



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*John Quincy Adams*

ADAMS 225.13



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# CHARACTERISTICKS:

V O L U M E II.

C O N T A I N I N G,

An Inquiry concerning V I R T U E  
and M E R I T.


The M O R A L I S T S;  
a Philosophical Rhapsody.

---

By the Right Honourable

ANTHONY Earl of SHAFTESBURY.

---



L O N D O N.

Printed in the year M D C C X X X I I I.

CHANGING THE  
WORLD

\* ADAMS 22513



... ..  
... ..



TREATISE IV.

VIZ.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

VIRTUE, *or* MERIT.

Formerly Printed from an Imperfect  
Copy: Now Corrected, and Pub-  
lish'd intire.

---

*Amoto quæramus serâ ludo.*

Hor. Sat. I.

---

Printed first in the Year M. DC. XCIX.

Book I.  
Occasion  
of this  
Inquiry.

believe well of their *Union*, that we hardly allow it just to speak, or even think of 'em apart. It may however be question'd, whether the practise of the World, in this respect, be answerable to our Speculation. 'Tis certain that we sometimes meet with Instances which seem to make against this general Supposition. We have known People, who having the appearance of great zeal in *Religion*, have yet wanted even the common Affections of *Humanity*, & shewn themselves extremely degenerate and corrupt. Others again, who have paid little regard to Religion, and been consider'd as mere *ATHEISTS*, have yet been observ'd to practise the Rules of *Morality*, and act in many Cases with such good meaning & Affection towards Mankind, as might seem to force an Acknowledgment of their being *virtuous*. And, in general, we find mere moral Principles of such weight, that in our dealings with men, we are seldom satisfy'd by the fullest Assurance given us of their Zeal in Religion, till we hear something further of their Character. If we are told a man is religious, we still ask, "What are his *Morals*?" But if we hear at first that he has honest moral Principles, and is a man of natural Justice and good Temper, we seldom think of the other Question, "Whether he be *religious* and *devout*?"

THIS

THIS has given occasion to enquire, Part I.  
 „ What *Honesty* or VIRTUE is, conti- §. 1.  
 „ der'd by it-self; and in what manner it  
 „ is influenc'd by Religion : How far  
 „ Religion necessarily implies *Virtue*; and  
 „ whether it be a true Saying, *That it is*  
 „ *impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous,*  
 „ *or share any real degree of Honesty, or*  
 „ MERIT.”

AND here it cannot justly be wonder'd at, if the *Method* of explaining things shou'd appear somewhat unusual; since the *Subject-Matter* has been so little examin'd, and is of so nice and dangerous speculation. For so much is the religious part of Mankind alarm'd by the freedom of some late Pens; and so great a Jealousy is rais'd every-where on this account; that whatever an Author may suggest in favour of *Religion*, he will gain little Credit in the Cause, if he allows the least Advantage to any other Principle. On the other side, the Men of Wit and Raillery, whose pleasantest Entertainment is in the exposing the weak sides of Religion, are so desperately afraid of being drawn into any serious thoughts of it, that they look upon a Man as guilty of foul Play, who assumes the air of a *Free Writer*, and at the same time preserves any regard for the Principles of Natural Religion. They are apt to give as

A 3 little.

Book 1. little quarter as they receive : And are resolv'd to think as ill of the Morals of their Antagonists, as their Antagonists can possibly think of theirs. Neither of 'em, it seems, will allow the least Advantage to the other. 'Tis as hard to persuade one sort, that there is any Virtue in Religion, as the other, that there is any Virtue out of the Verge of their particular Community. So that, between both, an Author must pass his time ill, who dares plead for *Religion and Moral Virtue*, without lessening the force of either; but allowing to each its proper Province, and due Rank, wou'd hinder their being made Enemys by Detraction:

HOWEVER it be : If we wou'd pretend to give the least new light, or explain any thing effectually, within the intended compass of this *Inquiry*; 'tis necessary to take things pretty deep; and endeavour, by some short Scheme, to represent the Original of each Opinion, whether natural or unnatural, relating to the DEITY. And if we can happily get clear of this thorny part of our Philosophy; the rest, 'tis hop'd, may prove more plain and easy.

## S E C T. II.

Part I.  
§. 2.

**I**N THE Whole of Things (or in the *State of* Universe) either all is according to a *Opinions.* good Order, and the most agreeable to a general Interest : *or* there is that which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely contriv'd, and with more advantage to the general Interest of Beings, or of the Whole.

**I**F every thing which exists be according to a good Order, and *for the best* ; then of necessity there is no such thing as real **ILL** in the Universe, nothing **ILL** with respect to the Whole.

**W**HATSOEVER, then, is so as that it cou'd not really have *been* better, or any way *better order'd*, is perfectly good: Whatsoever in the Order of the World can be call'd **ILL**, must imply a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been better contriv'd, or order'd. For if it cou'd not ; it is perfect, and as it shou'd be.

**W**HATSOEVER is *really* **ILL**, therefore, must be caus'd or produc'd, either by *Design* (that is to say, with Knowledge and Intelligence) or, in defect of this, by Hazard and mere *Chance*.

Book I. IF there be any thing ILL in the Universe from *Design*, then that which disposes all things, is no one good designing Principle. For either the *one* designing Principle is it-self corrupt; or there is some *other* in being which operates contrarily, and is ILL.

*State of  
Opinions.*

IF there be any ILL in the Universe from mere *Chance*; then a designing Principle or mind, whether Good or Bad, cannot be the Cause of *all* things. And consequently, if there be suppos'd a designing Principle, who is the Cause only of Good, but cannot prevent the Ill which happens from Chance, or from a contrary ill Design; then there can be suppos'd in reality no such thing as a superior good Design or Mind, other than what is impotent and defective: For not to correct, or totally exclude that Ill of Chance, or of a contrary ill Design, must proceed either from *Impotency*, or *Ill-will*.

WHATSOEVER is superior in any degree over the World, or rules in Nature with Discernment and a Mind, is what, by universal Agreement, Men call G O D. If there are several such superior Minds, they are so many *Gods*: But if that single, or those several Superiors are not  
in.

in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of DÆMON. Part I.

§ 2.

To believe therefore that every thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated *for the best*, by a designing Principle, or Mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect THEIST.

To believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any Cause, Measure, or Rule of Things, but *Chance*; so that in Nature neither the Interest of *the Whole*, nor of any *Particulars*, can be said to be in the least design'd, pursu'd, or aim'd at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST.

To believe no *one* supreme designing Principle or Mind, but rather *two*, three, or more, (tho' in their nature *good*), is to be a POLYTHEIST.

To believe the governing Mind, or Minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confin'd to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere Will or Fancy; is to be a DÆMONIST.

THERE are few who think always consistently, or according to one certain Hypothesis, upon any Subject so abstruse and intricate as the *Cause of all Things*, and the *O Economy or Government of the Universe*.

Book I. *verse.* For 'tis evident in the Case of the most devout People, even by their own Confession, that there are Times when their Faith hardly can support 'em in the Belief of a supreme Wisdom; and that they are often tempted to judg disadvantageously of a Providence, and just Administration in the Whole.

THAT alone, therefore, is to be call'd a Man's Opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him, and occurs upon most occasions. So that 'tis hard to pronounce certainly of any Man, that *he is an Atheist*; because unless his whole Thoughts are at all Seasons, and on all Occasions, steddily bent against all Supposition or Imagination of *Design in things*, he is no *perfect* ATHEIST. In the same manner, if a Man's Thoughts are not at all times steddy and resolute against all Imagination of *Chance, Fortune, or ill Design in things*, he is no *perfect* THEIST. But if any one believes more of Chance and Confusion than of Design; he is to be esteem'd more an ATHEIST than a Theist, from that which most predominates, or has the ascendant. And in case he believes more of the Prevalency of an ill designing Principle, than of a good one, he is rather a DÆMONIST; and may be justly so call'd, from the side to which the Ballance of his Judgment most inclines.

ALL



ALL these sorts both of *Dæmonism*, *Polytheism*, *Atheism*, and *Theism*, may be \* mix'd. Religion excludes only perfect *Atheism*. Perfect *Dæmonists* undoubtedly there are in Religion; because we know whole Nations who worship a *Devil* or *Fiend*, to whom they sacrifice and offer Prayers and Supplications, in reality on no other account than because they fear him. And we know very well that, in some Religions, there are those who expressly give no other Idea of GOD, than

A 6 of

\* As thus :

1. Theism with *Dæmonism* : 2. *Dæmonism* with *Polytheism* : 3. Theism with *Atheism* : 4. *Dæmonism* with *Atheism* : 5. *Polytheism* with *Atheism* : 6. Theism (as it stands in opposition to *Dæmonism*, and denotes Goodness in the superior *Deity*) with *Polytheism* : 7. The same Theism or *Polytheism* with *Dæmonism* : 8. Of with *Dæmonism* and *Atheism*.

1. As when *the one* chief Mind, or Sovereign Being, is (in the Believer's sense) divided between a good and an ill Nature, by being the Cause of Ill as well as Good : Or otherwise, when *Two* distinct and contrary Principles subsist ; one, the Author of all Good, the other of all Ill.

2. As when there is not *one*, but *several* corrupt Minds who govern ; which Opinion may be call'd *Polydæmonism*.

3. As when *Chance* is not excluded ; but God and *Chance* divide.

4. As when an evil *Dæmon* and *Chance* divide.

5. As when many Minds and *Chance* divide.

6. As when there are more principal Minds than one, but agreeing in Good, with one and the same Will and Reason.


7. As when the same System of *Deity* or corresponding *Deity* subsists, together with a contrary Principle, or with several contrary Principles or governing Minds.

8. As when the last Case is, together with *Chance*.

Book I. of a Being arbitrary, violent, causing Ill, and ordaining to Misery; which in effect is the same as to substitute a DÆMON, or Devil, in his room.

*State of Opinions.*

Now since there are these several Opinions concerning a *superior Power*; and since there may be found perhaps some Persons, who have no form'd Opinion at all upon this Subject; either thro' *Scepticism*, Negligence of Thought, or Confusion of Judgment: the consideration is, how any of these Opinions, or this want of any certain Opinion, may possibly consist with VIRTUE and MERIT; or be compatible with an *honest* or *moral* Character.



## PART II.

### S E C T. I.

*A Consti-  
tution,*

WHEN we reflect on any ordinary Frame or Constitution either of Art or Nature, and consider how hard it is to give the least account of a particular *Part*, without a competent-

petent Knowledge of *the Whole*; we need not wonder to find our-selves at a loss in many things relating to the Constitution and Frame of *Nature* her-self. For to what End in Nature many things, even whole Species of Creatures, refer; or to what purpose they serve; will be hard for any-one justly to determine: But to what End the many Proportions and various Shapes of Parts in many Creatures actually serve; we are able, by the help of Study and Observation, to demonstrate, with great exactness.

Part 2.  
§. 1.  
*Whole and  
Parts.*

WE know that every Creature has a private Good and Interest of his own; which Nature has compel'd him to seek; by all the Advantages afforded him, within the compass of his Make. We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong State of every Creature; and that his right-one is by Nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every Creature a certain *Interest or Good*; there must be also a certain END, to which every thing in his Constitution must naturally refer. To this END if any thing, either in his Appetites, Passions, or Affections, be not conducing, but the contrary; we must of necessity own it *ill* to him. And in this manner he is *ill, with respect to himself*; as he certainly is, *with respect to others*.

*Interest or  
End in  
Creatures.*

Book 1. *of his kind*, when any such Appetites or *Interest of the Species.* Passions make him any-way injurious to them. Now, if by the natural Constitution of any rational Creature, the same Irregularitys of Appetite which make him ill *to Others*, make him ill also to *Himself*; and if the same Regularity of Affections, which causes him to be good in *one* sense, causes him to be good also in *the other*; then is that Goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage to himself. And thus *Virtue* and *Interest* may be found at last to agree.

Goodness.

OF this we shall consider particularly in the latter part of our *Inquiry*. Our first Design is, to see if we can clearly determine what that Quality is to which we give the Name of *Goodness*, or VIRTUE.

Private Good.

SHOU'D a Historian or Traveller describe to us a certain Creature of a more solitary Disposition than ever was yet heard of; one who had neither Mate nor Fellow of any kind; nothing of his own Likeness, towards which he stood well-affected or inclin'd; nor any thing without, or beyond himself, for which he had the least Passion or Concern: we might be apt to say perhaps, without much hesitation. "That this was doubtless a very melancholy Creature, and that in this  
" unfo-

„ unfociable and follen ſtate he was like Part 2.  
 „ to have a very diſconſolate kind of §. 1.  
 „ Life.” But if we were aſſur'd, that  
 notwithstanding all Appearances, the  
 Creature enjoy'd himſelf extremely, had  
 a great reliſh of Life, and was in nothing  
 wanting to his own Good; we might ac-  
 knowledg perhaps. “ That the Creature  
 „ was no *Monſter*, nor abſurdly conſtitu-  
 „ ted *as to himſelf*.” But we ſhou'd hard- Private  
 ly, after all, be induc'd to ſay of him, SYSTEM  
 „ That he was a *good Creature*.”

However, ſhou'd it be urg'd againſt us,  
 “ That ſuch as he was, the Creature was  
 „ ſtill *perfect in himſelf*, and therefore to  
 „ be eſteem'd good: *For what had he to*  
 „ *do with others?*” In this ſenſe, in-  
 deed, we might be forc'd to acknowledg,  
 “ That he was a *good Creature*; if he  
 „ cou'd be underſtood to be abſolute and  
 „ compleat in himſelf; without any real  
 „ relation to any thing in the Univerſe  
 „ beſides.” For ſhou'd there be any where  
 in Nature a *System*, of which this living System of  
 Creature was to be conſider'd as a *Part*; the Species  
 then cou'd he no-wiſe be allow'd *good*;  
 whilſt he plainly appear'd to be ſuch a  
*Part*, as made rather to the harm than  
 good of that *System* or *Whole* in which he  
 was included.

IF therefore in the Structure of this  
 or any other Animal, there be any thing  
 which

Book I. which points beyond himself, and by which he is plainly discover'd to have relation to some other Being or Nature besides his own; then will this Animal undoubtedly be esteem'd a *Part* of some other System. For instance; if an Animal has the Proportions of a Male, it shews he has relation to a Female. And the respective Proportions both of the Male and Female will be allow'd, doubtless, to have a joint-relation to another Existence and Order of things beyond themselves. So that the Creatures are both of 'em to be consider'd as Parts of *another System*: which is that of a particular Race or Species of living Creatures, who have some one *common Nature*, or are provided for, by some one *Order or Constitution* of things subsisting together, and co-operating towards their Conservation and Support.

*Animal System.*

IN the same manner, if a whole Species of Animals contribute to the Existence or Well-being of some other; then is that whole Species, in general, a *Part* only of some other System.

FOR instance; To the Existence of the Spider, that of the Fly is absolutely necessary. The heedless Flight, weak Frame, and tender Body of this latter Insect, fits and determines him as much a *Prey*; as the rough Make, Watchfulness, and Cunning of

of the former, fits him for Rapine, and the Part 2.  
 ensnaring part. The Web and Wing are §. 1.  
 fitted to each other. And in the Structure  
 of each of these Animals, there is as appa-  
 rent and perfect a relation to the other, as  
 in our own Bodys there is a relation of  
 Limbs and Organs; or, as in the Branches  
 or Leaves of a Tree, we see a relation of  
 each to the other, and all, in common, to  
 one Root and Trunk.

IN the same manner are Flys also neces-  
 sary to the Existence of other Creatures,  
 both Fowls and Fish. And thus are other  
 Species or Kinds subservient to one ano-  
 ther; as being *Parts of a certain System*;  
 and included in one and the same *Order of*  
*Beings*.

So that there is a System of all Animals;  
 an *Animal-Order* or *O Economy*, according  
 to which the animal Affairs are regulated  
 and dispos'd.

Now, if the whole System of Animals, *System of*  
 together with that of Vegetables, and all *the Earth.*  
 other things in this inferior World, be  
 properly comprehended in *one System* of a  
 Globe or Earth: And if, again, this *Globe* *Planeta*  
 or *Earth* it-self appears to have a real De- *System.*  
 pendence on something still beyond; as,  
 for example, either on its Sun, the Ga-  
 laxy, or its Fellow Planets: then is it in  
 reality

Book I. reality a PART only of some other System.  
 And if it be allow'd, that there is in like  
*Universal*  
*System.* manner a SYSTEM of all Things, and a  
*Universal Nature*; there can be no parti-  
 cular Being or System which is not either  
 good or ill in that *general one* of the *Uni-*  
*verse*: For if it be insignificant and of no  
 use, it is a Fault or Imperfection, and con-  
 sequently ill in the general System.

THEREFORE if any Being be *wholly*  
 and *really* ILL, it must be ill with respect  
 to the *Universal System*; and then the  
 System of the Universe is ill, or imper-  
 fect: But if the Ill of one private System  
 be the Good of others; if it makes still to  
 the Good of the general System, (as when  
 one Creature lives by the Destruction of  
 another; one thing is generated from the  
 Corruption of another; or one planetary  
 System or *Vortex* may swallow up ano-  
 ther) then is the Ill of that private System  
 no real Ill in it-self; any more than the pain  
 of breeding Teeth is ill, in a System or  
 Body which is so constituted, that without  
 this occasion of Pain, it wou'd suffer worse,  
 by being defective.

So that we cannot say of any Being,  
 that it is *wholly* and *absolutely* ill, unless  
*Absolute*  
*ILL.* we can positively shew and ascertain, that  
 what we call ILL is no where GOOD be-  
 sides, in any other System, or with re-  
 spect



spect to any other Order or OEconomy Part 2.  
whatsoever.

§. I.

BUT were there in the World any intire <sup>Relative</sup> Species of Animals destructive to every o- <sup>ILL,</sup> ther, it may be justly call'd an *ill* Species; as being ill in the *Animal System*. And if in any Species of Animals (as in *Men*, for example) one Man is of a nature pernicious to the rest, he is in this respect justly styl'd *an ill Man*.

WE do not however say of any-one, that <sup>Good and</sup> he is an *ill Man* because he has the Plague- <sup>ill Man,</sup> spots upon him; or because he has convulsive Fits which make him strike & wound such as approach him. Nor do we say on the other side, that he is a *good Man*, when having his Hands ty'd up, he is hinder'd from doing the Mischief he designs; or (which is in a manner the same) when he abstains from executing his ill purpose, thro' a fear of some impending Punishment, or thro' the allurements of some exterior Reward.

So that in a sensible Creature, that <sup>Goodness</sup> which is not done thro' any Affection at <sup>thro' Affe:</sup> all, makes neither Good nor Ill in the na- <sup>tion,</sup> ture of that Creature; who then only is suppos'd *Good*, when the Good or Ill of the System to which he has relation, is the immediate Object of some Passion or Affection moving him.

SINCE

Book I. SINCE it is therefore by Affection merely that a Creature is esteem'd good or ill, *natural* or *unnatural*; our business will be, to examine which are the *good* and *natural*, and which the *ill* and *unnatural* Affections.

## S E C T. I I.

*Private or  
Self-Affec-  
tion.*

IN the first place then, it may be observ'd, that if there be an Affection towards any Subject consider'd as private Good, which is \* not really such, but imaginary; this Affection, as being superfluous, and detracting from the force of other requisite and good Affections, is in it-self vicious and ill, even in respect of the private Interest or Happiness of the Creature.

IF there can possibly be suppos'd in a Creature such an Affection towards Self-Good, as is actually, in its natural degree, conducing to his private Interest, and at the same time inconsistent with the publick Good; this may indeed be call'd still a vicious Affection: And on this Supposition a Creature \* cannot really be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural toward himself. But if the Affection be

\* *Infra*, pag. 79, &c. 163, 4. &c.

then.

then only injurious to the Society, when it is immoderate, and not so when it is moderate, duly temper'd, and allay'd; then is the *immoderate* degree of the Affection truly vitious, but not *the moderate*. And thus, if there be found in any Creature a more than ordinary Self-concernment, or Regard to private Good, which is inconsistent with the Interest of the Species or Publick; this must in every respect be esteem'd an ill and vitious Affection. And this is what we commonly call \* SELFISHNESS, and disapprove so much, in whatever Creature we happen to discover it.

ON the other side, if the Affection towards private or Self-good, however *selfish* it may be esteem'd, is in reality not only consistent with publick Good, but in some measure contributing to it; if it be such, perhaps, as for the good of the Species in general, every Individual ought to share; 'tis so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledg'd absolutely necessary to constitute a Creature *Good*. For if the want of such an Affection as that towards Self-preservation, be injurious to the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural as well thro' this Defect, as thro' the want of any other natural Affection. And this no-one would doubt

\* VOL. I. pag. 120.

Book I. I doubt to pronounce, if he saw a Man who minded not any Precipices which lay in his way, nor made any distinction of Food, Diet, Clothing, or whatever else related to his Health and Being. The same wou'd be aver'd of one who had a Disposition which render'd him averse to any Commerce with Womankind, and of consequence unfitted him thro' *Illness of Temper* (and not merely thro' a *Defect of Constitution*) for the propagation of his Species or Kind.

*Private  
or Self-  
Affection.*

THUS the Affection towards Self-good, may be a good Affection, or an ill-one. For if this private Affection be too strong (as when the *excessive Love of Life* unfits a Creature for any generous Act) then is it undoubtedly vitious; and if vitious, the Creature who is mov'd by it, is vitiously mov'd, and can never be otherwise than vitious in some degree, when mov'd by that Affection. Therefore if thro' such an earnest and passionate *Love of Life*, a Creature be accidentally induc'd to do Good (as he might be upon the same terms induc'd to do **ILL**) he is no more a good Creature for this Good he executes, than a Man is the more an honest or good Man either for pleading a just Cause, or fighting in a good one, for the sake merely of his Fee or Stipend.

WHAT-

WHATSOEVER therefore is done Part 2.  
 which happens to be advantageous to the § 2.  
 Species, thro' an Affection merely towards  
 Self-good, does not imply any more Good-  
 ness in the Creature than as the Affection  
 it self is good. Let him, in any particular,  
 act ever so well; if at the bottom, it be that  
 selfish Affection alone which moves him,  
 he is in himself still vitious. Nor can any  
 Creature be consider'd otherwise, when  
 the Passion towards Self-good, tho' ever so  
 moderate, is his real Motive in the doing  
 that, to which a natural Affection for his  
 Kind ought by right to have inclin'd him.

AND indeed whatever exterior Helps or  
 Succours an ill-dispos'd Creature may find, *Temper,*  
 to push him on towards the performance of  
 one good Action; there can no Good-  
 ness arise in him till his *Temper* be so far  
 chang'd, that in the issue he comes in ear-  
 nest to be led by some immediate Affection,  
*directly,* and not *accidentally,* to Good,  
 and against Ill.

FOR instance; if one of those Crea-  
 tures suppos'd to be by Nature tame, gen-  
 tle, and favourable to Mankind, be, con-  
 trary to his natural Constitution, fierce and  
 savage; we instantly remark the Breach of  
*Temper,* and own the Creature to be unna-  
 tural and corrupt. If at any time after-  
 wards;

Book I. wards, the same Creature, by good Fortune  
 Temper. or right Management, comes to lose his  
 Fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and  
 treatable, like other Creatures of his Kind.  
 'Tis acknowledg'd that the Creature thus  
 restor'd becomes good & natural. Suppose  
 now that the Creature has indeed a tame  
 and gentle Carriage; but that it proceeds  
 only from *the fear of his Keeper*; which  
 if set aside, his predominant Passion instant-  
 ly breaks out: then is his Gentleness not  
 his real Temper; but his true and genuine  
*Nature* or *natural Temper* remaining just as  
 it was, the Creature is still as *ill* as ever.

NOTHING therefore being properly ei-  
 ther Goodness or Illness in a Creature, ex-  
 cept what is from *natural Temper*; „ A  
 „ good Creature is such a one as by the na-  
 „ tural Temper or Bent of his Affections  
 „ is carry'd *primarily and immediately*,  
 „ and not *secondarily and accidentally*, to  
 „ Good, and against Ill:” And an *ill Crea-*  
*ture* is just the contrary; *viz.* „ One who  
 „ is wanting in right Affections, of force  
 „ enough to carry him *directly* towards  
 „ Good, and bear him out against Ill; or  
 „ who is carry'd by other Affections  
 „ directly to Ill, and against Good.”

WHEN in general, all the Affections or  
 Passions are suited to the publick Good, or  
 good

good of the Species, as above-mention'd; Part 2.  
 then is the *natural Temper* intirely good. §. 2.  
 If, on the contrary, any requisite Passion  
 be wanting; or if there be any one super-  
 numerary, or weak, or any-wise disservice-  
 able, or contrary to that main End; then is  
 the natural Temper, and consequently the  
 Creature himself, in some measure corrupt  
 and ill.

THERE is no need of mentioning  
 either *Envy*, *Malice*, *Frowardness*, or  
 other such hateful Passions; to shew in  
 what manner they are ill, and constitute an  
 ill Creature. But it may be necessary per-  
 haps to remark, that even as to *Kindness*  
 and *Love* of the most natural sort (such as  
 that of any Creature for its Offspring) if it  
 be immoderate & beyond a certain degree  
 it is undoubtedly vitious. For thus over-  
 great *Tenderness* destroys the Effect of  
 Love, and excessive *Pity* renders us unca-  
 pable of giving succour. Hence the Excess  
 of motherly Love is own'd to be a *vitious*  
*Kindness*; over-great *Pity*, *Effeminacy* and  
*Weakness*; over-great concern for Self-pre-  
 servation, *Meanness* and *Cowardice*; too  
 little, *Rashness*; and none at all, or that  
 which is contrary, (*viz.* a Passion leading  
 to Self-destruction) a *mad* and *desperate*  
*Depravity*.

Book I.

## S E C T. III.

**B**UT to proceed from what is esteem'd mere *Goodness*; and lies within the reach and capacity of all *sensible Creatures*, to that which is call'd *VIRTUE* or *MERIT*, and is allow'd to *Man* only.

*Reflex  
Action.*

**I**N a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the Affection; but the very *Actions* themselves, and the *Affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike.

**T**HE Case is the same in the *mental* or *moral* Subjects, as in the ordinary *Bodys*, or common Subjects of *Sense*. The Shapes, Motions, Colours, and Proportions of these latter being presented to our Eye; there necessarily results a \*Beauty or Deformity, according to the different Measure, Arrangement

\* *Infra*, pag. 414.



arrangement and Disposition of their several Parts. So in *Behaviour* and *Actions*, when presented to our Understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent Difference, according to the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects.

Part 2.

§ 3.

THE MIND, which is Spectator or Auditor of *other Minds*, cannot be without its *Eye* and *Ear*; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment or Thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels the Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a *Foul* and *Fair*, a *Harmonious* and a *Dissonant*, as really and truly here, as in any musical Numbers, or in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things. Nor can it \* withhold its *Admiration* and *Extasy*, its *Aversion* & *Scorn*, any more in what relates to one than to the other of these Subjects. So that to deny the common and natural Sense of a **SUBLIME** and **BEAUTIFUL** in Things, will appear an † Affectation merely, to any-one who considers duly of this Affair.

Moral  
Beauty and  
Deformity.

Now as in the *sensible* kind of Objects, the Species or Images of Bodys, Colours, and Sounds, are perpetually moving before

B 2

our

\* *Infra*, pag. 415, 418, 419, &c.

† VOL. I. p. 90, 91, 2, 3: VOL. III. p. 32, &c.

Book I. our Eyes, and acting on our Senses, even  
*Moral* when we sleep; so in the *moral* and *intel-*  
*Beauty and* *lectual* kind, the Forms and Images of  
*Deformity.* Things are no less active and incumbent on  
 the Mind, at all Seasons, and even when  
 the real Objects themselves are absent.

IN these vagrant Characters or Pictures  
 of *Manners*, which the Mind of necessity  
 figures to it-self, and carries still about  
 with it, the Heart cannot possibly remain  
 neutral; but constantly takes part one way  
 or other. However false or corrupt it be  
 within it-self, it finds the difference, as to  
 Beauty and Comeliness, between one *Heart*  
 and another, one *Turn of Affection*, one  
*Behaviour*, one *Sentiment* and another;  
 and accordingly, in all disinterested Cases,  
 must approve in some measure of what is  
 natural and honest, and disapprove what is  
 dishonest and corrupt.

THUS the several Motions, Inclina-  
 tions, Passions, Dispositions, and conse-  
 quent Carriage and Behaviour of Creatures  
 in the various Parts of Life, being in sever-  
 al Views or Perspectives represented to the  
 Mind, which readily discerns the Good  
 and Ill towards the Species or Publick;  
 there arises a new Trial or Exercise of the  
 Heart: which must either rightly, and  
 soundly affect what is just and right, and  
 disaffect what is contrary; or, corruptly  
 affect

affect what is ill, and disaffect what is worthy and good. Part 2.  
§. 3.

AND in this case alone it is we call any Creature *worthy* or *virtuous*, when it can have the Notion of a publick Interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. For tho we may vulgarly call an ill Horse *vitious*, yet we never say of a good-one, nor of any mere Beast, Idiot, or Changeling, tho ever so good-natur'd, that he is *worthy* or *virtuous*. *Publick  
Good and  
Object.*

So that if a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is *worthy* or *honest*; and make that Notice or Conception of *Worth* and *Honesty* to be an Object of his Affection; he has not the Character of being *virtuous*: for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a *Sense of Right or Wrong*; a Sentiment or Judgment of what is done, thro' just, equal, and good Affection, or the contrary. *GOOD-  
NESS  
and VIRTUE.*

WHATSOEVER is done thro' any unequal Affection, is *iniquous*, *wicked*, and *wrong*. If the Affection be equal, sound, and good, and the Subject of the Affection such as may with advantage to Society *Unequal  
Affection,  
or Iniquity.*

Book I. ciety be ever in the same manner prosecuted, or affected; this must necessarily constitute what we call *Equity* and *Right* in any Action. For, *WRONG* is not such Action as is barely the Cause of Harm, (since at this rate a dutiful Son aiming at an Enemy, but by mistake or ill chance happening to kill his Father, wou'd do a *Wrong*) but when any thing is done thro' insufficient or unequal Affection, (as when a Son shews no Concern for the Safety of a Father; or, where there is need of Succour, prefers an indifferent Person to him) this is of the nature of *Wrong*.

*Impair'd  
Sense.*

NEITHER can any Weakness or Imperfection in the Senses be the occasion of *Iniquity* or *Wrong*; if the Object of the Mind it-self be not at any time absurdly fram'd, nor any way improper, but suitable, just, and worthy of the Opinion and Affection apply'd to it. For if we will suppose a Man, who being sound and intire both in his Reason and Affection, has nevertheless so depriv'd a Constitution or Frame of Body, that the natural Objects are, thro' his Organs of Sense, as thro' ill Glasses, falsly convey'd and misrepresented; 'twill be soon observ'd, in such a Person's case, that since his Failure is not in his principal or leading Part; he cannot in himself be esteem'd *iniquous*, or unjust.

'TIS

'TIS otherwise in what relates to *Opinion*, Belief, or Speculation. For as the Extravagance of Judgment or Belief is such, that in some Countrys even Monkeys, Cats, Crocodiles, & other vile or destructive Animals, have been esteem'd *holy*, and worshipp'd even as *Deitys*; shou'd it appear to any one of the Religion or Belief of those Countrys, that to save such a Creature as a Cat, preferably to a Parent, was *Right*; and that other Men, who had not the same religious Opinion, were to be treated as Enemies, till converted; this wou'd be certainly *Wrong*, and wicked in the Believer: And every Action, grounded on this Belief, wou'd be an *iniquous*, wicked and vitious Action.

AND thus whatsoever causes a Misconception or Misapprehension of the Worth or Value of any Object, so as to diminish a due, or raise any undue, irregular, or un-social Affection, must necessarily be the occasion of *Wrong*. Thus he who affects or loves a Man for the sake of something which is reputed honourable, but which is in reality vitious, is himself vitious and ill. The beginnings of this Corruption may be noted in many occurrences: As when an ambitious Man, by the Fame of his high Attempts, a Conqueror or a Pirate by his boasted Enterprizes, raises in another

Book 1. *Right and Wrong.* Person an Esteem and Admiration of that immoral and inhuman Character, which deserves Abhorrence: 'tis then that the Hearer becomes corrupt, when he secretly approves the Ill he hears. But on the other side, the Man who loves and esteems another, as believing him to have that Virtue which he has not, but only counterfeits, is not on this account either vicious or corrupt.

A MISTAKE therefore *in Fact* being no Cause or Sign of ill Affection, can be no Cause of Vice. But a Mistake *of Right* being the Cause of unequal Affection, must of necessity be the Cause of vicious Action, in every intelligent or rational Being.

BUT as there are many Occasions where the matter of *Right* may even to the most discerning part of Mankind appear difficult, and of doubtful Decision, 'tis not a slight Mistake of this kind which can destroy the Character of a *virtuous or worthy Man*. But when, either thro' Superstition or ill Custom, there come to be very gross Mistakes in the assignment or application of the Affection; when the Mistakes are either in their nature so gross, or so complicated and frequent, that a Creature cannot well live in a natural state; nor with due Affections, compatible with human Society and Civil Life; then is the Character of VIRTUE forfeited.

AND

AND thus we find how far WORTH and VIRTUE depend on a knowledg of *Right and Wrong*, and on a use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural Affection by which the Species or Society is upheld, may, on any account, or thro' any Principle or Notion of Honour or Religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of Esteem. For such a Principle as this must be wholly vicious: and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than Vice and Immorality. And thus if there be any thing which teaches Men either Treachery, Ingratitude, or Cruelty, by divine Warrant; or under colour and pretence of any present or future Good to Mankind: if there be any thing which teaches Men to persecute their Friends thro' Love; or to torment Captives of War in sport; or to offer † human Sacrifice; or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves, in a religious Zeal, before their God; or to commit any sort of Barbarity, or Brutality, as amiable or becoming: be it Custom which gives Applause, or Religion which gives a Sanction; this is not, nor ever can be *Virtue*,

Part. 2.  
§. 3.  
*VICE in*  
*Opinion.*

*Vicious*  
*Worship.*

B 5

of

\* VOL. I. p. 18, 19, 20. VOL. III. p. 115.

† VOL. III. p. 124.

Book I.

Vicious  
Customs.

of any kind, or in any sense; but must remain still horrid Depravity, notwithstanding any Fashion, Law, Custom or Religion which may be ill and vicious *it-self*; but can never alter the *eternal Measures*, and immutable independent Nature of *Worth* and VIRTUE.

## S E C T. IV.

Sensible and  
rational  
Objects.

UPON the whole. As to those Creatures who are only capable of being mov'd by *sensible Objects*; they are accordingly *good* or *vitious*, as the sensible Affections stand with them. 'Tis otherwise in Creatures capable of framing *rational Objects* of moral Good. For in one of this kind, shou'd the *sensible Affections* stand ever so much amiss; yet if they prevail not, because of those other *rational Affections* spoken of; 'tis evident, the Temper still holds good in the main; and the Person is with justice esteem'd virtuous by all Men.

Trial of  
Virtue.

MORE than this. If by Temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous; yet resists these Passions, and notwithstanding the force of their Impression, adheres to *Virtue*; we say commonly in this case, *that the Virtue is the greater*: and we say well. Tho' if that which restrains the Person, and holds him to a virtuous-like Behaviour,



behaviour, be no Affection towards Goodness Part 2.  
 or Virtue it-self, but towards private Good §. 4.  
 merely, he is not in reality the more vir-  
 tuous; as has been shewn before. But  
 this still is evident, that if voluntarily, and  
 without foreign Constraint, an angry Tem-  
 per bears, or an amorous one refrains, so  
 that neither any cruel or immodest Action  
 can be forc'd from such a Person, tho' ever  
 so strongly tempted by his Constitution; we  
 applaud his Virtue above what we shou'd  
 naturally do, if he were free of this Temp-  
 tation, and these Propensities. At the same  
 time, there is no body will say that a Pro-  
 pensity to Vice can be an Ingredient in Vir-  
 tue, or any-way necessary to compleat a  
 virtuous Character.

THERE seems therefore to be some  
 kind of difficulty in the case: But it a-  
 mounts only to this. If there be any part  
 of the Temper in which ill Passions or Af-  
 fections are seated, whilst in another part  
 the Affections towards moral Good are  
 such as absolutely to master those Attempts  
 of their Antagonists; this is the greatest  
*Proof* imaginable, that a strong Principle  
 of Virtue lies at the bottom, and has  
 possess'd it-self of the natural Temper.  
 Whereas if there be no ill Passions stir-  
 ring, a Person may be indeed more *cheaply*  
*virtuous*; that is to say, he may conform  
 himself to the known Rules of Virtue,  
 B. 6. without.

Book I. without sharing so much of a virtuous Principle as another. Yet if that other Person, who has the Principle of Virtue so strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary Impediments suppos'd in him, he certainly loses nothing in Virtue; but on the contrary, losing only what is vitious in his Temper, is left more intire to Virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree.

Degrees of  
Virtue.

Thus is *Virtue* shar'd in different degrees by rational Creatures; such at least as are call'd *rational*; but who come short of that sound and well-establish'd Reason, which alone can constitute a *just Affection*, a uniform and steady *Will* and *Resolution*. And thus Vice and Virtue are found variously mix'd, and alternately prevalent in the several Characters of Mankind. For it seems evident from our *Inquiry*, that how ill soever the Temper or Passions may stand with respect either to the sensible or the moral Objects; however passionate, furious, lustful or cruel any Creature may become; however vitious the Mind be, or whatever ill Rules or Principles it goes by; yet if there be any Flexibleness or favourable Inclination towards the least moral Object, the least appearance of moral Good, (as if there be any such thing as *Kindness*, *Gratitude*, *Bounty*, or *Compassion*) there is still something of *Virtue* left;

left; and the Creature is not wholly vitious and unnatural.

Part 2.  
§. 4.

THUS a Ruffian, who out of a sense of Fidelity and Honour of any kind, refuses to discover his Associates; and rather than betray them, is content to endure Torments and Death; has certainly some Principle of Virtue, however he may misapply it. 'Twas the same case with that Malefactor, who rather than do the Office of Executioner to his Companions, chose to keep 'em company in their Execution.

IN short: As it seems hard to pronounce of any Man, „That he is *absolutely an A-thief* ;” so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any Man, „That he is *absolutely corrupt or vitious* ;” there being few, even of the horridest Villains, who have not something of *Virtue* in this imperfect sense. Nothing is more just than a known saying, „*That it is as hard to find a Man wholly Ill, as wholly Good* :” because wherever there is any good Affection left, there is certainly some *Goodness* or *Virtue* still in being.

AND, having consider'd thus of VIRTUE, *What it is in it-self*; we may now consider how it stands *with respect to the Opinions concerning a DEITY*, as above-mention'd.

Book I.



## PART III.

## SECT. I.

Causes of  
VICE.

**T**HE Nature of VIRTUE consisting  
(as has been explain'd) *in a certain  
just Disposition, or proportionable  
Affection of a rational Creature towards the  
moral Objects of Right and Wrong*; nothing  
can possibly in such a Creature exclude  
a Principle of Virtue, or render it in-  
effectual, except what

1. EITHER takes away the *natural and  
just* Sense of Right and Wrong:
2. OR creates a *wrong* Sense of it:
3. OR causes the right Sense to be op-  
pos'd, by *contrary* Affections.

Of VIR-  
TUE.

ON the other side, nothing can assist,  
or advance the Principle of Virtue, except  
what *either* in some manner nourishes and  
promotes a Sense of Right and Wrong;  
*or* preserves it genuine and uncorrupt;  
*or* causes it, when such, to be obey'd; by  
subduing

subduing and subjecting the other Affections to it. Part 3.  
§. 1.

WE are to consider, therefore, how any of the above-mention'd Opinions on the Subject of a DEITY, may influence in these Cases, or produce either of these three Effects.

I. As to the first Case; THE TAKING AWAY THE NATURAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. *Loss of Moral Sense.*

IT will not surely be understood, that by this is meant *the taking away the Notion of what is good or ill in the Species, or Society.* For of the Reality of such a Good and Ill, no rational Creature can possibly be insensible. Every-one discerns and owns a publick Interest, and is conscious of what affects his Fellowship or Community. When we say therefore of a Creature, „ That he has wholly lost the Sense „ of Right and Wrong;” we suppose that being able to discern the *Good* and *Ill* of his Species, he has at the same time no Concern for either, nor any Sense of Excellency or Baseness in any moral Action relating to one or the other. So that except merely with respect to a private and narrowly confin'd Self-good, 'tis suppos'd there is in such a Creature no *Liking* or *Dislike*.

Book I. *Dislike* of Manners; no Admiration, or Love of any thing as morally good; nor Hatred of any thing as morally ill; be it ever so unnatural or deform'd.

*Moral  
Sense.*

T H E R E is in reality no rational Creature whatsoever, who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to any-one, he cannot fail to create an Apprehension & Fear of like harm, and consequently a Resentment and Animosity in every Creature who observes him. So that the Offender must needs be conscious of being liable to such Treatment from every-one, as if he had in some degree offended All.

T H U S Offence and Injury are always known as punishable by every-one; and equal Behaviour (which is therefore call'd MERIT) as rewardable and well-deserving from every-one. Of this even the wickedest Creature living must have a *Sense*. So that if there be any further meaning in this *Sense* of Right and Wrong; if in reality there be any *Sense* of this kind which an absolute wicked Creature has not; it must consist in a real Antipathy or Aversion to *Injustice* or *Wrong*, and in a real Affection or Love towards *Equity* and *Right*, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural Beauty and Worth.

'T H I S

Part 3.  
§. 1.

'TIS impossible to suppose a mere sensible Creature originally so ill-constituted, & unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to be try'd by sensible Objects, he shou'd have no one good Passion towards his Kind, no foundation either of Pity, Love, Kindness, or social Affection. 'Tis as impossible to conceive, that a rational Creature coming first to be try'd by rational Objects, and receiving into his Mind the Images or Representations of Justice, Generosity, Gratitude, or other Virtue, shou'd have no *Liking* of these, or *Dislike* of their contraries; but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A Soul, indeed, may as well be without *Sense*, as without Admiration in the Things of which it has any knowledg. Coming therefore to a Capacity of seeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a Beauty & a Deformity as well in Actions, Minds, and Tempers, as in Figures, Sounds, or Colours. If there be no *real* Amiableness or Deformity in moral Acts, there is at least *an imaginary one* of full force. Tho perhaps the Thing itself shou'd not be allow'd in Nature, the Imagination or Fancy of it must be allow'd to be from Nature alone. Nor can any thing besides Art and strong Endeavour, with long Practice and Meditation, overcome

Book I. come such a *natural Prevention*, or \* *Pre-*  
*possession* of the Mind, in favour of this  
*Moral Sense* moral Distinction.

How im-  
 pair'd:

SENSE of Right and Wrong therefore being as natural to us as *natural Affection* it-self, & being a first Principle in our Constitution & Make; there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion or Belief, which is capable *immediately* or *directly* to exclude or destroy it. That which is of original & pure Nature, nothing beside contrary Habit and Custom (a second Nature) is able to displace. And this Affection being *an original one* of earliest rise in the Soul or affectionate Part; nothing beside contrary Affection, by frequent check and controul, can operate upon it, so as either to diminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole.

By opposite  
 Affection,  
 or Antipa-  
 thy;

'TIS evident in what relates to the Frame and Order of our *Bodys*; that no particular odd Mein or Gesture, which is either natural to us, & consequent to our Make, or accidental and by Habit acquir'd, can possibly be overcome by our immediate Disapprobation, or the contrary Bent of our Will, ever so strongly set against it. Such a Change cannot be effected without extraordinary Means, & the intervention of Art and Method, a strict Attention, and repeated Check. And even

\* *In, ra*, p. 412, 420, 421.



ven thus, Nature, we find, is hardly Part 3.  
 naster'd; but lies sullen, & ready to revolt, §. 1.  
 on the first occasion. Much more is this  
 the Mind's case in respect of that natural  
 Affection and anticipating Fancy, which  
 makes the sense of Right and Wrong.  
 'Tis impossible that this can instantly, or  
 without much Force and Violence, be  
 effac'd, or struck out of the natural Tem-  
 per, even by means of the most extrava-  
 gant Belief or Opinion in the World.

Not by  
 Opinions  
 merely.

NEITHER *Theism* therefore, nor *A-*  
*theism*, nor *Dæmonism*, nor any religious  
 or irreligious Belief of any kind, being  
 able to operate immediately or directly in  
 this Case, but indirectly, by the interven-  
 tion of opposite or of favourable Affec-  
 tions casually excited by any such Belief;  
 we may consider of this Effect in our last  
 Case, where we come to examine the A-  
 greement or Disagreement of other Af-  
 fections with this natural & moral one  
 which relates to Right and Wrong.

## S E C T. I I.

II. **A**S to the second Case, viz. THE Corruption  
 WRONG SENSE OR FALSE IMA- of Moral  
 GINATION OF RIGHT AND WRONG. Sense.

THIS can proceed only from the Force  
 of custom and Education in opposition to  
 Nature;

Book I. Nature; as may be noted in those Countries where, according to Custom or politick Institution, certain Actions naturally foul & odious are repeatedly view'd with Applause, & Honour ascrib'd to them. For 'tis possible that a Man, forcing himself, may eat the Flesh of his Enemys, not only against his Stomach, but against his Nature, & think it nevertheless both right & honourable; as supposing it to be of considerable service to his Community, & capable of advancing the Name, & spreading the Terror of his Nation.

*Causes of this Corruption.*

*Custom.*

But to speak of the Opinions relating to a DEITY, and what effect they may have in this place. As to *Atheism*, it does not seem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the setting up a false Species of Right or Wrong. For notwithstanding a Man may thro' Custom, or by licentiousness of Practice, favour'd by Atheism, come in time to lose much of his natural *moral Sense*; yet it does not seem that Atheism shou'd *of it-self* be the cause of any estimation or valuing of any thing as fair, noble, and deserving, which was the contrary. It can never, for instance, make it be thought that the being able to eat Man's Flesh, or commit Bestiality, *is good and excellent in it-self*. But this is certain, that by means of *corrupt Religion*, or SUPERSTITION, many things the most

*Superstition.*

most horridly unnatural and inhuman, Part 3.  
 come to be receiv'd as excellent, good, and §. 2.  
 laudable *in themselves*.

NOR is this a wonder. For where-ever any-thing, in its nature odious and abominable, is by Religion advanc'd, as the suppos'd Will or Pleasure of a *supreme Deity*; in the eye of the Believer it appears not indeed in any respect the less ill or odious on this account; then must *the Deity* of necessity bear the blame, and be consider'd as a Being naturally ill and odious, however courted, and sollicitated, thro' Mistrust and Fear. But this is what Religion, in the main, forbids us to imagine. It everywhere prescribes Esteem and Honour in company with Worship and Adoration. Whensoever therefore it teaches the Love and Admiration of a DEITY, who has any apparent Character of *Ill*; it teaches at the same time a Love and Admiration of *that Ill*, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in itself horrid and detestable.

FOR instance: if JUPITER be He who is ador'd and reverenc'd; and if his History represents him amorously inclin'd, and permitting his Desires of this kind to wander in the loosest manner; 'tis certain that his Worshippers, believing this History to be literally and strictly true, must of course

Book I. course be taught a greater Love of amorous and wanton Acts. If there be a Religion which teaches the Adoration & Love of a GOD, whose Character it is to be captious, and of high resentment, subject to Wrath and Anger, furious, revengeful, and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the Offence and if there be added to the Character of this GOD, a fraudulent Disposition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongst Men; favourable to a few, tho' for slight causes, and cruel to the rest: 'tis evident that such a Religion as this being strongly enforced, must of necessity raise even an Approbation and Respect towards the Vices of this kind, and breed a suitable disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper. For even *Irregularitys* and *Enormitys* of a heinous kind must in many cases appear illustrious to one, who considers them in a Being admir'd and contemplated with the highest Honour and Veneration.

THIS indeed must be allow'd, that if in the *Cult* or Worship of such a Deity there be nothing beyond common Form, nothing beside what proceeds from mere Example, Custom, Constraint, or Fear; if there be, at the bottom, no real Heartiness, no Esteem or Love imply'd; the Worshipper perhaps may not be much misled

nished as to his Notion of Right and Wrong. If in following the Precepts of his suppos'd G O D, or doing what he esteems necessary towards the satisfying of such his D E I T Y, he is compel'd only by *Fear*, and, contrary to his Inclination, performs an Act which he secretly detests as barbarous and unnatural; then has he an Apprehension or *Sense* still of Right and Wrong, and, according to what has been already observ'd, is sensible of Ill in the Character of his G O D; however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on this Subject, or so thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct Opinion in the case. But if by insensible degrees, as he proceeds in his religious Faith and devout Exercise, he comes to be more and more reconcil'd to the Malignity, Arbitrariness, Partiality, or Revengfulness of his believ'd D E I T Y; his Reconciliation with these Qualitys themselves will soon grow in proportion; and the most cruel, unjust, and barbarous Acts, will, by the power of this Example, be often consider'd by him, not only as just and lawful, but as divine, and worthy of imitation.

F O R whoever thinks there is a G O D, and pretends formally to believe that he is *just* and *good*, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as *Justice* and *Injustice*, *Truth* and *Falsehood*, *Right* and *Wrong*;

Book I. *Wrong*; according to which he pronounces that *God is just, righteous, and true*. In the mere *Will, Decree, or Law* of God be said absolutely to constitute *Right and Wrong*, then are these latter words of no significancy at all. For thus if each part of a Contradiction were affirm'd for Truth by the supreme Power, they wou'd consequently become *true*. Thus if one Person were decreed to suffer for another's fault, the Sentence wou'd be *just and equitable*. And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily, and without reason, some Beings were destin'd to endure perpetual Ill, and others as constantly to enjoy Good; this also wou'd pass under the same Denomination. But to say of any thing that it is *just* or *unjust*, on such a foundation as this, is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning.

Superstition.

AND thus it appears, that where a real Devotion and hearty Worship is paid to a supreme Being, who in his History or Character is represented otherwise than as really and truly just & good; there must ensue a Loss of Rectitude, a Disturbance of Thought, and a Corruption of Temper and Manners in the Believer. His Honesty will, of necessity, be supplanted by his Zeal, whilst he is thus unnaturally influenc'd, and render'd thus immorally devout.

To

To this we need only add, that as the Character of a GOD does injury to the Affections of Men, & disturbs & impairs the natural Sense of Right & Wrong; so, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a sound Judgment or Sense of Right and Wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, highest Goodness and Worth. Such a view of divine Providence & Bounty, extended to *All*, and express'd in a constant Good Affection towards *the Whole*, must of necessity engage us, within our Compass and Sphere, to act by a like Principle and Affection. And having once the Good of our Species or Publick in view, as our End or Aim, 'tis impossible we shou'd be misled by any means to a false Apprehension or Sense of Right or Wrong.

As to this second Case therefore; RELIGION (according as the kind may prove) is capable of doing great Good, or Harm; and ATHEISM nothing positive in either way. For however it may be indirectly an occasion of Mens losing good and sufficient Sense of Right and Wrong; it will not, as *Atheism merely*,  
 VOL. II. C be

Book 1. be the occasion of setting up a false Species of it; which only false Religion or fantastical Opinion, deriv'd commonly from Superstition & Credulity, is able to effect

### S E C T. III.

**N**OW as to the last Case, THE OPPOSITION MADE BY OTHER AFFECTIONS TO THE NATURAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

*Opposition of  
the Affections.*

'T IS evident, that a Creature having this sort of SENSE or *good Affection* in any degree, must necessarily act according to it; if it happens not to be oppos'd, either by some settled sedate Affection towards conceiv'd *private Good*, or by some sudden, strong and forcible Passion, as of *Lust* or *Anger*; which may not only subdue the Sense of Right and Wrong, but the very Sense of private Good it-self; and overrule even the most familiar and received Opinion of what is conducing to Self-interest.

BUT it is not our business in this place to examine the several Means or Methods by which this Corruption is introduc'd or increas'd. We are to consider only how the Opinions concerning a *Deity* can influence one way or another.

THAT



THAT it is possible for a Creature capable of using Reflection, to have a Liking or Dislike of moral Actions, and consequently a Sense of Right and Wrong, before such time as he may have any settled Notion of A GOD, is what will hardly be question'd: it being a thing not expected, or any-way possible, that a Creature such as *Man*, arising from his Childhood slowly and gradually, to several degrees of Reason & Reflection, shou'd, at the very first, be taken up with those speculations, or more refin'd sort of Reflections, about the Subject of GOD'S Existence.

Part 3.

§. 3.

*Rise of Moral Sense.*

LET us suppose a Creature, who wanting Reason, and being unable to reflect, as, notwithstanding, many good Qualities and Affections; as Love to his Kind, Courage, Gratitude, or Pity. 'Tis certain that if you give to this Creature a reflecting Faculty, it will at the same instant approve of Gratitude, Kindness, and Pity; be taken with any shew or representation of the social Passion, & think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is *to be capable of VIRTUE*, and *to have a Sense of RIGHT and WRONG*.

C 2

BEFORE

## Book I.

*Rise of Moral Sense.*

BEFORE the time, therefore, that a Creature can have any plain or positive Notion one way or other, concerning the Subject of a GOD, he may be suppos'd to have an Apprehension or Sense of *Right & Wrong*, & be possess'd of *Virtue & Vice* in different degrees; as we know by Experience of those, who having liv'd in such places, & in such a manner as never to have enter'd into any serious Thoughts of Religion, are nevertheless very different among themselves, as to their Characters of Honesty & Worth: some being naturally *modest, kind, friendly*, and consequently Lovers of *kind and friendly Actions*; others *proud, harsh, cruel*, and consequently inclin'd to admire rather the Acts of *Violence and mere Power*.

DEITY.

Now, as to the Belief of a DEITY, and how Men are influenc'd by it; we may consider, in the first place, on what account Men yield Obedience, and act in conformity to such a supreme Being. It must be either *in the way of his POWER*, as presupposing some Disadvantage or Benefit to accrue from him: or *in the way of his EXCELLENCY and WORTH*, as thinking it the Perfection of Nature to imitate and resemble him.

Part 3.

§. 3.

IF (as in the first Case) there be a Belief or Conception of a DEITY, who is consider'd only as *powerful* over his Creature, and enforcing Obedience to his *absolute* Will by particular Rewards and Punishments; and if on this account, thro' Hope merely of *Reward*, or fear of *Punishment*, the Creature be incited to do the Good he rates, or restrain'd from doing the Ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse; there is in this Case (as has been already shewn) no Virtue or Goodness whatsoever. The Creature, notwithstanding his good Conduct, is intrinsically of as little Worth, as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread or terror of any sort. There is no more of *Rectitude*, *Piety*, or *Sanctity* in a Creature thus reform'd, than there is *Meekness* or *Gentleness* in a Tiger strongly chain'd, or *Innocence* and *Sobriety* in a Monkey under the Discipline of the Whip. For however orderly and well those Animals, or Man himself upon like terms, may be induc'd to act, whilst the Will is neither gain'd, nor the Inclination wrought upon, but *Awe* alone prevails and forces Obedience; the Obedience is *servile*, and all which is done thro' it, merely *servile*. The greater degree of such a Submission or Obedience, is only the greater *Servility*; whatever

C 3

may

Book I. may be the Object. For whether such  
*Fear.* Creature has a good Master, or an ill one  
 he is neither more or less servile in his own  
 nature. Be the Master or Superior ever  
 so perfect, or excellent, yet the greater  
 Submission caus'd in this Case, thro' this  
 sole Principle or Motive, is only the lower  
 & more abject Servitude, and implies the  
 greater Wretchedness & Meanness in the  
 Creature, who has those Passions of Self-  
 love so predominant, and is in his Temper  
 so vitious and defective, as has been  
 explain'd.

*Honour and  
 Love.*

As to the second Case. If there be a  
 Belief or Conception of a DEITY, who  
 is consider'd as *worthy and good*, and ad-  
 mir'd and reverenc'd as such; being under-  
 stood to have, besides mere Power and  
 Knowledg, the highest Excellence of Na-  
 ture, such as renders him justly amiable to  
 All; and if in the manner this Sovereign  
 and mighty Being is represented, or, as he  
 is historically describ'd, there appears in  
 him a high and eminent regard to what is  
 good and excellent, a Concern for the  
 good of *All*, and an Affection of Benevo-  
 lence and Love towards *the Whole*; such  
 an Example must undoubtedly serve (as  
 above explain'd) to raise and increase the  
 Affection towards Virtue, and help to sub-  
 mit and subdue all other Affections to that  
 alone.

*Divine  
 Example.*

N O R.

NOR is this Good effected by *Example* Part 3. merely. For where the Theittical Belief §. 3. is intire and perfect, there must be a steddy Opinion of the Superintendency of a Supreme Being, a Witness and Spectator of human Life, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the Universe: So that in the perfectest Recess, or deepest Solitude, there must be *One* still presum'd remaining with us; whose Presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most august Assembly on Earth. In such a Pre-<sup>Divine</sup> sence, 'tis evident, that as the *Shame* of <sup>Presence.</sup> guilty Actions must be the greatest of any; so must the *Honour* be, of well-doing, even under the unjust Censure of a World. And in this Case, 'tis very apparent how conducing a *perfect Theism* must be to Virtue, and how great Deficiency there is in *Atheism*.

WHAT the FEAR of *future Punishment*, and HOPE of *future Reward*, ad-<sup>Fear and</sup> ded to this Belief, may further contribute <sup>Hope.</sup> towards Virtue, we come now to consider more particularly. So much in the mean while may be gather'd from what has been said above; That neither this *Fear* or *Hope* can possibly be of the kind call'd *good Affections*, such as are acknowledged the Springs and Sources of all Actions truly *good*. Nor can this *Fear* or

C 4

Hope,

Book I. Hope, as above intimated, consist in reality with Virtue, or Goodness; if it either stands as *essential* to any moral Performance, or as a *considerable Motive* to any Act, of which some better Affection ought, *alone*, to have been a *sufficient Cause*.

*Self love,*

*How advanced.*

It may be consider'd withal; That, in this religious sort of Discipline, the Principle of *Self love*, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being no-way moderated or restrain'd, but rather improv'd and made stronger every day, by the exercise of the Passions in a Subject of more extended Self-interest; there may be reason to apprehend lest the Temper of this kind shou'd extend it self in general thro' all the parts of Life. For if the Habit be such as to occasion, in every particular, a stricter Attention to Self good, and private Interest; it must insensibly diminish the Affections towards publick Good, or the Interest of Society; and introduce a certain Narrowness of Spirit, which (as some pretend) is peculiarly observable in the devout Persons and Zealots of almost every religious Persuasion.

*Its Effects in Religion,*

THIS, too, must be confess'd; That if it be *true Piety*, to love GOD for *his own sake*; the over-sollicitous regard to private Good expected from him, must  
of

of necessity prove a diminution of Piety. For whilst *God* is belov'd only as the Cause of private Good, he is no more belov'd than as any other Instrument or Means of Pleasure by any vicious Creature. Now the more there is of this violent Affection towards *private Good*, the less room is there for the other sort towards *Goodness it-self*, or any good and deserving Object, worthy of Love & Admiration for its own sake; such as *GOD* is universally acknowledg'd, or at least by the generality of civiliz'd or refin'd Worshippers.

'TIS in this respect that the strong Desire and *Love of Life* may also prove an Obstacle to Piety, as well as to Virtue and publick Love. For the stronger this Affection is in any-one, the less will he be able to have true *Resignation*, or Submission to the Rule and Order of *THE DEITY*. And if that which he calls *Resignation* depends only on the expectation of infinite Retribution or Reward, he discovers no more Worth or Virtue here, than in any other Bargain of Interest: The meaning of his *Resignation* being only this, „ That he resigns „ his present Life and Pleasures, conditionally for *THAT* which he himself „ confesses to be beyond an Equivalent; „

C 5 „ eternal

Book I. „ *eternal living in a state of highest*  
 „ *Pleasure and Enjoyment.*”

BUT notwithstanding the Injury which the Principle of Virtue may possibly suffer, by the Increase of the selfish Passion, in the way we have been mentioning; 'tis certain, on the other side, that the Principle of *Fear of future Punishment*, and *Hope of future Reward*, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many Circumstances, a great Advantage, Security, and Support to *Virtue*.

*Belief of future Life;*

*How advantageous.*

IT has been already consider'd, that notwithstanding there may be implanted in the Heart a real Sense of Right and Wrong, a real good Affection towards the Species or Society; yet by the violence of Rage, Lust, or any other counter-working Passion, this good Affection may frequently be controul'd and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the Mind capable to render such ill Passions the Objects of its Aversion, and cause them earnestly to be oppos'd; 'tis apparent how much a good Temper in time must suffer, and a Character by degrees change for the worse. But if Religion interposing, creates a Belief that the ill *Passions* of this kind, no less than their consequent *Actions*, are the Objects of a Deity's Animad-

*Supporting.*



Animadversion; 'tis certain, that such a Part 3.  
 Belief must prove a seasonable Remedy § 3.  
 against Vice, and be in a particular man-  
 ner advantageous to Virtue. For a Belief  
 of this kind must be suppos'd to tend con-  
 siderably towards the calming of the Mind,  
 and disposing or fitting the Person to a  
 better Recollection of himself, and to a  
 stricter Observance of that good and vir-  
 tuous Principle, which needs only his At-  
 tention, to engage him wholly in its Party  
 and Interest.

AND as this Belief of a future Reward Savings  
 and Punishment is capable of supporting  
 those who thro' *ill Practice* are like to apo-  
 statize from Virtue; so when by *ill Opini-*  
*on* and wrong Thought, the Mind it self  
 is bent against the honest Course, and de-  
 bauch'd even to an Esteem, and deliberate  
 Preference of a vitious one; the Belief of  
 the kind mention'd may prove on this oc-  
 casion the only Relief and Safety.

A PERSON, for instance, who has  
 much of Goodness and natural Rectitude  
 in his Temper, but withal, so much Soft-  
 ness, or Effeminacy, as unfits him to bear  
 Poverty, Crosses or Adversity; if by ill  
 Fortune he meets with many Trials of  
 this kind, it must certainly give a Sour-  
 ness and Distaste to his Temper, and  
 make him exceedingly averse to that

Book I. which he may falsely presume the occasion of such Calamity or Ill. Now if his own Thoughts, or the corrupt Insinuations of other Men, present it often to his Mind,

*Belief of future Life;*

„ That his HONESTY is the occasion of this Calamity, and that if he were deliver'd from this Restraint of VIRTUE and HONESTY, he might be much happier:” 'tis very obvious that his Esteem of these good Qualities must in proportion diminish every day, as the Temper grows uneasy, and quarrels with it-self. But if he opposes to this Thought the Consideration,

„ That Honesty carries with it, if not a present, at least a future Advantage, such as to compensate that Loss of private Good which he regrets;” then may this injury to his good Temper and honest Principle be prevented, and his Love or Affection towards Honesty and Virtue remain as it was before.

*Improving:* IN the same manner, where instead of Regard or Love, there is rather an Aversion to what is good and virtuous, (as, for instance, where Lenity & Forgiveness are despis'd, and Revenge highly thought of, and belov'd) if there be this Consideration added, „ That Lenity is, by its Rewards, made the cause of a greater Selfgood and Enjoyment than what is found in Revenge;” that very Affection of Lenity and Mildness may come to be industriously

lustriously nourish'd, and the contrary Passions depress'd. And thus *Temperance, Modesty, Candour, Benignity*, and other good Affections, however despis'd at first, may come at last to be valu'd *for their own sakes*; the contrary Species rejected, and the good and proper Object belov'd and prosecuted, when the Reward or Punishment is not so much as thought of.

Part 3.  
§. 3.

THUS in a civil STATE or PUBLICK, *Rewards and Punishments,* we see that a virtuous Administration, and an equal and just Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, is of the highest *In the State.* Service; not only by restraining the Vicious, and forcing them to act usefully to Society; but by making Virtue to be apparently the Interest of every-one, so as to remove all Prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and lead Men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For thus a People rais'd from Barbarity or despotick Rule, civiliz'd by Laws, and made virtuous by the long Course of a lawful & just Administration; if they chance to fall suddenly under any Misgovernment of unjust and arbitrary Power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a stronger Virtue, in opposition to such Violence and Corruption. And even where, by long & continu'd Arts of a prevailing Tyranny, such a People are at last totally

Book 1. opprefs'd, the scatter'd Seeds of Virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a second Generation; ere the utmost Force of misapply'd Rewards and Punishments can bring them to the abject and compliant state of long-accustom'd Slaves.

Rewards  
and Pu-  
nishments,

BUT tho' a right Distribution of Justice in a Government be so essential a cause of Virtue, we must observe in this Case, that it is *Example* which chiefly influences Mankind, and forms the Character and Disposition of a People. For a virtuous Administration is in a manner necessarily accompany'd with Virtue in the Magistrate. Otherwise it cou'd be of little effect, and of no long duration. But where it is sincere and well establish'd, there Virtue and the Laws must necessarily be respected and belov'd. So that as to Punishments and Rewards, their Efficacy is not so much from the Fear or Expectation which they raise, as from a natural Esteem of *Virtue*, and Detestation of *Villany*, which is awaken'd and excited by these publick Expressions of the Approbation and Hatred of Mankind in each Case. For in the publick Executions of the greatest Villains, we see generally that the Infamy and Odioufness of their Crime, and the Shame of it before Mankind, contribute more to their Misery than all besides; and that it is not the immediate Pain, or Death

it.

itself, which raises so much Horror either Part 3.  
 in the Sufferers or Spectators, as that igno- §. 3.  
 minious kind of Death which is inflicted  
 for publick Crimes, and Violations of Jus-  
 tice and Humanity.

AND as the Case of Reward and Punish- *In the Fam-*  
 ment stands thus in the Publick, so, in the *mily,*  
 same manner, as to *private Familys*. For  
 Slaves and mercenary Servants, restrain'd  
 and made orderly by Punishment, and the  
 Severity of their Master, are not on this  
 account made good or honest. Yet the  
 same Master of the Family using proper  
 Rewards and gentle Punishments towards  
 his Children, teaches them Goodness, and  
 by this help instructs them in a Virtue,  
 which afterwards they practise upon other  
 grounds, and without thinking of a Penal-  
 ty or Bribe. And this is what we call a *Li-*  
*beral Education* and a *Liberal Service*:  
 the contrary Service and Obedience, whe-  
 ther towards God or Man, being *illiberal,*  
 & unworthy of any Honour or Commen-  
 dation.

IN the Case of Religion, however, it *In Reli-*  
 must be consider'd, that if by the *Hope of* *gion.*  
*Reward* be understood the Love and De-  
 sire of virtuous Enjoyment, or of the very  
 Practice and Exercise of Virtue in another  
 Life; the Expectation or Hope of this  
 kind is so far from being derogatory to  
 Virtue,

Book I. Virtue, that it is an Evidence of our loving it the more sincerely and *for its own sake*. Nor can this Principle be justly call'd *selfish*: for if the Love of Virtue be not mere Self-Interest, the Love and Desire of Life for Virtue's sake cannot be esteem'd so. But if the Desire of Life be only thro' the Violence of that natural Aversion to Death; if it be thro' the Love of something else than virtuous Affection; or thro' the Unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or token of real Virtue.

THUS a Person loving Life for Life's sake, and Virtue not at all, may by the Promise or Hope of Life, and Fear of Death, or other Evil, be induc'd to practise Virtue, and even *endeavour* to be truly virtuous, by a Love of what he practises. Yet neither is *this very Endeavour* to be esteem'd a *Virtue*. For tho' he may intend to be virtuous; he is not become so, for having only intended, or aim'd at it, thro' love of the Reward. But as soon as he is come to have any Affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such Good *for its own sake*, as good and amiable *in it-self*; then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till then.

SUCH

Part 3.

§. 3.

SUCH are the Advantages or Disadvantages which accrue to Virtue from Reflection upon private Good or Interest. For tho' the Habit of *Selfishness*, and the Multiplicity of *interested Views*, are of little improvement to real *Merit* or *Virtue*; yet here is a necessity for the Preservation of *Virtue*, that it shou'd be thought to have no quarrel with *true Interest*, and *Self-enjoyment*.

*Security to  
Virtue.*

WHOEVER therefore, by any strong Persuasion or settled Judgment, thinks in the main, *That Virtue causes Happiness, and Vice Misery*, carries with him that Security and Assistance to Virtue which is requir'd. Or tho' he has no such Thought, nor can believe Virtue his real Interest, either with respect to his own Nature & Constitution, or the Circumstances of human Life; yet if he believes any supreme Powers concern'd in the *present Affairs* of Mankind, *immediately* interposing in behalf of the Honest and Virtuous, against the impious and Unjust; this will serve to preserve in him, however, that just Esteem of Virtue, which might otherwise considerably diminish. Or shou'd he still believe little of the *immediate* Interposition of Providence in the Affairs of *this present Life*; yet if he believes a God dispensing Rewards and Punishments to Vice and Virtue.

in

Book I. in a future; he carries with him still the  
*Cariton.* same Advantage and Security; whilst his  
 Belief is steady, and no wise wavering or  
 doubtful. For it must be observ'd, that  
 an Expectation and Dependency, so mira-  
 culous and great as this, must naturally  
 take off from other inferior Dependency's  
 and Encouragements. Where infinite Re-  
 wards are thus inforc'd, and the Imagina-  
 tion strongly turn'd towards them, the o-  
 ther common & natural Motives to Good-  
 ness are apt to be neglected, and lose much  
 by Dis-use. Other Interests are hardly so  
 much as computed, whilst the Mind is  
 thus transported in the pursuit of a high  
 Advantage and Self-Interest, so narrowly  
 confin'd within our-selves. On this ac-  
 count, all other affections towards Friends  
 Relations, or Mankind, are often slightly  
 regarded, as being *worldly*, and of little  
 moment, in respect of the Interest of *our*  
*Soul*. And so little thought is there of  
 any immediate Satisfaction arising from  
 such good Offices of Life, that it is custo-  
 mary with many devout People zealously  
 to decry all temporal Advantages of Good-  
 ness, all natural Benefits of Virtue, and  
 magnifying the contrary Happiness of a  
 vitious state, to declare, „ That except  
 „ only for the sake of future Reward, and  
 „ fear of future Punishment; they wou'd  
 „ divest themselves of all Goodness at  
 „ once, and freely allow themselves to be  
 „ most.

*Imprudent  
 Zeal.*



most immoral and profligate.,, From Part 3. whence it appears, that in some respects § 3. here can be nothing more \* fatal to Virtue, than the weak and uncertain Belief of future Reward and Punishment. For the stress being laid wholly here, if this Foundation come to fail, there is no further Prop or Security to Mens Morals. And thus Virtue is supplanted and betray'd.

Now as to ATHEISM: tho it be plain-<sup>Atheism</sup>ly deficient and without remedy, in the case of *ill Judgment on the Happiness of Virtue*; yet it is not, indeed, of necessity the Cause of any such *ill Judgment*. For without an absolute Assent to any Hypothesis of *Theism*, the Advantages of Virtue may possibly be seen and own'd; and a high Opinion of it establish'd in the Mind. However, it must be confess'd, that the natural Tendency of Atheism is very different,

'TIS in a manner impossible, to have any great opinion of the Happiness of Virtue, without conceiving high thoughts of the Satisfaction resulting from the generous Admiration and Love of it: And nothing beside the Experience of such a Love is likely to make this Satisfaction credited. The chief Ground and Support therefore of this Opinion of *Happiness in Virtue*, must arise from the powerful feeling of this generous

Book 1. nerous moral Affection, and the Know-  
*Atheism.* ledg of its Power and Strength. But this is  
 certain, that it can be no great strengthening  
 to the moral Affection, no great support to  
 the pure Love of Goodness and Virtue, to  
 suppose there is neither *Goodness* nor *Beau-*  
*ty* in the *WHOLE* it-self; nor any Exam-  
 ple, or Precedent of good Affection in any  
 superior Being. Such a Belief must tend  
 rather to the weaning the Affections from  
 any thing amiable or self-worthy, & to the  
 suppressing the very habit & familiar Custom  
 of admiring natural Beautys, or whatever  
 in the Order of things is according  
 to just Design, Harmony, and Proportion.  
 For how little dispos'd must a Person be, to  
 love or admire any thing as *orderly* in the  
 Universe; who thinks the Universe it-self  
 a Pattern of *Disorder*? How unapt to reve-  
 rence or respect any particular subordinate  
 Beauty of a *Part*; when even *THE WHOLE*  
 itself is thought to want Perfection, and  
 to be only a vast and infinite Deformity?

NOTHING indeed can be more melan-  
 choly, than the Thought of living in a  
 distracted Universe, from whence many  
 Ills may be suspected, and where there is  
 nothing good or lovely which presents it-  
 self, nothing which can satisfy in Contem-  
 plation, or raise any Passion besides that  
 of Contempt, Hatred, or Dislike. Such  
 an Opinion as this may by degrees im-  
 bitter

itter the Temper, and not only make the Love of Virtue to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin the very Principle of Virtue, *viz. natural and kind Affection.*

UPON the whole; whoever has a firm <sup>Theism</sup> belief of a GOD, whom he does not merely call good, but of whom in reality he believes nothing beside *real Good*, nothing beside what is truly suitable to the exactest Character of Benignity and Goodness; such Person believing Rewards or Retributions in another Life, must believe them annex'd to real Goodness and Merit, real Willany and Baseness, and not to any accidental Qualities or Circumstances; in which respect they cannot properly be styl'd *Rewards* or *Punishments*, but *capricious Distributions of Happiness or Unhappiness to Creatures.* These are the only Terms on which the Belief of a World to come, can happily influence the Believer. And on these Terms, and by virtue of this Belief, Man perhaps may retain his Virtue and Integrity, even under the hardest Thoughts of human Nature; when either by any ill Circumstance or untoward Doctrine, he is brought to that unfortunate opinion of *Virtue's being naturally an Enemy to Happiness in Life.*

THIS, however, is an Opinion which cannot be suppos'd consistent with sound *Theism.*

Book I. *Theism.* For whatever be decided as to a future Life, or the Rewards and Punishments of hereafter; he who, as a sound *Theist*, believes a reigning Mind, sovereign in Nature, and ruling all things with the highest perfection of Goodness, as well as of Wisdom and Power, must necessarily believe Virtue to be naturally good and advantageous. For what cou'd more strongly imply an unjust Ordinance, a Blot and Imperfection in the general Constitution of Things, than to suppose Virtue the natural Ill, and Vice the natural Good of any Creature?

*Atheism and Theism.* AND now last of all, there remains for us to consider a yet further Advantage to Virtue, in the *Theistical* Belief above the *Atheistical*. The Proposition may at first sight appear over-refin'd, and of a sort which is esteem'd too nicely philosophical. But after what has been already examin'd the Subject perhaps may be more easily explain'd.

*Effects of each.* THERE is no Creature according to what has been already prov'd, who must not of necessity be *ill* in some degree, by having any Affection or Aversion in a stronger degree than is suitable to his own private Good, or that of the System to which he is join'd. For in either Case the Affection is *ill* and vitious. Now if a rational

ional Creature has that Degree of Aversion which is requisite to arm him against any particular Misfortune, and to arm him against the Approach of any Calamity; his is regular and well. But if after the Misfortune is happen'd, his Aversion continues still, and his Passion rather grows upon him; whilst he rages at the Accident, and exclaims against his private Fortune or Lot; this will be acknowledg'd both vicious *in present*, and for the future; as it affects the Temper, and disturbs that easy Course of the Affections on which Virtue and Goodness so much depend. On the other side, the patient enduring of the Calamity, and the bearing up of the Mind under it, must be acknowledg'd *immediately* virtuous, and *preservative of Virtue*. Now, according to the Hypothesis of those who exclude a general Mind, it must be confess'd, there can nothing happen in the Course of things to deserve either our Admiration, and Love, or our Anger, and Abhorrence. However, as there can be no Satisfaction at the best in thinking upon what *Atoms and Chance* produce; so upon disastrous Occasions, and under the Circumstances of a calamitous and hard Fortune, 'tis scarce possible to prevent a natural kind of Abhorrence and Spleen, which will be entertain'd and kept alive by the Imagination of so perverse an Order of Things.

But

*Of Atheism*

Book I. But in another Hypothesis (that of perfect  
*O' Theism.* *Theism*) it is understood, „ *That whatever*  
 „ *the Order of the World produces, is in*  
 „ *the main both just and good.*” There-  
 fore in the Course of Things in this  
 World, whatever Hardship of Events may  
 seem to force from any rational Creature  
 a hard Censure of his private Condition or  
*Lot*; he may by Reflection nevertheless  
 come to have Patience, and to acquiesce  
 in it. Nor is this all. He may go fur-  
 ther still in this Reconciliation; and from  
 the same Principle may make the *Lot* it-  
 self an Object of his good Affection;  
 whilst he strives to maintain this generous  
 Fealty, & stands so well dispos'd towards  
 the Laws and Government of his higher  
 Country.

SUCH an Affection must needs create  
 the highest Constancy in any state of Suf-  
 ferance, and make us in the best manner  
 support whatever Hardships are to be en-  
 dur'd for Virtue's sake. And as this Af-  
 fection must of necessity cause a greater  
 Acquiescence and Complacency with re-  
 spect to ill Accidents, ill Men, and In-  
 juries; so of course it cannot fail of pro-  
 ducing still a greater Equality, Gentleness,  
 and Benignity in the Temper. Conse-  
 quently the Affection must be a truly  
 good one, and a Creature the more truly  
 good and virtuous, by possessing it. For  
 what-

whatsoever is the occasion or means of more affectionately uniting a rational Creature to his PART in Society, and causes him to prosecute the publick Good, or Interest of his Species, with more Zeal and Affection than ordinary; is undoubtedly the Cause of more than ordinary Virtue in such a Person.

Part 3.  
§. 3.

THIS too is certain; That the Admiration and Love of Order, Harmony and Proportion, in whatever kind, is naturally improving to the Temper, advantageous to social Affection, and highly assistant to *Virtue*; which is it-self no other than the Love of Order and Beauty in Society. In the meanest Subjects of the World, the Appearance of *Order* gains upon the Mind, and draws the Affection towards it. But if *the Order of the World it-self* appears just and beautiful; the Admiration and Esteem of *Order* must run higher, and the elegant Passion or Love of Beauty, which is so advantageous to *Virtue*, must be the more improv'd by its Exercise in so ample and magnificent a Subject. For 'tis impossible that such a *Divine Order* shou'd be contemplated without \* Extasy and Rapture; since in the common Subjects of Science, and the liberal Arts, whatever is according to just

Contem-  
plation.

Religious  
Affections.

VOL. II.

D

Harmony

\* *Insta*, pag. 394, 400, &c. And VOL. III. p. 30, &c.

Book I. Harmony and Proportion, is so transporting to those who have any Knowledge or Practice in the kind.

NOW if the Subject and Ground of this divine Passion be not really just or adequate (the Hypothesis of *Theism* being suppos'd false) the Passion still in it-self is so far natural and good, as it proves an Advantage to Virtue & Goodness; according to what has been above demonstrated. But if, on the other side, the Subject of this Passion be really adequate and just (the Hypothesis of *Theism* being real, and not imaginary) then is the Passion also just, and becomes absolutely *due* and *requisite* in every rational Creature.

*Conclusion.*

HENCE we may determine justly the Relation which VIRTUE has to PIETY the *first* being not compleat but in the *latter*: Since where the latter is wanting there can neither be the same Benignity Firmness, or Constancy; the same good Composure of the Affections, or Uniformity of Mind.

AND thus the Perfection and Height of VIRTUE must be owing to *the Belief of a GOD.*

BOOK





# BOOK II.

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## PART I.

### SECT. I.

**W**E have consider'd *what VIRTUE is*, and to whom the Character belongs. It remains *Obligation* to inquire, *What Obligation to Virtue.* here is to VIRTUE; or *what Reason* to embrace it.

WE have found, that to deserve the name of *good* or *virtuous*, a Creature must have all his Inclinations and Affections, his Dispositions of Mind and Temper, suitable, and agreeing with the Good of his *Kind*, or of that *System* in which he is included, and of which he constitutes PART. To stand thus well affected, and to have one's Affections *right* and *in-ire*, not only in respect of one's self, but of Society & the Publick: This is *Rectitude*, *Integrity*, or VIRTUE. And to be wanting in any of these, or to have their

D 2      Contrarys,

Book 2. Contrarys, is *Depravity, Corruption, & VICE.*

*Difficulty  
stated.*

IT has been already shewn, that in the Passions & Affections of particular Creatures, there is a constant relation to the Interest of a *Species*, or *common Nature*. This has been demonstrated in the case of *natural Affection*, parental Kindness, Zeal for Posterity, Concern for the Propagation and Nurture of the Young, Love of Fellowship & Company, Compassion, mutual Succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor will any-one deny that this Affection of a Creature towards the Good of the Species or common Nature, is as *proper & natural* to him, as it is to any Organ, Part or Member of an Animal-Body, or mere Vegetable, to work in its known Course, and regular way of Growth. 'Tis not more *natural* for the Stomach to digest, the Lungs to breathe, the Glands to separate Juices, or other Intrails to perform their several Offices; however they may by particular Impediments be sometimes disorder'd or obstructed in their Operations.

*Union with  
a Kind or  
Species.*

THERE being allow'd therefore in a Creature such Affections as these towards *the common Nature*, or *System of the Kind*, together with those other which regard *the private Nature*, or *Self-system*; it will appear that in following the *first* of these Affections,

fections, the Creature must on many Occa- Part 1.  
 sions contradict and go against *the latter*. §. 1.  
 How else shou'd the Species be preserv'd?  
 Or what wou'd signify that implanted *na-*  
*tural Affection*, by which a Creature thro'  
 so many Difficultys & Hazards preserves  
 its Offspring, and supports its Kind?

It may therefore be imagin'd, perhaps, *Opposition*  
 that there is a plain and absolute Oppo- *from Self-*  
 sition between these *two* Habits or Affec- *interest.*  
 tions. It may be presum'd, that the pur-  
 suing the common Interest or publick  
 Good thro' the Affections of *one kind*, must  
 be a hindrance to the Attainment of pri-  
 vate Good thro' the Affections of *another*.  
 For it being taken for granted, that Ha-  
 zards and Hardships, of whatever sort, are  
 naturally the *Ill* of the private state; and  
 it being certainly the Nature of those pub-  
 lick Affections to lead often to the greatest  
 Hardships and Hazards of every kind; 'tis  
 presently infer'd, "That 'tis the Creature's  
 „ Interest to be without any publick Af-  
 „ fection whatsoever. „

THIS we know for certain; That all  
 social Love, Friendship, Gratitude, or  
 whatever else is of this generous kind,  
 does by its nature take place of the self-  
 interesting Passions, draws us out of our-  
 selves, and makes us disregardful of our-  
 own Convenience and Safety. So that

Book 2. according to a known \* way of reasoning on *Self interest*, that which is of a social kind in us, shou'd of right be abolish'd. Thus Kindness of every sort, Indulgence, Tendernefs, Compassion, and in short, all natural Affection shou'd be industriously suppress'd, and, as mere Folly, and Weakness of Nature, be resisted and overcome; that, by this means, there might be nothing remaining in us, which was contrary to a direct *Self-end*; nothing which might stand in opposition to a steady & deliberate Pursuit of the most narrowly confin'd *Self-interest*.

*Opposition  
from Self-  
interest.*

ACCORDING to this extraordinary Hypothesis, it must be taken for granted,  
 „ That in the System of a Kind or Species,  
 „ the Interest of *the private Nature* is di-  
 „ rectly opposite to that of *the common*  
 „ *one*, the Interest of *Particulars* directly  
 „ opposite to that of *the Publick in gene-*  
 „ *ral.*” ——— A strange Constitution! in  
 which it must be confess'd there is much  
 Disorder & Untowardness; unlike to what  
 we observe elsewhere in Nature. As if in  
 any vegetable or animal Body, the *Part* or  
 Member cou'd be suppos'd in a good and  
 prosperous state *as to it self*, when under  
 a contrary Disposition, and in an unnatural  
 Growth or Habit *as to its WHOLE*.

Now

\* VOL I p. 90, &c. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120.

NOW that this is in reality quite other-  
wise, we shall endeavour to demonstrate;  
as to make appear, „ That what Men  
represent as an ill Order and Constitu-  
tion in the Universe, by making moral  
Rectitude appear *the Ill*, and Depravity  
*the Good* or Advantage of a Creature, is  
in Nature just the contrary. That to  
be well affected towards the *Publick*  
*Interest* and *one's own*, is not only con-  
sistent, but inseparable: and that mo-  
ral Rectitude, or *Virtue*, must accor-  
dingly be the Advantage, and *Vice* the  
Injury and Disadvantage of every Crea-  
ture.”

## S E C T. I I.

THERE are few perhaps, who when  
they consider a Creature void of na-  
tural Affection, and wholly destitute of a  
communicative or social Principle, will  
suppose him, at the same time, either to-  
lerably happy in himself, or as he stands  
abroad, with respect to his Fellow-Crea-  
tures or Kind. 'Tis generally thought,  
that such a Creature as this, feels slender  
Joy in Life, and finds little Satisfaction in  
the mere sensual Pleasures which remain  
with him, after the Loss of social Enjoy-  
ment, & whatever can be call'd *Humanity*  
or *Good nature*. We know that to such

Contradic-  
tory Ne-  
cessities.

Book 2. a Creature as this, 'tis not only *incident*, to be morose, rancorous and malignant; but that, *of necessity*, a Mind or Temper thus destitute of Mildness and Benignity, must turn to that which is contrary, and be wrought by Passions of a different kind. Such a Heart as this must be a continual Seat of perverse Inclinations and bitter Aversions, rais'd from a constant ill Humour, Sourness, and Disquiet. The Consciousness of such a Nature, so obnoxious to Mankind, and to all Beings which approach it, must overcloud the Mind with dark Suspicion and Jealousy, alarm it with Fears and Horror, and raise in it a continual Disturbance, even in the most seeming fair & secure state of Fortune, and in the highest degree of outward Prosperity.

*In whole.*

THIS, as to the *complete* immoral state is what, of their own accord, Men readily remark. Where there is this *absolute* Degeneracy, this *total* Apostacy from all Candour, Equity, Trust, Sociableness, or Friendship; there are few who do not see and acknowledg the Misery which is consequent. Seldom is the case misconstru'd, when *at worst*. The misfortune is, we look not on this Depravity, nor consider how it stands, *in less degrees*. The Calamity, we think, does not of necessity hold proportion with the Injustice or Iniquity. As if to be *absolutely* immoral and inhuman,

*In part.*

inhuman, were indeed the greatest misfor- Part 1.  
 tune and misery; but that to be so, in a §. 2.  
*little degree*, shou'd be no misery nor harm  
 at all! Which to allow, is just as reasona-  
 ble as to own, that 'tis the greatest Ill of a  
 Body to be in the utmost manner distorted  
 and main'd; but that to lose the use only  
 of *one* Limb, or to be impair'd in some *one*  
*single* Organ or Member, is no Inconve-  
 nience or Ill worthy the least notice.

THE Parts and Proportions of *the Mind*, Inward  
Proportion.  
 their mutual Relation and Dependency,  
 the Connexion and Frame of those Passions  
 which constitute the Soul or Temper, may  
 easily be understood by any-one who  
 thinks it worth his while to study this in-  
 ward Anatomy. 'Tis certain that the Or-  
 der or Symmetry of this *inward-Part* is, in  
 it-self, no less real and exact, than that of  
 the *Body*. However, 'tis apparent that few  
 of us endeavour to become *Anatomists* of  
 this sort. Nor is any-one asham'd of the  
 deepest Ignorance in such a Subject. For  
 tho the greatest Misery and Ill is generally  
 own'd to be from *Disposition*, and *Temper*;  
 tho 'tis allow'd that *Temper* may often  
 change, and that it actually varys on many  
 occasions; much to our disadvantage; yet  
 now this Matter is brought about, we in-  
 quire not. We never trouble our-selves  
 to consider thorowly by what means or  
 methods our *inward Constitution* comes at

Book 2. any time to be impar'd or injur'd. The  
*Solutio Continui*, which bodily Surgeons  
*Continuity,* talk of, is never apply'd in this case, by  
 Surgeons of another sort. The Notion of  
*a Whole and Parts* is not apprehended in  
 this Science. We know not what the ef-  
 fect is, of straining any Affection, indulg-  
 ing any wrong Passion, or relaxing any  
 proper and natural Habit, or good Inclina-  
 tion. Nor can we conceive how a particu-  
 lar Action shou'd have such a sudden  
 Influence on the whole Mind, as to make  
 the Person an immediate Sufferer. We sup-  
 pose rather that a Man may violate his Faith,  
 commit any Wickedness unfamiliar to him  
 before, engage in any Vice or Villany,  
 without the least prejudice to *himself*, or  
 any Misery *naturally* following from the  
 ill Action.

THIS thus we hear it often said, "Such  
 „ a Person has done ill indeed : But what  
 „ is he the worse for it?" Yet speaking  
 of any Nature thorowly savage, curst, and  
 inveterate, we say truly. "Such a one is  
 „ a plague and torment to himself:" And  
 we allow, "That thro' certain *Humours*,  
 „ or *Passions*, and from *Temper* merely, a  
 „ Man may be compleatly miserable; let  
 „ his outward *Circumstances* be ever so  
 „ fortunate." These different Judg-  
 ments sufficiently demonstrate that we are  
 not accusom'd to think with much cohe-  
 rency



rency on these moral Subjects; and that our Notions, in this respect, are not a little confus'd, and contradictory. Part 2.  
§. 2.

Now if the Fabrick of the Mind or Temper appear'd such to us as it really is; if we saw it impossible to remove hence any one good or orderly Affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without drawing on, *in some degree*, that dissolute state, which *at its height* is confess'd to be so miserable: 'twoud then undoubtedly be own'd, that since no ill, immoral or unjust Action cou'd be committed without either a new inroad and breach on the Temper and Passions, or a farther advancing of that Execution already begun; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his Integrity, Good-nature, or Worth, wou'd of necessity act with greater Cruelty towards himself, than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands shou'd voluntarily mangle or wound his outward Form or Constitution, natural Limbs or Body.

Book 2.

## S E C T. III.

*SYSTEM  
explain'd.*

IT has been shewn before, that no Animal can be said properly *to act*, otherwise than thro' Affections or Passions, such as are proper to an Animal. For in convulsive Fits, where a Creature strikes either himself or others, 'tis a simple Mechanism. an Engine, or Piece of Clock-work, which acts, and not the Animal.

*Spring of  
Actions.*

WHATSOEVER therefore is done or acted by any Animal *as such*, is done only thro' some Affection or Passion, as of Fear, Love, or Hatred moving him.

AND as it is impossible that a weaker Affection shou'd overcome a stronger, so it is impossible but that where the Affections or Passions are strongest in the main, and form in general the most considerable Party, either by their Force or Number; thither the Animal must incline: And according to this *Ballance* he must be govern'd, and led to Action.

*Affections,  
three kinds.*

THE Affections or Passions which must influence and govern the Animal, are either,

I. THE *natural Affections*, which lead to the good of THE PUBLICK.

2. OR

2. OR the *Self-Affections*, which lead on-ly to the Good of THE PRIVATE. Part 2. §. 3.

3. OR such as are neither of these; nor tending either to any Good of THE PUBLIC or PRIVATE; but contrary-wise: and which may therefore be justly styl'd *unnatural Affections*.

So that according as these Affections stand, a Creature must be virtuous or vitious, good or ill.

THE *latter* sort of these Affections, 'tis evident, are wholly vitious. The *two former* may be vitious or virtuous, according to their degree.

IT may seem strange, perhaps, to speak of natural Affections as *too strong*, or of Self-affections as *too weak*. But to clear this Difficulty, we must call to mind what has been already explain'd. "That *natural Affection* may, in particular Cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree:" As when Pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own End, and prevent the Succour and Relief requir'd; or as when Love to the Offspring proves such a Fondness as destroys the Parent, and consequently the Offspring it-self. And notwithstanding it may seem harsh to call

Book 2. that *unnatural* and *vitious*, which is only an Extreme of some natural and kind Affection; yet 'tis most certain, that where ever any single good Affection of this sort is over-great, it must be injurious to the rest, and detract in some measure from their Force and natural Operation. For a Creature possess'd with such an immoderate Degree of Passion, must of necessity allow too much to that *one*, and too little to *other* of the same Character, and equally natural and useful as to their End. And this must necessarily be the occasion of Partiality and Injustice, whilst only *one Duty* or *natural Part* is earnestly follow'd; and *other Parts* or *Dutys* neglected, which shou'd accompany it, and perhaps take place and be prefer'd.

THIS may well be allow'd true in all other respects; since even RELIGION itself, consider'd as a *Passion*, not of the *selfish* but *nobler* kind, may in some Characters be restrain'd beyond its natural Proportion, and be said also to be *in too high a degree*. For as the End of Religion is to render us more perfect, and accomplish'd in all moral Dutys and Performances; if by the height of devout Extasy and Contemplation we are rather disabled in this respect, and render'd more unapt to the real Dutys and Offices of Civil Life; it may be said that RELIGION indeed is then *too strong*  
in

us. For how, possibly, can we call this Part 2.  
 SUPERSTITION, whilst the Object of §. 3.  
 the Devotion is acknowledg'd just, and the  
 Faith orthodox? 'Tis only the Excess of  
 Zeal, which, in this Case, is so transport-  
 ing, as to render the devout Person more  
 eniv'ls in secular Affairs, and less concern'd  
 for the inferior and temporal Interests of  
 Mankind.

Now as in particular Cases, *publick*  
*Affection*, on the one hand, may be *too*  
*high*, so *private Affection* may, on the  
 other hand, be *too weak*. For if a Creature  
 be self-neglectful, and insensible of Dan-  
 ger; or if he want such a degree of Passion  
 in any kind, as is useful to preserve, sus-  
 tain, or defend himself; this must certainly  
 be esteem'd vicious, in regard of the Design  
 and End of Nature. She her-self disco-  
 vers this in her known Method and stated  
 Rule of Operation. 'Tis certain, that her  
 provisionary Care and Concern for the  
 whole Animal, must at least be equal to  
 her Concern for a single Part or Member.  
 Now to the several Parts she has given,  
 we see proper Affections, suitable to their  
 Interest and Security; so that even with-  
 out our Consciousness, they act in their  
 own Defence, and for their own Benefit  
 and Preservation. Thus *an Eye*, in its na-  
 tural state, fails not to shut together, of  
 its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a  
 peculiar

Book 2. peculiar Caution and Timidity; which if it wanted, however we might intend the Preservation of our Eye, we shou'd not in effect be able to preserve it, by any Observation or Forecast of our own. To be wanting therefore in those principal Affections, which respect the Good of the whole Constitution, must be a Vice and Imperfection, as great surely in the principal part (the Soul or Temper) as it is in any of those inferior and subordinate parts to want the self-preserving Affections which are proper to them.

Degrees of  
Affection.

AND thus the Affections towards private Good become necessary and essential to Goodness. For tho' no Creature can be call'd good, or virtuous, merely for possessing these Affections; yet since it is impossible that the publick Good, or Good of the System, can be preserv'd without them; it follows that a Creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in some degree to Goodness and natural Rectitude; and may thus be esteem'd vicious and defective.

'TIS thus we say of a Creature, in a kind way of Reproof, that he is *too good*; when his Affection towards others is so warm and zealous, as to carry him even beyond his *Part*; or when he really acts beyond it, not thro' too warm a Passion of

f that sort, but thro' an over-cool one of Part 2.  
 nother, or thro' want of some Self passion §. 3.  
 o restrain him within due Bounds.

IT may be objected here, that the  
 aving the natural Affections too strong,  
 where the Self-affections are overmuch  
 o) or the having the Self-affections de-  
 ective or weak, (where the natural Af-  
 ections are also weak) may prove upon  
 occasion the only Cause of a Creature's  
 cting honestly and in moral proportion.  
 For, thus, one who is to a fault regard-  
 ess of his Life, may with the smallest de-  
 gree of natural Affection do all which can  
 be expected from the highest Pitch of so-  
 cial Love, or zealous Friendship. And  
 thus, on the other hand, a Creature ex-  
 cessively timorous may, by as exceeding  
 a degree of natural Affection, perform  
 whatever the perfectest Courage is able to  
 inspire.

To this it is answer'd, That whenever  
 we arraign any Passion as *too strong*, or  
 complain of any as *too weak*; we must  
 speak with respect to a certain Constitution  
 or *Oeconomy* of a particular Creature, or  
 species. For if a Passion, leading to any  
 right end, be only so much the more ser-  
 viceable and effectual, for being strong;  
 we may be assur'd that the strength of  
 it will not be the occasion of any distur-  
 bance

Book 2. bance within, nor of any disproportion between it-self and other Affections; they consequently the Passion, however strong cannot be condemn'd as vitious. But i  
*Degrees of Affection.* to have *all* the Passions in equal proportion with it, be what the Constitution of the Creature cannot bear; so that only *some* Passions are rais'd to this height, whilst *others* are not, nor can possibly be wrought up to the same proportion; then may those strong Passions, tho of the better kind, be call'd excessive. For being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an *Ballance* in the Affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of Inequality in the Conduct, and incline the Party to a wrong moral Practice.

*O*Economy  
of the  
Passions.

BUT to shew more particularly what is meant by the *O*Economy of the Passions from Instances in the Species or \* Kinds below us. As for the Creatures who have no manner of Power or Means given them by Nature for their defence against Violence, nor any-thing by which they can make themselves formidable to such as injure or offend them; 'tis necessary they shou'd have an extraordinary degree of Fear, but little or no Animosity, such as might cause 'em to make resistance, or incline 'em to delay their Flight. For in this their Safety lies,

\* *Infra*, p. 131, 307, 8, 9, &c. And VOL. III. P. 216, 217, &c.



es, and to this Passion of Fear is ser-Part 2.  
ceable, by keeping the Senses on the §. 3.  
atch, and holding the Spirits in readiness  
give the start.

AND thus *Timorousness*, and an habitu-  
strong Passion of Fear, may be *according*  
*the O Economy* of a particular Creature,  
both with respect to himself, and to the rest  
of his Species. On the other hand, *Courage*  
may be *contrary to his O Economy*, and  
therefore vitious: Even in one & the same  
species, this is by Nature differently or-  
der'd, with respect to different Sexes, Ages,  
and Growths. The tamer Creatures of  
the grazing kind, who live in Herds, are  
different from the wilder, who herd not,  
but live in Pairs only, apart from Compa-  
ny, as is natural and suitable to their rapa-  
cious Life. Yet is there found, even among  
the former inoffensive kind, a *Courage* pro-  
portionable to their Make and Strength.  
At a time of danger, when the whole Herd  
flies, the *Bull* alone makes head against the  
Lion, or other whatever invading Beast of  
prey, and shews himself conscious of his  
*Make*. Even the Female of this kind is  
firm'd, we see, by Nature, in some degree,  
to resist Violence; so as not to fly a com-  
mon Danger. As for a Hind, or Doe, or  
any other inoffensive and mere defenceless  
Creature; 'tis no way unnatural or vitious  
in them, when the Enemy approaches, to  
desert

Book 2. desert their Offspring, and fly for Safety. But for Creatures who are able to make Resistance, and are by Nature arm'd offensively; be they of the poorest Insect-kind such as Bees or Wasps; 'tis natural to 'em to be rouz'd with Fury, and at the hazard of their Lives, oppose any Enemy or Invader of their Species. For by this known Passion in the Creature, the Species it-self is secur'd; when by Experience 'tis found that the Creature, tho' unable to repel the Injury, yet voluntarily exposes his Life for the Punishment of the Invader; and suffers not his Kind to be injur'd with Impunity. And of all other Creatures, *Man* is in this Sense the most formidable: since if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly in his own, or in his Country's Cause revenge an Injury on any-one living; and by throwing away his own Life (if he be resolute to that degree) is almost certain Master of another's, however strongly guarded. Examples of this nature have often serv'd to restrain those in Power from using it to the utmost Extent, and urging their Inferiors to Extremity.

*Measure,  
Tone.*

UPON the whole: It may be said properly to be the same with the Affections or Passions in an Animal-Constitution, as with the Cords or Strings of a Musical Instrument. If these, tho' in ever so just proportion one to another, are strain'd beyond

and a certain degree, 'tis more than the Instrument will bear: The Lute or Lyre abus'd, and its Effect lost. On the other hand, if while some of the Strings are duly strain'd, others are not wound up to their due proportion; then is the Instrument still in disorder, and its Part ill perform'd. The several Species of Creatures are like different sorts of Instruments: and even in the same Species of Creatures (as in the same sort of Instrument) *one* is not intirely like the *other*, nor will the same Strings fit each. The same degree of Strength which winds up *one*, and fits the several Strings to a just Harmony and Consort, may in *another* burst both the Strings and Instrument it-self. Thus Men who have the liveliest Sense, and are the easiest affected with Pain or Pleasure, have need of the strongest Influence or Force of their Affections, such as Tendernefs, Love, Sociableness, Compassion, in order to *Ballance* reserve a right **BALLANCE** *within*, and to maintain them in their Duty, and in the best performance of their Part: whilst others, who are of a cooler Blood, or lower Key, need not the same Allay or Counterpart; nor are made by Nature to feel those tender and indearing Affections in so exquisite a degree.

It might be agreeable, one wou'd think, to inquire thus into the different *Tunings* of

Book 2. of the Passions, the various Mixtures and  
 TEMPER. Allays by which Men become so different  
 from one another. For as the highest  
 Improvements of Temper are made in  
 human kind; so the greatest Corruption  
 and Degeneracy are discoverable in the  
 Race. In the other Species of Creature  
 around us, there is found generally a  
 exact Proportionableness, Constancy and  
 Regularity in all their Passions and Affec-  
 tions; no failure in the care of the Off-  
 spring, or of the Society, to which they  
 are united; no Prostitution of themselves  
 no Intemperance, or Excess, in any kind.  
 The smaller Creatures, who live as it were  
 in Cities (as Bees and Ants) continue the  
 same Train and Harmony of Life: Nor  
 are they ever false to those Affections  
 which move them to operate towards their  
 Publick Good. Even those Creatures of  
 Prey, who live the farthest out of Socie-  
 ty, maintain, we see, such a Conduct to-  
 wards one another, as is exactly subtile to  
 the Good of their own Species. Whilst  
 Man, notwithstanding the Assistance of  
 Religion, and the Direction of Laws, is  
 often found to live in less conformity with  
 Nature; and by means of Religion it-  
 self, is often render'd the more barbarous  
 and inhuman. Marks are set on Men:  
 Distinctions form'd: Opinions decreed,  
 under the severest Penalties: Antipathies  
 instill'd, and Aversions rais'd in Men a-  
 gainst

Best or  
 worst in  
 Man.

inst the generality of their own Species.  
 ) that 'tis hard to find in any Region a  
 man Society which has *human* Laws.  
 o wonder if in such Societys 'tis so hard  
 find a Man who lives NATURALLY,  
 d as a Man.

BUT having shewn what is meant by *State of the*  
 'assion's being *in too high*, or *in too low* *Argument*,  
 degree; and that, "To have any na-  
 tural Affection too high, or any Self-  
 affection too low," tho it be often ap-  
 ov'd as *Virtue*, is yet, strictly speaking,  
*Vice and Imperfection*: we come now to  
 e plainer & more essential part of *Vice*,  
 id which alone deserves to be confi-  
 er'd *as such*: that is to say.

1. "WHEN *either* the publick Affec-  
 tions are weak or deficient.

2. "OR the private and Self-affections  
 too strong.

3. "OR that such Affections arise as  
 are neither of these, nor in any degree  
 tending to the Support either of the  
 publick or private System."

OTHERWISE than *thus*, it is impossi-  
 e any Creature can be such as we call  
 LL OF VITIOUS. So that if once we  
 prove

Book 2. prove that it is really not the Creature  
 Interest to be thus *vitiously* affected, but  
 State of the contrariwise; we shall then have prov'd  
 Argument. " That it is his Interest to be wholl  
 " GOOD and VIRTUOUS: " Since in  
 wholesom and sound state of his Affec  
 tions, such as we have describ'd, he can  
 not possibly be other than sound, *good* and  
*virtuous*, in his Action and Behaviour.

OUR Business, therefore, will be, to  
 prove;

I. ,, THAT *to have the NATURAL*  
 " KINDLY, or GENEROUS AFFEC  
 " TIONS *strong and powerful towards the*  
 " Good of the Publick, is to have the chie  
 " Means and Power of Self-enjoyment.  
 And, " That to want them, is certain Mi  
 " sery and Ill."

II. " THAT *to have THE PRIVATE*  
 " or SELF-AFFECTIONS *too strong,*  
 " or beyond their degree of Subordinacy to  
 " the kindly and natural, is also miserable."

III. AND, " That to have THE UN  
 " NATURAL AFFECTIONS (*viz.*  
 " such as are neither founded on the Inte  
 rest of the Kind, or Publick; nor of the  
 " private Person, or Creature himself) is  
 " to be miserable in the highest degree."

PART

PART II.

SECT. I.

**T**O begin therefore with this Proof, *FIRST*  
 „ THAT TO HAVE THE NA- *Proof,*  
 „ TURAL AFFECTIONS (such *from the*  
 as are founded in Love, Complacency, *natural*  
 Good-will, and in a Sympathy with the *Affections.*  
 Kind or Species) IS TO HAVE THE  
 CHIEF MEANS AND POWER OF  
 SELF-ENJOYMENT: *And THAT*  
 TO WANT THEM IS CERTAIN  
 MISERY AND ILL.”

WE may inquire, first, what those are, *Pleasures*  
 which we call *Pleasures* or *Satisfactions*; *of the BO-*  
 from whence Happiness is generally com- *DY and*  
 uted. They are (according to the com- *MIND.*  
 mon distinction) *Satisfactions* and *Plea-*  
*ures* either *of the Body*, or *of the Mind*.

THAT *the latter of these Satisfactions* *The latter*  
*are the greatest*, is allow'd by most People, *preferable*  
 and may be prov'd by this: That when-  
 ever the Mind, having conceiv'd a high  
 VOL. II. E Opi

Book 2. Opinion of the Worth of any Action or Behaviour, has receiv'd the strongest Impression of this sort, and is wrought up to the highest pitch or degree of Passion towards the Subject; at such time it sets itself above all bodily Pain as well as Pleasure, and can be no-way diverted from its purpose by Flattery or Terror of any kind. Thus we see *Indians, Barbarians, Malefactors*, and even the most execrable *Villains*, for the sake of a particular Gang or Society, or thro' some cherish'd Notion or Principle of Honour or Gallantry, Revenge, or Gratitude, embrace any manner of Hardship, and defy Torment and Death. Whereas, on the other hand a Person being plac'd in all the happy Circumstances of outward Enjoyment, surrounded with every thing which can allure or charm the Sense, and being then actually in the very moment of such a pleasing Indulgence; yet no sooner is there any thing amiss *within*, no sooner has he conceiv'd any *internal Ail* or *Disorder*, any thing *inwardly* vexatious or distemper'd, than instantly his Enjoyment ceases, the pleasure of Sense is at an end; and every means of that sort becomes ineffectual, and is rejected as uneasy, and subject to give Distaste.

*Inference.*

THE Pleasures of the *Mind* being allow'd, therefore, superior to those of the *Body*;



Body; it follows, „ That whatever can Part 2.  
 create in any intelligent Being a constant §. 1.  
 flowing Series or Train of mental Enjoy-  
 ments, or Pleasures of the Mind, is more  
 considerable to his Happiness, than that  
 which can create to him a like constant  
 Course or Train of sensual Enjoyments,  
 or Pleasures of the Body.”

Now the mental Enjoyments are either *Mental*  
 actually the very natural Affections them- *Enjoyments,*  
 selves in their immediate Operation: Or *whence.*  
 they wholly in a manner proceed from  
 them, and are no other than *their Effects.*

IF so; it follows, that the natural Af-  
 fections duly establish'd in a rational Crea-  
 ure, being the only means which can pro-  
 cure him a constant Series or Succession of  
 the mental Enjoyments, they are the only  
 means which can procure him a certain  
 and solid *Happiness.*

NOW, in the first place, to explain, *Energy of*  
 How much *the natural Affections are in natura*  
*themselves the highest Pleasures and En- Affections:*  
*joyments:*” There shou'd methinks be  
 little need of proving this to any-one of  
 man-kind, who has ever known the Con-  
 dition of the Mind under a lively Affection  
 of Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity,  
 Piety, Succour, or whatever else is of a so-

Book 2. cial or friendly sort. He who has ever a little Knowledge of human Nature, is sensible what pleasure the Mind perceives when it is touch'd in this generous way. The difference we find between Solitude and Company, between a common Companion & that of Friends; the reference of almost all our Pleasures to mutual Converse, and the dependence they have on Society either present or imagin'd; all these are sufficient Proofs in our Behalf.

Energy of  
natural  
Affections.

How much the social Pleasures are superior to any other, may be known by visible Tokens and Effects. The very outward Features, the Marks and Signs which attend this sort of Joy, are expressive of a more intense, clear, and undisturb'd Pleasure, than those which attend the Satisfaction of Thirst, Hunger, and other ardent Appetites. But more particularly still may this Superiority be known, from the actual Prevalence and Ascendency of this sort of Affection over all besides. Where-ever it presents it-self with any advantage, it silences and appeases every other Motion of Pleasure. No Joy, merely of Sense, can be a Match for it. Whoever is Judge of *both* the Pleasures, will ever give the preference to *the former*. But to be able to judge of both, 'tis necessary to have a Sense of each. The honest Man indeed can judge of *sensual Pleasure*, and knows its  
utmost

most Force. For neither is his Taste, or  
 sense, the duller; but, on the contrary,  
 the more intense and clear, on the account  
 of his Temperance, and a moderate Use  
 of Appetite. But the immoral and profligate  
 Man can by no means be allow'd a  
 good Judg of *social Pleasure*, to which he  
 is so mere a Stranger by his Nature.

Part 2.  
 §. 1.

NOR is it any Objection here; That in  
 many Natures the good Affection, tho' really  
 present, is found to be of insufficient  
 force. For where it is not *in its natural*  
*degree*, 'tis the same indeed as if it were  
 not, or had *never been*. The less there is  
 of this good Affection in any untoward  
 Creature, the greater the wonder is, that  
 it shou'd *at anytime* prevail; as in the very  
 worst of Creatures it sometimes will. And  
 if it prevails but for *once*, in any *single*  
 instance; it shews evidently, that if the  
 Affection were thorowly experienc'd or  
 known, it wou'd prevail *in all*.

THUS *the* CHARM of kind Affection  
 is superior to all other Pleasure: since it  
 has the power of drawing from every o-  
 ther Appetite or Inclination. And thus  
 in the Case of Love to the Offspring,  
 and a thousand other Instances, *the Charm*  
 is found to operate so strongly on the  
 Temper, as, in the midst of other Temp-  
 tations, to render it susceptible of this

Book 2. Passion alone; which remains as the *Master-Pleasure* and *Conqueror* of the rest.

Energy of  
natural  
Affections.

THERE is no-one who, by the least progress in Science or Learning; has come to know barely the Principles of *Mathematics*, but has found, that in the exercise of his Mind on the Discoverys he there makes, tho' merely of speculative Truths. he receives a Pleasure and Delight superior to that of Sense. When we have thoroughly search'd into the nature of this contemplative Delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private Interest of the Creature, nor has for its Object any Self-good or Advantage of the private System. The Admiration, Joy, or Love, turns wholly upon what is exterior, and foreign to our-selves. And tho' the reflected Joy or Pleasure, which arises from the notice of this Pleasure once perceiv'd, may be interpreted a *Self-passion*, or *interested Regard*: yet the original Satisfaction can be no other than what results from the Love of Truth, Proportion, Order, and Symmetry, in the Things without. If this be the Case, the Passion ought in reality to be rank'd with *natural Affection*. For having no Object within the compass of the private System; it must either be esteem'd superfluous and *unnatural* (as having no tendency towards the Advantage or Good of any

ny thing in Nature) or it must be judg'd Part 2.  
 to be, what it truly is, \*, A natural Joy §. 1.  
 in the Contemplation of those *Numbers*,  
 that *Harmony*, *Proportion*, and *Concord*,  
 which supports the universal Nature, &  
 is essential in the Constitution and Form  
 of every particular *Species*, or *Order* of  
 Beings."

BUT this speculative Pleasure, however  
 considerable and valuable it may be, or  
 however superior to any Motion of mere  
 sense; must yet be far surpass'd by *vir-*  
*uous Motion*, and *the Exercise of Benig-*  
*nity and Goodness*; where, together with  
 the most delightful Affection of the Soul,  
 here is join'd a pleasing Assent & Appro-  
 priation of the Mind to what is acted in this  
 good Disposition and honest Bent. For  
 where is there on Earth a fairer Matter of  
 Speculation, a goodlier View or Contem-  
 plation, than that of a *beautiful, propor-*  
*tion'd, and becoming Action*? Or what is  
 there relating to us, of which the Con-  
 sciousness and Memory is more solidly and  
 lastingly entertaining?

WE may observe that in the Passion of  
 Love between the Sexes, where, toge-  
 ther with the Affection of a *vulgar* sort,  
 there is a mixture of the *kind and friend-*  
*ly*, the Sense or Feeling of this *latter* is

E 4

in

Book 2. in reality superior to the *former*; since often thro' this Affection, and for the sake of the Person belov'd, the greatest Hardships in the World have been submitted to, and even Death it-self voluntarily embrac'd, without any expected *Compensation*. For where shou'd the Ground of such an Expectation lie? Not *here*, in *this World* surely; for Death puts an end to all. Nor yet *hereafter*, in *any other*: for who has ever thought of providing a Heaven or future Recompence for the suffering Virtue of Lovers?

Energy of  
natural  
Affections.

WE may observe, withal, in favour of the natural Affections, that it is not only when Joy and Sprightliness are mix'd with them, that they carry a real Enjoyment above that of the sensual kind. The very Disturbances which belong to natural Affection, tho they may be thought wholly contrary to Pleasure, yield still a Contentment and Satisfaction greater than the Pleasures of indulg'd Sense. And where a Series or continu'd Succession of the tender and kind Affections can be carry'd on, even thro' Fears, Horrors, Sorrows, Grievs; the Emotion of the Soul is still agreeable. We continue pleas'd even with this melancholy Aspect or Sense of Virtue. Her Beauty supports it-self under a Cloud, and in the midst of surrounding Calamitys. For thus, when by mere Illusion,

son, as in a Tragedy, the Passions of this Part 2.  
 kind are skilfully excited in us; we prefer §. 1.  
 the Entertainment to any other of equal  
 duration. We find by our-selves, that the  
 moving our Passions in this mournful way,  
 the engaging them in behalf of Merit and  
 Worth, and the exerting whatever we  
 have of social Affection, and human Sym-  
 pathy, is of the highest Delight; and af-  
 fords a greater Enjoyment in the way of  
*Thought and Sentiment*, than any thing  
 besides can do in a way of *Sense and com-  
 mon Appetite*. And after this manner it  
 appears, „ How much *the mental Enjoy-  
 ments are actually the very natural Af-  
 fections themselves.*”

NOW, in the next place, to explain, *Effects of*  
 „ How they proceed from them, as their *natural*  
 „ natural *Effects*:” we may consider first, *Affections.*  
 That the EFFECTS of Love or kind Af-  
 fection, in a way of mental Pleasure, are,  
 „ *An Enjoyment of Good by Communication.*  
 „ *A receiving it, as it were, by Reflection,*  
 „ *or by way of Participation in the Good*  
 „ *of others.*” And „ *A pleasing Con-  
 sciousness of the actual Love, merited*  
 „ *Esteem or Approbation of others.*”

How considerable a part of Happiness  
 arises from the former of these *Effects*, will  
 be easily apprehended by one who is not

Book 2. exceedingly ill natur'd. It will be consider'd how many the Pleasures are, of *sharing Contentment and Delight with others*; of receiving it in Fellowship and Company; and gathering it, in a manner, from the pleas'd and happy states of those around us, from accounts and relations of such Happineffes, from the very Countenances, Gestures, Voices and Sounds, even of Creatures foreign to our Kind, whose Signs of Joy and Contentment we can any-way discern. So insinuating are these Pleasures of Sympathy, and so widely diffus'd thro' our whole Lives, that there is hardly such a thing as Satisfaction or Contentment, of which they make not an essential part.

Effects of  
natural  
Affection.

As for that other *Effect* of social Love, viz. *the Consciousness of merited Kindness or Esteem*; 'tis not difficult to perceive how much this avails in mental Pleasure, and constitutes the chief Enjoyment and Happineffes of those who are, in the narrowest sense, *voluptuous*. How natural is it for the most selfish among us, to be continually drawing some sort of Satisfaction from a Character, and pleasing our-selves in the Fancy of deserv'd Admiration and Esteem? For tho' it be mere Fancy, we endeavour still to believe it Truth, and flatter our-selves, all we can, with the Thought of *Merit* of some kind, and the Persuasion of



of our deserving well from some few at least, with whom we happen to have a more intimate and familiar Commerce. Part 2.  
§. 1.

WHAT Tyrant is there, what Robber, or open Violator of the Laws of Society, who has not a Companion, or some particular Set, either of his own Kindred, or such as he calls Friends; with whom he gladly shares his Good; in whose Welfare he delights; and whose Joy and Satisfaction he makes *his own*? What Person in the world is there, who receives not some Impressions from the Flattery or Kindness of such as are familiar with him? 'Tis to this soothing Hope and Expectation of Friendship, that almost all our Actions have some reference. 'Tis this which goes thro' our whole Lives, and mixes it-self even with most of our Vices. Of this, *Vanity*, *Ambition*, and *Luxury*, have a share; and many other Disorders of our Life partake. Even the unchasteft *Love* borrows largely from this Source. So that were Pleasure to be computed in the same way as other things commonly are; it might properly be said, that out of these two Branches, viz. *Community or Participation in the Pleasures of others*, and *Belief of meriting well from others*) wou'd arise more than nine Tenths of whatever is enjoy'd in Life. And thus in the main Sum of Happiness, there is scarce a single Article, but what

Book 2. derives it-self from social Love, and depends immediately on the natural and kind Affections.

Now such as CAUSES are, such must be their EFFECTS. And therefore as *natural Affection* or *social Love* is perfect, or imperfect; so must be the *Content* and *Happiness* depending on it.

*Partial  
Affection  
examin'd.*

BUT lest any shou'd imagine with themselves that an *inferior* Degree of natural Affection, or an *imperfect partial* Regard of this sort, can supply the place of an *intire, sincere, and truly moral* one; lest a small Tincture of social Inclination shou'd be thought sufficient to answer the End of Pleasure in Society, and give us that Enjoyment of *Participation* and *Community* which is so essential to our Happiness; we may consider first, That PARTIAL AFFECTION, or social Love *in part*, without regard to a compleat Society or *Whole*, is in it-self an Inconsistency, and implies an absolute Contradiction. Whatever Affection we have towards any thing besides *our-selves*; if it be not of the *natural sort* towards the System, or Kind; it must be of all other Affections, the most *dissociable*, and destructive of the Enjoyments of Society: If it be really of the natural sort, and apply'd only to *someone* Part of Society,

ty, or of a Species, but not to the Spe- Part 2.  
 es or Society *it-self*; there can be no §. 1.  
 ore account given of it, than of the most  
 id, capricious, or humourfom Passion  
 hich may arife. The Person, therefore,  
 ho is conscious of this Affection, can be  
 onscious of no *Merit* or *Worth* on the ac-  
 ount of it. Nor can the Persons on whom  
 his capricious Affection has chanc'd to  
 ll, be in any manner secure of its Conti-  
 nance of Force. At it has no Foundation  
 Establishment *in Reason*; so it must be  
 asily removable, and subject to alteration,  
*without Reason*. Now the Variableness of  
 ch sort of Passion, which depends solely  
 a Capriciousness & Humour, and under-  
 oes the frequent Successions of alternate  
 Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclina-  
 ion, must of necessity create continual  
 Disturbance and Disgust, give an allay to  
 what is immediately enjoy'd in the way of  
 Friendship and Society, and in the end ex-  
 inguish, in a manner, the very Inclination  
 towards Friendship & human Commerce.  
 Whereas, on the other hand, INTIRE  
 AFFECTION (from whence *Integrity* has  
 its name) as it is answerable to it-self, pro-  
 portionable, and rational; so it is irrefra-  
 gable, solid, and durable. And as in the  
 case of *Partiality*, or vitious Friendship,  
 which has no rule or order; every Reflec-  
 tion of the Mind necessarily makes to its  
 disadvantage, and lessens the Enjoyment;

Book 2. so in the case of *Integrity*, the Consciousness of just Behaviour towards Mankind in general, casts a good reflection on each friendly Affection in particular, and raises the Enjoyment of Friendship still the higher, in the way of *Community* or *Participation* above-mention'd.

*Partial  
Affection.*

AND in the next place, as *PARTIAL AFFECTION* is fitted only to a short and slender Enjoyment of those Pleasures of *Sympathy* or *Participation with others*, so neither is it able to derive any considerable Enjoyment from that other principal Branch of human Happiness, *viz. Consciousness of the actual or merited Esteem of others*. From whence shou'd this *Esteem* arise? The *Merit*, surely, must in it-self be mean, whilst the Affection is so precarious and uncertain. What Trust can there be to a mere *casual Inclination* or *capricious Liking*? Who can depend on such a Friendship as is founded on no moral Rule, but fantastically assign'd to some single Person, or small *Part* of Mankind, exclusive of Society, and *the Whole*?

IT may be consider'd, withal, as a thing impossible; that they who esteem or love by any other Rule than that of *Virtue*, shou'd place their Affection on such Subjects as they can long esteem or love. 'T will be hard for them, in the number of  
them

their so belov'd Friends, to find any, in Part 2.  
 whom they can heartily rejoice; or whose §. 1.  
 reciprocal Love or Esteem they can sin-  
 erely prize and enjoy. Nor can those  
 pleasures be sound or lasting, which are gainer'd from a Self-flattery, and false Persuasion of the Esteem and Love of others, who are incapable of any sound Esteem or Love. It appears therefore how much the Men of narrow or *partial* Affection must be Losers in this sense, and of necessity fall short in this second principal part of mental Enjoyment.

MEAN while *intire Affection* has all the <sup>*Intire Affec-*</sup> opposite advantages. It is equal, constant, accountable to it-self, ever satisfactory, and pleasing. It gains Applause and Love from the *best*; and in all disinterested cases, from the very *worst* of Men. We may say of it, with justice, that it carries with it a Consciousness of merited Love and Approbation from all Society, from all intelligent Creatures, and from whatever is original to all other Intelligence. And if there be in Nature any such *Original*, we may add, that the Satisfaction which attends *intire Affection*, is full and noble, in proportion to its *final Object*, which contains all Perfection; according to the Sense of *Theism* above-noted. For this, as has been shewn, is the result of *Virtue*. And to have this

**INTIRE AFFECTION OF INTEGRITY**  
 of

Book 2. of Mind, is to live according to Nature  
*Intire Af-* and the Dictates and Rules of *supreme Wis-*  
*jection.* dom. This is Morality, Justice, Piety, and  
 natural Religion.

BUT lest this Argument shou'd appear perhaps too *scholastically* stated, and in Terms and Phrases, which are not of familiar use; we may try whether possibly we can set it yet in a plainer light.

*Mind and Temper.*

LET any-one, then, consider well those Pleasures which he receives either in private Retirement, Contemplation, Study and *Converse with himself*; or in Mirth, Jollity, and Entertainment, with *others*; and he will find, That they are wholly founded in *An easy Temper, free of Harshness, Bitterness, or Distaste*; and in *A Mind or Reason well compos'd, quiet, easy within it-self, and such as can freely bear its own Inspection and Review*. Now such A MIND, and such A TEMPER, which fit and qualify for the Enjoyment of the Pleasures mention'd, must of necessity be owing to the *natural and good Affections*.

TEM-  
PER.

AS to what relates to TEMPER, it may be consider'd thus. There is no state of outward Prosperity, or flowing Fortune, where *Inclination and Desire* are always satisfy'd, *Fancy and Humour* pleas'd.

There

here are almost hourly some Impedi-  
 ents or Crosses to the Appetite; some Ac-  
 cidents or other *from without*; or something  
*from within*, to check the licentious course  
 of the indulg'd Affections. They are not al-  
 ways to be satisfy'd by mere Indulgence.  
 And when a Life is guided by *Fancy* only,  
 there is sufficient Ground of Contrariety  
 and Disturbance. The very ordinary Lassi-  
 tudes, Uneasinesses, and Defects of Dispo-  
 sition in the soundest Body; the interrupted  
 course of the Humours, or Spirits in the  
 healthiest People; & the accidental Disor-  
 ders common to every Constitution, are  
 sufficient, we know, on many occasions, to  
 breed Uneasiness and Distaste. And this, in  
 time, must grow into a Habit; where there  
 is nothing to oppose its progress, and hinder  
 its prevailing on the Temper. Now the  
 only sound Opposite to ILL HUMOUR, is  
*natural and kind Affection*. For we may  
 observe, that when the Mind, upon reflec-  
 tion, resolves at any time to suppress this  
 disturbance already risen in the Temper,  
 and sets about this reforming Work with  
 earnestness, and in good earnest; it can no  
 otherwise accomplish the Undertaking,  
 than by introducing into the affectionate  
 part some gentle Feeling of the social and  
 friendly kind; some enlivening Motion of  
 kindness, Fellowship, Complacency, or  
 love, to allay and convert that contrary  
 Motion of Impatience and Discontent.

Part 2.

§. 1.

## Book 2.

Temper.

IF it be said perhaps, that in the case before us, *Religious Affection* or *Devotion* is a sufficient and proper Remedy; we answer That 'tis according as the Kind may happily prove. For if it be of the pleasant and chearful sort, 'tis of the very kind of *natural Affection* it-self: if it be of the \* dismal or fearful sort; if it brings along with it any Affection opposite to Manhood Generosity, Courage, or Free-thought, there will be nothing gain'd by this Application; and the *Remedy* will, in the issue be undoubtedly found *worse than the Disease*. The severest Reflections on our *Duty*, and the Consideration merely of what is *by Authority* and *under Penalties* enjoin'd will not by any means serve to calm us on this occasion. The more dismal our Thoughts are on such a Subject, the worse our Temper will be, and the readier to discover it self in Harshness, and Austerity. If, perhaps, by Compulsion, or thro' any Necessity or Fear incumbent, a different Carriage be at any time affected, or different Maxims own'd; the Practice at the bottom will be still the same. If the *Countenance* be compos'd, the *Heart*, however will not be chang'd. The ill Passion may for the time be with-held from breaking into Action; but will not be subdu'd, or it

\* VOL. I. p. 32, 33, &c. And VOL. III. p. 115  
116-124 . . . . 128.



the least debilitated against the next occasion. So that in such a Breast as this, whatever *Devotion* there may be; 'tis likely there will in time be little of an *easy Spirit*, *good Temper* remaining; & consequent few and slender Enjoyments of a *mental* kind.

IF it be objected, on the other hand, that tho' in melancholy Circumstances ill humour may prevail, yet in a Course of outward Prosperity, and in the height of fortune, there can nothing probably occur which shou'd thus sour *the Temper*, and give it such disrelish as is suggested; we may consider, that the most humour'd and indulg'd state is apt to receive the most disturbance from every Disappointment or smallest Ail. And if Provocations are easiest rais'd, and the Passions of Anger, Offence, and Enmity, are found the highest in the most indulg'd state of Will and Humour; there is still the greater need of a supply from *social Affection*, to preserve *the Temper* from running into Savageness and Inhumanity. And this, the Case of Tyrants, and most unlimited Potentates, may sufficiently verify and demonstrate.

NOW as to the other part of our Consideration, which relates to a MIND or Reason well compos'd and easy within it-self; upon

Book 2.

upon what account this Happiness may be thought owing to *natural Affection*, we may possibly resolve our-selves, after this manner. It will be acknowledg'd that Creature, such as Man, who from several degrees of Reflection has risen to that Capacity which we call Reason and Understanding; must in the very use of this reasoning Faculty, be forc'd to receive Reflections back into his Mind of what pass'd in it-self, as well as in the Affections, or Will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his Character, Conduct, or Behaviour amidst his Fellow-Creatures, and in Society. O shou'd he be of himself unapt; there are others ready to remind him, and refresh his Memory, in this way of Criticism. We have all of us Remembrancers enow to help us in this Work. Nor are the greatest Favourites of Fortune exempted from this Task of Self inspection. Even Flattery it self, by making the View agreeable, renders us more attentive this way, and insnares us in the Habit. The vainer any Person is the more he has his Eye inwardly fix'd upon himself; and is, after a certain manner employ'd in this home Survey. And when a true Regard to our-selves cannot oblige us to this Inspection, a false Regard to others; and a Fondness for Reputation raises a watchful Jealousy, and furnishes us sufficiently with Acts of Reflection on our own Character and Conduct.

IN whatever manner we consider of <sup>Part 2.</sup> this, we shall find still, that every reason- <sup>§. 1.</sup> ing or reflecting Creature is, by his Nature, oblig'd to endure the *Review* of his own Mind, and Actions; and to have Representations of himself, and his inward Affairs, constantly passing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his Mind. Now as nothing can be more grievous than this is, to one who has thrown off *natural Affection*; so nothing can be more delightful to one who has preserv'd it with sincerity.

THERE are TWO Things, which to a <sup>Conscientious?</sup> rational Creature must be horridly offensive and grievous; *viz.* "To have the Reflection in his Mind of any *unjust* Action or Behaviour, which he knows to be naturally *odious* and *ill-deserving*: Or, of any foolish Action or Behaviour, which he knows to be prejudicial to his own *Interest* or *Happiness*."

THE former of these is alone properly <sup>Moral</sup> call'd CONSCIENCE; whether in a mo- <sup>Conscientious?</sup> ral, or religious Sense. For to have Awe and Terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply Conscience. No one is esteem'd the more conscientious for the fear of evil spirits, Conjurations, Enchantments, or whatever may proceed from any unjust, capricious, or devilish Nature. Now to fear

GOD

Book 2. GOD any otherwise than as in consequence of some justly blameable & imputable Act, is to fear a *devilish* Nature, not a *divine* one. Nor does the Fear of Hell, or a thousand *Terrors* of the *DEITY* impede Conscience; unless where there is an Apprehension of what is *wrong, odious, morally deform'd, and ill-deserving*. And where this is the Case, there Conscience must have effect, and Punishment of necessity be apprehended; even tho' it be not expressly threaten'd.

AND thus *religious Conscience* supposes *moral or natural Conscience*. And tho' the former be understood to carry with it the Fear of divine Punishment; it has its force however from the apprehended moral Deformity and Odiousness of any Act, with respect purely to the Divine Presence, and the natural Veneration due to such a suppos'd Being. For in such a Presence, the Shame of Villany or Vice must have its force, independently on that further Apprehension of the magisterial Capacity of such a Being, and his Dispensation of particular Rewards or Punishments in a future state.

IT has been already said, that no Creature can maliciously and intentionally *do ill*, without being sensible at the same time, that he *deserves ill*. And in this respect, every sensible Creature may be said to have

*Conscience.*

Conscience. For with all Mankind, and all Part 2.  
intelligent Creatures, this must ever hold, § 1.

That *what* they know they deserve from every-one, *that* they necessarily must fear and expect from all." And thus Suspicions and ill Apprehensions must arise, with Terror both of Men and of *the DEITY*. But besides this, there must in every rational Creature, be yet farther *Conscience*; *iz.* from Sense of *Deformity in what is thus ill-deserving and unnatural*: and from consequent *Shame or Regret of incurring what is odious, and moves Aversion*.

THERE scarcely is, or can be any Creature, whom Conscioufnes of Villany, *as such merely*, does not at all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or heinously imputable, move, or affect. If there be such a one; it is evident he must be absolutely indifferent towards motal Good or Ill. If this indeed be his case; 'twill be allow'd he can be no-way capable of natural Affection: If not of that, then neither of any social Pleasure, or mental Enjoyment, as shewn above; but on the contrary, he must be subject to all manner of horrid, unnatural, and ill Affection. So that to want **CONSCIENCE**, or *natural Sense of the Odiousness of Crime and Injustice*, is to be the most of all miserable in Life: but where *Conscience*, or *Sense* of this sort, remains; there, consequently, whatever is committed  
against

Book 2. against it, must of necessity, by means of  
*Moral Con-* Reflection, as we have shewn, be conti-  
*Science.* nually shameful, grievous and offensive.

A MAN who in a Passion happens to kill his Companion, relents immediately on the sight of what he has done. His Revenge is chang'd into Pity, and his Hatred turn'd against himself. And this merely by the Power of the Object. On this account he suffers Agonys: the Subject of this continually occurs to him; and of which he has a constant ill Remembrance and displeasing Consciousness. If on the other side, we suppose him *not* to relent or suffer any real Concern or Shame; then, either he has no Sense of the Deformity of the Crime and Injustice, no natural Affection and consequently no Happiness or Peace within: or if he has any Sense of moral Worth or Goodness, it must be of a perplex'd, and contradictory kind. He must pursue an inconsistent Notion, idolise some *false Species* of Virtue, and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, that which is irrational and absurd. And how tormenting this must be to him, is easy to conceive. For never can such a *Phantom* as this be reduc'd to any certain Form. Never can this *PROTEUS* of Honour be held steady, to one Shape. The Pursuit of it can only be vexations and distracting. There is nothing beside real Virtue (as has been shewn) which

*False Con-*  
*science.*

hich can possibly hold any proportion to Part 2.  
 Esteem, Approbation, or good Conscience. §. 1.  
 and he who, being led by false Religion or  
 evalling Custom, has learnt to esteem or  
 mire any thing as Virtue which is not  
 ally such; must either thro' the Incon-  
 tency of such an Esteem, and the perpe-  
 al Immoralities occasion'd by it, come at  
 t to lose all Conscience, and so be mise-  
 ble in the worst way: or, if he retains  
 y Conscience at all, it must be of a kind  
 ver satisfactory, or able to bestow Con-  
 it. For 'tis impossible that a cruel En-  
 siast, or *Bigot*, a Persecutor, a Murderer,  
*Bravo*, a Pirate, or any Villain of less  
 gree, who is false to the Society of Man-  
 nd in general, and contradicts natural  
 ffection; shou'd have any fix'd Principle  
 all, any real Standard or Measure by  
 hich he can regulate his Esteem, or any  
 id Reason by which to form his Appro-  
 ion of *any one* moral Act. And thus  
 e more he sets up *Honour*, or advances  
*al*; the worse he renders his Nature, and  
 e more detestable his Character. The  
 ore he engages in the Love or Admira-  
 n of any Action or Practice, as great  
 d glorious, which is in it-self morally ill  
 d vicious; the more Contradiction and  
 f-disapprobation he must incur. For  
 re being nothing more certain than this;  
 hat no natural Affection can be contra-  
 icted, nor any unnatural one advanc'd,  
 VOL. II. F " without

Book 2. “ without a prejudice in some degree to  
*False Con-* “ natural Affection in general : “ it m  
*science,* follow, „ That inward Deformity gro  
 “ ing greater, by the incouragement  
 “ unnatural Affection; there must be  
 “ much the more subject for dissatisfac  
 “ ry Reflection, the more any false Prin  
 “ ple of Honour, any false Religion or S  
 “ perstition prevails.“

So that whatever Notions of this kind are cherish'd; or whatever Character affected, which is contrary to moral Equity and leads to Inhumanity, thro' *a false Conscience,* or *wrong Sense of Honour,* serve only to bring a Man the more under the lash of *real* and *just Conscience,* Shame, and Self-reproach. Nor can any one, who, by any pretended Authority, commits or suffers a single Immorality; be able to satisfy himself with any Reason, why he shou'd not at another time be carry'd further, into the same manner of Villany; such perhaps as he himself ven abhors to think of. And this is a Reproach which a Mind must of necessity make to it-self upon the least Violation of natural Conscience; in doing what is *naturally deform'd,* and *ill-deserving;* tho' warranted by any Example or Precedent amongst Men, or by any suppos'd Injunction or Command of higher Powers.



Now as for that other part of Conscience, viz. the remembrance of *what was any time unreasonably and foolishly done, to the prejudice of one's real Interest or Happiness*: This dissatisfactory Reflection must follow still and have effect, wheresoever there is a Sense of moral Deformity, contracted by Crime, and Injustice. For even where there is no Sense of moral Deformity, as *such merely*; there must be still a Sense of the ill Merit of it with respect to God and Man. Or tho' there were a possibility of excluding for ever all Thoughts or Suspicions of any superior Powers, yet considering that this insensibility towards moral Good or Ill implies a total Defect in natural Affection, and that this Defect can by no dissimulation be conceal'd; 'tis evident that a Man of this unhappy Character must suffer a very sensible Loss in the Friendship, Trust, and Confidence of other Men; and consequently must suffer in his Interest and outward Happiness. Nor can the Sense of this Disadvantage fail to occur to him; when he sees, with Regret, and Envy, the better and more agreeable Terms of Friendship, and Esteem, which better People live with the rest of Mankind. Even therefore where natural Affection is wanting; 'tis certain that by Immorality, necessarily hap-

Book 2. pening thro' want of such Affection, there must be disturbance from Conscience of this sort, *viz.* from *Sense of what is committed imprudently, and contrary to real Interest and Advantage.*

*Conclusion drawn from the MEN. TAL PLEASURES.*

FROM all this we may easily conclude how much our Happiness depends on *natural and good Affection.* For if the chief Happiness be from the MENTAL PLEASURES; and the chief *mental Pleasures* are such as we have describ'd, and are founded in *natural Affection*; it follows, "That *to have the natural Affections, is to have the chief Means and Power of Self-enjoyment, the highest Possession and Happiness of Life.*"

*Pleasures of the SENSE,*

*Dependent also on natural Affection.*

NOW as to the *Pleasures of THE BODY*, [and the Satisfactions belonging to *mere SENSE*; 'tis evident, they cannot possibly have their Effect, or afford any valuable Enjoyment, otherwise than by the means of *social and natural Affection.*

*Vulgar Epicurism.*

To *live well*, has no other meaning with some People, than to *eat and drink well.* And methinks 'tis an unwary Concession we make in favour of these pretended *good Livers*, when we join with 'em, in honouring their way of Life with the Title of *living fast.* As if they liv'd the fastest who

who took the greatest Pains to enjoy least Part 2.  
 of Life: For if our Account of Happiness §. 1.  
 be right; the greatest Enjoyments in Life *Pleasures*  
 are such as these Men pass over in their *of the Sense.*  
 taste, and have scarce ever allow'd them-  
 selves the liberty of tasting.

BUT as considerable a Part of Volup-  
 tuousness as is founded in *the Palat*; and  
 is notable as the Science is, which depends *Imaginatio-*  
 on it; one may justly presume that the *on, Fancy.*  
 Ostentation of Elegance, and a certain  
 Emulation and Study how to excel in this  
 sumptuous Art of Living, goes very far in  
 the raising such a high Idea of it, as is ob-  
 serv'd among the Men of Pleasure. For  
 were the Circumstances of a Table and  
 Company, Equipages, Services, and the rest  
 of the Management withdrawn; there  
 wou'd be hardly left any Pleasure worth  
 acceptance, even in the Opinion of the  
 most debauch'd themselves.

THE very Notion of a *Debauch* (which *a De-*  
 is a Sally into whatever can be imagin'd of *bas. b.*  
 Pleasure & Voluptuousness) carrys with  
 it a plain reference to Society, or Fellow-  
 ship. It may be call'd a *Surfeit*, or *Excess*  
*of Eating and Drinking*, but hardly a *De-*  
*bauch* of that kind, when the Excess is  
 committed separately, out of all Society,  
 or Fellowship. And one who abuses him-  
 self in this way, is often call'd a *Sot*, but  
 F 3 never.

Book 2. never a *Debauchee*. The Courtizans, an  
*Pleasure of* even the commonest of Women, who liv  
*the Sense.* by Prostitution, know very well how ne  
 cessary it is, that every one whom they  
*Women.* entertain with their Beauty, shou'd be  
 lieve there are Satisfaction reciprocal  
 and that Pleasures are no less *given* than  
*receiv'd*. And, were this Imagination to  
 be wholly taken away, there wou'd be  
 hardly any of the grosser sort of Man  
 kind, who wou'd not perceive their re  
 maining Pleasure to be of slender Estima  
 tion.

Who is there can well or long enjoy  
 any thing, when *alone*, and abstracted per  
 fectly, even in his very Mind and Thought,  
 from every thing belonging to Society?  
 Who wou'd not, on such Terms as these,  
 be presently cloy'd by any sensual Indul  
 gence? Who wou'd not soon grow uneasy  
 with his Pleasure, however exquisite, till  
 he had found means to impart it, and  
 make it *truly pleasant* to him, by commu  
 nicating, and sharing it at least with some  
*one* single Person? Let Men imagine  
 what they please; let 'em suppose them  
 selves ever so selfish; or desire ever so  
 much to follow the Dictates of that nar  
 row Principle, by which they wou'd  
 bring Nature under restraint: Nature will  
 break out; and in Agonys, Disquiets, and  
 a distemper'd state, demonstrate evidently  
 the

e ill Consequence of such Violence, the Part 2.  
 bsurdity of such a Device, & the Punish- §. 1.  
 ent which belongs to such a monstrous  
 id horrid Endeavour.

THUS, therefore, not only the *Plea- Pleasures of*  
*ures of the Mind,* but even those of *the the Senses,*  
*ody,* depend on natural Affection: inso-  
 uch that where this is wanting, they  
 ot only lose their Force, but are in a  
 manner converted into Uneasiness and Dis-  
 ist. The Sensations which shou'd nat- *Convertible*  
 urally afford Contentment and Delight, *into Disgust*  
 roduce rather Discontent and Sourness,  
 nd breed a Wearisomness and Restlessness  
 n the Disposition. This we may per- *Variable;*  
 eive by the perpetual Inconstancy, and  
 Love of Change, so remarkable in those  
 who have nothing communicative or  
 riendly in their Pleasures. *Good Fellow-*  
*ship,* in its abus'd Sense, seems indeed to  
 ave something more constant and deter-  
 mining. The Company supports the Hu-  
 nour. 'Tis the same in *Love.* A certain *Insupport-*  
 Genderness and Generosity of Affection *table.*  
 upports the Passion, which otherwise  
 wou'd instantly be chang'd. The per-  
 fectest Beauty cannot, of it-self, retain, or  
 fix it. And that Love which has no  
 other Foundation, but relies on this exte-  
 rior kind, is soon turn'd into Aversion.  
 Satiety, perpetual Disgust, and Feverish-  
 ness of Desire, attend those who passio-

Book 2. nately study Pleasure. They best enjoy it, who study to regulate their Passions  
*Pleasures of the Sense.* And by this they will come to know how absolute an Incapacity there is in any thing sensual to please, or give contentment, where it depends not on something friendly or social, something conjoin'd, and in affinity with *kind* or *natural Affection*.

*Balance of the Affections.*

BUT ERE we conclude this Article of *social* or *natural Affection*, we may take a general View of it, & bring it, once for all, into the Scale; to prove what kind of \* BALLANCE it helps to make *within*; and what the Consequence may be, of its *Deficiency*, or *light Weight*.

THERE is no-one of ever so little Understanding in what belongs to a human Constitution, who knows not that without Action, Motion, and Employment, *the Body* languishes, & is oppress'd; its Nourishment turns to Disease; the Spirits, unemploy'd abroad, help to consume the Parts within; and Nature, as it were, preys upon her-self. In the same manner, the sensible and living Part, *the Soul* or *Mind*, wanting its proper and natural Exercise,

\* *Supra*, p. 92, 93, &c.

exercise, is burden'd and diseas'd. Its Thoughts and Passions being unnaturally withheld from their due Objects, turn against it-self, and create the highest Impatience and Ill-humour.

Part 2.  
§. 1.

*Ballance of  
the Affections.*

IN \* *Brutes*, and other Creatures, who have not the Use of Reason and Reflection (at least not after the manner of Man's mind) 'tis so order'd in Nature, that by their daily Search after Food, and their application either towards the Business of their Livelihood, or the Affairs of their species or Kind, almost their whole time is taken up; and they fail not to find full employment for their Passion, according to that degree of Agitation to which they are fitted, and which their Constitution requires. If any one of these Creatures be taken out of his natural laborious state, and plac'd amidst such a plenty as can profusely administer to all his Appetites and Wants; it may be observ'd, that as his Circumstances grow thus luxuriant, his Temper and Passions have the same growth. When he comes, at any time, to have the Accommodations of Life at a cheaper and easier rate than was at first intended him by Nature, he is made to pay dear for them in another way; by losing his natural

*Instance in  
the animal  
Kinds.*

F 5

ral

\* *Supra*, p. 92, 93. And *Infra*, p. 307, 8, 9, &c.  
And VOL. III, p. 216, 17, &c.

Book 2. ral good Disposition, and the Orderline  
of his Kind or Species.

*Ballance of  
the Affec-  
tions.*

THIS needs not to be demonstrate  
by particular Instances. Whoever has the  
least knowledg of natural History, or has  
been an Observer of the several Breeds of  
Creatures, and their ways of Life, and  
Propagation, will easily understand the  
Difference of Orderliness between the *wild*  
and the *tame* of the same Species. The  
latter acquire new Habits; and deviate  
from their original Nature. They lose  
even the common Instinct and ordinary  
Ingenuity of their Kind; nor can they  
ever regain it, whilst they continue in this  
pamper'd state: but being turn'd to shift  
abroad, they resume the natural Affection  
and Sagacity of their Species. They  
learn to unite in stricter Fellowship; and  
grow more concern'd for their Offspring.  
They provide against the Seasons, and  
make the most of every Advantage given  
by Nature for the Support and Mainte-  
nance of their particular Species, against  
such as are foreign and hostile. And thus  
as they grow busy and employ'd, they  
grow regular and good. Their Petulancy  
and Vice forsakes them with their Idleness  
and Ease.

*Animal  
Kinds.*

*Mankind.* IT happens with *Mankind*, that whilst  
some are by necessity confin'd to Labour,  
others



Others are provided with abundance of all things, by the Pains and Labour of inferiors. Now, if among the superior and easy sort, there be not something of fit and proper Employment rais'd in the room of what is wanting in common Labour and Toil; if instead of an Application to any sort of Work, such as has a good and honest End in Society, (as Letters, Sciences, Arts, Husbandry, publick Affairs, OEconomy, or the like) there be a thorough Neglect of all Duty or Employment; a settled Idleness, Supineness, and Inactivity; this of necessity must occasion a most relax'd and dissolute state: It must produce a total Disorder of the Passions, and break out in the strangest Irregularitys imaginable.

Part 2.  
§. 1.

WE see the enormous growth of Luxury in capital Citys, such as have been long the Seat of Empire. We see what Improvements are made in Vice of every kind, where numbers of Men are maintain'd in lazy Opulence, and wanton Plenty. 'Tis otherwise with those who are taken up in honest and due Employment, and have been well inur'd to it from their Youth. This we may observe in the hardy remote Provincials, the Inhabitants of smaller Towns, and the industrious sort of common People; where 'tis rare to meet with any Instances of those Irregularitys,

Book 2. which are known in Courts and Palaces and in the rich Foundations of easy and pamper'd Priests.

*Ballance of the Affections.*  
9125.

Now if what we have advanc'd concerning an *inward Constitution* be real and just; if it be true that Nature works by a just Order and Regulation as well in the Passions and Affections, as in the Limbs and Organs which she forms; if it appears withal, that she has so constituted this *inward Part*, that nothing is so essential to it as *Exercise*; and no Exercise so essential as that of *social or natural Affection*: it follows, that where this is remov'd or weaken'd, the *inward-Part* must necessarily suffer and be impair'd. Let Indolence, Indifference, or Insensibility, be study'd as an Art, or cultivated with the utmost Care; the Passions thus restrain'd will force their Prison, and in one way or other procure their Liberty, and find full Employment. They will be sure to create to themselves *unusual and unnatural Exercise*, where they are cut off from such as is *natural and good*. And thus in the room of orderly and natural Affection, new and unnatural must be rais'd; and all *inward Order* and *O.Economy* destroy'd.

*O.Economy.*

ONE must have a very imperfect Idea of the Order of Nature in the Formation and Structure of Animals, to imagine that:

so.

So great a *Principle*, so fundamental a Part: Part 2.  
 as that of *natural Affection* shou'd possibly §. 1.  
 be lost or impair'd, without any inward  
 Ruin or Subversion of the Temper and  
 Frame of Mind.

WHOEVER is the least vers'd in this  
 moral kind of Architecture, will find the *Fabrick*  
 inward *Fabrik* so adjusted, and *the whole*  
 so nicely built; that the barely extend-  
 ing of a single Passion a little too far, or  
 the continuance of it too long, is able to  
 bring irrecoverable Ruin and Misery. He  
 will find this experienc'd in the ordinary  
 Case of Phrenzy, and Distraction; when  
 the Mind, dwelling too long upon *one*  
 Subject (whether prosperous or calami-  
 tous) sinks under the weight of it, and  
 proves what the necessity is, of a due  
*Ballance*, and Counterpoise in the Affec-  
 tions. He will find, that in every diffe-  
 rent Creature, and distinct Sex, there is a  
 different and distinct *Order, Set, or Suit*  
 of Passions; proportionable to the diffe-  
 rent Order of Life, the different Functions  
 and Capacities assign'd to each. As the  
 Operations and Effects are different, so are  
 the Springs and Causes in each System.  
 The inside Work is fitted to the outward  
 Action and Performance. So that where  
 Habits or Affections are dislodg'd, mis-  
 plac'd, or chang'd; where those belonging  
 to one Species are intermix'd with those

Book 2. belonging to another, there must of necessity be Confusion and Disturbance within.

*Ballance of  
the Affections.*

*Monsters.*

ALL this, we may observe easily, by comparing the more perfect with the imperfect Natures, such as are imperfect from their Birth, by having suffer'd Violence *within*, in their earliest *Form*, and in most *Matrix*. We know how it is with *Monsters*, such as are compounded of different Kinds, or different Sexes. Nor are they less *Monsters*, who are misshapen or distorted in an inward Part. The ordinary Animals appear unnatural and monstrous, when they lose their proper Instincts, forsake their Kind, neglect their Offspring, and pervert those Functions or Capacities bestow'd by Nature. How wretched must it be, therefore, for MAN, of all other Creatures, to lose that *Sense*, and *Feeling*, which is proper to him as a MAN, and suitable to his Character, and Genius? How unfortunate must it be for a Creature, whose dependence on Society is greater than any others, to lose that *natural Affection* by which he is prompted to the Good and Interest of his Species, and Community? Such indeed is Man's natural Share of this *Affection*, that *He*, of all other Creatures, is plainly the least able to bear Solitude. Nor is any thing more apparent, than that there is naturally in every Man  
such

Such a degree of social Affection as inclines him to seek the Familiarity and Friendship of his Fellows. 'Tis here that he lets loose a Passion, and gives reins to a Desire which can hardly by any struggle or inward violence be with held; or if it be, is sure to create a Sadness, Dejection, and Melancholy in the Mind. For whoever is unfociable, and voluntarily shuns Society, or Commerce with the World, must of necessity be morose and ill-natur'd. He, on the other side, who is with-held by force or accident, finds in his Temper the ill Effects of this Restraint: The Inclination, when suppress'd, breeds Discontent; and on the contrary affords a healing and enlivening joy, when acting at its liberty, and with full scope: as we may see particularly, when after a time of Solitude and long Absence, the Heart is open'd, the Mind disburden'd, and the Secrets of the Breast unfolded to a Bosom-Friend.

Part 2.  
§. 1.

THIS we see yet more remarkably instanc'd in Persons of the most elevated Stations; even in Princes, Monarchs; and those who seem by their Condition to be above ordinary human Commerce, and who affect a sort of distant Strangeness from the rest of Mankind. But their Carriage is not the same towards *all* Men. The wiser and better sort, it's true, are often

Book 2. often held at a distance; as unfit for their Intimacy, or secret Trust. But to compensate this there are others substitute in their room, who tho' they have the least Merit, and are perhaps the most vile and contemptible of Men, are sufficient, however, to serve the purpose of an imaginary Friendship, and can become *Favourites* in form. These are the Subjects of Humanity in *the Great*. For These we see them often in concern and pain in These they easily confide: to These they can with pleasure communicate their Power and Greatness, be open, free, generous, confiding, bountiful; as rejoicing in the Action it-self: having no Intention or Aim beyond it; and their Interest, in respect of Policy, often standing a quite contrary way. But where neither the Love of Mankind, nor the Passion for Favorites prevails, the tyrannical Temper fails not to shew it-self in its proper colours, and to the life, with all the Bitterness, Cruelty, and Mistrust, which belong to that solitary and gloomy state of un-communicative and unfriendly Greatness. Nor needs there any particular Proof from History, or present Time, to second this Remark.

THUS it may appear, how much NATURAL AFFECTION is predominant:

ant; how it is inwardly join'd to us, Part 2.  
 and implanted in our Natures, how in- §. 2.  
 woven with our other Passions; and  
 how essential to that regular Motion and  
 Course of our Affections, on which our  
 Happiness and Self-enjoyment so imme-  
 diately depend.

AND thus we have demonstrated, That  
*on one side*, TO HAVE THE NATU-  
 AL AND GOOD AFFECTIONS, IS  
 TO HAVE THE CHIEF MEANS AND  
 POWER OF SELF-ENJOYMENT: SO  
*the other side*, TO WANT THEM, IS  
 CERTAIN MISERY, AND ILL.

## S E C T. II.

WE are now to prove, That BY HAV- SECOND  
 ING THE SELF-PASSIONS TOO *Proof; from*  
 INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREATURE *the Self-*  
 BECOMES MISERABLE. *passions.*

In order to this, we must, according to  
 Method, enumerate those Home-affecti-  
 ons, which relate to the private Interest or  
 separate OEconomy of the Creature: such  
 as *Love of Life*; — *Resentment of In-*  
*jury*; — *Pleasure, or Appetite towards*  
*Nourishment and the Means of Generation*;  
 — *Interest, or Desire of those Conveni-*  
*ences, by which we are well provided for,*  
and

Book 2. and maintain'd; — *Emulation*, or *Love of Praise and Honour*; — *Indolence*, or *Love of Ease and Rest* — — These are the Affections which relate to the private System and constitute whatever we call *Interestedness* or *Self-love*.

Self-passions.

Now these Affections, if they are moderate, and within certain bounds, are neither injurious to social Life, nor a hindrance to Virtue: but being in an extreme degree they become *Cowardice*, — *Revengefulness* — *Luxury*, — *Avarice*, — *Vanity* and *Ambition*, — *Sloth*; — and, as such, are own'c vicious and ill, with respect to human Society. How they are ill also with respect to the private Person, and are to his own disadvantage as well as that of the Publick we may consider, as we severally examine them.

Love of Life.

IF THERE were any of these Self-passions, which for the Good and Happiness of the Creature might be oppos'd to *Natural Affection*, and allow'd to overballance it; THE DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE wou'd have the best Pretence. But it will be found perhaps, that there is no Passion which, by having much allow'd to it, is the occasion of more Disorder and Misery.

THERE



Part 2.

§. 2.

THERE is nothing more certain, or more universally agreed than this; "That *Life* may sometimes be even a Misfortune & Misery." To enforce the continuance of it in Creatures reduc'd to such extremity, is esteem'd the greatest Cruelty. And tho' Religion forbids that any one shou'd be his own Reliever; yet if by some fortunate accident, Death offers of *self*, it is embrac'd as highly welcome. And on this account the nearest Friends and Relations often rejoice at the Release of one intirely belov'd; even tho' he himself may have been so weak as earnestly decline Death, and endeavour the utmost prolongment of his own un-eligible state.

SINCE *Life*, therefore, may frequently prove a Misfortune & Misery; and since it naturally becomes so, by being over-prolong'd to the Infirmitys of old Age; since there is nothing, withal, more common than to see *Life* over-valu'd, and purchas'd at such a Cost as it can never justly be thought worth: it follows evidently, that the Passion it-self (viz. *the Love of Life*, and *Abhorrence or Dread of Death*) beyond a certain degree, & over-balancing in the Temper of any Creature, must lead him directly against his own Interest; and make him, upon occasion, become the greatest

Book 2.

Love of  
Life.

greatest Enemy to himself; and necessitate him to act as such.

BUT tho' it were allow'd the Interest and Good of a Creature, by all Course and Means whatsoever, in any circumstances, or at any rate, to preserve *Life*; yet wou'd it be against his Interest still to have this Passion in a high degree. For wou'd by this means prove ineffectual and no-way conducing to its End. Various Instances need not be given. For what is there better known, than that all times an excessive *Fear* betrays to danger, instead of saving from it? 'Tis impossible for any-one to act sensibly, and with Presence of Mind, even in his own Preservation and Defense, when he is strongly press'd by such a Passion. On extraordinary Emergences, 'tis *Courage* and *Resolution* saves; whilst *Cowardice* robs of the means of Safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive Facultys, but even runs us to the brink of Ruin, and makes us meet that Evil which of it-self wou'd never have invaded us.

BUT were the *Consequences* of this Passion less injurious than we have represented; it must be allow'd still that *in itself* it can be no other than miserable; it be Misery to feel *Cowardice*, and be haunted by those Specters and Horrors which

which are proper to the Character of one who has a thorough Dread of Death. For not only when Dangers happen, and Hazards are incurr'd, that this sort of Fear oppresses and distracts. If it in the last prevails, it gives no quarter, so much that at the safest stillest hour of Retreat and quiet. Every Object suggests Thought enough to employ it. It operates when it is least observ'd by others; and enters all times into the pleasantest parts of life; so as to corrupt and poison all Enjoyment, and Content. One may safely aver, that by reason of this Passion alone, many a Life, if inwardly and close-view'd; wou'd be found to be thorough-miserable, tho attended with all other circumstances which in appearance render it happy. But when we add to this, the Meannesses, and base Condescensions, occasion'd by such a passionate Concern for living, when we consider how by means of it we are driven to Actions we can never view without Dislike, and forc'd by degrees from our natural Conduct, into still greater Crookednesses and perplexity; there is no-one, surely, so insincere as not to allow, that *Life*, in this case, becomes a sorry Purchase, and is pass'd with little Freedom or Satisfaction. For how can this be otherwise, whilst every thing which is generous and worthy, even the chief *Relish, Happiness,*

Book 2. *pinefs*, and *Good* of Life, is for *Life's* sake  
abandon'd and renounc'd?

*Love of  
Life.*

AND thus it seems evident, " That  
" have this Affection of DESIRE and  
" LOVE OF LIFE, too intense, or beyond  
" a moderate degree, is against the Interest  
" of a Creature, and contrary to his *Ha-*  
" *pinefs* and *Good*."

*Resentment.*

THERE is another Passion very different from that of *Fear*, and which in certain degree is equally preservative to us, and conducing to our Safety. As *this* is serviceable, in prompting us to shun Danger; so is *this*, in fortifying us against it, and enabling us to repel Injury, and resist Violence when offer'd. 'Tis true that according to strict Virtue, and a just Regulation of the Affections in a wise and virtuous Man, such Efforts towards Action amount not to what is justly styl'd *Passion* or *Commotion*. A Man of Courage may be cautious without real *Fear*. And a Man of Temper may resist or punish without *Anger*. But in ordinary Characters there must necessarily be some Mixture of the real Passions themselves; which however, in the main, are able to allay and temper one another. And thus ANGER in a manner becomes necessary. 'Tis by this Passion that one Creature offering

ffering Violence to another, is deter'd  
 rom the Execution; whilst he observes  
 ow the Attempt affects his Fellow; and  
 nowns by the very Signs which accompa-  
 ny this rising Motion, that if the Injury be  
 rry'd further, it will not pass easily, or  
 with impunity. 'Tis this Passion withal,  
 which after Violence and Hostility execu-  
 ed, rouzes a Creature in opposition, and  
 sists him in returning like Hostility and  
 Harm on the Invader. For thus, as *Rage*  
 and *Despair* increase, a Creature grows  
 till more terrible; and being urg'd to  
 he greatest extremity, finds a degree of  
 strength and Boldness unexperienc'd till  
 hen, and which had never risen except  
 thro' the height of Provocation. As to  
 his Affection therefore, notwithstanding  
 ts immedirte Aim be indeed *the Ill* or Pu-  
 nishment of another, yet it is plainly of  
 he sort of those which tend to the Advan-  
 age and Interest of the Self system, *the*  
*Animal himself*; and is withal in other re-  
 spects contributing to the Good and In-  
 terest of the Species. But there is hardly  
 need we shou'd explain how mischievous  
 and self-destructive ANGER is, if it be  
 what we commonly understand by that  
 word: if it be such a Passion as is rash, and  
 violent in the Instant of Provocation; or  
 such as imprints it-self deeply, and causes a  
 settled *Revenge*, and an eager vindicative  
 Pursuit. No wonder indeed that so much  
 is

Book 2. is done in mere *Revenge*, and under the  
*Resentment* Weight of a deep *Resentment*, when the  
 Relief and Satisfaction found in that In-  
 dulgence is no other than the assuaging of  
 the most torturous Pain, and the alleviating  
 the most weighty and pressing Sensation of  
 Misery. The Pain of this sort being for  
 a-while remov'd or alleviated by the ac-  
 complishment of the Desire, in the Ill or  
 another, leaves indeed behind it the per-  
 ception of a delicious Ease, and an over-  
 flowing of soft and pleasing Sensation.  
 Yet is this, in truth, no better than the  
*Rack* it-self. For whoever has experienc'd  
 racking Pains, can tell in what manner a  
 sudden Cessation or respite is us'd to affect  
 him. From hence are those untoward De-  
 lights of Perverseness, Frowardness, and  
 an envenom'd malignant Disposition, act-  
 ing at its liberty. For this is only a *perpe-  
 tual assuaging of ANGER perpetually re-  
 new'd*. In other Characters, the *Passion*  
 arises not so suddenly, or on slight Causes;  
 but being once mov'd, is not so easily  
 quieted. The dormant *Fury*, *REVENGE*,  
 being rais'd once, and wrought up to her  
 highest pitch, rests not till she attains her  
 End; and, that attain'd, is easy, and re-  
 poses; making our succeeding Relief and  
 Ease so much the more enjoy'd, as our pre-  
 ceding Anguish & incumbent Pain was of  
 long duration, and bitter sense. Certainly  
 if among *Lovers*, and in the Language of  
 Gallantry,

allantry, the Success of ardent Love is Part 2.  
 all'd the *assuaging of a Pain*; this other §. 2.  
 success may be far more justly term'd so.  
 However soft or flattering the former Pain  
 may be esteem'd, this latter surely can be  
 no *pleasing one*: Nor can it be possibly  
 esteem'd other than sound and thorow  
 Wretchedness, a grating and disgustful  
 feeling, without the least mixture of any  
 thing soft, gentle, or agreeable.

'TIS not very necessary to mention the  
 effects of this Passion, in respect of our  
*Minds or Bodys*, our private Condition, or  
*circumstances of Life*. By these Particu-  
 ars we may grow too tedious. These are  
 of the moral sort of Subjects, join'd com-  
 monly with Religion, and treated so rheto-  
 cally, and with such inforc'd repetition in  
 publick, as to be apt to raise the Satiety of  
 Mankind. What has been said, may be  
 enough perhaps to make this evident,  
 That to be subject to such a Passion as  
 we have been mentioning, is, in reality,  
 to be very unhappy: And, „ That the  
 Habit it-self is a *Disease* of the worst  
 sort; from which *Misery* is inseparable.”

NOW AS to *Luxury*, and what the PLEA-  
 World calls PLEASURE: Were it true <sup>SURE.</sup>  
 as has been prov'd the contrary) that the <sup>Luxury.</sup>  
 most considerable Enjoyments were those  
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SURE.  
Luxury.

merely of *the Sense*; and were it true withal, that those Enjoyments of the Sense lay in certain outward things capable of yielding always a due and certain Portion of Pleasure, according to their degree and quality; it wou'd then follow, that the certain way to obtain Happiness, wou'd be to procure largely of these Subjects, to which Happiness and Pleasure were thus infallibly annex'd. But however fashionably we may apply the Notion of *good Living*, 'twill hardly be found that our inward Facultys are able to keep pace with their outward Supplys of a luxuriant Fortune. And if the natural Disposition and Aptness *from within* be not concurring; 'twill be in vain that these Subjects are thus multiply'd *from abroad*, and acquir'd with ever so great facility.

It may be observ'd in those who by Excess have gain'd a constant Nauseation and Distaste, that they have nevertheless as constant a Craving or Eagerness of Stomach. But the *Appetite* of this kind is *false* and *unnatural*; as is that of Thirst arising from a Fever, or contracted by habitual Debauch. Now the Satisfaction of the *natural Appetite*, in a plain way, are infinitely beyond those Indulgences of the most refin'd and elegant *Luxury*. This is often perceiv'd by the Luxurious themselves. It has been experienc'd in People  
bre



ed after the sumptuous way, and us'd ne- Part 2.  
 er to wait, but to prevent Appetite; that §. 2.  
 hen by any new Turn of Life they came  
 fall into a more natural Course, or for a  
 hile, as on a Journey, or a day of Sport,  
 me accidentally to experience the Sweet  
 a plain Diet, recommended by due Ab-  
 inence & Exercise; they have with free-  
 om own'd, that it was then they receiv'd  
 e highest Satisfaction and Delight which  
 Table cou'd possibly afford.

ON the other side, it has been as often  
 mark'd in Persons accusom'd to an  
 tive Life, & healthful Exercise; that hav-  
 g oncethorowly experienc'd this plainer  
 more natural Diet, they have upon a fol-  
 lowing Change of Life regretted their  
 loss, and undervalu'd the Pleasures re-  
 ceiv'd from all the Delicacys of *Luxury*, in  
 comparison with those remember'd satis-  
 factions of a preceding state. 'Tis plain,  
 that by urging Nature, forcing the Appe-  
 te, and inciting Sense, the Keeness of  
 the natural Sensations is lost. And tho'  
 thro' Vice or ill Habit the same Subjects  
 Appetite may, every day, be fought  
 with less Satisfaction. Tho' the Impa-  
 tience of abstaining be greater; the Plea-  
 sure of Indulgence is really less. The  
*Colics* or *Nauseatings* which continually in-  
 vene, are of the worst and most hate-  
 ful

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LUXURY.

ful kind of Sensation. Hardly is there any thing tasted which is wholly free from this ill relish of a surfeited Sense and ruin'd Appetite. So that instead of a constant and flowing Delight afforded in such a state of Life, the very State it-self is in reality a Sickness and Infirmary, a Corruption of Pleasure, and destructive of every natural and agreeable Sensation. So far it from being true, „ That in this licentious Course we enjoy LIFE best, or as likely to *make the most* of it.”

As to the Consequences of such an Indulgence; how fatal to *the Body*, by Diseases of many kinds, and to *the Mind*, by Sottishness and Stupidity; this needs no any explanation.

THE Consequences *as to Interest* are plain enough. Such a state of impotent and unrestrain'd Desire, as it increases our Wants, so it must subject us to a greater Dependence on others. Our private Circumstances, however plentiful or easy they may be, can less easily content us. Ways and Means must be invented to procure what may administer to such an imperious *Luxury*, as forces us to sacrifice Honour to Fortune, and runs us out into all irregularity and extravagance of Conduct. The Injurys we do our-selves, by Excess and Unforbearance, are then surely  
apparen

pparent, when thro' an Impotence of this Part 2.  
 ort, and an Impossibility of Restraint, we §. 2.  
 o what we our-selves declare to be de-  
 ructive to us. But these are Matters ob- PLEA.  
 fious of themselves. And from less than SURE.  
 what has been said, 'tis easy to conclude.  
 That *Luxury, Riot, and Debauch*, are  
 contrary to real Interest, and to the true  
 Enjoyment of Life."

THERE is another *Luxury* superior *Amounts.*  
 to the kind we have been mentioning, and  
 which in strictness can scarce be call'd a  
*self-passion*, since the sole End of it is the  
 advantage and Promotion of the Species.  
 but whereas all other social Affections are  
 join'd only with a *mental Pleasure*, and  
 founded in mere Kindness and Love; this  
 has more added to it, and is join'd with  
*Pleasure of Sense*. Such Concern and  
 Care has Nature shewn for the Support  
 and Maintenance of the several Species,  
 that by a certain *Indigence* and kind of  
 Necessity of their Natures, they are made  
 to regard the Propagation of their Kind.  
 Now whether it be the Interest or Good  
 of the Animal to feel this *Indigence* beyond  
 natural and ordinary degree; is what we  
 may consider

HAVING already said so much con-  
 cerning *natural* and *unnatural Appetite*,  
 G 3 there

Book 2. there needs less to be said on this occasion. If it be allow'd, that to all other Pleasures there is a Measure of Appetite belonging, which cannot possibly be exceeded without prejudice to the Creature even in his very Capacity of enjoying Pleasure; it will hardly be thought that there be no certain Limit or just Boundary of the other Appetite of *the AMOROUS kind*. There are other sorts of ardent Sensation accidentally experienc'd, which we find pleasant and acceptable whilst they are held with'n a certain degree; but which as they increase, grow oppressive and intolerable. *Laughter* provok'd by Titillation, grows an excessive Pain; tho' it retains still the same Features of Delight and Pleasure. And tho' in the case of that particular kind of *Itch* which belongs to a Distemper nam'd from that effect, there are some who, far from disliking the Sensation, find it highly acceptable and delightful; yet it will hardly be reputed such among the more refin'd sort, even of those who make Pleasure their chief Study, and highest Good.

Now if there be in every Sensation of mere Pleasure, a certain Pitch or Degree of Ardour, which by being further advanc'd, comes the nearer to mere Rage and Fury; if there be indeed a necessity of stopping *somewhere*, and determining

in *some* Boundary for the Passion; where Part 2.  
 an we fix our Standard, or how regulate §. 2.  
 ur-selves but *with regard to Nature*, be-  
 ond which there is no Measure or Rule  
 f things? Now *Nature* may be known  
 om what we see of the natural state of  
 reatures, and of Man himself, when un-  
 rejudic'd by vitious Education.

WHERE happily any one is bred to a  
 atural Life, inur'd to honest Industry  
 nd Sobriety, and un-accustom'd to any  
 ing immoderate or intemperate; he is  
 ound to have his Appetites and Inclina-  
 ons of this sort at command. Nor are  
 ey on this account less able to afford him  
 e Pleasure or Enjoyment of each kind.  
 On the contrary; as they are more sound,  
 ealthy, and un-injur'd by Excess and  
 buse, they must afford him proportio-  
 ate Satisfaction. So that were both these  
 ensations to be experimentally compar'd;  
 at of *a virtuous Course* which belong'd  
 o one who liv'd a natural and regular  
 ife, and that of *a vitious Course* which  
 elong'd to one who was relax'd and dis-  
 olute; there is no question but Judg-  
 ment wou'd be given in favour of the for-  
 mer, without regard to Consequences, and  
 nly with respect to the very Pleasure of  
 ense it-self.

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SURE.  
*Amours.*

AS to the Consequences of this Vice with respect to the Health and Vigour of *the Body*; there is no need to mention anything. The Injury it does *the Mind*, though less notic'd, is yet greater. The Hindrance of all Improvement, the wretched Waste of Time, the Effeminacy, Sloth, Supineness, the Disorder and Looseness of a thousand Passions, thro' such a relaxation and enervating of the Mind; are all of them Effects sufficiently apparent, when reflected on.

WHAT the Disadvantages are of this Intemperance, in respect of Interest, Society, and the World; and what the Advantages are of a contrary Sobriety, and Self-command, wou'd be to little purpose to mention. 'Tis well known there can be no Slavery greater than what is consequent to the Dominion and Rule of such a Passion. Of all other, it is the least manageable by Favour or Concession, and assumes the most from Privilege and Indulgence. What it costs us in *the Modesty and Ingenuity* of our Natures and in the Faith and Honesty of our Characters, is as easily apprehended by any one who will reflect. And it will from hence appear, " That there is no Passion which in its Extravagance and Excess

" more

more necessarily occasions Disorder and Part 2.  
Unhappiness.“ §. 2.

NOW AS to that Passion which is es-<sup>INTE-</sup>  
tem'd peculiarly *interesting*; as having <sup>REST</sup>  
for its Aim the Possession of Wealth, and  
what we call a *Settlement* or *Fortune* in  
the World: If the Regard towards this  
be moderate, and in a reasonable de-  
gree; if it occasions no passionate Pursuit,  
or raises any ardent Desire or Appetite,  
there is nothing in this Case which is not  
compatible with Virtue, and even sutable  
and beneficial to Society. The publick as  
well as private System is advanc'd by the  
Industry, which this Affection excites.  
But if it grows at length into a real *Passion*;  
the Injury and Mischief it does the Pub-  
lick, is not greater than that which it  
creates to the Person himself. Such a one  
is in reality a Self-oppressor, and lies  
heavier on himself than he can ever do on  
Mankind.

How far a COVETING OR AVARI-  
LOUS TEMPER is miserable, needs  
not, surely, be explain'd. Who knows  
not how small a Portion of wordly Mat-  
ters is sufficient for a Man's single Use  
and Convenience; and how much his  
Occasions and Wants might be con-  
tracted and reduc'd, if a just Frugality

Book 2. were study'd, and Temperance and a natural Life came once to be pursu'd with half that Application, Industry and Art which is bestow'd on Sumptuousness and Luxury? Now if Temperance be in reality so advantageous, and the Practice as well as the Consequences of it so pleasing and happy, as has been before express'd there is little need, on the other side, to mention any thing of the Miserys attending those covetous and eager Desires after things which have no Bounds or Rule; a being out of *Nature*, beyond which there can be no Limits to Desire. For when shall we once stop, when we are beyond this Boundary? How shall we fix or ascertain a thing wholly *unnatural* and *unreasonable*? Or what Method, what Regulation shall we set to mere Imagination or the Exorbitancy of Fancy, in adding Expence to Expence, or Possession to Possession?

HENCE that known Restlessness of *covetous* and eager Minds, in whatever state or Degree of Fortune they are plac'd there being no thorow or real Satisfaction but a kind of Insatiableness belonging to this Condition. For 'tis impossible there shou'd be any *real Enjoyment*, except in consequence of *natural* and *just Appetite*. Nor do we readily call that an *Enjoyment* of Wealth or of Honour, when thro' *Cove*



covetousness or Ambition, the Desire is Part 2.  
 all forward, & can never rest satisfy'd with §. 2.  
 its Gains. But against this Vice of CO-  
 VETOUSNESS, there is enough said conti-  
 nually in the World; and in our common  
 way of speaking, "A covetous, and a mi-  
 serable Temper, has, in reality, one and  
 the same Signification."

NOR IS there less said, abroad, as to *Emulation*  
 the Ills of that other aspiring Temper,  
 which exceeds an honest *Emulation*, or  
 love of Praise, and passes the Bounds  
 even of *Vanity* and *Conceit*. Such is that  
 passion which breaks into an enormous  
 RIDE and AMBITION. Now if we  
 consider once the Ease, Happiness, and  
 security which attend a *modest Disposition*  
 and *quiet Mind*, such as is of easy Self-  
 command, fitted to every Station in Soci-  
 ety, and able to suite itself with any rea-  
 sonable Circumstances whatever; 'twill, on  
 the first view, present us with the most  
 agreeable and winning Character. Nor  
 will it be found necessary after this to  
 call to mind the Excellence and Good of  
*Moderation*, or the Mischief and Self-in-  
 jury of immoderate Desires, and conceited  
 and Imagination of personal Advantage,  
 in such things as Titles, Honours, Prece-  
 dencys, Fame, Glory, or *vulgar Astonish-  
 ment*, *Admiration* and *Applause*.

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*Emulation.*

THIS too is obvious, that as the Desires of this kind are rais'd, and become impetuous, and out of our command; if the Aversions and Fears of the contrary part, grow proportionably strong and violent, and the Temper accordingly suspicious, jealous, captious, subject to Apprehensions from all Events, and incapable of bearing the least Repulse or ordinary Disappointment. And hence it may be concluded, " That all Rest and Security  
 " *as to what is future*, and all Peace, Contentedness & Ease *as to what is present*  
 " is forfeited by the aspiring Passions of  
 " this emulous kind; and by having the  
 " Appetites towards *Glory* and *outward*  
 " *Appearance* thus transporting and beyond  
 " command."

*Indolence.*

THERE is a certain Temper placed often in opposition to those eager and aspiring Aims of which we have been speaking. Not that it really excludes either the Passion of *Covetousness* or *Ambition*; but because it hinders their Effects, and keeps them from breaking into open Action. 'Tis this Passion, which by soothing the Mind, and softning it into an EXCESSIVE LOVE of REST and INDOLENCE, renders high Attempts impracticable, and represents as insuperable the  
 Difficult

Difficultys of a painful & laborious Course Part 2.  
 towards Wealth and Honours. Now tho §. 2.  
 an Inclination to Ease, and a Love of moderate  
 Recess and Rest from Action, be as natural and  
 useful to us as the Inclination we have towards  
 Sleep; yet an excessive Love of Rest, and a  
 contracted Aversion to Action and Imployment,  
 must be a Disease in the Mind equal to that of  
 a Lethargy in the Body.

How necessary Action and Exercise are to the  
 Body, may be judg'd by the difference we find  
 between those Constitutions which are accus-  
 tom'd, and those which are wholly Strangers  
 to it; and by the different Health and Complexion  
 which Labour and due Exercise create, in  
 comparison with that Habit of Body we see  
 consequent to an indulg'd state of Indolence  
 and Rest. Nor is the lazy Habit ruinous to  
 the Body only. The languishing Disease cor-  
 rupts all the Enjoyments of a vigorous and  
 healthy Sense, and carries its Infection into  
 the Mind; where it spreads a worse Contagion.  
 For however the Body may for a-while hold  
 out, 'tis impossible that the Mind, in which  
 the distemper is seated, can escape without  
 an immediate Affliction and Disorder. The  
 Habit begets a Tedioufness and Anxiety,  
 which influences the whole Temper, and  
 converts the unnatural Rest into

G 7

Book 2. into an unhappy sort of Activity, ill Humour, and Spleen: of which there has been enough said above, where we consider'd the want of a due *Ballance* in the Affections.

*Indolence.*

'TIS certain that as in *the Body*, when no Labour or natural Exercise is us'd the Spirits which want their due Employment, turn against the Constitution and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in *a Soul*, or *Mind*, unexercis'd, and which languishes for want of proper Action and Employment, the Thoughts & Affections being obstructed in their due Course, and depriv'd of their natural Energy, raise Disquiet, and foment a rancorous Eagerness and tormenting Irritation. The Temper from hence becomes more impotent in Passion, more incapable of real Moderation, and, like prepar'd Feul, readily takes fire by the least Spark.

As to *Interest*, how far it is here concern'd; how wretched that state is, in which by this Habit a Man is plac'd, towards all the Circumstances and Affairs of Life, when at any time he is call'd to Action; how subjected he must be to all Inconveniencies, wanting to himself, and depriv'd of the Assistance of others; whilst being unfit for all Offices and Dutys of Societ

ociety, he yet of any other Person most Part 2.  
 needs the help of it, as being least able to §. 2.  
 sists or support himself; all this is ob-  
 vious. And thus 'tis evident, " That to  
 have this over-biassing Inclination to-  
 wards *Rest*, this *slothful*, *soft*, or *effe-*  
*minate* Temper, averse to Labour and  
 Employment, is to have an unavoidable  
*Mischief*, and *attendent Plagne*."

THUS have we consider'd the *Self-Passions*; and what the Consequence is of <sup>*Self passions*</sup>  
 their rising beyond a moderate degree. <sup>*in general.*</sup>  
 These Affections, as self-interesting as  
 they are, can often, we see, become con-  
 trary to our real Interest. They betray us  
 into most Misfortunes, and into the great-  
 est of Unhappineses, that of a profligate  
 and abject Character. As they grow im-  
 merious and high, they are the occasion  
 that a Creature in proportion becomes  
 mean and low. They are original to  
 that which we call *Selfishness*, and give  
 rise to that sordid Disposition of which  
 we have already spoken. It appears there  
 can be nothing so miserable in it-self, or  
 so wretched in its Consequence, as to be  
 thus impotent in Temper, thus master'd  
 by Passion, and, by means of it, brought  
 under the most servile Subjection to the  
 World.

## Book 2.

'TIS evident withal, that as this *Self passions fishness* increases in us, so must a certain *in general.* *Subtlety, & feignedness* of Carriage, which naturally accompanys it. And thus the Candour and Ingenuity of our Nature the Ease and Freedom of our Minds must be forfeited; all *Trust and Confidence* in manner lost; and *Suspicious, Jealousy* and *Envy*s multiply'd. A *separate En* & *Interest* must be every day more strongly form'd in us; *generous Views* and *Motives* laid aside: And the more we are thus sensibly disjoin'd every day from Society and our Fellows; the worse Opinion we shall have of those uniting Passions which bind us in strict Alliance and Amity with others. Upon these Terms we must of course endeavour to silence and suppress our natural and good Affections: since they are such as would carry us to the good of Society, against what we fondly conceive to be our private Good and Interest; as has been shewn.

NOW if these SELFISH PASSIONS, besides what other Ill they are the occasion of, are withal the certain means of losing us our *natural Affections*; then (by what has been prov'd before) 'tis evident  
 " That they must be the certain means of  
 " losing us the chief Enjoyment of Life

" and

and raising in us those horrid and *unnatural Passions*, and that Savageness of Temper, which makes **THE GREATEST OF MISERYS**, and the most wretched state of Life:" as remains for us to explain.

Part 2.  
§. 3.

### S E C T. III.

**T**HE Passions therefore, which, in the *THIRD Proof, from the unnatural Affections* last place, we are to examine, are those which lead neither to a *publick* nor a *private Good*; and are neither of any advantage to the Species in general, or the creature in particular. These, in opposition to the *social and natural*, we call the **UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS**.

**O**F this kind is that **UNNATURAL** *Inhumanity.* and **INHUMAN DELIGHT** *in beholding* *torments*, and in viewing Distress, Calamity, Blood, Massacre and Destruction, with a peculiar Joy and Pleasure. This has been the reigning Passion of many Tyrants, and barbarous Nations; and brings, in some degree, to such Tempers have thrown off that Courteousness of behaviour which retains in us a just Reverence of Mankind, and prevents the growth of Harshness and Brutality. This Passion enters not where Civility or affable Manners have the least place. Such is the Nature of what we call *good Breeding*,  
that

Book 2. that in the midst of many other Corruptions, it admits not of **INHUMANITY** or *savage Pleasure*. To see the Sufferance of an Enemy with cruel Delight, to proceed from the height of Anger, Revenge, Fear, and other extended Passions: But to delight in the Torture and Pain of other Creatures indifferent Natives or Foreigners, of our own or another Species, Kindred or no Kindred known or unknown; to feed, as it were on Death, and be entertain'd with dying Agonys; this has nothing in it accountable in the way of Self-interest or private Good above-mention'd, but is wholly absolutely unnatural, as it is horrid and miserable.

*Patience.*

THERE is another Affection nearly related to this, which is a *gay and frolicsome Delight* in what is injurious to others, a sort of **WANTON MISCHIEVOUSNESS**, and Pleasure in what is destructive, a Passion which, instead of being restrain'd, is usually encourag'd in Children: so that 'tis indeed no wonder the Effects of it are very unfortunately felt in the World. For 'twill be hard, perhaps, for any one to give a reason why that Temper which was us'd to delight in Disorder and Ravage, when in a Nursery; shou'd not afterwards find delight in other Disturbances, and be the occasio



equal Mischief in Familys, amongst Part 2.  
 Friends, and in the Publick it-self. But §. 3.  
 of this Passion there is not any foundation  
 in Nature; as has been explain'd.

**MALICE, MALIGNITY OR ILL-*Malignity***  
**VILL**, such as is grounded on no Self-  
 consideration, and where there is no sub-  
 ject of Anger or Jealousy, nor any thing  
 to provoke or cause such a Desire of doing  
 ill to another; this also is of that kind of  
 Passion.

**ENVY** too, when it is such as arises *Envy*  
 from the Prosperity or Happiness of ano-  
 ther Creature no ways interfering with  
 ours, is of the same kind of Passion.

**THERE** is also among these, a sort of *Moroseness*  
**HATRED OF MANKIND AND SOCIE-**  
**TY**; a Passion which has been known  
 perfectly reigning in some Men, and has *MISAN-*  
 had a peculiar Name given to it. A large *THROPT.*  
 share of this belongs to those who have  
 long indulg'd themselves in a habitual *Mo-*  
*roseness*, or who by force of ill Nature,  
 and ill Breeding, have contracted such a  
 reverse of Affability, and civil Manners,  
 that to see or meet a Stranger is offensive.  
 The very Aspect of Mankind is a distur-  
 bance to 'em, and they are sure always to  
 hate at first sight. The Distemper of this  
 kind is sometimes found to be in a man-  
 ner

Book 2. ner *National*; but peculiar to the more  
 savage Nations, and a plain *Characteristick*  
*Inhospitality, Barba-* unciviliz'd Manners, and Barbarity. It  
 rity. is the immediate Opposite to that not  
 Affection, which, in antient Language, was  
 term'd \* *Hospitality*, viz. extensive Love  
 of Mankind, and Relief of Strangers.

*Superstition.* WE may add likewise to the number  
 the *unnatural Passions*, all those which  
 are rais'd from SUPERSTITION (as before  
 mention'd) & from the *Customs* of barba-  
 rous Countrys: All which are too horrid  
 and odious in themselves, to need a  
 proof of their being miserable.

*Unnatural* THERE might be other Passions nam'd  
*Lusts.* such as *unnatural Lusts*, in foreign Kinds  
 Species, with other Perversions of the  
 morous Desire within *our own*. But as  
 these Depravities of Appetite, we need not  
 mention here; after what has been already  
 said, on the Subject of the more *natural*  
 Passion.

SUCH as these are the only Affections  
 or Passions we can strictly call *unnatural*  
*ill*, and of no tendency so much as to a  
 separate or private Good. Others indeed  
 there are which have this tendency, but  
 are so exorbitant and out of measure,  
 beyond

yond the common Bent of any ordinary Part 2.  
*Self-passion*, and so utterly contrary and §. 3.  
 horent to all *social* and *natural Affec-*  
*tion*, that they are generally call'd, and may  
 justly esteem'd *unnatural & monstrous*.

AMONG these may be reckon'd such *Tyranny*.  
 ENORMOUS PRIDE or AMBITION,  
 such an ARROGANCE and TYRANNY,  
 wou'd willingly leave nothing eminent,  
 nothing free, nothing prosperous in the  
 World: such an ANGER as wou'd sacri-  
 ce every thing to it-self: such a RE-  
 VENGE as is never to be extinguish'd,  
 nor ever satisfy'd without the greatest  
 crueltys: such an INVETERACY and  
 ANCHOUR as seeks, as it were, occasion  
 to exert it-self; and lays hold of the least  
 object, so as often to make the weight of  
 its malevolence fall even upon such as are  
 mere Objects of Pity and Compassion.

TREACHERY and INGRATITUDE *Treachery,*  
 are in strictness mere negative Vices; and, *Ingratitudes.*  
 are themselves, no real Passions; having  
 neither Aversion or Inclination belonging  
 to them; but are deriv'd from the De-  
 fect, Unsoundness, or Corruption of the  
 Passions in general. But when these  
 vices become remarkable in a Charac-  
 ter, and arise in a manner from Inclina-  
 tion and Choice; when they are so for-  
 ward

Book 2. ward and active, as to appear of their own accord, without any pressing occasion; 'tis apparent they borrow something of the mere *unnatural* Passions, and deriv'd from *Malice, Envy, and Inve* *racy*; as explain'd above.

*Unnatural  
Pleasure in  
general.*

IT MAY be objected here, that the Passions, *unnatural* as they are, carry with them a sort of *Pleasure* with them; and though however barbarous a Pleasure it be, still it is a Pleasure and *Satisfaction* which is found in Pride, or Tyranny, Revenge, Malice, or Cruelty exerted. Now it will be possible in Nature, that any-one can feel a barbarous or malicious Joy, otherwise than in consequence of mere Anguish and Torment, then may we perhaps allow this kind of Satisfaction to be call'd *Pleasure* or *Delight*. But the Case is evidently contrary. To love, and to be kind; to have social or natural Affection, Complacency and Good-will, is to feel an immediate Satisfaction and genuine Content. 'Tis in it-self *original Joy*, depending on no preceding Pain or Uneasiness, and producing nothing beside Satisfaction merely. On the other side, Animosity, Hatred and Bitterness, is *original Misery* and *Torment*, producing no other Pleasure or Satisfaction, than as the *unnatural Desire* is for the instant satisfy'd by something

ng which appeases it. How strong so- Part 2.  
 er this Pleasure, therefore, may appear; §. 3.  
 only the more implies the Misery of that  
 te which produces it. For as the cruel-  
 it bodily Pains do by intervals of Assuage-  
 ment, produce (as has been shewn) the  
 ghest bodily Pleasure; so the fiercest and  
 ost raging Torments of the Mind, do, by  
 ertain Moments of Relief, afford the grea-  
 t of mental Enjoyments, to those who  
 ow little of the truer kind.

THE Men of gentlest Dispositions, and *Unnatural*  
 t of Tempers, have at some time or *state.*  
 er been sufficiently acquainted with  
 ose Disturbances, which, at ill hours,  
 en small occasions are apt to raise. From  
 ese slender Experiences of Harshness and  
 I-humour, they fully know and will con-  
 s the ill Moments which are pass'd,  
 hen the Temper is ever so little gall'd  
 o fretted. How must it fare, therefore,  
 th those who hardly know any better  
 urs in Life; and who, for the greatest  
 rt of it, are agitated by a thorow active  
 Sleen, a close and fettle'd Malignity, and  
 ancour? How lively must be the Sense  
 every thwarting and controuling Acci-  
 ent? How great must be the Shocks  
 o Disappointment, the Stings of Affront,  
 ad the Agonys of a working Antipathy,  
 ainst the multiply'd Objects of Offence?  
 or can it be wonder'd at, if to Persons  
 thus

Book 2. thus agitated and oppress'd, it seems a  
*Unnatural* Delight to appease and allay for the w  
*state.* those furious and rough Motions, by  
 Indulgence of their Passion in Mischief &  
 Revenge.

Now as to the Consequences of this  
*natural state*, in respect of Interest, a  
 the common Circumstances of Life; up  
 what Terms a Person who has in this ma  
 ner lost all which we call *Nature*, can  
 suppos'd to stand, in respect of the Soci  
 of Mankind; how he feels himself in  
 what Sense he has of his own Dispositi  
 towards others, and of the mutual Dispo  
 tion of others towards himself; this is ea  
 ly conceiv'd.

What Injoyment or Rest is there  
 one who is not conscious of the merit  
 Affection or Love, but, on the contrar  
 of the Ill-will and Hatred of every hum  
 Soul? What ground must this afford  
 Horror and Despair? What foundation  
 Fear, and continual Apprehension fro  
 Mankind, and from superior Power  
 How thorow and deep must be that *M  
 lancholy*, which being once mov'd, has n  
 thing soft or pleating from the side  
 Friendship, to allay or divert it? Whe  
 ever such a Creature turns himself; whic  
 ever way he cast his Eye; every thin  
 around must appear ghastly and horrid  
 ever

every thing hostile, and, as it were, bent Part 2.  
 against a private and single Being, who is §. 3.  
 thus divided from every thing, and at de-  
 fiance and war with the rest of Nature.

'TIS thus, at last, that A MIND be-  
 comes a *Wilderness*, where all is laid waste,  
 every thing *fair* and *goodly* remov'd, and  
 nothing extant beside what is savage and  
 deform'd. Now if Banishment from one's  
 country, Removal to a foreign Place, or  
 any thing which looks like Solitude or De-  
 sertion, be so heavy to endure; what must  
 it be to feel this *inward Banishment*, this  
 total *Estrangement* from human Commerce;  
 and to be after this manner in a Desert,  
 and in the horridest of Solitudes, even  
 when in the midst of Society? What  
 must it be to live in this *Disagreement* with  
 every thing, this *Irreconcilableness* and *Op-  
 position* to the Order and Government of  
 the Universe?

HENCE it appears. That the greatest  
 Miserys accompanys *that state* which  
 is consequent to the loss of natural Affec-  
 tion; and THAT TO HAVE THOSE HOR-  
 RID, MONSTROUS, AND UNNATURAL  
 AFFECTIONS IS TO BE MISERABLE  
 IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE.

Book 2.

## CONCLUSION.

**T**HUS have we endeavour'd to prove what was propos'd in the beginning. And since in the common and known Sense of *Vice* and *Illness*, no-one can be vicious or ill, except either,

1. By the Deficiency or Weakness of *natural Affections*;

OR, 2. by the Violence of *the selfish*

OR, 3. by such as are plainly *unnatural*.

IT must follow, that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the Creature, insomuch that his compleatest State of Misery is made from hence; **TO BE WICKED OR VITIOUS, IS TO BE MISERABLE AND UNHAPPY.**

AND since every vicious Action must in proportion, more or less, help towards this Mischief, and *Self-ill*; it must follow **THAT EVERY VITIOUS ACTION MUST BE SELF-INJURIOUS AND ILL.**

ON the other side; *the Happiness* and *Good* of **VIRTUE** has been prov'd from the contrary Effect of other Affections  
suc



ch as are according to *Nature*, and the Part 2.  
 Economy of the Species or Kind. We  
 ve cast up all those Particulars, from  
 hence (as by way of Addition and Sub-  
 ction) the main *Sum* or general Account  
 Happiness, is either augmented or dimi-  
 h'd. And if there be no Article excep-  
 nable in this Scheme of *Moral Arithme-*  
 k; the Subject treated may be said to  
 ve an Evidence as great as that which is  
 ind in Numbers, or Mathematicks. For  
 us carry *Scepticism* ever so far, let us  
 bt, if we can, of every thing about us;  
 cannot doubt of what passes *within our-*  
*ves*. Our Passions and Affections are  
 own to us. *They* are certain, whatever  
*Objects* may be, on which they are em-  
 y'd. Nor is it of any concern to our  
 gument, how these exterior Objects  
 id; whether they are Realities, or mere  
 sions; whether we wake or dream. For  
*Dreams* will be equally disturbing. And  
 ood *Dream* (if *Life* be nothing else)  
 l be easily and happily pass'd. In this  
 eam of *Life*, therefore, our *Demonstra-*  
 is have the same force; our *Ballance*  
*O Economy* hold good, and our *Obliga-*  
 to VIRTUE is in every respect the same.

UPON the whole: There is not, I pre-  
 ue, the least degree of Certainty wanting,  
 what has been said concerning the Pre-  
 ebleness of *the mental Pleasures to the*

Book 2. *sensual; and even of the sensual, accomp-*  
*ny'd with good Affection, and under a tem-*  
*perate and right use, to those which are;*  
*ways restrain'd, nor supported by any thin-*  
*social or affectionate.*

NOR is there less Evidence in what has been said, of *the united Structure and Fabric of the Mind*, and of those Passions which constitute *the temper, or Soul*; and on which its Happiness or Misery so immediately depend. It has been shewn, That in *this Constitution*, the impairing of any one Part must instantly tend to the disorder and ruin of other Parts, & of the Whole it self; thro' the necessary *Connexion and Ballance* of the Affections: That the very Passions thro' which Men are vitious are of themselves a Torment and Disease & that whatsoever is done which is knowingly ill, must be of ill *Consciousness*; and in proportion, as the Act is ill, must impair and corrupt social Enjoyment, and destroy both *the Capacity of kind Affection*, and *the Consciousness of meriting any such*. So that neither can we *participate* thus in Joy or Happiness with others, or receive Satisfaction from *the mutual Kindness or imaginary Love of others*: on which, however, the greatest of all our Pleasures are founded

IF this be the Case of moral Delinquency; and if the state which is consequent

to this *Defection* from Nature, be of all Part 2.  
 ther the most horrid, oppressive, and mi-  
 erable; 'twill appear, " *That to yield or*  
*consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a*  
*Breach of Interest, & leads to the grea-*  
*test Ills:" and, " That on the other*  
*side, Every thing which is an Improve-*  
*ment of Virtue, or an Establishment of*  
*right Affection and Integrity, is an Ad-*  
*vancement of Interest, and leads to the*  
*greatest and most solid Happiness and*  
*Enjoyment."*

THUS the Wisdom of what rules, & is  
 FIRST and CHIEF *in Nature*, has made  
 to be according to the *private Interest*  
 Good of every-one, to work towards the  
*General Good*; which if a Creature ceases to  
 promote, he is actually so far wanting to  
 himself, & ceases to promote his own Hap-  
 piness & Welfare. He is, on this account,  
 directly his own Enemy: Nor can he any  
 otherwise be good or useful to himself, than  
 he continues good to Society, and to  
 that *Whole* of which he is himself a *Part*.  
 That VIRTUE, which of all Excellencys  
 Beautys is the chief, and most amiable;  
 that which is the Prop and Ornament of  
 human Affairs; which upholds Communi-  
 ties, maintains Union, Friendship, & Cor-  
 respondence amongst Men; that by which  
 Countrys, as well as private Familys, flour-  
 ish and are happy; and for want of which,

Book 2. every-thing comely, conspicuous, great & worthy, must perish, and go to ruin; *the single Quality*, thus beneficial to all Society, & to Mankind *in general*, is found equally a Happiness and Good to each Creature *in particular*; and is *that* by which alone Man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable.

AND, thus, VIRTUE is *the Good*, and VICE *the Ill* of every-one.

TREATISE V.

VIZ.

THE

MORALISTS,

A

*Philosophical Rhapsody.*

BEING

A RECITAL of certain  
Conversations on *Natural*  
and *Moral* Subjects.

---

*-Inter Silvas Academi quærere Verum.*  
Horat. Ep. 2. Lib. 2.

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Publish'd in the Year M.DCCIX.

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THE  
MORALISTS,  
A  
PHILOSOPHICAL  
RHAPSODY.

---

PART I.

SECT. I.

---

HILOCLES *to* PALEMON.

WHAT Mortal, if he had never  
chanc'd to hear your Character,  
PALEMON, cou'd imagine that a  
genius fitted for the greatest Affairs, and  
form'd amidst Courts & Camps, should  
take so violent a turn towards Philoso-

Hy

Part I. phy and the Schools? Who is there possibly believe that one of your Rank and Credit in the *fashionable* World, shou'd be so thorowly conversant in the *learned* and deeply interested in the affairs of People so disagreeable to the generali of Mankind and humour of the Age?

I BELIEVE truly, you are the only well bred Man who wou'd have taken the fancy to talk Philosophy in such a Circle of good Company as we had round yesterday, when we were in your Coach together, in *the Park*. How you could reconcile the Objects there, to such subjects as these, was unaccountable. I could only conclude, that either you had an extravagant Passion for Philosophy, or that some of those tender Charms had an extravagant effect, which sent you to Philosophy for Relief.

IN either case I pity'd you; thinking it a milder Fate, to be, as I truly was, for my own part *a more indifferent Lover*. 'Twas better, I told you, to admire Beauty and wisdom a little more moderately. 'Twas better, I maintain'd, to ingage cautiously as to be sure of coming off with whole heart, and a Fancy as strong as ever towards all the pretty Entertainment and Diversions of the world. For these  
me



methought, were things one wou'd not Sect. I.  
willingly part with, for a fine romantick  
affion of one of those Gentlemen whom  
they call'd *Virtuso's*

THE Name I took to belong in com-  
mon to your *Lover & Philosopher*. No mat-  
ter what the Object was ; whether Poetry,  
Musick, Philosophy, or *the Fair*. All who  
were enamour'd any-way, were in the same  
condition. You might perceive it (I told  
you) by their Looks, their Admiration,  
their profound Thoughtfulness, their wa-  
ving ever and anon as out of a Dream,  
their talking still of one thing, and scarce  
finding what they said on any other Sub-  
ject, — Sad Indications !

BUT all this Warning serv'd not to de-  
ter you. For you, PALEMEN, are one  
of the Adventurous, whom Danger rather  
animates than discourages. And now no-  
thing less will satisfy you than to have our  
philosophical Adventures recorded. All  
must be laid before you, and summ'd in one  
complete Account; to remain, it seems, as  
Monument of that unseasonable Con-  
versation, so opposit to the reigning Geni-  
s of *Gallantry and Pleasure*.

I MUST own, indeed, 'tis become  
fashionable in our Nation to talk Politicks

Part I.

PHILO-  
SOPHY.

in every Company, and mix the Discourse of State-affairs with those of Pleasure and Entertainment. However, 'tis certain we approve of no such Freedom in PHILOSOPHY. Nor do we look upon *Politick* to be of her Province, or in the least related to her. So much have we Modern degraded her, and stripp'd her of her chief Rights.

You must allow me, PALEMON, thus to bemoan *Philosophy*; since you have forc'd me to ingage with her at a time when her Credit runs so low. She is no longer *active* in the World; nor can hardly, with any advantage, be brought upon the publick Stage. We have immur'd her (poor Lady!) in Colleges and Cells; and have set her fervilely to such Works as those in the Mines. Empirics, and pedantick Sophists are her chief Pupils. The *School syllogism*, and the *Elixir*, are the choice of her Products. So far is she from producing States-men, as of old, that hardly any Man of Note in the publick cares to own the least Obligation to her. If some few maintain their Acquaintance, & come now and then to her Recesses, 'tis as the Disciple of Quality came to his Lord and Master; "*secretly, and by night.*"

*Morals.*

BUT as low as PHILOSOPHY is reduced; if *Morals* be allow'd belonging to her

er, *Politicks* must undeniably be hers. For Sect. I.  
 understand the Manners & Constituti-  
 is of Men *in Common*, 'tis necessary to  
 dy MAN *in particular*, & know the Crea-  
 re, as he is in himself, before we consider  
 m in Company, as he is interested in the  
 ate, or join'd to any City or Communi-  
 . Nothing is more familiar than to rea-  
 n concerning Man in his *confederate* state  
 d *national* Relation; as he stands in-  
 g'd to this or that Society, by Birth or  
 aturalization: Yet to consider him as  
 Citizen or *Commoner of the World*, to  
 ace his Pedegree a step higher, and view  
 s End and Constitution in *Nature* it-self,  
 ust pass, it seems, for some intricate or  
 ver-refin'd Speculation.

IT may be properly alledg'd perhaps, as  
 Reason for this general shyness in *moral*  
*quirys*; that the People to whom it has  
 incipally belong'd to handle these Sub-  
 cts, have done it in such a manner as to  
 it the better Sort out of countenance  
 ith the Undertaking. The appropriating  
 is Concern to mere *Scholasticks*, has  
 ought their Fashion and Air into the ve-  
 Subject. There are formal *Set-places*,  
 here, we reckon, there is enough said  
 d taught on the Head of these graver  
 bjects. We can give no quarter to any  
 ing like it in good Company. The least  
 ention of such matters gives us a disgust,

Part I. and puts us out of humour. If Learning comes a-cross us, we count it *Pedantry*; Morality, 'tis *Preaching*.

*Language.* ONE must own this, however, as a disadvantage of our modern Conversations; that by such a scrupulous Nicety they lose those masculine helps of Learning and sound Reason. Even the *Fair Sex*, in whose favour we pretend to make this Condescension, may with reason despise us for, and laugh at us for aiming at their peculiar Softness. 'Tis no Compliment to them, to affect their Manners, & be *effeminate*. O Sense, Language, and Style, as well as of Voice, and Person, shou'd have something of that Male-Feature, and natural Roughness, by which our Sex is distinguish'd. And whatever *Politeness* we may pretend to, 'tis more a Disfigurement than any refinement of Discourse, to render it thus delicate.

*Style*

No Work of Wit can be esteem'd perfect without that Strength and Boldness of Hand, which gives it Body and Proportions. A good Piece, the Painters say, must have good *Muscling* as well as *Colouring* and *Drapery*. And surely no Writing or Discourse of any great moment, can seem other than enervated, when neither strong Reason, nor Antiquity, nor the Records of Things, nor the natural Hist

of Man, nor any-thing which can be Sect. 1.  
all'd *Knowledg*, dares accompany it; ex-  
cept perhaps in some ridiculous Habit,  
which may give it an Air of Play and  
alliance.

THIS brings to my mind a Reason, I  
have often sought for; why we Moderns  
who abound so much in *Treatises* and *Es-*  
*ays*, are so sparing in the way of \* DIA-<sup>DIA-</sup>  
LOGUE; which heretofore was found the <sup>LOGUE,</sup>  
politest & best way of managing even the  
toughest Subjects. The truth is; 'twou'd be  
an abominable falsehood & belying of the  
Age, to put so much good Sense together  
in any *one* Conversation, as might make it  
hold out steddily, & with plain coherence,  
for an hour's time, till any *one* Subject had  
been rationally examin'd.

To lay Colours, to draw, or describe,  
against the Appearance of Nature and  
Truth, is a Liberty neither permitted the  
Historian nor the Poet. Much less can *the*  
*Philosopher* have such a Privilege; espe-  
cially in his *own Case*. If he represents  
Philosophy as making any figure in  
Conversation; if he triumphs in the De-  
bate, & gives his own Wisdom the advan-  
tage

\* VOL. I. pag. 193, 4, 5, 6, 7, &c. VOL. II, pag.  
20, &c.

Part 1. tage over that of the World; he may liable to found Raillery, and possibly made a *Fable* of.

A *Fable*.

'T IS said of *the Lion*. that being in a Conference with *the Man*, he wisely refus'd to yield the Superiority of Strength him; when instead of Fact, the Man produc'd only certain Figures & Representations of human Victories over the Lion-kind. These Master-pieces of Art the Beast discover'd to be wholly of human Forgery: and from these he had good right to appeal. Indeed had he ever in his life been witness to any such Combats as the Man represented to him in the way of Art; possibly the Example might have mov'd him. But old Statues of a HERCULES, a THESEUS, or other Beast-subduers, cou'd have little power over him, whilst he neither saw nor felt any such living Antagonist capable to dispute the Field with him.

WE need not wonder, therefore, that the sort of moral Painting, by way of *Dialogue*, is so much out of fashion; and that we see no more of these philosophic Portraitures now-a-days. For where are *the Originals*? Or what tho you (PALMON) or I, by chance, have lighted on such a one; and pleas'd our-selves with *the Life*? Can you imagine it shou'd make a good *Picture*?

YO

YOU know too, that in this *Academic* Philosophy I am to present you *wisely*.  
 with, there is a certain way of Questioning  
 and Doubting, which no way suits the Ge-  
 nus of our Age. Men love to take party  
 instantly. They can't bear being kept in  
 suspense. The Examination torments 'em.  
 They want to be rid of it, upon the easiest  
 terms. 'Tis as if Men fancy'd themselves  
 downing, whenever they dare trust to the  
 Current of Reason. They seem hurrying  
 away, they know not whither; and are  
 ready to catch at the first Twig. There  
 they chuse afterwards to hang, tho' ever so  
 insecurely, rather than trust their Strength  
 to bear 'em above Water. He who has got  
 hold of an *Hypothesis*, how slight soever, is  
 satisfy'd. He can presently answer every  
 Objection, and, with a few Terms of Art,  
 give an account of every thing without  
 trouble.

'Tis no wonder if in this Age the Philo- *Alchymists*  
 sophy of the *Alchymists* prevails so much:  
 since it promises such Wonders, & requires  
 more the Labour of Hands than Brains.  
 We have a strange Fancy to be Creators, a  
 violent Desire at least to know the Knack  
 or Secret by which Nature does all. The  
 most of our Philosophers only aim at that in  
 Speculation, which our Alchymists aspire  
 to

Part. I. to in Practice. For with some of these has been actually under deliberation how to make *Man*, by other mediums than Nature has hitherto provided. Every Sect has a *Recipe*. When you know it, you are Master of Nature: you solve all her \* *Phænomena*: you see all her Designs, and can count for all her Operations. If need were you might, perchance too, be of her Laboratory, and work for her. At least you wou'd imagine the Partizans of each modern Sect had this Conceit. They are ARCHIMEDES's in their way, and make a World upon easier terms than offer'd to *move* one.

*Dogmatists.* IN short; there are good Reasons for our being thus superficial, and consequently thus dogmatical in Philosophy. We are too lazy and effeminate, and withal little too cowardly, to dare *doubt*. The decisive way best becomes our Manner. It sutes as well with our Vices as with our Superstition. Which ever we are for, is secur'd by it. If in favour of Religion we have espous'd an Hypothesis on which our Faith, we think, depends we are superstitiously careful not to loosen'd in it. If, by means of our Morals, we are broken with Religion 'tis the same case still: We are as much afraid

\* See VOL. III. p. 160.



raid of *Doubting*. We must be sure to  
 y, "*It cannot be;*" and "*'t is Demonstrable:*  
 For otherwise *Who knows?* And  
 not to *know*, is to *yield!*"—

Thus we will needs *know* every thing,  
 and be at the pains of examining nothing.  
 All Philosophy, therefore, how abso-  
 lutely the most disagreeable must *that* ap-  
 pear, which goes upon no establish'd Hy-  
 pothesis, nor presents us with any flattering  
 theme, talks only of Probabilities, Suffi-  
 ciency of Judgment, Inquiry, Search, and  
 Caution not to be impos'd on, or deceiv'd?  
 This is that *Academick* Discipline in which  
 formerly \* the Youth were train'd: when  
 not only Horsemanship and Military Arts <sup>*Antients?*</sup>  
 had their publick Places of Exercise; but  
 Philosophy too had its Wrestlers in repute.  
 Reason and Wit had their *Academy*, and  
 underwent this Trial; not in a formal way,  
 apart from the World; but openly, among  
 the better sort, and as an Exercise of the  
 gentleman-kind. This the greatest Men were  
 not ashamed to practise, in the Intervals of  
 publick Affairs, in the highest Stations and  
 employments, and at the latest hour of  
 their Lives. Hence that way of DIA-  
 LOGUE, and Patience of Debate and Rea-  
 soning, of which we have scarce a Resem-  
 blance left in any of our Conversations, at  
 this season of the World.

CON-

\* VOL. I. pag. 333, &c. and Notes.

## Part. I.

CONSIDER then, PALEMÓN, w  
*our Picture* is like to prove : and how  
 will appear ; especially in the Light y  
 have unluckily chosen to set it. For w  
 wou'd thus have confronted Philosop  
 with the Gaiety, Wit, and Humour  
 the Age?—If this, however, can be  
 your Credit, I am content. The Proj  
 is your own. 'Tis you who have match  
*Philosophy* thus unequally. Therefore I  
 ving you to answer for the Success, I be  
 this inauspicious Work, which my  
 Stars and you have assign'd me ; and  
 which I hardly dare ask Succour of  
*Muses*, as poetical as I am oblig'd to sh  
 my-self in this Enterprize.

## S E C T. II.

“ O WRETCHED state of Me  
 “ kind! — Hapless Nature, th  
 “ to have err'd in thy chief Workma  
 “ ship! — Whence sprang this fa  
 “ Weakness? What Chance or Desti  
 “ shall we accuse? Or shall we mi  
 “ the Poets, when they sing thy Trage  
 “ (PROMETHEUS!) who with thy ste  
 “ celestial Fire, mix'd with vile Cla  
 “ didst mock Heaven's Countenance, a  
 “ in abusive Likeness of the Immort  
 “ mac

had'st the compound MAN; that Sect. 2.  
wretched Mortal, *ill* to himself, and  
Cause of *Ill* to all." —

WHAT say you, PALEMÓN, to this  
now upon second thoughts? Or  
did you forgot 'twas just in such a ro-  
mantic Strain that you broke out against  
*human Kind*, upon a Day when every  
thing look'd pleasing, and the *Kind* it-self  
(thought) never appear'd fairer, or made  
a better shew?

BUT 'twas not the whole Creation you  
quarrel'd with: Nor were you so out  
conceit with *all* Beauty. The Verdure  
of the Field, the distant Prospects, the  
gilded Horizon, and purple Sky, form'd  
by a setting Sun, had Charms in abun-  
dance, and were able to make impressi-  
on upon you. Here, PALEMÓN, you allow'd  
me to admire as much as I pleas'd; when,  
at the same instant, you wou'd not bear  
me talking to you of those nearer Beautys  
of your own Kind, which I thought more  
natural for Men at our Age to admire.  
Your Severity however cou'd not silence  
me upon this Subject. I continu'd to  
praise the Cause of *the Fair*, and advance  
their Charms above all those other Beau-  
ties of Nature. And when you took ad-  
vantage from this opposition, to shew how  
little there was of *Nature*, and how much  
of

Part I. of *Art* in what I admir'd, I made the best Apology I cou'd; and fighting for Beauty kept the Field as long as there was a *Fair-one* present.

*Gallantry.* CONSIDERING how your Genius sto inclin'd to Poetry, I wonder'd most to find you on a sudden grown so out of concert with our modern Poets, and *Galante Writers*; whom I quoted to you, as better Authorities than any Antient in behalf of the Fair Sex, and their Prerogative. But that you treated slightly. You acknowledg'd to be true indeed, what had been observed by some late Wits, "That GALLANT *was of a modern Growth.*" And were it might be so, you thought, without dishonour to the Antients; who understood *Truth* and *Nature* too well, to admit so ridiculous an Invention.

'Twas in vain, therefore, that I held up this Shield in my defence. I did not cause no service, when in behalf of the Fair I pleaded all the fine things which are usually said, in this romantick way, to the advantage. You attack'd the very Fort of *Gallantry*, ridicul'd *the Point of Honour*, with all those nice Sentiments and Ceremonials belonging to it. You damn'd even our Favourite *Novels*; those delicate sweet natural Pieces, writ most of 'em by the Fair Sex themselves. In short, the  
who

whole Order and Scheme of Wit you condemn'd absolutely, as *false, monstrous*, and **ORTHICK**; quite out of the way of Nature, and sprung from the mere Dregs of *Chivalry* or *Knight-Errantry*; a thing which in it-self you prefer'd, as of a better Title than that which reigns at present in it lead. For at a time when this Mystery *Gallantry* carry'd along with it the Notion of doughty Knighthood; when *the* were made Witnessses, and in a manner, Partys to Feats of Arms, enter'd into the Points of War and Combat, and were won by dint of Launce and manly prowess; 'twas not altogether absurd (you thought) on such a foundation as this, to pay 'em Homage and Adoration, make 'em Standard of Wit & Manners, and bring Mankind under their Laws. But in a Country where no *She-Saints* were worship'd by Authority from Religion, 'twas as imminent and senseless, as it was profane, to pay the Sex, raise 'em to a Capacity above what Nature had allow'd, and treat 'em with a *Respect*, which in the natural Order of Love they themselves were the best to complain of.

INDEED as for the *Moral* Part, 'twas wonderful (you said) to observe the Licentiousness which this foppish courtly Humour had establish'd in the World. What a flattering way of Address to all the Sex

Sect. 2.

Part I.  
Gallantry.

Sex in common cou'd mean, you know not; unless it were to render 'em who *common* indeed, and make each Fair-creatur apprehend that the Publick had a right to her; and that Beauty was too communicative and divine a Thing, to be made a Property, and confin'd to *One* at once.

MEAN while our Company began to leave us. The *Beau-monde*, whom I had been thus severely censuring, drew away in haste: for it grew late. I took notice that the approaching Objects of the Night were the more agreeable to you, for Solitude they introduc'd; and that Moon and Planets which began now to appear, were in reality the only prople Company for a Man in your Humour. For now you began to talk with much satisfaction of natural things, and of all Orders of Beautys, MAN only excepted. Never did I hear a finer Description than you made of the Order of the heavenly Luminarys, the Circles of the Planets, and their attendant *Satellites*. And you would allow nothing to those fair earthly Luminarys in the Circles which just now we mov'd in; you, PALEMEN, who seem'd to overlook the Pride of that Theatre, began now to look out with rapture and triumph in this new philosophical Scene of Worlds that we know

own. Here, when you had pretty well Sect. 2.  
 out the first Fire of your Imagination, I  
 you'd have got you to reason more calmly  
 with me upon that other part of the Crea-  
 tion, your own Kind; to which (I told  
 you) you discover'd so much Aversion, as <sup>Misan-</sup>  
 you'd make one believe you a compleat <sup>thropy.</sup>  
 MON, or *Man-bater*.

' CAN you then, O PHILOCLES  
 and you in a high strain, and with a mov-  
 air of Passion) " Can you believe me  
 of that Character? Or can you think it  
 of me in earnest, that being MAN, and  
 conscious of my nature, I shou'd have  
 yet so little of Humanity, as not to feel  
 the Affections of a *Man*? Or feeling  
 what is natural towards my Kind, that I  
 shou'd hold their Interest light, and be  
 indifferently affected with what affects  
 or seriously concerns them? Am I so ill  
 a Lover of *my Country*? Or is it that  
 you find me indeed so ill a *Friend*? For  
 what are all Relations else? What are  
 the Ties of private Friendship, if that  
 to *Mankind* be not obliging? Can there  
 be yet a Bond in Nature if *That* be  
 none? O PHILOCLES! Believe me  
 when I say I feel it one, and fully prove  
 its Power within me. Think not that  
 I wou'd willingly break my Chain:  
 Nor count me so degenerate or unna-  
 tural, as whilst I hold this Form, and  
 VOL. II. I " wear

Part I.

“ wear a human Heart, I shou’d thro’  
 “ off Love, Compassion, Kindness,  
 “ not befriend *Mankind*. ——— But O w  
 “ Treacherys! what Disorders! And h  
 “ corrupt is all! ——— Did you not obse  
 “ e’en now, when all this Space  
 “ fill’d with goodly Rows of Compa  
 “ how peaceful all appear’d. ——— W  
 “ Charms there are in publick Compar  
 “ What Harmony in Courts and Cou  
 “ Places! How pleas’d is every Fa  
 “ How courteous and humane the ge  
 “ ral Carriage and Behaviour! ——— W  
 “ Creature capable of Reflection, if  
 “ thus saw us Mankind, and saw no mo  
 “ wou’d not believe our Earth a  
 “ *Heaven*? What Foreigner (the In  
 “ bitant, suppose, of some near Plan  
 “ when he had travel’d hither, and  
 “ vey’d this outward face of things, wo  
 “ think of what lay hid beneath  
 “ Mask? ——— But let him stay a-wh  
 “ Allow him leisure, till he has gain’d  
 “ nearer View, and following our  
 “ solv’d Assemblies to their particular  
 “ *cesses*, he has the power of seeing  
 “ in this new Aspect. — — Here he may  
 “ hold those great Men of the Minist  
 “ who not an hour ago in publick appea  
 “ such Friends, now plotting craftily ea  
 “ other’s Ruin, with the Ruin of the St  
 “ it-self, a Sacrifice to their Ambitio  
 “ Here he may see too those of a sof  
 “ kir



kind, who knowing not Ambition, follow only *Love*. Yet (PHILOCLEES) who wou'd think it?"----- Sect. 2.

AT these words, you may remember, I cover'd the lightness of my Temper, & sigh'd aloud; which I cou'd hardly hope you wou'd have pardon'd, had I not freely told you the true reason. 'Twas not for want of being affected with what you spoke. I only imagin'd a more particular Cause had provok'd you, when having pass'd over the Ambitious, you were coming full-charg'd against the People of a later Passion. At first, I look'd on you as a Man *in the Spleen*: But now I concluded you *in love*, and so unhappily engag'd as I have reason to complain of Infidelity. This, thought I, has mov'd PALEMÓN thus. Hence the *sad World*! Here was that *Corruption*, and those *Disorders* he lamented!"

AFTER I had begg'd pardon for my idle Mirth, which had the good fortune however to make some change in your humour; we fell naturally into cool reasoning about the Nature and Cause of *ILL* in general; "Thro' what *Contingency*, what *Chance*; by what fatal *Necessity*, what *Will*, or what *Permission* it came upon the World; or being come  
I 2 "once,

Part 1. "once, shou'd still subsist." This \* 1  
*Cause of Ill.* *quiry*, which with slight Reasoners is easi  
 got over, stuck hard, I found, with o  
 of your close Judgment and Penetratic  
 And this insensibly led us into a nice Cri  
 cism of NATURE; whom you sharply  
 raig'n'd for many Absurditys you thoug  
 her guilty of, in relation to *Mankind*, a  
 his peculiar state.

FAIN wou'd I have persuaded you  
 think with more Equality of NATURE  
 and to proportion her Defects a little b  
 ter My Notion was, that the Grievan  
 lay not alogether in *one* part, as y  
 plac'd it; but that *every thing* had  
 share of Inconvenience: Pleasure & Pa  
 Beauty and Deformity, Good and I  
 seem'd to me every-where interwove  
 and one with another made, I thought,  
 pretty Mixture, agreeable enough, in t  
 main. 'Twas the same, I fancy'd as  
 some of those rich Stuffs, where t  
 Flowers and Ground were oddly put  
 gether, with such irregular Work, a  
 contrary Colours, as look'd ill in  
*Pattern*, but mighty natural and well  
*the Piece*.

BUT you were still upon Extrem  
 Nothing wou'd serve to excuse the Fau

\* Treatise IV, See the Beginning.

of Blemishes of this part of the Creation, Sect. 2.  
 MANKIND; even tho' all besides were  
 fair, without a Blemish. The very Storms  
 and Tempests had their Beauty in your  
 account, those alone excepted which arose  
 from human Breasts. 'Twas only for this  
 turbulent Race of Morals you offer'd to  
 excuse Nature. And I now found why  
 you had been so transported with the Story  
 of PROMETHEUS. You wanted such  
 an Operator as this for Mankind: And  
 you were tempted to wish the Story cou'd  
 have been confirm'd in modern Divinity;  
 that clearing the supreme Powers of any  
 concern or Hand in the ill Workmanship,  
 you might have the liberty of inveighing  
 against it, without Profaneness.

THIS however, I told you, was but a  
 slight Evasion of the religious Poets a-  
 mong the Antients. 'Twas easy to an-  
 swer every Objection by a PROME-  
 THEUS: as, "Why had Mankind *origi-*  
*nally* so much Folly and Perverseness?  
 Why so much Pride, such Ambition,  
 and strange Appetites? Why so many  
 Plagues, and Curses, entail'd on him  
 and his Posterity?"----PROMETHEUS  
 was the Cause. The plastick Artist, with  
 his unlucky Hand, solv'd all. " 'Twas  
 His Contrivance (they said) and He  
 was to answer for it." They reckon'd  
 it a fair Game, if they cou'd gain a *single*

Part I. *Remove*, and put the *evil Cause* farth  
 off. If the People ask'd a Question, th  
*Cause of Ill* told 'em a *Tale*, and sent 'em away fat  
 fy'd. None besides a few Philosoph  
 wou'd be such Busy-bodys (they thoug  
 as to look beyond, or ask a secc  
 Question.

AND in reality, continu'd I, 'tis not  
 be imagin'd how serviceable a *Tale* is,  
 amuse others besides mere Children; a  
 how much easier the Generality of M  
 are paid in this Paper-coin, than in St  
 ling Reason. We ought not to laugh  
 readily at the *Indian* Philosophers, who  
 satisfy their People how this huge Fra  
 of the World is supported, tell 'em  
 by an Elephant. ——— And the Elepha  
 how? --- A shreud Question! but whi  
 by no means shou'd be answer'd. 'Tis he  
 only that our *Indian* Philosophers are  
 blame. They shou'd be contented with  
*Elephant*, & go no further. But they ha  
 a *Tortoise* in reserve; whose Back, th  
 think, is broad enough. So the Torto  
 must bear the new Load: And thus t  
 matter stands worse than before.

THE Heathen Story of PROM  
 THEUS was, I told you, much the san  
 with this *Indian* one: only the Heathe  
 Mythologists were so wise as not to g  
 beyond *the first Remove*. A single P  
 METHEU

PROMETHEUS was enough to take the weight Sect. 2.  
 from Jove. They fairly made Jove a  
 Under-by. Heresolv'd, it seems, to be  
 Deuter; and see what wou'd come of  
 this notable Experiment; how the dan-  
 gerous Man-moulder wou'd proceed; and  
 what wou'd be the Event of his Tamper-  
 ing. ----- Excellent Account, to satisfy the  
 Heathen *Vulgar*! But how, think you,  
 wou'd a *Philosopher* digest this? " For  
 the Gods (he wou'd say presently)  
 either cou'd have hinder'd PROME-  
 THEUS'S Creation; or they cou'd not.  
 If they cou'd, they were answerable  
 for the Consequences; if they cou'd  
 not, they were no longer Gods, being  
 thus limited and controul'd. And whe-  
 ther PROMETHEUS were a Name for  
*Chance, Destiny, a plastick Nature, or*  
*an evil Demon*; whatever was design'd  
 by it; 'twas still the same Breach of  
 OMNIPOTENCE."

THAT such a hazardous Affair as this  
*Creation* shou'd have been undertaken  
 by those who had not perfect Foresight as  
 well as Command, you own'd was neither  
 wise nor just. But you stood to Foresight.  
 You allow'd the *Consequences* to have been  
 understood by the creating Powers, when  
 they undertook their Work: and you de-  
 ny'd that it wou'd have been better for  
 them to have omitted it; tho they knew

Part I. what wou'd be the Event " 'Twas bet  
 " ter still that the Project shou'd be exe  
 Cause of Ill. " cuted, whatever might become of Man  
 " kind, or how hard soever such a Cre  
 " ation was like to fall on the generalit  
 " of this miserable Race. For 'twas im  
 " possible, you thought, that Heave  
 " shou'd have acted otherwise than fo  
 " *the best*. So that even from this Mi  
 " fery and ILL of *Man*, there was un  
 " doubtedly some GOOD arising; some  
 " thing which over ballanc'd all, & mad  
 " full amends."

THIS was a Confession I wonder  
 indeed how I came to draw from you  
 And soon afterwards I found you some  
 what uneasy under it. For here I took u  
 your own part against you; and settin  
 all those Villanys & Corruptions of hu  
 man Kind in the same light you had don  
 just before, I put it upon you to tell  
 where possibly cou'd be the Advantage o  
 Good arising hence; or what Excellenc  
 or Beauty cou'd redound from those tra  
 gical Pictures you your-self had draw  
 so well after the Life. Whether it mu  
 not be a very strong philosophical Faith  
 which shou'd persuade one that those dis  
 mal parts you set to view were only th  
 necessary Shades of a fine Piece, to b  
 reckon'd among the Beautys of the Crea  
 tion

tion : Or whether possibly you might look upon that Maxim as very fit for Heaven, which I was sure you did not approve at all in Mankind ; “ *To do ILL that GOOD might follow.* ”

THIS, I said, made me think of the manner of our modern PROMETHEUS's, the *Mountebanks*, who perform'd such Wonders of many kinds, here on our earthly Stages. They cou'd create Diseases, & make Mischief, in order *to heal*, & to *restore*. But shou'd we assign such a Practice as this to Heaven? Shou'd we dare to make such *Empiricks* of the Gods, and such a *Patient* of poor Nature? “ Was this a reason for Nature's Sickliness? Or how else came she (poor Innocent!) to fall sick, or run astray? Had she been *originally* healthy, or created sound *at first*; she had *still* continu'd so. 'Twas no credit to the Gods to leave her destitute, or with a Flaw which wou'd cost dear the mending, and make them Sufferers for their own Work. ”

I WAS going to bring HOMER to witness for the many Troubles of JOVE the Death of SARPEDON, and the frequent Crosses Heaven met with, from the fatal Sisters. But this Discourse, I saw, displeas'd you. I had by this time plainly discover'd my Inclination to SCEP-

Part I.

*Scepticism.*

TICISM. And here not only *Religion* was objected to me, but I was reproach'd too on the account of that *Gallantry* which I had some time before defended. But were join'd together in the Charge you made against me, when you saw I adher'd to nothing: but was now as ready to declaim against *the Fair*, as I had been before to plead their Cause, and defend the Moral of Lovers. This, you said was my constant way in all Debates: was as well pleas'd with the Reason on one side, as on the other: I never trouble my-self about the Success of the Argument, but laugh'd still, whatever way it went; and even when I convinc'd others never seem'd as if I was convinc'd my self.

I OWN'D to you, PALEMÓN, there was Truth enough in your Charge. For above all things I lov'd Ease; and of all Philosophers those who reason'd most at their ease, and were never angry or disturb'd, as those call'd SCEPTICKS, you own'd, never were. I look'd upon this kind of *Philosophy* as the prettiest, agreeablest, roving Exercise of the Mind, possible to be imagin'd. The other kind, I thought, was painful & laborious; “ To keep always in the Limits of *one Path*; “ to drive always *at a Point*; and hold “ precisely to what Men, at a venture, “ call'd



call'd THE TRUTH: A *Point*, in all appearance, very unfix'd, & hard to ascertain " Besides, my way hurt no body. was always the first to comply on any occasion: and for Matters of Religion, was further from Profaneness and erroneous Doctrine than any one. I cou'd never have the Sufficiency to shock my spiritual and learned Superiors. I was the furthest from leaning to my own Understanding: nor was I one who exalted *Reason* above *Faith*, or insisted much upon what the dogmatical Men call *Demonstration*, and dare oppose to the sacred Mysteries of Religion. And to shew you (continu'd I) how impossible it is for the Men of our sort ever to err from the Catholick and Establish'd Faith, pray consider; That whereas *Others* pretend to see with their own Eyes, what is properest and best for 'em in Religion, *We*, for our parts, pretend not to see with any other than those of our spiritual Guides. Neither do we presume to judg those Guides ourselves; but submit to them, as they are appointed us by our just Superiors. In short, you who are *Rationalists*, and walk by Reason in every thing, pretend to know all things, whilst you believe little or nothing: We for our parts *know* nothing, and *believe* all.

## Part I.

*Scepticism.*

HERE I ended; and in return, you only ask'd me coldly, "Whether with that fine SCEPTICISM of mine, made no more distinction between Sincerity and Insincerity *in Actions*, than did between Truth & Falsehood, Right and Wrong, *in Arguments*?"

I DURST not ask what your Question drove at. I was afraid I saw it too plainly; and that by this loose way of talking which I had learnt in some fashionable Conversations of the World, I had given you occasion to suspect me of the worst sort of *Scepticism*, such as spar'd nothing, but overthrew all Principles, *Moral and Divine*.

FORGIVE me (said I) good PALAMON: you are offended, I see, and no without cause. But what if I shou'd endeavour to compensate my *Sceptical* Misbehaviour, by using a known *Sceptick Privilege*, and asserting strenuously the Cause I have hitherto oppos'd? Do not imagine that I dare aspire so high as to defend reveal'd Religion, or the holy Mysterys of the Christian Faith. I am unworthy of such a Task, and shou'd profane the Subject. 'Tis of mere *Philosophy* I speak: And my Fancy is only to try what I can muster

nuster up thence, to make head against Sect. 2. the chief Arguments of *Atheism*, and re-establish what I have offer'd to loosen in the System of *Theism*.

YOUR Project, said you, bids fair to *Deism*. to reconcile me to your Character, which I was beginning to mistrust. For as averse as I am to the Cause of *Theism*, or Name of DEIST, when taken in a sense exclusive of Revelation; I consider still that, in strictness, the Root of all is THEISM; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a good THEIST. For *Theism* can only be oppos'd to \* *Polytheism*, or *Atheism*. Nor have I patience to hear the Name of DEIST (the highest of all Names) decry'd, and set in opposition to *Christianity*. „ As if our Religion was a kind of *Magick*, which depended not on the Belief of a single supreme Being. Or as if the firm & rational Belief of such a Being, on philosophical grounds, was an improper Qualification for believing any thing further.“ Excellent Presumption, for those who naturally incline to the Dis-belief of Revelation, or who thro' Vainety affect a Freedom of this kind!-----

BUT let me hear (continu'd you) whether in good Earnest, and thorow Sincerity,

I 7

ty,

\* " To *Polytheism* (*Demonism*) or *Atheism* : " as above, pag 13.

Part I. ty, you intend to advance any thing in favour of that Opinion which is fundamental to all Religion; or whether you design only to divert your-self with the Subject as you have done hitherto? “ Whatever your Thoughts are, PHILOCLES, I am resolv’d to force ’em from you. You can no longer plead the Unfurlableness of the Time or Place to such grave Subjects. The gaudy Scene is over with the Day. Our Company have long since quitted the Field. And the solemn Majesty of such a Night as this, may justly suit with the profoundest Meditation, or most serious Discourse.”

THUS, PALEMÓN, you continu’d to urge me; till by necessity I was drawn into the following Vein of *Philosophical Enthusiasm*.

### S E C T. III.

YOU shall find then, said I (taking a grave Air) that it is possible for me to be serious; and that ’tis probable I am growing so, for good and all. Your Over-seriousness a-while since, at such an unseasonable time, may have driven me perhaps into a contrary Extreme, by opposition to your melancholy Humour. But I have now a better Idea of that *Melancholy*

wholy you discover'd; and notwithstanding Sec. 3.  
 the humorous Turn you were pleas'd to  
 give it, I am perswaded it has a different  
 Foundation from any of those fantastical  
 Causes I then assign'd to it. " LOVE, LOVE.  
 " doubtless, is at the bottom: but a no-  
 " bler Love than such as common Beautys  
 " inspire." ---

HERE, in my turn, I began to raise my  
 Voice, and imitate the solemn way you  
 had been teaching me. " Knowing as  
 " you are, continu'd I, *well-knowing* and  
 " experienc'd in all the Degrees and Or- Beauty.  
 " ders of Beauty, in all the mysterious  
 " Charms of the particular Forms; you  
 " rise to what is more general; and with  
 " a larger Heart, and Mind more com-  
 " prehensive, you generously seek that  
 " which is highest in the kind. Not cap-  
 " tivated by the Lineaments of a fair  
 " Face, or the well-drawn Proportions of  
 " a human Body, you view *the Life* it-  
 " self, and embrace rather *the Mind* which  
 " adds the Lustre, and renders chiefly  
 " amiable.

" NOR is the Enjoyment of such a sin- Society.  
 " gle Beauty sufficient to satisfy such an  
 " aspiring Soul. It seeks how to combine  
 " more Beautys, and by what Coalition  
 " of these, to form a beautiful Society.  
 " It views Communitys, Friendships, Re-  
 " lations,

Part I. “lations, Dutys; and considers by which  
 “ Harmony of particular Minds the general  
 “ Harmony is compos’d, and *Commonweal*  
 “ *weal* establish’d.

*Virtue.*

“ NOR satisfy’d even with publick Good  
 “ in *one* Community of Men, it frames  
 “ it-self a nobler Object, and with enlarged  
 “ Affection seeks *the Good of Mankind*.  
 “ It dwells with Pleasure amidst that Reason,  
 “ and those Orders on which this fair Correspondence  
 “ and goodly Interest is establish’d. Laws, Constitu-  
 “ tions, civil and religious Rites; whatever  
 “ ever civilizes or polishes rude Mankind, the  
 “ Sciences and Arts, Philosophy, Morals, Virtue;  
 “ the flourishing state of human Affairs, and the  
 “ Perfection of human Nature; these are its  
 “ delightful Prospects, and this the Charm of  
 “ Beauty which attracts it.

*Universe.*

“ STILL ardent in this Pursuit (such is its  
 “ Love of Order and Perfection) rests not here;  
 “ nor satisfys it-self with the Beauty of a Part;  
 “ but extending further its communicative Bounty,  
 “ seeks the Good of All, and affects the Interest  
 “ and Prosperity of *the Whole*. True to its  
 “ native World and higher Country ’tis here it  
 “ seeks Order and Perfection, wishing the best,  
 “ and hoping still to find a just and wise  
 “ Administration.

“ AND

" AND since all Hope of this were vain Sect. 3.  
 " and idle, if no *universal Mind* presided;  
 " since without such a supreme Intelli- GOD.  
 " gence and providential Care, the dis-  
 " tracted Universe must be condemn'd to  
 " suffer infinite Calamity; 'tis here the  
 " generous Mind labours to discover that  
 " *healing Cause* by which the Interest of  
 " *the Whole* is securely establish'd, the  
 " Beauty of Things, and the universal Or-  
 " der happily sustain'd.

" THIS, PALEMÓN, is the Labour <sup>Ill natural</sup>  
 " of your Soul; and This its *Melancho-* <sup>and moral</sup>  
 " *ly*; when unsuccessfully pursuing the  
 " supreme Beauty, it meets with dark-  
 " ning Clouds which intercept its Sight.  
 " Monsters arise, not those from *Lybian*  
 " Desarts, but from the Heart of Man  
 " more fertile; and with their horrid  
 " Aspect cast an unseemly Reflection up-  
 " ON NATURE. She, helpless (as she is  
 " thought) and working thus absurdly, is  
 " condemn'd the Government of the  
 " World arraign'd, and DEITY made  
 " void.

" MUCH is allerdg'd in answer, to  
 " shew why *Nature* errs, and how she  
 " came thus impotent and erring from an  
 " unerring Hand. But I deny she errs;  
 " and when she seems most ignorant or  
 " perverse

Part I. “ perverse in her Productions, I assert her  
 Ill natural “ even then as wise and provident, as in  
 and moral. “ her goodliest Works. For ’tis not then  
 “ that Men complain of the World’s Or-  
 “ der, or abhor the Face of things, when  
 “ they see various Interests mix’d & inter-  
 “ fering; Natures subordinate, of different  
 “ kinds, oppos’d one to another, and in  
 “ their different Operations submitted, the  
 “ higher to the lower. ’Tis on the con-  
 “ trary, from this Order of inferior and  
 “ superior Things, that we admire the  
 “ \* World’s Beauty, founded thus on *Con-*  
 “ *trarietys*: whilst from such various and  
 “ disagreeing Principles, a *universal Con-*  
 “ *cord* is establish’d.

“ Thus in the several Orders of ter-  
 “ restrial Forms, a *Resignation* is requir’d,  
 “ a Sacrifice and mutual yielding of Na-  
 “ tures one to another. The Vegetables  
 “ by their Death sustain the Animals:  
 “ and Animal Bodys dissolv’d, enrich the  
 “ Earth, and raise again the vegetable  
 “ World. The numerous Insects are re-  
 “ duc’d by the superior Kinds of Birds  
 “ and Beasts: and these again are check’d  
 “ by Man; who in his turn submits to o-  
 “ ther Natures, and resigns his Form a Sa-  
 “ crifice in common to the rest of Things.  
 “ And

\* See VOL III. p. 263. 264. what is cited in the  
 Notes from the ancient Author on the *World*.



And if in Natures so little exalted or pre-eminent above each other, the Sacrifice of Interests can appear so just; how much more reasonably may all inferior Natures be subjected to *the superior Nature* of the World! That World, PALEMON, which even now transported you when the Sun's fainting Light gave way to these bright Constellations, and left you this wide System to contemplate.

“ HERE are those *Laws* which ought not, nor can submit to any thing below. The central Powers, which hold the lasting Orbs in their just Poize and Movement, must not be controul'd to save a fleeting Form, and rescue from the Precipice a puny Animal, whose brittle Frame, howe'er protected, must of it-self soon dissolve. The ambient Air, the inward Vapours, the impending Meteors, or whatever else is nutrimental or preservative of this Earth, must operate in a natural Course: and other Constitutions must submit to the good Habit & Constitution of the all-sustaining Globe.

“ LET us not therefore wonder, if by Earthquakes, Storms, pestilential Blasts, nether or upper Fires, or Floods, the animal Kinds are oft afflicted, and whole  
“ Species

Part I. "Species perhaps involv'd at once in com-  
 " mon Ruin : But much less let us accour-  
 ill natural " it strange, if either by outward Shock  
 and moral. " or some interior Wound from hostile  
 " Matter, particular Animals are deform'd  
 " even in their first Conception, when the  
 " Disease invades the Seats of Generation  
 " and seminal Parts are injur'd & obstruc-  
 " ted in their accurate Labours. 'Tis the  
 " alone that monstrous Shapes are seen  
 " Nature still working as before, and not  
 " perversly or erroneously ; not faintly, or  
 " with feeble endeavours ; but o'erpower'd  
 " by a superior Rival, and by another  
 " Nature's justly conquering Force.

" NOR need we wonder, if the inter-  
 " rior Form, the Soul and Temper, partakes  
 " of this occasional Deformity, and  
 " sympathizes often with its close Partner  
 " Who is there can wonder either at the  
 " Sicknesses of Sense, or the Depravity of  
 " Minds inclos'd in such frail Bodys, all  
 " dependent on such prevertible Organs

Good.

" HERE then is that Solution you re-  
 " quire : and hence those seeming Blot-  
 " tishes cast upon Nature. Nor is there  
 " ought in this beside what is natural and  
 " good. 'Tis Good which is predominant  
 " and every corruptible and mortal Na-  
 " ture by its Mortality and Corruption  
 " yields only to some better, and all in  
 " common

common to that *best and highest Nature*, Sect. 3.  
which is incorruptible and immortal."

I SCARCE had ended these Words,  
're you broke out in admiration; asking  
what had befall'n me, that of a sudden I  
had thus chang'd my Character, and en-  
ter'd into Thoughts, which must certainly,  
you suppos'd, have some Foundation in  
me, since I cou'd exprefs them with such  
seeming Affection as I had done.

O, SAID I, PALEMON! that it had  
been my fortune to have met you the other  
day, just at my Return out of the Coun-  
try, from a *Friend* whose Conversation had  
in one day or *two* made such an Impression  
in me, that I shou'd have suted you to a  
Miracle. You wou'd have thought indeed  
that I had been cur'd of my *Scepticism* and  
levity, so as never to have rally'd more,  
at that wild rate, on any Subject, much  
less on these which are so serious.

TRULY, said you, I cou'd wish I had  
met you rather at that time, or that those  
good & serious Impressions of your *Friend*  
had without interruption lasted with you  
ill this moment.

WHATEVER they were, I told you,  
PALEMON, I had not so lost 'em neither,  
as

Part I. as not easily, you saw, to revive 'em on occasion; were I not afraid. Afraid said you. For whose sake, good PHILOCLES, I intreat you? For mine or your own? For both, reply'd I. For tho' was like to be perfectly cur'd of my *Scepticism*; 'twas by what I thought worth downright *Enthusiasm*. You never knew a more agreeable ENTHUSIAST!

*Enthusiast.*

WERE he my Friend (said you) I shou' hardly treat him in so free a manner. No shou'd I, perhaps, judg that to be *Enthusiasm* which you so freely term so. I have a strong suspicion that you injure him. No can I be satisfy'd till I hear further of the serious Conversation for which you take him as *Enthusiastick*.

I MUST confess (said I) he had nothing of that savage Air of the vulgar enthustick Kind. All was serene, soft, and harmonious. The manner of it was more after the pleasing Transports of those ancient *Poets* you are often charm'd with than after the fierce unsociable way of modern *Zealots*; those starch'd gruff Gentlemen, who guard Religion as Bullies do a Mistress, and give us the while a very indifferent Opinion of their Lady's Merit, and their own Wit, by adoring what they neither allow to be inspected by others, nor care themselves to examine in a fair light

ight. But here I'll answer for it; there was nothing of Disguise or Paint. All was fair, open, and genuine, as Nature herself. 'Twas *Nature* he was in love with: 'Twas *Nature* he sung. And if any-one might be said to have a *natural* Mistress, my Friend certainly might, whose Heart was thus engag'd. But LOVE, I found, was every-where the same. And tho' the Object here was very fine, and the Passion it created very noble; yet *Liberty*, I thought, was finer than all: And I who ever car'd to engage in other Love of the least continuance, was the more afraid, I told you, of this which had such a power with my poor *Friend*, as to make him appear the perfectest ENTHUSIAST in the World, *Ill-humour* only excepted. For this was singular in him, "That tho' he had all of the *Enthusiast*, he had nothing of the *Bigot*. He heard every thing with Mildness & Delight; and bore with me when I treated all his Thoughts as visionary; and when, Sceptick-like, I unravel'd all his Systems."

HERE was that *Character* and *Description* which so highly pleas'd you, that you cou'd hardly suffer me to come to a conclusion. 'Twas impossible, I found, to give you satisfaction, without reciting the main of what pass'd in those *two* days between my *Friend* & me, in our Country-Retire-

Part I. Retirement. Again and again I bid you beware: " You knew not the danger of  
*Enthusiast.* " this *philosophical Passion*; nor consider  
 " what you might possibly draw upon  
 " your-self, and make me the Author of  
 " I was far enough engag'd already: and  
 " you were pushing me further, at your  
 " own hazard."

ALL I cou'd say made not the least impression on you. But rather than proceed any further this night, I engag'd, for your sake, to turn *Writer*, and draw up the *Memoirs* of those *two philosophical Days*; beginning with what had pass'd this *last Day* between our-selves; as I have accordingly done (you see) by way of *Introduction* to my *Story*.

BY this time, being got late to Town some hours after the latest of our Company, you set me down at my own Lodging; and thus we bade Good-night.

## PART II.

## SECT. I.

## PHILOCLEES to PALEMON.

AFTER such a Day as Yesterday, I might well have thought it hard, when I awak'd the next Morning, to find my self under positive Engagements of proceeding in the same philosophical way, without intermission, and upon harder terms than ever. For 'twas no longer the agreeable Part of a *Companion* which I had now to bear. Your Conversation, PALEMON, which had hitherto supported me, was at an end. I was now *alone*; confin'd to my Closet; oblig'd to meditate by my self; and reduc'd to the hard Circumstances of an *Author*, and *Historian*, in the most difficult Subject.

BUT here, methought, propitious Heaven, in some manner, assisted me. For if *Dreams* were, as HOMER teaches, sent

Part 2. from the Throne of J O V E; I might conclude I had a favourable one, of the *trifort*, towards the *Morning-light*; which as I recollected my-self, gave me a clear & perfect Idea of what I desir'd so earnestly to bring back to my Memory.

I FOUND my - self transported to distant Country, which presented a pompous *rural Scene*. It was a Mountain not far from the Sea, its Brow adorn'd with antient Wood, & at its foot a River and well-inhabited Plain: beyond which the Sea appearing, clos'd the Prospect.

No sooner had I consider'd the Place than I discern'd it to be the very far where I had talk'd with THEOCLES the second Day I was with him in the Country. I look'd about to see if I cou'd find my Friend; and calling THEOCLES! I wak'd. But so powerful was the impression of my Dream, & so perfect the Idea rais'd in me, of the Person, Words, and Manner of my Friend, that I cou'd now fancy myself philosophically inspir'd, as that ROMAN Sage \* by his ÆGERIA, & invite on this Occasion, to try my *Historical MUSE*. For justly might I hope for such Assistance in behalf of THEOCLES, who lov'd *the Muses*, and was, I thought, less belov'd by them.

T

\* *Numa*?



Sect. 1.

TO RETURN therefore to that *original* rural Scene, & that *Heroick* GENIUS, the Companion and Guide of my first Thoughts in these profounder Subjects: I found him the first Morning with his belov'd *Mantuan* MUSE, roving in the Fields; where, as I had been inform'd at his House, he was gone out, after his usual way, to read. The moment he saw me, his Book vanish'd, and he came with friendly haste to meet me. After we had embrac'd, I discover'd my curiosity to know what he was reading; and ask'd, if it were of a secret kind, to which I cou'd not be admitted. " On this he shew'd me his Poet; and looking pleasantly: Now tell me truly, said he, PHILOCOLES, did you not expect some more mysterious Book than this? I own'd I did, considering his Character, which I took to be of so contemplative a kind. And do you think, said he, that without being contemplative, one can truly relish these diviner Poets? Indeed (said I) I never thought there was any need of growing contemplative, or retiring from the World, to read VIRGIL or HORACE.

YOU have nam'd *two*, said he, who can hardly be thought so very *like*; tho' they

Retire-  
ment.

Part 2. they were Friends, and equally good Poets. Yet joining 'em, as you are pleas'd to do, I wou'd willingly learn from you whether in your opinion there be any Disposition so fitted for reading 'em, as that in which they writ themselves. In this, am sure, they both join'd heartily; to love *Retirement*: when for the sake of such Life and Habit as you call *contemplative* they were willing to sacrifice the highest Advantages, Pleasures, and Favour of Court. But I will venture to say more favour of *Retirement*: „ That not only the best Authors, but the best Companions require this seasoning.” Society itself cannot be rightly enjoy'd without some Abstinence and separate Thought. A Conversation grows insipid, dull, and tiresome, without the help of some Intervals of Retirement. Say PHILOCLEES, whether you yourself have not often found it so? Do you think those Lovers understand the Interests of their Loves, who by their good will wou'd never be parted for a moment? Or wou'd they be discreet Friends think you, who wou'd chuse to live together on such Terms? What Relish must the World have (that common World of mix'd and undistinguish'd Company without a little Solitude; without stepping now and then aside, out of the  *beaten Track* of Life, that tedious Circle of Noise and Show, which forces we

y'd Mankind to seek relief from every Sect. &  
 oor Diversion?

By your Rule, said I, THEOCLES,  
 here shou'd be no such thing as *Happiness*  
 or *Good* in Life, since every Enjoyment  
 wears out so soon; and growing painful, is  
 diverted by some *other* thing; and that a-  
 gain by some *other*; and so on. I am sure,  
 Solitude serves as a Remedy or Diversion  
 to any thing in the World, there is no-  
 thing which may not serve as Diversion to  
 Solitude; which wants it more than any  
 thing besides. And thus there can be no  
 Good which is regular or constant. Hap-  
 piness is a thing out of the way, and only  
 to be found in wandering.

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, I rejoice *Happiness,*  
 to find you in the pursuit of *Happiness* and *Good.*  
 Good; however you may wander. Nay,  
 do you doubt whether there be *that Thing*;  
 yet if you reason, 'tis sufficient; there is  
 hope still. But see how you have un-  
 wares engag'd your self! For if you have  
 destroy'd all *Good*, because in all you can  
 think of, there is nothing will constantly  
 hold so; then you have set it as a Maxim  
 (and very justly in my Opinion), „ That  
*Nothing can be good but what is constant.*”

I OWN, said I, that all I know of  
 worldly Satisfaction is inconstant. The

Part 2. Things which give it, are never at a stay and the *Good* it-self, whatever it be, depends no less on Humour than on Fortune For that which Chance may often spare Time will not. Age, Change of Temper other Thoughts, a different Passion, new Engagements, a new Turn of Life, or Conversation, the least of these are fatal, and alone sufficient to destroy Enjoyment. *The Object* be the same, *the Relish* changes and the short-liv'd *GOOD* expires. But thou'd wonder much if you cou'd tell many thing in Life which was not of a changeable a Nature, and subject to the same common Fate of Satiety & Disgust

*Pleasure.*

I FIND then, reply'd he, that the current Notion of *Good* is not sufficient to satisfy you. You can afford to *scepticize* where no-one else will so much as hesitate For almost every-one philosophizes dogmatically on this Head. All are positive in this, „ That our real *Good* is PLEASURE „ SURE.”

IF they wou'd inform us „*Which* (said I) or *What sort,*” and ascertain once the very Species & distinct Kind; such as must constantly remain *the same*, and *equally eligible* at all times; I shou'd then perhaps be better satisfy'd. But when *Will* and *Pleasure* are synonymous; when every thing

thing which \* *pleases us* is call'd PLEASURE, and we never chuse or prefer but as we please, 'tis trifling to say, „ *Pleasure our Good.*” For this has as little meaning as to say, „ *We chuse what we think eligible:*” and, „ *We are pleas'd with what delights or pleases us.*” The Question is Whether we are *rightly pleas'd*, and chuse as we *shou'd do?*” For as highly *pleas'd* as Children are with Baubles, or with whatever affects their tender Senses; we cannot in our Hearts sincerely admire their *Enjoyment*, or imagine 'em Possessors of any extraordinary *Good*. Yet are their Senses, we know, as keen and susceptible of *Pleasure* as our own. The same Reflection is of force as to mere Animals, who in respect of the Liveliness and Delicacy of Sensation, have many of 'em the advantage of us. And as for some low and fordid *Pleasures* of human Kind; shou'd they ever so lastingly enjoy'd, and in the highest credit with their Enjoyers; I shou'd never afford 'em the name of *Happiness* or *Good*.

W O U' D you then appeal, said he, from the immediate Feeling and Experience of one who is *pleas'd*, and satisfy'd with what he enjoys?

K 4

M O S T

\* VOL. I. pag. 308. VOL. III. pag. 200.

Part 2. MOST certainly I shou'd appeal, said  
*Pleasure.* I (continuing the same Zeal which THE-  
 OCLEs had stirr'd in me, against those  
 Dogmatizers on *Pleasure*.) For is there  
 that fordid Creature on earth, who does  
 not prize his own *Enjoyment*? Does not  
 the frowardest, the most rancorous distem-  
 per'd Creature do as much? Is not Malice  
 & Cruelty of the highest relish with some  
 Natures? Is not a hoggish Life the height  
 of some Mens Wishes? You wou'd no  
 ask me surely to enumerate the several spe-  
 cies of Sensations, which Men of certain  
 Tastes have adopted, and own'd for their  
 chief *Pleasure* and *Delight*. For with some  
 Men even *Diseases* have been thought va-  
 luable and worth the cherishing, merely  
 for the *Pleasure* found in allaying the Ardo-  
 of an irritating Sensation. And to these  
 absurd *Epicures* those other are near a-kin  
 who by study'd Provocatives raise unnatu-  
 ral Thirst and Appetite; and to make way  
 for fresh Repletion, prepare *Emeticks*, as  
 the last Desert; the sooner to renew the  
 Feast. 'Tis said, I know, proverbially  
 „ That *Tastes are different, and must no*  
 „ *be disputed.*” And I remember some such  
 Motto as this plac'd once on a Devise  
 which was found sutable to the Notion  
 A Fly was represented feeding on a certain  
 Lump. The Food, however vile, was nat-  
 ural to the Animal. There was no Ab-  
 surdity

ardity in the Case. But shou'd you shew Sect. 1.  
 ne a brutish or a barbarous Man thus ta-  
 ten up, and solac'd in his Pleasure; shou'd  
 you shew me a Sot in his solitary Debauch,  
 or a Tyrant in the exercise of his Cruelty,  
 with this *Motto* over him, to forbid my  
 Appeal; I shou'd hardly be brought to  
 think the better of his *Enjoyment*: Now  
 can I possibly suppose that a mere sordid  
 Wretch, with a base abject Soul, and  
 the best Fortune in the World, was ever  
 capable of any *real Enjoyment*.

By this Zeal, reply'd THEOCLES,  
 which you have shewn in the refuting a  
 wrong Hypothesis, one wou'd imagine you  
 had in reality some Notion of a *right*; &  
 began to think that there might possibly  
 be such a thing at last as *Good*.

THAT there is something nearer to  
 good, and more like it than another, I  
 am free, said I, to own. But what *real*  
 GOOD is, I am still to seek, and must  
 therefore wait till you can better inform  
 me. This I only know; „ That either  
 All Pleasure is Good, or only Some.“  
 If *all*, then every kind of Sensuality must  
 be precious and desirable. If *some* only,  
 then we are to seek, *what Kind*; and dis-  
 cover, if we can, *what* it is which distin-  
 gishes between one Pleasure and another:  
 and makes *one* indifferent, sorry, mean;

Part 2. *another* valuable, and worthy. And by this *Stamp*, this *Character*, if there be any *Pleasure*. such, we must define GOOD; and not by *Pleasure* it-self; which may be very great, and yet very contemptible. Nor can any-one truly judg the Value of any immediate Sensation, otherwise than by judging first of the Situation of his own Mind. For that which we esteem a Happiness in *one* Situation of Mind, is otherwise thought of in *another*. Which Situation therefore is the justest, must be consider'd; "How  
 „ to gain that *Point of Sight*, whence  
 „ probably we may best discern; & How  
 „ to place our-selves in that unbiased  
 „ state, in which we are fittest to pro-  
 „ nounce. "

O PHILOCLEES, reply'd he, if this be unfeignedly your Sentiment; if it be possible you shou'd have the Fortitude to with-hold your † Assent, in this Affair, & go in search of what the meanest of Mankind think they already *know* so certainly 'tis from a nobler turn of Thought than what you have observ'd in any of the *modern Scepticks* you have convers'd with. For if I mistake not, there are hardly anywhere at this day a sort of People more peremptory, or who deliberate less on the  
 choice

† VOL. I. pag. 8r.



choice of *Good*. They who pretend to Sect. I.  
 such a Scrutiny of other Evidences, are  
 the readiest to take the Evidence of the  
 greatest *Deceivers* in the World, *their own*  
*Passions*. Having gain'd, as they think, a  
 Liberty from some seeming Constraints of  
 Religion, they suppose they employ this  
 Liberty to perfection, by following the  
 first Motion of their Will, & assenting to  
 the first Dictate or Report of any prepos-  
 sessing \* *Fancy*, any foremost *Opinion* or  
*Conceit* of GOOD. So that their Privilege  
 is only that of being perpetually amus'd ;  
 and their Liberty that of being impos'd on  
 in their most important Choice. I think  
 one may say with assurance, „ That the  
 greatest of Fools is he who imposes on  
 himself, and in his greatest Concern  
 thinks certainly he *knows* that which he  
 has least study'd, and of which he is  
 most profoundly *ignorant*. He who is  
 ignorant, but knows his Ignorance, is far  
 wiser. And to do justice to these fashiona-  
 ble Men of Wit; they are not all of 'em,  
 indeed, so insensible as not to perceive  
 something of their own Blindness and  
 Absurdity. For often when they seriously  
 reflect on their past Pursuits and Engage-  
 ments, they freely own, „ That for what  
 remains of *Life*, they know not when  
 K 6 „ ther

Part 2.

Pleasure.

„ ther they shall be of *a-piece with them-*  
 „ *selves*; or whether their Fancy, Hu-  
 „ mour, or Passion will not hereafter lead  
 „ 'em to a quite *different Choice* in PLEA-  
 „ SURE, and to a Disapprobation of all  
 „ they ever enjoy'd before." --- Comfortable Reflection!

To bring the Satisfactions of *the Mind*, continu'd he, and the Enjoyments of *Reason* and *Judgment* under the Denomination of PLEASURE, is only a Collusion, and a plain receding from the common Notion of the word. They deal not fairly with us, who in their philosophical Hour, admit that for *Pleasure*, which at an ordinary time, and in the common Practice of Life, is so little taken for such. The Mathematician who labours at his Problem, the bookish Man who toils, the Artist who endures voluntarily the greatest Hardships and Fatigues; none of these are said „ *To follow Pleasure.*” Nor will the Men of Pleasure by any means admit 'em to be of their number. The Satisfactions which are *purely mental*, and depend only on the Motion of a *Thought*; must in all likelihood be too refin'd for the Apprehensions of our modern *Epicures*, who are so taken up with Pleasure of a *more substantial* kind. They who are full of the Idea of such a *sensible solid* Good, can have but a slender Fancy for the mere *spiritual & intellectual*

sort

fort. But 'tis this latter they set up and magnify upon occasion; to save the Ignorance which may redound to 'em from the former. This done, the latter may take its chance: Its Use is presently at an end. For 'tis observable, that when the Men of this sort have recommended the Enjoyments of the Mind under the title of *Pleasure*; when they have thus dignify'd the Word, and included in it whatever is mentally good or excellent, they can afterwards suffer it contentedly to slide down again into its own genuine and vulgar sense; whence they rais'd it only to serve a turn. When *Pleasure* is call'd in question, and attack'd, then *Reason & Virtue* are call'd in to her Aid, and made principal parts of her Constitution. A complicated Form appears, and comprehends straight all which is generous, honest, & beautiful in human Life. But when the Attack is over, and the Objection once solv'd, the Specter vanishes: *Pleasure* returns again to her former Shape: She may 'ven be *Pleasure* still, and have as little concern with *dry sober Reason*, as in the nature of the thing, and according to common Understanding, she really has. For if this rational sort of Enjoyment be admitted into the Notion of *Good*, how is it possible to admit withal that kind of Sensation which in effect is rather opposite to this Enjoyment? 'Tis certain that in

Part 2.

*Pleasure  
and Pain.*

respect of the Mind and its Enjoyments, the Eagerness and Irritation of *mere Pleasure*, is as disturbing as the Importunity & Vexation of *Pain*. If *either* throws the Mind off its bias, and deprives it of the Satisfaction it takes in its natural Exercise and Employment; the Mind in this case must be Sufferer as well by one as by the other. If *neither* does this, there is no harm on either side.----

By the way, said I, interrupting him: As sincere as I am in questioning, „ Whether PLEASURE be really *Good*;” I am not such a Sceptick as to doubt, „ Whether PAIN be really *Ill*.

WHATSOEVER is *grievous*, reply'd he, can be no other than ILL. But that what is grievous to *one*, is not so much as troublesome to *another*; let Sportsmen, Soldiers, and others of the hardy Kinds be witness. Nay, that what is *Pain* to one, is *Pleasure* to another, and so alternately, we very well know: since Men vary in their Apprehension of these Sensations, and on many occasions confound one with the other. Has not even Nature her-self, in some respects, as it were blended 'em together, and (as a wise Man said once) „ join'd the Extremity of „ one so nicely to the other, that it ab- „ solutely

solutely runs into it, and is undistin- Sect. 1.  
guishable?"

IN FINE then, said I, if *Pleasure* and *Pain* be thus convertible and mix'd; if, according to your Account, ,, That which is now *Pleasure*, by being strain'd a little too far, runs into *Pain*, and *Pain*, when carry'd far, creates again *the highest Pleasure*, by mere Cessation, and a kind of natural Succession; If some Pleasures to *some* are Pains, and some Pains to *others* are Pleasures:" All this, if I mistake not, makes still for my opinion, and shows That there is nothing you can assign which can really stand as *GOOD*. For if *Pleasure* be not *GOOD*, <sup>Good</sup> nothing is. And if *Pain* be *ILL* (as I must necessarily take for granted) we have a shreud Chance on the *ill* side indeed, but none at all on the *better*. So that we may fairly doubt, ,, Whether *LIFE* *it self* be not mere Misery;" since *Gainers* by it we can never be: *Losers* we may sufficiently, and are like to be, every hour of our Lives. Accordingly, what our *English* Poetess says of *Good*, shou'd be just and proper: ,, 'Tis *Good not to be born*." ----- And thus for any thing of *Good* which can be expected in *Life*, we may e'en ,, Beg pardon of *Nature*; and return her Present on her  
,, hands,

Part 2. „ hands, without waiting for her Call.  
 Good. For what shou'd hinder us? or What ar  
 we the better for living?

THE Query, said he, is pertinent. Bu  
 why such Dispatch, if the Case be doubt  
 ful? This, surely (my good PHILO  
 SOPHES!) is a plain Transgression of you  
*sceptical* bounds. We must be sufficientl  
*dogmatical*, to come to this Determina  
 tion. 'Tis a deciding as well concerning  
 Death as Life; „ What possibly *may* b  
 „ hereafter, and What *not*." Now to b  
 assur'd that we can never be concern'd  
 in any thing *hereafter*, we must under  
 stand perfectly what it is which concern  
 or engages us in any thing *present*. We  
 must truly *know our-selves*, and in wha  
 this SELF of ours consists. We must  
 determine against *Pre-existence*, and giv  
 a better reason for our having neve  
 been concern'd in ought before our Birth  
 than merely, „ Because we *remember not*  
 „ nor are *conscious*." For in many things  
 we have been concern'd to purpose, o  
 which we have now no Memory or  
 Consciousness remaining. And thus we  
 may happen to be again and again, to  
 perpetuity, for any reason we can show  
 to the contrary. All is *Revolution* in us.  
 We are no more the self-same Matter, or  
 System of Matter, from one day to ano  
 ther. What Succession there may be *here-*  
*after*.

fer, we know not; since even *now*, we Sect. 11  
 ve by Succession, and only perish and  
 re renew'd. 'Tis in vain we flatter our-  
 lves with the assurance of our Interest's  
 nding with a certain Shape or Form.  
 What interested us *at first* in it, we know  
 ot; any more than how we have *since*  
 eld on, and continue *still* concern'd in  
 uch an Assemblage of fleeting Particles:  
*There* besides, or in *What* else we may *Futurity*  
 ave to do, perchance, in time to come,  
 e know as little; nor can tell how  
*chance* or *Providence*, hereafter, may dis-  
 ose of us. And if *Providence* be in the  
 ase, we have still more reason to con-  
 der how we undertake to be our own  
 isposers. It must needs become a S C E P-  
 I C K above all Men to hesitate in Mat-  
 rs of *Exchange*. And tho' he acknow-  
 dges no present Good or Enjoyment in  
 ife, he must be sure, however, of bet-  
 rring his Condition, before he attempts  
 o alter it. But as yet, PHILOELES,  
 ven this Point remains undetermin'd be-  
 een us: Whether in this present *Good*  
 Life there be not such a thing as *real*  
 GOOD."

BE you therefore (said I) my Instruc-  
 or, sagacious THEOCLES! and inform  
 e, ,, *What* that GOOD is, or *Where*,  
 which can afford Contentment and Sa-  
 tisfaction always alike, without varia-  
 tion

Part 2. „tion or diminution.” For tho on some  
 Occasions, and in some Subjects, the Mind  
 Good. may possibly be so bent, and the Passion so  
 wrought up, that for the time no bodily  
 Sufferance or Pain can alter it; yet this is  
 what can seldom happen, and is unlikely to  
 last long: since without any Pain or Incon-  
 venience, the Passion in a little time does  
 its own work, the Mind relaxes with its  
 Bent, and the Temper weary'd with Repe-  
 tition finds no more Enjoyment, but runs  
 to something new.

HEAR then! said THEOCLES. For  
 tho I pretend not to tell you at once the  
 Nature of this which I call Good; yet  
 I am content to shew you something of  
 it, in *your-self*, which you will acknow-  
 ledg to be naturally more fix'd and con-  
 stant, than any thing you have hitherto  
 thought on. Tell me, my Friend! if ever  
 you were weary of doing good to those  
 you lov'd? Say when you ever found it  
 Friendship. unpleasing to serve a *Friend*? Or whether  
 when you *first* prov'd this generous Plea-  
 sure, you did not feel it less than at *this*  
*present*; after so long Experience? Be-  
 lieve me, PHILOCLEES, this Pleasure is  
 more debauching than any other. Never  
 did any Soul do good, but it came readier  
 to do the same again, with more Enjoy-  
 ment. Never was Love; or Gratitude, or  
 Bounty



ounty practis'd but with increasing Joy, which made the Practiser still more in love with the fair Act. Answer me, PHILEAS, you who are such a Judg of *Beauty*, and have so good a *Taste* of Pleasure; is there any thing you admire, so fair as *Friendship*? or any thing so charming as a *generous Action*? What wou'd it be therefore, if all Life were in reality but one continu'd Friendship, and cou'd be made one such intire Act? Here surely wou'd be that wou'd and *constant* GOOD you sought. Or wou'd you look for any thing beyond?

Sect. i.

Friendship  
private,  
public.

PERHAPS not, said I. But I can never, surely, go beyond this, to seek for a *chimera*, if this GOOD of yours be not grossly chimerical. For tho a Poet may possibly work up such a single Action, so to hold a *Play* out; I can conceive but very faintly how this high strain of Friendship can be so manag'd as to fill a *Life*. nor can I imagine where the Object lies of such a sublime heroick Passion.

CAN any Friendship, said he, be so heroick, as that towards Mankind? Do you think the Love of Friends in general, and of one's Country, to be nothing? or that particular Friendship can well subsist without such an enlarg'd Affection, and sense of Obligation to Society? Say (if possible) you are a *Friend*, but hate your *Country*.

Part 2.

Friendship  
private,  
publick.

*Country.* Say, you are true to the Interest of a *Companion*, but false to that of *Society*. Can you believe your self? Or will you lay the Name aside, and refuse to be call'd *the Friend*, since you renounce *the MAN*?

THAT there is something, said I, due to *Mankind*, is what I think will not be disputed by one who claims the Name of *Friend*. Hardly indeed cou'd I allow the Name of *Man* to one who never cou'd call or be call'd *Friend*. But he who justly proves himself a *Friend*, is *MAN* enough nor is he wanting to *Society*. A single Friendship may acquit him. He has deserv'd a *Friend*, and is *Man's Friend*; tho' not in strictness, or according to your high moral Sense, *the Friend of Mankind*. For to say truth, as to this sort of Friendship it may by wiser Heads be esteem'd perhaps more than ordinarily manly, and even heroick, as you assert it: But for my part, I see so very little Worth in *Mankind*, and have so indifferent an Opinion of *the Publick*, that I can propose little Satisfaction to my-self in loving either

Gratitude.

Do you, then, take *Bounty* and *Gratitude* to be among the Acts of Friendship and Good-nature? Undoubtedly. For they are the chief. Suppose then that the oblig'd Person discovers in the  
Obliger

Obliger several Failings; does this exclude Sect. 1.  
*the Gratitude* of the former? Not in  
 the least. Or does it make *the Exer-*  
*ise* of Gratitude less pleasing? I think  
 rather the contrary. For when depriv'd of  
 other means of making a Return, I might  
 rejoice still in that sure way of shewing my  
 Gratitude to my Benefactor, by bearing  
 his Failings as a Friend. And as to  
*our* *ounty*: Tell me, I beseech you, is it to <sup>Bought y.</sup>  
 those only who are *deserving* that we  
 should do good? Is it only to a good  
 Neighbour, or Relation, a good Father,  
 Child, or Brother? Or does Nature, Rea-  
 son, and Humanity better teach us, to do  
 good still to a Father, because a *Father*;  
 and to a Child, because a *Child*; and so to  
 every Relation in human Life? I think,  
 and I, this last is rightest.

O PHILOCLEES, reply'd he, consider  
 when what it was you said, when you ob-  
 jected against the Love of *Mankind* because  
 of human Frailty; and seem'd to scorn  
 the *Publick*, because of its Misfortunes.  
 How if this Sentiment be consistent with  
 that Humanity which elsewhere you own  
 and practise. For where can Generosity  
 exist, if not here? Where can we ever  
 exert Friendship, if not in this chief Sub-  
 ject? To what should we be true or <sup>Love of</sup>  
 grateful in the World, if not to *Mankind*, <sup>Mankind's</sup>  
 and that Society to which we are so deep-  
 ly

Part 2. ly indebted? What are the Faults or B  
 mishes which can excuse such an Om  
 sion, or in a grateful Mind can ever l  
 sen the Satisfaction of making a grate  
 kind return? Can you then out of *Go  
 breeding* merely, and from a Temper  
 tural to you, rejoice to shew Civil  
 Courteousness, Obligingness, seek Objec  
 of Compassion, and be pleas'd with eve  
 Occurrence where you have power to  
 some service even to People unknow  
 Can you delight in such Adventures  
 broad in foreign Countrys, or in the c  
 of Strangers here at home; to help, aff  
 relieve all who require it, in the m  
 hospitable, kind, and friendly manne  
 And can *your Country*, or what is mo  
*your* KIND, require less Kindness fro  
 you, or deserve less to be consider'd, th  
 even one of these Chance Creatures?--  
 O PHILOCLES! how little do you kno  
 the Extent and Power of *Good-natur*  
 and to what an heroick pitch a Soul m  
 rise, which knows the thorow force  
 it; and distributing it rightly, frames  
 it-self an equal, just, and universal Frien  
 ship!

*Good na-  
 ture.*

JUST as he had ended these Words  
 a Servant came to us in the Field, to gi  
 notice of some Company, who were con  
 to dine with us, and waited our comit

1. So we walk'd home-wards. I told THEOCLES, going along, that I fear'd I should never make a good *Friend* or *Lover* after his way. As for a plain natural love of *one single* Person in either Sex, I could compass it, I thought, well enough; but this *complex universal* sort was beyond my reach. I could love the Individual, but not the Species. This was too mysterious; too metaphysical an Object for me. In short, I could love nothing of which I had not some sensible material image.

Sect. I.

*Mystical  
Love.*

How! reply'd THEOCLES, can you ever love except in this manner? when yet I know that you admir'd and lov'd a friend long ere you knew his Person. Or was PALEMON'S Character of no force, when it engag'd you in that long correspondence which preceded your *late* personal Acquaintance? The Fact said I) I must, of necessity, own to you. And now, methinks, I understand your Mystery, and perceive how I must prepare for it: For in the same manner as when I first began to love PALEMON, I was forc'd to form a kind of material Object, and had always such a certain Image of him, ready drawn, in my Mind, whenever I thought of him; so I must endeavour to order it in the Case before us: if possibly by your help I can raise any such

Part 2. such Image, or Specter, as may represent this odd Being you wou'd have me love.

METHINKS, said he, you might have the same Indulgence for NATURE MANKIND, as for *the People of ROME*; whom, notwithstanding their Blemishes, I have known you in love with many ways; particularly under the Representation of a beautiful Youth call'd *the GENIUS of the People*. For I remember, that viewing once some Pieces of Antiquity, where the People were thus presented, you allow'd 'em to be no disagreeable Object.

*Genius of a Country.*

*Nature.*

INDEED, reply'd I, were it possible to stamp upon my Mind such a Figure as you speak of, whether it stood for *Mankind* or *Nature*, it might probably have its effect; and I might become perhaps a *Lover* after your way: But more especially, if you cou'd so order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and to bring me to fancy of this GENIUS, that cou'd be "sensible of my Love, and capable of a *Return*." For without this, I shou'd make but an ill Lover, tho' of the perfectest Beauty in the World.

'TIS enough, said THEOCLES, I accept the Terms: And if you promise *love*, I will endeavour to shew you *the*

BEAUTY

BEAUTY which I count *the perfectest*, Sect. 2.  
 and *most deserving of LOVE*; and which  
 will not fail of a *Return*.---- To-morrow,  
 when the eastern Sun (as Poets describe)  
 with his first Beams adorns the front of  
 yonder Hill; there, if you are content to  
 wander with me in the Woods you see,  
 we will pursue those *Loves* of ours, by  
 favour of the Silvan Nymphs; and in-  
 voking first *the Genius of the Place*, we'll  
 try to obtain at least some faint and distant  
 view of *the sovereign GENIUS* and *first* Genius of  
the World.  
*beauty*. This if you can come once to  
 contemplate, I will answer for it, that all  
 those forbidding Features & Deformitys,  
 whether of *Nature* or *Mankind*, will va-  
 nish in an instant, and leave you that  
*Love* I cou'd wish.---But now, enough!---  
 let us to our *Company*; and change this  
 conversation for some other more suitable  
 to our *Friends* and *Table*.

## S E C T. II.

YOU see here, PALEMÓN, what a  
 Foundation is laid for the *Enthusiasms*  
 I told you of; and which, in my Opinion  
 (I told you too) were the more dangerous,  
 because so very odd, and out of the way.  
 If Curiosity had seiz'd you, I perceiv'd,  
 as it had done me before. For after this  
 Conversation, I must own, I long'd  
 VOL. II. L for

Part 2. for nothing so much as the next day, at the appointed Morning-walk in the *Wood*.

WE had only a Friend or two at dinner with us; and for a good while we discours'd of News and indifferent things till I, who had my head still running upon those other Subjects, gladly laid hold of something dropt by chance concerning *Friendship*; and said, That for my own part, truly, tho' I once thought I had known *Friendship*, & really counted myself a *good Friend* during my whole Life yet I was now perswaded to believe myself no better than a *Learner*: since THEOCLES had almost convinc'd me, "That to be a *Friend* to any one in particular 'twas necessary to be first a *Friend* to *Mankind*." But how to qualify myself for such a *Friendship*, was, methought, little difficulty.

INDEED, said THEOCLES, you have given us a very indifferent Character of your-self, in saying so. If you had spoken thus of the *Friendship* of any *great Man* at Court, or perhaps of a *Court* itself and had complain'd "How hard it was for you to succeed, or make Interference with such as govern'd there;" we should have concluded in your behalf, that there were such Terms to be complied with, as were unworthy of you. E



To deserve well of *the Publick*," and Sect. 2.  
 To be justly styl'd *the Friend of Man-*  
*kind*," requires no more than to be good <sup>Virtue,</sup>  
 and virtuous; Termes which for one's  
 own sake one wou'd naturally covet.

How comes it then, said I, that even <sup>Motives?</sup>  
 these good *Terms* themselves are so ill ac-  
 cepted, and hardly ever taken (if I may so  
 express it) except on *further Terms*? For  
 VIRTUE, *by it-self*, is thought but an ill  
 bargain: and I know few, even of the Re-  
 gious and Devout, who take up with it  
 any otherwise than as Children do with  
 hyfick; where the Rod and Sweetmeat  
 are the potent Motives.

THEY are Children indeed, reply'd  
 HERCLES, and shou'd be treated so,  
 who need any Force or Persuasion to do  
 what conduces to their Health & Good.  
 But, where, I beseech you, are those for-  
 bidding Circumstances which shou'd make  
*virtue* go down so hardly? It is not, a-  
 mong other things, that you think your-  
 self by this means precluded the fine Ta-  
 kes and costly Eating of our modern *Epi-*  
*ures*; and that perhaps you fear the being  
 educ'd to eat always as ill as now, upon a  
 main Dish or two, and no more?

THIS, I protested, was injuriously sup-  
 pos'd of me. For I wish'd never to eat

Part 2. otherwise than I now did, at his Table which, by the way, had more resemblance (I thought) of EPICURUS's, than tho' which now-a-days preposterously pass under his name. For if his Opinion might be taken, the highest Pleasures in the World were owing to *Temperance*, and *moderate Use*.

*Tempe-  
rance.*

IF then the merest Studier of *Pleasure* (answer'd THEOCLES) even EPICURUS himself, made that favourable Report of *Temperance*, so different from his modern Disciples; if he cou'd boldly say "That with such Fare as a mean Garder afforded, he cou'd vie even with the Gods for Happiness;" how shall we say of this part of Virtue, that it need be *taken upon Terms*? If the immediate Practice of *Temperance* be thus harmless are its Consequences injurious? Does it take from the Vigour of the Mind, consume the Body, and render both the one and the other less apt to their proper Exercises, "the Enjoyments of Reason or Sense, or the Employments & Offices of Civil Life?" Or is it that a Man's Circumstances are the worse for it, as he stands towards his Friends, or Mankind? Is a Gentleman in this sense to be pity'd "As *One* burdensem to himself, and others; *One* whom all Men will naturally shun, as an ill Friend, and a Corrupter

" c

of Society and Good Manners?---Shall Sect. 2.  
 we consider our Gentleman in a *publick*  
*Trust*, and see whether he is like to suc-  
 ceed best with this restraining Quality;  
 whether he may be more rely'd on, &  
 thought more incorrupt, if his Appetites  
 be high, and his Relish strong towards  
 that which we call Pleasure? Shall we  
 consider him as a *Soldier*, in a Campaign,  
 or Siege; and advise with our-selves how  
 we might be best defended, if we had oc-  
 casion for such a one's Service? Which  
 Officer wou'd make the best for the  
 Soldiers; Which Soldier for the Offi-  
 cers; or Which Army for their Coun-  
 try?---- What think you of our Gen-  
 tleman, for a *Fellow-traveller*? Wou'd  
 he, as a temperate Man, be an ill Choice?  
 Wou'd it indeed be more eligible and de-  
 lightful "To have a Companion, who,  
 in any shift or necessity, wou'd prove the  
 most ravenous, and eager to provide in  
 the first place for himself, and his own  
 exquisite Sensations?"---- I know not  
 what to say where *Beauty* is concern'd.  
 Perhaps the *amorous Galants*, and exquisite  
*Refiners* on this sort of Pleasure, may have  
 refin'd their Minds and Tempers, that,  
 notwithstanding their accusom'd Indul-  
 gence, they can, upon occasion, renounce  
 their Enjoyment, rather than violate Ho-  
 nour, Faith, or Justice.---- And thus, at  
 last, there will be little Virtue or Worth

Part 2.

Tempe-  
rance.

ascrib'd to this patient sober *Character*  
 " The dull *temperate Man* is no fitter to  
 " be trusted than the elegant *luxurious one*  
 " Innocence, Youth, and Fortune may  
 " be as well committed to the Care of this  
 " latter Gentleman. He wou'd prove as  
 " good an *Executor*, as good a *Trustee*  
 " as good a *Guardian*, as he wou'd  
 " *Friend*. The Family which entrusted  
 " him wou'd be secure; & no Dis-honour  
 " in any likelihood, wou'd happen from  
 " the honest *Man of Pleasure*."

THE Seriousness with which THE  
 OCLES spoke this, made it the more  
 pleasant; and set our other Company up  
 on saying a great many good things on the  
 same subject, in commendation of a *tempe-  
 rate Life*. So that our Dinner by this  
 time being ended, and the Wine, accord-  
 ing to Custom, plac'd before us; I found  
 still we were in no likelihood of proceed-  
 ing to a Debauch. Every-one drank only  
 as he fancy'd, in no Order or Proportion  
 and with no regard to circular Healths or  
 Pledges: A Manner which the sociable  
 Men of another Scheme of Morals wou'd  
 have censur'd no doubt, as a heinous Ir-  
 regularity, and Corruption of *Good Fel-  
 lowship*.

I OWN

Sect. 2.

I OWN (said I) I am far from thinking TEMPERANCE so disagreeable a Character. As for this part of Virtue, I think there is no need of taking it on any other *Terms* to recommend it, than the mere Advantage of being sav'd from Intemperance, and from the desire of things unnecessary.

How! said THEOCLES, are you thus r. advanc'd? And can you carry this *temperance* so far as to Estates and Honours by opposing it to *Avarice* and *Ambition*? ----- Nay, then truly, you may be said to have fairly embark'd your-self in this Cause. You have pass'd the Channel, and are more than half-seas over. There remains no further Scruple in the case of Virtue, unless you will declare your-self *Coward*, or conclude it a happiness to be born one. For if you can be *temperate* withal towards LIFE, and think it not so great a business, whether *it* be of fewer or more *Years*; but satisfy'd with what you have liv'd, can rise a thankful Guest from a full liberal Entertainment; Is not this the Sum of all? the finishing Stroke and very Accomplishment of *Virtue*? In this Temper of Mind, what is there can hinder us from forming for our-selves as we choise *a Character* as we please? What is there either *good*, *generous* or *great*,

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which

Part 2. which does not naturally flow from such a modest TEMPERANCE? Let us once gain this simple plain-look'd *Virtue*, and see whether the more shining *Virtues* will not follow. See what that *Country of the Mind* will produce, when by the wholesome *Laws* of this *Legislatress* it has obtain'd its *Liberty*! You, PHILOCLEES, who are such an Admirer of *Civil Liberty*, and can represent it to your-self with a thousand several *Graces* and *Advantages*; can you imagine no *Grace* or *Beauty* in that original *native Liberty*, which sets us free from so many in-born *Tyrannys*, gives us the *Privilege* of our-selves, and makes us *our own*, and independent? A sort of *Property*, which, methinks, is as material to us to the full, as that which secures us our *Lands*, or *Revenues*.

LIBER-  
TY.  
Civil.

Moral.

I SHOU'D think, said he (carrying on his Humour) that one might draw the Picture of this *moral Dame* to as much advantage as that of her *political Sister*; whom you admire, as describ'd to us "in  
" her *AMAZON-Dress*, with a free man-  
" ly Air becoming her; her *Guards* the  
" *Laws*, with their written *Tables*, like  
" *Bucklers*, forrounding her; *Riches*,  
" *Traffick*, and *Plenty*, with the *Cornucopia*,  
" serving as her *Attendants*; and in her  
" *Train* the *Arts* and *Sciences*, like *Children*,  
" playing." --- The rest of the Piece  
is

easy to imagine: " Her Triumph over Sect. 2  
 Tyranny, and lawless Rule of Lust and  
 Passion. "--But what a Triumph wou'd  
 er Sister's be! What Monsters of savage  
 affions wou'd there appear subdu'd!  
 There fierce *Ambition, Lust, Uproar,*  
*Misrule,* with all the *Fiends* which rage  
 in human Breasts, wou'd be securely  
 chain'd. And when *Fortune* her-self, the  
 Queen of Flatterys, with that Prince of  
 Terrors, *Death,* were at the Chariot-  
 wheels, as Captives; how natural wou'd  
 it be to see *Fortitude, Magnanimity,*  
*Justice, Honour,* and all that generous  
 Band attend as the Companions of our  
 inmate Lady LIBERTY! She, like some  
 new-born Goddess, wou'd grace her  
 Mother's Chariot, & own her Birth from  
 humble *Temperance,* that nursing Mo-  
 ther of the Virtues; who like the Parent  
 of the Gods (old Reverend CYBELE):  
 wou'd properly appear drawn by rein'd  
 Lions, patient of the Bit, and on her  
 Head a Turret like Attire: the Image  
 of defensive Power, and Strength of  
 Mind."

BY THIS Picture THEOCLES, I  
 found, had given Entertainment to the  
 Company; who from this rough Draught  
 of his, fell to designing upon the same  
 subject, after the antient manner; till

Part 2. PRODICUS and CEBES, and all the Antients were exhausted.

*VIRTUE.* GENTLEMEN, said I, the Description you have been making, are, no doubt, the finest in the world: But after all, when you have made *Virtue* as glorious and triumphant as you please, I will bring you an authentick Picture of another kind where we shall see this Triumph *in reverse*; “*VIRTUE* her-self a *Captive* in her turn; and by a proud Conqueror triumph’d over, degraded, spoil’d of all her Honours, and defac’d; so as to retain hardly one single Feature of real Beauty.” ---

I OFFER’D to go on further, but could not, being so violently decry’d by my two Fellow guests; who protested they would never be brought to own so detestable Picture: And one of ’em (a formal sort of Gentleman, somewhat advanc’d in Years looking earnestly upon me, said, in an angry Tone, “That he had hitherto, in deed, conceiv’d some hopes of me; notwithstanding he observ’d my *Freedom of Thought*, and heard me quoted for such a passionate Lover of *Liberty* But he was sorry to find that my Principle of Liberty extended in fine to Liberty from all Principles” (so he express’d himself) “And none, he thought  
“ belid



“beside a Libertine in Principle wou’d ap- Sect. 2.  
 “prove of such a Picture of Virtue, as on-  
 “ly an *Atheist* cou’d have the impudence  
 “to make.”

THEOCLES the while sat silent; tho he  
 saw I minded not my Antagonists, but kept  
 my Eye fix’d steddily on himself, expecting  
 to hear what he wou’d say. At last, fetch-  
 ing a deep Sigh, O PHILOCLES, said  
 he, how well you are Master of that  
 Cause you have taken on you to defend!  
 How well you know the way to gain ad-  
 vantage to the worst of Causes, from the  
 imprudent Management of those who de-  
 fend the best! — I dare not, for my own  
 share, affirm to you, as my worthy Friends  
 have done, “That ’tis the *Atheist* alone  
 “can lay this load on *Virtue*, and picture  
 “her thus disgracefully.” — No —  
 There are other over-officious and less sus-  
 pected Hands, which do her perhaps more  
 injury, tho with a better colour.

THAT *Virtue* shou’d, with any shew  
 of Reason, be made a *Victim* (continu’d  
 he, turning himself to his Guests) must  
 have appear’d strange to you; no doubt,  
 to hear asserted with such assurance as has  
 been done by PHILOCLES. You cou’d  
 conceive no tolerable ground for such a  
 Spectacle. In this *revers’d Triumph* you  
 expected perhaps to see some foreign Con-

Part 2. queror exalted ; as either *Vice* it-self, or *Pleasure*, *Wit*, *spurious Philosophy*, or some *false Image of Truth* or *Nature*. Little were you aware that the cruel Enemy oppos'd to *Virtue* shou'd be *RELIGION* it-self! But you will call to mind, that even innocently, and without any treacherous design, *Virtue* is often treated so, by those who wou'd magnify to the utmost the Corruption of Man's Heart; and in exposing, as they pretend, the Falseness of *human Virtue*, think to extol *Religion*. How many religious Authors, how many sacred Orators turn all their edge this way, and strike at *moral Virtue* as a kind of *Step-dame*, or *Rival* to *RELIGION*! —“ \* *Mo-*  
 “ *rality* must not be nam'd; *Nature* has  
 “ no pretence; *Reason* is an Enemy; *Com-*  
 “ *mon Justice*, Folly; and *Virtue*, Misery.  
 “ Who wou'd not be vicious, had he his  
 “ Choice? Who wou'd forbear, but be-  
 “ cause *he must*? Or who wou'd value  
 “ *Virtue*, but for *hereafter*?“-----

TRULY, said the old Gentleman (inter-rupting him) if this be the *Triumph* of *Religion*, 'tis such as her greatest Enemy, I believe, wou'd scarce deny her; and I must still be of opinion (with *PHILO-CLES*'s leave) that it is no great sign of *Tenderness* for *Religion*, to be so zealous in honouring her at the cost of *Virtue*.

PERHAPS

Sect. 2.

PERHAPS so, said I. Yet that there are many such Zealots in the World, you will acknowledg. And that there is a certain Harmony between this *Zeal* and what you call *Atheism*, THEOCLES, you hear, has allow'd. --- But let us hear him out; if perhaps he will be so free as to discover to us what he thinks of the generality of our religious Writers, and their Method of encountering their common Enemy, *the Atheist*. This is a Subject which possibly may need a better clearing. For 'tis notorious that the chief Opposers of *Atheism* write upon contrary Principles to one another, so as in a manner to confute themselves. Some of 'em hold zealously for *Virtue*, and are *Realists* in the Point. Others, one may say, are only *Nominal Moralists*, by making *Virtue* nothing in it-self, a Creature of Will only, or a mere Name of Fashion. 'Tis the same in natural Philosophy: Some take one Hypothesis, and some another. I shou'd be glad to discover once the true Foundation; and distinguish those who effectually confute their other Antagonists as well as the *Atheists*, and rightly assert the joint-Cause of *Virtue* and *Religion*.

MORALISTS,  
Nominal,  
Real,  
Naturalists.

HERE, PALEMON, I had my Wish.  
For by degrees I engag'd THEOCLES to  
L 7 discover

Part 2. discover himself fully upon these Subjects which serv'd as a Prelude to those we were to engage in, the next Morning; for the approach of which, I so impatiently long'd. If his Speculations prov'd *of a rational kind* this previous Discourse (I knew) wou'd help me to comprehend 'em; if only *pleasing Fancies*, this wou'd help me however to please my-self the better with 'em.

HERE then began his Criticism of Authors; which grew by degrees into a continu'd Discourse. So that had this been a University, THEOCLES might very well have pass'd for some grave Divinity-Professor, or Teacher of *Ethicks*, reading a Afternoon Lecture to his Pupils.

### S E C T. III.

*Divinity.*

IT wou'd be undoubtedly, said he, a happy Cause which cou'd have the benefit of such Managers as shou'd never give their Adversarys any handle of advantage against it. I cou'd wish that in the Cause of RELIGION we had reason to boast much. But since 't is not impossible to write ill even in the best of Causes, I am inclin'd to think this great one of *Religion* may have run at least an equal hazard with any other; since they who write in defence of it, are apt generally to use

much

*Divines.*

much the less caution, as they are more exempt from the fear of Censure or Criticism in their own Person. Their Adversary is well secur'd and silenc'd to their hand. They may safely provoke him to a Field where he cannot appear openly, or as a profess'd Antagonist. His Weapons are private, & can often reach the *Cause* without offence to its *Maintainers*; whilst no direct Attack robs them of their imaginary Victory. They conquer for themselves, and expect to be approv'd still for their Zeal, however the *Cause* it-self may have suffer'd in their hands. —

Sect. 3.

PERHAPS then, said I, (interrupting him) it may be true enough, what was said once by a Person, who seem'd zealous for Religion, " That none *writ well* against the Atheists beside the *Clerk* who drew the Warrant for their Execution." *Atheists.*

IF this were the *true Writing*, reply'd he, there wou'd be an end of all Dispute or Reasoning in the Case. For where Force is necessary, Reason has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if Reason be needful, Force in the mean while must be laid aside: For there is no enforcement of Reason, but by Reason. And therefore if *Atheists* are to be reason'd with, at all; they are to be reason'd with, like other Men;

Part 2.

Men; since there's no other way in nature to convince 'em,

*Atheist.*

— THIS I own, said I, seems rational and just: But I'm afraid that most of the devout People will be found ready to abandon the *patient*, for the more *concise* Method. And tho' Force without Reason may be thought somewhat hard, yet your other way of Reason without Force, I am apt to think, wou'd meet with fewer Admirers.

BUT perhaps, reply'd THEOCLES, 'tis a mere Sound which troubles us. The Word or Name of *Atheist* may possibly occasion some Disturbance, by being made to describe two Characters so very different as His who *absolutely denies*, and His who *only doubts*. Now he who *doubts*, may possibly lament his own Unhappiness and wish to be convinc'd. He who *denies*, is daringly presumptuous, and sets up an Opinion against the Interest of Mankind, and Being of Society. 'Tis easily seen that *one* of these Persons may bear due respect to the Magistrate and Laws, tho' not *the other*; who being obnoxious to them, is therefore punishable. But how the former is punishable *by Man*, will be hard to say; unless the Magistrate had dominion over Minds, as well as over Actions and Behaviour; and had power to exercise

*Punishment.*

exercise an Inquisition within the inmost  
bosoms and secret Thoughts of Men. Sect: 3:

I APPREHEND you, said I. And by  
our account, as there are *two* sorts of  
people who are call'd Atheists, so there  
are *two* ways of writing against them,  
which may be fitly us'd apart, but not so  
well jointly. You wou'd set aside mere  
Menaces, and separate the *Philosopher's*  
Work from the *Magistrate's*; taking it for *Magistrate's*  
granted, that the more discreet and sober  
part of Unbelievers, who come not under  
the dispatching Pen of the Magistrate,  
can be affected only by the more delibe-  
rate and gentle one of Philosophy. Now  
the Language of the Magistrate, I must  
confess, has little in common with that of  
Philosophy. Nothing can be more unbe-  
coming the magisterial Authority than a  
philosophical Style: and nothing can be  
more unphilosophical than a magisterial  
one. A Mixture of these must needs spoil  
both. And therefore, in the Cause be-  
fore us, "If any one besides the Magi-  
strate can be said to *write well*; 'tis HE  
(according to your account) who writes  
as becomes Philosophy, with Freedom  
of Debate, and Fairness towards his  
Adversary."

ALLOW it, reply'd he. For what can  
more equitable? Nothing. But

Part 2. will *the World* be of the same Opinion. And may this Method of writing be justly practis'd in it? Undoubtedly it may. And for a Proof, we have many Instance in Antiquity to produce. The Freedom taken in this philosophical way was never esteem'd injurious to Religion, or prejudicial to the Vulgar: since we find it to have been a Practice both in Writing and Converse among the great Men of a virtuous & religious People; and that even those Magistrates who officiated at the Altars, & were the Guardians of the publick Worship were Sharers in these free Debates.

*Philosophy.*

FORGIVE me, THEOCLES, (said I) if I presume to say, that still this reaches not the Case before us. We are to consider *Christian* Times, such as are now present. You know the common Fate of those who dare to appear *fair Authors*. What was that pious and learned Man's Case, who wrote *the Intellectual System of the Universe*? I confess it was pleasant enough to consider, that tho' the whole World were no less satisfy'd with his Capacity and Learning, than with his Sincerity in the Cause of *Deity*; yet was he accus'd of giving the upper hand to the Atheists, for having only stated their Reasons, and those of their Adversarys, fairly together. And among other Writings of this kind, you may remember how a certain

*Jealousy of Authors.*

tain



in *Fair* INQUIRY (as you call'd it) Sect. 3.  
as receiv'd and what offence was taken  
it.

I AM sorry, said THEOCLES, it prov'd  
But now indeed you have found a  
ay which may, perhaps, force me to  
scourge at large with you on this head;  
entering the Lists in defence of a  
riend unjustly censur'd for this philoso-  
ical Liberty.

I CONFESS'D to THEOCLES and the  
ompany, that this had really been my  
im: And that for this reason alone I  
ade my self the Accuser of this Author;  
Whom I here actually charg'd as I did  
all those other *moderate calm* Writers,  
with no less than Profaneness, for rea-  
soning so unconcernedly and patiently,  
without the least shew of Zeal or Pas-  
sion, upon the Subject of a Deity, and  
a future state."

And I, on the other side, reply'd THE-  
OCLES, am rather for this patient way of  
reasoning; & will endeavour to clear my  
riend of this Imputation, if you can have  
tience enough to hear me out, in an Af-  
r of such a compass.

WE all answer'd for our-selves, and he  
gan thus,

OF

## Part 2.

*Authors.*

OF THE many Writers engag'd in the Defence of Religion, it seems to me that the greatest part are employ'd, either in supporting the Truth of the Christian Faith in general, or in refuting such particular Doctrines as are esteem'd Innovations in the Christian Church. There are not, 'tis thought, many Persons in the World who are loose in the very Ground and Principles of all Religion: And such as these we find, indeed, there are not many Writers who purposely apply themselves. They may think it a mean Labour, and scarce becoming them, to argue sedately with such as are almost universally treated with Detestation and Horror. But as we are requir'd by our Religion to have Charity for all Men, so we cannot surely avoid having a real Concern for those whom we apprehend to be under the worst of Errors, and whom we find by Experience to be with the greatest difficulty reclaim'd. Neither ought they perhaps in prudence to be treated with so little regard, whose Number, however small, is thought to be rather increasing; and this too among the People of no despicable Rank. So that it may well deserve some Consideration, " Whether in our Age & " Country the same Remedys may serve " which have hitherto been try'd; or " whethe

whether some other may not be prefer'd, Sect. 3.  
 as being futable to Times of less Strict-  
 nefs in Matters of Religion, and Places  
 less fubject to Authority."

THIS might be enough to put an Au-  
 thor upon thinking of fuch a way of rea-  
 soning with thefe deluded Perfons, as in  
 his Opinion might be more effectual for  
 their Benefit, than the repeated *Exclama-*  
*ons* and *Invectives* with which moft of  
 the Arguments us'd againft them are com-  
 monly accompany'd. Nor was it fo ab-  
 furd to imagine that a quite different Me-  
 thod might be attempted; by which a  
 Writer might offer Reason to thefe Men  
 with fo much more Favour & Advantage,  
 as he appear'd un-prepoffefs'd and willing  
 to examine every thing with the greateft  
 Concern and Indifference. For to fuch  
 Perfons as thefe, 'tis to be fear'd, 'twill  
 always appear, "That what was never  
*question'd*, was never *prov'd*: and That  
 whatever Subject had not, at fome time  
 or other, been examin'd with perfect In-  
 difference, was never *rightly examin'd*,  
 nor cou'd *rightly be believ'd*". And in  
 a Treatife of this kind, offer'd as an *Essay*  
 : *Inquiry* only, they wou'd be far from  
 finding that Impartiality and Indifference  
 which is requifite; if inftead of a Readi-  
 nefs to comply with whatever Confequen-  
 ces fuch an Examination as this, and the  
 Course

Part 2. Course of Reasoning brought forth; the Author shou'd shew a previous inclination to the Consequences only on one side, an Abhorrence of any Conclusion on the other.

*Authors.*

OTHERS therefore, in different circumstances, may perhaps have found it necessary, and becoming their *Character*, to shew all manner of Detestation both of the Persons and Principles of these Men. Our Author, on the contrary, whose Character exceeds not that of a *Lay-man*, endeavours to shew Civility and Favour, by keeping the fairest Measures he possibly can with the Men of this sort; allowing, as far as he is able, and arguing with a perfect Indifference, even on the subject of a *Deity*. He offers to conclude nothing positive himself, but leaves it to others to draw Conclusions from his Principles: having this one chief Aim and Intention

“ How, in the first place, to reconcile  
 “ these Persons to *the Principles of Virtue*;  
 “ *that*, by this means, a Way might  
 “ be laid open to *Religion*; by removing  
 “ those greatest, if not only Obstacles to  
 “ it, which arise from the Vices and Passions  
 “ of Men.”

*Fundamental Principles.*

'T IS upon this account he endeavours chiefly to establish *Virtue* on Principles by which he is able to argue with those who

who are not as yet induc'd to own a GOD, Sect. 3.  
 or *Future State*. If he cannot do thus  
 much, he reckons he does nothing. For  
 how can *Supreme Goodness* be intelligible  
 to those who know not what *Goodness it-*  
*self* is? Or how can *Virtue* be understood  
 to deserve *Reward*, when as yet its *Merit*  
 and *Excellence* is unknown? We begin  
 surely at the wrong end, when we wou'd  
 prove *MERIT* by *Favour*, and *ORDER*  
 by a *Deity*. — This our Friend seeks to  
 address. For being, in respect of *VIRTUE*,  
 what you lately call'd a *Realist*; he en-  
 deavours to shew, "That it is really some-  
 thing *in it-self*, and in the nature of  
 Things: not arbitrary or *factitious* (if  
 I may so speak) not constituted from  
 without, or dependent on *Custom*, *Fan-*  
*cy*, or *Will*; not even on the *Supreme*  
*Will* it-self, which can no-way govern  
 it: but being *necessarily good*, is go-  
 vern'd by it, and ever uniform with it."  
 And notwithstanding he has thus made  
*VIRTUE* his chief Subject, and in some  
 measure independent on *Religion*, yet I  
 fancy he may possibly appear at last as high  
*Divine* as he is a *Moralist*.

I wou'd not willingly advance it as <sup>Theists,</sup>  
 Rule, "That those who make only a <sup>Nominal,</sup>  
*Name* of *VIRTUE* make no more of <sup>Real.</sup>  
*DEITY*, and cannot without *Affecta-*  
*tion* defend the Principles of *Religion*:"  
 But

Part 2. But this I will venture to assert; "Th  
 " whoever sincerely defends VIRTU  
 " and is a *Realist* in MORALITY, mu  
 " of necessity, in a manner, by the sam  
 " Scheme of Reasoning, prove as very  
 " *Realist* in DIVINITY."

Theists,  
 Nominal,  
 Real.

ALL *Affectation*, but chiefly in Philo  
 sophy, I must own, I think unpardonable  
 And you, PHILOCLES, who can give n  
 quarter to ill Reasoning, nor endure an  
 unsound or inconsistent Hypothesis; yo  
 will be so ingenuous, I dare say, as to re  
 ject our modern DEISM, and challeng  
 those who assume a Name to which the  
*Philosophy* can never in the least intitle 'em

COMMEND me to honest EPICURUS  
 who raises his DEITYS aloft in the ima  
 ginary Spaces; and setting 'em apart ou  
 of the Universe and Nature of Things  
 makes nothing of 'em beyond a *Word*  
 This is ingenuous, and plain dealing: Fo  
 this every one who philosophizes may easi  
 ly understand.

THE same Ingenuity belongs to thos  
 Philosophers whom you, PHILOCLES  
 seem inclin'd to favour. When a SCEP  
 TICK questions, "Whether a *real Theo*  
 " *logy* can be rais'd out of *Philosophy* alone  
 " without the help of *Revelation*;" he  
 does no more than pay a handsom Com  
 pliment

oliment to Authority & therreceiv'd Religion. He can impose on no-one who Sect. 3.  
 reasons deeply: since whoever does so, will easily conceive, that at this rate Theology must have no Foundation at all. For Revelation it self, we know, is founded on the Acknowledgment of a divine Existence: And 'tis the Province of Philosophy alone to *prove* what Revelation only *supposes*.

I LOOK on it, therefore, as a most unfair way, for those who wou'd be *Builers*, and undertake this *proving* part, to lay such a Foundation as is insufficient to bear the Structure. Supplanting and Undermining may, in other cases, be *fair War*: But in philosophical Disputes, 'tis not allowable to work under-ground, or as in Sieges *by the Sap*. Nothing can be more unbecoming than to talk magisterially and in venerable Terms of „A *supreme NATURE*, an *infinite Being*, and A *DEITY*;" when all the while a *Providence* is never meant, nor any thing like *Order* or *the Government of a Mind* admitted. For when *these* are understood, and *real Divinity* acknowledg'd; the Notion is not dry, and barren; but such Consequences are necessarily drawn from it, as must set us in Action, and find Employment for our strongest Affections. All the *Dutys* of RELIGION evidently follow hence;

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## Part 2.

Theists,  
Nominal,  
Real.

and no exception remains against any of those great Maxims which *Revelation* has establish'd.

Now whether our Friend be unfeign'd & sincerely of this latter sort of *real Theologists*, you will learn best from the Consequences of his *Hypothesis*. You will observe, whether instead of ending in *mere Speculation*, it leads to *Practice*: And you will then surely be satisfy'd, when you find such a Structure rais'd, as with the Generality of the World must pass at least for *big Religion*, and with some, in all likelihood for no less than ENTHUSIASM.

Divine  
Love.

FOR I appeal to you, PHILOCLE whether there be any thing in *Divinity* which you think has more the Air of *Enthusiasm* than that Notion of *Divine Love* such as separates from every thing world sensual, or meanly-interested? A Love which is *simple, pure, and unmix'd*; which has no other Object than merely *the Excellency of that Being it-self*, nor admits any other Thought of Happiness, than *its single Fruition*. Now I dare presume you will take it as a substantial proof of my Friend's being far enough from *Irreligion*, if it be shewn that he has espous'd this *Notion*, and thinks of making out this *big Point of Divinity*, from Arguments familiar even to those who oppose *Religion*.

Acco



ACCORDING, therefore, to his Hy- Sect. 3.  
 othesis, he wou'd in the first place, by  
 way of prevention, declare to you, That  
 the *disinterested Love of GOD* were  
 the most excellent Principle; yet he knew  
 very well, that by the indiscreet Zeal of  
 some devout well-meaning People it had  
 been stretch'd too far, perhaps even to  
 extravagance & Enthusiasm; as formerly  
 among the *Mysticks* of the antient Church, *Mysticks.*  
 whom these of latter days have follow'd.  
 On the other hand, that there were those  
 who in opposition to this devout mystick  
 way, and as profess'd Enemy's to what  
 they call *Enthusiasm*, had so far exploded  
 every thing of this ecstastick kind, as in a  
 manner to have given up Devotion; and  
 reality had left so little of Zeal, Affec-  
 tion, or Warmth, in what they call their  
*rational Religion*, as to make them much  
 suspected of their Sincerity in *any*. For  
 to it be natural enough (he wou'd tell  
 you) for a mere political Writer to ground  
 a great Argument for Religion on the  
 necessity of such a Belief as that of a fu-  
 ture Reward and Punishment; yet, if you  
 will take his Opinion, 'tis a very ill Fo-  
 undation of Sincerity in Religion, and in the  
 Christian Religion more especially, to re-  
 ceive it to such a Philosophy as will allow  
 room to that other Principle of *Love*;  
 which treats all of that kind as *Enthusiasm*,

Part 2.

for so much as aiming at what is call'd *Disinterestedness*, or teaching the *Love of God or Virtue* for GOD or VIRTUE'S sake

HERE, then, we have two sorts of People (according to my Friend's account) who in these opposite Extremes expose *Religion* to the Insults of its Adversary. For as, on one hand, 'twill be found difficult to defend the Notion of that high rais'd Love, espous'd with so much warmth by those devout *Mysticks*; so, on the other hand, 'twill be found as hard a Task upon the Principles of these cooler Men to guard Religion from the Imputation of Mercenariness, and a slavish Spirit. How shall one deny, that to serve God by Compulsion, or for Interest merely is *servile* and *mercenary*? Is it not evident, that the only *true* and *liberal* Service paid either to that supreme Being, or any other Superior, is *that*, „ which proceeds from an *Esteem* or *Love* of the Person serv'd, a *Sense* of Duty or Gratitude, and a *Love* of the dutiful and grateful Part, as *good* and *amiable*, „ *it-self*?" And where is the Injury to *Religion*, from such a Concession as this? Or what Detraction is it from the Belief of an After-Reward or Punishment, „ own „ That the Service caus'd by it, „ not equal to that which is *voluntary* and „ *with Inclination*, but is rather differing „ *no*

RELIGION,  
liberal;  
liberal.

Sect. 3.

„nuous and of the slavish kind?” Is it  
 not still for the Good of Mankind and  
 of the World, that Obedience to the Rule  
 of Right shou'd some way or other be  
 paid; if not *in the better way*, yet at least  
*in this imperfect one?* And is it not to be  
 hewn, „ That altho this Service of *Fear*  
 „ be allow'd ever so low or base: yet RE-  
 „ LIGION still being a *Discipline*, and  
 „ *Progress* of the Soul towards Perfection,  
 „ the Motive of Reward and Punishment  
 „ is primary and of the highest moment  
 „ with us, till being capable of more sub-  
 „ lime Instruction, we are led from this  
 „ *servile* state, to the generous Service of  
 „ *Affection and Love?*” *Rewards  
and Pun-  
ishments.*

To this it is that in our Friend's Opi-  
 nion we ought all of us to aspire, so as to  
 endeavour „ That *the Excellence of the*  
 „ *Object*, not the *Reward or Punishment*,  
 „ shou'd be our Motive: But that where  
 „ thro' the Corruption of our Nature, the  
 „ *former* of these Motives is found insuffi-  
 „ cient to excite to Virtue, there the *latter*  
 „ shou'd be brought in aid, and on no ac-  
 „ count be undervalu'd or neglected.” *Supplemen-  
tal Motives.*

Now this being once establish'd, how  
 can RELIGION be any longer subject  
 to the Imputation of *Mercenariness*? But  
 thus we know Religion is often charg'd.  
 „ *Godliness*, say they, *is great Gain*: nor

Part 2. „ is G O D devoutly serv'd *for nought.*” --  
 Is this therefore a Reproach? Is it confess'd there may be a *better Service, a more generous Love?* — Enough, there need no more. On this Foundation our Friend presumes it easy to defend RELIGION and even that *devoutest Part*, which is esteem'd so great a Paradox of Faith. For if there be in Nature such a Service as that of Affection and Love, there remains the only to consider of *the Object*, whether there be really that *supreme One* we suppose. For if there be *divine Excellence* in Things: if there be in Nature a *supreme Mind* or D E I T Y; we have then an Object consummate, and comprehensive of all which is *good or excellent*. And this Object, of all others, must of necessity be the most amiable, the most ingaging, and of highest Satisfaction and Enjoyment. Now that there is such a principal Object as this in the World, the World alone (if I may say so) by its wise and perfect Order must evince This Order, if indeed perfect, excludes all *real ILL*. And that it really does so, is what our Author so earnestly maintains, by solving the best he can those untoward *Phænomena* and ill Signs, taken from the Course of Providence, in the seemingly unequal Lot of *Virtue* in this World.

Object of  
Love.

'TIS true: tho the Appearances hold ever so strongly against *Virtue*, and in fa  
 vou.

your of *Vice*, the Objection which arises Sect. 3.  
 nence against a DEITY; may be easily  
 remov'd, and all set right again on the sup-  
 posal of a *future State*. This to a Chri- *Future*  
 stian, or one already convinc'd of so great *State.*  
 a Point, is sufficient to clear every dark  
 Cloud of Providence. For he needs not  
 be over-and-above solicitous as to the Fate  
 of VIRTUE *in this World*, who is secure  
 of *Hereafter*. But the case is otherwise as  
 to the People we are here to encounter.  
 They are at a loss for Providence, and  
 seek to find it in the World. The Aggra-  
 vation of the appearing Disorders in world-  
 ly Affairs, & the blackest Representation  
 of Society and Human Nature, will hard-  
 ly help 'em to this View. 'T will be diffi-  
 cult for 'em to read Providence in such  
 Characters. From so uncomely a Face of  
 things *below*, they will presume to think  
 unfavourably of all *above*. By the *Effects*  
 they see, they will be inclin'd to judg *the*  
*Cause*; and by the Fate of *Virtue* to deter-  
 mine of a *Providence*. But being once  
 convinc'd of Order and a Providence as *Previous*  
 to things *present*, they may soon, perhaps, *Proof.*  
 be satisfy'd even of a *future State*. For  
 if Virtue be to it-self no small Reward,  
 and Vice in a great measure its own Pu-  
 nishment; we have a solid ground to go  
 upon. The plain Foundations of a distri-  
 butive Justice, & due Order in this World,  
 may lead us to conceive a further Building.

Part 2.

A Provi-  
dence.  
O R D E R.

We apprehend a larger Scheme, and easily resolve our-selves why Things were not compleated in this State; but their Accomplishment reserv'd rather to some further period. For had the good and virtuous of Mankind been wholly prosperous in this Life; had Goodness never met with Opposition, nor Merit ever lain under Cloud; where had been the Trial, Victory, or Crown of *Virtue*? Where had the Virtues had their Theater, or whence their Names? Where had been *Temperance* or *Self-denial*? Where *Patience*, *Meekness*, *Magnanimity*? Whence have these their being? What *Merit*, except from Hardship? What *Virtue* without a Conflict and the Encounter of such Enemies as arise both within, and from abroad?

BUT as many as are the Difficulty which *Virtue* has to encounter in this World, her force is yet superior. Expos'd as she is here, she is not however abandon'd or left miserable. She has enough to raise her above Pity, tho not above our Wishes: and as happy as we see her here, we have room for further Hope in her behalf. Her present Portion is sufficient to shew Providence already engag'd on her side. And since there is such Provision for her *here*, such Happiness and such Advantages even in this Life; how probable must it appear, that this providential

dential Care is extended yet further to a *Succeeding Life*, and perfected *hereafter*? Sect. 3.

THIS is what, in our Friend's opinion, may be said in behalf of a future State, to those who question Revelation. 'Tis this must render Revelation probable, and secure that first step to it, the Belief of a Deity and Providence. A Providence must be prov'd from what we see of Order in things present. We must contend for Order; and in this part chiefly, where Virtue is concern'd All must not be refer'd to a *Hereafter*. For a disorder'd State, in which all present Care of Things is given up, Vice uncontroul'd, and Virtue neglected, represents a very *Chaos*, and reduces us to the belov'd Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the Atheists. Recapitulation.

WHAT therefore can be worse done in the Cause of a *Deity*, than to magnify Disorder, and exaggerate (as some zealous People do) the Misfortunes of Virtue, so far as to render it an unhappy Choice with respect to this World? They err widely, who propose to turn Men to the Thoughts of a *better World*, by making 'em think so ill of *this*. For to declaim in this manner against *Virtue* to those of a looser Faith, will make 'em the less believe a *Deity*, but not the more a *future State*. Future State.

M 5.

that.

Part 2.

Favourers  
of the Opi-  
nion.

that any Man, by having the most elevated Opinion of Virtue, and of the Happiness it creates, was ever the less inclin'd to the Belief of a future State. On the contrary, it will ever be found, that they who are Favourers of Vice are always the least willing to hear of a future Existence; so they who are in love with Virtue, are the readiest to embrace the Opinion which renders it so illustrious and makes its Cause triumphant.

Antients.

Friendship.

THUS it was, that among the Antients the great Motive which inclin'd so many of the wisest to the Belief of this Doctrine unreveal'd to 'em, was purely *the Love of Virtue* in the Persons of those great Men the *Founders and Preservers* of Society the *Legislators, Patriots, Deliverers, Heroes*, whose Virtues they were desirous shou'd live & be immortaliz'd. Nor is there at this day any thing capable of making the Belief more engaging among the Good and Virtuous than *the Love of Friendship*, which creates in 'em a Desire not to be wholly separated by Death, but that they may enjoy the same bless'd Society hereafter. How is it possible, then, that an Author shou'd, for exalting *Virtue* merely, be deem'd an Enemy to a *future State*? How can our Friend be judg'd false to *Religion* for defending a Principle on which the very Notion of *GOD* and *Goodness* depends.



pende? For this he says only, and this is Sect. 3.  
 the Sum of all: „ That by building a fu-  
 „ ture State on the Ruins of *Virtue*, RE-  
 „ LIGION in general, and the Cause of *Conclusion.*  
 „ a *Deity* is betray'd; and by making Re-  
 „ wards and Punishments the principal  
 „ Motives to Duty, the Christian Religion  
 „ in particular is overthrown, and its grea-  
 „ test Principle, that of *Love*, rejected  
 „ and expos'd.”

UPON the whole then, we may justly  
 as well as charitably conclude, that it is  
 truly *our Author's* Design, in applying him-  
 self with so much Fairness to the Men of  
 loose Principles, to lead 'em into such an  
 Apprehension of the Constitution of Man-  
 kind & of human Affairs, as might form  
 in 'em a Notion of *Order in Things*, and  
 draw hence an Acknowledgment of that  
 Wisdom, Goodness, and Beauty, which is  
 supreme; that being thus far become Pro-  
 felytes, they might be prepar'd for that  
*divine Love* which our Religion wou'd  
 teach 'em, when once they shou'd embrace  
 its Precepts, and form themselves to its sa-  
 cred Character.

THUS, continu'd he, I have made  
 my Friend's Apology; which may have  
 shewn him to you perhaps a good *Mora-*  
*list*; and, I hope, no Enemy to Religion.

Part 2.

Conclusion.

But if you find still that *the Divine* has not appear'd so much in his Character as I promis'd, I can never think of satisfying you in any ordinary way of Conversation. Shou'd I offer to go further, might be engag'd deeply in spiritual Affairs and be forc'd to make some new Model of a *Sermon* upon his System of Divinity. However, I am in hopes, now that it good earnest Matters are come well nigh to *Preaching*, you will acquit me for what I have already perform'd.

## S E C T. IV.

**J**UST as he had made an end of speaking came in some Visitants, who took us up the remaining part of the Afternoon in other Discourses. But these being over and our Strangers gone, (all except *the old Gentleman*, and *his Friend*, who had din'd with us) we began a-new with THE C L E S, by laying claim to his Sermon, and intreating him, again and again, to let us hear him, at large, in his *theological* way.

THIS he complain'd was persecuting him: As you have seen Company, said he often persecute a reputed Singer, not out of any fancy for the Musick, but to satisfy a malicious sort of Curiosity, which ends commonly in Censure and Dislike.

How

HOWEVER it might be, we told him Sect. 4.  
we were resolv'd to persist. And I assur'd  
our Companions, that if they wou'd se-  
cond me heartily in the manner I intended  
to press him, we shou'd easily get the  
better.

IN revenge then, said he, I will com-  
ply on this Condition; That since I am to  
sustain the part of *the Divine and Preacher*,  
it shall be at PHILOCLE'S cost; who  
shall bear the Part of *the Infidel*, and stand  
for the Person *preach'd to*.

TRULY, said the old Gentleman, the  
*Part* you have propos'd for him is so natu-  
ral and sutable, that, I doubt not, he will  
be able to act it without the least Pain.  
I cou'd wish rather, that you had spar'd  
your-self the trouble of putting him thus  
in mind of his proper *Character*. He  
wou'd have been apt enough of his own  
accord to interrupt your Discourse by his  
perpetual Cavils. Therefore since we have  
now had Entertainment enough by way of  
*Dialogue*, I desire the *Law* of SERMON  
may be strictly observ'd; and „ That  
„ there be no *answering* to whatever is ar-  
„ gu'd or *advanc'd*.”

I CONSENTED to all the Terms, and  
told THEOCLES I wou'd stand his Mark  
M 7 willingly:

Part 2. willingly: And besides, if I really were that *Infidel* he was to suppose me, I shou'd count it no Unhappiness; since I was sure of being so thorowly convinc'd by him, i he wou'd vouchsafe to undertake me.

THEOCLES then propos'd we shou'd walk out; the *Evening* being fine, & the free Air suting better ( as he thought ) with such Discourses, than a Chamber.

ACCORDINGLY we took our Evening-Walk in the Fields, from whence the laborious Hinds were now retiring. We fell naturally into the Praises of *Country-Life*; and discours'd a-while of *Husbandry*, and the Nature of the *Soil*. Our Friends began to admire some of the *Plants* which grew here to great perfection. And it being my fortune (as having acquir'd a little Insight into the nature of *Simples*) to say something they might approve'd upon this Subject, THEOCLES immediately turning about to me; „ „ my ingenious Friend!” said he, „ who „ Reason, in other respects, must be allow'd „ so clear and happy; How is it possible „ that with such Insight, and accurate „ Judgment in the *Particulars* of nature's „ Beings and Operations, you shou'd not „ better judg of the Structure of Things „ in general, and of the Order and Fram

„ C

„ of NATURE? Who better than your-  
 „ self can shew the Structure of each  
 „ Plant & Animal-Body, declare the Of-  
 „ fice of every *Part* and *Organ*, and tell  
 „ the Uses, Ends, and Advantages to  
 „ which they serve? How therefore, Sect. 4.  
Organiz-  
zation.  
 „ shou'd you prove so ill a *Naturalist* in  
 „ *this WHOLE*, and understand so little  
 „ the Anatomy of *the World* and *Nature*,  
 „ as not to discern the same Relation of  
 „ Parts, the same Consistency and Unifor-  
 „ mity in *the Universe*!

„ SOME Men perhaps there are of so  
 „ confus'd a Thought, and so irregularly  
 „ form'd *within themselves*, that 'tis no  
 „ more than natural for them to find fault,  
 „ and imagine a thousand Inconsistencies  
 „ and Defects in this *wider Constitution*.  
 „ 'Twas not, we may presume, the abso-  
 „ lute Aim or Interest of the Universal Na-  
 „ ture, to render every private-one infal-  
 „ lible, and without defect. 'Twas not  
 „ its Intention to leave us without some  
 „ Pattern of Imperfection; such as we  
 „ perceive in Minds, like these, perplex'd  
 „ with froward Thought. But you, my  
 „ Friend, are Master of a nobler Mind.  
 „ You are conscious of better Order *with-*  
 „ *in*, and can see Workmanship and Ex-  
 „ actness in your-self, and other *innumera-*  
 „ *ble Parts* of the Creation, Can you an-  
 „ swer it to your-self, allowing thus much

„ not

Part 2. „ not to allow all? Can you induce your  
 „ self ever to believe or think, that when  
 „ there are Parts so variously united, and  
 „ conspiring fitly within themselves, *the*  
 WHOLE „ *Whole* it self shou'd have neither Unio  
 and Parts. „ nor Coherence; and where inferior and  
 „ private Natures are often found so per  
 „ fect, *the Universal-one* shou'd want Per  
 „ fection, and be esteem'd like whatsoever  
 „ can be thought of, most monstrous, rude  
 „ and imperfect?

„ STRANGE! That there shou'd be  
 „ *Nature* the Idea of an Order and Per  
 „ fection, which NATURE her-self wants  
 „ That Beings which arise from *Nature*  
 „ shou'd be so perfect, as to discover Im  
 „ perfection in her Constitution; and to  
 „ be wise enough to correct that Wisdom  
 „ which they were made!

„ NOTHING surely is more strongly  
 „ imprinted on our Minds, or more closely  
 „ interwoven with our Souls, than the  
 Proportion. „ Idea or Sense of *Order* and *Proportion*  
 „ Hence all the Force of *Numbers*, and  
 „ those powerful *Arts* founded on the  
 „ Management and Use. What a differ  
 „ ence there is between *Harmony* and  
 „ *Discord!* *Cadency* and *Convulsion*  
 „ What a difference between compos'd &  
 „ orderly Motion, & that which is ungo  
 „ vern'd and accidental! between the re  
 „ gula

gular and uniform Pile of some noble Architect, & a Heap of Sand or Stones! Sect. 4.  
 between an organiz'd Body, and a Mist or Cloud driven by the Wind!

„ Now as this Difference is immediately perceiv'd by a plain internal Sensation, so there is withal in Reason this account of it; That whatever Things have *Order*, the same have *Unity of Union*, *Design*, and concur in *one*, are Parts constituent of *one* WHOLE, or are, in themselves, *intire Systems*. Such is a *Tree*, with all its Branches; an *Animal*, with all its Members; an *Edifice*, with all its exterior and interior Ornaments. What else is even a *Tune* or *Symphony*, or any excellent Piece of Musick, than a certain *System* of proportion'd Sounds?

„ Now in this which we call the *System*, UNIVERSE, whatever the Perfection may be of any *particular Systems*; or whatever *single Parts* may have Proportion, Unity, or Form within themselves; yet if they are not united all in general, in \* ONE *System*, but are, in „ respect

\* *Vid.* LOCKE of human Understanding, Book IV. Chap. 6. §. 11.

*Ac mihi quidem Veteres illi majus quiddam animo complexi, multo plus etiam vidisse videntur, quam quantum nostrorum ingeniorum acies intueri potest: qui omnia hæc, que supra & subter, unum esse, & una vi, atque una consensu*

Part 2. „ respect of one another, as the drive  
 „ Sands, or Clouds, or breaking Waves  
 System. „ then there being no Coherence in the  
 „ Whole, there can be infer'd no Order  
 „ no Proportion, and consequently no  
 „ Project or *Design*. But if none of the  
 „ Parts are independent, but all apparent  
 „ united, then is the WHOLE a *System*  
 „ compleat, according to one *simple, con-*  
 „ *sistent, and uniform DESIGN.*

„ HERE then is our main Subject, in  
 „ sifted on: That neither *Man*, nor any  
 „ other Animal, tho ever so compleat  
 „ *System* of Parts, as to all *within*, can be  
 „ allow'd in the same manner compleat;  
 „ to all *without*; but must be consider'd  
 „ having a further relation abroad to the  
 „ *System of his Kind*. So even this *System*  
 „ of his Kind to the *Animal-System*; this  
 „ the *World* (our *Earth*;) and this again  
 „ to the *bigger World*, & to the *Univer-*  
 „ *AL*

Animal.  
System.

*sione natura constricta esse dixerunt. Nullum est enim ge-*  
*nerum, quod aut avulsum à cæteris per seipsum consta-*  
*nt quo cætera si careant, vim suam, atque aternitatem co-*  
*servare possint. Cicero de Oratore, lib. 3.*

*Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana concis-*  
*sunt, unum est: membra sumus corporis magni. Sene-*  
*Epist. 95.*

*Societas nostra Lapidum fornicationi simillima est: q-*  
*casura, nisi invicem obstarent, hoc ipso sustinetur. Ibidem.*

*Estne Dei Sedes, nisi Terra, & Pontus, & Æther,*  
*Et Cæum, & Virtus? Superos quid querimus ultra?*  
*Jupiter est quodcumque vides, quocumque moveris*

*Lucan lib. 2.*



„ ALL things in this World are *united*. Seat. 4.  
 For as the *Branch* is united with the *Tree*, so is the *Tree* as immediately with the *Earth, Air, and Water*, which feed it. *System of the World.*  
 As much as the fertile *Mould* is fitted to the *Tree*, as much as the strong and upright *Trunk* of the *Oak* or *Elm* is fitted to the twining *Branches* of the *Vine* or *Ivy*; so much are the very *Leaves, the Seeds, & Fruits* of these *Trees* fitted to the various *Animals*: These again to one another, and to the *Elements* where they live, & to which they are, as *Appendices*, in a manner fitted & join'd; as either by *Wings* for the *Air, Fins* for the *Water, Feet* for the *Earth, & by other correspondent inward Parts* of a more curious *Frame & Texture*. Thus in contemplating all on *Earth*, we must of necessity view *All in One*, as holding to one common *Stock*. Thus too in the *System* of the bigger *World*. See there the mutual *Dependency* of *Things*! the *Relation* of one to another; of the *Sun* to this inhabited *Earth, & of the Earth & other Planets* to the *Sun*! the *Order, Union, & Coherence* of *the Whole*! And know (my ingenious *Friend*) that by this *Survey* you will be oblig'd to own the *UNIVERSAL SYSTEM*, & coherent *Universal System.*  
*Scheme* of *Things*, to be establish'd on  
 abun-

Part 2. „ abundant Proof, capable of convincin  
 „ any fair and just Contemplator of th  
 „ Works of Nature. For scarce wou  
 „ any-one, till he had well survey'd th  
 „ universal Scene, believe a *Union* th  
 „ evidently demonstrable, by such n  
 „ merous & powerful Instances of mutu  
 „ Correspondency and Relation, from t  
 „ minutest Ranks and Orders of Bein  
 „ to the remotest Spheres.

*Appea-  
 rance of ill  
 necessary.*

„ Now, in this mighty UNION,  
 „ there be such Relations of Parts one  
 „ another as are not easily discover'd;  
 „ on this account the End and Use  
 „ Things does not every-where appe  
 „ there is no wonder; since 'tis no mo  
 „ indeed than what must happen of r  
 „ cessity: Nor cou'd supreme Wiscd  
 „ have otherwise order'd it. For in  
 „ Infinity of Things thus relative, a Mi  
 „ which sees not *infinitely*, can see nothi  
 „ *fully*: And since each Particular has  
 „ lation to all in general, it can know  
 „ perfect or true Relation of any Thir  
 „ in a World not perfectly and ful  
 „ known.

*Solution.*

„ THE same may be consider'd in a  
 „ dissected Animal, Plant, or Flowe  
 „ where he who is no Anatomist, n  
 „ vers'd in natural History, sees that  
 „ many *Parts* have a relation to *the Whole*

for thus much even a slight View affords: But he who like you, my Friend, is curious in the Works of Nature, and has been let into a Knowledge of the animal and vegetable World, he alone can readily declare the just Relation of all these Parts to one another, and the several Uses to which they serve. Sect. 4.

„ BUT if you wou'd willingly enter further into this Thought, & consider how much we ought not only to be satisfy'd with this our View of Things, but even to admire its Clearness; imagine only some Person intirely a Stranger to Navigation, and ignorant of the Nature of the Sea or Waters; how great his Astonishment wou'd be, when finding himself on board some Vessel, anchoring at Sea, remote from all Land-prospect, whilst it was yet a Calm, he view'd the ponderous Machine firm and motionless in the midst of the smooth Ocean, and consider'd its Foundations beneath, together with its Cordage, Masts, and Sails above. How easily wou'd he see *the Whole* one regular Structure, all things depending on one another; the Uses of the Rooms *below*, the Lodgments, and Conveniences of Men and Stores? But being ignorant of the Intent or Design of all *above*,  
 „ wou'd

Part 2. „ wou'd he pronounce the Masts and Cords  
 „ to be uselefs and cumberfom, and  
 „ for this reason condemn the Frame, and  
 „ despise *the Architect*? O my Friend  
 „ let us not thus betray our Ignorance  
 „ but confider where we are, and in what  
 „ a Universe. Think of the many Parts  
 „ of the vast Machine, in which we have  
 „ fo little Infight, and of which it is im-  
 „ possible we shou'd know the Ends and  
 „ Ufes; when instead of feeing to the  
 „ highest *Pendants*, we fee only some *low*  
 „ *Deck*, & are in this dark Cafe of Flesh  
 „ confin'd even to *the Hold*, and mean  
 „ Station of the Veffel.

„ Now having recogniz'd this uniform  
 „ confistent Fabrick, and own'd the *Un-*  
 „ *iversal System*, we must of confequence  
 „ acknowledg a *Universal MIND*; which  
 „ no ingenious Man can be tempted to  
 „ difown, except thro' the Imagination or  
 „ Diforder in the Universe, its Seat. For  
 „ can it be fuppos'd of any-one in the  
 „ World, that being in some Defart far  
 „ from Men, and hearing there a perfect  
 „ Symphony of Mufick, or feeing an ex-  
 „ act Pile of regular Architecture arifing  
 „ gradually from the Earth in all its Or-  
 „ ders and Proportions, he shou'd be per-  
 „ suaded that at the bottom there was no  
 „ *Design* accompanying this, no secre-  
 „ Spring of *Thought*, no active *Mind*.  
 „ Wou'd

*Universal  
 Mind.*

Wou'd he, because he saw no Hand, Sect. 4.  
deny the Handy-Work, & suppose that  
each of these compleat and perfect Sys-  
tems were fram'd, and thus united in  
just Symmetry, and conspiring Order,  
either by the accidental blowing of the  
Winds, or rolling of the Sands?

„ WHAT is it then shou'd so disturb *Distur-*  
our Views of *Nature*, as to destroy that *bance,*  
Unity of Design and Order of a *Mind,* *whence:*  
which otherwise wou'd be so apparent?  
All we can see either of the Heavens or  
Earth, demonstrates Order and Perfec-  
tion; so as to afford the noblest Subjects  
of Contemplation to Minds, like yours,  
enrich'd with Sciences and Learning.  
All is delightful, amiable, rejoicing, ex-  
cept with relation to *Man* only, and  
his Circumstances, which seem unequal. *Human*  
Here the Calamity and Ill arises; and *Affairs.*  
hence the Ruin of this goodly Frame.  
All perishes on this account; and the  
whole Order of the Universe, elsewhere  
so firm, intire, and immoveable, is here  
o'erthrown, and lost by this one view;  
in which we refer all things to our-  
selves: submitting the Interest of *the* *Selfishness*  
*Whole* to the Good and Interest of so  
small a *Part.*

„ BUT how is it you complain of the  
unequal state of Man, and of the few  
Advan-

Part 2. „ Advantages allow'd him above t  
 „ Beasts? What can a Creature claim,  
 „ little differing from 'em, or whose M  
 „ rit appears so little above 'em, except  
 „ *Wisdom* and *Virtue*, to which so fe  
 „ conform? Man may be virtuous; a  
 „ by being so, is happy. His Merit  
 „ Reward. By *Virtue* he deserves; a  
 „ in *Virtue* only can meet his Happiness  
 „ deserv'd. But if even *Virtue* it-self be u  
 „ provided for, & *Vice* more prosperou  
 „ be the better Choice; if this (as y  
 „ suppose) be in the Nature of Thing  
 „ then is all Order in reality inverted, a  
 „ supreme *Wisdom* lost: Imperfection  
 „ Irregularity being, after this manne  
 „ undoubtedly too apparent in the mo  
 „ World.

*Virtue and  
 Vice.*

*Their  
 Power,  
 Effect.*

*A Mind.*

„ H A V E you then, ere you pronounce  
 „ this Sentence, consider'd of the state  
 „ *Virtue & Vice* with respect to *this L*  
 „ *merely*; so as to say, with assurance  
 „ When, and how far, in what partic  
 „ lars, and how circumstantiated, the o  
 „ or the other is *Good* or *Ill*? You w  
 „ are skill'd in other *Fabricks & Con*  
 „ positions, both of *Art & Nature*, ha  
 „ you consider'd of the *Fabricks* of  
 „ *Mind*, the Constitution of the *Soul*, t  
 „ Connexion & Frame of all its *Passio*  
 „ and *Affections*; to know according  
 „ the Order and Symmetry of the Pa  
 „ a

and how it either improves or suffers; Sec. 4.  
 what its Force is, when naturally pre-  
 serv'd in its sound state; and what be-  
 comes of it, when corrupted and a- *Impro-*  
 bus'd? Till this (my Friend!) be well *ment.*  
 examin'd and understood, how shall we  
 judg either of the Force of *Virtue*, or  
 Power of *Vice*? Or in what manner  
 either of these may work to our Hap-  
 piness or Undoing?

„ HERE therefore is that INQUIRY  
 we shou'd first make. But who is there  
 can afford to make it as he ought? If  
 happily we are born of a good Nature;  
 if a liberal Education has form'd in us  
 a generous Temper and Disposition, *Tempora*  
 well-regulated Appetites, and worthy  
 Inclinations, 'tis well for us; and so  
 indeed we esteem it. But who is there  
 endeavours to give these to himself,  
 or to advance his Portion of Happi-  
 ness in this kind? Who thinks of im-  
 proving, or so much as of preserving  
 his share, in a World where it must of  
 necessity run so great a hazard, and  
 where we know an honest Nature is  
 so easily corrupted? All other things  
 relating to us are preserv'd with Care,  
 and have some Art or OEconomy be-  
 longing to 'em; this which is nearest  
 related to us, and on which our Hap-  
 piness depends, is alone committed to  
 VOL. II. N Chance:

Part 2. „ Chance: And *Temper* is the only thing  
 „ ungovern'd, whilst it governs all the re-

*Appetites.* „ THUS we inquire concerning what  
 „ is good and suitable to our Appetites  
 „ but what Appetites are good and fi-  
 „ table to us, is no part of our Examin-  
 „ tion. We inquire what is according  
 „ *Interest, Policy, Fashion, Vogue*; but  
 „ seems wholly strange, and out of the  
 „ way, to inquire what is according to Na-  
 „ TURE. The Ballance of EUROPE  
 „ of Trade, of Power, is strictly sought  
 „ after; while few have heard of *the Ba-*  
*Ballance.* „ *lance of their Passions*, or thought  
 „ holding these Scales even. Few are ac-  
 „ quainted with this Province, or know-  
 „ ing in these Affairs. But were we mo-  
 „ so (as this *Inquiry* wou'd make us) w  
 „ shou'd then see Beauty and Decorum  
 „ here, as well as elsewhere in Nature  
 „ and the Order of the Moral World  
 „ wou'd equal that of the Natural. E  
 „ this the *Beauty of VIRTUE* wou'd ap-  
 „ pear; and hence (as has been shew'd  
*Virtue.* „ *the Supreme and Sovereign BEAUTY*  
*Deity.* „ the Original of all which is Good &  
 „ Amiable.

„ BUT lest I shou'd appear at last to  
 „ like an *Enthusiast*, I chuse to express  
 „ my Sense, & conclude this *Philosophical*  
 „ *Sermon* in the words of one of those an-  
 „ tier



tient *Philologists*, whom you are us'd to esteem. For *Divinity* it-self, says he, is surely beauteous, and of all Beautys the brightest; tho not a beauteous Body, but that from whence the Beauty of Bodys is deriv'd: Not a beauteous Plain, but that from whence the Plain looks beautiful. The River's Beauty, the Sea's, the Heaven's, and Heavenly Constellations, all flow from hence as from a Source Eternal and Incorruptible. As Beings partake of this, they are fair, and flourishing, and happy: As they are lost to this, they are deform'd, perish'd and lost."

Sect. 4.

WHEN THEOCLES had thus spoken he was formally complimented by our *Two* companions. I was going to add something in the same way: but he presently stop'd me, by saying, he shou'd be scandaliz'd, if instead of commending him, I did not according to my *Character*, chuse rather to criticize some part or other of his long Discourse.

IF it must be so then, reply'd I; in the first place, give me leave to wonder that, instead of the many Arguments commonly brought for proof of a *Deity*, you make use only of one single one to build on. I expected to have heard from you, in custo-

Part 2. many form, of a *first Cause*, a *first Being* and a *Beginning of Motion*: How clear the *Idea* was of an *immaterial Substance*: An how plainly it appear'd, that at some time or other *Matter must have been created*. But as to all this, you are silent. As for what is said, of, „ A material unthinking „ Substance being never able to have „ produc'd an immaterial thinking one; I readily grant it: but on the condition that this great Maxim of *Nothing being ever made from Nothing*, may hold as well on my side as my Adversary's. And then, I suppose, that whilst the World endures, he will be at a loss how to assign Beginning to *Matter*; or how to suggest Possibility of annihilating it. The spiritual Men may, as long as they please, represent to us, in the most eloquent manner, „ That *Matter* consider'd in a thousand „ different Shapes, join'd and disjoint, „ join'd, vary'd & modify'd to Eternity „ can never, of it-self, afford one single „ Thought, never occasion or give rise to „ any thing like Sense or Knowledge. Their Argument will hold good against a DEMOCRITUS, an EPICURUS, or any of the elder or latter *Atomists*. But it will be turn'd on them by an examining *Academist*: and when the two Substances are fairly set asunder, and consider'd as part as different kinds; 'twill be as strong Sense, and as good Argument, to say a

wel

*Matter  
and  
Thought.*

vell of the *immaterial kind*; „ That do Sect. 4.  
 , with it as you please, modify it a thou-  
 , sand ways; purify it, exalt it, sublime  
 , it, torture it ever so much, or rack it,  
 , as they say, with thinking; you will  
 , never be able to produce or force the  
 , contrary Substance out of it.” The  
 poor Dregs of sorry *Matter* can no more  
 be made out of the simple pure Substance  
 of immaterial *Thought*, than the high Spi-  
 rits of *Thought* or *Reason* can be extracted  
 from the gross Substance of heavy *Matter*.  
 So let the *Dogmatists* make of this Argu-  
 ment what they can.

BUT for your part, continu'd I, as you  
 have stated the Question, 'tis not about  
 what was *first*, or *foremost*; but what  
 is *instant*, and *now* in being. „ For if  
 , DEITY be *now* really extant; if by any  
 , good Token it appears that there is *at*  
 , *this present* a universal Mind; 'twill ea-  
 , sily be yielded there *ever* was one.”-----  
 This is your Argument.----- You go (if I  
 may say so) upon *Fact*, and wou'd prove  
 that things *actually are* in such a state and  
 condition, which if they really *were*, there  
 wou'd indeed be no dispute left. Your  
 UNION is your main Support. Yet  
 how is it you provethis? What Demon-  
 stration have you given? What have  
 you so much as offer'd at, beyond *bare*  
*Probability*? So far are you from demon-

Part 1. *strating* any thing, that if this uniting Scheme be the chief Argument for Deity (as you tacitly allow) you seem rather to have demonstrated, „ That the Case it-self „ is incapable of Demonstration.” For „ How, say you, can a narrow Mind see „ *All Things?*” ---- And yet if, in reality, it sees not *All*, It had as good see *Nothing*. The demonstrable part is still as far behind. For grant that this *All* which lies within our view or knowledge is orderly and united, as you suppose this mighty *All* is a mere Point still; a very Nothing compar'd to what remains

*Atheistical Hypothesis.* „ 'Tis only a separate *By-World* (we'll „ say) of which perhaps there are, in the „ wide Waste, Millions besides, as horrid „ and deform'd, as this of ours is regular and proportion'd. In length of „ time, amidst the infinite Hurry and „ Shock of Beings, this *single odd World* „ by accident, might have been struck „ out, and cast into some Form (as among infinite *Chances*, what is there „ which may not happen?) But for the „ rest of *Matter*, 'tis of a different hue. „ Old *Father CHAOS* (as the Poets call „ him) in these wild Spaces, reigns absolute, and upholds his Realms of „ Darknes. He presses hard upon our „ Frontier; and one day, belike, shall „ by a furious Inroad recover his lost „ Right, conquer his Rebel-State, and re-  
„ unite

unite us to primitive *Discord* and *Con-* Sect. 4.  
*fusion.*“

THIS, said I, THEOCLES! (concluding my Discourse) is all I dare offer in opposition to your *Philosophy*. I imagin'd, indeed, you might have given me more scope: But you have retrench'd your-self in narrower Bounds. So that to tell you truth, I look upon your *Theology* to be hardly so fair or open as that of our Divines in general. They are strict, it's true, as to *Nimes*; but allow a greater latitude in *Things*. Hardly indeed can they bear a home-Charge, a downright questioning of *Deity*: But in return, they give always fair play against NATURE, NATURE and allow her to be challeng'd for her arraign'd. failings. She may freely err, and we as freely censure. *Deity*, they think, is not accountable for her: Only she for herself. But you are stricter, and more precise in this point. You have unnecessarily brought *Nature* into the Controversy, and taken upon you to defend her Honour so highly, that I know not whether it may be safe for me to question her.

LET not this trouble you, reply'd THEOCLES: but be free to censure *Nature*; whatever may be the Consequence. 'Tis only *my Hypothesis* can suffer. If I defend it ill, my Friends need not be scandaliz'd.

Part 2. daliz'd. They are fortify'd, no doubt with stronger Arguments for a Deity, and can well employ those *metaphysical* Weapons, of whose Edge you seem so little apprehensive. I leave them to dispute this Ground with you, whenever they think fit. For my own Arguments, if they can be suppos'd to make any part of this Defense, they may be look'd upon only as distant Lines, or Outworks, which may easily perhaps be won; but without any danger to the Body of the Place.

NOT WITHSTANDING, then, said I, that you are willing I shou'd attack NATURE *in Form*, I chuse to spare her in all other Subjects, except MAN only. How comes it, I intreat you, that in this noblest of Creatures, and worthiest her Care, she shou'd appear so very weak and impotent; whilst in mere *Brutes*, and the irrational Species, she acts with so much Strength, and exerts such hardy Vigour? Why is she spent so soon in feeble *Man*, who is found more subject to Diseases, and of fewer years than many of the *wild Creatures*? They range secure; and proof against all the Injurys of Seasons and Weather, want no help from *Art*, but live in careless Ease, discharg'd of Labour, and freed from the cumberfom Baggage of a necessitous human

NATURE  
*in Man.*

*In Brutes.*

man-Life. In Infancy more helpful, vigorous in Age, with Senses quicker, and more natural Sagacity, they pursue their Interests, Joys, Recreations, and cheaply purchase both their Food & Maintenance; cloth'd and arm'd by Nature her-self, who provides them both a Couch and Mansion. So has Nature order'd for the rest of Creatures. Such is their Hardiness, Robustness, Vigour. Why not the same for *Man*?----- Sect. 4.

AND do you stop thus short, said THEOCLES, in your Expostulation? Methinks 'twere as easy to proceed, now you are in the way; and instead of laying claim to some few Advantages of other Creatures, you might as well stand for *All*, Nature is: and complain „ That *Man*, for his part, Man.  
 „ shou'd be any thing less than a Consumption of all Advantages & Privileges  
 „ which Nature can afford.” Ask not merely, why *Man* is naked, why unhoof'd, why slower-footed than the Beasts? Ask, „ Why he has not *Wings* also for the  
 „ Air, *Fins* for the Water, and so on; that  
 „ he might take possession of *each* Element, and reign in *All*?”

NOT so, said I, neither. This wou'd beto rate him high indeed! As if he were, by Nature, LORD of *All*: which is more than I cou'd willingly allow.

N. 5.

'TIS.

Part 2.

'TIS enough, reply'd he, that this is yielded. For if we allow once a *Subordination* in his case; if *Nature* her-self be not for MAN, but *Man* for NATURE; then must *Man*, by his good leave, submit to *the Elements* of NATURE, and not *the Elements* to him. Few of these are at all fitted to him: and none perfectly. If he be left in *Air*, he falls headlong; for *Wings* were not assign'd him. In *Water* he soon sinks. In *Fire* he consumes. Within *Earth* he suffocates.-----

As for what Dominion he may naturally have in other Elements, said I, my concern truly is not very great in his behalf; since by Art he can even exceed the Advantages Nature has given to other Creatures: But for *the Air*, methinks it had been wonderfully obliging in Nature to have allow'd him Wings.

Volatiles.

AND what wou'd he have gain'd by it, reply'd THE OCLES? For consider what an alteration of *Form* must have ensu'd. Observe in one of those wing'd Creatures, whether the whole Structure be not made subservient to this purpose, and all other Advantages sacrific'd to this single Operation. The Anatomy of the Creature shews it, in a manner, to be *all Wing*: its chief Bulk being compos'd of

Anatomy.



two exorbitant Muscles, which exhaust the Sect. 4.  
 Strength of all the other, and engross (if  
 I may say so) the whole OEconomy of  
 the Frame. 'Tis thus the aerial Racers  
 are able to perform so rapid and strong a  
 Motion, beyond comparison with any o-  
 ther kind, and far exceeding their little  
 share of Strength elsewhere: these Parts  
 of theirs being made in such superior  
 proportion, as in a manner to *starve* their  
 Companions. And in Man's Architec-  
 ture, of so different an Order, were the  
 flying Engines to be affix'd; must not  
 the other Members suffer, and the multi-  
 ply'd Parts starve one another? What  
 think you of the Brain in this Partition? *The Brain.*  
 Is it not like to prove a *Starveling*? Or  
 wou'd you have it be maintain'd at the  
 same high rate, and draw the chief Nou-  
 rishment to it-self, from all the rest?----

I UNDERSTAND YOU, said I, THE-  
 OCLES (interrupting him:) The Brain  
 certainly is a great *Starver*, where it a-  
 bounds; and the thinking People of the  
 World, the *Philosophers* and *Virtuoso's* es-  
 pecially must be contented (I find) with  
 a moderate share of bodily Advantages,  
 for the sake of what they call *Parts* and *Capacity* in another sense. *Parts.*  
 The Parts, it  
 seems, of one kind agree ill in their OEco-  
 nomy with the Parts of the other. But  
 to make this even on both sides, let us

Part 2.

turn the Tables; and the Case, I suppose, will stand the same with the MILO's of the Age, the Men of bodily Prowess and Dexterity. For not to mention a vulgar sort, such as *Wrestlers, Vaulters, Racers, Hunters*; what shall we say of our fine-bred Gentlemen, our *Riders, Fencers, Dancers, Tennis-players*, and such like? 'Tis the Body surely is the *Starver* here: and if the Brain were such a terrible Devourer in the other way; the Body and bodily Parts seem to have their Reprisals in this Rank of Men.

Balance.

IF then, said he, the Case stands thus between *Man & Man*, how must it stand between *Man & a quite different Creature*? If the BALANCE be so nice, that the least thing breaks it, even in Creatures of the same Frame and Order; of what fatal effect must it be to change *the Order* it-self, and make some essential Alteration in the Frame? Consider therefore how it is we censure *Nature* in these and such-like Cases. "Why, says one, was I not made by Nature strong as a *Horse*?" "Why not hardy and robust as this *Brute-Creature*? or nimble and active as that other?"-----And yet when uncommon Strength, Agility, and Feats of Body are subjoin'd, even in our own Species, see what befalls! So that for a Person thus in love with an *Athletick MILO-*

NEAN

NEAN Constitution, it were better, methinks, and more modest in him, to change the Expostulation, and ask, „ Why was „ I not made in good earnest *a very* „ BRUTE?“ For that wou'd be more suitable.

Sect. 4.

I AM apt indeed, said I, to think that the Excellence of MAN lies somewhat different from that of *a Brute*: and that such amongst us as are more truly *Men*, shou'd naturally aspire to manly Qualities, and leave the Brute his own. But Nature, I see, has done well to mortify us in this particular, by furnishing us with such slight Stuff, and in such a tender Frame, as is indeed wonderfully commodious to support that Man-Excellence of *Thought* and *Reason*; but wretchedly scanty and ineffectual for other Purposes. As if it were her very Design, „ To „ hinder us from aspiring ridiculously „ to what was misbecoming our Character.”

I SEE, said THEOCLES, you are not one of those timorous Arguers who tremble at every Objection rais'd against their Opinion or Belief, and are so intent in upholding their *own* side of the Argument, that they are unable to make the least Concession on *the other*. Your Wit allows you to divert your-self with whatever oc-

Part 2. curs in the Debate: And you can pleasantly improve even what your Antagonist brings as a Support to his own Hypothesis. This indeed is a fairer sort of Practice than what is common now a-days. But 'tis no more than sutable to your *Character*. And were I not afraid of speaking with an Air of Compliment, in the midst of a philosophical Debate; I shou'd tell you perhaps what I thought of the becoming manner of your SCEPTICISM, in opposition to a kind of Bigot-Scepticks; who forfeit their Right to the *philosophick Character*, and retain hardly so much as that of the *Gentleman* or *Good Companion*.-----But to our Argument.---

Distribu-  
tion.

SUCH then, continu'd he, is the admirable Distribution of NATURE, he adapting and adjusting not only the *Stuff* or *Matter* to the *Shape* and *Form*, and even the *Shape* it-self and *Form* to the *Circumstance*, *Place*, *Element* or *Region*; but also the *Affections*, *Appetites*, *Sensations* mutually to *each other*, as well as to the *Matter*, *Form*, *Action*, and all besides

„ All manag'd for the best, with perfect  
 „ Frugality and just Reserve: profuse to  
 „ none, but bountiful to all: never employ-  
 „ ing in one thing more than enough  
 „ but with exact OEconomy retrenching  
 „ the superfluous, and adding Force to  
 „ what is *principal* in every thing.” And

is not THOUGHT and REASON *prin-* Sect. 4.  
*cipal* in Man? Wou'd he have no *Reserve*  
 for these? no saving for this part of his  
 Engine? Or wou'd he have the same Stuff *Prin. ipal*  
 or Matter, the same Instruments or Or- *Part.*  
 gans serve alike for different purposes,  
 and an Ounce be equivalent to a Pound?  
 --- It cannot be. What wonders, then,  
 can he expect from a few Ounces of Blood  
 in such a narrow Vessel, fitted for so small  
 a District of Nature? Will he not rather  
 think highly of that NATURE, which  
 has thus manag'd his Portion for him, to  
 the best advantage, with this happy *Reserve*  
 (happy indeed for him, if he knows and  
 uses it!) by which he has so much a bet-  
 ter Use of Organs than any other Crea- *Reasons*  
 ture? by which he holds his Reason, is a  
 Man, and not a Beast?

BUT \* Beasts, said I, have *Instincts*, *Instincts*,  
 which Man has not.

TRUE, said he, they have indeed Per-  
 ceptions, Sensations, and † *Pre-sensations*  
 (if I may use the Expression) which Man, *Animals*  
 or his part, has not in any proportionable  
 degree. Their Females, newly pregnant,  
 and before they have bore Young, have a  
 clear Prospect or *Pre-sensation* of their state  
 which

\* *Supra*, p. 92, 93, &c. and 131, 132. And VOL.  
 II. p. 216, 217, &c.

† *Infra*, p. 412.

Part 2. which is to follow; know what to provide, and how, in what manner, and at what time. How many things do they pre-ponderate? How many at once comprehend? The Seasons of the Year, the Country, Climate, Place, Aspect, Situation the Basis of their Building, the Materials Architecture; the Diet and Treatment of their Offspring; in short, the whole OEconomy of their Nursery: and all this a perfectly at first, and when unexperienc'd as at any time of their Life afterwards

Human  
Kind.

And „*Why not this*, say you, in Human Kind?“ Nay, rather on the contrary, I ask „*Why this?* Where was the Occasion or Use? Where the Necessity? Why this Sagacity for *Men*? Have they not what is better, in another kind? Have they not Reason and Discourse? Does not this instruct them? What need then of the other? Where would be the prudent Management at this rate? Where the *Reserve?*“

THE *Young* of most other *Kinds*, continue'd he, are instantly helpful to themselves, sensible, vigorous, know to shun Danger, and seek their Good: A *human Infant* is of all the most helpless, weak and infirm. And wherefore shou'd it not have been thus order'd? Where is the loss in such a *Species*? Or what is *Man* the worst for this Defect, amidst such large Supplies.

uly? Does not this *Defect* engage him Sect. 4.  
 he more strongly to Society, and force Society.  
 im to own that he is purposely, and not  
 y accident, made rational and *sociable*;  
 nd can no otherwise increase or subsist,  
 an in that *social* Intercourse and Com-  
 munity which is his *natural State*? Is  
 ot both conjugal Affection, and natural  
 affection to Parents, Duty to Magistrates,  
 ove of a common City, Community, or  
 ountry, with the other Dutys and so-  
 al Parts of Life, deduc'd from hence,  
 nd founded in these very *Wants*? What  
 an be happier than such a Deficiency, as  
 the occasion of so much Good? What  
 etter than a Want so abundantly made  
 o, and answer'd by so many Enjoyments?  
 ow if there are still to be found among  
 rankind, such as even in the midst of  
 ese Wants seem not asham'd to affect a  
 ight of Independency, and deny them-  
 lves to be by Nature *sociable*; where  
 ou'd their Shame have been, had Na-  
 re otherwise supply'd these Wants?  
 What Duty or Obligation had been ever  
 ough of? What Respect or Reverence  
 Parents, Magistrates, their Country,  
 their Kind? Wou'd not their full and  
 lf-sufficient state more strongly have de-  
 rmin'd them to throw off *Nature*, and  
 eny the *Ends* and *Author* of their Crea-  
 on?

WHILST

## Part 2.

WHILST THE OCLES argu'd thus concerning NATURE, the old Gentleman, my Adversary, express'd great Satisfaction in hearing me, as he thought refuted, and my Opinions expos'd. For he wou'd needs believe these to be strongly my Opinions, which I had only started as Objections in the Discourse. He endeavour'd to reinforce the Argument by many Particulars from the common Topics of the *School-men* and *Civilians*. He added withal, „ That it was better for me „ to declare my Sentiments openly; for „ he was sure I had strongly imbib'd that „ Principle, that \* *the State of Nature* was „ *a State of War.*”

State of  
Nature

THAT it was no *State of Government* or *publick Rule*, reply'd I, you your-self allow. I do so. Was it then *State of Fellowship*, or *Society*? No „ For when Men enter'd first into *Society* „ they pass'd from *the State of Nature* into „ to that new one which is founded upon „ *Compact.*” And was that former *State a tolerable one*? Had it been absolutely intolerable, there had never been any such. Nor cou'd we properly call that *a State*, which cou'd not stand or endure for the least time. If Man therefore cou'd

\* VOL. I. p. 109. &c.



ou'd *endure* to live without Society; & Sect. 4.  
 it be true that he *actually* liv'd so, when  
*the State of Nature*; how can it be said,  
 That he is *by Nature sociable*?“

THE old Gentleman seem'd a little dis-  
 turb'd at my Question. But having reco-  
 ver'd himself, he said in answer, „ That  
 M A N indeed, from his own *natural In-*  
*clination*, might not, perhaps, have been  
 mov'd to associate; but rather from  
 some particular *Circumstances*. „

HIS *Nature* then, said I, was not so  
 very good, it seems; since having no *na-*  
*ral Affections*, or *friendly Inclination* be-  
 longing to him, he was forc'd into a social  
 state, *against his will*: And this, not from  
 any necessity in respect of outward things  
 (for you have allow'd him a tolerable  
 subsistence) but in probability from such  
 inconveniences as arose chiefly from him-  
 self, & his own malignant Temper & Prin-  
 ciples. And indeed 'twas no wonder if  
 creatures who were *naturally* thus unso-  
 ciable, shou'd be as naturally mischievous  
 and troublefom. If *according to their*  
*Nature*, they cou'd live out of Society,  
 with so little Affection for one another's  
 company, 'tis not likely that upon occa-  
 sion they wou'd spare one another's Per-  
 sons. If they were so fullen as not to  
 meet for Love, 'tis more than probable  
 they

Part 2.  
State of  
Nature.

they wou'd fight for *Interest*. And thus from your own Reasoning it appears  
 „ That the *State of Nature* must in all  
 „ likelihood have been little different  
 „ from a *State of WAR*. ”

HE was going to answer me with some sharpness, as by his Looks appear'd when THEOCLES interposing, desir'd That as he had occasion'd this Dispute, he might be allow'd to try if he cou'd end it; by setting the Question in a fairer Light You see, said he to the old Gentleman what Artifice PHILOCLES made use of, when he engag'd you to allow, that the *State of Nature*, and that of *Society* were perfectly distinct. But let us question him now in his turn, & see whether he can demonstrate to us, ” Tha  
 ” there can be naturally any *Human State*  
 ” which is not *social*. ”

WHAT is it then, said the old Gentleman, which we call the *State of Nature*?

NOT that imperfect rude Condition of Mankind, said THEOCLES, which some imagine; but which, if it ever were in *Nature*, cou'd never have been of the least continuance, or any-way *tolerable*, or sufficient for the Support of human Race. Such a Condition cannot indeed so properly be call'd a *State*. For what if speaking

Speaking of an Infant just coming into the World, and in the moment of the Birth, shou'd fancy to call this a *State*; wou'd be proper? Sect. 4.

HARDLY so, I confess.

JUST such a *State*, therefore, was that which we suppose of MAN, ere yet he enter'd into *Society*, and became in truth *Human Creature*. 'Twas the rough Draught of Man, the *Essay* or *first Effort* of Nature, a *Species in the Birth*, a Kind yet *unform'd*; not in its *natural* state, but under *Violence*, and still restless, till it attain'd its natural Perfection.

AND thus, said THEOCLES (addressing still more particularly to the old Gentleman) the Case must necessarily stand, even on the supposal, „ That there was ever such a Condition or *State* of Men, when as yet they were unassociated, unacquainted, and consequently without any Language or Form of Art.” But That it was their *natural State*, to live thus separately, „ can never without absurdity be allow'd. For sooner may you divest the Creature of any other Feeling or Affection, than that towards *Society* and his *Likeness*. Allowing you, however, the Power of divesting him at pleasure; allowing you to reduce even whole  
Parts

Part 2.

State of  
Nature.

Parts and Members of his present Frame wou'd you transform him thus, & call him still *a Man*? Yet better might you do this indeed, than you cou'd strip him of his *natural Affections*, separate him from all his *Kind*, & inclosing him like some solitary *Insect* in a Shell, declare him still a MAN. So might you call the human Egg, or Embrio, *the Man*. The Bug which breeds the Butterfly is more properly *a Fly* tho without Wings, than this imaginary Creature is *a Man*. For tho his outward Shape were *human*, his Passions, Appetites, and Organs must be wholly different. His whole inward Make must be revers'd, to fit him for such a recluse OEconomy, and separate Subsistence.

To explain this a little further, continu'd he: Let us examine this pretended *State of Nature*; how & on what Foundation it must stand. " For either *Man* " must have been from Eternity, or not. " If from Eternity, there cou'd be no " *primitive* or *original State*, no *State of* " *Nature*, other than we see at present before our eyes. If not from Eternity, he " arose either *all at once* (& consequently " he was at the very *first* as he is *now*) or " *by degrees*, thro' several Stages & Con- " ditions, to that in which he is at length " settled, and has continu'd for so many " *Generations*. "

FOR

FOR instance, let us suppose he sprang, Sect. 4.  
 as the old Poets feign'd, from a *big-belly'd*  
*Oak*: and then belike he might resemble  
 more a *Man-drake* than a MAN. Let us  
 suppose him at first with little more of  
 life than is discover'd in that Plant which  
 they call *the Sensitive*. But when *the Mo-*  
*ver-Oak* had been some time deliver'd, &  
 the false Birth by some odd Accident or  
 device was wrought into Form; the  
 Members were then fully display'd, & the  
 Organs of Sense began to unfold them-  
 selves "Here sprang an *Ear*: there peep'd  
 an *Eye*. Perhaps a *Tail* too came in  
 company. For what *Superfluitys* Nature  
 may have been charg'd with at first,  
 is difficult to determine. They dropt  
 off, it seems, in time; and happily  
 have left things, at last, in a good pos-  
 ture, and (to a wonder!) just as they  
 should be."

THIS surely is the lowest View of *the*  
*original Affairs* of human Kind. For if  
 PROVIDENCE, and not CHANCE,  
 give *Man* his being, our Argument for his  
*original Nature* must surely be the stronger.  
 But admitting his Rise to be, as we have  
 describ'd, and as a certain sort of Philo-  
 sophers wou'd needs have it; Nature has  
 then had no Intention at all, no Meaning  
 or Design in this whole Matter. So how  
 any

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State of  
Nature.

any thing can be call'd *natural* in the Case how any *State* can be call'd a *State of Nature*, or according to *Nature*, one more than another, I know not.

LET us go on however, and on the Hypothesis consider, Which *State* we may best call *Nature's own*. "She has by Accident, thro' many Changes & Changes rais'd a Creature, which springing first from rude Seeds of *Matter*, proceeded till it became what now it is & arriv'd where for many Generation it has been at a stay." In this long Proceffion (for I allow it any length whatever) I ask. "Where was it that the *State of Nature* cou'd begin?" The Creature must have endur'd many Changes: and each Change, whilst he was thus growing up, was as *natural*, one after another. So that either there must be reckon'd a hundred different States of *Nature*; or if one, it can be only *that* in which *Nature* was *perfect*, & her Growth *compleat*. Here where She *rested*, and attain'd her End, here must be her *State*, or no-where.

COU'D she then *rest*, think you, in that desolate State before Society? Cou'd she maintain and propagate the Species such as it now is, without Fellowship or Community? Shew it us in fact any-  
where,

where, amongst any of our own Kind. Sect. 4.  
 For as for Creatures which may much resemble us in outward Form, if they differ yet in the least part of their Constitution, if their Inwards are of a different Texture, if their Skin and Pores are otherwise form'd or harden'd; if they have other Excrescences of Body, another Temper, other natural inseparable Habits or Affections, they are not truly *of our Kind*. If, on the other hand, their Constitution be as ours; their natural Parts or inward Facultys as strong, and their bodily Frame as weak as ours; if they have *Memory*, and *Senses*, and *Affections*, and a *Use of Organs* as ours: 'tis evident they can no more by their good-will abstain from *Society*, than they can possibly preserve themselves without it.

AND here (my Friends!) we ought to remember what we discours'd a while since, and was advanc'd by PHILOCLEES himself, concerning the \* Weakness of human Bodys, and the necessitous State of *Man*, in respect of all other Creatures; His long and helpless Infancy, his feeble and defenceless Make, by which he is more fitted to be a Prey himself, than live by Prey on others." Yet 'tis impossible for him to subsist like any of those

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grazing Kinds: He must have better Provision and choicer Food than the raw Hebage; a better Couch and Covering than the bare Earth or open Sky. How many Conveniences of other kinds does he stand in need of? What Union and strict Society is requir'd between the *Sexes*, preserve & nurse their growing *Offspring*? This kind of *Society* will not, surely, be deny'd to MAN, which to every Beast-Prey is known proper, and *natural*. As can we allow *this* social part to Man, as to go no further? Is it possible he should pair, and live in Love and Fellowship with his *Partner* and *Offspring*, and remain still wholly wild, and speechless, and without those Arts of Storing, Building, and other OEconomy, as natural to him surely as to the *Beaver*, or to the *Ant* or *Bee*? Where, therefore, should he break off from this *Society*, if once begun? For that it began thus, as early as Generation, and grew into a Household and OEconomy, is plain. Must not this have grown soon into a *Tribe*? and this *Tribe* into a *Nation*? Or tho' it remain'd a *Tribe* only; was not this still a *Society* for mutual Defence and common Interest? In short, if Generation be *natural*, if natural Affection and the Care and Nurture of the *Offspring* be *natural*, Things standing as they do with Man, and the Creature being of that Form and Constitution



tion he now is ; it follows, „ That *Society* Sect. 4.  
 „ must be also *natural to him* ;” And  
 „ That out of *Society and Community*  
 „ he never *did*, nor ever *can* subsist.”

To conclude, said he, (addressing still to the two Companions) I will venture to add a word in behalf of PHILOCLEES: That since the Learned have such a fancy for this Notion, and love to talk of this imaginary *State of Nature*, I think 'tis even Charity to speak as *ill* of it as we possibly can. Let it be a *State of WAR*, *Rapine*, and *Injustice*. Since 'tis unsocial, let it e'en be as uncomfortable and as rightful as 'tis possible. To speak well of it, is to render it inviting, and tempt Men to turn Hermites. Let it, at least, be look'd on as many degrees worse than the worst Government in being. The greater Dread we have of *Anarchy*, the better *Country-men* we shall prove, and value more the *Laws & Constitution* under which we live, and by which we are protected from the outrageous Violences of such an unnatural state. In this I agree heartily with those Transformers of Human Nature, who considering it abstractedly and apart from Government or Society, represent it under monstrous Visages of *Dragons*, *Leviathans*, and I know not what devouring Creatures. They wou'd have done well however, to have express'd

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themselves more properly in their great Maxim. For to say in disparagement of Man, „That he is to Man a Wolf,” appears somewhat absurd, when one considers that Wolves are to Wolves very kind and loving Creatures. The Sexes strictly join in the Care and Nurture of the Young and this Union is continu'd still between 'em. They hold to one another, to bring up their Company; whether to hunt, or invade their Prey, or assemble on the discovery of a good Carcase. Even the swinish King wants not common Affection, & runs in Herd to the assistance of their distress'd Fellowes. The meaning therefore of this famous Sentence (if it has any meaning at all) must be, „That Man is naturally to Man, as a Wolf is to a tamer Creature:” as, for instance, to a Sheep. But this will be a little to the purpose as to tell us, That there are different Species or Characters of Men; That all have not this \* wolfish Nature, but that one half at least are naturally innocent and mild.” And thus the Sentence comes to nothing. For without belying Nature, and contradicting what is evident from natural History, Fact, and the plain Course of Things, 'tis impossible to assent to this ill-natur'd Proposition when we have even done our best to make a tolerable sense of it. ----But such is Man kind

kind! And even *here* HUMAN NATURE shews it-self, such as it is; not perfect, or absolutely successful, tho' rightly tending, and mov'd by proper and just Principles. 'Tis *here*, therefore, in *Philosophy*, as in the common *Conversations* of the World. As fond as Men are of *Company*, and as little able to enjoy any Happiness out of it, they are yet strangely addicted to the way of *Satir*. And in the same manner as a *malicious Censure* craftily worded, and pronounc'd with assurance, is apt to pass with Mankind for shreud WIT; so a *virulent Maxim* in bold Expressions, tho' without any Justness of Thought, is readily receiv'd for true PHILOSOPHY.

## S E C T. V.

IN these Discourses the Evening ended; and Night advancing, we return'd home from our Walk. At Supper, and afterwards for the rest of that Night, THE OCLES said little. The Discourse was now manag'd chiefly by the *two* Companions, who turn'd it upon a new sort of Philosophy; such as you will excuse me (good PALEMON!) if I pass over with more haste.

THERE was much said, and with great *Miracles,* Learning, on the Nature of *Spirits* and *Prodigys,* Apparitions; of which, the most astonishing

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Accounts were the most ravishing with our Friends: who endeavour'd to exceed one another in this admirable way; and perform'd to a miracle in raising one another's Amazement. Nothing was so charming with them, as that which was disagreeing and odd: nothing so soothing, as that which mov'd Horror. In short, whatever was rational, plain, and easy, bore no relish; and nothing came amiss which was cross to Nature, out of Sort and Order, and in no Proportion or Harmony with the rest of Things. *Monstrous Births, Prodigys, Enchantments, Elementary Wars, and Convulsions* were our chief Entertainment. One wou'd have thought that in a kind of Rivalship between PROVIDENCE and NATURE, the latter Lady was made to appear as homely as possible; that her Deformitys might recommend and set off the Beautys of the former. For to do our Friends Justice, I must own I thought their Intention to be sincerely *religious*. But this was not a Face of Religion I was like to be enamour'd with. It was not from hence I fear'd being made *enthusiastick, or superstitious*. If ever I became so, I found it wou'd rather be after THEOCLES'S manner. The *Monuments and Church-yards* were not such powerful Scenes with me, as the *Mountains, the Plains, the solemn Woods and Groves*; of whose Inhabitants I chose much rather to hear, than of the

the other. And I was readier to fancy Sect. 5.  
 Truth in those poetical Fictions which  
 THEOCLES made use of, than in any of  
 his Friends ghastly Storys, so pompously  
 set off, after the usual way, in a lofty Tone  
 of Authority, and with an assuming Air  
 of Truth.

YOU may imagine, PALEMÓN, that *Scepticism*  
 my \* *Scepticism*, with which you so often  
 reproach me, cou'd not well forsake me  
 here: Nor cou'd it fail to give disturbance  
 to our Companions, especially to the grave  
 Gentleman who had clash'd with me some  
 time before. He bore with me a-while;  
 till having lost all patience, One must cer-  
 tainly, said he, be Master of no small share  
 of Assurance, to hold out against the com-  
 mon Opinion of the World, and deny  
 things which are known by the Report of  
 the most considerable part of Mankind.

THAT s, said I, is far from being my  
 case. You have never yet heard me deny  
 any thing; tho' I have question'd many.  
 If I suspend my Judgment, 'tis because I  
 have less Sufficiency than others. There  
 are People, I know, who have so great a  
 regard to every Fancy of *their own*, that  
 they can believe their very *Dreams*. But

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\* VOL. III. pag. 71, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. And  
 141, 2, 3, 4. And 316, 17, &c.

Part 2. I who cou'd never pay any such deference to my *sleeping* Fancys, am apt sometimes to question even my *waking* Thoughts, & examine. "Whether these are not *Dreams* too;" since Men have a Faculty of dreaming sometimes with their Eyes open. You will own 'tis no small pleasure with Mankind to make their *Dreams* pass for *Realities*; & that *the Love of Truth* is, in earnest, not half so prevalent as this *Passion* for *Novelty* and *Surprize*, join'd with a *Desire of making Impression*, & being admir'd. However, I am so charitable still, as to think there is more of innocent *Delusion* than voluntary *Imposture* in the World, and that they who have most impos'd on Mankind, have been happy in a certain Faculty of imposing first upon themselves, by which they have a kind of Salvo for their Consciences, and are so much the more successful, as they can act their Part more naturally, and *to the life*. Nor is it to be esteem'd a Riddle, that Mens *Dreams* shou'd sometimes have the good fortune of passing with 'em for Truth; when we consider, that in some Cases, that which was never so much as *dreamt* of, or related as *Truth*, comes afterwards to be believ'd by one who has often told it.

So that the greatest *Impostor* in the World, reply'd he, at this rate may be allow'd *sincere*.

As to the *main* of his Imposture, said I, Sect. 5. perhaps he may; notwithstanding some obvious Frauds made use of between whiles, *Imposture.* in behalf of a Belief thought good and wholesom. And so very natural do I take his to be, that in all Religions, except the true, I look upon the greatest Zeal to be accompany'd with the strongest Inclination to deceive. For the Design and End being *the Truth*, 'tis not customary to hesitate or be scrupulous about the Choice of Means. Whether this be true or no, I appeal to the Experience of the last Age: in which 'twill not be difficult to find very remarkable Examples, where *Imposture & Zeal, Bigotry and Hypocrisy* have liv'd together, in one and the same *Character*.

LET this be as it will, reply'd he, I am sorry, upon the whole, to find you of such an *incredulous* Temper.

'Tis just, said I, that you shou'd pity me as a Sufferer, for losing that Pleasure which I see others enjoy. For what stronger Pleasure is there with Mankind, or what do they earlier learn, or longer retain, than *the Love of hearing and relating things strange and incredible?* How wonderful a thing is *the Love of wondering,* and of raising *Wonder!* 'Tis the Delight of Children to hear Tales they shiver at, and  
 the

Part 2.

Wonder-  
ment.

the Vice of Old Age to abound in strange Storys of Times past. We come into the World wondering at every thing; and when our wonder about common things is over, we seek something new to wonder at. Our last Scene is to tell Wonders of *our own*, to all who will believe 'em. And amidst all this, 'tis well if TRUTH comes off, but moderately tainted.

'TIS well, reply'd he, if with this moderate FAITH of yours, you can believe any *Miracles* whatever.

Credulity.

No matter, said I, how incredulous I am of *modern Miracles*, if I have a right Faith in those of *former Times*, by paying the deference due to sacred Writ. 'Tis here I am so much warn'd against *Credulity*, and enjoin'd never to believe even the greatest *Miracles* which may be wrought, in opposition to what has been already taught me. And this Injunction I am so well fitted to comply with, that I can safely engage to keep still in the same *Faith*, and promise *never to believe amiss*.

BUT is this a *Promise* which can well be made?

IF not, and that my Belief indeed does not absolutely depend upon my self, how am I accountable for it? I may be justly punish'd.



punish'd for Actions, in which my Will is free; but with what justice can I be challeng'd for my Belief, if in this I am not at my Liberty? If Credulity and Incredulity are Defects only in the Judgment; and the best-meaning Person in the world may err on either side, whilst a much worse Man, by having better Parts, may judge far better of the Evidence of things: how can you punish him who errs, unless you wou'd punish *Weakness*, and say, 'tis just for Men to suffer for their Unhappiness, and not their Fault?

I AM apt to think, said he, that very few of those who are punish'd for their *Incredulity*, can be said to be Sufferers for their *Weakness*.

TAKING it for granted then, reply'd I, that *Simplicity* and *Weakness* is more the Character of *the Credulous* than of *the Unbelieving*; yet I see not, but that even this way still we are as liable to suffer by our *Weakness*, as in the contrary Case by our over-refin'd *Wit*. For if we cannot command our own Belief; how are we secure against those false Prophets, and their deluding Miracles, of which we have such Warning given us? How are we safe from Heresy and false Religion? *Credulity* being that which delivers us up to all Impostures of this sort, and which

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Credulity.

actually at this day hold the *Pagan* and *Mahometan* World in Error and blind Superstition. Either therefore there is no Punishment due to wrong Belief, because we cannot believe as we will our-selves; or if we can, why shou'd we not promise never to believe amiss? Now in respect of Miracles to come, the surest way never to believe amiss, is never to believe at all. For being satisfy'd of the Truth of our Religion by past Miracles, so as to need no other to confirm us; the Belief of new may often do us harm, but can never do us good. Therefore as the truest Mark of a believing Christian is to seek after no Sign or Miracle to come; so the safest Station in Christianity is his who can be mov'd by nothing of this kind, and is thus Miracle-proof. For if the *Miracle* be on the side of his Faith, 'tis superfluous and he needs it not; if against his Faith let it be as great as possible, he will never regard it in the least, or believe it any other than Imposture, tho coming from an Angel. So that with all that *Incredulity* for which you reproach me so severely, I take my-self to be still the better and more Orthodox Christian. At least I am more sure of continuing so than you, who with your Credulity may be impos'd upon by such as are far short of *Angels*. For having this preparatory Disposition, 'tis odd you may come in time to believe Miracles

racles in any of the different *Sects*, who, we know, all pretend to them. I am persuaded therefore, that the best Maxim to go by, is that common one, „ That *Miracles are ceas'd*: “ And I am ready to defend this Opinion of mine to be the most probable in it-self, as well as most futable to Christianity.

THIS Question, upon further Debate, happen'd to divide our *two* Companions. For the elderly Gentleman, my Antagonist, maintain'd, “ That the giving up of „ Miracles for the time present, wou'd be „ of great advantage to the Atheists. „ The younger Gentleman, his Companion, question'd, “ Whether the allowing 'em „ might not be of as great advantage to „ the Enthusiasts and Sectarys, against „ the National Church: This of the two „ being the greatest Danger ( he thought ) „ both to Religion and the State. „ He was resolv'd, therefore, for the future to be as cautious in examining these modern *Miracles*, as he had before been eager in seeking 'em. He told us very pleasantly what an Adventurer he had been of that kind ; and on how many Partys he had been engag'd, with a sort of People who were always on the hot Scent of some new *Prodigy* or *Apparition*, some upstart *Revelation* or *Prophecy*. This, he thought,

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was true *Fanaticism errant*. He had enough of this visionary Chace; and wou'd ramble no more in blind Corners of the World, as he had been formerly accustom'd, in ghostly Company of Spirit-hunters, Witch-finders, and Layers-out for hellish Storys and diabolical Transactions. There was no need, he thought, of such Intelligences from *Hell*, to prove the Power of *Heaven*, and Being of a *God*. And now at last he began to see the Ridicule of laying such a stress on these Matters: As if a *Providence* depended on them, and *Religion* were at stake, when any of these wild Feats were question'd. He was sensible there were many good Christians who made themselves strong Partisans in this Cause; tho' he cou'd not avoid wondring at it; now he began to consider, and look back.

THE HEATHENS, he said, who wanted Scripture, might have recourse to *Miracles*: And Providence perhaps had allow'd them their *Oracles & Prodigys*, as an imperfect kind of *Revelation*. The JEWS too, for their hard Heart, and harder Understanding, had this allowance; when stubbornly they ask'd for *Signs and Wonders*. But CHRISTIANS, for their parts, had a far better and truer *Revelation*; they had their plainer *Oracles*, a more rational Law, and clearer Scripture, carrying its own Force, and withal so  
well

well attested, as to admit of no dispute. Sect. 5. And were I, continu'd he, to assign the exact time when Miracles probably might first have ceas'd, I shou'd be tempted to fancy it was when *Sacred Writ* took place, and was compleated.

THIS is Fancy indeed, (reply'd the *Miracles* grave Gentleman) and a very dangerous *past,* one to that Scripture you pretend is of it- *present,* self so well attested. The Attestation of Men dead and gone, in behalf of Miracles past and at an end, can never surely be of equal force with Miracles present: And of these, I maintain, there are never wanting a Number sufficient in the World to warrant a *Divine Existence*. If there were no Miracles now-a-days, the World you'd be apt to think there never were any. The present must answer for the Credibility of the past. This is „*GOD* wit- *Human* ness for himself;” not „*Men* for *GOD*.” *Testimony.* For who shall witness for *Men*, if in the Case of Religion they have no Testimony from Heaven in their behalf?

WHAT it is may make the Report of *Men* credible (said the younger Gentleman) is another Question. But for mere *Miracles*, it seems to me, they cannot be properly said „To witness either for *GOD* or *Men*.” For who shall witness for the *Miracles* themselves? And what  
tho

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tho they are ever so certain? What Security have we, that they are not acted by DÆMONS? What Proof that they are not wrought by *Magick*? In short,, What  
 ,, Trust is there to any thing above, or  
 ,, below, if the Signs are only of *Power*;  
 ,, and not of *Goodness*?"

AND are you so far improv'd then, reply'd the severe Companion, under your new *sceptical* Master (pointing to me) that you can thus readily discard all Miracles, as useles?-----

THE young Gentleman, I saw, was somewhat daunted with this rough Usage of his Friend; who was going on still with his *Invective*. Nay then (said I, interposing) 'tis I who am to answer for this young Gentleman, whom you make to be my Disciple. And since his Modesty, I see, will not allow him to pursue what he has so handsomly begun, I will endeavour it my self, if he will give me leave.

THE young Gentleman assented; and I went on, representing his fair Intention of establishing in the first place a rational and just Foundation for *our Faith*; so as to vindicate it from the Reproach of having no immediate Miracles to support it. He wou'd have donethis (I said) undoubtedly,

doubtedly, by shewing how good Proof Sect. 5.  
 we had already for our *sacred Oracles*,  
 from the Testimony of *the Dead*; whose  
 Characters and Lives might answer for  
 them, as to the Truth of what they re-  
 ported to us from God. This, however,  
 was by no means „*Witnessing for GOD*,”  
 as the zealous Gentleman had hastily ex-  
 press'd himself. For this was above the  
 reach either of Men, or Miracles. Nor  
 cou'd God witness *for himself*, or assert his  
 Being any other way to Men, than „By Divine  
Testimony.  
 , revealing himself to their *Reason*, ap-  
 , pealing to their *Judgment*, and submit-  
 , ting his *Ways* to their *Censure*, and *cool*  
 , *Deliberation*.” The Contemplation of  
 the Universe, its Laws and Government,  
 was (I aver'd) the only means which  
 cou'd establish the *sound Belief* of a DE-  
 TY. For what tho innumerable *Miracles*  
 from every part assail'd the Sense, and  
 gave the trembling Soul no respite? What Miracles  
no proof of  
Divinity.  
 tho the Sky shou'd suddenly open, and  
 all kinds of Prodigys appear, Voices be  
 heard, or Characters read? What wou'd  
 this evince more than „That there were  
 , *certain POWERS* cou'd do all this?”  
 But „*What POWERS*; Whether *One*, or  
 , *more*; Whether *Superior*, or *Subaltern*;  
 , *Mortal*, or *Immortal*; *Wise*, or *Foolish*;  
 , *Just*, or *Unjust*; *Good* or *Bad*.” this  
 wou'd still remain a Mystery; as wou'd  
 the true Intention, the Infallibility or Cer-  
 tainty

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tainty of whatever *these* P O W E R S asserted. Their Word cou'd not be taken in their own case. They might silence Men indeed, but not convince them: since  
 „ P O W E R can never serve as Proof for  
 „ \* *Goodness*; and G O O D N E S S is the on-  
 „ ly Pledg of *Truth*.” By G O O D N E S S  
 alone, *Trust* is created. By G O O D N E S S  
*superior* P O W E R S may win Belief. They  
 must allow their Works to be examin'd.  
 their Actions criticiz'd: And thus, *this*  
 only, they may be confided in; „ Where  
 „ by repeated Marks their *Benevolence* is  
 „ prov'd, and their *Character* of *Sincerity*  
 „ and *Truth* establish'd.” To whom there-  
 fore the Laws of this Universe and its Go-  
 vernment appear just and uniform; to him  
 they speak the Government of one J U S T  
 O N E; to him they *reveal* and witness a  
 G O D: and laying in him the Founda-  
 tion of this *first* Faith, they fit him for  
 a † *subsequent* One. He can then hear-  
 ken to *Historical Revelation*: and is then  
 fitted (and not till then) for the recep-  
 tion of any *Message* or miraculous *Notice*  
 from Above; where he knows beforehand  
 all is just and true. But this, no Power of  
 Miracles, nor any Power besides his REA-  
 SON, can make him know, or apprehend.

BUT

\* VOL. I. p. 94. And VOL. III. p. 114.

† VOL. I. p. 298. And in this Volume, p. 269.



Sect. 5.

BUT now, continu'd I, since I have been thus long the *Defendent* only; I am resolv'd to take up *offensive* Arms, and be Aggressor in my turn; provided THE-CELES be not angry with me for borrowing Ground from his Hypothesis.

WHATEVER you borrow of his, reply'd my Antagonist, you are pretty sure spoiling it: And as it passes thro' your hands, you had best beware lest you seem rather to reflect on *Him* than *Me*.

I'LL venture it, said I; whilst I maintain that most of those Maxims you build upon, are fit only to betray your own cause. For whilst you are labouring to change Nature; whilst you are searching Heaven and Earth for Prodigys, and studying how to *miraculize* every thing; you bring Confusion on the World, you break its Uniformity, and destroy that admirable Simplicity of Order from whence the ONE infinite and perfect Principle is grown Perpetual Strifes, Convulsions, Violences, Breach of Laws, Variation and Insteddiness of Order, shew either no controul, or several uncontroul'd and un-bordinate Powers in Nature. We have before our eyes either the *Chaos* and *Atoms* of the ATHEISTS, or the *Magick* and *Dæmons*

*Atheism*  
from *Su-*  
*perstition.*

Part 2.

*Atheism  
from Su-  
perstition.*

*Demons* of the POLYTHEISTS. Yet in this tumultuous System of the Universe asserted with the highest Zeal by some who wou'd maintain a DEITY. This is that Face of Things, and these the Features by which they represent *Divinity*. Hither the Eyes of our more inquisitive and ingenuous Youth are turn'd with care lest they see any thing otherwise than in this perplex'd and amazing View. As if *Atheism* were the most natural Inference which cou'd be drawn from a regular and orderly State of Things! But after all this mangling and disfigurement of *Nature*; if it happens (as oft it does) that the amaz'd Disciple coming to himself, & searching leisurely into *Nature's Ways* finds more of *Order, Uniformity, & Constancy* in Things than he suspected; he is of course driven into *Atheism*: And this merely by the Impressions he receiv'd from that preposterous System, which taught him to seek for DEITY in *Confusion*, and to discover PROVIDENCE in an *irregular disjointed World*.

AND when you, reply'd he, with your newly-espous'd System, have brought all things to be as *uniform, plain, regular, and simple*, as you cou'd wish; I suppose you will send your Disciple to seek for DEITY in *Mechanism*; that is to say, in some exquisite System of *self-govern'd Matter*

Fo

For what else is it you Naturalists make of Sect. 5.  
the World, than a mere *Machine*?

NOTHING else, reply'd I, if to the  
*Machine* you allow a *Mind*. For in this  
case 'tis not a *Self-govern'd*, but a *God-go-*  
*vern'd Machine*.

AND what are the Tokens, said he,  
which shou'd convince us? What Signs  
shou'd this dumb *Machine* give of its be-  
ing thus govern'd?

THE present, reply'd I, are sufficient.  
It cannot possibly give stronger Signs of  
Life and steady Thought. Compare *our*  
*own Machines* with this *great-ONE*: and  
see, Whether by their Order, Manage-  
ment and Motions, they betoken either  
to perfect a Life, or so consummate an In-  
telligence. The *one* is regular, steady,  
permanent; the *other* are irregular, varia-  
ble, inconstant. In one there are the  
Marks of Wisdom & Determination; in  
the other, of Whimsy and Conceit: In  
one there appears Judgment; in the o-  
ther, Fancy only: In one, Will; in the  
other, Caprice: In one, Truth, Certainty,  
Knowledge; in the other, Error, Folly,  
and Madness. — But to be convinc'd  
there is something above, which thinks  
and acts, we want, it seems, the *latter* of  
these Signs; as supposing there can be no  
Thought


Part 2. Thought or Intelligence beside what  
*Atheism* like *our own*. We sicken and grow wear  
*from Su-* with the orderly and regular Course of  
*perstition.* Things. Periods, and stated Laws, and  
 Revolutions just & proportionable, work  
 not upon us, nor win our Admiration.  
 We must have Riddles, Prodigys, Matters  
 for Surprize and Horror! By Harmo-  
 ny, Order and Concord, we are made  
*Atheists*: By Irregularity and Discord, we  
*are convinc'd of DEITY!* "The World  
 ,, mere Accident, if it proceeds in Course  
 ,, but an Effect of Wisdom, if it run  
 ,, mad!,"

THUS I took upon me the part of  
 found THEIST, whilst I endeavour'd to  
 refute my Antagonist, and shew that his  
 Principles favour'd *Atheism*. The zealous  
 Gentleman took high offence: And  
 we continu'd debating warmly, till late  
 night. But THEOCLES was Modera-  
 tor: And we retir'd at last to our Repose  
 all calm and friendly. However, I was  
 not a little rejoic'd to hear that our Com-  
 panions were to go away early the next  
 Morning, and leave THEOCLES to me  
 alone.

FOR NOW (PALEMON!) that Morn-  
 ing was approaching, for which I so much  
 long'd. What your Longing may prove

may have reason to fear. You have had Sect. 5.  
enough, one wou'd think, to turn the  
edge of your Curiosity in this kind. Can  
it be imagin'd, that after the Recital of  
*Two* such Days already past, you can with  
patience hear of *Another* yet to come,  
more Philosophical than either? --- But  
you have made me promise; and now,  
whate'er it cost, take it you must, as fol-  
lows.

PART



## P A R T III.

## S E C T. I.

PHILOCLES *to* PALEMÓN

**I**T WAS yet deep Night (as I imagin'd) when I wak'd with the noise of People up in the House. I call'd to know the matter; and was told that THEOCLES had a little before parted with his Friends; after which he went out to take his Morning-Walk, but would not return (they thought) pretty soon: For so he had left word, and that no-body in the mean time shou'd disturb my Rest.

THIS was Disturbance sufficient, when I heard it. I presently got up; and finding it light enough to see the Hill, which was at a little distance from the House, soon got thither; and at the foot of it overtook THEOCLES; to whom I complain'd of his Unkindness. For I was not certainly (I told him) so effeminate and weak a *Friend*, as to deserve that he shou'd

treat

reat me like a *Woman*: Nor had I shown Sect. 1.  
 uch an Aversion to his Manners or Con-  
 versation, as to be thought fitter for the  
 ull Luxury of a soft Bed and Ease, than  
 or Business, Recreation, or Study with an  
 arly Friend. He had no other way there-  
 ore of making me amends, than by allow-  
 ng me henceforward to be a Party with  
 im in his *serious Thoughts*, as he saw I was  
 esolv'd to be in his *Hours* and *Exercises* of  
 his sort.

YOU have forgot then, said THEO-  
 LES, the Assignment you had yesterday  
 with the *Silvan NYMPHS* at this Place  
 and Hour? No, truly, said I: For,  
 s you see, I am come punctually to the  
 lace appointed. But I never expected  
 ou shou'd have come hither without  
 ne. Nay then, said THEOCLES,  
 here's hope you may in time become a  
 lover with me: for you already begin to  
 ew *Jealousy*. How little did I think  
 hese NYMPHS cou'd raise that Passion in  
 ou? Truly, said I, for the *Nymphs*  
 ou mention, I know little of'em as yet.  
 My Jealousy and Love regard *You* only.  
 was afraid you had a mind to escape  
 ne. But now that I am again in posses-  
 ion of you, I want no *Nymph* to make me  
 appy here; unless it were perhaps to join  
 orces against you, in the manner your  
 elov'd Poet makes the *Nymph ÆGLE*  
 VOL. II. P join

Part 3. join with his two Youths, in forcing the God SILENUS to sing to 'em.

I DARE trust your Gallantry, reply THEOCLES, that if you had such fair Company as you speak of, you would otherwise bestow your time than in an Adventure of *Philosophy*. — But do you expect I shou'd imitate the Poet's God you mention'd, and sing „ The Rise of „ Things from Atoms; the Birth of Order from Confusion; and the Origin of „ *Union, Harmony, and Concord*, from the „ sole Powers of CHAOS, and blind „ *Chance?* „ The Song indeed was fittest to the God. For what cou'd better suit his jolly Character, than such a drunken Creation; which he lov'd often to celebrate, by acting it to the life? But even this Song was too harmonious for the Night's Debauch. Well has our Poet made it of the Morning, when the God was fresh: For hardly shou'd we be brought ever to believe that such harmonious Numbers cou'd arise from a mere *Chaos* of the Mind. But we must hear our Poet speaking in the Mouth of some soberer *Demi-God* or *Hero*. He then presents us with a different Principle of Things, and in a more proper Order of Precedency, gives *Thought* the upper hand. He makes MIND originally to have govern'd *Body*; not *Body* *Mind*: For this ha



had been a CHAOS everlasting, and must Sect. 1.  
 have kept all things in a *Chaos*-state to  
 this day, and for ever, had it ever been.  
 But,

*The active MIND, infus'd thro' all the  
 Space,  
 Unites and mingles with the mighty Mass:  
 Hence Men and Beasts.—*

HERE, PHILOCLES, we shall find  
 our *sovereign Genius*; if we can charm  
 the *Genius* of the Place (more chaste and  
 sober than your SILENUS) to inspire us  
 with a truer Song of Nature, teach us  
 some celestial Hymn, and make us feel  
*Divinity* present in these solemn Places of  
 Retreat.

HASTE then, I conjure you, said I,  
 good THEOCLES, and stop not one mo-  
 ment for any Ceremony or Rite. For  
 well I see, methinks, that without any  
 such Preparation, some *Divinity* has ap-  
 proach'd us, and already moves in you.  
 We are come to the sacred Groves of the  
*Hamadryads*, which formerly were said  
 to render Oracles. We are on the most  
 beautiful part of the Hill; and the Sun,  
 now ready to rise, draws off the Curtain  
 of Night, and shews us the open Scene  
 of Nature in the Plains below. Begin:  
 For now I know you are full of those Di-

Part 3.

vine Thoughts which meet you ever in this *Solitude*. Give 'em but Voice and Accents: You may be still as much *alone* as you are us'd, and take no more notice of me than if I were absent.

JUST as I had said this, he turn'd away his Eyes from me, musing a-while by himself; and soon afterwards, stretching out his Hand, as pointing to the Objects round him, he began.

*Meditation.*

„ YE Fields and Woods, my Refuge  
 „ from the toilsome World of Business, re-  
 „ ceive me in your quiet Sanctuaries, and  
 „ favour my Retreat and thoughtful Soli-  
 „ tude — Ye verdant Plains, how glad-  
 „ ly I salute ye! — Hail all ye blissful  
 „ Mansions! Known Seats! Delightful  
 „ Prospects! Majestick Beautys of this  
 „ Earth, and all ye Rural Powers and  
 „ Graces! — Bless'd be ye chaste Abodes  
 „ of happiest Mortals, who here in peace-  
 „ ful Innocence enjoy a Life unenvy'd,  
 „ tho' Divine; whilst with its bless'd Tran-  
 „ quillity it affords a happy Leisure and  
 „ Retreat for Man; who, made for Con-  
 „ templation, and to search his own and  
 „ other Natures, may here best meditate  
 „ the Cause of Things; and plac'd amidst  
 „ the various Scenes of Nature, may  
 „ nearer view her Works.

„ O

„ O GLORIOUS *Nature* ! supremely Sect. I.  
 „ Fair, and sovereignly Good ! All-lov-  
 „ ing and All-lovely, All-divine ! Whose  
 „ Looks are so becoming, and of such  
 „ infinite Grace ; whose Study brings  
 „ such Wisdom, and whose Contempla-  
 „ tion such Delight ; whose every single  
 „ Work affords an ampler Scene, and is  
 „ a nobler Spectacle than all which ever  
 „ Art presented ! — O mighty *Nature* !  
 „ Wise Substitute of *Providence* ! impow-  
 „ er'd *Creatress* ! Or Thou empowering  
 „ DEITY, supreme Creator ! Thee I in-  
 „ voke, and Thee alone adore. To thee  
 „ this Solitude, this Place, these Rural  
 „ Meditations are sacred ; whilst thus in-  
 „ spir'd with Harmony of Thought, the  
 „ unconfin'd by Words, & in loose Num-  
 „ bers, I sing of Nature's Order in crea-  
 „ ted Beings, and celebrate the Beautys  
 „ which resolve in Thee, the Source  
 „ and Principle of all Beauty and Per-  
 „ fection.

„ THY Being is boundless, unsearch-  
 „ able, impenetrable. In thy Immensity  
 „ all Thought is lost ; Fancy gives o'er its  
 „ Flight : and weary'd Imagination spends  
 „ it-self in vain ; finding no Coast nor Li-  
 „ mit of this Ocean, nor, in the widest  
 „ Tract thro' which it soars, one Point  
 „ yet nearer the Circumference than the

Part 3. „ first Center whence it parted.— Thus  
 Meditation. „ having oft essay'd, thus fall'y'd forth in-  
 „ to the wide *Expanse*, when I return again  
 „ within *my-self*, struck with the Sense of  
 „ this so narrow Being, and of the Fulness  
 „ of that Immense one; I dare no more  
 „ behold the amazing Depths, nor sound  
 „ the Abyſs of DEITY. —

„ YET since by Thee (O *Sovereign*  
 „ MIND!) I have been form'd such as I  
 „ am, intelligent and rational; since the  
 „ peculiar Dignity of my Nature is to  
 „ know and contemplate Thee; permit  
 „ that with due freedom I exert those Fa-  
 „ cultys with which thou hast adorn'd  
 „ me. Bear with my ventrous and bold  
 „ Approach. And since nor vain Curiosi-  
 „ ty, nor fond Conceit, nor Love of ought  
 „ save Thee alone, inspires me with such  
 „ Thoughts as these, be thou my Assistant,  
 „ and guide me in this Pursuit; whilst I  
 „ venture thus to tread the Labyrinth of  
 „ wide Nature, and endeavour to trace  
 „ thee in thy Works.” —

HERE he stop'd short, and starting,  
 as out of a Dream; Now, PHILOCLES  
 said he, inform me, How have I ap-  
 pear'd to you in my Fit? Seem'd it a  
 sensible kind of Madness, like those Trans-  
 ports

ports which are permitted to our *Poets*? Sect. I.  
 or was it downright Raving?

I ONLY wish, said I, that you had been a little stronger in your Transport, to have proceeded as you began, without ever minding me. For I was beginning to see Wonders in that *Nature* you taught me, and was coming to know the Hand of our *divine Artificer*. But if you stop here, I shall lose the Enjoyment of the pleasing Vision. And already I begin to find a thousand Difficultys in fancying such a *Universal Genius* as you describe.

WHY, said he, is there any difficulty *Unity*. in fancying the Universe to be *One Intire* thing? Can one otherwise think of it, by what is visible, than that All hangs together, as of a *Piece*? Grant it: And what follows? Only this; that if it may indeed be said of the World, "That it is simply *One*," there shou'd be something belonging to it which makes it *one*. As how? No otherwise than as you may observe in every thing; or to instance in what we see before us; I now you look upou the *Trees* of this vast Wood to be different from one another: And this tall *Oak*, the noblest of the company, as it is by it-self a different being from all its Fellows of the Wood, so with its own Wood of numerous spread-

Part 3.  
Unity.

ing Branches (which seem *so many different TREES*) 'tis still, I suppose, one and the *self-same TREE*. Now shou'd you, as a mere Caviller, and not as a fair *Sceptick*, tell me that if a Figure of Wax, or any other Matter, were cast in the exact Shape and Colours of this Tree, and temper'd, if possible, to the same kind of Substance, it might therefore possibly be *a real Tree* of the same Kind or Species; I wou'd have done with you, and reason no longer. But if you question'd me fairly, and desir'd I shou'd satisfy you what I thought it was which made this *Oneness* or *Sameness* in the Tree or any other Plant; or by what it differ'd from the waxen Figure, or from any such Figure accidentally made either in the Clouds, or on the Sand by the Sea shore; I shou'd tell you, that neither the *Wax*, nor *Sand*, nor *Cloud* thus piec'd together by our Hand or Fancy, had any real relation within themselves, or had any Nature by which they corresponded any more in that near Situation of Parts, than if scatter'd ever so far asunder. But this I shou'd affirm, „ That wherever „ there was such a *Sympathizing of Parts*, „ as we saw here, in our *real TREE*; „ Wherever there was such a plain Con- „ currence *in one common End*, and to the „ Support, Nourishment, and Propaga- „ tion of so fair a *Form*; we cou'd not be „ mistaken in saying there was a peculiar „ *Nature*

„ Nature belonging to this *Form*, & con- Sect. I.  
 „ mon to it with others of the same  
 „ kind.” By virtue of this, our Tree is  
 a real *Tree*; lives, flourishes, and is still  
*One and the same*; even when by Vegeta-  
 tion and change of Substance, not one  
 Particle in it remains *the same*.

AT this rate indeed, said I, you have  
 found a way to make very adorable Places  
 of these *Silvan* Habitations. For besides  
 the living *Genius* of each Place, the Woods  
 too, which, by your account, are anima-  
 ted, have their *Hamadryads*, no doubt,  
 and the Springs and Rivulets their *Nymphs*  
 in store belonging to 'em: And these too,  
 by what I can apprehend, of immaterial  
 and immortal Substances.

WE injure 'em then, reply'd THEO-  
 CLES, to say “*they belong to these Trees*;  
 and not rather “*these Trees to them*.”  
 But as for their *Immortality*, let them look  
 to it themselves. I only know that both  
*theirs* and all other *Natures* must for their  
 Duration depend alone on *that Nature* on  
 which the World depends: And that eve-  
 ry *Genius* else must be subordinate to that  
*One good GENIUS*, whom I wou'd wil-  
 lingly persuade you to think *belonging to*  
*this World*, according to our present way  
 of speaking.

Part 3.

LEAVING, therefore, these Trees, continu'd he, to personate themselves the best they can, let us examine this thing of *Personality*. *Personality* between you and me; and consider how you, PHILOCLEES, are *You*, & I'm *My-self*. For that there is a Sympathy of Parts in these Figures of ours, other than in those of *Marble* form'd by a PHIDIAS or PRAXITELES; Sense, I believe, will teach us. And yet that our own *Marble*, or *Stuff* (whate'er it be, of which we are compos'd) wears out in seven, or, at the longest, in twice seven Years, the meanest Anatomist can tell us. Now where, I beseech you, will that same *One* be found at last, supposing it to lie in the *Stuff* it-self, or any part of it? For when that is wholly spent, and not one Particle of it left, we are *Our-selves* still as much as before.

WHAT you Philosophers are, reply'd I, may be hard perhaps to determine: But for the rest of Mankind, I dare affirm, that few are so long themselves as *half seven Years*. 'Tis good fortune if a Man be *one and the same* only for a day or two. A Year makes more Revolutions than can be number'd.

TRUE, said he: But tho' this may happen to a Man, and chiefly to one whose  
contrary



Sect. 1.

contrary Vices set him at odds so often with himself, yet when he comes to suffer, or be punish'd for those Vices, he finds himself, if I mistake not, still *one and the same*. And you (PHILOCLEES!) who, tho' you disown Philosophy, are yet so true a Profelyte to *Pyrrhonism*; shou'd you at last, feeling the Power of the GENIUS I preach, be wrought upon to own the divine Hypothesis, and from this new *Identity*. Turn of Thought admit a total Change in all your Principles and Opinions; yet wou'd you be still the self-same PHILOCLEES: tho' better yet, if you will take any Judgment than the present one, as much as I love and value him. You see therefore, there is a strange Simplicity in this YOU and ME, that in reality they shou'd destill *one-and the same*, when neither *one* Atom of Body, *one* Passion, nor *one* Thought remains the same. And for that poor Endeavour of making out this *Sameness* or *Identity* of Being, from some self-same Matter, or Particle of Matter, *Matter*. suppos'd to remain with us when all besides is chang'd; this is by so much the more contemptible, as that *Matter* it self is not really capable of such Simplicity. For I dare answer, you will allow this *You* and *Me* to be each of us simply and individually *One*, better than you can allow the same to any thing of mere Matter; unless quitting your Inclination for *Scep-*

Part 3. *ticism*, you fall so in love with the Notion of an ATOM, as to find it fall as intelligible and certain to you, as that *You* are YOUR-SELF.

BUT whatever, continu'd THEOCLES, be suppos'd of *uncompounded Matter*, (a Thing, at best, pretty difficult to conceive) yet being compounded, and put together in a certain number of such Parts as unite and conspire in these Frames of ours, and others like them; if it can present us with so many innumerable Instances of particular Forms, who share this simple Principle, by which they are really *One*, live, act, and have a *Nature* or *Genius* peculiar to themselves, and provident for their own Welfare; how shall we at the same time overlook this in *the Whole*, and deny the Great and General-ONE of the World? How can we be so unnatural as to disown divine Nature, our common Parent, and refuse to recognize *the universal* and *sovereign* GENIUS?

*Form.*

*A Genius.*

*The Supreme One.*

SOVEREIGNS, said I, require no *Notice* to be taken of 'em, when they pass *incognito*, nor any *Homage* where they appear not *in due Form*. We may even have reason to presume they shou'd be displeas'd with us for being too officious, in endeavouring to discover them, when they keep themselves either wholly invisible, or in

in very dark disguise. As for the *Notice* Sect. I. we take of these *invisible Powers* in the common way of our Religion; we have our *visible Sovereigns* to answer for us. Our lawful Superiors teach us what we are to *own*, and to *perform*, in Worship. And we are dutiful in complying with them, and following their Example. But in a philosophical way, I find no warrant for our being such earnest Recognizers of a controverted Title. However it be, you must allow one at least to understand the Controversy, and know the Nature of these *Powers* describ'd. May one not inquire, „ What *Substances* they are of? „ whether *material* or *immaterial*? „

Substance,  
Material,  
Immaterial.

MAY one not, on the other hand, reply'd THEOCLES, inquire as well, „ What „ *Substance*, or which of these two *Substances* you count your real and proper „ SELF. „ Or wou'd you rather be *no Substance*, but chuse to call your-self a *Mode* or *Accident*?

TRULY, said I, as accidental as my Life maybe, or as that random Humour is, which governs it; I know nothing, after all, so *real* or *substantial* as MYSELF. Therefore if there be that Thing you call a *Substance*, I take for granted I am one. But for any thing further relating to this Question, you know my

Part 3. *Sceptick Principles*: I determine neither way.

ALLOW me then, reply'd he (good PHILOCLES!) the same Privilege of *Scepticism* in this respect; since it concerns not the Affair before us, Which way we determine, or Whether we come to any Determination at all in this point. For be the Difficulty ever so great; it stands the same, you may perceive, against *your own Being*, as against *that* which I am pretending to convince you of. You may raise what Objections you please on either hand; and your Dilemma may be of notable force against the manner of such a supreme Being's Existence. But after you have done all, you will bring the same Dilemma home to you, and be at a loss still about YOUR-SELF, When you have argu'd ever so long upon these Metaphysical Points of *Mode* and *Substance*, and have philosophically concluded from the Difficultys of each Hypothesis, „ That „ there cannot be in Nature such a *Universal-One* as This; „ you must conclude, from the same Reasons, „ That there „ cannot be any such *particular One* as „ Your-self. „ But that there is actually such a one as *this latter*, your own Mind, 'tis hop'd, may satisfy you. And of this *Mind* 'tis enough to say, „ That it is some- „ thing which *acts* upon a Body, and has „ some-

*Metaphy-  
sicks.*

*A Mind.*

something *passive* under it, and subject Sect. 1.  
 to it: That it has not only *Body* or mere  
*Matter* for its Subject, but in some re-  
 spect even *it-self* too, and what pro-  
 ceeds from it: That it superintends and  
 manages its own *Imaginations, Appearan-*  
*ces, Fancys*; correcting, working, and  
 modelling these, as it finds good; and  
 adorning and accomplishing, the best it  
 can, this composite Order of *Body* and  
*Understanding.*" Such a *MIND* and  
 governing Part, I know there is somewhere  
 in the *World*. Let *PYRRHO*, by the  
 help of such another, contradict me, if he  
 pleases. We have our several *Understand-* *Particular*  
*ings and Thoughts*, however we came by *Minds.*  
 them. Each understands and thinks the  
 best he can for his own purpose: He  
 for *Himself*; I for another *Self*. And  
 who, I beseech you, for *the WHOLE*?  
 -----No-one? Nothing at all?-----The  
*World*, perhaps, you suppose to be mere  
*Body: A Mass of modify'd Matter.* The *Mind of*  
*Bodys of Men* are part therefore of this *the Whole.*  
*Body.* The *Imaginations, Sensations, Ap-*  
*prehensions of Men* are included in this  
*Body*, and inherent in it, produc'd out of  
 it, and resum'd again into it; tho' *the*  
*Body*, it seems, never dreams of it! The  
*WORLD it-self* is never the wiser for all  
 the *Wit and Wisdom* it breeds! It has  
 no *Apprehension* at all of what is doing;  
 no *Thought* kept to *it-self*, for *its own*  
 proper

Part 3. proper use, or purpose; not a single Imagination or Reflection, by which to discover or be conscious of the manifold Imaginations and Inventions which it sets a-foot, and deals abroad with such an open hand! The goodly Bulk so prolifick, kind and yielding for every-one else, has nothing left at last for its own share; having unhappily lavish'd all away!---By what Chance I wou'd fain understand. „ How „ or by what necessity?--- Who gives the „ Law?--- Who orders and distributes „ thus? “ NATURE, say you.

*Nature.*

And what is Nature? Is it Sense? Is it a Person? Has *she* Reason or Understanding? No. Who then understands for her, or is interested or concern'd in her behalf? No-one; not a Soul But *Every one for himself.*

COME on then. Let us hear further. Is not this *Nature* still a SELF? Or, tell me, I beseech you, How are YOU one? By what *Token*? Or by virtue of *What*? „ By a Principle which joins certain „ Parts, and which thinks and acts consonantly for the Use and Purpose of „ those Parts. “ Say, therefore, What is your whole System a Part of? Or is it, indeed, no *Part*, but a *Whole*, by it-self absolute, independent, and unrelated to any thing besides? If it be indeed a *Part*, and really *related*; to what else, I beseech

beseech you, than to *the Whole of* NA-TURE? Is there then such a *uniting Principle* in NA-TURE? If so, how are you then a *Self*, and *Nature* not so? How have you something to understand and act for you, and NA-TURE, who gave this Understanding, nothing at all to understand for her, advise her, or help her out (poor Being!) on any occasion, whatever Necessity she may be in? Has the WORLD such ill fortune *in the main*? Are there so many *particular* understanding active Principles every where? And is there Nothing, at last, which thinks, acts, or understands for *All*? Nothing which administers or looks after *All*.

*Nature  
subject to  
a Mind.*

No (says one of a modern Hypothesis) for the WORLD was from Eternity, as you see it; and is no more than barely what you see: „*Matter modify'd; a Lump, in motion, with here and there a Thought, or scatter'd Portion of dissoluble Intelligence.*”--- No (says one of an antienter Hypothesis) for the World was once without any Intelligence or Thought at all; „*Mere Matter, Chaos, and a Play of Atoms*; till *Thought*, by chance, came into play, and made up a Harmony which was never design'd, or thought of.”--- Admirable Conceit!--- Believe it who can. For my own share (thank Providence) I have a MIND in my possession,

*Contrary  
Belief.*

*Two sorts.*

*Faith of  
Atheism.*

Part 3. possession, which serves, such as it is, to keep my Body and its Affections, my Passions, Appetites, Imaginations, Fancys, & the rest, in tolerable *Harmony* and *Order*. But *the Order of the UNIVERSE*, I am persuaded still, is much the better of the *two*. Let EPICURUS, if he please, think his *the better*; and believing no *Genius* or *Wisdom* above his own, inform us by what *Chance* 'twas dealt him, and how *Atoms* came to be so wise.

IN fine, continu'd THEOCLES (raising his Voice and Action) being thus, even by *Scepticism* it-self, convinc'd the more still of my own Being, and of this *Self* of mine,  
 „ That 'tis a *real Self*, drawn out, and  
 „ copy'd from another principal and *original SELF* (the *Great-one* of the *World*)”  
 I endeavour to be really *one* with it, and conformable to it, as far as I am able. I consider, That as there is *one* general *Mass*, *one* *Body* of the *Whole*: so to this *Body* there is an *Order*, to this *Order* a *MIND*: That to this *general MIND* each *particular-one* must have relation; as being of like *Substance*, (as much as we can understand of *Substance*) alike active upon *Body*, original to *Motion* and *Order*; alike simple, uncompounded, individual; of like *Energy*, *Effect*, and *Operation*; and more like still, if it co-operates with it to general *Good*, and strives *to will* according

Faith of  
Theists.



According to the best of *Wills*. So that Sect. 1.  
cannot surely but seem natural, „ That  
the *particular* MIND shou'd seek its  
Happiness in conformity with the *gene-  
ral* one, and endeavour to resemble it  
in its highest Simplicity and Excel-  
lence. “

THEREFORE, Now, said I, good  
HEOCLES, be once again the *Enthu-  
st*; and let me hear a-new that divine  
song with which I was lately charm'd. I  
m already got over my Qualm, & begin  
better than ever to fancy such a *Nature* as  
you speak of; insomuch that I find my-  
self mightily in its Interest, and concern'd  
that all shou'd go happily and well with  
it. Tho' at the rate it often runs, I can  
scarce help being in some pain on its ac-  
count.

FEAR not, my Friend, reply'd he. For *Energy of*  
now that every *particular* NATURE *Nature.*  
certainly & constantly produces what is  
good to it-self; unless something *foreign*  
disturbs or hinders it, either by over-  
powering and corrupting it *within*, or by  
violence *from without*. Thus *Nature* in  
the Patient struggles to the last, & strives  
to throw off the Distemper. Thus even  
these Plants we see round us, every  
*par-*

Part 3. *particular* NATURE thrives, & attain its Perfection, If nothing from *without* obstructs it, nor any thing *foreign* has already impair'd or wounded it: And even in this case, it does its utmost still to redeem it-self. What are all Weaknesses Distortions, Sickneses, imperfect Births and the seeming Contradictions & Perversitys of Nature, other than of this sort? And how ignorant must one be of all natural Causes & Operations, to think that any of these Disorders happen by: Miscarriage of the *particular Nature*, and not by the Force of some *foreign Nature* which over-powers it? If therefore every *particular Nature* be thus constantly and unerringly *true* to it-self, and certain to produce only what is good for it-self, & conducing to its own right state; shall not the *general-one*, *The NATURE of the Whole*, do full as much? Shall *That* alone miscarry or fail? Or is there any thing *foreign* which shou'd at any time do violence upon it, or force it out of its natural way? If not, then all it produces is to its own advantage and good; the *Good of All* in general: And what is for the good of all in general, is *Just* and *Good*.

'Tis so, said I, I confess.

THEN you ought to rest satisfy'd, reply'd he; and not only so, but be pleas'd and

General  
Good.

Distempers.

and rejoice at what happens, knowing Sect. 1.  
*whence* it comes, and to *what Perfection* it *Resignation.*  
 contributes.

BLES me! said I, THEOCLES, in-  
 to what a Superstition are you like to lead  
 me! I thought it heretofore the Mark of  
 superstitious Mind, to search for Provi-  
 dence in the common Accidents of Life,  
 and ascribe to the Divine Power those  
 common Disasters and Calamitys which  
 Nature has entail'd on Mankind. But  
 now, I find, I must place all in general  
 on one Account; and viewing things thro'  
 the kind of Magical Glass, I am to see the  
 worst of *Ills* transform'd to *Good*, and ad-  
 mire equally whatever comes from one  
 and the same perfect Hand —— But no  
 matter; I can surmount all. Go on,  
 THEOCLES; and let me advise you in  
 my own behalf, that since you have re-  
 minded me, you do not by delaying give  
 me time to cool again.

I WOULD have you know, reply'd he,  
 scorn to take the advantage of a warm  
 fit, and be beholden to Temper or Ima-  
 gination for gaining me your Assent.  
 Therefore ere I go yet a step farther, I  
 am resolv'd to enter again into cool Rea-  
 son with you, and ask, If you admit for  
 proof what I advanc'd yesterday upon  
 that

Part 3. that head, "Of a *Universal UNION*  
,, *Coherence, or Sympathizing of Things*

*Principle of Order,* BY Force of Probability, said I, you overcame me. Being convinc'd of a Consent and Correspondence in *all* we saw Things, I consider'd it as *unreasonable* not to allow the same *thro'out*!

UNREASONABLE indeed! reply'd he. For in the infinite *Residue*, were there a Principle of Union; it wou'd seem not to be impossible, that things within our Sphere shou'd be consistent, and keep their Order. "For what was infinite, wou'd be predominant."  
It seems so.

*Why universal.*

TELL me then, said he, after this *Union* own'd, how you can refuse to allow the name of Demonstration to the remaining Arguments, which establish the Government of a perfect Mind.

*Phenomena of Ill.*

YOUR Solutions, said I, of the *ill Appearances* are not perfect enough to pass for Demonstration. And whatever seems vicious or imperfect in the Creation, puts stop to further Conclusions, till the thing be solv'd.

DID you not then, said he, agree with me, when I aver'd that the *Appearance*  
mu

must of necessity stand as they are, and things seem altogether as imperfect, even on the Concession of a perfect Supreme Mind existent?

I did so.

AND is not the same Reason good still?

VIZ. „ *That in an infinity of Things, mutually relative, a Mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully; and must therefore frequently see that as imperfect, which in it-self is really perfect.* „

The Reason is still good.

ARE the *Appearances*, then, any Objection to our Hypothesis?

None, whilst they remain *Appearances* only.

CAN you then prove them to be any more? For if you cannot, you prove nothing. And that it lies on you to prove, you plainly see: since the *Appearances* do not only agree with the Hypothesis, but are a necessary Consequence from it. To bid me prove, therefore, in this case, is, in a manner, the same as to bid me be infinite. For nothing beside what is infinite can see infinite *Connexions*.

THE Presumption, I must confess, said, by this reckoning, is wholly on your side. Yet still this is only *Presumption*.

TAKE

Part 3.

Demonstration.

TAKE *Demonstration* then, said he, if you can endure I shou'd reason thus abstractedly and drily. The *Appearances* of ILL, you say, are not necessarily that ILL they represent to us.

I own it.

THEREFORE what they represent may possibly be GOOD.

It may.

AND therefore there may possibly be no *real* ILL in things: but all may be perfectly concurrent to one Interest; the Interest of that Universal ONE.

It may be so.

WHY, then, if it may be so, (be no surpriz'd) ,, It follows that it must be so; ,, on the account of that great *Unit*, and simple *Self-Principle* which you have granted in *the WHOLE*. For whatever is possible *in the Whole*, the Nature or Mind of the *Whole* will put in execution for *the Whole's Good*: And if it be possible to exclude ILL, it will exclude it. Therefore since notwithstanding the *Appearances*, 'tis possible that ILL may actually be excluded; count upon it, "That actually it is excluded." For nothing merely *passive* can oppose this universally *active* Principle. If anything active

active oppose it, 'tis *another Principle*. Sect. 1.  
I Allow it.

*Mani-  
chæism.*

'T IS impossible. For were there in Nature *Two* or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant: If they agree, there must be some natural Reason for their Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot be from *Chance*, but from some particular *Design, Contrivance, or Thought*: which brings us up again to ONE Principle, and makes the other *two* to be subordinate. And thus when we have compar'd each of the *Three* Opinions, *viz.* „ That *there* *Conclusions*  
„ *is no designing active Principle*; That  
„ *there is more than one*;” or, „ That fi-  
„ nally *there is but ONE*; „ we shall per-  
ceive, that the only consistent Opinion is *the last*. And since *one* or *other* of these Opinions must of necessity be true; what can we determine, other than that the *last* is, and must be so, demonstrably? if it be Demonstration, „ That in *Three* Opinions, *One* of which must necessarily be true, *Two* being plainly absurd, the *Third* must be the Truth. „

ENOUGH, said I, THEOCLES. My Doubts are vanish'd. MALICE and CHANCE (vain *Phantoms!*) have yielded to that *all-prevalent WISDOM* which you  
VOL. II. Q have

Part 3

have establish'd. You are Conqueror in the cool way of *Reason*, and may with Honour now grow warm again, in your *poetick Vein*. Return therefore, I intreat you, once more, to that *Perfection of Being*; and address your-self to it as before, on our Approaches to these *Silvan Scenes*, where first it seem'd to inspire you. I shall now no longer be in danger of imagining either *Magick* or *Superstition* in the case; since you invoke no other POWER than that single ONE, which seems so natural.

THUS I continue then, said THEOCLES, addressing my-self, as you wou'd have me, to that *Guardian-DEITY* and *Inspirer*, whom we are to imagine present *here*; but not *here* only. For, „ O mighty GENIUS! Sole-animating and inspiring Power! Author and Subject of these Thoughts! Thy Influence is universal: and in all Things, thou art inmost. From Thee depend their secret Springs of Action. Thou mov'st them with an irresistible unweary'd Force, by sacred and inviolable *Laws*, fram'd for the Good of each particular Being, as best may suite with the Perfection, Life, and Vigour of *the Whole*. The vital Principle is widely shar'd, and infinitely vary'd: dispers'd thro'out; no „ where



„ where extinct. All lives; and by Suc- Sect. 1.  
 „ cession still revives. The temporary  
 „ Beings quit their borrow'd Forms, and  
 „ yield their elementary Substance to  
 „ New-Comers. Call'd, in their several  
 „ turns, to Life, they view the Light,  
 „ and viewing pass; that others too may  
 „ be Spectators of the goodly Scene, and  
 „ greater numbers still enjoy the Privilege  
 „ of NATURE. Munificent and Great,  
 „ she imparts her-self to most; and makes  
 „ the Subjects of her Bounty infinite.  
 „ Nought stays her hastning Hand. No  
 „ Time nor Substance is lost or un-im-  
 „ prov'd. New Forms arise: and when  
 „ the old dissolve, the Matter whence  
 „ they were compos'd is not left useless,  
 „ but wrought with equal Management  
 „ and Art, even in *Corruption*, Nature's  
 „ seeming Waste, and vile Abhorrence.  
 „ The abject State appears merely as *the*  
 „ *Way* or *Passage* to some better. But  
 „ cou'd we nearly view it, and with In-  
 „ difference, remote from the Antipathy  
 „ of Sense; we then perhaps shou'd highest  
 „ raise our Admiration: convinc'd that  
 „ even *the Way it-self* was equal to *the*  
 „ *End*. Nor can we judg less favorably  
 „ of that consummate Art exhibited thro'  
 „ all the Works of Nature; since our  
 „ weak Eyes, help'd by mechanick Art,  
 „ discover in these Works a hidden Scene  
 „ of Wonders; Worlds within Worlds,

Part 3. „ of infinite Minuteness, tho as to Ar  
 Meditation. „ still equal to the greatest, and pregnan  
 „ with more Wonders than the most dis  
 „ cerning Sense, join'd with the greatest  
 „ Art, or the acutest Reason, can pene  
 „ trate or unfold.

„ BUT 'tis in vain for us to search th  
 „ bulky Mass of MATTER; seeking to  
 „ know its nature; how great *the Whole*  
 „ it-self, or even how small its *Parts*.

„ IF knowing only some of the Rule  
 „ of MOTION, we seek to trace it fur  
 „ ther, 'tis in vain we follow it into th  
 „ Bodys it has reach'd. Our tardy Ap  
 „ prehensions fail us, and can reach no  
 „ thing beyond the Body it self, thro  
 „ which it is diffus'd. Wonderfull *Being*  
 „ (if we may call it so) which Bodys ne  
 „ ver receive, except from others which  
 „ lose it; nor ever lose, unless by impart  
 „ ing it to others. Even without chang  
 „ of Place it has its Force: And Body  
 „ big with Motion labour to move, ye  
 „ stir not; whilst they express an Energy  
 „ beyond our Comprehension.

„ IN vain too we pursue that *Phanton*  
 „ TIME, too small, and yet too mighty  
 „ for our Grasp; when shrinking to a  
 „ narrow point, it scapes our Hold, or  
 „ mocks our scanty Thought by swelling  
 „ te

„ to Eternity, an Object unproportion'd Sec. 1.  
 „ to our Capacity, as is thy Being, O thou  
 „ Antient *Cause* ! older than *Time*, yet  
 „ young with fresh Eternity.

„ IN vain we try to fathom the Abyss  
 „ of SPACE, the Seat of thy extensive  
 „ Being; of which no Place is empty, no  
 „ Void which is not full.

„ IN vain we labour to understand that  
 „ Principle of SENSE and THOUGHT,  
 „ which seeming in us to depend so  
 „ much on *Motion*, yet differs so much  
 „ from it, and from *Matter* it-self, as not  
 „ to suffer us to conceive how Thought  
 „ can more result from this, than this a-  
 „ rise from Thought. But *Thought* we  
 „ own pre-eminent, and confess the real-  
 „ est of Beings; the only Existence of  
 „ which we are made sure, by being con-  
 „ scious. All else may be only Dream and  
 „ Shadow. All which even *Sense* suggests  
 „ may be deceitful. The SENSE *it-self*  
 „ remains still; REASON subsists; and  
 „ THOUGHT maintains its *Eldership* of  
 „ Being. Thus are we in a manner con-  
 „ scious of that *original* and *eternally ex-*  
 „ *istent* THOUGHT, whence we derive  
 „ *our own*. And thus the Assurance we  
 „ have of the Existence of Beings above  
 „ our Sense, and of THEE, (the great  
 „ Exemplar of thy Works) comes from

Part 3. „ Thee, the ALL-TRUE, and Perfect,  
 Meditation. „ who hast thus communicated thy-self  
 „ more immediately to us, so as in some  
 „ manner to *inhabit* within our Souls;  
 „ Thou who art *Original SOUL*, diffusive,  
 „ vital in all, inspiriting *the Whole*.

„ ALL Nature's Wonders serve to ex-  
 „ cite and perfect this Idea of their *Author*. 'Tis here he suffers us to see, and  
 „ even converse with him, in a manner  
 „ suitable to our Frailty. How glorious is  
 „ it to contemplate him, in this noblest  
 „ of his Works apparent to us, The *Systems*  
 „ of *the bigger World!*” —

HERE I must own, 'twas no small  
 Comfort to me, to find that, as our Me-  
 ditation turn'd, we were likely to get clear  
 of an entangling abstruse *Philosophy*. I was  
 in hopes THEOCLES, as he proceeded,  
 might stick closer to *Nature*, since he was  
 now come upon the Borders of our World.  
 And here I wou'd willingly have welcom'd  
 him, had I [thought it safe at present to  
 venture the least Interruption.

„ BESIDES the neighbouring Planets  
 (continu'd he, in his rapturous Strain)  
 „ what Multitudes of *fix'd STARS* did  
 „ we see sparkle, not an hour ago, in the  
 „ clear Night, which yet had hardly  
 „ yielded

„ yielded to the Day? How many others Sect. F.  
 „ are discover'd by the help of Art? Yet  
 „ how many remain still, beyond the reach  
 „ of our Discovery! Crowded as they  
 „ seem, their Distance from each other is  
 „ as unmeasurable by Art, as is the Dis-  
 „ tance between them and us. Whence  
 „ we are naturally taught the Immensity  
 „ of that BEING, who thro' these im-  
 „ mense Spaces has dispos'd such an Infi-  
 „ nity of Bodys, belonging each (as we  
 „ may well presume) to Systems as com-  
 „ plet as our own World: Since even the  
 „ smallest Spark of this bright *Galaxy* may  
 „ vie with this our SUN; which shining  
 „ now full out, gives us new Life, exalts  
 „ our Spirits, and makes us feel DIVINI-  
 „ TY more present.

„ PRODIGIOUS ORB! Bright Source  
 „ of vital Heat, and Spring of Day!---  
 „ Soft Flame, yet how intense, how ac-  
 „ tive! How diffusive, and how vast a  
 „ Substance; yet how collected thus with-  
 „ in it-self, and in a glowing Mass con-  
 „ fin'd to the Center of this *planetary*  
 „ World!— --*Mighty* Being! Brightest  
 „ Image, and Representative of *the Al-*  
 „ *mighty*! Supreme of the corporeal  
 „ World! Unperishing in Grace, and of  
 „ undecaying Youth! Fair, beautiful,  
 „ and hardly mortal Creature! By what  
 „ secret ways dost thou receive the Sup-

Part 3. „ plys which maintain Thee still in such  
 Meditation „ unweary'd Vigour, and un-exhausted  
 „ Glory; notwithstanding those eternal-  
 „ ly emitted Streams, and that continual  
 „ Expence of vital Treasures, which in-  
 „ lighten and invigorate the surrounding  
 „ Worlds?-----

„ AROUND him all the PLANETS,  
 „ with this *our Earth*, single, or with At-  
 „ tendants, continually move; seeking to  
 „ receive the Blessing of his Light, and  
 „ lively Warmth! Towards him they  
 „ seem to tend with prone descent, as to  
 „ their Center; but happily controul'd  
 „ still by another Impulse, they keep their  
 „ heavenly Order; and in just Numbers,  
 „ and exactest Measure, go the eternal  
 „ Rounds.

„ BUT, O thou who art the *Author*  
 „ and *Modifier* of these various Motions!  
 „ O *sovereign* and *sole Mover*, by whose  
 „ high Art the rolling Spheres are go-  
 „ vern'd, and these stupendous Bodys of  
 „ our World hold their unrelenting Cour-  
 „ ses! O wise OEconomist, and power-  
 „ ful Chief, whom all the Elements and  
 „ Powers of Nature serve! How hast  
 „ thou animated these moving Worlds?  
 „ What Spirit or Soul infus'd? What  
 „ Biass fix'd? Or how encompass'd them  
 „ in liquid *Æther*, driving them as with  
 „ the

the Breath of living Winds, thy active Sect. I.  
 and unweary'd Ministers in this intri-  
 cate and mighty Work?

THUS powerfully are the *Systems* held  
 intire, and kept from fatal interfering.  
 Thus is our *ponderous* GLOBE directed  
 in its annual Course; daily revolving on  
 its own Center: whilst the obsequious  
 MOON with double Labour, monthly  
 surrounding this our bigger Orb, attends  
 the Motion of her Sister-Planet, and  
 pays in common her circular Homage  
 to the *Sun*.

YET is this *Mansion-GLOBE*, this  
*Man-Container*, of a much narrower  
 compass even than other its Fellow-  
 Wanderers of our System. How nar-  
 row then must it appear, compar'd with  
 the capacious *System* of its own *Sun*?  
 And how narrow, or as nothing, in re-  
 spect of those *innumerable Systems* of o-  
 ther apparent *Suns*? Yet how immense  
 a Body it seems, compar'd with ours  
 of human Form, a borrow'd Remnant  
 of its variable and oft-converted Sur-  
 face? tho animated with a sublime Ce-  
 lestial Spirit, by which we have Rela-  
 tion and Tendency to *Thee* our Heav-  
 enly Sire, Center of Souls; to whom these  
 Spirits of ours by Nature tend, as earth-  
 ly Bodys to their proper Center. —

Part 3.  
Meditation.

” O did they tend as unerringly and con-  
 ” stantly!----- But *Thou* alone composest  
 ” the Disorders of the corporeal World,  
 ” and from the restless and fighting *Ele-*  
 ” *ments* raisest that peaceful Concord, and  
 ” consp'ring Beauty of the ever flourish-  
 ” ing Creation. Even so canst thou con-  
 ” vert these jarring Motions of intelligent  
 ” Beings, and in due time and manner  
 ” cause them to find their Rest; making  
 ” them contribute to the Good and Per-  
 ” fection of *the UNIVERSE*, thy *all-good*  
 ” *and perfect Work.*” —————

HERE again he broke off, looking on me as if he expected I shou'd speak; which when he found plainly I wou'd not, but continu'd still in a posture of musing Thought: Why PHILOCLEES! (said he, with an Air of Wonder) What can this mean, that you shou'd suffer me thus to run on, without the least Interruption? Have you at once given over your scrupulous Philosophy, to let me range thus at pleasure thro' these aerial Spaces and imaginary Regions, where my capricious Fancy, or easy Faith has led me? I wou'd have you to consider better, and know, my PHILOCLEES, that I had never trusted my-self with you in this *Vein of Enthusiasm*, had I not rely'd on you to govern it a little better.



I FIND then, said I, (rouzing my-self from my musing Posture) you expect I shou'd serve you in the same capacity as that Musician, whom an antient Orator made use of at his Elbow, to strike such moving Notes as rais'd him when he was perceiv'd to sink; and calm'd him again, when his impetuous Spirit was transported in too high a Strain. Sect. I.

YOU imagine right, reply'd THEOCLES; and therefore I am resolv'd not to go on, till you have promis'd to pull me by the Sleeve when I grow extravagant. Be it so, said I; you have my Promise. But how if instead of rising in my Transports, I shou'd grow flat and tiresome: What Lyre or Instrument wou'd you imploy to raise me?

THE Danger, I told him, cou'd hardly be suppos'd to lie on this hand. His *Vein* was a plentiful one; and his *Enthusiasm* in no likelihood of failing him. His Subject too, as well as his Numbers, wou'd bear him out. And with the Advantage of the rural Scene around us, his number'd Prose, I thought, supply'd the room of the best Pastoral Song. For in the manner I was now wrought up, 't was as agreeable to me to hear him, in this kind of *Passion*, invoke his *Stars* and *Elements*, as to

Part 3. to hear one of those amorous *Shepherds* complaining to his *Flock*, and making the Woods and Rocks resound the Name of *Her* whom he ador'd.---Begin therefore (continu'd I, still pressing him) Begin anew, and lead me boldly thro' your *Elements*. Wherever there is danger, be it on either hand, I promise to give you warning, when I perceive it:

*Meditation.*

LET us begin then, said he, with this our *Element* of EARTH, which yonder we see cultivated with such Care by the early Swains now working in the Plain below ———, Unhappy restless *Men*, who  
 „ first disdain'd these peaceful Labours,  
 „ gentle rural Tasks, perform'd with such  
 „ Delight! What *Pride* or what *Ambition*  
 „ bred this Scorn? Hence all those fatal  
 „ Evils of your Race, Enormous *Luxu-*  
 „ *ry*, despising homely fare, ranges thro'  
 „ Seas and Lands, rifles the Globe; and  
 „ Men ingenious to their Misery, work  
 „ out for themselves the means of heavier  
 „ Labour, anxious Cares, and Sorrow:  
 „ Not satisfy'd to turn and manure for  
 „ their Use the wholesom and beneficial  
 „ Mould of this their EARTH, they  
 „ dig yet deeper, and seeking out imagi-  
 „ nary Wealth, they search its very En-  
 „ trails.

„ HERE,

,, HERE, led by Curiosity, we find Sect. 1.  
 ,, *Minerals* of different natures, which  
 ,, by their Simplicity discover no less of  
 ,, the Divine Art, than the most com-  
 ,, pounded of Nature's Works. Some are  
 ,, found capable of surprizing Changes ;  
 ,, others as durable, and hard to be de-  
 ,, stroy'd or chang'd by Fire, or utmost  
 ,, Art. So various are the Subjects of  
 ,, our Contemplation, that even the Study  
 ,, of these inglorious Parts of Nature, in  
 ,, the nether World, is able it-self alone  
 ,, to yield large Matter & Employment  
 ,, for the busiest Spirits of Men, who in  
 ,, the Labour of these Experiments can  
 ,, willingly consume their Lives.— But  
 ,, the noisom poisonous Steams which  
 ,, the *Earth* breathes from these dark Ca-  
 ,, verns, where she conceals her Trea-  
 ,, sures, suffer not prying Mortals to live  
 ,, long in this Search.

,, How comfortable is it to those who  
 ,, come out hence alive, to breathe a pu-  
 ,, rer AIR! to see the rejoicing Light of  
 ,, *Day!* and tread the fertile Ground!  
 ,, How gladly they contemplate the Sur-  
 ,, face of the Earth, their Habitation,  
 ,, heated and enliven'd by the *Sun*, and  
 ,, temper'd by the fresh AIR of fanning  
 ,, *Breezes!* These exercise the resty Plants,  
 ,, and scour the unactive Globe. And

Q 7.

” when

Part 3:

Meditation.

" when the *Sun* draws hence thick cloud-  
 " ded Steams and Vapours, 'tis only to di-  
 " gest & exalt the unwholesom Particles,  
 " and commit 'em to the sprightly *AIR*;  
 " which soon imparting its quick and vi-  
 " tal Spirit, renders 'em again with im-  
 " provement to the *Earth*, in gentle  
 " Breathings, or in rich Dews & fruit-  
 " ful Showers. The same *AIR*, moving  
 " about the mighty Mass, enters its Pores,  
 " impregnating the Whole: And both the  
 " *Sun* and *AIR* conspiring, so animate  
 " this *Mother-Earth*, that tho' ever breed-  
 " ing, her Vigour is as great, her Beauty  
 " as fresh, and her Looks as charming, as  
 " if she newly came out of the forming  
 " Hands of her Creator.

" How beautiful is the *WATER* a-  
 " mong the inferior Earthly Works!  
 " Heavy, liquid, and transparent: with-  
 " out the springing Vigour and expansive  
 " Force of *Air*; but not without Activi-  
 " ty. Stubborn and un-yielding, when  
 " compress'd; but placidly avoiding Force,  
 " and bending every way with ready  
 " Fluency! Insinuating, it dissolves the  
 " lumpish *Earth*, frees the intangled *Bodys*,  
 " procures their Intercourse, & summons  
 " to the Field the keen terrestrial Parti-  
 " cles; whose happy Strifes soon ending  
 " in strict Union, produce the various  
 " Forms which we behold. How vast:

,, are:

„ are the Abyſſes of the *Sea*, where this Sect. 1.  
 „ ſoft Element is ſtor'd; and whence the  
 „ Sun and Winds extracting, raiſe it in-  
 „ to Clouds! Theſe ſoon converted in-  
 „ to Rain, water the thirſty Ground,  
 „ and ſupply a-freſh the Springs and Ri-  
 „ vers; the Comfort of the neighbouring  
 „ Plains, and ſweet Refreshment of all  
 „ Animals.

„ BUT whither ſhall we trace the  
 „ Sources of *the LIGHT*? or in what  
 „ Ocean comprehend the luminous Mat-  
 „ ter ſo wide diffus'd thro' the immense  
 „ Spaces which it fills? What Seats ſhall  
 „ we aſſign to that fierce Element of FIRE  
 „ too active to be confin'd within the  
 „ Compaſs of the *Sun*, and not excluded  
 „ even the Bowels of the heavy *Earth*?  
 „ The *Air* it-ſelf ſubmits to it, and ſerves  
 „ as its inferior Inſtrument, Even this  
 „ our *Sun*, with all thoſe *numerous Suns*,  
 „ the glittering Hoſt of Heaven, ſeem to  
 „ receive from hence the vaſt Supplies  
 „ which keep them ever in their ſplendid  
 „ State. The *invisible ethereal Substance*,  
 „ penetrating both liquid and ſolid Bodys,  
 „ is diffus'd thro'out the Universe. It  
 „ cheriſhes the cold dull maſſy *Globe*,  
 „ and warms it to its Center. It forms  
 „ the Minerals; gives Life and Growth  
 „ to Vegetables; kindles a ſoft, invisible,  
 „ and vital *Flame* in the Breasts of living  
 „ Creatures;

Part 3. „ Creatures; frames, animates, and nurses  
 „ all the various Forms; sparing, as well  
 Meditation. „ as imploying for their Use, those *sulphu-*  
 „ *rous* and *combustible* Matters of which  
 „ they are compos'd. Benign and gentle  
 „ amidst all, it still maintains this happy  
 „ Peace and Concord, according to its  
 „ stated and peculiar Laws. But these  
 „ once broken, the acquitted *Being* takes  
 „ its Course unrul'd. It runs impetuous  
 „ thro' the fatal Breach, and breaking into  
 „ visible and fierce *Flames*, passes trium-  
 „ phant o'er the yielding Forms, convert-  
 „ ing all into it self, and dissolving now  
 „ those Systems which it-self before had  
 „ form'd. 'Tis thus"-----

HERE THEOCLES stopt on a sud-  
 den, when (as he imagin'd) I was put-  
 ting my Hand out, to lay hold on his  
 Sleeve.

O PHILOCLES, said he, 'tis well re-  
 member'd. I was growing too warm, I  
 find; as well I might indeed, in this *hot*  
 Element. And here perhaps I might have  
 talk'd yet more mysteriously, had you  
 been one who cou'd think otherwise than  
 in the common way of the soft Flames of  
*Love*. You might, perhaps, have heard  
 Wonders in this kind: „ How all things  
 „ had their Being *hence*, and how their  
 „ noblest

„ noblest End was to be *here* wrapt up Sect. I.  
 „ consum'd and lost.” --But in these high  
 Flights. I might possibly have gone near to  
 burn my Wings.

INDEED, said I, you might well expect the Fate of ICARUS, for your high-soaring. But this, indeed, was not what I fear'd. For you were got above Danger; and, with that devouring Element on your side, had master'd not only the *Sun* himself, but every thing which stood in your way. I was afraid it might, in the issue, run to what they tell us of a *universal Conflagration*; in which I knew not how it might go, possibly, with our GENIUS.

I AM glad, said he, PHILOCLES! to find this grown such a Concern with you. But you may rest secure here, if the Case you meant were that *periodical Conflagration* talk'd of by some *Philosophers*. For there the GENIUS wou'd of necessity be *all in all*: And in those Intervals of Creation, when no form, nor Species existed any-where out of *the Divine Mind*, all then was DEITY: All was that ONE, collected thus within it-self, and subsisting (as they imagin'd) rather in a more simple and perfect manner, than when multiply'd in more ways; and becoming productive,

Part 3. ductive, it unfolded it-self in the various Map of *Nature*, & this *fair visible World*.

BUT for my part, said I, (interrupting him) who can much better see DIVINITY *unfolded*, than in that *involv'd* and *solitary* state before Creation; I cou'd wish you wou'd go a little further with me in the Map of *Nature*; especially if descending from your lofty Flights, you wou'd be content to pitch upon this humble Spot of EARTH; where I cou'd better accompany you, where e'er you led me.

BUT you, reply'd he, who wou'd confine me to this heavy *Earth*, must yet allow me the same Wings of Fancy. How else shall I fly with you, thro' different Climates, from Pole to Pole, and from the Frigid to the Torrid Zone?

O, SAID I, for this purpose I will allow you the PEGASUS of the Poets, or that wing'd *Griffin* which an *Italian Poet* of the Moderns gave to one of his Heroes: Yet on this Condition, that you take no such extravagant Flight, as his was, to the *Moon*; but keep closely to this Orb of *Earth*.

SINCE you will have it so, reply'd THEOCLES, let us try first on the darkest  
and



and most imperfect Parts of our Map, and see how you can endure the Prospect.

„ How oblique and faintly  
 „ looks the Sun on yonder Climates, far  
 „ remov'd from him! How tedious are  
 „ the *Winters* there! How deep the Hor-  
 „ rors of the Night, and how uncom-  
 „ fortable even the Light of Day! The  
 „ freezing Winds employ their fiercest  
 „ Breath, yet are not spent with blowing.  
 „ The Sea, which elsewhere is scarce con-  
 „ fin'd within its Limits, lies here im-  
 „ mur'd in Walls of Chrystal. The Snow  
 „ covers the Hills, and almost fills the  
 „ lowest Valleys. How wide and deep  
 „ it lies, incumbent o'er the Plains, hiding  
 „ the sluggish Rivers, the Shrubs, and  
 „ Trees, the Dens of Beasts, and Man-  
 „ sions of distress'd and feeble Men!-----  
 „ See! where they lie confin'd, hardly  
 „ secure against the raging Cold, or the  
 „ Attacks of the wild Beasts, now Mas-  
 „ ters of the wasted Field, and forc'd by  
 „ Hunger out of the naked Woods.-----  
 „ Yet not dis-hearten'd (such is the force  
 „ of human Breasts) but thus provided  
 „ for, by Art and Prudence, the kind  
 „ compensating Gifts of Heaven. Men  
 „ and their Herds may wait for a Re-  
 „ lease. For at length the Sun approach-  
 „ ing, melts the Snow, sets longing Men  
 „ at liberty, and affords them Means and  
 „ Time to make provision against the

„ next

Part 3.

Medita-  
1707.

„ next Return of Cold. It breaks the  
 „ icy Fetters of the Main; where vast  
 „ Sea-Monsters pierce thro' floating  
 „ Islands, with Arms which can withstand  
 „ the Chrystal Rock: whilst others, who  
 „ of themselves seem great as Islands, are  
 „ by their Bulk alone arm'd against all but  
 „ Man; whose Superiority over Crea-  
 „ tures of such stupendous Size & Force,  
 „ shou'd make him mindful of his Privi-  
 „ lege of Reason, and force him humbly  
 „ to adore the great Composer of these  
 „ wondrous Frames, and Author of his  
 „ own superior Wisdom.

„ BUT leaving these dull Climates, so  
 „ little favour'd by the Sun, for those hap-  
 „ pier Regions, on which he looks more  
 „ kindly, making perpetual *Summer*; How  
 „ great an Alteration do we find? His  
 „ purer *Light* confounds weak-sighted  
 „ Mortals, pierc'd by his scorching *Beams*.  
 „ Scarce can they tread the glowing  
 „ Ground. The Air they breathe can-  
 „ not enough abate the *Fire* which burns  
 „ within their panting Breasts. Their  
 „ Bodys melt. O'ercome and fainting,  
 „ they seek the Shade, and wait the cool  
 „ Refreshments of the Night. Yet oft  
 „ the *bounteous* CREATOR bestows other  
 „ Refreshments. He casts a veil of *Clouds*  
 „ before 'em, and raises gentle *Gales*; fa-  
 „ vor'd by which, the Men and Beasts  
 „ pursue

„ pursue their Labours ; and Plants re- Sect. I.  
 „ fresh'd by Dews and Showers, can glad-  
 „ ly bear the warmest Sun-beams.

„ AND here the varying Scene opens  
 „ to new Wonders. We see a Country  
 „ rich with *Gems*, but richer with the *Indias*  
 „ fragrant *Spices* it affords. How gravely  
 „ move the largest of *Land Creatures* on  
 „ the Banks of this fair River ! How  
 „ ponderous are their Arms, and vast  
 „ their Strength, with Courage, and a  
 „ Sense superior to the other Beasts !  
 „ Yet are they tam'd ( we see ) by Man-  
 „ kind, and brought even to fight their  
 „ Battels, rather as Allies and Confede-  
 „ rates, than as Slaves.----But let us turn  
 „ our Eyes towards these smaller, and  
 „ more curious Objects ; the numerous  
 „ and devouring *Insects* on the Trees in  
 „ these wide Plains. How shining, strong,  
 „ and lasting are the subtile Threds spun  
 „ from their artful Mouths ! Who, beside  
 „ *The All-wise*, has taught 'em to compose  
 „ the beautiful soft Shells, in which re-  
 „ cluse and bury'd, yet still alive, they  
 „ undergo such a surprizing Change ;  
 „ when not destroy'd by Men, who  
 „ clothe and adorn themselves with the  
 „ Labours and Lives of these weak Crea-  
 „ tures, and are proud of wearing such in-  
 „ glorious Spoils ? How sumptuously ap-  
 „ parel'd, gay, and splendid, are all the va-  
 „ rious

Part 3.

Medita  
tion.

„ rious *Insects* which feed on the other  
 „ Plants of this warm Region! How  
 „ beautiful *the Plants* themselves in all  
 „ their various Growths, from the trium-  
 „ phant *Palm* down to the humble *Moss*!

„ Now may we see that *happy* Country  
 „ where precious *Gums* and *Balsams* flow  
 „ from Trees; and Nature yields her most  
 „ delicious Fruits. How tame and trac-  
 „ table, how patient of Labour and of  
 „ Thirst, are those large Creatures; who  
 „ lifting up their lofty Heads, go led and  
 „ loaden thro' these dry & barren Places!  
 „ Their Shape and Temper show them  
 „ fram'd by Nature to submit to Man,  
 „ and fitted for his Service: who from  
 „ hence ought to be more sensible of his  
 „ Wants, and of the Divine Bounty, thus  
 „ supplying them.

„ BUT see! not far from us, that *fer-*  
 „ *tilest* of Lands, water'd and fed by a  
 „ friendly generous Stream, which, ere  
 „ it enters the Sea, divides it-self into ma-  
 „ ny Branches, to dispense more equally  
 „ the rich and nitrous Manure, it bestows  
 „ so kindly and in due time, on the ad-  
 „ jacent Plains,-----Fair Image of that  
 „ fruitful and exuberant Nature, who  
 „ with a Flood of Bounty blesses all  
 „ things, and, Parent-like, out of her ma-  
 „ ny Breasts sends the nutritious Draught  
 „ in

„ in various Streams to her rejoicing Off-  
 „ spring!--- Innumerable are the dubious  
 „ Forms & unknown Species which drink  
 „ the slimy Current: whether they are  
 „ such as leaving the scorch'd Desarts, fa-  
 „ tiate here their ardent Thirst, and pro-  
 „ miscuously engendring, beget a mon-  
 „ strous Race; or whether (as it is said)  
 „ by the Sun's genial Heat, active on the  
 „ fermenting Ooze, new Forms are gene-  
 „ rated, and issue from the River's fertile  
 „ Bed.-----See there the noted Tyrant  
 „ of the Flood, and Terror of its Bor-  
 „ ders! when suddenly displaying his hor-  
 „ rid Form, the *amphibious* Ravager in-  
 „ vades the Land, quitting his watry Den,  
 „ and from the deep emerging, with hi-  
 „ deous rush, sweeps o'er the trembling  
 „ Plain. The Natives from afar behold  
 „ with wonder the enormous Bulk, sprung  
 „ from so small an Egg. With Horror  
 „ they relate the Monster's Nature, cruel  
 „ and deceitful: how he with dire Hypo-  
 „ crisy, and false Tears, beguiles the Sim-  
 „ ple-hearted; and inspiring Tenderneſs  
 „ and kind Compassion, kills with pious  
 „ Fraud,-----Sad Emblem of that spiritual  
 „ Plague, dire *Superstition*! Native of this  
 „ Soil; where first \* Religion grew unfo-  
 „ ciable, & among different Worshippers  
 „ bred mutual Hatred, and Abhorrence of  
 „ each

\* VOL. III pag. 59, 60, &c.

Part 3., each others Temples. The Infection  
 ,, spreads : and Nations now profane one  
*Meditations.* ,, to another, war fiercier, & in Religion's  
 ,, Cause forget Humanity : whilst savage  
 ,, Zeal, with meek and pious Semblance,  
 ,, works dreadful Massacre ; and for Hea-  
 ,, ven's sake (horrid Pretence!) makes  
 ,, desolate the Earth.-----

,, HERE let us leave these Monsters  
 ,, (glad if we cou'd here confine 'em!)  
 ,, and detesting the dire prolifick Soil, fly  
 ,, to the vast *Desarts* of these Parts. All  
 ,, ghastly & hideous as they appear, they  
 ,, want not their peculiar Beautys. The  
 ,, Wildness pleases. We seem to live alone  
 ,, with Nature. We view her in her in-  
 ,, most Recesses, and contemplate her  
 ,, with more Delight in these original  
 ,, Wilds, than in the artificial Labyrinths  
 ,, and feign'd Wilderneses of the Palace.  
 ,, The Objects of the Place, the scaly Ser-  
 ,, pents, the savage Beasts, and poisonous  
 ,, Insects, how terrible soever, or how  
 ,, contrary to human Nature, are beauteous  
 ,, in themselves, and fit to raise our  
 ,, Thoughts in Admiration of that *Divine*  
 ,, *Wisdom*, so far superior to our short  
 ,, Views. Unab'e to declare the Use or  
 ,, Service of all things in this Universe,  
 ,, we are yet assur'd of the Perfection of  
 ,, all, and of the Justice of that *O Economy*,  
 ,, to which all things are subservient, and

„ in respect of which, Things seemingly Sect. 1.  
 „ deform'd are amiable, Disorder becomes  
 „ regular, Corruption wholesom, and  
 „ Poisons (such as these we have seen)  
 „ prove healing and beneficial.

„ BUT behold! thro' a vast Tract of  
 „ Sky before us, the mighty ATLAS rears  
 „ his lofty Head, cover'd with Snow a-  
 „ bove the Clouds. Beneath the *Moun-*  
 „ *tain's* foot, the rocky Country rises into  
 „ Hills, a proper Basis of the ponderous  
 „ Mass above: where huge embody'd  
 „ Rocks lie pil'd on one another, and  
 „ seem to prop the high Arch of Heaven.  
 „ -----See! with what trembling Steps  
 „ poor Mankind tread the narrow Brink  
 „ of the deep Precipices! From whence  
 „ with giddy Horror they look down,  
 „ mistrusting even the Ground which bears  
 „ 'em; whilst they hear the hollow Sound  
 „ of Torrents underneath, and see the  
 „ Ruin of the impending Rock; with fal-  
 „ ling Trees which hang with their Roots  
 „ upwards, and seem to draw more Ruin  
 „ after 'em. Here thoughtless Men, seiz'd  
 „ with the Newness of such Objects, be-  
 „ come thoughtful, and willingly con-  
 „ template the incessant Changes of this  
 „ Earth's Surface. They see, as in one  
 „ instant, the Revolutions of past Ages,  
 „ the fleeting Forms of Things, and the  
 „ Decay even of this our *Globe*; whose  
 VOL. II. R „ Youth

Part 3. „ Youth and first Formation they con-  
*Meditation.* „ sider, whilst the apparent Spoil and irre-  
 „ parable Breaches of the wasted Moun-  
 „ tain shew them the World it self only  
 „ as a noble Ruin, and make them think  
 „ of its approaching Period.---But here  
 „ mid-way the *Mountain*, a spacious Bor-  
 „ der of thick Wood harbours our wea-  
 „ ry'd Travellers: who now are come  
 „ among the ever green and lofty Pines,  
 „ the Firs, and noble Cedars, whose  
 „ towring Heads seem endless in the  
 „ Sky; the rest of the Trees appearing only  
 „ as Shrubs beside them. And here a dif-  
 „ ferent Horror seizes our shelter'd Tra-  
 „ vellers, when they see the Day dimi-  
 „ nish'd by the deep Shades of the vast  
 „ Wood; which closing thick above,  
 „ spreads Darkness and eternal Night be-  
 „ low. The faint and gloomy Light  
 „ looks horrid as the Shade it-self: and  
 „ the profound Stillness of these Places  
 „ imposes Silence upon Men, struck with  
 „ the hoarse Echoings of every Sound  
 „ within the spacious Caverns of the  
 „ Wood. Here *Space* astonishes: *Silence*  
 „ it-self seems pregnant; whilst an un-  
 „ known Force works on the Mind, and  
 „ dubious Objects move the wakeful Sense.  
 „ Mysterious *Voices* are either heard or  
 „ fancy'd: and various Forms of *Deity*  
 „ seem to present themselves and appear  
 „ more manifest in these sacred Silvan  
 „ Scenes;



Scenes; such as of old gave rise to Temples, and favour'd the Religion of the antient World. Even we our-selves, who in plain Characters may read DIVINITY from so many bright Parts of Earth, chuse rather these obscurer Places, to spell out that mysterious Being, which to our weak Eyes appears at best under a Veil of Cloud."-----

Se&t. 2.

HERE he paus'd a-while, and began to cast about his Eyes, which before seem'd fix'd. He look'd more calmly, with an open Countenance and free Air; by which, and other Tokens, I cou'd easily find we were come to an end of our *Descriptions*; and that whether I wou'd or no, THEOCLES was now resolv'd to take his leave of *the Sublime*: the Morning being spent, and the Forenoon by this time well advanc'd.

## S E C T. II.

**M**ETHINKS, said he, PHILOCLES! (changing to a familiar voice) we had better leave these unfociable Places, whither our Fancy has transported us, and return to our-selves here again, in our more conversable Woods, and temperate Climates. Here no fierce Heats nor Colds

R 2

annoy

Part 3. annoy us, no *Precipices* nor *Cataracts* amaze us. Nor need we here be afraid of our own Voices, whilst we hear the Notes of such a chearful Quire, and find the *Echoes* rather agreeable, and inviting us to talk.

I CONFESS, said I, those foreign *Nymphs* (if there were any belonging to those miraculous Woods) were much too awful Beautys to please me. I found our familiar Home-*Nymphs* a great deal more to my humour. Yet for all this, I cannot help being concern'd for your breaking off just when we were got half the World over, & wanted only to take AMERICA in our way home. Indeed as for EUROPE, I cou'd excuse your making any great *Tour* there, because of the little Variety it wou'd afford us. Besides that it wou'd be hard to see it in any view, without meeting still that *politick* Face of Affairs, which wou'd too much disturb us in our *philosophical* Flights. But for the *Western* Tract, I cannot imagine why you shou'd neglect such noble Subjects as are there; unless perhaps the *Gold* and *Silver*, to which I find you such a bitter Enemy, frighted you from a Mother-Soil so full of it. If these Countrys had been as bare of those Metals as old SPARTA, we might have heard more perhaps of the PERU's and MEXICO's than of all

ASIA

ASIA and AFRICA. We might have had *Creatures, Plants, Woods, Mountains, Rivers*, beyond any of those we have pass'd. How sorry am I to lose the noble AMAZON! How sorry----- Sect. 2.

HERE as I wou'd have proceeded, I saw so significant a Smile on THEOCLES'S Face, that it stop't me, out of Curiosity, to ask him his Thought.

NOTHING, said he; nothing but *this very Subject* it-self.—Go on.—I see you'll finish it for me. The Spirit of this sort of *Prophecy* has seiz'd you. And PHILO-CLES, the cold indifferent PHILO-CLES, is become a Pursuer of the same *mysterious BEAUTY*.

'TIS true, said I, (THEOCLES! I own it. Your *Genius*, the *Genius* of the Place, and the GREAT GENIUS have at last prevail'd. I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me for Things of a *natural* kind; where neither *Art*, nor the *Conceit* or *Caprice* of Man has spoil'd their *genuine Order*, by breaking in upon that *primitive State*. Even the rude *Rocks*, the mossy *Caverns*, the irregular unwrought *Grotto's*, & broken *Falls* of Waters, with all the horrid *Graces* of the *Wilderness* it-self, as representing NATURE more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a

*Natural  
Beautys*

Part 3. Magnificence beyond the formal Mockery of princely Gardens.-----But tell me, I intreat you, how comes it, That, excepting a few *Philosophers* of your sort, the only People who are enamour'd in this way, and seek the *Woods*, the *Rivers*, or *Seashores*, are your poor vulgar **L O V E R S**?

*Passion of this kind.*

SAY not this, reply'd he, of **L O V E R S** only. For is it not the same with **P O E T S**, and all those other *Students* in **N A T U R E**, and the *Arts* which copy after her? In short, is not this the real Case of all who are *Lovers* either of the **M U S E S** or the **G R A C E S**?

**ENTHUSIASM,**

HOWEVER, said I, all those who are deep in this *romantick* way, are look'd upon, you know, as a People either plainly out of their wits, or over-run with *Melancholy* and \* **ENTHUSIASM**. We always endeavour to recall 'em from these *solitary* Places. And I must own, that often when I have found my Fancy run this way, I have check'd my-self; not knowing what it was possess'd me, when I was passionately struck with Objects of this kind.

No

\* See *Letter of Enthusiasm*, towards the end. See also above, p. 75. And VOL. III. p. 30, &c.

No wonder, reply'd he, if we are at a loss, when we pursue the *Shadow* for the *Substance*. For if we may trust to what our Reasoning has taught us; whatever in Nature is beautiful or charming, is only the faint *Shadow* of that *First Beauty*. So that every *real LOVE* depending on the *Mind*, and being only the *Contemplation of Beauty*, either as it really is *in it-self*, or as it appears imperfectly in the *Objects* which strike the *Sense*; how can the *rational Mind* rest *here*, or be satisfy'd with the absurd *Enjoyment* which reaches the *Sense alone*? Sect. 2.  
Shadow.  
First  
Beauty.

FROM this time forward then, said I, I shall no more have reason to fear those *Beautys* which strike a sort of *Melancholy*, like the *Places* we have nam'd, or like these solemn *Groves*. No more shall I avoid the moving *Accents* of *soft Musick*, or fly from the *enchanting Features* of the fairest *human Face*.

IF you are already, reply'd he, such a *Proficient* in this *new LOVE*, that you are sure never to admire the *Representative-BEAUTY*, except for the sake of the *Original*; nor aim at other *Enjoyment*, than of the *rational* kind; you may then be confident. I am so; and presume accordingly, to answer for my-self. However I

Part 3. shou'd not be ill satisfy'd, if you explain'd your-self a little better as to this Mistake of mine you seem to fear. Wou'd it be any help to tell you, „ That the Ab-  
*Enjoyment.* „ furdity lay in seeking *the Enjoyment* „ elsewhere than in the *Subject lov'd?*

The Matter, I must confess, is still mysterious. Imagine then, good PHILO-  
 CLES, if being taken with the Beauty of the Ocean which you see yonder at a distance, it shou'd come into your head, to seek how to command it; and like some mighty Admiral, ride Master of the Sea; wou'd not the Fancy be a little absurd?

Aburd enough, in conscience. The next thing I shou'd do, 'tis likely, upon this Frenzy, wou'd be to hire some Bark, and go in Nuptial Ceremony, VENETIAN-like, to wed the *Gulf*, which I might call perhaps as properly *my own*.

LET who will call it theirs, reply'd THEOCLES, you will own *the Enjoyment* of this kind to be very different from that which should naturally follow from the Contemplation of the Ocean's *Beauty*. The Bridegroom-*Doge*, who in his stately *Buc-centaur* floats on the Bosom of his THE-  
 TIS, has less *Possession* than the poor *Shep-herd*, who from a hanging Rock, or Point of some high Promontory, stretch'd at his ease, forgets his feeding Flocks, while he admires *her Beauty*.---But to come nearer home,

home, and make the Question still more familiar. Suppose (my PHILOCLEES!) that, viewing such a Tract of Country, as this delicious *Vale* we see beneath us, you shou'd for *the Enjoyment* of the Prospect, require the *Property* or *Possession* of the Land.

THE *covetous* Fancy, reply'd I, wou'd be as absurd altogether, as that other *ambitious* one.

O PHILOCLEES! said he; May I bring this yet a little nearer? And will you follow me once more? Suppose that being charm'd, as you seem to be, with the *Beauty* of these TREES, under whose shade we rest, you should long for nothing so much as to taste some delicious *Fruit* of theirs; and having obtain'd of Nature some certain *Relish* by which these *Acorns* or *Berrys* of the Wood became as palatable as the *Figs* or *Peaches* of the Garden, you shou'd afterwards, as oft as you revisited these *Groves*, seek hence *the Enjoyment* of them, by satiating your-self in these new Delights.

THE Fancy of this kind, reply'd I, wou'd be fordidly *luxurious*; and as absurd, in my opinion, as either of the former.

Part. 3.

*Enjoyment*

CAN you not then, on this occasion, said he, call to mind some other *Forms* of a fair kind among us, where the Admiration of Beauty is apt to lead to as irregular a Consequence?

I FEAR'D, said I, indeed, where this wou'd end, and was apprehensive you wou'd force me at last to think of certain powerful FORMS in *human* Kind. which draw after 'em a Set of eager *Desires, Wishes & Hopes*; no way sutable, I must confess, to your rational and refin'd Contemplation of *Beauty*. The Proportions of this *living Architecture*, as wonderful as they are, inspire nothing of a *studious* or *contemplative* kind. The more they are view'd, the further they are from satisfying by mere View. Let that which satisfies be ever so disproportionable an Effect, or ever so foreign to its Cause; censure it as you please, you must allow however that it's *natural*. So that you, THEOCLES, for ought I see, are become the *Accuser* of NATURE, by condemning a *natural Enjoyment*.

FAR be it from us both, said he, to condemn a *Joy* which is from *Nature*. But when we spoke of *the Enjoyment* of these Woods and Prospects, we understood by it a far different kind from that  
of



of the inferior Creatures, who rising in these places, find here their choicest *Food*. Sect. 2.  
 Yet we too live by tasteful *Food*; and feel those other Joys of *Sense* in common with them. But 'twas not here (my PHILOCLES!) that we had agreed to place our *Good*; nor consequently our *Enjoyment*. We who were rational, and had Minds, methought, shou'd place it rather in those MINDS; which were indeed abus'd, and cheated of their real *Good*, when drawn to seek absurdly the Enjoyment of it in the Objects of *Sense*, and not in those Objects they might properly call *their own*: in which kind, as I remember, we comprehended all which was truly *Fair, Generous, or Good*.

SO that BEAUTY, said I, and GOOD, *Beauty and Good.*  
 with you, THEOCLES, I perceive are still. \* *one and the same.*

'TIS SO, said he. And thus are we return'd again to the Subject of our Yesterday's Morning Conversation. Whether I have made good my Promise to you, in shewing † the true *Good*, I know not. But so, doubtless, I shou'd have done with good success, had I been able in my poetick Extasys, or by any other Efforts, to have

R 6. led.

\* *Supra*, p. 238, &c. † *Supra*, p. 245.

Part 3. led you into some deep View of *Nature*,  
 and the *Sovereign GENIUS*. We then  
*Beauty*  
*and Good.* had prov'd the *Force of Divine BEAUTY*;  
 and form'd in our-selves an *Object* capable  
 and worthy of *real Enjoyment*.

*Enthusiasm.*

O THEOCLES! said I; well do I re-  
 member now the Terms in which you en-  
 gag'd me, that Morning when you be-  
 spoke my *Love* of this *mysterious Beauty*.  
 You have indeed made good your part of  
 the Condition, and may now claim me for  
 a *Profelyte*. If there be any seeming Ex-  
 travagance in the case, I must comfort my-  
 self the best I can, and consider that all  
 found *Love* and *Admiration* is \* ENTHU-  
 SIA SM: „ The Transports of *Poets*, the  
 „ Sublime of *Orators*, the Rapture of *Mu-*  
 „ *sicians*, the high Strains of the *Virtuosi*;  
 „ all mere ENTHUSIASM! Even *Learn-*  
 „ *ing* it-self, the *Love* of *Arts* and *Curiosi-*  
 „ *ty*s, the Spirit of *Travellers* and *Adven-*  
 „ *turers*; *Gallantry*, *War*, *Heroism*; All,  
 „ all ENTHUSIASM!“ -- 'Tis enough:  
 I am content to be this *new Enthusiast*, in a  
 way unknown to me before.

AND I, reply'd THEOCLES, am con-  
 tent you shou'd call this *Love* of ours  
 ENTHUSIASM: allowing it the Privi-  
 lege of its Fellow-Passions. For is there

2

a fair and plausible *Enthusiasm*, a reasonable *Extasy* and *Transport* allow'd to other Sect. 2.  
 Subjects, such as Architecture, Painting, Musick; and shall it be exploded *here*? Are there Senses by which all those other Graces and Perfections are perceiv'd? & none by which this higher Perfection and Grace is comprehended? Is it so preposterous to bring that *Enthusiasm* hither, and transfer it from those *secondary* and *scanty* Objects, to this *original* & *comprehensive* One? Observe how the Case stands in all those other Subjects of Art or Science. *Arts.* What difficulty to be in any degree knowing! How long ere a true *Taste* *A Judg-*  
 is gain'd! How many things shocking, *ment, Taste.* how many offensive at first, which afterwards are known and acknowledg'd the highest *Beautys*! For 'tis not instantly we acquire the *Sense* by which these *Beautys* are discoverable. *Labour* and *Pains* are requir'd, & *Time* to cultivate a natural Genius, ever so apt or forward. But Who is there once thinks of cultivating *this* Soil, or of improving any Sense or Faculty which Nature may have given of *this* *Improve-*  
 kind? And is it a wonder we shou'd be *ment.* dull then, as we are, confounded, & at a loss in *these* Affairs, blind as to *this* higher Scene, *these* nobler Representations? Which way shou'd we come to understand better? which way be knowing in *these* *Beautys*? Is Study, Science, or Learning

Part 3. Learning necessary to understand all Beautys *else*? And for the Sovereign BEAUTY, is there no Skill or Science requir'd? In Painting there are *Shades* and *masterly Strokes*, which the Vulgar understand not, but find fault with: in Architecture there is the *Rustick*; in Musick the *Chromatick* kind, and skilful Mixture of *Dissonancys*: And is there nothing which answers to this, in THE WHOLE?

Chief Science  
Beauty.

I MUST confess, said I, I have hitherto been one of those Vulgar, who cou'd never relish *the Shades*, *the Rustick*, or *the Dissonancys* you talk of. I have never dreamt of such *Master-pieces* in NATURE. 'Twas my way to censure freely on the first view. But I perceive I am now oblig'd to go far in the pursuit of *Beauty*; which lies very absconded and deep: And if so, I am well assur'd that my *Enjoyments* hitherto have been very shallow. I have dwelt, it seems, all this while upon the Surface, and enjoy'd only a kind of slight superficial Beautys; having never gone in search of *Beauty it-self*, but of what I *fancy'd* such. Like the rest of the unthinking World, I took for granted that what I liked was *beautiful*; and what I rejoic'd in, was my *Good*. I never scrupled loving what I *fancy'd*; and aiming only at the Enjoyment of what I lov'd, I never troubled my-self with examining.

amining what *the Subjects* were, nor ever Sect. 2.  
hesitated about their *Choice*.

BEGIN then, said he, and *chuse*. See what the *Subjects* are; and which you wou'd prefer: which honour with your Admiration, Love and Esteem. For by these again you will be honour'd in your turn. Such, PHILOCLES, as is the Worth of these Companions, such will your Worth be found. As there is Emptiness or Fulness here, so will there be in your Enjoyment. See therefore where *Fulness* is, and where *Emptiness*. See in what Subject resides *the chief Excellence*: where BEAUTY reigns: where 'tis *intire, perfect, absolute*; where *broken, imperfect, short*. View these terrestrial Beautys, and whatever has the appearance of Excellence, and is able to attract. See that which either really is, or stands as in the room of *Fair, Beautiful, and Good*:  
,, A Mass of Metal; a Tract of Land; a  
,, Number of Slaves; a Pile of Stones;  
,, a human Body of certain Lineaments  
,, and Proportions:" Is this the highest of the kind? Is BEAUTY founded then in *Body* only; and not in *Action, Life, or Operation*?-----

HOLD! hold! said I (good THEOCLES! you take this in too high a Key, above my reach. If you wou'd have me accom-

Part 3. accompany you, pray lower this Strain a little; and talk in a more familiar way.  
*Beauty.*

THUS THEN, said he; (smiling) Whatever Passion you may have for *other Beautys*; I know, good PHILOCLE, you are no such Admirer of *Wealth* in any kind, as to allow much Beauty to it: especially in a rude Heap or Mass. But in Medals, Coins, Imboss-work, Statues, and well-fabricated Pieces, of whatever sort, you can discover *Beauty*, and admire the Kind. True, said I; but not for the *Metal's* sake. 'Tis not then *the Metal* or *Matter* which is beautiful with you.

No. But *the Art*. Certainly. *The Art* then is the *Beauty*.

Right. And *the Art* is that which beautifies. The same. So that

the Beautifying, not the Beautify'd, is the really *Beautiful*. It seems so. For that which is beautify'd, is beautiful only by the accession of something beautifying: and by the recess or withdrawing of the same, it ceases to be beautiful.

Be it. In respect of Bodys therefore, *Beauty* comes and goes. So we see.

Nor is the Body it self any Cause either of its coming or staying. None.

So that there is no Principle of Beauty in *Body*. None at all. For *Body*

can no way be the Cause of Beauty to it self.

self. No-way. Nor govern nor regulate it-self. Nor yet this. Nor mean nor intend it-self. Nor this neither. Must not *that* therefore, which means and intends for it, regulates and orders it, be the Principle of Beauty to it? Of necessity. And what must that be? MIND, I suppose; for what can it be else? Sect. 2.

HERE then, said he, is all I wou'd have explain'd to you before: „ That *the* „ *Beautiful, the Fair, the Comely,* were „ never in the *Matter*, but in the *Art* and „ *Design*; never in *Body* it-self, but in the „ *Form* or *forming Power*.” Does not the beautiful *Form* confess this, and speak the Beauty of *the Design*, whene'er it strikes you? What is it but *the Design* which strikes? What is it you admire but MIND, or the Effect of *Mind*? 'Tis *Mind* alone which forms. All which is void of *Mind* is horrid: and Matter formless is *Deformity* it-self.

OF all *Forms* then, said I, Those (according to your Scheme) are the most amiable, and in the first Order of Beauty, which have a power of making other *Forms* themselves: From whence methinks they may be styl'd *the forming Forms*. So far I can easily concur with you, and gladly give the advantage to *the human Form*,

Part 3. *Form*, above those other Beautys of Man's Formation. The Palaces, Equipages and Estates shall never in my account be brought in competition with the original *living Forms* of Flesh and Blood. And for the other, the *dead Forms* of Nature, the Metals and Stones, however precious and dazling; I am resolv'd to resist their Splendour, and make abject Things of 'em, even in their highest Pride, when they pretend to set off human Beauty, and are officiously brought in aid of the *Fair*.

Orders of  
Beauty.

Do you not see then, reply'd THEOCLES, that you have establish'd *Three Degrees* or Orders of Beauty? As how?

First Order.

Why first, *the dead Forms*, as you properly have call'd 'em, which bear a Fashion, and are form'd, whether by Man, or Nature; but have no forming Power, no Action, or Intelligence. Right. Next, and as the *second* kind, *the Forms which form*; that is, which have Intelligence, Action, and Operation. Right still.

Second Order.

Here therefore is double Beauty. For here is both the Form (the *Effect* of Mind) and *Mind* it-self: The first kind low and despicable in respect of this other; from whence the dead Form receives its Lustre and Force of Beauty. For what is a mere *Body*, tho a human one, and ever so exactly fashion'd, if *inward*



ward Form be wanting, and the *Mind* be Sect. 2.  
 monstrous or imperfect, as in an *Idiot*, or  
*Savage*? This too I can apprehend,  
 said I; but where is the *third Order*?

HAVE patience, reply'd he, and see  
 first whether you have discover'd the  
 whole Force of this *second Beauty*. How  
 else shou'd you understand the Force of  
 Love, or have the Power of Enjoyment?  
 Tell me, I beseech you, when first you  
 nam'd these *the Forming Forms*, did you  
 think of no other Productions of theirs be-  
 sides the *dead Kinds*, such as the Palaces,  
 the Coins, the Brazen or the Marble Fi-  
 gures of Men? Or did you think of some-  
 thing nearer *Life*?

I COU'D easily, said I, have added,  
 that these *Forms* of ours had a Virtue of  
 producing *other living Forms*, like them-  
 selves. But this Virtue of theirs, I thought  
 was from *another Form* above them, and  
 cou'd not properly be call'd *their* Virtue  
 or Art; if in reality there was a *superior*  
*Art*, or something *Artist-like*, which gui-  
 ded their Hand, and made Tools of them  
 in this specious Work. *Third  
Order.*

HAPPILY thought, said he! You  
 have prevented a Censure which I hardly  
 imagin'd you cou'd escape. And here you  
 have unawares discover'd that *third Order*  
 of

Part. 3. of Beauty, which forms not only such as  
*Third*  
*Order.* we call mere Forms, but even *the Forms*  
*which form.* For we our-selves are nota-  
 ble Architects in Matter, and can shew  
 lifeless Bodys brought into Form, and  
 fashion'd by our own hands : but that  
 which fashions even Minds themselves,  
 contains in it-self all the Beautys fashion'd  
 by those Minds; and is consequently the  
 Principle, Source, and Fountain of all  
*Beauty.*

It seems so.

THEREFORE whatever Beauty ap-  
 pears in our *second* Order of Forms, or  
 whatever is deriv'd or produc'd from  
 thence, all this is eminently, principally,  
 and originally in this *last* Order of *Supreme*  
 and *Sovereign Beauty.*

True.

THUS Architecture, Musick, and all  
 which is of human Invention, resolves it-  
 self into this *last* Order.

Right, said I : and thus all the *Enthu-*  
*siasms* of other kinds resolve themselves  
 into ours. The fashionable Kinds borrow  
 from us, and are nothing without us.  
 We have undoubtedly the Honour of be-  
 ing *Originals.*

NOW

Sect. 2.

NOW therefore say again, reply'd  
 THEOCLES; Whether are those Fa-  
 bricks of *Architecture, Sculpture*, and the  
 rest of that sort, the greatest Beautys  
 which Man forms; or are there greater  
 and better?

None which I know,  
 reply'd I.

Think, think again, said  
 he: and setting aside those Productions  
 which just now you excepted against, as  
 Master-pieces of *another Hand*; think What  
 there are which more immediately proceed  
 from us, and may more truly be term'd *our*  
*Issue*.

I am barren, said I, for this  
 time: you must be plainer yet, in helping  
 me to conceive.

How can I help  
 you, reply'd he? Wou'd you have me be  
 conscious for you, of that which is imme-  
 diately *your own*, and is solely in, and  
 from *your-self*?

You mean my *Sen-  
 timents*, said I.

Certainly, reply'd *Beauty  
 moral.*  
 he: and together with your *Sentiments*,  
 your *Resolutions, Principles, Determina-  
 tions, Actions*; whatsoever is handsom and

noble in the kind; whatever flows from  
 your good *Understanding, Sense, Knowledg  
 and Will*; whatever is ingender'd in your  
*Heart* (good PHILOCLEs!) or derives

it-self from your *Parent-MIND*, which *Offspring:  
 Generations;*  
 unlike to other *Parents*, is never spent or  
 exhausted, but gains Strength and Vigor  
 by producing. So *You* (my Friend!) have  
 prov'd

Part 3.

prov'd it, by many a Work: not suffering that fertile *Part* to remain idle and unactive. Hence those good Parts, which from a natural Genius you have rais'd by due Improvement. And here, as I cannot but admire the pregnant Genius, and *Parent-Beauty*; so am I satisfy'd of the *Offspring*, that it is and will be ever beautiful.

Source.

I TOOK the Compliment, and wish'd (I told him) the Case were really as he imagin'd, that I might justly merit his Esteem and Love. My Study therefore shou'd be to grow *beautiful*, in his way of *Beauty*; and from this time forward I wou'd do all I cou'd to propagate that lovely Race of mental Children, happily sprung from such a high Enjoyment, and from a Union with what was *Fairest* and *Best*. But 'tis you, THEOCLES, continu'd I, must help my labouring Mind, and be as it were the Midwife to those Conceptions; which else, I fear, will prove abortive.

Pregnancy.

YOU do well, reply'd he, to give me the Midwife's part only: For the Mind conceiving of *it-self*, can only be, as you say, *assisted in the Birth*. Its *Pregnancy* is from its *Nature*. Nor cou'd it ever have been thus *impregnated* by any other *Mind*, than that which form'd it at the beginning; and which, as we have already prov'd,

prov'd, is Original to all *mental*, as well Sect. 2.  
as *other Beauty*.

Do you maintain then, said I, that these *mental* Children, the Notions and Principles, of *Fair, Just* and *Honest*, with the rest of these *Ideas*, are *innate*? *Innate Ideas.*

ANATOMISTS, said he, tell us that the Eggs, which are Principles in Body, are *innate*; being form'd already in the *Fœtus* before the Birth. But *When* it is, whether *before*, or *at*, or *after* the Birth, or at *What* time after, that either these, or other Principles, Organs of Sensation, or Sensations themselves, are *first* form'd in us, is a matter, doubtless, of curious Speculation, but of no great Importance. The Question is, whether the Principles spoken of are *from Art*, or *Nature*? If from *Nature* purely; 'tis no matter for the Time: nor wou'd I contend with you, tho you shou'd deny *Life* it-self to be *innate*, as imagining it follow'd rather than preceded the moment of Birth. But this I am certain of; that *Life*, and the *Sensations*, which accompany Life, come when they will, are from *mere Nature*, and nothing else. Therefore if you dislike the word *Innate*, let us change it, if you will, for INSTINCT; and call *Instinct*, that *Instinct*, which *Nature* teaches, exclusive of *Art*, *Culture* or *Discipline*.

Content, said I.

LEAVING

## Part. 3.

Generations.

LEAVING then, reply'd he, those admirable Speculations to the *Virtuosi*, the *Anatomists*, and *School-Divines*; we may safely aver, with all their Consents, that the several Organs, particularly those of Generation, are form'd by *Nature*. Whether is there also from Nature, think you, any *Instinct* for the after-Use of them? Or whether must *Learning* and *Experience* imprint this Use? 'Tis imprinted, said I, enough in Conscience. The Impression, or *Instinct*, is so strong in the Case, that 'twou'd be absurdity not to think it *natural*, as well in our own Species, as in other Creatures: amongst whom (as you have already taught me) not only the mere engendering of the Young, but the various and almost infinite Means and Methods of providing for them, are all foreknown. For thus much we may indeed discern in the preparatory Labours and Arts of these wild Creatures; which demonstrate their anticipating *Fancys*, *Pre-conceptions*, or *Pre-sensations*; if I may use a word you taught me \* yesterday.

Pre-conceptions.

I ALLOW your Expression, said THEOCLES, and will endeavour to show you that the same *Pre-conceptions*, of a higher

\* Pag. 307.

degree,

degree, have place in human Kind. Do so, said I, I intreat you: For so far am I from finding in my self these Pre-conceptions of *Fair* and *Beautiful*, in your sense, that methinks, till now of late, I have hardly known of any thing like them in Nature. How then, said he, wou'd you have known that *outward Fair* and *Beautiful* of human Kind; if such an Object (a fair fleshly one) in all its Beauty, had *for the first time* appear'd to you, by your-self, this morning, in these Groves? Or do you think perhaps you shou'd have been unmov'd, and have found no difference between *this Form* and any *other*; if first you had not been *instructed*?

I HAVE hardly any Right, reply'd I, to plead this last Opinion, after what I have own'd just before.

WELL then, said he, that I may appear to take no advantage against you; I quit the dazzling *Form*, which carries such a Force of *complicated Beautys*; & am contented to consider separately each of those *simple Beautys*, which taken all together, create this wonderful effect. For you will allow, without doubt, that in respect of *Bodys*, whatever is commonly said of the unexpressible, the unintelligible, the *I-know-not-what* of Beauty; there can lie no

Part 3.

*Beauty of  
Soul.*

Mystery here, but what plainly belongs either to *Figure, Colour, Motion* or *Sound*. Omitting therefore the *three* latter, and their dependent Charms; let us view the Charm in what is simplest of all, *mere Figure*. Nor need we go so high as *Sculpture, Architecture*, or the *Designs* of those who from this Study of *Beauty* have rais'd such delightful Arts. 'Tis enough if we consider the simplest of *Figures*; as either a round *Ball*, a *Cube*, or *Dye*. Why is even an *Infant* pleas'd with the first View of these Proportions? Why is the *Sphere* or *Globe*, the *Cylinder* and *Obelisk* prefer'd; and their irregular *Figures*, in respect of these, rejected and despis'd?

I AM ready, reply'd I, to own there is in certain *Figures* a natural \* *Beauty*, which the *Eye* finds as soon as the *Object* is presented to it.

*Beauty of  
Soul,**As real,**And neces-  
sarily mo-  
ving.*

Is there then, said he, a natural *Beauty* of *Figures*? and is there not as natural a one of *ACTIONS*? No sooner the *Eye* opens upon *Figures*, the *Ear* to *Sounds*, than straight *the Beautiful* results, and *Grace* and *Harmony* are known and acknowledg'd. No sooner are *ACTIONS* view'd, no sooner the *human Affections & Passions*

\* Pag. 28.



*Passions* discern'd (and they are most of Sect. 2.  
 'em as soon discern'd as felt) than straight  
 an inward EYE distinguishes, and sees the  
*Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable,*  
 apart from the *Deform'd, the Foul, the* Idea Natural.  
*Odious, or the Despicable.* How is it possible  
 therefore not to own, "That as these  
 " *Distinctions* have their Foundation in  
 " *Nature*; the Discernment it-self is *natural,*  
 " *and from NATURE alone?*"

IF this, I told him, were as he represented it; there cou'd never, I thought, be any Disagreement among Men concerning Actions & Behaviour: as which was *Base*, which *Worthy*; which *Handsom*, & which *Deform'd*. But now we found perpetual Variance among Mankind; whose Differences were chiefly founded on this Disagreement in Opinion; "The one *affirming*, the other *denying* that this; or "that, was *fit* or *decent*."

EVEN by this then; reply'd he, it appears there is Fitness and Decency in Actions; since the *Fit* and *Decent* is in this Controversy ever pre-suppos'd: And whilst The Fit, and Decent. Men are at odds about the Subjects, the Thing it-self is universally agreed. For neither is there Agreement in Judgments about other *Beautys*. 'Tis controverted "Which is the finest *Pile*, the loveliest *Shape* or *Face*:" But without controversy,  
 S 2 'tis

Part 3.

Standard  
own'd.

'tis allow'd " There is a BEAUTY of each kind." This no-one goes about to teach: nor is it learnt by any; but confess'd by all. Allown the Standard, Rule, and Measure: But in applying it to Things, Disorder arises, Ignorance prevails, Interest and Passion breed Disturbance. Nor can it otherwise happen in the Affairs of Life, whilst that which interestes and engages Men as *Good*, is thought different from that which they admire and praise as *Honest*. — But with us (PHILOCLES!) 'tis better settled; since for our parts, we have already decreed " That \*Beauty and " *Good* are still the same."

Confirma-  
tion.

I REMEMBER, said I, what you fore'd me to acknowledg more than once before. And now (good THEOCLES!) that I am become so willing a Disciple, I want not so much to be *convinc'd*, methinks, as to be *confirm'd* and *strengthen'd*. And I hope this last Work may prove your easiest Task.

NOT unless you help in it *your-self*, reply'd THEOCLES: For this is necessary, as well as becoming. It had been indeed shameful for you to have yielded without making good Resistance. To help one's-  
self

self to be convinc'd, is to *prevent Reason*, Sect. 2.  
 and bespeak Error and Delusion. But upon fair Conviction, to give our heart up to the evident side, and reinforce the Impression, this is to *help Reason heartily*. And thus we may be said *honestly to persuade our-selves*. Shew me then how I may best persuade my-self.

HAVE courage, said he, PHILOCLES! (raising his Voice) Be not offended that I say, *Have Courage!* 'Tis COWARDICE alone betrays us For whence can *false Shame* be, except from *Cowardice*? To be ashamed of what one is sure can never be shameful, must needs be from the want of Resolution. We seek the *Right* and *Wrong* in things; we examine what is *Honourable*, what *Shameful*: and having at last determin'd, we dare not stand to our own judgment, and are ashamed to own there is really a *Shameful* and an *Honourable*.  
 " Hear me (says one who pretends to value  
 " lue PHILOCLES, and be valu'd by  
 " him) There can be no such thing as real  
 " *Valuableness* or *Worth*; nothing in it-  
 " self estimable or amiable, odious or  
 " shameful. All is OPINION: 'Tis *Opinion*, Opinion,  
 " *nion* which makes Beauty, and unmakes Fashion,  
 " it. The Graceful or Ungraceful in  
 " things, the Decorum and its Contrary, Measure of  
 " the Amiable and Unamiable, Vice, Vir- Virtue and  
 " tue, Honour, Shame, all this is founded Vice,

Part 3. “ in *Opinion* only. OPINION is the  
 “ *Law* and *Measure*. Nor has *Opinion*  
 “ any Rule besides mere CHANCE; which  
 “ varies it, as *Custom* varies: and makes  
 “ now this, now that, to be thought wor-  
 “ thy, according to the Reign of *Fashion*,  
 “ and the ascendent Power of *Educa-*  
 “ *tion*.”

*Falsehood  
 of this.*

What shall we say to such a one? How represent to him his Absurdity and Extravagance? Will he desist the sooner? Or shall we ask *what Shame*, of one who acknowledges no *Shameful*? Yet he derides, and cries, *Ridiculous*!

By what Right? what Title? For thus, if I were PHILOCLEES, wou'd I defend my-self: “ Am I ridiculous? As how? *What* is ridiculous? “ *Every-thing*? or *Nothing*?” Ridiculous indeed!

But something then, something there is *Ridiculous*: and the Notion, it seems, is right, “ of a “ *Shameful* and *Ridiculous*, in things.”

*Shame.*

How then shall we apply the Notion? For this being wrong apply'd, cannot it-self but be ridiculous. Or will he who cries SHAME, refuse to acknowledg *any* in his turn? Does he not blush, nor seem discountenanc'd on any occasion? If he does, the Case is very distinct from that of mere Grief or Fear. The Disorder he feels is from a Sense of what is shameful and odious in it-self, not of what is hurtful or dangerous in its Consequences.

For

For the greatest Danger in the world can never breed Shame: nor can the *Opinion* of all the World compel us to it, where *our own Opinion* is not a Party. We may be afraid of appearing impudent, and may therefore feign a Modesty. But we can never really blush for any thing beside what we think truly *Shameful*, and what we shou'd still blush for, were we ever so secure as to our Interest, and out of the reach of all Inconvenience which cou'd happen to us from the thing we were ashamed of.

Sect. 2.

Shame.

THUS, continu'd he, shou'd I be able, by Anticipation, to defend my-self; and looking narrowly into Mens Lives, and that which influenc'd 'em on all occasions, I shou'd have Testimony enough to make me say within my-self, " Let who will be my Adversary in this Opinion, I shall find him some way or other prepossess'd with that of which he wou'd endeavour to dispossess me." Has he Gratitude or Resentment, Pride or Shame? Which-ever way it be, he acknowledges a Sense of *Just* and *Unjust*, *Worthy* and *Mean*. If he be Grateful, or expects Gratitude, I ask " *Why?* and on *What* account?" If he be angry, if he indulges Revenge, I ask " *How?* and in what *Case?* *Re-* veng'd of *What?* of a Stone, or Mad-man?"

an Acknowledgment of moral Beauty and Deformity.

Anger.

Who is so mad? " But

S 4

" for

Part 3. “ for What? For a Chance-hurt? an  
 “ Accident against Thought, or Inten-  
 “ tion?” Who is so unjust?

Anger as  
 Acknow-  
 ledgment of  
 Just and  
 Unjust.

Therefore there is *Just* and *Unjust*; and belonging to it a *natural Presumption* or *Anticipation*, on which the RESENTMENT OF ANGER is founded. For what else shou'd make the wickedest of Mankind often prefer the Interest of their Revenge to all other Interests, & even to Life it-self, except only a *Sense of Wrong*, natural to all Men, and a *Desire to prosecute that Wrong* at any rate? Not for their own sakes, since they sacrifice their very Being to it; but out of hatred to the *imagin'd Wrong*, and from a certain *Love of JUSTICE*, which even in *unjust Men* is by this Example shewn to be beyond the *Love of LIFE it-self*.

Pride,

THUS as to PRIDE, I ask, “ Why  
 “ *proud*? Why *conceited*? and of *What*?  
 “ Does any-one who has Pride, think  
 “ meanly or indifferently of himself?”

No: but honourably. And how this, if there be no real *Honour* or *Dignity* presuppos'd? For *Self-valuation* supposes *Self-worth*; and in a Person conscious of real *Worth*, is either no *Pride*, or a just and noble one. In the same manner, *Self-contempt* supposes a *Self-meanness* or *Defectiveness*; and may be either a just *Modesty*, or unjust *Humility*. But this is cer-  
 tain,

our Ac-  
 knowledg-  
 ment of  
 Worth &  
 Baseness.

tain, that whoever is proud, must be proud Sect. 2.  
of something. And we know that Men  
of thorow Pride will be proud even in the  
meanest Circumstances, and when there is  
no visible Subject for them to be proud of.  
But they descry a *Merit* in themselves,  
which others cannot: And 'tis this *Merit*  
they admire. No matter whether it be  
really in them, as they imagine: It is a  
*Worth* still, an *Honour*, or *Merit* which  
they admire, & wou'd do, wherever they  
saw it, in any Subject besides. For *then* it  
is, *then* only, that they are humbled,  
“ When they see in a more eminent degree  
“ in *others*, What they respect and admire  
“ so much *in themselves*.”—And thus  
as long as I find Men either *angry* or *re-*  
*vengeful*, *proud* or *asham'd*, I am safe:  
For they conceive an *Honorable* and *Dis-*  
*honorable*, a *Foul* and *Fair*, as well as I.  
No matter *where* they place it, or *how* they  
are mistaken in it: This hinders not my  
being satisfy'd “ That the Thing *is*, and is  
“ universally *acknowledg'd*; That it is of  
“ *Nature's* Impression, *naturally conceiv'd*, Natural  
Impressions  
“ and by no *Art* or *Counter-Nature* to be  
“ eradicated or destroy'd.”

AND NOW, what say you, PHILO-  
CLES, (continu'd he) to this Defence I  
have been making for you? 'Tis ground-  
ded, as you see, on the Supposition of

S 5

your

Part 3. your being deeply ingag'd in this philosophical Cause. But perhaps you have yet many Difficultys to get over, ere you can so far take part with *Beauty*, as to make this to be your *Good*.

*Good.*

I HAVE no difficulty so great, said I, as not to be easily remov'd. My Inclinations lead me strongly this way: for I am ready enough to yield there is no real *Good* beside *the Enjoyment of Beauty*. And I am as ready, reply'd THEOCLES, to yield There is no real Enjoyment of *Beauty* beside what is *Good*. Excellent! But upon reflection, I fear I am little beholden to you for your Concession.

As how? Because shou'd I offer to contend for any Enjoyment of *Beauty* out of your mental Way, you wou'd, I doubt, call such Enjoyment of mine *absurd*; as you did once before.

*Mental Enjoyment.*

Undoubtedly I shou'd. For what is it shou'd enjoy, or be capable of Enjoyment, except *MIND*? or shall we say, *Body enjoys*?

By the help of *Sense*, perhaps; not otherwise.

*Body.*

Is *BEAUTY*, then, *the Object of Sense*? Say how? Which way? For otherwise the help of *Sense* is nothing in the Case: And if *Body* be of it-self incapable, and *Sense* no help to it, to apprehend or enjoy *Beauty*, there remains only the *MIND* which is capable either to apprehend or to *enjoy*.

TRUE,



TRUE, said I; but show me, then,  
 " Why BEAUTY may not be *the Object*  
 " of the Sense?" Shew me first, I <sup>Sense.</sup>  
 intreat you; " *Why, Where, or in What*  
 " you fancy it may be so?" Is it not  
*Beauty* which first excites the Sense, and  
 feeds it afterwards in the Passion we call  
*Love*? Say in the same manner,  
 " That it is *Beauty* first excites the Sense,  
 " and feeds it afterwards in the Passion we  
 " call *Hunger*."--- You will not say it.  
 The Thought, I perceive, displeases you.  
 As great as the Pleasure is of good Eating,  
 you disdain to apply the Notion of *Beauty*  
 to the good Dishes which create it. You  
 wou'd hardly have applauded the pre-  
 posterous Fancy of some luxurious RO-  
 MANS of old, who cou'd relish a Fri-  
 casse the better for hearing it was com-  
 pos'd of Birds which wore a beautiful Fea-  
 ther, or had sung deliciously. Instead of  
 being incited by such a historical Account  
 of Meats, you wou'd be apt, I believe, to  
 have less Appetite, the more you search'd  
 their Origin, and descended into the *Kitch-*  
*in-Science*, to learn the several Forms and  
 Changes they had undergone, ere they  
 were serv'd at this elegant voluptuous Ta-  
 ble. But tho the *Kitchin-Forms* be ever  
 so disgraceful, you will allow that the *Ma-*  
*terials* of the Kitchin, such, for instance,  
 as the *Garden* furnishes, are really fair and  
 beautiful:

Part 3.  
Sense.

beautiful in their kind. Nor will you deny Beauty to the wild *Field*, or to these *Flowers* which grow around us, on this verdant Couch. And yet, as lovely as are these Forms of Nature, the shining *Grass*, or silver'd *Moss*, the flowry *Thyme*, wild *Rose*, or *Honey-suckle*: 'tis not their BEAUTY allures the neighbouring Herds, delights the brouzing Fawn, or Kid, and spreads the Joy we see amidst the feeding Flocks: 'Tis not the *Form* rejoices; but that which is beneath the Form: 'tis *Savouriness* attracts, *Hunger* impels; and *Thirst* better allay'd by the clear Brook than the thick Puddle, makes the fair NYMPH to be prefer'd, whose Form is otherwise slighted. For never can the *Form* be of real force where it is un contemplated, unjudg'd of, unexamined, and stands only as the accidental Note or Token of what appeases provok'd sense, and satisfies the brutish Part. Are you persuaded of this, good PHILOCLÉS? or rather than not give Brutes the advantage of *Enjoyment*, will you allow them also a Mind and rational Part?

Not so, I told him.

IF BRUTES therefore, said he, be incapable of knowing and enjoying Beauty, as being *Brutes*, and having SENSE only (the brutish part) for their own share; it follows, " That neither can MAN by  
" the

„ the same *Sense* or brutish Part, conceive Sect. 2.  
 „ or enjoy *Beauty*: But all the *Beauty* and  
 „ *Good* he enjoys, is in a nobler way, and  
 „ by the help of what is noblest, his  
 „ MIND and REASON.” Here lies his *Reason*.  
*Dignity* and highest *Interest*: Here his *Ca-*  
*capacity* toward Good and Happiness. His  
*Ability* or *Incompetency*, his *Power* of En-  
 joyment, or his *Impotence*, is founded in  
 this alone. As this is *sound, fair, noble,*  
*worthy*; so are its Subjects, Acts and Em-  
 ployments. For as the *riotous MIND*,  
 captive to *Sense*, can never enter in com-  
 petition, or contend for *Beauty* with the  
*virtuous MIND* of Reason’s Culture; so *Comparison*  
 neither can the *Objects* which allure the *of Objects.*  
 former, compare with those which at-  
 tract and charm the latter. And when *and En-*  
*each* gratifies it-self in the Enjoyment and *joyments,*  
 Possession of its Object; how evidently  
 fairer are the Acts which join the *latter*  
*Pair*, and give a *Soul* the Enjoyment of  
 what is *generous* and *good*? This at least,  
 PHILOCLEES, you will surely allow,  
 That when you place a Joy elsewhere  
 than the in Mind; *The Enjoyment* it-self  
 will be no beautiful Subject, nor of any  
 graceful or agreeable Appearance. But  
 when you think how *Friendship* is enjoy’d,  
 how *Honour, Gratitude, Candour, Benig-*  
*nity*, and all internal *Beauty*; how all  
 the *social Pleasures, Society* it-self, and all  
 which constitutes the *Worth* and *Happi-*  
 ness

Part 3. nefs of Mankind; you will here surely allow Beauty in the *Act*, and think it worthy to be view'd, and pass'd in review often by the glad Mind, happily conscious of the generous Part, and of its own Advancement and Growth in Beauty.

Recapitulation.

THUS, PHILOCLES, (continu'd he, after a short Pause) thus have I presum'd to treat of *Beauty* before so great a Judg, and such a skilful Admirer as your-self. For taking rise from Nature's Beauty, which transported me, I gladly ventur'd further in the Chase; and have accompany'd you in search of Beauty, as it relates to us, and makes our highest *Good*, in its sincere and natural Enjoyment. And if we have not idly spent our hours, nor rang'd in vain thro' these deserted Regions; it shou'd appear from our strict Search, that there is nothing so divine as BEAUTY: which belonging not to *Body*, nor having any Principle or Existence except in MIND and REASON, is alone discover'd and acquir'd by this diviner Part, when it inspects *it-self*, the only Object worthy of it-self. For whate'er is void of Mind, is *Void* and *Darkness* to the *Mind's EYE*. This languishes and grows dim, whene'er detain'd on foreign Subjects; but thrives and attains its natural Vigour, when

when employ'd in Contemplation of what is like it-self. 'Tis thus the *improving* MIND, slightly surveying other Objects, and passing over Bodys, and the common Forms, (where only a Shadow of Beauty rests) ambitiously presses onward to its *Source*, and views *the Original* of Form and Order in that which is intelligent. And thus, O PHILOCLEES! may we improve and become Artists in the kind; learning „ To know *Our-selves*, and what „ *That* is, which by improving, we may „ be sure to advance our Worth, and real „ Self-Interest.” For neither is this *Know-* *Knowledge* *of ourselves* *Interest:* *Ability,* *ledg* acquir'd by Contemplation of Bodys, or the outward Forms, the View of Pagantrys, the Study of Estates and Honours: nor is He to be esteem'd that self-improving Artist, who makes a Fortune out of these; but he (*He* only) is the *wise* and *able* Man, who with a slight regard to these Things, applies himself to cultivate another Soil, builds in a different Matter from that of Stone or Marble; and having righter Models in his Eye, becomes in truth the *Architect* of *his own Life* and *Fortune*; by laying within himself the lasting and sure Foundations of *Order*, *Peace*, and *Concord*.--But now 'tis time to think of returning home. The Morning is far spent. Come! Let us away, and leave these uncommon Subjects;

Sect. 2.

Part 3. jects; till we retire again to these remote and unfrequented Places.

AT THESE words THEOCLES mending his pace, and going down the Hill, left me at a good distance; till he heard me calling earnestly after him. Having join'd him once again, I begg'd he wou'd stay a little longer: or if he were resolv'd so soon to leave both the *Woods*, and that Philosophy which he confin'd to 'em; that he wou'd let me however part with 'em more gradually, and leave the best Impression on me he cou'd, against my next Return. For as much convinc'd as I was, and as great a Convert to his Doctrine, my Danger still, I own'd to him, was very great: and I foresaw that when the Charm of these Places, and his Company was ceas'd, I shou'd be apt to relapse, and weakly yield to that too powerful Charm, *the World*. Tell me, continu'd I, how is it possible to hold out against it, and withstand the general Opinion of Mankind, who have so different a Notion of that which we call *Good*? Say truth now, THEOCLES, can any thing be more odd, or dissonant from the common Voice of the World, than what we have determin'd in this matter?

WHOM

Sect. 3.

WHOM shall we follow then? reply'd he. Whose Judgment or Opinion shall we take, concerning What is *Good*, What *contrary*? If *All*, or *any part* of Mankind are consonant with themselves, and can agree in this; I am content to leave *Philosophy*, and follow them: If otherwise; Why shou'd we not adhere to what we have chosen?---Let us then, in another View, consider how this Matter stands.

## S E C T. III.

WE THEN walk'd gently homewards (it being almost Noon) and he continu'd his Discourse.

ONE Man, said he, affects the *Hero*; *Manners of Men.* esteems it the highest Advantage of Life, to have seen War, and been in Action in the Field. Another laughs at this Humour; counts it all Extravagance and Folly, prizes his own *Wit* and *Prudence*; and wou'd take it for a Disgrace to be thought adventurous. One Person is assiduous and indefatigable in advancing himself to the Character of a *Man of Business*. *Contrary Pursuits.* Another on the contrary thinks this impertinent; values not Fame, or a Character in the World: and by his good-will

Part 3.

will wou'd always be in a *Debauch*, and never live out of the *Stews* or *Taverns*; where he enjoys, as he thinks, his highest Good. One values *Wealth*, as a means only to indulge his *Palat*, and to eat finely. Another loaths this, and affects *Popularity*, and a *Name*. One admires *Musick* and *Paintings*, *Cabinet* .curiositys, and in-door *Ornaments*: Another admires *Gardens*, *Architecture*, and the *Pomp* of *Buildings*. Another, who has no *Gusto* of either sort believes all those they call *VIRTUOSI* to be half-distracted. One looks upon all *Expence* to be *Madness*; and thinks only *Wealth* it-self to be Good. One *games*; another *dresses*, and studies an *Equipage*, another is full of *Heraldry*, *Points of Honour*, a *Family*, and a *Blood*. One recommends *Gallantry* and *Intrigue*; another ordinary *Good-fellowship*; another *Buffoonery*, *Satir*, and the *common Wit*; another *Sports*, and the *Country*; another a *Court*; another *Travelling*, and the sight of *foreign Parts*; another *Poetry*, and the *fashionable Learning*.-----All these go different ways. All censure one another, and are despicable in one another's eyes. By fits too they are as despicable in *their own*, and as often out of conceit with themselves, as their *Humour* changes, and their *Passion* turns from one thing to another.---  
What is it then I shou'd be concern'd for?

Whose

Mutual  
Censure.Disagree-  
ment with  
one another.And with  
themselves.



Whose Censure do I fear? Or by whom, Sect. 3.  
after all, shall I be guided?

IF I ask, „ Are RICHES *good*, when  
„ only heap'd up, and un-employ'd?” *Riches.*  
One answers, „ *They are.*” The rest de-  
ny. „ How is it then they are to be  
„ employ'd in order to be good?” All  
*disagree.* All tell me different things.  
„ Since therefore RICHES are not, of  
„ themselves, *good* (as most of you de-  
„ clare;) And since there is no Agree-  
„ ment among you *which way* they become  
„ good; why may not I hold it for my  
„ Opinion, that they are neither good *in*  
„ themselves, nor *directly* any Cause or  
„ Means of Good?

IF there be those who wholly despise *Fame and*  
FAME; And if among those who covet *Honour.*  
it, he who desires it for one thing, despises  
it for another; he who seeks it with some  
Men, despises it with others: Why may  
not I say, „ That neither do I know how  
„ any *Fame* can be call'd a *Good*?”

IF of those who covet PLEASURE, *Pleasure.*  
they who admire it in *one* kind, are supe-  
rior to it *in another*; Why may not I  
say, „ That neither do I know *which* of  
„ these Pleasures, or how *Pleasure* it-self,  
„ can be call'd *Good*?”

IF

## Part 3.

*Life.*

IF among those who covet LIFE ever so earnestly, that Life which *to One* is eligible and amiable, is *to Another* despicable and vile; Why may not I say, „ That „ neither do I know how *Life* it-self can, „ of it-self, be thought *a Good?*”

*Inflavement.*

IN the mean time, This I know certainly; „ That the necessary Consequence „ of esteeming these things highly, is to „ be *a Slave*, and consequently miserable.” --- But perhaps (PHILOCLE!) you are not yet enough acquainted with this odd kind of Reasoning.

*LIBERTY.**Goods of Fortune.*

MORE, said I, than I believe you can easily imagine. I perceiv'd the goodly Lady, your celebrated Beauty, was about to appear a-new: and I easily knew again that fair Face of LIBERTY, which I had seen but once in the \* Picture you drew yesterday of that Moral Dame. I can assure you, I think of her as highly as possible: and find that without her Help, to raise one above these seemingly essential Goods, and make one more easy and indifferent towards *Life*, and towards *a Fortune*; 'twill be the hardest thing in the world to enjoy *either*. Sollicitude, Cares, and

\* *Supra*, p. 251. And VOL. III. p. 201, 307, &c.

and Anxiety, will be multiply'd : and in Sect. 3. this unhappy Dependency, 'tis necessary to make court, and be not a little servile. To flatter the Great, to bear Insults, to stoop, and fawn, and abjectly resign one's Sense and Manhood ; all this must courageously be endur'd, and carry'd off, with as free an Air, and good Countenance as possible, by one who studies Greatness of this sort, who knows the general way of Courts, and how to fix unsteady Fortune. I need not mention the Envyings, the Mistrusts, and Jealousys---

No truly, said he (interrupting me) neither need you. But finding you so sensible, as I do, of this unhappy State, and of its inward Sores, (whatever may be its outward Looks) How is it possible but you must find the Happiness of that other contrary State? Can you not call to mind what we resolv'd concerning *Nature*? Can any thing be more desirable than to follow her? Or is it not by this Freedom from our Passions and low Interests, that we are reconcil'd to the goodly *Order* of the Universe ; that we harmonize with *Nature* ; and live in Friendship both with GOD and Man?

LET us compare, continu'd he, the Advantages of each State, and set their *Goods of the Mind.*  
*Goods*

Part 3. *Goods* one against another: On one side, those which we found were *uncertainly* so; *Comparison.* and depended both on Fortune, Age, Circumstances and Humour: On the other side, these which being *certain* themselves, are founded on the Contempt of those others so uncertain. Is manly *Liberty, Generosity, Magnanimity*, not a Good? May we not esteem as Happiness, that *Self-Enjoyment* which arises from a Consistency of Life and Manners, a Harmony of Affections, a Freedom from the Reproach of Shame or Guilt, and a Consciousness of Worth and Merit with all Mankind, our Society, Country, and Friends: all which is founded in Virtue only? A *Mind* subordinate to Reason, a *Temper* humaniz'd, and fitted to all natural Affections; an Exercise of *Friendship* uninterrupted; a thorow *Candor, Benignity, and Good Nature*; with constant *Security, Tranquillity, Equanimity*, (if I may use such *philosophical* Terms) are not these ever, and at all seasons *Good*? Is it of *these* one can at any time nauseate and grow weary? Are there any particular Ages, Seasons, Places, Circumstances, which must accompany *these*, to make 'em agreeable? Are *these* variable & inconstant? Do *these*, by being ardently belov'd, or sought, occasion any Disturbance or Misery? Can *these* be at any time overvalu'd? Or,

to say more yet, can these be ever taken Sect. 3.  
 from us, or can we ever be hinder'd in  
 the Enjoyment of 'em, unless by our-  
 selves? How can we better praise the  
 Goodness of *Providence*, than in this,  
 „ That it has plac'd our Happiness and  
 „ Good in things *We* can bestow upon  
 „ *our-selves*?

IF this be so, said I, I see no reason we  
 have to accuse Providence on any ac-  
 count. But Men, I fear, will hardly be  
 brought to this good Temper, while their  
 Fancy is so strong, as it naturally is, to-  
 wards those other movable *Goods*. And in  
 short, if we may depend on what is said  
 commonly, „ All *Good* is merely as we  
 „ fancy it. 'Tis *Conceit* which makes it.  
 „ All is OPINION and *Fancy* only.” *Opinia All,*

WHEREFORE then, said he, do we  
*act* at any time? Why *chuse*, or why *pre-*  
*fer* one thing to another? You will tell  
 me, I suppose, 'tis because we fancy it,  
 or fancy *Good* in it. Are we therefore  
 to follow every *present* Fancy, Opinion,  
 or Imagination of Good? If so, then we  
 must follow that at *one* time, which we  
 decline at *another*; approve at *one* time,  
 what we disapprove at *another*; and be at  
 perpetual variance with our-selves. But  
 if we are not to follow *all* Fancy or Opi-  
 nion

Part 3.  
Opinion.

nion alike; If it be allow'd. „ That of  
 „ *Fancys*, some are *true*, some *false*;" then  
 we are to *examine* every *Fancy*; and there  
 is some *Rule* or other, by which to *judg*,  
 and *determine*. 'Twas the *Fancy* of one  
 Man to set fire to a beautiful *Temple*, in  
 order to obtain immortal *Memory* or  
*Fame*. 'Twas the *Fancy* of another Man  
 to conquer the *World*, for the same *Rea-*  
*son*, or what was very like it. If this  
 were really the Man's *Good*; Why do we  
 wonder at him? If the *Fancy* were *wrong*;  
 say plainly in What it was so; or Why the  
 Subject was not *Good to him*, as he *fancy*-  
*cy'd*? Either therefore, „ *That* is every  
 „ Man's *GOOD* which he *fancies*, and  
 „ because he *fancies* it, and is *not content*  
 „ without it:" Or otherwise, „ There is  
 „ *That* in which the *Nature* of Man is  
 „ *satisfy'd*; and which alone must be his  
 „ *GOOD*." If that in which the *Nature*  
 of Man is *satisfy'd*, and can *rest contented*,  
 be alone his *GOOD*; then he is a *Fool*  
 who follows that with *Earnestness*, as his  
*Good*, which a Man can be without, and  
 yet be *satisfy'd* and *contented*. In the same  
 manner is he a *Fool* who flies that *earnestly*  
 as his *ILL*, which a Man may *endure*, and  
 yet be *easy* and *contented*. Now a Man  
 may possibly not have burnt a *Temple* (as  
*EROSTRATUS*) and yet may be *con-*  
*tented*. Or tho he may not have con-  
 quer'd

quer'd the World (as ALEXANDER) Sect. 3.  
 yet he may be easy and *contented*: as he  
 may still without any of those Advantages  
 of *Power, Riches, or Renown*; if his FAN-  
 CY hinders not. In short, we shal' find  
 „ That without any one of those which  
 „ are commonly call'd *Goods*, a Man may  
 „ be *contented*:” As, on the contrary,  
 „ He may possess them all, and still be  
 „ *discontented*, and not a jot the happier.”  
 If so; it follows, „ That Happiness is  
 „ from *within*, not from *without*.” A  
 good FANCY is the Main. And thus,  
 you see, I agree with you, „ That \* O P I -  
 „ NION is all in all.” — But what is Opinion  
 this, PHILOCLES, which has seiz'd you? All, in  
 You seem of a sudden grown deeply what  
 thoughtful, sense

To tell you truth, said I, I was consi-  
 dering What wou'd become of me, if, af-  
 ter all, I shou'd, by your means, turn  
*Philosopher*. The Change, truly,  
 wou'd be somewhat extraordinary, re-  
 ply'd THEOCLES. But be not con-  
 cern'd. The Danger is not so great. And  
 Experience shews us every day, That for  
 talking or writing *Philosophy*, People are  
 not at all the nearer being PHILOSOP-  
 HERS.

VOL. II.

T

BUT,

## Part 3.

BUT, said I, the very *Name* is a kind of Reproach. The word *IDIOT* stood formerly as the Opposite to *Philosopher*: but now a days it means nothing more commonly than *the PHILOSOPHER himself*.

*Philosophy.*

YET, in effect, (reply'd he) what else is it we all do in general, than *philosophize*? If *PHILOSOPHY* be, as we take it, *the Study of Happiness*; must not every-one, in some manner or other, either skilfully or unskilfully *philosophize*? Is not every Deliberation concerning our main Interest, every Correction of our Taste, every Choice and Preference in Life to be reckon'd of *this kind*? For „ If Happiness be not allow'd to be from *Self*, and „ from *within*; then either is it from *outward Things* alone, or from *Self* and *outward Things* together.” If from *outward Things* alone; shew it us, in fact, „ That „ all Men are happy in proportion to „ these; and that no-one who possesses „ them is ever miserable by his own fault.”

But this, it seems, hardly any-one will pretend to evince: All own the contrary.

Therefore „ If Happiness be „ partly from *Self*, partly from *outward Things*; then each must be consider'd, „ and a certain Value set on the Concerns  
of



„ of an *inward* kind, and which depend Sect. 3.  
 „ on *Self* alone.” If so: and that I con-  
 sider „ *How*, and *in What* these are to be  
 „ prefer’d; When and on what occasion  
 „ they are in season, or out of season;  
 „ When properly to take place, when to  
 „ yield:” What’s this, after all, but to *phi-*  
*losophize*?

Yet even this, still, is e-  
 nough to put one out of the ordinary way  
 of thinking, and give one an unhappy turn  
 for Business, and the World. Right!

For this also is to be consider’d, and well  
 weigh’d. And therefore *This*, still, is P H I -

L O S O P H Y; „ To inquire Where, and in  
 „ what respect one may be most a *Loser*;

„ Which are the greatest *Gains*, the most  
 „ profitable *Exchanges*;” since every thing

in this World goes by *Exchange*. No-  
 thing is had for nothing. *Favour* requires

*Courtship*: *Interest* is made by Sollicita-  
 tion: *Honours* are acquir’d with Hazard;

*Riches* with Pains; *Learning* and *Accom-*  
*plishments* by Study and Application. *Se-*

*curity*, *Rest*, *Indolence* are to be had at  
 other Prices. They may be thought, per-

haps, to come easy. For „ What Hard-  
 „ ship is there? Where is the Harm?

’Tis only to abate of *Fame* and *Fortune*.  
 ’Tis only to wave *the Point of Honour*,

and share somewhat less of *Interest*. If  
 this be easy; all is well. Some *Patience*,

you see, is necessary in the case. *Privacy*  
 T 2 mult

Part 3. must be endur'd; even *Obscurity* and *Contempt*. — Such are the Conditions. And thus every-thing has its CONDITION. *Power* and *Preferments* are to be had at one rate; *Pleasures* at another; LIBERTY and HONESTY at another. A good MIND must be paid for, as other things.

*Philosophy.*

But we had best beware lest, perhaps, we pay *too dear* for it. Let us be assur'd we have a good Bargain. Come on then. — Let us account. — „ What is a „ MIND worth? What *Allowance* may „ one handsomly make for it? Or What „ may one well afford it for? — If I part with it, or abate of it, 'tis not for *Nothing*. Some value I must needs set upon *my Liberty*, some upon *my inward Character*. Something there is in what we call WORTH; something in *Sincerity*, and a sound HEART. *Orderly Affections*, *generous Thoughts*, and a commanding REASON, are fair Possessions, not slightly to be given up. I am to consider first, „ What „ may be *their Equivalent*? Whether I „ shall find my Account in letting these „ *inward Concerns* run as they please; or „ Whether I shall not be better secur'd „ against Fortune by adjusting Matters „ *at home*, rather than by making *Interest abroad*, and acquiring first one „ great Friend, then another; to add still „ more and more to my *Estate* or *Quality*?

“*lity?*” For Where am I to take up? Sect. 3.  
 Begin; and set *the Bounds*. Let me hear  
 positively “How far I am to go, and  
 “Why no further?” What is a *moderate*  
*Fortune, a Competency*, and those other *De-*  
*grees* commonly talk’d of? Where is my  
*Anger* to stop? or how High may I suf-  
 fer it to rise? How far may I ingage in  
*Love*? How far give way to *Ambition*?  
 How far to other *Appetites*? Or am I to  
 let all loose? Are *the Passions* to take  
 their swing; and no Application to be  
 given to ’em, but all to *the outward Things*  
 they aim at? Or if any Application be  
 requisite; say plainly, “How much to  
 “*one*, and how much to *the other?*”  
 How far are the *Appetites* to be minded,  
 and how far *outward Things*? Give us  
 the Measure and Rule. See Whether this  
 be not to *philosophize*? and Whether wil-  
 lingly or unwillingly, knowingly or un-  
 knowingly, directly or indirectly, Every-  
 one does not as much? “Where, then,  
 “*is the Difference?* Which Manner is *the*  
 “*best?*” Here lies the Question. This  
 is what I wou’d have you weigh and ex-  
 amine. “But the Examination (say  
 “you) is troublesome; and I had better  
 “be without it.” *Who* tells you thus?  
 “Your REASON, you say, whose Force,  
 “of necessity, you must yield to.”  
 Tell me therefore, have you fitly culti-  
 vated


Part. 3. vated that REASON of your's, polish'd  
*Philosophy.* it, bestow'd the necessary Pains on it, and  
 exercis'd it on this Subject? Or is it like  
 to determine full as well when un-exer-  
 cis'd, as when thorowly exercis'd, or ever  
 so expert? Consider, pray, in *Mathema-*  
*ticks*; Whose is the better REASON of  
 the two, and fitter to be rely'd on? The  
 Practiser's? or his who is unpractis'd?  
 Whose in the way of *War*, of *Policy*, or  
*Civil Affairs*? Whose in *Merchandize*,  
*Law*, *Physick*? ——— And in MORALITY  
 and LIFE, I ask still, *Whose*? May he  
 not, perhaps, be allow'd the best Judg of  
*Living*, who *studies* LIFE, and endeavours  
 to form it by some *Rule*? Or is he in-  
 deed to be esteem'd most knowing in the  
 matter, who *slightly* examines it, and  
 who *accidentally* and *unknowingly* philoso-  
 phizes?

THUS, PHILOCLES (said he, con-  
 cluding his Discourse) Thus is PHILO-  
 SOPHY establish'd. For every-one, of  
 necessity, must reason concerning his own  
 Happiness; "What his *Good* is, and what  
 his *Ill*." The Question is only, "Who  
 reasons best?" For even he who re-  
 jects this *reasoning* or *deliberating* Part,  
 does it from a *certain Reason*, and from a  
 Persuasion "That this is *best*."

BY this time we found our-selves in- Sect. 3.  
sensibly got home. Our *Philosophy* ended,  
and we return'd to the common Affairs of  
Life.

*The End of the Second Volume.*

















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