duty of Re- ligion^ profefs'd by us, but is ownM and maintain'd by fome or other of thefe bold Tree-thinking Author s^ which are fo high- ly approved and commended by the pre" fent Atheijh. And w hat a grofs Partiality is this, not to allow thoie, whom they cry up for unpreindtc^d Men, to talk a Word of Senfe or Reaibn , but when Vy'hat they fay makes for their Furpofe 'f
1. Bui
of (}{eli^ion in Gennal. 1 49
I. But Thirdly, we have a more con- vincing Proof, that the Doctrines oj Irre- iigton arc the genuine IJfue and Effecfs of the Cdufes before afTigned, from the o- pen Confeffion of feveral Atheijls them- felves ; who, upon luft Convi^lionb of Confcience , having difclaimed their A- theifm^ have freely and fincerely owned that they threw oft* Religion^ without e- ver examining, or confidering the Proofs of it ; that they were difpofed and indu- ced to entertain irreligious Notionb by the Power and Influence of their Lnfls , or fuch vicious Habits and Cuftoms of living, as they thought irreconcilable with a con- trary Belief; that the Reafons why they endeavoured to perfuade themfelves, of what their Courfe of Life inclined them to believe, were, to defend thofe Liber- ties of Pra6: ice which they took, againft the Cenfures of others , and to fccure their own Minds in an eafie undifturb'd Enjoyment of them; that, commonly, che firit and ftrongeft ImprefTions of Un- belief they were fenfible of, were occa- fioncd by fome bold Hints and Tnfinua- tions, or fome witty Ridicule or Raillery upon the Subjecl of Religion ; that, as
thefe,
2 JO Tl?e Certainty and ISLeceffity
thefe , coming from others , either in Books , or Difcourfe , gave them very great Pleafure, and by that means Af^ furance, in embracing their new Princi- ples , fo were they further pleafed and confirmM together in the Behef of them^ by applauded Trials , and Exercife of their own "Wit the fame way ; efpecially, when the general Difpoftttoyi of the Per- fons they convers'd with, made this En- tertainment very agreeable, and very frequent. All this have feveral Atheifts, upon their Repent aftce^ acknowledged.
And that which firrengthens the Argu- ment drawn from hence, is, that thole who have renounced their Irreligwm Principles , and given this account of themlelves , have been , fome of them. Men of the he^^\^ natural Abilities , and greateft acquired Iravro'vements , of anv that ev^er took the Party of Jtheifm\^ and their Repentance has been free and volun- tary ^ and not extorted by any frightful Reprefentations, or importunate Addref- fes, in the feafons of Fear and Weaknels -, it has begun from themfelves, and been wholly owing to the over-ruling Impref- fions of a Divine Poiver, and not to Hu-^ man Perfuafion ; and their Blindnefs and
Pre
of Religion in General. 1 5 i
Prejudices being, by this means, remo- ved, the Arguments for Religion have prevailed upon them hy their own Strength, as fuggclled to them by their own Reafon, without receiving any Ad- vantage from the Management and Art of others.
And this I think fufficlent to fliew, that Atheifm proceeds from (hong Preju' dices ^ ana falfe^ dtfproportioned Motives of judgingy and is not the rcfult of jAf// Rea- fonirjgy and impartial Reflexion.
I have now gone through the fevcral Branches of my Difcourfe, which I pro- pofed to my felf in the beginning of it ; and have finifhed tlie FroofI undertook o'i general ^ or, as 'tis commonly called, natural Religion.
All that I have further to add upon this Subjecl, at prelent, is, to give fome ac- count of the Notions of Atheifm , and Deifm ; which Words we are forced to ufe fometimes promifcuoufly , and in a different Senfe from tlie common accep- tation, for want of a fit and proper Word to exprefs a Belit'f\ or Profejfion of any j'lich 0\^imons which t;ikc away the
p AiitCiXl
252, Tl:'e Certainty and Islecejiity
^Y/tBicd Influence and Power of Religion, For which reafon I think it convenient in this place, that I may remedy any Confulion or Miftake, which the Liberty I have taken in the ufe of thefe Terms may have occafioned, to fet down di- ftinftly what I look upon to be the com^ man Notions di Atheifm and Deifm^ and what UeAs I fhouid chufe to affix thefe Words to.
By an Atheift is commonly meant fuch a one as will own no Being under the Name and Title of God, And he who does acknowledge fuch a Being, let his Conceptions of him be what they will, is reputed no Acheif, An<\y in this Senfe of the Word, it may well be made a qusftioii , Whether there be any fuch thing as m\Athci{l- m the World? For, \is hard to meei with a M in w!io has not fome IdeA in Iiis Mind, which he will be content to allow the N^me of G 3^' to ; tho\ upon EKamination, perhaps it will he found to be nothing elfe but a confa- fed Notion of fom-e t'ajl Poiver , Fir/l Caufe, Ongirul Mn-'er^ or Immrnd Be- ing^ enjoying Eterntl R^fl^j dai Q^iiet.
NoWj
of ^'Ir^ion VI General. 2 5 >
Now, accordi?igtothis Notion of A- theifm^ he who profcircs to bclitve a, Gody wJiatcvcr N.ttnre^ Charaffcrs and Jttri- hutes lie afcribcs to him, and at the fame time De/iies his Provtdcnce^ or Govern- ment of Mankind is called a Deifl,
But, in fuch places where the Preten- ces of /<^ir/.i//(^/i; are acknowledged, and defended, he that is called a Deifi is one who owns a God^ and believes fome fort of Providence , and nMur,iL OhltgMtons^ but denies ^H nLxnner of Revelation ; who contines his Duty to matters o^ Ctvil Ju- ftice and Commerce ; makes thefe his chief Principles^ not to n*jttre /mother^ and to keep hti Word ; grounds his Pra£lice upon the Reafon and Interejt of Societies^ and his o)vn prefent Advantage, not Obedience to God, or a future Profpccl ; believes, no future Life^ or only Jucb a one as can jiave no great Influence upon a Man's Anions here. I'his is the common Vfc of thefe Words.
But, by an Atheifi^ I think, may pro^ pcrly, and juftly be meant, not only he who .ihjhlutcly denies the Bei?fg of a God,, but whofoever lays there is no God thu governs the IVorld^ and jud^^cth the Earth ;
there
1 5 4 The Certainty and Neceffity
there is ^o God who hah appointed Laws And Rules for Men to a6h by •, there is no God to whom Men are accountable for all pheir Aciions^ and by whom they jb all be re- warded^ or punifhed inafutureState, ac- cording to their Behaviour here ; and, in general, whoever holds fuch an Opinion as exempts him from all Obligation of Duty to a Superiour Beings .or cuts off the Expe- Bat ton of Rewards and Puniflfments conle- quent thereupon.
For Atheifm is to be confidersd as a Vice^ and not a meer Error in Spep^ulation. And therefore, he who denies Providence^ Natural Law , or a Future State , is as much an Athetft as he who denies God''s Being : For, it's all one, with refpeR: to Praftice, to fay there is no God^ as to fay there'^s no Obedience due to him^ or no Pu- nishment for Difohedience , if there be : It is likewife all one to deny divine Pr/» mjhment direclly, and to deny the Immor- tality of the Soiil^ or the Scriptures^ in the Senle of thofe who at prefent deny thefe things: For they who fay the Soul dies with the Body , think hereby to prove, that God cannot punish ; and they who deny the Scriptures do it, in order to fhew- that he will not pf^^^ijh, that is, in another
Lifey
of ^'li^ion in Geneyai 255
Life ; and, as to the prefent^ they per- ceive that thofc who arc ftilcd IVicked fare as well, and have as large a Portion ot the good things of this World, as their Righteous Brethre^i, The End and De- ftgn then of all thefe Opinions is the fame ; namely, to cftablifli a Libertj for every Man to live ns hepleafes^ and to do whatfo- ever is right in his own Eyes ; and what is this , but to fay, there is no God. in the World.
This is tlie Notion I have of an Athe* ift ; and accordingly 1 have applied the word i?idifferently^ as I had occafion, to any Perfons who denied any of the Princt^ pies of Reiigto^ which I have endeavour'd to ellabiifli : And the word Deijl is to be taken in the fime Senfe with that of A- theifi^ every where, but where we arc particularly difcourfing about the Being of God, as diftinguifhed from the o/W Parts of Rehgton.
But , in oppofition to the Chara6lcr which I have now given of aii A:heift^ by a Deijl is to be meant, one who ac- knowledges all the PrinctpUs of Religion here maintained', who thinks he is obliged to inform him felf truly of his whole Duty
to
t<^6 The Certainty and Neceff/ty
to God, and to live up to the highefi: and pureft Rules of Morality that he can form to himfelf, by the Afliftance of his own Reafon, and the united Lights of other Men who looks upon all the moral ^ or practical Part of the Scriptures as very ufeful and inftruftive, and confequently what ought to be read and valued as Tn/Iy and Artflotle are, upon the fame Subject : hut does not believe any fuch thing as Revelation^ orafTentto any of thofe/f^«- liar matters of Fact ^ or Doctrines , which are wholly grounded upon that extraor- dinary way of Conveyance , and are not level to his Reafon^ oi' difcoverable by it.
And, if a Dei ft be fuch a one as I have defcribed, it would be as jufl: a matter of Enquiry, whether there be any Perfons to whoin this Title belongs, as whether there be any real Atheifts in the World. For my part, I will not pofitively fay there is no fuch thing as a true Deift, in that fenfe which 1 have now given of the word , becaufe , I beheve , there hardly ever was any Opinion known among Men, which fome body did not efpoufe ; but this, I think, I may venture to af- firm, that it would be the moH: difficult tiling imaginable to find a Man in a Chri-
of^'lii^ion in General. 1^7
jhan Countreyy who was acquainted witli the Books of Holy Scrif^ture , and the co?nmon Proofs of Chrifiunity ; wlio was fully perfuadcd of the Truth of d the Prifjciples o^ Naturd Religion here Uid do)v?i^ and who ferioully endeavoured to conform his Life to the Moral Rules ^ and Precepts of the Gofpely and yet who deni- ed Revelation, and all thofe particular Truths which ftand diftinguifhed by the .Mamc of Revealed Religion : fuch a Man as this, I believe, is hard to be met with. For it is not Propheftes, or Miracles, or M)feries , which puzzle the Faith of thofe who now go under the Name of Deilb ; but a plain and full Difcovery of a fiitin-e State of Rewards and Punifh- mtnts. This is the fhocking repugnant Doclrine, in comparifon of which, the Trinity, and Incarnation arc eafie Noti- ons, and very reconcileable to their Rca-
Upon this account it is, tliat 1 nave mentioned Deijls as Enemies of Natural Religion, and h properly coming within my Subject, and not as meer Oppofers of Revelation , which belongs to another
.A resume m.
"^ S Anct
2)8 Tl^e Certainty and Kccelfity
And now , having pointed out who tliev are that are particularly concerned in the foregoing Difcourfe, it might be expected that I fhould addrefs rny felf to them to embrace thofe Principles of Religion which I have there proved, and to beiiow fome ferious Thoughts about the Danger of their Unbelief ; but I am ^oo well acquainted w^ith their Chara- ditv to trouble them with any Advice of this nature : If they are not convinced^ and bore down by Arguments^ I am fiire they will never yield to Ferfuafwn ; nei- ther indeed is it proper to go about to perfuade Men to heiiete ; they only are to be applied to in this manner, v/ho are fatisfied of the Truth of what you would perfiaade them to, but w^ant fuilicient Motives and Incitements to
I ihall tlierefore fliut up this whole Difcourie with my earneft Prayers to God, tliat he would be plea fed to incHne ?:nd difpofe thofe who are doubtful, and wavering in the Concerning Points of Religion, to weigh and confider wcU the Proof it ftands upon, before they venture to withdi-aw tliemfelves from under tlie '[nfiiience and Government of it , that
he
of ^li^ion in General, 255)
he would defend the Innocent, and fuch as are unacquainted with the Wa)s of Irreligion , from the falfe Suggeflions, andlnfinuationsof UnheHevers; that he would convince the Carelefs and indiffe- rent of the abfolute Neceffity of having fome Religion ; and that he would be further pleafed to enable thole, who are already convinced of this Trutli, to Hop the Mouths of Gain-fayers, by a llcady and uniform Practice ot their Duty, eve- ry way anfwerable to their Knowledge, and FrofeiTion.
FINIS.
T H E
Certainty and Necejfity
O F
Religion in General^ dec.
The Contents.
INtrodMon (hewing the defign of the Difcourfe^ and the Method in which it is Profecuted. Page i uin account of the Nature of A^an, fo far as con- terns Religion. p. 9
Qf the Nature of God. p. 1 4
Of the Relation there vs hetwixtGod andMan. p. \6 A dire^ proof of the Being of God. p. 1 7
CPoJihle, p. 18
Confidired as*^ Probable^ p. 24
C Certain. p. 37
The certainty of God's Exijlence proved^ Indirettly and Negatively^ by pjewing that none of thofe Suppoftttons which exclude the Being of Cod can be trite. ?• 5-
Matter alone ccnfidercd at refl could not be Eternal^ and in time produce the Prefent frame of the World. p. 5-;
'Hj impoJTiUc to account for ihs Frcdu^ion of the
Worlds
The Contents.
IVorld, by the jithdfl\ Hy^othefts of moving A- toms. p. 5y
'Tie abftird to fuplofe that the World has Exijled Eternally^ under the fame Form we novo behold tt^ without a Gnd. p, 6 1
T)}e Eternal Coexiflcnce of Matter and Mind^ im- probable, p, 6^
Suppofmg it probable^ neither Matter alone nor A^atter and Motion^ nor the prefent ConflitU' tion of things could have been Eternal Indepen - dently of Cod. ' p. 75
The Original of all things from God^ further evin- ced from General Reflexions. P- 78
A po/itive and direct Proof of Religion drawn from the Natures of God and Man^ and the Relations there are betwixt them. p. g^
Of the Nature and Ground of Obligation^ together with the Right and Power of Obhgiyig, i5
That Man is obliged to order hvs Ufe according to the WiU of Gud^ is proved ^ p. 1 04
From the Natural Judgments we make concerning our ABions. p. i q-.
From the End and Deftgn of God in making us which appears by fever al Tokens and Indications.
p. 120 in the Frame and Difpofttion of our Mind^ ib.
and in the 0 economy and Conjlitution of Humane Society. p. , 28
From the Nature of Religion it felf^ a regular pradice of which conduces to the greatefi Happi- nefs we are capable of in this Life. p. i 32
And from the certainty of a Future State which is proved. p. 141
From
The Contents.
From the defe[i of a General and Regular PraCiice of Religion here : p. i ^.2
^nd from the General Wants^ Nccejftties and Im- pyfeCtions of our prefent Nature. p- '45
From all which Confiderations it appears^ that *tw more for our Happinefs to live Religioujly than otherwife^ and therefore we are obliged to live fo.
p. 151
'the Certainty^ and NeceJJlty of Relipon further Jhewn^ from the pernicious effeifs of all kind of Jr religion J with refpeGt to the Happinefs of Man- kind. P- ^S3
The ahfurdity and folly of all the Grounds and Pre^ fences of Irreligion^ and whatever is aUedged in defence of it. P- 185
Jrreligion not capable of any direB proof. p. 1 85
The ufual Ways and Methods of defending it Im- proper and Jnfufficient. p. 19Q
Ridiculing Religion proves nothing againfl it. p. 191
Requiring a more certain and Mathematical proof of it umeafonable. p. 1 92
Schemes and Hypothefes to account for the prefent flate of things^ without God and Religion^ ab- furd and inconftflcnt. p. 19$
The chief and mofi common Obje{lions againfl Re- ligion anfwered^ viz.. p. 204
Myfteries , feeming Inconjiflencies^ and jibfurdi- 'ties in Scripture. \). 20$
JLxtravagant Notions^ and Pernicious DoUrines^ matntaiHed under the name of Religion, p. 206
Variety of Opinions among the Profeffors of the fame Religion. p. 207
Fooli/h
The Contents.
Foolijh and Ridiculous Arguments urged in defence of it. p. 2Gy
Scandalous Lives of great Pretenders to Piety and Firtuc. ib.
Religion the cffelt of Fear and Education p. 2 1 3
Religion a politick Contrivance. p. 214
The Abfurdity and Folly of Irreligious Principles^ and Practices dcmonjlrated^ from General Rv- flc&ions upon the different Grounds^ and Foun- dations which Religion andlrrcVgionflands upon-^ and the different Conduit of thofe ivho ait under the Influence of the one and the other. p. 2 1 6"
Irrcligion further cxpofed from the Caufes and Rea- fons that induce Men to take up Atheifiical and Prcphane Opinions. p. 230
The chief Caufes of Atheifm fheven to be thefe trvo ^ 7lbe Fear of an after-reckoning for a xvickcdLife^ and the Vamty of appearing greater or wifer than other Men. p. 233
The Doctrines of Irreligion the fole refult of Preju- dice^ and not deliberate Reafoning more plainly made out ^ p.' 242
From theChara&cr and Capacities of thcAtheifls. ib.
From the manner and Procefs of their Infidelity.
p. 245
And from the Confejfion of feveral Atbeijls them- felves. ' p. 249
An account of the Notions of Atheifm and Dcijm and how they ate to be difiinguifhcd. p. 2 5 1
ERRATA.
PAge6. line 9. read reformed? p. 33. !* 20. r. beJieve aGody p. 4.7. 1. 16. d. if. p. 51. 1. 27. r.pojjtbly. p. 68. 1. 23. for Cmje r, exz/?, p. 70. 1. 4.r. Perception^ and wiQ-^ p. 71. 1. 21. for 4;y r. W p. 80. 1. 22. for cm r. could, p. 109. 1.4. d. to, p. 148.1. 23. r. 0/ greater, p. 181 1. 5. r. Attahment. Id. p. 183. 1, laft. p. 224 1. 6. for r^sre r. their, p. 23 3 laft line r. ? p. 249 1. 24. r. th p. 2^6 1. ^.r. Men.
BOO K>S Printed for Thomas Bennet.
PSyche.^ Or Loves Adyjltry^ in 24 Canto's dif- playing the Intercourfe betwixt Chriftand the Soul , By Jofe^h Beaumont , D. D. Late King's ProfeObr of Divinity, and Mafter of St. FeUr's CoUege^ in Cambridge. The Second E-^ dition, with Corrections throughout, and four new Canto's never before Printed.
A Conferente with a Theifl., in Five Parts ; Being a Defence of the Chriftian Religion, a- gainfl: the Objections of all forts, which are advanced in oppofition to it by the Unbelie- vers. By William NichoUs^ D. D.
By the fame Author. A Treatife of Confo- lation to Parents for the death of Children. Written upon the occafion of the Death of the Duke of Gloucejler.
An Ejfay of Self-Murther., wherein is endea- voured to prove, that it is unlawful according to Natural Principles. By J. Adams^ Redtor of St. Alban^ Weodjlreet,
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