C.G. JinTG'S THEORY OF THE C0LLECTI7E UNCONSCIOUS:
A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

TMLTER A70RY SHELBURNE

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF

THE UNIVTKSITr OF FLORIDA

IN PARTIAL FULFTLU^IENT OF THE REQUIREMEI'ITS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHUOSOPHT

UNITERSITZ OF FLORIDA
1976

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

3 1262 08666 238 3

Copyright 1976
Vfelter Avoiy Shelbume

ACKMOIilLEDOENTS

I irould like to grateful^sr acloioirledge the persons of rcr supervisory
committee for their help in this project: Marilyn areig, Tom Aarber,
i^anz lifting, Richard Ilaynes and Tom Simon. Special thanks to Iferiljoi
and Tom Sijnon for their tiine, encouragement and helpful criticism. I
would also like to thank Debbie Botjers of the Graduate School, who, in
addition to her technical advice, has through her friendliness contri-
buted in an immeasurable and intangible way to the final preparation of
this manuscript,

3h addition to this personal assistance, I TTould also like to aclaiow-
ledge the help of the follo;.jing agencies: the spirit of Carl Gustav Jung,
the Archetn>e of the Self, and the three luminous beings tAo cleansed iry
spirit.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACiaro V/LEDGlJEI'rPS iii

ABSTRACT , ^

HrPRODUCTION ,, .,

CHAPTER 1 JUl'JG'S I-IEMTAL CONSTRUCTS.. ,,.., 3

Pgyxjhe...... , ,,, 3

Uiconscioiis. . . , .,, .,,, 16

Collective Ifciconscious. . . . , 19

Notes. .................,,..,,,,,,,,, , 28

CHAPTER 2 TI£EORr OF ARCHETTPES: PART I ,,,, 30

Introduction,.., , ,,.,,. ..,,,. 30

The Syrabolic Mature of the Archetypes ,, , l^;^

Archetiypes and Instincts ,,,,... hi

Notes.... , ..,,,.. , ,, ^3

CHAPTER 3 THEOrar OF ARCHETn=ES: PART II..... ^

The Origin of the Archetypes ^

Archelypal ninage and Archetype Per Se ., 63

Tlae .'irchetypes as Autonomous Factors,. , 72

Archeigrpes and Synchroniciiy 77

Archetypes and Teniporalitiy. .......,,...,. 82

Notes ^ ......,,, 8^

iv

Page

CHAPTER li CRITICiaiS OF TIIE ARCIIETIPAL TlffiOHT:

GHJEI'JUL COITSIDERATIOHS. . , 89

Preliminary Remarks, ,,, 89

Psychoanalytic Criticism 9^

Iheological Criticism.,...,.....,....,.. , 102

Ifotes. •.•••..••••.,•.«••.••..«..«.,, ..........•,.,. .111

CHAPTER ^ JTJIIG AMD THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITDDE: PART I II6

The Relevance of the Question.,,.,.,...,,.,,..,,..,., 116

The Charge of I-^rsticism .,,,.. 11?

l-tjrsticism Characterized, .,,, ,,,.,...,...,.119

Is Jung a Ifystic? , 120

Jung's Attitude ToTrard Science.. , 12?

Notes il;i

CHAPTER 6 JUITG AMD TIIE SCIEIITIFIC ATTITUDE: PART II,, ll;6

Can There Be A Science of Arche%pes? ...II16

Jung ' s Ifethodology ..................I63

Ifotes. ...........171

CHAPTER 7 THE STUDY OF ARCHETYPES AS A SCIEIITIPIC DISCIPLINE., I7I;

Introduction. ,.,,................,,..,.,,,,,, ,,..,,.17li

Falsifiability ,«,,,..,,, .,,», ,..,,,176

Explanation. .••...•...•....••.....,......,...,,,.,,,,,,,,, i8li

Evidence , ..•.,,. ....I88

Archetypes and Evolution Theory , 196

Notes, .•,,.....••......,,•• ....................199

REFERENCES L 203

BIOGRAPHIC.VL SKETCH .......^ ....206

«-f. +1, ^f^^^a°* of dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial PiiLfirijaent of the Itequireiaents
for the Degree of Doctor of Hiilosopl-cr

C.G. JUNG'S THEOHY OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS-
A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

By

Vfelter Avory Shelbume

June 1976

Chairman: Mu?ilyn Zireig ;. !• "

Ifejor Department: Hiilosopl-y

This study is an examination of Jung's idea of the collective un-
conscious being primariay concerned id.th the chief aspect of the collec-
tive unconscious, the concept of the archetype.

In the first half of the dissertation, an attempt is made to
understand what Jung means by the archetypes. The e.-cposition of the
theory of archetj-pes begins xrith a look at the basic Jungian mental
constructs, p^che and unconscious, and td.th a stetch of Jung's theoiy
of mind. Then the various aspects of the idea of the archetype are
discussed treating such topics as the ontological status of the archetype,
the archetypes as a prfx)ri conditioners of*e:cperience, the symbolic
nature of archetypes, the archetypes and the instincts, the origin of
archetypes, the phenomenology of archetypes, personification of arche-
types, the archetjTes and ^ynchronicity and changes in archetypes through

tiiae.

i

Bie exposition of the archetypal theory is undertaken with the aim
in mijid of shCTjing hoT7 the idea of archetypes can be construed as a
plausible scientific theory compatible idth standard scientific

vi

vii

imder^andins. ^^ the second half of the disserbation, v/e discuss
problematic aspects of our reconstruction from the point of vietr of
criticisms which have been brought against the theory. AS^er a
preldjidnaiy chapter in which criticisms of a general nature are
discussed, we treat specific problematic aspects involved i/ith under-
handing the archetj^al theory as a plausible scientific one. !Ihe
rationalily of the archetypal theoiy is discussed in reply to the
accusation that Jung's theory is mrstical rather than scientific,
nh addition to the question of rationality, we treat the relationship
bettTeen the practical and theoretical aspects of the theory in order
to disbingulsh bettreen a theoretical and therapeutic discourse about
archetypes, idth the latter discourse being concerned id.th personal
meaningful interpretation of archetypal experience and hence often
justifiabHy employing philosophical and religious teminology. Thus
tre attempt to show how the use of such teiroinology bjr Jung in dis-
cussions of archetypes does not count against the scientific nature
of theoretical claims about archetypes.

In addition to attempting to show how the archetypal theoiy is
•a rational one and how its relationship to philosopl^ and religion
does not count against it as a scientific theoi^r, ,re also examine
how the theory can be understood in the context of general criteria
for scientific theories. ]ii this regard ire discuss the problem of
falsification shordiig how the theoiy can not be interpreted as com-
patible Tjith all observational i?tates of affairs. I-fe also discuss
the explanations and predictions wliich can be expected from the
theory. PinaTly the evidence for the theoiy is discussed.

■Qie conclusion is reached that the archetj-pal theoiy can satisiy

viii

general scientific criteria and also meet specific criticisms of it
from the scientific point of vieTr and that thus the scientific plau-
sibility of the theoiy should be admitted.

HWRODUCTION

In this study ire attempt a rational reconstruction of J\mg«s
theozy of archetypes ^d.th the goal in view of shoidiig that this
theoiy is a scientifically plausible one. In regard to this task,
some preliMnaiy questions need to be addressed. Vhat is meant
by a rational reconstruction? T*iy is the reconstruction undertaken
fl^ a scientific point of viesi and lAat is the purpose of shoidng
that the archetypal theoiy is scientifically plausible?

So far as the first question is concerned, the idea of a rational
reconstruction is to clarify the meaning and interrelationship of the
basic concepts of a theory so that the theory can be shoxm to be con-
sistent and to be a theoiy >jith a clearly specified meaning.

In. Jung's style of theorizing, clairlty and precision of basic
concepts are much less important than fullness of meaning and phe-
nomenologically accurate characterization of events. As a consequence
many of Jung's ideas are as vague and ambiguous as th^ are fas-
cinating and insightful. However, the purpose of a rational recon-
struction as we understand it is not to oppose the spontaneity and
riclmess of creativity vrith a sljiiple desire for order and clarity.
Rather the aim of a rational reconstruction is the transformation
of the unti(^ richness of creativity into a more directly useable
form. By attempting to clariiy the meaning of the archetypal theoiy
then, we hope to bring about a vdder aclmowledgement and study of

the theoiy so as eventually to contribute to its dissemination as a
fruitful conceptual schenK.

Horrever, our reconstruction from the scientific point of view
needs some Justification, For a survey of Jungian literature in-
dicates on the whole a tendency to eniphasize the therapeutic aspect
of the theory and its immediate personal relevance . rather than its
employment in an attempt to gain scientific knotrledge. But unless
the scientific plausibility of the archetypal theoiy can be establii^ed
on firm ground, the personal and therapeutic relevance of the theory
will be undermined. In Jung's terminology, the dilemma of modem
man is that he can no longer simply believe, he must know. The
modem individual's desire for a conqjrehensive understanding of
the XTorld can thus not be satisfied by viei:s which are incompatible
T-Tith scientific understanding.

But if the author must confess that he is attracted to the arche-
igrpal theory from the standpoint of its personal existential relevance,
it should not be concluded that the archetypal theory is seen only
as a therapeutic tool. For in arguing for scientific plausibility,
\je have in mind a more ambitious goal of eventually showing hoir the
theoiy can be used to gain theoretical unde,rstanding in a vride range
of scientific disciplines. Vfe believe that the theory is not only
scientifically plausible, but that it should be accepted and employed
as well. Hovrever, this more ambitious aim must await the outcome
of our attempt to argue for scientific plausibility. For a rational
reconstruction of the theory is necessary before its true scientific
merit can be appreciated.

CHAPTEH 1
JUlTG'o MENTAL CONSTIIUCTS

Pg/'che

Preliminary Remarks

In order to gain a full understanding of Jung's theoiy of arche-
tjrpes, it is necessary to see his vieiis on this matter within the con-
text of his p^yxjhology as a whole. Hbt-rever, within the scope of this
study of the archetypes, >7e can not attempt to trace the relationship
beti-reen all of Jung's vier-rs and the archetypes. A principle omission
in this regard is Jung's theoiy of individuation where he attempts to
examine the role which the archetypes play in the development of per-
sonality.

But if ire can not consider all of Jung's vies^s which are related
to the archetypal theory, it is essential to gain an understanding of
his mental constructs, Ihus, as a preliminary to discussing the arche-
typal theory itself, we i-dll examine these constructs. Oar approach in
this regard will be to begin with the mental constructs of the xd.de st
application. I* i^ill consider first then the most general of the Jungian
mentalistic terras, the psyche,
Psyche-Body Relation

Jung emphasizes that his notion of the psyche is not intended to be
a precise notion in the sense that its limits are well defined, "I Imow
that veiy many people have difficulties id.th the wrd 'psychological. '

To put these critics at ease, I should like to add that no one laior.s
lAat 'psfyche' is, and one knows o'ust as little hoi-r far into nature
•psiyiche' extends."^

Before attempting a definitive cliaracterization of the p^che then,
TO will examine hoi-i the concept is used. For if the p^che is a vague
notion, we have, nonetheless, little trouble for the most part vrLth
regard to deciding ^Aether or not to app^jr it in specific cases.

Shics hythe p^hic Jung has in mind something close in meaning
to mental, one flniitful way to see ho>x Jung uses this concept is to
explore the intended .relation betwen pgyche and body.

In this regard tlien, it is clear that by p^/che Jung does not
iiean to imply a Cartesian dualism in .Aich the p^he would be a
mental substance. For rather than a thiiig or a substance, the psyche
is to be considered in terms of a system of energy relations. The
terra "libido" is used by Jung to designate the psychic energy. 'This
energetic vieiTponut seems to suggest a reductionist position in which
the p^he understood as physical energy was seen as reducible to
physico-chemical terms or else a vitalist position in irfiich a special
■tgrpe of mind energy vxas postulated.

The possibility that Jung might be taking a reductive position is
suggested by the fact that the purpose of the energetic standpoint is
to enable the psychologist to understand p^hological phenomena in
such tenns as entropy, conservation of energy and equilization of
differences in an analogous way 1^ the manner in which physical phe-
nomena can be so understood. Thus Jung belives that the concept of
libido "accomplishes for p^holdgy the same advance that the concept
of energy introduced into physics" (Vol. TV, p. 112).

3h the absence of any methods of exact measurement of the energy,
quantitative estimations can be reached through appeal to the system
of psychological values, as the value intensity of psychological
phenomena T/ill be held to be a quantitative estijnate of the amount of
psychic energy involved (Vol. Vm, p. 9),

Hmrever, Jung makes clear that the analogy beti^een plysical energy

and p^srchic energy cannot be taken in too literal a sense:

... in spite of the nonmeasurability of psychic
processes, the perceptible changes effected by
the psyche cannot possibly be understood except
as a plienomenon of energy. Biis places the
p^chologist in a situation which is highly re-
pugnant to the physicist: the psychologist also
talks of energy although he has nothing measurable
to manipulate, besides ^*ich the concept of en-
ergy is a strictly defined mathematical quan-
tity which cannot be applied to anything psychic. . . .
If psychology nevearfcheless insists on en^jloylng
its OTjn concept of energy for the purpose of
expressing the activity ... of the psyche, it
is not of course being used as a mathematical
formula, but only as its analogy (Vol. i/ITI, p. 233).

Jung's energetic standpoint is then obviously not an attempt to
bring about a reduction of psychology to psychophysics. Jung in-
sists on the autonomous position of psychology in relation to
other sciences:

Since, unfortunately, we cannot prove scien-
tifically that a relation of equivalence e:cists
betTv-een physical and psychic energy, ire have
no alternative except eitlier to drop the ener-
getic viei;point altogether, or else to postu-
late a special psychic energy— which would be
entirely possible as a hypothetical opera-
tion. Psychology as much as physics may avail
itself of the right to build its o;m concepts . . .
(Vol, vm, p. 15-16).

But this characterization of libido as a "special psychic energy"
would seem to imply a vitallst position. This suspicion seems confirmed

Trfien we read: "From a broader standpoint libido can be understood
as vital energy in general, or as Bergon'sllan vital" (Vol. 17, p.
2U8), and " . . . tre irould probably do best to regard the psytjhic
process siinply as a life-process. In this tray ire enlarge the
narroxrer concept of psychic energy to a broader one of life-
enei^, which includes »p^chic energy* as a specific part" (Vol.
mi, p. 17).

However, Jung nalces clear that "this broader standpoint" is
a hcTJothetical and problematic one.2 Jn order to maintain its func-
tional autonany, p^chology must not conflate its concept of psychic
enei^ vd-tli a possible biological concept of vital energy. "I have
therefore sugge^bed that, in view of the psychological use ttb intend
to mabe of it, ^-re call our hypothetical life-energy 'libido. 'To
this esrtent I have differentiated it fixan a concept of universal
energy, so maintaining the right of biology and psychology to foira
their oim concepts" (Vol. VEII, p. 17). Biere is also an explicit
disclaimer of the concept of vitalism: "Vfe shall not be disturbed
if we are met vdth the cry of vitalism. Ife are as far removed from
ai^y belief in a specific life-force as fi-om ai^ other metaphysical
assertion" (Vol. IV, p. 12^).

I* see then that in regard to the question of reductionism,
Jung wants to avoid comraitinent to either reductionism or vitalism.
Jung's stand on this issue can then best be characterized as de
facto antireductionist. Father than attempting to defend the a
priori nonreduction of psychological phenomena to physics or chem-
istry, Jung holds to a de facto antireductionism. This nonreduction
as a matter of fact is supportable hy the available empirical evidence

and is strictny speaking neutral T^Tith respect to the issue of reduc-
tion in principle.

Jung's noncoranital stand on reductionism is characteriffbic of
his p^hology as a whole i/here he attenpts to define his psycholog-
ical conrtructs dji ways which are as free as possible from philoso-
phical controvert. Howver, this dislilce for philosophy frequently
leads to the situation of unclarity with regard to the full implica-
tions of Jung's views. This situation of ambiguity if well e:3eRrpli-
fied when we attempt to comprehend i-jhat sort of psyche-bo(fy relation
Jung has in mind in constructing his psychology. For Jung's non-
commital vieirs on reductionism fail to give us a definite clue as
to his position on the mind-bo^ problem.

Hoirever, in regard to this clue, there are indications that
Jung holds to a nondualistic position in which the psyche is seen
as necessarily dependent on the brain, >7ith p^he entailing em-
bodied pj^i-che.

So far as our e:qperience permits of any inference
at all about the nature of the psyche, it shotrs
the p^rchic process as a phenomenon dependent on
the nervous sj-stem (Vol, VHI, p. 322, 1926).

• . • the human psyche lives in indissoluble
union idth the body (Vol. YUl, p. llii, 1936).

Md just as the material of the body that is
ready for life has need of the p^che in order
to be capable of life, so the psyche pre-
supposes the living body in order that its
images may live (Vol. VHI, p. 326, 1926).

But Jung seems to call into question the view that the psyche is

necessarily embodied, thus suggesting a dualifffcic position. Ih a

193U essay \je read such irtatements as the follwdng:

... the psyche's attachment to the brain, i.e.,
its space-time limitation, is no longer as self-
evident and incontroviertible as we have hitherto
been led to heUeve (Vol. vni, p. kl3).

The l^rpothetical possibility that the pi^che
touches on a form of ejdstence outside space
and time presents a scientific question-mark
that merits serious consideration for a long
time to come (Vol, Vm, p. klh).

LAt deatlQ we may establish T-jith reasonable
certainty that an individual consciousness as
it relates to ourselves has come to an end.
But Tjhether this means that the continuity of
the psychic process is also interrupted re-
mains doubtful, since the psyche's attachment
to the brain can be confirmed tdth far less
cei'titude today than it could fifty years ago.
Psychology must first digest certain para-
p^'-chological facts, which it has hardly begun
to do yet (Vol. Vm, p. 1,12),

One vray to come to terras Td.th this apparent radical shift in
position is to atten^jt to distinguish an earlier necessary embodi-
ment view from a later view \jhen, in the last years of his life,
Jung held to the belief in the existence of disembodied psyches. A
consideration of the dates of ttie above quoted statements, however,
casts doubt on the idea that Jung's position can be neatly divided
into an earlier and later period,^ Although there certainly is a slow
gradual shift airay from the necessary embodiment vleir, the certitude
wi-Ui which Jung states that the psyche has a necessary connection
with the body is never replaced xjith another position which Jung
can state in an unhypothetical way and \M.ch can easily be integrated
uTith the rest of his vieirs.

Just as the parapsychological data have to an esrtent proved to
be anomalies inejrplicable in terns of present pl^sical Istis, so do
the considerations concerning the related phenomena which caused
Jung to doubt the psyche's necessaiy connection vdth the brain prove

to be anomalous in.th respect to his pgycholosy as a whole. ]h order
then to understand the place of these anomalous statements in relation
to the totality of what Jung says about the p^che, the sort of
distinction to mxst bear in ndnd is that betireen a T-rell-worked out
and fruitful concept, the notion of the pj^yxshe as embodied and de-
pendent on the brain, versus tentative, hypothetical attempts to
see hOTj this vlerr could be expanded, or perhaps revised, in order
to take into account the full range of the parapsychological phe-
nomena,

^though a full discussion of Jung's parapsychological reflec-
tions can not be attempted here, it would seem that the parapsyxiho-
logical data did not lead Jung to conclude that comniiianent to a
position of dualism, in the sense that psj-che and matter are radi-
caiay different types of entities, was necessaiy. Ifather, present
in the latest as well as earlier Tndtings is the viei-; that psyche
and bo(fy (matter) are different aspects of a common fundamental
entity.

... it is not on3y possible but fairly probable,
even, that psyche and matter are two different
aspects of one and ttie same thinp- (Vol. VIII
p. 21^, 19li6).

This living being appears outuardOy as the ma-
terial boc^y, but inwardly as a series of images
of the vital activities talcing place within it,
Ihey are tvro sides of the same coin, and vre can-
not rid ourselves of the doubt that perhaps
this whole separation of mind and body may
finally prove to be merely a device of reason
for the purpose of conscious discrimination—
an intellectually- necessary separation of one
and the same fact into two aspects, to which
we then Illegitimately attribute an inde-
pendent existence (Vol. VHI, p. 326, 1926)

10

"Diat even the psychic world, which is so e:d;ra-
ordinarily different from the physical vjorld,
does not have its roots outside the one cosmos
is evident from the undeniable fact that causal
connections e^dst betireen the pj^yche and the
bo^' T/hich point to their underlying unitary
natm'e (Vol. :crv, p. ^38, 19^).

If one is untdUing to postulate a pre-established
haiTOory of pl^ysical and psychic events, then
they can only be in a state of interaction. But
the latter hypothesis requires a psyche that
touches matter at some point, and, conversely,
a matter idth a latent psyche, a postulate not
so very far removed from certain f onnulations
of modem physics (Eddington, Jeans, and others).
In this connection I would remind the reader of
the existence of parapsychic phenomena . . ,
(Vol. Vni, p. 23^, 19h6),

In order to understand Jung's theoiy of mind, it :rould seem
essential to understand t:ro problematic aspects of Jung's views.
On the one hand, ire need to understand how Jung's essentially dou-
ble aspect approach can be made compatible idth acceptance of dis-
embodied psyches. On the othei' hand, as e:<Bmpliiled in the last
quotations, Jung appears to want to hold sijnultaneously to a double
aspect theoiy and an interactionist vie;j-.^

^uice lie cannot attempt a full discussion of the relevant
problems in the philosopliy of mind which these problems raise, -je
vdll be content to point out that v^hereas the double aspect theory
and interactionism can perhaps be shcfim to be compatible in principle,
it is clear that the acceptance of disembodied psyches would at least
greatly complicate such an endeavor. For if it can be shoira that
pgyches can exist independently of bodies, then the essentially
monistic double aspect vieir irould be in great difficulty.

But if vre have then good cause to tiy to construe Jung's vieirs
on the p^he-body relation independently of the statements about

11

disembodied psyches, ve can nonetheless understand hou Jung's vievrs
on this matter can seem at one moment to be dualistic, ..hile in another
instance he appears to hold to a monistic double aspect theoiy. For
the p^he is to be studied from the standpoint of the empirical data
as if it Trcre a distinct entity from the bo<fy, although this phenomeno-
logical approach does not for Jung entail a substantial dualism. Ife
can then say both that "... ,je have absolutely no means of dividing
lAat is p^ycliic from the biological process as such" (Vol. VHI, p.
16), and also that "so far, then, as our present loioirledge goes,
neuroses are to be iiifluenced or cured by approaching them not from
the proxiinal end, i.e., from the functioning of tlie glands, but from
the distal end, i.e., from the psyche, just as if the psyche xmre
itself a substance" (Vol. XI, p. 329),

The duaOlstic point of vie;/ is then assumed when xm vieu the psyche
as phenomena. Then ,m stop to consider ijhat the psj-che is essentially
and in its relation to the boc^, .re see that the psyche is in all
probability merely another aspect of the bocfy-.
Characterization of the Psyche

Ifeepijig these considerations about the psyche-body relation in
mind, ire are noT. prepared to appreciate Jung's positive characteriza-
tion of the p^he. Moreover, this characterization is to serve as
a criterion of applicability of the tenn, defining the pemLssible
range of its use and giving us at least a method in principle of
discriminating the p^/chic from :the nonp^chic. It is to be then
a sort of operational definition. Frm the point of vie:; of onto-
logical considerations, vre can not of course specify a psychic realm
as distinct from and uncontaminated ;;ith a nonpsychic realm.

12

PJeuriffticainy though ire can make such a specification in principle
as this specification is to indicate the phenomenological difference
betiTOen the psychic and nonpsj'xjhic.

Jung says then that 'H/hat I would call the psyche proper extends to
all functions which can be brought under the influence of a i/ill" (Vol,
YTLl, p. 183). Ibreover, by irill is understood a form of disposable
energy (Vol, vni, pages 182-183).

The sort of worldng model that emerges from this characteriza-
tion then is a separation of the p^jrche and the tru3y psychological
from the instincts and the only physiological in terms of the poss-
ibility of modification or fle:dLbility in the othen.dse rigid c^'-
namisms of ph^rsiological compulsion,

ySn ej:2unple of what is meant by the nonpqrchic in terms of animal
life is perhaps instructive. For in consideration of the insect
world, there seem to be no e:3ceptions to the rigid physiological
detenninisra of behavior, An insect is essentially a physiological
automoton. However, as we consider more coiig)lex forms of organisms
idth more centralized nervous systems, the hypothesis of the exis-
tence of at least a rudimentary form of consciousness becomes more
probable. Vfi.th the higher mammals the e:d.stence of psychological
processes becomes evident. Thus Jung e3:plicitly affirms the eJcLs-
tence of psychic processes in dogs and domestic animals (Vol. VIII,
pages 173 and I89). For Jung then the psyche is not restricted to
man but only finds its greatest development there as the outcome of
a continuous developmental sequence of gradual phylogenetic emergence.

In specifying the relationship betiv^een the instincts and the
psyche then, the instincts are conceived to be ectopsychic in origin. '

13

Jung summarizes his argument on this point in the folloxdng way:

If we started with the hypothesis that the
psyche is absolutely identical v/ith the state
of being alive, then we should have to accept
the e:d.stence of a psychic function even in
unicellular organisms. ...

But if we look upon the appearance of the
p^che as a relatively recent event in evo-
lutionary history, and assume that the psychic
function is a phenomenon accompanying a ner-
vous :^stem which in some way or other has be-
come centralized, then it woiad be difficult
to believe that the instincts were originally
psychic in nature, iind since the connection
of the p^che T-dth the brain is a more probable
conjecture than the pqychic nat\ire of life in
general, I regard the characteristic compul-
slmiess of instinct as an ectopi^ychic factor
^Vbl. vni, p. 11^).

3h stating that instincts are ectopsychic, Jung does not of
course vdsh to deny a psychological aspect to instinctual pheno-
mena,- and thus he \Ashes to make clear that the instincts can be
considered from ti/o potots of vier/: as they appear in conscious-
ness, their p^chic impact, as it irere, and as physiological stim-
uli.

3hstinct as a ectopi^ychic factor would play the
role Ox a stimulus merely, while instinct as a
psychic phenomenon would be an assimilation of
this stimulus to a pre-existent psychic pattern.
A name is needed for this process. I should
■term it psvchization. Thus, what we call in-
stinct offliand would be a datura already psychized,
but of ectopsychic origin (Vol. VIII, p. n^).

A further clarification of Jung's theoretical model of the
psyche comes into play when this ambiguous interface region betireen
the psychological and the physiological is explicitly considered. For
the psychological phenomena associated idth the disposable energy
of the will are according to Jung's model merely the end of a con-
tinuum tTith the physiological at one end and the psychic at the other.

11;

Ibreover, in tlie middle of this continuum, Jung identifies psychoid
functions which are quasi-psychic yet not merely pliysiological. In-
stincts are examples of these p:^nchoid phenomena vrtiich though not
p^chic in the full sense of Jung's designation yet have p^chologi-
cal aspects. Jung states then that the teiro "psychoid" is "meant
to distinguish a category of events from merely vitalistic phenomena
on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on the other"
(Vol. Vni, p. 177).

Since in order to be influenced by the disposable energy of the
vrill a function or process must be capable of becoming conscious, the
characterLstic quality of those functions which are psychoid is their
incapability of reaching full consciousness. The sense in which
Jiing sees the instincts as not capable of full consciousness is made
clear in the folloidng way:

Ih spealc of "instinctive actions," meaning by
tliat a mode of behaviour of vxhich neither the
motive nor the aim is fully conscious and \rh±ch
is prompted only by an obscure inner necessity. . . ,
Bius instinctive action is characterized by an
unconsciousness of the psychological motive be- -f-
hand it, in contrast to the strictly conscious
processes which are distinguished by the conscious
continuity of their motives (Vol. vni, p. 130).

Now the positive characterization of the psyche in terms of

functions triiich can become fully conscious and hence capable of being

influenced by the disposable energy of the will is not fully described

by dlstlnguislTing betTreen the pi^he and the instincts. For Jung

makes the point that there is another tj^pe of function which liMts

the will and which cannot be described as instinctual in the pl^sio-

logical sense. Ohis function is called spiritual. Identical i^th

the factors lAlch Jung calls the archetypes, the spiritual function

1^

is like instinct a p^jrchoid function incapable of full consciousness,^

A full discussion of what Jung means hy the spiritual Tdll be
given in Chapter 3. Here it Tdll suffice to state tliat for Jung the
compulsiveness associated xiith the nonpsychic realm is due not only
to (^araisras of pliysiological origin, the instincts; but, in addition
to this loT-rer limit, the psyche has an upper limit ijhere the pi^chic
functions gradually fall under the influence of spiritual determinants.
"Just as, in its louer reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic -
mateilal substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into
a 'spiritual' form about lAich ire knoir as little as we do about the
functional basis of instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 183).

Tn terms of the continuum model then, there wotild appear to be
psychoid pTOcesses on both sides of the p^che, and the psyche could
be figuratively sa±d to be surrounded by psychoid processes. But
from a phylogenetic point of view, the question non/ arises why the
spiritual function is said to be "higher" than the instinctual psy-
choid function, since the p^che appears to have developed out of
the psychoid processes considered as a whole and thus to be "higher"
than it in the sense of having developed later.. The solution to
this enigma seems to be that although the archetypal psychoid pro-
cesses are probabOy present, at least in rudimentary form, through-
out the animal kingdom, it is only vdth the development of the more
advanced foims of consciousness that there is a clear separation be-
tereen instinctual and spiritual psychoid functions. Moreover, it
seems to be just this separation which brings about the phenomenon
of consciousness so that "psychic processes seem to be balances of
energy floidng betireen spirit and instinct" (Vol, Vm, p. 207),

16

Not; in this separation of spiritual and instinctual functions,
the instinctual energies seem to be channelled by the spiritual forms.
3h a sense the spiritual function is then that which allmrs the en-
ergies of man to be employed in other than instinctual activities.
TMs is the sense in T7hich the spiritual function is higher than the
instinctual. PVom the standpoint of phylogen^r, hoi-rever, the desig-
nation of "higher" is misleading since both types of psychoid pro-
cesses are unconscious in relation to the later developing conscious-
ness associated Td.tli the psyche. "Spirit and instinct are by nature
autonomous and both limit in equal measure the applied field of the
Tdll" (Vol. Vni, p. 183).

Ihconscious
Ifow it vrould seem that an understanding of the positive charac-
terization of the psyche in terms of the \d21 leads to the conclusion
that the psyche is to be conceived as equivalent to consciousness or
atfareness in opposition to the p^choid functions, the distinguishing
feature of which is their incapability of full consciousness and hence
relative autonomy from the will (Vol. VHI, p. 18U). Itorever, it is
only when ve consider tlie attribution of an unconscious dimension to
the psyche that a full characterization of what Jung intends by his
pgyche construct can be accomplished.

3h order to resolve this apparent paradox of the existence of an
unconscious psyche then, it is necessaiy to focus on the meaning Jung
gives to the notion of the unconscious. He s^s that "since we per-
ceive effects whose origin cannot be found in consciousness, >re are
compelled to allow hypothetical contents to the sphere of the non-
conscious, which means presupposing that the origin of those effects

17

lies in the unconscious precisely because it is not conscious" (Vol.
IV, p. lltO). Thus "... eveiTthing in the personality that is not
contained in the conscious should be found in the unconscious" (Vol.
HI, p. 20U).

Hie unconscious understood in this negative xra^ as the non-
conscious is relatively unproblematic, liiatever is not imraediately
present in ai-jareness is said to be unconscious, Ifenories, for e:c-
aniple, can be said to be unconscious contents ivhich can be brought
into consciousness at idll. Other unconscious contents such as re-

s

pressed experiences or subliminal perceptions nay also be brought
Into ai^areness, although a special effort or technique is needed.
Since tlie latter are not as easily recoverable to airareness as the
former, they are s&id to belong to a "deeper level" of the uncon-
scious. The analogy of depth then amounts operationally to a func-
tion of energy. Contents xd.th a certain critical energy stay in
consciousness and lacking it become unconscious. IJien contents
which are ordinarily unconscious became charged Td.th energy, they
intrude themselves into conscious at/areness and produce a so-called
'lOTrering of consciousness" with a consequent disruption of conscious
intentionali tie s ,

Ihe boundary or dividing point then betireen conscious and un-
conscious is an energy threshold. HoiTever, ttiis idea that conscious
and unconscious are qualitatively separate should not be understood
to mean that a sort of energy membrane sharply divides conscious from
unconscious contents. For it rather the case that every psychic
content is to some degree unconscious and that consequently the
psyche is both conscious and unconscious at once.

Consequently there is a consciousness in vrhich
unconsciousness predominates, as ttbH as a con-
sciousness in which self -consciousness predomi-
nates. This paradox becomes immediately intelli-
gible when we realize that there is no conscious
content which can with absolute certainly be said
to be totally conscious ... (Vol. VHI. pares
187-188). ' ^^

Vfe must, hoa/ever, accustom ourselves to the thought
that conscious and unconscious have no clear de-
marcations, the one beginning where the other
leaves off. It is rather the case that the psyche
is a conscious-unconscious whole (Vol. VUI, p. 200),

It becomes clear then hour the characterization of the psyche
in terms of the i.-ill allows for an unconscious dimension to the
p^che. For it is only the possibility of an influence by the ^rUl
that is necessary to characterize the psychic as distinct from the
p^jrchoid. iAnd although it is this possibility lAich is the distin-
guishing feature of the psyche, rather than being identical vTith
consciousness, the psyche is better conceptualized as for the most
part unconscious, Tiith the conscious region being of congiaratively
narrow scope.

Bie idea of the unconscious then adds a dimension of depth to
the notion of the psyche. ]h addition to those items of immediate
airareness, there are other contents on the fringes of consciousness
or just beloi; the threshold of at/areness, Jung catalogues these
unconscious contents in the follmnng way: " . , , lost memories,
painful ideas that have been repressed (i,e,, forgotten on purpose),
subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense -perceptions that
were not strong enough to reach I consciousness, and finally, contents
that are not yet ripe for consciousness" (Vol. Vn, p. 66). "...
Eroiything forgotten or repressed or othenn.se subliminal that has

19

been acquired by the individual consciously or unconsciousljr" (Vol.
XVn, p. 116).

Often these unconscious contents group together to form subliminal
functional units vM.ch then become sort of "splinter psfjrches" or "frag-
mentaiy personalities" (Vol. VHI, p. 97). These focal points of un-
conscious psychic activity are designated as the coniple^aes. They are
groups of oi^ten highly emotionally charged feelings, thoughts and
images which are associated together so that, for instance, an
environmental stiinulus which activates the comple:c results in the
entirety of the associated psychic contents coming into play and
affecting consciousness. !IMs often leads to a response which is out
of proportion to the initiating stimulus. For Jung the ego itself is
merely a complex, "the complex of consciousness" (Vol. XTJ, p. 3^7).

In so far as the meaning of the ego is psycho-
logxcally nothing but a complex of imaginings
held together and fixed by the coenesthetic im-
pressions, Cbodily feeling^ ... the comolex
of the ego may ^rell be set parallel T-rith a^d com-
pared to the secondary autonomous complex (Vol. U
p. 601), '

Collective Ifaconscious
I'ath the description of these unconscious components to the
pjyche then, the concept of the psyche according to Jung's "defini-
tion" of it in teiTOS of the idll is complete. HoT-jever, Jung goes
on to describe the p^choid region of the unconscious which is desig-
nated as a collective unconscious in contrast to the region of the
unconscious in relati^ly close | association to consciousness which
he calls the personal unconscious. "As to the no man's land which
I have called the 'personal unconscious,' it is fairly easy to prove

20

that its contents correspond exactly to our definition of the pssrchic.
But— as tre define 'psychic '--is there a psychic unconscious that is
not a 'fringe of consciousness' and not personal?" (Vol. VIII, p,
200).

!rhe above quotation should make it clear that although according
to Jung's specification of what the psrsrche means in the strict sense,
it should be applied only to consciousness and the personal unconscious,
Jung frequently uses the tenn to include the collective impersonal por-
tions of the unconscious as well. Thus Jung often speaks of a collec-
tive p^che or of an impersonal, objective psyche. Further discussion
on this point of hoir the collective unconscious can be said to be
psychic on the one hand and not to fit into the definition of the
p^che on the other must wait until further in the exposition. The
crucial distinction involves discz-lMnating between the psychic con-
tents as they appear in consciousness and their postulated but unob-
served determinants xrhich are said to be psychoid rather than psychic.

There is then for Jung an impersonal and collective aspect to
the unconscious in contrast to the personal unconscious described
above, tbreover, this collective unconscious is said to constitute
a deeper stratum of the unconscious than the personal. l*iereas for
the personal unconscious the "depth" of a content represents a corres-
ponding lack of energy and hence a greater degree of nonassociation
to the central focus of awareness, the collective unconscious is
"deeper" In the additional sense of being the foundation of the
"upper" layers. Consciousness and the personal unconscious then
represent the individual and personal heterogeneity which develops
through maturation from a common and universal homogeneity.

21

"Individual consciousness is only the flower and the fruit of a
season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the earth . . .
(Vol, V, p. xxiv).

Jung then uses the terra "collective" to mean the opposite of
personal or individual. "I have chosen the teiro 'collective' be-
cause this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal;
in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of be-
haviour that are more or less the same everyiThere and in all indivi-
duals" (Vol. IX-A, pages 3-k).

Jung argues that since the bo(fy may be said to have certain
universal features which form a common basis for the emergence of
individual differences, it would then be reasonable to expect that
the p^che, which is intimately related to the body, would also have
common and universal features: "... Just as the human bo(^ shows
a common anatomy over and above all racial differences, so, too,
the human psyche possesses a common substratum transcending all
differences in culture and consciousness" (Vol, HII, p. 11), "For
just as taiere is an objective human body and not mere3y a subjective
and personal one, so also there is an objective psyche xjith its
specific structures and activities , . . " (Vol. Ill, p. 267).

The idea of a collective \mconscious thus understood as the
coMuon, universal element of the pqyche would seem relatively un-
problematic or perhaps even superflous as a concept since no one
would wish to deny that the psyche has foundations in the structure
of -Oie brain which are common to all men, Ho;rever, the real import
of Jimg' s theoiy of a collective unconscious is brought into clari-ty
^•jhen Jung states tliat the contents of the collective imconscious are

22

in fact psychic contents triiich come into awareness but uhich are not
the direct consequences of the individual's om personal experiences.
"... Si addition to memories from a long-distant conscious past,
completely ner. thoughts and creative ideas can also present themselves
from the unconscious-thoughts and ideas that have never been con-
scious before."'^ Ihe collective unconscious is then not only the
structural element common to the psyches of all menj it is also the
active source of original psychic contents.

Mditional features of Jung's concept of the collective uncon-
scious come to light vrhen v;e learn that "... ego-consciousness
seems to be dependent on tr^o factors: firstly, on the conditions
of the collective, i.e., the social, consciousness; and secondly,
on the archetjrpes, or domliiants, of the collective unconscious.
The latter fall phenomenologic ally into t>/o categories: instinctual
and archetypal" (Vol. VHI, pages 217-218).

Ohus both instincts as well as archetypes characterize the
collective unconscious. Ifcreover, there is in addition a concept
of collective consciousness which is to be distinguished from the
collective unconscious. Jung states that by collective consciousness
he has somethiiig sinilar iji mind to Preud's idea of the superego
(Vol. EC-A, page 3, note 2). like the superego, the collective
consciousness is partially conscious and partially unconscious.
It consists of "generally accepted truths" (Vol. VHI, p. 218),
i.e., of beUefs, values and ideals which are supposedly held in
common hy members of a community and which senre as a sort of common
ideological basis or cultural idea for the community. :ihe contempor-
a^ phenomenon of the so-called counter-culture would then represent

23

a process of development or change in the collective consciousness
of our time.

I^e collective consciousness has its ultimate source in the
collective unconscious. For through the influence of the collective
unconscious on individuals, ner^ ideals, ethical and religious sys-
tems, and basic scientific discoveries come into avrareness for the
first time. Hoivever, the symbolic quality of these images from the
unconscious is eventually lost as the images and ideas are subjected
to the interpretative powers of generations in order to assimilate
them to the existing i^stem of culture. !Ihrough this process the
manifestation of the collective unconscious in one pioneer individual
is gradually transforaied into the cultural heritage and collective
consciousness of the coraraunity. The result is then often the sort
of transition that the religious insight of an individual undergoes
in the change from the teachings of the individual in his lifetime
to the formation of a doctrine of established belief ly his later
followers. It is the difference between an original religious ex-
perience and the dogma of an established church. Jung states then
that "... we can hardly avoid the conclusion that betvreen collec-
tive consciousness and the collective unconscious there is an aLnpst
unbridgeable gulf over which the subject finds himself suspended"
(Vol. vni, p. 218).

Jung makes the point that through the process of socialization
and in attempting to adapt to the demands of society v;e tend to iden-
tify ourselves with the consequent roles T*ich to must play in order
to fit smoothly into the social; order. This part of the personalily
Jung calls the persona. The word means mask and like a mask the

2U

persona is the person that -.re pretend to be In order to have a
well-defined niche in the comnuniV.

I'hen ire analyse the persona ire strip off the mask,
and discover that what seemed to be individual
is at bottom collectivej in other words, that
the persona was onlly a mask of the collective
psyche. FtrndanentaTIy the persona is nothing
real: it is a compromise betireen individual
and society as to what a man shoidd appear to
be (Vol. TH, p. 1^8).

By "collective p^/che" in this context it is clear that the
collective consciousness is meant. However, there are other
passages in which the teiro "collective psyche" means collective
unconscious. For example:

It is therefore absolutely essential to make
the sharpest possible demarcation betvreen the
personal and the impersonal attributes of the
psyche. O^is is not to deny the sometimes
very formidable existence of the contents of
collective unconscious, but only to stress that,
as contents of the collective psyche, th^-^ are
opposed to and different from the individual
psyche (Vol. VII, p. 9k).

"Collective p^che" is then an ambiguous tem leaving stni to
be specified the amount of unconsciousness that is implied. This
foiTOulation is sometimes preferable when speaking of the conscious-
ness of a group, particularly when there is a strong group identity.
For since the collective consciousness is grounded in the collective
unconscious, there are then correspondences bettreen the institutions
of culture and the related archetypes. The effectiveness of the
conrmmity leader, for example, is often a function of his capacity
to fulfil the expectations brought about by the projection of the
archetype of the hero or Old Vise Ifen upon him, and the guiding ideals
of the community remain cohesive factors for the life of that coraraunity

25

oiLly so long as they remain living symbols capable of constellating
the appropriate archetyipal configurations. The aribiguous "collective
p^he" is then sometLTies the best description of the Zeitgeist of a
people, as it aclmat7ledges the close relationship beti/een the founda-
tions of culture in the collective unconscious and the eribodijnents
of those foundations in the accepted standards of collective life.
Iforeover, Jung's use of the aiiibi^ous "collective psorche" be-
comes easier to appreciate when it is made clear that for him the
relationship of the personal psorche to the collective unconscious
is closely analogous to the relationship of the individual to society.
"Now, all that I have said here about the Influence of society upon
the individual is identicaUy true of tlie influence of the collec-
tive unconscious upon the individual psyche" (Vol. VII, p. 1^1;).
Therefore the psychology of a comraunliy is not basically different
from the p^hology of an individual: " . . . Ihe psyche of a
people is only a somer^hat more complex structure than the psyche
of an individual" (Vol. X, p. 86).

Collective consciousness and the collective unconscious may then
both be subsumed under collective psyche due to the close relation-
ship beti-reen the tt/o and the siutilar relatlonsliip of the individual
to the collective aspect in each case. Bie individual has thus both
an inner and an outer relationship to the collective as he mu^ con-
tend Tdth society ad.thout and the collective unconscious Td.thin.
One point that sliould be made clear when use is made of the
te™ "collective p^che" is that Jung does not mean to iiiqjly that
a group consciousness ercLsts in the sense of a psychic entity vrfilch

26

exists over and above the p^hes of individuals. For the coimon
aspects of the p^hes of a group can be abstract2y said to represent
a group p:^he vdthout this having to mean that there is something
P^TJhic which persists independently of the individuals involved.

3h so far as the similarities rather than the differences betireen
collective consciousness and collective unconscious are emphasized as
in "collective psyche," questions then arise concerning the e:d.stence
of distinct kinds of group psyches. That is, to what extent is the
idea of a collective unconscious meant to be truly transcultural and
to what extent is there intended to be a different collective unc on-
for each distinct community of men?

Evidence can be found in Jung's wrk to support either of the
tiro possible positions suggested above. For example, ,re find: "Ihe
collective unconscious is sijnply the p^rchic e^xpression of the iden-
tity of bradji structure irrespective of all racial differences" (Vol.
XIII, p. 11). But there are also abatements such as the folloTTing:

lb doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of
p^tjhic development, ifhere it is still imposs-
ible to distinguish beti/een an Axjan, Semitic,
Hamitic, or Ibngolian mentality, all human
races have a common collective psyche. But
Tiith the beginning of racial differentiation
essential differences are developed in the
collective psyche as well (Vol. Vn, p. 1<2
note 8). > F. -«-^ ,

Inasmuch as there are differentiations corres-
pondong to race, tribe, and even family, there
is also a collective psyche limited to race,
tribe, and family over and above the "universal"
collective psyche (Vol, VET, p. 275).

The difficulty of understanding is again partly the result of

the problematic interaction of foin and content, of the difference

betvreen a common universal rtructure and its concrete embodiment in

27

WS irhich are characteristic of individual cultures. Ibreover, the
irord "collective p^/che" tends to obscure these differences which
arise from ttie fact that the collecti^ unconscious is an abstraction,
a theoretically postulated coinr»nallty derived from the phenomena of
concrete cultures in Trhich the archetypes exist as actual symbols
and images,

Hoirever, this line of erqjlanation is only partially satisfac-
toiy in LLght of the totality of Jung's vndtings. It seems that
notidthstanding the differences that come about when the common
structure of the psyche is embodied in culturally characteristic
ways, Jung means that the common structure itself is different Td.th
respect to the different ethnic and racial groups, ffis statements,
for example, about the inapplicability of Indian yoga practises for
the Ifestem psyche (Vol. XE, p. ^3h) and the characteristic quality
of JetTish p^chology which might not be appropriate for non-Jewish
peoples (Vol. VH, p. 1^2, note 8) seem to support this idea.

HoTTBver, the concept of racial differences in the collective
unconscious seems one of the least defensible of all Jung's ideas on
the unconscious. For nof.rLthstanding the lack of credibility In
the notion that Je^dsh p^hology or Indian yoga are inapplicable to
someone tdth a Ifcstem Christian heritage, it would seem that the
similarities of a universal structure of the psyche would greatily
overshadow, any racial differences that Mght exist in that struc-
ture, just as the bodies of persons of different races and ethnic
groups seem to be of overwhe3Mng simllapity differing only in veiy
minor ways.

There are, of course, marked differences in the collective

28

p^/ches of distinct human groups, if ty this teiro is understood the
culturally distinct ways in which the collective unconscious is
developed and expressed. Iluch of what Jung says about the inherent
psychic differences of people of vai-ious human groups can be under-
stood in this way without the necessity of postulating significant
racial or ethnic differences in the structure of the collective
unconscious itself.

.£'^'; Ji»«* f^ollected Vforks. Vols. I-XC^C (Rrinceton: Princeton
TAixversiiy ft-ess, 1^6?;, Vol."Tm:; p. ]|09. Quotations are from the
follovnng editions: Vol. I, Psychiatric Studies. First liiition, 19^7'
Vol. II, aaaerimental Itesearches. 1973; Vol. ni. The Psychogenesis
^J±^^ Qi-sease, 1960j Vol. IV, Freud and Psychoanalv^s . 19^31 —
Vol. V, %mbols of Transfoiroation. Plrst Edition, 19^; Vol. ''H.
.I^cholof^ical, TvTjes. 1971; Vol. VII, Two Essays ^ Malvtic4 Psy-
cholof?^, Second Edition, 1966; Vol. Vm, The Structure and Dynamics
of the Psyche. Second Edition, 1969; Vol. IX, Part I, The ilrchetyTJes
and the Collective Ihconscious. Second Edition, I968 T!iereafter cited
as Vol. E(-AJ; Vol. IX, Part H, .Aion, Second Edition, I968 (hereafter
cited as Vol. t;,>.b); Vol. X, Civilization in Transition. First Edition,
196it; Vol. XI, PgycholoCT- and Religion; Tfest and East, Second Edition,
nnJo' 1°}' ^^' Fsycholopiy ^2^ ^cheiir^. Second Edition, I968; Vol. XEII,
I960; Vol. 'Crv, I?;-sterium Coniunctionis. First Edition, 1963; Vol. XV,
Ihe Spirit in 1^ Art, and Literature. 1966; Vol. XVI, The Practise
of Psychotherapy. Second Edition, 1966; Vol. XVH, Tlie Develomen-b of
^rsonality. ig^Iit Vol. XVTII, ia.scellany; Vol. XIxT^blioirraphy a5d
Inde:-c. Hereafter cited by volume nuriber,

It is not in the passage where he spealcs of Bergson that this
is made clear but in the essay "On Psychic Qiergy," Vol. VHI, pages
3-66 where the implications of the libido theory idth respect to the
problem of the mind-body relation are discussed in detail. Ibfor-
tunately this seems to be characteristic of Jung's style. 1-fi.sunder-
standings^are pixjduced by a causal or parenthetical comment Trhich
then require manj' lengthy passages or even whole essays to correct.
■3

3h determining the chronology of Jung's writings the volume
number of the collected irorks is not a reliable indicator, ^e
collected works are grouped by subject matter, and while this serves
as a rough guide to different periods of Jung's trork, some of the
ear^y and middle inltings appear in the last volumes.

29

h

+« K« '* ^x.°°"^^^ anomalous facts i^ith respect to a given theoiy
to be ones ..hich f ail to be e:q,la3jied b7 the theory and whiS Sfcer a
protracted period of such failure lead either to the ad hoc revision
of the theoiy^or to emergence of a new more comprehensive theory which
icLll be able to encompass their e:^lanation in a context i^ch pre-
h!TS Pj^°js:iy exgLained data. The sense of anomaly is that used
by T.H. I^ in hxs Structure of Scientific Evolutions. Second Edition
C Chicago: IMversity of Chicago Press, 1970)1 '

Statements about the disembodied psj-che then have this anoma-
lous relaUonshxp to Jung's established theory. Diis becomes evident
iTiiOT efforts are made to see hov: the statements can be made consistent
vath the established theoiy.

4 , ^,J^ aspect theoiy is meant the viei^ that mental and pliys-
ical are different aspects of some third entity xAich is itself neither
mental nor pliysical. Lateractionism is the viei/ that mental events can
cause physical events and vice versa.

Strictly spealdng the archetypes are completely incapable of
?!^^!Ln°°"^°J°x^ ^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ '^a* appears in consciousness
i,fJ^L^\^^^^^^ P®^ s® ^* on^ an archetypal image. This
distinction bet^/een the archetype per se and the archetypal image
loll be fully discussed in Chapter 3.

n 2'^ w:i=^' ®f ?"*' ^ aal laa §m^2lS. dfew York: Den, 1968),
p. d5. Hereafter cited as Ifen and las Symbols.

CHAPTER 2
THEORT OF ARCHETYPES: PART I

Introduction

Rrelindnaiy Remarks

Our discussion of the notion of a collective unconscious sei'ves
as an introduction to the main concern of this stu^jr, the concept
of the archeiype. For in addition to the instincts, the collective
unconscious is said to contain archetypes. It is the notion of arche-
Igrpes then irfiich gives Jung's collective unconscious its real sub-
stance, and it is the resolution of questions concerning the arche-
types vcpon which the real point of a concept of a collective un-
conscious depends.

Ihny such questions inhabit the fringes of consciousness while
reading about the archetypes: I-Jhat really is an archetype? Vhat
sort of ontological status is it supposed to have? T-hat is the
relationship betijeen the archetypes and the instincts? Irhere do
the archetypes come from? \ha.t is the difference betireen the
archetype in itself and as it apisears in consciousness? T'hat are
the chief arche-types? Vhat causes their appearance in consciousness?

Ihese many questions about the archetype reflect the many aspects
and perspectives from which the idea can be considered. Th order to
gain an insight into the unii^ying elements of these different per-
spectives on the archetypes, our eaiposition toll proceed vjith a

30

31

conceptual avervie:, fol3oT.;ed hy a detailed discussion of the different
aspects of the concept, vath this approach ve hope to gain a unified
understanding of the archetype which .rill mke clear the reasons for
the characteristic complexity- of the idea.
Characterization of the Archeiype

It Trill be remembered from the above discussion of the collective
unconscious then, that the contents of this portion of the psyche irere
said to be objective and iuipersonal in the sense that the collective
unconscious is the supposed source of original contents which appear
in consciousness but which seem not to have been conscious before.
For example, an individual has a dream, vision or fantasy composed
of alien images to which he has no personal associations. IbreovBr,
parallels to the phenomena's basic themes can then be found in mater-
ials draim from comparative symbology irhich are unloioim to the person
previous to his e::perience of the archetypal event.

The folloTTing dream illustrates these characteristic archetypal
qualities.

3h my dream, I am at an amusement pai-k .rith my
iTife and another couple. The first amusement
we decide to see is a sorb of "haunted house."
To enter, we descend a ilight of stairs into a
cool, damp cellar, consisting of an empty main
room. looIcLng into one i-oom I see nothing.
At tills point a ghost-like figure appears. I
recognize the "ghost" as a child dressed in a
costume, and am friendly- to it. The "ghost"
then leaves. 3h the next room, I see a table,
upon the table is a small, incomplete child-like
body. A large knife is hovering in the air over
^e table, and proceeds to dismember the body,
m^od gushes out, spurting into the air in great
streams. I thinic that this "shoir" is a little
too much for an amusement for the general public,
although I personally am not affected by the erore
The yey" then begins to cany on a noLS con-
versation Tlth me, while the blood continues to

32

spurt and gush over the table top. The shcnr
is then over, and the "body" disappears.'

3h this particular case, it is the arche-typal motif of
ritual disnonberment which is the most outstanding featiire of the
dream. The dreamer had no idea as to what this ijnage might mean
and was unfamiliar idth the frequent occurrence of tliis theme in
the literature of alchei;^,

I'hat Jung means by an archetype then is a disposition in the
collective unconscious to produce such an ±mge in consciousness
as the one above. Ibreover, Jung distinguishes bettreen the actual
image, which he calls the archetypal image, and the archetype per
se, which as a disfosition of the unconscious is unobservable in
principle. Hoirever, the teiro "archetype" is used indiscriminately
for both the archetypal manifestation and the archetypal disposition.

Bie archeiijrpal image is a concrete instantiation of the hypothe-
tical, unobservable archetypal disposition. Ibreover, archetypal
contents which emerge into airareness assume a form which is a
reflection of the individual consciousness. The fact that arche-
types appear in a personal foim seems to be an instance of the ten-
dency to structure awareness of unfamiliar phenomena so that they
resemble fainiliar forms of esqperlence,

The unconscious supplies as it were the archel^rpal
foiTO, which in itself is empty and irrepresentable.
Consciousness immediately fills it TTith related
or similar representational material so that it
can be perceived. For this reason archetypal
ideas are locally, terar>orally, and individually
conditioned (Vol. XTIl", p. 3^6).

In the case of the dismembenaent dream, this assimilation of the
archetypal motif into an individual context is illustrated Tjhen the

33

uncannor and alien ritual of dismemberment, concerning which the dreamer
had no knowledge, >ras represented in the familiar setting of an amuse-
ment part,
Qntolo£;ical Status of the Archetype

As a disposition the archetype has then the ontological status of
a hypothetical construct. Like the electron, the archetype can be
detected on3y through the effects which it produces, but, as with
the electron, this unobsenrability is not held to make the archetype
ai^ less real than direct^jr perceivable ob.jects like chairs and door-
knobs. Unlike the electron, hoxrever, the archetypes are unobsenrable
in principle. Since the unconscious can only be knotm indirectly
through its effect on consciousness, there is no possibility of a
direct perception of these unconscious contents. I-fareover, the
archetypes per se, existing as dispositions, are only possibilities
to form obsenrable phenomena with the deteircinate foiro in which thej-
appear being the result of the interaction betireen this disposition
in the collective unconscious and the infoirdng consciousness.
Di basing the ontology of the archetypes on a position of
scientific realism, Jung wants to carefully distinguish his unobser-
vable theoretical entities from metaphysical concepts such as Plato's
foms. Bie difference is that the archetypes are empirically derived
and grounded. Ihey are the product of Jung's therapeutic work in
which he found it Increasingly difficult to fit all of the phenomeno-
logical material into an ejqplanatoiy frameirork which included only
a personal unconscious. Ihere exists then the possibility of falsi-
fication to the extent that the ^archetypal theoiy falls to provide
adequate explanation for the observed phenomena. The relationship

3h

betireen experience and the postulated concepts of metapl^rsics, on
the other hand, is too va^ue to allow for the possibility of dis-
confirjaation in principle,
relationship of Archet'/pes and Instincts

Since the archetypes are not the product of an individual's
personal experience, they must then be the result of inheritance.
Rather than inherited experiences or inherited ijnages, ho^rever,
the archetypes are transmitted as the disposition to form images
and ideas. There are close parallels here Td.th the instincts, which
rather than being inherited behaviors are instead inherited dis-
positions to produce certain behaviors when activated by the appro-
priate environmental releasing stimuli. Va.th this similarity to the
instincts in mind, Jung often refers to the archetypes as patterns
of behavior.

. . . they prove to be typical attitudes, a»des
of action~tho;;ight-processes and ijrpilses which
must be regarded as constituting the instinctive
behaviour i^ical of the human species. The
term I chose for this, namsly "archetype," there-
fore coincides id.th the biological concept of the
"pattem of behaviour" (Vol, HI, p. 26l),

Just as the body develops evolutionarily conditioned modes of

responding to external and internal stimuli, Jung hypothesizes the

development of similar phylogenetic patterns for the psyche. The

archetypes are then somer^hat like psychic instincts, Ibreover,

since the body is not functionally a separate entity from the ndnd,

these "mental instincts" are parallel psychic counterparts to the

inherited modes of bodiOy response. " , , . There is good reason

for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the

instincts themselves ..." (Vol. IX-A, p. Uk),

3^

The fact that avchetypes can be understood as patterns of be-
havior emphasizes then their biological aspect and their continuity
Tdth natiu-alistically understood processes, Ifith a vddening of toe
traditional use of "patterns of behavior, " this allows for the possi-
bility of archetypes in anjjnals. "There is nothing to prevent us frora
assuming that certain archetypes exist even in animals, that they are
grounded in the pecularities of the living organism itself . , . "
(Vol. VU^ p. 69).
Archetypes as A Priori Conditioning Factors

However, the archeiypes can also be seen from the cognitive point
of vien-r as inherent categories of apprehension (Vol. ^71, p. 376).
This perspective then underlines their role as the structuring elements
of the psyche and focuses on those aspects of the archel^'pes which
seem least directly connected id.th instincts as ordinari^sr understood.
It may then seen difficult to grasp hot; the archei^rpes can be at once
both patterns of behavior and "a priori conditioning factors. " Hott-
ever, man's characteristic pattern of behavior is to develop con-
sciousness which can then act at variance with or in relative in-
dependence of the instincts understood as drives of the body, ^d,
since for Jung, the mind and bo<^ are not realOy separate entities
but merely different points of view, his shift from the archeiypes
as patterns of behavior to talk of archetypes as categories of the
pgyche can be seen as a plausible move rather than as a logical jump.
"As a priori conditioning factors they represent a special, psycholog-
ical instance of the biological 'pattern of behaviour'" (Vol. XI, p.
1U9, note 2).

Ifcw in characterizing the archetypes as a priori conditioning i

36

factors what Jung has in rdnd is similar to the idea of categories
worked out by Kant. Moreover, it souEtimes appears as if Jung is
attempting to breaden Kant's concept so that in addition to
necessary foniis of cognition, the archetypes T/ill also be cate-
gories of the imagination. 2 Specifically the archetypes are held
to be foiTOs of thought, perception and imagination (Vol. IX-A, p.
l}h). Ibirever, the comparison of the archetypes to the Kantian
categories is onlj- of limited usefulness. For the archetj^es can
be said to be necessary only in the biological sense of being part
of our inheritance -Aich vdll then necessarily inQuence us. They
are not necessaiy in the sense that they could not have been other
than they are. 3he archetypes are products of evolution and are
thus subject to vihatever contingent environmental forces made them
an enduring part of the genotype. A homtooid on a different planet
could then conceivably develop different archetypes. 3

Ibreover, I^t's categories ^rere the necessaiy fomal aspects
to irhich any experience must confonn ivhereas Jung's archetjijes are
the fonas of only certain tj-pes of experience. Biiia, the archetypes
are more properly described as primordial images than as categories
in Kant's sense. For the archetypes as "thought-foims" (Vol. vn,
p. S6), i.e., dispositions to form certain typical images and thoughts
come into consciousness only under unusual circumstances, rather than
being the structuring aspect of experience in general. Biis is then
what Jung has in mind when he states: "Only, in the case of our
'foms,' we are not dealing vzith categories of reason but vdth cate-
gories of the ima<dLnation" (Vbli XE, p. ^8).

From the point of view of similaritj- >d.th Kant, the archetypes
can be seen to be universal, inborn and foimal elements of the psyche

37

(Vol. IX-A, p. hk). Ibreover, the ijidividual and personal aspects
of the psyche are held to develop from a universal substratum in
tlie collective unconscious. Prom this perspective the ego is itself
an archei^^e in the sense that it is prefigured as an a priori possi-
bility in the collective unconscious of the individual before it
emei'ges by a process of differentiation. -All of the comple:aes,
in fact, although th^^ are predominantly manifestations of the
personal unconscious, have a "nuclear element" (Vol. Vni, p. 12)
which is an archetype.

... every complex, has or is a (fragmentary)
personality. At any I'ate, this is how it looks
from the purely observational standpoint. But
when we go into the matter more deeply, we
find that they are really archetypal forma-
tions (Vol. V, p. 255).

Vhat this archetypal basis of complexes amounts to is that a
complex iMch can be traced to events in the individual's personal
history is often "magically" complicated because the personal situa-
tion has been assimilated to the archetypal one. For example,
problems originating from the relationship Td.th the parents are
frequently the result of the fact that the individual has since
childhood seen the parents as gods. The father is perceived as
God the Father and the mother in teiros of the Archetype of the
Great Ifother or Earth Ifother. Tlie troubled individual then can
not successfully distinguish betireen parents as individuals and the
archetypal projections in teiros of ^Mch he has habitually perceived
them. i

For eveiy typical human situation there is a corresponding
archetype so that the experience of the individual in such a situation

33

invariably falls under the influence of an archei?ypal pattern. In
this respect the description of the archetypes as "patterns of in-
stinctual behaviour" seems awply justified.

Ibwever, the arcliel^rpal notion runs tlie risk of beir^ over-
generalized into triviality if the idea of the archetypes as formal
a priori conditioning factors is taten as a guide for explaining all
human behavior. For example, the archetypes can be seen as the
phylogenetic forms to ij-hich ontogeny supplies the content. But,
although this understanding of the archetypes is hypbthetically
plausible, it is misleading from an operational point of vier/. For
although in principle all aspects of the personality are founded on
the common stznicture of the collective unconscious out of which
individuality emerges like an island out of the ocean, the arche-
tj-pes can not be exclusively appealed to in order to form a compre-
hensive theory of behavior. This irauld be an incomplete and one-
sided perspective ignoming the vitally ijnpoi'tant ontogenetic factors
influencing individual development.

In the case of the complexes, for example, Jung identifies them
ijitli the personal unconscious, Ihe archetypal nucleus is called upon
as an explanatory principle only \ihen. the psychological situation
seems incomprehensible from an exclusively personal point of viei/.
■Qiat there is a common and universal structure to the psyche is then
a true statement but not always an informative one for all distinct
aspects of behavior.
Further Implications of Kantian IhfluKice

On the basis of the discussion so far, it could be fairly

39

concluded that on the '.*ole it is more accurate to understand the
arche-types as patterns of behavior than to thinlc of them in terms
of Kant's theory of Imovrledge. TMs conclusion, hoiTever, would be
too hastily arrived at as the full stoiy of Kant's influence on
June's idea of the archetypes has yet to be e:q)lained.

Jung's insistence on the label of empiricism to characterize his
work, for e:caiaple, is a consequence of his raethodological ideal of
staying ^jithin the bounds of possible experience. Ibreover, in teims
of Juns's thought, the concept of the psyche describes these bounds.
Biere is no possibility of getting outside the psyx:he to detenrdne
hou the p^che djiterprets the world, for all e^qjerience is most
djnraediately and inescapably psychic experience. !Ihe psyche is the
mediator of all experience, both from ixithin and from without.
If a tliinker comes up ^dth a metapl-^rsical scheme Trhich he
tliinlcs grasps the essential nature of reality, Jung then cauti&ns
as to the need for a psychological critique. The claims of universal
validi-ly which the gj^stem mater has put forUi transcend possible ex-
perience and are justified on the basis of an intuitive certainty.
It is just at this point that Jung's theoiy of archetypes assumes a
deflationary role by explaining the appeal of the metaphysical system
on the basis of its confoimity to the fundamental aspects of the
thinker himself rather than to conformity of the system trlth the
ultimate nature of reality.

lihen a speculative philosopher believes he has
comprehended the world once and for all in his
system, he is deceiving himself; he has merely
comprehended himself and then naively projected
that view upon the world (Vol. HI, p. 185).

1|0

Archet?rpes and Scientific theories

To conplicate matters at this point is the fact that basic
scientific insights are held to be fotaided on archetj-pes. For
ercample, Robert Ifeyer's idea of the conservation of energy (Vol.
Vn, p. 67), the concept of the atom (Vol, IX-A, p. 5?) and Ifekule's
discoveiy of the structure of the benzene ring (Jfen and ffi£ Symbols.
pages 2^-26) are all understood as illustrating the effect of arche-
"t^'pes,

• • . we spealc of "atoms" today because v/e have
heard, directily or indirectly, of the atomic
theory of Democritus. But v:here did Democritus,
or whoever first spoke of minimal constitutive
elements, hear of atoms? !Ihis notion had its
origin in archetypal ideas, that is, in pri-
mordial images which trere never reflections of
physical events but are spontaneous products
of the pgyclTic factor (Vol. IX-A, p. 57).

This archetypal basis of scientific theory is supported i-jhen it
is shorm that the ideas have been present in the histoiy of diviliza-
tion for many centuries. In Kekiae's case the solution to his
theoretical dilemma came during a state of relaxation when, dozing
before his fireplace, he seemed to see snakelike atoms dancing in
the fire, l-hen one of the snalces f owned a ring by grasping its orm
tail, the idea of the benzene ring was conceived in a flash of in-
sight.-^ This image of a snake (or dragon) biting its oim. tail is
called the uroboros and dates from at least as early as the third
century B.C. (l^ and His Symbols, p. 26).

Naturally the role of the unconscious must alw^s be seen in
proper relation to the activity of consciousness in these cases. Had
Kelcule not already spent great amounts of time and energy consciously
thinJdng about the problem of the structure of benzene, the situation

W]

h^

of an Insightful archetypal constellation could not have occurred.
M>reover, there t;as a great deal of effort necessary after the fire-
place episode before the structure of benzene ims finally worked out.
Ifoti-rithstanding the well-documented and critical role of the uncon-
scious then, it should not be thought that scientific theories e:dLst
prefoimed in the collective unconscious.

Ife might v;ell iMtate Kant at this point and ask hoir tliis appar-
ent confoimity betijeen ^/mbols from the collective unconscious and
scientific theories is possible, ^breover, it needs to be made clear
rhy scientific ideas derived from the archetypes are held to be
genuine discoveries and advances, TAereas sindlarly derived meta-
phcrsical ideas are restricted to a sphere of only subjective validity.

3h the case of science then, the archetypal constellation some-
times proves to be instrumental in bringing about a progressive
theoretical ad^rance for science when the image from the unconscious
is assimilated in tems of the already e:d.sting bo^ of kno^Tledge.
llanjr oHier ideas from tfie same source are never put to scientific
use because they do not happen to be compatible ilth the progress of
science.

Dius vri.th scientific theories, archetypes are sometimes an im-
portant influence tdthin the context of discoveiy. Regardless of the
origin of a scientific hypothesis, hoirever, in order for it to become
acceptable to the scientific community, it must be validated in terms
of criteria of scientific methodology. Ihese criteria of accepta-
bility involve relating the theoretical terns of the I^ypothesis to
obsenrational statements in such a way as to constitute an empiirl-
cal3y derived decision procedure which xnH indicate what obsenrational

states of affairs irill count for or against the hypothesis.

l-ath metaphysical theories based on archetypal experience,
on the other hand, the relationship beti.'een the theoiy and observa-
tions is not specified in such a way as to foim the basis for an
objective decision procedure which could be used to adjudicate con-
flicting aetaplTysical claims,

Ibreovcr, the archetypal images are alvrays the partial result of
the individual traits of the embocjyLng consciousness, with aspects of
personal histoiy and cultural baclcground being always associated x/ith
their appearance. Ihus the personal factor can not be eliminated in
order to arrive at an objectively valid metaphysical statement. In
addition to the inevitable contamination of the personal factor, the
archetypes can be said to be unavoidably anthropoimorphic. As the
product of human evolution, they mirror man and are man. Although
the archetjijes represent man's relationship to the world, it is only
from the historically conditioned human standpoint reflecting hoiT
the universe affects man.

There is for Jung, nonetheless, a possibility of evaluating the
pragmatic value of the metaphysical ideas considered from the stand-
point of their ability to further and enhance human e:d.stence. Thus
veiy similar to lEetzsche, Jung would judge metaphysical ideas on
their life-affinnLng quality, while maintaining that the final truth
of the ideas in teiros of which of them rdrror best the ultimate
structure of reality could not be decided,

In Jung's vieir we must be careful to distinguish subjective,
p^chological truth from objective truth about the ^eternal world.
Thus, although it is an error to see the archetypes as objectively

h3

true in the sense that they represent literal statements about objec-
tive states of affairs, yet the archetypes have a psychological
validity and are p^hologically true in the sense that it is possible
to interpret them in a subjectively meaningful w^. The validity of
the archetypes in teniis of applicability to tlie human situation must
then be aclaiowledged even in absence of the possibility of a scientLfLc
validation of statements based on them. For exaugxLe, the existence of
a God can not be either proved or disproved scientifical3y; yet the
existence of an intez^ial God-image or its equivalent must be acknov;-
ledged as a psychologically real and effective event.

Die gods cannot and must not die. I said just
no\i that there seems to be something, a kind of
superior power, in the human psyche, and tiiat
if this is not the idea of God, then it is the
"belly. " I wanted to express the fact that one
or other basic instinct, or coii^jlex of ideas,
will invariably concentrate upon itself the
greatest sum of psychic energy and thus force
the ego into its seind.ce (Vol. VH, p. 72),

^e Symbolic Mature of the Archetypes
Ihe way in tAich Jung characterizes the distinctive psychologi-
cal validity of the archetypes is by emphasizing the symbollo nature
of the archetypal iinases. The archetypes are said to be "symbolic
foiTOulas" (Vol^ VI, p. 377).

The symbol for Jung is to be shaiply distinguished from the
semiotic function of signs. Signs are representations of Imovjn
things. Ihe trademark of a company, for example, sirapOy represents
the company itself. Syinbols, on the other hand, can not be said to
be logically equivalent to their referents. Bie symbol points be-
yound itself to an unknorm.

hli

Dius a i-rord or an image is sQonbolic \fhen it
implies something more than its obvious and
immediate meaning. It has a xd.der "uncon-
scious" aspect that is never precisely defined
or fuUy explained. ... As the mind e:xplores the
symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the
grasp of reason (^ and Itts Symbols, p. k),

Symbols functixin as interconnecting linlcs betireen the conscious
and the collective unconscious, as they bring into consciousness in
representable form the othertrf.se unlmotrable archetypes. The sjiribols
mediate the experience of the archetypes and because of the unavoid-
able personal characteristics due to embodiment in an individual con-
sciousness are products of both the collective unconscious and con-
sciousness.

Biere is then in the symbol a synthesis of known and unknoim
and of real and uirreal.

If it Trere only real, it xrould not be a symbol,
for it vjould then be a real phenomenon and hence
un^ymbolic. . . . Jind if it vrere altogether unreal,
it would be mere empty imagining, vjhich, being
related to nothing real, would not be a symbol either
(Vol. VI, p. 111).

The Efymbol . . . unites the antithesis betireen
real and unreal, because on the one hand it is
a psychic reality (on account of its efficacy),
while on the other it corresponds to no physical
reality (Vol. VI, pages 128-129).

% a large extent then, what we add to the picture of the

archetype hy calling the archetypal images symbols is an emphasis

on the living intensLly of the archetypes as they are experienced.

The archetypal images are not abstract intellectual concepts but

symbols which are not transparent to reason and the intellect. Ibre-

over, these symbols have a certain aura of fascination. They appeal

not on3y to the intellect as puzzles for the understanding but to the

h^

emotions as T-rell. "They are as much feelings as thoughts ..."
(Vol. vn, p. 66),

Biis characteristic quality of the sgnnibol to evoke emotion is
teimed its numinositjr, the numen being the specific energy of the
arche-t^^s.

lith the description of the nurainosity of the archetypes, the
close relationship betireen archetypal images and religious motifs
becomes evident. For Jung accepts Rudolf Otto's characterization
of religious experience as a "careful and scrupulous obserration
of . . . the nundnosum ..." (Vol. XE, p. 7). "I-fe might say, then,
that the term 'religion' designates the attitude peculiar to a con-
sciousness which has been changed by experience of the numinosum"
(Vol. n, p. 8).

iO-though originating through individual experiences of the collec-
tive unconscious, religion is, strictly speaking, a phenomenon of
collective consciousness. Jlnd since not all experiences of the
archetTpes result in their being assimilated in teiros of a religious
frame of reference, another vrider designation is needed to character-
ize the effect of the numinous quality of archetypes. Thus the arche-
tTPes are said to be "sjjirittial" factors.

In a sense spiritual and archetypal are aOiaost equivalent and
interchangeable teims. For when \re have understood the transpersonal
nature of the archetypes,^ their aura of numinosity and their ability
to generate images >jhich serve as the foundations of culture, then
^76 have made definite the meaning of the spiritual.

That keeps us from assertiiig this equivalence of meaning, hwrever,
is the instinctual perspective. For the archetypes are said to be

h6

"patterns of instinctual behaviour" (Vol. IX-A, p. hh). Aid it is the

instinctual aspect of man which seems to stand in sharpest contrast

to xAat we M±sh to designate as spiritual.

However, Jung points to Christian prejudice as the origin of the

apparent antithesis between spirit and nature.

• • . vezy remarkable opposition of spirit and
nature. Bren though spirit is regarded as
essentially alive and enlivening, one cannot
really- feel nature as unspiritual and dead.
Vfe must therefore be dealing here with the
(Christian) postulate of a spirit whose life
is so vastly superior to the life of nature
that in comparison \r±th it the latter is no
better than death (Vol. IX-A, p. 210).

A more in-depth perspective, then, reveals the paradoxical re-
lation between spirit and instinct. For th^ seem to be siirllar pro-
cesses of pgychic energy which are distinguidied by the application
of this energy into diametricalOy contrasting modes.

Ibreover, it is in the description of the relation between the
spiritual and instinctual that Jung's psychological viewpoint is in
sharpest contrast to that of Preud. For Jung does not conceive all
psychic energy as being instinctual energy as does Freud. He uses
the teim for p^jrchic enei^gy, libido, in a way i*ich does not isiply
its equivalence i-dth instinctual energy. Ohere is then for Jung
no need of a concept of sublimation in lAich Instinctual energy
must be siphoned off for cultural purposes. Any diversion of the
flwr of libido from its natural Instinctual channels in Jung's view
leads only to neurotic maladjustment. H6;revBr, there is more p^hic
energy available for the human being than is utilized hy the natural
Instinctual processes. This e-^ess p^hic energy can then be used
for other than instinctual purposes, and w might say that this e:ocess

hi

energy represents a degree of freedom for nan to pursue cultural
activities for their om sake. The ^pibolic images fi^ the collec-
tive unconscious then serve as "transfoimers" of energy in the sense
that the archetypes represent inherent patterns for this energy floi/
(Vol. V, p. 232).

Since the spiritual uses of pcsjrchic energy are the result of the

influence of the archetypes v/hich are themselves the product of

evolution, it becomes evident that the development of the spirit

in man is his characteristic pattern of behavior.

5i feallty of course the world-spuming passion
of the 'spirit" is just as natural as the
marriage-flight of insects (Vol. V, p. 396),

Bie spiritual appears in the psyche also as an
instinct, indeed as a real passion, a "consoming
fire .... It is not derived from a^y other
instinct ... but is a principle sj^ generis.
a specific and necessaiy fomi of instinctual
povier (Vol. VUI, p. ^8).

Archetypes and Ihstlncta
3h order to fuUy understand the meaning of the tenii "spiidtual"
then, a further clarification of the archetype-instinct relation is
necessaiy. For we need to grasp how the spiritual if to be of the
same type of rtuff as the instincts and yet seendngOy different from
and even opposed to them.

A look at animals other than man helps to gain an insight into
what Jung has in mind in this regard. For ±a the exa«?>lBs of patterns
of behavior in animals, >;e see clearly the unity which in man becomes
a tension of opposdtes betvreen spirit and instinct,

A fc?y MOTd "pattern" is th^ the link which enables us to
connect the behavior of animals \dth the archelypes and instincts in

hQ

man. For the Surtlnctual behavior of animals is not to be understood
as just a blind Impulsion to action. Rather, for each instinctual
act there is present a total pattern vhich Includes a sort of Image
of the Instinctual situation.

^IZ f!i4^/!''*' "° amorphous instincts, as

?S^SfJJ^°* ^ff ^ ^ "^^^ *h« pattern of
its ^tuation. Always it fulfils an image,
^d the Ijnage has fixed qualities. Ihe in-
stinct of the leaf -cutting ant fulfils the Image
^^P^i^i'^'*^^^!^"**^' transport, and^
Sfi J.!?*"^^"^^^^ ^^i- If any one of
these conditions is lacldng, the instinct does
not faction, because it cannot exist with-
out its total pattem, without its image.
Such an image is an a priori type. It is
inborn an the ant prior to any activity, for
there can be no activity at all unless an
instinct of corresponding pattern initiates
and makes it possible (Vol. Vni, p. 201).

Wie inrtlnctual acts of animals then seem to be unified by a
pattem which liK^ludes a sort of intuitive recognition of the goal
of the instinctual acts as well as the ptyslological mechanisms
which supply the necessaiy energy.

Of course. In the case of animals, our use of "image" must
be metaphoricalj but it is Jung's point that this regulating prin-
ciple Of the Instinct, the factor which especially m the Insects
makes the operation of instinctual behavior amazin^y precise and
selective rather than haphazard, can be recognized.

ae organizing factor of the instinct together with its
specific enei^ make up a unified pattem of behavior for animals.
In man, on the ottier hand, the representations of this foi«al factor
of instinct can come into awareness as actual images. Bms, whereas
In aniinals the archetypes and the instincts exist in a fused, undiffer-
entiated state; in man, with the foi^ation of consciousness, they

h9

become separable and distinct.

Th the hxnnan realm then the archetypes become -Uie forms which
r^ulate the instincts, Ibreover, the archetypal Images are said
to represent the meaning of the instincts and to be "the unconscious
images of the instincts themselves" (Vol, EC-A, p, kh)» The arche-
•tgrpes thus act as guiding factors for the release of instinctual
energy in appropriate ways characteristic of man as a species.

But lAat are these human instincts? Jung recognizes five types
of instinctual factors for man: "hunger, sexuality, activity,
reflection and creativity" (Vol. VOU, p. 118). He conceded that
any attesapt to enumerate the human instincts is at least a matter
of controvert. "Hie principle reason for this confusion as to what
constitutes an instinct in man is the complication of the psycho-
logical factor. For the criterion of what to count as psychic is
the ability of the functioning of the will to modiiy the otherwise
automatic and compulsive Instincts. It would seem evident then
that the reason we can not decide on what to count as purely instinc-
tual in man is due to the fact that instincts are alwajrs in part
Influenced by the psyche. Thus Jang says that the instincts per
se are ectopsychic and serve the function only of a stlimilus,
whereas the detemlning factor for human behavior is always the
result of an interaction between the ectopsychic instinct and the
psychic situation of the moment (Vol, vm, p. 11^).

This mutual interaction between psyche and instinct in man has
then the result of making the Instinctual element ambiguous. For,
on the one hand, all psychic processes seem to be founded on an
instinctual base, wiiereas, on the other hand, psychic processes

^0

also influence the working of the instincts. "... The instincts
are a condition of p^hic activity, while at the sane time p^chic
processes seem to condition the instincts" (Vol. H, p. 330),

Thus the twofold nature of instinct becomes most evident in
human behavior where for each instinctual action we have to take
into account both the aspect of "c^ynamism and coiapulsion" as well
as that of "specific meaning and intention" (Vol. I, p. 287). For
each instinctual action then we can pose the question as to its
meaning,

Ihe archet3Tjal Images are these psychic factors i*ich provide
the meaning for the instincts. Th^ are the necessaiy fonns of
instinctual behavior for man. The sense of spying that something
represents the meaning of an instinct for man is thus clarified by
an understanding of this process of "p^hization, " the assimilation
of the physiological stimulus to a preexistent psychic pattern (Vol.
Vm, p. 11^).

3h the animals which have no p^he there is nevertheless pre-
sent a unified pattern of behavior. The instinctual acts are the
ways in which the animal realizes its inherent nature, its possi-
bilities of becoming what it can be. The appropriate fulfiljnent
of the instinctual natui-e of an animal is its way of realizing its
nreaning.

If we say then that the archetypes in man are the images of
the Instincts and represent their meaning, ,re are eagAasizing this
continuity with the lower animals. Ifen also has his characteristic
patterns of beha:vior, and the arehetypes act as the patterning fac-
tors for these human Instincts, mi the f^ilfilment of the instincts

51

In nan then also lead to an unfoldnent of his inherent human nature?

The answer to this question must of course deal with the factor
of the p^he. Wiat is only dimly prefigured in anijnals becomes in
man with the developgnent of consciousness his particularly human
way of being. For a human being to realize its nature then iniplies
the dervelopjnent of consciousness.

Ihis development is like an instinct in the sense that it comes
into being conditioned by the archetypal patterns. However, its
nature is to exist as a factor which can operate as a will and hence
control and regulate the "other" instincts. The nature of con-
sciousness contains then the possibility of being able to act
against nature.

It is recognized that man living in the state of
nature is in no sense merely "natural" like an
fflilmal, but sees, believes, fears, worships things
wiiose meaning is not at all discoverable from the
conditions of his natural environment. Iheir
underlying meaning leads us in fact far away
from all that is natural, obvious, and easily
intelligible, and quite often contrasts most
shajTxIy ^rlth the natural instincts, tfe have
only to think of all those gruesome rites and
customs against which every natural feeling
rises in revolt, or of all those beliefs and
ideas which stand in insuperable contradiction
to the evidence of the facts. All this drives
us to the assumption that the spiritual prLn-
ciple (xdiatever that mi^t be) asserts itself
against the merely natui^ conditions with in-
credible strength. One can say that this too
is "natural," and that both have their origin
in one and the same "nature." I do not in
the Ifiast doubt tliis origin, but must point
out that this "natural" southing consists
of a conflict beti/een ttro principles, to
which you can give this or that name according
to taste, and that this opposition is the
Kqaression, and perhaps also the basis, of
the tension >re call psychic energy (Vol. Vni,

$2

Bras the fact that arche-t^Tpes seem to enter the human picture
on two levels— as patterns of instinctual behavior and as spiritual
factors— is due to the fact that one of the innate human patterns,
the tendency to develop consciousness, can act againsrt the other
lotTer drives and become a channel of psgrchic energy in its ovm
right independently of the instincts. Bierefore the archetypes
seem to have two paradoxically opposite qualities: " . , , The
archetype is partly a spiritual factor, and partly like a hidden
meaning immanent in the instincts ..." (Vol. Vin, 222), Only
in man then is there this potential split between his natural ten-
dencies and the realization of his human-most potentiality of being,
This split, which is the same as that bettireen the conscious and
xmconscions, is a state of necessajy tension since the development of
aw-areness and the giving in to the \mconsciousness of instinctual
motivations tend to irork against each other and to a large extent
they are mutually exclusive activities. However, Jung's psychological
viewpoint as a v/hole can be understood as the attempt to show hovr
this necessaiy tension between conscious and unconscious and between
spirit and instinct need not necessarily be a conflict. For the
integrated personality is one which leams to live with a balance
bettreen these forces of tension rather than excluding one for the
sake of the other.

But if T-re can reconcile ourselves to the mys-
terious truth that the spirit is the life of
tlie body seen from within, and the bocty the out-
v/ard manifestation of the life of the spirit—
the two being really one — then we can understand
why the striving to transcend the present level
of consciousness through acceptance of tlie un-
conscious must give the body its due, and why
recognition of the body cannot tolerate a philos-
opl-QT that denies it in tlie name of the spirit (Vol. X, p. 9^),

^3

Notes

1

This dream was provided by a student and friend, George
Clough. '6

2

Bie fact that Kant had a strong influence on the develop-
ment of Jung's ideas is amply evidenced by the mai^ explicit re-
ferences to Kant scattered throughout Jung's wrks. Moreover,
when Jung talks of the philosophers t*o had been linportant to his
intellectual development, to again find him acknowledging' the
influence of Kant: "Ihe philosophical influence that has pre-
vailed in iny education dates frem ELato, Kant, Schopenhauer,
Si, V. Hartraann, and Ittetzsche. Biese names at least character-
ize w main studies in philosophy." C.G. Jung, Letters. Vol. I
1906-1950, Vol. H 19^0-1961, edited by Geiiiard Mler and JSniela
Jaffe (Princeton: Princeton Tfeiversity Press, 1973), Letters.
Vol. n, pages 500-501, letter to Joseph F, Rychlak dated 27
April 1959. Hereafter cited as Letters Vol. I or Vol. II,

]h his autobiography Jiing describes an interest in Kantian
philosophy which \iaa part of a "philosophical development" which
extended from w seventeenth year until toII into the period of
n^ medical studies." C.G. Jung, ffemories. Dreams. P^flections
Ufeif York: Random House, I96I), p. 70. Hereafter cited as
^fei°°^es, Breams. Bteflections. The extent of that interest is
revealed when Jimg relates that while a medical student "the
clinical semesters that folloTred kept me so bu^ that scarcely
My time remained for my forays into outlying fields. I was
able to study Kant only on Sundays" (Mamories. lireams. Reflec-
tions. p. 101). —^ '

^.

3 Jolande Jacobi, ^mplex/Archetype/Symbol in the Psycholot
of Of Of Jung. (Princeton: Princeton University Press7T97i'), p. f

CmL XttcS^: ggogoaz^oS Natural Science (B.gle:«,od

5
4, X ^J^^ transpersonal nature of the archetype, v?e mean to
refer to the fact that archetypal experience is not completely ex-
planable by reference to the individual's past experience or develop-
ment.

CHAPTER 3
THBORT OP ARCHEPTPESi PART U

The Origin of the Archetypea

3he next aspect of the archel^ypal theory lAich ire must tal« up
for discussion is the question of the origin of the archeigrpes: Ihere
do the archelgrpes cone from?

One way of approachins this pvdblm is by considering the rela- -
tLonship befereen archel^ypes and mythological motifs. For since norths
and fairytales are one of the most characteristic w^s in which
archeigrpes manifest themselves, if we can discover hot; norths origi-
nate, then perhaps this vdll shed light on the question of the
origin of the archetypes J

^hological motif s then are characteristic archetypal images
so that the archel^npes are sometimes designated as '%thologems" by
Jung.

The inrthological feature of archetypal manifestation can be seen
to fit in Td.th what was previously said about the archetypal images
being ^jrmbols and having a religious or spiritual significance in
that a mrfch is a phenomenon of collective consciousness. It is the
end product of a conscious elaboration of the oilginal unconscious
content, ^Ad.ch often includes the efforts of many generations of
stoiyfcellers. ^h this way the numinous quality of the nythologem,
the immediate impact of the living intensity of tlie unconscious

5^

revelation, is lessened, and the genuine s^tabollc nature of the arche-
types is expressed in a diminished degree. "The so-called religious
statement is still numinous, a qualily T*ich the n^rth has alreatfy lost
to a great extent" (Vol, XI, p. 301),

Since the religious expression of the archetypes can also suffer
the sane fate as Berths and cease to become "living" symbols, it would
seem that Jung's distinction between the religious and tlie inytholog-
Ical in terms of numinosity is not realOy adequate. Ih addition, there
are exan^xLes from primitive cultures where the ncrthological and re-
ligious coincide, "A tribe's in/thology is its living religion , , . "
(Vol. K-A, p. 1^), Tihen then does a religious statement cease to
be religious and becomes ncrthological? Ifees Jung mean that when a
religious dogma loses crediblli-ty it becomes a ncrth?

Ibreover, there seems to be at least in ordinaiy usage an im-
plied difference in content irith the iicrthologlcal involving move
primitive types of thought and being more concerned vri.th naturalistic
phenomena than the religious. Religions then would seem to be more
sophisticated i^'pes of mjrthologies.

At any rate, it is clear that Jung is not particularly concerned
id.th establlslilng strict criteria of usage which would keep the teiros
distinct as is evidenced by the follo^^dng:

• . • ncrths of a religious natua^e can be inter-
preted as a sort of mental therapy for the suffer-
ings and anxieties of mankind in general ...
(I-fan and las SK/mbols. p. 68).

I was driven to ask Herself in all seriousness:
"Vhat is the north you are living?" ... So, in
the most natural way, ; I took it upon ncrself to
get to knavT "my" myth, and I regarded this as
the task of tasks, for—so I told inyself —how
could I, when treating n^r patients, maloe due

56

alloxrance for the personal factor, for n^y
personal equation, \M.ch is yet so necessary
for a IcnOTxledge of the other person, if I was
unconscious of it? I simp3y had to laioir T*at
unconscious or preconscious rcrfch was fomdng
me, from what rhizome I sprang (Vol. V, pa^os
xjcLv-xxv),

In speaking about his personal north as in the above, it is
evident that Berths are often used as vehicles of the most j^ymbolic
and numinous manifestations of the unconscious. Thus Jung's use
of the tem "ncrth" deviates somewhat from the ordinaiy usage. Some-
times he means north to refer to the symbolic archetj-pal ijnages
themselves, and at other tiines he uses rayUt in the conventional >ray
to indicate tlie cultural product as an aspect of the collective
consciousness.

Hius both norths and religious (spiritual) statements2 can be
original symbolic expressions of the collective unconscious.

... esoteric teaching. Ohis last is a typical
means of expression for the transmission of collec-
tive contents originalOy derived from the mcon-
scious.

-Another vrell-kno;m expression of the archetypes
is myth and fairytale (Vol. IX-A, p. 5).

In attributing a positive function to norths even in the case

of modem man, it is evident that Jung does not see nortlis as a

sort of primitive inferior science, or sdjnply as a crude foiin of

prescientific explanaUon. This is because of the symbolic nature

of norths. For if to understand that northological statements are

not really about the external world but are actuaUy psychological ^

statements, then we are less apt to criticize the norths for their

variance with current scientific knoi^ledge. !Ihus norths have a

psychological validity and accurately depict the nature of the

^7

human situation.

The inability of primitive and other unsophisticated peoples to
distinguish between the psychological and the objective sense of
truth frequently leads then to the phenomenon of projection in
Tihich an unconscious content is perceived as belonging to an object
and being a property of the object. Borough the agency of pro-
jection natural phenomena take on qualities stemming from the
collective unconscious so that " . . . the T^iwle of aorthology
could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective uncon-
scious" (Yol. Vni, p. 152).

In spite of this confusion about inner and outer observed in
mrthological thinking, Jung asserts that ncrthology should not be
understood as an attempt to formulate a type of scientific ex-
planation.

Biere can be no doubt that science and
philosophy have gram from this matrix, but
that primitives thinlc up such things merely
frora a need for explanation, as a sort of
physical or astronomical theory, seems to
me highly improbable (Vol, VIII, p. 153),

It would seem rather that the anthropomorphism seen in ncrth-
ology, the projection of human qualities onto natural phenomena,
is an attempt to grasp the meaning of nature in human terms. It
is then the symbolic meaning of natural phenomena which captures
tloe iiiterest of the myth-mabers. If x^ look at alchei^, for exam-
ple, only as a sort of proto-chemistiy, this can not explain how
the interest in it continued in; spite of the failure to produce the
desired objective results over periods of hundreds of years. ^ ihe
alchemist is of course taken in to an extent by his o^m projections;
but Jung points out that the hubris of assuming that our scientific

^8

world vie-./ is thus superior to one founded on mrthological projec
tix>ns is not justified, since if the unsophisticated ndnd anthropo-
inorphizes the world, we harre in the present era "nechanicomorphized"^
it TTith the result that the embolic quality of our existence is im-
poverished, life anist then avoid the mistake of trying to see rcrthology
as an aUerapt at explanation in objective tenas when its erqxLanations
are sjoiibolic in nature. ?^

Ifow since the arclielgrpal psjrche expresses itself in the language
of north, it irould seem as if the sorthological interpretation of na-
ture had been someliow Imprinted on the p^he so that these archaic
images reappear in modem man. \h look then to a description of this
process of how the nc^hological image arises in response to the pl^-
sical process in order to gain what apparently is the essential clue
to the question of the origin of the archetiypes.

Keeping in mind the previous discussion of the nature of myths,
it is clear that the relationship betcreen the jd^rsical process and
images of ncrthological motifs is not understood by Jung as being one
of siB^iLe representation. Vhen he says then that the archet3T>al
image is not to be understood as an allegoiy of the physical pro-
cess, he means that the objective content of representation is ex-
perienced symbolically and hence takes on psychic aspects due to
projection.

It is not the world as we know it that speaks
out of hxs unconscious, but the vnkncrm world
of the p^che, of which to knot/ that it mirrors
our en^rical irorld onOy in part, and that, for
the most part, it moulds this empirical world
in accord^e ^dth its ora psychic assumptions.
JJie archetype does not proceed from physical
;?f ,' ^* describes how tiie pj^he ercperiences
the pliysical fact, and in so doing the psyche

59

oi'ten behaves so autocratically that it denies
tangible reality or makes statements that fly
in the face of it (Vol. IX-A, p. 1%),

Hius original archetypal (ncrthological) images are posttilated
as being the resultant of an interaction between a physical process
and the primitive psyxihe, irdth the physical process being Interpreted
in terms of a psychic fantasy content. Ibreover, it is the subjective
part, the fantasies which arise concomitant vrith the physical pro-
cess, that are the foiroative elements for the n^rthological motif.

I'hat we can safely say about northical images is
that the physical process imprinted itself on
the psyche in this fantastic, distorted form
and was preserved there, so that the uncon-
scious still reproduces similar images today
(Vol. Vni, p. 1^3).

It is not storms, not thunder and lightning,
not rain and cloud that remain as images in
the pjgrche, but the fantasies caused by the
effects they arouse (Vol. VIII, pages l^U-l^^).

Still to be explained, however, is the process of pgjrchic im-
printing through which an original inythological image becomes an
enduring aspect of the collective unconscious, which can then pro-
duce images of similar fom even to the present day. VJhen ue read
Jung on this point, there seems to be an evident appeal to a theoiy
involving inheritance of acquired characteristics. For although
Jung is careful to make clear that it is the disposition to foiro
ijnages rather than the images themselves which are inherited, yet
this inherited disposition is held to be a sort of condensation of
the repeated experiences resulting from typical human situations.

These archetypes, whose innermost nature is in-
accessible to experience, are the precipitate
of the psychic functioning of the whole ances-
tral line; the accumulated experiences of
organic life in general, a million times re-
peated, and condensed into types. In these

60

archetypes, therefore, all experiences are re-
presented irhich have happened on this planet
since prLneval ttoes (Vol. VI, p. 1;00).

The repetition of these laical human experiences leaves a sort
of function trace in the psyche which then can act to produce ana-
logous rc^ological djnages in succeeding generations. Tttixs the
archetypes are described as "mnentic deposits. "

From, the scientific, causal standpoint the pri-
mordial image can be conceived as a mneraic deposit,
an iij?)rint or engram (Seraon), tjhich has arisen
through the condensation of countless processes
of a similar kind. In this respect it is a
precipitate and, therefore, a typical basic fonn,
?£ ^^^^^ ever-recurring psychic experiences
(Vol, VI, p. hlO),

This reference to the influence of Richard Semon seems to clar-
ify what Jung had in mind as a mechanism by ^fh±ch archetypes itdght
be inherited. For the exjwsition of Semon' s theoiy in his book
Bie Ihme reveals a sort of theory of racial meraoiy which tries to
integrate the factors of memoiy, habit and inheritance under one
theoretical principle and which appeals e:<plicitly to the idea of
the inheritance of acquired characteristics.^ For ercample:

... the engraphic effects of stimulation are
not restricted to the irritable substance of
the individual, but that the offspring of that
andivxdual may jnanifest corresponding ^graphic
modxfications." —*' — ^

Hbi/ever, Jung's mention of Semon and use of his terwlnology does
not constitute a complete endorsement of his theory. 3h particular,
Jung is sensitive to the chicken and egg dilerama in relation to the
question of the origin of the arfchetypes. For the archetypes can
not only be seen as the product of past experiences but can also be
seen as themselves conditioners of e:q,erience. In^ad of seeking an

61

explanation of t^ere the archetypes corae flxjm b7 saying that they are
the result of the influence of physical processes on the pgyche then,
there is the alternative of conceiving the archetypes as part of the
inherent nature of the psyche itself,

nie fact that the sun or the noon or the metero-
logical processes appear, at the veiy least, in
allegorized form points to an Independent colla-
boration of the psyche, which in that case can-
not be merely a product or sterotype of environ-
mental conditions. Prom whence wuld it drat/
the capacity to adopt a standpoint outside sense
^eption? ... In view of such questions
i^eaon's naturalistic and causalistic engram
theoiy no longer suffices, tfe are forced to
assume that the given structure of the brain
does not oire its peculiar nature merely to
the Influence of surrounding conditions, but
also and just as much to the peculiar and auto-
nomous quality of living matter, i.e., to a
lat; inherent in life itself (Vol. VI, p. 1^).

Jimg in the course of his work abandoned Semen's theoiy of
engrams and talk of mnemic deposits disappears from his later writings.
Archetypes were then siii5xly said to be part of the inherited brain
structure, thus leaving the mechanism of hereditary transmission
unspecified,

Ittth Jung's retreat from the position that archetypes are
"deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity" (Vol.
Vn, p, 69), we see tl:at the stople correlations he had pi^viously
dram relating physical processes to the fonnation of rc^thological
images must also be reconsidered. Vhat must then be revised in the
theoiy of aythology is not the concept of projection and the vital
role it plays in nythological tliinldng but the implication that
Berths were once original contents of consciousness, that th^ or-
iginate from the fantasizing of individual psyches, mth the aban-
donment of the engram theoiy, Jung is no longer certain he can

62

reconstruct the process by ijhich the objective physical process and
the interpretive ppyche Interact to fom i^yths. He seems, on the
whole, in his later work (as exjemplified in the quotations lOTiediately
belovr) to have come to the conclusion that mythological motifs are
not amenable to a simple naturalistic explanation, as if thery were
caused by physical processes. Rather the subjective part of the
process, the inherent laws of psychic apprehension, is novr thought
to be the essential determining factor.

Thus even the question of havT archetypes (n^thologems) origi-
nate is not seen by Jung as being a legitimate question since it im-
plies the need for a special explanation of how the archetypes came
to be in the psyche, ;*ereas Jung nm sees the archetypes as devel-
oping along id.th the psyche as part of its inherent pattern of func-
tioning,

Qiipiricany considered, however, the archetype
did not ever come into existence as a phenomenon
of organic life, but entered into the picture
iri.th life itself (Vol. XT, p. m?, note 2).

Biese images are "primordial" ijnages in so far
as they are peculiar to whole species, and if
th^ ever "originated" their origin must have
coincided at least \i±th the beginning of the
species. They are the "human quality" of the
human being, the specifically human fona his
activities take, Ihis specific fona is hered-
itary and is alreacfy present in the genn-plasm
(Vol, II-A, p, 78),

The hope expressed earlier then that Jung's ideas on the way
in which norths originate would prove to be the clue to solidng the
riddle of the origin of the archetypes proves to be unjustified, and
we are left >d.thout a definitive ansvrer to where the archetypes come
from. Jung is naturally quite happy to abandon questions of ulti-
mate origin to the sphere of metaphysics: "Vhether this psytihic

63

structure and its eleinents, the archetypes, ever 'originated' at aU
is a metaplysical question and therefore unanswerable" (Vol. IX-A,
p. Idj and "... it is impossible to say where the archetype comes
from, because there is no Archimedean point outside the a priori con-
ditions it represents" (Vol. IX-A, p. 69, note 27).8

But peiliaps Jung should not be let off so easily. For rather
than postulating that the archetypes are sort of an ultlinate p^hic
fact for which no explanation in terms of more basic psychological
theoiy is possible, it seems evident that, heuristicaOly at least,
we must seek an answer to the question of how it is that the p^che
structures experiences in tenns of the archetypes instead of other
sljiipler modes. Perhaps, as Jung seems to think, the archetypes will
eventually prove to be an ultlanate w^ry for human consciousness,
but from the scientific point of view this can not be assumed.

Archetypal 3mage and Archetype Iter Se
The claljtt that the archetypes are ultimately inaccessible must
be further examiixed. For many difficult points in the articulation
of Jung's theory of archetypes seem to hinge on distinguishing be-
ttveen the unreachable archetype per se and the an^hetypal image.
Bie archetype per se was said to be not truly part of the psyche at
all but rather p^choid and to be incapable of consciousness. As a
consequence it TTas said to be unobservable in principle. The essen-
tial question in this regard would seem to be how such claims as the
above can be justified Srom the empirical point of view.

But that nothing In principle would count as a direct observation
of an archetype is a result of the total conceptual framework of the
archetypal theoiy, which as a whole is grounded en^jirically. Ih this

61i

respect it irould seem not to differ significantly from other
scientific theories, ^breover, if from the behaviorist point of
view, the suggestion is made to do ai-;ay ^dth the horpothetical
construct of the archetype per se and instead speak only of arche-
typal images, the reply is that this move would mean that a theory
of archeig^jes is no longer possible. For there must be postulated
an underlying common collective aspect to the p^ches of individuals
which will mate the archetypal manifestations more than personalistic
and idiosyncratic products. I'Jiat counts as evidentially conclusive
for the presence of archetypes then is just the appearance of con-
tents iijhich prove to constitute universal themes or motifs which can
be recognized in contexts T^hich transcend the individual's personal
sphere of reference. Ibless the arche-types are to be reduced to the
merely personal -ttien, there must be postulated an archel^ype per se
•t*ich will be the transpersonal organizing principle for the personal
and culturally determined archeiypal manifestation.

It is better on the whole to think of the archeigrpe per se as
a principle or disposition rather than as an entity, i.e., something
which can be clearly distinguished as an individual thing. Thus
Jung says that the phenomenologlcal material does not justify ary-
thing other than the postiiLation of principles which act to form
distinct archetypal images, without it being possible to conclude
anything definite about the nature of the archetjlie per se.

I'hen one carefully considers this accumulation
of data, it begins to seem probable that an
archeiype in its quiescent, unprotected state
has no exactly determinable form but is in it-
self an indefinite structure which can assume
definite forms only in projection (Vol. TI-A,
p. 70).

65

Moreover, this mcertainty about the nature of the archetype per
se extends even so far as to leave undetermined the number of arche-
types and the point of differentiation bet^^en one archetype and
another,

Hnpirically spealdng, vre are dealing all the
time idth "types," definite forms that can be
named and distinguished. But as soon as you
divest these l^rpes of the phenomenology pre-
sented by the case material, and try to ex-
amine them in relation to other archetypal forms,
they branch out into such far-reaching ramifi-
cations in the histoiy of symbols that one comes
to the conclusion that the basic psychic ele-
ments are infinitely varied and ever changing,
so as utterly to defy our por/ers of imagination
(Vol. IX-A, p. 70).

Although heCilie investi^ato:!;^} is forced, for
episfcemological reasons, to postulate an in-
definite ntimber of distinct and separate arche-
types, yet he is constantly overcome l^ doubt
as to how far tliey are really distinguishable
from one another. They overlap to such a de-
gree and have such a capacity for combination
that all atteittpts to isolate them conceptually
must appear hopeless (Vol, XT, p. 288).

3h considering the problem of the nature of the archetJTe per
se, Kant's influence on Jung's vierfs must again be acknowledged.
For Jung accepts the Kantian distinction betvreen the thing-in-itself
and that which appears. In these teiros then the archetype per se
is held to be inaccessible on analogy ivith Kant's noumenon, where-
as the arclietypal image is that which appears in the phenomenal
realm.^

Bie existence of a transcendental reality is
indeed evident in itself .... That the world
inside and outside ourselves rests on a trans-
cendental bacltground is as certain as our ovm
existence, but it is equally certain tliat the
direct perception of the archetypal world inside
us is Just as doubtfully correct as that of tlie
physical outside us (Vol. XEV, p. 551).

eG

Vhen I say "atom" T am talking of the model made of
it J when I say "archetype" I am talking of ideas
corresponding to it, but never of the thing-in-
xtself , T*ich in both cases is a transcendental
^stery. ... One must therefore assume that
the effective archetypal ideas, including our
model of the archetype, rests on something actual
even though unknovrable. Just as the model of the
atom rests on certain unknotrable qualities of

SJJ*®? ^l!^^ !°^- '^* P* ^' letter to H.
Haberlandt dated 23 J^jril 19^2).

HbT/ever, it is unnecessaiy to follow Jung's Kantian way of
construing the archetype per se. For rather than ii>5)licating the
archetypal theory .^th a problematic phenomena/noumena distinction,
vie can interpret the archetype per se as an unobservable l^^pothe-
tical construct. Ohus, although Jung holds that the archetype
per se is an ultimate i^ysteiy, the aix:hetypal theoiy on3y requires
that it be the unobservable and mostly unknom structuring prin-
ciple responsible for the archetypal image,

]h any case, our efforts to discover the nature of the archetype
directly are frustrated since the archetypal image always reflects the
personal histoiy of the consciousness in which it is embodied. Ihus when
ve attempt to abstract the archetype itself frem its personal and cul-
tural matrix, the result is that the distinctiveness of the arehetype
^ranishes, and v,e can no longer say what it .rould be like in itself.
But if the arehetype is then essentially an "irrepresentable fonn," the
question is hot. we are to distinguish collective archeiypal manifestations
fi-om merely personal contents of consciousness. It would seem that there
mst be definite phenomenological differences betaken the arehetypal
iiaages and other contents if .re are to be Justified in speaking of the
e:d^ce of a collective unconscious containing arehetypes. For in the
absence of ^ common features xrhich the individual arehetypes manifest in

67

every person, xre inust have general criteria for recognizing \iha.t con-
stitutes an archetypal content.

As previously mentioned in the exaniple of an archetypal dream,
arche-liTpal images characteristically have an alien. Impersonal char-
acter so that they do not appear to be contents which Trere once con-
scious and then forgotten or repressed. But this does not mean that
the contents attributed to the collective unconscious contain images
which the dreamer can not recognize at all. lather it seems that
the strange and alien contents amount to fantastic rearrangements
of items of e:<perience alrea^ knotm to the dreamer. If one dreams
of God, for exaniple, the image may be conveyed as that of tlie figure
of Supennan. The archetypal images are for tlie most part then some-
thing familiar appearing in an unfamiliar context. Thus ucrthological
motifs may appear in dreams but with modem substitutes for the prin-
ciple characters.

Vfe have on3y to disregard the dependence of dream
language on environment and substitute "eagle" for
"aeroplane," "dragon" for "automobile" or "train,"
"snalre^jite" for "injection," and so forth, in
order to arrive at the more universal and more
fundamental language of injrthology (Vol. XL, 289),

It irould be perhaps advantageous to distinguish the objective

from the subjective aspects of the phenomenology of archeiqrpes.

Subjectively the archetypal appearance is characterized by its :^ym-

bolic qualities. It has an aura of numinosity and seems to point

beyond itself to an unlmown. From the third person point of viet^,

however, the synibolic nature of! tlie archetype is less evident as ire

have to do only with a content of consciousness tdiose origin is

unlmotm, so that what may appear objectively to be a symbol may

upon closer examination prove to be a sign i-dth a simple representational

68

explanation,

3h order to verify the presence of an archetype then, both the
vleifs of introspection and exfcraspection are necessaiy. ^0 The sym-
bolic nature of the person's e:xperLence and his for the most part
absence of personal association to the material is taken into
account along vdth tlie presence of the same theme or motif in mater-
ial dravm from the histoiy of symbols. The ability of these his-
toidcal parallels to provide an explanation of the meaning of the
otheniise unexjxLicable content is then the crucial factor justifying
the employment of the archetypal hcrpothesis, Tihen such a procedure
provides the most plausible explanation for the presence of contents
of consciousness, ve can say that an arche-t^'pe is present.

Rather than taking one particular image or dream in isolation,
hotrever, the determination of which contents are said to be arche-
tjrpal is best arrived at Td.th an examination of a serf.es of dreams
or other similar experiences. In this way the margin of error in-
volved in any introspective evaluation is lessened. Then ire are also
able to see how the alleged archetjype functions in more than one con-
text. Prom tlie objective point of viet^, it is not so much how the
supposed archetype appears as lAat it does and how it functions that
is crucial for deciding about the presence of archetypes. This is
especially so since the archetypes often appear as images which are
themselves ordinaiy although the role they play in the dream as a
Tdiole is archetypal. For example, the images of actual persons
knotm to the dreamer may function as archetypal images, H

^though there is thus no definite objective criteria by which
one can identify archetjTpal images out of the context of the function

69

they play in particiaar maiiifestations, Jung does give us an idea

of the objective features ■ablch as a matter of fact are associated

>d.th the appearance of many aaTche-tgrpes.

An unfallible sign of collective images
seems to be the appearance of the "cosmic"
element, i.e., the images in the dream or
fanta:^ are connected ;d.th cosmic qualities,
such as temporal and spatial infinity, enor-
mous speed and extension of movement, "astro-
logical" associations, telluric, lunar, and
solar analogies, changes in the proportions
of the bo<^, etc. The obvious occurrence of
nythological and religious motifs in a dream
also points to the activity of the collective
miconscious. The collective element is very
often announced by peculiar ^nnptoms, as for
example by dreams where the dreamer is flying
through space like a comet, or feels that he
is the eaorthf or the sun, or a star; or else
is of immense size, or dwarfishly small; or
that he is dead, is in a strange place, is a
stranger to himself, confused, mad, etc. (Vol.
VII, p. 160).

Ch the whole, the fantastic nature of the archetypal imagery

often bears an alanning similarity to or even identity with the

symptoms of schizophrenia. But the schizophrenic, although he has

gained an access to the collective unconscious, has been figurative-

3y spealdng sirallowed up by it, so that he has lost the ability to

function as an ego and relate in a practical iray to the objective

world, 3h a sense he is unable to -wake from his symbolic fantasies,

so that they are more ^Togtoms of psychic brealcdovm than th^ are

numinous symbols which can be meaningfully integrated into the total

pattern of his life.

The difference betireen archetypes and the dis-
sociated products of ischizophrenia is that the
former are entities endoired id.th personality
and chained vriLth meaning, whereas the latter are
only fragments with vestiges of meaning—in
reality, they are products of disintegration
(Vol, Vni, p. 122),

70

The phenomenology of the archetypal manifestation is often of

immediate therapeutic relevance as the contents of the unconscious

take on dark and menacing aspects when the point of view which they

represent is not being acknowledged by the conscious ndnd.

The guise in which these figures appear depends
on the attitude of the conscious mind: if it is
negative tov/ard the unconscious, the animals win
be frightening; if positive, they appear as the
helpful anijnals" of faiiytale and legend (Vol.
V, p. 181),

nh the foiTO in which the archetypes appear is thus influenced
by the attitude of the conscious mind, it would seem that the man-
ifestation of the archetypes are not random and due to chance but
that their appearance is conditioned by certain necessaiy circum-
stances in the individual. Ibreover, an understanding of these
conditions should shed light on the nature of the relationship
between the collective and personal aspects of the p^che. For
by calling the collective unconscious the impersonal and objective
portion of the psyche, the integral part this aspect of the uncon-
scious pl^s in the life of the individual is not given adequate
consideration. In this regard we find then that the archetypes
behave in an analogous fashion to other contents of the unconscious
in the sense that their appearance functions in a compensatory
fashion to consciousness. That is, the unconscious supplies con-
tents which compensate the conscious attitude by representing fea-
tures of the person's total situation which are overlooked, re-
pressed or undervalued by the conscious personality. The appearance
of the archetype then usually indicates the need for a collective
compensation. I^at this means is that the true nature of the per-
son's situation corresponds to a universal and typical human pattern.

71

so that ijhat it is -ttiat is missing from the person's conscious

attitude is an understanding of the broader human perspective t^hich

an appreciation of the basic patterns of human existence would give.

The archei^ypal stnictiure of the imconscious
corresponds to the average run of events. The
changes that maor befall a man are not infiniteHy
variable; they are variations of certain -typical
occurrences iMch are limited in number, l*en
therefore a distressful situation arises, the
corresponding archetype idll be constellated in
the unconscious (Vol, V, p, 29k),

One instructive example to make clearer the meaning of collec-
tive compensation can be drawn from Jung's Trork on the UFO pheno-
menon. After e3:±ensLve research lasting a decade, Jung concluded
that the UFO phenomenon represented a sort of rwdem north in ijhich
the Arche-lgrpe of the Self, an archetype expressing "order, deliver-
ance, salvation and wholeness" (Vol. X, p. 328), was being projected
into the heavens, iilthough tmable to reach a definite conclusion
about the physical reality of the reported objects, Jung makes a
convincing case for the activation of -ttie Self archetype as a com-
pensation for the ominous world situation follovring Ifcrld Vfer II in
vMch nuclear annihilation seemed possible at any moment,

Tife have here a golden opportunity of ^eing howr
a legend is formed, and hotir in a difficult and
dark time for humanity a miraculous tale grows
up of an atteB5)ted intervention by e:ctra-terrestial
"heavenly" porters , , . (Vol. X, pages 322-323).

Bie ArchetTpe of the Self then functions to direct attention
id-thin to the possibility of the realization of an inner center of
order and personal unity. WLthlthe vrorld threatened xd.th destruction,
the Self can provide an inweird source of meaning and unity.

Archelypal manifestations are thus the compensatoiy response of

72

the unconscious to typical human situations, with the response being
a representation of an inherent pattern of human functioning. Jn
this i^ray the archetype supplies the insight of a universal perspec-
tive to vdiat are universally e:cperienced problems.l2 tms enables
the individual then to grasp the meaning of his situation in its
more than personal aspect. If actual persons appear in archetypal
guise in dreams, for example, >re can see that the activation of some
universal human pattern is complicating the personal interrelationship.
If a knovm girl appears as the archetype of the anim then, she also
represents a vehicle of ^pibolic projection.'' -3

The Archetypes as Autonomous Factors
In our investigation of the conditions under which the archetypes
come into consciousness, we have emphasized the similarity of behav-
ior of archetypes to other contents of consciousness in that their
appearance is the result of the overall corapensatoiy influence of
the unconscious. In tlais regard it must also be pointed out that
the archetypes behave in a similar fashion to the complexes of the
personal unconscious, i.e., they are autonomous factors. Bius,
although archetypes as a rule arise in response to the needs of the
individual, the end result of their activation mgy be that the arche-
type subjugates or even possesses the person.

The archetypes are then not only objects of consciousness btit
also subjects lAich can be described as having Intentionalities which
may oppose that of the ego personality,

piey are spontaneous phenomena which are not subject
to our will, and we are therefore jiistified in
ascribing to them a certain autonomy. They are to
be regarded not onily as objects but as subjects
with laifs of their mm. From the point of viet;

73

of consciousness, we can, of course, describe
them as objects, and even explain them up to
a point, in the same measure as "we can describe
and e35)lain a living human being. But then
\je have to disregard their autonomy. If that
is conisidered, \je &re coa:g»lled to treat them
as subjects} in other wi'dsyW have to ad^
that they possess spontaneity and purposiveness,
or a kind of consciousness and free ;dll. life
observe their behaviour and consider their state-
ments. This dual standpoint, which vb are forced
to adopt towards eveiy relatively independent or-
ganism, naturally has" a dual result. On tlie
one hand it tells me xvhat I do to the object,
and on the other hand what it does (possibly
to me) (Vol. XL, p. 362). ^ -^

In describing the archetypes as autonomous factors, Jung
wants to hold to the distinction betireen the complexes as contents
of the personal unconscious and the archetypes of a collective un-
conscious. For the vrord "complex" is used primarily to refer to
the autonomous contents of personal origin, to those contents which
develop ontogenetically. The archetype, on the other hand, is in-
herited and thus seems impersonal in the sense that it can not be
explained in the terns of the person's own life hisboiy, Naturally,
this clear separation bettreen the personal and collective aspects
of the unconscious is in reality always more or less an interrelation.
For the complexes appear to have an archetypal nucleus and the arche-
types are always manifested in images made up out of combinations
dravm fi^>m the individual's store of experience. Ifevertheless, it is
stni possible in practise to discriminate bettreen those contents of
conscixjusness which owe their origin primarily to the individual and
his experience from those i*ich I are impersonal and which point beyond
the individual.

The archetype behaves like a complex then in that it is a locus
of thoughts, feelings and images which function in a unified iray as

7h

a sort of personality. Rather than Indicating that the archelgrpes
are actually entities outside man, hovrever, the personification which
the archetypal images manifest are typical of autonomous contents which
e:d.st in the unconscious ^d.thout being integrated \Ath the conscious
personality. The less acknowledgement and understanding an unconscious
element is accorded then, the more it tends to function independently
of the conscious personality and even assume the characteristics of a
personality itself. Md since the archetypes are symbolic, numinous
factors \Th±ch do not originate from one's personal experience, the
ability to integrate than into one's personality has definite limita-
tions. Uiey are, in fact, xd.der than the individualj they have a
universal collective meaning which the individual can only partici-
pate in but can not hope to completely assimilate. Ohere is often the
real danger that the archetypes vriJLl even assimilate the ego person-
ality. "It is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the uncon-
scious or an archetjrpe to take complete possession of a man and to
detennine his fate doim to the smallest detail" (Vol. XE, p. k09),
ELausible exaniples of this phenomenon are to be seen in -ttie lives
of Christ and Hitler.

"Hie archetypes seem to have a dual nature, being potentialities
for both evil as well as good. Thus what to one person proves to be
a healing experience giving meaning to life, may prove to another
less stable consciousness to be a source of evil, disorientation or
madness.

Anong the most common archetypes \Aich show a distinct personality
are the shadot-j archetype and the anina and aniimxs. The shadow is a
representation of the personal unconscious as a whole and usually

7^

embodies the compensating values to those held by the conscious per-
sonality. Thus the shadoi: often represents one's dark side, idiose
aspects of oneself which e:dLst but which one does not acknowledge
or identify idth. nh dreams it may appear as a dark figure of an
Arab or Megro of the same sex as the dreamer. ^U

The anima archetype appears in men and is his primordial image
of woman. It represents the man's biological expectation of women
but also is a symbol of a man's feminine possibilities, his counter-
sexual tendencies. The e:!periences of one's mother and other actual
women are a third contributing factor to the fonn of the archetype.
Die anima often appears in dreams as a strange or unlmorm >7oman.
The animus archetype, the analogous image of the masculine which
occurs in vraraen, may appear as a series of strange men.^^

The personification of the above archetypes is often of such a
distinct character that dialogues of significant therapeutic value can
be carried on betireen the ego and the shadow or anima/animus in the
conscious state. Biis form of communication with the unconscious,
popularized by the method of Gestalt Iherapy, tos enthusiastically
recommended by Jung (Vol. VTI, p. 201),

In addition to the archelypes mentioned above, there are many
other archetypes which appear in personified foiro notably the Cld
va.se Ibn, the Great lather, the Earth Ifother, the Divine Child and
the Archetype of the Self. HoTrever, any atteD5)t to give an exhaus-
tive list of the archetypes would be a largely futile exercise since
«ie archetypes tend to combine Td.th each other and interchange qua-
lities making it difficult to decide where one archetype stops and
another begins. For exaii?>le, qualities of the shadoix archetype may

76

be prominent in an archetypal image of the anima or aniMis.

One archetype may also appear in various distinct forms, thus
raising the question whether four or five distirict archetypes should
be said to be pre sient or merely four or fives forms of a single type.
There i-rould then seem to be no decision procedure for determining the
exact boundaries of an individual archetype. For what is to count
as a typical situation and thus indicate the presence of an arche-
ignpe can not be decided a priori, so that for instance iie can not
determine on the basis of general considerations that there must be
so many archetypes, And from the phenonienological point of view,
the appearance of distinct types of archetypal images does not per-
mit us to conclude anything definite about how many archetypes per
se there may be. Therefore, it vrcrald seem evident that the complete
cataloguing of the archel^'pes thereby determining their exact number
is an irresolvable matter and an unreasonable expectation of the
archetypal theory,

3h addition to the personified foims mentioned above, there are
many archetypes which do not appear in personal form. For exariple,
the -'irche-l^rpe of the Self may be manifested as a stone, diamond,
floT-rer or as a four-sided figure, Aiimals, plants and natural ob-
jects such as the viind, a lake or a mountain may also figure into
archetypal images. There is in fact no determinate condition re-
gulating what form an archetype must assume. Tliis is not to s^,
hovrever, that there are not definite conditions an image must
satisfy in order to count as archelgrpal. But these conditions de-
pend more on the function of the image in the overall context of
the manifestation than they do on the specific form.

77

Irath regard to the queistion of personification, a paradoxical
situation seems to exist since Jung says tliat all autonomous contents
of the imconscious are personified, "iill autonomous psychic factors
have the character of personalHy ..." (Vol. X, p. k2). On the
other hand, the archetypes, which presumably are all more or less
capable of autonomous function in the unconscious, do not all appear
in the foim of persons. It would seem clear then that personification
is being used in a general sense to mean ascription of traits of per-
sonality to an entity rather than in^jlying that vrhat is personified
must appear as a distinct personality or in the form of a person.

Archefanaes and 97nchronicity

In our discussion of the phenomenology of the archetypes, dreams
have been emphasized as a characteristic state of consciousness in
^jhich the archetypes come into awareness. Fantasies and visions are
other altered states of consciousness in which archetypes frequently ap-
pear. But in addition to these modes of manifesting themselves,
Jung states that the archetypes may also affect nonpsychic physical
processes. This effect of the archetypes is described by Jung's
theory of synchronicity. la ^synchronistic events then, there is a
meaningful correspondence between a physical event and a psychic con-
tent id.th the possibility of a causal connection beti-reen the ti-ro
having been ruled out. These events are the often recorded meaning-
ful coincidences TThich seem to defy undersrtanding in terms of either
causality or chance. i

fsa exaniple Jimg describes from his therapeutic work serves to
illustrate these ideas.

78

A young \Toman I was treatiiag had, at a critical
inament, a dream in Trfiich she was given a golden
scarab, lihile she was telling me this dream I
sat with nor back to the closed windox/. Siddealy
I heard a noise behind me, liks a gentle tapping.
I turned round and savr a flying insect knocking
against the vrindovr-pane flrora outside. I opened
the window and caught the creature in the air
as it fie;; in. It was the nearest analogy to
a golden scarab that one finds in our latitudes,
a scarabaeid beetle, the common rose-chafer
(Cetonia aurata), which contrary to its usual
habits had evidently felt an urge to get into
a dark room at this partic;xlar moment (Vol.
VIII, p. U38).

Biere i-rould seem to be no plausibility of atten^jting a causal
explanation here, although chance seems a possible rational explana-
tion. Other examples of synchronistic events, hovrever, seem to
eliminate the possibility of the meaningful coincidence being the
result of the chance intersection of random events. Ihe best
illustration of ^ynchronicity vrtiere chance is ruled out occurs in
experiments atteanpfcing to verity the phenomenon of extrasensory
perception, ESP. Ohese tests using card guessing techniques are
sometimes structured so that the subject tries to guess the se-
quence of a deck of cards before they are shuffled by a randomizing
machine. As the subject is guessing the sequence of a future order
of the cards, this of course also elbninates the possibility that
the order of tlie cards can have a causal effect on the mental state
of the subject, Bie overall results of this type of e3qperiment re-
vealed a probability of reproducing the same results by chance as
1:U00,000 (Vol. vm, p. h33). In another experiment one person
guessed all tirenty-five cards in the deck correctly after they had
been shuffled. Indicating a probability of 1:298,023,223,876,9^3,12^
(Vol. vni, p. i;33).

79

nh the ESP tests the meaningfld coincidence is between a con-
tent of consciousness, the person's idea of what cards will appear,
and the actual order of the cards. The archetj^pal theory comes into
play then as Jung says that an archetype is manifesting itself syn-
chronously in both a psychic content and a physical process. The
tenn "synchronous" is used instead of simultaneous in the formulation
of the synchronistic hypothesis to indicate that the meaningful coin-
cidence between the p^jnchic and physical events need not occur at
exactly the same time. Ttxe physical event can be slightly before
or after the psychic content.

In tlie ESP examples, it is the archetype of magical effect, the
expectation that a miraculous event can occur, which seems to be at
vrork.""^ Evidence for this is the fact that the results of the ex-
periments are positively correlated with the emotional state of the
subject, so that an enthusiastic, hopeful subject can score well
above chance probability at the beginning of the experimentsj and
then his score will move toward the chance probability as the novelty
of the experiments lessen, or if he becomes bored or depressed (Vol,
VIII, p. k3k).

The archets'pal influence is clearly seen in the first example
given. Bie woman patient was at a crisis point in her analysis due
to a too narrow rationalistic vieti idiich did not leave her sufficiently
open to the possibility of change which could result from taking ser-
iously the irrationally prodticed contents of the unconscious. The
meaningful coincidence was then the tuitiing point in this regard and
produced the needed change in attitude alloTriing tlie analysis to pro-
gress to a successful conclusion. The scarab motif, noreover, is a

80

classic ^yrtbol of rebirth (Vol. VHI, p. k39) so that it would seem
that the patient's situation of iinpasse had conrtellated the arche-
type of rebirth and renewal.

Jung postulates that an archetypal ordering principle is at irork
in these instances of ^chronicity bringing about a situation in
wMch an outer event and a psycMc content are expressions of the
same meaning. Ohe arche-types in these cases seem to be localized
as much in matter and in the environment as they are in the psyches
of individuals,

5he psychoid archetype has a tendency to behave
as though it \iere not localized in one person
but T-rere active in the whole environment (Vol.
X, pages lt^-li52).

... the archetypes are not found exclusively
xn the p^jTchic sphere, but can occur just as
much in circumstances that are not psychic
(equivalence of an outv^ard physical process
x-Tith a p^cliic one) (Vol. VIII, p. 5l^).

In using the designation "p^hoid" for the archetypes, it
seems that Jung x^anted to ijapOy that the archetypes could be mani-
fested in nonpsychic ways, specificaUy influencing matter. Ihis
UB6 of "psychoid" does not have the same iittpUcations as when the
instiiictsaresaidtobep^choid.''^ lii the case of the Instincts,
the psychoid label describes a sort of interface region betireen
the p^he and the physiological processes. " . . . tem 'psychoid'
. . . meant to distinguish a categozy of events from merely vitaHstic
phenomena on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on
the other" (Vol. Vm, p. 177). | But the archetype -h^th its p^hoid
nature, forms the bridge to matter in general" (Vol. VIII, p. 216). 3he
psychoid archetype therefore seems to be "quasi-p^hic " in the special

81

sense that it may be independent of the body.

Sjmchronicity postxilates a meaning which is a
priori in relation to human consciousness and
apparently exists outside man. , , , the possi-
bility that synchronicity is not only a psycho-
physical phenomenon but might also occur -without
the participation of the human psyche , , .
(Vol. VIII, pages 501-^02, note 71).

It may well be a prejudice to restrict the
pEjyche to being "inside the body" (Vol. XIV,
p. 300).

The phenomena which Jung describes in his theory of ^ynchro-
niciiy undoubtedly exist and his efforts to take account of these
events in his overall theory of the psyche seems a worthvrtiile and
needed endeavor. However, as ire have previously stated, the notion
that there can be a pgyche independent of a bo(fy and archetypes
which persist outside of man is a postulate which can not be un-
problematically integrated in a consistent way with Jung's theory
of archetypes as a irfiole. Perhaps the ESP phenomena and the other
events associated with gynchronicity will eventually lead to a neij
scientific model of the universe. But as this major revolution in
the basic theories of science has yet to come about, the best plan
for trying to gain a coherent understanding of the idea of the arche-
type is, as we have previously argued, to parenthesize the postula-
tion of archetypes existing outside man and to regard this idea as
one possible theoretical extension of the archeig^sal notion which
has yet to be successfully integrated into the overall theoiy.

Ibreover, the interpretational approach we have used in trying
to grasp the meaning of Jung's archetypes has not had to assume that
archeiypes exist outside of man^ The overall success of this approach
in making the archeigrpes comprehensible is perhaps a matter to be

82

left to the judgment of the reader. However, In taking into account
the full panaroma of Jung's utterances on the archetypes, it has
been necessaiy only twice to mention this possibility as a way of
understanding the archetypal theory.

So far as the assertion that the arche-types have a pi^rchoid
characteristic is considered then, this may perhaps best be ren-
dered to mean that the archetypes manifest themselves in a pi^ychic
way but seem to be more than pgychic or not only psychic. Vhat this
quali-ty may eventually prove to be would seem part of the puzzle of
the nature of the arehelype per se. But this way of conceiving the
p^jrchoid characteristic of the archetypes need not imply that they
exist outside of or independently of man.

3h any event, the concept of the archetype is not logically
tied to the notion of synchronicity. Althoi^h ^ynchronicity may
well require something like an archetypal hypothesis to make it
intelligible, the reverse is certainly not the case.^*^

Archetypes and Temporality

One final topic which must be taken up before our eaqxssition of

the archeiypal theory is complete is the aspect of the changes in

archetypes through tine. Ttro distinct questions seem to be involved.

!Ih the first place, are there emergent archetypes, that is, do new

archetypes come into being in response to the changing situation of

man? Secondly, how can we account for the changes that arehe-types

1
manifest through tijne as, for example, the changes that the God

archetype undergoes when the Jehovah of the Old Testament is ex-
perienced as the Christian Trinity and Devil?

83

It seems evident that an answer to our first question must hinge
on our idea of the origin of the archetypes. As t^I be remembered,
it was concluded in this regard that the archetypes are inherited
in a similar fashion to other biological siructures. If we take
changes in archelypes as being strictly analogous to the way that
the bo(fy changes through evolution, vie would expect that the chance
of Dew archelypes coming into being through the evolutionaiy process
constitutes a very lov; probability. For the evolutionaiy process
\Torks in an accumulatoiy fashion in the sense that the origins of
new structures occurs, as a rule, as an addition to the pattern of
the existing genotype. Highly evolved creatures then tend to be
more complex organisms. Ifereover, as a structure becomes highly
evolved, there is less probability of major changes occurring in
it since the chance that single mutations in the genotype will
lead to an improvement in the overall structure compatible with
the rest of the existing genotype is veiy small. Ife would not
expect then the appearance of human beings with new basic struc-
tures for the body, a third eye or an extra limb. These occurrences
T«>uld be monstrosities rather than improvements to be passed on to
the next generation. Analogously, the origin of nev; archetypes
through evolution wuld seem unlikely, especially in the light of
the basic structuring function that the archetypes are held to play
in the p^che. The archetypes are the phylogenetically old aspects
of the p^che and hence those parts least liable to be changed to
the overall benefit of the organism.

A contemporary man is thus genetically very similar to what man
was like ten thousand years ago, and no radical changes in the overall

8h

pattern of inherited human behavior are to be e^rpected, at least not
for the next fei-7 willenia. Moreover, ^ihat would a neiT typical human
situation be like corresponding to i/hich a new archetype could arise?
It TOuld seem clear that any changes in the basic human situation would
only be variations of situations which have existed coteraporously vdth
the emergence of man as a species.

If from phylogenetic considerations >7e then reject the practical
possibility of the formation of new archetypes through the evolution-
ary process, the observed changes in archetypal manifestation through
time must be escplained fixjm the ontogenetic viei^point, as the result
of cultural and individual development. Ihe changes in archetypal
manifestation do not thereby indicate a change in the archetype it-
self. By comparison vre might consider the human brain which genet-
ically is basically tlie same structure as it was thousands of years
ago at the dawn of civilization. Modem man's degree of conscious-
ness and his overall conception of reantj-- is, however, far differ-
ent today than it was then, as we see reflected in the development
of culture. The cnrial importance of the ontogenetic influence in
giving shape and content to the archetypal disposition must then
not be underestimated, as the basic patterning influence of the
archetype itself can take on a seemingly limitless variety of forms.
Although there can be no nevr archetypes, there can be new sym-
bols and nevx ncrfchs. The UFO phenomenon is a particularly instruc-
tive exaniple in this regard.

It is characteristic of our time that the
archetype, in contrast to its previous mani-
festations, should now take the form of an
object, a technological construction, in order
to avoid the odiousness of mythological per-
sonification (Vol. X, p. 328).

It is then the interaction between the conscious and uncon-
scious aspects of the psijrche that accounts for the changes in arche-
types across tine. For vdth the development of consciousness
through the agency of culture, the archetjTal images undergo a
gradual transformation. This is, moreover, what would be expected
if the archetypes are to function as compensatory agents for the
conscious attitude.

^•i^.-.-, ^ ^^ become apparent as we pi'oceed, this hope trfll not be
fulfilled. It is on3y in Jung's earlier writing that he attenipts to
explain how archetypes originate through ideas about the origins of
^jrths. HoTxever, due to the fact that clung 's vier^s on this matter
become implicated xdth ideas about the Inlieritance of acquired
characteristics, this earlier vievr merits full discussion,

2
+1, -Qi the above >re have not distinguished the spiritual from
the r^igious, as in the previous discussion of the spiritual when
the latter te«i referred to the archetypal manifestation and
"religious" to tiie product of collective consciousness. Jung does
not alvrays use these tenns in a consistent way, although from the
contejct it is usually clear whether he is referring to the indi^d.-
dual or the collective manifestation.

3
_ However, it is ea:^ to fall into the opposite error of seeing
alcheuy solely as a philosophico-religious enterprise and thus fail
to appreciate the luiportant role which alchemical work has played in
the history of chemisti^-. Jung, in his work ^rith the psychological
^jnificance of alchemical symbols, is particularly open to this
l^^ y.^ J'^^^^ overemphasized the p^/chological aspect of
alchen^y while failing to give due credit to the naturalisSc and
practical aspects of the art.

n—r.., , ^® ^™' "aechanicomorphize" is taken from Joseph F.
T"^' 45^°^?^b^ Science f^ Itersonalitv Theory (Bbston:
Houghton mruji 196317 p. 57. ^ is also possiflTtb taS the
opposite approachii^bo anthropamorphisnjj and assign non-human char-
acteristics to human organisms. Some psychologists feel that
the behaviorist does this when he 'mechanicomorphizes' man . . . "

Richard Semon, ^ISL >^eme (Nei-; York: JfeicJHllan, 1921), p. n.
Ibid., p. 12.

86

7
and 193^ transition apparently occurred SQmetijne bettreen 192^

o

the nr^Jt J? ?J^**^\*5^* by Saying in effect that the question of
the origin of the archetypes is not a useful one to ask, Jung is
attenipting to avoid the stl^^na of the doctrine of inheritance of
acquired characteristics. For from the Lainarcldan point of viet^.
it makes saise to ask hmr the archetypes come to be in the psyche
and to postulate possible enrironraental causative conditions. ia.th
hxs VTithdra/al from implicit support of the lamarcldan position.
Jung sees no point to raising the question, Hbirever, asking abJut
ttie origin of archetypes need not imp^y a LamarcIdLan answer. One
ad.^t legitiraate3y idsh to knotf ^Aether archetypes have a natural,
biological origin or nonnatural origin as result of intervention
^ ^irf-tual agencies. Jung speculates about the possibility of
the latter alternative in the folloidng:

The question is nothing less than this: Does
the pgychic in general—ttie soul or spirit or
■the unconscious—originate in us, or is the
p^jrche, in the early stages of conscious evolu-
tion, actuaUy outside us in the fom of ar-
bitrary powers xd.th intentions of their aim, and
does it gradually take its pl^ce within us in the
course of psychic development? . . . Biis whole
idea strikes us as dangerously paradoxical, but,
at bottom, it is not altogether inconceivable
(Vol. X, pages 69-70),

9
+« +V, ^e application of the Kantian phenomena/noumena distinction
to the problem of archetype per se versus archetypal image is not
unproblematic. For the appeal to the archetype per se as the prin-
''Sif*i^P°"^^-'-® £°^ *^® archetypal image would seem to imply the
attribution of qualities to the thing-in-itself, i.e., thS^tte iltter
was real and had certain effects. Ohus, if to take the archetype
per se as strictly analogous to the thing-in-itself, we end up
attributing properties to that which from Kant's viewpoint we are
not supposed to be able to attribute anything at all. See Eavrard
Casey s article "Towards An Archetypal Imagination" in Spring. 197li,

10
+« ^+ T„ ^*T ^V?^*?® y°^ "extraspection" in the sense ascribed
to it by Joseph F. Jjrchlak in A Hiilosoohv of Science for Personality
The^ssr, page 2?: "If a theorist^5kgr^e^ri[^5StivglbrspecSro
or fjame of reference, he defines his abstractions from liis vantage
rtui^."^ ^ ^^'^'"' ""^Sardless of the point of vier^ of the objectof

u A ^^5^3 portion of a dream of Jung's, for example, the
shadoi7 archetype ^^ars as "Or. Y. and his son." Iforeovir, the
l^L^-" J^f^^^^^""^ ^^^° P^^'^ ^ archeti'pal role in the dream.
Smho?^^^f ^J° the relationship Jung had .dth his real fatherf^s
qoribolic father acts as a guide to the nysteries of the unconscious.

87

It started with my paying a visit to my long-
deceased father. He was living in the countiy—
I did not knoxjr where. I sa;r a house in the
style of the eighteenth centuiy, veiy rooiny,
with several rather large outbuildings, , . ,
i'^ father guarded these as custodian.

He was, as I soon discovered, not only the
custodian but also a distinguished scholar
in his o-tm right—which he had never been in
his lifetime, I met him in his stu^, and,
oddly enough, Dr, T.-w;rho was about ay age—
and his son, both psychiatrists, were also
present, I do not laiow whether I had asted
a question or vrfiether my father wanted to
ejqiain something of his own accord, but in
any case he fetched a big BLble doim from a
shelf, a heavy folio volume like the I^rian
Bible in toy libraiy, Bie Bible ray father
held JTSLS bound in shiny fishsldn. He opened
it at the C)ld Testament— I guessed that he
turned to the Bentateuch— and began inter-
preting a certain passage. He did this so
s-^riLftly and so leamedOy that I could not
follow him, I noted on3y that what he said
betrayed a vast amount of variegated knowledge,
the significance of which I dimly apprehended
but could not properly judge or grasp, I saw
that Qp, Y, understood notliing at aU, and
his son began to laugh. They thought that
W father was going off the deep end and what
he said was simply senile prattle, . , ,

The tvro psychiatrists represented a limited
medical point of view which, of cotirse, also
infects me as a physician. They represent
my shadow— first and second editions of the
shadow, father and son (l^famories. Dreams.
Reflections, pages 217-21571
12

Si talkijig in this way about the insight of a universal per-
spective, there xs a temptation to speak in tems of the "id-sdom"
of the-unconsciou^. ]h regard to collective compensation then,
lie must be careful to avoid the misunderstanding that this tiT)^ of
language iiaplies that the unconscious is a sort of higher con-
sciousness xrfiich purposiveHy guides the personality to its destina-
4 ?: * L^^ sort of "guidance" which the unconscious provides
is that which results from the Tjorldngs of a natural process which
Itself has no end in view. Jung makes tliis point in a discussion
concerning compensation 1^ the unconscious.

Yet it would, in my view, be wrong to siq)pose that in
such cases the unconscious is worldng to a deliberate
and concerted plan and is striving to realize certain
definite ends. I have found nothing to support this
assumption. The driving force, so far as it is

possible for us to grasp it, seems to be in
essence only an urge tovrards self -realization.
If it TOre a laatter of some general teleologi-
cal plan, then all Individuals who enjoy a sur-
plus of unconsciousness would necessarily be
driven towards higher consciousness by an
irresistible urge (Vol. VXE, p. l8U).
13 ^
^ ,, "le anima xs in part man's inner image of iraman. See pa^e 7^
for further characterization of the anima archetype.

Piis generalization is prijnarfJy based on the dream material
of caucasiais. Do the shadotjs of Lfegroes and other racial groups then
appear as figures with white sldn? !Ib vsy knowledge this quesUon
has not been resolved through empirical studies.

1^
w 4.V ^ ^though the content of all the archetypes is conditioned
^^ individual's personal experience, the shadot; and the anima/
anlms^differ from the otlier archetypes in the fact that their
content is more directly relatable to the person's personal situa-
tion than the other archetypes. In tems of the analogy of depth
tnen, these archetypes occupy a position intemediate betvreen con-
scioumess and the personal unconscious and the other aspects of
zae collective unconsciousness.

(Ife.; Iorkf^]£?a,'^i7l); ^.^^"^^'^^^ ^ ^ML Sgstisjr

^ na^.^.H^^^T^^S^i?'^ has been ruled out, the question might ^rell
J^+^n?°'' *^-i! i^««nce" of the archetype can then be mide
intelligible. It irould seem that some sort of laiOike ordering
principle must be postulated not involving a cause and effect
relationship beti^een the objective event and the correlated internal
state of expectancy, llaldng clear hoi7 the archetype is supposed to
fimction as this ordering principle is one of the major conceptual
ambiguities which must be resolved in order to maloe synchronicity
into a viable explanatoiy hypothesis.

17

Compare use of psychoid as discussed on page 1 3,

-x x^ ^^°f ^^® position taken here is that a rational recon-
struction of the archetypal theory is not corardtted to the task of
a rational reconstruction of synchronicitj-, to m21 not attempt a
critical assessment of synchronicity in this stu(^. Ih order to
cany out that task, several crucial questions would have to be
conadered. In addition to the problem of making archetsTal
influence" intelligible, additional clarification is needed as
how the crucial distinction betvreen coincidence and meaningful
coincidence can be made operationally sound. Questions csa also
be raised as to the validity of Rhine's statistical procedures
and results. See C.E.M. Hansel's ESP (Ifevr York: Scrilbner, 1966).

CHAPTER k
CRITICISI4S OF TIIE ARCHETYPAL THEORY: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pt'elimlnary Remarks

The exposition of Jung's concept of the archetype having now
been completed, it is the objective of the second half of this sbuic^
to consider criticisms of the theoiy. To an extent we have anticipated
this task in the first half. For in order to rationally reconstruct
Jung's concept of the archetype, it has proved necessary on occasion
to distinguish betvreen essential aspects of the idea and other aspects
which although linked by Jong on occasion vrLth discussion of arche-
types would, if e:cplored in teims of their full implications, lead
to a situation of either obvious inconsistency or hopeless obscuritsr
and confusion concerning \That is meant to be inqjlied ty the concept
of an archetj'pe.

As the chief case in point, vre have interprerted the archetypes
naturalistical3y in the sense that it was assumed that they occur as
a natural phenomenon of man rather than as subsistent entities with
an ontological locus outside of man. Closely related to this natur-
alistic stance on the origin and ontological nature of the archetype
was the position taken asserting the psyche's necessary dependence
on the brain. la addition, in terms of our project of reconstruction,
it \ms found necessary to emphasize the logical Independence of the
idea of archetypes from the hypothesis of ^ynchronlcity. The assump-
tion of an extrap^ychlc locus for the archetype vrhich was entailed l^

89

90

^chronicity, a locus "in matter," was considered to be an imnecessaiy
complication to an already cumbersome theory and to be, moreover, an
addition which is ijicompatible idth other aspects of the archetypal
theory as \ie have reconstructed it,

Che could, of course, postulate archetypal entities which are
responsible for the phenomena of ^ynchronicity and vrtiich subsist in-
dependently of man vjithout having to assume that they were there-
fore supernatural agencies. This supernatural agency l^ypothesis is
then only one of several conceivable types of nonnaturalistic inter-
pretations. "> Hoirever, this assumption of extrapsychic subsistence,
even if it need not invoke the supernatural, still has the effect of
naldng the archetypes into occult entities, that is, entities which
have veiy little in common with man as he is understood ±n terms of
standard scientific knm/ledge.^

3h addition to the questions related to the naturalistic inter-
pretation of the archelypes, we have also previously discussed the in-
fluence of Kantian epistemology on Jung's archetypes (pages 3^ and 38).
Biis topic TTill be further treated in the third section of this chapter.

The question of evolution theory and its possible consequences
for the plausibility of the archetypal concept, foreshadoired on page ^9
will be examined further in the last section of Chapter 7.

The last of Jung's rims previously critiqued concerns the ques-
tion of racial differences (page 26 ). Following VJbrld Ifer H, Jung
appears to have retreated from the ijiiplications for racial differences
lAlch he drei/ flx>m the idea of the collective unconscious, ^le
claiffl that different racial groups have a distinctly different collec-
tive unconscious is at ary rate not emphasized by Jung in his writings

91

aner librld >far U, although the quotes in support of such a view
presented on page 26, from Vol. VTI, ^re not retracted by Jimg in
the "thorough revision" to i^hich he subjected the book in the fifth
edition in 19h2 (Vol. VII, p. 7), 3

lath objections from the scientific perspective and evaluation
of the archetypal concept as a scientific theoiy having been i^served
for later discussion (Chapters 5,6,7), what remaining criticisms must
then be considered? This question is rendered problematic l^ the vast
panorama of different types of critical attacks vjhich have been directed
against Jung's viei^s. The project of presenting conclusive counter-
arguments against each individual dissenting author could conceivably
engage one's efforts for several years. But such a volume and variety
of critical literature is not itself a reliable indication of the
inherent wealmess of Jung's conceptions nor even of the result of his
violation of beliefs and presuppositions of vested professional in-
terest so much as it is an iiidication of the obscurity of his method
of presentation, which in its magnificant rhetorical style manages
through its all-encompassing, cosmic scope to have something to offend,
confound or confuse just about everyone. There is also, of course,
a veiy large and rapidly groidng literature from Jungian enthusiasts.
But as the xrork of even the most immediate Jungian disciples (indivi-
duals such as Ttoiele Jaffe, Jolande Jacobi and liichael Fordham) offer
supposedly authoritative accounts of Jung's vlei^s xAich differ vriLdely
in interpretational approach and emphasis at crucial points,^^ one begins
to ironder if periiaps there is in fact a problem in that through a com-
bination of intuitive overdeteiTOination^ and lack of precision in for-
mulating and liMting his basic constructs, Jung has tried to e:cplain

92

too much tor his archetypal theoiy through the use of conceptual cate-
gories lAich are sijiiply too vague and too s^/eeping in scope.

Jung's work certaijily offers ample justification for this type of
comment, but rather than being the result of laziness or lack of
attention, such openness and indeteirdnateness in regard to his theoret-
ical constructs was rather the product of a conscious methodology.
In Chapter 6 to Tdll have occasion to examine this methodology and
consider in v*at measure it is adequate for the tasks which it pur-
ports to accomplish. Ohe point to be made here, hoover, in regard
to criticisms of Jung is that the aiiibiguity and openness to different
possible interpretations characteristic of Jung's foiwulations gives
the unEympathetic critic an abundance of possible avenues of attack.
Jung is particularly vulnerable when passages are criticized out of
their proper context or id-thout regard to V7hat is said in other wriLt-
ings. For it is fi^equeiitly necessaiy to read Jung's explanation of a
theoretical point in several different ^^tlngs in order to gain a
complete understanding of what he is saying in light of the overall
development of his ideas. Jung thus offers more than the usual diffi-
culties for the reader, and as a consequence a significant amount of
Jungian criticism is grounded in misunderstanding of Jung's basic

ideas.

6

1* vjill be content here viith ttra examples of this type of criticism.
Hather than being ijistances of simple errors, they are more aptly des-
cribed as "a misture of distortion and misunderstanding, which is ob-
viouaLy motivated by ill will. "7

The first sample comes from the pen of Philip Rieff . ih the passage
beloi/ this unfortunately influential critic slides from a discussion of

93

the role of fante^ in mediating the e^^jerience of the a«:hetypes to
two subsequent passages on the same page T*ere it is apparent that he
is equating "iUusion" and "archetype." though I^eff w feel that
the archetypes are Illusions, it should not be supposed, as he teplies,
that this in any way approximates Jung's meaning of the teim. It would
seem that Rieff wants the reader to think that because ai^hetypal images
can be produced through a type of fantasy activity (Jung calls it ac-
tive imagination) archetypes are then merely "forms of fanta^"^ in
the sense of being a system of illusions,

Ihat exactly is this "creative impulse" which
Jung sets up as the highest activity of man?
On first glance, one would think it is merely
a nei-; term for artj but actually Jung implies
something much more general, public as well as
private, Tihat Jung means by fantasy is, in a
word: illusion. , , . I^re than ever before,
then, both the high cidture and the individual
sense of well-being depended, for their veiy
e:!astence, on erotic illusions. If old illus-
ions no longer functioned satisfactorily, then
they must be replaced by "something nei/," Junr
dedicated his life to the pwjduction of something
new xn the, way of saving illusions, ... ^

Jung despised the fundamental "unspirLtuality"
implied by Freud's suspicious treatment of the
dynamics of the unconscious. Ju^ there, in
the unconscious, are those superior illusions
that would compensate manldnd for the barren
interdicts of Christianity and the almost „
equally barren interdicts of psychoanalysis.^

Our second sample of misconceived criticism comes f3nom Edward
dLover, whose book Freud ^ ^^m^ is the fortunately as yet unsur-
passed nadir of anti-Jimgian literature. Ihe following statements
reveal that he fails to appreciate even so basic an idea as the
importance of the unconscious iii Jung's p^hology. Glover is
apparently unairare of the distinction Jimg draws between collective
conscixjusness and the collective unconscious and thus deduces the

9h

absurdity that Jung is actually proposing a brand of conscious psy-
chology,

Ifow in so far as Jung is convinced of the over-
T^ihelMng Ifflportance of the Collective Thconscious
(and it must be remembered that although he
appears to be sincerely convinced of this, he
also adduces considerations vrhich if correct
would reduce its in^jortance to the level of
purely conscious forces and factors) ....
Indeed it is hard for any Fb^eudian xrho takes
the trouble to immerse his mind in Jungian
pqyxjhology to avoid the honrid suspicion that
Jung is nothing more or less than a pre-Preudian
who having at first let himself be carried in
the stream of Freudian thought has ever since
striven to make his peace vri.th conscious psx'-
chology, '^

But by thus dismissing fi-om further discussion extant criticisms
based on misunderstandings of what Jung's archetypal theoiy implies:,
xre must not then also exclude certain gysbematically biased cri-
tiques. Biese criticisms are based not so much on a misundersband-
ii3g of Tjhat Jung says as on the failure to see how Jung's arche-
types can be made corgsrehensible ^d.thin the scope of a particular
conceptual framevrork for understanding human experience." Con-
sequently these criticisms recur as a type or species of criticism
^rfiich adherents of a given intellectual persuasion t^caliy raise
against Jung i^ regard to the archetypes. (!Ihe examples to be dis-
cussed beloi; are from p^hoanalysis and Judeo -Christian theology.)

T*iat is at stake then in the consideration of such systematic
critiques is the intelligibility of the archetypal hypothesis fi-om
the perspective of a given image of man. Criticism from such a
point of vlei7 could readily be mderstood as having begged the
questions at issue. Hoirever, this consideration is not a sufficient
reason to disregard the criticisms discussed belovr. For in addition

9^

to helping us imderstand the point of tv/o coiamon types of criticism,
lie must consider vAether the phenomena for which the archetypes pur-
port to provide an explanatory framwrork can not be accounted for in
less cumbersome ways. Berhaps from the perspective of these other
iinages of man, archetypes can be sham to be no longer necessary.
At any rate, a discussion of such criticism vrill better enable us
in gaining a critical viev/point on Jung's image of man. 1 2

FgAihoanalTtic Critic-! sm
If yje consider then the characteristic criticism of J^udians
to the archetype concept, this is usually a claim to the effect that
all unconscious contents can be accounted for in tenns of an indivi-
dual's personal history ^rithout the need for an hypothesis of a
collective unconscious. According to this line of argument, the
latter should then be elijtiinated in favor of a more parsimonious ex-
planation couched in ijidividual developmental terms. As a case in
point dLover argues as follows:

... but at the very least we must examine the em-
biyonic stages of individual development to see
i^hether they could not account satisfactorLOy for
those mental contents that led Jung to develop
his theory of the collective or racial unconscious. 13

. . . n^ iSmgian archetypes are capable of ade-

JtosbJl^.IaiiL alaa JMc aa long jTShSrSff^n^
exBlored toe eariai joms of individual thSkliT^
Hie :^di^ and universalit^r of the,collg3H^
^kkES is undeTilEnrSyii^^""^ ^^

A second representative instance of Freudian systematic cidti-

cian is taten from Nandor Pbdor's PVeud, Jm^Q, and Occultism. Ih the

passage cited belmr he gives exai^^les of dreams which from the Jungian

point of view vrould provide good paradigm cases of aix^hetypal images.

9S

He concludes that these ijnages can be adequateOy understood in teiros
of Freudian personal psychology vrLthout the need for a concept of a
collective unconscious of archel^ypes,

^e chief point of interest, hoirever, is
vjhether the concept of tlie Old Vase r-3an and
the archet^Tpe of transformation inalce any novel
contribution to the interpretation of the dream.
They do not, liiconscious guidance and subli-
mation cover "toe situation just as i^ell. Bie
spiritual elaaent is a beautiful unconscious
fantasy, Bie Jungian contribution is onOy
verbal— but it is stimulating and anpeals
to tlie imagination, ' 5

>fes then the Carpenter of his dream an arche-
type of the Self or just a personification of
the integrating dirlve? It malces no difference
whichever vray you look at it,""*^

Qrchetype of the^ Shadow or neurosis. It
malces no difference. The meaning is the same.
^ The Jiingian approach yields nothing that
the Freudian does not imply. 17

nh considering the force of this tj-pe of objection, it is im-
portant to note that what is at issue is not the existence of the
phenomena for which the archetypal theoiy is to provide an explana-
tory frameiTOrk so much as how these phenomena are to be interpreted.
The British psychoanallyst Mthor^r Storr admits for example that:
"It is not difficult to prove the existence of an inner world of
highly irrational images , , , , "18 and "the existence of the
mythological substratum to human experience is recognized by
analysts of entirely different theoretical orientations, fi.e.,
different from Jung^ though they would use another nomenclature, "19

vathough Fodor and OLover argue that Freud's psychology can
account for the images alleged to be archei^ypal trtthout need for
any theoretical adjusteent of basic Freudian theoxy, another school

97

of psrjnchoana3jtical thought has deroloped a concept of "internal
objects" to account for the type of phenomena at issue. This
neo-ft-eudian school is composed of followers of Ifelanie laein.
Accordiig to the laeinian viei7 then, the iinages \ih±ch Jung would
call archetypes are the result of a process of introjection in which
items of experience in the child's immediate environment such as the
mother's breast are internalized and become incorporated into the
child's ego as internal objects.

Si the passage cited beloi;, we see an example of how this ex-
planatory device of introjection of internal objects attempts to '
account for the allegedly archetypal images vrithin the context of
an essentially Freudian psychology which explains unconscious images
in terms of individual development.

Si reali-ty parents and child possess limited povrer
or goodness and badness, vjisdora and foolishness.
Bie cliild's phanta^ makes gods and demons and all
those unearthly creatures of them tAich folklore
and inythology, religious legends and artistic crea-
tion present to us in sublimated, and the imagina-
tion of the insane in more misublimated, fonn.
Ibreover, the child places his self -created figures
Inside his am body and treats them as live en-
tities alien to himself and beyond his control. "20

Ttie proper Jimgian reply to this line of criticism \d21 appeal
to evidence that the images said to be archetypal have collective
features which rule out an interpretation solely in terras of in-
dividual development. The reaaining in stqjport of the collective
nature of such features will consist of a demonstration of the
correspondence of the images \T±ih symbols in the histoiy of culture
which are unknorm to the individtial previous to his experience of
the images. IJius the spontaneous appearance of the same symbols in

98

cultures vridely separated 3ji space and time x/ill be seen as necessita-
ting a concept of the collective unconscious.

The soundness of such reasoning is naturally open to question
in various ways. In the case of the individual vrho experiences
allegedly archelgrpal images, how is the absence of previous cultural
Influence estabOlshed, for example? >breover, vrould not a theory of
cultural diffusion better account for the appearance of the same
J^pibols in different cultures?

Baw&ver, the sort of systematic attack on the archetypal theoiy
VTith Tihich we are concerned here is not so much interested in directly
inipugning the evidence for a collective unconscious as it is to tiy
to sho:-/ how its ovm Ijiterpretative frame^rork makes the allegedly arche-
typal phenomena Intelligible ^d.thout the need for a concept of a
collective unconscious. Vfe vjill then reserve an examination of the
evidence given in support of the collective unconscious for a later
chapter. For it is our task in the present section to indicate the
manner in which the Freudians and KLeinians see the Jungian inter-
pretation of the phenomena at issue as not mereily false or unsuppor-
tabO^ by the evidence given but as violating basic assumptions they
appear to hold about the nature of man.

The sort of assumption on which the tension bettreen the Jungian
and Freudian Images of man seems to turn involves the issue of des-
cription of human experience in terms of "spiritual" predicates.
As T.-iill perhaps be remembered from previous discussion (page h^),
V7e were unable to grasp t-Aat -Jung means by the spiritual until vre
had contrasted the spiritual and the Instinctual. The spiritual was
that vrfiich alloi7s the energies of man to be employed in other than

99

instinctual activities. !Ihe enrphasis of the Jungian image of man is
thus on the existence of a source of creative ^pibolic activity which
may manifest itself in artistic, religious and even scientific ws,
but which can not be understood merely as an outgrorrth of instlnctuality
interpreted in a narrot;, physiological sense.

Bjr contrast, what might be characterized as a Freudian image
of man seeks to explain all aspects of human activity in terns of
the development of the individual's instinctuaLity. This tlie attempt
is made to give the so-caUed spiritual aspects of man a reductive
biological interpretation, ^ce it is difficult to see hoi; creative
symbolic activity relates directly to the biological needs of the in-
dividual, from this perspective it is then easy to believe that the
symbolic manifestations must be either infantile phenomena or delus-
ions. Thus Storr states:

As will be perceived, I am putting fort/ard suggestions
as to possible norths which can be variously SKrded
exther as paranoid delusions or as religious beliefs.
'rr,! :i,\ ^ ^y^^ KLeinians and Freudians would ar-
gue that religxous beliefs are as unnecessary as de-

P^choanalysts consider that the inner world and
xts ojnages are infantile phenomena, admittedlr
po'^rerful deteiminants of a man's idea of the ex-
ternal world, and therefore of his behavior, but
actually a hindrance in adaptation to reality,
ae mythological level of the psyche is, in this
viei7, a misconstruction which ought to be out-
groim or overcome if a person is to be properly
orientated toward people in an adult way, and
toT/ard the external world as it actually is. ^2

Diis w of understanding as instinctual perversities that which
from the Jungian perspective constitutes man's human-^ost potentialities
for being seems to lead to an Incomplete and nondescriptive image of
the human situation. Ohe suspicion that there has been an effort to

100

KqxLain away a vitally important aspect of experience through a bio-
logical reductionlsm is reinforced by the often enotionally worded
attacks on Jung. If the archetypes irere really only infantile phe-
nomena or delusions, then one wonders if they would elict such emo-
tional counterattacks. As a case in point GLover states that "...
he Dunga proceeds to invest hman ideas and iioages irLth an atmosphere
politely described as nysticism, but which the less polite observer
vjould call an atmosphere of religiosity."^^

vath such differing ways of looking at the human condition as
that represented in the writings of Preud and Jung, >re can not
attempt here to provide conclusive arguments in favor of Jung's
vietTs versus those of JVeud. Such a task would cawy us beyond the
purpose of tMs study. 3h so far as ^^hat >re say here about Jung
and his theory of archetypes proves to b© intelligible and to offer
a genuine gain in understanding the human situation, this may perfiaps
count against a Freudian perspective if a comparison :7ith Fmid's ideas
fans to provide an equally satisfactoiy explanation. But beyond ;Aat
we have said about the archetypes, no effort vrLLl be made to conclusive]y
validate the inrportance of a spiritual dimension to erqjerience. Such
a question can not be resolved only through argumentation but must be
settled as the course of time proves the relative merits of the Freud-
ian or Jungian images of man.^U

In any case, it seems evident that the claim that the archetypal
theoiy must be rejected on grounds of parsimour can not be upheld.
For although it is readiJy admitted that Jung's archetypal theozy is
a more cumbersome theoretical device than Freudian explanation in tenns
of individual development, in contrast to Freud, Jung's idea of

101

archetj^es reflects the characteristic quality of the phenomena it
seeks to explain. To charge Jung rath violation of parstoony is
thus beside the point until another theoiy can provide a simpler
er^planation while at the sane time being able to adequately charac-
terize the phenomena.

Jung' s view has an obvious advantage over Freud in that in dis-
pensing vdth the idea that dreams and other unconscious products are
systematically distorted by the unconscious, Jung can have his theoret-
ical explanations of the Images in close agreement Td.th the phenomeno-
logical content. The actual content of the images must then for Jung
be taken seriously, not as mere disguishes for sexuality.

A passage from Fodor serves to illustrate this point. Ife once
had a dream involving a coal mine and under the influence of having
read Jung attempted a Junglan type of explanation in terms of the
archetype of transfoimation.^^ His interpretation along these lines
pi^jceeds in part:

Coal preeminently stands for transformation—of
vegetable life (and imprisoned sunshine) into
stone. Ibreover, coal is something valuable;
it is called black diamond, not quite without
reason, as both coal and diamond are made of
carbon. • . , Treasure is undoubted3y referred
to and, if it is in the mine or if it is to be
mined, it has been ndned from the unconscious. ^6

Then in an attempt to discount the ijnportance of this interpretation

he remarks: "It is interesting to note that, under the influence

of Jung, I comjxLetely ignored the obvious uterine element in the

coal mine .... "27 The interpretation of the coal mine as uterus

does not have much phenomenologlcal plausibility; that is, \je fail to

see on what grounds the interpretations of the coal mine as representing

a uterus can be adequately defended. If a coal mine is a uterus, then

102

any enclosed space could on basis of this reasoning be a uterus and
any elongated object a penis.

%■ comparison id.th the rb?eudian inteipretation, the KLeinian
theoretical model can talce the phenomenology of the iinages success-
fulily into account. HOT/ever, its explanatory device of the intro-
jection of internal objects lacks credibility. 2he internal objects
thesis seems to be, moreover, a sort of ad hoc addition to the Freudian
theoiy, an atteng^t to save at any cost the perspective of explanation
in terms of individual development.

Perhaps someday a theozy ^dll succeed in accounting for what Jung
cans archetjrpes idthout the necessity of a concept of collective un-
conscious and yet Td.thout explaining airay the phenomena. Ho^rever,
there is no good reason to believe that the Freudian or KLeinian
approach is in fact such an account.

Theological Criticism
The second type of ^steraatic criticism we idll discuss comes
from the theological point of viet/. Rather than opposing the arche-
typal theory idth an alternative psychological interpretation of
events as was the case Tdth the I^eudian and laeinian approaches,
the tiieologians are concerned id.th the issue of psychologism. !Ihey
object to Jung's theory of archetypes then since, in their understand-
ing, Jung's theoiy attempts an illegitimate psychological reduction
of the transcendental concerns of religion. Th regard to the psycho-
logical interpretation of religious assertions. Father Josef

Cioldbrunner thus remarks that:

"In the language of science this

thinking of Jung's must be called psychologisra, the levelling dorm

103

of supra-psychic realities to the level of purely psychic reality. "^^

It is then not so much the theory of the archei^qje itself to
iMch the theologians object, as it is Jung's use of the theoiy to
understand and es^lain religious experience in a psychological way
which attempts to be metaphysically neutral Trf.th respect to such
issues as the e:d.stence of God.

The Jexd.sh theologian Ikrtln Buber voices this type of criticism
of Jung. He feels that Jung's psychological treatment of God in tenas
of a God arche-l^rpe has the effect of maldng God into an entity which
has reality only within the psyche, Ihus he accuses Jung of over-
stepping the legitimate scientific bounds of psychology and indulging
in a type of psychologically based theology.

In short, although the nenj p^rchology protests that
it is "no world-view- but a science, " it no longer
contents itself xd-th the role of an interpreter
of religion. It proclaims the new religion, the
only one which can still be true, the religion of
pure psychic iimnanence,^

Jung does not e:cBrcise such a restraint when he
ejcplains that God cannot e3d.st independent of men.
For, once again, if this is a statement about an
archetype called God, then the emphatic assurance
that it is a psychic factor is certainly unnecessary
(l^lhat else coiiLd it be?) But if it is a state-
ment abotrt some ertra-psychical Being which
corresponds to this psychic factor, namely the
statement that no such Being e:d.sts, then ve have
here, instead of the indicated restraint, an
illict overstepping of boundaries. -^°

The validity of Buber 's criticism must be evaluated in the face

of what Jung has to say about God. Jung distinguishes God-as-he-is-

Kcperienced, the psychic God-image or God archetype, from a possible

God entity transcending possible psychic e:cperience to which the

God-image could correspond. Ih terms of his scientific methodological

lOh

ideal of avoiding undecidable metaphysical claims, Jung's assertions

about God are then to be restidcted to psychological statements about

the Ood-lmage.

PsychologicaUy, however, Cbd is the name for a
comple:: of ideas grouped round a poirerful feel-
ing; the feeling-tone is -what really gives the
complex its characteristic efficacy ... (Vol.
V, p. 85).

Hie idea of God is an absolutely necessary psy-
chological function of an irrational nature, which
has nothing whatever to do i/ith the question of
God's existence. The human intellect can never
ansi/er this question, still less give any proof
of God. Jbreover such proof is superfluous, for
the idea of an all-poijrerful divine Being is pre-
sent everywhere, unconsciously if not consciousOLy,
because it is an archetype. There is in the
psjTJhe some superior power, and if it is not
consciously a god, it is the "belly" at least,
in 3t» Paul's words. . . , Our intellect has
long laioiim that we can foiro no proper idea of
God, much less picture to ourselves in what
manner he really e:d.sts, if at all. The
ejcistence of God is once and for all an un-
ansiTerable question (Vol, VII, p. 71),

Ihat Jung says above about God seems relatively unproblematic.
Hoirever, Jung frequently uses his God-ijaage construct in ^rays which
imply that it has the same meaning as the ordinary traditional re-
ligious usage of "God."

"Absolute" means "cut off," "detached." To assert
that God is absolute amounts to placing him out-
side all connection \T±th manldnd. Ifen cannot
affect him, or he man. Such a God would be of
no consequence at all. , , . this urge to re-
gard God as "jabsolute" derives solely from the
fear that God might become "psychological."
This T-rould naturally be dangeroTxs. An absolute
God, on the other hand, does not concern us in
the least, whereas a Vpsychological" God would
be real (Vol. VII, p. |235, note 6).

Yet Jung is not agnostic and affirms his personal view that

there is something to which the psychological God-djnage corresponds.

10^

Biis is certainly not to: say that what to caOl
the unconscious is identical v/ith God or is set
up in his place. It is simply the medium from
which religious e3cperience seems to flow (Vol. X.
p. 293). ^

For me "God" is on the one hand a ncrsteiy
that cannot be unveiled ....

On the other hand "God" is a verbal image,
a predicate or ncrthologem founded on arche-
typal premises . . . (Letters. Vol. U, pages
25U-25^, letter to Pastor Jakob Anstutz dated
23 Ifey 1955).

From these different perspectives from which Jung talks about
"God" we can begin to understand why his vietrs attract theological
criticism. For Jung believes that he can restrict himself to the
"facts" of religious experience and that id.thout comnrLttlng himself
to any metaphysical assertions arrive at certain valid engdrical
statements about God-as-he-is-experienced. But since these assertions
will be based on a cross-cultural comparison of religious symbology,
they may come into conflict with the dogma of a specific religion
where the archetypally based religious experiences have undergone
a prolonged period of interpretation.

Thus Jung, says that the doctrine of the privatio boni and its
Implication: "Ctoe bonum a Deo, omne malus ab homine" is not suppor-
table by existing archetypal evidence.

... I have felt compelled to contest the
validity of the privatio boni so far as the
empirical realm is concerned. ...

Criticism can be applied only to psychic
phenomena, i.e., to ideas and concepts, and
not to metaphysical entities. These can only
be confronted with other metaphysical entities.
Hence my criticism is valid only within the
^'"P^J^cal realm. ... It seems to me, hoover,
that the e:d. sting empirical material, at least
so far as I am acqu^ted witti it, permits of
no definite conclusion as to the archetypsil
background of the privatio boni. Subject to

106

correction, I would say that clear-cut moral
distinctions are the most recent acquisitions
of civnized man (Vol. U, pages 305-306).

For the most part, ho^rever, Jung feels that his enpirical for-
mulations leave the door open for at least theoretical congiatability
vdth metaphysical religious statements based on faith. Since these
metajAiysical statements such as the assertion that a God exists who
transcends the p^che are supported hy faith rather than by exper-
iences, they can not be either empirical3y validated or disproved.
For even the numinous experience of the God archetype reveals only
that a certain psycliicalOy conditioned factor exists.

Bius Jung's reply to theological criticism is that he is
making empirical statements about the God archetype rather than
uttering metaphysical truths. He is not talking theologicalOy but
scientifically.

You evidently did not knot; that episbemologicaUy
I take rui/- iand on Kant, wliich means that an
assertion doesn't posit its object. So when I
say "God" I am speaking exclusively of asser-
tions that don't posit their object. About
God himself I have asserted nothing, because
according to my premise nothing ^riiatever can
be asserted about God himself. Jill such asser-
tions refer to the p^chology of the God-image.
Their validity is therefore never metaphysical
but only psychological. All my assertions,
reflections, discoveries, jetc, have not the
remotest connection with theology but are,
as I have said, only statements about psy-
chological facts (letters. Vol. I, p. Z9U,
letter to Josef Goldbrunnejr dated 8 Februarv

In spite of all Jung's protests of innocence, the theologians
have nonetheless good reason to be upset ^dlii Jung's archetypal
treatment of religion. It is not that Jung has explained atray
religion by reducing it to psychology— his psychological treatment

107

maintains the authentic ejdstence of nundnous experience which
transcends reference to the personal ego to an indeterminable
extent. Rather the difficulty is that the Jungian image of man
with its archetypal understanding of the spirit is in real con-
flict with a traditional religious fvlet-rpoint based on faith.

Thus although Jung is attempting to approach religious con-
cerns from a strictly empirical point of view and is not advo-
cating that his vieirs be interpreteci in a religious way, it is
hard to avoid perceiving the manifest incompatibility vrith a
traditional religious viev;point. For if one holds Jung's theoty
of archetypes to be true, then traditional religious understanding

can only claim to be a relative and
In a letter Jung once admitted

limited interpretation.

this point:

not supreme and solely

If the Christian truth is _^

valid, then it believBS it has lost it raison'
d'etre and, if I may express ray htmible opinion,
it would have lost it. It xroxHd instantly have
to turn into a sort of philosophical i^yncretism.
I think that this is a most serious point (Letters.
Vol. I, pages 269-270, letter to ¥.E, Hocking
dated 5 Ifey 1939).

Jung's claim then is that all experience which could count as

supporting a religious understanding, since it must be a psychic

experience, falls irithin the damadu of his theoiy. The religious

interpretation of this experience is thus always open to question

and to possible p^chological critique.

... I approach these problems in a way that has
often been charged td-th "psychologisra. " If "psy-
chology" xrere meant, I should indeed be flattered,
for vjy aim as a psychologist is to dismiss ;d.th-
out mercy the metaphysical' claims of all esoteric
teachings. ... Let the convinced Christian
believe, by all means, for that is the duty he
has taken upon himself j but whoever is not a

108

Christian has forfeited the charLsraa of faith,
(Perhaps he was cursed from birth vdth not being
able to believe, but merely to ]mm. ) ... One
cannot grasp anything metaphysically, one can
on3y do so psychologically. Therefore I strip things
of their metaphysical tiralppings in order to make
them objects of psychology (Vol. XEII, p. k9).

The fact that I am content vjith what can be ex-
perienced psychically, and reject the meta-
physical, does not amount, as any intelligent
person can see, to a gesture of scepticism or
agnosticism aiTied at faith and trust in higher
poirers, but means approxiinately the same as
what Kant meant I'/hen he called the thing-in-
itself a "merely negative borderline concept. "
Svery statement about the transcendental is to
be avoided because it is only a laughable pre-
suii5)tion on the part of a human mind unconscious
of Its limitations. Therefore, when God or the
Tao xs named an Ijiipulse of the soul, or a psychic
state, something has been said about the knowable
only, but nothing about the unloioi/able, about
which nothing can be determined (Vol. xril, p. 51|).

3uch a position, although technically leaving open a loophole
for religious faith, has the practical effect of destroying any
ground for belief in the extrapsychological truth of such faith,
i.e., a truth that would be more than just valid relative to a
particular psychology. Unless one is motivated hy an arbitrary
will to believe, the choice of one religious interpretation of
archetypal experience over another or over an atheistic interpre-
tation must be on the basis of pragmatic reasoning, i.e., one finds
it helpful and congenial to one's personaliigr.

Ii)reover, there is some real question to vjhat extent Jung is
successful in mai^tadjiing his discourse about reUgious concerns on
a solely empirical psychological level. Bie appropriation of the
emotionally loaded word "God" to mean the p^hological God-image
opens him up to the criticism that he is indulging in theological

109

discourse. In his Jm^ ^ds, and ?bdem Ibn, Moreno complains then
that "Jung, the philosopher-psychologist, interprets man's ideas
of God within the framework of his ovm ideas of God."^'' Iforks
such as Aisifer to Job leave tlie Impression that what is being ex-
pressed is more a personal religious testament than an objective
psychological discussion.

The claim that Jung's theory of archetypes constitutes a psy-
chologistic treatment of religion is then justified in the sense
that his theoiy offers a psychological frama/ork f or understanding
id.th which a traditional religious framework can be made compatible
only by assuming the subservient role of an undecidable metaphysical
interpretation based on the archet^jpal "facts."

The question remains, hoirever, to what extent this "psychologism"
is the basis for a valid criticism of the archetypal theoiy. For the
fact that ps^-chologism can be established does not necessarily mean
that something is i-rrong irtth the theoiy. It would seem clear that
p^/chologism is an objection only to a misuse or misapplication of
the archetypal theoiy rather than to the theoiy itself. If, for ex-
aiiiple, the claim is made that the psychological perspective is the
onOy valid way to understand a religious, philosophical or aesthetic
work or event, then there exists the manifest possibility of an illegit-
iJtiate reductionism. Freud's p^chologistic understanding of religion
and art in teims of sublimation of sexuality seems an example of this
pernicious "nothing but"32 psychologirtic application of a theoiy.
But surely there is a legitlinate psychological element in re-
ligion,, art and philosophy which can be discussed id.thout the Im-
plication that these disciplines are nothing but confused psychology.

110

Jung's application of the archetypal theory beyond psychology to

these other areas is for the most part sensitive to this problem.

But of course ercaniples can be found where Jung is guilty of failing

to appreciate a work In its ovm teims because of his at-rareness of

the psychological element. He seems to arbitrarily dismiss the

philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger in this manner:

. . . Hegel, who in ny very incompetent opinion
is not even a proper philosopher but a misfired
psychologist. His in^ssible language, which
he shares with his blood-brother Heidegger,
denotes that his philosoply is a highly ration-
alized and lavishly decorated confession of his
unconscious (letters. Vol. I, p. 5oi, letter to
Joseph F. I^hlak dated 27 iipril 1959).

Ibreover, it can be readily seen hor-x it is Jvaig^s Kantian
strategy which brings him into direct conflict with the theologians.
Jung will give a psychological treatment of the phenomena and leave
the theologians and metaphysicians with the impossible task of
talldng about noumena. But vre need not follow Jimg on this point?
the archetypal theory can be made intelLigible ;d.thout the need for
a Kantian distinction betireen phenomena and noumena. In this vray
much of the theological criticism loses its force. For there is no
longer the necessity for the misleading en5)hasis on the merely phe-
nomenal nature of the God-image we erqjerience.^-^

But on the other hand, with the abandonment of this Kantian
distinction, the question about the locus of the archetypes re-
appears. Are archetypes on3y psychic entities or is the psyche
mereily one place in vjhich they manifest themselves. 3U

Our argument for an understanding of the archetypal theory in
terms of the foriner alter^iative, which vre ha^e con^rued as a natura-
listic interpretation, can now be shora to have the advantage of

Ill

helping to separate the scientific aiais of such a theoiy from un-
necessary metaphysical and theological complications. For Jung was
perhaps misguided in believing that Kant's doctrines woidd perserve
the scientific character of his theoiy and prevent metapl^^sical and
theological discourse in its name. It is not clear that Kant suc-
ceeded in preventing the claims of science and religion from becom-
ing competing systems of explanation, and, in ar^r case, Jmg in fact
fails to Strictly adhere to Kant and sometimes indtdges in discourse
which is of dubious scientific justification (Mswer to Job). Ifone-
theless, it is in the spirit of Jung's theory to tiy to interpret
it in such a way that the scientific import of the theory is not
hopelessly implicated vdth nonscientific discourse.

«„+, n ^ example of a nonnaturalistic account not involving suTDer-
natural agencies could be dravm from the work of Carlos Castaneda!
Jn Journey to Ibcfclan (New York: Sjmon and Schuster, 1972), for ex-
aii^le,^he purports to describe entities called allies which have
intentionality and i*ich "reside" in natural locations such as
springs. Such an entity, if it existed, would not be a super-
natural agency since it is partly on the basis of such entities
that the workmgs of nature are described and understood, according
to the vrorld vxeij of sorcery which Castaneda describes. On the
other hand, tiying to interpret the archetjrpes as allies would not
be a naturalistic interpretation either since it involves appeal to
a radically nonstandard understanding of natural processes. Our
usage of the tern "naturalistic" then involves at least prima facie

!^!ISS^''^*L."^J^ ^andard (i.e., scientifically anlightened, common
sense) understandings of nature.

2

-As the interpretation of Jung's archetypes as supernatural
agencies is not attributed to any particular author in the follo^djif'.
It should be mentioned that this line of interpretation of Jung is
one which is veiy popular ^ri.th university students and others v*o
are eager to embrace doctrines which from their point of vietj re-
present sensationalistic alternatives to a scientific world view.

Jrnig's social and political vims have been the subject of
irf-despread misunderstanding due in no small measure to Jung's notor-
ious ineptness in public affairs, la order not to add to such

112

ndsunderstandings, it should be made clear that in no sense does
Jung's life or work offer any evidence that he was a bigot or
advocated racial supremacy. Our critical statements on this matter
are intended merely to argue that in fact the concept of the collec-
tive unconscious is not relevant to arguments concerning racial
differences. For an unbiased account of Jung's social-political
T"^^^.^!^^^ unfortunate adventures in public affairs see i\niela
Jaffels tol me Ufe and Vfork of C,G. Jung (Ifew York: Harper and
Row, 1971).

-l^ comparison of discussion of the concept of the archetype
in Aniela Jaffe' s book ^ I^^to of Jfeaning (New York: Penguin B^ks,
tI-^^'J"^^ Jacobi's The Pgychology of C.G. Jung (New Haven: Tale
Iftuversity Press, 1962), and IB.chael Fordham's The Ob.jective Psyche
(london: Houtledge and Ifegan Paul, 19^8) offerlrtTat at first sirht
seem to be incompatible accounts. Fordham looks at the archetypes
from ascientific perspective, while Jaffe emphasizes the role of
archetypes in mediating authentic religious, ircrstic and paranormal
experiences. Jacobi, on the other hand, by literalizing Jung's often
metaphorical language through the use of simplistic and misleading
diagrams, creates her own unique account of what is involved in
Jung's model of the p^che.

However, this is not to say that these books grossly mis-
represent Jung's views. Together with a reading of the Greeted
I^rte, they help in gaining a fuller appreciation of the many facets
Lr^ ^ ^^?^^* ^^ individuals who each read one of these books
without reading Jung in the original would in all probability end
up with ^Tidely differing ideas of what Jung means by the arche-
^es. An interesting passage from the Letters, although not men-
tioning names, must be quoted as relevant here: "There have been
so many pupils of mine who have fabricated every sort of rubbish
from vrhat they took over from me" (Letters. Vol. I, p. 5l8
letter to Jurg Plerz dated 13 Januaiy 19l(9). '

Jung's analytical inclinations and abilities at times fail
to keep pace with the flood of insights and ideas from tlie unconscious.
His expositions frequently become so involved id-th lengthy examples
and parenthetical elaborations that the main thread of discussion is
lost. Vol. V of the Collected Vforks, Symbols of. Transfonnation. is
a good example of this overdetemLnation of content at the expense

of f OITO. ^

"OverdeteiTdnation" is a word introduced by Freud to mean
the fusing together of different elements in the unconscious to
produce single images ;7ith compound meanings. 55ee Jung. Vol. Ill
pages 62-63. ^' '

K« 4^ ^i ^° "°* ^t^ *° Imply here that the secondary work should
be ignored in an effort to understand .Jung. In the course of a^si-
tion of Jung's work, instructive and thought-provoldng errors arV
sometimes made. A case in point occurs in Tbreno's Jung. Gods and
Ibto ^fen (Notre Dame, Indiana: IMversity of Notri^e-ffsS^
1970) where m the course of a discussion of the relationship between

113

archetypes and norths he reaches the folloi^diig conclusion:
In spite of Jung's explanation, the relation
of ncrth and archeigrpes is not yet clear. It
is the nyfch which foms the archetype, and at
the same time, it is the arche-type which pro-
duces mythical ideas. Is it a vicious cycle?
Not likely, because for Jung, the sub.jective
fantasies of myths are the causes of arche -
t^^es. [Italics mine .J But once the archetype
is formed, it is endot/ed Td.th a kind of
readiness to arouse the sam n^ythical ideas
vxhich were the cause of its foimation, a
familiar psychological process, ffeibits and
dispositions are formed in the same way;
repetition of acts forms the habit, but
once the habit exists it is inclined to
produce the very acts that were the cause
of its e:d.stence (Ibreno, p. 19),
By thus clearly spelling out one possible interpretation of
irtiat Jung intends as the relationship beti-jeen archetype and myth,
we are directed to its implausibility as an account of Jung's viei^
211 regard to its consistency vd.th his i^ritings on the subject as a
vmole .

7

Gerhard Adler, Letter to the editor. Horizon, 19 (I9h9), p. h9i,
p

Tr.r^y.y.r.^^ SfS^ ^^f^> MlSIEll of the Iherapeutic (New York: Harper
lorchbooks, 1963), p. lil, where this temtinology is used.

9
^^^•f? ^^^' "^'^'' "^'s Confession: Psychology as a lan-
guage of Faith," Ehcounter. 22 Tl961i), p. Ii9.

10 _

B±rard GLover, "Freud or .Tung," Horizon. 18 (I9l;8), p. 2k3.

11

As Mght be expected, what :re have called criticisms based
on misunderstanding could also conceivably be fitted into this second
categoiy of systematic aUy biased critiques, iSlthough it is not clear
what ideological motives Rieff may have, GELover is obviously a Freud-
ian defending the faith. But as many of Dover's criticisms can not
be understood solely in terns of a l<Veudian interpretation of the
pEfychological phenomena, they have no value for determining whether
an alternative hypothesis can account for the objects of Jungian
theoretical interest. Thus some but not all of Clover' s objections
to Jung's ideas can be relegated to the first categoiy.

But it should be made clear that our categorization of criti-
cisms is not intended to be a definitive guide for identifying in-
competent critiques. It is rather intended as an e:q>lanation of why
some extant criticians are discussed and others passed over in silence.

^ ^^ Q"e could conceivably critize Jung's archetypal hypothesis

from other standpoints than those mentioned here. One could viell
image a behayiorist critique, for ejcaraple. Ibwever, an exandnation
of such a critique would not shed much light on archetypal theory.

11h

i'^!?i"^*^i^^!Vff^°^ ^'^^d be one drawn from the standpoint of
Sn?S:?t2?f^ ..''^^^Sf • ^though the phenomenologi^s a^id e:ds-
tentialists do not for the most part address themselvls to Jung's
S^* ?^ *Jf c°llfctive mconscious, it night xTell be thought
IrL^^ll ^^^* to frame their ideas idthout appeal to a concept
of an unconscious vrould constitute a strong implicit repudiation of
"^M^fl"^*- ^ ^°^ thinloers as ISisserl, Heidegger. Sartre

S?houf?ha^S f ''°"^' "^'^^ f ^ ^ ^^^°^i^^ humanlJp^riSr
TTitdiout the need for an unconscious, have in actuality smuggled it
back xnto thexr vieus xdLth functionalHy equivalent concepts. For
example, in Heidegger's vork the concepts of "horison" plus "throim-
mco^Lci^sf ""^ ^^^*i°^^^^ equivalent to what ^ meiSs l^ ST

13
1950), pf*]?!^ ^°''^''' ^^^^^ ~ "^^ (london: George men and lind.n,

^^ ZMd., p. 38.

15
16

Books, imf "^ !°177' ^^^^^ "^^^ ^^ Qg-g^ltism (Hew York: IMverSity
aid., p. 180.

^^ Ibid., p. 182.
11

p. 38. ^^^°^ ^°^* ^«^^« JmP (Net/ York: ^e Viking Press, 1973),

19

Ibid., p. 37,

20
T 4. . I^^% Heimann, "Some Notes on the Psycho-analytic Concept of
Introjected Objects," British Journal of IfeScal Schology? 2Ph?),QV

p. m.

21

Storr, p. 39.

Ibid., p. 68.
23
19 (19U9^°S5.' "^^'''^ °'' ^^^' Applied Jungian Psychology," Horizon

21; ^
+>,o+ +V,. ^^^^"^ misunderstanding it must be made clear that in saying
that i±e question of the value of a spiritual ddinension to exTeriSf
?f „^f +?^''f^°^y^^ ^ *^^^h argumentation, the point being made
is not that the oinportance of such a dimension cannot be argued for
S.1ii%S\*^Ji the final justification of an iinage of man based upon
the belief in the value of such a dimension will be ho;/ well it enables
us to understand and effectively deal with the human situation intoe
long run. Ih cor^jaring the relative merits of Freudian and Jungian
images of man then, v/e do not at this time in histoiy have suf^cient
per^ctive on what sort of consequences follow from these ways of

i^s^^H ?f >,^ ?'^%'" ^ ^ ^^^ ^ ^^ *^^* *h« ^°^h of one vlevr
has proved to be clearly superior to that of the other.

11^

2^ M U-.

.,^n=i4+4«o* L I aE£hg22es Of transformation. They are not per-
Zft^S. \?\Fr^ si^^^ions, places, ways and meaS,
that ^pibolize the kind of transformation in question" (Vol. IX-A

26

Fodor, p. 176.

27

M^', p. 177.
28

^x„ -^ose^^^ldbrunner, Dhdivlduation (Ifotre Dane, Indiana: Uni-
versity of Notre Dane Press, l^^E), p. 172. -^oiana. uni

29
pages 83-8^!^ ^^''' ^^^^^^ ~ — ^^^' ^°''^* ^^^^^ ^ ^'' 196^),

^° Ibid., pages 135-136.

lioreno, p. Ill,
32
^ The editors of Jung's letters. Gerhaixi MLer and Aiiela Jaffe,
give the follot.jing ejiplanation of this cotnmDn2y used ej^jression of
Jung's:

A term frequently used by Jung to denote the
cortmon habit of explaining sometlrLng unloioxm
by reducing it to something apparently loioim
and thereby devaluing it. It is borroired
from Vailiam James, PpaCTiatism (1907), p. l6:
"Ihat is higher is e:.-plained by what is loirer
and treated for ever as a case of 'nothing
but'— nothing but sometliing else of a quite
inferior sort" (letters. Vol. I, p. 1)^2, note 1 ).
33
K«n+i=r, w"* the Kantian point of vieii, it might be objected that a
Kantian Interpretation of the archetypes is still possible even if
we do not Identify the archetype per se i^lth the thing-in-itself .
For it is possible to think of both the archetypal image and the
archetype per se as part of the phenomenal realm and as distinct
irom the noumenal archetypal referent. In keeping T/ith the in-
tent of Jung's line of reasoning on this matter, ire could then
state that vrhat is said about the C!od archetype does not neces-
sarily implicate us i-dth claims about God as noumena.

3U ^
f-innr.^ ^"^?^ '^^es Hillman's "Ihy Archetypal Psychology," Sprinp
U970;, p. 216, xjhere he opts for the latter alternative.

CHAPTER 5
JTOIG Al© THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART I

The Relevance of the Question

In the previous chapter in the course of considering various
types of criticism of Jung's idea of airihetypes, we discussed the
problem of p^chologism: the claim that Jung was illegitijnately
reducing religion and metaphysics to psychology. ]h the present
chapter we must consider the opposite problem: the claim that Jung
is making psychology into religion and metaphysics. From this fact
that Jung is attacked both fi-om the theological and metaphysical
perspective as well as from the scientific point of vievx, one might
be tempted to conclude that Jung has hopelessly confused the tra-
tional distinctions beti^een these areas of inquiiy and produced a
type of discipline which fails to be either good philosophy, religion,
or good science.

But as we have urged in the previous chapter that Jung's theory
should not be implicated id.th theological and metaphysical claims,
so in the present and subsequent chapters we must consider the scien-
tific status of the archetypes. Ihis question is the most crucial
one for our naturalistic reconstruction of the archetypal theoiy.
For if Tie are to establish successfully that there is a continuity
beti-reen ordinaiy natural phenomena and the phenomena of archetypes,
then vre must shoir how the archetype construct can be compatible in

116

117

prfjiciple Tdth a scientific understanding. If on the other hand, it
can be shoxm that Jung appeals to a frametrork of understanding of a
radical]y different nature ^riLth different principles of explanation
from what constitutes at least a irrLniinal3y acceptable scientific
^andard, then in light of the scientific claims Jung makes for his
archetypes, 1 vre would have to conclude that the idea of archetypes
is not only nonscientific but perniciously pseudoscientific, decep-
tively claiming the authority of scientific method.

But ire do not mean to imply that for any of Jung's ideas to be
meaningful, they must be shorn to be genuinely scientific. Certainly
such works as Answer to Job are meaningful and Insightful though most
probably not science. Jung was too complete an individual to have
been only a scientist, and his xndtings often reflect his extrascientific
vieifs and interests. But the fact that Jung at times exceeds the
legitimate boundaries of scientific inquiiy as in Job is all the more
reason to assess the scientific status of the archetype. For the
many facets of Jung's personality—philosopher, therapist, "spec-
ulating heretic" (Vol. XT, p. 307), scienti^-invite the unsympa-
thetic and shortsighted critic to dismiss Jung's viei-rs carte blanche
as hopelessly unscientific or "jcrstic." j\nd since to underhand our
task in this stady to be, at least in part, an attengjt to show why
the archetypes merit serious scientific study and consideration, we
must then address ourselves to the questions centerijig around the
putative scientific status of archetypes.

The Charge; of %-sticifan
The firfft problem to be tackled in treating the various que^ions
related to the scientific validity of archetypes is the issue of

118

ncrsticisra. For if Jiing's vier/s are mjrstical then certainly they can

not be scientific. To simply dismiss Jung's ;7ri tings as norstical

is, of course, an extremely unfair and prejudical attitude to talce

toward his vrork. HoiTOver, the uncertain relationship betvreen n^s-

ticisra and Jung's views gives the critic a chance to impugn Jung's

ideas by JJitimating that they constitute a ncrstical rather than a

scientific body of statements. Thus in an article entitled "The

IJrstical and Scientific Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Theories of

Freud, Adler and Jung," Bdirard Burchard states:

But it is only in Jung Qn contrast to Freud and
MlerJ that ire find a conscious and deliberate re-
pudiation of rationality and empirical science
and a lush proliferation of concepts which are
indistinguishable in fonn and intention from
those of Christian and Oriental reli^^ious mys-
tics. "^

Though not actually using the peo'orative label "ncrsticism, "
Rieff criticizes Jung in a similar vein stating that Jung's views
are based on revelation rather than scientific method.

There is no arguing id.th revelation. Jung's
was a personal language of faith, revelatory,
and therefore beyond danger of being invalidated
by argument or contrary experience. ...

iigainst the democracy of the scientific in-
tellect, he represents the aristocracy of emo-
tional profunditj'-.^

Because it offers no criteria of validity, other
than the therapeutic e>q)erience of conviction,
Jungian theory amounts at once to a private
religion and an anti-science.'^

It would seem that in relation to the quertion of i^ysticisra, there
exists a confusion of various issues. For it is unclear exactly what
the charge of rcrsticism amounts | to or what the word "rorsticism" is
supposed to signify other than "unscientific."^ Ibreover, the accusa-
tion that Jung is a myrstic would seem to be the most polemical and

119

extreme form of criticism of various sorts that Jung is unscientific.
But lAereas some critics such as Rieff refrain from using the loaded
word V^icism, " the substance of their criticism seems to amount
to the similar claim to that of calling Jung a nystic in that they
allege that Jimg is involved in paradigmaticalOy unscientific en-
deavors. The mildly worded srtatement below by PWedman and Goldstein
seems to be of this nature:

Jungian pj^ychology, viith its emphasis on the archaic
and its tendency to passive preoccupation with ssrn-
bolic content, stands in strong contrast to the
rationalism and determinism characteristic of
Ifestem thought in general and modem science in
particular."

Tn order to untangle the confusion of issues centering around the
allegedly unscientific nature of Jung's work then, to vdll employ the
strategy of considering various plausible reasons which, in light of
a knovrledge of Jung's work, would lead one to question its genuine
scientific status. Hather than further discussing extant criticisms
then, TO >dll proceed ;d.th a consideration of scientifically proble-
matic aspects of Jung ' s work.

I^Srsticism CJiaracterized
W.T. Stace in his I^sticism and Philosophy argues that genuinely
inystical experience can be divided into two basic types. A so-called
extroverted mystical e3cperience is to be distinguished from an intro-
verted one. 3h the extroverted ezqp&Aence there is a " . . . unif^^lng
vision, expressed abstractly by i the formula 'All is One.' The One
is . . . perceived through . . j the multiplicity of objects, "^ Thus the
extroverted itystic perceives a oneness of all things which is distin-
guishable from the individual things themselves. The introverted

120

rcrstic on the other hand experiences a oneness in a consciousness
othend.se devoid of all ideational content. "The Unitary Con-
sciousness, from TThich all the multiplicity of sensuous or conceptual
or other empirical content has been excluded, so that there remains
only a void and empty unity. "^

In addition to the experience of oneness, Stace lists other
characteristics shared ty both types of irysticisra: "Sense of ob-
jectivity or reality; feeling of blessedness, job, happiness, satis-
faction, etc.j feeling that what is apprehended is ho^3r, or sacred
or divine; parado:d.cality; alleged l^ nystics to be ineffable . . . . "^0

Is Jung a %stic?

NoTiT if vre characterize someone as a nystic, ^.■m could mean that
this person adhers to nystical beliefs. Ifovrever, it would seem that
a plausible case could be made for the claim that a true nysfcic must
come by his nysticism first hand, i.e., that he must be a person xvho
has himself had nystical experience. But as in any case vre vTill con-
sider later the influence of nystical in?itings on Jung's viei^s, ire
must pause here to consider whetlier there is any evidence that Jung
had personal nystical experiences.

In this regard iie discover that although Jung in his autobio-
graphy reports several instances of paranoiroal p^yxihic experiences
and in one case an out-of-bo^ e^qjerience, plus maiy visions and
instances of hearing voices or conversing \Tith spirits,^ ^ there do
not seem to have been any genuine cases of nystical experience. Ifere-
over, in deciding about the nature of Jung's altered states of con-
sciousness, it is important to note that the visions and voices which

121

Jung describes do not qualify as genuine mystical states. Stace

points out that visions and voices are not reaUy i^ysbical phenomena.

Not only is this the opinion of most competent
scholars, but it has also been the opinion which
the great Ji^rstics themselves have generally held,^^

The main point is that the most typical as irell as
the most ingjortant type of nystical experience is
nonsensuous, whereas visions and voices have the
character of sensuous imagery. The introv«rtive
kind of mystical states are, according to all
the accounts we have of them, entirely devoid of
all imageiy.'-'

On the basis of the negative evidence then, we might feel jus-
tified ±n concluding that Jung had no genuine myfftical e:q)eriences.
For in viet7 of the disclosure of the types of unusual experiences
lAich Jung does reveal in his autobiography, it would be reasonable
to expect a description of a mystical state had there been one to
report.

Jbreover, at least in regard to the introverted ncrstical state,
there is also the fact that Jung argues against its possibility, i.e.,
in teims of the first characteristic, he says the experience of a
oneness in a consciousness devoid of all thought, imageiy and sen-
sation is impossible.

"As io2S.as Smjjjata"'^ is cognized bv a sub.ject
it remains object. " But when the subject enters
^^W^'^^ and becomes identical idth it, the subject
itself is Srajrata, namely void. Aid when the void
is really void, there is not even a cognizing sub-
ject in it. The subject has vanished and there
cajmot be a consciousness of this fact, because
there is nothing left any more. Ihere can also be
no msraoiy of it, because there was nothing. ...

I want to knovr what there is to be knotm, but
I don«t want to malce assumptions about things of
which I know that one cannot know them. Thus it
is absolutely impossible to know xdiat I T-rould ex-
perience when that "I" which could experience
didn't e:d.st any more. One calls this a con-
tradictio iji adjecto. To

122

experience Sunyata is therefore an impossible ex-
perience by definition, as I explained above, and
it is also impossible to experience consciousness
in a field of vrhich I know nothing (Letters. Vol,
I, p. 263, letter to ¥.Y. Evans-Ifentz dated 9
Februaiy 1939).

It would seem that Jung's comment that the introvert nystical
experience is "impossible bry definition" needs qualification. For
although 176 can argue ^dth the ncrsfcic about the meaning of his ex-
perience and hoT7 it should be con^rued, \-je are less open to question
that he had an e:<perience. Ihus Jung is opposed to one of the ways
in tiMch uystics most commoaly characterize their experience, the
characterization of it as a oneness in a consciousness devoid of
all multiplicity. For in terms of Jung's oim framerork of under-
standing, what happens in the mystical experience is that there is
a loireidjxg of the threshold of consciousness trfiich allows an ex-
perience of the unconscious.

It is psychologically correct to say that "At-one-
ment" is attained by idthdrawal from the world of
consciousness. In the stratosphere of the un-
conscious there a2?e no more thimderstoiros, be-
cause nothing is differentiated enough to pro-
duce tensions and conflicts (Vol. XL, pases
Ii98-li99).

Now if consciousness is emptied as far as possi-
ble of its contents, they >jill fall into a state
of unconsciousness, at least for the time being,
in Zen, this displacement usually results from
the energy being Tdthdraim from conscious con-
tents and transferred either to the conception
of "emptiness" or to the Kban. As both of these
musrt be static, the succession of images is
abolished and vjith it the energy x^hich maintains
the kinetics of consciousness. IJie energy thus
saved goes over to the unconscious and reinforces
its natural charge to bur^fcing point (Vol, XI,
p. 551).

Since Jung understands the mystical experience as analogous to

other more familiar types of experience of the unconscious (e.g.

123

dreams or visions), he then irants to say that the feeling that the
bounds of the ego have been dissolved and that the experient has
become merged viith the oneness he e.^cperiences can not be T/hat it
seems to be. For since all experience of the unconscious is possi-

ble onl^r through its relation to the ego, the r^zstical experience

1 "5
must also involve the ego.

If the Vidians would call sublime psychic experience
psyche" or something equivalent to it, I would
agree vdth them, but to call it consciousness
cannot be substantiated by any evidence. If
the highest psychic condition is 3anyata« then
it cannot be consciousness, because conscious-
ness is by definition the relation between the
subject and a representation. One is conscious
o^ something. As long as you are conscious of
.^unyata it is not amyata. because there is
still a subject that is conscious of something
(letters. Vol. I, pages 2k9-2^0, letter to
ivTiT^vans-'Wfentz dated 8 December I938 ) .

As Jung understands the mystical experience then, it involves
only a relativizing of the ego perspective of consciousness rather
than a complete elimination of it.

In addition, Jung's standpoint also amounts to a denial of the
acrstic's claim that his experience is of sometldng outside himself,
that it is of something objectively real. It is not a direct ex-
perience of the essence of reality that the nestle enjoys hvct only
an insight into the unknorm depths of himself. Of course from the
psychological point of view, Jung is trying to restrict himself to
the phenomena and avoid metaphysical assertions. Ho^^ever, the force
of Jung's objections to the mystic's way of construing his experience
as seen in the above quotations | seems to be the argument that the
p^hologlcal interpretation of rysticism in teiros analogous to other
more common experiences of the unconscious is at least consistent Td.th

12)(

p^Tchological common sense, whereas the i^ystic • s characterisation
of it is not.

Vfe can conclude then that not only is Jung not a i^ystic by
virtue of personal e:q)erience but that, in addition, his treatment
of ncrstical ejqserience is a psychologistic one e:cpressed in terms
Tjhich conflict vjith the ncrstic's aim iray of construing the exper-
ience. It Ttdght then seem difficult to understand Jung's mystic
reputation except on the basis of an unjustified prejudice. The
fact is, hoi-jever, that although Jung disputes some of the claims
the E^rstic malces for his e:cperience on psjnchological grounds, he
nonetheless considers the rcrstic e:q5erience as having considerable
valTxe and significance.

This is not really surprising since Jung understands rnys-
ticism as an ezrperience of the unconscious. Consequently the value
of the mystical e:xperience is due to the positive effects of the
e:5>ansion of consciousness which a direct insight into the un-
conscious makes possible. The ei^jerience affords an opportunity
to realize the limitations of the perspective of ego consciousness
and thus helps to bring about the process of individuation, the goal
of >jhich is an integration of the conscious and unconscious aspects
of the personality.

The occurrence of satori''^ is interpreted and
formulated as a break-throu£>h . by a conscious-
ness limited by the ego-foim, into the non-
ego-like self (Vol, XT, p. ^3).

So far as 1-festem inysticism is concerned, its
texts are full of instructions as to how man
can and must release himself from the "I-ness"
of his consciousness, ; so that through knowledge
of his oxm nature he may rise above it and
attain the inner (godlike) man (Vol. XT, p. ^$),

12^

Satori corresponds in the Christian sphere to
an ezqperlence of religious transfonnation (Vol.
XT, p. ^7).

In relation to the question of the charge that Jung is a ncrstic
then, although we can ascertain vrith reasonable certaln-ty that Jung
had no personal norstic ezq^xnAences and outline the essential differ-
ences bettireen his way of interpreting the e::perience versus the ws-
tic fraraeirork of understanding, there is still some ambiguity about
Tihether Jung ascribed to any mystical beliefs. For despite the
differences heti^een the way in which inystical e^cperience was char-
acterized and T7hat Jung says about the e:cperience of the archetypes,
there is nonetheless some degree of overlap. For e^cample, what we
have said about the numinosity of archelypal e^^ierience (Chapter 2)
agrees well idth the ircr^tic characteristic of "feeling that what is
apprehended is holy, or sacred or divine,"

Concerning the mystical quality of "alleged ineff ability, " it
is difficult to mate comparisons. For it is not clear what sense it
makes to talk about degrees or kinds of ineffability. In any case,
the irystical ineffability is related to the quality of paradoxicality
in that parado:d.cal descriptions vrhich violate basic laws of logic
seem appropriate for its description. Ihis way of talldng about the
mystic experience is then another way of stating the inability of
language and logic to adequately express the ine3q>ressible.

The language iMch he finds himself compelled
to use is, when at its best, the literal truth
about his eicperience, but it is contradLctoiy.
"fliis is the root of his feeling; of embarrass-
ment TrLth languageP"

But even though Jung does not follow the irystic in an explicit
appeal to the transcendental domain of the ineffable, it might well

126

be arsued that there is, nonetheless, some siMlarity beti;een the
description of a i,^,rtical e:.perience as ineffable and the ascription
of numinosity to characterize archetypal e^erLence. !lhe point needs
to be made, then, that although presumably all allegedljr ineffable
experience T.ould be numinous, i.e., charged Td.th a great deal of
emotional energy, Jung does not clato the numinous e:cperience of
archetypes is ineffable, in this regard ue need to e.:amlne what
Jung says about the paradoxical and also consider to T/hat degree
the Hidetemmate nature of symbols, i.e., the fact that they refer
beyond themselves to an indeterrdnable e.d;ent, constitutes a kind
of ineffability. (See the section entitled Can There Be a Science
of Archetypes?) But .;e will have occasion to examine these questions
in a later section. For the present, it is sufficient to remark
that there is a certain family resemblance betireen iiorsticism in
the strict sense and some of the things Jung says about the arche-
types. HbT/ever, there seems to be no point in talking in terms
of a ireak or loose definition of r^rsticism, for the claim that
Jung is quasi-iicr^ical must, in any case, be examined on the basis
of the individual reasons for such a contention and to the under-
standing of the several relevant questions involved, the quasi-ticrstical
label contributes nothing. Ifcreover, since Jung does not understand the
archetypes from a it^^stical point of view but rather understands i^s-
ticism in terms of the collective unconscious, the remaining crucial
question to be resolved is thus not whether Jung is a n^rstic In any
nai^ginal sense, but Tvhether what he is doing v/ith the archei^al
theoxy is paradigmatically unscientific, i.e., opposed in principle
to the scientific attitude.

127

Jun;;'s Attitude Tanavd Science
Introduction

Postponijig for the present the questions relating to rationality
uhich xie left unresolved in the last section, ire turn noir to the
issue of Jung's attitude toward science. The relevant issue in this
regard is the ex-tent to which Jung's empiricism is nonscientific in
attitude, that is, the degree to which Jung holds vievrs incompatible
Tdth an attitude necessary for science.

Ihe objection could well be raised at this point that this
question is an ad homLnem type of consideration. For regardless of
what beliefs an iirvestigator holds concerning the nature of the
scientific endeavor, the issue of whether his theories constitute
good science must in any case be resolved in tenns of what the
theories can do in relation to acceptable scientific standards.

In Jung's particular case, horrever, there are good reasons for
looking into the question of his scientific attitudes and beliefs.
(Ihe problem of acceptable scientific standards is the subject of a
future chapter. ) One reason is that we need to understand the rela-
tionship Jung sees betireen the idea of archetypes and the domain of
science. Is archetypology, the sj^stematic stucfy of archetypes, to
be understood as one branch of science, or is science merely one
manifestation of archetypes?!^ Tn the latter case, the question of
validity of archetypal theoiy could not be decided solely in terms
of scientific validity. Vfe need then to understand how Jung inter-
prets science in relation to his archetypes.

A second reason for investigating Jung's scientific attitudes
is to get clear about the empiricistic claims he makes for his theory.

128

m other uords, on nhat grounds does Jung claoB that the study of
archetypes is scientific. Ohis question is particularly crucial in
Viet, of the fact that the demarcation bet.^een Jung-s allegedly scien-
tific statements and his extrascientific statements is at ttoes ve^
difficult to make. It is, of course, a separate question whether
Jung does What he claims to be doing, but it is nonetheless relevant
to the question of scientific validity to see whether what he says
he is t^g to do T-nth the archetypes .dll in principle qx,alify as
scientific. (This question .dll be examined in the section on meth-
odology. )

Archetvpolo/o- as I-^.hos^^

3h regard to the question of hoi. Jong sees the archetypes in
relation to science as a whole, it may v;ell seem that we have posed
an artifical question in asking whether the stuc^ of archetypes is
to be considered as a branch of science rather than science being
subsumed under archetypology. And to a certain extent this question
does pose a false dichotonor. For Jung both defends the scientific
nature of the archetype, its compatibility ,.ith a contemporaxy
scientific understanding, while also stating that science is one
modern instance of the attempt to integrate the essentially mytho-
logical archetypes into acceptable cultural forms.

^S°^°??!: ^^ °"® °^ ^^^ J"^ expressions of
psychic life, operates with ideas which in their
^ are derived from archetypal st^ctuSs SS?
«ms generate a somex^hat more abstract kind of
Wth,^ Psychology therefore translates the
archaac ^ech of i^jrth into a modem rorthologem-
Jt^,°^ course, recognized as such--T^ch

Tvol^'S!!: ri?'""' °' ''' ^ "^°'^"^^"
Edward Bilnger expresses this same point in a succint manner:

129

?on+=r ' *°/?^ction properly, me ncthological
container must be acceptable to the conscious
personalxtj-, including the critical intellect.
. . . Jmg considers Iiis oim psychological theories
as an atteii^t to provide a new ^^^hologjr or vessel
for the archetypes wiiich will be acceptable to the
modem scientiTic mind.^^

But the understanding of science as a modem enactment of a
noHih is a speculative rather than a scientific statement. This
attitude toiiard the logos is, then, necessarily part of the i^j/thos.
And thus we can see why ex-pressing ir?yfchos and logos as an eitlier/or
is misleading (the study of archetypes as science versus science
as a type of archetypal phenomenon). For of course the logos must
not attempt to usuip the function of the mrthos, whereas the iicrthos
Tihile always assuming a bixjader perspective than the logos must not
confuse itself irith the logos.

However, the point of framing the question about archetj^pology
versus science is that the confusion of the rcrthological vnLth the
scientific is just the sort of problem that Jung is confronted idth
and just the sort of error he is accused of maJdng. For Jung pur-
ports to stu^ scientifically about j^hs and to do so phenomenolog-
icalDy, i.e., taldng into account the phenomena in their totaHty.
Md in this regard there always exists the temptation and the danger
of losing the critical point of vie:/ about archetj'pes and instead
proclaojning a new metaphysical doctrine of truth. To avoid this
problem and thus to succeed in keeping the scientific statements
about arche-b^-pes distinct from metaphysical interpretations of
archetypal events, Jung clings to the ideal of empiricism. ^^

This is not to say that Jimg is uninterested in possible meta-
physical implications of archetj-pes. Naturally he has his personal

130

metaphysical viws and from the clinical point of view, he encourages
the individual to develop a functional philosophy of life based in
part on the individual's experience of the archetypes. But Jung
atteimts to distinguish the scientific level of discourse about
archetypes from the level of personal metaphysical interpretation.
iO-though it would be an exaggeration to say that Jung al^rays succeeds
in sharply distinguishing these levels of discourse—all too often
he talces the distinction for granted, thus leading to many confusions-
the point to be made is that Jung sees the distinction as a necessaiy
one if there is to be a science rather than just a philosophy or
metaphysics of archetypes,

Tiien Jung says as above that psychology is part of the modem
myfcli, this is then a statement on tlie personal level of discourse,
i.e., part of hcr.j Jung the individual understands the metaphysical
significance of archetypes. But the fact that Jung is motivated to
value scientific endeavor frcsii the point of vleir of his personal
metaphysical perspective should not lead us to conclude that Jung
is merely paying lip service to science or attempting to pa'.m off
his ideas by coating them ',ri.th a scientific veneer. For in working
\T±th an ideal of empiricism, he is attempting to gain a critical

knoTjrledge of the archetypes, one which can inthstand the rigorous

23
demands of scientific Imowledge.

Science and the Individual

Ihus Jung understands his work in part as an attempt to gain a
scientific understanding of archetypes. But even though Jung sees
himself as a scientist, this is! not to say that in aspiring to em-
piricism Jung views science as the only valid path to knowledge or

131

truth. For Jung's aim is al--7ays to provide a legitlTiate scientific
treatment of the irrational phenomena of the unconscious while at
the sane time maintaining a position as metaphysically neutral as
possible wliich Tdll allow the metaphysical and the ncrthological
their otm domain of validitj-. As ^.Te saw in Chapter h, Jung as a
matter of fact is unable to carry completely through this essentially
Kantian program and at tdjnes gets involved in psychologisfcic reasoning
incompatible '.d.th the claims of religion and metaphysics. But, although
in this regard, Jung's attempt to rely ttpon a phenomena/noumena dis-
tinction is open to criticism, it seems nonetheless clear that T/hat
Jung is striving for is a separation of scientific and metaphysical-
religious types of discourse about archetypes as far as this is possi-
ble.

This separation, moreover, does not entail for Jung the supre-
macy of either type of discourse but oaly its validity vdthin the
IteLts of its aim sphere of application. Thus we find some cases
iihere Jung defends the practical and tlierapeutic value of a meta-
pl;ysical -religious outlook against an attempt to elminate it en-
tirely in favor of a world viet-; dominated by the findings of science
and other places where Jung defends the necessity of a metaphysically
neutral approach for science.

Ho science will ever replace «crth, and a n^h

cannot be made out of any science. For it is

not that "God" is a m^h, but that inyfch is the

revelation of a divine life in man. It is not

\Te who invent myth, rather it speaks to us as

a \-brd of God (l-femories. Breams. Reflections, p. 3kO),

Tiiere is, however, a strong empirical reason why
we should cultivate thoughts that can never be
proved. It is that they are knovm to be useful.
I^Ian positively needs general ideas and convictions

132

that Tdll give meaning to his life and enable him
to find a place for himself in the universe (Man
and liLs 9yinbols, p. 76).

r^ subjective attitude is that I hold every religious
position in high esteem but draw an inexorable
dividing line betireen the content of belief and
the requirements of science (Letters. Vol. I, p,
125, letter to Paul llaag dated 12 June 1933 )«

As a scientist I have to guard against believing
that I am in possession of a final truth (Letters,
Vol. I, p. 3k6. letter to 11. Irminger dated 22
September 19UU).

As our exposition of Jung's vims of science has progressed up
to this point, it may seem relatively unproblematic. For to summarize
Trtiat we have said thus far in this regard: Jung sees his mm work as
part of the contemporary attempt to develop a scientific understanding
of the world which is not, however, to be understood as a substitute
for the religious and metaphysical needs of man. If this iTere the
full story of Jung's scientific attitude, it would be cause for little
further comment. Such viei^s on the nature and limits of science might
well be shared by many conten^xjrary scientists. However, the problem
is that Jung is doing science about the metaphysical and religious
needs of man, and not entirely in an objective detached manner either.
For Jung not only studies religion and rstaphysics, he advocates them.

This close interrelation beti-reen the scientific level of dis-
course and the level of personal meaningful interpretation is in part
a direct result of Jung's therapeutic involvements. Jung, then, is
sensitive to the practical -therapeutic as well as the strictOy theoret-
ical scientific aspects of his work. In order to malce Jung's views
on the nature of science intelligible then, we need to understand
the basis for the particular tensions \ie find in Jung's v/ritings

133

between what he sees as theoretical scientific knowledge on the one
hand versus personal therapeutically revelant understanding on the

other.

On this account what is necessaiy is to shoi/ how on the one
hand when one goes from the scientific perspective of theoretical
ImoTTledge about archetypes to the therapeutic perspective, one in
effect malres a move not only from theoretical to practical knowledge
but also from the scientific to the religious and philosophical. Qn
the other hand t^ need to determine to what extent Jung understands
the tension between the two levels of discourse about archetypes as
due to an incommensurability between theory and practise, betT^een
scientific versus therapeutic aims, and to what extent Jung is trying
to argue for an idiographic versus nomothetic type of distinction
within the realm of theoretical knowledge itself. ^'^

Not/ if we address ourselves to what Jung sees as an incommen-
surability in principle betxreen his scientific theory and the prac-
tical work of therapy, it is not at all clear why this sort of in-
commensurable relationship must exist. For after all, it would seem
that scientific knowledge about psychological matters would prove in
the long run to be therapeutic, tfe can easily imagine paradigm cases
of "unscientific" therapy such as a witchdoctor treating a case of
hysteria by trying to cast out the demon responsible. Even if the
ijitchdoctor succeeds and produces a cure, our scientific mentality
assumes that suggestion or some isuch mechanism must be at work for
which there exists a scientific explanation which if knovm would
prove eventually to be therapeutically valuable. Prom the scientific
point of vieT7 then, we assume that there are discoverable principles

131;

at work in human psychology which if we knew them would greatly de-
crease the gap between our theoretical knowledge and what can be
accomplished in tenns of practical applications to therapy. From
this point of vievx, it is steply the immaturity of science which
leads to an incommensurability between theory and practise.

But this is not the sort of incommensurability between theoiy
and practise that Jung principally has in mind. For parenthesizing
for the moment idlographic considerations in terms of applicability
of a theoretical knoi-rledge for understanding the individual, it mu^
be emphasized that Jung sees theoretical scientific knowledge as
necessary but never sufficient for accomplishing the work of psycho-
therapy. For it is characteristic of Jung's view of therapy that it
is necessary for the therapist to enable the patient to reorganize
his philosophical and religious vieTTJolnt. therefore, for Jung it is
not that science is rejected in doing therapy but that objective
scientific knowledge about psychology must be complemented vrf.th a
subjectively meaningful reorientation of world view.^^

The intellect is the soverign of the scientific
realm. But it is another matter lihen science
steps over into the realm of its practical appli-
cation. The intellect, which was formerly king,
IS now merely a minister—a scientifically, refined
instrument it is true, but still only a toolj no
longer an end in itself, but merely a precondition
(Vol. VI, p. 57).

. . . sooner or later it was bound to become clear
that one cannot treat the psyche without touching
on man and life as a whole, including the ultimate
and deepest issues, any more than one can treat
the sick body vrithout regard to the totality of
its functions . . . (Vol. XVI, p. 76).

I can hardly draw a veil over the fact that we p^-
chotherapists ought really to be philosophers or
pliilosophic doctors— or rather that vre already are

13^

^* ' '^.' f °°^^ ^^° °3^ i* religion in statu
nascendi, for in the vast confusion that reims""
at the roots of life there is no line of division
betireen philosopl^r and religion (Vol. WL, p. 79).

The most healing, and pscrchologicaUy the most
necessaiy, experiences are a "treasure hard to
attain, ' and its acquisition demands something
out of the common from the common man.

As ire hnow, this something out of the common
proves, in practical work vrith the patient, to
be an innrasion \rj archetypal contents (Vol.

an:, p. 82).

The statement that Jung sees scientific knowledge and psycho-
therap7 as incommensurable irrespective of the state of the complete-
ness of scientific Imox^ledge amounts then to a reiteration of the
prervlous claim that Jung believes that science can not ser^re as a
substitute for the religious and metaphysical needs of man in teims
of which the Jungian therapy is primarily oriented.

VJien Jung talks about what he calls psychological truth then,
he is emphasizing this subjective aspect of the therapeutic process
for which the term scientific is not appropriate precisely because
of the philosophical and/or religious nature of the questions involved.
P^hological truth is that which as a matter of fact proves to be
meaningful to the individual.

Considered from the standpoint of realism,
the symbol is not of course an external truth,
but it is p^chologically true ....

Psychological truth by no means excludes
metaphysical truth . . , (Vol. V, p. 231).

Is there, as a matter of fact, any better truth
about the ultimate things than the one that
helps you to live (Vol. n, p. lo^),

Vhen an idea is so old and so generally believed,
it must be true in some waj', by which I mean that
it IS psychologically true (Vol. V, p. 7).

nh his ]^ and ^hetype,, Edward Bdinger furnishes an illuminating

136

exaiople of essentially irhat Jung has in mind by emphasizing the sub-
jective nature of psychological truth.

These are abstract, objective meanings conveyed
by signs. Ifovrever, there is another kind of mean-
ing, namely subjective, living meaning which does
not refer to abstract Imouledge but rather to a
psychological state which can affirm life. It is
this sense of the word we use xxhen vre describe a
deeply moving e^cperience as something meaningftil.
. . * It is the failure to separate these two
different usages of the word "meaning" which
leads one to ask the unansrrerable question,
'".fliat is the meaning of life?" The question
cannot be answered in this form because it con-
fuses objective, abstract meaning iiith subjective,
living meaning. If vre rephrase the question to
make it more subjective and ask, "Ihat is the
meaning of njjr life, " it then begins to have the
possibility of an ansirer. . . .

•'Vho am I?" The latter question is clearly a
subjective one. An adequate ansiver can come only
from Td-thin. Thus ire can say: Ifeaning is found
in subjectivity.'^"

This example from Bdinger amply shows the subjective and essen-
tially philosophical emphasis in Jungian therapy. But this subjective
therapeutic emphasis should not mislead us into overlooking the
possibility of a valid scientific level of understanding. Jung, for
example, does attack the question of the meaning of life in general.
His ansirer in terms of a theoiy of individuation purports to be an
objectiveljr valid account of the p^'chology of the various aspects
leading to a fulfilment of the personality and self-realization,

Ife must be careful to distinguish then between the subjective
psychologically true statements and scientifically valid statements
about psychological truth. Vhereas in the first case we have lAat
is found by the individual to be subjectively meaningful, in the
second case we have generalized statements concerning what has as a
matter of fact been found to be meaningful.

137

I'hen psychology spealcs, for instance, of the motif
of the virgin birth, it is onOy concerned idth the
±act that there is such an idea, but it is not
concerned \rith the question whether such an idea
xs true or false in any other sense. The idea is
p^hologicalily true inasmuch as it e3d.sts (Vol,
aI, p. 6),

But whereas from the scientific theoretical point of vlei-x,
psychological truth is the object of study-, in the actual thera-
peutic situation. He are no longer on a meta -level of psychological
truth, so to speak, but on the object-level working director ^vith
the patient's "iicrth," i.e., his life-outlook. Ibreover, it is just
when the scientist-therapist moves from the objective scientific
level of discourse about the unconscious to the level of personal
psychological truth that Jung emphasizes the importance of taking
what prove to be essentially idiographic considerations into accoijnt.
Ih the practical therapuetic situation, vre must, in Jung's view, be
prepared to set aside our theoretical p^chological knorrledge to
a large extent so that ire can gain an understanding of the individual
who may deviate from the scientific ideal case to a greater or lesser
degree,

Iheories in p^chology are the veiy devil. It is
true that we need certain points of view for their
orienting and heuristic value; but they should
always be regarded as mere auxUiaiy concepts that
can be laid aside at any time (Vol. XVTI, p. 7).

He {the therapist] should remember that the patient
xs there to be treated and not to verify a theoiy.
v''-,*^^'!^ natter, there is no single theoiy in the
whole field of practical psychology that cannot
on occasion prove basically wong (Vol. XVI, p. n^).

Thus Jung likes to emphasize that science is nomothetic in nature

being concerned >dth the lawlike behavior of classes of particulars,

t^hereas in therapy it is just the idiographic particularities of the

138

individual Trhich need to be understood. Instead of a nomothetic /idio-
graphic terminology, Jung tallcs in tenns of knonledge versus under-
standing,

Erojjr theory of comple?: psiyichic processes presupposes a
tmifoiTi human pE^rchology, jusrfc as scientific theories in
general presuppose that nature is fundamentally one and
the same (Vol, VI, p, ^90),

Ifence it is not the universal and the regular that
characterize the individual, but rather the unique.
... At the same time man, as member of a species,
can and must be described as a statistical unit;
otherT.ri.se nothing general could be said about him.
. . . This results in a universally valid anthro-
pology or p^chology, as the case may be, Tri.th an
abstract pictui'e of man as a average unit from
which all individual features have 'been removed.
But it is precisely these features which are of
paramount ijiiportance for understanding man. ...
I can onZy approach the task of understanding
\n.th a free and open mind, triiereas Icnovaedge of
man, or insight into human character presupposes
all sorts of knoiaedge about mankind in general
(Vol, X, p, 250),

Md if the p^chologist happens to be a doctor
who wants not only to classify his patient scien-
txlically but also to understand him as a human
being, he is threatened T-dth a conflict of duties
between the tiro diametrically opposed and rautuaUy
exclusive attitues of Imoixledge on the one hand
and understanding on the other. This conflict
cannot be solved by an either/or but only by a
kind of tivO-v;ay thinking: doing one thing irhile
not losing sight of the other.

In Viet/ of the fact that, in principle, the
positive advantages of knoirledP^e work specifically
to the disadvantage of understanding, the judge-
ment resulting therefrom is likely to be some-
thing of a paradox. Judged scientificalily, the
individual is nothing but a unit which repeats
itself ad infinitum and could just as irell be
designated Tri.th a letter of the alphabet. For
laiderstanding, on the other hand, it is jujrfc
the imique individual human being Tvho, when stripped
or all those confoiroities and regularities so dear
to the heart of the scientist, is the supi-eme and
only real object of investigation (Vol. X, p. 251).

Thus, we can see how Jung emphasizes the different aims of science

139

and of therap/ on ti.-o accounts. As already discussed, Jimg under-
stands theoretical pqjrchology and his type of therapy as finaTIy
leading to different types of understanding: theoretical pqrchology
to objective scientific l<noi:ledge and therapy to subdective!!^- mean-
ingful self-knowledge. On the other hand i;hen Jung contrasts Imo;-;-
ledge and understanding, this emphasizes i/hat he sees as the limita-
tions of a general scientific Imouledge in its application to the
particular individual.

But whereas if therapy eventually leads to a subjectively mean-
ingful "psychological truth," we can readiOy .agree that the therapist
is in^rolved in an enterprise vdth the individual patient for which the
tern scientific is not entirely appropriate^ it is less clear that
the mere particularity of the individual malcEs his understanding some-
thing beyond the range of science. Ih his discussion of knorrledge and
understanding, Jimg seems to overlook the possibility of ai^jr idio-
graphic scientific methods27 and seems on the whole to understand
science in too narrow a way as only a study of universale.

. Th fairness to Jung, hoirever, the essential point of the dis-
tinction betT/een Imowledge and understanding is to avoid the thera-
peutic attitude of seeing the patient only as a scientific problem.
Ibreover, the validity of this point would seem to hold independentHy
of the question of nomothetic versus idiographic scientific methods.
For Jung's "understanding" is not so much a question of seeing to what
degree the individual's behavior confoms to lawlike scientific ex-
pectations or is idio^cratic but rather of establishing the right
therapeutic relationship \r±th the patient.

But at any rate, it is evident that what Jung is saying about

HiO"

the incommensurability betxreen the theoretical and practical aspects
of psyichology can often seem to be simply the adoption of an anti-
scientific attitude as in this example:

Yet this is still "psychology" although no longer
science J it is psychology in the idder meaning
of the word, a psychological activity of a
creative nature, in which creative fantasy is
given prior place (Vol. VI, p. ^7). 20

Jung is open here to ttie criticism of giving the false impression
of holding to a dichotomous division betireen theoretical and practical
psychology, irhereas, in reality, there is in fact a close interdepen-
dence and interrelation beti/een the tiro aspects of his psychology.
For the distinctive aspects of Jung's therapy are a direct product
of his theoretical understanding (compare Jung's emphasis on the
practical religious and metapliysical needs of man irith Freud' s)j and,
on the other hand, Jung's psychological system is to a large e:ctent
the end result of his exi)eriences in worldng id-th patients.

Ik can conclude then that there is a real basis for distinguish-
ing a scientific level of discourse about archetypes from a level of
personal meaningful interpretation. However, im must be ai-rare of
the danger of understanding this distinction between the ttro levels
of discourse as a dichotoncr between theoretical and practical knor^-
ledge about archetypes ajnplying that what is learned in theoiy does
not have real application to the practical therapeutic needs of the
individual, that therapy goes on completely independently of theoreti-
cal knowledge. Qn the other hand, to abandon the distinction altogether
is tantamount to giving up the ^ientific perspective of objectivity
.rithout which the study of archetypes can easily degenerate into pseudo-
science Td.th metapliysical and religious overtones.

Ilil

Notes

1

Psa example of these claims is the follovdng:

Nobody has ever shorn me in hoir far ra^r method
has not been scientific. One was satisfied
vath shouting "unscientific." Uider these
circumstances I do malae the claim of being
"scientific" because I do exactly i:hat you
describe as the "scientific method." I
observe, I classify, I establisli relations
and sequences befcreen the observed data, and
I even shoi; the possibility of prediction
(letters. Vol. U, p. 567. letter to E.A.
Bennet dated 23 June i960).
2

Bd'rard Burchard, "Ifystical and Scientific inspects of the
P^hoanaOytic Theories of Freud, .Adler, and Jung," American
ifournal of Py/chotheraw. ll; (i960), p. 306.

IH^eff, "C.Q. .lung's Confession: Psychology as a Lan-
guage of Faith," Ehcounter. 22 (1961;), p. k7.

h

M.eff , Triumph of the Therapeutic . p. llU.

n^+« + QSrsticalO "The denotation of this neologism in the polemical
literature of the social sciences, lAere it is employed as a term of
abuse, is obscure. It seems to mean, rougli2y, "unscientific."
Joseph Campbell, "Bios and J^hos," in Psvchoanalvsn .^ and Culture
edited by George G. laibur and Tferner Ihensterberger (mr ^^
International IMversities Press, 19^), p. 331.

I^ul Friedman and Jacob Goldstein, "Some Comments on the
Psychology of C.G. Jung," Ps^^xhoanalvtic Quarterly. 33 (19610, p. I96.
7
4 j..^?^®°^® "^Sh^ ^'^^ object at this point that in regard to the
scientific nature of the archetypes, the question of vrhether Junr
himself is n^stical is not relevant. For if Tze can shovx horx the
archetypal theoiy is scientifically viable, then the question whether
Jung is^himself rcrstical t/ill not matter. HoiTever, the importance of
the TK-oblem of inysticisra is that questions of the rationality of the
archetj-pal theoiy are brought into focus through a discussion of this
issue. Our strategy is thus to work totrards a clarification of the
problem of rationality by first discussing the question of Junr's
ncrsticism. The investigation of the latter question is then a way
to see what is at stake in the issue of rationality by first discussing
the limiting case of arationalitj^, i.e., ncrsticism.

11;2

Hovrever, the examination of the question o^ June's itrrs-

n^i?l"^"?r ^?^""* *^^ j^^ ^^ ^ ^-e to InS^uceThe
?r^+^;-*^^ rationality of the archetypal theoiy. For ?f Jw
xs attemptxng a justification of archetyp^ theoiy from the noSt
;f '^^^of'^stical insight, then the scientific TigSicScfS
the archetypal theoiy would be tmdemined, and ire J^ h^^ °^
t?ST?^r^^°'' *c *^ seriously the question of its scientific
^SmXicance. See also page 127 .rhere there is a continuaSon of
thxs lone of reasoning attempting to shor; the rc^ev^ice of dis-
cussion of Jung's scientific vieirs to the question of the scien-
tific status of the archetypal theoiy.

Idppd^cottJ'l96?);'p?ir^ — ^°^°^ ^''^' ^-^' ''^'
^ Ibid., p. no.

^° aid., p. 79.

11
P

11
oDo ^r^ out-of-body experience see Ifemories. Qreams. Reflections
IftJ^:. ?L^'^i^^°^ ^'^'^ paranonnal- psychic Sii^n^l=^l|p^
Ifemories, Dreams, Reflections, pages 137 and 1^5. W tells o-

l?9'Sd%^''ViS?^^ °^P^^ "■''' Fo'r'viSs'S'p^ges
191 oTthT;ut;biSr1S^! °' '^"^ ^°^^^^ ^= -^^^^ - Paso"^

12

Sfcace, p. U7.

^^ Ibid., p. i;9.
the i^^^l'^T's^J^'^S^T. ^^,^r ^^^ ^"

15

+1, rv- ^^, feeling of loss of individualitj^ and bein*' mereed i^th

S'tSV;Ji'- °''^? ^^"^ "^^^^^ e:q>erience uouirbe^^onsL^^nce
of the experience of an empty consciousness, if it irere posSbS? ?or

can ^\^^Zil Tl^^^^^lrTfi^l^U^ ^^^' ''
ctace, pages 3Cl;-305,

to the «* o. ai![LrttSSr\ ^iS; S^.fla./SerS'^"'

li;3

arche-typology is a genuine arche-typal topograpliy, a mapping of the
piomary togoi of the iraaginal realm." Casey references Durand's
"Efq)loration of the Snaginal," in Sprin/T« 1971, p. 91.

Jung does not use the term "archetypology, " but it seems to
be appropriately descriptive of the irork of some irriters who approach
tne archetypes from a pliilosophical as opposed to a scientific point
of viei7. Casey's r.rticle is, moreover, a good example of the arche-
typology as li^rfchos perspective as discussed under the next heading.

19

nh using the terms "ncrthos" and "logos" below, \re do not mean
to refer to the work of any particular philosoplier \±o may have used
tliem. The distinction can easily be attacted by citing e:caiiiples
Trfiich are not easily classified as either r^y-bhos or logos. However,
in our use of this distinction, ire are presuming only that there
ejdsts a discemable difference in degree beti-reen what passes for
the ideal of exact Imowledge, the logos, and metaphysical specula-
tions of the widest scope, the myfchos,

20

Ifolfgang Giegrich in an illuminating article criticizes
^ch Ife'.jmann's Origin of the Ilistonr of Consciousness (Hew York:
Pantheon Books, 1955) for confusing science and mrthology and doing
^culative ircrthology while giving the appearance of an empirical
study, nonetheless, he appreciates Ifeumann's work on its Otsi terms.
In the folio vdng passage, similar to Jung's view, he e:q)resses the
tnought that there is a sense in which the logos is grounded in the
nythos since logos can aliTays be interpreted as an ermression of
the n^ythcs.

Something (some "factor") obviously keeps us
from the truly psychological orientation and
malces ovr thinldng unpsychological hy maldng
us vrtsh for, or even need, empirical verifica-
tion, scientific truth, and systematizations.
This "factor" is our containment in the
Great Ibther/Here-ricrbh, t/hose nature it is to
create the (mythic J) fantasy of the possibility
of heorically breaking out of ircrfcl^ into "fact, "
"truth," "science" (ifolfgang Giegrich, "Qntoreny=
Fhylogeny?" Sprinpc. 197U, p. 118^.

21

Eiirard Bdinger, "The Collective liiconscious as Manifested
in P^nchosis," American Journal of Psychotheratr;-. 9 (1955), p. 625.

22

In order that the reader not thinic tliat ire have been per-

^*^*i^ ^ ^"^'^ "^ ^ *^® foregoing discussion, it must be pointed
out that some i/riters viho take their inspiration essentially from
Jung's Trork have not attempted to folloTr Jung in his empirical,
scientific approach to the archetypes. For e:cample, in the folloif-
xng passage Haomi Golderiberg characterizes the work of x*at she
calls a third generation of Jungians who go beyond strict adherence
to Jung's vierxs and develop their o^m approach to the archetypes.
m this regard Jaraes KLLlman is. the dominant figure.

Snaginal life becomes primary i/hile natural
science and biology become Txorldng areas of

Mdi

Imaginal life. This leads to an "ijnaginal
reduction" aimed at shordng the fantasies
belund^scientific or scholarly erroiricisra.

Facts" and "empirical" proof are no longer
^yoked to validate psyche or psychology.
i«ientifxc tenns are by no means the ulti-
mate stopping places. ...

"^'0.1 ways of speaking of archetypes are
translations from one metaphor to another.
_j^en a sober opei-ational definition in the
language of science or logic is no less
metaphorical than an ijnage irhich presents
the archetypes as root ideas, psj^chic organs,
figures of ncrth, typical stj^es of Kdstence!
or dominant fantasies that govern conscious-
ness (Quoted from James Ilillman, Revisioninf^"
Psycholop^ (Hew York: Harper and R^j, 197^)
^,*^J^H- ™^ Goldenberg, ".Archetypal Theo^
After Jung," Spring. 1975, v, 213).
^ch an approach has the disadvantage of maldng loiOTrledfre
of archetypes incommensurable lath standarTscientific knSiT-
ledge m the sense that what is said about archety^s if then
i? m^ ITt^'f'y'^''''^'^' '^"^"^^^ altogether.^en though
ledS're^s^ S^L^I?? ^"^ Tl ^'^^ll-^ ^^^li shed scientific kna.-
xeoge rests on an irrational basis and is the end result of the
worlang out of a ir^h, it is nonetheless uirdse to ^Se up the
Ideal of rationality as embodied in the methods of scSnce Ihi.,
se^s an i^ view to be particularly relevant in ?egSf ?o ;rch^'

^Ut^lt,.^^'' f r^"^ ^Ser of bei^g overwhelmed bj^^he
numnosity of the archet^Q^s necessitates a critical attitude
2J a h.S ^"°°^^^th Jung's view of the importance of S?kn-
Ing a balance between conscious and unconscious. Ihe ratSml^

ScSSr Stono^.'"' ^^°"— -' ^t Tdthout losing its oxm par-

^£Mr^^ ^^?St-?in\\%^i.?L^^^^

^retetT^nf ?; ^ ^°^ '"^^^ *° maintain that the scientific inter-

bul*SSr°L't^^\1^:/^,^^^^^^^ - -^^ -pp--"

be discarded or Sdonef ^^ scientific perspective must not

^ Mequate substantiation for this claim viill be cresPn+^H ir,

the section on methodology in the nex-t chapter. Presented in

acterizeftJS:'"'^ ""^"'^ '^"™' "^ ^"^^ '^'^ "^ ^^^ich I^chlak char-
Noraothetic study essentially prestmes that a
theoretical abstraction can be made which has
general applicability for several members of
a given class (i.e. distribution). Idio-
graphic stuc^, on the other hand, emphasizes
the uniqueness of personality manifestation
(I^hlalc, p. 2k J.

11^5

4.V. u ' T ?®^ ^® *^^° distinct issues involved in discussing
the basxs for the tension bettreen a scientific level of discourse
about archetypes versus a personal therapeutic level. The issue
of^an incoimnensurability in principle betireen theory and practise
and the issue of nomothetic versus idiographic methods for under-

SSSSn-^\^'^'^'^x?- ^ "^ ^^^°^ ^=^6^^' ^2 does not really
distinguish beti/een these trro questions but equates nomothetic idth
the therapeutic and extrascientific. Ife intent to shoiT how Jung's
distinction betiveen the tiro levels of discourse is defensible on

dn^nn?'?^+ /!?^ l^f ^'''^^' ^^^^ ^^^°^ ^ *^^ ^°°"d issue, T/e
do not intend to fuUy explore the question of the relative merits
of nomothetic versus idiographic methods for stwfying the individual.
However, it can be reasonably maintained that an idiographic scien-
S;2'' T *" "-^ possible outside the conbe^ of therapry. Thus, although
^^J^ T^ about the value of an idiographic appS^ach to the in-
dividual mal^s sense i.dthin the therapeutic context, Jung fails to
+?S^°^J'..?°r.*^®.^^°^^P^° approach does not have to be iden-
ISZ^ the aajns of practical psychology but can also be de-

fended as a legitimate scientific method in its om right.

Books' m^/ZlT'^^''* %£ Hid ^rche^ (Baltimore: Penguin
27

sort nf Sr^'L^^'^ ^ ?^ ^ idiographic scientific method is the
sort of stucty- recommended by Gordon mport who suggests, for example

S^L^h't^r'^^^^^.'" ^"T ^^" ^^°S^^P^^ ^d lx^?atu?J the S '
of such toigs as the in-depth stucfy of individual cases of persS^-
alxty. Bersonal3i2L ^ Social aicots^ Beacon PrSs,?960),

It seems that in this regard ije have a discrepancy beti;een
what Jung says and what he actually does. For the in^SpLltu^
of individual cases is in fact charactei-istic of his work. The
massive volume S^nbols 21 'Pransfomation (Vol. V) is prijnarSy
an extended commentary centered around the material of one
schizophrenic individual. (The person was not a patient of Jung. )

28
of +h. JUiLS^''^ iscpoted somst,tot out of cont&cb. The reminder

CHAPTER 6
JUNG AND THE SCIEtJTinc ATTITUDE: PART II

Can There Be A Science of Archet.yyv^s?

Other questions relating to Jung's vlerrs on science must wait
until the section on methodology ^^here we t^II examine Jung's reasons
for claiMng that his work on archetypes is scientific. Ih regard to
T*at ;re just discussed in the last chapter, it would seem that ,re have
not yet fully resolved the question posed at the beginning of that
chapter, the question of whether Jung holds vie,7S incompatible T.ri.th
an attitude necessaiy for science. So far as this question is con-
cerned, our strategy has been to argue for a distinction hei^reen two
levels of discourse; one appropriate for scientific statements about
archetypes and one appropriate for abatements on a personal, subjective
level of meaning involving iji many cases metaphysical and/or religious
interpretations of archelgrpal experience. Bie distinction then is
essentially one between the facts of archetypal e^rience versus the
attitude one takes towards these facts, vrtiat we should do about them.
It was pointed out, moreover, that the frequent shifts in Jung's
.rark betvreen the levels of discourse, which Jung understands in tenns
of theoretical versus practical :kno,aedge, is due to his professional
involvement on both levels as scienti^ and therapist. Thus someti^s
he tallcs about his scientific views, and at other times he gives us
practical, therapeutic advice or relates his personal, subjective
understanding of the metaphysical and religious iinpHcations of the

Mi6

111?

archetypes,

Hoi^ever, the critic tdll perhaps Td.sh to point out that Jung
can not be so easily saved from scientific criticism. For even if
TO can distinguish a scientific level of discourse from a level of
personally meaningful interpretation, questions can sbill be raised
conceiTdiig the justification of what is advocated for therapjr. For
we vjish our theoretical knowledge to rule out some therapeutic prac-
tises as unscientific even if to admit that scientific knov.ledge is
not itself sufficient for therapeutic success as determined by the
individual's gain in self-kno-^ledge and self-realization.

Horrever, our distinction betireen the levels of discourse is not
intended to have the result of immediateny resolving the questions
of scientific validity of Jung's vie^rs on the archetypes. Rather the
len^hy discussion on this matter is intended to clear the u^ for
a proper consideration of this problem by shoidng hmx arguments from
the scientific point of view need not be concerned idth eveiything
Jung says about the archetypes. Specifically, the question of the
scientific validity of the archetypal theoiy is not prejudiced by
what Jmg says about what attitude to should take torrards archetypes. "•
Only iThen we have come to an understanding of the Grange mixture of
statements in Jung's work by means of the distinction betTOen the
levels of discourse, then, can we genuinely appreciate the possibility
that Jung's repeated pleas to be understood as an empiricist must be
given careful consideration.

Ohere still remain ample grounds for withholding the sanction of
a scientific label to Jung's theoiy of archetypes which to have yet to
consider. But keeping what has been said about Jung's views on the

Ili8

natirre of science in mind, hopefully ire can nm examine these remain-
ing questions irith some insight into the reasons for Jung's unscientific
reputation. (A summary of our conclusions as to the extent to which
tliis reputations is deserved :rfll appear in the next chapter along
ijith our conclusions concerning attitudes necessaiy for science. )

T'fe proceed now to redeem a promise made on an earlier page to
consider questions of rationality in relation to the archetypal theoiy.
For recalling the context of the discussion in that section, ire T^re
considering the question of whether Jung was a ncrstic. .Although ire
concluded that Jung did not qualify as a UQrstic either on the grounds
of experience or because he held n^ystical beliefs, this conclusion
ims reached on the basis of a rather exact characterization ot rays-
ticisra. \k have still to consider ^Aether Jung is advocating views
resembling or analogous to nysticisni. !Ihese questions have to do TTith
the rationality of the archetypal theoiy. I-fe understand the problem
of whether Jung's vierrs are analogous to mystical vierrs as equivalent
then to the problem of v/hether the archetypal theory is scientific in
the loose sense of satisfying requirements of rationality. Only when
we have worted our way to a clear vie?/ of this question Tdll vre be in
position to properly assess the problem of whether Jung holds viei^ s
incompatible irLth an attitude necessaiy for science. 3h addition, the
extent to which Jung's therapy is justifiable on grounds of rationality
is at stake. For if Jung's theoretical views can be shorn to be irra-
tional, then we could hardly eapect the therapeutic attitude based on
such theoretical views to be justified.^

This question of requirements of rationalitj' comes to focus in
li^ht of the apparent similarity between the qualities of ineffability

Mi9

and paradoxicality which are said to characterize r^rstical experience
and what Jung says about the paradoxical nature of an^hetypal e:q»r-
ience and its symbolic character which "is never precisely defined
or may explained" (^ ^ m^ 9mS22ls, p. )4). Hov^ever, parenthe-
sizing the problematic of this sdMlarity for the time being (it
will be discussed at the end of this section), we can arrive at
this same question of requirements of rationality ftxjm other consid-
erations. For in light of the apparent difficulty in maintaining
an objective, theoretical level of discourse about archetypes, evi-
denced by the fact of the mixture of theoretical statements about
archetypes and statements of an interpretational character concerning
hmr we should relate to archetypal experience that .:e find in Jung's
^^tings, we might .;ell ask: Is a science of archetypes possible at
all? Rerhaps in light of the tremendous emotion-evoking quality of
numlnosity characteristic of the subject matter, the effort to defend
the rtudy of archetjTes as genuinely scientific is an idealistic fan-
ta^. One of Jung-s follormrs, Gerhard MLer, seems to be of this
opinion as expressed in the following passage;

Jung himself fought against the reproach of beinr
a philosopher or metaphysican or even a wstic.
iSiT J ^^^^ *his critician because he felt
that he had elevated his approach to the status
^;„^'^°fu''''?i ^S P^^haps, also, he was stUl
caught in the idealisation of the scientist's
^f^ ^P^^^Jfd by natural science, so rampant
1^ the first half of the centmy. Biere are ?ast
philosophical, metaphysical, and even inysti^al
aspects and implications in Jung's scientific
research and results .... 3

E^en Jung himself had moments of skepticism and doubt con-
ceding whether irrational phenomena lite archetypes .^re proper
subject matter for science.

150

3hdeed, I am persuaded that, in view of the tre-
inendous irrationalitjr and individuality of dreams.
It may be altogether outside the bounds of possi-
bility to construct a popular theoiy. T-hy should
Tre believe that everything i/ithout exception is
a fit subject for science? ... It might be
better to look upon dreams as being more in the
nature of irorlcs of art instead of mere obse^-
163-1610 ^^ ^°'' *^° ^i^^ist (Vol. XTIl/pages

Of course, scientific is a characteristic of a method of study
rather than a subject matter per se. But in this regard T-re w)uld
naturally expect that some subjects lend themselves more easily to
the methods of science than do others. Certainly p^hology is one
of the most difficult subject matters to study in a rigorous scientific
way. Moreover, i-dthin p^hology itself Jung's interests can be eas-
ily identified as subjects which are at least at the veiy frontier of
scientific endeavor, subjects which have either just begun to attract
scientific attention or else have been given no previous scientific
consideration at all. Such subjects as astrology, alchencr, UFO's,
I Ching, and ESP are among Jung's professional Interests in addition
to inve^dgations into the delusional ^sterns of the insane and the
world^.:ide literature of HBrsticism, i^hology, and religions of all
sorts. Vfe might even chance a stTeeplng generalization and say that
Jung's chief area of Investigation was the irrational in all of its
multlfona manifestations, ^though such a generalization perhaps
stands in need of some qualification, it is ea^ to see ho^r as an
approximate truth this fact of Jung's professional interest in the
occult and the irrational could lead to the conclusion that there
is a simllanty between the subject matter and its investigator.
Jung addresses this problem in the following passage:

151

ff you call me an occultist because I am seriously in-
;vestigating relif^ous, ncrtholocdcal. fbUdoristie^and
philosopliical fantasies inmodem ir.H^-n^^»^T^^n^ •^-
ancient tercts, then you are bound to diagnose Prettd
as a issj^ pervert, since he is doing lifedse^with
seroial fantasies, and the psychologically inclined
cnrainologist must neisds be a gaol-bird. It

is not^ responsibility that aichenor is occult
and ystical, and I an jusfc as guilty of the imrs-
txcal delusions of the insane or the peculiar
creeds of manldnd (Letters, Vol. H, p. 186.
letter to Calvin S. Hall dated 6 October 1951;).

though this sort of identification betiTeen a subject matter

and its investigator is easily e.xposed as an error if taken as a

necessaiy or universal type of relationship, it nonetheless contains

an element of truth .dth respect to some individuals. For ^m wonder

if there is not, as a matter of fact, some relationship betireen Freud's

professional preoccupation Td.th sex and his otm sercual problems, be-

te^een his theoiy of the Oedipus complex and the facts of his oim

family histoiy. As an analogous case, Jung had an abundance of first

hand experiences idth the irrational i7hich i^as the source for at least

part of the motivation for his researches as he confesses below:

I was particularOy satisfied with the fact that
you clearly understand that I am not a ncrstic but
an empiricist. It is true hoirever that a vivid
interest in religion and religous truth has
guided iht: research (Letters. Vol. I, p. 237
letter to Norbert DreiTitt dated 2$ September 1937).

I'Jien TTe consider then the fact of Jung's interest in the irrational

in regard to the question of the possibility in principle of a science

of archetypes, we can conclude on the one hand that the irrationality

of a subject matter should not disqualify it as legitimate suba'ect

matter fbr scientific study, si^e a scientific statement about the

irrational need not itself be an irrational statement. But, on the

other hand, we must acknowledge certain practical problems for

1^2

scientific rtudy T-Mch arise due to the irrational nature of arche-
types. Tn this regard a mjor practical problem seems to be the diffi-
culty of maintaining a suitable scientific attitude of objectivity and
detachment. This is reflected in the problem of the ttro levels of dis-
course asTTe saw hoTT Jung frequently shifts from an objective scientific
level of discourse to a subjective, personal levBl or therapeutic level.
Ihis problem is also exemplified in the ve:y close relationship that
exists beti-reen Jung's life and wk. For it seems to be the case that
archetypal experience does not produce only objective scientific know-
ledge but also a personal involvement. One does not only assimilate the
archetypes to one's scientific understanding, but in a sense one's
overall outlook becomes modified by the archetypes. One not only gains
a scientific concept of the irrational, there is, at least in the ideal
case, a coming to terms T/ith the irrational forces inside oneself.

P^ the therapeutic perspective then Jung can be seen to advocate
the necessity for direct involvement ,nth the irrational forces exper-
ienced in the unconscious. Particularly in regard to this perspective,
we need to detentdne the theoretical justification for what Jung says
about the irrational. Bius vre need to knot-; whether .*at Jung says
about the irrational can itself be justified by rational means. 3h
this respect it is essential to understand what theoretical claijns
Jung is tiyijig to defend in relation to the irrational. In par-
ticular we need to faiow what Jung understands by this terra.

I-fe find then that Jung closely associates the irrational idth
unconscious processes, whereas for Ixbn rationaHty is a correlate of
consciousness.

153

ITo natter, hm beautiful and perfect man ma^r believe
his reason to be, he can always be certain that it
xs only one of the possible nental functions, and
cavers on3y that one side of the phenomenal vorld
which corresponds to. it. But the irrational, that
which is not agreeable to reason, rings it about
on all sides, ilnd the irrational is Ulcewise a
p^hological function—in a word, it is the collec-
tive unconscious^ whereas the rational is essentially
tied to the conscious mind (Vol. i/TI, p. 71).

To a large erfcent, then, the statements which Jung nalces about the
UMts of reason and the intellect for comprehending the totality of
experience can be seen to be the result of his vier-r that conscious-
ness has a necessarily incomplete comprehension of the totality of
the unconscious.

There are several related reasons that Jung gives for the loirita-
tions of consciousness to fully comprehend the unconscious. The first
has to do idth the fact that loiowledge of the unconscious necessarily
is the product of its interaction TnLth consciousness. Since conscious-
ness always mediates the erqjerience of the unconscious, Jung argues
that there is a sense in which we never Imovr the unconscious itself
but only as it interax:ts idth the more or less interferring medium
of consciousness.

Between the conscious and unconscious there is a
kmd of 'Uncertainty relationship," because the ob-
server is inseparable from the observed and always
disturbs it by tlie act of observation (Vol. IX-B, p. 226).

Tn the concluding chapter of L^ and I^s STiiibols. II.L. von Franz
elaborates this same argument.

^ohnoiT content that I comes up from the unconscious

^.^^"^t ^J-^^ ^^^'^ °^*"^^ ^ ^®^S partly ihte-
^ated into the conscious mind of the observer.
Ihren dream contents (if noticed at all) are in that
\i^ semi-conscious. J\nd each enlargement of the
observer's consciousness caused by dream inter-
pretation has again an iinraeasurable repercussion
and influence on the unconscious.^'

1^1

As ire havB previously remarked on other occasions, Jung likes

to think about the archetype per se in terms of Kant's concept of

the thing-in-itself. Ihus, he fi^equently makes the move from assei-ting

that there exists an uncertainty relationship bettreen conscious and

unconscious to the statement that the ultlinate nature of the archetype

per se is unlmotrable in principle as a thing-in-itself,

nh Ilysterium Coniunctionis iter psychology was at
last given its place in reality and established
upon its historical foundations, , , , jQie mo-
ment I touched bottom, I reached the bounds of
scientific understanding, the transcendental,
the nature of the archetype per se, concerning
vrhich no further scientific statements can be
made (Ifemories. Eireams. Inflections . p. 221).

A third reason for asserting the limitations of consciousness to
completely comprehend the unconscious is derived from the consideration
that, as a matter of fact, consciousness is limited and finite in
potential capacity, vjhereas the unconscious, although not infinite,
contains a much larger relative store of content. Since consciousness
is only possible through a restriction of attention, this narrower
scope of consciousness means then that consciousness cannot be atrare
of all aspects of the unconscious. Although this line of reasoning
strictly shorrs that consciousness is liMted only at any one tine
to what it can be ai-xare of , it is Jung's claim that the overall po-
tential capacity for consciousness is limited, and that thus our
attempts to make our actions and endeavors conipletely articulate and
transparent to consciousness ^dll alirays fail, and the unconscious in
all its manifestations can never be completely assimilated to a con-
scious awareness,

« . , even the most matter-of-fact contents of
consciousness have a penumbra of uncertainty about

15?

them. Even the most carefully defined philosopM-
cal or mathematical concept, which Tre are sure
does not contain more than we have put into it
is nevertheless more than we asstime (Ikn and liis
^t>ols, p. 29),

Since we do not know everything, practically every
experience, fact, or object contains something un-
knom. Ifence, if to speak of the totality of an
e:>5)erience, the \-iovd "totality" can refer only
to the conscious part of it (Vol. XL, p. la).

The fact that the unconscious is never completely assimilated

to consciousness means then that for Jung human Kdstence always

consists to a large e:ctent of essentially irrational aspects and

that consciousness and rationality are alxTays circumscribed by

the irrational and vmconscious.

. • . the rational is counterbalanced by the
irrational, and irhat is planned and purposed
by what is (Vol. IX-A, p. 9U).

Biat is, I do not believe that reason can be
the supreme law of human behaviour, if only
because e^qperience shows that in decisive
moments behaviour is precisel;^'- Mt guided
by reason but rather by overpor-zering un-
conscious impulses (Letters. Vol. I, p.
402, letter to Pastor H. Ifegmann dated
12 December 19li5).

I'fe have on the contrary good grounds for
supposing that . . . QjJ?e and fat^ axe
irrational, or rather that in the last
resort they are grounded beyond human
reason (Vol. VU, p, h9)»

But from the fact that Jung holds that human erf.stence and reason
do not mirror each other perfectly can to then conclude that at least
certain aspects of experience li.e beyond the grasp of reason alto-
gether? Jung apparently thinks Ithat this in fact is the case. For
he says that "there is a certairi incommensurability beti^een the ^s-
tery of existence and human understanding" (Vol. XII, p. 212),

Of course, it is just the archetypes of the collective unconscious

1?6

that Jung has in irrijid as regards this "mystery. "

^ these TTOrds Preud was expressing his conviction
that the unconscious still harboured many things
that wiglit lend themselves to "occult" interpre-
tation, as is in fact the case. Ohese "archaic
vestiges" or archetypal foms grounded on the
instxncts and giving expression to them, have
a numinous quality that sometimes arouses fear.
Ihey are ineradicable for they represent the
Ultimate foundations of the psyche itself.
Bigir cannot be grasped intellectually, and when
one has destroyed one manifestation of them,
they reappeai' in altered form (Italics mineO
(Vol. X, p. 272).

nh order to understand Jung's position on the irrational then,
we need to get clear about precisely what he means by "incommen-
surability" and "cannot be grasped intellectually." Although it
may seem that in this regard what Jung says about the archetypes
is veiy similar to mystical utterances, there is one sense in which
what he means is vexy mundane. For in pointing to an incommensura-
bility bett-reen archetypal experience and the understanding, part of
what Jung wants to emphasize is the particular quality of the lived
experience of archeiypes which is not adequately captured by concepts.

Harever, many e^^^eriences of an emotional nature have in common
idth archetypes this feature of relative ineffability, i.e., the fea-
ture of the relative inadequacy of concepts to e:5>ress their lived
quality. The particular emotive quality of a beautiful sunset, for
example, is best e:cpressed by a poem or a painting rather than hy a
concept. Because of the numinosity of the archetypes then, a concept
of archeiypes does not adequately convey th^ir essential nature as
experienced.

Hbi^ver, considerations about the relationship between the exper-
ience of archetypes and the formulation of a theoretical understanding

1^7

are not particularly crucial in regard to the question of the ra-
tionality of archetypal theoiy. For Jung does not maintain that an
intuitive knoirledge of archetypes based on their iinniediate e^^perience
is the only sort of understanding of them possible. Rather he main-
tains on the whole that intuition is not sufficient for intellectual
knoi/ledge.

The safe basis of real intellectual Imowledge
and moral understanding gets lost if one is
content vri.th the vague satisfaction of having
understood by "hunch." One can explain and
loiow only if one has reduced intuitions to
an exact knowledge of facts and their logical
connections (Lfan and ig.s Symbols, p. 82).

On the other hand Jung frequently points out the inadequacy of

an intellectual understanding as a substitute for the experience of

confronting the unconscious and the archetypes in a therapeutic con-

text.

It IS precisely our e:cperiences in psychology
which demonstrate as plainly as could be ^-dshed
that the intellectual "grasp" of a p^chological
fact produces no more than a concept of it, and
that a concept is no more than a name, a flatus
vocis (Vol. IX-B, p. 32). - ■

I'fe can understand then that from the therapeutic perspective it
is just the emotive qualities of archetypes and the particular pro-
blems of value and purpose in relation to the individual's life as
brought into focus by archetypal e^jperience that are of utmost im-
portance. Ihus much Of what Jung has to say against reason must be
understood in a therapeutic context. In this respect it is a misuse
of reason rather than reason itself which is the object of vilification.

... a relativation of rationalism is needed, but

?M„^/ ^ ^^? °^ '^^^°"' ^o^ *he reasonable
thing for us xs to turn to the inner man and his

S^ 2fuf ^^Si^ ^°1- ^* p. ^Q6, letter to
iaigen Bohler dated 8 Januaiy 1956).

158

The great difficxaty seems to consiErt in the fact
that on the one hand ire nust defend the sanity
and logic of the huinan rdnd, and on tlie other
hand \m have to accept and to irelcome the exis-
tence of illogical and irrational factors trans-
cending our coEQjrehension (Letters. Vol, IT, p,
53, letter to Father Victor Ihite dated 9 April
1952).

It would seem evident then that if aXL Jung has in mind by his
"cannot be grasped by the intellect" is to emphasize the practical
therapeutic aspects of vrorking iTith the archel^Tpes on an experiential
level that the question of rationality need not be considered as a
serious problem, Hoijever, in addition to the practical problems of
assimilating archetypes into one's experience on a personal basis,
Jung apparently feels that the archel^'pes also pose particular pro-
blems for theoretical understanding, Tliis point is well exemplified
in regard to the symbolic manifestations of archetypes.

To the scientific rdnd, such phenomena as ^ym-
bolic ideas are a nuisance because they cannot
be formulated in a way that is satisf actoiy to
intellect and logic (Vbn and m^ SK/mbols. p, 80),

It symbol has a i7±dev "unconscious" aspect
that is never precisely defined or fully ex-
plained. Ilor can one hope to define or ex-
plain it. As the mind e:q)lores the ^^nnbol,
it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp
of reason (rfen and ffi^s Symbols, p. U).

This metaphorical way of talldng about what lies beyond the grasp
of reason can be made clearer as -VTell as more plausible if instead of
talldng about what can not be grasped or understood, vre say that arche-
typal eicperience can not be completely rationalized, That is, the
archetypal phenomena have a sort of cognitive autonomy which eludes
atter^ts to completely reduce it to an unambiguous rational foiroula-
tion. An exao^jle using the familiar phenomena of dreams helps clarify

159

this point*

Then TTO tiy to rationally understand a dream then, tre attenpt
an interpretatibn which translates the pictographic images of the
dream into words. Tfe encounter difficulties, hoTiever, because the
dream images frequentljr fail to confoiro to rational expectations of
order and logic. Ibreover, even T-dth the most in-depth interpretation,
\re somehow feel that something is lost in the transition from the
dream images to words. Si addition to the emotive content which is
difficult to convey in xrords, it seems that the dream has its aim
way of cognitive e:q)ression which an interpretation does not com-
pletely capture. The dream linages then repx-esent a certain gestalt
of meaning which often resists translation into a linear sequence of
ideas.

Ibreover, lihen rre say that a dream or other manifestation of
the unconscious can not be rationalized, what we previously dis-
cussed in terms of the inability of consciousness to completely
assimilate the unconscious must be bome in mind. Excepting Jung's
appeal to the Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself then, the ar-
guments TO mentioned there are additional reasons in support of this
vietr.

Our way of talldng in teiros of the inability of the unconscious
to be completely rationalized might seem to amount to the claim that
a complete conscious reduction of unconscious experiences is unadvisable.
And the objection could be raised at this point that if this is what
our claim amounts to, then it is not so much relevant to the question
of theoretical Imowledge as to the problem of how best to deal xdth
unconscious experience in a therapeutically beneficial way. Prom

160

the theoretical perspective, it Trould seem that it is jusfc our task
to try to make unconscious e:q)erience intelligibile, i.e., to ration-
alize it.

Hoifever, in spite of Jung's unfortunate uay of expressing hdm-
self in teims of ,rhat lies beyond the grasp of reason, Tvhat he has
in ralnd does apply to the theoretical loioi-aedge of archetypes, (itod,
of course, it also has practical therapeutic implications.) For it
is his contention that to must make our theoretical statements about
the archetypes reflect the actijal nature of the phenomena. That ire
need to avoid in the problem of rationalizing the unconscious then
is the reading in of more order and logic than is really there. If
vie think of dreams in tenns of their being only inf onnational static
or noise in the braiji, for example, an explanation satisfactory to
the rational need to account for such disturbing phenomena in a
theoretically elegant way, ,re not only fail to benefit frem them
in a practical ixay, but to also miss the distinguishing feature
of the phenomena itself, the fact that its cognitive content con-
stitutes a meaningful message Trtiich can be shorm to compensate the
conscious attitude. Thus Jung .rants to argue that a conscious re-
duction of unconscious experiences is inadvisable not only in terms
of the practical situation of the individual dreamer but also frem
the standpoint of scientific methodology.

The problematic of the rational reduction of unconscious processes
must also be kept in mind when to tiy to understand Jung's attitude
tovrard the paradoxical. Tn regard to the paradoxical then, to often
find Jung associatiJig the paradoxical and the metaphysical. For he
says that metaphysical assertions can only be adequately foimulated

161

in an antinomial way.

Eroiy metaphysical judgment is necessarily antinomial,
since it transcends eacperience and must therefore be
complemented by its counterposition (Letters. Vol, II -
p. 25I;, letter Pastor Jakob Anstutz dated 23 Ifey 195^),

Hius, when we state a metaphysical truth in a paradoxical way,

T-re express what Jung sees as its quality of unknoirability,

Paradox is a characteristic of tlie ftiostic
iTTitings, It does more justice to the unloiowable
than clarity can dc^ for uniformity of meaning
robs the raystery of its darlmess and sets it up
as something that is knoxm (Vol. XC, p, 275),

Paradox is a characteristic of all transcendental
situations because it alone gives adequate ex-
pression to their indescribable nature (Vol. K-B, p. 70),

This use of paradoxical then linlcs the paradoxical xd-th a meta-
physical way of interpreting archetypal experience, Ilh this regard
there is a real similarity irith the way in which ncrstical experience
is commonly interpreted. But irrespective of Jung' s Kantian views
on the appropriateness of an antinomial expression for the metaphysi-
cal, it seems that there is no problem trith rationality here since to
say that archetypal experience is frequently described in paradoxical
tenns is itself not a paradoxica] statement.

Hoirever, Jung also means not only that the ascription of paradox-
ical qizalities to archetypal experience applies to the interpretation
of the experience in metaphysical terms but also that it applies to
a metaphysically neutral description. But in the latter regard when
\re say that archetypal experience is paradoxical, this amounts to a
restatement of the considerations about the problem of rational reduc-

tion of archetypal experience.

For rather than as assertion that the

experience cannot be described eiscept by contradictory predicates.

162

this Treak sense of paradoxical implies onHy that you can not pxn

doi-m the experience and nalce it unambiguous j i.e., it is open to

different interpretations. This use of paradoxical is then not

an assertion that the eiqperience transcends logic altogether (the

n^rstical sense of parado:dcal), but onOy that it is veiy ambiguous.

For example, the frequent archetypal symbol of the snalce conibines

both negative and positive qualities. "Hence it is an e:ccellent

^JTiibol for the tiro aspects of the unconscious: its cold and ruthless

instinctuality, and its Sophia quality or natural Tdsdoiii, which is

eribodied in the archetypes" (Vol. "CTII, p. 333),

Ibreover, this ambiguity of the manifestations of the unconscious

reflects for Jung the tension beti^en the conscious and the unconscious

attitudes. The symbols from the unconscious change their form then

in response to the conscious attitude (see page 70). The symbols

are a reflection of this c^Tnamic relationship between conscious and

unconscious and thus often represent a ^oithesis of oppo sites.

And since the ssjiribol derives as much from the con-
scious as from the unconscious, it is able to
unite them both, reconciling their conceptual
polarity through its foim and their emotional
polarity through its mondnosity (Vol. IX-B, p. I80).

Ihat can ire say then about the rationality of Jung's treatment

of the archetypes? 2h the first place it is obvious that Jung's

sage statements about the untaioTrable are not satisfactory; i.e., i-re

want to loiOT-r on iihat grounds he can talk meaningfully- of what is un-

knovrable. This sort of tallc seems to imply a transhuman perspective

from ifhlch the relationship beti-reen our trays of knouing and the world

can be detenidned. However, as has been pointed out on other occasions,

there is no necessity to follow Jung's I^tian line in order to

163

rationaUy reconstruct the archetypal theoiy. Md T*en t^ no longer
think of the archetype per se as a thing-in-itself, many of Jung's
least rational sounding statements need no longer concern us.

But if ire disregard Jung's Kantian viei/s on the unlmovable, what
Jung s^s about the irrational seems to be both reasonable and de-
fensible on empirical grounds. If there is a genuine similarity here
between inysticism and Jung's views, it is that both concur in the
discoveiy of genuine irrational aspects of e:{perience. Hoirever,
Tijhereas the nystic says that vre have to accept this irrational given
and abandon efforts to understand it rationally, it is always Jung's
position that vre must try to assijnilate the irrational with our ra-
tional understanding as best we can. JSnd although Jung's view that
the rationality of consciousness as a matter of fact cannot completely
assimilate and rationalize the unconscious may seem at first sight
to be the veiy repudiation of the methodology of science, it is Jung's
claim that far from deserting science his phenonenological method of
approach to the archetypes provides the key for a valid objective
understanding of them. \k need to examine this phenomenological
method then in order to see irhether it in fact qualifies as a valid
and adequate scientific methodology.

Jung's IfethoHnlnprw
]h discussing the topic of Jimg's methodology, it is important
to understand what substantive issues are at stalce. 3h the first
place then, i-re are atteiiipting to get clear about the grounds for
Jung's claim that his study of archetypes is a scientific enterprise.
This question, moreover, must be considered in the context of the
discussion of the last section T.^here the problem of the rationality

161;

Of the archetypal theoiy was taloen up. There it was emphasized that
although scientific statements about the irrational need not them-
selves be irrational, there are nonetheless special problems involved
iJi £rtudylng archetypes which fi«ora the theoretical perspective we
described by talldjig of the difficulty of accomplishing a rational
reduction of archetypal experience, i.e., the need to allow for a
certain inherent ambiguity i^ the phenomena in order to characterize
them properly. Ife need then to discover what actual consequences
for the study of archetypes these considerations of the problem of
the rational reduction produce.

If ire inquiore how Jung understands what he is doing, ire discover
then that he asserts that his psychological views fall id.thin the
domain of natural science, although science \r±th certain special
limitations. "ihaOytical psychology is fundamentally a natural
science, but it is subject far more than any other science to the
personal bias of the observer" (l^femories, Breams, Reflections « p.
200).

The problem of subjectivity enters into psychology then at the
theoretical level. Jung likes to enphasize that this is due to the
fact that in psychology to have no e:rf;rapsychological point of vie;-:
from which to view the phenomena since all observations are themselves
p^chological processes. "... in contra^ to a^y other scientific
theory, the object of psychological e:cplanation is consubstantial
;,d.th the subject: one psychological process has to e:cplain another"
(Vol. VI, p. i^k). I

l^reover, this difficulty ^cLth objectivity is, as previously-
discussed, especially relevant trlth regard to the observation of

16^

unconscious processes. "• . . . this uncontroUable reactive effect
of the observing subject on the unconscious limits the objective
character of the latter 's reality and lends it at the same time a
certain subjectivity'" (Vol. .VUI, p. 229, note 130).

For Jung this dilemna of subjectivity in p^chology necessitates
tlie toleration of a plurality of vievjpoints. Vh must realize, then,
that a psychological theory ndrvors tlie psychology of its foimulator.
"The assumption that only one psychology exists or only cgie fundamental
psychological principle is an intolerable tyranny, a pseudo-scientifLc
prejudice of the common man" (Vol, VI, p. hi).

This point of the plurality of theories in psychology is developed
in the context of Jung's theoiy of types. He sometimes argues, there-
fore, that the necessity of considering a plurality of theories must
be taken to the ejctent of admitting one "true" theoiy for each type.

I believe that other equally "true" explanations
of the psycliic process can still be put fon-7ard,
just as many in fact as there are types (Vol. VI, p. k93)»

For, besides his otm theoiy, he would have to
regard seven other theories of the same process
as equally true, or, if that is saying too much,
at least grant a second theory a value equal to
his cam (Vol. VI, pages h90-h9l).

I am quite convinced that a natural process which
is very largely independent of htmian psychology,
and can therefore be viewed only as an object,
can have but one true explanation. But I am
equally convinced that the explanation of a
camplezt psychic process vrhich cannot be ob-
jectively registered by any apparatus must
necessarily be only the one which that sub-
jective process itself produces (Vol. VI, p. k9l).

In addition to the problem: of the typological bias of an inves-
tigator making a truth claim in psychology, Jung also states that we
must be prepared to see these truth claims as relative rather than

166

absolute since due to the polaristic nature of the p^he (conscious
and unconscious attitudes do not coincide), to mu^ be prepared to
admit the reverse of our claim as also valid.

Because p^jnchology basically depends upon balanced
opposities, no Judgment can be considered to be
final in trhich its reversibility has not been
taloen into account (llan and His Symbols « p. 'k7),

. « . . T-re must observe the rule that a p^yxshological
proposition can only lay claim to significance if
the obverse of its meaning can also be accepted
as true (Vol. WI, p, 115).

rioi'7 if the above considerations are the sorts of things Jung
has in mind as a way of reraeding the special problems with subjec-
tivity in psychology, we might well wonder if the solutions are
not as problematic as the difficulties for which they are to be
remedies. However, Jung's statements about the relativity of truth
in pgychology and the necessity for admitting the validity of a
plurality of theories remain more or less theoretical methodological
ideals for Jung rather than actual practises he observes.

Bi any case these sorts of considerations are actually more re-
levant to problems of practical applications of theoretical reason-
ing in theraw than they are problems of theory itself. For example,
in doing therapy Jung emphasizes that the therapist must never put
the desire for tlieoretical confimation of his pet theoiy above the
need to understand the patient as an individual. Ibreover, it is
just in therapy that the potential conflict of personalities as a
result of differing personality types is most Ireenly relevant. Then,
the need to consider questions from the standpoint of both the con-
scious and unconscious attitudes comes to focus mo^ clearly in
regard to the working out of the individual's personal problems.

167

To generalize, as Jung sometimes does on these points, from what
is useful in therapor to what is necessaiy for a theoretical psycho-
logical understanding in general is at best a questionable move. It
is alvrays open to us, hoi/ever, to accept the p^chological facts of
subjectivity that Jung points to >dthout dra.dng the same conclusions
for theoretical understanding in p^hology. That is, ue can admit
that there is a real problem i/ith subjectivity vdthout having to
concede that truth claims in p^chology can onOy be considered valid
relative to individual personalities.'''

But we may consider the queiErtion of subjectivity in psychology
as a generalization of the problem of the rational induction of arche-
typal e>:perience. 3h regard to que^ions of methodology then, if .re
can satisfactoil2y detennine the allegedily scientific method ty which
Jung studies archetypes, vre need then not be unduly concerned if some
of the things that Jung says about psychological methodology in general
seem to be problematic,

Ife discover, then, that Jung recommends a phenomenological tech-
nique for the scientific ^uc^ of archetypes. Here it is essential
to understand what he means by phenomenology. The tem connotes
for him a theoretically unbiased observation of phenomena. It is
clear, moreover, that the Plreudian technique of dream interpretation
(see page 101 ) is the sort of unphenomenological theory-biased con-
strual of unconscious phenomena to which Jung is opposed.

Ifevertheless, it cannot be maintained that the
phenomenological point of viet; has made much
headt^ay. theory ^ill plays far too great a
^^f S ?f °£_t'eaJig included in phenomenology
as It should. Even Preud, whose empirical atti-
tude xs beyond doubt, coupled his theoiy as a
S£e aua non vdth his method, as if psychic

168

phenomena had to be vie^red in a certain light
in order to mean something (Vol. IX-A, p. ^),

Here the interpretation must guard against
making xise of any other vieiTpoints than those
manifestly given hy the content itself. If
someone dreams of a lion, the correct inter-
pretation can only lie in tlie direction of
the lion . . . (Vol. XTH, p. 88).

mat this phenomenological method entails for Jung becomes more
evident in the folloTjing where in response to a challenge that his
stu<fy of archetypes is not grounded on a scientific method, Jung
states what is his understanding of that method.

I can entirely subscribe to your statement ....
"as (the scientific method's) tool is the
objective observation of phenomena. Bien comes
the classification of the phenomena and lastly
the deriving of mutual relations and sequences
between the observed data, thereby maldng it
possible to predict future occurrences, which,
in taira, must be tested ty observation and
experiment, " if, I must add, the e:cperitnent is
possible , . . (letters. Vol. n, p. 567,
letter to E.A. Bennet dated 23 June i960).

As may be expected, Jung's method of studying the archetypes
does not employ an experimental technique.

Every science is descriptive at the point where
xt can no longer proceed ej^ieriraentally, vdthout
on that account ceasing to be scientific (Vol.
IX-A, p. 55).

Analytical psychology differs from esqjerimental
psychology in that it does not attempt to isolate
individual functions (sense functions, emotional
phenomena, thought-processes, etc.) and then
subject them to experijnental conditions for
puiposes of investigation. It is far ii»re
concerned Td.th the total manifestation of
the p^che as a natural phenomenon— a highly
complex structure , . |. (Vol. XVII, pages 91-92).

Jung justifies his nonexperimental method of study by pointing

out that as a medical psychologist he has to investigate the phenomena

as they appear in his patients without being able to institute

169

controls and manipulate variables. In Ifeslow's terms Jung's psy-
chology is problem-centered rather than method-centered.^

• • . academic pi^ychology , , , prefers to avoid
conQDlex situations by asking ever simpler questions,
which it can do vrith impunity. It has full freedom
in the choise of questions it \d21 put to Nature.

I'fedical psychology, on the other hand, is very
far from being in this more or less enviable
position. IJevQ the object puts the question and
not the experimenter. Bie analyst is confronted
\rith facts which are not of his choosing and
which he probabOy never would choose if he were
a free agent (Vol, X, p. 272).

The difference between this and all earlier
psychologies is that analytical psychology does
not hesitate to taclde even the most difficult
and coii5)licated processes, iinother difference
lies in our method of procedure. ... Our
laboratory is the world. Our tests are con-
cerned xriLth the actual, day-to-day happenings
of himan life, and the test-subjects are our
patients, relatives, friends, and, last but
not least, ourselves (Vol. ]{VII, p. 92).

But if it is clear that the primary context of discovery for the
archetypes is the clinical situation, it must not then be concluded
that this is also the only context of validation. For when Jung uses
the tenn phenomenological for his method of study, this should not be
understood to mean that it is entirely dependent upon introspective
techniques. Ihe other term "empirical" that Jung employs for his
method of study is then in some respects more descriptive.

Jung thus emphasizes the necessity of supplementing the findings
derived from work vrith patients by examining the manifestations of
archetypes in a cross-cultural contercfc. For irfien the same sorts of
phenomena as appear in the clinical situation can be seen as exemplified
in the art, literature, rcrthology and religion of many different cul-
tures, this gives the archetypes an erctraclinical and publicably

170

observable dimension. Jung then likes to conipare his method of study
of archetypes to that of comparative anatoncr. "i-^ scientific metho-
dology is nothing out of the ordinary, it proceeds exactly like
comparative anatoi^jr, on3y it describes and compares psychic figures"
( letters y Vol. I, p. 360, letter to Pastor Ilaz Prischlmecht dated
7 iipril 19k^).

The psychologist must depend therefore in the
highest degree upon historical and literary
parallels if he ijishes to eroclude at least
the crudest errors in judgment (Ifemories,
Dreams, reflections, p. 200).

STmbolisra has today assuned the proportions of
a science and can no longer make do vdth more
or less fanciful se:aial interpretations. SLse-
where I have attempted to put symbolism on
the only possible scientific foundation, namely
that of comparative research (Vol. WII, p. IO6),

In our discussion of Jung's scientific methodology, one chief
question remains to be explored. This question has to do xjith what
Jung sees as the appropriate method of characterizing archetypes.
For if we understand that the phenomenological method tries to pro-
duce an accurate description of the archetj-pal phenomena which is as
theoretically unbiased as possible, it seems evident Jung takes this
to imply that his descriptions of the archetypes must mirror the
phenomena described iji the sense that they are themselves aiabiguous
descriptions,

I don't know whether I ought to be glad that w
desperate attempts to do justice to the reality
of the psyche are accounted "ingenious ambiguity".
At least it aclmowledges ncr efforts to reflect,
as best I can, the "ingenious ambiguity" of
the^psjTche. . . . The language I speak must be
ambiguous, must have two meanings, in order to
do justice to the dual aspect of our psychic
nature. I strive quite consciously and

171

deliberately for ambiguity of expression, because
it is superior to unequivocalness and reflects
the nature of life (letters. Vol. II, pages 69-70,
letter to R.J, Ztri T'ferbloi^slsy dated 17 June 19^2),

Ife must, hcnrever, di^binguish here betireen two senses of ambiguous
description. Qn the one hand, there are empiricaiay acc\trate descrip-
tions of ambiguity, and on the other hand, there are ambiguous des-
criptions of ambiguous phenomena.

But if Jung is all too often guilty of the latter type of am-
biguity, this should not prejudice our attitude toward the genuine
problem posed by the rational reduction. For irrespective of Jung's
individual style of description of archetypes, a plausible case can
still be made for the necessity of having our descriptions of the
archetypes take into account their Inherent ainbiguity.

1

In distinguishing betvreen the facts of archetypes versus the
attxtude one talces tw^ard them, this has the effect of distinguishing
the theoretical claims frem therapeutic considerations on the one
hand and frem philosophical interpretations of archetypal experience
on the other. Thus, it is misleading to say that in separating facts
frem attitudes in terms of the ttro levels of discourse ire have in
effect separated scientific from extrascientific claims about arche-
types. For what Jung says about horr to deal irf.th archetypes from the
therapeutic point of viev; is open to scientific critique and needs
scientific justification. Often, hoxjever, Jung can be seen to gen-
eralize frem therapeutic experience and to relate his views on vrhat
is^beneficial for man in general. In this way a great deal of philoso-
phcr does jm fact appear in Jung's i,rritings. Ih spite of Jung's avowed
disloke for the label of philosopher, it is tlms still very evident
tnat he is the son of a preacher.

J4 -^^ ^® dirtinguishing betireen the two levels of discourse as a
distinction beti/een scientific statements about arehetypes versus
personal meaningful interpretation is of course Jung's distinction.
It should be apparent that V7e have changed tlie meaning of the dis-
tinction slightly so that it nm distinguishes facts of archetypal
e^erience frem attitudes one t^iloes toiTards the experience. But
attitudes can mean one's o;m attitude, the personal meaningful
interpretation, or it can refer to i^at attitude is recommended frem
a_toerapeutic point of view. As a therapist Jung is naturally qua-
lilted to recommend appropriate attitudes. But irtien he does so, there

172

IS then the tendency to get involved Td.th philosophical statements.

men we argue for a separate consideration then of what Jung
says about the facts of archetypal experience versus ;jhat attitudes
he advocates \Te take toward them, this hopefully T-jill pave the way
for an objective consideration of the archetypes irrespective of
our attitude toward Jung's philosophizing,

Ibreover, by means of the distinction betiTeen the tiro levels
of discourse, we also save ourselves from having to specify the re-
lationship betireen the effectiveness of therapy and the truth of a
theoretical vieiTpoint. This is not to say that they are not inti-
mately related, but only that it is veiy difficult to deteniiine what
causes success or failure in therapy,

2

or course, it is possible that Jung's theory could be im-
peccably scientific wliile his therapeutic vie;jpoint ms open to ob-
vious criticisms. For a sound pi^chological theoiy does not auto-
matical3y lead to an effective therapeutic technique. Although in
the context of this study ire can not enter further into discussion
of Jung's ideas on therapy, it is our view that Jungian therapy on
the whole proves to be practicallly effective as iiell as theoreticallv
sound,

3

Gerhard MLer, "Analytical Psychology and the Principle of
oomplementarxty, in ^ii. -Analytic Process; Aims, Analysis. Training.
edited by Joseph B. Vheeli/right (Ifew York: G,P, Putnam's Sons, 1971),
p. 120. '

. r, ^'^ ^* ^°^ Franz, "Conclusion: Science and the Ifticonscious,"
in Jfen^and ps Symbols, edited by C.G. Jimg (New York: Dell, 196k),
pages 3o2-3o3.

The point of the inability of the conscious mind to completely
assimilate the unconscious ttUI be considered later in this section
Trfiere we will say that the unconscious can not be completely rationa-
lized. That discussion T/ill be a continuation of the sorb of reason-
ing presented here, Ife defer presentation of that discussion for the
sake of preserving the continuity of our argument.

Jung's -i^Tpology works trilth tiro attitude tjTes called extrovert
and introvert vjhich indicate the overall orientation of the individual
vrith regard to objective or subject processes respectively. There are
also four function types: intuition, tliinldng, feeling and sensation.
Together ^dth the attitude types tliis yields then eight basic types of
personality: an eictroverted intuitive, thinldng, feeling and sensing
type and an introverted intuitive, thinldng, feeling, and sensing type.

7

... Si fairness to Jimg it must be pointed out Jimg is usually
sensitive to a distinction between theoretical and practical knot/ledge
as outlined in the section on science and the individual, Horrever, as
KaeE^Oified m the passages cited here, Jimg sometimes is guilty of not
distfnguisliing between the practical requirements for applying a theoir
in therapy and requirements for the acceptance of a theoretical claim.

173

■4.U ' J. \' ^-^ psj^chologists Tjho choose to uork as best they can
tath ijiiporfcant problems (problem-centering) rather than restrictinjj
themselves to doing only that ^Aich th^ can do elegantly TTitli the
techniques alrea^ available (method-centering)." ia,raham K. Fasloxr,
The I-sycholo^ of .Science (Ife^ York: Harper and Ibn, 1966), p. 16.

CMPTER 7
THE STUDY OF AKCIffiTTPES AS A SCIEMTIFIC DISCIELnfE

Introduction

In the previous tiro chapters we have considered the question of
whether Jung holds viet/s incompatible lath those necessaiy for science
and also looked at the basis upon which he claims that his study of
archet^Tjes is scientific. From these discussions what can be con-
cluded concerning Jung's scientific vier/s?

In ttie first instance, it must be remarked that Jung's lutings
do not confom to any expectations vie may have had concerning what
constitutes ideal scientific >;riting. I-breover, this is due prin-
cipally to the fact that the works are not unifonnly scientific in
character. Ih this regard we have suggested that by separating the
theoretical claiins Jung makes for the archetypes from statements
where Jung discusses attitudes toward archetypal expei-ience, we could
e:camiiie the question of scientific status independent^^ of both what
Jung says about the archetypes from a therapeutic perspective and
from philosophical and religious implications which also appear in
Jung's work. But if such a distinction is successful in isolating
the question of scientific ^atus, this is not to sgy that we have
then purified the theoiy or arrived at its meaningful core, as if to
iJnp]y that Jung should have done this himself at the very beginning.
Such an attitude only confuses the logic of reconstruction and the

171;

17^

process of discoveiy. For if we admit that the ertrascientific
aspects of Jung's personality in fact dominate his >nltings as a
whole, this is not in the end to the disadvantage of scientific Iaio;f-
ledge. For it is onOy through the wholeness of Jung's personality
that we have such a theory which ire can then examine in terms of
scientific criteria, that is to say, it is only through Jung's in-
terest in and involvement Td.th the irrational aspects of e^cperience,
both as an individual and a therapist.

In regard to Jung's scientific views then, our arguments so far
have endeavored to sho;^ that Jung did in fact attempt to construct
a theoiy compatible idth scientific understanding. Considering the
highly irrational nature of the phenomena which are the objects of
such a theoiy, success in such an enterprise would most certainly
entitle Jung to be regarded as a truly great scientific pioneer and
investigator.

But did Jung in fact succeed in formulating a theoiy which can be
construed as a genuine scientific one? Ihstead of attempting to dis-
cuss necessaiy and sufficient criteria of what is scientific in general,
our approach to this question has been to e:camine possible reasons on
the basis of which the scientific label could be vrlthheld from Jung's
theory. Rather than attempting to show that Jung's theoiy is scientific
because of its similarity to paradigmatic models of science such as
physics and chemistiy, we have atteuqjted to estabU.sh that Jung's theory
is not unscientific. This sort of approach allows for a liberal under-
standing of >jhat constitutes a scientific theoiy. For rather than es-
tablishing a priori standards of \fhat science must be, we instead ex-
amine the putative scientific theoiy in regard to what it can in fact

176

acconplish toward a rigorous understanding of its subject matter.

But the sort of considerations we have discussed in regard to
shoidng that Jung's theoiy is not unscientific do not suffice to
establish the scientific status of the theoiy. For if we have
successfully shoim, for example, that the theoiy can be understood
as a rational theoiy and that religious and philosophical utterances
often associated vrith it are not a necessary part of the theoiy itself,
these are, for the most part, special problems of the archetypal theoiy.
The resolution of these problems is then necessaiy but not sufficient
to shov^ that the archetypal theory is not unscientific. There are
other considerations which must be Kcamined before the scientific
critic idll rest content. For to still need to discuss the problem
of falsiflability. Jh addition we need to show what sorts of pre-
dictions the theoiy can make and what e^qilanations resxat from it.

Ifi.th the examination of these remaining questions, the basis upon
which we trill advocate scientific status for the archetypal theoiy
Trill not be so liberal a basis as to admit other disciplines such as
astrology and numerology from which we would vrish to vrithhold the
scientific label. For these questions still to be discussed are the
sorts of questions which any discipline must be capable of anstjering
in a satisfactory way if it is to be included in the domain of science.

Falsifiability
A preliminaiy topic which must be discussed in confronting the
issue of falsifiability is the problem of specil^dng the basis on
which ^m claim that an archetype is present. The question at stake
here is brought into focus by the difficulties encountered by the

177

non-Juncian in detenrdning what observational ^ates of affairs count
as evidence for the presence of an archetype.

Bie existence and working of the Jungian arche-
types seems more difficult to deiaon^trate opera-
tionally: one can define objectively particular
stujiulus features or combinations of these, and
can say whether or not they are present? but
the Jungian archetypes have no clearly defined essential
features by which their presence may be un-
equivocany established, and so mai^ specific
features are included as possible manifestations
of one or another archetype that it is always
possible to claim one is present,

Ibreover, Jungians themselves, sometimes make statements which
seem to indicate that they see archetypes in everything. The follow-
ing statement from Jacobi thus indicates an attitude insensitive to
the problem of falsifiability:

fnd sijice all p^hic life is absolutely grounded
m archetypes, and since i-re can spealc not only
of archetypes, but equally well of archetypal
situations, e^gjeriences, actions, feelings,
insights, etc., any hidebound liMtation of the
concept would only detract fi-om its richness
of meaning and implication. ^

Ih order then to shm: that claims involving archetypes can not be
made compatible idth all possible observational states of affairs,
we must clearly indicate the observational basis for presence of
archetypes.

A clue to hoi; we can go about meeting this difficulty is provided
by reflections on the problem of individuation of ai^rhetypes. This is
the problem of hcnr to tell one archetype from another. This problem
is one manifestation of what :.;e have called the problem of the rational
reduction. For it seems that the archetypal phenomena do not readily
lend themselves to classification into unambiguous types.

178

These unconscious nuclei are the archetypes and
they can, up to a point, be classified and enumerated
through special images—the northologems—but they
have a tendency to, as it vrere, dissolve into each
other so that they seem at one time to be numerous
and at others to be a single entity.^

Vhen \ie speak of a problem of rational reduction, this is to
iJidicate that the ambiguity is inherent to the phenomena rather than
being a result of the inadequacy of the classificational criteria.
]h this regard it is helpful to consider the analogous preblem of
individuating species or other biological groups such as phyla.
Tihen TO consider then on what basis it is decided that in this
instance you have Uo species whereas in another instance only
one, we do not expect frem our taxanomist a definite decision pro-
cedure which can be applied in all problematic cases. Rather the
classification of species turns in the end not so much on a priori
criteria of species as on the reasonable judgment of the professional
taxonomist, subject to its acceptance by the professional taxonandc
community.

The poijit of this analogy is to indicate that iihen dealing with
naturally occurring complex phenomena precise operational definitions
can not be expected in regard to the classification of the basic en-
tities. Bius there are no simple answers to the question of where
to draw the line beti-reen one archetype and another. But although it
is unreasonable to expect a definitive decision procedure for dis-
tinguishing archetypes, nonetheless discriminations can be carried
out by the experienced Jungian practioner, although on analogy with
biological speciation this will not eliMnate the element of conven-
tionality and thus professional controversy concerning the specification
of specific archetypes.^

179

If ;re consider ttien the more general problem of the recognition

of archeiypes in regard to the difficultjr of the non-Jungian in

deciding -That to call an archelgrpe, the sort of ansner ire give is

one couched in terms of lack of experience Tzith the theoiy.

To understand the peculiar pheaomena of the arche-
-t^-pe one needs a lot of practical experience, f.i,
the numinous quality, so indispensable to the
recognition of an archetype, is an indefinable
imponderable like the expression of the human
eye, vrhich is indubitable yet indescribable
(Letters. Vol, II, p. h90, letter to Stephen
I. -Abrams dated 5 Iferch 19B9),

Bat of course the claim that difficulties ^dth the empirical inter-
pretation of the theory are due to lack of knowledge of the theoiy
or lack of expeirience in applying it in specific cases can easily
be construed as a possible defense against all critician of the
theoiy. For to say that only the person e:cperienced vrlth applica-
tion of the theory really knonrs lAether or not it applies in ai^
specific case seeras to Txork against the possibility of there being
criticisms of the theory from standpoints which do not alreadj-- assume it.

In order to understand Jung, it has been said,
one must experience Ms findings at first hand—
his -rork must be "at least partially lived
through and validated existentialOy, befoi^ it
can be throughly grasped on a conscious level"
Dra Rrogoff , Jung's Fs7/cholog,r and Its Social
ileaninf? (London: Pujutledge and Kegan Paul,
1953), p. ix^ Prom the academic side, by
contrast, comes the ai^ument that a consider-
able amount of direct contact is likely to
diminish objectivity. This, of course, is
the old dilemma often set forth for depth
p^chology in general—either one remains
outside and therefore insufficiently ac-
quainted ^Jith the facts, or one moves in-
side and is cured of the desire to
criticize. 5 ;

Itowever, although the practical difficulties i-rith ImoT-zing hot-?
to apply the theory do seem in fact to lead to a situation in which

180

oiOy experts ±n the theoiy can detennine hoi; it applies in a specific
case, this does not have the consequence of making the theoiy un-
falslfiable or ijtimune f rom the possibility of criticism. In order
to demonstrate this point, it Tdn be necessary to recapitulate
the observational grounds for asserting the presence of archetj^es.
Pficalling the discussion of this topic from Chapter 3, it was
stated that the chief difficulty ixx establisl^g the presence of
archetypes ms the fact that although the archetjije was postulated
to be part of the collective unconscious, the form of its manifes-
tation in the individual always reflected the cultural and personal
experiences of the individual. The problem of identifying the pre-
sense of archetypes then is one of distinguishing the personal and
collective contents. Ibreover, irhat i:as distinctive of the collec-
tive, archetypal contents iras, on the one hand, their sjonbolic and
numinisfcic qualities, and, on the other hand, their alien character,
i.e., the fact that they appear in consciousness T-dthout the indivi-
dual being able to account for then solely on tlie basis of his pre-
vious, personal experience. But these are introspective and subjec-
tive features and if the claiin that there are archetj^es just rested
on these types of claims, the critic ivould be justified in pointing
out the difficulties of establishing validation of introspective
reports. This difficulty would be accentuated by the fact that
the reports are usually made by patients in Jungian therapy. Ilorr-
ever, in addition to the subjective introspective reports of arche-
typal e.^rience, Jung points to! the presence of the same motifs in
the nytJiology, religion, art and literature of widely divergent
cultures. A loiowledge of cross-cultural ^^bology is then brought

181

to bear on the symbolic manifestations in the individual. The
clal.-u is that these cultural parallels help to ercplain the meaning
and diiplications of particular ^Tnbolic manifestations in the indi-
vidual in .rays .Aich can not be satisfactorily accounted for solely
lor appeal to the person's individual development or previous exper-
iences. M example of how this method is used to elucidate the
meaning of ^bols by appeal to cultural parallels helps clarify
this point.

I can remember many cases of people trho have
consulted me because they xrere baffled by their
aim dreams or by their cliildren's. They were
at a complete loss to understand the temis of
the dreams. The reason iras that the dreams
contained images that they could not relate to
anything that they could remember or would have
passed on to their children, . .
u /Ji^^ recall the case of a'professor who
had had a sudden vision and thought he was in-
sane. He came to see me in a state of complete
panic. I simp]y took a ItOO-year-old book from
tne shelf and showed h±a an old woodcut depicting
hxs very vxsxon. "There's no reason for ySu
to belxeve that you're insane," I said to him.

ihey laieT-7 about your vision 1|00 years ago. "
Ihei-^upon he sat doim entirely deflated, but
once more normal (I^and ^s 9ymbols, p. 58).

It should be evident then where the difficulty is encountered

in ImoTdng hoi. to apply the theory. For if the non-Jimgian has access

to the same data as the Jungian practioner, he could easily be shoim

that the mministic symbolic images >ri.th cross-cultural parallels

existed and that in this sense the^ were archetypes; but he .«>uld

be at a loss to say which archei^Tes he had been shoim or what was

their full meaning. Ih order to deal with the later problems and

employ the theory in a meaningful way, it Is thus necessaiy to gain

a worldng Knowledge of cross-cultural ^ymbologies. Ihis tdll entail,

for ezcample, a toor-rledge of the motifs of world^-dde ncrthologies and

182

religions. From the standpoint of its empirical basis then, it is
ea^ to understand uhy the archetypal theoiy is ft-equently not given
Mich seidous consideration. For the archetypal steptic frequently
lacks either extensive experience vrith unconscious phenomena or else
is unacquainted i/itli the sort of cross-cultural parallels :;hich
Jungians claim as validation for the theoiy.

But although confirmation of the archetypal theoiy vrould entail
a great deal of erudition, the validational basis of the theory, the
cross-cultural parallels, are nonetheless part of the public domain.
Ibreover, these de facto considerations concerning the practical
difficulty of gaining a working Imowledge of the employment of the
theoiy do not mean that the validity of the theoiy can not be evaluated
by.the non-Jungian. For although to understand ho-j the theory i-rorks
IJi a practical way involves specialised loiowledge, the theoiy claims
certain states of affairs which can be checked independently of a
detailed Imowledge of the manifestations of individual archetypes.
For example, the theoiy claims that archetypal manifestations
can be demonstrated in all races and civilizations of men ^/ithout
exception, llhat then will count as shotting that archetypes are
not present in a group of men? In this regard the ideal test case
wuld be a tribe which has not had previous cultural contact with
other human groups. Biis is to guard against the possibility of
the group having talccn over symbols threugh contact id.th other cul-
tures. To gather evidence against the archetypal theory, we have
to show that the group has no indigenous religious or nythological
symbols. This would in effect involve shovang that the group had
no indigenous religious or itcrthological beliefs.

183

Other consequsnces which follcyj from the archetypal theoiy in-
clude the postuiation of biological parallels to the archeiypes in
lotrer organians. For since the archetypes are assumed to arise
through the course of evolution, th^ must be prefigured in the other
animals. Ibreover, due to the close relationship uhich is postulated
bettieen the archetypes and the instincts, this is an especially critical
point since \ie vrould ercpect whatever instinctual aspects there are in
man to have homologies in the animal kingdom. (See page U7.) If the
efforts of the ethological school of animal behavior to demonstrate
the existence of innate patterns of behavior can be shoim to be
misguided, this trill count against the archetypal theoiy. Tims
in order to ma2<5e the archetypal theoiy viable, it must be shotm
that either ethology or some similar tjrpe of theory is valid.

A tliird consequence wliich follows from the archetypal theory
is the assertion that archetj'pes idll be manifested in altered states
of consciousness," Although this seems to be a very vague claim,
what it rules out is the situation iriiere archel^irpes appear only in
patients undergoing Jungian therapy or in individuals who have read
Jung, In this regard erqierimental results can be brought to bear
for or against the theoiy. If experimental techniques designed to
produce altered ^ates of consciousness uniformly do not produce ar^
sort of subject reports which describe phenomena similar to the
Jungian description of archetypal experience, then this vdll be
damning evidence against the theoiy, Ibreover, it must be emphasized
here that the reports of subjects can not be uniformly interpreted
as archetypal. Electrical stimulation of tlie brains of epileptics,
for ercample, tend to produce dream-like states, but they are easily

I81t

identified hy the subjects as being for the most part memories of
previous experiences,"^

Ihese three e^camples indicate x/hat sort of evidence rjOTild count
againsrt the theoiy, and thus what sorts of states of affairs are in-
compatible TTith it.^

Explanation
iO-though i-re can not enter here into all aspects of the question
of archetypal explanation, 5* one principle problem Td.th explanation
in the archelg^al theory is that it does not seem possible in prin-
ciple to predict tjhen an arche-t^fpe ijill be manifested nor what its
appearance Trfll be liloe except idthin broad outlines.

As has been stressed in this book, there are
no lairs governing the specific form in ijhich
an archetj'pe might appear, !Ihere are only
"tendencies" . , , that, again, enable us
to s^ only that such-and-such is likely to
happen in certain psychological situations. ^ ^

Hoirever, it is not reasonable to e:cpect lai;s depicting the re-
lationship betireen the arche-type per se and the archelypal image.
For the questions of when an archeiype appears and what its manifes-
tation vrtll be like are answered in terms of the interaction bett<reen
the innate archetype per se and the environment. The archetypal
Image is then always a product of these tv7o factors interactirig with
each other in a djoiamic way,

Biis often leads to a rtate of affairs in which we explain a
situation by appeal to the archetypal theory which ire could not have
predicted. For example, Jung attergjted to explain the phenomenon of

Jlational Socialism on the basis of the activation of specific arche-

1 1

■types in the German people. However, previous to the rise of Hitler

18^

and shortly thereafter Jung was imcertaln of vrhat outcome would ensue
flm the possession of the Gennan people by these archetypes.

In regard to explanation then, the archetypal theoiy is more like
evolution theoiy than Ifevrtonian mechanics. For prediction on the basis
of the principles of evolution, such as the prediction that the fittest
populations of organisms vdll survive, is always subject to environ-
mental circumstances which are subject to unforseeable changes. For
example, txhat species survives might be due as a matter of fact to some
environmental accident, such as location relative to the eruption of

a volcano, which has no relation to the organisms' adaptation to the

12
envxronment. Bius the coui-se of evolution can not be predicted

;ri.th certainty, although this does not mean that the theoiy of evolution
is not e:5)lanatoiy.

Oh the archetypal theoiy on the other hand, what is unforseeable
that prohibits reliable prediction of the outcome of behavior of
individuals or groups due to the activation of archetypes is exactly
how a nm archetypal manifestation irill intei^late Td.th the existing
cultural matrix. For example, we can explain the appeal of the cult
of Guru laharaj Ji, a teenage Indian who is celebrated as the messiali
by the Qlvine light ISlssion in the Ifeited States, on the basis of the
projection of the Archetype of the QLvine Child. ""^ T.^en xre attempt
to determine why this particular archetype is manifested in this
particular fom at this particular t±m in histoiy, the anstrers we
give in teims of the loss of numinosity of the traditional re-
ligious symbols and the consequent appeal of symbolic f onns from a
non-TfesteiTi culture which are different enough to seem neir and alive,
yet sijullar enough to the old symbols to be easily assimilated to the

186

existing culture. Horrever, due to the uniqueness and comple:d.ty of
the factors i/hich are involved in any pai-ticular time in histo:cy,
this ejqjlanation of the appearance of a neir manifestation of the
-Archetype of the Divine Child is not sufficient for us to make
law-like generalisations from TrirLch ^^ could then e:cpect e:cact
predictions.

If T'xe consider the situation in the individual rather than talk-
ing from a cultural perspective, the uncertainty^ t^ich prohibits
our loiOTTing exactly when an archetype trill appear and what its
manifestation trill be lilce is again due to the indeterminancy of
the relationship beti/een the innate archetype per se and environment.
For the appearance of archetypes is conditioned ly one's overall
knoijledge and eiqjeriencej^

Ibreover, trhereas from the cultural perspective the difficulty
vjith predicting archetypal manifestations is primarily due to the
complexity and uniqueness of the relevant factors (here archetypal
theoiy shares the same problems vriLth historical ejqilanation and pre-
diction), TTith regard to the individual there is the additional fac-
tor of an ethical issue. For in order to be able to separate the var-
iables at tfork in determinijig hot; environment conditions the appearance
of archetypes in the individual, tre trould need to perform an isolation
experiment on a human being lasting several years. ""^

In addition to the ethical problems tdth the isolation experi-
ment, another reason trliich compHcates the problems td.th determining
the appearance and manifestation of archetypes is the effect of the
conscious attitude. For the degree to which the individual trorks
t^th the archetypes and attempts to understand their relationship to

187

his personality effects hovj and when thej-- appear to the individual.
Ibreover, it is evident that Jung's irork in attenipting to trace this
relationship betvreen the phenomenology- of archetypes and the develop-
ment of personality as encompassed by his theoiy of individuation is
veiy much pioneer work and that much additional study on this matter
still needs to be done,

mth regard to e:cplanation and prediction ijith the archetypal
theory then, ire must conclude that two principle factors prohibit
the theoiy from being able to accomplish feats of explanation and
prediction similar to those of the physical sciences. Qn the one
hand, it is evident that the archetypal theory is an iinmature theory
in the sense that its full empirical implications have yet to be
worked out. Ibreover, in many respects the theoretical foundations
of the theoiy are still far from adequate. 1^ To mention one e:cample,
the relationship xrhich Jung has in mind bet^treen archetypes and in-
stincts needs to be more precisely specified. It has been one of
the goals of this study to attempt to make some progress in the
direction of clarif^ring foundational questions, but it must be con-
fessed that a great deal of further vrork in this direction needs to
be done before to could e:cpect its acceptance and widescale ectployment
in such obviously applicable areas as anthropology.

But, on the other hand, if we admit that the theory is an immature
theory, this is not to say that the theory is not scientifically
viable or that its methods are inadequate for what they attempt to
accomplish. For the complex nature of the subject matter imposes
certain definite limitations on T;hat vre could ej^ject from even a
foundationally impeccable archetypal theorjr whose empirical implications

188

had been throueh^jr trorked out. EspeciaUy id.th regard to e^^planation
and prediction then, ire can hardly e:qpect perfect knOTrledge in prin-
ciple from an archetypal theoiy.

Evidence
The archetypal image is postidated to be the end result of the
interaction betireen the innate archetype per se and the environment.
But from the discussion in the last section we sat: that the arche-
t^al theory does not attempt to specify precisely horr these two
factors interrelate to produce the archetypal image. Thus, in the
absence of axjy archetypal laws speciiying how these two factors inter-
act to produce the archetypal images, the question arises how the
innateness of the archetype per se is to be established. For if we
are not in fact able to separate these two factors through some type
of Isolation e:5>erdment, it might xrell seem that the claim that the
archetypes are innate rather than acquired as a result of e3:perlences
in individual development would be on very weak ground. Ifcreover, if
■we cannot sub^antiate the Innate nature of the archetype per se,
then the theoiy as a whole vrill lack a credible basis.

In this regard it is Instructive to consider in general the sort
of evidence Jung gives in support of his theory. la particular vre
need to examine hoi-r he attempts to establish that the archetypal images
are due to Innate factors.

Jung argues then that the archetypal Images are due to innate fac-
tors primarily on the basis of paradigm cases In which it can be rea-
sonably- ascertained that the persons involved had had no previous ex-
posure to the sort of motifs that appear in the dreams or visions.

139

iathough ire cannot from an ethical point of view isolate the human
subject fi-ora the possibilitjr of cultural influences, in some actual
cases it is nevertheless possible to determine that the subject could
not have learned of the motifs. Naturally in mo^ cases of alleged
archetypal manifestation, this degree of control irill not be possible.
For when the individual reports that he can not trace a specific image
to something he has acquired through learning, he may be either lying
or mistaken. In the latter case the possibility of ciyptomesia must
always be kept in mind, i.e., the possibility that the person has
forgotten what he had previously learned which now appears as an alien
content of consciousness without apparent connection with antecedent
experience, when in fact this connection has been simply forgotten.
A third corrolicating factor is the element of suggestion, where in-
stead of the ojiages being spontaneously produced their appearance is
due to the suggestive influence of the investigator.

Ibreover, in order to e^fcablish that the content of the dream or
vision is an archetype, in addition to establisliing that it has not
been acquired through previous ejqjerience, ire must also shw; that it
has cultural parallels. However, in this regard the sort of correla-
tion that ire need to establish betiTeen spontaneous products without
previous experiential antecedents and similar manifestations in
cultural ^Tmbology is not one beti^een images but rather one bet^reen
motifs. Bjr emphasizing tlie similarity betiTeen motifs rather than
symbols per se, we rule out the | possibility that the similarity
bettreen symbols is due to chance or is a similarity viith no signifi-
cance. For in order to establish that a qynibol is a manifestation of
an archetypal motif, rather than simply comparing the similarity of

190

isolated ^bols, tts mist examine hoi: the syvibols function in relation
to their context.

It does not, of course, suffice sintply to connect
a dream about a snalce irith the noiiiological occiir-
rence of snakes, for uho is to guarantee that the
functional meaning of the snalos in the dream is
the same as in the irorthological setting? ]h
order to draw a valid parallel, it is necessaiy
to knor; the functional meaning of the individual
^jTtibol, and then to find out Txhether the apparently
parallel mj^thological symbol has a similar con-
tex-t and therefore the same functional meaning
(Vol, IX-A, p. 50), ^

1!hus, if lie can shovr that a given content is not due to previous
learning and has the required cultui-al parallels, this is the sort
of evidence that Jung gives in support of his theory of archetypes.
I'breover, it is evident here that it is the first factor, the demon-
stration that the spontaneous content has not been learned, that iri.ll
be the most difficult aspect of the task of evidentially substantia-
ting the archetypes,

A paradigm case to irhich Jung refers most often in the latter
regard involves the vision of a schizophrenic patient vihich Jung
noted in 1906.

One day I found the patient standing at the x^^indoTr,
Tragging his head and blinking into the sun, Ife
told mo to do the same, for then I Tjould see some-
tlrnig very interesting. Ihen I aslced him trhat
he saw, he T7as astonished that I could see no-
thing, and said: "SureHy you see the sun's penis—
\rhen I move ror head to and fro, it moves too, and
that is vrhere the iriLnd comes from" (Vol. IX-A. paces

Jung, who at that time was
of mythology, did not knor-r what

not Tjell acquainted tdth the literature
to malce of the vision. Hbrrever, four

years later in a text describing a rite of lUthras he discovered an

account which depicted the same motif.

191

"Draw breath from the rays, draw in three times
as strongily as you can and you TidU feel yourself
raised up and walking towards the height, and
you vrill seem to be in the middle of the aerial
region. ... The path of the visible gods irin
appear through tlie disc of the sun, who is God
my father. likeirise the so-called tube, the
origin of the ministering irind. For you idll
see hanging doim from the disc of the sun
something that looks like a tube, ilnd toiTards
the regions vzestrrard it is as though there
were an infinite east >7ind. But if the other
Tond should prevail towards the regions of the
east, you xtUI in like manner see the vision
verring in that direction"' (quoted Albrecht
ib.eterich. Sine Mlthrasliturprie. Leiozip. 1903.
p. 6) (Vol. IX-A, p. £), "-^ . b, 7 ,

Tlie possibility of the patient having previously learned of this
archetj-pal motif, "the idea of a Tdnd-tube connected vrlth God or the
sun" (Vol. IX-A, p. 52), is largely nullified by tlie fact that the
passage wliich Jung cites as a parallel was only published in 1903
which was after the patient had been committed. Ibreover, other
incidences of this rare motif as depicted in medieval paintings
xrere not in tlie local gallery in Zurich where the patient had lived
his whole life (Vol, IX-A, p. ^2).

Another ercmple cited by Jung in Ifen and lis Symbols involves
archetypal dream motifs reported by a ten-year-old girl.

"The evil animal," a snakelike monster vriLth mam-
horns, kills and devours all other animals. But
God comes from the foxxc comers, being in fact
four separate gods, and gives rebirth to all
the dead animals.

A^ small mouse is penetrated by vroiros, snakes,
fishes, and human beings. Thus the mouse becomes
human. This portrays the four stages of the
origin of mankind.

A drop of water is seen, as it appears when looked
at through a microscope. The girl sees that the
drop is full of tree branches. This portrays the
origin of the world (Ifan and His Symbols, p. 59).

192

The first citation contains the motif of divine restitution,
.#okatastasis, as trell as the motif of a divine quaternity. The
second and third citations illustrate the cosmogonic itorth depicting
the origin of the uorld and man (Ijfen and His Symbols, pages 6O-6I).

The problem >/ith this sort of evidence is that it has the charac-
ter of a selected demon^ration of a lifted number of individual
cases. Ibreover, it is never possible >d.th absolute certainty to
rule out the possibility of deception and/or ciyptomnesia, and Jung's
word is just about all the basis to have for judging the reliability
of his subjects and detemlning their lack of previous exposure to
symbols from ciatural sources.

But ^/ithin the context of his method of investigation, x^hich is
phenomenological rather than experimental, it is difficult to see hou
lie could go beyond the sort of evidence Jung presents. l€th this
l5Te of approach, the best ire could manage i/ould seem to be a larger
collection of siMlar paradigm cases. In regard to numbers of cases,
Jung often says that he could easily multiply his examples but hesi-
tates to do so since each case requires lengthy discussion in order
to mate clear the context out of wliich the symbols are taten for com-
parison.

Establishing such facts not on3y requires lengthy

and wearisome researches, but is also an ungrateful

subject for demonstration. As the symbols must

?n^h^«^"' °^^ of their context, one has to launch

lorth into exhaustive descriptions, personal as

vrell as symibological, and this is practically

impossible in the frameiTork of a lecture (Vol. IX-A, p. 50).

In order to make clear what is meant by an archetypal nwtif then,

rather than givijig a sumtnaiy of its essential features, the best

approach is to give examples of the motif vdthin its various contexts

193

of manifestation. This is illustrated Tvhen ire tiy to give a list of
archelypes. For vdthout actual examples of how these archetypes func-
tion in a given context, such a list produces only a very superficial
understanding of what an archetypal motif consists. Ibreover, in any
case archetj'pal motifs are not easiOy divided into unambiguous discrete
types. These sorts of considerations then are reasons lAy Jung adheres
to a descriptive, phenomenological method of investigation ijhich yields
evidence of an essential3y nonquantitative nature.

IIoiTever, the archetj^pal theoiy irould rest on a very suspect
empirical basis if the onJy evidence \ie had for the theory is the
sorts of cases just discussed, which for the most part arise out of
the context of therapeutic work done by Jungians. Ih order for the
theory to be credible at all, it must be shaim to have consequences
which are manifested outside of the Jungian therapeutic context.

In this regard ;re can appeal to the commonality of sr/mbolic mo-
tifs in cultures throughout the world :ri.dely separated in space and
tijue. However, although this type of evidence is of a extraclinical
and publicly observable nature, it has definite limitations so far as
constituting compelling evidence for the archetypal theoiy is concerned.
For it is erven more difficult to establish the spontaneous origin of
symbolic motifs in cultures than it is in individuals, since the
histoiy of and influences on the foraier are more uncertain than for
an individual. Ibreover, appeal to cross-cultural similarities will
not have much probative stren^h independently of the ability to demon-
strate the emergence of these same archetypal motifs in individuals.

athough we might expect that, irrespective of the difficulty of
substantiating the spontaneous origin of symbolic motifs in various

19li

cultures, anthropological evidence would nonetheless prove to be
veiy helpful in e^ablishing the credibility of the theory, this
e^ctation is for the most part not fulfilled. For due to the
difficult nature of the theoiy in its practical application, anthro-
pologists tend either to accept the theoiy and to interpret their
data from a Jungian perspective, or else reject the theoiy from an
xmkna.ledgeable standpoint. In the latter case, it is difficult to
deteiMne the degree to uhich their findings support the theoiy,
since for the mo^ part they are not sensitive to .rhat constitutes
an archetype and are unaware of the diverse phenomenology of the
various arehel^rpal motifs. ^ 7

Due to the difficulties of evaluating the evidence for the arehe-
typal theoiy independently of a Jungian framework of understanding,
in the last chapter we suggested that reports from e^^rfments designed
to dJiduce altered states of consciousness be ^udied in order to see
whether anything siMlar to descriptions of arehetypal motifs was
reported. If none were reported, then this would be streng evidence
against the theoiy. Qn the other hand, hor^ver, the claim that there
are such siMlar descriptions which constitute confiiming evidence
for the archetypal theoiy is rendered preblematic by the fact that
mny of the investigators are d^uenced by Jung's work and thus
readily assume his theoretical vie.;point in interpreting their data.
Ibreover, in many of the ^udies involving drugs, the element of sugges-
tion was a relevant variable not controlled. (Bbth of these considera-
tions apply to the Masters and Houston stuc^r discussed below. )

But it is clear that this sort of researeh offers the promise of
a solution to the problem of e:ctending the validational basis of the

19^

theory beyond the sort of evidence to uluch Jung originally appealed.
For if no additional support for the theory is forfchcoming besides
the sort of data for rrhich it ims oi-iginalOy designed to e:q)lain,
then ue T;ould have to conclude that the theoiy is on wak grounds.
Ife vjill thus proceed to discuss one e:cainple of such evidence
from altered states of consciousness research.''^ This research as
reported by R.K.I.. Ilasters and Jean Houston in Varieties o_f Psychedelic
^^^^"°^. involves T;ork viith the chemical substances LSD-25 and
p^'ote and covers a period of more than fifteen years. A total of
206 subjects i/ere given the drugs.

Bie investigators reported that the perception of the guides In.
the e:cperiinent iras frequently distorted In such a way that th^ were
apparently seen as archetypal figures.

3h a fairly comraon distortion the guide may be
perceived by the subject as one or rore of a
vaidety of archetypal figiu-es. For e:;2mple, a
female guide may be seen as a goddess, as a
priestess, or as the personification of Tri.sdom
or truth or beauty. Descriptions of some of
these "archetypal" perceptions have included
seeing the guide's featm^s as "gloiTing vrLth a
luminous pallor" and her gestures as beinp
"cosmic," yet "classical. "20

Ibreover, in the course of the ercpei-iments, rrythological and
religious symbolic imageiy -jas frequentlcjr encountered.

Jh the p^Tchedelic drug-state rcrthologies abound.
The guxde often may feel that he is bearing
latness to a multi-layered complex of in/tholopical
^stems as they arise out of their latency in
the mind of the subject, ^^

Bie most frequently recurring irythic themes ^re summarized as
follows:

^V'^ll °V'^^ Child-IIero, I'yths of Creation, I^hs

of the Eteraal Itetum (Cycles of Ilatui-e), IRrths

of Paradise and the Fall, Ifero I-^hs, Goddess Ifyths,

196

I-^yths of nhcest and Parricide (Cfedipus, Electra,
etc.}, IJrths of Polarity (light and Darlmess, Order
and Chaos), I-Tjrths of the /^di-ogyne (ihle -Female
Synthesis J, I^^hs of the Sacred Quest. Prometheus-
Faust lijrths (lyths of the Trickster). '2

Heli['ious images of some Idnd vrere repoii^ed in ninety-six
percent of the 206 subjects. These included images of religious
figures: Qirist, Buddha, saints, godOy figures, IfiJJlam HLake-
type figures (fifty-eight percent)? devils and demons (forty-
nine percent)} and engels (seven percent ).23

Despite the factors of the influence of Jung's work and the pro-
blem of suggestion, these results seem to con^itute convincing evi-
dence for the archetypal theoiy.

Archetypes and Evolution Theorj

In considering the scientific status of the archetypal theoiy,
it has been oui- concern to demonstrate that the theory is compatible
in principle irith a contemporary scientific understanding, i.e., that
the theory can be construed as a viable scientific one. In this re-
gard, it is essential to ecrtablish that the theozy is not logically
tied to an evolutix)naiy theory r/hich has been repudiated hy modem
biologists, namely, one involving appeal to the inheritance of
acquired characteristics.

As vre saxr in Chapter 3 (page 6o ), there was one point in Jung's
career irhere he postulated that the archetypes xTere inherited by means
of such a mechanism and that archetj^pes were the deposits of repeated
e^cperiences (Vol. VH, p. 6?). jllot^ver, Jung retracted this viex. and
thereafter did not atteii^^t to e:cplain the evolutionaiy mechanism by
Tihich archetypes become part of the innate structure of the psj-che

197

e.xept to say that the archetypes .rere inherited as part of the struc-
ture of the brain and hence evolved as man evolved (Vol. XL, p. H^p,
note 2 and Vol. IX-A, p. 78).

It is cleai' hou the latter position can be construed as in
principle compatible .dth Daondnian mechanisms of evolutionary change.
Ha^evor, although ue can see ho., this sort of origin of archetypes
through evolution is possible in principle, we might still question
whether the iiiheritance of such dispositions to produce symbolic
linages is plausible from the standpoint of modem evolutionary
theoiy. ]h other words, is there any reasoning from the biological
pod^t of vieu which can support the hypothesis that such dispositions
are in fact inherited?

Now although ,re do not Imow what sort of genetic mechanisms might
be responsible for the inheritance of such di.spositions, this aspect
of ignorance does not count against the archetypal theory since the
genetic mechanisms .;hich are responsible for mary aspects of the hu-
man being are as yet, to say the leart, imperfect^, understood. Ho,.-
ever, if it can be shorn how a structure enables a man to be better
adapted to the environment i^ such a manner as to produce relative^,
inore proger;,. than another man lacldng the structure, then it is rea-
sonable to suppose from the standpoint of modern evolutionary theory
that whatever genes are responsible for the structure ..oil tend to
increase in the overall population of the species. a.ot.-ing that

dispositions to produce symbolic
is then reducible to the problem^
it is reasonable to believe that

Mages have probably been inherited
of shoidng the basis in terms of irhich
these dispositions did in fact confer

a selective advantage on those humans or predecessors of humans who

190

happened to have the necessaiy genes to produce then.

In. this regard ue point to the fact that man is not a solitary
species but evolved as a social andinal. Ihus, it is not difficult
to see hoir the sui-vival of nan as a species has been enhanced by
mechanisms which facilitate social cooperation such as the develop-
ment of a shared ciature. Ibreover, it is eagy to understand haii
the religious or ncrthological heritage of a human society gives it
unity and stability and hoi; "the integration of a social group,
its cohesion, is maintained by the direction of certain sentiments
toT7ard a ^inbolic center, "^^^

If we admit that religious and mythological ^Tnbolic systems
have survival value in that they enhance social cooperation tjithin
the human community, the likelihood that dispositions tjhich tend to
produce symbolic manifestations xdJ.1 be selected for in the course
of evolution would seem to veiy great, Fran the standpoint of
modem evolutionary theoi-y, we can conclude from these considerations
that the inheritance of archetypes is something Trhich is very lilcely
to have occurred, -^

199

Notes
1

n,™^ 4. i*h ^^®^' "P^f Sociopsycholosical Malysis of Follcbales."
Cigrent Mthropology. 1; (1963), p. 2^6. -^i-^i^s,

Jacobi, CoiTOle:c. Archetype. Symibol. p. ^9,
3

lUchael Pordham, Hew Dgvclotaisnts in ihalytical P^ircholoErvr
(london : Pujutedge and Ifegan Vaxilimi), ^7 ^7. "^ ^

1;

r^^>,^«« ''^ aspect of disanalogjr i-dth biological speciation in the
fr'^^^.J^^.J^fy^^-'^^^.^^^-types is that vhereas it is reasonable
to a,qpect that bxological species delineate distinct entities,
nane^jr populations of similar organisms capable of interbreeding
irlth each other, archetypes are better thought of as processes
rather than as distinct entities. Ira Rrogoff suggests then that

... in the final analysis it is incorrect to speak of arche-
22££ ^s noTins, if ire are implcjdng by tliat each has a speciHT"
Sd SSSTSi^^tT^A" ^^ ^^f^. ^ S^ch^nicity.

and Ifunan Destiny, p. 1^6.

(IT.. Yor;^^Jo^'vaiy^?gfS' f 6^P. MP^ ^i^IE-tation

^r, m^r,^ ^.fTf^^''^^ ^^^^ altered states of consciousness, im have
in inind such things as dream research, vrark id.th hypnosis, Kcneriments
iTxthp^rchedelic drugs, sensoiy deprivation e:q5eriinents, and work idth
electrical stimaation of the brain. uuxit i/iwi

.^ -..^^^ '^° "°* ^^^ ■'^^ ^^ ^®^® ^^at arche-types can only be
manifested m altered states of consciousness. Presumably the
archetypes influence consciousness in all its states. Hovrever,
analogously to other aspects of the unconscious, the archetypes
are most noticeable when consciousness is interferred idth in
some way as under the influence of drugs or if there is a relaxa-
tion of conscious attention as in hypnosis or dreams,
7
^ 4.1. T^ ^^ ^' '^* Sem-Jacobsen, Depth-SLectrograTihic Stimulation
foil ^)^^ — ^^'^^°'' (Springfield, ILHnois.-^^riT.

8 i

^««-?M« ^^* *^^!.if not to say, of course, that there are no
possible ad hoc modifications which could save ttie theoiy from
contraiy evidence in these cases. For in addition to the fact
that ire must not underestimate the ingenuity of theorists, theories
^ not in any case sijnply overthroTm by single incidences of con-
traiy evidence. Iloirever, in the cases cited, it is veiy difficult
to see what sort of ad hoc modifications could be invoted which

200

would not involve a radical revision of the theoiy itself.

I^lcul2ygS Se'"t%e?L'JtirSi^ ?r°^^^^ e.T,lanation.

tions conc^g arohetySs^o not'^ol^ SSnfAf '"^?%"^ ^"^-

quertiln*' ^"^' ''°^- '^ "^ ™ ^°=- ^ ■^'^^ discussion on this
TV J tT^ ''^',""'? ''^^''ologyof the Child ArchetTpe." to Vol

rA^P'-^s ^^-"<^-^^^^ s:o^^=s^,ssr«

^™\T ^°Pl® ''''° ^"^ ^^ "Cr boolcs and never
have a dream of anjrthing rerdniscent of m- xj^l

^.^t. "* "/^ ^"^ *^^^* " you understand what
, you have read, you get a frame of mind or a

^oblematic outlook v.-hich you did not have before,

and that, of course, influences your dreams

(^iies^ ^01. II, p. 137, letter to a yZg

C-reel: girl dated lU 'Dctober 19^4). "'

to an Iso'iatSf ^oS^S"^ TS^'tS^S^'''' "^ "J*^ «'->

np^seLf in enon^ous difficulties b^' f raSng Sn^ral
fonnulations which az^ intended Z e^Sl the

201

Trtiole field of htnnan experience. I had to keep
to errperienceis that uere directlir accessible to me
and coiiipare then -.rlUi data dra:ni from the irhole
iiistoiy of the mind. This gives rise to some
degree of inexactitude which ma]:es rny efforts
appeal' provisional. It is perfect!-'- clear to
me that evei^-thing I do is pioneer ^rark vjiiich
has still to be folloired by a real laying
of foundations, but there are gratifjdng"
signs that others are beginning to make
forays into this territory (letters. Vol, I,
p. 231, letter to Hiidolf Pannr.Tits dated
27 I larch 1937).
17

It might seen that these considerations indicate that one must
assume the archet^^pal theoiy in order to be able to see v/hat counts as
data 111 favor of it. Ilotrever, this difficultjr of appraisiiig the evi-
dence for the ai-chet^rpal theoiy from a non-Jungian perspective e-oen-
plxfies tne close interrelationshiTJ that e:dsts bet-zeen theory and
evidence. Tliat is to say, the tlieoiy determines irhich data ai-e re-
levant as evidence and ^rhat is relevant as evidence from one theoret-
xcal perspective is irrelevant from another. The fact that Jun^'
employs a phenomenological method of djircstigation does not of "
course mean tliat he does not select what is relevant for descrip-
tion from essentially theoretical considerations.
18
jathin the scope of this study, we cannot hope to e:camine all
relevant evidence. Ibreover, in light of the lengths discussion often
necessary to malce clear what is meant by the claim that an arcliety^
has been e:q)erienced, ttb thought it better to discuss one e-cample dn
detail rather than simply mentioning several. Other sources of evi-
dence involving irork :iith altered states of consciousness wJiich ire
will not discuss include the works of such authors as the follotrijif"
Carlos Castenada, Journey, to Scblan. Jolin liOy, The Center of the "
2Z£lone (Ilew York: Bantam Bo5!=s71^72), and itanT^ac!ay7T5^aifr-
Power (]Iei7 fork: Berkeley Publishing Corp., 1972).

19

^»^.U I festers and Jean Hou^on, The Varieties of Psycliedelic
Bqjenence (U&.i York: Dell, 1966), p. §. " ^^ =^=^

^° aid., p. 92.

21

Ibid., p. 22lt,

22

Ibid., pages 22];-22^.

^^ Ibid., p. 26^.

Co. 1966!™^'^3li; ^"^^^^^ ^^™3II E2o2aii2a (Chicago t MLine Publishing

2^

^ Of course, the arche-^j^pal theoiy is not the only possible ex-
planation of how religious and rtrfahological ^inbolic systems come into

202

^^r l*^".^^heP?jnt about the survival value of religions and
rytnologies IS adratted, this on2y entails the inhei-itance of dis-
?hSl^°''''o!° ^^ff ^^^^^^'^ ^2es rather than the full archetypal
theoiy. C^e msht Tdsh to argue, for e:xariple, that an that Sas
necessaiy for such ^stenis to come into being is language Sd
imaginatxon. Ilorrever, it irould seem that the archetyp2 theory
Tixth Its hypothesis of the Innate archetj'pesVoffers f theo^ of
dispositions to produce images which goes a long va^- toiTard e'c-
plao^ tne culturain;5r universal sJonilarity and emotional a^al
of religious and mjrfchological motifs, whereas this additional
e.^lanatoiy ainport is lacldng ,i±th other ideas of hw; symbolic
Ideas might have originated, j ^^

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BIOGRAPHICAL SICETCH

I-felter Avoiy Slielbume was bom Jfarch 26, 19k6 in Bristol, ,
Virginia. He attended the local high school, graduating in 196h.
From 196k until I968 he was a student at the Ckjllege of I411iam
and Ilaiy in IBlliamsburg, Virginia. In I968 he received the
Bachelor of Science degree in Biology. ELans to attend the
Graduate School of the University of Florida trere interrupted
by the Hilitaiy draft. The author saw service in Vietnam from
Februaiy, 1969 until .Ipril, 1970. I^on release from the Ara^ in
liiy, 1970, the author came to Gainesville, Florida where he
started graduate school in Ehtonology in June, 1970. Ih September
of that year, the author transferred from the College of %riculture
to the College of Arts and Sciences and began graduate work in
philosophy. -The Ilaster of Arts degree in Hiilosopl^r uas axjarded
in Iferch, 1973. The author is not married.

206

rn«f«i.^ f^ ?" ?*uf ^^P ^®^ this stiufy and that in ncr opiMon it
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation Ind is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

larilyn Zwiig, thaimai

Marilyn Zweig,

Assistant Professor of Hiilosophy

«« ^ certify that I have read this stvidy and that in w opinion it
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

Thomas P, Arcter

Assistant Professor of Philosophy

I certify that I have read this stucfy and that in w opinion it
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is
f^ adequate, i^ scope and quality, as a dissertation for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Richard P. Haynes

Associate Professor of Hiilosophy

.««.» certxiy that I have read this study and that in w opinion it
confoiTOS to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is
fulOy adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Thomas W, Simon

Assistant Professor of Philosophy

I certify that I have read this study and that in w opinion it
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

Tta.3 dissertation was submitted to the CJraduate Faculty of the
Deparianent of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences and to
the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Hoilosopl^,

Jiine, 1976

Dean, Graduate School