



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
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, Princeton, N. J.



James Lines







THE

CHRISTIAN LIFE.

WHEREIN THE

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

OF

CHRISTIAN DUTY

ARE

Assigned, Explained, and Proved.

VOL. II.


By $\mathcal{F} O H N S C O T T$, D. D.

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TOTHE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

AND

Right Reverend FATHER in Go

ENR

Lord Bishop of London,

And one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy, Council, &c.

My Lord,

Here present to your Lordship the first Volume of a second Part of that Treatife of Christian Life, which I published some Years fince, and which under the Protection of your Venerable Name hath found good acceptance with the World; and to make an ingenuous Confession to

A 2

your

The Epistle Dedicatory.

your Lordship, my design in this second Dedication is not purely to render you the due Respects of a Presbyter to his Diocesan; not to tender those just Acknowledgments I owe to your Lordship for the Happiness I have enjoyed, with the rest of your Clergy, under the auspicious Influence of your ferene and watchful Government; no nor yet to express the grateful Sense I have, and shall always retain, of the personal Obligations you have laid upon me; no, my Lord, though these were all of them sufficient Inducements, yet I confess that together with these I had a certain Politick end in my Eye. For I thank God I can truly fay, my main Defign in composing this Treatise

The Epistle Dedicatory.

was to benefit the World; but reflecting upon the manifold Defects it abounds with after all the Pains I had bestowed upon it, I found that, to palliate its internal Blemishes, it was but needful to grace it with fome external Ornament, and could think of none fo proper for my Purpose as this of affixing your Lordship's Name to it; a Name that carries with it Power enough to recommend any thing to the World that is but pious, and honest and welldesigned, and all that, I am sure, this is, how defective soever it be in other respects; which together with the Experience I have had of the great candor and benignity of your Lordship's Temper, give me Encouragement to hope that A 3 you

The Epistle Dedicatory.

you will not only accept but approve it; and then I am fure your Lordship's Approbation will give it Credit and Authority enough with the World to enable it to effect those good and honest Ends for which it was sincerely intended, by

Your Lordship's

Most Humble,

Most Obliged, and

Faithful Servant,

John Scott.

PREFACE

TO THE

READER.

HEN I wrote the Treatise of Christian Life, of which this and another Volume, now in the Press, is a fecond Part, I had no defign of engaging any further in that Argument; but now I find by Experience, that Writing is like Building, wherein the Undertaker, to supply some Defect, or serve some Convenience which at first he foresaw not, is usually forced to exceed his first Model and Proposal, and many times to double the Charge and Expence of it. For after that Treatife began to be a little known in the World, I was advised from several Hands that there was one thing wanting in it, which is the common Defect of most practical Treatifes, and that was, an Explication and Proof of those main Principles of Religion in which the Obligation A s.

gation of our Christian Duty is founded, which they thought might be fufficiently done within a very narrow Compass, though herein I find that either they were very much mistaken, or that I have very much exceeded the necessary Limits of my Argument, which I am not yet convinced of, but that I must submit to the Judgment of the World. I confess the Prospect of doing it in that narrow Compass they talked of was a great Inducement with me to undertake it, and perhaps had I foreseen at first what a large Field of Discourse it would oblige me to traverse, I should never have entered on it; but when once I was in, I could not handsomely retreat.

And indeed, confidering with what prodigious Rudeness and Insolence the very Foundations of Religion are struck at in this dissolute Age, he who would now treat of them to any purpose will find himself obliged not only to give a distinct and clear Explication of them, but also to affert the Truth of them with convincing Evidence, and to answer and expose those Atheistical Cavils that are levelled

levelled against them; which tatter would have been much less necessary in an Age of a more Serious and Religious Genius. And upon this Account I have been forced upon a much larger and more laborious Proof of the several Principles of Religion than I first intended. Not that I have any great Hope of reclaiming those who are professed Atheists to the acknowledgment of the Truth; for when Men are feduced by Luft, as I verily believe most Atheists are, there is little Reason to expect they will be reduced by Reason. But that which I chiefly aimed at is to confirm and establish those that are wavering, and to Antidote all against this spreading Contagion of Irreligion and Atheism, which in a fatal Chain draws after it not only the Ruin of Men's Souls hereafter, but also the utter Subversion of all Human Society here: And it is this hath constrained me to enlarge this fecond Part into two Volumes, which at first view I promised myself to finish in one.

In this first Volume I have treated only of those Principles which are common

to natural Religion and Christianity together; as an Introduction to which I have in the first Chapter explained and demonstrated the natural Distinction of Human Actions into good and evil, by fome eternal Reason for or against them; and having shewn at large that God hath made this Distinction sufficiently clear and evident to all Men to enable them to conduct themselves to their own Happiness, and that those Actions of Men which fall under this natural Distinction are the principal Subject Matter of the Commands and Prohibitions of Religion; I proceed in the fecond Chapter briefly to explain the Nature of Religion in general, and of natural and Christian Religion in particular: From the Nature of both which I have deduced those fundamental Principles from whence the Obligations of Religion are derived; the five first of which being common to natural Religion with Christianity, I have handled in this first Volume in so many distinct Chapters.

And then as for the last, viz. the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ our Mediator.

Mediator, which contains under it all those Religious Principles that are peculiar to Christianity, though I have endeavoured to treat of it with all the Brevity that is confistent with a clear and satisfactory Account of the whole Argument, yet it is run out into a fecond Volume, which is now in the Press, and, I hope, within a few Weeks will be ready to follow this. And perhaps when the Reader confiders the Copiousness of the Argument it handles, he will rather blame me for being too brief than too tedious; for in treating of those Doctrines which have been handled at large in other English Treatises of the Christian Faith, and especially in that incomparable one of our most learned Bishop of Chester, on the Creed (a Book which next to the Bible I thankfully acknowledge myself more beholden to for my Instruction in the Doctrines of Religion than to any one I ever read) I have contracted myself into as narrow a Compass as barely the necessary Application of them would permit me; but where that renowned Pen hath infifted more Curforily (as for instance on the particular Offices

of our bleffed *Mediator*) I have most enlarged myself, though even there I have for brevity sake pretermitted some things I intended less immediate and necessary appertaining to the Argument.

Upon the whole I can truly fay, that to the best of my Understanding, I have herein delivered nothing but what is agreeable to the Doctrine of the Primitive Church, which as the most faithful Comment on the Holy Writings of our Saviour and his Apostles I have all along carefully confulted in doubtful and difficult Cases; and this is the Reason why it hath stuck fo long in hand, the Pains I have taken in consulting the antient Monuments of Christianity about it, being, as I may truly fay, at least double to that of composing it; and in following the Primitive Doctrine, I have followed the Doctrine of the Church of England, which in its Faith, Government, and Discipline, I believe in my Conscience, is the most Primitive Church in the World.

As for the Method I have chosen, which is to deduce all the Doctrines of Christianity from one general Head, viz. the Doctrine

Doctrine of the Mediator, it is the most convenient I could think of for my Purpose, which was to represent at once to the Reader's View all the Parts of our holy Religion in their natural Connection with and Dependance on one another, that fo he might be the better able to judge of the beautiful Contexture and admirable Contrivance of the whole, and that by feeing how regularly all the Parts of it proceed out of one common Principle, and conspire in one common End, he may be the better fatisfied that Christianity is fo far from being a Heap of Incoherencies, as some have injuriously represented it, that confidering it merely as an Hypothesis, abstracted from all that external Evidence that accompanies it, the very Art and Contrivance of it, the Proportion, Symmetry, and Correspondence of its Parts, their Subserviency to each other, and the Concurrence and Tendency of them all together to the common Ends of Religion, are fuch as do apparently exceed all human Invention, and argue it to be the Product of a divine Mind. For as he who would form a true *Idea* of the *Beauty* of

a Picture, must not contemplate the Parts of it separately, but furvey them all together, and consider them in their Proportions, and Correspondencies with each other; fo he who would frame a right Notion of Religion must not look upon it as it lies scattered and divided into single Parts and Propositions, but consider them in Contexture, and as they are connected all together into one Body or Hypothesis. For it is in their apt JunEtures, their mutual Dependencies and admirable Coherencies with one another, that the Beauty and Harmony of the whole confifts. And therefore to do right to Christianity, and enable the Reader to contemplate it with the greatest Advantage, I have endeavoured to represent to him the whole in a View, and to give him a Prospect of all the Parts of it together, in an harmonious Union and Connection with each other. For I verily believe that the mean Opinion which fome witty Men have entertained of Christianity, proceeds in a great Measure from their broken and imperfeEt Apprehensions of it; they understand it piece-meal, and take it afunder into

into fingle Propositions, which they confider feparately and apart by themselves, without ever putting them together into one regular System, and presenting them to their Thoughts in that orderly Connection wherein the holy Oracles have delivered them to us. For I can scarce imagine how any Man of Sense should contemplate Christianity all together, and thoroughly consider the harmonious Coherence of all its Parts, and the wonderful Contrivance of the whole, without being captivated with the Beauty and Elegancy of it.

And now I have nothing farther to add concerning this Treatife but only to intreat the Reader not to be too fevere in the perusal of it. For though as for the Doctrine of it, I see no reason at all to Apologize for it, because I am fully persuaded of the Truth of it, yet being forced, as I was, to compose it by fnatches, and in the more quiet Intervals of a busy and uneasy Life, I very much suspect the Exactness both of the Stile and Method of it; and therefore all the Favour I desire is this, that where I have improperly or obscurely

obscurely expressed myself, I may be construed in the most favourable Sense; and that where-ever I may feem to be confused or immethodical, it may be attributed to those frequent Interruptions which the Diforders of my Body have given to my Thoughts. And these are Requests so very just and reasonable, that I am confident none will be so peevish as to deny me, but they who read Books only to carp and find Fault, and without any defign to Edify their own Understandings. But I hope the Reader will confider that the Argument here treated of is of too great Moment to him to be fo wretchedly trifled with, and that therefore he will not be either so disingenuous to me, or uncharitable to himself, as to peruse with such a spiteful Defign that which I sincerely intended for his good, and which he, I am fure, if he pleases, may be the better for for ever.

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OF

OF THE

CHRISTIAN LIFE.

VOL. II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the Being, and Nature of Moral Goodness.

LL Human Actions are either Necessary, or Sinful, or Indifferent. The Necessary are fuch as are commanded, the Sinful fuch as are forbidden by God, the Indifferent fuch as are neither commanded nor forbidden, but left entirely free to our Choice and Discretion. Again, the necessary and the finful Actions are either such as are necessary and finful in themselves, and are commanded and forbidden upon the account of fome Good and Evil that is inseparable to their Natures; or fuch as are indifferent in their own Natures, as to any good or evil inherent in them, but are made necessary or finful by some positive Command or Prohibition superinduced upon them. Of the first fort are those which we call Moral Actions; as being the subject matter of the Moral Law, which commands, and forbids nothing but VOL. II. what

what is effentially and immutably good and evil: and whilst there was no other Law but this, every Action which did not oblige by fome eternal Reafon, or which is the fame, by fome inseparable good or evil, was left free and indifferent. But in process of time God superadded to this Moral Law a great many *Politive* ones, whereby he obliged Men to do, and forbear fundry of those indifferent Things, which were left to their liberty by the Law of Nature. For such we call the Rites and Ceremonies of the Mefaick Law; all which were indifferent before they were imposed, and as soon as ever the Imposition was taken off from them, did immediately return to their Primitive Indif-ferency; fo that by the abolition of their Ceremonial Law, the Jews were restored to all the Liberties of the Moral; excepting only the matter of the two Sacraments, and of maintaining a vifible Communion with the Church, which are determined by positive Laws of Christianity. And of this latter fort of necessary and finful Actions, are, not only all those indifferent ones which God himself has commanded and forbidden immediately, but also all those which he commands and forbids by his Viceroys and Representatives, in this World. For whatfoever he hath not commanded or forbidden by his own immediate Dictate and Authority, he hath authorized his Vicegerents to command or forbid, as they shall judge it most expedient for the Publick. So that when they command what God hath not forbidden, or forbid what he hath not commanded, their will is God's, who commands us by their Mouths, and stamps their Injunctions with his own Authority. And

And of this distinction between Actions that are morally and positively Necessary, the Scripture frequently takes notice, and particularly, Mich. vi. 6, 7, 8. Wherewithal shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? shall I come before him with Burnt Offerings, with Calves of a Year old, &c. No, these are not the things that will render me acceptable in his Eyes, and procure me a welcome Admission into his Presence; and yet it is certain that these things were then required and commanded, and therefore were positively necessary; but that they were not necessary in themselves upon the account of any intrinsick Goodness that was in them, is evident from what follows, He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; as much as if he should have said, the things abovenamed are in their own nature indifferent, having neither good nor evil in themselves; and are made necessary merely by positive Command, upon which account they are infufficient to recommend you to God; but there are other things that carry an intrinsick Beauty and Goodness in their Nature, by which they strictly oblige you to embrace and practife them, and do thereupon recommend you by their own native Charms, to the Love and Favour of God; and what these good things are he hath fufficiently shewn or difcovered to you, viz. To do justly, to love Mercy, and to walk humbly with your God, which are the main and principal Duties that he requires of you. Which plainly implies that there are some Actions which are morally, that is, in their own Natures, eternally good, and therefore eternally neceffary, and fome that are necessary only because B 2

for fome prefent Reafon God Wills and Commands them. For no account can be given why he should be more pleased with Justice and Mercy and Humanity, than with Sacrifice, unless we suppose the former to be good, and therefore necesfary upon immutable Reasons, and upon that account to be immutably pleasing to him; and the latter to be necessary only upon mutable Reasons, which therefore were to lose their necessity as foon as those Reasons did alter and cease. For had Sacrifices been good in their own Natures, their Goodness had been as unalterable as their Nature: whereas, on the contrary we find, that whereas their Nature neither is nor can be altered, yet their Goodness or Necessity is. For as before God adopted them into the Rubrick of Religion by his own positive Institution, they were indifferent things; so after this Institution was repealed by a contrary Command, they became unlawful. So that it is now as Necessary that we should not offer them in the Worship of God, as it was before that we should. And the same may be said of all the other Rites of the Mofaick Law, which being in their own Nature indifferent, could no otherwise be converted either into Necessary or Sinful, but by GOD's express Command or Prohibition. Whereas Justice and Mercy, &c. are good in themselves abstractly considered from all Will and Command; and are not good merely because they are Commanded, but are commanded because they are good; because they carry with them such unalterable Reasons as do in themselves render the practice of them eternally necessary. For though there be very good reason why Men should not offer offer material Sacrifices, notwithstanding they were once enjoined; yet it can never be reasonable for them to be unjust, or cruel, or proud, because the contrary Virtues carry fuch fixed and immutable Reasons with them as will bind and oblige us to Eternity; infomuch that though we had a Difpenfation to be proud under the Broad-Seal of Heaven, yet 'twould still be very abjurd and unreasonable to be fo. And as things that are only positively necessary or finful, derive all their necessity and finfulness from God's direct or express Command and Prohibition, fo they cannot be commanded or forbidden by Consequence. For if the Matter of them be antecedently Lawful or Indifferent, it must necessarily remain so till it be directly commanded or forbidden; there being no other Reafon to bound and limit it, but only the Will of the Law-giver in whose disposal it is; and therefore till he directly fignifies his Will either for or against it, it must remain as it is, i. e. Free and Indifferent. But you will fay, Suppose God hath commanded fuch an indifferent thing for fuch a Reason, doth it not thence follow that he thereby commands every other indifferent thing that hath the fame Reason for it? I answer, No; for if the Reason why he commands it be necessary and eternal, it is not a thing indifferent, but morally necessary, and fo is every thing else that hath the same Reason for it: and consequently the reason of the Law, though it be applied but to one thing, extends to every thing of the same Nature; because in all moral Cases the Reason of the Law is the Law. But if the thing commanded be in itself indifferent, the Reason why it is commanded cannot be necoffary;

cessary; and therefore though there be the same Reason why another thing of the same Nature should be commanded, yet it doth not necessarily oblige unless it be commanded actually; because in such Cases it is not the Reason but the Authority of the Law that obliges: and therefore where there is only the Reason and not the Law, it lays no obligation to the Conscience.

From the whole therefore it is evident, what is the difference between things that are politively and morally Necessary and Sinful; which I thought very necessary to explain at large, for the giving a fuller light to the ensuing Discourse; in which

I shall endeavour to shew,

First, That there is such an intrinsick Goodness in some Human Actions, as renders them for ever necessary and obliging to us.

Secondly, That God hath fufficiently discovered to us what those Human Actions are, which carry

with them this perpetual Obligation.

Thirdly, That these Actions which carry with them this perpetual Obligation, are the main and principal parts of Religion.

SECT. I.

That there is fuch an Intrinsick Good in fome Human Actions as render them for ever necessary and obliging to us.

OOD is two-fold, Absolute, or Respective, Tor the Good of the End and the Good of the Means. The good of the End is that which is the Perfection and Happiness of any Being; the good of the Means is that which tends and conduces thereunto. As for instance, the absolute Good of a Brute Animal confifts in the Perfection and Satisfaction of its Sense, or in having perfect Feeling and Senfation of fuch things as are most grateful to its Appetite and Senses. Its respective good is the Means by which its Senses are perfected or rendered lively and vigorous, and by which it's provided for with fuch things as are grateful and pleafing to them. For there being in every animate Nature a Principle whereby it's neceffarily inclined to promote its own Preservation and well-being, that which hath in it a fitness to promote this End is called Good, as on the contrary that which is apt to hinder it Evil. Now Man being not only a fensitive but a rational Creature, hath a two-fold Good belonging to his Nature, the first Sensitive, which is the same with that of brute Animals, confifting in the Persection and Satisfaction of his bodily Senses and Appetites, and in those means which conduce thereunto; and this for distinction sake is called his Natural B 4 Good;

Good; the fecond Rational, which confifts in the Perfection and Satisfaction of his Rational Faculties, and in those means which tend thereunto; and this is stiled his Moral Good, though in reality 'tis as much Natural as the former. Man being naturally as well Rational as Sensitive, that which promotes his Rational Perfection and Happiness, is no less naturally good for him than that which promotes his Sensitive: Nay his Rational Nature being the much more noble and excellent Part of him, that which naturally promotes the Perfection and Happiness of it, is in itself a much greater good to his Nature, and ought to be preferred by him before any of those Natural Goods, which conduce only to the happiness of his fensitive Nature; and he who indulges his sensitive Part in any Pleasure which his Rational disallows, doth thereby create a Torment to himself, and raise a Devil in his own Mind. For though Reason and Religion doth allow that the fenfitive Nature should be gratified in all its natural Appetites and Defires, yet neither allow that it should be pampered and indulged in any fuch Excesses as are prejudicial either to itself or to that Rational Nature whereunto it is joined; and he who indulges his Sense in any such Excesses, renders himself obnoxious to his own Reason, and to gratify the Brute in him displeases the Man, and sets his two Natures at variance. So that there is nothing can be naturally good for us, that is any way inconfiftent with what is morally so, i. e. with what conduces to the Perfection and Happiness of our rational Nature; and though this natural and moral Good are no way inconfistent with one another, yet it is the Moral that is the Supreme Good of a Man, because it is the Good of his most excellent Nature. Having thus premised what I mean by Good in general, and particularly by Moral Good, I proceed to shew that in some Human Actions there is such an intrinsick moral Good as renders them for ever obliging to us. And this I shall endeavour in these following Propositions.

First, That the Happiness of Human Nature

is founded in his Perfection.

Secondly, That the Perfection of Human Nature confifts in acting fuitably to the most perfect Reason.

Thirdly, That the most perfect Reason is that wherein all reasonable Beings do consent and

agree.

Fourthly, That there are certain Rules of Moral Good, wherein all Reasonable Beings are

agreed.

Fifthly, That to act suitably to those Rules hath been always found by universal Experience conducible ro the Happiness of Human Nature, and the

contrary mischievous thereunto.

I. That the Happiness of Human Nature, is founded in its *Perfection*. For the Perfection of Beings consists in their being *compleatly* disposed and adapted for the End whereunto they are defigned. Now the End of all Beings that have Life and Sense, is that fort of Happiness that is suitable to their Natures; for 'tis thither that they all of them naturally tend, and therein that their Faculties do all concenter. When therefore their Faculties or Powers of Action are compleatly disposed to enjoy the proper Happiness of their Na-

tures, then are they perfect in their Kind. Thus for instance, the End of Brutes which have only bodily Sense, is sensitive and corporeal Happiness; and therefore then is the Brute Creature perfect in its kind, when it hath not only all the Parts and Senses that are necessary to procure and enjoy its Happiness, but hath them also perfectly fitted, tempered, and qualified to pursue and relish it. And supposing that all the Pleasure or Happiness of a Beaft confifted in the Tafte and Smell of its Pasture, it could never be compleatly happy so long as the Organs of its Smell or Tafte were imperfect. So that the Perfection of every Senfible Nature confifts in being perfectly disposed to enjoy its natural Happiness. And accordingly herein confists the Perfection of Human Nature, in being perfectly fitted and disposed to enjoy and relish Human Happiness. For this being its proper End, it is impossible it should ever be perfect in its Kind till 'tis compleatly contempered and adapted thereunto. So that our Happiness must necessarily be founded in our *Perfection*, which is nothing else but the perfect Disposition of our Natures to relish and enjoy those Goods wherein the Happiness of our Nature consists; and till our Nature is perfectly disposed to enjoy them, all the good things of Heaven and Earth will be insufficient to render us perfectly happy.

II. That the Perfection of Human Nature confifts in acting suitably to the most Perfect Reason. For Reason being the Top and Crown of Human Nature, hath a natural Right to Command and Dispose of its Motions; to be the Eye of its Will, and the Guide of its Affections, and the

Law

Law of all its Powers of Action. And indeed, for what other use serves the Reason of a Man, but to prescribe Rules to his unreasonable Affections, to light and direct them in their proper Objects, and as they are moving towards them, to moderate their Excesses and to quicken their Defects, and to lead them on to true Happiness in an even Courfe through all the wild Mazes of popular Mistake? And unless it be thus employed, the Man is Reasonable in vain, and his Light, like a Candle inclosed in a Dark-Lanthorn, burns out in waste and spends itself in an useless and unprofitable Blaze. And whilst to please our Appetites and Passions we run counter to the advice of our Reason, we forsake the Rule of our Natures and act like Beafts and not like Men; in which course of Action if we perfift, we must necessarily degenerate from ourselves, and fink by degrees into the most fordid Brutality. For when once our Appetites have gotten the Command of our Reafon, and not only dethroned but enflaved it, the very Order of our Nature is transported and we are become our own Reverse and Antipodes. If therefore we would arrive at our own Perfection, it must be by following our Reason, and submitting all our Affections and Appetites to its Government. For what else can be the Perfection of a Rational Nature, but to be perfectly Rational; and what is it to be perfectly Rational, but to have our Minds thoroughly instructed with the Principles of Right Reason, and our Will and Affections intirely regulated by them? For herein confists the Supreme Perfection not only of Men, but of Angels, yea and of God himfelf, the Crown

Crown and Glory of whose Nature it is, that he always knows, and chuses and acts what is sittest and best and most reasonable. And when once our Understanding is so far enlightned as that it always dictates right Reason to us; and our Will and Affections are so far subdued as that they always freely and chearfully comply with it, we have arrived to the very top of our Nature, and are com-

menced perfect Men in Christ Jesus.

III. That the most perfect Reason is that wherein all Reasonable Beings do consent and agree. For if there be any fuch matter as True and False, Reasonable and Unreasonable, in the Nature of Things, and if there be any fuch thing as Understanding among Beings, whereby they are capable of diftinguishing between the one and the other; either that must be True and Reasonable which all Understandings do consent and agree in, or all the Understandings that are in the World must be under a fatal Cheat and Delufion. Which latter being fupposed, inevitably destroys all Knowledge and Certainty, and lays a Foundation for the wildest Scepticism. For supposing all Understandings to be deceived and imposed on, it is impossible for us to be certain of any thing, and for all we know, a Part may be bigger than the Whole, two and two may make twenty, and both parts of a Contradiction may be true. Nay we can never be certain whether we are not Dreaming when we think we are Awake, and whether we are not Awake when we think we are Dreaming. Either therefore we must renounce all Certainty whatsoever, and fluctuate in eternal Scepticism, or allow that to be True and Reasonable which all Understandings do unanimously vote so. IV. That

IV. That there are certain Rules of Moral Goodness concerning the immutable Reason whereof all Understandings are agreed. For such are all those which prescribe the Dueness of Worship and Veneration to God, of Obedience and Loyalty to our Parents and Superiors, of Temperance and Fortitude to ourselves, and of Justice and Charity to one another; to the Goodness and Reasonableness of which Rules, all Understandings do as unanimously confent, as to the Truth of any Proposition in the Mathematicks. Now of all the Orders of reasonable Beings, that which we most converse with, and with whose Consent and Agreement in any matters we are best acquainted, is that of Men; and therefore if among Men we can difcover fuch an Universal Agreement concerning the Goodness of these Rules as will warrant us to conclude all other Rational Beings to be confenting with them, this will be a fufficient Demonstration of the Truth of the Proposition. These two things therefore I shall endeavour to make out, 1. That the Reason of Men is Universally consenting in this Matter, viz. That there is an immutable Goodness in these Rules of Morality. 2. That this Universal Consent of Mens Reason in this Matter is a fufficient Demonstration that all other reasonable Beings are confenting with them.

First, Therefore there is nothing more evident than that Men are universally agreed in this Matter, that to Worskip God, to Honour their Pasents and Superiors, to be temperate in their Passions and Appetites, and just and charitable towards one another, are things in their own nature immutably good; that this is not an Opinion pecu-

liar to fuch an Age, or to fuch a Nation, or to fuch a Sect of Religion, but the Universal Judgment of all Mankind of whatfoever Age, Nation, or Religion. For 'tis upon this Judgment that all that Conscience is founded which approves of or condemns Mens Actions; which Confcience is nothing else but a Sense or Feeling of Moral Good and Evil; and is every whit as natural to Mens Minds, as the Sense of pleasant or painful Touches to their Bodies. Since therefore general Effects must spring from general Causes, it necessarily follows that that Pain and Pleasure which Mens Minds generally feel upon the Commission of bad and good Actions, must be resolved into some general Cause; and what else can that be, but the general Consent of their Reason concerning the immutable Evil of the one and Good of the other? I know 'tis pretended by fome of our Modern Navigators, that there are a fort of People in the World who have not the least sense of Good and Evil, and do own neither God, nor Religion, nor Morality. But confidering the short Converse and imperfect Intercourse which these our new Discoveries have had with those Barbarous Countries, it is fairly supposed that the Inhabitants may have Notions both Religious and Moral, of which Strangers who understand not their Language and Customs, and Manners, can make little or no Difcovery. But suppose that what they report were true; yet by their own Confession these wretched Barbarians are in all other things fo extreamly Brutish, that they discover no other token of their Humanity but their Shape. For they live altogether regardless of themselves, of the Conveniences

Conveniences of their Lives, and of the Dignity of their Natures, without making any Reflections on their own Minds, or any Observations from their own Experience. Since therefore all Knowledge is acquired by Attention, it is not at all impossible for Creatures fo utterly fupine and negligent to be ignorant of the most common Notions. But for any Man to question the Truth of this general Rule, because there are a few Exceptions from it, is every whit as abfurd as if he should question whether Men are generally two-legged Animals, because there have been some Monsters with three. And what if among Men there are some Monsters in respect of their Minds, as well as others in respect of their Bodies? This is no more a prejudice to the standing Laws of Human Nature, than Prodigies are to the Regularity of the constant course of Universal Nature. Specimen naturæ cujuslibet, saith Tully, à natura optima sumendum est, i. e. The true sample of every Nature is to be taken from the best Natures of the Kind. Since therefore the Men of all Nations and Ages and Religions, who have in any measure attended to the Nature of things, and made but any tolerable use of their Reasons, are, and always have been univerfally agreed that there is an immutable Good in Virtue, and Evil in Vice; it is no Argument at all that this is not the general Sense of Mankind, fuppofing it true which is very questionable, that there are some few such inhuman Barbarians in the World as make no diffinction at all between 'em. But then,

Secondly, This Universal Consent of Mens Reafon in this matter, is a sufficient Demonstration

that all other Reasonable Beings are consenting with them. For it shews that God himself is of this Mind; and if He be, we may be fure that all other Reasonable Beings are. For if we believe that God made us, we must believe that he made us for fome End; and if he made us for any End, he must esteem those Actions good which promote it, and those evil which obstruct and binder it. And what other End can an infinitely happy and bleffed Being have in making other Beings; but only to do 'em good, and according to their feveral Capacities to make them partakers of his own Happiness? And if this be the end for which God made us, to be fure those Actions must be good in his esteem that are beneficial, and those evil that are burtful and mischievous to our Nature. And therefore fince he hath implanted in us not only a natural Desire of Happiness; but also a rational Faculty to differn what Actions make for our Happiness, and what not, we may be sure that whatsoever this Faculty doth universally determine to be good or evil for us, is good or evil in the Judgment of God. 'Tis true, when the Reason that is in one Man judges contrary to the Reason that is in another, there must be a Disagreement on one fide or the other from the Reason and Judgment of God: but when all Mens Reason is agreed that this is good and that evil, it is plain that this is the Judgment of the rational Faculty which naturally makes such a Distinction of things. For there is no Man that uses his Reason can possibly think that Truth and Falshood, Justice and Injustice, Mercy and Cruelty, are equally good in themselves; his rational Faculty

Laws

only being fo framed as that at the first glance and reflection, it naturally distinguishes 'em into Good and Evil. When therefore God hath created us with fuch a Faculty as naturally makes fuch a Judgment of Good and Evil, that Judgment must be God's as well as the Faculty which made it. That therefore which is the unanimous Judgment of all Men, must be the natural Language of the Rational Faculty; and that which is the natural Language of the Rational Faculty must be the Language of the God of Nature. For he who created me with fuch a Faculty as naturally judges this Good and that Evil, must either have the fame Judgment himself, or create in me a Contradiction to his own Judgment; and that Judgment which he hath created in me, he must be supposed to create in all other Beings that are capable of Judging; otherwise he would be the Author of Contradictory Judgments. For, should one Rational Faculty naturally judge this, and another the contrary, they must necessarily be so framed as to contradict each other, and consequently he who framed both must be the Author of the Contradiction. So that this univerfal Confint of Men concerning the Good and Evil of Human Actions is a plain Evidence that God and all other Rational Beings are confenting with 'em.

V. And lastly, that Mens acting conformably to these Rules of Moral Goodness, in which they are thus univerfally confenting, hath by long and constant Experience been found most conductive to Mens Welfare and Happiness. For the Proof whereof I shall need urge no other Argument than this, that the great Defign of all Human Vol. II.

Laws and Constitutions hath been to fecure and enforce these Rules of Morality; which is a plain Argument that Men have always found by Experience that they are naturally good and productive of their Happiness and Welfare. For how can it be thought that after Men have had fo many thousand Years Trial of Piety, and Justice, and Mercy, and Temperance, they should still be so folicitous to fence and guard 'em with Laws, had they not found 'em highly advantageous, and their Contraries as Mischieveus to Mankind. For do but suppose that the Contraries to all Virtue were for Experiment fake imposed for some time upon Mankind, and it were made as Penal by the Laws of Nations to be Pious, and Just, Merciful, and Temperate, as it is now to be the Contrary; is it imaginable that that which we now call Vice should in process of time acquire the same Universal Reputation that Virtue hath always had among Men? Or at least, is it probable that after fome thousand Years Trial and Experience of such a Law, Men should still be as much concerned to guard and enforce it, as they are and always have been to secure the Law of Piety and Virtue? No, it is most certain they would not. For the very enjoining of Impiety, Injustice, and Cruelty would be in effect to enjoin men to render themselves most wretched and miserable; to furrender up all the Supports of their Hope, the Peace of their Consciences, and the Tranquillity of their Minds; to live in everlafting Broils and Difcords, then turn Robbers and Cut-Throats to one another, and utterly deprive themselves of all the Comforts and Securities of Human Societies.

So that there is no doubt but after a few Years of Experience of the mischievous Consequents of fuch a Law, the whole World would groan under it as an insupportable Tyranny, and even the most Vicious would soon grow quite weary of it, and heartily wish that it were for ever Repealed, and the good old Laws of Piety and Virtue reftored and enforced upon Mankind. And if so, it is plain that Virtue and Vice are distinguished by their Natures into Good and Evil; and that the Obligation we lie under to practife the one, and abstain from the other, are not founded in any Arbitrary Constitution, but in the effential Goodness and Malignity that inseparably adheres to them.

And if we consult the Experience of particular Men, we shall always find, that whereas Impiety and Injustice, Fraud and Malice, do naturally torment Mens Minds with Anguish and Confusion, baunt their Breasts with fearful Thoughts and dire Expectations, barafs their Souls with perpetual Male - contentedness, and intricate their whole Lives with everlasting Shifts and Intrigues; Piety and Justice, Truth and Benevolence, do as naturally footh and ravish their Minds, fill 'em with bleffed Hopes and chearful Reflections; compose their Passions, strengthen and invigorate their Hearts, and render the whole Course of their Lives plain and direct, even and easy. And hereby Virtue doth fenfibly recommend itself to our Natures in all its Capacities, as being fuited to the Satisfaction of all its reasonable Defires, and fo by consequence designed to make up the compleatest and most entire Enjoyment. All which is as plain and obvious to the Reason of Mankind as any Matter of fact that is before us. So that 'tis not only the Reason, but also the Experience of Mankind that universally agrees and consents in this great Truth, that there is such a Good in Virtuous and such an Evil in Vicious Actions, as doth eternally and inseparably cleave to their Natures.

And therefore fince our Nature is to continue the fame for ever; the fame Virtues and Vices which are now the Perfection and Depravation, and consequently the Happiness and Misery of it, will be fo for ever. From whence it necessarily follows, that our eternal Happiness and Misery is founded in the Course of our own Actions. So that as in the Course of a virtuous Life we are growing up into a State of fixed and everlasting Virtue, wherein we shall be everlastingly Perfect and Happy; so on the contrary, in a course of vicious Actions we are finking into a state of everlasting Viciousness, wherein we shall be everlastingly wretched and miserable. For fince Virtue is good for, and Vice evil to us in its own Nature, it necessarily follows that according as we remain Virtueus or Vicious for ever, our Condition must be good or evil for ever. And this being fo, of what unspeakable Consequence are the Actions of Men, that thus draw after 'em a Chain of Joys or Woes as long as Eternity; and how careful ought we to be, to what course of Life we determine ourselves, considering that our eternal Fate depends upon what we are now doing: That every Moral Action we perform is a step Heaven or Hellwards; that in every bad or good Choice we make,

we are planting our Tophet or our Paradife; and that in the Confequents of our present Actions we shall rue or rejoice to eternal Ages? O would to God Men would at last be so wife as to confider these things before it be too late, and not live at Random as they do, without any Regard to the certain and unavoidable Fate of their own Actions! For doubtless would they but thoroughly weigh the Nature and Event of things, and look before they leap into actions, they would fee infinitely more Charm and Terror in that Good and Evil which inseparably adheres to virtuous and vicious Actions, than in all the Temptations in the World. Wherefore in the name of God let us look about us, and for once resolve to act like Beings that must for ever feel the bad or good effects of our own Doings. Which if we do, we shall not only live well and happily here, but to all Eternity experience the bleffed Confequents of it.

SECT. II.

That God hath sufficiently discovered to us what those Human Actions are which are Morally Good, and upon that account perpetually obliging.

HE Truth of which will evidently appear by confidering the Particulars; what it is that God hath done in order to the making this C₃ great great Discovery to us; the most considerable of which are reducible to these fix Heads:

First, He hath implanted in us a Natural De-

fire of Happiness.

Secondly, He hath given us Reason to discern what Actions they are that make for our Happiness, and what not.

Thirdly, He hath so contrived our Natures as that we are thrust on by our own Instincts and Passions, to those Actions which make for our

Happiness.

Fourthly, He hath taken care to excite and oblige us to those Actions, by annexing natural Rewards to them, and entailing natural Punishments on their Contraries.

Fiftbly, To strengthen and enforce this Obligation, he hath frequently superadded to these natural Rewards and Punishments supernatural

Blessings and Judgments.

Sixthly, That to enforce all this, he hath made fundry supernatural Revelations, wherein he hath plainly told us what those things are that carry with them this intrinsick Good and Necessity.

I. God hath taken care to discover to us what is morally Good, by implanting in us a natural Desire of Happiness, which is so inseparable to Human Nature, and it is impossible for us to forbear desiring what is good for us, or at least what appears so. For the through our own Ignorance and Inconsideration we many times mistake Evil for Good, and Misery for Happiness, yet such is the Frame of our Nature, that we cannot desire Evil as Evil, or Misery as Misery; but whensoever we embrace a real Evil, it is either under the Notion

Notion of a less Evil, or of a real and substantial Good. Now by this unquenchable Thirst and Defire of Happiness which God hath implanted in our Nature, we are continually importuned and excited to search out and enquire by what Ways and Means we may arrive to be Happy. So that as Hunger and Thirst and the Sense of bodily Pain and Pleasure forceth Men upon the Invention of Trades, and Civil Occupations to supply their Necessities and Conveniences: So this vehement Hunger and Thirst after Happiness, which God hath created in our Bosoms, doth almost necessitate and constrain us to pry into the Nature of our Actions; that so we may discover what Trade and Course of Life it is that tends most directly to our own Felicity. And by thus importuning us by our own felf-love to enquire into the Nature of our Actions, and into their natural Tendencies to our Weal or Woe, he hath not only expressed his good Will towards us by taking Security of ourselves for our own Welfare, and obliging us to be happy by the most tender and vigorous Passion in our Natures, but hath also taken an effectual Course to discover to us the Good and Evil of our own Actions; Confidering,

II. That he hath given us Reason to discern what Actions they are that make for our Happiness, and what not. 'Tis true, had he only implanted in our Breasts a blind Desire of Happiness, without any Eye of Reason in our Heads to guide and direct our Actions towards it, we must have wandered in the Dark for ever, till we had pined away our wretched Beings with a kungry and unfatisfied Desire. But by giving us a quick-sighted C 4 Faculty

Faculty of Reason to guide and conduct this our blind Defire, he hath taken sufficient care not only to excite our Enquiry after the Way to Happinels, but also to inable us to find it. For the natural tendencies of our Actions to our Happiness or Mifery are fo very obvious and visible, that we can scarce open our Eyes and look abroad without observing them. For how can any Man who makes any Observations upon things, be so stupid as not to different the vast difference there is between Truth and Fallkood, Justice and Injustice, as to their natural tendency to the Good and Hurt, Hap-piness and Misery of Mankind? 'Tis true, if Men will neglect using their Reason, they may be ignorant of the plainest Propositions; but if they be, 'tis their inexcufable Folly. But if Men will be so true to their own Interest, as calmly to reflest upon their Actions, their Sense cannot more readily diffinguish between Heney and Gall, than their Reason will between Virtue and Vice; the fundamental Reafons of which are so legible in all the Appearances of Nature, so necessary to the Being and Preservation of Mankind, and their Equity is so apparent, and their Convenience so obvious, that a Man can hardly reflect upon any thing either within or without him, without being convinced of their Force and Obligation. So that for a Man that hath the afe of his Reason not to observe the Difference of his Actions, as to their intrinsick Good and Evil, and necessary Tendency to his Happiness and Misery, would be as gress and inexcufable a Stupidity, as if he should pass through the World without ever taking notice that two and two makes four. God therefore by giving uś

us a reasonable Faculty to discern the nature of things, upon which the Differences of Good and Evil are so plainly and legibly imprinted, hath hereby taken fufficient Care to shew us the difference of our own Actions. For, to inspire us with a Faculty of Reasoning, by which we can form true Notions of things from fingle Experiments, and infer one truth from another, and immediately to inspire this Faculty with Divine Truth, are only two different Modes of Divine Revelation; and God did as really reveal himself to us when he gave us Reason to understand his Will, and when he sent to us his Messengers from Heaven to make known his Mind and Will to us. For God hath fo framed our Understandings, as that whensoever we impartially reason about things, we are forced to diftinguish between Good and Evil, and cannot perfuade ourselves without doing infinite Violence to our own Faculties, that to Blaspheme God or to Reverence him, lye or speak Truth, to bonour our Parents, or to fcorn and despise them are things of an indifferent Nature; but as foon as ever we open the Eye of our Reason, we discern such an essential Difference between them, as forces us to condemn the one and approve the other. And accordingly as for the greatest strokes of Iniquity, we find they have as much the Universal Judgment of our Reafon against them as any false Conclusion in the Mathematicks; whilst the Goodness of their contrary Virtues is as univerfally acknowledged by us as the Truth of any first Principle in Philosophy. Since therefore God hath fo framed our Understanding as that it cannot calmly reflect upon our Actions without diftinguishing between

the good and bad, he hath hereby fufficiently revealed to us what that good is that immutably binds

and obliges us.

III. God hath fo contrived our Natures, as that we are thrust on by our own Instincts and Passions to those Actions which are morally Good and do make for our Happiness. For we are framed and constituted with fuch Passions and Affections as do naturally point and direct us unto virtuous Actions; and though by the Constitution of our Natures, our Passions are subjected to our Reason, and all our Virtue confifts in being reasonably affected, yet in the very Nature of our Passions there is a certain Tendency and Direction to Virtue, antecedent to all our Reasoning and Discourse. Which Theages the Pythagorean stiles Παρόρμησις κ) ένθεσιασμός τᾶς κατά Φῦσιν άρετᾶς, a certain natural Impetus or Enthusiasm, by which without any previous Discourse or Deliberation we are forcibly carried on towards virtuous Actions. For some Affections there are in our Nature, which do in the general plainly fignify to us that there is fuch a thing as Moral Good and Evil in Human Actions; and others that do plainly point out what those Actions are wherein this moral Good and Evil is subjected. Of the first Sort are the Affections of Love and Hatred, Complacency and Horror, Glory and Shame, Repentance and Self-Satisfaction; which plainly declare that there are answerable Objects in the Nature of Things and Actions; that there is a Good to be beloved and an Evil to be hated, a Deformity to be abborred, and a Beauty to be delighted in; an Excellency to be glorified in, and a Filthiness to be ashamed

askamed of; a Well-doing to be satisfied with, and an Ill-doing to be repented of For if there were no such real Distinctions in the Nature of Things and Actions, all these Affections in us would be utterly vain and impertinent. And as these Affections of our Nature do fignify in the general that there is a moral Good and Evil in our Actions, fo there are others which do particularly point out what Actions are morally Good and what Evil. Thus for Instance, the Passions of Veneration and Distance do plainly direct us to Honour God and our Superiors, and to be constant in good Courses out of a generous Scorn of all Temptations to the contrary. Thus Commiferation and Envy direct us to Charity and Justice, to lament and affift those who are undeservedly unfortunate, and to be displeased with the Advancement of base and undeserving People; and consequently to be just and equal in our Distributions, and to proportion them to Mens Merit and Defert. For by this Passion of Envy, Nature teaches us that there is fuch a thing as just and unjust, equal and unequal, and that the former is to be embraced, and the latter to be shunned. And to name no more, thus Sorrow and Joy doth by filent Language dissuade us from injuring, and persuade us to benefit one another. For so by the mournful Voice, the dejected Eyes and Countenance, the Sighs, and Groans, and Tears, of the forrowful and opprest, (all which are the powerful Rhetorick of Nature) we are importuned not only to forbear heaping any further İnjuries upon them, but also to commiserate their Griefs, and by our timely Aids to fuccour and relieve them.

As on the contrary the florid and chearful Looks, the pleasant and grateful Air which we behold in those that rejoice, are so many Charms and Attractives by which Nature allures us to mutual Urbanity and Sweetness of Behaviour, and a continual Study to please and gratify one another. By these and many other instances I might give, it is evident that though by our own ill Government we too often deprave our Affections and corrupt them into Vices, yet their natural Drift and Tendency lies towards Virtue. Thus by their own natural Light which they carry before us, they direct our steps to the Way we are to walk in, and point out all those Tracts of eternal Goodness that lead to our Happiness. For fince these Affections are in us antecedently to all our Deliberations and Choices, it is evident they were placed there by the Author of our Natures; and therefore fince 'tis He who hath inclined them to all that they naturally incline to, He doth in Effect direct and guide us by their Inclinations. So that their nagural Tendencies and Directions are the Voice of God in our Natures, which murmurs and whifters to us that natural Law which our Reason indeed doth more plainly and articulately promulge. And from this natural Tendency of our Affections to Good, proceeds that pleasant and painful Sense of good and bad Actions, which we experience in ourselves before ever we can discourse. For thus before we are capable of reasoning ourselves into any Pleasure or Displeasure, our Nature is rejoiced in a kind of just Action either in ourfelves or others, and we are fenfibly pleafed when we have pleasured those that oblige us, and

and as fenfibly grieved when we are conscious of having grieved and offended them. We love to fee those fare well who we imagine have deserved well; and when any unjust Violence is offered them, our Nature skrinks at, and abbors it. We pity and compassionate the Miserable when we know not why; and are ready to offer at their Relief when we can give no Reason for it; which shews that these things proceed not either from our Education or deliberate Choice, but from the Nature of our Affections which have a Sympathy with Virtue, and an Antipathy to Vice implanted in their very Constitution. And hence it is that in the Beginnings of Sin our Nature is commonly fo sby of an evil Action; that it approaches it with fuch a modest Coyness, and goes blushing to it like a bashful Virgin to an Adulterer's Bed; that it passes into it with such Regret and Reluctancy, and looks back upon it with fuch Shame and Confusion; which in our tender Years, when as yet we are not arrived to the Exercise of our Understandings, cannot be supposed to proceed from Reason and Conscience, and therefore must be from the natural Sense of our Affections, which by these and fuch like Indications do fignify that they are violated and effended. Now this natural Sense of Good and Evil which springs from the Frame and Nature of our Affections, was doubtlefs intended by God to be the first Guide of Human Nature; that so when as yet 'tis not capable of following Reason and Conscience, it might be directed to what is good, and preserved from wicked Habits and Prejudices by its own Sense and Feeling, till fuch time as it is capable of the Conduct

Conduct of Reason, that so when this leading Faculty undertakes the Charge of it, it may find it *pliant* and *obsequious* to its *Dictates*; and be able to manage it with more *Ease* and *Facility*; and that by the Natural Drift and Tendency of our Affections God hath plainly revealed to us

what is good and what not.

IV. God hath also entailed upon our Actions natural Rewards and Punishments, and thereby plainly declared which are good and which evil. For it is easily demonstrable by an Induction of Particulars, that every Virtue hath some natural Efficacy in it to advance both our publick Good and our private Interest. That Temperance and Charity, Righteousness and Fidelity, Gratitude and Humility are not only convenient, but abfolutely necessary to our Joy and Comfort, our Peace and Quietness, our Safety and Contentment; to the Health of our *Body*, and the Satisfaction of our *Mind*, and the Security and Happiness of our *Society* with one anotherr Whereas on the contrary, Vice naturally teems with mischievous Effects, and is ever productive of Horror in the Conscience, Anguish in the Mind, Discord in the Affections, Diseases in the Body, and Confusions and Disturbances in Human Society. Since therefore the Divine Wisdom and Contrivance hath thus inseparably coupled good Effects to good Actions and evil ones to evil, it hath hereby very plainly and fenfibly declared to us what it would have us do and what not. For feeing it hath fo conflituted Things as that in the Course of Nature such Proportions of Happiness do necessarily result to us from fuch Actions, and such Proportions of Mi-Sery

fery from their Contraries, what can be more evident than that its Defign was hereby to encourage us to the one and affright us from the other? So that by these natural Rewards and Punishments which in the Course of things God hath chained to our Actions, he hath as expressy prescribed us what to do and what not, as he could have done if he had spoken to us in an audible Voice from the Battlements of Heaven. For fince the whole Train of Natural Effects is to be refolved into the Providence of God, and fince his Providence hath so ordered and contrived Things, as that in the ordinary Course of them good Effects do spring out of good Actions and evil of evil ones, what else could he intend by it but to allure us to the one, and terrify us from the other? For it is by Rewards and Punishments that all Law-givers declare their Will and Pleasure concerning those Actions which they command and forbid: and therefore fince God in his Providential Government of the World hath thought good to link natural Rewards to fuch actions, and natural Punishments to such, these are to be looked upon as the great Sanctions of the Law of Nature, whereby he commands what pleafes, and prohibits what displeases him. For when God had no otherwise revealed himself to the World than only by the established Course and Nature of Things, that was the great Bible by which alone Mankind was inflructed in their Duty; and there being no revealed Threats or Promises annexed to good and bad Actions, God's Will and Pleasure concerning them was visible only in the good and bad Confequents which they drew after them; which are io plain

plain and obvious to the Observation of Mankind, that 'twould be the most inexcusable Inadvertency not to take notice of them. So that the moral Good and Evil of all Actions, finally refolves into the natural Good and Evil that is appendant to them; and therefore are our Actions morally good because they are naturally beneficial to us, and therefore morally evil because they are naturally prejudicial and burtful; and those which in their own nature are neither good nor evil, are indifferent in themselves, and left altogether undetermined by the Law of Nature, which commands and forbids nothing but under the Sanction of those natural Rewards and Punishments which in the Course of things are made necessary to Human Actions.

V. To these natural Rewards and Punishments which God hath entailed upon good and bad Actions, he hath thought a good many times to fuperadd supernatural Blessings and Judgments. For though he had before sufficiently expressed his Will concerning Human Actions in the great Bible of Nature, and by their natural Effects had plainly enough diffinguished the good from the bad; yet confidering what beedless and inobservant Creatures we are, and how apt to overlook the ordinary Confequents of our Actions, he hath not altogether abandoned us to the easy Inflructions of Nature, but out of his superabundant Care to shew us what is Good and lead us to our Duty and Happiness, he hath from time to time feconded the natural Rewards and Punishments of our Actions with supernatural Favours and Judgments; that so by these he might awake

awake our drowfy Attention, and revive in us the languishing sense of our Duty. Of which we have infinite Instances in the several Ages of the World; there being scarce any History either Sacred or Profane that abounds not with them. Several of which, both Bleffings and Judgments, do as plainly evince themselves to be intended by God for Rewards and Punishments, as if they had been attended with a Voice from Heaven proclaiming the Reasons for which they were sent. For how many famous Instances have we of miraculous Deliverances of Righteous Persons, who by an Invisible Hand have been rescued from the greatest Dangers, when in all outward Appearance their Condition was hopeless and desperate; and of wonderful Bleffings that have happened to them not only without but contrary to all fecondary Causes; of fome that have been so eminently rewarded in kind, as that the Goods which they received were most visible Significations of the Goods which they did; and others who have received the Bleffings which they have asked, whilft they were praying for them, and obtaining them with fuch diftinguishing Circumstances as plainly fignified them to be the Answers and Returns of their devout Addreffes to Heaven? And fo on the contrary, how many notable Examples are there of fuch miraculous Judgments inflicted upon unrighteous Persons, as have either exceeded the Power of fecondary Causes, or been caused by them contrary to their natural Tendencies? Of Men that have been punished in the very AET of their Sin, and sometimes in the very Part by which they have offended; that have had the evil of their Sin retaliated upon Vol. II them

them in a correspondent Evil of Suffering, and been fruck with those very Judgments which they have imprecated on themselves in the Justification of a known Falshood? All which supernatural Judgments and Bieflings of God are only his Comments on the Text of Nature, by which he farther explains to us the Meaning of those natural Rewards and Punishments which Virtue and Vice draw after them, and shews us what clear Indications they are of his Almighty Pleasure and Displeasure. For when he rewards Men supernaturally, it is for those Actions that carry a natural Reward with them; and when he punishes them supernaturally, it is for such Actions as do carry a natural Punishment with them; so that his supernatural Rewards and Punishments do speak the fame Sense and Language with his natural, only they speak plainer and louder, to rouse and awake those stupid Souls that are deaf to and regardless of the foft and still voice of natural Rewards and Punishments. Thus when the old World by not attending to the natural Consequents of their own Actions, had almost extinguished their Sense of Good and Evil, God by a Supernatural Deluge in which he drowned the wicked and preserved the rightcous, configned to all future Generations a standing Monument of his Hatred of Sin, and Love of Righteoufness; that so by the Remembrance of it he might keep Mens heedless Minds more attentive to the natural Rewards and Punishments of their Actions. And when the Remembrance of this was almost worn out, and with it Mens natural Sense of good and evil, God by raining down Fire and Brimstone upon Sodom and Gomorrha, and rescuing

cuing the Righteous Lot from that dire Conflagration, alarm'd the World with a new Declaration of the wide Distinction he makes between Virtue and Vice. And lastly, when the Virtue of these great Examples was almost spent, God raifed up the People of Ifrael, and by the miraculous Bleffings he bestowed on them when they did well, and the stupendous Judgments he inflicted when they did wickedly, exposed them to all the Nations round about for a standing Demonstration of the vast Difference he makes between Good and Evil. For so the Psalmist tells us, Psa. xcvi. ver. 2. compared with Psalm cii. ver. 15. The Lord bath made known his Salvation, his Righteousness hath he openly sheeved in the Sight of the Heathen; that the Heathen might fear the Name of the Lord, and all the Kings of the Earth his Glory. Thus by frequent Examples of fupernatural Rewards and Punishments God hath been always instructing the degenerate World in the Essential Differences between Good and Evil.

VI. And lastly, To enforce all this God hath made fundry supernatural Revelations, wherein he hath plainly instructed us what Actions are good and what evil. That he hath made sundry Revelations to the World is evident in the Fact, because there are sundry Revelations extent, which by those many miraculous Effects of the Divine Power that attended the Ministration of them, have been sufficiently demonstrated to be of a divine Original. And such are those contained in the five Books of Moses, and the Property, which have been all most amply confirmed, both by the Miracles which were wrought by their inspired D 2

Authors, and the exact Accomplishment of the feveral Predictions contained in them. And such is also the less and best Revelation contained in the New Testament; which both by the Types and Predictions of the Law and Prophets, and the infinite Miracles wrought by Jesus and his Followers, together with its own inherent Wisdom and Goodness, hath been so effectually proved a Divine Revelation, that nothing but Ignorance or inveterate Prejudice can cause any Man to dishe-

lieve or suspect it.

Now if you confult these several Revelations, you will find that the main Drift and Defign of them is to detect and expose what is morally Evil, and explain and recommend to us what is morally Good. For thus the feveral Revelations made to Abraham and his Children, were only fo many Repetitions of that Covenant of Righteousness which God had struck with them, to encourage them to persevere in Well-doing. Thus the Law of Moses confisted partly in Ceremonial Rites, which were either intended for Divine Hieroglyphicks to instruct that dull and slupid People in the Principles of inward Purity and Goodness, or else for Types and Figures of the holy Mysteries of the Goipel; and partly of Precepts of Morality, together with some few of Policy, suited to the Genius of that People; and partly of fuch Promifes and Threats as were judged most apt to oblige them to the Practice of Piety. And as for the Prophets, the substance of their Revelations was either Reprehensions of Sin, together with fevere Denuntiations against it; or Invitations to Virtue and Piety, together with gracious Promi*les*

fes to encourage them to practife it; or Predictions of the Meffias and of that everlasting Righteoulness which was to be introduced by him. And then as for the Gospel, all the Duty of it consists either in Instances, or Means and Instruments of Moral Goodness; and all the Doctrines of it are nothing but powerful Arguments to oblige us to the Practice of those Duties. Thus the great Intendment of all God's Revelations is to explain and enforce the Duties of Morality; to difcover the Nature, and lead us on to the Practice of them by the most powerful Obligations. And in this most perfect Map of the Road to Happiness, all the Tracts of Piety and Virtue are so plainly described and delineated to us, that no Man can possibly miss his Way, that sincerely enquires after it. For though in matters of Opinion Men may be innocently misled and deceived, yet there is no Article either of Doctrine or Duty upon which our Happiness necessarily depends, wherein it is possible for an honest and diligent Mind to be mistaken. And thus you see by how many excellent ways God hath discovered to us which of our Actions are good and which evil. So that if after all this we proceed in any finful and immoral Courses, we are utterly inexcusable. For if after God hath thus plainly made known his Will to us, we fill perfift to contradict it in our Practice, we do thereby in effect declare that we regard not the Almighty, and that we will do what we lift, let him will what he pleases. And what an unpardonable Infolence is it for us who depend upon his Breath, and hang upon his Providence every Moment, to treat him as if he had nothing D_3

nothing to do with us, and were the merest Cypher and most infignificant Peing in the World? For though it is true he hath not made fo full a Difcovery of his Will to fome as to others, yet he hath to for Executly discovered it to all, that none can pretend to the Excuse either of invincible or unaffected Ignorance. For as for the Heathen, tho' they have no Revelation of God's Will without them, yet they have the Bible of Conscience within them, and the large and legible Bible of Nature that lies continually open before them, in which they may eafily read the principal Differences between Good and Evil, and all the great Principles of Morality. And if notwithstanding this they will be to regardless of God as not to attend to and countly with those natural Discoveries of his Will, what Pretence can be made for them why they should not perish for ever in their obstinacy? For as the Apostie tells us, the they had not the Law, that is, the revealed Law, yet they did, or at least might have done, by nature the things contained in the Law; and therefore as many of them, faith he, as sinned without this revealed Law, shall perish without the Law, that is, by the Sentence of the Law of Nature, Rom. ii. 12, 14. And then as for the Yews, befides those natural Indications of God's Will which they had in common with the Heathen, they had fundry supernatural ones; they had fundry great and notorious Examples of God's recearding good Men, and punishing bad; and belides they had the Law of Moles, the Moral part of which was but a new Edition of the Law of Nature; as for the Ceremonial Part of it, it was thought an obscure, yet an intelligible Repre-

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Representation of all those sublime Motives to Piety and Virtue, which the Gospel more plainly proposes. So that would the Yews but have heedfully attended either to the Spiritual Sense of their Law, or to the Sermons of their Prophets which very much cleared and explained it, they could not have been ignorant either of any material Part of their Duty, or of any confiderable Motive by which it is prefled and enforced. And if notwithstanding, they would be so regardless of God, as to take no notice of his Judgments and Mercies; fo rude to his Authority as not to mind ei her his Law within or his Law without them, upon what reasonable Pretence can they excuse themselves? But then as to us Christians, we have not only all those natural Discoveries of our Duty which the Heathen had, and all those Supernatural ones which the Jews had, but a great deal more. For in our Revelation the Laws and Motives of Virtue are fet before us in a much clearer Light, and are neither wrapt up in Mystical Senfes, nor overcast with typical Representations, but laid before us in the most plain and easy Propositions. For that which was the Mystical Sense of the Jewish Law, is the literal Sense of the Christian; in which all those Precepts and Promises and Threats which were delivered to the Jews in dark Riddles, ebscure and typical Adumbrations, are brought forth to us from behind the Curtain, and propofed in plain and popular Articles. So that if we still continue in our finful Courses, we are of all Men the most inexcusable. The Heathen may plead against the Jews, that their Law of Nature was not so clear in its Precepts, nor yet so cogent

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in its Motives as the Law of Moses; the Yews may plead against us Christians, that their Law of Moses was neither so express in the Precepts, nor yet so intelligible in its best and most powerful Motives as our Gospel; but as for us Christians, we have nothing to plead, but by our own Obstinacy, against the clearest Discoveries of our Duty, do stand condemned to everlasting Silence. So that when it shall appear at the dread Tribunal of God, that we have perfifted in our Wickedness, notwithstanding all these Advantages, we must expect to be repreached by all the reasonable World, to be exploded and hifs'd at, not only by Saints and Angels, but by the Yews and the Gentiles, and the Devils themselves, who will all conspire with our own Consciences to second our woeful Doom with the Loud Acclamation of Just and Righteous art thou, O Lord, in all thy Ways. Wherefore as we would not Perish for ever without Pity and Excuse, let us make haste to forsake all Ungodliness and worldly Lusts, and to live soberly, and righteoufly, and godly in this present World.

SECT. III.

That those Actions which carry with them this perpetual Obligation are the main and principal Parts of Religion.

HE truth of which is most evident from the above-named Text. Mich vi 8 And anhat doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? Which Interrogation, tho' it implies not an absolute Negation, viz. that the Lord required nothing else of them (for under the Law he required Sacrifices and fundry other positive Duties, as under the Gospel he requires Sacraments and Reading and Hearing his holy Word, &c. which are positive Duties as well as those legal Institutions of Moses;) yet it plainly implies a comparative Negation, viz. that the Lord requires nothing else so principally and so affectionately, for the sake of things themselves and upon the account of their own inherent Beauty and Goodness, as he doth these Moral Duties here specified. He did indeed require the Jews to offer Sacrifice to him, and to perform those other Ceremonial Rites specified in the Law of Moses; and for them wilfully to have neglected those Duties would have been such an avowed Defiance to his Authority as would have rendered them justly obnoxious to all the Judgments threatned in their Law; but yet he did much more earnestly require them to be just, and merciful, and humble, and manifested himself to be

be far better pleafed with one Act of Moral Goodness than with a thousand Sacrifices. And thus he requires of us Christians that we should communicate with him and with one another in our Evangelical Sacraments, and dutifully conform to all those sacred Institutions and Solemnities of Religion which are contained in the Gospel; and if we wilfully neglect them, we justly incur all that everlasting Vengeance which is there denounced; but yet our fincere Compliance with the immutable Obligations of Piety and Virtue, is a thousand-fold more acceptable to God than our strictest Observation of these his positive Institutions. So that the Question in the Text, What doth the Lord require of thee plainly implies this Proposition, that tho' God doth exact of us certain Duties which are not moral, i. e. have no intrinsick necessity in them, yet it is the Moral Duties, fuch as Juffice, and Mercy, and Humility, which he principally requires at our hand. Thus concerning Sacrifice, God plainly tells us, I will have Mercy and not Sacrifice, i. e. I will have Mercy rather than Sacrifice, Hof. vi. 6. And the Wife Man affures us that to do fustice is more acceptable to the Lord than Sacrifice, Prov. ii. 3. And to the same purpose our Saviour himfelf pronounceth, even before that Ceremonial Worthip was abolished, that to love the Lord with all our Heart, with all our Understanding, with all our Soul, and with all our Strength, and to love our Neighbour as ourfelves is more than all Burnt - offerings and Sacrifices, Mark x. 33. But for the clearer Demonstration of this great and necessary Truth, I shall endeavour, First, to prove the Truth of it by some Scripture Arguments. Secondly,

Secondly, to affign the Reasons of it. As for the Proof of it, the following Particulars will be a-

bundantly fufficient.

First, That the Scripture plainly declares that the great Design of all the Doctrinals of Religion hath always been to move and perfuade Men to the Practice of Moral Goodness.

Secondly, That the main Drift and Scope of all the politive Duties of Religion hath been always to improve and perfeci Men to Moral Goodness.

Thirdly, That God expresses in Scripture a great Contempt of all the positive Duties of Religion, whenever they are separated from Moral Goodness.

Fourthly, That wherever we find the Whole of Religion fummed up in a few Particulars, they are always fuch as are Inftances of Moral Goodness.

Fifthly, That wherever fuch Persons as have been most dear and acceptable to God are described in Scripture, their Churches always confifts of some Instances or other of Moral Goodness.

Sixthly, That the Scripture plainly declares that at the great Account between God and our Souls, the main Inquisition will be concerning our Moral Good or Evil.

I. The Scripture expresly declares that the great Design of the Doctrines of Religion is to move and perfuade Men to Moral Goodness. For so the Apostle speaking of the Grace of God, i. e. the Gospel, assures us that its great Design is to teach Men to deny all Ungodliness and worldly Lusts, and to live foberly, rightcoufly, and godly in this present World, Tit. ii. 12. And if we consider the

the Doctrines in *Particular*, we shall find that they all conspire in this great Design. For so the Doctrine of eternal Life is proposed by God to per-fuade us to cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of steps and spirit, and to perfect holiness in the fear of God, 2 Cor. vii. 1. So also the Doctrine of our future Punishment is levelled against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of Men, Rom. i. 18. And as for these Doctrines which concern the Transactions of our Saviour, they are all proposed to us as Arguments to persuade us to Piety and Virtue. For it was for this cause that Christ was manifested, to destroy the Works of the Devil, I John iii. 8. It was for this purpose that he bore our sins in his own body on the tree, that we being dead to Sin should live to Righteoufness, I Pet. ii. 24. It was for this end that he rose from the Dead, that thereby he might prevail with us to walk in newness of Life, Rom. vi. 4. and 'tis for this end that he intercedes fer us at the right-hand of God, that thereby he might encourage us to come to God by him, Heb. vii. 2. and in a Word, for this cause he hath told us he will come to Judgment, to reward every Man according to his Works, that thereby he might stir us up to Sobriety and Vigilance and to all koly Conversation and Godliness, Matt. xxiv. 42. comp. with 2 Pet. iii. 11. Thus you fee all the Doctrines of Religion are only so many Topicks of Divine Perfutation, whereby God addresses himself to our Hope and Fear, and every other Affection in us that is capable of Perfuafion, to excite us to comply with the eternal Obligations of Morality; and there is no one Article in all our Religion, that is matter of mere Speculation, or that entertains our

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Minds with dry and empty Notions that have no Influence on our Wills and Affections. For fince the Defign of Religion in general, is to bind and fasten our Souls to God, we may be fure that there is no Part of it but what doth in some measure contribute hereunto. Since therefore 'tis Moral Goodness that God chiefly recommends to us by the Persuasions of Religion, we may be sure that what his Arguments do chiefly persuade us to, that his Commands do chiefly oblige us to.

II. From Scripture it is also evident that the main Drift and Scope of all the positive Duties of Religion is to improve and perfect Men in Moral Goodness. We find the fewish Religion exceedingly abounded with positive Precepts; for such were all those sacred Rights and Solemnities of which the Bark and Outfide of that Religion confifted; of all which it is true what the Pfalmist saith of Sacrifices in particular, Thou desirest not Sacrifices, thou delightest not in Burnt Offerings, Psa. li. 16. that is, thou takest no Delight in them upon the Score of any internal Goodness that is in them, but defirest them merely as they are instituted Means and Instruments of Moral Goodness. For so many of the Rites of the Mosaic Law were instituted in Opposition to the Magical, Unclean, and Idolatrous, Rites of the Eastern Heathen. As particularly, that Prohibition of sowing their Fields with mingled Seed, Lev. xix. 19. in Opposition to that Magical Rite which the Heathens used as a Charm for Fructification. So also that Command of fprinkling the Blood of their Sacrifices upon the Ground like Water and covering it with Dust, in Opposition to that Idolatrous Rite of gathering the Blood

Blood into a Trench or Vessel, and then sitting round it in a Circle, whilst they imagined their Gods to be licking it up. And to name no more of this Kind, the Prohibition of feething a Kid in bis Mother's Milk, Exod. xxiii. 10. was in Opposition to a Custom of the ancient Heathens, who at the Ingathering of their Fruits were wont to take a Kid and feeth it in the Milk of its Dam, and then in a Magical Procession to sprinkle all their Trees, and Fields, and Gardens, with it, thereby to render them more fruitful the following Year. Befides all which you may find a World of other Instances in Maimonides More Nevoch. lib. 3. who tells us, that the Knowledge of the Opinions and Customs of these Eastern Churches was Porta magna ad reddendas præceptorum causas, the great Rationale of the Mosaick Precepts; and that multarum legum rationes & caufæ mihi innotuerint ex cognitione fidei, rituum & Cultus Zabiorum, i. e. that by being acquainted with the Opinions and Customs of those Eastern Heathens, he understood the Grounds . and Reasons of many of the Laws of Moses, More Nevoch. lib. 3. cap. 29. So that though these Precepts were not moral, yet were they fet up as fo many Fences by God, to keep the People from stragling into those Heathenish Immoralities.

Again, there are other Rites of their Religion, which were instituted to shadow out the Holy My-steries of the Gospel; the great Design of which Mysteries was to invite and persuade Men to comply with the eternal Laws of Morality. Thus their Laws of Sacrifice were instituted to represent to them the great Transactions of their suture Messias; his Incarnation and immaculate Life,

his Death and Refurrection, Ascension, and Intercession at the Right-hand of God. So also their Festival Laws, and particularly their Laws of Jubilee, were made to shadow out their Docarines of our Redemption and eternal Life; and their pouring out Water in their Sacrifices, and their ritual Purgations from Uncleanness, were intended for obscure Intimations of the Effusion of the holy Spirit, and the Doctrine of Remission of Sins; all which Doctrines carry with them the most preg-

nant Invitations to Piety and Virtue.

Lastly, There are other Rites of that Law which were appointed to instruct them in moral Duties. For God finding them not only a perverse, but a dull and sottish People, as those generally are that have been born and bred in Slavery, apprehended that the most effectual Way to instruct them would be by Signs and material Representations, even as Parents do their Children by *Pictures*. And accordingly in *Ifaiab* xxviii. 10. he tells us, that he gave them line upon line, and precept upon precept, here a little and there a little, with a stammering tongue; i. e. we looked upon them as Children, and so condescended to their Weakness, and spake to them in their own Dialect. And this Way of instructing them by outward and visible Signs, being much in use in the Eastern Countries, and more especially in Egypt, whose Manners they were infinitely find of, was of all others the most probable and taking. And accordingly a great Part of the Jewish Rites confisted of Hieroglyphicks, or visible Signs, by which their Minds were instructed in the Precepts of Morality. Thus by Circumcision God signified to them the Necessity

Necessity of mortifying their unchaste Desires; by their Legal Washings, he intimated to them their Obligations to cleanse themselves from all Impurities of Flesh and Spirit; yea this, as St. Barnabas in his Epistle tells us, was the Intent of all that Difference of Meats in the Jewish Law, which pronounced Swines Flesh unclean, to instruct them not to live like Hogs, that wallow in the Mire while they are full, and whine and clamour when they are empty; which forbid them to feed on Eagles and other Birds of Prey, to instruct them to live by honest Industry, and not by Rapine; which prohibits Fish without Scales, that generally live in the Mud, to teach the evil of Sensuality and earthly Mindedness, &c. From all which it is evident that Moral Goodness was the constant Mark at which all the positive Precepts of their Law were levelled.

And then as for the Christian Religion, all the politive Precepts it contains are directed to the same End. It requires us to believe in Jesus Christ, and in his Mediation to draw near unto God; the Defign of which Faith it expresly tells us is to Sanctify our Natures, Acts xxvi. 18. and to purify our Hearts, Acts xv. q. It enjoins us to be Baptized into the Name of Jesus; and for what purpose? but to oblige us thereby to die to Sin and to walk in newness of Life, Rom. vi. 4. It requires us to commemorate our Saviour's Passion in a Sacramental Communion of his Body and Blood; and to what End? but only to excite us to Love and Thankfulness to God, and Charity towards one another, 1 Cor. v. 7, 8. In a Word, it requires us to live in Unity with the Church, and not to feparate

parate ourselves from her sacred Alexandies; and for what other reason, but that we might become an holy Temple, and an kahi ctio of God by being compasted together into an uniform and regular Society, Epkes. ii. 21, 22. Since there ore all the Precepts both of the Old and New Totament which are purely positive, do bear a Respect to Moral Goodness, and were imposed by God in subserviency thereunto, it is evident that that is the principal Mark which he designs and aims at.

III. Another Evidence from Scripture, that Moral Goodness is the strincipal matter of our Duty, is the great Contempt which God expresses of the tolitive Duties of Religion whenever they are feparated from moral Goodness. For thus concerning the Positives of the Jewish Religion, we are told that the Sacrifice of the wicked is an Abomination to the Lord, Prov. xv. 8. And concerning the Whole of their positive Religion, the Prophet thus pronounces in the Name of God, To what purpose is the multitude of your Sacrifices to me, saith the Lord? I am full of the burnt Offerings of Rams, and of the fat of fed Beasts, i. e. so full as that I loath them; and I delight not in the blood of Bullocks, or of Lamls, or of H-Goats. When ye come to appear before me, who hath required these things at your hands, to tread my Courts? bring no more vain Oblations, Incense is Abomination to me; the new Moons and Sabbaths, the calling of Affemblies I cannot away with; it is Iniquity, even the folemn Meetings. Your new Moons and your appointed Feasts my Soul hateth, they are a trouble to me, I am weary to bear them. And when you spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes, yea, Vol. II.

when ye make many Prayers I will not hear. And what I befeech you is the Reason that God should thus dislike his own Institutions? Why he plainly tells you, your Hands are full of Blood, your Cruelty and Oppression doth profane your Worship, and turn it all into Impiety, Isa. i. 11. to the 16th. For so Isa. Ixvi. 3. he plainly tells them, He that killeth an Ox, is as if he flew a Man; he that facrificeth a Lamb, as if he cut off a Dog's Neck; he that offereth an Oblation, as if he offered Swines Blood; he that burneth Incense, as if he blessed an Idol; and why fo? why they have chosen their own Ways, i. e. of Impiety and Wickedness, and their Soul delighteth in their Abominations. Nor doth God express a less Contempt of the Positives of Christianity, when separated from moral Goodness. For thus St. James tells us even of our Faith or Belief in Jesus, that without Works it is dead; that it is a fenfeless, squalid Thing, that hath neither Life nor Beauty in it, James ii. 17. And St. Peter compares Baptism to the washing of a Swine when it is separated from Purity of Life and Manners, 2 Pet. ii. 22. And our receiving the Lord's Supper without Charity and Devotion is by St. Paul stiled coming together to Condemnation, I Cor. xi. 34. All which is a plain Demonstration that moral Goodness is the principal Matter that God insists on; fince it was this that fanctified the Sacrifices of the Yews, and crowned all the ceremonial Observances with the Divine Acceptation, and without this all their other Sacrifices were noisy and offensive to him; and it is this that perfumes our Faith and our Sacraments, our Prayers and Religious Assemblies, and renders them a grateful and

and fweet smelling Savour in the Nostrils of God, and without this they are all a hateful Stench and Annoyance to him. Doubtless therefore the trincipal Matter of Duty which God requires of us, is that which he esteems the Grace and Fragrancy of all other Duties.

IV. Another Evidence from Scripture that moral Goodness is the principal Matter that God requires of us, is, that wherever we find the Whole of Religion fummed up in a few Particulars, they are always fuch as are Parts and Inflances of moral Goodness. Thus in the above cited Mic. vi. 8. What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love Mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? Thus also the Prophet Isaiah giving an Account to his People what they were to do in order to their Reconciliation with God, thus directs them, Wash ye, make ye clean, put away the Evil of your Doings from before mine Eyes, cease to do Evil, learn to do well, seek Judgment, relieve the Oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the Widow; come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord, Isa. i. 16, 17, 18. So also our Blessed Saviour fums up the Whole Duty of Man into two Particulars; And what are they? Why, Thou jkalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy Heart, with all thy Soul, and with all thy Mind; this is the first and great Commandment. And the second is like to it, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thyself; on these two Commandments hang the Law and the Prophets, Matt. xxii. 37, 38, 39, 40. Thus St. James, True Religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to wifit the Fatherless and Widow in their Afflictions, and to keep himself unspotted from the World,

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James i. 27. And elsewhere the Apostle sums up the whole Law into one leading Head of Morality, and that is Love; for love, faith he, is the fulfilling of the Law, Rom xiii. 10. So this Observation generally holds true, that in all those Summaries of Duty mentioned in the Holy Scripture, only fuch Duties are taken notice of as are Parts and Inflances of Morality. Which is a plain Demonstration that it is this which God principally requires, fince it is this which he most takes notice of; and it may be reasonably supposed that in those Summaries of our Duty wherein but a few parts are enumerated, they are fuch as are the chief and principal; it being contrary to all Rules of Language to express the Whole of any Thing by the meanest and most inconsiderable

parts of it.

V. Another Evidence from Scripture that moral Goodness is the principal matter of Duty that God requires of us, is, that wherefoever fuch Perfons as have been most dear and acceptable to God are described, their Character is always made up of Instances of Morality. Thus the Description of Job is, that he was a Man perfect and upright, and one that feared God and eschewed ovil, Jobi. I. and in the 15th Pfalm the Description which David gives of the Man who should abide in the Tabernacle of the Lord, is this, that he walketh uprightly, and worketh rightcousness, and speaketh the truth in his Heart; that he backbiteth not with his tongue, nor doth evil to his neighbour, nor take h up a reproach against his Neighbour, &c. He that doth these things, saith he, shall never be moved. And the greatest Character that

that is given of Moses the Darling and Favourite of God, is, that he was very meck above all the men that were upon the face of the Earth, Numb. xii. 3. Thus also the Character of Cornelius by which he was so indeared to God, is, that be was a just and devout man, one that feared God with all his house, who gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God always, Acts x. 2. And in a Word, the general Character of those whom God accepts, is, in every Nation, he who doth righteousness is accepted of God, Acts x. 35. Thus Moral Goodness is the great Stamp and Impress that renders Men current in the Esteem of God; whereas on the contrary, the common Brand by which Hypocrites and false Pretenders to Religion are figmatized, is their being zealous for the Politices, and cold, and indifferent, as to the Morals of Religion. But so our Saviour characterises the Pharisees; Wee unto you Scribes, and Pharisees, Hypocrites, for ye pay tythe of Mint, Annise and Cummin, which yet was a positive Duty, and have omitted the weightier matters of the Law, Judgment, Mercy, and Faithfulness; these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone. Ye blind Guides, ye strain at a Gnat, and fwallow a Camel, Matt. xxiii. 23, 24. plainly implying the Morals of Religion to be as much greater than the Positives in weight and moment, as a Camel is than a Gnat in bulk. Since therefore Moral Goodness is always mentioned as the great Character of God's Favourites, and the neglect of it out of a pretended Zeal to the positive duties of Religion is always recorded as a mark of the most odious Hypocrites; this is a sufficient Argument how high a Value God fets upon the Moralities of Reli-VI. And gion. E_3

VI. And lastly, Another Evidence from Scripture that mo.al Goodness is the principal Part of Rengion, is, that at the great Account between God and us, his main Inquisition will be concerning fuch Actions as are morally good or evil. For for on. i. 6. We are told that God will render to every Man according to his Deeds; to them who by fatient continuance in well-doing, feek for Honour and Glory, and Immortality, eternal Life. But to them who are contentious, and do not obey the Truth, but obey Unrighteousness, Tribulation and Wrath, Indignation and Anguish. And accordingly Enoch as he is quoted by St. Jude, ver. 14, 15. declares this to be the Occasion of the Lord's coming with Thousands of his Saints, viz. to execute Judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them, of all their ungodly Deeds, which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard Speeches, which ungodly Sinners have spoken against him; all which are Matters of Fact against the eternal Rules of Morality. And our Saviour himself in that popular Scheme and Description he gives of the Proceedings of the Day of Judgment, plainly declares that one of the principal Matters he will then enquire into, will be our Neglect or Observance of that great moral Duty of Charity towards the Poor and Needy, Matt. xxv. 3, 46. Which is a plain Evidence that our obeying or disobeying the eternal Laws of Morality, is that by which we do most please or displease God; since it is up-on this that he will most insist in his final Arbitration of our eternal Fate. For fince his last Judgment is only the final Execution of his Laws, we may be fure that whatsoever it is that he will principally cipally insist on in his Judgment, that is the principal Matter of his Laws. And now having sufficiently proved the Truth of the Proposition, I proceed to the Reasons of it; upon what Accounts it is that God hath made moral Goodness the main and principal Part of our Religion. The chief Reasons of which are these four.

First, Because it is by moral Goodness that we

do most honour him.

Secondly, Because it is by this that we do most imitate him.

Thirdly, Because it is by this that we advance

to our own Happiness.

Fourthly, When all our positive Duty is ceased, this is to be the eternal Work and Business of our Nature.

I. God hath made moral Goodness the principal Part of our Religion, because it is by this that we do him the greatest Honour. It is an excellent faying of Hierocles, Tiuทิง ซอเรียนละ ซรี ล้งยงอิธรีร ที่ ซฉัง ύπ' ἐκείνε τροβεινομένων ἀγαθῶν ὑποδοχὴ ε γὰρ τιμήσεις του θεου δίδες τι αυτώ, αλλ' άξιω τε λαβείν τα wap eneive yivoner , the best Honour we can do to a self-sufficient Being is to receive the good Things be holds forth unto us; and therefore it is not by giving to God that you honour him, but by rendring yourfelves worthy to receive of him; for, faith he, "Osis
τιμα τον θεον ως προσδεόμενον, ετω λεληθεν διόμενω. έαυτον τε θεε είναι κρείτζονα, i.e. Whosoever gives Honour to God as to one that wants, doth not confider that he thereby fets himself above God. For by his own Self-sufficiency he is infinitely removed above all Capacity of Want, and so can never need any additional Contributions of Glory and E 4 HappiHappiness from his Creatures. For Glory being nothing else but the Reschendency of Persection, which always reflects its own Beams upon itself, where ver there is infinite Perfection (as to be fure there is in the Nature of God) there must an infinite Glory proceed from it; and therefole being infinitely glorious in himfelf, it is impossible that any thing we do should add any further Glory to him. So that if we would truly bosour and glorify him, it must not be by giving to, but by receiving from him. Now the best thing we can receive from God is Himfelf; and Himfelf we do receive in our strict com: hance with the eternal Laws of Goodness. Which Laws being transcribed from the Nature of God, from his own ciernal Righteousness and Goodness, we do by obeying them, derive God's Nature into ours. So that while we write after the Copy of his Laws, we write out the Perfections of his Being; and his Laws being the Scal upon which he hath engraven his Nature, we do in obeying them take Impression from him and stamp his blessed Nature on our own. For all those virtuous Dispositions of mind which we acquire by the Practice of Virtue, are so many genuine Signatures of God, taken from the Seal of his Law, and Participations of his Nature. For fo Holiness which confifts in a Conformity of Soul with the eternal Laws of Goodness, is in Scripture called the Signature or Impression of the Spirit of God, whereby we are scaled unto the day of Redemption, Ephef. iv. 30. and fuch as do rightconfness, are said to be born of God, I John ii. 29. which implies their deriving from him who is their Divine Parent, a Divine and God-2

God-like Nature, even as Children do their human Nature from their buman Parents. So that by the Practice of moral Goodness we receive from God the best Thing he can bestow, viz, a Divine and God-like Nature; and confequently by fo doing, we render him the highest Honour and Glory. For fince we can no otherwise honour him but by receiving from him, we doubtless do him the greatest Honour when we receive Himself, by partaking of the Perfections of bis Nature, which are the greatest Gift he can communicate to us. Herein, saith our Saviour, is my father glorified, that ye bear much fruit, John xv. 8. Μόν τροροί δε τιμαν ο προηγεμένως ιερείον έαυτον προσάγων, faith the aforenamed Philosopher, i.e. he only knows how to honour God who prefents himself a Sacrifice to him, carves his own Soul into a divine Image, and composes his Mind into a Temple for the Entertainment of God, and the Reception of the divine Light and Glory. It is then therefore that we best honour God, when by the Practice of true Godliness we conform our Wills and Affections to him; and derive into ourselves his Nature and Perfections; and should you erect to him a Temple more magnificent than Solomon's, and load his Altars with Hecatombs of Sacrifices, and make it perpetually ring with Pfalms and refounding Choirs of Hallelujahs, it would not be comparably fo great an Honour to him, as to convert your own Souls into living Temples, and make them the Habitations of his Glory and Perfections. For he values no Sacrifices like that of an obedient Will, delights in no Choir like that of pure and heavenly Affections, nor hath he in all his

his Creation an Enfign of Honour fo truly worthy of him, as that of a Divine and God-like Soul: a Soul that reflects his Image, and skines back his own Glory upon him. Wherefore fince it is by the Practice of moral Goodness that we receive God, and copy his Nature into our own, it is no wonder he should make it the principal Part of our Duty. For how can it be otherwise expected but that he should exact that chiefly of us, which most conduces to his own Glory. Since then nothing we can do can conduce to his Glory but only our receiving Benefits from him, and fince no Benefit we receive from him can fo much conduce to it as our receiving Himself, and fince we can no otherwise receive himself but by practising that Goodness which is the Perfection of his Nature, we must bereby doubtless render him the greatest Honour and Glory.

II. God hath made moral Goodness the principal Part of our Duty, because it is by this that we do most truly imitate him. For so you find in Scripture, that every where God is proposed to us for a Pattern of Action, it is by some Act or other of Morality that we are required to transcribe and imitate him. So 1 Pet. i. 16. Be ye holy, for I am holy; and Luke vi. 36. Be ye merciful as your father is merciful; and Matt. v. 48. Be you perfect as your father in heaven is perfect. And indeed it is only in moral Goodness that God can be the Pattern of our Imitation; as for those Perfections of his which for Distinction-sake we call Natural, viz. his Omniscience and Omnipresence, Omnipotence and Eternity, they are all beyond the Sphere of our Imitation, and therefore were never

propo-

proposed to us as the Copies of our Actions. But as for his moral Perfections, viz. his Goodness, and Righteousness, and Purity, and Mercy, they are the fundamental Rules and Standards of all moral Action. For the Nature of God, as it is infinitely good and righteous, is the eternal Fountain whence all the Laws of Morality are derived; and all those moral Precepts by which he governs his rational Creation, are only fo many Exemplifications of the moral Perfections of his own Nature. For the Holiness of God, which comprehends all his natural Perfections, confifts in that effential Rectitude of Nature, whereby he always chooses and acts conformably to the Dictates of his own infallible Reason; and it is to this Rectitude of choosing and acting that all his moral Laws do oblige us. For moral Laws are only the Dictates of Right Reason prescribing us what to do, and what to avoid; fo that in our Compliance with them, we follow the Rule of God's own Will and Actions, and thereby imitate the eternal Rectitude of his Nature. For though in those different States and Relations of God and Creature, right Reason cannot be supposed to oblige him and us to all the fame particular Choices and Actions, yet it obliges us both to act reasonably in our respective States and Relations; it obliges God to act reasonably and as it becomes the State and Relation of a God and Creature: and it obliges us to act reasonably and as it becomes the State and Relation of Men and Creatures. And as for God, He is invariably inclined to do all that right Reason obliges him to, by the effential Rectitude of his own Nature; and herein confifts all his moral Perfection,

tion, which is nothing elfe but the immutable Inclination of his Nature to do whatever is just and good and reasonable. So that while we live according to the Dictates of Reason, or, which is the fame thing, the eternal Laws of Morality, we trace and imitate the moral Persections of God: and in our Place and Station, live at the fame Rate and by the same Rule, that He doth in bis. We do what God himself would do, if he were in our Place, and what the Son of God did do when he was in our Nature; and there is no other Difference between his Life and ours, but what necessarily arises out of our different States and Relations. Since therefore moral Goodness is an Imitation of God, it is no wonder that he fo much prefers it before all other Matter of Duty. For he must needs be supposed to love that above all Things, which is the true Copy and Image of those Perfections of his Nature, for the fake of which he loves Himself above all. For he loves himself not merely because he is Himself, but because he is in all Respects morally good, and his Will and Power are perfectly compliant with the infallible Dictates of his own Reason; and hence arises his infinite Complacency in himself, that there is nothing in him but what his own Reason perfeetly approves, no Inclination in his Will or Nature but what is exactly agreeable to the fairest Ideas of his own Mind. And fince it is for his own Goodness-sake, that he loves himself as he doth, we may be fure that there is nothing without him can be so dear to him, as that in us which is the Image of his Goodness. Every like, we say, loves its like, and the righteous Lord, faith the Pfalmist,

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Pfalmift, loveth Righteoufnefs, Pfal. xi. 7. i. e. being righteous limfelf, he loves Righteousness in others by an invincible Sympathy of Nature. His greatest Heaven and Delight is in his own most righteous Nature, and next to that in lighteous Souls that imitate and resemble him. Ψυχης καθαρᾶς τόπου cineióτερου επί γης θεός έκ έχει God hath not a more grateful Habitation upon Earth than in a pure and virtuous Mind; ευσεβεσίν δε βροτοίς γάνυμαι τόσου όσον ελύμτω, faith Apollo, that Mimick of God by his Pythian Oracle, i. e. I rejoice as much in pious Souls as in my own Heaven. Which is much what the same with that gracious Declaration that God himself makes by the Prophet Isaiah, lvii. 15. Thus faith the high and lofty One, that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is holy, I dwell in the high and holy place; with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and so revive the heart of the contrite ones. Since therefore moral Duties are all but so many Copies and Exemplifications of God's Nature, this is fufficient Reason why he should prefer them before all the Politives of Religi-

III. God principally requires moral Goodness, because 'tis by the Practice of this that we advance to our own natural Happiness. For the natural Happiness of reasonable Creatures, consists in being entirely governed by right reason; i. e. in having our Minds perfectly informed what it is that right Reason requires of us, and our Wills and Affections reduced to an entire Conformity thereunto. And this is the Perfection of moral Goodness, which confists in behaving ourselves towards

on.

towards God and ourselves and all the World as right Reason advises, or as it becomes rational Creatures placed in our Circumstances and Relations. And when by practifing all that true Piety and Virtue which moral Goodness implies, we are perfectly accomplished in our Behaviour towards God, ourselves, and all the World, so as to render to each without any Reserve or Reluctancy what is fit and due in the Judgment of right Reason, we are arrived to the most happy State that a reasonable Nature can aspire to. 'Tis true, in this Life we cannot be perfectly happy; and that not only because we live in wretched Bodies that are continually liable to Pain and Sickness, but also because we are imperfect ourselves, and have none to converie with but impersect Creatures. But were we once stript of these natural and moral Impersections, wheresoever we lived we should necessarily be happy. Were I to live all alone, without this painful Body, I should neceffarily be in a great measure happy while I followed right Reason, though I lived in the darkest Nook of the Creation. For there I should still contemplate God, and while I did fo, my Mind would be always ravished with his Beauty and Perfections; there I should most ardently love him, and whilst I did so, I should sympathize and share with him in his Happiness; there I should still adore and praise him, and while I did so, I should feel myself continually drawn up to him; and wrap'd into a real Enjoyment of him; there I should be imitating his Perfections, and while I did so, I should enjoy an unspeakable Self-satifaction, perceiving how every moment I grew a more

more Divine and God-like Creature; there I should intirely resign up myself to his heavenly Will and Disposal, and while I did so, I should be perpetually exulting under a joyous Assurance of his Love and Favour; in a word, there I should firmly depend upon his Truth and Goodness, and while I did fo, I should be always triumphing in a fure and certain Hope of a happy Being for ever. Thus were I shut up all alone in an unbodied State, and had none but God to converse with, by behaving myself towards bim as right Reason directs me, I should always enjoy him, and in that Enjoyment should be always Happy. And if while I thus behaved myself towards God, I took care at the same time to demean myself towards myself with that exact Prudence and Temperance and Fortitude and Humility which right Reason requires, I should hereby create another Heaven within me; a Heaven of calm Thoughts, quiet and uniform Desires, ferene and placid Affections, which would be so many ever-flowing Springs of Pleasure, Tranquility and Contentment within me. But if while I thus enjoyed God and myself, by behaving my-felf as right Reason directs, I might be admitted to live and converse among perfect Spirits, and to demean myself towards them with that exact Charity and Justice and Peaceableness and Modesty which right Reason requires, the Wit of Man could not conceive a true Pleasure beyond what I should now enjoy. For now I should be possest of every thing my utmost Wishes could propose of a good God, a God-like, joyful and contented Soul, a peaceable, kind and righteous Neighbourhood; and so all above, within and without me, would be

a pure and perfect Heaven. And indeed when I have thrown off this Body, and am stripp'd into a naked Ghost, the only or at least the greatest Goods my Nature will be capable of enjoying, are God, myself, and bleffed Spirits; and these are no otherwife enjoyable, but only by Acts of Piety and Virtue, without which there is no good thing beyond the Grave that a Soul can tafte or relish. So that if, when I go to feek my Fortune in the World of Spirits, God should thus bespeak me, "O Man, now thou art leaving all these En-" joyments of Sense, consult with thyself what " will do thee good, and thou shalt have what-" foever thou wilt ask to carry with thee into " that spiritual State; I am fure the utmost I should crave would be this, "Lord give me a Heart " inflamed with Love, and winged with Duty to "thee, that thereby I may but enjoy thee; give " me a fober and a temperate Mind, that thereby I " may but enjoy myself, give me a kind, a " peaceable, a righteous Temper, that thereby I " may but enjoy the fweet fociety of bleffed Spi-" rits; O give me but these blessed Things, and " thou hast crowned all my Wishes, and to Eter-" nity I will never crave any other Favour for my " felf but only this, that I may continue a pious " and virtuous Soul for ever; for while I con-" tinue fo, I am fure I shall enjoy all spiritual "Good, and be as happy as Heaven can make me. So that the main Happiness you see of Human Nature confitts in the Perfection of moral Goodness; and it being so, it is no wonder that the good God, who above all Things desires the Happiness of his Creatures, should above all Things exaEt

act of us the Duties of Morality. He knows that our fupreme Beatitude is founded on our Picty and Virtue, and that out of our free and constant, sprightly and vivacious Exercise of these arises all our Heaven both here and hereafter; and knows this, that tender Love which he bears us, that mighty Concern which he hath for our Welfare makes him thus urgent and importunate with us. For he regards our Duty no farther than it tends to our Good, and values each Act of our Obedience by what it contributes to our Happiness; and it is therefore that he prefers moral Duties above positive, because they are more essential to our eternal Welfare.

IV. And laftly, God principally requires of us moral Goodness, because when all politive Duty is ceased, this is to be the eternal Work and Exercife of our Natures. For moral Good is from everlasting to everlasting, its Birth was elder than the World, and its Life and Duration runs parallel with Eternity; before ever the Mountains were brought forth it was founded in the Nature of God, and as an inseparable Beam of his all comprehending Reason it shines from one end of the World to the Other. For as foon as ever there was a rational Creature in being, the Obligation of Morality laid hold on him, before ever any positive Duty was imposed; and as long as ever there remains a rational Creature, the Obligations of Morality will abide on him, when all positive Duty is expired. For moral Obligations are not founded like positive ones upon mutable Circumstances, but upon firm and everlafting Realons; upon Reafons that to all Eternity will carry with them the Vol. II.

fame force and necessity. For as long as we are the Creatures of an infinitely perfect Creator, it will be as much our Duty as it is now, to love and adore him; as long as we are reasonbs: Creatures it will be as much our Duty as it is now, to submit our Will and Affections to our Reafon, and as long as we are related to other reasonable Creatures, it will be as much our Duty as it is now, to be kind and just and peaceable in all our Intercourses with them. So that these are but Duties as no Will can disperfe with, no Reason abrogate, no Circumstances difarmul or make void; but as long as God is what he is, and we are what we are, they must and will oblige us. So that what the Plalmift faith of God, may be truly applied to moral Goodness, the Heavens shall perish, but thou shalt remain, they oll thall wan old as doth a garment, and be folded up and changed, but thou art the same yesterday, to day, and for ever, and thy years shall have no end. But as long fince the politive Parts of the Yewish Religion were cancelled, and repealed, the Vail of the Temple rent in twain, the Temple itself buried in Ruins, and all its Altars thrown down and their Sacrifices abolifhed, whilft the moral Parts of that Religion still stand firm as the everlasting Mountains about Ferufalem; so the time will come when the postive Parts of Christianity itfelf must cease, when Faith must be fivallowed up in VII in, and Sacraments be made void by Perfection, and all the flated times and outward Solemnities of our Worship, expire into an everlasting Sabbath; but then when all this Scene of things is quite vanifleed away; Plety and Virtue will fill keep the Stage, and be the everlasting Exercise

Exercise of our glorified Natures. For as I shewed before, all politive Duty is instituted in subserviency to moral, and like a Scaffold to a House is only erected for the Convenience of Building up this everlasting Structure of Morality; and when this is once finished, must be all taken down again as an unnecessary Incumbrance that now only kides and coscures the Beauty of that Heavenly Building that was raifed on it, and shall abide without it for ever, to entertain our Faculties through all the future Ages of our Being, and to be the everlasting Mantion of our Natures. Wherefere fince positive Duties must all cease and expire, and only moral Goodness is to be our Business for ever, it is no wonder that God, who is so good a Master, takes so much Care in this shore Apprenticeskip of our Life to train us up in that which is to be our Trade for ever. He knows it is upon Piety and Virtue that we must live to Eternity, and maintain ourseives in all our Glory and Happiness; and that if when we come into the invisible World we have not this bleffed Trade to fubfift by, we are undone for ever; and therefore out of a tender regard to our Welfare, he makes it his principal Care to train us up in this everlashing Bufness of our Natures.

What then remains but that above all things we take care to apply ourselves to the Practice of moral Goodness: To contemplate, and love, and adore, and imitate, God; to depend upon him, and refign up ourselves to his Disposal and Government; to be fober and temperate in our Affections and Appetites, and just, and charitable, and modest, and peaccable, towards one another. These are the great things which God requires at our Hands, and without these all our Religion is a fulfome Cheat. It is true the positive Parts of Religion are our Duty as well as these, and God by his Sovereign Authority exacts them at our Hands: and unless when Jesus Christ hath been sufficiently proposed to us we do sincerely believe in him, unless we strike Covenant with him by Baptism, and frequently renew that Covenant in the Lord's Supper; unless we diligently attend on the Publick Assemblies of his Worship, and use an honest Care to avoid Schism, and to perfist in Unity with his true Catholick Church, there is no pretence of Morality will bear us out when we appear before his dread Tribunal. But then we are to confider that the proper Use of all these positive Duties is to improve and perfect us in moral Goodness; and unless we use them to this effect, we shall render them altogether void and infignificant. Wherefore as we would not lose all the Fruits of our positive Duties, let us take care to extend them to their utmost Design, to improve our Sacrifice to Obedience, our Sacraments to Gratitude and Love, our Hearing to Practice, our Prayer to Devotion, and our Fasting to Humility and Repentance. For if we rest in these Duties and go no farther, thinking by fuch short Payments to Compound with God for all those Debts we owe to the eternal Laws of Morality, we miferably cheat and befool our own Souls, which notwithstanding all the Exactness about the Positives of Religion are by their own immerial Affection still enslaved to the Devil; to whom it is much at one what our outward Form of Religion is, whether it be Chriftian

tian or Heathen or Mahometan, provided it doth not operate on our Minds, or give any Check to the Current of our depraved Natures. For whether we bow to God or to an Idol, is all one to the Devil, fo long as our Souls remain Profane and Indevout; whether we Communicate in the Holy Sacrament of Christ's Death, or in the impure Rites of Venus and Priapus, is indifferent to him as long as our Hearts continue putrid and corrupt, steaming with unchaste Desires and Affections; whether we Celebrate the Christian Feftivals, or the bloody Saturnals, or Barbarous Bacchanalia is no great matter to him, provided our Minds be but cankered with Wrath, and Malice, and Cruelty, and Revenge. These are the Sinews of his Government, and the Bands of our Allegiance to his Throne; and whilst they are preferved, he knows his Kingdom is fafe, and fo long he doth not much regard what our outward Religion is. Nay, there is nothing can be a higher Gratification to his Ambition, than to behold Himself served in Christ's own Livery, and Worshipped in a Form of Godliness; by which he hath the pleasure of dividing Empires with God, and ravishing the better share from him; of beholding his hated Creator mocked with the Shell and Outfide of a Worshipper, whilst himself is treated with the Kernel and Infide. For whilst we continue wicked under an outward Form of Religion, we do in effect Sacrifice our Beaft to God, and ourselves to the Devil; who above all things loves those unnatural Commixtures of Hearer and Slanderer, Worshipper and Deceiver, Communicant and Drunkard, Sacrificer and Oppressor; by which we onl# \mathbf{F}

only exalt and fublimate Impiety, which never looks fo Glorious as when it is gilded with Fasts and long Prayers. Wherefore as you will answer it at your eternal Peril, do not cheat and abuse yourselves with the Name and Shadow of Religion; lest when you have superstructed your Hopes of Happiness on a rotten Foundation, it should finally misserry and sink underneath you into everlasting Wretchedness and Despair.

СНАР.

CHAP. II.

Concerning Religion; What it is, and what Things are Necessary for the founding and securing its Obligations.

I AVING in the foregoing Chapter briefly discoursed concerning the *Nature of Moral Goodness*, and shewn that it is the *principal Part* of Religion, it will be requisite in the next Place to *explain* what Religion is, that so from thence we may collect what things are necessary to the *founding* and *fecuring* its Obligations, which will be the Subject of the ensuing Chapters.

Religion in the General respects God as the Object and Centre of all its Acts and Offices. For upon Supposition, that there is such a Being as a God, and that there are fuch Beings as unreasonable Creatures, or capable Subjects of Religion, it will necessarily follow that there must be some Religion or other to tie and oblige these Creatures to that God. For by God we mean a Being that hath all possible Perfection in him, and is the fupreme Caufe and Fountain of all other Being and Persection; and such a Being we must needs acknowledge doth not only deferve the worthiest Acts of Religion, that reasonable Creatures, who alone are capable of understanding his Wrath, can render to him, but hath also an unalienable FA Right

Right to exact and require them; and that not only upon the Account of his own effential Defert (for whatever he deserves he hath a right to demand) but also upon Account of the Right he hath to reasonable Creatures, who owe their Beings to him and all their Capacities of serving him, and so cannot dispose of themselves without manifest Injury to him contrary to his Will and Orders. By reasonable Creatures we mean Beings that are derived from God, and are endowed by him with a Capacity of understanding him and themselves; and such Creatures must necessarily stand obliged to render him such Acts as are suitable to, and due Acknowledgments of the Perfections of his Nature and their own Dependence upon him; and this Obligation is that which we call R. ligion. Which word, according to Lactantius, lib. 4. Divin. Inslitut. c. 28. is derived a religando, from binding or obliging us to God. So that true Religion in the general is the Obligation of reasonable Creatures to render such Acts of Worship to God as are suitable to the Excellency of his Nature and their Dependence upon him. Which Definition includes both the Doctrines and Dutics of Religion. For the Doctrines are the Reafons by which it obliges us to the Duties: And as there is no Duty in Religion but what derives its Tie and Obligation from some Dectrine contained in it, so there is no Doctrine in Religion but what ties and obliges us to some Duty that is enjoined in it. When therefore I call Religion an Obligation, I conclude in that term all those Destries of it concerning God, his Nature, and his

his Transactions with his Creatures, which are the Reasons by which we stand obliged to render all Acts of Worship to him. But for the better understanding of the Nature of true Religion, it is necessary we should distinguish it into natural and revealed. By natural Religion I mean the Obligation which natural Reason lays upon us to render to God all that Worship and Obedience, which upon the Consideration of his Nature and our Dependence upon him it discovers to be due to him. For God having planted in us a rational Faculty, by the due Exercise of which we are naturally led into the Belief of his Being, the Sense of his Perfections and the Acknowledgment of his Providence, he expects we should follow it as the Guide and Directory of our Lives and Actions; and whatfoever this Faculty doth naturally and in its due Exercife dictate to us, is as much the Voice of God as any Revelation. For whatever it naturally dictates, it must dictate by his Direction who is the Author of its Nature, and who having framed it to speak such a Sense and pronounce such a Judgment of Things, hath thereby put his Word into its Mouth, and doth bimself speak through it as through a standing Oracle which he hath erected in our Breast on purpose to convey and deliver his own Mind and Will to us. So that whatfoever natural Reason rightly exercised teaches us concrning God and our Duty towards him, is true Religion, and doth as effectually bind and oblige us to him as if it had been immediately revealed by him. It teaches us that God is infinitely wife and just and powerful and good; that he is the Fountain of our Beings, the Disposer of our Affairs, and the

the Arbitrator of our Fate both here and hereafter; and by these Doctrines it obliges us to admire and adere him, to fear and love him, to trust and obey him. And this is natural Religion, which confitts of such Doctrines as natural Reason teaches us concerning God and his Nature and Providence, and of fuch Duties as it infers from those Doctrines and inforces by them; and all the Doctrines of this Religion upon which it founds its Duties, being eternal Verities, as they must necesfarily be, being all deduced from the immutable Natures of God and Things, all the Duties of it must be morally, that is eternally good and reasonable, because those Doctrines are the cternal Reafons upon which they are founded, and by which they oblige. So that wharfoever is a Duty of natural Religion must oblige for ever, because it obliges by an eternal Reason, and so can never be dispensed with or abrogated till the Natures of Things are cancelled and reverfed, and eternal Truths are converted into Lies.

In short therefore, natural Religion hath only natural Reason for its Rule and Measure, which from the Nature of God and Things deduces all those eternal Reasons by which it distinguishes our Actions into longs and distonct, decorous and filthy, good and evil, neeffary and singul. For it doth not make them good or evil by judging them so, but if it judgeth trads, it judgeth of them as it finds them; and unless it finds them good or evil in thems were upon some eternal Reason for or against them, its Judgment is salle and erroneous. So that the biessive Goodness or Evil that is in the Actions themselves is the Measure of our Natural Reason,

Reason, but our natural Reason judging truly concerning them is the Measure of our Choice or Refusal of them; for be our Action never so good or evil in itself, unless we have some eternal Reafon for or against it, we cannot judge it so; and unless we judge it so, we cannot reasonably choose or refuse it; but as foon as ever we have judged and pronounced it good or evil upon an eternal Reason, we stand obliged by that Judgment to do or forbear it. So that right Reason pronouncing fuch Actions good, and fuch evil, is the Law of Nature, and those eternal Reasons upon which it so pronounces them are the Creed of Nature, both which together make natural Religion. And by this Religion was the World governed, at least the greatest Part of it, for some Thousands of Years; till by long and fad Experience it was found too weak to correct the Errors of Mens Minds, and restrain the wild Extravagancies of their Wills and Affections; and then God out of his great Pity to lost and degenerate Mankind, vouchfafed to us the glorious Light of revealed Religion, which in the largest acceptation of it includes all natural Religion, as well the credenda as agenda, the Doctrines as the Duties of it; both which are contained in that Revelation of his Will which God hath made to the World, to which it hath superadded fundry Doctrines and Duties of supernatural Religion.

But *strictly* fpeaking, revealed Religion, as it is distinguished from natural, consists of such Doctrines and Duties as are knowable and discoverable only by Revelation; as are not to be deduced and inferred by Reasoning and Discourse from any

necessary

necessary or natural Principles, but only depend upon the Council and good Will of God. And where Things depend entirely upon God's Will, and their Being or not Being lies wholly in his free Disposal, it is impossible that our natural Reason should ever arrive at the Knowledge of them without some Revelation of his Will concerning them. For in such Matters as these, where the Will of God is absolutely free, Reason without Revelation hath neither necessary nor probable Causes and Principles to argue from, and therefore can make neither certain Conclusions nor so much as probable Gueffes concerning them, but must necessarily remain altogether in the Dark till fuch time as God hath revealed to it which Way his Will is determined; and of fuch Matters as these consists all revealed Religion strictly fo called. For though God hath made fundry Revelations of his Will, yet the fubject matter of them was for the main always the fame; viz. the Doctrines of the Mediation of Jesus Christ, and the Duties that are subsequent thereunto, which from that Promise which God made to Adam upon his Fall, the Seed of the Woman Ji. ali break the Serpent's Head, to the last Promulgation of the Goffel, hath been the great Theme of all divine Revelation. For what elfe was that Revelation which God made to Abraham, in thy Seed shall all the Nations of the Earth be bleffed, but only the descring of the Gospel? which is nothing but glad Tidings of the Mediator. What was the Law of Moses, but only the same Gospel skining through a Cloud of Types and symbolical Representations; and what are all the succeeding Prophelies of the Old Testement but only the same Gospel

Gospel still shining clearer and clearer, till at last it broke forth in its Meridian Brightness? And were this a proper Place, I think I could eafily demonstrate, that from Adam to Moses, from Moses to the Prophets, from the Prophets to Jesus Christ, the main Scope and Design of all Divine Revelation hath been the gradual Discovery of this great Mystery of the Mediation. So that revealed Religion was for the Matter of it always the fame, though it was not always revealed with the same Perspicuity, but cleared up by Degrees from an obscure Twi-light to a perfect Day. Wherefore Christianity, which in Strictness is nothing but the Doctrine of the Mediation, together with its appendant Duties, ought not to be looked on as a new Religion of 1600 Years Date, for in Reality it is as ancient as the Fall, and was then preached to Adam in that dark and mysterious Promise; aster which it was a little more clearly repeated, though very obscurely still, in God's Covenant with Abraham; and again, after that it was much more amply revealed in the Types and Figures of the Law of Moles, which yet like painted Glass in a Window did under their pompous Show still darken and obscure the holy Mysteries within them, which were nothing but the Doctrines and Laws of the Christian Religion. So that Judoisia was only Christianity veiled, and Christianity is only Judaism revealed.

Thus the Religion of the Mediator, you see, was the principal Subject of all divine Revolution; and this without Revelation natural Reason could never have discovered, because the whole fit depended upon the free Will of God. For whether he would

admit of any Mediator or no; whether he would admit his own Son to be our Mediator or no; whether he would deposit such inestimable Bleffings for us or no in the Hands of our Mediator, was entirely left to his free Determination; and there was no necessary Cause either within or withour him, no nor any probable one neither, that humane Reason could ever have discovered, that could incline or determine him one Way or the other. So that till fuch time that he revealed his Will to us, we were left utterly in the Dark as to this Matter, and had no manner of Principles to argue from, or so much as to guess by. This therefore is strictly the revealed Religion as it flands in Opposition to the natural. But fince together with revealed Religion God hath put forth a freend Edition of natural, which was almost left and grown out of Print through the wretched Negligence and Suspidity of Mankind; and fince he bath not only revealed them together, but also incorperated them into one; Religion, as it is now figured and confirmted by this happy Conjunction of natural with revealed, may be thus defined, It is the Obligation of rational Creatures to render fach 21cls of Worflip to God through Jefus Christ as he him if kash instituted, and as are in their own Natures fintable to kis Execulencies and their Dependree uparkim. Where by Acts of Worship, I do not mean such only as are immediately directed to and terminated upon God, as all those are which are contained in the first Table of the Decalogue; but all thefe Acis in general which God hath commanded, which being performed upon a religious Account, that is, out of Homage and Obedience

to God's Will and Authority, are as truly and properly Acts of Worship to him as Prayer or Praise or Adjuration.

And now having given this fhort Account of the Nature of Religion, it will from hence be eafy to collect what *Principles* are necessary to the *founding* and *fecuring* its Obligations; for

First, God being the great Object of all Religion, it must be absolutely necessary, in order to our being truly Religious, that we believe that God is.

Secondly, Religion being an Obligation of us to God; that this Obligation may take Effect upon us, it is necessary we should believe that he concerns himself about us, and consequently that he governs the World by his Providence.

Thirdly, Religion obliging us to render all due Acts of Worship to him, to inferce this Oh igation upon us, it is necessary we should believe that he will certainly reward us if we render those Acts to him, and as certainly punish us if we do not.

Fourthly, These Acts of Worship which Peligion obliges us so, being such as are fuitable to the Excellency of God's Nature, to enable us to fulfil this Obligation it is necessary we should have right Apprehensions of the Nature of God.

Fifthly, Religion obliging us to render all these Acts of Worthip to God in and through Jesus Christ,

to our performing this it is necessary we should believe in his *Mediation*.

These are the great *Principles* in which all the Obligations of Religion are founded; and therefore in order to the thorough fixing those Obligations upon Mens Minds, it will be necessary before we proceed to the particular Duties which Religion obliges us to, to discourse of these Principles distinctly.

CHAP

CHAP. III.

Of the Necessity of believing that God is, in order to Men's being truly Religious.

HE that cometh unto God, faith the Apostle, must believe that God is, Heb. xi. 6. where by coming to God is meant worshipping him, that is, expressing our Veneration of, and Affection to him, by outward and visible Signs and Actions; and unless our outward Actions in Religion proceed from an inward Veneration of, and Affection to him, they are not Worship but Mockery: But how is it possible a Man should inwardly venerate God, when he believes there is no fuch Being in the World? For how real foever any thing may be in itself, if we believe it is not, it is to us as if it were not; and therefore though God doth fo necessarily exist, as that he cannot but be, the very Notion of him implying an infinite Distance from not being; yet while we believe he is not, our Thoughts can be no more concerned about him, than about purchasing an Inheritance in Utopia. So that this Proposition that God is, is the prime Fundamental of all Religion; and if this be removed, Religion must fink, and all its Sucred Obligations fly in funder. But this is fo felf-evident, that it would be very impertinent to infift upon the Proof of it. All that I shall do therefore in pursuance of this Argument, shall be Vol. II.

to endeavour to establish the Belief of this fundamental Truth upon which all Religion depends; and that First, by inquiring into, and removing the Causes of Men's Insidelity in this Matter; Secondly, by representing the Folly and Unreasonableness of it. For as for the Proofs and Evidences of God's Being, I shall reserve them till I come to discourse of his Providence, where I think there is enough said to satisfy any Man that is not desperately hardned against all Conviction.

SECT. III.

Of the Causes of Atheism; shewing the great Absurdity and Unreasonableness of them.

Onsidering how loudly the Voice of Nature, the Consent of Nations, and the beautiful Structure and Contrivance of Things do proclaim the Being of God, one would think it impossible there should be any such Monster as an Atheist among reasonable Beings; and indeed it hath been warmly disputed among the Learned, whether there be any such or no? A Question, which these later Ages have determined in the Assirtance, by an Induction of too many woeful Instances. But doubtless had Men impartially attended to the Dictates of Reason, and not delivered themselves up to the Insauation of their Lusts, and the investerate

veterate Prejudice of a corrupt Imagination, it would have been impossible for so many gross Absurdities as Atheism implies, to have entred into their Minds; but when once Men's Wills and Affections have espoused a Proposition, they will make one Shift or other, be it never so absurd, to impose it on their *Understandings*; and considering how many Caules there are leading Men to Atheism who are predistrosed thereunto, I cannot think an Atheist to be so great a Wonder. For fo long as Men's Understandings are led by their Wills, and their Wills are biaffed with Inclinations to Impiety, they can hardly forbear wisking there were no God; and then from wilking there were none, to believing there is none, will be a very short and easy Transition. Since therefore their Atheism proceeds not so much from the Desect of their Reason as from the Fault of their Wills, perhaps the most effectual Way to cure it, is rather to detect and remove those faulty Causes in their Wills, than to attempt upon their Reason with the Proofs and Demonstrations of a Deity. And accordingly you see, that when God had once erceted this goodly Theatre of Beings, and imprinted on it fo many glorious Characters of his own Power, and Wislom, and Goodness, though from time to time he hath wrought innumerable Miracles, to reduce Men from Superfition, Idolatry, and Wickednos, yet he never wrought one to reduce them from Atheism. And indeed to what Purpose should he? it being highly improbable that they who will not be convinced of the Being of God by this standing Miracle, the World, in which there are fo many ample Demonstrations of his Being, should G ? be

be convinced of it by any other Miracles; for other Miracles are only the Diforders and Interruptions of Nature; and certainly the regular Course and standing Order of Nature, is a much more glorious Evidence of God's Wisdom and Power, than the most miraculous Interruptions and Diforders of it. And therefore if Men will be Atheists, notwithstanding God hath imprinted so many Proofs of his Being on this visible Creation, it is plain it is not their Reason but their Wills that make them so; and if so, to what Purpose is it to urge their Reason with the Arguments of God's Being? fince if they will not liften to those that are round about them, and are every where to be found in the great Volume of Nature, it is highly improbable that even Miracles themselves, which are God's peculiar Arguments (and are therefore called the Demonstrations of his Spirit) should ever be able to perfuade them. Wherefore to put a Stop to this pestilential Disease, which in these latter Ages hath been so fatally propagated among all Degrees and Orders of Men, I conceive the most proper Way is to discover and remove those Faults in their Wills which have such a malevolent Influence on their Understandings; and the principal ones may be reduced to these nine Heads.

- I. A perverse Opposition of Will to the Will and Nature of God.
- II. Superstitious Misatprehensions concerning God.
- III. Precipitant Rashness in prescribing to, and prejudging the Divine Providence.

IV. Vain

IV. Vain Affections of Singularity in Opini-

V. Custom of Drolling on, and Ridiculing the most ferious Things.

VI. Taking up our Religion or Opinions in Re-

ligion, without Examination.

VII. Measuring the Truth or Falshood of Religion by the Practice of fuch as make high Pretences to it.

VIII. Placing Religion in the little Opinions that constitute the Sects and Parties we are engaged in.

IX. Profane and carcless Neglett of Publick

Worfinp.

I. One great Cause of Atheism is the perverse Opposition of Men's Wills to the Will and Nature of God. For the natural Notion which Men have of God is, that he is a most pure and boly Being, infinitely removed by the Perfection of his Nature from all Inclinations that are contrary to the Dictates of right Reason. And accordingly in all those Declarations which he hath made of his Will, they find him expressing an high Detestation of all Immorality and Wickedness, and commanding them to abstain from it under the most dreadful Penalties, which they know he hath both Right and Power to inflict when he pleases. Notwithstanding which, presuming on his Goodness, and a future Repentance, they suffer themfelves to be tempted and feduced into Wickedness; the Pleasure of which rolls them on from one Wickedness to another, till their Wills are captivated by Custom to inveterate Habits of sinning. So

So that now their Seafe of God, and of his Almigh v Di pleasure, being no longer able to master the Stubb ranefs of their Wills, only ferves to fret and d'hurb them, to raise Terrors and Anxieties in their Confciences and therewithal to imhitter the Pleasure of their Sin. For so long as this Sense remains alive in their Bosoms, they can never hope to fin quietly for it; and it being fo, they have no other Remedy but only to part with that or their Sins. For while they retain their Sins, the Belief of a God will grow an intolerable Vecation to them, unless by fophisticating their Belief with falle Notions of Religion they can temper into an amicable Compliance with their Lasts. And this is usually the Artifice of the duller fort of People whose Understandings are more cafily imposed on, viz. to intermingle with their Belief of a God fuch Notions of Religion as may render it favourable and propitious to our Lusts. And hence I doubt not iprang most of those wicked Doctrines which from time to time have been foilled into Christianity, from the Defire which Men have to accommodate the Difference between their Consciences and their wicked Wills, and reconcile their natural Sense of God to their Sins. But alas, these Artifices are all so thin and transparent, that it is a hard Matter for Men of Wit to impose them on their Understandings; and though they have an equal good Will to these wicked Doctrines with the duller fort of Sinners, yet their Reason is too sharp-sighted to be choused and deceived by them. And therefore usually they go another way to work, and being fenfible that they can never enjoy their Sins in quiet, while they are awed

awed with the Sense and Belief of a Deity, and vet obstinately resolved that they will enjoy them, they have no other Expedient but to mufter up all their Wit and Reason to dispute the Belief of a God out of their Minds; and being sliffly resolved to perfift in their Wickedness, they are obliged by their own Interest to wish there were no God to observe and punish them. And then facile credunt quod volunt, they eafily believe what they would have, and the *stender oft* Probability will fively their Understanding to vote on the Side of their Interest and Affections. So that when Men are refolved to be wicked, Atheisin is their Interest and Refuge, to which they are many times forced to fly in their own Defence, to avoid the Clamours and Persecutions of their Consciences. Had these Men lived in those good Pagan Days wherein they might have rioted with Devotion, facrificed to the Gods in drunken Bowls, and worshipped in the Arms of a Strumpet, no Men would have been more religious than they; and could they now but compound the Matter fo as that God should let them alone to enjoy their Lufts, there is no doubt but they would be well enough content to let bim alone to enjoy his Being. But because their Sense of him frets and galls them, they first grow impatient under it, and then fet their Wits at Work to raife Objections against it, and either to laugh or dispute it out of their Minds. And accordingly Plato makes mention of a fort of Atheists as an webs τη δόξη, τη θεῶν ἔρημα είναι σάνλα, ἀκράτειαί τε λόο-νῶν κὸ λυπῶν σροσπέσωσι μνημαι, τὰ ἰσχυραὶ κὸ μαθήσεις οξείαι παρώσι; who in confequence of their Opinion, that all Things are void of Gods, have plunged

plunged themselves into Intemperance of Pleafures and Pains, being otherwise Persons of great Memories and quick Understandings, De Leg. Lib. 10. But alas, how unreasonable is it in a Matter of fuch vaft Importance for Men to believe by their Interest and Affections! it is true, could Men put out the Sun with winking, or extinguish the Nature of Things by an obstanate Disbelief of them, it would be very justifiable for those Men to believe there is no God whose Interest it is that there flould be none. But alas, the Natures of Things are walterable, and will be what they are whatfoever our Opinion is about them. It there be a God, there will be one, whether we think fit to believe it or no; and tho' when the Interest of our Lusts requires it, we may possibly dispute ourselves out of the Belief of his Being, yet he is not to be disputed out of his Being. We may indeed secure curselves from the Dread of his Vengeance by disputing ourselves into a Disbelief of him, but we can never fecure ourselves by it from the danger of his Vengeance. And what a fenfeless thing is it for a Man to shut his Eyes against an unavoidable Danger, merely for fear of being frightned by it; and when he might shun God's Vengeance by dreading it, instead thereof to shun the dread of it? What is this but to fet his Reason at work to rock his Conscience asleep, that so he may destroy him'elf without Fear or Disturbance?

II. Another great Cause of Atheism is super-stitious Misapprebensions concerning God; which though they are lodged in the Mind, yet are most commonly exhaled from the Affections, that like impure Pogs do generally breath up all those Me-

teors that darken and disturb the Region above. And indeed most of our ill apprehensions of God are transcribed and copied from our own Affections; which be they never fo irregular, our own felf-love will be apt to celebrate for Perfections. And then whatsoever we esteem a Persection in ourselves, we naturally attribute to God, who is the Source and Standard of all Perfection; and those Affections of our own Nature which we most injuriously attribute to God, we love or hate in him according as we love or hate them in other Men. Thus the fond and indulgent, who are apt to doat upon others without reason, and to hug even their Vices and Deformities, are prone to attribute their own Temper to God, and to look upon him as a Being that is infinitely indulgent to those whom without any reason he hath chosen for his Favourites. And because he who is fond of others, loves others should be fond of him, to be fure he will love his fond God too, and be far more devoutly affected towards the Idol of his own Temper, than to the true God himfelf cloathed in all the native Glory of his own Attributes. But on the contrary, those who are stern, and peevish, and implacable, can by no means indure their own Temper in others; and therefore it is no wonder if they hate it in God to whom they are wont injuriously to attribute it. For how is it possible for them to affect a Divinity whom they have pictured in their own Minds with fuch a flern and terrible Aspect, with an Imperious Selfwill that bears down all things before it, by irrefiftible Might, without any Respect to Right or Wrong, with bloody Hands and a Vengeful Heart, and

and a testy, peevish, and unaccountable Nature that loves and bates without any reason, and is pleased or displeased as the too takes it. And having thus fet up such a grim Idol of God in their Minds as they can by no means affect, they fecretly wish there were no such Being, which is the brink of Atheism. Thus their ghastly Apprehensions of God meeting with the *furly* and *churlish* temper within them, instead of moulding them into Devotion to him, commonly enrage and canker them with Malice against him; and accordingly Plutrach well observes, 'Our οιεται θεως είναι ὁ ἄθε, ὁ κ) δεισιδαίμων & βέλεται, i. e. the Atheist thinks there is no God, and he who hath dreadful Apprehenfions of him wifhes there were none; and he who wishes there were none is but one remove from believing there is none.. Thus you fee in what a direct Line Vice leads to Superfition, and Superstition to Atheijin. For Pride and Wrath, Malice and Revenge, are naturally apt to ingender in Men's Minds borrid and frightful Apprehensions of God; which working on those four and rugged Passions that begot them, are as apt to exasperate and inrage them against him; and then their Reason immediately takes part with their Passion, and to gratity its wish that there were no God, sets itfelf industriously to argue him out of his Being. But alas, what an unreatonable Procedure is this, for Men to pin their Faults upon God, and dress him in their own Deformities, and when they have thus difguised him by putting upon him their own frightful Tempers, as the old Perfecutors did the Christians by wrapping them in Lions Skins, to fet on their Wit and Reason to worry him out

of his Being; what is this but to make a God as the Heathens did their Mercuries, and then fling Stones at him; to transform him into a menstrous Idol, and then dislike him, and then dash him in pieces? but be not deceived, God will be what he is, a most perfect, gloricus, and amiable Being, how inglorious soever he may appear to you thro' the salse Medium of your own Diabolical Temper, which like Crimson colcured Glass, will represent the sairest Objects to you bloody and terrible: But for you to hate God for no other reason but because our own hateful Passions do reslect to you such an inglorious Idea of him, and then to deny him because you hate him, is equally impicus and

unreasonable.

HI. Another great cause of Atheism is Rashnefs and Precipitancy in prescribing to and prejudging the Divine Providence, and this also most commonly arises from some great Irregularity in Men's Wills and Affections. For generally the raft Judgments which Men make of the Divine Providence are grounded on those unequal Distributions it makes of the good Things of this World, in prospering the Bad and afflicting the Good, upon which we are too often ready to charge it with being an unequal Arbitrator of Men's Fates: The occasion of which is our immoderate Estimation of the Goods and Evils of this World. We fo inhance the Goods of it in our Opinions, as to think them great enough to be the Crown and Reward of Virtue; and have fuch borrible Apprehenfions of the Evils of it, as to imagine them great enough to be the Plagues and Punishments of the most obstinate and notorious Offenders.

Where-

Whereas by the whole Course of his Providence it appears that God hath a different esteem of them both; that he thinks the best things of this World to be bad enough to be thrown away upon the most despicable Persons; and therefore to express his Scorn of these admirable Vanities, he many times scatters them with a careless Hand, as not thinking it worth the while to be so exact in the Distribution of them, as to put them in Gold Scales and weigh them out to Mankind by Grains and Scruples. And as for the worst things of this World, he thinks them not so bad but that they may be indured without any confiderable Damage to the Sufferer; and therefore many times fuffers them to befal his own Favourites, as not thinking it of Moment enough to interpose his Providence to shield them against their impotent Impressions. And upon this difference of Judgment Men too often ground an inveterate Quarrel against God; and because they doat upon this World, and think the Goods of it good enough to be the Portion of good Men, and the Evils of it bad enough to be the Punishment of bad, they are angry with God for not being of their Opinion, and are ready to arraign his Providence, and to conclude that this World is governed by a blind Chance that drops her favours at random, as the full plumed Hawk mews her loofe Feathers and never cares who stoops to take them up. And this Ovid ingeniously acknowledges himself.

Dum rapiunt mala fata bonos, ignoscite fasso, Sollicitor nullos esse putare Deos; i.e. While I behold ill Fates attend good Men, I am tempted to think there are no Gods.

Marmoreo Licinus tumulo jacet, at Cato parvo, Pompeius nullo, quis putet esse Deos? The wicked Licinus lies in a Marble Tomb, but Cato in a small one, and Pompey in none, who

So also there are others, who beholding themselves in the flattering Mirrour of their own selfconceit, are so taken with the Reflections of their own Merit and Excellency, as that they cannot fee how it is possible but that if there be a God he must love and reward them; and therefore if initead of fo doing, God either deprives them of those worldly Goods which they don't on, or frustrates them of those carnal Hopes for whose Accomplishment they have earnestly supplicated, they presently begin to murmur against him, and thence proceed to arraign the Justice of his Providence, and thence to deny both that and his Being. For thus it comes to pass, faith Simplicius, that such who have no grounded Belief of a Deity, when they observe the Miseries of good Men, and the Prosperities of bad, are without any Regard to the common Notions of God, ready to cry out with him in the Tragedian, τολμῶ κῶρειπεῖν μήπο] εκ είσιν θεοί, κακοί γαρ εὐτυκονθες επιπλήτθεσί με, i.e. I dare affirm there are no Gods, because the wicked prosper that hurt me. Thus from their fond Affection to these worldly Goods, Men frequently take occasion to quarrel with God's Providence, for not appropriating them to be the Rewards of Virtue; and being once engaged in a Quarrel against

against his Providence, their next attempt is to

dispute him out of his being.

But what an unreasonable way of concluding is this? I value this to be best and that to be worst. and therefore God ought to be of my Opinion, and to proceed accordingly to his Providence over the World; and there is nothing can be better or worse within the Prospect of an infinite Wisdom than what I apprehend to be best and worst for Mankind; and therefore if he will do good to the Good, it must be in the Method that I shall prescribe him, that is to say, he must crown them with Rose-buds. and cloath them in Purple, and feed them with the fat of the Land; and if he punish the wicked he must give me leave to give aim to his Arrows, and to direct him bow, and subat, and when, and where to shoot, and so long I am contented to allow him a Being in the World; but if he will prefume to cross my Opinion of Things, and steer his actions by the unerring Compass of his own infinite Wisdom; if he will rather choose to do good to the Good by chaftening than by prospering them, and to evenge himself upon the Wicked by fattening them with Prosperity for Slaughter, I shall look upon it as fuch an Affront to my Judgment as will admit of no meaner Expiation than the stripping him out of his Providence and Being. And what can be more ridiculous than for Man to deny the Being of God, because his Providence sometimes crosses their foolish Opinion of Things, and doth not govern itself by the crooked Rules which they are pleased to prescribe it.

IV. Another great Cause of Atheism is vain Affectation of Singularity in Opinion; a Vice that hath been always incident to Men of Speculation, who valuing themselves upon the Stock of their Knowledge and deep Infight into the Nature of Things, have always affected to start new Notions and advance contrary Hypotheses to the received Opinions of Mankind, that so they may be vogued for Men of fingular Knowledge, and feem to have taller Understandings than the rest of their Brethren. And this I doubt not hath been one great Cause of speculative Atheism; for there is no Principle in Nature which hath been more univerfally received among Men than the Belief of a Deity, which doubtless is the main Reason why Men who affect Singularity have been so prone to quarrel at it. It doth not comport with their Defign of being thought wifer than the rest of the World, to fubmit their Understandings to common Notions and univerfal Doctrines; because should they think as other Men do, they might probably be thought no wifer. Perhaps had the Belief of a Deity been lately started, and only received by tome singular Sect of Virtuoso's, these Men might have been as forward to entertain it as they are now to reject it; but because it is an old-fashion Doctrine, in which all Ages and Nations have concurred, they think it would be a Discredit to their Understanding to wear it, and therefore they fet their Wits at work to invent Atheistical Hypotheses to solve the Phanemena of Nature without a Deity. And he that doth but impartially confider the baughty Genius of those Philosophers that laid the Foundations of speculative Atheism,

theism, may easily perceive that the great Motive of their Infidelity was nothing but a proud Affectation of thinking counter to Mankind. And in-deed could I but embrace the Doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls, I should be tempted to believe, by the Likeness of their Humours, that it was one and the same Soul that passed through Democritus into Protagoras, through Protagoras into Epicurus, and thro Epicurus into Mr. Hobbs: And fince they so exactly agreed in their Pride and haughty Ostentation of Knowledge, it is justly supposable that this was the main Cause of their Agreement in Atheism; which being a singular Doctrine, and directly contradictory to the common Notions of Mankind, was upon that Account more adapted to the Humour of these arrogant Philosophers. And accordingly Plato describes the Atheists of his Age to be a conceited and scornful fort of People, and declares the cause of their Atheism to be ἀμάθεια μάλα χαλεπη δοκεσα είναι μεγίς η Φρόνησις, a certain pernicious Sort of Ignorance that puts on a Semblance of the greatest Wisdom: And afterwards he calls Atheism τὸν παξὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σωφώτα]ον πάντων λέγων, that which in the Eyes of some conceited People seemed to be the wifest of all Doctrines, de Leg. Lib. 10. And because these Atheistical Philosophers, whowere some of them great Masters of Witand Learning, had the good Luck to be remarked and gazed on like so many Anticks for their Singularity, they have always found Disciples and Followers among the People of *little* Sense and a great deal of Vanity, who being ambitious of the Reputation of Wits and Philosophers, but having neither Brains

nor Industry enough to merit it, are fain to skelter their Ignorance in Atheisin, and there to face it out with Laughter and Boldness; and became by laughing at God and Religion they decide the common Faith of Mankind, they fancy themselves fingularly wifty, and expect that others thould fancy them to to; whereas in reality these little People are but mere Pretenders to speculative Atheifin. For before they can be move, they must comprehend the whole System of the Athelitical. Philolophy, and be able to describe all those suppoled Laws of Motion, by which Matter without the Conduct of a Juperior Wildom and Power did originally range itself into this beautiful World, and to fh. w at least the Possibility of all the strange Appearances in Nature, without suffesting a God; which is such a Task as their fach! Understandings durst never attempt; for the utmash they can pretend to is a few Terms of the Athe flical Philofight, which they have learned by rote, and do cant and finatter with as much Skill and Understanding as Parrots do the Leslons they are taught them. And though the brisk young Gentlemen will fometimes boldly affirm, and if you dare take them up will lay a Wager on it too, that Reason is nothing but a Train of Imaginations; that Choice is nothing, but the last a Stroke of cutward Object on the Fancy; and that there is nothing in Nature but Matter and Motion; yet should you be to rude as to ask them what they mean by these Phrases, you would uncase their Ignorance and utterly undo them. So that fuch as thefe are only the Hawkers and Retailers of Athelim, that wife and cry it about; but have neither Wit nor Indu-Vol. II. HI fl.y

flry enough to understand it, but to take it up with the same implicit Faith as the Papists do their Religion. Thus as the Ambition of being accounted wifer than others, causes Men to affect Singularity in their Opinions, so the Affectation of Singularity in Opinion doth very often transport Men into Atheisia.

Now tho' I would by no Means plead for Mens enflaving their Understanding to vulgar Opinions, to as to put a Stop to all Advancements of Knowkage, and hinder the World from ever growing wiser; yet doubtless for Men to quarrel at Opinions for no other Reason but because they are vulgarly received, is not only a rude Afront to the Reason of Mankind, but also an effectual Way to involve ourselves in an endless Labyrinth of Mistakes. For while I affect to be singular in my Opinion, I deprive myself of the Assistance of other Men's Understandings, and in my Travel for Knowledge chuse rather to go alone by myself through untrodden By-ways, than to keep the Road, and follow the Track of those that have gone before me. So that unless I am wiser than all the World, which is very unlikely, it is a thoufand to one but I bewilder and lose myself; for how wife and fagacious soever I may be, it is certain that many Heads are wifer than one; and therefore when all Heads concur in the same Judgment, it is probable at least that fludgment is true: He therefore who rejects an Opinion because all or most do embrace it, affects to think counter to the strongest Evidence, and to believe against the greatest Probability. It is true in many things the generality of Men have been mistaken, which

which is a fufficient Reason why we should not sin our Faith upon the Sieeve of vulgar Opinions, but impartially examine before we confidently embrace them; but yet there is a Reverence due to the Judgment of Mankind, and the Laws of Modefly require us not to be confident against it without very great Reason; but to gaets to run counter to it, especially in such a Matter of Moment as the Belief or Dishelief of a Duty, is not only the highest Arrogance but the most extravagant Madness. For it is at least probable that there is a God, because all Mankind do believe one, and if there be one it is of infinite Moment that we should believe it, and all accordingly; and therefore for Men to turn Asheifts out of mere Singularity, is not only to believe there is no God, because it is probable there is by to play and dally with one's own Fate, and run the Hazard of being eternally miserable out of a wanton Affectation of contradicting the Judgment of Mankind.

V. Another great Cause of Atheism is Custom of drolling on and ridicaling the most friens Things; a Humour which hath strangely prevailed in this pleasant and jecular Age, wherein the wild Rovings of Men's Fancies into odd Similitudes, startling Metaphors, humorous Expressions, and spertive Representations of Things are grown more acceptable in almost all Conversations, than the most solid Reason and Discourse, and it is generally looked upon as a far more genteel and septionable Quality for a Man to be witty than wife. Now though I do not deny but that Wit in itself is a very useful and valuable Indowment, and serves to many excellent Purposes; as namely to

feliph and adorn the most serious Truths, and represent them to Men's Minds in the most comely and affecting Dreffes; to expose what is apparently base and ridiculous, and losh it with the Satyrs it makes against it filf; to quicken and give Life to a folid Argument, and render it more piercing and convictive; and in a Word, to indear our Society, and give a Relish and Piquancy to our Conversation, and to recreate our Minds after we have been tired and cloyed with feverer Occupations; though Wit, I fay, be a very uleful Quality as to all those good Purposes, yet unless a wife Man hath the keeping it, that knows when, and where, and have, to apply it, it is like Wild-fire that files at Rovers, runs biffing about, and blows us every thing that comes in its Way without any Respect or Discrimination. And indeed the more grave and frious any thing is, the more prone it will be to expele and ridicule it. For the Life of Wit confists in the Surprisingness of its Conceits and Expressions, in making such smart or uncouth Representations of Things as are most apt to raise a pleasing Wond r and Amazement in those that hear us. Now there is nothing more furprifing in its own Nature, than to see or hear a ferious Thing sportfully represented and dressed up in an antick and ridiculous Dilguile; the very exposing it in a Garb and Figure so unexpected because so very unlike and suitable to itself, is apt of its own Nature to furbrife and amufe the Spectators or Hearers; which Surprise, if he be a vain Person, will tickle him in Laughter, but if he be ferious, will affect him with Deteflation and Horrer to fee a ferious Thing fo contemptibly treated. But the greatest

greatest Part of Men being of vain and trifling Spirits, that are whiffled up and down in little Levities of Fancy, there is nothing commonly doth more gratefully farprife them and provoke their Laughter, than ridiculous Representations of ferious Arguments; and hence it comes to jass that it is grown a great Instance of Wit among the Generality of Men to spert and play with frieus Things, to burlefque the Sense of them, and apply them to ridiculous Purpoles; wherein in reality this miftaken fort of Wit is nothing but dull and impudent Buffoonry, and a very little Wit joined with a great deal of Sauciness will enable a Man to make sport with the most serious Arguments. For it is but cloathing them in rude and perterly Expresfions, or misconstruing them to a present or ludicrous fense, or debauching the phrases by which they are expressed to a filly or a wicked Meaning, and it shall be presently cried up for an excellent Jest, and the Author of it dubbed a Wit Lourcat. This therefore being so easy a Way for dull People to advance themselves to the Reputation of Wits, hath of late Years especially been mightily frequented by the impotent Well-withers to Wit and Ingenuity; and because Religion hath been always esteemed the most serious Thing in the World, therefore they fix upon that as the common Theme of their Raillery, confidering that the mere scrious it is, the more it will furprise Men to hear it burlefqued and drolled on. So that if they do but speak flightly and irreverently of God, or never so clownifely ridicule a dystery of Rel gion, or cloath an obscore Thought in a Text of Scripture, their Sauciness will supply the Defect of their Wit, H and

and Men will laugh not fo much at the Piquancy of their Conceit, as at the Boldness and Presumption of it: And because their Discourse hath the Luck to be laughed at, they think themselves celebrated for the Oracles of Wit, and are thereby emboldeed to proceed in their impious Buffoonry, till at last they have drolled themselves into a Contempt of God, and from thence into downright Atheifm. For though a Yest be no Argument, nor yet a bud Laughter a Demonstration, yet if you inspect the Generality of our little Pretenders to Atheifm, you will find this is the main Foundation that their Irreligion depends on; for their Gift confifts not in arguing and demonstrating, but in fuch a Set of fine Phrases and terse Oaths; and all the Stock of Learning they pretend to is a few Shavings of Wit gathered out of Plays and Romanccs, and these they pin upon Religion, as you have feen unhappy Boys do Rags at Men's Backs, to expose it to Scorn and Derision; and having accustomed themselves to treat it with such rude and porterly Contempt and Difingenuity, it grows by Degrees cheap and vile in their Eyes, and at last is rejected by them as a ridiculous Imposture; and if now when they are urged with Evidences of Religion, they have but Wit enough to answer Reason with Drollery, and to retort a Jest to a Demonstration, how gloriously do they imagine they have acquitted themselves, and with what triumphant Shrugs do they celebrate their Victory over the little Man in black

Now though for Men to deride what they do not understand, savours neither of Learning nor good Manners, and is equally unbecoming a Gentleman

and a Scholar; and though for a Man to venture to be damned for deriding of God and Religion, is fuch a Triumph of Wit as argues the utter Defeat of his Reason, yet so long as there are vain Men enough to be tickled with this profane fort of Drollery, to be fure there will never want Fools enough to venture on it. For when a Fop will needs aspire to the Reputation of a Wit, he hath no other way but to drefs up Religion in a Fool's Coat, and expose it for a Spectacle of Derision, and then how dull foever the Conceit be, the stupendous Presumption of it will surprise and amuse the Company, and Men will admire him, just as they do Rope-dancers, for daring to perform what a wife Man would tremble to attempt; and being thus emboldned by the Admiration and Laughter of his Company, which the vain Creature mistakes for a Proof and Evidence of his Wit, he grows more pert and confident, and so fools and fleers on till he hath toyed and laughed himfelf out of all Sense of Religion.

But alas! what a disperate Piece of Folly is this, for Men thus to sport and dally with the Almighty, whose Vengeance they can neither withstand nor endure; to point and make Mouths at him to his Face, and set him up as the Finger-butt of their Scorn and Derisson! For certainly if there be Sins that can raise a Cry loud enough to reach Heaven, this, as a great Author of our own hath expressed it, will be so far from whispering there, that it will give an Alarm to the Vengeance of Heaven, whose Instictions like Stones tumbling from the Tops of Towers, will by so much the more fatally crush those they light on, by how much the longer they

are failing upon them. And therefore Men thus to delly with their own Fate, to venture to be durated that they may be thought to be witty, and expose themselves to endless Wailing and Woe only to role a present Fit of Laughter, is doubtless a las more deperate Attempt than it would be to play at the Mouths of Cannons while they are spitting Fire, or to lay hold on a Thunderbolt as

it comes roaring down from the Clouds.

But suppose there were neither Evil nor Danger in this impious Practice, yet for Men to conclude there is no God because they have the Confidence to storm and despise him, is altogether as ridicaious as their despising him is impious. For there is nothing in Nature so real or scrious but may be drolled and rallied on; if a Man will set his Wits at work he may break sefts upon Pain, and entertain his Company with comical Representations of the Groans and Agonies of dying; but it would be a Jest indeed should he droll himself into a Belief that there are no such Things as Pain or Death; but alas, Things are not to be altered by Laughing at them, and how merry soever we may make ourselves with the Belief and Notion of a Deity, we shall one Day sind in earnest that he is not to be jested out of his Being.

VI. Another Cause of Atheism is taking up Religion or Opinions in Religion without Examination. The Generality of Men do embrace their Religion as a Part of their Fate, as the Temper of their Clime, or the Entail of their Ancesters; and the Reason why they are Christians, is, because Christianity had the Luck to bespeak them first, and by its timely Interposure to preposes and fore-

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fal them. So that in all probability had Makometism plied them first, they would have had as much Faith for the Alchoran as they have now for the Bible. Now when Men thus take up their Religion they know not why, their Minds must needs be left naked and defenceless to all the Temptations of Atheism. For when a Man can render no reason for his Religion, his Faith hath nothing but blind *Prejudice* to support it; and it is with his Will that he believes, and not with his Underfanding; fo that he may chuse whether he will believe or no, because he hath no Evidence to determine his Understanding. And how unstable and insecure must his Faith needs be, when it hath no other Foundation but a fickle and inconstant Will; when it lies at the mercy of his Humour and Inclinations, and it is in his power to determine his Affent to that fide of the Question which is most for his Interest? For now his Faith being determined by his Will, and his Will by his Interest, whenever he thinks it his Interest that there should be no God, to be fure he will be ready enough to believe that there is none; and confequently as foon as he grows wicked enough to need Atheism for a Refuge from his Conscience, he will betake himself thither in his own defence, and endeavour by an obstinate Disbelief of God's Being, to skelter himself from the *Dread* of his *Power*. Thus when Men's Belief is not grounded upon Reason and Evidence, but stands tottering on the fickle Foundation of their Wills, it is liable to be blown down by every blast of Temptation. And hence I doubt not in a great measure proceeds the Irreligion of the Age we live in; for if you furvey the prefent

fent Sticklers for Atheism, you will find they chiefly confift of the hair-brained and uncatechifed. Youths of the Town, who never troubled themsclves to understand the first Principles of Religion, nor to consider the Dependance and Connexion of its Doctrines, and know nothing at all either of the admirable Contexture of the Parts of it, or of the Reason and Evidence of the Whole. For alas, their Study hath been employed another way, viz. in courtly Forms of Speech and Punctilio's of Action, in fashionable Garbs, and Oaths, and artificial Luxuries, in conning of fine Jests and Modes of Address, and retailing Fragments of Wit from Plays and Romances; but as for the feverer and more useful Studies, they bequeath them to the dull Men of Scnse and Reason.

Such as these for the most part are the Sages that droll upon Religion, and make Jests upon the Scripture; and what wonder is it that fuch as thefe turn Infidels, who are never able to render any Reason of their Faith? For how weak soever the Arguments of Infidelity are, it is a hard cafe if it cannot baffle that Faith which hath no Reason on its fide to guard and defend it; especially when they are feconded with a Man's Lusts and Inclinations, as to be fure the Arguments of Infidelity will a'ways be. For when a Man hath no Reason for his Paith, but a great many Lusts against it, the fundraft thems of Probability will fuffice to make him an Infidel. But what an horrible Neglect is it for Men that have Reason to distinguish between Truth and Fallhood, to take no care to inquire into the Truth and Evidence of their Religion in

which their greatest Interest is involved; but to

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wink hard and believe at a venture they know not why nor what? What is this but to cast Lots for their Souls, and throw Cross or Pile for their eternal Salvation? They refolve, they fay, to adhere to the Religion of their Ancestors, but whether that be true or false they never inquire; so that if it be true, they may thank their Stars for it, but if it be false, they have the worse Luck. Thus they wholly commit themselves to the Conduct of Chance to be conducted to Heaven or Hell, as it babbens; and as if those distant Fates were indifferent to them, they concern not themselves to inquire whether the way they are in be the Broad or the Narrow, the Right or the Wrong, but even leave the Event to determine it. And can any thing in the World be more wild or extravagant, than for Men who are so folicitous about their finaller Concerns, who will not purchase an Acre of Land without examining the Deeds and Evidences by which the Right to it is Conveyed, thus to take up their Religion upon Trust, and stake their everlasting Fate upon such a desperate Venture? But then for Men to take occasion to despise and reject Religion from their own sottists Neglect to inquire into the Truth of it, is such an height of Extravagance as no Bedlam can parallel; it would be as reasonable for a Man to put out his Eyes, and then refolve not to believe there is a Sun in the Firmament, because he doth not see it, or to flop up his Ears, and then peremptorily deny the Being of Sounds, because he does not bear them; for Men thus to graft Infidelity upon Ignorance, is only to heap one Extravagance on another; if they understand not the Evidence of Religion, the more Shame it is for them, but methinks it might very well become them to be modest and teachable till they do; and in the mean while to take care to inform themselves better; but then immediately to leap out of Ignorance into Atheism, is first to play the Fool, and then run stark mad upon it.

VII. Another cause of Atheism is Men's meafuring the Truth or Fallhood of Religion by the Prastice of such as make the loudest Pretence to it. When a Man is unwilling to undergo the trouble of fatisfying his own Reason of the Truth of his Religion, his usual Method is to inquire what other Men think of it, who by the zealous Profesfion which they make, may be supposed to understand it better than bimself; but because Men's Thoughts are fecret and invisible, and do not always correspond with their Words and Professions; therefore to fatisfy himself what other Men think of Religion, he concludes the fafest way is to judge by what they do, and not by what they profels; and so far indeed he is in the right. For to be fure Men's Actions are a much more certain Index of their Thoughts than their Words; and therefore when he fees those who profess Religion all as if they did not believe it, and observes how their Lords do run a tilt at their Practice, and how broadly their Lives give the Lye to their Professions, he presently concludes that whatever they pretend they are Infidels in their Hearts; and being once periuaded that those whom he thinks do best und r, and Religion do not believe it, he thence immediately concludes that they find no reason to believe it, and only put on the Profession of it as an Angelical Vizor, being minded to play the Devils

Devils in it with more Credit and Security. And by this popular Way of Reasoning they conclude Religion to be nothing but a politick Device and Engine which wife Men have contrived to beguile and manage the simple; and that whatsoever is pretended for it, it is a mere Juggling-box which Knaves play Tricks with to delude and cozen Fools. And of this Way of Men's reasoning themselves into Atheim, the Age we live in is full of woful Instances; for now-a-days to scorn and despite Religion is no longer the Prerogative of Wits and Virtuosos, but the infection is spread and propagated into Shops and Stalls, and the Rabble are become Professor Stheism. Now whence should this proceed? alas, it is not to be supposed that such Persons as these should ever be able to Philosophize themselves into Infidelity, and turn Arheists either upon Aristotle's or Epicurus's Hypotheses; no, no, their Argument lies nearer bome, and more open to their Capacities: They have seen a World of vile Tricks played in our Religious Carnivals and Masquerades; some making their Religion a Sanctuary for their Treasons and Rebellions; others gilding over their Faction and Sedition with a specious Pretence of Zeal for God's Glory: Some profecuting their own Revenge and Ambition under the Enfigns of pure Worship, and true Protestant Religion; others commuting for their Excesses of Riot, with a clamorous Zeal for December and Order; and others picking Peckets with one Hand while they have been lifting up the other to Heaven in Devotion; the Sight of which hath tempted the rude and unthinking Vulgar to look upon Religion as a mere Castle in the Air, that hath no FounFoundation but in the *Inventions* of Knaves, and in the *Faith* of Fools.

Now though there is no doubt to be made but that these vile Hypocrites who have laid this Stumbling block in Men's way, shall one Day dearly answer for the Ruin of those whom it hath occafioned to fall, and for thus exposing the Credit and Reputation of Religion to the Misprisions of those that do not understand it; yet it is a most inexcusable Piece of Folly for Men thus to infer atheistical Conclusions from the ill Example of hypocritical Professors. For in the first Place, to conclude a Man an Infidel because his Actions run counter to the Faith he pretends to, is very rash and fallacious. For do we not see Men very often act against their Consciences, and fly in the Face of their own Convictions? why may we not then as fairly suppose those wicked Actions we argue from to be the Effects of an obstinate Will as of an Infidel Judgment? but suppose it were true that those Men were all Infidels that do thus act against their Faith, doth it therefore follow that you must turn Infidel too? If it be so unsafe and so unworthy of a Man to carry his Brains in other Men's Heads, what a Shame is it to carry them in other Men's Heels, and to fuffer his Faith to be led by the Track of their Examples through all the wild Mazes of Irreligion and Atheism?

But you will fay, by these Men's Examples you plainly see what a Mystery of Iniquity there is in religious Pretences; and what then? must Religion be a Cheat, because bad Men play Tricks with it, and make it a Chak for their Knavery? if so, then the best Things in the World are liable to Suspi-

picion;

cion; because there is nothing so good but what is capable of being prosituted to very ill Purposes. I consess when we see so many Cheats acted under the Majque of Religion, we have just Reason to call it to a more severe Examination, and to enquire more narrowly into the Proofs and Evidences upon which it is founded; but presently to reject Religion because Knaves and Hypocrites make bold to disguise themselves in it, is every whit as absurd and ridiculous as if Men should deny that there is any such Virtue as Chastity in the World, because there are common Prositutes that pretend to it.

VIII. Another Cause of Atheism is Divisions and Schisms formed out of little Opinions in Religion. For it is natural to Men to place a great Part of their Religion in those Opinions, for whose fake they divide and feparate from each other; fo that if hereafter they happen to be diffatified with those Opinions of which they are excessively fond at the present, they will be under a great Temptation to suspect Religion infelf, as it that were as ill grounded as those little Opinions which they laid so great a Strefs on, and so after they have run through several Setts of Opinions, and in fine have discovered them to be all Delusions, they are ready to conclude Religion itself to be nothing but a System of Lies and Impostures. For as weak Heads when they perceive the Battlements shake are apt to suspect the Foundations, so weak Understandings will be prone to surpest even the Fundamentals of Religion, when once they perceive those darling Notions totter which they have confidently prefumed to fuperfirues thereupon.

And

And upon this Account I make no doubt but that the Irreligion of this Age is very much to be attributed to the Sects and Divisions of it. For how many woful Examples have we of Perfons who had once a great Zeal and Satisfaction in Religion, that upon their causeles Separation from the Church's Communion, have run from Sect to Sect, and from one extravagant Opinion to another, till at last being convinced of the Cheats and Impostures of them all, they have totally difcarded Religion itself, and made their last Refort into Atheism. And as separating into Parties upon little Differences in Religion exposes the Separatifts themselves to great Temptations to A-theisin, so it doth those also who are indifferent on both Sides, and stand engaged on neither Part of the Separation. For whilft these Men behold the State of Religion thus miferably broken and divided, and the Professors of it crumbled into so many SeEts and Parties, and each Party spitting Fire and Damnation at his Adversary, so that if all say true, or indeed any two of them in five bundred Sects which there are in the World, (and for all I know there may be five thousand) it is five hundred to one but that every one is damned, because every one damns all but itself, and itself is damned by four hundred and ninety nine; fo that 'tis a mighty Chance if in so great a Volley of Anathema's which every one hath levelled at it, any one escape: When, I say, unengaged Persons that are not able to diftinguish between the diffuiable Opinions that constitute these Sects, and the Necessaries and Essentials of Religion, shall reflect upon this tumult and confusion of Faiths, they will be apt

will be apt to conclude without farther Enquiry, that Religion itself is nothing but an infinite Maze of disputable Opinions, wherein Men wander about in the dark, and juftle and rencounter one another without any certain Clew on either fide to guide and direct their Enquiries; under which misapprehension they will either damn all Religion for a Cheat, or hover about in eternal Uncertainty, not knowing where in fo great a Confusion of Religions to fix and fettle their Faith: And hereunto I doubt not is to be attributed a great part of the Irreligion of this Age. For while some Men by running themselves out of Breath in pursuit of those Ignes fatui or New-Lights, that have broken and divided our Communion, have at length quite tired out their Zeal and religious Pretences, and fo are at length lain down in the Mire of Irreligion and open Profaneness; others by looking on and beholding the wild Divisions which these new Lights have made, have been tempted to run away from Religion itself, as if that were only a Labyrinth of uncertain Opinions contrived on purpose to distract and bewilder Men's Brains.

Now though the Authors of these Divisions, whosoever they are, are doubtless highly accountable to God for all that Irreligion which attends them, yet for Men from hence to draw Atheistical Conclusions, is much more imputable to the Perverseness of their Wills than to the Weakness of their Understandings.

For in the first Place, what if you have discovered some Opinions in Religion to be false and erroneous, of the Truth of which you were once very consident; doth it therefore follow, that Vol. II.

there is nothing certain in Religion? If so, you may as well conclude that there is nothing certain in the Mathematicks neither, fince some Men have been as confident of the Truth of false Axioms in Geometry as ever you could be of false Propositions in Religion. That you were once over-confident in a diffutable Matter was your own Fault and Folly, but must it therefore follow that Religion is a Cheat, because you have been rash and inconfiderate? And what tho' you once laid the great firess of your Religion upon an Opinion which you now discern is erroneus, must Religion needs suffer for your mistake, and be branded for an Impostor because you took that for Religion which was not? For there are a thousand Propositions about Religion, which have been zealously difputed for and against, which have torn Men into Sects, and been the Religion of the separate Communions they have formed and denominated, that yet are very remote Superstructures on the true Foundations of Religion, and may be true or false, believed or disbelieved without any damage to Religion. And therefore before you suspect the Truth of Religion itself, upon your discovering the Falskood of any particular Opinion, you ought in all reason to consider whether that Opinion be so effential to Religion as that it cannot subsist without it; for if it be not, 'tis the most unreafonable thing in the World, to infer a suspicion of the Truth of Religion from the Faishood of Propositions that have little or no Dependence on it, and to reject the Gold and the precious Stones for the fake of the Wood, and Hay, and Stubble that have been superstructed upon them. And then, 2. What

2. What can be more abfurd than for Men to reject Religion because Men's Opinions about it have been so divided? For if you survey the several Divisions of Christians, you will find they generally concur in all the necessary and essential Doctrines of Religion, and that the Opinions wherein they divide are for the most part such unnecessary Speculations, as that it is almost indifferent to Religion whether they be true or falle: And with what reason can we suspect the Truth of necessary Doctrines wherein all are agreed, because there are Difagreements in unnecessary ones? Because there are some Propositions in the Mathematicks, about which the Opinions of the Mathematicians are divided, shall we therefore suspect the Truth of all these wherein they are agreed? For if their Difagreement be an Argument of the Falfhood of the former, why should not then their Agreement be as good an Argument of the Truth of the latter? But how much foever Men's Opinions about Religion may be divided, all that can be thence inferred is, that some Men are mistaken; and while fome Men judge of Religion by their Paffions and Interests, and others by the Prejudices of their Education, it is impossible it should be otherwise. But for Men in the midst of such apparent Causes of Difference, to resolve to be of no Religion till all are a greed in one, is just as wife, and as rational as if they should determine not to go to Dinner till all the Clocks in Town ftrike Eleven together.

IX. And lastly, Another great Cause of Atheism is the proface and careless Neglect of God's Publick Wership. For Men of Secular lives, whose

Minds are always engaged in this eternal hurry of worldly Affairs, are too prone to forget God, and all their Concerns in Religion and another World; and even their conversing so much with these senfitive Things which are always before them, and are continually crowding in upon their Thoughts, doth naturally indispose them to exercise their Faculties about divine and spiritual Objects, and render their Minds οπίσθω βαρείς, unfit and unable to ascend to the Contemplation of God. And therefore God hath appointed the flated Times of Publick Wership, on purpose to withdraw Men from their fecular Pursuits, that so they may be at leisure to retire into themselves, to recollect their scattered Thoughts, and awake their Minds to a fenfe of Piety and Religion; which can by no way so effectually be performed as by the Solemnities of Publick Worship, wherein our remembrance of God is not only refreshed, and our Piety to him excited and directed by the publick Instructions, but our natural Sense of Religion is also actuated and intended by the mutual Concurrence and Example of each other's Devotion. Thus after our Religion hath been flackened by our worldly Cares and Delights, it is daily wound up again by the Returns of our Publick Worship, and so the sense of God is still kept alive in our Minds. Men therefore turn their Backs upon the Publick Worship, and devote the boly Seasons of it to their fecular Bufiness or Pleasures, it is not to be wondered at that their fense of a divine Power, which they feldom or never think of, should by degrees decay and wear off, and that that being extinguished they should fink into Irreligion and Atheism. For

For when once Men have worn out their Sense of a Deity, and as the Confeduence of that are broke loose from all the Ties and Obligations of Conscience, they can have no other Principle but Atheism to warrant their Actions; and when once they have abandoned all Sense and Remembrance of God, so that he is not in all their Thoughts, they are in a fair forwardness to Infidelity. For the as yet they do not actually difbelieve his Existence, fo neither do they actually believe it; for how should they actually believe that which they have no Sense or Thought of; so that in this insensible State their Faith is concerned neither one way nor tother, nor are they at all folicitous whether there be a God or no. Thus from their profane Neglect of God's Worthip, Men naturally flide into an habitual Sent lefnefs and Incogitancy of him, and from thence to not believing; and from thence to disbelieving him is an easy and almost necessary Transition.

Of the Truth of which the Age we live in will furnish us with too many forrowful Instances. For as this Nation which hath been always remarked for a grave, ferious and religious Genius, was never so generally tainted with Atheism as now; so neither was it ever chargeable with such a general Neglect of the Publick Worship of God, which for several Ages after the Reformation, was duly frequented, and devoutly celebrated, till by the Prevalence of our restless Sects and Factions, the Discipline of the Church was gradually weakned, and at last totally destroyed; in the happy Days before which the Families of each Parish went band-in-band together to the House of God, and

with one Heart and Voice celebrated his Praise and Worthip; and to abfent one's felf ordinarily from the Publick Assemblies, was hardly consistent with the Reputation of being a Christian. By which means their natural Sanse and Dread of the divine Power, being continually awakened and revived, they were not only secured by it from all Atheistical Impressions, but also animated and excited to a pious and fober Conversation. But the Spirit of Schism prevailing against the Power and Discipline of the Church, till it had utterly disabled it from restraining the Wantonness of that crooked and percerfe Generation; some incorporated themfelves into separate Communions, and others, under Pretence of so doing, withdrew from the Publick Affemblies to the common Resorts of Lands, Drunkenness and Debauchery: and which the Masters took the Liberty of Confeience to go to Conventicles, the Servants pretending to be of a different Persuasion assumed the Liberty of Will to go to Taverns and Ale-houses; insomuch that it grew a common Observation, that there have been more young Feople debauched on the Lord's Day than all the Week after, whilst under pretence of joining with a different Communion, they have taken occasion to withdraw themselves from the inspection of their Parents and Masters. And till once our Schisins and Divisions are cured, it will be impossible to prevent this ill Practice, unless we will be so unjust as to deny that Liberty of Canfrence to our Scients which with fo much Chammur and Confidence we demand of our Governors. And thus by degrees Profaneness hath ininvated itself under the Covert of Schism, and Liberty Libsrty of Confcience became a common Sanctuary, for the licentious Neglett and Contempt of God's Worship, till at last it grew so common and fashionable, that it aimo's reased to be scandalous. Yea, fo far at length bach this impious Humour prevailed, that to go to Church, and be devout, is among too many Men grown a Note of Diffgrace, and the Charaster of a Prieft-ridden Fool; and a Man is hardly looked upon as fit for genteel Conversation, that knows any other use of a Holy-day, but only to be at leifure to lie a bid, or to Game or Drink and Debauch; by which Neglost and Contempt of the Worship of God, that natural Sense of him which should have been quickened and charified by it, hath been gradually worn out of Men's Minds; the Confequence of which is, all that Atheism and Infidelity that overspreads this present Age. For when once Men have renounced the Worship of God, and in Consequence are abandoned of their natural Sense of his Majesty, they are upon the Brink of Atheism, into which their own sile Lusts, whose Interest it is that there should be no God, will eafily precipitate them. But alas! how ridiculous as well as impious is it for Men to take occasion from their own Neglect of God's Worship, to renounce the Belief of his Being! what is this but to tail one folly to another, and to fecond Extravagance with Madnefs? It would make one amazed to think that ever real nable Beings should be so befored, and to live in a World over which an Almighty Being profides, who fees all their Actions, and in whole Hands all Events are which concern them, and even the everla/ling Fate of their Souls; and yet take no more notice

of him, pay no more Respect or Veneration to him, than if he were the meerest Trisse or most insignificant Cypher in the whole Creation. But sure when Men have been guilty of such a black and horrid Impiety, one would think their wisest Course for the time to come should be to repent of it, and to endeavour to compensate for their past Profaneness by the strictness and sincerity of their suture Devotion. But for Men to proceed from neglecting God's Worship to denying his Being, is to do worse because they have done ill, and thereby to instant the provocation, as if they were resolved to render their Condition desperate, because they have been so fool-hardy as to render it dangerous.

And thus I have given a short Account of the common Causes of Atheism, which you see are all derived from Men's Wils and not from their Reason. For this I do most firmly believe, that the Arguments of God's Existence are so plain and convincing, that no Man ever was or can be an Atheist without some inexcusable Fault in his

Will.

SECT. II.

Of the inexcusable Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism.

HE next thing I proposed was to endeavour to consist and establish this great Principle of Religion, viz. the Belief of a God, by representing

fenting the great Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism. In discoursing which I shall meddle no more than needs must wish the Proofs and Arguments of a Deity, because as I have shewed before, it is not for want of Arguments that Men turn Atheifts, but for want of Confideration and an bonest Will; and that the Biass that carries them towards Infidelity is not in their Understandings, but in their Wills and Affections; that 'tis only their Partiality to their Lusts, that inclines them to Atheism; and that the Reason why they are so ready to believe that there is no God, is, because they wish in their Hearts that there were none. To establish the Belief of a God therefore, I shall endeavour to represent the Folly and Unreasonableness of Men's being partial on the side of Atheism, supposing it were disputable whether there be a God or no: And this will evidently appear in the following Particulars.

I. The Atheist concludes against the Dignity of human Nature, and renders it not only mean but ridiculous.

II. He concludes against the very Being and Well-being of human Society.

III. He concludes against that which is the

main Support and Comfort of human Life.

IV. He concludes for that side of the Question which is infinitely the most unsafe and hazardous.

V. He concludes for the unsafest side of the Question upon the highest Uncertainties.

VI. He plainly contradicts bimfelt in his Con-

clusion.

I. The

I. The Atheist concludes against the Dignity of buman Nature, and thereby renders it not only mean but ridiculous. For the chief Worth and Dignity of human Nature confifts in its Relation to God, without whom its noblest and most excellent Faculties are in a great measure useles and insignificant; for if there be no God, the Objects of our five Senses are the jole Entertainment of our Understanding and Will, and we have no other use of these mighty Faculties, which (if there were any fuch thing as an infinite Truth and Gwdness are naturally capable of enjoying them) but only to confult and choose the Gratifications of our Sense, and the Pleasures of this perishing Body. For excepting God there is no fuch thing in Nature as a spiritual Enjoyment, no Good to be found, but what is prepared to entertain the boundless Liquorishness of our carnal Appetites; and had we none but fuch as these to consult for, our Reafon, which is the Crown and Glory of our Natures, would have nothing elie to do but to cater for our Flesh, and we should have an Understanding and Will to no other Purpose, but to enable us to play the Brutes with more Skill and Sagacity. And indeed, fetting God afide, we are fo far from havingthe Advantage of Brutes by being rational, that we are rather so much the more wretched and defpicable, than they. For as for the Happiness of this Life, which only consists of fenfual Good, the Senses and Appetites we have in common with the Beafts that perish are sufficient for the Enjoyment of it; and with these we might relish it as well without our Reason as with it; we might eat and drink and fleep, and enjoy all the Pleasures of

of a Brute with as much Gust and Savour as we do now with our Reason. For if we were Brutes we should do as Brutes do; we should sceary ourselves no longer with vain Pursuits, nor vex ourselves with fruitless Expectations, nor torment ourselves with the Fears of a Disappointment, but even rake our Pleafures when our Appetites croved them, and they freely offered themselves to our Enjoyment. And though our Reafer doth sometimes cook the Enjoyments of our Sene, and give them a higher Adillo and Luxury, yet this Advantage is very much out-weighed by the many Regrets, and Remories, and flinging Reflections it intermingles with our Pleasures; so that had we only the Faculties of Brutes, I am verily persuaded we should more incerely enjoy the Happiness of the brutal Nature; but to be fure we should bear our Miseries with much more Ease and Chearfulnefs. For supposing there is no God, our Reason can afford us no tolid Support under any Calamity; the main Arguments of Comfort, as i shall shew by and by, being derived from the Confideration of Ged and his Providence; which being taken away, I doubt not but we should bear our Miseries without our Reason much better than with it. For then we should neither be terrified at the Appreach of them, nor tormented with Despair under them; then we should neither multiply them with false Opinions, nor enrage them with bitter Reflections on the Causes of them; but whenever they happened, bear them as Beafts do, without any other Pain or Uneafiness than what they necessarily impressed on our Senses, which would render them a thousand times more tolerable to

us, than all our Arguments can do, supposing we have no God nor Providence to argue from.

So that were that true which the Atheist concludes for, viz. That there is no God, it would follow that Reason in a Man serves to no other Purpose, but to render him more wretched and despicable. If there be a God indeed, our rational Faculties are of excellent Use; as having an Object commensurate to their widest Capacities, and every way fit and worthy to employ and exercise them; an infinite Truth for our Understanding to dive into, and an infinite Good for our Wills and Affections to pursue and embrace. But if there be nothing to be enjoyed by us but what is carnal and fenfual, our Reason is so far from being our Ornament and Perfection, that it is the

Plague and Difgrace of our Natures.

For for any Nature to have more Faculties than what are necessary to its Happiness, is monstrous; and therefore had we nothing to enjoy but the Happiness of Brutes, it would be a Deformity to our Natures to have the Faculties of Angels; because these Faculties would be in vain, there being no adequate Object in the Nature of Things to employ and entertain them. So that were the Doctrine of the Atheist true, it would cashier our Reason for a vain and useless Faculty; a thing that ferves our Nature to little other Purpose, but only to vex and disquiet it. And what Man that hath any Regard or Reverence for himself, would ever be fond of a Belief that thus finks and depreciates him, and lays the Glory of his Nature in the Duft? For if it be true that there is no God, it is as true that Man is a most despicable Creature,

that

that his Reason, upon which he so much values himself, is a frivolous and impertinent Faculty; a Faculty that can ferve him to no higher Purpose than only to be a Cook and a Taylor to his Body, to fludy Sauces and Falkions for it; and that while it ferves him in this, differves him in a thousand other Instances; in mingling his Pleasures with Gall and Wormwood, with Fears and Impatiencies, Anxieties and Remorfes, and in aggravating and putting Stings into his Griefs and Calamities. So that when all is done, the only thing that makes it worth the while for a Man to be reasonable, is, that there is a Being of infinite Perfection to be known, and loved, and imitated, and adored by him; and to deny the Existence of this blessed Being, is infinitely to undervalue ourselves, and to eclipse the Glory and Dignity of our Natures. So that by being partial to Atheism we are partial to our own Shame and Disgrace, and industriously confult the Reproach and Infamy of human Nature; for the Devil himself cannot affix a blacker Scandal on our Reason than what is implied in this Affertion, That there is no God.

And as it lays the greatest Reproach upon our Nature, so it also renders us the most ridiculous of all Beings. For there are certain Affections interwoven with human Nature, which if there be no God are shamefully ridiculous; such as the Dread of invisible Powers, the Sense of Good and Evil, and the anxious Expectation of a Judgment to come; all which are so deeply inlaid in our Beings, as that with all our Arts and Reasoning we cannot totally erase them. And even the Atheists themselves, who have tried all possible Ways of

extinguishing them, have found by Experience that the unnost they can do is, to damp and stupify them at present; but that in despight of them they will revive and awake again when Death or Danger approaches them. Now how ridiculous are these Affections in human Natures, if there be no fuch Being as a God? For upon this Suppofal we have Passions that have no Objects in the Nature of Things, that have nothing in the World to move and affect them, but wild Chimeras, flying Dragons, and Castles in the Air; and whereas all other Beings have real Objects in Nature corresponding to their several Instincts and Affections (for so the Hare hath a natural Dread of a Dog, the Sheep of a Wolf, the Mice of a Cat, the Toad of a Spider, all the Objects of which Dread have a real Existence) poor filly Man, supposing there is no God, naturally trembles at an invisible Nothing, and is horribly afraid of the Shadow of an Imagination. So that if the Atheist's Opinion were true, the Ape that looks pale at the Sight of a Snail, and flies as if he feared left that flow Creature should overtake and devour him, would be a great deal less ridiculous than timorcus Man, whose Nature is thus hagged with frightful Imaginations of invifible Powers and a Judgment to come.

And what Man that hath any Reverence for the human Nature within him, would ever suffer himself to be bribed for an Opinion that doth not only undervalue but deride and ridicule it? Should you hear yourielf branded with a comemptible Character, or realted among Apes or any fuch ridiculous Animals, you would doubtless be so far from courting the Author of it, that you would re-Sent

fent it as a great Affront, and think yourselves obliged in honour to return the Provocation; and yet for the sake of a few base Luss, which are the Shame and Scandal of your Natures, you espouse the Cause of Atheism, though it derides and affronts you to your Face, and stains the Glory of your Natures with the most contemptible and ridiculous Character in the World.

II. The Atheist concludes against the very Being and Well-being of human Society. For the Soul that penetrates through all human Society, and compacts and unites it in a regular Body, is Religion, or the Sense and Acknowledgment of a Divine Power, without which all the Parts of the Corporation of Mankind, like the Members of a dead Body, must necessarily distand and sty abroad into Atoms. For a formed Society, which is an united Multitude, consists in the Harmony and Consent of its Members mutually united by Laws and Agreements, and disposed into a Regular Subordination to one another, neither of which can any human Society long continue without the Belief and Acknowledgment of a God.

For without this, in the first Place, it is impossible that the Parts of any Society should continue united by Laws and Agreement. For it is from the Belief of a God, that all the Obligations of Conscience are derived; so that take that away and these must dissolve; and when the Obligations of Conscience are dissolved, there is nothing but Men's temporal Interests can oblige them to conform to those Laws and mutual Agreements, by which they are united to one another. And if it be their Interest only that obliges them to be just

and faithful to their mutual Agreements, they will be equally obliged to be unjust and unfaithful, whenever it is their Interest to be so. So that this Principle, which only obliges them to be honest while it is for their Advantage, will as effectually oblige them to be Knaves whenever the Case is altered; and Things being reduced to this Issue, there remains no Foundation of Trust and mutual Confidence among Men. For what can any Man's Promise fignify, if he be under no Obligation but Interest? To be fure if it be for his Interest he will do what he fays without any Promise; but if it be not, what Promise can oblige him? You will fay it is his Interest to keep his Word, because otherwise he will forfeit his Reputation for the future? But pray what Reputation can a Man have to forfeit, that owns no other Law or Obligation but his Interest? Or who will ever presume upon that Man's Word and Engagement, whose avowed Principles it is to be honest no longer than he can gain by it? Thus Atheism you see, resolves all our Obligations into our worldly Interest, which is so fickle and mutable a Principle, so dependent upon Chance and the Inconstancies of Fortune, that there is no hold to be taken of those that are governed by it. For that which is their Interest to Day may be their Disadvantage To-morrow, and if it should so happen, they must steer a contrary Course, or else act contrary to their leading Principle. So that for Men to trust each other upon this fickle Principle, is all one as to rely upon the Constancy of a Weather-cock, which every contrary Wind turns to a contrary Position. And Things being once reduced to this Issue, that Men

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can place no Trust or Considence in one another, their Society will soon become their greatest Plague and Vexation. For every Man will be forced to stand upon his Guard against every Man, and keep himself reserved and retired within himself, till at last, out of mutual Distrust and Jealousy of one another, they are forced to withdrew their Society, and to live apart, in separate Dens, for sear of being intrapt and devoured by each other.

And as Atheism cuts in sunder those Ligaments of mutual Truft and Agreement, by which the Parts of human Society are united; fo it also diffolves that regular Subordination that is between them. Plutarch observes in his Treatise against Colot, Πόλις ἄν μοι δοκει μάλλον εδάφες χώρι, η ωοληεία της σερί θεων δόξης αναιρεθείσης σανηά σασι, συσασιν λαβείν, η λαβεσα τηρησαι, i.e. It feems to be more possible for a City to stand without Ground, than for a Common-wealth to subfift and continue without the Belief of a God; which is indeed the only firm Foundation whereupon all Government and Society depends. For if there be no God, what should oblige any to even any Superier, or pay any Submission? And if his Interest be his only Obligation to his Superiers, whenever he can mend his Fortune by rebelling against them, that very fame Interest, which at present restrains him from it, will with equal Force invite him to it; nor will it fignify any thing that we are obliged to the contrary by Oaths of Fidelity and Allegiance: For if it be our Interest to be faithful to the Government, our own Prudence and Diferetion will oblige us to it without such Oaths as well as with them; but if it be not our In-

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terest, and this be the only Principle that obliges us, no Oath or Engagement can hold us. So that in this State of Things all the Security that Governours can have of their Subjects, is, that they will not rebel when they are not able; but as foon as they think it fafe, to be fure they will think it lesseful; which being once admitted, will undermine the very Foundation of Government, and utterly diffolve that regular Subordination by which human Society is *Supported*. Whereas admitting that the Laws of our *Prince* are bound upon us by the Authority of our Sovereign Lord, who can render us eternally happy or miserable, we are obliged to obey him by all that we can hope or fear, and have all the Engagements to Loyalty that the Reflections on a kappy or miserable Eternity can lay upon us. What a prodigious Piece of Folly is it therefore for Men to embrace Athei/m as their Interest, which doth thus directly tend to deprive us of all the Comforts of Society, by involving us in eternal Confusions and Disorders? For if once we take away mutual Trust, and Government from the World, both which have a necessary Dependence on the Belief of a God, we break all the Harmony of human Society, and convert it into a Common-wealth of Canibals. And what Man in his Wits could ever be found of an Opinion that proclaims open War with Mankind, and is pregnant with Confequents so fatal and destructive to the World? Can we think it more advantageous to us that Atheisin should be true, than that human Society should be upheld and perpetuated? or are the Pleasures we reap from the Lusts which incline us to Atheism, comparably so valuable as the Benefits

nefits which accrue to us from being formed and united into regular Corporations? If not, how apparently do we engage against our own Interest, when we espouse the Cause of Irreligion?

III. The Atheist concludes against that which is the main Support and Comfort of human Life. For while we are in this World, our best and securest Condition is exposed to a World of sad and uncomfortable Accidents, which we have neither the Wisdom to foresee, nor the Power to prevent: So far are we from being felf-fufficient as to our worldly Happiness, that there are a thousand Causes upon which we depend for it, that are not in our Power to dispose of; and in such a State of Uncertainty, wherein we are continually bandied to and fro, and made the Game of inconstant Fortune, what Quiet or Security can we enjoy within ourselves without believing that there is a God at the Helm, that steadily over-rules all Events that concern us, and fteers and directs them by the invariable Compass of his own infinite Wisdom and Goodness. For confidering how poor and indigent our Nature is, how we are feign to feek abroad, and to go a begging from Door to Door for our Happiness; how we depend upon Chance, and are sccure of nothing we possess, or desire, or hope for; how prone we are to be alarmed with the Prospect of a fad Futurity, and to magnify distant Evils in our own Apprehensions; how apt we are to aggravate our Miseries by our Impatience and Despair, and to pill our Enjoyments by expecting more from them than their Natures will afford; confidering these Things, I say, which way can we turn ourselves without a God? or where can

we reftele our reftless Thoughts but in his Provid'nce? Verily, could I be tempted to believe that there is no God, I should look upon human Nature, in its prefent Circumstances, as the most forlers and abandoned Part of the Creation, and with that I had had the Luck to be of any other Species than that of rational Animal. For in the State I am I find myfelf liable to a thousand Dangers against which I have no Sanctuary, and under which I have no Support, if there be no God to govern the World; and having fuch a difmal Prospect of Things before me, and a busy Mind within me that will be continually working on and aggravating the Evils of it, what can I do with myself, or how can I enjoy myself without a God to rely on? Upon the Supposal that he is, and that he governs the World, I can eafily relieve myself under the most dismal Apprehensions; I can fairly conclude and fafely depend on it, that if I take care by my Submission to God's Will to make him my Friend, he will either prevent the Evils I apprehend, or fupport me under them, or convert them to my Good, either of which is fufficient to set my Heart at ease, and instate me in a quiet Enjoyment of mylelf. But now, by giving up the Belief of a God, I throw away all these Confiderations, and leave myself utterly destitute and fuppertless. For what solid Ground of Support can I have when I have no manner of Security either that the Evils I dread shall be prevented, or that I shall have a proportionable Strength to bear them, or that I shall ever reap any good or advantage from them? without which Confiderations every Evil that threatens or befals me is pure unmingled

unmingled Mifery, against which there is no Fence or Cordial in Reason or Philosophy. For suppose I thould agree with the ancient Moralists, that every ill Accident that befals me is fatal, as being the Effect of fome necessary Cause that is without my Power or Disposal, and therefore it is unreasonable for me to grieve at it; this will be so far from any way mollifying the Anguish of my Mind, that it will rather inrage and inflame it. For that my Calamity is fatal, so that it is not in my Power to avoid or remove it, is rather an Aggravation than a Diminution of it. Or suppose I should reason as the fame Moralists otherwhiles do, Why should I grieve at the Evils that befal me, when alas! my Grief will be fo far from leffening them that it will rather increase and multiply them, contribute new Venom to their Stings, and render them more pungent and doloreus? What a faint Cordial would it be to my optreffed Mind, to confider that my Griefs will but augment my Load? It is some Ease to a dejected Soul to vent its Griefs in Moans and Lamentations, which while she feeks to smother in a fullen Silence, like imprisoned Wind will breed a Cholick in her Bowels; and is it not a fad Thing that I must deny myself the enly Solace of a miserable Man for fear of augmenting my Misery? Again, suppose I should reason thus with the same Authors, that Afflictions are indifferent things, and in themselves neither good nor evil, but indifferently improveable into Mischiess or Benefits; this I confefs were a good Argument, supposing that the Afflictions came from a Good God, who can extract Good out of all Evils, and render the rankest Poiton Medicinal; but otherwise K 3 you

you will find it is but a cold Comfort to call your Misery by another Name: For if there be no God to temper our Evils, and to ordain and direct them to wife and good Ends, we shall find in the Issue they will prove themselves Evils to us by what fift Name soever we may call them. Again, and to name no more, Suppose I should reason thus, as these Masters of Morality do, that to bear Afflictions with an unconcerned Mind is brave, and manly, and generous; that it is an Argument of a great and beroick Mind, that hath raised itself above the Reach of Misfortunes; I readily confess fo it is, supposing a Man hath good Reason thus to bear his Afflictions, which is the Question in Debate; for then it is the Triumph of Reason over Passion, and an illustrious Instance of a well-fortified Mind; but if we have no Reason for it, all these glorious Words, Generous, Brave, &c. are nothing but empty Flash and mere Rodomontade. For for a Man to be unconcerned with Evils without Reason, is so far from being generous and brave, that it is an Argument of his brutal Stupidity and Foolbardiness. But yet supposing that there is no God, these are the main Arguments we have to fupport ourselves under any Calamity. But alas, fuch real Griefs of ours are not to be redreffed with petty Sayings and grave Sentences, which though they may look takingly at a Distance, will when we come to apply and experience them force us to pronounce as Job did of his Friends, miserable Comforters are ye all, and Physicians of no Vahue. So that were we left destitute of God and a Providence, and of all those bleffed Supports we derive from thence, we were of all Creatures the most

most miserable. For in this State of Things we are compassed about with Miseries and Missortunes, and which without God is our greatest Missortune, we have a Thing called Reason with n our Breast, which is very ingenious in giving Stings to our Miseries, and vexing us with cutting Reflections of them, but it is not able to qualify one Grief, or minister one Dram of folia Comfert to

But when we lift up our Eyes to God, there are fuch vaft and imumerable Comforts flowing down to us from the Confideration of his Nature and Providence, as are sufficient not only to allay our Sorrow, but to convert them into Yeys and Triumphs. For in him we behold not only an infinite Wildom that always knows what is best for us, but also an infinite Goodness that always wills what it knows to be fo, and an infinite Power that always does what it wills; and whilst we see and consider this, there is nothing in the World can happen amis to us; welcome Pain, welcome Pleasure, welcome Loss, welcome Gain, welcome Disgrace, welcome Honour; for if we have but God our Friend, we may fecurely depend upon it, that whatfoever befals us is best for us.

Who but a Madman therefore would ever efpouse the Cause of Atheism, or make it his Interest to exclude God out of the World? Indeed were he an envious, malicious, or tyrannical Being, that repined at the Happiness of his Creatures, and watched all Opportunities to plague or destroy them, it were but reasonable we should endeavour to quit our Minds of the Bellef of him; but to imagine it our Interest to believe there is no such K 4 Being

Being in the World as a Good God, that out of the immense Benignity of his Nature espouses our Interest, and takes care of our Happiness; that understands our Wants, and compassionates our Sufferings, and is able and willing to support and re-Teve us; that requires nothing of us but what is for our good, and will infinitely reward us for doing that which is best for ourselves; that connives at our Follies, and fittes our Infirmities, and upon our unseigned Repentance is ready to be reconciled to us, even when we wilfully and prefumptusufly provoke him; to imagine it, I say, our Interest to shake off the Belief of such a blessed Being as this, is the utmost beight of Folly and Madnefs. For it were doubtless a thousand times more tolerable for Men that the Sun should be pulled down from the Firmament, and all the Lights of Heaven extinguisked, than that the Belief of a God should be banified from the World, the abfence of which would over-spread Mankind with fuch a difmal Night of Horror and Defpair and Blackness and Darkness, as would render all wife and confidering Men weary of their Beings, and cause them to wish a thousand times over, as for the utmost Good they could devise for themselves, O that there were such a Being as a God at the Helm of the World, that so the Affairs of it might be fleered by an infinite Power, that is always directed by an infinite Wisdom, and always bioffed and inclined by an infinite Goodness? What then can be more brutish or irrational, than for the fake of a few base Lusts that are the Scandal of our Nature, the Bane of our Society, the Vexation of our Lives, and the Diffurbance of all our Happiness,

piness, to banish the *Belief* of a God from our Minds, which is the *Foundation* of our Hope, and the only *Support* we can rationally *depend* on.

IV. The Atheist concludes for that fide of the Question which is infinitely the most unsafe and bazardous. He who believes there is a God and acts accordingly, runs a very fmall and inconfiderable Venture, if in the Issue of Things he should chance to be mislaken; he only ventures the disfatisfying a few extravagant Lusts, the croffing some irregular Inclinations of his Nature, which if he had gratified would have vexed and tormented him, and entangled his Life with a thousand ill Circumstances; he only ventures some Prayers and some Tears, some Watchings and Strugglings and Contentions with himfelf, and perhaps fome Reproaches and Persecutions for Righteousness sake, in Exchange for which he hath commonly a kealthful, and a prosperous, an even, safe and contented Life, a quiet and a triumphant Conscience, and a joyous Expectation of a blisful Eteruity to come, which do outweigh all the Incommodities he ventures, all the Pains he undergoes, and all the Pleafures of which he debars himself; and if in the Conclusion, when he refigns up his Breath, it appears that there is neither God nor Heaven nor Hell, his Condition will be altogether as good, as the Atheift's, with whom he will fleep quietly, in the fame Dust, under the same everlasting Insensibility.

But on the contrary, the Atheist, by believing that there is no God, and acting accordingly, runs the most desperate Hazard in the World. For besides that he throws away the main Support and Comfort of his Life, and lays himself open to all

Contingencies, and religns up the Satisfaction of a good Conscience together with the Hope of a bleffed Futurity, and all the innumerable Joys it abounds with; befides all which, I fay, he ventures to be eternally wretched and miserable in the World to come, and exposes himself naked and defenceless to the unquenchable Wrath of an everlasting God; in Exchange for all which he hath no other present Compensation, but the Pleasures of a riotous and tumultuary Life, which do always die away in the Enjoyment, and are generally dash'd and sophisticated with a thousand very sad and uncomfortable Circumstances. And then if when he concludes this present Scene of Life he should find himself mistaken in his Atheistical Confidence, and be unexpectedly fummoned to the Tribunal of that God, whose Being and Authority he hath fo peremptorily denied and affronted, and from thence be transmitted into a dismal Eternity, there to languish out an Everlasting Existence in remediless Woes and unpitied Lamentations; how would it aftenish and confound him to find his confident Infidelity baffled by fuch a woful Experiment, when instead of being a-sleep in a State of Silence and Infensibility, which was the Thing he depended on, he shall find himself wasted to a strange shoar, and there landed among Devils and miserable Spirits in a State of endless, easeles and remediles Calamity! How blank and forlorn will the Fool look to find himself thus fatally mistaken? and yet for all he knows this may be the Refult and Issue of Things. So that it is a very small Hazard vou see that good Men run, compared with that of the Atheift; for should they

they be mistaken, their Condition will be as good as bis at the winding up of the Bottom; but if they should not, it will be infinitely better.

It is storied of a certain Hermit, who being retired from the World, led a very fevere and mortified Life, that being one Day met by two Cardinals, who were riding by with a very pompous Equipage, was thus accosted by them, Father, why should you thus mortify and macerate your-felf by retiring from the Glories and Pleasures of this Life? Suppose now that after all your Religious Severities, there should be neither a God nor a future World to reward you, would it not be egregious Foliy in you thus to throw away present Enjoyments for future Nothings? To which the good Man prefently returned this Answer; But, Sirs, suppose there should be a God and a future World to punish you, would it not be egregious Folly in you, to run fuch a desperate Venture as you do of being everlastingly miserable, for the take of a few momentary Honours and Advancements? Upon which, as the Story faith, the Cardinals being convinced, went away very pensive. And herein doubtiess the honest Hermit was very much in the right. For were it a Moot-point whether there be a God or no, one would think in a Matter of fuch unspeakable Moment, that where the Hazard on each Side is so infinitely wrequal, there is no Man in his Wits but would choose the *safest* Side, and make that his Rule and Principle to live by. In this therefore the Atheist is justly chargeable with the most desperate Folly, that whereas at least he might be safe, if not eternally happy, by believing that there is a God.

God, and acting accordingly, he rather chuses to venture being eternally miserable, by believing there is none, and acting as if there were none. In short, this is the plain State of the Case, if I believe that God is, and act consonantly, I shall be safe if he be not, and eternally kappy if he be; whereas if I believe that he is not, I am sure to be miserable for ever if he be, and am only safe from being miserable for ever if he be not; and this being the Case, I leave any Man to judge which of the two is in Prudence more eligible, the Peradventure of being happy for ever, or of being miserable for ever, supposing both to be equally probable. But,

V. The Atheist concludes for the unsafest side of the Question upon the greatest Uncertainties in the World. One would think before a Man affented to a Conclusion, the Consequence of which, if he should be mistaken, will be for ever fatal to him, he should be so wife at least as to look before he leap, and fatisfy himfelf of the Grounds he concludes on, and not to give up his Affent upon every doubtful and uncertain Appearance. Now that Part of the Question which the Atheist assents to, is of fuch mighty Consequence, as that should it prove false he is lost for ever; and therefore one would think it concerned him to be very fure of bis Hand, and take care that his Affent be founded upon very firong and undeniable Evidence; instead of which he affents at a venture, and grounds his Being upon the most fandy Foundations.

1. He concludes for a pure Negative.

II. He concludes for it upon a bare Possibility.

III. He concludes for it against the best Evi-

dence that the contrary will admit.

I. He concludes for a pure Negative. All Men are agreed that it is a very bard thing to prove a Negative; but to prove a pure Negative is impossible, unless the Existence of the thing which it denies implies an express Contradiction. Tis true where a Thing vifibly exists so that we can perceive as well how it doth not exist, as how it doth, we may with as good Evidence deny as affirm; but as for pure Negatives, which deny the very Existence of fuch Things as may possibly exist, it is impossible to be certain of them without an infinite Underflanding. For before we can be fure that what is not in our Understanding is not in Nature, we must be fure that whatfoever is in Nature, is in our Understanding, otherwise a thousand Things may be, tho' we do not understand them. As for Instance, Unless I were fure that I had the perfect Map or Geography of fuch a Country in my Head, it is impossible I should be fure that there is no such Town or City, or Region belonging thereunto; and fo unless I were fure that the Cosmography or universal Map of Nature were perfectly delineated on my Understanding, I cannot positively asfirm that such or such a Being doth not actually exist. So that as a great Divine of our own hath well observed upon this very Argument, after all that can be faid against a thing this will still be true, that many Things possibly are which we know not of, and that many Things more may be than are. For unless our Understanding were extended to the whole Compass of Nature, there may be, for all we know, ten thousand Things in Nature which

are not in our Understanding. So that concerning pure Negatives we can never be certain, unless the Things which they deny be absolutely impossible, and imply, in the very Notion of their Existence, a plain Contradiction; which cannot be faid of the Existence of God. For by God we mean nothing but a Being endowed with all possible Perfections, and to fay that it is impossible that there should be any fuch Being as is endowed with all the Perfections that it is possible for a Being to be endowed with, is to affert Possibilities impossible, which is a Contradiction in Terms. Since therefore this Negative that there is no God, denies that which is possible in its Nature, and which implies not the least Shadow of Contradiction, it is impossible fupposing it were true, for any finite Understanding to be certain of it. What Man in his Wits then would ever presume to deny the Being of God, and to flake his everlasting Fate on it, when he knows beforehand that he cannot be fure that his Denial is true, and that if it prove false he is lost for ever? Alas! what is this but to throw Dice for our Souls, and to venture our Salvation on a wild Uncertainty.

II. The Atheist concludes for a pure Negative upon a bare Possibility. One would think in a Matter of such infinite Moment, Men should at least be so wise as not to conclude without strong Probabilities, where they can find no Certainty to rely on; but so desperately Fool-hardy is the Atheist as to suspend his Faith, and with that his Salvation, upon the bare Possibility that there may be no God. For when he is urged with those Arguments of God's Being, that are drawn from the beautiful Con-

Contrivance of the World, he hath no other way to evade them, but by endeavouring to demonstrate how by the necessary Laws of Matter and Motion, Things might possibly be shuffled together as they are without the Agency and Direction of a God; and yet even in this Attempt so many inextricable Difficulties present themselves as have puzzled and confounded the acutest Wits that were ever engaged in it; and while with all their Art and Contrivance they have been framing their Hypothesis of the Existence of this World without a God, they have been forced not only to beg some Principles, but also to affert others that upon Examination have been found repugnant to the Nature of Things; and when all is done, if both were true, yet they are altogether infufficient to folve a thousand Phanomena in Nature. So that the utmost that the most learned and inquisitive Atheift could ever pretend to, was to advance A-theifm to a grand Perhaps, and by endeavouring to demonstrate how Things might possibly be as they are without a God, to prove that it is possible there is none; and yet when all is done, their most ingenious Endeavours are only a Demonstration that the most acute and witty Men may be mistaken. For what a hopeless kind of Task is it to shew how that may be the Effect of a blind Chance or Necessity, which hath all the Characters of a wife Defign and Contrivance fairly imprinted on it? How is it possible for an undefigning Chance to fit Means to Ends, or Ends to Natures, or so to proportion Parts to one another as to make a comely Symmetry in the whole, and this in ten thousand Instances, and not sail in one? How often, as the above named Author from

from Tully discourses, might a Man after he hath shaken together a Sett of Letters in a Bag, sling them out upon the Ground, before they would fall into an exact Poem, or make a good Discourse in Profe? And may not a little Book be as eafily made by Chance, as the great Volume of the World, in which there is such an inexhaustible Treasure of rich Sense and Contrivance? Or how long might a Man be in fprinkling Colours upon a Canvass with a careless Hand, before they would happen to fall into the exact Picture of a Man? And is a Man eafier made by Chance than his Picture? Why may we not as well conceive the most regular Building in the World to be framed by a cafual Concourse of Stone and Iron and Timber, as that these blind and rambling Parts of Matter should chance to place themselves so orderly in the World, and to observe such an exact Harmony and Decorum as if they kept Time with the mufical Laws of some Almighty Mind, that composed their Meafures and regulated their Motions up and down in the Universe?

But granting the Atheist what he so eagerly though unsuccessfully contends for, that it is pessible all this might happen by meer Chance, and consequently that there may be no God in the World, would any Man in his Wits found his Faith upon a meer Possibility, when it will be as much as his Soul is worth if he should happen to be mistaken? It is possible that should he throw himself from the Top of a high Steeple, the Air between may be so condensed as to bear him up and preserve him from being dash'd in Pieces by the Fall; but would you not think the Man stark mad that should venture his Neck

Neck upon that Possibility? And yet it is a far more desperate Venture that the Atheist makes, by thus bazarding his Soul to everlasting Destruction, upon a bare Pollibility that there may be no God to

deftroy him.

III. The Atheist concludes against the best Evidence that the Contrary will admit. For that there is a God we have as full Evidence as the Matter could bear if there were one, and to require more is abfurd and unreasonable. For let us at present suppose, but for Argument-fake, that there were such an infinite Spirit in the World; a Spirit that were as wife, and as good, and as powerful as be whom we call God is supposed to be; supposing, I say, there were such a Spirit actually existing, we could not have greater Evidence of it than we have already that he actually exists. For we could not fee him with our Eyes, because we suppose him to be a Spirit; we could not demonstrate his Existence à priori or from any Cause, because being the first Cause he must be uncaused or self-originated. It remains therefore that the only Demonstration we could give of his Being, is that which we call à posteriori, or from such sensible Effects as can only be ascribed to the Power and Wildom and Goodness of such a Being; and of such Effects as these we have infinite Instances before us. For in fum, we have all this vifible World about us, whose changeable Nature demonstrates it to be the Effect of some superior Cause, and whose unspeakable Vastness, Beauty, and Contrivance, argues it to be the Effect of some most wife, and good, and powerful Cause. For as to the first, whatsoever is changeable cannot felf-exist, but will necessarily proceed Vol. II.

ceed from some superior Cause; because whatsoever self-exists is necessarily, and whatsoever is necessarily is always the same; that which is without any Cause cannot but be, and that which is thus or thus without any Cause, cannot but be so of so for ever; and consequently if the World were of itself without any Cause, it would not only be necessarily, but also be such as it is necessarily and unchangeably; but contrariwise we plainly perceive that it runs a perpetual Course of Change and Alteration, that its Parts are continually altering their Figure, and shifting their Places with one another; whereas if this Part were of itself necessarily, as it must be if the Whole be so, it would necessarily be subsere it is and what it is eternally.

And fince the Mutability of this World argues it to be the Effect of some superior Cause, I would feign know whether, confidering the Vastness, and Beauty, and Contrivance of it, it be not most reafonable to attribute it to fuch an all-good, all-wife, and almighty Cause as we suppose God to be. For what less than an infinite Power can bear a due Proportion to such a vast and immense World? Should you enter into a vast and magnificent Palace, and find no Creature in it, but a Company of Mice or Weafels, could you possibly believe that these impotent Vermin built it? And yet the Building of the most Royal Palace doth not fo much exceed the Power of these weak Animals, as the building of this World doth the Power of any Cause but a God. But then if we consider the infinite Number of Beings in the World that are capable of Happiness, and the vast Provisions that are made to entertain them according to their feveral

feveral Capacities, we cannot but thence conclude that the Power which made them was a Eled by an infinite Goodness. Lastly, that we consider the rare and admirable Contrivance of the several Parts of the World; how perfect each one is in its Kind, how exactly fitted to each other, and what a lovely Symmetry and Proportion they all make in the whole, how can we otherwise imagine but that that Power and Goodness which caused it was directed by an infinite Wisdom? So that the World is such an Effect as openly proclaims its Cause to be a God; and if this Evidence of God's Existence will not convince Men, they are impregnably fortified against all Conviction; and if God should carry them into those infinite Spaces that are beyond the Limits of this World, and there command a New One into Being, while they stood looking on, and faw it springing out of nothing, they might with as good reason conclude that World to be nothing but a fortuitous Concourse of insensible Parts of Matter, as they now do that this is so. So that in fine, he that denies God after all these Demonstrations which he hath given of himself, is out of the reach of Argument, and if he pursue his own Principles, can never be convinced by any possible Reasons. And what a desperate Folly is it for Men to embrace a Belief, which should they be mistaken, draws after it everlasting Ruin, when they have all the Reasons to the contrary that the Matter is capable of? What is this but to shut their Eyes, and cast themselves blindfold on their own Destruction, and to resolve to wink hard and believe against against all possible Reason, that so they may ruin

themselves without any Interruption?

VI. And lastly, The Atheist plainly contradists himself in his own Conclusion. For by denying that God is, he necessarily denies the Possibility of his Being. For if he be not, it is impossible he should ever be; because Eternity of Being is included in the Notion of him. For when we fpeak of God, we mean by him a Being that is before all Causes, and the Cause of all Causes, and that therefore oweth not his Being to any prior Cause, but doth necessarily, independently, and eternally exist. So that if he be not now, he cannot be at all, because he must begin to be, which is contradictory to the very effential Notion and Idea of him. For if he should ever begin to be, he cannot be Eternal; and if he be not Eternal he cannot be God. So that to fay God is not, is by necessary Consequence to say he cannot be at all; and yet by a God we mean at the same time a Being that is endowed with all possible Perfections that a Being is capable of. Wherefore as by faying that God is not; we do by Consequence affert that it is impossible he should ever be, we do in effect affert this gross Contradiction; that it is impossible such a Being should ever be as includes all the Perfections that are possible to a Being. Thus in the same breath we pronounce that God can and cannot be, that it is possible he is, and yet impossible he should ever be. For by faying that he is a Being endowed with all the poBble Perfections of a Being, we expresly affirm that it is possible he may be; but by faying, that there is no fuch Being actually existing, we do as expresly affert

affert that it is impossible he should ever be. He therefore who afferts that God is not, doth by necessary consequence affert this express Contradiction, that it is impossible there should ever be a Being as perfect as it is possible. And when if there be a God, Men's eternal Fate depends but upon believing that he is, and acting accordingly, what a monstrous Folly is it for Men to contradict themselves to deny him? What is this but to stake their Souls upon it, that the very first Principle of Reasoning is false, and put their Fate upon this desperate Issue, that unless both Parts of a Contradiction prove true, they must inevitably perish for ever?

And now having shewn you from what malignant Causes Atheism springs, and how desperately foolish and unreasonable it is in itself, let us all endeavour by the serious Consideration of what hath been said, to fortish our Minds against it. And since this Proposition, That God is, is the prime Foundation of all Religion, it concerns us all to use our utmost Diligence to establish our Minds in the sirm and steadsfast Belief of it; and this we cannot sail to do, if we heartily endeavour it. For the Arguments of God's Being do shine all round about us with such a clear and convincing Light, that we need do no more than just open our Eyes to it, and distret those mischievous Causes from our Wills, that kide and obscure it from our Understandings. And when once we have thoroughly settled the Belief of God's Being in our Minds, it will mightily insuence all our Powers of settion; it will invite our Hope, and

alarm our Fear, and Address to every Passion in us that is capable of Persuasion, and be an ever-living Spring of Religion within us; for God is an Object so infinitely Great in himself, and of such infinite Moment and Concernment to us, that it is next to impossible we should sirmly believe that he is, without being vigorously impressed with religious Assections upon the Consideration of his Being.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Necessity of acknowledging the divine Providence to oblige us to be truly Religious.

HE main Influence which the Belief of a God hath upon the Minds of Men proceeds immediately from the Belief of his Providence, without which we are no way concerned or interested in him. For a God without a Providence is a folitary kind of Being that lives alone from the World, altogether retired within himself, and never looks abroad or any ways intermeddles with any thing without; and what have we to do with a Being that hath nothing to do with us or our Affairs, but lives apart from us in some inaccessible Retirement, where neither we can go to him nor he come to us? So that it is by his Providence that all Correspondence and Intercourse between God and his Creatures is maintained; which being taken away, he is nothing to us, and we are as nothing to him. For what doth it fignify to us that there is a certain excellent Being called God, fitting on the Top of the Heavens with his Arms folded in his Bosom, and who doth nothing there but enjoy himself in a quiet Contemplation of his own Perfections, without regarding any thing without him, or doing either good or hurt to the World? Such a God is nothing but a great Cypher in the World, that only makes a glorious La Flourish,

Flourish, but is as infignificant as no God at all. For to what purpose should we pray to a God that is not at leisure to bear us, or hope in a God that is not concerned to help us? What should move us to leve a God that bestows no Good, or to fear a God that inflicts no Evil, or to obey a God that hath no Regard of our Actions? Why should we thank him if we receive nothing from him? For what should we praise him if he be no ways beneficial to the World? And wherein should we imitate him if he fits fill and does nothing, and exercifes neither Wisdom, nor Goodness, nor Justice, nor Mercy towards anything without him? All which Perfections of the Deity without a Providence are utterly void and useless. For his Providence is the great Sphere of Activity wherein he exercises and displays his Perfections, wherein his Power executes the Contrivances of his Wildom, and his Wisdom contrives the Methods of his Goodness; so that without his Providence all his Perfections will fignify nothing. For what doth that Wisdom fignify that contrives nothing? Or that Power which doth nothing? Or that Goodness that is good for nothing? Or that Justice which distributes nothing? And yet just such Cyphers are all the Perfections of God, suppose there is no Providence wherein to employ and exercise them. And if once we vacate and extinguish these Perfections of God which are the Graces which render him so sublime and adorable, what Reason can move us to adore and worship him? For why should we concern our felves with a God who concerns himfelf with no Body, and that either hath neither Power.

Power, nor Wisdom, nor Goodness, or which to us is the same, makes no use of them? So that the Denial of God's Providence, you see, directly cuts in sunder all the Ties of Religion, by rendering him an insignificant Being to the World.

In the Profecution of this Argument I shall shew, First, What of the Divine Providence it is that is necessary to be believed in order to our being truly religious. Secondly, What Evidence there is to create in us this Belief. Thirdly, The Insufficiency and Unreasonableness of the common Pretences to Insidelity in this Matter.

SECT. I.

What it is we are to believe of the Divine Providence.

N general it is not fufficient that we believe this or that Part or Branch of it, but we must acknowledge the Whole; every Part whereof the Whole consists being pregnant with very powerful Obligations to Religion. Now the Whole of Providence consists in God's continual Conservation, Possession, Inspection, and Disposal of all Things, and Government of the rational World. So that the Whole of it includes these five Parts or Branches.

I. God's continual *Confervation* of all Things. II. His continual *Possipion* of all Things.

III. His continual Inspection of all Things.

IV. His continual Ordering and Disposal of all

Things.

V. His continual Government of the rational World. All which, as I shall shew, are highly necessary to be believed in order to our being truly religious.

I To oblige us to be truly religious, it is necesfary we should believe that God continually upbolds and conferves all Things. That he alone is the great Atlas on whose Almighty Shoulders the whole Frame of Things depends. For though the Works of buman Art do often stand many Ages after the Workman's Hand is withdrawn from them, yet the Reason is because there is something between them and nothing, viz. the pre-existing Matter of which they are formed; whereas the Works of God being all produced out of nothing, have nothing between them, but that creative Power which produced them. And therefore as Man's Work would necessarily perish were that pre-existing Matter taken away, which stands between them and nothing, fo God's Works would necessarily resolve into nothing, should that creative Power be withdrawn which stands between them and nothing. In short, pre-existing Matter is the Basis of our Works, and creative Power of God's; and therefore as our Works must cease to be, were their pre-existing Matter withdrawn, so God's Works must cease to be, were his creative Power withdrawn. So that it is the same Almighty Power which raifed the World out of nothing that keeps it from finking into nothing; and that it is this Mo-

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ment is as much the Effect of Divine Power, as that it was the Moment when it was first created. For the World was no more able to give itself the fecond Moment of Being than it was the first, and the third than the fecond, and so on through all the past and future Moments of its Being. For one Moment of Being is as much as another, and therefore to give a fecond requires the same Power as to give a first; and if so, then each succeeding Moment of the World's Duration and Continuance, must be derived from the Cause of the first Moment of its Being. So that the Creation and Conservation of the World, is only the same Act continuing and flowing on (like a Line from a Mathematical Point) from the first Instant of its Being to the last Period of its Duration. And so the Scripture represents it: Thus Nehemiah ix. 6. Thou, even thou art Lord alone, thou hast made beaven, the beaven of heavens with all their hosts, the earth and all things that are therein, and thou prefervest them all; and Acts xvii. 25.28. He giveth to all life, and breath, and all things, in him we live, and move, and have our being; and Heb. i. 3. he is faid to uphold all things by the word of his Power.

Which is a Truth of that vast Importance to Religion, that it is hardly conceivable how it can fubfift without it. For while we look on ourselves as Beings that are independent from God, that do live, and breath, and fubfift of ourselves, without any new Supplies of Being from him, why should we ferve and worship him? What Reason have we to trust in a Being from whom we expect no Support? Or to render Homage to a Being on whom we have no Dependence? So that by difbelieving

believing this Part of the Divine Providence, we do in effect cut off all Intercourse between God and ourselves, and lay an Embargo on Religion. For if we depend not on him, what have we to do with him? And if we owe not our Lives and Beings to his Power, what Right hath he to exact our Obedience? But while we look upon ourfelves as Being that bang upon him, and derive every Breath and Moment of our Beings from him, so that should he withdraw from us that Almighty Arm that fusitions us, and leave us to substift of curfelves, we must presently drop into nothing, how can we forbear without infinite Stupidity and Ingratitude, to devote ourselves and all our Powers and Faculties to his Service? For what a fupid Wretch should I be, should I not study to please him upon whom I know my Life and Being depends, and who merely by withdrawing his Hand from underneath me can let me fink into nothing when he pleases? And what an ungrateful Wretch should I be, should I refuse to honour, worship, and obey, him, from whom I draw every Breath I breathe, and derive new Life and Being every Moment?

II. It is also necessary we should believe that God possesses all Things; that he hath not given away this World from himself, and cast it out of his own Disposal as a common Scramble among Men; but that he hath reserved to himself an absolute, unalienable and independent Propriety in all that we enjoy and possess. For all Things owe their Being to him, as he is the Creator and Upholder of them; and therefore whatsoever is must necessarily be his, because it is by his Power and Providence. And if we who act by the Power of God, and can do nothing

thing without him, may claim a Right to the Effects of our Invention and Industry, how much more may God who contrived and produced all Things by his own independent Wisdom and Power? For our Wisdom and Power being God's, he hath a Sovereign Right to all the Effects of them; but bis Wisdom and Power are absolutely his own, without Dependance on any superior Cause; and therefore whatsoever are the Effects of them must necessarily be his by a most absolute and independent Propriety. And accordingly he is stiled the possession of heaven and earth, Gen. xiv. 19. And Moses tells his People, Behold the heaven and the heaven of heavens is the Lord's, the earth also, and all that is therein, Deut. x. 14. and the earth, faith the Pfalmist, is the Lord's and the fulness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein; for he hath founded it upon the sea, and prepared it upon the floods, Psalm xxiv. 1. and 1. 12. and the beavens, saith he again, are thine, the earth also is thine; as for the world and the fulness thereof thou hast founded them, Pfalm Ixxxix. 11.

God therefore being the Supreme Proprieter of the World, there is nothing can be justly ours but by bis Will and Grant; and nothing can be ours by bis Will, but what is bonestly and justly ours. So that for us to seize upon any Part of the World by Fraud, or Violence, or Oppression, is to trespass upon God and invade his Property, and to tear his World from him against his Will. Thus whatsoever we possess by Wrong, we possess as Robbers and Invaders of God, and whatsoever we enjoy by Right, we enjoy as Tenants to the great Landlord of the World; and without owning and acknowledging

knowledging this we cannot be truly religious. For if the World be not his, why should we pray to him for what we want of it, or praise him for what we crijoy? why should we patiently submit to his Disposal when he deprives us of what we have? Or thankfully acknowledge his Goodness when he fupplies us with what we need? Why thould we employ our *Possessions* in his Service, or think ourselves obliged to return him any part of them in pious or charitable Works? In a Word, why should we be contented with a fmall Share, and abide by that unequal Division of Things that is made in the World, and not endeavour to increase our own poor Heap by pilfering from other Men's that are ten times bigger than ours? Whence are these Obligations but from this Supposal, that God is the supreme Proprietor and Possession of all Things; which being denied, there remains no folid Foundation of Reason for any of these great and necessary Duties of Religion.

III. To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that God is present with and inspects all Things, that his Divine Substance is disfused through and circumfused about all Things, so as to penetrate them within as an universal Soul, and contain them without as an universal Place. For so the Jewish Doctors are wont to call God Hamakom, that is to say, the Place or Continent of all Things, because all Things are encompassed by him, and do live and move within his infinite Bosom. For so in Scripture the Divine Substance is described, as spreading itself through and around the World, even to the utmost Possibility of Extension. Whither, saith the Psalmist, skall I go from

the Spirit, or whither shall I flee from the Presence? If I ascend up into Heaven thou art there, if I make my Bed in Hell, behold thou art there; if I take the Wings of the Morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea, even there shall thy Hand lead me, and thy Right-hand shall hold me, Pfalm exxxix. 7. 8, 9, 10. And behold, faith Solomon, the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain thee, 1 Kings viii. 27. yea do not I fill Heaven and Earth, faith the Lord

bimself, Jer. xxiii. 24.

Now though God's Omnitresence be strictly an Attribute of his Effence, and not a Part of his Providence, yet it is fuch an Astribute as includes his universal Providence, and without supposing of which, an universal Providence can bardly be conceived. For if he co-exists and he present with all things, he must be supposed to operate upon them; because wherever be is, his infinite Wisdom and Power and Goodness are; which in their own Nature are fuch active Perfections as cannot be prefent where such a World of things are to be done, and sit still and do nothing. For how can we conceive that infinite Wisdom should be present where a world of things are to be ordered, and yet order nothing? That infinite Power should be present where a world of things are to be done, and yet do nothing? Or that infinite Goodness should be present where a world of good is to be done, and do no good at all? Such an idle, restive Presence as this, is utterly inconfishent with such active Perfections. So that the Omnipresence of an infinite Power and Wisdom, and Goodness necessarily supposes an universal Providence, and without such an Omnipresence an universal Providence can hardly

be conceived. For how can God be prefent by any Power, or Virtue, or Efficacy, of his Nature, in any place from whence the real Substance of his Divinity is excluded? How can he operate by his own immediate Efficiency where he is not? Or extend his divine Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness over all things, except his divine Substance in which these Attributes are, be co-extended with them? Every Agent must be where it acts, because it acts from its Being, and it is as possible for that which is not to operate, as for that which is to operate where it is not; and hence Socrates being asked how it was possible for one God to order all the Affairs of the World? returns this Answer, Τοτέτον η τοιέτον ές ι το θεῖον άσθ' άπανζα δρᾶν η σάντα ἀκέςιν, κὴ σαταχε σαρείναι κὴ άμα σάντων έπιμελείσθαι, i.e. God is so great and vast a Being, as that he *bears* and *fees* all things *together*, and is prefent every where, and takes care of all things at the *fame time*. Thus God's *Omnipresence*, you see, doth *so* include his *univerfal Providence*, that with it it is necessary, and without it inconceivable.

And then from his Presence with all things, necessarily follows his Inspection of all things; because wherever he is, his insinite Knowledge is, which is inseparable from his Being; and wherever his infinite Knowledge is, it must necessarily have a thorough Prospect of all things round about him, so that nothing can be concealed from its Inspection. For so the Scripture assures us that the Eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole Earth, 2 Chron. xvi. 9 and that the Eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and good, Prov. xv. 3. and in a word, that all things are open and

and naked to the eyes of him with whom we have to

do, Heb. iv. 13.

Both which are Truths of valt Importance to Religion. For while Men look upon God as a Being that dwells at a great Distance from them, they will be ready enough to conclude Precul à Jove procul à Fulmine, that being far off from him, they are out of his Reach, and beyond the Danger of his Thunder-botts; and that he is too far removed from them either to fuccour them when they want his Aid, or to punish them when they deferve his Difpleafure; which must needs extinguish both their Hope and Fear, which are the Master-springs of their Religion. And though we should believe him to be present with us, yet unless we also believe that he hath a full Inspection into all our Actions and Affairs, we shall have no Regard to him. For if he tees not into our Affairs, how can he fuccour and relieve us? And if he cannot relieve us, to what End should we hope in him, depend upon him, or pray to him? And unless he hath a persect Insight in all our Actions, how should he reward or punish us? and if he cannot reward us, what should encourage, if he cannot punish us, what should terrify us to our Duty to him? But if we look upon him as a Being that is always with us, and wherever we are furrounds us with his boundless Presence; that includes and penetrates every Part of our Substance, sees into our inmost Thoughts and Purposes, and ransacks every Corner of our Souls with his all-feeing Eye, and hath a thorough and perfect Prospect of all our Affairs and Concerns, we cannot without in-Vol. II. finite M

finite Force to our Reason forbear fearing, and re-

verencing, ferving and adoring him.

IV. To fathen the Obligation of Religion upon us it is also necessary that we believe that God continually orders and disposes of all Things; that he is the Spring of all the Motions of this great Machine of the World, that fets every Wheel and Caufe a-going, and by his all-commanding Influence maintains, directs and over-rules their Motions; and that there is nothing happens in the World, whether by Nature, or Chance, or Defign, but by his Ordination and Disposal; that even those natural Causes which are necessarily determined to fuch particular Courses and Effects, are influenced and conducted by him, and that whenfoever they stray from their Courses, suspend or precipitate their Motions, or move counter to their natural Tendencies, it is by his Order and Direction; that it is he who derives and guides the Heavenly Bodies, impresses the Degrees and chalks out the Paths of their Motions, and by his own Almighty Hand turns round those stupendous Wheels in a perpetual Revolution. For fo the Scripture tells us, that be makes his Sun to shine upon the good and bad, Mat. v. 45. that it is at his Beck and Command that those vast Bodies of Light exhale the Vapours of the Earth and Sea, and dissolve them down again in Hail, and Rain, and Snow. For so we are told that it is he who covers the heavens with Clouds, and prepares the Rain for the earth; that fends forth his commandment unto the earth; and giveth frow like wool, and feattereth the hoar frost like askes, and casteth forth his Iee like morfels, and fendeth forth his word

word and melters them, and coufes the wind to blow and the waters flow, Pf. extvii. 8, 15, 16, 17, 18. that the fire, and bail, and flower, and vertours, and flrong winds do fulfil bis word, Pf. extviii. 9. And in a Word, that it is by his Order and Internet that the Earth fends up its Sap into the Sard, and Roots of Herbs, and Corn, and Plants, and causes them to spring and grow, and that all Animals do propagate their Kind, and fall replenish the Store-houses of Nature; for so we are told, that he clearls the grafs of the field, and arrays the lilies in all their glery, Matt. ii. 28, 29, 30. and that he causes the grafs to grow for the earth, and both for the ase of man, that he may bring forth food out of the earth, Pf. civ. 14.

And then as for fortuitous and casual Events, which depend upon accidental and irregular Causes, as a Man's being bit with an Arrow let fly at random, or brained with a Stone falling from the Top of an House, we must believe that they are all ordered, directed, and over-ruled by God; fo as that to him there is nothing casual or contingent; and tho' there are many Things happen of which there was no Necessity in their immediate Causes, yet do they as necessarily depend upon the Will and Power of the first Cause of all, as the Rising and Setting of the Sun, and Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea. So that how fortuitous foever these Things may be, in respect of the Design and natural Tendency of second Causes, yet none of them ever happen besides the Purpese and Intention of God, who foresees and designs them before they come to pass, and directs and levels them to his own most wife and kely Ends and Purposes. For fo the Arrow which the Soldier let ilv at random

was levelled by God at Ahab's Breast, so that his Death was Chance in respect of the Soldier who shot the Arrow, but Design in God who directed it; and accordingly, Prov. xvi. 33. we are told that the lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. And so in the Case of Chance-Medley, when a Man accidentally kills another without any Design or Intention, though it be mere Accident in him, it is Council and Design in God, who, as the Scripture expresses it, delivers the man he slays into his hand, Exod. xxi. 13.

And then Laftly, As for those Events which happen by the Defign of free and rational Agents, it is necessary we should believe that they are all over-ruled by God too; that whatever befals us in this World, whether it be by the good or ill Defign of Men or Angels, is for good, and just, and holy Ends, either permitted or determined by the fovereign Disposer of all Events; so that without his wife Permission or Determination, neither Angels, Men, nor Devils can do us either Good or Hurt; that every good Thing we receive from them, only passes to us through their Hands from God, and that they are only the Channels and Conveyances of the over-flowing Streams of his infinite Bounty; and that whenever we fuffer any ill from them, they are but the Rods in God's Hand wherewith he chaftens and corrects us; that he hath the over-ruling Disposal of all the Ills which they inflict upon us, and can render their Stings a fovereign Balm, and the rankest Poifon medicinal to us; fo that the Malice being in God's Disposal, can effect nothing but what he will have it; and if it doth us hurt it is his Executioner, but

but if he pleases it shall do good, and like Leaches applied by a skilful Physician, that draw away our Disease while it is sucking our Blood. For so God made the Malice of Joseph's Brethren the Means of his Advancement in Egypt; and by the Covetousness of Judas and Cruelty of the Jews advanced the Holy Jesus to his own Right-hand, and executed his Purpose to redeem Mankind. Thus God overrules the Actions of Men, and when he pleases directs them quite contrary to their Intentions; for the way of man, saith the Prophet, is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps, Jer. x. 23. It is the Man that walks and acts, but it is God alone that leads his Way, and directs his Actions to what End he pleases.

All which it is necessary we should believe in order to our being truly Religious. For while we look upon God as a Foreigner in the World, that hath altogether retired himself from the Affairs of it, and abandoned it to the Disposal of blind Chance or Necessity, he must stand for a Cypher in our Efleem, and fignify no more to us than the Emperor of the World in the Moon, who for all we know may be a glorious and puiffant Prince, but is fo far removed from us and our Affairs, that he can do us neither Good nor Hurt. And if God intermeddle not with those Goods and Evils which happen here below, what doth he fignify to us who live apart from him in another World from which he is wholly retired and withdrawn? But if we firmly believe that there is nothing befals us whether it be in the Course of Nature or by Chance, or Design, but by his Order and Direction, we M_3 must must lay aside our Reason and Humanity, if for every Good we want, or do receive, we do not ap ly ourselves to him with humble, and submisfive, thankful and ingenuous Minds; and if under every Evil that we feel or fear, we do not refign up our Wills and lift up our Eyes to him, as to the fole Arbitraior of our Fate. For where should we pay our Thanks, or whence should we expect our Supplies and Deliverances, but to him who is the Fountain of all Good, and from him who is the fupreme Moderator of all Events? Who is there in *Heaven* or *Earth* whom we are fo much concerned to please, and so much obliged to acknowledge and fubmit to, fo much engaged to trust to and rely on; as him who hath all our Fortunes in his Hands, and the absolute Disposal of every Thing in which we are, or may, or can be any way interested or concerned? So that the Belief of God's over - ruling Providence hath every Link of our Duty fastened to it in a strong and rational Concatenation, and if it be loofened from this Principle, the whole Chain must necessarily fall in sunder.

V. And lastly, To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe God that is the supreme Governor of the rational World; which is a distinct Branch of Providence from the former. For all Things whatsoever are subject to God's Order and Disposal, but in strictness of Speech it is only rational Beings that are subject to his Government. For Government supposes Laws, and Laws Rewards and Punishments, or which rational Beings alone are capable, they alone having the Power to deliberate, and upon

Deliberation to choose what is Good, and refuse what is Evil, without which no Being can deserve either to be rewarded or punished. So that the Government of God, in Strictness of Speech, respects only the rational World consisting of Angels and Men.

As for the Government of Angels it is impossible we should understand any more of it than what God hath revealed, because though they converse with us and our Affairs, yet we do not converse with them; our spiritual Nature by which we are near allied to them being shut up in Matter, which like a Wall of Partition divides us from them. and hinders us from looking over into their World, and from feeing their Nature and Operations, and furveying their Polity and Government. Indeed so far as we understand their Natures, we may easily understand the Laws by which God governs them; because we know God's Laws are always adapted to the Natures of Things; and confequently fince we know that they are rational Creatures, we may conclude from thence, that whatfoever is fit and decorous for rational Creatures as such, they stand obliged to by the Law of their Natures. But fince there are particular Powers and Properties in their Natures which we understand not, it is impossible we should understand all the particular Laws by which they are governed. Only thus much in gcneral we know, that the whole Order of Angelical Beings were from the first Moment of their Creation subjected to Laws fitted to their Nature; by which natural Laws they flood obliged to obey their Creator in all his positive Commands and In-M 4

stitutions; and that these Laws, whatsoever they were, both natural and positive, were established in Rewards and Punishments, by which if they continued Obedient they were to continue for ever in their most blissful Ranks and Stations; but if they rebelled were immediately to be banished theree into everlasting Wretchedness and Misery; that a certain Order of these Angelical Beings, excited either by their Pride, or Envy, or fenfual Affections, did under their Head or Chiestain revolt from God by transgressing some natural or positive Law, for which they were expelled the high Territories of Happiness, and driven into these lower Parts of the World, where under the Prince of their Rebellion they have ever fince waged War against God and Man; that in this State of War they are under the Restraint of God's Almighty Power, who fets Bounds to their Power and Malice which it cannot pass, and determine it to what Ends and Purposes he pleases; employing it sometimes to try and chaften good Men, fometimes to execute his Wrath upon the Children of Disobedience, and fometimes again letting it loofe merely to display his own Almighty Power in its Defeat and Overthrow; in which State they are referved as Prisoners at large to the Judgment of the great Day; whereby, together with wicked Men, they shall be fentenced and confined to everlasting Flames and Darkness; that the good Angels in reward of their constant Obedience are continued and fixed in a most blissful Condition, in which they enjoy the confrant Smiles of God, and the unspeakable Pleasure of being entirely resigned to his Will, who upon all Occasions sends them

to and fro in the World, as the great Messensers and Ministers of his Providence, to minister to the recovery of recoverable Sinners, and to pour out the Vials of his Wrath upon the Obstinate and Unreclaimable; to assist, protect and comfort good Men while they live, and when they depart from hence to conduct their Spirits thro' the airy Territories of the wicked Angels into those blissful Mansions that are prepared to receive them till the Resurrection; at which Time their Part will be to summon and gather both the good and bad before the Tribunal of Christ, to receive their final Sentence to everlasting Weal or Woe.

This is the main of what we know concerning God's Government of Angels; the fincere Belief of which will be of vaft Advantage to us in the whole Course of our Religion. For fince there is fuch a mighty Colony of evil Angels roving about the World, watching all Opportunities to lay Snares in our Way, and to tempt us into their Revolt and Ruin; and fince their Design in tempting us now, is only to get us into their Power, that fo they may torment us hereafter, how much doth it concern us to guard and defend ourselves against their evil Motions and Suggestions, lest by complying with them we give them Opportunity to train us on from one Degree of Wickedness to another, till they have made us provoke the Almighty to cut us off, and abandon us for ever to their Rage and Fury; and fince they are all of them under his Restraint, and can proceed no farther in their mischievous Designs against us, than he lets loose his Chain to them, how should this encourage us manfully to fruggle and contend against them; fince if

we do we may depend upon it, that God in whose Power they are, will either command them off, or at least not permit them to over-power us with Temptation. And fince by God's Permission there are great Flocks of good Angels always hovering about us, to guard us against those malignant ones, and to prompt us to Good, as they prompt us to Evil, and with their holy Inspirations to countermine their impure Suggestions, how much doth it import us to cherifh and reverence every pious Thought and Motion, fince for all we know it may be the Whifper of some Angel of God, who by these and such like holy Injunctions is now strug-gling with the Powers of Darkness, to rescue our Souls out of their Hands? And fince these blessed and benevolent Spirits do by God's Appointment pitch their Tents about good Men, while they live, and convoy them fafely to the Seat of the Bleffed when they die, how should this encourage bad Men to be good, and good Men to perfevere in well doing; fince they place and continue themselves under the blessed Patronage of Angels, to be conducted safely by them through this perilous Sea to the calm Regions of eternal Light? Thus the Belief of God's Government of Angels, fo far as he hath thought good to reveal it to us, very much conduces to a boly Life.

But that which more nearly concerns us, and hath a more immediate Influence on our Practice, is his Government of Men; the Belief of which is indifferentiably necessary to render us truly religious. Now concerning this Government of God over Men, there are seven Things necessary to be

believed:

I. That the great *End* of God's Government is the *Welfare* of *Mankind*.

II. That in order to this End, God hath given us Laws for the Regulation and Government of our Actions.

III. That to fecure our Obedience to these Laws he hath derived his Authority upon all lawful Sovereignties to govern us according to them.

IV. That he is ready to contribute to us all necessary Assistance, to enable us to observe these

Laws.

V. That the Affistance he contributes to us is fuch as supposes us free Agents, and concurs with and maintains our natural Freedem.

VI. That he takes particular Cognizance of the good and ill Use which we make of our natural Freedom.

VII. That he will certainly reward or punish us accordingly.

I. To oblige us to be truly religious it is necessary we should believe that the great End of God's governing us is our Welfare and Happiness. That being infinitely raised above all Want and Indigence, he doth not assume the Government of us to advance himself, or to gratify any boundless Ambition of his own, which is a Vice that springs out of Poverty and Indigence, and therefore can have neither Root nor Room in a nature so infinitely happy as bis; but that all his Design in reigning over us is to do us good, and to consummate our Happiness; to restore and rectify our disordered Nature, and to advance and raise it to the utmost Persection.

Perfection, and Blife and Glory it is capable of: to protect and defend us against present Evils, and fupport us under them, and convert them into Inftruments of good, and to rescue us from that worst of Evils, Sin, and from all those endless Miseries it is pregnant with. This we ought to believe is the great Scope of all his Acts of Government, and even of the direct Punishments he inflicts; which are always intended either to reclaim the Offenders themselves, or to warn others by the fad Example of their Suffering not to follow the ill Example of their Sin. And that this is the great End of his Government he himself hath expresly declared. So Pfal. cxxxv. 9. we are affured that the Lord is good to all, and that his tender mercies are over all his works; and Ver. 13. 14. that in the Exercise of his everlasting kingdom, he upholdeth all that fall, and raiseth up all that are bowed down; and tho' in the Administration of his Government, he hath decreed to cut off all fuch obstinate Rebels as will not be reduced by the Methods of his Love, yet he hath declared that he is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, 2 Pet. iii. 9. and that he would have all Men to be faved, and to come to the knowledge of the Truth, I Tim. ii. 4. And unless we believe him to be a benevolent Governour, that aims at the Good of his Subjects, we shall look upon his Government as a cruel Tyranny erected for no other End but to squeeze and oppress us, to inthral our Liberty, and rob us of the Rights of our Nature, and to chain us down to an endless and careless Toil and Wretchedness; and whilst we thus look upon it, it is impossible we should ever Submit

fubmit to it with that generous Freedom and Chearfulness that true Religion requires. But if we firmly believe that the great Defign of it is to promote our welfare both here and hereafter, we have all the reason in the World to covet to be Governed by God, and to receive bis Yoke as a mighty Grace and Favour.

II. To oblige us to be truly religious, it is also necessary we should believe that God hath given us Laws for the Regulation and Government of our Actions. For without Laws to direct Men what to do, and what to avoid, there can be no fuch thing as Government, the proper business of which is to regulate Men's Actions, and without a Rule there can be no Regulation; fo that divine Rules or Laws are necessarily included in the divine Rule or Government; and as God cannot be supposed to give Laws without Governing, so neither can he be supposed to Govern without giving Laws; fo that unless we believe that God governs us by Laws, we are utterly destitute both of all reason why, and of all Direction wherein to obey him, and have neither Motive to enforce, nor Measure to regulate our Obedience. And as it is necessary we should believe that he hath given us Laws, fo it is also necessary we should believe that those Laws are for our good; that he neither imposed them on us pro imperio, as arbitrary Tests and Trials of our Obedience, nor exacts them of us to ferve himfelf and advance his own Interest and Greatness, but that the great Design of them is to do us good, and to direct our Actions to our own Interest; to render our Lives placed and easy, and to perfect and glorify our Natures. For while we look

look upon the Matter of God's Law either as indifferent in itself, and imposed upon us by him for no other end but to shew his absolute Sovereignty over us, or as beneficial only to him, and imposed upon us merely to promote his *Interest*, it is impossible we should ever comply with it with a free and chearful Mind. We may haply obey him out of Fear and Dread, because he is too mighty for us, and not to be contended with, without infinite Peril and Disadvantage; but it is impossible we should obey those Laws with a resigned and chearful Will, from which we only fear ill, but expect no benefit. Wherefore to oblige us to render a free and unforced Submission to God's Laws, it is absolutely necessary we should believe that the great Defign of them is the good of those they are imposed on; and so the Psalmist assures us that the statutes of the Lord are perfect, converting the foul, and making wife the simple; right, rejoicing the heart; pure, enlightning the Eyes; true and righteous altogether, more to be defired than gold, yea than much fine gold, sweeter also than boney and the honey comb, and that in keeping them there is great reward. Psalm xix. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. and that the law of God's mouth was better to him, that is, for the good it did him, than thousands of gold and filver, Pfalm cxix. 72.

And this if we firmly believe it will infinitely encourage our Obedience. For when I am fure that God commands me nothing but what my own Health and Ease and Happiness requires, and that every Law of his is both a necessary and a Sovereign Prescription against the Diseases of my Nature, and that he could not have prescribed me less than

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he hath without being defective in his Care of my Recovery and Happiness, with what Prudence or Modesty can I grudge to obey him? How can I think much to serve him, when I serve myself by it to the best purpose in the World? Or why should I so much as wish that he had not imposed this or that Law on me when I knew he imposed it to no other End but to oblige me to be happy, and that he cannot Dispense with any Duty he requires of me without giving me leave to be mi-serable? When therefore God's Authority doth thus strike in with our Interest, and walk hand in hand with it thro' every Duty it imposes, by refusing to obey him we fight against ourselves, and renounce his Authority and our own Happiness together.

III. To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that to secure our Obedience to these Laws, God hath derived his own Authority upon all lawful fovereign Powers, to govern us according to them. That to promote our Happiness which is the End of his Government; and to fecure our Obedience to his Laws, which are the Means to that End, he hash established a visible Authority upon Earth to represent his own invisible Majesty, and in his Name to exact our Obedience to his Laws, fo far as it is liable to their Cognizance; and that the Persons vested with this Authority are exalted by it above all Control or Refistance, and in their several Dominions placed next to and immediately under God, by whose Commission alone they act, and to whose Tribunal alone they are accountable: So that by refifting them, we do as much refift God, whose Deputy Governors they are, as a Neapolitan doth the King

King of Spain by levying Arms against his Vice-Roy of Naples; and by refusing to obey their just and lawful Commands we demur to God's Authority, who in every just thing they impose or require, speaks to us by their Mouths, and commands us by their Laws. For fo the Scripture tells us, not only that they are ordained of God, and that to resist them is to resist the Ordinance of God; not only that they are the Ministers of God, and that therefore for Conscience sake, or in Reverence to God's Authority which they bear, they are to be obeyed, Rom. xiii. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. but that they judge for God and not for Men, 2 Chron. xix. 6. and that therefore their Judgment is God's, Deut. i. 17.

The Difbelief of which excludes God's Government out of the World, and confequently diffolves all our Obligations of Duty and Allegiance to him. For how can he be supreme Governor of the World, if all other Governments are not imnediately under him? and how can they be immediately under him if they are not immediately authorized by him? And by what other Right can any Person or Persons pretend to govern in God's Kingdom under him, but by Commission from him? For every fupreme Authority is the Head and Fountain of all other Authorities, fo far as it extends; and if it be not fo, it cannot be fu-And therefore unless all Authority be depreme. rived from God, he can have no fuch thing as a fupreme Authority in the World. And this I doubt not is very well understood by our Atheistical Politicians, who in pursuance of their Denial of God, derive all Authority from the People; being truly aware that if the Authority of the Governors can he

be derived from the Pcople, it will necessarily follow that both must be independent upon God, and that to derive Authority to govern from any other Head but God, is to deny him to be the fupreme Governor of the World, which is the thing they would be at. If it be faid, that God hath given Authority to the People to authorise their Governors, and so he is still Head of all Authority, tho' it be derived from him immediately through the People, I answer, That this doth very little mend the matter. For if God hath given Authority to the People to authorife their Governors, he hath in Effect given the Reins out of his own Hands, and left the People to govern the World. For I would fain know, do Governers govern by God's Authority or the People's? If by the People's, 'tis the People that govern by them and not God; if by God's, 'tis God that governs by them and not the People e.In short, if they govern by the People's Authority, they are, as Governors at least, independent from God, and accountable only to the Tribunal of the People; if by God's Authority, they are Independent from the People, and accountable only to the Tribunal of God. So that whether he authorises them immediately or by the People it is all one, the Question being not so much bow they are authorized, as by what Authority they govern; if it be by God's, to God alone they are accountable; if by the People, God's Authority is quite excluded from having any hand in the Government of the World. In short, If the Choice of the People make their Governor without God's authorifing him, he is the People's Vice-roy and not Gods; but if it be God that authorifes him, he is Vol. II. God'a N

God's Vice-rey and not the People's. So that their choice even in Elective Governments can fignify no more than the bare presenting of a Person to God to be authorifed his Vicegerent by him: who, if their Choice be just and loweful, is supposed to confent and to approve it, and thereby to authorize the Person so presented. For sovereign Authority in the Abstract is ordained and instituted by God; but abstract Authority cannot govern unless some Perfor be vefted with it; and to vest him with it, be must not only be applied to the Authority, but the Authority must also be applied to kim; but where the People have the Right of Election, they only apply the Person to the Authority, but it is God's Confent and Approbation that applies the Autherity to the Perfon, who thereupon commences Supreme under God, and hath no Superior Tribunai but God's to account to.

And thus according to the Prophet Daniel, the most High rules in the Kingdom of Men, because as Lord of all the Lords, and King of all the Kings of the Earth, he rules and governs by their Minifry, and they rule and govern by his Authority. So that to fecure and maintain the Obligations which God's Government of the World devolves upon us, it is necessary we should believe that all rightful Sovereigns are his Vicegerents, and do rule by kis Commission and Authority, and that the Sword which they bear is God's, who hath delivered it into their Hands, to protect his faithful Subjests, and to execute his Wrath, and to avenge his Authority upon Evil doers. So that we cannot rebel against them, nor willfully disobey their just Commands, without giving a Defiance to God bimself, and rejecting the Toke of his Government. Whilst therefore we behave ourselves Factority and Seditiously towards those whom God high set over us, we live as Out-laws in the Kingdom of God, without any respect to that wished Authority by which he governs the World; and whilst we do so, all our Presences to Religion are impudent

Lies and Impostures.

IV. In order to our being truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that God is ready to contribute to us all that Affiliance which is neceffary to enable us to observe his Laws. That whereas in this corrupt State of our Nature, we are so indiffested to all good by our carnal Affections and vicious Habits, as that without some foreign Aid it is morally certain we shall never be reduced to a thorough Compliance with our Duty, God is always ready not only to fecond but to prevent our Endeavours, to inspire good Thoughts into our Minds, and by them to kindle devout Affections in our Wills, and by them to excite us to a conflant Course of pious and virtuous Endeavours; and that when he hath proceeded thus far with us he doth not presently abandon us to ourselves, and leave us to contend and flruggle in vain with insuperable Difficulties, but all along co-exercite with us, aids and affifts our Faculties, and with his boly Inspirations cherifbes our languishing Endeavours, 'till they have wrought their way thre' all the Difficulties of Religion into a permanent State of Picty and Virtue. So that unless we either turn a decf Ear to those good thoughts he fuggests to us, and refuse to listen to their Fer-Juapons, or quench those boly Affections which N_2 ther they kindle in us with earthly Cares and Pleasures, or by wilful finning harden our Heart against all the Impressions of his Grace, we shall not fail of being frequently and powerfully excited by him to Piety and Virtue; and when he thus excites us, if we do not wilfully flacken our Endeavours, and basely surrender back ourselves to our Lusts, in despight of all our Resolutions and his Persuasions to the contrary, we shall be so effectually and confuntly affifted by him, as that it will be impossible for us to fail of Success. For thus the Scripture assures us, that he gives grace to the humble, I Pet. v. 5. and thereby works in them to will and to do, Phil. ii. 13. and that to this End be gives bis bely Spirit to every one that asks, Luke xi. 13. The Belief of which is absolutely necessary to oblige us to submit to Religion. For tho' we are naturally free to Good as well as Evil, yet through the vicious Habits we have generally contracted, either through youthful Levity and Inconfideration, or ill Education and Example, our Liberty to Good is fo straitned and confined, that whenever we attempt to exercise it, we find a prevailing Biass on our Natures, that carries us the contrary Way, bearing before it all our good Refolutions, and tiring out our short-breath'd Endeavours, so that the good, we would, we do not, and the evil we would not, we do. And therefore unless we can depend upon God for Affiftance against the Violence and Outrage of our bad Inclinations, after we have once struggled with them in vain, and thereby made a woful Experiment of our own Impotence, we shall out of mere Despair of prevailing against them, give over attempting it, and utterly abandon ourielves to their Tyranny. But

But if we firmly believe that God who knows our Weakness and our Enemies Strength, will in Proportion to both readily affift us, whenfoever we heartily invoke his Aid, and in Concurrence therewith exert our own Endeavour, we have all the Encouragement in the World to undertake our Duty, maugre all the Difficulties that attend it. For being affured that God will concur with our Endeavours, we may depend upon it, that not only our own Endeavours are in our Power, but God's Assistance too, and that the Corruptions of our Nature do not so much overmatch our Endeavours, as God's Assistance over-matches those Corruptions. So that if we heartily exert our Endeavour, we are fure we cannot fail of Success, because we know that God will affift our Endeavour, and that with his Affiftance we cannot but be victorious. Since therefore the Grace of God is as much under the Command of our Will as our own Principles of Action, it is as much in our Power to do that which we cannot do without God's Grace, as to do that which we can. And therefore if God's Grace be fufficient to supply the Defect of our natural Power, and enable us to conquer the Difficulties of our Duty, we are fure there is nothing in it can be too hard for us; because now we can do not only all that we can do by eurselves, but also that we can do by the Grace of God.

V. To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that the Assistance which God affords us, is such as supposes us free Agents, and concurs with and maintains our natural Freedom. That it doth not necessarily determine us to Good, but leaves it to our own free Choice

to determine our felves which way we pleafe; that as he acts upon necessary Agents by a necessary In-flux and Causality which they cannot resist, and determine those things to act by his Will; which have no Will of their own to determine them, fo he acts upon free Agents by a free and unconstraining Influence, i. e. by suggesting Arguments to their Minds, to incline and perfuade them, but leaves it to tacir own Liberty to confider those Arguments are not, and to comply with those Perfugions, or rijest them; and that though as he hath sometimes sulpended the Powers of necessary Agents, and interrupted the natural Course of their Motion, as when he forbad the Sun to move, and the Fire to burn, so he hath at other times restrained the natural Liberty of free Agents, and determined them by an over-ruling Necessity, yet both the one and the other are extraordinary and miraculous: but that in the ordinary Course of his Government, he doth as well leave free Agents to that natural freedom with which he first created them, as necessary ones to those Necessities which he first impressed upon their Natures. For his Providence is succedaneous to his Creation, and did at first begin where that ended, and doth full proceed as it began, ordering and governing all things according to the feveral Frames and Models, in which he first cast and created them. Nor can be order and govern them cherwife without unravelling his own Creation, and making things to be otherwise than he first made them. For how can he ordinarily necessittate those Agents whom he first made free, without changing their Natures from free to necessary, and making them a different kind of Being

than he made them? So that though in the Course of his Government God doth powerfully importune and perfuade us, yet he lays no Necessity upon our Wills, but leaves us free to chuse or refule; and as the Temptations of Sin incline us one way, fo the Grace of God inclines us another, but both leave us to our own Liberty to go which way we please. And this the Scripture plainly afferts, where it makes mention of Men's refling the boly Ghost, Acts vii. 51. and grieving and quenching the Spirit of God, Ephel. iv. 30. 1 Thef. v. 19 and refujing to hear when God calls, and to regard when he stretches forth his Hand, and of their setting his Counsel at naught and rejecting his Reproofs, Prov. i. 24, 25. and in a word, where it makes mention of some Men's baffling and defeating that very Grace which would have conquered and perfuaded others, Matt. xi. 21. Which plainly imply that all that Assistance to do our Duty, that God ordinarily vouchfafes us in the Course of his Government, is fuch as no way determines or neceffitates us.

The Belief of which is highly necessary to engage us in the Service of Religion. For while Men imagine that their Duty is fuch as they cannot heartily comply with, which being compelled to it by an irreliftible Grace, and that no Affistance of God can be sufficient to this End, but that which fuspends their Liberty to Evil, and fatally determines them to Good, what should move them to exert their own Endeavour? Why flould they watch and pray, and strive and contend against a cerrupt Nature? For if God will make them good irrefifiibly, their Endeavour is needlefs; but if he will

will not, it is Labour in vain. To what End should they ply the Oar to stem the Tide of a degenerate Nature, fince without an irrefistible Gale from Heaven they shall never succeed, and with it they shall whether they ply or no? So that while Men live in Expectance of an irrefiftible Grace to make them good, they quit themselves of all their Obligations to a pious and virtuous Endeavour: but fo long as they believe that God's Grace is fuch as supposes and leaves them free, such as they may defeat or prosper by the good or ill Use of their Liberty, they cannot but discern themselves infinitely obliged to co-operate with it, to liften and confent to its bleffed Motions and Perfuafions, and constantly to endeavour to comply with them in their Actions, or at least not to refift them, and harden and fortify themselves against them, by acting counter to, and flying in the Face of their own Convictions. For fince the Grace of God doth not determine us to Good, but leaves us to our own Freedom, we can never expect to be determined to Good without our free Concurrence; which if we refuse we shall certainly perish in our Ein, and have not only the Bleed of our own Souls to answer for, but all that Grace too which we have baffled and defeated.

VI. To oblige us to be truly religious it is necessary that we should believe that God takes particular Cognizance of the good and ill Use we make of our natural Freedom; that he doth not merely gaze upon our Actions as an indifferent and unconcerned Spectator, but beholds them with the highest Concern and Regard, with infinite Complacency or Detestation, and treasures them up

in his all-comprehending Mind, to be produced for or against us in the Day of fearful Reckonings and Accounts; that he doth not inspect our Actions with a paffant and curfory View, as Things of little or no Moment, but lays them up in everlasting Remembrance, so that every good or evil Thing we do, stands upon Record in the Mind of God in order to our final Acquittal or Condemnation. fo the Scripture tells us, not only that God's eyes are upon the ways of man, and that he feeth all his goings, Job xxxiv. 21. and that his eyes run to and fro throughout the earth, and are in every place beholding the good and evil, 2 Chron. xvi. 9. and Prov. xv. 3. but that he fees good Actions though done in secret, and will reward them openly, Matt. vi. 6. and that he will bring every work into Judgment with every fecret thing, whether it be good or evil, Eccles. xii. 24.

The Belief of which is absolutely necessary to found the Obligations of Religion. For if we fuppose either that God sees not our Actions, or looks upon them with an indifferent Eye, without taking any Notice or Cognizance of them, there is no religious Consideration to oblige us. For upon this Supposal our Actions must all be indifferent to him; and if they are indifferent to him, what Reafon have we to make any Difference between them? It is true, good Actions are in themselves beneficial, and evil ones prejudicial to us, and therefore for our own Interest-sake we ought to chuse the one and refuse the other; but this abstracted from all Respects to God, is only a prudential and not a religious Observation; but why should we do any good or avoid any evil upon God's Account, if good and

and cvil are alike to him? But if we firmly believe that God not only fees whatfoever we do, but takes particular Notice of all our good and evil Actions, and out of an high Complacency in the one, and Abhorrence of the other, treasures up both in curlafling Remembrance, we cannot but discern ourselves obliged by all the Reason in the World to chaft what is good, and efchew what is evil. For what an infinite Encouragement is it to do good, to confider that while we are doing it, God's Eye is upon us, regarding us with high Applause and Approbation, and entring it with all its acceptable Circumstances into the eternal Record of his own Mind, from whence it shall be produced in the last Day, and proclaimed before Men and Angels to our everlasting Honour and Glory? So that when our Memory is lost upon Earth, and all that we did is swallowed up in the deep Abyss of Oblivion, our Pieties and Virtues shall be famed in the Records of Heaven, and have everlasting Memorials in the Mind of God. As on the contrary, what an infinite Discouragement is it from sinning, to consider that the Eye of that God, to whom Vengeance belongs, is intent upon us, following us thro all our Retreats and Concealments, and recording every ill Deed, and all its foul Aggravations, in the eternal Volumes of his own Remembrance, which he will one Day most certainly open and read out before all the World, to our everlasting Shame and Confusion? So that when the Pleasure of our Sin is gone, and all that rendered it tempting or definaile, forever vanished and forgotten, the Shame and Infamy of it shall stand upon Record, and be transmitted down to eternal Ages. VII. And. VII. And lastly, To oblige us to be truly religious it is also necessary we should believe that God will reward and punish us according to our doings; that he is neither an idle nor an impotent Spectator of our Actions, that merely pleases and vexes himself with the Contemplation of them; but that all the Notice he takes of them is in order to his rewarding and punishing them, which he will one Day most certainly do, to our everlasting Joy or Confusion. But because this Argument will be the Subject of the ensuing Chapter, I shall insist no farther on it.

SECT. II.

Of the Proofs and Evidences which there are to create in us a Belief of the Divine Providence.

AVING in the foregoing Section given an Account of those Parts and Branches of the Divine Providence, which are necessary to be believed, in order to the founding the Obligation of Religion; I shall proceed in the next Place, to shew what Evidences there are to create this Belief in us; and because this is the great Fundamental of all Religion, upon the Belief of which it all immediately depends, I shall endeavour to demonstrate the Truth of it.

I. A priori, by Arguments drawn from God himfelf.

- II. A posleriori, by Arguments drawn from fenfible Efficts of God in the World.
- I. I shall endeavour to assert the Truth of a divine Providence by Arguments drawn from God himself. For supposing that there is a God, that is to say, an infinitely wise, and good, and powerful Cause of all Things, (which I doubt not to make appear when I come to discourse of the sensible Effects of God in the World) it will from thence necessarily follow, that he upholds, disposes, and governs all Things by an over-ruling Providence: For,

I. If there be fuch a God, he must necessarily be and exist of bimself, without any Dependence upon any superior Cause.

II. He must necessarily be the Cause of all other

Things that are and do exist.

III. He must necessarily be present with all

Things.

- IV. Wherever he is, so active are his Perfections, that he cannot but operate wheresoever he finds Objects to work upon. From all which I shall make appear it will necessarily follow, that he continually exercises an over-ruling Providence over the World.
- I. If there be a God, he must necessarily exist or be of bimself without Dependence on any superior Cause. For when we speak of God, we mean by him a Being that is as perfect as it is possible, that hath nothing before him, nothing superior to him, nothing greater than himself; which cannot be meant of any derived Being; because all Effects

Effects are after their Causes, and in some respect inferior to them, as deriving their Beings, and all their Excellencies and Perfections from them. But to fay of God, that he is after or any way inferior to any Cause, is a palpable Contradiction to the very Notion of him; it is to say that there is fomething before the eternal Something, fuperior to this supreme Something, more perfect than infinite Perfection. So that either there can be no fuch Being as a God in the World, or he must be of himself or from his own Essence, in which there must be such an infinite Fulness of Being, as that from all Eternity past, to all Eternity to come, it is infinitely removed from not Being, and so by Necessity of Nature must from ever have been, and for ever be. And fuch a Being we must admit of whether we will admit of a God or no; for either we must allow that this World, or at least the Matter of it exists of itself by its own never-failing Fulness of Being, without ever needing any Cause to produce it, (which as I shall shew you by and by is impossible) or that all Things in it derive their Being from some first Cause, who having no Cause in being before him must necesfarily be uncaused and unproduced; and if God exists of himself, as he must do supposing he is, he must be superior to all Things; for that which is of itself cannot but be, and that which cannot but be can have no Power above it, because if it hath, that Power might have either bindered or extinguished its Being, and so it might not have been.

So that God's Self-existence necessarily supposes him exalted above all Power and Superiority, and consequently to be the supreme and sovereign Power over all Things; but to suppose him to be supreme and sovereign without exercifing Rule and Dominion, is ridiculous; for without the Exercise of Dominion, supreme Power is but a useless and insignificant Cypher-flourish with a glorious Name, Rule and Dominion being the only proper Sphere for supreme Power as such, to move and act in. So that unless God rules and governs, he is supreme to no Purpose, and his sovereign Power is useless and in vain, for if he exert his fovereign Power at all, it must be in Rule and Dominion, which is its only natural Province; but if he doth not, his Sovereignty is only a majestick Sloth that sits sleeping in an awful Throne with its Hands in its Bosom, without ever doing any Thing that is Sovereign; and of what Use is that fovereign Power that never exercises any AEt of Sovereignty? Since therefore God's Self-existence necessarily supposes his sovereign Power over all Things, we must either grant that he continually exercifes this power in ruling and governing the World, or affert that it is utterly useless and in vain, which, as I shall shew by and by, is as abfurd as it is blafphemous.

II. If there be a God he must necessarily be the Cause of all other Things that are and do exist. For whatsoever might not have been, or may not be, must be derived from something which cannot but be. If it might not have been, how came it to be? Not from itself to be sure, for then it must always have necessarily been; and therefore it must similarly be resolved into some other Cause which is of itself, and so cannot but always have been and

always

always be. Now that this World is not of itself, but from some other Cause that is of itself, is evident; because whatsoever is of itself, must necesfarily have all the Being, and all the Perfection of Being that is possible. For that which is of itself is necessarily of itself, and it is not only true that it cannot but be, but also that it cannot but be of itself; for if it might not have been of itself, it might not have been at all, because itself or its own Essence is the only Ground or Reason of its Being; and therefore if that Reafon might have failed it might never have been at all. Now that which necessarily is of itself, both neither actual nor pessible Cause of Being; for if it hath an actual Cause, it is not of itself; if any possible one, it is not necessarily of itself; and if it hath no possible Cause of Being, it is all that it is possible to be, that is, it is so compleat and perfect, that no possible Being or Perfection of Being can be added to it.

Besides, that which is of itself includes Necessity of Being in its Essence, and that which includes Necessity of Being, must always actually be what it is, and have nothing totential in its Nature; and that which hath nothing potential must have all possible Being and Persection. if there be any fessible Persection of Being which it hath not, it must be in possibility of being what it is not, and if so, it is not necessarily what it is. So that if the World be of isself, it must include in the Nature of it a Necessity of Being; and if fo, it must always actually be, that is, be always out of all Possibility either of not being or of being what it is not; and if it be cut of all Possibility of not Being, it must have all possible Being; if out of all Possibility of being what it is not, it must have all possible Perfection of Being, that is, all possible Power, and Knowledge, and Wisdom, and Goodness, which do all as necessarily result from Self-being as any essential Property from any Essence. Since therefore this material World hath none of these possible Perfections of Being in it, it is impossible it should be of itself, and if it be not of itself, it must have a Cause of Being that is distinct from and before itself; and what can the Cause be but God; since that which caused the World must be before all Causes, and that which is before all Causes must be uncaused and of itself; and that which is of itself must have all possible Reference.

fible Perfection, and confequently be God.

Since therefore the World was made by God, it will from hence necessarily follow that it is ruled and governed by him. For if he made the World, to be fure he made it for some End, it being unconceivable that infinite Wisdom should frame a World that is capable of the most noble and excellent Ends, without designing it to any End at all; and if he defigned it for any End, to be fure he is concerned that that End whatever it be should be accomplished; and if he be, his own Concernment will lead him to the Exercise of a Providence, which is nothing else but a constant and feedy Guidance of those Beings which he hath made, to those common and particular Ends for which he made them. For if he made them for any End, to be fure whatever it was, he did not let it drop out of his Mind and Thoughts as foon as he had made them, but still carries it a-

long

long in his Eye and Intention; and if he still intends that End, there is no doubt but he still profecutes it, which he cannot do without a Providence; for how can he drive Things on to the Ends for which he made them, if he be withdrawn from the World, and hath wholly sequestred himself from all the Affairs of it?

III. If there be a God, he must necessarily be present with all Things; because being of himself without any Cause, he must be without any Bounds or Limits of Being. For it is altogether unconceivable how any Thing that is of itself should be restrained or limited by itself. For tho' we must allow something to be of itself, whether we will admit of a God, or no, yet we cannot suppose that which is of itself to be the Cause of itself, without a Contradiction; because every Cause must be before its Effect; and therefore to suppose that which is of itself, to be the Cause of itself, is to suppose it to be before itself, that is, to be when it is not, or to be and not be together, which is impossible. When therefore we say that something is of itself, our Meaning can be no other than this, that it hath fuch an immense Plenitude of Being in itself, as that it neither needed nor required any Cause to produce it; and how can that which is of itself without being the Cause of itself be any way restrained or limited by it-felf? For that which limits Beings, is only the Will or Power of their Caufes, which either would not or could not bestow any further Being or Perfection upon them; and therefore only fuch Things as are caused are limited, because they being produced out of nothing, are only so far and no far-Vol. II. ther

ther brought into being, as their Cause was willing or able to bring them. That therefore which exists of itself without any Cause of Being, must exist of itself without any Limits of Being, be acuse it was neither limited by itself nor by any other Cause; and that which hath nothing to limit it, must necessarily be immense and boundless. God therefore being this Self-existing Being, must necessarily be of an unlimited Essence; an Essence which no possible Space can either circumscribe or define, but must necessarily be diffused all through, circumsused all about, and present with

all Things.

And if he be present with all Things, how is it imaginable he should fit still among them, and exercise no Providence over them? For fince he is a living Being, he must be vitally present wheresoever he is, and that he should be vitally and yet unactively present among a World of Beings, that he should live in this wide University of Things, and in every Part of it, and yet take no more Notice of, have no more Influence upon it than if he were a dead and fenfeless Idol, is altogether inconceivable; and we may as well imagine a Sun in the Universe without *Heat* or *Light*, as a living God furrounding and penetrating all Things without ever exerting his active Powers, or shedding forth his vital Influence upon them. For wherever Life is, it will operate; and therefore fince God, who is all Life and Activity, is every where, he must operate every where, and if he operate every where, that Operation is an Universal Providence.

IV. And laftly, If there be a God, he must be endowed with all those active Perfections of Power

and Wisdom, Justice and Goodness; all which must be present wheresoever he is. For as for Power, it is nothing else but the Spring or Fountain of Caufality, and therefore fince God is the first Cause, he must necessarily be the Spring of the Power of all Causes, and that from which all Power is derived must itself be all powerful; otherwise it will derive more Power than it hath, and be the Caufe of that whereof it hath no Caufality, which is a Contradiction. And then as for Wifdom and Goodness, they are inseparable to perfect Power; which how forcible foever it be, cannot be perfect except it be conducted by Wisdom and Goodness; for without these, Power is only an irrelistible Whirlwind, that sweeps and hurries all Things before it without any End, or Method, or Order. And what a lame, blind, and defective Power must that be, that can neither defign nor contrive, neither propose to itself beneficial Ends, nor yet chuse suitable Means to effect them? and in a Word, that can neither intend well nor profecute wifely? If therefore the Power of God be perfect, as it cannot but be, being the Original of all Power, it must necessarily be conjoined with perfect Wijdom and Goodness; with perfect Goodness to level its Intentions at good and beneficial Ends; with perfect Wisdom to order and direct its Profecutions.

Since therefore perfect *Power*, and *Wisdom*, and *Goodness*, are essential to God, they must be coextended with his *Essence*, which as I shewed before is extended to *all* Things. And how can we conceive such active Perfections as these to be present with all Things without ever acting upon O 2

them? For the very End and Perfection of all these Attributes consists in their Exercise; for so the End of Power is Action, the End of Wildom is ordering and contriving, and the End of Goodnefs is doing good. How then can we suppose that an infinite Power, whose End is Action, should be present where a World of Things are to be done, and do nothing? that infinite Wisdom whose End is ordering and contriving, should be present where a World of Things are to be ordered, and order nothing? Or that infinite Goodness whose End is doing good, should be present where a World of Good is to be done, and do none at all? What is this but to transform the Divine Perfections into fenfeless Idols, that have Eyes, but fee not, Hands, but act not; that have boundless, but useless and unactive Powers; that have glorious Names, but in reality stand but for so many Cyphers in the World? And thus I have endeavoured to demonstrate a Providence by Arguments drawn from God himself; but because there may be something in them too fubtle and metaphyfical for common Apprehensions to reach, I have but briefly infifted on them. I proceed therefore in the fecond Place to another fort of Arguments, which are more eafy and obvious, viz. fuch as are drawn from fenfible Effects, of which I shall give these fix Instances.

I. The constant Direction of Things to the same good Ends, which have no Design in them-felves.

II. The watchful Providence of Things which have no Forefight in themselves.

III. The

III. The mutual Agreement and Correspondency of Things which have no Understanding of themfelves, or of one another.

IV. The Continuation of Things in the fame

comely Order, which have no Government of

themfelves.

V. Miraculous Events.

VI. Predictions of future and remote Contingencies.

I. One sensible Instance of a Divine Providence is the constant Direction of Things to the fune good Ends which have no Defign in themselves. When we fee Things void of all Sense and Reason as constantly directed to good Ends, as they could be if they had Sense and Reason, we may be sure that there is a Reason without them that framed them for those Ends, and directs them to them; it being unconceivable how Chance or blind Necessity that have no Delign, or Art, or Contrivence in them, should constantly operate as regularly as Reason itself. Now if we survey this wast Univerfality of Things, we may easily observe, at least of the Generality of them, that they are framed for and directed to some wife and excellent End; and though through our own Shortfightedness, or want of Enquiry, we do not see the Use and Tendency of them all, yet this is no Argument at all that they are vain and laperfluous. For as we now the the Use of a World of Things which past Generations understreed not, so there is no doubt but future Generations will understand the U@ of a World more than we; and therefore fince the Ufefulness of the Generality of Things

Things is now so apparent and visible, we ought in all Reason to conclude, that our not discerning the Usefulness of them all, proceeds not from their Desect, and from our own Ignorance.

Let us therefore briefly furvey this beautiful Scene of Things that is before us. The Sun and Earth, for Instance, are Things that are utterly void of Understanding, and therefore can have no Design or Contrivance in them; how then came they to place and continue themselves at such commodious Distance from one another; whereas in fuch a vast and immense Space they might have found ten thousand Millions of other Places and Distances to fix in? The Earth might have found room enough to place itself either much nearer to, or much remoter from the Sun than it is; but if it had done so, it must have been either everlastingly parched or everlaftingly frozen and benighted, and either way converted into an useless, barren and uninhabitable Defert; whereas where it now is, it stands at the most convenient Distance from the Sun, to be warmed and cherished by his enlivening Fires, and neither to be roafted by being too near them, nor frozen by being too far from them; but to receive from them such a temperate Heat as is sufficient to excite its seminal Virtues, and to draw up its Juices into them, and thereby to ripen its natural Fruits, and in a Word, to comfort and refresh its Inhabitants, and to render it to them a pleasant, a healthful, and a fruitful Paradife. Since therefore of ten thousand Millions of Places wherein it might have fixed to that Immenfity of Space that furrounds it, it hath fixed upon, and doth still continue in the best, without any De-

fign or Wisdom of its own, it is plain that there is an over-ruling Wisdom without it that chose its Place, and fixes and determinates it thereunto. Again, How came the Sun, (for whether it be the Earth that moves about the Sun, or the Sun about the Earth is all one to our Enquiry) how came this Sun, I fay, which hath no Reafon to govern itself by, to be determined to such a useful Course of Motion? What makes this vast and mighty Bady move round the Earth in twenty-four Moisrs, in finishing which spacious Circle of Motion it must fly far fwifter than a Bullet from a Cannon's Mouth; and yet through fo many Ages each twenty-four Hours it hath constantly performed it, without being so much as one Minute faller or flower; whereby it makes those just and regular Returns of Day and Night to both the Hemispheres, so that neither the one nor the other is either too much heated by his Presence, or too long benighted by his Absence, because as soon as the one hath been fufficiently warmed and cherifbed with his Roye, he immediately retires from it into the other, and by fo doing he gives the active Animals leave to reft, the over-heated Air to cool, and the galling Earth to repair its fainting Virtues, which a continued Heat would foon exhauft and extinguith. Thus by returning Day and Night to both Parts of the Earth once in twenty-four Hours, he preserves both their Heat and Moisture upon which all Generations depend, in a due and regular Temper, so that neither their radical Moisture is consumed by the parching Droughts of the Day, nor their vital Heat extinguished by the cool Moistures of the Night, but the one still allays and tempers the other by their quick

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and alternate Revolutions. How then can the Sun that understands no Utility, and designs no End, to be determined to this Course or Motion, which above all others is so admirably useful and advantageous to this World we live in? Again, What is the Reason that since he thus equally moves round the Earth, he doth not always move in the fame Circle, but run out every Day into a different Circle almost a whole Degree farther Northward or Southward, and this so constantly and so precisely, that in fix thousand succeeding Revolutions he hath never varied to much as one Minute from his Course either one way or the other, and by these his stated Excurrencies towards the North and South he makes the Scafons of the Year, gives a Summer and a Winter, a Spring and a Fall to all Parts of the Earth, without which the Earth would long ere this have been utterly useless, and all its Fruits, and for want of them its Animals too would have for ever perished? For some Paits of it would have been scorched with everlasting Heat, others bound up with everlasting Frost; here it would have been all a Sandy, there all an Icy Defert, and fo both Vegetation and Generation would every where have utterly ceased, either for want of Moissure or for want of Heat. How came the Sun then, which hath neither Sense nor Reason of his own to guide him, to be directed into such a commodious Course of annual Motion, when as in that vast Space he moves in, he might as well have run ten thousand other Courses of Motion? He might have moved all the Year round the Earth's Equator; but if he had done so, all the middle Tracts of Earth both Northward and Southward would foon have been **fcorched** feorched up with his continual Presence, and all the remoter Parts both ways would quickly have died with Cold through his perpetual Absence: or he might have run his annual Course on one Side only of the Earth's Equator, an I made his circular Excursions to or beyond the Pole; but if he had done so, he must have left a great Part of the opposite Hemisphere exposed to everlasting Night and Cold; whereas in the annual Course of Motion he now performs, he sheds forth his Light, and Heat and Influence over all the World, and by turns gives every Part its yearly Seafons, which is a plain Evidence that all his Motions are conducted by a wife and over-ruling Mind, which among so many Courses of Motion that lie before him in the boundless Space he moves in, hath determined him to that which for Perpetuity is much the best and most commodious.

And the same is to be said of the Motions of the Moon, which Nature bath designed for a vicarious Light to the Sun, to fupply his Absence and perform his Office in this lower World. For what makes this fenfeless and irrational Planet, that moves without any Intention of its own, wander by turns Northward and Southwarnd some Degrees beyond the Sun? and what makes it move Northward when the Sun is Southward, and again Southward when the Sun is Northward; whereas in that immense Space wherein it swims, it hath room enough to run a thousand other Courses of Motion, none of which could have been so advantageous to us as this? For by moving Northward when the Sun is Southward, and so è contra, it moderates the Cold and Darkness of the Winter Nights, and by passing beyond the Tropicks, which are the Boundaries of the Sun, it in some Measure supplies his Absence, by enlightening those long and tedious Nights in which the Regions towards the Poles are buried; which is a plain Instance of the singular Care of Providence, that no Parts of the Earth should be left altogether destitute of the necessary Comforts of the Heavenly Light and Warmth.

Again, How came the Air which hath no Defign in itself, to place itself so commodiously as it hath done between the Earth and the Heavens? Why is there not a wide Vacuity between? Or if fome Body must needs intervene, why was it not Fire or Water as well as Air, which of all other Bodies is the most commodious? For had it been a void Space, there could have been no Intercourse between Heaven and Earth; or had it been filled with Fire or Water, it would have confumed or drowned the Earth, and all Things belonging to it; but as for the Air, which is a thin, swift, fluid and transparent Body, it is of all others the most proper Vehicle of the Celestial Influences. For what other Body is there, that through fuch a stupendous Distance could have conveyed down to us the Light and Heat of the Sun, with fuch an ineffable Swiftness; or what other Element could have been fo proper for Animals to move and breathe in? Since therefore this Space between the Earth and Heavens might have been supplied with other Bodies, but with none fo fit as Air, which yet is no way conscious of its own Fitness, and so cannot be supposed to choose this Space for itself, it is a plain Evidence that there was a wife

wife Mind without it that chose this Habitation for it.

And now weare come down to this terrestrial Globe, which confifts of Earth and Water, let us briefly confider the admirable use of both, and of all Things appertaining to them. How came the fenfeless Water to bore Holes and Channels in the Banks of the Ocean through long Tracts of Earth, and against its own Nature to climb up to the Tops of Mountains, that fo it may be able not only to run down again with Ease, but also to carry itself to fuch Heights afterwards, as the Necessities of Men and Beasts require, and to unite into large Rivers, that run into all the inland Parts of the Earth, watering both them and their thirsty Animals all along as they go, till at last they return into the Ocean again? How comes this dull and fenfeless Element, that can consult neither its own Conscience nor that of other Beings, to be salt, where it is convenient for itself to be salt, viz. in the Ocean, by which it is preserved from Putrcfaction; and fresh where it is convenient for other Beings that it should be fresh, viz. in the Fountains and Rivers, that so it may be fit to fructify the Earth, and to be a wholesome Drink for its Animals? How came so many Rivers and Fountains which do all arise from the salt Waters of the Sea, to be stripped of their falt Particles, by running through the Pores of the Earth, and thereby to be rendered both fruitful to the Ground and wholesome for Men and Beasts? How comes it to pass that so many Clouds as are drawn up out of the falt Ocean, should in their Ascent so far shake off their Salt as to descend back again upon the

Earth in fweet and fresh Showers? and how come those Vapours of which the Clouds consist, and which are much thicker and heavier than the Air, to be drawn aloft as they are by the Rays of the Sun, which have neither Pumps nor Buckets to exhale them? And when they are aloft in the Air, how come they to gather into thick Clouds, and not rather to disperse themselves about in that vast Expansum, or to return back again to the Earth in thin Vapours as they arose? and while they hang in the Air, what is it that fustains their Weight, and when they fall, how comes it to pass that they ordinarily fall in soft and gentle Showers that water the Roots of the Grass and Corn, without any prejudice to their Stalks and Blades, and not rather in Miss or Streams, which either would be insufficient to moisten the Earth, or lay waste its Corn and Fruit, with the Violence of their Fall? all which are illustrious Instances of a wife and powerful Providence, that directs and orders this fenfeless Element, and causes it ordinarily to move and act as if it had Wisdom in itself, and did therewithal industriously consult the publick good of this World; but this Argument you may find handled more at large in a late excellent Treatife de Deo.

And now we are arrived to the *Earth* whereon we live and move and have our Beings, which though itself be of a broken and irregular Figure, and feems to be rather the mighty Ruins of some more beautiful Structure, than an *original Effect* of the divine Art and Contrivance, yet contains in it the most amazing Instances of an *all-wise* and *all-powerful* Providence. For how comes this dull

and stupid Lump to be impregnated with such an infinite Variety of seminal Virtues, all which do proceed as orderly and artificially in the Formation of their Plants and Fruits, as if they were every one endued with a most wise and intelligent Mind? For fince the Plants do all derive their Nourishment from the inward Parts of the Earth, it is necessary that some Parts of them should be buried under Ground, that so they may come at their Food; and that these Parts would be fitted with spungy strings to fasten them to the Earth, and to fuck in those Juices of it whereon they feed; and accordingly the feminal Virtue of every Plant first forms itself a Root under Ground, which runs out more or less from the Centre of it into greater or smaller Strings proportionable to the Magnitude of the Plant it bears, that so how great foever it be, it may by these Strings be so fastened to the Earth, as that the Wind to which its upper Parts are exposed, may not be able to tear them up; then this feminal Form, whatfoever it be, digefts these Strings into a porous and spungy Substance fit to suck in the Juices of the Earth on every fide, and bores little Holes or strait Fibres through them from one end to the other, that fo by these Conduit-pipes they may all convey the Juices they imbibed into the Centre of the Root; and having thus formed its Root, and by these Strings or nervous Filaments fupplied it with plenty of Juice, by strange mysterious Art it concocts the liquid Matter into a hard and folid Substance, through which it also bores an infinite number of strait Fibres from the very Centre of the Root, to convey up with it those Juices that

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that are lodged there, with the thicker Parts of which it nourishes and increases its more solid Substance, thrusting forth the thinner towards the Surface, and the thinnest at the Extremities of its Branches; the former of which it digests into a Bark, wherewithal it cloaths the tender Body of its Plant, to defend it against the Violences of Heat and Cold; the latter into Leaves, and therewithall adorns its Branches, and shelters its Fruit from the Scorching of the Sun, and the exceffive Moisture of the Rain; and by thus distributing the still-rising Juices, it still encreases its Plant till fuch time as it arrives to its full Growth and Maturity; fo that from the utmost Strings of the Root, to the Centre of it, from the Centre of the Root to the highest Branches of it, from the Branches to the Leaves and Fruit of it, these porous Fibres run on, by which every Part, how distant foever from the Root, fucks up its Juices and digests them into its own Substance; for even the Leaves and Fruit are hung upon the Branches by little, foft and fpungy Stalks, through which there run innumerable Fibres that convey the Juice from the Branches, and by stupendous Art distribute it by their Pores through all the whole Body of the Leaves and Fruit. But then by what particular Art the feminal Vir-Vide Lessius tues of each particular kind doth fo de Prov. constantly and regularly concoct and elaborate the Juices of the Earth into their own fpecifick Smells and Tastes, and Figure and Colours, is a Mystery that confounds and puzzles all our Philosophy. Now whence I beseech you proceeds this curious, inimitable Art which

we with all our Reason can neither transcribe nor compichend? Not from the things themselves fure: For how can they have Art that have no Reason? And therefore of Necessity it must proceed from some all-wise, superintending Mind, that either immediately contrives and frames them, or else impresses their seminal Virtues with its own all-wife and powerful Art whereby they contrive and frame themselves.

And if in the Composure of every plant there are fuch visible Footsteps of a divine Art, how much more of every Animal, whose Parts for infinite Variety, delicate Smallness, exquisite Shape, Pofition and Temper, do as far excel the other, as the Offices for which they are defigned? For tho' the plastick Soul that forms the Animal hath not the least Ray of Art or Reason of its own, yet in the Formation of it, it proceeds with as much curious and incomparable Art as if it were endowed with the most perfect Reason. For first it spins out the thicker Parts of the seminal Matter into little Threads or Fibres, part of which it hollows into Pipes, and part into Spunges, some whereof are more thin, and some more solid; all which with wondrous Arts it cuts and prunes in divers places, fitting their Ends to one another, and in divers Manners knitting them together into a well-proportioned Structure of Bones and Members; then of the thinner Parts of the feminal Matter it forms the Entrails, viz. the Liver and Heart and Brains, drawing out from each certain Fibres to be formed into Vcins, and Arteries and Nerves, for which end it bores and hollows them through, extends and stretches them out at length, and divides them

them into innumerable Branches, which it spreads through all the Intrails, and thereby maintains a mutual Communication between them, and derives the Nourishment and Animal and Vital Spirits through all the Body; and having thus foun the feveral Parts of the feminal Matter, and curioully woven them together, it concocts the remainder of the Matter which is still supplied with new Nourishment into the Substance of those several Parts, and this in fuch precise and regular Proportions, as to form every one of them, tho' infinitely various from one another, into its own proper Figure, and Measure, and Proportion; so that within feven Days after the Conception, the whole Body is entirely framed, and diffinguished into all its proper Parts and Members; which, though they are fo vastly great in their Number, so strangely different in their Size and Figure, fo infinitely various in their Motions and Tendencies, do all contribute one way or other to the Beauty and Benefit of the whole; fome to propagate the Kind, others to preserve the Individual, others to diffinguish what is necessary, convenient and pleasant from what is dangerous, offenfive or destructive to its Nature; some to pursue what is good, others to shun what is evil; others to enjoy those goods, and others to defend it against those evils that threaten or invade it; so that of all these infinitely numerous and diverse Parts, not one can be wanting or defective without fome confiderable Damage to the whole. How then is it conceivable that such infinite number of different Animals, which are all fo perfect in their Kind, fo amazingly curious in their Composition, as that we with

with all our Reason can discern nothing in them that is either fuperfluous or defective, nothing in their Figure that is irregular, nothing in their Pofition that is misplaced, nothing in their Metion that is exorbitant, should all of them be framed by their feveral plastick Souls, which are utterly blind and irrational, without the Conduct and Direction of an all-wife and all-powerful Providence? Should you behold a confused Heap of Earth, and Stone, and Iron, and Timber, without any visible Artificer near it, fall a polifhing its own Parts, fitting them to one another, and disposing them into Order according to the Rules of Architecture; and at length frame them all together into the Form of a most beautiful Palace, would you not conclude that some skilful Mind were invisibly prefent there, and did work upon this fenfeless Heap, and dispose its Parts into this comely Order? And yet in the Composure of any one Animal there is infinitely more Art than in the most beautiful Structure in the World. How then can we imagine that the blind, art'ess Matter, of which it is composed, could ever have framed itself into this admirable Form and Contexture, had not some great Mind been invifibly prefent at the Compofition of it, or at least imprinted on its artless Matter, some powerful Signature of its own wife Art to direct, and Order to contrive it.

I might from hence have proceeded to the Formation of Man, the Master-piece of all this lower Creation, in whose Frame and Structure there are fuch Miracles of Art as do out-reach both the Imitation and Wonder of the most raised and comprehenfive Minds. For who can fufficiently admire the skilful Contexture of his Corporeal Parts, which, tho' almost infinite in Number and Variety, do not only compose a Body of a most amiable Symmetry and Proportion, but are also as exactly framed, and tempered and adapted to perform the Offices of Life, and Motion, and Sense, and Reafon, as Art or Wit can fancy and imagine them? But then how much more admirable is the Soul which inhabits and animates this Body? for of whatfoever Substance this Thing we call our Soul is, it is evidently framed for great and noble Operations, to disclose the Mysteries of Nature and to dive into its deep Philosophy, to penetrate into the Causes of Things, and with its nimble and sagacious Thoughts to furvey this ample Theatre of Beings; to recollect Things past, and to foretel Things to come; to invent the most useful Arts and comprehenfive Sciences, to dictate good Laws, and project wife Policies for the Government of Human Societies; and in a Word, to understand the right Reasons of Things, and to regulate its Will and Affections by them; and is it poslible we should imagine a Being thus exquisitely framed, to be the Product of a blind and artless Matter, to be nothing but a lucky Jumble of fenfeless and irrational Atoms? For suppose it were nothing but elaborated Matter, yet certainly it requires infinite Art and Skill to contrive and fashion it into all those curious Springs, and Wheels and Mechanick Knacks that are necessary to render it not only a living and feeling, but also a wife and rational Matter. For how is it conceivable that a little Drop of Water, without the Affistance of any Mind or Providence, should form itself not only into all

the Parts and Lineaments of a Human Body, but also into a Human Mind, a Mind of velt Defires and infinite Capacities of Knowledge, that can form Ideas within itself of every thing that is round about it, and from them can frame innumerable Propositions, and deduce them into Arts and Sciences; and in a Word, that can move itself and the Body it lives in, by its own internal Springs, and form itself into so many various and contrary Affections, by the mysterious Force and Energy of its own Reason and Discourse? If you beheld a dead Pencil move without any visible Hand, and dip itself into various Colours, and draw but an exact Picture of a Man, you would doubtless conclude either that some invisible Limner had infused into it the Art of Limning, or did immediately manage and direct it. But should you find this Picture, when it is drawn and finished, not only live and move, but reason and discourse, and exert all forts of Animai and Human Operations, could you imagine that ever the blind, irrational Pencil formed it of itself without being managed or directed by some superior Mind or Providence?

And thus I have given some brief Instances of the constant Direction of all sorts of Things, how stupid and irrational soever, to some wife and good End; which is a plain Evidence of an universal Providence over the World, that in a constant and uniform Series directs Things to their proper Ends, that have no Aim or Design of their own, and so are utterly uncapable to guide and direct

themselves.

II. Another fensible Evidence of a Divine Prowidence is, the fagacious Providence of Things that P 2 have have no Forefight in themselves. For among irrational Beings that can neither apprehend for what Ends they act, nor by what Means they may best effect them, how strange it is to confider with what Infight and Providence they many of them act in firring up Provisions for themselves against a Time of Extremity, in framing their own Beds and Nests, and defending themselves and their Young against approaching Dangers; in educating their Young, and propagating their Kind through all succeeding Generations; insomuch that if they were every one endued with Reason of their own to feresee their own Dangers, and forecast their own Conveniency and Safety, they would not act with more Skill and Sagacity than they do. For thus the Plants that have neither Sense nor Reason to different he Periods of their own Growth and Decay, when they have almost spent themselves, and are ready to wither and die, run up into Seed, as if they foresaw their own approaching Fate, and did thereupon bethink themselves of propagating their Kind before it be too late, and leaving a numerous Posterity behind them. And therefore fince they have neither Thought nor Forecast in themselves, it is evident that there is a Providence that thinks and forecasts for them.

Thus also those Plants that shoot up on high, but are too weak to support themselves, such as the Hop, and Vine, and Ivy, run out into little Strings or Tendrils with which they lay hold upon some Body that is stronger than themselves, as if they were conscious of their own Weakness, and so to prop up themselves did designedly twist about those stronger Bodies, that are best able to support

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them. And therefore fince they neither know their own Weakness, nor yet the Strength of the Trees or Wall they depend on, it is evident that there is a wife Providence that knows both, and

guides and directs them to their Safety.

And as there is a visible Providence over Plants, fo there is also over brute and irrational Animals, and especially over the smallest and most contemptible, who by Reason of their natural Weakness and Impotence are less able to provide for themfelves. For thus the Spider is a Creature as void of Reason as the Plant of Sense; and yet with what wondrous Art doth he spin his Web out of a viscous Matter within his own Bowels? He extends the Threads of it cross to one another, leaving equal Angles in the Middle, fastering the extreme to the opposite Threads, and then, lest through the Weakness of the slender Threads of which it is composed, the Fly he hunts should happen to break through, he weaves feveral Under-nets one within another, and with a wondrous Art fastens them all together, that so if one should fail. the other might hold; and when he hath thus fixed and spread his subtile and strange contrived Snare, he lies in wait in a little Den without. made by him on purpose to conceal himself; from whence, as foon as the Ply is entangled, he fwiftly runs and feizes it, and having killed it, carries it away and lays it up in a fafe Repository against a Time of Famine. In all which Performance this irrational Infect proceeds as providently and wisely as if in a long Deduction he had inferred one Thing from another, and acted upon the most rational Deliberation; and therefore fince he

is void of reason bimfelf, and doth not determine himself by any natural Logic of his own, he must proceed by the Region and Direction of some wife Mind without him, that he hath the guidance and disposal of his Motion. For be begins not to exercife his Art after he is arrived to a riper Age, but is born with his Trade about him, and spins and weaves from his very Infancy; nor is there any diversity in his Manufacture, as there useth to be in those of rational Artificers, but it is always woven in the same Manner, and Figure, and Fashion, which is a plain evidence that he effects it not by any Art or Reafon of his own, but by mere natural Infinst, which is nothing but the Impreffion of the Art and Reafen of the Author of Nature, which Impression knows not what it doth, nor upon what Reason it proceeds, but only anfwers to the Reafon of God as the Signature doth to the Seal that imprest it, and like an Echo, articulates and refounds his Voice without understanding what it means. And as the fenfeless Echo when it reverberates Words that carry Sense and Reason in them, supposes the original Voice to proceed from some intelligent Mind; so these irrational Instincts of Nature, which express so much Art and Reason in their Operations, do neceffarily imply that there is fome wife Mind or Providence to which they owe their Original and Continuance.

For thus to inftance farther, with what a strange and wonderful Art do the Bees frame their Combs, which they divide on each side into a world of little fix-cornered Cells, and then prop them up with middle Walls of Pillars which they raise from

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the Floor into an Arch, by which as they are rendred more firong, so the Bees have an entrance through to repair them whenever they decay; and having thus artificially built their Houses, with what industry they do wander to and fro to gather the fweet Dews of Heaven, whereon they live, from the Herbs and Flowers of the Field, and with what care do they treasure them up in those little Cells against Winter, when they can neither go forth by reason of the Cold to seek their Sustenance abroad, nor yet find it if they could; and when they have filled their Cells with their winter Provision, they providently draw over the mouth of them a thin Skin or Membrane to preferve the grateful Liquor lest it should drop out and be lost; and in a Word, in what a regular Order do they live, they rest and labour all together, and in the discharge of several Offices conspire to the same Work; some press the Flowers with their Feet, others with their Mouths or Down of their Podies gather up the Moistures which these press out and carry them home to these Cells; some bring home the Materials of which their Cells are composed, others disburthen them of it, others build with it, and others plane and polish the Building. Thus all Hands are at work first to build the House they are to dwell in, and to divide it into its feveral Apartments, and then to store them all with Provifion against the ensuing time of Scarcity. Now therefore (not to mention their wondrous Polity and Government of which so many curious Observations have been made) how is it possible they should do all these Things with so much Regularity and exact Order, without being guided by P 4 fome

fome Art and Reafon? Be et it is certain it is not by any Reaton of their case; they do not at all confider when they build, how needful Houses are for themselves and their Winter Provisions, nor how convenient that waxy Matter which they gather is to build those Houses, nor what Necessity there is of dividing them into diffinet Cells and Apartments; they understand not the Nature of those sweet Dews which they gather, whether they are Food or Poison, and when they gather more than they have prefent Need of they know not why they do it, they reason not with themfelves that Winter is approaching, wherein neither these Dews will fall, upon which they live, nor themselves be able to go forth and gather them, and that therefore it behoves them to store themselves before-hand against the ensuing Famine; and when they have laid up their Store and are binding it in with the Membrane they draw over it, they do not confider that it is a fluid Matter that will be apt to run out and be loft; and yet all these Things they perform with as much Regularity and Art, as if they had thoroughly weighed and confidered, and perfectly understood the Reasons of them; which is a plain Evidence that they are acted by a Reason that is not their own, and what other Reason can this be than that of the divine Mind which governs and disposeth all Things? And the same may be said of Ants, and Moles, and Palmer-avorms, and innumerable other Animals, which tho' they have no Reason of their own, are vet in many Instancesas evidently conducted by Reason as any rational Beings whatever.

For with what admirable Art do the irrational Birds form their Nests a little after their coupling; they begin to build though they neither confider that they are breeding, nor yet do foresee when they shall lay; by which it is plain that there is a Providence which confiders and foresees for them; and though they understand not what Materials are fittest to build their Nests, nor in what Order to frame and dispose them, yet there is a very wise Understanding that directs them both to choose and contrive the Materials, and this with greater Art than we with all our Reason can do. For as for the outward Surface of their Nests which comes not near their Bodies, they frame it with Sticks and Thorns, which with inimitable Art they twist and interweave into a round and uniform Hollowness, which they commonly daub round with Mud to render it more compact and warm; when this is done, tho' they understand not their own specifick Frame and Constitution, yet they proceed as if they did, and fuit their Nests to the strength or weakness of their Natures; for those of them that are of a bardier Make, content themselves with an inward Plaistering, and when it is dried proceed to lay and batch their Eggs on it, without troubling themfelves to line it with any fofter Materials, as if they knew beforehand that the Constitution of their Young would be fuch as would not need any Softness or Delicacy; whereas those that are of a tenderer Frame take care to cloath the bard Plaistering with Straw, or Hay, or Moss, upon which those that are tenderest of all make another Layer of Hair, or Down, or Feathers, as if they perfectly understood what degree of Softness and Warmth would be neceffary

ceffary for the Prefervation and Nourishment of their tender Offspring. Since therefore it is certain that they know none of all these Things, and yet they act as if they did, they must necessarily be supposed to act by the Direction of some wise Mind that perfectly knows them all. And then again, confidering with what Patience and Diligence the Female fits upon her Eggs when she hath laid them, as if the understood the Philosophy of her own Warmth, how necessary it is to form and animate and hatch them, and with what Care and Industry the Male brings her in Provision whilst she is sitting, that so she may not be forced by the Necessiaties of Nature to neglect her Eggs, and leave them too long exposed to the cold Air, which in a short time would destroy the tender Principles of Life within them; and in a Word, with what Care and Industry they both conspire to cherish and feed their Young when they are hatch'd, till fuch time as they are cloath'd and fledged, and can fly abroad to feek Provision for themselves; considering, I fay, how in all these Things they proceed as if they perfectly understood the Reasons and Necessities of their own Actions, it is plain that they must be guided either by a Reason in their own, or in some other Mind, that hath the Command and Conduct of their Motions. Now that it is not by a Reason of their own is evident, because whatsoever they do, they necessarily do, and cannot possibly do otherwife, for they never vary in their Operations, never try any new Experiments, but always proceed in the same Road and repeat the same Things in the fame Method, which is a plain Sign that they cannot do otherwise, and consequently that they act

not from Reason but Necessity; and therefore since they are made and impelled to act as they do, and yet do act fo rationally and wifely, that which impels them must be a rational Mind, either acting upon them immediately, or by a fixed and permanent Impression of its Art and Reason on their Motions. For as Ariflotle hath long fince observed, έτε τέχνη έτε ζητήσον α έτε βελευσάμενα σοιεί, they do these things neither by any art nor council nor deliberation of their own. They are not Masters of the Wisdom by which they act, but are merely passive to the Impressions of that Wisdom that are made upon them. For so Men we see for their own Profit and others Pleasure can teach Dogs and other Animals to dance the Measures of Tunes and other artificial Motions, the Rules and Ends of which they understand not; for when they perform these Motions, they neither think of their Master's Prosit nor the Spectator's Pleasure, which is the End and Design of them, nor understand the Proportions of Musick, which is the Rule of them, so that the Reason of their Motion is only in their Teacher's Mind, who by frequent use doth by Degrees imprint the Practice of his Art upon their Fancies: and if Man can so imprint his Art upon these artless Creaturs, as to make them practife it without understanding either the Grounds or Reasons of it, how much more may an all-wife, and Almighty Mind? And therefore fince de facto we behold a World of curious Art among brute Animals, that far exceeds all the little Feats we can teach them, why may we not as reasonably believe, that any one of these dancing Animals learned all his artificial Motions, the Reasons of which he understands not, without any Arts Master to teach them, as that Ants and Bees acquired all the Art and Providence they practise, without either discovering the Reasons of it by any Understanding of their own, or being ever instructed in it by any other provident Mind: for Art and Provvidence cannot be supposed without Reason, and therefore since the Reason of their Art is not in themselves, it must necessarily be in some Mind without them that hath the Conduct and Direction of all their Motions.

III. Another fensible Evidence of a divine Providence is the mutual Agreement and Correspondency of Things that have no Understanding in themfelves, or of one another. For if we look abroad into the World, we cannot but observe an admirable Harmony among things which yet have no kind of Knowledge of one another, and therefore cannot be supposed to have framed and adapted themselves to one another, nor yet to be so framed and adapted, but by the Art and Contrivance of some very wife and intelligent Mind. For how can any cause fit any two Things to one another without having some Idea in his Mind of the Natures of them both? If therefore in the Nature of Things we can discover a World of mutual Suitabilities of this or that, and of one thing to another, it will be a fufficient Argument that they all proceed from some wise Cause that had an universal Idea of their Natures in his Mind, and faw how fuch a thing would fuit fuch a thing, before ever he actually adapted them one to another.

Now not to infift any farther upon the admirable Fitness of the Sun and Earth, the Water and Earth, the Air and Heaven and Earth one to an-

other, which I have largely discoursed already, how exactly is every Animal fitted for its Element? and every Element for its Animals? Thus the Birds for Instance, are fitted with Wings to fly aloft in the Air, and the Air is fitted to bear them up, and to yield to the Vibration of their Wings: Fiftees are fitted to fwim in the Water, having Fins which ferve inflead of Oars to cut through and divide the Streams, and the Waters are fitted for the Fish to swim in, being a soft and shid Substance that is eafily cut and divided; and as for the Earth and those earthly Animals that inhabit it, there is an admirable Congruity between them; for they being all framed to walk or creep must have an hard and folid Matter to move on, and the Earth being an hard and folid Matter requires fuch Animals as can walk or creep on it; and as every Element is fitted for the Motion of its Animals, and every Animal to move in its Element; fo every Element hath a Food that is proper to the Appetites of its Animals, and every Animal an Appetite that is proper to the Food of its Element. So that as every Animal is fitted within with all those Faculties and Organs that are requisite to its procuring and enjoying what is good for it, and its shunning and repelling what is hurtful; fo it is also furnished without with all that is necessary or convenient for its Support and Satisfaction. Thus every Faculty within hath an Object without prepared for it, that is exactly correspondent therewith, without which, as hath been excellently obferved, the Faculty would become vain and ufelefs, yea and fometimes harmful and destructive, as reciprocally the Object would import little or nothing, thing, if such a Faculty were not provided for and fuited to it. For thus the Eye would be perfectly useless if it were not for the Light, and the Light would be much less considerable if it were not for the Eye: for if all Light were extinguished, all those curious Colours into which the Light is refracted would be utterly infignificant; and if all those Colours were extinguished, the Eye would be utterly deprived of one of its most pleasant Entertainments. And what Use would there be of all their infinite variety of melodious Sounds, fragrant Odours, and delicious Savours which this Frame of Nature affords, were there no hearing, smelling or tasting Faculties? And what would these Faculties fignify, were there no fuch Sounds, or Odours, or Savours? So that these Objects and Faculties are all as perfectly fitted one to another as it was possible for Art to fit them; nothing could be better fitted for feeing than the Eye, nothing better framed to render Things visible than the Light, and Light can be refracted into no Colour fo grateful into the Eye as green, which is the great Colour of Nature; and the fame may be faid of the Ear and Sounds, the Smell and Odours, the Taste and Savours; and if the Eye were made to fee, and the Ear to hear, as there is no doubt but they were, being so exquisitely framed for that Purpose; to be fure Light was made for feeing, and Sounds for hearing, and fo for all the rest; and how is it posible that fo many Things should be made fo exactly harmonious and agreeable with one another without the powerful Art and Direction of some very skilful Mind, and knew before-hand that this Thing would perfectly fit that, and confequently had

had a perfect Idea of them both? When therefore we behold fuch exact correspondencies between the motive Faculties of Animals and the Elements they move in, between the Fruits and Products of those Elements and the Faculties of Taste, Digestion and Nutrition in those Animals that inhabit them; and in a Word, between all fenfible Objects without, and fensitive Objects within, how is it possible we should be so senseless as not to trace out an all-directing Wisdom by Footsteps that are so express and remarkable? For suppose you heard a musical Instrument move its own Strings into an exquisite Harmony, and run long Divisions of curious and well-proportioned Notes, without the Impulse of any visible Artist, would you not conclude either that fome invisible Hand did immediately touch and play upon its Strings, or that they were moved by some internal Spring and Contrivance of a mufical Mind? How then can we attend to the admirable Harmonies of Nature, to the natural References and due Proportions and exact Correfpondencies of all its innumerable Parts to one another, without believing that there is some great harmonical Mind which tuned it at first, and still plays upon it by the immediate Touch and Impulse of its own invisible Hand?

And as all Things are thus fitted and adapted together, so are they also most regularly fubordinated to one another according to their Rank and Worth; the fenfeless Elements, with all their Fruit and Product, being subject to the Use of Animals to whom they afford a vast Variety of all Conveniencies and Necessaries answerable to their Defires and Needs; fo that of all those vast Numbers

of fensitive Beings there is no one kind or individual, no not so much as a Fly, or Worm, or Infect but what is plentifully supplied out of these common Storehoules of Nature. And as the Elements are subjected to the Use of Animals, so both are subject to the Use of Man, who is as much superior. to the brute Animals, as they are to the senseless Elements. To him therefore, as it is most fit and congruous, all Things here below pay Tribute; the Earth engenders within its Bowels Quarries of Stone, and Mines of Coal and Metals, to ferve his necessary Uses and Conveniencies, and spreads its Surface with a vast Variety of Herbs and Flowers and fruitful Trees to fupply him with Food and with Phylick, and treat him with Pleasure and Delight; to entertain his Eye with beautiful Colours, his Smell with fragrant Odours, and his Palate with delicious Savours; the Waters ferve to quench his Thirst, to dress his Food, to fructify his Fields and Gardens, to cleanse his Body and Habitation, and to maintain and facilitate his Intercourse and Trassick with all Parts of the World; the Air fans him with refreshing Gales, supplies him with Breath and with vital and animal Spirits; the Fire warms and cherisheth him, concocts his Meat and Drink into fit and wholesome Nourishment, and serves him in his most necessary Arts and manual Operations. And as all the four Elements do one way or other conspire to our Use and Benefit, so do all the Animals too that inhabit them, though as yet there are fundry of them whose Use we have not discovered, but as for the Generality of them there are innumerable Ways adapted to our Use; some to furnish our Table with Food and Delicacies, others to prevent or remove our Difeases with their medicinal

medicinal Vertues; some to cloath, and some to adorn our Bodies, others to affift us in, and others to eafe us of our Labours, and others to entertain us with chearful Sports and Recreations. Thus all Things here below have as plain a Reference to the Use of Man, who is the noblest Part of them, as if some wife and powerful Mind had contrived them on purpose to serve and benefit him; as on the contrary Man hath so plain a Reserence to them, confidering his Needs and his fenshive and rational Faculties, as if the same wife Mind had fram'd him on purpose to use and enjoy them.

And is it possible that after all this we should be fo stupid as not to discern those bright Heams of Wisdom which thine through so many perspicuous Correspondencies: For it's certain that either they must be design'd by Wisdom, or happen by Chance; and is it possible that a blind Chance, which can do nothing regularly, and is the Parent only of monfrous and deform'd Births, should thus exquisitely fit and adapt Things to one another in fuch a long and orderly Series; that Chance which never yet compos'd a Tune, or wrote a Line of coherent Sense, should ever be the Author of this great Frame of Things, in which there is more of Harmony than in all the mufical Composures, and more of Sense and Philosophy than in all the studied Volumes in the World? And if it cannot be the Effect of Chance, it must be the Product of Wifdom and Providence.

IV. Another fenfible Evidence of a divine Providence is the Continuation of Things in the fame comely Order which have no Government of themfelves. That Things are put into a most useful, Vol. II.

wife and artificial Order hath been sufficiently demonstrated under the foregoing Particulars; now I would fain know what was it that reduced them to, and still continues them in this Order? did the blind Parts of the Matter whereof these Things are composed, once upon a time as they were wandering thro' the Field of infinite Space, beckon to one another, and by common Confent affemble themselves into a General Council, and there advise together how they should rank and marshal themselves into a World, and when upon grave and mature Advice they had agreed upon, and defcribed and chalked out the Laws of their Motion, did they break up Council, and fet forth in their feveral Lines to the Execution of their Canons and Decrees, till by their oblique, parallel and Counter-motions, they at last intervove themselves into all those beautiful Contextures we behold? He who can imagine this to be either probable or possible, must himself be as dull and stupid as those senseless Parts of Matter are, of which he dreams. Well then, fince these Things could not be effected by any Council or Contrivance in the Matter itself, was it by mere Chance that these blind Parts of Matter sloating in an immense Space, did after several Justlings and Rencounters, jumble themselves into this beautiful Frame of Things? Alas, this is a Conceit, if poffible, more ridiculous than the former; for how is it possible to imagine that Chance should ever make a Man, in the Contexture of whose Parts there are such Wonders of Art as do as far exceed the most curious Engines and Machines that everhuman Art invented, as the most glorious and magnificent Palace doth a Castle of Cards? And if

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if Chance cannot fo much as draw the Picture of a Man, which is but a rude Imitation of his Outlide, how much less can it shape, temper and connect all those hidden and subtile Springs of Life and Motion, Sense and Imagination, Memory and Passion within him? Well then, fince it was neither from any Wildom in the Matter of them, nor from any cafual Motion of that Matter that this orderly Series of Things did proceed, was it from a blind Neceflity? But pray what made this Necessity? How came the Matter of these Things that might have mov'd otherwife, having an infinite Space about it, and no Principle within it to incline it one way more than another, to determine itself to this Series of Motion? if you fay it was by Chance, I have shew'd it is impossible; and if you say it was from Eternity, that is all one. For as an excellent Author of our own hath observ'd, Whether it were now, or Yesterday, or from Eternity, infers no Difference as to our Purpole; nor the Circumflance of the Time, but the Quality of the Caufe being only here confiderable; the same Cause being alike apt or unapt Yesterday as to Day, always as fometimes, from all Eternity as from any fit-time to produce fuch effects. So that 'tis as pollible for Matter fortuitously moved without any Art or Counfel to compose a World now, and to frame it into Animals and Men as it was from Eternity; that is, 'tis from all Eternity, and now equally impossible; and if it were by the Counfel of some intelligent Mind that it was fram'd in o this World of Beings and orderly Series of Things, then it is doubtless by the same Mind that its Order and Harmony is still continued and preserved. For it is altogether

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as impossible for Matter of itself unguided by Wisdom and Art to pursue any constant Course, as to fall into any regular Form, it being as we fee ail torn and broken into little Parts innumerably many, and infinitely diverse in their Size, and Figures, and Motions, and thence only fit in their feveral Courses to cross and confound each other. How then is it possible without vast Wisdom and answerable Power so to manage this wild and disordered Swarm of Atoms as to determine them to their proper Bounds, continue them in their regular Ranks and Files, and preserve them in the same Tenure of Action, so as that in all those new Productions of the Individuals of every Kind of Plants and Animals which are every Day compounded out of them, they should none of them ever extravagate in their Motions so as to disturb and binder one another, and finally disorder and interrupt the natural Course of Generation? When therefore we consider how this great Machine of the World (as the above-cited Author expreffeth it) whose Parts are infinite for Number and Variety, hath stood fix thousand Years together always one and the fame, unimpair'd in its Beauty, unworn in its Parts, unwearied and undifturbed in its Motions; thro' what an infinite Series of Generations and Corruptions all its Plants and Animals have past, and yet how after they have been corrupted over and over, and their whole Frames have been broke in Pieces, and all their Parts divided and dispers'd, they have still been generated a-new, and rallied into the fame specifick Natures, which, tho' they still confist of numberless Parts, are constantly drawn up into the same Postures and Figures and

befides

and Positions, and with strange Regularity digested into the same handsome Order, as if they all kept Time with the mufical Laws of fome Almighty Mind, as the Stones of Thebes did with Amphion's Lute, and thereby continually danc'd into their natural Figures. When, I say, we consider these strange and wondrous Things, what tolerable Account can we give of the Performance of them without an over-ruling Providence? For how is it imaginable that in a fix thousand Years Course of Generations and Corruptions these blind and undefigning Parts of Matter, which by reason of their infinite Diversity are so naturally apt to thwart and disturb one another, should maintain fuch regular Courses of Motion as still to concenter in the same Forms, so as that through all this vast Tract of Time not so much as one Kind of Plants or Animals should miscarry: How, I say, could this have been, had they not all along been conducted by a fleady unerring Providence?

V. Another sensitive Evidence of a divine Providence is the miraculous Events that have happened in the World. By miraculous Events, I mean fuch as either for their Matter or Manner of Production do exceed the Power of natural Caufes, or at least are produced by them out of their establish'd Course and Order. Such as dividing the Sea, stopping the Sun, raising the Dead, curing the Sick, and Blind, and Lame, with a Touch or Word; of all which we have notorious Instances both in the Old and New Testament, and these attested with as full and convincing Evidence as ever any Matters of Fact were that are recorded in History. For as for the Miracles of the Old Testament,

besides that they were fundry of them performed in the publick View of Nations, and were recorded in those very Ages wherein they were wrought, and so could have been easily disproved by ten thousand living Witnesses, had they not been true; befides that they were attested by the most ancient Heathen Poets and Historians in their Mythologics and Histories, who to be fure would never have yielded the Glory of fuch wondrous Effects to a Nation whom they kated and despised, had they not been forced to it by undeniable Evidence. In a Word, besides that they were confirm'd by the fucceeding Prophets of that Nation, who both by the Miracles they wrought, and by the exact Accomplishment of their Predictions, have sufficiently evidenced themselves to be fupernaturally inspired: Besides all which, I say, the Miracles of the Old Testament are abundantly attested by the New, the Credit whereof is ratified and confirmed by a World of new Miracles wrought by our Saviour himself, and particularly by his Resurrection from the Dead, which are not only in part confessed by the Jews themselves, his most mortal Enemies, and by the Heatken Writers who were implacable Perfecutors of his Religion, but also by his own Disciples and Apostles, who, as I shall shew hereafter, were Eye-witnesses of these Miracles, and did not only attest them with their Mouths, but also seal'd their Testimony with their Blood, and confirm'd it before all the World with infinite other Miracles which they wrought in his Name, and which they continued to work for feveral Ages together, as is evident not only from the wondrous Success of their Ministry, which withwithout being attested with such miraculous Effects could never have propagated in fo short a Time such a hated Religion over all the World, but also from the confident Appeals which the Christian Writers frequently make to their Heathen Enemies, in which they Subtwene them in as daily Spectators of their wondrous Works, and for the Truth of them challenge their own Eyes and Ears. So then that there have been fuch miraculous Effects can no more be doubted than that there have been fuch Men as Pompey the Great, or Julius Cæfar, the former being attested, all Things considered, with much more Evidence than the latter.

And if this Attestation be true, there must be a Providence; for how is it possible that blind Nature which neither deliberates nor chuses, should of itself ever vary or interrupt its Course without rushing into utter Confusion and Disorder? How should any Part of it, when 'tis once moved either faster or slower than ordinary, so restrain, or quicken its own Motion as to reduce itfelf back again to its establish'd Course? For if it once move faster, it must have some Degree of Motion superadded to it, and till that is withdrawn it must, move fasher for ever: If it move flower, it must have some Degree of Motion withdrawn from it, and 't'll that be restored it must move flower for ever: How then is it possible that Nature or any Part of it which moves by a blind Necessity, should of its own Accord either kessen and then flacken, or flacken and then kaften the Course of its Motion, as it must do in the Production of miraculous Effects, without being influ-Q 4

enc'd by an Almighty Providence? We have feveral miraculous Instances of the diverting natural Causes from their Course, and stopping them in it; fuch as causing the Waters to divide and ftand ftill, and the Sun to move backward. Now how is it conceivable that any natural Cause that hath no Will of its own to move and determine it, fhould either frop its own Motion and then move again, or divert from its Course and then return again if it were not under the Command of some Will without it, that guides and disposeth it according to its own Council? Eut besides these Scripture Miracles, there are fund-y miraculous Instances of the rewarding Good Mcn and punishing Bad, publickly recorded in the Flidories of all Ages; fome of vindicating the Innocence, others of restoring the Lives, others of relieving the Necessities of good Men; some of detecting the Crimes of bad Men, others of striking them Dead in their impious Facts, others of punishing them in kind, and others of inflicting on them those very Plagues which they have imprecated on themselves to give Credit to a Falshood; of some or other of which there is fcarce any Age in the World which hath not been furnished with fundry notorious Instances; fo that unless we will give the Lye to all human Testimony, and condemn the Records of all Ages for publick Cheats and Impoflures, we cannot deny but that there have been fundry Miracles in the World, and if of all these Miracles that have been so strongly attested, there be but any one true and real, that one is a fufficient Argument of an over-ruling Providence. For if ever any thing hath been effected that is either above the

the Power, or contrary to the established Course of natural Causes, it must be brought to pass by the Power of God; and if God doth fometimes visibly exert his own immediate Efficacy on this World, that is a plain Evidence that he always governs it; for whenever he thus exerts it, it is for some Reason to be sure, and for what other Reason should he thus strip his Arm and visibly exert his Power upon or before us, but either to awaken our Attention, or to confirm our Faith, or alarm our Fear, or encourage our Hope? And if ever he had any fuch Defign upon us, it must be in order to his governing us; for to what other purpose can an Almighty being be supposed to Address himself to our Hope and Fear, and Faith and Attention, but to subdue and reduce us under his Rule and Government?

VI. And lastly, another visible Evidence of a divine Providence is Predictions of future and remote Contingencies. That there have been such things hath been univerfally acknowledged by Heathens, as well as Jows and Christians. As for the Heathen, Tully gives numerous Instances of it in his two Books of Divination; in the first of which he fets down this as the great Principle of Prediction: Esse Deos, & corum providentia mundum administrari, eosdemque consulere rebus humanis, nec folum universis, verum etiam singulis, i. e. That there are Gods, and that by their Providence the World is Governed, that they take Care of hu-man Affairs, and this not only in general, but in particular. And of these Predictions he tells us there was one Chrysippus who wrote a large Book, in which he gives innumerable Instances of them,

all confirmed by very good Authority. Befides which there were their Oracles, and their Sybilline Writings, among which if there had not been a great many true Predictions, it is not to be imagined that ever the wifer and more inquisitive Part of Men should be so far imposed on as they were to pay fuch mighty Respect and Veneration to them, and that not only for a little while, but for feveral Ages together. But as for their Oracles, there are fundry of them recorded in antient Historians, together with their punctual Accomplishments; and Tully in particular tells us of one of Apollo his Oracles, which foretold a thousand Years before that Sypfelus the Tyrant should reign at Corinth. And Varro makes mention of one Vectius Valens an Augur in the time of Romulus, who when Rome was a building, foretold by the flying of twelve Vultures, that the City should continue a thousand two hundred Years, which accordingly happened. But as for the *Reality* of Predictions we need feek no farther than the Holy Scriptures, in which you have fundry *Prophecies* of Things which happened a long time after, as particularly of the Deliverance of the Yews from those tree Captivities, the one in Egypt, the other in Babylon; the former of which was foretold four hundred Years, and the latter above feventy Years before it came to pass, and yet Both of them accomplished punctually to a Day, as you may fee in Gen. xv. 13. compared with Exod. xii. 41. and Jer. xxv. 12. compared with 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21, 22, which latter Prophecy is not only recorded in Scripture, but mentioned by Eupolemus, an Heathen Historian cited by Eusebius, Præpar. pag. 454. Thus also you have *Esay*

Esay his Prophecy of Cyrus, whose Name and Atchievements he most exactly foretels long before he was born, Efai. xlv. 1, &c. And then for Daniel's Prophecies of the grand Revolutions of the Empires of the Wo.ld, they do fo punctually describe what happened long after, that Porphyry himself, though a mortal Enemy to Christianity, is forced to confess the exact Agreement of his Prophecies with the fucceeding Events (vid. S. Chrysolt. cont. Jud. Tom. 6. p. 326.) and hath no other way to evade the Force of them but by affirming without any Colour of Reason or Authority that they were written afterwards in or near the Time of Antiochus Epiphanes, though it is evident that the LXX Interpreters who translated the Old Testament a hundred Years before, translated this Prophecy of Daniel with it. And Josephus expressly tells us, that Jaddus the High Priest shewed this very Prophccy to Alexander the Great, who lived long before Antiochus, Joseph. Antiq. 1. 11. But to name no more, there are the Prophecies of the Messias, of the Place, and most particular Circumstances of his Nativity, and Ministry, and Life and Death, and Resurrection, and Ascension, all which were fo punctually accomplished in our bleffed Saviour, that did not the Yews, in whose Hands they have been always preferved, own and acknowledge them, one would be apt to suspect that they were forged on purpose by some Christian to countenance our Saviour's Pretence of being the true Messias.

And if there be any fuch thing as Prophecy, if but any one of all these Instances be real, (and that none of them should, would be very strange) this one will be a sufficient Evidence of a Divine

Providence; for to foresee Things at a Distance, and before the Causes are in being, so as to describe before-hand the precise Time, Place and Manner of their Existence, or to foresee Things casual and contingent, that wholly depend upon the free Choice and Determination of voluntary Agents, requires a Mind of infinite Comprehenfion, that fees through all the whole Series of Caufes, and hath a perfect Prospect not only of those Things that a fually exist, but also of all that are future and pessible. For how is it possible to foresee a remote Futurity in all its particular Circumstances, whose immediate Cause is either unborn, or free and undetermined, without having a perfect Inspection not only into the Natures and Inclinations, and Tendencies of Things, but also into all their particular Conjunctions and Conspiracies? and that Mind which fees into all these, must needs be all-seeing and having nothing concealed from it, that is either prefent or future, or possible. So that if there be any fuch thing as Prediction of remote and contingent Futurities, it must necessarily proceed from an all-seeing Mind; and if there be an all-seeing Mind that overfees the whole World, and accurately inspects all that is past, or present, or to come in it, is it imaginable that such a Mind should sit looking on as an idle Spectator, and act no part itself in such a vast and busy Scene of Things? For that it thus exactly inspects and takes notice of the World, is a plain Argument that it is greatly concerned for it; and that it should be greatly concern'd for it; and yet do nothing about it, nor exercise any Providence over it, is altogether inconceivable. And thus I have shewn, with all the PlainPlainness I could, what Evidences there are to create in us a Belief of a divine Providence, which I persuade myself are such, as duly considered, cannot but prevail with Minds that are not steeled against all Convictions, and utterly abandoned both of their Reason and Modesty.

SECT. III.

The Objections against Providence confidered and answered.

Now proceed to the third and last Thing proposed to be treated of in this Chapter; and that is, to shew the Insufficiency and Unreasonableness of the common Pretences to Insidelity in this Matter; and here, not to insist upon all the little and shameful Cavils which have been made against Providence, which are so very inconsiderable that it would be too great a Credit to them to be seriously consuted; I shall insist upon those only which are the common, and do carry the fairest Shew of Reason with them, and they are these sive:

I. That the Exercise of a Providence doth not comport with the Majesty of God.

II. That it doth not confift with the Ease and

Happiness of God.

III. That it is not reconcileable with the manifold Evils which we behold in the World.

IV. That if there were fuch a Providence, it could not admit of the unequal Divisions of Goods and Evils which are made in this World.

V. That it is not to be reconciled with the revertehed State and Condition to which we behold

the greatest Part of Mankind abandoned.

I. It is objected against the Being of Providence, that it doth not comport with the Majesty of God to take notice of, or concern himself about the little Affairs of this World. Which is fuch an Objection as carries its own Answer with it; for I would fain know which is most suitable to Majesty, to sit ftill or to act, to wrap up itself in everlasting Sloth and Idleness, or to display itself in a vigorous Activity? And if it be greater, and more majestick, as doubtless it is, for any Being to employ and exercise its Powers, than to let them lie asleep and make no use of them, I would fain know in what bigher Sphere can God exercise his Powers than in governing the World. For to govern well is the best and greatest Thing that we can frame an Idea of; it is to do the greatest Good, to dispense the noblest Virtues, and to shed forth the amplest Sphere of Benefits. And therefore fince the World is fuch a vast Dominion, doubtless the most glorious Employment that the largest Mind can undertake, is to rule and govern it; and there is nothing can be greater and more Godlike, than to fit at the Hilm of this floating Universe, and steer its Motions to their Ends with a steady and unerring Hand. What therefore can God do more worthy of himself than to govern the World well and wifely? Or wherein can he better display the

the Glory of his own Perfections, than in keeping this mighty Engine in such an admirable Order, so as that though its Parts are infinite in Number and Variety, and in their feveral Lines of Motion do frequently cross and intersect each other, yet they do neither clash nor interfere, disturb nor confound one another, but in their different Functions mutually affift each other, and all conspire in a common Good, composing out of their infinite Discords a most elegant Harmony, in which mighty Performance there is Scope enough for an infinite Power to exert its utmost Activity, for an infinite Wisdom to employ its utmost Skill, for an infinite Goodness to put forth its utmost Beneficence.

So that to undertake this Province of governing the World, is so far from being beneath the Majefty of God, that it would be an unpardonable Arrogance for any but a God to undertake it; and if Contrivance be the End of Wisdom, Action of Power, Beneficence of Goodness, as doubtless they are, where can the infinite Power, and Wifdom, and Goodness of God find a more ample Sphere for Action, Contrivance, and Beneficence, than in the Government of the World? And if it be the proper Exercise of Majesty to govern, what can better comport with the greatest Majesty than to display itself in the Government of the largest Deminion, which is that of the World?

But then confidering that God himself is the Father of all this great Family of Beings, how can it be beneath his Majesty to take care of his own Off-spring? Why should it be below him to provide for any Thing which was not below him tocreate? If there be any Thing in this World fo contemptible as not to deferve his Regard, why did he create it? If there be not, why should he disdain to govern it? And if every Thing in this World hath some End for the sake of which God thought it worthy to be one of the Objects of his Creation, why should he not as well think the constant Directions of it to that End, to be an Object

worthy of his Providence?

II. It is farther objected against the Being of God's Providence, that it is inconfiftent with his Quiet and Hattiness. For to attend to such an infinite Number of Things as the Government of the World includes, cannot but distract his Thoughts, and thereby disturb him in the Enjoyment of himself. All which is a gross Mistake, arifing from no other Caufe but our measuring God by our felves; because we find our own Minds fo narrow, and our own Powers fo limited, as that we cannot without Distraction attend to many Things at once, therefore we conclude that this mighty Business of governing the World must needs be very uneafy to God: whereas if we confidered God as a Being that is infinitely perfect, whose Almighty Power implies an Ability to do whatfoever is possible, and whose infinite Knowledge includes an universal Prospect of all Things past, present, and to come, this would eafily convince us of the Vanity and Falfehood of this Objection; for it is by reafon of Imperfection that Beings operate with labour and difficulty; it is because their Powers are weak, and not able to conquer without fruggling with the Resistances of the Objects upon which they operate; but against perfect and infinite Powers there

ects can make fuch Refistance as to put them upon Struggling and Labour; fo that to an omnificient and omnipotent Mind there can be nothing difficult to be known or effected; and it is altogether as eafy to it to know all things that are knowable, and do all Things that are possible, as to know or do any one Thing whatfoever; because whatsoever it doth, it doth perfectly. How then can the Government of the World be difficult and uneasy to God, whose Knowledge and Power are perfect and infinite, and confequently can inspect and govern all the Beings in the World with as much Facility as if they had only one Being to take care of; and if one Man can with Eale manage one Bufiness which he perfectly understands, why may not God manage all, who understands all better than we understand any one; and suppose the Things of the World were infinite, yet fince God's Knowledge and Power are infinite too, there is the very same Proportion of Infinite to Infinite, as of One to One.

For it is to be considered that the natural Tendency of infinite Power is to Action, of infinite Wisdom to Contrivance, of infinite Gocaness to Beneficence; and how can we imagine that it should be any Disturbance to God to follow the Inclination of his own Perfections? And therefore fince it is equally easy to his infinite Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness to exert themselves in a larger Sphere of Action, Contrivance and Beneficence as in a narrower, why should it more disturb him to govern a whole World than one single Being? It would doubtless be rather a Disturbance to him to act nothing, to contrive nothing,

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and to do no Good; because this would be to cross the Inclination of his own Persections; but since it is as easy to him to exercise those Persections about many things as about few; to exercise them about a world of things must rather be a Delight than a Disturbance to him, because the more he exercises them, the more he complies with their natural Tendencies and Inclinations.

And what though this World be a great and cumbersome Mass of Things; it can be no Labour to God to move and actuate it, who as an univerfal Soul is diffused through it, and vitally present with every Part of it; for he moves it not as Bodies move Bodies by Thrusting and Pressure, but as Souls move Bodies by Thought and Will; and as our Soul doth move its Body, and determine the Motion of its Members merely by Thinking and Willing, without any material Pressure, without any Machines or Engines, even fo God, who is the Great Soul of the World, doth actuate every Part and regulate every Motion of it without any laborious Heavings or Thrustings merely by the all-commanding Influence of his own Almighty Thought and Will. And if it be no Labour to our Soul to Think and Will, and therewithal to move our Body, why should we think it any Labour to God by the fame Operations to move the World? For suppose our Soul were cloathed with a Body as large as the whole Universe, and were but vitally present with every Part of it, it would doubtless move it all with as much Ease, and Command it every Way with as much Freedom as it doth the Body wherein it now Resides: How then can it be difficult to a perfect Mind which penetrates

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all through, and co-exists with every Part of this material World, to move and actuate the Whole, and moderate all the Motions of it according to its own Will and Pleasure?

III. It is farther objected against a *Providence*, that it is not consistent with the manifold Evils, both *Moral* and *Natural*, which we behold in this World. If there were a just and gracious Providence over-ruling the World, how can it be imagined that it should ever permit so many Irregularities as we every Day behold in Mens Lives and Manners, or suffer so many Calamities and Miseries to befal its Subjects? Both which, as I shall shew you, are very fairly consistent with a just and righteous Providence.

For as for the first, to wit, the moral Evils or Irregularities of Mens Manners, the Permission of them in the World is no more inconfiftent with the Goodness of God's Providence, than his making of free Agents was with the Goodness of his Nature. For his Permission of Sin is no more than his permitting free Agents to act freely, and according to that Liberty to Good and Evil wherewith he framed and created them; and why may he not as well permit them to act freely as create them to act freely? But to be effentially determined to Good, fo as not to have any natural Liberty to Evils, feems inconfishent with the State of a Creature; for there is no Will can be naturally and effentially determined to Good, which is not conducted by an infallible Mind; for whilst the Mind which is the Guide may possibly err, the Will which is guided by it must be liable to go astray. Since therefore no Will can be effentially good but R 2

that which is guided by an infallible Mind, and fince no Mind can be effentially infallible but one that is omniscient, it necessarily follows that to be free to Good and Evil is as natural to all reasonable Creatures, as to be finite in Knowledge and Understanding; and accordingly our Saviour declares that to be naturally effentially good is the incommunicable Prerogative of the divine Nature, Luke xviii. 19. and if fo, then either God must have made us free to Good and Evil, or not have made us at all, and there must have been no fuch Orders of Being as Men and Angels, which are the Crown and Glory of all the Creation; and is it not much better that there should be such Beings, than that there should be no such Thing as Liberty to Good and Evil? And if it were not inconfissent with the Divine Goodness to create free Agents, why should it be inconsistent with it to permit them to act freely? 'Tis true indeed we are naturally more free to Evil than the Angels, and some Angels perhaps were more free to it than others; but what then? Was God obliged in Goodness to make all Kinds of Beings equally perfect? If so, there must have been but one Kind of Beings in the whole Universe, and consequently there must have been infinite Kinds of Beings that are capable of happiness for ever unmade, or for ever unprovided for. Wherefore fince the Goodness of God was so infinitely fruitful as to communicate itself in different Degrees of Perfection to all Poffibilities of Being, that fo there might be no Kind wanting to compleat the Universe, it was requisite that there should be a mean Degree of Perfection between Angels and Brutes; otherotherwise there would have been a Gap and Chasm in the World, not only a possible Kind of Leing wanting, but a Kind which by partaking both of Reason and Sense of Spirit and of Matter, is the Σύνδεσμω ζωτικός τῶν τε ἄνω κ) τῶν κάτω, as Simplicius expresses it, i e. the vital Joint that classes the upper and lower World together; and if it were no way unsuitable to the Goodness of God to create the two Extremes, viz. Angels and Brutes, why should it be thought unsuitable to make a middle Nature between them?

It is true, by partaking of both Natures, we are not only free to Evil in common with Angels, but also liable to stronger Temptations to it than they; because we are placed in a tempting Body among a great many brutish Passions and Appetites, and that Body is placed in a tempting World, among a great many fenfitive Goods and Evils, that are continually importuning those Appetites to mutiny against Reason, and to carry us away captive into Folly and Wickedness; but to place us in this State is fo far from being inconfistent with the Goodness of God, that it is exactly pursuant to the Design of a most wife and gracious Providence. For fince we are placed by the Condition of our Natures in a lower Rank of Deing and Persection than Angels, we have no more Reason to complain of that, than Ants or Flies have that they are not Men. But in this imperfect State the highest Good that Providence could defign us was to put us into a State of Trial and Prebation, wherein by the good Use of our Liberty we might by degrees fit our felves for, and at length arrive to a better and more raifed Condition, and by an er- R_3 de.ly

derly Progression from this rude and imperfect State, might in the different Periods of our Lives grow up into bigher and more excellent Capacities, and at length ripen into Perfection. Now in order to our Trial it was requifite we should be placed among Difficulties, without which no Proof can be made of our Virtues, of our Patience, and Temperance, and Chaftity and Equanimity, Meekness and Sobriety; all which are proper to us as Beings made up of Angel and Brute; from the latter of which Natures all those brutal Appetites arise in us, in the good or bad Government whereof confifts the Nature of human Virtue and Vice. So that this present State of our Life is intended by God for a Field of Combat between our Sense and our Reason, our brutal and angelical Nature, and that the Victory of our Reason might through the Difficulty of it be rendered more glorious and rewardable, God hath furnish'd its Antagonist with the Weapons of worldly Temptation to affault and oppose it, to try its Strength and Mettle, and to exercise both its active and passive Virtues; intending when it hath conquered, to translate us hence, as a Reward of our Victory, into a free and difintangled State, where we shall be vexed and enticed no more with the Importunities of Jenfual Lust and Affection, but to all Eternity enjoy the Serenity and Pleasure of a pure, angelical Nature. And what is there in all this that is any way unfuitable, yea, that is not every way answerable to the Goodness of Providence? "Tis true, instead of conquering, we may, if we please, yield our selves captive to Folly and Wickedness; but what then? Is Providence to be blam'd for

for leaving Men's Hands at Liberty, because some have been fo desperate as to cut their own Throats? It is fufficient that he hath proposed to us Reward enough to encourage us to contend, and contributed to us Assistance enough to enable us to conquer, and having done all that becomes a wife and good Governor, to prevent our Sin and Ruin, who is to be blamed for it but ourselves? God leaves us at Liberty indeed among Temptations to Evil; and this the very State and Composition of our Natures requires; but all he defigns by it, is to exercise our Virtues, and thereby to improve and train us up to a State of higher Perfection, and to furnish us with glorious Opportunities of fighting for and winning Crowns and Reward; and this is fo far from any way reflecting on the Goodness of his Providence, that it is an illustrious Instance of it; and yet it is only thus far that he is concerned in the Being of Sin in the World; all the rest is owing to our own mad and desperate Abuse of our natural Liberty, to our willful Opposition to his gracious Intentions, and obstinate Resistance to his powerful Arts and Methods of preventing our Sin and Ruin. What then can be more unreasonable than for us to object against the Goodness of God's Providence that which is purely the Effect of our own Madness and Folly?

And if the Evil of Sin be no way inconfistent with the Goodness of Providence, much less is the Evil of Misery, since the Generality of those Evils which we suffer in this World are either the natural Esses, or the just Punishments, or the necessary Antidotes and Preventives of our Sin. And therefore when you come into a great School

of wild and unruly Boys, you may as well argue that there is no Master of it, because there are Rods and Forulas in it, as that there is no Providence over this sinful World, because there are Miseries and Afflictions in it; for upon the Being of Sin in the World, the Being of Misery is so far from being an Argument against Providence, that it is rather a Demonstration of it; because a sinful World can no more be governed without Misery, than an unruly School without Correction.

IV. Another Objection that is made against Providence is that unequal Division of Goods and Evils that is made in the World. If there were a just Providence that over-ruled the World, one would think it should make a more visible Distinction between good and bad Men in the Distribution of its Rewards and Punishments; whereas in the ordinary Course of things we see all things happen alike to all, and many times it fares worst with the best, and best with the worst of Men. Now because this is the greatest and most universal Objection that was ever urged against the Providence of God, I shall in answer to it endeavour to shew, I. That it is for the most Part salse and groundless, 2. That so far as it is true, it is no Argument at all against Providence.

First, I say, this Objection, that there is no Difference made among Men as to the Goods and Evils of this Woold, is in a great Measure false and groundless. For I make no doubt but in the ordinary course of things good Men are more prosperous even in this World than bad; as for Times of Perfecution, they are a just Exception from the general Rule of Providence; because therein God to serve

his own Glory, and the great Ends of Religion, exchanged with good Men fpiritual for temporal, and beavenly for earthly Enjoyments, which is fuch an Exchange as no Man will account Robbery, that understands the just Value of those different Commodities.

It is true, it hath been an usual Complaint in all Times and Ages, that it fares best with the worst, and worst with the best; and through the Commonness of it, it is now grown into a Maxim. But it is to be confidered that Men always pity the miserable and envy the prosperous, and that these Passions do naturally bribe their Judgments to think worse of the one, and better of the other than either deferve; for those whom we pity we are inclined to love, and those whom we love we are inclined to think well of; as on the contrary, those whom we envy we are inclined to hate, and those whom we hate we are inclined to think ill of; and then because God doth not reward and punish Men according to the Sentence that our blind Pity or Envy paffes on them, we are ready to quarrel with his Providence. And besides, there are a World of close Hypocrites, that under a mighty Shew and Oftentation of Piety do sccretly indulge themselves in sundry wastful and ruinous Vices, which many times reduce them to Poverty and Misery, and these we commonly rank among the good it fares ill with; as on the contrary, there are abundance of good Men, that in the Course of a reserved, modest and unaffected Piety, which makes but very little Shew in the Eyes of the World, are bleft and prospered, and these we as commonly rank among the bad that fare well. Since therefore we are such in-

competent Judges of good and bad Men, we shall be very careful how we object against the Providence of God fuch Maxims as are only founded on our own fallacious Observations. But could we ftrip ourselves of Pity and Envy, and penetrate into the insides of Men, I doubt not but we should soon be fatisfied that good Men have much the Advantage of bad, even as to the Happiness and Prosperity of this World; for though perhaps there are many more bad Men prospered than good, because there are far more bad than good Men in the World, yeti n Proportion to their Numbers I doubt not but the prosperous Good would far exceed the prosperous Bad, though there should be but thirty of the one to forty of the other; and supposing that in Proportion there were more bad Men than good advanced to worldly Greatness, (which yet is very doubtful, confidering how prone we are to judge ill of great Men, and to reckon more of them into the Number of the bad than we ought, through Envy and Missinderstanding the Reasons of their Actions) yet it is to be considered, that the true State of worldly Happiness and Prosperity consists not in a great but in a moderate Fortune, and that the good Things of this World are no where fo freely and entirely enjoyed, as in the middle Region between Poverty and Riches; for as Poverty is attended with Famine, and Cold and Anguish, so Greatness is attended with Hurry and Tumult, impaled with Cares, and imprisoned with Pomp and tedious Ceremony; fo that the truly Unfortunate are the Necessitous and the Great, while the middle State, without partaking of the Evils of either, includes all that is truly desirable in both Extremes; all

all their Poverty wants, and all that Greatness enjoys; and in this happy State I dare boldly affirm there are proportionably far more good Men than bad: For it is a very rare Thing for a good Man that is konest and industrious, and depends upon God for a Bleffing, to be reduced to extreme Necessity; fo very rare, that David in all his Life-time could not produce one Instance of it, Pf. xxxvii. 25. for miserable Poverty is usually the Consequence either of Idleness or Luxury, or Faction or Knavery; all which are inconfistent with true Goodness; and a good Man in any Condition on this Side pincking Necessity, is ordinarily even in this Life far more happy than the most gay and prosperous Sinner, whose outward Glory and Greatness is usually nothing but the gaudy Cover of a tragical Inside, of a Mind that is tortured with Pride and Envy, with boundless Hopes, insatiable Desires, and borrible Reflections, that dash and imbitter all his Enjoyments, while the good Man under his mean and fimple Outfide, carries a great and happy Soul, a contented Mind, a chearful Heart, and a calm Conscience, which mightily fweeten all his Enjoyments, and make his homely Morfel out-relish the most studied Luxuries. Let us therefore but judge impartially of Men, and but truly state what is the most happy Condition of buman Life, and proportion the Number of the Good to the Bad, and ballance the Insides of the one with the Outsides of the other, and I doubt not but we shall be easily convinced that even in this Life the Good ordinarily fare much better than the Bad; for in true Computation Necessity and Greatness are the only unfortunate States of human Life, and in these there are far more bad Men than good; but between these two all Conditions are in a manner indifferent as to the Happiness of Men; and in this happy Mean there are far more god Men than bad; and then the Minds of good Men having infinitely the Advantage of the Minds of bad, as to the rendering their outward Condition happy, it is impossible but that ordinarily and generally they must be the

more bappy and prosperous.

Secondly, So far as the Maxim, that all Things happen alike to all, is true, it is no Argument at all against a Providence; and that upon these following Accounts. 1. Because many of the Goods and Evils of this World happen to us not as Rewards and Punishments, but in the necessary Course of fecondary Caufes. 2 Because the Goods and Evils of this World are in themselves so mean and inconfiderable, that it would be beneath the Wisdom of Providence to be very exact and curious in the Distribution of them. 3. Because this Life is properly the State of our Trial and Probation, and not of our Reward and Punishment. 4. Because the Goods and Evils that befal us here are not fo truly to be estimated by themselves as by their Effects and Confequents. 5. This promiseuous Distribution of Things, so far as it is, is very requisite to assure us of a Yudgment to come. 6. Because the exact Adjustment of Things is referved for a future Judgment.

I. The happening of all things alike to all is no Argument against Providence; hecause many of the Goods and Evils of this World happen to us not as Rewards and Punishments, but in the necessary Course of second Causes. For in this Life good

and bad Men are fo mingled together, that in Cases of common Calamity, what happens to the one must happen to the other, without a miraculous Interposal of Providence. Thus while God leaves fecond Caufes to their natural Courfe, how is it possible that War, or Plague, or Famine should diffinguith between the Good and bad that are incorporated together in the same Societies? and so long as free Agents are left to act freely, wicked Parents will frequently spoil their Constitutions by the repeated Excesses of their Riot and Wantonnels; and while they do so, their Diseases, without a Miracle, will descend upon their righteous as well as unrighteous Posterity; and wicked Neighbours, whilst it lies in their way, or serves their Interest, will wrong and oppress the Just and Unjust without any Distinction. But you will say, why then doth not Providence interpose between second Causes and good Men, and miraculously protect them from their mischievous Effects? To which in short I answer, that in some extraordinary Cafes God hath interposed, of which there are innumerable Instances both in facred and prophane History; but to expect that he should ordinarily and constantly do this, is very unreasonable, because it cannot be done without giving a perpetual Disturbance to the Course of Nature, which being in the whole most orderly and regular, full of admirable Becuty and Confrivance, ought not to be disturbed and inverted upon ordinary Occasions. For if the established Course of Things be wise and regular in the whole, why should we expect that God should be perpetually tampering with it, and inter-

interrupting and varying it by his immediate Interposals, as if he were distatisfied with his own Contrivance, and upon every Revisal of this great Volume of the World, did still discover new Erratas in it to be corrected and amended. The Evils therefore which good Men fuffer are not ordinarily fo momentous as to oblige a wife and good God to interrupt the Course of Nature to prevent them; and it is much better that some Violences should be offered to good Men, than that a constant Violence should be offered to the Nature of Things; and fince God can carry on his good Designs to good Men in a still and silent Path, and cause all their adverse Accidents to unwind of themselves, and at last to clear up into a blessed Close, is it not much better he should do it this way, than by offering perpetual Violence and Disturbance to Nature?

II. The happening of all Things alike to all is no Argument against a Providence, because the Goods and Evils of this World are so mean and inconsiderable, that it would be beneath the Wisdom of Providence to be very exact and curious in the Distribution of them. It is no Part of Wisdom to be nice and curious about Trifles. ridiculous enough in Caligula to employ a mighty Army only to gather a great Heap of Cockle-shells; but when he had gathered them, it would have been much more ridiculous to have taken a great deal of Care to divide them amongst his Soldiers in exact Proportions to each one's Merit and Defert. Now tho' we look upon the Goods and Evils of this World, as Things of vast and mighty Moment, yet God who fees them with far better Eyes than we, knows very well that they are but

but Trifles in comparison of those endless Goods or Evils we must enjoy or suffer in another World, and that it is a very inconsiderable Thing whether we fare well or ill this Moment, who immediately after must fare well or ill for ever; and therefore he looks on it, as he justly may, as a thing beneath his infinite Wisdom, to be very exact and curious in dividing to us these momentary Trisles in just Proportions to our particular Deferts; and did we not strangely magnify them, by looking on them through the false Opticks of our own fantastick Hopes and Fears, we should be so far from objecting against God's Providence these unequal Distributions of them, and were they more exact and equal we should rather object against his Wisdom, as thinking it a very mean Employment for a Deity to be very nice and curious in proportioning fuch momentary Enjoyments and Sufferings to the Merit or Demerit of immortal Creatures. So that confidering of what little Moment the prefent Goods and Evils are which good Men fuffer and bad Men enjoy, they ought rather to be looked on as an Argument of God's Wisdom than as an Objection against his Providence; for he understands the just Value of Things, and knows that the best of these Worldly Goods are bad enough to be thrown away upon the worst of Men, and so expresses his just Scorn of these admired Vanities, by fcattering them abroad with a careless Hand; for why should he partake of the Errors of vulgar Opinion, and express himself so very regardful of these Trisles as to put them in gold Scales, and weigh them out to Mankind by Grains and Scruples?

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III. That all Things here do happen alike to all is no Argument against Providence, because this Life is properly the State of our Trial and Probation, and not of our Reward and Punishment. The divine Providence hath placed us here as Candidates and Probationers for those everlasting Preferments it defigns us hereafter, that fo by training and exercifing us in all those excellent Virtues that are proper to our Natures, it may improve us from one Degree of Perfection to another, itill at last it hath accomplished us for the heavenly State; in order to which Defign it is necessary that there should be an unequal Distribution of Things, whereby good Men may fometimes fuffer and bad Men prosper; otherwise there would be no Occafion for any of our passive Virtues, nor any Trial of our active. For Affliction is the Theatre of Patience and Fortitude, and Resignation to God, and without it there would be no Room in the Lives of good Men for the Exercise of those Virtues, which for want of Objects to act on, would rust and wax languid. Again, Difficulty is the Touchstone of our Love and Faith and Ingenuity; but should Providence be always crowning the Righteous, and dragging Offenders to Execution, fuch a Procedure would determine our Liberty, and leave us no Room for the Exercise of our Faith and Ingenuity; for then the Rewards and Punishments of Providence would be so sensibly and continually present with us, and so urgently press upon our Hopes and Fears, that it would be impossible for us not to believe in God, and next to impossible not to obey him; and being thus forced to believe and obey, what Excellency would there

be in our Pietv and Virtue; What Charity is it for a Mifer to lend his Money upon Affurance of twenty per Cent? Or what Loyalty for a Truytor to difcover his Conspirators, within Sight of a Rack. And just as little Virtue would there be in any of our good Works, were there an exact equality in the distributions of Providence. For then we should never do a good Work but upon the certain Prospect of an immediate Reward, nor repent of a bad one but upon the irrefifeble Dread of some immediate Punithment. But in this inequality of Things wherein the Good often fuffer, and the Wicked prosper, we are left to a free and unconstrained Condition, and whether we are Virtuous or Vicious, Devout or Profane, it is out of Cheice and not of Necessity. So that now to believe and obey the facred Dictates of Religion, is generous and ingenuous, and our Faith and Obedience is our Virtue and Excellency, because we believe and obey without Force and against Temptations and Difficulties.

And as this unequal State of Things is of absolute Necessity to try and exercise our Virtues, so it is also very assistant thereunto. For that Providence doth generally and not universally bless and prosper good Men, is a great support to a wise and rational Belief. For as a late excellent Author hath well observed, if things were constantly managed one way without any variation, we might be apt to conclude that the World was under the rigid Laws of a satal Necessity; if on the other side there were no Rule observed, no Footsteps of Method in the Dispensations of Providence, we might be tempted to believe that Chance rules the World; but when we observe that in the Manage-Vol. II.

ment of things there is an Intermixture of these two, viz. that there is a general Rule, and that there are particular Exceptions from it, we have just reason to conclude that all is under a free Almighty Agent that rules the World according to the Determinations of his own Will. way of Providence, viz. to interweave into good Mens Fortunes Adversity with Prosperity, is in this respect very advantageous to their Faith, so is it also to the whole State of their Virtue; for as on the one hand a continued train of prosperous Events would be apt to bloat and elevate their Minds, fo on the other a continued feries of Adversity would be apt to fink and depress their Spirits, whilst this middle way of Interchange in their Condition balances them on both fides, and keeps them in an even, steady and well-poized Temper. Since therefore this Life is the State of our Trial, it is evident that an exact Equality of Things would be a much stronger Objection against the Wisdom of Providence, than all these present Inequalities are against the Justice of it. For Hardships and Difficulties are necessary to a state of Trial, and were good Men always bleft, and bad Men always punished, this Life, instead of being a Probation to either, would be the Heaven of the one, and the Hell of the other; and fince fome Afflictions are necessary to try good Men, and some Prosperities to try bad, it would be a strange overfight of Providence, when it defigns the Trial of both, to fix them in fuch a Condition, wherein no thorough Experiment can be made of either. So that for us to object against Providence for making such unequal Distributions in a state wherein it designs our Trial, is in Effect to object against Wisdom for

acting most suitably to its own Designs.

IV. That all things here do happen alike to all is no Argument against Providence, because the Goods and Evils that befal us here, are not fo truly to be estimated by themselves as by their Essects and Confequents. For the Divine Providence, which runs through all Things, hath disposed and connected them into fuch a Series and Order, that there is no fingle Event or Accident but what is purely miraculous, but depends upon the whole System, and hath innumerable Causes antecedent to it; and innumerable Consequents attending it; and what the Confequents will be, whether good or bad, is beyond our Skill to prognosticate; so that though the Event be never fo good or bad fingly and apart by itself, yet in Conjunction with all those Consequents that will most certainly attend it, the best Event for all we know may prove most mischievous and the worst most beneficial to us. So that for us boldly to pronounce concerning the Good or Evil of Events, before we see the Train of Confequents that follow them, is very rash and inconsiderate. As for instance, you see a good Man oppressed with Sorrows and Asslictions, and a bad Man crowned with Pleafures and Prosperities; and considering these Things apart by themselves, you conclude that the one fares very ill, and the other very well; but did you at the same time see the Consequents of the one's Adverfity and the other's Prosperity, it is probable you would conclude the quite contrary, viz. that the good Man's Adversity was a Blessing, and the bad Man's Prosperity a Curse. For I dare boldly aifirm

affirm that good Men generally reap more substantial Benefit from their Afflictions, than bad Men do from their Prosperities; the one smarts indeed at present; but what follows? perhaps his Mind is cured by it of some Disease that is ten times worse to him than his outward Affliction, of Avarice or Impatience, of Envy or Discontent, of Pride or vanity of Spirit; his Riches are lessened, but his Virtues are improved by it; his Body is impaired, but his Mind is grown found and hale by it, and what he hath loft in Health or Wealth, or Pleasure or Honour, he hath gained with Advantage in Wisdom and Goodness, in Tranquillity of Mind and Self-enjoyment. And methinks no Man, who believes he hath a Soul, should grudge to suffer any tolerable Affliction for the bettering his Mind, his Will and his Conscience. On the other hand the bad Man triumphs and rejoices at present; but what follows? His Prosperity either shrivels him into Miserableness, or melts him into Luxury; the former of which impoverishes, and the latter diseases him; for if the former be the Effect of his Prosperity, it increases his Needs, because before he needed only what he had not, but now he needs both what he hath not and what he hath; his covetous Defires treating him as the Faulkner doth his Hawk, his luring him off from what he hath feized to fly at new Game, and never permitting him to prey upon his own Quarry; and if the latter be the Effect of his Prosperity, that is, if it melts him into Luxury, it thereby wastes his Health to be fure, and commonly his Estate too; and so whereas it found him poor and well, it leaves him poor and diseased, and only took him up from the *Plow*, and fets him down at the *Hof-pital*. In general. while he is possessed of it, it only bloats and fwells him, makes him proud nd infolent, Griping and Oppressive, pampers and enrages his Lust, stretches out his Desires into an insatiable Bulimy, sticks his Mind sull of Cares and his Conscience of Guiles, and by all these wosul Effects it inflames his Reckoning with God, and treasures up Wrath for him against the Day of Wrath; so that comparing the Consequents of the good Man's Adversity with those of the bad Man's Prosterity, it is evident that the former fares well even in his worst Condition, and the latter ill in his best. It's well for me, saith good David, that I was afflicted, for before I was afflicted I went astray, but now I have kept thy commandment, Pfalm exix. 67. But on the contrary, when the wicked spring as the grass, saith the same Author, and when all the workers of iniquity do flourish, it is that they shall be destroyed for ever, Psalm xcii. 7. If then in the Consequents of Things good Men are blessed in their Afflictions, and bad Men plagued in their Prosperities, as it is apparent they generally are, these unequal Distributions are so far from being an Argument against Providence, that they are a glorious Instance of it. For wherein could the Divine Providence better express its Justice and Wisdom together, than by benefiting the Good and punishing the Bad by such cross and improbable Methods?

V. That all Things here do happen alike to all, is no Argument against Providence, because it is very requisite it should often do so, to assure us of a Judgment to come. For were the Assairs of

this World managed with that exact Equality as that the Good did never fuffer, nor the Bad escape unpunished, we should be deprived of one of the best moral Arguments of a future Judgment. For as on the one Hand should Providence never reward the Good nor punish the Bad in this Life, but confound them together without any Distinction, it might tempt us to despair of any just Retribution sfrom it in the Life to come; so on the other Hand, were the Goods and Evils of this Life weighed out to Men in exact Proportions to their Merit and Demerit without any Inequality, we might be tempted to think that there is no Need of, and confequently no Ground to expect any Judgment to come. For what Occasion would there be for any future Judgment if all Things were already exactly balanced and adjusted? and therefore as to confirm us in the Belief of the Juffice of Providence, it was requisite the same plain Instances should be given of its distinguishing the Good from the Bad by present Rewards and Punishments; so to confirm us in the Expectation of a Judgment to come, it was no less requisite that there should be some Inequality in the present Management and Distribution of things, and that the Goods and Evils of this World should not be administred with that exact Regularity as to prevent the Necessity of a Day of Judgment; but that there should be undecided Cases enough remaining for a future Tribunal to adjust and determine. So that as in the present Management of Things there is Equality enough to induce us to believe a just Providence; so there is also Inequality enough to induce us to expect a future Judgment; Ged having wifely provided in his prefent

fent Administration of Things, to give us Instances enough of his just Procedure towards the Good and Bad, and yet to leave us Instances enough of unrewarded Virtue and prosperous Wickedness, to affure us that he intends an after Reckoning. For how can we reflect upon these repeated Examples of just Reward and Punishment, which in every Age almost God sets before us, and not believe that he governs the World? And how can we reflect upon those manifold Evils which some good Men suffer, and Goods which some bad Men enjoy, without believing that he hath appointed a Day wherein he will adjust these Inequalities, and vindicate the Cause of oppressed Virtue, and crush triumphant Wickedness into everlasting Confufion?

VI. And lastly, That all Things here do happen alike to all, is no Argument against Providence, because the exact Adjustment of Things is referved for a future Judgment. I confess were God to make no other Distribution to the Just and Unjust, but what is made in this Life, the Inequality of it would be a strong Objection against his Providence; but then confidering that this cloudy Scene of Things will shortly close up in a righteous Judgment, wherein for the Evils which the Good have fuffered they shall be awarded with an eternal Happiness, and for the Goods which the Bad have enjoyed they shall be doomed to everlasting Wretchedness, this is sufficient to vindicate the Justice of Providence were these present Inequalities a thousand times greater than they are. For suppose that after a short melancholy Dream good Men were to live happily, and after as short a pleasant

pleafant one bad Men were to live wretchedly but for a thousand Years in this World; we might as well object against Providence this unequal Distribution of the melancholy Dream to the Good, and the pleasant one to the Bad, notwithstanding the succeeding thousand Years of their Happiness and Misery, as we do the Sufferings of the Righteous and Prosperities of the Wicked, which bear for less Proportion to that Eternity of Happiness and Misery that is to succeed them, than the Sorrow or Pleasure of a Moment's Dream doth to a Thousand Years real Calamity or Blessedness.

For the Providence of God from the first to the last is all but one continued Plot, like that of a well-contrived Comedy, which at first is very obscure and intricate; so that by what is past or present there is no guesting at the Conclusion; for all through the intermediate Acts, Virtue and Honour fight their way through Difficulties and Disappointments, and sometimes the Hero acts a sad, and fometimes the Villain a prosperous Part, at which the unskilful Spectator grieves, and is ready to damn the Poet for distributing such unequal Fates; but then in the fifth and last Act, all the cross Accidents clear up, and issue in a fair Conclusion; and in the close of all, the Hero is Crowned, and the Villain hiffed off the Stage. Let us therefore have but the Patience to stay 'till Providence hath finished its whole Plot, and closed up all its mighty Scenes in the general Judgment of the World, and then we shall see all these Inequalities set right, and the Fates of good and bad Men determined by a most just Award.

But for us to quarrel at Providence now, who are yet got no farther, it may be, than the Middle of the great Drama, and to find fault with its Procedure for crossing the Good, and prospering the Bad, is rudely to over - turn the Stage before the Entrance into the fifth Act, and to bis off the Almighty Poet for not compleating his Design before he is arrived to the Conclusion. And thus I have endeavoured to answer more at large this Objection against Providence, because it hath been more insisted on than any other, and hath more generally stumbled Men's Belief of Divine Providence.

V. And lastly, it is farther objected, that the Being of a just and good Providence, is not to be reconciled with that wretched State and Condition to which we behold the greatest Part of Mankind abandoned. For if there were a good Providence that over - ruled the Affairs of this World, how is it imaginable that ever so great a Part of Mankind as the Insidel World includes, should be left so utterly destitute as they are of the Knowledge of God, and of the Means of attaining their everlasting Happiness? to which I shall briefly answer these three Things:

I. That the Infidel World is not perhaps left to utterly deftitute as we are apt to imagine; for they have the Law of Nature to direct them, by which alone they must be tried, and stand or fall at the Day of Judgment; which as to the main Strokes of their Duty, is so plain and intelligible, that no sincere Inquirer can be ignorant of it; and if when they may understand it they will not, or if when they do understand it, they wilfully transgress

transgress and violate it, the Divine Providence hath been sufficiently good to them to leave them for ever inexcusable. For so far as their Ignorance is invincible it is not their Sin, nor shall they ever be accountable for it, or for any sinful Omission or Commission thence proceeding; and if they only answer for not understanding their Duty when they might, or for not performing it so far as they understood it, they can have no Reason to complain that they are bardly dealt with. But then,

II. As they have not those vast Advantages that we have of becoming good, and growing up into the State of Perfection and Happiness, so proportionably less Degrees of Good will be accepted of those that do well, and less Degrees of Punishment exacted of all those that do ill; for that Maxim of our Saviour, Luke xii. 48. To whomfoever much is given, of him much shall be required, necessarily implies the contrary, viz. that to whomfoever less is given, of him less shall be required; and if so, it is certain that so much as their Means of being good are less than ours, so much the less good God will accept of them than of us; and as God will accept less Good of the best Infidels, so he will exact less Punishment of the worst; for so our Saviour himself hath assured us, that it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon, and Sodom and Gomorrka, in the last Day, than for those who perfift in their Unbelief and Disobedience in Despisht of the Proposals of the Gospel. If then in Proportion to their present Disadvantages less Good will be accepted of those who make any Improvement, and less Punishment exacted of them

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who make none, neither the one fort nor the other hath any Reason to complain; and though their Condition were worse than it is, yet under these Circumstances it would be fairly consistent with the Goodness of the Divine Providence. But then,

III. And lastly, Though their Condition were a great deal worse than it is, yet it would be very unreasonable for us to object it against the Goodness of the Divine Providence, unless we better understood than we do, how God will dispose of them in the other World. Indeed if Men's Fate confifted in what they fuffer and enjoy in this Life, we might better judge of Providence by what is before us; but fince our main State is beyond the Grave, whatever befals us here is very inconfiderable, compared with what we must suffer or enjoy hereafter; and as for the present Disadvantages which the heathen World lies under, they are but very short and momentary, and if Providence pleases, it can abundantly compensate them in the World to come; and therefore fince yet we know not what it will do, as having no Revelation in the Case, it becomes us to suspend our Judgment 'till the Event hath determined it.

This we know, that Providence hath Ways enough, and Time enough too between this and the Day of Judgment, to supply these destitute Souls with all those spiritual Advantages in the other Life, which for Reasons best known to itself it hath hitherto withheld from them; it may if it pleases extend their Trial and Probation beyond this Life, and discover in the other Life the Light of the Gospel, to so many of them at least as

have here made any tolerable Improvements under the Light of Nature, and if they make good Use of it, reward them accordingly. For tho' we Christians have no Reason to expect any farther Trial after this Life is expired, because we have passed the utmost Trial already, yet who knows but God may make a farther Trial of those in the other Life, upon whom the great Experiment of the Gospel was never yet made; and therefore fince Providence can yet be infinitely good to them notwithstanding their wretched Condition at prefent, and fince for all we know it will be fo, we ought not to object against it its present Disregard of them, 'till we fee the final Issue of Things; for that their present Condition is so bad is no Ground for us to argue against Providence, unless we were fure it would never be better; Because for all we know it may yet be rendered good enough not only to justify but to glorify the Goodness of God's Providence towards them.

And now to conclude this great Argument. Since we see how necessary the Belief of Providence is to our being truly religious, and what unanswerable Evidence there is of the Truth and Reality of it, what remains but that we heartily endeavour, by a calm, fix'd, and impartial Confideration of these Things, thoroughly to instruct ourselves in the Nature, and firmly to establish ourselves in the Belief of it: for our Religion must necessarily ebb or flow according as it is influenced more or less by our Understanding and Belief of the Divine Providence, which are the great Principles that move and govern it. For every Branch of the Divine Providence is an inexhaustidle

exhaustible Fountain of religious Rhetoric and Persuasion, and in this single Proposition, that God upholds and governs the World, there are a thousand times more Inducements to Piety and Virtue, than in all other Topicks in the World. But how pregnant foever it is with Arguments, and how powerful foever its Arguments are, 'tis impossible it should prevail upon any reasonable Mind that understands not the Force, and believes not the Truth of it; for all the possible Access which outward Objects have to our Minds, is through our Knowledge and Belief of them, without which the most momentous Proposals are no more capable of affecting us, than one of Tully's Orations is of calming the North-wind; but he who firmly believes the Truth, and understands the full Emphasis of a Divine Providence, must necessarily be affected by it, if he be but within the Reach or Power of Persuasion; and unless his Will be impregnably fortified against all the Force of Argument and Reason, he will find himfelf so besieged with Motives on every Side, perfuading him to fubmit to the Obligations of Religion, that it will be almost impossible for him to defend himfelf against their powerful Importunities. For what Man in his Wits can fit unconcerned under the lively Belief that he is in the Hands of a most just and gracious, all-wife, and Almighty Providence, that is conscious to his inmost Thoughts and Purposes, and beholds all his Actions with infinite Complacency or Abborrence; that hath the D'hofal of his Life and his Soul, and of all the Goods he can hope, for and all the Evils he can fear, and will certainly reward him a thona thousand-fold if he doth well, and if he doth ill as certainly pursue him with a dire Revenge? This Belief carries with it such constraining Terrors and Allurements as cannot but affect all reasonable Minds, and finally prevail with their Hopes and Fears against all contrary Temptations. Wherefore if we would fix the Obligations of Religion upon our Minds, it concerns us above all Things to be thoroughly instructed in the Nature, and confirmed in the Belief of the divine Providence.

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CHAP. V.

Of the Necessity of believing divine Rewards and Punishments in order to our being truly Religious.

Uman Nature is framed to move upon the Hinges of *Hope* and *Fear*, and to be elicited and drawn forth in Action either by the Propofal of some attainable Good, or Prospect of some avoidable Evil, the former of which begets Hope in us, and that Pursuit; the latter Fear, and that Flight and Avoidance; and accordingly we find all Laws address to the Hopes and Fears of Men, with Proposals of Reward and Punishment, as to the Master-springs and Principles of their Action, by which they are moved to do or forbear according as they are required and enjoined. And indeed to give Laws to Men without inforcing them with Rewards and Punishments, would be to leave it indifferent whether they obey'd them or no, which is inconfistent with the Nature of Laws; for Laws necessary imply an Obligation to Obedience; but what Obligation could we have to obey them, did they leave it indifferent as to any Good or Evil accruing from it, whether we obey'd them or no; for if it will be as well for us one way as the other, what matter is it which way we determine ourselves? And this holds good in nothing more than in the Matter of our Obedience to the Laws of Religion, to which our corrupt Nature is above all Things backward and averse; all that spiritual Exercise which those Laws require being quite against the Grain of our earthly and sensual Inclinations; so that were we not drawn to it by the *Hope* of Good, and driven by the *Fear* of Evil, to be sure our own bad Natures would keep us at an eternal Distance from it; but unless we believe God to be a *Rewarder* of those that obey, and a *Punisher* of those that despise him, we have no Ground to hope for any Good,

or to dread any Evil at his Hands.

For unless we believe that he will crown those that ferve him with fome Mark of his Favour, how can we think he is pleafed with them; there being no other way for him to express his being pleased, but by crowning them with some signal Reward; and if he be not pleased with those that serve him, to be fure he is not displeased with those that neglect him; and if he be not displeased with them, what Reason have we to apprehend that he will punish them? Thus the Unbelief of God's being a Rewarder of those that obey him draws after it an Unbelief of his being a Punisher of those that despise him, and so on the contrary. For unless we believe him to be fo much concerned for his Service as to punish those that neglect it, we have no Reason to think he is so much concerned for it as to reward those that embrace it. So that the Belief and Unbelief of God's being a Rewarder and a Punisher do by necessary Consequence mutually imply each other; and unless we believe both, there is no Reason we should believe either. And when

Our Nature is fo averse, as it is, to his Service; what should induce us to ferve him when we expect no good from him, or hinder us from flighting him when we fear no Evil? And what is there can bring us home to God when we are carried away from him with an impetuous Tide of corrupt Inclinations, and have neither Hope nor Fear to bound or restrain it? So that considering the Averfation of our Nature to God's Service, it is morally impossible we should ever be heartily reconciled to it without being drawn with the Hope of Reward, and driven with the Fear of Punishment.

In the Profecution of this Argument I shall endeavour to shew,

First, How far it is necessary that our Belief of divine Rewards and Punishments should extend.

Secondly, What Evidence there is to induce us to believe them.

Thirdly, By what Means this is to be begotten and confirmed.

SECT. I.

How far it is necessary that our Belief of Divine Rewards and Punishments *should* extend.

OR to induce us to fubmit to the Obligations of Religion, it is by no Means fufficient that we believe in the general, that God will reward us if we do well, and punish us if we do Vol. II. wick-

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wickedly. For this we may firmly believe, and yet at the same time prefer the *Pleasures* of Sin as much greater Goods than the *Rewards* of Virtue, and dread the *Difficulties* of Virtue as much greater Evils than the *Punishments* of Sin; wherefore to render our Belief of divine Rewards and Punishments an *effcetual* Principle of Religion, these four Things are necessary.

First, That we should believe that God is so far a Rewarder of those that serve him, and so far a Punisher of those that neglect him, as to make a plain and sensible Distinction between them.

Secondly, Confidering how promiscuously the Goods and Evils of this World are distributed among good and bad Men, it is necessary we should believe, that there is a future State of Re-

wards and Punishments.

Thirdly, It is necessary we should believe those future Rewards and Punishments to be such as do infinitely transcend any Good we can reap by our Sins, and any Evil we can incur by doing our Duty.

Fourthly, It is necessary we should believe that there is no other way for us to avoid those Punishments but by forsaking our Sins, or to acquire those Rewards, but by submitting to our Duty.

I. It is necessary we should believe that God is so far a Rewarder of those that serve, and so far a Punisher of those that neglect him, as to make a plain and sensible Distinction between them. For unless we believe that God makes some Distinction between those that serve and those that neglect him.

him, we shall confound Good and Evil in our own Apprehensions, and look upon all human Actions as indifferent, and thereby diffolve all the Tics and Obligations of Religion. For Things are in themfelves, as they are in the Judgment and Esteem of God who cannot be miftaken in offimating their Natures; and therefore unless there be some Distinction between Men and Men, and Actions and Actions, in the Esteem of God, they must be all alike and indifferent in their own Natures. And if all Actions are indifferent in themselves, we are free from all the Ties and Obligations of Religion; and it is left indifferent to us whether we will worship God or biaspheme him. So that unless we believe that God makes some Distinction between the Good and Bad, Religion can have no Force

at all upon our Minds.

But now there is no other way for God to diftinguish between Men and Men, but by rewarding and purifising them; because if he make any Distinction in his Affections between us, we may be fure his Love will incline him to reward, and his Hatred to punish us; and fince it is as easy to him to follow his Inclination as not, fince he can reward where he loves, and punish where he hates, without any Disturbance to his own Happiness, what should hinder him from doing it, supposing that he really loves or hates, or makes any Diftinction in his Affections between those that serve and those that neglect him? So that unless he reward the one and punish the other, he can make no visible Distinction in his Affections between them. If he be contrailly affected to good and bad Men, his Affections will infallibly appear in his T 2 Astions; Actions; but if he use them alike, it is plain they are alike to him. So that unless we believe that God distinguishes between good and bad Men by rewarding and punishing them, we must look upon both as indifferent to him, and believe that he concerns himfelf neither with the one nor the other; and if we think it is indifferent to God, whether we are good or bad, to be fure it will not be indifferent to us, whose Natures are so biassed with bad Inclinations, which having neither Hope nor Fear to restrain them, will run towards bad Objects without Rub or Interruption. And what Likelihood is there that we who are so prone and inclinable to Evil, should concern our selves in the Service of God, whilft we look upon it as a thing indifferent to him whether we ferve him or no?

Wherefore to the *fubduing* our Minds to the Obligations of Religion, it is necessary we should believe that God is so far a Rewarder of good, and Punisher of bad Men, as to make a sensible Distinction between them, and demonstrate that he is differently affected towards them. For to what End should we serve a God that takes no Notice of us, that regards not what we do, but sits above in the Heavens as an unconcerned Spectator of our Actions? Why should we cross our own Inclinations, and forsake our beloved Lusts for his sake, when it is altogether indifferent to him what we do, or whither we go, or what becomes of us?

II. Confidering how promiscuously the Goods and Evils of this Life are distributed among good and bad Men, it is necessary that we should believe there is a future State of Rewards and Punishments.

nishments. For tho' fometimes in this Life God rewards good Men, and punishes bad with such fignal and remarkable Goods and Evils as are fufficient Indications of the vast Distinction he makes between them, yet this is extraordinary, and befides the constant and regular Course of his Providence, which for wife and excellent Ends and Purposes doth ordinarily scatter Good and Evil among Men with an open and undistinguishing Hand; infomuch that as the wife Man observes, Eccles. ix. 1, 2, 3. No man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before him; all things come alike to all, there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, and as the good so is the sinner, and he that sweareth as he that feareth an oath; this is an evil among all things that are done under the Sun, that there is one event to all. Since therefore God's Love of good Men, and Hatred of bad appears not by any thing before us, we must either conclude that they are both indifferent to him, which would be to rafe the very Foundations of Religion, or that there is a future State of Rewards and Punishments, wherein there will be no more fuch promiscuous Distributions, no more such cross coupling of Prosperity with Vice, and Misery with Virtue, but all Things will be adjusted fuitably to Men's Deferts and Qualifications, and those that are good advanced to immortal Glory and Honour, and those that are bad depressed into eternal Shame and Confusion. For the Difference which God makes between them in the present Course of his Providence is too small and indiscernible to induce us to believe that he makes any Difference between them in his Esteem and Affection; and therefore either

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we must believe that there is another State wherein he makes a far wider Difference between them, or conclude that they are both indifferent to him, and that he hath no more Regard to the one than the other, or that he hath no Regard at all to either, which, as I shewed before, utterly disolves the

Obligations of Religion.

III. It is necessary we should believe those Future Rewards and Punishments to be such as do infinitely transcend any Good we can reap in our sinful Neglect of God, and any Evil we can incur by our Submission to him. It is true, were our Natures equally inclined to fubmit or to neglect him, we should need no more Good and Evil to move us one way than the other; but the same Proportion of Goods and Evils which tempts us now to forfake and abandon him, would equally tempt us to ferve and obey him: But alas, this is far from our Case; for in fubmitting to God we move counter to our selves, we cross the Grain of our degencrate Nature, and run away from our dearest Inclinations: whereas in forfaking him, we row with the Tide, and are driven on with an impetuous Current of finful Lusts and Affections; and the Case being thus, the Temptations of the one Side must be incomparably greater, if ever they prevail with us, than they need be on the other. For Men are easily rempted to act in Compliance with their own Inclinations; and the fmallest Goods or Evils that can be proposed to them from without, will readily induce them to do what they have a mind to; but to prevail with a Man to do that which he is extremely averse to, to act against Nature, and live in Defiance with his own Inclinations, requires a mighty

mighty Force of outward Temptation; and it must be a very great Good that he will not lose, a very formidable Evil that he will not incur, rather than enter into any Course of Action that is irkfome and ungrateful to his Nature. So that unless we believe the Goods and Evils of the other World to be incomparably greater than all the Pleasures of Sin, and all the Sufferings of Piety and Virtue, there will not be Force enough in our Faith to perfunde us; because those future Goods and Evils move against Nature, and persuade us to a Course of Life we are extremely averse to; whereas these present ones join Hands with our Inclinations, and find a ready Concurrence in our Wills and Affections; and a very small Temptation will prevail against a great one, when it hath Nature, that bosom Orator, to sollicit and plead for it. Wherefore unless we believe the Rewards and Punishments of a future State to be such as infinitely outweigh those present Goods and Evils that tempt us to Sin, they will never be able to prevail against them; because they must not only out-tempt them, but, which is the much harder Task of the two, they must out-tempt the Reluctances of our degenerate Nature; and yet for future Goods and Evils to out-tempt present ones is not so easy a Matter neither; especially if those future ones are invisible and out of the Ken of our Sense, which is the Case here. For Futurity lessens all Objects to the Mind, even as Difiance dorh to the Eye, and makes Things appear to us much implies than they are in their own Natures: So that the Fuzurity of the Rewards and Punishments of the other Life, are a mighty Difadvantage to them when they stand T 4. in

in Competition with the present Goods and Evils; because the latter appear to us in their full Proportion and Magnitude, with all their tempting Circumstances about them; whereas the former exhibit to us a dim and confused Landskip of Things afar off, of Things which we never faw nor felt, and which by Reason of their Distance imprint very dark Ideas on our Minds. And as their Futurity lessens their Appearance, and renders it confused and indistinct, so their Invisibility weakens their Force and Influence on our Minds, which no Objects can so nearly affect as those that strike upon our Serses. So that unless by an immense Magnitude they compensate for being future, and insensible, it is impossible they should prevail with such Minds as ours against present and sensible Goods and Evils. Wherefore to render our Belief of a future State effectual to reduce us to God and our Duty, it is absolutely necessary we should believe the Rewards and Punishments of it to be infinitely greater than all the Goods and Evils that can tempt us to Sin; and that not only because our Natures are extremely averse to that which these Rewards and Punishments tempt us to, but because the Goods and Evils which tempt us the contrary way have the prevailing Advantages of being present and senfible.

IV. And lastly, It is necessary we should believe that there is no other way for us to acquire these Rewards or avoid these Punishments, but by submitting to the Obligations of Religion. For to be throughly convinced and persuaded of the immense Rewards and Punishments of the other Life, is by no means sufficient to reduce us unto God, so long as we do but dream of any possible way to obtain

obtain those Rewards and to avoid those Punishments without fubmitting to Him, to which above all imaginable ways our corrupt Nature hath the greatest Antipathy. So that though we were never fo much convinced of the absolute necessity of escaping Hell and purchasing Heaven, yet if at the fame time we have a prospect of any other way or means of effecting it, to be sure we shall shun this, this most ungrateful one of forsaking our Sins and returning to God. And if lifting ourfelves into Godly Parties, or putting on a demure and fanctified Countenance; if being Moped, Dejected or Unfociable; if Whining or Fasting, or long Prayers, or an affected Club, or rigid observance of holy Times; if confuming our Lives in a bare - footed Pilgrimage, or wearing a Hair Shirt, or whipping our Bodies, or spending our Estates on Masses and Indulgencies; if being made free of a holy Confraternity, or vifiting Altars and Shrines, or numbering Prayers, like Faggots by a Tally of Beads; if these or any of these will but secure us of Heaven and from going to Hell, we shall think them a thousand times more tolerable and easy than to submit our Wills to God in all the instances of true Piety and Virtue; in the doing of which we must strangle the corrupt Inclinations of our Nature, tear our beloved Lusts from our Hearts, rack off our earthly Affections from their Lees, and refine and spiritualize them into a divine Zeal, and Love, and Devotion, than which there is nothing in the World more irksome to a degenerate Nature. So that until we are reduced to an utter despair of reaping the Rewards and escaping the Punithments of the other Life by any other Means

Means than this of *fubmitting* ourselves to the Obligation of Religion, our *Faith* will be altogether *inefjectual*.

SECT. II.

What Evidence there is to induce us to believe these future Rewards and Punishments.

HAT there are future Rewards and Pu-nishments is a Doctrine universally affented to by all Ages, and Nations, and Religions, and there is fcarce any first Principle in Philosophy, in which Mankind are more generally agreed. Thus among the heathen Poets, Divines, and Philosophers, there is an unanimous Acknowledgment of these future States, although their Descriptions of them are generally nothing but the Dreams of an extravagant Fancy. For so as Josephus observes, speaking of the Essense Doctrine concerning the future State of the Bleffed, Ταις μεν αγαθαις ψυχαις όμοδοξεντες πασιν Έλληνων, &c. i. e. They teach, as all the Greek Nations also do, that for good Souls there are bleffed States prepared beyond the Ocean in a Region that is always free from Rain and Snow, and excessive Heats, being perpetually fanned with gentle Breezes from the Ocean; which Description he hath translated almost verbatim out of the 4th Book of Homer's Ulysses, where he brings in Proteus thus bespeaking Menelaus — σες ηλύσιον ωεδίου — κ) σειραζα γάιη, &c. i. e. The Gods shall send thee

thee to the Fields of Elysium which lie on the utmost Parts of the Earth, where thou skalt live secure and happy, there being neither Rain, nor Snow, nor Winter, but the bleffed Inhabitants are perpetually refreshed with the gentle breathing of cold Zephyrs from the Ocean. Plato tells us of an easy Law concerning Men, Kai asi ng vũn ἔτι ἐς in ἐν θεοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων του μεν διααίως του βίον διέλθονία κζ έσίως, επειδών τελευτήση, είς μακάρων νήσες απίουζα, οίκεῖν έν το αση ευδαιμονία εκδός κακών, τον δε αδίκως κ αθίως, είς τὸ της τίσεως κ) δίκης δεσμοτήριου, ὁ δὲ τάρθαρου καλεσιν, είναι, i. e. which was always and is still in force among the Gods, that those who lived just and holy Lives should after their Death go into the Isles of the Blessed, where they should enjoy all manner of Happiness without the least Intermixture of Misery; but that those who lived here unjustly and ungodly should be sent into that Prison of just Punishment, which is called Hell, Plat. Gorg. p. 312. Thus also Tully Tuscul. lib. 1. Permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium, i. e. We believe, as all Nations do, that the Souls of Men do survive their Bodies; and to name no more, Seneca, Epist. 117. tells us, Cum de animarum æternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet confensus oninium aut Timentium inferos, aut Colentium, i. e. When we discourse of the Eternity of Souls, the general Confern of all Men either fearing or worthipping the hellish Powers is of very great Moment. And indeed this Eelief of the future Scates being fo generally imprinted on Men's Minds is a ve y probable Argument of the Reality of them, it being hardly conceivable, how the Reafon of all Mankind should have so unanimously conserted in it,

it, had it not been extremely agreeable to the Make and Frame of our Minds; and we cannot fuppose any falle Proposition to be agreeable to the Frame of our Mind, without reflecting diskonourably upon the Truth of him that framed it. And indeed this Notion of a future State is such as bath been generally embraced by those Persons who are least capable of deducing it by a logical Dependence of one Thing upon another; and therefore fince it hath no Dependency in their Minds on any other antecedent Notion, how could it have been so generally entertained, did not the common Dictate of Nature or Reason, acting alike in all Men, move them to conspire in it, though they knew not one another's Minds? For it hath been believed with a kind of Repugnancy to Sense, which discovers all Things round about it to be mortal, and which upon that Account would have been too apt to have feduced ruder Minds into a Disbelief of any other State, had not some more powerful Impression on their Souls forcibly urged them to believe it.

But because this Argument drawn from universal Consent is liable to some little Exception, I shall not insist upon it, but endeavour to prove the Reality of this suture State of Rewards and Punishments from these Topicks:

First, From the Wisdom of God's Government. Secondly, From the Justice of his Providence. Thirdly, From the natural Capacity of our Souls to survive our Bodies, and to enjoy future Rewards, and suffer future Punishments.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, From the natural Expectance we have of future Rewards, and Dread of future Punishments.

Fifthly, From the excellent Frame and Struc-

ture of human Nature.

Sixthly, From the Testimony of the Christian Religion.

I. From the Wisdom of God's Government. That Mankind is under the Government of God, is evident from that Law which he hath imprinted on our Nature, by which our Actions are distinguished into Good and Evil, Virtuous and Vicious; of which sufficient Proof hath been given Chap. I. and fince God hath given a Law to our Natures, there is no doubt to be made but he hath taken fufficient Care to enforce the Observance of it by Rewards and Punishments, otherwise his Government over us would be very insecure and precarious. For that Law-giver doth only Petition his Subjects to obey, who doth not promife such Rewards and denounce such Penalties as are sufficient to oblige them thereunto.

But now there is no Reward can be fufficient to oblige us to obey, which doth not abundantly compensate any Loss or Evil we may sustain by our Obedience; no Punishment sufficient to deter us from disobeying, that doth not far surmount all the Benefits and Pleasures which we can hope to reap from our Disobedience: But unless there be a future State, the Law of Nature can propose no such Rewards and Punishments to us. For if we have nothing to dread or hope for beyond the Grave, our present Interest is all our Concern, and in Reason

we ought to judge Things to be Good or Evil, according as they promote or obstruct our temporal Happiness. Now though it is certain that in the general there is a natural Good accruing to us from all virtuous Actions; as on the contrary a natural Evil from all vicious ones; and it is ordinarily more conducive to our temporal Interest to obey than to disobey the Law of our Natures; yet there are a World of Instances wherein Vice may be more advantageous to us than Virtue, abstracting from the Rewards and Punishments of another Life. It is ordinarily better for me to be an honest Man than a Knave; it is more for my Reputation and usually for my Profit too; and it is more for the Publick Good in which my own is involved; but yet in feveral Circumstances it may be better for me with respect only to this World to be a Knave than an honest Man. For whensoever I can cheat fo fecretly and fecurely as not to fall under the publick Lash, nor impair my Reputation, and I can gain more by the Cheat than I shall lose in the Damage of the Publick, it will be doubtless more Advantageous for me as to my Worldly Interest to Cheat than to be Honest; and how often fuch fair Opportunities of Cozenage do Occur, no Man can be Insensible that hath but the least infight into the Affairs of the World. So that if there were no future Rewards and Punishments, this great Law of Righteousness would not have Force enough Universally to oblige us; because there are a World of Instances wherein we might gain more Good and eschew more Evil by doing Unrighteoufly, than all its prefent Rewards and Punishments do amount to. And the same may be said of all

all other Laws of Nature, which without the great Motives of future Happiness and Misery can no longer induce Men to obey them than it is for their temporal Interest to do so. For suppose I can secrefly flab or poison a Man whom I hate or dread, or from whose Death I may reap any confiderable Advantage, what should restrain me from it? If you say the Law of Nature, pray what Reward doth the Law of Nature propose that is sufficient to compensate for the Dissatisfaction of my Revenge, or for the Danger I run in sussering my Enemy to live; or what Punishment doth the Law of Nature denounce that can ballance the Advantage of a thousand, or perhaps ten thousand Pounds a Year that may accrue to me by his Death?

If you say the Law of Nature proposes to me the Reward of a quiet and satisfied Mind, and denounces the Punishment of a guilty and amazed Conscience; I easily answer, that this Peace and Horror, which is consequent to the Forbearance or Commission of Sin, arises from the Hope and Dread of future Rewards and Punishments; which being taken away, to sin or not fin will be indifferent as to any Peace or Horror that can follow upon it; and when this Restraint is taken off, what Consideration will there be left that is sufficient to withhold me from the bloody Fact, whenever I have an Opportunity to act it fecurely, and am furioufly spurred on to it by my own Revenge and Covetoufness? So that if there be no Rewards and Punishments in another Life to inforce the Commands of the Law of Nature, it is certain there are no fuch annexed to it in this as are univerfally sufficient to oblige us to observe them. For as for the Goods and

Evils of this Life, they are ordinarily distributed among Men with solittle Respect and Discrimination, as not only to occasion but to justify that famous Observation of the Wise Man, that all Things happen alike to all. Either therefore there are other Goods to be hoped for, and other Evils to be feared, or there are a World of Cases wherein God hath not sufficiently provided to secure our obedience to the Law of our Nature; and to imagine that God should give a Law to his Creatures, and take no care to secure the Authority of it, is a most senieless Blasphemy of the Wisdom of his Government; for this would be to expose his own Authority to Contempt, and to cast his Laws at the Feet of his Creatures, to be spurned and trampled on

by them at their Pleasure.

If it be objected, that all that this Argument proves, is, that to fecure our Obedience to the Law of Nature, it is necessary we should believe that there are future Rewards and Punishments; but that it doth not hence follow that it is necessary that there should be future Rewards and Punishments; because whether there be any such Things or no, our Belief of them will be fufficient to fecure the Authority of the Law; I answer, That if our Belief of future Rewards and Punishments be necessary, one of these two Things must inevitably follow; either that the Objects of our Belief are real, which is the thing I am proving; or that to countenance the Authority of his Laws it is necessary for God to impose upon our Faith, and deceive us into the belief of Fallhood. For if to inforce God's Law, it is necessary we should believe that there are future Rewards and Punishments,

either there must be such Things really existing, or God must inforce his Law with our Belief of a Falshood; and to imagine, that when God might have created for us a future State of Reward and Punishment, if he had so pleased, and governed us by the Hopes and Fears of it, he hash rather chosen to govern us by Tricks and Lies, and to wheedle us into Obedience by a Cheat and Delucion, is a Blasphemy no less fensiles than bor rid. Since therefore to focure the Authority of that Law by which the human Nature is to be govern'd, it is necessary that it should be inforced with the Motives of everlassing Reward and Punishment, one of these three Things necessarily follows; either that God hath not fufficiently inforced his Law, which is a foul Imputation on his Wifdom, or that he is feign to inforce with it a Lie, which is an impious Reflection on his Truth, or that there are everlasting Rewards and Punishments.

II. From the Justice of the divine Providence. For if there be a divine Providence presiding over the World (as, that there is, hath been already sufficiently proved) Justice and Equity, which is the most glorious Persection of an over-ruling Power, must necessarily be included in the Notion of it. For without Justice, over-ruling Power is nothing but an impotent Tyranny, which to attribute to God is far more diskonourable and incongruous to the Nature of his Persections, than to strip him of all Providence, as Epicurus did, and finite him up in the Heavens in a State of everlasting Sloth and Luxury. For not to govern, is only to do nothing; but to govern without Justice, is to do Mischief; and 'tis a much less Derogation from Vol. II.

the Perfection of any Being, to suppose it to be idle than to suppose it to be mischievous. So that allowing that God, who is the most perfect of all Beings, governs the World, it would not be only Blasphemous, but Nonsense to imagine that he governs it unjuftly. Now the proper Justice of Government confifts in the Equality of its Distributions; for fince there is fuch a thing as immutable Good and Evil in the Actions of free and reasonable Agents, it is naturally fit and due, that those who do Good should receive Good, and those who do Evil, Evil, from their Hands who have the Government of Actions; and this proportionable to the Good and Evil of their Doings. So that God's governing the World juffly, confifts in distributing Good to those that do Good, and Evil to those that do Evil, or in other Words, in proportioning Rewards and Punishments to Men according to the Good and Evil he finds in their Actions; and unless we suppose him to do this, it is Nonsense to imagine that he governs the World.

But if all his Diffributions are confined to this Life, and there is neither Reward nor Punishment to be expected from him in another, there are infinite Instances of his Providence wherein it will be impossible to defend his Equality and Justice. For if there be no other Scene of Good and Evil, Reward and Punishment, but only this Life, all the afficted good and prosperous bad Men that ever were in the World, of which there are infinite Instances, are so many reproachful Monuments of the woeful Inequality of the divine Government. For how many Millions of brave Souls have there been, who have thought nothing too dear for God and his

Service,

Ch. V. Proofs of a Future State. Service, and have facrificed their Lufts, their Lives and their Fortunes to him, and yet upon this Suppotal have reaped no other Recompence for so doing but only a mijerable Life, and a wooful Death, and an obscure dishonourable Grave? As on the contrary, how many Millions of Millions of wicked Men that have liv'd in open Defiance to all that is facred, and just, and good, blasphemed Goo, affronted his Authority, and trampled upon all the Laws of his Government, and yet, supposing there is no other life, have undergone no other Punishment for so doing but to live prosperously, and die quietly, and lie inskrin'd in a Marble Monument? Now how can we otherwise epologize for the Justice of Providence when it thus cross-couples Prosperity with Vice, and Adversity with Virtue, but only by supposing this present Life to be only the State of our Trial and Probation, which will quickly determine in our everlasting Recompence or Punishment, according as we behave and acquit ourfelves in it; upon which Supposal the Juflice of Providence may be fairly accounted for, were the present Distributions of it a thousand times more unequal than they are? For then we need not wonder that good and bad Men are at prefent so uncqually treated, fince now they are only upon their Proof and Trial, which, as I have shewn before, requires fuch a Treatment, but their Reward and Punishment is referved for another State, wherein all these seeming Inequalities shall be fairly adjusted, and Virtue shall be createn'd with everlasting Glery and Pleasure, and Vice dami'd to eternal Horrer and Confusion. But if the Goods and Evils of this present Life, are all the Reward and Punishment U 2

that good and bad Men are to expect, where is the Justice of the divine Government, that many times oppressits Friends, and advances its Enemies, and in the Conclusion extinguishes their Beings together, and therewith all Possibility of making any tuture Retribution of Good to the one, or Evil to the other? And therefore if it be true, that the Judge of all the World will do righteoufly, that first or left he will certainly distribute his Rewards and Punishments to his Subjects according to the Merit and Demerit of their Actions, it must be as true, that for the main he hath referved the doing it to a future State; fince it cannot be denied but that at present he very often doth the quite contrary: And if it be but as evident that there is fuch a future State as it is that God governs the World justly, I think 'tis as fair an Affurance of it as any modest Man can require.

III. From the natural Capacity of our Souls to furvive our Bodies, and enjoy future Rewards, and fuffer future Punishments, it also follows, that there is a future State of Reward and Punishment; for we find in our Souls a certain innate Force and Power, whereby they determine themselves which way they please in their Motions and Operations, whereby they are exempt from the necessitating Induence of any thing that is foreign to them; and this innate Liberty or Power of Self-determination is necessarily supposed in the Management of all human Affairs; in Commerce and Treatics, in Government and Laws, and Administrations of Justice; in Councils, Admonitions, Reproofs and Persuasions; in all which Applications are made to our Souls as to free and felf-determining Agents, that have the

the absolute Disposal of their own Motions, and can direct them which way they please; and indeed were not our Souls left to their own free Disposal, but concluded by the Laws of a fatal Necessity, as we fee all material Agents are, fuch Applications to them as there, would be very abfurd and ridiculous, and we may as reasonably hope to tame Wolves and Tygers by reading Ethics to them, or to fill the North-Wind, by fending Ambaffadors to him to propose Articles of Peace, as to prevail upon Men's Minds by moral Addresses and Ferfualions; because if they are not Masters of their own Choices, whatsoever the rigid Laws of Nocessity determine them to, they must necessarily chase

in despight of all Persuasions to the contrary.

Now by this felf-determining Power our Souls do evidently manifest themselves to be immaterial Substances, and confequently not liable to Death and Corruption. For if they were Matter they would be moved like Matter, i. c. by the Preffure or Thrulling of other Matter upon them; and it would be no more in their Power to move any other way than that which fome other Matter presses and impels them, than it is so: a Stone not to move upwards when it is impelled by the Force which your Arm impresses on it, and not to move down again when that Force is spent, and it is press'd back by its own Weight and Gravity. Whereas we feel in our Soul an mnate Power to determine itself which way it pleases, and even to move quite contrary to all foreign Impressions. For when 'tis press'd on by cutward objects, to fuch and fuch thoughts and purposes with all imaginable Vigour, it often siems the impetuous Tide, and thinks and purposes the quite quite contrary. How then can that be Matter which is not determined in its Motions by Matter, but when it pleases can either move counter to all material Impressions, or of two material Impressions.

fions can move counter to the ftrongest? That our Souls therefore are immaterial, is just as evident as that they have Liberty of Will; and that they have Liberty of Will, needs no other Proof than the common Sense and Feeling of Mankind; and whatfoever Effence feels this Freedom within it itself, whereby it is absolved from the rigid Laws of Matter, may with all the Reason in the World conclude itself immaterial; and if our Souls are immaterial Substances, to be sure they can naturally subfift and live without these Bodies, and must necessarily do so unless God destroys them, as having no centrary Qualities or divisible Parts, no Principles of Death or Corruption in them; and fince God hath made our Souls of an immaterial and immortal Nature, we have all the Reason in the World to conclude that he will not unravel his own Workmanship, but permit it to survive its Body, and enjoy or endure that happy or miscrable Fate which it self hath chosen and made.

IV. From the natural Expediance we have of future Rewards and Dread of future Punishments, it is also evident that there is a State of future Rewards and Punishments. Thus after the Commission of any flagitious Wickedness there naturally arise ill Abodings in Men's Minds of a dire After-reckoning; and though the Commission be freret and concealed from all human Cognizance, so that there is no Reason to dread the Corrections

of publick Juflice for it, yet whenever the Man reflects on it, it fills his Mind with borrible Prefages of a receful Futurity; as, on the contrary, whenever a Man doth any great Good or conquers any violent Temptation to Evil, it lifts up his Soul into a bleffed Expectation, and fwells his Hope with the Promise of a future Reward; and tho' the Good he hath done, or the Evil he hath avoided, gives him no kind of Prospect of any present Advantage, yet his Mind is soothed and ravilhed with the Contemplation of it, which naturally suggests to him the joyous Hopes of a Recompence to come. For whence should this Hope and Dread spring up in Men's Minds upon the Commission of good and bad Actions, but from some common Impression upon human Nature, intimating to us a future State of Reward and Punishment; If you fay, it is from those religious Principles which we imbibe in our Education; I would feign know how came this Principle concerning the future State to be fo univerfally imbibed, if there were not fomething in it that is very agreeable with the Reason of all Mankind? For, whatever is the Matter, we fee it is very eafily embraced, but very difficultly parted with; Men's Minds do catch at it with a strange kind of Greediness, but when once they have fivallowed it, it never comes up again without Straining and Violence; and what should be the Reason of this, if there were not something in it that is very agreeable with the natural Taste and Relish of our Understandings? We know there have been great Wits and Philosophers, that have taken as much Pains to rafe the Belief of a future State out of Men's Minds as ever any others did to imprint it there; and yet though their Docaine hath been always highly befriended by Mon's wicked Lefts and Affections, to which the Belief of a nature State is the most terrible and generalizes thing in the World, yet with all their Wit and Scilling they have never been able to rest it out of Min's Minds. If then our Hopes and Flores of another World be merely owing to our Tembing and Education, why should not Teaching crafe as well as imprint them; especially when it has powerfully seconded with all the bosom Rhetarick of Minis vicious Inclinations? Whereas on the contrary, those who have most industriously artempted to extinguish their Sense of another World, have generally been very unsuccessful, and though in the Rioi of their Iniful Delights, they many times charm and supify it for the present, yet no sooner do they retire into themseives, and cooly reflect upon their own Minds, but it prefently awakes again, and haunts and purfues them; and though they use all imaginable ways to divert their Minds from the Thoughts of another World, and, to avoid these bosom-Accusers and Tormentors, run for Sanctuary to all Things without them, to Sports and Recreations, to Wine and Women, to Care and Business, yet full they pursue them, and ever and anon break in upon them, and scare and terrify them; and because their Minds are so bounfed with these importunate Terrors of the World to come, they are afraid to look inwards, but are feign to live abroad in their own Defence, as not during to trust themselves alone with themselves; all which are plain Presages of a future judgment and vengeance that awaits wicked Souls after after this Life. For if this Dread of future Punishment be natural to us (as its slicking so closely and universally to human Nature plainly argues it is) it must be impressed on us by the great Author of Nature; and for him to impress a Passion on us which hath no real Object, would be to impose a Cheat upon our Natures, and abuse our Minds with a salse Alarm. So that either we must suppose that God hath implanted in our Natures a Dread of that which is not, which is a distronourable Restriction on his Truth and Veracity; or that there is really a future Punishment answerable to that Dread.

And as the Dread of future Punishment is natural to us when we do ill, fo the Defire and Expectance of future Reward is no less natural to us when we do well. For I dare boldly fay, there never was any virtuous Man, of whatfoever Nation or Religion, or Sect of Philosophers, whose Mind hath not been winged with earnest Hopes and Defires of a future Happiness; and there is none that ever yet either denied or despaired of it, but only fuch as have first debauched the very Principles of their Nature. For fuch it is evident were the Sadducces and Epicureans, Sects of Men that had drowned all that was buman in them in Senfuality and Vohibtwousness, and are branded upon Record for their shameful Indulgence to their own brutish Genius; and foch are no Standards of human Nature, but ought rather to be looked upon as Monsters of Men. And therefore as we do not judge of the natural Figures and Proportions of human Bodies by monstrous and miskapen Births, so neither ought we to judge of what is natural or unnatural, to Men by those Brutes in buman Skape, who by submiting their Reason to their Passions and Appetites, have disfigured their Natures and distorted it into an unnatural Position: But if we would know what is buman and natural to us, we must take our Measures from those who live most conformably to the Laws of a rational Nature; and these are they whom we call Pious and Virtuous, who are therefore to be looked upon as the true Standards of human Nature, by whom we may best judge of what is natural and unnatural to us; and if we judge by these, we shall most certainly find that Virtue, and the Hopes of Immortality are so nearly allied, that like Hippccrates's Twins they live and die together. For though while Men live a brutish and sensual Life, their suture Hopes are usually drowned in their present Enjoyments; yet when once they recover out of this unnatural State, and begin to live like reasonable Beings, immediately they feel great Defires and Expectations of a future Happine's springing up in their Minds, and fo arifing higher and higher proportionably as they advance in Virtue and Goodness; which is a plain Evidence that these Hopes and Desires are natural to us and interwoven with the Frame and Constitution of our Souls. But now how can it confift with the Goodness of God to implant such Desires and Hopes in our Natures, and then withhold from them that which is the only Object that can fuit and fixinfy them? For as a great Divine of our own high well observed, Other Beings we see have no natural Defire in vain, the good God having to ordered Things that there are Objects in Nature apportioned to all their natural Appetites; but if there be no future State of Happinel's referved for good Men, we are by a natural Principle most strongly inclined to that which we can never attain to; as if God had purpofely framed us with fuch Inclinations, that fo we might be perpetually Tormented between those two Passions Desire and Despair, an earnest Propension after a suture Happiness, and an utter Incapacity of enjoying it; as if Nature itself, whereby all other Things are difposed to their Perfection, did serve only in Man to make him miserable, and, which is more confiderable, as if Virtue, which is the Perfection of Nature, did only ferve to contribute to our Infelicity, by raifing in us fuch Defires and Expectations as without a future Happiness must be for ever disappointed. But if this Defire and Expectation be natural to us, as it evidently is, it must be implanted there by the God of Nature, with whose Truth and Goodness it can never confist to inspire us with fuch Defires and Hopes as he knows have no Object in the Nature of Things, and so can never be fulfilled and accomplished.

V. From the excellent Frame and Conflitution of human Nature, it is also evident that there is a future State of Reward and Punishment. For whoever shall impartially consider the Frame of our Natures, will eafily differn that we are made for much greater Purpoles than to enjoy this World, and that our Faculties are as much too big for these sensitive Fruitions as the Channel of the Ocean is for the Streams of a little River. For the highest Happiness we can frame an Idea of, is the enjoyment of God by Contemplation and Love, and an imitation of his Perfections, as I have prov'd at large, Part I, c. 3. Which doth as far excel all Worldly

worldly Happiness, as the Enjoyments of a Prince do the Pleasures of a Fly; and yet it is evident that our Minds are framed with a natural capacity of enjoying this supreme Beatitude, i. e. of contemplating, and loving and imitating God. For as for the Being and Existence of God, all Things round about us preach and proclaim it, and which way foever we turn our Eyes we behold the Footsteps of his Power and Wisdom; and being endowed with a reasoning Faculty, we can easily ascend to the infinite Perfections of his Nature by those borrowed Perfections we behold in his Creatures, which are fo many lively Comments and Paraphrases upon him, and so far forth as they are Perfections, must necessarily meet and concenter in him; and then such is the frame of our Natures, that from the Contemplation of the Beauty and Perfection of any Being, we naturally proceed to Admire and Love it; so that unless our Wills be violently prejudiced against the Perfestions of God, our Contemplation must necessiarily kindle our Love of them; and then those Perfections which we Love and Admire in another, we are naturally ambitious to transcribe into our felves; so that being once inflamed with the Love of God, that will be continually prompting us to imitate him, and that will by Degrees mould us into a fair and glorious resemblance of him. God hath implanted in the very frame of our Natare a most forward Capacity of enjoying himself, which in the Perfection of it infinitely transcends all that can be imagined in a terrestrial Paradise. And yet though we have Faculties that we are fure are naturally cayable of enjoying him to Perfection; of

of contemplating him without Wearinefs, of loving him without Aversien, of imitating him without Difficulty or Interruption; in this present State of Things it is morally impossible we should ever arise to it. For our Faculties are clogged with fo many finful Prejudices, interrupted with fo many bodily Necessities, diverted with so many secular Occasions, that it cannot be reasonably expected even from the best Men in the World, that they should in this Life approach the Perfection of the Happiness of divine Enjoyment; especially if there were no other Life but this, for then it would be Folly so much as to attempt it. For what Man in his Wits would ever think it worth the while to spend a considerable Part of his Life in waging War with himself, mortifying his Affections, crossing and starving out his dearest Inclinations (which yet he must do e'er he can arrive to any comfortable Degree of divine Enjoyment) if there were no other Recompence to be expected at last, but to live a few Days longer in a rapturous Muse, and then lie down in everlasting Darkness and Insensibility? Had he not a thousand times better please and gratify himself at present, content his craving Defires with the Goods that are before him, and take his fill of those sensual Delights that readily offer themselves to his Enjoyment, than run away from them in a long and wearifome Quest of Spiritual Joys, which for all he knows he may never arrive to, or if he doth, is fure within a few Moments to be deprived of for ever. So that if there be no other State but this, it is plain we are made naturally capable of the highest Happiness to no Purpose; we are naturally

capable of enjoying God, and yet fuch are our Circumstances in this present State, that if there be no other, it is not to be expected we should ever arrive to any high degree of Enjoyment; and if it were, all things confidered, it would be an egregious piece of Folly to attempt it. Now how can it consist, either with the divine Wisdom or Goodness, to create in us such vast Capacities of spiritual Happiness, and then place us in such Circumstances wherein it would be both Imprudent and in Vain for us to purfue any other Happiness but what is Carnal and Senfual? No wife Man would build a House unless he meant it should be inhabited; and can we imagine that the All-wise God would ever have created in us fuch vast and boundless Capacities of Happiness, merely to stand empty and be for ever uninhabited; that he who always proposes to himself the most noble and worthy ends of his Actions, would ever have formed in us fuch superfluous Capacities; or built such spacious Rooms in our Nature when he never intended to make any Use of them?

And then, confidering the Goodness' as well as Wisdom of God, what likelihood is there that he should create such ample Capacities in our Nature, and furnish it with such excellent Faculties, for no other end but to enjoy the trisling Goods of this Life; that he who hath created Goods for all other Creatures, that are every way adequate to their natural Capacities, should make us capable to partake of the Felicities of Angels, and then stake us down to the Pleasures of Swine? Especially considering that by making us capable of a higher Happiness and sensible of our own Capacity, he hath almost

most necessitated us to expect and desire it; and what is this, if he doth not intend it for us, but to create in us an Appetite merely to vex and tantalise it; as if it were a Recreation to him to sit above in the Heavens and behold the Work of his own Hands spending itself in weary Struglings towards him, and vexed all the while it continues in Being with an impotent Desire of that which it shall never enjoy, and which by giving it a Capacity to enjoy, he hath encouraged it to desire and expest?

VI. And lastly, from the Testimony of the Chriflian Religion it is also evident that there is a future State of Reward and Punishment; which in most express Terms affures us of another Life beyond this, wherein we shall be for ever kappy or miserable according to what we have done in the Flesh; so that we have as full evidence of the Reality of future Rewards and Punishments, as we have of the Truth of Christianity, and as full evidence of the Truth of Christianity as all the miraculous Works of our Saviour can give, and as full evidence of the Truth of his Miracles as the most credible Testimony of Eye Witnesses can give, who not only confirmed their Testimony by other Miracles of their own, but at last sealed it with their Blood, which is the highest Security that mortal Men can give of their Fidelity; but tho' this Argument be of all others the most convincing and fatisfactory, yet I shall insist no farther on it in this Place, because I shall have occasion to profecute it at large in the feventh Chapter.

SECT. III.

By what means this Belief of divine Rewards and Punishments is to be begotten and confirmed in us.

Hough the Evidences of future Rewards and Punishments be such as are sufficient to Convince any reasonable Mind, yet it is evident that in this degenerate State of our Natures there is a strong Repugnancy to the lively Belief of them, insomuch that the bare proposal of Evidence is not sufficient effectually to persuade us; wherefore before we dismiss this Argument, it will be necessary to add, to what hath been said, such Means and Directions, as, together with the Evidences, are proper to dispose our Minds to the effectual Belief of the future State; and these I shall reduce to these four Particulars:

I If we would effectually believe the future State of Rewards and Punishments, we must fix and inure our Minds to serious Thoughts and Confiderations. For whilst our Minds are taken up with Fancies and Levities, with wild or ludicrous or incoherent Ideas, or entertained with the Cares or Pleasures of this Life, they will not be at leifure to turn their Thoughts towards another World. For to think close of another World requires a very serious and thoughtful Mind; because the other World doth not press upon our Senses as this World doth, which wheresoever we turn our selves is continually thrusting its Objects into

into our Minds through our Eyes and Ears, and whifpering to our Thoughts through the Organ of our Senses which are the most immediate Entries and Inless to our Mind. So that the other World being quite out of fight, and this always in view, it is as difficult for us to keep the one out of our Minds as to let the other in. For before we can fet ourselves to think closely of the other World, we must shut our Eyes and Ears to the Objects of this; otherwife they will obtrude themselves upon us, and draw away our Thoughts and Meditations; we must gather in our Thoughts from the Objects of Sense that are round about us, take leave of this World, and retire into our own Minds, and shut up ourselves within our selves, that none of these lenfitive Things may come at us, and that we may be wholly at leifure to entertain ourselves with the invitible Things of another World. And this we shall never be able to do to long as our Minds are vain and roving, and defultory, and posses'd with rolld Imaginations, or refiless Cares, or extravagant Mirth and Jollities; for these Things will put our Thoughts upon so many Vagaries, and render them fo loofe and wild, and incoherent, that they will never be able to hang long enough together to form any ferious Conceptions. So that when we would fix them upon the other World we shall scarce be able to gather them in from those outward Objects among which they are squandered; or if we do, we shall never keep them long enough together to form any ferious Apprehension of it; but as foon as they have taken a curfory View of it, they will be flying abroad again, and roving into Vanity and Impertinence. So that while our Minds are Vol. II. X Light

Light and Vain, they cannot think enough of another World feriously to apprehend and believe it; the Rewards and Punishments of that invisible State are things too ferious for our wild thoughts to dwell on; and till our Minds are grown more fixed and fleady, till they are more withdrawn from fenfitive Objects, and more accustomed to retired Thinking, they will be too volatile and fugitive feriously to apprehend, and heartily to believe a future State. If therefore we would attain to a firm Belief of it, we must endeavour to reclaim our wild Thoughts by accustoming our selves to ferious Thinking; and when by fad and ferious Meditations we have rendered our Minds more fixed and retired, we must

II. Endeavour to remove those vicious Prejudices which indipose us to the belief of future Rewards and Punishments. For while Men live in Opposition to God, and have therefore Reason to apprehend his Displeasure, this will strongly prejudice our Minds against the belief of a future State, because this Belief must necessarily gall and disturb us, and render our vicious Courfes extremely troublesome and uneasy. For when a Man is refolved to lead an ill Course of Life, and at the same time believes it will conclude in eternal Wretchedness, his Faith will be a perpetual plague to his Mind, like Beltesbazzar's Mene Tekel, it will scare and alarm him in his finful Caroufes, and imbitter the gust of them with many a sad Thought and dire Reflection; and till he either shakes Hands with his Creed, or his Ill-Refolution, it will be impossible for him ever to be quiet. Whilst therefore he refolves to continue his ill Courses, it is his

his Interest to believe there is no other World but this; he is obliged to it in his own Defence, and as he hopes to enjoy bimfelf, and Sin without Difterbance; and then his Interest having bribed his Affection, his Afrection will be fure fo to biass his Reafou, that it will be a difficult matter for him to convince and perfuade himfelf. For if there be future Rewinds, he knows he hath no Interest in them; if future Pun'jhments, he is confcious he must feel and endure them; and to believe that there are fuch Goods as he shall never be the better for, and fuch Evils as he shall be infinitely the worse for, must needs be extremely repugnant to his Inclinations. For that which Men would not have, they are averse to believe; and that which they are averse to believe they are not eafily convinced of, because their Aversion will cast such a Mist before their Minds as that they will hardly be able to difcern a fair Probability in a clear Demonstration. Wherefore, if ever you would arrive at a firm Belief of the future Rewards and Punishments, you must endeavour to dispel from your Minds those Prejudices against it with which your own ill Courses are apt to inspire you, by resolving to lay aside your finful Affections and Interests while you are examining the evidences of another World, and not to fuffer them to intermingle with your Reasonings; concluding, that in a matter of such infinite Moment, it is the greatest madness in the World to Think as you Wish, and Believe as you Affect; that it is not your Unbelief will either extinguish the Joys of Heaven, or quench the Flames of Hell. and that fince the nature of Things will not bend to your Wifhes, and be as you would have them, X_2

it is your true Interest to believe that they are what they are, especially in a matter of such infinite Concern to you; that if Heaven and Hell are not Dreams but Realities, you will most certainly find them to whatever they think of them, and that therefore it concerns you as much as an eternity of Happiness or Musery amounts to, to believe that they are real if they are so, lest out of a vain Confidence that there are no fuch Things, you forfeit Heaven and incur Hell Fire. With such Thoughts as these you must often encounter those Prejudices which Sin raifes in your Minds; and when once you have conquered them, and reduced your Minds to an impartial Defire of being rightly informed in this Matter, and in order to that, to give an equal hearing to the Reasons on both Sides, you are fairly prepared for the Belief of another World, which cannot fail to obtain your Understandings, if

III. You duly examine those Motives of Credibility upon which those future Rewards and Punishments are proposed. For though Faith be the Gift of God, yet it is a Gift which he confers upon us as he doth all his other Blessings, in the use of due and proper Means; and as it is the bleffing of the Lord that makes Rich, but not without the concurrence of the diligent Hand, so it is the grace of God that gives us Faith, but not without our Application to the *natural* Means. Now the natural means of Faith is a due Consideration of the Evidence upon which the matter to be believed is founded and proposed. For though the matter be never so evident in itself, yet it is not evident to us, 'till we have duly confidered it; and if we Believe without Evidence, we Believe with our Wills

and

and not with our *Understandings*; whereas in reality believing is properly an act of the Understanding, whereby it affents to a thing as true, which it cannot do without some Proof and Evidence that it is to; and therefore when we affent to Things as true with our Wills without our Understandings, or, which is the fame Thing, without Proof and Evidence, we cannot to properly be faid to Believe, as not to Differlieve them. For there are a World of Things which Men do neither dany nor affirm, believe nor difbelieve, that is, about which they never concern their Though's, nor trouble their Heads one way or tother. And thus it is here; there are many who pretend to believe another World, but if you ask them why, they can give no Reason, nor did they ever enquire whether there be any to be given: so that it is plain whatever they imagine, they do not believe it; for to Believe without Understanding, is as perfect Nonsense, as to Underfrand without Evidence, or B lieve without Faith. So that that which they call Faith, is only not Difbelieving; whether there be another World or no. they never troubled their Heads to enquire, and to having no Evidence pro or con, their Underfanding doth neither affirm nor deny, believe nor dispelieve, but negligently leaves the matter in fustense and uncertainty.

The natural means of Faith therefore you fee, is a due enquiry into the evidence of the truth and reality of the Things we Eclieve; and therefore if we would indeed Believe that there is a future World of Rewards and Punithments, we must feriously consider the Reasons and Evidences that prove and assert it, and urge them close to our Un-

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derstandings,

derstandings, till they have forced and extorted from them a rational and well grounded assent; which if we do, laying aside all Partiality and Prejudice, there is no doubt but they will be found weighty enough to turn the Scale against all Ob-

jections to the contrary; especially if

IV. and Jastly, you add to all these Means fervent and hearty Prayer. For Prayer in itself is a very proper and uteful Means to beget and confirm in us the Belief of the other World, because it is an abstraction of the Mind from those sensitive and material Objects which stand like Hills and Mountains between us and the invisible World, and intercept our Prospect of it. For whenever our Mind is engaged in a ferious and hearty Prayer, it dispels all earthly Things before it, and scatters them out of Sight, and having no Mists or Clouds in its way, nothing but a fair and clear Heaven above it, thither it directs its Eyes and Thoughts, and Defires without any Lett or Interruption. Now the very withdrawing our Minds from fenfible Things to converse with Spiritual and Invisible ones, doth, as I shewed you before, mightily dispose to the Belief of another World. When therefore by frequent and hearty Prayer our Minds have been accustom'd to retire from the objects of Sense, and to fix their Thoughts and Contemplations upon God, they will be able to turn themselves with more ease and readiness to the invisible Things of another World, which the more familiar they are to us, the better able we shall be to apprehend and believe them.

But then, by our fervent and hearty Prayers we shall also obtain the Assistance of God, without the concurrence of whose *Grace* we can do no good

Thing,

Thing, and much less effectually believe the Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which is the Root and Principle of all true Piety and Virtue. For to the forming of a firm Belief of this Doctrine in our Minds, there is required a very fevere and impartial Confideration of the Froots and Evidences upon which it is founded; and confidering how vain and roving our Thoughts are, how apt to fly off from any ferious Argument, and especially from this of another World, which is so offensive to our vicious Appetites and Affections, what likelihood is there that we should ever fix our Minds to fuch a thorough Examination of the Proofs of another World as is necessary to beget in us'a lively Beiief of it, unless God, who alone can command our Thoughts co-operates with us, and animates our faint Endeavours with his Grace and Affiltance; unless he by suggesting the Evidences of the suture State to us, and by urging and repeating them, imprints them on our Minds with all their natural Force and Efficacy; in a Word, unless by following our flying Thoughts with these his holy Infoirations, and importuning them with, and almost forcing them upon them, he at last prevails with them to flav and look back and confider and ferioully to ponder the weight and force of them, it is very improbable they should ever abide long enough upon our Minds to settle into a firm and efficacious Belief. Let us therefore carnestly implore the Aid and Affiflance of God, and befeech him frequently to inspire our Minds with the Argumeuts of a future Life, and to urge, and repeat and fet them home upon our Thoughts, till by a due Consideration of them we have extracted all their Force and X 4 EriEvidence, and digested it into a lively and active Belief; and if to the ase of all the above-named Means you do but add this or Prayer and Supplication, you may depend upon it, that he who hath promised to open anto all that knock, and to be found of all that seek him, will never deny you any Grace or Assistance that is necessary to produce in you the fundamental Principle of Religion, viz. an effectual Belief of the Rewards and Punishments of another World.

To conclude this Argument therefore, fince this Belief is to absolutely necessary to fabject our Minds to the chilyarinas of Religion, let us endeavour as much as in us lies, to found it in our Reason, by convincing our Minds of the truth and force of our Evidences upon which it is proposed. For while we Believe upon Trult and we know not why, our Faith must needs be very weak and insum, and like a Tree without Root in the midst of a Storm, Le unable to outjiand any blast of Temptation. For the temptations of Sin are fuch Goods and Evils as are evident to our Senfes, which do most certainly affure us that there are fuch Things in the World as Pleafure and Profit, Reproach and Perfecution; and therefore unless when we are Tempted, our Faith can confront the evidence of Senfe, with the Evidence of Reafen, and produce good Proof of those future Goods and Evils which it puts in the Ballance against these present Temptations, it will hardly be able to withstand them. For what likelihood is there that the Things which we Believe without Proof and Evidence, should have comparably that Force and Influence upon us, as the Things which we know, and feel and experience? So that when we come to oppose a Heaven and

Ch. V. The Means of Faith. 313 and a Hell, of whose Reality and Existence we have no Evidence, to Pleasures or Prosits, Reproaches or Persecutions, which strike immediately on our Senses, it is easy to prognosticate which will be most prevalent.

But if our Belief of the future Rewards and Punishments be founded on such Evidence as satisfies our Reason, what Temptation in the World is there that can prevail against it; what Good is there that can outbid Heaven, or what Evil that can vie Terrors with Hell? For we see by Experience, that the Objects of our Faith, when it is grounded upon fatisfactory Evidence, do as much influence our Minds as the Objects of Sense; they who never faw the Indies, unless it were in a Map, and so can hardly believe that there are fuch Countries, are yet as much affected with the rich Merchandife they abound with, as those who have been there, and as ready to venture their Estates and Persons thither, through the Danger of the Sea. in Hope of a prosperous Return. If therefore we believe that there is fuch a State as Heaven, with as full Satisfaction of Mind as we do that there is such a Place as the Indies, doubtless our Faith would affect us as much as our Eyes, and we should be as ferward to go to Heaven, and venture through all Dangers and Difficulties thither, as if we had been there already, and had feen with our own Eyes all the Glories and Delights it flows and abounds with. So that the Evidence of our Faith, if it be clear and satisffactory, will as much affect our Minds as the Evidence of our Sense; and Heaven and Hell will as vigoroufly influence our Hope and Fear, if with a full full Satisfaction of Mind we believe them, as if we had feen and felt them. Conceive then that you had fpent but one Hour in Heaven, furveying with your own Eyes the Glories of that Place, the Triumths and Exaltations of its bleffed Inhabitants, and the rapturous Joys and Delights wherewith it entertains them; conceive, that after this you have been fent for another Hour in Hell, and had there been Spectators of Horrors and Agonies of the Damned, or their Torture, and Rage, and dire Convulsions of Soul, caused by a desperate and remediless Misery; in a Word, conceive, that after all, you had been difmiffed into this World again to chuse your own Fate, and determine yourselves to that happy or this miferable Portion for ever; think now what your Mind and Resolution would be; whether you would not be willing to lose any thing rather than Heaven, or to endure any thing rather than Hell; whether any Good or Evil Sin can tempt you withal, would be able to out-tempt the Rewards and Punishments of Eternity. Doubtless no; the Remembrance you would have of the infinite Joys and intolerable Miseries you faw in that other World, would prove an invincible Antidote against all Temptation. Now what your Sense of the other World would be if you had feen it, that will your Belief of it be, when 'tis founded upon clear and fatisfactory Evidence; 'twill be an infallible Counter-charm against the most bewitching Temptations; 'twill render the greatest Goods dreadful to us that beckon us to Hell, and the greatest Evils desirable that drive us towards Heaven. For Faith, faith the Apostle, is the Substance of Things hoped for, and the Evidence of Things not feen, Heb. xi. 1. that is, it renders its invilible Objects as real and evident to us, as our Sense doth visible ones; and when Heaven and Hell are become as evident to our Faith as fentible Things are to our Senfes, what Good or Evil is there in all the World that can out-tempt 'em? For what Good is there so good as Heaven, or what Evil fo bad as Hell? So that if our Belief of the future Rewards and Punishments be but founded on fuch Evidence as gives a full Satisfaction to our Minds, 'twill draw our Souls to God like an invincible Loadstone, in defpight of all the Oppositions of Temptations from without, and of all the Counter-strivings of a corrupt Nature from within; and there is nothing in the World will be able to withstand it; no Good or Evil that Sin can promife or threaten that will have Power to refift its Almighty Perfuafions, but 'twill force its own way through all Oppositions, and like an overflowing Torrent bear down all our carnal Confiderations before it.

Wherefore, if ever we mean to difengage ourfelves from the Slavery of Sin, and entirely to devote ourselves to God and his Service, let us in the Use of the above-named Means endeavour to eftablish our Minds in a firm and well-grounded belief of the other World; that so our Faith being built upon a fure Foundation of Reason, may be able to outstand all the Waves of Temptation, and to chase all those Goods and Evils before it that stand in the way of our Return to God; and when by our Faith we have so far overcome the World as to fubmit and refign ourfelves to God, in Defpight of all its Temptations, we shall find our Belief Belief of the other World every Day grow and improve upon our Hands, 'till at last it commences into a certain Assurance. For 'tis not so much Men's Reason as their Lusts that do object against the Reality of the future World; they are loth to believe it, because it disturbs them in their sinful Enjoyments, and so their Will employs their Reason to argue against it; and when once their Wills are engaged in the Controversy, a very slender probability will weigh more on that fide than a ckar Demonstration on the other. When therefore our Wills are taken off by a free Refignation of them to God, all that finful Prejudice which renders us now so averse to believe, will vanish from our Minds; and then we shall see Things as they are, and the Arguments of another World will appear to our Minds with fuch a convincing Evidence, as will quickly diffel all our doubts and uncertainties, and render our Faith equivalent to a clear Vision. So that we shall pais through all the Temptations of the World with the same Constancy and Resolution of Soul, as if we walk'd in open View of Heaven and Hell, and these mighty Objects which do to infinitely transcend all the Goods and Evils which Sin can tempt us withal, will have as victorious an Influence on our Lives as if they were present, and did strike immediately on our Senses. And then how is it possible that any Temptation whatfoever should be able to cope with or prevail against them? For he who is fully perfuaded of the Reality of Heaven and Hell, must be utterly abandon'd of all his Reason, if he fin for any Goods fake that is less than Heaven, or for any Evils fake that is less than Hell. When therefore we

are drawn to God by such invincible Hopes and Fears as the firm Belief of the other World will suggest to us, how is it possible that any Temptation of Sin should either dissuade us from coming to him, or persuade us to forsake him? Wherefore it concerns us to take all possible Care to ground our Faith well, and improve and strengthen it, that so in Despisht of all Temptations it may influence our Wills and govern our Practice, and safely conduct us through all the Snares of this Life, and at length bring us home to everlasting Happiness.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Necessity of having right Apprehensions of God, in order to our being truly religious.

Τ is a noble and celebrated Passage of Epic-tetus, Ch 38. Της ωερί τὰς θεὰς ἐυσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτωθου ἐκεῖνο ἐς ιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψει ωερὶ ἀυτων έχειν ως όνθων κὶ διοικένθων τὰ όλα καλως κὴ δικαίως, i. e. Know that the main Foundation of Fiety is this, to have right Apprehensions of the Nature of God, and to be fensible that he is, and that he governs the World well and justly; and accordingly the Psalmist speaking of God, tells us, They that know thy Name will put their Trust in thee, Pfal. ix, 10. i. e. They who have made a true Discovery of thy Nature, and by obferving, as I have done, the glorious Effects of thy Wildown, and Power, and Justice, and Goodness, have formed in their Minds right and genuine Apprehensions concerning thee, will make no Scruple to place their whole Truft and Confidence in thee; which is equally true of all other Acts of Piety and Religion. For the true Knowledge of God will as much influence our Minds to love and adore him, to praise him and submit to him, as to put our Trust in him; and hence St. Paul ascribes all the Impiety and Wickedness of the Gentiles to their not liking to retain God in their Knowledge, i. e. to Ch. VI. The Right Notions of God. 31

to their wicked Aversion to the true and genuine Notions of God, Rom. i. 28.

In the Profecution of this Argument I shall

endeavour these three Things:

First, To shew in what Respects right Apprehensions of God are necessary to our being truly Religious.

Secondly, To lay down fome Rules for the forming of right Apprehensions of God in our

Minds.

Thirdly, To assign and remove the common Causes of our Misapprehensions concerning him.

SECT. I.

In what Respects right Apprehensions of God are necessary to our being truly Religious.

Men truly Religious must be derived from true Apprehensions of God, who is the great Object of Religion. For Religion being the Rule of divine Service must itself be regulated by the divine Nature, and without a right Understanding of the Nature of God, it is impossible we should regulate our Religion by it. Now to the right Conduct and due Regulation of our Religion, it is requisite, first, that we should be rightly informed what Services are pleasing to God; secondly, that we proceed upon a true Principle in serving him; thirdly, that we direct our Service to a right End;

fourthly, that we be furnished with fufficient Motives to engage us to ferve him; the want of either of which will prove an irreparable Flaw in the very Foundation of our Religion, and render the Whole not only infirm but defective in its very Constitution. And in all these Respects, right Apprehensions of God are indispensably necessary.

First, they are necessary to inspire us with what

Services are pleafing to God.

Secondly, They are necessary to inform us with the true Principle upon which we must serve him.

Thirdly, they are necessary to direct us to the

true End for which we must serve him.

Fourthly, They are necessary to furnish us with proper Motives and Encouragements to engage us to ferve him.

I. A right Apprehension of God is necessary to instruct us what Services are pleasing to God. For to be fure nothing can be pleafing to him but what is agreeable to the Perfections of his Nature, which are the Originals from whence the eternal Laws of Religion are transcribed; unless therefore we know what his Perfections are, how is it possible we should know what Services are agreeable to them? If you would ferve a Prince gratefully and acceptably, you must inform yourself before-hand what his Nature and Disposition is, that so you may accommodate yourfelf thereunto, and compose your Actions and Behaviour accordingly; that you may furnish him with fresh Pleasures if he be soft and voluptuous, and blow him up with Flatteries if he be

be proud and vain-glorious; that if he be Covetous and Tyrannical; you may founge and oppress his People, and drain their Wealth into his Coffers: if Just and Beneficent, you may offift and forward him in righting the Injuries, correcting the Miscarriages, and alleviating the Surthens of his Subjects. And that if you would ferve the great King of the World in such ways as are phasing and acceptable to him, you must study his Nature, and endeayour to inform yourselves which way his infinite Perfections do incline him, that so you may know how to comport yourfelf towards him and to render him fuch Services as are agreeable to his Nature. For there is no rule in the World but only that of his Nature, by which you can certainly conclude what will please him; and though he hath told you by express Revelation what Services he expects, and what will please him, yet without recurring to the rule of his Nature, you can never be fecure either that what he told you is true, or that what he told you was pleafing to him then, is still pleafing to him now. For how can you be fecure either that he told you truly what Services were pleasing to him, but only from the truth and veracity of his Nature, or that the Services which were pleafing to him then, are pleafing to him now, but from the Stability and Unchangeableness of his Nature. So that in our Enquiries after what is pleasing to God, we cannot depend upon his Word, without confulting his Nature, which is not only the Security but also the Test of his Word. For it is certain that that cannot be God's Word which contradicts his Nature, and what plausible Pretence soever any Doctrine may make Vor. II.

to divine Revelation, if it teach or command any thing that is apparently repugnant to the divine Perfections, we ought for that Reason to conclude it an Imposture; it being much more possible that the most plausible Pretence to Revelation should be false, than that God should reveal any Doctrine that is repugnant to his Nature. So that in all our Inquiries what is pleasing to God, our last Appeal must be to his Nature, which is the great Standard of Good and Evil, by which we are to measure what is pleasing and displeasing to him.

Whilst therefore we are ignorant of God's Nature, or possessed with wrong and false Apprehensions of it, we must necessarily wander in the Dark, and neither know what to do nor how to behave ourselves towards him. For how can we imagine what will please or displease a dark and unknown Nature, whose Bent and Inclinations we are utterly unacquainted with; but if we are under false Apprehensions of his Nature, they must necessarily mislead us in our Behaviour towards him, and put us upon false Ways of serving and pleasing him. Thus if we apprehend him to be a froward and testy Being, that is apt to be pleased and displeased with Trifles, in Conformity to our Apprehension of his Nature, we shall offer him a trifling Service. A Service made up of Pageantry and Complement, of Pompous Shew and ceremonious Respects and empty Formalities; for such a trifling Worship is in itself most proper for such a bumorous Divinity. So if we apprehend him to be of an imperious and tyrannical Nature, that governs himself and the World by a blind and obstinate Will, without any regard to the eternal Reasons of Things,

we shall worship him as the Indians do their arbitrary Devils, i. e. follow him with Howlings and Lamentations, with trembling Hearts and frighted Looks, and difinal Tones, and by flattering him with Praises, and favoring upon him with flavish Submiffions and Addresses, endeavour to collogue with Heaven, and ingratiate ourselves with its dreadful Majesty; for what can be more agreeable to fuch a tyrannical Divinity than fuch a forc'd and flavish Worship? In a Word, if we apprehend him to be a fond and indulgent Being, that is governed by a foolish Pity and blind Commiseration, we shall not fail to render him a suitable Worship, i. e. to retire and grow melanchely, to whine and bemoan ourselves; to deject our Looks and disfigure our Countenances, and teafe our Souls into Fits of fruitless Compunction, that fo by the foft Rhetorick of a well-acted Sorrow we may pierce his Bowels and melt him into Pity and Compassion towards us; for what can be more prevalent with fuch a foft and indulgent Deity, than such a mournful and passionate Religion? Thus whilft we have wrongful Apprehentions of God, they must necessarily mislead us into false Ways of Worship, because we can no otherwise worship him than by rendering him such Services as are fuitable to the Apprehenfions we have of his Nature; and therefore while we think any o herwife of his Nature than it is, we must necessarily think fuch Services fuitable to it as are not.

But if we truly understand what God is, we cannot but apprehend what Worship is suitable to him, by that eternal Congruity and Proportion that there is between Things and Things, which is as obvious to Men's Minds, as Sounds and Colours to their Ears and Eyes. If God be a Being endowed with fuch and fuch Perfections, every Man's Mind will tell him that between fuch an Object and fuch Actions and Affections there is a natural Congruity, and therefore so and so he ought to be treated and address'd to, with such and such Actions and Affections to be ferred and worshipped. So that if we apprehend God truly as he is, circled with all his natural Glories and Perfections, our Apprehensions will produce in us such Affections, and our Affections fuch Deportment and Behaviour towards him as are fuitable to the Perfections of his Nature, and we shall worship him with such Services as will both please and become him; with admiring Thoughts, and dutiful Wills, and God-like Affections; with an ingenuous Fear, an humble Confidence and an obedient Love; with chearful Praises and prefound Adorations; with fober, wife, and rational Devotions; fuch as will wing and employ our best Affections and most noble Faculties; for it is such a Worship only that can fuit such Perfections, and pleafe such a Nature as God's.

II. A right Apprehension of God is also necessary to inspire us with the best Principle of serving him. For it is certain that there is no Principle in human Nature that will so effectually engage us to the service of God, or render our Service so acceptable to him, as that of Love; which will tune our Wills into such an Harmony with God's, that we shall no longer chuse and resuse according to our particular likings or dislikings, but what is most pleasing or displeasing to him will be so to us; and our Wills being thus united and subjected to his, our Obedi-

him

ence will extend to all his Commands and admit no other bounds but his Will and Pleafure. Whereas if we do not obey him out of Love, we shall endeavour to contract our Obedience into as narrow a Compais as may be, because we shall render it to him with a gradging Mind, and consequently with a narrow and a flingy Hand; for we shall ferve him no farther than we are driven by feer and the reftless Importunities of a clamorous Conscience, and so consequently fall infinitely faort of our Duty, and take up in a partial and hypocritical Obedience. For while we do not bue him, it is impossible we should oby him with a ready Will, which is the proper feat of his Empire; and while we obey him with a flubborn and rebellious Will, we are only his Slaves, but the Devil's Subjects. 'Till therefore we do obey him, at least in some measure from a Principle of Love, it is impossible our Obedience should be either Univerfal or Sincere.

But to the inspiring our Souls with this Principle, there is nothing more necessary than right Apprebenfions of God, who in himself is doubtless the most amiable of Beings, as having all those Perfections in infinite Degrees, that can beget or deferve a rational Affection. So that we cannot think him to be any way otherwise than he is, without thinking him lefs lovely, and detracting more or lets from the infinite Beauty of his Nature: For fince he cannot be more Lovely than he is in bimself; every false Apprehention of him must needs represent him less Lovely. But fince of all his Perfections, that of his Goodness is the most powerful Motive and Engagement of Love, there is nothing more necessary to kindle our Love to

him than right Apprehensions thereof. For being infinitely gold, as he is, in his own Nature, it is impossible we should conceive him to be better than he is; and therefore every false Notion we entertain of his Goodness must necessarily detract from it, and fo much as we detract from his Goodness, so much we detract from the principal Reason and Motive of our loving him. And therefore in order to the engaging of our Love to him, it concerns us above all Things not to entertain any Opinion of him that reflects a Disparagement on his Goodness. For too many such Opinions there are that have been imbibed among Christians as the fundamental Principles of their Orthodoxy; namely such as these, that God's Sovereign Will is the sole Rule of his Actions, and that he doth Things not because they are just and reasonable, but that they are just and reasonable because he doth them; as if he were merely an Omnipotent, blind Will that acts without Reason, and did run through the World like an irrefiftible Whirlwind, hurrying all Things before him without any Confideration of Right or Wrong; that his Decrees of governing and distrosing his Creatures are wholly founded in his absolute and irrefifuble Will, that determines of the everlasting Fate of Souls without any Reason, or Ferright or Condition; that by this his unacountable Will he hath impaled the far greater Part of them within an absolute Decree of Reprobation, for no other End but that Nimrod-like, he might have Game enough to sport and breath his Vengeance for ever; and that having nailed them to this woeful Cross by this his dire Decree, he bids them fave themselves and come down, as those cruel Mockers did

did our Saviour, and because they do not obey, torments and cruciates them for ever, tho' he knows they are not able to do it of themselves, and hath purposed never to enable them to do it. Which Opinions do represent God in such a formidable Dress, circled with such a stern and ghastly Majesty, as is more apt to inspire us with Herror than Love. For tho' by perfunding ourfelves that we are of the small Number of his elected Favourites, we may work our Minds into some Degree of Love to him; yet when we confider how severely he hath treated the rest of our Fellow-Creatures, without any other Reason but his own Will, this will intermingle such a Grimness with his Smiles, such a Terrer with those Charms for which we love him, as must necessarily damp the Fervours of our Love, and ever and anon freeze it into Horror and Astonishment, and so Feer will be at least the predominant Principle of our Obedience; and while it is so, our Religion must needs tanguish under great Imperfellions and Infirmities. For while our Fear and Dread of God is the governing Principle of our Religion, we thall but do Penance in all our Addresses to him, and every Act of our Obedience will be a kind of Martyrdom, so that we shall never be able to entertain any chearful Converse or friendly Society with him, and yet ferve him we must, for fear our Neglett of him should rouze his Vengeance against us; and between this Necessary of coming to him, and this Fearfulness of approaching him, what can there be begotten but a forced and confirmined Devotion, which because we do not love, we vould willingly leave, did not our Dread and Horror of him drag us to his Altais. And as we finall force

him with a forced Obedience, so we shall obey him with a fordid and niggardly Affection; and while we grudge him our Chedience, we shall be most backward to obey him in those Instances of Duty that are of greatest Moment and most pleasing to bim, and most forward in those that are of least Concern and most pleasing to our selves. Thus while our Minds are ridden with four and rigid Apprehensions of God, they still inspire us with a flavish Dread of him, and that will restrain and con to our Obedience to him. Thus Maximus Trius coellently represents the Case, & μεν ευσεβής φίλ®, θεώ ... δε δεισιδαίμων κόλαξ θεε΄ κ., μακάρι®, δ ευσεβής δ φίλε... θεε, δυσυχής δε δ δεισιδαίμων δ μεν θαρσών τη άρετη περόσεισι τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνευ δέκς. ὁ δὲ ταπεινός διά μοχήηρίαν, μεζά σολλε δέσς, δύσελπις, κ δεδιώς τες θευς ώσπερ τυς τυράννες, i. e. the truly religious Man is the Friend of God, but the Superstitious is his Flatterer, and the former is happy, but the latter miferable; for the one being encouraged by his own Virtue, approaches God without any flavish Fear and Dread, but the other being debased with the Sense of his own Wickedness, approaches him with Trembling and Despair, dreading him as a cruel Tyrant, Differt. 4.

If therefore we would render him a chearful, free and univerfal Obedience, we must endeavour to represent him fairly to our own Minds, and to think of him as he is, and as he hath represented himself in the holy Scriptures, i. e. as a bountiful Benefactor to all his Creation, and an universal Lover of the Souls of Men; that would have all Men to be saved, and to come to the Know-

en-

ledge of the Truth, and doth heartily and readily contribute to our eternal welfare; that leaves no art of Love, no method of Kindness unattempted to rescue us from eternal Perdition, and when we have utterly baffled and defeated them all, doth most unwillingly abandon us to the woeful fate we have chosen and prepared for our solves; that in puniflying even the most incorrigible Sinners doth not at all defign to wreak and gratify his own Revenge, but to do Good to the World, and warn others by their Sufferings not to imitate their Sins: And in a word, that importunately invites us back when we are gone ajlray, and upon our return graciously receives us, and when he hath received us is infinitely Industrious to prepare us for Happiness, and when he hath prepared us abundantly, Rewards us, and when he hath rewarded us, everlastingly Triumphs in our Glory and Beatitude; these and such like Thoughts are truly worthy of God, and befitting the infinite goodness of his Nature, and as fuch do earnestly recommend him to our Affections, as the most amable and indearing Object in the World; and when by fuch Recommendation they have captive and our Affections, and kindled our Hearts into an unfeigned Love of him, they have inspired us with such a vigorous Principle of Action, as will both animate and ennoble our Religion, and render it truly worthy of God and our felves: For then we shall serve him with a free and dutiful Will, a liberal Affection, and a chearful Heart, and confequently render him a full, and generous, and willing Obedience. For fo holy David tells us, Pfal. cxix. 32. I will run the ways of thy commandments when thou shalt

enlarge my Heart, i. e. when thou shalt open and widen my Heart with the Love of thee, (for so St. Paul expounds the Phrase, 2 Cor. vi. 11.) I

shall most readily and chearfully obey thee.

III. A right Apprehention of God is also necesfary to direct us to the End for which we are to ferve him; without which it is impossible we should ferve him acceptably. For as a good Intention doth not justify a bad Action, so neither doth a good Action a bad Intention, and unless both are good, neither are acceptable. If I do an Action that is materially good, with respect to a bad End, I unballow and vitiate it, and render it formally evil. If I fast for Strife, or give Alms for Vain-glory, or pray to give a Colour to my Rapines and Oppressions, my very Devotion is a Cheat, my Mortification a Lic, and my Charity an Imposture. So that in order to our ferving of God acceptably, it is necessary we should direct those Services we render him to their right and proper End; and what that is we cannot well understand unless we have a right Apprehension of his Nature; for to be fure God hath proposed that to us for the End of our Worship, which is most agreeable to his own Persection; and therefore unless we have a right Notion of his Perfections, how can we rightly apprehend what End is most agreeable to them? As for Instance, the right End of our serving him, is that we may glorify him for ever in an everlasting Participation of his Perfection and Happiness; and this we can be no otherwife certain of, than by a true Survey and Inspection of his Nature, which will instruct us that being infinitely perfect as he is, he must be infinitely happy within himself, and

fo can defign no Self-end without himself, and confequently that the End for which he requires our Service is not any Advantage he expects to reap from it, or further Addition to his own Happiness, he being from all Eternity past as compleatly happy as he can be to all Éternity to come; and therefore what other End can he be supposed to aim at than our Good and Happiness? It is true indeed, he defigns to glorify himself in our Happiness; but how? Not to render himself more glorious by it than he is in himfelf, for that is impossible; but to display and skew forth his own esfential Glory to all that are capable of admiring and imitating him, that thereby he might invite them to transcribe that Goodness of his into their Natures, of which his Glory is the Shine and Lustre, and thereby to glorify themselves; and what can more effectually display the Glory of a Being who is infinitely wife and powerful and good, than to contrive and effect the Happiness of his Creatures, and especially of his rational Creatures, who of all others have the most ample Capacity of Happiness? Doubtless the highest Glory of an infinite Power, that is conducted by an infinite Wisdom and Goodness, is to contrive and execute the most effectual Methods of doing the greatest Good; and what greater Good can fuch a Power effect, than the eternal Happiness of reasonable Creatures? So that God's Glory and our Happiness are so inseparably conjoined, that we cannot aim right at either, but we must hit both, and whether we say that his End is his own Glory or our Happiness, it is the same Thing; for his Glory is our Happiness, and our Happiness is his Glory, and

and when he hath perfected our Nature, and advanced it to the highest Happiness it is capable of, it will shine back upon him, even as all other glorious Diffects do on their Causes, and reflect everlasting Flonour on that infinite Fower and Wisdom and Goodness from whence it was derived. Thus right Apprehensions of the Nature of God will naturally lead us to the great End which he proposes in all his Transactions with us, and thereby direct us what End we are to propose in our Transactions with him. For that which is God's End ought to be ours, and therefore fince his End is his own Glory, or, which is the same thing, our everlast-

ing Happiness, it ought to be ours also.

But now while we misapprehend the Nature of God, we shall be apt to set up false and indirect Ends of ferving him; as for Instance, whilst we look upon him as a felfish Being, that centers wholly in himself, and separates his Interest from the Interest of his Creatures, doing every thing merely for his own fake, we shall think ourselves obliged in all our Addresses to him, to set aside our own Interest and Happiness, and to aim fingly and separately at his Honour and Glory; and yet this is the great Fundamental of the whole Scheme of fome Men's Divinity, viz. That God aims wholly at bimfelf, and regards the Good of his Creatures no farther than it ferves bis own Interest; that he made this World out of mere Oftentation, to boaft and magnify his own Power and Greatness; and gives Laws to his Creatures, and exacts their Obedience for no other Reason but because it is for his Honour to be ferved and worshipped; that he created Hell only to shew the Power of his Wrath, and

and prepare an everlasting Triumph for his Vongeance; and erected Heaven for a Theatre to shew himfelf on, that so having filled it with a valt Corona of Angelical and Saintly Spectators, he might difflay the Glory of his Majetty before them, and thereby provoke them to extol and praise and commend him for ever. And while we thus conceive of God, how can we hope that he will ever be pleased with us unless we aim at the same End that he doth? i. e. unless laying aside all regard to ourselves and our own Happiness both here and hereafter, we intirely direct all our Worship and Service to his Glory and Interest; which being impossible for us to do, whilst we have so much Self-love and to much Indigence together, will either render our Religion wholly unpracticable, or perplex us with eternal Doubts of its Truth and Sincerity.

And supposing we could direct all our Religion to this End, this instead of rendering it more acceptable to God would only render it more unworthy of him; for then we should serve him under the Notion of his Benefactors rather than of his Pensioners, with a Defign to enrich him rather than to be enriched by him: And what an unbefeeming Prefumption is it for fuch indigent Creatures as we to entertain the least Thought of contributing to God, or making any Addition to his infinite Store? He is above all Want, being infinitely fatisfied from the inexhaustible Fountain of kis own Perfections; and for us to imagine that he needs our Services, and requires them to ferve his own Interest, is to biaspheme his All-sufficiency, and suppose him a poor and indigent Leing, that

for want of a perfect Satisfaction within himself, is forced to roam abroad and raife Taxes upon his Creatures to enrich and fupply himself. For if we ferve him for any End at all, it must be either to do him good or our felves; if it be to do him good, we reproach and dishonour him, by supposing that he hath need of us and our Service, which can do him no good unless he hath some need of them. So that whatfoever fome high-flown Enthufiasts may pretend, that it is fordid and mercenary to serve God for our own good, I am sure to ferve him for his good is prophane and blasphemous; and therefore either we must serve him for no good, or ferve him for our own; and fince he is to infinitely fufficient to himself, that nothing we can do can benefit and advantage him, to what better Purpose can we worship and serve him, than to receive Benefit and Advantage from him, which instead of being base and mercenary, is a Purpose most becoming both God and ourselves? For to ferve him with an Intent not to give to, but to receive from him, is to acknowledge his Fulness and our own Want, his All-fufficiency and our own Poverty; whereas by ferving him to the contrary Purpose, we do in effect set up our selves above him, it being much greater to give than it is to receive; and to make that the End of our worshipping God, which doth in effect suppose him to be our *Inferior*, is to make ourselves Gods instead of Votaries. What the true End therefore is of our ferving God, may be eafily inferred from a right Apprehension of his Nature. For do but confider him as a Being that is above all want, that is infinitely fatisfied in his oven Perfections,

fections, and an unbounded Ocean of Happiness to bimfelf, and then what other End can you propose in ferving him, but to derive Perfection and Happiness from him, in the Accomplishment of which

be and you will be glorified together?

IV. and lastly, A right Apprehension of God is alfo necessary to furnish us with proper Motives and Encouragements to ferve him. It is the Nature of all reasonable Beings to be drawn forth into Action by Motives and Arguments; and the most powerful Arguments to move us Godward, are drawn from the Nature of God, from his Majefty and Holinefs, his Truth and Juffice, his Mercy and Goodness; none of which can have their just and full Influence upon us, unless we have a right and genuine Apprehension of them. The Consideration of his Majesty is naturally apt to strike our Minds into an awful Reverence of his Authority; but if we look upon it under the Notion of a mere arbitrary Greatness, that governs not it self by Counsel and Reason, but by a blind and absolute and unaccountable Will, that always chuses and refuses pro imperio, without any Regard to the eternal Reasons of things, we may be aftonished and confounded at it, but we can never truly reverence it. The Confideration of his Holiness is naturally apt to deter us from approaching him with vicious and impure Affections; but if we place his Holiness in a mere formal Affectation of external Decency, Respect and Reverence, and not in the immutable Conformity of his Will with the eternal Rules of Righteousness, it may move us to be very ceremonious and respectful to him, as to the Place, and Garb, and Posture of our Worship, but it will never prevail

prevail with us to cleanse and rectify our Hearts and Affections. Again, the Confideration of his Justice is naturally apt to restrain us from affronting his Authority by perverse and wilful Violations of his Laws; but while we look upon it as a stern and implacable Attribute, which nothing will appeafe and fatisfy but Blood and Revenge, it may overwhelm us with Horror and Despair, but it will never persuade us to reform and amend. Once more, the Confideration of his Mercy is naturally apt, when we are gone aftray, to invite us to return, with the hopeful Prospect it gives us of Pardon and Reconciliation; but while we look upon it under the Notion of a blind Pity, or effeminate Easiness and Tenderness of Nature, that will admit of no Severity, how wholesome soever or necessary to the Ends of Government; instead of moving us to Repentance, it will animate us in our Rebel-In fine, the Confideration of his Goodnels is naturally apt to work upon our Ingenuity, and to draw us Godwards with the Cords of a Man, and the Bonds of Love; but whilft we mistake it for a blind Partiality, that chuses its Favourites without Reason, and rewards them without Respect to their Qualifications, instead of captivating our Love, it will provoke our Disdain, and excite in us a secret Contempt and Aversation.

Thus though the Nature of God be in it felf a most fruitful Topick of *Motives* and *Arguments* to engage us to *serve* and obey him, yet by the false Representations that are sometimes made of it, it may be perverted into an *Inducement* to Wickedness, and made a plausible Pretence to encourage and justify us in our Rebellions against him. Whist

we look upon God as he is in himself, shining with his own unstained and immaculate Glories, there is nothing more apt to influence all the springs of Motion within us; to inflame our Love, encourage our Hope, and alarm our Fear, and by these to set the Wheels of our Obedience a-going. For there is nothing in human Nature that is capable of being moved and affected by Reason, which hath not an answerable Reason in the nature of God to move and affect it. And as in him there are all the Reasons that can affect us, so there is all the Force and Efficacy of those Reasons, every thing in him being Perfest and Infinite; in him there is an infinite Beauty to attract our Love, an infinite Good to inflame our Defire, an infinite Kindness to affect our Ingenuity, an infinite Justice armed with an infinite Power to awaken our Fear, an infinite Mercy to invite our Hope, and an infinite Truth to confirm and support it. So that it is beyond the Power of all human Imagination, to frame or fancy an Object that is so every way fitted to affest human Nature, and influence all its Principles of Action, as God in himfelf is. Whilft therefore we apprehend him truly, and as he is in himfelf, the Consideration of him must needs be of wonderful Force to oblige us to ferve and obey him, and there is not one of all those glorious Perfections in which his Nature is arrayed, but will fuggest to us some powerful Persuasive to Piety and Virtue, and either by our Fear or our Hope, our Love or our Gretitude, incline our Hearts to keep his Commandments. So that if we are ignorant of his Perfections, or do entertain false Notions concerning them, we shall either want those Vol. II. Motives

Motives to Piety which they naturally fuggest, or draw Arguments from them to encourage and justify us in our rebellions against him. And thus you see in all these Instances how indispensably necessary right Notions of God are to engage us to serve and obey him.

SECT. II.

Rules for the forming right Apprehenfions of God.

Y Ienyfius the Areopagite, and from him all the Schoolmen, affign three ways by which we are to frame our Apprehensions of the Nature of God, viz. Viam Caufalitatis, viam Eminentia, & viam Remotionis, i. e. the way of Causality, the way of Eminency, and the way of Remotion. first consists in arguing from those Persections which God hath caused and produced in his Creatures to the Perfections of his Nature. For whatfoever degrees of Perfection there are in the Creature, they must either be uncreated, which is a Contradiction, or flow from the Creator as from the immenie Ocean of all Perfection; but it is impossible they should flow from him, unless they were first in him. So that when we behold such and fuch Perfections in the Creature, we may from them most certainly infer that the same are all in God, who is the Caufe and Fountain of them; and though

though the divine Nature abounds with innumerable Virtues and Perfections, yet it is impossible for us by our own natural Light to different any of them than those of which he himself hath imprinted some Specimens upon created Beings; these being the only Scales by which our Unde standing can afcond to the reach and view of the divine Perfections. But because all created Persections are not only short in their Degrees, but also intermingled with Defects in their very Kind and Nature; therefore in attributing them to God we ought carefully to abstract from them whatever is Defective, whether it be in kind or degree. For God is the cause of Perfection only, but not of Defect, which to far forth as it is natural to created Boings hath no cause at all, but is merely a Negation or Non-entity For every created Thing was a Negation or Non-entity before ever it had a politive Being, and it had only so much of its primitive Negation taken away from it, as it had positive being conferred on it: And therefore fo far forth as it is, it's being is to be attributed to that fovereign Cause that produced it, but so far forth as it is not, its not being is to be attributed to that Original Non-entity out of which it was produced. For that which was once nothing would fill have been nothing, had it not been for the cause that gave being to it; and therefore that it is fo far nothing still, i. e. limited and defective, is only to be attributed to its own primitive Nothingness. As for Instance, If I give a poor Man an Hundred Pounds, that he is worth fo much Money is wholly owing to me, but that he is not worth a hundred more, is owing only to his own Poverty; and just so, that I have such and such 7. 2 PerPerfections of Being is wholly owing to God who produced me out of Nothing, but that I have such and such Defects of Being, is only owing to that Non-entity out of which he produced me; and therefore since our Perfections are derived from God, but not our Defects, it is altogether as unreasonable to attribute the latter to him, as it is reasonable to attribute the former.

Now the Defects of created Perfections which we are to remove and abstract from God in our Conceptions of him are of two Sorts: First of the Thing: Secondly of the mode of the Thing. The Defect of the Tking is when the Thing itself is such as that it wholly excludes fomething much better and more perfect; thus Matter for Instance is defective in the Thing, because it excludes spiritual and immaterial Substance, which is much more excellent than itself. The Defect of the Mode of the Thing, is when the Thing is so excellent in itself, as that it excludes nothing better, but yet is deficient in degrees of Perfection. As for instance, Wifdom, and Goodness, Reason and Understanding, are Things so excellent in themselves, as that they exclude nothing that is more excellent, but yet as refiding in created Beings want a great many possible degrees of Perfection. Now both these defects being natural and uncaused, and so cannot proceed from the Author of Nature, and not proceeding from him, they cannot be supposed to be in him, and therefore in our Conceptions of him ought not to be attributed to him. In respect therefore of these twofold Defects in created Persections, it is necessary we should conceive of God in the way of Remotion and Eminence, as well as of Caufality; other-

otherwise we shall injuriously attribute to him the Defects of his Creatures, of which he is not the Cause, as well as their Perfections, of which he is. If therefore we would do God right in our Thoughts and Conceptions of him, we must in the first Place remove from him all defect in the Thing, that is, all matter and material Perfections; because they are desective in their very kind and nature, as excluding fuch Substance and Perfections as are incomparably more excellent than themfelves; and this is to conceive of him in the way of Remotion, which confifts in removing all kind of matter and material Affections from our Thoughts and Apprehensions of God. And then in the second Place we must abstract from him all defect in the mode of the Thing, i. e. all the Defect of degrees of these spiritual Perfections of the Creature, which we attribute to him; and raife and exalt them in our own Minds to their utmost beight atd eminence; and this is to conceive of him in the way of Eminency; which confifts in afcribing to God the fbort and limited Perfections of his Creatures abstracted from all defect and limitation. These three ways therefore are all indispensably necessary to lead us to a true discovery of the Nature of God; as will yet farther appear by the following Rules I shall lay down for the forming a right Notion and Apprehension of him.

First, if we would think aright of God, we must attribute all possible Perfection to him.

Secondly, In forming our Notions of his Perfections we must take our rise from the Perfections we behold in his Creatures.

Thirdly, In afcribing to him the Perfections of his Creatures we must abstract from them every

Thing that is Defective and Imperfect.

Fourthly, In arguing from the Persections of the Creature to the Persections of God, we must distinguish between the state and relations of God and Creature.

Fi thly, Though in arguing from the Perfections of the Creature to the Perfections of God we are not to subject him to the Rules of a Creature, yet we are not always to suppose his Will and his Power to be in perfect subjection to the Perfections of his Nature.

Sixthly, in conceiving of his Persections we must always suppose them to be exactly barmonious and confishent with each other.

I. To the forming of a right Apprekension of God, it is necessary that we afcribe to him all possible Perfection. For he being the first and supreme Cause from whence all the Perfections of Eeing are derived, must necessarily include all Perfection in birfif, and be all those Persections which he hath communicated to others; for how can he give that which he bath not? It is true indeed, free Causes may give less to their Effects than they have in themfelves, but it is impossible they should give more; though they may withkold from those Effrom any Perfection or degree of Perfection which they have, they cannot derive to them any which they have not. Whatfoever therefore is a Perfection of Being, must necessarily be effential to that furreme Cause from whence all Being is derived; otherwise there would be more in his Effects than

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there is in himself, and consequently more than he could give or be the cause of, which is a Contradiction.

And as all those Perfections that are in created Beings must necessarily exist in the nature of God, so must all those too that are possible in themselves. For every Persection that is possible in itself must be possible to him who is the Cause of all Things; but no Perfection can be possible to him that is not actually in him: For no Caufe can produce that Perfection in another which it hath not in itfelf, and therefore if there be any Persection that is not in him, it is impossible it should ever be produced by him, and that which is impossible to God, must be impossible in his own Nature; that which is not an Object of omnipotent Power is not an Object of any Power, and that which is not an Object of any Power, is in itself impossible. Since therefore every Perfection that is pollible in itself must be possible to God, and since no Persection that is not in him can be possible to him; it neceffarily follows, that all the Perfections that are possible in themselves are actually existing in the Nature of God.

II. In forming our Notions of Ged's Perfections, we must take our rife from those Persections which we behold in his Creatures. For our Understanding being too short sighted to penetrate immediately into the fubscance and essence of Things, hath no other way to know and apprehend them, but either by their Causes or by their Essets; but now God being the first and supreme Fountain of all Causes cannot be known by his Cause, because he hath none, and therefore is knowable only by

his Effects, that is, by the works of his Creation that lie before us, and are within the Prospect of our Understandings; in the which all that is Ex-cellent and Good is an illustrious Comment and Para-

phrase upon God.

Now the Effects of God are all reducible to these sour Generals, Substance or Essence, Life, Sense and Reason; all which are in Man, who is the Epitone of the World, and a compleat Model of all the Works of God; and therefore not only these, but all the proper Excellencies and Perfections of these must be supposed to be in God,

from whom they are drived.

The first Effect of God is Substance. Now the proper Perfections of Substance are Amplitude and Fulness of Being. By the Amplitude of Substance, I mean its greatness or largeness as to the diffusion or extent of it, in opposition to littleness, or which is the fame thing, to be defined to, or circumferibed within a finall and inconfiderable Space; by the Fulness of Substance I mean its having more of Essence or Being, by which it is more removed from not being, in Opposition to Things that have but little Being in them, that are of fo fleeting and transitory a Nature as that they are next to nothing. Wherefore in conceiving of God, we must ascribe to him these Perfections of Substance, even to their utmost Possibility, that is, we must conceive him to be a Being of infinite Amplitude, that is neither defined nor circumscribed within any certain space, but co-exists with, and penetrates and passes through all Things; and by thus conceiving of him we attribute to him Luminally, which confifts in being unconfined by

any Bounds of Space in the out-spreading of himfelf to all Places that we can fee or imagine, and infinitely beyond them. And then in conceiving of him we must also ascribe to him infinite Fulness of Being, by which he is so infinitely removed from not being, as that he cannot but be; and by thus conceiving of him, we attribute to him necessary Existence, which confifts in being out of all Possi-

bility of not being.

But then fecondly, another of those Works of God from which we are to take our Rife in conceiving of his Perfections, is Life. For he is the Cause and Fountain of all that Life that is in the World, and therefore must not only have Life in himself, but the utmost Perfection of it also that is possible. Now the Persections of Life are Activity and Duration; by Activity I mean a vigorous Power and Ability to act, in Opposition to Weakness and Impotence, which must needs be a great Perfection of Life, which is the Spring and Principle of Action; by Duration I mean a long Continuance of Life, in Opposition to that which is short and momentary; for the more lasting the Life is, the more perfect it is, and the more there is of it. Wherefore in conceiving of God we must ascribe to him the utmost Perfection of Life that is possible; that is, we muft conceive him to be infinitely active and powerful, and doth what he pleafes in Heaven and on Earth, and can effect whatloever is possible in itself, and not repugnant to the other Perfections of his Nature; and in thus conceiving of him, we attribute Omnipotence to him, which confifts in an Ability to do every thing that deth not imply a Contradiction, either to the Nature of the Things themselves, or to the Nature and Persections of the Doer; and then in conceiving of him we must also ascribe to him an infinite Duration of Life, that is, a Life that is not bounded either by a Beginning or an End, but is from everlighing to everlasting, and co-exists and runs parallel with all Duration past, and present, and to come; and by thus conceiving of him we attribute Eternity to him, which consists in a boundless Duration of Life without any Term of Beginning or End.

But then thirdly, Another of these Effects of God from which we are to take our Rife in conceiving the Perfections of God, is Sense; by which I do not understand carnal or material Sense only, which confifts in perceiving the Strokes and Impressions of material Objects on our Sensories, but Sense in the general, whether it be of material or spiritual Beings. For that spiritual Beings have as exquisite a Sense of spiritual Objects, as corporal of corporeal ones, there is no doubt to be made; because otherwise we must suppose them insensible both of Pleasure and Pain. Now the Perfection of Sense is Quickness and Sagacity of Perception, whether it be of painful or of pleasant, grateful or ungrateful Objects; and that is to be found not only in Beafts and Men, but also in Feparated Spirits, in Angels, and in God bimfelf. For the none of these have any corporeal Sense to feel and perceive the Impressions of corporal Objects, yet that both Angels and separated Spirits have a spiritual Sense of spiritual Impressions, by which they are subjected to Pain and Pleafure, cannot be denied; and though God by the infinite Perfection of his Nature is exempt from

from all Sense of Pain, yet it cannot be supposed that he who is the Fountain from whence all Sense is derived should himself be insensible; and if he be not, we ought to suppose him as sensible of all that is truly pleasant and good as it is possible to be; and where there is no infinite Good, as there is in the Nature of God, it is possible to be infinitely sensible of it; and in thus conceiving, we attribute to him infinite Happiness. For what else is an infinite Sense of Good but infinite Pleasure and Happiness; and this is the Happiness of God, that he is infinitely perfect in himself, and infinitely sensible of his own Persections, and therein infinitely

pleased and delighted.

Fourthly and lastly, Another of those Works of God from whence we are to take our Rife in conceiving of his Perfections, is Reason. For that Light of Reason which shineth in human and angelical Minds being rayed forth, and derived from him, he must be supposed not only to have Reason in bimself, but to have it in its utmost possible Perfection. Now the Perfection of Reason confifts in Knowledge and Wifdom, in the Understanding, and Rectitude or Righteousness in the Will. By Knowledge I mean confidering and understanding Things absolutely as they are in their own Natures, in their Powers and Properties, Differences and Circumstances. By Wisdom I understand a thorough Consideration of Things as they are related to one another, under the Notion of Means and Ends, and of their Fitness or Unfitness to the End and Purposes they are defigned for. Wherefore in conceiving of God we must ascribe to him all possible Knowledge and Wisdom, that

is, a perfect Comprehension of all Things that either are, or have been, or shall be, or can be; in fhort, a Knowledge infinitely extensive, as comprehending all knowable Objects, and infinitely intensive, as seeing every single Object in all its Relations, Dependencies, and Circumstances, with a most perfect and infallible View; and in thus conceiving of him, we attribute to him Omniscience and infinite Wisdom. By ReElitude or Righteousnels in the Will, which is the other Perfection of Reason, I mean a Conformity of the Will, and consequently of the Affections and Actions, to all that right Reason distates and trescribes; for the proper Office of Reason is to conduct the Will, and to give Bounds and Measures to our Principles of Action; and in following right Reason, and chufing and refusing by its eternal Prescriptions, confifts the Rectitude of the Will, and in that all moral Perfection. In conceiving of God therefore we must attribute to him all those moral Perfections which confift in the intire Compliance of his Will with the Dictates of his infallible Reason, and chufing every thing which right Reason approves, and refusing every thing which it disallows, and this with the most perfect Freedom and Exactness; and in thus conceiving of him we attribute to him infinite Goodness, infinite Justice, and infinite Truth. For as for the first, viz. infinite Goodness, which confifts in the invariable Inclination of his Will to do good to, and procure the Happiness of his Creatures, by which he is infinitely removed from Envy and Malice, right Reason dictates to him that being infinitely happy in kimfelf, the best and most becoming thing he can do, is to propagate

pagate his own Likeness and Resemblance by doing good to, and procuring the Happiness of Others; and that Envy and Malice, which are the Properties of poor and indigent Beings, are infinitely unbesceming him who is a self-sufficient Nature: And accordingly his Will, which always follows his Reason, is infinitely propense to the one, and averse to the other. And as for the second, which is infinite Justice, which confists in dealing with his Creatures according to their feveral Deferts, by which he is infinitely removed from all Partiality and Injustice, right Reason dictates to him, that fince there is an immutable Good and Evil in the Actions of free and reasonable Agents, it is fit that those who do good should receive Good from him, who is the supreme Judge and Moderator, and those who do Evil, Evil, in Proportion to the Good and Evil of their Doings; and that to reward evil Actions, and to punish good ones, or to reward those that are less good beyond those that are more, or punish those that are more evil beneath those that are less, is to go cross to the Natures and Reasons of Things; and by these Dictates of Reason, his Will is invariably regulated in all its Transactions with his Creatures. Lastly, as for infinite Truth, which confifts in a perfect Agreement of his Declarations with his Intentions, especially in Matters of Promise, whereby he is infinitely removed from all Deceit and Falshood, right Reason dictates to him, that to speak Truth is the only natural End of Speaking, that to promise is to give a Right, and to intend to perform strict Justice; that on the contrary, Lying perverts the Use of Speech, and betrays a Baseness

Baseness and Meanness of Spirit, that to deceive is to injure, and to fallisty Promise is to commit a Robbery; and accordingly his Will, which is ever guided by his Reason, embraces Truth, and rejects Palthood with infinite Abborrence.

And thus from the various Perfections of God's Works which are before us, we may fairly argue to all the Perfections of God himself. For whatfoever Perfections he hath given, he must kave, and whatsoever Perfections he hath, he must have fo far as it is possible; for if it be possible, it must be within his Power, and if it be within his Power to be sure 'tis included in his Nature; otherwise he must chuse to be less perfect when it is in his Power to be more. And by thus taking our Rise to God from the Perfections of the Creature, we discover him to be an immense, self-existing Sub-stance, that is omnipotent, eternal, infinitely knowing and wise, just and good, faithful and happy. But to render our Discovery yet more compleat,

III. It is necessary that in ascribing to him the Persection of the Creature we abstract from them every thing that is desective and impersect. For to be sure there is nothing can be desective or impersect in the Cause and Author of all Persection. So that whereas all other Beings have some Desect or other intermingled with their Persections, and do either want some kind of Persection, or some Degree of those Kinds wherewith they are adorned, God hath all Kinds and all Degrees of all Kinds of Persection; and so we must conceive of him, if we would do him right, when we attribute to him the above-named Persections. As for instance, when we attribute to him the Persections of Substance,

we must abstract from them the Defect of Corporeity or material Extension, which compared with Spirituality is a mighty Defect and Imperfection of Substance, both as to its Amplitude, and Fulness of Effence. For no corporeal Substance can be at the fame Time in the fame Place where another corporeal Substance is; because it consists of such Parts as cannot pencirate each other; so that every Body must be limited in Presence, because it cannot be where another Body is; whereas a Spirit being penetrable itself, can penetrate or pais through all Things, and confequently be present at the fame Time, and in the same Place, where not only other Bodies are, but other Spirits too. So that by attributing Body or Matter to God, we must necessarily confine and limit the Amplitude of his Substance, which if it be bodily must necessarily be excluded from all those Places which other bodily Substances are, and consequently have but a finite and limited Presence, which utterly destroys the infinite Amtlitishe or Omnipresence of his Substance. And then bodily Substances being all compounded of divisible Perts, and consequently liable to be divided and corrupted, cannot have that Fulness of Being in them which Spirits have, which are fimple and uncompounded Subflances, and confequently void of all Principles of Corruption; fo that by attributing Body or in atter to God, we fubstract from the infinite Fulness of his Deing, and instead of ascribing to him recessary Existence, which puts him beyond all Poffibility of not being, degrade him into a divisible and corruptible Nature. Wherefore in attributing to God the Perfections of Substance, we must abstract from them all Matter and material Affections, and conceive

of him as a most pure and simple Spirit.

Again, when we attribute to him the Perfections of Life, viz. Power or Activity and Duration, we must wholly abstract from them all those Imperfections with which they are commixed in the Creature. As for Instance, Activity in the Creature is attended with Labour and Pains; the not abstracting of which from the Activity of God made Epicurus suppose him to be a restive Being, that withdrew himself from Action, for fear of disturbing his own Happiness by it; whereas Labour and Pains are the Imperfections of Activity, and so ought not to be admitted into our Conception of God's, which being infinite, there is nothing can be difficult or uncally to him. For it is because of Imperfection that Labour and Trouble do attend any Beings in their Operations; could they do what they do perfectly, it would be no Labour at all to them. God therefore having an infinite Power to effect what he pleases, whatsoever he doth he doth it most perfectly, and consequently without any Toil or Labour; and fince all Things were derived from him, and are dependent upon him, they must all be perfectly subject to his power; and where there is perfect Subjection there can be no Refistance, and where there is no Resistance there can be no Labour. And then as for Duration, which is the other Perfection of Life, in the Creature it is attended with Dependence. For there is no Life but depends upon God, to be skorten'd or prolong'd, according to his Pleasure; the Lives of all Beings are maintain'd and supplied by his all-enlivening Power and Influence, which if he withdraw from them but

but one Moment they presently expire; so that the Duration of all created life is dependent and precurious; and even those I eings that thall live for ever have no other Tenure of Like but God's Will and Pleafure, who with the Ereath of his Notices can blow them out when he pleases. But the Duration of God's Life is altogether independent; for he sublists of himself, from that infinite Fulness of Being that is in him, and hath done so from all Eternity fast when there was no other cause but himself in being, and therefore can do so to all Eternity to come without the Support or Affistance of any other Cause. So that he is not at all beholden for his Duration to the good Will and Pleafure of any other Being, but derives from an inexhaustible Spring of Life within himself, whence he also derives Life to all other Beings.

Again, when we attribute to him the Perfection of Sense, viz. Quickness and Exquisiteness of Perception, we must wholly abstract from it all that Imperfection with which it is attended in the Creature; for in them it is attended with fundry Affections which argue Imperfection in their Nature and Happiness; such as Near, Serrow, Repentance, Desperation, and the like; all which argue a Defect of Power or Wiften, and proceed from a quick Sense of Evil past, or prefent, or to come, which is inconfident with perfect Happiness. When therefore we attribute to God this Ferfeetion of Scrie, we must abstract from it all those Affections which proceed from the Sente of Evil or Pain. For he is so infinitely Periest both in Nature and Happiness, that no Évil can approach him to vew or diffurb him, or make any fainful Im-Vol. II. preflions A a

pressions on his Nature; and being so, it is imposfible that in Propriety of Speech he should either Fear or Grieve, or Repent, or Despair. All these Affections indeed are in Scripture attributed to him, but then it is in an improper and metapkorical Sense; not as if he did at any time feel these Passions within bimself, but because he demeans himself towards us as if he did; nor as if the Affections themselves had any place in his Nature, but because the natural Effects of them appear in his Actions and Behaviour. And though there is no doubt but he refents all those Evils which good Men fuffer, and bad Men commit, yet it is not from any painful Impression that they make upon his Nature; for he neither feels the Mileries he pities and relieves, nor is vexed at the Sins he detests and abbors, but all the Resentment he hath both of the Evil of our Sufferings and Sins is perfeetly calm to himself, and devoid of all Pashon and Disturbance. 'Tis true his Will being perfectly reasonable must be differently affected towards different Objects, and contrarily affected towards contrary Objects, because they propose to it different and contrary Reafons; and therefore as it must be affected with Complacency towards good Objects, so it must be affected with Abborrence towards bad; but this Abhorrence arises not either from any Sense of Hurt they do him, or Fear of Hurt they can do him, his Nature being wholly impassible, but from the repugnancy they bear to his own infallible Reason; and his Abhorrence being wholly founded in his Reason, and not in any Sense or Feeling he hath of the Evils he detefts, must upon this Account be stript of all Grief and Vexation. Wherefore Wherefore in attributing to God the Persoction of Sense, we must take care to abstract from it all those Affections which spring out of the Impersionation either of our Nature or our Happiness.

But then in the last Place, when we attribute to him the Periestions of Reafon, viz. Knowledge and Restitude of Will, we must also abstract from them all these Imperfections with which they are attended in the Creatures; as for instance, Knowledge in the Creature is attended with Reafoning and Discoursing, that is, inferring one Thirg from another, arguing Confequents from Principles, and Effects from Caufes, which is a great Imperfection of Knowledge, and a plain Indication that it is narrow and confined in itself, and not to be improved without Labour and Study. For that we are fain to infer one Thing out of another is an evident Token that we know but in part, because in this way our Knowledge must be fuccesfive, and we must know one Thing before we can know another; we must know the Principles before we can know the Confequents, and the Carf she fore the Effects; else how can we deduce the one from the other? And this deducing or inferring requires a great deal of Study and Labour. Wherefore in attributing Knowledge to God, we must abstract from it this Impersection of Reasoning and Discourse; for his Knowledge being infinite or unconfined, by the utmost Extension and Duration of Things, doth at one Intuition or fimple View behold all Things past, and prefent, and to come, yea, whenfoever, wherefoever, or howfo ver possible; and beholding, as he doth, all Confequents in their Principles, all Effects in their Canjes, he doth not A a 2 know

know one thing after another, but comprehends them all together in his infinite Mind, without any Succession or Improvement. So that from all Evernity past he knew as much as he doth now, and as much as he will do to all Eternity to come; for his Knowledge was always Infinite, and what is Infinite admits not either of more or lefs. And then for that other Perfection of Reason which consists in Restitude of Will, in the Creature it is acquired, even as that Knowledge and Wildom is by which it is measured and regulated. For Rectitude of Well confifting in chusing and redusing as right Reason directs, must needs be acquired in the Creature, because that Right Reason is so, by which it chuses and refuses; so that there is the same Defect and Imperfection in the Rectitude of our Wills as there is in our Reason and Knowledge, that is, that it is not altogether, but acquired by degrees, and so it may be is infinitely Successive and Improvealle. Wherefore in attributing to God Rectitude of Will, which, as I shewed before, confists in Goodness, and Justice, and Truth, we are wholly to abitract from it this Imperfection of being acquired. For it is effential to his Will to follow the Dictates of his Understanding and Reason, and effential to his Understanding to dictate to his Will all the Parts and Degrees of Goodness, Justice, and Truth; fo that the Rectitude of his Will is infinite both as to the extent and degrees of it, there being no Good, no Degree of Good that an infinite Reason can propose, but what his Will doth most readily embrace, and perfectly comply with; fo that the Rectitude of his Will is fuch as could not be acquired Part after Part, Degree after Degree,

Degree, because it is effortially Infinite; and from everlasting he was as Good, and as Just, and as Faithful as now, and to everlasting he cannot be Better, or Juster, or Faithfuller than he is, because what is effectially Infinite admits no Improvement either of Parts or Degrees. And thus you see how in all these Respects it is absolutely needs a voice the framing a right Apprehension of God, that in askribing to him the Perfections of the Creature, we abstract all those Defects and Imperfections

with which they are intermixt.

IV. It is necessary that in arguing from the Perfections of the Creature to the Perfections of God, we diffinguish between the State and Relations of God and Creature. For there are many Things which are Perfections in the Creature confidering their State which would be Imperfections in God confidering his; and fo on the contrary. As for Instance, to be dependent and humble, refigned and fubmissive; to be grateful and devout are Perfections in the Creature, because there is a Being infinitely above them in all Degrees of all forts of Perfection, in Knowledge and Wifdom, in Power and Goodness, in Justice and Truth; a Being to whom they owe themselves, and all the good Things they poffers, and upon whom they depend for all that they are, or enjoy, or hope for; and therefore it infinitely becomes them to abase themselves before him, to trust to, and depend on him, and refign themselves to him; to supplicate him for all they want, and thank him for all they enjoy; but for God to be humble, who is infinitely Perfect above all, for God to depend, who is the upholder of all, for him to fubinit who is Lord over all, or Aaz to

to be Devout and Grateful, who is the supreme Fountain and Proprietor of all, would be to fneak and condescend far beneath the infinite Dignity of his Nature. As on the contrary, to love kimfelf above all, to fet up his Will above all other Wills, and to expect and require that they should do Homage to it; to exact Adoration and Worllip from all, and to apprepriate it to himself from all other l'eings, are Excellencies and Perfections in God, because he is infinitely amiable above all other Beings, and therefore ought in Reason to love himself above all, infinitely exalted above all other Beings, and therefore ought in Reafin to expect that all other Beings should be fubject to him; in a word, because ke, and he alone is God, and hath all divine Perfections appropriated to himself, and therefore ought in Reason to expect that all capable Beings should acknowledge his Divinity by fuitable Actions, and reftrain their Acknowledgment of it wholly to bimself; but for a Creature, that is infinitely less lovely than God, and infinitely inferior to him, to love itself, and set up its own Will above him, and invade his Throne and Divinity, and arrogate to itself his Honour and Worfhip, is not only unreasonable, but impious. In this Cate therefore we must carefully distinguish between the States of God and Creature, and not attribute to bim these Perfections of the Creature which are proper to it, under the Notion of Creature, because in doing so we shall infinitely degrade him; but whatfoever is in itself a Perfection, precifely confidered from all Respects to the State and Relations of a Creature, that we ought to afcribe to God in its utmost Extent aed Degree.

And

And yet even here it will in many Cases be necessary for us to keep this Distinction of God and Creature in our Minds; for though whatfoever is absolutely and in itself a Persection in the Creature, is also a Perfection in God; yet considering the State of God, that may be an Exercise of absolute Perfection in him, which would be Imperfection in a Creature. As for Instance, Wisdom, and Goodness, and Justice are absolute Persections in a Creature, and therefore ought to be attributed to God; but it doth not thence follow that that is no Exercise of these Perfections in God which is not so in Creatures. It is an Act of Wisdom in a Creature to purfue his Ends by the most probable Means, but it doth not therefore follow that it is an Act of Folly in God to effect his Ends by contrary Means, because he being not only All-wife, but All-towerful, which no Creature is, can make the most contrary Means as subservient to his Ends as the most probable; and therefore sometimes to display the Greatness of his Power, and to excite our Attention and Reverence he chuses to operate by contrary Means, and when he doth so he chuses most wifely. Again, it is an Act of Goodness in us to fuccour the Unfortunate, and refcue oppressed Innocence from undeferved Calamities; and not to do fo, when we can with Ecle, and without any Prejudice to ourselves, is a high Degree of Malice and Ill-nature. But it doth not therefore follow that it is an Act of Malice in God to permit Innocence to fuffer, when with Ease, and without the least Damage to himself he can relieve it, because being infinitely wife and fowerful, which no Creature is, he can infalliby bring Good out of Evil, A a 4 and

and advance us to Happiness by Suffering; and therefore sometimes he permits the Innocent to fuffer Evil, thereby to procure them some great and lasting Go d; and when he doth so it is an Act of great Goodness in him. Once more, it is Justice in the Creature not to kill or kurt the Innocent, not to deprive them of any Good they are rightfully poffeiled of, and to all contrary is great Injustice, because we have no Right to another Man's Life, or Limbs, or Goods, unless he forfeits them to us by some unjust Attempt to deprive us of ours; but it doth not therefore follow, that it would be unjust in God to do so, who being the supreme Proprictor of our Lives, and Limbs, and Goods, which no Creature is of any other Creatures, can justly refume them when he pleases, be we never so innocent, because they are his own; whatever he gave us he can take away from us, without any Injury, because he rather lent it than gave it us, reserving the absolute Propriety in himself; and his Right being fupreme, absolute, and independent, and curs but fubordinate and conditional, whatfoever we can justly do he can justly do, and abundantly more; so that though we may argue this or that is just in the Creature, therefore it is just in God, yet we cannot argue è contra, this or that is just in God, therefore it is just in the Creature, because bis right in all Things is infinitely paramount to our right in a y thing; and therefore though he cannot without our own Fault and Forfeiture reduce us to a worfe State than that of not being wherein he found us, because to do so would be equivalent to the taking away from us more than he gave us, and confequently more than he hath a right to, yet God's

God's Right being infinitely more absolute and retentive than ours, he can justly take away from us infinitely more than we can justly take away from one another. And therefore to correct the Iniquities of wicked Nations and Parents, God fometimes lays his Hand upon good Kings, and innocent Children, and either deprives them of their Comforts, and purfues them with constant Infelicities, or puts an untimely Period to their Lives; and when he doth fo, he hath an absolute Right to do it, which no other Being can tretend to. Wherefore in attributing to God the Perfections of the Creature we are carefully to distinguish between the State of God and Creatures, and neither to ascribe to him any of those Perfections which belong to a Creature, as a Creature, nor to bound the Exercise of those absolute Persections we ascribe to him by the Rules and Limitations of the Creature.

V. Altho' in arguing from the Perfections of the Creature to the Persections of God, we are not to subject him to the Rules of a Creature, yet we ought always to suppose his Will and Power to be intirely subject to the moral Perfections of his own Nature. For God who is infinitely exalted above all other Beings can be subject to no other Law but that of his own effential Wildom, and Justice, and Goodness; and fince every thing hath a Right to exercise its own Faculties so far forth as it is just and lawful, God who is subject to no other Law but only that of his own Perfections, hath an effential Right to will and do whatever that Law allows and approves of. Now the Perfestion of God which gives Law to his Will and Power. Power, are those which, for Distinction sake, we call moral, because their Office is the same in bim with that of moral Virtues in the Creature, viz. to conduct and regulate his Will and Powers of Action; and these moral Perfections are his Wisdom, and Goodness, Justice and Truth, which being all essential to him are as much a Law to his Will and Power, as moral Laws are to curs: And to suppose his Will and Power not to be perfectly fubject to them, is to suppose him a very defective and imperfect Being, a lawful Will and Power being the greatest Defect in Nature. Wherefore to fecure our Minds against all injurious Apprehensions of God, this is a most necessary Rule, that we conceive him to be fuch a Being as can neither will nor act any thing but what his own effential Wisdom, and Goodness, and Justice do approve; that in all his Decrees, Purposes, Choices, and Actions consults his moral Perfections, and perfectly regulates himself by them, and doth neither chuse nor refuse, elect nor reprobate, save nor damn without their full Confent and Approbation. For to affirm that he is not obliged to regulate himfelf by Wisdom, and Justice, and Goodness, or that he can do otherwise, is to attribute to him a Power to will and act foolishly, maliciously, and unjustly, which indeed is not so properly Power as Impotence; and to suppose that he can thus will and act, is to deny that he is infinitely Wise, and Just, and Good, which utterly excludes all Possibility of heing otherwise in any Respect or Degree. For to be infinitely. Wise and Just is to be infinitely removed from Folly and Injustice, which nothing can be that hath the least Degree of Possibility to act unreisely

unwifely or unjuftly. Wherefore in conceiving of God it is always to be supposed that his Will and Power are so immutably subject to the moral Perfections of his Nature, as that it is impossible for him to will or act against them. For all the Liberty of Will that is determinable to Good or Evil, Full or Uniult, is a Flaw and Imperfection in the reasonable Nature, because it speaks the Will to be defective in that which is the utmost Possibility of Goodness and Justice, i. e. in being immutably determined thereunto; and therefore to attribute fuch a Liberty to God, is to fcandalize his Nature, and repreach it with Imperfection. For all that Power which is not conducted by Justice and Goodness is only Power to do Mischief, to Tyrannize over other Beings, and to sport and play with their Miseries; which is so far from being a Perfection of Power, that it proceeds from the most wretched Weakness and Impotence. So that by attributing fuch a Power to God, we foully asperse and blaspheme him, and instead of a God imagine a worse Devil, and more qualified to do Mischief than any, that are now in Hell, who though they are powerful enough to do Mischief, are none of them omnipotently mischievous; it is to imagine a God without a Deity, that is, without that essential Recitude of Will wherein all his moral Perfections do confift, which are the Crown and Glory of his Nature. For to be good and just are the brightest Rays of the Deity, the Rays that illustrate and glorify all his other Perfections, and without which, infinite Knowledge and infinite Power would be nothing but infinite Craft and Mischief; fo that to imagine that he hath any Will or Power that

that is not effectially subject to his moral Persestions, is to deface the very Beauty of his Nature, and represent him the most horrid Thing in the World. Wherefore in conceiving of God we ought to fix this as the main and fundamental Rule of our Thoughts, that he hath no Will to chuse, or Power to act, but what are in persect Subjection to infinite Wisdom, and Justice, and Goodness; and this will secure our Minds from all those rigid and sour Apprehensions of him, which by resecting on his moral Persections do him the greatest Dishonour, and represent him the most disadvantageous-

ly to Mankind.

VI. And lastly, it is also necessary that in conceiving of the Perfections of God we always suppose them exactly harmonious and confistent with each other. For all Perfections of being, fo far forth as they are Perfections, are confistent with each other, and like strait Lines drawn from the fame Centre, run on together without croffing or interfering. For there is nothing centrary to Perfection but Imperfection, and there is no Disagreement but what arifes from Contrariety. When therefore we conceive of the Perfections of God, we must so conceive of them, as that there may be no manner of Inconsistency or Disagreement between them, otherwise we must admit into our Conceptions of them fomething or other that is defestive or imperfect. As for Instance, in G d there is infinite Wisdom, and infinite Justice, infinite Goodness, and infinite Mercy; wherefore if we would conceive aright of these his glorious Perfections, we must take Care not to admit any Notion of any one of them that renders it repug-

Per-

nant to any other, but so to conceive of them altogether as that they may mutually accord and agree with each other. For while we apprehend his Goodness to be such as that it will not accord with his Wisdom, we must either suppose his Wisdom to be Craft, or his Goodness to be Folly; and whilst we apprehend his Mercy to be such as that it will not agree with his Justice, we must either suppose his Justice to be Cruelty, or his Mercy to be blind Pity and Tondness; and it is certain that that Goodness cannot be a Perfection which exceeds the Measures of Wisdom, nor that Mercy neither which transgresses the Bounds, of Justice, and fo on the contrary. For if either God's Goodness excludes his Wisdom, or his Wisdom his Goodness; if either his Mercy swallow up his Justice, or his Justice his Mercy, there is an apparent Repugnance and Contrariety between them, and where there is a Contrariety there must be Imperfection in one or the other, or both.

Wherefore if we would apprehend them altogether, as they truly are in God, that is, under the Notion of Pirfections, we must so conceive of them as that in all Respects they may be perfectly confishent and barmonious; as that his Wisdom may not clash with his Goodness, nor his Goodness with his Wisdom; as that his Mercy may not justle with his Justice, nor his Justice with his Mercy; that is, we must conceive him to be as wise as he can be with infinite Goodness, as good as he can be with infinite Wisdom, as just as he can be with infinite Wisdom, as just as he can be with infinite Justice, which is to be wise, and good, and just, and merciful, so far as it is a

Perfection to be fo. For to be wife beyond what is good, is *Craft*; to be good beyond what is wife, is Dotage; to be just beyond what is merciful, is Rigour; to be merciful beyond what is just, is Eastness; that is, they are all Impersection, so sar as they are beyond what is perfect. Wherefore we ought to be very careful not to represent these his moral Perfections as running-a-tilt at one another, but to conceive of them altogether as one intire Perfection, which though like the Centre of a Circle it hath many Lines drawn from it round about, and fo is looked upon fometimes as the Term of this Line, and sometimes of that, yet is but one common and undivided Term to them. all; or, to speak more plainly, though it exerts itself in different Ways and Actions, and operates diverfly according to the Diverfities of its Objects, and accordingly admits of divers Names, fuch as Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, and Mercy, yet is in itself but one simple and indivisible Principle of Action, all whose Operations how diverse foever are fuch as perfectly accord with each other, whose Acts of Wisdom are all infinitely good, whose Acts of Goodness are all infinitely wife, whose Acts of Justice are infinitely merciful, and whose Acts of Mercy are infinitely just; so that in this, as well as in their Extension and Degrees they are all most perfect, viz. that they always operate with mutual Confent, and in perfect Harmony. And while we thus conceive of the divine Perfections, our Minds will be mightily fecured against all those false Apprehensions of God which lead to Superstition and Presumption; for we shall so apprehend his Wisdom and Justice as not to be fuper÷

fuperstitiously as and so apprehend his Goodness and Mercy as not to be presumptuously secure; and as on the other hand his Justice will protect his Mercy from being abused by our wanton Security, so on the other hand his Goodness will protect his Wisdom from being mis-represented by our anxious Suspicion. For while we consider his Mercy thus tempered with his Justice, and his Wisdom with his Goodness, we can neither expect Impunity from the one, if we continue wicked, nor yet suspect any ill Design against us in the other, if we return from our evil Ways, and persevere in well-doing.

SECT. II.

Of the Causes of our Mis-apprehensions of God.

Now proceed to the last Thing I proposed, which was to assign and remove the Causes of Men's Mis-apprehensions of God; many of which are so secret and obscure, so peculiar to the Frame and Temper of Men's Brains, so interwoven with the infinite Varieties of human Constitutions, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to trace them, so as to make an exact Enumeration of them all; and therefore I shall only assign the most common and visible Causes by which the Generality of Men are missed in their Apprehensions of the divine Nature, which are reducible to these six Heads:

First, *Ignorance* of what is the *true* Perfection of our own Nature.

Secondly, Framing our Notions of God according to the Model of our own *Humour* and *Temter*.

Thirdly, Obstinate Partiality to our own finful Lusts and Affections.

Fourthly, Measuring God's Nature by particular

Providences.

Fifthly, taking up our Notions of God from obscure and particular Passages, and not from the plain and general Current of Scripture.

Sixthly, Indevotion.

I. One great Cause of our Misapprehensions of God is Ignorance of what is the true Perfection of our own Natures. For, as I shewed before, in conceiving of the Perfections of God we mtst take our Rife from those Perfections we behold in his Creatures, and particularly in our own Natures, wherein there is a Composition of all created Perfections; fo that while we are ignorant of what is the true Perfection of our own Natures, our Thoughts can have no Rule or Aim whereby to judge of God's. That he hath all those Persections in bimfelf, which he hath derived to us, is the fundamental Maxim upon which we are to erect our Notions of him; and therefore unless we know what those Persections are which he hath derived to us, and wherein they confift, our Mind hath no Footing or Foundation wherein to raife any certain Idea of him. For fince we have no other way to conceive of his Perfections but by our own, how is it possible that while we are ignorant of our

own, we should ever conceive aright of his? This therefore is one great Reason why Men do so grossly misconceive of God, because they have no true Notion of their own Perfection, by which they are to form their Conceptions of his.

For whereas the true Perfection of human Nature confifts in Moral Goodness, or an universal Compliance of its Will, Affections, and Actions, with those everlatting Laws of Righteousness which right Reason prescribes, how many are there that look upon this as a very mean and carnal Accomplishment, and place all their Perfection in Things of a quite different Nature, viz. in the Ebbs and Flows of their fensive Pathon, and the extraordinary Fermentations of their Blood and Spirits, that is to fay, in unaccountable Dejections and Exaltations of Mind, in vehement Imprellions of Fancy, and mechanical Movements of Affection, in Raptures and Extacies and Hypochendriacal Incomes and Manifestations, that have nothing of fubstantial Vertue or Piety in them, nor commonly any other Effect but to cause Men to renounce that Righteousness which they never had, and rely upon that which they have no Title to, and to footh and tickle their Fancies, and blow them up into glorious Opinions of themselves, and triumphant Affurances of their being the Darlings and Favourites of God, whilst poor Moral Men, that make Conscience of regulating their Affections and Actions by the eternal Laws of Rightecufness, are looked upon by them with a fcornful Compaifion, and placed in the lowermost Form of Sinners, at the greatest Distance from the Kingdom of God. Now when Men take fuch false Measures of their VOL. II. Bb own

own Perfection, how is it peffible they should conceive aright of the Perfections of God, which they have no other way to conceive of but only by arguing from their own? Wherefore in order to the forming our Ideas of God's Perfections, it is necesfary we should first fix the true Notion of our oven; which is no hard Matter for us to do: For our Nature being reasonable, to be fure its Perfection must confift in willing, affecting and acting reasonably, or which is the same thing, in governing itself in all its Relatiens and Circumstances by those immutable Laws of Goodness which right Reason prescribes, and which are exemplified to us in the Holy Scripture; and when we have fixed in our Minds this Notion of our own Perfection, it will naturally conduct our Thoughts to God's, and let us fee that his Perfection confifts not in a lawless and boundless Will, that decrecs without Forefight, refolves without Reason, and wills because it will, and then executes its own blind and unaccountable Purposes by Dint of irrefistible Power, without any Regard to Right or Wrong: For if we rightly understand our own Perfection, we cannot but differn that fuch a Will as this is one of the most monstrous Deformities in Nature, because it is the most diametrically opposite to the true Idea of our own Perfection, which while we attentively fix our Eyes on, we cannot but infer from it that the true Perfection of God confifts in the invariable Determination of his Will by the allcomprehending Reason of his Mind, or in chusing and refuling, decreeing and executing upon such Reasons as best becomes a God to will and act on, i.e. upon fuch as are infinitely wife, good, just, and merciful. For if to will and act upon such Reasons as these be the Perfection of our Nature, we cannot but conclude that it is the Perfection of God's too; but if we are ignorant of our own Perfection, we must necessarily think of God as Rovers, without any certain Aim or Rule to square and direct our Apprehensions.

II. Another Caufe of our Mif-apprehension of God, is our framing our Notions of him according to the Model of our own particular Humour and Temper. For Self-love being the most vehement Affection of human Nature, and that upon which all its other Affections are founded, there is no one Vice to which we are more univerfally obnoxious than that of excessive Fondness and Partiality to ourselves, which makes us too often dote upon the Deformities, and even idelize the Vices of our own Temper. So that whether our Nature be stern, four, and imperious, or fend, easy and indulgent, we are apt to admire it as a great Perfection, merely because it is ours, without measuring it by those eternal Reasons which are the Rukes of Good and Evil, Perfection and Imperfection; and then whatever we look upon as a Perfection in our felves, we naturally attribute to God, who is the Caufe and Fountain of all Perfection. And hence it comes to pais that Men's Minds have been always tinctured with fach felfe and repugnant Opinions of God, because they frame their Judgments of him not so much by their Reason as by their Temper and Humour; and so their different Humours being not only unreasonable in themselves, but repugnant and contrary to one another, produce in them not only falle and unreasonable, but contrary and ryugnant Opinions of God. Thus for Instance, the Epicureans B b 2 who

who were a foft and voluptuous Sect, entirely addieted to Ease and Pleasure, funcied God to be such a one as themselves, a Being that was wholly sequestred from Action, and confined to an extramundane Paradife, where he lived in perfect Eafe, and was entertained with infinite Luxuries, without ever concerning his Thoughts with any thing abroad; for this they thought was the Top of all Perfection, and therefore thus they would have chosen to live had they been Gods themselves. Thus the Stoicks, who were a fort of very moroje and inflexible People, e pied their Notions of God from their own Complexion, supposing him to be an inflexible Being that was utterly incapable of being moved and affected by the Reasons of Things, but was wholly governed by a ftern and inexorable Fate. And accordingly the Scythians and Thracians, the Gauls and Carthaginians, who were a People of a bloody and barbarous Nature, pictured their Gods from their own Tempr, imagining them to be of a blood-thirsty Nature, that delighted to feed their hungry Nostrils with their nidorous Reeks and Steams of human Gore. Whereas, on the contrary, the Platonifts, who were generally of a very foft and amorous Nature, took their Measure of God thereby, and so framed an Idea of him that was as foft and amerous as their own Complexion, composed altogether of Loves, and Smiles, and Endearments, without the least Intermixture of Vengeance and Severity,, how just foever in itself, or necessary to the Well-government of the World. Thus as the Ethiopians pictured their Gods black because they were black themselves, so generally Men have been always prone to represent God in the Colour of their own Complexions; Complexions; which is the Caufe that they many times represent him so utterly unlike to bimself, because out of an unreasonable Partiality to themfelves they first mistake the Deformities of their own Natures for Perfections, and then deify them into divine Attributes. Thou thoughtest, faith God, that I was altogether fuch a one as thyfelf, Pfalm 1. 21. that is, thou didth frame thy Conceptions of me according to the Pattern of thy own ill Nature, and fo thoughtest basely and unwortkily of me. And hence I doubt not springs most of those Mif-apprebenfions of God, which have been received among Christians. For how is it possible for any Man that is not of a fierce and cruel Nature himfelf, to believe it confistent with the Nature of God to fnatch poor Infants from their Mother's Womb, that never actually offended him, and hurl them into the Flames of Hell? And confidering the flern and inflexible Temper of the famous Author of the Horrible Decree, tho' otherwife a rare and admirable Person, there is too much Reason to suspect that he tranferibed his own Nature into his Doctrine, and modelled his Divinity by his Temper. And fo on the contrary, who but a Man of exceffive Fondness and Partiality, that loves beyond all Reafon, and invincibly doats upon the Deformities of his own Darlings, could ever imagine it confiftent with the Wifdom and Holiness of God to chust his Favourites without Reason, and when he hath chosen them, not only to overlook all their Faults, but to hide them from his own Eyes with the Mantle of another's Righteoufness, that so how ill soever they behave themselves, he may never see Cause to be displeased with them? From these and other Instances it is evident

B b 3

evident that one great Caufe of our Mif-apprehenfions of God, is our measuring his Nature by our own. For first, our Partiality to ourselves makes us magnify our own Faults into Perfections, and then whatsoever we reckon a Perfection in our selves we naturally attribute to God, and fo many times it comes to pass that our Notions of God are nothing but the Images of ourselves, which, Narcissus-like, we fall in love with for no other Reason but because they reflect our own fweet Likeness. As therefore we would not wrong God in our own Thoughts, we must take Care not to attribute to him any thing of our own, but what is a Perfection in the Judgment of the most impartial Reason; and because our Selflove is apt to bribe our own Reason into a favourable Opinion of whatever is our own, we ought to admit nothing of our own into our Notion of God but what is voted a Perfection by the common Reason of Mankind.

III. Another Cause of our Mis-apprehensions of God is our obstinate Partiality to our own sinful Lusts and Affections. For while Men are vehemently addicted to any susful Courses, the true Notion of God must needs sit very uncasily on their Minds, because it will be always quarrelling with them, suggesting Arguments against them, and alarming them with dreadful Thoughts and dire Abodings of a Vengeance to come. For there is no true Conception of God's Nature but what is pregnant with some powerful Argument against Disobedience to his Will; so that while we obstinately persist in Disobedience to him, our Reason cannot truly conceive of him without waging War against our Lusts. And while a Man is thus at variance with himself, and one

End of his Soul is at War with the other, fo that he cannot gratify his Affection without affronting his Reason, nor comply with his Reason without doing Violence to his Affection, he can never be at ease within, till either he hath forced his Affection to fubmit to his Reafon, or his Reafon to fubmit to his Affection; but while a Man's Reason hath the true Notion of God and his Perfections before it, 'twill be impossible for him to reconcile it to his finful Affections, against which, whenever he cooly reflects, it must necessarily dictate bitter Invectives, and denounce borrible Sentences. So that if he be oblinately resolved to fide with his finful Affections, he must either be content patiently to endure the Clamour and Fury of his own Reason, which is one of the most unealy Penances in the World, or endeavour to cerrupt and sophisticate his Notions of God with fuch Opinions as countenance his Lusts. And this, confidering the mighty Influence which Men's Affections have on their Reason, is no hard Matter to do; for the least Shew of Probability, backed with a strong Affection for an Opinion, is of greater Force with corrupt Minds than the clearest Demonstration, against it. So that if the Opinion be but serviceable to the Interest of a Man's Lust, that will engage his Affection on its fide, and then the Opinion having once retained those powerful Orators in its Cause, it is fecure of a very favourable Trial at the Tribunal of Reason, where in all Probability only one fide of the Question will be weighed, and Judgment will be given upon hearing the Arguments for it, without admitting any Evidence against it.

Thus when Men are *bunted* and *purfued* thro' their wicked Courses by the *true* Notions of God,

it is expedient for them, if they refelve to go on, to take Sanctuary in false ones, where their Conscience and Will, their Reason and Affections may dwell quietly together, and they may be as wicked as they please without any Disturbance. And abundance of fuch false Notions there are prepared to their Hands, which Men's wicked Minds have invented in the Defence of their Lusts. For thus some, to ease their Consciences, have perfuaded themselves, that God is so wholly taken up with his own Happiness, as that he is not at leifure to concern himfelf about human Actions; and under this Persuasion they fin on with full Security that he will never punish them. Others on the contrary, to reconcile their Lusts, persuade themselves that God is wonderfully concerned about fmall things; about trifling Opinions and indifferent Actions, and the Rites and Modes, and Appendages of his Worship, and under this Persuasion they hope to attone him for all the Immoralities of their Lives by the Forms and Outsides of Religion, by uncommanded Severities and affected Singularities, by contending for Opinions, and flickling for Parties, and being pragmatically zealeus about the Borders and Fringes of Religion. Others there are that to quiet their anxious Minds perfuade themselves that God, in Christ at least, is all Mercy and Goodness, without the least Alloy of Righteousness, Severity, or vindictive Justice; and being thus perfuaded, they fin on fecurely, and under the Wing of his Mercy affront his Authority, without any Disturbance. Others again, that to stiffe the Sense of their own Guilt, persuade themselves that God hath irrevocably determined the everlasting Fate of Men without any Respect to their Doings, and

and that those whom he will fave he will fave irrefillibly without any Concurrence of theirs, whereas those whom he will not save he hath utterly abandoned to a dire Necessity of perishing for ever; from whence they conclude, that if they are of the Number of those that shall be faved, it is needless for them to endeavour after it, and if in the List of those that shall perish, it is in vain for them to endeavour to prevent it; and that therefore their wifest Course is to fin on and expect the Event. All which are only the Artifices of Wickedness to reconcile Men's Consciences to their Lusts, and compromise the Quarrel between God and their wicked Lives, that so they may fin on for the future without Check or Remorfe.

Wherefore if we would form a right Notion of God in our Minds, and preferve it pure and unfophisticated, we must above all Things beware not to let our Lusts intermingle with our Reasonings about him, or to bribe us to affent to any Opinion concerning him. For this is an eternal Maxim, That there is nothing can be true of the most koly God, and gives the least Countenance or Protection to Sin; and therefore whenever it makes for the Interest of our Lusts to believe any Opinion of him, for that Reason we ought to reject it; for nothing can be true of God that is not perfectly confistent with his infinite Holiness, and nothing can be confistent with his infinite Holiness that is any way serviceable to the Interest of Sin; fo that while we suffer our finful Interests to dictate to us our Opinions of God, we make Falsehood our Oracle, and the very Foundation of our Faith is a Lie.

IV. Another great Cause of our Mis-apprehenfions of God is our measuring his Nature by particular

ticular Providences. The Tree is known by its Fruit is the common Rule by which Men judge of God as well as of one another, and it is most certain that every free Agent is as it doth, that the ordinary Course of its Actions is an infallible Index of the inward Dispositions and Inclinations of its Mind; but as for the Actions of God, they are not to be judged of fingly and apart from one another, because they have all one general Drift and Tendency, and so are mutually dependent upon one another, and closely linked together even from the first to the second, and fo, on to the last, in one continued Chain and Series; fo that of all those innumerable Actions whereof his general Providence confifts, there is no one loofe or independent Link, but every one is connected unto all the rest, and all the rest to every one throughout that mighty Chain. Wherefore unless we had an entire Prospect of the whole Series of God's Actions, and of the mutual Respects and Relations which they bear one to another, it is impossible for us, without a divine Revelation, to make any certain Judgment of Particulars. For tho' this or that particular Action or Providence of God, confidered feparately from all the rest, may have a very pernicious and malevolent Aspect, yet it is to be considered that no Action of God is what it would be if it were apart by ittelf, but what it is in Conjunction with all the rest of his Actions, and that that which by itself might prove very pernicious, may by being contempered with others of a different Nature become exceeding beneficial to the World. For so in the Heavens there are fundry Stars of a very malignant Aspect apart by themselves, which yet in Conjunction with other Stars of a different Temper do many times derive a most benign

benign Influence upon us. And if Men can give no certain Judgment of any fingle Act or Scene of God's Providence without comprehending at once the whole Dramma, how is it possible they should take true Measures of his Nature by any particular Event that befals them? For, for all they know those very Events which fingly confidered are most noxious to the World, may be most beneficial as they are intermingled and contempered with other Providences; fo that while they measure God by single Events they will many times deduce four and rigid Opinions of him from those very Providences which are the highest Instances of his Benignity and Goodness. Thus, for Instance, should Joseph have framed his Judgment of God's Nature by his being thrown into the Pit, fold into Egypt, and there cast into Prison for his Integrity and Innocence, what could he have thought of him but that he was a very envious and malicious Being, that took Delight in afflicting Innocence, and *sported* himself with the *Miseries* of his Creatures? And yet considering what *followed* upon these sad Providences, and how these were all of them but so many Steps to his Advancement, it is plain, that had he thought thus, he had thought very injuriculty; those very Providences from which he must have inferred God's Malice to him, being, in Conjunction with what followed, most illustrious Instances of his Goodness towards him.

And yet how commonly do we see Men pass Judgment on God's Nature from such particular Providences? they see a world of deplerable Accidents, such as Famines, Butcheries, Plagues, and Devastations, in which themselves are many times involved, from whence they are ready to conclude,

clude, that certainly God would never inflict or fuffer these Things if he were not of a very froward, cruel, and implacable Nature; whereas did they but see these sad Accidents as they lie inter-wown with all the rest of his Providences, they would doubtless see infinite Reason to conclude the quite contrary. Sometimes again they behold Wickedness prosper in this World, and Virtue and Innocence depressed and trampled on, from whence they are ready to conclude, either that that which we call Vice and Virtue are Things indifferent to God, or that he is unjust in the Di-Aribation of Rewards and Punishments; whereas had they an intire Comprehension of the whole Train and Series of his Providence, they would foon be convinced that even in these cross Distributions he doth most equally and most effectually punish the Wicked, and reward the Good, by rendering the one's Prosperity his Bane, and the other's Adverfity his Restorative. Sometimes again they are denied those Blessings and Deliverances which they have a long while fought with most i nportunate Cries and Supplications, from whence they are ready to conclude, that God is of a stern and inexorable Nature not to be moved or prevailed with by Prayers and Intreaties; whereas could they but see through the whole Drift of his Providence, they would eafily be fatisfied that the Goods they pray for are many times pregnant with Evils, and the Evils they deprecate with Goods, which are much greater than themselves, and that that is the Reason why God was deaf to their Intreaties, because he could not grant them what they asked without doing them fome

fome great Unkindness, and that therefore these Denials are so far from arguing him flern and inexorable, that, on the contrary, they are fignal Instances of his tender Mercy and Compassion towards us. If therefore we would conceive aright of God, we must not take our Measures of his Nature by particular Providences, which many times import quite contrary to what they from and appear, but having formed our Notions of his Nature out of those Perfections we behold in his Creatures, by them we are to measure all his particular Providences, which though they are fometimes very dark and obscure, and semingly repugnant to our common Notions of him, yet because we see not the Ends and Reasons of them, we ought to conclude them good, because they proceed from a good God.

V. Another main cause of our Mis-apprehenfions of God, is the taking up our Notions of him from dark, and obscure, and fingle Passages, and not from the plain and general Current of Scripture. There is no doubt but that whatfoever God hath revealed of himself in Scripture, is true, because Truth and Veracity, being a great Perfection in itself, must needs be included in his Nature, which is the Centre of all Perfection; but yet fince there are fome Things in Scripture hard to be understood in themselves, and other Things difficult to us, who are not thoroughly acquainted with the Customs and Controversies they refer to, or with the *Phrase* and *Language* of the Age they were written in, it is impossible for us many times to comprehend its Meaning by the mere Clink and Sound of its Words, without ex-

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pounding its obscure Passages by its plain ones, and its particular Propositions by its general Current; and to found any Dostrine or Opinion upon obscure and particular Phrases, that seemingly contradicts the plain and general Drift, and then to expound the plain into the feeming Sense of the obscure, and the general Current into the seeming Sense of the particular Phrase, is a most egregious *Prevarication* on the holy Scripture. And yet this unreasonable Practice hath occafioned many false Apprehensions of God in Men's Minds. For there is nothing more evident than that all along through the general Current of Scripture God is represented to us as a most benevolent Being, that knows no Bounds of Good-Will, but stretches out his Arms unto all his Creation, and receives his whole Offspring, excepting only those Predigals that run away from him, with free and impartial Embraces; as one that would have all Men to be faved, and to come to the Knowledge of the Truth, and readily contributes to them all those Aids and Assistances that are necessary to the effecting of these blessed Ends; that reprobates none from his Kindness and Favour but only fuch as despise and reject it, and never abandons any to Wretchedness and Misery till they have first bassled and defeated all his Arts of saving them. Such is the Representation of God which the plain and general Scope of Scripture gives us; fo that had Men kept themselves to this Rule of expounding obscure Texts by plain ones, and particular Phrases by the general Scope, when they feemingly clash one with another, they had done right to God, and fecured their

their own Minds against fundry very wrongful Apprehensions of him. For that God hath destined the greatest Part of Mankind to endless Calamity, without any Respect to their Doings; that he hath two Wills, viz. a fecret and a revealed one; that his revealed Will is that he would have all Men to be faved, and his feeret one, that he would have the greatest Part of them perish; that he hach imposed a Law upon Men which without his irrefistible Grace they cannot obey, and notwithstanding he hath decreed to with-hold this Grace from the greatest Part of them, is resolved to perfecute all that do not obey it with everlassing Flames of Vengeance: These, I say, are all of them fuch Opinions as reflect very dishonourably upon God, and have no other Foundation, but a few farticular Phrases and obscure Passages in Scripture, not only abundance of plain Texts, but the general Drift and Scope of it being of a quite contrary Sense. So that had but this necessary Rule been observed, of interpreting dark Passages by plain, and particular ones by the general Scope, fuch diffenourable Opinions of God could never have found fhelter under Scripture Authority. For I would feign know whether those Texts which declare God to be an univerfal Lover of the Souls of Men, be not far more numerous and plain, than those which fcemingly restrain his Affection to a small select Number, and reprobate all the rest of Mankind; and if it be so, as I think no modest Man can deny, how can this Dectrine be deduced from Scripture, without forcing the far greater Number of Texts to subscribe to the fmaller, and the plainer to the observer, which is

contrary to the most necessary Rules of Interpretation, and which, if purfued, will open a wide Door to the groffest and most fulsome Errors in Religion. Wherefore to fecure our Minds from false Apprehensions of God, it is necessary that in confulting the Scripture concerning him, we should follow the plain and general Drift of it, and not entertain any Opinion of him upon the Credit of a few, or of obscure Texts, which more or plainer ones feemingly contradict. For it is certain, that that Opinion is either false, or of little Moment, that hath but one or two Texts to countenance it, and that very dubious, which hath none but obscure Texts to rely on; but when there are more and much plainer against it than for it, it must be false, or there is no relying upon Scripture, the Sense whereof, as to all particular Opinions, must be supposed to be that which the most and plainest Texts do countenance. So that he who embraces any Opinion that hath more and plainer Texts against it than for it, embraces it for its own fake and not for the Scriptures.

VI. and lastly, Another Cause of our Misapprehensions of God is the great Dissimilitude and Contrariety of our Natures to bis. For when Men have nothing of God in them, nothing of those amiable Graces which are the Glory and Lustre of bis Nature, it is impossible they should have any Experience of him, any inward Taste or Relish of his Perfections; so that they can only know him by the Hearing of the Ear, by Books, and dry Discourse and Reasoning, which compared with experimental Knowledge is very uncertain and desective. For between the notional

and the experimental Knowledge of God, there is the same Difference as between the Knowledge of a Geographer and a Treveller; the one hath only a faint and rule Figure of foreign Countries in his Head, copied from the Gibbe or Geographical Deferiptions; whereas the other having travelled through them, and beheld their Situations, and Cities, and Rivers, and conversed with their People, and tafted their Fruits, retains a clear and lively Idea of them, of the Enactors whereof he hath as firm a Certainty as of the Truth of his own Senfes. Thus he who knows God only by Books and Difcourfe, can have but a faint and imperfect Idea of him; he may believe him to be infinite in all Kinds and Degrees of Perfection, in Goodness, and Mercy, and Justice, and Truth, and be able to demonstrate it upon dry Principles of Reason; but having no Experience of these Perfections in himself, no Sense or Relish of their Beauty and Excellency, his Apprehenfions of them are but flight and obscure, like a deaf Man's Notions of Sounds, or a blind Man's of Colours, which for want of the Evidence of Sense cannot be so clear and certain, and distinct as theirs are who fee and bear. Whereas he who partakes of the Perfections of God, and is in any Degree pure as he is pure, and holy as be is boly, hath as it were travelled into his very Nature, and feen all his Perfections by the Light of an infallible Experience; he knows what God is, not fo much by Reafoning and Difeourfe, as by a quick and lively Sense of the divine Perfections, which he hath copied and transcribed Vol. II.

into his own Temper, and which, like the Beams of the Sun light up his Thoughts to that Fountain of Light from whence they were derived. And he who hath God's Picture in his own Breaft, and can fee bis Perfections in the Graces and Virtues of his own Mind, knows him by his Sense as well as by his Reason; he sees and feels God in the God-like Temper of his own Soul, the Graces whereof are so many living Images of God, and fensible Comments on his Nature, which render the Man's Notions of him not only as clear and distinct, but also as certain and indubitable as any Demonstration in Geometry. For there is no Evidence will give us fo full a Certainty of Things as that of our own Senses; it was by fenfible Evidence that our Saviour demonstrated himself to be the Messias, and confuted the Infidelity of his Apostle St. Thomas; and it is certain that our bodily Senses are not more infallible than is the purified Sense of our Minds. When therefore we are transformed into the Likeness of God, and made Partakers of his Nature, we shall have a vital Sense and Feeling of his Perfections within us, by which the true Notions of him will be more confirmed and ascertained to us than by all the Reasons and Demonstrations in the World. For now we shall behold the Beauties of God's Nature in the God-like Difpositions of our own, and beholding his Face in the Glass of our Natures, whensoever we reflect on it, his Perfections will be as intimate and familiar to us as the Graces of our own Minds; which will not only awaken our Thoughts into frequent

once

frequent Meditations of him, but also beighten and improve our Meditations into the most glorious Ideas of him. For, when all is done, there is no Man can think fo well of God as he who hath a God-like Nature, because the Resemblance he bears to him will not only frequently raife up his Thoughts to God, but also shape them into a Conformity with his Nature; whereas whilst we are unlike to God, we are not only devoid of all that Evidence of his Perfections which the purified Senje of our Nature would give us, and confequently our Notions of him, for want of that Evidence, will be only superficial and uncertain, but through our Partiality to our own ungod-like Dispositions, we shall be apt to entertain such Notions of him as are unlike him as ourselves. For either out of Fondness to ourselves we shall look upon our Ill-Dispositions as Perfections, and so attribute them to God, or out of Fondness to those Ill-Dispositions we shall be tempted to admit fuch Opinions of God as will licence and indulge them.

Wherefore if we would fecure our Minds against all falle Apprehensions of God, we must above all Things endeavour to purify our Hearts from those Evil-Di/politions which render us unlike him; from Senfuality and Injuffice, from Pride and Discontent, from Envy, Hatred, and all Uncharitableness, which are the great Corrupters of our Minds, the bosom Hereticks that feduce and pervert us, and as much as in us lies, to conform ourselves to the Nature of God, by practifing the contrary Virtues; and when C c 2

once by imitating the Perfections of his Nature we have transcribed them into our own, we shall see and feel him in ourselves, and our Sense of him will correct our Knowledge, and our Vision of him consummate our Faith; and we shall be more embytened in our Knowledge of him by beholding his Face in the Sanstity of our own Minds, than by a thousand Volumes of curious

Speculations.

And now, having feen what the true Caufes of all our Mis-apprehensions of God are, let us from henceforward beware of them, and, fo far as in us lies, labour to avoid them; and confidering of what vaft Advantage to our Religion right and true Notions of God are, let us diligently apply ourselves to the above-named Rules for the regulating our Apprehensions concerning him; that so having thoroughly purged our Thoughts of all erroneous Opinions, we may fee God truly as he is, arrayed in all the genuine Persections of his Nature. And then we shall find our Lives and Affections under the Influence of the most powerful Reasons in the World. For every thing of God is full of Perfuasion, all his Perfections have a conftraining Rhetorick in them, that by a kind of moral Violence conquers all that attend to it, and seizes and captivates their Wills in despight of all the Reluctances of their Natures. So that when once our Minds are thoroughly instructed with the true Notions of God, we shall not need to seek abread for Motives and Arguments, for we shall have a Fountain of divine Oratory within our own Bosom, from

from whence our Wills and Affections will be continually watered with the most fruitful Inducements to Piety and Virtue; infomuch that which way soever we turn ourselves, we shall see ourselves surrounded with such invincible Reasons to trust in God and to fear him, to admire and love him. to obey and worship him, as will animate our Faculties, wing and inspire our drooping Endeavours, and carry us on with unspeakable Chearfulness and Alacrity through all the weary Stages of Religion; and we shall no longer look upon Religion as the Burthen and Oppression of our Nature, and readily embrace it as our Ornament and Crown, our Glory and Happiness, as being fully convinced that in ferving of God we ferve not only the greatest, but the best Master in the World.

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